THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, RULING ELITES AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION.

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The end of the cold war resulted in much optimism in Africa that political and economic problems would be minimised. In line with this optimism a number of countries undertook political and economic reforms. These developments are the reason why I chose the topic of democratic consolidation. There has been a growing interest in the democratisation prospects of these 'fragile states'. The question is, would they succeed in establishing necessary institutions to support democratic norms? In the literature there are diverse opinions, some point to political elites as the main stumbling block to democratic consolidation. They argue that there are no incentives to pursue a democratic path. Modernisation theory has placed more emphasis on economic development as a prerequisite to political stability. As a result some people argue that poor countries have limited chances to consolidate their democracy.

This paper focuses upon the prospects of democratic consolidation in South Africa. The study has two main themes that are closely interlinked. The relationship between economic development and political development will be examined as will the positioning and ability of ruling elite to facilitate or impede democratic consolidation. What is argued is that institutions are in place to guarantee democratic consolidation. What is required now is a robust civil and political society to safeguard this democracy. This dissertation concludes by arguing that citizens are the key to democratic consolidation, they can guard their won freedom if they feel that it is threatened.
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INTRODUCTION

"The end of the cold war and the resurgence of more open political and economic interaction on a world scale, has inspired a new vision of political and economic renewal in Africa surpassed only by optimism which greeted the first years of decolonisation in the 1960s." (Mavimbela, 1997:1) This 'awakening' of Africa has been referred to as the "African renaissance". Advocates of the "renaissance" are referring to changes taking place on the continent over the last decade at a political, social and economic level. For example, according to Bratton and Van de Walle, "29 founding elections were held in Africa during the five-year interval between Namibia's historic legislative contest on November 11, 1989, and December 31, 1994..." (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997:196) Political liberalisation was accompanied by a rejection of a state-controlled economy in Africa. Privatisation on a large scale occurred on the continent during this period. This upsurge of liberal political and economic values was as a result of the collapse of the Eastern bloc.

This optimism that prevails on the continent of Africa amongst politicians and academics is one of the motivating factors which led me to look at the topic of democratic consolidation. The focus is upon the old hypotheses of scholars such as Lipset that economic development is a prerequisite to democracy. People who believe in modernisation theory such as Lipset, do not believe that a poor country can have a liberal democracy. For them only an industrialised country can have a liberal representative democracy. Then the question is what are the prospects for South Africa as a developing nation? South Africa is a developing nation where the majority of the population is poor and destitute while a fraction of the population lives in opulence. The fact that wealth to a large degree coincides with race is even more worrying. The black majority generally lives in abject poverty, while their white counterparts' standard of living is relatively high.
Classical and current literature on democratic consolidation is examined in Chapter One. This chapter acts as a literature review, and a theoretical framework for this thesis is outlined. It is important to note that all these developments are occurring in the context of a pacted transition, which is explored in Chapter Two. The transition was a result of a political stalemate in the 1980s, between the governing National Party (NP) and the African National Congress (ANC). The constitution which was a product of years of negotiations created a constitutional democracy, with all the necessary institutions to protect citizens' rights. There is a constitutional court that reviews legislation and can stop government action if it is deemed unconstitutional. The public protector's function is to protect the citizens against government action or omission that is not in the people's interest, while the Human Rights Commission exists to ensure that people's human rights are not violated.

The question of whether democracy has an intrinsic value amongst South Africans is seriously looked at in Chapter Three, and the implications of that for the new government. The relationship of economic development to democracy is examined. What is noted, generally, is that citizens want a government which can deliver a better life. In the case of South Africa, if the new dispensation which is being characterised as democratic fails to deliver prosperity, people might begin to question its usefulness. Education and wealth are noted as important factors in the promotion of democracy. If the new government fails to deliver peace and prosperity, the stability of the new regime will be in serious doubt. Surveys show, for example, that people believe that a 'strong' government is required to deal with crime. Some political parties, civic bodies and government spokesmen call for a stricter bail system. They even call for the death penalty. Another problem is that a charismatic leader can mobilise discontented members of society even if he/she has other mischievous intentions to take power.
The second issue is the role of political elites in hindering or facilitating democratic consolidation which will be looked at in Chapter Four. These two issues are closely interconnected. In a developed country there is a large pool of educated political and economic elites, who are dispersed to a number of levers of power. In a developing country, however, the elites are not sophisticated and in the main are concentrated in political structures. This creates competition among elites as to who controls political power. Political power enables one to have access to material resources, that is why there is so much competition. In South Africa there are two complicating factors, firstly the business elite is mainly white and its relationship with the ruling elite that is mainly black is not one of trust. There are fears within the ruling elite that the business leaders are trying to sabotage the new government, by not investing in the country, or by spreading the news that it is not a wise decision to invest in South Africa thus influencing foreign investors not to invest. While the government's insistence that land that has mining deposits belongs to the 'people' not the mining companies and can be confiscated if not used is worrying for business. The state could sell that piece of land to someone who will use it. For the business community the legislation which enables the minister to claim agricultural land, which is not used is unconstitutional and interferes with property rights. By making these examples one is trying to prove that there is little trust between political and economic elites.

Another point is the creation of a 'patriotic' bourgeoisie. This move might be good in so far as it reduces tension and fierce competition amongst political elites. The notion that political elites simply view government as a springboard to business has been expressed. Even the President has warned against careerism and corruption amongst elected representatives, who used their positions to enrich themselves. This reliance upon the state as an avenue to economic empowerment is a threat to democratic consolidation. It can lead to factionalism and in a multinational country it can even result in its balkanisation.
Finally, there is reason for hope that South Africa will reach the stage of democratic consolidation. Although the power-sharing deal was an interim arrangement that ends in 1999, there is a belief that its spirit of give and take will be sustained. A spirit which recognises minority views, which does not at the least provocation opt for voting because of numerical advantage of the incumbent. Elite behaviour in South Africa in terms of institutional provision is kept under control, but it would depend on the civil society to enforce and monitor it.
CHAPTER 1

The prospects of democratic consolidation in Africa and in developing countries generally are independent of international factors. "Whether democracy is advanced, weakened or abolished in the Third World is a question that will be decided in the first instance, in the Third World itself. Internal political structures can be influenced, promoted or undermined from the outside, but they can not be artificially created." (Hippler, 1995:1) This point is important because it enables one to look critically at internal factors, institutions and structures which hamper the process of democratisation in Africa. In this study I will focus on two of these problems. They are the relationship between levels of economic development and the process of democratisation; and the ability of ruling elites to facilitate or impede the process of democratic consolidation. This chapter examines the literature of democratic consolidation and elite theory. Classical and more recent modernisation theories are discussed. In other words this chapter is a literature review, in which concepts are defined and examined in order to outline the theoretical framework for this study.

Let me start with the conceptualisation of democratic consolidation. First, there must be acknowledgement that there is a divergence in terms of concepts of democracy. Schumpeter, for example, defined democracy "As a system for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for peoples vote." (Diamond, 1992:21) Huntington also supports Schumpeter. He defines the "political system as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote." (Beetham, 1994:158)
This conceptualisation is referred to by Beetham as a procedural approach, while Diamond refers to it as a minimalist or electoral definition. Some authors have rejected this definition as inadequate. Terry Karl for example has pointed out the risk of the “fallacy of electoralism” (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997:234). "The mistake consists of privileging electoral contestation over other dimensions of democracy and ignoring the degree to which multiparty elections, even if genuinely competitive, may effectively deny significant sections of the population the opportunity to contest power or advance and defend their interests, or may leave significant arenas of decision-making power beyond the reach or control of elected officials.” (Diamond, 1992:22) This criticism of electoralism is very important for the purpose of this study because it shows that democracy is not just about elections. Beetham in his critique of this procedural definition points out three shortcomings.

Firstly, “it encourages a purely formalistic approach to democracy, in which procedural means such as ‘freely competitive elections’ or multi-partism become treated as ends in themselves. Secondly, the concentration on the electoral process leaves out much else that is important to democracy, such as: the control by those elected over non-elected powers, ... their accountability and responsiveness to the public between elections... the confidence with which it is asserted that some countries simply are democratic overlooks important deficiencies ..., and obscures the way that democrats everywhere are engaged in a common struggle against authoritarian and exploitative forces ...”(Beetham, 1994:159)

Diamond asserts that a procedural definition is an alternative to the liberal democracy. “In addition to regular, free and fair electoral competition ..., it requires the absence of “reserved domains” of power for the military or other social and political forces that are not either directly or indirectly accountable to the electorate. Second, in addition to the “vertical” accountability to the ruled ... it
requires “horizontal” accountability of officeholders to one another, ... Third, it encompasses extensive provisions for political and civic pluralism, as well as for individual and group freedoms.” (Diamond, 1992:23) This definition of democracy places more emphasis on the rule of law and constitutionalism of the regime. It is possible to isolate countries which just hold elections but lack a human rights culture.

For Bottomore and other proponents of “radical democracy”, their “theory ... centres on the need to revive a sense of civic spirit throughout society. ‘Radical democrats’ would reform the institutions and attitudes of twentieth century democracy so that the participation of the ordinary citizen in decision-making would be regarded as normal, legitimate and desirable.” (Parry, 1969:152) Their concern really is the lack of participation by the citizens in the political processes of a country. “Participation, it is claimed, far from being an ideal is often discouraged by the democratic elitists as possibly subversive of democracy as it now functions.” (Parry, 1969:152)

They propose the democratisation of industry through a workers council. They emphasise the importance of worker participation in the decision-making of a company. In terms of politics, they argue that “political authority should be decentralised... local and regional governments, being less remote, facilitate participation and when they are granted real powers they can appear meaningful to the local population.” (Parry, 1969:154) But like other theories of democracy it has some limitations, which Parry points out. For example, it emphasises consultation, participation and individual leadership, ignoring the fact that “without leaders possessing expert knowledge democracy will, it is argued, not be able to compete with other regimes.” (Parry, 1969:155)

For one to critically engage with the topic of democratisation, it is important to outline five criteria and seven institutions which were outlined by Dahl. This is
going to assist in measuring and also in looking for chances for democratic consolidation in South Africa. He argues that "an ideal democratic process would satisfy five criteria:

1. Equality in voting: In making collective binding decisions, the expressed preference of each citizen (citizens collectively constitute the demos) ought to be taken equally into account in determining the final solution.

2. Effective participation: Throughout the process of collective decision making, including the stage of putting matters on the agenda, each citizen ought to have adequate and equal opportunities.

3. Enlightened understanding: In the time permitted by the need for a decision, each citizen ought to have adequate and equal opportunities for arriving at his or her considered judgement as to the most desirable outcome.

4. Final control of the agenda: The body of citizens (the demos) should have the exclusive authority to determine what matters are or are not to be decided by means of processes that satisfy the first three criteria...

5. Inclusion: The demos ought to include all adults subject to its laws, except transients." (Dahl, 1982:6)

In terms of political institutions as suggested by Dahl, they are critical in that they "distinguish the political regimes of modern democratic countries from all other regimes ... Seven institutions in particular, taken as a whole, define a type of regime that is historically unique:

1. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials.
2. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.

3. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the elections of officials.

4. Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government, though age limits may be higher for holding office than the suffrage.

5. Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socio-economic order, and the prevailing ideology.

6. Citizens have the right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law.

7. To achieve their various rights, including those listed above, citizens also have a right to form relatively independent associations or organisations, including independent political parties and interest groups.”(Dahl, 1982:11)

The five criteria and seven political institutions provided by Dahl are maximalist, in that it is very difficult to find a country that meets all of them. But it is important to note that they give us a framework to assess a country. A country might not meet all of them, but it is important to meet some which are essential for democracy.
Dahl's definition of the term democracy is very useful to researchers. Firstly, one can assess whether a government is meeting those five criteria. Secondly, enough literature has been written by academics such as Diamond and Huntington interrogating this definition. It is possible to look at elite attitudes to political participation as opposed to looking at the quality of life of the citizens. There are a number of factors which influence economic growth, some of which are external. One can deny the fact that "the experience of other countries indicated that economic growth and rising incomes would improve the prospects for a successful transition to democracy."(Tucker & Scott, 1992: 94) I will be using this definition and I think under these circumstances it is a more useful definition.

The second concept is **democratic consolidation**. Many authors have explained the process of democratisation as taking place in phases. The first phase is when people demand political change and the regime responds by political liberalisation. According to Bratton and Van de Walle "political liberalization entails the reform of authoritarian regimes. It comes to pass when public authorities relax control on the political activities of citizens... political liberalization involves official recognition of basic civil liberties."(Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997:159) By liberalisation the regime can unban opposition parties, release political prisoners, and allow the media to operate freely. The second phase in this transition is elections. Finally after elections democracy must be consolidated. It is a very difficult process, and most importantly it is longer and there are setbacks on the way. Democratisation is a process which introduces a form of governance which respects the rule of law.

In terms of the meaning of consolidated democracy, there are criteria which authors have proposed as a method of determining whether a country has consolidated its democracy. One criterion "is the two-election test, or more properly the 'transfer of power' test: democracy is consolidated when a
government that has itself been elected in a free and fair contest is defeated at a subsequent election and accepts the result. The point of this criterion is ... that powerful players [political elites], and their social backers, are prepared to put respect for the rule of the game above the continuation of their power."(Beetham, 1994:160) This criterion although it has some shortcomings, raises a very important issue; the role of political elites in accepting democracy is crucial to democratic consolidation. A criticism of this criterion is that "it is perfectly possible to have an electoral system that meets certain minimum democratic standards, but where such a transfer of powers simply does not take place..."(Beetham, 1994:160)

The second criterion is a "simple longevity or generation test: 20 years, say, of regular competitive elections are sufficient to judge a democracy consolidated, even without a change of ruling party, since habituation to the electoral process would make any alternative method for appointing rulers unthinkable."(Beetham, 1994:160) Beetham raises two problems with this criterion, the question of "quality" and "robustness" of a democratic system which is dominated by one player. "... the longer the same party remains in power, the more indistinguishable it becomes from the state apparatus on one side and powerful economic interests on the other..."(Beetham, 1994:160)

These are the three criteria which are provided by Whitehead; Diamond; Burton, Gunther and Higley. These criteria are very useful in understanding democratic consolidation. Burton, Gunther and Higley in the main propose two ways of measuring democratic consolidation. Firstly, the "elite settlement, in which previously disunified and warring elites suddenly and deliberately reorganise their relations by negotiating compromises on their most basic disagreements, there by achieving consensual unity and laying the basis for a stable democratic regime... [The criterion] is elite convergence, a process that involves a series of deliberate, tactical decisions by rival elites that have the accumulative effects,
over perhaps a generation, of creating elite consensual unity, thereby laying the
basis for consolidated democracy.” (Shin, 1995:150) This approach emphasises
the role of political elites which I think is critical in the consolidation of
democracy. Their misguided ambitions might derail the democratic process.

Larry Diamond emphasises the role of ordinary people in ensuring that
democracy is consolidated. “Democracy becomes truly stable only when people
come to value it widely not solely for its economic and social performance but
intrinsically for its political attributes.” (Shin, 1995:154) This is important because
the masses are the key to any democratic process, without their full backing,
political elites may be in a position to easily manipulate democratic rules and
norms.

The final criterion which I think caters for all these suggested criteria, is the one
provided by Whitehead. “A democracy can best be said to be consolidated when
we have a good reason to believe that it is capable of withstanding pressures or
shocks without abandoning the electoral process or the political freedom, on
which it depends, including those of dissent and opposition. And this will require
a depth of institutionalisation reaching beyond the electoral process
itself.” (Beetham, 1994:161) This criterion caters for the conduct of the masses
and the elites in hampering or facilitating democratic consolidation. Elections
alone are not enough, institutions should be in place to empower and regulate
power relations. The pressures might be economic, social or political, the system
may be challenged in a significant manner but it will be able to withstand that
challenge.

“That we characteristically take democracy to mean more than rule by the people
is easily demonstrated ... What matters above all is the creation of a loyal
opposition; that is, an opposition which refuses to entertain plans to change the
system and to exterminate its rivals - thereby of course ensuring its own
What is important according to Hall is the “marriage of interest”, by that he means the acceptance of a national agenda by all the role players. This “marriage” is important to create trust and consensus on major political questions, such as a political system. The consensus according to Hall is possible in the main if “politics was not all important: there were other avenues of social mobility, and anyone deprived of office was accordingly still able to prosper.” (Hall, 1993: 274) The political class generally should be in agreement as to the centrality of democracy.

In terms of conditions for democratic consolidation some social scientists have argued that economic growth is a determining factor. Lipset in an article entitled ‘Some social requisites of democracy’, argued that “the more telephones, the more democracy.” (Beetham, 1994:161) For Lipset there was a direct link between a “political system to other aspects of the society... concretely, this means that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.” (Etzioni-Halevy, 1997:38) This proposition has serious implications in terms of the prospects of democratisation in Africa. Africa is the least developed continent and in some parts of it there is no economic growth.

For Lipset there is “a means of concretely testing this hypothesis,[two] indices of economic development wealth... and education - have been defined...” (Etzioni-Halevy, 1997:38) Wealth is measured from an average per capita income of a country. In this respect Huntington “identifies a zone of economic development between $500-$1000 per capita GNP, at which a country is ripe for democratisation and capable of democratic consolidation...” (Beetham, 1994:161) Huntington gives four reasons for this proposition. “[Firstly] economic development creates new sources of wealth and power outside the state and a functional need to devolve decision making. Second, economic development increases the level of education in society... Third, economic development makes greater resources available for distribution among social groups and
hence facilitates accommodation and compromise... Finally, economic development promotes the expansion of the middle class... Democracy is premised, in some measure, on majority rule, and democracy is difficult in a situation of concentrated inequalities in which a large, impoverished majority confronts a small, wealthy oligarchy." (Etzioni-Halevy, 1997:287)

Lipset and Huntington’s arguments overlap and one can safely say they agree on many points. For example on education, like Huntington, Lipset believes in a “high level of education and literacy in creating or sustaining belief in democratic norms..." (Etzioni-Halevy, 1997:40) Secondly, he also advocates a role for a middle class. “A large middle class plays a mitigating role in moderating conflict since it is able to reward moderate and democratic parties and penalize extreme groups." (Etzioni-Halevy, 1997:40) People like Barrington Moore went a step further and pronounced a “famous statement that there can be no democracy without a bourgeoisie." (Hall, 1993:275) Some authors have rejected this economic determinism. India for example is not a wealthy country, according to the World Development Report in 1997 because her GNP per capita is $340. India is less than the $500 proposed by Huntington but her democracy is surviving. On the other side, Singapore and Hong Kong which are high income economies are not democratic. The role of the bourgeoisie has not been consistent, they have “not been the friend of liberty... [In Germany’s case during the Wilkemine and Weimar] ... the absence of liberalism owes a great deal to interest but at least something to the strategy of the ruling elite." (Hall, 1993:276)

Because of these inconsistencies it is important to note Di Palma’s argument that “successful democratisation is the product of human volition. When people have experienced the worst that arbitrary and oppressive governments can do, they will readily agree to rules that will at least limit the damage that governments can inflict upon them." (Beetham, 1994:161) What is important according to Di Palma is human volition: the people must take a stand to facilitate and agitate for
democratic change. It is very interesting that in the literature some argue that the working class is more critical than the middle class. "A priori considerations suggest that the working class stands to benefit from democracy ... evidence demonstrates that the working-class parties sought both to extend the franchise and to institutionalise social rights." (Hall, 1993: 276)

Finally it is very difficult to establish whether, "A favorable economic situation may give authoritarian elites the confidence necessary to begin a transition, [or] may also provide a justification for remaining in power." (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 36) This shows that there is no direct link both between transition and consolidation to democracy. But that does not mean that economic development is good for democracy. For example most of the countries which have consolidated democracies are high income economies. I support the argument put forward by Beetham, that economic "conditions can at most be described as facilitating or 'hindering', rather than as 'determining', a given outcome." (Beetham, 1994: 161) The reasons for my support are that, in high-income countries there is a large middle class which resources civil society. Secondly, politics is not a major source of power and wealth. There are thriving political and economic spheres which are independent of each other. Finally, the gap between rich and poor people is manageable through welfare schemes.

Martin Lipset noted that "whether democracy succeeds or fails continues to depend significantly on the choices, behaviours, and decisions of political leaders and groups.” (Lipset, 1994: 136) This is further supported by Higley and Gunther, who argue that "democracies become consolidated only when elite consensus on procedures is coupled with extensive mass participation in elections and other institutional processes." (Shin, 1995: 154) Elites are important in any study of democratic consolidation; they can either be a hindrance to or facilitators of the democratic process. Bratton, in an article about Second Elections in Africa, argues that "the consolidation of democracy involves the
widespread acceptance of rules to guarantee political participation and political competition. (Bratton, 1998:1) What is common to all these quotations is the centrality of the elites in accepting a political system where they freely compete. According to Adam Przeworski “democracy means that all groups must subject their interests to uncertainty... Democratic compromise cannot be a substantive compromise; it can be only a contingent institutional compromise.” (Etzioni-Halevy, 1997:130) Elites have to subject their interests to this uncertainty. It is important to point out that, elites have the capacity and ambitions to rule, and not the masses. Therefore the acceptance of the rules of democracy by them is critical, because they are significant players and they can subvert democracy. They can subvert democracy, by coming up with ‘rules of the game’ which will prohibit others from playing. For example in Zambia, Chiluba deliberately inserted a clause in the constitution that barred Kaunda from standing as a candidate for the presidency.

Political elites “[are] individuals who because of their position in relation to the environments of power are able to influence political decision making whether at national, provincial, or local level and set the rules of the political system.” (Berry, 1997:1) Leaders of political parties, whether ruling or opposition, business people, leaders of the labour movement and senior bureaucrats are example of elites. It is important to note that elites can play a positive or negative role. Their role can be judged in relation to their views on democracy as a means to attain power.

In analysing elite theory, I will review the work of three classical theorists - Pareto, Mosca, and Michels. “Pareto distinguishes between a governing and a non-governing elite, adding that, although in principle elites (including governing elites) are made up of people who excel, this is not always so in practise. As long as a governing elite, or class, is composed of people with the proper qualities of excellence, and is open to absorb into its ranks the most talented people from
the non elite- while shedding the more degenerated of its own numbers - this ensures a circulation of elites that keeps society in a state of equilibrium and gradual change."(Etzioni-Halevy,1997:44) This circulation of elites is critical for consolidation, because if the opposing elites feel that they have a chance to assume power through free and fair elections, they will not resort to undemocratic means to attain power. They will observe the rules with the hope that, all things being equal, they have the chance to win an election.

For Pareto, democracy as a "popular representation" is nothing but a fiction. He argued that in democracies "one finds everywhere a governing class of relatively few individuals that keep itself in power partly by force and partly by the consent of the subject class which is much more populous".(Etzioni-Halevy,1997:49) For Pareto this governing class is found in parliament, but in other regimes, like the military junta, it is found in a military council. Like many theorists Pareto was rejecting the notion of a substantive and normative definition of democracy. He was, however, extreme in that he failed to recognise the role of non elites in a democracy. Pareto argues that elites maintain power through using "individuals from the subject class, ... The one group uses force, and is made up of soldiers, police ... the other uses skill, and ranges in character and in time all the way from the clientage of the old Roman politicians to the clienteles of our contemporary politicians."(Etzioni-Halevy,1997:50)

The second theorist is Gaetano Mosca, who argues that "in all societies... two classes of people appear- a class that rules and a class that is ruled."(Etzioni-Halevy,1997:53) Mosca does not see the ruling elite as a homogenous group. He feels that it is fragmented and that is positive for democracy because different factions have different competing interests. Unlike Pareto he believed that democracy is possible although elites have more power on aggregate. It is a fact that "... some people have believed that the pyramidal shape of societal hierarchies is due to the "natural" distribution of attributes within the population.
The assumption was that only a small proportion of the population was "fit" to rule. (Welsh, 1979: 3) Pareto refers to those who excel and through their capabilities are entrusted by the masses with the task of running a country. For Michels this also happens in political parties. "Michels argues that there is an inescapable trend toward oligarchic rule in large organizations ... Political organizations set up for the purpose of competing in a political arena tend to become increasingly oligarchic internally." (Welsh, 1979: 11) This problem of powerful cliques is not restricted to national politics; political parties and trade unions also face this problem.

In terms of contemporary elite theorists, I will mention some of their main points. I will start with Schumpeter although he is categorised as a classical theorist. As I have indicated he emphasises elections. For him the role of the masses is to elect a leadership, freely and fairly. He claimed that democracy is a system where elites compete for political power. But for him the role of the masses is positive, they elect a leadership which governs on their behalf and can be voted out if they fail to deliver. Huntington, like Schumpeter places too much emphasis on elections. For Huntington "democracies are made through demonstrations, campaigns and elections ... They were made by leaders in both government and opposition." (Etzioni-Halevy, 1997: 288) For him a compromise and consensus by elites is central to a consolidation of democracy. Burton, Gunther and Higley argue that elites should "transform themselves from disunity to consensual unity, they identify two distinctive modes of consolidation. One mode is through elite settlements ... [the second] is through elite convergence ..." (Shin, 1995: 150)

It is not possible to look at democratic consolidation without looking at the process of transition. According to Beetham "two different aspect[s] of the transition merit examination: the character of the previous regime, and the actual mode of transition itself." (Beetham, 1994: 161) The question of the previous regime is important in Africa, because the African state has its own
characteristics which might hinder the development of democracy. The importance of the previous regime is so debatable that some people argue that it is not important. But it is important to note what Beetham argued "that previous democratic experience should leave some sediment of popular support for democracy, and provided an opportunity to improve on past mistakes...[he further argued that the previous regime] has an important bearing on the fate of democratisation, and that is the extent to which the inherited state structure is capable of asserting any systematic policy across the territory it supposedly controls. Strictly speaking, this is a question about the state as such ... State formation is necessarily prior to democratisation."(Beetham,1994:163)

This poses a challenge for Africa with its weak state structures. During the independence struggle most nationalist movements were democratic internally in terms of the way they were conducting their business, and also were saying that they were going to install democratic regimes when assuming power. But "in the process, the imposition of control from the top, rather than the mobilisation of support from below, became the predominant relationship between African rulers and those who had now become their subjects."(Clapham,1996:56) This relationship was transformed because leaders had assumed office and became state officials. What is even more detrimental to consolidation is the fact that "even the governing parties atrophied as their mobilising functions were removed, their electoral organisation became redundant, and their leaders were appointed to governmental positions which depended on the favour of the head of state rather than the support of their constituents ... Once political parties were removed as effective participants from the African scene states emerged as the sole viable mechanisms through which African leaders could maintain their power and seek their other goals."(Clapham,1996:57)

Clapham characterised post independence African states as "monopoly states". He argued that they were "confronted by weak administrative structures, fragile
economies, and in some cases dangerous sources of domestic opposition. Political leaders sought to entrench themselves in power by using the machinery of the state to suppress or co-opt any rival organisation - be it an opposition political party, a trade union, or even a major corporation." (Clapham, 1996:57) This situation is worrying for Africa because there is no immediate history of democracy and moreover no institutions were created to sustain the democratic project. If one takes into account what Hall said about memories, then there is cause for concern. “Other memories can be as important, not least because they help create attitudes that favour consolidation of democracy." (Hall, 1993:282) As a result of a "monopoly state" no institutions were developed, the question of an independent judiciary was just a slogan, civil society was non existent in other countries, whereas, even in those in which it existed it was extremely weak.

The second aspect of the transition is the mode of transition. “The mode of transition to democracy affects its subsequent consolidation." (Beetham, 1994:163) Huntington and Linz raised the importance of mode of transition and came up with two different models of transition. Huntington was concerned with who initiated the transition, and he proposed transformation and replacement. If the democratisation process was initiated within an authoritarian regime, and the masses had no role he referred to that as ‘transformation’. The second model is ‘replacement’, democratisation is initiated by opposition and civil society. In the first model the masses have no role they are just spectators, and it is difficult to consolidate because it is not grounded within society. Linz on the other hand looks at the duration of the transition process. ‘Reforma’ is gradual negotiated change while ‘raptura’ is a rapid break through. The question which is critical is “how inclusive or exclusive is [transition], who comes to own the transition process as such?” (Beetham, 1994:163) In a country where the citizens are active agents for change prospects for consolidation are high.
In this chapter I have reviewed the literature on democratic consolidation and elite theory in order to outline the theoretical framework of this study. Many authors such as Schumpeter and Huntington put more emphasis on elections when defining democracy. This has been rejected as the "fallacy of electoralism" (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997:234). I tend to agree with the argument which says that elections alone are not sufficient. I have listed Dahl's five criteria and seven institutions which distinguish a democratic country from an undemocratic one. In terms of consolidation Whitehead's criteria which judge a country on how it responds to shocks and pressures is favoured. South Africa like any other third world country has scarce resources, and that impacts negatively on free and fair elections. Elite competition for the resources can destabilise a country.

These are some of the views which I believe are useful in this study. Firstly, the "fallacy of electoralism" which was raised is important. It points out the mistake of paying more attention to elections and ignoring other dimensions of democracy. Such dimensions were raised by Dahl as equality in voting and the control of the country's agenda by the electorate, not just by a few political elites or the military. On democratic consolidation, Whitehead argued for a democracy which is capable of withstanding pressures and shocks. This is important in the context of a poor country or a country which is facing economic problems. In such a case a country could be said to be consolidated democratically if regardless of economic crisis, democracy remains protected. The centrality of elites in the political development of a country is raised by Lispet who argued that they are the key to the failure or consolidation of democracy. The question of elite transformation and consensus to set the country's agenda is very important. Finally, the key to democratic consolidation, I believe, is Di Palma's argument on human volition, because people will not allow elites to interfere with their rights if they know the adverse consequences. In the next chapter I will try to explain the South African transition, with the aim of preparing grounds for my main themes.
In this chapter I will look at the process of transition in South Africa. According to Beetham “the mode of transition to democracy affects its subsequent consolidation ... More important for democratic sustainability, we might conclude, than the question of how the transition process is initiated, or its particular sequence of development, is a different set of questions: how broad and deep does it run, how inclusive or exclusive is it, who comes to ‘own’ the transition process as such?”(Beetham, 1994: 163) The type of settlement is important in that it lays the basis for democratic consolidation. In South Africa we had pacting, which entailed an agreement between the National Party (NP), the governing party, the African National Congress (ANC), a liberation movement and with minority parties filling in the details. In this section I will try to explain the balance of forces which necessitated the transitional power-sharing period. Secondly, I will try to characterise the shifts in alliances which were a result of the transition and might have an impact on consolidation. The aim is to show the impact of each factor in democratic consolidation; some have a negative effect while others might facilitate consolidation. This chapter is important because it sets the framework in which political elites function and the economy may develop in South Africa.

“According to Karl and Schmitter, stable democracy has rarely occurred by the reformist mode of transition in which masses mobilize from below and impose a compromise outcome without resorting to violence. Nor has stable democracy occurred by revolutions of the masses rising up in arms and removing authoritarian rulers by force. Rather, the most successful formula for democratic transition has been negotiating pacts among elites.”(Shin, 1995: 161) It is in this context that one can look at the South African ‘miracle’. The establishment of a substantial consensus on a number of contentious issues by major players has
been one of the positive aspects of elite pacting. This national consensus can impact positively on democratic consolidation.

It is important to note that the South African transition was not simply classical elite pacting. It was a dynamic process which involved civil society and the South African population to a limited extent. But, it is important to understand that they were mobilised as constituencies to support certain positions during the negotiation process. Susan Booysen argues that “South Africa’s transition does not always neatly fit into the ideal types of modes of transition... between the four options of pact, imposition, reform and revolution. Share specifies incremental change, protracted revolutionary struggle, transactional and rupture as the four matrix options of transition.” (Booysen, 1992:66) But no one can deny the fact that the leadership on both side was leading and also trying to persuade its constituency about the importance of compromises and a peaceful settlement. Blade Nzimande in a reply to Slovo’s article in the African Communist, “Negotiations: What room for compromise?” raised the issue of mass participation and the danger “to tightly control the process from above.” (Nzimande, 1992:18)

The NP in more than one instance consulted the white community. They can justifiably claim, that the elections in September 1989 and the all white referendum were forums where they sought a mandate from their constituency. The only visible role played by the masses in the negotiation process was that of unlocking deadlocks. The programme of rolling mass action from May-September 1992 embarked upon by the ANC resulted in the Record of Understanding and a movement forward in substantive negotiations. The ANC alliance had a capacity to mobilise thousands of people to support their agenda. It is important to note that the National Party was not comfortable with the involvement of other political parties at one stage. They argued that, major parties should mobilise and persuade their constituencies to support the final
agreement. They were not happy with the ANC mass action, saying the ANC was trying to coerce the opposition and they were not negotiating in good faith. This point was clearly spelled out by the leader of the NP in a letter to the ANC leader in height of the mass action campaign. They even proposed a troika of Buthelezi, De Klerk, and Mandela to resolve problems in negotiations and also to address political violence instead of bilateral talks, this was also supported by the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).

The intransigence of the National Party government in the 1970’s and 80’s, resulted in a lot of hardship in the cultural, political and economic sectors. “On the cultural front, the academic and cultural boycotts were intensified, further depriving many South African artists, intellectuals and technologists of useful international contacts and experience and producing one of the most inward-looking intellectual cultures in the world... Economically, the South African economy went into a nose dive from which it has yet to recover.” (McGowan, 1996:194) The only option which was left for the regime to resuscitate the economy was through the abandonment of apartheid. Because “… apartheid had come to engender a level of conflict in society that seriously jeopardised the future of capitalism in South Africa.” (Ginsburg, 1996:38) It is in this context that the 1994 ‘miracle’ should be looked into, a context of decay and a possible collapse.

For the South African economy to grow it depends on attracting investment from outside, not just only investment but also markets to sell South African products. The reason for this reliance are “the size of the population [which is small about 40 million, and in that total] the majority play an insignificant role in the economy.”(COSATU, 1992:8) The required investments include capital, skilled personnel and technology. It is very important to locate what happened in South Africa in the world economic system. After the Second World War there was an economic boom, that ended in the early 1970s. There are explanations which
are given for that economic decline, they vary and different scholars emphasise different factors. This down turn was manifested by "a decrease in profitability in the heart-lands of capitalism because their own home markets were increasingly saturated; [and] growing instability in the international markets." (Shopsteward, 1996: 37) The decline of profits was due to taxes which were paid by companies to governments to meet welfare obligations. The other reason was the high wages and inflexible labour policies. The decrease in profitability in developed countries and the instability of the international market resulted in a more globalised world economy, where capital moved around to look for favourable markets and it was important for South Africa to attract this capital.

The end of the cold war had a number of implications for apartheid South Africa and the liberation movements. The balance of forces between the South African Government and the Liberation forces, African National Congress in particular was shifting but not decisively favouring the other. For the ANC the loss was severe, it meant the loss of military and political assistance. But what was even more devastating was the collapse of Marxism-Leninism as a viable option to capitalism in Eastern Europe. This collapse demobilised radical forces within the liberation struggle. It removed the threat of a Socialist revolution taking place in the current conjuncture. The other difficulty which the ANC was confronted with, was the fact that it could not operate freely in countries boundaring South Africa. Countries such as Botswana and Swaziland were part of the Customs Union, meaning in a way they were dependent on South Africa economically. The Inkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique meant the ANC had to move to Angola which was very far and disruptive. Even in Angola, the resolution of the Namibian question had a serious implication in relations between Luanda and Pretoria.
The NP government was also affected, and in a way it removed the justification for continuing the struggle against the ANC. During the height of the cold war, the North happy to back powerful military bureaucracies in many Third World countries including South Africa. With the cold war gone the whole world was united against apartheid. The Western powers had in the past treated South Africa as a strategic partner in the fight against communism, that threat was no more. "the resultant change in the relations between world powers brought the issue of a negotiated resolution to the fore - in this context, South Africa was not going to be treated as an exception. Importantly, these changes also exerted new pressures on the regime to fall in line with the emerging international "culture" of multi-party democracy."(ANC,1992:1) I do not think it is not important to give an account of the subjective and objective strengths and weakness of both sides, suffice to say that stalemate created conditions for a political compromise.

Slabbert in an article entitled South Africa Beginning At The End Of The Road raised two external factors. He raised "the changed international environment" which I have already discussed. The second factor which had a major impact on the ability of the government to govern properly, is "South Africa's vulnerability to a changing international economic climate."(Slabbert,1990:2) South Africa had to reform its systems or face economic collapse. There was no alternative for the ruling elite, and this was compounded by the fact that the problem was more than just an economic problem. "John Saul and Steven Gelb described the developing South African crisis as 'organic'. An organic crisis, they argued, is characterised by incurable structural contradictions... This conceptualisation makes a useful distinction between the present crisis and previous South African crises as well as those cyclical crises to which capitalism is subject. An organic crisis differs from others in that it pervades society, influencing economic, political, ideological, social and juridical relations and structures..."(Moss & Obery,1987:xv)
The ANC in an article entitled "Negotiations: A strategic perspective" characterised the balance of forces by the end of the eighties. In its analysis the paper identified strengths and weaknesses on both sides. Some of the strengths of the National Party government were that it "command[ed] vast state and other military resources; it continues to enjoy the support of powerful economic forces." (ANC, 1992:49) I think it's important to unpack the business support later, because it was very complex due to the fact that apartheid was affecting its profit margin. The National Party had the support of the civil servants who were not sure of their future in an ANC government. The skilled personnel who due to apartheid were mainly white were not comfortable with the ANC, and its policy of affirmative action. The tactical entry of the NP into negotiations made the "NP to achieve a resurrection. It strategised around the dictum of negotiate from a position of strength, a position based on detailed strategic calculations... While it still lacked popular legitimacy, it had acted soon enough to retain control over state institutions and concomitant power." (Booysen, 1992:68) It controlled the electronic media which was so vital to its propaganda.

The ANC on the other side enjoyed mass support and also very importantly it had a network of organisations overseas which were putting pressure on their respective governments to do something about South Africa. In other words it had international support, its struggle was seen as a just struggle and even the United Nations had declared apartheid a crime against humanity. In other words the ANC enjoyed political moral high ground, its struggle was seen as just.

The South African political crisis was resolved through elite pacting. Ginsburg argued that "elite pacting ... is premised on two theoretical assumptions. Firstly, that negotiations can not be conducted by the masses themselves ..., but must be entered into on their behalf by a leadership [elite] that ostensibly speaks for them. Secondly, it is assumed that not all members of the contending factions are enamoured with the idea of negotiations, or 'pacting'. Hard-liners within the
authoritarian bloc and radicals among the pro-democracy forces might well wish
to pursue maximalist solutions in the sense of provoking, or intensifying, a civil
war that each believes can be won in a final, decisive battle." (Ginsburg, 1996:75)

Two possible scenarios of pacting in the Italian and Spanish cases are important.
South Africa has some resemblance of the Spanish scenario, although there are
differences. In the Spanish case, "a 'seceding right' begins to initiate partial
liberalization; then, facing resistance from that part of the old elite that considers
any departure from authoritarianism treasonous, it moves to attract the support
of the Left for further democratic reforms... for reasons of self-interest, both the
seceding Right and the accommodating Left commit themselves to the rules of
democratic politics and coexist with mutual sacrifices." (Shi, 1995:162) I think the
question of who initiated the negotiation process is debatable, but indeed the
South African transition had all the characteristics which are in the Spanish
scenario. Leaving aside who initiated the process of liberalisation, it is a fact that
when the reform process started some of the NP hard-liners left the party and
formed opposition parties such as the Conservative Party and later the Freedom
Front. Even within the party there was a major opposition to a political settlement
which would result in a one man one vote in a united South Africa.

The reformers within the NP had in the first place to rely on the liberal parties
such as the Democratic Party in parliament and to mobilise and rally the white
community behind reforms. This was clear during the only white referendum; it
was not only the NP which was canvassing for the yes vote. It was a range of
organisations and associations, religious and even sport bodies. A broad support
for democratic consolidation is critical. A number of people who were not
necessarily NP supporters were behind this move of a peaceful settlement. This
broad support gives legitimacy to the process and minimises the possibility of the
new order being challenged in a significant manner. But what was important
more than this support within the white community was the commitment and

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support of the ANC as the significant player in the liberation struggle. This self-interest and mutual sacrifices was articulated by the President of the ANC when he rebuked President De Klerk during CODESA. He argued that he is trying to bring his supporters on board and explain the importance of a compromise, he even referred to De Klerk as a man of integrity. But he argued De Klerk was not reciprocating his commitment and efforts so that the process could succeed, as a result of mistrust whites were joining right-wing parties in numbers. This shows that actions and omissions by one of them had a serious effect on the other, for example a reckless statement by the ANC had a potential of strengthening the far right.

The problem of radicalism was not facing the NP alone the ANC also had to deal with the Pan African Congress(PAC) and AZAPO, on the 'far left' which were seeing negotiations as a sell-out strategy. But the major challenge for the ANC was to convince the members of the Alliance, and the broader mass democratic movement which included workers, church bodies, civic and sport associations that negotiations were the best option in the current conjuncture. The PAC and AZAPO were marginal parties and their impact was very minimal; the challenge for the ANC was within. Joe Slovo wrote a paper entitled "Negotiations: What room for compromises?", which triggered a serious debate within the alliance. Blade Nzimande, Gwala, Jordan, Cronin and many more contributed, but more importantly the ANC Youth League wrote papers in response to Slovo's paper. The debate was not limited to the alliance academics and ordinary people responded some in support while others were critical of the proposed compromises. Those who were critical of the proposed compromises like the ANC Youth League were arguing for mass mobilisation and further international pressure to unlock the deadlock and shift the balance of forces in favour of the liberation movement. The position of the Youth League is very interesting because it was openly opposed to the suggested compromises. It was not convinced that the compromises would result in peace and democracy, in other
words they harboured mistrust of the NP. This is reflected in a document which appeared in the African Communist of 1992. They argued that there was no guarantee that the NP leadership would implement the agreed resolutions.

The National Party's "transition from classic apartheid to reform-apartheid has had major implications for the NP. Up until the mid-1970s it was able to appeal to the interests of all the classes within the Afrikaner ethnic group." (Giliomee & Schlemmer, 1989:139) The change was costly but strategic for the NP, costly in that it lost support from some sections of the white community. But it was strategic in that it was able to safeguard its interest. At a tactical and strategic level the NP tried to amass support for negotiations and "de-emphasize its concern about Afrikaner needs and interests. It now stands as the instrument of white communal political power. Since whites control more than 90 per cent of the instruments of production (land and capital) it is strongly opposed to any radical redistribution of income or assets." (Giliomee & Schlemmer, 1989:133) This shift might affect democratic consolidation negatively. If it actually adopts that strategy and fights for the interest of the 'haves' it run the risk of losing support of the majority in the country. Then its future growth will be very limited and that is bad for democracy, because there is a need for a viable opposition.

After debates, consultations and persuasions both sides agreed that the South African crisis is going to be resolved through negotiations. This convergence was as a result of parties appreciating the fact that there is a stalemate. Slovo captured this stalemate very well when he argued "We are negotiating because towards the end of the 80s we concluded that, as a result of its escalating crisis, the apartheid power bloc was no longer able to continue ruling in the old way and was genuinely seeking some break with the past. At the same time, we were clearly not dealing with a defeated enemy and an early revolutionary seizure of power by the liberation movement could not be realistically posed. This conjuncture of the balance of forces provided a classic scenario which placed the
possibility of negotiations on the agenda." (Slovo, 1992:) One of the arguments which carried much weight in this debate was put forward by Thabo Mbeki when he argued that "It is only when the prospect of any peaceful settlement vanished that we [ANC] resorted to arms, while for the regime [NP], it was the failure of arms that imposed the obligation to concede the need for negotiations." (Mbeki, 1992:9) Mbeki in his argument was justifying the correctness of using negotiations as a strategy and also challenging those who were elevating armed struggle above all other tactics.

Finally, a proposal of a sunset clause was accepted as the basis of a negotiated settlement. In brief the sunset clause meant that there would be a limited power sharing arrangement to accommodate minority groups. That power-sharing arrangement would last 5 years after which a majority rule would be applied. Both sides had to compromise; the ANC had to accept power-sharing, and the NP majority rule after 5 years. For the NP "a point of departure is the acceptance that South Africa is one undivided state with one citizenship for all. Every South African has the right to participate in political decision-making..., provided the principle of non-domination is taken into account." (Meyer, 1990:58) This principle of non-domination was finally accepted. Some referred to this power sharing agreement as a form of "limited democracy". They define "limited democracy" as a "notion of democracy in which government must be strong enough to govern effectively, but weak enough not to be able to govern against important interests." (Ginsburg & Webster, 1995:4) In the case of South Africa those interests are those of the propertied elite which is mainly white and also the top hierarchy of the civil service. Initially, there was opposition to this sunset clause, for example the ANC was proposing a constitution which had no property clause. But due to pressure and the recognition that there was no trust between the propertied class and the in-coming elite, because they had no interest in maintaining the status quo which was in conflict with its historical mission of creating a non-racial South Africa. It finally decided to include it into the
constitution together with the bill of rights. The only concession which was made was that the clause should not hinder land reform, whether the clause is hampering land redistribution is open to interpretation. The second major compromise concerns state transformation, there was an agreement that old civil servants would be retained by the new government. Some were opposed to that arguing that they were going to sabotage the transformation agenda of the new government. The ‘sunset’ clause will lapse after the 1999 elections, meaning it is no longer an issue. But the notion of generalising about the civil service as reactionary and racist is not accurate as there are men and women of integrity who have served the new government professionally.

The implications for this power sharing arrangement are many and complex. Firstly, it limits fundamental transformation because, for a limited period of time the former ruling elite can be in a position to block change. For example, they would continue to occupy a strategic position in the civil service in particular in the top echelons, and also in the army and the police. The status quo was going to be observed in the private sector. What it means is that the government can not undertake a radical transformation programme which will change the status quo. This results in the perpetuation of inequalities which are mainly but not exclusively defined by race. This results in discontent by the historically disadvantaged majority which had hoped that the new dispensation would eradicate inequalities. This might affect democratic consolidation in that people associate the present regime with democracy, and if its losing credibility people might call for a benevolent dictator as an answer to their problems. On the positive side, although there was opposition to the sunset proposal by organisations in both extremes it enjoyed support among the general public. There was a public debate and a major consensus around the principle of a compromise was achieved. This is positive because it gives the process legitimacy, even those organisation which initially were sceptical of the notion of
compromises have come to accept the power sharing deal. For example, AZAPO, who are entering elections for the first time in 1999.

The impact of elite pacting in the democratic consolidation is very important. There are positives and negatives to consolidation. Let me start with the negatives. The lack of mass involvement is a real danger to democratic consolidation. Transition which follows this model of elite pacting is directed from above. That practise of dictating directions from above might be a norm in the new dispensation. Secondly, the use of “sufficient consensus” which meant an agreement between the ANC and the NP is sufficient meant that a number of parties were not satisfied with the outcome. Those parties in future might raise this issue that the deal was between the ANC and the NP they were not adequately consulted. Finally, the Government of National Unity was an outcome of a compromise and it was unable to rule against some vested interests. The question of private property is an example, because the leading party in government represented the poor and the landless and no radical programme was going to be undertaken. What happens if after 5 years parties revert back to their original policies and principles. This national project of nation-building will collapse and the possibility of major political instability cannot be ruled out.

There are also positives in elite pacting. The establishment of a consensus by major players is very important, because it removes a threat of major opposition or challenge to the present arrangement. There was a broad agreement on the property clause in the constitution, nation-building process and a macro-economic policy. The transition was peaceful, it was not a violent revolutionary take over. This might set a precedent for future generations, that they should negotiate rather than resorting to violence. They agree on a constitution and the bill of rights which sets the rules of the ‘game’. The constitution serves as a guide to ambitious elites and provides procedures for a take over. The other important factor is that the process was all inclusive. All significant players were invited to
participate in the negotiations. Even those who had objections like AZAPO and the white right-wing parties have accepted the outcome and are even planning to participate in the coming elections in 1999. The ANC-led Government of National Unity enjoy legitimacy. The elections were declared substantially free and fair by the Independent Electoral Commission.

The new dispensation resulted in the realignment of forces. New alliances were formed, also there were shifts in former alliances. The ANC and NP tried to win as many allies as possible during and after the elections. The NP tried to win former Bantustan and Tricameral parties, but the majority were not willing to associate themselves with a party which was about to lose power. The other dimension was that in the 1990s there were coups in a number of Bantustans, governments which assumed power, most of them were friendly to the ANC. The ANC formed what was known as the Patriotic Front, a front of all groupings which were opposed to apartheid. This front ended up being filled by former Bantustan, Tricameral and other non-governmental organisations because the PAC and AZAPO opted out due to their opposition to some modalities of negotiations. But what was primary for the ANC was the unity of its Tripartite Alliance (ANC, COSATU, SACP) and South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO) as an important ally.

The Tripartite Alliance had a major debate in 1993 and 1994 about the need to continue with the alliance after the elections. Some people were arguing for the termination of the alliance; left-wingers were vocal especially in COSATU. (Although) Some nationalist and aspiring capitalists in the ANC also had this view but they were not vocal. There was a NUMSA resolution which called for "COSATU to move out of its alliance with the ANC after next year's elections... [and a call] for a Workers' Party." (Masondo, 1993:29) They argued that the ANC is a governing party and most importantly its membership is changing. They wanted to engage the ANC as part of the system of capitalism with no
sentiments because in their analysis it was not addressing class contradictions. There was even a conference of the left where this idea of a Workers' Party was discussed. But NUMSA failed to convince other COSATU affiliates that this was the correct path to take under these circumstances.

The collapse of the Alliance, the majority in COSATU argued, would derail and reverse some democratic gains which had been made, and result in political instability. This phase of democratic transition needed a strong and decisive movement to lead it. Jeremy Baskin also raised another point that the "unions now have an institutionalised role in policy-making and are recognised as social partners by the democratic government." (Baskin, 1996:8) This was seen as a positive development for the trade union movement. Therefore, they were not about to leave that alliance; they were trying to maximise their closeness to the ANC to their advantage. They further argued that leaving the ANC at this stage would be suicidal for the left, because the ANC would be transformed to a liberal bourgeois party and fail its historical mission. "The primary mission of the ANC was, and remains, to mobilise all the classes and strata that objectively stand to gain from the success of the cause of social change." (ANC, 1997:19) The ANC is a broad 'church', workers, bosses, and clerics are members and it was more important for the progressive forces, according to them, to exert their hegemony than to surrender the ANC to antagonistic forces. David Hemson of the Marxist Workers Tendency within the ANC argued against this surrender. For him "the question of the Workers Party [should] be taken up by the workers to build a mass ANC on a socialist programme." (Hemson, 1991:83) A need for a mass-driven transformation which mobilises all classes and strata to address the legacy of apartheid compelled the three components to continue their alliance. What sustains the alliance and keeps it going is the fact that individual members have the right to differ on policy matters. A clear example of this is the macro economic policy.
"The African National Congress and its major ally, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, are bound to drift apart now the ANC is in Government. Future alliances are likely to be determined by constituency interests, economic policies, delivery on the Reconstruction and Development Programme and the need for consensus in reforming Government of National Unity." (Murphy, 1994:52) The question of interests has a potential of breaking the alliance. In the not so distant past President Mandela argued that the trade unions are just representing their members, whereas government has also to look at the interests of the unemployed and the business sector. There would come a time when COSATU felt that it may be that its cause would be better served if it distanced itself from the ruling party. A conflict between a powerful labour movement such as COSATU and a leading party in government would definitely affect political stability.

The alliance between the ANC and the SACP is more secure than that of COSATU in my analysis. "The SACP leadership are architects of these compromises [sunset period] and support them fully." (Hemson, 1991:83) It is a fact that both ministers of Labour, and Trade and Industries are members of the SACP. More importantly a number of top ANC executives are members of the Party, and that dual membership provides a dynamic interaction which makes the opting out of the Alliance by the SACP more unlikely. What is a serious danger to South Africa's young democracy is that the make-up of political parties would follow racial and class lines to a lesser extent. Then the problem of entrenched majorities which will be there as long as the present make-up prevail. If this trend is not reversed, present opposition parties have no chance of winning in the near future. Some people have argued that it is in the interest of South Africa's liberal democracy that the ANC alliance collapses. The argument is that different formations would pursue their agenda resulting in a plural political order.
These shifts and realignment of forces were not restricted to political parties. Business also was repositioning itself; historically it was very close to the NP. But due to hardship which was as a result of apartheid, the business sector had to make a tactical alliance with the new ruling elites. In the early 1980s business leaders recognised the fact that apartheid can not be reformed. They started to have a dialogue with the then banned ANC, and in those consultations some of them began to recognise the fact that the ANC was not that bad, it was possible to do business with them. They began to encourage the NP government to have a dialogue with the ANC. Gavin Relly who was the Chairman of Anglo-American argued “I have always taken the view that whether one likes the ANC or not - and I personally do not like its policy of violence nor its Marxist economic thinking - it constitutes an important factor in the political set-up.”(Relly, 1986) Tony Bloom, who was the Chairman of the Premier Group, was very clear in what he thought to be a solution to the South African crisis. “Political power-sharing is the ultimate issue to be addressed before South Africa can aspire to being a just society with equal treatment before the law for all citizens. The prerequisite for negotiations to take place must be the unbanning of organisations like the ANC and the release of Mandela and other jailed political prisoners.”(Bloom, 1986) The business sector came to realise that apartheid was a hindrance to their surplus accumulation.

There was also a recognition by the business sector that for capitalism to survive in the ‘new’ South Africa capital ownership should be deracialised. They tried to co-opt black people through organisations such as Urban Foundation, and National Association of Chamber of Commerce which were financed by big capital. For the ANC the deracialisation of the economy, and the creation of the black middle class in particular, is of strategic importance. For democratic consolidation to take place you need an independent economic society. More than that all nationalities should feel that they have a stake in the economy, otherwise they could easily resort to violence because they have got nothing to
lose. They feel alienated from the system. After the elections, the ANC and the business sector managed to work together, although in many economic policy positions the business sector is closer to the Democratic Party than government. The ANC in some quarters is seen as supporting the workers. This shift from confrontation and hostility to co-operation is as a result of mutual interest; both parties need each other for survival.

If the status quo in terms of ownership continues, the possibility of political and economic instability is high. There is great expectation by the historically marginalised groups and if that expectation is not met social problems such as crime would continue to be rife in the country. The opposition to privatisation, in particular by the African majority, will continue unless they have a share in the economy. I think it will be problematic if the ruling party represents the black majority who have no role in the economy. The relationship would be antagonistic and there would be no trust between government and business leadership. If there is no trust, government policy might be informed by prejudice rather than objective factors, and that would be detrimental to the economy.

Political parties are in a state of flux; some are disintegrating while others are gaining support as a result of the misfortunes of their rivals. The shifts in alliances is accompanied by changes in membership, form, and the ideological drive of parties. The collapse of the Eastern bloc was a blow to parties and formations which subscribed to Marxism and Leninism. After the collapse the sense of direction and purpose was affected. The South African Communist Party was under a lot of pressure from its opponents to abandon its socialist agenda. But its membership grew tremendously during the leadership of Chris Hani. The only serious change was that the SACP changed from being a cadre party to a mass party. It is within the collapse of a socialist option that the present Macro-Economic Policy was possible.
Most of the parties were affected by the transition period. The NP tried to change the ethnic composition of its membership. If parties wanted to play a major role in the politics of South Africa, the new era demanded nonracialism. An exclusively white party had no chance of winning the elections; therefore it is important to recruit other ethnic groups and races. But the recruitment of people of colour resulted in conservative whites leaving and joining far right-wing parties. Parties which did not take part in the elections were further marginalised; they were not in the mainstream of political activity. As a result AZAPO disintegrated, and a new Socialist Party was formed by a renegade group. The Inkatha Freedom Party also tried to widen its support base, by not focusing exclusively on their Zulu constituency. For the ANC most of the parties and personalities which were leading Bantustan Parties in the Patriotic Front either resigned or were expelled. One can safely say that opposition parties are fragmented and ineffective because most of them, if not all, lack a clear direction. What even makes things worse is the fact that people who had in the past participated and led extra-parliamentary organisations are now in government or in the business sector.

The inclusion of the property clause in the constitution has the potential of hindering Land Reform. It is a known fact that Africans hold about 13% of the land in South Africa. "Although there are only 50 000 white farmers they have almost 69% of the land of South Africa. Most of the 1.3 million African farmers are restricted to 13.3% of the land. [most importantly] Only 11% of all the land in South Africa is arable."(COSATU,1992:12) Apart from agriculture, land is required for housing, settlement and grazing. Another problem which is going to face the South African government is that mining rights and interests are held by companies and individuals and they are not in operation. For the Government to broaden ownership to other national groups, they have to repossess this land and lease it to those who are in need. This might be seen as interfering with property rights, while on the other hand people are calling for economic redistribution. This creates uncertainty for the business community which have
mining rights. Land Reform, it is argued, has a potential of stimulating economic growth. Land hunger can lead to political instability.

In conclusion, the framework in which political elites operates and the economy develops is somewhat set by the process of transition in South Africa. The collapse of the Eastern bloc shifted the balance of forces in a way that it made it possible for South Africans to address their political problem. For the NP, the fear of a communist take over disappeared. The new economic order made it possible for the new government to adopt the Growth Employment And Redistribution (GEAR) strategy which was labelled a neo-liberal strategy by its opponents on the left. That was only possible because socialism was no longer a viable option. Secondly, the South African transition was characterised by elite pacting. It is argued in the literature that stable democracy has rarely occurred through a revolution where the masses impose a settlement. This argument gives hope that there is a chance that the country's democracy will consolidate. The main players were the ANC and the NP who managed despite their different interests to strike a compromise solution. The transition was debated widely and parties opted for broader mandates in congresses and referendums which would allow them to bargain. Elite pacting has both negative and positive impacts on democratic consolidation. The major problem is the lack of mass involvement. On the positive side is the establishment of a substantial consensus by major players. These factors would influence democratic consolidation.

Finally, is the crisis of expectations: The South African public have great expectations that the new regime is going to satisfy their need. How the government reacts to criticism of lack of delivery is critical for consolidation. If it opt for a strategy of authoritarianism, and restricts the freedom of the media for example the process of consolidation could be affected negatively. The problem is that surveys show that people do not make any distinction between the ruling party and the democratic regime. If their expectations are not met they might
reject democracy, on the basis that it has failed to deal with crime and land hunger, for example. In the next chapter I will attempt to deal with this problem in depth, whilst examining the relationship of economic development to democratic consolidation.
"A society divided between a large impoverished mass and a small favored elite would result either in oligarchy ... or in tyranny ..." (Etzioni-Halevy, 1997:38) These were the words of Lipset, who argued that democracy without development is doomed. He provided two indices which would enhance democracy; they are wealth and high levels of education. He was not alone in this thinking, Huntington and More also held the same view with some minor variation. All these authors have argued that "the chances for sustainable democracy are indeed improved by economic development, though there are exceptional examples both of underdeveloped democracies and developed economies with little democracy." (Beetham, 1994:165) In this chapter I will try to analyse the prospects of democratic consolidation in South Africa, in the light of high levels of inequality. I will also briefly look at the historical role of the state in the economy. The pre-1994 position of the liberation movement which might inform the population's perception of what ought to be done by a democratic state will also be discussed.

Wealth is measured as the average per capita income of a country. The argument is that in a country which is economically well off there is an independent economic society which is not dependent upon the state. This is important for good governance which is free of corruption, nepotism and patronage. In a country where prosperity cannot be achieved outside the state there is a problem. Individuals look to the state to provide economic stability and in such a situation the population develops reliance upon the state. If it fails to deliver this could lead to discontent and instability, and political elites react either by restricting freedoms thus hindering democracy, by plotting a coup or a secessionist uprising. The aim of these competing elites is to gain access to resources; whether they go to elections or through a bloody coup is secondary. Finally this leads to the collapse of the democratic system, in the main caused
by the reliance on the state by the population for its survival. Political elites compete for office so as to be in a position to control who has access to resources. Ethnic mobilisation and regionalism are used to mobilise constituencies for political power. Uganda under Amin and the IFP in South Africa are a good example of groups which have used ethnicity to mobilise sectors of the population.

Wealth also creates the middle class who act as a democratic watchdog. This is possible because in a wealthy country the pool of skilled people is larger than in poor countries. The reason for the importance of the middle class is that it is a resource to civil society. The creation of the middle class is linked to another factor which is education. In a wealthy country there is a high standard of living, and often also a high level of literacy. Education engenders the spirit and norms compatible with democracy. "If we cannot say that a "high" level of education is a sufficient condition for democracy, the available evidence does suggest that it comes close to being a necessary condition in the modern world." (Etzioni-Halevy, 1997:39) The educated elite actually run governments as civil servants; they are the largest group in the middle class. They have aspirations for political office and they can make intelligent contributions both in opposition politics and in civil society generally. They are also essential to the private sector; their innovations and skills are critical in the functioning of the capitalist mode of production. Low literacy is associated with ignorance and radicalism because the assumption is that poor people have nothing much to lose in a revolutionary situation.

Historically, the state played a central role in creating wealth in South Africa. The NP had a clear programme to empower the Afrikaner community. They instituted laws and parastatals to attain this goal. At one stage the Afrikaner community was very poor, and the English-speaking South Africans controlled the economy. This is shown in Appendix 1; the ratio of income of Afrikaners to English-
speakers over a period of time. The table shows that the apartheid government managed to radically alter and improve the position of Afrikaners between the period of 1946 to 1976. It managed to address these disparities through its interventionist programmes and established strong Afrikaner economic power houses such as SANLAM. Organisations such as the Afrikaner Broederbond were central in the creation of wealth for Afrikaners. For example, "In the first eleven years of its existence, the Reddingsdaadbond mobilised more than R30 million for Afrikaans business enterprises... The number of Afrikaans businesses grew from 3710 in 1939 to 13047 in 1949. The turnover increased from 61 million to 322 million [GP pounds sterling] in a year."(Wilkins & Strydom,1978:425)

There was a clear dependency on the state by white farmers, the mining sector and the manufacturing sector. They obtained grants, subsidies and favorable laws to manage their labour.

After economic decline due to a number of factors such as huge military expenditure, economic sanctions and political instability the NP changed its approach and tried to lower its deficit in the late 1980s. This had a major impact on the farming sector and other industries which were reliant on the state. This was also a tactical change for the NP government which was trying to position itself as the custodian of capitalism. In the "1980s the government ... began to de-emphasize its concerns about Afrikaner needs and interests."(Giliomee & Schlemmer,1989:133) The emphasis was now on the protection of private property, which was mainly in the hands of whites. It was tactical for the NP because it managed to attract allies which were the emerging black bourgeoisie; class instead of race was the determining factor.

When the new order came into being the historically marginalised groups expected the same treatment from the new government which they had struggled to install. They expected a number of corrective measures to eradicate inequalities. In the liberation struggle it was the working class and the youth
which were in the forefront. Their social position in society made them militant and led them to strive for change. They had nothing to lose if the system of apartheid crumbled, whilst they hoped that they had something to gain in the new political arrangement.

Land and equality have been the two key factors in the liberation struggle. People were removed from their land and many became destitute. Moreover they were forced to work for mining companies as cheap labour. This transformed land dispossession into economic and political struggles. Oppressed people began to recognise that they needed a political voice to fight these injustices. The Freedom Charter advocated an interventionist state to deal with the legacy of colonialism and apartheid. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which was originally an ANC alliance election manifesto also emphasised the role of the state in redistributing wealth. It also linked democracy and development; "without thoroughgoing democratisation the resources and potential of our people will not be available for a coherent programme of reconstruction and development." (ANC, 1994: 11) Even the much criticised GEAR states that "as South Africa moves toward the next century, we seek:...a redistribution of income and opportunities in favour of the poor." (GEAR, 1996: 1)

"Others [in the liberation movement] view democracy as a means to change the South African society: the powerless will be empowered to restructure the society's institutions and to redistribute its wealth." (Haasbroek, 1994: 215) This view was informed by the fact that the struggle was not just about one man one vote, it was about something more than that. It was a recognition that state power, if better used can improve peoples lives. There was an idea of South Africa's democracy leading to an egalitarian society. The state was seen as a major instrument to redistribute and redress the past imbalances. Those assumptions have reinforced peoples' reliance on the state for their well being.
The ANC over the years has always insisted that political rights without the improvement of the quality of life of people have no value. "Democracy and development are intertwined, and one cannot be separated from the other." (ANC, 1997:8) It has seen as its task to eradicate this historical injustice. For example, in a discussion document entitled "The State, Property Relations and Social Transformation there is an argument that "the task of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) is to eliminate the basic causes of the national grievance wherever and in whatever form they manifest themselves." (ANC, 1998:39) These remarks by the ANC show that for them democracy without the improvement of the population's standard of living is just a shell. "The key liberation organisations subscribed to and spread to their poverty-stricken followers an economic, as opposed to a procedural view of democracy..." (Mattes & Thiel, 1998:102) The NP created reliance upon the state through apartheid. It protected the vulnerable white population by employing them in parastatals such as ESKOM and TRANSNET. In the liberation movement the role of the state was indirectly driven by ideology. The fact of the matter is members of the SACP such as Siovo were central in the drafting of the Freedom Charter and other documents of the liberation movement. The state was seen as the agent of change and it was further seen as having the capacity to enable the government to embark on a programme of reconstruction.

The country's wealth is measured by looking at the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). South Africa is a small player if compared to the well developed and the newly industrialised countries. But when compared to other Sub Saharan countries it is a relatively big player. What is important is that when one is analysing the population's standard of living one looks at GDP per person. In South Africa the GDP per person is not equally distributed. The question of racial distribution is not catered for. There is a high level of inequality. Appendix 2 shows income inequality by country, and it is clear that South Africa is outperformed by poor and developing countries. Zambia, for example, exhibits
less gap in income between the rich and poor than South Africa. In South Africa the gap between the few rich people who through the apartheid legacy are white and the majority which is poor and black is huge. This fact is exacerbated by the proliferation of conglomerates in the South African economy. Whites are the major share-holders on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.

The South African economy is not growing fast especially in proportion to the growth of the population. Appendix 3 illustrates that South Africa’s annual growth rate is 1.1 per cent. The economy should grow more than the population so as to meet people’s needs. With a high growth rate it is hoped that unemployment and poverty will be alleviated. In South Africa even if the economy is growing there is a problem with the distribution of wealth. The gap between whites and blacks is huge, for example “whites control about 85% of the South African economy. [the] “Africans who are 75.5% of the population had 33% of total income in 1990. Whereas whites who are 13.3% of the population get 54% percentage of total income.”(COSATU,1992:17) The South African labour movement in their submission to NEDLAC, argued that “South Africa has ... the highest income inequality in the world ... Only Brazil had comparable figures.” (COSATU, NACTU, FEDSAW,1996:1)

In 1992 it was argued that the South African population was growing at 2.6% per year. If the economy is to meet and satisfy this growth it must grow by more than 2.6%. I think it is important also to indicate that economic growth does not always correspond to development, and there is debate about the relationship of these two phenomena which I will not enter into in this paper. Suffice to say that in some countries growth came about at the expense in particular of development and the working people. In the South African case poor people suffered so as to enable companies to realise profits. They succeeded by reducing labour costs which meant job losses. Even the South African government was reducing its budget deficit thus abandoning its welfare
obligations. The growth in profit margins of companies is seen as growth in the economy.

"Economic performance usually detonates before the transition. Demonstrations, labour strikes and violence interrupt production. Domestic and foreign investment decline due to uncertainty about the outcome of the transition and the accompanying conflict. The deterioration of the economy and political conflict reinforce each other. Both hasten the breakdown of the preceding system." (Di Palma, 1984:178) This has happened in South Africa and this situation has been made worse by the fact that the South African economy is dependent on foreign investment. Foreign capital requires political and economic stability to make a long term investment. Such a climate is very difficult to create if people's expectations have not been satisfied.

"Democracy will not be valued by the people unless it deals effectively with social and economic problems and achieves a modicum of order and justice." (Diamond, 1990:2) This is what is happening in South Africa. South Africans are looking at the performance of government very critically. Surveys show that "South African blacks, for their part, attach as much or more importance to narrowing the gap between rich and poor as to having regular elections, party competition, free speech, and minority rights." (Mattes & Thiel, 1998:103) Opinion 1999, Appendix 4 shows that the evaluation of government performance is not satisfactory. The majority of the population complains about unemployment (86%) and the way the government is managing the economy (64%). They think that the government is not doing enough and this cuts across all races. On the other hand they appreciate government initiatives to encourage international investment (66%). Once there is a feeling that the government does not care about the population then there is a problem. The only thing which seems to satisfy the population is the delivery of housing (53%), possibly because housing is visible and can be quantified. The reason I am doubtful of what created this
perception is because the government has conceded that it would not meet its
target of one million houses. The South African economy is not growing
sufficiently to allow development and formal employment is not being created so
there is a real danger to the country’s democracy. These huge inequalities have
a direct impact on democratic consolidation.

Although South Africa is different from other African states in that it had a settler
oligarchy running this country who also viewed SA as their home there are
similarities in what happened in other parts of Africa. The question of economic
empowerment of the majority has been difficult in the newly independent
countries. The former President of Tanzania argued that “An African government
immediately discovers that it inherits effective power over economic
developments. It may be able to stop things; it will not be able to start
things.”(Nyerere,1976) This was due to a strategy which was adopted by
retreating colonialists, of practising a neo-colonial system. What they did was to
ensure “that change came with the minimum prejudice to the interests and ideals
of the Imperial Power.”(Turok,1993:86) To ensure that their interests were not
challenged in a significant manner they employed a number of strategies. Those
strategies included the “creation of] a whole set of new internal interests which
would benefit from the transition.”(Turok,1993:89) Empowerment consortiums
which are funded by banks are being formed, some of them have already listed
in the stock exchange. Some big companies are selling shares to historically
disadvantaged groups. Even government has created an Empowerment Fund to
assist black people to buy some of the privatised state assets. All these
strategies and tactics have been used in South Africa to protect the interests of
the propertied class. Indeed a new black capitalist class which is seen as an ally
is being created.

It is very clear that the leading party in the Government of National Unity is under
pressure from its constituency to address economic imbalances. The collapse of
the socialist option, which resulted in the formulation of GEAR with its conservative economics might result in a crisis. The compromise entailed an undertaking by the new order that there would be no radical transformation. This means that apart from constraints imposed by lack of resources, and fiscal discipline, it would not be advisable for government to come up with a revolutionary programme. "... if democracy is to be consolidated, government will have to implement more conservative changes than the masses will like. Consequently, disenchantment sets in amongst those who fought for democracy in the expectation of immediate social or economic benefits. Herein lies one of the chief dilemmas facing the GNU; how to balance economic responsibility and still deliver on material expectations."(Tokin, 1995:8)

Put in a different manner the government could be "confronted by previously repressed demands, heightened social and economic expectations, and strong pressures to reward supporters and incoming groups."(Tokin, 1995:40) This pressure could be exerted by the working class, which is also mainly organised in COSATU which is also presently an ally of the majority party in government. Secondly, the youth which is the largest group in South Africa could also put pressure on government. Employment opportunities are declining in a number of sectors such as mining, textiles and the metal industry. The workers which are declared redundant in numbers are looking at the state to provide answers. While these other sectors are shedding jobs the service sector is increasing employment, it is employing more people than agriculture and industry, South Africa's core economic sectors. This is clearly shown in a breakdown of employment percentage of the labour force in Appendix 5. The welfare system has no capacity to provide for the large number of the unemployed. The danger is, crime is rising and the whole criminal justice system could fail to cope and people would then argue for a 'stronger government' to rescue them from 'chaos' created by a 'soft' regime.
"Youth unemployment as a % of total unemployment is 50.6%...[the majority is in the] Eastern Cape 56% and Northern Province 61%." (CASE, 1997) These two provinces are very poor. In the past their economies were sustained by salaries of the public servants. With restructuring and rationalisation of the public sector the government is cutting jobs. The Eastern Cape, for example, had two Bantustans, the Transkei and Ciskei, and now the province is trying to merge these two administrations (see Appendix 6). South African youth have ambitions; some of them have studied matric while others are graduates. Some have less than a matric level education, they are normally referred to as the marginalised youth. Apart from the fact that the education budget is not big enough to meet the challenges of new entries in the system, there are other problems relating to books, school building and teachers. For me this is one of the most vulnerable groups which is impatient, militant and can undermine the authority of any government. Appendix 7 shows two very important facts; the break down of unemployment by race and gender. Total unemployment of young females is 52% and in all racial groups they constitute the majority. Unemployment rates by gender as a percentage in the labour force show that women are a vulnerable group. Historically, they were massively employed by the textile industry which is presently shedding jobs. Their position was worsened by the migrant labour system. Therefore a special programme is needed to address their plight. I think this is one of the reasons that the constitution called for affirmative action particularly for women. Secondly, this survey shows that there is a high level of unemployment among all racial groups. Therefore discontent could be widespread and it has the potential of galvanising historically moderate racial groups.

The problem is that the inequalities in South Africa follow group lines. The white community as a whole is more economically affluent as compared to the African community as whole. Secondly, some provinces are better off than others. There is a provincial dimension, a situation where, for example, Gauteng is the
economic capital of South Africa and all major companies are based there. "... equality means stability; inequality, movement." (Louw, 1984:98) Therefore it is going to be important for South Africa to address these inequalities so as to facilitate nation-building. Social integration is very difficult because of these huge disparities. Economic inequalities are so marked that racial groups rarely meet as equals in working life or socialise together or at the same venue. All these mutually reinforcing cleavages do not contribute to nation-building which is important to democratic consolidation.

The socio-economic circumstances of South African society is characterised by "polarisation into various opposing factions... socio-economic and political relations have become tense and are characterised by suspicion, intolerance and even conflict." (Haasbreck, 1994:218) The redistribution policy of the state has a potential to create a conducive climate for nation-building. If the status quo were to continue the historically marginalised groups would feel justified not to observe the rules. Although some people have argued that capitalism and democracy are a contradiction I think there is the possibility to take a middle road.

The creation of a 'patriotic' bourgeoisie has positive and negative aspects. The term 'patriotic' bourgeoisie is used in the context of a historical bourgeoisie which supported apartheid and is supposedly not committed to the new order. It is opting to invest abroad and in low intensive labour production. Let me start with the negatives. Historically, in South Africa, the chances of business success if you were a black person were very limited. This resulted in the politicisation of the majority of educated elites because their aspirations were blocked by the colour of their skin. The 'redeployment' of some politicians to the business sector can result in corruption and nepotism. A confused situation where there is no clear distinction between a political party and the business sector might arise. Secondly, this programme of empowerment which is not supposed to be the
major campaign of government might end up being the focus. This would divert the attention of government; instead of implementing programmes which would create wealth to the large public their focus becomes creating a black elite. The middle class is also not always progressive, it can enter into an alliance with the army for example if it feels that its interests are threatened. Chile is a classical example, where the military with the backing of the propertied class and the middle class overthrew an elected government. This is also possible in South Africa if there is a major push to create an egalitarian society.

There are also factors which have to be welcomed in a creation of black 'haves'. It deracialises the ownership of the means of production. It would hopefully, result in the constitution of the capitalist and the working class with the race factor playing no role in those classifications. It would enable ambitious people to opt for the private sector or public service in a non-political role if they feel that they have no chance in politics. In a country where the only good source of income is the state, there are struggles which could end up being violent conflicts. In South Africa presently if you join the private sector you earn more money than in the public sector. For example, Cyril Ramaphosa whom it is estimated has about 33 million rand in assets, and Saki Macozoma earns more than the President whereas in parliament he was not in the Executive. Doctors, teachers, nurses and private security personnel who work in the private sector earn more than those in the public sector, who are also over worked.

It is important to note that the government's fiscal discipline has disappointed a number of important constituencies. COSATU and the majority of the working people were not expecting privatisation on the scale that has occurred. It has always been ANC policy to nationalise some industries as a strategy to redistribute the country's wealth. But what has happened is that the government has opted for a tighter fiscal policy. This has resulted in retrenchments for workers in the public sector. Although social spending has increased, it has not
met the population increase. For example, the education budget has increased, but the level of pupil intake has superseded the increases. University budget cuts, retrenchments and restructuring are occurring without clear objectives. This might lead to a feeling of betrayal, people feeling that the political class has no interest in uplifting their standard of living. This could reduce government's legitimacy and has the potential of causing alienation. People might not participate and also not carry out their civic duties, such as voting, attending meetings or paying for the services they receive.

The role of government in the economy is critical. "Society's wealth can be reduced [and created] by government action."(Haasbroek, 1994:218) It is in this context that I argue for a Keynesian approach to the economic crisis of South Africa. An approach which does not accord any role for the state in the economy is flawed. "The state cannot relinquish its responsibilities in providing basic education and health care for all, reforming institutions to improve access to productive assets, shifting macro economic policy towards the goal of full employment and mobilizing resources to eradicate poverty and, through taxation, to control inequality. In every area of policy the state must advance the interests of poor people and promote pro-poor markets."(UNDP, 1997:10) The government should make a serious attempt to address inequality and poverty. This would guarantee, and hopefully deliver a stable country in which free political activity is possible. Peoples commitment to democracy is conditional, the condition is that it should deliver materially. Appendix 8 indicates that 30.2% South Africans are prepared to back a 'strong leader' to ensure that there is stability and prosperity. They in a way associate lawlessness with democracy where criminals enjoy human rights, and are prepared to even compromise their right to vote for the sake of law and order.
In conclusion, the importance of wealth and education in the promotion of democracy has been noted. It creates a middle class which has a critical contribution in the maintenance and promotion of democracy. The role of both the ANC and the NP in creating reliance on the state should be noted; the NP's interventionist approach and the ANC's liberation ideology. Economic inequalities are a threat to nation-building. They create a situation where people of different races do not mix, even in social gatherings because they are also organised along racial lines. “Democracy [should be seen] as a means to reconcile freedom and equality” (Haasbroek, 1994:215) rather than as a means to attain material benefits. During the liberation struggle material benefits for individuals were not highlighted; what was emphasised was sacrifice for a noble cause which is freedom and equality. If people opted for a democratic regime in the hope that their standard of living would be improved, they would opt out if there are economic problems. It is important to emphasise that the state has a particular responsibility in providing for its citizens. But, in the words of Tokin "what is needed is a commitment to values and culture [rather] than material benefits.” (Tokin, 1995:8) The commitment to the new order which is fragile, needs the efforts of all citizens. The upliftment of the standard of living of the poor can assist the process of consolidation. De-racialisation of South Africa should be a priority for the sake of maintaining stability and democracy. The state should play a crucial part in the upliftment of historically marginalised groups, whilst encouraging the development of a vibrant private sector.
Democratic Consolidation is highly unlikely if political elites are not convinced that democracy will satisfy their ambitions. In the South African case, consolidation is complicated by the fact that both political parties and civil society reflect the racially divided history of the country. "Elites are those who represent various interests in political life." (Tokin, 1995:1) The main protagonists, the ANC and the NP, have two opposing views on what should be done to eradicate racial imbalances. For example, for the ANC the creation of a new society requires "the liberation of African[s] in particular and black people in general from political and economic bondage. It means uplifting the quality of life... especially, the majority of whom are African..." (ANC, 1997:8) This sets the ANC against the NP, because it "offer[s] just and effective protection to minorities in South Africa." (NP, 1989:3) Practically, when the ANC calls for affirmative action to address the imbalances of the past the NP is obliged to defend the minority groups which might be affected negatively by such a programme. Even during the elections the ANC "... failed to win more than 2 - 3% of the white vote: ..." (Reynolds, 1994:190) If elites represent various interests in a country, and the fact that South African elites in the main are divided by race, then there is a serious threat to South Africa's democracy.

In this chapter I will look into the role of elites in hindering or facilitating democratic consolidation in South Africa. One of the questions which one has to ask is do racially constituted blocs assist the process of consolidation or hinder it? The form of elites also relates to elite transformation, where they transform themselves and start to value the contribution of the ordinary citizens and moreover accept democracy and human rights as sacrosanct. Thirdly, I will also look at their ability to stifle democracy through patronage and nepotism. These practices discourage critical engagement and reward loyal members. In this manner inner-party democracy is jeopardised. The question is can they affect
the outcome of the democratic process? This is very relevant to the South African situation because the transition was through elite pacting. If trust among elites breaks down for one reason or another, stability will not be guaranteed. In fact the possibility of pre-1990 conflict could not be ruled out. The focus will be on the impact the negotiation process had on creating elite consensus, the state and new institutions which have been created to strengthen democracy, legitimacy of the new dispensation, and political parties.

Tom Lodge posed a question which is central to the democratisation project, "how strong are democratic inclinations amongst most South Africans?" (Lodge, 1996:190) Inclinations among most South Africans are important because they give political elites room to manoeuvre. If the population does not value a principle, political elites can tamper with it in the hope that no one is going to protest vigorously. This question can be better answered if one looks back at the history of the former government, and the ANC in particular because it is the leading party in the GNU. The NP government embarked on a programme to empower the Afrikaner community. To achieve this they changed a number of laws, but the "... judiciary retained a measure of its former independence although increasingly it had to apply racist legislation."(Lodge, 1996:190) This is a good development in that it can discourage the new elites from tampering with the independence of the judiciary. The NP only intervened in appointing their trusted members into strategic positions. This resulted in people who were not in favour of the status quo not getting positions of Judge President for instance.

The media, especially the electronic media, were firmly in the hands of the government. In the print media there was room for manoeuvre. "A privately owned press allowed blacks a few significant channels for the expression of political ideas."(Lodge, 1996:190) In this category there were liberal white news papers and an alternative independent press. Some of these publications had a
principled position against apartheid. The culture of an independent media will remain and it can only grow in the new dispensation. A serious setback on this front happened when most of these newspapers closed because of lack of funds. This has resulted in a skewed media ownership in the country, a situation where the media are not representative of the South African population. The fact that most news in the country is published by whites is going to hamper diversity of views and presently there is an outcry by some groups that the media is practising 'subliminal racism'. In the year 1999 the case against the media of 'subliminal racism' will be investigated by the Human Rights Commission. In well developed countries where they have a consolidated democracy you have got a plurality of views in the media, for example in Britain there are newspapers which are known to harbour left or right feelings. The media is important for raising issues for national debates and in a way setting the national agenda. If it is exclusively white the political elites would feel justified in rejecting the issues they are raising. The ownership and the accusations of subliminal racism which flows from that could undermine the credibility of the media. If they raise serious matters of corruption and fraud they would be labelled racist and their stories would be challenged.

Another positive aspect of the South African history raised by Lodge is the fact that in South Africa since "1979, labour legislation instituted legal rights and obligations for black trade unions, giving formal recognition to their role in a 50-year history of attempting to represent black workers." (Lodge, 1996:190) In the 1970s and 80s South Africa witnessed the growth of a strong labour movement. Trade unions which were generally representing black people participated in the liberation struggle. They are very militant; some people argue that they might not assist consolidation because of their sectional interests. In South Africa where the majority were barred from participating in political structures and also in practising democracy, the trade unions served as a training ground for democratic practice. More importantly at an elite level they created a leadership
core with experience in the workings of democracy and which the new
government is using presently as a resource.

Democracy on the shop-floor has a lasting impression on the workers and they
expect that government will seek a mandate and consult as it happens in the
trade unions. This serves to educate the workers about the inner workings of
democracy. Of course government functions at a macro scale, but the
participation of ordinary people in democratic forms has a lasting impression.
Another issue is that if workers are organised, it is easy to make agreements that
are binding to the entire labour force. The question of corporatist arrangements
such as National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) serves
to consult and take on board the working class. NEDLAC is a forum which gives
labour, business and government a chance to discuss economic transformation.
The aim is to ensure that there is no unilateral decision-making on major policy
issues; there is consultation among stake-holders. It also looks at social and
developmental matters. As such community-based organisations have been
accommodated in one chamber, and in the main they are represented by a non-
governmental organisation coalition. If the workers are not organised a chaotic
situation might develop where the government and the business sector are not in
a position to negotiate and most importantly expect adherence to the agreed
resolution by the workers. Some have raised concerns with the labour movement
taking part in political and socio-economic matters. They state that the labour
movement would be co-opted and it would fail to fight for workers’ rights. The
existence of a vibrant civil society as in this case represented by the labour
movement is a positive factor which will assist the consolidation of democracy. It
will act as a watchdog to government and the fact that it is organised is a
strength. COSATU would also contribute in the development of democracy as
part of the tripartite alliance with the leading party in government.
Indeed apartheid was a horrible political experiment. It excluded the majority of the population from the political life of the country. It was undemocratic and repressive; it worked in the main through force applied by the army and the police. During the total onslaught, South Africa became a police state with serious decisions being taken in the State Security Council rather than in Cabinet. This practice disempowerer elected representatives, and elevated seurocrats above the legislator, which was very undemocratic. But it is important to note that the NP while it was practising this horrible system, managed to exercise a form of limited democracy. It was limited because only the white community enjoyed the rights of citizenship. Opposition parties were not outlawed; there was a relatively independent judiciary. The legislator acted as a rubber stamp of the executive.

The ANC's democratic credentials are satisfactory, but there are some causes for concern because of the manner in which ANC dissidents were treated in exile. But if one looks at the ANC in the 1950s and 1960s before it was banned it could be argued that democracy was accepted as the only option for South Africa by the party. Pallo Jordan raised a very interesting point, although he was referring to non-racialism, he argued that “the very strange fact that we have to struggle to maintain it has drilled non-racialism into the average ANC member so that it is almost second nature. It will not be easily erased. Any ANC leadership of the future that sought to abrogate non-racialism would need to de-indoctrinate that majority of the membership into rejecting it first.”(Adam, 1990:452) Democracy is also one of the central principles of the organisation, as it is stated in the Strategy and Tactics document, that it is the strategic objective of the organisation. Internally the party has tried to conduct itself democratically, although in many cases mechanisms are not adequate. One can point the adoption of the Freedom Charter and Conference for Democratic Future which followed a very elaborate processes of consultation. The party's national congress has been a final decision-making body of the organisation even if it
resolves against the leadership. If democracy can be challenged in a significant manner I think also the same would have to happen. The Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) of the 1980s also embodied participatory democracy although there were constraints in the main due to state repression. But the role of community organisations such as civic associations as a form of people’s democracy is very important.

The banning of the ANC eroded some of its historically democratic tendencies. Problems in the camps which included detention without trial and military execution were some of the human rights violations which occurred in exile. In terms of democratic practices, the lack of capacity to always be in close contact with its cadres, were some of its weakness. There were no regular congresses to give the leadership new mandates, and also to review the progress which had been achieved. The MDM had its fair share of problems from necklacing, to peoples courts which were not run properly. In some of these courts people were summarily sentenced to death without a proper hearing. There was a mob spirit which did not gave any regard to the rule of law, for example the principle of innocent before proven guilty. With all these shortcomings taken into consideration there is hope that the new elites are committed to the democratic regime, because those violations occurred under extreme state repression and the leadership was not in a position to be always in close contact with the members. It is also important to note some setbacks which have just occurred, which might erode this possibility of consolidation. The fact that to some extent civil society is demobilised, and it lacks a clear direction and leadership due to some leaders joining the executive and legislative arms of government is a concern. The positive aspects of this exodus which one can point out is that maybe their experience might help to promote democratic values.

The South African pacted transition, is very important if one wants to check whether political elites have managed to establish a national consensus in their
approach to South Africa's development. The transition was in the main driven by two parties that is the ANC and the NP, but that does not mean other parties were excluded. The inclusiveness of the process is crucial in ensuring that all parties and different interests respect the outcome. In South Africa, one can argue that the process was open to all political parties, it was only the trade unions (especially COSATU which indicated its willingness to attend) which were not present. Some political parties on both extremes decided to boycott the negotiation process. Whether the negotiation process of CODESA managed to establish a consensus on the 'rules of the game', is questionable in the light of dissatisfaction by other players. For example, the PAC and IFP felt that the sufficient consensus rule, used to settle dispute, was not accommodating their views. The sufficient consensus rule meant that an agreement between the ANC and the NP was enough for a resolution to be accepted as a standing resolution.

Some parties felt that they were excluded and the outcome of the process was the product of the ANC and NP. Organisations such as the PAC argued that if they could win the elections they would reverse some of the agreements which were taken at Kempton Park. This showed clearly that they were not satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations. However, due to broad support shown by the South African population they ended up co-operating with the structures which were created. They suspended their armed struggle and participated in the negotiation process. Their supporters also benefited from the political amnesty process, which enabled them to mobilise inside the country. Even AZAPO, which boycotted the whole process, now is poised to enter the 1999 elections. All of these parties were disputing the modalities of the negotiation process but have come to accept the constitution as the supreme law of the land. None of these left-wing parties were disputing the need for the creation of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa. Notwithstanding those shortcomings the process was inclusive, for example the right-wing parties managed to secure some concessions for their cause, mainly through negotiations with the ANC. The
concessions included the establishment of the Volkstaat Council and the inclusion of a clause in the constitution which recognises the right to self-determination of groups. The IFP also, after raising problems with proposals for a new constitution, managed to get some concessions which were negotiated between itself the ANC and the NP. They included more powers to Provincial governments such as [to have] their own provincial constitutions, albeit in line with the South African constitution, and the establishment of the House of Traditional leaders. Smaller parties, although they were not equal partners of the negotiation process, showed their commitment to the rules laid down in CODESA. They had reservations about some of the agreements and promised to change some clauses of the interim constitution if they assumed power. They were prepared to reverse agreements through democratic methods not violence.

The question whether the negotiation process was inclusive, or not impacts directly on the legitimacy of the process. Tokin raised this question, “how representative of public opinion were the results of negotiations.”(Tokin, 1995:2) As I have already indicated that the elites who were directly involved in the negotiation process 'represented various interests' the question whether they accepted the final outcome is critical. The fact that the constitution which was the final product of negotiations advocated power sharing for five years instead of majority rule is a positive indicator, because the fact of the matter is there were two opposing sides to the conflict, those who wanted to maintain the status quo and those who were trying to dismantle it. They had different expectations and perspectives on what should be the way forward. It was important to address concerns of both sides, to ensure that the outcome enjoyed their support.

In South Africa because of apartheid social cleavages are racially based. A survey which was conducted by MarkData and HSRC [see appendix 9] for example showed that “14% in the African community feel that good government is best served if: largest party not strong enough to govern alone, as opposed to
48% in the white community." (MarkData & HSRC, 1993) All sides in the end of the process of negotiations actually gained something. Africans have access to political power. The business sector is now in a position to invest and get funding from abroad, which was not possible during apartheid. There is political stability which enables them to plan properly about future investments. Workers no longer fear that gender or race would hamper their career development, although white workers have concerns about affirmative action. The white community which had concerns about the property clause and the form of political system where one party governs alone if it had won the elections, were also catered for in the constitution. One can safely say that with the exception of the white right-wingers such as the Freedom Front and the Boerestaat Party who are still pursuing self-determination, the constitution and the Bill of Rights was accepted by the majority. It is important to note that even their struggle for land reform is done through constitutional means.

It is very important to emphasise the fact raised by Lipset that "whether democracy succeeds or fails continues to depend significantly on the choices, behaviours, and decisions of political leaders and groups." (Lipset, 1994:136) In South Africa the behaviour of leaders is critical because the society is divided along racial lines. Most surveys show a remarkable difference based on race on a number of critical issues. Moderate leadership is required to lead all groups in this delicate transition process. Leaders should accept political competition and also be in a position to persuade their constituencies to accept the democratic regime. Because if that does not happen, one charismatic leader can destabilise the country and make nation-building a very difficult process because it requires responsible leaders.

In South Africa there is a worrying fact about the population's acceptance of democracy. In a National survey which included the "most important single reason for supporting a particular political party, 32% Africans, [stated that a]
party is powerful with a great and inspiring leader." (MarkOata & HSRC, 1993) [see appendix 10] The question of language and culture seems to be primary to both whites and Africans. This should be worrying if one takes into account the history of ethnic mobilisation using language as the rallying point. What is even more problematic is that all racial groups pay less attention to what the party would do for them. This means that one demagogue can raise people's emotions and get enough votes to run the country. We must not forget that in Germany, Hitler in the first instance was voted into power by the people. In a country with a high rate of crime, unemployment and hostility or fear of other groups, I think these factors are fertile grounds for mass mobilisation. Firstly, the historically marginalised groups have exaggerated expectations which were reinforced by promises and targets given by political parties during the elections in 1994. "A poll in September 1993 discovered that 80 per cent of its black respondents thought that government should supply free housing."(Sunday Times, 1993) Against these expectations a charismatic leader can mobilise millions of people. It is in this context, that I argue that responsible leadership is the key to South Africa's democratic consolidation.

Race is an important factor in South African politics. It is a source of conflict and polarisation. Race unfortunately coincides with class. Whites in the main are affluent while the majority of poor people are black. This racial composition of social classes can impede consolidation. Black people might feel they have got nothing to gain in maintaining stability and order in the country. They could feel justified in disrupting the stability because it was created by repression and exploitation. If a party wants to win an election it will try to appeal to the majority who are poor and black, then there lies a problem. A political 'entrepreneur' could call for a redistribution policy even if it is not sustainable and he or she can play a race card. Political party support reflects the history of the country which has put race as the most important factor in life. Unless this racial inequality is
eliminated consolidation can not be guaranteed, because elites can try to manipulate racial tensions to their advantage at any appropriate time.

The acceptance of the South African constitution would enhance the chances of smooth 'elite circulation'. It is important for ambitious elites to be sure that they have equal chances of gaining power. There should be no legal or constitutional impediments which will frustrate their desire to gain political power. If elites feel that their chances to gain power through elections are not there, they would opt for unconstitutional means. There is a constitution, bill of rights, and most importantly the constitutional court to ensure that no individual is barred from entering or winning the elections due to unfair actions or omission by the incumbent government. The problem is that opposition parties, mainly those who are white, have limited chances of winning the elections. This is because of the electoral population which is only 15% white. It is estimated that about 73% of the total national vote is black [see Appendix 11 for more statistics]. That means that white parties have no chances of winning the elections. Parties such as the DP have accepted that they are not going to win in the coming elections and as such they are campaigning to be the official opposition. In a survey in 1993[see appendix 9], it was found that whites for example, favour "largest party not strong enough to govern alone."(MarkData & HSRC,1993) This shows that the white community have accepted that they would contribute as minor players, but they want to make an input. This is important because it means that they have accepted the 'rules of the games', that there are winners and loser's.

"Apart from being distinguishing characteristics and a prerequisite of modern democracy, political parties form a major organizational component of almost all contemporary political systems."(du Plessis,1991:329) In South Africa the position of political parties is not very conducive to consolidation for the reasons I shall now discuss. In my analysis of political parties I will focus on the ANC and the NP as two leading parties in the South African transition. I have already
indicated the legacy of the ANC which might assist or hinder consolidation. The present character of the ANC as the 'broad church' can destabilise the party. The membership hold extremely diverse views, there are communist, emerging business, poor, and religious people. One can argue that it is a strength in that it ensures that ANC positions are a compromise of all these factions. The problem is that it is difficult to take strategic and unpopular decisions. Even if that decision has been taken, communists can continue to criticise the position though they were defeated as ANC members. This lack of collective responsibility has led to some members of the ANC questioning the bonafides of people who would sit in a meeting, discuss a matter, get defeated democratically, and then go outside and address the media as SACP to challenge the very same decision. Peter Mokaba is one of the people who is critical of this practice and the dual membership of the ANC and the SACP. If the majority party develops tendencies and factions and finally fails to operate cohesively the country would be affected negatively. It would fail to take important resolutions because of infighting, thus leading to a passive government which can not take bold initiatives.

The second point is infighting; people jockeying for senior positions in government. This is a serious problem which can derail the country's smooth transition. In some provinces ethnicity is used to mobilise against the incumbent. It also encourage ambitious politicians to form factions and try to float democratic principles as long as they get those positions. Corruption, nepotism and dictatorial tendencies can be the result of this jockeying for positions, when one person wants to win at all costs. There are allegations that in some provinces people are recruited just before party congresses and their membership fees are paid through money received from business people to ensure that there are enough voters for that particular individual. Those business people expect tenders from those they have backed financially during the campaign period. This has resulted in parties expelling individuals who they deem are bringing them into disrepute. A climate of suspicion and tension is created leading to a
more centralised style of leadership. Purges are occasionally done by the top leadership to discipline middle and lower leadership. In a multinational country like South Africa this can lead to calls for greater autonomy by the aggrieved groups. This practice if not eliminated can undermine democratic processes.

A perception has been created that the ruling party is Nguni dominated. In the past there was a claim that it is Xhosa dominated. The validity or not of these allegations is not the subject of this work, what is important is that a perception is created and people might believe that it is true. Even academics have entered this debate. Prof. Sono argued in an article in the Sowetan that indeed there is ethnicity in South Africa. He pointed out the number of cabinet ministers, commissioners, and senior civil servants as the proof for his assertion. The failure by the public broadcaster to use minority languages has not assisted in dispelling this notion. The South African Broadcasting Corporation in the main uses Nguni (Zulu and Xhosa) and Sotho as its indigenous languages. It pays little attention to languages such as Venda, Shangaan and Ndebele to name a few so they feel marginalised in the ‘new’ South Africa. This is one issue which should be addressed soon because it can encourage political entrepreneurs to capitalise on it and mobilise those who feel aggrieved. Ethnic mobilisation is a very dangerous strategy which can undermine the nation-building period which is so vital in this country.

The dominance of the African National Congress does not facilitate “elite circulation” which can be important if other groups feel that they have no chance of gaining power through elections. It does not make any sense to enter elections if the winner is known in advance. This point also relates to the “two-election-test”. In the near future the dominance of the ANC will not be significantly challenged. Presently other opposition political parties are trying to form a block to defeat the ANC. The problem would start if they feel frustrated
failing to fight the hegemony of the ANC, and resort to other undemocratic methods.

"... the NP has become nothing more than a coalition of those who are sceptical or fearful of the ANC's claims to rule." (Johnston, 1994:729) The NP is disintegrating and has no clear direction and purpose. In the past its main strategic objective was to promote and protect the interest of the Afrikaner community. With their central programme taken over by the Freedom Front, the NP has not pronounced clearly its new mission. It is very difficult for its members to cohere around a new clear theme. The only clear programme and central theme which unites them at this particular moment is their opposition to ANC domination. This is evident when one looks at their attempt to form an electoral front against the ANC. They all agree that the ANC is their common enemy, even in their electoral campaign they are urging people to vote for them to stop the ANC from getting a two-thirds majority. They are also failing to attract the kind of African leaders which command respect and political clout in their community. At the present moment the majority in leadership have some links with the former apartheid state, either as Bantustan, Tricameral or Black Municipal Authorities leaders. Some political commentators argue that it is finding it difficult to act as an opposition party because it has been in power for a long time. With all these problems the NP managed to be the best representative party in the last elections in terms of voters which voted for the party. The NP can succeed in attracting people from other races, if it can try to embrace and represent interests of all South Africans.

The IFP has been a regional party based in KwaZulu-Natal. Its constituency has been mainly Zulus and few a conservative Afrikaners. This is shown by the fact that it is only in KwaZulu-Natal where they managed to get parliamentary representatives. Even in Gauteng they are based in hostels where KwaZulu-Natal migrants are based. Apart from its call for a federal South Africa, one
doubts its capacity to enrich the South African democracy. Reasons for that
doubt is that there is no inner party democracy, in fact one would not be far from
the mark to argue that it is a 'one man show'. The IFP youth and women's wing
are not in a position to elect their leaders, they are appointed by the President. In
the mother body there is no is no deputy leader which leaves the President as a
sole leader. An example of intolerance was the dismissal of Dr Mzimela for
arguing for a merger with the ANC. The fact that it is a conservative and
traditionalist party, which in some instances promotes policies tantamount to
returning the country to the feudal period does not assist the democratic
process. They are concerned with matters of traditional authority and they even
go as far as to say that the traditional leaders should have more powers than
elected representatives. In the recent past the party has accepted that if it wants
to play a meaningful role in the political development of this country it should not
be confined to one province. One hopes that this move would transform its
outlook and discourage it to rely on ethnic mobilisation. The other feature of the
IFP is its capacity to unleash violence in support of its position. The ANC relies
on mass mobilisation, such as during CODESA, while the IFP on its ability to
create an unstable situation, for example before the elections where they were
demanding clarity on Zulu royal powers.

The PAC is riddled with conflict and infighting such that it is very difficult for it to
achieve its potential. The leadership is not universally respected in the party, for
example there are branches of the PAC where its President can not visit in the
Eastern Cape. Secondly the fact that it is seen as a radical and extremist party, it
has attracted a very militant membership which act as watchdogs over
leadership to ensure that it implements the latter and the spirit of party congress
resolutions. This tends to create factionalism and the party has split into groups
of loyalists and those who do not trust leadership. This militant approach has in
the past undermined the PAC leadership. Few people would be convinced that
by voting the PAC into power it will implement its land policy. The PAC's land
policy promises to confiscate land and distribute it to the landless poor. The other problem is that it has failed to adjust to its new position, where rhetoric without coming up with clear alternative policy does not assist. Finally, lack of resources hinder its development. It is not in a position to chart a new direction, the question is how it should operate as an opposition to the ANC.

The Democratic Party and the Freedom Front are the other parties which deserve to be noted. The Freedom Front targets a particular section of the community, that is the Afrikaner community. It is not appealing to other races, it is just fighting for the Volkstaat, where the Afrikaners would enjoy self-determination. The idea is a non-starter, because the majority would not support it, even in the white community. The insistence on the idea might erode its membership. The Democratic Party is complex. It is not a typical liberal party. Its constituency is changing fast, it is attracting far right-wingers who are joining to fight the ANC majority in particular. They believe that since the NP has no chance then it is better to join forces with the liberals. One has to carefully analyse what impact in terms of policy position they are going to make in the DP. My argument is that the traditional Democratic Party support is the one which is leaving the country in numbers. One can only explain their growth in support by the fact that they are attracting historically NP support. Therefore its orientation is going to change to meet this new ‘market’ they are getting.

Unelected traditional leaders are one of the undemocratic institutions which has been kept by the new order. Their functions include allocation of land in their tribal area; they also preside over tribal courts. They are very powerful in tribal areas because of the performance of these tasks. The unfortunate fact about this institution is that it is undemocratic and gender discriminatory. They demand levies in their area in the main for personal enrichment. They are also politically aligned, most for them in KwaZulu-Natal are members of the IFP. The problem is that traditional leaders as an elite have ambitions to get more powers. They are
trying to consolidate their position, they are interfering with the functioning of elected councillors and want to earn a salary of a member of parliament. I think they are a possible threat to democratic consolidation in rural areas because they compete and challenge the elected representatives.

The business community is trying its best to appease the political leadership of the country. This can lead to the stifling of debates and independence of civil society. A case in point which is alarming is that of the suspension of Anthony Ginsberg who was the director of the British bank Barclays in Southern Africa. He was suspended because of “writing a book that his superiors deem too critical of the ANC - led government.” (Morris, 1998) Mr Ginsberg is not the first person to be suspended or dismissed because of his/her criticism of government policy. This is a worrying trend by company executives which can lead to self-censorship. I think this behaviour is as a result of absence of trust between political and economic leadership. They are not sure how politicians are going to react to the criticism.

The electoral system can encourage the formation of opposition parties or discourage it. This depends on how seats are allocated to political parties. There are three main electoral systems, they are plurality, majoritarian system and proportional representation. “The plurality system is the simplest way of producing a winning party... and is best characterised by its winner-takes-all feature on a first-past-the-post basis.” (Frost, 1993:19) This system is not a good system for divided societies such as South Africa, because the opposition’s chances of making the threshold and thus a national impact is minimal. Lesotho, for example has slid into a serious confrontation among its political parties in part due to this system. There was a situation where the opposition obtained about 30 per cent of the popular vote but managed to get only two seats in parliament.
The second electoral system is the majoritarian system. "This requires a candidate to win not just the most votes, but an absolute majority (in other words, more than 50% of the votes cast) to be elected." (Frost, 1993:20) This system also does not address the situation of divided and conflicting national groups which are trying to engage their society in nation-building exercises. It only addresses the problem of minorities, where no party managed to get 50+1 in the elections.

South Africa opted for proportional representation (PR). "In a PR- system parliament closely reflects the overall proportion of support the different parties have amongst the electorate." (Frost, 1993:21) This system is in a position to accommodate all elites, they have a chance of being elected into parliament. Different views and interests can be represented in parliament in this system. This can also encourage people to form parties knowing that if they get votes they will get into parliament. Every voter would be encouraged to go and vote even if they are not going to vote for a bigger party with an understanding that his or her party would get one or two seats. The plurality of views in the legislature is critical in a democracy.

The only problem which has been identified in the South African system which needs attention is the independence or autonomy of elected representatives. Friedman points out that "the scope for energetic parliamentary work is further narrowed by a constitutional clause- arguably a logical consequence of closed list PR- stipulating that MPs who resign or are expelled from their parties lose their seats, an obvious disincentive to initiatives which might displease party leaders." (Friedman, 1994:23) This argument is supported by a study conducted by IDASA where they were informed by "one ANC MP ... that most ANC MPs are "too tame" and that they should be more aggressive, and probably would be but for the fact that they are worried about their careers and are anxious not to rock the boat. Most are disappointingly normal with an eye to their own
careers." (Jacobs, Calland & Ngwenya, 1997:5) This would make the legislature ineffective, although parliamentary committees have been commended for their independence in their monitoring role of the executive. This proves a point raised by Terry Karl of "fallacy of electoralism", that elections should not be elevated above other democratic norms.

In the post-1999 election period, there is a fear that Thabo Mbeki who is likely to be the next President could not accommodate dissent and criticism. These remarks have been made by some people in civil society, such as Wilmot James of IDASA. James argued that "the temptation to exert increasingly executive power over other organs could become irresistible during the Mbeki presidency as pressures intensify to alleviate poverty and deliver to the marginalised... It is the combination of steel, caution and the allure of executive power that make me worry."(Sulcas,1998) This mistrust is based in part on the assumption that the state would increasingly play a central role in the transformation of South Africa. With the sunset clause lapsing in 1999, there is a possibility that the new incumbent might initiate programmes which would not be acceptable to other sections of the community. Mbeki has been labelled by his detractors as an Africanist, some one who demands total loyalty and destroys political opponents. If these accusations are true that can seriously affect the democratisation process in the country.

Other people do not share this characterisation of the Deputy President of South Africa. They have hopes that under his leadership the country would change for the better. "... Schrire also offers a high - road scenario under Mbeki's rule in which Mbeki takes unchangeable control of the state and the ANC and confronts the related problems of crime and poverty, striking a balance between "what is necessary and what is politically possible."(Sulcas, 1998) Open debate I think is one of the strengths of the South African emerging democracy. Although this debate was sparked in an unfortunate manner that is through a leak of a letter
written by James to United States donors. Other people have characterised this letter as a conspiracy to discredit Mbeki, but it has managed to start a debate about the style of leadership South Africans expect from the highest office in the land. Whether Mbeki establishes an imperial presidency or not for me is less important, what is important is the strengthening and resourcing of institutions which will safeguard this democracy such as parliament, civil society and independent state organs.

Civil society is struggling, it lacks leadership with experience and the clarity of what the new challenges are. Another factor which handicaps its work is the lack of resources. Some people go as far as to claim that the government is attempting to demobilise civil society. "Demobilisation refers to attempts by the state to instil in the working class, or other independent organs of civil society, an understanding of 'proper behaviour' in the new society; namely compliance with the need for stability and economic growth within the framework of the market. In addition, demobilisation entails persuading the masses to participate in politics in the "correct" way, which is by voting every few years for the legislature." (Ginsburg,1996:98)

In South Africa during apartheid there was a vibrant civil society, and it was militant. Outsiders, in particular business investors, have long appealed to the ANC to 'tame' its ally COSATU. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the current opposition has no history of activism. With the exception of the ANC there is no other political party which from time to time engages in serious debates. Those debates which are internal are not restricted to party structures even academics and opposition parties participate and it becomes a national debate. One can point to the Strategic Perspective document, Reconstruction and Development Programme, GEAR and the latest debate on property and social transformation. All these debates involve the media, academics and people at large through letters to the editor. That is important because it
empowers ordinary members and they feel that they are makers of their destiny. All parties should have organisation not just for the purposes of mobilising for elections so that people would engage and own this transformation.

Public opinion is very important, if people are not confident that the government is governing in their best interests there is a problem of legitimacy. Public opinion has been shifting and people are now not trusting some of the government institutions. This erosion of confidence might lead to disillusionment and lack of interest in what government is doing. People would end up not voting. It is very worrying that in a survey conducted in December 1998 by IDASA, SABC and MARKINOR people indicated that they do not trust the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) as it appears in Appendix 12. This is worrying because it is the IEC which is going to conduct the country’s election. If a government lacks legitimacy it is vulnerable, and a possibility of opposition challenging its authority can not be ruled out.

In the main senior civil servants are political appointments and I think there is nothing to worry the nation in that. But if they are seen to be corrupt and there are rumours that their parties are benefiting out of the money there is a danger to democracy. Allegations are that they give tenders to companies who in return fund their preferred parties. This is abuse of government office and it is corruption which will hamper other parties which have no access to those resources. This problem is worsened by allegations that in the first place they are not supposed to hold those positions. They are incompetent, unqualified and they not getting things done. This has been reinforced by the fact that from year to year government departments are failing to spend all their allocations. There is a problem of capacity to manage their budgets. This is a serious problem because it affects government service delivery. If the government takes time to deliver on small things where in fact they do have the finances for those things that would undermine its credibility with the population. The elites who are
working there would be the only people who will gain out of the whole transition process by gaining positions and through corruption.

Affirmative action for those who have occupied those positions for a long time is done too hastily. They are asked to vacate their positions through severance packages, or to reapply for their old jobs. This has resulted in a friction between the government and public servant bodies who represent old public servants. They are raising concerns that some people of colour are appointed and they have to act as mentors, train them but at the end of the day they are going to be dismissed in favour of inexperienced people. This point of training also affects delivery because it takes time for people to get to understand their tasks. Once people "... view the state as comprised of managers in control of the overarching systems of political and economic power, personally benefiting from their pivotal positions and collectively acting as a class in pursuit of interests that are in conflict with those of other social classes" (Forrest, 1987:66) its legitimacy would be completely in tatters. It must try to carefully manage its affirmative action programme so as not to offend other groups. A dialogue is needed to convince them that it is in the interest of the whole nation not those who are close to the ruling party.

In conclusion there are reasons for optimism that democratic consolidation will finally take place in South Africa, but there are also challenges which must be confronted. Firstly race and ethnicity are the negative legacies of South Africa. The fact that there are organised groups which organise mainly around specific ethnic groups such as the Zulu's and Afrikaners in the long run might cause problems. Secondly, opposition parties are very weak and have no clear programme of action which distinguish them as alternatives. The infighting within parties which is as a result of people wanting to hold high office is a serious concern. It has been accompanied by corruption and nepotism by certain people who wants to consolidate their positions. There are positive signs for democratic
consolidation like the fact that elite compromise was possible in the form of a
power sharing deal during negotiations. That spirit is continuing, in critical issues
such as economic policy there is no faction or group which calls for massive
nationalisation or that the country should do away with the property clause. In
fact all interests with the exception of COSATU and other left-wing groupings are
in agreement that GEAR is a good economic framework which should be
implemented. The question of elite circulation is also proceeding well. I think the
country is fortunate to have a leadership which is prepared to surrender political
office [the President can not serve more than two terms in office]. The current
President has indicated his willingness to step down, and a clear succession is in
place. Others who have some ambitions which are not being fulfilled in the
political realm are opting for business practice. The only problem is that there is
no rural - urban balance both in terms of policy implementation and of elite
representation. The struggle against apartheid has created a vigilant and militant
population which I think is the hope for democratic consolidation. With a strong
civil society I think there is hope although it is not going to be easy.
CONCLUSION

A minimalist definition of democracy otherwise known as electoral democracy has limitations. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc resulted in assumptions that all countries would now embrace capitalism and democracy. When the democratisation process that is known as the "third wave" started, people were actually believing that democracy would be universally implemented. The problem is that they did not look critically at what these countries were implementing. This electoral definition did not look at the quality and the depth of that country's democracy. Issues of the rule of law, media freedoms, chances of opposition parties to be elected, corruption, nepotism and whether the incumbent government does not abuse power in any manner were not under focus. "The democratisation of Africa appears to have been largely a matter of form rather than content. But the ascendancy of form over content resulted in a significant blockage to democratisation. For the people of Africa, instead of emancipating them, democratisation is becoming a legitimation of their disempowerment. They are effectively worse off than they were before democratisation, for their alienation from power and their oppression are no longer visible as problems inviting solution." (Ake', 1995:70)

In this study I have briefly indicated the conditions that necessitated a power sharing compromise in Chapter Two. The compromise was as a result of political stalemate. The balance of forces did not favour any particular side. Power sharing came with it's constraints and possibilities for different parties. But no one can dispute the fact that it opens greater possibility for democracy. It was the start of an important journey to democratic consolidation. Pact transitions are not a democratically driven process, they are controlled from above and the role of the masses is minimal. But it was a good start because pact transition is very stable. They are important in so far as setting the rules of political conduct, and those rules are respected by all the important players because they have
participated in their formulation. Elite consensus in South Africa was achieved and, the outcome was legitimate to a large percentage of the population.

In Chapter Three the relationship between the level of economic development in South Africa and the process of democratisation has come under investigation. What complicates matters in the South African case is race; as a result of years of apartheid race is so pervasive in all the facets of society. Economic development is measured by education and wealth. In the South African scenario it is the white community that is well educated. They constitute the majority of people with a university qualification. Even in terms of wealth they control the South African economy. The logic is that a wealthy country has a sizeable middle-class which is seen as a catalyst to democracy. They are seen as vital group because of their activism in civil society. It is the middle class that acted as a resource to the South African liberation struggles, it had a theoretical capacity to assist in giving direction during difficult times. Even the ANC was established in the main through the agitation of Dr Seme who was a lawyer by profession. He was frustrated by the fact that although he had studied in Universities abroad, he was not recognised in his own country.

It is not, however, given that the middle class would be progressive and always fight for democracy. There are cases where the middle class either supported the military or a dictator because that leader was delivering prosperity. In Chile, Singapore and other Asian countries the middle class supported despots because they managed to deliver stability and an economic boom which satisfied their material needs. The point is there is nothing inherent in the middle class which made them democracy friendly. In the South African case I think it is the working class which would agitate for democratic rights more than other classes. They are the people who want accountability of government more than any other class. In industries they are not a force individually, but through collective action they manage to bargain with employers. The other factor is that they constitute
the majority of the adult population, though the number of unemployed is growing very fast. Democracy should enjoy the support of the majority.

One of the difficulties the South African democracy has to endure is the great expectations by the poor people that it will deliver materially. It is important that the economy performs during this period of delicate transition, because any decline in the standard of living would be associated with the democratic regime instead of failure by that particular government. In countries such as South Africa where the population has never enjoyed democratic rule it is important to have as smooth as possible a transition. People associate the ruling party with the democratic system and if they feel that it leads to a rise in crime and unemployment then there is a problem. It is important for the government to intervene in the economy in the interests of the poor which are a sizeable number in the country. The role of government in the economy is critical, it can not abdicate its responsibility of looking after its citizens.

The importance of political parties and political elites in particular was discussed in Chapter Four. Their role has to be emphasised, there can be no consolidation if there are no strong parties and elites which are constrained by democratic norms. There is a strong leading party in government, with its allies COSATU and the SACP. The opposition is divided and fragmented and they do not provide any viable option to the ANC for the majority of the people. Their membership remains ethnic and social group specific. Growth potential is hindered by this development. What worsens the situation is the fact that the opposition is fighting instead of uniting around common objectives. What at the present moment is happening is that the ANC alliance acts as an opposition to itself. Some people have argued that those debates show that the alliance is fragile and can break at any time.
The categorisation of South Africa as a middle-income country does not give the full picture because racial imbalances and high levels of inequality persist. State intervention alone would not address these levels of inequality and might result in discontentment by the historically marginalised groups. Public participation at all levels of government should be practised. A serious investigation on the possibility of mixing the PR electoral system with the constituencies system should be made.

Finally, the role of parliament which is very much active is very positive. There are committees which scrutinise bills and also act as an oversight to the executive. At the present moment the system is working well as it was shown during the Sarafina debacle. The only serious problem is the rate at which experienced and senior people are leaving parliament. This might leave the institution with less capable individuals, who might fail to exercise their duties. The South African parliament requires strong leadership. The fact that the South African leadership is seen in a good light in Sub Saharan Africa acts an incentive. All over the world people are pointing to South Africa as a political ‘miracle’, the country has managed to hold a number of senior international positions like UNCTAD and chairmanship of Non-aligned Movement. It has also ambitions of becoming a permanent member of Security Council. For me that would motivate the country’s political elite to behave.
Appendix 1

Ratio of income of Afrikaners to English-speakers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Personal Income</th>
<th>Per Capita Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>40:60</td>
<td>100:211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>47:53</td>
<td>100:156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>50:50</td>
<td>100:141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 2

Income Inequality by Country

### TRENDS IN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HDI rank</th>
<th>GNP (US$ Billions)</th>
<th>GNP annual growth rate (%)</th>
<th>GNP per capita annual growth rate (%)</th>
<th>Average annual rate of inflation (%)</th>
<th>Exports as % of GDP (% annual growth rate)</th>
<th>Tax revenue as % of GDP (% annual growth rate)</th>
<th>Overall budget surplus/deficit (as % of GNP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>125.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## APPENDIX 4

### EVALUATIONS OF GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Well</th>
<th>Fairly Well</th>
<th>Not Very Well</th>
<th>Not At All Well</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managing the economy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing unemployment by creating jobs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling inflation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building houses</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrowing the income gap between different race groups</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraging international investment</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SABC, IDASA and MARKONOR *Opinion 99* 1998
## EMPLOYMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HDI rank</th>
<th>Labour Force (As % of Total Population)</th>
<th>Women's share of adult labour force (age 15 and above)</th>
<th>Percentage of labour force in Total above</th>
<th>Real earnings per employee annual growth rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>33 33 37 36 14 27 32 35 55 2.7 0.2</td>
<td>33 33 37 36 14 27 32 35 55 2.7 0.2</td>
<td>33 33 37 36 14 27 32 35 55 2.7 0.2</td>
<td>33 33 37 36 14 27 32 35 55 2.7 0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## APPENDIX 6

### PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION-EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>YOUTH IN FULL-TIME EMPLOYMENT(%)</th>
<th>UNEMPLOYMENT YOUTH %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Province</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KZN</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX 7

**UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY RACE AND GENDER, % PER AGE IN THE LABOUR FORCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RACE</th>
<th>GENDER</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>Young males</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Young females</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>Young males</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Young females</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>Young males</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Young females</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>Young males</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Young females</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total unemployment</td>
<td>Young males</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Young females</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX 8

COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY WHEN IT “DOES NOT WORK.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Blacks(%)</th>
<th>Whites(%)</th>
<th>Coloureds(%)</th>
<th>Indians(%)</th>
<th>Total(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Need Strong Leader”</td>
<td>42.9 : 27.5</td>
<td>44.7 : 41.7</td>
<td>37.8 : 26.4</td>
<td>39.1 : 58.0</td>
<td>42.7 : 30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Democracy Always Best”</td>
<td>47.3 : 61.0</td>
<td>45.3 : 38.5</td>
<td>46.4 : 52.7</td>
<td>54.7 : 27.2</td>
<td>47.0 : 56.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## APPENDIX 9

**VOTER SUPPORT FOR EXCLUSIVE VERSUS SHARED POWER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Good government best if:</th>
<th>Africans %</th>
<th>Coloureds %</th>
<th>Indians %</th>
<th>Whites %</th>
<th>ANC supporters %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One party governs alone</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winning party includes other in government</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest party not strong enough to govern alone</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: PWV region, N=2500, survey by MarkData, HSRC, October 1993
### APPENDIX 10

**MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE REASON FOR SUPPORTING A PARTICULAR POLITICAL PARTY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items presented to respondents</th>
<th>Africans %</th>
<th>Coloureds %</th>
<th>Indians %</th>
<th>Whites %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party will work to improve lives, jobs and living conditions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party is powerful with a great and inspiring leader</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party is tough and strong in order to restore peace, law and order</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party will protect my language and culture</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party supports religious teaching and morality</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, uncertain, et cetera</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National survey, N=2000, fieldwork by MarkData, HSRC, October 1993
APPENDIX 11

ESTIMATED ETHNIC BREAKDOWN OF NATIONAL VOTE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Share of vote</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>14.2 million</td>
<td>2.9 million</td>
<td>1.8 million</td>
<td>0.6 million</td>
<td>19.5 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX 12

#### TRUST IN ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS BY RACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cannot trust the IEC to do what is right while managing the election process</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 election was not fair</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### TRUST IN ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS BY PROVINCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WC</th>
<th>EC</th>
<th>NC</th>
<th>KZN</th>
<th>MP</th>
<th>NProv</th>
<th>GP</th>
<th>FS</th>
<th>NW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cannot trust the IEC</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canot trust local presiding officers</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 election was not fair</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUST IN ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS BY VOTING INTENTION</td>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>UDM</td>
<td>FF</td>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Undecided/undisclosed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot trust the IEC</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot trust presiding officers</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 Election was not fair</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SABC, IDASA, and MARKINOR Opinion 99 Dec 1998
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