The Horn of Africa and International Terrorism: the Predisposing Operational Environment of Somalia

By
Rev. Canon Chukwudi Osondu

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science in the School of Politics, Faculty of Humanities, Development and Social Sciences University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg

South Africa

November 2008

Supervisor: Professor Nwabufo Okeke-Uzodike
Declaration

I declare that this short dissertation – “The Horn of Africa and international terrorism: the predisposing operational environment of Somalia” – represents the original work of the author and has not been submitted in any form for any degree or diploma at any university. Where use was made of the works of others, it has been acknowledged in the text.

Chukwudi Osondu
November 2008
Dedication

This work is dedicated to all those young men and women born in Somalia since 1991, who will have difficulty describing what peace is, because peace is a strange phenomenon in Somalia.
Acknowledgement

I am profoundly grateful to my supervisor, Prof. Nwabufo Okeke Uzodike for his guidance, suggestions, encouragement and assistance throughout the duration of this research. He has brought to bear in me, through his sound grasp of issues, expertise, integrity and commitment to academic excellence, the passion for scholarship. I also appreciate the kind assistance received from all the staff of the School of Politics, especially Ms Pedita Peters, the administrator. It has been rewarding knowing all of you.

I am greatly indebted to my bishop, Rt. Rev. Christian Ogochukwu Efobi and his wife Mrs. Jane (Nne Ifunanya), who gave me this one in a million opportunity to pursue this study outside the country, supporting me financially and with their prayers and being there for my family. I am very grateful to my Archdeacon, Ven. Eugene Nduka and his wife for their love and support for me and my family. And to all the clergy of the Diocese who have been there for us, I owe gratitude.

I am also grateful to the Acting Chaplain of the Anglican Chapel of the Light, Rev. Dr. Kamltoo and Ifunanya Obi for their support for me and my family while I was away. I thank all the faithful of the Chapel, the Church Teacher, Mr. Ben Ogbunmor, friends and staff of Federal Polytechnic, Oko, too numerous to roll-out, who rallied round me in the most trying period and have not ceased being there for my family and unendingly lavishing their prayers on me. I appreciate the Polytechnic Bursar, Chief Joseph Obi and his wife and Ben and Jully Okechukwu, the Registrar and his wife, for all their invaluable support especially in the time of the “dark clouds” and subsequently. Rev. Dr. Okey and Lady Nnena Nwobi, Dr. Chris and Ogoo Okoye, Dr. Okey and Chinyere Ezeobele, Constance Egbue, Ifeoma Ezeofor, Kenneth Johnson, Christopher Ezeomenaka and the Ezeanatas, I am very grateful that you were there for my family in many special ways.

I owe deep gratitude to His Excellency, Dr. Alex I. Ekwueme and his family for their enabling financial support. Dr. Alex Ekwueme is a benefactor per excellence. He came in when it was impossible to make the journey. I remain very grateful.

I am indebted to my mother, Ezinne Irene Osondu, and my brother and sisters, Chukwudulue and Akuadi Osondu, Afulenu Odenyi and the husband Sunday and Chinwe Osondu for their
support and prayers. My gratitude also goes to my cousin and his wife, Ikechuku and Oluchi Osondu for their support for me and my family. Sir Frank and Lady Ngozi Obi my parents in-law, Kenechukwu and Uchenna Obi, I owe you heartfelt gratitude for being there for my family all through my absence. My deep appreciation goes to Rev. Obiora Alokwu, Canon Benjamin Chinemelu, Chinedu Ekwealor, Elvis Chiaghanam, Nonso and Chiedochie Obi, Pastor and Mrs. Gilbert Lysias, Chris and Efe Isike, Ayo Whetho, Chris Ifeacho, Mrs. Uju Uzodike and Mrs. Nneka Okafor for the invaluable support received from them in the course of my study in South Africa.

In a most special way, my deepest gratitude goes to my beloved wife, Mrs. Tochukwu Chukwudi-Osondu, who has been carrying-on through the loneliness and difficulties my absence has created. And my children, Chioma, Chukwudi Jr. and Munachukwuso, who have missed my care a lot, deserve being appreciated. For being there for me, backing me with prayers, I owe you all a lot.

I alone take full responsibility for this work.

Above all, to God be all the glory for all we have done, He enabled.
# Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>African Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIAI</td>
<td>al-Itihaad al-Islaami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARPCT</td>
<td>Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALP</td>
<td>Caribbean Anti Money Laundering Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJFT-HOA</td>
<td>Combined Joined Task Force-Horn of Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOT</td>
<td>Department of Treasury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EACTI</td>
<td>East African Counterterrorism Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAPCCO</td>
<td>East African Police Chiefs’ Coordination Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIIPD</td>
<td>Ethiopian International Institute for Peace And Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIS</td>
<td>Islamic Salvation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HADDA</td>
<td>Horn of Africa Democracy and Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HM</td>
<td>Her Majesty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICPAT</td>
<td>IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Courts Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILEA</td>
<td>International Law Enforcement Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF-TS</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLF</td>
<td>Oromo Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONLF</td>
<td>Ogaden National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCPSR</td>
<td>Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POWs</td>
<td>Prisoners of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Pan Sahel Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNC</td>
<td>Somali National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNM</td>
<td>Somali National Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRRC</td>
<td>Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSDF</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFWG</td>
<td>Terrorist Finance Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
<td>Terrorist Interdiction Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNG</td>
<td>Transitional National Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSCTI</td>
<td>Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United Somali Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WW1</td>
<td>World War One</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War Two</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Table of Content

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaration</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgement</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Content</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter one

1. Introduction
   1.1 Introduction
   1.2 Statement of the Problem
   1.3 Objective of the Study
   1.4 Scope of the Study
   1.5 Significance of the Study
   1.6 Theoretical Framework
   1.7 Methodology
   1.8 Structure of the Study

## Chapter Two

A Review of Literature
   2.1 Introduction
   2.2 The Definitional Issues with Terrorism
   2.3 Nature of Terrorism
   2.4 Origin and Trends of Terrorism
   2.5 Causes of Terrorism
2.6 An Overview of Contemporary Terrorism

Chapter Three
The failed state of Somalia and its predisposing environment
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The porous boarders
3.3 The lingering conflict
3.4 The collapse of the institution of governance
3.5 The availability of weapons

Chapter Four
The failed state of Somalia and the rise of Islamist fundamentalism
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Islamist Organisation inside Somalia
4.3 The Islamist Court Union (ICU)
4.4 Terrorist and al-Qaeda activities inside Somalia

Chapter Five
Counterterrorism Initiatives in Somalia
5.1 introduction
5.2 US counterterrorism programme in Africa
5.3 Counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa
5.4 IGAD and counterterrorism
5.5 Counterterrorism in Somalia
5.5.1 Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia
5.5.2 US counterterrorism in Somalia
5.5.3 Assessing Ethiopia and US counterterrorism in Somalia

Chapter Six
Summary and conclusion

Bibliography
List of Tables

Table A: Arms purchases and sales at the Bakaraaha Arms Market from April 2006 – September 2006, investigated by the UN Monitoring Group 47

Table B: Quantity of arms sold inside Somalia from December 2006 – May 2007 investigated by the UN Monitoring Group 52

Table C: Overview of prices at the Bakaraaha Arms Market 55
Abstract

A fundamental driving factor to contemporary international terrorism is the role of religion. Since the 1980s, there have been not only a rise in the number of Islamist terrorist incidents but also of a more globalized and intense dimension. The casualties have risen to unprecedented levels. Africa, and the Horn of Africa, in particular, has experienced its fair share of terrorist activities. For instance, in December 1980, terrorists sympathetic to the PLO bombed the Norfolk Hotel, owned by an Israeli, in Nairobi, Kenya, killing sixteen people and injuring over a hundred. The 7 August 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were more deadly: 240 Kenyans, 11 Tanzanians and 12 Americans died, with over 5,000 Kenyans and 86 Tanzanians injured. There was yet another terrorist attack on another Israeli-owned hotel in Mombassa and an attempt on a passenger plane on the runway at the Mombassa International Airport, Kenya. Both incidents happened in November 2002. Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the 1998 and 2002 attacks. With rising terrorism in the Horn of Africa and the reality of the Somali state failure, there is a growing concern that the Somali environment is supporting terrorist activities in the region. The activities of the al-Itihad al-Islamiya (AIAI) and later the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the Somali Islamist fundamentalist organizations, with their feared international connections and the security implications, are of concern not only to the region but also to global security monitors.

There is not much debate regarding the level of collapse of the Somali state and the possible security implications of the territory as a congenial terrorist safe haven. Most experts have presented Somalia as a clear example of a completely failed state. Rotberg (2002:131) describes Somalia as “the model of a collapsed state: a geographical expression only, with borders but with no effective way to exert authority within those borders”. Jhazbhay (2003: 77) quoted Ali Mazrui as saying that ‘the situation in Somalia now is a culture of rules without rulers, a stateless society’. Menkhaus (2003: 27) has singled out protracted and complete state collapse, protracted armed conflict and lawlessness as aptly representing the Somali situation. “Somalia’s inability to pull together even the most minimalist fig-leaf of a central administration over the course of twelve years places the country in a class by itself
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

It was Jason Franks who wrote that “‘terrorism’ has become the plague of the 21st century [and] has seemingly penetrated all quarters of international society, especially in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and the subsequent ‘war on terrorism’” (Franks 2006: 1). The 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the United States brought international terrorism to the centre stage of issues of grave significance, threatening global peace and security. Soon to follow were other high-profile attacks in Madrid, Spain, and the subway attacks in Britain. The global reactions to this new wave of threat were to greatly impact the global security architecture, with an unprecedented level of securitization in the global system, as it affected domestic matters of individual countries as well as international engagements.

Much of the debate by policy-makers, scholars and commentators on international relations has, for the most part of the past decade and half, dwelt more on finding common ground on the definition of terrorism and which actor qualifies to be dressed as a terrorist. Franks (2006: 3) observed that this “orthodox” approach constitutes a major problem not only because it approaches and deals with terrorism at the level of “symptomatic management of the violence” but also, and more importantly, because of its inability to provide the basis for “enacting long-term solutions that attempt to solve the root causes” of terrorism.

The spate of attacks and the selective choices of western targets – primarily American – and their allies have opened a wide debate of the issue of motives in terrorist attacks. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, terrorism associated with revolutionary struggles had almost disappeared. It is pertinent to note that contemporary terrorism is mostly driven by fundamentalist Islamism. Contemporary international terrorism, therefore, tends to portray a conflict between cultures – the Judo-Christian/Western culture on one side and the Arab/Islamic culture on the other. The terrorist worldview of the global Islamic Jihad, represented by al-Qaeda, always appeals to the cultural conflict motif, taking terrorism as a response to aggression. Osama bin Laden, quoted in Schweitzer and Shay (2003: 27), charged that much when he said that “a Christian crusader-Jewish coalition
has been formed which is expressed in the alliance between the United States and Israel… which has conquered Islam’s most sacred lands of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem and aspires to crush it… this alliance methodically and intentionally massacred Muslims”. Bin Laden in 1998 called on “every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God’s order to kill the Americans and plunder their money” (Gunaratna 2002: 1). This is the tone of the “conflict”.

The September 11 attack has drastically redefined the US domestic and foreign policy direction, by having both homeland security and the security of its citizens and interests abroad prioritized (US Congressional Report Service 2002: 1). While its projection domestically is the defeat of violent extremism, which pose a threat to the way of life of US citizens and its society, it assigns to itself the responsibility of “creating a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them” (US National Strategy 2006:7). It introduced the PATRIOT Act to deal with domestic security concerns and launched the Global War on Terror to advance its international counterterrorism agenda of preventing attacks by terrorist networks. Additionally, it sought the following objectives: denying terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; denying terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and laying the foundation and building institutions and structures needed to pursue the fight and guarantee an ultimate success (US National Strategy 2006:1). This internationalization of its antiterrorism posture saw the US launching a full-scale war on Afghanistan, where it was believed the leadership of al-Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden, enjoy the full protection of the Taliban government. Iraq was also attacked and its leader, Saddam Hussein, deposed on the allegation of possession of weapons of mass destruction, which has since been found to be untrue (Franks 2006: 14). Many other countries came under the severe pressure of the US regarding their perceived roles in either harbouring or supporting terrorists; among them were Syria, North Korea, Sudan, Yemen, Pakistan and Libya, which was already in the “black book” of the US for its alleged involvement in the 1988 Lockerbie Pan Am bombing.

In Africa, while the US War on Terrorism was aimed at securing the United States’ interests all over Africa, the Horn of Africa, and particularly Somalia, has been of utmost security interest (Pope 2004: i. d; Wycoff 2004: i. d). This special interest in Somalia seems not to be unfounded. Somalia was believed to be serving as a staging ground for the al-Qaeda terrorists who attacked the embassies of the US in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, in
It is also believed that some of the terrorists who carried out the attacks are still protected within Somalia. The “ungoverned” environment of the collapsed state of Somalia and the growing Islamist fundamentalism there heightens the security concerns of the United States and its allies that Somalia presents a congenial safe haven and an attractive environment for incubating and exporting terrorism. By this calculation, Somalia poses a regional and global security threat. There has been debate on how grave a security threat Somalia poses and whose security is under threat (Menkhaus 2003:8). Hamre (2002: 85), speaking of Somalia, stresses that:

One of the principal lessons of the events of September 11 is that failed states matter – not just for humanitarian reasons but for national security as well. If left unattended, such states can become sanctuaries for terrorist networks with a global reach. As such, failed states can pose a direct threat to the national interests of the United States and to the stability of entire regions.

This argument raises a critical question on the current world order, how it is shaped, the factors that shape it, and the extent to which the interests of the entire global population are taken care of in the global status quo. It tends to brush aside humanitarian issues which such state failure imposes on the citizens of a collapsed state and securitizes the whole situation by projecting the “national interests of the United States” and regional stability as being of paramount importance. This explains the US involvement in counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa, in particular, and Africa as a whole. Kinfe Abraham, writing on the “Challenge of Terrorism to Africa and Perspectives of African States” emphasizes that:

United States policy for Africa since September 2001 has been one of supporting security forces and intelligence establishments to hunt down terrorists and eliminate the threat of terrorism. The policy is based on a “use fire to eliminate fire” approach. But this approach only addresses the symptoms without dealing with the causes. Nevertheless, what the United States needs to do is help eradicate poverty, illiteracy and diseases from the Third World, including Africa (Abraham 2005: i. d).

He believes the above proposal will be crucial in combating terrorism, adding that “poverty, oppression and hopelessness” drive people to violence in the current global economic system that is “exploitative and unjust; and that global citizens desire “a fair share of the wealth of the world” (Abraham 2005: i. d).
It is in the light of US policy and the expectation of the “global margin” that an assessment of the US counterterrorism encounters in Somalia are X-rayed including: its decision to float and bankroll the coalition of discredited Somali warlords as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPCT), charged with the surveillance and arrest of suspected terrorists; its backing and use of direct Ethiopian military involvement inside Somalia; and its eventual use of direct force. This is important in order to assess the complexities of the failed state environment of Somalia with a view to understand why the antidotes applied failed to improve the regional and global security, which supposedly informed the engagement in the first place.

1.2 Statement of the problem

In this research, Somali political history will be analyzed critically with a view of situating it within the contemporary geopolitical significance of the Horn of Africa and the global security attention it has attracted. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States of America, the Horn of Africa and Somalia, in particular, have attracted greater attention than ever before in the global security strategy. Somalia has slid into a state failure, where all the institutions of governance and social services have collapsed. Clan formations under contending warlords replaced constitutional levels of government and the rule of law has become a casualty. The Transitional National Government (TNG), put in place in May 2000 with the support of the AU and the United Nations, hardly controls beyond a small part of Mogadishu (Cornwell 2004:6; Anonymous 2002:247). This situation has enabled the activities of Islamist fundamentalists to go unhindered for years. Poverty and hunger are ravaging Somali society. These Somali realities have great implication for the recruitment, training, transit and hiding of terrorists within Somalia.

Somalia is positioned by the mouth of the Red Sea, at the Gulf of Aden, and with a very long Indian Ocean coast (Little 2003:7; Bryden 1999: 137; Wycoff 2004: i. d). This, together with its proximity to the Middle East, tends to heighten the security implications of the events in Somalia. The stability in the Horn of Africa, East and Central Africa cannot be said to be guaranteed with the Somali failed-state and conflict not addressed. The availability of small arms and the porous borders compound the problem for the entire continent, which is riddled with armed conflicts. The World Peace Foundation (2005: 19) observed that “the [Somalia situation is the] perfect storm. It’s [sic] got everything an Islamic terrorist would want – a long, unpatrolled coastline, unpatrolled borders leading to interesting targets, an Islamic
country with a radical movement, immiseration and desperation”. These present grave global security problems beyond the African continent and calls for more serious attention.

1.3 Objectives of the research
In the face of the lingering civil conflict in Somalia, the institutions of governance collapsed. The borders have remained porous, Islamist activities thrive uninhibited and there is wide availability of small arms. The research problem that this work addresses is to analyze the prevailing socio-cultural, political and economic conditions of Somalia and the extent to which these conditions shape that country’s security environment. The objectives of the study therefore include:

- To identify the prevailing conditions which characterize Somalia as a failed state;
- To determine the extent to which the dynamics of state failure renders Somalia not only a transit route but also a recruiting and training ground as well as a safe haven for terrorists; and
- To assess the efforts that have been made or are being made to counter the security implications of the above conditions.

1.4 Scope of the study
The thesis concerns itself with assessing the environment of the failed state of Somalia with a view to establishing the extent to which such an environment supports the development and spread of terrorism. The work concentrates on the prevailing conditions imposed on Somalia by the collapse of the Somali state since 1991, which tend to generate and sustain the regional and global security interests that Somalia has attracted since the middle of the 1990s. These conditions include: the absence of acceptable legitimate institutions of governance, social services and law enforcement; the wide availability of arms; the unmanned borders and ports; the continuing conflicts; and the rise of fundamentalist Islamism.

The work further focuses on the trends of fundamentalism in Somalia and how it mutated over the years. It explores the activities of the radical Al-Itihaad Al-Islami (AIAI), which operated inside Somalia in the 1990s and had so much impact on political Islam in Somalia. Al-Itihaad is also mentioned as the al-Qaeda cell inside Somalia. The investigation of the
extent of the global al-Qaeda connection and/or presence falls within the scope of this research.

Also of currency is the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the activities of which are believed to have made an unprecedented fundamental impression on the politics of Somalia, which may last for many years to come. The present study examines its rise and fall from power and tries to explain the dynamics that determined the turn of events for the ICU.

Finally, the work examines the interests of US counterterrorism in Africa, with greater attention to the Horn of Africa and Somalia, in particular. It tries to evaluate those counterterrorism initiatives, including those of the IGAD, from the standpoint of the extent to which they have achieved (so far) their touted motives for venturing into Somalia, which are to rid Somalia of domestic terrorists and suspected international terrorists hiding there and to prevent Somalia from sliding into a more complex security environment.

1.5 The significance of the study
The need to research terrorism and issues surrounding it cannot be over emphasized. With new scientific discoveries, the impact of globalization, which has decimated national boundaries, narrowing the global space to a village, and the increasing social tensions occasioned by different shades of global human insecurity, a study like this becomes invaluable.

The interest in Somalia is stimulated by its protracted state failure – since 1991 – which has left in its wake a battered society that has drifted into anarchy and a population which faces a dire situation of hopelessness and frustration, occasioned by the highest level of insecurity, in every sense of the word, yearning for a mindful and genuine rescue. Therefore, this study is, highly valuable in shedding more light on the real-life issues that affect the Somalis and will act as a tool in formulating policies to address this on-going human security calamity.

The significance of this research is further bolstered by its in-depth focus on the issues of regional and global security. Somalia featured prominently in all the major terrorist incidents that have occurred in the region, be it the US embassies bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, or the airport and hotel attacks in Mombassa in 2002. In the early and mid-1990s,
Ethiopia reportedly suffered repeated cross-border attacks, believed to be launched from Somalia by the al-Itihaad. Apart from the danger of direct cross-border attacks on neighbouring states, there is also the fallout effect of the conflict and worsening humanitarian situation in Somalia, such as the influx of refugees into neighbouring states, which has the propensity of triggering internal discontent within the host state. All these experiences, coupled with the geo-strategic positioning of Somalia at the mouth of the Arabian Peninsula, a gateway into the all-important Indian Ocean, raises the security profile of Somalia and makes events taking place inside it assume more than domestic categorization. Throwing light on the above was the preoccupation of this research and justifies the need for this study of Somalia.

Counterterrorism scholars and students alike, especially those with interest in counterterrorism in Africa, the Horn of Africa and Somalia, in particular, will find this work very useful. It carefully analyses the various counterterrorism initiatives that have been targeted on Africa in general, narrowing its focus to the Horn of Africa and then to Somalia. The analyses of the intricate US counterterrorism maneuvers in Somalia make an interesting tool for policy evaluation by the US government and policy-makers. Developing states’ governments and policy-makers will find it handy reference material in their quest to engage initiatives such as the counterterrorism programmes, which have far-reaching implications, in ways they will produce transformative change domestically, regionally and globally.

This work is, therefore, fundamentally significant as it promises to extend the frontiers of knowledge in the areas of terrorist/security implications of state failure, international terrorism and American foreign policy -- giving an insight especially into the US Global War on Terrorism as it affects Africa, the Horn of Africa and Somalia in particular.

1.6 Theoretical framework
As this research project is aimed at establishing the extent to which the lingering failure of the Somali state disposes it to becoming a terrorist operational environment, I shall be examining the Realist Theory of State, the Frustration-Aggression Theory, and Relative Deprivation Theory, to show how the enduring Somali state failure, its fallout in social and psychological terms predispose Somalia as a congenial terrorist operational environment. This will also enable us to understand the roles which the US, Ethiopia and other regional states are playing in Somalia.
Frustration-Aggression Theory has been widely employed in the study of terrorism. The theory states that aggression is always a consequence of frustration (Dollard et al. 1939: 27; Selg 1971: 9), where frustration is taken to be the inhibition of an organism’s “path to a goal” and aggression the response, which injures another “organism or its substitute” (Selg 1971: 10). Seen through this prism, terrorism becomes an aggressive action occasioned by frustration, and the terrorist becomes an individual whose goal(s) in life is/are blocked by certain societal circumstances. The situation in Somalia seems frustrating, creating a measure of permissive psychological disposition to terrorism. Abraham Kinfe (2005: i. d), commenting on the terrorist threat in Somalia, observed that the situation in Somalia is frustrating and that it is “poverty, oppression and hopelessness” that motivate people to “die with those whom they perceive as living in luxury at their expense.”

Ted Robert Gurr’s Relative Deprivation Theory complements the one above. This theory assumes that when an individual’s or a group’s progressive advancement is frustrated and its replaced with one which runs counter to the individual’s or group’s expectation, such an individual or group may resort to adopting violence to achieving the original “vision” or simply to register discontent (Gurr 1970: 46). To apply this theory to the study of terrorism may suggest that changes in the social and or political progress contrary to expectations of individuals or groups (or the neglect of individual and group expectations) may lead to terrorism in order to reverse the undesirable change (Kuznar and Lutz 2007: 347).

Both Frustration-Aggression and Relative Deprivation theories are useful to the extent that they can be applied in explaining certain behavioural factors that may have casual implications on terrorism, or why some individuals or groups may resort to violence when inhibited from desired expectations as in the case of Relative Deprivation. While the Frustration-Aggression theory over generalizes the psychological implications of cultural and political experiences across societies (as in the case Somalia), with inadequate evidence to suggest that most of the contemporary high profile terrorists are frustrated individuals, Relative Deprivation (as Kuznar and Lutz (2007: 348) argue) may be an important contributing factor but “not a sufficient condition” for violence with political motive. Somalia presents a peculiar case, a territory without a government. An analytical tool which will suit the Somali situation must be that which addresses the attendant realities of challenges to the cohesion of the Somali state.
In dealing with the core of this thesis that borders on condition of the “stateness” of Somalia and the activities of foreign powers in its affairs and that of the region, Political Realism becomes very relevant. Major twentieth-century proponents of Realism include Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, Kenneth Waltz, E.H. Carr and Rienhold Niebuhr. Thomas Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli are considered in the history of Western political thought to be great realists (Donnelly 2005: 30). Realism in its classical sense as an international relations theory presupposes an international environment where the survival of the individual state is of paramount concern, necessitating a selfish application of power in pursuit of national interest, forsaking every form of morality; this is known as power politics (Donelan 1990: 26; Donnelly 2005: 29). Furthermore, Donnelly (2005: 31) observes that realism has been equally adopted by “a few theorists” as being “a general theory of politics”. In this case, realism is used to analyze the domestic organization of the state which shapes and equips this state to participate in the international power politics. Donelan (1990: 23-24) portrays this dual nature of the state when he suggests that at the domestic level, the state makes individuals moral in their association as “a people” and members of a state. By contrast, in international relations where interaction is on the basis of “association to association” (state to state), an individual association’s survival becomes the central issue; morality is put aside. As Donelan (1990: 24) succinctly puts it, “the central point in Realism is then, this [sic]. Sometimes we are as persons and, still more important, as association, are made moral; for we have a common power over us, the state. Sometimes, we are not made moral; there is no common power; and that is international relations”.

For the purpose of this thesis, both characteristics of which the state is recognizable shall be applied. Realism as a theory of international relations helps us to understand the behaviour of the US in its counterterrorism activities in the Horn of Africa and Somalia. It equally helps to explain why Ethiopia and Eritrea are acting in the manner they are acting in the Somali conflict. In an endeavour to analyze the implication of the failure of the Somali state on the regional and global security, the realist perception of the state as an association of persons that are subjected to moral responsibility for one another and the state (Donelan 1990: 24) becomes applicable.

Though understanding Realism primarily as a theory of international relations emphasizes that the ultimate success of the state resides with its ability to navigate the international
relations arena where states confront one another in an intense power politics, it is the observation in this work that the participation of a state in international relations suffers a fatal setback when the basic foundation of existence and function of such a state domestically is either under a severe challenge or non-existent as in the case of Somalia. Realists hold that states are not just the principal actors in the international arena but are recognized as possessing the monopoly of sovereignty, and with the sole capacity to make laws and administer them within their jurisdictional territories. They are also vested with the sole claim to right of legitimate use of coercive force within their territories (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Jr. 1990: 23; Uzodike 2007: 16). The loss of these basic attributes by any territory strips it of the name and category “state” and invests it with a situation of “anarchy”. This condition exposes such a territory to many possibilities resulting from the collapse of order, the rule of law and moderating influence of any sort.

The Somali state failure in 1991 has resulted in the collapse of all forms of central control and authority. Law enforcement under this situation has become impossible. In the above scenario, common interests and values collapse as individual survival becomes paramount. The existence – indeed, the relevance – of a state is not only reflected in its basic structures and functions (as already enumerated) but also embodies a set of values (a collection of deeply held principles) which moderate the thinking and actions of its members. Apart from defining the individual’s perceptions of, and attitudes towards, the state, values shape the lives and the expectations of citizens within the context of the state. This very important factor, so crucial for social cohesion and development, is now lost in Somalia. Dempsey (2006: 15) observes that the experience of Somalia has shown that evolving terrorist hubs can easily operate safely in failed states. He posited that the “environment of such states provide what may be the greatest level of protection available to terrorist organizations...”

In light of the fore-going, and given its assumptions about the workings of the state and rationale for its actions, Realist Theory can be a very useful and sound tool of analysis not only of the measure of terrorist threat facing Somalia but also the global security implications of such a threat in the shaping of counterterrorism strategies of other governments in the Horn region and around the world.

1.7 Methodology
This research is undertaken using the tool of qualitative textual analysis of relevant scholarly works on the subject. These will include books and academic articles published by research institutions focusing on politics, security, peace and conflict issues. Relevant online research articles and papers will also be used. The strength of qualitative textual analysis is in its ability to allow for the presentation of a wide range of views on an issue and making an informed conclusion after a critical analysis.

In the quest to provide an answer to the research question on the failed state of Somalia and its predisposing environment, a spectrum of relevant works will be surveyed. The establishment that Somalia is a failed state takes the form of analyzing the basic characterizing features of a state as put forward by scholars in journal articles and books. The collapse of the institutions of governance and social services, the continuing clan conflict, porous borders, wide availability of arms, the activities of Islamists, the unsecured coastal Somali boundaries and proximity to the Middle East are the realities of present day Somalia. The reports of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia of 2006 and 2007 are to be reviewed. An analysis of scholarly articles, books and presentations of organizations (such as International Crisis Group) that work inside Somalia will be engaged.

The research question on the failed state of Somalia and the rise of Islamist fundamentalism, will lead to an analysis of a wide range of writings, discussions and debates on the history of Islamism in Somalia and the dynamics of its development, how they played out following the collapse of the state and their fallouts. A critical analysis of policy papers, conference presentations by government officials and agencies and reported testimonies of apprehended terrorist is deemed very helpful in addressing the alleged link between the radical Islamists inside Somalia and the global terrorist network – al-Qaeda -- and establishing the threat level Somalia poses to regional and global security.

To answer the question on the counterterrorism efforts that have been, or are being made, the author will rely on academic articles, position papers and conference communiqués on the peace process and counterterrorism initiatives of the UN, AU, IGAD, states of the Horn of Africa, individual or groups of foreign or African states and non-state actors. A great focus will be placed on the US national policy on, and its strategy for, countering terrorism. An analysis of the US National Strategy on Terrorism, the reports and testimonies to the US Congress on the various counterterrorism initiatives in Africa will be undertaken in order to
understand fully the behaviour of the US with regard to its counterterrorism activities in Africa, the Horn of Africa and, particularly, Somalia.

The author shall then be in a position to evaluate the possible dimensions of the Somali political and security prospects based on sound deductions from sound and critical evaluation of all arguments that have been canvassed.

1.8 Structure of the study
Chapter One: “Introduction”. This chapter is directed at the general focus of the thesis. The introduction provides an overview of the full work, including the rationale, the central objectives and significance as well as the theoretical and methodological underpinnings and breakdowns of the constituting chapters.

Chapter Two: “A Review of Literature”. This chapter is concerned with a review of a wide range of literature on global terrorism. It navigates through the various definitions of terrorism as well as the problems posed by those definitions in examining the arguments concerning the nature and causes, the trends and driving forces of contemporary global terrorism.

Chapter Three: “The failed state of Somalia and its predisposing environment”. In this chapter, justification for the categorization of Somalia as a failed state is made. It goes further to discuss the porous borders, the lingering conflict, the collapse of the institution of governance and the ready availability of weapons as the prevailing environment of Somalia occasioned by the state failure which synergize to make Somalia a congenial environment for the domestication terrorism and an attractive staging ground for foreign terrorists seeking a safe haven for their international terrorist activities.

Chapter Four: “The failed state of Somalia and the rise of Islamist fundamentalism”. This chapter examines the various strands of Islamism in Somalia and the emergence of radical Islam. It focuses attention on the activities of the al-Itihaad al-Islaami (AIAI), the emergence and rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) on the political scene of Somalia, with special attention on their involvement in terrorism and their connections to international terrorists and terrorism through their al-Qaeda connections.
Chapter Five: “Counterterrorism Initiatives in Somalia”. This chapter takes an overview of the US counterterrorism initiatives in the various regions in Africa. It then concentrates on the Horn of African with special attention on the role of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and goes ahead to focus on counterterrorism in Somalia. The various counterterrorism efforts of the US and Ethiopia in Somalia are analyzed as they affect the Somali conflict in general and the growing Islamist insurgency in particular.

Chapter Six: “Summary and conclusion”. This chapter stitches together all the key issues that are discussed in the various chapters of the work and illuminate the conclusions generated throughout the work.
CHAPTER TWO
A REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.1 Introduction

In a discourse on contemporary global issues, terrorism may well come up as one of the top three issues; the others being the environmental issue of global warming and the HIV and AIDS pandemic. When it comes to security matters, there may not be any word that is more frequently used today than terrorism. This chapter will examine terrorism with regards to defining the concept. It will also X-ray the arguments around the nature, causes, trends and the driving force behind contemporary global terrorism. Finally, it will introduce the connection of Somalia with international terrorism, highlighting the socio-cultural and political dynamics in Somalia that appear to explain its vulnerability to terrorist activities.

2.2 The definitional issues with terrorism

There is no consensus among scholars and commentators concerning the standard definition of terrorism (Franks 2006: 1; Kapitan 2003: 47; Crenshaw 2000: 406). In fact, to argue a comprehensive and generally agreed-on definition of terrorism seems virtually impossible, because a wide spectrum of violent actions, circumstances and competing causes lend well to such definition (Laqueur 1977: 10; Kiras 2005: 480). There is even the argument in some quarters that the elevation of terrorism to the level of global significance is just a ploy by the West, aimed at diverting the attention of the global public from the pervasive impact of the globalization of western values and its destructive implication around the world (Weinberg 2005: 2).

The definitions of terrorism have also suffered from their inability to be value-neutral. The statement, “one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter” is commonplace. This assumed subjectivity compounds the already definitional difficulties. Another serious problem in defining terrorism is the seeming difficulty in drawing a clear line between acts considered as terrorism and other legitimate political actions geared towards the exercise of the right to self-determination, freedom and independence (Chomsky 2003:70). For example, Kapitan (2003 in Sterba et al., ed.2003: 48) defines terrorism as “the deliberate use of violence, or the threat of such, directed upon civilians in order to achieve political objectives”. Wilkinson (2000:12-13) has also defined terrorism as “the systematic use of coercive intimidation, usually to service political ends” and commonly targeting “innocent civilians.” Some commentators
believe that the above distinction is very necessary, considering the political experiences of a
great number of peoples in history. This explains why the historical, political, religious and
ideological contexts in which certain acts are committed then condition, in most cases, the
categorization of such acts as whether they are terrorist acts or not. This explains why the use
of the above adage “one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter” is very common. But
most of the definitions encompass the goal (motive), method and the target as the
characterizing definitional contents of terrorism.

Pojman (2003 in Sterba et al., eds. 2003:140) defines it thus: “Terrorism is a type of political
violence that intentionally targets civilians (non-combatants) in a ruthlessly destructive, often
unpredictable, manner, employing horrific violence against unsuspecting civilians, as well as
combatants, in order to inspire fear and create panic which, in turn, advances the terrorist’s
political and religious agenda”. ‘The use of violence or the threat of it’ occurs in almost all
the many definitions of terrorism. But what qualifies an act as terrorism lies beyond this.
There seems to be a convergence around the view that for an act to qualify as a terrorist act,
the motive and the target are of significant importance. These seem to be the factors that
distinguish terrorism from other common crimes. The motive is mainly agreed to be, in most
cases, ‘political’. Sterba (2003: 1) observes that the use of violence or the “striking of terror”
may not be enough to categorize an act as terrorist. Horgan (2005: 34) argues that “the
terrorist’s use of violence is instrumental”, all with the intent of achieving the goal of creating
“widespread fear, arousal and uncertainty” beyond the direct victim(s), with the aim of
“influencing political process” and the outcome. Weinberg (2005: 7) feels that, rather than
being a goal, terrorism is a “tactic” employed in the course of pursuing a goal, which, in most
cases, is political. The act of choosing civilian targets is carefully made to possibly create a
feeling of general insecurity within a society among the civilian population (Weinberg 2005:
4). It is also aimed at attracting attention and publicity, where a single terrorist act can
“catapult” an obscure terrorist group into the international limelight, and bring about not only
the acknowledgement of their existence but also the discussion of their grievances, however
unpopular they may be (Weinberg 2005: 5).

Some scholars suggest that sometimes terrorist acts are targeted at forcing the government
into an over-reaction, as a result of panic which may become counterproductive, such as
taking stern security measures that compromise individuals’ freedom, resulting in a backlash
from civil right groups and the general public (Wilkinson 1979: 111; Smith 2004: 74;
The situation in Pakistan is a clear example of this scenario. The government of the United States has had to contend with constant challenges from within Congress, public outcries and sometimes outright condemnation, following a number of the security measures it put in place in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. An example is the selective phone-tapping measure granted the FBI, authorizing it to selectively intercept phone-calls coming into or going out of the US, a measure which has received enormous challenges, including court actions, as having greatly infringed on the individual’s right to privacy. Terrorist acts may not always be aimed at changing an existing political landscape but may also be aimed at forestalling a possible reversal of a status quo.

An example of this tactic was Hamas’ and Islamic Jihad’s use of consistent terrorist attacks on Israel to scuttle the 1993 Oslo peace deal between Israel and Palestine. Most scholars agree that for an act to be termed terrorist, it must be a violent act, committed for political reason(s), targeted at victims that may not be direct sources of anger, and aimed at creating fear, therefore, upholding motive and target as central to the definition of terrorism (Horgan 2005: 3; Wilkinson 2001: 16; Pojman 2003: 135; Kapitan 2003: 48; Kiras 2005: 482).

2.3 Nature of terrorism
Weinzieri (2004: 31) tries to distinguish between a terrorist and a guerrilla group and, by extension, acts of terrorism and those by guerrilla fighters. He posits that terrorists as much as practicable avoid face-to-face combat with states’ regular security forces. They concentrate rather on committing acts of violence against civilian populations to engender fear, influencing political change by coercion. By contrast, guerrilla fighters confront government soldiers and despoil whatever they can in such attacks, ranging from advantaged positions to military equipment. Hoffman (1989), quoted in Horgan (2005: 11), stresses that terrorism is never a war tactic. He asserts that:

even in wars there are rules and accepted norms of behaviour that prohibit the use of certain types of weapons…, prescribe tactics and outlaw attacks on specific categories of targets …The rules of war … not only grant civilian non-combatants immunity but also prohibit taking civilians as hostages; impose regulations governing the treatment of captured or surrendered soldiers (POWs); outlaw reprisals against either civilians or POWs; … and uphold the inviolability of diplomats and other accredited representatives.
Contrary to the above known “norms”, weak states that sponsor terrorism see it as an instrument of war against the West (Hoffman 1998: 28). Whether terrorism is seen as a tactic of war or not, as a strategy, it has, over the years, served the motives of the user. This may explain its continued employment as a viable line of action.

Cilliers and Sturman (2002: i. d) raise the issue of the efforts at domain restriction or broadening. They argue that countries that perceive themselves as terrorist targets or organizations in areas where they have overwhelming influence tend to broaden the crimes and acts of violence categorized as terrorist. Conversely, countries and organizations that see themselves as possible targets of such “over-broadened” definitions tend to cautiously and consciously narrow the defining features of terrorism. A good example of this is the OAU 1999 Algiers Convention, which clearly excluded actions conducted in the struggles for self-determination from its definition of terrorist acts. In Article 3 of the Convention, it provides that ‘armed struggles against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces shall not be considered as terrorist acts’. This standpoint can be understood when a number of African states fought wars of independence and political decolonization, but this is at variance with the Western perception of armed struggles as terrorist acts and some liberation organizations, including organizations like the anti-apartheid African National Congress, as terrorist organizations. There still exists a measure of consensus regarding issues such as hijackings, hostage-taking and diplomatic attacks as terrorist acts.

As can be seen from the definitions and/or attempts at defining terrorism as diversely as is represented above, all seem to view terrorism from the orthodox theoretical perspective. This perspective is state-centric, in that it looks at terrorism as “illegitimate” acts committed against an established authority or a state. Franks (2006: 1) has observed that defining or understanding terrorism “relative to the legitimacy of state governance” (as being an illegal or illegitimate act) restricts most works on terrorism at categorization of “what is” or “what is not”. He argued that the orthodox, traditional, state-centric approach leaves out an important ingredient, the roots of terrorism, in its definitions. Such inclusion would amount to legitimizing non-state violence, terrorism already seen primarily as “a challenge and threat to state authority by an illegitimate body” that has no locus whatsoever to contest whatever it is canvassing (Franks 2006: 3). William Laqueur (1987: 72) emphasized that the “disputes about a detailed, comprehensive definition of terrorism will continue for a long time and will make no noticeable contribution towards the understanding of terrorism”. For example,
while the US Defense Department defined terrorism to be “unlawful use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce and intimidate governments to accept political, religious or ideological objectives”, the spiritual leader of the Hezbollah, Sheikh Fadlallah, defined it as “fighting with special means against aggressor nations in religious lawful warfare against world imperial powers” (Franks 2006: 13). This kind of mixed signals has led some scholars to suggest the need to move the definition of terrorism away from the moral legitimacy environment, to a more value free landscape. This approach canvasses for terrorism to simply be seen in the realm of conflict. In line with this approach, Gurr (1988: 116) defines terrorism as “a doctrine about the efficacy of unexpected and life-threatening violence for political change and strategy of political action which embodies that doctrine”. Franks (2006: 17) simply defines it as: “an act of lethal violence for a political agenda”.

2.4 Origin and trends of terrorism

The use of the word “terrorism” dates back to 1793-1794 when the French revolution was called “the Reign of Terror”. This describes the situation during the reign of Jacobin, when the “Committee of General Security and the Revolutionary Tribunal” were given broad powers to deal with counter-revolutionaries. Violence was employed by the government as an instrument to consolidate the revolution and power against the enemies of the state and the people (Hubshle 2006: 3; Weinberg 2005. 3; Weizneri 2004 in Nyatepe-Coo and Zeisler-Vrasled 2004: 33). Weizneri (2004) in Nyatepe-Coo and Zeisler-Vrasled (2004: 34), pointed out that there exists a clear difference between the nature and trend of the ‘state terrorism’ of the then French state and the ancient and medieval period, to the effect that the French state’s use of violence was done as a socio-political platform to safeguard the revolution in the name and or ‘interest’ of the people – the masses or proletariat – and not in the name of God. It was a secular phenomenon, a deviation from the nature of group religious fundamentalism that was before it, and was to come centuries later, in the contemporary global, transnational and international terrorism. The French Revolution and its ‘violent’ defense sparked nationalism and intellectual (ideological) revolution across the world, especially in Europe.

Earlier acts of organized violence were not called terrorism. The earliest recorded organized violence was associated with the Jewish extremist Zealot sect, the Sicarii. This sect, whose motive was to provoke a revolt by the Jews against the “occupying” Roman government and bring it to an end, employed assassination by dagger against the Romans and moderate Jews,
who were regarded as collaborators with the Roman authorities. The Roman authorities and Greeks were equally targeted (Weinzieri 2004: 31). The Jewish revolt of AD 66-70 is ascribed to the Zealots. Its failure not only inflicted great destruction on the Jewish nation but also marked the end of the Sicarii. In the medieval period, between 1090 and 1275, the Assassins, a radical Shiite Ismaili sect waged a violent campaign aimed at purifying Islam (Weinzieri 2004: 31). They operated in the region occupied by the modern day Iran, Syria and Israel. The Assassins targeted mainly the Sunni Muslim religious and political leaders, who they accused of hijacking and corrupting Islam (Weinberg and Davis 1989: 19; Weinzieri 2004: 31). Many Christians were also victims of their activities. Weinzieri (2004: 32) observes that one of the intriguing elements of their operations was their readiness to die after killing their victims. The Assassin would trail and “kill the enemy and, rather than flee, would calmly await capture and execution” in a fashion depicting martyrdom. This attitude is viewed as the origin of suicide terrorism (Weinberg and Davis 1989: 21).

Before World War 1, terrorism was associated with left-wing revolutionaries in their contest for power and control of the state. Citing the anarchist Narodnaya Volya (meaning the people’s will) in Russia (1879), (Hubshle (2006: 5) observed that these organizations were not part of the core socialist revolutionary strategy, but rather a product of perceived “necessity in raising the consciousness of the masses”. Laqueur (1987: 62) pointed out that Lenin charged that left-wing revolutionary terrorism restricted itself to group action, as opposed to mass action by the working class and the peasants, thereby complicating the efforts at galvanizing the masses. The end of World War I coincided with the rise in right-wing groups that engaged in terrorist acts, either to scuttle rising revolutionary activities or to guard the status quo. For example, the activities of the ultra-right Ku Klux Klan, formed in the United States in 1865, became more prominent after WWI, spreading hate against non-Anglo Saxons (especially blacks and Jews) in the US and organizing violence against them to inspire fear and intimidate the rising black consciousness and Jewish influence (Weinzieri 2004: 35). In Europe, some governments that feared the incursion of communism reacted to the 1917 Russian revolution by initiating activities aimed at stemming it. The Nazi movement in Germany and the Fascist Movement in Italy resorted to the use of state terror against suspected ‘enemies of the state’ (Hubschle 2006: 6; Townshend 2002: 54). The trend shifted again to a new phase of terrorism associated with revolutionary motives by the end of World
War II. Nationalist movements emerged in many colonial territories in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East in the 1940s and 1950s. These groups waged struggles for independence and self-determination, with some employing violent means. While such groups saw themselves and were also seen by anti-colonial forces around the world as freedom fighters, most colonial powers and some other Western countries regarded them as terrorists. Hubschle (2006: 9) quoted Yassir Arafat, the former chairman of the PLO, as having reasoned that: “The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land … cannot possibly be called terrorist.” This argument, which was made on the floor of the UN General Assembly in 1974, prompted a debate aimed at drawing a distinction between anti-colonial groups and nationalist-separatist groups operating “outside colonial and neocolonial framework” in the 1960s and 1970s. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Basque separatist group (ETA) fall into this category (Hubschle 2006: 9).

The notion of ‘international terrorism’ made its way into security discourse in the 1980s. Townshend (2002: 28) traces it to Alexander Haig, a former American Secretary of State, who accused the Soviet Union in 1981 of being a sponsor of “International Terrorists”. This was to be followed in 1982 by The Terror Network, a book written by Claire Sterling, outlining how the Soviet Union was involved in organizing international terrorist networks, especially in the Third World. While it is not within the scope of this work to discuss the veracity of the above accusation against the Soviet Union, there is the need to observe that America’s reaction to the accusation led to a step-up in overt and covert military and political engagements around the world, especially in countries that leaned towards the communist East. By the middle of the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, left-wing motivated terrorism almost disappeared around the world, launching the contemporary world into a new phase of global terrorism inspired by religious motives (Hubschle 2006: 10-11).

When terrorism is mentioned today, greater thought is given to non-state actors. The US State Department defined terrorism as ‘the premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually to influence an audience’ (Hoffman 1999: 38). ‘The use of violence or the threat of it’ occurs in almost all the definitions of terrorism. But what qualifies an act as terrorism lies beyond this, in the motive and the target. Most scholars agree that for an act to be termed “terrorist”, the act must be violent, committed for political reason(s), targeted at victims that may not be direct sources of anger and aimed at creating fear. (Horgan 2005: 3; Wilkinson 2001: 16; Pojman 2003: 135; Kapitan 2003: 48; Kiras 2005: 482). One major difficulty in defining terrorism is the difficulty in drawing a line between acts considered as terrorism and other legitimate political actions geared towards the exercise of the right to self-determination, freedom and independence (Chomsky 2003: 70).

Weinzieri (2004: 30) posits that acts of terrorism are “well-planned, organized actions” and “not random” in the strict sense of the word. For him, they are clearly mapped-out combat methods engaged in by groups that may not be able to stand contemporary conventional wars. While Pojman (2003:140) calls terrorism “a type of political violence that intentionally targets civilians, Kapitan (2003: 46) calls it “the deliberate use or threat of violence” upon civilians and Hoffman (1999: 43) defines it as “the deliberate creation of fear.” One of the many definitions of terrorism by US agencies is that which defines terrorism as “the use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious or ideological in nature” (US Army 1984. TRADOC Pamphlet 525: 37). The juxtaposition of these points of view brings us face-to-face with what is assumed to be the psychological state of a terrorist, especially the suicide terrorist. The investigation into the personality of the terrorist has attracted attention to working out possible personality traits that may be associated with terrorist tendencies. Scholars have continued to engage in research of, and debate over, the psychology or the mindset of the terrorist. Victoroff (2005: 9) points out that terrorists have been associated with certain personality or psychological dispositions that include being violent, alcoholic, deeply religious, sexually shy, poor social achievement, ambivalence towards authority, defective insight, strong adherence to convention, emotional detachment and low education, but was quick to conclude that these traits have not been able to clearly distinguish terrorists from non-terrorists. Equally, the contemporary terrorist trend and profile seem to have nullified some of these assumptions, such as in the areas of education and achievement. Wilkinson (2001: 27) argues that terrorism is ‘a rational’ course of action taken
by a ‘relatively weak group in an asymmetric conflict with a high stake’. Smith (in Nyatepe-Coo and Zeisler-Vralsted eds.2004: 71) feels that terrorism should not be categorized with other forms of crime and ‘psychopathological actions’. He points out that most terrorists are ‘extremely shrewd and rational’ persons who execute clinically, well-designed plans, and in most cases undetected by the most intelligent security networks put in place.

2.5 Causes of terrorism
The task of isolating any singular factor as the root cause of terrorism poses a serious difficulty. The character of the social formation that gives rise to terrorism may seem easy to configure, but an analysis of different terrorists known to history presents no clear evidence that a particular kind of environment would always produce terrorists. Diverse social systems have had terrorists grown from among them. There is a debate on the connection between terrorism and the prevailing economic conditions of a society. Strong argument is made on a clear correlation between terrorism and economic factors such as economic deprivation, poverty and income inequality (Li and Schaub 2004: 231; Kiras 2005: 485; Burgoon 2006: 176). Through the studies on the patterns of terrorism and the individual attitudes and actions, scholars have tried to present a connection between economic conditions, such as poverty and income inequality’ arguing that these, in a number of instances, have defined the “level of the feeling of deprivation and of injustice, and hence political tension” (Burgoon 2006:176). The US Department of State’s report, ‘Counterterrorism Office: 2001 – Patterns of Global Terrorism – Report: Africa Overview’ tends to lend support to this linkage. It identifies poverty, among other factors, as being responsible for the failure of the Somali state, a condition that has created an enabling environment for the growth of Islamist extremists and suspected terrorists. Analyzing the rise of terrorism in Algeria, Cilliers and Sturman (2002: i.d) state that the ‘economic stagnation and massive unemployment in the post-independence bidonvilles or shantytowns that ringed its cities provided the fertile seed for radicalism’.

Deductively, therefore, fighting negative economic conditions by ‘promoting economic growth and combating inequality’ may well be the starting point for any effort at stamping out terrorism (Tyson 2001, in Li and Schaub 2004: 235). However, some scholars challenge this argument. Weinberg (2005: 66) feels that it is too simplistic to argue that economic conditions cause terrorism. If it was that simple terrorism would disappear if governments
and international bodies take decisions and implement policies that promote economic development and present people with a ‘secured future’. He stresses that if economic conditions were to be primary causes of terrorism, then sub-Saharan Africa and, indeed, most Third World countries would have been devastated by domestically grown terrorism, given their monumental economic crises. The official US position supports this view (The White House – CRS Report 2002). It challenges the linkage between poor economic conditions and terrorism, because the findings on the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States show the terrorists involved were educated Muslim youths with middle class backgrounds, supported and financed by very rich people (The White House – CRS Report 2002; Burgoon 2006: 117). Again, other studies of the characteristics of terrorists tend not to support the poverty and deprivation connection. For example, in interviews conducted by Hassan (2001), quoted in Tessler and Robbins(2007:312), involving nearly 250 members of organizations that use terrorism, failed suicide terrorists and members of their families, it was found that none reported significant economic deprivation. In two separate studies, by Krueger and Maleckova (2002: 13), on the profiles of 129 Hezbollah militants killed in action, and Berribi (2003), on about 335 deceased Palestinian terrorists, the researchers could not establish association between poverty and the likelihood of becoming a terrorist. On the contrary, both studies found ‘that terrorists tend to be relatively well off by the standards of their societies’ (Tessler and Robbins 2007: 310; Weinberg, Pedahzur and Perliger 2003: 18). Victoroff (2005:8) revealed that the result of a research conducted in 2001 by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) involving about 1,357 adults living in the West Bank and Gaza, which tested the hypothesis that poverty and low level of education factor in influencing attitude towards political violence, found that ‘support for terrorism against Israeli civilians was even more among professionals than among labourers (43.3 vs. 34.6 percent) and more common among those with secondary education than among illiterate respondents 39.4 vs. 32.3)’. In fact, Pedahzur, Perliger and Weinberg (2003: 22) suggest that terrorist groups look for membership among individuals whose motivation are not monetary gains but rather a conviction and commitment to the cause of the group. Criticizing the US counterterrorism policy in Africa, Prof. Kinfe Abraham, the President, Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD) and The Horn of Africa Democracy and Development Authority (HADDA), reasons that the US support for security and intelligence network and capacity building in Africa since the September 11, 2001 attack is tantamount to a “use fire to eliminate fire” approach’. He feels that:
this approach only addresses the symptoms, without dealing with the causes. Nevertheless, what the United States needs to do is help eradicate poverty, illiteracy and diseases from the Third World, including Africa. The above will help dry the swamp in which terrorists sprout and grow. It is poverty, oppression and hopelessness that motivate people to die with those whom they perceive as living in luxury at their expense. Such people want a fair share of the wealth of the world. They see the current economic system as exploitative and unjust (Abraham 2005: i.d)

Li and Schaub (2004: 238) counter-argue that sound reason prevails that economic development that positively impact people’s wellbeing in a society may have an “indirect negative effect on transnational terrorism”.

The role of democracy, or lack of it, in encouraging terrorism, is equally contentious. Some scholars feel that the absence of democratic governance in some countries is a prime cause of terrorism. These analysts opine that “extremism emerges partly out of frustration associated with a lack of political freedom” (Whitaker 2007: 1022). This argument, which is also the position of the West (especially the United States and Britain), is based on the premise that the lack of democracy in any state tends to block channels for political discourses and open participation which, in turn, can drive individuals to become violent and resort to terrorism as a form of expression. Weinberg (2005: 66) states:

In countries where citizens are denied the right to participate peacefully in political process, they naturally turn to political violence. If all channels of open political expression are blocked, aggrieved individuals will turn [to] terrorism as the only means available to make themselves heard.

Accepting this argument to be true is to agree that the introduction of democracy in “undemocratic” societies becomes a veritable weapon to solving the problem of terrorism. This particular conclusion appears to be central in the US global campaign against terrorism. The United States, therefore, champions efforts at sustaining democracies and, at the same time, supports campaigns for “democratization” of “undemocratic” states as the cornerstone of its war on terror. But the link between the lack of democracy and the growth of terrorism does not help to explain the surge in homegrown Islamist terrorist activities in Britain (or even the US itself). Since 2005, Britain has experienced an upsurge in domestic terrorist activities linked directly to British citizens (HM Government 2006: 1). There is also conflicting signals to this point of view generated by certain key elements in the global war on terror, as they concern certain basic democratic principles such as the fundamental human rights of the individual and the treatment of detainees and the fact that the West still co-
operates with authoritarian and undemocratic regimes around the world, such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

A slightly different argument by some scholars tends to link the increase in the incidence of terrorism to the widening of democratic space, including the more liberal media, which become attractive to terrorists who are seeking publicity, constitutional provisions which guarantee freedoms of expression and organization, as well as individual freedom (Li 2005: 281; Eugene 2004: 25). Writing on Spain, Weinberg (2005: 68) states that “the installation of democracy coincided with the sharp increase in ETA terrorism: the greater the opportunity for free expression in Spanish political life, seemingly the more terrorist violence occurs”. For their part, Wade and Reiter (2007: 331) feel that both the absence of democratic environment and the widening of democratic space can only present “permissive or enabling preconditions for terrorism rather than being an immediate precipitant” of terrorism.

Concerning the sharp rise in the incidence in, and profile of, global terrorism since the 1980s, the issue regarding the extent to which coalesced efforts at stopping the perceived Soviet (communist) incursions into territories that were of significant global geopolitical interests in the 1980s has contributed to the rise in global terrorism, becomes part of the debate. Cilliers and Sturman (2002: i.d) point out that the surge in terrorist incidents in the 1990s was a product of the concerted efforts by the West aimed at ‘reversing Soviet expansion in central-South Asia, Afghanistan in particular’. They point out that the West, especially the United States, funded, trained and provided logistic support to the mujihadeens in Afghanistan. They blame the return of the majority of Afghan war veterans to North Africa (Egypt, Algeria and Sudan) at the end of the war in 1989, as marking a watershed in the history of international terrorism. In Algeria, for example, Cilliers and Sturman (2002: i.d) estimate that between 1986 and 1989, six hundred (600) to one thousand (1000) ‘battle-hardened Algerian nationalists returned home. They provided a nucleus for the terrorist movement that would follow.’ Weinzieri (2004: 41) agrees with this position. He observes that the United States “actually engaged in state sponsorship [of terrorism] and helped train and fund al-Qaeda during the last phase of the Cold War, hoping to defeat the Soviets indirectly”. This illustrates the extent to which the global political environment may have influenced the character and shape of contemporary global and international terrorism. Thus, the saying ‘training for today’s just warriors may become the benefit of tomorrow’s terrorist’ is apt.
2.6 An overview of contemporary terrorism

A fundamental driving factor to contemporary international terrorism is the role of religion. The religious factor becomes even more important when we look closely at contemporary terrorists, who they are, where they come from (their background) and their targets and motives. Islamist fundamentalism has configured the modern-day terrorism to the extent that some scholars have a category, “Islamist terrorism” (Dalacoura 2006: 507; Tessler and Robbins 2007: 307). Since the 1990s, terrorist activities have seen a shift from predominantly nationalist-separatists and social revolutionaries, in the 1970s and 1980s, to more Islamist fundamentalist terrorism (Bjorgo 2005: 4). Kiras (2005:484) observes that the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union witnessed a rise in the emergence of religious terrorist groups following the sharp decline in global ideological polarization and by impact a corresponding sharp decrease of ‘revolutionary terrorists’. To understand the Islamists’ fundamentalist activities clearly, Dalacoura (2006: 510) subdivided it into three: transnational Islamist terrorism, Islamist terrorism associated with nationalist liberation movements, and Islamist domestic insurgencies. The domestic fundamentalist terrorist insurgencies involve Islamist fundamentalists within Islamic countries, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which challenge national governments by attacking government officials and interests. The activities of these organizations are often focused on attacking the global impact of western values, especially as they affect the Muslim world including, crude materialism, sexual licentiousness and gender equality, which Western culture promotes. Islam, for them, has been corrupted and secularism has infected a number of Arab states and their leaders. The activities of the domestic insurgencies are aimed at changing the religious and political status quo and bringing the un-Islamic governments and leaders down, by Jihad.

The Islamist terrorists that are involved in nationalist liberation movements are those that focus on national liberation struggles, such as Hamas and Fatwa Brigade of Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon (Dalacoura 2006: 510). These organizations are known to be both social and political platforms, not just for their membership, but also for struggles over established socio-political issues of national significance. The Hezbollah, for example, which came into existence during the civil war in Lebanon in the 1980s as a Shia militia, has since fought Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon on different occasions, has become a political party, participating in domestic national politics and elections and engages in social and civic roles among the Shiites in Lebanon. It has also become a rallying point for most Lebanese
that oppose Israel (Dalacoura 2006: 216). This is also true of the Hamas and the Fatwa in the Palestinian struggle. Although they do not agree on the ideal path to achieving a settlement for the Palestinian state – while Hamas rejects a two-state solution, Fatwa sees that to be the feasible outcome of their struggle – both focus on the plight of the Palestinians and the struggle for an independent Palestinian state. These organizations resort to terrorist attacks in pursuit of their goals (Dalacoura 2006: 217).

The transnational Islamist terrorists are those represented by the Islamic Front. Islamist organizations that fall under this group concentrate on the global unity of actions by all Muslims. At this level, both the members of domestic insurgencies and those concerned with nationalist struggles are united and connected to the global network of fundamentalist Islamist terrorists. The emergence of al-Qaeda as a global spearhead in international terrorism has injected much dynamism, co-ordination and precision into the planning, communication and execution of terrorist acts. Al-Qaeda is the ‘nexus’ of contemporary global terrorism (Kiras 2005:485). It is a loose organization of Islamist fundamentalist groups scattered all over the Muslim world, pre-occupied with a war (religious, cultural and historical) against the enemies of Islam – the West and its Jewish alliance (Schweitzer and Shay 2003: 25; Weinberg 2000: 74). Groups that may not have any physical connection find themselves brought together by the al-Qaeda network in the synergy presented by “a common ideology, a common enemy, mutual support and sponsorship” (Kiras 2005:484). Al-Qaeda was formally instituted in February 1998, with the establishment of the International Islamic Front for the Jihad against the Crusader and Jews. Al-Qaeda’s World View is contained in the Fatwa or religious edict which was signed by Osama Bin Laden, the head of al-Qaeda; Al-Zawahiri, the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad faction; Sheikh Mir Hamza, the secretary of the Gamat alal Ulma of Pakistan; Fasslul Rahman of the Jihad Bangladesh Movement and Ahmad Rifai Taha of Egyptian Gymea’s a-Islamiyah, calling on all Muslim faithful throughout the world to take the killing of American and their allies (civilians and military alike) as personal duties geared toward liberating the holy temple in Mecca and the Jewish occupied lands, especially Jerusalem, from the ‘infidels’ (Schweitzer 2005:26).

It is important to highlight the worldview that was presented by Bin Laden, which informs the current escalation in the incidents of global Islamist terrorism since the mid 1990s. Schweitzer and Shay (2003: 27) quoted Bin Laden as declaring:
the entire globe in general and the Middle East in particular constitute an arena in which a conclusive battle for survival prevails between the three main religions. In the struggle, a Christian Crusader-Jewish coalition has been formed which is expressed in the alliance between the United States and Israel… which has conquered Islam’s most sacred lands of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem and aspires to crush it… this alliance methodically and intentionally massacred Moslems… the massacre of Moslem Iraqi population by American forces in the Gulf war of 1991, the bombing of Iraq on December 1998, the massacre in Sabra and Shatilla during the war in Lebanon and the killing of the Palestinians in the lands occupied by Israel.

Islamist terrorists are not only armed against perceived enemies of Islam such as the United States and Israel but also “corrupt and sultanate Arab regimes that is the Gulf States, headed by the Saudi monarchy” (Schweitzer and Shay 2003: 27). The above presentation of violent acts as a religious (divine) duty to the terrorist recruits heightens the deadliness of these terrorists as the Islamist terrorist is given “unlimited” grounds to legitimize and/or justify the act. It shatters every measure of constraint by human morality, leading the terrorist to go all out to murder, including taking his or her own life, as part of the ‘divine obligation’ (Weinzieri 2004: 37; Hoffman 1998: 88) and recognizing no ‘ethical or human limits’ (Smith 2004: 71). This explains why the Middle East conflict (the Palestinian-Israeli conflict) has remained the most critical issue that encourages Islamist terrorism and shapes the contemporary international terrorism, whether transnational or domestic. As such, almost every single contemporary Islamist terrorist points at the Palestinian question as a grievance.

The impact of globalization on the surge in global terrorism is an ongoing debate. Victoroff (2005: 3) contends that globalization in the areas of “commerce, travel, and information transfer” has greatly affected the nature and the threat level of terrorism in the contemporary global system. The main characterizing feature of globalization is the fact of ‘knocked down’ boundaries, the reformatting of the world into a borderless community, compressing it in space and time, and greatly weakening and diminishing the sovereignty and influence wielded by states. Two major dimensions of the impact of globalization on terrorism seem to have played out over the years. Firstly, globalization can be said to have created and sustained an enabling environment for terrorists to operate, especially with the enhancement of terrorist operational efficiency through the use of modern technologies that are easily available to terrorists in the form of cheaper and more capable computers, software and wireless technologies, the uninhibited utility of the worldwide web, the unlimited electronic contact capacity, the advanced publicity enhancing globe-wide media and the lax
international financial system (Kiras 2005: 489). Terrorists have been aided by this conduciveness of environment in their recruitment drives, ability to disseminate information to the widest possible audience and to control the content of their messages; tailoring the information they post on the websites to have the expected effect on the audience. It has become easier for terrorist groups to match and/or dilute external information (or propaganda), co-ordinate activities across the globe from a single base, evade security mounted against them and mount security on their detractors. Sourcing of funds and transactions are made more secure by the prevailing mode of international money transfers. Added to these is the revolution in the transport industry in the contemporary international system. Traveling is made easier, faster, safer and more secure, even for the terrorist.

Secondly, the dissemination of Western socio-cultural, economic and political values not only as the dominant value system but also as the defining parameter for measuring currency or “up-to-dateness”, has created tension and resentment in some quarters across the globe. This tends to have greatly sharpened the antagonism against the West and Westerners by fundamentalist Islam in the contemporary global interchange. Victoroff (2005: 7) observes that the demise of the Soviet Union, which signaled the end of the Cold War, and inaugurating a triumphant neo-liberalism, caused an observable rise in the global profile of ‘radical Islamist terrorism’. Islamist fundamentalism has emerged as an ‘aggrieved competitor with the market – economic, democratic and secular trends of modernity’ (Victoroff 2005: 3). The vehemence with which the fundamentalist Islamists harp on about the issue of the perceived erosion of Islamic values shows the extent to which this has been of critical appeal to most Muslims. Hoffman (1998: 38) points out that a large percentage of the global population and most Arabs perceive the United States as imperialistic, spreading its liberal values and eroding values, thereby heightening tensions within and across cultures. The al-Qaeda principles said that much when Bin Laden was quoted as charging that the Middle East, which symbolizes the soul of Islam currently “constitutes an arena in which a conclusive battle for survival prevails”, a battle he sees the US and Israel as having “conquered Islam’s most holy lands….”(Schweitzer 2005: 27). The military inversion of Iraq by the coalition led by the US received widespread reaction among Muslims across the world. It was viewed as a continuation of the strategy of the West to completely overwhelm Islam. The Iraqi conflict, therefore, added a new impetus to the galvanization of fundamentalist Islamists’ challenge of the role of the West in the Middle East and its implications for Islam. This has become an issue which remains relevant even with those
moderate Arab governments such as Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This was especially complicated with the discovery that the allegation of possession or capability of possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) leveled against Iraq, on the strength of which the coalition against Iraq was built, was a flux. Insurgents from among Iraqis, as well as foreign fighters, coordinated by al-Qaeda continue to fight the coalition forces inside Iraq and still target Western interests across the world.

Since the 1980s there have been not only a rise in the number of Islamist terrorist incidents but also of a more globalized and intense dimension. The casualties have risen to unprecedented levels. Africa, the Horn of Africa in particular, has experienced its fair share of terrorist activities. For instance, in December 1980 terrorists sympathetic to the PLO bombed the Norfolk Hotel, owned by an Israeli, in Nairobi, Kenya, killing sixteen people and injuring over a hundred. The 7 August 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were more deadly: 240 Kenyans, 11 Tanzanians and 12 Americans died, with over 5,000 Kenyans and 86 Tanzanians injured. There was yet another terrorist attack on another Israeli-owned hotel in Mombassa and an attempt on a passenger plane on the runway at the Mombassa International Airport, Kenya. Both incidents happened in November 2002. Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the 1998 and 2002 attacks. With rising terrorism in the Horn of Africa and the reality of the Somali state failure, there is a growing concern that the Somali environment is supporting terrorist activities in the region. The activities of the al-Itihad al-Islamiya (AIAI) and later the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the Somali Islamist fundamentalist organizations, with their feared international connections and the security implications, are of concern not only to the region but also to global security monitors (Golden and Weiser 2001: i.d). Commenting on the al-Itihad al-Islamiya in its report of 21 May 2002 on patterns of global terrorism, the US State Department warned that:

Somalia, a nation with no central government, represents a potential breeding ground as well as safe haven for terrorist networks. .... one indigenous group, al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), is dedicated to creating an Islamic state in Somalia, has carried out terrorist acts in Ethiopia, and may have some ties to al-Qaeda. AIAI remains active in several parts of Somalia.

In the face of lingering civil conflict, all institutions of governance have collapsed in Somalia. The borders have remained porous, making Somalia a transit route for terrorists, as was the case with those responsible for the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania (Otenyo 2004:
As noted by the US State Department, Islamist activities thrive and there is a wide availability of small arms in the hands of unemployed youths. This growing concern that the governance vacuum in Somalia renders the territory a potential terrorist haven has not abated, rather it increases by the day. The following chapters are focused on Somalia, assessing the protracted failure and investigating the extent to which this condition (protracted statelessness) impacts on Somalia’s global security significance.

CHAPTER THREE
THE FAILED STATE OF SOMALIA AND ITS PREDISPOSING ENVIRONMENT

3.1 Introduction
In order to assess the environment of failed or collapsed states, the issue of what confers the status of a state on a territory comes into question. A state is characterized by a defined territoriality, a government that controls that territory and “a resident population” that lays claim to the territory. Uzodike (2007: 16) observes that the notion of sovereignty of states is conveyed by “territorial control” and Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Jr. (1990: 23) emphasize the basic responsibility of “making and administering” laws within a territorial jurisdiction as paramount. While Fukuyama (2005: 8) stresses the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force as the basic characterizing element of stateness, Samuel Huntington, in his 1965 work, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, states that the essence of any territory’s stateness is the “adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures” (Huntington 1965: 12), emphasizing not only territorial control but also the existence of a systemic order in the polity. Quaranto (2008: 8) feels that stateness does not only reside in the “control of a given territory, but also management of that territory’s public goods and interests”, which, in itself, “gives the state a degree of both legitimacy and relevance”. The survival of statehood, therefore, revolves around the tripod of territory, population and government. The implications of the absence of, or tampering with, any of these conditions on the continued existence and/or effective functioning of a state have posed some difficulty. Indeed, many scholars have engaged the debate of what constitutes state failure or collapse. For example, while the disintegration or break-up of the component
geographic parts of a state may result automatically in its cessation, as in the case of Bosnia, it was not the case with the break-up of the constituting parts of the former Soviet Union, which only resulted in the abolishment of the entity and the emergence of some new sovereign states. In the latter instance, the Russian Federation retained and maintained all the institutions of the former Soviet Union without any disruption of the institutions of governance or breakdown of law and order.

Quaranto (2008: 8) opines that underpinning the concept of state failure is the definition of “what a state entails or does”. In definitions of, and discussions on, failed states, most experts agree on focusing on governance and social, economic and legal institutions as being of primary importance for a territory to retain its “stateness”. Dorff (1999: 63), in his definition of failed states, highlights the basic characteristics of state failure thus: “the state loses the ability to perform the basic functions of governance, and it loses legitimacy … the inability of political institutions to meet the basic functions of legitimate governance is also accompanied by economic collapse”. Agreeing with Dorff, Susan Rice defines state failure as the inability of a central government to “maintain control over its territory and provide basic services to its citizens” (2003: 2). Dempsey (2006: v) defines the security characterization of state failure as including (among other things) “the disintegration and criminalization of public security forces, the collapse of the state administrative structures responsible for overseeing these forces, and the erosion of infrastructure that supports their effective operation”. Rotberg (2002: 130) associates state failure with the “collapse of the local justice system and the criminalization of the security services”. He makes a distinction between state failure and state collapse where the latter is characterized as “extreme failure” (Rotberg 2005: 10). Zartman (1995: 1) argues that state collapse results in “a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new”. The state, therefore, can be said to have failed or collapsed when it has suffered institutional collapse, giving rise to the break-down of law and order, collapse of the rule of law and moderating influence of any sort, even with the territory intact such as the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The Somali state failure has not led to debate on its level of collapse and the possible security implications of the territory as a congenial terrorist safe haven. Most experts have presented Somalia as a clear example of a completely failed state. Rotberg (2002:131) describes Somalia as “the model of a collapsed state: a geographical expression only, with borders but
with no effective way to exert authority within those borders”. Jhazbhay (2003: 77) quoted Ali Mazrui as saying that ‘the situation in Somalia now is a culture of rules without rulers, a stateless society’. Menkhaus (2003: 27) has singled out protracted and complete state collapse, protracted armed conflict and lawlessness as aptly representing the Somali situation. “Somalia’s inability to pull together even the most minimalist fig-leaf of a central administration over the course of twelve years places the country in a class by itself among the world’s failed states”. In Somalia: state of collapse and the threat of terrorism, Menkhaus labeled Somalia “a failure among failed states” (2004: 17). Even Little (2003:123), who points out that Somalia has not slid into anarchy, agrees that it is stateless. It is difficult to place the Somali political situation into any other known category, other than that of a territory in anarchy. The clans that were united around the single project of the removal of Siad Barre, who to them personified the Darod clan, could not collectively take over the power to establish authority over the country.

The fall of Barre was followed by the collapse of the alliance and the factionalization of the groups and clans, leading to the balkanization of the entire Somali territory. The clans and sub-clans were becoming ‘self-governing entities’, each carving out its own sphere of influence (Lewis 1994: 230; Vinci 2006: 77). The political environment in Somalia became very ‘volatile’ (Little 2003: 150). Service delivery collapsed and the security situation continued to deteriorate. Fundamentalist Islamist organizations operate inside Somalia without any internal security monitoring, following the collapse of the institutions of law and order. The administration of the Somali territory had changed hands at different periods from one warlord to another, to a Transitional National Government, to a coalition of warlords, to the radical Islamic Courts Union, and to the Transitional Federal Government, with each lacking the legitimacy to assert authority over the population and to be recognized as their government by the Somali people. State collapse does not suggest the absence of any form of organizational system in its totality, but the absence of any legitimate power monopoly. Quaranto (2008: 9) stresses that “there may be other forms of governance within a collapsed state, but they do not have a monopoly in the given territory”. This is the situation in Somalia. The environment created by this situation tends to predispose Somalia as an attractive terrorist destination. It readily presents an enabling environment for domesticating terrorists and a very attractive staging ground for international terrorists as a hiding place, a recruiting and training ground and a transit gateway to the region. This enabling environment is characterized by the lingering civil conflict, porous borders, the absence of institutions of
governance, the indiscriminate availability of arms and the prevalence of young unemployed independent militiamen. The synergy of these factors produces a Somalia that looks very vulnerable to terrorism.

### 3.2 The porous borders

One of the factors that have continued to reoccur in the discussions on conflicts and crimes in Africa is the porous nature of the borders of most African states. This problem has much to do, in most cases, with the manner in which the boundaries of these states were drawn at independence. Many ethnic groups are often split over more than one state. National boundaries in most parts of Africa are, therefore, regarded as “artificial”. This has serious socio-political, economic and security implications for not only African states but also for the global community. Somalia has serious political and security problems presented by the porosity of its borders. To assess these border problems meaningfully, it is pertinent to understand the peculiar history of Somalia, which is manifesting in the border issues. Somalia presents a classical case of dismemberment of peoples using indiscriminate colonial administrative lines, which eventually endured in the post-independence African states, causing and/or aggravating conflicts in many parts of Africa.

Somalis had a unique colonial experience. They were divided among four colonial powers, three European (Britain, France and Italy) and one African (Ethiopia). While the former French Somaliland became the independent state of Djibouti, Italian and British Somaliland metamorphosed into the Republic of Somalia. Ethiopia retains the territory it colonized (the Ogaden) to this day. Of the six major Somali clan families, the four largest are distributed across the borders into Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. The Hawiya clan in southern Somalia is cut into south-eastern Ethiopia and north-western Kenya. The Darod clan of Somalia occupies the whole length of the east-central, through the north-eastern part of Ethiopia, as well as the north-central through the north-eastern part of Kenya. This region is the Ogaden, which Somalia has been claiming as part of its territory. The Ishaak clan is cut into Ethiopia, while the Dir clan is cut into Ethiopia and Djibouti. In all these cases, with the exception of the Hawiya clan, the clans live on both borders of the Somali boundaries. The state boundaries, therefore, mean little to these kith and kin, who see them as merely artificial demarcations which do not matter. This explains why these borders have been a problem to secure. Laitin and Samatar (1987: 53) state that “many of the problems faced by the post-colonial Somali society were set in motion by the peculiar character of the colonial
occupation of Somalia” and the manner in which the decolonization process was conducted. The fact that the population in this region is predominantly pastoralist compounds the situation, as the basic character of such a population is migration from one area to another in search of pastures and water.

The exploitation of the porous nature of these borders for illegal activities and the smuggling of banned foreign products has existed for a very long time in the region (Little 2003: 102; Laitin and Samatar 1987: 54; International Crisis Group 2005a: 24). The failure of the Somali state and the consequent collapse of institutions of governance and law enforcement exacerbated the problem and heightened the security threat this situation poses to the region and to global security in general. The border towns inside Ethiopian and Kenyan territories grew in significance, with increased commercial activities and illegal cross-border traffic. Markets emerged and are thriving in Kenyan border towns, where Somali livestock is sold. Somali ports serve as transit entry ports for goods imported duty-free, such as cloths and electronics from Dubai, and then smuggled through the porous borders into Kenya (Bryden 1999: 138).

Somalia is adjudged as having one of the longest coastlines in Africa (Powell et al., 2006:11; Little 2003:7). There existed, even before the Somali state collapse, the problem of effective control of its vast international border, by the government. In the absence of government control on the Somali side of the border and with Somali towns under warlords who are only busy collecting money from vehicular traffic, the efforts on the other side of the border hardly solve any problems. The tightening of security across the border by Kenya and Ethiopia has usually yielded very little, owing to the activities of the “Somalis” living on both sides of the border. In an interview published on 7 November 2007 by the Council on Foreign Relations, a New York-based Peace and Conflict NGO, the Ethiopian ambassador to the US was quoted as stating that “to talk about commercial traffic in that part of the country is to talk about contraband. Contraband now means in this context weapons and explosives coming in – it is a very porous region, a 2000-kilometre border [with Somalia], very porous border and [contraband] comes in through many, many different points…” (Assefa, S. 2007: i. d).

The difficulties in policing these borders include not only the fact that the borders are very long, but also those of the very rough terrain. The long expanse is sandy and bumpy, vegetated by arid savanna shrubs and palms. This makes both ground and air patrols near
impossible. Added to this is the fact that the Kenyan and Ethiopian security forces are not well-equipped enough to face the trans-border smugglers, who use strong vehicles and are better armed, sometimes with “rocket propelled grenades and heavy machine guns” (Dexter, F. 2002: i. d). Corruption of officials across the Kenyan and Ethiopian borders with Somalia has also been revealed as a contributing factor to the porous nature of the border. The border guards, especially those on the Kenyan side, are believed to be in the habit of “cooperating with the smugglers in return for cash” (Dexter 2002: i. d).

The above scenario creates an enabling environment for possible movements of terrorist elements and arms in and out of Somalia, targeting the neighbouring states and Western interests in those states. Even though there is no consensus regarding the level of terrorist operations inside Somalia, there seems to be an agreement that it serves as a transit and shield for al Qaeda operatives in the region (International Crisis Group 2005a: 11; Menkhaus 2004: 70; Menkhaus 2005: 42-43; Dempsey 2006: 14; International Crisis Group 2006: 9; International Crisis Group 2007: 4; Harper 2007; Quaranto 2008: 28). Somalia has been linked with terrorist attacks in the neighbouring states, in which cases al-Qaeda used the territory as a co-ordination outpost and transit route. In the 7 August 1998 terrorist bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and the November 2002 hotel and international airport attacks in Mombassa (Kenya), for which al-Qaeda claimed responsibility, security reports confirmed the use of the Somali border for safe and shielded passage (Kagwanja 2006: 76; Otenyo 2004: 78).

At present there are fears that foreign Islamist fighters move into Somalia through its numerous porous entry ports to join forces with the Islamist fundamentalists who are fighting for the control of Somalia. The International Crisis Group (2007: 4) points out that “late 2006 … steady influx of jihadi volunteers from across the Muslim world (including numerous young radicals from Somali Diaspora)” was estimated to be “from several hundred to, less plausibly, several thousand”. This is in the wake of an on-going battle since December 2006 between the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and the Transitional National Government, backed by Ethiopian forces. Kenyan officials reported making “a few arrests of fleeing combatants, apparently including a commander from an Ethiopian separatist group and an Eritrean army colonel…” (Petrou 2007: i. d). This new dimension to the Somali conflict, in the light of the international terrorist connections of the Islamic Courts, raises the fear of a relapse into
continued insurgency, imitating Afghanistan and Iraq, as it is becoming another rallying point for Islamist jihadists.

3.3 The lingering conflict

The Somali state showed signs of crisis from its inauguration. It exhibited serious lack of cohesion from the very beginning. The pull towards disintegration seemed to be stronger than that towards unity. Primary among the reasons for this lack of unity was the contest among the various clan families in Somalia for power and resources, which was centralized in the national government (Elmi and Barise 2006: 33). The over-centralization of post-independence Somalia meant that the control and distribution of national resources became the monopoly of the government at the centre. Control of the state therefore, bestows access to, and control of, resources. The control of government institutions of policy decisions and implementation by any group places it at an advantage over the others. This explains the competition for capturing the state. The political elites see the clan as a viable platform for gaining political control of the state, and this provides access to the resources.

The complaint of alienation from the polity (Somalia) very early in the life of the young Republic by the north (former British Somaliland) can be seen, not only from the point of clan interest and/or marginalization, but also from the feeling of a sense of marginalization by the northern political elite whose counterparts from the south (former Italian Somaliland) took the offices of the president, prime minister and major cabinet positions and are in the majority in the parliament. Samatar (1988: 62) explains that it was a case of pure ‘intra-class’ struggle among the petite bourgeoisie on both sides, more than it was an issue of regional or inter-clan competition. Both Samatar (1988: 63) and Elmi and Barise (2006: 37) are of the opinion that the clan elements were only introduced by the various contending elites to legitimize their struggle and to create a fallback constituency. This position tends to be validated by the development of intra-clan conflicts and splits at some stages of the Somali crisis. The bitter conflict that ensued between Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, both of whom were from the same Hawiye clan, represents very clearly one of such elite competitions that were executed, in this case, on sub-clan platforms.

The coming to power of General Mohammed Siad Barre in a bloodless coup in October 1969, following the assassination of the president, was to eventually become the catalyst that facilitated the beginning of open armed hostilities in Somalia. The early days of the
administration enjoyed good support across clan lines because of its disposition to fighting corruption, which had by then eaten deep into the life of the young democratic system. The populace was weary of the ostentatious life-styles of politicians who were called to account by the new administration (WSP 2001: 8). The new military regime also mobilized the Somali masses around itself by its popular programmes, which included the introduction of a Latin script for the country in 1972, the launching of a successful mass literacy programme, the expansion of health and educational services, the introduction of a self-help community economic programme and the resettlement of the victims of the 1974/75 drought. The Barre administration condemned clannishness and continued to make its initial appointments across clan lines and seemingly on merit. These measures were not to last long, as the over-centralization of power led to its abuse by the government and its officials, as corruption gradually crept in and clannish considerations for government appointment surfaced (Ajulu 2004: 77; Laitin and Samatar 1987: 79; WSP 2001: 9).

Opposition started to mount and armed opposition groups began to spring up inside Somalia, and across its borders, in Ethiopia, its hostile neighbour. Somalia was not to be the same again, as this marked the turning point in the Somalia journey to imminent state collapse. With the opposition coming from clan-based groups, Barre himself resorted to clannishness, favoring his Darod clan in appointments. ‘Rebel clans’ were targeted, as was the experience of the Isaaq, Majerteen, Hawiye and other clans. The playing and arming of clans against one another, and the arming of militia groups against perceived opponents by Barre, was to be one of the major factors that eventually plunged Somalia into the intractable war that led to the fall of Barre and the eventual collapse of the Somali state (Ahmed and Green 2007: 118). This was so because most clans and militia that were armed eventually became part of the opposition that coalesced, armed with those weapons, and with military assistance from neighbouring states like Ethiopia in their final push against Siad Barre. This organized opposition included the Somalia National Movement (SNM), the Hawiye clan United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), and the Ethiopian-based Somalia National Congress (SNC), led by Mohammed Farah Aideed – all clan-based parties/groups (Adam 1992: 18).

The opposition against Siad Barre became a unifying factor for the armed opposition. This unity could not be sustained after the fall of Barre. Vinci (2006: 77) points out that the situation in Somalia at the point of collapse in 1991 “differed in important respects from civil
wars in which the state is taken over by one of the factions which sought to over-throw it”.
The ferocious inter group and intra group armed conflict which ensued among the groups in
the struggle for the control of the government after the fall of Barre eventually led to the
collapse of the state when none of the groups could take over state control (Ahmed, I. and
Green, R. 1999: 119). The conflict soon degenerated into clan militia struggles, with each
clan controlling a section of Somalia. Describing the situation, Lewis (1994: 231) explains
that:

In 1991/92, reactively influenced by the example of the Somali Salvation
Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali National Movement (SNM), United
Somali Congress (USC) and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the general
tendency was for every major Somali clan to form its own militia
movement. Thus clans were becoming effectively self-governing entities
throughout the Somali region as they carved out spheres of influence in a
process which, with the abundance of modern weapons, frequently entailed
savage battles with a high toll of civilian casualties.

The severity of the conflict, and the damage and losses inflicted on Somali society, was
magnified by the factionalization of most of the groups to the levels of sub-clans. Yoh (2003:
89) opines that the chaos, which trailed the defeat of Siad Barre was the result of the struggle
among splinters for control and which has persisted, rendering Somalia ungovernable. Lack
of central control and the enduring militia struggle for control softens the ground for the
thriving of terrorist nodes and hub, and the possible penetration and involvement of foreign
jihadists. The emergence and activities of the al-Itihaad al-Islaamiya (AIAI) in connection
with terrorist activities inside Somalia and within the region points clearly to how far the
administrative flux produced by state failure went in supporting terrorist activity. The AIAI’s
demise between the middle and late 1990s saw the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union,
which absorbed the former members of AIAI leadership and radical jihadists within its ranks
(International Crisis Group 2006: 9-10). The Islamic Courts took control of Mogadishu and
its environs from the warlords in the bitter battle of June 2006 that left hundreds of civilians
dead. By the middle of December that same year, the Courts had taken control of the entire
southern Somalia, with the exception of Baioda, which was hosting the Transitional Federal
Government, ably protected by Ethiopian soldiers. The attempt by the Islamic Courts to over-
run Baioda, and by implication the Transitional Federal Government, resulted in a disaster for
the ICU, following the full-scale war between it and all Islamists they could mobilize on one
side and the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian troops on the other. The ICU
was defeated in less than two weeks of battle, with an estimated casualty of 2000 to 3000
men and loss of a sizeable quantity of military equipment. Over 500 men and some equipment were estimated to have been lost on the side of the combined Ethiopian and TFG soldiers, all between the last week of December 2006 and the end of January 2007 (International Crisis Group 2007: 1; Harper 2007: i. d). One thing stands out: that battle saw the highest level of mobilization of radical Islamists and Jihadists in the Somali conflict, both locally and internationally, since the conflict began in the early 1990s. Also, it saw massive covert support of the TFG by the United States and the full-scale involvement of Ethiopian forces in the conflict. The Ethiopian contingent was made up of very experienced soldiers, specially trained by American instructors in their camp in Djibouti. They were highly equipped, including air cover. The conflict has not abated even with the defeat of the Islamic Courts Union; rather, it has transformed into an insurgency, which escalated following the declaration of jihad by the Islamic Courts and the call for international Jihadis to become involved (Harper 2007: i. d), causing further deterioration in the security situation in Somalia and increasing the terrorist threat it poses to the region and globally (Hassan and Barnes 2007: i. d). Incidents of suicide attacks on the Transitional Federal Government positions and foreign aid workers have become rampant since 2007. Armed skirmishes between Ethiopian soldiers inside Somalia and the Shabaab (Islamic Courts militia) are commonplace (Quaranto 2008: 1). Added to this situation is the fear that the warlords are rearming and repositioning themselves to the post-June 2006 territorial controls (UN Monitoring Group Report 2007: 19-20; See also the record of arms purchases in Tables A & B below). This will mean an accentuation of the conflict, worsening the security situation and throwing up new dimensions to the conflict, given the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia.

3.4 The Collapse of the institutions of governance

The collapse of the Somali state in 1991 has resulted in the collapse of all forms of central control and authority. In the absence of a central government that could exercise power over the whole territory, clan warlords control various segments of the country. Law enforcement in this situation has become impossible. In this scenario, some important common interests and values have collapsed, as individual and clan survival becomes paramount. Ali Mazrui was quoted in Jhazbhay (2003: 77) as saying that ‘the situation in Somalia now is a culture of rules without rulers, a stateless society’. Menkhaus (1998: 220) explains that there emerged in Somalia “fluid localized polities involving authorities as diverse as clan elders, professionals, militia leaders, businessmen, traditional Muslim clerics, Islamic fundamentalists and women associations”. Since then Somalia has relapsed deeper into
clannish territorial jurisdictions and militia controls, including the 2006 months of Islamic Courts Union control of most parts of southern Somalia. Whatever gains in nation and ‘national’ consciousness building, made on the basis of the ‘Greater Somalia’ project between 1961 and 1991, has been eroded.

Not surprisingly, the political environment in Somalia is unpredictable and ‘volatile’ (Little 2003: 150). Militias, mostly under warlords, control the now segmented parts of Somalia, with each setting the rules within its territory of influence. This dismembered form of territoriality provides the warlords with a population to ‘tax and exploit’ in what Little (2003) calls ‘economy of plunder and violence’ (Reno 1998: 3; Little 2003: 150-151). Warlords employ the services of the many unemployed and impoverished youths – ‘the mooryaans’, meaning the robbed or dispossessed - that roam the streets of Somalia. These youths are well armed and sometimes not really under the control of any particular warlord, but rendering security services on their own to those that may need it, such as the ‘merchants and development agencies’ (Menkhaus 2000:191; Little 2003: 151). In this way, the youths (through their activities) have supplanted the local clan elders.

The first Transitional National Government (TNG), headed by Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, which was the outcome of the Djibouti-brokered Arta conference of 2000, could not survive the arm-twisting policy of Ethiopia, which not only rejected the new Somali leadership but also facilitated the formation of the opposition Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council (SRRC). The demise of that government saw the emergence in 2004 of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) headed by Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. Seen as a surrogate of the Ethiopian government, the TFG was not able to impose its control over Somalia. It faces strong opposition from the Islamic Courts and other factional leaders who have continued to contest its legitimacy. Until the very last week of 2006, the TFG was not able to operate from Mogadishu, the Somali capital, which was before then in the hands of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). It took an onslaught by the Ethiopian military against the ICU between 26 December 2006 and 1 January 2007 to dislodge the ICU from the capital and for the TFG to move into Mogadishu. Ever since then, the TFG has not taken full control. By continuing to protect itself with Ethiopian troops, the Transnational Federal Government (TFG) faces legitimacy problems. Ethiopia has been a historical enemy of Somalia. Therefore, the involvement of its soldiers inside Somalia is seen as an unacceptable invasion by an enemy, assisted by the TFG. The TFG also continues to face a rising insurgency
orchestrated by the Shabaab militia (the armed wing of the Islamic Courts Union), which retained their military command and control, and the capability to conduct regular armed attacks, despite being pushed out of Mogadishu (Harper 2007: i. d; Crisis Group 2007: 3).

Describing their flight from Mogadishu as only a “tactical withdrawal”, to be followed by “an Iraqi style insurgency”, the United Islamic Courts is promising an enduring struggle that will eventually lead to the termination of the TFG and the expulsion of its foreign backers from Somali soil. Mary Harper observed in the Social Science Research Council report of 20 February 2007 that some radical Islamists across the world have started “adopting the UIC militiamen as their fellow Jihadists”. She highlighted the call on an internet audio recording in January 2007, believed to have been made by the al-Qaeda second-in-command. The content of that message was that “Muslims are called upon to join Somalis in launching ambushes, land mines, raids and suicidal combats against the crusader invading Ethiopian forces and to consume them as lions eat their prey” (Harper 2007: i. d). This call seems to have been heeded by the formation of an Islamist-led Somali opposition alliance in Eritrea in September 2007, whose aim is to force Ethiopian troops out of Somalia and to take the reigns of power in Mogadishu (www.insidesomalia.org). Fresh skirmishes, resulting in loss of lives and the taking over of many parts of Mogadishu and some other towns since late January 2007, have been reported (Harper 2007: i. d; International Crisis Group 2007: 4). This development may portend new danger, as it predisposes Somalia towards serving as a target for foreign Islamist fighters. Events in Somalia since the beginning of 2008 seem to suggest that it is sliding into a full-blown insurgency (Quaranto 2008: 59; Ryu 2008: i. d; Nguyen 2008: i. d).

The existence and indeed the relevance of a state are not merely in its basic structures and functions. It also embodies a set of values -- a collection of deeply held principles -- which moderate the thinking and actions of its members. Apart from defining the individuals’ perceptions of, and attitudes towards, the state, these values shape the lives and the expectations of the citizens within the context of the state. This very important factor, so crucial for social cohesion and development, is now lost in Somalia, which explains its slide into anarchy.

The declaration of independence by Somaliland on the heels of the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, and the declaration by Puntland of its own autonomy from the ‘Republic of
Somaliland’, tended to have rendered the political entity “Somalia” non-existent (at least for now). The international community has been in the quagmire of whether or not to recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state which, according to Lewis (quoted in Jhazbhay 2003:78) has remained, and may for many years remain, the ‘only viable Somali state on offer’.

3.5 The availability of weapons

The large-scale availability of weapons in Somalia has helped in configuring the Somali conflict and in determining its outcome. The emergence of many warlords with access to large quantities of weapons of various types contributed in no small measure to the escalation of the conflict leading to the defeat of Siad Barre and the eventual collapse of the Somali state. The availability of arms in Somalia has a grave security implication for Somalia and the entire region. It also holds global security concerns, given the attractiveness of such an enabling environment for sale and procurement of arms by terrorists.

During the Cold War, the geo-strategic location of Somalia made it an attractive location for the United States and the former Soviet Union, the then two superpowers. The two superpowers engaged in a debilitating competition over Somalia, with both presidents of the US Nixon and of the USSR Brezhnev wooing the Siad Barre government with massive military assistance. This support was in the form of arms and equipment, as well as training its forces and arming the security services and military forces. Bryden (1999: 134) called this competitive military support of the Barre regime by the two Cold War principal actors “a ruinous exercise”. He stated that those arms and equipment emboldened Siad Barre throughout his dictatorship, eventually plunging Somalia into its human tragedy (Bryden 1999: 136). Elmi and Barise (2006: 37) pointed out that a good quantity of those arms ended in the hands of the warlords and militias after the collapse of the Barre administration.

Somalia’s other source of arms was Ethiopia. Even before the Somali independence and the unification of the northern and southern Somalia, the Ethiopian regime had been under consistent pressure by the desire of the Somalis to achieve their dream of the ‘Greater Somalia’, which would include the Ogadeen region, The Ogadeen, which is considered by Somalis as part of Somalia, lies in part in Kenya and Ethiopia. This state of affairs has been argued to have disposed Ethiopia to supporting any activity that would destabilize Somalia (Marchal 2007: i. d). The support had been in the form of arms supplies, logistic and sometimes outright mobilization and sponsorship of opposition military activities against the
regime in Mogadishu ((Elmi and Barise 2006: 38). The Ethiopian regime reasoned that consistent crisis in Somalia would keep the Somalis preoccupied with internal conflict and thereby take their attention off the quest for the unification of all Somalis. Ethiopia was, therefore, ever willing to allow Somali insurgents the use its territory from where they launched attacks against the government forces inside Somalia. For example, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) has its headquarters in Ethiopia and was said to be heavily sponsored by that country. Different other Somali dissident groups (SNM; USC and SPM) were encouraged in different locations, therefore, opening armed conflicts in many quarters at the same time (Elmi and Barise 2006: 39; Ahmed and Green 2007: 116). These weapons were not only used against the government forces, but were equally available for use against rival groups in the struggle for supremacy among the different armed groups after the ousting of Barre (Elmi and Barise 2006: 34-35). Some of those weapons ended up in the hands of unemployed independent youths, who were more involved in freelance security, providing services to whomever could afford their services. These weapons became part of the security problem as they were on many occasions used in intimidating and robbing ordinary citizens at roadblocks and house raids (Ahmed and Green 2007: 117).

Again, there was the policy of the Siad Barre administration of arming clans that were loyal to the government of the day, against opposition clans. These were not members of the regular Somali military, but clan militias that were raised and armed to act as the first line of defense in the event of attacks against the state. Some of these weapons eventually ended up being used against the same government that provided them, when some of the clans that initially fought on the side of the government either completely turned against the government or factionalized and parted ways (Elmi and Barise 2006: 35).

Following the fall of Siad Barre and an ensuing bitter factional war for control among the clan warlords, the use and domestic sale and importation of weapons became widespread. The clan warlords were stocking arms to defend their areas of control and to advance their influence in the contest for control at the centre. The Somali state had been strongly centralized, so control of the state would bestow access to, and control of, resources. The control by any clan group of governance institution responsible for policy decisions and implementation would place it at an advantage over the other contending clans. This explains the quest and competition for capturing the state by the different clan warlords, which motivated greatly an armaments race among the Somali warlords, depending heavily on
[illegal] arms acquisition through external alliances. It was not long before Somalia became a field for competing external interests, especially among the Arab countries, each striving to have leverage over the others by supplying different factions in the conflict with military and technical support. Yoh (2003: 90) observes that Arab states were operating at “counter-points”, conflicting interests which was encouraged by the desire by each of them, mostly Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Yemen, to place themselves in an advantaged position in Somalia, should a government emerge. Even with the UN’s imposition of an arms embargo on both direct and indirect arms supplies to Somalia by way of the 1992 security Council Resolution 751(1992), the Somali arms situation did not improve; rather, it kept deteriorating in what the International Crisis Group called “The Culture of Impunity” in its April 2004 Africa Report No 79 (International Crisis Group 2004: 14). While Saudi Arabia, Libya and Qatar concentrated mostly on the provision of funding for procurement of arms, Yemen was touted as the major source of commercial arms into Somalia. The Yemeni role can be explained both as the result of its proximity and the presence (in Yemen) of radical Islamists that shared affinity with those inside Somalia and the unmanned and porous ports and borders of Somalia (UN Security Council 2003: 19; International Crisis Group 2004: 14). The cited UN Security Council report, which was reacting to the submission made to it by the Panel of Experts on Somalia, described Yemen as the “Somali Arms Supermarket” (UN Security Council 2003: 19).

A number of other countries contributed to the arms proliferation in Somalia. For instance, there were reports that on 25 July 2006 Iran shipped “PKM machine guns and M-79 grenade launchers, 1,000 machine guns and grenade launchers, an unknown quantity of mines and ammunition, and 45 shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile[s]”. Syria was accused of not only training Somali Islamists in guerrilla warfare, but also delivering a large quantity of arms to the Islamic Courts Union in September 2006, which included surface-to-air missiles (UN Monitoring Group 2006: 21, 26).

While Ethiopia had its troops inside Somalia on the invitation of the Transitional Federal Government, thereby possessing large quantity of arms inside Somalia, Eritrea has been named as “the principal clandestine source and conduit for arms supplies to the Shabaab” – the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union. (UN Monitoring Group 2007: 9). The Eritrean behaviour may have been encouraged by the overt involvement of its archenemy and neighbour, Ethiopia, which is fighting on the side of the Transitional Government, with US
and UN tacit consent, against the Islamic Courts Union, suspected to be involved in terrorist activities inside Somalia and in the region. The activities of independent actors (businessmen) from countries such as Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Britain, Australia and Djibouti who engaged in moving arms into Somalia exacerbated the problem.

The UN arms embargo did not in any way slow down the frequency of arms deliveries to Somalia. Newer models of assorted sophisticated weapons still made their way into Somalia in large quantity. They ranged from “large and expensive anti-aircraft gun to ocean freight containers filled with arms, explosives, ammunition, small arms, mines and anti-tank weapons” (UN News Service 2005: i.d; Lederer 2005: i.d). Writing in its June 2007 report on Somalia, the United Nations Monitoring Group observed: “Somalia is literally awash with arms. … The sheer quantities, numbers and diversity of arms, especially in central and southern Somalia, are greater than at any time since the early 1990s” (UN Monitoring Group 2007: 3). In its 2006 report, the UN Monitoring Group not only notes with grave concern the increase in arms flow but also the introduction of “new and more sophisticated types of weapons … into Somalia, including man-portable surface-to-air missiles such as the Strela-2 and 2M, also known as the SA 7a and 7b “Grail”, and the SA-6 “Gainful” low-to-medium altitude surface-to-air missile. Other new types of arms included multiple rocket launchers and second-generation infrared-guided anti-tank weapons. These weapons are readily available to the public in the “illegal” arms markets. Mogadishu, the Somali capital, was categorized as one of the most heavily armed cities in the world. The Bakaaraha arms market in Somalia has played a major role in both procurement and distribution of arms inside Somalia. It has taken the form of an “arms bazaar”, with all forms of arms available and as openly displayed as every other merchandise for whoever has the needs and the means. Idd Mohamed, Somalia’s deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, said that “the problem was people could go and buy weapons at that market and sell them to whomever — anybody with money could buy them” (http://www.pbs.org). The Bakaaraha arms market played a major role in the Somali conflict, serving as purchasing point for all the parties in the conflict, including the various clans and warlords, the Shabaab and even the Transitional Governments (UN Monitoring Group 2007: 190; UN Monitoring Group 2004: i.d) [See Tables A & B below]. These group and bulk purchases are complemented by private procurements that took place on a daily basis. Dealey (2006:) paints a picture of an arms shop in Bakaraaha market in late November 2006:
A grenade rests against a box of ammunition next to a row of AK-47s and still more rifles hang from the nails beneath a patch of tin roofing. His booth occupies prime real estate in the centre of Mogadishu’s Bakaraaha Arms Market, and he obsessively polishes his guns with an oil-stained rag in a battle against sand and grit. … Mohammed’s average daily sales have dropped from 15 AKs to just three and prices have fallen by almost half, to $300.

Dealey quoted Mohammed, aged 24, as complaining, “The only good job was selling guns. Now I don’t know what I’ll do”. The UN Monitoring Group Report (2007: 19) observe that following the ouster of the Islamic Courts Union from power between December 2006 and January 2007 the arms market has bounced back and prices of both weapons and ammunition continue to go up (see Tables A, B & C). This development is attributed to the attempt by the various warlords to reconstitute and rearm their different militias in an attempt to regain their positions of influence, which they lost with their defeat by the ICU. The Shabaab (ICU) was equally procuring arms locally to complement external supplies and its abundant hidden stockpiles, those that escaped the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian army’s detection, including an unknown number of surface-to-air missiles, suicide belts and explosives with timers and detonators (see Tables A & B).

The quantity of arms inside Somalia is one of the major problems to finding a solution to the Somali conflict and the war on terror. Since the “defeat” of the Islamic Courts Union in its battle with the combined forces of the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian troops, the security situation has not improved. Rather, the configuration of the conflict has changed to a guerrella war tactics – an insurgency. There has been a growing resort to car bombings and suicide attacks. A gloomy picture is painted of the unfolding events in Somalia if one considers the observations of the UN Monitoring Group that “the sheer numbers of arms currently in Somalia (central and southern Somalia, in particular) exceed those in the country since the early 1990s” (UN Monitoring Group 2007: 28). The above trend is reversible should the UN increase its commitment to enforcing the arms embargo it placed on Somalia and playing a more decisive role in finding a lasting solution to the conflict.

Table A
Arms purchases and sales at the Bakaraaha Arms Market from April 2006 – September 2006, investigated by the UN Monitoring Group
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Those conducting transaction at the Irtogte Market</th>
<th>Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qanyare Afrah Mohamed,</strong> Businessman and former Minister for National Security in TFG</td>
<td>80 AK-47, 20 PKM, 20 RPG-7, 4 DShK and a variety of ammunition <strong>May 2006</strong></td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45 AK-47, 24 PKM, 16 RPG-2 and RPG-7, 2 DShK <strong>10-20 August 2006</strong></td>
<td>Bought through business people who are not suspected by the sharia courts in Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rage Shiraar Bashir,</strong> Businessman</td>
<td>150 AK-47, 22 PKM, 2 ZU-23 and a variety of ammunition <strong>May 2006</strong></td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muse Sudi Yalahow,</strong> Former Minister of Commerce in TFG</td>
<td>145 AK-47, 33 PKM, 12 mortars, 3 DShK, 2 B-10 and a variety of ammunition <strong>May 2006</strong></td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Habsade Mohamed Ibrahim,</strong> MP, Minister of TFG</td>
<td>A variety of ammunition <strong>11 July 2006</strong></td>
<td>Purchased the arms and brought them to Baidoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>110 AK-47, 28 PKM, 3 B-10, 20 RPG-2 and RPG-7, and a variety of ammunition <strong>20 Aug.-20 Sept. 2006</strong></td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Barre Aden Shire “Hirale”,</strong> Minister of Defence in TFG, formerly in charge of Kismaayo</td>
<td>2 DShK and a variety of ammunition <strong>11 July 2006</strong></td>
<td>Purchased the arms and brought them to Kismaayo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>150 AK-47, 40 PKM, 50 RPG-2/7, and mines <strong>20 Aug. - 20 Sept. 2006</strong></td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abukar Omar Adaan,</strong> Businessman, financier AIAI</td>
<td>A variety of ammunition worth US$500,000 <strong>May 2006</strong></td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bakaraaha Arms Market traders</strong></td>
<td>1 ZP-39, 12 mortars, 6 DShK and a variety of ammunition <strong>29 April 2006</strong></td>
<td>From Somaliland via Puntland by road to BAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>360 AK-47, ammunition for ZU-23, B-10, RPG-2, RPG-7, DShK and ZP-39 <strong>07 May 2006</strong></td>
<td>From Puntland via Galkayo and Beletweyne to BAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Many AK-47, 63 PKM, 12 DShK, 4 ZU-23, 8 Dhuunshilkea and ammunition <strong>15 May 2006</strong></td>
<td>Brought by traders to BAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>480 AK-47, 24 PKM, 26 RPG-7, 24 mortars and a variety of ammunition <strong>27 May 2006</strong></td>
<td>Shipped from Yemen by trading networks to BAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300 AK-47, 120 RPG-7 and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Brought by traders to BAM on behalf of the sharia courts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 pistols and ammunition</td>
<td>Brought by traders to BAM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An unknown quantity of AK-47, RPG-2 and ammunition</td>
<td>Brought by traders to BAM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small arms, some anti-aircraft guns and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Brought by traders to BAM via the port of El Adde</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>680 AK-47, 132 PKM, 12 B-10, 15 DShK, 25 82mm and 120mm mortars, landmines, anti-tank mines and a large quantity of ammunition for AK-47, ZP-39, DShK, PKM and RPG</td>
<td>Brought by traders to BAM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 August - 20 Sept. 2006</td>
<td>Purchased the arms and gave them to Yusuf Mire Seerar, deputy of Barre Aden Shire “Hirale”</td>
<td>Sheik Yusuf Mohamed Siyad “Indohaadde”, Warlord/businessman, governor of Lower Shabelle and associated with Al-Itihaad Al-Islaami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 AK-47, 9 DShK and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
<td>Sharia courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97 AK-47 03 August 2006</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
<td>Sharia courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235 AK-47, 45 PKM, 37 RPG-7, 4 DShK and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
<td>Sharia courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185 AK-47, 70 RPG-2 and RPG-7 and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
<td>Sharia courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 DShK and a variety of ammunition 22 June 2006</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
<td>Sharia courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 AK-47, 6 PKM, 2 DShK and a variety of ammunition 20 June 2006</td>
<td>Sharia court at Guriel purchased the arms</td>
<td>Sharia courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 AK-47 and a variety of ammunition 05 July 2006</td>
<td>Sharia court at Saruur purchased the arms</td>
<td>Sharia courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 AK-47, 1 DShK and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Sharia court at Jiiramiskiin</td>
<td>Sharia courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Purchaser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08 July 2006</td>
<td>2 DShK and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Sharia court at Balad purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 July 2006</td>
<td>40 AK-47 and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Sharia court at Daynille purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 July 2006</td>
<td>1 ZU-23-1 and ammunition</td>
<td>Sharia court at Buuloburto purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 July 2006</td>
<td>An unknown quantity of mines</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 July 2006</td>
<td>1 ZU-23</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09 August 2006</td>
<td>120 AK-47, 5 PKM and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 AK-47, 15 PKM, 9 mortars and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>200 AK-47, 15 PKM, 9 mortars and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 June 2006</td>
<td>16 PKM, 14 RPG-7, 1 B-10 and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>16 PKM, 14 RPG-7, 1 B-10 and a variety of ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 June 2006</td>
<td>7 RPG-7, 6 mortars and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 June 2006</td>
<td>A variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 July 2006</td>
<td>A variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 July 2006</td>
<td>2 DShK and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July 2006</td>
<td>2 DShK</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 August 2006</td>
<td>50 AK-47, 16 PKM and 10 RPG-7</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-20 August 2006</td>
<td>75 AK-47</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Botan Ise Alin “Haaraan Kunaar”, former Minister for Rehabilitation and Training of Militias in TFG

Colonel Abdi Hassan Awale Qeybiid, former Police Chief, Banadir region. He controlled checkpoints between Afgooye and Mogadishu. Was arrested/released in Sweden. Re-arming his militia near Galkayo

Bought through businesspeople who are not suspected by the

(Hawaale clan) purchased the arms
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and Details</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdirashid Ilqeyte,</strong> businessman, owner of the Sahafi Hotel now under the control of ICU</td>
<td>170 AK-47, 25 PKM, 9 82mm or 120mm mortars, 28 RPG-2 and RPG-7, mines and ammunition <strong>20 August-20 Sept. 2006</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdi Nuur Siyad “Waal”, freelance militia leader</strong></td>
<td>95 AK-47 and a variety of ammunition <strong>May 2006</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Galjeel clan</strong></td>
<td>30 AK-47, 6 PKM and a variety of ammunition <strong>03 July 2006</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yusuf Mire Seeraar,</strong> Militia commander in Kismaayo</td>
<td>100 AK-47, 9 DShK and a variety of ammunition <strong>May 2006</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yusuf Dabageed,</strong> former governor of Hiraan region</td>
<td>5 PKM and 1 DShK <strong>09 August 2006</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mohamed Omar Habeeb “Dheere”, Former Governor, Middle Shabelle</strong></td>
<td>4 DShK and ammunition <strong>23 July 2006</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdishukri</strong></td>
<td>48 AK-47 and ammunition <strong>19 June 2006</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hussein Mohamed Aideed,</strong> Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, TFG</td>
<td>130 AK-47, 25 PKM, 3 120mm mortars, 2 DShK and a variety of ammunition <strong>May 2006</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goobaanle,</strong> Militia commander in Kismaayo</td>
<td>175 AK-47, 26 PKM, 7 120mm mortars, 3 DShK and a variety of ammunition <strong>20 Aug.-20 Sept. 2006</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dhuunshilke = 1-barrel Zu-23 mounted on a tripod.

*Source: UN Monitoring Group Report S/2006/913 pages 69-73*
Table B
Quantity of arms sold inside Somalia from December 2006 – May 2007 investigated by the UN Monitoring Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity of individual conducting transaction at the Irtogte Market</th>
<th>Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction</th>
<th>Role (supplier/purchaser/seller)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qanyare Afrah Mohamed</td>
<td>92 AK-47, 18 PKM, 22 RPG-2/7, a variety of ammunition 20 Dec.2006-15 Jan.2007</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warlord, member of Parliament and former Minister in the Transitional Federal Government</td>
<td>55 AK-47, 7 PKM, 17 RPG-2/7 February 2007</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>135 AK-47, 17 PKM, 25 RPG-2/7 March 2007</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48 AK-47, 11 RPG-2/7, a variety of ammunition, magazines and belts 20 March-20 April 2007</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>320 AK-47, 8 PKM, 24 RPG-2/7, 8 M-79 grenade launchers, 3 DShK, 1 Sekawe,* 40 boxes of ammunition for Zu-23, DShK, AK-47 and PKM 20 April-20 May 2007</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Omar Habeeb “Dheere” Governor of Banadir region and Mayor of Mogadishu</td>
<td>80 AK-47, 12 PKM, 19 RPG-2/7, 2 DShK, a variety of antitank mines, anti-personnel mines and hand grenades 20 Nov.-20 Dec. 2006</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>105 AK-47, 21 PKM, 28 RPG-2/7, a variety of ammunition 20 Dec. 2006-15 Jan. 2007</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21 RPG-2/7, 74 mortars, a variety of ammunition February 2007</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 PKM, 9 RPG-2/7, a variety of ammunition March 2007</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>85 AK-47, 19 RPG-2/7, a variety of ammunition 20 March-20 April 2007</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2015 AK-47, 35 RPG-2/7, 20</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Range</td>
<td>Purchased Items</td>
<td>Location/Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 April-20 May 2007</td>
<td>PKM, a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Nov.-20 Dec. 2006</td>
<td>85 AK-47, 9 PKM, 20 RPG-2/7, 2 DShK and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2007</td>
<td>75 AK-47, a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Nov.-20 Dec. 2006</td>
<td>22 PKM, 40 RPG-2/7, 2 B-10, 4 DShK, 2 dhuunshilke*</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2007</td>
<td>2000 AK-47, 5 B-10, 11 DShK</td>
<td>Shipment arrived at the Bakarraaha Arms Market from Hargeisa (Somaliland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Nov.-20 Dec. 2006</td>
<td>9 B-10, 5 Waqle, 2 ZU-23 and a variety of mines and hand grenades</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March-20 April 2007</td>
<td>74 AK-47, 17 PKM, 48 RPG-2/7, a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 April-20 May 2007</td>
<td>420 AK-47, 17 PKM, 48 RPG-2/7, 27 M-79 grenade launchers, 60 pistols, a variety of mines</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Nov.-20 Dec. 2006</td>
<td>295 AK-47, 95 PKM, 130 RPG-2/7, 11 DShK, 5 dhuunshilke,* 14 B-10, 5 Waqle, a variety of mines and ammunition</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Dec. 2006-15 Jan. 2007</td>
<td>187 AK-47, 16 PKM, 48 RPG-2/7, a variety of ammunition and mines, 53 pistols</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2007</td>
<td>105 AK-47, 47 PKM, 72 RPG-2/7, 110 hand grenades, a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March-20 April 2007</td>
<td>375 AK-47, 87 PKM, 47 RPG-2/7, 170 mines and hand grenades, a variety of ammunition especially for AK-47 and RPG-2/7</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2007</td>
<td>273 AK-47, 32 PKM, 41 RPG-2/7, a variety of ammunition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March-20 April 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Abdi Hassan Awale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qeybdiid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Chief, Banadir region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Nov.-20 Dec. 2006</td>
<td>65 AK-47, 25 PKM, 30 RPG-2/7, 1 dhuunshilke,* 3 B-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March-20 April 2007</td>
<td>125 AK-47, 15 PKM, 30 RPG-2/7, a variety of ammunition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 PKM, 5 82mm mortars, a</td>
<td>90 AK-47, 7 PKM, a variety of ammunition, magazines and belts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>variety of ammunition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March-20 April 2007</td>
<td>287 AK-47, 22 PKM, 3 B-10, magazines for assault rifles, a variety of ammunition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 April-20 May 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhagahtuur</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 PKM, 2 B-10, 10 RPG-2/7,</td>
<td>198 AK-47, 16 PKM, 2 DShK, 14 RPG-2/7, 1 dhuunshilke,* a variety of ammunition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a variety of ammunition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 April-20 May 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdiwaal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>198 AK-47, 16 PKM, 2 DShK,</td>
<td>20 April-20 May 2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 RPG-2/7, 1 dhuunshilke,*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a variety of ammunition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Dhuunshilke = 1-barrel Zu-23 mounted on a tripod
- Sekawe = 1-barrel Zu-23 with a seat for the gunner.


**Table C**

Overview of prices at the Bakaraaha Arms Market
(Costs in United States dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Before ICU</th>
<th>During ICU</th>
<th>After ICU</th>
<th>May 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zu-23</td>
<td>70 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>25 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DShK</td>
<td>14 000</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>3 000</td>
<td>8 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-10</td>
<td>7 000</td>
<td>2 000</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>6 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKM</td>
<td>12 000</td>
<td>6 000</td>
<td>4 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td></td>
<td>400</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-2</td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ammunition piece</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zu-23</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DShK</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-10</td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKM</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-2</td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UN Monitoring Group Report S/2007/436 page 50*
4.1 Introduction

The terrorist implication of the failed state of Somalia has been an issue of scholarly and expert debate. Some analysts have pointed out that the prevalent environment provided by a combination of the absence of a central government, collapse of all institutions of law enforcement, wide availability of arms in the hands of militias and unemployed youths, unmanned long borders and the enduring contention for power by clannish warlords, coupled with the steady growth of fundamentalist Islamism inside Somalia, makes Somalia an endearing destination for foreign terrorist elements. Basically, it has become not only an ideal safe haven for wanted terrorists but also a transit point and a recruitment and training ground for the al-Qaeda global terror network (US State Department May 2002; World Peace Foundation 2005: 19; Elmi and Barise 2006: 37). On this premise, terrorist activities inside Somalia and/or its linkage with such activities in the region and beyond is not surprising. What seems a surprise is the fact that the level of terrorist activities within Somalia and the linkage of its territory to such activities in terms of direct involvement or the provision of safe passage and shielding to wanted al-Qaeda operatives, still lies below the projections of security pundits going by the real condition of anarchy created by the cessation of any form of mediating influence of formal governance that commands the loyalty of a majority of Somalis.

This position is contested by those who argue that even though the environment of collapsed states like Somalia may appear attractive to terrorists, evidence has not confirmed that to be true. Menkhaus (2002: 11) points out that though failed states such as Somalia ordinarily look set to provide “a sanctuary beyond the rule of law, where terrorists can establish bases or staging grounds with little risk of detection” and where they will feel safe to operate under the “impunity of anarchy”, beyond “the reach of a national security and police force”, it only amounts to “a reasonable and compelling conventional wisdom” which, in some cases, like that of Somalia, leads to a “misdiagnosis of the relationship between collapsed states and terrorism”. He concluded that there is no “credible evidence that such a threat existed in Somalia” (Menkhaus 2002: 12). The unfolding events in Somalia, however, seem to favour
the argument that the realities thrown up by the failed-state-environment of Somalia actually provides an enabling setting for terrorism to not only take root but also to flourish (Tadesse 2001: i.d). The discussion of the terrorist threat posed by Somalia is hinged on the steady rise of fundamentalist Islamism and the increase in number of jihadi elements within Somali territory since the collapse of the state, as well as on the established links of these domestic elements with the wider global jihadi network. This will form the point of departure for this chapter, as it endeavours to trace the trend of growth and development of fundamentalist Islam in Somalia and the extent to which this has affected the terrorist profile of Somalia and its regional and global security implications.

4.2 Islamist Organizations inside Somalia

Somalia is a Muslim nation. By tradition, nearly all Somalis are Sunni Muslims. While some accounts locate the beginning of Islamic tradition in Somalia to the 13th and 14th centuries, others place it at an earlier date, between the 9th and 10th centuries, or even much earlier. What is clear is that there is broad agreement that by the 1331 visit of the Islamic explorer, Ibn Battuta, and later, Zheng He, Islam had already taken root in Somalia (http://en.wikipedia.org). Islamism in Somalia was not rife until the late 1950s into the 1960s, following the decline in the roles of mainstream Islam, especially in education, which was hitherto the responsibility of Islamic teachers, as these roles started being transferred to the secular authorities (http://en.wikipedia.org). The origins of most of the Islamist organizations are traceable to two major sources, the Waxda al-Shabaab al-Islaami, and the Jama’at al-Ahl al-Islaami, which arose in the late 1950s and early 1960s, respectively. Their membership and profile rose dramatically over the following decade, to their becoming important in the affairs of the state (Anouar Boukhars 2006: i.d). The Muslim Brotherhood inspired both organizations. The 1969 ascendancy to power of Siad Barre in Somalia affected the Islamist movements in two prominent ways. Firstly, it halted their spread and removed the Islamists from the hitherto important influences they commanded in state affairs. Barre’s Marxist government emphasized a strong secular and centralized administration, which he believed was very important in the achievement of the unification of all Somalis in the “Greater Somalia project” (http://en.wikipedia.org). Secondly, the tough policies of the administration against Islamist fundamentalism forced the radical Islamists underground. With the organizations’ structures intact, the Islamists carried out grassroot recruitment and mobilization, while some fled from Somalia for countries in the Middle East. This became a kind of blessing in disguise in the life of Islamism in Somalia, as many new radical Islamists
were groomed out of the experience of the harsh realities of the Barre administration. By 1980, the Islamists had grown underground so considerably that the fall of Barre in 1991 was only the trigger that unleashed them to resume overt activities (http://en.wikipedia.org).

From the start there did not exist much rapport among the various Islamist groups. They have been more of “a diverse community characterized more by competition and contradiction than cooperation …” (International Crisis Group 2006: 9). This may explain not only why extremist jihadi Islamism has not been able, over the years, to forge a very broad and unifying hold on Somalia, but also why jihadi militancy had not gained as much ground as pundits would have expected, until the Islamic Courts Union came to prominence from 1996 (International Crisis Group 2006: 9-10). This is especially so, given the seemingly conventional belief that Somalia had become a “fertile ground” for a radicalized population. Islamists in Somalia have as much diversity as there are diverse movements within Islam. Islamist organizations in Somalia fall under three major recognizable divisions.

The first group includes Islamic movements like the Jama'at al-Tabligh and the Salafiyiya Jadiida, whose motives are non-political but primarily missionary in character. Organizations in this group are opposed to ideological and political extremism and rather settle for missionary activism, with the sole aim of bringing back Muslim backsliders to “the true path of their faith”. They have preference for a democratic Somalia that will have a “broad-base and responsive” government, but which will reflect Islamic ethos of “tolerance, moderation and respect for variations in religious observances” (International Crisis Group 2005a: 17-18; Boukhar 2006: i. d). A former leader of al-Itihaad, the most radical jihadi organization in Somalia, Sheikh Ali Wajis, now leading the Salafiyiya movement, is a great opponent of al-Itihaad’s violent and armed approach. Ali Wajis’ defection to Salafiyiya and his commitment to, and passion for, “a rational reassessment of Islamic rules of warfare and the prevailing realities on the ground” is not only a blow to al-Itihaad but to the entire jihadi movement in Somalia (International Crisis Group 2005a: 13-14). It is pertinent to point out here that a greater number of Somali Muslims fall under this category (International Crisis Group 2005a: 15; Boukhar 2006: i. d).

The second cluster of organizations is made up of the likes of Harakaat al-Islah and Majma' 'Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaliya. The groups within this second cluster are politically active, but reject violence and extremism. Their goal is “either the adoption of a Sharia-based
system of government or the application of a certain interpretation of Islam within a modern, democratic framework of government” (Anouar Boukhars 2006: i. d), influencing the configuration of the Somali state and its political system. They concentrate on pursuing a reconciliation of the tenets of Islam with the ideals of modern-day democracy and cultural pluralism. These organizations have a reputation of including notable Somali elite in their membership. The Harakaat al-Islah is noted to have its membership dominated by high-profile academics and businessmen who command international respect. An example is its chairman, Dr. Ali Sheikh, who is also the President of Mogadishu University (http://en.wikipedia.org). The Majma' Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaliya itself is made up of predominantly notable Islamic scholars. While the Harakaat leaned more towards democratic ideals, the Majma’ leaned more to the sharia system. This, over the years, has tended to engender disagreement between the two on the nature of the future Somali state, with the Harakaat being accused of having been influenced by the imperialist West. However, this disagreement has given way to a consensus on the need for Islam to play its role within a contemporary democratic “framework”.

The third group of Islamists in Somalia represents the “Salafi-Jihadists”, of which the radical al-Itihaad al-Islami (AIAI) was the most significant, but includes all the new radical Islamist organizations such as al-Shabaab, the militia wing of the Islamic Courts Union led by Aden Hashi 'Ayro, which are believed to have links with the al-Qaeda jihadi network. The organizations under this group are committed to violence and armed resistance against all perceived enemies of Islam within Somalia. They resist the influence of neighbouring countries, especially Ethiopia, which is seen as an agent of the West. They are suspected of having links with al-Qaeda and the global jihadi movement. The al-Itihaad has been identified as collaborating with al-Qaeda in its attacks in 1998 and 2002 in Kenya and Tanzania against American and Israeli interests (International Crisis Group 2002: ii). Al-Itihaad remains among organizations listed as terrorist organizations by the US. The jihadi organizations in Somalia have secured strong membership and support locally over the years, but they continue to recruit members and infiltrate the moderate organizations with a view to radicalizing them from within. Reputedly, these groups receive financial support from oil-rich Gulf States (International Crisis Group 2005: 16).

4.3 The Islamic Courts Union (ICU)
The Islamic Courts emerged on the Somali religio-political landscape from about 1993, in southern Somalia (International Crisis Group 2006: 9). Their emergence appears to be the net result of the need to stem the increasing level of violence, which had spread across the entire southern Somalia landscape/region following the sustained conflict among the warlords. The birth of the courts, therefore, may be argued to be incidental to the growing insecurity and gang violence in the war-torn Somali environment (Marchal 2007: i. d; International Crisis Group 2006: 9). The courts were originally clan-based institutions, each concerning itself with the restoration of order and maintenance of security within the specific clan where it existed. Each court existed independently of the others (Boukhar 2006: i. d).

At inception, the Islamic Courts operated as independent sharia judicial systems. As time went by, these courts, in the absence of institutions for social services, started engaging in some social services like basic education and health care and later to providing security, fighting crime – robberies and drugs – and propagating the maintenance of some level of moral rectitude such as outlawing the presentation of films considered to contain pornography. Four of these independent courts (Ifka Halan, Circolo, Warshaddad and Hararyaabe) felt the need to work together to promote and coordinate security in their domains. They integrated their security forces, agreeing to exchange (extradite) criminals caught in the different clans’ court spere of influence (http://en.wikipedia.org).

The Islamic Courts’ pan-Somali inclination was never in doubt. The desire of an “Islamist Greater Somalia” – the eventual unification of all Somali-inhabited territories in the Horn within a single Islamic government – had usually been a strong point. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, the chairman of the ICU council, the shura, was quoted as stating in a June 2006 interview with Newsweek that “Really, Ogaden is a Somali region and part of Somalia, and Somali governments have entered two wars with Ethiopia over it, and I hope that one day that region will be part of Somalia” (Nordland 2006 in International Crisis Group 2007: 5). Later that year Aweys was again quoted as charging in another interview to Radio Shabelle, based in Mogadishu, that “We will leave no stone unturned to integrate our Somali brothers in Kenya and Ethiopia and restore their freedom to live with their ancestors in Somalia” (International Crisis Group 2007: 5).

The rise of the courts was very dramatic. By 2005 the Courts Union had grown from four at inception to about eleven, asserting their independence of clan-warlords control and the
mobilization for greater political activism. Determined to force power from the warlords and
the Transitional Federal Government, the Courts started recruiting and building a strong
military wing, the Shabaab (International Crisis Group 2006: 11). In April 2006, the UN
Monitoring Group had in its report called the Courts “a third force” in Somalia, pointing to
the Courts growing military capability, occasioned by massive arms purchases, and
recruitment and military training (UN Security Council 2006: 39-40). Before the end of that
month (April 2006), the ICU took control of the Mogadishu market and by July the whole of
Mogadishu and adjoining surroundings were under the Courts’ control, following its defeat of
the warlords’ alliance. Many factors played to the Courts’ advantage. The availability of
unemployed youths and independent young militiamen made the recruitment less
cumbersome. The disposition of the ICU and its success in bringing some measure of peace
and security in the areas under its control, which contrasted sharply with the lawlessness that
characterized areas under the control of the contending warlords, and the growing criminality
of the militiamen, attracted respect, support and followership for it (International Crisis
Group 2007: 1). Many young militiamen, who detached themselves from the control of the
warlords with their weapons in their hands, were operating independently. They not only
provided private security services to the emerging business class, who themselves were
asserting their independence from the warlords, but also engaged in other criminal activities
such as murder and robbery (International Crisis Group 2006: 15). Bringing a semblance of
order into the system by the Islamic Courts was enough to attract the loyalty of Somalis who
could not believe it could be possible to move through Mogadishu without being molested.
The alleged covert involvement of the American CIA in the formation in 2006 and funding of
the warlords forces’ coalition, Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
(ARPCT), and the support of the Transitional Federal Government by Ethiopia, a reputed
e healthy of Somalia, bolstered the profile of the ICU as the only viable platform to contend
with these “external aggressors” and expanded its support base (Hirsh 2006: 37; Dealey
2006: i.d; International Crisis Group 2006: 14). The formation and operation of that alliance,
whose purpose was the clearing of the Somali environment of al-Qaeda elements and their
collaborators inside Somalia, by arresting and turning them in (International Crisis Group
2006:12), raised the anti-American sentiment to a level it had not reached before, mobilizing
the greater majority of Somalis behind the Islamic Courts Union in the June 2006 battle for
Mogadishu. Writing on the battle for Mogadishu, fought between the Islamic Courts Union
and the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, Marchal (2007: i.d)
observed that the
American involvement mobilized Islamic movements well beyond Mogadishu. While these movements were very different in terms of rites, ideology and recruitment, they were united in their opposition to the United States. Hundreds of combatants arrived from Somaliland and others came from southern Somalia.

The infiltration of the courts by powerful jihadi elements, such as the members of al-Itihad Islamists, transformed them into a very strong politically motivated institution. Added to the above is the rise of radical young elements in the organization, particularly the Shabaab, which is the strike force of the organization, as well as the organ for the maintenance of internal discipline and order (International Crisis Group 2006: 10). These two factors portray the fundamentalist Islamist character the organization is known for among neighbouring states and in international security circles (Marchal 2007: i. d; Crisis Group 2007: 9). Among the leadership of the Shabaab were Aden Hashi ‘Ayro (the commander), Abdillahi Ma’alin, Mokhtar Rooban, Ibrahim Haji Jama and Fou’ad Mohamed Qald, all of whom were believed to have trained in Afghanistan and have connections with al-Qaeda (Crisis Group 2007: 9). In February 2006 the ICU mobilized and began a final push to take control of the capital and other major cities of Somalia. The cities fell one after the other as they fought the warlords who had hitherto held sway in their various clans and sub-clans. Until the last days of December 2006, the ICU was in control of most of the major cities of Somalia, including Jowhar, Kismayo, Beledweyne and the capital, Mogadishu. The northern part of Somalia, Somaliland and a part of Puntland and few jungle interiors did not come under ICU control (http://en.wikipedia.org).

The emergence of the ICU on the Somali national political scene greatly affected the crisis landscape in three major ways. Firstly, it emerged as a viable alternative to the warlords’ divisive and destructive struggle for control. Since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, the Islamic Courts’ Union had been the only organization or group that was able to command a broad appeal and support among the majority of Somalis (International Crisis Group 2006: 14-15). Therefore the ICU supposedly presented a platform through which the ideal dreams of the entire Somalia could be realized. Their imposition of Islamic laws in the areas they controlled, even when it did not go down well with many residents, were tolerated at least for as long as they were in power, in exchange for the peace and security they maintained and the social services they rendered all through the time they were in control,

Secondly, it led to the unification of warlords who, hitherto, were sworn enemies. The warlords shifted from fighting one another to coalescing into the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), to fight the ICU which they perceived as a “common enemy” (International Crisis Group 2006:11). This was to define the many events that followed: the June 2006 battle for Mogadishu, the ICU capture of Mogadishu and the defeat of the alliance of the warlords, the move by the ICU to bring the entire southern Somalia under its control and the eventual loss of control by the ICU to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which benefited from Ethiopian intervention on its side. The Islamic Courts Union’s defeat of the coalition of the warlords in Mogadishu, the swift military swing which it engaged to overrun the entire Somalia, its haste in implementing strict laws, especially the ban on the use of khat, the force with which it quelled demonstrations against the khat ban and its attempt to attack and sack the Transitional Federal Government, based in Baidoa, which was backed by a significant deployment of Ethiopian soldiers, together with its declaration of jihad against Ethiopia and Western allies on 26 October 2006, combined to bring the Courts to a disastrous end, following the massive and overt involvement of the Ethiopian armed forces on the side of the TFG, overrunning the Courts in less than two weeks.

Thirdly, and very importantly, the Islamic Courts Union tended to represent a grand coalition of all the radical Islamists in Somalia. At inception, the ICU – though fundamentalist in ideological leanings – had a sizable number of respectable “moderate fundamentalists” in full control. The Islamic Courts’ Union exploited the feelings of frustration and hopelessness among ordinary Somalis on the one hand and the disenchantment and loss of faith in the system by the elite on the other hand. By early 2006, these feelings had reached breaking point and the ICU wasted no time in capitalizing on it to drive itself into reckoning (International Crisis Group 2007: 3; Marchal 2007: i. d).

The early infiltration of the Courts by powerful jihadi elements, mostly the radical elements of the AIAI, who became key figures in the ICU, transformed it into a very strong politically motivated and ideologically driven institution. It launched fundamentalist Islamism in Somalia to new heights beyond the level AIAI had ever attained. It created a military (militia)
wing, the Shabaab, which was made up of ruthless and war-hungry young men, trained in the art of war and insurgency (International Crisis Group 2006:10). This group was to be actively involved in acts of terrorism within Somalia, at the peak of the Courts’ brief reign, and in insurgency after the ouster of the Courts in December 2006 (International Crisis Group 2007: 8).

The ICU took control of Mogadishu in June 2006, but its attempt to take control of the entire state of Somalia in December of the same year culminated in a two-week war that devastated the ICU and is believed to have disorganized the Islamists, at least in the interim (International Crisis Group 2006:11-14). The dimensions of the war were unprecedented. The evidence that some international jihadi organizations rendered assistance to the ICU tended to reflect the tacit support given to Ethiopia by the international community in its overt military engagement inside Somalia (International Crisis Group 2007: 4). It is reported that countries like Eritrea and Yemen supplied much of the weapons and equipment used to prosecute the war, while foreign fighters (Jihadists and al-Qaeda elements) were also involved (International Crisis Group 2007: 4-6; UN Security Council 2007: 9). The story of Daniel Maldonado, aged 28, an American Muslim convert who was reported in the New York Times of 20 March 2007 as having pleaded guilty in a Texas court to a charge of receiving terrorist training in an al-Qaeda-run camp in Somalia is an example. In the news report, captioned “National Briefing/ Southwest: Texas: Guilty Plea in Terrorism Case”, Maldonado confessed to having traveled to Somalia in December 2006, where he received training in the use of firearms and explosives, to fight on the side of the ICU in order to bring down the TFG and install an Islamic state. Maldonado was living in Egypt, from where he made the journey. He was captured by Kenyan security forces and repatriated to the United States (New York Times. 20 March 2007: 16).

On 27 December 2006, the ICU announced, through the Council of Somali Islamic Courts, that it was dissolving itself (International Crisis Group 2007: 1). It was strongly felt that the ICU was disorganized and not disintegrated or dissolved. This is because all the “institutions and grassroots networks of revolutionary Islam in Somali, the mosques, schools, charities and private businesses”, that produced the likes of Shabaab, were still intact (International Crisis Group 2007: 1). Indeed, the Shabaab threat to engage in guerrilla war with the Transitional Federal Government and the Ethiopian troops inside Somalia was made good, as is evidenced
by the growing incidence of hit-and-run attacks on TFG and Ethiopian troop targets (UN Security Council 2007: 17).

4.4 Terrorist and al-Qaeda activities inside Somalia

Since the Somali state’s collapse, and especially over the past decade, Somalia developed a growing reputation as not only providing a congenial environment for terrorists but also as a place where terrorism can flourish. Indeed, arguments have raged over the years regarding the level of terrorist activities that can be ascribed to Somalia. Some analysts feel that Somalia is merely experiencing Islamist fundamentalism, which is not uncommon in many other countries where Islam is dominant. Others maintain that it is simply one of the many examples of religious surges that have become commonplace across the world. That being the case, they argued, the rising Islamist hype does not pose any regional or international security threat, as some in the West would want the world to believe (Kaplan 2007: i.d). Ross (2006: i.d), writing from the vantage point of a past insider, a former employee of al Haramain Islamic Foundation in Somalia, pointed out that about seventeen active terrorist training camps have existed in Somalia for many years (Ross, D. and Roggio, B. 2006: i.d). This, coupled with the al-Qaeda-like propaganda tapes, the presence of foreign fighters inside Somalia and the revelations of Gouled Hassan Dourad, a Guantanamo detainee, concerning al-Itihaad planned attacks on US military bases in Djibouti, shooting down of Ethiopian airliners and the kidnappings of Western NGO aid workers, confirm that terrorist activities are rife within Somalia (International Crisis Group 2005b: 1). The US Institute of Peace (2004: 9) described Somalia as “a collapsed state, where terrorists can operate beyond the law”. In its 28 April 2006 release on terrorism, the US Department of State cited Somalia as a terrorist safe haven, defining a terrorist safe haven as “an area of relative security exploited by terrorists to indoctrinate, recruit, coalesce, train and regroup as well as prepare and support their operations” (US Department of State 2006: i. d).

Not long after the state collapse in 1991, Somalia was fingered as providing an enabling environment for the 7 August 1998 terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in which two hundred and forty Kenyans, eleven Tanzanians and twelve Americans lost their lives, with over five thousand Kenyans and eighty-six Tanzanians injured. The US, which has since placed Somalia under surveillance, categorized Somalia as a terrorist safe haven soon after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US. The US
placed Aden Hashi Ayro, the then leader of the al-Itihaad, who was trained in an al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan, on the list of most wanted terrorists. The terrorist attack on an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombassa and an attempt on a passenger plane on the runway at the Mombassa International Airport, Kenya, in November 2002 featured Somalia as providing the operational environment for the terrorists who carried out those attacks to finalize their plans. They were shielded inside Somalia before the attacks, shielded in their movements across the Somali borders into the countries where the attacks took place and then shielded back into Somalia after the attacks (International Crisis Group 2005: 1). There was to be another attack on the American embassy in Nairobi in 2003. The attack, which would have involved the use of a light aircraft, was foiled by Kenyan security operatives (Dempsey 2006: 14; Menkhaus 2004: 71; International Crisis Group 2005: 9). In all these incidents, for which al-Qaeda claimed responsibility, “Somalia was a trans-shipment site and safe haven” which provided shielding for the terrorist (International Crisis Group 2006: 11; http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org; US Institute of Peace 2004: 4), while al-Qaeda funded and provided the “expertise to the attackers, procuring sophisticated weapons for the attacks, and acting as a source of ideological inspiration for the attackers” (Dempsey 2006: 15). Ayro had been credited with terrorist activities inside Somalia, including assassinations of foreign aid workers and Somalis suspected of collaborating with America and Ethiopia (International Crisis Group 2005b: 5). These attacks heightened the fear of the danger the failed state of Somalia posed to the neighbouring region and global security, in general. For example, al-Itihaad al-Islami (IAIA) conducted several terrorist attacks inside Ethiopia in the 1990s, including the assassination attempt on the Minister of the Interior in 1996, which it made bold to claim. Although some analysts tend to see such attacks by the Somali Islamist organization as a mark of Somali irredentism against its neighbours (International Crisis Group 2007: 5), the argument fails to explain those terrorist acts committed inside Somalia itself. The involvement of Somalia in terrorism may be more of, but not completely limited to, acting as a training ground, safe passage and safe targets cognizance environment. As current events inside Somalia may suggest, it may be gladiating towards a hard-line Islamic state, which is the stated ultimate goal of the Islamist hardliners within Somalia.

It is difficult to qualify the extent of terrorist operations in Somalia, because of the fluidity of the environment. One point which seems clear is that some elements in the Islamist organizations inside Somalia have connections with al-Qaeda. The US has pointed repeatedly to the existence of an al-Qaeda cell inside Somalia which appears to be shielding foreign al-
 Qaeda operatives who are not only involved in the training of local Jihadists but also provide the link between these local islamists and the foreign jihadi outside Somalia (Crisis Group 2005b: 8; Crisis Group 2006: 11; http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org). For instance, evidence of terrorist activities linked to individuals such as Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl (former al-Qaeda member) and Khalfan Khamis Mohamed (a Tanzanian arrested in 1999 following the 1998 bombings) and others that have emerged over the years in the conflict inside Somalia itself tend to justify this claim. Mohamed testified in a US court that al-Qaeda operatives were training Somali Islamists at the AIAI camp in Luug between 1991 and 1996 (Ross, D. and Roggio, B 2006: i.d), and that the operatives involved in the 1998 embassies’ attacks stayed at the Ras Kiamboni camp in the Lower Juba region in 1997, while preparing for attacks (Golden and Weiser 2001: i.d). The Ethiopian military over-ran the AIAI camp in Luug following a terrorist attack in Ethiopia and recovered some documents said to confirm the presence of al-Qaeda elements in the camp. AIAI in 1991 took over the Bosaaso Port in an offensive, and used it as an important camp. It also established training camps in many parts of Somalia.

Some of the al-Qaeda elements believed to be operating inside Somalia include Jamaa Ali Isma’il (Kutiye) a former Somali commando who fought with al-Itihaad from 1992; Ibrahim al-Afghani, who reportedly fought in Afghanistan and Kashmir and later returned to Somalia to join al-Itihaad; Da’ud Salah Iidle, the former deputy manager of the local branch of the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, which Somali office the US charged in 2003 with being linked to al-Qaeda; and Farhan Abdulle Mohamed, who was a student at a school run by the Tablighi Jamaat and later joined the freelance militias. These men are listed as Ayro’s hit men inside Somalia (Ross 2006: i.d.). The murders of two British teachers, one Italian nurse (a nun), a notable BBC correspondent and a German aid worker have been traced to Ayro and his men since 2003 (Dempsey 2006: 13-14; International Crisis Group 2005b: 5-6). Other al-Qaeda operatives believed to be operating in Somalia include Ali Saleh Nabhan and Fazul Abdullah Mohamed, who were mentored by Tariq Abdullah (Abu Talha al-Sudani), the Sudanese close associate of Bin Laden. Abu Talha al-Sudani is the head of al-Qaeda in East Africa (International Crisis Group 2005b: 5; International Crisis Group 2005a: 14). Both men were key operatives in the Mombasa attack of November 2002 and were involved in the preparations for the attacks on the 1998 US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, according to the testimonies of Suleiman Ahmed (Issa Tanzania captured in April 2003). Suleiman was a co-participant, together with Issa Osman, in the Mombassa attack.
It is important to take note of the significance of the testimony that the terrorists that carried out the attacks returned to Somalia at the end of each of the attacks (International Crisis Group 2005b: 8; Ross 2006: i.d). Hassan Turki and Hassan Dahir Aweys, both leaders of the al-Itihaad, are believed to be involved in the al-Qaeda attacks on the U.S embassies, coordinating the preparations on the ground, leading to the attack (International Crisis Group 2005b: 6). Both men are on the US list of most wanted terrorists; Aweys was placed in 2001 and Turki in 2004 (International Crisis Group 2005b: 8). Godane Abdi, who fought in Afghanistan, Mohamed Mwakuuua Kuza; Ali Swedhan and Samir Said are also believed to be hiding inside Somalia. Rohan Gunaratna, in his book, *Inside Al-Qaeda Global Network of Terror*, recounted the case of al-Qaeda’s first military commander and Emir, Ali al-Rashidi, popularly called Abu Ubadiyah al-Banshiri, who died in the Bukova-Mwanza ferry accident of 21 May 1996 on Lake Victoria, Kenya, along with another 479 passengers on board. He was said to be preparing for the embassy attacks when he was involved in the accident (Gunaratna 2002: 26). Linking al-Banshiri to Somalia, Gunaratna (2002:26) writes: “Al Banshiri had been traveling on a Dutch passport, attending to a host of al-Qaeda matters, both military and business, in Africa, from the Somalia operation to dealing in gold and diamonds”.

The al-Qaeda Somalia cell is believed to be very active and poses a continued threat to the entire region. Fazul Abdullah Mohamed, the accused Comorean mastermind of the 1998 US East African embassies attacks and the 2002 attacks in Mombassa, is said to have been sighted in Kenya in 2003 and 2004 and is believed to have returned to Mogadishu with Ali Saleh Nabhan. The US security forces are looking for the duo, together with Abu Taha al-Sudani (Quaranto 2008: 28). According to the International Crisis Group (2005b: 9), “[t]he members of al-Qaeda’s Somalia cell are today among the most wanted fugitives on the planet”.

The International Crisis Group notes in its *Africa’s Briefing No. 45* that the Somali Islamists connections with al-Qaeda may not be compared to that of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, but avers that the fact of protection with “hard-to-trace financial transactions and transportation of goods and personnel”, which a failed state’s environment offers is the major attraction for al-Qaeda to Somalia (International Crisis Group 2007: 6). The complete absence of “functioning police, immigration, customs and intelligence agencies”, the unmanned beach ports and the very long and unguarded coast-lines of Somalia have provided
a shield for people and materials to move in undetected and then inland into the Somali heartland, Kenya or Ethiopia (International Crisis Group 2005b: 1). Also critical is the presence of many landing strips that are capable of taking light airplanes. Airlifts are the most convenient and fastest way of movement in and out of the region. Money transfer and telecommunication companies are also implicated as being involved in financial facilitations for al-Qaeda. In the absence of a regular banking system, these companies transact financial businesses without keeping documentation, thereby foreclosing any possibility of tracing transactions (UN Security Council 2006: 9, 18-20; Congressional Research Service 2002: 16). The United States Institute of Peace, in its January 2004 report, titled “Terrorism in the Horn of Africa”, observes that Somalia plays a specialized role in Islamic [sic] terrorism, being that it serves “primarily as a short-term transit point for the movement of people and materials through the porous and corrupt border between Somalia into [sic] Kenya, which has been a preferred site of terrorist attacks” (United States Institute of Peace 2004: 9).

The presence of foreign fighters (Jihadists) inside Somalia seems to have been corroborated over the years by different independent sources. In its 17 January 2002 report to the US Congress on “Africa and the War on Terror”, the Congressional Research Service reported the capture of Afghan and Arab fighters and the impounding of documents and pictures in an Ethiopian operation inside Somalia, following several terrorist attacks inside Ethiopia from across the Somali border (Congressional Research Service 2002: 2). Most recently, in the December 2006 fight between the Islamic Courts Union and the Transitional Federal Government, backed by Ethiopian forces, it is reported the a large number of foreign Islamist fighters fought on the side of the Islamic Courts (International Crisis Group: 2007: 4). The overt involvement of the Ethiopian forces, and the circulation in the public domain of America’s covert involvement, was enough to mobilize both domestic and foreign fighters behind the Islamic Courts. The 2006 move by the radical Islamic Courts Union to wrest control of the entire Somalia from the warlords in the first instance, and later from the Transitional Federal Government (Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen 2007: 65; Quaranto 2008: 27), saw the greatest mobilization of foreign jihadis into Somalia (International Crisis Group: 2007: 4).

In 2004, the US Institute of Peace stated, in its “Special Report: Terrorism in the Horn of Africa”, that the risks presented by the lawless nature of the Somali environment and the absence of Western targets inside Somalia portrays a Somalia that may only be used as a
transit by terrorists (US Institute of Peace 2004: 9). This statement may well have been overtaken by events, as Somalia gradually (but steadily) gravitates towards becoming part of a formidable terrorist axis, with thriving al-Qaeda hub and nodes, executing attacks inside Somalia against Western aid workers and locals suspected of collaborating with America and Ethiopia (Dempsey 2006: 13-14). A web message claiming to be from Osama bin Laden was posted on the web on 1 July 2006, urging Somalis to rise to the occasion of building Somalia into an Islamic state, while at the same time warning the US and its allies of the preparedness of al-Qaeda to fight them in defense of Somalia (Tadesse 2001: i.d). On 10 October 2006, a local Sharia court in Beledweyne called for a jihad against Ethiopia, and the Islamic Courts leadership declared the same on the 26 October 2006. Following these three events, there was an influx of foreign fighters into Somalia, mostly from the middle-east and the “Northern Tier” countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Yemen and Pakistan (Tadesse 2001: i.d; Ross, D. and Roggio, B 2006: i.d; http://en.wikipedia.org).

The Islamic Courts have continued to send mixed signals regarding the presence of foreign fighters inside Somalia. While it officially denies their existence, some of its leadership, allude in their statements to their existence. For example, Sheikh Yusuf Indohaadde, one of the Islamic Courts’ leaders, was quoted as saying, “We want to say in a loud voice that we have no enemies, we have no enmity towards anyone. There are no foreign terrorists here” (Ross, D. and Roggio, B 2006: i.d). By contrast, Sheikh Hassan Abdullah Hersi was quoted while addressing Islamist fighters and Islamic Courts supporters after they captured Kismayo, as saying, “Brothers in Islam, we came from Mogadishu and we have thousands of fighters, some are Somalis and others are from the Muslim world. If Christian-led America brought its infidels, we now call our Muslim holy fighters to come [and] join us” (Ross, D. and Roggio, B 2006: i.d). The content of an audio tape that was released in June 2006, claiming to be from bin Laden, declared the current struggle in Somalia an affair of the global jihad, stating, “We will continue, God willing, to fight you and your allies everywhere, in Iraq and Afghanistan and in Somalia and Sudan, until we waste all your money and kill your men and you return to your country in defeat as we defeated you before in Somalia”. Following a United Nations consideration of a hybrid African Union peacekeeping mission for Somalia, bin Laden, in July 2006, issued yet another statement saying: “we warn all the countries in the world from accepting a US proposal to send international forces to Somalia. We swear to God that we will fight their soldiers in Somalia and we reserve the right to punish them on their lands and every accessible place at the appropriate time and in the appropriate manner” (Ross, D. and
Roggio, B 2006: i.d). Between these statements, credited to bin Laden, and the December 2006 battle between the Islamic Courts and the Transitional Federal Government, supported by large Ethiopian forces, many Diaspora Somalis and foreign Jihadis were attracted into Somalia (International Crisis Group 2007: 4). It was alleged that by the time of the battle in December 2006 about 2000 Eritrean soldiers and between 4000 and 5000 other foreign Jihadists were involved on the side of the Islamic Courts Union (http://en.wikipedia.org).

Given the above context, it is not surprising that a growing insurgency, characterized by incidents of suicide bombings, car bombings, ambushes and other forms of guerrilla tactics, typical of international Jihadis, which has become rampant since the “defeat” of the Islamic Courts Union in December 2006, is threatening to take the significance of terrorist activities in Somalia to a higher level. It is also unsurprising that Somalia has become a target of significant counter-terrorism initiatives spear-headed by the American government. It is to those activities that we now turn our attention.
CHAPTER FIVE
COUNTERTERRORISM INITIATIVES IN SOMALIA

5.1 Introduction
Terrorism in the Horn of Africa was inaugurated with the December 1980 terrorist bombing of the Norfolk Hotel, owned by an Israeli, in Nairobi, Kenya, in which 16 people were killed and over one hundred injured. There were also scattered terrorist incidents in Kenya and Ethiopia in the early 1990s. But it was the 1998 bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania that seized global attention, and compelled the United States of America to unleash its counterterrorism programme to address the possible danger the Horn of Africa, particularly the failed state of Somalia, poses to international security. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon – in the heart of the US -- defined by US officialdom as an act of war, marked the beginning of a more robust and decisive United States counterterrorism effort to deal with a “war against the United States, peaceful people throughout the world, and the very principles of liberty and human dignity” (National Strategy: 2). This saw the initiation of numerous programmes, and the overhauling of some existing ones, geared towards combating terrorism globally. It also resulted in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) becoming a cardinal element in US foreign policy. The US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, first published in February 2003 and reviewed in March 2006, stated: “America is at war with transnational terrorist movement” (National Strategy 2006: 1). The achievement of the targeted goals of America’s global war on terror would entail success in the following areas: the defeat of terrorists and their organizations; denial of sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists; diminishing or eliminating the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; and defending US citizens and interests at home and abroad (US National Strategy 2006: 1; Piombo 2007: i.d). Specifically, the US National Strategy (2006: 1) outlines the short-term and long-term components of the War on Terror:

Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism; Prevent attacks by terrorist networks; Deny weapons of mass destruction to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them; Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and lay the foundation and build the institutions and structures we need to carry the fight forward against terror and help ensure our ultimate success.
It is in the light of the above tasks which America’s National Strategy enumerated for the War on Terror that the global thrust of the United States of America can be understood, the war on terror being primarily U.S. global engagement targeted at the protection of US citizens and property all around the world. This, therefore, explains the affirmation in the same U.S. *National Strategy for combating terrorism* that “the paradigm for combating terrorism” currently “involves the application of all elements of our national power” (National Strategy 2006: I). With the above resolve, the U.S. expresses its intention to cooperate with other states in this “war”, but at the same time stresses its readiness to go it alone in defending its interests and citizens worldwide (National Strategy 2006: 6; Dempsey 2008: i.d).

### 5.2 US Counterterrorism programmes in Africa

Since the 1998 East African embassy bombings, Africa has attracted a higher degree of consideration as an important environment in discussions of global terrorism and the United States’ global counterterrorism initiative. Though this work focuses on the Horn of Africa, and Somalia in particular, it is relevant to observe that Africa as a whole has occupied an important place in the general security calculus of the United States of America in its war against terrorism. Many problems confronting African states such as poverty, disease, prolonged wars and armed conflicts, weak governments, lack of adequate democratic space and issues of ungoverned spaces have attracted special concerns of the US security strategists in its global war on terror. These problems are viewed as inherently predisposing the region to terrorism and transforming almost the entire African continent into an “emerging haven” for terrorists (Wycoff 2004: i.d; Pope 2004: i.d; [www.globalsecurity.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org)). Therefore, since 2002 the US has engaged Africa in diverse initiatives geared towards combating and containing terrorism all over Africa. Some of these programmes include the 2002 Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI); the 2003 Joint Task Force AZTEC SILENCE; the 2003 East African Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI); and the 2005 Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI).

The Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) was initiated by the United States as an anti-terrorist programme involving the four Saharan states of Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Placed under the US European Command (EUCOM) by the US Department of Defense (DOD), the PSI was mandated to train and equip at least one rapid-response company of about 150 soldiers in each of the participating African states. This programme was ended in 2004. The
Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) was established in 2005, building on the
programmes of the defunct Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI). In establishing the Trans Sahara
Counterterrorism Initiative, the US Department of Defense took into consideration the
seeming vulnerability of the entire Maghreb and Sahel regions of Africa with their vast
expanse of desert, the porous borders and the ancient trade routes that have been maintained
across the regions. Informing this consideration is the security implications of a continued use
of these tracks by transnational criminals for illicit businesses and arms trades and free
passage and safe haven for terrorists (Motlagh 2004: i.d). The Trans Sahara Counterterrorism
Initiative was expanded to a ten-nation programme that includes Chad, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia. The major tasks of TSCTI included
the building of military capacity in intelligence and quick response, developing collaboration
among the participating states and with the United States, as willing partners towards security
and other stability-threatening issues as they arise in the region. The aim was to develop
among the participants the capacity and the will for information sharing and collaboration in
the planning and execution of operations. In this regard the TSCTI aims to strengthen
“regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhance and institutionalize cooperation among the
region’s security forces, and promote democratic governance” (Wycoff 2004: i.d; Pope 2004:
i.d; www.globalsecurity.org). The major US commitment in this programme is centered on
improving security capacities within the region for “detecting and deterring” terrorists
through the provision of training and equipment. The regulation of financial transactions
which support international and transnational terrorism, airport security and other social
issues such as educational assistance, form components of the TSCTI with the Department of
Treasury (DOT), Department of State (DOS), and the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) taking responsibility, respectively. Therefore, the TSCTI is an
interagency programme with a military component codenamed Operation Enduring Freedom
– Trans Sahara (OEF-TS). This initiative has been funded to the tune of one hundred million
US dollars ($100million) per year since 2005 and would run for an initial five years (Wycoff

The Joint Task Force (JTF) Aztec Silence was another counterterrorism programme initiated
and established by the United States in 2003, primarily targeting transnational terrorism in the
“under-governed” areas of North Africa. The high point of this programme is the
establishment of an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance base (station) in Sicily,
which aims at detecting, tracking and intercepting the mobile satellite and technical
communication equipment employed by the terrorist groups in the region in the execution of their plans. This project aimed at sharing any such information gathered among all the partnering states for collaborative action against transnational terrorist groups (www.globalsecurity.org). The US, aims by these capacity-building initiatives, at reducing as much as practicable, its physical military involvement in Africa.

Southern and Central Africa do not feature that much in the international counterterrorism programmes. These two regions tend not to be among the high-risk areas in terrorism, according to security reports (Piombo 2007: i.d). The only counterterrorism-oriented programme meant for these two regions is the International Law Enforcement Agency (ILEA) established in the Botswana capital, Gaborone, and run by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This programme is focused on enhancing the “general law enforcement” capabilities of the regional states. To achieve this, programmes were drawn for training the states’ law enforcement and security personnel in intelligence gathering and operations, and equipping them for their counterterrorism operations (Piombo 2007: i.d).

Generally, the US Departments engage with individual countries in Africa, the AU and the sub-regional organizations in counterterrorism initiatives with the aim of building enduring human and institutional capacities. This, the US hopes, will impact further actions towards increased bilateral and regional security initiatives. The Department of State assisted financially and through the provision of expertise in the establishment of the AU’s African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism, which was sited in Algiers, the Algerian capital, in 2004 (Wycoff 2004: i.d). Several conferences and workshops on terrorism and counterterrorism have been hosted by the African Union, resourced and funded by US agencies. The Department of State and the National Defense University’s African Centre for Strategic Studies assisted the AU technically and financially in organizing many of its counterterrorism events. These programmes include the Small Arms and Light Weapons Workshop in Burkina Faso in December 2006; Counterterrorism Workshop in Algeria, January 2007; Workshop on Managing Security Resources in Africa in Malawi, September 2007; Counterterrorism Seminar in Ethiopia, November 2007; and with that in Tanzania, scheduled for April 2008 (Fields 2007: 9). The National Defense University’s African Centre for Strategic Studies opened its first African annex in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, early in December 2006. The “Community Chapters” were later to follow in 19 other countries that include Benin Republic, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti,

5.3 Counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa
The Horn of Africa has been considered by terrorism experts and counterterrorism concerns as being the most terrorist-prone region in Africa and thus poses the greatest challenge to global peace and security in Africa, among other regions, in comparative security analysis (Pope 2004: i.d). Testifying on the Horn of Africa before the House International Relations Committee, Karl Wycoff, an associate coordinator in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the US Department of State, declared that “although we [the US] are concerned about attacks elsewhere in Africa, we consider the Horn Of Africa – Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Kenya, and Tanzania – to be the area of most risk” (Wycoff 2004: i.d). William Pope, the US Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism, expressed the same opinion at the 21 April 2004 East African Counterterrorism Initiative Conference in Uganda, when he stated that “the continent of Africa is vulnerable to the threat of international terrorism and ... of particular importance in the global effort to counter terrorist threats” but pointed out that “East Africa and the Horn” were “at particular risk” (Pope 2004: i.d). Quaranto (2008:35) reflected the attitude of US officials towards the Horn as that of “a front line of the war on terror”. This region seems to witness the most robust forms of US counterterrorism activities in Africa. Both the above assessment and the perceived higher US counterterrorism involvement in this region can be understood in the light of the 1980 terrorist attack on an Israeli-owned hotel in Kenya, the August 27, 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and the November 2002 simultaneous attacks in Mombassa, Kenya, on an Israeli-owned hotel and on an Israel bound aircraft at take-off from the Mombassa International Airport, Kenya (US Institute of Peace 2004: 2). Other factors that have been pointed out as having specially predisposed the Horn of Africa as a high security risk area include its proximity to the Arabian Peninsular, the events in Somalia – the rising Islamist fundamentalism, continuing armed conflict and the enduring state collapse. Also significant is the very large areas with weak or no government controls and the seeming lack of capacity by the local security agencies of the states in the region to effectively contend with the threat of terrorism ( Menkhaus 2004: 67; Pope 2004: i.d; Wycoff 2004: i.d). The 2002 Mombassa attacks were like a “wake-up call” for the US comprehensive counterterrorism interest and involvement in Africa, as the attacks signaled
the fact that the terrorist cells involved in the earlier attacks may still be intact and widening their reach on local populations in the region and the possibility of future attacks on Western interests (Wycoff 2004: i.d). These events and the accompanying security perceptions were to define dramatically and permanently the course of US foreign policy thrust in this region, with a great measure of securitization of almost every aspect of interaction with all the regional states (Quaranto 2008: 11).

In June 2003, the East African Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) was established with a US$100 million take-off fund; it is scheduled to run for an initial five years. This programme was primarily “designed to strengthen the capabilities of [US] partners in the region to combat terrorism and foster cooperation among these governments” (International Crisis Group 2005: 9; Wycoff 2004: i.d). Specific areas targeted by the programme include the training of the military of the regional states and other capacity-building programmes for the local military and security forces in border, coastal and aviation security. Also targeted was the building of capacity for regional cooperation against terrorist financing. Serious attention was given to the need to put in place programmes that were aimed at strengthening democratic institutions and effective governance (Wycoff 2004: i.d). This explains why the US counterterrorism involvement in East Africa unfolded in a wide range of cooperative programmes, with the region as a block and also with some of the individual states.

The programme implementation focused on law enforcement training for regional states. It was designed to enable these states to acquire and develop their own domestic capabilities in a number of areas: the detection of explosive devices and safe rendering, investigating attacks, hostage negotiations, protection of VIPs, and crisis management. Kenya, not surprisingly -- going by the spate of terrorist incidents it has experienced and perceived continued terrorist interest in the country, seems to be ahead of other regional states in receiving attention in these programmes. Through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance executed by the US Department of State, Kenya had about 594 of its security officers trained abroad in the most current intelligence gathering, counterterrorism and general security methods. About four and half million US Dollars worth of security assistance was extended to it between June 2003 and March 2003 (Pope 2004: i. d). The US interagency Terrorist Finance Working Group (TFWG) in the office of the Associate Coordinator for Counterterrorism collaborated with Kenya to develop Kenya’s Anti-Money Laundering/Counterterrorism Financing System. In 2004, a team of experts comprising one representative each from the US Department of
Justice, the Caribbean Anti-Money Laundering Programme (CALP) and a “legal expert from the United Kingdom” supported Kenya in drafting its anti-money laundering/counterterrorism finance legislation. Later Kenya was able to put in place an Anti-Terrorism Police Unit and the National Security Advisory Committee, to oversee all the national counterterrorism structures. It also established the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (Wycoff 2004: i.d).

In aviation counterterrorism, the US introduced the Terrorist Interdiction Programme (TIP), which enables a country’s security and immigration officials to check the identities of travelers leaving or entering their respective countries against the most current international “terrorist watch-list”, via the TIP computer systems installed in airports, seaports and border posts. This has enhanced the ability to share information on suspected individuals. The measure is aimed at curtailing the ability of terrorists to move undetected through the official entry ports of one country into another. The project connects national airports and border posts security monitoring to INTERPOL, enhancing collection, comparison and analysis of information on travelers. It enhances the “global effort to understand terrorist methods and track their movements” (Wycoff 2004: i.d). This programme in East Africa is credited to the Kenyan government’s desire to monitor all its entry ports and border posts following the 1998 and 2002 terrorist attacks within its borders. By the end of 2004, this programme was up and running in Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Uganda.

Earlier in 2002, the US had established the Combined Joined Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). CJTF-HOA has remained the most comprehensive, strategic and robust US counterterrorism programme in Africa. With a base in Camp Lemonire, Djibouti, the programme is targeted at “detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating” terrorist groups operating in the Horn of Africa. It has about 1600 personnel, made up of military, civilians and representatives of the coalition partners about 1500 of whom are US citizens (Quaranto 2008: 38; www.globalsecurity.org). African forces are not involved in its operations, despite being named “Combined Joint Task Force”. The force’s areas of responsibility include the “total airspace and land areas of Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Ethiopia, in Africa, and Yemen, in the Arabian Peninsula” (Cox 2003: i.d). As part of its designed program, the CJTF-HOA has since set up what is called “lily pads” in Uganda and Kenya (Quaranto 2008: 38; Ploch 2007: 7). In line with the US policy shift in war on terror, the programme emphasizes the training of national security forces, to enhance their capacities to
combat terrorism and ensure regional security and stability, the militaries of Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya receiving more attention in this regard than other countries in the region (Shinn 2004: 41; Quaranto 2008: 38). As a reflection of the same US policy shift, the CJTF-HOA has initiated some human security involvement in the region that focuses on certain peculiar problems facing the people. They have delved into water provision (drilling wells), medical care and renovation of medical and educational infrastructure (Hill 2006: 634; Pope 2004: i.d; Quaranto 2008: 39; www.globalsecurity.org). This fits into the battle for the “hearts and minds” (International Crisis Group 2005b: 11) of the population in the region. This new policy thrust tends to have acknowledged that certain discomforting human security conditions prevailing in weak and collapsed states tend to “create an environment more conducive for terrorism” (Pope 2004: i.d). The establishment of the African Command (AFRICOM) in 2007 falls under a wider securitization of Africa and is still unfolding.

5.4 IGAD and counterterrorism

The Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) came into being as a development assessment and cooperation organization among some East African states which include Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda. Its main aims are “to promote joint development strategies and to create an environment for foreign, cross-border and domestic trade and investment” (Cox 2003: i.d). Following the security challenges posed by conflicts within some member states and some other neighboring non-member states, and the terrorist incidents in the region, security issues became incorporated into the agenda of IGAD. The initial security concern of IGAD was to find lasting solutions to the protracted conflicts in Somalia and Southern Sudan which, in themselves, were perceived as “conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism” in the region (Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation 2008: 15). The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the US, the consequent reactions of the global community to the attack, and the various initiatives that were to follow on a global, regional and sub-regional level meant that IGAD had to include terrorism as a frontline issue in its programme (Abraham 2005: i.d).

The 9th IGAD Summit, which was hosted by Sudan in January 2002 focused extensively on the threat of terrorism in the region and the regional response to terrorist incidents within the region (Institute for Security Studies 2003: i.d). This Summit gave rise to the IGAD Counterterrorism Conference of June 2003 in Addis Ababa, to explore how much terrorism had affected the individual states and the region and to formulate a regional plan of action.
against terrorism. The outcome of this Conference was the “Draft Implementation Plan to Counter Terrorism in the IGAD Region” which was approved and adopted at the 10th IGAD Summit on October 24, 2003 (Institute for Security Studies 2003: i.d). The issues addressed by this document, according to the Institute for Security Studies (2003), include that of

- enhancing operational capacity to control illegal cross border movement,
- enhancing operational capacity to record and share information; measures to ensure the protection of human rights during counterterrorism operations;
- and education programmes to enhance public support.

The meeting of Ministers of Justice of the IGAD member states in Kampala on September 20-21, 2007 on the theme “Legal Cooperation against Terrorism” evaluated the implementation of the various aspects of the Counterterrorism Plan and the activities of the IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT) (http://www.igad.org).

ICPAT, with headquarters in Addis Ababa, was launched on 14 June 2006 as a four-year programme. Its objectives included: the enhancement of judicial measures among member states; the optimization of interdepartmental cooperation; the improvement of border security; general capacity-building by training of security forces; information sharing; and the promotion of strategic cooperation among the security and intelligence operatives of member states (IGAD 2006: i.d). ICPAT has been playing an important role in individual member states and regionally in IGAD’s modest counterterrorism initiatives. The publication of the Compendium of International and Regional Legal Instruments Related to the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism by ICPAT, with technical assistance from the Institute for Security Studies, is seen as an important contribution. The publication dwelt on familiarizing both the judicial and legislative authorities of all the member states with various international antiterrorism initiatives. Held in Addis Ababa on 4-5 March 2008, it specially emphasized the need to lay the foundation for concerted combat against terrorism, by “ensuring that the relevant international and regional conventions and protocols are signed, ratified and implemented in the IGAD region” (Institute for Security Studies: i. d).

ICPAT, in conjunction with the East African Police Chiefs Coordination Organization (EAPCCO), developed a training programme on counterterrorism for selected law enforcement officers in the member states. This four-week programme covers courses in terrorism, migration and transnational crime, international conventions, community policing, mutual legal assistance, crisis management, border security management, terrorist financing and money laundering, crime scene management, respect for human rights, alternate
strategies to resist terrorism and the role of INTERPOL. Interestingly, Somali police officers began their four weeks training on October 30, 2007 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This is an important development. It suggests an acceptance that Somalia is not irredeemable and shows that efforts are being made by the IGAD and the TFG of Somalia to address the problems within Somalia. Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan have all had the same course for their law enforcement officers, the latest being Ethiopia, beginning on 1 August 2008 and others are to follow (IGAD 2006: i.d). That the ICPAT programmes have attracted foreign donor and partnering organizations shows the extent of the confidence it commands. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark funded a two-day conference on “Implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in East Africa – Building National Capacities”, organized by ICPAT in collaboration with the Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation in Addis Ababa on 4-5 March 2008. The conference, which had in attendance all the ministries and parastatals security stakeholders in all the IGAD member states, was geared towards forging an understanding among member states, relevant multilateral bodies and all stakeholders in the region in the implementation of the UN Counterterrorism Strategy by strengthening “cooperative counterterrorism” initiatives in the region. The conference also targeted identifying the needs of individual member states for more counterterrorism efficiency to guide its drive to “secure tangible and relevant international support for this important task of assuring security in the region” (Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation 2008: 1).

The IGAD counterterrorism efforts have been regionally focused, but also without specific attention to any particular territory such as Somalia. IGAD involvement in Somalia has been more on the issue of conflict resolution. This can be understood in the light of the divergent views of some of the member states. Ethiopia and Sudan, for example, view the issue of terrorism differently and so differ on solutions to terrorism, especially where it concerns the involvement of the US. Through its efforts at capacity building, IGAD has not only made an invaluable contribution to counterterrorism in the region but also has the potential to produce an integrated counterterrorism mantle in the region, given consistence and commitment by all the member states.
5.5 Counterterrorism in Somalia

Somalia was the focal point in the war against terror in the Horn of Africa. The collapse of the Somali state and the security implications of such a collapse domestically, regionally and globally, are not lost to a world that has witnessed a rise in high-profile terrorist attacks. The linkage of Somalia to the 1998 terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2002 Mombassa hotel and airport attacks, in all of which Somalia served as the operational base, raised Somali terrorist-risk and threat level. Added to these were the activities of the radical al-Itihaad al-Islaami (AIAI), especially in the 1990s. Al-Itihaad was an Islamist organization propagating the transformation of Somalia into an Islamic state to be governed under strict Islamic law. The counterterrorism attention, which Somalia has attracted from both its neighbors and the international community since 2000, is not unconnected with the rise to prominence of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). From the early 2000s, ICU’s top leadership included the radical elements and former leaders of the AIAI. The speed at which the ICU was being embraced, its political posturing and eventual capture of political power in Mogadishu and its surrounding towns, following its defeat of the warlords’ alliance in June 2006, and the Islamist Courts’ lightening military offensive brought almost the whole of Somalia under its control by the middle of December 2006. The following sub-sections will explore the various counterterrorism efforts in Somalia, with special focus on seeing how far these efforts impacted the terrorism profile of Somalia.

5.5.1 Ethiopia’s involvements in Somalia

Ethiopia, of all the countries in the Horn of Africa, has had a peculiar counterterrorism experience. While most other states are involved in pursuing domestic counterterrorism measures and engagements, and/or bilateral and regional collaborative involvement, Ethiopia, in addition to those, has sought extensively to externalize its activities by taking overt actions beyond its borders against suspected terrorists whenever it deems it necessary. Its counterterrorism engagements have seen it making military incursions into Somalia on many occasions, in pursuit of suspected Islamist terrorists. Ethiopia has experienced a series of terrorist attacks from the mid-1990s. In 1995 it foiled an assassination attempt by some members of the Islamic Brotherhood of Egypt on the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa. Five of the suspects were killed and three captured by Ethiopian security forces in the foiled plot (US Institute of Peace 2004: 5). The terrorists’ weapons are said to have been flown into Ethiopia by Sudan Airways, originating from Sudan, where the terrorists’ travel documents were prepared (Abraham 2005: i.d). The internal tension created by the
domestic armed conflict by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) that are conducted from outside its borders has also kept Ethiopia on constant security alert. At the peak of its influence, the Somali radical Islamist organization, al-Itihaad al-Islami, was not only involved in the training of combatants for the Ethiopian rebel groups but had itself conducted a series of direct attacks inside Ethiopia, resulting in Ethiopia’s cross-border reprisal attacks on known AIAI training camps close to its border inside Somalia (International Crisis Group 2007: 6).

Ethiopia’s counterterrorism was its own affair at the early stage. It received no support, assistance or cooperation from any regional states or the international community. Kinfe Abraham, in a paper presented in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in January 2005, on “The Challenge of Terrorism to Africa and the Perspectives of African States” quotes an Ethiopian minister as commenting that “as a victim of a series of terrorist attacks in the last ten years, Ethiopia has been fighting it alone without any kind of material, political or moral support from the international community” (Abraham 2005: i.d). This could be understood as it was difficult to differentiate between Ethiopia’s internal insurgency – which was also an on-going experience of some other regional states like Uganda and Sudan – and terrorist activities that do not have much to do with internal grievances of its citizens.

The whole scenario was to change with the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US homeland. The US had, over the years, been concerned about the terrorist potential of the failed state of Somalia, with special reference to the growing significance and activities of the radical Islamist organization, the AIAI, an organization that expressed its intention of pushing for the realization of the “Greater Somalia” dream, under a fully-fledged Islamic state, with the Sharia legal system. It was not until after September 11 2001 that it took action against the organization. Very importantly, Ethiopia’s counterterrorism efforts benefited from the fallout of the attacks on the US. Ethiopia’s efforts started receiving a boost from the support and assistance in materials and logistics from the various US government departments and agencies saddled with countering global terrorism. It thus became a strong US ally in the Horn of Africa in the Global War on Terror, with great attention given to the rising radical Islamism in Somalia. The Islamists inside Somalia were already suspected of giving safe passage and protection to terrorists, and the environment serving as a staging ground for the 1998 US embassies’ bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The rise to prominence and the popularity and military strength of the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia, controlled by the
radical elements of the “defunct” AIAI, with jihadi ideology, raised the terrorist threat level in the region and portended grave danger to Ethiopia, considering the already existing internal contestations. Ethiopia stands out in the US counterterrorism initiatives in Somalia, being propped up as a regional power and receiving much assistance to enable it to perform the role effectively. William Pope had stated at the 2004 Ugandan Conference that the CJTF-HOA and the US Army Special Forces “continued to provide training to enhance Ethiopia border patrol and security skills” and to “enhance physical security, conduct investigations and provide surveillance in response to threat information directed at US citizens” (Pope 2004: i. d).

Ethiopia’s role in Somalia had a ‘boost’ in late 2006, with its the invitation by the TFG for assistance and protection against the Islamic Courts Union, which had taken over more than ninety percent of the important towns in southern Somalia and was gradually encircling it (the TFG) in Baioda. Ethiopian forces moved in and, in a fierce battle that lasted a little less than two weeks, overpowered and defeated the Islamic Courts forces. It is possible to see this latest Ethiopian intervention from its security perspective, rather than from the prism of its preference for any of the political platforms in the Somali conflict. The dangerous national, regional and global security implication of the emergence of a Somalia under the Jihadi Islamist government through the barrel of the gun, as the Islamic Courts Union were appearing to become, was not lost on Ethiopia, its US ally and other sensitive security watchers in the region. Ethiopia, in looking at the Islamic Courts from a security perspective, must have been suspicious of the external agenda of the organization. The Crisis Group in its Africa Report No. 45, while expressing Ethiopia’s concern for the long-term implication of an Islamic government in Somalia, may include the possibility of stimulating Islamic radicalism within Ethiopia, argued that the “Courts’ links to transnational terrorism” may have been a more important part of Ethiopia’s “immediate consideration” for fighting the Courts inside Somalia (Crisis Group 2007: 4). The US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, and Rear Admiral Richard Hunt, were reported as having emphasized at an Addis Ababa meeting in June 2006 the commitment of the US in supporting an Ethiopian military action should the Jihadists take over in Somalia (Quaranto 2008: 42). The events leading to the Ethiopian intervention on the invitation of the TFG, – the ICU take-over of virtually all the major cities in Somalia, its encircling and attempt to attack the TFG in Baioda – tend to support this security motive argument above every other motive Ethiopia may be said to have for intervening.
5.5.2 US Counterterrorism in Somalia

The first direct involvement of the US in Somalia was in the 1992 humanitarian intervention, along with the United Nations in UNISOM I and II. That outing ended in a humiliating experience for the US, following the killing of 18 US Marines in a Mogadishu street fight on 3-4 October 1993 while attempting to arrest a warlord, Farah Aideed. This tragic Somali street battle has come to be known as the “Black Hawk Down” incident. Al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, claimed responsibility for the fierce battle and those killings. Whether bin Laden did spearhead the battle or not has been contentious, but the demoralizing impact of the incident led to an early end of the programme and the exit of the UN in 1995 following the US pullout (International Crisis Group 2002: 1). The US intelligence officials believe strongly that there was a connection between the attack and bin Laden, believing that bin Laden provided the “training, organizational and logistical support to al-Itihaad forces in order to counter the American presence in Somalia” (International Crisis Group 2002: 5).

Since the US pulled out of Somalia in 1995, it has shown serious security concern to the steadily growing influence and activities of the AIAI, the radical Islamist organization in Somalia. This organization is strongly believed by the United States to have links with al-Qaeda. The September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States bolstered this security interest of the US security in Somalia, as it immediately designated al-Itihaad a terrorist organization, pointing to the organization’s alleged involvement in the 1998 bombing of the US embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, and an earlier attempt on the life of an Ethiopian minister (International Crisis Group 2002: 12). The US counterterrorism mounted intense intelligence at unraveling the link between al-Itihaad and al-Qaeda. It contended that al-Itihaad, operating as al-Qaeda cell inside Somalia, provided the shield for the terrorists, while they prepared for the embassy attacks and sheltered them after the attacks. The US continues to seek the suspects, whom it believes to be still under the protective cover of the Somali Islamists. Much of the US counterterrorist interest in Somalia remain focused on the apprehension of wanted al-Qaeda terrorists believed to be hiding inside Somalia, including some local Somali Jihadis (mostly former al-Itihaad leadership), believed not only to have links with al-Qaeda but also thought to be protecting some wanted terrorists. Also targeted in Somalia are individuals and organizations believed to be involved in financing terrorism.

The United States’ Somali counterterrorism takes a three-fold pattern. These are the use of allied frontline states, the engagement of local Somali proxies, and direct involvement. The
US considered strongly military actions against Somalia in 2001, immediately after September 11, but had to put it off on the realization that it lacked enough intelligence and knowledge of the terrain (Menkhaus 2004: 68; Cooke and Henek 2007: 4). It decided instead to limit its military operations to conducting surveillance over-flights and coastline patrols off Somalia. On 23 September 2001, twelve days after the September 11 attacks, the US included AIAI in the “Executive Order 13224”, which listed the names of terrorist organizations and had their assets frozen (Quaranto 2008: 36). In November of 2001, the former AIAI leader, Hassan Dahir Aweys, was placed on the US list of most wanted terrorists (Quaranto 2008: 36; Crisis Group 2005b: 9). On 7 November 2001 the Department of Treasury froze the assets of al-Barakaat, the most prominent Somali company in remittance and telecommunication, suspected of rendering assistance to al-Qaeda with fund raising, distribution and management of its finances, illegal arms shipments, and the extension of “secure telephone” and internet facilities to terrorists and their supporters (Menkhaus 2004: 67; Quaranto 2008: 37).

The incursions conducted by Ethiopia inside Somalia against the AIAI in the mid-and late-1990s, and the 2006 overt and massive Ethiopian military engagement inside Somalia against the Islamic Courts Union and its continued presence in the country are believed in many quarters to have been approved and financed by the US (Quaranto 2008: 40; International Crisis Group 2007: 7). The US understands that it is limited in its operational choices to air strikes by the circumstances presented by the peculiarity of Somalia and recognizes that air strikes in themselves are is not very effective in conducting the kind of operation the Somali environment demands. It, therefore, greatly values the role of an ally like Ethiopia, as a neighbour to Somalia. This explains the heavy investment and support the US extends to Ethiopia in military equipment, training and logistics (Tynes 2006: 111).

Inside Somalia, the US, partnered by some influential figures, seeks to put in place an intelligence network for carrying out surveillance and arrests of suspected terrorists, as in the case in Puntland (International Crisis Group 2005a: 9). Deeper south, a coalition of some warlords, the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism, (ARPCT) emerged, believed to have been put in place and funded by the US, with Ethiopian authorities as the middlemen. The alliance was given the task of monitoring terrorist suspects and conducting “snatch and grab operations” on suspects (Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen 2007: 68; Quaranto 2008: 41). It is believed that the US was, by 2006, running a monthly bill of over
150,000 dollars on the warlords (Quaranto 2008: 41). The ARPCT targeting the suspected Somali local Jihadis with terrorist connections, had very little success, while it raised the stakes in the Somali conflict, pitching the Alliance against the Islamic Courts Union and other militias opposed to the involvement of the US and Ethiopia in Somalia. It was this bitter struggle which culminated in the May-June 2006 Mogadishu battle that saw the Alliance roundly defeated and the Courts taking control of Mogadishu.

The resort to direct military action in 2007 was contemplated for a very long time. By mid-2006, the US was becoming worried not only about the takeover of Mogadishu by the Islamic Courts and their rising popularity but also, and most importantly, by their introduction and enforcement of strict Islamic laws (Quaranto 2008: 42). In pursuit of the three al-Qaeda suspects believed to be holed up inside Somalia and protected by the Islamists and some of the leadership core of the retreating Islamic Courts Union, the US military launched a two-day (7-8 January 2007) attack on some facilities in Afmadow, a southern Somali town close to the Kenyan border. This first overt US military operation in Somalia involved two US Air Force AC-130 gunships, which took off from the CJTF-HOA headquarters in Djibouti. The two-day aerial attack was said by US officials to be targeting buildings and areas suspected to be harboring foreign fighters and local Jihadists escaping from the fire-power of the Ethiopian soldiers in its war with the Islamic Courts (Harper 2007: i. d; Quaranto 2008: 43; UN Security Council 2007: 17). The death toll was given by US officials as between 5 and 10, including one of the three wanted terrorists believed to be hiding inside Somalia. Locals claimed that 31 civilians were killed in the attack. The island of Badmado and the village of Hayo were reported hit (http://www.ebsnews.com; http://www.news.bbc.co.uk).

A number of factors combined to trigger further US military actions inside Somalia. They included: the emergent and gradually intensifying insurgence; the increased suicide attacks on the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian forces; and the increasing incidence of assassinations of foreign aid workers and some prominent local businessmen considered allies of the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian forces. Two other military actions had since been taken by the US against targets inside Somalia. These were the missile strikes of Dobley, a border town with Kenya, on 27 February 2007, and the air strikes of 1 June 2008 on Dusamareb town. These air strikes have attracted condemnation from many Somalis, especially from the Islamists and those sympathetic to them. The last attack

The next sub-section shall assess the successes or otherwise of these counterterrorism methods adopted in the Horn of Africa, with special attention to Somalia. The stated goals of these counterterrorism efforts of defeating terrorists and their organizations, denying them sponsors, support and sanctuaries, diminishing the underlying conditions which terrorists seek to exploit, and defending US citizens and interests both at home and abroad, will be a guide in such assessment.

5.5. 3 Assessing Ethiopian and US counterterrorism in Somalia

This segment focuses on the successes, failures and implications of the various dimensions of the counterterrorism initiatives applied in Somalia by Ethiopia and the US. Each of the program shall be assessed to determine the extent and nature of their impact on the existing terrorist threat which the failed state of Somalia poses to regional and global security.

Firstly, Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia is complex. For a long time, Ethiopia has not known peaceful coexistence with its Somali neighbor. It is very difficult for Ethiopia to draw a clear line between its actions directed at containing the activities of its nationals seeking self-governance, as is the case with the Oromo, or seeking integration with their kith and kin in Somalia, as is the case with the Ogadenis. As such its externalized regional security concerns, occasioned in part by the presence and activities of radical Islamists in Somalia serve to further obfuscate the conflict situation in the Horn of Africa. The overt Ethiopian military involvement in Somalia since December 2006 (on the invitation of the struggling TFG) not only raised the already existing tension in the region as a whole, and in Somalia, in particular but also afforded Eritrea a leeway to become involved in Somalia by bolstering its military, material and logistics support for the Islamic Courts inside Somalia to spite Ethiopia (Ray 2007: i. d). This dealt a blow to the counterterrorism initiatives targeted against the growth of radical Islamist organizations and individuals that support terrorism in Somalia and the Horn in general. The enemy image, which had crystallized over the years in the minds of average Somalis, continues to stimulate Somali resentment of Ethiopia’s involvement and
continued presence. The International Crisis Group (2005a: 21; 2005b: 3) quoted a respondent as stating bluntly that

> From Ethiopia’s perspective, it will be a war between Ethiopia and the Islamists (Ikhwaan). But for we [sic] Somalis, it is not so simple. I have to fight side by side with anyone who is fighting Ethiopia … People do not want to join the Islamists (wadaado)…. but if it comes to that, how can you refuse a coalition with them? It won’t matter who chews the qaad and who doesn’t when the enemy is just over the horizon.

The physical presence of Ethiopian forces since they expelled the Islamic Courts from Mogadishu in late December of 2006 has boosted (rather than reduced) the activities of the Courts and a gradual but steady and deadly Iraqi-style insurgency has been initiated by the “ousted” Islamists. This gravitation is highly in favour of the al-Qaeda strategy: to continue penetrating, recruiting, mobilizing and forging a viable Islamist resistance to the US-led counterterrorism around the blunders that may occur in the course of counterterrorism operations themselves. The involvement and, most importantly, the continuing presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia may be posing one of the greatest challenges to the effort at countering terrorism in Somalia and the Horn as a whole.

The use of air strikes by the US in Somalia has not paid off. While the strikes are said to primarily target three al-Qaeda operatives involved in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2002 attacks on a hotel and an aircraft in Mombassa, Kenya, there is no evidence that the air strikes hit the targets. US officials maintain that these men are still holed-up inside Somalia even after those deadly air strikes (Quaranto 2008: 43; Cooke and Henek 2007: 3). Reports of civilian casualties in those air strikes not only served to increase anti-American sentiments but also played to the advantage of the Islamists who used the attacks to rally support and sympathy to their cause in resisting the actions and presence of Ethiopian troops, while denouncing their American backers (Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen 2007: 69). It has provided a tool around which the Islamists campaign and recruit fighters. Thomas Dempsey (a retired US Army Colonel, a professor at the Security Sector Reform US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and former Director, African Studies, US Army War College), while testifying on 11 March 2008 before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on “Evaluating US Policy Objectives and Options on the Horn of Africa”, argued that the “US response to terrorist hubs operating in African failed states, like Somalia, had
been less than adequate” (Dempsey 2008: i.d). He notes that very little success has ever been achieved by using air strikes to directly target terrorists in failed state environments while such strikes “have tended to legitimate terrorist groups by providing them combatant status…and promoting them in the eyes of the ordinary citizens” (Dempsey 2008: i.d). While concluding that Somalia was providing a “platform for terrorist recruitment and operational planning” and portends a very serious security danger, he charged that the adoption and the use of air strikes by the US in Somalia has “generated significant levels of controversy, skepticism and outright mistrust…” (Dempsey 2008: i.d). Noting the complexities and problems of the Somali conflict environment, given the context of the underlying clan politics and alliances, Dempsey advances the argument that the loss of innocent lives and other damages inflicted on Somalia in military strikes challenge the moral basis for the counterterrorism operations and “contributes to the ongoing recruitment efforts of the terrorist groups themselves” (Dempsey 2008: i.d). Al-Qaeda wasted no time in tapping into the opportunity presented it by the security quagmire facing the US and Ethiopia in Somalia. It was quick to portray Somalia as yet another theatre for the United States’ orchestrated war to conquer Islam and the Muslim world, which must be resisted through a global jihad. The January 2007 posted message credited to the al-Qaeda number two, al-Zawahiri, drew a connection between the involvement of the US in Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan, calling on Jihadis to give themselves to resist America in Somalia (Black 2007: 14).

One other blunder, and possibly the worst, of the US counterterrorism efforts in Somalia remains its involvement with the formation and funding of the coalition of warlords that came to be known as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPCT). The putting in place of this coalition may have been necessitated by the difficulty of the counterterrorism agencies in penetrating Somalia for information, surveillance, tracking and apprehending suspected terrorists. The security risk of such tasks inside Somalia by external operatives is real and high. The primary assignment of the alliance, which was to mount surveillance and apprehend terrorist suspects in the “snatch and grab” operation style, and to act as a wedge to the rising Islamism exacerbated the security problem in Somalia (Quaranto 2008: 41). Bipasha Ray, writing in his article, “US Aids to Somali Warlords,” argued that the US financial commitment for counterterrorism was “misguided”, as the warlords only pretended to be interested in the project for the sole reason of retaining control of their various fiefdoms (Ray 2007: i.d). On 30 June 2004, a warlord was reportedly offered four million US Dollars ($4 million) by the US for the apprehension of Tariq Abdallah (a.k.a. Abu
Talha al-Sudani), a highly sought-after senior al-Qaeda suspect believed to be hiding in an identified building in a Somali suburb. The operation was not successful as far as capturing al-Sudani was concerned (International Crisis Group 2005b: 10). The argument by Bipasha Ray tends to make sense, when it is observed that a good number of the warlords engaged separately in huge arms purchases between March and June 2006, when the alliance operations were supposedly running (UN Monitoring Group 2006: 69-73), ostensibly using the funds received from this program (See Table A in Chapter Three). Nevertheless, the program achieved few successes, with the most valuable being the April 2003 ambush and eventual capture of Suleiman Ahmed Hemed (Issa Tanzania) in Mogadishu by a warlord, Mohamed Dheere (International Crisis Group 2005b: 10). There were a few other arrests. The mastermind of the killing that took place in Somaliland in 2004 and the brother-in-law to Ayro were picked up in one of such operations primarily targeted at al-Sudan. They were caught with bomb-making manuals. Also to be mentioned are cases of intelligence sharing between the members of the alliance and the US intelligence, which, on some occasions, enabled the foiling of planned attacks (International Crisis Group 2005b: 10).

The activities of the warlords’ alliance impinged negatively on counterterrorism in Somalia. Firstly, the public profile of the Islamists (Islamic Courts Union) was positively enhanced by targeting them in the first place, increasing their public acceptability and popularity among ordinary Somalis. The coalition by the US, Ethiopia and the warlords against the radical Islamists elevated them in the eyes of average Somalis to the status of patriots, fighting to defend their land against foreign invaders who had found allies in the discredited warlords and the Ethiopians. Local Somalis not only supported the ICU but many joined their militia (Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen 2007: 68). Secondly, the Islamists adopted reprisal attacks, not only against the collaborating warlords but also against all influential Somalis that failed to cooperate with them. The International Crisis Group (2005b: 11) observes: “a number of Somalis believed to have been working for foreign counter-terrorism networks have been assassinated”. A fierce conflict, which ensued between the Courts and the Alliance, led to the warlords being completely defeated in June 2006 by the Courts, who took control of Mogadishu and its neighbourhoods (Lyons 2006: 17; International Crisis Group 2007: 7). This loss by the Alliance was to the great discredit of the US, which was known to be sponsoring the warlords. It also triggered a lightening level of Islamist activity throughout southern Somalia, so that by 20 December 2006, the Islamic Courts Union had taken control of virtually all the major cities in Somalia. Its attempt to attack the city of Baidoa, which was
hosting the Transitional Federal Government, resulted not only in the overt military involvement of the Ethiopian forces, on the invitation of the TFG, but also raised the profile of both the Courts and the conflict itself. It was declared a jihad and it was strongly believed that foreign fighters participated in the battle (Tadesse 2001: i.d).

The overt involvement of Ethiopia in Somalia brought to the fore the existing problem between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Eritrea’s show of resentment for Ethiopia’s presence inside Somalia manifests itself in Eritrea’s support for the Courts in the form of arms supplies, training, logistics and material provisions. Both the 2006 and 2007 reports of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia find Eritrea culpable of arming the Islamists in Somalia and also clandestinely facilitating deliveries from other sources (UN Monitoring Group 2006: 11-14; UN Monitoring Group 2007: 8-10). This turn of events has greatly imperiled counterterrorism in Somalia, as some want to see it as a proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (International Crisis Group 2007: 6). The physical presence of Ethiopia in Somalia is generating resentment following the rising insurgency targeting Ethiopian and TFG forces. Growing civilian casualties resulting from Ethiopia’s artillery responses to insurgent attacks have served to increase support for the insurgents and caused disdain for the TFG, Ethiopian forces and the US.

Generally, the counterterrorism initiatives in Somalia have not been a success; rather, they have tended to escalate the security threat profile of Somalia, which has continued to deteriorate, gradually slipping into a protracted insurgency. The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, in its October 2006 report to the Security Council (UN Security Council 2006: 40) regarding the turn of events in Somalia, stated:

Importantly, foreign volunteers also provide training in guerrilla warfare and special topics and techniques, including the making of bombs and their use against different targets, such as different types of transport and buildings. Other techniques include kidnapping and the conduct of assassination by ambush and sniping. It is the view of the Monitoring Group that ICU is fully capable of turning Somalia into an Iraq-type situation, replete with roadside and suicide bombers, assassinations and other forms of terrorist and insurgent-type activities.

The above fears were confirmed in its July 2007 report (UN Security Council 2007: 16), which reads:
Assassinations and attempted assassinations became virtually a daily occurrence during the latter part of May and the first week of June 2007. …the Shabaab waged a continuous campaign of hit-and-run attacks against Ethiopian, Transitional Federal Government and Ugandan military forces. They also made use of improvised explosive devices as part of their strategy during their attacks. Several prominent individuals were targeted in those attacks, including the Prime Minister, and the Mayor and Deputy Mayor of Mogadishu.

It is, therefore, clear that counterterrorism operations in Somalia have not been a success. There is an urgent need for a review of the whole process, with a view to employing models that can guarantee security inside Somalia and the entire Horn of Africa, the fallout of which will impact global security positively.
CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This work has endeavored to engage robustly the challenge presented by the failed state of Somalia and its steadily rising terrorist profile, the security concerns, and the various initiatives targeted at dealing with the security situation. The complete collapse of the Somali state has meant the absence of all forms of formal control and regulation by a generally acceptable government overseeing institutions vested with the responsibility for the application of law and order, including the employment of a coercive force in the interests of the state and its people. The unmanned borders and ports have resulted in an uncontrolled inflow of people and materials, including a wide variety of small arms and light weapons. Security and order are known to pose serious challenges to many states with fully working government apparatuses. Clearly, for a collapsed state like Somalia the situation is far more calamitous. The impact of the absence of a state in Somalia, the consistent rise of its security profile – the threat it poses to neighboring states, the Horn of Africa and the genuine concerns about its threat to international peace and security, with special attention to the established exploitation of the permissive Somali environment by the al-Qaeda network – cannot be underestimated. The securitization of Somalia has been the result of established involvement of Somali territory in terrorist activity. While terrorism has become a global phenomenon, threatening international peace and security, the situation in the Horn of Africa seems critical owing to the conducive environment presented by the failed state of Somalia. As a terrorist staging ground, Somalia was linked with the 1998 US embassy attacks and the 2002 Mombassa airport and hotel attack. There has also been a gradual, but consistent development of a radical Jihadi, movement inside Somalia. Since the beginning of 2007, this movement has adopted the Iraqi model of insurgency in dealing with its defeat by the combined forces of the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopia. Its consequent loss of power has stepped up global attention.

It is important to note the perils associated with the involvement of neighboring states in Somalia’s internal conflict. But it is equally pertinent to observe that some of these external actions were triggered by the dangerous security risk which Somalia itself imposed on these neighbors, including terrorist attacks and increased levels of violent criminality. In many ways, most of these external engagements by neighbors escalated the conflict to more
dangerous dimensions. For instance, the poor security profile of Somalia may not have reached the present level if not for the exploitation of the conflict environment by Ethiopia and Eritrea to engage in a proxy war. Indeed, there may be some truth in the allegation that Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia is laced with a selfish survival motive – the belief that as long as the conflict in Somalia lasts, Somalis will be distracted from pursuing the “Greater Somalia” project. Eritrea, for its part, is accused of supporting the Islamists and other forces fighting the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian forces inside Somalia, as a way of keeping Ethiopia busy with those conflict fronts and, thereby, distracting it from the border issue between it and Eritrea.

The counterterrorism methods so far adopted in Somalia – the use of neighboring states as surrogates by the US, the US employment of local warlords for tracking and apprehending terrorists and direct air strikes by the US military – are all problematic military strategies, which are riddled with consequences that impact negatively on the war on terrorism itself. There is ample evidence that these counterterrorism measures have actually contributed to the steady metamorphosis of the terrorist profile of Somalia, from serving merely as a staging ground from the middle of the 1990s to its position in 2007, which is marked by the emergence and steadily rising domestic insurgency propelled by strong domestic Jihadists and buoyed by foreign Islamists.

Somalia seems to portend a real and serious threat to peace and security for its neighbors in particular, and the global community in general. It should, therefore, not be underplayed, taking cognizance of the consistency in the rise and mutation of a radical, fundamentalist Islam in Somalia. The security alert and the concern and involvement of the US in the events in Somalia are, in the light of the above, not without seemingly sufficient reason. The question of whose peace and security are at risk in an international order which delegitimizes and distorts grievances, criminalizing any line of redress that tends to challenge the status quo, is of currency. This should not be debated here, so as not to veer off the focus on the conduct of counterterrorism activities. What seems clear is the fact that the antidotes so far employed by the US in dealing with the security situation presented by the Somalia environment have failed. An assessment of the measures adopted thus far shows the preference for military option in dealing with the terrorist threat posed by Somalia. Experience of the many hot-pots of the world in 2008 seems to suggest that, with respect to the “war on terror”, the military option has not paid much dividend. This is particularly clear
when one considers the extent to which these operations have encouraged further recruitment and the global appeal which the localized conflicts now attract. Military responses tend to expand the scope of conflicts and the sympathy they attract, be it the Palestinian conflict or the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, the Israeli attack on southern Lebanon in 2007, in pursuit of the Hezbollah who abducted two Israeli soldiers, achieved very little (if anything) for Israel. Israel did not rescue the abducted soldiers, lost more soldiers in the conflict, exposed civilians living in most of its northern region to constant Hezbollah rocket attacks that resulted in Israeli casualties and shored up the Hezbollah profile within Lebanon as heroes and the defenders of the territorial integrity of Lebanon. Military options to security threats, therefore, demand a critical reappraisal. Current trends favor undertakings that are more holistic, inclusive and transformative of any existing conflict or any peace and security-threatening situation, wherever it may exist.

Since the emergence of Somalia as a threat to international peace and security is a product of the collapse of the Somali state and the attendant permissiveness the situation provides, any conscious effort at obliterating this threat should address the issue of rebuilding the Somali state. Such rebuilding effort must go beyond putting together and backing a transitional administration against other domestic oppositions. To be effective, peace-building in Somalia must include a serious effort at addressing the issue of power, particularly its vestment and distribution among the contending forces in the country. Any arrangement in Somalia that is short of an inclusive option is very likely to fail. This requires a special multilateral approach. The unilateral engagement by the US has manifested enormous weaknesses and impropriety, driving contenders farther apart and further complicating and escalating the conflict. It may require robust United Nations involvement in the area of a peace mission, a mission strongly and legally mandated with peacemaking, peace-enforcement and peace-building initiatives in Somalia and with the capacity to bring all the contending forces in Somalia under a well thought out and all-inclusive UN program. To succeed, such a program should be adequately funded, with a stern stance against any form of interference from neighboring states. The UN should consider using an African Union force for the operation, which should not include personnel from neighboring states. This is because of the already existing contentious involvement of some of the regional states like Ethiopia and Eritrea since the Somali conflict began and the “understandable” interest of others such as Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Djibouti. Clearly, if such a mission is not properly constituted and handled, it could jeopardize any effort at implementing
effectively whatever plan the international community may have for Somalia, no matter what its other merits are. The way and manner the United Nations’ mission in Somalia, UNISOM, hurriedly ended its activities in the early 1990s (following the tragic death of eighteen U.S. Marines) without achieving its objectives, was unacceptable and not to be repeated. The withdrawal, the incident leading to it and the manner in which it was done led to the degeneration of Somalia into a wider conflict. It suggests a lack of concern for the human tragedy and commitment by the international community to resolving the conflict.

To deal decisively with the terrorist threat which Somalia poses, there must be a restoration of internal law and order through the re-establishment of transparent institutions, including a justice system that will be able to deal with violent and criminal actions in a manner that causes such actions to be discredited among the people. The engagement should be transformative. The issues of human security are of paramount importance in the Somali environment where lawlessness and war, criminality and vandalism, and intimidation and territorial confinement have conditioned the lives of the ordinary Somalis since 1991, when the Somali state collapsed. A rebuilt Somalia may not guarantee peace and security if issues of poverty, education, displacement, fear, hunger, loss of livelihood and hopelessness occasioned by the protracted state collapse are not addressed effectively. State rebuilding is very important as it creates a basis for encountering and working with people via the institutions of governance, administration and social service delivery. Counterterrorism measures that focus on military options have generally failed to achieve the goal of deterring terrorists and stamping out terrorism. The war against terrorism should be concentrated on the battle for the “hearts and minds” of people. If the global fight against terrorism is to be transparent, credible and result-oriented, attention should be paid to the factors that create a global environment in which terrorism thrives and remains appealing to some individuals in certain circumstances.

Finally, the world needs a global culture and initiative that is orientated towards the well-being of the human race, that which promotes human-flourishing, a global system that is mindful of individual and group experiences which are capable of instigating and disposing the individual or group to violent responses. It is this kind of system that can deal with the grievances which the world is experiencing today by containing the deep-seated hatreds and the often associated recourse to violence, criminality and terrorism.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books and Chapters in Books


Journals


**Published Reports**


**Internet Sources**


Unpublished work