A STUDY OF FREEDOM AS THE ONGOING QUEST FOR AUTHENTIC EXISTENCE AND FAITH AS EXISTENTIAL ENCOUNTER, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THEOLOGICAL METHOD

BY

GERALD JOHN PILLAY

Submitted in part-fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Theology in the Faculty of Theology at the University of Durban-Westville.

Promoter : Prof WA Krieger
Head of the Department of Church History and Missiology, and Dean of the Faculty of Theology

Joint Promoter : Prof GA Rauche
Head of the Department of Philosophy and Political Science, and Dean of the Faculty of Arts.

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If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed. (Jn 8:36).

Stand fast therefore in the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage. (Gal 5:1)

TO MY WIFE AND BEST FRIEND,
NIRMALA
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Curs is an age of crisis not only because of gross international strife and poverty (an age permeated with sociological and economic "wars and rumours of wars") but also because of a great spiritual vacuum in modern man. Having sought certainty in his own technological and scientific advancement, man faces a growing sense of alienation. It has suddenly dawned on him that the "promised land" of economic and social bliss that technology prophesied is shifting sand.

Among the numerous manifestations of this awareness of alienation are two evident signs: a quest for freedom and a growing disenchantment with faith. The quest for freedom, in our time, has become most vociferous in the movement of philosophy that has been termed "existentialism". However, existentialism as philosophy is only the conscious reflection on a "mood" that underlies the spirit of our age and which emerges in its art, sculpture, literature and lifestyle. There is a certain disillusionment with orthodoxy and conformism, and a refocusing on the greatly ignored individual and his freedom.

The crisis of individual freedom has emerged within both capitalistic and communist societies. In the former the freedom of the individual has been forfeited to monopolies, the technocrats, the specialists and mass-man. In the latter the individual has been subsumed by "the party", and has annulled his freedom by vesting it in a society governed and manipulated by guardianship. Collective
social being swallows up individual man. Capitalist society, in the name of "free enterprise", and communist society, by its sentimentalization of the proletariat, pay only lip-service to freedom.

This dissertation attempts to elucidate a single argument in two main parts. Firstly, it is argued that freedom is dynamic and obtains in man's ongoing quest for authentic existence. This view is elucidated and assessed vis-à-vis the ideas of freedom that have emerged in modern man's philosophical quests.

The term "modern" is intended to cover the period since the Enlightenment ie. the immediate background to the three most influential contemporary philosophical approaches: Positivism and neo-Positivism; Marxism and neo-Marxism; and Existentialism. The immediate antecedents to these approaches include the empiricist and rationalist schools of thought, Kant's critique of reason and Hegel's universal synthesis. Their notions of freedom are described in order to understand the Sitz-im-Leben of the three main contemporary forms and in order to facilitate an elucidation of the thesis that freedom is the ongoing quest for authentic existence.

The time span covered and the wide scope of this first part only permits a selection of historical philosophical expressions relevant to clarifying the controversial nature of modern theories of freedom. The dissertation cannot accommodate a detailed study of any one philosopher or philosophical tradition. However, it is often impossible to extract a philosopher's idea of freedom from his whole thought because as in the case of
Hegel, the quest for freedom is central to his thinking. In order to obviate this difficulty within the confines of this dissertation, only a brief synopsis is made of the salient features of a particular philosophy in so far as this is necessary to focus on its notion of freedom.

Another great difficulty that a study of this nature faces is the sifting through the mountain of material available on the sections and sub-sections of each of the approaches studied herein. Therefore, only the main primary sources and the more useful secondary sources were given pride of place. The author had at times to will himself to proceed forward in the argument lest he was at any one single point side-tracked. Selections will inadvertently admit some lacunae but it is hoped that the argument is sufficiently lucid to overcome any such omission.

In Part One, then, first an analysis is made of the notions of freedom that emerged in the Enlightenment, Kant, Hegel and in Positivism, Marxism and Existentialism. Then the thesis that freedom is the ongoing quest for authentic existence is discussed on the basis of the important argument that G.A. Rauche has elucidated in several publications, namely that the abdication of philosophy is equivalent to the abdication of man because philosophy as ongoing critical theory is what ensures the freedom of man. Rauche also presents an incisive critique, in this connection, of the three main contemporary philosophical forms. The benefit of analysing Rauche's critique and of his
argument in general for this study is three-fold:
i) It leads to the thesis that freedom obtains in the ongoing
critical quest for authentic existence and that it is neither the
result nor the derivation of theories about freedom. Freedom is
therefore, not a postulate;
ii) This thesis in turn presents, in an analogical way, the
"structure" of the quest for freedom which theology cannot ignore
since it also makes a truth claim in the market place where the
three contemporary approaches find a ready clientele. In Part II
it will be argued that faith as existential encounter not only
fulfills the "structure" for the quest for freedom but also that
it underpins human freedom;
iii) It lays the foundation for the claim in Part III that the
abdication of theology leads to the abdication of faith and, in view
of our contention in Part 2, to the abdication of man also.

As already intimated, this dissertation contends that the dialogue
between theology and philosophy has unnecessarily been confined to
the antithesis between faith and reason where both have been viewed
in essentially epistemological terms. Reason, the underlying
guide for the Enlightenment achieved a new legitimation during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries mainly under the impact of
the rise of the natural sciences. Christian theology responded
to the Enlightenment by postulating new and more refined arguments
for revelation. Revelation, conceived in epistemological terms,
became the bastion against the onslaught of the Enlightenment.
More "solid" bases for certainty were sought: in a historical
Jesus (Renan, Strauss, Schweitzer); the kerygma of the early church (Dibelius, Bultmann); in the church's tradition (Roman Catholicism); in devotion and inner illumination (the Pietists, Fundamentalists, the Pentecostals); in the faith of the believers themselves (the new questors) or in the eschatological hope proleptically present in the Christ-event (theologies of Hope: Pannenberg, Moltmann).

The dialogue between theology and philosophy has in the main remained at the epistemological impasse between faith and reason. To the question "How can I know for certain?", Revelation claimed a realm of validity vis-à-vis reason not unlike the distinction that Kant had made between the sphere of phenomena and that of noumena. Where theology became adventurous it ended up endangering faith itself, for example, in seventeenth century Deism and nineteenth century liberalism. The faith-reason antithesis leads the dialogue between theology and philosophy into a logical cul-de-sac.

A more meaningful basis for the dialogue is the quest for freedom that both philosophy and theology are deeply concerned with. However, before such a basis is understood, there is a need for a radical re-evaluation of the nature of philosophy and of the central impulse of theology viz. faith. Rauch's views help us towards the re-evaluation of the nature of philosophy (which should be vitally concerned with the quest for freedom i.e. man becoming fully man), and with its reformulation in dynamic terms. Only such redefinition will make the philosophical quest relevant to man's ongoing quest for freedom. It will then have an openness that all human quests for truth must have in order to be relevant for man's
wholeness. This openness will lead to the interchange of ideas and to the radical commitment of man to his fellowman.

Theology, on the other hand, needs to take seriously the dynamic quality of a person's commitment to God. In this age of systematization, professionalism and specialization, the individual has largely gone unattended, a problem which the Existentialists have highlighted for our time. After all, the basis for any meaningful talk about God must be on the basis of commitment. Hence theology must reconfirm constantly and protect what lies at its very heart viz. the dynamic dimension of "subjectivity" which is faith as existential encounter. Such a view does not jettison systematic theology but merely ensures that faith remains, as the Bible and the Reformation later had highlighted, vital and dynamic. The second part of the argument is to clarify the nature of faith as existential encounter. In order to do this a critical evaluation will be made of Existentialism's contribution to the unveiling in our time of that which is endemic to the very earliest proclamations of the Gospel. Special focus will be on the idea of faith in the thought of Kierkegaard, Bultmann, Brunner, Gogarten, Tillich and Ebeling.

There are at least three ways a study of these theologians can proceed: i) An evaluation of their thought vis-à-vis a conservative theological or confessional approach which invariably puts them out of the pale of orthodoxy. Such an approach benefits very little from their thought; ii) An assessment of their interpretive method and their significance
for hermeneutics. This approach achieves much more. It highlights a very controversial issue and an ongoing debate. These theologians sometimes develop an "Existentialist" methodology which is often imposed on Scripture and invariably constricts the message of the Scriptures to the limits of its predetermined Procrustean bed. A great amount has been published in this area. The hermeneutical contribution of these thinkers, albeit important, is also not the immediate concern of this dissertation;

iii) To understand their idea of the nature of faith. This does not mean an uncritical acceptance of their Christian existentialism but to understand the existential dimension of Christian commitment. This brings to light their most significant contribution to all of Christian theological quests viz. the dynamic understanding of faith which acts as the keystone of theological thinking.

Therefore, the dissertation does not cater for a detailed description of their whole systematic theology. On the contrary, several aspects of these theologies confound their understanding of faith; for example, the strict demythologization approach of Rudolph Bultmann. This approach remains highly controversial and cannot be accommodated in this study without detracting from the overall argument. The reactions to demythologization and the new hermeneutic has so preoccupied theologians that their important understanding of faith has in the main been overlooked or trivialized. The reaction, unfortunately, has lapsed again into the epistemological debate on the certainty of revelation and inspiration, or of historical certainty. The parallel development in philosophy has been the reaction to
Existentialism which also missed the Existentialist refocusing on the freedom of the individual. The "baby" as it were, "gets thrown out with the bath-water." Even the evangelicals, who understandably are wary of the approach of these theologians under consideration here, must take seriously what they say about faith and freedom in order to rescue Christianity from the ravages of institutionalism and conformity to the functionalist spirit of our age.

The argument presented here is briefly this: if freedom is the ongoing quest for authentic existence i.e. if man is free in so far as he is still free to strive for authentic existence then-

i) faith has an indispensable role to play in the quest for freedom i.e. in so far as faith itself does not lapse into a belief-system but remains an ongoing, existential encounter with God;

ii) if freedom is the ongoing quest for authentic existence then it is presupposed that man is free as man i.e. in so far as he is fully man not Grossmensch or slave to one or other philosophical or religious system or ideology. This idea undergirds the Christian doctrine of reconciliation.

The third part of the thesis attempts to point out some implications of this argument for theological method. It is argued that the attempt to jettison theology as ongoing, theoretical clarification of the dynamics of faith and as the critical quest for "the Gospel," for either pietistic devotion only or denominational confessionalism, leads to the abdication of faith.
PART 1

FREEDOM AS ONGOING QUEST FOR

AUTHENTIC EXISTENCE
1.1 THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE QUEST FOR FREEDOM

Endemic to the age of Enlightenment was a quest for freedom from absolutist powers, many of which had gained eminence during the Medieval period and which were exemplified in the totalitarianism of the Roman Church. The Enlightenment ushered in an optimistic mood into Europe as it emerged, or struggled to emerge, from a long period of superstition and feudalism. The Enlightenment is best understood when perceived as a mood or mental attitude rather than, as is often done, only a period in Western history. Such periodization, which views the Aufklärung as the years 1720 to 1770, ignores the fact that the spirit of an age moves in the spirit of man over and above, and definitely beyond, its particular objective manifestations in the arts, science and culture of any one period. The mood of Enlightenment permeated all of modern history. The Enlightenment's quest for freedom underlies all of modern man's existential crisis.

As J.D. Stowell stated,

The process of Enlightenment as a liberation from the chains of traditional patterns of thought proceeded only slowly during the first 50 years of the (eighteenth) century, in the 60's it became agitated, in the 70's tradition was overthrown and the 'creative life' of the emotions was prized more highly than the reflective powers of the mind. 2

However, it was this new found confidence in the reflective powers of the mind that was to be the all-pervading rationale of the age. Newton's Principia (1687) was the culmination of the new prestige
of the natural sciences. His discovery of the laws of physics facilitated a rational explanation of the world. The sense of cosmological mystery which the totalitarian powers, both secular and religious, had exploited, could now be explained away. Pope's well known lines captures the new found confidence of the natural sciences:

Nature and nature's laws lay hid in Night;
God said, Let Newton be: - and all was Light.

Principia highlighted the control that man could have over nature since the universe was now considered rational in all its aspects. This belief in the rationality of the universe, which is still taken for granted, represented a major "paradigm shift" in human history. In the eighteenth century it heralded a sense of well-being that permeated the consciousness of man and it demanded a major reorientation of man to his world. As a result of the discoveries of the natural sciences, the world-view of western man underwent upheaval. In this connection, the Copernican revolution and the discovery that the world was not flat, were accompanied by a reshaping of man's mental world.

Nowhere is the struggle to wrench free from absolution more vividly illustrated than in the church's intolerance and high handed treatment of Galileo. The church had married its theology with a particular system of philosophy and a particular view of science. Therefore, with the rejection of an outdated science came the rejection of the church and its theology. Hence Luther's rejection of theology that
had became clouded by the terminology and method of inquiry of Aristotelian thought, especially to the ends the scholastics had put it. 3.

The Enlightenment was accompanied by a this-worldly belief that Reason, if effectively applied, would lead to the mental, socio-economic and political liberation of man. Hence from Locke to Rousseau education was acclaimed as the means by which Reason would achieve its goal: the freedom of society.

Reason, Nature and Progress were the three cardinal signposts that marked the way to freedom. Because nature was rational and therefore predictable, man by harnessing nature was assured of unending progress. If people from their infancy were educated correctly in how nature intended them to be, they could attain unlimited progress toward material and spiritual happiness. For example, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781), one of the greatest representatives of the German Enlightenment, pursued this view. 4

This kind of optimism, grounded in the natural sciences, became the foundation of all human quests for knowledge: sociology, anthropology, history and economics. The anthropologist, Montesquieu held that human behaviour was determined by certain laws that were to be rationally uncovered, a knowledge of which would aid in the ordering and ameliorating of society. Gibbons, the historian, propounded a universe and human history that possessed a rational plan.

In theological circles, Deism epitomised the impact that the mood
of the age had on religion. The unpredictable, the miraculous and the immanent divine were removed from the world. God who made the universe with its own logical rules and physical laws, like a perfect clock, lets it runs on its own. Herbert of Cherbury's denial of revelation in 1624, John Toland's Christianity not Mysterious (1696) and Matthew Tindal's Christianity as old as the creation (1730) are key examples of this natural theology. 5

Alongside reason, nature and progress lay yet another underlying belief: the inherent harmony of human society. Descartes maintained that all men have bon sens 6 and Rousseau spoke of volonté générale, the true will of the whole. 7 Adam Smith (1723-1790) held that in spite of the personal profit motive, in the end the whole society would progress by some hidden law: some "invisible hand" that guides men's economic pursuit. 8 The same kind of belief occurred in politics where it was held that if every individual followed his own persuasion, a majority consensus would emerge that would benefit the whole society. As Paul Tillich stated, this belief in the harmony of society still underlies our present views of capitalism and democracy as it did their founders. 9

The doctrine of harmony enabled the Enlightenment's intelligentsia to bracket the contradictions in society. It admitted the dimension of "in spite of" which facilitated the optimistic view of progress. Leibniz, for example, held to the view of harmonie prééablie, a pre-established harmony, which existed between all the monads that constituted the world. 10 "In spite of " human error and the
imponderables in society, with time, these contradictions would be harmoniously smoothed out.

In the above discussion, in the attempt to describe the mood of the age of Enlightenment, the impression could be given that the development of thought proceeded in linear progression. On the contrary, the Enlightenment was culturally and ideologically greatly varied including within its orbit such moderates as Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Locke as well as radicals such as Bentham and Paine.

All agreed, however, in their belief in the autonomy of the individual which reached its most potent formulation in Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). In his often quoted essay "What is Enlightenment?", he stated, Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another. Immaturity is self incurred if its cause is ... lack of resolution and courage ... The motto of Enlightenment is therefore sapere aude. 11

The eighteenth century brought to fruition the humanistic spirit of the sixteenth century Renaissance. Kant's doctrine of man's autonomy reiterated the Renaissance belief in the "complete autarchy of rational man in a rational world." 12 This view was embodied in the life and philosophy of Leibniz who stated that, The utterly self-sufficient monad is an emanation, an urge, a mirror of God himself and is therefore nowhere limited by things outside it, but only in its own being which has no windows, and changes
only by its own principle, its own particular striving. 13

Thus as Karl Barth succinctly commented, "The geocentric picture of the universe was replaced as a matter of course by the anthropocentric." 14

Following in the wake of this awareness of the individual's freedom to determine his own future and social well-being, was a new perception of human society. A new-found sense of democracy fostered the decline of imperialism as "the people" themselves replaced the emperor as the embodiment of the State. Nationalism emerged as the attempt to ensure the freedom of individuals by furthering and protecting the freedom of the nation. "The people" now decided among themselves who should govern and when the government should be replaced ie. when that government violated the nation's interest. This perception of social liberty is lucidly illustrated in the two, now famous, documents which appeared within a few years of each other: the Declaration of Independence of the U.S.A. (June 1776) and the Statement of Human and Civil Rights ratified by the French National Assembly in August 1789. Both affirm that governments are instituted by the people. The French Statement promulgated freedom, property, security and the right to protect oneself from violence as basic rights. It defined freedom as consisting "in being able to do anything that does not harm anybody and is not as such forbidden by law." The U.S. statement listed as "basic rights"-life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Rousseau, the philosopher of the French Revolution, gave formal theoretical underpinning to this
In the area of philosophy an epistemological sequence was set up in the theories of knowledge that emerged in the writings of Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant. Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690) gave the Enlightenment doctrine of Reason its formal formulation. The quests for truth became epistemologically based. Not only was the question "How can truth be known?" stated anew, but also the question was now reformulated: "How can truth be known and conclusively shown to be known?" In other words, philosophical pursuits in Western thought centred around the problem of certainty of knowledge. This emphasis was directly the result of the ability of the natural sciences, mathematics and physics in particular, to demonstrate the grounds for their claims.

Accompanying this epistemological quest was the polarization of the universal and the particular, a problem that had always existed in the history of Western philosophy and which had emerged prior to the Enlightenment in the nominalist controversies. Now in view of the focus on the autonomy of man, it was held that general freedom within an appropriate social order can only be brought about through the knowledge and activity of free individuals. Both the rationalists and empiricists agreed on this although they disagreed totally on what constituted the basis for certain knowledge.

For the empiricists the alleged laws of reason that the rationalists claimed existed, were the result of custom and habit. 15 Such laws
or universals do not govern the facts; they merely adhere to them. Hence both John Locke and David Hume rejected Descartes' views concerning general ideas. Such ideas, Locke held, were "the inventions and creations of understanding ... the creatures of our own making." Hume similarly believed that universals can never provide rules or general principles since they "were abstracted from the particular and 'represent' the particular only." Thus by refocusing on experience the empiricists laid the basis for a radical questioning of the rationalists' claims to truth by the methodology engineered by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Wolff who functioned on the premise that reason could organize reality. However, by denying the universal, the empiricists had undermined metaphysics. The rationalists, as the empiricists attempted to show, by attempting to free man through reason, absolutized reason and led man into a new form of alienation from reality. The empiricists, on the other hand, in the name of liberation, also led man into a new captivity. they made him the prisoner of his senses. Empiricism, therefore, as Herbert Marcuse observed, "resulted in not only scepticism, but conformism." Hence Hume could write,

... we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying any desire than the desire itself vanishes. When we see that we have arrived at the utmost extent of human reason we sit down contented.

Our description of the man of the Enlightenment has to be qualified by at least four limitations that existed side by side with the optimism of the age:
The first limitation is the element of scepticism that existed in several quarters and whose standpoint reached comprehensive form in the writings of David Hume. Alongside the confident and busy man of the eighteenth century also lived the individual who was extremely doubtful about the dream of endless progress that his compatriot proffered. As Karl Barth pointed out, in Goethe's Faust, alongside the confident was the incurably sceptical Mephistopheles in whom "the Enlightenment doubts itself or at least reaches enlightenment about itself." 20 Voltaire's Candide (1759) was an attack on the view of Leibniz that this world is the best in the best of all possible worlds. 21

Secondly, the Sturm und Drang also represented a refutation of rationalism which had become dogmatic and authoritarian. The literature and art of the Sturm und Drang furthered the ideals of tolerance, freedom from rational arrogance and the search for virtue. Lessing's Nathan der Weise (1779) preached religious tolerance arguing that all are in the search for perfection and that the importance of revelation lay in the way men lived in the world not in the way they adhered to fixed dogma.

Thirdly, there was the disillusionment that set in with both empiricism and rationalism which, at the end of the eighteenth century, is best represented by Romanticism. Rousseau's writings exemplify the transition since he was very much part of the Enlightenment and yet had a
Romanticist view of nature. While he exalted the power of reason and advocated a view of society based on "harmony", he spoke of the paradisiacal state of man where for example, as among the "savages", no private property existed. There emerged here the Romanticist longing to go back to the natural. By a formal concept of nature, Romantism commenced the conquest of the principle of reason. For the Romanticist, the Enlightenment lacked imagination and spirit. Its perception of the world was too mechanistic. William Wordsworth's The Tables Turned succinctly captures this reaction:

> Enough of science and of art:
> Close up these barren leaves;
> Come forth, and bring with you a heart
> That watches and receives.

Fourthly, it became apparent that contrary to what the rationalists had maintained, man is basically unpredictable and that freedom is not necessarily the result (nor the initiator) of rational and harmonious progress; that the irrationalities of human existence cannot be logically explained away. The French Revolution highlighted this irrationality and did a great deal in tempering the prevalent optimism. The Revolution which had proceeded in the name of freedom and the rights of man, and which heralded a new age of democracy, lapsed into a reign of terror.

Hence Rousseau had to admit that the freedom of society was not the result of an ineluctable process and that "it may be necessary to compel a man to be free". Kant also maintained that only a few, by cultivating their own minds, have succeeded in freeing
themselves. He held that,

... a public can only achieve enlightenment slowly. A revolution may put an end to autocratic despotism and to rapacious or power-seeking oppression, but it will never produce a true reform in ways of thinking. Instead, new prejudices, like the ones they replaced, will serve as a leash to control the great unthinking mass. 25

Although still affirming the absolute value of reason, it gradually became clear to eighteenth century man, that the nature of human society and human consciousness was more complex than had been previously assumed. The age of Enlightenment had inadvertently reduced the problem of the autonomy of man, which it had correctly perceived, to the equivalence of the autonomy of reason, which admitted new problems. Hence, as Barth stated, the eighteenth century sought freedom but "in the very search for what it understood by freedom, again and again, recreated the old unfreedom." 26

It was pointed out already that the mood of Enlightenment which was given theoretical form in Locke's writings underwent a radical redefinition in Hume. Hume went beyond Locke in his undercutting of the metaphysical foundations of natural law and in introducing a thorough-going epistemological scepticism. Hume's revolutionary doubt about the ability of reason stemmed from his "discovery" that there was no "necessary connection" between matters of fact. Reason, he held, could disclose nothing about the real world but merely aided in detecting relations between ideas. As W.T. Jones states, Hume by pointing out that there was no rationale in nature to which the rational mind of man conforms since we experience nature
as ordered, in effect was "driving a wedge between reason and nature". 27 It was Immanuel Kant who understood most clearly the implications for Reason that Hume's view had. His *Critique of Pure Reason* was an attempt to provide a new paradigm to restore the absolute value of reason.

1.2 **IMMANUEL KANT AND TRANSCENDENTAL FREEDOM**

In Kant, German idealism reacted to Hume's attack upon reason as the guide of experience since it viewed Hume's empiricism as an attack upon metaphysics and therefore an attack upon the conditions of human freedom. For German idealism, unity and universality were not found in empirical reality. What, then, was the basis of knowledge? A new epistemology was required that would overcome the empiricist criticisms but still maintain the rational ideals of the individual and society which were considered the conditions of freedom. Kant believed that the basis of the new epistemology lay in the structures of the mind itself. He begins his *Critique of Pure Reason* by stating that,

...all our knowledge begins with experience. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than be means of objects which affect our senses ... to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which we call experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it. 28

Thus Kant agreed with the empiricists and Hume in particular. However, in his next statement he lays the basis for this new epistemology
that totally differs with Hume:

But though our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows, that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion)... Knowledge of this kind is called a priori, in contradiction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources a posteriori, that it is, in experience. 29

With this opening statement Kant intimated the direction such a redefined epistemology would take. His Critique of Pure Reason is a carefully worded analysis of the means and modes of understanding in order to show that knowledge is grounded in the mind. Only in this way, Kant believed, could the whole of reality still be rooted in man's rational faculties; that is, the mind provides the modes of understanding. He maintained that philosophy was in need of "a science which shall determine the possibility, principles and extent of human knowledge 'a priori'." 30 His Critique attempted to provide such an "architectonic of pure reason." By "architectonic" Kant meant the art of constructing a system for without,

... a systematic unity, our knowledge cannot become science; it will be an aggregate, and not a system. 31

Kant attempts to prove that the mind possessed the universal forms that organised sensuous experience, namely, the forms of intuition (space and time) and of understanding (the categories). While objects are given to us by means of sensibility "all thought must directly, or indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to intuition... because in no other way can the object be given to us." 32
"Form" Kant referred to that which arranges the content of the phenomenon under certain relations and by "intuition" in both space and time. "Space" being a "necessary representation a priori which serves for the foundation of all external intuition" 33 and "time", "a necessary representation lying at the foundation of all intuition. 34 The forms of understanding, Kant called the categories by which ideas were synthetically formed i.e. "the process of joining different representations to each other, and of comprehending their diversity in one cognition". 35 He claimed that the synthesis of cognition is only pure when "the diversity is not given empirically but a priori as in space and time." 36

These forms were universally valid and applicable because they constituted the structure of the mind and the basis of certainty is now shifted from the world of objects to the mind itself. In this way Kant hoped to "free reason from the vicissitudes of empiricist particularism." 37

It was at this point that Kant made a most important distinction: while his categorical structure of mind (causality, substance, quality and such like) pertains to phenomena, they were not valid for what he termed noumena, that which could not be understood in space and time. While Kant also was deeply impressed by Newton's findings, he maintained that the natural sciences were limited to describing spatio-temporal experience. To understand the concepts of God, freedom and immortality within the forms governing spatio-temporal experience was, therefore, impossible. This was the error
of natural theology. Kant wrote,

I cannot even make the assumption—as the practical interests of morality require—of God, Freedom and Immortality if I do not deprive speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent insight. For to arrive at these, it must make use of principles which, in fact, extend only to the objects of possible experience, and which cannot be applied to objects beyond this sphere without converting them into phenomena and thus rendering the practical extension of pure reason impossible. I must, therefore, abolish knowledge, to make room for belief. The dogmatism of metaphysics... is the true source of unbelief (always dogmatic) which militates against morality. 38

Hence Kant was led to the conclusion via his transcendental idealism that phenomena are nothing but representations which have no self-subsistent existence in isolation from human thought. 39 Therefore, what the "things-in-themselves" are that give the impressions cannot be known. 40 Furthermore, the noumenon cannot be an object of thought because it "represents an object for perfectly different intuition and perfectly different understanding from ours, both of which are consequently themselves problematic." 41 Hence the conception of noumenon remains problematic because it is connected with the limitation of our sensibility. 42 The categories were insufficient for a knowledge of things-in-themselves. Noumenon remains "problematic", "unknowable" and a "limiting concept" since it fulfills the important role of harnessing the pretentions of sensibility.

Kant, more than any philosopher before him, clarified man's finitude
in the realm of the mind. By rescuing God, freedom and immortality from the sphere of rational argument, he destroyed the optimism of the Enlightenment or at least cautioned the untempered claims for Reason. Barth rightly concluded that,

With Kant and from Kant onwards the human use of reason has left the broad way and finds itself within the 'strait-gate'... all self-affirmation of human reason would be asked and would continually have to bear being asked, whether it in fact rests upon a true maturity and everyone who used this reason would be asked from now on whether his use of it might not perhaps just be sophistry masquerading as reason, an uncritical adventure of the understanding prompted by obscure feeling. 43

It was a knowledge of man's finitude, however, that accentuated man's rational striving for it is in this striving that man's freedom is realized; that is, in so far as he heeds the imperative which is lodged within him. Obedience to this imperative will lead into the realm of noumena wherein exist God, freedom and immortality. Hence the shift from the "broad way" of Pure Reason to the "strait gate" of Practical Reason. 44

In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant set about clarifying the nature of this moral imperative which he also called the "categorical" or "unconditional" imperative. Man's breakthrough from finitude does not obtain in theoretical or rational argument but in his awareness of the moral imperative which as "imperative" makes an unconditional claim upon him and which is given in his will.
The basis for this view had been laid in his first Critique. There he had argued that "the words 'I ought' expresses a species of necessity, and imply a connection with grounds which nature does not and cannot present to the mind of man." Kant uses "necessity" here not for natural necessity but for logical necessity where the 'ought' (i.e. the moral imperative) is necessarily the consequence of the rational. It is not natural because it is not derived from experience. He wrote,

... the idea of an ought or of duty indicates a possible action, the ground of which is pure conception, while the ground of a merely natural action is, on the contrary, always a phenomenon.

Contrary to the behaviorist theories of psychology today, Kant rejected any view that implied that the will itself was determined by physical or natural conditions. "The moral ought is beyond their power to produce" and these conditions relate only to the effects of the will, and the consequence of those effects in the world. Kant's view of freedom was grounded in the undetermined moral ought, in the sphere of the noumena. In his writings, there is a clear break between freedom and necessity and this break was the result of the autonomy of the human will. He therefore spoke of "the cosmological idea of freedom."

It is in the central doctrine of the autonomy of man that rationality and freedom coalesce. Although man as autonomous is a "law unto himself" he could never become lawless if he lives by the law of reason. "Autonomy" was the rejection of "heteronomy" whereby
one subjected oneself to something beside pure reason such as desire, 
pleasure or fear. Hence in his Religion within the limits of Reason 
alone 49 he repudiated the subjection of the empirical church and 
the fear and superstitution that underlay the observance of its customs 
since these endangered autonomy. "Dogmas and formulas," he wrote, 
"those mechanical instruments for rational use (or rather misuse) 
of his natural endowments, are the ball and chains of his permanent 
immaturity." 50

Enlightened man is autonomous man and for "enlightenment of this 
kind, all that is needed is freedom. And the freedom in question 
is the most innocuous form of all freedom to make public use of one's 
reason in all matters." 51 The only way to bring about enlightenment 
among men is to ensure that the public use of reason remains free. 
Once people begin to think freely, they will be able to act freely. 52

It is the rational striving of man that undergirds and accentuates 
his moral striving. It is the urge for emancipation that forces 
striving for the unconditional. "Thou canst, therefore, though oughtest" 
is the command of pure reason which leads to freedom. As G.A. Rauhle 
points out, this act of liberation through striving leads to a 
transcendental autonomy ie. a rational form of existence free from 
the limitations of the senses. 53

Kant anticipated a possible objection to his view of freedom when 
he posed the following question,
Now granting that reason stands in a causal relation to phenomena, can an action of reason be called free, when we know that, sensuously - in its empirical character, it is completely determined and absolutely necessary? 54

Yes, he replies, because this empirical character of an action or effect of reason is itself determined by reason alone and not in accordance with empirical laws. The causal relation between reason and phenomena points only to the fact that reason is the originator of the character of an empirical series of effects. 55

Kant clearly stated that he intended to describe freedom as a transcendental idea by which "reason aims at originating a series of conditions in the world of phenomena with the help of that which is sensuously unconditioned." 56 He pointed out that it was not his intention to prove the actual existence of freedom or to demonstrate the possibility of freedom. To attempt the former would endanger the transcendental nature of his argument since freedom cannot be inferred from experience or understood in terms of natural laws. Therefore, any proof for the actual existence of freedom is impossible. The latter also was a pointless exercise since it was beyond the mind to "cognize the possibility of a reality or of a causal power by the aid of mere a priori conceptions." 57

Hence, as F.P. van der Pitte observed, the awareness of autonomy "forces man to postulate freedom as a fact of his own moral experience" and it is freedom which Kant employs as the "keystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason." 58 The idea of freedom
is inextricably bound up with his view of reason as that which regulates reality.

Kant attempted to solve the dilemma that Hume introduced by dividing the knowledge of objects and the awareness of values into two modes of experience too different to contradict each other. Therefore, if man is both empirical self and noumenal, to attribute freedom and natural necessity to one person did not appear contradictory. The empirical self could well be conditioned by history and the environment while the noumenal self is still free to choose and be morally responsible.

This distinction may be illustrated in his understanding of the existence of God. On the one hand he rejects any logical proof of God since, Being is evidently not a real predicate i.e., a conception of something which is added to the conception of some other thing... Logically it is merely the copula of a judgement... Now, I take the subject God with all its predicates... and say God is or There is no God I add no new predicate to the conception of God, I merely posit the object in relation to my conception... there is no addition to the conception. 59

Yet in the preamble to his *Critique of Pure Reason* he insisted that God and free immortal self are real because their reality is guaranteed by the facts of moral experience:

... it is plain that the hope of a future life arises from the feeling which exists in the breast of every man, that the temporal is inadequate to meet and
satisfy the demands of his nature. In like manner, the clear exhibition of duties in opposition to all the claims of inclination, gives rise to the consciousness of freedom... and that the glorious order, beauty and providential care, everywhere displayed in nature, gives rise to the belief in a wise and great Author of the universe... the schools have no right to arrogate to themselves a more profound insight into a matter of human concernment... 60

To live autonomously is to live as if the laws to which you subject yourself are your very own and at the same time universally valid. The will alone is the lawgiver even when one obeys laws. 61

Kant's view of freedom, nonetheless, remains ambiguous for one is not quite sure whether freedom is a possession of man or whether it is the result of him achieving autonomy or whether only autonomous man is free to achieve freedom in the noumenal sphere through moral striving. Aspects of all these alternatives emerge in citations of his thought that appeared in the above description. In spite of his division of man into the noumenal and the empirical, the problem of the relation between freedom and necessity remains unsolved. W.T. Jones points out that this "double and highly ambiguous sense" of freedom arises from his understanding of freedom in terms of autonomous free will. The moral act is free because the will is self-legislative, but freedom is also considered as "being spontaneous." 62 In this second sense, freedom is inconsistent with necessity in the first sense that says that when a maxim with a particular structure occurs and man acts on it, man is free. Kant is therefore accused of "sliding back and forth between freedom as 'spontaneous causality' and as 'maxim with autonomous
In the Critique of Judgement, Kant attempted to reconcile theoretical and practical reason in the idea of nature whereby the physical world could be viewed as a whole organic structure in spite of (als ob) its own complex physical laws. Paul Tillich remarked, however, that "in his Critique of Judgement he tried with great caution to escape the prison of finitude but succeeded only in beautifying it." 65

The ambivalence that remains is inevitable if freedom in the end is secured only in the attainment of morality. It arises from the schism between man's epistemological self and his moral self. Positively the awareness of man's empirical limits ensures his awareness of his finitude but negatively, freedom is made the inevitable result of rational striving. Kant has not abandoned the optimism of the Enlightenment that man will invariably break through the epistemological limits. For example, he stated:

All the interest of my reason (speculative as well as practical) comes together in the following three questions:
1. What can I know?
2. What ought I to do?
3. What may I hope? 66

That these three questions form the agenda of rationally liberated men is far from self-evident. On the contrary, in our age that testifies to the power of science and technology and the unprecedented awareness of man's abilities, a new functionalism places after the question "What can I know?" the question "What will work?" or "What will bring greatest benefit to the greatest number of people?"
The moral ought is not the necessary consequence of more incisive knowledge.

The problematic nature of this view of freedom emerges, for example, when one examines Kant's views on the freedom of society. Here the theoretical consistency of his views breaks down. Because of his claim that the goal of human existence is the realization of the moral law which is based on the idea of freedom, he adopts a highly optimistic view of human society. He, for instance, rejects any public resistance to authority since the rights of people to live under the conditions of freedom will be ensured by the responsibility which is incumbent on rulers to govern in a manner "which a people of mature rational powers would prescribe for itself." 67 He argued, therefore, that even under conditions of limited civil freedom, intellectual freedom can still "expand to its fullest extent" and "Eventually, it even influences the principles of government, which find that they can themselves profit by treating man ... in a manner appropriate to his dignity." 68 Hence he could state, "Argue as much as you like and about whatever you like, but obey." 69

Such an argument places too much confidence on the attainment of "mature rational powers" and presupposes too much on the part of those in positions of authority. It ignores the irrationalities of human existence, for example, human selfishness, the obsession with power and the individual profit motive. It places too much confidence in the ability of rational discourse or on the possibility of sufficient numbers in a society to participate in such discourse.
Hence, while Kant is committed to the goals of human autonomy and freedom, there is in practice, as R. Singh points out, the danger of "compromising the reality of one of the most valuable of Kant's insights - that of the moral responsibilities of finite but free human beings" since he absolutizes obedience.

Hegel perceived the epistemological dilemma that Kant had highlighted. As long as the "things-in-themselves" were unknowable, reason remained merely a subjective principle. As long as thought and existence, understanding and sense remained separated, the alienation of the mind remained. Kant's dualism was built on this antithesis between subject and object. Regarding Kant's attempt to first become acquainted with the instrument of thought (the mind) before we undertake the quest for knowledge, Hegel commented,

> Unless we wish to be deceived by words, it is easy to see what this amounts to. In the case of other instruments, we can try and criticize them in other ways then by setting about the special work for which they are destined. But the examination of knowledge can only be carried out by an act of knowledge. To examine this so-called instrument is the same thing as to know it. But to seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus not to venture into the water until he had learned to swim.

The historical form of this conflict Hegel called the "Entfremdung" and set about to construct a view of reality that would overcome this alienation. His philosophical system was to avoid the epistemological purview of Kant and be logical. Kant's transcendental solution was to be replaced by an immanentist one.
1.3. G.F. HEGEL: FREEDOM AND UNIVERSAL SYNTHESIS

To overcome the logical problems of Kant's approach which entrenched the subject-object antithesis and confined knowledge by pure reason only to phenomena, Hegel makes reason central to his whole thought as Kant had attempted by distinguishing between pure and practical reason. The main tenets of his philosophy are logically intertwined with reason from which they also are derived: mind, notion, freedom and such like. For example, reason presupposes freedom which is construed as the ability to act in accordance with true knowledge. On the other hand, perfect freedom obtains when the subject comprehends the independent objectivity of all objects. As long as an object exists which the subject has not mastered by pure thought, the subject is unfree. The free subject has no object. Hence true reality like reason presupposes freedom while the basis for attaining reality is reason alone. This tautology must now be explicated vis-à-vis the main tenets of Hegel's philosophy with a view to understanding his idea of freedom in particular.

Hegel, in attempting to reconcile the subject and the object, coined the terms an sich (in itself) and für sich (for itself) which Sartre used to elaborate his own philosophy of self-actualization: en-soi and pour-soi. The an sich is implicit until it becomes aware of its potential and its relations to its context. In developing such an awareness it becomes für sich. It is no longer implicit and potential but explicit and actualized.

However, both an sich and für sich themselves represent two levels
of alienation. In an sich the subject remains alienated from its true reality in the world. In the state of für sich the subject is alienated from its potential and the particular considers itself the whole. Alienation is only overcome when through a process of development, the end (telos) is achieved where no externalized subject remains. This unity of subject and object Hegel called Anundfürsichsein: the state of "being-in-and-for itself." This state itself is not the end but a stage in the historical process towards the eschatological merger of history and Absolute Spirit. Thus by postulating a monism of Spirit, Hegel hoped to overcome the Kantian dualism.

This historical movement towards the eschatological goal is achieved by a dialectical process. In *Phenomenology of the Mind* Hegel attempted a grand and comprehensive conceptualization of this process which is perceived as the logical outcome of the negations of history. Life is self-generative and expresses itself in successively unfolding forms. The process begins with simple contradictions and develops to more complex ones, the resolution of each leading to the "blossoming" of consciousness. The whole process achieving all the time a greater awareness and a higher degree of freedom.

Hegelian thought introduced into philosophical discussion an unprecedented historical dynamism. The achieving of truth and freedom was, as Kant had said, a rational activity but, according to Hegel, it was also historical: a process and a becoming. Each stage of the awareness of truth was understood to be a necessary step in the
process and each conflict a necessary negation to drive the process forward. Hence Hegel stated, "The truth is the whole and the whole is merely the essential nature reaching its completeness through the process of its own development." 75

In his seminal lectures on Art, Religion and Philosophy where his main ideas are more accessible, Hegel stated, "What is true is ... found in motion, in a process... Difference while it lasts, is but the temporary condition through which comes unity full and concrete." 76 In this connection, he agreed with Goethe that "that which is formed ever resolves itself back into its elements." 77

In the process of becoming, all matter which has developed form constitutes once more the material for a new form. Reason seizes all forms and, by cancelling and altering them, makes them more adequate to their notion. 78

By "notion" Hegel had in mind that quality or dimension of being which passes into its opposite without becoming anything different but which, even in the opposite, remains identical with itself. Herbert Marcuse pointed out that Hegel's term for this concrete universal (Begriff) is the activity of comprehending (Begreifen) rather than its abstract logical form or result; 79 More akin to the English word 'concept'. Hence Begriff as we find it used by Hegel is best translated 'notion' or 'idea' to make sense of the Hegelian view of striving towards an idea (or notion).

The quest for truth is directed towards the notion for in it the truth of the object is found. Reason, as it were, chisels the raw
materials of historical forms making them more adequate to their notion, that is, their state of being-in-and-for-itself. Notion, therefore, is also the "sphere of freedom" since freedom is actualized in the knowledge of truth. In the notion, the opposite has been overcome.

The notion is the sphere of freedom because it is self-mediated, and since "the other" is thereby absorbed, it is also self-determined. To be self-determined is to be free whereas to be determined by another constitutes necessity. The movement from Essence to Notion is the development from necessity to freedom. Hegel stated that,

The Idea as concrete in-itself and self-developing, is an organic system and a totality which contains a multitude of stages and of moments in development...
The Idea is one in its totality and in all its individual parts... all the parts (particulars) are but the mirrors and copies of this one life and have their actuality only in this unity. Thus the Idea is the central point, which is also the periphery... which in all its expansion... remains present and immanent within itself. Thus it is both the system of necessity and its own necessity, which also constitutes its freedom.

Hegel illustrates this point by referring to the fact that gold contains in every particle all its qualities in their entirety. He argued that the view which perceives this dialectic between 'the whole' and 'the part' as suitable for sensuous things and not for the spiritual, lacks justification.

In the process of becoming, freedom and necessity coalesce. In the
Science of Logic, Hegel argued that the process of freedom is of necessity because it follows the laws inherent in its own nature and freedom is this necessity because the process is self-determined and is not the result of external forces. 81

Hegel refutes the presupposition that underlies the argument that if the mind is free it is not in subjection to necessity or inversely, that if its will and thought are determined through necessity, it is not free. The presupposition being that freedom and necessity are mutually exclusive. He maintains that the mind is itself concrete and incorporates the attributes of both freedom and necessity and more than this, "mind is free in its necessity and finds its freedom in it alone, since its necessity rests on its freedom." 82 However, he admits, that unlike the natural objects, this unity of freedom and necessity is more difficult to show. 83

Men, unlike the plants and animals, can deviate from the necessity of their nature (their truth) and become what they ought not to be since in human freedom what is and what ought to be are separate. With the power of choice that freedom brings, comes the possibility for alienation i.e. when contrary to the laws of necessity, freedom works in opposition to the fulfilment of true destiny. When freedom is severed from necessity, the will "persists in obstinacy and stands aloof from its necessity and truth." 84 This "abstract" and "false freedom" is "self-will and for that reason is self-opposed, unconsciously limited, an imaginary freedom which is free in form alone." 85 This is what Hegel meant in The Logic by "The truth of necessity is freedom." 86
The notion, therefore, is also the identity of the universal and the particular. For Hegel, the whole concrete universal is mind and the whole concrete particular, nature. The notion (or Idea) unites the antitheses created in Kantian dualism between subjectivity and objectivity, thought and existence, understanding and sense. This Entfremdung (alienation) of the mind threatens man's freedom because it leads to a renewed inauthentic existence whereby man is influenced by laws and forces which Kant's "noumena" admitted. In order to jettison the dichotomy, Hegel conceives of a unified rational being of Truth and Reality in which there are no contradictions. Such negations are merely the modus operandi of Absolute Spirit. To let these negations remain contradictions is to admit that the "for-itself" is still alienated and that would mean that the world is not wholly rational. The apparent contradictions find their resolution in the whole and the Entfremdung is resolved only if man's world is integrated by the rational will. "The realm of mind achieves in freedom what the realm of nature achieves in blind necessity" and something is true if it is what it can be ie. when it is in-and-for-itself it is identical with its notion. 87 As Marcuse stated it, "The realization of reason is not a fact but a task." 88

Furthermore, there are two perspectives to this freedom. On the one hand, man has attained truth when the mind has attained the self-consciousness of its freedom and has become capable of freeing society. On the other hand, when truth is attained the Absolute Spirit has thereby attained self-knowledge in the sphere of human
consciousness and has thus created freedom. Spirit, as it were, breaks into history or inversely, man is in step with Spirit, at the moment of truth. Thus, Hegel unites personal, individual, communal and local striving in one epoch with the goal of human history.

As Karl Löwith commented,

The absolute or spirit which continuously surrenders and recollects, is per se historical, even though the dialectic of becoming does not proceed in a straight line toward infinity, but rather goes in a circle, so that the end is the consummation of the beginning... And because the essence of Spirit is the freedom of existing with itself, complete freedom is achieved with the completion of its history. 89

At the heart of his philosophical system, Hegel constructs a definite philosophy of history, devoting a whole book to this aspect. "The history of the world," he wrote, "is none other than the progress of consciousness of Freedom." 90 History is a transforming process, a process which carries forward each new and higher perception of freedom, which R. Dunayevskay described as "the task which Spirit accomplished as actual history." 91 Individuals invariably, and often inadvertently, promote the task of spirit. Individual achievements are "levers" of all historical progress. The universal is the true subject of history and historical reason works through and beyond individual interests. As Marcuse states it, "The law of history which the world mind represents... operates behind the backs and over the heads of individuals, in the form of an irresistible anonymous power." 92
Philosophy, says Hegel, is "the apprehension of the Development of the Concrete." It is conceiving thought and is itself this development in thought. Philosophy begins "where the universal is comprehended as the all-embracing existence or where the existent is laid hold of in a universal form." Thought must free itself from nature and sense perception and be "for itself" but it must also be "in itself" to arrive at the consciousness of freedom.

The task of philosophy is not merely to think freely but to grasp the Idea: it must bring thought and the object of thought into the form of universality. Philosophy, as F. Copleston states, must incorporate in the process of the Absolute's self expression the oppositions and divisions in history and society.

The Idea of universality is also the ground of Hegel's ethics. The will is free in so far as it wills the universal. Thus, as with Kant, freedom is not caprice or "motiveless action." A diatetical relation obtains between will and the universal. For will to be free its goal must be the universal but it is itself universal. Hence its *modus vivendi* is its constant task to preserve its freedom by making itself its own object. In willing the universal it wills the right and is free. It remains in bondage to nature if it wills the particular i.e. selfish or parochial ends. "Unfreedom is to be ruled by nature, what is not me." Freedom is not lawlessness for the nature of true laws is that they embody the universal. Obedience to bad laws i.e. those which reflect the interest of some individuals or class, leads to bondage because
it would mean that I am governed by the other. But since laws that embody the universal are what I myself should project, obeying them means I rule myself and I am free. "The inherent nature of law is to embody universality, that is, to embody myself." 99

As a consequence, Hegel has a dynamic view of state. The state is the true self of the individual and achieves reality when its laws are commensurate to the potentialities of its citizens and which allow their full development. The reconciliation of human freedom and the manifestation of state must be constantly ensured. 100 This means that the state must be constantly changing to ensure the freedom of the subject or else it will cease to be fully reasonable. 101

The ideas of motion and historical becoming admitted into politics a new dynamism which Avineri summed up as follows: "While political philosophy before Hegel was preoccupied with legitimacy, Hegel introduced the dimension of change and historicity which has since become central to modern political thought." 102 In his Philosophy of Right the process of attaining freedom in society, whereby greater consciousness of freedom is achieved by historical mediation, is explicated. Since the state is based on rational freedom and since its function is to allow each citizen to realize their freedom in relation to one another, the state is the sphere of universal and objective freedom. It is "the extension of man's self-consciousness." 103

In terms of the history of freedom, Hegel maintains that the Graeco-Roman man understood himself to be free as ingenuus but did not
understand individual freedom essentially as in-and-for-himself free; as free-born. That dimension was introduced into the world by Christianity which proclaimed that men are free in Christ and are equal before God. However, Hegel claimed, that although Christianity made man's freedom independent of birth, class or culture, it did not fully grasp that "to be free constituted the very notion of man." This problematic interpretation shall be evaluated in the second section of this study. 104

Hegel maintains that actual freedom develops political freedom. This freedom will only emerge when the individual attains consciousness of the fact that he is independent yet possesses universal significance. Because this freedom is dependent on self-determination, Hegel maintains that philosophy could only begin in the Grecian, not the Oriental world, since in the Greek world, mind must separate itself from its natural will. In Moksha there is a vanishing away of consciousness and all distinction between substance and individuality is removed. 105 He wrote,

In the brightness of the East the individual merely dissappears; in the West, the subject endures and continues in the substantial. In Greece we first see real freedom flourish, but still in a restricted form with a limitation... in the East only one individual is free, the despot; in Greece the few are free; in the Teutonic world the proposition is true that all are free, that is, man is free as man. 106

Thus the sphere of right (of the individual, family, society and state) derive from, and must conform to, the free will of the individual. Since state and society are to be constructed by free
individuals, "The realm of right is the realm of freedom." 107 L.W. Lancaster points out that because of this preoccupation with freedom in the state, Hegel believed that his political philosophy supplied the valid reconciliation of individual freedom and obedience to authority. 108

Hegel's whole system was thus permeated with the quest for freedom. Writing to Schelling, he remarked, "Reason and freedom remain our principles." 109 His Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences introduces his elaborate system of triads and sub-triads and sub-sub-triads, each dialectically related to one another and the rationale of the system is to understand the development of the consciousness of freedom in the whole. Being $\rightarrow$ Nothing $\rightarrow$ Becoming forms the basic triad while Being $\rightarrow$ Essence $\rightarrow$ Notion forms the main triad. The final triad which marks the eschatological fulfilment of history and of freedom is the triad Idea $\rightarrow$ Nature $\rightarrow$ Spirit. Each new triad reveals a greater awareness of freedom and within the system, Hegel affirmed that "Freedom wills freedom." 110

Hegel constantly reaffirmed the universal in order to objectively account for the whole of existence. This may be further illustrated in his view of Art and Science. He rejects the view that Art is unworthy of scientific consideration because what is enjoyed in the beauty of art is the freedom of its production and "plastic energy" as in contemplation. This view maintains that in Art and its production one wholly escapes from the fetters of rule and regularity.
Art cannot be scientific because science excludes imagination with its contingency. Science occupies itself with what is necessary. Therefore, there can be no universal laws of beauty and of taste. Hegel in contradicting this concept of science, points out that science which is used for finite ends, liberates itself from this service to fulfil its proper aims - the acquisition of truth. It can also rise up from being determined to be self-determined in order to be adequate to its notion which is Reason. Fine art, similarly, is not free until it is free in this sense also. Art must be free in its end as it is in its means.

In art, religion and philosophy the human mind is infinite for in them the object is rationally assimilated and subject attains self-determination and freedom. While even in "objective Spirit" human freedom objectifies itself in the external world, that very objectifying implies that something is still not grasped by the subject. Therefore, the full notion of freedom is attained only when objective Spirit is elevated to Absolute Spirit. For example, the freedom of the individual is only approximately realized in the State because the State in so far as it is objective is still outside his subjectivity. All otherness is removed only in Absolute Spirit.

Hegel's philosophy is undoubtedly the grandest attempt to present the whole of life in a comprehensive and logically coherent form which takes seriously both "the Idea" and history. The importance of the universal was re-affirmed in the face of its rejection in favour of only particulars by Locke and Hume. The importance of
synthesis was restored in the face of the Kantian dualism.

Nevertheless, Hegel's universal synthesis and its accompanying idea of freedom have difficulties of their own. Its view of authentic existence is not free from ambiguity in spite of the inbuilt dialectic that removes the contradictions of the world and human existence. Man is free as man yet he is in a state of becoming, for freedom wills freedom and Absolute freedom is attained by rational striving when freedom embodies the universal. Hence, by its very nature, idealist philosophy in order to be complete, as W T Stace points out, must deduce every detail in the universe. 114 This means that it can never be complete yet this is what Hegel believed must be possible and believed his own system represented.

Freedom and reason appear as the a priori and the a posteriori of the system so that their manifestation is logically worked out over and above the exigencies of existence which the Existentialists were at pains to rediscover. They reacted to Hegel's view mainly because his system of Ideas explained away the paradoxes. As L. Kolakowski states,

... the doctrine justified every actual reality as praiseworthy by the very fact of its existence, which proved it to have been planned by the divine mind. Freedom of the individual is in great danger if it is admitted that things cannot be different, that man was wrong and that he can redress. That what is, is not necessary. 115

Similarly, Hegel's historical vision, albeit comprehensive, may be criticised in view of the crisis of modern man who though possessing
greater ability to control nature is not necessarily any more free than his forbears. On the contrary, he appears to be more severely dehumanised. To understand history is often to question the validity of historical progress which in Hegel is cast in deterministic terms. Even retrogressions are explained as necessary and indispensable to progress. If Absolute Spirit works behind the backs of individuals in a deterministic way, what then is the nature of man's true freedom? Hegel would answer that a free man is one who acts in concert with Absolute Spirit and not for parochial ends. While there is some merit in this answer since all arguments for Providence will adopt a similar line, one is not sure what the grounds are for Hegel's optimistic view of man; an optimism which is open to much scepticism.

Ultimately, Hegel's man is governed by the inexorable law of world reason working out in the historical blossoming of Spirit. One may still justifiably ask whether it is possible for man to escape the tyranny of historical inevitability and habit by mere rational activity.

A major criticism of Hegel, therefore, is that he resolves man's crisis and alienation in theory only. To theoretically understand or describe the nature of freedom does not mean the attainment of that freedom any more than grasping of the notion of freedom means the attainment of freedom. Hegel has only managed to show what can potentially be the lot of man.

Herbert Marcuse maintains that Hegel is perhaps the best example of the cultural dilemma that existed in Germany at the time when "theory" was alienated from "practice". The educated classes had isolated themselves from practical affairs and "rendered themselves
impotent to apply their reason to the reshaping of society" 116 and fulfilled themselves in the realm of science, art, religion and philosophy. Culture was essentially idealistic and, Marcuse maintains, Hegel's system was "the last great expression of this cultural idealism, the last great attempt to render thought the refuge for reason and liberty." 117 It set freedom of thought before freedom of action and since the majority of our societies, albeit more scientifically advanced than the society of Hegel's, still cannot attain rational freedom, the questions of morality and practical justice remain unattended. These problems were the chief questions that the Marxists and neo-Marxists were to address themselves to. In this connection, both Kant and Hegel in their attempt to rescue reason and freedom from the rationalistic and empiricist attacks, were not themselves free of the belief in the inherent harmony of society and the doctrine of eternal progress based on rational striving. Morality and freedom are fully attained at the end of a process: either when man attains autonomy or has outgrown his immaturity in Kant's case, or when he has grasped the universal and when objective Spirit has merged into Absolute Spirit, in Hegel's case. Both claimed that man is free and that "freedom wills freedom" but what that means in practice they do not say; in society where the masses daily become dependent either on the few or "the party" who economically and politically manipulate their whole lives and who insidiously determines their value-systems because they manipulate their needs through sophisticated advertising and marketing.

Also, Hegel presupposes too much about historical harmony. He held that, the nature of humanity is to impel men to agree with one another, and its very existence lies simply in the explicit realization of a community of
This view not only admits a determinism that logically undercuts individual responsibility (since willing the universal even when it appears in Sartre is still only an interesting intellectualism) but it also underestimates the problem of synthesis. For example, the great difficulties existing in getting men to agree with one another in a large scale politically volatile context. That it is not self-evident that opposing views can be harmonized is best illustrated in the catastrophic world wars in our century which contrary to any theory of progress led to the most wanton destruction of men by men themselves. Contrary to the theory of historical ineluctability, these wars, as Nicolai Berdyaev stated, were a judgement in history on history.

Any theoretical framework whether philosophical, theological or historical, as we shall elaborate later, suffers from the problem of having to explain the whole and its diverse parts on the basis of a preconceived view. Theoretical frameworks are always means to an end and can never be ends in themselves because no one theory, especially of history, can cope with the complexity of life. Frameworks are by their nature static even if, as in Hegel's system, this ultimate static quality emerges after an almost indefinite process of development. When Absolute Spirit is attained the system is closed and then even reflection (philosophy) becomes redundant.

Hegel criticised the rationalists for their "raisonnement"; their speculative quests in the name of reason which were doomed to failure because their view of reason predisposed their understanding of
the world. Yet his selecting of historical data was also predetermined by his theory of history and thus his system ultimately is the Procrustean bed into which the various data are made to fit.

Kolakowski points to a further problem with Hegelian historiography. The system denies the independent value of personal human life for the sake of the demands of universal Reason and in the name of those demands permits the state to coerce individuals for a higher freedom. In practice, therefore, freedom ends in the all powerful state. In The Philosophy of Right Hegel argued that the monarch alone can provide a stable reference point since he is what he is by birth and not by his social existence. Marcuse strongly reacted to this view that makes "Freedom... identical with the inexorable necessity of nature, and reason terminates in an accident of birth." The philosophy of freedom turns into a philosophy of necessity.

In the history of the quest for freedom in Western thought since the Enlightenment, Hegel's synthesis of epistemology and metaphysics was one of the two most distinguished responses to the Kantian dualism and the epistemological crisis of the Enlightenment. The second response manifested itself in several attempts to abolish metaphysics altogether. These include Positivism and neo-positivism, and Marxism. Existentialism attempted a radical redefinition of metaphysics. Each of these three contemporary philosophical quests also offer a different conception of freedom which must now be clarified and evaluated.
1.4 POSITIVISM AND NEO-POSITIVISM: FREEDOM FROM METAPHYSICS

David Hume, by undercutting the rationalist position by his radical scepticism, isolated an aspect of the Enlightenment that was greatly to influence Positivism. Radical doubt, Kant saw, would endanger the rational principle itself. It, however, fostered confidence in empirical verification and the methodology of the natural sciences. Hume, for this reason, may be said to have been the fore-runner of Positivism.

August Comte gave this approach formal definition. He proposed that theology, metaphysics and "the Positive" represented three historical stages. Theology represented the projection of the emotions vis-à-vis the world; metaphysics depersonalized these projections and transformed them into abstract essences; but the Positive abolishes abstracts and essences and formulates relationships between what is directly observed. Science is the ground of the Positive and represents the evolution of man from the stages of theology and metaphysics. 125

Positivism and its subsequent neo-positivist schools, like the Enlightenment, fostered an intense epistemological quest. The quest for certainty of knowledge remained central.

G.E. Moore in his "Refutation of Idealism" (1903) argued for epistemological realism regarding the object of knowledge. Like Bertrand Russell, his writings were pioneering projects of the logical
positivist schools which caught the imagination of the Anglo-Saxon world. Russell and Moore adopted scepticism: Russell became known as "the passionate sceptic." 126

Russell maintained a Realist position at first, and defended the view that particulars which have quantities or relations are instances of universals. 127 In 1955, he added a footnote to his article "On the relations of Universals and Particulars" in which he stated that his argument in favour of the existence of particulars no longer seemed valid. The theories that assert particulars and deny them are equally tenable though the latter "has the merit of logical parsimony." 128

Moore's scepticism emerges in his attempt to refute Idealism in which he stated that it is not possible to say anything about the universe in general. "No conclusions can be drawn about any of the subjects about which we most want to know. An attempt to do will frustrate rather than liberate." 129 Hegel had attempted to understand that which cannot be understood. There was only one alternate to Kant's answer that matter and spirit exist and that was absolute scepticism. Philosophy adds nothing to the knowledge of things by its abstract speculations. Beside scepticism,

All other suppositions - the Agnostic's that something, at all events, does exist, as much as the Idealist's, that spirit does - are, if we have no reason for believing in matter, as baseless as the grossest superstitions. 130

Freedom of thought obtains in rational explanation, that is, in logical
and empirically viable formulations of truth not in abstract speculations. That which is inexplicable must be left unexplained. Hence the neo-positivists are content with clarifying only and they fight shy of explanation.

Freedom is conceived as freedom from doubt, conflict and frustrations which result when man indulges in abstract theoretical speculations. Both major schools of neo-positivism, Logical Positivism and Linguistic Analysis hold to a similar idea of freedom. The former represented mainly by the early Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ayer, Schlick, Reichenbach, Russell and Popper, and the latter by Ryle, Austin, Wisdom, Strawson and the later Wittgenstein also. Logical positivism attempted to show that only scientific concepts yielded meaningful propositions since they recorded verifiable facts. Man's freedom lies in his being one with truth and reality as reflected in his speech.

Wittgenstein, one of the chief initiators of neo-positivism, held that everything is given in language and nothing can be added by philosophy whose task is to demonstrate the meaninglessness of concepts. However, he realized the restrictive nature of truth within the confines of scientific language in the *Tractatus* and, in his *Philosophical Investigations*, broadened his view to include all language and he adopted the approach of linguistic analysis. A closer look at the nature of these approaches must now be taken.

1.4.1. LOGICAL ANALYSIS

Russell defined logical analysis as "the analysis of denoting phrases,
the resolution of incomplete symbols, the method of dispensing with abstractions and logical constructionism." 131 Philosophy’s role is the translation of grammatically misleading or defective expressions into their logical form. Russell’s "theory of descriptions" which defined this approach, became very influential in the 1930’s. In 1929, F.P. Ramsey had concluded that this "theory of descriptions was the paradigm of proper philosophical method." 132

Russell also maintained that "all philosophy is logic." 133 Mathematical logic was understood to be the correct basis for understanding abstract concepts and facilitating logical viability. This principle of abstraction or "enables us," Russell wrote, "to see quickly what is the smallest store of materials with which a given logical or scientific edifice can be constructed," 134 and would "clear away incredible accumulations of metaphysical lumber." 135 Because philosophy has opted for creating a super-sensible world of ideas, it has failed to give an account of this world and has lapsed into flights of fancy and intellectual sophistry.

Russell goes beyond the empiricists with his claim that if there is any knowledge of general truths at all, there must be some knowledge of such truths which is independent of empirical evidence. While Kant believed that Reason a priori is the source of knowledge, Russell believed that such knowledge was grounded in logic. Modern logic is able to provide self-evident general propositions that can aid the quest for true knowledge and aid the analysis of complex facts.136 "The old logic put (facts) in fetters, while the new logic
gives them wings." 137 Influences are replaced by logical constructions 138 and any need for metaphysical postulates, such as Kant's Ding an sich, 139 is avoided.

Gilbert Ryle, influenced by Russell's theory of descriptions and logical analysis, suggested that the task of philosophy should be "logical paraphrase" whereby language would be freed from absurdities and inadequate concepts. 140 This involved a systematic restatement which includes, more than semantics or literary criticism, the transmutations of syntax in order to exhibit the forms of the facts. This he maintained was "the sole task" of philosophy. 141

This rejection of metaphysics became more intense with the emergence of Logical Positivism

1.4.2 LOGICAL POSITIVISM

Logical Positivism gained popularity in the years between the emergence of the Vienna Circle (1922) and the outbreak of the second World War. Its epistemological emphasis included the verifiability theory of meaning, the unity of science and the conception of language as calculus. If a sentence is not verifiable or not a truth tautology it is cognitively meaningless.

Philosophy was defined as the systematic presentation of the logical syntax of the language of science. This approach to philosophy had two important formulations: Rudolph Carnap's The Logical Syntax
of Language (1934) and A J Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic (1936). Carnap expounded a formal theory of language and philosophy was construed as the logical analysis of sentences, terms, concepts and theories of science. Ayer, using Russell's theory of descriptions, defined philosophy as analysis.

In his "Rejection of Metaphysics" Carnap argued that a statement possesses meaning only if it can give rise to perceptual statements. Metaphysicians, he argued, avoid making their statements verifiable so that they would not have to meet the rigours of empirical science. They pretend to teach knowledge which is of a higher level. Hence "they are compelled to cut all connection between their statements and experience and precisely by this procedure they deprive them of any sense." 142 Metaphysical statements because they lie outside the field of knowledge have only an expressive function but no representative function. They are "neither true nor false because they assert nothing; they contain neither knowledge nor error." 143

In this regard Carnap compares the statements of metaphysicians and poets both of whose statements are expressive. The difference lies in that the metaphysician enters controversy with others believing that he is asserting something while the poet does not claim that the other's verses are wrong. He contents himself with calling them bad. 144

Carnap cites the following statement from Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding to affirm this point. It seems to me ... if we take in our hand any volume
of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or numbers? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. 145

Carnap infers that only the statements of mathematics and empirical science have sense, and that all other statements are without sense.

To the objection that his own book is neither mathematical nor empirical, Carnap cites the answer that Wittgenstein had given in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,

The result of philosophy is not a number of philosophical statements but to make statements clear ... My statements are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognises them as senseless, when he climbed through them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder after he has climbed up on it). He must surmount these statements; then he sees the world rightly. Where one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. 146

However, while acknowledging his own indebtedness and that of the Vienna Circle to Wittgenstein's analysis of metaphysics, Carnap takes issue with Wittgenstein on two counts: one, that he overstates the case when he thinks that ultimately his statements are as meaningless as metaphysical ones; two, he thinks that Wittgenstein contradicts himself by insisting that philosophical statements are meaningless and then proceeding to write a whole book on the subject. Carnap believes that it is imperative for philosophy to adhere to its "only proper task" of logical analysis since it is an exact method. 147
Hans Hahn came to a similar conclusion in his attempt to resolve the impasse between rationalism and empiricism both of which he believed had suffered shipwreck — rationalism, because its fruits lacked nourishing value, and empiricism because it could not do justice to logic and mathematics. Both have something vital to contribute since thought, as formulated in logic and mathematics, grasps the most general laws of all being while observation fills in the framework. 148

The only solution lay in a purely empiricist solution where observation is the only source of knowledge, without postulating, as Kant had done, an a priori knowledge. This new empiricism would require a new definition of logic and mathematics.

There are two kinds of statements: those which say something about facts and those which express the way words are dependent on each other to be meaningful. The latter Hahn called "tautologies" which say nothing about the objects but are universally valid and irrefutable by observation. 149 Logic and mathematics are construed as universally valid tautologies. 150

Hahn rejects the old empiricism and metaphysics which he called the "traditional-platonizing" view wherein thought and the laws of logic and mathematics are understood as the means to comprehending the eternal laws of the world. On the contrary, because thought can only transform tautologically what has been said about the world it cannot "pierce through" the sensible world. Hence metaphysics
is impossible not because it is too difficult for the mind but because it is meaningless. 151

From the above description of their approach, it is evident that the logical Positivists conceive of human freedom as existing within the limits of that which can be logically defined and empirically verifiable. One can only be assured of knowledge in so far as the incessant temptation to abstract or infer beyond these limits is overcome. Hence the logical positivists or logical analytic approach unanimously rejects metaphysics as the threat to human freedom since it alienates one from certain knowledge rather than achieves a surer knowledge of the world. The finitude of man, which the Enlightenment had realized in Kant, now became exemplified in the empirical limits of logical and mathematical tautologies.

J.O. Urmson criticised this approach which attempted to be a prophylactic against linguistic abuses but in equating philosophy with logic, it had not gone beyond the old empiricist position. The business is still old reductive analysis even if under new management. 152

He believed that the logical analysts had not really broken with Hume's analysis of causation, Berkeley's analysis of physical objects or even Plato's analysis in the Theaetetus. They only differed in detail. 153

A general problem with this analytical approach is that the logical positivists consciously limit, and fix the parameter of truth on
the basis of their empirical criterion and then proceed on that basis to determine what can be meaningful and what cannot. While we criticized the Hegelian approach for forcing truth into a preconceived historical scheme which is imposed upon the world, the logical positivists forced human consciousness of the world into the Procrustean bed of their revamped logical empiricism; for example, Hans Hahn in his attempt to refute metaphysics had said,

Every attempt to do metaphysics is an attempt to speak in a way that contravenes the agreement as to how we wish to speak, comparable to the attempt to capture the queen (in a game of chess) by means of an orthogonal move of the bishop. 154

Hahn and the logical positivists also may be asked, who determined the "agreement as how to speak" or who determined the rules of their logical positivistic chess game?

The Logical analysis of Russell and Moore and the logical positivists were repudiated by Wittgenstein, Wisdom and Ryle themselves who formerly had some connection with these approaches. The subsequent reaction to logical analysis gave rise to what came to be called "linguistic", "ordinary" or "conceptual" analysis or sometimes "conceptual elucidation."

1.4.3 LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS

Wittgenstein realized the restriction he had placed on language in the Tractatus by limiting truth to scientific language only and, in his Philosophical Investigations, broadened his view to include
all language. Gilbert Ryle describes the implications of this shift thus,

The rules of logical syntax, which in the _Tractatus_ appear chiefly as conditions of construing, appear in the _Investigations_ as conditions of composing... the world in the _Tractatus_ is like the newspaper room in a municipal library, in which old aged pensioners peruse sequences of printed sentences but never themselves write anything or even say anything, save 'yes' or 'no'... In the _Investigations_ we hear of people learning how to say things, even of their inventing ways of saying things. 155

The linguistic analysts attempted to elucidate concepts and not merely ascertain form. The later Wittgenstein, Wisdom, Ryle and Austen rejected Moore's theory of analysis and Russell's theory of description. The logical positivists had confused the meaning of a statement with the use of a descriptive expression. The logical positivist theory was now seen as "an illusion imposed upon language by language itself." 156

John Wisdom maintained that the problem of philosophical language is that they embody "puzzles" and "paradoxes" and that the task of philosophy is to resolve these puzzles. 157 Wisdom, who at first adopted a linguistic analytic approach disagreed, therefore, with Moore's approach which "with horrible ingenuity... can rapidly reduce any metaphysical theory to a ridiculous story" and with its falseness throws out the good also. 158 Wittgenstein, on the other hand, perceives this "puzzlement" of philosophical language but represents it as the sign of linguistic confusion. Wisdom argues that these "puzzles" are also the symptom of linguistic penetration for
"philosophies should be continually trying to say what cannot be said." Hisdan, therefore, finally overcame linguistic analysis.

Other linguistic analysts like Ryle and Austin pursue the need to establish the nature of true understanding and perception. Austin's _Sense and Sensibilia_ aimed at refuting Ayer's argument from illusion i.e. that knowledge is gained only by our sense-data and not by material things directly because our senses deceive us; they do not represent the object as it is. Against this view Austin pointed out that propositions are part and parcel of a particular situation and not of a class or category. Hence like Ryle, Austin repudiates Descartes' category mistake.

Ryle argued that mind is not an extra metaphysically hidden entity affixed to the body like a "Ghost in the Machine." He argued that Descartes had reduced crucial mind-statements to categorical ones and as such committed a fundamentally logical mistake. While Carnap had maintained that all propositions were protocols i.e. propositions of observation, Ayer and Austin argued that there must be a non-verbal reality by which the truth or falsehood can be determined. For Ayer such non-verbal reality is the sense-data. For Austin it was the particular factual situation:

The question of truth and falsehood does not turn only on what a sentence is, nor yet on what it means, but on, speaking very broadly, the circumstances in which it is uttered.

Thus, as Rauche points out, for Ayer the sentence is incorrigible, while for Austin the circumstances in which the sentence arises is
incorrigible. 164

It will be obvious from the above description of the rationale of the main neo-positivist movements that the central concern remains the freedom from idealistic abstraction and meaningless speculation. The logical positivists themselves came to see the limitations of their approach. However, they had succeeded in helping philosophy to see the need to constantly reassess its metaphysical presuppositions. As Morris Weitz states, "... their services in arousing philosophy from dogmatic slumbers ... cannot be over-estimated. 'Classical' logical positivism may be dead but it did not live in vain." 166

Nevertheless, linguistic analysis, although it broadened the scope of analysis, did not fare any better in addressing the problems of man. Its inherent caution for metaphysical enquiry results in little being said about the world itself. The fact that it in theory excludes this possibility makes its methodology as problematic as that of logical positivism. In going beyond the theoretical framework of the logical positivists, the linguistic analysts did not escape their epistemological prison. The fact that the age old questions of man cannot be wished away is evident in Wisdom's own writings but under the same, cautiously analytical stamp.

To wish away or logically explain away those questions that plague man does not lead to their solution or elimination. The analysts have been too smugly content with mere description and have neglected to grapple with life and human existence. The analysts, of course,
will disagree. B. Weitz points to Kurt Baier's book *The Meaning of Life* (1957) as an example to refute this general criticism. 166

Baier argued that "Human life is meaningful; and people who claim it is meaningless if God does not exist, simply confuse purpose in life with purpose of life." 167 He proceeds to argue that the acceptance of the scientific world-view provides no reason for saying that life is meaningless, but on the contrary, every reason for saying that there are many lives which are meaningful. He refutes as unsound the view that claims that the retention of the Christian world-view gives a guarantee of meaning for human existence. 168

An examination of Baier's views, although purporting to be in quest for meaning, reveals the blandness of the analyst's view of life and its coldly common-sense detachment. Man is reduced to a function whose meaning is assessed in terms of the scientific world picture. In the end, this view lapses into an uncritical humanism within which the optimism of the ability of reason (Science) is taken for granted. This is accompanied by an unwillingness to think through the Christian position which it attacked, especially since Baier himself admits, "It may still be objected that the best and most modern views (i.e., of Christianity) are wholly different. I have not the necessary knowledge to pronounce on the accuracy of the claim." 169

Neo-positivism arrives at a view of human freedom *via negativa*. Only in the absence of meaningless speculation is man free from the frustration of having to account for the unaccountable and from
escaping his responsibilities in this world by postulating a "real" or "super-sensible" world above or beyond this world. If man were free from such compulsive escapism he would be free to live in his world and accept his responsibilities in it. This view, though remodelled, has not escaped the belief in the inherent reason and harmony in society. It still functions on the belief that logical analysis and careful description, a highly intellectual exercise, will resolve the crisis of human existence.

Neo-positivism does not say what freedom is and in spite of the crisis of human freedom in our times, neo-positivism has contributed little to the solution. With its methodological caution against not saying too much, many applications of the method lapses into either insipid indifference or intellectual smugness; Like the scholar at a recent philosophical conference who attempted to prove from the inherent contradictions in the propositions for God's existence, that God in fact could not exist. In the attempt to free man from meaningless speculation, neo-positivism has led him into the bondage of a linguistic prison. Lack of the ability to express adequately becomes "proof" of the non existence of the object of expression. At best, neo-positivism can only offer ethical humanistic solution to the problem of freedom, a position that admits new problems, which we observed in our evaluation of the Enlightenment.

Wittgenstein in one of his musings in The Investigations asks the question, "What is your aim in philosophy?" to which he answered, "To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle." 170 One can
justifiably ask whether the neo-positivists, by absolutizing their analytical methodology and by repudiating man's freedom to raise the questions of his existential meaning, ruling such questions out of order, have not succeeded only in re-decorating the jar? The implications of their abdication of philosophy will be discussed later.

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Between the Hegelian synthesis and the other two contemporary philosophical approaches, Marxism and Existentialism, which specifically address the problem of human freedom, stands the thought of Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach (1804-1872). Feuerbach's criticism of Hegel influenced both these approaches.

Feuerbach maintained that Hegel only apparently rejected transcendence and that his attempt to reconcile the primacy of reason and necessity results in the negation of the whole system. By making reason the self-realization of absolute being to itself, Hegel "alienates and expropriates from man his typical essence and activity." 171 Feuerbach argued for a materialist metaphysics which went beyond idealism. Philosophy resolves theology into anthropology.

Feuerbach was to influence both Marx and Engels. Engels stated that "With one blow (Feuerbach) pulverised the contradiction of Idealism and ... placed materialism on the throne again" but relented that he had "stopped half way; the lower half of him was materialist, the upper half Idealist." 172

Karl Marx in his well-known "Theses on Feuerbach" pointed out that
the chief defect with previous materialism, including Feuerbach's, was that things (Gegenstand) are considered in the form of the "object" or of contemplation, but not as "sensuous human activity, practice." 173 Feuerbach wavers between "the theoretical attitude" and wanting "sensuous objects." He does not grasp the significance of "revolutionary" and "practical-critical activity." Marx maintains that Feuerbach, by resolving the essence of religion into the essence of man, fails to see that "the abstract individual which he analyses belongs to a particular form of society." 174

On the other hand, Feuerbach resolves Hegelianism into psychology by refocusing on the consciousness of man. As such he was to influence phenomenological anthropology which in turn influenced Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre.

1.5 MARXISM AND THE FREEDOM OF SOCIETY

Central to Marx's view of freedom is his understanding of "alienation" which appears in Hegel's thought also. For Hegel, alienation was the result of the failure to realize that Spirit was not a-historical. Man's freedom emerges when he understands his whole existence in the light of the history of Spirit. Marx, with Feuerbach, rejected the Idea of Spirit and viewed alienation as existing not between world and Spirit but between man and his social being. He wrote, "For Hegel, the human essence, man, is the same as self-consciousness. All alienation of man's essence is therefore nothing but the alienation of self-consciousness." 175 In Hegel, history and man are reduced
to an abstraction in pure thought and alienation occurs in the mind. 176

The idea of alienation is central to Marx's thought. It is a fundamental issue in *Grundrisse* and *Das Capital* where it is described at length how capital, having obtained in itself an inhuman power, arrogates the role of controlling the historical process and thus alienates man. In *Das Capital* he spoke of this arrogation as fetishism wherein the products of labour as soon as they are produced acquire a "mysterious social character." 177 One's produced commodities become the objects of desire of another making the other dependent. Production instead of being the basis for freedom in practice, actually leads one into bondage. 178 It becomes the means whereby people are ruled by others, since objects of production are robbed of their own social power and is used by some to control the process of production itself. The individual is thus swallowed up by the means of his own hands. 179 The relation between men takes the form of a relation between things. 180

This alienation affects the whole of society, both the workers and landed class. In the case of the worker, work is ultimately directed against himself since what he produces is used to control him and increase his poverty. "The worker is related to the product of his labour as to an alien object." 181 Moreover, alienation extends from his own alienation to that of his social alienation whereby he is alienated from his fellow-man and from nature. The influence of Hegel on Marx is evident here: Hegel held that as long as something
is externalised man is not free, Marx argued that,

the more the worker externalises himself in his work, the more powerful becomes the alien, objective world that he creates opposite him, the poorer he becomes himself in his inner life and the less he can call his own. 182

Elsewhere, he stated that selling is the embodiment of this externalization and that the alien entity under whose domination man places activity is "money". 183

The propertied class and the capitalists are also rooted in the same alienation but unlike the proletariat are unaware of it, but derive from this self-alienation power and legitimation. 184 Because his motive to accumulate surplus value (what Marx called the "selfValorisation" of capital) is fulfilled, the capitalist remains content in his semblance of existence. He shares the same "slavish relation to capital as the worker, although at the opposite pole." 185

The healing of man's alienation requires a radical re-definition of philosophy. Marx stated that, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it." 186 Philosophy has to become practical. Kant and Hegel had not gone far enough. Kant envisaged progress in a free society and Fichte viewed human history as rational development. Hegel with his doctrine of dialectical progress gave both views comprehensive form but his was still a system based on the Idea. Marx claimed to have stood Hegel's system, therefore, on its head. This he did
by replacing Hegel's abstract principles with the dynamic economic and social dimensions of history. To Kugelmann, Marx wrote,

"My method of development is not Hegelian, since I am a materialist and Hegel is an idealist. Hegel's dialectics is the basic form of all dialectics, but only after it has been stripped of its mystical form, and it is precisely this which distinguishes my method." 187

Practice does not derive from ideas but ideas are formed from the understanding of material practice.

Therefore, philosophy, politics and religion are secondary in that they are interpretive whereas productive activity is fundamental and primary. 188 In the Manifesto Marx maintained that the dominant idea of each age are those of the ruling class hence what was needed was the freedom from ideological theorizing. What was needed was not criticism but the practical overthrow of the social relations that gave rise to this "idealistic humbug" 189 for revolution was the driving force of history. All ideological forms, including philosophy and religion, must be abolished. He wrote that "as long as man is imprisoned within religion, he only knows how to objectify his essence by making it alien, imaginary being." 190

Marx has been criticised like Hegel was for his view of history viz that it was deterministic. Although there are elements in his thought that do give this impression it should be remembered that, unlike Hegel, he attempts to give much greater significance to the action of men in the material change of society. This he makes clear in The Holy Family.
History, does nothing; it does not possess immense riches, it does not fight battles. It is men, real, living men, who do all this, who possess things and fight battles. It is not 'history' which uses man as a means of achieving - as if it were an individual person - its own end. History is nothing but the activity of men in pursuit of the ends. 191

In The German Ideology the same point is reiterated but with the word of caution that men do not make history just as they please but are influenced by the past. 192 Man is conditioned by his historical circumstances even as he influences those circumstances also. Each generation receives from its predecessor a range of productive forces together with a historically created relation of individuals to nature and to each other. 193

By this historical materialism, Marx believes, men can resolve their alienation of self-consciousness and achieve freedom i.e. freedom from all that is opposed to the resolution of the class struggle in capitalistic society. He wrote,

The positive abolition of private property and the appropriation of human life is therefore the positive abolition of all alienation, thus the return of man out of religious, family, state is his human (i.e. social) being... Religious alienation... occurs only in man's interior consciousness, but economic alienation is that of real life and its abolition therefore covers both aspects. 194

In the future communist society, the absence of private property is the indication of real human life. Individual freedom is dependent
on one's freedom in society. Hence society must be radically reorganised so that man expresses what is really human as he reaches awareness of himself. "If man is shaped by his surroundings, his surrounding must be made human." 195

Since the problem of alienation is rooted in the exigencies of the production process and the fruit of production, the free society is one that shall have had redefined and transformed labour. Against Adam Smith who considered labour a necessary evil, Marx maintained that, in the free society, labour would be the self-realization of the subject and thus the very basis of real freedom. Against Fourier, who maintained that in the ideal society work would be the equivalent of play, Marxist argued that "truly free labour did not exclude, but fulfilled, labour especially since such free labour, for example, the composing of music demands the greatest effort." 196

Free labour in the future free communist society will be the result of the freedom of people to realize their full potential which, in the present society, is stultified by the long hours of the production line. All struggle with nature remains at the level of necessity even in the communist state. As long as labour is determined by need and external purposes, production remains at the level of necessity. 197 Freedom only begins when labour moves beyond the level of necessity when one is free to fashion things to "the laws of beauty." 198

In the future communist state, Marx envisaged that there would be a shortening of the working day as a prerequisite to even the abolition of labour. 199 Labour would be emancipated from its present unnatural
use to accumulate surplus capital and access wealth. 200 He wrote, "With labour emancipated, every man becomes a working man, and productive labour ceases to be a class attribute." 201 There would be in the classless society, for the first time, the possibility of "association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." It would be a society whose "international rule would be peace, because its natural ruler would be everywhere the same - labour." 202

In this way, Marx constructed his view of society also in terms of the historical process but for him the sufficient and necessary conditions lie in social existence itself. Communism, he claimed, is not an "Ideal to which reality will have to adjust" but is "the real movement that abolishes the present state of things." 203 Hegel's dialectics is thus rooted in the reality of everyday socio-economic life.

Marx appears to be very much aware that his views of the eventual communist state could easily be construed as idealistic or utopian, hence he objected to his views being applied willy-nilly outside Western Europe. In a reply to Mikhailovsky (1877) he objected to his views being turned into "a historico-philosophic theory of the general path every people is fated to tread" and pointed out, quite rightly, that historical understanding is confounded "by using as one's master key a general historico-philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being supra-historical." 204
This cautionary note that Marx here offered appears to have had little effect on many of his disciples and on the ideologues of socialism who have reduced the historical process of social development to an ineluctable progress that Marx was wary of. However, the seeds for this misunderstanding lie scattered throughout Marx's writings, both in his description of historical materialism and of the future communist society. For example, his view that in the future communist society people will "organize production and exchange in such a way as to make possible the normal satisfaction of all desires, that is, a satisfaction limited only by the desires themselves." 205 Such a dream for the future, if left at the level of a theory about the revision of society, no matter how practical-sounding it may be, is utopian. As the neo-Marxists were to point out, what was required here was a radical transformation of human consciousness.

That this consciousness, as Marx pointed out, is socially determined is only half the truth. Freedom cannot be based on theories of social behavior, although these do provide an interesting ex post understanding of human development. If human consciousness was environmentally determined then freedom is based on necessity, a point that Marx as we observed, was not averse to. However, such freedom is only a caricature of freedom, not only because freedom cannot be derived but also freedom cannot be \textit{a posteriori}, a consequence of material necessity. To illustrate this point, the central role that the proletariat will play in shaping the future society is based on the assumption that the fact of their oppression makes them aware of a change. Marx assumed that the workers.
fired by a new social task to be accomplished by them for all society, to do away with all classes and the class rule, were the men to break the instrument of that class rule - the state, the centralized and organised governmental power usurping to be the master instead of the servant of society. Marx in postulating this role, which Helmut Gollwitzer discerned as "the messianic role" of the proletariat, failed to recognise that the proletariat are as much part of the system and that a great number of the workers either do not possess the will to change it or have a vested interest in the system. Several slaves, for example, refused their manumission. The neo-Marxists were to show that the fact of socio-economic deprivation was not necessarily the basis for the self-awareness of the proletariat and that the process of self-consciousness was certainly more complex than Marx had supposed.

1.5.1 NEO-MARXISM

The critical theorists of the Frankfurt School attempted to make the Hegelian Marxist tradition relevant to contemporary society and found best expression in the writings of Horkheimer, Adorno, Neumann, Kirchheimer, Läwethal, Marcuse and Habermas. The early critical theorists, as Arato and Gebhardt point out, initially operated within a framework that "promised a socialist pot of gold at the end of the capitalist rainbow," but with Adorno in 1931, there emerged a lack of certainty about the future. Marx's philosophy of history had to be redefined in order to account for a shift in the development of capitalism that Marx had not anticipated. This revision of the Marxist dialectics proved to be the most incisive critique of Marx and the historical
dialectics was replaced by the dialectics of Enlightenment:

The changed circumstances that gave rise to this new critique included their awareness of the "reification" of the whole of modern society that Lukacs and Korsch, in the 1920's, had observed. The way the forces of production had development has the opposite effect to that which Marx had anticipated. Capitalism, instead of being merely a stage in the development to communism, in practice had replenished its strength and offered a new basis for its legitimacy. These special circumstances were manifested especially in the USA where a transition occurred from entrepreneurship to advanced capitalism.

The critical theorists were also disillusioned with the Hegelian logic in history and Horkheimer, Adorno and Habermas rejected the view of logical progression. They observed that there existed a sinister unfreedom in society which could not be depicted within the categories of the class-struggle and economics but was the result of the ideological hold of scientism and technologism on modern society.

Marcuse in the well-known attack on Weber at the Heidelberg Congress of 1964 pointed out the very idea of technical reason is ideological and that technology exercised a methodical and calculated control of society. Finding support in Horkheimer's critique of capitalism, Marcuse argued that the rationality which produces efficiency and growth is itself irrational. Technological domination creates needs which the very structure of the modern capitalistic society depended on, and which technology, cannot satisfy. In service to freedom.
of the individual, technological domination stultifies freedom by a new form of authoritarianism which in the name of objectivity even creates the space for opposition but within the status quo. As Lezek Kolakowski states, "Science, by virtue of its own method and concepts has projected and promoted a universe in which the domination of nature has remained linked to the domination of man." 210

Hence in his "Repressive Tolerance", Marcuse attempts to unveil the state of unfreedom in the so-called free societies which boast freedom of speech and thought. In the name of freedom of speech, the banal and the terrifying cease to be aberrations and appear as necessary elements in a covertly repressive system. In the name of "objectivity" all possibilities for a critical public are removed. 211 All that exists is a one-dimensionality in thought and practice that rules "out of order" ideas, aspirations and objectives that do not fit. Marcuse believed that the general contentment that the 'good life' gives accentuates one-dimensionality. 212

The Frankfurt School, in view of the need to redefine society and to develop a sound hermeneutic to analyse society, integrated into their approach several approaches in order to reconstitute the relationship between the individual and society, and nature. As David Held points out these "seemingly different approaches" include Hegel's Universal Reason, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Nietzsche, Freud, Weber and Lukacs. Habermas incorporated even the linguistic analytical tradition. 213
Horkheimer believed society to be diseased and in need of a radical transformation. His position is lucidly stated in his essay "Critical Theory and Traditional Theory" (214) written in 1937. Traditional theory, he points out, is the logical application of "conditional propositions" to given situations with a cause and effect formula. It corresponds to the approach of the scientists who have failed to see that traditional theory has become absolute and a-historical and therefore is unable to expose historical relativity and the social function of science. Therefore, traditional theory cannot aid in freeing society from scientific determinism and totalitarianism but, on the contrary, reinforces the status quo by its claims to objectivity.

Critical theory, on the other hand, is aimed at the radical reconstruction of bourgeois society. It aims to breaking the confines of theoretical explanation ex post. It argues that if bourgeois economy is the result of "blind" forces resulting from the activity of man, then that activity can be co-ordinated so that not only the part but the whole can be consciously directed and freed. 215

Critical theory seeks to remove the tension that exists between man and society. By achieving a radical conversion of the subject to critical thinker, objects would have a new status and the relation between subject and object will change. Only in such a way, he maintained, "will there emerge in the future age the relation between rational intention and its realization." 216

Thus Horkheimer was mindful that for the freedom of society, the
freedom of the individual was a non-negotiable prerequisite. Although the proletariat had an experience of meaninglessness by their increased wretchedness and experience of the injustice of the status quo, the experience was not a guarantee of correct knowledge. This awareness of the meaningless does not become a social force because of the differentiation of society imposed from above by those who are in "slavish dependence on the status quo." 217

Critical theory in its concern for social justice neither can rest in detachment from practice like the liberalist intelligentsia, 218 nor can it accept the separation of thought and action as the "scientific method" assumes. 219 Such a dualism, which Decartes had isolated, cannot accommodate a theory which becomes a genuine force and which results in the "self-awareness of the subjects of a great historical revolution." 220 Even the theoretician's profession is deeply immersed in the struggle in society of which his thinking is a part. 221

Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative action was also such an attempt to resolve the dualism between thought and action. He believed that language as a means for communication possesses the ability to underpin social action by serving mutual understanding and not be merely the medium of objective speculation. 222 Communicative action is, that form of social interaction in which the plans of action of different actors are co-ordinated through the exchange of communicative acts i.e., through the use of language (or of corresponding extra-verbal expressions) orientated toward reaching understanding. 223
In his *Knowledge and Human Interests* he attempts to devise a transcendental method that would re-establish the unity of reason in the theoretical dimension which he believed would lead back to metaphysics and into a "re-enchanted" world. 224

Herbert Marcuse, in his study of Hegel, pointed out that the traditional idealist view of reason in society is content to merely provide the concepts but does not actually guide experience. Hence, idealism represents an "attack upon the conditions of human freedom." 225

He attempts to re-think alienation which has, in our time, adopted a more insidious form than the economic-labour-production-based alienation of Marx. In what Marcuse calls the "lie against humanity," the propagators of the system present a case for the legitimacy of the system by pointing to the apparent compatibility between man's desires and the ability of the system to satisfy them. For example, the elaborate apologia for free enterprise that the economic experts provide. Underlying this apparent compatibility is in fact the marriage of dominant social realities and what Marcuse understood as sublimated instincts (false essence). The goals of the society in reality are incompatible with Eros, man's authentic existence. 226

There is here a major shift in rethinking man's inner freedom which falls outside the orbit of the Marxist paradigm. 227 The psychoanalytical philosophy of Freud added a dimension that was absent in Marx. Individual consciousness was now taken more seriously whereas in Marx it was absorbed into social consciousness. 228
John Fry highlights the influence that Freud had on Marcuse with the regard to his understanding of freedom and necessity. Prior to Freud, Marcuse agreed with Marx that necessary labour would forever remain unfree labour. Later in his *Eros and Civilization* he believed that this was not necessarily so, since science and technology can help in "the free play of human faculties" by increasing leisure time. When men are free to fulfill the demands of "Life instincts" (Eros) and not their sublimated false essence, people will be more committed to their work. Labour will cease to be alienating not because, as Marx thought, it would put the worker in control of his own labour and production, but because it will fulfill his true essence.

This perspective of work influenced his view of freedom. If the goal of society is to realize Eros, then society will only be free when individuals can live in harmony with the "unfolding demands of Life Instincts." This perspective requires a redefinition of society and will influence the socio-economic structure of society, but requires free individuals to begin the process of change. The Hegelian notion that freedom wills freedom is translated into concrete social terms. True freedom can only be achieved when the need for free existence becomes the central need of those who fight for it. The revolution of society will be led by an "Erotic elite" who are totally convinced about the need to achieve authentic existence and who themselves have achieved a measure of instinctual freedom that they can do no other.
To begin the liberation of the individual, in his Repressive Tolerance, Marcuse argued for the creation of a "mental space for refusal." Such a mental space was indispensable for inner freedom because of the ability and the extent of manipulation within the system, especially in highly affluent societies like the USA where such a lack of freedom is not understood. He presents a potent critique of the manipulative power of the news media which, he claims, pays only lip service to freedom.

Authentic freedom can only be achieved if a revolutionary vanguard of "new people", those who have escaped the "massification of the mind" and the technological manipulation of the instincts, will lead such a revolution. Thus the unwarranted sentimentalization of the proletariat is overcome. The mere fact of poverty is shown to be inadequate to greater awareness of unfreedom. The challenge, when viewed in the context of affluence, is for individuals to break with the manipulation of the system in spite of the comforts they enjoy in it.

Hence, as Marcuse points out in his One Dimensional Man, a society will be rational and free to the extent that it was organised, sustained and reproduced by an essentially new historical subject who has attained Eros. He wrote,

... radical change in consciousness is the beginning, the first step in changing social existence: emergence of the New Subject. Historically, it is again the period of the enlightenment prior to material change.
Neo-Marxism certainly presents one of the liveliest and incisive assessments of modern society which cannot be ignored. However, its solutions are not without problems. There is much truth in Marcuse's view which, with some help from Freud, perceived that only changed individuals can change society. He describes what the changed or "new" individuals would be but does not adequately address himself to how the change will come about? If his view like Marx's is fundamentally materialistic, what will be the impulse for this change? Marcuse appears to have been not unaware of this problem also since he thought that the fringe groups of society would be predisposed to enlightenment of this kind. He quickly changed his mind and thought that, perhaps, the Third World would fulfill that role but changed his mind again.

It is because, in the end, the critical theorists are overly cautious preferring to defend particularity, autonomy and non-identity against a totalitarian society where free thinking is greatly endangered, that they have been accused of escaping into "abstruseness and isolation." 239

We shall return to evaluate further the implications of Marxism and neo-Marxism, together with neo-positivism, after a consideration of the idea of freedom in Existentialism, the third important contemporary philosophical approach.
1.6 EXISTENTIALISM: FREEDOM AND THE INDIVIDUAL

The circumstances of the twentieth century led to a refocusing on "the individual" who had been lost sight of in all the philosophical quests of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. More than any other philosophical approach, existentialism has highlighted the crisis of human freedom, an issue which lay at the heart of its criticism of philosophy at large and of the present obsession with science, progress and objectivity in particular. As S.E. Stumpf states,

Existentialism was bound to happen. The individual had over the centuries been pushed into the background by systems of thought, historical events and technological forms. Philosophy for the most part... bypassed the intimate concerns of man about his personal destiny. 240

Existentialism defies neat compartmentalisation and clearly defined membership. Its most significant members reject the title "existentialism." Existentialism embodies an anti-naturalist and an anti-idealist spirit since it rejected the deprecation of the individual either into objects of his own making or into the world of things, or to the essences of these things. Pascal was one of the early forerunners of this approach. He had argued that the intellectual resolution of Descartes to the mind-body problem had not grasped the existential dimension of man. Man was neither res cogitans nor res extensa but, what he termed, les raisons du coeur.

Partly because of the trauma of the two world wars, there emerged
an unprecedented lack of confidence in the idea of progress or in reason to solve all of man's crises. The questions of the meaning of human life, individual decision and the problem of death became fundamental issues on the agenda of the Existentialists. Dostoevsky in his Notes from Underground reflects this changed mood and points out that "no good society can rid man of depravity." 241

Belief in an ineluctable progress of society, the inexorable law of rational development and the harmonious summation of history became meaningless in the face of the irrational in human existence which Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre, Camus and Marcel among others, now "discovered". Science and technology as reflections of the genius of man had promised a society free from conflict but then came the atom bomb, the exemplification of the warped use of that genius. Existentialism may be characterised as the attempt to uncover and to make sense of the irrationality endemic to nature, the world, the individual and the society of men. 242

The philosophies of the Enlightenment, especially Hegel's synthesis, proved inadequate because they rationalised away the irrational and did not face it. Existentialism may be seen as the logical end of the sequence in thought extending from Schelling, Feuerbach, the younger Marx, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. (Kierkegaard had heard Schelling in Berlin distinguish between Existentialism and essentialism).

Paul Tillich considers Existentialism a dispensation as wide-reaching as the Enlightenment, Romanticism or Naturalism. 243
Kaufman 244 and Seyppel 245 viewed Existentialism as a "timeless sensibility," a "philosophy as old as mankind" which has been reaffirmed in the exigencies of our age. As D.E. Roberts states,

Existentialism calls man away from stifling abstractions and automatic conformity... It drives us back to the most basic, inner problems: What it means to be self, how we ought to use our freedom, how we can find and keep courage to face death. Even more important, it bids each individual to think and wrestle with these problems until he has grown into personal authenticity... By clearing away philosophical underbrush it brings us face to face with the urgency of ultimate questions.246

Part of this clearing of the "philosophical underbrush" included the attempt to go back to a pre-Kantian, pre-idealist and pre-empiricist perspective. Hence Existentialists were sceptical of systems and the application of so-called scientific modes of logic to understand human affairs. Neither the cold consistency of science nor the attractive notion of harmonious determinism were able to grasp the ambiguity of existence. Hence, as Hector Hawton commented for the Existentialists, the metaphysics of Hegel, for example, when applied to society result "in a slave state; at the worst... a brutal despotism, at the best a human beehive." 247

A brief survey of the main representatives will now be undertaken in order to elucidate the Existentialist idea of freedom.
Søren Kierkegaard, (1813-1855) the Danish thinker, relatively anonymous until our century, marks a vital turning point in Western thought. Not only was he to highlight the crisis of the existential subject in his writings and his own life, but also he was to provide the later existentialists with many of their key ideas. The mark of the truly great thinker, the one who makes a difference for having lived and dared to be different, is surely the creative way he influences language and conjures cliches and thought forms that have a lasting effect on all of man's future discourse. Kierkegaard was one such thinker.

His innovative approach included an incisive critique of Hegel who he believed had tried to comprehend all of reality in his system but ended with only a grand abstraction that had not grasped what really mattered - existence. He wrote, "If Hegel had written the whole of his Logic and then said... that it was merely an experiment in thought then he could certainly have been the greatest thinker who ever lived. As it is, he is merely comic." 248 Hegel left no room for individual man except to see him, his decisions, culture and history as a means to a greater end and not an end in itself. 249 In the face of empirical scepticism, Hegel had emphasised the importance of the universe but had in effect clouded man's perception of reality which Kierkegaard believed could only be realized in participation, decision and commitment. Hence his distinction between the spectator who assesses in detachment and pseudo-objectivity, and the actor who subjectively understands in participation.
In this connection, Kierkegaard drew a distinction between the Renaissance Periclean man and existential man. The former was the good citizen, reasonable in all respects, who enjoyed the world in temperance. Existential man lived in the awareness of the crisis of human existence which reason could not grasp. The Enlightenment gave us several examples of Periclean level-headedness. Nietzsche, Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard were examples of the latter. 250 Kierkegaard wrote,

One may be great as a logician and become immortal through one's accomplishment and yet prostitute oneself by supposing that the logical is the existential, and the principle of contradiction is removed... in the realm of existence since it undeniably is removed in the realm of logic. Existence is exactly that separation which frustrates the mere logical stream. 251

In a logical system the possibility of freedom is limited to the ability to choose right or wrong and this possibility is understood to pass into reality whereas in reality this does not occur. An intermediate determinant is necessary and this for Kierkegaard is dread.

This concept of dread was to greatly influence Heidegger and Jaspers. Alongside apparent bliss and repose, there exists "something different which is not dissension or strife, for there is nothing to strive with it. What is it then? Nothing. But what effect does it produce? Dread." 252 Dread is not fear or similar human emotions which are directed towards an object. Dread is inextricably connected with the factness of man, his spiritual nature and freedom. He called it "a womanish debility in which freedom swoons... In dread there
is the egoistic infinity of possibility which does not tempt like a definite choice, but alarms and fascinates with its sweet anxiety." 253 Animals do not experience dread since they function on the basis of necessity, are not qualified by Spirit and therefore cannot achieve an awareness of freedom. In children, dread emerges as a thirst for the prodigious; the mysterious. The fact that some children lack the spirit of adventure, for Kierkegaard, is the exception that proves the general truth: "the less spirit, the less dread." 254 Dread "is the reality of freedom as possibility anterior to possibility." 255

Dread accentuates and therefore makes possible (or impossible) the possibility. It is not determined by either necessity or freedom but is itself "a trammeled freedom" 256 which makes the "I can" possible and therefore makes possible the undetermined leap and freedom. Hence he spoke of the dizziness of freedom.

Dread is the dizziness of freedom which occurs when the spirit would posit the synthesis, and freedom gazes down into its own possibility, grasping at finiteness to sustain itself. In this dizziness freedom succumbs... and when freedom rises again it sees that it is guilty. Between these two instants lies the leap, which no science has explained or can explain. 257

Thus freedom in dread makes faith possible, a point that will be elaborated in Part II. Here, however, it suffices to show how freedom is already, for Kierkegaard, made part of the existential self-awareness. Hence he insisted that "subjectivity is truth" and that
the crowd is the lie, and delivered his polemic against institutionalized Christianity. The crowd represented the absorption of the individual and the annihilation of personal responsibility. The institution exemplified bourgeois convention where the individual's commitment to God is trivialized.

It is because man feels a sense of insecurity and finitude (both recurring themes in later existentialists), he attempts to resolve his insecurity on his own only to increase guilt, despair and anxiety. Man's alienation from God is the ground for this existential vicious circle which only the leap of faith can break through. Man is free to choose God or not, yet that freedom is realized only in passionate decision. The decision to choose God can be only with such total passion that it can ultimately be the only option open; so great is the choice of faith. It could be argued that one can choose in freedom someone or something other than God with equal passion. Kierkegaard would disagree on the grounds that man's entire nature, his authentic existence and the only way out of the vicious circle of existence, is dependent on his relation with God.

The existing individual is one who, unlike "the Idiot," does not conform to society's standard which Kierkegaard, in his day, was highly critical of. He called his age an age of mediocrity and complained that it was "an age without passion!" 258 Life was not to be contemplated but must be lived. The leap of faith cannot be logically deduced or rationally derived. Existence is fundamentally irrational and offers no safeguards or objective certainty. Such safeguards
would trivialize faith and human choice; decision and commitment.

The phenomenological approach of Edmund Husserl also was to influence the emergence of modern Existentialism. Husserl aimed to construct a presuppositionless philosophy (philosophia prima) which would radicalize Descartes' demand that all philosophy be grounded in absolutely certain insight. Such a ground must be sought in phenomena but, unlike the empiricists and the methodology of the natural sciences, such an analysis of the phenomena can only take place by an analysis of consciousness. He used the view of his teacher, Brentano, that consciousness is an activity constituted in relations between the active subject and the object he is conscious of. Consciousness is always a consciousness of something since every act is characterized by intentionality. 259

Husserl spoke of the Lebenswelt, the life world of existing persons which Kant had made the unknowable noumena. Freedom lies in this experienced Lebenswelt not in noumena. Science, while it can objectively describe the Lebenswelt, it cannot reveal it because it is lived by me, is relative to me and finds its true meaning in my consciousness of it. Phenomenology is an attempt to avoid this Lebenswelt becoming unknowable noumena and by analysing consciousness hoped to analyse the everyday world of existence.

Phenomena were, therefore, not mere objects but disclosures of Being-in-itself and the basis of understanding being is man himself who alone poses the question of Being. 260 As J. Wild stated,
"Phenomenological existentialism is involved (like the novelist and art) in revealing life from within: to explore the mode of consciousnes, to intensify it, and to bring it to self-expression." 261

For the phenomenological existentialists the subjective human Lebenswelt was accessible only by the phenomenological method and since, they argue, this life-world embodies true freedom, any other method (especially the natural sciences) would force freedom into an objective frame which would destroy freedom. Freedom is in the way of existing and is neither an object nor a process but is expressed in the whole of human existence.

Husserl was to influence a whole trend of thought via his famous pupil, Heidegger, who although later differed with him still pursued the task of discovering Being.

Heidegger in his "What is Metaphysics?" argued that human existence cannot have a relation with being unless it remains in the midst of "nothingness." This doctrine of nothingness had two implications: either that life was fundamentally meaningless as atheistic existentialists like Sartre and Camus believed; or that Being may be discerned in existence either through hermeneutics or faith or, as we often see in the musings of the later Heidegger, a mystical religiousness although he was wont to avoid such an impression. Karl Jaspers, however, was more willing to uncover the religious implications of this second alternative.
1.6.2. MARTIN HEIDEGGER: FREEDOM AS OPENNESS TO BEING

Heidegger, following the cue of the phenomenologists, seeks to rescue man from being defined as the objects in the world are defined. Man was there (Dasein) not as an object but as "a field" of being. He is in the world and, therefore, must be open to and for the world in the act of Vorstellen ie. in placing oneself before Being. This openness, which Heidegger called **Offenst"ndigkeit** lies at the heart of the individual's relation with the world.

In *Being and Time*, 262 Heidegger attempted an ontology based on man's "being there" (Dasein) rather than, as traditional metaphysics had done, on cosmology. Man "stands out" (ex-sists) and does not merely exist; never absorbed by things yet being nothing apart from them. Alongside ex-sisting is the ongoing danger of falling away (Verfall) and being submerged into things. The inexplicable dread that Kierkegaard had perceived, Heidegger called the Angst which, as in Kierkegaard, has the potential for freedom since it is in the face of Angst that man may choose Being and authentic existence.

Heidegger does not define Being but maintains that in existing the awareness of Being is manifest in his anxiety of thrownness. Angst discloses Being. Roberts states that for man,

Anxiety both destroys and constructs like a flame around the portal of freedom: if driven away from the flame he falls deeper into self-estrangement because he is unable to pass through the door of freedom into the realization of his true self.
But if he can face anxiety, it will drive him toward the door. Once he crosses the threshold he is cut off from commonplace kind of existence where the pattern of his life was determined by the everyday world. Thus the challenge of existence is to heed the call of Being to live authentically.

This walking in accord with Being is exemplified in the life that is lived in the acceptance of one's own death. It is in the face of the possibility of dying that the dread of nothingness is most clearly manifested and the clearer the awareness of Augst, the clearer the disclosure of Being, the more pointed the call to authentic existence.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger emphasises that the horizon that makes it possible to understanding Being as Being is time. The relevance of time is commensurate with the awareness of human finitude and, therefore, is the basis of human freedom i.e. when one lives authentically, time is experienced as freedom to meet one's own death. Thus, like Scheler, Heidegger was faithful to the phenomenological insight that freedom is not empirical but is self-evident insight into the structure of experience. *Being and Time* for Heidegger were the pillars of that structure. He therefore distinguished between the "objectively measured" and the "existentially experienced" time. The latter was qualitatively characterised by *Sorge* (the restlessness of care) and the running ahead of the existential subject towards his own death. This distinction is not unlike the Biblical
distinction between ἐργατικός and ὄρκος: objective and fulfilled time.

Heidegger, in spite of his attempts to go beyond the confines of Kierkegaard's thought, on the crucial issue of human freedom adopts a similar position. The "standing - open" (Offenständigkeit) of the individual as an inner condition for truth (innere Ermöglichung der Wahrheit) is based on freedom; "Das Wesen der Wahrheit ist die Freiheit (The essence of truth is freedom)." Freedom is not merely freedom of choice or the freedom of the will as in traditional philosophy, but is the ground of existence and of truth. Freedom is "the commitment to the disclosure of Being" rooted in existence (Existence). It is the ejection (die Aussetzung) into the disclosure of Being (die Entborgenheit des Seienden).

Decision and commitment frees man to use both his past and his culture, not any longer in a deterministic way, but as an orientation to the future and to the fulfillment of possibilities. Freedom makes it possible for man to ex-pose (aus-Setzen) himself and to stand out of (ex-sistere) himself in the act of participation. However, instead of viewing freedom as a possession of man, Heidegger held that the self-transcending structure of Dasein possesses man so that he may freely have a relation with Being which is unique to his own history. Being by holding before man the possibility of authentic existence also provides the possibility for man to be re-housed; to have a true home and true self. This is true because...

... man in his freedom can turn toward either inauthenticity or authenticity; either sink into the man-
world correlation i.e. existence at the level of everyday concerns or nihilate it by responding to the mysterious call coming from beyond so as to be his 'true self'. 267

The history of man is the history of the unveiling and the concealing of Being. When one is alienated from Being, one is lost in a world of beings. While for Husserl, consciousness of freedom obtains in the rational, intentional act, for Heidegger it is the awareness of the thrownness and the grappling with this foreign world, and with the possibility of lapsing into inauthentic existence and the annihilation of freedom.

1.6.3 KARL JASBERS: FREEDOM AND THE AWARENESS OF THE TRANSCENDENT

Jaspers agreed with Heidegger's understanding of the existential crisis of man but maintained that Heidegger's Sein und Zeit in the end represented the wrong way to philosophize. In spite of his claim that existence is irrational, Heidegger still attempts to offer knowledge of a total conception of Being. 268 Jaspers denounces any attempt to gain esoteric knowledge. His Existenz philosophie can only be commenced when the limits of science have been understood: philosophy only begins were "reason has suffered shipwreck;" all else is "sub-philosophy." 269

The goal of philosophy is Existenzherhelling, the illumination of existence. Reality cannot be measured by subjects or objects but in a relation. If one or other aspect of reality (matter or mind, world or the self) is the basis of any generalisation (or prediction) then the whole is explained by a part. This was the problem with
Idealism wherein reality is made up of subjects, or with naturalism which understands reality as comprising objects. 270

In his work on Nietzsche, Jaspers states,

All true philosophizing... loosens from the fetters of deterministic thinking, not by abandoning such thinking but by pushing it to its limits... What seemed an abyss becomes the space of freedom: the seeming Nothing turns into Being speaks to us. 271

Authentic self is revealed to us in what Jaspers called "border-situations," for example moments of dread, guilt and awareness of death; experiences that impinge on our consciousness which, as it were, are moments of awakening.

Therefore, existence is the creative source of experience which is neither purely subjective or purely objective. 272 It is awareness of creative experience that makes any static, objective structure of understanding inappropriate. Existential truth is not static knowledge of an object but is directed to, or rather directs, the individual's self-awareness of his fate in the world. Truth is not a possession for then decision would be superfluous. Reality, he points out in his Vernunft und Existence, is an appeal. 273

It is in grasping his finitude that man becomes aware of its opposite, viz. Being as Transcendence for "Transcendence manifests itself in Existence." 274 He wrote,

Philosophy is the thinking by which I become aware
of Being itself through inner action; or rather it is the thinking which prepares the ascent to Transcendence, remembers it, and in an exalted moment accomplishes the ascent itself as a thinking act of the whole being. 275

We do not know what Transcendence is but we become aware of it in grappling with our existence.

Jaspers also moves beyond Heidegger at this point. Intrinsic to his understanding of reality he includes "existential faith" (Glaube) and argues that faith is the necessary basis for all meaningful existence. Where Heidegger held truth to be grounded in dynamic freedom, Jaspers grounded truth in dynamic faith. Both do not communicate truth but are toward truth. 276 He stated,

Man lives in his world as an existent. As thinking consciousness generally he is searchingly oriented toward objects. As spirit he shapes the idea of a whole in his world experience. As possible Existenz he is related to Transcendence through which he knows himself as given to himself in his freedom. 277

However, Jaspers emphasized, as Kierkegaard had done, that this awareness of Transcendence, which theology calls God is a purely personal experience which cannot be deduced or proved. Philosophy cannot, like theology, look for Transcendence in the guarantee of revelation but must "approach being in the self-disclosures of the Encompassing that are present in man as man... and through the historicity of the language of Transcendence." 278 The truth of the "Encompassing" unlike objective truth obtains in the real communication of man with man: in the fellowship of human self-disclosures. That human
existence is conditioned by Transcendence will be evident in this Encompassing wherein emerges the awareness of the imperfection of man, the incompleteness of the world, the impossibility of a permanently valid world order and universal failure. Jaspers maintains that "failure" (Scheitern) is our destiny yet the "unconditional decision to obey leads man to his own Being." 279

It is in these "border-situations" and this condition of "Scheitern" that one is aware of the Transcendent and therefore, of one's freedom. Freedom is the basis through which one becomes open for actual being. 280 Similar to Heidegger's position, one is free, says Jaspers, to deny or affirm the relation to Transcendence. To affirm the relation will lead to authentic existence. In the end, in the place of Kierkegaard's Christian faith, Jaspers argues for a kind of philosophical faith which also has no guarantees but is a union with the depth of life. 281 This point he had argued in his inaugural lecture at Basel, where he maintained that the philosophical quest which cannot be authenticated by speculation, can be fulfilled by means of faith. In his Von der Wahrheit also, he maintained that Freedom of Existence is only as identity with the origin (Ursprung) of Being, viz Transcendence "on which thinking gets stranded." 282 Man is free but his freedom is given to him through Transcendence. "The more I am conscious of my freedom," Jaspers wrote, "the more I am conscious of my Transcendence, through which I am. I am Existence only when I know Transcendence, which is the power (die Macht) through which I am myself." 283
Jaspers' resemblance to Heidegger's formulation is obvious in spite of his rejection of the latter's attempt to secure knowledge of a total conception of man's being, and aversion to logic and science. Jaspers, perhaps because of his own training as a psychologist, created greater leeway for the sciences. He pointed out that, "there must be freedom for all sciences, so that there may be freedom from scientific superstition i.e. from false absolutes and pseudo-knowledge." 284 For Heidegger, freedom exists in openness to Being which is the equivalent to saying openness to one's own existence and consciousness. For Jasper's, Being is manifested in Existence and in Transcendence and freedom obtains in the existential openness to Transcendence. Jaspers' idea of freedom is therefore invariably more dynamic. As Nicholai Berdiaev stated, in regard to Heidegger's view, "Being is, as it were, freedom arrested and congealed." 285

1.6.4 JEAN PAUL SARTRE: THE ABSURDITY OF FREEDOM

Sartre, like Heidegger, perceived that at the heart of existence lay Nothingness and that finitude was integral to the human mind. Yet Heidegger's vision of "Being-itself," Sartre maintained, is unattainable. 286 Sartre disagreed that there is a "Being-itself" that transcends the relationship between individual consciousness and the world. The difference Roberts states is that,

Where Heidegger speaks of encounter with 'mystery' in the language of philosophical asceticism, Sartre speaks of encounter with the sheer givenness of a thing in the language of repulsion and nausea. 287
Using the Hegelian notions of "in-itself" (en-soi) and "for-itself" (pour-soi), Sartre argues that man is in the permanently frustrating quest to synthesize both. Because pour-soi (man as he is aware of himself) is different from en-soi (for instance, as a table exists in itself), there is always the possibility that human beings deceive themselves in their attempt to be something (as en-soi). Behind everything a man thinks he is or appears to be, is conscious choice and decision. Nothing naturally exists in human existence for everything is the result of choice. Hence all that we are is the result of what we have thought. This fact is illustrated in Sartre's "Portrait of the Anti-Semite" where he argues that a man is not born an anti-Semite but is one because he wants to be something and this second role that he projects, after a while, becomes his own. He cannot conceive it as a role any longer. In the case of the anti-Semite, the person chose that out of fear of change and the lack of openness.

Sartre vis-à-vis Heidegger and Jaspers, the academic philosophers, has a certain earthiness of style; refusing the exegetical and etymological profundity of the other two and preferring to express his thought in novels. As Kaufman graphically states it,

It was Nietzsche who came first to write of faith and self-deception... and Jaspers and Heidegger dealt with similar topics, writing like professors, expounding despair and death and the attempt to know oneself in terms of quaint big words and one-two-three, and even Roman three, Arabic two, small b. Sartre in his café (the market place), alas, sees the waiter 'playing at being a waiter.'
The implication of Sartre's view is that only an atheistic position is tenable and that man is ultimately responsible for himself. The synthesis between en-soi and pour-soi is ideal and only God can attain it; but since there is no God and man is the being who wants to be God, man is a useless passion. 290 As Orestes in The Flies states, "There is no God, and man is alone in an empty world." He must, therefore take responsibility for himself. Any alibi, whether historical, cultural, psychological or environmental, will not do. To shift the responsibility for one's existence to anyone or anything else is to live in mauvaise foi (bad faith) or self-deception. This, for Sartre, is inauthentic existence.

He, therefore, rejects Freudian psycho-analysis and behavioristic theories of psychology which function on the premise that man is determined. Orestes, Sartre's hero, refuses to blame his crime of murder on childhood experiences. "My crime is my own", he exclaims. Any attempt to explain man's state of existence in terms of predestination of whatever kind is an abrogation of responsibility and the greatest threat to freedom is bad faith. 291

Because man is pour-soi, he is "condemned to be free." In his Being and Nothingness he argued that man's thrownness into the world, which Heidegger had perceived, is the basis for man's freedom. It is an absurd freedom because as soon as one is conscious of it, one becomes also aware that one is entirely alone, that one is responsible for one's passions and that there is no outside help or moral guide to present the ought.
Freedom, in the end, is a lack because it is this freedom that deprives man of a resting place in en-soi which he only attains in death when he becomes a thing. Man falls into existence and must create his own values. Human life simply happens and "absurdity" is the only category that covers both en-soi and pour-soi.

Each individual, as we repeatedly see in Sartre's novels, is a particular irruption of freedom in the world. All his heroes are lonely people; for example, Orestes in The Flies, Antoine Roquentin in Nausea and Charles Baudelaire in a novel by that name. Freedom exists in the act of perpetual decision-making even if those decisions are made in bad faith. Hence even those living inauthentically are free.

As Sartre stated, "To say that the pour-soi has to be what it is ... and to say that in it existence precedes and conditions essence... all this is to say one and the same thing: to be aware that man is free." 292 Sartre uses the view of Husserl that consciousness is always consciousness of something and maintained that only in such engage (commitment to the ever changing life situation) can he make his concrete decisions which manifest his freedom. While in the face of Dasein, Heidegger advocated "willing" authentic existence; for Sartre, in the face of indeterminate freedom, only in acting is there any reality. 295 Man's freedom obtains in the concrete decisions made in the ever-changing situations.

In a lucid passage from his Republic of Silence, Satre reflecting on the French Resistance (1940-1945), explains the experience of
freedom in even situations of great danger:

We were never more free than during the occupation. We had lost all our rights, beginning with the right to talk... and because of this we were free... Because we were hunted down, every one of our gestures had the weight of solemn commitment..... The choice that each of us made of his life was an authentic choice because it was made face to face with death...

I am not speaking of the élite... but of all Frenchmen who at every hour of the night or day throughout four years, answered No! 294

This moving statement pronounces a great existential truth, that only as one confronts the heart of existence, the danger of death and Nothingness where one is called to radical choice which affects one's life (and death), does one truly grasp the meaning of freedom and can live authentically. However, why this radical nature of choice means the removal of God and the abolition of faith, Sartre has not shown. As Roberts stated, if the main reason for believing in God is one's reluctance to face the fact that human life is threatened by insecurity and meaninglessness, then Sartre is right but it "does seem a pity that he is not familiar with forms of faith stronger than those he mentions." 295

As we have mentioned already, for Sartre, freedom realizes itself in action. Antoine Roquentin in Nausea demands "We must live forwards, not backwards," a view which Albert Camus also emphasised in his Sysiphe.

Sartre grounds this action on the Kantian maxim "Act as though thou
canst will to be law universal." One must choose in the spirit of choosing for all men. Sartre's ethics functions on the premise that if man acted in expression of his genuine humanity, honesty will become his very being not merely an idea. 296. He will not act any longer in bad faith.

However, because all affirm their freedom in this way, there is the constant threat that my decision can be governed by society. Hence, Sartre's ideal man and the hero of freedom refuses to repent for his action for if he did he would accept society's picture of himself and would loose his freedom. Hence King Aegus in The Flies exclaims, "I am trapped in my net, I have come to see myself as they see me." This constant threat that society presents to my freedom, Sartre summed up in another of his well-known cliches, "Hell is the other."

It is for this reason that Sartre, inspite of being attracted by several aspects of Marxism, criticised Marxism as a whole and did not join the Communist Party. In dialectical materialism individual freedom becomes an illusion since it is socially, behavioristically and historically determined. Marx's concept of history as containing the conditions for its development within itself was diametrically opposed to Sartre's view that consciousness makes history in decision and commitment. 297 History, for Sartre, is the history of human decisions and if he joined the Communist party he would have contradicted everything he had said about freedom in Being and Nothingness. As William Barrett stated, Sartre based his revolutionary activity upon free choice, the Marxist upon an objective historical
process. The former recognizing the inalienable subjectivity of man, the latter reducing man to an object in a process. 298

A.G. Rooks, in his inaugural lecture on Sartre's views of freedom and values makes the following criticism of Sartre's ethical theory:

By an unusual use of language (he) links in a manner which strikes us as being very odd, his teaching on Responsibility to his concept of Freedom. Freedom means responsibility eg. I am responsible for being a Jew, blind, Negro, a proletarian etc. because I have decided to live with it, and therefore I should have done something eg. change or modify it... in the last resort, commit suicide. 299

Rooks has highlighted here a central difficulty in Sartre's attempt to offer a viable ethic on the basis of his view of freedom. In spite of the very useful insights he offers, his approach is ultimately left shipwrecked in solitude that has the potential to deprive man of all moral compulsion.

Sartre's view of freedom is also ambiguous. At times one gets the impression that freedom is endemic to being human and at other times freedom appears to exist only in incessant decision-making. This inconsistency has opened Sartre's view to criticism. For example, Lukacs held that Sartre's concept of freedom is in the end "not a necessary and essential characterist of human nature but rather the contemporary indecision of the rootless bourgeois intellectual." 300

To teach that the blind or the proletariat must take responsibility for their condition is more complex for the people themselves than Sartre wishes to concede. However, to rule out all of existentialist
thought, as Hawton does, as "a middle class revolt against the spectre of the assembly line" 301 is a gross overstatement.

The Existentialists have rightly observed that at the heart of modern man's crisis is the problem of the freedom of the individual, which politics and philosophy, claiming to be in service to, have failed to come to terms with. It is true that their emphasis that "subjectivity is truth," as Kierkegaard had stated, and that their scepticism about attaining any "objective truth" about Being or Nothingness appears to have entrenched the subject-object scheme. But that is apparent only from within the epistemological scheme that has dominated the history of western philosophy. On the contrary, the existentialists attempt to integrate both dimensions in the existential encounter of the whole person with truth. They attempt to go beyond the mind-body problem and to place the understanding of truth not in cognition, as if the mind can stand apart from the 'object' or from the rest of the 'subject'. Truth is in the encountering of the object, a process of understanding that calls one to radical commitment.

The dynamic nature of the existentialist approach to understanding, therefore, is much more satisfying than the epistemological or logical entrenchment of subject-object which ignored individual freedom: for example, the views of freedom in empiricism, idealism and Postivism. It is not enough to expose the Cartesian myth, as the analysts have done, and then stand back in self-satisfaction as if the solution to the Cartesian problem will be self-evident.
In view of these general remarks, Alisdair MacIntyre's critique of Existentialism remains problematic. He claimed that the democratic ideal cannot be made to follow from the existentialist premises. This view fails to see that unless each person in a society is truly free to decide for themselves, take responsibility and will the good of the whole, democracy itself is in danger. As the neo-Marxists showed, societies who believe they are democratic, because of the absence of individual freedom, pay only lip-service to freedom.

MacIntyre also highlights a common criticism levelled at the Existentialists when he stated that Heidegger by secularizing Kierkegaard frees himself from the problems of Kierkegaard's theology but not from the problems inherent in both Husserl and Kierkegaard, one of these being "the solitariness of Heidegger's human being." He argues that human existence is social since we learn about ourselves from the mirror-image offered by other people. This, of course, was not what the Existentialists wished to deny but, at a much deeper level, wished to highlight the need for individuals to take responsibility for their lives and only in this way would they be able to take responsibility for others. Along this line Existentialists like Buber, Maritain, Shestov, Berdyaev and Marcel have steered the initial quest. That man is a social being is not the point of contention. What the Existentialists wished to clarify, and none more so that Kierkegaard himself, was the importance of the individual to make his decision for it is the free individual who can free society. Cummings, for example, has argued that our language-centred age has overlooked the Existentialists' preoccupation
with modus loquendi where the problem of alienation lies and has argued that Existentialism is a "communicative individualism." 304

Maclntyre's comment that whereas Hume wanted to connect religion with one particular frame of mind, Kierkegaard wanted to show pervasive-ness of this frame of mind is also unfounded. 305 On the contrary, it was because of the cool detachment of Hume who relegated freedom, like Kant also did, to moral action, that the Existentialists reacted to Idealism. When Kierkegaard (and Heidegger later) argued that freedom and possibility necessarily involve dread and that dread is a necessary feature of existence, he was only attempting to elucidate the importance of personal decision: a point that will be elaborated in Part II when Kierkegaard's concept of faith is discussed.

However, Maclntyre, quite rightly, points out that Heidegger (and we may add, Jaspers) while sceptical of systems themselves do not hesitate to let their construction of an ontology or philosophy of existence grow out of all proportion. He writes, "In Heidegger we are no longer faced with choice as the key to truth; We are faced with a systematic and argued ontology... in which choice has its place." 306

It is also ironical that Heidegger who wrote on "the end of philosophy and task of Thinking" 307 and at the end of his "Letter on Humanism" called for "rigour of meditation, carefulness in saying, frugality with words" 308 can also, as Jaspers also did, proceed to write so voluminously. It is for this reason that William Barrett stated,
"After Heidegger we feel the need for a new Kierkegaard to pump back living blood into the ontological skeleton of Heideggerian dasein." 309

This survey and appraisal of the notions of freedom since the Enlightenment and especially in the three main contemporary forms of philosophy prepares the ground to clarify now the thesis that freedom is the ongoing quest for authentic existence. This thesis propounded by G.A. Rauche will be evaluated in the light of his critique of the three main contemporary philosophical approaches that have already been discussed.

Rauche's reaction to the neo-positivist, Marxist and existentialist approaches is based on their rejection of philosophy, and more specifically, their abolition of metaphysics. In a seminal work *The Abdication of Philosophy* (1974) he argued that the abdication of philosophy is equivalent to the abdication of man. In four other works, *The Philosophy of Actuality* (1963), *Contemporary Philosophical Alternatives and the Crisis of Truth* (1974) *The Choice* (1973) and *Theory and Practice in Philosophical Argument* (1985) and several articles, he has elucidated this theme clarifying the relation between philosophy as critical theory and man as a free individual.

The benefit of analyzing Rauche's critique of the three contemporary forms of philosophy and his defense of philosophy as an ongoing critical study is three-fold:

1. It leads to the thesis that freedom obtains in the ongoing critical
quest for authentic existence. The details of this view will be
the main preoccupation of the next pages;
2. This thesis, in turn, presents in an analogical way the "structure"
of the quest for freedom which theology cannot ignore since it also
makes a truth-claim in the market place where the three contemporary
philosophies are found. In Part II it will be argued that faith
as existential encounter not only fulfils the "structure" of the
quest for freedom but also forms an important basis for the quest
for authentic existence;
3. It lays the foundation for our claim in Part III that the abdication
of theology leads to the abdication of faith and, in view of our
argument in Part II, to the abdication of man also.

1.7 THE ABDICATION OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE ABDICATION OF MAN'S FREEDOM:
G.A. RAUCHE'S CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

Positivism and neo-Positivism; Marxism and neo-Marxist; and Existentialism, whose notions of freedom have been evaluated above, in one
way or another reacted to Idealism, and more particularly, to Hegelianism. All share another quality also: they attempt to jettison
philosophy, and more especially, metaphysics, or they attempted its
redefinition beyond all recognition. This scepticism toward philosophy
as a theoretical and critical discipline, Rauche maintains, endangers
the very freedom these approaches wish to affirm.

1.7.1. POSITIVISM AND NEO-POSITIVISM: THE DANGER OF FUNCTIONALISM

Neo-Positivism attempts, as we observed, to discard all teleological
and metaphysical features and, by a via negativa attempts to free man from meaningless speculation. Logical Positivism held to the view that only scientific propositions i.e., those which are verifiable, yield meaning. Linguistic analysis tries to expose the fruitlessness of philosophical speculation and holds to the view that truth obtains in what can be stated in language, and that philosophy can add nothing further.

Rauche argues that such an approach is paradoxical since the attempt, say of Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, to subject man to a therapeutic treatment whereby he may be cured of his pathological desire to ask metaphysical questions is successful only at man's expense. Any attempt to rid man of "the will to truth" ends in the abolition of individual consciousness and hence of the individual as free man with the right to question his prejudices, his history and his world, and to think critically about his world. The linguistic analysts, by their attempt to eliminate all conflict, also dispose of individual consciousness. "Man's individual consciousness... has been levelled with language (or, rather, the functionalistic aspects of language)..." 310

Linguistic analysis is deeply concerned with correctness of statements of truth and is rooted in the descriptive level of understanding not with understanding itself. It embodies a world-view that a priori determines what can be stated and what constitutes the basis for meaning. That which does not conform to the pre-requisites of that world-view is eliminated as meaningless.
Rauche reacts to this approach in a two-fold way:

Firstly, that the inherent world-view is itself restricting since it inadvertently places its faith in the methods of natural science to solve the riddles of man and the universe. 311 The epistemological presupposition is that knowledge consists in recording the piecemeal functional relations between natural events established by mathematical equations. 312 This "piecemeal atomistic approach" of contemporary physics has been applied to human language by logical positivism: for example Russell's functionalistic "neutral monism." The problem for the logical Positivists is that the scientists themselves have come to understand that their methods are inadequate to resolve the riddles of the world.

The "scientific method" is functionalistic and wholly inappropriate to the humanities, since within it all philosophical questions about truth, reality, life, value, self, existence and such like, have to be ruled out as speculative and "unscientific" or have to be reduced to functionalistic terms. "Scientific" lapses into "scientism" and constitutes a religion of its own with its own belief-system.

Secondly, Rauche points out that language is richer than the linguistic analysts will have it. While it may be functional it has a metaphysical dimension as well. As the studies of Chomsky, Katz and Fodor, for example, have shown, language has an active and forming dimension as well. 313 Hence, the analyst's option, because it is restricted by its own functional theory of language and by the presuppositions
of its underlying world-view, cannot grasp the full import of language. Rauche finds the hermeneutical approach of Gabriel Marcel and Otto Bollnow, and the integrated logic of Hans Lipps, B. Liebrucks and Leo Gabriel more fulfilling.

To be fair to the linguistic analysts, it should be pointed out that some like Wittgenstein and Wisdom had seen the restrictive nature of their approach; for example, the former's view of his approach being merely the ladder which should be put away after the ascent had been made and also his own shift of emphasis in the Philosophical Investigations. Wisdom also, in leading back to a religious option in his Gods acknowledged that the metaphysical cannot be wished away. In his Philosophy and Psychology, he maintained that linguistic analysis had shown the futility of philosophical speculation but itself was the symptom of man's alienation with himself and therefore argued for the use of psychoanalysis. That alternative admits new problems which shall not be discussed here.

Rauche rightly argues against the straitjacket of the neo-positivist methodology. By the absolutization of the scientific approach, man "is changed from engineer of this approach into its slave." 314 Its abdication of philosophy in favor of an atomistic analytical functionalism has increased rather than decreased man's alienation from reality. Hector Hawton, himself very critical of existentialist philosophy, admits that "by reducing so many interesting questions to "nonsense," extreme Positivism has created a new phobia, "the dread of any sort of rational speculation." 315
It was noted earlier that for Marx, philosophy is translated into the analysis of man's productive or creative act of labour in order to transform society into a free, classless one. Philosophy attempted to understand the world while the need is to change it. Philosophy, argues Rauche, is thus reduced to a form of operationalism since action and the redirection of human society is seen as the means to transform society. For Marx, freedom is manifested in the harmony between man and society established through man's productive action. 316

The Marxist perspective quite rightly perceives the material alienation of man in contemporary society and wishes to humanize that society since, as we noted, they maintained that society determines the development of people to full potential. However, Marx had assumed that the proletariat were free by the fact of their oppression and that they, unlike the rest of society, were in step with historical reality and, therefore, represented the forces of freedom. The neo-Marxists soon discerned that the proletariat were incapable of leading the struggle since they were captive to the system also. As such the neo-Marxists provide a most important critique of Marx.

However, all brands of Marxism, the neo-Marxists included, share the view that philosophy has to abdicate as theory divorced from practice and has to merge in practice. Philosophy becomes the analytical science of laying bare the dialectics of economic laws that govern society and to show how the productive or other socially based forces
could transform society. 317

Three basic criticisms of this approach can be gleaned from Rauche's writings: Firstly, the idea of a dialectic at work in human society. Marx claimed that he had stood Hegel's system on its head by rooting the historical dialectics in the development of society through man's productive act while Hegel's dialectics was left stranded in the realm of ideas. This inversion, as Rauche points out, neither makes the view less controversial nor achieves Marx's aim to rid human thought of metaphysical speculation since the idea of a world logos in whatever form Marx clothes it, is a philosophical construction and remains highly controversial. 318 The controversiality of the view is evident in the numerous conflicting interpretations of Marx and in the interminable debates on how to apply Marxist principles to practice. As such, this perspective of truth is as controversial as any other.

By reducing philosophy to man's creative act, the dialectical process invariably constitutes an objective historical law or historical reason which fulfills itself. 319 Marx and the neo-Marxists, therefore, also share the faith of the Enlightenment in the achievement of freedom and authentic existence through the act of self-creation. The difference being that this act of self-creation depends on the use of science and technology as its ancillaries which help "to civilize nature in such a way that it is brought into harmony with man's natural reason so that man is set free from want, suffering and oppression." 320

Secondly, both the confidence in this materialistic dialectics and
the ultimate goal of society in spite of Marx's refusal to write "recipes for the cook-shops of the future" is thoroughly utopian in its application. The individual, says Rauche, is "swallowed up by both historical reason as well as the utopian society." Such a doctrine cannot stand dissension and independent thinking and hence remains authoritarian. This intolerance is illustrated in Lenin's condemnation of the revisionists Edward Bernstein and Rudolf Hilferding as traitors. The Marxist attempt to impose on all men, one unified view, especially since it is not above controversy, is directed at the individual and militates against human freedom. All absolutism and totalitarianism go the same way. Its ethic is at best utilitarian and at worst despotic. Hence Rauche concludes,

This aim, we venture to say, will never be reached as long as we are thinking men... it is humanity's curse and bane that ever new attempts at levelling man and making him conform to one vision of truth are made. Perhaps it is saying too much that it will fail because it "is directed against man's basically individualist nature" since it is not self-evident that individualism is endemic to being human. In another world-view with a history of communalism, like traditional African society which had no concept of private property, such socialist type governments may well take root more easily. Nevertheless, Rauche is correct in pointing out that even in a socialist society, the need for individual freedom is still imperative. We must agree, for creativity in the arts, for example, while conceivably may be widespread in a society, is not "mass produced" but remains an individual expression. So too, would individual freedom in the context
of a socialist society.

Thirdly, there is the Marxist and neo-Marxist view that the state of alienation will not be healed by theorising about alienation as Hegel had done but by praxis; where theory and practice are no longer contradictions. The belief is that when this happens man will be free from conflict and oppression. 325

In his latest book, Rauche begins by addressing this very problem. He warns about the danger of converting theory to functionalistic practice and argues for philosophical theory as a project of "full human practice." 326

When theory and practice emerge, what then? Do men stop thinking? In the face of the treat of totalitarian functionalism and totalitarian ideologism represented by both scientism and Marxism, the very freedom of the thinking individual is in danger. He argues, as we shall elucidate later, that human thinking and the resultant conflicts of opinion and practice, are the "very motor of human activity and of history." 327 Human progress is not deterministic but is dependent on the interplay between theory and practice not on their union which is only a utopian dream. Individual man is ignored in the face of social theory.

Such is the theoretical heritage of the neo-Marxists. Although they isolated several inadequacies in Marxist theory, they are still committed to social theory. Much can be said in their favour especially their incisive understanding of the social crisis of man even amid affluence and the trappings of economic success. They provide one of the best critique of so-called free, democratic societies.
Nevertheless, the doctrine of a historical logos and the utopian wish to reconcile theory and practice is still there. Marcuse's egalitarian concept of man points to the disappearance of man as independent individual and as critical and dissenting thinker. 328 Rauche points out that,

The identification of his own interest with that of the other man in terms of a utopian and imaginary goal, viz that of absolute equality, tends to make man just as one-dimensional as the functionalistic man of neo-Positivism. 329

Any form of utopianism in providing people with an eschatological point to fix their minds, may well rouse them from complacency and into action. However, negatively, especially among the socially disinherited, it becomes action for actions sake where no plan of action or critical insight is evident. As Rauche states, "Feeling themselves the torch-bearers of historical reason in the darkness of technological exploitation, oppression and repression, they believe the ends justify the means." 330 When Adorno, for example, realized the implication of his approach and maintained an element of self-restraint in his teaching, his pupils accused him of having betrayed the struggle for freedom against the repressive status quo.

The neo-Marxists, to their credit, view man as an individual who should be free of any kind of repression rather than a collective being, as in Marxism, subject to the inexorable laws of history. However, because they have not repudiated utopianism, in spite of their claims to have done so, Rauche called them "man's great seducers." 331
1.7.3. EXISTENTIALISM: THE DANGER OF EMPTY ACTIONALISM

Like the neo-Positivists, the Existentialists avoid abstraction from the finite (das Seiende) to the Absolute (das Sein) as traditional philosophy and metaphysics had done. They start from the facticity of man's being there and seek to understand man by an analysis of his moods.

Man can only achieve authentic existence through an act of self-creation in the face of Being (Heidegger), Transcendence (Jaspers) or Nothingness (Sartre). This act of self-creation makes philosophy redundant and, Rauche points out, can only be possible at the risk of bracketing the world, as the neo-Positivists had bracketed human consciousness. He cites the criticism of Existentialism by Marcuse and Fritz Joachim von Rintelen who had argued that the act of self-creation is "an empty gesture bare of any content and meaning." 333

In the attempt to abolish metaphysics and to re-think Being, Heidegger, for example, still leaves several questions unanswered: What is Being? Is not such an act of absolute transcendence from finite being a constitutive act? Heidegger maintained that "The truth of Being lays concealed." 334 Rauche concludes that,

... this act is even emptier than are the constitutive acts of metaphysics and science, since it is not only surrounded by emptiness, but, in addition, is bare of any concrete content... Heidegger's act of self-creation is an act divorced from the material world. 335
Sartre attempted to obviate any metaphysical implications a concept of Being may have by affirming his well-known diction: "Existence precedes essence." 335 Heidegger however, pointed out that Sartre has taken existentia and essentia according to their metaphysical meaning, which from Plato's time has said that essentia precedes existentia. He points out that although Sartre reverses the statement "a metaphysical statement remains a metaphysical statement. With it he remains with metaphysics in the oblivion of the truth of Being." 336

Heidegger, however, uses "metaphysics" to mean something quite different to its traditional use. He writes,

Human existence can relate to beings if it holds itself out into the nothing. Going beyond beings occurs in the essence of Dasein. But this going beyond is metaphysics itself. This implies that metaphysics belongs to the nature of man! It is neither a division of academic philosophy nor a field of arbitrary notions. Metaphysics is the basic occurrence of Dasein. 337

The paradox that occurs even here in Heidegger's case is, as Rauche points out repeatedly, that "the abdication of philosophy always occurs in a systematic or methodological way and in philosophical categories." 338 Furthermore, while the Existentialists extol human freedom, the ontological structure of their views ultimately make man not a possessor of freedom, as they everywhere claim, but one who is disposed of by Being (Heidegger) or Nothingness (Sartre).

Also, the abstruse etymological way that Heidegger constructs his
ideas has led to criticism. Hawton, for example, points out that Heidegger and Sartre appear to play word-games when they say that consciousness "is what it is not and is not what it is" or when Heidegger states, "Only in the clear night of dread's Nothingness is what-is as such revealed in all its original overtness: that it 'is' and is not Nothing," then inventing a verb "to nothing," Heidegger declares that "the Nothing nothings." 339

Both, Rauche thinks, commit the error of treating Nothing as a name. 340 Also, by making freedom inevitable the danger exists that it can be easily emptied of its contents. This problem is compounded when the non-theistic Existentialists speak of choosing at all cost the self alone or Being of which we cannot know or leap into Transcendence. The danger is that one may exalt one's liberty above all else and above others.

This danger of empty actionism, therefore, most clearly manifests itself in Existentialist ethics. Heidegger reports how soon after Being and Time was published, a young friend asked him when he was to write an ethics. His reply was,

Where the essence of man is thought so essentially i.e. solely from the question concerning the truth of Being, but still without elevating man to the center of beings, a longing necessarily awakens for a peremptory directive. (However) If the name 'ethics', in keeping with the basic meaning of the word ethos (abode), should now say that ethics ponders the abode of man, then that thinking which thinks the truth of Being as the primordial element of man, as one who ex-sists, is in itself the original
ethics. However, the thinking is not ethics in the first instance, because it is ongoing. 341

Rauche points out that in rooting truth (and ethics) in the indeterminable "throwness," the act of choosing or the act of existing itself becomes an empty action because the very foundation that underlies it becomes vacuous. Hence, the existentialists, Heidegger and Sartre in particular, turn man into an empty actionalistic gesture. 342

Sartre's conception of freedom which "turns freedom into a principle by which man is forced to be free, represents the greatest unfreedom in terms of which any of man's action is justified." 343

Albert Camus attempted to prevent the absolutization of the act of self-transcendence by his conception of humanitarian rebellion as the manifestation of moderation and freedom. "I rebel therefore we are" is his dictum for expressing how the affirmation of individual freedom must at the same time wish the freedom of the other. However, here the act of rebelling, says Rauche, is universalised and absolutised. 344

Marcel and Bollnow were also mindful of the actionalism that inheres in the existentialist view of man. They criticised the heroic defiance approach of Heidegger's man and the solitary actionalism of Sartre and attempted to move beyond their positions.

1.8. FREEDOM AND THE ONGOING QUEST FOR AUTHENTIC EXISTENCE

A study of the three main contemporary philosophical forms indicate inter alia that the attempt to jettison metaphysics leads to the
reduction of man to either a functional, operational or actional relation. Man is either absorbed into a collective being (Marxism) or is the function of his own language (neo-Positivism) or of Being (Heidegger), Transcendence (Jaspers) or Nothingness (Sartre). Hence the "abdication of philosophy as a critical, reflective theory leads to the abdication of man as a critical, reflective individual, one that is free to dissent and say No to the system." 345

Rauche's view of philosophy is a dynamic one because the dimension of critical enquiry is free and ongoing. He expounds in several parts of his writings what he calls "the permanent crisis of human truth." Philosophy's quest for the truth wherein all man's questions would be answered and thereby all conflicts and contradictions would be removed i.e. the state of permanent authentic existence, demands that philosophy remain the incessant striving for truth. The human quest for truth must necessarily be controversial because it always remains a human quest. All philosophical postulates that arise from this quest, as we repeatedly observed in our survey, stand in controversial relation to one another. Each postulate or theoretical construction is at best only a "truth perspective" since it is born in a particular historical context and embodies the quest for truth in a particular Sitz-im-Leben.

Because any one manifestation of human knowledge of truth is only a perspective on truth, the perpetual striving for truth can mean only a perpetual crisis of truth. When such striving ossifies or when the perpetuity of critical interaction between perspectives
(philosophical, theological, sociological, scientific and others) ends, then free thought petrifies and philosophy lapses into ideology (cf. Part III). The propensity for such lapsing we have already highlighted in the main philosophical forms of our time. The task facing us now is the elucidation of this understanding of philosophy as dynamic theoretical reflection. This shall be done under the following headings: Philosophy as Freedom from one's truth, philosophy as a human quest, and philosophy as ongoing quest for authentic existence.

1.8.1 PHILOSOPHY AS FREEDOM FROM ONE'S OWN TRUTH

Rauche contends that if the pursuit of truth never takes place in isolation and is a thoroughly historical activity then it will always be controversial since it takes place between man and his fellow. As a reflective being he forms and reforms his views in dialogue with the other differing radically at times yet changing his views as his perspective widens. It is imperative that philosophy as critical theory remains the basis wherein dissent and growth are registered or else all is lost in an ideological prison wherein man simply believes his own truth at the exclusion of everything else. 346 Within such a prison, individual freedom is sacrificed on the altar of blind prejudice.

A most insidious form of the dogmatism and absolutization of method is the science dogma of our time. In his "Emancipation from Science Dogma," 347 Rauche points out that the method of the natural sciences
has been absolutized to such an extent in our age that it has rendered knowledge (and the university) functional and has created thereby the climate for the current technologism. This absolutization is contradictory to the nature of science itself viz "the methodological systematization of man's world experience under changing conditions of life." Hence "science" cannot merely refer to the natural sciences but to other themes as well. It is in the very state of man's contingent experience which is the realm of human freedom from whence also arise man's science and morality. 349

The systematic aspects of the history of philosophy, Rauche argued elsewhere, confirms this non-negotiable dimension of philosophy as the reference to the other. In the various "models" of philosophy it is evident that since the moral act is practical and obtains in the controversial relation between myself and the other in all walks of life, it follows that there is no gap between ethics and science.

Both are governed by a self-critical spirit that must generate moderation of their claims. This "relation to the other" has permeated all the logical, epistemological, metaphysical and moral alternatives in the history of philosophy: the logical relation refers to the truth of the other as a necessary supplement to our own truth; the epistemological relation in comparison with the quests of the other understands the empirical limits of its own; and the metaphysical relation points to the world-view or cultural system of the other as being unequal but equivalent to our own; and the moral relation refers me to the other man in self-restraint and humility, thus liberating me from self-indulgence. 350
Rauche may be misunderstood here as assuming that man is essentially rational and critical and that in mutual interaction solves his conflicts. Hegel, as we have already pointed out, believed that contradictions and negations were natural for men but that they were necessary for the ongoing historical movement of spirit. Rauche appears to be saying something similar when he stated in his *Philosophy of Actuality* that "the essential nature of man is not rationality but contradictoriness," and that the fact of disagreement must not be rationalized in an idealistic or dialectical way but is itself "the generator of history." He maintains that in philosophy men are referred to their fellows and "in this beneficial atmosphere, discuss their mutual problems."

It should be emphasized that, unlike Hegel, Rauche did not conceive this philosophy of actuality as proceeding in a deterministic way. His views are free of any idealistic framework and do not insist on necessary syntheses or harmony but emphasizes a critical humanism that is based on mutual respect. His view does not postulate anything resembling a utopian model but preserves adequate room for man to change radically his mind and his society. The fact that he emphasizes the need for ongoing theoretical reflection does not absolutize reason, because both science and morality are grounded in contingent experience. Whether everyone can theoretically and critically reflect is also not the point at issue. What is important is that the door for self-criticism be always left open lest one's truth be one's prison and one loses one's freedom without knowing it. The philosopher should be the conscience of his society, holding up alternate perspective
as the prophet did in the context of Old Testament society.

As Rauche states, philosophy as the science of actuality is,

...the guardian of man's freedom, in the sense that it frees him from the chains and fetters of his own truth, his own self and enables him to make a break-through to the truth and the person of his fellowman. 352

It is therefore commensurate with the nature of man that any view of truth be aware of its controversiality and the incurable tension in the ongoing quest for truth. Man's freedom lies in the understanding of the fact of his permanent crisis of truth 353 so that "instead of reaching for the stars, suffering the torture and pain of Tautalus, because the stars remain unattainable to him, he should accept his truth visions as mere alternatives for coping with the problems of a specific situation of life." 354

The other, therefore, is one's constant stumbling block, not in the Sartrian sense of the other determining one's hell, but in the sense that the other constantly calls into question one's own philosophical calculations. It is "only by mutual-self restraint and self-restriction to the field of the actual crisis, and by accepting it as their common crisis, can man and his fellowman really meet in the spirit of humility." 355

This perspective transforms philosophy from a closed system into an open quest. Ethics and theories of knowledge are not made the derivation of logical propositions only but is placed in the dynamic
stream of human encounter and fellowship. Dogmatism, polarization
and self-righteousness 356 which appear in insidious forms in contem­
porary society and philosophies are ruled out because the other becomes
indispensable to truth.

1.8.2 PHILOSOPHY IS A HUMAN QUEST

What has just been stated highlights the fact that philosophy always
remains a finite task not only because it is conducted by men but
also because it is immersed in the crisis of human existence. That
philosophy is a human quest is the sign of both its true merit and
its limitation. As a human quest it remains a bastion against the
constant attacks by absolutism and totalitarianism on human freedom.

It is because of this a priori anthropological dimension of philosophy
that Räuche is at pains to clarify alongside the nature of freedom,
the nature of man. 357 He describes man as characterized by finitude,
historicality, fallibility and contingency. 358 Hence all philosophical
constructions will necessarily remain controversial because they
are truth perspectives; formulated within a historical milieu and
therefore bear the marks of its age; are prone to inadequacy and
even error and must bear the possibility of change, growth and develop­
ment.

Any human system which does not tolerate dissent or which is utopian
is contradictory to the nature of man and is not only absolutist
but also a danger to human freedom. In such theories man is easily
stricken by hybris (cf Part III) where he in the conceiving of theories,
whether idealist or materialist, has illusions of grandeur. Man ceases to be man in Marxism, for example, but is Grossmensch. The individual is merged with the collective being. Hegel's view of the state, Kant's view of absolute obedience to authorities, the functionalistic smugness of the analysts and the existentialist propensity in some of its thinkers to make man the measure of all things (as the Enlightenment had made Reason) - these open the possibilities for the nature of man to be distorted.

Rauche stated that, "There is no reason to believe that man will suddenly cease to be finite, limited, historical and controversial. If we did we would be either dead or God." 359

1.8.3. PHILOSOPHY AS AN ONGOING QUEST

It is the dynamic nature of the philosophical quest that forces it to remain in dynamic tension with various perspectives of truth. Hence man's existential security (Geborgenheit) has to be won again and again. 360 Hence Rauche called this aspect the dimension of "actuality." Only in the incessant constructing and reconstructing of a theory of truth does man become aware that none of his creations and constructions are of permanent duration and, as Bollnow had stated, man is always on the move. 361

The influence that Griesebach's (1880-1945) thought had on Rauche is evident here. 362 Griesebach had described the character of human truth-perspectives as representing many cycles of the human self
which clashed with one another. He had implored his contemporaries to desist from the mania of shaping the world and man according to their self-conceived truths. The crisis of human truth is the true dimension of reality and the experience of being contradicted by the other is the experience of transcendence which would make man abandon his attempt at self-transcendence and prepare him for bearing the other's contradiction in silent passion. Griesebach had also perceived the other as one's eternal stumbling block. For him reality obtained in the event of being annulled by the other, when self had been limited by assertive self and when historical time (the past) has been transformed by real time i.e. the actual experience of bearing the contradiction. Therefore, instead of living in the oneness of the seclusion of one's own conceived truth, man now lived in "twoness" i.e. in immediate communication and communion with the other. 363

Rauche appreciates Griesebach's attempt "to save us from our megalomania and our continual self-transcendence and self-glorification and thus to save us from mutual self-destruction resulting from the total clash of two antagonistic cycles of self." 364 However, he disagrees with Griesebach's ultimate view of reality outside of human consciousness since nothing could be experienced without self-realization and without which there would be no dialogue with the other. By trying to remove all theory in favour of a purely practical "silently suffering" ethical existence, he has moved beyond actuality of contradictions. If, says Rauche, I can bear the contradiction of the other it ceases to be a contradiction. 365
It is in the ongoing critical quest that authentic existence and freedom is manifested. Authentic existence, Rauche describes as an existence in conformity with one's actual experience of the crisis of truth.³⁶⁶ It is existence of man as not _Grossmensch_ or the man in _hybris_ or man as slave to one or other system. In other words, authentic existence is man existing as fully man and freedom is the _medium_ or his _modus vivendi_ whereby he ensures his full humanity and it obtains in his constant striving to be fully human i.e. to live authentically. We shall elaborate later on this most important point.

Inauthentic existence, Rauche defines as an existence where one is the prisoner of one's own truth wherein one is divorced from his fellowman by a wall of misunderstanding, prejudice and even hatred. It is an existence in _hubris_, self-glorification, self-love, self-righteousness, dogmatism and intolerance.³⁶⁷

In order, then, to secure human freedom, the _modus vivendi_ of authentic existence, philosophy must remain free, critical theory. In this regard, Rauche makes a call for a return back to metaphysics.³⁶⁸ The three contemporary philosophical approaches, whether they are aware of it or not, are transcendental theories of the world; they are comprehensions of the world by mind. Although they claim to be anti-metaphysical, they themselves have a metaphysical dimension in that they have a "built-in-world formula as a key to reality."³⁶⁹ transcendental consciousness (phenomenology), linguistic function (analytical philosophy), man's act of self-realization in the world (Existentialism) and man's act of self-emancipation through
changing the world (Marxism). "Back to metaphysics," for Rauche, means a transformation of attitudes that will be different from traditional metaphysics as well as contemporary functionalism, actionalism, and operationalism. The new metaphysics will be founded on man's natural, contingent experience whereby all human theory is permanently called into question and will be conducted not in the spirit of hubris but in humility. Back to metaphysics is in fact a call back to reality in contingent experience which is the realm of human freedom. By his contingent experience man is already free and by ongoing self criticism, the aim of philosophy, he will not throw away his natural freedom for total self-transcendence. Man, however, always wills this self-transcendence because, as Rauche points out, he has the natural inclination to overcome actuality (die Wirklichkeit das Geschehen) and to reach... absolute truth... because of his constant attempt to transcend himself... he lands in the impasse of alienation and self-estrangement. He creates the various 'Ids' of science, morality, metaphysics, the Godhead etc and if all this breaks down, or is shattered by actuality, he even communicates with himself as is revealed by existentialist philosophy. By so doing he becomes the architect of nothing. He, therefore, argues in his latest work for a "metaphilosophy" as the philosophy of the future which will be based on the real ground of contingent experience and will... the way out of the impasse between the totalitarian functionalism of the West and the totalitarian ideologism of the East. As a philosophia perennis it will prevent philosophy becoming a closed system which violates man's contingent experience of reality. He writes,

It is the task of the new metaphilosophy to guide
humanity out of (the) bottleneck... and ... avoid ...
artificial levelling of man's thinking with
that of his fellowman, which results in the uncritical
mass - thinking of an unfree mass-man... (It will
be) an advocate and a guardian of man's authentic
existence and freedom. 375

In The Choice, Rauche concludes that man is to choose between either
the offer of Utopia and absolute self-transcendence or reality grounded
in man's actual experience of the crisis of truth. Only by choosing
the latter will he move from uncritical to critical thinking, from
dogmatism to tolerance, from self-seclusion to open-mindedness, from
existence in oneness to existence in twoness. 376

A criticism that some may level at Rauche is that he appears to argue
for theory in its own right, over and above practice and that he
does not address himself to the problem of alienation that exists
between theory and practice. He appears to entrench the antithesis.

This criticism is ill-founded especially since Rauche is very aware
of the antithesis. He states that the methodological separation
had started with Kant and was to lead to its logical conclusion in
the Tractatus and underlies the impasses among the three main philosophi-
cal contemporary approaches. 377 He concludes, "It may be said
that in splitting apart theory and practice, man tore himself to
pieces." For Rauche, the solution did not lie in the trans-
formation of theory into practice. That would lead to operationalism.
However, if philosophy remained free theory grounded in the reality
of contingent experience, it will never be divorced from practice
because in the ongoing interaction with other truth perspectives it is constantly being called into question and, in turn, by reconstituting a view of man affects practice. The freedom of thought, Rauche seems to be saying, ensures the freedom and meaningfulness of practice. Theory and practice proceed in dynamic tension to one another. 378

SUMMARY AND SIGNIFICANCE

1. The problem of freedom in the Enlightenment became quickly bogged down in the problem of epistemology. Hence although the Enlightenment saw the need to break free from all absolutist tendencies, the autonomy of man soon became the equivalent of the autonomy of reason as was evident in the debates between the empiricists and rationalists. Rationalism absolutized the principle of reason and led man into a new state of alienation from reality while empiricism made him the prisoner of his senses.

2. With Immanuel Kant the confidence in reason was limited not because the world and man were not totally rational, in fact the structures of the mind became even more important; the confidence in reason was limited because the "thing-in-itself" was now beyond understanding: freedom together with God and immortality passed into the orbit of the noumena and within the sphere of the moral imperative. In Kant we have the formal split in man's awareness of truth. In the wake of this schism in human understanding followed positivism, scientism and technologism; where the issues of morality and human freedom are also confined to a "different" field. Kant, like Fichte
in his philosophy of freedom as pure act (Tathandlung), reduces freedom to a process of moral self-realization which Hegel later elaborated into spiritual and historical realization.

3. **Hegel's universal synthesis** was the last great attempt to unify man's awareness of truth and to place freedom at the centre of his whole system by viewing all of truth as part of the onward march of Spirit. Freedom and necessity, however, totally merge. Each manifestation of truth and its negation is a necessary step in the progression. Freedom is the logical outcome of a previous stage of development which itself was a clearer perception of freedom from a previous stage. Hence freedom begats freedom. Such a view of freedom linked to the logically determined universal synthesis must be called into question if that synthesis itself is problematic. As we observed, such an idealistic solution remains only a theoretical possibility to the problems raised by the Enlightenment in general and Kant in particular. It is an erudite commentary on history but is not the only way that history can be read. In a previous work, *Religion at the Limits?*, we argued that any reading of history which is based on a preconceived theoretical framework distorts that history. 379 The framework remains supra-historical. The main problem with Hegel's view of freedom is that it is based on necessity. If freedom is based on necessity then freedom itself is endangered.

The three contemporary forms of philosophy have in one way or another reacted to the Hegelian synthesis and have either gone back to the empiricist position or to the Kantian view in order to take those
views to their logical conclusion. They have attempted to go beyond Descartes as in neo-Positivism or have revolutionised the historical dialectic into a materialist one as in Marxism.

4. **Positivism and Neo-Positivism is a via negativa.** A view on reality is imposed that already prejudges what must be meaningful and what not. They are, therefore, as problematic as any other theoretical framework, especially since the methods of the natural sciences are wholly inappropriate to understand all of truth or human existence. It contributed little to solving the problem of freedom except to protect man from unfreedom in meaningless speculation. The question of individual freedom is submerged in the analytical concerns emanating from the "scientific" functionalism underlying Positivism. Freedom is endangered by functionalism.

5. In the Marxist concern for the freedom of society, one observes an alienation of a new kind: utopianism and the dissolution of individual being. The argument is that the freedom of the collective being will ensure the freedom of the individual. On the contrary, it is in such collectivism that the freedom of the individual is endangered. Freedom is reduced by an operationalism that propogates the collective.

6. The neo-Marxists saw the need for free individuals to lead the transformation of society into a free one. This is an important insight. However, they do not address clearly enough how the individual can be freed or whether truly free humans are possible in the totalita-
rian societies of our world, both western functionalist ideologies and eastern authoritarian ones.

7. The Existentialists, especially Heidegger and Sartre, view man's very existence of thrownness as the sphere of his freedom. Nietzsche and Sartre took the process a step further. Freedom was seen as the self-realization of the existential subject. Freedom becomes equivalent to the possibility of existing, its very "nature." It is not logically, morally or physically determined. However, man is either a function of Being (Heidegger) or Nothingness (Sartre) and, in view of the absence of the Transcendent, man is condemned to be free. He is left to determine his own course in the world. Nevertheless, as we observed, such an act could lead to empty actionalism. Being and Nothingness are also metaphysical postulates even though it is claimed they are lodged in existence alone and that existence precedes essence.

8. However, it was the Existentialists who perceived freedom as the possession of the individual. The existential act is the sphere of freedom since the existing subject is free already. However, the danger of actionalism emerges when the subject is reduced to a function of Being or Nothingness and, any "leap into Transcendence" or to moral action, even with the Existentialist revival of Kant's 'willing the good of the whole', leaves freedom in flux.

9. However, what is clear from the controversial nature of these theories of about freedom is that, as Rauche affirmed, freedom does
not arise as the result of any theory about freedom. Freedom like existence cannot be derived logically nor derived from one or other philosophical system because all systems stand in controversial relation to one another.

10. The danger of ideologism or functionalism however, is avoided if philosophy remains self-critical and an ongoing, critical quest for authentic existence; authentic existence being the existence wherein man remains free from absolutism of any kind. Only thus will philosophy not lapse into ideology. Rauche argues that the contingent experience of reality, therefore, is the sphere of freedom, that is, in so far as he remains man, he is free.

11. Rauche, therefore, presupposes that man as man is free and that when he is slave to any system or pretends to be Grossmensch absolutizing his truth, he ceases to be free or to live authentically. He is, therefore, in agreement with the Existentialist view that freedom is endemic to being fully man although he rightly rejects the absolutization of their approach whether it is the ontology of Heidegger or the absolutization of the act of self-realization in the others.

12. The Christian view, like Rauche's and the Existentialists', also understands freedom as endemic to being fully human while rescuing it from the act of self-realization or empty actionalism. As Berdyaev pointed out, man is free even when he does not choose. 380

This idea is endemic to the Christian doctrine of man being the
Imago Dei. His bearing of a spiritual dimension is the equivalent of his being essentially free. This freedom bursts forth in man in all his creativity: his morality, art and science. Freedom is the basis of his creativity and his construction of the world in theory and practice. This is the meaning of the command "to replenish the earth." That his freedom to create has been distorted to manipulate and shackle the earth is the sign of his having distorted the freedom of his being the image of God. Hence his abuse of the world and the use of power and science for destroying is the sign of his state of unfreedom.

Hence we agree with Rauche here that freedom is distorted when man loses or forfeits his freedom to one or other ideology or when he absolutizes his own perspective, the work of his own hands. When man worships his own creation or when any system becomes the object of his "worship," in theological language, that is idolatry.

It is intrinsic to the factness of his being fully human that man is truly free. Adam, which in Hebrew means "mankind," is representative of the incessant desire to be more than man and be "as God."

He thus over and over again forfeits true freedom in his attempt to be more than man. Freedom, he fails to see, exists in his contingent experience of reality as finite and historical man. While freedom leads to obedience to God (Rauche says humility before reality), hubris is man's constant attempt to usurp God-ship.

This attitude is what Rauche has repeatedly pointed out as the arrogance
and intolerance of utopian man. Utopian man and idolatrous man are basically the same; As the Bard stated it, he is "the engineer... hoist by his own petar." In striving to be more than man he destroys his true freedom as man.

It is this constant danger of lapsing into unfreedom that one sees illustrated in the history of Israel's disobedience to Yahweh and in their absolutization of the Law, the temple ritual, legalism or the nation Israel, as ends in themselves. Hence Christ stands in judgement even of the Temple and of the Pharisees' sincere but empty piety. The Old Testament prophets had prophetically performed that function also. The Tower of Babel represents most clearly man caught in hubris, seeking to reach God and ending in utter confusion.

Alienated man always seeks security in such system building thinking that such structures will ensure certainty and ensure his freedom. The opposite is the truth. Not even the presence of the physical Temple in Jerusalem in the end is proof of God's presence for he does not "dwell in a place made with human hands."

Reconciliation, whatever the details of the Christian doctrine are, is essentially directed at solving the problem of this alienation of man. In reconciliation with God, man is put into perspective again, hence undoing the hubris of Adam. The whole metaphoric outworking of this reconciliation in terms of redemption (buying back from slavery) and justification (the penal metaphor of freeing from a sentence of guilt) are theological descriptions of the "restor-
ing of fellowship with God\textsuperscript{9} so that man may be fully man; i.e. he may be truly free.

Over and above all the finer theological points related to the Incarnation, it is the historical illustration of the "making fully human." Jesus unlike Adam is not given to \textit{hubris} but takes on the responsibility of being fully \textit{man} before God. Around this becoming fully \textit{human} the Christian idea of freedom rotates. Freedom obtains in obedience before God; a freedom which man all too easily relinquishes. Even rigid religious systems, albeit Christian or Biblically based, can become as self-defeating and as absolutist as philosophical systems. Hence, the Christian view has constantly to ensure that freedom does not lapse into bondage or ideology also. But what is the dynamic principle which, in compatibility with the structure of the dynamic quest for freedom, will ensure that the Christian understanding of freedom is not distorted by theological systems themselves? That dynamic principle is faith itself. Faith as existential encounter is also an ongoing, self-critical encounter. An analysis of this view of faith is the task of Part II.
1. For example, it is incorrect to isolate the Sturm und Drang from the general flow of eighteenth century thought. As J.D. Stowell stated, "To call it a pre-Romanticist or pre-Classicism ... has not much more value than saying that these writers grew up and influenced others and it denies the debt they owe to the struggle for freedom of expression in life and art which had gathered momentum during the century." J.D. Stowell "Enlightenment and Storm on Stress" in Periods in German Literature, (ed) J M Ritchie, p. 85.

2. Ibid., p.85


6. Descartes, R A Discourse on Method He begins with the statement "Good sense is, of all things among men, the most equally distributed..." p.3

7. His view of the harmony of society is grounded in his belief in the natural goodness of man and that the true fulfilment of human nature is achieved only with the development of its highest possibility. cf. R. Grinsley "Jean-Jacques Rousseau, philosopher of Nature" in S.C. Brown Philosophers of the Enlightenment, p.184-198

8. Adam Smith who use the concept of the "invisible hand" did not mean the intervention of any divine agency in the economic affairs of men but referred to a natural effect not intended by the individuals involved. cf. D.D. Raphael's "Adam Smith: Philosophy, Science and Social Science" in Brown, S.C. Philosophers of the Enlightenment, p.74-93


10. Leibniz, G.W. Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays, p.161 cf. also Schacht, R Classical Modern Philosophers, p.40-65

11. Kant, I "What is Enlightenment?" in Kant's Political Writings, p.54

12. Barth, K Nineteenth Century Protestant Thought, p.38
13. Ibid., p. 77
14. Ibid., p. 38
16. Locke, J : "Essay Concerning Human Understanding" in Philosophical Works Bk. III ch. 3 Section ii Vol. 11, p.14
17. Hume, D : Treatise on Human Nature Bk. I part 1 Section vii, p.17f
18. Marcuse, H : Reason and Revolution, p.20
20. Barth, K : op. cit., p.34
21. Candide (1759) a satirical look at the prevailing views of his time which believed that even evil would be ultimately good.
22. Jansenism, an Augustinian movement, was condemned by Pope Innocent X in 1653 for its views on freewill, predestination, moral asceticism the hierarchy, sacraments and the mission of the church and drew strong Jesuit condemnation; On the implication of the Evangelical revival on England cf. J.H. Bready England: Before and after Wesley, p.33f and p.331ff; also H.H. Fitchett Wesley and His Century, p.139f.
23. Tillich, P : op. cit., p.356
24. cf. his Social Contract (1762)
25. Kant, I : op. cit., p.55
26. Barth, K : op. cit., p.35
28. Kant, I : Critique of Pure Reason, p.25
29. Ibid., p.25
30. Ibid., p.28f
31. Ibid., p.471
32. Ibid., p.41
33. Ibid., p.43
34. Ibid., p.48
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133. Russell, B: "Logic as the Essence of Philosophy", p.126
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222. Habermas, J: "A Reply to my Critics" in Critical Debates, p. 245ff cf. also his Theory and Practice which deals with this issue.
223. Ibid., p.234
224. Habermas, J: "A Reply to my Critics" op. cit., p.245
225. Ibid., p.234
225. Marcuse, H

: *Reason and Revolution*, p.20-21

226. Marcuse, H

: *Eros and Civilization*

This whole work is devoted to elaborating this idea

227. Marcuse, H

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233. Ibid., p.88f; p.66

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238. Marcuse, H

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239. Arato A and Gebhardt, E

: *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, p.xvii

240. Stumpf, S E

: *Socrates to Sartre A History of Philosophy*, p.444

241. Kaufman, W

: *Existentialism from Doestoevsky to Sartre* (SWE) a collection of seminal writings by the main representatives of Existentialism hereafter referred to as SWE (selected writings of Existentialism).

242. This issue will be elaborated at several points of this study. William Barrett's *Irrational Man* is a fine treatment of this dimension of human existence.

243. Tillich, P

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244. Kaufman, W

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PART II

FAITH AS EXISTENTIAL ENCOUNTER
Thus far, in Part I, it has been argued that the problem of the freedom of man is how to manifest freedom in the world and also how to preserve the integrity of man as man, not slave or Grossmensch. It was stated vis-à-vis G.A. Rauche’s thesis that freedom cannot be derived nor postulated from one or other theory about freedom but that freedom obtains in man’s contingent experience of reality. Thus freedom is expressed dynamically in the ongoing quest for freedom. Only in this ongoing quest will either complacency of the man stuck “in the system” and the arrogance of man in pursuit of his Utopia be avoided. Both, it was maintained, pay only lip-service to freedom because both are dogmatic, intolerant and “wise in their own conceits.”

If the manifestation of freedom lies in the ongoing quest for authentic existence, then it was also maintained, man is free in his being fully human. As the existentialists also have maintained, freedom is endemic to being human and has to be realized in decision. It has already been stated that the Biblical idea of faith and freedom also views man in these terms since the salvation of man is, in principle, the freedom of man for God. It affirms that man is “the image of God” and that freedom, therefore, is essential to being fully man. Faith is the manifestation of that primordial freedom. However, the crisis of faith is that in traditional thought faith has not been viewed in the dynamic frame of reference of the Biblical understanding of faith.

2.1 FAITH IN TRADITIONAL THOUGHT

Faith as a system of belief is as totalitarian and absolutist as
the philosophical alternatives which have been considered in Part I. In so far as faith is structured into a world-view (the temptation systematic theology has often fallen foul off) it does to faith what we observed philosophical systems do to human freedom. Man becomes a function in a theoretical relation concretised in creeds or sacraments which become the objects of faith. They arrogate a timelessness and an authority they can never possess. Faith cannot imply a metaphysical scheme because it highlights a view of God that vitally affects the world, society and man. It cannot imply a mythological world-view for then God would become an object among other objects.

Christian faith cannot be a moralistic standpoint because it is not founded on the will of man but is, as will be discussed, intrinsically bound up with justification by grace. R.G. Smith, therefore, rightly concludes that "... the traditional divisions, whether of notitia, assensus and fiducia or subject and object, cannot comprehend the historical complexity of God’s gracious act." 1

Faith becomes belief when these “objects” display a kind of historical tyranny and their historicity is ignored. This is not to trivialise their importance but to rescue faith from being grounded in the temporal and the finite, for faith then ceases to be faith as “ultimate concern.” On the contrary, sanctity is conferred on finite things and religion collapses into idolatry. W Cantwell Smith maintained that,

...faith is not to be subordinated to belief or to anything else mundane. To it, all religious forms are to be seen as at best strictly secondary... Nor is the intellect to be subordinated... It is making beliefs primarily that has tended to deprecate intellectuality - as the critics of
If faith is reduced in this way to belief, faith like reason becomes bogged down in epistemological terms. There are two possibilities: either we achieve a logically satisfying theoretical framework which by its very nature impinges on freedom and achieves equipoise by ignoring the contradictions of existence or we maintain the validity of God's sovereignty and the freedom of human decision which accompanies the paradox of existence. To explain these contradictions away and to achieve wholeness in principle only, is to increase the alienation of man from authenticity. Even Kierkegaard's "leap into the absurd" can easily be misunderstood as faith acting over and above reason, if we do not release his views from the epistemological stranglehold. This stranglehold is exemplified in the way the subject-object antithesis has become a non-negotiable paradigm with which to view reality so that it is inconceivable that one can speak of truth except in these terms. It is considered self-evident and incontrovertible that truth obtains in man as subject perceiving and understanding objects (the world, creeds, God, the other and such like). This is perhaps the single most important reason why the quest for freedom has often been a postulate or a derivation from one or other perspective of truth where truth has been judged on the basis of the certainty of the object. It was only a short step from this to the philosophy of the natural sciences and Positivism which held that only what is "scientifically" verifiable is true. It was this subjectivism that gave birth to the natural sciences and technology; that permitted the manipulation of the world as object. However, as was pointed out in the critique of rationalism, empiricism and positivism, this
antithesis proves a strait-jacket for truth.

The subject-object antithesis has uncritically been the paradigm in theological thinking also. Revelation, viewed epistemologically, has been understood primarily as the knowledge communicated from "above". It bore all the marks of knowledge except that it could not be proved. Grand attempts at explanation often perceived faith as an extension of reason. Gogarten pointed out that,

Theology may now attempt to protect its faith from modern subjectivism by asserting the 'objectivity of its basis for faith' by claiming a 'historical factuality'... If it does, however, it does so under the compulsion of subjectivistic thinking itself... Theological discussion with subjectivism must enter at an earlier point, where subjectivism had its source viz. with an understanding of faith which occasioned science yielding to the temptation to construct a world-view i.e. a faith no longer understood in the vigorous sense of the apostle Paul and Luther as the faith that alone justifies... i.e. whose proper task was to watch over man's freedom for God. 3

This kind of systematization of faith had forced science in the first place to seek its autonomy and thus it was this kind of faith which caused the initial alienation between faith and reason, and between theology and science.

Belief-systems lulled man into a state of complacency and spiritual inertia. They provided him with "objective assurances" within a religion ex opere operato. Faith within Law and credal Christianity is, therefore, "dead and powerless without worth." "It is," said
Emil Brunner,

...a facsimile of the true faith, a counterfeit bill which has exactly the same markings as a good one, but the signature, the certification is lacking. This faith is not written in the heart by the hand of God, but only by the church, by the hand of the apostles. This faith, begotten by permutations which clings to dogma and literalism ... which exchanges bare doctrine, - even though it be Biblical doctrine - for the Word of God, is a blight which lies over the whole history of the church.

It was this type of religion that Marx rejected, "religion that blinds the worker preventing him from seeing his true condition, a social force that worked contrary to awareness." It was "a prototype of surrogate satisfaction of man who either has not yet attained himself or had lost himself again." Kierkegaard called this "childish Christianity," a religion of "idyllic mythology and fantasy which emphasized the humanistic and soft traits of the character of Jesus."

The way out of the impasse requires a reorientation of the mind in order to think beyond the subject-object prison. To read the Bible within the confines of this antithesis is to distort its message since there are several texts which appear to fit the scheme. However, as Gogarten maintained, "Nothing is accomplished by obtaining one's understanding of faith from the warehouse stocked by the very theological tradition by which one tries to ward off subjectivism."

Theological discourse must be rescued from static epistemological terms. The language of faith must be expressed creatively and
existentially; that is, in a way that adequately expresses its true nature, that touches life and grapples with existence.

If the object of faith was a doctrine, faith would be an intellectual relation, which it is not. Since we take Christ seriously, we take seriously the God who is vitally bound up with our existence, our history and our death. Jesus did not come to found a new religion but to awaken faith and faith means living wholly before God and not to give allegiance or worship to anything less.

Therefore, faith cannot be systematised anymore than freedom and existence can. Nevertheless, church history is full of examples of how the church has sought assurances in system-building which Brunner refers to as "a mighty apparatus... by which it might become the power in control of divine revelation", a "practice wholly impersonal, something physical - metaphysical has evolved out of an experience wholly personal." 9 This kind of totalitarianism ultimately destroys both faith and freedom. As R.G. Smith states,

We must be continually ready to ask whether the dogmas we are invited to subscribe to, whether literally or passively, whether in a church or in a nation, in a political party or even in a small voluntary group, really contain in themselves the possibility of personal being. 10

The crisis of faith is that even *homo religiosus* becomes enslaved to a system of beliefs which holds him in awe and acquires a *mysterium tremendum et fascinans* of its own. Hence the possibility of him asking whether the objects of his belief have "the possibility of personal being" is often excluded. It is imperative that faith be reformulated in dynamic and existential terms, that is, as ongoing encounter with God. However, before the nature of faith as encounter
can be elucidated, it is necessary to clarify the distinction between Christian existentialism and existential Christianity. This distinction is most important lest what is attempted in this study be dismissed as existentialism in Christian dress. Nothing is further from the truth.

2.2 CHRISTIAN EXISTENTIALISM OR EXISTENTIAL CHRISTIANITY?

There is a vast difference between the two, a difference that is not always grasped by Christian orthodoxy. Existentialist Christianity is Christianity viewed within the paradigm of existentialism and therefore suffers from all the demerits of absolutization of a truth perspective. Existential Christianity has to do with the witness of the Christian gospel in the changing contexts of man; in their contingent experience of reality. "Existential" is the characteristic of faith as ongoing encounter. To clarify this distinction, a brief assessment of the evangelical reaction to existential Christianity will be made in order to show how the reaction of orthodoxy has not always discriminated carefully enough between existentialist Christianity and existential Christianity; then a brief evaluation of Christian existentialism will be proffered and finally, an analysis will be made of the "existential" dimension of Christianity.

2.2.1. THE EVANGELICAL REACTION

The evangelical scepticism about Christian existentialism has been
both varied and widespread, and not without some good reasons. In order to understand the main factors influencing this scepticism, a brief analysis will be made of N D Hunnex's *Existentialism and Christian Belief* since it is representative of the evangelical reaction and contains articles that had been published in *Christianity Today*, the influential evangelical periodical.

Let it be stated clearly that we appreciate his evangelical concern "to obey the God of Jesus and of the New Testament" 12 and his creation with regard to "trading the old model for a new model that may turn out to be a philosophical as well as a spiritual lemon." 13 However, Hunnex clearly confuses Christian existentialism and existential Christianity when he states, "...my task is not to create sympathy or appreciative understanding of existential Christianity. Rather it is to provide a philosophical critique of it on behalf of evangelical orthodoxy" 14 and when he states, "The logical conclusion of existential Christianity is the death of God;" 15 especially since he has in mind J J Altizer's view that, "Once we truly come to understand the Christian God as... a dialectical process we shall finally be purged of the Christian religious belief in the existence of a unique and absolutely autonomous God." 16 This is a classical statement of "Christian" existentialism which shall be evaluated below; it is not what is meant by existential Christianity of which Altizer is clearly not a representative.

Hunnex has two main problems with the dialectical theologians, especially Bultmann and Brunner:
Firstly, he is concerned about the objective reality of God. Against Bultmann's view that, "The act of God is not purely objective. The cross of Christ... is an objective fact of history for everyone, but it is a saving act of God only for faith, for the man who makes it his own", he asks,

Why is it necessary to mention God at all since the existence of the saving act is contingent only on someone making it his own?... The redemptive act of God through Christ is there to be appropriated so to speak without regard to whether or not you or I open our eyes to see it. 17

Bultmann and Brunner, together with those who will be discussed below, had no intention to deny the transcendence or objective reality of God. What they attempted to show was that unless one "opens one's eyes to see it" (or rather, "one's eyes are opened to see"), one cannot speak of God except in a speculative way. Hence they argue that God is "known" in encounter which is faith. Faith would be empty actionalism if God were not "objectively true". Nevertheless, faith apprehends God as he identifies with our contingent experience and our history. Men cannot surmise about God-in-himself because men cannot jump out of their historical skins.

Hunnex agrees with Hepburn that,

Overwhelmingly concerned with the phenomenology of faith and the life of faith, existential thought is in continual peril of failing to emerge from the subjectivistic circle at all. A subjectivistic account can provide an informative description of what it is like to think and act as if there was God... But it is unable to go further... and say
whether the belief is justified or unjustified whether or not there exists a being before whom the believer has taken up the attitude of faith. 18

Ultimately, Hepburn will only be pleased with objective proof for God which Hunnex also does not have. To say that one can only speak of what one knows and which the community of men testify to, is not to claim that that which we do not know does not exist. Such a view merely recapitulates the error of positivism.

Secondly, Hunnex finds, what he calls the "encounter theory" of Bultmann and Brunner problematic. Against the view that God discloses Himself rather than information about Himself and that He is known existentially as encounter, Hunnex maintains that it does not follow that "God cannot communicate facts about Himself and therefore propositions cannot be precluded. There are somethings about oneself and one's wife that are literally inexpressible. But it does not follow that nothing can be known about myself, my wife or God. Therefore, religious truth must be both existential and propositional." 19

Hunnex's analogy between knowing oneself and one's wife, and knowing God, mystifies the crisis of revelation because reflecting upon one's own nature or one's wife's is not the same as commenting upon the nature of God. Furthermore, the theologians he takes issue with have not denied the possibility of propositions or else they would not have attempted a constitution of theology. Their emphasis that these propositions be based on existential encounter was an attempt to temper the scholastic-type speculation of traditional theology and its smugness within theological systems. What we call propositional
truths (the creeds, articles of faith, theologies and even the scriptures themselves) are the result of, or the reflection on, personal encounter with God, whether it was the encounter of the prophets themselves within the historical Sitz-im-Leben of their prophetic role vis-à-vis the nation Israel, or the apostles vis-à-vis their encounter with Jesus of Nazareth, his life, death and resurrection.

Hunnex and others who argue as they do, fail to realize that the Church today and any theological attempt to formulate propositions, as it were, has to encounter the "encounters" of the prophets, the apostles and almost two thousand years of "encounters". This is what Ebeling, for example, meant by the "problem of historicity" and by his definition of Church History as "the history of the interpretation of scripture." 21

It is not as if faith is based on "true propositions." Hence it does not make sense to say as Hunnex does that "Either there is propositional revelation or there is no revelation at all, since God who disclosed Himself also disclosed propositions about Himself." 22 Hunnex asks, "What if God were to make a final self-disclosure? Can we say that He cannot do this or would not do this?" 23 He points out that in the theology of Bultmann and Brunner, for example, there is not the slightest assurance that our decision is right in any but a personal way since "the truth of encounter needs to be discovered anew." 24

Hunnex appears to have little appreciation for the crisis of truth and of faith that these theologians had experienced. 25 Even if
some of them indulge in "ivory tower" intellectualisms at times, the struggle of faith in Kierkegaard's life and writings, for example, cannot be overlooked. Hunnex appears to view faith and revelation within epistemological categories. Such a view fails to understand that the ongoing encounter of faith within the changing experiences of man is not the result of doubt or the uncertainty of faith, but is the result of the desire to hear the Word of God, the Gospel, again and again so that its clarity does not become confounded by habit, custom, human arrogance or man-made systems or theologies. As Gordon Kaufman states,

... theology is not to be understood as primarily or chiefly exposition or interpretation of the several creeds of the church or the ideas of the Bible. Doubtless both the Bible and the creeds are relevant and important for understanding the concept of God and for judging what are proper, and what improper, uses or formulations of that concept, but it is their utility for getting at the image-concept of God that gives the Bible and the creeds their importance for theology, not the other way around. 26

Hence to speak of "propositional revelation" is wholly inappropriate.

2.2.2. "CHRISTIAN" EXISTENTIALISM

Hunnex, however, is quite correct in his scepticism about forcing the message of the Bible into a pre-determined existentialist frame of reference. Here Bultmann's demythologization programme is especially problematic. As J. Macquarrie had pointed out, Bultmann's intention, was to translate all mythical statements into
existential statements (i.e., statements about man's existential situation), but... there is all the difference in the world between a statement about human existence and a statement in terms of human existence which is supposed to refer analogously to God... Either we must say here there is a limit to demythologizing, or else, we must redefine the aim of demythologizing... We are no nearer to having solved the problem of oblique language about God.

This would have been solved only if demythologizing, as purely existential interpretation, had been pursued without limit. This would have meant the abandonment of any attempt to talk about a transcendent God and the representation of Christianity as nothing but a possible way of existence for man. Obviously Bultmann did not want this. 27

As we have intimated, the implications which Bultmann and the other theologians studied here, have for hermeneutics fall outside the immediate scope of this thesis. However, the point should be made that any fixed perspective of interpretation when absolutised will invariably distort the message of the Bible because as we have argued elsewhere, fixed theoretical frameworks of interpretation whether applied to history, religion, philosophy or textual interpretation, act as Procrustean beds. Any fact or perspective which does not fit a predetermined norm is excised. 28 We observed this forcing of truth into logical limits in Hegel and Positivism; into societal categories in the Marxists and neo-Marxists and now into existentialists categories with the emergence of "Christian" existentialism. Hence, as Hunnex points out, even when theologians like J. A. T. Robinson intend to assert "the centrality of the confession 'Jesus is Lord' in
the full New Testament, sense," they invariably alter the meaning of New Testament and Christian language and convert the New Testament writers into contemporary existentialists. 29 This kind of hermeneutic "finally edges out Christian belief very much like the proverbial camel in the tent." 30 In so far as existentialist hermeneutics is imposed on the understanding of the Bible, a secularized, "scientific" world view becomes the straitjacket of the Christian message. Therefore, such an approach must elicit the same criticisms that were levelled at Hegel, the neo-positivists and the Marxist analysis of history.

Perhaps no one was more aware of the danger of applying an existentialist interpretation on the Biblical message than was Karl Barth. Hence the change in emphasis between the younger Barth of the Römerbrief and the later Barth of the Church Dogmatics and his rejection of the analogia entis. In the introduction to the first volume of his Church Dogmatics he wrote,

"The Word of God or existence? The first edition (ie. his "The Doctrine of the Word of God" of 1927) gave acumen or even stupidity some cause to put this question... in any thinkable continuation of this line I can see only the plain destruction of Protestant theology..." 31

In this study we have not approached the theologians under scrutiny here via a confessional paradigm like M.D Hunnex has done. That would only miss their real intention! Neither have we attempted to define a "Christian existentialism" for such an approach is fraught with many difficulties especially in the area of hermeneutics.
This study has attempted to draw out the dimension of the "existential" from their approach because Christianity in the Bible and later in the Reformers bears such a vital, dynamic dimension which all too easily has been lost in the history of Christian thought. This existential dimension which is "faith" is what makes theology dynamic, and commitment to God commensurate with human freedom. The nature of the "existential" must now be more closely examined.

2.2.3. THE EXISTENTIAL

That Christian existentialism as a clearly defined methodology is as problematic as other truth-perspectives, including Christian ones, will be quite evident from the preceding discussion. However, Existentialism, in spite of its formal ontology, highlighted a dimension of thinking, or rather, "being" which is endemic to the Christian idea of commitment as we find it described in scripture and most vividly illustrated in the life of Christ. This dimension Walter Kaufman called "a timeless sensibility that can be discerned here and there in the past but... only in recent times has hardened into a sustained protest and preoccupation." 32 The mystical tradition and some of the more pietistic groups had been more aware of this dimension than the more institutionalized and formally defined traditions in Church history which had been deeply influenced by neo-Platonism and later by Aristotle's philosophy. It was aspects of the pietistic mood that also ungirded the Reformation's re-emphasis on sola fide. One may cite the influence that Theologia Germanica had on Luther of which he had written,

... next to the Bible and St. Augustine, no book
hath ever come into my hands, whence I have learnt, or would wish to learn more of what God and Christ, and man and all things are. 33

This book, which Luther encouraged to be read in order "to revive the consciousness of spiritual life" of his countrymen, was well received. 34

Little wonder that, in modern times, the impetus for the revival of the existential has come from Christian sources. Pascal and Kierkegaard were not formulating a new Gospel nor attempting to proffer a new discovery or interpretation of Christianity. They called men to renewed commitment instead of formal church membership and nominal affiliation to the Christian body. They urged a vital dynamic and ongoing living in faith. D.E. Roberts, therefore, is correct in his assessment that Existentialism began as a "Christian mode of thinking." 35 We are not using "existentialism" here in the sense of a methodology or ontology of existence. It is safer to speak of "the existential" as a Christian modus vivendi which, as Roberts goes on to point out, if "sundered from faith become particularly vivid expressions of the spiritual disintegration of our age" but that "even where it leads to atheistic conclusions it is of great importance for it offers a particularly poignant expression of the predicament of modern man." 36

To highlight the dimension of the existential is not to argue for the absolutization of one methodology or truth-perspective. It is rather to bring a new dynamism into commitment which will remove faith and theological reflection on faith from the realm of detached
logical abstraction to considering truth and human existence in the attitude that it deserves; that is, as a matter of life and death. Again, this is not to deny the need for theology as an ongoing, critical theoretical discipline (cf. Part III). To remove faith from the crisis of human existence and contingency is to open the door to blind faith, or, as we have already pointed out, faith becomes belief in a body of dogma. To affirm the existential is to affirm faith as the dynamic, ongoing encounter which makes theology an ongoing quest and not a closed system of doctrines.

The existential prohibits an aesthetic or "scientific" smugness when men come to consider the issue of spiritual commitment. They must, as it were, "put the shoes from off their feet for the ground on which they stand is holy ground." Their whole being takes part in the quest. It is not a rational quest only but a living, existential one. Kierkegaard, who will be considered in greater detail below, insisted that Christianity was not a doctrine but a communication of existence and, therefore, one who is involved in it bears the responsibility of reproducing it. 37 This view has obvious implications for faith as dynamic commitment. Sartre, in quite a different way, also saw the nature of authentic existing as lying in commitment (engage).

When Christian doctrines lose this dimension of existential commitment and become merely one dimensional rationalizations, they become static tenets of belief; objects to be examined, analysed and systematised. Kierkegaard, for example, had anticipated when the university dons
would make his own works the subject of lectures and so would thorough-
ly misunderstand them. 38 The third dimension, the existential, does not rule out the rational but brings to bear on all thinking the commitment of the whole being because the quest for truth is the quest affecting life and death. As H. R. Mackintosh states, "Thou art the man" are the words which must sound in our ears perpetually if... our thought is to be 'existential', that is, carried on with the unfailing consciousness that we stand before God... which rejects the cold and futile objectiveness of speculative divinity which dissolves the Gospel into ideas and the tepid objectiveness of conventional churchmanship, which lies at peace with the world, atrophies the sense for spiritual heroism and displaces personal concern about salvation by descent or prosperous membership of an institution. 39

There are at least seven fundamental characteristics of this existential dimension:

1. The existential, which Kierkegaard called the "subjective", is concerned primarily not with the universal or abstractions but with the process of thinking and living as it goes on in the individual. Therefore, while the objective approach is preoccupied with the question "What is the truth of Christianity?", the existential questor asks "How can I become a Christian?" This latter question changes the agenda from being epistemologically based to being existentially based. The existential, instead of rejecting the universal as empiricism had done, gives it new ground; that is, existence. 40

2. The subject is changed from a function or relation to the "existing"
subject and is placed within continual striving, commensurate with his changing experience of reality. He is spurred on to be part of the ongoing quest for truth. Man is restored from being a thing (an "it") to being a person, a problem which, as we pointed out in Part I, lies at the heart of man's crisis and unfreedom.

3. This approach acknowledges that truth like the freedom of the subject cannot be logically deduced because existence is basically ambiguous and human beings, contrary to deterministic and idealist world-views, are not predictable. All the truths that affect human existence and human destiny are ultimately not the products of reason, what Hegel called "raisonnement", but the answers of the whole being. Lessing had stated that the accidental truths of history can never serve as proofs of eternal truths of faith, 41 a view that was to be greatly criticised by theologians like W. Pannenberg who attempted to obviate the gulf between faith and reason by constructing a philosophy of history. 42 Pannenberg's answer, however, like Hegel's synthesis, remains problematic also. 43 Because of the finitude of man, "a leap" must be taken. However, such a leap, as we shall observe below, does not have to be a-historical or a blind and empty gesture.

4. The existential quest is not satisfied with neat pseudo-assurances and abstractions but is inextricably bound up with decision, passion and with human freedom.

5. The existential introduces a dimension of vitality into thought
which abolishes the rigidity of systems, even Biblical well-intentioned ones, which petrify into sterile irrelevance. As J Wahl stated, it "invites us to a kind of sharpening of subjectivity." 44 Kierkegaard highlights pithily this point in a Journal entry in 1841 when he reflects on the lecture of Schelling he had heard in Berlin:

I am glad to have heard Schelling's second lecture, indescribably glad. I have sighed long enough, and my thoughts have sighed within me. When Schelling mentioned the word Virkelighed (actual daily life) in connection with the relation of philosophy to Virkelighed, thought leaped within me as the babe leaped in Elizabeth... That one word reminded me of all my philosophic sufferings and pains. 45

The existential is concerned with life itself.

6. The existential concentrates on the actuality of the subject, and, as was pointed out in Part I, it is in taking the actuality of the existing subject seriously that freedom manifests itself. This is what Kierkegaard had intended by his dialectics of existence whereby he analysed this actuality. G Malantschuk explains this point by drawing a distinction between Aristotle's concept of tragedy and Kierkegaard's understanding of actuality. In the former, the individual is involved in the hero's tragic situation as he sees it dramatized and is reconciled with actuality. However, for Kierkegaard, this reconciliation is inadequate because it provides no deeper meaning for the existential situation of the spectator. 46 Kierkegaard described his own shift from spectator to actor thus,

I am going to work toward a far more inward relation to Christianity, for up to now I have in a way been completely outside of it while fighting for its truth
like Simon of Cyrene (Luke 23.26). I have carried Christ's cross in a purely external way. 47

Kierkegaard's leap of faith is a leap from possibility to actuality, a "subjective actuality", which H. Diem points out, was related to Christianity as the base. 48

7. The existential is primarily concerned with the nature of believing itself and then about doctrine and the reflections about belief. R. M. Brown stated that it was a pre-reflective starting point which seeks to discover that which is prior even to our union with the world. 49 Jean Wahl maintained that this attempt to delve into thought "prior to reflection, the predictive, to surmount the dichotomy between idealism and realism" leads to a "consciousness of the movement of transcendence which is present in existence itself." 50 In theological parlance we are dealing here with the road to faith and with that which fosters true commitment. The objective schemes of beliefs and epistemology take the existential for granted. The existential is pre-reflective but does not, as so many assume, reject reflection.

There is a difference between the way Heidegger and Kierkegaard formulated the existential. For Heidegger, through the awareness of Dread one understands the general conditions of existence. While for Kierkegaard the Existential is the existential condition of the particular individual, Heidegger's Existential refers to what is characteristic of individuals in general. This has led some to ask whether Heidegger is not delving into essence by his postulation of existentialia and whether such existentialia are congruent with the affirmation of existence. 51
The existential may well form the basis of either Christian commitment or of an atheistic position such as Sartre's. Hector Hawton goes further by alluding to Sartre's "literature of extreme illusions" and points to the scope for fanaticism in the application of the existential to life. 52

However, what is meant here by faith as existential encounter vis-à-vis the divine cannot be reduced to the kind of empty actionalism we have isolated and criticized in Existentialism generally. Faith is not merely self actualization or self transcendence. T.H. Croxall, for example, rejects as a "grave injustice the lumping together of non-Christian existentialism, which the Pope condemned in his Encyclical Humani Generis, with the existential Christianity of Kierkegaard."53 The danger that existential encounter faces, namely of lapsing into unbelief, is quite unavoidable in any open search for truth. It is the risk that faith must take because there are no assurances given except the basis of faith itself. If faith were based on such assurances it would cease to be faith and would become a human achievement.

However, this does not mean that faith is merely a whim or an empty gesture. As it will be shown below, existential Christianity is not empty actionalism since its object is the God (the Absolute Paradox) who is vitally concerned with man and human existence. Hence faith has to grapple with the meaning of the Incarnation because faith grapples with life and existence. All Christianity is existential Christianity because Christianity is grounded in the Christ-event
whereby "the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us." If Christianity ceases to be existential, it destroys faith as ongoing encounter; it closes its eyes to the challenges of contingent experience; it becomes an institutionalized religion and within it faith is reduced to belief in creeds and the pontifications of councils and synods.

The danger of actionalism is only real when faith is removed from its object i.e. when *fides qua creditur* (the faith which is believed) and *fides qua creditur* (the faith by which it is believed) is separated. However, such a separation in existence is impossible. H.V. Martin states it succinctly, "The fides qua creditur... and the fides qua creditur... are as congruous as the human hand in a skin-tight glove." 54 "They cannot be separated in existence" says R.G. Smith, because "existential faith is a unity in relation of the Giver of faith and the believer." 55

The existential dimension is concerned with the actuality of the existing subject who is continually striving and whose *modus vivendi* obtains in vital commitment. Hence while Christian existentialism remains problematic, this dimension of the existential which has in our time been uncovered, has important implications for the understanding of faith which even the most orthodox believer, after he has rejected existentialism, cannot ignore for the Gospel's sake. When applied to Christian self-understanding, (doctrines, creeds and such like), the existential injects new vitality without which Christianity ceases to be understandable or relevant. Paul Tillich makes an incisive comment in this connection which should be quoted in full. He wrote,
A limiting statement must be made about the capability of existentialist thought to answer the questions implied in man's existential predicament. Certainly, there are existentialists who have answered those questions in terms of a special religious tradition and others who have answered them in terms of a special humanistic tradition. But these answers are not derived from their existentialist analyses. They are derived from the cultural or religious traditions out of which they evolved. But if they are answered out of these traditions, they received a new meaning, a new power and a new existential truth.

In the analysis of faith as existential encounter and the nature of this encounter in the thought of Soren Kierkegaard, Rudolph Bultmann, Emil Brunner, Friedrich Gogarten, Paul Tillich, Gerhardt Ebeling and others, the attempt is made to isolate this "existential truth" which can be to Christian theology "a new power". Such an analysis must begin with Kierkegaard not only because he was the first in the modern period to reawaken our attention to the existential but also because he gave to the other theologians under consideration a legacy of thought-forms that appears over and over again in their writings.

2.3 SOREN KIERKEGAARD: FAITH AND BEING CHRISTIAN

Kierkegaard's thinking was shaped by his own struggle for faith, a struggle that gained intensity in the face of a form of Christianity he was deeply alienated from and which, he believed, had made null and void its New Testament heritage. Faith had ceased to be personal
commitment but had become a cultural manifestation ungirded by a theology that was largely triumphalistic because of its idealist, especially Hegelian, moorings. Kierkegaard's views were consciously a polemic against both Hegel's influence and the Christendom of his time. It is against the backdrop of this polemic that his main themes like "the individual", "truth is subjectivity" and "the leap of faith" are best understood.

2.3.1. CONTRA HEGEL'S LOGICAL SYNTHESIS: A THREAT TO FREEDOM AND FAITH

For Kierkegaard, Hegel's universal synthesis constituted the greatest danger to both human freedom and faith. Freedom was endangered because in Hegel's logical, dialectical system the individual had no real place. He represents only a moment in the fulfilment of the whole. Logicality not only distorts the nature of historical "facts" which cannot shed their uncertainty and unpredictability, but also, it fails to grasp the meaning of history because it levels out individual, or rather, personal uniqueness. It has no place for ambiguity and hence excludes inadvertently existence itself for human existence is fundamentally ambiguous. 57 Building an objective system is therefore an abstraction. In his Concluding Unscientific Postscript Kierkegaard argued that Hegel had not broken with Kant's dualism by constructing his "fantastic hypothesis". He wrote,

To answer Kant with a fantastic shadow-play of pure thought is precisely not to answer him. The only thing-in-itself which cannot be thought is existence and this does not come within the province of thought to think. 58
Hegel removes the irrational and, this is his greatest problem because he does not escape the optimism of the Enlightenment. Ultimately his views stand or fall on the basis of his understanding of man, which for Kierkegaard was basically unbiblical because it denies man's contingency and reduces man to a determined function within the whole. The battle between Augustinianism and Pelagianism is a perpetual battle in human history and revolves around this very problem of man's possibilities. Hegel, for Kierkegaard, represents the examplepar excellence of Pelagian optimism, for both make Christianity conform to the world. 59 Kierkegaard insisted, like St Paul had done, that Christianity must be transforming not conforming for therein lies freedom. To use Hegel to understand human freedom, he said, is like using a map of Europe to travel through Denmark where Denmark appears the size of the head of a steel pin. 60

Hegel makes "nonsense" when applied in detail to history. 61 "A philosophy of pure thought is for an existing individual a chimera.".62 With his flair for stating things "tongue-in-cheek", Kierkegaard wrote concerning Hegel's system,

... men are determined to lose themselves in the totality of things, in world history, fascinated and deceived by magic witchery, no one wants to be an individual human being... As particular human beings they fear that they will be doomed to a more isolated and forgotten existence than that of a man in the country; for if a man lets go of Hegel he will not even be in a position to have a letter addressed to him. 63

Hegel's immanentist and logical solution constitutes the greatest
threat to freedom because it trivializes the individual's struggle for authentic existence, which is also the struggle of faith. It reduces human life to a single plain. In a Journal entry in 1844, he stated,

A view which sees life's doubleness (dualism) is higher and deeper than that which seeks unity and pursues studies toward unity (an expression from Hegel...). The passion which saw paganism as sin and assumed eternal torment in hell is greater than the summa summarum of the thoughtlessness (which is dishevelled) which sees everything in immanence. Hegel's negative implications for freedom are inextricably bound with his negative implications for faith. His ultimate synthesis removes the mysterium of faith. Contradictions and anything that provokes reason is explained away and with them also the object of faith, the God-man, is rationalized away. The God-man, Kierkegaard was wont to remind us is, "the greatest mystery (and is absurd... (for) God's eternal being is bounded by the dialectical determination of existence." On the contrary, because the object of faith is a person and not a doctrine, the "absurd" cannot be removed.

If Christianity is reduced in this Hegelian sense, then with the loss of the irrational, doubt is also abolished. Faith becomes blind faith because faith and doubt, although at opposite poles, are manifestations of freedom. "The means," D. E. Roberts succinctly states, "by which we apprehend the historical must have a structure analogous to the historical itself. Faith possesses that character."

It was in this connection that Kierkegaard was at pains to define
the limits of reason. Since "the Absurd" or "the Paradox of the Incarnation" is the object of faith it cannot be derived any more than existence can be deduced. There are no logical certainties that reason can supply nor can the risk be logically removed for then faith itself is abolished. As Kierkegaard descriptively stated it,

When faith begins to feel embarrassed and ashamed, like a young woman for whom her love is no longer sufficient, but who secretly feels ashamed of her lover and must therefore have it established that there is something remarkable about him - when faith thus begins to lose its passion, when faith begins to cease to be faith, then a proof becomes necessary so as to command respect from the side of unbelief...68

Albert Camus' reaction to Kierkegaard on this point should be mentioned at this initial stage of this analysis so that this common objection does not cloud an appreciation of Kierkegaard's idea of faith which follows below. Camus in his Myth of Sisyphus held that Kierkegaard had through a "strained subterfuge" given "the irrational the appearance, and God the attributes, of the absurd" and that for Kierkegaard "since nothing is proved, everything is proved." 69 Camus, however, reacts from his own presupposition that hope has no place in the universe because there is no God. Lescoe rightly points out that "the absence of God is of course a gratuitous assumption on Camus' part." 70 By jettisoning Kierkegaard's presupposition of God, Camus like Sartre is forced to make authentic existence the result of an act of self-realization and he invariably lapses, into empty actionalism.
In Part 1 it was pointed out, how for Kierkegaard, the individual, who by the nature of his being an existing individual, must face the dread and anguish of freedom but that that freedom is authentically manifested when the individual, as Luther said, exists coram deo. The anxiety and dread that accompanies existence (and this does not mean we are unmindful of the positive moods of existence which Bollnow wished to remind us), these negative moods have the propensity to lead us to despair which, left unattended, is sin. However, this sin can be atoned by single-eyed commitment for "purity of heart," said Kierkegaard "is to will one thing." As Roberts states, "For Kierkegaard truth does not lie in trying to show that history as a whole is rationally ordered but at the point where interplay takes place between human freedom and divine freedom." It is in this interplay that faith emerges. In his Training in Christianity he maintains that it is at the level of one's own existence and finitude that one comes to terms with the lowliness of the "one who gives himself out to be God (and) appears to be a low class, poor, suffering and finally impotent man." It is in the Incarnation that there exists the potential for man to recognize his dependence on God and hence to manifest his freedom. God, therefore, is not to be found in a grand metaphysical system but at the point where He touches human existence or He is not to be found at all. Thus contrary to making the subjective experience of the individual all important, as many of Kierkegaard's critics wrongly think, he was in fact attempting to make central to theology, to faith and to human existence and freedom, the Christ-event and the God-man. Therefore, in spite of his criticism of existentialism, the later Barth's Christo-centricism
remains faithful to Kierkegaard's principal thesis.

Faith is not a feeling but a risk of existence. It is that state of wholeness whereby, without closing one's eyes to the dread of existence, one does not give into despair or the "sickness unto death." As B. Reichenbach states, "A thing is qualitatively that by which it is measured, and in the state of wholeness, it is measured by God... whereas despair was before God, faith or wholeness came about before God." 75

2.3.2. CONTRA NOMINAL CHRISTIANITY: A RELIGION WITHOUT FAITH

Kierkegaard's refutation of the institutionalized Christianity of his day was a corollary of his polemic against Hegel. Hegel's thought had had a marked influence on the theology of Europe and his laudatory stance towards the Prussian State did much to confirm the alliance between the state and the Lutheran church in Denmark and other European countries. Kierkegaard considered the pastors of the state church "royal officials" who were paid by the State and had abrogated their calling as outlined in the New Testament. 76 He was not unaware of the need to criticize the prevailing forms of Christianity in order to liberate faith. In his The Point of View he wrote,

The whole of my work as an author is related to Christianity, to the problem of 'becoming a Christian' with direct or indirect polemic against the monstrous illusion we call Christendom or against the illusion that in such a land as ours all are Christians. 77

All Danes by virtue of their birth were Christians and the fact of
their faith made little or no difference to their lifestyles. He complained that the "illusion of a Christian nation..." was "the power which numbers exercise over the imagination." 78 People had become complacent in the fact of their church membership and, as R. Diem pointed out, "A wealth of information about Christianity had caused men to forget what it meant to exist as a Christian." 79 Therefore, Kierkegaard held, "It is easier to become a Christian when I am not a Christian than to become a Christian, when I am one." 80 He complained that his contemporaries' quest for an objective faith had led to Christianity becoming a

little system, if not quite so good as the Hegelian... It is as if Christ were a professor, and as if the Apostles had formed a scientific society. Verily if it was once difficult to become a Christian... it has now become easy. 81

His reaction to the Danish State Church was exemplified in his assessment of Bishop Mynster with whom he had entered into controversy and who had recently died. He wrote,

If only it had been possible to persuade him to end his life with the admission that what he had represented was not really Christianity, but a mitigation of it: that would have been most desirable, for he carried a whole age along with him... Dead without having made the admission, everything is altered; now it merely remains that his preaching hardened Christianity into a deception. 82

Kierkegaard struggles to present a challenge to those who pay lip-service to faith and who rest contented in a religion ex opere operato. He perceived his calling as that of a missionary within Christendom
itself and aimed to "introduce Christianity into Christendom." 83
It is within this context that his views on "the individual," "truth
as subjectivity" and "faith as encounter" must be understood.
Out of this context he can be easily misunderstood. As J Collette
stated, "He fought for the rediscovery of the specificity of a
Christian becoming. His effort is still ours today." 84

2.3.3. FAITH AND THE INDIVIDUAL, EXISTING SUBJECT

For Kierkegaard, more than any relation to a person, thing, race
or even church, to relate oneself to God in faith is the most important
manifestation of freedom. He, therefore, refocuses on the individual
who had been lost either in the logical system (Hegel and dogmatic
systems) or in the crowd (state church and nominal Christendom).
He repeats the view that "the crowd is the lie" because,

... it renders the individual completely impenitent
and irresponsible, or at least reduces his sense
of responsibility by reducing it to a fraction.
Therefore, in Either Or he argued not for "know thyself" but
for "choose thyself". 86 Only thus and not in the crowd can man
understand sin, penitence and responsibility. 87 "The crowd" he
wrote,

is an abstraction and has no hands... none has more
contempt for what it is to be a man than they who
make it their profession to lead the crowd... Therefore
was Christ crucified, because although he addressed
himself to all, he had no dealings with the crowd
because... he would be what he is, the Truth which
relates to the individual. 88
Over against "the abstract; fantastical and impersonal crowd" Kierkegaard seeks to reaffirm human freedom by refocusing on the existing subject, the "flesh and blood individual," as Lescoe says, "not some Platonic form or even a moment in a Hegelian dialectic process." 89

In his Concept of Dread Kierkegaard gives special attention to clarifying his understanding of the existing subject. In Heidegger, man's finitude was the basis by which to grasp the idea of Being but Kierkegaard had placed man's finitude in the context of man's relation with God. Finitude not only is the ground for man to come to terms with his sin but also it is his highest value because it is the basis of his freedom. Temporality, finitude and history are not evil in themselves. On the contrary, history is the sphere of human freedom for salvation is not the escape from temporality like some form of moksha or nirvana. Salvation is grounded in history because it is based on the Incarnation. 91 It is in the awareness of one's finitude that faith becomes possible. Hence existential Christianity is neither supra-historical nor a-historical.

It is only when man takes seriously his finitude which in Part 1 was defined as limited, historical and contingent experience, only then will faith and freedom be possible. As A. Shumukhi argued,

In order to become authentic and truly human, one must first recognize his limits... the aestheticist is indifferent to his limitations... (he) does not choose facticity or himself; facticity chooses him and manipulates him mechanically. The true man, however, consciously chooses his own facticity
and assumes responsibility for it. 92

Existence and the personal reality of the individual are synonymous. The individual does not exist in "empty solitude" and therefore the common charge of solipsism that is levelled at Kierkegaard is ill-founded. "The individual is alone before God" and "in the relation between God as personal being and the believer as personal being, in existence, is to be found the concept of faith." 93

In this connection, Kierkegaard made a statement which taken out of the context of the discussion on faith has been frequently misunderstood. He stated,

God only exists for an existing man i.e. he can only exist in faith. Providence, atonement etc. only exist for an existing individual... Faith is... the anticipation of the eternal which holds the factors together, the cleavages of existence. When an existing individual has not got faith God is not, neither does God exist, although understood from an eternal point of view God is eternally. 94

Kierkegaard is not saying, as many think he is, that God is a subjective experience or that the atonement is not an objective work. Nothing is further from his mind! On the contrary, he takes the objectivity of God, and the atonement as axiomatic but contends that one can only speak of that which one is aware; that God, over and above the catalogues of propositional statements about Him, is only really understood in personal encounter. Even if the universal could be expressed in abstract terms it still remains meaningless unless appropriated by the existing subject. Hence his emphasis on "true in-
wardness" is not an escape into subjectivism but an emphasis on living faith. This is what he meant by "an objective uncertainty held fast in the appropriation process of the most passionate inwardness... the highest truth attainable for an existing individual." 95

Some have criticized this view of Kierkegaard on the ground that the rejection of objectivity leads to the lose of the transcendent. 96 Others, similarly, have argued that subjectivity must presuppose objectivity since a person must know what Christianity is before he can reflect on it. 96 Such views, as we have intimated already, miss the intention of Kierkegaard. He did not deny the need for reflection on doctrine neither did he intend denying the validity of systematic theology but was affirming that no amount of information about Christianity makes commitment or decision any more viable because faith is not logically arrived at and because freedom, like existence, is not a postulate. As F. Nucho stated,

... applied to Christianity, the difference between objectivity and subjectivity is the difference between knowing what Christianity is and being a Christian. Subjectivity, therefore, implies continual striving without which human life disintegrates and man ceases to be a person. 97

Faith is the qualitative mode of being that crosses, say S E Stumpf, "the distinction between time and reality, and between objectivity and subjectivity." 98 For Kierkegaard faith was the mode of being Christian.

These aspects of faith are most vividly presented in Fear and Trembling in his incisive analysis of the faith of Abraham.
2.4. ABRAHAM: TRAGIC HERO OR KNIGHT OF FAITH?

Kierkegaard's choice of this story to expound on faith was not an arbitrary one. Hegel also had used the example of Abraham to illustrate that the drastic break from native cultural and natural ties is achieved in order to produce a new beginning; in Abraham's case, the beginning of Judaism. 99 Hegel had placed the story in socio-cultural and historical terms. Kierkegaard believed that the story of Abraham could only be grasped if it was set in existential terms since therein lay the clues to understanding the nature of faith.

1. Abraham's particular relationship with God dispenses with any form of mediation (community, state, tradition and such like) and as individual he sustains as absolute relation with the Absolute. The knight of faith has the power to concentrate the whole of life and the whole significance of life in one single wish; 100 to concentrate the whole result of the operations of thought in one act of consciousness. 101 He is not like the capitalist who spreads his investments so that if he loses on the one he will gain on another. Abraham's is courageous belief because he "believes for his life"; 102 he makes faith everything, which is what it is. 103

The courage of faith is paradoxical because in faith the individual is higher than the universal since his relation to the universal is determined by his relation to the Absolute which is greater than the universal. It is paradoxical because in faith meaning is grasped "by virtue of the Absurd." 104 Croxall suggests that "I Kraft af"
should rather be translated "on the authority" instead of "by virtue of" since it points to the authority of action. Believing by the authority of the Absurd is for Kierkegaard a radical fulfilment of Luke 14:26, "If any man cometh unto me and hateth not his father and mother and wife and children and brethren and sisters, yea, his own life also, he cannot be my disciple." "This is a hard saying" says Kierkegaard, "who can bear to hear it? For this reason it is heard very seldom." He complains that by "distasteful exegesis" the radicality of Christian commitment is explained away by Christendom. He wrote of the choice facing the Christian thus,

Either there is an absolute duty toward God, or if so, it is the paradox here described, that the individual as individual is higher than the universal and, as the individual, stands in absolute relation to the absolute or else faith never existed or to put it differently, Abraham is lost.

Here is the fundamental difference between Abraham, the knight of faith, and the tragic hero. The tragic hero sacrifices himself and all that he has for the universal whereas Abraham does nothing for the universal but stands in absolute relation to the Absolute. Hence Abraham was justified in keeping silent about his purpose before Sarah, Eleazer and Isaac. The tragic hero, on the other hand, is revealed and in this self-revelation is "the beloved son of ethics." He does not know "the distress" nor the terrible responsibility of solitude.

2. Abraham resigns infinitely to God's will whereas mediation in Hegel was supposed to explain everything. Every movement of infinity
comes about by passion and no amount of reflection can bring it about. "What our age lacks" said Kierkegaard, "is not reflection but passion." \[1\]

He explains what the infinite resignation of faith is by the allusion to learning how to swim. When a learner is suspended by a swimming belt he makes the motions of swimming but he is not swimming until when thrown into the water, he starts making the movements of infinity since his life depends on them. Faith does the opposite, after having made the movements of infinity, it makes those of finiteness. \[112\]

Therefore, anyone who thinks that he can reasonably deduce faith or that the story of Abraham will move him to believe, deceives himself and "wants to swindle God out of the first movement of faith, the infinite resignation." \[113\] The infinite resignation is the last stage prior to faith and only in this stage is one aware of one's eternal validity and only then can there be any question of grasping existence by virtue of faith. \[114\]

Furthermore, the knight of faith does not annul his resignation but preserves his love just as young as it was in its first movement. He never lets it go from him, precisely because he makes the movements infinitely. \[115\] Hence faith cannot lapse into blind faith or belief because it remains ongoing encounter with God.

3. There is a double-movement of the Spirit by which after the infinite resignation the knight of faith lives in the finite but in encounter
with God.

The tragic hero gave up his wish in order to accomplish his duty. For the knight of faith, wish and duty are also identical, but he gives up both. The tragic hero knows no absolute duty although he has a sense of a higher duty. There is, however, a continuity between the "is" and the "ought" even if that continuity is perceived antithetically i.e. between wish and moral duty. The knight of faith, on the other hand, makes the movement of faith in the authority of the absurd. Without passion of one's soul and all one's heart one cannot reach infinite resignation and, therefore, cannot reach faith.

In Abraham the double-movement of the spirit is most clearly evident when Abraham broke his silence to answer Isaac, "God will provide Himself the lamb of the burnt offering, my son." The double movement took place in his soul: the infinite resignation and the movement of faith. 116

4. The fearful teleological suspension of the ethical is exemplified in Abraham's faith. If the ethical telos means as in Hegel that man can transcend himself by abandoning himself in the universal, then Kierkegaard argues that Abraham becomes a murderer. 117 However, Abraham who stands in absolute relation to the Absolute is higher than the universal.

The difference between the tragic hero and the knight of faith is here again clearly evident. The tragic hero remains within the ethical
while Abraham suspended the ethical because he possessed a higher telos. 118 While Agamemnon, the tragic hero, has need of tears and claims them, one cannot weep over Abraham: "One approaches him with horror religiosus, as Israel approached Mt Sinai." 119 Therefore, Abraham cannot be a tragic hero; he is either a murderer or a believer. 120 Abraham was the knight of faith because while "the tragic hero apprehended a higher expression of duty, Abraham apprehended an absolute duty." 121

Hence, Abraham needed no "panegyric to console him" for he "didst gain all and didst retain Isaac." 122 The paradox of faith is that in staking all, one gains all. Faith is not an aesthetic or ethical impulse because its presupposition is resignation. Neither is it an instinct of the heart but obtains in the paradox of life and existence. The structure of existence is analogous to the structure of faith which is also analogous to the object of faith, the God-man. To remove the paradox or to reduce logically existence to a continuum of predictability or a rational whole which does violence existence itself and to God. Faith is ultimately distorted. The call to faith, therefore, is a call to live authentically i.e. to live fully human. In Part I we have described this living as taking seriously the contingency of reality and the historicity of man. The existential, must not be reduced again to an ontological a priori like the later Existentialists have done, but must remain as Kierkegaard intended it, the description of the vital and dynamic modus vivendi of the man of faith.
Some of the main criticisms of Kierkegaard's position must now be addressed since very similar criticisms can be leveled at Christian faith in general. An evaluation of these criticisms will permit easier discussion of other descriptions below of existential faith and will obviate the need to examine these criticisms in each instance.

1. There is the general criticism from non-theistic and atheistic quarters which reject any attempt to view man's salvation in the realm of faith. Camus' objection, for example, has been already mentioned. Herbert Marcuse, also, argued that Kierkegaard held to a content that could no longer take religious form. In Kierkegaard, he claims, the truth "gets separated from the social and political vortex in which it belongs." He points to Feuerbach's perception that Kierkegaard failed to see that the human content of religion can be preserved only by abandoning the religious, other-worldly, forms. "The realization of religion requires its negation." This criticism is a criticism of religion in general and is based on certain presuppositions that are problematic. The problem with reducing religion to a social function and the danger of operationalism have been amply stated already. This view is based on the gratuitous belief that God cannot exist. The burden of providing convincing proof for God cannot be placed on Kierkegaard who vis-à-vis philosophical and theological attempts to provide such proof, pointed out that faith obtains in taking human existence seriously and that there
cannot be proof in the natural "scientific" sense. If human existence cannot be forced into the Procrustean bed of logic, then neither can God nor faith, which are inextricably bound with existence, be restricted in this way.

Kierkegaard, however, made a most important point which these critics have failed to grasp. He struggled to clarify that even after proof of the miraculous or the Absurd is provided, such a "discovery" will not matter a jot to a person until he confronts it and appropriates it for himself. A rational explanation or public demonstration of divinity will not convince man. That conviction must be the result of his own encounter with truth. Hence Kierkegaard spoke of God existing for the existing man. Only such an encounter will preserve faith from the danger of actionalism, because faith does not derive the transcendent from existence, as Karl Jaspers tends to do, neither does faith or the object of faith become the self-actualizing or self-transcending act of the individual. The object of faith is the God-man who identifies with man in history and, whatever else men think of Christ, they cannot wish him away from time and history.

2. A general criticism of Kierkegaard is that in his thinking, individualism turns into "the most emphatic absolutism." 125 Walter Kaufman claims that Kierkegaard "tried to introduce the individual into our thinking as a category." 126 J von Rintelen maintained that this individualism "closes the door to authentic metaphysical transcendence wherein hope and the wholeness of the
person lie." 127 Mackintosh, also, held that Kierkegaard "induces distortions of belief so violent and perverse as gravely to imperil our hold on the New Testament conception of God... of the life His children are called to lead... his individualism is of so extreme a type as largely to disqualify him from understanding actual religion."

All these reactions that perceive Kierkegaard's refocusing on the individual as "individualism" or "isolationism" misconstrue his intention and fail to understand him against the background of the Hegelian hold on theology and the nominal complacency of Christians. They do not grasp his concern to restore the vitality and dynamism of Christian faith. If this central intention is missed one can accuse Kierkegaard of a host of inadequacies and omissions which he had no intention of denying in any case.

Any refocusing on the individual always must run the risk of this kind of misunderstanding and Kierkegaard was not unaware of this danger. While he emphasized the uniqueness of each existing subject, the differences between people, he was careful to point out,

... hang on the individual loosely, like the cape the king casts off to reveal himself, loosely like the ragged cloak in which a supernatural being has concealed itself. When the differences hang this loosely then that essential other is always glimpsed in every individual, that common to all, that eternal resemblance, that equality. 129

Kierkegaard does not emphasize the individual for its own sake but in order to highlight the fact that faith is a personal and individual encounter with the divine. P. Roubiczek pointed out that it is only
when truth is discovered from the inside, when we learn inwardness, that love can be commanded. Only then are men set free to live for each other. This is a far cry from individualism!

Kierkegaard understood his own work as maieutic in that he aimed to make men aware of who they are and what their significance and value was. A. Shumpili reminds us that Kierkegaard addressed himself to the educators and the clergy attempting to highlight the need for this maieutic; "an indirect communication... intensifying the learner's subjectivity." According to Kierkegaard, Christian society is "the conditio sine qua non of Christianity, and no man can be simultaneously a Christian and a hermit." Those who accuse Kierkegaard of individualism and isolationism fail to see that only by a maieutic approach whereby individual man achieves authenticity that the problem of solipism and alienation can be solved. In his Works of Love, Kierkegaard's concern for the whole of society is clearly indicated.

In this connection, D. E. Roberts maintains that "the acid test" of existential Christianity is its ecclesiology. This is true but, be that as it may, what is equally true and even more fundamental is that unless the individual can extricate himself from natural, historical, traditional or cultural ties and unless one's commitment to Christ is the most important relation, the unity and catholicity of the church is endangered. Hence L Dupré argued that Kierkegaard's emphasis could serve an important ecumenical purpose within, for example, the Roman Catholic Church. He thinks that Kierkegaard's
insights have the potential of highlighting the fact that Christianity is not a social institution but a matter of individual commitment. 135

3. An equally unfounded criticism levelled against Kierkegaard is that he is anti-rationalist. Marcuse maintains that his attack on the abstract led him "to assail certain universal concepts that uphold the essential equality and dignity of man." 136 Kaufman thinks that Kierkegaard "renounces clear and distinct thinking altogether." He cites as "proof" of his claim Kierkegaard's statements such as "The conclusions of passions are the only epigrams" and "What our age lacks is not reflection but passion." 137 He states, "Reason alone, to be sure, cannot solve some of life's most central problems. Does it follow that passion can, or that reason ought to be abandoned altogether?" 138

Again Kierkegaard's critics fail to grapple with the essentials of his thought. It is far removed from the truth that if one states that faith cannot be derived logically or that in the face of the Absurd, reason is impotent, that it in fact means that one is anti-rationalist. On the contrary, he held great respect for Socrates and claimed that Religiousness A "which is based on reason" prepares the way for Religiousness B "which is wholly of faith." However, he pointed out that Socrates also did not first get proofs of the immortality of the soul so that he could live on the strength of such proofs but, on the contrary, "he said that the possibility of there being an immortality occupies me to such a degree that I unquestionably stake my whole life upon it." 139 No one, however,
would claim that Socrates was anti-rationalist!

Kierkegaard's concern to limit reason was only to temper the wild claim for reason that Hegel and his contemporaries had made which invariably debunked the individual. In this connection, Kierkegaard rued having criticized Socrates in this M.A. thesis. He wrote,

Influenced as I was by Hegel and the moderns, without maturity enough to grasp what is great, I could not help in one place in my thesis indicating it as a defect in Socrates that he had no eye for totality, but only treated individuals as separate entities. O what a Hegelian fool I was! This is precisely the great proof of how great an ethicist Socrates was. 140

It is strangely ironical that what his critics accuse him of today, he in fact had criticised Socrates of, but had come to see the folly of it.

This point brings us to an important awareness that Kierkegaard himself was mindful of. He knew that his emphasis on faith would invariably lead to an imbalance but he proceeded fully aware of the danger because he was convinced that the situation in which he found himself was already greatly balanced. His critics should take heed of his remark in Concluding Unscientific Postscript: "I am well aware that every human being is more or less onesided and I do not regard it as a fault... but the onesidedness of the intellectual creates the illusion of having everything." 141 Hence L. Mackey quite rightly stated,

The fact remains that Kierkegaard's Christianity is imbalanced and excessive. And the fact, still outstanding, is that Kierkegaard knew it and meant
it that way. Training in Christianity, Fear and Trembling, the Fragments, the Postscripts and all the rest were but 'correctives' recommended to the complacent debility of the present age. 142

"Good God", wrote Kierkegaard, "What is easier for one who has first given the corrective to go on and add the complimentary aspect?". 143 Adding this "complimentary aspect" is the ongoing task of theology. Kierkegaard did not trivialize the theological task but was preoccupied with the more pressing task of reinforcing faith in order to restore the balance. "He intentionally and purposely overemphasized the role of faith," says Lescoe, "in order to compensate for Hegel's overemphasis of the function and importance of reason." 144 His central aim was to show the austerity of believing and the seriousness of faith.

4. A criticism levelled at Kierkegaard and the existentialists in general, is that they are a-historical. It is conceivable how their emphasis on transcendence and the self-transcending act may minimize the relevance of history for the existing subject. However, if that act is placed within context of Christian faith then it is an act rooted in history. If the object of faith is the God-man, then a historical rooting is an a priori of existential Christianity. With such faith goes both reflection on the Scriptures and the significance of the Christ-event (a wholly historical event), and the history of the interpretation of those scriptures which has already spanned almost two thousand years.

D. E. Roberts maintains, however, that Kierkegaard has failed to clarify
the relation between faith and history. However, Kierkegaard wished to point out that the bare facts of history cannot stand alone; that they have meaning in so far as the existing subject grasps them. The bridging of faith and history has been the central aim of all hermeneutics. The bridging is ultimately fulfilled in the existential encounter with Christ; that is, in faith. In other words, historical facts do not stand alone as inanimate objects do. Understanding history ultimately means the apprehension of those facts which involves a decision being about them.

Kierkegaard addressed this problem when he referred to Lessing's doubt whether one can base faith upon the accidental truths of history. For him, this "historical" basis was the Incarnation. But to the question whether this historical fact is certain, he answers, 

...even though it were the most certain of all historical facts, it would be of no help, there cannot be any direct transition from an historical fact to the foundation upon it of an eternal happiness. That is something qualitatively new.

The underlying aim of his thought was to highlight the importance of the most important decision about history in history: "I choose; that historical fact means so much to me that I decide to stake my whole life upon that if... without risk faith is an impossibility." The aesthete who stands aloof from existence and who insists on that aloofness in the name of "objectivity" will find this understanding of historical rootedness a scandal because he will claim that one can be deluded into believing that this is of God. Not so, thinks Kierkegaard, if the choice is made in the midst of existence; a
choice that calls the whole person into question because it is made with the whole life. The fault of our age, he said, is that it does not "grieve deeply enough" in order to understand the choice of freedom. Hence its joy is superficial. 148 "At the hour of death", however, "most people choose the right thing." 149

Wahl, furthermore, questions whether Kierkegaard ultimately does not remove the scandal when he claims that for those who see the truth, the Paradox vanishes. 150 Is Kierkegaard, therefore, not rationalizing the Paradox away? On the contrary, what Kierkegaard said was that from the vantage point of "the dialectic of belief", in encounter with the Absurd in faith, the apparent contradictions, not the Paradox, are removed. To remove the Paradox would mean that faith will be distorted. Hence he wrote, "When the believer believes, the Absurd is not the Absurd - faith transforms it; but in every weak moment, to him it is again more or less the Absurd."...151

5. Another criticism of Kierkegaard is that he reduces the content of religion to a minimum. Alisdair MacIntyre, for example, asks what difference does it make to be Christian, to be before God inwardly, since the knight of faith outwardly appears according to Kierkegaard, as if he were a tax-collector. The bareness of Kierkegaard's response, he claims, allows for easy secularization of his main thesis. 152 Matthew Spinka, similarly, argued that the revelation of God in Christ ought to have been given greater weight. He thinks that Kierkegaard's emphasis on the transcendence of God endangers the Christian doctrine of man as the image of God and that Kierkegaard fosters a distortion
of Christianity as serious as the one he fought against. 153

Again, one must be reminded of Kierkegaard's central purpose which was not to work out a systematic theology but to highlight the basis of theology; a living, dynamic faith. As Croxall stated,

> There are those who may wish Kierkegaard had concerned himself more with questions of orthodox dogma, all of which, in the Chalcedonian sense, he accepts without demur. But he saw how easy it is to get bogged down in dogma and miss life. 154

He wished to restore a dimension to doctrine that had become obsolete. Contrary to what MacIntyre intimates, namely, that the knight of faith goes on as before, Kierkegaard intended, as we observed in Fear and Trembling, to highlight the fact that in the knight of faith, while the external change may not be perceptible, the internal change is total. Faith means the transformation of the person's disposition to life. In Pauline language, he is in the world but he is no more of the world. The knight of faith "walks in newness of life" (Rom. 6:4); the "old man" he was in Adam is crucified with Christ (Rom. 6:3; Hence Blackham describes Kierkegaard's call as "the revivalist's call to repentance (and) turning to Christ for salvation, the gift of faith, new birth and the life of grace." 155 To criticize Kierkegaard from what he did not say is an inadmissible argument from silence.

What these critics fail to remember is that Kierkegaard did not primarily set out to achieve a fool proof metaphysic of belief for he claimed that such a superstructure was not only impossible but also undermined
faith itself. As Stumpf states, "What Kierkegaard wanted to underscore was that when a person has knowledge, he is still in the predicament of having to make a decision." 156

Kierkegaard was concerned with a pre-reflective question, namely, the nature of believing itself: the struggle of faith. Christianity had become contented only with the result of faith, that is, doctrines and confessions. He complained that,

People are curious about the result, as they are about the result in a book - they want to know nothing about dread, distress, the paradox. They flirt aesthetically with the result, it comes just as unexpectedly but also just as easily as a prize in the lottery; and when they have heard the result they are edified. 157

This easy going acceptance of doctrine or "the end" he likened to the "pillaging of the hold," an act worst than Judas' betrayal.

Kierkegaard did not intend to trivialize theological reflection or any of the doctrines of the church. 158 He wished to remind Christians that before one can proceed with theology and critical reflection, there is the struggle of faith itself and that this struggle is an ongoing one which keeps theology from lapsing into a fixed and static system. 159 To ignore this struggle and only to rest in the end of the struggle is like exalting only in the fact that in the end Isaac was saved and forgetting the deep struggle of faith that Abraham experienced long before that happy end and without any assurances of such an end. 160 The struggle must always be brought into focus or else,
One mounts a winged horse, the same instant one is at Mount Moriah, the same instant one sees the ram; one forgets that Abraham, rode only an ass, which walks slowly along the road, that he had a journey of three days, that he needed some time to cleave the wood, to bind Isaac and to sharpen the knife. 161

Faith, therefore, is not the end of the struggle but the beginning. It is not a completion but a commencement. Only in view of the struggle of faith will the existing in faith remain an ongoing and vital becoming. The knight of faith does not remain standing in faith but is on the move, the most important factor we have argued in Part 1 that will ensure his freedom, for freedom it has been argued, obtains in the ongoing quest for authentic existence. Freedom is endemic to being human but only manifests itself and remains authentic in continual affirmation; in the ongoing quest which is commensurate with his changing experience of reality. Faith as encounter spurs that movement on. It does not retreat into an ecclesiastical or theological cocoon. The knight of faith is always on the move and does not remain standing. "He would be offended," says Kierkegaard, ...

... if anyone were to say this of him, just as the lover would be indignant if one said that he remained standing in love, for he would reply, 'I do not remain standing at love, my whole life is this.' 162

This is the dynamic of Christian faith! This dynamic will be further enquired into in the study that follows of some theologians of our century who have been influenced by Kierkegaard and who have also attempted to clarify the nature of faith as ongoing encounter. In our attempt to place Kierkegaard in his historical setting and to
show why many of his critics have missed his intention, we have not intended to imply that Kierkegaard himself was free of a constitutive model. His assertion of the subject-object scheme, his view of the Absolute and the Paradox, are all part of such a model. As soon as one verbalizes a standpoint one invariably sets up such a model which itself must be continually questioned or else will also become a fixed theoretical framework. What Kierkegaard's model does not take sufficient notice of (and this is understandable within his own historical situation) is the encounter with one's fellow man. This dimension is given its rightful place in the encounter of faith for example, in the theologies of Ebeling and Gogarten which we shall later observe. This dimension of "the other", which Kierkegaard ignores, is indispensible for the ongoing, critical nature of theology which will concern us in Part III.

2.4 RUDOLPH BULTMANN: FAITH AND AUTHENTIC EXISTENCE

2.4.1. FAITH AND EXISTENCE

It has been intimated already that the problem with "Christian" existentialism is that its existentialist presuppositions, based on the presuppositions of Heidegger's philosophy in Bultmann's case, become the basis for reading the Bible. It attempts to understand, in our times, the Biblical message of the life, death and Resurrection of Christ whose elements of the miraculous and the mystical are disallowed by the functionalistic and Positivistic spirit of our age. Yet, as was stated already, in the attempt to make the message
of the Bible more accessible to our age; it imposes on the Biblical
texts a world-view quite foreign to it. This was the raison d'être
of Bultmann's demythologization programme.

Nevertheless, the hermeneutics of Bultmann remains highly problematic
(cf. 2.2.2) and the so-called "New quest for the historical Jesus"
is an attempt to redress the deficiencies of the approach. The
"theologians of hope," Wolfhart Pannenberg and Jürgen Moltmann,
in their attempt to understand the nature of revelation and provide
a greater historical rootedness for the Gospel, go even beyond the
new questors by offering a historical paradigm with which to understand
revelation. All these attempts vis-à-vis traditional Christianity
have problems of their own. The dynamic nature of theology demands
that the constitution and reconstitution continues and that the
questioning and being questioned by new perspectives be insisted
upon.

Regarding Bultmann, Tillich and others whose theologies will be referred
to below, it should be noted that the varying degrees of influence
that existentialism has had on them has to varying extents also in-
fluenced their understanding of God, scripture, Christology and other
doctrines, the results of which are not always free of problems.
However, as it will be stated in Part III, this very fact that
theologies do stand in controversial relation to each other demands
that theology remains an ongoing critical discipline.

However, an analysis of their understanding of these doctrines does
not fall within the scope of this study. What is of lasting value in their work, and which can make an important contribution even to the most rigid orthodoxy, is their grappling with the existential and their understanding of Christian faith and commitment. This dimension when applied to even the more conservative Christian understanding of life and doctrine infuses into them a new vitality and dynamism. Christianity ceases to be existential (not existentialist!) if it loses its ability to communicate life to man. Theology then petrifies into one or other confessional or denominational stance. (cf. part III).

Bultmann was aware of his use of the existentialist's perception and the concomitant problems his own theology faced. He wrote,

Some critics have objected that I am borrowing Heidegger's categories and forcing them upon the New Testament. I am afraid this only shows that they are blinding their eyes to the real problem, which is that the philosophers are saying the same thing as the New Testament and saying it quite independently. 163

Bultmann is quite right in so far as he applies the existential to the life of faith. The criticism of his theology still holds true for his hermeneutical method. For example, when he interprets the Resurrection existentially, an important task for all Christian proclamation, but functions on the premise that such an event was mythological because the idea of Resurrection is "scientifically" impossible. His method at this point restricts his answer and in the process says more than is permissible.

Pure existentialism does not take the relation between man and God
into consideration at all. But this, for Bultmann, is its merit because,

it is just this procedure which gives that analysis its freedom... an aspect of Being is thereby expressed which faith, but only faith, understands as the relatedness of men to God. 164

In so far as existentialism or any philosophical analysis highlights man's predicament, even though they remain neutral and may not provide the answers, they do formulate and accentuate the questions that are put to man. They assist the Christian answers to be meaningfully put because it is not as if Christian proclamation proceeds with dispensing answers without taking cognizance of the questions besetting man. Furthermore, such a view does not exclude the fact that the Bible also puts questions to man. But since the God of the Bible is the God that identifies with human existence, the questions that the Bible puts and those that derive from an open analysis of existence itself, do not contradict each other. Hence while Bultmann's demythologization programme is undoubtedly problematic for the same reasons that we criticised Hegelian or Positivistic attempts at absolutization of methodology, one should not rule out that which is of lasting value in his thought; namely, the understanding of the life of faith as authentic existence.

Helmut Thielicke's alarm about Bultmann's position should therefore be cautioned. He wrote that Bultmann,

is compelled to carry the method he has chosen - namely, that of secular philosophy - to its logical conclusion... Whenever a non-Biblical principle from contemporary secular thought is applied to
the interpretation of the Bible, the Bible's faculta
sem ipsum interpretandi is violated, with fatal
results. This is what happened in Kant's philosophy
and again in theological idealism. It is happening
with Bultmann too. 165

Thielicke's concern is applicable in the sphere of hermeneutics but
his kind of caution and disjunction between theology and philosophy
misses out Bultmann's perception of the dynamics of faith.

Austin Farrar maintained that "In so far as existentialism opens
and enlarges vision, what can we do but welcome it? But when it
is used to set up arbitrary limits to the scope of our thought we
have every reason to suspect and hate it." 166 In so far as he rejects
methodological absolutization we can only agree with him. However,
he too rejects Bultmann's theology at the very point at which it
can make its greatest contribution to Christianity and thinking at
large, namely in its implications for faith. Hence one cannot agree
with his next remark that an example of "arbitrary" limiting of
thought is its fixing of "the narrow model of personal encounter
on the whole form of our relation with the creator..." 167 It is
at this point at which Austin Farrar thinks that Bultmann's view
is at its narrowest, that it is in fact at its broadest.

It is unfortunate that in the controversies surrounding "demytholo-
gization" the theological spotlight fell only on the problem of
hermeneutics. This is evident in the writings of Ernst Kinder, Walter
Künneiith, A Oepke, Gerhard Gloege, and Hans Inwand amongst others. 168

Even Karl Jaspers and Karl Barth reacted to Bultmann mainly on the
issue of hermeneutics. Jaspers argued that,
Kierkegaard and Bultmann posit a doctrine intended to counteract a false rationalism which unwittingly provides the believer with a means to persevere in his faith with good conscience, at the price of violence to his reason. 169

However, whatever the problems one may have with demythologization, Jaspers, says Bartsch, fails to see that it was the result of a deep concern for the church's preaching. 170 Bultmann demythologized in order to prevent faith being based on human achievement; that is, where faith becomes based on the proof of the miraculous or faith becomes blind faith and the intellect is sacrificed. 171 However, even if we go beyond Bultmann and retain the miraculous and the Resurrection, such a message has still to be communicated and this primarily involves not a historical or cosmological question but an existential one. 172

Karl Barth in his assessment of Bultmann asks whether the "New Testament's affirmations about God's saving act and about man being in Christ are statements about man's subjective experience?"
He continues,

Is this not reversing the New Testament?... The New Testament, however, focuses, corrects and radicalizes this knowledge of man before faith. It tells him not only that he is inauthentic and fallen, but that he is powerless to extricate himself from his plight. 173

There is no need to argue which comes first, the awareness of need and then the Christian answer or the awakening of the need by the Christian witness before its answer may be given. It is quite possible that man becomes aware of such a need long before he is aware of
Christ in as much as it is possible that the exposure to the Christian proclamation brings consciousness of such a need. Barth's view does not take into consideration people in other religions who, in their sincere search within those religious persuasions, eventually are led to Christ. Their previous striving was the preparatio evangelica. Furthermore, Bultmann would have no quarrel with Barth that man is "powerless to extricate himself from his plight" since nowhere does he reject grace or perceive of faith as not being a gift of God. (cf. below).

Bultmann's contribution is best gleaned vis-à-vis his central intention which was as F. Schumann pointed out,

...to interpret the gospel, and the gospel is not an analysis of the formal structure of human life or of the universe, but the proclamation of event and encounter: God is present in Jesus Christ. 174

We might even claim, says Bartsch, that Bultmann was trying to "prevent the Barmen Declaration from hardening into a doctrinal proposition, so that all that was necessary was to give it formal assent." 175

Bultmann's interpretation of the creed, he claims, lays emphasis on the "'credo' - 'I believe' as Karl Barth taught us to do." 176 Bultmann stated it thus,

The man who wishes to believe God as his God must realize that he has nothing in his hand on which to base his faith. He is suspended in mid-air and cannot demand a proof of the Word addresses him. 177

It was over the issue of faith as gift, the work of grace, that Bultmann ultimately differs with existentialism and maintained a critical distance.
He wrote, "This is where we part company. The New Testament affirms the total incapacity of man to release himself from the fallen state..." Elsewhere he states, here then is the crucial distinction between the New Testament and existentialism, between Christian faith and the natural understanding of Being. The New Testament speaks and faith knows of an act of God through which man becomes capable of self-commitment, capable of faith and love and of authentic existence.

In the New Testament there are two series of statements concerning revelation. Bultmann categorizes the first series as that which deals with the revealing of Christ and of life. The second series reveal the Word of faith and proclamation. In the first series revelation is presented as an occurrence and not primarily as a communication of knowledge, while in the second, this occurrence is not placed outside of us but is present in proclamation. Bultmann attempts to rescue revelation from purely epistemological terms by describing revelation as an happening which "encounters man in the world." Outside of faith revelation is not visible. This does not, as many think, deny the objectivity of revelation. It is merely stating that it is only in faith that the object is disclosed and therefore faith itself belongs to revelation.

The Bible has an existential impact on one in a double-sense. It not only shows one a possible way of understanding one's existence which may be accepted or rejected. More than that "it assumes the shape of a word that addresses me personally... something which !
cannot anticipate or take into account as a systematic principle for my exposition," says Bultmann; that in traditional language is "the work of the Holy Spirit." 184

It should be remembered also that Bultmann was reacting to the liberals like von Harnack of the nineteenth century and the History of Religions school which had reduced the Christian message to certain timeless truths and had jettisoned history altogether. Bultmann attempted to reaffirm the historic Christ-event "through which God has wrought man's redemption because his person is what the New Testament proclaims as the decisive event of redemption." 185 "Redeemed" existence, "authentic existence" and "the life of faith" are all synonyms. These must now be more carefully studied.

2.4.2 FAITH AND AUTHENTICITY

The life of faith is authentic life and means the abandonment of all self-centred security. This in Pauline language is the life of the Spirit. The opposite is the "life in the flesh" (Phil. 3:3f) which Bultmann describes as "the sphere of visible, concrete, tangible and measurable reality, the sphere of corruption and death" wherein man is weighed down by anxiety (μεταμφωκα, 1 Cor. 7:32ff; Rom. 8:6). Life in the flesh is a transitory sphere, anxiety ridden and within it security can only be achieved at the other's expense. 186 Unlike the "spiritual man", the "natural man" places his confidence in the flesh (Phil. 3:3f). 187

There are two ways in which man can relate to the world; either
he "loses" himself in the world and identifies himself in the sphere of the flesh or he preserves an inner distance from the world by remaining open to the future. Thus the choice facing man is that of inauthenticity in the world or freedom from the world. This choice, man as to face by virtue of his being a uniquely historical being whose historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) is either authentic or inauthentic. As Schubert Ogden states it,

To be man is to be continually confronted with decision, which is posed by one's present encounters with other persons and with destiny, whether to lose oneself in the past constituted by one's inner and outer world or rather to become the new future self that is always being offered one to become. 188

To live according to the flesh (κατὰ σώμα) is to adopt the attitude and conduct that is directed to the sphere of the flesh from which it takes its norm. 189 Man becomes the slave of that very sphere he had hoped to master because "the flesh" becomes a power over him. 190

Life in the flesh is also described as life under the Law (Gal. 3:23). Inauthentic existence manifests itself when obedience to the Law is changed into an accomplishment and, as the Jews had misused the Law, it became a means of self-glory and boasting. Therefore, stated Bultmann, "The primal sin is not an inferior morality, but rather the understanding of oneself in terms of oneself and the attempt to secure one's existence... by means of one's own accomplishments..." (cf. 11 Cor. 11:18). 191
To be in Christ, said Paul, is to be "a new creature" and "to be in the Spirit" means to exist in a "new mode of being". Sin for Paul and John is not merely moral attitude but is, 

...the basic attitude of natural man who cannot bear to live in uncertainty before God, but longs to secure his existence and endeavours to create such security... Sin is to want to live out of one's self, out of one's own power, rather than out of radical surrender to God, to what he demands... 192

Being a "self" is what being a man means but being a creature leads one to exist by and for himself (superbia). 193 Freedom manifests itself in the ongoing affirmation of authentic existence and, even in the mode of inauthentic existence, the self cannot be entirely lost. Bultmann's Glauben und Verstehen argues that even in its inauthentic freedom, the self remains free to some extent because "it itself in its authentic freedom and responsibility is the only ultimate cause or explanation of its own inauthenticity." 194

In the transition from Law to Grace, a new understanding of one's self takes place. It is not a mental development but "is decision in regard to the grace which encounters man in the proclaimed." 195

In this connection, Bultmann maintained that Heidegger's ontological analysis "can be fructified by Kierkegaard's explicitly Christian understanding of man without Heidegger thereby becoming a theologian or Kierkegaard turning out to be a philosopher." 196

In contradistinction to inauthentic 'life in the flesh', the life
of faith means the abandoned of self-contrived security for "this life must have faith in the grace of God, faith that the unseen, intangible reality actually confronts us as love, opening up our future and signifying not death but life." 197 This faith invariably places the Law and the world in its proper perspective. Because faith is based on justification by grace and not on "works lest man should boast", faith frees man from the world. It restores to the world its proper autonomy as the "field of man's labours." The life of faith places the believer in a paradoxical relation to the world and the world-view of modern science since he lives in the world but is not of the world. He relates with the world "\( \omega \mu \eta \)." 198

Hence for Paul and John the life of faith is not a static state but a dynamic movement in the dialectical tension of "is" and "not yet." 199 Bultmann describes this as a tension between the indicative and the imperative.

To exist as a Christian means to live in freedom, a freedom in which the believer is brought by the divine grace which appeared in Christ. The one justified by faith is set free from his past, from his sin, from himself. And he is set free for a real historical life in free decisions. This is made clear by the fact that the demands of God are summed up in the commandment of love... which does not consist in formulated statements. 200

This Pauline description of the life of faith finds a counterpart
in John's thought where the life of faith is described as eschatological existence. John applies the indicative - imperative paradigm to explain the believers liberation from sinning and the constant temptation he faces even after such a liberation. The tension obtains in the fact that the believer does not sin (1 John 3:9; 5:18) yet the equally true statement that "If we say we have no sin we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us." (1 John 1:8). John believes that freedom from sin is an ongoing tension and the apparent contradiction between the statements form a paradoxical unity in the life of faith. The tension is unavoidable. On the one hand, it maintains a "radical consciousness of being a sinner" and on the other hand, prevents the life of faith from lapsing into any false security. 201. This is what Luther had meant by justificati in spe, peccatores in re.

2.4.3. FAITH AS ONGOING EXISTENTIAL ENCOUNTER

Julius Schniewind and the majority of Bultmann's critics accuse him of ignoring the connection between faith and the historical event of the death and resurrection of Christ. Bultmann's answers to this criticism highlight his understanding of faith as encounter.

To ignore the connection between faith and history in this way, he points out, would lead to the surrendering of the kerygma and that was not his intention. 202 What he was concerned with was the "permanent historic significance of the cross", not as a timeless, abstract idea, but as an "everpresent reality in the kerygma and
sacraments (both of which are forms of personal encounter) and... in the daily life of the Christian." 203

In reply to Schniewind he pointed out that he had no objection to speaking of "a unique and final revelation of God in history" 204 provided that the context put the meaning of the claim beyond all doubt since it was not as if we were making a statement about, for example, the history of Anglo American relations. The danger of the statement is that it may make revelation into a revelatum, something which took place in the past and which can now be an object of detached observation. If this happens then the cross loses its eschatological character 205 and the kerygma becomes merely a "bare report about something now dead and done with." 206 If this eschatological dimension is lost, says Bultmann, then it would be forgotten that, now is the day of Salvation... (that) it is only through the proclamation that the cross can become a personal encounter and so an ever-present reality. But this not to deny the uniqueness of Christ. On the contrary, it gives full weight to 'the Word made flesh' in which alone the proclamation has its origin and credentials. 207

He states emphatically, "I have no intention whatever of denying the uniqueness of the first Easter day in spite of my insistence on the 'historical significance of our being crucified and risen with Christ." 208 Christ's destiny, he believes, was indeed bound up with that of the whole human race but that universal significance can only be realized through encounter with the kerygma and the response of faith. This he argues, is what the Reformers meant by extra nos. 209
The historian’s personal encounter with the past does not take place by reproducing the events of the past in memory but by encountering those events as past human existence together with its interpretation. Kerygma, on the other hand, represents the past events in such a way that it renews them and becomes a personal encounter for me. Hence “the Now of the kerygma (2 Cor. 6:2) is not purely fortuitous, but identical with the advent of Jesus and his passion.” However, for Bultmann, trust in the reliability of the tradition should not be identified with “fiducial faith.” Bultmann here separates Geschichte and Historie, a separation which several have shown to be problematic. The dualism between salvation history and the secular is quite unwarranted as Pannenberg and others have recently shown. Nevertheless, Bultmann is quite correct in highlighting the “Now” of faith as the ever present moment of decision before God. He writes, “... assert with the New Testament that we are confronted with the eschaton in the Now of encounter... Here indeed is that paradox of the faith of the New Testament, and here is the answer to the question of eis ti and of the telos.”

Therefore, Bultmann refutes the criticism that he runs away from Historie in order to take refuge in Geschichte whereas what he was renouncing was any form of encounter with a phenomenon of past history, including an encounter with the Christ after the flesh, so that he may encounter the Christ proclaimed in the kerygma which confronts one in one’s present historic situation. That, he claims, is the only way to preserve the paradox or skandalon of Christian proclamation.

Bultmann quite definitely overstates his case when he claims that
the myth makes the mistake of getting rid of the offence and of the incognito of the Word and therefore only interpretation can preserve the eschatological significance of the Cross. He overlooks the fact that the apostles, who did not understand the Christ-event as myth but as real event in their time, were very aware of the scandal of the cross. Also "myth" itself, like Bultmann's existentialist interpretation, also attempted to work out the eschatological implications of that event. However, Bultmann makes the very important observation that "the impossibility of proving the kerygma need not surprise us, for the Saviour, as he appears in history, identifies completely with man (Phil 2:7)." 214 He will remain incognito even for the historian.

Austin Farrar maintained, in this connection, that the work of historical scholarship may bring me face to face with what will awaken faith in me. "I may believe then and there," he wrote, "and without waiting to hear Dr Bultmann preach (Christ) to me from the pulpit." 215 Of course what Farrar states is quite possible but this kind of response overlooks the crisis of proclamation. One can only understand the significance of the message and work of Christ through the reports one has from the apostles, which reports are not a catalogue of naked facts but a record of living convictions of the reality of the Christ-event. This is the difference between reading a personal letter and reading a dictionary.

Bultmann, in spite of the problems one may have with his hermeneutics, intended to clarify the need for the personal encounter of faith.
as the basis of understanding. He, therefore, is not concerned too much with the "how" of God's speech but with the "how" of our listening. "We must be prepared" he says, "to let God's word challenge everything in us and everything in the world... we must give up everything to which we are attached, everything that binds us." He who is reverent and humble before life will hear "God's voice in all its roar." Only he who is open to reality, which we have described as open to the contingency of reality and the limitation of his own truth; and only he who takes existence seriously will hear the call of faith. Bultmann wrote after the war,

... Has the war not also revealed all the dark, demonic forces of the human heart, all the passions of self-seeking and falsehood, of brutality and hate?... the depths into which we gaze are really the depths of God; that mysteries and riddles constantly emerge anew, that God is a God of contradictions.... clarity will be given to us from level to level, and as the riddles increase, so also will God's graces... And if we kneel at first humbly and reverently before the hidden God of the riddle, then we kneel humbly and reverently before the revealed God of grace. 218

This new life of faith is expressed as "encounter" not only because faith is viewed as "answer", "decision" and "authentic existence" but also because the "walk of faith" is an ongoing, dynamic experience before God. Therefore, the life of faith cannot be expressed only in indicative terms. It needs an imperative to complete it. The decision of faith, in other words, "needs to be renewed in each life situation." 219 This does not mean that faith implies a "timeless
now" says Bultmann, but that as long as were are historical beings and as long as the future, though apprehended, is never a possession; "faith is still in via (Phil. 3:12-14)." Elsewhere he pointed out that the life of the man of faith is not removed from its historical conditions but, because it continues in its historicity, always has the possibility of losing itself. Hence, "life is a possibility that can be laid hold of, but it is also a possibility that always must be laid hold of." The man of faith does not ever become an angel, but as Luther pithily put it, he is simul peccator, simul justus.

2.4.4. FAITH AND FREEDOM

Freedom, maintains Bultmann, is release from all worldly enslavement and "radical openness for encounters with God." It involves the renunciation of every security that a man may achieve in the world including even "right doctrine" or correct "Christian" behaviour or any attempt that makes the free grace of God a possession as if it were an object in the world. Freedom means the escape from every form of inauthentic existence and, therefore, is a renunciation of every form of legalism or any security "in the world." This kind of "security would mean seeking security while still in a state of unfreedom, which with Heidegger, Bultmann called the state of fallenness. Therefore, "genuine freedom of faith is man's radical surrender to God's grace as the sole means whereby he is severed from his factual insecurity, his total lostness." In Pauline language, then, freedom is freedom from the Law, sin and death, and freedom for God and the world. This is what Paul intended.
by the contrasts "in the flesh" and "in the Spirit" or "in the world" and "in Christ" (cf. Rom. 14:7f; Gal. 2:19f; 11 Cor. 5:14f; 1 Cor. 3:21-27). When St. Paul announces that the believer has been given "the gift of the Spirit" this is the equivalent of saying he has been given freedom from the power of sin and death (Gal. 5:25). The power of sin which is embodied in the law (1 Cor. 15:56), is ended "in Christ" (Rom. 10:4). In Christ, the law has been internalized which the scriptures described as "written in the tablets of the heart." Similarly, freedom from death does not mean that suffering or even physical death comes to an end, but that suffering is not an end itself (1 Cor. 4:12f; 11 Cor. 6:9f). Death cannot anymore have the crippling effect of a future-less anxiety not only because dying in faith promises hope but because living in faith fills life with hope.

Hence, faith is hope and hope is the freedom of the future 226 because the man of faith has turned over his anxiety about himself and his future to God in obedience (11 Cor. 3:1). The man of faith ceases "trusting in one's self" (11 Cor. 1:9) or "in the flesh" (Phil 3:3f) and trusts in "the God who raises the dead" (11 Cor. 1:9). 227: that is, in the God of the future who cannot be limited by time or space or death. This, ultimately, is the significance of the Resurrection.

There is for the man of faith, a freedom from the Law and the world, so that he is freed for the fulfilment of the Law and for the world. This is the significance of the indicative - imperative dialectic,
for example, in Gal. 5:25, "If we live by the Spirit we also walk by the Spirit." This "if-then" tension marks the life of the man of faith in the world. Because he is free from the obligation to the Law, he is free to keep it. This dialectical relation to the world, Bultmann expresses thus,

It is faith in God the creator that Christian freedom is based.... For such faith knows that nothing in the world can ultimately claim me and also that nothing in the world can destroy me. The man of faith is free from anxiety because he fears God and for the rest, fears nothing in the world... The powers of the world tempt man today as always to surrender his freedom, and they promise his domination over the world if he will fall down and worship them. But faith knows such worship is idolatry. 228

When man is freed in this way from himself, from sin and anxiety, from the Law and the world, he is free for the world and his fellowman. Christian faith, argues Bultmann, which claims to exist from God and for God means to exist for my neighbour. 229 Christian faith "has its limits in loving consideration for the anxious brother who is unable to free himself of the thought of the gods, evil power... it has its limits in love for the brother." 230 If love is the limit, in practice it is no limit at all because it opens up a whole world and manifests itself endlessly.

Hence, freedom in faith is not caprice or lawlessness or "doing what one wants." If man is a historical being, "doing what one wants" is to relinquish oneself to the past, which is to live inauthentically. But freedom is faith grounded in freedom because in faith man does
what he really wants to do, namely to achieve authenticity. 231

Because, for the man of faith, the past holds no tyranny and the world holds no threat, he is free to live authentically vis-à-vis the world and his neighbour. Everything worldly acquires a provisional character (1 Cor. 7:31; 1 John 2:17) and he is free to obey, which implies, that he is free to love. Hence for Bultmann, the nature of the Christian life is a life of radical freedom and responsibility. 232 Bultmann, in this connection, repeatedly refers to 1 Cor. 7:29-31 throughout his writings.

Mention has already been made of the dialectic of Christian existence between the indicative and the imperative and between the "already" and the "not yet." This dialectic is the motor of freedom and indispensable if man as man, and not _Grossmensch_ or slave, is to live in the world. The Christian man, says Bultmann, is a "man between the times." 233 He is never limited to the mundane for that would be alienated and inauthentic existence. "Life between the times" is life that is true to the past only because one is freed for the future; 234 an open-ended future _coram deo_, as Luther would say.

In the Gifford Lectures of 1955, Bultmann defined faith as

... faith in the future which God bestows on man, in the coming of God. And this means that in the Bible man is understood in his historicity, as qualified by his past and required by his future. 235

Schniewind objected to Bultmann's concept of freedom because he claimed that it overlooks the essential point that "the freedom which is
the theme of the New Testament is of a wholly different order" to
that which Heidegger, for example, had understood. It is the facultas
standi extra se coram deo. However, Schniewind does not explain
what that freedom before God, outside oneself, really means except
to rehash several Biblical allusions like "freedom from the curse
of the condemnation and bondage of the law." 236 All of these allusions
are not self-explanatory. They have to be explained outside the
Semitic or Graeco-Roman frame of reference in which they are embedded.
They still remain, as Barth would say, the language of Canaan. 237
Bultmann in his reply to Schniewind pointed out that the philosopher
cannot identify his "Verfallenheit" with the theologian's aversion
to deo because only faith can do that. 238 To explain how faith
perceives fallenness was the task he had set for himself, as the
above discussion of his understanding of anthropology and the life
of faith shows.

J. Macquarrie pointed to what he thinks is an inconsistency in
Bultmann's theology for he argues that Bultmann sets out to formulate
a purely "existential theology" but that,
as soon as that claim is made, as soon as we speak
of mighty acts or of grace, of revelation or of Jesus Christ, we are making or implying statements
which are not statements about human existence and
we have abandoned the concept of a purely existential
theology. This is the inconsistency of Bultmann's
own position. 239

Macquarrie is correct only in so far as Bultmann intended to develop
an existentialist theology, the difference between that and existential
theology is quite obvious and this has already been clarified above.
That Bultmann's theology lapses into an existentialist one by virtue
of his demythologization programme is not beyond doubt and as such remains highly problematic. However, this does not mean theology cannot be existential for that would mean faith ceases to be living, ongoing encounter. If theology is to be true to its calling as defined by the fact of its object, namely, the God of the Bible and the Christ-event of history, and to its subject, the existing man in history, then it cannot be anything but existential. A closer look at Gerhard Ebeling's understanding of Christian faith will help to further elucidate this argument.

2.5 GERHARD EBELING: FAITH AS HAPPENING, EVENT, PARTICIPATION AND ENCOUNTER

The danger that faith continuously faces, says Ebeling, is that it can be turned into the "Christian religion" and be submerged by a religious self-understanding which re-introduces the "whole religious paraphernalia" of priests, cult and performances. 240 Faith, then, loses its eschatological character and becomes immanentist. Ebeling argues that faith is not something separate from reality such as a pious mood or the sum of religious ideas or a highly developed theological system. "In such ways," he writes, "faith is under suspicion of being mere froth, an ideological illusion opposed to reality." 241 It was this "illusion," the caricature of faith, not faith itself, that Feuerbach and Nietzsche so vehemently criticised.

2.5.1. FAITH AND EXISTENCE

Ebeling believes that all meaningful talk about faith or God must be tied to human experience if it is not to become abstract speculation
or literally irresponsible. To speak of God and man in one sentence demands that we think about God concretely in terms of the ambiguity of existence. This ambiguity manifests itself in the awareness of human limitation and the historicity of human existence. It must be understood that "the sting of death" threatens our existence and in the end we have no future. To think about God in the face of this reality means to hold to the contradiction that if God is then we do have a future; that death is not the culmination of life. In Word and Faith, Ebeling states,

Faith is concrete faith in its being related to a concrete situation. Faith is not one act alongside other acts but is a 'fundamental act of existence'; it masters and overcomes the concrete situation on the basis of the ground of existence. 242

In existence man is radically questioned and this radical questioning is a concomitant of the passivity of human existence. Whatever we may believe about God, at least it must be admitted, argues Ebeling, that man is not his own creator but that he was given no choice of time, place or circumstances for his being. This "thrownness" characterizes his existence between birth and death and he must, therefore, confront seriously the questions about where he came and whither he goes? 243 The word "God" is this "radical question about where man is, the question which concerns him unconditionally." 244 To refute faith means not only to live in open contradiction of faith, as the nihilists or atheists do, but also to live in contradiction to human existence itself. 245

To speak of faith is to speak of man because it is man who encounters faith as the "I" of faith. It implies the encounter of the indivi-
dual, existing subject, as Kierkegaard had maintained. But to dispel the fears of those who accuse this view of admitting an individualism, Ebeling writes that although religious reality is directed towards the real existence of man it is wrong to suppose that this "I of faith" involves "an ominously individualistic bent." 246 Such an individualistic interpretation of faith is wholly inappropriate to understand the entirety of real existence. While the depth of faith can be glimpsed only in relation to human existence, faith is not an empty stretch of time but that which is still to come. 247 It grapples with the significance of the history of the "Crucified One" 248 in time and space and by virtue of that significance, faith is directed to the future. It is at the nexus of the Cross and time that faith observes in existence the omnipotence of God and, by a strange paradox, faith derives its power from powerlessness. 249 Hence, Paul could write,

For the word of the cross is folly to those who are perishing but to us who are being saved, it is the power of God... For the foolishness of God is wiser than man and the weakness of God is stronger than man. (1 Cor. 1:18, 25).

This is the paradox of faith and it is analogous to the paradox of existence! A decision about faith, as we observed also in Bultmann, is to be expected,

... at the point where every carnal motive of action which accompanies faith breaks down and falls away; where pure faith is exposed to the test of confirmation; where it is deprived of all other powers and abandoned by them, exposed, naked and defenseless to their hostility. 250
However, contrary to the many criticisms of faith as encounter, which have been alluded to already, Ebeling makes it clear that the existence of man and the reality of faith are not identical. Faith does not receive its significance from "man and the framework of his possibilities." If that were true, says Ebeling, then Pelagius would have been correct that salvation is derived from free will. For that matter, Feuerbach would also be right and faith would be man's work, not God's.

Christian faith, however, is the gift of God in that it is the renunciation of everything man can achieve and faith means being pointed extra se. It is literally the case of abandoning oneself (sich - selbst - Verlassen). Grace, the gift of God, undergirds faith because it takes place in encounter with Jesus Christ.

2.5.2. THE FAITH OF JESUS

What is the connection between faith and Jesus of history? Ebeling argues that, according to the witness of the whole New Testament, Jesus is not an "awkward" object of faith but the "source" of faith. "He does not make faith harder, but he makes it possible." In his Word of God and Tradition he argues that the traditional idea of Christ's vicarious activity implies his being for others and in this sense means "keeping a place... where the reconciliation between God and man can take place." He is a "keeper of a place for God among men, and of a place for men before God."
In the New Testament records, one observes that the decisive thing in all the encounters people had with Jesus of Nazareth is that when they approached him they were claimed by his message. This claim took the form of "a seeing and hearing not for neutral eyes" but for the "openness of faith." 256 Faith in Jesus is to let him as the witness of faith, be the ground on which we have to deal with God because in him we know what it is to deal with God both in life and death. Hence, he can never be just a moral example or a guru par excellence. In Jesus of Nazareth, authentic faith comes to full expression. 257

Jesus' faith bears all the characteristics of faith which Ebeling in *Word and Faith* outlines as follows: it is faith that concerns human existence at its very centre; 258 it belongs to the wholeness of existence and is directed to the future; 259 as participation in God's omnipotence it was not merely an isolated human act; 260 "its activity is its passivity, its strength of will is its surrender to the will of God, its power is its absolute powerlessness before God." 261 In this regard, Ebeling makes the important, but oft forgotten point, that "Jesus did not come in order to found a new religion, but in order to awaken faith." 262 Jesus came for no other reason, Ebeling pointed out in a sermon, "than to give us courage to believe, which means letting God be God," 263 and we may add, letting man be man. Jesus as witness of faith bore witness to what it means to do with God in death as well as life. 264 Hence faith is a following of Jesus not in the sense of repeating "outward motifs" of his life, like following the example of some great person. It
is "solely the taking up of the innermost motif of the way of Jesus, namely, having to do with God, being committed to him." 265

The faith of the early Christians understood itself in terms of Jesus having reached the goal. This understanding was the ground of their testifying to his resurrection. 266 The transition from the historical Jesus to the Christ of faith is no more a matter of course than is the leap from death to life. 267 Hence, the life of faith, means discipleship, not in the sense of merely following Jesus example, but in a sharing of his freedom before God and in sharing in his joy, his obedience, and his courage in face of the nearness of God. 268 It is sharing and participating in his inner motif and goal. Ebeling wrote,

"The very name Jesus Christ... means that Jesus and faith are joined together as closely as possible; first, in that faith is dependent on Jesus, it is faith in him; and second, clearly, in that this Jesus is to a certain extent dependent on faith: only faith can recognize him as he wishes to be recognised." 269

2.5.3. FAITH AS HAPPENING, EVENT AND PARTICIPATION

Faith is a historical happening maintains Ebeling. It comes to us out of history and it takes us into history. 270 Faith is not some kind of innate truth of reason which we may come upon as we please nor is it a private experience or inward happening. It is rather, the consequence of the "witness" of faith, which Ebeling calls, the "Word" of faith, that is handed down in tradition. There-
fore, faith is historical and can never be true faith if it assumes an ahistorical detachment. "Instead of being a turning away from history," faith "opens up true freedom for history." 271 This openness towards history is evident in that faith is forced into "historical change in the world, the spirit and language;" it does not, (in fact, it cannot afford to) avoid the contingency of reality. Yet faith itself urges on historical movement, "a being on the way, to fulfil its existence in the affirmation of freedom." 272

Furthermore, "believing" is an event. It is primarily as a verb and not as a noun that its reality is clearly expressed. Therefore, to speak of "having faith" distorts the nature of faith; so does the expression "I am a believer" for that matter. To bring out the idea of event it is better to say "I believe." 273 A good example of the distortion that can take place here is the way the English translation of Hans Küng's Christ Sein read "On being a Christian" whereas the dynamism of the idea was better rendered "Being Christian." So was the distortion of the English rendition of Emil Brunner's Wahrheit als Begegnung as The Divine and Human Encounter instead of "Truth in encounter." "Faith is by nature something lived," says Ebeling, "not thought; it is an event, not an idea. It does not have being, but it is." 274

Ebeling emphasizes the concept of the "Word of God" because, he maintains, it provides the most striking expression of what happens to man from the side of God. 275 The Word of God is not "just a piece of information about God" for to put faith and God in the...
same sentence is to affirm the possibility of a disclosure of that God and the possibility of participation in Him. The Bible does not provide knowledge about God in Himself but of the God who is for us and with us. To communicate this God who is open to us is to communicate the Word of God and it is therefore the communication of faith. 276

Faith and the Holy Spirit are two aspects of this one event; the relation of God and man by virtue of Jesus. "Faith is man's participation in God..... the Spirit is God's confirmation of this participation." 277 Man is always the subject of faith, whereas God is always the subject of the Spirit. 278 From man's side it is faith - from God's side it is the Holy Spirit. This distinction is also the basis of the difference between faith and grace. From man's side it is total commitment but from God's side it is totally a gift. A confusion of the two normally occurs when man forgets that he can only understand the historical, human dimension of faith just as he can only see "the human face of God." 279 This confusion happens all too often in theological discussion regarding free will, the preservation of the saints, predestination, grace and such doctrines.

2.5.4. FAITH AS ENCOUNTER

Faith is encountering God with one's whole being. Ebeling writes, God can only be spoken of in personal commitment... one must engage his existence for the existence of God... in the last resort this question cannot be answered in any piecemeal way, but only with one's own person, which owes an answer. 280
Talk about God is only meaningful if it takes place in life as the focal point of encounter, "not death or some artificially induced funeral mood." 281 God meets us in His Word in the midst of life. This meeting or encounter, Ebeling sometimes calls, "communication." "Communication" can mean either the communication of something as in a newspaper or as "a means for sharing" as in Hebrews 13:16. In the first instance, communication is limited to speech where I have experience of a thing as a subject of an object. In the second form of communication, something is not only said, something is done. Something happens to me I experience love. Hence, communication of the first kind takes part with me as the observer; in the second form of communication, I share an encounter. 282

This distinction is illustrated also in the difference between nous and pneuma. The image appropriate to nous is that of "the unchanging clarity of the light in which things stand for the gaze of the observer." The appropriate image for pneuma is the blowing of the wind which "catches one up in its movement." 283 Nous is connected with timeless truth while pneuma with living power in temporal existence. Ebeling points out that the Hebrew word of "spirit" has a personal sense in contrast to the more natural sense of the Greek usage. The New Testament uses "spiritual" and "Spirit" to mean "from God" and "before God," the latter being specifically the sense of "encounter." The man of the "spirit" is the "man of courage" (the spirited man) who is, not divided, or in doubt; he does not stand in his
own way, he is not consumed by self-contradiction, nor does he deceive himself. He affirms himself, and does not give up. 284

Paul Tillich, in this connection, described faith "as ultimate concern," as "act of the total personality... For faith is a matter of freedom. Freedom is nothing more than the possibility of centred personal acts... Faith is more than trust in even the most sacred authority. It is participation in the subject of one's ultimate concern with one's whole being... The certitude of faith is 'existential', meaning that the whole existence of man is involved — its certainty is not the uncertainty of a theoretical judgement based on probability." 285

It requires courage to depend on nothing in the world, the realm of inauthenticity as Bultmann described it, and to "fall into God," as Luther exhorted. This "courage of faith," says Ebeling, is the Holy Spirit 286; "the happening, the realizing, the very presence of what the Word of God and faith really mean." 287 This again reinforces the extra se of the Reformers; the fact of the encounter being between man and God. It is this factor of encountering and being encountered which prevents faith from being empty actionalism. Hence faith is not a self-transcending act but is a "movement in which the whole of existence is given aim, definition and ground." 288

This dimension of the word of faith, being also the word by which we are encountered, is illustrated by Ebeling by the idea of "word as encounter." "\text{\textit{Wort}}\text{\textit{a}\textit{Spraak\textit{\textquotedblright}}}\textit{\textit{as encounter.}}\textit{\textquotedblright}" applies to the word of a person and therefore to the person himself, and is best defined as "word - event." It
is the sphere of personal encounter in its New Testament application. In the Old Testament, "believing" is never directly related to a fact but is personal encounter because "the essence of personal encounter lies in the sphere of the Word." 289

On this basis, Ebeling develops his "theological theory of language" which is not of immediate concern to this study, accept perhaps to point out that this theory of language is also based on the ongoing encounter of the language of the Bible with the language of the world. "The language of faith" he argues, "exists only because of this encounter." 290 The Incarnation is for him the embodiment of all the criteria of the language of faith. "To extricate itself from this encounter will bring only apparent security" in a form of religionism, that is, a formal religious attitude that acts as though it could exist in isolation from the experience of the world. 291 The fact that "the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us" (John 1:14) points to the witness and basis of faith. God's word is where the communication of faith takes place. 292 Hence the "real locus of the Bible is not where faith is being judged, but where it is being produced." 293

2.5.5. FREEDOM AND FAITH

Faith in God is inextricably bound with the question of man's freedom. It is in the analogical relation of man to God, and with man and his own existence, that Christian understanding of faith and the question of human freedom is most meaning fully spoken about. Ebeling argues
for this analogy thus:

What is true of the futurity of God as Deus Absconditus 294 as a phenomenon of conscience, is true mutatis mutandis also of man and the world as phenomena of conscience... Human nature is respected as personal being only when it is respected as a mystery that is out of the reach of experience, incalculable, not at our disposal, that is, when man is respected as man by being granted freedom, allowed a future, given a hearing, regarded with trust. 295

This characteristic of human nature as mystery, which Gabriel Marcel also talks about and which many modern psychologists ignore, is even more obvious in the relation of man to himself. 296 Only as conscience, Ebeling argues, can man be seen as totus homo; as persona.

Ebeling finds support for his view in the thought of Martin Luther where freedom is fundamentally spiritual freedom which affects the very conscience of man and, hence, frees him as man i.e. allowing him to be fully human. 297 The freedom which is received in God, which we have defined above as man's participation in God, is essentially the freedom of man to become fully man. 298 In the Incarnation we learn that God being God involves in time God becoming man. Humanity is thus intertwined with the Christian understanding of God.

Therefore, faith in God, contrary to what many outside and inside Christendom think, is not a retreat from reason or the world of reality and an escape into the other-worldly. Such a view fails to understand that faith in God is also faith before God and hence is involved
vitaly with the problem of freedom because "only the man whose
dependence on God has liberated him to live in freedom has no need
to let himself become enslaved to his earthly dependencies." 299
If Luther's definition of being Christian is correct, says Ebeling,
that is "being before God," then the Christian is subject to no-
one and to no-thing. By virtue of the freedom implied in being coram
Deo he is free from all, so that he may be free to serve all. This
human maturity, which Kant believed was intrinsic to being fully
autonomous, proceeds directly from faith. "Faith is true maturity
because it is true freedom." 300 Unlike the attempts of the Enlighten-
ment and Hegel to base such freedom in reason, which we have pointed
out inadvertently does violence to human freedom, faith frees man
from "fetishism" and inauthentic existence. However, because of
this freedom, man is free and also encouraged to use reason and strive
also in matters of faith, for "an assent to the language of faith."
This faith, which is dynamic encounter, does not diminish the value
of reason or else it will itself be alienated from experience and
reality. 301

Faith, says Ebeling in his study of the Lord's prayer, is "God-given
freedom from our daily bread and freedom for our daily bread... from
our fellowman and for our fellowman... freedom from today and freedom
for today." 302 This freedom is a new kind of being 303 which is
exemplified in prayer, for prayer is fundamentally "turning to
God." 304 Only thus can we face the world without becoming enslaved
by it. Therefore, having faith in Jesus, and being Christian is
not to claim the right to imitate God in his majesty for that God
is Deus absconditus. As such he is hidden from us and of whom "we
at best make idolatrous images." 305 It would be important to remember
that such idolatrous images include not only the "pagan's" images
of God but also the more refined and intellectual, even Biblical-
sounding, theological images that are set up in order for men to
worship and obey. (cf. Part III). On the contrary, the freedom
of faith in Christ is "The freedom to follow God in his humility,
in his suffering, the incarnate crucified God..." 306 This freedom
does not violate the paradox of existence or the "contingency of
reality." It can never be Utopian or an ideological "opiate." This faith, furthermore, does not "seduce" men away from reality
but challenges him to take life seriously. Hence true faith, as
long as it is historical and is involved in human existence, does
not dissolve the antithesis that Luther observed between freedom
and bondage because we only "speak of man in the sight of God and
of God in regard to man." 307 All other talk of God and of the freedom
of man invariably lapses into abstract speculation.

Furthermore, this freedom that is manifested in faith as personal
encounter with God is not isolationist for that would distort its
very nature. In his essay, "On the Freedom of the Christian
Man" (1520) and his De servo arbitrio (1525) against the humanism
of Erasmus, Luther had argued that freedom through faith is freedom
to serve in love. He wrote, "Lo, that is how love and joy flow
out of faith, and how love give rise to a free, eager, and glad life
of serving one's neighbour without reward." 308 Faith takes man,
who is under the Law, and places his above and outside the Law (supra
Faith remains the doer," wrote Luther, "and love remains the deed." 310

This faith, therefore, is good conscience because the works of love towards my neighbour cease to be works of supererogation which aim to justify a man before God. Such justification precedes such works and this is what faith is careful to proclaim. If works are not liberated from "the hierarchy of a religious scale of values, in which some works are more meritorious than others," such works would lapse into empty charity or gestures of benevolence.

A factor that Kierkegaard overlooked is that faith also takes place in encounter with other men. This quite agrees with the point argued in Part I that freedom as "ongoing quest" obtains in the ongoing conflict of different truth-perspectives and forces one to be open to the other. This dependence on our fellow man is not a burden as Sartre had maintained. 312 "It is a blessing which we are mostly not aware of until no one takes interest in us and we have to eat our bread day in and day out alone." 313 Faith and love mean the simultaneous conjunction of "radical freedom and radical subjection to service... 314 sola fide is thus in conjunction with fides charitatis formata." 315 Faith that cannot reach beyond self is not faith at all. Luther went so far as to make this characteristic the basis of true theology: "Our theology is certain because it sets us outside ourselves." 316

Thus, contrary to those who repeatedly criticize existential Christiani-
ty of being individualistic, even solipsistic, a criticism we observed levelled especially against Kierkegaard, Christian faith does not take place in the inwardness of the believing subject. It is "an event taking place between the existing person and that which is outside of himself - God" and "the whole reality which concerns him." 317 Emil Brunner emphasized this aspect of faith as encounter by arguing that truth obtains, not in the subject's perception of an object but in the encountering of the object who is simultaneously encountering us (Wahrheit als Begegnung). He wrote,

There is no longer a place here for the object-subject antithesis ... an exchange... takes place here which is wholly without analogy in the sphere of thinking. 318 The sole analogy is in the encounter between human beings, the meeting of person with person... Faith is a change of hands, a revolution, an overthrow of government 319... Man in faith is the new man, life in faith is the new life. 320 Therefore, his fellow is face to face with him in a new way... Faith proves itself efficacious in love (because) love presupposes freedom.

In this connection, Bultmann acknowledged his indebtedness to Friedrich Gogarten 322: the concept of "neighbour" does not appear in Heidegger whereas for Gogarten it is precisely in the encounter with the neighbour as "thou" (not "it") that the historicity of man and faith is most clearly discerned. For Heidegger, man is limited by death; for Gogarten, he is limited by the "thou". For Heidegger, decision is demanded as a possibility of one's own existence, whereas for Gogarten, decision is made in relation to the "thou." 323 Hence, the concept of love does not feature in Heidegger's philosophy. For Gogarten, love is the only possibility of authentic existence,
because only in love is "the other," with whom one is bound throughout one's life, become visible and only in love does one understand the others claim on one. Love undergirds responsibility. Until such acknowledgement of the other's claim, that "other" stands over and against one in the Sartrian sense. In love, the "other" becomes "the thou" and appears as "neighbour."

2.6 THE IMPLICATIONS OF FAITH AS ENCOUNTER FOR MODERN MAN'S QUEST FOR FREEDOM - AN ELUCIDATION

In Part 1 it was argued that freedom does not arise as the result of any theory about freedom since freedom, like existence, cannot be derived logically or from one or other philosophical system and because all systems stand in controversial relation to one another. The contingent experience of reality is, therefore, the sphere of freedom (Rauche) and man is free in so far as he remains (or becomes) fully man. The crisis of modern man's quest for freedom, as clearly depicted in his contemporary philosophical quests, is that freedom is endangered by a new kind of functionalism or operationalism or actionalism. Man's alienation from reality, albeit in the name of freedom, is increased and he either has illusions of grandeur as Grossmensch or, claiming to be free, in fact, abrogates his freedom and becomes the slave of one or other ideology.

Part II of this study began with a description of faith in traditional thought where it was pointed out that theological understanding must be rescued from static epistemological categories and that the
self-understanding of faith, must be expressed creatively and existentially; that is, in a way that adequately expresses its true nature, that touches life and grapples with human existence. The crisis of faith is that even *homo religiosus* becomes enslaved to a system of beliefs which holds him in awe and acquires a power of its own over him. Hence, the possibility of him asking whether the objects of his belief have the possibility of personal being is excluded. Faith as a "belief system," is as totalitarian and absolutist as the philosophical systems that were studied. Man becomes a function in a relation concretised in creeds or sacraments which become the objects of faith. "Faith" becomes "belief" when these objects arrogate a timeless and authority over man that they can never possess. As such freedom is greatly endangered.

However, the object of faith is not a doctrine but the God who, we observe in the Incarnation, is open to human existence and in Christ seeks to restore man to wholeness. This relation between man and God, exemplified in the God-man, is the basis of the understanding of faith as existential encounter, which Kierkegaard, Bultmann, Ebeling and others have attempted to show. Now, the implications of faith as encounter for man's freedom must be elucidated.

Kierkegaard has helped us to see that faith essentially is the encounter of the whole being, a qualitative encounter with the divine and a matter of ultimate decision affecting one's whole existence. Faith is not the possession of the "subject" in his encounter with an object but is *in the encountering* of God. Because faith obtains
in the encountering, the object of faith must be the ultimate, the Absolute, as Kierkegaard would say, over and above the universal. Reason plays the indispensable role of uncovering fraudulence and the objects of self-deception; the finite that parade in divine garb; the gods of our own creation. Yet faith must also prevent Reason from rationalizing away the paradoxes which we observed repeatedly occurred in philosophy since the Enlightenment especially in rationalism, idealism, and positivism.

Christian faith lays claim to the ultimate because it takes seriously the paradox of existence. Hence faith is grounded in the Christ-event which must not be reduced to its factness or a series of metaphysical statements: the former leads to that event being merely an event in the past which requires a rational decision. The latter reduces the factness altogether or pays scant attention to the humanity of Christ. Without detracting from the factness or the historicality of the Christ-event (that is, the whole Incarnation, the Cross and the Resurrection), it is only a personal grasping of that event which explores its significance. One cannot view the Christ-event as a dispassionate observer anymore then one can reduce Christ to only a moral example if one wishes to grasp the meaning of the event.

Ultimately, in viewing the significance of the God-man, because that event touches the depth of human existence and therefore can only be stated as a paradox, a question is put to man which affects his whole future. How else can one make sense of Christ's challenge, "If any man come after me, let him first deny himself, take up his
cross and follow me daily?" (Mat. 16:24; Mk. 8:34; Lk. 9:23) As Cogarten states it,

... in the crucified Christ a question is articulated and if a man can continue to hold to that question and can refuse to answer it from the world and its wisdom, he will come to realize that this question... is asked of him. It is a question that puts him in question... that this being put in question precedes and is the origin of all his questioning. 325

This question can only be answered with one's whole being because it affects one's whole existence, history and future. Kierkegaard described this answering as "passionate decision" because faith is not a choice between alternatives but "the very fact that... there is no choice, expresses the tremendous passion and intensity with which it must be chosen." 326 It is so unfortunate that "scientific" man believes that faith is for the faint-hearted and the weak.

Gustaf Aulen pointed out that it was not simply fortuitous that Luther spoke of faith's "audacious 'nevertheless'" or Kierkegaard of the way faith "casts upon the deep waters" or Paul of our working out our salvation with "fear and trembling" (Phil 2:12). Aulen wrote, therefore, that "in spite of timidity, faith is the soul's audacious yes to God." 327

While the caricature of religion which Marx rejected may be "the sign of the oppressed", faith is for the free. To believe that which can be empirically proven does not affect my existence and requires no courage. Therefore, Christ's admonition, "Blessed are those who have not seen yet believe" (John. 20:19) is not an adage for blind faith, any more than it is a way of escape for the fearful.
Faith, in Tillich's words, is "a total and centered act of the self, the act of unconditional, infinite and ultimate concern ..., a passion for the infinite," 328 It is noteworthy, in this connection, that the Biblical allusions to faith are not cast in the substantive, as in Greek, but in the verbal, the mode of action. The thought of the Bible is not "neuter and abstract", appropriately embodied in the substantival, but is "historical and personal" conveyed by the verbal. 329

The faith of Christ demonstrated inter alia that faith is radical living coram deo, that death cannot annihilate faith as dependence on God, that such a life frees man from himself and from the anxiety of death, and opens up the possibility of radical living where each moment becomes kairotic (fulfilled time) and this life is an open future of hope.

That "the sting of death is sin" is self-evident to anyone who takes seriously the passivity of existence: passivity is illustrated in the fact that we had no control over our being here, our genealogy, our race, our social lot and our death. Sin results when we ignore that we are creatures of death and when our human restlessness, the result of our finitude, leads us to seek our security not in the author of our "being here" but in the realm of alienation itself. Yet it is only in relation to our existence that we can meaningfully speak about God. As Ebeling stated, all other talk is necessarily "abstract speculation and literally irresponsible, for it does not take place in the concrete responsibility of this reality of our existence." 330
Faith is based on the Christ-event because Jesus bore witness to what it means to "have to do with God in death as well as in life." This event, which is encountered existentially and which forms the ground of faith, highlights also the nature of revelation, which Bultmann described as "in actu" and "pro me" because it is understood and recognized only in personal decision.

There is no longer any room here for the subject-object paradigm since faith is an act; an event wherein man encounters God which defies an analogy in human thought. Brunner as we have pointed out, suggest that the only analogy is the meeting of a person with person.

Gabriel Marcel used the concept of "co-presence" to highlight the nature of personal encounter. To encounter someone, he says, is not to merely cross his path but to be near to or with him, to be a "co-presence" which implies an unconditional mutuality which affects one's very being. He gives the example of the ticket conductor who day in and day out one sees on the bus one travels and who one takes for granted until one day he is in distress and suddenly one is drawn to his aid as a person. He suddenly becomes a "presence." One is opened up to him to the extent that in his distress he is opened up to one. "Something unalterable is implied" in this moment of openness because now as a co-presence he is encountered. Marcel makes an incisive comment, in the face of this encounter, that illustrates what is being said here. He wrote,

I would be prepared to say dogmatically that every relation of being to being is personal and that the relation between me and God is nothing if it is not a relation of being with being, or strictly,
of being with itself. While an empirical 'thou' can be converted into him, God is the absolute Thou who can never become a him. 336

This faith as encounter, however, presupposes freedom which we have observed obtains in man's ability to answer. Austin Barker expressed this thus: one mark of freedom, he said, is the ability to say "I ought" rather than "I must" or "I cannot help it." "To think in terms of the 'ought' is already to be free in some small way but to act as we ought is real freedom." 337 Freedom is not identical with free will as Kant had maintained; that is, the ability to choose between alternatives because, as Nicholas Berdyaev maintained, this assumes a norm outside the person and, therefore, is externally determined. 338 Berdyaev in his *Destiny of Man* maintained that, "Man is free when he need not choose." 339

Hence, freedom is endemic to being human and to be fully human is to manifest that freedom and to protect that freedom. This is what the Bible means by man being made in the image of God. Faith awakened by God's love - for love also presupposes freedom - is the only possible union of complete freedom (endemic to being human) and complete dependence (the fact of being human, not Grossmensch or slave). Faith, therefore, is analgical to the paradox of existence. Man's answering "Yes" to God with his whole being is the manifestation of freedom.

This freedom wrought in faith is not another kind of freedom relegated either to the spiritual or moral side of man for then faith becomes
one option among others. The will-to-believe is intrinsic to being human as is the will-to-truth and cannot be diminished psychologically or sociologically as in modern custom. Against such psycho-sociological reductionism John Macmurray's observation should be noted. He wrote,

The only way to avoid religion is to avoid the consciousness that we are members of the community. The only way to reject religion is to reject, deny or ignore our relationship to one another... In a society which has lost the religious intention, culture and technology find themselves at war. 340

To deny the will-to-truth, like the positivists, Marxists and existentialists have done, or the will-to-believe as pseudo-scientific, secularized man caught in our age of functionalism has done, is to incur serious negative implications for man and human freedom. If the former attitude means the abdication of philosophy then it will mean the abdication of man. Similarly, if the later means the abdication of faith, it will mean the abdication of freedom. This is true because, as D. E. Roberts correctly pointed out, "Man as such seeks the Absolute, and if he does not do so with open eyes then he will turn fanatical and follow some spurious substitute." 341 Philosophy as ongoing critical reflection shares an important role with theology of helping to uncover these "spurious substitutes" and keeping man open to truth. Faith demands that trust is never put in anything less than the ultimate, and indirectly, spurs on the work of the philosopher and the scientist.

Faith therefore is the radical answer to the radical question about man. Faith and freedom are integrally involved with the manifestation of man as fully man. Luther succinctly stated the claim of faith
thus, "God became man in order out of proud and unfortunate gods to
make real man." 342 Cantwell Smith in his study of the difference
between belief and faith, makes some important observations that
support our thesis. He argues that "standard man is a man of faith"
and that "faith is normal in human life, and normative," 343 For a
crocodile, he writes, it is easy to be a crocodile; for us, on the
other hand, it is easy not to be fully human and to slip away from
our true calling. 344

To think or to feel that human behaviour may on
occasion be inhuman, that people may be 'less than
human' is to recognize 'man' as a transcendent
and not merely an empirical concept. Faith bespeaks
involvement in transcendence... Faith is neither
rare nor automatic, rather, it is ubiquitously
astonishing. It is the prodigious hallmark of being
human. 345

It is clear, that the implications of faith for human freedom cannot
be ignored especially in our age where the problem of dehumanization
is a world-wide phenomenon. As J. Mackay stated it, "the stock's
of man have fallen in the world market!" 346 Now more than ever
before we are forced to reconsider man as individual, for systems
do not change; people do!

Let us enquire a little further into the nature of this freedom mani-
fested in faith as existential encounter:

2.6.1. FAITH FREES MAN FROM THE PAST  Man is freed from the determinism
of historical inevitability, the tyranny of habit and necessity, and
from the guilt of his own wilfulness. Faith frees him to measure
life, time and the future by the category of hope.

Faith as faith in God means the opening up of ourselves freely to the future for this is the import of "walking in the Spirit not according to the flesh"; "living by the standards of the Kingdom of God not by those of the kingdom of this world;" "setting our hearts on what is above and not on what is below." These Biblical exhortations to "walk in the newness of life" is exemplified in the Resurrection which proclaimed life in the midst of death, hope in the midst of defeat and a future when we are weighed down by the burden of the past. Bultmann maintained that to have faith in the grace of God means "faith that the unseen, intangible reality actually confronts us as love, opening up our future and signifying not death but life." 347

2.6.2. **FAITH FREES MAN FROM HIMSELF** Faith frees man from the safeguards and assurances which his own systems provide.

In Jesus of Nazareth a new possibility of being fully man is epitomized in his being fully in communion with God. As Jürgen Moltmann stated it,

Religion does not claim to elucidate the mystery of man. It confirms and deepens the mystery that man is.... In the hiddenness of God, man experiences his own hiddenness; and all his sure, self knowledge becomes imperfection... (In Christ) he is not 'put into the picture' about himself, but filled with a hope and with a commission which brings him out of the certainty of his images on to the road
of freedom and danger of the temptations of the world and of the consolations of God. As Augustine has said,... The cross is the point of difference over against ideologies and humanistic images of man. 348

Faith involves turning our backs on ourselves and our securities because it views these as inadequate and "begging the question." As we have argued in Part 1, human systems invariably acquire a power of their own and in the end, while they claim to be monuments to human excellence, they hold man himself in their prison.

The tyranny of systems affects the very psyche of man. Hence he who glories in this state is actually glorying in himself. He confers absolute value on the works of his own hand. That is, at one and the same time, idolatry and hubris: man, having illusions about his own grandeur soon claims to be Grossmensch; he ceases to be "humble before reality." Hubris is exemplified in Adam claiming the right to be God and rejecting pistis, obedience in trust; faith as participation in God, as free encounter and event. Faith ensures that man remains man because it relates him continually to God. It rescues him from "being wise in his own conceits" (Rom. 11:25), and from placing confidence in a world-view or theory of his own making which in the attempt to give his life wholeness, ensnares him. Within philosophical systems, man becomes a functional relation; in idolatry of whatever kind, he becomes dependent on the "works" of his own hands. There is little difference between the two. Calvin has said somewhere that, "the human mind is a continuously working factory of idols." Philosophy as an ongoing critical quest for freedom calls
these idols into question and, hence, is not opposed to the goal of faith - the freedom of man before God. Faith prevents man from being what the Bard expressed as "the engineer hoist by his own petar."

Faith that recognizes that "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself," Moltmann explains, "reconciles man and liberates him from pride and anxiety, which has always been the sources of idolatry." He goes on,

He who believes no longer flees away, whether into an irony that cannot be touched, or into a defiant Utopia. He does not flee in a spirit of social romanticism into a golden past. He does not emigrate inwards into purity of heart. Nor does he lose himself in dreams of a better world. He finds suprisingly 'peace in the midst of strife' and the reconciling 'yes' in the midst of a well justified 'no'. 349

This is what Luther meant by faith coming to its own "Hann es in das Treffen get." This is the freedom we call faith!

2.6.3. FAITH FREES MAN FROM BONDAGE TO THE LAW AND TO THE WORLD. If faith as we have said, forces man to face the ultimate, faith rescues man from the bondage of necessity, a distinction that Reason could not make in the philosophies of the Enlightenment. Kant, and especially Hegel, did not extricate freedom from necessity because they failed to see that freedom was endemic to man as man. Berdyaev, more than anyone else in our times, has managed to perceive that the freedom that man seeks is ultimately spiritual freedom. 350 In this connection
Lev Shestov, the Russian Jewish Existentialist, maintained that, Kant, like his successors - Fichte, Schelling and Hegel - speaks of freedom often and enthusiastically. But when these men found themselves face to face with true freedom, they were terrified.... all of this only proves one thing: our thought has arrogated rights which do not belong to it.... Kant forgot Holy scripture when he meditated on the relationship between science and metaphysics. That is a pity! If he had remembered perhaps he would even have been led to recognize that the raison d'être of metaphysics is precisely to return to man his primordial freedom and to break forever the bonds in which general and necessary truths have fettered us. 351

Inauthentic existence obtains in living by that which is regulative (the Law), by the imperative without the indicative or by a utopian dream of happiness and a society without conflict. All these mystify freedom and existence. Faith's main role is to safeguard man's freedom for God and thus deprive the world and its laws of religious power. Faith puts man in perspective. Trust in any sort of authority which claims man's allegiance by parading a form of trustworthiness now lose their hold over man. The former mysterium tremendum et fascinans that they arrogated to themselves is now exposed as fraudulent. They have become "frail and superfluous says Barth. He goes on, These are the gods set up, honoured and worshipped by men in ancient and recent times: the authorities on whom man relies, no matter whether they have the form of ideas or of any sort of powers of destiny, no matter what they are called. Faith delivers us from trust in such gods, and therefore also from
fear of them... We are given freedom to trust in Him who deserves our trust... In God also is there faithfulness, and faith is the trust that we hold to Him. 352

Faith, therefore, can work closely with science and is not intimidated by it because the raison d'etre of science is to clarify the nature of the world of man and to demythologize its religious hold that it has over man. It de-religionizes the world and its laws. Faith insists that science and philosophy seek out and investigate that independence so that it may keep its own goal in focus. In turn, both science and philosophy need the witness of faith lest they forget the historicity of their own answers. As Gogarten maintained, "If science indulges in such worship (i.e. of the world and its laws), it abrogates its essential tasks." 353

2.6.4. FAITH ALLOWS FREEDOM FOR THE WORD Because man is freed from the bondage of the world and its laws, he is free for his world and his fellow man. This dialectic of freedom is what is communicated by such texts as "Be not conformed to this world but be ye transformed by the renewing of your minds." (Rom. 12:2). Only if man is freed from the world, from what the Bible means by life κοινός χάρις, can he be free to serve his world and his fellow man. As we have noticed in our analysis of Ebeling's views, the choice for or against love is the choice for or against freedom. Austin Barker provides an interesting comment in this regard: "We see easily," he says, "that the man who is ignorant or afraid is enslaved and will do harm. It is imperative both for him and for others that he should
become free." 354 What is not often realised, because it is hidden behind intellectual sophistication and affluence, or behind the cloak of general well-being, is that slavery is also the lot of the man who lives by his own wisdom because, in the end, "he has no means for making the most important decision of all, the decision in principle for or against love." 355 Christian freedom is the decision in which men have freedom of responsibility hence the "faith that believes in God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit," says Barth, "cannot refuse to become public. If you believe, you are challenged to pay in person (prayer de sa personne)." 356

Luther had maintained that faith is fidele facere (faithful doing), a fulfilling of freedom in the world (1 Thess. 1:3). 357 R G Smith, who like Michael Foster 358 and Gogarten insists on the independence of the world, describes faith as involving "response and mutuality, dependence and responsibility." 359

In this regard, it is quite understandable why Hegel criticised Luther's On Christian Liberty as "senseless, sophistic reasoning" because Luther had not admitted the freedom of the will. 360 The paradox that man's freedom does not achieve his salvation, that freedom is manifested in ultimate dependence and that man's salvation, therefore, is effected in the encountering extra se, cannot be fitted into a system like Hegel's.

Marcuse, commenting on Hegel's critique of Luther, stated that "inner freedom ... is only a transitory stage in the process of achieving freedom." 361 Faith, however, does not distinguish between inner
and outer freedom because it insists that "faith without works is dead" (Jas 3:7); not that "works" create "faith" but that faith is vitally bound up with the God who in Christ encounters man and this faith refers man to his fellowman. It cannot maintain its integrity in a vacuum. Freedom, unlike in the views of some existentialists, is not individualism. Berdyaev maintained correctly that individualism "demeans man, it is the tragedy of empty freedom." If freedom is individualism then Sartre was right, "Hell is the other person." However, when man is liberated to respond in love, the other person becomes the "thou" of fellowship.

Freedom is wholly different to the realm of necessity. Freedom is truly freedom in fellowship and, therefore, freedom and not necessity should determine marriage, sex, family, society and service to mankind. For example, if necessity was the basis of sex, the sex partner and oneself are immediately reduced to objects where the partner ceases to be the "thou of fellowship" but a "it." The whole spiritual basis of family and society, and of people themselves, is invariably eroded. If freedom lapses into necessity it degenerates into licentiousness, and leads to the abuse of the word and the other. Love presupposes freedom and cannot be contained in law as both philosophical humanism and religious ethicalism attempt to do. Only the freedom in faith can maintain that "all things are lawful but all things are not expedient (1 Cor. 10:23) because faith gives love a freedom that places it above the law. While legalism may demand service to man, legalism cannot legislate love. Love presupposes freedom.

As St. Paul stated,

... the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace,
longsuffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance: against such there is no law. (Gal. 5:22-23)

Thus faith which affirms that man as "image of God" is free, manifests that freedom by liberating man from the past for the future, from the law and the world for the world and from himself for his neighbour. 363 This dialectic from and for the world, Scripture describes as "being in the world but not of the world" (John 15:19; 1 John 2:6). R. G. Smith calls this dialectic the "ambiguity of secularism," and J. F. Hamann in a letter to Herder called it "holy hypochondria." 364

This dialectic injects into the Christian life, as Kierkegaard, Bultmann and Ebeling have maintained, a vital and ongoing dimension whereby faith is not the end of the encounter but the beginning of the encountering. Faith is never a point of rest but is expressed by St. Paul in the imperative, "walk in the Spirit not in the flesh." (Rom. 8:4). It is the "new life struggling continually with the old." (Ebeling).365 "It means to be travelling along the road between the 'already' and the 'not yet,' always to be pursuing a goal" (Bultmann). 366 "The only authentic 'work' of faith," states Gogarten, "is that it stands constantly in this reflection ... This work consists in nothing more nor less than man being himself before God." 367

Faith as encounter is decision that is won ever anew and, therefore, requires the courage to be hazarded ever anew. If it becomes complacent it ceases to be encounter and ceases to be faith. Man is unfree again. St. Paul succinctly expresses the dynamics of faith thus: "Stand fast therefore in the freedom wherewith Christ has made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage." (Gal. 5:1).
The Christian life has been described as characterised by "faith, hope and love" (1 Cor. 13:13) but these are not merely moral or spiritual qualities that one can be endowed with as latent talents are; neither are they abilities or dispositions that can be inculcated or achieved. Faith in God is that which frees man from the burden of the past for the future and, as such, faith is manifested in hope. Faith, we have said, also frees man from himself for his neighbour and for his world. As such, faith is manifested in love. Faith, hope and love, therefore, are three dimensions of the one event.

Marcuse had rightly contended that Marx's confidence in the proletariat to free society was ill-founded since the proletariat is as much in bondage to the system as those who manipulate it. Marcuse himself suggested that the fringe protest groups or the Third World may be the alternative avant garde. However, he became disillusioned with both since, he believed, they did not have the ability to free themselves from the manipulation of the system or achieve a changed social consciousness, a prerequisite for changing society. Faith by freeing man for God provides a standard outside the system to free man from it so that he may walk in "newness of life." (Rom. 5:9).

As we have repeatedly pointed out, especially when Kierkegaard's reaction to Christendom and the views of Bultmann, Ebeling and Gogarten were analysed, faith always runs the risk of being systematised and becoming, as we observed also in the history of philosophy and in traditional Christian thinking, self-contained and dogmatic. When this happens, faith becomes belief; it ceases to be dynamic
and self-critical. These aspects of faith vis-à-vis the nature of theological method will occupy our attention in Part III.

2.7 SUMMARY AND SIGNIFICANCE

1. Faith in traditional thought vis-à-vis the development of systematic theology, creeds and institutionalism has often lapsed into mere belief in one or more of these "objects" and thereby has ceased to be the living, dynamic faith that the Bible witnesses to. A corollary to this loss of vitality is the attempt of Christianity to mediate a position in terms of modern philosophical quests which in the main have been bogged down in epistemological categories (Marxism and Existentialism being notable exceptions).

2. This epistemological stranglehold has led to the discussion of faith with philosophical (and scientific) quests at large being based on the problem faith and reason. Several computations of that relation have surfaced since the controversy between Scotus and Aquinas, all of which at times led to grandiose claims for the abilities of Reason and a concomitant detached scepticism. At other time, it led to faith becoming the way of escape from the rigours of critical thought. In our century this antithesis between faith and reason has often led to the gross trivialization of faith and to the discussions between theology and both philosophy and science being led into a logical cul-de-sac.
3. These discussions between theology, philosophy and science, have often failed to see the deeply controversial nature of modern man's quests for freedom albeit in the name of science and philosophy. Modern man's crisis is the crisis of unfreedom either within his own philosophical and theological systems or within totalitarian, ideological or collectivistic societies which undermine freedom.

In Part II, it was observed that the quest for freedom, or rather, the manifestation of freedom that is endemic to man qua man, is the true task of all quests for truth, meaning and reality. All such quests must be aware of their own historicity and the contingent experience of reality. Hence, the quest for freedom is a far more fulfilling basis for dialogue between theology and both philosophy and the sciences. It was pointed out that theology is dependent on them for their ongoing critical evaluation of its own aim. Also their clarification and constitutive quests aid its own expression and proclamation for ultimately theology must undergird sound proclamation and this is always directed to men in their own historical and contingent situation.

4. Such dependence, of course, requires that philosophy is constantly aware of its ongoing, critical and reflective nature and that theology also remains equally dynamic. (cf. Part III).

5. At the heart of the awareness of the dynamics of theology, is faith as ongoing encounter, the generative motor of theological reflection. As the analyses of the thought of Kierkegaard, Bultmann, Ebeling,
among others have shown, only when faith is understood in living, existential terms will faith be prevented from lapsing into belief, and religion into a belief-system. These theologians have described faith as "encounter" because it implies that faith is "venture," "happening," "event" and "participation." These ideas preserve faith's dynamics and rescues its self-understanding from degenerating into static categories.

6. This generative quality of faith, which we have termed the "existential," makes all meaningful theological reflection, in fact all Christianity, existential. This statement, we have argued, in no way implies any form of Christian existentialism, the problematic nature of which has also been highlighted. The views of some of the theologians that have been described may well lead to a kind of Christian existentialism, as any programme of demythologization or such like will, since it would force scripture and the Christian self-understanding into a preconceived theoretical framework. Where this happens we must part company with them. However, the value of their work lies in their insight into the nature of faith. These insights orthodoxy can neglect only at its own peril and poverty.

7. The understanding of faith as encounter is endemic to the understanding of "believing in God" or "trusting in God" in the Bible. The analysis of the Biblical texts will require a study all of its own and cannot be fitted adequately into the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, we may point to a few illustrative Biblical ideas.

As Hermisson and Lohse point out, in the Old Testament, the awareness
of faith is illustrated rather than conceptualised. Nevertheless, faith is manifested as human reaction to God's will and promise based on total obedience "in the face of the future and promised gift of salvation." 368 The prophets are always the spokesmen of living faith and often denounce religion that functions ex opere operato whereby individual commitment and obedience in trust is diminished. Isaiah is the example per excellence of the prophet who openly condemns religion without faith.

Perhaps the most striking of old Testament illustrations of living, encountering trust in God is the example of Abraham, whom Kierkegaard has so incisively unveiled for us.

Another example is that of Jacob's wrestling with the angel from dusk to dawn which J A Hackay considered a symbolic expression of encounter with God which "operates a profound disturbance in the life of a man." 369 Faith is a struggle in time and space and a struggle of life and death. In the New Testament, St. Paul's struggle against Christianity and against Christ was a struggle of his whole being and his conversion illustrates the nature of "being grasped, laid hold upon, by the One who encounters (man) in life." 370

Faith is trust, says the Old Testament, before it is belief. As William Barrett points out, faith is always represented in Hebraic thought as a concrete mode of being of the human person which precedes intellectual assent. In Job and the Psalms, faith as trust involves
man's whole being: "his bones and his bowels." The final solution in Job, another great Old Testament example of faithful man, is not in a rational resolution of his problems, but in rededication to God.

The relation between Job and God is a relation between an I and Thou.... each being confronts the other in his completeness.... The relation between God and man is on the level of existence and not reason.... His relation to God remains of faith from start to finish though.... it takes on varying shapes of revolt, anger, dismay and confusion.... When faith is full it dares to express its anger, for faith is openness of the whole man toward his God, and therefore must be able to encompass all human modes of being.

While Jesus, the God-man, is the object of faith, it should not be forgotten that his own faith as radical living coram deo, both in life and death, is the example of the faith that is being discussed. This radical encounter, we have already pointed out, takes pre-eminence over every other relation. In fact, it places everything in this world in proper perspective. The challenges that Christ places before man cannot be softened by intellectual or allegorical exegesis since such attempts undermine faith and make religion spiritually bankrupt. Any attempt to soften these radical challenges to man, either by the Christians in the latter part of the first century already and definitely throughout Church history since, which were married to a kind of triumphalism by the institutionalized church, violates Paul's doctrine of justification by faith and the Reformers' sola fide.
All the creativity of liturgy, theology, polity and such like become ends in themselves if the radicality of faith is lost. Such faith alone keeps the imperative of the Christian life of love alive otherwise such an imperative burgeons into legalism. Such faith makes the encounter with the God-man a living, ongoing encounter and as such affirms the eschatological signification of that event. "In every moment," wrote Bultmann, "slumbers the possibility of being the eschatological moment. (One) must awaken it." 372

8. Finally, a point that has been repeatedly mentioned in Part 11, whose significance remains to be stated, is that this faith is not a subjective experience or possession but occurs in the encountering; and is extra nos as the Reformers stated it; it always remains "a gift;" the fruit of grace.

This point, says G C Berkouwer, is indispensable to the Christian understanding of faith. Faith and Justification, he points out, are intertwined. Berkouwer wrote,

Faith does not justify, Christ does; but faith is justifying because it appropriates the righteousness of Christ.' Therefore, faith does not mean works.

Faith is abandonment to God... With faith, sola gratiae is not spurned; it is verified.... 373

Berkouwer, in this connection, makes two points which support the understanding of faith as existential encounter: firstly, he maintains that the correlation between faith and grace is "firmly rooted in concrete human existence." Secondly, he points out that Grace or faith as abandonment to God does not "in anyway deny the activity
of faith, its grasp of its object, or its working itself out in love. Faith is still human act." 375

Therefore, as Ebeling pointed out, πιστεύειν and σώζειν belong essentially together. 376 Justification by faith alone is not one doctrine among others, but is the whole Christian faith. 377 The reality of faith is the justification of man but justification is manifested in its "public significance" and concerns the world as a whole. 378 Ebeling writes,

What kind of reality has this faith which consists of justification? Its reality is obviously of the nature of an event, which effects a total transformation, and yet never becomes a possession, but remains the justification of the sinner which lasts as long as the sinner lives. 379

The relation between faith and grace has unnecessarily been clouded by the debate on free will, for freedom, as we have pointed out, is not equal to the freedom of choice but is the ongoing quest for authentic existence. Faith, it has been argued, is the true mode of authentic existence because it allows man to be fully man, that is, it manifests man's primordial freedom. Furthermore, because it is ongoing encounter it preserves that freedom from lapsing again into unfreedom. Only if man is free can he indulge in constitutive thought and in living in the world without becoming a slave to it.
In Part I we observed that for philosophy, contingency is the realm of freedom and, in this section of the study we observed that for theology, freedom is the dynamics of faith. While philosophy’s perpetual cognizance of the contingent experience of reality undergirds the understanding of man as finite, historical and contingent faith affirms that man only before God is fully man and, as fully man only is he truly free. If theology loses sight of the dynamics of faith, then it also, like any philosophy which loses sight of the contingency of reality, lapses into ideology and creates anew the unfreedom of man. The implications of faith as ongoing and critical encounter for theology form the theme of Part III.
FOOTNOTES

1. Smith, R G : Secular Christianity, p. 29f
2. Smith, W C : Faith and Belief, p. 125
5. Fleisher, H : Marxism and History, p. 5
6. Ibid., p. 5
7. Martin, H V : The Wings of Faith, p. 18
8. Gogarten, F : op. cit., p. 97
9. Brunner, E : op. cit. p. 16-17
10. Smith, R G : op. cit., p. 43
11. These articles include, "A Theological Fifth Column?" Christianity Today March, 26, 1966; "Have the Secularists Abused God?" Ibid., October 13, 1967; "Religionless Christianity: Is it a New Form of Gnosticism?" Ibid., Jan 7, 1965; "Has the Spirit of Confusion Bewitched the Secular Theologians?" Ibid., Dec 23, 1966
12. Hunnex, H D : Existentialism and Christian Belief, p. 121
13. Ibid., p. 6
14. Ibid., p. 18
15. Ibid., p.39
17. Macquarrie, J : The Scope of Demythologizing, p. 240f; Hunnex, H D : op. cit., p. 29
19. Hunnex, H D : op. cit., p. 50f; 57; 58f; 52f
20. Raeling, R : The Problem of Historicity, p. 3-33

22. Hunnex, M D : op. cit., p. 55

23. Ibid., p. 55

24. Ibid., p. 64

25. Hunnex's assimilation of van Buren's analytical approach with Existentialism illustrates perhaps a lack of appreciation of the existential spirit. cf. p. 116


29. Hunnex M D : op. cit., p. 12f

30. Ibid., p. 16

31. Barth, K : Church Dogmatics I, I, p. ix-x; cf. also p. vii-xiv


33. Theologia germanica (anonymouse), p. 9

34. Ibid., p. 10; no fewer than seventeen editions appeared during Luther's life-time.

35. Roberts, D E : op. cit., p. 3

36. Ibid., p. 9

37. Hawton, H : Feast of Unreason, p. 71

38. Grimsley, R : Søren Kierkegaard..., p. 113

39. Naclintosh, H R : Types of Modern Theology, p. 216

40. cf. D E Roberts : op. cit., p. 92f

41. Ibid., p. 24
42. cf. Pannenberg, W  
Revelation as History, p. 46f, p. 199f
Basic Questions in Theology Vol. I
p. 36f

43. It is true that the Positivism of our age cannot make sense of unrepeatable events like Resurrection. Yet it is for this very reason that it cannot be systematized as Pannenberg has done. Like the significance of one's own death, it can only be existentially, not logically, appropriated.

44. Wahl, J  
Philosophies of Existence, p. 108

45. Kierkegaard, S  
Journals I I I a, p. 179 cited in Croxall, J H, Kierkegaard Commentary, p. 17

46. Malantschuk book Kierkegaard's Thought presents an excellent study of Kierkegaard's Journals; cf. p. 45

47. cf. scheme p. 5 Diem, H Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence, cited in Malantschuk G op. cit., p. 105

48. Casalis, G  
Portrait of Karl Barth, p. xiii

for R M Brown's comment;
The Prayers of Kierkegaard, p. 248;
Existentialism With or Without God, p. 61f.

49. cf. also Le Fevre, Lescoe, F J
Lescoe, F J Lescoe's work was an invaluable assistance in tracing the main secondary sources.

50. Wahl, J  
Philosophies of Existence, p. 108

51. Ibid., p. 93

52. Hawton, H  
op. cit., p. 57

53. Croxall, J H  
op. cit., p. 10

54. Martin, H V  
The Wings of Faith, p. 15

55. Smith, R G  
op. cit., p. 45

56. Tillich, P  
The Nature and Significance of Existentialist Thought, p. 748
underlining mine.


58. Kierkegaard, S  
Concluding Unscientific Postscript (henceforth CUP), p. 292

59. Malantschuk, S  
Kierkegaard's Thought, p. 144
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<td>60.</td>
<td>Kierkegaard, S</td>
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<td>61.</td>
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<td>62.</td>
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<td>63.</td>
<td>Ibid., p. 317</td>
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<td>Kierkegaard, S</td>
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<td>66.</td>
<td>Hence, H. Bouillard maintained, it is impossible to treat Christianity as a collection of propositions, a petty system or &quot;a philosophy&quot;. cf. lescoe, F J op. cit., p. 58; p. 70</td>
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<td>67.</td>
<td>Roberts, D E</td>
<td>: op. cit., p. 86</td>
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<td>69.</td>
<td>Camus, A</td>
<td>: Myth of Sisyphus, p. 29:</td>
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<td>70.</td>
<td>Lescoe, F J</td>
<td>: op. cit., p. 363</td>
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<td>71.</td>
<td>cf. also Malantschuk, G</td>
<td>: op. cit., p. 347</td>
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<td>72.</td>
<td>cf. Kierkegaard, S</td>
<td>: Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing; this is a view argued throughout the book;</td>
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<td>Diem, H</td>
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82. Rhode, P

83. Kierkegaard, S

84. Collette, J

85. Kaufman, W

86. Kierkegaard, S

87. Stumpf, S E

88. Kaufman, W

89. Lescoe, F J

90. Wahl, J

91. Roberts, D E

92. Shumuëli, A


94. Dru, A (ed)

95. Kierkegaard, S

96. Weiss, R

97. Nucho, F

98. Stumpf, S E

99. Blackham, H J

100. Kierkegaard, S

The four headings we used here to aid our discussion of Kierkegaard's analysis of Abraham's faith are the four themes that D F Swenson isolated cf. the introduction to this edition of Fear and Trembling.

102. Ibid., p. 34

103. Ibid., p. 42

104. Ibid., p. 59

105. Croxall, T M

: Kierkegaard Commentary, p. 151
106. Kierkegaard, S  : Fear and Trembling, p. 82
107. Ibid., p. 91
108. Ibid., p. 91; p. 122
109. Roubiczek, P  : Existentialism For and Against, p. 82
110. Kierkegaard, S  : Fear and Trembling, p. 123
111. Ibid., p. 53
112. Ibid., p. 48
113. Ibid., p. 48
114. Ibid., p. 57
115. Ibid., p. 55
116. Ibid., p. 128
117. Ibid., p. 65
118. Ibid., p. 69
119. Ibid., p. 71
120. Ibid., p. 67
121. Ibid., p. 86
122. Ibid., p. 37
123. Marcuse, H  : Reason and Revolution, p. 265
124. Ibid., p. 265
125. Ibid., p. 254
126. Kaufman, W
127. von Rintelen, J
128. Macintosh, H R
129. Kierkegaard, S
130. Roubiczek, P
131. Kierkegaard, S  : SME, p. 17
      : Beyond Existentialism, p. 255
      : Types of Modern Theology, p. 251
      : Works of Love, p. 50; 56
      : Existentialism For and Against, p. 175
      : Journal III A 42 cited in Shmuéli, A op. cit., p. 145
Blackham, H J maintains that Kierkegaard's "individualism is not the vulgar refusal to be one amongst many, a drumming on the differential traits. On the contrary, he lays the whole emphasis upon the generically human." op. cit., p. 21

Roberts, D E : op. cit., p. 9
Dupré, L : Kierkegaard as Theologian, p x
Marcuse, H : op. cit., p. 2f
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cf. Croxall, T H : op. cit., p. 147
Kierkegaard, S : CUP, p. 312
Mackey, L : Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet, p. 243
cited in Lescoe, F J ; op. cit., p. 69
Ibid., p. 70
Roberts, D E : op. cit., p. 88
Dru, A : op. cit., p. 184-185
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Ibid., p. 188
Wahl, J : Philosophies of Existence, p. 93
cited in Fabrio, C cf. Lescoe, F J
Spinka, H : "Existentialism" in O' Conner D J (ed) : op. cit., p. 511-512
Croxall, T H : Christian Thought from Erasmus to Bertkin, p. 150f
op. cit., p. 252
Bultmann pointed out that Jaspers, Heidegger and more recently Kamlah had transposed the Christian understanding of human life into the sphere of philosophy.


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196. Bultmann, R  : "The Historicity of Man and Faith"  
: *Existence and Faith*, p. 118

: cit., p. 19


199. Bultmann, R  : "History and Eschatology, p. 40; 
: of Johannine dualism.

200. Bultmann, R  : History and Eschatology, p. 45

: II, p. 79-80

: p. 147 for Helmut Thielleke's fear that "Historicity is in danger;" 
Adam Karl, "Das Problem de Entmythologisierung und 
: Auferstehung die Christus," Theologische Quartalschrift 1952, 
: p. 285-410, cf. p. 394 for his concern about the historicality 
: of the Resurrection; Barth, K Church Dogmatics III 2 "The 
: Doctrines of Creation," p. 442-477, and Vol IV "The Doctrine 
: of Reconciliation" p. 767f

203. Kerygma and Myth Vol I, p. 67

204. Ibid., p. 67

205. cf. Bultmann, R  : "Reply to J Schniewind" Kerygma 
: and Myth Vol I, p. 116f

206. Ibid., p. 111

207. Ibid., cf. also p. 117f

208. Ibid., p. 112

209. Ibid., p. 112

210. Ibid., and on p. 80; p. 116f

211. Pannenberg, W  : Jesus God and Man p. 111f; 
: Holtmann, J  : *Theology of Hope*, p. 50f;  The Crucifi-
: Gogarten, F  : Christ The Crisis, p. 150f; 
: Cullmann, O  : *Christ and Time*, p. 19f 
: Brunner, E  : *The Mediator*, p. 153f

212. Kerygma and Myth, p. 116; p. 81

213. Ibid., p. 117

214. Ibid., p. 118
215. Farrer, A "An English "Appreciation" Kerygma and Myth Vol I, p. 219 cf. F.K. Schumann's analysis of Bultmann's theology in Kerygma and Myth, p. 175f. He points out that, Bultmann is not trying to accommodate the gospel to a modern Weltanschauung or to make that Weltanschauung a norm to which the gospel must conform. On the contrary, his expressed intention is to throw into relief the real meaning of the gospel in all its paradox. p. 183

216. Bultmann, R : "How does God speak?" in Existence and Faith, p. 197

217. Bultmann, R : "The Hidden and the Revealed God" in Existence and Faith, p. 31

218. Ibid., p. 37-38


220. Ibid., p. 114; : cf. also his article "Faith as Venture" in Existence and Faith, p. 63-66.


224. Ibid., p. 285


226. Ibid., p. 320

227. Ibid., p. 323

228. Bultmann, R : "Faith in God the Creator" in Existence and Faith, p. 215


233. "Man Between the times" in Existence and Faith, p. 298f


235. Bultmann, R : History and Eschatology, p. 100

236. Shniewind, J "A Reply to Bultmann," Kerygma and Myth Vol I, p. 54f

237. Barth, K : Dogmatics in Outline, p. 31-32

The need for interpretation is indispensable even if, with Rudolph Schnackenburg, we accept that modern man can still accept the Chalcedonian formula because while one may believe a creed, one cannot simply repeat it.

cf. Kerygma and Myth Vol II, p. 355

238. Bultmann, R : Kerygma and Myth, Vol I, p. 104

239. Macquarrie, J : op. cit., p. 243

240. Ebeling, G : The Nature of Faith, p. 144

241. Ibid., p. 118

242. Ebeling, G : Word and Faith, p. 244

243. Ebeling, G : The Nature of Faith, p. 82

244. Ibid., p. 33

245. Ibid., p. 111

246. Ibid., p. 119

247. Ibid., p. 180

248. Ibid., p. 181

249. Ibid., p. 134

250. Ibid., p. 132

251. Ibid., p. 120

252. Ibid., p. 14f

253. Ibid., p. 47
254. Ebeling, G
255. Ibid., p. 202
256. Ebeling, G
257. Ebeling, G
258. Ibid., p. 240
259. Ibid., p. 241
260. Ibid., p. 242
261. Ibid., p. 243
262. Ebeling, G
263. Ebeling, G
264. Ebeling, G
265. Ibid., p. 74
266. Ibid., p. 60
267. Ibid., p. 58
268. Ibid., p. 56
269. Ibid., p. 45-46
270. Ibid., p. 21
271. Ibid., p. 30
272. Ibid., p. 31
273. Ibid., p. 108
274. Ibid., p. 152-153
275. Ibid., p. 90
276. Ibid., p. 87
277. Ibid., p. 106
278. Ibid., p. 105
279. cf Robinson, J A T
280. Ebeling, G

: The Nature of Faith, p. 70
: Word and Faith, p. 288-304; especially p. 236-246
: The Nature of Faith, p. 28
: On Prayer, p. 118
: The Nature of Faith, p. 73
: Word and Faith, p. 243f
: The Human Face of God, p. 210-211
: The Nature of Faith, p. 82
281. Ibid., p. 85
283. Ibid., p. 102
284. Ibid., p. 102
285. Tillich, P : The Dynamics of Faith, p. 4; 5; 9; 32
286. Ebeling, G
287. Ibid., p. 100
288. Ebeling, G : The Nature of Faith, p. 97
289. Ibid., p. 209-210
290. Ebeling, G : "Jesus and Faith" in Word and Faith, p. 239
291. Ibid., p. 193
292. Ebeling, G : Introduction to a Theological Theory of Language, p. 190
293. Ibid., p. 33
294. Ebeling, G : The Nature of Faith, p. 95
295. Ibid., p. 413
296. Ibid., p. 414
297. Ebeling, G : Word and Faith, p. 412
298. Ebeling, G
299. Ibid., p. 93
300. Ebeling, G : Luther, p. 213
301. Ibid., p. 215f
302. Ebeling, G : On Prayer, p. 60
303. Ibid., p. 106-107
304. ibid., p. 51
305. Ibid., p. 104
306. Ebeling, G : Introduction to a Theological Theory of Language, p. 213
307. Ibid., p. 93
306. Ibid., p. 104
307. Ebeling, G
308. Ibid., p. 212
309. ibid., p. 213
310. ibid., p. 159
311. Ebeling, G
312. Ebeling, G
313. Ibid., p. 91
314. Ebeling, G
315. ibid., p. 173
316. Ibid., p. 174
317. Ebeling, G
318. Brunner, E
319. Ibid., p. 52
320. Ibid., p. 72
321. ibid., p. 74
322. Bultmann, R
323. Ibid., p. 120
324. ibid., p. 121
325. Gogarten, F
326. Kierkegaard, S
327. Aulen, G
328. Tillich, P
329. Brunner, E
330. Ebeling, G
331. Ibid., p. 73
332. Bultmann, R

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: Luther, p. 211

: Word and Faith, p. 243

: On Prayer, p. 90-91

: Luther, p. 171

: The Nature of Faith, p. 165

: The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 59

: "The historicity of Man and Faith" in Faith and Existence, p. 119

: The Reality of Faith, p. 34

: The Journals (ed. A Dru), sect. 1051

: The Faith of the Christian Church, p. 24

: Dynamics of Faith, p. 9

: The Divine - Human Encounter, p. 32

: The Nature of Faith, p. 38

: Kerygma and Myth Vol II, p. 151
333. Brunner, E
334. Marcel, G
335. Marcel, G
336. Marcel, G
337. Barker, A
338. Berdyaev, N
339. Berdyaev, N
340. Macmurray, J
341. Roberts, D E
342. cf. Moltmann, J
343. Smith, W C
344. Ibid., p. 139
345. Ibid., p. 142
346. Mackay, J
347. Bultmann, R
348. Holtmann, M
349. Ibid., p. 115
350. cf. especially Nicolai and Reality
351. Shestov, L
352. Barth, K
353. Gogarten, F
354. Barker, A
355. Ibid., p. 411
356. Barth, K

: op. cit., p. 32f
: Creative Fidelity, p. 12
: Being and Having, p. 53-54 cf. also his The Existential Background of Human Dignity, p. 54f
: The Foolishness of God, p. 122
: Dream and Reality, p. 52
: The Destiny of Man, p. 80
: The Structure of Religious Experience, p. 109
: op. cit., p. 230
: Man, p. 20
: Faith and Belief, p. 135
: A Preface to Christian Theology, p. 5
: Kerygma and Myth, Vol I, p. 19
: Man, p. 14; 15; 17; 20
: "Selections from Shestov's writings" in Great Twentieth Century Jewish Philosophers (ed. Martin), p. 100
: Dogmatics in Outline, p. 19
: The Reality of Faith, p. 90
: The Foolishness of God, p. 411
: Dogmatics in Outline, p. 29; 34
357. Smith, R G : Secular Christianity, p. 38
358. Ibid., p. 151
359. Ibid., p. 35f
360. Hegel, F : Philosophy of Right, Section 48
361. Marcuse, H : Reason and Revolution, p. 199

363. Keith W Clements, conclusions in his book Faith, which the writer came upon after having made his own conclusions, definitely support this definition of faith and freedom. Faith, he points out, means freedom from self-concern and freedom for self-acceptance (p. 92); freedom from captivity to the past and freedom for openness to the future (p. 94); freedom from legalism and moralism and freedom for truly lawful and moral living (p. 97); freedom from authoritarianism the freedom for participation in community (p. 99) and, freedom from captivity to the world and freedom for mastery over the world. (p. 101).

364. Smith, R G : op. cit., p. 157
365. Ebeling, G : The Nature of Faith, p. 17
366. Bultmann, R : Kerygma and Myth Vol I, p. 21


369. Mackay, J A : op. cit., p. 58
370. Ibid., p. 68
371. Barrett, W : Irrational Man, p. 74f
373. Berkouwer, G C : Faith and Justification, p. 177, 179
374. Ibid., p. 179
375. Ibid., p. 178
375. Ebeling, G : Word and Faith, p. 245
377. Ebeling, G

378. Ibid., p. 121; 123

379. Ibid., p. 127

The Nature of Faith, p. 150
PART III

SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THEOLOGICAL METHOD
In this concluding section, some implications of the understanding of faith and freedom, proffered in Parts I and II, for theological method or approach will be highlighted. Within the scope of this study, only intimations can be made of the direction theology must take. This direction must be fully investigated in a separate study. The questions that will occupy us here include the relation between faith and theology; some modern attempts at the abdication of theology and the implications of such attempts for faith; the relation between theological reflection and rationalization; the definition of an existential theology and a definition of theology as contextualization.

3.1 FAITH AND THEOLOGY

It has been amply stated that faith, in spite of it being personal encounter with the divine, does not exclude systematic theology. Yet it was also argued that faith cannot be systematized any more than freedom or existence can. What, then, is the relation between faith and theology?

In Part II it was also stated that faith always runs the risk of being systematized and of becoming, as we observed in the history of philosophy also (Part I), self-contained and dogmatic, because it ceases to be self-critical. Faith in God, however, prevents such
an intrusion on man's freedom because of two important dimensions of its nature:

3.1.1. FAITH AS ONGOING ENCOUNTER

Kierkegaard and the theologians considered above all agreed that the attainment of authentic existence was not merely a matter of intellectual striving but of faith and commitment and that such commitment involved a continuous process of choice by the believing and existing subject. Hence to be Christian is not to arrive at a conclusion but to be placed in ongoing fellowship with God, which we have referred to as the ongoing encounter of faith. This ongoing decision is not as Blackham thinks, vis-à-vis Kierkegaard,

...... a morbid perpetuation of the moment of absolute choice...... a concentration of the whole life in a repetition of the empty abstract decision itself with increasing intensity. This fatal hypertrophy of will has a terrible fascination, for one sees in the dilated organ a living decision repeating itself like an accelerated pulse separated from the withered body it should have animated. 

Such a view removes Kierkegaard's understanding of the dynamics of faith from the dynamics of Christian life and theology. Kierkegaard had intended to emphasize that Christian life and thought must embody the pulsating vitality of faith or else they become a chimera; a caricature of what the New Testament witnesses to. "Let us never forget," he said, "that all Christianity is a life course." 2 Blackham is in error here because he places the perpetuity of faith outside the context of Kierkegaard's concern for reaffirming personal commitment in an age steeped in nominal Christianity and theological absolutism; an age not unlike our own. His attempt at the restoration of the
balance led him consciously to emphasize decision but he in no place jettisons fellowship, the church or love for one's neighbour. In a Journal entry on 13 February 1839 he wrote, "Fear and Trembling is not the primus motor in human life. That is love. But as the balance wheel in a clock it is the balance wheel in the life of a Christian." 3

Faith is bound up with openness and the future, and cannot seek rest along the way or else it becomes historicist. Faith opens up the future and is the basis of Christian hope and "hope" says Ebeling, is the "measure of time." 4 He also maintained that it is "the essence of human reality" that "nothing is finished; but there is always something to come, something to expect." 5 Hence, when we pray for the Holy Spirit we are in fact praying for faith to be given again and again. 6 Faith is not a matter of "slick theological solutions" but a lifelong "task". 7 "Till our deathbed," he writes, "we have to work unceasingly at the one lesson to learn to say with all our heart 'Abba Father!'" 8

The dynamism of faith also is manifested in the battle it has to wage with unbelief as long as man is man i.e. as long as he is historical, finite, contingent, and existing. Faith is always accompanied by doubt and is truly faith not when one believes "in spite of" doubt but when doubt is defeated 9 which may well be an eschatological victory for faith. Luther described this tussle with doubt thus: "We are always travelling and must leave behind us what we know and possess and seek for what we do not yet know and possess." 10 Hence
Ebeling comments that,

Faith does not die of temptation but of the flights from temptation.... 11 Faith that is not attacked or tempted is not faith at all. For faith can only be present.... Where it is realised in the concrete circumstances of your life.... Faith does not believe because it closes its eyes. Rather, faith means to hold and trust with eyes that see..... to hope against hope, to believe against experience. 12

Faith is victory over doubt, a doubt that is a corollary of human existing. Faith that gains victory along life's way, therefore, is not escapism from life but, in the face of the exigencies of existing, renews itself again and again. Luther said in his lectures on Romans, "Your life does not consist in rest, but in moving from good to the better, as the sick man moves from sickness to health."

13 Because faith is an event it cannot be possessed but has to be continually affirmed. Faith as encounter is decision that is won ever anew and therefore requires the courage to be hazarded ever anew. If it becomes complacent, it ceases to be encounter and it ceases to be faith.

It is this dynamics of faith, this "ongoingness" of faith, that makes theology, faith's self-awareness, an ongoing task. This ongoing dimension, the history of doctrine and the history of hermeneutics have abundantly shown to be the basis of Christian self-understanding. Hence, Gordon Kaufmann correctly assesses the nature of theology when he maintains that,

Theology also serves human purposes and needs and should be judged in terms of the adequacy with which
it is fulfilling the objectives we humans set for it. The task of Christian theology is to assess and criticize traditional ideas of God in terms of their adequacy in expressing God's absoluteness and humaneness, and to reconstruct the concept of God so that it will express these motives as adequately and meaningfully as possible in contemporary situations, i.e., so that God's presence in contemporary life becomes intelligible.

This description of the dynamics of the theological quest is quite correct but the point being made here is that the driving force behind even the desire to undertake such a quest and the motivation behind a serious commitment to the theological task, is the impulse behind the need to believe or reflect on God which is the event of faith as ongoing encounter. As Kierkegaard stated, "The knight of faith keeps his love young and along with him it increases with years and in beauty. He does not annul his resignation; he preserves his love as young as it was in its first movement." Theology helps to keep faith vital and love for God "young." Inversely, faith as living encounter insists that theology remains living and vital reflection.

Theology ensures that unlike the foolish virgins of Christ's parable, faith and the object of faith are never taken for granted. These foolish virgins, says Kierkegaard, "had lost the infinite passion of expectation. And so their lamps were extinguished.... they had made themselves strangers, in the spiritual sense of the word, through having lost this passion." Therefore, while the tragic hero rests secure in the universal because he finishes his fight, the knight
of faith is "kept sleepless" for he is constantly tried. 18 The "passion" endemic to faith is the life blood of true theology. The struggle that is part and parcel of theology is also endemic to faith. The two cannot be divorced.

Theology is the task of faith and must therefore be risked over and over again. A creed may be believed but it cannot merely be repeated. This dynamic nature of theology, Ebeling accounts for as follows:

"... the church has been sent into the world and is obligated to render testimony to Jesus Christ in the world. The world, however, is continually in motion, continually confronting us with new situations, speaking new languages and experiencing spiritual change. 19

This dynamism, he rightly contends, is true for all questions which have understanding as their goal and which are "accomplished in a kind of dialogue and must therefore be won ever anew, and must be hazarded ever anew." 20

Theology, therefore, is never above the contingency of human existence. It is forced, because of faith, to reckon with life and to enter dialogue with all quests for meaning and with all the studies that can cast light on the human situation in the world. The chief of these partners in dialogue is philosophy. Theology is forced to contend with the trauma (and the joy!) of human existence or else it easily goes off at a tangent and becomes abstract speculation about religious ideas. If it does not constantly relate to the ongoing encounter of faith it loses its rootedness in the living situation
of men. Hence the idea of a professional theologian, that is, one who theologizes without commitment or faith, who studies or teaches theology as a vocation alone, violates the nature of theology because he does not grasp "encounter". Theology is then reduced to the status of any other empirical study which leaves the subject untouched and unchallenged by its findings. Such a person treats religion as a phenomenon and theology becomes the phenomenology of religion. Religion is treated as a function and faith is catalogued, quantified, analysed and ordered like the way a librarian orders books for easy retrieval.

Theology is a reflection from faith on faith and the object of faith. Hence it is \( \Theta \upsilon \sigma \omega \ - \lambda \omega \gamma \iota \alpha \). Because faith is an ongoing encounter, theology itself must remain ongoing reflection.

3.1.2. FAITH IS SELF-CRITICAL

The other indispensable dimension of true faith is the fact of its self-critical quality which is also a complement to its "ongoing nature". Christian faith in contrast to every other claim of ultimacy possesses at its very heart a self-negating and self-critical dimension which not only prevents the absolutism that impinges on human freedom but also stands opposed to self deception and "blind" faith. This self-critical dimension is exemplified in the Cross which stands opposed to every form of idolatry. The Cross, because of its own history, symbolizes the means of God's judgement and grace. It signifies the judgement on sin and the death of Adam, the natural man of the
world, alienated from reality in his self-pride. At the same time it signifies the grace of God to man for it is the basis of man's reconciliation with God and ultimately is the basis for man becoming fully human. Paul Tillich perceived clearly this in-built quality of faith. He wrote,

"Every type of faith has the tendency to elevate its concrete symbols to absolute validity. The criterion of the truth of faith therefore, is that it implies an element of self-negation. That symbol is most adequate which expresses not only the ultimate but also its own lack of ultimacy. Christianity expresses itself in such a symbol in contrast to all other religions (and we may add, philosophical systems,) namely in the Cross of Christ.... Any acceptance of Jesus as the Christ which is not the acceptance of Jesus the crucified is a form of idolatry."

With this observation we come full-circle back to where we began this study, namely, the problematic view of freedom in contemporary thought and the problem of faith in traditional Christianity. Both have absent from their systems this self-critical and self-negating dimension which prevents absolutism, totalitarianism and triumphalism. These isms ignore the nature of existence and curb human freedom.

Cantwell Smith's study, which highlights several important insights on the nature of faith, on this issue must also be criticised. He held that "faith is not belief in a doctrine and not even belief in the truth as such" but "assent" in a "dynamic and personal sense" of "rallying to it with delight and engagement.... the ability to
see and respond." 22 His aim is most praiseworthy, namely, "to
open oneself to the profundity of being human and of the mystery
of reality." 23 However, this disjunction between faith and the object
of faith is dangerous. He intends to develop a theory of faith which
again is removed from the sphere of existential and critical encounter.
More than most, he takes serious cognizance of other forms of religious
commitment eg. the views of Ramanuja, Chu Hsi, Ghazzali and Hugh
of St Victor. However, his theory of faith, in isolating similarities,
levels off major differences and ultimately makes dialogue impossible.
If the critical dimension is removed, a kind of universalism replaces
the critical function of faith and theology. The cross cannot be
accommodated within a theory of faith but must be apprehended in existen-
tial encounter.

A similar danger exists alongside the element of truth in John
Macmurray's view, in his Freedom in the World, that

true freedom is freedom for something greater than ourselves. That is to say, freedom achieved as
a result of an objective loyalty, a loyalty which masters us. 24

This would mean that genuine Marxists, Capitalists or atheists are
all free provided their loyalty is total and they are "mastered
by their loyalty." Here again the disjunction between faith and
the object of faith emerges. Such a view which absolutizes loyalty
lapses into empty actionalism. Believing for believing sake is made
the criterion for reality.

In Part II it was argued that faith is encounter with the divine
and that is was "ultimate concern" grounded in the ultimate. For Christian faith that "ultimate" is not a figment of the imagination or merely a projection of ultimate concern but is the One who identifies with human existence of whom, the Council of Nicaea expanding on 

Because such reflection is vitally bound up with the God-man, the Absolute Paradox of existence, all speculation and abstraction is excluded. In Gordon Kaufman's terms, the absoluteness of God, which is common to religions at large and which can be the projection of human thinking, is offset by the dimension of the humane. Humaneness and absoluteness must be held in dynamic tension. To reflect on the Cross is to reflect on the judgement and the glory of the "humane" i.e. of being fully human. The cross which crucifies "man-in-Adam" also spells freedom for the "man-in-Christ" i.e. freedom to be fully human by reconciliation with God.

Theology, then, must be commensurate to this notion of faith if it is to be faith's awareness of itself and of its object. Because faith is ongoing encounter, theology is ongoing reflection. But because faith is also self-critical, theology is ongoing, critical reflection. The Cross stands opposed to theology ossifying, or to theological reflection running away with itself either in abstract speculation or self-glorification. It is the cross that prevents faith deteriorating into belief and
religion; that is, religion, which Bonhoeffer defined as "an attitude which regarded man's life as being somehow complete by the addition of God." On the contrary, the Cross cannot be domesticated within any system no matter how religious or Biblically sounding. It is the embodiment of that critical dimension which spurs on the life of the believer, the witness of the church, and the task of theology. It is that driving force which the Reformers intimated in their understanding of the church as _ecclesia reformata semper reformanda_. As Ebeling stated it,

The only reformation which the church always stands in need of is faith...(to overcome)... the divisions of Christendom, with each church imprisoned in its own tradition and full of self-righteousness, the dogmatics, intellectualisms of theology, the love of power among ecclesiastical leaders, the indulgence and apathy of the laity, the clinging to the past, the remoteness of sermons from reality... This "reformation" or ongoing renewal is a corollary of faith as ongoing, critical and existential encounter. Theology's task is to constantly relate to such a dynamic faith by being dynamic itself. The Reformation epitomised this critical dimension by its critical exposition of scripture. It was critical of the traditional view which held fast to certain dogmatic essentials, which fostered arbitrary interpretations and which domesticated the Bible in such a way that it did not threaten the ecclesiastical status quo. Hence it is not only the fundamentalists and the literalists who harmonize scripture in their exegetical methodology but any theological method that interprets scripture or the Christian self-understanding from the position of a fixed theoretical framework. The scriptures are
Faith and theology must exist in dynamic tension. Theology preserves the dynamics of faith and vice versa. Theology prevents faith ever being domesticated within any system, and faith prevents theology from ossifying into an uncritical system or being domesticated within an institution whether ecclesiastical or socio-political or economic. Faith is always on the way. The Gospel is always unfolding (cf contextualization below) and can never lose sight of its eschatological significance or else it becomes static and lifeless.

Furthermore, theology and faith are directed towards the same object God who has to be constantly understood. If the object of faith was self-evident, that is, if God was "visible everywhere not hidden everywhere," theology would not be necessary and faith would become redundant. Such knowledge of God would cause faith to "stand still." But the question of faith is inextricably tied up with the question of human existence (Part II). Hence the theological quest is never completed because all theological perspectives are historical and limited since they are human constructions and stand in controversial relation to one another.

R G Smith pithily states that, "The theology of faith is a theology of the cross and thus a theologia viatorum. It is a theology of a journey which makes up its own maps as it goes." 30 This is what Barth meant by theology being science, the nature of which is manifested in its ongoing and critical aspects. 31
Theology cannot be otherwise because,

i) it is the work of man who qua man is finite, limited and historical;

ii) it is rooted in the contingent experience of man and is therefore influenced by both theological and non-theological factors and theological systems stand in controversial relation to one another. If theology is not done within such experience of contingency it relinquishes its own freedom for the world and for all men; and

iii) it is driven by a faith that is self-critical and ongoing encounter with God who identified with human existence.

Therefore, no theology is final. The pursuit of clearer theological self-expression cannot take place in isolation but in constant dialogue and controversy between the Christian and his fellow believer, and between the Christian and his fellow man. Faith must insist on this freedom or else a certain fear or arrogance sets in and this is neither faith nor living theology. "Method" must reflect both freedom and openness. Christians, even from opposing theological or ecclesiastical camps, are united in their contingent experience of reality and in their struggle for freedom and faith. The locus of Christian unity is not the resolution of historical differences but the preserving of faith vis-à-vis the crisis of belief today and man's increasing dehumanization.

Every theological method, like any methodology in search of truth, must constantly change in keeping with the changing experiences of
the human situation. As Bultmann stated,

... because theology is an entirely human affair
and as such has no directly divine significance
- pure doctrine is an eschatological thing: all
theology is nothing other than a 'contribution'
to the discussion. 32

As such theology cannot become dogmatic, intolerant or a closed system
for that would lead to a form of idolatry (cf. Theology and ideology
below).

Hence the achievement of an ecumenical theology is not the acquiring
of a theological formulation which has the necessary doctrines to
satisfy all the various churches, neither will such ecumenical unity
be achieved in formal unions of various churches. An ecumenical
theology is that which understands the historicity of theology, creeds,
statements of belief and ecclesiastical institutions, which grasps
faith as ongoing encounter and which displays an openness in its
theological method that is concomitant with the dynamics of faith.
All theological constitutions are only truth - perspectives which
embody a valuable insight for their times and for the future but
they remain truth perspectives not the whole truth because as St
Paul states "For now we see through a glass darkly... now we know
in part... " (1 Cor. 13:12)

Theology must grasp the truth-perspective even in opposing views
and use it as "raw material" to do its work. For example, Calvin's
formulation of the doctrine of predestination and the Arminian response.
Both possess an important truth-perspective: Calvin wished to preserve
the sovereignty of God whereas the Arminians were concerned about individual responsibility. The possibility of heresy arises when one such perspective is absolutised at the exclusion of the other and at the exclusion of historical continuity ie. When truth perspectives become a-historical and when they diminish the truth-perspectives of others. Theology is by nature ecumenical because it is deeply aware that it is human work and that it can never be an end in itself. In dialogue and conflict each learns from the other, is rescued from the limitation of one perspective and in encountering the other develops a clearer insight into the Word of God.

Theology and faith are inextricably intertwined. If the dynamics of one is lost, the other is in danger. If the dynamics of faith is lost then theology abdicates. In our time there are several attempts, often unconscious, at the abdication of theology as ongoing, critical, and theoretical reflection.

3.2 THE ABDICATION OF THEOLOGY AND THE ABDICATION OF FAITH

At least four modern attempts, some inadvertent, at such abdication may be briefly stated, namely, faith as experience, faith as confessionalism faith as praxis and faith's subjugation to functionalism.

3.2.1 THEOLOGY AND EXPERIENCE

The view emerges within certain fundamentalism, Pentecostalism and some free churches who argue
that theology is redundant because it does not affect discipleship, true commitment and holiness. This view has always emerged in Church History, as early as the Montanist movement in the second century, whenever theology became caught up within itself and its own intellectual and language "games." This view often argues for the locus of faith to be shifted from the "ivory tower" or creeds to individual experience: inner illumination, the enlightenment of the Spirit, gifts of prophecy and tongues and such like.

This approach rightly emphasizes personal commitment but it is unconscious of the fact that its mode of piety already presupposes a theology of its own. Its views of individual experience, its emphasis on getting "back to the Bible," and its overt rejection of the history of doctrine and Biblical interpretation, already presuppose a decision about certain texts and of the Bible itself. No matter how simple its organization is, or the statements of faith it makes, a fixed view of man, society, God, inspiration, revelation, church and such like, is already governing its life and expression.

The danger is that because this governing influence is unconscious, it is also uncritical. In fact a much larger theology remains under the surface and is "at work" than is formally stated. As Cantwell Smith maintained, it is quite true that any given person may well be in closer touch with transcendent Truth, with God, than his intellectualization. He writes,

The locus of faith is persons. It is persons not propositions, not symbols and sacraments — though all may be channels! The locus is communities
in so far as these are personal and not merely institutionalized - although again an institution may be faith's channel. Moreover, faith is a quality of the whole person. It has therefore as many dimensions as has personhood. Accordingly, it has an intellectual dimension. 34

Because it is the nature of man to question, to formulate statements, to express faith and to pray, theology cannot be excluded. Even the view that claims that all that is required is to read the Bible (ie as one has it) overlooks the fact that the translation one holds in one's hand was the result of a series of theological decisions which governed its translation, language, style, the manuscripts used and the hermeneutical presuppositions of the translators themselves. Hence, while the pietistic truth-perspective that emphasizes devotion is important, it cannot jettison theology as critical, ongoing and theoretical reflection.

3.2.2. THEOLOGY AND CONFESSIONALISM

Another attempt at the abdication of theology, and with a much wider influence than the first, is the attempt to study theology or to theologize within fixed confessional parameters. The negative implications of this approach are clearly evident in the proliferation of the Church and the emergence of a multitude of irreconcilable denominations. Each believes that they are in possession of the truth, of having the most accurate interpretation of the Bible or of being the preservers of the Gospel. Hence, they become dogmatic, intolerant
and alienated from the truth-perspectives of their fellow Christians. The results of this dogmatism are evident throughout Church History; in the Inquisitions, the over-reaction to dissenters, the religious wars, sectarianism, the crusades, theological polarizations and such like.

One cannot rule out a confessional position because no one comes to the scripture tabula rasa and without presuppositions. Yet such presuppositions and confessional limits which become parameters within which to theologise, in effect, deprive theology of its openness and freedom. Protestantism reacted to Roman Catholicism because it claimed that the ecclesiastical parameters fixed by the Pope and "the traditions" restricted truth. Yet within its own ranks such unfreedom has also been consistently propagated. Theology is done within carefully defined synodal, conciliar or credal limits. While Catholicism understood the task of theology to be the definition and clarification of the church's confession, the Protestants had insisted that its task was to test the church's confession. In this "testing" lay theology's ongoing, open and self-critical nature. However, over and over again, Protestantism has lapsed into a denominational position; hence, for example, some are clearly "Presbyterian," "Methodist," "Calvinist," "Pentecostal" and such like. While they all insist on theological training, some of which is very rigorous and highly academic, such theological training is confined to a particular theoretical framework (or regulae fidei) and as such must bear all the criticisms we have levelled at fixed philosophical and theoretical frameworks. (cf. "Christian Ideology"
or Theology?" below)

Very often, in this approach, theology lapses into church history where certain truths of one historical perspective are clarified, described and made relevant. At best, this approach adapts a certain fixed perspective to a new situation and context, and theology becomes indigenization which is too narrow a scope for theology. (cf. contextualization below). Such an approach does not take the changing nature of human situations and the contingent experience of reality seriously enough and therefore cannot be self-critical and ongoing. As Ebeling pointed out,

If you take no notice of what is happening now and are not open to the fact that everything has time... and flee from the sphere of faith in this way, you may indeed have a timeless relation to ideas of faith, but they will be the ideas of yesterday and this is not faith. This kind of general availability of ideas of faith is an abstraction from history. 35

3.2.3. THEOLOGY AS THE ACTUALIZATION OF THEORY

There has been a widespread reaction to the theologies of the "first" and "second worlds" which were disseminated via the missionaries; a form of theological expression that legitimated the status quo. This view objects to theology being divorced from the everyday concerns of people; from their experience of oppression under the very powers that brought the Gospel; from social injustice and the dehumanization of man and society. It views traditional theology as irrelevant to society in the Third World and oppressed societies elsewhere.
The Gospel is viewed as praxis. "To say that the gospel must be understood as praxis," writes Orlando Costas, "is to say that its truth must be analysed and reflected upon, but fulfilled and actualized in concrete situation." 36 Praxis is viewed as action based upon reflection or the actualization of theory.

This approach has correctly perceived that theology done in isolation from the living situation is irrelevant. Theory cannot be divorced from practice. It is true that traditionally theology has often remained aloof of the living situation especially in the Third World. The Gospel submerged in a European or Anglo-Saxon perspective of the eighteenth century fails to speak the Word of Faith in a situation where people are socially or racially disinherited. That theology must touch life is axiomatic!

However, to make theology praxis i.e. to merge theory and practice together in this way is to endanger theology as free questioning and critical reflection on practice. What is required is for theology to be truly ongoing, critical and existential encounter. This means that it is never divorced from practice yet keeps its autonomy as theoretical reflection.

Theory and practice cannot merge in praxis otherwise the criticisms that were offered against the neo-Marxists may also be applied to it. Theory and practice must rather remain in critical relation to each other, affecting each other and calling each other into question. To resolve this tension in praxis is to open the door
again to operationalism and actionism. The tension between theory and practice is dynamic because they influence each other. If the tension between them is removed then theology ceases to be ongoing and self-critical reflection, and ultimately abdicates.

Similarly, some, like the Institute for Contextual Theology in South Africa, call for a "peoples' theology," vis-à-vis "academic theology" wherein a very similar presumption is tacitly implied. It is axiomatic that the living situation of the people must form the important agenda for theology and that people must be involved in the self-understanding of their faith but this idea of a "peoples' theology" presupposes too much. It assumes, for instance, that the average individual believer has the ability to fulfil the self-critical task of theology or that they have sufficient insight into the historical conditioning of their beliefs and religious language. Where in the world or in Church history has such an egalitarian state of affairs ever existed? This criticism is far from making theology elitist. Rather it highlights the great responsibility resting on the shoulders of the leaders, pastors, and theologians of the church regarding theological reflection. The theologian remains an indispensable servant of the church. To level-off the reflective dimension of theology in this way is often accompanied by a sentimentalization of the situation or context.

3.2.4. THEOLOGY AND FUNCTIONALISM

Perhaps the greatest danger to faith and theology is the functionalistic
spirit of our age that absorbs Christianity over into its frame of
reference. This is an age of description, specialization, professiona-
limism and pragmatism. This functionalism has permeated the Church
to such an extent that Christendom does everything to be modern and
plays up to pressure groups, and the 'elitist' sections of our society.
It loses its critical role in society and often shares the protection
of the prevailing system. It too, gets caught up, as Wordsworth
said, in "getting and spending and laying waste (its) powers."

Theology may therefore be highly professional and specialized but
constitutes no threat to this world. Christ, the Gospel and faith
are domesticated. Theology removed from the sphere of rigorous encoun-
ter with the world is content with description and remains conformist.
Theology becomes highly specialized sophistry and we are left again
with Christendom that remains snug within the system.

Holtmann rightly points out that it was,

\[...\] the non-Christians such as Marx and Nietzsche
who had to remind the Christians of the crucified
Jesus or of the wretchedness of man. The memory
of the crucified Jesus is a dangerous one for both
the established church itself and for the society
which erects its idols and taboos in order to make
itself safe. His memory emerges again and again
in iconoclasm of liberation against the images of
the beautiful and pious pretence in which men live
and with which they deceive themselves and others
about the truth. 37

To level off the radicality of the Christian challenge to men or
the differences in the Christian understanding of life vis-à-vis the aspirations of a this-worldly, mundane existence; or to marry the Gospel of Christ with a vicious capitalistic society or an oppressive communist one, is to fall prey to functionalism. This temptation is accompanied by the Church's seeking safety in numbers while it loses its critical role against the ethos of this age. Christian service is reduced to benevolence within the system. The latest "prosperity message" and the popular forms of Christianity in the US are merely extreme examples of a general form of pseudo-Christianity in the world. These forms are more difficult to uncover because they are often highly sophisticated and scholarly and deceptively Christian and Biblically sounding. One may cite as an example the Roman Catholic and Lutheran forms of Christianity in Germany that Bonhoeffer had criticised.

Theology within the functionalistic ethos is often reduced to a thoroughly conformist form; as such, any accommodation with functionalism must imply the abdication of theology as ongoing and critical. This is so because functionalism is diametrically opposed to the Gospel of Jesus Christ and the radical nature of his challenge to man.

Theology as ongoing and critical reflection cannot be abolished because man is essentially a believing being and he will set up gods whether in the form of emotional experience, Utopia, reason, science a host of functionalistic gods or even anti-faith itself. Man's will-to-believe is as axiomatic as his-will-to-truth or his-will-to-live (Schopenhauer). As John Wisdom pointed out, man "hankers after the supernatural."
If faith is to win man's Geborgenheit (existential safety or security)
it must insist on free critical reflection in order to keep its claims
in check. Theology cannot abdicate because of man's propensity to
believe. If the object of his belief is not evaluated and his own
belief not constantly reassessed, he will become idol-trous. A man
becomes more human, says Moltmann, if he is put in the position of
being able to abandon his self-deification and his idolatry with
all its gains and its achievements. He goes on,

What can put him in this position? It is the critical
task of theology to take away from anthropology
the absolute and totalitarian element and the legalis-
tic view of salvation. 39

When this dynamic quality of faith is removed, theology becomes most
vulnerable to being systematised and descriptively analysed. As Rauche
repeatedly pointed out, the method of the natural sciences has been
indiscriminately applied to fields like philosophy, psychology and
linguistics (and we may add theology) where it is wholly inappropriate.
When thought is removed from vital commitment i.e., when faith ceases
to fuel theological reflection, systematic theology lapses into quanti-
fication. The what of the gospel is bypassed. In its place is put
the remodelling of past perspectives or the emphasis is placed on
activism.

Theology cannot afford to be introverted for then it becomes preoccupied
with its past. It must engage the world and all honest quests for
truth. It cannot even be preoccupied with systematization. Eteling
correctly pointed out, and this is a point that has repeatedly been
made in Part II,

... faith is little capable of being systematised and exhaustively expounded as life itself. If talk about faith is to be open to the unpredictable and incalculable in life, it can have no finished model that it is to be realised and imitated as the uniform type of Christianity. 40

To fix a model or method within a creed and limited theological loci is invariably to rig the understanding of the Gospel.

Theology as living encounter of faith stands opposed to all idolatry, frees man from his own truth and opens him to his brother. What has been said about philosophy is even more applicable to theological method because of the Cross. Theological systems are always tentative and to absolutize them is to lead to alienation from truth, God, the Christ-event and life. As R G Smith stated it,

In so far as all the structures of religion, of secularization and of Christendom as a whole, partake of historical freedom - they are the inevitable partners of faith. For faith lives in and by history. And just as there can be no "pure" theology, and no absolute or permanent form of faith, separated from the untidy, ambiguous and distorting forms of man's historical existence, in all its vicissitudes, so faith is bound to be expressed, and thus communicated, in these same forms. 41

In view of the historicity of theology and theological structures, faith has the indispensable role of ensuring that these structures do not petrify. Faith, says Smith, has to exercise a constant critique of "religious forms" which it must "again and again" overcome; of "secularist forms" in order to "expose their uncritical nature
as a permanent threat to humanity" and of the structures of Christendom so that they may "never arrogate to themselves any claim to inviolability, or infallibility or sanctity." Faith as existential encounter preserves theology's and Christendom's openness to the future.

To constitute theologoumena or theories, to develop propositions and to formulate structures are unavoidable; in fact indispensable because ideas, beliefs and truth cannot exist in wordless nakedness. Nevertheless, such theological reflection is a reflection of faith and the further theology moves away from its pulse (living faith) to that extent it becomes a law unto itself; a system out of touch with the Word of God to man and with the crisis of the believer in the world. Unless the existing subject is the locus of theology's attempt to talk meaningfully about God, any such attempt, said Kierkegaard, is like a man building a castle but living in a hovel at the side of it. 43

Theology functions between two poles: to reflect on the object of faith and to constitute its content in ever new freedom, but also to preserve the ongoing, dynamic and self-critical nature of faith itself. In the process, it is continually renewed. If it abrogates this task, Christianity becomes dogmatic, intolerant, arrogant, insensitive, consumed with self-righteousness as the Pharisees in Jesus' day were, love-less and devoid of the compassion of Christ.

3.3 THEOLOGY OR "CHRISTIAN" IDEOLOGY?

In each historical moment the quest for meaning manifests itself
in an assessment of the predicament of man and in the constitution of a framework in which life may be meaningfully ordered. Yet, at the next historical moment, that very manifestation and its constituted framework of meaning is called into question, for the context (Sitz-im-Leben) is constantly changing and each new moment presents a new challenge to man moving the carpet from under his feet whether he is aware of it or not.

Any discipline which addresses itself to the human predicament is forced to define these changing circumstances and to clarify man's contingency; that is, to formulate the ever new problems of human existence, and to offer alternatives for making life meaningful and authentic. In this connection, theology can use the insights of philosophy provided philosophy realizes its own historicity and remains an ongoing critical quest. The absence of this ongoing critical dimension threatens the freedom of man for he becomes a mere object among other objects, not a questioning and thinking subject. A one-dimensional relation now obtains between an unthinking subject and a rigid ideology.

3.3.1. IDEOLOGY: THE FIXING OF ONE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Since the quest for meaning is always a human act in history, it may easily end in the propagation of one or other historical perspective of truth. This is the nature of ideology.

*preliminary findings of this section published in Scriptura No 15 July 1985, p. 1-22 University of Stellenbosch.
The fixing of one perspective leads to historicism, and the ongoing critical quest ends in accommodation to one perspective of truth as valid for all men at all times. In the words of G A Rauche, we have, as it were, "closed shop"; the awareness of the contingency of man and the empirical limits of every human construction is lost. An ideology is born when one constitution of meaning is absolutized. Ideology, therefore, is the petrification of open, free and ongoing quest for meaning. As such, no matter how meaningful an ideology may be for its adherents, it is static, not dynamic. Change occurs only within its confines. Its constitutive function is an end in itself; a terminus ad quem not a terminus a quo.

An ideology explains, for a community, the various structures of its being: social, cultural, religious, political and such like. It propagates certain non-negotiable fundamentals and attempts to guarantee the wholeness of the community or nation. These non-negotiables include the aspirations and self-image of the group, resolution of its major fears and protection of its interests and privileges. By postulating a rigid theoretical framework within which the "life-world" of the group is organized, it presents a "working hypothesis" for that group.

Nationalistic ideologies affirm in particular the survival instinct of the group, often at the expense of other groups. It addresses their insecurities and builds into its working programme the overcoming of these insecurities or threats. If it is labelled "Christian," or given any religious tag then the ideology has the potential to
be even more absolutist and to have a greater hold on the minds of its adherents because both its understanding of the image of the group and its programme to ensure its survival receive divine sanction. Since it possesses the dimension of _mysterium tremendum et fascinans_, questioning one or other aspect of the group's perception of the world is tantamount to heresy, or at worst, blasphemy. We may observe here the indictment that the religious status _quo_, albeit pious and sincere, levelled against Christ himself.

Little wonder that Marx maintained that for the dialectics in the class struggle to proceed unhindered in order that society may be changed, religion should be abolished, for it lulls people into a false consciousness and mystifies the revolutionary spirit. Marx described religion as the,

sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the people... the criticism of religion is thus in embryo the criticism of the vale of tears whose halo is religion. 44

Instead of dismissing the Marxist critique, it should be remembered that this critique arose from a deep concern for the enslaved man in society, and that it rejected a caricature of religion widely evident then and now. This form of religion depended on socio-economic circumstances and on the propagation of the _status quo_. Marx believed that religion required no independent criticism since it was "a secondary phenomenon." 45

This description of the nature of ideology and the limits of religion
may be illustrated by the apartheid ideology prevalent within the South African situation. Whatever "apartheid" may mean to different people, it is a powerful ideology that has absolutized ethnicity. Over and above its political, legal and social implications, according to A Jabensky, for those who have a vested interest in its maintenance, "It simplifies enormously the realities of the world." It presents things in black and white and excludes all the greys.

Even Marx and Althusser, despite their points of disagreement about what constitutes ideology, agree that ideology expresses in practice "a cognitively distorted and impoverished grasp of reality." Within the ideological system, a particular perception of the world is entrenched in the psyche of its members which determines inter alia the reporting of news and its interpretation, the writing of history, the emphasis in education, the organization of people and even the nature of belief in God. Often unconsciously, a type of hermeneutics is at work which reflects the world-view of its members. It is the result of their consciousness and it in turn determines that consciousness.

This circular hermeneutics is used not only to "read" the world, that is, events, news, criticisms, praises, enemies or friends of the system but, if it is a religious ideology, it also determines how the primary texts and the traditions of that religion should be read. Consider, for example, how differently say some Afrikaner Christians and the Black Ethiopian churches read the Old Testament. Observe their markedly different understanding of the exile and of
An ideology has a closed hermeneutics and all thinking within it is aimed at describing and clarifying its structures and goals. It is necessarily intolerant of criticism, especially if one of its non-negotiable fundamentals are called into question. News, information and even history are heavily censored and easily lapse into propaganda. Truths within these confines remain half-truths. What by nature is contingent is absolutized and given timelessness.

Therefore, while an ideology may undoubtedly provide a meaningful theoretical framework for a community or class, at the same time it represents that which is ossified, chiefly because of the absence of self-criticism.

3.3.2. A "CHRISTIAN" IDEOLOGY?

Some would argue that if an ideology is "baptized" and made "Christian," then it can be redeemed and is therefore acceptable. However, to speak of a "Christian ideology" is a contradiction in terms. It fails to understand the "closeness" and static nature of an ideology and it confuses the need for meaning and freedom with the need for ideology.

At first the contradiction is not apparent because "Christian," like the term "ideology," is often loosely and wrongly used. It has come to mean that which represents the teaching of "the Church,"
or belief in a body of ecclesiastical dogmas. This would mean, for example, the Canons of Dort, or the Westminster confession, or the Canons of the council of Trent or the Savoy Declaration or such like. Hence what one has is a multitude of churches, each convinced that it alone is preserving the truth. Therefore, modern attempts at forming an ecumenical body, in spite of the merits of organic unity, are at present shaky conglomerations rather than homogeneous prophetic bodies. They make grand, albeit praiseworthy, resolutions but simply do not change the consciousness of their members.

Within these denominations, some or other credal form becomes the theoretical framework of theology. "Theology," as we observed above, becomes the propagation of one historical perspective. "Christian" thus becomes the equivalent to one or other credal framework which over and above accepting certain basic beliefs, absolutizes certain distinctive doctrines or a theological position. Protestants are as open to the criticism of absolutism as the Roman Catholics whom they criticize on the same issue. Theological positions become fixed and churches continue to proliferate. For example, it is a sad commentary on the church that within the South African Indian Christian community of about 80,000 is found almost every denomination spawned in Europe and America. There are over 50 different churches in the Indian community in Durban alone. 51

The need for creeds is not in question here, for that would mean the denial of history and the rejection of tradition, without which understanding is impeded. We are arguing here against the denial
and lack of awareness of the historicity of these creeds, theologies and of man himself.

As N. Lash states,

The problem of ideology arises, in the first instance... not from the fact that our ideas are social products, but from our 'forgetfulness' of this fact. We tend to be forgetful both of the objective limits that 'determine' our perception of our circumstances and of the extent to which the way we think, and perceive, and argue, reflects underlying patterns of social division and dominance... The symbolic form in which we express our special relations constitute at one and the same time, the form of our freedom and a threat to that freedom. 52

In so far as credal Christianity absolutizes one historical perspective which in turn determines its perception of the world, society and social organization; or in so far as credal Christianity remains within any human system, either openly supporting the theoretical framework of that system or acquiescing by domesticating itself within it, to that intent that credal form has become ideological.

When "Christian" ceases to be the description of a living and vital relationship with Christ, a life of faith as existential encounter, it is no different to any other religious or political belief-system which uncritically co-exists in society. It is a religion that remains "a secondary phenomenon." It is more than a lapsus linguæ that we speak of being a Christian which makes "Christian" descriptive not existential. The essence of being Christian, on the other hand,
is summed up in the imperative: "If any man come after me, let him first deny himself, take up his cross and follow me daily." (Lk p:23) The challenge of the text is to be Christian. As such, "Christian" is a description of a dynamic life in faith.

"Christian Ideology," therefore, is a combination of essentially different and irreconcilable notions: a vital, ongoing encounter with a static ossified belief-system. Affixing "Christian" to any human structure whether religious, political, social or economic is to violate the inherent dynamics of faith and theology.

However, there is yet another reason why this coupling is a contradiction. If faith is not to be mere belief in historical assertions but is understood in dynamic, existential encounter, it has as the object of its concern the source of being (God), in whose image all men already participate. 53

Faith affirms, we have said, man's freedom in God and redemption from the bondage to lesser gods which alienated man (man in Adam) in wont to create. Even the atheist must have a point of reference by which he can order his life meaningfully. Where some form of personal integration or meaning is absent, man either becomes neurotic or escapes into even greater bondage. All men are believers of some kind. The danger is that they may believe in a god which man unwittingly creates in his own image. Little wonder then that Durkeim and the founders of the functional theory view religion as society's worship of itself. 54 This is what is referred to in this study
3.3.3. THE PROBLEM OF HUBRIS

In Greek tragedy the fate of the hero is always predictable: having become the hero he commits the sin of hubris; that is, he transgresses the law determining his mortality and finitude and therefore must, of necessity, suffer defeat and die. 55 Agamemnon walking on the purple carpet was in fact claiming to be more than man. In Sophocle's Ajax also the hero forgets the limits imposed on his nature and glories in his own worth. There is a portion due to man (moira) but if he claims more than his moira, then he commits hubris and dike casts him back. 56 Hence hubris means more than man's pride in himself or "insolence in prosperity." 57 It is man's self-worship; man's attempt to be more than man and to grasp at divinity.

In the creation story we have the clearest insight into the Biblical understanding of sin as hubris. Adam's sin is in principle his unwillingness to be the bearer of the image of God or to take seriously his humanity. He grasps at divinity yielding to the temptation "to be like God" (Gen. 3:5). The result is the belittling of his own humanity and his awareness of his nakedness (Gen. 3:10). The alternative to being fully human is not to be divine but rather to be less than human. Hubris is therefore the flight of man from himself. The way to measure hubris is to observe the extent of his alienation and de-humanization, whether he appears in "capitalistic," "nationalistic," "ecclesiastic" or, the more illusory, "scientific" dress.
Flight from God is the story of man's flight from himself. Alienation is the mark of original sin. Hubris manifests itself in history as the attempts of alienated man to construct a meaningful world wherein his politics, culture, society and religion can be ordered. Nationalism, Fascism, Communism and Capitalism are extreme examples of this attempt at ordering a world around man.

In Nationalism, for instance, there may be clear "Christian" elements. But elevated alongside God is also some other human concern, for example, race, language, culture preservation or survival of the folk. Elevation of creaturely concerns to the level of ultimate concern, to such an extent that these influence our perception of the world and man, leads to the domestication of God to worldly, "Adamic" ends. This is hubris. Ideology, as a rigid system, feeds on hubris. In every ideology some or other creaturely concern, sometimes even a doctrinal formulation, is given absolute value.

Hubris is sin against God and man. Pharisaic religion in the New Testament is a good example of a religious ideology which projected other national or cultural and even religious prejudices alongside God. It so distorted its view of God and its understanding of the human condition, that when the God-man appeared restoring man and calling all to reconciliation with God, it failed to recognize him and sentenced him to death on the charge of blasphemy. Is the cross then not the judgement of man's ideological slavery?

Pharisaic religion was no doubt sincere and pious. It integrated
a religious cultus that gave meaning to its adherents but, like all ideologies, it did so at the exclusion of self-criticism. Its closed hermeneutics excluded the message of Christ which called the whole system into question. For instance, Christ’s “Woe unto you scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites, who travel land and sea to make one convert and when you have made him you make him twice as fit for hell than yourselves” (Mat. 23:15); or, “Woe, unto you scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites, for you shut up the kingdom of heaven against men: for you neither go in yourselves nor allow them that are entering to go in.” (Mat. 23:13) Anything that does not fit into the ideological Procrustean bed is considered to be untruths or rejected as blasphemy.

Dialogue with such a “mental horizon” is determined and fixed only by its preunderstanding of truth; hence there can be no real encounter. On recognizing this, Christ lamented, “They have eyes and they do not see; they have ears and they do not hear.” (Mat. 13:13-15; Mk. 4:12; 8:18; Lk. 8:10; Jh. 9:39-41). Therefore, they are “ever learning but they do not come to truth.” (II Tim. 3:7). Pharisaic ideology professed to be in the service of truth, but it was a “truth” where obedience to fixed norms and the performance of rites that claimed divine sanction “led to salvation;” a “truth” that had enslaved its adherents to the Law. Christ, on the other hand, proclaimed, “Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free.” (Jh. 8:32-36)

This study has attempted to show that to live authentically
is to be fully human which as Christ showed is to live coram Deo. To be truly free, therefore, is to live in faith; in reconciliation with God. Freedom is a precondition of man's full humanity and of human creativity. This is the mark of his being the image of God. Divinity, therefore, is not opposed to humanity otherwise the Incarnation would not have been possible. Divinity fulfills humanity; it does not eclipse it. That is the significance of the Christ-event.

If freedom is the precondition of humanity which can only be realized in encounter with God, and if alienation is the denial of such an encounter, it follows then that the state of alienation is a state of unfreedom and slavery. This is the reason why, as we observed in Part I, man is obliged to pay homage to lesser gods such as "nation," "success." "Utopia" or, as in the case of the humanist, "human goodness." Religion within an ideological system necessarily lapses into idolatry, for Romans 1:28 defines idolatry as the raising of creatureliness to co-equality with God or, inversely stated, the conferring of ultimacy and absolute value on mundane and human concerns.

Faith and theology are by nature opposed to ideology since true worship is Biblically defined as loving God, with "all one's heart, with all one's soul, with all one's mind, and with all one's strength" because "The Lord our God is one Lord" (Mk. 10:29, 30). As Kierkegaard stated it, "Purity of heart is to will one thing." 58
3.3.4. THEOLOGY, FAITH AND ESCAPE FROM IDEOLOGY

How can the breaking through ideology, necessary to change society's consciousness, be achieved? How can we draw ourselves out of the system which controls our very minds? It may well be the case that rapid socio-economic or political change may fracture an ideology's theoretical framework, since its traditional answers may no longer satisfy some of its adherents. Two possibilities may arise from such a situation. Firstly, the justifications of the ideological stance will change and its educationists, political thinkers and theologians, amongst others, will provide a wider frame of reference for the group. Its previously restricted self-image may be extended to include others or the society will be reorganized to counter the treats to the system. Several changes and improvements will be effected provided the non-negotiable fundamentals remain intact.

Secondly, it may well be that with time the ideology becomes increasingly less meaningful, societal homogeneity is lost and the hold the ideology had on its adherents, dwindles and dies. It should be borne in mind that we are referring to ideologies at large and what is said here is relevant for social and political ideologies, like those we face in South Africa and several parts of the world, and religious or "Christian" ideologies which absolutize a credal, theological or historical form. In the latter case, if the ideological hold is lost, religious commitment disappears, the youth may be alienated from the church, church growth is almost non-existent and there may be general spiritual bankruptcy.

However, such change as described in the second possibility normally
occurs over a very long period of time unless it is brought about by revolutionary means. In fact, when aspects like race, nation, language and ethnicity are absolutized, such a transformation may never occur.

Within a nationalistic ideology, a substitution of one quantum for another, for example, black for white, proletariat for bourgeoisie or one race for another, will not achieve the liberation from ideology or the transformation of consciousness that is imperative to change society.

To begin with, it is incumbent upon us to ask "first order" questions in order to liberate us from the hermeneutical stranglehold of ideology. For example, not merely to ask whether a law is justly administered, or whether justice is properly executed, but to ask whether the law itself is just. The supporters of the status quo, in the enthusiasm to preserve law and order, fail to see that several of the laws themselves are designed to safeguard the prejudices and biases of the system.

Another example is the liberal plea within the system for equal opportunities and equal wages for equal work. However, the capitalistic system within which such parity would be achieved remains unexamined. "First order" questions would have to enquire into the crudity of the capitalistic ethic which is based on the supposed harmony that the Enlightenment believed existed in human societies; an ethic that accepts that the selfish seeking of one's own good will lead
to the benefit of all.

Failure to consistently ask "first order" questions will always lead us to marry off Christianity with that which is incompatible with it. The Russian Christian, Berdyaev saw, for example, how the capitalism within which "we live and move and have our being" gave rise to the de-personalization and de-spiritualization of man that prepared the way for Communism, Fascism and Nazism. 59 He wrote,

Modern capitalistic civilization is essentially atheistic and hostile to the idea of God. The crime of killing God must be laid at their door... The useful and practical God of capitalism cannot be the true God. 60

Reference has already been made to this danger that functionalism poses to faith and theology. Its pragmatism and utilitarianism stifle spirituality.

Unless we commit ourselves to a critical analysis of the fundamentals of our system or the systems within which men are generally imprisoned, we pay only lip-service to freedom and to God. Hence even a change of governments or a replacement of white nationalism by black nationalism will not guarantee the change of consciousness needed to transform society. To merely admit more blacks into the ranks of the middle-class so that greater numbers may wallow in greater opulence, only mystifies true freedom. It leaves the system intact and the spiritual crisis remains. The crisis of man today is his dehumanization and increasing ideological slavery. Berdyaev, has rightly pointed out that "any ideology... even the Christian, can
be turned to the service of egoism." The crisis of man's unfreedom is his falleness as a result of hubris and his inability to redeem himself and rediscover his full humanity on his own. The more he tries, the more he merely succeeds in redecorating his gods which continue to have feet of clay. The ideological crisis of man, therefore, is his state of idolatry.

How then shall we escape the ideological stranglehold? It has already been intimated that only faith as living encounter with God produces such a breakthrough. Faith, like freedom, can never be a possession; it is a state of being before God which has to be affirmed ever anew. Only as such can faith and freedom be gifts of grace. As we already asserted, when the dynamics of faith is lost, man settles down and puts down roots in some or other system, thus abrogating his freedom. The object of one's belief is the indicator of whether faith is authentic or not, for God as the object of ultimate concern, necessarily stands opposed to all possible rivals. Therefore, all religions, including Christianity, which accommodate themselves in a system which projects as primary a creaturely concern alongside God, are idolatrous.

To avoid this happening, as shown by the Reformation, the ongoing and critical dimensions must be built into theological approach and method. Tillich called this critical dimension the "Protestant principle" which he defined as that which...

... protests against the identification of our ultimate concern with any creation of the church, including the biblical writings, in so far as their witness to what is really ultimate concern is also
a conditioned expression of their own spirituality. The task of theology is no longer only clarification and confirmation, but the testing of the Church's teaching; hence the Reformational principle *ecclesia reformata semper reformanda*. Nevertheless, Protestantism all too quickly lost the self-critical dimension and became itself institutionalized and dogmatic.

This critical dimension we have already argued is indispensable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ which has the Cross at its heart and which sums up Christ's own life of faith. It symbolizes God's judgement on the whole system that put to death the God-man. It stands in judgement of all systems that continue to distort humanity and the true image of God. It stands in judgement, therefore, of all forms of human slavery, of ideological self-righteousness and arrogance, of hubris and of all forms of idolatry. Therefore, Christ proclaimed, "All who save their lives shall lose it but those who lay down their lives for my sake shall find it." (Mt. 10:39; Mk. 8:35; Lk. 9:34; Lk. 17:33; Jn. 12:25). While Adam grasped at divinity and in the process became dehumanized and unfree, Christ in the wilderness rejected the offer of divinity and willingly laid down his life. As St. Paul states it, "He thought it not robbery to be equal with God: but made himself of no reputation and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men... " (Ph. 2:7-8). Hence, unless we and all that we hold dear stand always under the judgement of the Cross, in our quest for freedom, we create greater unfreedom.

Theology as ongoing critical reflection constantly proclaims the Cross in each new age and context and can never be merely the explica-
tion of a creed or a body of dogmas. While a creed may be believed it cannot be merely repeated. The Christ of the Gospel, as it were, must become contemporaneous with us in order to call us to ever new commitment and to challenge us never to rest in our own system. The Christ that is confined to the Bible or a church tradition cannot present this challenge.

The nature of a living theology is summed up in Christ's call in Luke 9:23:

If any man would come after me, let him first deny himself and take up his cross and follow me, daily.

"Deny yourself" rescues man from the sin of hubris; "first" indicates that the starting point of his liberation is his acquiring this perspective of himself; "take up his cross" is the invitation to walk the way of faith which is open to judgement and grace, the critical way of faith; "follow me" affirms the ultimacy of the walk of faith vis-à-vis the ultimate object of faith; "daily" affirms the ongoing nature of faith as encounter. These injunctions that lie at the heart of the Gospel have the potential to rescue man from self-will, ideology and idolatry and to draw him out of his prejudices to live for God and for others. Only if the Church takes its theological task seriously, will it witness to living Christianity; only then can it be the community of faith; only then can it present a challenge to every human system which tribalizes God; and only then will the Church have the potential to transform society. 63

The neo-Marxists realized that one could not rely on the proletariat,
as Marx had done, to change the system. Only "new men," Marcuse said, who themselves have escaped from the stranglehold of the system can change it. However, he did not say how these "new men" come about. Humanism, also, with its uncritical faith in human nature, fails to alter the consciousness of society.

Only through spiritual effort, says Paul, will we not "conform to this world but be transformed by the renewing of the mind." (Rom. 12:2). Berdyaev who suffered the same anxieties as Marcuse and the humanists concluded,

I became a Christian not because I ceased to believe in man, in his dignity and higher calling, in his creative freedom, but because I sought a profounder and more stable basis for this faith.

Since nothing short of a change in consciousness is required to change society, the churches, in order to be the communities of faith, must direct all their energies to first developing a critical distance from the status quo. This may be achieved if the following factors are seriously heeded:

1. Since 

2. Commensurate with the freedom of faith for the world and for the other, the church to be truly church and not a caricature of it, must be the manifestation of the spiritual community which
represents all humanity. The Russian notion of sobornost is a useful analogy in this connection: a "communion of the Spirit;" "the dynamic life of the collective body;" "altogetherness" opposed to both authoritarianism and individualism, "a freedom in love which unites believers," says Bulgakov, where "tradition is a check upon mere individualism, but no check upon original creative activity." Sobornost does not mean collectivism which is a "means for domination and will-to-power" as the Grand Inquisitor believed, but is the spiritual quality of men and as such recognizes freedom and the value of the person. Therefore, the Church as the community of faith and of the Spirit must reject any ideological constraints which threaten to distort its true nature. The Church as sobornost is in service to the whole of humanity and its openness must be widely proclaimed in order to preserve its own integrity. A global vision must replace its tribal one. It is an anomaly that some churches do not allow everybody to attend its services or that their sole preoccupation is to maintain their own confessional, historical or theological character.

3. Theology, in order to make decisions of faith possible, must be living and ecumenical in spirit; that is, it must be accomplished in community otherwise it will always absolutize one truth-perspective at the exclusion of others. Hence every faculty of theology should insist that its doors be open to all irrespective of race or denominational affiliation. However, this must not be done because of socio-political expediency, but because of a serious concern for a living theology. To study theology in racial or denomination isola-
tion absolutizes one context or historical perspective, creates self-righteousness and dogmatism, and fosters a distorted understanding of the message of Christ.

4. A self-critical dimension that disallows ideology must be built into all our human programmes or theoretical frameworks, whether creeds or theologies, constitutions or statements of intent. Theology must remain a theology of the Cross (cf. p 302f).

5. The churches have to face the challenge that their relevance for society is not self-evident. That the mere citing of some creedal position or Biblical texts or even the name of Christ is not adequate to validate its claim to be the community of the Spirit. Those within the churches, who have achieved the escape from ideology, have the responsibility of taking the initiative in leading others out of ideological bondage to face the risk of faith. It is unfortunate that the heads of churches, the synods and "headquarters" are themselves often ideologically bound and are stumbling-blocks to the liberation from ideology. It therefore is futile to ask members of such institutions to vote on whether these institutions should be opened to all or be changed since they are themselves prisoners to the ideology. Such is also the myth of choice peddled in the name of democracy, a modern obsession that fails to understand that freedom must precede choice not the other way around.

It is clear that ad hoc socio-political adjustments will not solve the problems of dehumanization and ideological slavery. A society
can only be changed if the consciousness of individuals within it has been changed and if these form the avant-garde. If the "true church" is the community of faith and freedom, it is ipso facto the standard by which societies are judged.

As a writer in Theology Today stated,

"It is true that our political and social problems are monumental and need solution, but it may very well be that at their root is a deep spiritual crisis which makes any cleaning-up operations frustrating illusions. The truth is that we have lost touch with the depth of being and hence have become alienated from ourselves, from each other and from our environment as a whole. Our society, like Humpty Dumpty, cannot be put together by all the King's horses and men, no matter how well financed they be. In fact, they may only make matters worse."

This is especially true because what we have is not a church above the system seeking to transform it through committed service (or et labore), but churches firmly set within the system inadvertently bolstering it. Therefore, all their actions, though sincere and undoubtedly well-intentioned remain the toil of Sisyphus. They remain functional "solutions" for a spiritual and existential problem.

3.4 BACK TO THEOLOGY NOT SCHOLASTICISM!

Our emphasis on a return to true theology and not its abdication in favour of actionalism or, functionalism or confessionalism, and the call "for theology to be theology" may elicit the objection
that this is a return to Scholasticism; that is, it is "a retrogression to academic discussion." Such an understanding, says Mackay, involves a total misunderstanding of what true theology is. He cites the objection of none other than John Macmurray who in his *Clue to history* argued that theology is the child of Greek metaphysics. While his indictment on theology, for the reasons offered above, is incorrect, he has perhaps inadvertently placed his finger on the problem.

The history of Christian thought contains ample evidence of theology being besieged by rigid philosophical presuppositions; for example, the influence of Platonism and neo-Platonism during the first five centuries; of Aristotle's philosophy in the Medieval period; of idealism, especially Hegel, in the modern period and a host of reactions to Hegel, from Romanticism to Existentialism in our century. Theology must engage all the quests of man in order to undergird its own encounter with the world. We have said already that faith requires the ongoing, critical reflection of philosophy to evaluate its judgment of the historicity of human systems and to provide new paradigms to illustrate its own dynamic message. It requires the critical dimension of science to clarify its claims that the world and its laws cannot have religious power over man. However, theology must keep its critical distance or else it is subsumed by these philosophical or scientific quests the limitations of which philosophers and scientists themselves, at least the truly great among them, are keenly aware. Hermann Wayer, the mathematician, for example, admitted, "We have tried to storm Heaven and we have only succeeded in piling
Yet theology has uncritically imbibed these secular models and often unconsciously, compromised its own proclamation. Theology is not opposed to reason; that would make its own formulations anomalous. Yet its model of man as the man of faith must be protected from the ravishes of scepticism. Lev Shestov insisted that against speculative philosophy and science (Athens) must be set the revelation of the Bible (Jerusalem) with its "paradoxical but profoundly true and liberating proclamation that, through faith in God who transcends all rational categories and human expectations, man may not only again find that 'nothing is impossible' for him but also catch a glimpse of that true reality which the light of human reason only obscures." 74 He, of course, was not advocating irrationalism or anti-rationalism!

There is a major difference between Greek philosophy and Hebraic thought. The latter contains no eternal realm of ideas or essences. The Hellenic man is the man of reason who raises his eyes to the universal, the abstract and the realm of forms. 75 The Hebraic man is the man of faith who knew the "uncertainties and waverings of faith as a matter of personal experience" but did not know the conflict of faith with reason; that was to come much later with the Greeks. 76 However, even when that encounter with the Greeks took place, Paul still located the centre of human personality in faith while it was Aristotle who had placed that centre in reason. William Barrett concludes that the opposition is between what is vital and what is
rational. Macmurray's scepticism is well-founded in view of the fact that Western Christian theology, for the large part of its history, has been an extended footnote to Graeco-Roman theology. Hence its preoccupation with cosmological, functional and ontological proof for God and its indulgence in metaphysical speculation. As Shestov stated it, in history the case has been that "...first Athens was and only later Jerusalem. And consequently everything which proceeded out of Jerusalem must be weighed in the balances of Athens." Therefore, in spite of the fact that Christianity entered the Western world almost two thousand years ago, its inherent dynamism and message of unconditional freedom of all men before God has not made an appreciable difference to the quest for freedom because it has not dislodged its moorings in Graeco-Roman culture. Ivan Kireevsky, (1806-1856) therefore, accused Western theologians of elevating abstract logic above the "common consciousness of the Universal Church" and therefore the Western church "sowed within itself the inescapable seeds of the Reformation." It's Graeco-Roman mental framework rendered it incapable of "visualizing the unity of the church in any other form than that of a formal unity under one bishop." Zernov, from a Russian orthodox point of view, compares starkly the differences between Western Christianity and the Christianity of Eastern orthodoxy thus:

... the Western social and political order has been built on the Idea of the Law; the ten Commandments, the Roman ideal of justice and the notion of privilege were the three solid pillars which supported the imposing edifice of European civiliza-
tion. But the Russians were brought up in the Spirit of the Sermon on the Mount. 81
This view does not attempt to jettison reason but merely to keep reason in perspective. Theology does not have to make its object, the object of faith, logically accessible to me. That is impossible! The object of faith must be apprehended existentially. However, its reflection also must bear the character of vital existential reflection or else it indulges in abstract speculation.

The tendency to systematize is always present because it is a human tendency to find assurance in a fool-proof and complete system. However, such a rational system remains an abstraction and is the greatest danger to faith and freedom. The most potent literary description of this point, without doubt, is Dostoyevsky's parable of the Grand Inquisitor, wherein the ecclesiastical head in the sixteenth century interrogates Christ: "Why did you come to meddle with us?" he asks. "I know not who you are and I do not want to know ... the same people who today kissed your feet, will at the first sign from me rake up the coals at your stake tomorrow." 82 "Everything," the Inquisitor reminds Christ, "has been handed over by you to the Pope and, therefore, everything is in the Pope's hands, and there is no need for you to come at all now - at any rate, do not interfere for the time being... All that you might reveal anew would encroach on men's freedom for faith, for it would come as a miracle, and their freedom of faith was dearer to you than anything even in those days, fifteen hundred years ago." 83 What the Inquisitor says next indicates most profoundly how faith when formulated into a system
satisfies men more than true freedom which is offered to them in Christ. "For fifteen centuries," says the Inquisitor, "we have been troubled by this freedom. Now it's over and done with." The system has been completed in Christ's name. "These men are more than ever convinced that they are absolutely free, and yet they themselves have brought their freedom to us and humbly laid it at our feet." 84 Men find freedom "alluring" but also "tormenting." "We have corrected your great work," taunts the church leader, "and have based it on miracle, mystery, and authority." 85

The incisive beauty of Dostoyevsky's writing is impossible to reproduce here. What is clear, however, is that the radicality of faith and freedom often forces man to settle for less. Theology caught in logic, system-building and structuring, often succumbs to the temptation to systematize faith and invariably impinges on human freedom. Such is the bitter fruit of all rationalizations of faith!

The call for a living, existential theology therefore, is the call to place theology "on the Road" which means that it must steer away from both the Scylla of theological rationalism, scholasticism and dogmatism, and the Charybdis of actionalism, quietism, and ecclesiastical operationalism.

3.5 EXISTENTIAL THEOLOGY: A THEOLOGY ON THE WAY

It will be clear that what was said about the existential nature of faith is equally applicable to the nature of theological method.
Theology is existential since it is inextricably intertwined with man's contingent experience. It is true that is is based on revelation but the theological task is to seek out that revelation in history, in the world and in the coming of the kingdom of God. If such revelation were self-evident faith would be redundant. G A Rauche in his latest work points out that,

Real faith is a contingent experience in the sense that it might happen to man in the midst of the crisis of truth and himself. On the grounds of the experience of this crisis, theology ought to admit its own ignorance and confess that it cannot give conclusive answers. It is only in this insight that it can proceed to its real task of referring man to the event of the cross as an event of exemplary faith and in the face of this event, point to the possible experience of faith by man in his actual experience. 86

While faith is rooted in and manifests itself in, man's existential or contingent crisis, when faith "happens," the believing subject remains an existing subject and, therefore, can never escape the crisis of truth. Rather, faith confronts these crises and is strengthened in the process. The believer, as Paul says, must "fight the good fight of faith." (1 Ti. 6:12; 11 Ti. 4:7).

Similarly, theology also is rooted in the changing experience of man's crisis of truth. It is literally always on the way, or on "the road." This is the case, because faith is not wrought ex opere operate but is the ongoing quest for a clarification of revelation; God with us. James Brown, for instance, points out that truth does not lie on the road of "an unappropriated, unmediated object....
a hammer is a tool when it is being used (Zuhandenheit)." Revelation is only revelation when it is apprehended and appropriated otherwise it remains of no effect. Theology like faith appropriates tradition (Kierkegaard); it remains "a challenge in the appearance of things" (Buber) and is a "Kerygma claiming divine sanction" (Barth). Just as the language of faith itself is a language of struggle, says Ebeling, so theology is, for good reasons, a theory of struggle. F.H. Heinemann in his attempt to go beyond Existentialism and develop his "meta-analytics" spoke of the quest for truth as obtaining in the truism respondeo ergo sum. This view has positive implications for the view expounded in this study, of faith as ongoing, critical encounter provided Rauce's warning that this "responding," even in faith, is not removed from the actuality of human existence and from the contingent experience of reality. Theology is always on the way because it can never escape the sphere of human conflict. To speak in these terms is not to deny the objectivity of revelation, nor the finality of Christ nor is it to advocate Christian existentialism. Our distinction between "existential" and "existentialism" in Part II puts paid to that fear.

What is being contended here may perhaps be illustrated by J. A. Mackay's distinction between theology "from the balcony" and "theology on the road." For him "the Balcony" and "the Road" are qualitative descriptions of human life. "The Balcony" represents the life of the spectator for whom life and the world are permanent objects for study. "A man may live a permanent balconized existence even
though the physical part of him has the ubiquity of the globe trotter. " 92 "The Balcony" means an "immobility of soul" that may "perfectly co-exist" with a "mobile, peripatetic body."

On the other hand, "the Road" is,

... the place where life is intensely lived, where thought has its birth in conflict and concern, where choices are made and decisions are carried out... It is the place of action, of pilgrimage, of crusade, where concern is never absent from the wayfarer's heart. On the Road a goal is sought, dangers are faced, life is poured out... the Road, like the Balcony, is a state of the soul. 93

Theology must be found "on the Road" because that is where authentic faith is. If it stays in the Balcony, then no matter how profound its formulation, it is removed from life and becomes absolutist, dogmatic and life-less. Ernest Renan and several of the questors for the historical Jesus, the History of Religions School the liberalism of 19th century theology, Ritschl and other thinkers that advocate an ethical monotheism, and a host of theologians in our time who have reduced Christianity to a form of ethical humanism, on the one hand, or a rigid, self-contained dogmatics on the other, remain thinkers in the Balcony. Kierkegaard's "pugno ergo sum" is foreign to these theologians.

* * * * *

Finally, we must pursue a definition of theology as contextualization which, it will be shown, undergirds the dynamics of faith and which offers a methodology that keeps both the commitment to the sources
of Christian faith and the dynamism of that faith in balance. Again, in order to illustrate the argument, "home grown" examples will be elicited though several from elsewhere would have also made the point.

3.6 THEOLOGY AS CONTEXTUALIZATION*

In recent years "contextualization" has become a popular word in certain theological circles. It made its international appearance some 30 years ago and has since become the watchword of some theologians, especially those in the Third world. However, it has received little attention from theological faculties at large where it has occupied only a small place in the syllabus on mission studies. Europe, Great Britain and North America have, in the main, handled the call to contextualize theology as a Third World or a missiological concern and have given it only very cautious academic treatment.

Nowhere else is this ambivalence towards "contextualization" more evident than in South Africa. Here, theology is not only taught mainly within denominational and clearly defined ecclesiastical compartments, but also the issue is confounded by ethnic, linguistic and racial separation. Hence Bible colleges and faculties of theology at universities are in the main structured along denominational lines, each with its own linguistic or racial tag supported by a socio-political system that has idolized ethnicity.

*Part of these findings have been already published by the University of Potchefstroom's Institute for Reformational studies as a conference paper entitled "Contextualization of the Gospel in South Africa: the question of relevance" (December 1983).
3.6.1. THE PROBLEM OF POLARIZATION

This divisive milieu has spawned a series of other divisions also ethnically and racially determined; for example, church services, polity and constitutions. The formal separation of people and Christians from one another fosters gross ignorance about the life-world and the aspirations of one another. While such ignorance cannot be condoned, it can perhaps be understood how, in the vicious world of free enterprise, materialism and soul-less capitalism where men are not their "brother's keeper," such lack of empathy for the other could exist. However, what is dismaying is that churches, their ministers and theologians, have, by and large, displayed a similar lack. These divisions in South Africa along ethnic, racial and denominational lines must also be understood, however, against the polarization of thought and life symptomatic of our times.

One of the most unfortunate divisions in twentieth century church history has been the fixed lines drawn between so-called "evangelicals" and "ecumenicals." The former are concerned with the preservation of Apostolic Christianity based on the "inerrant scriptures" and emphasize the numerical growth of the church. Conversion of non-Christians and the "salvation" of the world are among their chief priorities. The latter, attempting to unite a divided church, reject the dichotomy that exists in much of "evangelical" Christianity between the "salvation of the soul" and the "whole person." They see as endemic to Christian proclamation the involvement of the Church in the struggles of the poor, the socially dispossessed and with
the pariahs of modern society.

While "evangelicals" have been accused of encouraging a theology that is other-worldly and which implies socio-political conformism, "ecumenicals" have been accused of theological liberalism and of politicising theology.

It is obvious how, in South Africa, theological reflection within racial divisions has been buttressed by the evangelical and ecumenical debate abroad. Some have openly given theological credibility to the underlying ideology that pervades this country. Others have been vociferous in their criticisms of this ideology, yet have established at almost every level of their church's structure a racially disunited witness to the oneness of the church they sincerely affirm.

Many black Christians, on the other hand, dissatisfied with the status quo, either move away from fellowship with whites or remain within the churches deeply frustrated.

Blacks in their theological reflection have been forced to critically evaluate the theology they inherited via the missionaries and theological teachers. Black theology, for example, attempted to establish the meaning of the Gospel for people who by the fact of being black were disadvantaged in society. Black theology not only interpreted the gospel as a means of healing the inner hurts and insecurities of black people, but also exposed the irrelevance for their context of much of traditional Christianity which had been worked out in
other contexts by other Christians at other times. Hence black theology aims to be part of the process that de-culturizes and 'demythologizes' the Christianity black people have inherited. 97

In this regard, Father Nolan, in June 1982, speaking at a conference on contextual theology, at Hummanskraal, pointed out that this inherited theology had been "done" in the context of Western culture and liberal capitalism and almost always in the context of middle-class comfort and complacency and therefore had turned out to be "simply meaningless words" in the Third World; they had, he argued, "no power to inspire" because they were from "another world." 98

Tissa Balasuriya, in the context of the human struggles of India and Sri Lanka, also maintained that the inherited western theology lacked inspiration and was irrelevant for his life-situation. He wrote,

Jesus of Nazareth is one of the persons most misrepresented and misunderstood in history. We Christians are largely responsible for this. He was presented to Asia in modern times in the manner he was thought of in modern Western Europe and later North America. Both the Protestant and Catholic institutions of religion adapted themselves to the capitalistic ethic, though with somewhat different accents. 99

Black theology aimed to indigenize theology; to make the proclamation of the Gospel meaningful to black people; indeed, to give the black experience and its struggle for freedom a biblical basis.
While South African, the North American brand of black theology received refinement at the hands of such black scholars as Manas Buthelezi, S. Molemela, B. Goba, Desmond Tutu, and others. They not only voiced the anxiety of the South African poor, the socially disinherited and the politically voiceless, but they also attempted to make the Gospel of Christ relevant to the black context.

Some argued that this "new" theology threatened the very nature of the "true gospel" because it politicised everything: it did not take seriously the creeds and beliefs of the Church. A certain well known white missiologist maintained that black theology narrowed salvation to only political liberation. He concluded that black theology was illegitimate in South Africa since blacks in this country had neither suffered slavery nor "lynching" as blacks in the U.S had experienced. Thus he trivialized the struggles of his fellow South Africans and of his fellow theologians who grappled seriously with the problem of the "relevance" of the Gospel of Christ.

Another important attempt at indigenizing theology in South Africa is so-called "African theology," sometimes called "cultural theology." This approach argues, and rightly so, that conversion of Africans to Christianity does not necessarily mean the abandonment of their cultural heritage, traditions and history. The cultural milieu within which the Gospel was proclaimed has always influenced its expression whether Semitic, Greek, Byzantine, Medieval European, German, Anglo-Saxon, Indian or African. G Setiloane, for example,
maintains that black theology in South Africa has not gone far enough in making the gospel relevant to black people. In order for theology to speak to the African mind it had to speak of God in a creatively new way not only within European categories of thought as Black Theology does. 102 Such Africanization would also help introduce new paradigms to describe, explain and understand Biblical truths. 103 This would help non-Africans also to speak creatively of the Gospel. 104

While African theology met with the approval of several missiologists, many believed that such an endeavour could lead to a flirtation with "paganism." It tended, they argued, to minimize the biblical metaphors of atonement, sacrifice, redemption, propitiation, penal justice and such like. For many, such metaphors and symbols, by virtue of their being part of the Scriptures, were also inspired and were therefore inviolable.

The preceding are not the only examples of theological indigenization in South Africa. Another example of how a community has attempted to make the Gospel relevant to their life-situation culture and history, is the theology that has undergirded a great deal of the Afrikaners' affirmation of political and cultural freedom, a theology that validated the Great Trek and provided a scriptural paradigm for the Afrikaner to overcome British imperialism and subdue the "black threat" and enter into a "covenant" with God as Israel had done. In fact, a remodelled version of this theology still underpins certain latent aspects of Afrikaner nationalism or its most recent form, euphemistically called, the "self-determination" of all races in South Africa.
N. Smith, a Dutch Reformed Church minister and former professor of missiology at the University of Stellenbosch, recently pointed out the role his church, for example, had played in initiating and propagating the ideology of separate development. 105

This kind of theology of race is not unique to the Afrikaner. In similar vein the "British-Israel" theory found acceptance among some Anglo-Saxons. The writer came upon a book which purported to be "a survey of scriptural prophecies over the last 3,500 years, which by their fulfilment, prove conclusively that the Anglo-Saxon race is the Israel nation of the Bible." 106

Thus theological compartmentalization has been fostered within South Africa as theologies, functioning within clearly defined theoretical frameworks, have created within this country, but also elsewhere, a theological impasse. The problem with these attempts at seeking theological relevance is that while they offer important new insights which all of Christendom can benefit from; they also fix one perspective or one theoretical frame of reference which becomes the parameters of their theological pursuit whether these are embodied in the categories "black," "African," "race," "Afrikaner," "Anglo-Saxon," "liberation," "political change," "success" "nation" etc. As such the criticism levelled at fixed theoretical frameworks in both philosophy and theology (Part I and II) must also apply, though to varying degrees, to such categorical absolutization. For example, the category "liberation" obviously has broader scope than "Anglo-Saxon" or "black." However, all such categories when absolutized vitiate the dimensions of "ongoingness" and "self-criticism."
One is reminded here of Solzhenitsyn's critique of modern society. In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech he observed that,

People of different countries (we may add "races," classes" or "colours") bring their own scales of value to events. Unyielding and in full self-confidence, they judge by that scale, and by no other... There is a scale for things that happen nearby and a scale for things that happen far away... There are different scales of humiliation... different scales for punishment and for crime... confidently we judge the whole world by our scale. For this reason what seems to us greater, more painful or more intolerable is not that which actually is greater, more painful or more tolerable but that which is nearer to us. Anything further away, which is not actually threatening to arrive on our front-door step is accepted by us - with all its groans of pain, smothered screams, destroyed lives and even millions of victims - as something generally tolerable and within reasonable limits. 107

The fact of different and fixed frames of reference and absolutized truth perspectives, and different "scales" for viewing "our" crisis and "their" concerns, explains also the incongruency that obtains in theological pursuits. In South Africa, for example, black and white Christians speak more often than not at cross purposes. While the former work for liberation and justice, the latter are at pains to emphasize the need for law and order. The gulf widens as the age feeds on self-righteousness which polarizes allegiances between Christians and Christians. Both sides listening but failing to hear the anxieties that "inhere" in the struggle of faith
in each other's contexts because of the uncritical "scales" which govern their very thought.

3.6.2. CONTEXTUALIZATION: THE WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE

In view of the danger of indigenous or "contextual" theology degenerating into "Christian" ideology, it would seem that contextualization is a highly suspect enterprise, raising fears among those concerned with "preserving the Gospel." On the contrary, contextualization is endemic to the very methodology of theology as ongoing, critical reflection of faith. Contextualization is part of the process of understanding the Gospel and is the bulwark against theology degenerating into ideology. In order to elucidate the points made in this statement we have to clarify several other issues first. We begin by first seeking a definition of contextual theology.

The pamphlet published by the Institute of Contextual Theology defines contextual theology as "the conscious attempt to do theology from within the context of real life in the world." 108 B Goba, commenting on the raison d'être of contextual theology, pointed out that "the right method of doing theology in our context is that of taking a story of our time... as being part of the Word of God... there is a challenge to evolve a new theological methodology, the involvement-option methodology... there is a need to move from orthodoxy to orthopraxis, a move from deductive to inductive reasoning which puts a high premium on sense observation and on contextualization particularities." 109 Goba's idea of orthopraxis, as we have pointed out already,
is bound to endanger ultimately the autonomy of theory. It tends to diminish the necessary tension that must remain between theory (whether inductive or deductive), and practice. As Ebeling had stated:

*The hermeneutic task consists for theology in nothing else but in understanding the Gospel as addressed to contemporary man. Whoever does not expose himself to the tension that entails, betrays both the Gospel and contemporary man alike.*

Goba, however, quite correctly points to the need for theory to be relevant for practice and for new theory which takes the context of its hearers seriously enough even to generate new "stories" or categories or loci for the theological task.

John Aitchison in his report on the contextual theology seminar held by the Association of Southern African Theological Institutions (ASATI), defines contextual theology as the,

...taking of the concrete situation itself as text within the broader real life situation or context. It is a recognition that the concrete situation is itself a 'text' and contains information that has to be 'read,' 'comprehended,' and 'integrated' into our existing store of experiential and literary knowledge.

In this ASATI experiment on contextualization, several characteristics of contextual theology emerged. It was found that contextualization required a reformation of the traditional theological curriculum and the *modus operandi* of theological and Christian education. It meant that students and staff have not only to experience the problems of living with the disadvantaged, to analyse their contexts with the aid of the social sciences and then to ask what light the Christian
faith throws on these issues, but also to make a commitment and within their communities to act on the basis of this commitment. 112

It is important, at this point, to distinguish between "contextualization" and "indigenization." The latter, as we have intimated already, is the attempt to make the Gospel relevant and understandable to a given context. Contextualization is the attempt to reflect critically within the context so that the Gospel may be understood. Hence contextualization precludes the carte blanche application of a given body of Christian teaching to a context even if contextual illustrations and examples, be they cultural, economic or political ones, are used to explain a predetermined view of what constitutes Gospel; that is the approach adopted by some attempts at indigenization. Contextualization reverses the process. Its terminus ad quem is the Gospel of Christ not the application of that Gospel to a context as is the case with indigenization. 113

Contextualization as a theological methodology often presupposes indigenization but goes beyond it. 114 Black theology in so far as it makes the Bible applicable to blacks and African theology in so far as it uses African categories to explain the Christian Gospel are both exercises in indigenization not contextualization; although the latter has greater scope for contextualization. The terminus a quo of indigenization is some consciously or unconsciously comprehended body of Christian doctrine which is adapted or made accessible to a given context (terminus ad quem). Many of those who at this point advocate the view that contextual theology begins in the context and moves towards the Gospel, however, fail to realize the just
as one cannot read the text without presuppositions, likewise no one can read the context in a presuppositionless way.

Contextualization rather refers to what we have been stating throughout this study, that theological reflection is done in the full understanding of the contingency of human experience of reality. Contextual theology attempts to reflect reflexively from a context to the Scripture and in the process it addresses both the context and man at large.

This distinction seems not to have been sufficiently grasped because much of the writing on contextualization relapses into views not dissimilar to indigenization. This is illustrated in a recent editorial in Missiology. Arthur Glasser claiming to be "reasonably aware of the varied ways in which the term contextualization is being currently harnessed to a wide range of mutually exclusive presuppositions," proceeds to point out that many evangelicals have posited "harsh limitations to any contextualizing process" because they "raise the orange flag of caution" when the "legitimate demands of the gospel which they believe is precisely defined in Scripture" have to be worked out within "any specific cultural context." Glasser points out that all too often this caution renders them (evangelicals) "incapable of discerning the significant ways in which the gospel impinges on the cultural context." "They need," he maintains, "the breadth of perspective that the social sciences bring to the analysis of culture." 115 Glasser also maintains that "liberal scholars" have "taken the dissection of economic, social and political components of a culture so far that their contextualizing of the Gospel within
it seems derived from warm hearted imagination rather than from hard biblical exegesis." 116

It is obvious that Glasser's description of contextualization is not different from the preceding definition of indigenization. However, in his critique he highlights the problem of contextualization to be the neglect of "hard, biblical exegesis." The text, to put it simply, must not be neglected or subsumed in the preoccupation with context.

John Aitchison, in the report already cited, raises the inverse of this problem. Having insisted that contextual theology begins with, as it were, the sociological, psychological and economic "exegesis" of the context, he concludes the report with the statement, "I thought (in preparing this paper) I would read up some of the documents on black theology. I took up Alistair Kee's *A Reader in Political Theology* and read articles by Cone, Wilmore and Mpunzi. I was struck, fascinated, horrified to notice something I had never noticed before, that their presentation all had a starting point in the written text not experience ... I found these essays irredeemably literary. Their fundamental reference point (in spite of pretensions of relevance and contextuality) was academic literature, not real experience." 117

Thus while Glasser attempts to save the text from being subsumed under context, Aitchison struggles to save the context from being subsumed by the text.
Both writers vis-à-vis the nature of contextualization have highlighted unnecessary problems mainly because they have failed to interpret contextualization as being endemic to the nature of every relevant and living theology, the absence of which allows theology to lapse into ideology and religion into idolatry. In the ongoing and dynamic process of theology, with its goal the proclamation of the Word of faith, the question is raised afresh in a new life situation, namely "What is the Gospel of Christ to me?" The context, as it were, provides the agenda and the exegetical tools to extend the process of understanding who God is and what the Gospel is; a question that confronts man already in the Incarnation and which elicited a hermeneutical challenge which was faced already in the Bible and has continued for almost 2000 years since. It is not as if we have a "Gospel kit" which can be modified to suit new contexts. Rather the context raises criteria which have not been hitherto raised and which challenge all our preconceived views about God and the Gospel. The context thereby calls the text (ie. the Scriptural witness and witness of the church) into question, forcing a new and engaging dialogue between context and text.

In doing this, contextualization touches the heart of the nature of theological reflection itself.

3.6.3. CONTEXTUALIZATION IS "DOING" THEOLOGY

Theology (reflection about God) has never occurred in a socio-cultural vacuum. Every theological expression, whether tome, prayer, hymn
or Christian act, has been influenced to some degree by its Sitz-im-Leben. Hence every theological expression signifies a decision about the text while at the same time embodying a world-view. Every theological statement, no matter how simple, is historically conditioned. This follows from the fact of the historicity of man, his language and culture, and also from the fact that these statements always remain human perceptions about God. At best we only "see through a glass darkly", seeking to know more fully the Christ who has come and who promised to be with us always.

Because of the historicity of theology, a creed is often more important for what it emphasizes than for its overall theological or Biblical content. Every context which has made a creed necessary had raised questions which, within that context, had threatened the very authenticity of Christian faith. Hence while every creed attempts to affirm the "whole" Christian Gospel (the whole truth about God) its value lies in its conception and understanding of the Gospel in so far as its own questions are answered. For example, in the struggle between Alexander of Alexandria and Arius, the Council of Nicaea used the creed of Eusebius of Caesarea which was wholly indifferent to the controversy at hand. That creed had to be edited in order to make it relevant to the problems which Eusebius of Nicomedia, the supporter of Arius, had raised at the Council. Hence, at the points of the editions the historical relevance of the creed in its own life situation breaks forth. The rest did not occupy the participants at the Council with the same historical import. While each creed in responding to its particular questions highlighted a new
perspective on the understanding of God, and while therefore the
creed is believed, it cannot be merely repeated in another context
which has its own, indeed different, questions.

The historical conditioning of creeds is amply attested to whether
we examine the exigencies that led to the *regula fidei* of Tertullian;
the creed of Nicaea, the Augsburg Confession, the canons of Dort,
the Westminster confession, the Savoy Declaration or the Cottesloe
Declaration.

In fact, this historicity of statements of belief may be discerned
within the scriptures themselves. For instance, Paul had no intention
in his letters to Rome or Galatia, for example, to pronounce on the
whole body of Christian truth, whatever that may be. Neither did
he conceive of the idea that his letters would be vital parts of
a future canon of scripture and that they would share the same im-
portance as the Old Testament scriptures which he himself greatly
venerated. On the contrary, in these letters he was reflecting on
the contextual problems of his fellow Christians and these letters
were in effect the first contextualizations of the Gospel. Certain
problems, controversies and questions of the congregations in his
charge elicited his theology. They prompted him to formulate guidelines
and doctrines; to ask afresh what the death and resurrection of
Christ meant for these Christians. In this way he was able to elicit
from his text (the Old Testament and the oral tradition about Christ)
a new significance that in his many years as a Jewish scholar and
Pharisee he had not seen. The context, as it were, forced the texts
into a new and even more fruitful dialogue. Other sections of Paul's writings, like the Pastoral letters, are obviously reflections from within a changed, or changing, life-situation. Paul's context, as it were, produced the text. This means that what we consider text today was actually Paul's response in context.

These remarks on the historicity of Scripture in no way questions its inspiration or its normative character. They are intended merely to clarify the fact that the biblical writers themselves, whether prophets or apostles, perceived God in their deep involvement in the crisis of their own contingent experience; that their proclamation was concomitant with their encounter of faith in the midst of their living situations that demanded an account of their faith and that their responses which today form our text was the result of their deep concern for the proclamation of the Gospel within their contexts. For instance, the writers of the epistles could not have understood the contexts of future Christians who would be reading their letters: like the changed life-situation of the Jewish Christians after 70 AD (only a few years after they wrote) or the tussle with Gnosticism in the second century (one generation later). Neither had Isaiah, for example, who foretold the coming of the suffering servant of God, conceived that his prophecy or the whole history of Messianic prophecy would be realized in the context of an anonymous manger and on a cross erected on a lonely hill.

To speak in this way of the historicity of the text and the creeds is in effect to understand contextuality, not to trivialize the text
or the Word of God. It indicates the error of the arguments (represented by Glasser and Aitchison) which separate text and context as if one is the subject and the other the object. To affirm the historicity of both text and context is to avoid the tendency to apply the text willy-nilly to any context; a tendency which either reduces the Bible to a compendium of proof texts or "a paper pope which men can carry around in their pockets." 118 While fundamentalism has been isolated in this connection for special criticism, much of traditional Christianity and the more "academically informed" theologies are also guilty of this kind of reductionism, especially since they advocate a priori fixed and predetermined credal limits.

In the interpretation of Scripture, the context of the Biblical writers themselves is trivialized if a particular interpretation of the text is imposed upon the interpreter's context. Instead, the task of interpretation is for the interpreter to "challenge" the text itself in making the text live. In other words, the questions and problems of the interpreter's context addresses the text in a unique way hence making the text speak uniquely. But this dialogue between context and text is a two-way process. The text on coming alive questions the context in turn. 119

Some have referred to a "hermeneutical circle" which Ebeling explains obtains in the text illuminating one's self-understanding; and one's illumined self-understanding enables one to perceive meaning in hitherto darkened corners of the text." 120 However, what we are referring to here is not merely the dialogue between the interpreter's
self-understanding and the mental horizon of the Biblical writers or that in the end what is required is merely a "merging of the mental horizons" of the interpreter and the writer of the text. This hermeneutical process may still remain ahistorical or even idealistic unless it is rooted in the context of the interpreter. The text is in dialogue with context which includes the existing subject's cultural, sociological, philosophical, economic and other dimensions of his life-world.

To illustrate this, we may cite the process involved when historians attempt to understand a past event. Primary sources (text) that describe the event are accumulated; then the various interpretations of those sources by other historians are also consulted. (These secondary sources are equivalent to our Biblical commentaries and the whole of church history). In the process of rejecting distorted or erroneous interpretations of the event, the historian has to isolate authentic sources of evidence from inauthentic ones before a decision is made about the event. The decision must be made on the basis of the quality of the evidence which would possess greater or lesser probability. In other words, the sources have no authority of their own except that which the historian gives them on the basis of carefully weighed warrants and rebuttals. Hence every historical judgement is an exercise in hermeneutics. The same procedure inheres in textual criticism. A textual reading is not necessarily authoritative because it has 200 manuscriptal citings while another may have only two. In the process of textual criticism, manuscripts are weighed not counted.
While the Scriptures have an authority of their own, they were written not only in foreign languages to our own but also in a plethora of styles and idioms, embodying a vast range of symbols, metaphors, stories and socio-cultural images, all attempting in human words to grasp the Word, the most definitive form of the which was the "Word made flesh" who dwelt among us "full of grace and truth" (Jn. 1:14). These words also, like creeds, while they must be wholeheartedly believed, cannot be merely repeated in another life-situation.

Theology is not merely translation or accommodation of the text within another context; that is indigenization. The understanding of the text is more complex than that. Here the theologian goes even beyond the historian. The level of assent or belief that his interpretation achieves is based not merely on the warrants that Old and New Testament scholars give the text but on the accessibility to the text that his context achieves. In other words, theology aims to create faith in the now on the basis of making the Word live again. In this regard, the theologian is again different from the historian who has to achieve assent about a past event on the basis of probability. The theologian in the encounter of faith himself has to make a judgement about the meaning of the text on the basis of his encountering his context. He cannot, therefore, be closed to the analyses of his context made by other disciplines, most especially by philosophy. The "exegesis" of his context which these offer are indispensable for his own exegesis of the text.

An understanding of the context also involves an understanding of the conflict situation that obtains between the various theological
systems or theories in that context which stand in controversial relation to each other. All human attempts at theological theories will always be in natural conflict. However, this conflict situation, which every theologian must be fully submerged in, is itself the bridge for dialogue between different perspectives. One transcends the prison of one's own truth, on the one hand, by being illumined by the text and drawn out of the limitation of one's limited perception; on the other hand, by exposing oneself to the theological perspective of the other. This exposure, however, is not disinterested academic analysis of the other's views but encounter with the other, with the truth perspective of the other and with the crisis of truth that is experienced in each context.

Only because one understands one's context and the crisis of truth that it embodies can one grapple with the "mental horizon" of the writers of the Bible, otherwise one may easily end up with merely an exercise in the realm of ideas. Theology is not merely adaptation of a preconceived body of truth to our contexts even if such adaptation is made with the use of illustrations from our context; this is still indigenization. Contextualization is the meeting of our unique context with the text and the whole history of the interpretations of the text. Our life-situation prepares the agenda for that meeting.

What then does it mean to affirm with the Reformers the theological principle of sola scriptura? For Luther such an affirmation was the guiding principle in the contextualization of the Gospel in sixteenth century Germany. His context was the moribund totalitarianism
of the church patterned after the oppressive feudal mentality; an age that fostered sacramentalism and accommodated side by side with Scripture a whole body of tradition that claimed an authority of their own. Much of this tradition during the time of the church fathers had been contextual theologies which had attempted to clarify the Gospel. By the sixteenth century, however, it was no longer possible to distinguish living tradition from the lifeless past beliefs which now posed a threat to the very understanding of the Gospel itself. Sola scriptura was the Reformers' watchword whereby such traditions which stifled the Gospel were rejected so that the Word could live again.

Again and again in church history we observe how the living Word has been constantly threatened by the very theology which attempted to clarify it. Each attempt to theologize has itself to be re-evaluated within new contexts or else the Gospel becomes historically ossified. Theology is the critical and ongoing hermeneutical process that interprets and re-interprets, seeking the living Word and fostering faith. When this process stops, then the very theology that is gospel in one context becomes "law" in another; that which is "the spirit that gives life" in one context" becomes "the letter that kills" in another. (II Cor. 3:6).

The Reformers' sola scriptura, sola gratia and sola fide are essential principles of theological contextualization: sola scriptura rejects dead tradition and affirms the ongoing search for the living Word; sola fide is the rejection of all human works including all theologies as ends in themselves, and affirms
an ongoing abandonment of oneself to the hope which is in Christ Jesus; **sola gratia** rejects any form of self-sufficiency, complacency, hubris and arrogance which would prescribe truth for all time and affirms total dependency on the Spirit of God in whose power we face the future.

When these principles ceased to be dynamic principles, Protestant orthodoxy found itself confounded by the very scriptural principle it was at pains to preserve. Now the problem was "how should Scripture be interpreted?" This dilemma led to numerous dry-as-dust theological controversies and credal formulations which ended with Protestantism greatly divided. Scripture as an "authority" in itself proved as problematic as the pope pontificating on Christian truth. At least in Roman Catholicism the church remained largely intact. One needs only to take a brief look at the history of Protestantism in the 17th and 18th centuries to see how **sola scriptura** had become a hackneyed and meaningless principle which generated strife, intolerance and dogmatism.

In all these controversies, the other Reformational principle had been "forgotten," namely, **ecclesia reformata semper reformanda**.

This principle is perfectly compatible with our definition of contextualization as an ongoing, critical reflection; the ongoing reformation wherein the creative tension between Letter and Spirit, Law and Gospel, Creed and meaningful proclamation and, text and context is maintained. Because this dynamic tension was not always maintained, the history of the church is the history of a series of ossifications of the
contextual process; each ossification creates immutable doctrinal frameworks which subsequent generations ardently perpetuate, each believing that they alone are preserving the Gospel. To argue for contextuality is not to argue for theological relativity but to stand opposed to the human tendency to absolutize its own creations. 121

While this monadization 122 may not be readily evident to Europeans, the British or North Americans, perhaps it is clearer from the vantage point of the Third World where geographically, culturally, and historically we are distanced from the burden of the past controversies in those countries' histories. It, therefore, is very dismaying that in the Third World the conflicts of Europe and Britain are still propagated. For example, in a small community like the Indians in South Africa with some 80,000 Christians almost every denomination spawned in Europe, Britain and the U S are to be found. In this community and elsewhere allegiance to Christ has become allegiance to a particular historical perspective of Christ. These perspectives, which were crystallised in far-removed contexts, have become for us the "Gospel." Conversion meant conversion to a particular view of Christ, a Christ who says very little to our context and its anxieties, where one has to struggle to find Him. Hence while affirming a creed and believing the Bible, one is in constant danger of losing Christ.

Therefore, the numerous theological images, symbols, metaphors and such like can never be final, all-encompassing vehicles of truth. Truth is greater than all of them. If the Word is to live in the
context of faith, theology (and preaching) must not only attempt to speak meaningfully in a context (indigenization) but it must also allow the human condition it addresses to throw up new categories; indeed, it must consciously seek out such categories. New parables and new paradigms must be created from the human stories of our unique contexts: alienation of the human spirit, poverty, oppression, racial discrimination, dehumanization, a society whose faith is placed in arms and technology, the widespread trivialization of life and family, middle class complacency, the exploitation of labour, the economic woes resulting from an economic system where the poor get poorer, the manipulation of all by a few, an emergence of a popular culture controlled by an amoral educational system, violation of freedom by propaganda and manipulative news reporting; a society within a world "out of joint." These issues cannot be relegated to discussions under ethics, practical theology or apologetics anymore than contextualization can be confined to an exercise in missiology. They form the basis for contextualization and contextualization is "doing" theology. These issues must form the agenda for a relevant theology of all peoples; in the South African context they affect the lives of both black and white Christians for both groups are inextricably bound up with the state of things as they are in this country.

6.4. SOME FACTORS THAT HAVE TENDED TO MILITATE AGAINST THEOLOGICAL CONTEXTUALIZATION, WITH SOME SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SOUTH AFRICA

1. Theology, in the main, is studied by different race groups in separation from each other since in South Africa the human constructs of language, race, culture and denomination have been absolutized.
Theological institutions and churches have, consciously or unconsciously, entrenched these divisions between whites and whites (Afrikaners and English) and between whites and blacks. Hence, while part of the same context, each group still views the situation from its perspective, its "scale" only. Ideological commitments, dogmatism and insensitivity are thus fostered.

2. The content of theological syllabi and the approach to ministerial training show in the main, little or no creativity. We have been satisfied mainly with systematizing and ordering theological loci: beginning with the doctrine of God and ending with eschatology. To this extent we have not progressed beyond Peter Lombard (C 1100-1160). Systematizing, ordering or quantifying is not theologizing. Contextualization forces us to consider or create new loci and paradigms or else God and the Gospel become historically hamstrung.

Furthermore, a programme of study at our institutions may well be the same as that which is offered in Tubingen, Oxford or Princeton. The fact that it is offered in South Africa makes little or no difference to its character. This criticism does not imply that we must not master Greek and Hebrew, historical theology and hermeneutics, or that we should abandon the hard slog through Luther, Calvin, Barth and others. We can only do that to our detriment. Our deficiency lies in the fact that we have not gone further. Theology has been, in the main, an exercise in historical theology; hence the charge of it being "academic theology" and irrelevant.

Perhaps a word of caution should be sounded here in view of some
who in their anxiety for a relevant theology belittle serious academic preparation. We should be careful in setting the balance that the pendulum does not swing the other way. Theologians, whether pastors or teachers, are always servants of the church, a principle that the Roman Catholic Church has properly maintained. The irrelevant theology that must be discarded is the theology that is not commensurate with faith as existential encounter; which does not prompt one to pray more fervently and love one's neighbour (and one's enemies) more earnestly. A theologian can never be more than a servant!

"Academic" theology ("balconised" theology) because it propagates a spiritless and cerebral Christianity, must be discounted as an exercise in soulless sophistry. But this criticism also affirms the need for theologians and ministers to commit themselves even more to study so that our presuppositions (the furniture of our minds) may be constantly questioned. 127 For this reason, the theologian cannot confine himself to the Bible and church history only. If he is to exegete his content he must be in dialogue with, amongst others, sociologists, historians and more especially philosophers. 128

3. The formal separation of people in South Africa by the Group Areas Act and its corollaries propagate effectively and maintain a distorted view of man, a view which stands diametrically opposed to the humanity that the freedom of the Gospel points to. These laws have created racial tension on the one hand, and racial smugness on the other. Now after many years of their execution, a very plausible case is offered for why these very laws are necessary in order to
main law and order; thus increasing the polarization which the laws themselves created.

The most dismaying effects of this separation are that the possibilities for encounter and critical dialogue are removed and with them go any real opportunities for the escape from the ideological prison.

4. Theology in South Africa, and elsewhere, propagates an unwarranted division between clergy and laity. This is all the more unnecessary when one considers that laikos and kleros were magisterial not biblical terms borrowed by the church in the third century to validate an hierarchy that remains, till this day, elitist and largely obstructionist. Hence many laymen are excluded from the process of critical self-reflection and dialogue. What E M F Tomlin said of philosophers is equally true of theologians. "We should beware," wrote Tomlin, "of a philosopher who offers to think on our behalf, and who, by adopting a jargon of his own, seeks to exclude us from his deliberations." 129

3.6.5. To conclude this section, and this study, we should perhaps return to consider a possible objection that might be levelled at contextualization, namely,

Does contextualization not end up as only a local expression of theology and does it not absolutize the context? This objection, while it may be valid for some aspects of indigenization, is not valid for contextualization as we have defined it herein. Refocusing on the context by viewing contextualization as endemic to theological method
is, as we have observed, a call to reform the very nature of theologizing. The possibility of contextualization degenerating into a "local expression" or a "Christian Ideology" arises only if the ongoing, critical nature of theology is lost, or stated differently, if the tension between theory and practice, text and context is dissolved.

Theology refuses to live in the past though it takes its past seriously. As Tillich stated it,

A theological system is supposed to satisfy two basic needs: the statement of truth of the Christian message and the interpretation of the truth for every new generation. Theology moves back and forth between two poles, the eternal truth of its foundation and the temporal situation in which the eternal truth must be received. Not many theological systems have been able to balance these two demands perfectly. Most of them either sacrifice elements of the truth or are not able to speak to the situation. Some of them combine both shortcomings. 130

Tillich still speaks of a body of eternal truth that have to be communicated to a situation whereas our contention is that the situation is the basis to actually seek out the significance of these "eternal truths." This is not to deny their objective nature but to accentuate the fact that they have to be existentially encountered for them to have meaning for my situation.

However, Tillich does highlight the need for balance between context and text or, put another way, between contingent experience and history. Bishop Desmond Tutu clearly perceived the need of a thorough historical
understanding when he wrote, "subsequent generations of Christians will appropriate the genuine insights of the past theologizing if these are relevant to their own contexts, and will build on those abiding truths which have been apprehended during the hectic business of living the Christian life by earlier generations of Christians." 131

Contextualization takes history seriously but refuses to absolutize any one historical perspective for then it will become historicist. The corollary of being thoroughly historical and contextual so that the text may live again, is its open-ended future. Contextualization and, therefore, theology, is an ongoing critical struggle to speak meaningfully about God.

When philosophy ceases to be an ongoing critical argument it degenerates into ideology. By the same token, when theology ceases to be an ongoing critical struggle concomitant with the dynamics of faith, it collapses into ideology, and Christianity becomes idolatrous. 132 This was illustrated with reference to how even "Gospel" becomes "Law," and "Spirit" becomes the "Letter."

When the theological frame of reference is absolutized only then will the fear of the critics of contextualization be valid. However, these critics, in their anxiety to conserve truth, open themselves up to a similar charge being levelled at them. The terms "conservative" and "liberal" are each inadequate to describe a relevant theology, for the emphasis of both are endemic to its nature namely, the commitment to the text and history ("eternal truth"), and the context
("existential truth"). Theology as contextualization cannot ignore the richness of the text which past contexts have uncovered (conservative) nor can it not affirm an ongoing and open-ended methodology (liberal). Every theology is a human construct and therefore every theology is inadequate and must be reformed and renewed.

Furthermore, another reason why contextualization cannot be local only lies in the fact that it creates a new basis for ecumenicity. For example, all South Africans can come together in spite of their history of separation, not on the basis of their historico-theological positions but to read and "exegete" the one context which they all share.

Another very important aspect, perhaps the most important, which the antagonists of contextualization fail to see, is the fact that every valid interpretation of the Gospel unearthed by the exigencies of a particular context is valid for all men. A context draws out of the text an element which would have otherwise remained hidden. It highlights a new dimension of the God all Christians worship wherever they may be. The God who is always present with man is also always hidden (deus absconditus). Every new historical experience "draws" Him out since revelation is historical. God is not revealed everywhere but is hidden everywhere both in the text (Scripture) and the context (history). Therefore, the perspectives of God that are discovered in the ongoing dialogue between text and context must be taken seriously by all. Thus contextualization must always also affirm catholicity and universal relevance.
For example, the perspectives about God and the struggle of faith that blacks uncover in their theological reflection has relevance for man at large who, we have repeatedly pointed out, struggles against the forces of dehumanization. Malcolm Muggeridge incisively described the dehumanized and oppressed state of western man when he wrote, "...it has become abundantly clear in the second half of the twentieth century that Western man has decided to abolish himself. Having wearied of the struggle to be himself, he has created his boredom out of his affluence, his own impotence out of his erotomania, his own vulnerability out of his strength; himself blowing the trumpet that brings the walls of his own city tumbling down... until at last, having educated himself into imbecility, and polluted and drugged himself into stupefaction, he keels over, a weary, battered old brontosaurus, and becomes extinct..." 137

This startling vision of the way man is going, brings us back to where we began this study, namely the problem of the freedom of man which manifests itself in his alienation from God and from himself, and also his enslavement to systems, theories and mundane securities which accentuate his inauthentic existence. (Part I) Faith as ongoing and critical encounter manifests man's freedom coram deo because it allows man to be fully human and because it frees him from himself for God, his neighbour and the world. (Part II) Theology and faith are inextricably interdependent because both share a dynamism that keeps them vital and living encounter. (Part III) In living faith there is hope for the healing of man's spiritual schizophrenia and dehumanization because in faith through Christ he is reconciled with God.
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44. cf., for example Marx, K, "Towards a critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Rights" in McLellan, D (ed) Karl Marx selected Writings, p. 64

45. McLellan, D : Marx before Marxism, p. 21


47. We do not, within the scope of this study, have to deal with the debate on Althusser's and Marx's use of the word "ideology;" whether, as Althusser puts it, "Human societies secrete ideology as the very element and atmosphere indispensable to their historical respiration and life," or whether ideology is a system of representations that mystifies the relation between men and their conditions of existence and is a means by which the ruling class maintains its position "by obscuring the conditions of exploitation and oppression at the heart of society." In Marx, ideology is not always equated with illusion; he lists judicial, political, religious, artistic or philosophic forms as ideological forms, in which men become "conscious of the
conflict (in society) and fight it out." Althusser goes so far as to maintain that "the distortion of ideology is socially necessary as a function of the very nature of the social totality, more precisely, as a function of its determination by its structures, which is made, as all the social opaque for individuals who occupy a place determined by the structure. The opacity of social structure makes necessarily mythical the representation of the world necessary for social cohesion." cited in Larrain, T. The Concept of Ideology, p. 156f.

It appears that Althusser, making ideology indispensable to societies, has overstated the case. He has confused the normal process of societisation and the need for meaning with ideology which we defined as a crystallized truth perspective in which certain non-negotiables are fixed for all time and in which one or more social, cultural or political aspects of the society are absolutized.


49. cf. Cornevin, M: Apartheid, power and historical falsification, p. 78f for examples of historical myths that have been propagated within the prevailing ideological confines.

50. cf. for example, Sundkler, B Bantu Prophets, p. 238f

51. Oosthuizen, G C Pentecostal penetration into the Indian Community in South Africa, p. 70f; Pillay, G J Religion at the Limits? Chapters 3 and 5

52. Lash, N: op. cit., p. 130

53. Paul Tillich described faith as "more than trust in even the most sacred authority. It is participation in the subject of one's ultimate concern with one's whole being." Therefore, the term "faith" should not be used in connection with theoretical knowledge. cf. his Dynamics of Faith, p. 4; 34; also p. 8. Faith is defined as "a total and centred act of unconditional, infinite and ultimate concern."


55. Murray, Gilbert: Aeschylus: The Creator of Tragedy, p. 5

56. Ibid., p. 85; also Kitto, H D F. Form and Meaning in Drama, p. 7. To the Greek "the essence of piety was humility, the conscious acknowledgement that the gods are greater than man, and man's greatness is held by their sufferance." Vellacott, P
Introduction to Aeschylus: The Oresteian trilogy, p. 26; also Lucas, D W The Greek Tragic Poets, p. 95; 133

57. Durant, W : The Life of Greece, p. 186
58. Kierkegaard, S : Purity of Heart, p. 47f
59. Vallon, M : Apostle of freedom: Life and teaching of Nicholas Berdyaev, p. 132
60. Berdyaev, N : Meaning of history, p. 217
61. Berdyaev, N : Slavery and Freedom, p. 43

63. Ebeling maintains that, "If discipleship means sharing in the way of Jesus, then understanding his preaching of the will of God means sharing in his freedom, and understanding his message of the rule of God means sharing in his joy, his obedience and his courage in the face of the nearness of God." The Nature of Faith, p. 56

64. Marcuse argued that "Society will be rational and free to the extent to which it were organised, sustained and reproduced by an essentially new historical subject." One Dimensional Man, p. 252; cf. also his Essay on Liberation.

65. Berdyaev, N : Dream and Reality, p. 191
66. Lowrie, D : Rebellious Prophet, p. 216
Berdyaev, N : The Realm of Spirit and the Realm of Caesar, p. 122

67. Berdyaev, N : Slavery and Freedom, p. 68; p. 201

68. Bulgakov, S : The Orthodox Church, p. 74
69. Horton, H M : Contemporary Continental Theology, p. 37
70. Berdyaev, N : Freedom and the Spirit, p. 20

71. Williams, J G, "Other - Worldly Christianity: Some positive considerations" Theology Today, p. 27. This comment was made in connection with quite a different issue to the one with which this study is concerned.

72. Ibid., p. 22
73. cited in Barrett, W: Irrational Man, p. 40
74. Shestov, L: A Reader in Jewish Existentialism (Martin, 4th ed.), p. 6
75. Barrett, W: op. cit., p. 77
76. Ibid., p. 92
77. Ibid., p. 93
78. Shestov, L: op. cit., p. 28
79. Raeff, M: Russian Intellectual History, p. 181
80. Ibid., p. 181
81. Zernov, N: Three Russian Prophets, p. 32
82. Dostoyevsky, F: The Brothers Karamazov, p. 293
83. Ibid., p. 294
84. Ibid., p. 294
85. Ibid., p. 301
86. Rauche, G A: Theory and Practice, p. 288
87. Brown, J: Subject and Object in Modern Theology, p. 173
88. Ibid., cf. p. 181
89. Ebeling, G: Word and Faith, p. 211
90. Heinemann, F H: Existentialism and the Modern Predicament, p. 190f
91. Rauche, G A: Philosophy of Actuality, p. 81
92. Mackay, J A: op. cit., p. 29
93. Ibid., p. 30; W.M. Horton identified this existential dimension as a "fourth dimension" which he claimed was missing in the "neat, orderly, three dimensional world of Anglo-Saxon theology. This "fourth dimension" was "full of terror as well as of glory, demons as well as angels, and only to be known through suffering; yet so fascinating and compelling to those who have known it that they would never again be content in our plumber's paradise, nor exchange their apocalyptic torment.
for an eternity in our bourgeois bliss" Contemporary Continental Theologians. An Interpretation for Anglo-Saxons, p. xxi.

94. cf. Harvie M Conn "Contextualization: where do we begin?" in Evangelicals and Liberation (ed. Carl E Armerding), p. 90-120 offers a historical review of the contextualization discussion. Within South Africa it is claimed that the idea of contextualization goes back to the last quarter of the 19th century when the independent churches broke away from the main-line, traditional churches. (Minutes of the Institute for Contextual Theology Conference (Consultation) Hammanskraal, 11-12 June 1982).

95. For example, a survey conducted recently by the magazine IQ found "that most South African whites are totally ignorant of the political realities of this country." The survey found the majority of white South African teenagers to be "complacent, self-satisfied and content to bask in white baaskap for as long as possible " reported IQ. White teenagers, for example, had difficulty with even basic questions such as who the State President was. Prof Willem Kleyhans and Dr Hennie Coetzee of the departments of political studies at UNISA and and Afrikaans University confirmed the findings of the survey on the basis of their own researches. The Star 28 September 1984.

96. The series of schisms from the mission churches that have led to the Ethiopian movement and the multitude of Zionist churches are proof of this breach of fellowship. It is estimated that independent churches exceed 3000 in number (information provided by G C Oosthuizen, researcher of these churches: University of Zululand ). However, this unwillingness to continue dialogue with white Christians is also widespread among many blacks within the established churches also. They maintain, understandably so, that dialogue has achieved very little and that whites are not prepared or willing to understand the black struggle or the crisis of faith for the disinherited in South Africa because they have a vested interest in the maintenance of the status quo. The writer continues to maintain this fellowship, although he too is disillusioned with white attitudes in South Africa, so as not to give into despair. He is of the opinion that those who are responsible for the dehumanization of others invariably become dehumanized themselves and are also in need of the Gospel of freedom.

97. The following are representative of the black theological approach described here:

28. 7-13; S Gqubule, "What is Black Theology?" JTS September 1974
No. 8, 16-23; E Mgojo "Prolegomenon to the Study of Black
Theology" JTS December 1977 No. 21, p. 25-32; JTS: Journal
of Theology in Southern Africa; D Tutu, "Black Theology"
Frontier 17:2 (1974), p. 73-76; "Church and Nation in the
Perspective of Black Theology" JTS June 1976 No. 16, p. 5-
11; A. Boesak Farewell to Innocence, "Relevant Preaching

98. Fr. A Nolan, "What is Contextual Theology?" Lecture published
by the Institute of Contextual Theology (Braamfontein) June 1982.

99. Tissa Balasuriya O.M.I. Jesus Christ and Human Liberation, p. 7

100. The most vulnerable of these aspects are some of the views
of James Cone, for example, that sail close to charges of racism.
cf. his Black Theology and Black Power.

101. C W H Boshoff, "Christ in Black Theology in a South African
Context," The South African Missiological Society annual congress
Pretoria 1981.

102. "Black Theology," Setiloane wrote, "is still doing theology
within the field of Western European, Graeco-Roman rooted thought-
forms and Weltanschauung," "Theological Trends in Africa"
Missionaria Vol. 8 No. 2. August 1980, p. 48. cf. also
1975.

Theologies" in G H Anderson and T F Stransky Mission Trends
No. 3 p. 135-150; B H Kato, "Black Theology and African Theo-
logy" Evangelical Review of Theology October 1977, 35-48;
J S Mbiti, "Christianity and African Culture" JTS September
1977, No. 20, p. 26-40; D Tutu, African Challenge p. 56-
65; "Black Theology/African Theology - Soul Mates or

104. cf. Albert Widjaja "Beggary Theology" in J C England (ed)
Living Theologies in Asia Orbis: p. 154-155. He points out
that theological begging, which was one of the major outcomes
of the western missionary endeavour, is unfortunately perpetuated
by third World churchmen. Hence any theological pursuit that
is not from the theology of Luther, Barth, Bultmann etc. is
considered shallow, untheological and even perhaps sinful and
secular.

105. Dr Nico Smit pointed out that is was the NGK that had sent
a delegation to Smuts asking to introduce laws separating
Universities and Group Areas. He believed that the only way
open for this church was for it to "call a Day of Atonement.....
a day of confession of sinning against God and man - and admit
that it co-operated in leading the country down the road to disaster, and ask God to save us from the mess. Then people will be saved." Sunday Tribune October 7, 1984.


107. Solzhenitsyn, A : Nobel Prize Lecture, p. 25


110. Ebeling, G : Word and Faith, p. 11


112. Ibid., p. 8

113. Dr Shoki Coe of Taiwan, in attempting to distinguish between indigenization and contextualization, pointed out that indigenization derives from the idea of "taking root in the soil" and tends to suggest a static response to the Gospel in terms of traditional culture. Coe maintained that contextualization conveys all that is implied in indigenization yet seeks "to press beyond for a more dynamic concept which is open to change and which is also future - oriented." cf. "Contextualizing Theology" in Gerald H. Anderson and Thomas F Stran sky Mission Trends No. 3, p. x

114. J S Kruger in "Theology as response to social change: a case study" Missionalia April 1979 Vol. 7 No. 1, 17-30 defines "reflective theology" as "a theology which does not take account that it is a human effort at giving meaning to life and action and that it is linked to its social context with a 1000 threads, namely purporting that it is truly passing on divine Truth, may in fact be reflecting uncritically on the needs, aspirations and interests of society..."Reflexive theology" which is radically conscious of itself being a human product takes its own social situation into full and explicit account and critically reflects on the links between the social reality and itself," p. 22

115. Arthur F Glasser "Help from an Unexpected Quarter or the Old Testament and Contextualization" Missiology October 1979 Vol. VII No. 4, p. 404
116. Ibid., p. 404

117. Aitchison John : op. cit., p. 14


119. cf. R Hardowirajono, "Serving the Faith by Promoting justice" in J C England op. cit., p. 148-154. In a slightly different connection, the writer illustrates how this two-way process proceeds when he states, "the church is to evangelise the Asian revolution and at the same time she is to be evangelised by the Asian revolution." p. 152

120. Ebeling, G : Word and Faith, p. 321-322

121. cf. here G D Kaufman, "Christian Theology and Indigenization" in A Vision for Man (S. Amirthur i ed) Madras: Christian Literature Society 1978. (essays in honour of J P Chandran). Although Kaufman in this article is in fact discussing contextualization not indigenization as his title suggests, his insights are interesting. He places the whole process, quite rightly, at the centre of theologizing.

122. We are adapting the idea of Liebniz here that monads are self-contained, self-sufficient units (geschlossene and volendete).

123. cf. S Kappen "Orientation of Asian Theology" in Logos Colombo, Sri Lanka Vol. 20 No 1, March 1981. Kappen states that "...the primary locus of God - encounter is to be sought not within but outside and beyond religion in its institutionalized forms. This does not mean that symbols traditionally handed down are necessarily incapable of mediating religious experience...theological reflection should be our meeting with God in the contemporary historical situation i.e. in the realities of practical life, individual and social," p. x

124. An interesting attempt at a theological analysis of labour was recently made by T Ilagale in "Towards a Black Theology of Labor" in Voices from the Third World, Minila, Philippines: EATWOT December 1983 Vol. VI No. 2.

125. In the twelfth century, Peter Lombard published his compendium Sententiarum Libri Quatuor (Four Books of Sentences) which was a systematization of Christian doctrines with many quotations from the fathers divided into four books: the first deals with God, providence and predestination; the second with creation, original sin, grace and free-will; the third with Christology; and the fourth with the sacraments and eschatology.
126. cf. John S Mbiti illustrates the point being made here by citing the case of the theological student who returned home after nine and a half years of theological training, with a ThD, and excess baggage in theology, to confront the realities of his people whose hope he incarnated. At the peak of the celebrations marking his return, his sister fell to the ground, possessed by the spirit of her great aunt—and they looked to him to exorcise the spirit. But all he could do was to demythologize her suffering according to Rudolf Bultmann. cf. "Theological Impotence and the Universality of the Church" in Anderson and Stransky op. cit., 18.

127. One of the main principles of policy governing the work of the Theological Education Fund is formulated thus:

(There is a need) "to sense with great clarity that the situation in theological education today demands deep-seated and indeed radical changes in existing aims and structures, and yet to discern what is good and valid from the past.... We are convinced that theological reflection is at most and at best theologia viatorum that our thrust forward to the true catholicity is at most and also at best the theologia in loco. From "A working policy for the implementation of the third mandate of the Theological Education Fund July 1972" in Ministry in Context Bromley, Kent: TEF Oct., 1972 p. 18

128. Orlando E Costas in "The Whole World for the Whole Gospel" in Missionology October 1980 Vol. VIII No. 4, 395-405. Costas writes that "In our mission of incarnating, internalizing, proclamation and celebrating the gospel in today's world, the good news of Salvation must be made flesh, communicated and celebrated in each piece of the human mosaic. In order to fulfill this multipronged mission intelligently, we need constantly to explore the nature of the world." p. 396

129. E W F Tomlin, : R G Collingwood, in foreword p. iii
131. Desmond Tutu, : "Church and Nation in the Perspective of Black Theology" JTSA No. 5 1970, p.5
132. cf. K Koyama, "Tribal Gods or Universal God" Missionalia November 1982 Vol. 10 No. 3, p.x Koyama maintains that within a local cultural context "If our God does not make critical comments against us, that god must be a tribal and parochial god. It will come to us with comfortable messages of 'Western Movie Theology' 'God follows Success Theology' and 'Fabricated Holiness Theology.' In all, this god will make us self-righteous." 133. D J Bosch points out that "people' as cultural and ethnic entity is not a theological category and wherever it is made into such a category (as an 'ordination of creation' or 'God-
given distinctive entity') it cannot but lead to mutual exclusiveness which endangers the life of the church as the new community. 'Man,' however, is a theological category; therefore the church has to concern itself with the liberation of people (not peoples)," in "The Church and the Liberation of Peoples," Missionalia Vol. 5. Aug. 1977 No. 2, 34.


136. Andrew Walls in "The Gospel as the Prisoner and Liberator of Culture" argues that there are two antithetical principles involved in theologising: the indigenizing and the pilgrim principles. The latter is always in tension with the former. He writes, "Just as the indigenising principle, itself rooted in the Gospel, associated Christians with the particulars of their culture and group, the pilgrim principle, in tension with the indigenising and equally of the Gospel, by associating them with things and people outside the culture and group, is in some respects a universalising factor," p. 99 Missionalia Vol. 10 No. 3 November 1982. While Walls does not view contextualization as we have done, his idea of a "pilgrim" principle helps to illustrate our point here regarding "universal relevance."

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