MASS VIOLENCE IN DURBAN'S SETTLEMENTS IN THE 1980S

by

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ABSTRACT

The focus of this study is on the occurrence of mass violence in Durban's settlements in the 1980s. Mass violence is defined as the violent reaction of crowds against targets, which may be people and/or objects - for example the stoning of buses or administration buildings, schools, etc.

The theoretical framework for the study derives from recent realist philosophy emerging from prominent British social theorists. The method of analysis is based on a framework developed for the analysis of the UK inner city 'riots' of the 1980s. The theory emphasizes the nature of the relationship between the contending groups with particular attention paid to the presence of contingent factors. The analytical method was broadened so as to incorporate rebellion rather than simply 'rioting', as it was developed for in the UK context.

Data was gathered in the first instance through an analysis of news reports of 'unrest' for the period 1980-85. Due to restrictions on the press from 1985, the Indicator SA unrest chronologies were used extensively for the period 1985-87.
This extensive analysis provides an overview of mass violence, organizational developments, and government response for the period under consideration.

Case studies were selected for the more intensive analysis presented in Chapter 4. These are based on published and unpublished reports of 'unrest', interviews, and group discussions. The extensive/intensive dualism of method assisted in giving both an overview of mass violence for the area, and an insight into the particular form it took in specific areas.

Finally, the case studies were placed in their regional context, and further reasons sought for the particular nature of 'unrest' in Durban and Natal during the period. The conclusion assesses the explanatory power of the theory and methodology employed in relation to the South African situation.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank first and foremost those people who agreed to be interviewed, for offering me insights into the processes of 'unrest' in Durban's settlements which would not otherwise have been available.

I am greatly indebted to my supervisor Dr. Jeff McCarthy, whose guidance and criticism was always concise, constructive and stimulating. Others in the Department who were a source of encouragement and clarification were Di and Martin, who were always available for discussion.

Jenny McDowell and Hem Hurrypursad produced the maps in record time and for this they must be thanked.

It is impossible to individually thank all the friends who offered me encouragement and support in this venture, so to all these people a very warm thank you.

The Human Sciences Research Council provided financial assistance and this is greatly appreciated. The views expressed here are those of the author and in no way reflect those of the HSRC.
This work is entirely my own and has not been submitted in any form to another University. Where use has been made of other work this is duly acknowledged in the text.
## ABBREVIATIONS

**Newspapers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
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<td>B</td>
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<td>C</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>City Press</td>
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<td>Cape Times</td>
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<td>DB</td>
<td>Die Burger</td>
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<td>DN</td>
<td>Daily News</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>Evening Post</td>
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<td>EPH</td>
<td>Eastern Province Herald</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Financial Mail</td>
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<td>L</td>
<td>Leader</td>
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<td>NM</td>
<td>Natal Mercury</td>
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<td>Natal Witness</td>
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<td>P</td>
<td>Post</td>
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<td>PN</td>
<td>Pretoria News</td>
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<td>RDM</td>
<td>Rand Daily Mail</td>
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<td>S</td>
<td>Star</td>
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<td>SO</td>
<td>Sowetan</td>
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<td>ST</td>
<td>Sunday Tribune</td>
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<td>T</td>
<td>Die Transvaler</td>
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<td>V</td>
<td>Vaderland</td>
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<td>WA</td>
<td>Weekend Argus</td>
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<td>WM</td>
<td>Weekly Mail</td>
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### ACCRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>BINFO</td>
<td>Bureau of Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Community Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIIR</td>
<td>Catholic Institute for International Relations</td>
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<td>COSAS</td>
<td>Congress of South African Scholars</td>
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<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTC</td>
<td>Durban Town Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTMB</td>
<td>Durban Transport Management Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAYCO</td>
<td>Hammarsdale Youth Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOSATU</td>
<td>Federation of South African Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>INCH</td>
<td>Institute for Contemporary History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSUP</td>
<td>Institute For Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCC</td>
<td>Joint Commuters Committee</td>
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<td>JORAC</td>
<td>Joint Rent Action Committee</td>
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<td>KLA</td>
<td>KwaZulu Legislative Assembly</td>
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<td>NAB</td>
<td>Native Administration Board</td>
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<td>NECC</td>
<td>National Education Crisis Committee</td>
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<td>NIC</td>
<td>Natal Indian Congress</td>
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<td>NSE</td>
<td>National State of Emergency</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>Progressive Federal Party</td>
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<td>PNAB</td>
<td>Port Natal Administration Board (now PNDB)</td>
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<td>PNDB</td>
<td>Port Natal Development Board (previously PNAB)</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>PUTCO</td>
<td>Public Utility Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>PWV</td>
<td>Pretoria Witwatersrand Vereeniging</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSC</td>
<td>Regional Services Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAIC</td>
<td>South African Indian Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>South African Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSE</td>
<td>Select State of Emergency</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCC</td>
<td>United Committee of Concern</td>
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<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
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<td>USM</td>
<td>Urban Social Movement</td>
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In recent years South Africa has experienced an unprecedented degree of popular revolt. An important characteristic of this revolt compared with past episodes of protest is its geographic spread and longevity. Not only are major towns encountering intense political strife but smaller towns too have begun to experience the effects of the continued subjugation of the black majority. While in 1989 it may seem that these protests have abated, this should not lead us to ignore the important impacts they have had.

It is necessary to briefly outline recent developments in South Africa so as to provide a background to the present study, which takes as its focus mass violence in Durban’s settlements in the 1980s. This is provided through a brief review of the economy and of political struggle in the period, which is followed by a discussion on the objectives, theoretical context, and values informing this study.

1.1 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Saul and Gelb, writing in 1981 argued that South Africa was facing an ‘organic crisis’. This crisis, they argued re-
quired 'formative' efforts to overcome (Saul and Gelb, 1981:3), and such formative efforts necessitated "the attempt to put together a new 'historical bloc', new political configurations and philosophies, a profound restructuring of the state and ... ideological discourse" (Hall, cited in Saul and Gelb, 1981:3). More recently Morris and Padayachee (1988) have argued that the present crisis has affected both political stability and capital accumulation, and therefore requires attention at both of these levels.

On the economic front these reforms took the form of a "market oriented monetarist state reform policy articulated and implemented gradually from 1979" (Morris and Padayachee, 1988:5). These economic reforms included the "abolition of exchange control on non-residents" and, "the encouragement of short term foreign borrowing" (Morris and Padayachee, 1988:5). This economic liberalization resulted in an outflow of capital and -with the dramatic fall in the value of the rand and in the price of gold - increased the indebtedness of the South African economy to the point where the balance of payments were "in deficit for most of the first half of the 1980s" (Niddrie, 1988:52). The real value of South Africa's Gross Domestic Product declined in the 1980s (Holden and McGrath, 1988:31), and foreign debt increased 34 percent in dollar terms, and 293 percent in Rand terms between 1980 and 1985 (Niddrie 1988:52).
The effects of such developments in the economy have been experienced on the ground in terms of increasing taxation, high inflation, declining employment opportunities, growing unemployment, and declining living standards for the poor. Cassim (1987) and Cachalia (1983) have both argued that increasing economic hardship tends to intensify political conflict. Early reforms on the part of the state to deal with the political element of the crisis included the Wiehahn and Rieckert proposals (Morris and Padayachee, 1988:4). While the former attempted to divide black workers in relation to union rights (and failed), the latter attempted to divide urban and rural blacks in relation to urban dwelling rights.

Other reforms followed, for example: the introduction of the tri-cameral parliament; the scrapping of Section 16 of the Immorality Act and of the Mixed Marriages Act; and the dropping of influx control. The most controversial ‘reform’ was the selective opening up of parliament to Indian and ‘coloured’ members (the tri-cameral system). Popular resistance to the tri-cameral system necessitated, in the eyes of the state, the imposition of a State of Emergency in 1985.

This declaration of a State of Emergency was the government’s attempt to quell popular resistance which had in-
creased in the 1980s. Important highlights in this resistance were: the launch of the trade union federation Fosatu in 1979; the school boycotts of 1980; the amalgamation of over 400 youth, civic, women's and students organizations into the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983; and the launch of the larger trade union federation Cosatu in 1985. This resistance has been expressed as strikes; work stayaways; school, rent, and bus boycotts; and as increasingly militant actions against police and army personnel in the townships. The state's response was to impose a State of Emergency. This and subsequent emergencies (still in force) have led to thousands of detentions, restrictions on media coverage of 'unrest', and the imposition of severe restrictions on several leaders and organizations, not to mention the countless deaths of activists at the hands of the security establishment and vigilantes.

The cost of this repression has been high for the progressive movement, but a further aspect is that much 'unrest' has been so-called 'black-on-black violence'. While such terminology is simplistic, and reduces popular resistance to a racial reaction, mass violence has often had negative effects on the progressive movement. In Natal this has been particularly evident, and it is the objective of this study to elucidate the processes through which this has occurred in Durban's settlements in the recent past.
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The objective of the research presented here is to examine the experience of mass violence occurring in the greater Durban area in the 1980s. This focus on mass violence, therefore excludes incidents of individual violence, for example, petrol bombing of a house. It is recognized, of course, that the distinction between mass and individual violence is not a clearcut one. Often violent incidents of an individual nature may inform collective violence - for example, the assassination of a popular leader. Moreover, past patterns of collective violence between opposing groups commonly inform future patterns of individual violence and vice versa. This study, however, focuses on examples of mass violence, defined as events where groups of people confront other groups (be they police, army, or other members of the community) and where physical violence ensues.

In particular, the study is oriented towards those examples of mass violence which have been either ignored or considered anomalous in the social science literature, including 'faction fights' and 'inter-ethnic' conflict. In short, the rationale for the study stems on the one hand from the considerable practical gravity of mass violence in the South.
African context, and a simultaneous hesitance to treat the topic in a scientific manner on the other.

1.3 THEORETICAL CONTEXT

A further consideration is the possible contribution of a contemporary geographic perspective on mass violence. Since the late 1970s a concern has emerged in the geographical literature with the 'difference that space makes' (Sayer, 1985). This concern was aroused by the peripheral position which spatial structures had been assigned in social theory (Gregory and Urry, 1985:3). Spatial structures came to be assigned such a position during the radical critique of geography and the planning sciences during the 1970s. This critique was responding, in part, to the widespread positivist assumption that spatial restructuring would alleviate social inequalities. The emphasis in such positivist work was on uplifting depressed regions or communities through spatial engineering. The radical critique of the 1970s was quite correct in stating that such actions would do little to alleviate social inequalities, as it was not regions that were poor or depressed but rather the people within them.

Massey (1985) illustrated this when she argued that:

The radical critique of the 1970s - for very understandable reasons both intellectual and political -
went far too far overboard in its rejection of the im-
portance of the spatial organization of things, of dis-
tance and perhaps above all, of geographical differen-
tiation (p.10).

The emphasis on geography as a spatial science under positivism
led to the study of spatial interaction devoid from the social
context. But while the 1960s saw the elevation of space to a
pedestal, the 1970s witnessed its fall from grace. The spatial
was seen as a social construct without the realization that "so-
cial relations are also constructed over space, and that makes a
difference" (Massey, 1985:12).

Massey is one of the major proponents of the need to reintegrate
space into social theory. She argues that:

The fact that processes take place over space, the
facts of distance or closeness, of geographical varia-
tion between areas, of the individual character and
meaning of specific places and regions - all these are
essential to the operation of social processes them-
selves. Just as there are no purely spatial processes,
neither are there non-spatial social processes (Massey,
1984:52).

In an attempt to come to terms with the variety of local forms
which social relations and processes exhibit, a spatially sensi-
tive approach has been proposed for this study. In searching for
an explanation of the different forms of mass violence experien-
enced in Durban, it was realized that each of the areas concerned exhibited a high level of locally specific social relationships. These social relations and processes, it was recognized, reflect the dialectical relation between social processes and spatial structures.

1.4 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF MASS VIOLENCE

Any serious study of political protest (and it will become clear shortly that mass violence is often a form of political protest) will experience problems in acquiring access to information. This is not least because protest is about disagreement with the status quo and there is therefore a paucity of useful official data and analysis. State functionaries prefer not to acknowledge the legitimacy of protest, especially violent protest, tending to blame it on 'agitators'. On the other hand, much of the literature on mass violence in South Africa is too general and overarching, it tends to count incidents, deaths, and the costs of violence to determine 'trends'. Indeed, after examining the South African literature on this topic, it becomes possible to identify two broad approaches to social revolt.

The first approach is that of 'agitator-promoted violence' and this literature generally supports the status quo in South Africa. The problem is perceived in terms of the need for the
restoration of 'law and order', so as to allow the process of 'reform' to continue. Those promoting an agitator-based approach argue that 'militants' stir up otherwise quiescent individuals and coerce them into acts of violence. Such analyses can be criticized as being simplistic, mechanistic, and ahistorical. They tend to treat human beings as passive, impressionable and uncritical, acting on impulse or under leadership influences rather than in response to felt grievances.

Another common approach to mass violence is of the 'Robin Hood' type and is more commonly espoused by revolutionary activists. This method is also simplistic, as it tends to categorize people into 'heroes' and 'villains'. The ambiguities of social protest are ignored and, as a result, the researcher may conveniently forget or misrepresent some aspects of the violence.

As an alternative to the above mentioned approaches we need to develop a critical, self-conscious method which falls into neither the agitator nor the Robin Hood categories, and which can lead us to further understanding of the causes and consequences of mass violence. This is not to argue for a 'neutral' stance, but rather to take a consistently critical approach which can be both committed and self-critical. If we are unaware of our own values when undertaking research, we deceive only ourselves that we are being 'neutral'. However, if we are aware of the values and mean-
ings we ascribe to particular activities and remain constantly self-conscious of them, then we are better equipped to assess the evidence.

1.5 THE VALUES UNDERLYING THE RESEARCH

There is an important value position informing the author's interest in researching mass violence which, as with most complex issues, requires clarification and elaboration. During the early 1980s many radical and a few liberal intellectuals in South Africa were caught up in the enthusiasm of the period. There was widespread belief in the potential for far-reaching, even revolutionary change, in South Africa. Reform was on the government's agenda; progressives saw themselves as gaining local and international support in their struggle against apartheid; and militants believed the government to be on the defensive in the townships.

With the declaration of the partial and then later national State of Emergency; the use of the Army in the townships; the emergence of a conservative backlash; and the extensive presence of vigilantes in the townships, this enthusiasm rapidly died down. It is now time to take stock and assess the strengths and shortcomings of recent mass protests. In so doing we need to remain consistently self-critical of the methods we use to make sense out of chaos.
This methodological question leads to the principal value position informing the present research. While acknowledging that oppression and exploitation frequently leads to social protest and violence, the question becomes how can such actions (protest) be structured so as to result in a disciplined militancy? Such a militancy needs to be expressive of people's lived realities, while also being directed at the appropriate causes or targets. It must result in the least possible destruction of progressive organizations and existing unity, and the greatest destabilization of the identified causes.

In attempting to address this question, use will be made of the example of Durban in the 1980s. Prior to August 1985, Natal was considered to lag behind the rest of the country as far as 'unrest' was concerned. In August of 1985, however, Durban exploded with protest and violence and all observers were taken by surprise. This situation was to be repeated towards the end of 1985, and with continued strife in Durban and Pietermaritzburg, Natal began to move into the forefront in the geography of social protest.

Natal escaped the first, limited, State of Emergency and this allowed a degree of euphoria to develop amongst liberals with the proposal of some form of joint executive decision-making in the
province as a laboratory for reform (the so-called Kwa-Natal Indaba). With the 'troubles' of August 1985, however, and the second, blanket State of Emergency, such euphoria rapidly evaporated.

Inkatha and the Kwazulu government on one hand, and COSATU and the UDF on the other, have emerged as the two major identifiable protagonists of conflict in the Natal area. Violence, either collective or individual, has been directed against identified activists of either camp, and in many cases quite arbitrarily against whole families. While there has been much talk about talks, this has had little effect on the ground, and it was only when Edendale (near Pietermaritzburg) had been torn apart in virtual civil war, that the parties actually got to the negotiating table. In such a context the present study examines the nature of the social base, the underlying socio-economic situation, and the recent local histories of the areas which have become embroiled in contemporary mass violence in the study area.

1.6 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

The following Chapter reviews the literature on 'the crowd', and that on the urban 'riots' in American and British cities, before exploring that on Third World and African urban revolts. The Chapter also outlines the theoretical approach adopted in the
study, which requires a creative use of both theory and practice in moving from the abstract and the general, to the concrete and specific. In so doing, the researcher has followed the current resurgence of interest in realist philosophy while adopting a theoretical position which can be termed ‘neo-Gramscian’. It can be termed thus because of its focus on the importance of civil society as the intervening force between social structures and human agency. In particular the effects of locality in understanding how events and outcomes are generated in specific situations, is emphasized.

Chapters 3 and 4 present accounts of incidents of ‘unrest’. Chapter 3 uses information gathered from media reports over the period, while Chapter 4 makes use of interviews, group discussions and other documents and secondary literature to gather information on specific incidents of mass violence. The objective of Chapter 3 is to provide a general account of social revolt (and organizational development) in the greater Durban area for the 1980s. This presents the background, and to some extent the context, for the more in-depth account of selected case studies which are presented and discussed in Chapter 4.

In Chapters 3 and 4 it is argued that developments at either a national or regional level are perceived through the prism of locality and that it is an understanding of these local experi-
ences which can inform our understanding of the processes of mass violence. By contrast, Chapter 5 examines the region and the influence of regional dynamics on local examples of collective conflict. Chapter 6 concludes the study by summarizing its particular contribution to the literature, as well as raising questions for theory and future research.
The main event was the dissolution of the old precapitalist regime under the repeated assaults of capitalism and revolutions. Its downfall involved religious and traditional institutions - it disrupted the stable world of family, small holdings, and moral principles that had survived for many centuries. It precipitated thousands of men, women, and children into the precarious world of cities and industry. The human galaxies spread over spaces no one would have considered habitable, dwelt in hovels no one would have thought of building. They disrupted multitudes of beings who became isolated and anonymous. Severed from their social networks, these people were drawn into the orbit of mechanized labour, into the cycle of the media and consumerism, but equally into that of violence where the new poor and the new rich confronted one another. Mass conflict and class conflict were born on the same day - and this is no coincidence.

While it is tempting to see the passage above as an analogy of present day South Africa, this is not altogether useful. Whereas 18th century Europe was experiencing the birth of capitalism, present day South African capitalism is part - albeit a peripheral part - of a dominant capitalist world economic order. There are, nevertheless, some quite striking similarities between contemporary South Africa and early European capitalism, for example, rapid urbanization, poor dwelling conditions and mass-based conflict.
cultivated individual, in a crowd he is a barbarian - that is a creature acting by instinct" (Le Bon, 1960:32-3).

Freud, by contrast, never used this type of emotionalism when discussing crowds. He referred rather to the unconscious nature of 'man' and how this surfaces in crowd situations. As Rey, (1986:55) argues, crowd phenomena were, for Freud, "more or less similar, but as it were writ large, to phenomena that, in the field of individual psychology are hard to discuss because they are more inaccessible, better concealed by mechanisms of defense and resistance".

Both Le Bon and Freud considered the crowd to be under some form of mass hypnosis, but whereas Le Bon leaves this untheorised, Freud proposed that there exist two types of bonds in crowds. These bonds, he argued, exist on two planes, the one horizontal (between members of the crowd) and the other vertical (between the crowd and 'the leader'). Freud went on to argue that this vertical bond did not necessarily require the physical presence of a 'leader' but that it may be replaced by a 'leading idea' (Rey, 1986:59). Freud further considered the horizontal bond to be a consequence of the vertical bond. Thus, crowd solidarity was a direct result of the identification of individuals in the crowd with a 'leader' or 'leading idea', and this identification led to the formation of the horizontal bond.
crowd'. In such cases a revolutionary crowd is not unconscious and does not see itself as guilty; it is convinced that it is inflicting a just and deliberate punishment (cited in Graumann and Moscovici, 1986:9).

Whereas Le Bon, Tarde, and Freud concentrated on the transformation of the individual in crowd situations, the latter group (Rude, Lefebvre, etc) have stressed the social purposes of crowd violence. By and large they have analyzed crowd phenomena in terms of the composition of the crowd, the nature of the targets the crowd attacked, the historical context of the time, and the specific 'spark' which preceded the onset of crowd violence. Because of their concentration on Europe in the 18th and 19th century the historical context tended to be one of: urbanization of the peasantry; collapse of the nobility; rise of the bourgeoisie; decline of the clergy; and the emergence of a labouring class.

By stressing the rationality of participants in crowds, and the social purposes of crowd disorders this group of writers has also brought attention to the role of the police and the military in re-establishing 'law and order'. As Cobb (1970:20) illustrates, the police are in a contradictory position. Being in the 'front line' in civil disorders they need on one hand, to be "well primed in the patterns of collective violence" so as to anticipate and quell possible uprisings, yet on the other hand
they need to produce results, that is, restore order and arrest culprits. According to Cobb they were not reticent in the latter:

This is not to suggest that the police deliberately set out to mislead the magistrates and the higher authorities; but to come back empty-handed would be to admit impotence. If rioters could not be found, they had to be invented (Cobb, 1970:28).

Thus police were able, to an extent, to produce the type of 'evidence' they needed and in so doing align themselves with the predominant view of Parliament, nobility and the clergy that the rioters were 'the dregs of society, bandits, savages, thieves, beggars, and prostitutes'.

Hayter (1978), writing on the military in 18th century Britain, shows that not only were they poorly equipped and trained for the suppression of civil disorders but that the soldiers found 'riot duty distasteful' because "...the men quite simply come from the same social group as the mob and often sympathized with it" (Hayter, 1978:27).

The views of writers such as Le Bon, Tarde, and McDougal no longer hold much credibility in the light of work by historians such as Rude, Hobsbawm, and Thompson. These 'new' historians have engaged in a polemical debate with the likes of Le Bon et al, and arguably vanquished them. However, from a post-polemical point of
view, one needs to be wary of labelling all crowd disorders as necessarily 'rational' and seeing order where there is perhaps chaos. In fact Dunning et al (1987:24) suggest that the terms 'rational' and 'irrational' are misleading and argue that "it might be more fruitful to see crowds not as 'rational' or 'irrational', but rather to explore the changing balance over time between what one might call the 'expressive' and the 'instrumental' aspects of different types of disorders"; 'expressive' violence being the cathartic release of aggression, and 'instrumental' violence being protest to redress grievances.

There is further need for elaboration on the 'collective-rational' approach. While it is useful as a starting point for analysis, in itself it is more a form of historical description and interpretation than a method for contemporary social analysis. Being for the most part historians, these writers have developed a methodology which is suited to their purposes, but which needs refinement in dealing with more contemporary events. It is appropriate therefore to review the work of sociologists (and others) on the American and British inner-city 'riots' in the 1960s and 1980s respectively.

2.1.2 The American and British Contributions

Gurr (1970), writing in the US context, proposed the 'relative deprivation' thesis in which he argued that the "root cause of
rebellions lie in peoples' feelings of frustration, discontent and despair" (cited in Gaskell and Benewick, 1987:4). In terms of this perspective the important 'variables' are people's perceptions of their circumstances, the reference group to which they aspire, and the opportunities, or lack of such opportunities, for realizing these aspirations.

According to Eckstein (1980:142) Gurr's theory falls into the contingency category. This assumes that the "fundamental disposition of individuals (or groups) in politics is towards 'peace': the resolution or avoidance of violent conflicts". When pacific politics is blocked under 'aberrant' conditions, the propensity for collective violence is increased. Such an assumption is totally at odds with 'conflict theory' - placed in the inherency category by Eckstein - which argues that the "fundamental disposition of individuals (or groups) in politics is to maximize influence, or power, over decisions" (Eckstein, 1980:143), and that collective violence is merely a means of achieving this. Thus in the former case mass violence is abnormal or aberrant, whereas in the latter it is merely another form of conflict.

Eckstein assesses the two abovementioned approaches (contingency and inherency) as theories of collective political violence, and concludes that neither approach yet offers conclusive evidence for its superiority - although he clearly prefers the relative...
deprivation approach. In ascribing these two approaches to different poles - inherency and contingency - however, he fails to acknowledge that any theory which hopes to explain a complex and contradictory reality is itself going to reflect these qualities. Rather, he seeks a simple (initial) theory hoping that "...once the essentials are known, the nagging complexities will ... fall into place more persuasively" (Eckstein, 1980:164). It is, however, precisely these overlaps in contending theories which seem at present to offer the greatest hope for social theory, as became evident in the 'emerging consensus in social theory' which will be considered later. In brief, however, this states that social relations are neither completely conflictual nor completely consensual but rather a negotiated mix of conflict and consensus.

Relative deprivation is, in itself, insufficient reason for rebellion. It does, however, provide a structural basis, or underlying reason, for discontent and actions based on such discontent. Whether or not this is activated (that is, results in crowd violence) depends on factors such as mobilization (or agitation), and 'trigger' events. This mobilization correlates with the horizontal and vertical bonds discussed earlier, whereas the 'trigger' event has been likened to a spark or flashpoint that sets off the conflagration/confrontation.

The concept of flashpoints is perhaps the most useful contribution to have emerged from the studies of the US urban 'riots'. In
a context of economic and political deprivation, any incident can serve as a flashpoint for the outbreak of collective violence. The concept of flashpoints was also amongst those used (along with those of 'copycat' rioting and agitators) to explain the 1981 urban riots in the UK. In many cases these flashpoints occurred between the police and the community in the 'front line'. Such actions as wrongful arrests and over-zealous policing served as the spark for many of the UK disorders. The tendency towards collective violence was increased by the popular conception of racist policing practices, where police (mostly white) would enter (largely black) inner city areas and arrest youth on 'sus' (suspicion) charges. Eventually, one too many arrests led to a crowd forming on the streets, protesting the police actions, and possibly erupting into violent confrontation between the police and local populace.

Gaskell and Bennewick (1987:17) argue that in research on flashpoints 'locale' is a critical element in the search for explanation. Thus the local context in which events occur needs to be researched along with the national context and the material deprivation experienced by subjugated communities. As Parry et al (1987) put it:

Locality may be a crucially important factor in crowd mobilization and in understanding the aftermath of disturbances. National trends in unemployment and economic recession are refracted through the prism of locality
into the conditions in which the individual functions. However mobile our society, the local spatial dimension is a necessary and major part of our experience (p.213).

Waddington et al (1987:159-162) go further to develop a model of disorder which attempts to link the structural and the experiential. They argue that any 'type of disorder' needs to be analyzed in terms of six levels, namely:

(i) The structural, that is: "the relative distribution of power and resources";
(ii) The political/ideological, that is: "the activities of political institutions - government, pressure groups - and the ideological agencies such as the mass media [which] help to create a context in which disorder may occur";
(iii) The cultural, that is: "the ways in which groups of people understand the social world and their place within it, their definition of the rules which do or should govern behaviour and how they define themselves and other social groups";
(iv) The contextual, that is: "the dynamic temporal setting in which disorder occurs";
(v) The situational, that is: "the spatial context, the setting of the event";
(vi) The interactional, that is: "the level of analysis where flashpoints occur...[defined]...as actions seen by participants as breaking the unwritten rules governing behavior between groups".

They summarize their model by stating that "incidents of public disorder can best be understood as resulting from a combination
of factors operating at different levels", and that it is when factors conducive to disorder are present at all or most of these levels that disorder is most likely to occur (Waddington et al, 1987:162). This model appears to be a particularly useful one as it offers a means of linking the structural and the experiential through the concept of locality. It further reflects the diversity of approaches within the literature under review and emphasizes the "multi-dimensional aspects of crowds and the need to study them from the perspective of different social science disciplines" (Gaskell and Benewick, 1987:13).

It seems that much of the disagreement amongst researchers on crowd violence is largely a question of emphasis reflecting their particular discipline's speciality, that is, social or psychological, historical or contemporary, and so on. However, this question of emphasis must not blind us to the irreconcilable differences which do exist between approaches, most notably between that approach which sees the crowd as irrational and driven by agitators, and the other which argues that the crowd is responding to felt grievances in the only way left open to them.

This review has begun to sketch the outlines of both an appropriate theory and methodology for dealing with crowd violence. However, before such a theory and methodology are explicitly articulated it is necessary to examine research on crowd violence
in Third World social formations. Most of this Third World literature has not used the terms crowd or collective violence but rather that of 'social movements'.

2.1.3 The Third World Contribution

Although much has been written about rebellion and revolution in the Third World - for example by Griffiths and Griffiths (1979); Kasfir (1984); Burchett (1978); and White et al (1983) - these studies have tended to focus on rebellion at the national level, and they give little attention to conflict at 'regional' or local levels. There are, however, a few studies which pay attention to locally specific crowd protests in Third World social formations.

Moises and Stolcke (1980) in an article on urban transport and popular violence in Brazil argue that: "the riots were not only a sign of growing discontent of the urban poor with their living conditions, but also a consequence of their loss, since the military coup of 1964, of any adequate means of political expression" (1980:174). They argue that commuters were 'rioting' as much against political powerlessness as against economic or locational deprivation and that while the poverty of the urban poor led to "the creation of a favorable climate for revolt" this in itself was insufficient as an explanation for the immediate causes of the 'riots' and the form they took (Moises and Stolcke, 1980:176).
Most importantly, they disagree with Hobsbawm's argument that in industrial societies crowd actions such as 'riots' are superseded by labour movement activities (strikes, sit-ins, occupations of factories, and so on) as the predominant form of protest. Moises and Stolcke argue that "in those industrial societies where autocratic political regimes have assumed power and suppress popular discontent spontaneous riots may tend to occur once again" (1980:182).

They make reference to the demonstration effect of the 'riots' and state that "each new incident reinforced the future potential for revolt" (Moises and Stolcke, 1980:190). At the same time they draw attention to the issues which sparked off the 'riots'. These varied from train accidents to lateness of trains and mistreatment of fellow passengers.

Hasson (1983) in a study of the Ohalim movement in Israel has argued for a 'integrated approach', stating that:

Any adequate understanding of the rise of an urban social movement requires an integrated approach between explanations stressing the general structural conflicts and those stressing the particular subjective characteristics (personal values, beliefs, and intentional actions) of the social actors (p.170).
Hasson (1983) argues that a contextual approach (for example materialism and realism) is useful in helping to identify ethnic conflict, class formation, and housing-territorial conflicts; and that a humanist approach is helpful in determining the emergence of informal groups and local leadership, as well as the impact of intellectual intervention.

In an African context Faredi (1973) analyses Nairobi's urban 'riots' from the 1920s to 1960s making use of the concept of 'the crowd' as developed by Rude (1959) and others. He examines the relationship between tribal groups and political activities stressing the way in which different African political groups were expressive of different social bases largely along tribal lines. These ethnically based conflicts resulted in "the elimination of popular movements as a political force by a ruling African political elite" in the post-colonial state (Faredi, 1973:275).

Interestingly, there were a number of social processes in Nairobi which have parallels to those operating in South Africa. These include: The massive urban-ward migration of the landless poor, target workers, and divorced, widowed or barren women to the towns which in turn led to the mushrooming of 'squatter' settlements around the major towns; the reaction of the colonial government to these settlements and protests through the use of
the police and military to suppress revolt and demolish the settlements; and the promotion of tribal associations and the integration of a privileged African elite into the colonial administration of the territory.

Although the above-mentioned studies have focused on urban protest in the Third World, they have little theoretical contribution to make which is significantly different to that of the literature already reviewed. Castells (1977; 1983) is perhaps the only theorist to focus specifically on urban protest in both the First and the Third Worlds.

Castell's (1977) basic thesis is that the urban poor can and do come together to form 'social movements' which question and challenge their subjugated position. This involves the development of the social base (the urban poor) to a social force (an organized protest movement) which pursues specific claims, (social, political and economic goals). He argues that the particulars of the social base concerned are important in determining the claims pursued, as are their links to political and other movements, which in turn influence their potential for success. The structural content of each claim (how seriously it challenges the structures supporting the existing order) is assessed by placing it in its economic and political context, that is, the role it plays vis-a-vis the various classes involved.
While recognizing the diversity of urban social movements, Castells (1983) argues that they are similar in that they: generally consider themselves as urban; are locally based and territorially defined; and mobilize around issues of collective consumption, cultural identity, and political self-management.

2.1.4 The South African Literature

There has been an explosion of literature in, and on, South Africa dealing with 'unrest'/revolt/insurrection in recent years - see for example: Schlemmer (1983;1985a;1985b); Schoeman (1986); Gwala (1985;1988); Haysom (1986); Leach (1986); Sitas (1986); Schofield (1986); Hughes (1987); Cole (1987); Booth (1987); Mashabela (1987); Meer (1988); Meer and Sitas (1988); Nzimande (1988); van der Merwe (1988); and Aitchison (1988). Most of this literature, however, does not concentrate on specific incidents of protest, and is generally descriptive in nature. As a result there is little attention paid to theory building (perhaps because of other pressing demands which are seen as more immediate) and the literature on 'the crowd' remains largely unmentioned in analyses of South African protests. Nevertheless one can discern a number of implicit theoretical approaches.

The one approach is that adopted by the South African government and its apologists. This sees the 'unrest' as the work of
agitators stirring up an otherwise quiescent population for their own dubious ends which are inevitably linked to those of the ANC and Moscow. An example of such an approach is that of the Institute for Strategic Studies at Pretoria University (ISSUP) - (see ISSUP Strategic Review, August 1987). Essentially this literature sees the State of Emergency as having returned, or as returning the townships 'to normal'.

Another approach is the 'Robin Hood' approach mentioned earlier. This sees every act of violence as attacking the state or as a result of state repression - see for example Booth (1987) and Schofield (1986). However morally praiseworthy such an approach may be, it does little to advance our understanding of incidents which do not fit neatly into the categories 'heroes and villains'.

A third approach deals with civil 'disorders' as the result of a set of complicated and interrelated social processes. Examples of such analysis come from across the political spectrum and, regardless of the specific politics of the researcher concerned, reflect a commitment to rigorous analysis. Thus liberal reformists such as Schlemmer (1983) can draw attention to the underlying inequalities and political powerlessness of the 'rioters', as can more critical observers (for example, Hughes, 1987; and Sitas, 1986). The principal difference between the two
centres on whether they regard capitalist social relations as inherently conflictual or not.

Cole (1987) and Sitas (1986) are perhaps the best examples of rigorous analyses of the outbreak of community conflict in South Africa during the 1980s. Both draw attention to the complex set of relations existing within the settlements studied (Crossroads and Inanda respectively), with Sitas paying particular attention to the emerging class forces at work and Cole to the role of women and different political actors, including the state. These contributions make almost all others seem marginal by comparison, but they also fail to explicitly articulate a rigorous theoretical approach to the subject. In essence they are similar to the social history approach of Rude, Cobb, Hobsbawm, and Lefebvre reviewed earlier and as such, offer the greatest scope for the development of theory.

It is the light of this almost universal lack of appropriate theory that the following section needs to be seen as offering a possible theoretical and methodological way forward. While this theory is articulated at the general level of social processes it is possible to apply it to the study of political violence.
2.2 THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

In recent years there has been some enthusiasm in the social science theoretical literature over an emerging theoretical consensus amongst geographical and social theorists (Pred, 1982). This consensus aims to make use of the two poles around which social theory has clustered in the past, namely the determinist (structuralism, functionalism) and voluntarist (humanism, idealism) poles. The argument goes that both positions have been stressing different aspects of the same reality, and the difference between them largely revolves around which concepts are given priority.

While structuralists, for example, will emphasize the social structures, institutional forces, and stratification of social life, humanists will emphasize the actors' perceptions of these structures, institutions, and their own actions. The debate between the two has resulted in structuralists being seen as simply deterministic, leaving no room for human agency to influence events, while humanists are accused of lacking any coherent theory and of ignoring the constraints of social structures on human activity.

This emerging consensus has largely been articulated within realist philosophy. The argument goes that people are not mere vessels to be influenced hither-thither by social structures, but rather that in everyday activities people either reinforce,
reform, or confront these structures and, in the process, either reconstitute them or create new structures. Thus structures are not seen as unalterable but rather as being constantly reconstituted by human activity. As Sayer (1984:87) states: "Social structures do not endure automatically, they only do so where people reproduce them; but in turn, people do not reproduce them automatically and rarely intentionally".

Structures are therefore able to be challenged and changed. Whether or not this happens, to what extent, and why, is the objective of concrete research. Realism, however, does not assume that people can alter structures merely by choosing to do so. Rather it links this ability to create new structures to elements of the material world which constrain human choice. An example of such a constraint is the need for a functioning productive system in order to reproduce any particular social formation. In a sense this echoes Marx's statement that: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past" (cited in McLellan, 1983:43).

Before discussing further the realist 'project' it is useful to trace the evolution of theory in human geography. This will assist an understanding of the theoretical developments in human
geography, and motivate for the author's choice of a marxian approach based on realist philosophy.

2.2.1 A Journey Through Human Geographical Theory via David Harvey and Manuel Castells

The traditional approach to social research has been for subjects (that is, researchers) to study objects (that is, people) in an alienated manner. Thus the researcher does not see her/himself as bringing any values into the study or of influencing the activities of those studied. It is assumed that events can be studied in isolation from 'extraneous' factors, and that the whole research process is geared to produce a laboratory type situation where 'facts' can be 'discovered' (Sayer, 1984:16-46). This was considered a 'scientific' approach to knowledge and has dominated human geographical theory since the 1950s. Since the early 1970s, however, the traditional scientific approach has begun to be challenged, most successfully by marxists.

As a result of the theoretical predominance of positivism in geography the concern was largely with issues which could fit into the paradigm. This work concentrated on issues such as: shopping site location, route optimization, urban hierarchies, and distributive networks. David Harvey, who in 1969 produced the pioneering text on scientific explanation in geography (titled Explanation in Geography) was to comment only a few years later:
there is a clear disparity between the sophisticated theoretical and methodological framework which we are using and our ability to say anything really meaningful about events as they unfold around us (Harvey, 1973:128).

Harvey went on to call for a 'revolution in geographic thought', arguing that the quantitative revolution had run its course and that the "emerging objective social conditions and our patent inability to cope with them" (1973:128) were the pressing factors behind such a call. He then outlined three possible directions for such a revolution, namely, idealism, phenomenology, and materialism, before concluding that:

the most fruitful strategy at this juncture is to explore that area of understanding in which certain aspects of positivism, materialism, and phenomenology overlap (Harvey, 1973:129).

Such an overlap, he argued, was most developed in marxism, which had a phenomenological basis - "the concept of man as in constant sensuous interaction with the social and natural realities which surround us" (Harvey, 1973:129). At the same time, marxism has in common with positivism a materialist base and the use of an analytical method. The important difference between marxism and positivism is that whereas positivism seeks only to understand the world, marxism seeks also to change it. Methodologically, there are also important differences between marxism and posi-
tivism. Positivist methodology requires that social processes are treated as closed systems (a categorical approach) whereas marxism stresses the interactions between elements involved in the processes operating in open systems (a relational approach).

Since Harvey's (1973) call for a paradigmatic overthrow, there has been an explosion of marxist-oriented literature in geography, taking as its focus issues such as: ghetto formation; poverty; spatial and social inequalities; dislocation of communities; protests; housing struggles; development and underdevelopment; imperialism; etc. Much of the emerging research has worked towards an understanding of the processes which enable collectives to mobilize in a diversity of subjugated situations.

This emphasis was exemplified in the work of Manuel Castells on urban social movements (USMs), which can be defined as extra-state mobilizations that organize around issues of collective consumption; in "defence of cultural identity associated with and organized around a specific territory"; and which "mobilize politically in relation to the state, specifically local government" (Castells, 1983:xix). In organizing around the above issues social movements contest the urban social forms envisaged by the state and/or the various power blocs, and present an alternative interpretation of urban social crises and perhaps offer alternative solutions.
Thus, as Cooper (1983) and Callinicos (1987) have argued, the form of the city is as much shaped by the everyday struggles of ordinary people as it is by the forces of state intervention or capital accumulation. An example of this in the South African context is that of 'squatter' settlements on the borders of the 'independent' or 'self governing' states in close proximity to the industrial areas of the 'white' cities. This movement of people to 'squatter' settlements has significantly altered the actual form of the city and interaction within it. It has also challenged previous spatial patterns, most notably the Verwoerdian ideal of 'white' cities.

The form of the city is worked out in concrete struggles between the ambit of state institutions, local community activities (organized or not) and the forces of capital accumulation. The resultant form cannot be predicted a-priori but is the result of the relative strengths of these factors.

Although Castells has been criticized for his ahistorical approach and his inability to explain how a social base (a particular community) becomes a social force (see Dunleavey, 1977; Pickvance, 1977; and Duncan, 1981), his major contribution to geographic thought has been the argument that heterogeneous communities can unite to form effective oppositional power groups,
and in so doing influence future urban forms. His other major contribution has been the discovery of the themes around which (urban) social movements develop, namely: collective consumption; cultural identity; and political mobilization in opposition to the (local) state.

2.2.2 Some Criticisms of Marxism and a Response

Before discussing how theory can be used to render township conflict more understandable, it is necessary to tackle some of the criticisms which have been leveled at marxist analyses. A major criticism which is often raised is that of determinism or economism (Duncan and Ley, 1982; Choinard and Fincher, 1983). It is argued that marxists claim that the economic activities of a given society are the most important and that they therefore determine the rest of social life. While this criticism is valid in some cases it generally represents a partial understanding of marxism as a theoretical and methodological approach. No doubt, when engaged in polemical debates marxists tend to overstate their case, and it is this the critics have seized upon.

Marxists do not (or should not) argue that the economy determines the rest of social and political life (Showstack Sassoon, 1982:9–11; Quaini, 1982:149). Rather they stress that economic relations have a pervasive effect on all other levels of society, due to
the simple fact that without a functioning productive system (the economy) no social formation can reproduce itself. This, however, does not mean that the economy therefore determines all non-economic aspects of social existence, the so-called superstructure, but merely that it (the economic base) is a necessary precondition for the existence of other aspects of the social formation. Thus, while the importance of the existence of the economy can be stated a priori, the degree of influence and determination which this base has over the superstructure and vice versa can only be ascertained through concrete research at particular conjunctures.

Critics also fail to recognize the levels of abstraction in Marx’s work - see Horvarth and Gibson (1984) for a discussion of these. Thus while marxists argue that the major fracture line in capitalist societies is that between bourgeoisie and proletariat - that is, the line along which social stratification and access to wealth and power occurs - they do not argue that other fracture lines (language, religion, culture) have little social effect. The effect of these other fractures is not to be seen as an element of ‘false consciousness’, as the oppressed do experience these as real (Eyles, 1981). Rather it is argued that such fractures overlie those between workers and capitalists, and these fractures are involved in a complex and dynamic interdependent relationship, for example, the relationship between class and race in South Africa.
Marxists are also accused of relegating human agency to the mere bearer of structures, - see Quaini (1982:144-171) and Smart (1983:4-31) for discussions of this - but this is again a case of erecting a 'straw man' and then knocking it down. With the initial enthusiasm of a new paradigmatic framework in which to work, many marxist practitioners were bent on avoiding the pitfalls of a voluntarist approach. This voluntarist approach ascribed all social change to individual (or group) choice, and took little cognizance of the constraints which established social, political, and economic practices imposed on these agents (Cox, 1981). However, having made their initial point, marxists have been incorporating 'human agency' into their work in illuminating and exciting ways, that is, human agents as active participants in (class) struggles striving to make their own histories, at times partially successfully (Thompson 1971; Cooper, 1983; and Cal- linicos, 1987).

Thus far it has been argued that human geography needs to concern itself with the objective social conditions and processes of the time, and that this requires a philosophy which: (i) is sensitive to the felt grievances of the oppressed/exploited majority; and (ii) maintains that there is a concrete material basis to this oppression. In coming to understand such social conditions the researcher has to use a mode of analysis which renders the asso-
ciated social processes open to scrutiny. The methods of positivism, by and large, are not suited to scrutinizing social processes. Faccioli et al (1986:154) argue that:

if the object of sociological investigation involves behavioural innovation or the outbreak of a social movement - which will show up as minority phenomena in any statistical survey, but may express the underlying trend or emergent patterns of behaviour - then research based upon quantitative methods and techniques will be inadequate to 'understand' them and, above all, to penetrate the specific component features of such a trend.

The marxist emphasis on the dialectical relations between social structures and human activity - through the process of struggle within the institutions of civil society - is a more appropriate approach for the study of social revolt.

2.2.3 The Realist Project

Realist philosophy is not incompatible with marxism. It attempts to offer a philosophical framework for the pursuit of knowledge. In doing this it acknowledges that different theories and methods are useful for different ends. Thus the theory and methods used to analyze contemporary social problems would be very different from those used to determine the optimal location of a shopping centre or the ideal width of a major road. Realism acknowledges that "social science is not simple and monistic but differentia-
ted in its aims, methods and types of objects" (Sayer, 1984:46), and while realism argues that all knowledge is fallible, it asserts that not all knowledge is equally fallible (Sayer, 1984:64). Knowledge is neither absolute nor entirely relative, rather it needs to be assessed in terms of its 'practical adequacy'. Sayer argues that to be "practically adequate, knowledge must generate expectations about the world and about the results of our actions which are actually realized" (1984:66). Realism therefore offers a philosophical framework within which to conduct and assess the applications of social research.

As has been mentioned earlier marxism makes use of relational thought as opposed to the categorical thought of traditional approaches. Relational analysis requires that we examine the nature of the relations we are analyzing, namely, are they necessary (internal) or contingent (external)? If necessary, then subjects/objects in that relation presuppose one another, for example: worker - boss, landlord - tenant, man - woman. Thus one object/subject is of necessity defined in relation to the other to which it is necessarily related. If, on the other hand, they are contingently related then they do not depend on one another for their definition, for example: boss - tenant, woman - worker, bureaucrat - landlord (Sayer, 1984:82-85).

Furthermore, necessary relations between objects or practices also include other internal relationships that have to be present
as prerequisites for that necessary relation to exist. Thus the "landlord - tenant relationship itself presupposes the existence of private property, the production of an economic surplus and so on" (Sayer, 1984:84). Figure 2.1 below illustrates this proposition.

![Diagram of landlord-tenant relationship]

**Figure 2.1 Structure**

Source: Sayer, 1984:85.

In the above example the landlord could be (a) male, (b) female, (c) black, (d) white, etc, as could the tenant. Thus it is contingent whether the landlord or tenant is a, b, c, or d, but this does not change the necessary relation between landlord and
tenant even though it may modify its contingent expression. The set of necessarily related objects/subjects and processes above is considered to be a structure. Any person is integrated into several structural arrangements, or 'sets of internally related practices'. Thus a worker may simultaneously be a tenant, a member of a particular race group, hold certain political positions, and so on. Kasfir (1984:4), for example, has drawn attention to what he refers to as the 'plasticity of class formation' in Africa. He argues that "other social claims, such as ethnicity, region, and religion, intermittently mediate the involvement of individuals in classes as well as their participation in the state" (Kasfir, 1984:4).

Not all these 'roles' will come to the fore in the generation of particular events, and some may overlap others, for example the landlord is often the local state, and in recent rent boycotts in the PWV area (Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging), tenants were confronting the 'landlord' (the local state) not only as exploited tenants but also as a disenfranchised black populace. When the nature of the relationship between necessarily related objects/subjects is a conflictual one, and the roles occupied overlap with other conflictual situations the potential for violence to erupt is increased.

Objects/subjects have causal powers and liabilities by virtue of their particular structures, for example, tenants may pay rent or
withhold it, workers may work or strike, scholars may go to school or boycott. A causal power is defined by Sayer (1984:95/6) as a statement about "what a object is like and what it can do", and only by empirical study can we determine whether particular causal powers or liabilities are activated. Whether or not these are activated is dependent on "conditions whose presence and configuration is contingent" (Sayer, 1984:96), as is illustrated in Figure 2.2 below.

Object X, having structure S, necessarily possessing causal powers (p) and liabilities (l), under specific conditions (c), will:

- (c1) not be activated, hence producing no change — e1
- (c2) produce change of type e2
- (c3) produce change of type e3, etc.

**Figure 2.2 The structure of causal explanation**

Source: Sayer, 1984:98.
2.3 CONCLUSION

This chapter began with a review of the historical literature on the crowd, and then proceeded to the contemporary American and British contributions to this literature. The 'collective rational' approach was seen as offering the greater potential for the development of theory and the analysis of 'unrest'. The concepts of relative deprivation and flashpoints were useful contributions to emerge from studies on the U.S. inner city 'riots', while the importance of 'locale' in the search for explanations emerged from the British studies.

The literature on collective violence emerging from the Third World and South Africa was reviewed and seen to offer little of theoretical importance that was different to the historical and First World literature. In the theory section, developments in human geographical theory were briefly described through a sketch of the work of David Harvey and Manuel Castells, before proceeding on to an explanation of the realist approach adopted here.

In the following account of mass violence use will be made of the realist approach outlined above. This approach enabled the researcher to determine the necessary relations present, and the
contingent conditions under which the causal power of violent protest emerged. This was done through a regression from the description of events - the 'disorders' - to discover the conditions present within specific localities within the greater Durban area. Use was made of the model proposed by Waddington et al (1987:159-162) described in the literature review earlier. This model helped to identify the structural, political, cultural, historical, and spatial conditions under which crowd 'disorders' erupted. It therefore offered a useful means of identifying the specific, contingent conditions present when the causal power of violent protest was activated by crowds in particular places and times.
CHAPTER THREE

EXTENSIVE RESEARCH

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The objective of this chapter is to provide an introductory overview of mass violence and related developments that occurred in the study area during the period 1980-87. The method used to achieve this was an extensive computer-based media search performed by the INCH (Institute for Contemporary History) service of the University of the Orange Free State. Over 1 000 news reports were examined, and a year-by-year account of mass violence in Durban’s settlements is given. This is followed by an analysis of these events, in particular an examination of their relative frequency over the period, identification of the issues around which mass protest and violence occurred, and the identification of case studies for further examination in Chapter 4. First, however, it is necessary to critically evaluate the media as a data source.

3.2 A CRITICAL NOTE ON THE NEWS AND THE MEDIA.

The media in South Africa is under heavy restrictions as to what it can report on, and how critical an interpretation it
can provide. Even before the State of Emergency was declared in 1985, the Press was severely restricted under the Public Safety Act of 1953. Since July 1985 however, there have been a number of proclamations which constrain the Press even further. In effect these prohibit coverage on:

- security force activity in containing revolt
- the reactions of the township residents to security force actions
- activities of, and quotes from, banned or 'listed' organizations and individuals
- the names of people detained unless released to the Press by the relevant Minister.

Further, the Minister of Law and Order can seize any publication which he sees as including 'subversive statements', that is: promotes the objects of unlawful organizations; opposes the government or the security forces activities; 'incites' the public to boycott, strike, or protest; promotes hostility between sections of the public; weakens public confidence; or encourages foreign action against South Africa (*Indicator South Africa*, 4(3):18).

Although these overt restrictions are very severe, we should not allow this to blind us to the more covert restrictions which come to bear on the press. Indeed, it is necessary to
examine both the legal restrictions on the press and the more subtle pressures and persuasions which influence the selection and interpretation of the 'news'. In doing this, we need to investigate the objective material position of the press in society.

It cannot be over-emphasized that the press is a commercial enterprise. As such it is in the business of 'news' to earn a profit, and the major source of profits derive from advertising revenue. This places advertisers in a potentially powerful position; only potentially so, however, as advertisers may not form a cohesive bloc, and the editors' own perceptions of the role of the press may modify their coverage.

An example may serve to illustrate the above point. A strike at GAME discount stores in Durban in October 1981 received only very limited coverage by the local press, which carries several full page adverts for the store almost daily. While it is not being suggested that the press was directly pressurized by GAME, it might be hypothesized that the local papers would have been reluctant to enter into direct conflict with a major advertiser.

There now enters into this argument a complication, as advertising can only be effective if it reaches a 'market',
that is, the public. Should the press be so restricted - both overtly and covertly - so as to result in a tepid 'product' which the public is less than interested in, then advertising becomes ineffective. Such a situation is further complicated when a sector of the market (white consumers) is becoming saturated, and producers are beginning to appeal to the growing black market. If the newsworthiness of the papers is perceived as low, and black consumers refrain from buying them, then this potential consumer market remains untapped. Thus the commercial press finds itself between contending forces, pinched between critical readers on one hand, and market-seeking capital on the other, with government imposed restrictions limiting their relative freedom even more.

The press apparently deals with this contradictory position by: blaming its lack of content on restrictions; arguing for a supposed balanced viewpoint which is in reality no more than the political perspectives of its editor and staff; and by production of 'African' editions which include news more relevant to their black readership. There are, however, a few newspapers (for example, the Weekly Mail, New Nation, and South) which do their best to report as much as possible within the limits of the restrictions. By comparing these to the others, it is possible to estimate the impact of
editorial policy and advertisers on the 'news'. These 'alternative' papers are privately funded and/or survive on specialized subscriptions. As such they are less sensitive than the commercial media to the need for advertising revenue.

Besides the objective material position outlined above, the press is also in a subjective position, that is, the editors' or sub-editors' selection of what is considered newsworthy. In this regard one can distinguish between the liberal and conservative sections of the press, with the former adopting a slightly more critical approach to news selection and reportage. Most editors, however, practice a form of self-censorship, and tend to err on the side of caution rather than incur the wrath of the state.

Given the arguments outlined above, how is it possible to use the press (especially in South Africa) as a data source in serious research? Reintges (1986:27) argues that:

Some degree of scientific control over such bias can be effected, however, through comparisons of news reports with the communications emanating from the grassroots organizations, primary research in the area, as well as published and unpublished sources which are relevant to the questions raised.
One can, therefore use the press as a source of reference for the occurrence of events and their sequencing. This does not imply, however, a necessary reliance on the interpretations given in press reports, although these too, are often useful. For such explanations one can make use of the techniques and sources mentioned by Reintjes above (1986). There is also little alternative when seeking a consistent cataloguing of past events, than to use the press. This, of course, is not to discount the use of archival material so favored by historians, but for such recent occurrences these do not exist, or access to them is restricted.

3.3 ANALYSIS OF NEWS REPORTS

To gain an overall impression of the occurrences of political mass violence in Durban it is necessary to refer to both the press and to whatever other sources are available as well as to use interviewing and personal interaction to gain information. In this chapter press reports were used to gain a general impression of the scope and nature of mass violence in Durban. This includes a description of the issues around which collective violence occurred, the areas in which it occurred, the groups involved, and in some cases the results of the violence.

A computer search was conducted using the INCH (Institute for Contemporary History) service provided by the University of the
Orange Free State in Bloemfontein. This categorizes news reports into major subject headings, as well as providing a list of key words contained in every news report. The researcher provides a list of key words which s/he feels will capture all the relevant news reports, and specifies the time period for the search and the newspapers to be included in the search. In this search all South African newspapers were included and the period under consideration was 1980-85. The search was stopped at the end of 1985 because on 2 November 1985 an amendment to the Public Safety Act of 1953 was published in the Government Gazette. This effectively prevented the reporting of any public disturbances, strikes or boycotts, and reports on "the damaging of property or assault on or killing of persons, or of people and security forces involved in these incidents" (Indicator SA, 1987, 4(3):18). The key words used in the news search were: unrest; riot; rampage; violence; revolt; protest; mobs; disorder; boycott; and disturbance. Furthermore, it is possible to limit the search by linking the key words to the place one wishes to cover, thus Durban was specified as the place and a list of the settlements around Durban was also included to narrow the search down to this specific area.

Over 1000 press reports were yielded by the computer search, and these were distributed as follows:
Table 3.1  Number of news reports by year

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of reports</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Already this indicates an initial high in 1980 and 1981, a period of relative quiescence in 1982 and 1983, before rising again in 1984 and peaking in 1985. The number of reports in 1985 is, however, not a true reflection of the extent of mass violence, as on 21 July and 2 November of that year amendments were made to the Public Safety Act of 1953 and press coverage of 'unrest' was subsequently restricted.

In the following section press reports have been summarized and condensed in order to provide an overall description of the extent of crowd violence during the period. Reference to other literature is made where necessary, to clarify an event. From 1985 to 1987, due to restrictions on press coverage of 'unrest', use was made of the Indicator SA Chronologies of Township Unrest (Indicator SA, 1985-1988).
3.3.1 Summary of Incidents of Mass Violence as Reported in the Press, 1980-1987

1980

As mentioned above, it is possible to gain an impression of the extent of mass violence in one particular year by the relative frequency of such reports. This index cannot be taken as conclusive, however, and one needs to bear in mind both overt and subjective censoring of 'the news'. The school boycotts of 1980 were to attract a lot of attention from the press, and they were in fact the major event around which crowd violence occurred in that year.

The boycotts began in 'coloured' schools in the Cape Peninsula in April, and sympathy boycotts spread to Durban where scholars at Bechet High School in Sydenham - a 'coloured' residential area located about 6 km from the CBD - boycotted and marched to a nearby school to persuade the scholars to join them (DN 22/4/80; NM 22/4/80). The grievances around which 'coloured' scholars boycotted were listed as: overcrowding; lack of school equipment and books; lack of scholar representation; under-qualified teachers; and the low salaries of teachers (SACHED, 1986:244-5).

Students at the two universities in Durban and pupils at schools in central Durban (Indian), Chatsworth (Indian), and Wentworth ('coloured'), joined in the boycott. Incidents of police-pupil confrontation were reported in Chatsworth and Wentworth when
pupils attempted to march to the City Hall with their demands (P 24/4/80; A 24/4/80; RDM 24/4/80).

By the end of April schools in KwaMashu (an African residential area about 25 km north of the CBD) had joined in the boycott and reports of police-pupil confrontation proliferated in the press (A 30/4/80; P 1/5/80; RDM 1/5/80; NW 1/5/80). Typically, pupils would march in the streets singing slogans and encouraging others to join them, move towards schools which they would then stone; the police would then arrive and using teargas, quirts, batons, and at times birdshot and hard ammunition, disperse the protesting pupils. The pupils would usually retaliate with stones, and disperse only to regroup again shortly afterwards and move to other schools, administration buildings or bus stops where the process would repeat itself (DN 1/5/80; RDM 2/5/80).

The police began appealing in early May for the intervention of the 'KwaZulu government', who were quick to blame the protests on 'instigators' and intimidation. They threatened to close the schools where pupils were protesting, most of which were in KwaMashu (EP 2/5/80; C 3/5/80).

At a meeting in KwaMashu convened by pupils on 6 May it was decided to end the boycott. While 'coloured' and Indian pupils returned to school African pupils continued to boycott (RDM
7/5/80; CT 6/5/80). This return by ‘coloured’ and Indian pupils, however, did not last and they resumed boycotting shortly thereafter (DN 8/5/80).

Towards the middle of May, Buthelezi (Chief Minister of the Kwazulu Legislative Assembly and President of Inkatha) held a rally in KwaMashu to encourage parents to discipline their children and get them back to school. People were bussed into KwaMashu and an impi (a group of armed Zulu warriors) controlled access to the stadium where the rally was being held. At this rally Buthelezi accused ‘foreign representatives’ in Durban of being amongst those ‘orchestrating the disturbances’ in KwaMashu schools (NM 13/5/80). Pupils meeting at the KwaMashu cinema (to decide on a response to Buthelezi) were confronted by an impi, who, allegedly with police support, attacked and dispersed them (S 17/5/80; RDM 19/5/80; C 19/5/80; P 19/5/80).

Following the rally the support of KwaMashu parents for the boycott began to wane, and there were reports of parents sjamboking (beating) pupils in the streets to force them back to school. These reports, however, were paralleled by others of parent-pupil meetings in which parents expressed support for pupils in continuing to boycott (S 22/5/80; S 23/5/80; A 22/5/80).

When pupils still on boycott were threatened with expulsion they resorted to the tactic of reporting to school in the morning for
rollcall and leaving shortly thereafter. This resulted in a 90 percent attendance in the morning which waned to 20 percent by noon (ST 8/6/80).

With the beginning of the mid-year exams in June there were reports of parents and vigilante groups gathering outside exam venues to protect those pupils wishing to write from 'intimidators', and of hostel dwellers beating pupils (NW 7/6/80). There were some reported clashes between attending pupils and boycotters and between boycotters and parents/vigilantes (NM 3/6/80; ST 8/6/80; DB 11/6/80).

With the commencement of the June school vacation violent activity diminished, but there was a resurgence around June 16-18 (16 June is the anniversary of the 1976 student protests which began in Soweto) in KwaMashu (T 18/6/80; CT 17/6/80; NM 17/6/80). The targets, however, were not schools but rather buses, government vehicles, and administration buildings, all of which were stoned. Barricades were also erected in the streets and obstructed private vehicles, public transport and the police.

Apart from the violence around the school boycotts and June 16 there was little other political violence in 1980. In the third week of May Frametex workers embarked on a strike and damaged some equipment, then stoned vehicles outside the factory. There
was also a confrontation between scabs and strikers and police were called in (P 23/5/80; RDM 23/5/80; C 24/5/80). Figure 3.1 indicates areas of 'unrest' in 1980.

Figure 3.1 Areas experiencing sustained 'unrest' in 1980.

Township conflict in 1980, therefore, centered around the schools, and in particular KwaMashu schools (see Fig. 3.1 above). The violence, however, cannot be interpreted as being limited to educational issues, as can be seen from the pupils’ reaction to Buthelezi. An important development was the solidarity of Afri-
can, and 'coloured' and Indian scholars, illustrated by the sympathy boycott of African pupils and the re-boycott of some 'coloured' and Indian pupils. Buthelezi's reaction is also worthy of note. Pupils were adamant in stressing that they were boycotting Pretoria's 'Bantu education' and not Inkatha, yet Buthelezi insisted on seeing the boycott as an attack on himself and the 'Kwazulu government' orchestrated by 'Indian lawyers' and 'foreign representatives' who were using African pupils for their own ends. The confrontation which developed between pupils and Buthelezi/Inkatha was to set the tone for the future relationship between these groups.

1981

By comparison to the previous year 1981 was a relatively quiet year in terms of reported mass violence. Rent boycotts began in 'coloured' and Indian areas in March, in response to an approximate 15 percent increase in rents for City Council housing. There were some reports of intimidation of non-boycotting households, but no sustained violent conflict over the issue (ST 15/3/81). This boycott lasted until the middle of April when it was decided to end the boycott to "avert hardship to families whose lights had been cut" (NM 17/4/81).

Workers at an ILCO Homes site in Phoenix clashed when management changed from fortnightly wage payment to a monthly payment in
late March and police were called in to disperse workers (C 31/3/81; DN 30/3/81). Clashes occurred again in early April, following which the entire Natal labour force of ILCO Homes went on strike demanding fortnightly wages (C 2/4/81). Management blamed intimidators and threatened workers with mass dismissal claiming that it was only a few new workers who were dissatisfied while the older ones were happy with monthly wages.

Several progressive organizations began organizing protests against the 20th anniversary of the Republic celebrations in late April, and when pupils from Merebank and Chatsworth demonstrated on the streets police were called in to disperse them. Pupils were also expelled from a Chatsworth school for protesting against the Republic celebrations (NM 16/5/81; DN 20/5/81; NM 19/5/81).

In June the government banned all political meetings and commemorative services (CT 20/6/81), but this did little to prevent 'unrest' as such bannings are alleged to do. Around 16 June buses and vehicles were stoned in the townships (most notably in KwaMashu) and police patrolled the streets using teargas to disperse crowds of youth congregating on the streets (NW 17/6/81; NM 17/6/81). There were reports of many running battles between police and youth, and of petrol bomb attacks on a creche and a school (NM 18/6/81).
In late August violence again erupted when police confronted approximately 250 striking workers at Hullets in Mount Edgecombe and used teargas to disperse them (C 28/8/81; NW 28/8/81). This followed a strike the preceding week at the Hullets' mill in Tongaat. In central Durban there was a confrontation at GAME Discount Store between striking workers and non-strikers in October, and police were called in to disperse workers (B 2/11/81). The South African Indian Council (SAIC) elections in November also led to some clashes between pro- and anti-SAIC groups in Chatsworth, but again these did not develop into serious violence (WA 2/11/81).

All in all, 1981 was a quiet year, with a number of campaigns organized by anti-apartheid organizations - the rent boycott, the anti-republic day campaign, and anti-SAIC election protests - but with limited incidents of crowd violence. June 16th served as a focus for discontent, but the noticeable feature is the number of times police were called to deal with striking workers, and the violence which occurred around these occasions.

1982

In January 1982 schools were again the focus of collective violence. Pupils in Umlazi and KwaMashu protested against exam rewrites forced on them because of alleged leakage of the pre-
vious years exam papers (EPH 26/1/82; NW 29/1/82). Police were called in and dispersed pupils, who later regrouped and clashed with police again. Reports of clashes between pupils and groups of Inkatha supporters and 'parents', were also prevalent in the press. In one case Winnington Sabelo (a now well known figure in incidents of mass violence in Durban) who is a KLA (Kwazulu Legislative Assembly) official and an Inkatha 'leader', led an impi against pupils who had stoned his car and marched on his shop in Inanda (CT 27/1/82).

The next reports on mass violence appeared in mid March when a crowd of largely women commuters in Clermont stoned buses and pulled passengers out. They were expressing dissatisfaction with the new bus service which no longer went into the township but dropped people at the outskirts, leaving them to walk the rest of their journey, or to spend more money on a taxi (DN 15/3/82).

Surprisingly, there were no reports around 16 June of any mass violence and it was only in December that crowd violence erupted again, this time over transport. A boycott of DTMB (Durban Transport Management Board) buses began in KwaMashu over a 12 percent fare increase. This rapidly spread to other affected areas, namely, the PNAB (Port Natal Administration Board) townships (Clermont, Klaarwater, and Lamontville). Buses ran empty and were stoned when entering these areas, they then withdrew services from these areas (C 2/12/82; T 2/12/82; NM 2/12/82).
The Durban City Council resorted to dropping leaflets from a plane to urge commuters to return to the buses, but commuters continued to boycott and stoned buses entering the townships. In mid-December the situation deteriorated when PUTCO (Public Utility Company) increased fares on its routes by 13 percent (NM 14/12/82). Boycotts of PUTCO services began in Inanda, Clermont, Ntuzuma, KwaMakuta, and Malukazi (SO 15/12/82; DN 14/12/82). By mid December almost all African settlements around Durban were involved in a boycott of bus services.

Police prevented commuters meeting in Clermont to discuss the boycott, and the crowd ‘rampaged’ through the area, stoned an administration building, and then looted and burnt down a bottle store. Violence occurred again two days later in Clermont between stone-throwing youths and police (NM 14/12/82; NM 17/12/82). The boycott continued at the end of the year in Inanda and Lamontville, but had abated in most other areas.

Violence in 1982 occurred largely in the latter part of the year, and centered around bus fare increases to the townships and ‘squatter’ settlements. The bus boycott was extensive and covered most of Durban’s settlements, with mass violence also occurring extensively - see Fig. 3.2 below.
Bus boycotts initiated in December continued, particularly in Inanda, despite attempts to re-introduce services to Inanda. In fact when PUTCO sent buses into Inanda even though services were cut by 75 percent these buses still ran empty, indicating the degree of support for the boycott (C 20/1/83).

The authorities began to put pressure on commuters to return to the buses. Transport inspectors and police clamped down on all
traffic to the townships, taxis and private cars were stopped and inspected, commuters were made to wait, and fines issued. As a result the boycott began to wane in some areas, but still continued strongly in Lamontville and Inanda (NM 28/1/83).

In the PNAB townships, the bus boycott was superseded by rent increases in April and May, and there were reports of extensive conflict between police and residents in Chesterville (ST 8/5/83). The Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC) which formed in response to the rent increases and out of the JCC (Joint Commuters Committee) began to hold meetings over the rent increases in the PNAB townships (NM 23/5/83).

In May, Harrison Dube, a JORAC leader, was assassinated and widespread 'unrest' erupted in Chesterville and Lamontville with attacks on buses and PNAB buildings. Police sealed off and occupied Lamontville and rent increases were 'postponed'. It was at this time that Buthelezi announced that Lamontville should be incorporated into Kwazulu.

Memorial services were again banned over June 16, but this failed to prevent renewed outbreaks of violent rebellion. Violence was extensive in Durban’s African settlements, especially those areas which experienced the bus boycott and the threat of rent increases (RDM 18/6/83). Police responded by setting up roadblocks
outside the entrances to Chesterville and Lamontville. Violent protest took the form of the stoning of vehicles and shops, and clashes between police and youth (DN 17/6/83).

In early July allegations of continuing police brutality in Chesterville and Lamontville were raised in Parliament by PFP (Progressive Federal Party) members. They (some PFP members) had been taken on a tour of these townships by JORAC and collected affidavits of police brutality (CT 8/7/83; DN 8/7/83; NM 8/7/83).

In late October angry Umlazi pupils protested over the misuse of monies collected for speech day activities. They gathered outside the school, stoned it and passing vehicles, and marched to the headmaster’s house where they clashed with police who dispersed them (NM 26/10/83). In mid-November Inkatha supporters in Hammarsdale prevented a UDF (United Democratic Front) gathering from leaving a hall there. Police were called in and escorted the UDF members to their bus which was stoned by the Inkatha group but managed to leave without injury to people (DB 22/11/83).

1982 and 1983 were very interesting years in relation to crowd activity and they mark a distinct change compared to previous years. Locally there was the formation of a co-ordinating committee (the JCC) which responded to spontaneous protests against fare increases, and which incorporated people from a range of
Durban's settlements. This committee re-formed into JORAC when rent increases became the issue. The presence of inter-township organization (indicated by the JCC and JORAC) was a significant development and allowed for coordination between affected areas. Responses to fare and rent increases now had the potential to be co-ordinated in all the affected townships. As the PNAB was responsible for these townships, JORAC can be seen as a response to the incorporation threat at the same geographical level.

On the national level hundreds of small civic, youth, scholar, and women's organizations united under the umbrella of the UDF to protest against central government's new constitutional plans. These plans involved incorporating 'coloureds' and Indians into the parliamentary process through the creation of more 'houses of parliament', and excluding Africans altogether from parliamentary participation. A referendum was held amongst the white population late in the year (November) to gauge the support for the proposals, and they were largely unopposed by the white population. Figure 3.3 indicates areas of 'unrest' in 1983.
Figure 3.3 Areas experiencing sustained 'unrest' in 1983.

A further noteworthy observation for 1983 was the intensity of the reported conflicts. They continued from the previous year and spilt over from issue to issue. Towards the middle of the year there seemed to be a virtual civil war between police and youth in some areas (in particular Lamontville), and eventually police placed these areas under siege. This 'siege' controlled access to these areas, thus preventing reporters from covering the situation in more detail and eventually residents had to use Parlia-
ment as a means of bringing the situation into the news. Mass violence in 1983 affected large portions of Durban (see Fig. 3.3 above), but was particularly severe in Lamontville and other PNAB townships, owing to the resistance against incorporation.

1984

The year began quietly and the first reports of 'unrest' appeared in March, when buses were stoned in Clermont. This was thought to relate to a strike by DTMB drivers (NM 16/3/84).

Surprisingly, there were no reports of 'unrest' over June 16, but towards the end of June, in the run up to the protests which were expected over elections to the Indian and 'coloured' parliaments, the government detained 43 UDF leaders and banned UDF meetings (FM 29/6/84). The NIC (Natal Indian Congress), the UDF and the UCC (United Committee of Concern) nevertheless managed to hold several protest meetings in August over the elections (DN 3/8/84; DN 9/8/84; NM 12/8/84; NW 20/8/84; DN 23/8/84). Students at the medical school also boycotted classes to protest the elections (NM 17/8/84).

In late August many UDF leaders and activists were arrested in pre-dawn raids (P 29/8/84). This was to prevent anti-election sentiments being expressed. Also in August, Buthelezi held an anti-election meeting in the Durban City Hall, and there was a
reported clash between police and those attending (NM 22/8/84; NM 23/8/84). Over the election period, (late August) five people were arrested for alleged intimidation of voters in Chatsworth (NM 30/8/84), and 80 percent of 'coloured' pupils boycotted school to protest the elections (CP 26/8/84).

Buthelezi proposed to hold a rally in Lamontville on 1 September to discuss the issue of the proposed incorporation of the area into Kwazulu, a much contested issue (DN 20/8/84). Although JORAC argued that such a rally would lead to violence and applied for a court order to prevent it, Buthelezi persisted and got Supreme Court permission to go ahead with the rally (DN 29/8/84). On the eve of the rally hundreds of residents fled Lamontville and took refuge in Durban churches and private houses (DN 1/9/84). The meeting went ahead the following day with no serious incidents.

Hammarsdale experienced conflict between strikers and strike breakers in early September. The cause according to workers was management delay in negotiating, and the employment of 'scab' labour (NM 6/9/84). Also in early September six members of the UDF were released from detention and, fearing re-detainment, they sought refuge in the British Consulate. Some demonstrators supporting them outside the Consulate were arrested (NW 15/9/84; WA 22/9/84). Although Durban was relatively quiescent, this was the period which marked the outbreak of what has been termed 'the
Vaal uprising’. Army troops were extensively used to quell the rebellion in the PWV (Pretoria Witwatersrand Vereeniging) area (ST 28/10/84), and this led to an international focus on the rebellion in South Africa.

A bus boycott was initiated in Ngwetha near Hillcrest in response to fare increases in late October. Buses were stoned, a ticket office burnt down, and commuters clashed with police (DN 8/11/84; NM 8/11/84). Although talks took place between the Department of Transport, the bus company, and local chiefs, (NM 9/11/84) the boycott spread to nearby Molweni (NM 13/11/84). Police and transport inspectors clamped down on taxis and private cars ferrying people to Hillcrest (CP 18/11/84). Meetings to end the boycott continued through November but to no avail, and although buses were running on some routes they carried no passengers (NM 29/11/84).

Towards the end of November there were reports of police assaulting workers outside the Toyota factory in Prospecton after the arrest of illicit beer sellers who usually supplied the workers. The Toyota personnel director, who was present at the time, stated that the police assault was unprovoked and unnecessary (RDM 24/11/84; ST 25/11/84). Figure 3.4 indicates areas of ‘unrest’ in 1984.
1984 saw the continuation of protests against the tri-cameral elections, largely under the UDF banner. But more important, in local terms, was the continuation of conflict in Lamontville and Chesterville over their proposed incorporation into KwaZulu. Although these were not extensively reported in the press, due to restricted access, these areas were in a virtual state of siege and civil war (see Reintjes 1986, and Schofield, 1986). Also
noteworthy was the initiation of the bus boycott in an area which had not experienced 'unrest' before (Nqwetha and Molweni), and where the chiefs enjoyed popular support as was illustrated by their representation of commuters in negotiations with the bus company. Collective violence in 1984 centered around the above-mentioned areas as is illustrated in Figure 3.4 above.

**1985**

Due to the non-release of the previous years exam results pupils in Lamontville resolved to boycott until results were released (NM 10/1/85). Medical school students were said to have intimidated staff at King Edward VIII hospital following the dismissal of 500 casual workers from the hospital (C 9/2/85).

In early April the SAP (South African Police) public relations officer announced that the police would no longer give details of 'unrest incidents' unless they were of 'major importance' (DN 3/4/85). This was in response to the deteriorating image of the security forces both nationally and internationally, which in turn, was related to television and press coverage of revolt and repression in South Africa. This marked the beginning of a series of restrictions on press and television coverage of 'unrest'.

UDF and Inkatha supporters clashed in Hambanati in early May and the homes of six UDF supporters were destroyed (Indicator SA,
Violence erupted around June 16 and vehicles and buildings were stoned in Durban's townships. Attempts to blow up government buildings in Lamontville and Umlazi failed, and 'unrest', which continued into the following week, was reported in KwaMashu (V 17/6/85; PN 17/6/85, Indicator SA, 1985, 3(2):8). From late May to early August there were a series of marches in and around Durban involving labour solidarity, and youth and student protests over continued repression and detentions (NW 31/5/85; NM 26/6/85; C 30/7/85; NM 2/8/85).

While 'unrest' was reported nationwide, Durban seemed, at this stage, to be relatively quiet with the exception of Lamontville which experienced odd incidents of 'unrest' (Indicator SA, 1985, 3(2):8). On the 21 July a State of Emergency was declared in 36 magisterial districts, none of them in Natal. This gave the security forces greater powers to search, arrest, and detain people, without any checks on their actions as long as they were carried out 'in good faith'. The declaration of this limited State of Emergency followed opposition to government attempts to push two Bills through Parliament. These were the Unrest Areas and Detention Bills, the former allowing the government to declare any area an 'unrest area' and giving them the powers of an Emergency without having to declare one. The latter would allow for the extension of detentions from thirty to one hundred and eighty days before renewal was needed. Due to parliamentary
and extra-parliamentary pressure the government was unable to force these Bills through Parliament before the mid-year recess (Baynham, 1987:108) and thus declared a State of Emergency.

Durban’s period of ‘quiescence’ was not to last, however, and the assassination of Victoria Mxenge, a civil rights lawyer and patron of the UDF, on 1 August, served as the catalyst for the outbreak of widespread violence in Durban’s settlements. A demonstration protesting this brutal murder attracted 2500 people who marched in Durban’s CBD on Friday, 2 August. Students, scholars, shoppers, and workers who participated in the demonstration were dispersed by police and 31 people were arrested (NM 3/8/85; S 3/8/85). The following day an Inkatha mob danced outside Victoria Mxenge’s house and threatened to kill her remaining children (SO 16/8/85). On Monday, 5 August, a boycott of schools began in Lamontville and Umlazi and spread to other areas. Scholars marched in the townships and confronted police in Lamontville, Inanda, and KwaMashu (SO 16/8/85; NM 8/8/85). On the Wednesday a memorial service for Victoria Mxenge, attended by 5000 mourners, was disrupted in Umlazi by an Inkatha impi and between 13 and 17 people died (SO 16/8/85; Indicator SA, 1986, 3(3):10). This served as the turning point for the violence, which began as a protest but now developed a momentum of its own.

Most of the media reports focussed on the antagonism between Africans and Indians in the Inanda/Phoenix area, which raised the
spectre of the 1949 riots in which many Indians had been killed by Africans (S 9/8/85). Shops and businesses were looted and burnt out, and Indians fled their homes and businesses in Inanda (NM 8/8/85; BD 9/8/85). In other townships (Umlazi, KwaMashu, Lamontville, Ntuzuma, etc.) general havoc reigned, with numerous reports of 'criminal elements' and 'hooligans' using the 'unrest' to loot and raze buildings (SO 16/8/85; C 9/8/85).

Over the weekend of the 9th to 11th August, Inkatha mobilized its forces and Indian vigilante groups formed (DN 10/8/85; DN 13/8/85). The press praised Inkatha for re-establishing order in the townships, and Inkatha held a 'peace rally', attended by between 10 000 to 20 000 people, near the burnt-out ruins of the Ghandi settlement in Phoenix (DN 12/8/85; S 12/8/85; ST 18/8/85).

The toll of the violence throughout Durban was reported to be: over 70 dead (37 by police action); 244 businesses destroyed; and thousands homeless (Indicator SA, 1986,3(3):10). Forty-four of the businesses were Indian owned and four of the dead were Indian (L 27/9/85). In the aftermath of the violence Inkatha blamed the UDF, while the UDF blamed Inkatha, and academics called attention to high unemployment levels, poverty, overcrowding, and the prevalence of shacklords (WM 14/11/85).

At the end of August the results of a Markinor survey, published in the press (DN 29/8/85) stated that 69 percent of urban blacks
- that is, Africans - believed civil war to be inevitable, and that 43 percent supported the use of violence to end apartheid (amongst younger respondents the percentage was over 50).

Conflict was reported between residents of Newtown and Piesangs Rivier (both part of Inanda) at the beginning of September. It was reported as being a conflict between 'Zulus' and 'Pondos'. The 'Zulu' spokesman said that 'Pondos' discriminated against 'Zulus' living in the shack settlement (Piesangs Rivier) and had attacked 'Zulus' living on the borders of the settlement. 'Zulus' responded by obstructing 'Pondo' access to water (in Newtown) and 'Pondos' then prevented buses entering Newtown. Talks between the two groups, with the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) mediating, managed to resolve the conflict (NM 4/9/85; NM 5/9/85).

Also in September there were allegations of violence and intimidation over the general consumer boycott of white businesses which had recently been extended to Durban (ST 8/9/85). Due to only limited support in Durban and the threat of escalating violence, the trade unions called off the boycott at the end of the month (L 11/10/85).

Although there were only a few reports of violence in Durban's townships, Ray Swart (a PFP Member of Parliament) stated in Parliament that Durban's townships were experiencing a 'reign of
terror'. He used information collected by the PFP unrest monitoring group to support his statements (NM 23/9/85). Press restrictions and editorial self-censoring meant that the public was generally kept unaware of this 'terror' and assumed that the situation had 'returned to normal'. Towards the end of September six youths died in clashes with Inkatha supporters in Lamontville (Indicator SA, 1986 3(3):12).

Throughout September and October there were reports of the petrol bombing of policemen and Community Councillors' homes, and of the homes of UDF supporters and leaders (C 30/9/85; SO 30/9/85). In early October the SADF and the SAP established a base in Lamontville. A school boycott began in several townships around Durban at the beginning of October, and Chesterville schools were closed (CP 6/10/85). The boycott was to protest the attacks on UDF homes and the detentions of community and youth leaders, as well as the presence of SADF troops in the townships.

Arson attempts on six KwaMashu schools were reported and the bodies of five youths discovered in a car in Umlazi. Attendance began to return to normal at schools in Clermont, Umlazi, and KwaMashu towards the end of October, but in Lamontville the boycott continued. Francis Dlamini, a KwaZulu MP, was assassinated in KwaMashu at the end of October. Also at the end of October the State President extended the indemnity for security
forces nation-wide, and the ban on media reports of security force actions and on 'unrest' reports was likewise extended (C 31/10/85; Indicator SA, 1986, 3(3):12).

Conflict erupted at Bechet Training College in November when some pupils broke the boycott to write exams. Students ended up writing exams under police guard at another venue (ST 3/11/85; DN 9/11/85).

Reports of a vigilante group calling themselves the A team who were assaulting pupils in Chesterville emerged in mid-November. Pupils alleged that the A team consisted of paid ex-convicts and informers who were working with the police (CP 10/11/85). There were reports of 'unrest' in Chesterville, Umlazi, and Hammersdale, and towards the end of November the first reports of Zulu-Pondo conflict in Malakazi and Umbumbulu emerged (Indicator SA, 1986, 3(4):10).

A UDF rally to call for the release of Nelson Mandela was held at Currie's Fountain (near the CBD) in mid December and attracted 5000 people. After the rally some youths 'rampaged' through the bus station and stoned police vehicles. More police were called in and clashed with the youth. UDF leaders managed to calm the youth who then departed. Reports of further clashes in Chesterville between A team vigilantes and youth were reported in mid-December (NW 16/12/85; DN 16/12/85; NM 16/12/85).
Over Christmas, conflict between about 3 000 'Zulus' and 2 000 'Pondos' broke out in Section 5 and Malakazi settlements, south of Durban (NM 27/12/85). Talks aimed at ending the conflict broke down when the local Zulu chief (Mkanye) demanded the expulsion of all Pondos living in the area (C 31/12/85). The conflict continued into the new year. Also over Christmas time, Durban's beaches were the scene of African-Indian conflict, when Africans 'invaded' the adjacent Indian beach, chased off people, injuring two, and looting possessions left behind (NM 27/8/85; NM 28/12/85).

While 1985 began 'normally' in Durban with only a few reports of violent conflict, even over Soweto Day (June 16), it was not to remain that way. Natal escaped the State of Emergency declared in July, but in August violence erupted surprising all observers. Following Victoria Mxenge's assassination, conflict was to become endemic in Durban's settlements, and although Inkatha 'restored order' in the area in a relatively short period this was only to serve as the basis for further violent confrontation between Inkatha supporters and UDF/COSATU supporters. A noteworthy point was the emergence of vigilante groups following the August 'disorders', most evidently in areas with strong anti-Inkatha sentiments. Mass violence in 1985 was widespread throughout Durban's settlements as is illustrated in Figure 3.5 below.
Conflict between 'Zulus' and 'Pondos' continued in the Umbumbulu district south of Durban. On the 23 January a large 'Zulu' raiding party moved into Section 5 (a 'Pondo' dominated enclave) and, finding no one there, proceeded to burn down the settlement and loot possessions. The toll of the resulting violence was over 63 dead, and up to 40 000 homeless (WM 31/1/86; DN 24/1/86; DN 14/2/86; Pace, April 1986).

Figure 3.5 Areas experiencing sustained 'unrest' in 1985.
Sporadic conflict was reported in Durban's townships in late January and continued in February. Reports of 'faction fighting' in Umbumbulu continued as did reports of clashes between UDF and Inkatha groups in KwaMashu and Umlazi. Conflict was also reported in Chesterville and Clermont (Indicator SA, 1986, 3(4):12).

On 7 March the State of Emergency was lifted in all areas, but reports of conflict in Chesterville, Clermont, Umbumbulu, and KwaMashu were still common. Towards the end of March Inkatha supporters arrived in buses and disrupted a NECC (National Education Crisis Committee) conference at Pioneer Hall (near the CBD) and two Inkatha members died in the ensuing battle (Indicator SA, 1986, 3(4):12).

Throughout April and May reports of violent conflict in Hammarsdale (between UDF/COSATU and Inkatha supporters), Umbumbulu (between 'Zulus' and 'Pondos'), KwaMashu (between youth and vigilantes/police), Hambanati (between pupils and Inkatha supporters), and Chesterville (between 'comrades' and the 'A team') continued (Indicator SA, 1986, 4(1):24).

On the 12 June a national State of Emergency was imposed with controls over media coverage and political reporting, and all unrest reports were in future to emanate only from the Bureau of
Information (BINFO). Around 16 June there was general civil 'unrest' throughout South Africa, and although meetings were banned Inkatha got permission to hold an outdoor rally in Durban (Indicator SA, 1986, 4(1):26; 1987, 4(3):56).

Pupils in Lamontville refused to wear identity cards, went on boycott, and burnt their identity cards. There were reports (from BINFO) of 'unrest' in most of Durban's settlements through August, September, and October. A noticeable point was the number of killings of black policeman and Community Concillors, as well as of Inkatha and Kwazulu officials, and of UDF leaders (Indicator SA, 1987, 4(3):56).

In mid-November the Metal and Allied Workers Union held their annual general meeting at Currie's Fountain. The crowd left amid worker songs and dancing, but the police panicked and fired into the crowd killing a worker. There were reports of a bus boycott (now in its third week) in Durban's townships and violent conflict was reported in Chesterville, Inanda, and KwaMakuta throughout December (Indicator SA, 1987, 4(4):22).
Conflict in 1986 was largely a continuation of the confrontations which began in the latter half of 1985, namely the 'Zulu-Pondo' conflict in Umbumbulu, the 'comrades-vigilante' violence in Chesterville and KwaMashu, the UDF-Inkatha clashes in Hammarsdale and Hambanati, and the youth-police conflict in Lamontville. The imposition of the national State of Emergency in June restricted press and TV reportage of 'unrest' and the Bureau of Information became the sole source of information on 'unrest'. Following this, the reports in the press were very limited and in many cases no areas were mentioned. Extensive use was therefore made of the Indicator SA Unrest Chronology reports. Violence in 1986 was again widespread as is indicated in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6 Areas experiencing sustained 'unrest' in 1986.

1987

In early January, Inkatha officials' homes in KwaMakuta were subjected to arson attacks, and violence was reported in Chesterville and Umlazi. Later in the month thirteen people were shot dead in an attack on a UDF youth organizer's home in KwaMakuta, and there was a grenade attack on a home in Chesterville. In Umlazi a security force member's home was also grenades (Indicator SA, 1987, 4(4):22).
Violence continued in Hammarsdale and KwaMakuta throughout February, and 'unrest' was also reported in Clermont, Chesterville, KwaMashu and KwaDabeka. In March, it was reported that the HAYCO (Hammarsdale Youth Congress) president was stabbed and burnt to death after holding peace talks with the Inkatha chairman. Following this two Inkatha youths were abducted and killed after a funeral for three HAYCO members in KwaMashu. In Inanda a community leader was shot dead and in Clermont police dispersed youth holding a memorial service for seven youths murdered in KwaMashu in mid-March. Reports of 'unrest' in Chesterville, KwaMashu, and KwaDabeka seem to indicate that violence was between UDF youth on one hand and Inkatha vigilantes on the other (Indicator SA, 1987, 4(4):24).

An attack on UDF homes in Makabeni (south of Durban) left three people injured in early April, and towards the middle of April a security policeman in Umbumbulu was shot dead in an AK 47 attack. In Chesterville a policeman's house was grenaded, and in Umlazi a riot policeman was injured in a shoot out with suspected ANC insurgents. Continued internecine violence was reported in KwaDengezi, and 'unrest' continued in Chesterville (Indicator SA, 1987, 4(4):24).

On the 6th May, the National Party won the white election with a new right wing official opposition (the Conservative Party) oust-
ing the liberal PFP (Progressive Federal Party). A massive stayaway organized by COSATU and the UDF to protest the whites only election resulted in an estimated one million workers participating on each day (5 and 6 May). In Natal a 60 percent stayaway was recorded on the first day and 70 percent on the second (Indicator SA, 1987, 4(4):25; 1988, 5(3):73).

There were reports of violence in Clermont, Lamont, Malukazi, KwaMakuta, and particularly in KwaMashu, throughout May. From mid-May the Bureau of Information ceased preparing daily unrest reports. On 12 June the State of Emergency was renewed with stricter restrictions on rent and consumer boycotts, and on 'il-legal' strikes. The UDF called for two weeks of national protest over the State of Emergency (12 June), Soweto Day (June 16) and Sharpeville Day (June 26). A stayaway on June 16 resulted in 55 percent of Durban workers responding (Indicator SA, 1987, 5(3):73) and violence was reported in Umlazi, in Hammarsdale, and in KwaMakuta where UDF families were evicted (Indicator SA, 1988, 5(2):16; 1988, 5(3):73).

From July to September increasing internecine violence (between Inkatha supporters and COSATU/UDF supporters) was reported in Mpumalanga - as a result of the Pietermaritzburg conflict 'spilling over' - and sporadic violence was also reported in Chesterville, Umlazi, Lamontville, Clermont, KwaMashu, St Wendolins, and
KwaDabeka. Buses were stoned in Clermont and KwaDabeka due to protests over fare increases and some of the 'unrest' in other areas might also have been related to fare increases (Indicator SA, 1988, 5(2):16-18) but this is not clear from the press reports.

For the remainder of the year the pattern remained more or less the same, with 'faction fights' being reported in Molweni as well. At the end of the year it was stated that an estimated 25,000 people had been detained since the start of the Emergency in June 1986, and 9,194 in 1987 alone. Of these 1987 detentions, 50 percent were released without being charged, 15 percent were brought to court, and only 3.46 percent convicted (Indicator SA, 1988, 5(3):47).

The situation in 1987 was similar to that for 1985 and 1986 with continual violence and killings throughout Durban's townships (see Figure 3.7 below). Hammarsdale was increasingly drawn into the conflict as a result of 'spillover' from the Pietermaritzburg conflict. In KwaMakuta, Umlazi, KwaDabeka, Clermont, and Hammarsdale the conflict was between UDF youth and COSATU supporters on one hand and Inkatha supporters on the other. In Chesterville UDF youth were in conflict with the 'A team', and in Lamontville conflict was largely between youth and police. There were widespread allegations of police support for vigilantes in these
conflicts. A noticeable difference from previous years was the number of grenade attacks and shootings, which may illustrate greater insurgent activity as well as increased contact between insurgents and local militants. See Figure 3.7 indicating 1987 'unrest' areas.

Figure 3.7 Areas experiencing sustained 'unrest' in 1987.

3.4 ANALYSIS OF NEWS REPORTS

The foregoing account of crowd violence describes the level and continuity of social protest in Durban's townships and 'squatter'
settlements in the recent past. While it leaves a good deal to be explained, in that events seem to arise out of thin air, and are seldom followed through to their conclusions, it does offer a descriptive scenario for further analysis and investigation. As mentioned earlier such investigation can utilize reports by grassroots organizations, other research work, interviews, group discussions or personal experiences. The following chapter will provide this additional information, but first it is useful to analyze the above scenario so as to extract some trends.

Table 3.2 below breaks down the reports into certain categories. These categories should be viewed with caution as any attempt to categorize social processes is fraught with difficulty. For example, a protest beginning as a school boycott often becomes both an educational and political protest, similarly rent or bus boycotts also become political. For the purposes of this table a protest which began as an educational one was considered as such; political protests were more narrowly considered to be protests around June 16, between opposing political groups, or those sparked off by a political action (for example, assassination); internecine conflict are those that develop between factions which do not identify themselves along political lines, but along some other cleavage (for example, ethnicity).

As has already been mentioned, caution must be exercised in interpreting the table below and the news reports from which it has
been derived. The number of news reports should not, for example, be taken as a final indication of the extent or importance of the events. Nevertheless, tentative conclusions can be drawn.

Table 3.2 Breakdown of events reported in the press by category

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<td>6</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Note: Figures for 1985 are under reported due to the restrictions placed on the media, and comparable figures for 1986 and 1987 cannot be constructed due to the further restrictions on the media from June 1986.

Firstly, the frequency of reports on political violence was initially high, decreasing through 1981 to 1984 and rising dramatically in 1985. Secondly, the geographical distribution of reports on mass violence increased from 1980 to 1985 (see Figures 3.1 to 3.7). In 1980 it was largely restricted to KwaMashu, yet in 1981 it was Indian and 'Coloured' areas that experienced violence, and by 1982-83 mass violence was widespread in both PNAB and Kwazulu settlements, whilst by 1984 Lamontville and Molweni/Nqwetu were
the epicentres of mass violence. In 1985 violence was again widespread throughout Durban, and this pattern continued in 1986 and 1987. However, it should be recalled that media restrictions made it difficult to ascertain the level and intensity of protest from late 1985.

Thirdly, there have been changes in the issues around which mass violence was reported to occur. Most notable in quantitative terms was the shift from educational-based conflict in 1980 to political-based conflicts from 1983. In 1980 the major issue was the school boycotts with conflict between pupils on one hand, and police and Inkatha on the other. By comparison, the major issues in 1982/3 were bus and rent boycotts which continued into the incorporation issue. The major protagonists here were commuters and tenants on one hand, and bus companies, local government organs, Inkatha and the Kwazulu government, and police on the other. The violence in 1985, and subsequently, emerged from protests and organization against the declaration of a State of Emergency and state repression. Vigilante groups and 'warlords' came to the fore from late 1985, and much of the conflict was between militant UDF-inclined youth on the one hand, and Inkatha-inclined vigilante groups on the other. Also from 1985 we can discern an increase in factional or 'ethnic' violence, most notably in the Inanda and the Umbumbulu areas, but more recently in Molweni.
It is instructive to compare the above scenario to other research on political violence. Booth (1987) notes a similar trend from 1980 to 1985, that is, the initial high followed by a decline then a rise. Booth (1987), however, is concerned only with KwaMashu and Lamontville and to a large extent ignores the developments in other settlements around Durban. He does, however, identify transport, rents, incorporation, and education as the major "precipitating causes of resistance in Lamont and KwaMashu" (Booth, 1987:184). In this regard there is complementarity between Booth's (1987) results and those reported here.

Schoeman (1986:1) lists the main reasons for the 'disturbances' as:

- rent increases 85%
- bus fare increases 55%
- death of Mr Dube 45%
- housing dissatisfaction 28%
- poor councillors 25%
- PNAB policies 25%
- police action 9%

Schlemmer (1985a:10), by contrast, in a more general survey of township residents lists the following as causes of youth violence in Natal:

- liquor, drugs and poor recreation 74%
- breakdown of tradition/family discipline 38%
- Unemployment/lack of opportunity 36%
- financial frustrations 16%
- education related 13%
- other 31%
Schoeman's (1986) survey indicates quite different 'reasons' to the 'causes' identified by Schlemmer (1985a). This is partly a reflection of the context in which the surveys were conducted. The first was conducted in 1983 when Durban townships were facing widespread bus fare and rent increases as well as the incorporation issue. The second was a survey conducted in November/December 1984, and was not specifically targeted at determining causes of 'unrest'. At this time Durban was quiescent by comparison with the rest of the country, and it is interesting to note that in other metropolitan centres the weight given to political causes by respondents (in Schlemmer, 1985a) was far higher than in Natal. Thus it would seem that surveys do give an indication of what respondents feel, but this is strongly related to the spatio-temporal context in which the survey occurs.

Schlemmer, in a later article (1985b:3) suggested that a "matrix of interacting factors" act on "one another to contribute to the social instability in townships". He singled out "the failure of local level leadership" as of one of the more important of these 'factors'. In proposing a model of 'the propensity to unrest', however, he failed to specify any spatial variation in causes and consequences of 'unrest'.

Thus, a brief survey of some of the literature on political violence illustrates that there may be as many 'explanations' as
there are researchers. One reason for this may be the individual agendas of the researchers. For example, Schlemmer (1985a; 1985b) is well known as a liberal reformer and as a former director of the Inkatha Institute. His priorities in analyzing 'unrest' would be very different from that of Booth (1987) who is more intent on categorizing participants into progressives and reactionaries. A more important reason for such discrepancies, however, is the absence of a rigorous and appropriate theory of mass political violence. This omission is not unrelated to the need for the researcher to be self-consciously and critically aware of the values informing his/her research.

The second problem raised by the brief review above, relates to the need for a powerful theory which not only explains why, and under what conditions people rebel (as in Gurr, 1970), but which also links structural explanations of determinancy (or tendencies) to the self-willed actions of real people in specific places and times (conjunctures). The potential link between these it may be hypothesized is via the concept of civil society which was first explored by Gramsci (Showstack Sassoon, 1982). Further elaboration of this hypothesis, however, must await the chapter to follow.
3.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter began with a critique of the media, but has nevertheless made use of (a flawed) data base of news reports to gain a general impression of the nature and scope of mass violence in Durban for the 1980s. It has been argued that while such reports, and analysis/tabulation of them, cannot serve as sufficient means to enable an adequate understanding, they can serve to illustrate patterns over time, to identify the protagonists, to elucidate the issues, and in some cases to specify the spark/flashpoint. It was emphasized that one needs to use media data very cautiously, and to supplement them with other sources where possible. While identifying trends and issues is very useful, these pursuits should not be seen as the objectives of study on mass violence. Understanding the processes which promote crowd violence, and the conditions under which it occurs, are more worthy scientific objectives. Past research on 'unrest' seems to continually fall into the categorical trap and, whilst categories may be useful, they can also render opaque the processes of revolt.

The following chapter examines, in greater depth and detail, three major occurrences of mass violence that developed over the period under consideration. These occurrences were identified as primary events through the work performed for the present chapter, as well as through personal understanding gained through interaction with members of the affected communities. They all im-
pacted upon large numbers of people, attracted the attention of critical observers, and were clear examples of violent crowd activity. Furthermore, they derive from a diverse range of locational contexts, from formal township to older 'squatter settlements' and to more recent 'squatter settlements'. The examples selected are those of Lamontville from 1982/3, Inanda in August 1985, and Malukazi/Section 5 in 1985/6. These examples also cover an array of time periods, causes and consequences of 'unrest', and as such, offer a fairly representative group with which to test the proposed theory's explanatory power.

The school boycott of 1980, whilst also a 'major' event, was not selected because it was felt that this fell into a different political context to the other cases. In 1980 community organization was relatively weak, and to a large extent non-political. From 1982/3 community organizations were to engage in direct confrontation with the local, regional and central state, and in so doing change the terms of reference of their constituents. The 1980 school boycotts preceded this development and in some important ways also contributed to it.
CHAPTER FOUR

INTENSIVE ANALYSIS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

It was argued in the previous chapter that it is necessary to augment news reports with other sources of information. This clearly cannot be done for every incident reported in the press, and some kind of sampling is therefore necessary. Such sampling may focus on the major incidents as outlined at the end of the previous chapter, or it may focus on a few case studies using locational criteria as part of the sampling frame. In the former case the main advantage is that there are more likely to be alternative sources of information on major events than minor ones. This raises the question of whether any explanation from such a sample can be generalized to include other situations and areas specifically given the proposed socio-spatial theory. If we combine the two frameworks, that is, major events and geographic location, we can perhaps overcome this limitation to a degree.

Using the identification of major events and situating these events with respect to locational variation, we can divide
Durban into three sectors, the northern, western, and southern. All of these sectors experienced major events of political violence in the period under consideration. This allows us to focus in more depth on conflict over the rents/incorporation issue occurring in Lamontville and Chesterville, (western sector); the August 1985 'disorders' (occurring throughout Durban but particularly in Inanda located in the northern sector); and the Malukazi/Section 5 'faction fights' in the southern sector.

A concern with geographic representation, however, must not be allowed to obscure political representation. In Durban a few of the older townships - Chesterville, Lamontville, Hambanati, Clermont and Klaarwater - fall under the jurisdiction of the PNAB (now the PNDB) while the more recently built (and larger) townships - KwaMashu, Umlazi, and Ntuzuma - fall under Kwazulu administration. There are also a number of informal/squatter settlements, and whilst it is often ambiguous as to who has control over these, most are situated on Kwazulu administered land. In practice, it appears that authority in these areas is accredited in most cases to 'traditional leaders' or 'shacklords'; that is, individuals who have control over access to, and allocation of land in their specific domain. Taking these circumstances into consideration some differentiation of the case study samples
according to local variations in the structures of political control has been incorporated into the methodology.

Finally, Massey (1978) has proposed the analogy of a social geology. She argues that previous rounds of investment and social relations impact on future ones, in the same way as geological strata effect future sedimentations. These past social geologies have a spatial specificity. As a result, the spatial forms of past social formations impact on the present to influence both the form and content of existing patterns of economic and social practices. However, these spatially specific practices must not be seen as entirely independent of one another, nor as independent of practices imported from other spatially distinct sets of social relations. There are therefore both vertical (between regions or localities) and horizontal (the influence of past social and economic practices) dynamics to be considered.

Thus it is necessary to examine the specificity of mass violence in spatially distinctive settlements, as well as to explore the more general patterns to which they are related. This outlook informs the author's decision to adopt a spatial-sectoral approach, through which it becomes possible to describe the spatial specificity of events (that is, the specific form they took in particular places and why) and
analyze the impacts of more widespread social relations of domination and exploitation under racial capitalism. As mentioned in Chapter 2, national experiences of economic recession, political repression, and mobilization for opposition, are "refracted through the prism of locality into the conditions in which the individual functions" (Parry et al, 1987:213)

Booth's (1987) analysis of political violence in KwaMashu and Lamontville is categorical, specifically in his division of protagonists into 'reactionaries and progressives'. This means he is unable to analyze conflicts between groups which do not fit neatly into the categories progressives' and 'reactionaries'. Furthermore, these categories can be implicitly translated as referring to 'villains' and 'heroes' which leads the researcher to assume the Robin Hood approach mentioned earlier. This may influence the researcher to see all acts of violence by 'progressives' as legitimate while those of 'reactionaries' are seen as illegitimate. Clearly such an approach becomes inadequate whenever conflict is less categorically defined, and reflects the diversity of social consciousness of the various actors concerned.

The need for a diverse range of case studies can be further illustrated with reference to the research of Reintges
(1986). Reintges (1986) concentrates on the development of a specific organization, the Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC), in relation to (local) state initiatives (rent increases and incorporation). She applies Castells's (1977) theory of urban social movements, incorporating the concept of organic intellectuals developed by Gramsci (1971). During much of the period of JORAC'S existence the FNAB townships (particularly Chesterville and Lamontville) experienced continual protest and reaction. While Reintges's work (1986) offers invaluable insights into the dynamics and development of JORAC, and how conflict was mediated by the presence of a strong popular organization, her thesis does little to promote our understanding of conflict in communities where such an organization is not present.

The purpose of the following discussion is to advance our knowledge of political violence beyond those explanations given by Booth (1987), Reintges (1986), and those researchers reviewed both at the end of the previous chapter, and in the literature review in Chapter 2. In so doing, use is to be made of the theory of necessary and contingent relations, and of causal powers and mechanisms, as described in Chapter 2. In addition, the methodology outlined by Waddington et al (1987) from the structural to the interactional is also deployed here.
The events selected are those of the PNAB townships from 1982/3, Inanda in August 1985, and those in Umbumbulu in 1985/6. The Inanda 'August events' were reported in the press as African-Indian conflict, and Umbumbulu as Zulu-Pondo conflict, both considered 'black-on-black' violence. By contrast, the conflict in the PNAB townships was initially reported as community-police violence, and only later as between Inkatha and UDF supporters. While Inanda received an abundance of press coverage and subsequent analysis (Gwala, 1985; Sitas, 1986; Hughes, 1987; and Byerley, 1987) the events in Umbumbulu were virtually ignored by the press and received only limited analysis (Diakonia, 1986; Day, 1987; and Byerley, 1987). This conflict was no less dramatic than the 'Inanda riots' in terms of deaths and displacement of people, but it somehow failed to capture the attention of the media in the same way as the events in Inanda, or the PNAB townships. This was possibly due to the sensational nature of the African-Indian conflict, and the fact that Indians form a sizable middle class grouping in Durban, and would therefore attract the attention of a middle-class oriented press. By contrast the 'Zulu-Pondo' conflict could be virtually ignored as 'faction fights'.
In summary, these three events were selected because: they affected significant numbers of people; represented the heterogeneity of Durban's settlements; attracted the attention of both the media and progressive organizations; and were felt to represent deeper and more enduring contradictions than those represented by the spark/flashpoint events alone. Furthermore, these conflicts have led to continuing strife in all the areas concerned. The PNAB townships experienced almost continuous political violence since the bus fare increases of late 1982. Lamontville received the greatest degree of coverage of the PNAB townships, while Chesterville, Hambanati, and Klaarwater have been more or less ignored. Similarly, violence has continued to erupt in both Inanda and Umbumbulu.

4.3 CONFLICT IN LAMONTVILLE

The bus boycotts of 1982/3 were to serve as the start of an extended period of protest and rebellion for the PNAB townships. Rent increases were announced in October 1982, and were to become effective from May 1983 (Reintjes, 1986). With the organizational experience gained through the bus boycott and the Joint Commuters' Committee (JCC), the residents of Lamontville, Klaarwater, and Hambanati formed rent
action committees. These combined to form JORAC in April, and "JORAC approached Chesterville, Shakaville, and hostel residents which elected representative organizations that affiliated to JORAC" (Schofield, 1986:32).

On the 25 April, Harrison Dube, a JORAC founder member and previous township councillor, was assassinated. This served as the spark unleashing youth discontent, and three months of intense violence was to follow in Lamontville and Chesterville. Youths were in the forefront of this 'revolt': they marched through the streets; targeted councillor's homes, beerhalls and administration buildings; stoned cars, buses and police vehicles; and battled with police in the streets.

This precipitated a virtual police siege of Lamontville, with a permanent police roadblock monitoring the entry and exit of vehicles from the township. In mid-May Buthelezi announced that the PNAB townships should be incorporated into Kwazulu. Rent increases were postponed and reports of police brutality were raised in Parliament. At the end of June police were withdrawn and violence abated in Lamontville. From July residents began a rent boycott and this continued until December.
In August, the government announced its intention to incorporate Lamontville into Kwazulu, but this was resisted by JORAC through moves such as appeals to churches, the PFP, the Black Sash, and other liberal groupings (Reintjes, 1986).

This was essentially the framework within which the violence was to continue in Lamontville, with JORAC adopting new strategies as events developed (see Reintjes, 1986). In July 1984 Inkatha supporters arrived at the unveiling of Dube's tombstone and proceeded to attack mourners who retaliated in kind. The rise of vigilantes in the townships from 1985, especially in Chesterville and Hambanati, was to deliver the final blow to continued resistance in these areas.

Sporadic violence has continued in these areas until the time of writing, but all forms of representative bodies have been virtually destroyed by detentions, vigilante attacks, bannings, and police action. In such a situation youth have responded to state repression and continued harassment with rebellion and violence, as almost all forms of non-violent protest are illegal.
4.3.1 Lamontville, a Brief History

Lamontville was conceived in the 1930s as a "model village to provide housing for married Africans employed in Durban, develop communal life among township inhabitants, and to provide the necessary amenities generally associated with a self contained society" (Booth, 1987:80). However, these high ideals were to prove elusive and in 1977 Lamontville was described as "a place fraught with problems - crime, alcoholism, illegitimacy, unemployment, fear, insecurity and pent up frustrations" (cited in Booth, 1987:80).

Lamontville was built in response to the growth of 'shack towns' and shacks in Durban, particularly in the Greyville and Point areas. Although the Durban Town Council of the time preferred to deal with this problem by proposing the building of more barracks to house African workers, under pressure from the government they concurred to build an African location. Finance for such developments was not forthcoming from central government and had to be met by the municipalities concerned. Local authorities raised finances for township development through fines, rents, and the sale of African beer (Booth, 1987:84-86).

Following the De Waal inquiry into the beerhall boycotts and riots of 1929/30 the DTC came to see the establishment of a 'native village' as a priority. Land was purchased in 1931
for the development of Lamontville, and the location opened in February 1934. Lamontville was not immediately occupied due to distance and transport costs, lack of facilities (schools and shops), and regulations which prevented residents from earning income from informal activities (Reintges, 1986:37).

Although construction began in the 1930's Lamontville was not completed until 1958 (Reintges, 1986:33). With the coming to power of the Nationalist Party in 1948, control over black administrative functions became increasingly under central state control. Complete centralization was achieved in 1971 with the "passing of the Bantu Affairs Administration Act and the consequent creation of the Administration Boards" (Reintges, 1986:40).

The Native Administration Boards (NABs) were created to give Africans representation, but they played a purely advisory role and were recognized as impotent by residents. In 1962 the Urban Bantu Councils replaced the NAB's but these were again considered as unrepresentative and powerless (Reintges, 1986:43).

Torr (1985; 1987) reports that Lamontville was considered a dormitory area by residents, and that lacking any elite
areas for the petty bourgeoisie, well-to-do Africans were frustrated by the lack of business and trading opportunities in the township. This frustration was compounded by the absence of adequate school facilities, negligible recreational facilities, and inadequate housing, as well as by "insecurity of homeownership and uncertain status in the urban area" (Torr, 1985:172).

Thus, although intended as a model village for middle class urban Africans, Lamontville was unable to satisfy their expectations. This was partly due to the cost of construction on geologically unsuitable land, and partly to the lack of finances for township development, for which municipalities were responsible (Reintges, 1986:37;42). By 1982/3 the PNAB had a deficit of approximately R7 million and rent increases of up to 63 percent were announced at a time when the average wage in Lamontville was R192 per month (Torr, 1985:175). This prompted the youth organization in the area (Malayo) to adopt the slogan 'asminimali' (we have no money).

4.3.2 Analysis

It was argued in the theory section of Chapter 2 that the nature of the relations between contesting groups is an important indication of the structural positions occupied by
those groups. Necessary (or internal) relations exist between objects which are interdependent on each other for their existence, while contingent (or external) relations are between objects which do not presuppose the existence of one another. Furthermore, "sets of internally related objects or practices may be termed structures" (Sayer, 1984:84).

Landlords and tenants are internally related, and further presuppose the existence of private property in land and buildings. The race, gender, and occupation of the tenant is a contingent factor, but in specific historical conjunctures it is these contingent factors which often come to the fore in conflict situations. Importantly, however, people occupy several positions in different sets of internally related practices (structures). Thus a tenant can also be in a necessary relation to an employer, furthermore these positions may overlap, for example when the landlord also employs tenants.

In Lamontville tensions began with the raising of bus fares. Rent increases followed and the proposed incorporation of the township into Kwazulu exacerbated these tensions. In all these spheres residents were involved in necessary relations, as tenants (to the PNAB, a representative of the lo-
cal state), as commuters (to the DTMB, also part of the local state), and as citizens (to the central state and/or Kwazulu). Thus we find a large degree of overlap between the roles occupied in the different structures, and this reinforced the antagonisms experienced at the hands of the local and central state representatives.

The causal powers and liabilities which were activated in Lamontville residents were those of organization, protest, and violence. While humans have a range of causal powers by virtue of their existence, thus indicating a necessary relation between the causal powers and objects/agents possessing them, it is contingent whether these are activated in any particular situation. Thus, although people have the ability to protest, negotiate, fight, or acquiesce, what they actually 'choose' to do is dependent on a number of other conditions which may or may not be present.

In order to identify the nature of these contingent conditions, which may themselves be expressions of necessary relations in other spheres, use will be made of a 'model of disorder' proposed by Waddington et al (1987:159-163) which was previously discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2. This involves analyzing the course of events at six different levels ranging from the structural and political,
through the cultural and contextual, to the situational and interactional.

**Structural**

This level refers to the relative distribution of power and resources between groups (Waddington et al., 1987:159) and is an important indication of the potential fracture lines (for example race, gender, class, ethnicity) along which antagonism may arise.

Africans experience oppression and exploitation at many points in South African society, and these act to reinforce one another. Thus the feelings of alienation from the process of production, the goods produced, and profits realized in the workplace are reinforced when overlaid by similar feelings in the place of residence, where residents are alienated from control over their living environment.

It is important to bear in mind the economic recession - which South Africa has been experiencing since the beginning of the 1980s - when examining the effects of rising rents and bus fares. Reintges (1986) has argued that the gains being made by unions (higher wages) at the point of production were eroded by inflationary increase in rents, fares, and food and clothing prices in the sphere of circula-
tion/reproduction. Given these deteriorating conditions of existence, residents rapidly responded to fare increases - which they saw as unjustified - by boycotting bus services.

An important factor which needs to be borne in mind is the class stratification existing within the townships. Township traders, African businessmen, civil servants, teachers, and other professionals will experience higher standards of living than the mass of township residents. It is this category of people who have come to form the urban support base of Inkatha (Sitás, 1986:95-97; Mare and Hamilton, 1987:193). Interestingly, in Lamontville it was only after incorporation was announced that Inkatha became a factor in the conflict.

Political

Community Council (CC) elections were held in Lamontville and Hambanati in 1979, and "some residents believed that if people with a commitment to serving township-dwellers were elected, they might find ways to relieve some of the problems that beset the PNDB [previously the PNAB] townships" (Mare and Hamilton, 1987:191). These problems included

1. However, Gwala (1988) has argued that the African middle class in Edendale (Pietermaritzburg) could be brought into an alliance with the 'popular' classes, see Chapter 5.
shortages of housing, poor services and maintenance, absence of recreational facilities, and so on.

Although some Councillors (notably Harrison Dube from Lamont and Ian Mkize from Hambanati) were working within the CC structures to uplift their areas, they soon became aware of the "structural and financial impotence" of the Councils and this led to a "total rejection of the system by the two councillors and significant numbers of supporters" (Mare and Hamilton, 1987:191). Their disaffection with the CC system increasingly alienated them from the other councillors and when the Durban Transport Management Board (DTMB) increased bus fares to the PNAB townships in December 1982, they were to take a leading role in the Joint Commuters Council (JCC), which coordinated the bus boycott and formed the basis for the formation of JORAC (McCarthy and Swilling, 1984; Reintges, 1986).

Dube's murder in April 1983 - in which Moonlight Gasa, a Community Councillor, was implicated - led to the unleashing of popular discontent. This was expressed between JORAC members and CC members, and later between youth on one hand and police and Inkatha supporters on the other. In May Buthelezi exacerbated the issue by proposing the incorporation of
Lamontville and Hambanati into Kwazulu. This meant the threatened loss of Section 10 rights, which gave these residents preferred access to jobs in terms of apartheid legislation, as well as the provision of less efficient services provided by the Kwazulu 'government' instead of those provided by the Durban municipality (Schofield, 1986:40).

Mare and Hamilton (1987:193) argue that before incorporation was announced the allegiance of Councillors to Inkatha was 'relatively undefined', but that following this, "it seems that the Council became an Inkatha mouthpiece when those who were not supporters left the Council in the month following the announcement". It is difficult to gauge the degree of support Inkatha had amongst residents rather than Councillors; but Booth (1987:168-9) mentions that a survey of residents in Lamontville, Chesterville and Klaarwater in 1983 "...found that 83 percent of respondents thought JORAC was making a sincere effort to solve township problems..." compared with "...only 20 percent [who] felt Inkatha was trying to help...".

Thus the political terrain created a context which favored the outbreak of civil disorder. Particularly noteworthy is the murder of Harrison Dube, a popular leader at the time, which served as a flashpoint for the unleashing of dis-
content and indignation. The divergence between the CC and JORAC was reinforced by the involvement of a Community Con­
cillor in this murder, and by the incorporation announceme­
nt, after which the CC came to increasingly express the In­
katha position. The launch of the UDF in August 1983 was to
further exacerbate the tensions, with Buthelezi seeing this as a direct challenge to his desired hegemony over
resistance in Natal.

Cultural
The cultural level is more ambiguous than the structural or
political. It refers to the "ways in which groups of people
understand the social world and their place within it, their
definition of the rules which do or should govern behavior
and how they define themselves and other social groups"
(Waddington et al, 1987:160). The potential for conflict be­
tween groups is increased if they have "differing or in­
compatible definitions of the situation or of what their
rights are" (Waddington et al, 1987:161).

In general it can be argued that the 'shared culture' of the
oppressed leads to a tolerance or acceptance of anti-state
activities, through a popular interpretation of a history of
resistance against attempts to disempower the indigenous
population. In more particular circumstances, however, we
need to look at the diverse cultures in the locality. One of these is that of youth and scholars brought up in an urban environment which is substantially different to that of their elders or of rural dwellers. These, often politicized, youths have become involved in scholar organizations (for example, COSAS) since 1976/7, as well as in civic organizations (JORAC), and exiled groups. There exists a feeling of camaraderie (or comradeship) and this is articulated in freedom songs and dances as well as through pamphlets and meetings.

The other culture is that of 'traditionalism'. Inkatha attempts to "restore African socio-cultural values" (Mare and Hamilton, 1987:188) amongst the community, and particularly amongst the youth which it sees as constantly being led astray by 'outsiders'. The restoration of such 'socio-cultural values' may be possible amongst the rural youth, but is questionable in the urban environment, where traditional lines of authority (related to access to land through chiefs, and deference to 'elders') have largely been eroded by a number of factors including: access to land through the rental markets; deepening recession and increasing unemployment; overcrowded homes; and increasing politicization of the youth.
There also exists another 'cultural' viewpoint amongst the groupings involved in the conflict. This is that of the police, which Waddington et al (1987:177) describe as "characterized by strong orientations to 'action', 'excitement' and 'control'". In South Africa this is further exacerbated by the ruling government's ideology of 'swart gevaar' (black danger) and the 'total onslaught' of the ANC (African National Congress). This results in a police force which has a large number of racists and anti-communists, and who perceive any threat to the status quo as needing to be squashed before it spreads.

In summary then, these discrepant sub-cultures lead to differing perceptions of the legitimacy of violence by the 'other side'. Each generally sees their own actions as legitimate, and those of their opponents as illegitimate. The cultural level acts to reinforce the tendency to civil disorder expressed at the structural and political levels.

**Contextual**

This is regarded as the 'dynamic temporal setting' in which the disorder occurs, that is, the specific local history. The relevance of such settings has already been described in the historical section, but to recap briefly via an example. The bus fare increases in Durban came in December, a bad
time for communities to have to pay an increased proportion of their income into an essential service. This was followed by rent increases in early 1983, the murder of a popular leader in April, and the incorporation announcement in May. Thus the local context at the time immediately preceding the outbreak of conflict was one of community organization against, and antagonism towards, representatives of the local state.

**Situational**

The 'situational level' is regarded by Waddington et al (1987:162) as "the spatial context, the setting, of the event". This has a "bearing on the form taken by activities within it, making some forms of behaviour more likely and others more difficult". Waddington et al (1987:162) use this level of analysis to interpret crowd behaviour in a particular place which may have some symbolic importance, and they emphasize that the spatial context is "always mediated by social and cultural factors".

Although it is possible to use this concept in the local context (the area in which violence erupted), it also needs to be enlarged so as to include the wider spatial configuration of apartheid spatial policies. The African townships were grudgingly constructed as dormitory suburbs to house
African workers in the cities. These areas have historically had a contested existence throughout South Africa, with the minority government intent on 'granting independent status' to Africans in 'their own territories'. Such 'independence' removes the African majority's South African citizenship and replaces it with that of a geographically separated political entity (Transkei, Ciskei, Venda, etc). It is in the light of this history of removals, resettlement, and 'independence' that the threat of incorporation needs to be viewed.

This was the situation faced by the residents of Lamontville and Hambanati when the possibility of incorporation into Kwazulu was raised. Such a development would have removed responsibility for these areas from 'South Africa' to Kwazulu, while at the same time threatening the Section 10 rights of the residents.

The spatial context also needs to be considered in another way, namely, the actual location and layout of the townships and informal settlements. Townships have been designed in such a way as to discourage peaceful public marches and protests. They are situated far from the city, and therefore attract a minimum of attention and media coverage which could act to publicize the dilemmas faced by township dwel-
lers. Furthermore, the street layout facilitates access by police and security forces, (Pinnock and Konings, 1984:43-55) and peaceful protests are thus very susceptible to disruption and vindictive reaction. What has developed in some areas and conflicts, is a type of guerrilla warfare, with youth practicing 'hit and run' tactics. They march in the streets until confronted by police, a battle often ensues and the youth disperse only to regroup and reappear in another place shortly thereafter, where the process is repeated. There have also been reports of police being 'lured' to a particular place and subsequently 'ambushed' (NM 8/7/83).

The social/cultural and political 'levels' interact with the spatial context to encourage the protection of 'territory', and in the case of Lamontville this occurred under a situation which threatened the political status of the residents, that is, their citizenship. Power is exercised over space and our understanding of this relationship has important implications for political practice. As political power is contested, so the spatial coordinates of this struggle are constantly being re-negotiated (see Cobbett et al, 1985). For example, Lamontville was considered a 'no-go' area for Buthelezi (as other areas around the country were considered 'liberated zones'), yet Buthelezi insisted on holding a
'rally' in the township to test opinion for incorporation. On the eve of the rally (31 August 1984) hundreds of Lamontville residents left the area and sought refuge in Durban. The following day saw the bussing of hundreds of Inkatha supporters into the area, but no violence ensued (DN 1/9/84) due to the exodus of many residents.

**Interactional**

This refers to the interaction between the contending groups at the time immediately preceding the outbreak of conflict, and during the conflict. It refers to actions which are "seen by the participants as breaking the unwritten rules governing the behaviour between groups" (Waddington, et al, 1987:162). This level of analysis needs to be widened to include the historical interaction between the contending groups. The history of conflict between militant youth and police (for example Soweto 1976 and the 1980 school boycotts) is well known and need not be elaborated on.

The most evident action is this case was the assassination of a popular community leader (Harrison Dube). This was seen by JORAC members (in particular youth) as 'breaking the rules', and once this had occurred it became virtually impossible to prevent large scale 'social disorder' breaking out in Lamontville. However, it is possible to argue that
even at this stage certain actions could have reduced the likelihood of conflict, by redressing these grievances. Such actions could have included the immediate arrest and/or punishment of those responsible for Dube's murder, more impartial behaviour by the police, the removal of rental and fare increases, and the recognition of JORAC as a representative community organization.

Although this prevention of conflict is, or was, theoretically possible, it did not occur in reality. Here it is important to bear in mind the nature of the contingent conditions present between the protagonists. These conditions meant that the groups' diverging political and ideological perspectives, as well as their conflicting material interests at the levels just discussed, acted upon each other to reinforce the likelihood of confrontation. In fact, given the widely diverging structural, political and cultural priorities it would have been extremely unlikely for a peaceful settlement to have won the day.

Thus although the presence of a strong civic organization (JORAC) acted to both delay and reduce the conflict, the causal powers of protest and violent conflict were activated under the contingent conditions of: political power struggles in the community (within the CC); the threat of loss of
citizenship to a relatively deprived group (through incorporation); and diverging and contradictory cultural interpretations of their position and rights within the world.

4.4 THE INANDA 'RIOTS' - 1985

The 'rioting' which occurred in August 1985 was not limited to Inanda, but it was particularly prominent there. This area had long been inhabited by Africans and Indians who co-existed peacefully for generations. Following the assassination of Victoria Mxenge, pupils boycotted schools in most of Durban's townships, and marched in the streets attacking quasi-governmental targets (schools, administration buildings) and running battles with police ensued.

The conflict spread from townships to nearby informal settlements, and people began targeting businesses and symbols of affluence (shops, bottle stores, cars, and so on). In Inanda this included harassment of Indian shopkeepers and looting of their businesses, clinics, and homes. As a result, Indian residents began to fear for their safety and a mass exodus occurred. Indian refugees fled to Phoenix, where together with Phoenix residents they began to mass on the Inanda-Phoenix border, and armed themselves to repulse an expected attack.
in Inanda. In other areas, shops which were burned down and looted belonged to African entrepreneurs. This targeting of shops may be explained by reference to the relative deprivation of the general populace compared with traders, and the fact that traders in townships are often staunch Inkatha supporters - as well as frequently being Councillors - as licenses for trading are controlled by KwaZulu.

On the night of the fourth day of 'rioting' Inkatha impis were being deployed throughout Durban's settlements. Hughes (1987:9/10) observes that the nature of the injuries reported changed from being mostly bullet wounds (the result of police firing on crowds) to stab and assault wounds (the result of vigilantes armed with spears and clubs). These impis were projected by the media as 'restoring order' as they marched from home to home searching for looted goods and ordering all able bodied men to join them.²

By Friday the 'rioting' in KwaMashu and Umlazi had subsided, but was to continue in Inanda until Sunday, when Inkatha held a 'peace rally' to assure Indians that the violence was

². Personal communication with an African academic resident in Umlazi.
not a repeat of 1949. The Inkatha Vice-President, Oscar Dhlomo, stated at this meeting that Inkatha "had taken control of the townships in order to put an end to the violence, to protect property, public buildings and businesses" (Sitas, 1986:111/112, my emphasis).

It is interesting to note that the spark which set off the confrontation (Victoria Mxenge's assassination) generated parallel events in all the settlements around Durban. The courses of events in different areas, however, exhibited a large degree of specificity. At one level one can explain the August 'riots' as the outbursts of repressed communities throughout Durban in response to the brutal assassination of a popular leader. This general level of explanation, however, does little to help us understand why the conflict took the form it did in Inanda. To gain further clarification we need some understanding of the local history of the Inanda area, as well as of African-Indian relations in Durban.

3. This refers to the 'African-Indian' riots which centered around Cato Manor in 1949. See Kirk (1983) and Ladlau (1975) for further information.
A Brief History of Inanda

From the 1860s Indian people who had completed their period of indenture started to acquire land in the area and made African producers into tenants on this land. Concomitant with the increase of Indian land-ownership in the area was the growth of Indian agriculture, and retail trade with local African residents. There were also a few African landowners, most notably Dube and Shembe, but the 1913 Land Act prevented further purchase of land by Africans until the 1930s (Hughes, 1987:2).

With the 1936 Land Act designating Inanda as 'released area 33' Indian agriculture began to stagnate. At this time Indians made up 52 percent of the population of the Inanda Division (Hughes, 1987:3) and the Act was seen as restricting further purchases of land in Inanda by Indians. From this period on it was largely African landowners, entrepreneurs, and churches who would acquire land in the area. An Act in 1946 - the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act - further reduced the potential for agricultural production on Indian owned property, and this led to an increase in the sub-division of landholdings. By the start of the 1950s the beginnings of population pressure on the land were noticeable (Hughes, 1987:3).
From the 1950s the monopolization of Natal agriculture further eroded Indian agriculture in the area, and at the same time 'shack farming' began to be noticed in Inanda. With the removal of 'squatters' from Cato Manor, beginning from 1958, and their 'resettlement' in KwaMashu, Inanda became a viable location for workers and work-seekers. The Africans settling in Inanda were those who either did not qualify for, or did not want to settle in, KwaMashu (Hughes, 1987:3-4).

This meant a steady income for the few large and numerous small landholders through rents and retail sales. The relationship which came to be established between landlord-retailers (mostly Indian) and tenant-consumers (mostly African) was one in which the landlord-cum-retailer wielded a significant amount of power in the area, and specifically over the conditions of life of their tenants. Furthermore, the absence of any local authority in Inanda increased the already immense power of the landlord-retailers (Hughes, 1987).

From the close of the 1950s - with the Bantu Self Government Act of 1959 - we find an African trader based petty-bourgeoisie bidding for a share in the spoils of Inanda, and beginning to couch their class protectionism in explicitly
anti-Indian rhetoric (Hughes, 1987; Sitas, 1986). This rising African middle class also presented a challenge to the traditional authorities, and initially had a strained relationship with Buthelezi. In 1976 the African traders organization, Inyanda, was, however, consolidated into Inkatha as another "brick in the building of the nation" (Sitas, 1986:92).

The growth of this middle class since the 1960s - from two percent in middle class employment in 1960, to ten percent in 1983 (Sitas, 1986:100) - owed a lot to increasing employment opportunities in local government and 'homeland' structures, and the 'black advancement' programs of some companies. Furthermore this middle class has become separated from the black majority. As Sitas has argued, while the "black elites of the 1950s and 1960s had been tied to the destiny of the lower classes, the late 1970s and 1980s witness how they get slowly untied and then yanked away from the broader population" (Sitas, 1986:98).

In the late 1970s the state was forced to take a more active interest in the area which was fast becoming one of the largest informal settlements in South Africa. The population had grown by 137 percent between 1966 and 1979, and was to increase by a further 400 percent between 1977 and 1985 to
reach a population of approximately 250 000 in 1985 (Hughes, 1987:5). It is likely, however, that the population is even larger, as Jeffery (forthcoming) estimates the population of the greater Inanda area to be over 661 000 in 1987.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s more land was being acquired from Indian owners by both African entrepreneurs and the state. The drought, beginning in 1979 and leading to 30 typhoid deaths in 1980, was also to increase tensions in the area. Some landowner-retailers were selling water to tenants while others provided it free. The state seized on the issue of water and health to begin removals of tenants from Indian-owned land to site and service schemes elsewhere. According to Hughes (1987:6) many of those who were thus relocated said they moved because they "had found themselves subject to the whims of the landlord". In 1982 the Department of Cooperation and Development began numbering shacks in the area marked for removal. They also began to prosecute tenants. This occurred simultaneously with the release of a structure plan for the Inanda area, which argued for the upgrading of the area and its incorporation into Kwazulu as soon as possible (Hughes, 1987:6-7).

Evictions continued from 1982 through to 1984, and the area experienced some 'organized' resistance in the form of bus
boycotts and school protests in 1982/3. The evictions have been seen as the prelude to the 'Africanization' of Inanda (Hughes, 1987; Sitas, 1986; and Schofield, 1986). The plight of residents meanwhile was particularly bleak, with a lumpen proletariat of 15 percent in one survey, and an estimated 40 to 50 percent unemployment of the economically active population (Sitats, 1986:101).

At the time preceding the outbreak of conflict, Inanda was regarded as "a checkerwork of social relations from chiefly domains to modern entrepreneurial enclaves" in one of the biggest informal settlements in South Africa (Sitats, 1986). The community was a generally fractured one, with fracture lines occurring between: tenant/consumers and landlord/retailers; African landlords and Indian landlords; and between Zulu and Pondo tenants (Hughes, 1987).

ANALYSIS

Structural

Inanda residents would probably experience their positions in the structures of South African society in similar ways to Lamontville residents, namely as exploited workers and oppressed citizens. There would, however, be some important local variations which require further elaboration.
Whereas residents in PNAB townships such as Lamontville were in a necessary relationship (as tenants) to a branch of the local state, those in Inanda were in a similar relation with Indian (and African) landlords. This is complicated by the further necessary relationship between retailers (largely Indian) and consumers (largely African) in the area. In both these cases the distribution of power and resources structurally discriminates against African tenant-consumers.

Another way in which the landlord-tenant relationship varies is that in Lamontville residents experienced the landlord as a collective entity (the PNAB). By contrast, Inanda residents' relation to landlords was individualized to small groups of households and individual landlords. Organization to redress grievances is much more difficult in the individualized cases.

A further important local variation is the differential access to employment of 'squatters' compared with formal township residents. As already mentioned, residents with Section 10 rights - which will generally be those in formal townships inside 'South Africa' - had preferential access to jobs in the major cities/towns and better provision of services. Thus Inanda residents would have been materially dis-
advantaged by comparison with Lamontville residents: the former area would have higher unemployment ratios and more 'informal' economic activity than Lamontville. As mentioned above Sitas (1986:101) estimates unemployment in Inanda to be approximately 40 to 50 percent of the economically active population. He also states that "a variety of petty commodity production or informal sector activity proliferated" (Sitas, 1986:101).

The relationship between Indian landlord-retailers and African landlord-retailers also needs to be explored. According to Sitas:

the trading interests in the emerging African petit-bourgeoisie of Durban found their most articulate ideologue and prototype in A W G Champion in the 1960's. His authoritarian populism...matured into a coherent trader ideology: separatist, ethnic, and exclusivist (1986:88).

Hughes (1987:4) goes further to argue that Champion and other African landlords and traders "couched their class protectionism in explicitly anti-Indian terms". She quotes Champion as stating that:

Here in Durban, when the Indians were very arrogant, the Africans took sticks to them in 1949. They beat them and made them close their shops. Yes, the enrichment of Africans
from stores and buses started in 1949, it started like that... (Hughes, 1987:4).

Historically the relationship between African and Indian traders in Durban has been an antagonistic one where both have competed for a limited market. Similarly the relationship between Africans and Indians in general has been one of competition for limited resources (employment, land, etc), and in Durban this has also been informed by the history of Cato Manor and the 1949 'riots'.

Political
A structure plan for Inanda published in 1982 recommended the incorporation of the entire area into KwaZulu. It stated that: "Land owned by non-blacks (i.e., non-Africans) in Released Area 33 should be acquired as necessary in accordance with the approved implementation proposals" (cited in Hughes, 1987:7). The obvious implication of this was the acquisition of Indian owned land in the area.

Alongside this development, Indian landlords had been instructed by the Department of Health in 1981 to either provide water and sewerage for tenants or to evict them. Noticeably, African landlords were given no such ultimatums (Hughes, 1987:6). Following these initiatives, and the prosecution of tenants and landlords, "some landlords began to issue eviction orders and some called in officials to demolish shacks, actions which led to much bitterness" (Hughes, 1987:6).
Although Inanda had experienced some form of prior protest and organization during the bus boycott of 1982/3, this did not lead to the formation of a local civic organization. Residents were therefore not part of organized political resistance to any recognizable degree, as had happened in the PNAB townships.

Cultural

Indian South Africans and Africans are part of two very disparate cultures, which have hitherto tended only to meet at 'the fringes', that is, in progressive organizations. Kirk (1983:13) in his analysis of the 1949 Durban 'riots' argues that "the exclusivity of groups should be emphasized because conflict is more likely to arise where culturally or linguistically distinct groups remain unasimilated". He goes on to note that Indian culture has tended "to retain traditional values" and that thereby "ethnic exclusivity was maintained" (Kirk, 1983:16).

The sub-culture of 'squatter' settlements needs to be briefly elaborated on. Residents in so-called squatter areas do not, by and large, consider themselves to be squatters. This is because they are involved in a rental arrangement with land/shacklords. Nevertheless, they are considered as occupying 'informal' housing and often fitting into the 'informal' economy. These categories (formal and informal) influence the 'squatter's' world view and promote a sense of
'illegality' which was exacerbated from 1982 with evictions and removals in Inanda.

Cultural distinctiveness or exclusivity in itself, however, is insufficient cause for the outbreak of conflict. Other factors such as the structural positions occupied by the tenant-consumers and the landlord-retailers, and the political actions of the state (which inflamed relations between Indian landlords and African tenants), increased the potential for violent confrontation. The intervention of 'the cultural level' helps to explain why African landlord-retailers were not initially targeted in Inanda, even though they occupied similar structural positions, in relation to tenants, to their Indian counterparts.

Contextual

This has already been described in the preceding historical section, but to recap, Indian acquisition of land in the Inanda area was first used for market gardening. With the removal of Africans from Cato Manor an increased influx of African settlers was experienced. This brought both a better and more regular income than agriculture, with the result that the area developed into a large informal settlement area. From the early 1980's residents were threatened with removals, as well as increasing unemployment and poverty due to the recessionary nature of the economy. This, together with the influx of settlers due to the drought conditions of the time, growing township populations and intensifying
poverty increased the pressure on the land and competition for employment.

**Situational**

The spatial context is similar to that described for Lamontville, but with important local variations. Adjacent to Inanda is the Indian residential area of Phoenix. Many Indian residents in Inanda had applied for housing in Phoenix, but were refused because they were living "beyond the Council's jurisdiction" (Hughes, 1987:7).

The uncertain future faced by both African and Indian tenants in the area was different from that of Lamontville, where tenants were not threatened by removals but by incorporation. Incorporation did not become the issue as it did in Lamontville and Hambanati because residents were facing more immediately threatening circumstances, namely, removals. Furthermore, incorporation would give residents a degree of legitimacy, as they would now be on Kwazulu land and removed from the control of 'South African' state bodies.

African tenants and Indian landlords lived in close proximity to one another, meaning that the relative affluence of the Indian landlord-retailers was highly visible to those people who made this 'affluence' possible. Thus the spatial proximity of 'exploiter' and exploited, and of 'affluence' and poverty fueled the sense of relative (and
absolute) deprivation experienced by African tenant-consumers.

**Interactional**
The assassination of Victoria Mxenge served as the flashpoint which unleashed violence around Durban in August 1985. Whereas in other Durban settlements "homeland government or other quasi-political targets" were threatened, in Inanda "gangs of youth started threatening Indian shopkeepers and residents that they would burn their houses and property" (Sitas, 1986:107). The looting and burning of Indian shops served as the catalyst for the rapid exodus of Indians from the area.

Although students initially came out in demonstration against Victoria Mxenge's murder, their protest was rapidly peripheralized by 'fringe elements' (Hughes, 1987:8), 'young lumpen-proletarians' and 'gangsters' (Sitas, 1986:107/8). These people seemed to set the tone of interaction between protesters and Indian shopkeepers and residents as confrontational, but it also seems that not all the blame can rest here. African tenant-consumers were able to identify with the sentiments being expressed by these 'fringe elements' because this correlated with their own experiences.

It is not sufficient to argue that Inanda was "overrun by mobs of criminals looting and burning indiscriminately"
(Meer, 1985, cited in Sitas, 1986:108). One needs to look instead to the proximity of 'affluence' and (relative) deprivation; the nature of the necessary relationships between landlords and tenants; and the idealistic assumption of unity between Indians and Africans often held by left-wing analysts, which was in reality only applicable to small sections of both communities.

The contingent factor in the landlord-tenant relation was the fact that landlords were generally Indian and tenants generally African. This was further complicated by relations such as those between shopkeepers and consumers, by cultural exclusivity, and racial animosity being fueled by state attempts at the Africanization of Inanda. Connected to this was the way in which the majority of Africans have experienced relations towards Indians, both historically and contemporarily. This has tended to be as shopkeepers, supervisors at work, and as higher skilled (and therefore better paid) members of the labour force. As Kirk (1983:45) argues for the case of the 1949 'riots', "instead of attacking the ruling white class the aggression was deflected against an exploitative minority".
In December 1985 violence erupted in Section 5, a 'squatter' settlement on the Natal south coast adjacent to Umbogintwini. This followed a series of skirmishes in the area in November. Section 5 had experienced an influx of new settlers from the Transkei and Natal south coast in the preceding few years, and these settlers were able to acquire a degree of legitimacy due to the area falling under the administration of Kwazulu. This is because 'squatters' are less likely to be removed off Kwazulu administered land than off 'South African' land.

Initially, the conflict began in Malukazi, when 'Pondos' - who felt discriminated against in local Inkatha elections - elected their own chief. The explanation given was that even though 'Pondos' had joined Inkatha and stood for local elections in a predominantly 'Pondo' ward they had not been voted in, and as a result decided to set up their own alternative 'political structure'.

This created some tension with the Cele tribal authority in Malukazi and relations began to become strained. A 'Zulu' woman was murdered in Malukazi, allegedly by 'Pondos', and although it is not known if this was related to the tension

4. Interview August 1986, tape held by author. Interviewee wishes to remain anonymous.
it did serve to inflame antagonisms along ethnically defined lines.

Following this the 'Pondo chief' in Malukazi was murdered in late November, and a large number of 'Pondos' fled the area anticipating the outbreak of conflict. They settled in Section 5 on land owned by a Mr. Mbambo, who seemed to favour renting land to 'Pondos' rather than to 'Zulus'. In fact it would appear that a landlord could acquire higher rents from 'Pondos' because of their relatively weak position as regards access to land. 'Foreign' Africans are more likely to be removed from 'squatter' areas and resettled in their 'homeland' than are 'local Zulu' Africans. Thus a 'Pondo' enclave developed in Section 5 under the patronage of this Mr Mbambo, and when 'Pondos' fled from Malukazi they took refuge here.

Following this, the Celes sent a letter to the Mbambos urging them not to accommodate the 'Pondos', and threatening to come and expel them if they were permitted to settle on Mbambo land. Interestingly, there had existed some previous antagonism between the Celes and the Mbambos which may have

5. Interview with trade unionist, August 1986, tape held by author. It seems that it is generally easier for 'Zulus' to get permission from local Chiefs or Tribal Authorities than it is for non-'Zulus'

6. The Celes and the Mbambos are large landowning families in Malukazi and Section 5 respectively. Information gained from interview with unionist, August 1986, tape held by author.

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assisted to set the tone of relating between these areas. In the event, Mr Mbambo showed the Cele's letter to the 'Pondos' who "began to prepare themselves for the fight" by administering various 'mutis' and bussing off most of the women and children to the Transkei.

When the threatened expulsion party did not arrive, a raiding team from Section 5 went into Malukazi. On the first two attempted raids police presence prevented conflict, but on the third attempt the raiders damaged houses in Malukazi and killed seven people. It is noteworthy that these raiders consisted of both 'Pondos' and 'Zulus' living in Section 5, as 'Zulus' living there also felt threatened by the anticipated attack from Malukazi.

As a result of the destruction of houses and particularly the deaths, people in Malukazi began to organize a 'Zulu army' from the surrounding Umbumbulu area - a peri-urban area under the authority of Chief Mkanye. This 'army' was to meet two 'needs', the first being protection from the 'warring Pondos', and the second the taking of revenge for the lost lives (see Clegg, 1981 for a discussion of the 'ideology of vengeance' in the Msinga area).

7. Interview with trade unionist, August 1986, tape held by author.
8. The term 'muti' refers to the preparation of various herbs and/or animal products administered by Sangomos ('witchdocters').
9. Interview with trade unionist, August 1986, tape held by author.
In an attempt to prevent the escalation of conflict, 'Pondos' from a nearby hostel approached the local Kwazulu representative seeking to defuse the situation. He referred them to Ulundi who in turn referred them to the Kwazulu representative in Durban, who expressed anger at their having by-passed him in going to Ulundi and showed no further interest in their dilemma.\(^\text{10}\)

Simmering conflict broke out into full-scale warfare a few days before Christmas. People were assaulted as they left work and along the main road, resulting in 59 deaths by Christmas, most of these being 'Zulu'. Talks intended to end the conflict broke down on 27 December when Chief Mkanye demanded no less than the expulsion of all 'Pondos' in the area (CP 12/1/86).

Conflict continued throughout January and culminated in the razing to the ground of Section 5 on 23 January 1986. This followed the mass arrest of 533 'Pondos', and when the 'Zulu army' arrived in Section 5 they were able to loot and raze the settlement unopposed. The toll of the conflict was to be over 100 dead and an estimated 40 000 homeless. Many of the 'Pondo' refugees were 'resettled' in Winkelspruit and Bambayi (in Inanda) while others returned to the Transkei,

\(^{10}\) Interview with trade unionist, August 1986, tape held by author.
and the 'Zulu' refugees were largely absorbed into the adjoining settlements.

**Umbumbulu, a Brief History**

It is necessary to interpret events in Umbumbulu in the light of its particular history, and following this to offer an explanation of the events in their present context. Until the mid 1960s the area was one of African agriculture with low population densities. The area fell under the authority of Chief Mkanye, who still has authority today. Chief Mkanye allocated land under a tribal tenure arrangement. In the 1950s and 1960s some of the original 'tribal' families purposely settled in the area to prevent encroachment on the land by white industrial interests (Jenkins et al, 1986:64). From the mid 1960s the first shack developments were noticed in the area.

From 1965 relocatees from Cato Manor began arriving in Malukazi and settling there. The area developed into a shack settlement on the outskirts of Umlazi from which residents could draw on services, particularly transport. Until 1979 Malukazi fell under the Cele tribal authority, and tenants experienced security of tenure once they had been allotted land. In 1979 Malukazi was incorporated into Kwazulu and earmarked for 'upgrading' into a 'formal' township. Many tenants lost their secure tenure, and land speculators began operating in the area. The displaced residents were
'resettled' in Folweni where they in turn displaced original inhabitants — who were largely agricultural labourers, subsistence farmers, and small sugar cane farmers. This resulted in a "simmering antagonism between the original residents of Folweni and the new immigrants" (Schofield, 1986:22).

From about 1980 an increased movement of people into the area became noticeable, this time settlement occurring in Section 5. This occurred alongside the 'discouragement' of settlement at Malukazi and at Mgaga, as 'non-Zulus' (basically 'Pondos') experienced difficulty gaining entry into the "closely knit adjacent tribal areas" (Jenkins, et al, 1986:64). At the same time the incorporation of Malukazi into Umlazi was proposed.

Original families who had settled in the area now began to feel a loss of control over the land as increasingly land became available for 'rent or illegal purchase'. Much of this renting and selling of property occurred without the approval of the tribal authorities who had allocated it in the first place, and the result was the growth of 'shack farming' in the area (Jenkins et al, 1986:65).

The result was two communities existing side by side, the one 'tribal' and retaining some relationship with tribal authorities — through which the possibility of obtaining land for ploughing in adjacent sparsely populated land
existed - and the other a 'community' of newer residents who were locked into a patronage relationship with their landlords. Hence at the time immediately preceding the outbreak of conflict we find: a decline in the power of traditional authorities; the increasing power of land/shacklords; increasing population pressure on land and water resources; and discontent expressed towards the influx of new 'squatters' who many saw as responsible for this situation.

4.5.2 Analysis

**Structural**
The 'squatter' population in Section 5 and Malukazi would experience their structural positions similarly to the people of Inanda and to a lesser extent Lamontville. The similarities would include their material position in relation to the means of production (as non-owners) and to the apartheid system (as a disenfranchised populace). This, however, is subject to considerable local variation. The presence of 'Pondos' in the area, and their supposed Transkeian identity led to differing conceptions of citizenship and rights towards land, resources, and jobs.

The nature of the landlord-tenant relationship is different from that experienced in Lamontville and Inanda. The contingent nature of this relation in Lamontville and Inanda respectively was the presence of the local state as
landlord, and of Indians as landlords. By comparison in section 5 'Zulus' were the landlords (by and large), and both 'Zulus' and 'Pondos' were tenants.

Section 5 and Malukazi residents were tied into the traditional authority structures in the area. This structure was in transition to a more rental-based, private property-dependent set of structures and relations. Chiefs, who had allocated land originally, found themselves becoming gradually sidelined with the population influx into the area. New settlers increasingly dealt with the second tier of 'landowners' who had received land allocations from Chiefs originally. As stated by one Chief, "some of the Zulus who had big farms did not need all the land, and they rented land out to the Pondos" 11. This empowered the 'landowners' at the expense of the traditional authorities.

When factories were built in the area from the 1950s, the power of the Chief's diminished further. Newcomers to the area came to seek work and settle there. These people "came from further away, like Kokstad, Ixopo, Port Shepstone, and Transkei, and the local people felt they did not have to work because they had large pieces of land and lots of cows" (see note 11, above). This process of migration continued through the 1960s without friction. As stated by Chief

11. Interview with Chief Mkanye, original transcript held by F. Christensen to whom I am indebted for permission to quote from transcripts of interviews with Chiefs Mkanye and Mkize.
Mkanye "the 1960s were a good time as there were lots of jobs for people and also lots of space for people to build homes" (see note 11, above).

When employment began to get scarce from the late 1970s it was 'Zulus' who were retrenched first (on a last in, first out basis). They ('Zulus') had not initially sought employment in factories because of their access to land for agriculture and rental to factory employees. From the 1970s more 'Zulu' youth sought employment in factories in the area, and it was these who were most affected by retrenchments (Chief Mkize, see note 11, above). Land and water was becoming increasingly scarce in the 1980s, and the erection of taps, by the AECI chemical plant near their compound gates, led to friction over queuing and waiting for water (Chiefs Mkanye and Mkize, see note 11, above).

**Political**

While Section 5 and Malukazi residents would tend to experience their political positions in similar ways to Inanda and Lamontville residents, important variations need to be noted. Firstly, 'Pondos' were considered as 'Transkeian' citizens by local 'Zulus' and regarded as having no, or limited, political rights in Natal/Kwazulu. This means that three 'states' can be envisaged as relevant to this conflict, the 'South African state', the 'Kwazulu state', and the 'Transkeian state'. There were several cases of 'Zulus' feeling that 'Pondos' should "go back to the
Transkei because there is no place for a 'Zulu' to make a home" (Chief Mkanya, see note 11, above).

As noted above, there had been some antagonism over the results of local Inkatha elections, resulting in the setting up of an 'alternative' political structure - the election of a 'Pondo' Chief by 'Pondos' - which by virtue of its mere presence was a threat to traditional authority structures and Inkatha. The 'Pondo' chief was murdered and this promoted a deepening of hostilities between those identifying themselves as 'Pondos' and those as 'Zulus'. As in Inanda there was no evidence of any 'progressive' political organizations in Section 5 and Malukazi, although some 'Zulus' alleged that the 'Pondos' were UDF supporters and that 'this was not right' as "how can you welcome the Pondo when they join a grouping which is against your tribe" (Chief Mkanye, see note 11, above).

Also it was claimed that some 'Pondos' join Inkatha and "throw their Transkeian passports away as they say they want to be Zulus ... they throw away their country's passport and act like a Zulu, but inside they are pure Pondo, this is cheating" (Chief Mkanye, see note 11, above).

12. Interview with Sibusiso Welcome Hill, Inkatha Youth Brigade Chairman, Sepember 1986, transcript with author.
Cultural

The cultural 'level' is very important in this instance, the feeling of discrimination experienced by 'Pondos' in the elections and their subsequent election of a 'Pondo' Chief points to their awareness of their cultural diversity. This diversity was reinforced when 'Pondos' fled from Malukazi to Section 5, considered a 'Pondo' enclave.

The preparation for 'war' by the use of mutis and their administration by a 'Pondo' Sangoma, also reflected diverse cultural practices, and similar (but different) rites were performed by 'Zulus' to enable them to attain victory in the conflict. Some statements by Chief Mkize illustrate this cultural division: "The Zulu are strong and not afraid to fight, we have been warriors for a long time. The Pondos are not strong like the Zulus"; and, "in our custom it is not bad to fight, it shows which group is the strongest, and the strongest group has the first choice. Also, it is an easy way to finish an argument" (see note 11, above).

It is particularly interesting to note how these cultural perceptions overlaid and coincided with the political. As stated by one respondent "they [Pondos] came here and didn't want to listen to the Chief, that is wrong" (see note 12, above). While in Inanda, African residents differed in both cultural and material terms from Indian landlords, in Section 5 and Malukazi the cultural differences overlaid and reinforced political differences between 'Zulus' and
'Pondos'. Furthermore, the conflict did not occur between an oppressed community and their perceived oppressors (as in Lamontville and Inanda) but between two groups of culturally distinctive oppressed groups, of which one group was perceived as 'taking our jobs, land, and water' (see note 11, above).

**Contextual**

This has been described under the historical section, but it should be recalled that the Umbumbulu area is relatively unique in the Durban regional context. It is a largely peri-urban, low density area, with strong ties to the land and traditional authority structures. It is bordered by both developing formal townships and growing 'squatter' settlements, and as such is experiencing pressure on both land and traditional authority structures.

**Situational**

The spatial context in Section 5 and Malukazi was similar to that of Lamontville and Inanda at the level of apartheid spatial engineering. An important distinction, however, was the development of a 'Pondo' enclave in Section 5. This meant that the conflict could take the form of territorial protection of an area from 'invaders'. The spatial distribution of Section 5 and Malukazi places them on opposite sides of a small river with a valley and open bush between. This is of some significance as it enables raids and counter-raids to occur from one area to the other.
Also of significance is the recent influx of settlers into the area in the past few years. Section 5 and Malukazi became increasingly densely settled, and competition for scarce resources, particularly land, became intense. While in the 1950s and 1960s this was welcomed, by the 1980s "grumbles began to be heard about the Pondo who were taking over the area. Zulus thought that they should have first preference as they were on the land long before the Pondos" (Chief Mkanye, see note 11, above). Under these circumstances any incident could have served to inflame violent conflict between 'Zulus' and 'Pondos'.

Some dissatisfaction was also expressed against 'shacklords' who had 'rented' land to 'Pondos' and with this money bought up their neighbours' lands. They "got rich and do not need jobs", and were seen as 'greedy' as well as becoming "mini Chiefs or Indunas, and controlled their areas" (Chiefs Mkanye and Mkize, see note 11, above). Thus 'Pondos', in particular, were tied into a patronage relationship with shacklords who they saw as powerful and this was perceived as a threat by the Chiefs.

Historically, there was some dissatisfaction with the location of factories in the area from the 1950s, and it was felt that 'the government' and 'magistrates' did not take the Chiefs into account when deciding "where people (factories) could build" (Chief Mkanye, see note 11, above). Thus, according to Jenkins et al (1986:64):
"Originally tribal families had been settled in this area in a bid by the tribal community to stake a claim to resist possible encroachment on the land by local white industrial interests".

**Interactional**

As the pressure on land and resources increased, so interaction between existing settlers and newcomers was increasingly seen as inter-ethnic competition. The murder of the 'Pondo' Chief and of the 'Zulu' woman was a reflection of this. As Waddington et al. have stated, "harsh treatment of someone from a vulnerable social category - a woman, a child, or an elderly or infirm person - will intensify the moral indignation of participants" (1987:162). Thus the murder of both the Chief and the women were seen as 'breaking the rules' and precipitated the outbreak of ethically defined conflict.

Before the outbreak of conflict, however, "some of the Zulu called a meeting to see what could be done about the Pondos. It was decided at this meeting that the Pondos should be told to leave the area and move somewhere else less crowded" (Chief Mkanye, see note 11, above). Chief Mkize stated that: "the Pondo headman was not pleased" with this decision, and he also felt that "some of the shacklords who are Zulu were also cross with us, as if the Pondos went they would lose money" (see note 11, above). Thus nature of the interaction between 'Pondos' and 'Zulus' was confrontational and
encompassed competition for jobs, and conflict over land, water and political power.

The necessary relation between tenants and landlords in this instance, did not emerge as the major fracture line amongst the protagonists. Rather this was substantially affected by the contingent status (ethnicity) of some of the tenants. However, at another level, this contingent relation becomes a necessary one. People cannot perceive themselves as members of a particular group unless they can also distinguish another group from which they are 'different'. Thus 'Zulus' could not perceive themselves as 'Zulus' without the presence of 'Pondos' or some other similarly defined group. Therefore, in this conflict, although ethnicity was a contingent factor in the landlord-tenant relationship, it became a necessary relation between 'Zulus' and 'Pondos'.

It was under these circumstances of increasing pressure on the land, political struggles defined along ethnic lines, declining traditional authority control over the allocation of land, and the increasing power of shacklords that the 'faction fights' took the form they did.
A number of similarities in the underlying tensions which informed the conflicts in the three examples cited here can be noted. Firstly, in all cases land was an important element which helped to structure the nature of the relationships between the conflicting groups, albeit in different ways in different areas.

Secondly, the issue of 'citizenship' was also raised in all the conflicts. In Lamontville this was raised as the potential loss of Section 10 rights and in Inanda residents were faced with incorporation into KwaZulu. The difference between Lamontville and Inanda, however, is that whereas Lamontville residents were threatened by incorporation, it was Indian landlords in Inanda that were threatened by incorporation. Inanda tenants may have stood to gain a degree of legitimacy by incorporation and this could have been a factor informing their actions. In Section 5 and Malukazi citizenship was raised in the form of holding 'outsiders' ('Pondos' from the Transkei with a different 'citizenship') responsible for declining opportunities.

Thirdly, state intervention was also a notably common factor in all. Residents of Lamontville and Inanda were both faced with incorporation into KwaZulu, while those in Inanda and Malukazi had faced 'upgrading' and resettlement. In Inanda African landlords had had land expropriated for the
development of Indian townships, thus exacerbating racial
tensions (Hughes, 1987:4)

A fourth common variable is a 'popular conception' of who is
to blame. In Inanda this was seen as Indian landlord/retailers, while in Umbumbulu it was 'Pondos' who were seen as responsible. In Lamontville this was slightly different, as it was local and central state representatives who were considered responsible for increased hardships on the local population.

There were also important differences between the three areas. One critical difference between them was the nature of political organization in the areas. Lamontville was the only area to exhibit the presence of 'progressive' political organizations, in the form of JORAC, Malayo (a youth organization), and COSAS (a scholar organization). By comparison, Umbumbulu was still strongly linked to traditional authority structures and Inkatha, whereas Inanda was in something of a political vacuum.

The second important difference was discernible at the cultural level. In both Inanda and Umbumbulu, differences at the cultural level reinforced structural and political differences, acting to promote the potential for conflict along ethnic/cultural cleavages. In Lamontville, this level did not impact to any significant degree along the above
mentioned lines. Rather, it operated to legitimate anti-state violence.

Finally, the civil 'disorders' which erupted in Durban in the 1980s need to be seen as the local expression of processes being experienced at a regional and national level. It should be clarified that these were not passive reflections of wider processes, but rather exhibited a spatial specificity in the working out of these processes at the local level. While this chapter has concentrated on the examination of locally specific dynamics in the generation of 'unrest', the following chapter looks at the region as a possible source for explanation at a more general level than the locality.
CHAPTER 5

THE SPECIFICITY OF NATAL: REGIONAL INFLUENCES ON THE FORM OF MASS VIOLENCE

5.1 INTRODUCTION

As mentioned in Chapter 1, specific regions have social geologies reflecting past investment and labour practices, as well as conflict and struggle over these. Historically, Natal’s economy grew on the basis of sugar and timber production and this had specific effects on settlement forms and on the nature of the labour process in the province. Not insignificant was the existence of the peasantry on a larger basis and for longer than in most other places of the country. This existence was maintained through a utilization of tribal structures in subordination to a white government. As a result the existence of 'Zulu' nationalism is still a political force in Natal. Conflict between different 'ethnic groups', and between a traditional constituency and progressive movement have tended to be the norm in Natal's recent history of 'unrest'. Reasons for this are rooted in the past social geologies mentioned above, and since rapid urbanization and the growth of informal settlements on the fringes of Durban there has been a meeting of the traditional and progressive forms of consciousness, often with disastrous results.
5.2 FACTORS SHAPING NATAL'S SPECIFICITY

Civil 'unrest' in Natal has taken a distinctive form, and while this is comparable in some cases to events elsewhere - for example, the 'witdoeke' in Crossroads and the 'A team' in Chesterville, or the Lamontville and PWV rent boycotts - there are a number of features of local 'unrest' which are distinctive to Natal. The particularity of conflict in Natal can be better understood if one is aware of the spatial and historical features of the region.

Beall et al (1986) have described the 'regional distinctiveness' of Natal in terms of its spatial and historical aspects. They argue that spatially Natal is distinct due to:

1. "The division of authority between the Kwazulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) and the Natal Provincial Administration (NPA)" which includes division at the local level between "municipalities and Tribal or Regional Authorities" (Beall et al, 1986:6).

2. The constitution of the population. Compared to the national average Natal has a lower proportion of whites (7,8 percent compared to 15,3 percent); a higher proportion of Indians (10,5 percent compared to 2,8 percent); a lower proportion of 'Coloureds'(1,4 percent compared to 8,9 percent); and a higher proportion of Africans 80,1 percent compared to 73 percent). Furthermore, 90 percent of Africans in Natal are Zulu-speaking (Beall et al 1986:6).
3. The fragmentation of Kwazulu compared to that of other bantustans, or 'national and self governing states'.

4. The close proximity of Kwazulu to the "major 'white' urban areas and to industrial activity" (Beall et al, 1986:7). This, in turn, has promoted the growth of large 'informal settlements' around the urban areas.

They argue further that Natal is historically distinct owing to:

1. "The tenacity of pre-capitalist social and economic structures in the region, surviving on a larger scale and for longer than in most other parts of South Africa" (Beall et al, 1986:21).

2. "The continued role played by Zulu royalty in resistance... (which) was a factor that would prove useful in the development of a Zulu ethnic chauvinism" (Beall et al, 1986:21).

3. The administrative arrangements, initiated in the mid 19th century by Theophilus Shepstone, which "recreated a tribal tradition [and] gave rise to a particular administrative framework strongly based on the principle of divide and rule" and which continues to have affects on Natal's African population to this day (Beall et al, 1986:12).

4. The distinctive form of capital accumulation in Natal which was based on sugar, and the importation of indentured labour from India to work on the sugar estates.
Beall et al (1986) also detail the convergence between sugar capital and the Zulu King and Chiefs. They argue that this was best illustrated by the formation of the first Inkatha movement (in the 1920s) which "brought together traditionalism, the aspiring African petty bourgeoisie and commercial agriculture (especially sugar)" (Beall et al, 1986:21). While "traditionalists hoped to restore the central position of the king," and retain the power of the chiefs; the African petty bourgeoisie "hoped to benefit from the political power that a 'Zulu nationalism' under the Zulu monarchy would give them"; and sugar capital hoped to gain "control over labour that they needed to counter the drain to the Transvaal mines and industries" (Beall et al, 1986:21-22).

The launching of the second Inkatha in 1975, was to "provide a power base for the Kwazulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) leadership outside of directly government-created structures" and "captured the political arena and symbols that might otherwise have been readily available" to contending political forces (Beall et al, 1986:32). Furthermore, they argue that Inkatha has "increasingly come to represent the linking of the regional representatives of an 'African middle class' and the interests of monopoly capital" (Beall et al, 1986:32; see also Stadler, 1987; and Marks, 1986).
It is no wonder then that "patterns of accumulation and class struggle took on a specific form in Natal" (Beall et al, 1986:30). This was to be further complicated by the severance of links between Inkatha and the ANC-in-exile in 1979 which was to deepen the divide between Buthelezi and militant youth. This was to form the backdrop to conflict in the 1980s.

The 'faction fights' in Section 5 are perhaps the best example of conflict being influenced by these spatial and historical features. Until the 1970s there was sufficient land available for both subsistence farming and the influx of 'Pondo' settlers. However, with the increasing influx of settlers, the effects of the drought, and the economic recession in the 1980s, tensions began to express themselves along ethnic lines. Retrenchments affected the 'Zulus' more severely, as it was on a system of 'last in, first out', and "this meant that lots of Mkize ['Zulus'] had to leave, as they were new to the factories"1.

The fact that many 'Zulus' did not have to seek employment in the factories until the 1970s was strongly linked to large areas of land still being available for agriculture. As new settlers moved in so some shacklords bought land from other landowning families. As stated by Chief Mkize: "The

1. Interview conducted with Chief Mkize by F. Christensen, see note 11, Chapter 4.
Mkizes could no longer grow lots of vegetables as land had shrunk, also, lots of people had sold their cattle, and rented the grazing land out to newcomers, or sold it to the shacklords\(^2\). Thus we can see two dimensions here, one being the later proletarianization of 'Zulus' in the area (compared to 'Pondos'), and the other the growth of shacklords as an indigenous petty bourgeoisie.

The social formation of the KwaMkanya area was therefore experiencing a slow transition (since the 1950s) from a predominantly subsistence based semi-rural economy, to one based on wage employment and rented land. Together with this the transition towards land arrangements based on private property - Jenkins et al (1986:64) report that in 1983, 33 percent of residents claimed to own the land, while 53 percent obtained land traditionally - meant that tribal families were "losing control of land allocation ...[as]... sites became available for illegal purchase" (Jenkins et al, 1986:64).

The growth of informal settlements and concomitantly of the power of shacklords was also a major feature in Inanda. While the shacklords of Section 5 were not challenged, the Indian landlord-retailers in Inanda were to experience the anger of their tenant-consumers. The proximity of a relatively more affluent group, whose affluence derived in

\(^2\) As for note 1 above.
large measure from the rents and purchases of local Africans was a major predisposing factor to their being targeted. This was further supported by antagonism from African traders towards Indian traders in Inanda, and the African-Indian riots of 1949. Overlaying this relative deprivation, the effects of different cultural practices and the lack of any real contact on the ground between Africans and Indians in Durban reinforced disparity at the structural level. This overlay of structural, political, and economic differences between Africans and Indians in Inanda increased the potential for violent confrontation.

An important element in all the conflicts considered here has been access to land on the urban periphery. This begs the question of who controls this land and why? Evers (1984) has argued that in dependent economies land is an important means for a local petty bourgeoisie to accumulate capital.

Basing his argument on a study of urban landownership in southeast Asian cities, Evers argues that:

in countries on the periphery of world capitalism,
in countries of dependent production...the means of production are largely owned by foreigners and multinational corporations (and) the local bourgeoisie is consequently restricted to own what is left (Evers, 1984:494).
In this context, he states that:

"the ownership of land and the construction of housing become important fields of local investments. Ownership in these sectors does, however, control the reproduction of the urban population and urban living in general" (Evers, 1984:494).

In South Africa the means of production (including land) are largely owned and controlled by white capital, thereby restricting an African middle class to accumulate on the basis of what is left - for example: taxi operations, commercial outlets in the townships, informal sector activities, and most important renting of rooms or land. However, even within this restricted scope aspirant African entrepreneurs still have to compete with Indian traders and landlords.

Evers further argues that:

Ownership of the means of reproduction, ie, urban land that controls access to urban living space as well as to other economic activities, is perhaps more important than the usually assumed class relations in highly developed capitalist societies (Evers, 1984:494).

He proposes an 'urban class structure' which is "divided into landowners and landless tenants" as potentially
offering "a better understanding of urban processes and urban conflict in third world cities" (Evers, 1984:494).

The situation in South African cities is obviously different from that in southeast Asian cities, and it is debatable whether one needs to counterpose 'class relations' with the proposed 'urban class structure'. What is important, however, is a recognition of the power which accrues to individuals or classes who have control over land allocation and use. In Durban this is a prominent and growing means by which an emerging African, and in many cases Indian, elite is establishing its economic and political power in the informal settlements which surround the city and account for almost half of its population (the Inkatha Institute estimated the 'informal' population of Durban to be over 1,7 million in 1987, compared with a total population for Durban of 3,6 million - see Woods, 1988:1).

The rise of such urban land 'owning' lumpen-capitalists does raise the question of the relationship between these lumpen-capitalists and representatives of traditional and bantustan authorities. Many of these land/shacklords are tied into traditional authority power structures and political processes through the Inkatha movement and the Kwazulu government. Whether or not these emerging lumpen-capitalists come into conflict with the established traditional and bantustan structures is dependent on the degree to which land/shacklords pursue policies which threaten the power
base of the traditional and political elites. This has occurred in Edendale and New Hanover, both near Pietermaritzburg, where local landlords have attempted to retain their 'neutrality' in the light of the UDF-Inkatha conflict (Gwala, 1988; DN 5/12/88).

More specifically landowners in Edendale (outside Pietermaritzburg) and others in New Hanover (north of Pietermaritzburg) have attempted to maintain a 'neutral' stance (see Gwala, 1988:89 on Edendale) or remain 'unaligned' (see DN 5/12/88:4 on New Hanover) in the face of conflict emerging from Inkatha recruitment drives. This indicates to some extent tensions between Inkatha/KLA on one hand and landowners/merchants in these areas on the other. Gwala considers this fertile ground for "winning over the local petty bourgeoisie as a means of isolating Inkatha" (1988:89). Thus the potential for conflict between an emergent capitalist class and traditional/bantustan structures may be realized in particular circumstances. The experience of Natal, however, is predominantly of an alliance between African lumpen-capitalists and traditional/bantustan authorities.

Gwala's (1988) argument, furthermore, does not acknowledge that any alliance between tenants and landlords is inherently a conflictual one, much as is any 'alliance' between capital and labour. This is due to the nature of the necessary relationship between them and the nature of the
'transaction', with the landlord more interested in the exchange value of the land, and the tenant in its use value. Landlords therefore pursue means to increase the returns from the land, by for example, crowding more people on to it. This conflicts with the use value attached by the tenants, but as this study has shown, there is no inevitability that conflict should break out along theoretically determined fracture lines. The presence of contingent factors play an important part in influencing the lines along which conflict occurs, and the form that conflict assumes.

In Natal the persistent survival of elements of previous social formations, albeit in modified forms, goes some way towards explaining the particular form 'unrest' has taken in the province. The survival of these practices and ideologies is explained by Sitas in the following way:

"The tight application of influx control and the infamous 'Durban system' of urban settlement ... [together with] ... the more recent processes of upheavals in the countryside ... [help to explain the] ... stubborn survival of cultural formations, symbolisms, and ideologies that betray a continuum between the country and the city" (1986:93).

The more recent urbanization and proletarianization of Natal's African population - a result of "demographic upheavals pioneered by agrarian capitalism and apartheid
policies of relocation which lashed them [workers] into wage-labour in the last two decades" (Sitas, 1986:93) - has resulted in a conflict between a 'traditional' consciousness (reflected in Inkatha) and a more militant progressive consciousness (reflected in trade unions and popular organizations). Conflict, however, has not always broken out along these lines, and the influence of locality is important in this regard as has been illustrated in the case studies in the previous chapter.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The research presented here began with a literature survey of the crowd. From this review it emerged that it was necessary to develop a theory and research methodology which: (i) was sensitive to the legitimacy of crowd violence rather than treating it as irrational and agitator led; (ii) would recognize that the targets the crowds identified and attacked were an indication of how discontent was experienced and interpreted locally; and (iii) would help to identify flashpoints and predisposing factors contributing to the outbreak of the violence.

However, a theory based solely on the above would still provide too general an explanation to allow for an understanding of the variance and specific character of recent 'unrest' in Durban. It was therefore necessary to make the theory and methodology spatially sensitive. Informed by Massey's (1978) analogy of social geologies which impact both horizontally (between localities and regions) and vertically (over time), a spatially sensitive approach was adopted. This was given explanatory power at two levels: firstly, by the identification of the type of relations existing between conflicting groups, ie, necessary relations and contingent conditions; and secondly, by the analysis of the contingent conditions present at several
reinforcing levels, from the structural through the political and cultural to the interactional.

The methodology employed involved the division of the research methodology into extensive and intensive components. The extensive component mainly involved the analysis of news reports on mass violence for the period, and this allowed for a general account of organization and protest throughout the period to be provided. Some broad conclusions were drawn on the intensity and spread of mass violence in the study area, and some of the issues around which people organized and protested were identified.

The news search also served to identify the case studies for further intensive analysis. The case studies included widely differing forms of mass violence – anti-state, racial/ethnic, and inter-ethnic – occurring in diverse spatial settings. It was found that spatially specific practices and histories informed the form and content of collective violence in particular instances. The presence of civic organizations in Lamontville contrasted with the vacuum of social organization in Inanda, and with the declining power of traditional leadership structures in Section 5.

It is relatively easy to identify the 'causes' or predisposing factors responsible for the outbreak of mass violence. These include:
(i) economic factors, for example, increased rents and bus fares, growing unemployment, deepening economic recession, relative deprivation, declining standards of living, etc;

(ii) political reasons such as insufficient and/or slow reform, unrepresentative and corrupt leadership imposed by state initiatives, state repression of popular organizations, etc;

(iii) civic factors such as educational inadequacies, lack of facilities and services in townships and other settlements; and

(iv) other material factors, most notably the lack of land for urbanization.

Identification of these 'reasons,' however, does little to help us understand why collective violence has taken specific forms in particular situations. Natal's recent experience of collective violence has largely been one of internecine violence. This has tended to destroy the potential for unity between ideologically distinct groups in Natal, as well as to throw progressive organizations into disarray.

While it has become popular to blame Inkatha for this, such a response still fails to answer an important question. Namely, why does Inkatha have the popular appeal it does amongst 'Zulus' in Natal? Part of the answer is due to coercion (both physical and civic), and the clientist nature
of Inkatha, that is, its ability to disburse rewards through its links with the Kwazulu government. But there is yet another reason, and this is related to the particular nature of the social base (population) in Natal. This social base is differentiated along class lines, urban-rural lines, racial/ethnic lines, and township-squatter lines.

Durban is the fastest growing city in South Africa, and is experiencing massive urbanization. This has resulted in overcrowding in the townships, the growth of new settlements, the mushrooming of existing settlements, and increasing pressure on available resources (land, water, employment, transport, education, and so on). With this growth in the 'squatter' population - resulting both from urban population growth and migration from rural areas in Natal/Kwazulu and Transkei - comes both competition for scarce resources and challenges to existing authority structures.

The existing authorities in African settlements in the region are generally tied into traditional/bantustan structures and as such are expressive of the ideology promoted by these structures. This ideology does have an appeal to many of the residents in both townships and informal settlements. When competition for limited resources emerges, especially if an appeal can be made to this ethnically defined consciousness, recourse to the more conservative elements of this consciousness is made (see for
example the quotes from the Mkanya and Mkize interviews in Chapter 4).

The situation in townships, however, is partially incongruous with that in informal settlements in the region. These township communities are more likely to have some experience of civic organizations. In the case of Lamontville, residents, when experiencing a crisis, responded in an organized fashion (mass meetings, media pressure, and pressure on authorities through liberal support groups). This organized resistance went through several 'stages' with different strategies employed as circumstances changed - see Reintges (1986) for a discussion of this. The assassination of a popular leader, however, prompted this organized resistance to develop into sustained violent confrontation.

To summarize the spatial variability in the selected occurrences of collective violence then, the key points are as follows.

In Lamontville the immediate issues were the fare and rental increases, which flowed into the threatened incorporation of Lamontville to Kwazulu. The spark which unleashed the violence was the assassination of a popular leader, and the violence took the form of youth and community versus police, with 'hit and run' tactics being adopted by youth/community.
In Inanda the issues were the ongoing removal of tenants from Indian land, the Africanization of the area, and the plans for 'upgrading' and incorporation into KwaZulu. The spark was the assassination of Victoria Mxenge, and the form of the violence was African-Indian conflict seemingly expressed as mob riots.

In Section 5 and Malukazi the issues were competition for scarce resources including land, water and employment, and political power struggles within the community. The spark was the murder of a 'Pondo' leader, and the violence took the form of 'Zulu-Pondo' factional conflict, with raids and counter raids taking place.

All these examples occurred against the backdrop of the state's reform-cum-repression tactics - WHAM (winning hearts and minds) and COIN (counter insurgency) strategies - as developed in the 1980s. Furthermore, they were all informed by a deepening economic recession leading to growing unemployment, as well as by the prevailing mood of rebellion in the country. However, in all cases protagonists 'responded' to these national and regional economic and political processes in ways specific to their distinctive contextual (socio-historical) and situational (spatial) experiences.

In all cases it is possible to identify conflict over land and the control of land as major material and political issues informing the conflict.
In Inanda a major influence informing the African-Indian conflict was the competition for land in this area between these groups dating back to the 1860s, and the relative economic and political deprivation of African tenants vis-à-vis Indians. This was reinforced by structural, political and cultural differences, and the predominant form of interaction between these two groups.

In Lamontville, it was the popularly perceived threat of loss of South African citizenship, being imposed by both the South African and Kwazulu governments which promoted the conflict.

In Section 5 a history of subsistence farming came under increasing threat by the development of industries nearby and migration of jobseekers into the area. 'Zulu' landholders rented land to these newcomers ('Pondos') who sought employment in the factories. These new settlers later came to be seen as 'stealing our jobs and land', and this relationship came to inform the 'Zulu-Pondo' conflict in the context of increasing pressure on the land.

Thus the land issue came to the fore in influencing the form of the violence, which, for two of the selected examples was internecine in nature. This raises some important points, namely, why did critical observers fail to anticipate the potential for such destructive violence, and why have they

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failed to come up with any suggestions for avoiding a repeat along the same lines as is evidenced in the Natal midlands - which has come to the forefront in the geography of 'unrest' from mid-1987 (Bennett and Quin, 1988:13,86)?

The different forms that mass violence took in the examples cited helps to illustrate the 'difference that space makes'. While structures, politics, and cultural phenomena influence the arrangements of social life in space, so too do past spatial forms of accumulation, administration, and civil society influence present social processes. Previous social arrangements at locality, regional and national scales have left their legacy in terms of still existing spatial forms, and these have come to influence present patterns of collective behaviour, including violence.

A few methodological points remain to be made. The different levels of analysis proposed by Waddington et al (1987) needed to incorporate an awareness of rebellion rather than simply an explanation of 'rioting' for which the model was developed. Thus a broader interpretation of the contextual (socio-historical), situational (spatial), and the interactional (flashpoint) levels was adopted in the present analysis. This meant giving more attention to the social histories of the areas concerned, and drawing attention to the spatial peculiarities of townships and 'squatter' settlements under apartheid spatial and social engineering.
It was also recognized that trigger events which sparked off the violence may have a delayed reaction. Thus they may inform reactions a few days later, rather than immediately. Examples are Victoria Mxenge's murder and the murder of the 'Pondo' chief in Malakazi. In both these cases violent reaction only erupted later, and not necessarily in the same locale as the 'trigger' event.

From a policy and research perspective, attention needs to be focused on the lack of representative authority structures in both the townships and 'informal' settlements. This is more severe in the 'informal' areas due to the lack of penetration of progressive organizations into the urban periphery. By comparison, many townships have had some experience of progressive organizations whether or not these are informally recognized by authorities. The presence of such organizations in Lamontville, and their effect on the form of mass protest and collective violence has already been mentioned. Much more research needs to be done on this topic.

Secondly, the degree of unity amongst oppressed classes/groups clearly needs more critical evaluation. The examples of Inanda and Section 5 illustrate the lack of unity between Africans and Indians, and 'Zulus' and 'Pondos' respectively. The absence of African-Indian unity on the ground may seem surprising given the high profile of many Indians in progressive organizations in Durban and
nationally. This lack of unity, however, reflects the interactional experiences of the majority of Africans in relation to Indians. Indians and Africans in Durban predominantly relate as employer-employee; supervisor-supervised; merchant-consumer; landlord-tenant; and as skilled-unskilled members of the labour force.

Lastly, further research is needed on the levels, rates, and most importantly on the processes of urbanization. Within informal settlements more research on the existing authority structures is required and the links - or absence of such links - between traditional authorities and shack/landlords, and those between shack/landlords and civic organizations are in need of closer scrutiny. About half of Durban's population is resident in informal settlements, and the ways in which the experiences and perceptions of residents of such areas influence collective behaviour, including violence, requires a major research effort.