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Table of Contents

1. Chapter One - Introduction  p.1
2. Chapter Two - Changing objective and subjective conditions which necessitated changes in South Africa's foreign policy from P.W. Botha to F.W. de Klerk  p.25
3. Chapter Three - The decision-making structures  p.54.
4. Chapter Four - South Africa's relations with the West  p.81
5. Chapter Five - South Africa's relations with the Eastern bloc countries  p.127.
6. Chapter Six - South Africa's relations with Southern Africa  p.156
7. Chapter Seven - Conclusion  p.185
8. Bibliography  p. 197
CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

As we stand at the point of shedding our pariah status and being welcomed back into the community of nations, there is an urgent need to evaluate our foreign policy from the bleak days of Mr P.W. Botha to the present optimism surrounding South Africa’s foreign policy under Mr F.W. de Klerk. The urgency to objectively assess the Republic’s present foreign policy is underlined by the momentous developments in the international arena such as Europe 1992, the shattering developments in Eastern Europe as well as "Afrostroika" - the winds of democracy blowing through the continent of Africa (The Sunday Times, 9 December 1990).

Although this study is a comparison of South Africa’s foreign policy as conducted in the eras of Mr P.W. Botha and Mr F.W. de Klerk, the emphasis is placed on Mr De Klerk’s foreign policy, using Mr Botha’s policy as a foil. The prime reason for my emphasis on foreign policy in the era of Mr F.W. de Klerk is due to the glut of literature on South Africa’s foreign policy from September 1978 to August 1989 - the P.W. Botha era; and, conversely the relative dearth of literature on South Africa’s foreign policy from September 1989 onwards - the De Klerk era.
The aim of this study is to provide a broad comparison of foreign policy as conducted in the eras of Mr Botha and Mr De Klerk, as well as to provide some indication where Mr De Klerk is leading the country on his present foreign policy course. As such this study must be seen as tentative and not definitive. Another factor which prevents one from engaging in more substantive issues has less to do with choice than with exigency. President De Klerk has been in office for slightly over two years. A concomitant of this has been a tremendous shortage of primary as well as secondary sources of information. This scarcity of information has to a large extent determined the structure of this paper as well as accounting for the fact that certain Chapters are longer or shorter than others.

This study is to be located within the broad parameters of the postmodernist school of enquiry, which leads to a wide and eclectic methodology, the justification for which follows.

**POSTMODERNISM**

The discipline of political science is characterized by various approaches to the study of politics from the traditional, classical, qualitative way of viewing politics with its strong emphasis on intuition to the more 'scientific' quantitative analysis of the behavioralists of the 1960s, and structuralist
approaches with its emphasis on dialectics, social class theory and historical materialism (Banks, 1985 : 17). International Relations is also characterized by a variety of theories such as Hans Morgenthau's power politics, Snyder's and Allison's decision-making theories, Ernst Haas' integration theory, Margaret Hermann's psychological theories. All these theories, to mention a few, have their positive as well as their negative points. All these partial theories [as well as their respective big brother grand theories] prove to be correct when applied to one set of conditions - yet when applied to a different set of conditions they prove to be less appropriate. This has placed students of international relations, in particular, in a dilemma of which theory or approach they should champion. Students may find certain aspects of a particular theory or approach attractive whilst they may reject other aspects. Faced with a rapidly changing international system, necessitating a re-evaluation of our existing theoretical approaches, students may wish to combine certain theories, modify some or totally reject others. The way out of this dilemma is to be found in the eclecticism which postmodernism represents.

Postmodernists believe that they should in no way subscribe to any foundational dogma of their own (Cohen, 1989 : 387; Ingram, 1987 : 286). Postmodernists believe, that given the complexity of our
contemporary world, no one theory or approach can be universally applied with total success (Isaac, 1989: 57). Postmodernism therefore seeks to combine in an eclectic and pragmatic way the best of all theoretical approaches (Rusen, 1985: 235; Hutchoon, 1989: 2). Given this eclecticism and its varied intellectual roots, postmodernism has been defined differently by its various proponents. However, there is a 'bottom-line' which all these proponents of postmodernism have in common, and this is captured in the definition given to postmodernism by the French neo-conservative philosopher Lyotard who stated: "Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodernism as incredulity towards metanarratives" (Isaac, 1989: 48). Rorty (1985: 161-162) states that these 'metanarratives' may be seen as any overarching or universal theoretical approach. Thus postmodernism stresses plurality and difference as opposed to the uniformity of modernism. However, the best way to understand what postmodernism is, or is not, is to briefly describe its historical development.

THE INTELLECTUAL ROOTS OF POSTMODERNISM

Some commentators see postmodernism's roots in such diverse followers as Marx, Wittgenstein and Heidegger (Cohen, 1989: 381). For example, Marx is seen to borrow in an eclectic way from idealist philosophers like
Hegel (the dialectic) to fuse with his materialist philosophy of history. Others see postmodernism as the direct result of disenchantment with the prevailing modernist credo and the crisis of twentieth-century civilization (Isaac, 1989). The real intellectual roots of postmodernism are to be found in this latter aspect.

The latter half of the eighteenth century saw the beginnings of modernism. Under the influence of the Enlightenment appeals to theological dogma were replaced by Science as the medium of truth. This scientific paradigm (positivism) initially developed in the context of the study of nature, was later extended to human nature and society (Norris, 1984 : 426; Jay, 1985 : 125). Hence, by the end of the eighteenth century, there were a number of proposals for a social science. Although different in many ways, these proposals shared two presuppositions. First, the aim of this social science was to achieve a "conceptual and analytical unity" by reducing the human and social domain to a limited number of general principles or "universal truths" regarding human nature (Isaac, 1989 : 48). Second, there was general agreement among the philosophers that the purpose of this social science was to act as a mechanism of social progress. It would serve to eliminate prejudices and ignorance, by revealing these universal truths about human nature, society and history, thereby enabling mankind to
create a rational social order in accordance with these general principles of history and nature (Bernstein, 1988: 407-408). This modernist project based upon discovering general principles was sustained from its inception to the present age - from Comte, Marx, Durkheim, Spencer, Weber, Pareto, Albion, to Small and Lester Ward (Seidman and Wagner, 1992: 4).

From around the mid-twentieth century this modernist approach has increasingly been challenged by various social theorists wearing the garb of postmodernism.

Postmodernists repudiated the all-totalizing, all-encompassing theories of the modernists, with its rational demand for unity, purity, universality and ultimacy (Cohen, 1989: 383; Ingram, 1987: 286). This repudiation was based upon two factors. First postmodernists like Albert Camus rejected the notion that man was endowed with a definitive human nature, hence displaying the futility of any such general theory regarding human behaviour (Isaac, 1989: 59-60). Following from this Sheldon Wolin (1985: 219) is of the opinion that, "... to represent society as an integrated 'system' composed of functionally interrelated parts is to distort empirical reality by reconstructing it in an ideal form". Second, postmodernists like Hannah Arendt saw the modernist totalitarian impulse towards
homogeneity and its attendance marginalization of sub-cultures as culminating in Stalin's Russia and Hitler's Germany. Hence Arendt states that ideologies generally, but specifically Stalinism and Nazism, "... are totalistic world views based upon a necessitarian logic ... Totality is a form of perfectionist politics premised upon the suppression of any and all human difference, dedicated with a murderous logic to the fabrication of uniformity" (Isaac, 1989 : 55). This was a damning criticism of modernism.

The modernist assertion that scientific knowledge is universal and value-free and can be justified in a non-contextual way, was also attacked. Postmodernists launched a 3-fold attack against these claims. First, Seidman and Wagner (1992 : 1) demonstrated that philosophic, moral and aesthetic factors play a role in all social enquiry. By demonstrating the social embeddedness of 'science' they challenged the scientificity of the positivists. They also questioned the claims of a value-neutral science given social research's dependence on private and public funding agencies as well as the personal whims, moods and predilections of human researchers (Seidman and Wagner, 1992 : 5). Linda Nicholson (1992) goes one step further by arguing that the standards of truth are context dependent by proving that the standards of European and Anglo-American social science are inextricably bound up with the culturally
specific presuppositions of Western modernity.

The twin ideas from the Enlightenment which modernism inherited, that of human reason and social progress, were debunked by developments in the twentieth century. The rise of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Spain and Stalinist Russia, the slaughter of six million Jews, the use of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the polarization of the world into two power blocs in the post-1945 period and the resultant nuclear arms race all made a mockery of the Enlightenment, and hence modernist, notions of human reason and social progress. Hence, Hannah Arendt, a German Jewess who suffered the horrors of a Nazi concentration camp, has the following to say, "The systematic and successful employment of deceit, and the frightening gullibility and acceptance of the masses, flew in the face of Enlightenment notions of human reason. The seemingly unproblematic identification of individuals with totalitarian regimes and their willing performance of genocidal acts, falsified any concept of a necessary human inclination toward freedom" (Isaac, 1989 : 53-54).

All these resulted in postmodernism championing heterogeneity and plurality over homogeneity; and eclecticism and pragmatism over dogma.
However, postmodernism itself, has been the object of great criticism, specifically from those who found their home in modernism.

Modernists criticize postmodernism on two levels. Firstly, the eclectic pragmatism of postmodernism has been attacked. Some modernists see postmodernism as deliberately vague (Rorty, 1985: 163). A response to this might be that it enhances its eclectic nature. However, such a response will not put the debate to rest since, following from this, modernists argue that the rejection of the project of a general theory means the abandonment of a strong program of analytical theorizing. However, I reject this criticism since it is obviously derived from a very superficial understanding of postmodernism. Postmodernism does not necessarily repudiate methodologically sophisticated and analytically informed social analysis but rather "... invokes a suspicion regarding claims that social enquiry can be grounded in some way that gives it a privileged epistemological status. Likewise, postmodernism does not necessarily repudiate generalizing analytical moves but rejects the modernist one of a totalizing, general theory or the quest for a unified social scientific paradigm" (Seidman and Wagner, 1992: 8).

Secondly, postmodernism is criticized for being "... distressingly abstract, idealistic and obscuring the practical involvements and struggles, the
material concerns and relations, which are equally constitutive of social
life" (Isaac, 1989 : 49). Thus modernists claim that postmodernists are
more involved in metaphysical discourse than in actual social problems.
However, this criticism is valid only to a certain extent when referring to
postmodernists like Rorty or Lyotard who are submerged in metaphysical
discourse. But, it is invalid when discussing postmodernists like Albert
Camus and Hannah Arendt who, as both individuals and through their
writings, were concerned about day-to-day real issues and sought to
improve the lot of man. Camus, for instance, played an instrumental role
in the French Resistance against the Nazi occupation, and Arendt, played
a key role in the formation of the state of Israel. Moreover, their theories
are not only based on metaphysical philosophy but in actual social
problems and the practical conditions on the ground (Isaac, 1989 : 49).

However, there is a compelling reason why we should adopt the
postmodern framework of analysis and this is related to our rapidly
changing international world order. The disappearance of our bipolar
world, the emergence of new power-centres, the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism, President Bush's "New World Order", the strong
emergence of environmental concerns like the depletion of the ozone
layer and the global threats of AIDS, all necessitate a re-examination of
our basic theoretical presuppositions of the world and our claims to have
the necessary conceptual tools with which to analyze it. In South Africa, the decline of apartheid, the emergence of a new "Southern African Order" and the novel way in which the De Klerk regime is responding to both opportunities and challenges in the conduct of its foreign policy demand a theoretical approach which is both pragmatic and eclectic. Such an approach is postmodernist.

The critique postmodernists levelled against the modernists is also a valid critique against the structuralist who shared ideas like human progress and all-encompassing universalistic general theories with the modernists. Certain writers put forward structural theory or Marxist theory or dependency theory to analyze South Africa's foreign policy given the semi-peripheral character of South Africa's economy within the world capitalist economy. These writers argue that South Africa like Nigeria occupies this semi-peripheral position and its primary objective is to exploit/underdevelop the states surrounding it for the benefit of its capitalist masters in the North. However, such structural approaches hold little water as I shall attempt to prove.

To begin with, the role Nigeria plays in West Africa or Brazil plays in South America or South Africa may be playing in Southern Africa to "underdevelop" its neighbours on behalf of its "Northern Masters" may be
just as easily explained, as Chan (1987: 143) correctly observes, by using the realist school of power as opposed to the social class theory of the dependentistas.

Another criticism to be levelled against structuralists is that they see the North as a single united bloc versus the South as a single united bloc. However, this is a fallacy. The North is far from united if one just takes the example of currency stabilization within the EC (i.e. the acrimony between Germany and Britain). The South too is disunited as Chan (1987: 97) observes, "The South has no unity except in its sense of desperation ...".

Structuralists have been also criticized because they see all aid as exploitative and cannot distinguish between the various types of aid (Tyler, 1984: 27). For example, there is official bilateral aid which functions on a government-to-government basis; multilateral aid, which is channelled through international agencies such as the World Bank and UN; and unofficial aid given by non-governmental agencies such as Oxfam, War on Want and Save the Children. While the former two may or may not be exploitative, the later is definitely not.

Norman Ehtherington (1987) meanwhile attacks the circularity in
argumentation in structuralist theories, stating, "Victims of underdevelopment were identified by their relative poverty which in turn was taken as proof of victimisation".

Another objection to structuralist theories is the mockery it makes of nationalist struggles for independence. Nationalists according to the dependentistas were not so much struggling for their independence as they were mere pawns/lackeys in a sophisticated sham to modify the appearance and personnel of formal rule, leaving the underlying apparatus of exploitation untouched (Chan, 1987: 140). These nationalists or the national bourgeoisie or comprador class were seen to act as agents for international capital in underdeveloping their respective "southern" countries on the periphery for the benefits of the "northern" metropolis. But historical evidence does not support dependency theory. In what way, for example, was Nkrumah or Nyerere or Mahatma Gandhi a comprador? Or for that matter, in what ways was Simon Bolivar, who one hundred years before the wave of African independence drove out the Spanish by force and military brilliance, a comprador? Moreover, as Chan (1987: 142) correctly observes, nationalist leaders in the south have been campaigning for changes in the world system since Bandung rather than aiding and abetting it for personal gain. Etherington (1987) on the other hand, proves that, "...neither the interference of any foreign state
nor a previous colonized status is necessary for a dependent relationship to rise. A view of dependency can be sustained quite adequately without the mechanism of a comprador class." It should be noted, however, that other theories, usually rooted in sociology exist to explain the behaviour of ruling elites in developing countries. While these may indicate an emulation of the lifestyle of former colonialists, they do not necessarily propose a linkage between elite lifestyle and international capitalism (Chan, 1987: 142).

Finally the international economic crises of the 1970s negated the notion that the north had structured the world economy for its own benefit. This truism had been admitted by some leading proponents of structural theories. André Gunder Frank said, "The usefulness of structuralist, dependence and new dependence theories of underdevelopment as guides to policy seems to have been undermined by the world crises of the 1970s" (Chan, 1987 : 143). Another former champion of structuralism, Colin Leys, has also recanted stating, "... it is becoming clear that underdevelopment and dependency theory are no longer serviceable and must now be transcended" (Chan, 1987 : 143).

Having analyzed structuralism broadly the paper will now engage in greater discourse of the weaknesses of specific structural theories and
why a more eclectic approach has been adopted.

Structuralism draws upon a heritage of classical theory. This includes the early Christian and humanist concerns with justice and the fate of the individual, the dialectics of Hegel, and above all the historical materialism of Marx, Engels and Lenin (Banks, 1985: 17). Though there are various structural schools, all are united in the common belief that some countries (or economies) are conditioned in their development by their dependence on other countries (or economies) and that this dependence is structural: the structure of the global economy which results in the enrichment of the North at the expense of the South.

Structuralism is not a single coherent body of thought; rather it consists of several strands. Whilst each of these strands are distinct from each other, they are also interrelated (Brown, 1985: 62). The three major strands or schools of structural thought are:

1. Dependencia;
2. Centre-Periphery analysis; and
3. World-System analysis

1. Dependencia

This school originated in Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s
under the intellectual leadership of Raul Prebisch, an Argentinean economist, and the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA).

Prebisch and the ECLA maintained that exploitation could be sustained without formal empire and political control. They also emphasised Latin America's role as an exporter of primary products and an importer of capital goods from the industrial world, much the same as in South Africa, and argued that the terms of trade were moving against primary products. In such a situation dependentistas argued, development takes place rather sluggishly, if at all. The ECLA's solution was import substitution industrialization (ISI). This policy consisted of the construction of an industrial base, behind tariff barriers, which would meet the internal need for manufactured goods.

However ISI failed to bring in the desired growth. Brown (1985: 63) gives several reasons which account for the failure of ISI as a developmental strategy. These are:

a. the internal market for consumer goods is too limited;
b. the nature of the demand is determined by elite tastes oriented to the products of the developed world;
c. ISI tended to be based on capital-intensive industries, which have low employment effects and therefore does little to create demand;  
d. it is based on imported capital goods, components and materials which, adversely affects the balance of payments; and  
e. it increases dependence on multinational capital and foreign technology.

What the above serves to demonstrate is that while the ECLA approach identifies the root of the problem as lying in the position of Latin American economies in the international division of labour, dependentistas fails to follow the logical implications of this position; leaving the Latin American economies still firmly tied to their unfavourable world status.

Perhaps, even more fundamentally, Brown (1985: 62) challenges the dependentista position that the terms of trade are actually moving against primary products. He notes, for instance, that while Prebisch and others of the ECLA school state that the terms of trade are unfavourable to primary products, they do not prove this to be so. After a survey of the literature, Brown concludes that the most that can be said regarding the relationship between primary products and the terms of trade is that the evidence is inconclusive.
2. Centre-Periphery analysis

This is a more radical version of dependencia. Two of its main proponents were Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin. Centre-periphery analysts add a number of features to the original model of the dependentistas. The key idea of Frank's and Amin's work is that of a "chain of exploitation linking centres and peripheries." The most common metaphor to explain this is that of a giant multi-headed octopus, with powerful tentacles sucking wealth from the weakened peripheries towards the powerful centres (Banks, 1985: 12). Hence in Frank's vision of the world, the capitalist world economy reaches the ends of the earth, with the chain of exploitation beginning in the villages of the Andes and reaching the corporate headquarters of New York and London.

Latin American countries do not develop, because this chain drains them of the resources they need for development. Indeed, according to Frank and Amin development and underdevelopment are two sides of the same coin: the core developed at the expense of the underdevelopment (read exploitation) of the periphery. For Frank, no limited "economistic" strategy will remedy this unfavourable state of affairs for the periphery. According to Frank, development in the periphery is only achievable via revolution and a "delinkage" from the world capitalist economy (Brown, 1985: 65).
Here one needs to pause and ask whether revolution and delinkage are practical solutions to the reality of the growing impoverishment of the periphery. The nation-state as Nye and Keohane (1972) point out is deeply penetrated economically, politically and socio-culturally. Asian dishes being served in a posh London restaurant; West African music permeating the sound-waves of a Parisian discotheque; the virtual internationalisation of Michael Jackson; Boeing; Toshiba; CNN; Coca-Cola and perhaps even Madonna are all testimony to this truism. The world is literally a global village and delinkage in such a situation is, to put it mildly, inconceivable.

However, a more devastating critique of the Frank-Samin position is put forward by Brown (1985: 66). While centre-periphery analysts outline the fact of exploitation they are unclear on explanation. The centre is not a capitalist employer of the periphery [although some of the capitalists of the centre may be via MNCs]. Therefore, exploitation cannot take place according to the normal route of "surplus value" as explained by Marx. How then does exploitation occur? Frank's answer is that exploitation [or the underdevelopment of the periphery] takes place through "unequal exchange." But, Brown asks what is unequal exchange given Marx's assumption that commodities exchange at their values. Frank, nor other centre-periphery analysts, have any answer to this central problem.
3. World-System analysis

The third variant of structuralism to be examined is termed "world-system analysis" and is focused on the work of Wallerstein. Wallerstein accepted much of what centre-periphery theorists like Frank and Amin had said but see this on a much wider global level.

Wallerstein insisted that any analysis of the present structure of the world economy must be based on a long-run study of the capitalist world economy seen as a totality. He puts forward the position that a world economy emerged in the sixteenth century, with the institutionalization of an international division of labour and the establishment of core, peripheral and semi-peripheral regions. The emergence of cores, peripheries and semi-peripheries is partly a function of state structures; strong states having the ability to structure the international division of labour to their own advantage, and partly a question of the form of labour control. Wage labour, Wallerstein argues, is characteristic of cores, share-cropping of semi-peripheries and forms of slavery and serfdom of peripheries. This three-fold pattern has persisted since the sixteenth century through a series of waves of contraction and expansion and a concurrent series of "hegemonies" as Portugal, Spain, Holland, Britain and the United States have in turn occupied the core role within the structure. This view of history however has been criticized by Anderson
(1978: 207) for being oversimplified and incorrect. Anderson, for instance, points out that from the sixteenth century to the present all three forms of labour control coexisted, in varying degrees, in core, periphery and semi-periphery.

Moreover, Wallerstein insists that the international political system and international economic system are two ways of looking at the same thing. Equally, he argues, that such categories as "class", "nation," "race," and "ethnic group" are again different ways of viewing the same phenomena: namely divisions created by the structuring of the world system. This gives a considerable degree of coherence to Wallerstein's analysis, albeit making him argue a rather "... mechanistic view of the world in which dominant groups alter their strategies in response to changes in the system in seemingly implausibly neat ways." (Brown, 1985: 68).

Wallerstein's work has drawn criticism from other quarters as well. Tilly (1975) and Anderson (1979) found that Wallerstein's historical generalizations were not only methodologically weak but also historically inaccurate. This is taken up by Brown (1985: 69-70) who mounts a further attack on Wallerstein's thesis. Brown argues that even a cursory glance at the last twenty years statistics will indicate that real living standards in the third World have grown in general at rates that are historically quite
impressive. He argues that despite the recent stagnation in the world economy - which has affected both rich and poor states - development has taken place. Structuralists might argue that much of the growth has been wiped out by population explosion and maladministration, and that the gap between rich and poor remains, and often is increasing - but they cannot argue that the dependent status of Third World countries has prevented development.

Second, Brown takes exception to the "fatalism" which characterises the work of Wallerstein: that developing countries, irrespective of the policy they pursue, are conditioned to remain in the shadows of the rich. Policy, he proves, does matter. This is particularly true of East Asia.

Third, Brown notes that while many small developing countries will inevitably find their prospects determined from the outside - is this the position of a small country "dominated" [in the classic realpolitik sense] by a larger country, or a small less-developed country "dependent" [in the structuralist sense] on a large developed country? Or is there a difference between the two?

In the last resort dependency is more convincing as a critique of naive developmentalism than as a substantive alternative view of the world. The
inherent flaws within structuralism prevents me from adopting it as an adequate framework to explain change and continuity in South African foreign policy. Once more an eclectic approach is, in my opinion, the most fruitful vehicle of conducting social science research.

Finally, one more point needs to be made regarding the theoretical approach of postmodernism. The inherent eclecticism of postmodernism has resulted in my adopting several theories in the course of the thesis which can be classified as definitely not postmodern. For example, in Chapter Three the behaviouralist decision-making framework is adopted. However no contradiction is seen since postmodernism, as has been noted above, is not so much a rigid theoretical paradigm as a way of viewing phenomena. Its eclecticism allows one to pick and choose a specific theoretical framework to suit the case at hand. Thus the behaviouralist decision-making framework has been utilized in the discussion of the decision-making processes in the P.W. Botha and F.W. de Klerk eras. In this it is good to remember the words of James N. Rosenau who stated that, "No existing paradigm in itself seems adequate to the study of international relations theory in the late twentieth century..." (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1982: 544).

In Chapter Two, we will seek to understand the reasons for a drastic
change in South Africa’s foreign policy around 1988 by analysing both objective and subjective factors which necessitated this change. Chapter Three will seek to understand how the decision-making process affected both the quality and the nature of the decisions arrived at in the Botha and De Klerk eras. In Chapters Four, Five and Six we will attempt to see just how much the foreign policy of Mr P.W. Botha had in common with that of his successor - Mr F.W. de Klerk.

This study will also attempt to provide some indication where Mr de Klerk is leading the Republic to on his present foreign policy course.
CHAPTER TWO

2. CHANGING OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE CONDITIONS WHICH NECESSITATED CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY FROM PW BOTHA TO F.W. DE KLERSK

THE CONCEPT OF CHANGE IN FOREIGN POLICY

The concept of change is a highly contentious issue amongst foreign policy analysts, with each analyst proposing a theory of change which is to a greater or lesser extent universalistic thus falling within the modernist paradigm (McGowan, 1990: 7).

Theorists like Amitai Etzioni (1969) see change as primarily the result of a "spill-over effect", where developments in one country have a spill-over effect on another country. For example, some commentators argue that the political democratization of the Soviet Union under Mr Gorbachev from 1985 (perestroika and glasnost) proved to be the inspiration for the students in Red China to demand an end to authoritarianism in Tiannamen Square. Other theorists such as Pruitt (1969: 392) also see change primarily as the result of external influence. However, such theories must be rejected since, when we assess the changes in South African foreign policy, we will see it is both the product of external as well
as internal (domestic) factors. Still other writers postulate that change occurs when "... people generally, and the leadership in particular, share a future-oriented viewpoint and the perception that the future is shaped by human plans" (McClelland, 1966: 34). However, such an analysis is severely limited in that people, generally, and the leadership in particular, do not operate in vacuums (McGowan, 1990: 7).

More recent theorists like Holsti (1983: 87), in an effort to move away from such monocausal explanations of change, prefer a multicausal approach. For example, in his analysis of sources of change in the global system, he lists nine sources of change. These are the growth in ethnic nationalism, an increase in the number of small weak states, the development of Red China's economic and military strength, the depletion of scarce resources by industrialized countries, the growth of important nonstate actors, the growth of Brazil as a major power, revolutionary ideas and technological developments, nuclear proliferation, and the growing collaboration of developing countries who demand the reform of the international economic system.

However, even adopting such a multicausal approach is far from satisfactory. Some students of international relations may be dissatisfied with the fact that the issue of population dynamics has not been
addressed. Others may feel that the role of developing countries has no power to change the global status quo; that reform of the international economic system does not constitute a source of change. They would argue that collaboration amongst a group of weak states, simply constitutes a union of weak states with little or no power to change the status quo. Rosenau (1991: 58) in his analysis of change in the USSR sees change as the result of 'new technologies, institutions and social structures'. However, other theorists may argue that the role of personality is neglected (i.e. having a Gorbachev or Yeltsin in power as opposed to a Brezhnev). This multicausal approach is also evident in the work of Hermann (1990: 3) who sees change as the result of four change agents. These are leader driven [change results from the determined efforts of an authoritative policy-maker]; bureaucratic advocacy [where a group within the government becomes an advocate for change]; domestic restructuring [where elites with power to legitimate the government either change their views or themselves alter in composition]; and external shock [which are sources of foreign policy change that result from dramatic international events]. But this viewpoint proves to be somewhat myopic when applied to the South African context, since several sources of change are unexplained - economics and public opinion, to name but two. For instance, the fact that the South African economy could not afford the war in Angola, which was costing R4 billion a year by mid-1988
was a powerful motivation to pulling out of Angola. Likewise, the force of public opinion, black and white, [to be discussed later] placed powerful constraints on the decision-making process, limiting the options available to policy-makers.

What all this serves to demonstrate is that:

i. a theory of change can, at best, be only a very broad guideline with which to equip us to understand change generally;

ii. no theory of change can realistically come to grips with the plethora of variables involved in any act of change; and

iii. each area of change is ultimately unique (though it may have parallels elsewhere) and therefore must be studied independently.

This study, therefore adopts a more descriptive approach to study the dramatic changes which have taken place in South African foreign policy, because a postmodernist mode would maintain that no broad, overarching theory can be used effectively in the South African context given its unique character.

REASONS FOR THE SHIFT IN SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY

During May 1988, a South African delegation travelled to London to begin the first round of negotiations concerning Angola and the implementation
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 regarding Namibian independence. Present were officials from Cuba, Angola and the United States. The result of those deliberations was an agreement concerning the withdrawal of South African Defence Force (SADF) troops from Angola. This withdrawal of SADF troops was completed on the 30 August 1988. Following hot on the heels of the London agreement were the Brazzaville and New York Accords (signed on 13 and 22 December respectively), which provided for a Cuban withdrawal from Angola in phases, and for Namibia to begin its transition to independence in accordance with Resolution 435. In 1988 President Botha and President Chissano of Mozambique attempted to revive the stalled Nkomati Accord. In September 1988, President Botha paid official visits to Mozambique, Malawi and Zaire, in an effort to convene a multilateral security summit consisting of all the states of Southern Africa. In the same month an agreement was signed by Portugal, Mozambique and South Africa binding them to repair the Cahora Bassa powerlines which was sabotaged by the Mozambician rebel movement Renamo, also known as the MNR (Davies, 1989: 167-168).

This period of detente immediately followed a period in which the Botha Administration actively destabilized its neighbouring states and challenged the nations of the world to "do their damnedest" to break the South
African state. Thus 1988 signified a turning point in South Africa's foreign policy, and more specifically its regional relations with the Frontline States (FLS). But what were the reasons for this sudden change from aggression to cooperation? It is this fundamental question which this Chapter attempts to answer.

It is contended that this shift in South Africa's foreign policy must be sought in both the objective conditions on the ground as well as in the personalities of key decision-makers i.e. the subjective factor.

**ECONOMICS**

One of the major reasons for this shift in policy relates to economics.

South Africa is 50-60% an open economy with more than half of the country's Gross National Product (GNP) dependent upon trade with the West. Being such an open economy SA is very vulnerable to trade boycotts, sanctions or disinvestment (Razis, 1986: 12). Hence we can conclude that the fact that 90% of SA’s merchandise exports were subjected to sanctions of one kind or another, and that one hundred states applied restrictions on trade with the Republic, did not do wonders for the economy (Geldenhuys, 1989: 93) Neither was the country’s rising inflation rate and stagnating growth rate helped by the R18 billion in
private capital disinvestment in South Africa between 1986 - 1988 (Moorcraft, 1990 : 25). The fact that sanctions were beginning to hurt the apartheid regime and were clearly perceived to be hurting the state was demonstrated in a South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) survey of white public opinion in 1988 which showed that 46,5% of respondents agreed to the statement that sanctions hurt SA's economy (Du Pisani, 1988 : 35). Sanctions and disinvestment were perceived by senior government officials to be hurting the economy, and they were a powerful motivational force in causing the apartheid state to adopt a less aggressive foreign policy. Foreign Minister Pik Botha, in particular, publicly declared several times that the only way out of the Republic's international isolation was through domestic reform. In addition, they precipitated the tasks of domestic reform as "borne out in the following statement by President De Klerk, "We realise that credible constitutional reform has a very important role to play in creating a climate which will be conducive to private investment, to the normalisation of South Africa's international economic relations, and to the development of a strong economy" (Address by Mr F.W. De Klerk, State President, to the Financial Mail Conference on Investment in 1990, Johannesburg, 6 October 1989 : 3).

The need for South Africa's domestic and foreign policy change at the
height of the international community's economic pressure against South Africa, is also illustrated by the fact that the South African economy needs to export in order to achieve the projected (and rather idealistic) 4,5% growth rate required to fulfil the basic needs of its 29,65 million population (Barber and Barrat, 1990 : 345; Address by Mr F.W. De Klerk, State President, to the Financial Mail Conference on Investment in 1990, Johannesburg, 6 October 1989).

The fact that a hundred countries officially restricted trade with the Republic for political reasons, meant that several export markets were closed to South Africa, which contributed to an adverse growth rate in the South African economy. It was also hoped that the capital generated from increased exports would help to service the country's massive foreign debt of US$22,6 billion (Cammack, 1989 : 201). A decline in exports is translated as a decline in capital which means further impoverishment for the South African people. This impoverishment is reflected in the fact that the Republic in 1988 had a per capita GNP of only $2 000 which places the country among the poorer half of the nations of the world (Jaster, 1988 : 13).

Yet another reason for South Africa to bow to international pressure to mend its ways both domestically and in its foreign policy was the fear of
the economic might and political clout such regional power blocs as Europe in 1992 have in comparison to the balkanised nations of the Third World and specifically southern Africa (Address by Minister R.F. Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Africa Institute, Pretoria, 30 October 1990). This is clearly brought out in Mr Pik Botha's speech to parliament in which he proposes closer regional cooperation in southern Africa: "The world is therefore entering a very interesting period, with the four or five major power groupings of the future competing with one another. We in SA must keep our eyes open. There are major dangers inherent in their agreeing to oppose us, but there are also great challenges and benefits for us, in terms of our African position, in being able to form our own grouping, which does not compete with them, but which they will have to take note of. That must be our goal. That is specifically why I am seeking a summit conference of all the leaders of Southern Africa" (Hansard, 1989 : col. 7560).

Yet another economic constraint, which necessitated a re-think by Pretoria's strategists was the economic costs of destabilization. In 1984 it was estimated that the economic cost of killing each SWAPO insurgent was over R1,7 million (Grundy, 1988 : 93) and as mentioned above, by mid-1988 it was estimated that the war in Angola was already costing R4 billion a year and that any escalation would have placed an " ...
intolerable burden on an economy, already running out of steam" (Davies, 1989 : 173). Thus by 1988 Pretoria's decision makers realised that the economic costs of its militarism far outweighed any benefits which may have derived from it.

**MILITARY FACTORS**

Another important factor which necessitated a change in the Republic's foreign policy was the significant military reverses its security forces received on both the conventional and unconventional levels. In addition, the morale of SADF troops was low, and proxy groups such as Renamo and Unita were considered unreliable.

Towards the end of 1982, Angolan military commanders reflected upon the success of previous South African military campaigns and their dismal failures. This reflection resulted in a stronger Angolan army with emphasis on both increased speed and firepower. Aerial defence was stressed, and one found surface-to-air- missiles (SAMS), ringing strategic sites. Control of the skies was regarded as paramount in order to provide air cover for ground assaults. Hence by 1986 Angola had nearly a hundred Soviet fighter aircraft, including advance MG-23 fighter interceptors, as well as 125 helicopter gunships received from France and the USSR. Angolan ground forces were also beefed up with Soviet T-54
tanks. As early as 1983 these changes in Angola's army and air force began to pay off. A South African helicopter was shot down in May 1983 by a SAM in Southern Angola resulting in the loss of 15 SADF personnel. In December 1983, a further 21 SADF soldiers, lost their lives at the battle of Cuvelai when Angolan T-54 tanks counter-attacked an SADF armoured column (Jaster, 1988: 96).

One of the major reasons for the SADF reversal on the military front was the fact that its equipment was technologically inferior, partly the result of the arms embargo. Faced with up-to-date Soviet military technology brought onto the battlefield by the Cubans, the SADF rapidly lost the air superiority it had previously relied upon. This loss of air superiority was the single most important reason for the SADF defeat at Cuito Cuanavale (Davies, 1989: 173; Ohlson, 1989: 1982). Seen in broader terms, however the battle at Cuito Cuanavale must be seen as a stalemate. The South Africans could not wrest control of the city from Cuban and MPLA hands; but the MPLA, together with their Cuban allies, could not exploit their military advantage and push the SADF and their UNITA allies over the border into Namibia. This strategic balance, one may argue, was partly a reflection of the thaw in the Cold War and the common understanding of the superpowers that they wished to extricate themselves from regional conflicts. The United States stopped sending
consignments of Stinger missiles and other sophisticated weaponry to UNITA, and via UNITA, to the SADF. On the other hand, the Soviet Union refused a request by the Cuban and Angolan forces for MIG-29s (Interview with Dr. Vladimir Shubin, who was at the time the head of the Africa desk of the Politburo of the CCCP, 28-02-94).

But it was not only on the level of conventional warfare that the South Africans received setbacks. South Africa also received setbacks on its more covert "hit-and-run" commando raids. For example, in January 1988 a whole network of suspected South African agents were captured after a bomb blast at an alleged ANC residence in Bulawayo. 17 People were detained after this bomb blast and three (Kevin Woods, Micahel Smith and Philip Conjwayo) were later sentenced to death for murder (The Sunday Times, 3 September 1989 : 15; Davies, 1989 : 175). In Botswana two members of the SADF were captured and sentenced to ten years imprisonment after a bungled raid on Gaborone. Neither, were South African backed dissident movements such as Renamo doing any better. At the beginning of 1988, Frelimo government forces together with troops from Tanzania and Zimbabwe managed to push Renamo back and away from Maputo and the Beira corridor (Davies, 1989 : 173-175).

Furthermore, South Africa’s international pariah status tended to be
further entrenched in the eyes of the international community by the atrocities committed by its surrogate forces. The massacres of innocent civilians committed by Renamo at Homoine, Manjacaze, Taninga and Molwana tended to be very costly diplomatically to South Africa. In April 1988 an emergency aid donor's conference was held in Maputo and Roy Stacey, US deputy assistant Secretary of State accused the MNR of "...one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since World War Two" (*The Weekly Mail*, 05-12 May 1988 : 4). South Africa, by virtue of its support of the bandit movement, was implicated by the MNR and this reinforced calls in the West, and particularly in the US, that South Africa be declared a 'terrorist state' (Jaster, 1988 : 157).

The advantage of South Africa's support for movements like Renamo in Mozambique, Unita in Angola, The Lesotho Liberation Army in Lesotho, the 'Super-Zapu' in Zimbabwe, and the Mashala gang in Zambia, is that they are relatively low cost, low risk tools of foreign policy. However, the negative side of the coin is that they have the potential to become "...Frankenstein monsters with political minds of their own" (Grundy, 1988 : 127). The leader of Renamo, Alfonso Dhlakama certainly fits this latter category and he has given Pretoria more than a headache (this will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter Six).
The final factor accounting for South Africa's weakening iron fist was the weakening morale amongst SADF personnel. Stories of desertion, mutinies and unrest among and between battalions abound. For example, in November 1987 400 members of the South West Africa Territorial Force's (SWATF's) 101 Battalion had mutinied and refused to serve in Angola. There were also reports of unrest in three other SADF units (Jaster, 1988: 102; Callinicos, 1988: 189). The fact that a large number of young white males do not relish the prospect of conscription is clearly illustrated in that between 1978 and 1982 close to 5181 people were prosecuted for not reporting for military service. Hundreds of others had gone into exile in an effort to avoid conscription (Davies, et al, 1988: 186). Thus military weakness was a further factor forcing South Africa to find a diplomatic as opposed to a military solution to its security problems.

Moreover, to give this quest for a diplomatic as opposed to a military solution for the Republic's security dilemma added impetus, one found white public opinion also questioning the utility of wars in Angola and Namibia at about this time. For instance, in 1987 a British Broadcasting Corporation survey revealed that 51.6% of white South Africans were against the war in South West Africa/Namibia and wanted its peaceful settlement (BBC World Service, Transcript dated 4 December 1987).
RAPPROACHMENT BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS

The harmonisation of US-Soviet relations and the fact that both superpowers were prepared to put pressure on their respective allies to accept compromises which would result in the restablisation of the various regions of the world, was an added incentive for the South African regime to change the coercive nature of its foreign policy and the repressive nature of its domestic structures (Moss, 1989 : 164).

The fact that the Soviet Union was trying to extricate itself from costly regional conflicts, rendered the "Total Onslaught" theory archaic, and this in turn necessitated a more realistic foreign policy (Friedman and Narsoo, 1989 : 3; Nel, 1990 : 6). The "total onslaught" was the conceptual paradigm which members of the Botha Administration used to analyse the world. According to this paradigm there was a Kremlin-hatched plot to destroy the present status quo in South Africa. This plot would replace the present government with a black-dominated Communist government which would simply be a satellite of Moscow. According to the "total onslaught" theory organisations like the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) were simply agents of the 'Red Bear'. Furthermore, western governments who applied sanctions against South Africa were perceived to be ignorantly playing into the hands of the Soviet Union. Moreover, various Frontline States
hostile to South Africa, were also seen as satellites of Moscow, and this was used to justify the arbitrary action taken by Pretoria against them.

With the coming of Mr Mikhail Gorbachev, and the policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring), South African decision-makers were placed in a quandry, since the total onslaught was rendered superfluous. No more could draconian apartheid legislation be justified with reference to a hostile and communist Soviet Union contemplating imperialist designs on South Africa. No longer could South Africa justify its military incursions into the Frontline States (FLS) as the Republic striking a blow for free enterprise and democracy against the pro-Soviet, pro-Communist dictatorships in African countries. More importantly too, South Africa's relevance as the world's largest supplier of strategic minerals had declined. The Soviet Union shares several sources of minerals with South Africa. A reforming Soviet Union found that several markets which were closed to her previously were now opening to her, and she is making use of the opportunity to sell her primary products in order to generate much needed capital for the declining Soviet economy (see Chapter 5 for details). Pretoria's decision-makers were afraid that the decline of the country's relative place in the world economy might mean that South Africa could no longer count on Western support and protection from calls to isolate the apartheid state. This was a further
'push' factor which accounted for a change in South Africa's foreign policy.

THE INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC OPINION

The affect of public opinion on the formation of foreign policy is contentious. Stephen Chan (1987: 45) maintains that public opinion only has a limited impact on foreign policy, stating that "... the mobilisation of public outcry is laborious and often unsuccessful. Even over Vietnam, public protest was only one factor among others in the minds of policy-makers". However, other writers such as Deon Geldenhuys (1984: 29) believe that the public cannot be ignored as a factor in the formulation of South African foreign policy. Geldenhuys talks of a foreign policy 'mood' held by members of the public which prescribes limitations on the alternatives available for Pretoria's policy-makers. In the course of this study, this researcher found that the latter view more appropriate. For example, P.W. Botha was notorious for avoiding any foreign policy moves which might cost him domestic political support from the white electorate (Jaster, 1988: 3). However, by 1988 certain changes in this 'mood' of white public opinion, was yet another factor which caused the government to rethink its foreign policy. In 1988, for instance, a South African Institute of International Affairs survey of white public opinion illustrated that 46.5% of whites believed that sanctions hurt the South African
economy; 57% were in favour of the government reaching a negotiated settlement over the thorny issue of Namibian independence even if this meant engaging in dialogue with SWAPO; and 70.7% of respondents were against increased government military expenditure (du Pisani, 1988: 19-35). This change of 'mood' amongst whites can also be seen in the phenomenal growth of the End Conscription Campaign (ECC). The ECC was launched in later 1983. By 1986 it had grown into a national umbrella body representing over 50 organisations and had branches across the Republic. According to Evans and Phillips (1988: 134-135) the rapid growth of the ECC reflected the "...growing discontent within the white community with the system of conscription and the role of the SADF ...".

This shift in white public opinion has been immense, if one has but to compare it to an earlier survey conducted just four years earlier, also by the South African Institute of International Affairs. The 1984 survey found that 79.9% of white South Africans believed that the communist threat against South Africa was a very real one; 62.2% maintained that the government of Zimbabwe constituted a threat to South Africa's security; 81.6% believed South Africa should conduct military attacks against 'terrorist' bases in neighbouring states; 68.4% agreed with the idea that South Africa should not export food to states in the region who are either
hostile to South Africa and/or harbour ‘terrorists’; and a staggering 75% of respondents believed that a terrorist war like that in South West Africa/Namibia will develop in time in South Africa (Geldenhuys, 1984: 7-17).

What accounted for the shift from this bellicose attitude to a more tempered view? Various reasons could be put forward to account for this change. First, it could be argued that the total onslaught paradigm with its attendant ‘Rooi Gevaar’ increasingly lost its credibility in a world which was witnessing a thaw in the cold war and in which glasnost and perestroika were part of a new discourse. Second, the time lapse between the 1984 and 1988 surveys saw an improvement, from the perspective of white South Africans, of the internal situation. The 1984-1986 mass uprisings was but a bad memory. Finally, on the regional level things appeared to be looking brighter. The new president of Mozambique - Joaquim Chissano - appeared to be a far moderate leader than his predecessor, Samora Machel and seemed intent to forge better relations with South Africa. Lesotho, too, under Major-General Justice Lekhanya, sought closer ties with the Republic. Lekhanya, it seemed did not wish to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor, Chief Leabua Jonathan, and challenge Pretoria. (For more details on the changed regional situation see chapter six).
However, it was not only white public opinion which affected the process of foreign policy formulation. Black public opinion also affected the process of policy-making, albeit in a more indirect way since they did not have the franchise. Black public opinion may be articulated in mass popular uprisings, such as the 1984-1986 uprisings, which caused the government to make major concessions. These concessions included the repeal of the mixed marriages act and the recognition of the legal right to form trade unions. Furthermore black public opinion, as articulated by organisations such as the ANC and PAC, internationalise the Pretoria regime's racial policies and in so doing helped to isolate the Republic. This was largely done by arms embargoes; foreign disinvestment and divestment; sanctions; cultural, scientific and educational exchanges; and minimizing diplomatic contact with the apartheid state (Geldenhuys, 1984: 29). The ANC, in particular, by means of its small, but competent, staff in its diplomatic offices in 22 countries, actually assisted in the establishment of lobbies in their respective guest countries to pressurise the respective governments to isolate the Republic (Lodge, 1988: 232). For example, the British Anti-Apartheid movement, the oldest and largest of the anti-apartheid groupings, was initiated by ANC exiles in London. In the United States action undertaken against Pretoria was the result of three factors. First, it was the result of American, especially Afro-American, public opinion.
These groups transformed themselves into powerful lobbies who pressurized senators and congressmen to pass various anti-apartheid legislations. Second, the growth of these interest groups were fuelled by the power of mass media which nearly daily bombarded the American living room with the cries of the victims of apartheid. Finally, the efficiency and organization of the liberation movements, but especially the ANC, in getting their message across in an unambiguous way to the American public also assisted in this process. Thus movements like the ANC and PAC helped to shape South Africa's external milieu within which her foreign policy has to be conducted. Given the success in their drive to isolate the Republic, black public opinion became increasingly a factor which could not be ignored by the regime.

THE ROLE OF PERSONALITY IN THE FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

The role personality plays in the formulation of foreign policy is one of the most underrated factors in the academic literature (Davies, 1989). Personality, is in my view, one of the most important factors to account for the change in the Republic’s foreign policy in the P.W. Botha and F.W. de Klerk eras. After all, irrespective of the objective reality [be it sanctions, domestic uprisings, military defeat] it is the leader’s perception of that reality that matters. For instance,
Adolf Hitler was still talking of a thousand-year Reich even after he heard that the Allied forces were on the outskirts of Berlin. On the other hand, Emperor Hirohito authorized the signing of the Japanese surrender after Hiroshima and Nagasaki but before any Allied troops had set foot on Japanese soil. Thus it is not the objective factors which really matters but the interpretation given to it by individual leaders.

Evidence to support my viewpoint is given by Holsti who engaged in case studies of eight nations who changed their foreign policy alignment [through shifts in isolation, self-reliance, dependence, or diversification]. Among the various foreign and internal sources of explanation Holsti considered, only one factor was regarded as a powerful explanation of change in seven out of the eight case studies: the variables of personality and perception. In the eighth case this factor was judged to have been somewhat less powerful, but was still rated a "moderately significant explanation" (Hermann, 1990: 8). The next most frequently cited source - non-military threats - was noted as a powerful explanation in only four of the eight cases.

It is a truism that the higher one goes up the hierarchy of any
organisation, the less structural constraints are placed on individual
decision-makers. As such one finds key decision-makers relatively
free from structural constraints. It is here that these personality
traits play a vital role when leading policy-makers are relatively free
to start acting on their 'hunches', on their personal likes and
dislikes.

Margaret Hermann, a political psychologist analysed the influence
of a leaders personality on foreign policy decisions and she arrived
at the following conclusions:

1. "The more general interests the head of state has in foreign
   policy the more likely his personality characteristics are to
   affect foreign policy.

2. The more dramatic are the means of assuming power, the
   more likely the personality characteristics of the head of state
   are to affect foreign policy behaviour.

3. The more charismatic is the head of state, the more likely his
   personality characteristics are to effect foreign policy
   behaviour.
4. The more authority a head of state has over foreign policy, the more likely his personality characteristics are to affect foreign policy behaviour.

5. The more crisis-like is the national situation the more likely the personality characteristics of the head of state are to affect foreign policy behaviour” (Hermann, 1976 : 328-329).

If we are to apply the above set of criteria to Mr Botha and Mr De Klerk’s rule we will certainly arrive at the conclusion that they both exercised tremendous influence over the foreign policy-making process given the fact that the above set of principles can be seen to be active to a greater or lesser extent in both their periods.

Mr Botha and Mr De Klerk assumed power in a dramatic way. Mr Botha, assumed power after the dramatic revelations concerning the Information Scandal of 1977/78. This scandal effectively destroyed the political careers of Mr John Vorster, Mr Connie Mulder and General van den Bergh and paved the way for him. Mr De Klerk assumed power in a way which many observers describe as an intra-party coup, which resulted in the enforced resignation of Mr. Botha.
The third point, that of the charisma of the leadership, seems to be more appropriate in the case of Mr De Klerk than Mr Botha. This is clearly brought out in their handling of the media. While Mr Botha was noted for his belligerent style (especially with the foreign media) and defensive manner, Mr De Klerk is noted for his open manner and friendly style (*The Sunday Times*, 14 January 1990).

Concerning the authority each leader had, one can come to the conclusion that both leaders had a tremendous degree of authority as head of state (this will be discussed further in a subsequent chapter).

Finally, both leaders faced a crisis-like situation. Sanctions, disinvestment and isolation on the international front; economic stagnation and political unrest on the domestic front.

Having determined that the personal characteristics of both Mr P.W. Botha and Mr F.W. De Klerk affected foreign policy decisions, one must ask what were the personalities of both these policy-makers.

Mr Botha was noted for his predisposition for order and was noted to be an 'organisation man'. This was soon to result in the establishment of the National Security Management System (to be discussed in a later
Mr Botha was strongly anti-communist. He was known to have a distinct threat perception, according to which South Africa stood alone in the face of a communist onslaught. South Africa, he believed, could not count on outside (especially Western) support, since they were either ignorant of the threat, or apathetic (Geldenhuys, 1984: 72-89). On a more negative note Mr Botha was nicknamed 'Pangaman' (Axeman) by his cabinet colleagues. He was found to make rash decisions in fits of temper (Geldenhuys, 1984: 45). Hence Mr Botha was notorious for repeatedly challenging the outside world, and stubbornly refusing to give in to international demands for domestic reforms. This mood of defiance was clearly evident in his infamous Rubicon speech in August 1985.

Mr De Klerk, on the other hand, is noted for his rationalism, openmindedness, and charm. He is known to listen to his fellow colleagues in the cabinet before acting. Mr De Klerk is known above all for being a pragmatist and his pragmatism was clearly displayed in his speech to the Joint Session of Parliament on the 7 June 1990.

"We cannot live in isolation from the rest of the world. We need foreign trade and investment. We need technological, cultural and sporting interaction with other countries ... We cannot stop the world and get off as some people in South Africa would like us to do. Nor can we turn the
clock back and take refuge in the past. Whether we like it or not, we
must wrestle also with the international realities of the present and secure
for our country its rightful place in the community of nations" (Speech by
Mr F.W. De Klerk, State President : Joint Session of Parliament, 7 June
1990).

Furthermore, Mr De Klerk comes across as a very sincere man. For
example, after his meeting with Mr De Klerk, President Kaunda of Zambia
described him as "...an honest and sincere man" (The Sunday Times, 22
October 1989 : 17). This positive reaction is in sharp contrast to the
unfavourable reaction of FLS to the 'double-dealing; double-talking' of the
members of the Botha Administration. Thus South Africa's foreign policy
during the Botha era suffered from a credibility crisis. This credibility
 crisis exists where there is a gap between promise and performance
(Geldenhuys, 1989:92). A classic example of this is where, for instance,
President Botha, signing the Nkomati Accord, pledged himself and his
government to cease their support of the MNR. A year later, however,
the Gorongosa Diaries (which were the diaries kept by an MNR
commander listing South African assistance to Renamo), revealed that
South African aid to Renamo had continued after the signing of the
Accord (Davies, 1989 : 168). All this helped to create the idea that Mr
Botha's word meant nothing, and inhibited a positive dialogue with the
Pretoria regime. The same cannot be said of the De Klerk Administration which suffers from far less of a credibility gap, given its strong strong reformist initiatives.

Furthermore, while the various pressures, mentioned earlier in this chapter, were instrumental in converting Mr Botha to accept a less bellicose foreign policy, these pressures were perceived by the outside world, and the FLS in particular, to be instrumental in forcing a major about-turn in South Africa's foreign policy. Mr De Klerk, while subject to the same pressures, was also seen to be motivated by a very genuine desire on his part for a more cooperative and less conflictual foreign policy, and a more just order inside South Africa (The Sunday Times, 22 October 1989).

Mr Botha was more short-sighted than his successor. He recognised the significance of the emerging economic union of Europe 1992, and Mr Botha, quite rightly in my opinion, sought greater regional cooperation among the countries of Southern Africa. However, he saw regional cooperation primarily in security terms, and sought to convene a multilateral regional security summit (Davies, 1989 : 167). Mr De Klerk, whilst seeing regional cooperation as a solution to the greater power alignments of the world, as well as a way to restabilize the region, saw
regional cooperation in much wider terms - speaking of an African Common Market and a Southern African Community.

Hence this writer believes that the inauguration of Mr De Klerk as State President of the Republic of South Africa signified another factor which was instrumental in a change on South Africa’s foreign policy.

To conclude, then, five variables: economic factors, military factors, rapportoachment between the superpowers, influence of public opinion and personality factors can be seen to account for the about turn in South Africa’s foreign policy between 1988 and 1989.
3. THE DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES

3.1 THE DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK

In our analysis on the decision-making structures in the P.W. Botha and F.W. de Klerk eras we will make use of the decision-making framework, especially the one espoused by Margaret and Charles Hermann and Joe Hagan (1989), Wright (1990) and D'Oliveira (1991).

Research based on the decision-making theory seeks to expose the key decision-makers and decision-making structures, and seeks to evaluate the impact of rational and irrational decisions (Ofoegbu, 1980: 16; McClelland, 1971: 108). In Synder's 1954 decision-making scheme two elements are stressed as fundamental to the decision-making framework. These are:

1. the presupposition that foreign policy consists of "decisions", made by a small, elite group of decision-makers; the making of decisions, therefore, is the activity which requires explanations, and
2. the fact that the policy making process itself may be an "... important, independent source of decisions" (White, 1978: 144; Ofoegbu 1980: 20).
The assumption by decision-making theorists that political structures shape political processes (and, by implication the products of that process, i.e. "decisions") must not be seen in oversimplified or monolithic terms as Waltz (1979: 87) correctly explains, "Political structure produces a similarity in process and performance so long as a structure endures. Similarity is not uniformity. Structures operate as a cause, but it is not the only cause in play".

As was already mentioned, this Chapter is largely grounded in the decision-making theoretical framework as espoused by Herman et al (1989). In this article the authors start off the hypothesis that within any government the important decision-making units often change with time and issue. Whilst emphasising the role of the "pertinent decision units" the authors do not, however, neglect the plethora of domestic and international variables which can and do affect foreign policy behaviour but maintain that these "... influences must be channelled through the political apparatus of a government which identifies, decides and implements foreign policy" (Herman et al, 1989: 309). The writers postulate that the structure and dynamics of the "pertinent decision unit" or "ultimate decision unit" would shape the substance of foreign policy.
behaviour and they identify three types of such "ultimate decision units." These are:

i. Predominant leader

ii. Single Group


**PREDOMINANT LEADER**

In this type of unit a single individual, the leader, has the power to make the choice and to embark on a foreign policy initiative unilaterally. Those with differing points of view and who are members of the group will stop publicly expressing their views either due to deference/respect for the leader or for fear of political reprisals. The important set of factors in this type of unit becomes the character traits of the leader since the personality of the leader will "... shape his initial inclinations and determine whether and how the leader will regard advice from others, react to information from the external environment, and assess the political risks associated with various actions" (Hermann et al, 1989 : 313).

**SINGLE GROUP**

Where no one individual has the power or ability to embark upon a
course of action unilaterally or whether such an individual refuses to exercise such authority - another ultimate decision unit comes into operation. The single group represents one such alternative. A single group may be defined as a set of interacting individuals, all of whom are members of a single body, having the ability to select a course of action and obtain compliance (Hermann et al, 1989: 312-313). Examples of single group decision units are the National Security Council in the United States, the Standing Committee of the Communist Party in Red China and the cabinet in various parliamentary governments.

To be the 'pertinent decision unit' the single group does not have to be legally constituted as an authoritative body. Instead it must have the *de facto* ability to commit or withhold resources without another decision unit being able to reverse or nullify its decisions, it is unnecessary that individual members must concur on every decision of the group nor is it necessary for the members of the unit to have equal weight in the formulation of group decisions (Hermann et al, 1989: 315).

Analysts examining the single group decision unit must determine how soon consensus can be reached within the group-regarding the
resolution of a specific problem, since this would determine the extent of external influence in the policy-making process. Where consensus is arrived at quickly (usually, in the course of one meeting) external factors are limited since members do not look outside the group for support of their positions. This results in elements outside the group remaining either peripheral to or completely excluded from the decision-making process. Members of the unit reinforce "... each others' predispositions and feel secure in their collective decision" (Hermann et al, 1989 : 315). Where disagreement persists, factors external to the unit become influential as group members become more attuned to external political pressures in an effort to bolster their positions by seeking information which would serve to support their viewpoint. The authors furthermore hypothesize that consensus is more likely;

1. if the information the group receives is from a common source, is shared amongst group members, and is similarly interpreted by members;

2. if the group is small, if members have their primary loyalty to the group and, if power is unequally distributed among group members (that is, there is a strong but not predominant leader) (Hermann, et al, 1989 : 316).
MULTIPLE AUTONOMOUS GROUPS

Another alternative to the predominant leader decision unit is the multiple autonomous group. The important actors here are the members of the different units, groups or coalitions, "... no one of which by itself has the ability to decide and force compliance on the others; moreover, no overarching body exists in which all parties are members" (Hermann et al, 1989: 312). To be one of the units in the set delineated as the pertinent decision unit, a unit must be able to give or withhold support that when combined with the support (or lack thereof) from other units is sufficient to determine whether regime resources will be allocated (Hermann, et al, 1989: 316). The classic example of a multiple autonomous group decision unit is the coalition government in a parliamentary system as in Italy in the past two decades and in Israel under the Labour-Likud coalition. The decision-making structures of the P.W. Botha and F.W. de Klerk eras seem to parallel the single group decision unit. We will now analyse these structures.

DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES OF THE P.W. BOTHA ERA

In September 1978 Mr P.W. Botha took over the premiership of the Republic of South Africa from Mr B.J. Vorster, and promptly began to radically reorganise the civil service in general and the key policy-
making organs, in particular. The result of this reorganisation was what
came to be known as the National Security Management System
(NSMS).

There were three major factors which accounted for the establishment of
the National Security Management System.

The first factor was the result of the Angolan debacle of 1975-1976 which
underlined the need for a more formalized decision-making process
(Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1983: 34). During the Angolan debacle of 1975-
76 the Department of Defence unilaterally invaded Angola with little or no
consultation with other Departments such as Foreign Affairs. The net
result was that the Department of Foreign Affairs was taken by surprise
by the international condemnation which followed the invasion. More
importantly, because of poor communication channels the Department of
Foreign Affairs was unable to warn the SADF that such an invasion might
provoke a U.S. backlash. The U.S. was not prepared to tolerate a South
African invasion into Angola. The result was that the SADF were forced
to withdraw their troops. Thus Vorster’s uncoordinated, often ad hoc
approach was discredited (Barbar and Barrat, 1990: 252).

The second factor which once again stressed the need for a more
formalised policy-making process had more to do with the personality of the new premier - P.W. Botha. Mr Botha was known as an 'organisation man' - a management type and his 12 years as Minister of Defence simply reinforced these propensities. It was also known that he dislike the *ad hoc* informal approach of his predecessor, which in *his* eyes proved its failure in the Angolan debacle (Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1983: 35). Hence upon *his* elevation to the rank of Prime Minister it was to be expected that he would have a more formal structure and rigid civil service - no doubt principles which *he* was familiar with as Minister of Defence.

The final factor was the perceived 'total onslaught' mentality held by members of the Botha administration. Mr Botha came to power at a time when the Republic was in a precarious position. Angola and Mozambique had just attained their independence and boldly pronounced their Marxist ideals; the Carter administration with its almost naive emphasis on human rights in its foreign policy resulted in an all-time low in the United States - South African relationship. Zimbabwe fell to the Marxist Mugabe whose avowed aim was to destroy white majority rule in South Africa; the legacy of the Soweto Uprisings (1976) were still fresh in the minds of Pretoria's policy-makers; there was the very real threat of a right-wing backlash; there were increased Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK)
activities inside the country; illustrated during the course of 1980 when the ANC launched armed attacks on policy stations, a bank and the SASOL oil installations; finally there was also increased Soviet influence in Africa as well as the threat of the Red Bear epitomised in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 (Geldenhuys, 1984 : 40-41). Thus the perceived security threat, which to a great extent was very real, necessitated, in the eyes of Pretoria's strategists, a "total national strategy" to combat the total onslaught (Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1983 : 34). It was obvious that this total national strategy had to be co-ordinated at the highest levels of decision-making and that co-ordination could no longer rest on the informal and ad hoc approach to policy-making of Mr Vorster. Hence these concerns also gave birth to the more formal decision making processes inherent in the National Security Management System (NSMS).

The beginning of the NSMS began in late 1979, early 1980 when Mr Botha launched his 3-phase rationalisation programmed. This involved:

a. the strengthening of the Office of the Prime Minister;

b. the establishment of a cabinet secretariat;

c. the reduction and consolidation of the existing 39 government departments into 22;
d. the rearrangement of functions and finance between the new departments;

e. the replacement of Vorster's 20 ad hoc cabinet committees into 4 permanent ones (The State Security Council (SSC); Economic Affairs; Social Affairs and Constitutional Affairs); and

f. the granting to the various cabinet committees of the power to make decisions as opposed to merely making recommendations for the consideration of the cabinet (Geldenhuys, 1984: 90-91).

Of all the cabinet committees the SSC was certainly the most important. In fact during the Botha period the SSC was the highest decision-making body in the country (Davies et al, 1988: 3). The importance of the SSC can clearly be illustrated by the fact that:

1. the SSC was the only cabinet committee created by law (The Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act of 1972);

2. because security was defined in such broad terms, the SSC concerned itself with a larger range of issues than the other cabinet committees;
3. the decisions of the SSC carried more weight than other cabinet committees because it was the only cabinet committee chaired by the Prime Minister (later State President);

4. moreover the SSC, unlike other cabinet committees did not allow any minister who was not a member of the SSC to sit in on the proceedings;

5. the SSC had a far wider range of supporting bodies than other cabinet committees. These included a secretariat; a working committee, thirteen interdepartmental committees, eleven joint management centres (JMCS); sixty sub-JMCs and four hundred and forty-eight mini JMCs;

6. finally, and most importantly, the SSC was exempt from the rule that its decisions, needed the approval of the cabinet (Geldenhuys, 1984: 91-92; *The Weekly Mail*, October 31 - November 6, 1986: 2).

The SSC was chaired by the State President, which naturally enhanced his own power since he was at the head of the most important policy-making body in the country. Its other statutory members were the Ministers of Defence (then Magnus Malan), Law and Order (then Adrian Vlok), Foreign Affairs (Pik Botha), Justice (Kobie Coetzee), Constitutional
Development (then Gerrit Viljoen) and Finance (then Barend du Plessis). Other statutory members were the Head of the National Intelligence Service (then Lukas Neil Barnard), Chief of the SADF (then General J.J. Geldenhuys), The Commissioner of Police (General Johan Coetzee) and finally the Directors-General of the Foreign Affairs and Law and Order (Davies, et al, 1988 : 31).

On the positive side the whole SSC apparatus had introduced a new "team" concept of government, with the team consisting of both senior political and bureaucratic office holders (Geldenhuys, 1984 : 95). This helped to minimise the traditional antagonism and conflict between the politicians and bureaucrats. This has been noted by Van Wyk (1989 : 76) who states that, "The operation of the NSMS has forged strong structural links between the political and bureaucratic elites, particularly in the SSC".

It was also a positive development that for the first time South Africa's policy-makers had recourse to rely on expert inputs from a corps of professional civil servants from a variety of fields (Geldenhuys, 1984 : 95). It is generally acknowledged that the quality of the decisions taken depend to a large extent on the quality of the information reaching the organs of decision-making. But information is of various grades. If it is
primary it would contribute positively to the quality of the decision at hand. But if it is low-grade then it would adversely affect the quality of the decision arrived at (Ofoeglu, 1980: 16). The heavy reliance on expert inputs by seasoned diplomats provided for by the structure of the NSMS, must therefore be seen as an attempt to improve the quality of the information arriving at the key decision-making structures, and in so doing improving the quality of the decisions arrived at themselves.

Another explanation of Mr Botha's system of government is connected to his erratic temperament, specifically his quick temper. It was hoped that the NSMS with its team concept would serve to ameliorate somewhat irrational decisions embarked upon by a bad-tempered State President. Geldenhuys (1984: 95) puts it this way, "... his (Mr Botha's) very system of government by committee and the heavy reliance on expert inputs may go some way towards preventing rash decisions being taken in moments of ill-will".

However, there was the negative side to the NSMS and this related to the fact that the cabinet was in practice subordinate to the SSC and simply rubber-stamped decisions taken by the SSC (Barber and Barrat, 1990: 253). The NSMS, in practice, diminished the power of the cabinet and enhanced the power of the executive State President. If he wished, the
President could pursue a major foreign policy initiative which was only discussed and analysed by a very small group of officials in the SSC (Joster, 1988: 39). This must be seen as a reduction in political accountability (specifically to the white electorate) and greater emphasis placed on secrecy. In fact there was a corresponding NSMS structure for every official state structure and its relationship was like the SSC to the Cabinet. Thus at every level of government there was a shadow NSMS structure which dominated it (Davies et al, 1988: 32). This is clearly brought out in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. The National Security Management System (NSMS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NSMS</th>
<th>OFFICIAL STATE STRUCTURE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Security Council</td>
<td>Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC Working Committee</td>
<td>Cabinet Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdepartmental</td>
<td>Department Heads</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committees (13)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Management</td>
<td>Executive Committees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Centres (JMCs) (11)</td>
<td>previously provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-JMCs (60)</td>
<td>Regional Services Councils</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Another negative aspect related to the NSMS is that by drawing various departments into the policy-making process at various levels it has increased interdepartmental rivalries. This is not a phenomenon unique to Mr Botha's NSMS. In fact it is present in any system where responsibility of foreign policy is shared by several agencies. In the United States some of the foreign policy decision-makers are the Department of State, Department of Defence, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Atomic Energy Commission, which sometimes leads to intense interdepartmental rivalries (Chan, 1987: 42-43). The reasons for this interdepartmental competition is that as more departments are brought into the decision-making process, they become increasingly conscious of "... current foreign policy issues and the departmental interests that may be at stake" (Jaster, 1988: 35). Sheldon (1986: 7) suggests that this interdepartmental conflict and competition might negatively affect the policy making process and provides the example of interdepartmental rivalries existing between South Africa's intelligence organisations (especially between the Directorate of Military Intelligence and the National Intelligence Service...
This has resulted in each intelligence organisation using selected information to strengthen its own position at the expense of the other organisation. The ultimate result of this in-fighting is a distortion of the intelligence picture which adversely affects the policy-making process.

No discussion of the National Security Management System would be complete without a discussion of the power or influence of the military within the NSMS.

Several writers such as Grundy (1988: 107), Davies *et al* (1988: 31) and Evans and Phillips (1988: 119) believe that the men in uniform - the military - were totally and firmly in control of the policy-making process of the country. There is plenty of evidence to support this view.

Proponents of this view point to the composition of the Secretariat of the SSC which consisted of 70% SADF personnel, 20% NIS personnel and only 10% Department of Foreign Affairs personnel (Sheldon, 1986: 5). They also point to the fact that the chairmanship of both the Working Committee and the Secretariat were in military hands - the importance of the latter is stressed given its agenda setting role with regards to the SSC (Sheldon, 1986: 5-7).
However, opponents of the 'military-dominant' view, point out the fact that the numerical dominance of the SADF in both the Secretariat and the Working Committee does not assure the SADF of control over foreign policy debates. The decisional structure allows the foreign minister or other senior ministers to by-pass both the Secretariat and the Working Committee and to present proposals directly in the SSC itself (Sheldon, 1986: 7). They also point out instances where the Department of Foreign Affairs views have prevailed over those of the SADF in the SSC. This was certainly the case when the Minister of Foreign Affairs received SSC approval for the 1984 Nkomati peace initiative over the protests of the Minister of Defence. Yet another occasion where the SADF view was overruled, within the SSC, took place after the ANC car bombing in Pretoria in May, 1983. The SADF proposed that a reprisal attack be delayed so that intelligence could be gathered about possible targets. On this particular occasion the SSC rejected the SADF proposal and adopted the view put forward by the Commissioner of Police that an immediate attack was essential to display South Africa's retaliatory power and South Africa's outrage (Jaster, 1988: 37).

Moreover, it must be pointed out that Mr Botha's State Security Council is by no means a unique mechanism for policy formulation and coordination. In the United States, for example, one has the National
Security Council (NSC) which was established by law. Its avowed purpose is to advise the President on security matters. Its membership includes the President, the Secretaries of State and Defence as well as certain key civil servants. According to Geldenhuys (1984 : 94) the National Security Council in effect "... formalises the role of the American military in foreign affairs".

In the United Kingdom one has a similar yet more powerful body in the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, whose membership includes the Prime Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Minister of Defence, Foreign Secretary and certain senior military personnel. Like the South African State Security Council, the British Defence and Overseas Policy Committee can actually make decisions on key security issues (Geldenhuys, 1984 : 94).

Opponents of the military-dominant view also point out that key Department of Foreign Affairs officials do not believe, at least not publicly, that there is military dominance in the policy-making process or that there is a conflict of interests between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Defence. This is clearly borne out in the following extracts of speeches made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Pik Botha.
(Mr Pik Botha on the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence cooperation during Namibian Independence). "Once more the security forces have gained a victory. Once again we have gained a diplomatic victory because the South African Defence Force and the Department of Foreign Affairs cooperated and complemented each other, my colleagues and I understood each other completely, boarded the aircraft together, jointly participated in the negotiations and our respective officials and heads of department engaged in joint planning" (Hansard, 1989 : col. 5366).

"At the outset I should like to make matters very clear and that is that the Department of Foreign Affairs and the South African Defence Force cooperates very closely indeed. Obviously there is a difference in style and culture. It cannot be otherwise. However, we are fighting and striving to achieve exactly the same goals, and that is the safeguarding of our country, its trade and its economic power in order to maintain our military strength as well" (Hansard, 1989 : col. 7481).

While, it could be argued that Foreign Minister Botha is engaged in a public cover-up by making statements such as these, it is nevertheless instructive to quote them since they reveal an often unnoticed truism - that despite their differences and inter-departmental rivalries - the
tentacles of the apartheid octopus has a great deal in common.

Although the influence of the military within the SSC is rather controversial, as is demonstrated above, we can safely conclude that while the SADF does not fully control or dominate the SSC, as was previously thought, its role within the decision-making process of the country was considerably enhanced by the workings of Mr Botha’s National Security Management System.

**DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES OF THE F.W. DE KLERK ERA**

In 1989 Mr F.W. de Klerk replaced Mr Botha first as leader of the National Party, then as President of the Republic of South Africa. What followed was a total restructuring of the decision-making process of the Botha period, every bit as radical as the change over from Mr Vorster to Mr Botha. This revamping entailed the dismantling of the National Security Management System, the reduction of the influence of the military and cutbacks in defence expenditure and the affirmation of the Cabinet as the highest decision-making body of the country. But what were the reasons which accounted for these drastic changes?

The first reason must be related to the personal style of Mr De Klerk who
with his legal background preferred governance through law and probably felt that the military had acquired too much power. Thus he wished to bring the country back to civilian rule proper. It was also obvious that once in power, Mr De Klerk would move the fulcrum of power to that end of the spectrum from which he draws his own, authority - the civilian one (The Sunday Times, December 3, 1989: 2). But while it is true that Mr De Klerk wished to move the centre of power away from the military and closer to the civilian end of the spectrum, he still did not wish to alienate or isolate the military from key policy-making organs since he recognises the need for a strong security force to hold the ring when a society enters a dangerous period of transition (The Sunday Times, December 3, 1989: 24).

The second reason is related to the improvement of the security situation, at least, in the external environment. On the regional level, several heads of government in Southern Africa realised the need to reach some form of compromise/agreement with the Republic in an effort to restabilise the region (see Chapter Six). On the international level, South Africa was receiving favourable signals from most of the nations of the world for its role in the negotiations around Resolution 435. Furthermore, the constructive role the Soviet Union played in the Namibian independence process together with the United States went some way to assuage the
threat - perception among South Africa's policy-makers of a communist threat (for some details see Chapter 5). The improvement in the security situation reordered the heavy military input into the policy-making process making it somewhat superfluous.

Another factor which militated towards a total restructuring of South Africa's policy-making organs was the high costs connected with the NSMS, with its overblown civil service which was a direct product of the duplication of functions which took place within the NSMS.

Yet another reason which accounted for the change was the need for greater efficiency which meant the need to avoid the duplication of personnel and to minimise interdepartmental rivalries by according to each department exclusive control of the affairs of that department (Toespraak deur Mnr F.W. de Klerk, Staatspresident : Oorhandiging van die Nasionale Vaandel aan die SA Polisie, SA Polisiekollege, 28 November 1989 : 10-12).

In his very first Cabinet shuffle Mr De Klerk made his intention clear to dismantle the NSMS from the top downwards when Deputy Minister Leon Wessels, whose exclusive brief to coordinate the activities of the NSMS at the various levels, was shifted from Law and Order to Foreign Affairs.
The State Security Council was relegated to its original status - simply that of four standing Cabinet Committees to advise the Cabinet on security matters. Called the Cabinet Committee for Security Affairs it meets every two weeks under the chairmanship of Mr de Klerk. Under Mr Botha, the SSC was served by a massive Secretariat, headed by a military general and assisted by a veritable army of colonels, majors and brigadiers. Today the whole job of the Secretariat is being done by a single senior official of the National Intelligence Service. Mr De Klerk has also restructured the Office of the State President and reduced its size. During Mr Botha's time the Office of the State President was akin to a miniature civil service with a large number of officials replicating the work of other civil servants in other government departments. The Joint Management Centres (JMCs) of the Botha era have been renamed as Joint Coordinating Centres (JCCs) and they function in an entirely different context. The JCCs are no longer chaired by senior military or police officers with the rank of brigadier or above, but by local civil servants. JCCs no longer execute policy as this has been redirected to the various state departments as part of their ordinary functions. The JCCs only function is to prevent duplication and coordinate action (Toespraak deur Mnr F.W. de Klerk, Staatspresident: Oorhandiging van die Nasionale Vaandel aan die SA Polisie, SA Polisiekollege, 28 November 1989 : 12-15; The Sunday Times, October 7, 1990 : 21).
There are several advantages connected with the new policy-making process. First, the position of the Cabinet as the highest decision-making organ was confirmed. This must be seen as a victory for the principle of political accountability (albeit only to the white electorate since the majority of South Africans do not have the franchise). Secondly duplication of functions were avoided which increased efficiency. Thirdly, and a concomitant of the previous point, it was cost-effective. Fourthly, a great deal of flexibility or adaptability was built into the new system. This can be clearly illustrated by the fact that provisions had been made in the JCCs to include private sector participation in development projects on both the regional and local levels (The Sunday Times, October 7, 1990: 2). Furthermore, provisions have been made in the new system for ad hoc committees to be formed on the regional and local levels as and when regional or local problems arise. Fifthly, another positive feature of the new system is the team concept of government of the Botha era has been retained and carried over into the De Klerk era. This can clearly be illustrated by the fact that interdepartmental cooperation is still stressed as and when the need arises. This interdepartmental cooperation is to take place within the Cabinet, within and between Cabinet Committees, between senior officials and within Interdepartmental Working Committees. Finally, by resorting to each department, exclusive authority over its 'line-functions' it has reduced somewhat

However, there has been a negative factor connected with the new system initiated by President De Klerk and this relates to the meteoric rise in the status and influence of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) under its former director Dr Neil Barnard (formerly Professor of Political Science at the University of the Orange Free State). The importance of the NIS in the policy-making process is clearly demonstrated by the fact that, it alone is responsible for coordinating the inputs from the various security sources (The Sunday Times, October 7, 1990: 12). Whilst entrusting only one intelligence organisation to coordinate the inputs from the various security sources reduces the rivalries between intelligence organisations, it does not necessarily lead to an improvement in the quality of information reaching the decision-makers since you are relying upon the interpretation and analysis of information from only one organisation.

So to summarise some of the main differences and similarities of the decision-making systems in both the Botha and now the de Klerk periods are as follows:
both systems differed from the *ad hoc* informal style of the Vorster era in that policy-making was more formalised; however, the Botha policy-making machinery tended to be more formalised bordering on the rigid;

both systems laid strong emphasis on a new team system of government;

although President de Klerk retained much of the structures of his predecessor, the context, in which they operated as well as their functions were dramatically altered;

a major difference between the two systems has been a dramatic reduction of the role and influence of the military in the decision-making process in the De Klerk period. Furthermore, after the recent 'Inkathagate Scandal' one witnessed a further reduction of the seurocrat's power epitomised with the appointment of General Magnus Malan to the portfolio of Forestry and Water Affairs and the brief appointment of Mr Roelf Meyer (a civilian) to take over the portfolio of Defence (*The Sunday Times*, August 4, 1991 : 17).

Upon surveying the policy-making structures of the Botha and De Klerk eras, one can safely conclude that they fall within the single group
decision-making unit. In both one finds a single individual having both the power and ability to embark upon a course of action unilaterally but refusing to exercise such authority. Mr. De Klerk, more than Mr. Botha, preferred consensus decision-making and refused to play the role of a "heavy" in the cabinet. He was known to allow fierce debates to continue in the cabinet until everyone, or at least the vast majority agreed with a particular course of action. In Mr Botha's time the single group took the form of the State Security Council. In Mr De Klerk's time it has taken the form of the Cabinet. Both Mr. Botha's SSC and Mr. De Klerk's cabinet fit the following characteristics of a single group decision-making unit:

a. a set of interacting individuals, all of whom are members of a single body, having the ability to select a course of action and obtain compliance;

b. have the *de facto* ability to commit or withhold resources, without another decision unit being able to reverse or nullify its decisions; and

c. individual members of the group need not necessarily concur on every decision reached, nor is it necessary for members of the unit to have equal weight in the formulation of group decisions [consider, for example the influence of the military in Botha's SSC and the influence of the NIS on De Klerk's cabinet].
CHAPTER FOUR

4. SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST DURING THE BOTHA ERA

South Africa's relations between 1977 and 1987 were conducted primarily with its neighbouring states and the West. Pretoria's relations with the West during this period consisted of 31.19% of its total foreign relations. Moreover 57.76% of the Republic's relations with the West were cooperative and 43.23% conflictive. This has given rise to what some observers have labelled a "love-hate" relationship to describe South Africa's relations with the West during the Botha era (Van Wyk, 1988 : 47-48). It is important for us to find the underlying causes which accounted for this kind of relationship between the Republic and the West during Mr Botha's time.

REASONS FOR COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOUR BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WEST DURING THE BOTHA ERA

One of the major reasons for a strong cooperative element in Pretoria's relations with the West stems from the economic interdependence of one on the other.

On the South African side - Pretoria depended on the West for foreign
investment and the importation of capital goods needed to ensure industrial growth. The Republic also needs the West as a market for exports, specifically of raw materials (Mathews, 1983: 154). The importance of the West as a source of foreign investment for the capital-starved South African economy is underlined by the fact that in 1985, five countries - the United States, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany and Switzerland made up 90% of the total foreign investment (US $16 billion) in South Africa (Razis, 1986: 49; Jaster 1988: 159). The importance of the West as an important source of capital for the Republic is once more underlined by the fact that of the approximately 2500 foreign controlled companies operating in South Africa in 1981; the overwhelming majority consisted of Western companies. The breakdown is as follows:

- Britain - 1200 companies
- West Germany - 350
- United States - 340
- Japan - 70
- France - 50
- Netherlands - 50
- Austria - 35
- Belgium - 20
Italy - 20
Switzerland - 12
Spain - 6
Canada - 5

(Davies et al, 1988 : 92).

The importance of the West to the South African economy is further illustrated in that the bulk of Pretoria's trade is conducted with Western states as the Republic imports capital goods from the West and exports primary goods to the West. Hence in 1985 South Africa imported the following amounts of goods from the following countries:

- Federal Republic of Germany - R3 807,2 million
- U.S.A. - R3 159,5 million
- Japan - R2 772,1 million
- France - R1 040,1 million

The Republic exported the following amounts of goods to the following countries:

- U.S.A. - R3 029,7 million
- Japan - R2 829,1 million
- United Kingdom - R2 124,6 million
- Federal Republic of Germany - R1 258,4 million

(Barber and Barrat, 1990 : 349).

But it was not simply a case of the Republic being economically
dependent on the West but the West also being dependent (albeit to a lesser extent) on South Africa. The Republic's mineral and energy resources are not only a vital component of its own economy, but also an essential factor in the economies of several Western states (Geldenhuys, 1984: 100). South Africa is the world's major supplier of a large range of mineral and energy commodities which are of strategic importance. This is illustrated by the fact that the Republic is the world's largest source of gold, platinum, gem diamonds, chrome, manganese and vanadium, and one of three of the world's largest sources of energy minerals - coal and uranium. The Republic is also a major supplier of industrial minerals like antimony, asbestos, fluorspar, vermiculite, and andalusite and a host of other mineral and energy commodities. These mineral and energy commodities are mainly exported to the West and Japan (Neethling, 1983: 25-42).

An additional factor accounting for cooperative relations existing between Pretoria and the West relates to the Pretoria regime's strong anti-communist stance and the strategic importance of the Cape sea-route. There was a perception among Western states that they need the cooperation of the Botha Administration in order to combat Soviet-Cuban influence in Southern Africa. This was especially true during the Reagan Administration's first term in office which saw in the Pretoria government
their natural ally to combat the spread of that "evil empire" (Soviet Communism). This attitude was clearly reflected by President Reagan's first Secretary of State - General Alexander Haig who spoke of "shared values" and "shared strategic concerns" between Washington and Pretoria (Jaster, 1988: 144). The mineral wealth of the Republic as well as its strategic geographical position at the Cape of Africa all served to underline the need in the eyes of the West to keep South Africa firmly within the Western camp. There is no doubt that Pretoria benefitted a great deal from this attitude and exploited it to the hilt in order to draw maximum advantage (Chan, 1987: 157).

These two factors then - economic interdependence and the Republic's strong anti-communist stance were the major factors which accounted for the cooperative element in South Africa's relations with the West.

REASONS FOR CONFLICTIVE BEHAVIOUR BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WEST DURING THE BOTHA ERA

There are several reasons which accounted for the souring of the Republic's relations with the West. The first reason has to do with such groups as the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC).
The ANC and PAC were allowed to establish offices in several Western countries (for instance, United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Scandinavian countries) and were seen by some as the legitimate representatives of the South African people. As such they were accorded a place in the councils or forums of the world, for example, in their observer status at the United Nations. This was cause for grave concern to the South African government. It also created a feeling of antagonism on the part of the Botha Administration towards the Western states for this slight against them (Lodge, 1988: 242; Esterhuysen and Nel, 1990: 78-80; Geldenhuys, 1984: 179). The fact that the ANC and PAC received a great deal of financial assistance and humanitarian aid from several Western states is a further factor that led to the souring of relations between the Republic and the West. For example, between 1984 and 1987 alone the Swedish government provided the ANC with R57 million in financial assistance (Esterhuysen and Nel, 1990: 80). Members of the Botha Administration moreover felt further anger when senior members of the Thatcher and Reagan Administrations held high-level discussions with the ANC and labelled the ANC as "... a legitimate voice in the black community ... one of the important players" (Jaster, 1988: 139). The bitterness Pretoria felt towards its erstwhile allies in the West was certainly summed up by Foreign Minister Pik Botha who stated, after US Secretary of State George Schultz met with ANC President
Oliver Tambo: "It is a tragic thing that this powerful country, the United States, can send machines to the planets, but when it comes to judging political affairs, they are hopeless. They are absolutely hopeless" (Minister Pik Botha - Press Briefing: 3 February 1987: 1).

The West's support to the Frontline States (FLS) was a further factor which antagonised Pretoria towards the West. South Africa's military actions against its neighbouring states prompted several Western governments to provide weapons and military training to Zimbabwe, Mozambique and other FLS. For example, in 1987 Britain doubled its efforts to train Mozambican field-grade officers and the United States and other Western governments made clear their support for the Chissano government in Mozambique and condemned Pretoria's clandestine aid to Renamo (Jaster, 1988: 14, 39). Western support was also instrumental in the formation of SADCC. SADCC developed in 1979 as a direct counter constellation to CONSAS (proposed by the Botha regime) and had as its aim the reduction of economic dependence on the Republic. Foreign capital and technological know-how poured into SADCC countries through the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Tangri, 1985: 145). A more indepth anaylsis concerning SADCC and CONSAS will follow in Chapter Six). Thus, once again, Pretoria's policy-makers were filled with
feelings of animosity because of a particular Western action.

Another factor which adversely affected Pretoria's relations with the West was the apartheid regime's policy of destabilisation which took the form of assassinations, support for surrogate forces, economic sanctions, commando raids and airstrikes as well as conventional military invasions. Perhaps the height of South Africa's brutal subversion of the neighbouring governments took place in May, 1986.

In May, 1986 a delegation of senior Commonwealth officials known as the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) arrived in South Africa after talks with the ANC. But on the very day of the arrival of the EPG, the Pretoria government undertook a 3-pronged air-raid on Gaborone, Harare and Lusaka, ostensibly to eliminate ANC bases. However, the targets were not randomly chosen, since all three states - Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia were prominent members of the Commonwealth and since they were attacked on the very day of the arrival of the EPG. This was interpreted as Pretoria's defiant rejection of the EPG peace initiative. International condemnation was instantaneous. Argentina broke off diplomatic ties with the Republic. The Reagan Administration expelled a South African military attache and a coalition of US senators - both Republican and Democrat - called for stiffer sanctions. Canada recalled
its ambassador and introduced stiffer sanctions against Pretoria. Moreover, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and several other Western states withdrew their military attaches from Pretoria (Jaster, 1988 : 122-139). The defiance displayed by the Botha Administration in the face of international condemnation led Malcolm Rifkind, a British Minister, to comment that, "...Pretoria seems almost suicidally determined to alienate even those who wish the best for that country" (Barber and Barrat, 1990 : 320).

The Pretoria regime's domestic racial policies - apartheid - was a further factor which soured relations with the West. As early as 1946, the Republic's domestic policies began to become internationalised and South Africa began to acquire its pariah status amongst the nations of the world. But events like Sharpeville in 1960 and the Soweto Uprisings of 1976 served to underline South Africa's position as a moral leper in the international community and served to reinforce calls for the isolation of the apartheid state and for punitive measures.

During Mr Botha's era the Pretoria regime experienced just such a crisis in the 1984 -1986 Uprisings. Events like the shooting of unarmed demonstrators in Langa in 1985 and the declaration of the State of Emergency once more placed the Republic in the "dog-box". The
European Community's Foreign Ministers sent a strongly-worded statement in July 1986 which called for the immediate release of political detainees and an end to the state of emergency. All the ambassadors of the 12 EC countries were then recalled for consultation. The EC despatched a delegation of 3 Foreign Ministers (Netherlands, Italy and Luxemburg) to convey EC views to Pretoria. Faced with Pretoria's intransigence the EC placed a ban on new investment into South Africa and on the import of iron, steel and gold coins. Moreover, Australia recalled its ambassador, Canada announced a new sanctions package and France banned further investment in South Africa. Tokyo announced its own sanctions package which included a ban on iron and steel imports and on tourist visas for South Africans as well as a ban on computer sales to government agencies and discouraging the import of Krugerrands. Britain placed a ban on all oil and arm exports to the Republic and a curtailment of sporting and cultural ties. In the US, events in 1985 in South Africa (such as the Langa shooting and the State of Emergency) were instrumental in causing Congress to pass the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986 which forbade the importation of coal, iron, steel, uranium, arms and ammunition, textile and agricultural products. Furthermore, new investment and the export of oil to the Republic were banned and the landing rights of South African Airways (SAA) were revoked (Barber and Barrat, 1990: 320-326). The
Pretoria government responded defiantly to this by stating that they were a sovereign state and that they would do as they wished in accordance with the rights of a sovereign state, including exercising the right of self-defence. Whilst there was an outward show of unity, in reality, however, the cabinet was split into "hawks" and "doves". Hawks like General Malan argued for a strategy which effectively repudiated the West (to be discussed later) whilst doves like Pik Botha argued for a more flexible, almost conciliatory approached towards the West (Davies, 1988 : 33-35).

Another factor which served to introduce a conflictive element in Pretoria's relations with the West was the Republic's nuclear weapons programme. As early as August 1977 the USSR alerted the US of a possible South African nuclear test site under construction in the Kalahari Desert. In 1979 US spy satellites provided information that indicated there was a "strong possibility" that Pretoria had conducted a nuclear test. Western states have sought to dissuade the Republic from continuing its nuclear weapons programme. The fear of the West is that they see in South Africa, like Argentina and Pakistan, a threshold nuclear state, "...one of those more likely to break through the fragile non-proliferation barriers" (Jaster, 1988 : 159). Activities by Western states, such as the US to prevent the Republic from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability by putting pressure on states like Israel to desist from providing Pretoria
with the relevant nuclear technology, is seen by Pretoria as a threat to its national security and resulted in a further cooling of relations between Pretoria and the West (Barber and Barrat, 1990 : 336).

However, one of the root causes of the souring of the Republic's relations with the West lay in the personality of the President - Mr P.W. Botha himself. Mr Botha's belligerent style and his defiant mood coupled with a built-in antipathy towards the West, all resulted in Western governments believing that the only language Mr Botha and members of his administration would understand was the language of force - hence they increased economic sanctions, severed diplomatic ties, brought arms embargoes, various socio-cultural sanctions and the general isolation of South Africa taking place during Mr Botha's time.

Mr Botha's belligerent and defiant style surfaced several times. For example, after Pretoria's three-pronged air-raid on Gaborone, Harare and Lusaka in 1986 and after facing international condemnation for this action as well as calls from Western states to negotiate with the ANC, Mr Botha responded:

"We will continue to strike against the ANC base facilities in foreign countries in accordance with our legal right (a reference to the Republic's
right to self defense). We have only delivered the first instalment. We will certainly not be deterred by fanciful arguments that are being advanced both here and abroad. South Africa has the capacity and the will to break the ANC. I give fair warning that we fully intend doing it" (Davies et al., 1988: 8)

And on another occasion when faced with international criticism of the South African government's racial policies Mr Botha advised the nations of the world,

"... sweep in front of your own door before you do so in front of ours" (Jaster, 1988: 79).

Mr P.W. Botha also brought to his premiership an antipathy towards the West. This anti-Western bias of Mr Botha has two basic sources. First it stems from Mr Botha's personal humiliation during the 1975 invasion of Angola when the US, fearful of another Vietnam, abruptly closed down its clandestine cooperation with South Africa (Jaster, 1988: 29). Secondly, it stems from the perception shared by Mr Botha and senior members of his administration that the West had 'gone soft' on communism and that by isolating Preotria, "... the Western powers make themselves available as handymen of the communists and they are indirectly contributing to the
destruction of capitalism and the establishment of world communism" (Geldenhuys, 1984: 209). Thus in the eyes of Mr Botha, Western states were consciously or unconsciously contributing to the total onslaught against the Republic which resulted in his adopting an adversarial approach towards the West.

Combined with his antipathy towards the West, Mr Botha also displayed a total lack of sensitivity to Western opinion. This lack of sensitivity only served to isolate Pretoria further. For example, the 1988 assassination in Paris of a senior ANC official, Mrs Dulcie September, led to violent anti-South African demonstrations and resulted in an all-time low in Franco-South African relations (Barber and Barrat, 1990: 341).

This then sets out in broad terms the reasons for Pretoria's cooperative-conflictive relationship with the West. The question we now have to pose is what was the South African government's response to Western pressure?

**THE BOITHA ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSES TO WESTERN PRESSURE**

In my opinion the Pretoria government's response to Western pressure took five basic forms and I have labelled them broadly as concessions,
counterpressure, repudiation of the West, playing for time and jumping on the anti-Communist bandwagon.

CONCESSIONS

Mr Botha brought into his premiership the concept of 'hard bargaining' which in practice meant never to go soft on concessions (Geldenhuys, 1984: 224). However hard bargaining could only succeed if one possessed all the trump cards. Since Pretoria did not possess all the trump cards, she was forced to make concessions, especially when she was under threat. For example, in December, 1983, Pretoria agreed to withdraw its troops from Angola only after the US threatened that it would stop blocking UN actions against the Republic (Jaster, 1988: 147). This resulted in other Western states using the threat of the stick as opposed to the reward of the carrot in their dealings with South Africa. Constant threats, however, only served to reinforce the threat perception amongst white South Africans and also served to sour the Republic's foreign relations with the West.

COUNTER-PRESSURE

Mr Botha's response to Western sanctions was the threat to counter-sanction South Africa's neighbours. Moreover, these counter-sanctions were brazenly and publicly embarked upon. This can be illustrated by a
speech Pretoria's permanent representative at the United Nations Security Council delivered on 17 February 1987:

"I must therefore remind you that the South African government has on many occasions pointed out that South Africans will be hit hardest by punitive actions ... those who believe that by imposing punitive measures against South Africa, they will bring about the imminent downfall of the South African government delude themselves. Their attempts to achieve the destruction of the South African economy will fail but they should be in no doubt that their actions could well have unforeseeable consequences for other countries of the Southern African region... But let there be no misunderstanding. If the Security Council and the international community are determined to pursue their course of sanctions on which they have embarked, then they should know that they will inevitably retard not only the very process of reform itself but the social and economic well-being of many countries of our sub-continent"
(Statement by the South African Permanent Representative at the UN Security Council on 17 February 1987).

Two of the most favoured forms of counter-pressure used by Pretoria was the expulsion of foreign workers, and denying FLS access to South African rail and port facilities (Jaster, 1988 : 148). However, counter-
pressure must be seen, at best, as a very short-sighted strategy and, at worst, a bad miscalculation on the part of Pretoria’s policy-makers. Instead of preventing further sanctions, it reinforced calls for sanctions as the West refused to be blackmailed by South Africa holding the FLS hostage and the ransom being: no more sanctions to be applied! Moreover, by imposing counter-sanctions on the FLS, the Republic was hurting its own economy since South African business interests needed to export goods to the FLS and needed to transport manufactured goods to the FLS and raw materials from the FLS in order to earn much needed foreign exchange (Potgieter, 1983).

PLAYING FOR TIME

The strategy of playing for more time is a common method employed by the Botha Administration to stave off more sanctions, international condemnation and isolation. This strategy can clearly be seen in the talks surrounding Resolution 435.

Faced with international condemnation of the Republic’s continued presence in Namibia and the threat of more punitive action to be taken against Pretoria, Mr Botha had pursued a two-track diplomacy. South Africa continued to talk to the UN and the Western Five about a settlement of UN Security Council Resolution 435. During the talks,
South African representatives had bargained hard for advantage, creating the impression that they were serious about reaching a solution on the Namibian issue. They also sought to draw out the talks for as long as possible. At the same time, however, Pretoria sought to weaken SWAPO's position and strengthen that of the South African-backed Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). The Republic had also attempted to reach a settlement that would bypass the UN process entirely. Moreover, Pretoria increased its support of DTA activities and provided the DTA with financial assistance that was estimated at US$250 000 a month in 1980 (Jaster, 1988 : 96-109).

However, this strategy of playing for time has severe drawbacks since it enhances South Africa's "Problem of Credibility" (Geldenhuys, 1989 : 90). This results in other states using the "bad faith model" in their dealings with the Republic. The Pretoria regime is seen as untrustworthy, its promises were seen as hollow and therefore this spurred on Western states, in particular, to use more coercion (threats, economic sanctions, severing of diplomatic ties) in their dealing with the apartheid state.

**REPUDIATION OF THE WEST**

As Western pressure increased on Pretoria and as the Republic's relationship with Western states declined, the Botha government
denounced the West and sought to reduce its dependence on it.

One way in which Pretoria sought to reduce its ties with the West was to emphasise its close links with Africa. Thus in September 1986, Mr Botha proclaimed:

"Stop being blindfolded and exploited by the major powers. They care for nothing but their own wealth and interests. Let us, as the leaders of this continent, come here together, in Africa, and not on other continents, to reflect on our problems, and seek solutions" (Jaster, 1988 : 150).

South Africa's repudiation of the West and its emphasis on links with Africa and specifically Southern Africa is clearly to be seen in the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) proposal of the Botha Administration in 1979. The CONSAS proposal demonstrated a total rejection of Western peace initiatives in both Rhodesia and Namibia. In this way Pretoria sought to seize the initiative from the West in resolving regional conflicts. The CONSAS proposal must be seen as very similar to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 since South African foreign policy makers sought to build a wall around Southern Africa within which the Republic and its neighbouring countries would together work out solutions to the region's political, economic and security problems independent of the
West. However, the Botha Administration failed in its attempts to
decrease its links with the West by increasing its links with Africa since
no independent black state showed any interest in "getting into bed" with
the apartheid state (Jaster, 1988: 11).

In an effort to decrease its ties with the West, South Africa sought to
increase it ties with other pariah states. Thus throughout the 1980s
Pretoria sought, and was successful in establishing, economic, technical
and military ties with states like Israel and Taiwan. However such
relations did not in any significant way reduce the Republic's dependence
on the West for capital investment and capital goods. This was partly
due to the fact that the Israeli and Taiwanese economies were not as
advanced or as compatible as those of the West with South Africa's
economy. This can be witnessed by the fact that as late as 1986 the
West accounted for 50% of the Republic's exports and 70% of its imports
(Jaster, 1988: 157). But more importantly it was due to the fundamental
weakness and instability inherent in inter-pariah links. This was aptly
illustrated when Israel, under pressure from the US, was forced to impose
sanctions on South Africa in 1987 (Barber and Barrat, 1990: 336).

Hence we can conclude that Pretoria's strategy of repudiating the West
was a failure.
JUMPING ON THE ANTI-COMMUNIST BANDWAGON

Another strategy employed by the Botha Administration was that of portraying itself as the bastion of free enterprise in South Africa and a defender against the Communist onslaught. It emphasised the importance of the rich mineral resources of the country to the West and the strategic significance of the Cape sea-route. Through this strategy Pretoria hoped to attain the twin objective of being placed under the Western nuclear umbrella, as well as the removal of sanctions and other punitive measures taken against the Republic.

However, this strategy failed since although the US and NATO recognised a Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, neither felt that the Cape shipping route was threatened. It was also thought that breakdown at sea, and hostilities there, were more likely to reflect a breakdown in relations generally between the superpowers, rather than to serve as a first step in causing it. As for the case of the vital minerals the Republic possessed, it was thought in Western circles that judicious stockpiling and other precautionary measures already undertaken would prevent a crisis within Western states if ever a South African government suspended their import. Furthermore there was a feeling in the West that it would be business as usual no matter who comes into power in South Africa since "... to whom else would a new South African government
export these minerals - particularly a government needing funds to create more equitable conditions within South Africa... If the second major producer of these minerals is the Soviet Union, they could not in profitable quantities be exported there" (Chan, 1987: 153).

This then in broad terms was the Republic's relationship with the West during the Botha era. The various failures suffered by members of the Botha Administration in their relationship with the West can be attributed to the miscalculations they made in part due to the low quality of the information supplied to the decision-makers. More importantly these miscalculations must be attributed to the personal mind-set of the leadership who clung on to their out-moded notions of the world, refusing to change and adjust these notions to the dynamic developments occurring all over the world.

SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WEST DURING THE F.W. DE KLERK ERA

The coming to power of Mr De Klerk has seen a dramatic improvement in South Africa's relations with the West.

The presidency of Mr De Klerk has seen South Africa's bilateral trade with Holland increase tremendously. For example, between January and
September 1991 alone the Dutch exported 573,4 million gilders or R665 million worth of goods to South Africa (The Citizen, 2 May 1992). The period of Mr De Klerk’s presidency (Sept 1989 - Sept 1991) has also seen an increase of 8,8% in South Africa’s exports to Germany (Business Day, 13 May 1992). October 1991 witnessed the beginning of direct flights between Johannesburg and Athens, an indication of the improved relations between South Africa and Greece (Die Volksblad, 22 October 1991).

Pretoria’s relations with Austria has also improved. In September 1991 Austria decided to lift its ban on investments and export credits to South Africa. With the ban, trade between the two countries amounted to R720 million in 1990. Without the ban, economists say that this figure could easily quadruple. In the wake of the lifting of the ban, a large Austrian delegation visited the country. The delegation consisted of representatives of 35 of the largest Austrian companies and their aim was to increase and improve trade relations between the two countries (Argus, 24 October, 1991, E.P. Herald, 25 September 1991). Following this direct air-links between Vienna and Johannesburg were established (Business Day, 15 October 1991).

Shortly thereafter, it was learnt that CREDITANSTALT, Austria’s leading

Pretoria's relations with Italy are also on the rise, following the signing of an agreement on economic and industrial cooperation between the two countries. This trade agreement between Mr Vito Lattazzio, the Italian Minister of Foreign Trade, and the South African Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism, Dr Org Marais also contains an agreement whereby Italy pledges to loan the Republic $150 million or R420 million to encourage small and medium industries in the Republic (City Press, 18 August 1991, The Daily Dispatch, 16 October 1991; The Citizen, 16 October 1991). This was followed by the decision of Alitalia, the Italian Airlines, to increase the number of direct flights between Rome and Johannesburg (The Cape Times, 26 October 1991). Taking advantage of the new improved climate, several Italian firms, including the motor industry giant, Fiat, have returned to South Africa (Die Burger, 15 August 1991). The result of all these changes has been that Italy has become South Africa's largest export market, importing US$3 billion of South African goods and precious metals from South Africa in 1991 (EP Herald, 26 February 1992, Financial Mail, 10 April 1992).
The Republic's relations with the United States and Britain, its two strongest allies, continued to expand and strengthen during Mr De Klerk's presidency. In July 1991, the US lifted its oil embargo against South Africa and Britain played a key role in both the EC and the Commonwealth in introducing measures to dismantle sanctions against Pretoria (Argus, 6 February 1992). Britain's efforts would no doubt be supported by Portugal whose Cooperation Minister, Mr Jose Manuel Durao Barroso made clear his country's anti-sanctions stance (Argus, 3 October 1991). Spain, too, followed Britain's and Portugal's lead and sought to dismantle EC sanctions against South Africa (Argus, 11 October 1991).

Improved trade relations between Switzerland and South Africa resulted in half of South Africa's diamonds being exported to Switzerland and 85% of all the coal consumed in Switzerland coming from the Republic (Financial Mail, 10 May 1991).

Reasons for Pretoria's improved relations with the West are not hard to find. Areas of conflict have been removed or reduced whilst areas of cooperation have expanded between the Republic and the Western states.
The resolution of the Namibian issue, which began during the latter parts of Mr P.W. Botha's premiership and was finally settled during the early days of Mr De Klerk's leadership was an important obstacle removed in the warming of the Republic's relations with the West. Pretoria's part in the process leading to Namibian independence was welcomed and the credibility of the Pretoria regime was immediately enhanced in the capitals of the world (Hansard, 1989: cols. 138, 4882-4883; The Sunday Times, 3 September 1989). The settlement of Resolution 435 had, almost immediately, a positive impact on South Africa's diplomatic relations. For example, in September, 1989 Australia's most important state government, New South Wales, decided to re-admit South African Rotary Exchange students to government schools after a four-year ban (The Sunday Times, 17 September 1989). October, 1989 witnessed several Western states publicly talking of using more of the carrot and less of the stick in their dealings with Pretoria. And on November 24, 1989 members of the House of the Lords in England praised President De Klerk for his contribution to the Namibian independence process and lauded his reform initiatives (The Sunday Times, 26 November 1989).

The De Klerk Administration realizing the fear among Western states of South Africa's nuclear capacity and the possibility of Pretoria exporting such nuclear technology abroad have decided to assuage such fear by
acceding to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This has resulted in a warming of Pretoria's relations with Western nations. However, the Republic's desire to improve its relations with the West was not the only reason for Pretoria’s accession to the NPT. South Africa’s accession to the NPT and its objective of keeping Southern Africa as a nuclear free zone must be interpreted as a very real fear on the part of Pretoria that the FLS would acquire a nuclear arsenal possibly via Eastern European countries. Thus Foreign Minister Botha was quoted as saying "... the South African government is prepared to accede to the NPT in the context of an equal commitment by other states in the Southern African region" (Statement of South Africa's position on accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 17 September 1990).

South Africa's domestic policies were yet another factor adversely affecting the Republic’s relations with the West. Upon his accession to the leadership Mr De Klerk moved rapidly to remove this obstacle in the way of improving South Africa's relations with the nations of the world and specifically those of the West. However, it should be pointed out that Mr De Klerk's domestic policies were not only a result of his efforts to break the Republic's isolation but also as a result of internal pressure in the form of black resistance inside the country. Mr De Klerk's public
acknowledgement that white minority rule has to end, his release of political prisoners, all culminating in his February 2, 1990 speech to parliament which spoke of an end to apartheid, the unbanning of various political organisations such as the ANC, PAC and SACP have all served to create a much warmer type of relationship between the Western nations and Pretoria. This can be illustrated by the fact that immediately after the February 2 speech Mr De Klerk was hailed by Prime Minister Thatcher, President Bush, Chancellor Kohl, President Gorbachev, President Mitterand and a plethora of other leaders (The Sunday Times, February 4, 1990: 2). Moreover the European Community (EC) opened an office in Pretoria under the leadership of Mr Tim Sheety, the EC's Windhoek representative and Greek Prime Minister Mr Constantine Mitsotakis spoke of a review of sanctions (The Sunday Times, May 13, 1990). Prime Minister Thatcher and President Mario Soares of Portugal accepted invitations from Mr De Klerk to visit South Africa (The Sunday Times, May 20, 1990). Immediately following Mr De Klerk's February 2 speech Holland's cold war against the Republic showed signs of thawing when Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek invited Mr De Klerk to pay his country a visit. This invitation was followed by a Hague proposal to the EC to lift sanctions in 6 phases linked to the dismantling of apartheid (The Sunday Times, May 13, 1990). Across the Atlantic, in the US there was a marked softening of attitudes amongst members of Congress, Senate

Another factor which contributed to an improvement in Pretoria's relations with the West during Mr De Klerk's time is the decline in support such movements as the ANC received from Western governments. This decline in support for movements like the ANC was the result of 3 factors. Firstly, Mr De Klerk's unbanning of these movements and their being able to freely mobilize support in South Africa robbed them somewhat of their international support base. It was now argued that they should seek redress to their grievances via the legal channels of a political party now open to them. A concomitant of this is that President De Klerk's own domestic reforms and efforts to foster a more cooperative spirit amongst the states of Southern Africa served to improve his government's image in the eyes of the world. This resulted in the dropping of their former hostile attitude towards the Pretoria government and its replacement with a more supportive attitude. Secondly, the decline in Western support to the liberation movements can be seen in the context of its own personal bias against movements like the ANC (e.g. use of armed force, policies like socialism and nationalisation) and its traditional historic links with the Pretoria government. Finally, the cooling in the relations between the Western governments and the ANC must be sought in the ANC's
insensitivity to Western opinion. Thus Mr Mandela in praising the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) leader, Mr Yasser Arafat, angered the powerful Jewish lobby in Washington during his tour of the US in July, 1990. He also dismayed Washington policy-makers by telling them that the US should wait for a green light from the ANC before lifting sanctions. It was regarded as ill-considered interference in US domestic policy (Sunday Times, July 29, 1990). More recent talk of nationalisation on the part of the ANC has further soured relations between the ANC and Western states. The result of this has been a weakening of the amount of influence the ANC can exercise as an actor in the international arena. This was aptly illustrated during Mr Mandela's European tour in June, 1990.

Although his meetings with Chancellor Helmuth Kohl of Germany and President Mitterand of France had been extremely cordial, he came back empty-handed, since neither statesman opted to agree with Mr Mandela on the retention of sanctions (The Sunday Times, June 17, 1990). Neither did Mr Mandela fare any better across the Atlantic during his trip to the US. President Bush remained unmoved by Mr Mandela's calls for further sanctions and President Bush also refused to support Mr Mandela's proposals for a Constituent Assembly stating that the proposals were unclear on several points (The Sunday Times, 1 July
1990). The fact that South Africa had a greatly improved net capital flow of R1,5 billion in the third quarter of 1990 must also be interpreted as a failure on the part of the ANC, amidst its calls for the retention of sanctions. The fact that this was the first flow of capital in three years and the biggest since the last quarter of 1982 further underlines the success of Mr De Klerk's Pretoria-stroika (Sunday Times, 9 December 1990).

Yet another obstacle to the improvement of South Africa's relations with the West, i.e. that of Pretoria's appalling relations with the FLS, has also been removed under the leadership of Mr De Klerk. Mr De Klerk's efforts to bring peace to the sub-continent is widely recognised and his overtures to various leaders of the FLS are lauded in Western capitals (see Chapter 6 for more details). Moreover, Western support for the FLS was no longer seen as a source of antagonism by the new administration in Pretoria. In fact the De Klerk Administration sees Western involvement as essential for the development of the Southern African region.

This is certainly brought out in Mr Pik Botha's proposal for a Development Programme for Southern Africa (DEPSA), also called the "Marshall Plan". This plan aims to achieve economic growth and political stability in Southern Africa through regional integration on one level, and through a
partnership between South African business and development institutions and Western capital and know-how on another level. In more specific terms Pretoria sees the role of the West as providing funds, expertise, education and training to Southern African governments as well as to "... urge and assist (these governments) to create economic and legal conditions conducive to attracting local and foreign private investments in processing the manufacturing and other productive ventures ... and to promote steps to facilitate the importation of Southern African products into the European Community (and other Western markets)" (Address by Mr Pik Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Africa Institute, 30 October 1990: 9-16; Department of Foreign Affairs: All Heads of Mission - Overseas Countries Circular Minute No. 9 of 1990: Botha's M-Plan: Proposal for a Development Programme for Southern Africa (DEPSA), The Sunday Times, 19 November 1989).

There is ample evidence to suggest that Mr De Klerk has been extremely successful in the proposals for a Marshall-Plan for Southern Africa. As early as March 1990 US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mr Herman Cohen, stated that the US would encourage regional integration in Southern Africa (The Sunday Times, 18 March 1990, The Natal Mercury, 16 March 1990). This was followed by the formation of a new bank - the South African Development Bank (separate from the
Development Bank of Southern Africa) by US private capital. This new bank, spearheaded by the Rockefeller Foundation, was to form part of a huge multilateral aid strategy designed to form the basis of US policy towards a post-apartheid South African policy (*The Sunday Times*, 4 August 1991). The DEPSA proposals also seem to find support with the French. In October, 1991 Jean-Pierre Proteau, a leading French financier lead a high-level French business delegation to the Republic investigating ways in which trade could be expanded between the EC and a Southern African Community which includes South Africa (*Leadership*, October/November 1991). Dr Alexander Christiani, former Austrian Ambassador to South Africa and now director of the Middle East and African Department in Austria’s Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that he sees South Africa as the engine of development in Africa generally and Southern Africa, in particular. He therefore proclaimed his support for the Republic’s membership of both and OAU and SADCC as well as the DEPSA proposals (*The Star*, December 8, 1991). These views expressed by Dr Christiani, also find strong support with Italian President Francesco Cossiga who promised Italy’s active aid to South Africa in her efforts to harness the economic potential of Southern Africa. These views Mr Cossiga expressed to Pretoria’s Ambassador to Rome, Mr Glenn Babb (*Evening Post*, 12 July 1991; *Daily Dispatch*, 13 July 1991).
Meanwhile the EC has also displayed a deep interest in the DEPSA proposals, setting aside R200 million for development aid projects in South Africa. Brussels has also raised the prospect of South Africa's eventual admission to the Lomé Convention, where Third World countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific are given preferential treatment in agricultural exports to the EC (The Sunday Times, February 17, 1990).

The EC has made it clear that it would like to see a post-apartheid South Africa become the economic hub of sub-Saharan African. There are three major reasons for this view of the EC. First, the EC believes, quite rightly, that the Republic of South Africa with its rich mineral sources and developed infrastructure (e.g. rails, roads, harbours and technical skills) can make a large contribution in developing Southern Africa. Second, as Europe's attentions turns eastward on its own continent, it is keen to see Pretoria take on the burden of economic leadership in Africa. Finally, the EC would prefer to deal on a "bloc-on-bloc" basis rather than with a plethora of competing nations. Thus one finds Germany's Minister of Economic Cooperation Mr Jurgen Warnke who emphasised regional cooperation in Africa and stressing that Germany and its EC partners would like to see South Africa as a member of the Organisation of African Unity, the African Development Bank and the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference. One also finds President Mitterand of France proclaiming that he would like to see South Africa

Another obstacle to improved relations between South Africa and the West, that of the personality of the leader was also removed with the political demise of 'die groot krokodil' - Mr P.W. Botha - and the ascension of Mr F.W. De Klerk to the leadership. Mr Botha’s belligerent style, his defiance and intransigence in the face of Western pressure and his threats and vindictive nature (displayed in his counter-sanctioning FLS for Western sanctions against Pretoria) did much to sour relations between the Republic and the West. Mr De Klerk’s personal integrity, his ability to keep his word no matter how trying the circumstances and his honouring of his pledges, have all contributed to a thawing of relations between Western governments and South Africa. It is acknowledged that President De Klerk’s personal credibility was a major factor in creating a climate of trust that made dealing with the Pretoria regime much easier. President Bush, for example, after his marathon three-hour meeting with Mr De Klerk in September 1990, said that he was convinced that change in South Africa was irreversible (*The Sunday Times*, July 29, 1990; *The Sunday Tribune*, September 9, 1990; *The Sunday Times*, September 23,
President De Klerk is also far more pragmatic than his predecessor. This is illustrated by the fact that while both Presidents Botha and De Klerk resisted outside interference, Mr De Klerk unlike his predecessor did not attempt to build a wall around South and Southern Africa, instead he sought the active cooperation and involvement of the West in Southern Africa. Thus Mr De Klerk states,

"... any attempt to place Southern Africa on the road to prosperity will require the cooperation and involvement of the industrialised world"

(Press statement by the State President of the Republic of South Africa, Mr F.W. De Klerk Windhoek, 22 March, 1990).

Mr De Klerk also displays a quicker grasp of the changing face of reality than Mr Botha ever did. This can be seen as a product of Mr De Klerk's open-minded approach and his balanced rational judgement. For example, Mr De Klerk was quick to understand that the Republic could derive enormous advantages, especially economic advantage from current developments amongst Eastern bloc countries. He was also quick to grasp that the EC represents the biggest single market in the world and that South Africa could export to and import a great deal from
them if we maintain cordial relations with the EC states (Speech by Mr F.W. De Klerk, State President; Budget Vote, Joint-Sitting of Parliament, 19 April 1990).

There are two striking differences regarding relations between Pretoria and the various Western governments in the Botha and De Klerk periods. The first relates to the level of sophisticated threat analysis. Dr Chester Crocker, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs once remarked that what the Botha Administration lacked was the capacity for sophisticated threat analysis (Geldenhuys, 1991). The poor level of threat analysis during Mr Botha's time can closely be illustrated by the fact that he as well as senior members of his cabinet could not distinguish between the various pressures being exerted on Pretoria hence leading them to falsely conclude that Western sanctions was part of the total onslaught against the Republic. Members of Mr De Klerk's administration however display a high level of sophisticated threat analysis. A good example of this was when the US imposed new arms sanctions in October 1991 preventing South Africa from acquiring missiles and missile technology. Upon hearing this news Foreign Minister Pik Botha instead of responding with anger or frustration (a normal reaction with Mr Botha) stated quite simply,
"The sanctions must not be perceived as sanctions against the South African government, for having done anything of a political nature with which the United States does not agree. They are directed world-wide against the proliferation of missile technology" (The Sunday Times, October 13, 1991).

This was certainly an adequately threat analysis as it followed a decision by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a group of the 7 industrialised countries and Australia, to renew its efforts to end global nuclear proliferation, especially among Third World states (The Sunday Times, October 13, 1991).

The other major difference when comparing Pretoria's relations with the West in the Botha and De Klerk eras is to carefully select and target a state for specialised treatment. The Botha Administration had a very ad hoc way of conducting its relations with the West.

Some political commentators have called it a 'reactive' foreign policy in the sense that Mr Botha responded to overtures or threats made by certain states towards South Africa, or else a positive response on the part of these states to overtures made by the South African government.
Unlike his predecessor's reactive foreign policy - a great deal of forethought has gone into South Africa's foreign policy in the De Klerk era. This can be seen in the fact that President De Klerk and members of his administration carefully selected and targeted specific Western states for special treatment. This, of course, was largely the result of the fewer structural constraints placed on Pretoria's foreign relations in the post 2 February 1990 period when everyone sought to relate to the reforming Pretoria regime. This necessitated Pretoria's planners to prioritise which state it needed to relate to and in what way. Such was the case of Luxembourg, a tiny state consisting of only 250 000 people. On his October, 1990 European tour, Mr De Klerk not only included Luxembourg in his itinerary, but allocated to it a priority status. The reasons for this decision was not hard to find. Luxembourg was to occupy the presidency of the EC in January 1991 and its role as a banking and finance centre is beginning to threaten that of Switzerland (The Star, 22 October 1990; Pretoria News, 22 October 1990; Die Burger 26 October 1990; EP Herald, 26 October 1990).

Another case which springs to mind is that of Denmark, one of apartheid's bitterest opponents. Pretoria's strategic planners, realising the importance of Denmark, being the only Nordic member of The European Community had targeted the Copenhagen government for special
treatment; making overtures to Denmark from as early as 1989. The success Mr De Klerk has attained in this regard is borne out by the fact that in April 1990 the Copenhagen government sent Pretoria the name of a senior Danish diplomat for clearance as its first ambassador (*The Sunday Times*, 29 April 1990). March, 1991 witnessed the easing of Danish visa restrictions against South Africans. April 1991 saw President De Klerk and Foreign Minister Pik Botha visiting Denmark and August, 1991 witnessed increasing bilateral trade taking place between the two countries (*The Citizen*, 25 March 1991; *Argus*, 28 March 1991; *The Star*, 30 August 1991). Given the Danish government's historic anti-apartheid, pro-sanctions stance, this diplomatic breakthrough is all the more significant and once again illustrated the pragmatism of the De Klerk Administration.

**TACTICS EMPLOYED BY THE DE KLERK ADMINISTRATION IN ITS DEALINGS WITH THE WEST**

The vast difference in relations of the Pretoria regime with Western governments in the Botha and De Klerk eras is strikingly borne out in the tactics employed by the successive Pretoria Administrations. The difference in the tactics employed is to a large extent the result of Mr De Klerk having a firm grip on reality. Hence one finds that Mr De Klerk does not believe in a repudiation of the West as a viable strategy given
the fact that the Republic is dependent on the West for its economic survival. Neither does Mr De Klerk see exerting counter-pressure on FLS in the form of sanctions as a viable way to stave off further Western sanctions, since it simply provides an incentive for further sanctions. Given the tremendous changes in Eastern Europe, Mr De Klerk realises he can’t use the 'anti-communist mantle' to shield the Republic from Western sanctions. Neither does Mr De Klerk believe that his predecessors tactic of playing for time is any solution to South Africa’s problems since it only allows the problem to fester and serves to increase frustrations and anger and delays the search for a lasting solution. However, while there are tremendous differences in tactics employed by Mr Botha and Mr De Klerk in their dealings with the West, there are some similarities too and these will be discussed below. These are concessions, the "Halt Blacks will get hurt strategy"; using contact with African states to boost its relations with Western states; using Western states to improve Pretoria's relations with Africa; and finally arming pro-South African Western leaders to ward off sanctions.

CONCESSIONS

One finds that both the Botha and De Klerk Administrations made concessions to the West. However, the fundamental difference between these Administrations was how the concessions were obtained. Mr Botha
only made concessions when 'squeezed' into doing so, i.e. under threat. For example, he only withdrew SADF troops from Angola in December 1983 when the US threatened to no longer block UN sanctions against South Africa (Jaster, 1988: 67). President De Klerk however creates the impression that he volunteers to make these concessions of his own free will because he believes that it is the correct thing to do. Mr Nicholas Carlisle, a visiting British political scientist, puts it this way, "The president's (i.e. Mr De Klerk) integrity and credibility, borne out in doing the right-things not because of international pressure but because it is the moral thing to do will always allow him to occupy the high moral ground in the international arena" (BBC News, Africa Section, 21h00, October 15, 1991). Thus one find President De Klerk proclaiming that apartheid is immoral and that it has to go and that only through 'credible constitutional reform' can South Africa normalise its international relations with the countries of the world (Address by Mr F.W. De Klerk, State President, to the Financial Mail Conference on Investment in 1990, Johannesburg, 6 October 1989: 2, SABC TV, News, 20h00, October 15, 1991). This type of attitude obviously plays a positive role in facilitating relations between South Africa and the West since it gives the impression that both Western governments and Pretoria are on the same wavelength - in that apartheid has to go because it is unjust and immoral and not because of international pressure.
HALT! BLACKS WILL GET HURT

This strategy has been effectively used by Mr De Klerk in warding off any further sanctions as well as attempting to dislodge those already in place. Mr De Klerk points out regularly that sanctions will only retard the reform process and will negatively affect the economic position of blacks in South Africa. Hence Mr De Klerk proclaimed in London that,

"... South Africa is now more than ever in need of international investment to aid economic growth ... it (is) ... vital if political freedom for the black majority were to be meaningful" (Address by Mr F.W. De Klerk, State President of the Republic of South Africa, to the Institute of Directors, London, 23 April 1991 : 1).

Mr De Klerk, like his predecessor, claims that sanctions prevent South Africa from playing a constructive role in the economic development of Southern Africa and hence other states in the region will also be negatively affected by the sanctions placed on the Republic (Address by the State President, Mr F.W. De Klerk, Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Royal African Society, 23 April 1991 : 4; Address by Mr F.W. De Klerk, State President of the Republic of South Africa, to the Institute of Directors, London, 23 April 1991 : 2-3).
Although both Mr Botha and Mr De Klerk used this strategy, Mr Botha, unlike his successor, encountered little success. The reason is not hard to find. Mr De Klerk's personal credibility, coupled with his reform initiatives, simply makes this strategy far more believable coming out of Mr De Klerk's mouth than from Mr Botha's (*The Sunday Times*, July 29, 1990).

**THE WAY TO THE WEST IS VIA AFRICA**

As Mr Botha became increasingly disenchanted with the West, he sought to reduce all links with the West and sought to emphasise Pretoria's links with the rest of Africa (Jaster, 1988: 11). Mr De Klerk is also hoping to increase South Africa's contact with African states but not in an effort to reduce Pretoria's links with the West. In fact, Mr De Klerk hopes to boost Pretoria's relations with the West by emphasising the Republic's contact with Africa. This is clearly illustrated in the DEPSA proposal which sees Western capital and know-how in partnership with South African business interests trying to economically develop the sub-continent.

**USING WESTERN STATES TO IMPROVE SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA**

Unlike his short-sighted predecessor who rigidly compartmentalized the world into the West, East, The Third World and so forth, President De
Klerk displays a good grasp of the dynamic intra- as well as inter-power bloc relations. This is partly demonstrated by the fact that Mr De Klerk is using his improved relations with Western states as a gateway into Africa. For example, after his very successful visit to France and his extremely cordial meeting with President Francois Mitterand in May, 1990, Mr de Klerk followed this with a path-breaking tour to several African states, especially those in Francophone Africa. The reason for this was obvious. The French government enjoys wide respect and wields great influence in many African capitals, especially those which were formerly part of its vast colonial empire (Leadership, October/November 1991, The Sunday Times, May 27, 1990).

ARMING PRO-SOUTH AFRICAN WESTERN STATES TO WARD OFF SANCTIONS

This strategy was used mainly in the first few months of Mr De Klerk's reign when the threat of sanctions against the Republic still loomed large. Mr De Klerk sought to assist the West in resisting calls for sanctions, notably from the nations of the Afro-Asian bloc. For example, it is widely acknowledged that Mr De Klerk timed his release of eight political prisoners just before the Commonwealth meeting in October 1989 to provide British Premier, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, with the necessary ammunition to prevent any further sanctions being imposed on the
Republic by other Commonwealth states. In this he was very successful *(The Sunday Times, 15 October 1989)*. This stands in sharp contrast to Mr Botha, who to put it mildly, was most uncooperative in assisting the West in their anti-sanctions drive.

Thus we may conclude by stating that the Republic of South Africa has seen a dramatic improvement in its relations with the West under the leadership of President De Klerk.
CHAPTER FIVE

5. SOUTH AFRICA’S RELATIONS WITH THE EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES

SOUTH AFRICA’S RELATIONS WITH THE EASTERN BLOC DURING THE BOTHA ERA

The Republic’s relations with countries in the eastern bloc during the reign of Mr Botha was minimal and the contact that did take place was primarily conflictual. This can be illustrated by the fact that between 1977-1987 Pretoria’s relations with the eastern bloc countries comprised only 2,73% of its total foreign relations with other countries and 87,71% of the total contact between South Africa and eastern bloc countries were conflictive (Van Wyk, 1988 : 48). There were several reasons for the poor relations existing between the Republic and countries in the eastern bloc.

Firstly, there was the ideological reason. The National Party was firmly opposed to communism and did not take too kindly to the Soviet rhetoric of class struggle and the need to speed up a socialist revolution in South Africa (Friedman and Narsoo, 1989 : 1). The result was that a distinct threat perception surfaced among members of the Botha Administration.
This threat perception was further entrenched with the coming of independence to Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe with each proclaiming their Marxist credo. This threat perception among the Republic's decision-making elite about communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular is clearly reflected in the 'total onslaught' concept (Geldenhuys, 1984: 37-41). This is clearly reflected in the 1984 South African Institute of International Affairs which of elite decision-makers which revealed that 94.1% of the political elite and 82.8% of the bureaucratic elite maintained that there was a very real communist threat against the Republic which organized in the Kremlin. Neither was this threat perception unique to the Republic's policy-makers, it pervaded the spectrum of white public opinion. This is reflected, for example, in a 1988 survey of white public opinion which found that only 20.6% of respondents agreed with the statement that the communist threat against South Africa is exaggerated by the government (Du Pisani, 1988: 10).

Another reason for the poor relations between Pretoria and the eastern bloc states is the fact that communist states directly supported the actual armed struggle and provided financial assistance to such groups as the ANC (Geldenhuys 1984: 133). For example, in 1985 alone the ANC received R50 million from the Soviet Union (Nel, 1990: 12).
Finally, the Soviet Union's military support for the MPLA in Angola and Frelimo in Mozambique was perceived by Pretoria's decision-makers as a direct security threat to the Republic and served to further sour South Africa's relations with eastern bloc countries (Jaster, 1988 : 96-100).

However, relations between Pretoria and eastern bloc countries were not all bad. For all the differences, for all the antagonism there was still one area in which cooperation was still possible between the two countries and that was in the area of trade. In fact, trade had never ceased between South Africa and the eastern bloc even after the closure of the Soviet and Czechoslovak consulates in 1956 and 1963 respectively. However, towards the latter part of Mr Botha's rule one found increased trade taking place between countries behind the 'Iron Curtain' and South Africa in agricultural products, electrical supplies, consumer goods and even arms (Nel, 1990 : 37).

Moreover as trade sanctions, imposed by the West began to be felt, the Pretoria regime began to look for some sanctions-busting allies. In a capital-starved Soviet Union hungry for much needed foreign exchange they found just such an ally. Hence one found South Africa shipping large quantities of uranium to the Soviet Union who then reshipped them to the United States since United States sanctions laws prevented the

Furthermore, as more markets in the West were closed to goods of the apartheid state, the Botha Administration turned to the eastern bloc countries, even if this meant trading with communists. Politics took a back seat to pure economics. This new attitude was captured in the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Pik Botha’s response to the Conservative Party’s protests of the Republic’s trade relations with the Soviets:

"If the Russians, however, indicate of their own accord that they do not believe in boycotts, must I tell them on behalf of the Conservative Party: 'No, boycott us! Do not buy my farmers maize! Do not buy our oranges and coal!'" (Hansard, 1989: col. 5368).

**REASONS FOR CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICAN-SOVIEt RELATIONS**

The thaw in South African-Soviet relations was the result of changes taking place in both Moscow and Pretoria.

With the election of Mr Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 and his new line of thinking epitomised by the twin concepts of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) one found important changes taking place
throughout the eastern bloc countries.

At the 27th Congress of the CPSU in February and March 1986 Mr Gorbachev announced, what was to be a cornerstone of his foreign policy, an end to all regional conflicts (including Southern Africa) and the resolution of such conflicts by means of diplomacy and negotiation as opposed to violence; thereby reducing the Soviet Union's own role in such costly conflicts (Nel, 1990: 24). This new line of thinking in the Kremlin soon manifested itself on every level of Soviet foreign policy towards South Africa. The rhetoric of class struggle was abandoned and Soviet academics thought of new ways to allay white fears. For example, Dr Gleb Starushenko, Deputy Director of the Africa Institute's Southern African Department, stressed the need for group rights to be built into a post-apartheid political system (Friedman and Narsoo, 1989: 2). This new line of thinking also resulted in the USSR cooperating with the US in sponsoring peace initiatives in both South and Southern Africa (Moss, 1989: 164). For instance, the USSR together with the US played a vital role in Namibian independence. The Soviets are credited, by even South African diplomats, as playing an instrumental role in keeping both the Cubans and the MPLA at the negotiation table and in so doing keeping negotiations on track (Hansard, 1989, col. 5368).
This new thinking in Soviet foreign policy also resulted in the Soviets thinking that it is no longer wise to isolate the Republic. Thus as early as September 1987, the Soviet Union vetoed a proposal pushed by Nigeria to expel South Africa from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Nel, 1990: 32).

This new thinking was also reflected in Moscow's rapidly declining support for movements like the ANC and its pressuring them into negotiations. This can be illustrated by the fact that an ANC spokesman was quoted as saying in *The Los Angeles Times*:

"We are probably getting more pressure from Moscow to agree to negotiation, than we do from London or Washington today, and they are very critical of us when we say that the conditions are not yet ripe. They say that we should do more ourselves to improve conditions for talks, and to make compromise possible" (Nel, 1990: 35).

Efforts by the Soviets "to talk sense into" the ANC was certainly not lost on South Africa's policy-makers, and further contributed to a softening in Pretoria-Moscow relations. Thus Pík Botha was quoted as saying:

"Let me say very clearly that it is in this country's interest for the Soviet
Union to talk to the ANC and tell them bluntly that the season for violence is over and that it has to be stopped" (Hansard, 1989 : col. 7503).

Secondly, the fact that the Soviet Union was distancing itself from Marxism and moving towards a more democratic political system as well as a market economy was a further factor resulting in the softening of Pretoria’s attitude towards the Soviet Union (Hansard, 1989 : Cols. 7493-7496).

Finally, the Republic's trade relations with Comecon (Council for Common Economic Cooperation) countries has blossomed following Mr Gorbachev’s economic reforms. Mr Gorbachev sought to relieve Russian trade of bureaucratic mismanagement. The result of this has been a greater degree of freedom for individual producers, and trade organisations to develop new markets for their products abroad. The results of all this has been a greater degree of imports from eastern bloc countries. Hence, since 1987 one found Soviet manufactured goods such as motor vehicles, hunting rifles and household products such as jams and clocks for sale in South Africa. One also found Czech crystal, Hungarian porcelain, embroidered clothes and table cloths freely available in South Africa (Nel, 1990 : 37-38).
On the Soviet side they have been impressed by the fact that apartheid was slowly being dismantled in South Africa as well as South Africa's new commitment to play a more constructive role, and conversely a less destructive role, in Southern Africa. Although these changes were begun during the latter years of the Botha era they have gathered considerable momentum under Mr De Klerk. The Soviets have also been suitably impressed with the personality of the new State President of the Republic of South Africa. Hence, Mr Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet Foreign Minister, who after meeting with Mr De Klerk in Windhoek said, "My impression is that Mr De Klerk understands that apartheid is an anachronism in our time ...." (The Sunday Times, 25 March 1990 : 2). No doubt the Soviet's were also well aware of the contribution a vibrant South African economy could make to the Soviet Union's own chaotic economy.

More recent developments like the enforced resignation of Mr Gorbachev, the coming to power of the radical reformer Mr Boris Yeltsin with his attempts to restructure Russia's political systems along Western democratic lines and his passion for the free market economy have only served to consolidate this trend in the thawing relationship between Pretoria and Moscow.
The De Klerk era has seen a blossoming of USSR-RSA relations as areas of conflict between the two countries were removed. Thus one finds the Soviet Foreign Ministry proclaiming that only through dialogue can a new South Africa be attained. One also finds Mr Gorbachev's refusing to sign a R1.8 billion deal with President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe for sophisticated MiG-29 and MiG-31 jet interceptors; or to continue supplying the ANC with arms for guerrilla warfare (The Sunday Times, 25 March 1990). This must be seen in the context of Mr Gorbachev's commitment to end all regional conflicts.

The trade taking place between the Republic and the Soviet Union was consolidated and expanded during the present De Klerk era. Pretoria's desperate need for cheaper oil and the considerable need in the Soviet Union for food, consumer articles and certain minerals drove the two states to strengthen economic ties since statesmen of both countries realised that their economies need each other. Moreover, an economic alliance between the Soviet Union and South Africa based largely on an exchange of technology would be to the mutual benefit of both states. Further, the fact that the Soviet Union and South Africa have a near monopoly in several key minerals was yet another factor which
encouraged Soviet-South African trade. Thus senior South African officials began talking about the formation of a minerals cartel (specifically gold and diamonds) as this would give both states tremendous economic leverage in their dealings with other states (Nel, 1990: 98-108; Moorcraft, 1990: 39).

However, other writers such as Ian Roxborough (1991) and Rob Davies (1992) criticize Nel and Moorcraft's views. They give two reasons why a minerals cartel between Russia and South Africa will not work:

1. Both South Africa and Russia are likely to be large recipients of G7 aid and cannot antagonize potential donors.

2. The decline in the military-industrial complex has also meant a decline in the demand for so-called strategic minerals.

One of the most attractive benefits of expanding Soviet South African trade from the South African perspective was the fact that such an economic alliance would somewhat reduce Pretoria's near total dependence on trade with the West and give South Africa more flexibility in its economic trade relations with the economies of the world.

Another facet of South African-Soviet relations during the De Klerk era was not only increasing official contact between the countries but also
more informal links between the countries in the form of increasing contact between academics and businessmen from both countries. For example, in November, 1989 Soviet academics - Professor Appolon Davidson and Professor Irina Filatova visited the country as guests of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA) (The Sunday Times, 26 November 1989). Then in March 1990, Dr Valdimir Zelman, a visiting Soviet anaesthetist, invited South Africa to be the third partner in a US-Soviet medical programme (The Sunday Times, 1 April 1990). By August 1990, a visiting Soviet expert on South Africa, Dr Valdimir Tikhomirov, Secretary of the USSR Academy of Sciences Africa Institute, stated that those "black opposition groups" who insist on the use of violence to attain change in South Africa were only leading the country into anarchy (The Sunday Times, 19 August 1990). The press also reported several instances of South African and Soviet business men exchanging visits to each other. All these developments served only to underline and reinforce the tremendous improvements in USSR-RSA relations over the past few years.

Another sharp contrast when comparing the Botha and De Klerk eras is Pretoria's ability to objectively evaluate Soviet policy. Until 1988 South African foreign policy-makers, when making an important decision regarding the Soviet Union, relied on information supplied to them by the
National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Directorate for Military Intelligence (DMI). They alone dealt directly with Soviet policy towards South Africa. Given the personal inclinations of the personnel of those two organisations, particularly their anti-communist orientation, information regarding the activities of the USSR was more often than not cloaked in ideological terms, firmly within the total onslaught paradigm. The obvious result of this was that information being supplied to South African foreign policy-makers was heavily distorted by the personal bias of the individuals in the NIS and DMI (Nel, 1990 : 6-31). The obvious net product of this was incorrect policy decisions arrived at by Pretoria’s foreign policy decision-makers regarding the Soviet Union. Dr Vladimir Shubin, a member of the Politburo of the CCCP, and in charge of the Southern African section agrees with Nel’s assessment that ideological blinkers adversely affected the quality of the intelligence flowing to Pretoria’s decision-makers. More importantly, he believes that these individuals have not been able to adapt to the new circumstances of a post-total onslaught world. To substantiate this he gives the example of a regional security conference he attended in Windhoek in early 1993. During a break in the proceedings - two brigadiers in the SADF conspiratorially pulled him away from other delegates and pleaded with him to reveal his position in the ANC and SACP. When he truthfully answered that he occupies no position in either organisation nor ever did they refused to
believe him!

The De Klerk era has seen a significant improvement in South Africa's ability to realistically assess Soviet policy. With the decreasing input of military personnel into the policy-making process, the fact that the Department of Foreign Affairs for the first time established their own Soviet Section, the establishment of interest offices between the two countries, increased contact between the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and the Soviet Foreign Ministry and finally diplomatic contact between the two states has all served to reduce suspicion, build up feelings of confidence and finally increase the capacity of realistic Soviet threat assessment on the part of Pretoria's decision-makers (SABC TV1 News, 20h00, 25 October 1991). Thus when faced with Conservative Party (CP) animosity regarding increased South African contact with 'Communist Russia' Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha could easily have responded as early as 1989 with the following extracts of his speeches in Parliament:

"... but if the CP has not yet discovered that major shifts are occurring in Russia, they must now start taking note of that fact, because Russia has withdrawn from Afghanistan and has already played a silent role in helping to draw up a timetable for the Cuban withdrawal" (Hansard, 1989
"There is consequently no doubt that there have been changes in Russia. Too many firmly entrenched old, ultra-conservative Communist Party members lost on 26 March (reference to the elections held in the USSR in early 1989 which saw most Stalinist-inclined Party members losing their seats to the more liberal-minded Party members) for us to think that we are dealing with cosmetic changes. Too many of them lost. It is still a one party state, but for the first time they could vote for their candidates within the party, and honourable members know who lost and who were elected" (Hansard, 1989: col. 7500).

Freed from their ideological perceptions, Pretoria’s foreign policy-makers were able to make a more realistic assessment of the "Red threat" and this paved the way for increased cooperation between the two states.

This realistic assessment meant that Pretoria could now keep pace with the swift developments occurring in the Soviet Union as its empire began to disintegrate and a new confederal structure, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) began to emerge. Thus in November 1991 on the eve when the Ukraine was holding a referendum to decide whether to form a separate independent state, Foreign Affairs Minister, Pik Botha
visited the Ukraine where he held discussions with the Ukraine Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko. At a subsequent news conference in Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, Mr Botha said that South Africa wanted closer ties with the Ukraine through joint commercial ventures, cultural exchanges and cooperation in areas such as mining and technology (Pretoria News, 5 November 1991; The Evening Post, 6 November 1991). This trip to the Ukraine proved that Pretoria was keeping abreast of the latest developments in Eastern Europe, was aware of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and more importantly, because of the latter fact, realized its own inadequacy by maintaining ties only with Moscow and now sought to diversify and increase its ties with each major state in the former Soviet empire.

Another major difference in the conduct of South Africa’s foreign policy in the P.W. Botha and F.W. De Klerk eras relates to the objects of such relations. Mr Botha, in the latter years of his reign, sought to achieve Soviet cooperation itself, hoping that Moscow would reduce or even pressurise the ANC into giving up the armed struggle as well as pressurising the FLS into dialogue with the Pretoria regime. Mr Botha, doubtless, was also aware of the economic benefits cooperation between the two states would hold (Jaster, 1988 : 152). Mr De Klerk no doubt shares these goals of Mr Botha but he clearly does not see Soviet
cooperation as an end in itself. There are indications that Mr De Klerk may be using the Soviet Union as a gateway to other states who have traditionally had strong ties with the Eastern bloc countries, such as Cuba. There are also indications that Mr De Klerk is achieving success in this regard as well. For example, as early as December 1989 relations between Cuba and South Africa had thawed sufficiently for senior officials of the two countries to visit each other and the Cuban delegation was reported to have presented the South Africans with a gift of twenty rare Caribbean flamingoes (*The Sunday Times*, 3 December 1991).

There are certain obvious advantages connected with such contact. Firstly, it broadens the network of Pretoria’s diplomatic relations. Secondly, increased pressure may be placed on liberation movements like the ANC from its erstwhile staunchest allies. Finally, and more importantly, Cuba holds a great deal of sway in several Southern African capitals, most notably Luanda and Windhoek. South Africa may wish to use this influence to better its own relations with the states in the region.

Another substantial difference between the Botha and De Klerk periods in the conduct of their foreign relations with Eastern bloc countries was that for the former these relations took the form of almost exclusive contact with the Soviet Union. The De Klerk Administration is clearly of
the opinion that it is worth cultivating friends with states in Eastern Europe, specifically Hungary and Poland, due to the relative strength of their emerging free-market economies, and their potential political clout.

Hence in January 1990 Foreign Minster Mr Pik Botha visited Hungary where he held talks with his Hungarian counterpart, Mr Gyula Horn. The end product of the talks was a decision by both Foreign Ministers to strengthen relations between Budapest and Hungary in the political, cultural and economic spheres (The Sunday Times, 7 January 1990). On 31 March 1990 permanent missions were established between the two countries. These missions were to function above the level of consulates and "very soon" would be given the full status of embassies (Hansard, 1990 : cols. 7206-7207). Soon one found increasing economic activity between the two countries and as early as June 1990, South Africa's permanent representative to Hungary, Mr Nicky Scholtz stated that South Africa was supplying Hungary with building construction equipment, and he noted that Hungarian businessmen were keen to export television components, crockery and agricultural products to the Republic (The Sunday Times, 3 June 1990). The two countries concluded their first trade agreement in August, 1990. Soon after this agreement, Hungary began to export to South Africa, food, herbicides and other agricultural products as well as pharmaceuticals, rubber tyres and other industrial
goods. In the first four months of 1991, Hungary exported R2,9 million worth of goods to South Africa and imported South African goods valued at R750 000 (The Evening Post, 25 July 1991). One also witnessed burgeoning cultural liaison between the two countries throughout 1990, specifically in the fields of literature, music and the performing arts. Hungary also expressed the wish to have closer contact with the nearly 10 000 Hungarians living in the Republic (Hansard, 1990 : col. 7207). There was also increased tourism taking place between Hungary and South Africa which prompted the Hungarian airlines to apply to South Africa for landing rights. The Hungarian airlines also established direct flights between Budapest and Johannesburg (Die Beeld, 20 November 1991). Finally on the 24 July 1991 Hungary and South Africa established full diplomatic ties to ambassadorial status. Hungarian Foreign Ministry Secretary, Ferenc Somogyi, after signing the diplomatic agreement, told reporters that his signature signalled Hungary’s recognition of the constitutional changes that have taken place in South Africa (The Evening Post, 25 July 1991).

1990 also marked the turning point in Polish-South African relations. In January, 1990 a senior Polish Foreign Ministry official announced that his government was seeking closer liaison with Pretoria specifically in two
areas:

- increased trade relations between the two countries, and
- closer contact between the Polish authorities and South Africa's 7000 strong Polish community.

After Pretoria responded positively to these overtures there has been increased contact between the states, specifically in the form of reciprocal trade delegations (Hansard, 1990: col. 7207). After a 3-man Polish delegation visited the Republic in July 1991, the text of a trade agreement between the two countries was finalised. This trade agreement was later ratified and signed by Dr Org Marais, South Africa's Minister of Trade and Industry and Tourism in Warsaw in September 1991. The trade agreement said Mr Marek Kulczycki, Director of Foreign Economics Relations in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations who headed the delegation, signified an end to Polish sanctions against South Africa. According to the terms of the agreement Pretoria undertook to remove certain obstacles such as surcharges which made Polish consumer goods uncompetitive in South Africa. Mr Kulczyckie said it was estimated that the annual value of trade between the two countries would amount to US$50 million making South Africa Poland's largest trading partner in Africa. Poland exports agricultural products, ships, steel, minerals such as sulphur, clothing, motor vehicles and processed food
such as jam to the Republic. In the meantime, South Africa's exports to Poland are increasing and are becoming increasingly diversified including sophisticated mining equipment, wine, fruit, chocolates, manganese, iron ore, chemical wood pulp, manufactured goods such as domestic electrical appliances and safes and other security equipment. Dr Marais had also signed similar preferential trade agreements with Hungary and Czechoslovakia (Business Day, 5 September 1991; Business Day, 19 September 1991; Pretoria News, 22 July 1991).

But it was not only in the economic field that Pretoria and Warsaw were reaching out to each other. Progress also took place on the diplomatic front. In April 1991 South Africa and Poland established official diplomatic relations on consular level. In December, 1991 Polish Deputy Foreign Minster Jerzy Macarczyk, on a visit to the Republic, signed a protocol with Mr Pik Botha upgrading diplomatic representation between the two countries to ambassadorial level (Die Beeld, 19 December 1991; The Citizen, 19 December 1991; The EP Herald, 19 December 1991; Business Day, 18 December 1991).

Following the Polish government’s example, Rumania also began making overtures to the South African government in early 1990 and on 22 March 1990 the Rumanian Foreign Minister visited Cape Town where he had
talks with his South African counterpart - the product of which was described as "fruitful" (Hansard, 1990: col. 7207). Trade also blossomed between the two countries. In May 1991 the Northern Transvaal Chamber of Industries (NTCI) affiliate body, the International Chamber of Trade and Industry, had signed a cooperation agreement involving economic, cultural and sporting ties with the National Confederation of the Romanian Owners of Private Companies (Patronal). The confederation represents more than 100 000 employer organisations in Rumania that employ about 1,2 million people. The agreement follows a similar cooperation agreement signed in February 1991 with the Rumanian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. In terms of the pact, Rumania and South Africa, via the NTCI, were to strengthen economic relations through the expansion of trade, investment, joint ventures and any other economic activity (Pretoria News, 30 May 1991). Soon thereafter in November, 1991 Mr Adrian Nastase, Rumania's Foreign Minister visited Pretoria where he signed the relevant protocols establishing full diplomatic relations between the two countries at ambassadorial level (The Citizen, 22 November 1991; The Cape Times, 22 November 1991; The Natal Mercury, 23 November 1991, The EP Herald, 23 November 1991).

1991 was also the year when South Africa and Yugoslavia established diplomatic ties. In June 1991 the Yugoslav government in an effort to
increase economic ties with the Republic dispatched a two-man trade
delegation to South Africa. The delegation consisted of Mr Stojsoic
Nikola, president of the Chamber of the Economy for Vojvodina province,
the richest part of Yugoslavia and Mr Lain Radovan, an expert on
Yugoslavian business and foreign investment law (Die Beeld, 28 June
1991; The Citizen, 26 June 1991). In a reciprocal gesture, 12 South
African companies tested the opportunities of trade with Yugoslavia by
exhibiting at the Zagreb International Autumn Fair (The Star, 7 July 1991).

In November, 1991 Foreign Minister Pik Botha toured the 3 Baltic states
of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. During his visit to these states, Mr
Botha promised the Baltic states of South Africa's "active support" in their
efforts to get their respective economies back on their feet. In exchange
Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania agreed to establish full diplomatic relations
at ambassadorial level with Pretoria. A joint statement by the 3 Baltic
states stated that they had a full understanding of the reform process and
recognized the integrity of State President De Klerk as well as the
"unquestionable irreversibility of the reform process". The three states
had also indicated their unequivocal rejection of the tenets of Marxist
ideology, including notions of a planned centralised economy, one-party
system, mass demonstrations or intimidation. The statement also went
on to say that "... there is no difference between the basic political and
economic principles of the South African government and the governments of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania” (Business Day, 7 November 1991; The Citizen, 7 November 1991, Die Beeld, 7 November 1991). A more positive statement, Pretoria could not hope to have and the Baltic trip from the perspective of Mr Botha was certainly worth the effort.

Cash-strapped Bulgaria also followed the example of its neighbours. In an effort to boost its flagging tourist trade, Balkanair, the official Bulgarian state airline, decided to operate direct flights between Sofia and Johannesburg (The Argus, 6 August 1991). Trade relations between Bulgaria and South Africa also improved. This was clearly illustrated in November 1991 when the South African corporation, The Altron Group, signed a joint venture agreement with Bulgaria’s major electronic corporation Isotimpex. This bilateral deal provided for the development and exploitation of trade opportunities not only between Bulgaria and South Africa but also in Europe, Asia and other African countries (Business Day, 7 November 1991).

South Africa’s contacts with Eastern Europe obviously holds tremendous diplomatic and economic advantages for the Republic. Official contact with Eastern European countries served to broaden South Africa’s
diplomatic network, and gave Pretoria's foreign policy makers a great deal more flexibility in the conduct of the Republic's foreign relations. These developments also served to underline the fact that South Africa was losing its pariah status amongst the nations of the world extremely rapidly. In other words, greater diplomatic contact with the states in Eastern Europe increased the international legitimacy of the Pretoria regime. Greater economic contact between the Republic and the former Eastern bloc countries is not only beneficial for South Africa in terms of markets, investments, joint ventures and an exchange of technology but also in terms of the geographic positioning of these eastern European states. South African businessmen have already expressed the desire of using these states as a springboard to exploit markets in both Western Europe and the former Soviet Union. Thus South African businessmen do not lightly call these former Eastern bloc states, "... the dual gateway to the EC and the Soviet Commonwealth" (Business Day, 27 December 1991).

The tremendous importance Pretoria has attached to its relations with Eastern Europe can be clearly witnessed in the quality of its personnel staffing its various consulates and embassies in Eastern European states. In April, 1991 the Department of Foreign Affairs announced that Mr Nico W du Bois, a deputy-director of the Department had been appointed the
country’s first consul-general in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and Mr Pieter Cilliers was to take up the post of the first consul-general in Bucharest, Romania. Mr Jurie van Zyl Gryffenberg, a director of the Department, was appointed as the head of the newly established Office of Interests in Warsaw, Poland. The Department also announced that Mr Alewijn Burger, a deputy director, was to move to Sofia, Bulgaria, as head of the new Office of Interests. The four men have extensive experience overseas with Mr Van Zyl Gryffenberg having served in New York, Washington and Brussels and Mr Du Bois in Cologne, The Hague, Bonn and Munich. Mr Cilliers has served in London, Glasgow and Vienna and Mr Burger in Buenos Aires (The Citizen, 12 April 1991). The fact that these men are now holding Eastern European posts is indicative of the great importance Pretoria has attached to the region.

We have looked at this contact taking place between Eastern Europe and South Africa from the perspective of Pretoria. But what about the perspective of these former Eastern Bloc states?

Why have they, in many instances, initiated the contact and what can they expect to gain from it? The answer is not difficult to find. Upon achieving full political independence, the former Soviet satellites realized that they were still economically tied to Russia via Comecon. They are faced with
a rapidly distingegrating Soviet Union beset with economic difficulties resulting in the shrinking of the market due to the decline of purchasing power among ordinary citizens in the former Soviet Union. These former satellites realise the necessity to expand and diversify their trade relations. South Africa, with its combination of first and third worlds, proved to be both a market of sophisticated manufactured goods as well as a source of raw materials, sophisticated mining equipment and household appliances. The Republic was also seen as the "gateway into Africa". Emphasising the economic motivation behind these contacts it should be borne in mind that in nearly every case commercial relations preceded any diplomatic ties. Thus in the space of one week in August, 1991 South Africa signed business contracts which included a supply of shoes to Yugoslavia, household appliances to Hungary, 7 000 bakkies and 500 000 litres of wine to Poland (The Executive, August 1991).

There is a point of view represented by Davies (1989) amongst others, which expresses the position that the individual's own contribution to the policy-making process is minute, and that the determining factor for change is the force of real events and processes. As an extension of this they maintain that since the thawing of USSR-RSA relations began in the Botha era and continued during the De Klerk period, the personalities of these two leaders did not really affect the state of relations between the
two countries. Rather, they claim, the vehicle for the thawing in relations between the two countries must be sought in the objective conditions existing on the ground, as opposed to the subjective factor - the personality of the leaders.

Whilst acknowledging the vitally important role objective conditions play in change, it is equally clear that one cannot negate the subjective factor nor deny the interconnection or interplay between the objective and subjective factors. Jervis (1969 : 240) notes that it is not so much the objective conditions that matter, but the decision-makers perceptions of objective reality that matters. Jervis also notes resistance amongst policy-makers to changes or new information which contradicts their own "gut feelings". Thus Jervis (1969 : 240-242) states, "... decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images. Indeed, their theories and images play a large part in determining what they notice ... scholars and decision-makers are apt to err by being too wedded to the established view and too closed to new information as opposed to being too willing to alter their theories".

The above certainly describes Mr P.W. Botha's reaction to the domestic changes occurring in the Eastern Bloc. From as early as 1986, local Kremlin watchers were attempting to draw his attention to the momentous
developments occurring in the Soviet Union. However, he seemed to resist any attempt to convince him that there are important developments occurring there. Instead he continued to take refuge in the more familiar posture, that of "Rooi gevaar" as epitomised by the "total onslaught" concept. He only begrudgingly conceded that there were changes occurring in the Soviet Union as late as January 1988 after his meeting with the Bavarian premier, arch-conservative and pro-South Africa Dr Franz Josef Strauss who partially convinced him of the important changes there. But even then Mr Botha proceeded very cautiously and suspiciously, and as late as 1989 he continued with his anti-communist rhetoric (Nel, 1990: 47).

Thus it is my opinion that Mr Botha proved a major stumbling block for improved SA-USSR relations from as early as 1985. The argument that if Mr Botha had stayed in power, the present much-improved SA-USSR relations would have been attained is highly unlikely, since proponents of this view forget that it was the very fact that Mr Botha resisted these changes that lost him his place at the helm of the government.

So by way of summing we can conclude that:

a) while trade increased between the Republic and the Soviet Union during Mr Botha's time, it has been greatly expanded
during Mr De Klerk's period with talk of a formal economic alliance between the two countries;

b) while the primary form of contact between South Africa and the Eastern Bloc took place in formal terms, with envoys or diplomatic delegations sent by Mr Botha, under Mr De Klerk one sees an increase in the more informal contact as well especially in the form of visiting academics and private business delegations;

c) under Mr De Klerk one has seen an increased ability by Pretoria's decision-makers to objectively and realistically evaluate Soviet policy;

d) whilst Mr Botha saw improved Soviet-South African relations as an end in itself, Mr De Klerk sees it also as a means to other ends, for example, improved relations with Cuba;

e) the De Klerk Administration seeks to broaden the geographical scope of its contacts in the Eastern Bloc as opposed to just concentrating on the Soviet Union, as was the case with the Botha Administration.
CHAPTER SIX

6. SOUTH AFRICA’S RELATIONS WITH SOUTHERN AFRICA

There is no sharper contrast of the Republic’s foreign policy between the Botha and de Klerk eras than in South Africa’s relations with its Southern African neighbours.

SOUTH AFRICA’S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS DURING THE BOTHA ERA

Pretoria’s relations with its neighbours during the premiership of Mr Botha were primarily one of conflict. The reasons for this were not hard to find. South Africa’s racial policies, its continued occupation of Namibia, its creation of new black states the former ‘bantustans’, its military attacks on its neighbours all served to antagonise African opinion against the Pretoria regime (Geldenhuys, 1984: 41, 100; Jaster, 1988: 92).

On the South African side, the Marxist orientation of many Southern African governments, as well as their support of “terrorism” against the Republic in the form of their providing bases for the ANC’s armed wing,
"Umkhonto We Sizwe ('Spear of the Nation') was a source of conflict with the Frontline States (FLS) (Barber and Barrat, 1990: 272; Geldenhuys, 1984: 37, 179; Esterhuyse, 1990: 78). Pretoria was also very unhappy about the huge Cuban presence in Angola, which numbered more than 40 000 in 1988 (Jaster, 1988: 102). Given the numerous sources of conflict between South Africa and the rest of the continent in general, and its neighbours in particular, it was no surprise that during Mr Botha's time South Africa enjoyed diplomatic relations with only one internationally recognized African state - Malawi (Geldenhuys, 1984: 133).

However, Pretoria's relations with its neighbours was not all conflict. There was also a degree, albeit a small degree, of cooperation taking place between Pretoria and its neighbours during Mr Botha's time and this cooperation took place in the field of trade. This trade is rather ironic taken in the context of the hostile state of relations existing between South Africa and its neighbours. However, it is hardly surprising if one has to consider the level of economic interdependence existing between the countries of Southern Africa. Most of the states in the sub-continent are dependent on the Republic for capital investments, technology transfers, grain, labour markets and harbour facilities. However, South Africa is also, to a certain extent, economically dependent on its neighbours as a source of markets for its manufactured goods. Endless
examples abound which graphically illustrate this trade taking place between Pretoria and the FLS during the Botha era. Botswana, Lesotho and Zimbabwe obtain their supplies of refined petroleum from South Africa. During 1978 as much as 38% of Malawi's imports came from the Republic (Rotberg, 1981 : 97). And in spite of strained relations on account of Pretoria's support of the MNR and Mozambique's failure to expel ANC operatives, trade relations between the two countries blossomed with the establishment of South Africa's permanent trade representative in Maputo in 1987. And in May 1987 South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs spokesmen announced that Pretoria would make available US$1.5 million for the upgrading and expansion of Maputo harbour. Then in the mid-1980's, the Southern African Development Bank, established by South Africa in 1983 to provide economic development financing to the former nominally independent black 'homelands' of South Africa, began to turn its attention to the neighbouring independent states. Thus by 1987 the bank made loans available to Swaziland for a river basin development project and to Mozambique for a forestry development plan (Jaster, 1988 : 153).

**TACTICS EMPLOYED BY THE BOTHA ADMINISTRATION IN ITS DEALINGS WITH NEIGHBOURING STATES**

There were two broad tactics employed by the Botha Administration in its
dealings with the FLS - these were assertive and coercive incorporation. The aim of both these tactics or strains of regional incorporation was to keep the neighbouring states directly or indirectly under Pretoria’s sphere of influence (Barber and Barrat, 1990: 268; Vale, 1987: 176-184).

**ASSERTIVE INCORPORATION**

Assertive incorporation entailed the use of certain "economic disincentives" by the Pretoria regime against the FLS in order to pressurise them to comply with Pretoria’s wishes (Vale, 1987: 182).

Assertive incorporation was used in various degrees, ranging from the benevolent to the belligerent. An example of the former: in 1982 Pretoria wished to reward Swaziland for entering into a security arrangement with South Africa and intended to hand over the KaNgwane-Ingwavuma area in northern Natal to the Swazi government. An example of the belligerent approach: On 20 January 1986 when the Jonathan government fell in a military coup led by General Justice Lekhanya after several weeks of economic blockade imposed upon Lesotho by Pretoria (Grundy, 1988: 81, 99). The underlying rationale was clear - those states which cooperated with the Pretoria regime in its regional designs were to be materially rewarded. However, those states which served as an obstacle to South Africa’s regional designs were to be economically punished.
This was aptly illustrated in the case of Zimbabwe. In early 1981 President Mugabe had voiced strong anti-apartheid sentiments and called for sanctions against Pretoria. The Botha Administration's response was immediate. South Africa recalled one hundred and fifty railway technicians and twenty-five locomotives, leaving Zimbabwe's railway system in disarray, preventing Zimbabwe from marketing a bumper grain harvest (Barber and Barrat, 1990 : 268).

The assertive incorporation arsenal included outright blockades, manipulation of migrant labour flows and custom union revenues, delays in supplying essential commodities and the delay of transit cargoes (Dekker, 1983 : 68; Grundy, 1988 : 81, 99; Davies et al., 1988 : 9).

Ideas of assertive incorporation culminated in a vision by Foreign Minister Pik Botha in March 1979 of a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) - an anti-Marxist regional grouping (Vale, 1987 : 183; Grundy, 1988 : 86). CONSAS was to consist of between seven and ten states south of the Kunene and Zambezi Rivers who were to devise a 'common approach' in the security, the economic and even the political arenas! CONSAS was to include Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Rhodesia, Namibia, South Africa and its three 'independent' homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, with the possibility of also
including Mozambique and Zambia at a later date. CONSAS, with its heavy security bias, must be seen primarily as a defensive strategy by the Pretoria regime in order to thwart the perceived 'total onslaught' against the Republic (Geldenhuys, 1984 : 41). In exchange for their cooperation in the Republic's regional designs, these states were to be materially rewarded. However, CONSAS failed. There were several reason for this failure. Firstly, the massive electoral defeat suffered by the South African-supported United African National Congress (UANC) of Bishop Abel Muzorewa at the hands of the Marxist Robert Mugabe. This was the 'first nail in the coffin' of the CONSAS proposals (Vale, 1987 : 185). Secondly, the independent FLS, all members of the OAU, were also reluctant to join a formal association with the non-recognized former "bantustans" and South African controlled Namibia, as full and equal partners. Thirdly, the Pretoria government's domestic racial policies and the political and ideological differences existing between South Africa and its neighbours also prevented the constellation proposals from becoming a reality (Geldenhuys, 1984 : 41). Finally, the fact that there was no consultation with the FLS, on the part of Pretoria, regarding the formulation of the CONSAS proposals, gave the FLS an added reason to reject the constellation. Thus one finds that the Pretoria regime's CONSAS proposal was restricted to South Africa and its former 'homelands'. 
In an effort to break loose of Pretoria's regional economic hegemony and to demonstrate their rejection of the CONSAS proposals, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe in 1979 launched their own regional grouping - the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) as a direct counter-constellation to Pretoria's CONSAS proposals (Tangri, 1985: 143). Some writers such as Tangri (1985: 144) maintain that SADCC represented a clear challenge to Pretoria's regional designs and reduced or negated South Africa's tactics of assertive incorporation. However, Chan (1987) and Moorcraft (1990) do not agree with Tangri's viewpoint, and instead they argue that the establishment of SADCC in 1979 actually resulted in the perpetuation of the economic dependence of the FLS on the Republic, hence reinforcing Pretoria's strategy of assertive incorporation. Chan (1987: 155) puts it this way, "The more SADCC becomes a truly functioning example of interdependence amongst its members the more easily can South African interference ripple out to the region at large". This was aptly illustrated when attacks against the transport system in Mozambique forced Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe to use South African ports and put these countries in a very real position of dependence upon South Africa (Chan, 1987: 156).

Moreover, given their own internal problems and the Republic's economic
dominance in the sub-continent it was laughable to even contemplate SADCC reducing economic links with Pretoria. Lesotho was surrounded by South African territory and all its foreign trade went through this literally all embracing giant - the Republic of South Africa. Malawi was almost completely dependent upon South African trade and development loans. Sanctions and war kept Zimbabwe firmly under the South African thumb. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were firmly tied to Pretoria by a customs union and the rand monetary zone. As for Mozambique, its power, post and railway access were kept functioning by South African personnel. Whilst Angola and Tanzania were further removed from Pretoria's economic tentacles, compared to the other FLS, Angola's scarce resources were committed almost entirely to its civil war and Nyerere had reduced Tanzania to an economic basket case. Furthermore, most of the mines in the FLS were run by Anglo-American. As one senior SADCC official laconically commented, "SADCC does not have to worry about the regional coordination of mining; Anglo-American already does it" (Moorcraft, 1990: 166). To make a bad situation worse, most of the SADCC states rail and road routes were either closed by war or disrupted by poor maintenance. Moreover, both black and white businessmen were used to dealing with Johannesburg, since better goods came from Johannesburg and far more quickly than from Europe. Hence much of the foreign aid donated to Sweden ended up in the vaults of
Johannesburg banks. Sweden, for example, actually had to prohibit Mozambique from using its aid to buy goods from South Africa (Moorcraft, 1990: 166).

There is no doubt that the Republic derived advantage from this strategy of assertive incorporation in the short term. However, in the medium to long term, it had severe drawbacks. First, actions such as counter-sanctioning regional states only resulted in denying South African business access to lucrative regional markets and this resulted in the South African economy being negatively affected, especially at a time when it was being denied access to markets abroad. Second, tactics like assertive incorporation not only soured the Republic's relations with its neighbouring states, but also further entrenched South Africa's pariah status in the international community.

COERCIVE INCORPORATION

Given the worsening security situation, the failure of CONSAS, and the rise of the securocrats in Pretoria's decision-making structures, Pretoria moves to abandon the policy of assertive incorporation and opts for a second strategy, that of coercive incorporation. Coercive incorporation entailed the use of military instruments to force the FLS to comply with Pretoria's demands.
Like assertive incorporation, coercive incorporation operated on several levels. It ranged from the use of death squads (to assassinate key government personnel and ANC operatives in the FLS,) to the support of proxy groups (like Renamo in Mozambique, UNITA in Angola, the "Super-Zapu" in Zimbabwe, the Lesotho Liberation Army in Lesotho and the Mashala gang in Zambia). It also involved commando raids and air strikes (as was the case in 1985 when South African commandos attempted to sabotage the US-owned Gulf Oil in Angola's northern enclave, Cabinda) and, finally, there were full-scale conventional military invasions as in the case of Angola (Davies et al., 1988: 8; Grundy, 1988: 127; Chan, 1987: 152; Evans and Phillips, 1988: 126-127).

Undoubtedly the FLS suffered greatly because of Pretoria's strategy of coercive incorporation. For example, South Africa's aggression had cost Angola US$10 billion and had made over 100,000 people homeless (Tangri, 1985: 137). And by 1984 direct South African aggression together with the activities of the South African-backed Renamo had cost Mozambique US$38 billion with 140 villages, 840 schools, 900 rural shops and over 200 health institutions destroyed (Davies, et al., 1988: 5).

There is no doubt that Pretoria achieved a great deal of benefit from
employing the strategy of coercive incorporation, since faced with mass
destruction the FLS began to adopt tougher measures towards ANC
activities and to confer jointly with South African officials about border
violations (Jaster, 1988 : 154). However, there were several drawbacks
connected with the use of coercive incorporation. First, whilst the
cultivation of proxy groups like Renamo and UNITA are advantageous in
that they are "low cost, low risk" instruments of foreign policy, some have
the capacity to become 'Frankenstein monsters' with political minds of
their own (Grundy, 1988 : 127). This certainly was the case with
Renamo. In early 1987, South Africa realized that it was in its own
interests to secure peace in Mozambique between Frelimo and Renamo.
However Pretoria's protege Alfonso Dhlakama, leader of the MNR,
resisted all attempts by South Africa to force him to agree to a cease-fire
with Frelimo. Foreign Minister Pik Botha then devoted a great deal of
time and energy to persuade suspected governments to end their
assistance to Renamo. However, Renamo seemed increasingly able to
operate beyond Pretoria's control. Funds and supplies were thought to
be reaching Renamo through the Comores Islands, Tanzania and Malawi
and from sources in Portugal, Germany and the Middle East as well as
from private and public groups within South Africa (Grundy, 1988 : 97).
Thus the MNR had turned into a severe liability for Pretoria. Secondly,
the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy must be seen as a very
tenuous and short-sighted strategy since any change in the balance of power, (as had occurred at Cuito Cuanavale,) results in the advantage passing over to one's better armed opponent.

Taken together, assertive and coercive incorporation was part of Pretoria's regional policy of destabilisation directed at the FLS. The aim of this destabilisation was primarily defensive in that it sought to create a buffer of unstable countries. However, instability on the borders cannot provide a buffer of security, but rather a source of insecurity. This was aptly illustrated by the fact that Pretoria's own interests were adversely affected by its surrogate force, Renamo, in Mozambique when South Africa suffered the loss of power from Cahora Bassa and sabotage of the railroad carrying exports to Maputo (Barber and Barrat, 1990 : 272).

This then, in a nutshell, was the Botha Administration's relations with the FLS.

**SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS DURING THE DE KLERK ERA**

If the relations between South Africa and its neighbouring states during the Botha era were characterised by conflict then Pretoria's relations with
its neighbours during the leadership of Mr De Klerk has been characterised by cooperation. But what accounts for this cooperation? Ofoegbu (1980 : 39-40) maintains that the following set of four conditions facilitates cooperative behaviour:

1. "When the interests and objectives of actors in the international system converge and become compatible. Such convergence on goals arouses both the consciousness and awareness of the benefits and advantages of cooperation.

2. There may exist a common external source of danger which may induce actors that are so threatened to work jointly in ways that are essentially harmonious.

3. The realities of common problems which can be more effectively solved by working together than by "going it alone" may also induce patterns of cooperation.

4. As long as international actors respect and observe laws, treaties, agreements, rules and customary usages which bind them and regulate their intercourse, and which most of them freely enter into, the general pattern of their relations will be governed by cooperation and collaboration".

We can see each of the four conditions at play, facilitating cooperative
behaviour from as early as 1989. The dismantling of apartheid, the settlement of Namibian independence, and the fact that President De Klerk spoke of the reincorporation of the TBVC states into the Republic of South Africa as a "distinct likelihood," all resulted in major areas of conflict between South Africa and its neighbouring states diminishing (Hansard, 1990: col. 5). And on the part of the FLS, such as in the case of Mozambique, President Joaquim Chissano distanced himself and his party from Marxism and a single-party state in a landmark Frelimo Congress in June 1989 (The Sunday Times, 3 June 1990). The blurring of ideological differences between Pretoria and the FLS in general, but Mozambique in particular, was also illustrated in March 1990 when Mozambican Prime Minister Dr Mano Machungo warned the ANC against the introduction of socialism in South Africa (The Sunday Times, 11 March 1990). Once more underlining this new convergence of interests one finds by March 1990 President De Klerk launching economic aid programmes to rebuild both Angola's and Mozambique's shattered economies; between April and June 1991 one finds the SADF assisting in drought relief in Malawi; and by September 1991 Malawi and South Africa engaging in joint development programmes (The Sunday Times, 4 March 1990; The Cape Times, 13 April 1991; The Star, 23 May 1991; Paratus, June 1991, The Natal Witness, 3 September 1991; The Citizen, 3 September 1991). In a remarkable example of the rapprochement

The existence of an external source of danger has also played a vital role in inducing patterns of cooperative behaviour amongst the countries of Southern Africa. There are indications which suggest that the amount of aid to the nations of Africa, and especially Southern Africa, will be severely reduced since much of European aid will be directed to countries in Eastern Europe. Realising this, the nations of Southern Africa have begun to look to each other for assistance (Hansard, 1990, col. 4; Address by the State President, Mr F.W. De Klerk : Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Royal African Society, London, 23 April 1991 : 4). The existence of a post Cold War, multi-polar world also poses challenges to the nations of Southern Africa. Countries in Southern Africa realize that a balkanized Southern Africa stands no chance of competing with power-blocs like Europe 1992, the economic union of the US, Canada and Mexico and now talks of a merging of the "Five Tigers" in the Pacific. Hence one finds the states of the sub-continent making
overtures to each other in an effort to form their own power bloc. This can be illustrated by, for example, Pretoria’s DEPSA proposals, Lesotho’s desire to give up its independence and become part of a greater Southern Africa, as well as an invitation by the Vice-President of the African Development Bank, Mr Adewale Sangowawa, for the Republic to become a member of the Bank (Hansard, 1989: Col. 7560; The Weekly Mail, 11-17 January 1991; The Weekly Mail, 1-7 February 1991; The Cape Times, 18 March 1991; The EP Herald, 18 March 1991; The Citizen, 23 April 1991).

The realities of common problems which can be more effectively solved by working together has also induced more cooperative behaviour. This is aptly illustrated by the growing willingness amongst actors in the region to enter into direct discussion with South Africa about the economic development of the subcontinent and the problems which they jointly share. For example, a conference of the World Economic Forum in Geneva was held on 1 and 2 October 1990 to discuss the prospects for economic growth in Southern Africa. It included Ministers and other senior officials from Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, Zambia, Namibia and South Africa together with representatives from the World Bank, African Development Bank and the European Community Commission. Further, South African political parties ranging from the ANC, PAC and
Inkatha to the Conservative Party jointly discussed ways to overcome obstacles to the economic development of the sub-continent (Address by Mr R.F. Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Africa Institute, Pretoria, 30 October 1990: 8).

One also finds a new respect for laws, agreements and treaties amongst the nations of the sub-continent. This is illustrated by the fact that the states of Southern Africa are displaying a greater respect for the principle of national sovereignty (Toespraak deur Mnr F.W. De Klerk, met sy inhuldiging as Staatspresident, Pretoria, 20 September 1989: 11). It is also illustrated by the fact that an agreement between South Africa and Angola in March 1990 to cease aid to UNITA and the ANC respectively has been honoured to this day (The Sunday Times, 4 March 1990). This stands in sharp contrast to Mr Botha, who after signing the Nkomati Accord in 1984, which forbade Pretoria from supporting Renamo, continued with aid to Renamo. This honouring of agreements and promises further facilitates cooperation between the states of Southern Africa by building mutual trust.

**TACTICS EMPLOYED BY THE DE KLERK ADMINISTRATION IN ITS DEALINGS WITH NEIGHBOURING STATES**

The tactics, a specific state follows in its dealings with other states is
closely associated with its perception of its national role. Holsti (1983: 116) in his discussion of national roles has this to say, "... national roles are foreign policy outputs associated only with states that are involved in systemwide and regional affairs ... We can consider a national role conception as the policy-makers' definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state and of the functions their state should perform in a variety of geographic and issue settings ... Roles, too, reflect basic predispositions, fears and attitudes towards the outside world as well as systemic, geographic economic variables. But they are more specific than orientations because they suggest or lead to more discrete acts". For instance, we could predict with reasonable probability that a government that constantly portrays itself as a "mediator" would, when confronted with a regional or world conflict, offer to intervene in various conflict resolving ways.

The statements and actions of the De Klerk Administration leads one to conclude that they see South Africa as having three separate, yet interconnected, national roles. These are "mediator", "regional leader", and "developer".

**MEDIATOR**

Several governments perceive themselves as responsible for mediating
in conflicts concerning other states or groups of states. They see themselves as regional or global 'fixers' (Holsti, 1983: 118). It is clear that President De Klerk and his government see themselves as playing just such a role to end all conflict and bringing peace to the Southern African region (Toespraak deur Mnr F.W. De Klerk, Staatspresident, Presidentsraad, 16 November 1989: 17; Press Statement by the State President of the Republic of South Africa, Mr F.W. De Klerk, Windhoek, 22 March 1990: 2). This was clearly borne out in September 1989 when there was a strong possibility that the ceasefire agreed upon at Gbadolite between the MPLA and UNITA was breaking down. Mr De Klerk paid hurried visits to President Mobutu and President Kaunda in Zaire and Zambia respectively, and in doing so, it is widely acknowledged, prevented the Angolan talks from breaking down completely (The Sunday Times, 3 September 1989). Another illustration of this occurred in May 1990, when South Africa played an instrumental role in getting Mozambique's Frelimo and Renamo to meet in Lisbon in an effort to bring peace to that strife-torn country (The Sunday Times, 3 June 1990).

REGIONAL LEADER

This national role conception refers to special duties or obligations that a government perceives itself as having in relation to the states in its region. The themes in this role conception are prominent in America’s
conception of its international task as 'global policeman' as well as in Libyan statements on its position in the Middle East (for example, statements on its being the protector of the region against Western imperialism and its superior Islamic system vis-a-vis the other states in the region) (Holsti, 1983: 117). It is also evident in the De Klerk Administration's perceptions of its regional role. President De Klerk, for example, made several speeches referring to South Africa as the "king-pin" of Southern Africa on account of it being the economic powerhouse in the region, and on account of its "knowledge, experience and intellectual resources" (Toespraak deur, Mnr F.W. De Klerk, Staatspresident, by the geleentheid van the Statspresident se toekennng vir uitvoerprestasies, 20 November 1989, Johannesburg: 7; Address by Mr F.W. De Klerk, State President of the Republic of South Africa, to the Institute of Directors, London 23 April 1991: 2). One can also see such a role conception permeating Mr Pik Botha's DEPSA proposal which sees South African business interests in partnership with Western capital and technology developing the sub-continent (Department of Foreign Affairs: All Heads of Mission - Overseas Countries Circular No. 9 of 1990: 'Botha's M Plan': Proposal for a Development Programme for Southern Africa: 1).
The themes in this role conception are closely related to the preceding one - that of regional leader. A government sees itself as having a special responsibility to assist developing countries. Reference to special skills or advantages a country might possess is often used as a justification for undertaking such a role. Most First World countries see this as one of their international or regional roles (Holsti, 1983: 118). Statements by senior members of the De Klerk Administration leads one to conclude that the Pretoria government perceives itself as a regional developer (Toespraak deur Mnr F.W. De Klerk met sy inhuldigning as Staatspresident, Pretoria, 20 September 1989: 11; Address by Mr R.F. Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Africa Institue, Pretoria, 30 October 1990: 8). One can also see this role conception at play in Pretoria's economic aid packages to Angola and Mozambique, as well as the assistance rendered to Malawi after the floods of May/June 1991 devastated its infrastructure. Another instance was Pretoria's dispatch of six locomotives to Zimbabwe to provide desperately needed coal to its tobacco farmers in Mashonaland after a monumental logjam in Zimbabwe's rail traffic resulted from the theft of signal cables near Huange (The Cape Times, 13 April 1991; The Star, 23 May 1991; Paratus, June 1991; The Sunday Times, 22 October 1989). One can also witness the themes in this role conception prevalent in Pretoria's DEPSA proposals.
CRITIQUE

There is no doubt that President De Klerk has extracted tremendous advantage from tactics like playing the regional peace broker as well as being seen to economically assist his less well-endowed neighbours. His credibility both within the region and internationally has been enhanced. It has also facilitated South Africa's return to the international community and away from its position as moral leper in the world. However, the above tactics do have their drawbacks. For instance, while the role of mediator has certain advantages it also has certain inherent dangers. While an area of dispute which is settled amicably to the mutual satisfaction of the parties concerned would enhance the stature of the mediator (in this case South Africa); the converse is also true. This was aptly illustrated in the case of the Felimo-Renamo peace talks when both parties to the conflict lost confidence in the two official mediators - Present Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya and President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe (The Sunday Times, 3 June 1990). This inherent danger in the mediator role must be further stressed given the fact that South Africa, in the past, has been a key participant in almost all conflicts in the region.

The national roles of regional leader and developer are similarly problematic. Both these role conceptions accord to the FLS an essentially passive position in the development of the sub-continent. It
is also paternalistic in the sense that the underlying message is: "South Africa, the economic powerhouse of the region, will lead our poor, backward neighbours into a brighter future by benevolently developing the entire region". This type of approach might very well lead to feelings of animosity on the part of our neighbours towards the Republic. This can be seen in the case of Zimbabwe who like South Africa, saw herself as the fulcrum of the region. Within SADCC states there was resentment towards Harare as well as fears that Zimbabwe sought to dominate SADCC (Chan, 1987: 125). This type of approach, then, might contribute to fear amongst the FLS that Pretoria seeks to dominate the region, by more subtle means.

PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

No discussion of President De Klerk's regional policy would be complete without briefly looking at the prospects for regional integration which is fundamental to the DEPSA proposals.

Various writers have defined integration differently. Karl Deutsch sees integration as "... the attainment within a territory of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough to assure for a long time dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population" (Hodges, 1978: 237). Ernst Haas defined integration as a
process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states (Dougherty and Pfuffzgraff, 1981: 421). Johan Galtung, on the other hand, simply describes integration as "... a process by which cultural, political and economic interdependence between actors is increased" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1981: 423).

Whilst differences might exist amongst the above writers of what exactly integration is, all three concur that integration results in increased multilateral cooperation amongst the states concerned.

There is no doubt that the states of Southern Africa need each other and would greatly benefit from this multilateral cooperation. For example, Mozambique in 1987 imported R2 200 million worth of goods while its exports (mostly prawns and cashew nuts) were valued at only R4 500 million. It is now one of the poorest nations on earth with a foreign debt estimated at R10,5 billion. Mozambique looks to South Africa for capital and technology transfers. On the other hand, however, Mozambique could offer the nations of Southern Africa a great deal given its good hydroelectrical, agricultural and mining prospects and harbour facilities. Moreover, in 1987 Frelimo launched an economic reconstruction
programme which sought to move the country steadily to a free market economy. By 1990, this programme was already bearing fruit with the economy showing a 4% growth rate (*The Sunday Times*, 9 September 1990).

Integration amongst the states of Southern Africa would also benefit South Africa, increasing its access to the lucrative markets of Southern Africa. However, the Republic's integration into the sub-continent would provide tremendous advantage to her neighbours given the giantism of the South African economy in the regional context. This dominating capacity is clearly evident in the fact that the Republic accounts for nearly 80% of the Gross National Production of Southern Africa (Geldenhuys, 1989: 91). It is also manifested in the fact that although South Africa occupies only 27,9% of the surface area of Southern Africa, it has 57,9% of the road network, 65% of the rail truckages and 60% of the international harbours (Potgieter, 1983: 181). This road and rail network is absolutely vital to the economies of many of the Republic's landlocked neighbours.

Integration would also increase the countries of Southern Africa's bargaining position in relation to other power blocs like the European Community and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) consisting
of the US, Canada and Mexico.

Besides the mutual benefits which would accrue from integration, another factor which could speed up integration in the sub-continent is the existence of a diversity of structures amongst the nations of Southern Africa, and these structures may be slightly adapted or expanded to meet the new requirements of regional integration. These structures are SADCC; the Southern African Regional Conference for the Conservation and the Equalisation of the Soil, the Southern African Regional Tourism Council; the Southern African Monetary Union as well as the Development of Bank of Southern Africa (Address by Mr R.F. Botha, Minster of Foreign Affairs, at the Africa Institute, Pretoria (30 October 1990: 15-16).

However, the mere existence of these structures, the fears connected with being simply a sovereign state in a multipolar world and the rewards linked to regional integration is not enough to ensure successful regional integration. Regional integration can only be successful where the collective interest takes primacy over the national interest (Ojo et al., 1985: 49). Where the national interest predominates one finds the breakup of the East African Community, the disintegration of ECOWAS (The Economic Union of West African States), fears of Zimbabwe's
potential hegemony as an eventual factor in SADCC, and Chile's withdrawal from the Andean pact in 1976 (Chan, 1987 : 138; Hodges, 1978 : 253). However, one possible way of circumventing this problem is by introducing techniques of harmonisation and strengthening structures of coordination (Chan, 1987 : 125). In fact one of the main reasons for the strong appearance of the national interest within SADCC was its loose (and therefore weak) organizational structure, and the absence of any formal interactive institutions, other than the Secretariat (Thompson, 1991 : 61-63).

Another obstacle to regional integration is the fear that the costs and benefits of multilateral cooperation will be distributed unequally. Certainly this uneven distribution of costs and benefits was one of the main reasons for the demise of the East African Community. It is a truism of regional integration that without special preferential measures favouring the less developed members in the union, the benefits of integration are likely to be concentrated in the more advanced countries, while a disproportionate share of the cost will be paid by the less developed countries. A possible way to circumvent this problem of inequality is "... by asymmetrical tariff policies providing a higher degree of protection for a prolonged transition period for the less developed states, as well as directly subsidizing their development in key sectors" (Jones, 1988 : 227).
We may conclude this section by stating that the De Klerk Administration's proposals for regional integration in the sub-continent is viable, and if handled correctly, holds great promise for the states of Southern Africa.

A COMPARISON OF SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH THE FLS IN THE BOTHA AND DE KLERK ERAS

This comparison of South Africa's relations with the FLS under Presidents Botha and De Klerk could be captured in the two words - "aggressive" and "pragmatic". During the Botha period, Pretoria's relations with its neighbours were marked by hostility and overt and covert aggression which manifested itself in tactics like assertive and coercive incorporation. The hostile state of relations existing between south Africa and its neighbours to a large extent reflected the rise of the seurocrats within Pretoria's decision-making processes as well as the personality of Mr Botha.

The De Klerk era however has been characterised by a new cooperative spirit between Pretoria and its neighbouring states, in part a product of the personality of the new State President, the decline in influence of the seurocrats and the changing international context.
Thus one finds President De Klerk attempting to play a far more constructive role in the region than his predecessor. This is manifested in his attempts to develop the region as well as to act as mediator.

However, there is a similarity in the CONSAS proposals of the Botha era and the DEPSA proposals of the De Klerk era, in the sense that both proposals envisaged the states of Southern Africa engaging in multilateral cooperation for the benefit of the entire region. This similarity may be accounted for by the fact that both proposals emanated from the same individual - Foreign Minister Pik Botha. However, there are some differences here, too, and these differences might well reflect the prevalent international context. The CONSAS proposal was largely seen in the context of a security pact amongst the nations of the region. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that CONSAS was primarily seen as an anti-Marxist constellation whereas the DEPSA proposals are largely economic in nature, its primary focus being the economic development of the region.

Broadly speaking we can conclude that President De Klerk’s regional policy has been far more successful than that of his predecessor.
CHAPTER SEVEN

7. CONCLUSION

This study has sought to provide a broad overview of developments in Pretoria's foreign relations from 1978 to 1991, illustrating major points of convergence and divergence between the foreign policies of the Botha and De Klerk eras. Some aspects of President De Klerk's foreign policy have been neglected. These included a thaw in the relationship between South Africa and the Seychelles, Mauritius, the Comores and Jamaica. The year 1991 also witnessed Pretoria making overtures to other African states beyond the Frontline states. This was rewarded when Morocco granted South African Airways landing rights and Gabon eased visa restrictions of South African tourists. The period also witnessed Pretoria despatching a plethora of trade delegations to the Far East, notably to mainland China (Pretoria News, 24 June 1991). The reason for my excluding these developments from the main body of the thesis is that to a large extent these developments by 1991 were more speculation in the media than tangible, substantive foreign policy initiatives. They took the form of Pretoria "putting its feelers out" and cautiously entering the international political arena. Another factor which also has to be taken
into consideration when undertaking such a study is that one can never include each and every development taking place.

This paper has attempted to graphically illustrate change and continuity in South Africa's foreign policy between the Botha and De Klerk administrations. Towards the end of such a paper it is customary to ask whether the changes undertaken by President De Klerk were of a token, or substantive nature?

Hermann (1990: 5) identifies four graduated levels of foreign-policy change. These are: adjustment changes; program changes; problem/goal changes; and international orientation changes.

Hermann defines adjustment changes as those which occur on the level of effort (greater or lesser) and or scope of recipients (such as refinement in the class of targets). What is done, how it is done and the purposes for which it is done remain unchanged in structural changes.

Did structural changes occur from the Botha to the De Klerk eras? The facts suggest that they did. Consider the following: both the Botha and De Klerk Administrations sought closer relations with the West, however little effort was expended by the Botha administration on smaller Western
states like Luxembourg and Denmark. However the De Klerk administration spent a great deal of effort to foster closer ties with these states - with Luxembourg because it is rapidly becoming the financial capital of Europe and because it was to occupy the EC presidency; with Denmark because it was the only Nordic member of the EC. Hence adjustment changes on both the levels of greater effort and a refinement in the class of targets took place.

Program changes constitute changes made in the methods or means by which the goal or problem is addressed. In contrast to adjustment changes, which tend to be quantitative, program changes are qualitative and involve new instruments of statecraft (such as the pursuit of goals through diplomatic negotiation rather than military force). What is done and how it is done changes, but the purposes for which it is done remains unchanged (Hermann, 1990: 5).

Did program changes occur between the two administrations? Once again the evidence suggests an affirmative response. Both the Botha and De Klerk administrations sought the role of regional hegemon for the republic by dominating other states in Southern Africa. However, in the P.W. Botha era this was primarily accomplished by strong-arm tactics - such
as invading Angola, blockading Lesotho, supporting RENAMO in Mozambique and withdrawing its locomotives and railway technicians from Zimbabwe at a time when they really needed it. In the De Klerk era, this goal of regional domination is done by more subtle means and the goal of regional hegemony is rarely espoused. Cooperation is the watchword now. Cooperative ventures are now embarked upon with Frontline States which serve to increase their dependence on South Africa. The methods have become more sophisticated but the purpose, as espoused by Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha, after the Crown was passed to F.W. de Klerk in September 1989, remains unchanged: "What we must do in this country [South Africa] is to ensure that we remain economically strong, and that our relative strength as a regional power subtly filters through the region..." (Hansard, 1989: col. 7504).

In problem/goal changes the initial problem or goal that the policy addresses is replaced or simply forfeited. In this foreign policy change, the purposes themselves are replaced (Hermann, 1990: 5).

Did the De Klerk administration also undertake problem/goal changes? The answer is again positive. Thus whilst the Botha administration sought closer ties with the West for its own sake; the De Klerk administration sought improved ties with the West not only for its own sake but also in
the hope of making use of these ties to improve its relations in other areas. For example, De Klerk made use of thawing relations between Pretoria and Paris to extend the Republic's relations in Francophone Africa. One can also witness such a problem/goal change in terms of the Republic's relations with the Frontline States. Whilst the foreign-policy makers in both the Botha and De Klerk eras sought multilateral relations with the states in the region as epitomised by the CONSAS and DEPSA proposals; the former saw it primarily in military terms whilst the latter saw it in primarily economic terms.

International orientation changes are the most extreme form of foreign policy change since they involve the redirection of an actor's entire orientation towards world affairs. In contrast to lesser forms of change that concern the actors approach to a single issue or specific set of other actors, orientation change involves a basic shift in the actors international role and activities. Not one policy but many are more or less simultaneously changed (Hermann, 1990: 5-6).

Did the De Klerk administration engage in international orientation changes? The answer - yes. We can see this change in orientation on the regional level when the national roles of "Defender against Communism" was dropped in favour of mediator, regional leader and developer. But it
can also be seen on the international level when Minister Pik Botha announced that the Republic was ready to actively support the United Nations in any of its endeavours (SABC, TV 1 News, 17 April 1992, 20h00). This seemed to underscore the dramatic changes which occurred in South African foreign policy in the era of F.W. de Klerk - from pariah to participant in the international community. International orientation changes can also be discerned in the De Klerk administration's attempts to diversify the Republic's trade relations, in order to minimize its dependence on economic ties with the West. Hence, one finds the Republic reaching out to the Far East, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Africa, the Middle East, and a plethora of states in South and Central America.

I am thus of the opinion that the change which took place, and continues to take place in the era of President F.W. de Klerk is substantive in nature.

By way of conclusion we may sum up as follows:

i. that South African foreign policy began to change in 1988 as a result of several variables including economic and military factors, rapprochement between the superpowers, influence of public opinion and the role of personality, and
ii. that the De Klerk Administration's foreign policy is far more effective than that of his predecessor.

His pragmatism and perceived reasonableness coupled with his personal credibility have all resulted in broadening his government's diplomatic network (Interview with a foreign journalist - Mr Klaus von Eitelberg). Other factors which contributed to his diplomatic successes is his choosing the best people for the job as opposed to their loyalty to the National Party (for example, the appointment of Mr Harry Schwartz, a senior Democratic Party member as the Republic's ambassador to the United States); as well as the new decision-making structure which he initiated and which substantially reduced the power of securocrats, along with Mr De Klerk's domestic reforms. Mr De Klerk's diplomatic success can best be illustrated by the fact that since he assumed the presidency in September 1989 the Republic's foreign missions have increased from 48 to 70 - a total gain of 22! The new doors that have opened for South Africa include Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Zaire, Togo, Turkey, Sao Tome, El Salvador, Argentina, Brazil, Russia and other East European states (The Natal Witness, 20 April 1992).

One of the factors which accounted for this success and which I have mentioned above is the personal credibility of Mr De Klerk. This
credibility however has been repeatedly dented over the past few months with:

i. the government’s financial assistance to Inkatha (Inkathagate);
ii. allegations of the continued operation of state death squads;
iii. the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) Report which slated President De Klerk for his reluctance to take decisive steps to end the violence;
vi. the Waddington Report which implicated the South African Police (SAP) in the violence;
v. the embezzlement of funds from the Department of Development Aid;
and finally 
vi. the Boipatong and Bisho massacres.

While there is no doubt that these incidents tarnished the credibility of Mr De Klerk, they have not damaged it as severely as Mr P.W. Botha’s, was and hence it does not seem to have adversely affected the Government’s foreign policy (Interview with Mr Klaus von Eitelberg). The reason for this is not hard to find. If Mr De Klerk’s administration has suffered some loss of its credibility so has the ANC resulting from:

a. allegations of Mrs Winnie Mandela’s involvement in the murder of 14
year old Stompie Seipei, her affair with Dali Mpofu and their embezzlement of funds from the ANC (by the time this thesis went to print the Mandelas had separated);
b. Mr Harry Gwala's interview with a British newspaper in which he admitted to ordering the death of Inkatha members;
c. Mr Ronnie Kasrils action at Bisho (i.e. by leading a group of ANC supporters through a hole in the fence at the stadium and thereby provoking members of the Ciskei Defence Force (CDF) to fire on the demonstrators);
d. the ANC's ambivalent relationship with the SACP;
e. allegations of torture made against the ANC by returning exiles which has resulted in the ANC setting up their own commission of enquiry into these allegations; and

This has resulted in both the National Party and the African National Congress suffering from some loss of credibility both internally and externally. This has resulted in the international community adopting a far more cautious approach towards South Africa than they did in the past
(Interview with Mr Klaus von Eikelberg). Given the fact that neither side possesses the moral high ground, at least in the eyes of the international community, Mr De Klerk’s credibility seems not to have suffered irreparable harm by the abovementioned incidents. It would therefore appear that President De Klerk’s foreign policy will not suffer adversely from these rather embarrassing incidents.

THE INTEGRATION OF PRETORIA’S DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE ANC’S DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Whilst the integration of Pretoria’s Department of Foreign Affairs and the ANC’s Department of External Affairs falls a little beyond the discussion of a comparison between the foreign policies of Mr P.W. Botha and Mr F.W. De Klerk between 1978 and 1991, it is important that we briefly discuss this phenomena since this is the direction in which South Africa’s foreign policy is going.

There are two major reasons which entrench this belief. Firstly, there is the objective reality, a reality that both the National Party and the ANC share, that no matter what their differences, there is a need for consensus on foreign policy issues since that the external foreign milieu is becoming increasingly challenging for a new post apartheid state to survive and prosper. In other words, the need for a single, clear, well-
coordinated foreign policy is more than ever necessary by nature of the world which we inhabit - a world increasingly dominated by the emergence of large power blocs. In North America there is the economic union of the United States, Canada and Mexico called the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). In Europe the EC is still a powerful force to reckon with regardless of the difficulties surrounding monetary policies in the Pacific Rim, countries are considering some unity structure possibly under the economic leadership of Japan, and in Central Asia the Islamic states of the former Soviet Union may gravitate towards the banner of Islamic Fundamentalism with Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan (*The Natal Witness*, 20 April 1992).

The second reason that such integration is most likely to take place is that both the NP and the ANC have already started coordinating their respective foreign policies, to a certain extent, for the benefit of the entire country as opposed to narrow partisan interests. For example, the ANC was indispensable in selling Pik Botha’s Marshall Plan (DEPSA) to the FLS (*Pretoria News*, 14 May 1992). ANC Foreign Relations chief Thabo Mbeki was also instrumental in:

1. asking New York City to lift some of the strict anti-South African sanctions (*Pretoria News*, 14 May 1992);
2. securing new foreign investments in the form of US conglomerates Pepsi, Sara Lee, Heinz and construction giant Morris and Knudsen (*Business Day*, 13 April 1992) and

3. securing the tour of South Africa by a Comores soccer team and a Swedish jazz group called 'Contemporary Be Bop Quintet' (*The Weekly Mail*, January 10-16, 1992).

An integrated foreign policy, combining the ANC’s 42 and the government 70 foreign missions would hold tremendous advantages for a new post apartheid South Africa stripped of its former ideological constraints. South African foreign policy would be far more pragmatic guided by the principle of NSI - National Self Interest. Following this principle both the ANC and the government would make use of their extensive diplomatic contacts in the interests of the Republic of South Africa and all its people.
CHAPTER EIGHT

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