DECENTRALISATION AND COMMUNITY BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN TANZANIA.
– THE CASE OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND COMMUNITY BASED CONSERVATION IN DISTRICTS AROUND THE SELOUS GAME RESERVE

by Hajo Junge

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Social Science in the School of Development Studies, University of Natal, Durban, South Africa
DECLARATION

This dissertation represents original work by the author and has not been previously submitted in any form to any university. Where use has been made of the work of others, this has been duly acknowledged and referenced in the text.

Hajo Junge
Berlin, 15 October 2001
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Finally, I owe special thanks to my parents, Gertrud Junge and Theo Junge, who always supported my studies and my personal interest in sub-Saharan Africa.
ABSTRACT

The dissertation presents the results of a study of the role of decentralisation and community participation in natural resource management in Tanzania. It analyses whether the shift of central government power to decentralised government units and the participation of local communities at village level result in more effective and more sustainable management of natural resources, wildlife in particular. The study uses Songea District and the Selous Conservation Programme south of Tanzania as a case study.

As the examination of the origins and meaning of community-based natural resource management and decentralisation and the analysis of international experiences show, both approaches have been adapted in a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The government of Tanzania, with the support of a wide range of donors, is implementing an ambitious Local Government Reform Programme. The Selous Conservation Programme, jointly administered by the Tanzania Wildlife Division and GTZ, is promoting community-based conservation in villages bordering the Selous Game Reserve. The new Wildlife Policy, 1998, aims at the country-wide implementation of community-based conservation.

Linkages between local government reform and improved environmental management are weak from institutional, legal and technical points of view. On the other hand, the country has a policy environment that is highly supportive to decentralised environmental management and there is potential for improvement at both local and national levels.

Songea District Council has defined the sustainable management of natural resources and the environment as one of its development priorities. Concerning the implementation of the Local Government Reform Programme, the district faces some problems and difficulties. Lack of human capacity and insufficient financial resources constrain the decentralisation process.

Until now, up to about 50 villages bordering the game reserve have established their Wildlife Management Areas utilising their hunting quota. Due to insufficient and overdue legislation, the communities cannot fully make use and benefit from their wildlife resource. If remained uncorrected in the near future, the sustainability of community-based conservation programmes is threatened.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADMADE</td>
<td>Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (Zambia)</td>
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<td>ALAT</td>
<td>Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMPFIRE</td>
<td>Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (Zimbabwe)</td>
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<td>CBC</td>
<td>Community Based Conservation</td>
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<td>CBNRM</td>
<td>Community Based Natural Resource Management</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organisation</td>
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<td>CC</td>
<td>Community Conservation</td>
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<td>CSRP</td>
<td>Civil Service Reform Programme</td>
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<td>CWM</td>
<td>Community Wildlife Management</td>
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<td>Danida</td>
<td>Danish International Development Assistance</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>District Commissioner</td>
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<td>DDP</td>
<td>District Development Plan</td>
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<td>DED</td>
<td>District Executive Director</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGO</td>
<td>District Game Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPIQ</td>
<td>Environmental Policy and Institutional Strengthening, IQC</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCA</td>
<td>Game Controlled Area</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoT</td>
<td>Government of Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for Technical Cooperation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUKUMU</td>
<td>Jumuiya ya Kuhifadhi Mazingira Ukutu (Society for Conservation and Wise Use of Natural Resources in the Ukutu Area)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Authority</td>
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<td>LGR</td>
<td>Local Government Reform</td>
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<td>LGRA</td>
<td>Local Government Reform Agenda</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGRP</td>
<td>Local Government Reform Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNRT</td>
<td>Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism</td>
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<td>MRALG</td>
<td>Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Government Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Protected Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>SCP</td>
<td>Selous Conservation Programme</td>
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<td>Sida</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>SGR</td>
<td>Selous Game Reserve</td>
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<td>SNV</td>
<td>Netherlands Development Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>STP</td>
<td>Sustainable Tanga Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>TANAPA</td>
<td>Tanzania National Parks</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCDF</td>
<td>United Nations Capital Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>VNRC</td>
<td>Village Natural Resources Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>Village Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCA</td>
<td>Wildlife Conservation Act</td>
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<td>WD</td>
<td>Wildlife Division</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to examine the role of decentralisation, local governance and the participation of local communities in natural resource management in Tanzania. Of particular interest is the relationship between local government reform and the management of natural resources, wildlife in particular, at district and village level.

On the one hand, the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP), which is currently being implemented in 38 pilot districts throughout the country, is of major interest in the discussion below. Local government reform is a key component of the far-reaching reforms that Tanzania is currently undertaking. The reforms aim at replacing the former control and command system of central government with a decentralised system that allocates authority and responsibility to local authorities.

On the other hand, community-based conservation (CBC) is of interest. Community-based conservation as applied here broadly refers to the new management and benefit sharing arrangements in natural resource management, wildlife in particular, outside protected areas by local communities. Tanzania’s new Wildlife Policy (1998) has declared CBC a country-wide approach aiming at the establishment of Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) on village land.

Songea District adjacent south to the Selous Game Reserve (SGR) is used as a case study. Songea District is one of the pilot districts in the Local Government Reform Programme and one of the the first districts in which the Selous Conservation Programme (SCP) has promoted CBC in villages bordering the game reserve. To broaden the analysis, further experiences of CBC in Tunduru and Morogoro Districts are analysed.

The study additionally reviews the more general situation relating to the integration of environmental concerns and natural resource management into local government planning and implementation in Tanzania.
Problem Statement

Wildlife is a natural resource of immense economic and cultural value in Tanzania. Due to pressure of increasing population numbers and widespread poaching in the 1970s and 1980s, destruction of natural habitats and overexploitation of the nature have decreased the number of wildlife drastically. There has been an important shift in wildlife policy in Tanzania since the end of the 1980s. Past policy approaches in Africa have shown that the ‘fences and fines’ approach to wildlife protection has failed. Major policies now emphasise conservation with and by the people instead of conservation against the people.

Tanzania, like several other African states, has suffered from inefficient governance. The above mentioned recent policy approaches in Tanzania try to address these problems of weak governance by emphasising a shift towards decentralisation and devolution of government power to district and local government levels. Such devolution of power could have positive effects on more effective and sustainable management of natural resources at district level.

Research Question and Rationale

The focal question of this paper is what role the Local Government Reform Programme plays for the management of natural resources at the community level. It is important to ask whether the shift of central government power to decentralised government units and the participation of local communities at village level result in more effective and more sustainable management of natural resources, wildlife in particular.

Organisation of the Dissertation

The dissertation is divided into six chapters. The first two chapters examine the origins and meaning of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) and CBC, Chapter 1, and decentralisation and local governance, Chapter 2. Both topics are seen as development paradigms, even developmental ‘fashions’, of the last decade (Leach et al. 1997, Manor 1999). These chapters give an overview of
relevant theories and examine international experiences, with most analyses drawn from East and southern Africa.

Chapter 3 describes the overall socio-economic framework of Tanzania. Tanzania has undergone several important political and economic changes since the beginning of the 1990s, with efforts aiming at the restructuring of the state to enable it to address the country's severe development challenges.

Chapter 4 provides an overview of Tanzania's overall policy framework for decentralisation and community-based conservation. The Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) and the new Wildlife Policy of Tanzania (1998) are of major interest. The Local Government Reform Policy covers four main areas: political decentralisation, financial decentralisation, administrative decentralisation, and changed central-local relations aiming at the creation of largely autonomous, strong and effective institutions at the local level. The goal is to improve the delivery of services to the public. The new Wildlife Policy of Tanzania commits the country to CBC. It intends to transfer wildlife management rights and revenues to the communities on the basis of the creation of Wildlife Management Areas on village land. The chapter assesses the relevance of the two policy areas for community-based conservation and wildlife conservation.

Findings and analysis drawn from the case study are discussed in Chapter 5. The structure of local government is further examined and the implementation of the LGRP is discussed in the case of Songea District. Furthermore, the set-up of the Selous Conservation Programme at district and village level is analysed.

Finally, I draw conclusions from the analysis of my research in Chapter 6. Implications for decentralised district planning and natural resource management programmes are discussed.
Data and Research Methods

My research was conducted in districts bordering the Selous Game Reserve, Songea District in particular, and in Dar es Salaam from mid October to mid December 2000.

The employed research techniques varied. For the case study, use was made of both primary and secondary data collection. Primary data included responses from semi-structured interviews and a few unstructured interviews with stakeholders, such as district officials, the SCP project team, members of village government, village natural resources committees, village game scouts and individual local residents mainly in Songea District and further in Tunduru and Morogoro Districts. Furthermore, semi-structured interviews and consultations were held with the following: all major donor and development agencies involved with the local government reform, wildlife authorities, the GTZ-SCP project team, and key informants from the University of Dar es Salaam and the Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania (ALAT) in Dar es Salaam.¹

Other primary sources included participant observation of planning meetings at the district level, community meetings, village natural resources committee meetings, a CBC training for village representatives and ward officials, a national workshop on village governance and democracy in the context of the Local Government Reform Programme, and a national workshop on the formulation of Wildlife Management Area guidelines.

Secondary data sources included policy papers, project progress and evaluation reports, donor publications, technical papers in workshop proceedings and newspaper publications.

The research was backed up by personal experience gained as an intern with SCP and other community-based conservation programmes in Tanzania in 1999 and 2000. I was already familiar with a number of the visited districts and villages and

¹ For a detailed list of the interviews conducted see Appendix IV.
previous interaction with district officials and local residents helped me to conduct the interviews comfortably.

It is important to mention that the dissertation does not intend to give an overall socio-economic analysis of the study area, i.e. the visited villages. This study rather tries to analyse the socio-political structure and the issues of governance and management concerning local government reform and community-based conservation.
PART ONE –
LITERATURE REVIEW AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES

The first two chapters of this paper discuss the origins and meaning of the terms ‘community-based natural resource management’ and ‘decentralisation’. Furthermore, recent experiences of programmes and initiatives of decentralisation and community-based natural resource management are analysed. Community-based natural resource management is examined in more detail in the case of Community Based Conservation. The discussion is focused on sub-Saharan Africa with most analyses drawn from East and southern Africa.

1 Community Based Natural Resource Management

1.1 Origins and Meaning of Community Based Natural Resource Management

In the 1990s ‘community-based’ approaches to environment and development have become internationally accepted and seen as essential principles in the field of development. Community-based approaches to the environment have, on the one hand, heavily evolved from statements and outcomes of the Brundtland Commission (WCED 1987) and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro 1992, which put the environment firmly on international development agendas (UNCED 1992). Underlying this is the moral argument that conservation goals should contribute to and not conflict with basic human needs. On the other hand, in the broader development field equally, the concept draws on ideas about the ‘community’ and particularly about the need for local communities to be more involved in designing and implementing public policies. This has been emphasised in development for the last two to three decades, especially in the 1980s – by some even called the decade of participation (Chambers 1983; Ingham 1993). The overall concepts of development experienced a great shift towards ‘people
centred' development, public involvement, cooperative management, power sharing, decentralisation and devolution, and empowerment. There is an emerging global consensus that the implementation of what has come to be known as 'sustainable development' should be based on local-level solutions derived from community initiatives. As Ghai and Vivian (1992) argue in their call for 'grassroots environmental action' people's legitimate interest in the conservation of their resource base must be recognised and supported – not only because this is their basic right, but also because it is a pragmatic course to take in the interests of achieving sustainable development. People's participation is perceived as an important dimension of an environmentally sustainable pattern of development (Egger and Majeres 1992).

Recently, and more than in other development fields, community-based natural resource management approaches have experienced a rapid rise to prominence. Statements of intent on global environmental problems following the Earth Summit, including Agenda 21 and the Desertification Convention, strongly advocate as solutions a combination of government decentralisation, devolution of responsibility for natural resources held as commons to local communities, and community participation (Holmberg et al. 1993). Many academics and development practitioners see CBNRM as a great chance to grow and succeed as more responsibility, authority and capacities are handed over to the resource users (Veit et al. 1998).

The meaning of CBNRM is examined in more detail in the case of community-based conservation in the following section. Crucial aspects for the successful implementation of such initiatives, such as community participation, questions of ownership and devolution of management, are discussed more deeply.

1.2 Community Based Conservation in Africa

As outlined above, the concepts, policies and practices of conservation in Africa have been challenged by a set of radical alternatives over the last decade. They have progressively been challenged by calls that stress the need not to exclude local people, either physically from protected areas or politically from the conservation policy process, but to ensure their participation (Western and Wright 1994). In its
struggle to preserve wildlife the ‘protectionist approach’ to conservation or ‘fortress conservation’ (Adams and Hulme 2001) (commonly known as the ‘fences-and-fines’ approach) caused scepticism, lack of trust, and even hatred between wildlife authorities and the communities in wildlife areas. Yet there is a growing consensus especially among conservationists and international conservation agencies that the protectionist approach has failed to protect wildlife in Africa. A growing realization among conservationists of the importance of understanding the needs and perspectives of human communities in wildlife areas, of interactive communication, and of building or strengthening community-level institutional capacity to manage wildlife emphasises approaches of ‘conservation with the people’ instead of ‘conservation against the people’ (IIED 1994).

Conceptually, a set of radical ideas of international provenance were introduced to the conservation agenda. Hulme and Murphree (2001) describe three particular strands to these ideas which are woven together in different ways by theorists, policy makers and managers of the African environment. The first is that conservation should be more based in society, it should involve the local community rather than being purely state-centric. Secondly, the concept of sustainable development has promoted the notion that the things to be conserved (species, habitats or biodiversity) should be viewed as exploitable natural resources that can be managed to achieve both developmental and conservation goals. Sustainable wildlife utilization rather than wildlife preservation might be best for conservation. Thirdly, and in keeping with the neo-liberal thinking that dominated the late twentieth century, are ideas that markets should play a greater role in shaping the structures of incentives for conservation. Following the slogans ‘use it or lose it’ or ‘giving wildlife value’, it is suggested that if species or habitats are to be conserved they must not be isolated from the market where their uniqueness and scarcity will lead to high economic values being placed on them. Thus the likelihood of conservation is greatly enhanced.

Community oriented approaches to conservation take many different forms and many kinds of projects and programmes can be found. In general, community-based conservation can be defined as “those principles and practices that argue that
conservation goals should be pursued by strategies that emphasise the role of local residents in decision-making about natural resources" (Adams and Hulme 2001: 13). Two main participatory approaches – passive and active – can be distinguished. The passive participatory approach is commonly known as 'Community Conservation', the active participatory approach as ‘Community Based Conservation’ (Songorwa et al. 2000).

The concept of Community Conservation (CC) tries to reduce conflict and improve the relationship between ‘people and parks’ (Wells et al. 1992). This concept sees the community as the protected area’s neighbours and not as proprietors. Such an emphasis leads to a focus on park outreach strategies (revenue-sharing, public relations, conflict resolution, community development). Park outreach programmes can influence attitudes towards national parks among local communities without materially altering the balance of costs and benefits experienced by them (Hulme and Infield 2001; Kangwana and Mako 2001). These programmes achieve conservation objectives without contributing greatly to local development, a 'win-lose' result. They can, however, create a degree of benefit for local people by creating new financial opportunities (for example through eco-tourism), or by allowing material benefit flows to commence or recommence (for example if CC allows people to harvest products from a formerly closed reserve). However, the cost of such Community Conservation programmes is high. The primary objectives of such CC programmes are the integrity of protected areas, such as the Mgahinga Gorilla National Park in Uganda, and the conservation of certain wildlife species and their habitats (Infield and Adams 1999). The contribution of such programmes to rural livelihoods and community institutions result from these efforts and are thus means rather than ends. While initiatives and programmes of Community Conservation require significant policy changes they stand for an incremental and non-radical approach towards community involvement in conservation which does not seek to devolve tenure over natural resources to local communities (Hulme and Murphree 2001).

In comparison to Community Conservation, the active participatory approach aims at devolving much of the decision-making process and significant control over important wildlife resources to the community level. Commonly known as Community Based
Conservation (CBC) this active participatory approach is also called Community Wildlife Management (CWM). The underlying thinking of CBC/CWM is that local communities have been alienated from a resource they should rightfully own, control, manage, and benefit from (Songorwa et al. 2000). In CBC, communities are perceived not as mere beneficiaries but as active participants capable of carrying out wildlife management activities. One of Africa’s first CBC initiative has been Zimbabwe’s acclaimed CAMPFIRE (the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) programme. CAMPFIRE has been hailed internationally for its participatory approach and its innovative strategies for confronting the developmental and environmental problems of some of the most marginal rural areas by promoting local control over wildlife management and use. Within Zimbabwe CAMPFIRE has been praised as a means of overcoming the legacies of colonial development practices, which focused on technical prescription, coercive implementation, and, through a battery of rules and regulations, undermined people’s control over their environment and legal rights to resources (Hasler 1996). Despite its achievements the programme still faces fundamental challenges which are further discussed in the section of devolving management in this chapter.

Other experiences of more devolutionary approaches can be found in Namibia where a CBC project in the arid Kunene Region has evolved over time from a focus on halting poaching to ensuring community benefit from wildlife and ultimately to communities as proprietors of the wildlife resource (Jones 1999). Such a programme, similar to others in southern Africa, typically focuses on providing rural communities with strong proprietorship over their land and resources, establishing or strengthening existing community resource management institutions, and strengthening community organisational, institutional and resource management capacity. These programmes represent a potentially powerful development paradigm, addressing issues of governance and rural development as well as conservation. However, as a result of the multiple levels at which such programmes operate they are necessarily complex and time consuming to implement. Most participatory wildlife management programmes are neither passive nor active, as they tend to combine initiatives associated with both (IIED 1994).
Besides Community Conservation (protected area outreach) and Community Based Conservation another type of approach can be identified in policy and practice: collaborative management (Table 1.1). Collaborative management "... seeks to create agreements between local communities or groups of resource users and conservation authorities for negotiated access to natural resources which are usually under some form of statutory authority" (Barrow and Murphree 2001: 31). Collaborative management differs from protected area outreach in permitting local people access to and use of state-controlled conservation resources.

Table 1.1 Community approaches to conservation and some key characteristics

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<th>Protected area outreach</th>
<th>Collaborative management</th>
<th>Community Based Conservation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objectives</strong></td>
<td>Conservation of ecosystems, biodiversity and species</td>
<td>Conservation with some rural livelihood benefit</td>
<td>Sustainable rural livelihoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ownership/tenure status</strong></td>
<td>State-owned land and resources (e.g. national parks, forests and game reserves)</td>
<td>State-owned land with mechanisms for collaborative management of certain resources with the community. Complex tenure and ownership arrangements</td>
<td>Local resource users own land and resources either <em>de jure</em> or <em>de facto</em>. State may have some control of last resort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Management characteristics</strong></td>
<td>State determines all decisions about resource management</td>
<td>Agreement between state and user groups about managing some resource(s) which are state owned. Management arrangement critical</td>
<td>Conservation as an element of land use. An emphasis on developing the rural economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus in East and southern Africa</strong></td>
<td>Common in East Africa, with a little in southern Africa</td>
<td>East Africa, with some in southern Africa</td>
<td>Predominant in southern Africa, but increasing in East Africa</td>
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Source: Barrow and Murphree 2001

Community oriented approaches to wildlife conservation usually have a strong economic rationale. They are typically based on the premise that if local people
participate in wildlife management and economically benefit from this participation a 'win-win' situation will arise whereby wildlife is being conserved and community welfare is improving at the same time. It is argued that if wildlife cannot contribute sustainably to local livelihoods then it stands little chance of survival (Emerton 2001). In combination with other forms of local participation in wildlife management, benefits have tended to be provided by returning a proportion of the revenues earned by the state from wildlife back to local communities through indirect benefit-sharing arrangements and grassroots development activities: mainly the provision of social infrastructure such as schools, water supplies and health facilities. Emerton (2001) argues that generating broad development or social infrastructure benefits is a necessary but in itself may not be a sufficient condition for communities to engage in wildlife conservation because it does "... not ensure that the presence of wildlife generates a net local economic gain and is not the same as providing economic incentives for conservation" (:225).

Wildlife imposes a lot of costs on local communities in cash and livelihood terms. Livestock and crop loss through wildlife damage to agriculture can have major impacts on already insecure rural livelihoods and make them even more marginal in economic terms. Furthermore, the opportunity cost of alternative land uses, such as agricultural production and local resource utilisation, forgone or diminished by the presence of wildlife can load a heavy burden on communities (Emerton 2001). As Infield and Adams (1999: 311) describe in the case of Uganda "... the benefits experienced (as expressed by participants mainly construction of schools, roads, water flowing from the Park in streams, and some employment) do not out-weigh the perceived costs of lost agricultural production, lost grazing and natural resources (bamboo, water, thatching grass, medicinal plants and sites for beehives)". "Providing communities with economic incentives to conserve wildlife means ensuring that they are better off in financial and livelihood terms with wildlife than they would be without it, at the same time as overcoming the root economic factors

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2 The opportunity costs of wildlife are the income and profits forgone from those activities which are precluded or diminished by allocating resources to wildlife conservation. In East and southern Africa, where wildlife areas predominantly lie in subsistence agricultural zones, agricultural production and local resource utilisation forgone are major components of the opportunity cost of wildlife conservation.
which cause them to engage in economic activities which threaten or deplete wildlife resources" (Emerton 2001: 226).

Economic and financial benefits are often seen as the most crucial factor to ensure the sustainability of CBC initiatives. But there are other incentives which are based on intrinsic cultural and religious values. As experiences from East and southern Africa illustrate, rural Africans place an intrinsic value on wildlife. Local residents value wildlife for its existence and wish their children and grandchildren to be able to enjoy seeing wild animals (Jones 2001; Kangwana and Mako 2001). Religious beliefs in many African societies also promote respect for wildlife and have contributed to the development of systems of use and non-use (Matowanyika et al. 1995).

Conservation appears to be dependent on a complex and dynamic interaction between cultural values, livelihood issues, human relationships and economic benefits.

Although CBC is mainly concerned with wildlife conservation, potentially it has political, social, and institutional implications beyond wildlife conservation. As part of the advocacy for popular participation in development, the approach has the “...potential of becoming a catalyst for socio-political and institutional changes in the communities where it is introduced, and may spread to other parts of the country, and lead to a demand for an even greater devolution of power” (Songorwa et. al 2000: 608). This element of CBC, a broader democratisation and decentralisation process, is of central importance for the analysis of decentralisation and CBC in the Tanzanian context. These new approaches to conservation, CBC and CC, are not simply about technical choices or changes in laws or formal organisations. They are part of a wider process of social change and about attempts to redistribute social and political power (Hulme and Murphree 1999). While being shaped by these wider processes they contribute to them at the same time. In particular, this means that while community approaches promise to ‘empower’ communities they may also be seen as threatening those who will have reduced control over resources or flows of benefits.
1.2.1 Community Participation

It is widely accepted that ‘participation’ is not merely desirable but essential to the success of rural development and natural resource management projects, policies, and regulations (Hoben et al. 1998). As mentioned above community participation is one of the central principles and a key to the success of community-based conservation and wildlife management. To understand the concept of participation and its crucial role for CBC it is necessary to have a closer look at the origins and meaning of the terms ‘participation’ and ‘community’.

Contemporary critiques of CBNRM and CBC note that communities are often seen as homogeneous and consensual entities resulting in misleading analyses which inform community-based sustainable development initiatives (Leach et al. 1997). CBNRM and CBC strategies are said to be guilty of oversimplifying the complex socio-economic and institutional circumstances that prevail in rural areas throughout most African countries (Ainslie 1999). The reality shows that most rural communities in sub-Saharan Africa are not homogeneous and not free of conflict (Little 1994). Differences between communities and within communities by age, gender, social group, and poverty and wealth, or differences of capability and disability, education, livelihood strategy, types of assets, and much else are almost universal and significant (Chambers 1997). Even individuals have more than one status (for example a man may at the same time be old, male, poor, head of his family, and a Muslim) and the relevance of these various statuses to their interests may depend on the context.

In its study of community approaches to wildlife management, IIED (1994: 4) points out that the concept can be approached in spatial, socio-cultural and economic terms. Spatially, communities can be viewed as “groupings of people who physically live in the same place”. Socio-culturally, they can be considered as social groupings who derive a unity from common history and cultural heritage, frequently based on kinship. Economically, they can be considered as “groupings of people who share interests and control over particular resources”. Combining these constructs, one can derive a model of community as an entity socially bound by a common cultural identity, living within a defined spatial boundary and having a common economic
interest in the resources of this area. Such a model of ‘communities of place’ is rather problematic when applying it across contemporary rural Africa as it does not consider the heterogeneity, changing membership, and composition of rural localities due to forced relocation, migration, rural/urban labour and resource flows, and changing agricultural practice in a sufficient manner (Barrow and Murphree 2001). ‘Communities’ are far more internally differentiated and dynamic than such a model implies. In some parts of sub-Saharan Africa clearly bounded social and residential units may not be present. Locating the community is especially problematic in East and central Africa, where many people live in dispersed hamlets and households instead of in nucleated villages, as well as among pastoral and agro-pastoral peoples throughout Africa as they move about in complex patterns in response to short- and long-term variation in conditions (Hoben et al. 1998). Their boundaries also change as development shifts land from one jurisdiction to another and governments impose new units of local governance on rural areas. Other problems arise when the spatial dimension of the model does not match socio-cultural or economic boundaries as described in the case of land rights problems and conflicts of interest in natural resources around the Mkambati Nature Reserve, situated in South Africa’s Eastern Cape province (Kepe 1997). The uncertainty around the meaning of ‘community’ can be a problem for both, policy makers who may easily get confused and blurred by local realities, and local people engaged in struggles in terms of social and territorial groupings. Such different implications of this term may constrain many government and development programmes (Kepe 1998).

Participation is often described as a problematic concept while “...so widely and so loosely used, like many other catchwords in development jargon, that the meaning of the concept has become rather blurred” (Mikkelson 1995: 62). In the most general sense participation is understood as “a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them” (World Bank 1995: 3). The meaning of stakeholders describes all those individuals, groups, and organisations which will be affected, positively or negatively, by a development intervention. In this broad sense, stakeholders include politicians, the various organisations that constitute government, groups within the private sector, voluntary sector organisations, and various groups and categories of
ordinary citizens. In the same sense Blackburn (1998:169) argues that "...the heart of participation means allowing the proposed beneficiaries to increase their stake in the design, implementation and review of a project, whatever its nature".

It is always an important question in the development field whether to take participation as a 'goal' or as a 'means' (Vivian 1992; Ingham 1993). As already mentioned above, participation in community conservation and park outreach programmes, as in the case of Uganda’s Mgahinga Gorilla National Park, is viewed in an instrumental sense: as a means to achieve goals and conservation objectives, as a means to efficiency in the programme management (Adams and Infield 2001). Although community-based conservation aims at empowering and actively involving local people in the whole process of wildlife conservation, participation can still be viewed rather as a means than a goal. In terms of the roles assigned to local people in participation, the categories of 'passive' and 'information giving' (Table 1.2) as described in the participatory typology after Barrow and Murphree cannot be considered for community conservation initiatives since they do not involve local collective action. It is only in the last four categories in the table that collective activity is required and that the concept of 'community' has relevance. While the nature of participation varies greatly in community conservation and community-based conservation the most commonly found forms in East and southern Africa are consultative and functional (Barrow and Murphree 2001).
### Table 1.2  How people can participate in development programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participatory typology</th>
<th>Roles assigned to local people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Passive</td>
<td>Told what is going to happen or already happened. Top-down, information belongs to external professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information giving</td>
<td>Answer questions from extractive researchers. People not able to influence analysis or use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Consulted. External agents listen to views. Usually externally defined problems and solutions. People not involved in decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional</td>
<td>Form groups to meet predetermined objectives. Usually done after major project decisions made, therefore initially dependent on outsiders but may become self-dependent, and enabling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactive</td>
<td>Joint analysis and actions. Use of local institutions. People have stake in maintaining or changing structures or practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-mobilisation or empowerment</td>
<td>Take decisions independent of external institutions. May challenge existing arrangements and structures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Barrow and Murphree 2001*

It is important to see participation as a dynamic political process and not just as an implementing tool to deliver development products as soon and as effectively as possible (White 1996; Botes and Rensburg 2000). There are always questions to be asked about who is involved, how, and on whose terms. Participation can open great opportunities for people to challenge existing power relations, both within communities, e.g. challenging local elites, and in wider society, and government structures. This of course can result in conflicts. As Alexander and McGregor (2000) describe in the case of the Gwampa Valley, which is situated in Zimbabwe’s Matabeleland North province, that the CAMPFIRE programme, despite having democratic potential, has become a focus of resistance and fear among local residents. CAMPFIRE transformed from its democratic and decentralising ideals into authoritarian practice and "... CAMPFIRE became a word associated not with development, but with dispossession" (Alexander and McGregor 2000: 625).
Furthermore, despite the best of intentions, efforts to engage local residents run the risk of neglecting the poor and marginalised. “Those who are marginalized and powerless are likely to be both unorganized and silent” (Thomas-Slayter 1994: 1486). This threat is especially evident in rural areas in many sub-Saharan African countries which are characterised by symptoms of the kinds of weaknesses in civil society and democratic process. One of the biggest challenges remains “… to ensure that the people who neither have the capacity, nor the desire to participate, are involved in the development process” (Botes and Rensburg 2000: 46).

Another factor which appears to be fundamental in the context of community participation in conservation is the question of ownership. Lack of local ownership has often been seen as a major reason why so many development initiatives in the past decades despite having good intentions have not been sustainable (Eylers and Forster 1998). In community-based conservation the question of ownership is especially important in the case of tenure. In the context of CBC the term tenure covers the rights of secure, long-term access to land and other resources, their benefits, and the responsibilities related to these rights. The terms of (common) property, proprietorship and entitlement all relate to these rights (Barrow and Murphree 2001).

Tenure conditions in sub-Saharan Africa are generally insecure and not favourable for community-based natural resource management and conservation programmes. As inhabitants of what is technically state land, the residents of most communal lands in Africa do not have strong property rights and their tenure is rather uncertain. Without secure rights of access to natural resources, rural people do not have a long-term interest in managing them or participating in community-based conservation. Without assurance that their access to the natural resources on which their livelihood depends are protected against arbitrary appropriation by government or private outsiders, they are unlikely to invest in improvements on the land or to be eager to participate in community-based natural resource management programmes with only long-term benefits (Hoben et al. 1998).
Resource tenure rights do not need to be private to be secure. Tenure rights in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa derived from membership in culturally based local groups are often more secure than those based on freehold or leasehold introduced and backed by the state. Contrary to earlier assumptions, customary resource tenure is not insecure, inflexible, and less productive (Hoben et al. 1998). Common property resource theory has fundamentally challenged the notion of Hardin’s (1968) 'tragedy of the commons'. Hardin argues that group management of the commons will invariably lead to resource degradation since the private benefit of maximising returns exceeds the private cost because the costs of maintaining the commonage are shifted onto the group as a whole. This view has largely lost theoretical support as the distinction between common property regimes3 (which consist in essence of jointly held property) and open access systems (which have no restrictions on resource use, and which are in fact subject to degradation) has become clear. Thus, group ownership of land does not necessarily result in the 'tragedy of the commons'. Indeed, under common property, the use rights of individuals are defined and limited to prevent over-exploitation of the common resource base (Vivian 1992; Shackleton et al. 1998).

Recent experience and research support a view that the expansion of the commons in conjunction with the devolution of decision-making over the management of common land to the lowest possible level has the effect of increasing ecosystem complexity, diversity and sustainability (Rohde et al. 1999).

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3 Common property regimes are structured arrangements in which group membership is defined, boundaries are clear, outsiders are excluded, rules are developed and enforced, incentives exist for co-owners to conform, and sanctions work to ensure compliance (Shackleton et al. 1998).
1.2.2 Devolution of Management

The issue of governance plays an important role in community-based conservation as most CBC programmes aim at decentralising and devolving powers to a lower level of government. Without giving a detailed examination of governance and decentralisation in general, as the origins and meaning of the terms local governance, decentralisation and devolution are examined in chapter two in more detail, the importance of decentralised structures for decision-making and planning for CBC is discussed in the following.

In the case of Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE programme decentralisation and devolution plays a crucial role for the implementation of community-based conservation. Despite widely being regarded as one of Africa’s most successful contemporary conservation initiative and despite its achievements to reduce the rate of loss of wildlife habitat in many areas, the programme still faces fundamental challenges (Bond 2001). In particular the development strategies of households in CAMPFIRE areas are focusing on land uses that are incompatible with wildlife -- population in-migration, the extension of cropping and increased livestock numbers (Murombedzi 1999). To a significant degree these problems arise because CAMPFIRE has only been able to devolve authority over natural resources, property rights and management from the central government to rural district councils, which are designated as the ‘appropriate authority’ for wildlife in communal lands (Chitsike 2000). Despite CAMPFIRE principles requiring full participation and decision-making by producer communities rural district councils have failed to devolve authority of natural resource management to lower tier structures of administration, such as village CAMPFIRE Committees and ward CAMPFIRE Committees (Mamimine 2000).

Critics argue that CAMPFIRE is in fact a ‘district-based’ and not community-based programme and “… stands at present as a partially decentralised programme of wildlife conservation and use in which power rests at the ‘meso’ level of the rural district council” (Murombedzi 1999: 292). This lack of devolution constitutes a mismatch between the unit of authority (rural district councils) and the unit of responsibility (producer communities). If the CAMPFIRE programme is to be effective in the future “… there has to be complete and unambiguous devolution of control
over resources to the communal residents themselves", and "... they must determine how wildlife is to be used and what role wildlife should play in the evolving patterns of land use in these difficult environments" (Murombedzi 1999: 292).

Experience from the southern African region illustrates that in most cases governance issues in CBNRM have never been able to successfully go below the district level (Mujakachi 2000).

Another example illustrating the importance of the question where to locate the decision-making body and management authority is the Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE) in Zambia. The programme has opted for a governance system at local level of the traditional authority. This has facilitated rapid implementation and reduced the costs of institutional development. However, critics of the programme describe it as a chief-based conservation. Chiefs used ADMADE initiatives to secure more power and resources for themselves rather than to facilitate local participation or wildlife conservation. Because ADMADE policy did not stipulate clearly the composition or operation of the Sub-Authority, as an important decision-making body, chiefs generally controlled its agenda and membership (Gibson and Marks 1995).

Mamimine (2000) emphasises the importance of decentralised and devolved structures in natural resource management and the centrality of decentralisation to good governance and development, "... decentralisation is the quintessence of democracy in the strictest sense of government by the people, for the people and with the people" (11).

1.2.3 Concluding Remarks

'This approach to wildlife management is still evolving... experience has shown that implementation is a complex and demanding process' (IIED 1994: 37).

As examined above community-based approaches to conservation in Africa are rather complex and highly diversified and outcomes of CBC and CC initiatives differ from country to country, region to region, and community to community. Experiences
of programme and project activities in Africa show very positive outcomes and success, others are neither contributing to conservation nor the improvement of livelihoods of rural communities participating in programmes.

Experience shows that community-based approaches to conservation have not proved the 'panacea' for the problems and challenges conservation and rural development faces (Hulme and Murphree 2001). These approaches are more complex than the simple dynamic of a shift of responsibility and authority from the state to the 'community' suggests. It must be recognised that conservation is a complex issue of governance and "... it is about the roles and relationships of the state, of society (of which communities are elements) and of markets" (Hulme and Murphree 1999: 283). CBC requires a set of governance processes which allow all three actors to operate in the fields of conservation and development while being accountable to the other actors. They have to be flexible enough to permit relationships, policy and practice to evolve as environmental, economic and social conditions change (Hulme and Murphree 2001).

Although the experience shows that CBC approaches have not proved the panacea to solve Africa's problems in wildlife conservation, these new approaches are worth pursuing. If "... conservation is about handling change, and about the transition from past to future" (Adams 1996: 96-97 in Hulme and Murphree 2001) then the 'new conservation' provides the basis for a set of experiments, through which conservation policies and practice in Africa can more effectively respond to the transition from its unsatisfactory past to its uncertain future.
2 Decentralisation and Local Government

Decentralisation has been a very fashionable concept in the development literature since the early 1980s. But yet a wave of new decentralisation processes has occurred over the past decade. The 1990s have witnessed a major resurgence and interest in decentralisation as a key element of public sector policy reform and management in sub-Saharan Africa (Stockmayer 1999; UNCDF 2000). The majority of countries have adopted decentralisation policies, including strengthening local government and initiating processes of devolution, in their national and sub-national development planning and programming (Reddy 1999a). Many bilateral donors and international development agencies have sought to encourage this. The World Bank (1997; 1999; 2000a) has seen decentralisation as one of the key components to face the world’s development challenges entering the 21st century, such as reducing poverty and promoting sustainable development.

The fundamental aim of decentralisation is to bring government closer to the people in the interests of enhancing efficiency and democratic accountability. Transfer of power and resources to the local level will help to empower communities to work together to define and resolve their problems (Reddy 1999b; Stockmayer 1999).

Before discussing the origins of the current wave of decentralisation in Africa and its implications, different terms and types of decentralisation, the notion of local government, and benefits and shortcomings of decentralisation are examined below.

2.1 Types of Decentralisation

Numerous definitions of decentralisation emerge from the literature and it is generally accepted that it is impossible to standardise the word decentralisation (Manor 1999; Reddy 1999b). However, in a broad sense decentralisation denotes the transfer of power, authority or responsibility for decision-making, planning, management or resource allocation from the central government to its field units, district
administrative units, local governments, regional or functional authorities, semi-autonomous public authorities, parastatal organisations, private entities and non-governmental private or voluntary organisations (Rondinelli and Cheema 1983). More often decentralisation refers to the formal devolution of power to local decisionmakers (see below). “A government has not decentralized unless the country contains autonomous elected subnational governments capable of taking binding decisions in at least some policy areas” (World Bank 1999: 108).

Decentralisation can be either horizontal or vertical. Horizontal decentralisation disperses power among institutions at the same level, while vertical decentralisation, which is more useful, allows some of the powers of a central government to be delegated downwards to lower tiers of authority. Four major types of decentralisation are commonly described in the literature, namely delegation, deconcentration, devolution and privatisation (Rondinelli and Cheema 1983, Reddy 1999b). Manor (1999) emphasises another type of decentralisation referring to fiscal transfers.

Delegation is the transfer of some responsibility and decision-making powers to organisations that are outside the regular bureaucratic structure and are only indirectly controlled by the central government. Delegation has only rarely been attempted. When it has been tried it has either failed to facilitate a genuine decentralisation of decision-making or it has impeded project implementation, or both (Manor 1999).

Deconcentration or administrative decentralisation is the passing-down of selective administrative functions to lower levels or subnational units within central government ministries and agencies (Reddy 1999b). The central government is not giving up any authority. It is simply relocating its officers at different levels or points in the national territory. In such circumstances, it tends in practice to constitute centralisation (Manor 1999).

Devolution or democratic decentralisation is the transfer of resources, tasks and decision-making power to lower level authorities which are largely or wholly independent of the central government and which are democratic in some way and to
some degree (Manor 1995). This includes financial power as well as the authority to
design and execute local development projects and programmes (Hope 2000). This
type of democratic decentralisation will be of further interest in the discussion below
and plays an important role in the Tanzanian context.

Privatisation refers to the transfer of all responsibility for government functions and
services to private enterprises or non-governmental organisations independent of the
government (Reddy 1999b). Critics argue that the private sector firms which take
over the tasks from the state are themselves often quite large so that, far from being
decentralised, power is actually passing from one major power centre to others. They
also argue that user charges, which often come with privatisation, exclude many poor
people and thus do not necessarily increase choice (Manor 1995; Manor 1999).

Sometimes decentralisation refers to down-ward fiscal transfers by which higher
levels in a system cede control over budgets and financial decisions to lower levels.
This authority can pass either to deconcentrated bureaucrats and/or unelected
appointees on the one hand, or to elected politicians on the other. When the latter
occurs, fiscal decentralisation becomes relevant to democratic governance (Manor
1999).

As devolution or democratic decentralisation is of major interest below, some further
points are important to raise. Manor (1999) argues that devolution or democratic
decentralisation on its own is likely to fail, "democratic authorities at lower levels in
political systems will founder if they lack powers and resources – meaning both
financial resources and the administrative resources to implement development
projects" (: 7). Decentralisation must be attended both by some fiscal decentralisation
(since that supplies financial resources) and by some deconcentration or
administrative decentralisation (since that supplies bureaucratic resources required
for implementation). If it is to have significant promise, decentralisation must entail a
mixture of all three types: democratic, fiscal and administrative decentralisation.
2.2 Local Government

Local government is a second or third level of governance created to ensure that government is brought to the grassroots population to give its members a sense of involvement in the political processes that control their daily lives. Reddy (1999b) emphasises the importance of local government as the basis of all structures of governance – it is vital in the universal quest for a stable democratic society. UNDP (2000) defines local governance "... as the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at the local level" (p. 26). According to this definition, local governance may be seen as a system that is in place or to be achieved.

Local government, or decentralised political decision-making and management, is the level of democracy that is closest to the people and that allows the local populace to actively participate in affairs which affect them directly. Local governments can regulate matters that pertain to their local citizenry using their own knowledge and local expertise and consulting a democratically elected, local representative body (Reddy 1999b).

The emphasis on promoting local governments is heavily based on the principle of subsidiarity. In every aspect of life the level or area can be defined which is best suited to fulfil certain tasks (Scholz 1997). The principle that subsidiary structures are better is based on the idea that citizens and their organisations are more creative and cooperative in the cause of 'their' community for the one they are responsible for. The objective of maximising both economic efficiency and citizen participation is more easily achieved the closer one gets to the local populace, since smaller administrative units are better suited to this task than larger ones (Scholz 1997; Stockmayer 1999). Obviously local government is better equipped to carry out local functions and act on behalf of the local populace, provided it has the powers and resources to do so (Reddy 1999b).
2.3 Benefits and Shortcomings of Decentralisation

It has been generally accepted that effective and participatory decentralisation yields substantial benefits and has many virtues when it works well (Manor 1999; Reddy 1999b; Hope 2000). Reddy (1999a) argues that "... effective and fair forms of decentralised local self-government that is given the required support could constitute the basis for a new and improved relationship between the local citizenry and the state" (: 17-18).

Manor (1999: 87-93) describes a number of matters in which decentralisation has considerable promise. For practical reasons for this paper only the most important are outlined in the following.

1. Promoting greater political participation and associational activity. Participation grows both at elections (in terms of voting and of participating in campaigns) and between them – through increased contact or petitioning of elected representatives and (to a lesser degree) of bureaucrats, through attending official and unofficial meetings, through protests, and the like. Levels of both tend to be high in Africa. This tends to occur even where civil society has previously been weak.

2. Enhancing the responsiveness of government institutions. Democratic decentralisation tends strongly to enhance speed, quantity and quality of responses from government institutions. Since it usually entails some empowerment and autonomy for elected bodies at intermediate or local levels, or both, those bodies usually possess the authority and resources to respond quickly to problems and pressures from below – without waiting for the approval of agencies at higher levels.

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4 It is often mentioned in the literature that it is quite difficult to make statements about the impacts of decentralisation due to a distinct shortage of reliable research about the workings of many experiments with decentralisation and the consequences of decentralised governmental and administrative practice. Furthermore, institutions which are being assessed are still quite young. (Manor 1999; Stockmayer 1999).
3. *Increasing the information flow between government and people.* This is again quite commonly a major gain from democratic decentralisation. Elected members and heads of local and/or intermediate authorities usually live near or within their constituencies (unlike many members of higher level parliaments). Voters know that these people owe their position to a popular mandate and that they (usually) have the power to shape government action, so they tend to put their views to these representatives and to bureaucrats now more often than before decentralisation. This results in a considerable and often enormous increase in the amount of information flowing to persons in government. Democratic decentralisation also, although to a lesser degree, enhances the flow of information from government to citizens. Many gains often occur in government programmes, such as health, environment, etc..

4. *Making development programmes more sustainable.* If people at the grassroots are drawn, even quite marginally, into decisions or just discussions about rural development projects, they develop the belief that they have stake in their success. And since the quality of responses from government institutions tends to improve in the sense that they are more congruent with locally felt needs, people naturally identify more strongly with development projects. This does a great deal to make those projects more sustainable. This applies to the management of natural resources, service delivery and much else.

5. *Enhancing transparency.* When large numbers of decentralised bodies are thrown open to people who usually live within their constituencies, their neighbours and constituents become far better able to see and understand what goes on within government institutions. The same is true of the elected representatives themselves, who explain their doings and decisions in order to cultivate popular support.

6. *Promoting greater accountability.* For the reasons outlined above, and because positions of power are obtained by election, democratic decentralisation tends to enhance the accountability of elected representatives to citizens.
7. Achieving political renewal. The creation of elected authorities at intermediate and local levels opens up a large number of positions of power for people – many of them young – who aspire to political influence.

Despite the benefits illustrated above, it should always be reminded that decentralisation is no panacea for all governmental and developmental problems and that opportunities offered by it should not be overestimated (Stockmayer 1999). The successful implementation of decentralisation programmes heavily depends on national frame conditions. Manor (1995) emphasises the lack of democratic experience and the lack of adequate financial resources prevailing in many African countries as major constraints on the successful implementation.

There are certain areas in which decentralisation tends to fall short of expectations. An important matter in this context is poverty alleviation. Does decentralisation help rural poor people or marginalised and vulnerable groups such as women or minorities? Manor (1999) argues that decentralisation tends to help in the case of poverty which afflicts remote, underdeveloped and underrepresented subregions. The creation of elected authorities within such arenas often provides vulnerable groups with a stronger voice and a fairer share of the resources distributed by the state. The major concern is that decentralisation has so far had little impact on inequalities within subregions or localities. This tends to be a more serious concern than inequalities between them. It can even make things worse since hierarchical relations and elite biases against the poor tend in many countries to grow stronger as we move from higher levels down towards the grassroots. Decentralisation initiatives cannot replace national programmes to reduce poverty.

2.4 Decentralisation and Local Governance in Africa

As mentioned above, decentralisation has become increasingly significant on the African continent and the majority of countries have adopted decentralisation policies, including strengthening local government and initiating processes of devolution in their national and sub-national development planning and programming. At the national level many countries have recognised the limitations of centralised
planning and management which has stifled local level participation and resulted in significant inefficiencies and bottlenecks in the delivery of services. The call for decentralisation has come from a technocratic and efficiency argument, which projects more effective and efficient planning and management outcomes out of decentralised arrangements. Another call has come from the political opening of space with the adoption of democratic multiparty systems of governance which have stimulated the opening up of formerly closed systems with a desire for political inclusiveness and plurality. Local government becomes an instrument for giving political power and responsibility to local levels (UNCDF 2000).

The reasons why governments emphasise decentralisation is linked to a variety of political, economic and social factors at the national and global levels. The causes of decentralisation differ substantially from one country to another. Manor (1999) tries to explain the latest waves of decentralisation from a political economy perspective, linking the democratisation process to decentralisation, highlighting the political dimensions but recognising the diversity of origin of decentralisation. He argues “...that no single cause, or even a small number of them, triggered decisions to decentralise” (: 26).

In general, the decentralisation rationale for Africa is an outcome of a variety of governance problems that were being experienced in the 1970s and 1980s. These included monopolisation of political power by narrow groups of elites (political/military), corruption and the collapse of the systems of public sector management (Pasteur 1999). These factors created significant pressure locally and internationally for the democratisation and liberalisation of the political systems, which form the basis for the current thinking on democratic decentralisation. Most of the countries which had previously followed the centralised model, controlled through one-party systems, witnessed the combined pressure of a local desire for greater democracy, and increasing pressure from the donor community demanding for greater accountability and transparency in decision-making (UNCDF 2000).

In the early 1960s, when most African countries achieved political independence, they inherited centralised political and administrative structures of government and
local governments were largely confined to urban areas and responsible for control of local development and providing basic social services. Rural local government was relatively undeveloped, in most cases relying on an authoritarian mode of government controlled by the District Commissioners in anglophone countries and Prefects in francophone countries. The initial preoccupation of the newly independent governments was the consolidation of political power and promotion of development to reach the formerly neglected rural areas. The primary objective required the state to expand its apparatus and so decentralisation was largely viewed in terms of deconcentration and creating lower level subnational structures. The 1960s and 1970s was an era of one-party states and state socialism, and therefore local governments were viewed as defacto extensions of central government and the power of ruling parties. The result in many African countries was very limited civic participation at local government levels and participation was defined in terms of belonging to the political party, excluding the majority of ordinary people from decision making. The emerging landscape of local government was not democratic. Decentralisation programmes in the 1960s and 1970s were largely about deconcentration of central government institutions, top down and they failed to empower the citizens. By the end of the 1970s it was clear that the institutional apparatus and set up had neither promoted participation nor promoted meaningful economic and social advancement and by the 1980s there was disillusionment with socialism and centralised planning (Pasteur 1999; UNCDF 2000).

Ghana and Uganda are often mentioned as being highly committed to democratic decentralisation and making great process in devolving powers to the local level. Although the local government system has only recently been reformed, it is comparatively strong and well established (Engel 1999; Pasteur 1999).

Uganda stands out as one of the most radical and ambitious examples of devolution in the African context. Decentralisation has served as a path to national unity. The broad-based politics of ‘resistance councils’ and committees that had been developed during the years of civil war helped pacify most parts of the country. This system – which entails giving power to the people of a village (the council) to freely choose their leaders (committees) – served as the basis for the local government
policy enshrined in the 1995 constitution. The 46 districts, which are subdivided into smaller units down to the village level, have taken on substantial responsibilities for education, health and local infrastructure. They now account for 30 percent of overall government spending (World Bank 1999).

Botswana is one of those countries which is formally committed to the promotion of democratic decentralisation and representative local democracy has been promoted in a far-reaching way (Hope 2000). Despite this formal commitment to decentralisation, local government in the country remains underdeveloped. Central-local government relations are characterised by a strong and dominant centre with limited autonomy of local government and the capacities of local government remain limited (Sharma 1999).

In Mozambique, political and administrative decentralisation is given high emphasis within the country's national policy agenda and the National Reconstruction Programme. Although the principle of a decentralised, self-governed local community/municipality was proclaimed, its realisation is very limited in scope, content and territorial extension. Instead of the far-reaching administrative reform and decentralisation of power initially legislated in 1994, the constitutional amendments of 1996 and legislation revised in 1997 basically restricted local self-government to cities, secondary towns and district centres and simultaneously maintained structures of central administration in the latter. There will be no self-governing, democratically legitimised local authorities in rural areas (Engel 1999; Weimer and Fandrych 1999).

Limited local capacity is often described as a major constraint on successful implementation of decentralisation processes. Bornstein (2000) describes in the case of district development planning in Mozambique's Sofala Province that "... neither the district directors nor the planning delegate had any experience in planning; some were barely literate and numerate" (: 249). Inadequate planning and coordination skills and lack of administrative competence at district level were also identified as core problems of the Zambian decentralisation strategy (Engel 1999). Similar problems can be found in Ghana where actors in the districts lack the required know-
how and expertise which prevents decentralisation processes being implemented consistently in most of the 110 districts (Engel 1999).

More problems can be traced to a lack of political restraint as Kullenberg and Porter (1999) describe in the case of Uganda’s UNCDF supported District Development Project: to keep expenditure within approved budget limits, to observe rules and regulations for financial management. Corruption and collusion disrupt revenue collection, contracting and the accountability of politicians. Kullenberg and Porter further emphasise the pressing need to develop a system of incentives and sanctions to promote accountability and establish a clear link between taxes and transfers received and services delivered.

Local government officials very often state the lack of political commitment of central government to devolve powers and resources as a major constraint on successful implementation of decentralisation policies. As UNDP experience in Mali and Uganda illustrates, centralist tendencies prevailed at many levels and in many branches of central government administration. Typically there was an observed reluctance on the part of central authorities to assume their new roles of policy and guidance as opposed to those of administration and control. This was manifested in a difference of views of capacities at the central and local levels: on the one hand, many central authorities (usually ministries responsible for local government, finance and planning) stated that they were reluctant to delegate too much (financial authority) owing to serious capacity limitations at the local levels. On the other hand, local authorities often complain that central authorities were simply unwilling or resistant to give up power and territory (UNDP 2000).

Being part of political powerplays, resistance to decentralisation might be strong. Decentralisation means devolving powers from central to lower levels of government. In many cases, members of central government, e.g. sector ministries, are not prepared to lose control over their limited resources (Rauch 1999). Furthermore, it is always important to ask who takes a decision on decentralisation and why (Manor 2001).
2.5 Concluding Remarks

Democratic decentralisation in the African context can be seen as the means to an end, namely the development of communities and improved provision of services.

Decentralisation is a long-term process. A number of difficulties stand in the way for a rapid and smooth implementation in the majority of countries in Africa and a long-term struggle has to be taken into account (Rauch et al. forthcoming). Many of the decentralisation policies have faced major problems of implementation and have not achieved the desired results. As illustrated above, limitations of basic human resources, capacity and know-how especially at local level in rural areas and hesitation of central government to devolve real powers and sufficient resources to local authorities constrain the reform process in many countries. It is imperative that decentralisation initiatives be accompanied with corresponding financial (guaranteed) and human resources (administrative and technical capacity) to ensure that the process is successful and will have the desired political and administrative effect.

While the success of reform programmes is by no means assured, there seems to be commitment by central governments of a number of countries to democratic decentralisation and to the process of reform that will lead to it.\(^5\) Furthermore, promising progress has been made in a number of countries, e.g. Uganda, Ghana and South Africa. The fact that democratic decentralisation is a worldwide trend makes it more likely that it will not be a passing phase, but will be a foundation for long-term development.

\(^5\) At the ministerial conference held in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, in September 1999, delegates from 20 countries made strong commitments to supporting and promoting the vision of decentralisation and to building systems of planning and budgeting to strengthening local governments. In May 2000 the second AFRICITIES conference was held bringing delegates from cities and municipalities to share experiences on financing local level development. The main theme was ‘Financing local government’ and all key recommendations pointed to the need for central governments to put in place enabling legislation for subnational governments to function (UNCDF 2000). Another important international conference was hosted by GTZ in 1999 on Decentralisation and Rural Development and the key issues that were identified in the implementation of decentralisation were: fiscal decentralisation, institutional capacity building, community participation, role of NGOs and the private sector. These issues were considered central in the agenda for researchers and policy makers in Africa and the conference recommended further dialogue on design and implementation issues.
PART TWO –
THE TANZANIAN CONTEXT

3 Tanzania Entering the 21st Century

This chapter analyses development problems Tanzania is currently facing with relevance to the country’s local government reform and the management of natural resources discussed in the chapters below.⁶

Tanzania is one of the poorest and most indebted countries in the world. Per capita income is estimated at about US $ 250. About 50 percent of the estimated 33 million people (1999) live below the poverty line with about 92 percent in rural areas. Women are especially affected by poverty (World Bank 2000b).

The government spent 23 percent of the 1997/98 domestic budget revenue on foreign debt service, with 30 percent of the domestic budget revenue spent on total (including domestic debt) debt service (Drescher 1999). While aid dependency remains extremely high, Tanzania is one of the first countries eligible for debt relief under the IMF’s Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative framework.

The political situation in Tanzania is characterised by two major transformation processes: firstly, economic reforms have converted the command-based economy into a market-oriented economy; secondly, the transformation from a one-party state dominated by the CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi) Party for over three decades to a multi-party democratic system. Multiparty elections were held at local level in late 1994 and 1999, presidential and parliamentary elections in 1995 and October 2000.

⁶ For additional relevant data also see Appendix I: Tanzania Data Profile.
Yet the newly established opposition parties have not gained significant political powers and have not become a real alternative to the ruling party in personal and programmatic terms. While the political situation on the mainland is rather stable, the conflict between the mainland and the islands of Zanzibar constitutes a major political conflict having recently resulted in political violence on the islands. The majority of Zanzibar's mainly Muslim dominated population of Arabic descent supports Tanzania's major opposition CUF (Civic United Front) party. The presidential and parliamentary election in Zanzibar in October 2000 were seriously affected by disruption and numerous people were arrested and even some killed. CUF blamed the Mkapa government and boycotted the second round of elections repeated in some constituencies.

Despite attempts of the Mkapa Government to fight mismanagement and corruption, corruption remains a major problem hindering the country’s development efforts. According to the annually published Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, Tanzania is ranked 82nd out of 91 countries in the 2001 report (Transparency International 2001). International donors blame the government for not implementing forcefully enough the anti-corruption strategy, and the action plan has not been given the total strength needed to be effective (The Guardian 24/05/00; The Guardian 04/12/2000). A major problem constitutes the administration of justice which is said to be seriously afflicted by corruption and legal security in Tanzania remains unsatisfactory (BMZ 2000).

After the deferment of IMF and World Bank programmes in 1994 and an interruption of balance of payment assistance from several donors, the Mkapa Government, which came into power in November 1995, has heavily focused on improving fiscal

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7 In December 1996 the Warioba Commission, which was appointed by the newly elected President Mkapa, presented the ‘Report of the Warioba Commission on Corruption’. The report mercilessly describes the dimension of corruption rampant in all sectors of economy, public services and politics in the country. In February 1999 the government presented a detailed report (‘Tanzania’s Third Phase Government Fight Against Corruption: A Brief on Achievements and Challenges 1995-1999’; President’s Office/State House, February 1999) on measures taken in the fight against corruption at the Consultative Group Meeting in Paris. An anti-corruption action plan has followed and an anti-corruption strategy has been implemented.

8 The Corruption Perception Index, which Transparency International has now been compiling for several years, ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among officials.
performance and instituting structural reforms. In early 1996 the government committed itself to a shadow programme monitored by the IMF, and from September 1996 a three-year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) was underpinned by a Policy Framework Paper. In 1997 the World Bank agreed on a Structural Adjustment Credit. In this context, the Mkapa Government focuses on structural adjustment policy aiming at macro-economic stability. The aim is to create conditions for a sustainable economic development supported by the private sector and an efficient public service (Drescher 1999).

The tight budget seriously constrains government development attempts. 79.1 percent of the 1999/2000 budget cover recurrent expenditure (mainly salaries and debt service) and only 21 percent are used for development expenditure. Foreign loans and grants cover about 33 percent of the national budget (Drescher 1999).

As illustrated above, poverty remains a major development problem. More recent efforts to tackle poverty and other development problems have been pursued under relatively decentralised, but largely complementary policy initiatives. 'The Tanzania Development Vision 2025' lays out the long-term developmental goals and perspectives⁹, against which the strategy for poverty alleviation ‘National Poverty Eradication Strategy’ (NPES) was formulated (United Republic of Tanzania 1998a; United Republic of Tanzania 1998b). The ‘Tanzania Assistance Strategy’ (TAS) is the result of a mutually felt need by the Government of Tanzania and its international partners for a comprehensive development agenda. TAS is an “... initiative aimed at restoring local ownership and leadership, as well as promoting partnership in designing and executing development programmes” and “… it is also about good governance, transparency, accountability and capacity building and effectiveness of aid” (United Republic of Tanzania 2000a: 1). The ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper’

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⁹ Tanzania of the year 2025 is envisaged to have the following features: high quality livelihoods; peace, stability and unity; good governance; a well educated and learning society; and a competitive economy capable of producing sustainable growth and shared benefits. It is interesting to mention that the so called ‘donor dependence syndrome’ is seen as a major obstacle to development. “The mindset of the people of Tanzania and their leaders has succumbed to donor dependency and has resulted in an erosion of initiative and lack of ownership of the development agenda”, implementation of the Vision 2025 requires to “… reactivate the commitment to self-reliance and resourcefulness in order to curb the donor-dependence syndrome which has led many Tanzanians into unprecedented apathy” (United Republic of Tanzania 1998b: 8).
(PRSP) is an integral part of the HIPC process, focusing mainly on poverty alleviation, subject to a relatively hard (central government) budget constraint (United Republic of Tanzania 2000b).

The over-exploitation and degradation of natural resources, such as soil, forests, wildlife and to a certain extend also water, constitutes a major challenge for the country. This is mainly caused by the pressure of increasing population numbers and inappropriate land use practices. This deterioration of the natural resource base directly affects the livelihoods of rural people. On the other hand, it also has immense negative impacts on the national economy. Decreased numbers of wildlife for instance would mean dramatic losses of income from the tourism sector.
4 Policy Framework for Decentralisation and Community Based Conservation

The following chapter explores the extent to which the recent government reforms in Tanzania adequately promote decentralisation, local governance and the management of natural resources. Whether these policy reforms are conducive to community-based conservation is discussed below.

4.1 Natural Resource Management Policy and Approaches

Until recently, there was no devolution of management of natural resources in Tanzania. In the past, the colonial and the independent state introduced a systematic dilution of customary tenure to natural resources and land, inhibiting access to resources of the majority of Tanzanians who live in rural areas. The state and its parastatals controlled natural resources. Villages, which are the lowest level of community-based administration, were not given tenure over natural resources (Shauri 2000).

Several reforms have changed Tanzania's overall framework for environmental and natural resource management in recent years. New policies have been formulated and changes in legislation are taking place in several sectors underpinning environment and natural resource management and aiming at the devolution of management from central government authorities to local communities. For example, the National Environment Policy, 1997 (United Republic of Tanzania 1997a), provides strong policy support to the process of decentralisation of environmental management and the National Forest Policy, 1998 (United Republic of Tanzania 1998c), provides for the designation of village forest reserves to be managed by communities. The new Wildlife Policy, 1998 (United Republic of Tanzania 1998d), is of major interest in the discussion below. Policies and legislation with further

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10 However, a semblance of devolution existed in the forest sector in which the devolution went down to the highest ladder of the local government structure, that is, the district council.
relevance to the management of natural resources and wildlife in particular, are examined in the context of the case study below.

The Wildlife Policy of Tanzania, 1998 (WPT), is taking a clear step towards devolving management to local communities and allowing communities to benefit from wildlife in their areas. The WPT recognises wildlife endowment of the country and its potential in the economic and development of local communities.

It elucidates some of the constraints in reaching the potential to contribute to the economy of the local communities as:

- Failure of wildlife conservation as a form of land use to compete adequately with other land uses, especially in rural communities.
- Inadequate financial and human resources to enable the government to devolve wildlife management responsibilities to the rural people countrywide.
- Inadequate wildlife user rights especially for rural communities.

In addressing the constraints the WPT puts forward the following challenges:

- To promote the involvement of local communities’ participation in wildlife conservation in and outside the protected area network;
- To integrate wildlife conservation with rural development;
- To foster sustainable and legal use of wildlife resources;
- To ensure that wildlife conservation competes with other forms of land use; and
- To enhance rural people’s recognition of the intrinsic value of wildlife.

In ensuring that the challenges of community participation are met, the policy has specific objectives:

- To promote the conservation of wildlife and its habitats outside core protected areas by establishing Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs)\(^\text{11}\); and

\(^\text{11}\) The Wildlife Policy defines WMA as: ‘An area set aside by village government for the purpose of biological natural resource conservation’.
• To transfer the management of WMAs to local communities, thus taking care of corridors, migration routes and buffer zones and ensure local communities obtain substantial tangible benefits from wildlife conservation.

Strategies for conserving and managing wildlife resources are:
• Devolving management responsibilities of the settled area outside the unsettled protected areas to rural people and the private sector, and those for integrating wildlife conservation and rural development; and
• Adopting measures that bring an equitable share of revenue from tourist hunting to the rural communities, on whose land the industry is practised.

Transfer of wildlife management responsibility to the local communities in WMAs entails the creation of this new category of a protected area, since this type of wildlife conservation area does not exist today. The policy says that this category of a protected area is created for the purpose of effecting CBC. It further defines CBC as conservation of wildlife resources based on the participation of the local communities.

The focus of the wildlife policy is on assuring user rights of wildlife and allowing local communities to actively engage in wildlife conservation and entrepreneurship thereof while ensuring protection of the resource for their own benefits. Since the state maintains the overall ownership of wildlife, the government controls the use of the same resources throughout the country, including wildlife on the village land. However, the aim of the wildlife policy is to ensure that this mode of production system contributes significantly to the improvement of the livelihood of local communities, particularly in agricultural marginal areas, and therefore the government provides support to the local communities to ensure local communities' right over the resource.

To sum up, the Wildlife Policy of Tanzania commits the country to CBC. It intends to transfer wildlife management rights and revenues to the communities on the basis of the creation of WMAs on village land.
To accommodate this new policy, the Wildlife Conservation Act No. 12 of 1974 (WCA) is about to be revised. However, in Tanzania it takes a long time, most probably up to several years, for a law to be formulated, passed and made operational. Since review of the WCA might delay, it is obvious that interim mechanisms have to be formulated soon. Guidelines are being formulated that are assisting the communities and other partners to establish and manage WMAs.

4.2 Local Government Reform

Tanzania is currently undertaking far-reaching reforms of which the local government reform is a key component with the aim to replace the former control and command system of central government with a decentralised system that allocates authority and responsibility to local authorities.

4.2.1 Set-up of Local Government

Before embarking on a historical analysis of local government in Tanzania, it is appropriate to lay down the basic features of the system. The administrative set-up of Tanzania comprises of regions (20 in Tanzania mainland), districts (some 115) (see map of Tanzania, Annex II), divisions, wards, villages and sub-villages (hamlets). Local governments entail district councils, urban councils (established for bigger towns) and municipal councils.

The ‘District Commissioner’ (DC) represents the central government administration in the district. The divisional secretaries are the only administrative staff directly answerable to him/her. Until recently, the DC was the ‘Assistant Proper Officer’ of the district council. The position of proper officer has been abandoned and the ‘Regional Commissioner’ (RC) or the Minister for Regional Administration and Local Government are now the supervisory bodies for the district councils (see below). Although the DC now does not have a legitimate supervisory role to play in the district, he still considers himself and is still respected to be the overseer of all affairs in the respective district. His future role remains to be seen.
Village councils and hamlet leaders are part of the local government of a district council. The administration of a district council entails the ‘District Executive Director’ (DED), ‘Ward Executive Officers’ (WEO), and village secretaries. Hence, local government is well organised right down to the sub-village level.

Since 1984, most of the technical staff (for example in the sectors of education or natural resources) have been directly answerable to the district council. In 1999, the agriculture staff was made answerable to the district council as well, the remaining sectors are to follow in the course of the local government reform. The staff of the latter in the districts, e.g. in the health sector, are currently still answerable to their parent ministry through their regional representative in the office of the 'Regional Administrative Secretary' (RAS).

The central ‘Local Government Service Commission’ appoints all technical and administrative staff in the districts above a certain salary scale, i.e. more or less all staff with formal training. Central government also pays the salaries for this staff through subsidies.

Financially the district councils up to now rely almost entirely on central government subsidies. Local revenues – through taxes (mainly direct taxes), licences, levies and fees – only constitute some 10 percent of the annual budget of an average district council of about US $ 150,000 (Lipp 1999).

It should also be noted that the Local Government Reform Programme involves Tanzania mainland only and it does not in any way touch Zanzibar. This is partly because local government is not a Union matter.

4.2.2 History of Local Government

A number of factors arise from Tanzania’s long and varied history of local government restructuring – of particular relevance to the present reform process. A brief historical review follows, highlighting key developments.
Tanzania mainland has been subjected to decentralisation programmes during the German colonial period (1884-1919) as well as during the subsequent British colonial administration (1919-1961). In the administration of the territory, Germans preferred ‘direct rule’ and monitoring of activities and supervision were done by commissioned officers from the central government. In the first years of their rule, the British were content with the administration left behind by the Germans. In the years between 1926-1954 the British introduced the system of ‘indirect administration/indirect rule’ whereby the British Government ruled through or used Chiefs to govern the country and its people (Warioba 1999).

During the first years of independence, the country’s local government policies were in a transitory phase. The official recognition of chiefs in local government was abolished in 1962, and local authorities with elected representatives were established. From 1966 onwards these were conducted as one-party elections. Throughout the 1960s, the local authorities expanded their activities as providers of essential services, including health and education, and their total expenditure increased substantially. The income base of the authorities, on the other hand, was static or falling. The authorities also lacked qualified manpower to keep abreast with their increasing responsibilities. Local authorities started from a very low resource base at independence, and the young nation simply did not have the sufficient resources to build up local capacities at a pace that could keep up with requirements of the people at the local level. A number of other central government decisions put local governments on the road to bankruptcy and collapse. Following the Arusha Declaration of 1967, the country’s policy of socialism and self-reliance (commonly known as Ujamaa) strengthened central government rather than local authorities. The central government formally abolished district councils in 1972 although they had already ceased to operate from 1969 (Liviga and Mfunda 1999).

The main purpose of the new decentralisation scheme introduced by President Nyerere in 1972 was to foster increased popular participation. Central Government was brought closer to the people as powerful Development Committees consisting of centrally appointed members were established at Regional and District levels. The Regions assumed greatly expanded powers and responsibilities as organs of policy.
making and implementation. It had been expected that the incorporation of party cadre into the structure of local government would serve as a boost to local participation, strengthen the legitimacy of the councils and give rise to self-help activities. These gains failed to materialise, however, and local government institutions were increasingly seen to be accountable to central government, rather than to their own constituents, and the legitimacy of the local councils deteriorated.

The villagisation drive of the early 1970s, which entailed the resettlement of the rural population, added another level to the local government structure. With the Village Act of 1975, Tanzania's villages were formerly included in the local government hierarchy. Elected councils and development committees were established at the village level. Decentralisation and villagisation was part and parcel of the vision of centrally planned development led by State and Party. This approach scored some early achievements, notably in the attainment of Universal Primary Education in the late 1970s. However, the benefits of this progress was partly offset by a decline in the standard of services provided, as existing resources were spread more thinly, and with steadily decreasing resources for regular maintenance of physical infrastructure. Towards the end of the 1970s, central government was facing worsening budgetary constraints, at the same time as the public grew increasingly critical of weak provisions for transparency and accountability in central and local government.

In 1982, elected District Authorities were re-established.12 The ‘new’ local government system differs from the 1972-1982 decentralisation system in a number of important respects (Liviga and Mfunda 1999: 249):

- The new local governments took over, in addition to other functions, most of the staff and functions of the central government administration run by the district development directors at the district level.

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12 The decision to reintroduce local governments was a reaction to an economic crisis that threatened not only the existence of the state but also total collapse of social services, the provision of which formed part of the leadership’s basis for legitimacy (Liviga and Mfunda 1999).
- The new local authorities were given powers that the district development directors, for example, never had.¹³
- The new local authorities are dominated by elected councillors and the appointed officials do not have the right to vote in the councils.

These differences notwithstanding, the principal organisational form still remains the same, that is functional rather than territorial.

The reinstated authorities were faced with serious problems at their inception. First, and regarded as a core problem permeating all aspects of local government (council) work, but particularly prevalent in the field of finance, accountancy and other technical areas, is insufficient qualified human resources. The second major problem is the inadequacy of funds. The third problem, which is endemic in all sectors and professions, is the scarcity of technical equipment and materials. The inability of the local governments to deliver social services to their constituencies without help from central government is the fourth problem.

The reinstatement of elected councils at district level caused further problems by a lack of clarity in the lines of authority and accountability between the civil service and the political authorities. Large parts of the regulatory structures put in place through decentralisation were kept in place, with an added political dimension consisting of the elected councillors reporting to the Prime Minister's Office. Despite the establishment of the elected councils at district level the regional offices remained significant power centres with considerable authority over policy and management. The authority of central government, represented by the line ministries and district and regional commissioners appointed by the president, and local government, represented by elected councils and the Prime Minister's Office, would subsequently frequently overlap and conflict. In the administration of land, for example, this resulted in frequent cases of 'double allocation' of land, as officials of local councils and the Ministry of Lands both claimed the authority to allocate land. This kind of confusion of authority worked against the objective of improving local services

¹³ These powers included hiring their own staff, making their own budgets and taxing the residents in their areas of jurisdiction.
through strengthened provisions of accountability. The dual problem of lacking resources and weak authority significantly eroded the interest and participation in local elections (UNDP 2000b).

4.2.3 The Local Government Reform Programme

Local government reform in Tanzania in the 1990s was first taken up as one of the core elements of the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) in 1994 with the common goal – to improve service delivery to the public. In 1996 a comprehensive policy document on local government reform, the Local Government Reform Agenda (LGRA), was presented (United Republic of Tanzania 1996). The LGRA argues for devolution of powers from central to local government through the creation of largely autonomous institutions at the local level, which are strong and effective. The LGRA was approved by the Government of Tanzania (GoT) and presented to donors in a round table meeting in 1997, which also in effect marked the launching of the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP).

The LGRP was institutionally separated from the CSRP and a Local Government Reform Team (LGRT) has been set up under the Prime Minister’s Office and charged with the responsibility to organise and lead the reform process (United Republic of Tanzania 1999a). In 1998, the Policy Paper on Local Government Reform was adopted and the Government established the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government (MRALG) (United Republic of Tanzania 1998e).

During this period, the Local Government Reform Agenda was developed into a comprehensive operational programme – the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) with an Action Plan and Budget (APB). The APB has provisions for this organisation to be supported by Zonal Reform Teams and for the setting up of task forces at the regional and district levels. The APB has been revised and elaborated several times and the latest version is of October 1999 (United Republic of Tanzania 1999b).
The development of the LGRP has taken place in close consultations between the GoT and a group of donors supporting the general policy of local government reform in Tanzania. To co-ordinate donor contributions and to facilitate the contact between donors and the LGRT (including the flow of donor funds into the reform programme), a basket funding arrangement has been put in place. The Common Basket Fund has provided funding for the planning activities and for the LGRT. Donor-GoT coordination and contact is more formally structured through a Local Government Consultative Forum which meets monthly and which, inter alia, approves terms of reference for the Basket Fund Steering Committee. The main donors contributing to the Common Basket Fund are Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, UK, Ireland, Finland and UNCDF. Furthermore, the MRALG is supported by UNDP and a Japanese government advisor.

Since the initial launching of the LGRP key enabling legislation and a number of institutional changes have been introduced in order to facilitate decentralisation to local government in Tanzania:

- Regional administration underwent substantial restructuring in 1997, whereby most of the regional staff was transferred to the districts and the regional secretariat under the Regional Commissioner was left with core staff for coordination and support activities vis-à-vis local authorities (United Republic of Tanzania 1997b).
- A Policy Paper on Local Government Reform has been developed and approved by the Cabinet (United Republic of Tanzania 1998e).
- With effect from October 1998 a separate Ministry for Regional Administration and Local Government has been set up. Local government affairs were formerly under a Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office.
- In the Parliamentary session ending on 13th of February 1999 the Bill proposing substantial amendments of the Local Government Law was approved. The legislative changes thus adopted are a formal prerequisite for a number of the reforms suggested in the LGRP.

The LGRP has become an integral part of the National Framework on Governance, which was initiated by Government in 1997, in order to improve the governance situation in general. The National Framework on Governance has contributed to
further elaboration and inclusion of governance concerns at the local level in the local government reform (UNDP 2000b). All policy and sector reforms aim at a slim state. In future central government shall be restricted to regulatory functions (political and legal framework, monitoring and audit, law enforcement, etc.), communities and the private sector shall be given more security and autonomy to drive development.

4.2.4 Objectives and Components

The overall goal of the LGRP has been defined as "To improve the quality of and access to public services provided through or facilitated by Local Government Authorities (LGAs)" (United Republic of Tanzania 1999b: 12). The local government reform addresses four main areas: political decentralisation, financial decentralisation, administrative decentralisation, and changed central-local relations aiming at the creation of largely autonomous institutions at the local level, which are strong and effective.

As outlined in the LGRA (United Republic of Tanzania 1996) the key objectives of the local government reform are as follows:

- That local governments will be more transparent in managing their administrative, personnel and financial affairs and determining their own priorities.
- That local governments will operate in a more transparent and democratic manner, reflecting enhanced accountability to the people they are supposed to serve.
- That staff will be responsible and accountable to their councils in terms of appointment, performance and discipline.
- That councils will have enhanced capacity in terms of staff who are better trained in relevant skills.
- That local governments will have more financial resources through improvements of their own resource mobilisation as well as central government and donor grants. Their financial management should improve significantly.
- That local governments will provide more equitable and better quality services and will facilitate and enable other agencies to do the same.
• That relevant national institutions will improve their capacity to enable and empower local governments to grow stronger.

The LGRP has six major components (United Republic of Tanzania 1999b: 12):
• Governance: To establish broad based community awareness of and participation in the reform process and promote principles of democracy, transparency and accountability.
• Local Government Restructuring: To enhance the effectiveness of Local Government Authorities in delivering quality services in a sustainable manner.
• Finance: To increase the resources available to LGAs and improve the efficiency of their use.
• Human Resource Development: To improve the accountability and efficiency of human resource use at LGA level.
• Institutional and Legal Framework: To establish the enabling legislation which will support the effective implementation of Local Government reforms.
• Programme Management: To support the effective and efficient management of the overall Local Government Reform Programme and in particular, the work of the LGRT.

4.2.5 Implementation of LGRP

Taking into consideration the substantial changes in the local government structure, the local government reform will be implemented in phases spread over four years.

Nevertheless, certain reform measures will be introduced countrywide subsequent to the changes of law:
• Decentralised management of staff;
• New code of conduct for councillors and local government staff;
• Minimum requirements for council chairpersons; and
• Strengthening democracy.

In-depth reform measures will be implemented in three phases with about one third of the country’s district councils each phase. The plan projected that the first batch of
councils would start implementation in January 2000, the second batch in January 2001 and the third batch in January 2002. Six months for mobilisation has been included in advance of the implementation of each phase. Actual implementation will cover two years and the process is planned so that experiences from Phase I will feed into the implementation of the second batch of councils. Due to a six months delay Phase I implementation was only started in 38 districts in July 2000. More serious delay is expected especially in Phase II and Phase III districts as these councils seriously lack human capacity and financial resources. It is noteworthy that the criteria for the selection of the first 38 districts are, besides human capacity and willingness to reform, a considerable donor support and the capability to raise local revenue generation. Hence, it is understood that the first 38 councils are ‘strong’ councils with higher prospect of successful implementation.

The tasks in the districts encompass:

- Restructuring council administration and committee structure;
- Procedures and criteria for retrenchment;
- ‘Revamping’ revenue collection, administration and control;
- System to make council appointing and employing authority; and
- Training councillors on their new rights and responsibilities.

4.2.6 Local Government Reform and Natural Resource Management

As illustrated above, decentralisation and the other reform processes in Tanzania aim at improving the delivery of services to the population. In this context, development is understood as the provision of water, health facilities, education and roads. Sustainable development or the consideration of natural resource aspects is of no concern in the Local Government Reform Programme.

There are, however, many ways in which the overall reform process and the general principles of the programme could benefit environmental management in districts and municipalities. The decentralised local government structure places increased responsibility on districts to define their own development priorities. Local government councils will be the political body responsible to ensure environmental
issues within their jurisdiction. This is the level where good governance, political and financial accountability, and public participation could be effectively applied for sustainable environmental management.

4.3 Concluding Remarks

As the above discussion illustrates, Tanzania has an overall policy framework which is highly conducive to decentralisation and local governance at district level. The Local Government Reform Programme is a far-reaching reform rarely seen elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. If implemented, it will mean complete devolution of power unseen in the country before.

Key important areas for the implementation of decentralisation being successful as outlined by Manor (1999) have been addressed in the LGRP, namely: political, fiscal and administrative decentralisation.

While aiming at the improvement of service delivery, the sustainable management of natural resources is of no concern in the local government reform process. However, there are ways in which the overall reform process could benefit environmental management emphasising the creation of largely autonomous institutions at the local level.

Recent policy reforms in the field of environmental management reinforce this new, decentralised strategy. The new Wildlife Policy, 1998, commits the country to community-based conservation intending to transfer wildlife management rights to the communities. While aiming at the devolution of authority over natural resources to the villages, problems as outlined by Murombedzi (1999), Chitsike (2000) and Mamimine (2000) in the case of Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE programme discussed in Chapter 1.2.2 have been addressed in the new policy.
5 Local Government and Community Based Conservation in Districts Around the Selous Game Reserve

The chapter examines the experience of Songea District with local government reform and community-based conservation within the Selous Conservation Programme. Where seen as appropriate and important for the analysis, additional experience of other districts bordering the Selous Game Reserve is examined to a lesser degree. The following discussion focuses on the key questions around CBC and decentralisation identified in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2:

- To what extent do local people participate in CBC?
- To what extent have appropriate decision-making and management institutions developed?
- To what extent is CBC supported by an appropriate legal framework?
- What sort of benefits have accrued?
- What problems have resulted, i.e. with respect to wildlife?
- Are local governments capable to fulfil their new tasks?
- Have local authorities being provided with sufficient human capacities and financial resources?
- Has decentralisation and the devolution of power and control overall political support?

5.1 Selous Conservation Programme

Wildlife conservation in the districts bordering the Selous Game Reserve (SGR) has been framed by the Selous Conservation Programme (SCP), the first pilot initiative in Tanzania that targets rural people as a basis for more effective wildlife conservation. The programme is aimed at integrating conservation of the Selous Game Reserve by empowering local communities living on the periphery of SGR to manage the natural resources, wildlife in particular, on their land.
SCP, jointly administered by the Tanzania Wildlife Division\textsuperscript{14} and the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), started in 1988.

The Selous Game Reserve is located in southeast Tanzania covering an area of approximately 50,000 sq. km or 6 percent of the country's land surface (see map of Tanzania, Appendix II). A declared UNESCO 'World Heritage Site' SGR is a protected area of exceptional conservation value in terms of its biological resources and ecosystem functions. SGR encompasses a wide variety of wildlife habitats, including open grasslands, Acacia and Miombo woodlands, riverine forests and swamps. Two factors make SGR a protected area of great importance. Firstly, its sheer size making it the largest protected area in Africa. Other protected areas on the Selous periphery, such as Mikumi and Udzungwa National Parks, and Kilombero Game Controlled Area, conserve other habitats not represented in SGR itself and add a further 10,440 sq. km to the area under protection. The adjacent areas of low population density contribute an additional 40,000 to 50,000 sq. km to the ecosystem. Secondly, SGR is a refuge to some of the largest and most important populations of elephants\textsuperscript{15}, buffalos, wild dogs and hippopotamus in Africa. Furthermore, with its extensive area of Miombo woodland, the Selous is one of the largest continuous forest areas under protection (Ndunguru and Hahn 1998, Siege 2000).

The major issues facing the management of SGR prior to the establishment of SCP stem from problems of under-funding, illegal off-take and incompatible land use practices in the buffer zones that propagated human-wildlife conflicts. Peasants around SGR severely suffer crop damage from wildlife such as bush pig, baboon, buffalo and elephants. It is estimated that up to one fifth of the food crops produced in the area are destroyed by animals (Masunzu 1998). As in most rural areas of Tanzania, farming of food and cash crops is the major source of income.

\textsuperscript{14} The Wildlife Division is one of the four major divisions in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Its principle responsibility is that of managing and administering the Game Reserves and Game Controlled Areas that have been declared national projects. Tanzania's National Parks are administered by TANAPA.

\textsuperscript{15} About 50 to 60 percent of Tanzania's elephants are found in SGR and there are also black rhinos remaining in isolated areas. Furthermore, there is evidence that elephants migrate to and from northern Mozambique through corridors in Songea and Tunduru Districts.
Furthermore, wild animals cause serious threats and death to people. Livestock keeping is hardly possible due to the prevalence of the Tsetse fly transmitted disease. Although villagers were dependent on game meat as an important source of protein, they had no legal access to game meat. Communities surrounding SGR did not accrue any direct benefits from wildlife. As a result, villages served as entry points for poachers. Villagers did most of the poaching because they are knowledgeable about the area and the distribution of game. Even though villagers received little money from illegal sales of ivory, poaching was the only activity from which they could earn money easily. During the 1980s commercial poaching for ivory and rhino horn reached disastrous levels. The elephant population had been reduced from more than 100,000 in the 1970s down to around 30,000 in the late 1980s. In addition, the SGR management authorities were severely constrained through the lack of sufficient trained personnel, finances and equipment to effectively service their mandates (Ndunguru and Hahn 1998, Siege 2000).

The overall goal of SCP is to develop a pragmatic and lasting solution for sustainable conservation of the Selous ecosystem. The programme has two major objectives (GTZ 1999a):

- To safeguard the existence and ecological integrity of the Selous Game Reserve as a conservation area; and
- To significantly reduce conflicts between the reserve and the local population by developing mechanisms to make the protected area a vehicle for rural development for the local communities.

The programme is expected to achieve the following results/outputs (SCP 1998):

1. Potential for revenue from wildlife explored and tapped;
2. Collaboration with similar projects and relevant institutions enhanced and attraction of others promoted as appropriate;
3. Selous Game Reserve management capacities further strengthened;

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16 It is estimated that an average of ten people are killed by wild animals around SGR annually, an average of 200 people in the whole of Tanzania.
17 The project planning matrix (PPM) defines the project development goal as “Selous eco-system is secured and sustainably yields benefits for local communities and the nation” and the project purpose as “Wildlife Division and local communities efficiently manage and ensure sustainable utilisation of wildlife in the Selous Game Reserve and the bufferzones” (SCP 1998: Annex 1).
4. SGR infrastructure and equipment further improved;
5. Wildlife Management Area established, demarcated and effectively managed;
6. Community Wildlife Management institutional set-up supported.¹⁸

Besides giving support to the reserve’s administration, SCP has introduced mechanisms for community wildlife management in the villages around SGR. Until now, the project supports CBC in five districts adjacent to the reserve, namely Songea, Tunduru, Liwale, Rufiji and Morogoro with 47 villages participating in the scheme (see maps of Tanzania and SGR, Appendices II - III).

Before embarking on the CBC set-up at district and village level, the local government structure is further examined in more detail below.

5.2 Local Government Institutions and Level of Local Participation in Decision-Making

As illustrated in Chapter 4, Tanzania’s local government structure is well organised right down to the village, sub-village level.

The institutions of governance at village level are the Village Assembly and the Village Council. The Village Assembly (VA), the ‘supreme authority’ in the village, consists of all adults over the age of 18 years and an elected Village Council (VC), which shall consist of not less than 15 and not more than 25 members. According to the Local Government (District Authorities) Act 1982, the Village Council is an independent legal entity able to sue and to be sued, hold property and enter into contractual arrangements. Democratisation has made the VC the starting point of governance. The VC is formed by the Village Chairpersons, Village Executive Secretaries from all the sub-villages, sub-village chairpersons, all extension officers – mainly from the agriculture and livestock and community development, and heads of other institutions such as dispensaries, churches, mosques, and primary schools.

¹⁸ The results/outputs did not exhibit a means ends relationship among themselves. Consequently the placement of the results does not indicate prioritising or any form of ranking.
The Village Government forms several functional committees, including a finance and planning committee, a services and self-help committee, and a security and defense committee. Where necessary, mechanisms exist for reducing management to the level of sub-villages or even smaller sub-divisions.

Districts are sub-divided into wards. Unlike the Village Council or the District Council, the ward does not have a democratically elected leadership or organ. There are functionaries who manage the ward under the direction of the Ward Development Committee (WDC). The functionaries who are in charge of the ward are the Chairperson and the Ward Executive Officer. The Ward Executive Officer is an appointee of the District Council. The Ward Development Committee is composed of the Ward Councillor, Ward Executive Officer, Village Chairpersons and appointed members.

The main functions of the WDC are to organise and generally oversee the issue of peace and stability in the Ward. At theoretical level, they are also supposed to prepare their own development plans and make input into the district development plans. However, practice indicated that even where WDCs prepare such plans and forward them to the district level they are rarely acted upon. Rather than base themselves on ward and village plans, district authorities tend to prepare district plans in accordance with national priorities and vision of development. Although the intention might be to plan bottom-up and thus integrate ward and village plans in district plans, the traditional top-down planning continues to operate in practice in many cases (Shivji and Peter 2000).

The District Council, which was also created by the Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 7 of 1982, meets four times annually and is made up by the Members of Parliament, the District Executive Director (DED), the Ward Councillors, the District Commissioner, the District Council Chairperson, the District Administration Secretary (DAS), the District Heads of Departments, Ward Development Officers and one representative from each village. At district level there is also a District Development Committee.
5.3 Management Institutions Established

Institutional development at the local level can be seen in the districts and villages participating in the CBC scheme. To secure the sustainability of the programme and not to build parallel administrative structures, SCP is implemented through existing government structures and has forged strong links with development and natural resources staff in the districts within which they operate. SCP has facilitated the formation of committees, provided training and has put in place procedures and modalities for district level facilitation. At district level, the District Game Officer (DGO) took over the function as a Community Wildlife Management Officer (CWMO) to assist villagers in conservation and sustainable utilisation of natural resources. A Village Development Officer (VDO) further assists and trains the villages in basic management tools such as bookkeeping, planning, and budgeting.

At village level, Village Natural Resources Committees (VNRC) have been established. These VNRC comprise 10 to 12 members elected by the Village Assembly, namely a Chairperson, Secretary, Treasurer and ordinary members. The responsibilities of the VNRC include:

- Prepare village land use plans;
- Supervise and coordinate patrol including crop protection;
- Oversee communal hunting and distribution of meat;
- Manage and keep records of the profits earned from wildlife-related enterprises;
- Prepare work plan and budget;
- Formulate village by-laws;
- Educate the community on sustainable use of natural resources; and
- Use funds according to the wishes of the entire community.

Observations in the villages suggest that the management institutions established show success. The VNRC of Nambecha village has, besides wildlife management, further taken over additional activities. The community members have approached the District Natural Resources Officer asking for assistance for the establishment of a

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19 Interview with D. Kaggi, GTZ-SCP.
20 Interviews with VNRC in Kitanda and Nambecha villages, Songea District.
nursery. The VNRC now successfully runs the nursery planning to use the trees for the purpose of afforestation.

The Village Assembly is responsible for selecting – strong and energetic, usually six, village game scouts (VGS).

The duties of the VGS include:

- Schedule and undertake patrol activities in the village wildlife areas at least 10 days a month;
- Arrest and apprehend poachers;
- Monitor game populations;
- Prepare hunting trails for hunting, camping sites, prevent encroachment and boundary demarcation;
- Supervise resident and tourist hunting;
- Conduct problem animal control;
- Conduct hunting for meat for the village; and
- Carry out bush fire management.

Both the village scouts and the village officials are trained in the Community Based Conservation Training Centre (CBCTC) in Likuyu-Sekamaganga, Songea District. The centre provides training in natural resource legislation and basic management tools like bookkeeping, budgeting and planning for the VNRC and further hunting skills training for the VGS.

A District Natural Resources Management Committee (DNRMC) for villages with WMAs has been established to facilitate district level involvement in the programme. The committee comprises the District Natural Resource Officer, District Game Officer, Forestry and Beekeeping Officer, Fisheries Officer, Agricultural and Livestock Officer, the District Executive Director and the SGR Sector Warden, as the representative of the game reserve. Committee meetings are held biannually and are chaired by the District Commissioner. The DNRMC is responsible for settling disputes and conflicts, developing guidelines for wildlife management, proposing

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21 Interviews with VGS in Kitalda and Nambecha villages, Songea District.
hunting quotas for utilisation and overseeing the overall natural resources management.

Observations at the district meetings in Songea and Tunduru suggest that village representatives have developed a good understanding of CBC and have strengthened knowledge about their rights in recent years. Most of the villagers openly raise their questions and state their problems towards the district officials and the project team. The district officials seem to be committed to CBC and recognise the potential benefits it holds for future development. The DC for example, encourages villagers to raise questions and to discuss their problems and conflicts they face in regard to natural resource management. He also emphasises the importance of the sustainable use and management of natural resources for securing the future livelihoods of the people.22

In Morogoro District north of SGR, 19 villages, with a population of about 45,000 people, bordering the Gonabis Game Controlled Area have jointly registered a non-governmental organisation (NGO) called JUKUMU Society in 1996.23 In order to improve the management of their small wildlife areas and to reduce overhead costs the villages opted to form a NGO, which is administering the Wildlife Management Area. JUKUMU is composed of a ten-member central committee, which is the central administrative body. The committee is elected by the council made up of three representatives of all 19 villages. A five-member board of trustees is further elected. After the joining of the individual areas the common WMA has a size of 750 sq. km.

It is further interesting to mention that villages south of SGR, in the corridor to Mozambique, have organised themselves without any support of SCP. As the news of CBC activities has been spreading, the communities have collected muskeldloaders and snares, formed VNRC and selected village game scouts themselves. Afterwards, they have approached SCP to join the CBC scheme.

22 Personal participation in district meetings and interviews with D. Kaggi, GTZ-SCP and N. Madatta, CWMO of Songea District.
23 JUKUMU stands for JUMIA YA KUHIFADHI NA MATUMIZI BORA YA MALIASILI UKUTU or translated “Society for Conservation and Wise Use of Natural Resources in the Ukutu Area”.

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As the above analysis illustrate, participation in the villages studied can be best characterised as functional, according to Barrow and Murphree’s typology (see Table 1.2).

5.4 Issues of Land and Natural Resource Tenure

As discussed in Chapter 1.2.1, appropriate land and natural resource tenure systems are the fundamental basis of the long-term nature of CBNRM / CBC strategies, as it allows communities access to natural capital. It is important to comment that wildlife management and land management are inseparable disciplines. In Tanzania, land tenure system and land use planning are necessary considerations for the success of the 1998 Wildlife Policy with its consequent Guidelines for Wildlife Management Areas.

Until recently, the legal framework for village land has remained unclear and a potential source of enormous conflict in Tanzania (EPIQ 2000). With the objective of updating and overhauling the Land Ordinance, 1923, the new land laws Land Act No. 4 (1999) (United Republic of Tanzania 1999c) and the Village Land Act No. 5 (1999) (United Republic of Tanzania 1999d) have been finally drafted and approved by parliament after several years. The acts still have to be empowered to become law. Whereas the law, mostly through caselaw prior to 1999, had defined customary land rights vaguely, the Village Land Act, 1999, clarified this important point. The Customary Law right of occupancy is as definite as a granted right of occupancy. The Village Land Act has also put in place an elaborative formal and transparent procedure for obtaining a customary right of occupancy.

Under the Land Act Tanzania is divided into three major categories of land for the purpose of land management and administration, i.e. general land, village land and reserved land. The Commissioner for Lands will administer all land other than village land area demarcated and administered by their respective Village Assemblies and Village Councils (VC) under the Local Government Act (District Authorities) Act, 1982. Each village will be granted certificate of boundary and the VC empowered to issue subtitles (customary rights of occupancy) to villagers for land within the village.
The Village Land Law defines village land to mean:

“All land within the boundaries of a village registered under section 22 of the Local Government (District Authorities) Act, 1982; and all land designated as village under land tenure (Village Settlements) Act, 1965; area demarcated as village under law; and land which had been used by a village for at least 12 years before the enactment of the proposed Village Land Act, 1999.”

The Village Land Law allows villages to declare as common land designate a part of their land as WMAs.

Until now, 50 villages out of 85 around SCP have developed village land use plans (VLUPs) with the assistance of the respective land offices. Villages were assisted to survey and demarcate their land and to obtain certificates of land boundaries. 24

The major forms of land use that were identified were areas for settlement, agriculture, fuelwood, livestock grazing, areas for future expansion and areas for wildlife management. To minimise conflicts between land uses such as agriculture, livestock grazing and wildlife, the different land uses were zoned far apart. WMAs have been zoned out as buffer areas to SGR and are used for sustainable wildlife utilisation with the goal of procuring sustainable economic benefits from wildlife resources. Each WMA has legal administrative boundaries based on VLUPs approved by the districts and may include one or more villages. Other designated forms of land use include forestry reserves, wood lots, bee keeping, swamps, agricultural areas, roads and settlements.

24 Experiences with assisting villages to prepare and implement village land use plans have been gained in several GTZ and other donor supported projects and have been summarised in a village land-use planning manual which is available in in both Kiswahili and English. It is to be used making sure that all beneficiaries to the new land laws comprehensively understand the rights, duties and obligations under the new land laws (United Republic of Tanzania 1998f, GTZ 1999b).
Respondents at the district and village level said that villagers were generally eager to participate in village boundary demarcation and most of the community members acknowledge the identified areas. Some problems of encroachment have arisen in Kitanda village where one member of the community started to clear cut an area of the WMA for the purpose of farming. In response the VNRC and VC issued an ultimatum to leave the area after the first harvest.  

5.5 Regulations and By-laws for Natural Resource Use

The formulation of by-laws\(^\text{26}\) is an essential precondition that guides the management and protection of the resources within the village land area. SCP supported the villages in the formulation of by-laws. Under SCP village stake holding over the areas has consolidated as the villages succeed in establishing rigorous and effective protection regimes and use-regulations. The project has activated the capacity of registered Tanzanian villages to make by-laws in respect of any village matter or resource as stated in the Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 7 of 1982. In collaboration with the district staff and by drawing on experiences of other projects, SCP has facilitated project villages to develop appropriate natural resource by-laws that will enable villages to utilise the allocated game in an institutionalised legal way. Village governments have defined clear objectives for wildlife management, are

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\(^{25}\) Interviews with Kitanda VNRC and N. Madatta, CWMO of Songea District.

\(^{26}\) By-laws can be defined as all those laws that have been passed by an authorised authority on behalf of the Parliament, which received the power to do so by a specific mandate from an Act of Parliament. To put it simply, by-laws are expected to provide specific details that the Parent Act could not provide. This means, by-laws are supposed to lead to the smooth implementation of the Parent Act. There are four sources of by-laws in Tanzania important for the management of natural resources and these are:

1. The Chief Justice and Ministers are empowered by various Acts of Parliament to make subsidiary legislation in terms of orders, rules and regulations to cater for various circumstances and situations. These by-laws may apply to a selected area, district, region, or the whole country as the case might be;

2. The Minister responsible for local government under section 147 of Act. No.7 of 1982 is empowered to make rules for villages, and District councils;

3. District Councils, under section 148 of the Local Government Act No.7 of 1982 and section 7 and 13 of the Local Government Finances Act (No.9 of 1982), have powers to make by-laws on a wide range of issues in their respective districts. These powers, however, are only exercisable subject to the consent of the Minister responsible for local government; and

4. Village Councils under sections 163 have been given powers to make by-laws for the better functioning and administration of their respective villages and the resources found therein. This power is exercisable subject to the approval of the District Council (EPIQ 1999).

These sources of by-laws could, therefore, be utilised to regulate many sectors of life in Tanzania, one of which is natural resource management and environmental protection.
willing to combat illegal use of wildlife and have developed by-laws to enforce compliance. These by-laws are binding to all persons, irrespective of whether they belong to the community or not. Without approval by the District Council the rules cannot enter statutory law and be upheld in courts. Village leaders and natural resource committees have been exposed to existing legal provisions that would enable the development of these by-laws. Use regimes have matured and become more detailed, usually as a consequence of conflict between the users and the VNRC, or the evidence that a rule was unworkable, or unfair.

While the villages around SGR have been assisted in making by-laws, many communities lack the capacity and knowledge to go about creating and enforcing them. Experience shows that the assistance of district and project staff is critical in facilitating the existence of functional by-laws that are not in conflict with other existing laws (EPIQ 2000). Further experience shows that in most cases by-laws passed by the Councils and Ministers apply a top-down, control oriented approach and have undermined local government authority. The problem with this approach is the lack of community ownership: involvement of the people in the discussion, formulation and passing of a by-law is absent or minimal. This has led to widespread failure in the implementation of projects at district and village level in Tanzania (Kikula et al. 1999).

The making of by-laws by village governments faces many practical problems. A study on village democracy and district governance identified the following problems (Shivji and Peter 2000):

- The district council, rather than the village council, make most of the subsidiary legislation affecting the villages.
- A lot of legislation passed by the district council concerns the imposition of taxes, fees and charges, or imposing mandatory minimum acreage cultivation to encourage cash crops.
- Village councils generally lack both a policy-orientation and the necessary training to prepare their own by-laws. Furthermore, district and municipal councils do not generally create a facilitative environment to encourage village bodies adopt their own by-laws.
• Village councils, and much less village assemblies, are scarcely involved in making village by-laws.
• The enforcement of by-laws is replete with problems of lack of resources, impartial adjudication and inadequate collection and local retention of fines.

5.6 Categories, Type and Value of Benefits

Benefits, direct and indirect, are crucial for the future success of CBC programmes and if wildlife cannot contribute sustainably to local livelihoods then it stands little chance of survival (see 1.2, Emerton 2001). In the area of the Selous Conservation Programme the main income potential of communities rests with safari hunting. A good hunting block can produce between 50,000 and 100,000 US $ per year for the government. Unfortunately communities are not yet entitled to this income because safari hunting is administered by the Wildlife Division and the majority of the revenues goes straight to the central government’s Treasury. This is resented by the villages, because the demanding task to manage the wildlife rests now with the community but tenths of thousands of US $ earned from safari hunting are bypassing them. Under a decree by the Prime Minister a nominal 25 percent of the safari hunting revenues (game fees) of the districts are channelled back to the communities via the districts; in the case of the Selous the actual share is less than 10 percent, because it is calculated after different retention schemes. However, Songea District still receives about 5 Mio. Tanzanian Shillings (Tshs.)27 from game fees annually. Neighbouring Tunduru District receives around 10 Mio. Tshs., Liwale District even around 26 Mio. Tshs..28 The districts are supposed to pass these funds, mainly in the form of social development projects, back to the villages where wildlife revenue is generated. In many cases District Councils have been reluctant to transfer the money to the communities and the villages were only able to receive funds through facilitation of SCP.

Photographic tourism is now picking up in the northern section of SGR. The first contract between JUKUMU and a private tour operator who built a lodge on village

27 TShs. 800 = US$ 1
28 Interview with R. Hahn, GTZ-SCP.
land have been signed. The volume of the contract is around 200,000 US $ over a
period of 10 years.29

SCP has tried to push the hunting companies to contribute at least 4 Mio. TShs. per
annum to the villages. Except from the Gonabis Game Controlled Area north of the
Selous, the companies have paid much less. The contributed money is supposed to
be passed to the District Natural Resources Committee which transfers the money to
the villages. In the case of Songea District, the money from the 1999 hunting season
was almost distributed by a Member of Parliament who tried to use the money for the
purpose of his election campaign throughout the entire district. At the end, and only
through the pressure of the District Game Officer, most of the money reached the
villages participating in CBC. Such cases illustrate the importance of facilitation by
the project team and the district.30

Until now, the major source of income for the communities has come from meat
hunting as the villages are allowed to harvest a quota of game for their own
consumption. The VNRC is allowed to sell the meat in their locality.

Major changes and an increase of financial revenues are expected with the
endorsement of the government Guidelines for the Establishment of Wildlife
Management Areas and in the future with the enactment of the revised WCA.

Statements of respondents in Kitanda and Nambecha villages suggest that
community members also place an intrinsic and cultural value on wildlife (see 1.2,
Kangwana and Mako 2001). Local residents highlighted their satisfaction when being
able to spot animals, like elephants, again, which have been absent in the area for
many years (see below).

Additionally, and not less important, are the socio-political benefits being an
important outcome of CBC. As already discussed above (compare 5.3), CBC has the

29 Interview with JUKUMU Chairperson.
30 Interview with R. Hahn, GTZ-SCP
potential of becoming a catalyst for socio-political and institutional changes in the communities.

5.7 Development of Wildlife Population

There is strong evidence that the number of wildlife has increased or at least stabilised in and outside SGR since the beginning of SCP in the late 1980s. Apart from the community wildlife programme, other efforts were also involved in combating commercial poaching. In 1989, Tanzania had responded to the ivory poaching situation by carrying out 'Operation Uhai', an antipoaching campaign supported by army and police. The country was also in the forefront to facilitate the ivory trade ban at the CITES-Conference of Parties in Paris in 1989. Since then, commercial poaching had reduced drastically.

Analyses of the aerial wildlife censuses of 1989, 1991, 1994, and 1998 suggest that population numbers have stabilised and increased. The elephant population, for example, has increased by an average of around 6.5 percent p.a. since 1989. The Selous ecosystem now probably contains over 60,000 elephants.  

Statements from village game scouts and VNRCs in Songea and Tunduru Districts suggest that wildlife is now coming back to areas where it has been absent for many years. As a result, crop damage conflicts are on the increase in the bufferzone areas. Villagers and game scouts spend an increasing amount of time protecting their cultivated land.

5.8 District Planning and Local Government Reform

Songea District is one of the pilot districts in the Local Government Reform Programme. Even as one of the ‘better off’ districts in the country, the district faces major capacity problems, i.e. qualified manpower for financial management and lack of funds.

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31 For a detailed analysis of the different surveys carried out in and around SGR see Siege 2000.
32 Interview with B.J. Kilonzo, DED of Songea District.
Songea District Council is supported by the Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV) in building district planning capacity. SNV gives technical assistance to the LGRP process in form of one District Management Officer and one Financial Management Advisor. Financial support consists of approximately 500,000 US $ annually which is allocated to the council budget and used as part of its resources.

On a careful reading of the Local Government Reform Programme, it becomes clear that the thinking on local government reform was aimed at the district level and the reform was not set up below the district. The sub-district level has not been integrated in the LGRP nor conceived as an integral part of the reform programme. The administrative and governance framework of the village level remains as it was established by the Local Government Act (District Authorities) Act of 1982. Neither the Policy Paper, other consultancy reports deriving therefrom, nor the Local Government (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 1999, which gives preliminary legal effect to LGRP, directly address the legal or institutional framework at the village level. A national workshop on village governance and the LGRP tried to address these problems discussing in which way the sub-district level could be addressed in the reform process.

Furthermore, concerns have been raised whether the decentralisation of extensive central government responsibilities to the local level is feasible in Tanzania, where the overall political system is irresponsible in itself. Problems, such as corruption, might decentralise as well. Additionally, there is evidence of strong resistance of government officials themselves being afraid of losing their political powerbase.33

As mentioned above, the 'new' role of the Regions remains unclear. Officially, the regional staff, i.e. the Regional Commissioner and Regional Secretary have remained with an advisory role coordinating and supporting activities vis-à-vis local authorities. However, some regional staff members still behave as Proper Officers. As the case of Songea District illustrates, the Regional Game Officer severely

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33 Interview with Dr. A. Liviga, Department of Public Administration and Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam.
interrupts CBC activities telling village game scouts to stop their quota hunting and issuing licenses to private hunters. Fortunately, the DED is aware of such problems using his political powers to pressurise the regional officials. Additionally, the line ministries do not really accept that they do not hold the powers at district level anymore constituting in resistance to the local government reform process.\textsuperscript{34}

Local government reform has been put on top of other sector reform programmes, causing bad feelings and resistance in sector ministries. Some of the ministries felt robbed as money is now supposed to go straight to the districts. Hence, there is an enormous power struggle between MRALG and line ministries.

Songea District officials blame the central government of not devolving sufficient financial resources. In 2000, the Songea District Council was supposed to receive 65 Mio. TShs. Only five million TShs. were passed from central government down to the district until November 2000.\textsuperscript{35} As local government revenues are much too small, district councils heavily depend on block grants for specific sectors. From the start of the LGRP it was acknowledged that the local authorities would not be able to raise sufficient revenue on their own to finance the delivery of the improved services envisaged under the programme. However, for the moment the sectors to be financed are determined by central, not local, government.

5.9 District Planning and Natural Resource Management

The Songea District Council drafted a three year District Development Plan 1999-2001 (DDP) in 1998 which incorporates priorities formulated by the district council, village assemblies held in most of the villages in Songea District as well as the main development agencies in the district (Songea District Council 1998). The format used for the plan followed the logical framework approach.

\textsuperscript{34} Interview with B. J. Kilonzo, DED and N. Madatta, DGO of Songea District.

\textsuperscript{35} Interview with Mr. Mchome, District Planning Officer of Songea District.
The goal of the DDP has been formulated as:

“To structurally improve the well-being of men and women in Songea rural, by enhancing food security, rural income and improving social services, in a sustainable, efficient and equal way”.

The objectives of the DDP focus on seven programme components:

- District Management, Administration, Finance and Planning;
- Empowerment;
- Economic Development and Food Security;
- Health and Water;
- Education;
- Rural Access Infrastructure; and
- Natural Resources and Environment.

The programme component 7 on natural resources and environment is of central importance for this paper. The objective of the programme 7 on natural resources and environment is:

“To manage the natural resource base in Songea sustainably, meaning that:

- Present and future generations can live in the environment comfortably, grow their food and generate an income from the land; and that
- Resources will be used without causing irreversible damage to flora and fauna.”

The Songea District Council defines the sustainable management of natural resources and the environment as one of its development priorities. This recognition of the importance of natural resources is absolutely crucial for the future success of CBC initiatives in the district.

5.10 Donor Assistance

In both, CBC and local government reform, international donors have become key players in the policy formulation and implementation process.
Critics argue that the local government reform process is heavily donor driven while over 95 percent ("... probably even 100 percent ...")\textsuperscript{36} of the LGRP is financed through international aid. This lack of own commitment constitutes a serious lack of national ownership. Even some of the donors involved perceive this inefficient financial contribution as a serious problem resulting in lack of national ownership. However, sufficient financial resources are not available in Tanzania and the political commitment of national government on the topics seems to be substantial.\textsuperscript{37}

In the case of CBC, bilateral and multilateral donors are supporting almost all the CBC activities in the country. For the start-up phase, the main funding sources for some of the pilot CBC programmes include GTZ, DFID, Frankfurt Zoological Society, USAID, NORAD, Sida and others include local funds through TANAPA. The amount of external funding surpasses the local component and the duration of funding can last from a year to several years, funding different components and stages of project, but generally declining as a CBC initiative becomes more self-sufficient. Overall, in most cases external funding is over 80 percent of the total funding, a situation which calls into questions, the sustainability of the programmes.

5.11 Concluding Remarks

Community-based conservation in Songea District has been framed by the Selous Conservation Programme. Villages participating in the CBC scheme have set up Village Natural Resources Committees elected by the Village Assembly. The committees together with the village game scouts are responsible for the wildlife management in their areas. The Songea District Council has committed itself to sustainable natural resource management and CBC.

While still being in the first phases of implementation of the Local Government Reform Programme, problems constraining the decentralisation process in Songea District can already be identified. The district council severely lacks human planning and management capacity and sufficient funds. Political resistance from higher levels

\textsuperscript{36} Interview with Dr. A. Liviga, Department of Public Administration and Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam.

\textsuperscript{37} Interview with J. Vloet, SNV and M. Eirola, Embassy of Finland.
of government, i.e. the Region, additionally constrains the implementation of both the LGRP and CBC.

While the institutional and management set-up of CBC is established in the villages, an inadequate legal framework constrains the reform process. The communities cannot fully assert their right over the natural resources in their areas.

Limited benefits from sale of meat or hunting revenues to communities constitute a major constraint to the implementation of CBC. An increase of crop damage conflicts caused by a growing number of wildlife in the bufferzone areas additionally constrain the implementation process.
6 Conclusion: Programme and Development Implications

Community-based natural resource management approaches have emerged over the last ten years in the African region. In parallel, a major resurgence and interest in decentralisation as a key element of national policy has emerged. The majority of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa have adopted decentralisation policies, initiating a process of devolution of functions based on the principle of subsidiarity and undertaken local government capacitating programmes.

As the case of Tanzania illustrates, both community-based conservation and decentralisation are high on the national development policy agenda. The country has an overall policy environment that is highly supportive to decentralised district planning and environmental management at the community level. The envisaged reforms are far-reaching in the Tanzanian context and rarely seen elsewhere in Africa. However, the implementation of the reform processes faces some problems and difficulties.

In the case of SCP, the implementation of CBC has made progress in numerous villages bordering SGR resulting in reduced poaching and the increase of wildlife population in the area. Until now, almost 50 villages participate in the scheme. They have set up Village Natural Resources Committees and a village game scout force to utilise their hunting quota. The income from meat hunting constitutes the largest source of income for the villages. At present, the benefits from sale of meat or hunting revenues to communities are very limited. To ensure the sustainability of CBC in the districts around SGR, increased benefits in the form of financial income at district and village level are absolutely essential. Until now, the benefits are too small. Effective and sustainable management will not be successful until real powers will be passed from central government down to local communities.
The Guidelines for the establishment and management of WMAs are overdue and the revision of the WCA has to be speeded up to open up opportunities for the communities to benefit from the wildlife in their areas. The Guidelines have to made public and translated into understandable Kiswaheli. Otherwise, communities cannot fully assert their right of access to and tenure of natural resources resulting in a rapid deterioration of the natural resource base as being witnessed already in many areas of the country.

As the example of JUKUMU illustrates, private business can substantially contribute to the success of CBC establishing lodges and camps on village land and contributing to village development. Such linkages with the private sector should further be strengthened.

Songea District Council seems to be committed to CBC. Some problems constitute the management of funds generated from tourist hunting as the district has been reluctant to pass the money to the villages bordering SGR. This makes clear that most of the financial revenues from the trophy hunting should go directly to the producer communities.

While the villages around SGR are highly supported by SCP, other areas that are not supported by any donors face serious problems. Challenges for CBC include closing or at least narrowing the gap between well-intended legislation on paper and practice in the field.

Although implementation of LGRP is only starting – and there is little direct attention paid to environmental concerns in the present design – there is potential to use LGRP as a vehicle to deliver improved environmental management services to local communities. In the case of Songea District the right steps have been taken into the right direction. The importance of the natural resource base has been recognised and the sustainable management of natural resources has been put on the district development agenda.
However, sustainable development and the consideration of natural resource aspects must be promoted in the context of LGRP. If uncorrected, this would have detrimental consequences especially in districts where natural resource management does not receive the required attention and donor assistance is absent.

The local government reform itself is very risky and the possibility of failure is very high. However, it is an absolutely necessary reform, trying to find a solution to the serious problems by the ‘failed’ Tanzanian centralised state.

Decentralisation seems to be the right way into the right direction. But democratic and administrative decentralisation has to go along with fiscal decentralisation as local government in Tanzania is seriously constraint with respect to financial resources to promote development demanded by the people. If the district councils do not receive the needed funds, decentralisation is very likely to fail. This lack of fiscal decentralisation illustrates the hesitation and even resistance of central government to devolve real powers and sufficient resources to local authorities. The fear of central government to face a considerable loss of power seems to be high. There are signs that similar resistance occurs in the line ministries, e.g. the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. The overdue Guidelines for the establishment and management of WMAs seem to demonstrate this resistance.

Another crucial factor, which has to receive immense attention, is the promotion of democracy at all levels. This is especially important at village level. LGRP has to take governance at village level into account. It cannot stop at district level, resulting in key failure of the whole reform process.

CBC can play an important role in the promotion of democracy at village level. As the case study illustrates, community members speak out their problems and concerns in front of the district council. However, it is still a big step until the majority of community members will speak out and make use of their rights. In this context, it has to be accepted that the “... core objective of CBC is communal capacity for dynamic and adaptive governance in the arena of natural resource use” (Murphree
In promoting CBC, people should be enabled to participate in the governance of their own lives (Murphree 1999).

As the case of Songea District illustrates, both CBC and LGRP are highly supported by donor agencies. If Songea District and the villages bordering SGR already face so many problems and difficulties of implementation, one may consequently argue that for less potential districts the local government reform and the implementation of CBC is a challenge beyond means.

As the involvement of donor agencies in the LGRP and CBC processes is remarkably high, strengthened donor coordination is absolutely essential for the successful implementation of the reforms. While the basket funding arrangement seems to assure good coordination in the LGRP process and donor exchange in the CBC process takes place regularly, insufficient coordination between the local government reform and other donor supported reform processes, i.e. in the line ministries, constitute major constraints.

The above discussion illustrates, that both CBC and LGRP are no panaceas to solve Tanzania’s problems in wildlife conservation and governance. However, both are absolutely necessary reforms and processes in the right direction.
REFERENCES


### APPENDIX I

**Tanzania Data Profile**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surface area</td>
<td>945.1 thousand sq km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic profile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (people per sq km)</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth (annual %)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth (years)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to safe water (% of total population)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban:</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural:</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population without access to health services (% 1990-95)</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate (% 15+)</td>
<td>Male: 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female: 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Primary School Enrolment Ratio (%)</td>
<td>Male: 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female: 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Primary School Enrolment Ratio (%)</td>
<td>Male: 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female: 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School Enrolment (%)</td>
<td>Male: 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female: 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GNP (current US $)</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual growth of GNP</td>
<td>3.8 % (1995-1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>8.8 billion US $ (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (annual %)</td>
<td>4.7 (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt stock</td>
<td>Total: US $ 9.2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic: US $ 1.3 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign: US $ 7.9 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.3% multi-lateral debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42.8% bi-lateral debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(all as of end December 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture as % of GDP</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- provides 85% of exports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- about 80% of population engaged in agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential agricultural land</td>
<td>55% (only 15% under cultivation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protected area network as % of total land area</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19% (PAs where no human settlement is allowed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9% (PAs where wildlife co-exists with humans)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** UNDP 2000; UNICEF 2000; World Bank 2000

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38 All data from 1999 except where marked separately.


APPENDIX III

Selous Game Reserve and Bufferzone Areas

Source: Selous Conservation Programme
APPENDIX IV

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Individual interviews:

1. **Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania (ALAT)**  
   Mr. M.I. Mfunda, Secretary General, Dar es Salaam, 26/10/2000
2. **University of Dar es Salaam - Department of Political Science**  
   Dr. A. Liviga, Senior Lecturer, Dar es Salaam, 26/10/2000
3. **Royal Danish Embassy**  
   Mr. T. Lindquist, Counsellor (Development) Dar es Salaam, 30/10/2000
4. **Embassy of Finland**  
   Dr. M. Eirola, First Secretary, Dar es Salaam, 31/10/2000
5. **SNV – Netherlands Development Organisation**  
   Mr. J. Vloet, Senior Programme Officer (Local Government Programme)  
   Dar es Salaam, 01/11/2000
6. **Royal Norwegian Embassy**  
   Mr. Finanger, Dar es Salaam, 02/11/2000
7. **UNDP – Governance Unit**  
   Ms. M. Baek, Programme Specialist (Governance and Local Government)  
   Dar es Salaam, 03/11/2000
8. **Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany**  
   Dr. R. Drescher, First Secretary (Development Cooperation)  
   Dar es Salaam, 07/11/2000
9. **Songea District Council**  
   Mr. B.J. Kilonzo, District Executive Director, Songea, 10/11/2000
10. **Songea District**  
    Mr. N. Madatta, Community Wildlife Management Officer, Songea, 13/11/2000
11. **Tunduru District**  
    Mr. D. Koishwa, Community Wildlife Management Officer, Tunduru, 13/11/2000
12. **Songea District**  
    Mr. A.D. Shola, District Natural Resources Officer, Songea, 20/11/2000
13. **Songea District**  
Mr. Mchome, District Planning Officer, Songea, 20/11/2000

14. **Songea District**  
Ms. A. Ngali, Chairperson of Gender Task Force, Songea, 20/11/2000

15. **JUKUMU Society**  
Mzee A. Mwinyihija, Chairperson of, Dar es Salaam, 27/11/2000

16. **GTZ – NRM & Buffer Zone Development Programme - Lushoto District**  
Mr. H.J. Lipp, Project Coordinator, Dar es Salaam, 28/11/2000

17. **Morogoro District**  
Mr. J. Mnyune, Village Development Officer, Duthumi, 02/12/2000

18. **Morogoro District**  
Mr. P.F. Kauzeni, Community Wildlife Management Officer,  
Dar es Salaam, 02/12/2000

19. **GTZ – SCP**  
Mr. R. Hahn, Dar es Salaam, 04/12/2000

20. **Local Government Reform Team**  
Mr. B. Kasegge, Competence Manager, Dar es Salaam, 11/12/2000

21. **GTZ – SCP**  
Dr. L. Siege, E-mail interview, 17/01/2001

**Group interviews at village level:**

**Nambecha Village, Songea District, 16-17/11/2000**

1. Village Natural Resources Committees:  
   Mr. I. Ndomondo, Secretary and Ms. J. Komba, Assistant Secretary, 16/11/2000

2. Village game scouts (4), 16/11/2000


4. Three Wives of Village Game Scouts, 17/11/2001

**Kitanda Village, Songea District, 18-19/11/2000**

1. Village Natural Resources Committee:  
   Mzee A. Athuman, Chairperson; Ms. M. Fusi, Secretary; J. Komba, Member,  
   18/11/2000
3. Village Government: Mr. J. Hamza, Chairperson; Ms. F. A. Nyoni, Member; Mr. R.S. Mhagama, Village Executive Officer, 19/11/2000

**Nyamwenyu Village, Tunduru District, 11/11/2000**
VNRC Chairperson and 11 village game scouts

**Rahaleo Village, Tunduru District, 13/11/2000**
VNRC Chairperson, 2 female committee members and game scouts

**Mbwade Village, Morogoro District, 02/12/2000**
Village Government:
Mr. H. Malozo, Chairperson; Mr. S. Ngongote, Secretary; Mr. S. Mungi, Member

**JUKUMU Committee, Morogoro District, Duthumi, 03/12/2000**
Mr. A. Kizuwa, Secretary; Mr. S. Kolahili, Chairman; Mr. N. Mbande, Treasurer

**Attended meetings at district level:**
Songea District Natural Resources Management Committee Meeting, 09/11/2000
Tunduru District Natural Resources Management Committee Meeting, 14/11/2000

**JUKUMU Council meeting:**
57 members, Duthumi, Morogoro District, 02/12/2000