NEPAD, NARRATIVE, AND AFRICAN INTEGRATION

By

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Development Studies, Faculty of Humanities, Development and Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal

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ABSTRACT

The untenable inequalities and suffering experienced by Africans blatantly exposes that a lot more than simple developmental ‘lag’, lack of economic ‘growth’, ‘governance’, or a shaky ‘investment climate’ inhibits Africa’s legitimately progressive human development. This dissertation calls for and probes a serious reflection on the roots of the concepts broadly understood as ‘African Integration’ and ‘African Renaissance’ in light of how the space we call Africa has been constructed across centuries, serving very particular interests to effect modernity’s meta-narrative into reality, subsequently positioning Africa at the periphery of the periphery of its hierarchical ordering. Narratives, defined as a distinct form of discourse as retrospective meaning-making are effective stories manifesting the conscious experience of every ‘thing’ in the universe. How Africa’s ‘story’ has been constructed, and how its actual story diverges from the convergence theories of the colonial-imperial-globalisation project are this dissertation’s major focus. It deeply mines what Foucault exposed as global technologies-of-power, to elucidate the negative impacts of northern-centric discourses on Africa’s ‘self’, from individuated to collective aspects of that ‘self’. This dissertation draws attention to how Africa’s eco-social justice practices vindicate particular scientific, cultural, and social emancipatory discourses, and democratic theories emphatic that the monumental task of de-colonising Africa’s minds from meta-narrative constructions should prioritise, and inform developmental continental policy design.
This study would not have been possible without the time, energy, warmth, hospitality, care, and graciousness of a great many people.

I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Vishnu Padayachee, for “removing the shackles from [my] feet, so [I] could fly”. I am infinitely grateful for his mentorship, respect, encouragement, and intellectual freedom.

My deep thanks must be extended to Professor Patrick Bond, for going out of his way to open doors for me, and providing me with so many great references, in person and text. Were it not for his ‘Elite Transition’, I would not have registered for the Masters, and ‘found myself’ in Civil Society.

I thank Dr. Richard Ballard, for his incredible support, suggestions, and generosity with his time, and always replying to my requests with such precision and care.

I extend my respect to the incredible support afforded me by Professor Francie Lund, Professor Sufian Bukurura, Richard Devey, Professor Julian May, Imraan Valodia, Lesley Anderson, and Priya Gayadeen.

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I am additionally forever indebted to the following for opening their homes, despite an incredibly stressful year economically and otherwise, while I worked on this thesis: Alice in Bologna; Giuliano, Marissa and Lilia in Naples; Sebastian and Andrea in Germany; my very special friends, Rodney and Siobhán in Éiréann; and my beloved parents Anne and Bles in South Africa.

I would not be alive were it not for the never-ending care, and hilarity of my eternal circle, most especially Andrew, Chris and Elle. Enkosi mfo’ wam.

This text is dedicated to my father Peter, brother Jaime, and sister Nonthuthuzelo, who never saw the age of thirty, and join the vast ranks of Africa’s fallen ‘warriors of the force’.
DECLARATION

Submitted in fulfilment / partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts,
in the Graduate Programme in Development Studies,
University of KwaZulu-Natal,
Durban, South Africa.

I declare that this dissertation is my own unaided work. All citations, references and
borrowed ideas have been duly acknowledged. It is being submitted for the degree of
Master of Arts in the Faculty of Humanities, Development and Social Science, University
of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa. None of the present work has been submitted
previously for any degree or examination in any other University.

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Student signature

17 August 2009

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<td>ADB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community (Proposed)</td>
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<td>AFDC</td>
<td>African Financing for Development Caucus</td>
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<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress (SA)</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>ARVs</td>
<td>antiretrovirals</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Social Forum</td>
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<td>ASGISA</td>
<td>Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (SA)</td>
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<td>ATU</td>
<td>African Trade Unions</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AUG</td>
<td>African Union Government</td>
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<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation (UK)</td>
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<td>BCE</td>
<td>before Christian Era</td>
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<td>BNC</td>
<td>Binational Commission (SA – Nigeria)</td>
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<td>CCS</td>
<td>Centre for Civil Society (UKZN, SA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCSDCA</td>
<td>Conference for Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (US)</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Administration</td>
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<td>CODESA</td>
<td>Convention for a Democratic South Africa</td>
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<td>CODESRIA</td>
<td>Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions (SA)</td>
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<td>Civil Society Indaba (SA)</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Discourse Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire)</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
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<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
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<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of 8 Industrialised Countries</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GEAR</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
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<td>HIPC</td>
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<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDASA</td>
<td>Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>LDC</td>
<td>Less Developed Country</td>
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<td>LIC</td>
<td>Low Income Country</td>
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<td>LPA</td>
<td>Lagos Plan of Action</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Millennium Africa Recovery Plan</td>
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<td>Multilateral Development Bank</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>Mail and Guardian</td>
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<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>NAI</td>
<td>New African Initiative</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>Opinion Editorial</td>
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<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
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<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>South African Communist Party</td>
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<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>Structural Adjustment Programme (WB inspired)</td>
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<td>SLM</td>
<td>Sin Lam Mim</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Treatment Action Campaign</td>
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<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SA)</td>
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<td>TWNA</td>
<td>Third World Network Africa</td>
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<td>United Nations International Feminine Programme</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>United States / of America</td>
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<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States of Africa</td>
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<td>WDM</td>
<td>World Development Movement</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

In the spirit of the dead, the living, and the unborn;
Empty your ears of impurities, o listener;
That you may hear our story.


Introduction

At a Centre for Civil Society *Wolpe Lecture* on 23 March 2007, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o sat and waited for his audience to enter and still themselves before beginning his lecture on *Regaining our Tongues*, a treatise on the imperative of reclaiming indigenous languages on, for, by and with the subaltern of Africa. The hall filled to capacity, and after a long silence under his penetrating gaze, he mesmerically commanded us to, “Know thy self”.

This inscription on the dolmen arch of Delphi, heralds a rite of passage for any individual or collective. It is a crossing of the threshold between here and there. The conscious moment of acquiescence to, and honour of, the sensuality of the fruits of knowledge, to jump off the cliffs of ‘rational’ modernist-contrived race, class and gender binaries, to swim in the primordial waters that lie way down deep below and beneath a positivist endorsed naïve realism. It is the willing surrender to transformation from blind subjugated ‘innocence’ to clear articulating wisdom. It once was, and should again become, a conscious ‘principle-as-norm’ guiding the social practices of African actors and their societies, to integrity and integration (see Fanon 1963, 1964; Biko 1986; Lumumba 1960, 1963; Nkrumah 1964, 1970, 1973a, 1973b, 1973c).

This process is no less than a continuous revolution involving what Frantz Fanon termed “absolute violence” (1963: 29): “liberation [...] renaissance [...] restoration [...] commonwealth – whatever the name, decolonisation is always a violent phenomenon” (1963: 27). What was (thought to be), is (at a fundamental level), not. What is, is (actually) constantly mutating. What will be, is an evolution of being, another possible Africa, and world. This process is life, loving its ‘self’, experienced through humans loving their ‘self’. Is scientific. Is natural. Is political. Is spiritual. Is normal, and is – to use an Ethiopian-originated social practice – I and I, as individuations of a(n infinite) whole realising we are ‘cinematographers’ of life, which is all that is, constantly moving through us (see Fanon 1963, 1964, 1968; chapters 4 & 5).
As such, it is the work of making deeply intuited and implicit understanding (knowing), productive (knowledge), to shape and guide conscious experience collectively. I and I are both the cause to and effect of Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o’s elaboration of a social practice termed, “moving the centre”. In order to shift the centre, I and I must ‘de-colonise’ the mind. In order for the mind to become de-colonised, I and I must know our ‘self’, and be who we know our ‘self’ (actually) to be (see wa Thiong’o 1993, 1986). This knowledge of ‘self’ is empowerment. Knowing how one’s ‘self’ has been realised (constructed), and should be realised, to become manifest as self-determination, is the critical turning point. Who we are, matters to life. Who we are, is to make power work, and how we choose to make this power work is (self-reflexively) indicative of who we are, or whom we have realised ourselves to be.

Literary giant Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o’s instruction of the revolutionary power of artists, was anticipated in and by the earlier work of Cheik Anta Diop, Frantz Fanon, Patrice Lumumba, and Kwame Nkrumah who subsequently influenced theorists Homi Bhabha, Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak and Achille Mbembe to diagnose binary thinking as “not an accidental discovery,” but “fit[ting] into a definite pattern, which is the pattern of the exploitation of one group of [self-consciousness] by another” (Fanon 1964: xiii; see also 1968). Fanon was one of the first to amplify the common struggle of all colonised, as the colonisation of and by the power of thought, as such he envisaged concretely not as prophetic vision, but as immediate resistance objective, with Lumumba and Nkrumah – the unity of Africa.

Last year, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o offered us the tantalising apple, and I, well-versed in the performativity of being and becoming, falling and waking, delightedly gobbled it up core and all. Who we are is our ontology, how we come to know this is our epistemology, wondering about it all is philosophy, and performing it into being is developmental dramaturgy. Thus the seed for my dissertation was planted.

Rationale

Unusually for a master’s dissertation in Development Studies, I have not isolated a particular part of African development in, for example, an ethnographic fieldwork process, to gain intimate knowledge of particular social actors in a particular developmental study. Rather, given my-story and experience in arts activism, performance, and documentary, I was magnetically drawn to, and found ‘self’ in, the space articulating – and by – Civil Society. I am intent on bringing the conditions of subalternity to challenge the bourgeois public sphere(s), using a methodology, I, as artist and Afro-Celt, am intimately engaged
with: critical realism through an auto-ethnographic narrative and performative-based inquiry.

I want to illumine an idea concerning everyone and ‘thing’ in, on and of Africa, a longing hovering in the shadows, whispered by the Qamata\textsuperscript{2} for centuries. This sodade\textsuperscript{3} gripping every African heart is the vision of a ‘re-turn’, ‘re-covery’, ‘re-birth’, or ‘renaissance’ (Evora 1992; Diop 2000; Mbeki 1998). It is the desire for wholeness, so that justice articulated may at last constitute peace. It is the re-construction of an imperative sense of commonality amongst, in, for, by and with the African peoples, towards the manifestation of an ‘integrated’ Africa. It is Africa ‘re-stored’, as egalitarian and self-determining. It is, “African unity, that vague formula, to which the men and women of Africa remain passionately attached, and whose operative value serves to bring immense pressure to bear on colonialism in all forms” (Fanon 1963: 128). I therefore believe this can only be addressed by venturing beyond existing kinds of knowledge claims that can be firmly ‘grounded’ in any specific developmentally known case.

Reasons for doing this are compelling namely, responding to, and honouring the call of Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, amongst those (not enough) committed to social justice and transformation at a global level. To connecting ‘indigenous’ epistemologies and theories of de-colonisation with highly progressive socio-economic schemas, through the implications of practical, critical, participatory politics of performative inquiry and emancipatory discourse, emerging from an indigenous ontology. I believe the narrative-performance-arts-based human disciplines contribute immensely to radical social transformation, economic justice, and utopian cultural politics extending localised critical race, class, and gender theories, and radical democracy to aspects of de-colonising indigenous societies. I believe this is what is developmental about critical human-centered development. I advocate transformation envisioning a democracy rooted in a social justice articulated by the Freedom Charter of 1954, that is ‘not yet’, but that we are (and not) collectively shaping (ANC 1954; Polley 1988). I also believe this initiative should be part of a larger conversation namely, the global de-colonising discourses connected to the works of anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist scholars, artists and citizens across the breadth and length of the geo-political south.

**Thesis Aims and Outline**

*The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD 2001)* is as chapter five articulates, the most advanced as discursive form of the various threads weaving *The African Renaissance* into conscious experience. Recently deposed South African president Thabo Mbeki’s discourse, marketed as a ‘public’ policy to the global and
continental elite, for Africa’s ‘recovery of self’, has come under intense criticism from various continental social actors, and collectives in the public and civil society spheres.

The dissertation deeply mines whether the ideas constructing NEPAD as political discourse, will shape an African integration serving African interests, and what the implications will be for the African public and policy? Fairclough defines texts as “processes in which political work is done – work on elaborating political discourses, as well as the rhetorical work of mobilising people behind political discourses” (2000: 158). Discourse is defined as “language use as a form of shared social practice, represented by and representing social structures” (1989: 17). Chase (2005) describes narrative as a distinct form of discourse as retrospective meaning-making. This dissertation reveals NEPAD's narrative as an ‘effective-story’ in relation to other ‘effective-stories’, manifesting as conscious experience – the sum-total of which is the macro-story – subsequently exposing the interests being served, and what the implications for Africa’s public and policy will be.

I begin with methodology, outlining critical realism, and autoethnographic narrative and performative inquiry. Here I discuss the mechanisms and processes constituting what is real – the dialectic at the centre of Western philosophy enabling conditions constructing effective-stories. Chapter three casts a wide-angle lens on Foucault’s contribution clarifying the (anti)humanist dialectic at the heart of theories of power. Chapter four shifts our gaze to Africa, its philosophy and context field. With these four chapters providing the necessary background to constructing an effective ‘our-story’ in terms of philosophy, theory, power, and context, chapter five introduces the political narratives of documentaries, What the bleep do we know? (Chasse et al 2004) and The Century of the Self (Curtis 2002), and Thabo Mbeki’s construction of the AU and NEPAD (2001). Documentaries are text as visual representation forming different ways of recording and documenting what passes as social life, termed ‘the mirror with a memory’. Chapter six concludes tabulating implications for Africa’s public and policy.

Conclusion

For an authentic and legitimate African integration to be realised, individual integrity to a collective solidarity dedicated to what Seidler (1994) has termed the ‘recovery of ‘self”, constituted by the African Social Justice practices of uBuntu, needs to become the dynamic political and developmental focus (see chapter 4). Judith Butler defines ‘self’ as the subject-position, which “is neither a ground nor a product, but the permanent possibility of a certain resignifying process” (1992: 13). This ‘self’ becomes ‘known’ through what Ngūgĩ wa Thiong’o has articulated as ‘de-colonising the mind’, in order to

4
'move the centre', to be (and become) rooted in an African ontology from which *uBuntu* emerges (see wa Thiong'o 1993, 1986; chapter 4). This dissertation seeks to illuminate what these concepts mean, and how they constitute reality.

By establishing a theoretical framework that articulates a critical realism, and using an auto-ethnographic narrative and performative inquiry, this dissertation challenges and confronts the dialectic at the heart of philosophy, power theories about humanity, and the north-south geo-political development question. This dissertation is about the narrative of *uBuntu* as radical democratic practice; practice that cares the personal is political, creating space for dialogue and debate about the untenable issues of injustice on the African continent (see chapters 4 & 5). The documentaries employed, tell, by showing.

Social scientists seem to have rejected people-centered stories turning only to discourse and language as technical and therefore ‘appropriately scientific’ in a depoliticised globalising paradigm (Ferguson 2003). This discourse far from disparaging and denigrating more technical methods seeks inclusion as scientific art-form evoking the humanities more so than other traditions, widening communities of understanding by dialoguing with voices of the ‘other’ remaining unvoiced, and taking a strong participatory democratic impulse as the force behind its thinking and investigating. As a form of imagery to think about social life, this is all to the common good, making social inquiry engaging in poetry, poetics, drama, performance, philosophy, photography, film, and stories possible and developmental. These are fundamental ‘Africanist’ ‘tools’ helping Africa – as collective ‘self’ articulating ‘self’ – re-cover the ‘space’ stolen, destroyed, dismissed, brutalised, bloodied, poisoned, rejected, appropriated, dispossessed, denied and denigrated, yet who has evocatively and unendingly displayed the grace and beauty constituted by what Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o (2007b: 4) calls the “aesthetics of resistance”, immortalised in the words of Maya Angelou (1978):

```
Out of the huts of history's shame,
I'll rise.
Up from a past that's rooted in pain,
I'll rise.
I'm a black ocean, leaping and wide,
Welling and swelling I bear in the tide,
Leaving behind nights of terror and fear,
I'll rise.
Into a daybreak that's wondrously clear,
I'll rise.
Bringing the gifts that my ancestors gave,
I am the dream and the hope of the slave,
I'll rise.
I'll rise.
I'll rise.
```
THE DREAM BEFORE (LYRICS FOR WALTER BENJAMIN)

BY LAURIE ANDERSON

Hansel and Gretel are alive and well and they're living in Berlin,
She is a cocktail waitress, and he had a part in a Fassbinder film,
And they sit around at night now drinking schnapps and gin;
And she says: Hansel, you're really bringing me down,
And he says: Gretel, you can really be a bitch.
He says: I've wasted my whole life on our stupid fairytale, when my one and
only love was the wicked witch.
She says: What is his story?
And he says: History is an angel being blown backwards into the future.
He says: History is a pile of debris,
And the angel wants to go back and fix things,
To repair the things that have been broken;
But there is a story blowing from Heaven,
And the story keeps blowing the angel backwards into the future,
And this story,
His story;
Is called progress.
CHAPTER TWO

METHODOLOGY

It was only used for the special gatherings to taste the fruit of the harvest. The pot was made of dark clay and decorated with intricate light-blue lines. Each line, the elders explained, told a story. And in those gatherings everything was solved. The hurricane was tamed and the absence of rain was given a name and the dead were given a meaning. The pot was eventually broken. For decades people tried to remake it. They used dark clay and light-blue paints. They dug deeper than a goldmine for the right consistency. They even used twigs, sackcloth and diamonds. They stole old pots from mu-seums. They failed.

The hurricane lifted cows off the fields, the drought parched the soul, the dead were meaningless. But the new pots were wonderful to look at.


Introduction

*Philo Sofia* in Greek, is the love of Sofia, who was Gaia – Goddess and Creatrix – wearing the face of reflexive wisdom. Philosophy is the study of the fundamental nature of existence, reality, and knowledge. The philosophy of science in the twentieth century has been a battlefield between (anti)realist discourses.

How scientific theories should be interpreted, and the dialogical conflict about the cognitive significance of their theoretical conceptual frameworks and claims was the catalyst behind the work of the Vienna Circle in the 1920s (see chapter 5; Said 2003b). Logical positivism gave begrudging way to scientific realism as a tool of analytic philosophy in the 1950s. The sixties birthed historical-relativist approaches where anti-realist attitudes became fashionable again, and the late seventies turned towards the pragmatic. Arthur Fine, along with Fukuyama’s absurd ‘end of history,’ purportedly declared ‘realism is dead’ (Niiniluoto 1999: v). Niiniluoto, Bhasker (1978), and Sayer (1992, 2000) however, are adamant “realism is alive and well”, and that critical realism, “can be successfully defended against its most important current alternatives: instrumentalism, constructive empiricism, Kantianism, pragmatism, internal realism, relativism, social constructivism, and epistemological anarchism” (Niiniluoto 1999: v).

Despite the (anti)realist division morphing into several sub-sets each producing “endless sequences of more elaborate positions and technical arguments” (*ibid*), the fundamental realism dialectic is eternal, and cannot be (dis)proved by a *singular pro* or *contra* argument. Rather, it keeps ‘life’ alive and fascinating, and from which vital lessons, phenomena, and probabilities in the discourses of logic, ontology, semantics, epistemology, methodology, axiology and ethics emerge (*ibid*). This is highlighted by how emerging contextual fields of thought informing praxis, can be located in diverse ways, in coordinate positions defined by axes of reality, truth and knowledge. This is legitimate not only between binaries, like (anti)realism, but also for ‘minimalists’ (like Fine), or
‘absolutists’ (like Fukuyama) who try to remove the problems of realism by denying their existence.

**Varieties of realism**

The word ‘real’ from Latin res means ‘thing’ in a concrete as well as an abstract sense. ‘Reality’ encompasses the totality of all ‘things’, and ‘realism’ is a philosophical doctrine about the reality of some of its aspects. One delineates between *varieties of realism* within many sub-disciplines of philosophy including social sciences (as genre), and development (as field). One speaks of philosophy – and thus the problems of realism – as ontology, semantics, epistemology, axiology, methodology, and ethics. ‘Common sense’, ‘scientific’, and ‘metaphysical’ realisms are also delineated (Niinluoto 1999: 2).

Ontology inquires into and focuses on the nature of reality, especially existence. Semantics concerns the relations between language (as semiosis and linguistic) and reality. Epistemology investigates the possibilities, sources, nature and scope of human knowledges. One of the subjects of axiology is the aim of inquiry and deals with knowledge function and purpose, methodology is the study of the most effective means of attaining knowledge, and ethics concerns the standards of evaluating human actions and alternative possible states of the world (see Niinluoto 1999).

Reality can thus be problematised accordingly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Ontological Realism (OR)</strong></th>
<th>Which entities are real? Is there a mind-independent world?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Semantical Realism (SR)</strong></td>
<td>Is truth an objective language-world relation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemological Realism (ER)</strong></td>
<td>Is knowledge about the world possible?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Axiological Realism (AR)</strong></td>
<td>Is truth one of the aims of enquiry?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methodological Realism (MR)</strong></td>
<td>What are the best methods for pursuing knowledge?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethical Realism (VR)</strong></td>
<td>Do moral values exist in reality?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: The six problems of realism (Niinluoto 1999: 2).

This is an extremely complex situation, but such is life. The relationships between these realisms and their inquiries divide the realm of philosophy, as well as being the source of the (anti)realism dialectic, subsequently reverberating through the social, political and economic spaces of power effecting individual and collective conscious experience.

**The historical dialectic (in brief)**

From a western perspective, Niinluoto (1999: 3) explains how Plato’s ‘theory of forms’ was a bold attempt solving altogether the six problems tabled above contrasted to
Aristotle’s ‘traditional’ regard for ontology as the primacy of all philosophical inquiry (see chapters 4 & 5).

Kant rejected ontological primacy as ‘metaphysical’ and ‘non-scientific’, declaring the first task of philosophy to be the study of the possibility and conditions of knowledge by uncovering the innate structures of the human mind (see Niiniluoto 1999: section 4.3). Consequently, mental structures to languages and conceptual frameworks were fundamentally changed, and Western analytic philosophy has over the course of the twentieth century, studied questions of existence through the ‘ontological commitments’ of conceptual systems and theories (Quine 1969).

From this emerged the pragmatist tradition that developed variations of Pierce’s proposal to ‘define’ reality and truth by the ultimate consensus of the scientific community. These approaches place epistemology and methodology before semantics, and semantics before ontology. Pragmatists also deny the fact-value distinction (Putnam 1992), and the independence of ontological and ethical realisms are defended by ‘Hume’s Guillotine’, whereby is does not logically imply ought (see Niiniluoto 1999: section 4.6). Scientific realism followed accepting the scientia mensura principle (‘science is the measure of all things’), claiming all existence questions are a posteriori, to be decided last after science has reached its completion (Niiniluoto 1999: 3).

Refuting this however, Michael Devitt’s Realism and Truth starts with clearly formulated maxims implying ontological realism should be settled centrifugally, before proceeding to epistemological or semantic realism, which should be sharply distinguished from each other. His main thesis is that ontological realism and truth should be separated (1991: x): “No doctrine of truth is constitutive of realism: There is no entailment from the one doctrine to the other” (1991: 5). In other words, an ontological realist may accept an anti-realist notion of truth, and semantical (representational) realism, alone, does not tell which particular statements are truth and which are false. Devitt however, also defines the realist correspondence theory of truth so that it entails the existence of a mind-independent reality (1991: 29); many formulations of epistemological realism would not make any sense without some minimal assumptions of ontological realism.

Subsequently, Niiniluoto posits it is fair to accept “the philosophy of language will help to clarify the issues of realism and anti-realism. Ontological questions are certainly intertwined with semantical and epistemological ones. But it is very doubtful whether the study of language and meaning as such, could resolve any metaphysical issues” (1999: 3). Realism is a philosophical worldview, and its successful defense requires the most
plausible combinations of ontological, semantical, epistemological, axiological, methodological, and ethical positions.

**Scientific, Metaphysical, and Common Sense Realism**

Science is a source of cognitive attitudes about the world, characterised by its reliance on Pierce’s self-corrective scientific model (1931–1935 vol. V: 575). The scientific ‘community’ solves cognitive problems by suggesting hypotheses and/or constructing theories, and testing them through controlled observation and experimentation. We can thus construe science is a ‘local belief system’, comparable to and contrasted with other methods employed to acquire beliefs about the world: myths, religion, metaphysics, and common-sense (Niinluoto 1999: 5).

The scientific worldview is the position that science is the only legitimate source of beliefs about reality. A large part of views and beliefs termed ‘common sense’ are included, so long as they are obtained through ‘reliable’ sources of information and justified scientifically. A scientific worldview dominating (and constructing) the age of modernity, and the field of development, is positivism founded by Comte in 1830. Comte’s theory advocated and grounded itself in a historical law of the progress of humanity: religion is replaced by metaphysics, inevitably replaced by ‘positive science’ (Comte 1970; see chapter 3). This ‘law’ derived validity from the historical Enlightenment project clearly underestimating the mythical, mystical, magical and religious cultural power of the thought of moral humankind. Consequently fifty years later, another form of positivism emerged as Mach’s phenomenalism: the world is a ‘complex of sensations’, and scientific purpose is to give an ‘economical’ description of it (Mach 1959). This extremely rigid empirical tradition took the metaphysical systems of traditional philosophy as false and unjustified. However, this worldview posits scientific knowledge has to be restricted to beliefs certified by empirical evidence, effectively cutting itself loose from its theoretical aspects, and making it ‘anti-realist’.

All advocates of the scientific worldview are not scientific realists, and some scientific realists are not willing to commit themselves to the scientific worldview. Examples being: Cassirer’s (1965) relativism of worldviews where science, metaphysics, art, religion, and myth are symbolic forms, with their own standards of truth and objectivity; Wittgenstein’s regard of religion and myths as language games (Wilson 1970); and Karl Popper’s (1959) view of metaphysics as non-scientific but not meaningless, suggesting falsifiability criterion in order to delineate between it and science to imply all unrestricted existence claims are metaphysical. In spite of advocating for realist interpretations of theories against instrumentalism (Popper 1963), and insisting existential
Religious realism – gods, angels, demons, fairies, leprechauns, tokoloshe, etc., exist. A ‘narrow’ religious realist, is a theist; a ‘weak’ religious anti-realist is an atheist; a ‘strong’ religious anti-realist asserts religious statements are metaphysical and meaningless (Abraham 1985);

Metaphysical realism – abstract entities and principles accessible to scientific methods exist (i.e., Plato’s ideas, Leibniz’s monads, Hegel’s phenomenological spirit, Africanist ancestors) (Butler 1997);

Common-sense realism – everyday beliefs about ordinary objects are correct (Bhasker 1978);

Scientific realism – broadly, all scientific statements are claims with truth-values; narrowly, realists endorse scientific knowledges as truth-like, accepting the existence of theoretical entities postulated by successful theories (Niinluoto 1999).

Science and common-sense worldviews are often contrasted dualistically, implying the latter to be forms of naïve realism taking the world precisely as it appears, while religion, metaphysics and science add some interpretation to the ‘raw’ material of ‘pure’ perception (Devitt 1991; Musgrave 1993). I believe common-sense is a repository of local daily experience, ‘laden’ with practical interests, conceptual categories, and theoretical assumptions: we tend to see what we wish, are able to detect, and desire to expect, meaning the more conscious we are, the more we see. There is no unique common-sense framework, and ‘naïve realism’ is as much a myth as claims to ‘neutrality’. Nor should this prevent us from speaking about commonalities of sense dominating in cultures at specific nodes in the space-time continuum.

Sellars (1963) regards common-sense realism to be the manifest image, different from the original image where all things are conceived as thinking, acting agents. The manifest image is a person (self), as well as ordinary observable objects (stones, tables, stars). It is thus the surface level of social actor common-sense conceptions in local cultural contexts, i.e., ‘folk physics’ and ‘folk psychology’ (Churchland 1988). Sellars also distinguishes the scientific image by its reliance on ‘methods of postulation’: scientific theories introduce unobservable theoretical entities explaining observable object behaviour. Deductive reasoning indicates scientific images are not ‘fixed’, considering
'new' theories supposedly improve earlier ones. Sellars (1968) urges the 'true' ('singular', 'fixed'), is reached only in the ideal limit. A scientific realist thus only commits to the existence of entities postulated by this limit theory. Scientific images therefore replace manifest images, and 'scientific objects' eliminate those of 'folk' physics or psychology.

This is a very strong form of eliminativist realism: the objects of the manifest image are 'unreal' (Pitt 1981). Weaker non-eliminativist realism instead accepts both scientific and manifest entities may be real (see Popper 1979; Boyd 1984; Tuomela 1985). Eliminativism applies a strong attachment to scientific realism against common-sense realism. Common sense objects of manifest images (mere figments of our imagination) will be abolished when science uncovers the true nature of reality – in choosing between Eddington's famous two tables (table as middle-sized ordinary artifact, and table as a bunch of atoms), only-the-table-as-described-by-physics-really-exists (see Tuomela 1985).

A critical realist perspective and methodology

Bhasker (1978) developed critical realism as a philosophy of science that is neither positivist nor constructionist; holding to both ontological realism and epistemological fallibility in order to avoid the fallacy (of idealist and constructionist social theory) of conflating ontology with epistemology (see Bhasker 1978; Sayer 1992, 2000; Apple 1996; Niinuloto 1999; Moore 2007). It supports and asserts common-sense realism; there is an existing external world constituting intransitive objects independent of our (subjective) knowledge of it, and/also that our knowledge (worldview) is provisional and open to revision (knowledge is a transitive object) (ibid).

Critical realists assert the possibility of holding this view of reality together with the constructivist view that knowledge is social, relative and fallible; absolute concepts of truth are rejected, and no universal criteria exist to determine theory choice. This does not mean advocating radical relativism – 'anything goes' – adopted by postmodernists: epistemic relativism must be accepted (i.e. all discourses are constructed relative to the social positions people are in), but judgmental relativism must be rejected (i.e. all discourses are equally good) (Bhasker 1989; Fairclough & Chouliaraki 1999). Theories are judged 'better' than others through "practical adequacy"; that is, particular theories are more "useful" due to "correspond[ing] to the structure of the real world" in context (Sayer 1992: 69). Bhasker proposes a "stratified" view of reality as opposed to the "flat monistic ontology" of positivists, or a relativist "discursively constructed ontology" of social constructivists (1978: 10). Three ontological strata are discernable – the real, the actual and the empirical.
The real is the deepest level of reality, consisting of the structures and causal powers of material or social objects, (usually) unobservable generative mechanisms, liabilities or potentials. Given the nature of subjects of study and the dis/enabling conditions under which their powers can be exercised, critical realism aims to identify what could (potentially) happen, and what must (necessarily) happen for a ‘world’ (reality) to be as it is. This recognises unrealised powers and potential existing in ‘things’ as possibilities. The (constructed and potential) nature of real subjects present at a given time and place constrain and enable what can happen, but does not pre-determine what will happen (Sayer 2000: 12). Bhaskar (1978) describes the actual as the domain of events; what actually happens, when identified potential powers (the real) are activated. The empirical is the domain of experience; what we know and observe though sensory experience (including intuition). He insists existence is not dependent on, and so limited by mundane experience and observability. In other words, partial possible experience of the real and the actual is not a condition for their existence.

Critically, Bhasker challenges positivism’s adoption of Hume’s theory of causation – the “constant conjunction of events” – based on observed regularity, the assumption that if an event repeatedly follows another, it is caused by the initial event (1978: 12). Critical realism claims regularity in event sequences, and between two or more variables does not necessarily imply causation. Gathering data on regularities conventionally proved causation, but critical realists believe this is misguided, at best, these repeated occurrences suggest where to locate the causal mechanism. In other words, what causes something to happen has nothing to do with the number of times we have observed it happening, “[e]xplanation depends instead on identifying causal mechanisms and how they work, discovering if they have been activated and under what conditions” (Sayer, 2000: 14).

Causality is consequently understood in terms of the necessary tendencies, properties, or potential capacities of the subjects of study, distinguished from the conditions in which they are likely to occur. These conditions are contingent. Contingent relations arise from the contextual social practices and they may enable or trigger causal mechanisms, or they may block them from working effectively. Bhasker (1978) argues that in open social systems where multiple causal structures interact with each other – contrasted to closed experimental systems – the same causal mechanism can generate different effects in different contexts, on the other hand, the same effects can be generated by different mechanisms. This recognition of a gap between causal
mechanisms and their effects, explains the unpredictability, instability and variety of causal relationships in social systems.

Twenty-eight days later

This dissertation emerged against a backdrop of rapidly escalating consequences signifying a crucible of change for the world and Africa. Many claim we are moving into a ‘post’-modern, late-modern, globalising, risk, and liquid society, and their research is geared toward shaping Africans into neo-liberal subjects capable of ‘celebrating’ this self-indulgent, designer reality (see chapter 5). The ‘new’ global order rhetorically depoliticised is said to be more provisional and less authoritative than the past; a society of increasing self-reflexivity and individuation, a network society of flows and mobilities, a society of consumption and waste (Bauman 2000, 2004; Beck 2003; Giddens 1991).

Indeed. I and I of the so-called ‘developing’ worlds are more numbed from the “shock doctrine” of Friedman’s ‘Chicago Boys’ (see Klein 2007). More appalled at the plunder and murder masked-as-liberation of neo-colonial Anglo-American imperialism in Iraq (see Harvey 2005; Pilger 2008a). Darkly resigned to the recent world economic crisis, knowing without-a-doubt who is going to suffer even more, and the most (see Hobsbawm 2008; Pilger 2008a, 2008b). Sick to our stomachs at the re-emergence of Italy’s neo-fascism, and Mugabe’s never-ending belligerent insanity (Pilger 2008b). Deeply saddened at the amount of suffering Palestine has been forced to endure. Ironically relieved and desperately hopeful Éire’s working class outnumbered the elite squashing the EU’s anti-democratic Lisbon Treaty, and Mbeki was ousted from Lethuli House (see Wise Up Journal 2008; Pilger 2008c). Intensely watching Obama erase and re-construct his discourse now he is firmly in the White House (Pilger 2008a, 2008b).

German sociologist Ulrich Beck (2003) speaks of “zombie categories”, and Irish Jungian-psychologist Mike Tsarion (2008) polemically confronts “global necrophilia”, a symptomatic dis-ease of “global apartheid”, idiomatically indicating we (ego)-selfinterestedly move among the living dead in spaces of concrete, plastic and money (see Figure 3.1). This is a world in limbo desperately infusing past ‘invented traditions’ with energy, masking the actual and real – a planet that’s lost its soul – with carefully designed pleasant words (Hobsbawm & Ranger 2008). As such, conventional methodological approaches to inquiry are well past their sell-by-date. I and I suggest our tools for theory and research need radical overhaul especially regarding voicing the unvoiced.
RADICAL DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP (MOUFFE 1993; LACLAU 1994; SEE CHAPTERS 4 & 5);

A POLITICS AND ETHICS OF CARE AND COMPASSION CENTERED ON EMPATHY, LOVE, AND TRUTHFULNESS (HOOKS 1984; TRONTO 1993; DALY 2002; AKINTOLA 2004);

A POLITICS OF RECOGNITION AND RESPECT (SEIDLER 1994; HONNETH 1995);

THE IMPORTANCE OF RECIPROCITY OF TRUST (O’ NEILL 2002).

In our own time, it is becoming extremely difficult for non-market values to gain a foothold. Parenting is a non-market activity; so much sacrifice and service go into it without any assurance that the providers will get anything back. Mercy, justice: they are non-market. Care, service: non-market. Solidarity, fidelity: non-market. Sweetness, kindness, and gentleness: all non-market. Tragically, non-market values are relatively scarce (1999: 11).
Narrative is the prime humanistic tool, but this is not limited to regulated typologies. A human-story may be re-told as text, photograph, documentary, genealogically, ethnographically, as testimonio, auto-ethnographically, or collectively. The fundamental concern is not only humanistic understanding of conscious experience, but also how the re-search-story is told; the researcher’s voice is present. Considering no passivity of interaction exists, texts are never neutral, but are effective in Foucault’s (1994a) use of the term: the centre will shift (see chapter 3).

**Narrative and performative inquiry as self-reflexive auto-ethnographic research process**

Thomas and Znaniecki allowed life-histories to infiltrate sociological inquiry in the first decade of the last century with the following: “A social institution can be fully understood only if we do not limit ourselves to the abstract study of its formal organization, but analyze the ways in which it appears in the personal experience of various members of the group, follow[ing] the influence it has upon their lives” (1927: 1833). Sixty years later the race and women’s movements shifted the analytic gaze with Barthes’s dramatic words: “narrative is present in every age, in every place, in every society” (1977: 79). We know ‘self’, and the world, through the stories told about it.

Narrative inquiry is not the easy option, and I have struggled to interpret and represent as narrative my research, relying on a very rich intra-trans-disciplinary tradition to defend the subaltern in relation to an African whole constituted by its place in the global ‘order-of-things’ (Ferguson 2006; see chapter 4). That tradition has drawn on every moment of my life for two years, constantly, reflexively, snaking deeper and deeper into this particular reality. I gathered and read as many examples of prosaic data with any affinity to my research topic as I could, wrestling with establishing contours; which voice(s) – within and without – should I give life to in moulding my thesis? The narratives of my narrative are constantly coming into being and retreating to memory, captured perhaps in text, photographs, body language, silences, lyrics, statistics – everything that came my way as signs to follow towards self-knowing and integration into a critical realism articulating a critical humanism, where the African ‘self’ flourishes instead of constantly being brutalised.

The visibility of the narrative (including discourse) as Chase (2005) and Fairclough (1997) indicate, is owed to poets, griots, and bards catalysing the women’s movements, igniting the post-colonial movements. As the androcentric assumptions of social science – placing the lives and activities of white men in the ascendancy, constituting the norm from which women’s and so-called ‘non’-European/’non’-Western/’non’-Upper/middle-class/’non’-heterosexual lives and activities deviate – were critiqued by artists, feminists
and post-colonialists the personal became political, and the narrative became the ‘essential primary document’ in the self-represented research of the ‘other’. Previously silenced voices challenged epistemological realism(s), and their false-consciousness about society, culture, and history. Issues of working-class ‘others’, identified by race, ethnicity, nationality, social class, sexual orientation, and disability came to the fore as central aspects of ‘modern’ life (see chapters 3 & 5).

Most important of all, under the narrative gaze, I and I became subjects giving voice to self, rather than as objects of scientific observation, categorised and pathologised by those categories. Simultaneously, the matter of subjectivity was illuminated: What are the researcher’s interests? What role does space, place, environment, and location play in research relationships? Whose questions get asked and answered? Who gets the last say? How does power operate in the research relationships? Whose voice, authenticity, interpretive authority, and representation are preferred? What does it mean for the ‘other’s’ voice to be heard? In what sense do(n’t) I and I’s life-stories ‘speak for themselves’? How do interactional, social, cultural, and historical conditions mediate I and I’s stories? In what ways are I and I’s voices muted, multiple, and/or contradictory? Under what conditions do I and I develop ‘counter-narratives’? How should all voices and ideas be re-presented in written works? Narrative inquiry accordingly advances a social transformation agenda. Wounded storytellers may empower others to speak. Testimonies, as emergency narratives may mobilise a collective against social injustice, repression and violence, catalysing social movements. Marginalised voices may create public spaces requiring others to hear what they do not want to hear.

I, drawing from Chase (2005), highlight five analytic lenses sculpting narrative inquiry:

- **Narrative as distinct form of discourse.** It is retrospective meaning-making shaping and ordering conscious experience. Through self-reflexive critique and analysis of different voices (internal and external) listened to, knowing is granted authority producing knowledge articulated by language as social practice – discourse (see Fairclough 1989 – 2000; Gee 1996). Understanding inter-subjective social actor interactions, and exercising intuition to consider the intent behind experiences enables organisation of conscious experience into meaningful wholes. Connecting these moments across the space-time continuum clarifies consequences. Narratives are not reduced to what happened, but how what happened came to be, and how it felt, was experienced, and interpreted – in other words, what it meant. It is therefore intertextual, forging connections between human existences and visual imaginings and articulations, illuminating ontological realism informing semantic realism, articulating epistemologies.

- **Narrative as praxis.** Narratives do work; as verbal action something is accomplished – they explain, entertain, inform, defend, complain, heal, describe,
articulate, clarify, express, confirm or challenge the status quo (amongst infinite possibilities). Whatever the particular action, when a story is being told, self (I) constitutes, shapes, constructs, and performs self (I), experience, and reality, into manifestation and being. This active creativity recognises and acknowledges voice(s), communicating what and how, as well as the subject-positions of social, political and economic locations from which I and I speak, making the voice particular (Gubrium & Holstein 2002). Furthermore, when narration is recognised as actively creative, and voice as particular, focus moves away from the de-politicised ‘factual nature’ of contrived reality, to the actual reality of ‘self’ and experience as political (Gubrium & Holstein 2000; Lincoln 2000).

- **Narrative as structural mechanism.** Stories are enabled and constrained by social and cultural structures, mechanisms, resources and circumstances. These include the possibilities and potentials for self and reality construction, intelligible within the narrator’s local settings, organisations, social memberships, and cultural and historical locations. While acknowledging that every instance of narrative is particular, inter-subjective commonalities exist across narratives (Bruner 2002; Gubrium and Holstein 2000).

- **Narrative as performative.** Particular social actors articulating voice and telling stories, are socially situated performances manifesting as conscious experience in a particular setting, for a particular audience, serving particular purposes and interests. A narrator’s story is thus flexible, variable, and shaped in part by inter-subjective interaction, making manifest intertextual and inter-discursive reconstructions. Narratives are thus joint productions of narrator(s) and listener(s), wherever they arise (Bauman 1986).

- **Narrative researcher as narrator.** These analytic lenses apply to the auto-ethnographic research process shaping, for example, this dissertation. I have extrapolated meaning from, and established an order to, the prosaic data gathered and studied over an extended period. My own voice and self have been articulated and re-constructed whilst dissembling the voices and realities of ‘others’ concerning Africa’s ‘recovery of self’. My research is enabled and constrained by the socio-cultural resources, structures, and circumstances embedded in my discipline, cultures, and subject-position on the space-time continuum. This idea seeds a range of complex issues about voice, representation, and interpretive authority. I am well aware of the interconnectedness of the above lenses, and in what follows, I will shift back and forth among them, depending on the narrative I am re-presenting.

**Conclusion**

Personal conscious experience constructs, fills and shapes I an I’s repository of common-sense realism, reflected in the constant stream of thought-as-imagination-and-experience, voices and meanings a ‘self’ has in any immediate moment. This occurs within and as a person’s life, and is spoken into being in narrative form. Conscious experience (empirical realism) always becomes a re-constructed re-presentation, because language, speech, and orders of discourse (semantic realism) mediate and define the very experience one is describing of ‘self’ for ‘self’. I study the representations of experience, not experience itself.
A critically humanist radical democratic research agenda (see chapters 4 & 5), works toward the manifestation of self-determining self-governance – such as the Zapatistas are realising in Chiapas, Mexico (see Baker 2002; Holloway 2002). It establishes that empowerment, authentically and legitimately, means we can only study our own experiences towards self-knowing. Researchers crucially become research subjects complicit in knowledge production serving particular interests in direct proportion to consciousness of self-knowing.

To echo Padayachee (2007), “Does this mean we all become social scientists?” This is the topic of auto-ethnography where one performs one’s own narrative reflexivity continuously into being. I endorse this self-determined-reliancy especially regarding Africa’s ‘renaissance’ to integrate and make manifest, a legitimate post-colonial reality, as subsequent chapters indicate. And my reply to the above question is, as we master the mechanisms and tools of re-presentation, re-construction, and re-articulation, we remember we are all artists, refracting social creations (self) evocatively back at our self. Thus do we become committed to truthfulness, active creation, and the critical values and principles of social justice: do what you will so long as you harm none in the continuous revolution of knowing thy self.
**THIS IS A REBEL SONG**

by Sinead O'Connor

I love you my hard Englishman,
Your rage is like a fist in my womb.
Can't you forgive what you think I've done
And love me – I'm your woman?
And I desire you my hard Englishman,
And there is no more natural thing,
So why should I not get loving?
Don't be cold Englishman.

How come you've never said you love me,
In all the time you've known me?
How come you never say you're sorry?
And I do.

Ah, please talk to me Englishman,
What good will shutting me out get done?
Meanwhile crazies are killing our sons,
Oh listen – Englishman.
I've honored you – hard Englishman,
Now I am calling your heart to my own,
Oh let glorious love be done,
Be truthful – Englishman.

How come you've never said you love me,
In all the time you've known me?
How come you never say you're sorry,
And I do?
CHAPTER THREE

POWER

Shelelembuze was not human, they said. He or she was impossible to classify: you see, you thought he was a man, but she was a woman, or the other way around, which confused everybody. He would be placed to work on one machine and would be found working on another without abandoning the first one. He or she would be at the head of the food queue and at the back. When asked whether he or she had been served, he or she would say yes and no. He would finish a job before starting it and start something that no one could finish. She would appear ten times on any list and then each correction would have her reappear more than once. He would even start something totally new before the managers even ordered it. The managers were wrecked. They started getting doctors, sangomas and scientists to help them – but they couldn’t, because there was nothing wrong. Every time they looked at Shelelembuze he or she was doing something very sensible, such as working harder than anyone on three machines in different parts of the factory at the same time.

They finally got rid of him (I think he was a man that day) because he started being both black and white and that, they said was the last straw: Sir/Madam, you are a very versatile somebody, but our world cannot work without discipline and order.


Introduction

Research works through Wittgenstein’s ‘language games’, and power works through Foucault’s ‘truth games’. The multiple languages used and available to us are riddled with tensions and contradictions. Despite attempting, and sometimes succeeding, to chart paths of clarity through dense woods of quantum reality, the elitism of I (and I) playing the role of ‘researcher’, subjecting the subaltern (within and without) to the hegemony of English brings with it its own intensity. As Fanon repeatedly enunciated, being colonised by a language has larger implications for one’s consciousness: "To speak [...] means above all to assume a culture, to support the weight of a civilisation" (1968:17-18). Speaking English means we accept, and/or are coerced into accepting, the collective consciousness of all English is. Similarly, under the duress of neo-liberal discourses, we are coerced into accepting all neo-liberalism is.

Should I speak?

I as one of the ‘illegitimately privileged’ (Beverly 2005: 551) young white South African women occupy the space-in-between ‘fields of power’ of the geo-political-North and South, and the modernist-immersed ‘cultivated self’ and radical artist-as-democratic-citizen ‘caring self’ (see Bourdieu 1993, 1996, 1998). Despite being only second generation removed from colonialism’s effects – the slums of Glasgow, the Irish famines, and the Roma (Gypsy) holocaust\textsuperscript{11} – I am literate, middle-class, speak English as a native language, and possess developed intellectual and artistic sensibilities as a consequence of the legally enforced racial, sexist, and classist discriminations of apartheid. Just because my memory was consciously awoken through the deeply traumatic losses and suffering effective of resisting apartheid, and other forms of domination to honour my
gene pool, or that I am woman, subjected daily to the harm of patriarchal insanity, does not alleviate the actual: illegitimately privileged. I have benefited from harm and destruction and this reality manifests social disequilibria.

Pivotal then to my constructing a thesis on Africa’s ‘recovery of self’, are the ideas of Edward Said (1994a, 2003a, 2003b), Achille Mbembe (2001, 2002b), and Gayatri Spivak (1988) regarding the problems of misrepresenting voices. Should I speak for the subaltern? Might my bringing stories to refute the proposed ‘public’ policy document NEPAD (2001) create further harm to those denied and denigrated as inconsequential to ‘progress’?

My intent is obviously not that but to show how narrative makes the personal political, as contra- to the unproblematised and deceitful claims of the ‘neutral’, ‘a-political’, ‘a-historical’, ‘universal’, ‘natural’, and ‘normal’ of the dominant neo-liberal regime. Auto-ethnography is a self-determining act of resistance to the modernist separation of reason from emotion, constructing objectification. Re-claiming I (and I) catalyses healing by shifting the ‘fixed’ centre from out to in, through the catharsis of releasing self’s experience, a process allowing us to know ourselves (see Holman Jones 2005; chapter 5).

To be or not to be …

Like the (anti)realist dialectic raging at the heart of the art of existence for the twentieth century, the idea of agency, authority, identity, self, and humanism rages at the heart of theories on power – I in relation to I – Foucault calls, “the ethics of control” (1990b:65). Specifically now, humanism is a thoroughly controversial and contested term, not least between the social actors of the ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ worlds. From a Western worldview the idea of the ‘self’ (as I and I) has been attacked by theologies, behavioral psychologies, and certain philosophers (see Curtis 2002: parts1-4; Said 2003b), even Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, despite crucial differences, shared a sense that oppression and injustice are only ‘real’ and ‘objective’ if they take place within the ‘public realm’ (Seidler 1994).

Positions critical of mainstream humanism usually identify with a post-modern sensibility, loosely including queer-, multicultural-, and post-structural theorists, post-colonialists, many feminists, Africanists, and anti-racists. They critique Western ‘humanism’s’ fixed and universal ‘self’: a common normalised humanity, practicing naïve realism blinkered to the wider differences and positions in the world, functioning to normalise a ‘universal’ series of ideological assumptions about the centrality of the white, Western, male, bourgeois position. This ‘self’ is a powerful, actualising, and ‘autonomous’
force: the individual agent at the centre of the universe, sustaining, maintaining, and retaining his position at the centre, through a winner-takes-all competitive social practice – ‘naturally’ so. This overt individualism umbilically connected to the Enlightenment project (western, patriarchal, racist, colonialist, etc.), makes its moral, socio-economic and political claims about ‘progress’ and ‘development’ through a neo-liberal-democratic society (see chapter 5). This ‘humanism’ is the enemy of feminism (human is ‘rational’ male), Africanists/Indigenes (human is white superiority), gays (human is heterosexual), and all cultures outside the Enlightenment project. A ‘humanism’ describes Fanon, that “does not follow [a] heroic, positive, fruitful and just path [but] disappears with its soul set at peace into the shocking ways […] of a traditional [colonial] bourgeoisie, of a bourgeoisie which is stupidly, contemptibly, cynically bourgeois” (1963: 121).

“The modern individual – objectified, analysed, fixed – is a historical achievement,” says Foucault, “[t]here is no universal person on whom power has performed its operations and knowledge, its enquiries” (1979b: 159-160 author’s emphasis). The Western invention of “human subject” is not a “progress” or “liberation” – merely a trapping in the forces of power (ibid). Here I began the ‘long night of the soul’ of this research process. I understand, endorse, accept and empathise with the above standpoints, but I am also ‘other’ with vast inner subalternity. How do I voice the being I know at the level of the real to be self – defined by Judith Butler as the subject-position, which “is neither a ground nor a product, but the permanent possibility of a certain resignifying process” (1992: 13), and illustrated by Jung (1990) as both the nucleus and the whole sphere – and humanist, described by Edward Said as “shorn of all its ‘unpleasantly triumphantalist weight’”? (1992: 230; 2003a).

Jung compares the psyche to a sphere with a bright field (A) on its surface, representing consciousness. The ego is the field’s centre (only if I know a thing is it conscious). The Self is the nucleus and the whole sphere (B); its internal regulating processes produce vision. The organising centre from which the regulatory effect stems seems to be a “nuclear atom in our psychic system. One could also call it the observer” (1990: 161-162; see chapter 5).

Figure 3.1. Jung’s spherical psychic ‘Self’ (1990: 161).

I began excavating Foucault’s ‘effective histories’ in the original, to find the ‘missing link’. 
Foucault ... AM – NOT – AM

Magritte wrote on his painting of a pipe, “this is not a pipe,” (Foucault 1973b). What you are reading is not Foucault’s theory of power, but your interpretation of my representation of Foucault at a particular moment in the space-time continuum. Effectively, I claim no accuracy or truth of this representation as neither exist nor are possible. His theory was anticipated by Fanon who located the historical point at which certain psychological formations became possible, and analysed how historically-bound cultural systems, such as the Orientalist discourse Said describes, perpetuate themselves as ‘psychology’ (see Fanon all; Said 2003a, 2003b). Foucault always worked with stories, the his-stories shaping, sustaining, and imposing modernity upon the soul of the world:

I do not mean to dispense with earlier texts; I have taken pains to read them, but not in order to recopy them, as many writers do; what interests me in the “already said” is not established authority but rather the breadth and variety of experience to be found there. And I have not searched for this experience in a few great authors, but insisted on going to those places where it is formed (1990b: 8).

Questions […] must be addressed to a rationality that asserts its unity and yet proceeds only through partial modifications, that validates itself by its own supremacy but that cannot be dissociated in its history from the inertias, the dullness, or the coercions that subjugate it. In the history of the sciences in France, as in German Critical Theory, what is to be examined, basically, is a reason whose structural autonomy carries the history of dogmatisms and despotisms along with it – a reason, therefore, that has a liberating effect only provided it manages to liberate itself (1994a: 469).

Texts as discourse were his data – ‘the archive’ – from which central patterns emerge constructing ‘power’ defined by Greenstein “as a set of practices and discourses govern[ing] the interactions between social actors” (2003: 1). Steeped in the French school of thought, Foucault’s contribution extends from his mentor, Canguilhem:

[q]uestions […] must be addressed to a rationality that asserts its unity and yet proceeds only through partial modifications, that validates itself by its own supremacy but that cannot be dissociated in its history from the inertias, the dullness, or the coercions that subjugate it. In the history of the sciences in France, as in German Critical Theory, what is to be examined, basically, is a reason whose structural autonomy carries the history of dogmatisms and despotisms along with it – a reason, therefore, that has a liberating effect only provided it manages to liberate itself (1994a: 469).

This “theme of ‘discontinuity’” (1994a: 470), developed into “whoever says ‘history of discourse’ is also saying recursive method […] in the sense in which successive transformations of this truthful discourse constantly produce reworking in their own history” (1994a: 472). Scientific ‘universal reason’ contrary to how it portrays itself, has constantly rewritten its own story, without ever acknowledging that it is doing so. Foucault places the “sciences of life back into [the] historico-epistemological perspective, [bringing] to light a certain number of essential traits that make their development different from that of the other sciences, and present historians with specific problems,” because of the dominant portrayal of all sciences as unified or the same (1994a: 475 my emphasis).

Foucault notes Canguilhem raised, “in a peculiar way, the philosophical question of knowledge” (1994a: 474); at the centre of epistemic realism, granted primacy by scientific universal reason,
The first is “the analysis of discursive practices [that] made it possible to trace the formation of disciplines” (1990a: 4): the “archaeological” dimension; the second is “the analysis of power relations and their technologies” (ibid): the “genealogical dimension”; and the third is “the modes according to which individuals are given to recognise themselves as … subjects” (1990a: 5), or “the games of truth in the relationship of self with self and the forming of oneself as a subject” (1990a: 6): the “care-practices-of-the-self” dealing with ethics, liberation, and freedom.

This ‘random error’ – the ‘mutation’, ‘transformation’, or ‘death’ integral to life sustaining itself – undermines the self-constructed story of reason, as dominant, fixed, eternal, unified, or constant. Consequently, Foucault states, “should not the whole theory of the subject be reformulated, seeing that knowledge, rather than opening onto the truth of the world, is deeply rooted in the ‘errors’ of life?” (1994a: 478). Effectively, he posits a re-turn to the primacy of ontological realism to clarify the ‘truths’ of existence informing knowledge, rather than the imposition of epistemic reality over existences. Thus were his ‘effective histories’ first articulated.

**Archaeology, genealogy and care of the self**

I would be digressing in my dissertation purpose to describe these three dimensions rigorously. Foucault was prolific and greatly misrepresented due to their preferential use detached from the whole theory of power they illuminate. I have realised this is erroneous, as together they clarify the (anti)humanism/(non)self dialectic at the heart of theories of power.

After writing his four archaeologies and two genealogies, Foucault gave the first of his Two Lectures on Power and Knowledge in 1976, saying: “If we are to characterise it in two terms, then ‘archaeology’ would be the appropriate methodology of this analysis of local discursivities, and ‘genealogy’ would be the tactics whereby, on the basis of the descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjected knowledges, thus released would be brought into play” (1980: 85). In an interview just before he died in 1984, he expressed hope scholars would use archaeology and genealogy in the pursuit of truthful knowledge, as a means to liberation addressed by the care-practices-of-the-self. The Use of Pleasure divides his work into three “axes” (1990a: 4), labeled “theoretical shifts” to be made to study “the games of truth” (1990a: 6):

- The first is “the analysis of discursive practices [that] made it possible to trace the formation of disciplines” (1990a: 4): the “archaeological” dimension;
- The second is “the analysis of power relations and their technologies” (ibid): the “genealogical dimension”; and
- The third is “the modes according to which individuals are given to recognise themselves as … subjects” (1990a: 5), or “the games of truth in the relationship of self with self and the forming of oneself as a subject” (1990a: 6): the “care-practices-of-the-self” dealing with ethics, liberation, and freedom.
The archaeological dimension

Rather than a metaphor for geological excavation, this refers to a complex set of concepts centered on savoir and connaissance constructing the discursive space of power. In an interview in 1966, Foucault stated:

By “archeology”, I would like to designate not exactly a discipline but a dimension of research: in a society, different bodies of learning, philosophical ideas, everyday opinions, but also institutions, commercial practices and police activities, mores – all refer to a certain implicit knowledge [savoir] special to this society. This knowledge is profoundly different from the bodies of learning [des connaissances] that one can find in scientific books, philosophical theories and religious justification, but it is what makes possible at a given moment the appearance of a theory, an opinion, a practice (1994a: 261 author’s brackets and emphasis).

Savoir, contrasted to particular knowledges of connaissance (neural physics, Freudian analysis), are the broad discursive conditions necessary to develop connaissance (Gutting 1989: 251). Savoir are thus the multiple common-sense realisms from which scientific epistemic realisms emerge. Foucault describes how these two concepts differ:

The linch-pin of Madness and Civilization was the appearance at the beginning of the nineteenth century of a psychiatric discipline. This discipline had neither the same content, nor the same internal organisation, nor the same place in medicine, nor the same practical function, nor the same methods as the traditional chapter on “diseases of the head” or “nervous diseases” to be found in eighteenth century medical treaties (Foucault 1972: 179).

Comparing the psychiatric discipline of the 1800s to the “diseases of the head” and “nervous diseases” of the 1700s, indicates the discontinuity of the supposedly ‘unified’ logic of ‘rational’ scientific knowledge. Continuing, he clarifies how,

examining this new discipline, we discovered two things: what made it possible at the time it appeared, what brought about this great change, in the economy of concepts, analyses, and demonstrations was a whole set of relations between hospitalisation, internment, the conditions and procedures of social exclusion, the rules of jurisprudence, the norms of industrial labour, and bourgeois morality, in short a whole group of relations that characterised for this discursive practice [psychiatry] the formation of its statements (1972: 179 my emphasis).

Psychiatry emerged as connaissance, due to discursively changing the concepts, practices, procedures, institutions, and norms of the much broader savoir, to serve particular hierarchical economic interests; common-sense realisms are constituted by, and subordinated to scientific epistemological realism’s discursive projections, limits and claims (see chapter 5). Foucault argues the claims of formal knowledges, merely being formal disciplines naturally so, are not only inadequate, but false: “[T]his practice is not only manifested in a discipline possessing a scientific status and scientific pretensions; it is also found in the operation of legal texts, literature, philosophy, political decisions, and the statements made and the opinions expressed in daily life” (1972: 179). Truly understanding a ‘thing’, and how it came to be that particular ‘thing’, necessitates
The history of reason is "not wholly and entirely that of its progressive refinement, its continuously increasing rationality" (1972: 4). Modernity’s civilising reason and its ‘natural’, ‘normal’, ‘neutral’ universalism, is not more refined, more rational, better, or more true. There is “discontinuity” between what is, and what is said to be so, within the meta-narrative, and about the master myth indicated in the reality it effects into being, as well as the processes of social practices from which it emerges (1972: 2).

Archeology is the study of savoir: “the conditions of possibility of knowledge” (Foucault 1994a: 262). Savoir, is thus what Bhasker (1978) calls ‘the real’ – the deepest level of conscious reality, consisting of the structural and causal powers of ‘things’, their generative mechanisms, liabilities and potentials (Sayer 2000:12-16). By ‘conditions of possibility’ Foucault indicates it is not deterministically inevitable connaissance will emerge out of savoir. How it emerges, is through discursive formation and a performative act of the ‘community’ of connaissance, serving the interests of connaissance (Butler 1997b). Archeology demonstrates a ‘thing’ does not simply emerge from the discursively-constructed rational historical trajectory of that ‘thing’ but must address the formal statements of a ‘thing’ (isolating the ‘historical trajectory’ as such), and the broader, less/not rational, real reality of a ‘thing’. These more complex, ambiguous, messier, “condition[s] of possibility” undermine the ‘one-truth-story’ or ‘meta-narrative’ of modernity’s ‘universal’ ‘rational’ formal knowledges (see chapters 4 & 5).

Foucault’s archaeologies don’t just critique modernity’s ‘grand narrative’, they are a vast number of research-based examples systematically exposing the faultlines upon which it is constructed, indicating it is fundamentally wrong:

1. The history of reason is “not wholly and entirely that of its progressive refinement, its continuously increasing rationality” (1972: 4). Modernity’s civilising reason and it’s ‘natural’, ‘normal’, ‘neutral’ universalism, is not more refined, more rational, better, or more true. There is “discontinuity” between what is, and what is said to be so, within the meta-narrative, and about the master myth indicated in the reality it effects into being, as well as the processes of social practices from which it emerges (1972: 2).

2. Formal knowledges cannot (indeed must not) be studied and understood within the confines of their own formal terms. A connaissance emerges out of savoir; scientific realism emerges from common-sense realisms; and epistemological realisms emerge from ontological realism. The elite exaltedness of reason, its ‘purity’, its high status, its very rationality is made up by itself, for itself, in order to be itself, in relation to that which it assumes it is not. Understanding particular disciplines means not being ventriloquists of that discipline’s self-constructed identity but understanding the depth, breadth, richness and complexity of savoir (the real and actual) co-existing “on the same plane” (1972: 4). As such, equality (manifesting as actual) lies in the acknowledgement and acceptance of difference without exclusion.
Problematising modernity’s “reason” is not archaeology’s only focus, it’s “twin” and “shadow” is modernity’s “subject”: “Making historical analysis the discourse of the continuous and making human consciousness the original subject of all historical development and all action are the two sides of the same system of thought” (1972: 12 my emphasis; see chapter 5). The idea that “man” is creating human history and knowledges in a logical, rational, continuous manner is modernity’s ideology. This ideology is made dominant by being the lens though which historians, philosophers, economists, linguists, social scientists, etc., have fashioned the ‘picture’ of the ‘reality’ that is said-to-be logical and rational, and that has the ‘human subject’ as its main actor at its privileged center. This ideology and its representation of ‘reality’ through historical, philosophical, economical, psychological, linguistic revisionism, is undermined through archeology. Archaeology de-centres the modernist-constructed ‘subject’.

The genealogical dimension

Archeology drew on Canguilhem’s theses, and Nietzsche’s literary and poetic language inspires genealogy14. ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, the bridging text between archeology and genealogy makes four powerful claims about how genealogy works (Foucault 1994a).

The first, drawn directly from Nietzsche, is genealogists “challenge the pursuit of the origin […] an attempt to capture the exact essence, purest possibilities, [and] original identity” (1994a: 371) of phenomena, categories, or dimensions such as “values, morality, asceticism, and knowledge” – the various realisms – in philosophy, history, and the social sciences (1994a: 373 author’s emphasis). Through refusing “metaphysics” and listening deeply to “history as effect” Foucault-as-genealogist finds that,

There is ‘something altogether different’ behind things: not a timeless and essential secret but the secret that they have no essence, or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms. […] What is found at the historical beginning of things is not inviolable identity of their origin, but the dissension of other things. […] Examining history of reason, [we] learn that it was born […] from change; devotion to truth and the precision of scientific methods arose from the passion of scholars, their reciprocal hatred, their fanatical and unending discussion, and their spirit of competition – the personal conflicts that slowly forged the weapons of reason (1994a: 371-373; see Curtis, 2004: 2nd & 3rd; chapter 5).

Targeted again are the foundational assumptions of modernity, specifically the teleological assumption that history moves upward or forward from some base origin, when actually, no such ‘origins’ exist, and what are said to be are fabricated to grant the assumptions legitimacy (see chapter 5). What is found, are vortexes of irrational emotions, “details and accidents”, “petty malice”, “the minute deviations – or conversely,
The body is directly involved in the political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs. This political investment of the body is bound up, in accordance with complex reciprocal relations, with its economic use; it is largely as a force of production that the body is invested with relations of power and domination; but [...] its constitution as labour power is possible only if it is caught up in a system of subjection (in which need is also a political instrument, system meticulously prepared, calculated, and used); the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and subjected body (1979a: 25-26).

Foucault’s third focal point describes,

the various systems of subjection [...] the endlessly repeated play of dominations [...] of certain men over others lead[ing] to the differentiation of values [...] and how a class domination generates the idea of liberty establish[ing] marks of its power and engrav[ing] memories on things and even within bodies. It makes itself accountable for debts and gives rise to the universe of rules, which by no means are designed to temper violence, but rather to satisfy it (1998: 376-377).

The modernist rationale for debts, rules, laws, and the current social, economic, governmental, and legal arrangements divert critical attention from its domination and subjugating effects, which dis-ease bodies, subsequently locating ‘the problem’ in ‘victims’ or individuals not following the ‘rule-of-law’ or ‘norm’ (see chapter 5).

The law is a calculated and relentless pleasure, delighting in promised blood, permit[ing] the perpetual instigation of new dominations and the staging of meticulously repeated scenes of violence. The desire for peace, the serenity of compromise, and the tacit acceptance of the law, far from representing a major moral conversion or a utilitarian calculation that gave rise to the law, are but its result and, in point of fact, its perversion (1998: 378).

Foucault concludes this coercive technology will never manifest a “humanity [of] progress [magically] arriving at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination” endlessly (ibid). The genealogist’s purpose is to expose this rationale’s self-construction as humane and evolving, as false. Modernity’s "system of
rules” are no less than ‘structures of violence’ perpetuating its hegemonic assumption of power over humanity apropos a self-determining power with.

The fourth focus illuminates Foucault’s “effective history”, as contra to the traditional “history of historians” claiming certain “constants” that are, actually, false:

The traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history, and for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development, must be systematically dismantled. Necessarily, we must dismiss those tendencies, which encourage the consoling play of recognitions. Knowledge even under the banner of history does not depend on “rediscovery of ourselves” (1998: 380).

Modernity’s foundational assumptions are again shown as supporting historical revisionism soothing and dissolving “the singular event into an ideal continuity,” asserting “regulative mechanisms” to control and “confirm our belief that the present rests upon profound intentions and immutable necessities” (1998: 380-381). ‘Subjects’ are subjugated into performative acts of complicity with modernity's hegemony. History as actual, has been without constants and effective,

to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being – it divides our emotions, dramatises our instincts, multiplies our body, and sets it against itself. Effective History leaves nothing around the self, it deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature, and it will not permit itself to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millennia ending. It will uproot its traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its pretended continuity. […] Effective History […] deals with events in terms of their most unique characteristics; their most acute manifestations. An [historical] event, consequently is not a decision, a treaty, a reign, or a battle, but the reversal of relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of vocabulary turned against those who had once used it, a domination that grows feeble, poisons itself, grows slack (1998: 380-381 author's emphasis).

The sense of effective-stories exposes an existence “among countless lost events, without a landmark or a point of reference” (1998: 381), affirming “perspectival knowledge” as traditional “historians take unusual pains to erase the elements in their work reveal[ing] their conditioning” (1998: 382). They thus de-scale the eyes to see history as an invented effort to console selves with assumptions that unity, continuity, teleology, meaning, destiny, fate are built into history itself, a view making us feel safe or ‘his-story’ our safe harbour. This invented ‘humanism’ is a kind of modernist psychosis of spell, hiding the fact that our-story is the unconscious “profusion of entangled” probabilities Nietzsche calls, “a host of errors and phantasms” (1998: 381). The sensical work of genealogists is consequently realised through comparisons of one moment-of-effects-as-period (not a chronological time sequence of constants) with another.

As example is how the “economy of punishment” became “distributed” in the “second period” of the geo-political-North-story (1979a: 7). ‘New’ theories of criminal law constructed ‘new’ politically moral justifications, and ‘old’ penal systems “died out” (ibid).
Under this ‘new’ theory, “punishment [became] an economy of suspended rights [and] whole armies of technicians took over from the executioner, the immediate anatomist of pain; warders, doctors, chaplains, psychiatrists, psychologists, educationalists, economists” – the ‘expert’ (1979a: 11). This ‘liberal-progressive’ view of ‘less’ cruelty and pain, were “the new tactics of power” (1979a: 23; see Curtis 2004; Harvey 2005; Pilger 2008a; Said 2003b). This system, “a strange scientifico-juridical complex,” now punishes souls rather than bodies (1979a: 19), it’s ultimate target being “not simply a judgement of guilt [but] assessments of normality and technical prescriptions for a possible normalisation” applying to individuals and societies as a whole (1979a: 21). Behaviour diagnosed as ‘correct’, and said-to-be-‘human’, is ‘naturally’, the projection of modernist-subjects constructing their own supremacy and ascendancy. The ‘invisible hand’ of this economy is fear. Vital is how liberalism’s view of “greater leniency in punishment” is seen as a causal principle of the new regime, rather than the actuality of “greater leniency” being an “effect” of “the new tactics of power” (1979a: 23). Foucault describes four guidelines to this exposition:

1. Do not concentrate the study of the punitive mechanisms on their “repressive” or “punishment” aspects alone, but situate them in a whole series of their possible positive effects, even if these seem marginal at first sight. As a consequence, regard punishment as a complex social function (1979a: 23).

   “Positive” refers to something produced apropos repressed or excluded. ‘Positive’ effects of liberalism are the normalisation of appropriate behaviour, where ‘equality’ becomes conditioned ‘sameness’ rather than critical ‘difference’ (see chapter 5).

2. Regard punishment as a political tactic (1979a: 23).

   Foucault demands we ‘shift the centre’ analysing punitive methods as consequences of legislation, indicators of social structures, and crucially as specific techniques granted a quasi-important “specificity”, within “the more general field of other ways of exercising power” (ibid). Imperative is thus how norms mandated by policies get thought into being; governmental actions articulated through policy are not merely functions of established social structures, a modernist-constructed-subject is discursively sustaining those structures, not necessarily through Machiavellian intent, but indicative of subjugation multiplying technologies-of-power across social fields, more oppressively regulating souls not only bodies.

3. Instead of treating the history of penal law and the history of the human sciences as two separate series whose overlapping appears to have had on one or the other, or both, a disturbing or useful effect, according to one’s point of view, see whether there is not some common matrix or whether they do not both derive from a single process of “epistemologico-juridical” formation; make the technology-of-power the very principle both of the humanisation of the penal system and of the knowledge of man (1979a: 23).

   The “process of epistemologico-[fill-in-the-blank] formation” is constructed by granting primacy to epistemological realism, for doing so constructs technologies-of-power, embeds them within, and multiplies them across particular systems and the social sciences, as discourse – a performative narrative.
4. [D]iscover whether this entry of the soul onto the scene of penal justice, and with it the insertion in legal practice of a whole corpus of "scientific" knowledge, is not the effect of a transformation of the way in which the body itself is invested by power relations [i.e.,] study the metamorphosis of punitive methods on the basis of a political technology of the body in which might be read a common history of power and object relations. Thus, by an analysis of penal leniency as a technique-of-power, one might understand both how man, the soul, [and] the normal or abnormal individual have come to duplicate crime as objects of penal intervention, and in what way a specific mode of subjection was able to give birth to man as an object of knowledge for a discourse with a "scientific" status (1979a: 24).

By “soul” Foucault means the new regime focuses “not only on what they do but also on what they are, will be, may be” (1979a: 18 author’s emphasis); behaviour is not ‘the problem’, but an actor’s being or self-determination is. “Soul” is memory, the knowing of all that is, “will be, may be”, and these technologies serve to subjugate “consciousness, [to] instead of being the all-embracing crystallisation of the innermost hopes of the whole people, instead of being the immediate and most obvious result of the mobilisation of the people, will be […] only an empty shell, a crude and fragile travesty of what it might have been” (Fanon 1963: 119).

Care (practices) of the self

Foucault relentlessly exposes how trapped we have globally become by the Enlightenment project, and modernity of ‘man’ as both the human scientist and object of human sciences constantly re-producing itself, through rigorous conjunctural analyses of “periods” on the space-time continuum: “We think and dream on the plane of physical conjunctions, on that of social relations of superiority and inferiority, and on that of economic activities of expenditure and profit” (1990b: 31). These analyses of technologies-of-power binding moments, minds, and bodies, to maintaining invented traditions discursively sustaining a violent and destructive system, move far beyond that of conventional history, indicating what is said to be ‘progressive’ and more ‘humane’, is actually worse, more oppressive, and more demeaning. Targeted now by the system is the soul rather than the body, who we are, rather than what we do.

Foucault’s third dimension ‘care-practices-of-the-self’, glaringly illuminates the imperative to de-centre ‘man’ as the primary subject of modernity. Modernity constructed ‘man’, the central subject as agent running the world, fashioning the whole of human life as constructed around and for man, and so wrote a his-story of the progressive rational rise of the human sciences guided by, and for, a rational-only-man, to dominate the earth for his gain, as the centre of the universe. Here ‘the archive’ is an intensely critical examination of texts at the juncture between the Hellenic philosophers and the birth of Empire. An effective historical reading exposes how,

this theme of the care of oneself, consecrated by Socrates, that later philosophy took up again and ultimately placed at the centre of that “art of existence” which philosophy claimed to be, was this theme which, breaking out of its original setting and working loose from its first
philosophical meanings, gradually acquired the dimensions and forms of a veritable “cultivation of the self” in response to adequacy. What is meant by these remarks is that the principle of care of oneself became rather general in scope. The precept, according to which one must give attention to oneself, was in any case an imperative that circulated among a number of different doctrines. It also took the form of an attitude, a mode of behaviour; it became instilled in ways of living; it evolved into procedures, practices, and formulas that people reflected on, developed, perfected, and taught. It thus came to constitute a social practice, giving rise to relationships between individuals, to exchanges and communications, and at times even to institutions. And it gave rise, finally to a certain mode of knowledge and to the elaboration of a science (1990b: 44-45).

The human-subject-as-centre and ‘his’ oppression-as-positive technologies-of-power were seeded in the first two centuries of the Roman Empire, where care (as being) to experience sensual, sensory, and sensical pleasure and joy, mutated into, cultivation (as mode of production). Dominion with mutated into domination over. The consequences are: a deeply complex matrix of processes, dispersions, procedures, accidents, hatreds, policies, desires, dominations, uncontrolled circulations of power, commercial practices, demonstrations, the norms of industrial labour and bourgeois morality, literature, political decisions, discontinuities, thoughtless opinions expressed, dissensions, petty malice, precise scientific methods, subjected bodies, faulty calculations, and the plague of modernity: addiction.

Foucault has been criticised for never offering alternatives for resistance to the oppression so thoroughly described. While insightfully characterising the complexity of a discipline or regime, every facet becomes critical, opening up new perspectives on specific truth regimes, but foreclosing through totalised critique the possibility these new frontiers might become ‘new’ possibilities or imaginaries. Yet this is Foucault’s profundity. The dialectic will be eternal because the dialectic is eternal; so long as the modernist project is infused with life, to constantly appropriate any ‘new’ imaginaries as a facet of itself, and so long as it holds power over human subject-positions, this particular dialectic will be an (anti)humanist one. The words ‘resistance’ and ‘emancipation’ are humanist, and the view that his unwillingness to offer any alternative is to maintain an ‘anti-humanist’, ‘anti-subject-position’ epistemology, is, as Care of the Self shows, incorrect:

In the slow development of the art of living under the theme of the care of oneself the first two centuries of the imperial epoch can be seen as the summit of a curve; a golden age of the cultivation of the self [followed ...] – it being understood, of course, that this new phenomenon concerned only the social groups, very limited in number, that were bearers of culture and for whose members a technē tou biou could have a meaning and a reality (1990b: 45).

Fraser (1989) highlights that Foucault’s language, like "systems of subjection" (1979a: 376), and “the endlessly repeated play of dominations" (1979a: 377), is a modernist-humanist language, and that the technologies-of-power he critiques is indicative of our immersion in, and attachment to modernism constructing a need for a
‘humanist’ language resisting the technologies-of-power constructing it. In *The Will to Knowledge* Foucault elaborates,

[w]e must think that by saying yes to sex, one says no to power; on the contrary, one tracks along the course laid out by the general deployment of sexuality [when one says yes to sex]. It is the agency of sex that we must break away from if we aim – though a tactical reversal of the various mechanisms of sexuality – to counter the grips of power with the claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledges, in their multiplicity and their possibility of resistance. The rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality ought not be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures at ease with them selves (1976: 157).

Clearly self-determining discipline-as-resistance towards transforming conscious experience, rather than reactionary cultivation-of-addiction is alluded to and introduced (see chapter 5). Additionally, Foucault was a radical activist of especially prison issues, vociferously supporting activism while resisting critiques of its lack in his writings. In an Italian journal interview in 1978, he said ‘I don’t construct my analyses in order to say, ‘This is the way things are, you are trapped’. I say these things only insofar as I believe it enables us to transform them’ (1994b: 295-296).

If the third dimension of his triune ontological episteme tabulating global-technologies-of-power are the care-practices-of-self, then in the truth games we play, by caring for whole self (I and I) as an actual, political, social practice, do we resist the technologies-of-power constructing cultivated-individualism as a prototype of ‘rationality’. This actual, like Foucault's expositions, is resisting the invention of a tradition through asserting the real as actual, thereby transforming conscious experience in the moment (see chapter 5). As Vaclav Havel declared in his essay, ‘The power of the powerless’: “If the main pillar of the system is living a lie, then it is not surprising that the fundamental threat to it is living in truth. This is why truth must be suppressed more severely than anything else” (1987: 57).

**Conclusion**

Foucault contributed powerful, innovative, insightful and provocative avenues of thought, critique, and understanding to the relationality of energies, or the economy of power, between ‘things’, and moments on the space-time continuum. His prolific works are ‘the hard dirty work’ of exposing the underbelly of humanism-as-modernity done. All that is actual and real about its de-politicising rhetoric and capillaries of structurally violent power, the malignant hierarchical interest its meta-narrative serves.

It is up to I and I, now, to re-cover (not re-discover) a self-as-subject-position that is real, actual, cares, and through that committed, integritous care emerges emancipated from the ‘grips of power’ as a Self, determining Self. Deluze thought and said as much perhaps more poetically,
When people follow Foucault, when they're fascinated by him, it's because they're doing something with him, in their own work, in their own independent lives. It's not just a question of [Foucault's] intellectual understanding or agreement, but of intensity, resonance, musical harmony – [sense and] being (1995: 86).
WAR

BY BOB MARLEY ET AL

Until the philosophy which hold one race superior,
And another inferior,
Is finally and permanently
Discredited and abandoned –
Everywhere is war –
Me say war.

That until there no longer be first class,
Second or third class citizens of any nation,
Until the colour of a woman's skin
Is of no more significance than the colour of her eyes –
Me say war.

That until the basic human rights are equally guaranteed to all,
Without regard to race, class or gender –
Dis a war.

That until that day,
The dream of lasting peace, world citizenship, rule of international morality
Will remain but a fleeting illusion to be pursued,
But never attained –
Now everywhere is war –
Me gotta say war.

And until the ignoble and unhappy regimes,
That hold our brothers and sisters in sub-human bondage,
Have been toppled,
Utterly destroyed –
Well, everywhere is war –
Me say war.

War in the east,
War in the west,
War up north,
War down south –
War – war – war –
Rumours of war.

And until that day,
The African continent will not know peace,
We Africans will fight – we find it necessary –
And we know we shall win,
As we are confident in the victory of
Good over evil, yeah!
CHAPTER FOUR
AFRICA - NOT YET UHURU!

The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind. Their consequences already have been great; but, in the short period of between two and three centuries which has elapsed since these discoveries were made, it is impossible that the whole extent of their consequences can have been seen. What benefits, or what misfortunes to mankind may hereafter result from those great events, no human wisdom can foresee. By uniting, in some measure, the most distant parts of the world, by enabling them to relieve one another’s wants, to increase one another’s enjoyments, and to encourage one another’s industry, their general tendency would seem to be beneficial.

To the natives however...


The *amasi* bird was taken from the homesteads. The men had to leave and work in the holes where the walls are singing. The elders aged even more. The children were declared dead before they were born. The women walked up and down the fields collecting insects and thorns for the pot. In the palaces they cut the *amasi* bird up to see which parts made it wise. They took notes about its soft feathers and soft bones; they separated each tiny piece of its small head, they placed its scrawny feet on washing lines and put its beak in bottles of vinegar. They nodded to one another. We can make many of these from coal or rubber. The man with the cart walked over the hill to the homesteads.

He was shouting, ‘Cheap, cheap. *Amasi* bird and chips, five bob. Try some tasty meat on the bone.’


Introduction:

I waded through Foucault in a womb-like space while biblical rains descended upon Ireland for forty long days and nights. Rather than the dove, I was waiting for the *amasi* bird to rescue my dreams from the monster-of-modernity embracing me. I and I from the geo-political-South experienced the claustrophobia Foucault relentlessly exposes, waking nightly from terrifying visions of being burned alive in global concentration, and refugee camps in neo-fascist Italy, a month earlier. Unlike in South Africa where what Bond describes as “the freedom to write far-reaching commentaries reflect[ing] the strength of South Africa’s democratic constitutional form, the still-fluid power relations in the society, and the openness to democratic debate” are actual, I experienced the EU to be the dark side of the moon: the source and triumph of the modernist project (2005a: 93; see Pilger 2008b).

Ireland with its “undefeated *Óglaigh na hÉireann*" stymied the EU elite’s less-than-transparent plans in the referendum opposing the Lisbon Treaty (see Wise Up Journal 2008). At a public debate the Irish elite tried to call for another referendum, rhetorically postulating the public was ‘mis-guided’ by the government’s ‘lack of implementation’ of ‘correct knowledge’ concerning the Treaty’s aims. They were met with utter contempt, as a young man stood and asked, ‘Do you think that the Irish people are thick? Sixty-five percent of this nation voted ‘no’, because they, we, are *working class*. 

37
The treaty does not serve our interests of democracy, they serve ye, as elites. Your existence, shames the entire history and memory of Ireland!

Simultaneously I received a link to a video of science’s latest astronomical discovery: black holes are not the totalising gravitational field of power science thought. A gossamer light stream emerges from the pulverising monster counteracting the increasing density of material accumulation, moving beyond as both a part of, and apart from, the original star (world) having exhausted its nuclear fuel and collapsed. Recall Foucault: “What is found at the beginnings of things, is not inviolable identity of their origin, [but] the dissension of other things” (1994a: 371-373). This light-stream (anti-gravity) emerging from the dissolution of a world is in-exhausted nuclear fuel carrying with it infinite memory of what it is: pure energy as intelligence. A legitimately human(ist) ‘self’ emerges after being shorn of Said’s “triumphalist weight” (1992: 230). Next wonder was a message reading “the takeover has begun.” The BBC substantiated this, informing me Thabo Mbeki with his re-constructed ‘African Renaissance’ as NEPAD, was no longer the president of South Africa (Mbeki 1998; see chapter 5). I flew home singing, “Another Africa (and world) is probable, phantsi pessimism, phantsi!” (ASF 2002a).

Back to truth-like and actual roots

*Ex Africa semper aliquid novum* (‘from Africa, the eternal flow of things new’) Pliny the Elder once remarked (Adedeji 1994: 3). “Many sources”, writes Olela, “have now dispelled the dogma of the ‘compulsive originality’ of the Greek mind” (1984: 43). Foucault excavated how imperialism constructed a philosophy of a ‘cultivated self’ from what was said to be the ‘original’ Greek ‘care of self’ (see chapter 5). Olela clarifies, “[a]ny claims concerning the lack of precedence for Greek philosophy overlook its historical development, [and] this insistence on the ‘purity’ of Western philosophy has successfully forged a place in academic circles” in order to constantly re-produce itself (1984: 43). Chapter three demonstrated how these “insistence[s]” of “purity” are (re)produced as well as the interests served by (re)producing them (*ibid*).

What Foucault intimated with “the [pre-Socratic] care of oneself [hovering in] the first two centuries of the imperial epoch can be seen as the *summit of a curve*” (1986: 45 my emphasis), Olela categorically states as “[t]he Greek [mutating into] the Roman worldview came from Ancient Africans” (1984: 43). Gomperz believed “knowledge about geographical factors and influences are necessary [to] understand a people’s philosophy” (1920: 3), and Greece’s location led to it “becoming an apprentice of older civilisations” (1920: 47). “Primary Hellenic culture was born [... in the] mystery of Crete,” writes Dibinger wa Said (1970: 1), and “the ancestors of Cretans were African.
The Sahara’s power, presence and influence today remain absolute in a way that no other feature of the African continental mass can equal. It is the most compelling of all of Africa’s natural phenomena and symbols: the Alpha and Omega. A beginning and an end. Any sense of Africa is incomplete without an impression of what it was, and what it is. Uncovering its mysteries, will inform what will possibly be (Mostert 1992: 54).

In re-constructing an ‘effective our-story’ what follows is not chronological, but exposes nodes-of-transformation on the space-time continuum. The most far-reaching of which to Africa, is the great and fundamental presence of the Sahara:

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The Sahara separates what are categorised today as the Arabic peoples of North Africa from the Bantu peoples of sub-Saharan Africa, said to “co-exist uneasily [as] the principles animating them are often in conflict with one another” (Nkrumah 1964: 81). The Sahara’s desiccation beginning circa 3000 BCE (Mostert 1992: 59) led to constructing this ‘separation and conflict of principles’, and the Cretan invasion by northern Barbarians circa 1000 BCE (Huggins & Jackson 1969: 4) resulted in its categorisation. A categorisation effectively leading to the exclusive Hegelian dictum that Africa is “outside of history” because it never achieved the “German” “self-consciousness” of “reason” (Hegel 1899). A dictum ignoring “ancient Greeks themselves credited Africa with being the source of […] philosophical knowledge” as they practiced it, and rigorously questioning why imperialist legionaries under Julius Cesar and later Constantine (from Germany) burnt the great libraries of Alexandria and Addis Ababa (Olela 1984: 44).

The direct route across the Sahara from Atlas to the Hoggar is “a scene of great natural violence […] the violence of vanished water” (Mostert 1992: 56). The last “moist period” beginning 10 000 BCE coincided with the “neo-lithic revolution” involving the Bantu ancestors and the beginnings of pastorilism (ibid). The “greening of the Sahara” was the “prime agent activating the development of Africa’s staple grains, and gave the world its greatest assembly of prehistoric art”, an enormous force, as source of food, mobility, and power among the Bantu. Relics of Bantu-styled pottery dating to 8000 BCE were found in the Hoggar highlands (McIntosh & McIntosh 1986: 419). This Sahara contained lakes covering hundreds of square kilometers, fed by massive rivers sourced in the Atlas, Hoggar and Tassili mountains; a hydrographic system linked to the Niger and Lake Chad. Bantu pastoralists of this aquatic world participated in what archaeologist Clark annotated as a single process of agricultural development extending from the oldest farming community in the world at Obobogo, now a suburb of Yaoundé in Cameroon, to
Egypt and the Near East (1959: 55). Bantu are thus the powerful maritime ancestors of the Cretans, and Olela explains how ‘Egyptian’ and ‘Ethiopian’ were used interchangeably as in “ancient times all black men were called one or the other by foreigners [and] Ethiopians impacted [what became] Egyptian religion” (1984: 44).

_Thropos_ is Greek for (hu)man, etymologically rooted in the name _Ethiope_, and _Bantu_ also means ‘human’ (see later). Egypt meaning ‘to wander’ was the Greek name for _Sais_, and “add[ing] the Egyptian prefix _ma_ [meaning ‘of’] to Sais, we have the Ma-Sais […] the descendents of the [nomadic] Gallas Somalians and Masais today living in Kenya and Tanzania” (ibid; Ochieng 2007). Additionally, “pure” mathematics and science “found their way to Greece after the voyages of Thales, Pythagoras, and Euclid [to have] lessons from the Sais astronomers and seers” as indicated in the _Rhind Mathematical Papyrus_ and _Edwin Medical Papyrus_, dating to 2000 and 4000BCE respectively (Olela 1984: 45). By 5000BCE “the discovery of metals […] including a definite knowledge of the ratios of elements [to alchemise] tin alloy to bronze had already been made, and glass-making was a major industry” by Africans (1984: 46). The philosophical schools of Ancient Africa are well documented by Olela (see 1984: 45-49), and Clark asserts, “[w]hen Kant looked upon the movements of the starry sky and then into the moral order within himself recognising the two as the signs of one and the same God, he was closely following the thought stolen from an anonymous Memphite [of Africa] more than five thousand years before” (1959: 64).

By 4000BCE Ethiopians had identified “creation was done out of thought [naming]: water (Nun); boundless (Huk); air (Shu); fire (Atum); the mind; and chaos and order (Tefnut)” (Olela 1984: 47). Regarding the soul, this “is _Ba_, the soul of the ancestor [having] human characteristics and distinguishable from _Ka_, a [conceptual] _double_ [shadow] of any conceivable object” (ibid; see Jung 1990: 161-176). Two other phenomena are _Khu_ and _Khat_: _Khu_ is “the shining part bridg[ing] the gap between human and superhuman beings”; and _Khat_ is the body “subject to complete destruction at moment of transformation or death” (Olela 1984: 47). According to Sayce, “Plato’s ideas, where the real world is the world of ideas or forms, were the last development of the Ethiopian doctrine of _Ka_. They were the archetype after which all things have been made” (1902:48). This is significant as “Plato went to study in Sais when he was 27 years old” (Olela, 1984:48; see chapter 5). Tabulated in the _Sumerian Book of the Dead_ remaining after death is a real self – _Ka_; within _Ka_, is _Khu_, divine, pure intelligence (‘the mind’) linking humans to ‘God’ regarded as ‘All that is’; _Khu_ is limited by _Khat_ (intelligence by form), and the nature of reality is only fully realised at the
transformative moment, where *Ka* separates from *Khat* to become intelligence reformed. This is the source of Aristotle’s theory of creation moving to order from chaos as a performative act of manifesting reality through the mind and word. It is also where his doctrine of the soul (an integration of *daemons*) is rooted (Olela 1984: 49; see Jung, 1990: 161-176; chapter 5).

Our star and black-hole story, as a ‘thing’ of the universe (all that *is*) clearly fits into the real and actual ‘order of things’, making it befitting to take James’ recommendation seriously:

Now that it has been shown that philosophy, arts, and sciences were bequeathed to civilisation by the people of Africa and not by the people of Greece; the pendulum of praise and honour is due to shift from the people of Greece to the people of Africa; the rightful heirs of such a praise and honour. This is going to mean a tremendous change in world opinion and attitude for all people and races that accept the new philosophy of African redemption, i.e. the truth that the Greeks were not the authors of Greek philosophy; but the people of Africa (1954: 171).

The seeds of *Geru-Ma*

By 2000 BCE, the Sahara’s last moist period was over and the desert established (Mostert 1992: 60). At the height of colonial expansion in 1933, French Lieutenant Brenans, leading a camel patrol into a Tassili gorge, stumbled across a continuous frieze of ancient engravings. Thirty years later archeologist Lhote tracked their location describing,

[w]e were confronted with the greatest museum of prehistoric art in the whole world [with] pictures of extraordinary aesthetic quality. The main art styles stand out from the mass of paintings. One is symbolic in character. It is the more ancient and the work of Negro artists […] belonging to a school unknown up to now and one […] of local origin. The pictures of this latter phase afford us the most ancient date that we have concerning Negro art (1959: 13).

In no other part of the world did pre-historic artists treat the human body with such skill – we have, indeed, to wait for the Greeks before we find comparable works of art (1959: 62).

Greece’s Bantu ancestors are confirmed, and this story resonates with Jung’s
deimorially known” (1983: 283), for this culture passing steadily down the one side of Africa, “recreated itself powerfully at certain points along the way, becoming a formidable part of the Bantu momentum in sub-equatorial Africa” (Mostert, 1992: 58). Panoramic views of great cattle herds are the most spectacular scenes described by Lhote: “the ‘Bovidians’ are seen managing their large herds, with every beast painted with loving delicacy: these cattle paintings are […] copied directly from nature and painted with evident and very skilful care for detail. […] The ‘Bovidians’ […] seem to have practiced an ox-cult” (1959: 63).
The ox is still the symbol of pride, wealth, and power for Bantu peoples, inclining one to regard the Tassili beasts as ancestors of the Sanga-Nguni butchered in the amaXhosa cattle killings the day the tide turned, laying Africa’s frontiers open to the 'colonial experience' (See Mostert 1992; Peires 1989; Mnguni 1952). The colonial 'experience' is undoubtedly the most tragic 'developmental' intervention in Africa’s story. A period when the ‘great’ European ‘powers’ – Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Portugal – driven by the narcissistic desire to expand their own image, put their hegemonic belief in their racial superiority into practice in a brutal abuse of power relations still intact today (Pilger 2008b). These dehumanising, demoralising, technologies-of-power existed alongside, and were justified by, an arrogantly patronising display of condescension all in the name of ‘civilising’ the ‘natives’ from the ‘dark continent’. Victor Hugo put it like this:

Man's destiny lies in the South. [...] In the nineteenth century, the White made a man of the Black; in the twentieth century, Europe will make a world of Africa. To fashion a new Africa, to make the old Africa amenable to civilisation – that is the problem. And Europe will solve it. [...] Go forward nations grasp this land! Take it! From whom? From no one. Take this land from God! God gives the earth to men. God offers Africa to Europe. Take it! [...] Pour out everything you have in this Africa, and at the same stroke solve your own social questions! Change your proletarians into property-owners! Go on, do it! Grow, cultivate, colonise, multiply! (Quoted in Zorn 1989: 6).

This speech – presented at a banquet commemorating the abolition of slavery – is indicative of the economic objective fuelling colonial intent: the continual growth of production and the accumulation of capital constantly require new outlets. Couched in the humanitarian-religious discourse of the ‘enlightenment’ project – ‘civilisation’, ‘moral well-being’, ‘social progress’ – meddling in the stories of so-called ‘lesser’ beings and plunder were legitimated to sway public opinion and garner its support.

Effectively not only the ‘pursuit of origins’ confronted the amaXhosa as “the first independent black Africans exposed to intense scrutiny about themselves from Europeans”, but that their cultural practices of social and ecological justice were the frontier (Mostert 1992: 41). Growing up in the region, I learnt their roots from “the waters of life” at the “source-of-the-source of the Umzimvubu river” made them the “people of peace” who came to rest at “Xolobeni” (‘be with [place of] peace’) in South Africa. This peace was violently disrupted by the arrival of umlungu with his one-truth, and black and white cows riddled with bovine pneumonia, laying waste to their Sanga-Nguni, their vast wealth, food source, and link to the ancestral voices of the Qamata: Inkomo luhlanga, xazifile, luyakufa uhlanga (‘cattle are the race, they being dead, the race dies’) (Peires 1989).
Ultra-conservative colonialist historian Theal who rarely said anything truthful about the Bantu peoples described isiXhosa as having:

a very copious verb, and abstract nouns can be formed readily when they are not already in common use, so that any idea whatever can be expressed in it. As nearly every word ends in a vowel, and the enunciation of the people is clear and distinct, with the voice nicely modulated, the language is musical to the ear. Many individuals, especially among the chiefs and counselors, display great ability in public speaking (1964: 55).

Other colonialists regarded it as a “verbal palimpsest”, believing it to have roots in Hebrew, Arabic, Greek, Latin, English, Dutch and German, as well as affinities with Malayan, Papuan and Polynesian tongues. Missionary Calderwood, wrote, “the philosophy of the language – its perfect euphony, its construction, the completeness of the verb, the entire subjection of the language to definite rules – indicate a higher and more civilised origin than the present condition of this people would lead us to expect” (1848 n.p.). The amaXhosa are indeed a seed of a great linguistic tree. Archeological and genetic studies indicate Khoisan, !Kung San, Bantu, Masais, and Arabs are individuations of a single African population (Phillipson 1985: 112)23. The Sumerian Book of the Dead corroborates this stating Africans are the descendents or “city” of Enki, the fruit (child) of the tree (principles and practices) of the Goddess Ma’at24 (Ochieng 2007: 1). Ptah-hotep, the Coptic guru, defined Ma’at as truth, justice and righteousness, for it was “she who could transform a human individual into geru-maa, self-disciplined and virtuous” (ibid). Geru-maa is likened to a “tree growing in fertile ground, offering pleasant shade and yielding succulent fruit” (ibid). Her essence embraces the love (care) of self through social and ecological practices of justice.25 Ma, means ‘of’, ‘origin’ and ‘source’, so Ma’at, means ‘of At(um)’ – of light – symbolising nuclear energies (intelligence) released during transformation (see chapter 5).

Sithlanu a warrior, told Canon Callaway the following story about origins:

My grandparents told us we came out of water, from a bed of reeds, by the sea [...] The first man is called Unkulunkulu ['Great greatness'] and he came out with a wife, she as well as he, is called Unkulunkulu. Whether it is a man or a woman we say Unkulunkulu, because both are of the female and the male. Other men came out of the bed of reeds after them [...] Unkulunkulu came out as they were. We do not see them and hear only of Uthlanga ['the gateway'], the place out of which they all came. So we say they were first: they made the earth, mountains, water, corn, food, cattle, everything. All things came out of the water. We say they made them, for when we came into being they were already in existence. We see them in dreams, but all we know is the young and the old die, and their shade departs returning into them (1870 n. p.).

isiXhosa for ‘source’ is ma. It also signifies ‘strength’, ‘energy’ or ‘power’. For example: ‘agreement’ translates into ‘the willingness to add strength/power’ – vuma; the symbolical bird of wisdom and culture sent by the shades (ancestral spirit) is the amasi bird, translating into ‘the-power-of-ours messenger’; the shades are Qamata meaning
The continent’s varied faunal and vegetal resources as well as the indigenous grasp of environmental balance helped ensure sufficiency, as research vividly indicates. There was, as one study finds, ‘no clear dividing line between environmental manipulation and food production.’ This research postulates a similarity to the social practices prevailing in the big gap of ‘history’, suggesting that lack of intensive food production during earlier epochs were not through lack of knowledge; furthermore, traditional views that transition from hunting and gathering to cultivation, was a sudden, irreversible adoption of one way of life for another was therefore a fallacy (1992: 52 author’s emphasis).

As the oldest on Earth the Bantu story is the story of what it means to be and become human. This ‘effective our-story’, imperative to knowing self, has huge black holes between readings of fossils and carbon-dated artworks, and the arrival of literate imperialists serving the ‘cultivated-self-interest’ of the ‘Enlightenment’ project’s capitalist exploitation during the millennia of the Christian era. Missing is its developmental story: a re-construction using critical realism serving truth-likeness, requires closely integrated trans-disciplinary collaborations supported by human and advanced technology. Clark informs, “[t]here is no doubt indigenous African races have a very long history, and an equally long relationship with the geographical regions that are their traditional home. The scarcity of remains in the tropics is attributed to the swift decomposition that the high humidity and acid forest soils ensure” (1976: 358). What ‘pure’ science cannot answer, the living fabric of Africa, and something very important to the Bantu peoples, human memory, will (see chapter 5). Consequently, included in ‘our-story’ to speak with the voices of the shades for the subaltern must be the ‘other’ readers of bones: the Sangoma (‘those who sing open the gateway to power’), who for the centuries of the ‘colonial experience’ were otherised as ‘witches’ of ‘superstitious lore’.

umntu ngumntu ngobuntu

High modernist propaganda is that farming is man’s intelligent removal of self from a scavenger’s existence of hunter-gathering considered too demanding to have leisure time for cultural and technological advancement (Mostert 1992: 51). Ethnographies of the !Kung San reveal the opposite to be true: sufficiency is gathered without over-exerting or damaging delicate physiological and eco systems (ibid). Even in intense drought the balance informing epistemologies is maintained to sustain sufficiency (ibid). Recalling Foucault’s instruction to look for technologies-of-power in ‘positive’ outcomes, Mostert illumines:

The continent’s varied faunal and vegetal resources as well as the indigenous grasp of environmental balance helped ensure sufficiency, as research [...] vividly indicates. There was, as one study finds, ‘no clear dividing line between environmental manipulation and food production.’ This research [...] postulates a similarity to the social practices prevailing in the big gap of ‘history’, suggesting that lack of intensive food production during earlier epochs were not through lack of knowledge; furthermore, traditional views that transition from hunting and gathering to cultivation, was a sudden, irreversible adoption of one way of life for another was therefore a fallacy (1992: 52 author’s emphasis).
Intensive food production is the harder, less rewarding and dangerous option, as the current global environmental (and economic) crisis clearly indicates. Hunter-gathering gave people time, freedom and space to invoke in ritual, dance, mime, and oral storytelling, the sociability forging and sustaining individual ease, harmony of a society requires. The reciprocity and equality of you are therefore I am, or I and I at the level of the real, practiced as actual. Not embarking on intensive food production was the rational choice given deeply rooted beliefs in social and ecological justice sustaining a harmonious reality.

Ancient farming communities occurred in regions like the Cameroon, from which the first Diaspora spread across the subcontinent, because environmental diversity allowed sustainable sedentary activities. Different food sources supplementing one another were abundant even during environmental upheaval. Such spaces bonded people ancestrally – a phenomenon deeply significant to Bantu peoples and their harmonious social practices (Vansina 1984: 129; de Maret 1985: 134). “The conviction of ‘pre-historians’”, writes Mostert, “is that the fundamental instincts possessed by humans on the African continent were for harmony and co-operation rather than for killing and aggression. This is seen, rather, as contamination via the conduit of colonialism and imperialism” (1992: 46). Archeologist Leakey voiced this conviction at Oxford:

There still are, always have been, and probably always will be, people believing some races are inferior and others superior physically. When we talk so glibly of the ‘superiority’ of the white races at the time when the Europeans arrived to introduce western civilisation to the peoples of Africa, we should do well to reflect that in nearly all ways Africans already had reached a position which we, the so-called civilised races, are only just beginning to comprehend (1961: 14).

He was referring to the carefully balanced social codes of Africa’s social and ecological justice practices: uBuntu.

“A human is a human through the humanity of others,” said Mandela at his inaugural address on May 10, 1994, “[n]ever, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by another, suffering the indignity of being the skunk of the world.” An eloquent discourse feeding directly into Africa’s starving and wounded longing for renewal, as well as illumining uBuntu nambheko (‘humanitarian respect for all is one’).

Recalling ‘real’ means ‘thing’ in a concrete and abstract sense, and informs the dialectic at the heart of philosophy, uBuntu as a social practice is the ontological episteme constituting all that is real through actual conscious experiences. For Bantu peoples -mntu refers to all ‘things’ human, and -mno encompasses all ‘things’; human
subject-positions (I and I) are not privileged by any logo-centric binaries, or positioning in the relatiotality with all that is (life), but made of the same stuff as all ‘things’, highlighted earlier as atum – particles of ‘light’, ‘energy’, ‘power’ – ‘ma’. Different noun articles will differentiate singular and plural, human and non-human forms – -ntu/-nto – but no gender binary exists, I (and I) as human occupy the same energy-based plane whatever our physiology. Gender-difference comes into specific names for particular adopted identities like ‘husband’, ‘wise(grand)-mother’, etc. In effect, the Bantu peoples, are the human peoples, where the Ba of -mntu is a plural noun article as well as the ‘ancestral soul’: -mntu is the ‘actual’ ‘thing’ contained with in Ba, the ‘real’ ‘soul’, given form as -mba/-mbo the body, experiencing the ‘empirical’. The noun article bu in uBuntu, means ‘to be and become’ signifying choices, willingness, and possibilities of being; uBuntu is thus the inter-subjective ontology of what it means to be and become human in relation to life (all that is).

The social and ecological justice practices of uBuntu, like the Ethiopian, are a triune conception of reality contingent on the dynamic interaction between three conceptions and spaces of power:

- uBuntu – is a human, or ‘thing’, possessing consciousness, body and intelligence, and is actual in relation to all subject-positions (I and I);
- umBheko – is a fusion of meanings signifying ‘respect’, contained within the synthesis are ‘recognition’ and ‘acknowledgement’;
- uXolo – means ‘peace’, ‘apology’ and the active signification of responsibility, i.e. the ability to respond.

Energy, life-force, intelligence, and/or power flows between these spaces of meaning and power forming the episteme through which social and ecological justice is realised. I and I moderate behaviour, restrain self, and channel intelligence through these signifiers in relation to all things. Energy, power, intelligence – its movement and flow – are what life is, and as umntu, one is both source and channel of power towards manifesting reality and life. Thoughts, words and deeds are how energy/power are channeled in the fundamental dance of relationality to life. Because we are life, we affect and effect life, we are therefore one at the macro-conception with all of life, and at a more contained level, or layer, with all people. What I am, you are, what he, she, and I and I and I and I are we (see chapter 5).

Power flow is contingent on umbheko. If the flow of energy is not respected, if the humanity of one is not respected, if a person’s sentience of being are not recognised and acknowledged, none are respected. Without respect, uBuntu (humanity) is undermined and compromised manifesting suppression, repression and oppression.
Where there is respect there is uXolo and harmony. Where there is peace it means people, from the individual to the collective assume the ability to respond, and allow energy/power to move fluidly from 'self', amongst, and with 'self'(s), and all other layers and spaces of power, for collective-self. uXolo also means apology, signifying the ability to ask forgiveness (stand publicly accountable) if one’s thoughts, words, or actions create harm, for harm of one is harm of all.

Where there is fluidity of movement, a cycle and season of inyala (‘sufficiency' and ‘abundance’) is experienced. Where there is abundance, justice is served. Where there is non-abundance (poverty or lack), it means ‘self’ compromised what it means to be ‘self’: ndigumnyala (‘I am sufficient unto myself’). This compromise manifests injustice, for the consequences of not adhering to the triune ontological reality means in not serving interests of sufficiency, insufficiency has been created; insufficiency means social and ecological justice has not been served; I and I, incorrectly and deceitfully, became I and not-I, or ‘other’, competing for energy instead of collaborating towards its equitable distribution.

This should clarify deficit discourses concerning ‘the individual’ in African epistemologies. Independence is strongly encouraged, individuals (I) exist and must be respected, however maturation or evolution of conscious experience, comes through realising what it means to be human: I is always I in relation to I (see Okot p'Bitek 1985: 73). Effectively it is a social practice of self-reliance that cares for self to enable ‘autonomy’ and independence (freedom) in relation to all selves; that is, I do not create insufficiency (need) in I, to depend on I (you), dis-effecting the balance of the whole, this is considered pathological and self-destructive. uBuntu as conscious experience, relies on knowing discrimination and discernment, instructed through: bamabusenyameni lam, ndikakhurhazukhe ukuphe, kodwa kusegazini lam, andingakohlula, ‘if your power was only in my flesh, I could tear you out, but you are in my blood-truth, which can never be divided'.

The triune ontological episteme of Arabic peoples is encapsulated in the following image-as-word:

Figure 4.1. Sin–Lam–Mim (San Oo Aung 2008).
Shades of humanity

For Adedeji, Pliny the Elder’s comment has under the ‘cultivation of self’ of the last 500 years, come to signify “Africa has open veins” (2007b: 40). This unappeased blood-flow draining the continent is not due to ‘universal reason’, but technologies-of-power enabling pathologically terrifying violence and barbarity: slavery, military defeat, genocide, pandemic plagues, partition, colonialism, dependence, economic exploitation, dispossession, psychic vampirism, bio-piracy, rape, addiction, racism, sexism, classism, apartheid, starvation, blood diamonds ad nauseam (ibid; Bond 2004d, 2005a, 2006: 2, 2007a). What Nkrumah termed “malignant schizophrenia” as a result of separating Africans from their ontological realism, “racks society” (1964: 81). The amasi bird has been “cut up in the palaces” (Sitas 2004: 3) in support of a process Bond terms ‘Looting Africa’: “looting is a system driven from capitalist institutions in Washington, London and other Northern centres, and accommodated by junior partners across the Third World, including African capitals, especially [Tshwane]” (Bond 2006: xiii). Africa’s place-in-the-world – an ‘enlightened’ West’s ‘order of things’, which is, due to an effective ‘looting’ of ‘our-story’ to support their grand-cultivation-of-self-narrative – has been constructed as a deficit discourse. The world is “dripping” in “Africa talk,” writes Ferguson,

both on the continent and off [that has] a certain intensity, full of anguished energy and (often vague moral concern). When we hear about “Africa” today it is usually in urgent and troubled tones. It is never just Africa, but always ‘the crisis in Africa’, the ‘problems of Africa’, the ‘failure of Africa’, the ‘moral challenge of Africa’ to the “international community”, even (in Blair’s memorable phrase) Africa as “a scar on the conscience of the world” (2006: 2).

Clearly ‘our-story’ is that of radical ‘other’ to ‘his-story’ at the centre of the action and the universe. As Mbembe sees it, “Africa as an idea, a concept, has historically served, and continues to serve, as a polemical argument for the West’s desperate desire to assert its difference from the rest of the world” (2001: 2). Remembering Hegel, Mbembe reminds us that the idea of Africa is seeded in Western epistemologies and imaginations as a metaphor of “an absent object”, a “dark continent” in relation to the illuminating white brightness of the full ‘civilising’ presence of the West (ibid). Today, for all that has supposedly changed since the halcyon days of independence from the colonial experience, Mudimbe’s (1988) “invention of Africa” persists: an example of the failure to globalise says the IMF; a “global ghetto abandoned by capitalism” writes geographer Smith (1997); a continent of “wasted lives” useless to the capitalist economy laments Bauman (2004); the “black hole of the information society” insists Castells (2000).

Drained of ‘things’ vital, human, real and actual, indeed: “Even the World Bank was
compelled to confess in mid-2005 that Africa is being continually drained of wealth through depletion of minerals, forests and other eco-social factors ignored by [SA Finance Minister] Manuel and mainstream economists” (Bond 2006:5). These categorisations rooted in a strong anti-realist position, have in their continual delusional pronouncement serving the purposes of a ‘cultivated self’, manifested as a reality for Africa’s people. Ferguson puts this well,

“Africa” [is] a category through which a “world” is structured – a category that (like all categories) is historically and socially constructed (indeed, in some sense arbitrary), but also a category that is “real”, that is imposed with force, that has a mandatory quality; a category within which, and according to which, people must live. [... A] vast, complicated, heterogeneous region of the planet has come to occupy a place-in-the-world called “Africa” that is nowadays nearly synonymous with failure and poverty. [What must be asked is] how that place-in-the-world functions in a wider categorical system and what this means for the way we understand an increasingly transnational political, economic and social “global order” (2006: 5).

Provocatively Mbembe asserts, “there is no description of Africa not involv[ing] destructive and mendacious functions” (2001: 241-242; see chapter 5). Western manifest images are constantly propagated and re-produced by especially, but not only, ‘cultivated’ ‘experts’ – scholars, politicians, media – working to keep this “geo-body” intact (Winichakul 1994; see Chomsky 1996; Mayer 2002). At the same time, every continental social actor, to degrees of conscious understanding of their own situation, endures; constructing strategies to improve or resist the weight of experience these propagated images produce. This counter-‘cultivation’ is also an imagined Africa where the longed for rank, status, and place-as-position – fuelling such a concept as an African Renaissance – is included in respected, just, and equal relation to the wider world. Mbembe observes, “the oscillation between the real and the imaginary, the imaginary realised and the real imagined, does not take place solely in writing. This interweaving also takes place in life” (2001: 241-242).

The manifest image of ‘the global’ in the globalising processes informing northern-centric common-sense realisms, evoke an image of a planetary network of connected points (see Ferguson 2006: chap. 1; Harvey 2005; Bond 2004b, 2004c, 2004d, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2006: 4). Africa’s place in this ‘network’ is, “so severely marginalised it is now at the periphery of the periphery of the world” (Adedeji 2007a: 1). Adedeji attributes this to "ever-recurring armed conflicts and civil wars [as well as t]he failure to deconstruct and reconstruct Africa’s inherited colonial economy exacerbat[ing] centuries-old dependence and dispossession” (ibid). Supporting this thesis, recent research of private capital flows to Africa, highlighted “negative perceptions of Africa are a major cause of under-investment” (Bhinda et al 1999: 72). These perceptions are not based on actual
realities occurring in particular places, articulated by honest media coverage, “even successful countries suffer from negative information about the continent as a whole: potential investors lump them together with other countries, as part of a continent that is considered not to be attractive” (ibid my emphasis). Findings indicated investors were “unable to distinguish among countries [tending] to attribute negative performance to the whole region” (1999: 55), and that, “[t]he basic rule for black Africa is to get your money back as soon as possible, or don’t do it. Who knows what’s going to happen next year?” (1999: 49). An ‘effective’ economic reading of ‘our-story’ is thus, “a vicious circle of poor information, low expectations, and low investment” (1999: 72). The authors clearly indicated, “if caution reduces investment in a given year, the resulting decline in productive capacity then fulfils their negative expectations, resulting in a low investment equilibrium” (1999: 49), and it is “complex investor perceptions rather than objective data” guiding investment decisions (1999: 15). The study speaks volumes regarding how (mis)representations and (mis)understandings of ontological and social realities shape and embed negative constructions in vicious cycles of lack, absence, exclusion, insufficiency, poverty, and dis-ease with powerful and far-reaching consequences. Adedeji says it poignantly:

Africa’s most serious mistake has been the separation of politics from economics. By so doing, the discipline of economics has been cut from its origins of political philosophy, and ethics has been deprived of its human dimension […] convey[ing a heartless] message that people are irrelevant. Instead, what counts are fine theories and technicalities – the marabouts, soothsayers, and latter day prophets of the development merchant system – rather than the holistic combination of the political, social, cultural, psychological, [discursive] and institutional factors (2007b: 40-41).

A review of recent literature indicates the consequential power, and mandatory force of regional categorisations in relation to ‘the cultivated self’, and how Africa has acquired distinctive contemporary meanings, in distinctly negative terms as ‘failing’ to perform what it is ‘supposed’ to be performing, according to northern-centered socio-political-economic norms imposing epistemological realisms over existence and reality (Bond 2004c, 2004d, 2005a, 2006, 2007a). Equally clear, is how thirty years of neoliberal, capitalist restructuring has tightly constricted the global economy maintaining the colonial “Africa of labour reserves” – producer of raw materials specifically minerals, cheap labour, and an ‘emerging market’ of opportunistic exploitation (Mamdani 1996: 8; Bond 2005a; Harvey 2005; Ferguson 2006). Structural adjustments (SAPs) have exacerbated what Mamdani terms the “bifurcated state” maintaining stark categorisations between urban and rural social actors at all levels of stratification (1996: 9). Endemic poverty is not only not improving but actually getting worse: “consider[ing]
the most banal measure of poverty, most sub-Saharan countries suffered an increase in 
the percentage of people with income of less than US$1/day during the 1980s and 
1990s, the World Bank itself concedes. […] Even more worrying evidence (also from the 
Bank) regard[s] the depletion of Africa’s raw materials, and the implications for the 
continent’s declining net national income and savings (Bond 2006:2; World Bank 2005: 
66; see Reddy 2005; Bush 2007). HIV/AIDS statistics (66 percent of the world, some 25 
million people) are so appalling one cannot overstate the tragedy to the continent and 

Arrighi names Africa’s economic reality “the African tragedy” noting from the mid-
1970s African economies suffered “a true collapse – a plunge followed by continuing 
decline in the 1980s and 1990s” (2002: 16; see chapter 5). Citing statistics indicating 
sub-Saharan regional per capita GNPs standing at 17.6 percent of the world average in 
1975 had dropped to 10.5 percent by 1999 severely effecting “health, mortality and 
adult-literacy levels [which] deteriorated at comparable rates” (2002: 5; see Bond, 
2007a). Africa’s reality has “disastrous consequences not only for the welfare of its 
people but also for their status in the world at large” (Arrighi 2002: 17). van de Walle, 
writing from a very different theoretical and political position to Arrighi and Bond, 
substantiates Africa’s “progressive marginalisation from the world economy” (2001: 5), 
indicating the average African national GNP per capita shrunk between 1970 and 1998, 
position in global economic activity as “small and declining”; the continent accounts for 
10 percent of the world’s population, but a mere 1.1 percent of world GDP, and 0.6 
percent of world FDI (2001: 5-6). In response to Africa’s declining world trade share, 
George remarked, “one can almost hear the sound of sub-Saharan Africa sliding off the 
world map” (1993: 66).

Clapham (1999) talks of ‘hollowed out’ bureaucratic states due to political elites 
capitalising on insecure, violent conditions increasingly entrenching what Reno (1999) 
terms ‘warlord politics’. No African social actor denies the experienced megalomania 
constructing social practices of personal rule, clientelism, and corruption, nor increasing 
inability and unwillingness to provide basic level infrastructure, social services, and 
public order by ‘weak’ or ‘fragile’ African states. Self evidently rather than impose law or 
ideology, some African rulers have secured a niche in the global economy through 
organised illegality – termed “the criminalisation of the state in Africa” by Bayart, Ellis, 
“based upon relationships of loyalty and dependence with a blurred distinction between
private and public” driving “well-meaning NGOs and charity proponents” to increase “African integration into imperial circuits of trade, aid, finance and investment, citing state corruption as the major impediment to this cure-all” is however, unbelievably blinkered and one-sided (Bond 2006: 4). These phenomena are not specific and ‘indigenous’ to Africa, but crude models of constructed hierarchies of a ‘liberal’ global elite (Pilger 2008b).

Pronouncements, assuming ‘authority’, enable performative mechanisms of reality into being, ensuring what Mbembe has pointedly observed as the propagation of “nearly everything that African states, societies and economics are not, while telling us little or nothing about what they actually are” (2001: 9 author’s emphasis). Adedeji adds, “[p]erversely Africa [is] viewed by these neo-liberal fundamentalists […] to be a tabula rasa, having no culture, moral values and ethical principles of its own […] needing to rely hook, line, and sinker on the cultures, values, and ethics of western societies. This lack of development respect[ing] the nature and dynamics of existing African political economy has resulted in many failures in the last five decades” (2007b: 41). The view of the ‘other’ – the voices of the shades speaking through the African subaltern – rejecting and refusing what Padayachee et al call the “hazardous […] epistemological mimicry [of the] functional and neo-functional [model] that has its roots in the colonial era” adopted by African elites (2006: 15-17), or what Bond voices as, “African rulers keep their people poor because they are tied into a system of global power, accumulation and class struggle” (2006: 4) – is what is missing entirely. As Rodney clarified:

Because of the superficiality of many approaches to ‘underdevelopment’, and because of resulting misconceptions, it is necessary to emphasise ‘development’ and ‘under-development’ are not only comparative terms, but have a dialectical relationship; that is the two produce each other through their interaction. […] The ‘developed’ and ‘under-developed’ parts of the present capitalist [cultivated ‘self’ project] have been in continuous contact for [twenty] centuries. […]

The question as to whom and what is responsible for African under-development can be answered at two levels. Firstly, the answer is that the operation of the imperialist system bears major responsibility for African economic retardation by draining African wealth and by making it impossible to develop more rapidly the resources of the continent. Secondly, one has to deal with those who manipulate the system and those who are either agents or unwitting accomplices of the said system (1972: 84-86).

Rodney’s research, greatly substantiated by Bond (2006), indicates Africa has been looted along two trajectories: South–North resource drains now termed ‘global apartheid’; and constructing an African class-system (in every way contrary to uBuntu) re-producing “global apartheid’s local agents” (2006: 5), what Fanon named “compradors”, whose “historic mission is that of intermediary. [A] mission [having] nothing to do with transforming the nation: it consists, prosaically, of being the
transmission line between the nation and a capitalism, rampant though camouflaged” (1963: 122). “In the former case,” writes Bond, “the central processes are associated with exploitative debt and finance, phantom aid, capital flight, the brain drain, unfair trade, distorted investment and the ecological debt the North owes the South, in the context of profoundly undemocratic global power relations” (2006: 5-6). Harvey indicates these relations are not only “undemocratic”, but “anti-democratic” (2005: 11; see chapter 5).

As Foucault exposed, modernity’s ‘juridical-epistemologico-complex’ of neo-liberal reforms were supposed to bring African states and economies into line with a ‘cultivated self’: a ‘rational’, ‘standard’, ‘global’, ‘norm’28. However, emerging from the structural-adjustment era is an Africa more different than ever from the delusional projected fantasy of this ‘norm’. In ‘cultivated’ eyes we are more of a ‘problem’ than ever before. “Africa’s participation in ‘globalization’” writes Ferguson, has certainly not been a matter simply of ‘joining the world economy’; perversely, it has instead been a matter of highly selective and spatially encapsulated forms of global connection combined with widespread disconnection and exclusion. Any attempt to understand the position in the world that is Africa must take into account both its bleak political economic predicament and its broader implications with respect to Africa’s “rank” in an imagined (and real) “world”. That a purportedly universalizing movement of “globalization” should have the effect of rendering Africa once again “dark” in the eyes of the wider world suggests the intimate link, in this respect, between the question of economic marginalization in a global economy and that of membership in a global society (2006: 14).

Jung’s archetypal shadow (drawn from African beliefs of Mshologu, and Ka) is not hard to avoid, especially in ‘otherising’ constructions of Africa by the ‘cultivation of self’ project. Africa’s ‘shadow economies’ emerging from ‘informal sectors’ where ‘un-official’ goods and services are traded on ‘black markets’ is larger than the ‘formal economy’. Regarding elite compradors, Mazrui stated Africans have borrowed “the shadow, not the substance” of a Western capitalist economy (cited in Ferguson 2006: 15). Reno (1999) argues the idea of “shadow states” to deal with adoption of not the ‘bureaucratic form’ that in every case is still the relic of the colonial era, but the complex network of state-private concealed alliances with local power brokers, warlords, arms deals, and multinational corporations. Nordström (2001) has written an ‘ethnography of the shadows’ exploring international trade networks emerging in African war zones. Duffield (2001) unlocks a window on civil conflict and its “shadow networks”, and private security forces and mercenaries so prominent in continental conflicts are termed “shadow armies” and “shadow soldiers” by international media (New York Times 2004). Ferguson (2006) has entitled his book about Africa’s-place-as-absence-in-the-neo-liberal-order:
Global Shadows, alluding to there being more to prevailing “shadow” metaphors than the obvious analogies highlighted, but a depth illuminated in the explanation of Ka. Modernity’s ‘twin’, the ‘human-subject’, and structurally violent conditions forming it emerge here. Ka – a shadow – is not merely an empty likeness of the ‘human’ form, there is an inseparable bond and relationship, a connection, proximity, and equivalence, a conscience, articulating and governing I and I’s identities in relation to it. Ferguson says it well, “[a] shadow, […] is not simply a negative space of absence, it is […] an inseparable other-who-is-also-oneself to whom one is bound”, the sum-total of all I and I’s mis-deeds (2006:17).

Conclusion

It is, as this chapter has extrapolated in a brief ‘effective our-story’ time for Africa to emulate our star with the black hole. The black hole is not, nor ever has been, ‘Africa’ from which ‘eternal new ‘things’ and lifeblood flow’. Rather, the black hole with its “triumphalist weight” is the infinite density of material accumulation rendering itself as the one-and-only-truth through imposed historical constructions and categorisations, trapping the innately balanced flow of life. Emerging from its magnetic gravitational pull, a process Hobsbawm (2008) recently termed “capitalism in convulsions”, and Pilger (2008c) calls the smoking ruin of neoliberalism, is Fanon’s consciously experienced “absolute violence” (1963: 29). The light stream of ‘pure intelligence’ making it through the gargantuan transformation of de-colonisation can only be the social and ecological justice practices of uBuntu: survival of this (and all) species depends upon it. Harvey advises,

US leaders have, with considerable public support, projected upon the world in general the idea that [Anglo-]American neo-liberal values are universal and supreme, and that such values matter since they are the heart of what civilization is about. The world is [now] in a position to reject that imperialist gesture and refract back into the heartland of neo-liberal capitalism and neo-conservatism a completely different set of values: those of an open democracy dedicated to the achievement of social equality coupled with economic, political and cultural justice (2005: 51).

As such, it is as Adedeji says, time to “bring the people back in” (2007a: 1).
THE WAY WE LOVE

by LeboGang Mashile

Being African is
Being part of an unseen force
That speaks to the mind
That created the earth
It is the knowledge
That when I speak to myself
I speak to the beginnings and endings
Of the world
So when we love
We love with the power of lifetimes
Reaching towards the infinite
We love with the fear that the darkness in our hearts
Overshadows our light
We love through mutated eyes and arms
That stretch into the soil
To remember themselves
Love is held together by fragile hopes
That forge a path on the forgiving earth
When she bears fruit
It is with the promise
That she will never let me forget
The makings of me
CHAPTER FIVE
THE PHILOSOPHER KING, QUANTUM REALITY, AND A CENTURY OF THE SELF

The madman was truly dangerous. He had to be strapped up and have his tongue rubbed with bitter herbs. Can you believe it? He walked around the paths asking for money or goods in exchange for … yes, you guessed it: AIR! He even hit people over the head with a stick, accusing them of crossing his boundary and breathing his air without permission. ‘You there,’ he would shout, ‘Stop breathing now.’ And if the poor soul, too surprised to know how to respond, took a deep breath, his stick would do some dancing on the head, the shoulders, and the backside. At least now, all tied up and silent, he can let us sleep. We can even walk around without being harassed. What is this world coming to? We ask one another: can you imagine what the world would come to if people started selling the ground we live on, selling rain, the water, the ponds, selling the twigs and stones that make up fire?

Can you imagine, three heads of cattle for some rain?

Introduction:

An article by Pilger entitled The Downfall of Mbeki: The Hidden Truth appeared in The Mail and Guardian in October 2008, succinctly elucidating the final conjuncture in this ‘effective our-story’, in it he said:

The political rupture in South Africa is being presented in the outside world as the personal tragedy and humiliation of one man, Thabo Mbeki. It is reminiscent of the beatification of Nelson Mandela at the death of apartheid. […] This is not to diminish the power of personalities, but their importance is often as a distraction from the historical forces they serve and manage. Mbeki’s fall and the collapse of Wall Street are concurrent and related events, as they were predictable (2008c: 1).

He is alluding to the technologies-of-power this dissertation has sought to expose, and how Mandela came to be theorised as the last ‘great-man theory’ constructed by, and confronting modernity’s ‘grand-narrative’ symbolising humanism’s shadow side, the denial of which is actually that which is anti-humanistic. Far from “diminishing the[ir] power”, and personal stories of resistance to oppression, it is to clarify it in truth-like terms of verisimilitude in relation to socio-economic and cultural contexts catalysing and shaping the theory and narrative into being.

Mandela’s advocation of a re-turn to the justice practices of uBuntu synchronistically co-incided with the emergence of Laclau, and Mouffe’s concept of radical democratic citizenship circa 1993. This participatory democratic model extrapolated from the global civil society movements rooted in the liberation struggles of South Africa, Africa, Ireland, Latin America and Central Europe from the 1960s onwards forcefully addresses re-turning political agency and authority of self, from state/elite control to self in relation with collectives of ‘self’.

Radical democratic citizenship

In Mouffe’s analysis, this is “an articulating principle affect[ing] different subject-positions of the social agent […] while allowing for plurality of specific allegiances and respect of individual liberty” (1993: 235 my emphasis). Radical democracy is contingent
on “collective forms of identification among democratic demands found in a variety of movements” – women, workers, black, gay, ecological, etc. Commonly identifying with a radical democratic interpretation of the principles of liberty and equality, towards egalitarian social practices, a ‘we’ is constructed: “a chain of equivalence among demands so as to articulate them through the principle of democratic equivalence” (ibid; see later). Consequently, not all social interests are granted gravity by this governance, only those magnifying specific values centered on the pursuit of liberty and equality, their realisation and respect. Social actors are therefore democratic, only to the extent they align themselves with integrity in manifesting these as conscious experience.

Laclau contributes, “social and political demands are discrete in the sense that each of them does not necessarily involve the others”, however the view, “they can be politically met only through a gradualist process of isolating and dealing with them one by one” is odious (2000: 197 author’s emphasis). He argues universality as an emancipatory discourse is effected into being by dynamic interactions between social actors and their demands (I and I). Critical, is how discursive power is engaged “providing that element of universality mak[ing] possible the establishment of equivalential links” through meaning making (2000: 209). Radical democratic discourses link particular demands in a universal pattern of “hegemonic articulation” (ibid), departing from meta-narratives proclaiming universal validity by forcing particularities to conform within boundaries of a narrative, to indicate universality can only emerge “through an equivalence between particularities, and such equivalences are always contingent and context-dependent” (2000: 211). Consequently, no inherent logic unites political and social demands out of context, and no valid universal logic of emancipation – radical democracy, or socialism – can determine correct balances apart from particular, contextual, historical, circumstantial, realities of actors, I and I.

Returning to Pilger, while ‘great men’ from the imperial epoch like Mandela, King, Guevara, Gandhi, Malcolm X, Jesus, Biko, Mohammed, Lumumba exist(ed) and are great, they are/were voice(s) articulating the sentiments for hundreds of thousands of voice-less ‘others.’ They do/did not stand alone and separate as ‘great individuals’, modernity’s agentic human subject, but their ‘standing out from’ the dismissively-labelled ‘masses’ to ‘lead them to a promised land’ is a liberal construction. They were simply orators, imbongi, griots, performative-actors voicing collective sites of pain, courage, and integrity to integrate a cacophony of disparate voices needing to be articulated, and above all heard, serving the interests of social justice in the dramaturgy of constructed social injustices established by the ‘cultivation of self’ project. Mandela’s conscious
humility of his construction by the context, as well as advocating uBuntu with its I and I relational practice was actually African demo-cracy (together-rule) manifesting universally: all people are ‘great’, and magnificence is articulated by integrity of action to constituting the ‘greatness’ of all people – as actual.

Chapter outline

This chapter focuses on four key texts, ‘effective-stories’ in their own right: Curtis’ four-hour documentary, The Century of the Self powerfully challenges the supremacy of the western liberal “free self” constructed as the “ultimate expression of democracy” (2004:1st). Spanning 100 years, Curtis traces scene-for-scene how present reality was constructed creating connaissance from savoir, serving very specific elite political economic interests. Specific knowledges that emerged shaping reality are public relations discourses, which manipulate knowledges generated by social research to blatantly cultivate a so-called ‘free’ self that is, actually, subjected to and by marketing practices generating elite profit, and maintaining class structures and disempowering relations.

Zapiro30 dubbed Mbeki ‘the philosopher-king’, capturing his intent behind his ‘progressive’ African Renaissance Agenda. Plato, the original philosopher-king transformed traditional philosophy where ontological realisms informed the other varieties, by merging ontological and epistemological realisms, fundamentally re-constructing reality, cognitive functioning, and how realities are perceived, in order for ‘care of the self’ to become ‘cultivation of the self’. Fanon’s Warning (2005a) co-authored by Bond and various African civil society representatives penetratingly critiques NEPAD, the ‘public’ policy constructed to launch Mbeki’s ‘Agenda’, which enforces and entrenches neo-liberal power-techniques.31 This section re-presents Mbeki and his personal ‘renaissance’ vision, not as critique, but in light of substantial evidence, as a citadel of error. Legitimate ‘recovery’ of Africa’s ‘self’ must emerge, first and foremost, from African ontological epistemes, serving African interests, not through entrenching ‘liberal democracy’ – Century of the Self exposes as blatant propaganda – into African consciousness to re-produce particular conscious experiences as social practices in perpetual disequilibria.

The chapter ends with the inspiring What the bleep do we know? A collective of quantum physicists extend scientific knowledges as documentary-narratives to interrogate the realism dialectic, and what it means at the stratified levels of reality, to be a human being. I re-present this together with Nkrumah’s Consciencism (1964), detailing the intellectual strategy required of Africans to constitute integration emerging from, by,
for and with Africans as an actual phenomenon. Quantum physics, which Nkrumah uses as his scientific verification, is the ‘new’ science emerging to address realities as spaces of power felt. It is the science of ubuntu inspiring radical democratic narratives of socio-social justice, and supporting ‘effective our-stories’ re-turning to ontologically real care of self-in-relation-to-self as fundamental to life sustaining life, so humanity may actually develop – socially, politically, economically, spiritually, emotionally, intellectually, physically, and ethically.

A century of self

“This is the story of the rise of an idea dominat[ing] our society; the belief that the satisfaction of individual feelings and desires is our highest priority,” begins part 4 of Curtis’ narrative (2002:4th). A British talk show host then announces, “today we’re going to tell you how to get whatever you want!” Next a celebrity miserably confesses, “I want to live a different life, you know, in the image that wasn’t available to the one in which I was born” (ibid). Previous parts elaborated how the idea of a ‘cultivated’ self became the special project of big business to intentionally construct an age of ‘mass-democracy’. It is the story of how corporate America and the CIA exploited Freud’s ideas of human ‘nature’, because of how his daughter Anna, and nephew Edward Bernays, re-presented and manipulated these theories, developing techniques to read and fulfill individuals’ inner desires with products. These violently imposed technologies-of-power became embedded in a mentally colonising socialisation process determining the ‘normal’, and ‘natural’ categories of the ‘human’ subject. Anna and Bernays’ direct interventions included:

- Abuse of emerging democratic Guatemalan social processes, assassination and murder, to protect US United Fruit Company (see also Pilger 2007);
- Anti-humanist constructions of blacks, gays and women as “maladjusted” to psychological normalisation projects (see also Fanon 1968; Said 2003b); and
- The entire impetus behind the ‘Cold War’ morphing into the ‘War on Terror’ (Curtis 2002:1st-3rd).

Part four clarifies how the idea colonised politics, and politicians on the Anglo-American ‘left’ uncritically practiced naïve realism ‘believing’ they were “creating a new and better form of democracy, that truly responded to the inner feelings of individuals” (Curtis 2002: 4th). The intent of those constructing these techniques, however, were not to emancipate social actors but to develop an insidious ‘new’ way of controlling us in a ‘post’-conflict age of ‘mass democracy’.

This conjuncture’s roots lie in 1920s America, when Bernays, fascinated by his uncle’s theory of human behaviour driven by unconscious sexual and aggressive drives,
invented public relations (PR) discourse. He explained to corporations more products would be sold by semantically linking them to unconscious desires, in effect, as PR-historian Ewen states, he sold them a strategy of ‘hegemonic articulation’ sustaining elite-class control:

[p]eople look[ed] at goods that were emerging within this society, and not merely viewed them as things that they needed in order to deal with some specific material want, but also as goods that would stroke, and evoke deep emotional yearnings. So how, this ‘bar of soap’, or this ‘bag of flour’ would make you a happier, more successful, more sexually appealing, less fearful person – somebody to be admired, rather than reviled. The powerful people in that world are those people capable of reading the public mind, and giving the public what it wants in those terms. Bernays was the guy who was the foremost articulator of the theories, which would drive this new system (2002: 4th).

By 1980, vast industries wielding Foucault’s technologies-of-power had developed devoted to manipulating consumers’ inner desires. At its heart was the exploitation of a method invented by psychoanalysts employed by US corporations – the focus group (2002: 2nd-3rd). Consumers were ‘allowed’ to express their innermost feelings and needs like patients of psychoanalysis without the stigma of ‘mal-adjustment’, but as participants in the ‘creative’ processes of ‘new products’, designed with the emerging information to fulfill that caveat of desire (2004: 4th).

Surprisingly this ‘new’ technique also conquered Britain. Deeply entrenched ruling elites had always mistrusted the idea of “pandering to the masses” epitomised by “the patrician elite who ran the BBC,” calling popular programmes “ground bait” as their “real job” was to “lure the viewers into watching the more serious programmes, the elite knew was good for them” (ibid). Market research categorised social actors according to social class, from A to C and through D and E, and the idea of asking lower classes what they desired and then giving that to them would fundamentally challenge and undermine the elite belief that they already knew what was best for the public. The 1970s economic crisis forced British industry to listen to consumer desires, and so the advertising industry brought in Americans to run focus groups on the more ‘vulnerable’ (sic) public: housewives (ibid). Synchronistically a politician, “who also believed the individual should become the central focus of society” rose out of the conservative ranks declaring at a Party Conference in 1975:

Some socialists believe people should be numbers in a state computer. We believe they should be individuals. We’re all unequal, no-one – thank heavens – is quite like anyone else, however much the socialists may pretend otherwise, and we believe everyone has the right to be unequal, but to us, every human being is equally important. A man’s right to work as he will, to spend what he earns, to own property, to have the state as servant, and not as master, they’re the essence of a free economy, and on that freedom, all our other freedoms depend (Thatcher 2002: 4th).
Thatcher’s vision of the ‘free market’ instantly gratifying the desires of millions of individuals as the regenerative energy to further cultivate Britain, utterly transformed the political-economic landscape. In this ‘new’ climate advertising industries mushroomed by delving ever deeper into the public’s innermost sanctuaries: their souls. Marketisation discourses constituted a new individualism particularly amongst conservative swing-voters (see Fairclough all). Business responded eagerly to this individualism, yearning to escape socio-economic categories: “I just want to be different to everyone else”; “I just want it to be of a different status to everyone else’s”; “you know, an individual yeah, just me” (2002: 4th). Focus group data fuelled the consumer boom as manufacturers created products ostensibly allowing people to express their ‘new’ individuality and identity. Maslow’s ‘hierarchy of needs’ was employed to re-categorise social actors no longer by class, but by inner psychological needs. Banks, an advertising executive elaborated: “if the primary need is security and belonging, we call them ‘mainstreamers’; if it’s status and the esteem of others, then its aspirers; if it’s control, it’s successors; and if it’s self esteem, it’s reformers” (ibid).

This culture colonised institutions previously dominated by the patrician elite, particularly the field of journalism (see Achbar et al 1992; Chomsky 1988). Leading the assault, were PR discourses:

In the past PR was seen as seedy and corrupt, but now it became a glamorous business promoting products and celebrities, and one of its leading stars was Matthew Freud, son of a liberal MP. He realised that they could use their celebrity clients to infiltrate advertising into the editorial content of newspapers. The newspapers were offered exclusive interviews with celebrities, only if they mentioned certain products, in terms dictated by the company (Curtis 2002: 4th).

By 1989 Thatcher and her media compradors had instigated the same transformation Reagan had manipulated in America: encouraging business to fulfill public needs rather than government, by encouraging consumers to see instant gratification as the overriding priority (2002: 2nd-3rd). Their discourse articulated this to be a ‘new’ and ‘better’ form of democracy, when effectively they were summoning and grounding the most selfish and greedy parts of human self-interest as conscious experience. Robert Reich33 elaborates:

Reagan and Thatcher both embraced an economic philosophy that was not only the individual, but it was the individual’s personal satisfaction, the individuals’ own unique happiness and well being; it was the triumph of the individual over other individuals of purely emotional beings who have needs and wants and desires that need to be satisfied, and can be satisfied – unconsciously. It goes way back to the early part of the twentieth century, to Freud, to notions of the unconscious, to assumptions, that we are (in terms of our rational minds) little corks bobbing around on this great sea of hopes and fears and desires that we are only dimly aware. But the role of the marketer, the role of somebody selling someone – including a politician – is to appeal to this great swamp of unconscious desire (2002:4th).
Cuomo\textsuperscript{34} adds, “the worst thing Reagan did for the world, was to make the denial of compassion respectable. He said, ‘you’ve worked hard, you’ve made your money, you shouldn’t have to feel guilty about refusing to throw it away on people who choose to be homeless, who choose not to work’. That’s what he said, and he said it with an elegance and a kind of benign aspect which disguised its harshness” (2002: 4\textsuperscript{th}).

Thatcher’s meteoric rise effected a crisis in Labour who assumed a return to power meant embracing the doctrine of individualism. Advertising guru Gould commissioned the ubiquitous focus groups on swing-voters across suburbia for Labour, not to investigate policy responses, but to reveal their underlying desires. This research indicated a fundamental shift in actors’ relationship to politics had ensued: The performative act of allowing individuals to be ‘free’ of ‘class’ structures and strictures had severed the need ‘to belong’ to any ‘groups’, establishing a culture of entitlement that made demands of politicians in return for paying taxes. ‘Citizen’ now meant ‘model subject’ of the business-school of ideal consumption. Gould explained the mechanisms constructing “the new aspirational classes” to Labour, who refused to compromise the values they served, so he left to work for Clinton who tailored campaign policies to emerging information from his focus groups. Clinton’s “forgotten middle class”, to be taxed only for things benefiting them, not for the welfare of others, played the central role in extremely reactive politics. Reich remarked,

Presidential candidates in the US had been pre-packaged and designed for many years, what was new was the attempt to use very pseudo-sophisticated techniques, to plum the public psychology to find out exactly what the desires of the individuals were, and then to come up with a candidate and a platform, and images and words, that exactly responded with those deep desires. This was packaging at a fundamentally new level, this was extreme (2002: 4\textsuperscript{th}).

Rather than confront the actual – they were capitulating to nascent middle-class ego-self-interest – Clinton chose to believe ‘tax cuts’ were the price of regaining power and a return to traditional social welfare provision, specifically providing universal health care to counteract the vast inequalities effected by the Reagan regime would ensue post-victory. Wealth-tax and cutting defence spending would achieve this vision. The Clinton administration however, inherited a budget deficit of $300 billion, and informed that borrowing against this would panic the markets causing a global crisis. To deliver on campaign promises public spending was cut in defence and welfare, but when Clinton tried to appeal to his electorate through the traditional values of the US left, individualism was too deeply entrenched, and they reacted by swinging their vote so he lost control of congress.
Morris subsequently became Clinton’s strategy advisor from 1994 – 1996, warning crucial swing voters – suburban consumers – were immune to ideology and would only respond to politics presented as a *form* of consumer business:

The most important thing for [Clinton] to do was to bring to the political system, the same consumer rules and philosophy the business community has. I think politics needs to be as responsive to the whims and desires of the market place, as business is, and needs to be as sensitive to the bottom line – profits or votes – as business is. I think all of this involves a changed view of the voters. Instead of treating them as targets, you treat them as owners, instead of treating them as something you can manipulate, you treat them as something that you can learn from, and instead of feeling that you can stay in one place and manipulate the voters, you need to learn what they want, and move yourself to accommodate them (2002: 4th).

Morris bought ‘lifestyle marketing’ into politics, commissioning a “neuro-personality poll” from research companies to “get into [voter] heads” (*ibid*). This survey of hundreds of thousands of voters asked a single ‘political’ question – were they a swing-voter? – amongst many intimate psychological ones designed to identify ‘types’, later categorised and identified according to “security of lifestyle” (*ibid*). Consequently, Clinton re-drafted all policies in response to swing-voter anxiety, causing Reich to comment:

> The people who ultimately got to the president shap[ing his] mind were those who viewed the voters as just a collection of desires [needing] to be catered and pandered to. It suggests democracy is nothing more, and should be nothing more, than pandering to these unthought-of or about, and very primitive desires. Primitive in the sense that they are not necessarily even conscious, just what people want in terms of satisfying [emotional hunger] (2002: 4th).

This “politics of the self” emerged in Britain under Blair’s leadership of Labour in 1994, and Gould’s “new aspirational classes’” desires shaped all policy (*ibid*). “Law and order is a Labour issue today,” Blair intoned responding to nameless suburbanite desires craving acknowledgement in equally nameless focus groups, “we want people to consume *more*, to have the good things of life, and we want them to pay less taxes”, he continued echoing others (*ibid*). Like their US predecessors, Labour was ‘forced’ to cut loose policies not catering directly to swing-voters, sacrificing fundamental party principles. “The commitment to public industry,” enshrined as clause four in its constitution, “to use the collective power of the people to challenge the unfettered power of greed of business” was dropped (*ibid*). Labour faced the individual power of voters no longer feeling exploited by the free market, but gratified and given an identity as consumer, by what business delivered them. Blair’s new constitutional clause promised to let the free market flourish. Draper explained,

what ‘new’ Labour did, was [re-shape itself to] suit people in society who get power not through the political system – or not through the *democratic* political system. So it suits big business, and the status quo. What happens is that big business carry on exerting power, and behind the scenes getting their way, because behind the scenes there’s no counter-power exerting pressure (2002: 4th).
Those who master-minded ‘new’ Labour’s victory in 1997 however, saw their triumph as a vindication of the ‘new’ democracy: by understanding and fulfilling individuals’ desires, these actors were being given the great gift of empowerment by a government who no longer imposed the elitist idea that they knew best upon them. As Blair declared (not so subtly echoing Thatcher): “What the people give, the people can take away. We are the servants, they are the masters now” (2002: 4th).

We are approaching the futurama informs a frame displaying America from the thirties. “In 1939, Bernays, Freud’s nephew, created a vision of a future world, in which the consumer was king. It was at the world’s fair in New York. Bernays called it ‘Democracy’” (Curtis 2002:4th). It was the earliest and most dramatic manifest-image of a consumerist ‘democracy’, projecting how business and the free market fulfilled every individual need and desire. Ewen elaborates:

The world’s fair created a spectacle in which all of these concerns were met, and General Motors, and the American Cash Register Company met them. Company after company presented itself as the centrepiece of a society where human desire, human anxiety, and human want would all be responded to. It would all be met purely through the free enterprise system. There was this notion that the free market was not guided by ideologies, or by political power, it was guided simply by peoples’ will (2002: 4th).

A century later, the left bought into this so-called ‘democratic’ model accepting Bernays’ claim it “was a better form of democracy”; however “the world’s fair, had been an elaborate piece of propaganda designed for his clients, the giant American corporations” (Curtis 2002: 4th). Bernays never believed that democracy could truly work, and his uncle Freud’s theories that humans were driven by primitive unconscious desires and feelings, led to he and Anna Freud advocating that it was too dangerous to ever let ‘the masses’ control their own lives. While she worked for the CIA, Bernays gave “people the illusion of control, through consumerism, while a responsible elite continued managing society” (ibid). People are now conditioned by this propaganda: “they took at face value, the ideas promoted by big business that the systems invented to read the consumer’s mind, could form the basis for a new type of democracy” (ibid). Attempts to govern through Gould’s ‘effortless’, “continuous democracy” that works for business constantly re-producing itself, has led governments into a maze of contradictory whims, too capricious to build stable, progressive and developmental policies upon (ibid). The effects are unprecedented inequalities, and an utterly worn social fabric teetering atop a catastrophic environmental crisis. Governments have to now seriously appeal to social actors to imagine ‘self’ beyond the cultivated egoistic self-interest, and instant gratification conditioned to be ‘natural’ and
'normal'. This means fundamentally challenging the dominant Freudian view of humans as selfish, instinct driven individuals – a concept propagated by business whose tentacles-of-power reach deeply into universities, education, and media, because business produces ideal consumers.

**The philosopher king**

Gee tells us “the master myth of our 'civilised' society” is the literacy myth, “foundational to how we make sense of reality, though not necessarily an accurate reflection of that reality, nor does it necessarily lead to a just, equitable, and humane world” (1996: 26). Plato, a self-proclaimed revolutionary, invented the basis for Western literacy in opposition to his society’s traditional order respecting an ontological realism informing diverse epistemologies. *The Republic* discursively shapes a ‘perfect’ state into being, and contra- to the ‘care of the self’ social practices of his time, his ‘republic’ was authoritarian; grounded in a worldview that some individuals are born *naturally* suited for particular places in a *naturally* constituted hierarchy, with ‘philosopher-kings’ like him, at the top. People accessed positions in this perfect system by passing particular tests, but philosopher-kings innately knew best, and would govern in the interests of people as a result of knowing best (Gee 1996: 26-28).

Plato’s vision was sourced in his toxic envy for the great bard Homer, whose epic verses committed to memory were open works inspiring evocative interpretation by *listeners*. Audience imaginations and souls stimulated by the incandescence of the bard, refused to listen to Plato’s restrictive written dialogues. Writing, Plato was convinced, would establish a *personal authority* to words determining the status of philosopher-asking *over* that of oral storyteller (Gee 1996: 29-30). Not only is this myth the sponsoring idea behind socially constructed inequalities whereby today, Plato’s republic is manifest, but enter Mbeki the “pipe-smoking, Sussex University-trained economist, who writes his own speeches” and is also a self-proclaimed revolutionary renaissance man (Adebajo 2007b: 223; see Mbeki 1998b).

![Figure 5.1. The Philosopher King (Zapiro 2007).](image)
“When Mbeki talks of the ‘progressive’ African Agenda, he is referring to a wide range of measures to make democratic political systems, peace and security, and accelerated economic growth the basis of development in Africa” (Landsberg 2007b: 195). These measures to be established through the African Union (AU), the reform of Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and NEPAD. ‘Accelerated economic growth’ is to be achieved by integrating Africa into the global economy according to the precepts of ‘mutual responsibility’ and ‘mutual accountability’; both African states and international powers are obligated to realise the agenda’s policy goals (Landsberg 2004a).

In the here and now, this ‘agenda’ evokes incredible pathos. The actual African Renaissance is a very noble vision of re-covering and re-storing the African ‘self’ to an egalitarian position of respect, peace, and humanity contained in, and constituted by the radical democracy of uBuntu. Contrary to Mbeki being the intellectual architect, various collectively inspired reforms, ideas and visions became melded into the concept of an ‘African Renaissance’ in the 1930s, by Senegalese scientist, linguist, philosopher and writer, Cheikh Anta Diop who dedicated his life to charting the paths African development should take towards re-constituting “herself in her own image” (Makalela & Sistrunk 2002: 1). Fundamental, was the necessity for manifest images provided by intellectuals, artists and social actors to be spoken into being through indigenous languages constructing an ‘Africanist' discourse, key to shaping African integration and ‘re-birth’ authentically (2002: 2). With explicit reference to how semantic realism shapes ontological realism, Diop said, “[t]he development of our indigenous languages is the pre-requisite for a real African renaissance” (Diop 2000: 35). He consequently requested African linguists, intellectuals and policy makers to transform national languages to suit present day exigencies in order to re-construct discursive, social, organisational, and institutional structures emerging from an African ontology to inform a truly egalitarian epistemology and subsequent ideology (2000: 118). He called on all social actors to assume the ability to respond, unite and become conscious, “there exists a capitalist exploitation, which is the cause of all our misery, and which cannot stop without the total annihilation of colonialism” (2000: 48). Africanists have interpreted this re-construction of a socio-political-economic ideology as a call to solidarity to emancipate ourselves from insidious forms of neo-colonialism “masked through African elite groups and political leaders having an “[un]holy alliance” with [the] capitalist West (2000: 71).

Mbeki shouldered this vision as his own long before he returned from exile and became South Africa’s president in 1999. Paradoxically it is his triumph as well as his
hubris, and therein lies the pathos. Understanding this conjuncture requires deep sensitivity to the existing raw delicacies calling for deft handling of the implementation of any ‘thing’, especially a renaissance vision against a barbarically violent and painful colonial/apartheid his-story constituting the need for such a concept to begin with. At this level, identities, roles, and ‘self’ forcefully come into play: who you are, who you have been, who you want to be, and who you will become matter to the continental landscape.

Mudimbe – leading the Africanist deconstructionist school – casts a lens on ‘the invention of Africa’ focusing on how a landmass was carved up in Berlin by the colonial ‘powers’, using a map, a sharp pencil and a ruler. This active construction and appropriation of space led to all that passes for knowledge of Africa being a product of the Western episteme. The portions became states-with-boundaries-as-invented-by-Europeans serving particular colonial, economic, social and political interests, and exist today post-the-colonial-experience under the Rubicon of ‘failed’, ‘weak’ and ‘fragile’. The identity of each has not been constituted through the thoughts, words, and actions of the subaltern in their triumphant survival of destructive processes. Rather comprador elites and technologies-of-colonialism-imperialism-globalisation-power, “speak about neither Africa nor Africans, but justify the process of inventing and conquering a continent and naming its ‘primitiveness’ or ‘disorder’, as well as the subsequent means of its exploitation and methods for its ‘regeneration’” (Mudimbe 1988: 20).

South Africa’s identity in relation to the continental landscape as brutalising nation pre-1994, and nation-as-transformer post-1994, arouse tension and wariness in official, intellectual, and civil society spheres about its ‘messiah’ or ‘mercantilist’ intentions, neither of which are wanted nor needed (Landsberg 2007b; Adedeji 2007b; Bond 2004b, 2005a, 2005c, 2006). Like its 52 predecessors, South Africa embraced the democratic ‘transition’ of a neo-liberal orthodoxy rather than radical deconstruction and transformation, accordingly its social actors have highly conflicting epistemic intent, serving extremely opposing interests exacerbating eco-social dis-integration and fragmentation. Its economic power and history engender a degree of illegitimate arrogance amongst South Africans in relation to the rest of the continent, causing legitimate fear and resentment about it behaving like, and harbouring the ambitions of, a domineering hegemon (Adedeji 2007b: 21; Hudson 2007b; Matlosa 2007; Schoeman 2007; Landsberg 2007b). Additionally, South Africa has its own tensions about not pandering to Northern expectations to become “Africa’s policeman” (Landsberg 2007b: 195). However, rather than concentrate on local protests about the intense pain generated by neo-liberalism, “Mbeki and his colleagues claimed a unique noblesse
oblige, namely [Tshwane] would help bridge the gap between the world’s rich and poor” (Bond 2005a: 9; see also Bond 2003: chapters 8-12): “When we decided to address the critical question of the ANC as an agent of change, […] we sought to examine ourselves as an agent to end the apartheid legacy in our own country […] and] the question of what contribution we could make to the struggle to end apartheid globally” (Mbeki 2000). Mbeki however, engaged the continental landscape cautiously following the 1995 Nigerian ‘experience’:

> After the brutal hangings by General Sani Abacha’s regime of Nigerian activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, and eight of his fellow Ogoni campaigners […] in November 1995, a deeply betrayed Mandela called for […] oil sanctions on Nigeria, and [its] expulsion from the Commonwealth. This policy failed spectacularly to gain support, and South Africa found itself diplomatically isolated (Adedeji 2007b: 23).

Instead of calling on civil society spheres for solidarity and support, Mbeki, in true neo-liberal ‘best-practice’ style ‘exploited the opportunity’ by dint of what Bond terms his “impressive positionality [whereby] no other African ruler had such systematic influence at home and abroad” to build strategic partnerships with key African governments (2005a: 2 author’s emphasis). Working closely with Chissano and Guebuza of Mozambique, his closest friend Obasanjo of Nigeria, Bouteflika of Algeria, and Mkapa and Kikwete of Tanzania – all with deplorable human rights records – he systematically began grounding his pretentious personal plans for Africa’s renaissance (see Bond 2005a: 10 for details).

Chissano, Obasanjo and Mbeki closely coordinated their foreign policy strategies, “cajoling” Africa’s RECs – SADC, ECOWAS, and IGAD – to reform and streamline their work [to be] consistent with NEPAD and the AU” (Landsberg 2007b: 196; Adebajo & Landsberg 2003: 179). Central to Mbeki’s agenda was re-constructing Africa’s relationship to the geo-political North, a shift from ‘patronage’ to ‘partnership’. A strategy constituted by a neo-liberal discourse of incentive trade-offs; ‘good governance’ for greater integration into the international market “itself in need of better regulation and fairer economic rules” (Bond 2005a: 3; Landsberg 2007b). Bond emphasises an issue many documentary-makers highlight regarding the global elite; “their project is to reform interstate relations and the embryonic world-state system35 (2005a: 3). As NEPAD explains,

> While globalisation increased the cost of Africa’s ability to compete, we hold that the advantages of an effectively managed integration present the best prospects for future economic prosperity and poverty reduction […] The case for the role of national authorities and private institutions in guiding the globalisation agenda along a sustainable path and, therefore, one in which its benefits are more equally spread, remains strong (NEPAD 2001: 28-40).

This is the shady area evoking pathos, as it wasn’t what Mbeki was trying to do – “the ‘African Renaissance’ branding exercise endowed with poignant poetics but not
much else” (Bond 2005a: 9) – but how he went about it: through the primacy of a northern-centered epistemological realism, rather than an African ontological realism (see Landsberg 2002). Like Plato laying the ground for his ‘republic’, he charged ahead without ever taking truly progressive action and consulting the imaginations, identities, presence, needs, voices and desires of Africa’s people. Consequently Bond articulates its “failure already emanat[ed] from the very project of global-reformism, [and] Mbeki’s underlying philosophy, incorrect analysis, ineffectual practical strategies, uncreative and inappropriate demands and counterproductive alliances” (2005a: 3). Recent online fora debate whether South Africa’s indulgence of “the cargo cult of bureaucratic czars” (Landsberg 2007b: 20), to “tread the well-known, dusty path, of a [neo]-colonial, neo-liberal cul-de-sac, of predictable direction and duration” (Bond 2005a: 3), were because Mbeki and Manuel ‘grew up’ in exile, split off from the grassroots realities of the struggle, and disconnected from the social practices of uBuntu such as they are in this traumatically fragmented reality we interact with and in.

Accusations of the “northern-centered gaze” of this agenda are substantiated by Mbeki and his allies’ practices, and evident in for example his dismissive treatment of civil society, local and international labour, social and environmental movements, and of Qaddafi’s ‘radical agenda’ for an integrated Africa. At a grassroots level many African social actors of my generation consider this ‘radical’ agenda to be more ‘progressive’ and serving of Africa’s interests than Mbeki’s elite neo-liberal plan effectively constituting him and others like him as cultivated philosopher-kings at the top of his personal ‘republic’. The ‘radical’ agenda, drawing heavily on Nkrumah’s pan-African vision, posits a ‘return to roots’ establishing a developmental state, and the total annihilation of boundaries-as-invented-by Europeans, and all other residual colonial ideas, to engender de-centralised self governing local regions with open capillaries-of-power to a central governing structure of wise elders (Nkrumah 1963, 1970, 1973b, 1973c). While Mbeki on the one hand acknowledged actual reality stating, “we understand very well what is meant by […] the globalisation of apartheid” (Mbeki 2000), on the other relentlessly persuaded Africa’s public and leaders “no alternative” to globalisation exists:

There is nobody in the world who formed a secret committee to conspire to impose globalisation on an unsuspecting humanity. The process of globalisation is an objective outcome of the development of the productive forces that create wealth, including their continuous improvement and expansion through the impact of advances in science, technology and engineering (ibid).

Mbeki’s choice of discourse of technological determinism is decidedly ‘neutral’, and like the northern-centered constructions of Africa, fails to clarify what globalisation actually is.
According to NEPAD, “the current economic revolution, has in part, been made possible by advances in information and communications technology [...] We readily admit that globalisation is a product of scientific and technological advances, many of which have been market-driven” (NEPAD 2001: 29,31,39). As described earlier, the de-politicised ‘admission’ masks the deep manipulations of ‘class’, ‘identity’ and ‘state-corporate partnerships’ fundamentally effecting social wage, and ontological perceptions of humanism, being and needs (Bond 2005a: 5). This opaque discourse emphatically contradicts that used by Mbeki to secure the SACP – COSATU – ANC alliance before 1999 national elections:

The present crisis is, in fact, a global capitalist crisis, rooted in a classical crisis of overaccumulation and declining profitability. Declining profitability has been a general feature of the most developed economies over the last 25 years. It is precisely declining profitability in the most advanced economies that has spurred the last quarter of a century of intensified globalisation. These trends have resulted in the greatly increased dominance (and exponential growth in the sheer quantity) of speculative finance capital, ranging uncontrolled over the globe in pursuit of higher returns (Mbeki 1998b).

This assessment, in light of recent phenomena, is clearly the more valid one. Dramatic technological change facilitated rather than catalysed ‘globalisation’, and should be included with:

- fundamental changes to investment incentive structures due to declining manufacturing profits of the sixties/seventies leading to the search for new markets and cheaper inputs, and the switch of productive reinvestment into financial assets;
- financial sector deregulation, concentration and centralisation allowed banks and financiers to transcend national boundaries and capture foreign borrowers severely affecting local institutions;
- disempowered states due to empowered trade agencies and the Bretton Woods institutions; and
- severely shortened investor time horizons (Bond 2005a: 6).

These factors not inevitable, are cyclical in nature, they could have been, and should be, reversed. NEPAD does not even engage such issues, effectively constructing an empty analysis of the actual realities, problems, and conditions consciously experienced by Africans in relation to global technologies-of-power.

Qaddafi tabled a proposal for a United States of Africa (USAF), at the September 1999 OAU special summit in Sirte (Landsberg 2007b: 197; AU 2004; Nkrumah 1970). He deserves the credit for bringing urgency to, and encouraging debate on, the ‘new Pan-Africanism’ getting African heads-of-state to focus on establishing an AU (AU 2004). However,
Mbeki, Obasanjo, and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma resorted to deft diplomacy to shift focus from establishing a USAF to that of creating an AU: a process of building common norms, values and principles persuading 53 African governments to live in closer union with each other. While Mbeki worked to secure the incorporation of key elements of his African Renaissance vision in the AU project, Obasanjo worked on trying to guarantee inclusion of elements of his 1991 concept of the CSSDCA in these plans. The CSSDCA is a set of norms and benchmarks on accountability, transparency, and principles of action in stability, security, development and cooperation. Its main argument is that the AU must articulate ‘new’ values for African states to live by in order for the continent to become more peaceful, secure, and prosperous (Landsberg 2007b: 198 my emphasis).

Accordingly the July 2001 OAU summit in Lusaka was a pivotal one mandating the transition from the OAU to the AU, displaying Mbeki’s skilful coercion to ensure his New African Initiative (NAI) – merging his Millennium Africa Recovery Programme (MAP) (unveiled to select global elites and ratified by Wolfensohn (Bond 2005a:9)) with Wade’s Omega Plan (OP) – was endorsed. Wade contrasted his OP’s ‘realistic rigour’, proposing rapid infrastructural and socio-economic co-ordination of development at sub-regional rather than national levels, with MAP’s ‘romanticism’ (Wade 2001). Mbeki spent vast political, diplomatic, and economic time and energy ensuring the AU was born from the last July 2002 OAU summit in Durban (Landsberg 2007b).

In an effort to break down the OAU’s dysfunctional non-interference principle at the 1998 summit in Burkina Faso, Mandela declared, “we cannot abuse the concept of national sovereignty to deny the rest of the continent the right and duty to intervene when behind sovereign boundaries people are being slaughtered to protect tyranny” (Hutchful 2000: 218). Mbeki was instrumental in establishing an intervention regime and the AU Constitutive Act states four intervention pretexts: genocide; gross violations of human rights; instability in one country threatening broader regional instability; and unconstitutional changes of government (AU 2000). These (to date) have not been progressively enacted upon, rather ‘silent diplomacy’ has intensified suffering, indicating the terrible hypocrisy of those heads-of-state instrumental in ensuring it became constitutionally enshrined (Bond 2005a: 11; Adebajo & Landsberg 2001: 75). The act also provides for establishing 18 organs, key among which are:

- Assembly of the Union;
- Executive Council (i.e., foreign ministers);
- Pan-African Parliament (PAP);
- Commission (holding some executive power and initiative authority);
- Peace and Security Council (PSC);
- the influential Permanent Representative Committee (PRC);
- Specialised Technical Committees;
- the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), involving civil society representatives; and
- Financial Institutions (AU 2000; Landsberg 2007b)
Mbeki poured energy into constructing the Assembly as the most powerful decision-making organ, marketing it as the powerhouse of an ‘emerging continentalism’: “There are already signs of progress and hope,” NEPAD uncritically asserts, “[d]emocratic regimes committed to the protection of human rights, people-centered development and market-oriented economies are on the increase” (NEPAD 2001: 7). The discursive strategy making murky the actual, is the “(untenable) neo-liberal conflation of free markets and free societies – a presumption typically com[ing] unstuck in Africa [in] the 1990s during the course of repeated IMF Riots” (Bond 2005a: 11). Contra to Qaddafi advocating urgency for pan-African federalism opening up the continent to the movement of capital and people, before pouring capital into constructing operationalising organs, Mbeki tightly controlled the gradual and functionalist approach allowing neo-liberalism to take root at a national level first. To this end, NEPAD’s core elements include:

- greatly enhanced privatisation especially of infrastructure – despite its strategic failure;
- greater integration of Africa into the world economy – despite its rapid decline in trade terms since the 1990s;
- more multi-party elections – despite how contradictory this model is to indigenous participatory democracy;
- costly and ambitious visions of ICT – hopelessly unrealistic considering the lack of basic services;
- a self-mandate for peace-keeping – taken by South Africa in the DRC and Burundi (Bond 2005a: 11; NEPAD 2001).

Another mechanism instructive of Mbeki’s intentions, strategies and tactics was the 15-member PSC established in March 2004, the “premier policy blueprint [and] centerpiece of the AU’s work in the politico-military field” (Mwanasali 2004: 12-13). Effectively the Tshwane-Abuja axis favoured a PSC modeled after the UNSC, envisaging five veto-wielding permanent members and ten rotating non-veto members, and they, naturally, would be permanent veto powers (ibid). Thankfully, neither vetoes, nor permanent members will be allowed on the AU Council.

At the end of 2006 Nkrumah’s USAF with a single currency, was back on the agenda packaged by Qaddafi as an interim ‘African Union Government’ (AU 2006; Landsberg 2004a: 137). The January 2007 summit in Addis Ababa brought establishing the AUG as early as 2015, including measures facilitating the free movement of persons and rights of residence, to a head. In Accra in July 2007, Mbeki and Qaddafi engaged in a public row about what was ‘best’ for Africa, clearly however, the former’s functionalist, incrementalist
approach embedding a neo-liberal rather than participatory democratic agenda, is
decidedly dangerous for eco-social African reality.

Mbeki sold the ideas embedded in his agenda at a regional and international level
on the back of NEPAD, merging NAI and MAP. NEPAD employs a blatant marketisation
discourse to broker partnerships along the lines of ‘trade-offs’ between African heads-of-
state and international donor governments on the basis of common commitments to
upholding global standards of ‘mass democracy’ and ‘good governance’ (Adedeji 2007b;
Fairclough 1997; Bond 2005a; Landsberg 2007b). It aims to reform international aid
delivery to bolster development prospects more effectively through these ‘new’
‘partnerships’. As head of the Non-Aligned Movement, at the April 2000 South Summit in
Havana, Mbeki argued for reforming ‘global apartheid’ through:

- alleviating debt including its cancellation;
- effective mechanisms ensuring increased capital flow into developing
economies as a prerequisite for development;
- reversal of the trend causing a drop in official development assistance;
- opening developed markets to African, specifically agricultural, products;
- technology transfer (Mbeki 2000b).

NEPAD rarely ventures into “detailed demands – the document says are to be worked out
later by technical teams” (Bond 2005a: 12). Anxious about transforming Africa’s ‘bad’
image, Mbeki reasoned NEPAD constituted a needed break with what he sees as a culture
of victimisation, to inculcate a culture of ‘taking responsibility’ for Africa’s own mistakes, in
order to ‘take ownership’ and be ‘self-reflexive’ (Moore 2003: 6). Again the pathos is
clearly evident:

The economic dimensions of NEPAD have been the most controversial, both for the
orthodoxy underpinning them, and for the way they came about. Even through there is
reference in NEPAD to the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) of 1980, it is clear that the LPA has
not been carefully studied and certainly not sufficiently incorporated into NEPAD. The
economic dimensions of NEPAD have been likened by some to the Africanisation of South
Africa’s macro-economic GEAR policy. […] Mbeki] was so determined to see NEPAD
succeed that by 2006, [he] was seeking to transform NEPAD into [South Africa’s] domestic
socio-economic plan. But the perception was also gaining ground throughout the continent
that South Africa was so committed to NEPAD’s success, that it would even allow NEPAD to
become a rival to the AU (Landsberg 2007b: 205).

The last six years have seen the donor community generally supporting NEPAD more than
the AU, and it feeling undermined by its socio-economic plan. Additionally Mbeki’s role
constantly developing rival, duplicate plans, and establishing organs before public
discussions, undermining actual integration and democratic intent, were a monumental
waste of precious time, energy, resources, and capital, on a continent where poverty and
starvation are endemic. Critical observers hold South Africa responsible. Tensions and contradictions erupted when Wade withdrew from NEPAD’s implementation committee in 2007, severely criticising Mbeki for his northern-centric gaze escalating expenses in efforts to engage the G8 for their endorsement of NEPAD, rather than ensuring it was a legitimate avenue for Africa’s development with African social actors (Landsberg 2007b, 2005: 7-9).

With reference to NEPAD’s five strategic points to end global apartheid, the following effects are already visible:

Regarding debt cancellation, Bond argues, “Mbeki’s approach to debt relief has already done incalculable damage by fail[ing] to endorse the Jubilee Movement’s campaign against ‘Odious Debt’, including apartheid debt” (2005a: 12). Critics argue had he been serious about the debt issue, South Africa’s government would not have,

- agreed to repay apartheid debt to commercial banks;
- repeatedly claimed they owed no foreign debt, ignoring approximately US$25 billion private sector, and parastatal debt for which they inherited guarantor responsibilities;
- negated reparation demands for foreign credits to the apartheid regime; and
- repeatedly endorsed the G8, IMF and World Bank HIPC initiative effectively distracting attention away from the debt cancellation cause (AIDC 2007).

Far from challenging HIPC, NEPAD, supports existing poverty reduction initiatives at the multilateral level, such as the Comprehensive Development Framework of the World Bank and the Poverty Reduction Strategy approach linked to the HIPC debt relief initiative [...] Countries would engage with existing debt relief mechanisms – the HIPC and the Paris Club – before seeking recourse through the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD 2001: 118,149).

These programmes are derided as “a cruel hoax”, fundamentally committed to maintaining technologies-of-power and underlying conservative economic and political philosophies of the modernist-colonialist-imperialist-juridical-complex (see Jubilee South; Dingle 2006). Increased liberalisation of the lowest-income countries were traded for slight adjustments to debt loads, for example, Mozambique’s conditionality trade-offs quintupled cost-recovery charges at public health clinics, privatised urban and rural water supplies, and destroyed its largest agro-industry cashew-nut processing (Bond 2005a: 13).

Regarding increased capital inflow there are two kinds: financial and FDI. “It hardly needs arguing ‘hot-money’ speculative inflows to emerging markets such as Africa do not by any stretch qualify as ‘a prerequisite for development’” (Bond 2005a: 14). Nor do developing country loans serving as leverage to entrench neo-liberal conditions, and
The transnational pharmaceutical corporations threatened a constitutional lawsuit against the Act, which they actively pursued for a month in March 2001 before international protest forced them to withdraw. This life-and-death case of technology transfer – blocked by corporations whose billions of dollars in profits overrode access to drugs that would save millions of lives – is instructive about the nature of alliances (2005a: 17).

NEPAD however, pledges to “work with the African Development Bank [ADB] and other development finance institutions to mobilise financing especially through multilateral processes, institutions and donor governments, with a view to securing grant and concessional finance to mitigate medium term risks” (NEPAD 2001: 106). Bond highlights “[f]inancing is one of NEPAD’s Achilles Heels, because existing institutions and processes are so destructive” (2005a: 14-15; see Grignon 2006). Furthermore, the ADB and World Bank practices of lending hard currency with high effective interest rates for developmental goods and services based on locally-sourced inputs against falling African currency is illogical; hard currency usage rarely serves public interest. Africa’s financing challenges, rather than FDI, concern “establishing scrupulous, publicly-owned development finance institutions and tough financial-sector regulations, including effective exchange controls, […] allowing for the circulation and reinvestment of the continent’s existing financial resources, too many of which are frittered away in debt repayments, speculative projects, luxury real estate development, and capital flight” (2005a: 16).

Regarding increasing foreign aid, under neo-liberalism Clinton and Blair curbed welfare policies, invoking the now tired ‘a hand up, not a hand out,’ or ‘trade, not aid’ dictums (Curtis 2002: 4th). Besides, “Mbeki has not provided a convincing case, aid won’t exacerbate well known problems of bureaucratic capture and non-sustainability” (Bond 2005a: 16). Mbeki wanted to correct the “rules and regulations that make the world trading system unbalanced and biased against the very countries that need a fair trading system so that these countries, represent[ing] the majority of humanity, benefit from international rules of trade” (Mbeki 2000c). Yet, Trade Minister Erwin weakly argued for less protectionism of manufacturing and agricultural “dinosaur industries”, in UNCTAD IX by “stressing partnership” (2000), and ‘partnership’s’ implicit meaning became explicit, when Gore lobbied Erwin, Dlamini-Zuma and Mbeki to roll back the 1997 Medicines Act, promoting parallel import and generic production of ARVs vital to dealing with the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Bond illuminates,

The transnational pharmaceutical corporations threatened a constitutional lawsuit against the Act, which they actively pursued for a month in March 2001 before international protest forced them to withdraw. This life-and-death case of technology transfer – blocked by corporations whose billions of dollars in profits overrode access to drugs that would save millions of lives – is instructive about the nature of alliances (2005a: 17).

In November 2006 the Adedeji-led panel of Eminent Persons completed South Africa’s APRM draft report – NEPAD’s key structural mechanism to hold particular country’s accountable to their commitments. Need for imperative action was cited on:
unemployment; capacity constraints and poor service delivery; poverty and inequality; land reform; violence against women and children; HIV/AIDS; corruption; crime; xenophobia and racism; and multi-culturalism (APRM 2006:17). Government reacted predictably – throwing up vast amounts of dust, vociferous and loud protestations, vehement denial, and strong reservations regarding the panel’s assessment of South Africa as a ‘developmental state’; the accuracy of rape statistics and xenophobia; floor crossing; and cooperative and integrated governance. This was all detailed in a 54-page memorandum which to date has not been resolved. South Africa’s APRM by other African states was therefore not performed.

Not once have the civil society and public spheres been engaged in dialogue and debate, exacerbating the dubiousness of it as a truly ‘progressive’ and ‘democratic’ agenda serving an actual manifestation of Africa’s ‘recovery of self’ serving its collective interests. Until the public are holistically engaged with, and included in a legitimately participatory and public dialogue, with a referendum about how organisational organs and institutions should unfold, any and all agendas serve exclusive, top-down, and elite interests. This is an anti-African, anti-humanist, and anti-democratic agenda and in the words of Nkrumah:

Neo-colonialism is a greater danger to independent countries than is colonialism [...] people are divided from their leaders, and instead of providing true leadership and guidance, informed at every point by the ideal of the general welfare, leaders come to neglect the very people who put them in power, incautiously becom[ing] instruments of suppression on behalf of the neo-colonialists. It is far easier for the proverbial camel to pass through the needle’s eye, then for erstwhile former colonial administration to give sound and honest counsel to liberated territories. Allow[ing] foreign countries, especially ones loaded with economic interests in our continent, to tell us what decisions to take, what courses to follow, is for us to hand back our independence to oppression on a silver platter (1964: 92 my emphasis).

So, what the bleep do we actually know then?

Chasse, Vicente, and Arntz’s documentary (2004) follows deaf photographer, Marlee Matlin, grappling with the problems of humanism in a globalising paradigm. Shadowing her-story, a collective of quantum physicists re-present an ‘effective-scientific-story’ to shift “a culture in the wrong paradigm, not appreciating the power of thought” (Pert 2004), and challenge the “modernist paradox” of “historical untruths” and “assumptions” (Hagelin 2004). Revealing how and why, at a personal level, we keep re-experiencing particular (same) realities, when we actually exist in an infinite sea of potentials, it scientifically verifies Feminist, Africanist and post-Colonialist articulation of the imperative to de-colonise minds, take responsibility, and raise consciousness. “We are conditioned into buying the idea we have no control, [...] believing the external world
is more real than internal worlds,” but quantum physics indicates, “what is happening within, will create what is happening outside of us” (Dispenza 2004).

“Practice without thought is blind; thought without practice is empty,” begins Nkrumah’s treatise, Consciencism, interrogating the dialectic between Western principles informing capitalism, and the socialist egalitarianism of African societies, half a century earlier (1964: 81). Imperative therefore,
is a body of connected thought determining our action in unifying our inherited society [...] to take account, at all times, of the philosophy underlying African society. Social revolution must have, standing firmly behind it; an intellectual revolution [where] thinking and philosophy direct the redemption of our society, find[ing] its weapons in the living conditions of African people. [...] Emancipation of the African continent is the emancipation of the human being, require[ing] two aims: the restitution of egalitarianism to human society, and the logistic mobilisation of all resources towards attain[ing] that restitution (ibid).

‘Consciencism’ intellectually “map[s] the disposition of forces” enabling social actors to manifest an actual post-colonial reality and integrated Africa. It indicates legitimate progress is forged from consciousness of the (anti)realism dialectic rooted in conscience. It is knowing with every thought, word and action (being), one embodies Marx’s dialectical materialism, and the action assumed is performative, constantly shaping into existence (being), realities effecting the macro-story, consciously experienced (being). Every ‘thing’ therefore has conscience; the memory of each possible motion taken by self in every moment, is stored within constructing instinct – recall this is Ba, the shades, ancestors, memory and soul. The dialectic at the nexus of conscience is the process of remembering – perspectival consciousness’ wrestling with real identities manifested as actual – to consciously effect realities sustaining justice and egalitarianism. “The philosophical point is that ‘matter’,” a ‘thing’, ‘exists independently’, but is “also a plenum of energetic forces in antithesis to one another endowed with powers of self-motion in full diversity” (Nkrumah 1964: 81).

Nkrumah’s detailed point is that Western philosophy predating our global conscious experiences is fundamentally wrong. Its concept of materialism – the “inertness of matter” – eschews the dialectic at the basis of all of life. Unpacking Newton’s ‘law of motion’ he states:

In reality philosophers seek intellectual parallels to physical motion, deny[ing] this of matter [...] harping incontinently on the ‘stupidity’ of matter. They mean [...] matter is incapable of intellectual action; neither thinking, perceiving, nor feeling. [...] In deny[ing] physical and mental activity to matter, [...] philosophers thoroughly contradict themselves (1964: 82).

As example, he cites Locke’s ‘theory of perception’ attributing all activity to ‘spirit’, which ‘matter’ lacks: ‘corpuscles travel’ from perceived objects to sense organs in order to perceive it. The contradiction is obvious: inert “corpuscles” somehow detach from inert
“objects” subjecting observers to “radiative bombardment” (ibid). Nkrumah rigorously exposes how gravitational theory explains motion (including rest), but is silent on the question of antecedents; why bodies move at all, how ‘things’ come to be moving, and why they keep moving in particular patterns.

Those who conceive the universe in terms of an original super-atom multiplying internal stresses to such a pitch as to burst asunder, imply matter has powers of self-motion, for they do not conceive this primordial building up of internal stresses in terms of externally impressed forces, for how can there be external forces to the original super-atom? (1964: 83).

He states, “the phenomenon of radiation” and “wave mechanics of quantum physics” is the first ‘scientific’ model theorising ‘things’ as having “inherent power of self-motion”. Knowing informs African social and ecological justice practices, and yet Western epistemologies serving a constructed superiority of knowledge over ontological realism, “closed the dossier, pleasantly identifying the limits of their own knowledge with the limits of what can be” (ibid). Maintaining the ‘inertness of matter’ relegated the phenomenon of ‘self-motion’ or ‘active intelligence’ to a Holy Spirit privileged with preferential powers, crying foul of the “heathen animism” of Africans; an “animism of idioms” articulating and holding sacred the power inherent in all ‘matter’ (ibid).

Satinover (2004) explains, “physical reality […] only comes into existence when it bumps up against some other piece of physical reality […] interaction provokes […] particular states of existence.” Looking at objects and imagining the same object engages the exact same area of the brain. The brain processes 400 billion bits of information a second, but generally humans are conscious of a mere 2000 bits – the environment, the body, and time. Accordingly, reality is produced in the brain, to varying degrees of conscious integration of received information (Dispenza 2004). The information processed enters through our senses and percolates until “finally what’s bubbling up to consciousness, is the most self-serving […] the way our brain is wired up, we only see what we believe is possible. We match patterns already consisting within ourselves, through conditioning, onto ‘reality’” (Pert 2004). By analogy Knight (2004) reiterates:

The eyes are like the lens [of your camera] but the tape that’s seeing is the visual cortex [and it] imprints what it has the ability to see. […] Now – this is important – for example, [your] camera is seeing a lot more than what is here, because it has no objection [or] judgment, [but] the movie that’s playing in the brain is what we have the ability to see, [and] our eyes, our cameras, see more than our brain is able to consciously project.

What our eyes do see is stored in the brain, as memory. We are thus literally creating reality and its effects constantly, and the fact that we actually capture more than our consciousness re-produces, due to the imposition of structures conditioning and so
we think of it as a hard ball, then we say no, [...] it's actually this point of really dense matter at the centre surrounded by a fluffy probability cloud of electrons popping in and out of existence. [But] that's not right. Even the nucleus, which we think of as so dense, pops in and out of existence [like] electrons. The most solid thing you can say about all of this insubstantial matter, is that it is more like a thought; it's a concentrated bit of information.

What makes up things, are not more things, but ideas, concepts, and information.

we habitually think everything around us is already a 'thing' existing without my input, without my choice. You have to banish that thinking. Instead, you really have to recognise, the 'material world' – tables, chairs, the room, all these 'things' – are nothing but possible moments of consciousness. I am choosing moment to moment – out of all possible moments – to bring actual experience into manifestation. This is the only radical thinking that we need to do. It is so radical, it is so difficult, because our tendency is [to think] that the world is already 'out there', independent of 'my' experience. It is not. Quantum physics has been so clear about this; atoms are not 'things' they are only tendencies. So, instead of thinking of things we have to think of possibilities, [all 'things' exist as] possibilities of consciousness (2004).

Remarkably, no 'thing' ever touches another 'thing'; charged electrons push against other charged electrons, and we feel the charge (dialectic) of what Nkrumah called "the disposition of forces". Consequently, 'progressive time' is a constructed myth, we actually only appear to go forward in conscious experience, in quantum reality, we can and do go back, reflexively, imaginatively and emotively all the time. "When you're not looking then there are waves of possibility, when you're looking then there are particles of possibility" (Goswami 2004). A particle actually exists "in a 'super' position, a spread out wave of possible positions, and it's in all of those at once. The instant you track it, it snaps into just one of those possible positions, the one you are consciously placing" (Satinover 2004).

Life is therefore, potential strips of reality, until we choose; we are in many places at once, experiencing many possibilities at once, choosing collapses us in on one possibility manifesting as conscious experience. Goswami explains:

Nkrumah's 'consciencism', as the embodiment of dialectical materialism toward consciously choosing which potential strip of reality to performatively manifest, serving the interests of actual egalitarianism and social-eco justice is the more evolved and ethical choice of systemic possibilities. His analysis rooted in an African ontology is
The mind-body problem arises in the following manner: If one says there are only two types of substances, matter and mind, and furthermore allows interaction between them, then the question arises how there can be interaction between substances, which are so disparate. Mind is purely active, thinks, and is unextended; matter is passive, extended and is without awareness. If one asserts the sole reality of matter, as extreme materialists do, or if one asserts the sole reality of spirit as Leibniz must have done, then the mind-body problem is solved by removing the conditions in which the perplexity arises. This is to cut the Gordian Knot, for now mind and body will not be disparate, but will either both be forms of matter, or both be forms of spirit (1964: 85).

Consciencism therefore accepts the intra-action (fluid mutation between) of mind and body as fact, rejecting outright a “mere parallelism” categorising, separating and denying interaction (1964: 85). Nkrumah further refutes claims regarding the incompatibility of ‘materialism’ with Einstein’s Theory of Relativity because it requires the absolute and independent existence of space and time as necessary receptacles of matter. “Philosophical consciencism [as Africanist materialism] does not assert the sole reality of matter [but its] primary reality” for the former is impossible as space and time are not absolute and independent (1964:86 author’s emphasis). Rather ‘things’ mutate and transform into other ‘things’ constantly, and transformation is, produced by a dialectical process. If it is from a lower logical type to a higher logical type, it involves loss of mass. […] This is again deducible from Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity[…] every chemical change from simpler substances to more complex substances, in so far as it entails the emergence of new properties, represents a loss of mass. Indeed, it represents a conversion of part of the mass of matter. In Einstein’s theory, the loss is calculable according to the general formulae $e=mc^2$ where $e$ represents ergs of energy, $m$ mass, and $c$ the velocity of light. […] According to philosophical consciencism, however, though the whole of this amount of mass is converted, it is not all converted to the emergent properties, in actual chemical changes some of it transpires as variant energies (1964: 86).

Consciencism grounded in African ontological realism makes links to philosophical ‘materialism’, to explain how all ‘things’ are capable of effecting dialectical transformation, as all ‘things’ are fundamentally “a plenum of forces in tension containing the incipient change in disposition which is necessary to bring about a change in quality or property” (1964: 86). Force (wave motion) is constituted by particles, and hence all particles (the
Progress in man’s conquest and harnessing of the forces of nature, has had a profound effect on the content of rules. [...] Ethical rules are not permanent but depend on the stage reached in the conscious evolution of a society, so that cardinal principles of egalitarianism are conserved. Thus, if a capitalist society [wishes] to change its ethics, a revolutionary transformation of its principles will have to be constituted (1964: 88 my emphasis).

It is evident philosophical consciencism cannot issue in a closed set of ethical rules, a set of rules which must apply in any society and at any time. Philosophical consciencism is incapable of this because it is based upon a view of ‘matter’, as caught in the grip of an inexorable dialectical evolution. To the extent materialism issues in egalitarianism on the social plane, it issues in ethics. Egalitarianism is not only political but also ethical, for it implies a certain range of human conduct, which is alone acceptable to it. At the same time, because it conceives all things as a plenum of tensions and forces giving rise to dialectical change, it cannot freeze its ethical rules with changelessness (1964: 87).

Consciencism does not however sanction a gratuitous or groundless ethics, for one is still informed by one’s memory – as conscience – and one’s consciousness is still (dis)enabled by existence in a social context, as such, rules and principles are different. Rules refer to coercive impositions, and principles to reflexive guides:

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Life’s process of manifestation is not linear, says Nkrumah, as such commonalities are not a common manifestation, but a common wave of particles manifesting as a chosen social practice: “the different manifestations are results of dialectical processes unfolding according to objective laws. There is a determinate process through which every manifestation is derived, […] and it is the basic unity of all things, despite the diversity of manifestation, which gives rise to egalitarianism” (1964: 89). Radically eschewing Kant who forbid an ethics founded on observation of human practices, he exposes how meaning is made by Africanist epistemologies through granting primacy to ontological realism; all knowledges emerge from internal conditions governing action. These being: all ‘things’ exist independently; are inherently endowed with “powers of self-motion” (intelligence); and are simultaneously connected by waves of particles in constant motion (1964: 89). A plurality of ‘things’, where these things are -mntu or human, constitute a political body that is social, “consciencism consequently adumbrates a political theory and a social-political practice which together seek to ensure that the cardinal principles of ethics are effective” (1964: 90 my emphasis).
Goswami elaborates, “Quantum physics calculates only possibilities. If we accept this, then the question immediately comes, who and what among these possibilities, chooses the actual event of experience? So we directly and immediately see that consciousness must be a part of it, the observer cannot be ignored” (2004). These physicists understand what ‘the observer’ does, yet cannot explain who or what ‘the observer’ actually is:

We’ve looked. We’ve gone inside your head, into every orifice you have, to find something called ‘an observer’, and there’s nobody home. There’s nobody in the brain, there’s nobody in the cortical regions of the brain, there’s nobody in the sub-cortical regions, or the limbic regions, there’s nobody there called the observer, and we all have this experience of being something called the observer, observing the world, and everything in and out there. The observer is consciousness and every single one of us affects, and effects the reality that we see (Wolf 2004).

The documentary further draws on molecular scientist Masaru Emoto’s research, *The messages from water*, whose interest in how the molecular structure of water becomes effected by the non-physical events of a context indicates water is the most perceptive of the four elements (see also Dewey 2004). He set up a series of studies subjecting water to mental stimuli and photographing the effects with a dark-field microscope. The first study depicts a ‘blob’ of watery substance from the Fujiwara Dam in Japan. The second study is the essence of pure distilled water, the ‘blob’ has mutated into a fractal of smooth and clear lines under distillation. The third study is the distilled water after receiving a blessing from a Zen Buddhist monk; the emergent fractal is exquisitely intricate, delicate and beautiful. Emoto then taped words on the outside of bottles of the distilled water leaving them for a period of twenty-four hours. Each subsequent photograph is different: the fractal emerging from the chi of love is as intricate and beautiful as that of the Zen blessing. The fractal shaped by “thank you” has graceful and fluid openness to its form. The molecules constituted by “you make me sick I want to kill you”, “rage”, “anger”, and “pain” do not crystallise at all, rather they fragment, shard, and shatter violently into disintegration. Mr. Emoto’s thesis articulates the projected thought of intent being the driving force to conscious experience. The science of how the molecules become effected is yet unknown, beyond that intent is the mechanism shaping frequencies triggering conscious experience. Most fascinating to this dissertation and Africa integrating, is recalling how our bodies are 90 percent water, and how thought alone can completely transform the body (Chasse et al 2004; Dewey 2004). Goswami explains how this works:

When we think of things [as concrete] then we make the reality [of that thing] more concrete, [and so we] become stuck in the sameness of reality, because if [external] reality is concrete, it is a case of thinking that I am insignificant, and I cannot really change it. But,
if reality is \textit{mind possibility}, the possibility of consciousness itself, then immediately comes the question of \textit{how} can I change it? \textit{How} can I make it better? \textit{How} can I make it happier? You see \textit{how} we are extending the image of our \textit{self}?

In the old thinking [there was no agency, just] material objects all subjected to deterministic \textit{laws}, and mathematics [epistemological realism] determines what [objects] do in a given situation. I, in that experience and paradigm of consciousness [knowing], have no [self-determining] role at all.

In the ‘new’ view, yes mathematics can give us something, it gives us the possibility that all this movement can assume, but it cannot give us the actual experience that I’ll be having. In my consciousness I \textit{choose} that experience. And therefore, literally, I actively create my own reality. It may sound like a terribly bombastic claim by some new agey without any understanding of physics whatsoever, but really quantum physics is telling us that; the world being possible timelines of reality, until we choose (2004).

Recalling Figure 3.1. illustrating Jung’s spherical psychic ‘Self’ which is both the nucleus (subject position) and the total sphere (1990: 161), Hagelin describes the “different worlds” our consciousness inhabits as the macroscopic world of sight and memory, the cellular world, the atomic world, and the sub-atomic world of nuclei, each with its own language and mathematics, not necessarily smaller, and complimentary despite total differences. “I am my atoms. I’m also my cells, I’m also my macroscopic physiology, it’s all true, there are just different levels of truth. The deepest level of truth is the fundamental truth of unity. At the deepest sub-nuclear level of our reality you and I are \textit{literally} one” (Hagelin 2004).

Knight (2004) furthers this thesis, explaining how ‘addiction’ symptomatic of the cultivation-of-self project, gives us a \textit{supreme} beautiful opportunity to decipher the difference between the intangibility of our nobleness of character, our conscience mediating consciousness, and the day-to-day business of how that character is revealed in a three-dimensional world through our bodies”. A brain firing thoughts is like a thundercloud; neural physicists actually see veins of electric impulses (lightening) moving through the synaptic clef (sky) to the recepticide (earth) when a coherent thought is being \textit{presented}. A ‘storm’ is seen raging around different quadrants of the brain, as a person responds to holographic images (the thoughts presented) igniting feelings like rage, murder, hate, compassion, love, etc. The brain is comprised of tiny nerve cells, neurons with tiny branches connecting and forming a neuron net. Every connection point (node) is a thought \textit{integrating} into conceptual ideas, which produce feelings by the principles of associative memory. Dispenza elaborates:

The concept in the feeling of ‘love’, for instance, is stored in this vast neural net. But we \textit{build} the concept of love from many other different ideas. Some people have love connected to disappointment, when they think about love; they experience the memory of pain, sorrow, anger, and even rage. Rage may be linked to hurt, which may be linked to a specific person, which is then connected back to love (2004).
We thus effectively construct “models of how we see the world outside of us, and the more information we have, the more we refine our model, one way or another. And what we ultimately do, is tell ourselves a story about what the outside world is. Any information, that we process, any information that we take in from the environment, is always colored by the experiences that we’ve had, and an emotional response that we’re having to what we’re bringing in” (Monti 2004).

Consequently, feeling is a chemical rush cascading through glands, ductless glands, and spinal fluid in response to a thought. Physiologically, nerve cells that ‘fire together’ also ‘wire together’. Repetitive social practices ritualistically perform our nerve cells into long-term relationships, emotive patterns creating supposedly ‘natural’, but actually invented physiological traditions. “If you get angry [or] frustrated on a daily basis, if you suffer on a daily basis, if you [allow] victimization in your life, you’re re-wiring, and re-integrating the neural net on a daily basis. And that neural net now has a long-term relationship with all those other nerve cells called an identity” (Dispenza 2004; see Hobsbawn 1983a, 1983b). Fixed (clung to) identities are effectively addictions. Interrupting fixed thought processes (deconstructing invented traditions), exposes and breaks long-term relationships between nerves inducing ‘new’ chemical rushes, firing off different neurons, and provoking different thoughts into feeling. Conscious interruptions from reflexive observation of how we effect reality, is to engage the conscience, consciously. Emotions function to reinforce ideas chemically into long term memory that is why we have them.

The body, a carbon unit whose physical structures are formulated by small chain amino-acid sequences, is a protein-producing machine. Small chain amino-acid sequences called peptides, are chemically assembled into neural peptides to match every emotional state possible in the hypothalamus. The second a thought forms a holographic imprint in our brain, a peptide is assembled in the hypothalamus, released into the pituitary gland and the bloodstream, traveling to every part of the body. The surface of each cell in the body is studded by thousands of receptors, and a peptide sits on the receptor surface, fits into it, and unlocks it releasing a signal into a cell triggering a whole cascade of bio-chemical effects. “Each cell is definitely alive,” says Pert, “and has a consciousness, particularly, if we define consciousness as the point of view of the observer. There’s the perspective of the cell, the smallest unit of consciousness in the body” (2004). Addiction is defined simply:

Anything you can’t stop. We draw to ourselves situations that will fulfill the bio-chemical craving of the cells in our body, by creating situations that fulfill our bio-chemical needs. An addict will always need a little bit more in order to get a rush of what they’re looking for.
chemically. [This] definition means if you can’t control your emotional state you must be addicted to it. Emotions are life. We can’t direct our eyes without having an emotional aspect to it. They’re the richness of our experience. It’s our addiction, that’s the problem, [...] people don’t realize that [emotional addiction] is not just psychological it’s biochemical.

[...H]eroin uses the same receptor mechanisms on our cells that emotional chemicals use. Its easy to see then, that if we can be addicted to heroin, we can be addicted to any neural peptide, any emotion. If we’re bombarding cells with the same attitude [and] chemistry, over and over again [over] time, then when that cell finally decides to divide, [to] produce a daughter cell, that next cell will have more receptor sites for those particular emotional neural peptides, and less receptor sites for vitamins, minerals, nutrients, or even the release of waste products or toxins. All ageing and disease is the result of improper protein production (Dispenza 2004).

This fundamentally transforms the landscape of personal needs and identities, and how business and politicians serving their elite economic and political interests, have manipulated these needs and identities across centuries. This also returns us to the point Foucault raised, and the principles of discrimination and discernment guiding uBuntu (see chapters 3 & 4). If I and I cannot stop performing a particular reality into being, there is no self-determination: If I cannot stop as a result of my own volition I am physically and psychologically addicted; If I cannot stop as a consequence of systemic conditions I have no agency. An un-reconstructed individual, in other words those who as a result of not engaging ‘the observer’, in order to consciously respond to creating the possibilities of every moment effecting collective conscious experience, are not operating as integrated whole beings. By not operating as integrated wholes, a dependency and a violence is imposed upon all ‘things’ ‘other’ to that which we perceive to be ‘self’ from contextual moment to moment, This not only robs individual self, but all selves, and collective self of social and ecological justice as conscious experience. Integration of a continental society therefore demands, first and foremost, a self-conscious integration of its individuals, as a process of and toward continuous self-determination – I in relation to I. This is a mindful process, a participatory process, and a dialectical process whereby all thoughtful intent focuses on making manifest such an evolved stream of possibility. It cannot privilege certain aspects of being over others bar those, constituting active integrity towards manifesting a particular reality, serving the egalitarian interests of liberty and equality as conscious experience. By necessity therefore, must this process be, as Nkrumah articulated, an intellectual and philosophical one, emerging from an ontological realism informing all the other varieties.

Consciencism as a social practice in line with Africanist ontological realism, must thus prevent the “emergence or solidifying of economic inequality” due to the historical exploitation, and subjection of class by class, order by order, status by status (Nkrumah
By reason of its egalitarian tenet [...] consciencism seeks to promote individual development, but in such a way that the conditions for the development of all, become the conditions for the development of each; that is, in such a way that the individual does not introduce violence to destroy the egalitarian basis. The social-political practice also seeks to coordinate social forces in such away as to mobilise them logistically for the maximum development of society along true egalitarian lines. [...] In its political aspect, consciencism is faced with the realities of colonialism, imperialism, disunity and lack of development. Singly and collectively, these four militate against the realisation of a social justice based on ideas of real equality (Nkrumah 1964: 90).

Nkrumah advocates a process of de-colonisation, whereby the first step to constituting a healthy conscience, to become continuously and reflexively more conscious, realising self-determination, and making manifest eco-social justice, is “to liquidate colonial intent wherever it is, and whatever form it takes” (1964: 90 my emphasis). The basis of colonial intent is economic rationale, privileging particular forms of self-consciousness over ‘others’. Allowing energetic conversion of all ‘things’ to a prescribed value, benefit particular individuations of a whole, to the deprivation of ‘others’, wherefore all ‘things’ considered, and constructed, as ‘other’ are value-less: “a dumping ground for manufactured goods [ideas produced] of foreign industrialists and capitalists” (ibid). “The solution”, posits Nkrumah, “lies in the fierce and continuous political struggle for emancipation,” in resistance to the intent and thought that embed realities, not as the addictions they actually are, but as ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ to being ‘human’ (ibid). This struggle is to be seen as having the same etymological meaning as the Arabic ‘itijihad’ in its actual spiritual context: a positive action “represent[ing] the sum of those forces seeking social justice in terms of the destruction of oligarchic exploitation and oppression. Negative actions correspondingly represent the sum of those forces tending to prolong colonial subjugation and exploitation. Positive action responds and is revolutionary, and negative action is reactionary” (ibid). Positive action constitutes healthy emotional states, and negative action exacerbates consumerist addiction.

In light of Africa’s colonial story, negative actions far outweigh the positive, when urgently needed, and easily possible, is the opposite. It certainly is only as hard, or difficult as one makes it. Nkrumah articulates a thought, echoed by Foucault half a century later regarding the mis-representation of ‘will’ as a surrendering to ‘desire’, when actually it is an integritous commitment to deep pleasure and ease.

When there is a semblance of independence without the active transformation, we say neo-colonialism has set in, for neo-colonialism is a guise adopted by negative action in order to give the impression that it has been overcome by positive action. [...] Any oblique attempt of a foreign power to thwart, balk, corrupt or otherwise pervert the true independence of a
sovereign people is neo-colonialist. It is neo-colonialist because it seeks, notwithstanding the acknowledged sovereignty of a people, to subordinate their interests to those of a foreign power (1964: 91-92 my emphasis).

Because colonialism – whatever other forms, or idiomatic masks it may disguise itself in – has an economic intent, systematically separating, diverting, and channeling energies to generate profit from, and privileging, one space of power to and over another, it binds its ‘colonies’ to itself vampirically. By analogy, we can consider another mis-use and abuse of power effected into being by the phenomenon of rape. In light of the psychological and physiological processes discursively articulated above, an actual victim of traumatic invasive abuse cannot, indeed must not, place ‘Self’ within the same environment as its abuser in order to re-trench the same bio-chemical needs, addictions, and patterns. This will only effect the same unconscious experiences repetitively into being. In order to re-construct a ‘self’, the bio-chemical neural networks of the individuated ‘selves’ of that ‘Self’, need to be re-wired, altering emotive states towards the imperative realisation of ‘liberty’, ‘equality’, ‘peace’, ‘stability’, ‘security’, which legitimately enable development, progression and evolution. Africa, therefore, cannot bind her economy – her time, energy, thoughts, resources, environment, space, and all ‘things’ – to the hegemonic thought-pattern of the former colonial or imperial ‘ruler’. Nor to the processes, which engendered her destructive fragmentation to begin with: “the liberation of a people must institute principles which enjoin the recognition and destruction of imperialistic domination, whether it is political, economic, social or cultural. To destroy imperialistic domination in these forms is to” source all thought, words, and action towards “the care and needs of the liberated territory,” thus is “authenticity” derived:

Unless the self-reference is religiously maintained […] the price of great suffering will be paid. The true welfare of a people does not admit compromise. If we compromise on the true interest of the people, we forfeit conscience and consciousness […] this is the fundamental law of the evolution of matter to higher forms. This evolution is dialectical. And it is the fundamental law of society. It is out of tension that being is born. Becoming is a tension, and being is the child of that tension of opposed forces and tendencies (Nkrumah 1964: 92 author’s emphasis).

“To acknowledge the quantum self, to acknowledge the place where we really have choice, to acknowledge mind … when that shifts our perspective to make manifest an integrated being, then, and only then, we say that someone has been enlightened,” punctuates Goswami (2004).
THE CHILD

BY INGRID JONKER

The child is not dead.
The child lifts his fists against his mother,
who shouts Africa! Shouts the breath
of freedom and the veld
in the locations of the cordoned heart.

The child lifts his fists against his father
in the march of the generations
who shouts Africa! Shouts the breath
of righteousness and blood
in the streets of his embattled pride.

The child is not dead, not at Langa, nor at Nyanga,
not at Orlando, nor at Sharpeville,
nor at the police station at Philippi,
where he lies with a bullet through his brain.

The child is the dark shadow of the soldiers
on guard with rifles, saracens and batons.
The child is present at all assemblies and law-givings.
The child peers through the windows of houses and into the hearts of mothers.
This child who just wanted to play in the sun at Nyanga is everywhere.
The child grown to a man treks through all Africa!

The child grown into a giant journeys through the whole world without a pass.
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

Tu nîz del'kabâbî darmân ze dard yâbî; Gar gerd-e dard gardî, farmân-e man gerefte.
You are broken-hearted too, you shall find cure in love; If you listen to me and pursue this ailment.

It is a common saying that humans are constantly a challenge to their self, and that were [s/]he to claim that [s/]he is so no longer [s/]he would be denying self. It must be possible, however, to describe an initial, a basic dimension of all human problems. More precisely, it would seem that all the problems which humans face on the subject of being human can be reduced to this one question:

“Have I not, because of what I have done or failed to do contributed to an impoverishment of human reality?”

The question could also be formulated in this way:

“Have I at all times demanded and brought out the human that is in me?”


Africa’s ‘inconvenient’ reality and truth,

is not surprising if we consider that most of the dominant theories of globalization have been theories about worldwide *convergence* of one sort or another. From the earliest European projects of colonization to the latest structural adjustment programs, Africa [I and I] has proved remarkably resistant to a range of externally imposed projects that have aimed to bring it into conformity with Western or “global” models (Ferguson 2006: 27).

Is this our ‘failure’ or our ‘strength’? Does our reality profoundly challenge global political and economic convergence? What exactly are we converging to and on? The ‘mass democracy’ exposed by Curtis to be blatant propaganda due to the (mis)representation of the Freud family, and corporate America as to what human ‘nature’ is? Are we endowed with rebellious mutant genes, or do we (un)consciously choose to resist the processes of mental colonisation intent on cultivating a particular ‘self’, predating and continuously driving colonialist, neo-colonialist, and imperialist agendas, because this choice, made at the level of the deep cellular structure is the most self-preserving, and self-serving, given how we do conceive of self, as I and I? The ‘cultivated self’ project is the capitalist and Enlightenment project, and its convergence theories can only work, if a ‘self’ is cultivated to serve it’s *particular* ‘superior’ interests. NEPAD exploits a discourse that re-produces the narrative structure cultivating this particular self, and is thus complicit in further coercing Africans to live out the so-called ‘rational’ teleology of the imperial-colonial-globalising-technologies-of-power.

Mbeki’s personal, and so political intent, which used coercive techniques to manifest a neo-colonised Africa complicit with these convergence theories, thankfully, failed spectacularly to be realised. Nevertheless, the waste of capital, energy, lives, and time driving this very carefully cultivated and so-called ‘progressive’ agenda has been monumental. He, and his allies, need to stand accountable to the African public for
insulting and disrespecting I and I, in that he saw fit to not consult us – ever – about the so-called ‘public’ policies affecting and effecting our lives into the conscious experience that is our present ‘inconvenient’ reality.

This dissertation has illuminated that this ‘inconvenient’ reality is however, not simply a dismissive, anti-realist stand-point of ‘development failure’, or ‘lack of implementation’, to be refracted back at the morally complacent and complicit comprador elites. There is no ‘lag’ to be overcome in ‘catching up’ with the so-called ‘developed’ ‘north’. Africa is not a terrible accident, predicated on contingencies like the HIV/AIDS pandemic. There is always a theoretical meaning to the existence of any ‘thing’, and I have tentatively scratched away at the roots of why we are perpetually constructed as a continental anomaly, to expose a semblance of what that theoretical meaning is: I and I am that I and I am, not what ‘you’ imagine for, and over, I and I.

The so-called ‘economical’, ‘efficient’, ‘managed’, ‘liberal’ demo-cracy (together-rule) is actually a coerced, imposed, and constructed auto-cracy (one-rule) of a global political, economic, and racial elite. The illusion of superiority and subsequent separation, is the primary sponsoring thought to all modernity theoretically is, with its culturally hegemonic one-truth, and grand narrative imposed with force, and violence upon eco- and bio-systems: -mntu, and -mnto. Neo-liberalism, the so-called ‘mass democracy’, is just another re-production of imperialism, which was philosophically seeded as ‘the cultivation of self’ in the first two centuries of Empire. Far from ‘empowering’ the body politic to assume the ability to respond, it propagates an extremely reactive reality, where all time, energy, power, and ease of life-force is constantly consumed in dealing with globally constructed crisis after crisis – the rapidly escalating consequences of our (mis)thoughts, (mis)words, and (mis)deeds. Effectively its insidiousness strips I and I of the ability, the inclination, and the will to think, articulate, and shape a reality that is authentically, and collectively, our own, serving interests that progressively develop I and I, to perform into being a sense of self that is whole and common to the space we call Africa.

Nkrumah’s pan-Africanist theory of integration, conscientism, rooted in the ontological episteme of a participatory radically democratic uBuntu elaborated upon in this dissertation, actually does promise ‘another’ and ‘better’ Africa and world, than the toxic meta-narrative shadowing us like a bad smell for so many centuries. His analysis of the imperative for an intellectual and philosophical revolution driving the socio-economic revolution of Africa towards holistic, actual, participatory, human-centered development, and legitimate egalitarian eco-social justice practices is correct. Quantum physicists have
Decolonisation never takes place unnoticed, for it influences individuals and modifies them fundamentally. It transforms spectators crushed with their inessentiality into privileged actors, with the grandiose glare of history’s floodlights upon them. It brings a natural rhythm into existence, introduced by new humans, and with it a new language and a new humanity. Decolonisation is the veritable creation of new beings. But this creation owes nothing of its legitimacy to any supernatural power; the ‘thing’ which has been colonised becomes human during the same process by which it frees itself (Fanon 1963: 129).

The implications are effectively daunting at a personal as well as a policy level: There is so very much work for I and I to undertake, in a very short amount of time, thanks be to the catastrophic environmental crisis looming over us. No one is not complicit. No one is exempt. All must take part. This work must happen on our self, at the nucleic-, micro-, meso-, and macro-levels. Fundamentally, this imperative work begins, where it always begins, within the dialectic of our conscience, the nucleus of every cell. We have to clean house: de-colonise, de-toxify, de-construct, de-pollute, dis-arm, stop, and ultimately cut loose from the ‘cultivated self’ trajectory to re-enact a ‘care of the self’ pattern manifesting as conscious experience. Every ‘thing’ has to be brought beneath the gaze of discrimination and discernment, and all that which does not serve the interests of eco-social justice, the consequences of a legitimate participatory democracy and uBuntu, must be consciously ‘let go’: survival of all species depends upon this reality. In the prophetic words of that African mind par excellence:

Decolonisation never takes place unnoticed, for it influences individuals and modifies them fundamentally. It transforms spectators crushed with their inessentiality into privileged actors, with the grandiose glare of history’s floodlights upon them. It brings a natural rhythm into existence, introduced by new humans, and with it a new language and a new humanity. Decolonisation is the veritable creation of new beings. But this creation owes nothing of its legitimacy to any supernatural power; the ‘thing’ which has been colonised becomes human during the same process by which it frees itself (Fanon 1963: 129).

In other words, the will to live, to love, and to finally laugh, last, heartily, and longest, because “when she returned after her search and many struggles, with the amasi bird in her arms, hunger ended” (Sitas 2004: 7).
The critical humanist would be strongly allayed to the methodologies of participatory action research, and Abbreviation for cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Hobsbawm (1983a: 1) uses the term 'invented tradition' in a broad but very precise sense, to See Greenstein (2003), for a rigorous analysis of these strata once infused with energy, becoming 'spaces Tuomela (1985) gives a detailed discussion of Sellarsian realism and its variations. This strong realism has the 'subaltern' was first used by Gayatri Spivak in her famous but notoriously difficult essay 'Can the Sodade (see Plummer 2005). O’Connor’s song was a direct challenge to Bono from U2’s statement in the radical lyrics Sunday, “this song is not a rebel song”, which confused the world who otherwise heard it as an impassioned call to action following the brutal murders of twenty Irish civilians by the English paramilitary during the Derry Civil Rights March in 1971. Directly contrasting U2’s thunderous challenge, O’Connor’s song is heartbreakingly poignant, sung as a lament for all the colonised. The intertextuality of the song is very subtle: Ireland in Gaeilge is Éiréann, named for their ‘Fa known, light and effortless, not easily articulated or named, due to the improbability of ‘it’ ever being realised. This tradition additionally includes the ‘pre-Socratic’ philosophers of nature, namely: Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger. Tuomela (1985) gives a detailed discussion of Sellarsian realism and its variations. This strong realism has See Greenstein (2003), for a rigorous analysis of these strata once infused with energy, becoming ‘spaces of power’. Hobbsbawm (1983a: 1) uses the term ‘invented tradition’ in a broad but very precise sense, to capture those ‘traditions’ actually constructed and formerly instituted from ‘make-believe’ serving very particular interests, and those emerging in less easily traceable ways within conjunctures, taking root as ‘common’ very quickly. He defines the term, as a set of social practices established by tacit acceptance, to engender ‘rules’ of a ritual and symbolic nature, inculcating certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition. The repetition of the performative act constructs and imposes teleological continuity with an ‘acceptable’ and ‘suitable’ historic past, re-inforcing the centralisation of power of a particular form of governance through ritual and symbol. He is careful to clarify that ‘tradition’ in this sense must be distinguished from ‘custom’ dominating so-called ‘traditional societies’ (1983a: 2). Abbreviation for cardiopulmonary resuscitation. The critical humanist would be strongly allayed to the methodologies of participatory action research, and emancipatory action research championed by Paulo Freire, Orlando Fals Borda, Rajesh Tanson, Anisur Tahman, Marja-Liisa Swantz, Myles Horton, and Robert Chambers (see Kemmis & McTaggart 2005). O’Connor’s song was a direct challenge to Bono from U2’s statement in the radical lyrics Sunday Bloody Sunday, “this song is not a rebel song”, which confused the world who otherwise heard it as an impassioned call to action following the brutal murders of twenty Irish civilians by the English paramilitary during the Derry Civil Rights March in 1971. Directly contrasting U2’s thunderous challenge, O’Connor’s song is heartbreakingly poignant, sung as a lament for all the colonised. The intertextuality of the song is very subtle: Ireland in Gaeilge is Éiréann, named for their ‘Faéire Queen’ Éireu (see Robert Graves, The White Goddess). I have no way of verifying this story of a story of a story due to my paternal line being deceased. Most famous is the debate between Sartre’s Existentialism and Humanism, and Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism (see Plummer 2005). This dissertation has taken many winding off-routes from the original mapped ‘expedition-of-inquiry’. When I drew up my proposal, I uncovered that Foucault apparently ‘changed his position’ towards the end of his life (see Seidler 1994), and the last of his books, Care of the Self (1990b), documented this need to ‘re-think’ the subject and identities. By way of reflexive auto-ethnography, I already understood intuitively what was meant by these statements, but didn’t know how he had reached this understanding. Whilst reading Care of the Self, I realised I couldn’t just include this last analysis of power, as it wasn’t a mere ‘change of position’, as the chapter articulates. The effects of mining Foucault’s works as a whole, subsequently led me to making an eleventh hour 180 degree shift in methodology from discourse analysis and narrative enquiry, to simply narrative as a form of discourse. My axiology serves an integrated Africa and so interest, and to emerge from my own totalising dark night of the soul, and despite having read tomes on discourse analysis, I applied what I’d learnt from Foucault: in order to care for self, I had to stop cultivating self, and so whatever that meant, enabling greater focus on care, had to go (see note 31). Foucault plays off specific quotes and issues from Nietzsche’s works, particularly The Genealogy of Morals.
This first appeared in French in 1975. It contains well-researched descriptions of torture used by the French penal system prior to the contemporary period, and as such is provocative and uncomfortable reading.

War is a very popular and evocative song, recorded by Bob Marley and The Wailers. The lyrics come verbatim from a speech by Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie I to the United Nations General Assembly in 1963 in New York. Selassie called for equality among all without regard to race, class, creed, gender, or nationality in a hymnal cry for peace, urgently asserting UN officials and country representatives need(ed) to disarm nuclear weapons, and end international economic exploitation (specifically with Africa). The song honours Haile Selassie I as a call to action against binary thinking and international injustice. In his speech to the UN, Selassie declared “these are only words; their value depends wholly on our will to observe and honour them, and give them content and meaning” (see Selassie 1963).

Óglaigh na hÉireann has been used by various groups since Cromwell, in responding to a ‘call to arms’ in defense against imperialism. It presently includes the Irish National Defence Force as well as peoples belonging to various organisations termed the Irish Republican Army (IRA). It translates from Gaeilge into ‘The Warriors of Ireland’.

In 1974, Stephen Hawking of Cambridge (building on Jacob Bekenstein’s earlier work) included quantum mechanics in the observation of quantum fields surrounding a black hole. His findings indicated the hole is not predominantly black, but radiating invisible particles into its surroundings. These particles constitute what became known as ‘Hawking Radiation’, a fundamental scientific breakthrough involving the precise application of quantum physics to re-presentations of ‘reality’. The critical question arising from this new aspect of consciousness is: if the particles emitted from a black hole are random, how is it possible to recover the information encoded in it? Video: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ou3TukauccM](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ou3TukauccM) (see Hawking 1994: 105 -120).

George G. M. James (1954) additionally contains this line of inquiry within his very rare The Stolen Legacy.

French archaeologist Henry Lhote describes flying in a light aircraft from the Hogaar following the length of a fossil river to the Niger near Gao (1959: 23).


Carl Jung’s theories drifted to consciousness upon his visit to East Africa in the 1920s. He described the catalytic moment as a time when looking from a train window crossing Kenya, he saw a Masai leaning on a spear gazing down at him, and he knew “that his world had been mine for countless millennia” (1983: 283).


She became Maya in India, Maéiru among the Gaeilge, and hieroglyphically known as I.S.I.S. in Egypt (see Wikipedia).

As Goddess Ma’at, she is the Goddess of Justice (see Wikipedia).

A human is human through the humanity of humans in isiXhosa.

Gabriel revealed the Qur’an to God’s final prophet Muhammad (after Abraham, Jesus, and the Buddha), and Muslims regard the Qur’an and the Sunnah (Muhammad’s Discourse) as the fundamental sources of Islam as din (religion). Muhammad was not the founder of a ‘new’ religion, but re-stored truth to the revelations given to former prophets which had become distorted by Jews and Christians by either altering texts, and/or introducing false interpretations (see Qur’an; ISLAM 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Wikipedia).

For insightful, penetrating analyses and critiques, describing the full scale destructive effects of the era of neo-liberalism upon the people of Africa and the land-mass through such practices as “austerity measures meant to roll back the state” (van de Walle 2001:14); “the privatisation of the state” (Hibou 2004); “western-style ‘donor’ ‘low-intensity’, ‘quasi’, ‘illiberal’ managed democracy” (Adebajo 2007:24); “a depoliticised mode of technocratic governance” (Gould and Ojanen 2003:7); “economic predations of resource-extracting multinational firms operating in secured economic enclaves” (Reno 1999); see also Adedeji 1994, 2007b; Bond all; Ferguson 1995, 2006, 2007; George 1993; Gruffydd Jones 2003; Hudson 2007b; Kankwenda 2004; Landsburg 2002, 2007b; Reddy 2005, Smith 1997; Saul & Leys 1999.

For a penetrating discussion, see Mbembe 2002a.

Jonathan Shapiro, as Zapiro, is South Africa’s leading cartoonist and recipient of the international ‘speak truth to power’ award.

My original plan was to analyse NEPAD as discourse, juxtaposing this neo-liberal marketisation discourse (see Fairclough 1992b, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000) against specific scenes from a population of regional documentaries and films clearly indicating the consequences of two decades of liberalisation for specific
social actors and communities on the continent, as well as Curtis’ *The Century of the Self* (2004). I first read Bond’s (2005) analysis *Fanon’s Warning*, in September 2007 and in December of that year, a South African historian stated in passing, he wished Bond had gone “deeper”, as his analysis dealt with the exoskeleton of the problems Africa faces. A very toughly embedded exoskeleton masking those depths, needing piercing analyses to break it apart in order to reach those depths, I might add.

In August this year I finally overcame obstacles, prior scholarly commitments and distractions by escaping to Ireland to stay with a close friend who’d lost her mother to suicide, a huge social problem in Ireland due to its ontological realism having been denied for so many centuries. There, I separated NEPAD from Bond’s critique and went through it line by line. What emerged however, was that Bond’s acute and deeply penetrating analysis, had already rigorously extrapolated, analysed and theorised it as neo-liberal discourse constituting social practices. Further analysis of the discourses it draws on towards establishing its discourse in existing ‘orders of discourse’ (see Fairclough all) shaping reality with neo-liberalism in the ascendency would be a doctoral thesis in its own right. I suggest this is further necessary research, perhaps as one of a pool of all policy documents as semantic realism constituting conscious experience for Africans.

This contributed to my eleventh hour switch in methodology in October 2008. During that month, I went through many of Fairclough and Gee’s books on Critical Discourse Analysis and came to the following understanding: my dissertation and me would have been nothing more than a good dissembling of *Fanon’s Warning*, I had already gone to the depths Bond’s analysis exposed, and following a conversation regarding my PhD plans, I switched to include Bond’s critique, as an analytic narrative supporting my narrative of effective narratives.

32 Frantz Fanon’s analysis of the effects of racism and colonisation is contained in *Black Skin, White Masks* (1968). Part manifesto, part analysis, it clearly illuminates the ways in which the coloniser/colonised relationship is normalised in, by, and as ‘psychology’, as a Foucaultian technology of power constructing the ‘cultivation of self’ project. Racist constructs engender profoundly deep psychological harm that both blinds the black person to their subjection to a universalised white norm and alienate their consciousness. His resonating articulation is that a racist culture prohibits psychological health in the black person. The same can thus be said for sexism and classism prohibiting the integration of peoples into whole selves.

33 Robert Reich was a member of Clinton’s cabinet from 1994 – 1997.

34 Mario Cuomo was former Governor of New York from 1982 – 1995.

35 see Zeitgeist 2007; Grignon 2006;

36 For a brief description by Wade of his Omega Plan, see: http://allafrica.com/stories/200106280650.html; his further comments are posted at: http://www.african-geopolitics.org/show.aspx?ArticleId=3147.

37 Interviewee and collaborator quantum physicists, psychologists, and teachers are:

David Albert, Professor and Director of Philosophical Foundations of Physics, Columbia University.

Dr. Joe Dispenza, C.D., Professor of Chiropractic Medicine, Life University.

Amit Goswami, Professor of Physics, University of Oregon, and Senior Scholar in Residence, Institute of Noetic Sciences.

John Hagelin, Professor of Physics and Director of Institute of Science, Technology and Public Policy, Maharishi University.

Dr. Stuart Hameroff, M.D., Professor of Anesthesiology and Psychology, and Associate Director of Centre for Consciousness Studies, University of Arizona.

Dr. Miceal Ledwith, Professor of Systematic Theology, Maynooth College, Ireland.

Dr. Daniel Monti, M.D., Director of Mind-Body Medicine Program, Thomas Jefferson University.

Dr. Andrew Newberg, M.D., Associate Professor, Department of Radiology, and Staff Physician in Nuclear Medicine at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania

Dr. Candace Pert, M.D., Professor of Medicine, Georgetown University.

JZ Knight, Master Teacher, Ramtha School of Enlightenment.

Dr. Jeffrey Satinover, M.D., (Psychiatry), M.S. (Physics), President CG. Jung Foundation NY, and William Kames Lecturer in Psychology and Religion, Harvard University.

William Tiller, Professor Emeritus of Material Science and Engineering, Stanford University.

Dr. Fred Wolf, PhD., Physicist, lecturer, and writer, UCLA.

38 See http://www.life-enthusiast.com/twilight/research_emoto.htm for the photographs online.


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