THE IMPLICATIONS OF STRUCTURATION THEORY FOR EDUCATION

BY

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The author wishes to state that the whole thesis, except for fully referenced extracts, is her own work and has not been submitted in any form to another university.

P. NAIDOO
We are like puny dwarfs perched on the shoulders of giants .........
We see more and farther than our predecessors, not because we have keener vision or greater height, but because we are lifted up and borne aloft on their gigantic stature.

Bernard of Chartres (fl. 1114-1124)
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is concerned with the implications of the theory of structuration for education. Central to the theory of structuration, is the idea of structuring social relations across time-space, in virtue of the duality of structure. Anthony Giddens, who coined the term 'structuration', acknowledges the call for a decentering of the subject but reaffirms that this does not imply the evaporation of subjectivity into an "empty universe of signs". Rather, social practices, "biting into time and space", are considered to be at the root of the constitution of both subject and social object.

However, the value of structuration theory lies in the fact that it helps to illuminate problems of educational research. The points of connection are to do with working out the logical implications of studying a 'subject matter' of which the researcher is already a part and with elucidating the substantiative connotations of the core notions of structure and action.

The polarisation in thinking about education is only one symptom of the classic and fundamental tension in social theory between those explanations which stress structure and those stressing action, between deterministic and voluntaristic views of behaviour, between a concern with statics and one with dynamics, between man viewed as subject and man viewed as object.

The theory of structuration has implications for education in that it has pointed to a possible resolution of this dualism. The oppositions of society and individual, determinism and voluntarism, structure and action and so on are dealt with by denying that they are in opposition. Social structures are both constituted by human agency and yet at the same time are the very medium of this constitution. In societal terms, actors, since they know how to behave, contribute through their actions to the continuous production and reproduction of the social structure of rules.
Yet in every action there is the potential for actors to participate in changing the 'rules' or structure which they may know and realize in further action. In this way Giddens is able to deal with a recurrent difficulty in sociological theory accounting for both continuity and change.
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CHAPTER ONE

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

The background to the theory of structuration is to be found in a series of significant developments which have taken place in the social sciences over the past decade and a half, particularly in the field of social theory. The English-speaking world had been dominated for a long time by views of social science which drew their inspiration from the natural sciences. Such views formed the main foundations of the orthodox consensus which dominated the post war period. One can discern three general characteristics of this consensus namely:

(a) The influence of positivistic philosophy as a logical framework – this view advocated that the social sciences should be modelled upon the natural sciences.

(b) On the level of method the influence of functionalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, functionalism stood in easy and close relation with the thesis that sociology should be a 'natural science of society'.

(c) On the level of content – the influence of the conception of 'industrial society' and of 'modernisation theory'. According to these theorists, industrialism was the main force for transforming the contemporary world (1).

Combining these three elements, the orthodox consensus provided the body of mainstream opinion for sociology. These views were challenged by authors influenced by Marx and although they differed in their disagreements, there was at least some unity in sociological theory in that common issues were discussed. The disagreements, challenges and new interests generated by the orthodox consensus eventually prevented it from occupying a primary position in mainstream sociology. One such interest, responsible for the toppling of the orthodox consensus is,
hermeneutics. The English speaking recovery of this tradition has been facilitated in present day social theory by the post-Wittgenstein movement within Britain and American philosophy. This latter trend in social theory has converged with themes in hermeneutics, by emphasizing the need to study meaningful action when explaining events in nature. The interest in natural science is important in the development of present day sociological theory as well as in providing relevance to current issues in the philosophy of science.

The current phase of social theory is one demanding reconstruction on several fronts. Such a process of reconstruction can be seen in Giddens' formulation of the theory of structuration which he sees as a hermeneutically informed social theory.

Giddens reacts to the orthodox consensus in two ways:

(a) Despite acknowledging the contributions of functionalism to social theory, he is concerned to develop an approach to social theory in which the concept of 'function' has no place.

(b) He believes that a limitation of hermeneutic social theory is that it makes no mention of what has always been the primary concern of functionalism: the unanticipated conditions and unintended consequences of action.

In Giddens' hermeneutically informed social theory, he tries to recognize the need to correct an account of meaningful action with the analysis of its unanticipated conditions and unintended consequences. This theory he refers to as the theory of structuration. He believes that modern hermeneutics has joined phenomenology in emphasizing the importance of every day beliefs and practices and the 'taken for granted' in social activity.
The social sciences, he believes, involves also a rather special type of hermeneutic phenomenon which he calls the ‘double hermeneutic’. The social scientist studies a social world which is constituted as meaningful by those who produce and reproduce it in their activities that is, human subjects. To describe human behaviour in a valid way is to be able to participate in the forms of life which constitute and are constituted by that behaviour. The double hermeneutic Giddens believes is important in the post-positivistic reformulation of social theory.

The organisation of the dissertation is as follows: having posed the main focus of the dissertation in the first chapter, in the second I begin with a discussion of the schools of thought in sociology in the period of the post 1960s. These include: functionalism, marxism, interactionism, ethnomethodology, structuralism and the sociology of knowledge. Functionalism is discussed as a distinct methodology and theory of society. Durkheim is seen as the dominant influence on the development of sociological functionalism for his argument that "social institutions exist solely to fulfill specific social needs" (2). The social system is seen as consisting of actors interacting in a socio-cultural situation, a process mediated by a system of culturally shared and structured symbols (3).

R.K. Merton has sought to introduce a more flexible form of functional analysis in his 'dialectic of social control' (4). Merton distinguishes manifest from latent functions and sees the latter as constituting a significant development in social theory since these challenge all commonsense knowledge and focus on 'hidden' components of processes. Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore sought to elaborate a functionalist theory of social stratification which enables individuals to fill functionally essential positions which reward them with high renumeration and status (5).

Chapter three looks at the development in philosophy of science in the post 1960s. In essence the philosophical questions asked
about the social sciences are all to do with their distinctiveness. If we can establish clearly exactly what the character of theory, method and so on are in science, we should, so it is thought, be able to determine the claims to scientific status which the social sciences can make. Discussions are usually couched in terms of a consideration of history of science with little or no attention given to why these sciences should be thought to be philosophically significant.

The most important influences on all discussions of the philosophy of the social sciences have been the works of Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend. This chapter also deals with marxist philosophy as both continuous and distinct from other philosophies. Althussers' vision of marxist philosophy is based on a certain view of the organisation of social relationships. Critical theorists rejected positivist tendencies since these mystified the real nature of social life.

Hermeneutics, also a post 1960s school of thought in philosophy of science was determined to show that the generalizing of the natural science model of knowledge to all spheres of knowledge was unacceptable. Phenomenology questioned the claim of scientific knowledge that it was free of subjectivity by believing that all knowledge began in consciousness, in subjectivity — even science. Through a discussion of Levi-Strauss, Lacan, Foucault and Derrida it is shown how structuralism was able to provide objective universal knowledge which was not grounded in particular, individual, historically given subjectivities.

British analytic philosophy, in particular that of Wittgenstein is dealt with particularly for the latter's preoccupation with logical questions, logical form and logical relations and as providing the axis of the so-called linguistic turn. Lastly, naturalism is discussed because of its belief that there is an essential unity of method between the natural and social sciences. Roy Bhaskar argues for an anti-positivist naturalism based on an essentially realist view of science.
Chapter four deals with the educational implications of the main schools of thought in sociology namely, functionalism, marxism and interactionism. According to the functionalist perspective, the school is viewed as an agency of socialization. Education, by providing the necessary technical and social skills to members of a society, sustains the common culture of a society and provides the appropriate human material for the social structure. The marxists maintain that education helps to reproduce or maintain the capitalist economic system. Schools are seen as tailoring the self-concepts, aspirations and social class identifications of individuals to the requirements of the social division of labour.

The interactionists developed largely in reaction to the last two schools of thought by stating that one can understand education, if one looks at everyday activity. To understand everyday activity implies an ability to grasp the meanings that people give to their behaviour. This approach to education therefore advocates the subjectivist method.

Chapter five deals with the theory of structuration, the concepts involved and the criticisms levelled against such a theory. In the theory of structuration, Giddens argues that neither subject (human agent) nor object (society) should be regarded as having primacy. The notion of human action presupposes that of social institutions and vice versa. Explication of this relation thus comprises the core of an account of how it it that the structuration (production and reproduction across time and space) of social practices takes place. The notion of action refers to the components of human conduct namely 'capability' and 'knowledgeability'. In the first we imply that the agent could have acted otherwise. By the second is implied all those things which members of the society know about that society and the conditions of their activity within it.

An explication of subjectivity must relate 'discursive consciousness' (this implies that something can be held in the
mind in a conscious way) to practical consciousness and the unconscious. In the theory of structuration "the structured properties of society, ........ 'exist' only in their instantiation in the structuration of social systems, and in the memory traces (reinforced or altered in the continuity of daily social life) that constitute the knowledgetability of social actors. But institutionalized practices happen and are made to happen through the application of resources in the continuity of daily life. Resources are structured properties of social systems but 'exist' only in the capability of actors in their capacity to 'act otherwise' ........ the organisation of social practices is fundamentally recursive. Structure is both medium and the outcome of the practices it recursively organises" (7).

Chapter six looks at the arguments put forward by Giddens in his book: The Constitution of Society (1984) to counter the criticisms against his theory and then looks at the implications of structuration theory for education. Finally, the importance of structuration theory for education is discussed by showing that it points to a possible resolution to the polarization in thinking about education which has dominated the past few decades. By discussing the ethnographic data of Paul willis and Gambetta, the implications for educational research is evident as well as a study of key concepts in structuration theory, for instance, practical consciousness, positioning and seriality.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


CHAPTER TWO

SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT IN SOCIOLOGY IN THE POST 1960S

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The period of the late nineteenth century which marked the advent of the so called 'human sciences' meant that human behaviour needed to be explained and analysed. The two world wars brought about insecurity and as a result of this the individual and his survival in a world of insecurity was the centre of interest. Human sciences therefore still dominated after the wars and up until the 1960s. Thereafter radical changes took place. Industrialization and technological progress which characterized growth in the nineteenth century, was accelerated due to the interval of the long war-time period. Humanistic ideals seemed irrelevant and more social relevance was demanded from the human sciences, especially in Western Europe. The accent in the human sciences shifted to the "individual-in-context whether on the micro or the macro level, hence the shift from 'human sciences' to 'social sciences'" (1).

Trends in sociological thought in the 1960s can be grouped broadly under the following headings:

- functionalism
- marxism
- interactionism/ethnomethodology
- structuralism

Contemporary modern schools of thought in sociology of knowledge begin with the breakdown of the 'classical voluntarist model' which centred not on large scale changes but on the human subject (2). The dominant paradigm becomes functionalism, its pre-eminence bound up with the emergence of American sociology in the years following the Second World War. Classical sociology, which entails a reaction to
positivist thought, was especially dominant in the European continent. The rise of fascism, communism and the Second World War shifted the focus of sociological thought across the Atlantic. It was not until the 1960s that schools of sociology, the re-emergence of phenomenology, new action theory, structuralism, marxist-humanism - which drew much of their inspiration from classical sociology, re-emerged.

2.2 FUNCTIONALISM

Functionalism as a distinct methodology and theory of society originated first in the work of Comte, Spencer and Durkheim and secondly in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century anthropology, especially in the writing of A.R. Radcliffe-Brown (1881 - 1955) and Bronislaw Malinowski (1884 - 1942). Durkheim is often cited as the dominant influence on the development of sociological functionalism for his argument that social institutions exist solely to fulfill specific social needs.

Basically, Durkheim argued that whenever men came to interact together, they produce an emergent level of reality which is distinct from that of the individuals and which is external to such individuals and exercises control over their actions. He sees this reality as consisting of two kinds of phenomena: the first set of phenomena is on the level of social organisation and the second set of phenomena he sees as ‘social currents’. These are "other facts without such crystallized form which has the same objectivity and the same ascendancy over the individual" (3). So he sees the world of reality then as a world of social facts.

The background to Durkheim’s sociology hence can be seen as located in the taken-for-granted commonsense view of the world as an objective reality. An investigation of the social world through interpretative practices of its members is not regarded by Durkheim as a feature of that world.
According to Durkheim, sociology is to address itself to an already preconstituted world of social facts in order to determine the relationship between such facts. "The determining cause of a social fact should be sought among the social facts preceding it and not among the states of individual consciousness" (4). In his later work, Durkheim moves away from social facts to social consciousness per se. He attempts to discuss the latter concept in terms of moral systems.

Given its early development in Durkheim’s sociology, functionalism was barely a significant presence in the mainstream of European sociology during the first years of the twentieth century. The early American sociologists, Albion Small, Robert Park, Charles Cooley and W.I. Thomas were attracted to the individualistic psychological approach of Tarde and Simmel’s theory of sociation, both of course, criticised by Durkheim for a failure to grasp society as a collective phenomenon (5). American individualism combined with empiricism and social psychology, effectively precluded the development of a theory of society in the manner of the European sociologists. A collectivist conception of society did however emerge in America during the 1930s in the form of a ‘dogmatic marxism’ although it failed to strike deep roots in American intellectual culture (6). Sociological functionalism developed as the major sociological paradigm after the Second World War, the most significant holistic conception of society developed by American sociologists (7).

Kingsley Davis defined society in macro-sociological terms with the main focus being on integration and survival and the relation of parts to whole and in the work of Talcott Parsons, functionalism became codified into a form of systems analysis (8). Parsons’ theory of action emphasised the need for values at a time in American history when American values appeared to be under strain caused by
economic depression and the Wall Street collapse of 1929/1930. This economic depression had repercussions for the whole of society.

Parsons argues that his model of the social system is concerned with the problem of social order. Order in society is attained through two processes which organize the interdependence of the parts of the system. These two processes are:

(a) equilibrium - the tendency of the system to self maintenance.

(b) homeostasis - the tendency of the social system to maintain certain boundaries relative to an environment.

The central feature of Parsons' model is the analysis of the operations of the system in the environment. Parsons is concerned with areas of interchange between the social system and other systems namely the physical system, the cultural system and the personality system. Through a scarcity of resources the physical system has to adapt, by organising the object world through allocation of personnel and resources to meet the ends of the system. This is met by the activity of the economy. The cultural system is concerned with the co-existence of men and legitimation of the system's normative order.

The cultural system gives rise to two pre-requisites namely (a) goal attainment and (b) integration. The personality system refers to the unsocialized individual and gives rise to 'latency'. This latter concept ensures that the different parts of the system are motivated enough to attain their goals. This is met by the family which provides primary socialization and emotional support for members. Finally, Parsons claims that the social system is a system
of action because the social system emerges through social interaction and secondly the actor as role performer, is the vehicle through which the systems' activities operate.

Merton has argued that far from embodying a conservative ideology, sociological functionalism can be radical and critical by pointing to failures and weaknesses, that show the malfunctioning of specific institutions in order to satisfy the collective needs of society. Thus for Merton functionalism is "methodologically neutral given an ideological colouring only by the politically motivated" (9).

The basic characteristics of sociological functionalism can be summarised as follows (10):

2.2.1 Societies are wholes, systems of interrelated parts. Each part has meaning only in terms of its relations with the whole performing a specific function within the system.

2.2.2 The concept of system is central to all forms of sociological functionalism. Society is thus defined as a structure of elements possessing a patterned form, the point of departure is the system as a whole and those factors essential for its survival, evolution and adequate functioning.

2.2.3 All elements that make up the social system are indispensable to the extent that they perform special functions related to the 'needs' of the system as a system.

2.2.4 Integration of all parts of the system - the sub-system is never perfect. Hence the importance of social control mechanisms.
2.2.5 Deviance, tension and strains exist as dysfunctional elements. They become institutionalised or resolved in the direction of social integration and equilibrium.

2.2.6 Social change is adaptive and gradual. Even if there is rapid social change it occurs within the cultural rather than within the economic institutions.

2.2.7 Social integration is achieved essentially through value consensus and shared cognitive orientations that is through a pervasive set of principles which legitimize the existing social, economic and political structure.

2.3 MARXISM

During the past two decades there has been a notable revival of marxist thinking in the social sciences (11). Bolshevik dominance over marxism came to an end with the revelations about the Stalinist regime, political and intellectual revolts took place in Eastern Europe and a more critical view of marxist theory emerged encouraged further by the rise of alternative centres of marxist political practice, especially in China. Largely as a result of these changes a transformation of marxist thought has occurred in Western Europe, partly through the re-discovery and renewed discussion of earlier thinkers, amongst them Lukacs, Gramsci and the Frankfurt School.

In sociology, marxist theory has emerged in diverse forms, as a major paradigm that was perceived as bringing together in a systematic form the results of the more specialised sciences. In this recent development two principal orientations of marxist thought have emerged (a) structural marxism and (b) critical theory. The former owes its
distinctive character to the work of Louis Althusser.

Althusser's own concerns are primarily epistemological - he sets out to establish a theory of knowledge in opposition to empiricism, to make apparent the "immense 'theoretical revolution' that Marx accomplished, and to show the 'scientificity' of Marx's mature theory in contrast with ideological thought" (12). Althusser's work shows an increasing emphasis in marxist theory on the concept of mode of production and its relation with the superstructure, and the theory of ideology. For Althusser the mode of production constitutes a number of different structures including the economic. It is the way these structures are combined that differentiates one mode of production from another.

For example, the capitalist mode of production has a specific economic structure, and a legal system which forms part of the superstructure. A different combination will exist therefore between the economy and legal systems in a socialist mode of production. However, the impact Althusser has had on marxism can be seen in his analysis of ideology. Althusser sees the source of ideology being that of an objective material reality which cannot be understood in terms of consciousness of the subject. He sees ideology as a system through which the individual exists as a social being. Ideology in other words, is produced by institutions and if we take state capitalism as an example then these institutions would largely be state organs (13).

In his analysis of ideology, Althusser distinguished between Ideological State Apparatuses (consisting of religious, educational, cultural institutions as well as political parties) and the Repressive State Apparatuses (for example institutions of coercion, the police, army, judiciary) (14). In pre-capitalist societies the church functioned as the dominant ideological apparatus and in modern capitalism, the
educational institutions have become the dominant ideological apparatus.

It will be useful in this context to consider the ideas of some of the thinkers associated with another broad tendency in present-day marxist thought, namely 'critical theory', for in spite of the different character of their basic conceptions, critical theorists agree with the structural marxists in distinguishing three principal spheres of social life - economic, political and ideological, among which there is a complex interaction rather than simple unilinear determination by the economic structure. Although there are considerable differences among individual thinkers some of the general conceptions which characterize empirical theory are evident (15). The first general characteristic of critical theory is emphasis upon consciousness and intentional activity which played an important part in society. In this respect critical theory drew from many sources namely marxism, German idealism and especially phenomenology, in order to comprehend the relationship between the intentional activities of individuals and unintended consequences of the behaviour of groups and classes.

The second distinctive feature of critical theory is its preoccupation with cultural criticism. Critical theorists argue that the reproduction or transformation of the social world depends upon the interpretation and legitimacy given to that world in the consciousness of individuals. This interpretation is expressed in a system of cultural values and ideologies for example social, philosophical and religious doctrines, legal systems and educational practices.

Such emphasis has led to analyses of late capitalist society as Habermas's study of science and technology as ideology and the problems of legitimation (16). For Habermas, late capitalist society has become a state-capitalist system
which is highly centralized and regulated. The public sphere which served to mediate society and the state in nineteenth century capitalism has been eclipsed with the growth of technology and bureaucracy. Institutions which served to communicate public opinion have become commercialized and depoliticized.

Habermas also focuses on the crisis tendencies and the legitimation problems of late capitalism. A study of legitimation involves objective structures such as the state and economy as well as motivation and patterns of communication. A crisis of legitimacy occurs when the socio-cultural system no longer functions to socialize individuals into roles, occupations and institutions and also when the administrative system can no longer allocate adequate rewards for labour and the necessity for capital accumulation. Legitimation problems develop therefore because of disjunctions between the various sub-systems.

A third feature of critical theory is its conception of society as being concerned with historical interpretation. Social life is seen as a historical process and progress in which reason is able to recognize and seize opportunities for liberation (17). It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that recent works on Marxism have been devoted to problems of method and this is a similar concern which prevails in sociology as a whole. Both are preoccupied with questions about the nature of a general social science, its scientific standing and its relation to philosophy and they also draw upon many of the same sources among them phenomenological criticisms of the idea of a social science, theories of language and structuralist doctrines.
2.4 INTERACTIONISM (18)
'Interactionism', or 'symbolic interactionists' or the 'Chicago School' are terms of reference which in themselves yield a clue to explaining the variety of images that exist around this approach. Nevertheless it would appear as though commentators today either critical of or sympathetic to interactionism, frequently use the term 'symbolic interactionism'. Herbert Blumer (1969) is regarded by many as an authority and founding father as G.H. Mead, who laid the basis for the interactionist perspective in society.

The impetus for the formation of the school of interactionism seems to have come primarily from men and women whose avowed intellectual positions are grounded in the writings of G.H. Mead. As such I propose to look at Mead's theory of social self in symbolic interactionism. For Mead, both mind and self were the social creations of everyday life. Mead was concerned with analysing the patterns of interaction, the social acts which he saw as the basis of human society. Social acts, he believed involved the co-operation of more than one person within a framework or group. The self was individual only through its reciprocal relations with others in the community.

The self he saw as being both subject and object. The 'I' as the subject that thinks and acts and the 'me' as the individual's awareness of self as an object. Mead believes that one cannot separate the 'I' and the 'Me' as the former develops through social experience. Childhood, for Mead, represented the first stage in the formation of the self; the second he described as the 'game' which he viewed as distinct from play where individual roles are internalized since 'game' connotes a collective role, the generalized other, the organised group.

Mead's theory of self represented a marked advance on previous sociologies of the actor. Although both the act
and the self were bound with the social structure, they were both reflexive and creative (20).

2.5 ETHNOMETHODOLOGY (21)
Ethnomethodology borrows and extends ideas from both symbolic interactionism and phenomenology. In extending the ideas of these schools of thought however, ethnomethodology begins to posit a very different view of the world thus making it an alternative paradigm in sociology. Alfred Schutz, an important figure in phenomenology, is at the same time the major source of the approach which was called ethnomethodology by its founder, Harold Garfinkel (22). An important aspect in ethnomethodological analyses is the development of concepts and principles that can help explain how people's sense of reality is constructed, maintained and changed (23).

Garfinkel is concerned to establish a meaningful level of social reality for the purposes of sociological analysis. It involves therefore a sociological study of everyday life. The study of ethnomethodology therefore becomes the examination of the process by which members in their everyday way make rational and accountable their everyday experiences. Garfinkel sees the most ordinary and mundane activities of social interaction as having an organized character. Since meaning is part of the process of everyday interaction, it has to be studied by participation in the interactions which make it up because the meanings of these interactions to the participants is the only way everyday practices can be seen as being valid.

Another important characteristic of ethnomethodology as expounded by Garfinkel is a rejection of the distinction between 'extraordinary' events and practices and 'ordinary' everyday ones. All social events and activities are seen as being equal. In ethnomethodology an important distinction is made between two types of expression - 'indexical' and
'objective'. The former refers to objects described in terms of their uniqueness and thus are bound by the context in which they are used and the latter describes general properties of their referent objects, in other words, characteristics that make an object typical. Indexical expressions are used to describe the commonplace character of everyday social activities and objective expressions describe formal discourse (24).

Garfinkel believes that in so far as sociology is to be considered a science it has to explain commonplace everyday social activities in the objective expressions required by formal discourse. Yet, these activities, being everyday are also described adequately at everyday level by indexical expressions. Thus sociology begins to explain them 'scientifically' by substituting objective for indexical and Garfinkel feels this is unnecessary on the grounds that indexical expressions have national properties through their ability to present everyday social activities as being ordered. The skills and techniques involved in the employment of national properties of indexical expressions in everyday life is the concern of ethnomethodology.

Garfinkel's work in ethnomethodology is a fundamental challenge to traditional modes of sociological explanation. This is evident in three spheres namely (a) the natural-scientific character of their rationality (b) their objectivity and hence the validity of their existing generalizations (c) it has shown that to study social phenomena there is a requirement for sociology to study its epistemological and philosophical roots (25).

2.6 STRUCTURALISM (26)
Symbolic interactionism and social phenomenology are sociological approaches which centred on the notion of a creative human subject and which rejects the objectivism of positivism and functionalism. Both functionalism and
marxism are characterised by an insistence on the objectivity of social structure. Societies are not simple aggregates but structures consisting of elements which have their meaning only in relation to the whole.

Recent structuralism however represents a new intellectual outlook in philosophy, linguistics, and literary criticism as well as in the social sciences. As a broad movement of thought, structuralism is characterized by its antihumanism and/or antihistoricism. In the former the conscious and purposive actions of individuals and social groups are excluded from analysis and sociological analysis is concerned in terms of 'structural causality'. In the latter the aim is to discover universal structural characteristics of human society and relate these characteristics to universal structures of the human mind itself (27).

However, two other features distinguish recent structuralism from earlier works discussed and that is (a) the concept of structure occupies a central and dominant place and its theoretical elaboration is beyond the work of previous thinkers and (b) there is an insistence upon penetrating behind the immediately given surface appearances of social phenomena to an 'inner', 'hidden' or 'deep' structure.

Structuralism therefore has exerted an enormous influence in the social sciences especially in the work of Levi-Strauss, Althusser, Poulantzas, Godelier, Foucault and Lacan. Although these theorists disagree about the exact nature of structuralism there is nevertheless a broad consensus that a structuralist approach to the study of human society and culture involves the notion of wholes, the idea of transformation and the concept of self-regulation (28).
2.7 THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

It was the German sociologist, Max Scheler (1874-1928) who coined the term sociology of knowledge in 1924. This school of thought was concerned with the social distribution of knowledge through specific social institutions such as schools and newspapers and the reality of social interests in the formation of different kinds of knowledge. The sociology of knowledge was therefore an attempt to trace the social location of different forms of knowledge examining their genesis in relation to specific social structural elements (29). The major European contribution to the sociology of knowledge, however, came in the works of Karl Mannheim (1893-1947).

Mannheim saw the rapidly changing and dynamic nature of the historical and social context as constituting the major problem for the sociology of knowledge. His sociology of knowledge theory had two distinct emphases. The first saw an emphasis on the theory of knowledge in which styles of thought were said to be related to social groups and social locations and the second emphasized an historicist conception of truth and validity, in conjunction with 'appropriateness' and 'needs' (30).

More recently, Berger and Luckmann claim to have attempted "a redefinition of the problems and tasks of the sociology of knowledge .... to have produced some general implications for social theory and sociological enterprise at large" (31). They hope to obtain the "proper object of society, which is, society as part of a human world, made by men, and in turn, making men in an ongoing historical process" (32). From their work there emerges certain prerequisites for the attainment of this ideal (33):
(a) A sociology of language (which a sociology of knowledge presupposes).

(b) A sociology of religion (without which a sociology of knowledge is impossible).

(c) A dialectical perspective, in order to facilitate an understanding of what Marcel Mauss called the 'total social fact'.

They believe that not only is the sociology of knowledge a humanistic discipline but that it must be carried on in a continuous conversation with both history and philosophy or lose its proper object of inquiry.

The idea of sociology of knowledge is not new but it began to acquire more attention in the 1960s with the shift in emphasis to the social sciences. "Abberrant Marxists, structuralists and Habermasians began to argue that we can give a sociological account of why scientists adopt virtually all of the specific beliefs about the world which they do. Contemporary schools in the sociology of science was promoted by a group of Edinburgh sociologists. The sociology of scientific knowledge should, they say "be symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same types of cause would explain say true and false beliefs" (34). This has come to be known as the 'strong programme' in the sociology of knowledge (35). The last five or six decades have seen important shifts in philosophical thinking about scientific thinking and the growth of scientific knowledge.

In Europe a renewed interest in 'classical' sociology of knowledge caused scientists to take a hard look at 'scientific' knowledge. The interest in the work of Mannheim, Scheler, Weber and Mead, to quote some examples formed the basis for a critical stance concerning the American - style research by Merton and others. "Despite
an obvious epistemological difference between the two mentioned approaches, contemporary sociologists of science acknowledge the contributions of both" (36). The sociology of science in the 1970s had progressively studied the following issues:

- the questioning of existing theories, concepts and ideologies in science and
- the concentration of interests behind these;
- social organisational bases of science and
- their roots in experience and observation (39).

Nel states that the proliferation of thinking and research in the sociology of science during the last decade is best illustrated by the Trend Report and the 1983 publication edited by Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay. In the former mention is made of two dominant schools of thought, "an institutional and interactional approach respectively. The difference between the two can be seen in the fact that in the institutional approach observation was made of the way scientists act towards each other, patterns of scientific quotation and habits of consultation" (38).

In the review by Nel, four approaches are identified by Chubin and Restivo. The first school of thought is referred to as the 'Edinburgh School' which advocates a so called 'strong programme' in research in the sociology of scientific knowledge. Roy Bhaskar is an important exponent of this programme. The second branch of the Edinburgh school is identified as the 'Bath School' or 'mild programme' and the influence of Collins and Pinch is notable in this regard. The so called 'constructivist' or 'contextual' school of thought is one of the most prominent in the context of the sociology of science. Knorr-Cetina, a prominent exponent, explains that the briefest participation in the world of scientific investigation suggests that the language of truth and hypothesis testing is ill-equipped to
deal with laboratory work. Most of the reality with which scientists deal with is highly preconstructed, if not wholly artificial (39). The epistemological baseline in this approach is the acceptance of a social construction of knowledge.

The third 'arena' is 'scientometrics' which involves research that conforms to the concept of science in the positivist mould. In South Africa, this style of research is promoted by the Human Sciences Research Council. It involves an 'objective' study by the use of sample and measurement as well as testing of hypotheses (40). The fourth "arena" is the 'weak programme'. This approach shows some similarities to the constructivist and the strong programme.

The central question of this line of approach is "in what kind of world would what kind of epistemic activities lead an epistemic community to conclude that it was improving its model of the world and what are the implications for those inside and outside of the epistemic community" (41). It is difficult to name definite exponents of this school of thought but Restivo and Chubin had a tremendous influence in this area. The importance of this programme is its attempt to bring about a closer link between present philosophical inquiries on science since it attempts to study science as a meta-form of inquiry.

2.8 CONCLUSION
All the schools of thought dealt with in this chapter are based on a model of human action that makes reference to people's intentions, the means available to carry them out and the meaning in which they formulate their intentions and select what seems to be appropriate. Each approach works with an explicit or implicit idea of social structure as a system built up out of the actions and interactions of individuals. This was particularly explicit in the works
of the structural-functionalists. Conflict theory, while also focussing on the level of the system, made its greatest contribution however, by pointing to the complexity of the social world. Symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology both concentrated on individual action as opposed to system analysis. The former school of thought tries to make sense of the flux and flow of everyday life while the latter school of thought offers a more rigorous idea of the structure of action. Structuralism as a school of thought is important firstly, in that it sees social structures as being independent of our knowledge and in one sense of our actions and secondly, it is a theory which states that our ideas, the way we think, have an underlying structure which in fact determines what we think.

The necessity of including a survey of some of the dominant schools of thought in sociology was intended to show how Giddens was able to draw and react to ideas postulated by these theorists. Giddens felt that it was no longer possible to conceive of social reality as a pre-given structure awaiting disclosure. Rather, it must be seen as an ongoing product of intentionality and reason, both of which are part of the creative consciousness. The fact that human beings have interests of which they are not conscious means that social life is not just a dialogue over the meaning of events and objects but is a practical affair in which actors pursue lines of action that others will resist.

It is clear from the discussion on structuration theory in chapter five that Giddens was influenced by the dominant schools of thought discussed in this chapter and this is further qualified by the introduction into his theory of concepts drawn from the terrain of sociology as well as philosophy of science.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


See also:


4. See (3) pp. 110-111.

5. Tarde believed that society is not conceived in atomistic terms but is structured through forms that realise both the individuality and regularity of human action. Simmel’s theory of sociation was that society is a product of human activity in the sense that society is sociation and sociation itself exists at the level of ordinary everyday life forms which bind individuals together. The individual link with society is dualistic, both within and outside of it.

7. We will not elaborate on the pre-World War I sociologies in America as this is an interesting study on its own.


See also the following books for more detail on Parsons:


10. See (2a) p. 233.

11. (a) See (2b) p. 135.

See also:


12. See (2b) p. 136.


   See also:


15. (a) See (2b) p. 139.

   (b) An example is that of Habermas who argued that since the economic system surrendered part of its autonomy to the state, an economic crisis cannot directly provoke a crisis of the whole social system. The latter condition will occur if there were a political and an ideological crisis in which the cultural system became incapable of providing the necessary motivations for the maintenance and reproduction of the existing system. There is a
move away from the idea of determination although some authors argue that the dominance of the state and ideology is the consequence of a particular mode of production viz. that of advanced capitalism which in this sense remains determinant.


17. See (2b) p. 140.


See also:


22. Schutz’s theoretical stance will be dealt with later under phenomenology in Chapter 3 and his importance in ethnomethodology would be able to be seen from that discussion.


24. See (20), Lecture Fifteen, pp. 257-280.

26. (a) See (2a), Chapter 10, pp. 276-293.

See also:

(b) (2b), Chapter 14, pp. 557-594.


27. See (2b), pp. 590-591.


29. See (2a), Chapter 11, pp. 294-297.

30. (a) See (2a), Chapter 11, pp. 298-311.

See also:


See also:


32. See (31b), p. 211.
33. See (31b), pp. 207-211.


36. See (35), p. 3.

37. See (35), p. 3.

38. See (35), p. 6.


40. See (35), p. 9.

41. Nel quotes Knorr-Cetina, p. 9.
CHAPTER THREE

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In discussing the general relationship between philosophy and the sciences, Benton distinguishes four conceptions of this relationship (1). Benton is able to show that the 'under-labourer' and 'master scientist' conceptions (terminology he adopted from P. Winch's book: "The idea of a social science") do in fact have underlying themes in common even though they are classical opponents. In the 'under-labourer' conception, the philosophers's task is to obliterate obstacles that impede the growth of science. These obstacles are vague and insignificant forms of speech and language abuse that have passed for science but in reality hinder the growth of genuine knowledge. The task of philosophy then is "to set criteria for significance and insignificance in the use of language and hence of erecting standards by which all claims to knowledge are to be judged" (2).

The 'master scientist' or metaphysical conception sees the relationship between philosophy and science as "the enterprise of constructing or rather reconstructing the whole of (acceptable) human knowledge into one massive logically connected and internally consistent system of proposition" (3). Although the 'master scientist' concept like the 'under labourer' concept seeks to distinguish genuine knowledge from spurious claims, the former proposes that genuine knowledge can be deduced from a small number of self-evident premises. The common underlying assumption of both these conceptions is that the relationship between philosophy and science is the same for all sciences and for all historical epochs.
Benton also discusses two modern conceptions which challenge this assumption and see the relationship between philosophy and science as subject to historical change. The first is the work of Thomas Kuhn who presented a set of concepts for understanding scientific activity and which challenged the dominant traditions of thought in the history, philosophy and sociology of science. Kuhn's contribution to a study of philosophy of science will be discussed later in this chapter. The second historically informed conception of the relationship between philosophy and science is to be found in the work of Karl Marx. He advocates that "philosophy is the predecessor of scientific knowledge; it has its place prior to the emergence of a science, but only when the scientific investigation of the relevant field begins, then philosophy loses its point" (4).

It is now possible to discuss the question of how the great body of theoretical science is thought to grow since it seems to be a major concern of philosophy of science. An attempt will be made in this chapter to examine the answers provided by some of those who had a major influence in the twentieth century namely Karl Popper and his method of falsification, Thomas Kuhn and the scientific paradigm, Imre Lakatos and research programmes and Paul Feyerabend and the principle 'anything goes'. Through a discussion of these thinkers, it can be seen that the current position is a complex one which has arisen by embracing the wisdom of the past and at the same time by reacting against what is now seen as false or unsatisfactory.

3.2 KARL POPPER (5)
One of the most important influences on all discussions of the philosophy of science since the 1950s has been the work of Karl Popper. Popper gained popularity for his 'method of falsification' which proposed that hypotheses
are to be developed and attempts made to falsify them through empirical research. The act of falsifying a theory is for Popper a high point of science since it is the moment at which its body of knowledge grows. For the falsificationist, observations are theory laden and progress therefore occurs by making bold speculations which can account for more observations and survive the test that falsified earlier theories. It is not enough for a new theory to be falsifiable. For science to grow, it must be more falsifiable than the one it replaces for then it will be more general and informative (6).

Popper is of the opinion that scientific knowledge, imperfect though it may be, is the most certain and reliable knowledge to which human beings can aspire. He sees science as separated from the other forms of tradition in so far as its theories and findings are capable of being exposed to empirical testing and therefore to potential falsification.

According to Popper, the distinctive characteristic of science is that instead of merely seeking confirmation or verification of a theory, the scientist attempts to refute it. "Confirmation of a theory results from its successful withstanding of empirical assaults which have the aim of falsifying it" (7). Popper's philosophy of science is based on the fact that no scientific law can be conclusively proved, it insists that scientific advances are possible through the empirical refutation of hypotheses.

3.3 THOMAS KUHN (8)
The most important formulation in philosophy of science
during recent years has been to a large degree reaction against Popper’s work, just as his was a rejection of inductivism and the variability principle of the Vienna Circle. The emphasis in the growth of science recently has been on structured ‘wholes’ with a distinct organic continuity through time. One of the first attempts to give science the organic character was by T. Kuhn. He saw science in terms of communities of scientists rather than individuals. A characteristic feature of Kuhn’s work is the emphasis on the ‘indoctrination’ of the scientist doing research. This is ‘indoctrination’ within the confines of what Kuhn calls a ‘paradigm’. The paradigm, Kuhn views as a research tradition, a way of thinking and acting within a given field. The paradigm represents the structure of a science and guides its research activities. Laws and theories within this paradigm are taught to the scientist as if they were true, to be accepted by him if he is to become a member of the scientific community. The activity within this community, Kuhn refers to as ‘normal science’ (9).

‘Normal science’ is stable and successful and is seen as the limiting functions of the paradigm because the latter exerts its control by ensuring that normal science tackles only problems it has every expectation of solving. The paradigm demarcates science from non-science. The most important source of scientific ‘advancement’ Kuhn sees as occurring in the revolutionary paradigm shifts. Because of the nature of normal science, the start of a revolutionary phase is at first resisted. The experience of a scientific revolution Kuhn likens to that of ‘religious conversion’ The scientist’s earned commitment to his paradigm is broken and he has to transfer allegiance to what is in effect a new world view.
According to Kuhn, the scientist is too committed to his present paradigm to reject it, for this would be a rejection of science itself, and research would be impossible thereafter. Thus the act of judgement that leads scientists to reject a paradigm is simultaneous with that which accepts another (10).

3.4 IMRE LAKATOS (11)

The second theory which derives from history a view of science as consisting of structured organic wholes is that of Imre Lakatos. He speaks of sequences of theories being welded together, into continuous 'research programmes'. The programmes offer the scientist guidance, both as to which research problems to avoid and which to pursue. The former constitutes the 'vegetative heuristic' of the programme and contains a 'hard core' of background information that has emerged over a long period of trial and error.

Once established this 'hard core' is protected by a belt of auxiliary hypotheses and observation, the function of which is to be tested and refined or rejected while protecting the core. So in a given research programme auxiliary hypothesis will be added to accommodate new anomalies, and the programme is said to be progressive so long as the range of empirical observations that it accounts for grows, particularly in the sense of its success at predicting novel facts. The programme is described as degenerating if it does not do this (12).

Lakatos agreed with Popper about the steps that may be taken to save a research programme. The protective belt may be modified to defend the hard core in any way. For a programme to be successful and, indeed, scientific, means in fact that it must maintain its own ordered and cohesive framework to guide research and it must continue to develop novel phenomena which can be tested.
Lakatos’s theory was formulated to improve on Popper’s falsificationism by giving its theories continuity through time. In achieving this the theory also revealed its debt to Kuhn. Lakatos’s theory is also similar to Kuhn in the problem of determining which of two competing research programmes is better or at least to be preferred.

3.5 **PAUL FEYERABEND** (13)

The main thread linking all the accounts of science that was discussed has been the emphasis on rationality and progress. Despite important differences in how scientific advance is interpreted, all philosophers have stressed the logical process by which old theories are replaced by new. Paul Feyerabend gives an ‘irrationalist’ view of science, denying that there is or ever has been an objective scientific method and claiming that if any progress is seen in science it is the result of scientists having broken the rules of rationality.

Feyerabend feels that proliferation of theories is beneficial to science while uniformity could impair its critical powers. Uniformity is seen as an ideological device to be found in the institutionalization of science. To stray from the conformist standards of the scientific community is to be branded unscientific and this could be construed not only as advocating non-science but also nonsense (14). The principle to follow in order to proliferate theories and not inhibit progress is that of ‘anything goes’. That this is the only methodology for science is revealed by a scrutiny of history. According to Feyerabend no episode in real science is simple enough to fit any one of the conventional methodologies thus it has always been normal practice to cope with inconvenient facts by ignoring them, explaining them away in an ad hoc fashion and even concealing them.
Feyerabend believes that Lakatos, in failing to define the time limit after which a degenerating research programme must be abandoned, has to admit that there is no means by which a rational scientist may direct his allegiance from one programme to another. Science he believes cannot be proved the best ideology for a given individual to follow any more than a given theory in or methodology of science can be proved the best. But by allowing genuine choice those who are best suited to science will choose to follow it and in this way science itself can only gain (15).

3.6 NEOMARXIST PHILOSOPHY (16)

I will not deal in any depth with marxist economic or political theories as these have been covered in Chapter Two. What I will be emphasizing in this chapter is an introduction to marxist philosophies as both continuous with and distinct from other philosophies. I will therefore only discuss some views of the critical theorists particularly relating to science.

Habermas undertakes a study of philosophies of science and social science with the aim of unveiling the illusion of "pure knowledge and of elaborating a constructive framework for critical theory. He maintains that critical theory cannot be conceived on the natural science model nor can it be identified with those disciplines concerned to interpret and renew our cultural heritage. Critical theory has been characterized above all by self-realization, a concept which has been eclipsed by the rise of positivism as a philosophy" (17). Habermas believes that there is no single model of science but rather several forms of scientific inquiry, each of which is governed by a particular kind of 'interest', the latter being connected to the social world.
"By eliminating the activity of reflection, positivist philosophies of science transformed epistemology into the elucidation of the scientific method. The methods of the natural sciences in general and of physics in particular, were regarded as paradigmatic for any discipline which aspires to the production of knowledge: such is the essence of scientism" (18). Habermas maintains that this transformation of epistemology has prevented positivist philosophers from grasping the conditions of possibility of natural science, as well as of its emulators in the social sphere. He uses the term 'empirical - analytic' to describe those sciences that formulate general laws about a domain of objects or events and to derive predictions therefrom (19).

The knowledge produced by the empirical analytic sciences is constituted by an interest in the technical control of a world of objects that can be manipulated. Habermas believes therefore that Popper's contention that falsifiability is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science must be rejected, since it precludes the possibility that there may be types of science which do not concur with the empirical - analytic model and which are constituted by fundamentally different interests.

An example of science that cannot be assimilated to the empirical-analytic model is the 'historical-hermeneutic' science (20). These are disciplines concerned, above all, with renewing cultural heritage through the interpretation of texts and works received from the past. Habermas sees this domain as being constituted by an interest in practical interaction between persons and social groups. The suggestion is that a view of theoretical science incorporating overall views of the natural and social worlds might be adopted, not as
correspondences of the world, but as media of human communication about nature and society.

The third type of science, Habermas calls the 'critical social sciences'. By referring to Freud's theory of psycho-analysis Habermas shows how this theory presupposes a framework in which action and communication are systematically distorted by the exercise of power and repression and this discipline is paradigmatic for those sciences which are governed by an 'interest in emancipation'.

In more recent years Habermas has turned his attention to another theory of language which is central in the formation of consciousness and provides a foundation for critique. This will be further elaborated when we examine Wittgenstein's "linguistic turn" (21).

3.7 HERMENEUTICS (22)

The dominant methodological orientation of nineteenth century sociology was positivism. According to this approach it was assumed that a fundamental continuity existed between the realms of nature and society. In Germany, the emergence of sociology as a distinctive discipline owed much to the positivist tradition but in striving to define its own specific methodology and concept of society, many of the central assumptions of positivist orthodoxy were abandoned. One such philosopher was Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) who was concerned with epistemological issues and problems of methodology in the social and cultural sciences. For Dilthey, understanding and interpreting constituted the true method of the human sciences. The task of the cultural sciences, he believed, was to systematise the form of understanding that existed at the everyday level into complex forms of understanding.
For Dilthey understanding was always connected with the concept of the cultural whole. Dilthey’s concept of understanding was clearly historicist in that he believed the human act flows from the objective world of culture and in so doing discovering its inner structure. In this sense, humanity becomes the subject matter of the cultural sciences. Dilthey was critical of positivism because it tried to assimilate complex human experience to deterministic external processes (23). Dilthey believed that trying to integrate the concept of meaning into a methodology that emphasized the externality of the social and cultural worlds was impossible. Human actions and experiences he believed were subjective and formed part of a humanly created historical whole.

A more recent influence in the hermeneutic tradition who is one of Dilthey’s most important successors as a philosopher of the human science, is Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur compares spoken discourse with written language. In the text the connection between meaning and intention of the actor is broken. The written text must be addressed to whomever knows how to read and to whomever may read it in the future. It must have an objective quality. What the text says therefore is more important than what the author meant to say.

This brings us to Ricoeur’s principal point and that is that meaningful action should be seen as a text. Because the parties in real life rarely know one another, they must speak as if they are writing for an unknown audience. Because people must use common symbols if their subjectivity is to be understood, the symbols used to achieve understanding are accessible to a wide variety of people. There is therefore, according to Ricouer an
objective element to hermeneutical interpretation. This does not mean that hermeneutics can escape subjectivity altogether. The observer, in trying to construct meaningful wholes must rely on his own interpretative reservoir from previous intuitive experiences to see how things 'fit together' in cultural life (24).

3.8 PHENOMENOLOGY (25)

The foundations of modern phenomenology were laid by Edmund Husserl during the first thirty years of this century. His writing presents the main concerns and problems of phenomenology and provide the background against which to set off the writings of other contributors to the movement for example Schutz, Max Scheler, Martin Heiddegger, Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

Husserl wanted to make phenomenology the first to inquire into those forms of conscious experience which other philosophers and sciences took for granted and on which they built. Husserl's phenomenology attempts to describe the ultimate grounds of experience through a particular method - the 'phenomenological reduction'. So phenomenology will give insight into consciousness as a region of being which is unique and this region according to Husserl would be revealed by the phenomenological method.

The notion of intentionality is also central to phenomenology. 'Mind' or 'consciousness' is viewed as a relationship between subject and object and the notion of 'intentionality' is an attempt to describe this relationship. Intentionality thus describes an essential feature of consciousness, that it is always conscious of something.
Moreover, Husserl sees this life-world as an inter-subjective world. The latter concept refers to the sociality of consciousness and to the experience of the world by self and others as a world in common.

The method through which phenomenology investigates conscious experiences, Husserl called 'eidetic reduction' which is aimed at describing the essences given to consciousness. The concrete phenomena of pure consciousness are thus examined to identify their essential characteristics (26). Many of Husserl's concepts became central to the works of Alfred Schutz who was the one that showed the actual relevance of some of Husserl's concepts to sociology. According to Schutz the everyday world is an intersubjective world and this makes meaningful communication possible. Social action he sees as flowing from and being sustained by meaning.

Schutz believes that as the life-world comprises such meanings, sociology, if it is to provide organised knowledge of social reality, must come to terms with the meanings from which social action emerges. In laying claim to 'scientific status' sociology must aim at some kind of objectivity which would require procedures of verification. So the most serious question facing the scientist is how to form objective concepts and objectively verifiable theories of meaning structures (27). The focus and starting point of the sociologist in his inquiry should be the level of meaning, given by men in their commonsense mundane activities. The lived intentionalities and meanings of men in their commonsense attitudes become the raw data for the sociologist. The
very things that are regarded as 'obvious' and 'taken-for-granted' in the commonsense attitude become problematic for the sociologist. Schutz says of the sociological inquiry that the sociologist should "make up his mind to observe scientifically this life-world. This means to no longer place himself and his own condition of interest as the centre of his world, but to substitute another null point for the orientation of the phenomena of the life-world" (28).

3.9 STRUCTURALISM AND POST-STRUCTURALISM (29)
A historical survey of structuralism shows that while the concept of 'structure' and the structural analysis of social systems have been important elements in the theoretical schemes of major sociological thinkers since the beginnings of the discipline, the structuralist movement more recently displays a new and distinctive orientation by its rejection of and formulation of an alternative to humanist, historicists and empiricist conceptions of the methodology of the social sciences.

As a broad movement of thought, structuralism is characterized particularly in the writings of Levi Strauss, Lacan, Foucault and Jacques Derrida by its antihumanism and or antihistoricism. In the former concept sociological explanation is conceived in terms of 'structural causality'. The antihistoricist tradition of structuralism may be expressed in different ways. In Levi-Strauss there is a preference for synchronic as opposed to diachronic investigations with the aim of
discovering the universal structural characteristics of human society and trying to relate these characteristics to universal structures of the mind itself. This type of structuralist approach shows an affinity with linguistic theory.

Lacan has a 'decentred' view of the subject since the subject to him is always divided. The view has its origins in the subject's relation to 'the other'. Foucault is concerned to uncover the structural principles that govern human action. He believes that we are the products of what we study and we can never stand outside them. Jacques Derrida aims to critique the Western European mode of thought on construction of concepts which he terms 'logocentrism'. The latter suggests that there is an absolute order in the mind or in reality which give rise to meaning.

From the above presentation it will be apparent that structuralism rests upon, or embodies, a general philosophy of science which is not only antihumanist and antihistoricist but also antiempiricist. The latter concept implies that in the development of any science the essential step is the theoretical construction of the object of inquiry by the formation of concepts which refer to 'hidden' realities, not to the immediately given data which provides the starting point for empiricist science. The structuralist movement therefore expresses a very general and distinctive orientation to scientific inquiry in any field as well as a particular approach to the study of social systems (30).

3.10 BRITISH ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY: WITTGENSTEIN (31)
Wittgenstein, originally making a stand in the Vienna Circle and later in Britain is perhaps one of the most important twentieth century philosophers who has made a tremendous impact on contemporary thinking.
Wittgenstein’s work can be distinguished into two main periods. "The first which is before the First World War to the nineteen twenties and the second developed in the latter half of the nineteen thirties through to his death in 1951. Both these periods are linked by a time of transition" (32).

"The Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus" was the main book published in his lifetime. "Philosophical Investigations", incomplete at his death is the most developed form of his later position. Wittgenstein is especially important for what might be called the sociological and naturalistic sides of his thought. He stressed the priority of society over the individual. He was of the opinion that the life of the human individual and therefore also all individual manifestations of culture are deeply entrenched in basic structures of a social nature. The structures in question, he calls ‘lebensformen’, meaning forms of life and their embodiment he calls ‘language-games’.

Basically there are three aspects to Wittgenstein’s thought (33):

i. individual’s beliefs, judgments and thoughts are entrenched in unquestioningly accepted language games and socially sanctioned forms of life.

ii. philosophical problems are disquietudes of the mind caused by some malfunctioning in the language games and hence the way of life of the community.

iii. a rejection of the scientific technological civilization of industrialised societies which he regarded as the decay of culture.

Wittgenstein’s view of the entrenchment of the individual in social reality is intimately connected with his view of
the nature of philosophy. The problems of philosophy have their root in a distortion of the language games which in turn symbolises that there is something wrong with the ways in which men live. On the intellectual level this malfunctioning consists in certain 'unhealthy' habits of thought permeating the intellectual culture of a time.

He did not think the philosopher could cure these conditions but merely expose the disorder in the language games described and thereby rid his mind of the torments produced by the recognised illness (34). He believes that we are engaged in a struggle with language. Tearing away from the grammatical confusions that exist will only happen to those who already revolted against the language in question and not to those who have accepted the language as a form of expression of the herd (35).

3.11 NATURALISM (36)
From the period of the 1980s onwards, the primal problem of the philosophy of the social sciences was the question of the extent to which society can be studied in the same way as nature. The history of the philosophy of the social sciences has been polarized around a dispute between two traditions: (a) a naturalist tradition claimed that the sciences are unified in their concordance with positivist principles (b) the anti-naturalist tradition has posted a cleavage in method between the natural and the social sciences grounded in a differentiation of their subject matters (37). The great error according to Bhaskar, that unites these disputants is their "acceptance of an essentially positivist account of natural science. Recent developments in the philosophy of science permit that the current crisis in the human sciences necessitates a reconsideration of the problem of
naturalism as the thesis that there is an essential unity of method between the natural and the social sciences" (38). Roy Bhaskar argues for an anti-positivist naturalism based on an essentially realist view of science. Such a naturalism holds that it is possible to give an account of science under which the proper and more or less specific methods of both the natural and the social sciences can fall. However, ontological, epistemological and relational considerations all place limits on the possibility of naturalism, rather the form that it must take.

Bhaskar's naturalism sees science as "diametrically opposed to that of positivism and which departs in fundamental respects from that of the hermeneutic tradition" (39).

3.12 Conclusion
From the discussion in this chapter, one could maintain that the philosophers of science, already discussed, have shown that we do not need a cumulative history of science but rather a new and richer notion of rationality. It is widely thought by the champions of scientific rationality that sometimes a scientist can act irrationally. In consequence, some kind of guideline is required, a rule perhaps in explaining a particular case in the history of science.

Philosophers have traditionally given sociologists only the non-natural sciences to account for and only the irrational residue to explain. Even sociologists traditionally adopted a hands off policy towards science. However, this view has changed somewhat in the period of the post 1960s when important questions were raised regarding the sociological enterprise. The sociologist came to be seen as a scientist, who should characterize knowledge in a scientific fashion.
The works of Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, Wittgenstein, have all played a big role in the sociological turn. The belief that experimental evidence cannot choose a correct or true theory from the many logically possible theories, shows that the scientist cannot always make decisions based on rational considerations and therefore needs to look elsewhere for an explanation of the choice. The use and extension of scientific concepts, it is believed, cannot be formed in the nature of things but are rather social factors.

Giddens, in trying to construct a theoretical synthesis, was influenced by the subjectivist tradition. The latter, in his view, consisted of three related strands: the phenomenology of Husserl, Schutz; the philosophy of Wittgenstein and Winch and the hermeneutic school of Dilthey, Ricoeur, Habermas and others. In effect, Giddens claims that this broad tradition has transformed our conception of social reality. However, in spite of this belief, Giddens rejected the subjectivist notion that an observer's accounts of social life must either reproduce the actors' accounts or at least be consistent with them.

In the theory of structuration, Giddens tries to resolve the dilemma somewhat by suggesting that while the dialogue between actors cannot generate valid accounts due to the distorting effects of interest and power, the dialogue that constitutes science may be a sort of validity. The discussion on philosophy of science in this chapter, therefore, serves to reinforce the idea implied by Giddens in his theoretical synthesis that scientific dialogue can exist as an interpretative process.

A discussion of Bhaskar was included because as a philosopher with particular interest in sociology, he starts from a remarkably similar position to that of Giddens, namely, the opposition but unlike Giddens, he does not reject the natural science model of the social
sciences. Bhaskar attempted to provide the natural sciences with a philosophical mantle that renders them more amenable to social scientists, including those who accept the force of subjectivist arguments.

The justification for the inclusion of contemporary schools of thought in sociology as well as philosophy of science in the dissertation is intended to show how the theory of structuration illustrates the more positive developments in social theory to the degree that Giddens recognised that synthesis is crucial to its development and that this task arises out of the inability of the alternative strategies to solve fundamental problems in their own terms.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


The following sources also provide for interesting reading on philosophy of science.


2. See (la), p. 6.


See also the following sources on Popper:


See also (1f), pp. 166-170.


See also:


(b) See (6), pp. 61-66.

10. See (6), pp. 61-66.

11. (a) See (8b).

See also:


12. (a) See (6), pp. 66-68.
(b) See (9a), pp. 15-19.

13. (a) See (6), pp. 68-70.

See also:


14. See (6), pp. 68-70.

15. See (9a), pp. 19-20.


See also:


21. See references to Wittgenstein in this chapter.

23. See (22), pp. 281-301.

24. See (22), pp. 281-301.


See also:


26. See (22), pp. 238-256.


28. See (27), p. 139.


See also:


See also:

(b) 29(a), (c) and (d).


32. See (31a), p. 118.

33. See (31a), p. 118.

34. See (31a), p. 114.

35. See (31a), p. 113.


37. See (36), p. 25.

38. See (36), p. 23.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONTEMPORARY SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT IN EDUCATION

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The theoretical trends in educational approaches to research in the social sciences can be grouped under the following headings:

A. Functionalist theories of Education

B. Marxist Perspectives of Education

C. The Interpretative Approach to Education

Within these three broad headings various sub-divisions can be distinguished: conflict and consensus theories under functionalism, under interpretative can also be included phenomenology, symbolic interactionism and hermeneutics.

A brief glance at sociology of education textbooks written some twenty years ago is sufficient to discover that functionalism was then the dominant perspective which provided the main conceptual guide and influenced the research agenda (1). The focus of structural-functionalism is upon consensus, equilibrium and shared values. In an institution such as education, it is assumed that all the parts are interdependent and work together to contribute to the functioning of society.

In Britain sociologists of education did not automatically embrace this tradition since they were involved in examining education as an aspect of the studies in social stratification and social mobility (2).
The work of Musgrave "The Sociology of Education" (1965) also illustrates some of the main concerns of the functionalist perspective (3). He shows that functionalism was applied to an analysis of relations between education and the economy, between education and the political system and to the selective mechanisms in the educational system as well as to an analysis of early childhood socialization. These concerns dominated much early British and American work. Within this tradition several major paradigms can be identified, for example Emile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons (4).

Although this approach has influenced the direction of much research in the 1950s and 1960s, it also attracted several criticisms. Halsey and Floud find that the emphasis on shared values, integration and consensus is a difficult notion to apply to the study of education in societies that are characterized by social change (5). Furthermore, such an approach is seen as overlooking conflict and the content of education (6). By the end of the 1960s many of these criticisms that were directed at functionalism, attracted the attention of sociologists of education who were seeking alternative perspectives to examine their field of study which included broadening their subject area to include topics relating to the school, the classroom and the curriculum.

For sociologists of education 1970 was an important turning point in the development of their subject in Britain. In that year the annual conference of the British Sociological Association took as its central theme the sociology of education. Michael F.D. Young and Basil Bernstein provided a critique of much current work. In particular Young pointed to the importance of focusing on classroom practices and the content of the curriculum (7).

The interpretative approach, as this 'new' school became known as, focuses on the way in which individuals
construct their own actions, attribute meanings to social situations and define them. In turn, attention is directed towards perspectives, cultures, strategies and negotiations - especially between teachers and pupils in schools.

4.2 THE FUNCTIONALIST TRADITION

Emile Durkheim, referred to as the 'founding father' of sociology saw the major function of education as the transmission of society’s norms and values. He maintained that "society can survive only if there exists among its members a sufficient degree of homogeneity; education perpetuates and reinforces this homogeneity by fixing in the child from the beginning the essential similarities which collective life demands" (8).

Durkheim argues that in complex industrial societies, the school serves a function which cannot either be provided by the family or peer groups. Membership of the family is based on kinship relationships, membership of the peer group on personal choice. Membership of society is based on neither of these principles. Individuals must learn to co-operate with those who are neither kin nor their friends. The school provides a context where these skills can be learned. In school, a child must interact with members of society and school community in terms of a fixed set of rules, which in effect teaches the child respect for rules in general. Whenever men interact they produce an emergent level of reality which exercises control over their action.

Durkheim also argues that education teaches the individual specific skills necessary for his future occupation. This function is particularly important in industrial society with its increasingly complex and specialized division of labour. Social solidarity in industrial society is based largely on the interdependence of specialized skills.
Thus schools transmit both general values which prove the ‘necessary homogeneity for social survival’ and specific skills which provide the necessary diversity for social co-operation. He assumes that the norms and values transmitted by the educational system are those of society as a whole rather than those of a ruling elite or ruling class.

4.2.1 APPROACH TO EDUCATION

Drawing on Durkheim’s views, the American sociologist Talcott Parsons outlined his functionalist view of education. Parsons, like many functionalists, maintains that value consensus is essential for society to operate effectively. The school is an "agency of socialization" says Parsons, that is, "it is an agency through which individual personalities are trained to be motivationally and technically adequate to the performance of adult roles" (9).

Parsons defines "socialization as the process by which the values of society are internalized in the individual’s personality" (10). In his view man is an "approval seeking creature who can only obtain satisfaction by observing society’s moral standards and by doing what is expected of him. In this way, the values of society are perpetuated, roles properly played and social order and stability assured" (11).
Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture-shared values</th>
<th>maintain shared values</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Structure-roles/role expectations</td>
<td>individual act out their role</td>
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<td>Individuals-needs</td>
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Education, by providing the necessary technical and social skills to members of a society, sustains the common culture of a society and provides the 'appropriate human material' for the social structure. Parsons' thesis in "The School Class as a Social System" rests on the assertion that "all pupils begin from a basis of equality. However, there is evidence to suggest that pupils are not always treated equally by teachers, whose assumptions and preconceptions may influence their assessment of pupils' abilities" (12).

Parsons also states further that both home and school value achievement. Again we need to define what we mean by achievement and show in this case that both parents and
school mean the same thing by achievement. Finally we can also dispute the validity of Parsons' view "that educational qualifications, and not market position, determine success in the modern world. There is also some doubt that educational qualifications are a major determinant of occupational position" (13).

In the 1950s the 'cold war' between the United States and the Soviet Union led to systems of education creating a concern for preservation of human resources. "Due to the development of nuclear weapons, functionalist theory at this time became technologically orientated as an outcome of the technologically determined changes in occupational structure" (14). In Britain it was believed that technical changes in the system of production could provide the impetus for educational change. It was believed that the worker, possessing the relevant skills and knowledge, had the capacity to invest in himself (15).

4.2.2 ASSESSMENT OF THE FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH TO EDUCATION

This will be done by examining the concepts of consensus, change and approval-seeking as viewed by the functionalist.

(a) **Consensus**

Very often social cohesion in society is obtained through a 'manipulated' or 'false' consensus. As a
result it is difficult to find values that are common to all members of a society. Education therefore may transmit the values of a dominant group which helps to legitimize the power of the dominant group.

(b) **Change**

By placing emphasis on equilibrium and social stability, functionalists have been criticized for their inability to deal with social change. Society is viewed as a stable institution where members have clearly defined roles.

(c) **Approval-Seeking**

It is believed by this school of thought that roles members of society play are so done in order to gain the approval of others. In this respect, functionalists are presenting a one-sided view of man. More recent writers on the sociology of education, namely Peter Woods and Viv Furlong, have shown, in terms of pupils' conduct, that approval seeking is not the primary motive for pupils' conduct and that several other factors come into play when studying pupils' behaviour.

4.3 **MARXIST PERSPECTIVES**

Marxism can fall under the broad umbrella of structuralism as both marxism and structuralism largely share similar assumptions. While the emphasis in functionalism is on consensus, in marxism the focus is on conflict.

Two main concerns in marxist theory can be distinguished:

(a) The theory of society and history (historical materialism) which concerns itself with how society changes and how the various parts are related to one another and
(b) the concept of man and human nature which is linked with a theory of a good society.

Marxists see society as composed of two major parts:

(a) The economic structure or 'base' and

(b) the superstructure of other social institutions and practices such as politics, education, religion, family life, and men's ideas, beliefs and values.

Structuralist marxism which was discussed in Chapter Two and of which Louis Althusser was a notable exponent, combines a deterministic view of the social process with an 'interactionist' view of the relationship between the base and superstructure. Voluntarist marxists of which Antonio Gramsci is a prominent exponent, do not see marxism as a science of society which uses natural science as its model. For Gramsci economic conditions are not sufficient enough to bring about change but, there must be certain subjective conditions that prevail.

Another important interpretation of marxist theory which has already been dealt with in Chapter Three, is the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. The main concern of this school is with the 'positivism' of the social sciences which sees 'laws' of society akin to laws of 'nature'. Many contemporary critical theorists, one of whom being Habermas, believe that the political system is one of the main determining forces in modern society and that political decisions are central to the functioning of the economic systems. As a result they look at political activity of individuals as a basis for emancipation.
4.3.1 MARXIST ANALYSIS OF EDUCATION

Education, according to the marxist view helps to 'reproduce' or maintain the capitalist economic system. Within sociology of education, two important views in this school are advanced. On the one hand we have Althusser and on the other hand we have Bowles and Gintis.

Althusser (16)

Althusser, for example, sees education as an element of the 'state apparatus' which perpetuates capitalist relations of production. Education, according to Althusser, maintains and reinforces the capitalist mode of production. Education performs its function in several ways:

(a) It teaches skills and techniques appropriate for the child's future,

(b) imparts the 'rules of good behaviour' or attitudes suitable for the child's later economic role,

(c) teaches children the ruling ideology of capitalist society both directly and indirectly.

Althusser believes that this whole class maintaining policy is concealed by the ruling ideology of the school. This ideology suggests that the school is a neutral environment, and that freedom is respected.

Bowles and Gintis (17)

Bowles and Gintis believe that education can be properly understood in the context of society of which it is a part. They see education as tied to society's basic economic and social institutions. Education reinforces the existing economic and social order and cannot act as a force for social change (18). Education, they believe is an integral element in the reproduction of the prevailing
class structure of society. The function of education therefore is reproduction and it takes place by means of legitimation and socialization (19). In other words it legitimates the class structure by fostering the belief that economic success depends on the possession of appropriate skills in education and it prepares young people for their place in the world of class dominated and alienated work by creating those capacities and qualifications which are appropriate to a capitalist economy (20).

With regard to socialization, Bowles and Gintis believe that the school "tailors the self-concepts, aspirations and social class identifications of individuals to the requirements of the social division of labour" (21). By crushing creativity and spontaneity and rewarding passivity and obedience, schools destroy the capacity for self-determination, and teach people to be properly subordinate. All this is attained through the correspondence principle which maintains that education operates through a close correspondence between social relations of production and social relations of education (22).

In summary then Bowles and Gintis' theory breaks down into three parts (23):

(a) what education does - reproduction

(b) how education reproduces - the correspondence principle

(c) forces responsible for education - economic structure.
In recent years in marxist sociology of education, theories of direct reproduction have been superseded by conceptions of education which stress the importance of resistance within education to the process of the reproduction of capitalism. The idea of the relative autonomy of education has also been given serious attention and both concepts are combined with an analysis that is voluntarist in nature (24).

4.3.2 ASSESSMENT OF THE MARXIST PERSPECTIVES

Blackledge and Hunt refer to a statement by Hickox that Bowles and Gintis have advanced no real evidence to support the view that education reproduces the class structure by means of legitimation and socialization (25). Marxist theory as we have seen, is a broad umbrella term that shelters variations of the same theme. Althusser's views have been likened to those of the functionalist tradition namely: Durkheim and Parsons both of whom are concerned with explaining the existence of social order.

Bowles and Gintis place emphasis on the correspondence principle between the organisation of education and the demands of the capitalist economy. More recently a fundamental feature of the education system is resistance to the demands of the capitalist economic structure. The idea that schools simply moved their pupils to fit the 'needs' of contemporary society ignores, they believe, the existence of oppositional cultures within the education system (26).

4.4 INTERPRETATIVE APPROACHES TO EDUCATION

Both functionalism and marxist theorists believed that education can only be understood by locating it within the wider society (macro perspective). However, there was very little done on the day to day classroom encounters
(micro perspective). So the interpretative perspective developed as a reaction to the last criticism. This school of thought has the following underlying assumptions:

To understand education the interactionists/interpretivists must look at everyday activity since it is related to the way people act in everyday life. To understand everyday activity it is important that we grasp the ‘meaning’ that people give to their behaviour. In interpretative theory, meanings could include aims, intentions, significance and reasons.

In our daily lives we are constantly interacting with others. So besides assigning meaning to our own behaviour, we also give meaning to the activity of others. In the classroom, the teacher is constantly involved in a process of interpretation with the pupils and vice-versa. How we interpret the activity of others, depends on what we know about the person. So we form typification schemes of people which we use to interpret behaviour.

An analysis of action should also include a study of the actors’ meanings and interpretations. A belief of the interpretative school of thought is the fact that over time actors come to have shared meanings and interpretations, which is brought about through a process of negotiation of meaning. An important point of consideration is the approach to be used when studying actors’ meanings. The interpretative approach advocates the subjectivist method which implies the ability to get inside the actors’ heads and see how they define the situation (27).
4.4.1 VARIATIONS WITHIN THE MICRO APPROACHES

(a) INTERACTIONIST APPROACH
This approach, for example, sees the relationship between teachers and pupils as a situation of conflict in which teachers have different goals which they want pupils to achieve. Each party tries to impose its definition of the situation on the other. While the teachers have more power than the pupils, compromise is reached through a process of negotiation.

(b) THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH
The emphasis in this perspective is the actors' definition of the situation. Phenomenologists argue that it is important to examine the taken-for-granted language and its implicit meanings (35).

(c) ETHNOMETHODOLOGIST APPROACH
This approach tries to unravel the procedures and processes whereby people make their everyday world intelligible. It concentrates on eliciting the actors' knowledge of the situation. Actors have a set of categories which they use to interpret the behaviour of others.

4.4.1.1 SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM AND EDUCATION

In this section we will look at the works of David Hargreaves, Martyn Hammersley and Peter Woods.

(i) David Hargreaves (29)
Hargreaves follows the ideas of G.H. Mead on the development of self and traces the implications of these for the analysis of the relationship between teacher and pupil.
In his discussion on teachers, Hargreaves believes that we can discern three types of self-conception: (a) lion tamers, (b) entertainers and (c) romantics. The first type regards education as a civilizing process and hence believes that pupils should be driven to learn. The teacher is an expert on the subject and pupils have to be brought up to the level required by the teacher. Discipline is firm and testing frequent.

The 'entertainer' believes the best method of inducing learning is to make the material interesting. He prefers themes to subjects, employs the 'discovery method' and uses a variety of audio-visual material. Relations with pupils are friendly and informal.

The 'romantic' sees learning as a part of the human condition. The task of the teacher is facilitator of learning and pupils should be free to choose what they should learn. The curriculum should be constructed by both teachers and pupils.

Hargreaves believes that there are two sub-roles teachers must fulfill; that of disciplinarian and instructor. The former implies organising classroom activities, as well as defining and enforcing roles. The latter implies discovering what should be learnt, how it should be learnt and what is regarded as proof of learning. These sub-roles suggest that the teacher cannot define his role as he wishes. The situation must be regarded in some sense as being independent of and limiting to the individual's definition.

Hargreaves says we can say the teacher defines the situation in terms of his own roles and goals, especially as they relate to his instructional and disciplinary objectives, and assigns to the pupils
notes and goals that are congruent with his own. He selectively perceives and interprets pupil behaviour in the light of the definition of the situation (31).

From the pupil's point of view, says Hargreaves, the most important thing is 'pleasing the teacher' which involves finding out what the teacher wants, what displeases the teacher and balancing the need to please the teacher with the need to gain approval from friends. The two other alternatives to pleasing the teacher are the delinquent pupils who will annoy rather than please and the indifferent pupil who pleases only to avoid trouble.

Nevertheless, Hargreaves maintains that both pupils and teachers use a variety of strategies to try to foster their own definition or to modify the other's views. Among the teacher's negotiative techniques are use of promises and threats, modifying excessive demands, divide and rule or appeal to higher authority. Pupils use justice and appeal to higher authority. The end product is a reasonably organised classroom and a development of shared understanding.

(ii) Martyn Hammersley (32)

Hammersley notes that teachers may be placed along a continuum with several dimensions. Some teachers consider that there is a special expertise to teaching which ordinary people do not have (authoritative role), some teachers may regard skills of teaching as something that all people possess (no distinct role). Teachers may consider themselves as experts in areas of knowledge (curriculum) or in teaching method (method).

They may see their role as concerned with teaching a specific skill (narrow) or see it as being concerned
with developing the whole child (wide). Teachers may consider that they control many aspects of pupil behaviour (high control) or allow a great deal of freedom (low control). All pupils may be judged according to ability, age or background (particularistic). Finally, teachers may see knowledge as akin to a given body of facts to be mastered (product) or they may be chiefly concerned with thinking (process) (33).

With regard to pupils, teachers may see them as having special rights because they are young or they could treat them as adults. Pupils could be seen as having free will (individualistic) or as being determined by inheritance in what they do. Teachers may adopt a pessimistic view of nature which requires pupils to be forced to learn and behave properly or they may adopt an optimistic view of human nature.

### TABLE: HAMMERSLEY'S TYPOLOGY.

1. **DEFINITION OF THE TEACHER'S ROLE**

   a. authoritative role $\leftrightarrow$ no distinct role
   b. curriculum $\leftrightarrow$ method
   c. narrow $\leftrightarrow$ wide
   d. high-degree of teacher control $\leftrightarrow$ low control
   e. universalistic $\leftrightarrow$ particularistic
   f. product $\leftrightarrow$ process

2. **CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PUPIL ACTION**

   a. licensed child $\leftrightarrow$ apprentice adult $\leftrightarrow$ adult
   b. individualistic $\leftrightarrow$ deterministic vocabulary of motive
   c. pessimistic $\leftrightarrow$ optimistic theory of human nature
3. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE

a. distinct curriculum $\iff$ no distinct curriculum
b. knowledge objective and universally valid $\iff$
knowledge $\iff$
personal and/or tied to particular purposes or cultures
c. hierarchical structure $\iff$ no hierarchy
d. discipline-bound $\iff$ general

4. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF LEARNING

a. collective $\iff$ individual
b. reproduction $\iff$ production
c. extrinsic $\iff$ intrinsic motivation
d. biological $\iff$ cultural learning path
e. diagnosis $\iff$ pupil initiative
f. learning by hearing about $\iff$ learning by doing.

5. PREFERRED OR PREDOMINANT TECHNIQUES

a. formal $\iff$ informal organization
b. supervision and intervention $\iff$ participation and non-intervention
c. interpretative mode plus positional appeals $\iff$
personal appeals
d. class tests $\iff$ assessment compared to past performance $\iff$ no formal assessment
e. grouping $\iff$ no grouping
f. group by age and ability $\iff$ random, friendship or pupil-choice grouping.

(iii) Peter Woods (34)

Woods focuses on how the context of action is defined, the frameworks through which people make sense of the world and distinctive styles of life including values, beliefs, speech patterns and forms of understanding (35).

He argues that pupils in the early years of school tend to adopt a positive attitude towards the goals and means which the school offers. When pupils are divided into examination and non-examination forms they develop either a conformity mode or a dissonance mode of adaptation. The middle and last years of schooling are characterized by 'colonization' which implies indifference to goals and ambivalences to means (36).

Pupils perspectives of teachers he argues tends to focus on three guiding principles (a) whether they are human (b) can teach (c) keep control (37). This would imply that majority of pupils have a basic orientation towards school which is largely and potentially supportive of the official programme. This is further reflected in their respect for firm, though sympathetic and fair, not authoritarian, control.
TABLE: WOODS' MODES OF ADAPTATION

DURING 1ST, 2ND AND 3RD YEARS

- Optimistic Compliance
- Opportunism

DURING 4TH AND 5TH YEARS

- Non-examination Group
  - Expressive Curriculum
    - Rejection and/or
      - Indifference
        - Produce
          - Retreatism
            - Intransigence
              - Rebellion
                - Dissonance
  - Examination Group
    - Instrumental Curriculum
      - Primary Adjustments
        - Produce
          - Instrumental Compliance
            - Ritualism

- Secondary Adjustment
  - Produce
    - Colonization
      - Conformity

KEY
- main routes
- lesser tendencies

4.4.1.2 ETHNOMETHODOLOGY AND EDUCATION

Although ethnomethodologists share with the interpretative approaches a subjectivist approach and an understanding of meaning, they differ also in many ways. Ethnomethodologists are interested in the way that actors make sense or link each interaction together to form an intelligible whole. Language is of major importance in this linking process.

(i) George Payne (38)

He shows how the first few utterances in a lesson show how the lesson is accomplished or created. He says that members share a common culture but points to the way that teachers' utterances direct pupils to pay attention to or relate into aspects of that culture and thereby make intelligible and orderly what is happening.

What Payne is doing is showing how sense may be made of the language used by teachers and pupils. The teacher by speaking first refers to the cultural categories of teacher and pupil and the relationship between them. The teacher through the initial utterances in the classroom establishes himself as teacher and his hearers as pupils by 'membershipping' them into cultural categories.

4.5 ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERPRETATIVE APPROACH

This approach to the study of education is particularly attractive because of its attempts to grasp the meanings that actors give to their interactions. Secondly this approach suggests that we must get the actors' definitions of the situation, the goals, intentions, typifications, categories, assumptions and interpretation of others.
However, the problem of observer bias is difficult to deal with as the researcher will always enter the scene with preconceived notions and assumptions.

It is very difficult to bracket out our own assumptions. Peter Woods suggested that there are meanings which the actors do not give to their actions, but which are implicit in their actions (39). Haralambos says "interactionists have often been accused of having examined human interaction in a vacuum. They have tended to focus on small scale face to face interaction with little concern for its historical or social setting. They have concentrated on particular situations and encounters with little reference to the historical events which led up to them or the wider social framework in which they occur" (40).

To some extent this is true, but the micro-perspective has not ignored factors outside the interaction entirely. A second criticism of Haralambos is failure of interactionists to explain the source of the meanings to which they attach importance. The most pointed attack on interpretative sociology from this point of view is Sharp and Green (41).

Besides providing an interesting analysis of classroom discourse, ethnomethodologists have been criticized for failing to explain the observable similarities between classrooms. They seem to suggest that what makes classrooms similar is the way people make sense of them. The only reality then becomes that which is created and recreated by the human mind. With regards to the functionalist approach, the view of education tends to focus on the positive contributions made by education to the maintenance of the social system. This leads to questions about value consensus and social solidarity as well as those emphasizing the relationship between education and other parts of society and how the
relationship helps to integrate the society as a whole.

In marxist view the role of education involves questions which relate education to the economic infrastructure as well as linking education with power, ideology and the relations of production in capitalist society. From an interactionist perspective man actively constructs social reality. His actions are not simply shaped by social forces which act upon him. His behaviour is a reaction to the pressures of stratified structures. Meanings are constructed by actors in the process of interaction and are created, modified and changed in a process of negotiation. In his interaction with others, man interprets and defines situations, develops meaning which direct his action and so constructs his own social world.

4.6 CONCLUSION
Having examined the dominant sociological trends in chapter two, it was imperative to ascertain the relevance of these sociological trends for education. Such evaluation will provide the basis for my examination of the educational merits of Giddens' structuration theory.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See


3. See 1(b) p. 12.

4. See 1(a) and 1(b).

   See also:

6. It was this criticism essentially that gave rise to Marxist theories which concentrated on conflict as opposed to consensus and also in the sphere of education led to a closer examination of the school curriculum. See (7) for more detailed sources.

See also:


10. See (9), p. 72.

11. See (9), p. 72.


13. See (9), p. 75.


18. See Chapter Three in (17).


22. Blackledge and Hunt refer to Marx, K. (1970 translated): *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. Progress Publishers, Moscow, when he speaks of 'relations of production' being the 'real foundation on which rises the legal and political superstructure to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness'.

23. (a) See (17), p. 142.


28. See (9), for a detailed discussion.

29. See (9) for detailed discussions.

30. See (9), p. 163.

31. See (9), pp. 129-30.


33. See (32), p. 37.


35. See (34), p. 7.

36. See (34), p. 74.

37. (a) (34), p. 171.

See also:


39. See (34), p. 17.


CHAPTER FIVE

STRUCTURATION THEORY

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The writings of Anthony Giddens on structuration theory can be traced back some ten years ago when significant developments took place in the social sciences. He was concerned with the examination of residues of nineteenth century European social theory for contemporary problems of the social sciences.

Giddens sees the publication by Parsons "The Structure of Social Action" as the key in the formation of modern sociology since Parsons emphasized "that although human action has special and distinctive attributes, social science by and large shares the same logical framework as natural science" (1).

European social theory today is concerned with the following common themes (2):

(a) A rejection of the tendency of the orthodox consensus to see human behaviour as a result of forces that actors neither control nor comprehend.

(b) A fundamental role is accorded to language and to cognitive faculties as being partly constitutive of the activities of day-to-day life.

(c) The declining importance of empiricist philosophies of natural science is recognized to have profound implications for the social sciences as well.

Giddens' theory of structuration is by no means a new orthodoxy to replace the old one. While Giddens is
sensitive to the shortcomings of the orthodox consensus, he is also aware of the significant developments that have taken place in social theory as set out above, as well as their mutual connections. The emphasis in structuration theory, however, is an understanding of human agency and social institutions.

5.2 STRUCTURATION THEORY

In discussing the main concepts of structuration theory, it is significant to explain the divisions as set out in Chapter Two which have separated functionalism and structuralism on the one hand from hermeneutic and the various forms of interpretative sociology on the other. Both functionalism and structuralism emphasize the pre-eminence of the social whole over its individual parts (i.e. its constituent actors, human subjects). In hermeneutics subjectivity provides the basic foundation of the social or human sciences and in interpretative sociologies action and meaning are accorded primacy in the explication of human conduct. In functionalism and structuralism structure has primacy over action.

In the theory of structuration, Giddens attempts to "put an end to each of these empire-building endeavours" (3). A primary concern of the theory of structuration is the conceptualization of human knowledgability and its involvement in action. Giddens sees human social activities as being 'recursive'. This implies that "they are not brought into being by social actors but continually recreated by them via the very means whereby they express themselves as actors. In and through their activities agents reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible" (4). In structuration theory "to be a human being is to be a purposive agent, who both has reasons for his or her activities and is able, if asked, to elaborate discursively upon those reasons. .......

Human action occurs as a durée, a continuous flow of conduct, as does cognition. Purposive action is not
composed of an aggregate or series of separate intentions, reasons and motives" (5).

It can be seen therefore that Giddens, in his explication of structuration theory, has drawn from both the interpretative sociologies as well as hermeneutics. The former is evident in his study of human action and the latter in his description of human activities which he sees as demanding a familiarity with the forms of life expressed in those activities. Another basic concern of structuration theory is that of time-space which Giddens sees as "constitutive of social practices,..... which began from temporality and thus, in one sense, history" (6)

5.2.1 THE AGENT, AGENCY


In his discussion of human action, Giddens is aware of the obvious dualism that runs through the literature of both philosophy and sociology in
respect of problems of human action. While the action oriented philosophers have spent a great deal of time discussing the concept of action itself, they have paid little attention to the unintended consequences of action or the unacknowledged conditions of action. On the other hand, schools of thought like structuralism and functionalism, while placing at the forefront unintended consequences of action and unacknowledged conditions of action, have failed by and large to develop theories of action at all.

Giddens believes that a conception of action in the social sciences, has to place at the centre the everyday fact that social actors are knowledgeable about the conditions of social reproduction in which their day to day activities are enmeshed. The reasons people have for their actions or what Giddens calls the 'rationalization of action' are crucially involved with how those actions are sustained.

In the diagram represented, Giddens tries to show through phrases like 'reflexive monitoring of action' and 'rationalization of action', the purposive character of human everyday behaviour. Giddens believes that very often philosophers treat 'intentions' and 'reasons' as aggregated together in action and ignore what Schutz called, the 'reflexive moment of attention' (7) which breaks into the continuing flow of action. Again, unlike most action philosophers who see reasons and motives as synonymous, Giddens distinguishes the two by seeing motivation as "wants which prompt it" (8).

In trying to conceptualize the knowledgeability of social actors, Giddens not only distinguishes between conscious and unconscious but he also distinguishes two levels in which agents are knowledgeable about the social environment, namely, between discursive
and practical consciousness. The 'supplying of reasons' for action refers to the discursive capabilities of actors "what actors are 'able to say' about their activities is by no means all that they 'know' about them" (9).

Practical consciousness refers to tacit knowledge that is skillfully employed in the courses of conduct but which the actor is unable to formulate discursively.

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discursive consciousness  ↑
                        │
practical consciousness  ↓
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unconscious motives/cognition


The knowledgeability of human agents is bounded by the unacknowledged conditions of action on one side and its unintended consequences on the other. The latter is important to social theory since they are incorporated within processes of the reproduction of institutions. Giddens shows in his theory of structuration that the functionalist notion that reasons of actors are really 'society's reasons' is incorrect because he believes that societies have no 'reasons' or 'needs', only the actors whose activities constantly constitute and reconstitute those societies.

5.2.2 AGENCY AND POWER

Giddens maintains that one can logically link power to action, if power is defined in the broad sense as the capability of intervention in the world or refraining from such intervention. Philosophical discussions, he believes tend to see power as
concerned with the capabilities of the individual subjects. In other words these discussions see the individual subject as "being able to intervene in the world, or to refrain from such intervention with the effect of influencing a specific process or state of affairs" (10). In contrast to this Parsons and Foucault see power as a phenomenon of the collectivity. What we have then are two interpretations of power.

Giddens attempts, in the theory of structuration, to connect these two aspects of power, by means of the notion of resources. Resources are drawn upon and reproduced by actors during the course of interaction, but are not constituted as structures of domination. Resources are the media whereby power is employed in the routine course of social action but they are at the same time structural elements of social systems, reconstituted in social interaction. Social systems are constituted as regularized practices, reproduced across time and space. Power in social systems can thus be treated as involving reproduced relations of autonomy and dependence in social interaction (11).

5.2.3 STRUCTURE, STRUCTURATION
In contemporary sociology, the term 'structure' appears in each of the traditions of 'objectivist' social thought, namely structuralism, which has taken its name from it, and functionalism. The functionalist writers, have laid greater emphasis on function as opposed to 'structure'. However, Giddens believes that although structuralism can be criticized in definite ways, there are ideas prominent in the structuralist tradition, to do with the notion of structure that are important to social theory. In structuralism, structure is linked to the notion of transformations. Structural analysis is considered to penetrate below the level of surface
appearances. Despite internally diverse traditions of thought, both functionalism and structuralism share common themes, two important themes being (a) a distinction between synchronic and diachronic (b) a mutual concern not only with structures but with systems.

Within structuralist thought the attempt to overcome the synchronic/diachronic distinction has produced an emphasis upon structuration or as Derrida puts its "the structuring of structure" (12). The concept of structuration which Giddens wishes to develop depends upon making a distinction between structure and system but it also involves understanding each of the terms differently from the characteristic usages of both functionalism and structuralism.

Giddens believes that there are a number of limitations of the structuralist notion of structure which compromise the usefulness of structuralist notions. Firstly structuralism lacks a concept of structure-as-structuration. A theory of structuration however allocates a central place to discursive and practical consciousness in the reproduction of social practice. Secondly, there is ambiguity in structuralism when structure is regarded as rules of transformation. Giddens believes that it is misleading to "speak of rules of transformation because all rules are essentially transformational" (13).

Giddens sees structure in social analysis as referring to the structuring properties allowing the binding of time-space in social systems. He believes that to speak of structure only as 'rules' and 'resources' runs a risk of misinterpretation because of certain uses of rules in philosophical literature which will be summarized as follows (14):
(a) Rules are often thought of in connection with games. For example Wittgenstein used the game of chess to explain certain linguistic and social rules but no study was made of the history of chess or the actual game of chess.

(b) There is not a singular relation, between 'an activity' and 'a rule'. Activities or practices are brought into being in the context of connected rules given coherence by their involvement in the constitution of social systems.

(c) Rules cannot be analysed in terms of their own content because rules and practice only exist in conjunction with one another.

(d) Rules imply 'methodical procedures' of social interaction. Every competent social actor should be a methodological specialist on both the discursive and practical consciousness.

(e) Rules have two aspects to them and both should be distinguished conceptually. On the one hand there are rules relating to the constitution of meaning and on the other hand to the sanctioning of modes of social conduct.

"One of the main propositions of structuration theory is that the rules and resources drawn upon in the production and reproduction of social action are at the same time the means of system reproduction (the duality of structure)" (15).

Giddens uses the following example to explain such a claim (16).
(a) The rules defining checkmate in chess is
............... 

(b) A formula $a_n = n^2 + n - 1$

(c) As a rule R get up at 6.00 everyday.

(d) It is a rule that all workers must clock in at 8.00 am.

Rule (c) can be equated to habit or routine. This emphasizes the importance of routine in social life. Rule (a) and (d) represent two types of rule, constitutive and regulative. Rule (a) is constitutive in that it says something about what goes into the making of chess as a game and (d) is regulative in that it does not help define what work is, it specifies how work is to be carried out.

Rule (b) is regarded as being the most germane because Giddens believes that the nature of the formula is such that "we can best discover what is the most analytically effective sense of 'rule' in social theory" (17).

Finally, "the most important aspects of structure are rules and resources recursively involved in institutions. Institutions by definition are the more enduring features of social life. In speaking of the structural properties of social systems, I mean their institutionalized features, giving 'solidity' across time and space. I use the concept of structures to get at relations of transformation and mediation which are the 'circuit switches' underlying observed conditions of system reproduction" (18).
5.2.4 THE DUALITY OF STRUCTURE

The dualism of object and subject must cede place to recognition of a duality that is implicated in all social reproduction, the duality of structure. By the latter concept "the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices that constitute those systems" (19).

Giddens believes that structure should not be equated with constraint but should be seen as both constraining and enabling. In the discussion on the knowledgeability of social action, Giddens argues that every competent member of every society knows about the institutions of that society. "Such knowledge is not incidental to the operation of society, but is necessarily involved in it" (20).

According to Giddens, the duality of structure is always the "main grounding of continuities in social reproduction across time-space. It in turn presupposes the reflexive monitoring of agents in, and as constituting, the duree of daily social activity. But human knowledgeability is always bounded. The flow of action continually produces consequences which are unintended by actors and these unintended consequences also may form in acknowledged conditions of action in a feedback fashion" (21).

5.2.5 FORMS OF INSTITUTION

The division of rules and resources into modes of signification or meaning constitution has important implications according to Giddens. These 'modalities' as Giddens calls it, "serve to clarify the main dimensions of the duality of structure in interaction, relating the knowledgeable capacities of agents to structural features. Actors draw upon the
modalities of structuration in the reproduction of systems of interaction, by the same token reconstituting their structural properties" (22).

One can distinguish three structural dimensions of social structure namely signification, legitimation and domination. All three of these concepts are interrelated for example, legitimation necessarily involves signification as well as playing a major part in co-ordinating forms of domination. These connections make the legitimation–signification–domination scheme a useful one for the classification of institutions" (23).

Giddens stresses that the differentiation of signification, domination and legitimation is an analytical one. Domination depends upon the mobilization of two types of resource (a) allocative which refers to generating command over objects, goods or material phenomena and (b) authoritative which refers to command over persons or actors (24).

5.2.6 TIME, BODY, ENCOUNTERS

An important criticism of social theory by Giddens is its failure to take seriously the temporality of social conduct as well as its spatial attributes. He believes that social analysts who spoke of patterns of social interaction were merely presenting 'snapshots' of social relations because any patterns of interaction that exist are situated in time and only when examined in time do they form patterns at all. A good example of this would be individuals in face-to-face encounters.

Giddens says that the term face-to-face itself emphasizes the importance of the body in space in
social interaction. The face, the most expressive part of the body is "chronically monitored by actors in checking upon the sincerity of the discourse and acts of others" (25). Giddens believes that the extension of social systems in space and in time is an evident feature of the overall development of human society. Social development involves spatial as well as temporal movement. All social systems both express and are expressed in the routines of daily life, mediating the physical and sensory properties of the human body.

Another important concept looked at by Giddens is that of co-presence. For this Giddens has drawn heavily on the work of Goffman who aptly called relations in conditions of co-presence, encounters. "The study of interaction in circumstances of co-presence is one basic component of the 'bracketing' of time-space that is both condition and outcome of human social association" (26).

5.3 CURRENT CRITICISMS OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION

The theoretical enterprise of Giddens to create a comprehensive theory of the social, has aroused both awe and suspicion. Giddens is praised by most authors for his portrayal of the 'orthodox consensus' in the social sciences and also his account of its demise (27). He shows that the orthodox consensus was held together by logical, methodological and substantive commitments.

The disintegration of the orthodox consensus calls into question all three of these components. According to my analysis it seems that Giddens' ability to present this kind of outlook is indeed commendable even though one may in fact discern flaws in his theory. Equally praiseworthy is Giddens' proposal for a reorientation of social theory as Giddens refers to it. "Giddens is attentive not only to
post-positivist contemporary thought but his emphasis on human subjectivity is indeed important. Giddens attacks the subject-centred philosophies of Heidegger and contemporary post-structuralist writers such as Foucault, Derrida and Lacan at the same time realizing that social theory must see human beings as actors and is thus concerned with the associated concepts of human agency and social action" (28). I agree with Dallmayr when he says that Giddens is faced with a momentous challenge: "of incorporating the lessons of ontology and post-structuralism without abandoning concern with the 'knowledgeability' and accountability of actors; more ambitiously phrased, the task of moving beyond subjectivist metaphysics without relinquishing some of its insights and especially without lapsing into objectivism and determinism" (29).

Many writers agree that while the chief merit of the theory of structuration lies in Giddens' reinterpretation and novel correlation of agency and structure, they believe that this structural perspective has serious flaws: Thompson believes that Giddens' argument of conceiving "structure as rules and resources is unsatisfactory because he fails to give a clear and consistent explication of the study of rules and resources and does not address directly to some of the key concerns in the analysis of social structure. He is of the opinion that Giddens' approach to the enabling character of structure has led him to underplay the role of structural constraint" (30).

It was also felt amongst most writers (namely Bertilsson, Dallmayr, Thompson) that Giddens' concept of structure and structuration is ambiguous. Giddens proposes to have drawn from Derrida's notion of 'structuring of structure' and his portrayal of structure as 'virtual order' is also reminiscent of Derrida. The latter concept refers not only to a factual but also an ontological difference.
Structuration, on the other hand, injects into social theory "a 'transcendental dimension'. Structure tends to merge with system, the virtual order of structural properties shades over into Mertons' distinction between latent and manifest function" (31). It is also mentioned that if Giddens sees rules as being an ingredient of virtual order then how can rules be regarded as being medium and outcome of recursive social practices.

Critics also allege that ambiguities surround the notion of agency. To Giddens, the notion of action refers mainly to two components of human conduct - capability and knowledgeable. The former is defined as the actor's possibility of acting or 'doing' otherwise. Practical consciousness, as one form of knowledgeable is said to denote "the vast variety of tacit modes of knowing how to 'to go on' in the contexts of social life" and the same concept is circumscribed as "tacit knowledge that is skillfully applied in the enactment of courses of conduct" (32). The problem here, according to critics, is the claimed status of agency beyond the poles of intentional activity and reactive behaviour.

Dallmayr says "if agency according to Giddens adumbrates the connection of being and action then social theory today needs a grasp of 'what cannot be said as practice'. The mentioned ambiguity cannot be resolved through the 'unacknowledged conditions' and 'unconscious sources of action as long as such conditions or sources of action are depicted simply as boundaries to the knowledgeable, capability of agents" (33).

Another problematic area of Giddens' theory is his conception of 'double hermeneutic'. There is no doubt that in this regard Giddens is influenced by Schutz and ethnomethodology. Critics, already discussed, felt that Giddens has not yet adequately attended to the 'methods'
to be employed in utilizing rules and resources contained in the duality of structure. Giddens sees hermeneutics serving mainly as a substitute for positivism on the level of epistemology and is not restricted to the social sciences but extends to the philosophy and epistemology of the natural sciences. "In stressing this linkage Giddens presents a notion of 'universal hermeneutics' in the same vein as Gadamer and perhaps even as Paul Ricoeur. The difficulty of a common logic between natural and social sciences is how it can be squared with Giddens' critical reservations - regarding hermeneutics and his broader ambition to overcome the verstehen-erklären dichotomy" (34).

Another difficulty according to critics arises between hermeneutics and the theory of structuration. Given the claim that human agency as a major component of structuration is somehow 'logically prior to a subject - object differentiation', it is not clear how under the heading of double hermeneutic, the object world or target area of social science can simply be described as a 'subject-world'. The problems surrounding the relation between logic of inquiry and methodology affect also the status of history in Giddens' outlook and its relevance for social science.

Social theory seems set for a renewed struggle for an adequate synthesis of the major developments that have occurred in theory over the last decade or so. Giddens' work has already provoked reviews and responses which testify to the unresolved nature of these problems in sociology (35). This project has been likened to that of Herbert Spencer and Talcott Parsons in its "immensity of ambition and complexity of logical construction" (36). Another writer has hailed Giddens' work as "the first work of mainstream sociology since Weber in which the problematic of action and structure, in all its forms is
directly repudiated" (37). One possible ground on which to assess Giddens' theory is to ask to what extent are issues clarified and positions developed. Gane feels that Giddens' approach is disappointing in that there is no serious examination of the theory or history of marxism after Marx (38). Giddens comments that since Marx there is not much to help us but Gane feels that paradoxically he is eager to "defend the socialist status of the socialist countries (of the East) against Western marxists (39). That Lenin might be a source of both "the ideological defence of a 'war machine' and political criticism in both east and west is not seriously considered and with it the opportunity to consider the politics of social theory - a serious omission in a theorist devoted to the importance of reflexive theory in social transitions" (40).

Gane gives another perspective of Giddens which shows that he evades the necessity of historical reflection, and presents a confrontation between new modes of analysis and 'old' structural determinism. "Parsons' actors are cultural dopes but Althusser's agents are structural dopes and no analysis can be made henceforth without the acknowledgement of the freedom of the individual actor who might have behaved otherwise" (41).

This critique by Gane is puzzling especially as Parsons has left a strong mark on Giddens work. For example Parsons' position is different from Durkheim in that the latter sees sociology as possible because of a difference in reality between individual and social phenomena. Althusser's position is also different because the concept of individuals as support is used not to make concrete realities disappear but to make mechanisms intelligible by grasping them through their concept.
Gane says that by 1977 Giddens began to adopt key elements of Lacanian theory, paradoxically aligning with the Althusserians (42). Giddens apparently denied this in 1981 asserting that the most adequate concept of the individual could be found in the anti-freudian psychologist Victor Frankl whose main thrust was logotherapy. Gane is of the opinion that these changes of emphasis and position have considerable importance for the precise significance of the formula for the unification of the individual and social levels, the 'duality of structure' or the 'theory of structuration'. What he finds interesting about Giddens' theory is that it completely rejects the principle "of a single intelligibility of both individual and social of a Sartrean kind" (43).

Most writers believe that Giddens' work requires the resolving of certain ambiguities. His definition of agency as 'could have acted otherwise' is moral in nature and assumes an agent capable of choice in 'critical situations'. But these situations are precisely those which at other places Giddens identifies as capable of calling out the largely unconscious, ontological security in which "heightened anxiety renders actors vulnerable to regressive modes of object-affiliation involving a strong measure of ambivalence" (44). Once again Giddens' concept of agency, according to critics already discussed, does not differentiate between various action or practice claims. If everything is identified as action or practices then these concepts have no empirical content.

Structure in itself is ambiguous but to conceive of it as rules and resources is more problematic. According to his critics, Giddens fails to give a precise meaning to the concept of rules and using Wittgenstein's analysis of rule
following behaviour, does not make the concept any clearer. Nevertheless, these commentators concede that Giddens has to be given credit for his insight into social theory and the ways in which he was able to show how action and structure intersect in everyday life.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


   See also:


   (c) Parsons, T. (1949) : The Structure of Social Action.
       Allen and Unwin, United Kingdom.

2. See (1a) p. xvi.

3. See (1a) p. 2.

4. See (1a) p. 2.

5. See (1a) p. 3.

6. (a) See (1a) p. 3.

   For more detailed discussions of the basic concepts
   of structuration theory see also:

       Method. Hutchinson, London, Chapters Two and Three

   (c) Giddens, A. (1981) : A Contemporary Critique of
       Historical Materialism. MacMillan, London,
       Chapters One and Two.


8. See (1a) p. 6.
9. See (7) p. 31.

10 (a) See (1a) p. 14.

See also:


11. See (1) pp. 15-16.


13. See (1a) p. 17.


15. See (1a) p. 19.

16. See (1a) p. 19.

17. See (1a) p. 20.

19. See (7) p. 36.


22. See (1a) p. 28.


25. See (12) p. 203.

26. (a) See (1a) p. 36.

See also:


27. See


31. See (27d), p. 22.

32. See (12), p. 23.

33. See (27d), p. 23.

34. See (27d), p. 24.

35. See (27a-i).


38. See (27f), p. 372.


40. See (27f), p. 372.

41. See (27f), p. 372.

42. See (27f), p. 373.

43. See (27f), p. 374.

44. See (1a), p. 127.
CHAPTER SIX

IMPLICATIONS OF STRUCTURATION THEORY FOR EDUCATION

6.1 INTRODUCTION
The last chapter dealt with the essence of criticisms levelled against Giddens' structuration theory. This chapter attempts to determine whether those criticisms are justified or not in view of implications for education, although an important point to note is that most of the critics on structuration theory seem to have been written prior to the publication of "The Constitution of Society". This point is not insignificant because, in my opinion, Giddens counters the various criticisms levelled against him in this publication, thereby discrediting most of his critics.

6.2 REACTION TO CRITICISM
A common criticism of Giddens' theory is the so-called ambiguity inherent in his explanations of structure, structuration and agency. Giddens sees structure as comprising rules and resources and as such structure is "recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems and is wholly fundamental to structuration theory" (1). The criticism is unjust and can be confirmed by Giddens' use of the term 'recursive' which implies that the structured properties of social activity via duality of structure are constantly recreated out of the very resources which constitute them.

Giddens has been accused of underplaying the constraint element while emphasizing the 'enabling character'. Giddens, through a discussion on Durkheim, is able to show
how structure can be both constraining and enabling. He explains how Durkheim discusses three senses of constraint in society: firstly, he sees "constraints as being fused with enablement through the process of socialization" (2). For example the learning of a first language involves definite elements of compliance which sets certain limits to cognition and activity. But at the same time the learning of a language greatly expands the cognitive and practical capacities of the individual.

Secondly, Durkheim says that "societal totalities, not only pre-exist and post date the lives of the individuals who reproduce them in their activities; they also stretch across space and time away from any particular agent considered singly. In this sense the structural properties of social systems are certainly exterior to the activities of the individual" (3). Giddens believes that this is essential to structuration theory since human societies cannot exist without human agency. Similarly time-space distanciation is relevant since the greater the time space distanciation of social systems, the more resistant they are to change by any individual agent.

The third form of constraint Durkheim sees is in juxtaposition to the scope of action of the agent. The point here is that "'social facts' have properties that confront each single individual as 'objective' features which limit that individual's scope of action. They are not just external but also externally defined, incorporated in what they consider right and proper to do" (4). So Giddens shows that his concept of structure as both constraining and enabling is valid. He says the "range of 'free action' which agents have is restricted, as it were, by external forces that set strict limits to what they can achieve, in other words the structural properties of social systems are like the walls of a room from which an individual cannot escape but inside which he
or she is able to move around at whim" (5).

With regard to the ambiguity in the notion of agency, Giddens was accused of ignoring the element of action and non-action within agency itself and of seeing human agency as logically prior to the subject-object dichotomy. Giddens clearly illustrates that to suppose that the 'I' is the agent, is mistaken. To relate the 'I' to agency, it is necessary to follow the detour suggested by structuralists in respect of the decentring of the subject, without reaching conclusions which treat the subject simply as a sign without a signification structure. "The constitution of the 'I' comes only via the discourse of the 'Other' - that is through the acquisition of language, but the 'I' has to be related to the body as the sphere of action" (6). The contextuality of social 'positioning' determines who the 'I' is in any situation of talk. In other words there is a decentring of the subject: human agency is not necessarily logically prior to an interrelatedness - in-context.

The criticism by Gane that "Giddens' theory did not incorporate any serious examination of Marxism" (7), is unjust since Giddens uses Marx's discussion of private property in modern capitalism to show that structures can be analytically distinguished within each of the three dimensions of structuration, signification, legitimation and domination.

Giddens believes that the structural relations indicated in the structural sets represented below mark out one of the most fundamental transmutations involved in the emergence of capitalism and hence contribute in a significant way to the overall structuration of the system (8).

(a) private property : money : capital : labour contract : profit.
(b) private property : money : capital : labour contract : industrial contract.

(c) private property : capital : money : educational advantage : occupational position.

Giddens says that although private property is not distinctive of modern capitalism, the different modes whereby private property is converted are. This is related to the signification of private property. For example (a) money enables private property to be converted into capital. This in turn provides for the convertibility of capital into profit through the extraction of surplus value. The same sort of transformation relations is evident in (b) with regards to the conversion of private property into industrial authority. In (c) is yet another example of convertible elements.

I tend to agree with Graaff when he says that the critics "exclude the notion of practical consciousness and that they privilege the viewpoint of a particular group or class" (9). Graaff discredits Margaret Archer's criticisms that structuration theory forecloses the possibility of theorizing time in social analysis by seeing agency and structure as co-terminous. By this she implies that "if time cannot be inserted between the action of agency and structure on each other then it does not exist and following from the first, if structure and agency can not be separated in time, they have no impact on each other. To illustrate this sequence, Archer uses the metaphor of a motor car into which drivers with different interests climb and fight for the control of the wheel - (social interaction), as a result of which the next set of drivers take the seat with the car going in a new direction (structural elaboration)" (10).
Graaff illustrates the flaw in this argument by substituting the idea of a motor car by that of a wave. He sees it as being impossible to insert time between the interaction of molecule and the changing shape/movement of the wave. Their interaction is what constitutes the wave (11). He argues that time is "intrinsic to structuration theory in two ways (a) in the notion of system where Giddens rejects the distinction between statics and dynamics found in functionalism and (b) time is implied in the post-structuralist conception of structure, which he has termed 'embeddedness'. Archer's argument that agency and structure are co-terminous does not make contact with either of these ideas" (12).

The other critic whom Graaff discredits is Thompson who believes that Giddens equates structure with systems of generative rules and resources. Graaff believes that if one accepts Giddens definition of a rule as knowing 'how to go on' in society, albeit via practical consciousness, it is impossible to conceive of deeper lying structural conditions of, for example the capitalist system in terms of rules and resources.

Secondly, Thompson believes that the extent to which an action transforms an institution does not coincide with the extent to which the social structure is thereby transformed. On this basis Giddens needs to reconceptualise notions of constraint and of structural differentiation, according to Thompson. Graaff describes Thompson's view on structure as follows: "structure seen as rules and resources, only takes up part of the way from social interaction to structure, for example the differential access of social groups to higher education is conditioned by restrictions which may operate quite independently of the rights and obligations of the agents concerned" (13).
Graaff believes that while there are great difficulties in Giddens' account of how institutions are structured, for example by the axis relating state institutions and economic institutions in modern capitalism, Thompson's account tends to return us to subject-less underlying structural imperatives and constraints to which agents have no access and over which they have no control. Thompson is also quoted as excluding Giddens' ideas on power from his discussion on structure. So the point made by Giddens that it is not possible to "conceptualize structures without taking into account the knowledge-ability, intentions and power of the agents who embody them" still stands (14).

Finally, Graaff says that both functionalists and structuralist theorists, "play in putting structures out of reach, tucked away in 'subconscious', 'meta', 'prior' or 'deep' corners of social reality. Without returning us to the naive optimism of liberal or cartesian thought, Giddens assists us to secularize 'structure' by inserting the notion of practice" (15).

6.3 RELEVANCE TO EDUCATION
It is clear from the discussion thus far presented that Giddens' theory of structuration has important implications for education: in the following section it is proposed to focus on several of Giddens' key concepts in order to evaluate the significance for education. The rationale for choice of concepts is simply those that are most obvious as being relevant and does not imply completeness in any sense. The polarization in thinking about education is only one symptom of the fundamental tension in social theory between those schools which stress structure and those stressing action, between deterministic and voluntaristic views of behaviour, between a concern with statics and one with dynamics,
This polarization is inappropriate to the study of teachers who can be regarded as located at the interface of 'structure' and 'action'. In other words to the structuralist the teacher is "significant as the person who virtually mediates whatever 'goals' or 'functions' may be attributed to the education system in the confrontation with pupils, who at the same time represent other aspects of the social structure (class, race, sex, ecetera)" (16). Today, it is difficult for any structuralists to deny that at the micro-level of the school and even the classroom, teachers and pupils are engaged in negotiation and construction of knowledge and reality. For the interactionists, awareness of these interactional processes in which teachers engage with pupils and other teachers must be tempered by a recognition that teachers are not autonomous.

"Teachers have to co-exist with others and cope with manifestations of the wider social structure. If this analysis of the teachers' location at the paradigm interface is accepted it becomes clear that teachers cannot be fully understood other than viewing them from a plurality of sociological perspectives" (17). There were numerous attempts to resolve the tensions between perspectives: Olive Banks pleaded for a 'building of bridges', Sara Delamont wanted a 're-approachment', Ivan Reid talked of a 'synthesis' (18). Several attempts were made to overcome the over-socialised view of the teacher, an accusation levelled against structural functionalists.

We have Hargreaves' (19) discussion of a middle school's staff meetings and the resulting suggestion that teachers exhibit a form of 'hegemony' and the remark of Peter Woods that committed teachers have an 'institutionalized consciousness' (20). "Both Hargreaves and Woods perform a valuable service in exposing and analysing the sub-
cultures of staff rooms but there are limits to the extent and accuracy with which such studies can reveal the consciousness of teachers. The problem is crucially revealed when Woods refers to teachers' personal orientation as being most clearly evident in the staff room at times when it served as a private area or 'back region'. In the staff room the teacher might be released from the exigencies of role, either as a survivor or a professional and might view school activities through a private framework" (21). While it is true that in the classroom the teachers might be released from their professional roles, surely this does not mean that they are role-less.

Giddens, more than other writers, has exposed the dualism in social theory which has led to sometimes bitter debate between advocates of structuralist and interactionist sociologies, the dualism which has afflicted the sociology of teachers and teaching. More than this, Giddens has pointed to a "possible resolution of dualism by means of his theory of structuration. Here the opposition of society and individual, determinism and voluntarism, structure and action are dealt with by denying that they are oppositions. Giddens maintains that neither element can be understood without reference to the other. Social structures are both constituted by human agency, and yet at the same time are the very medium and outcome of this constitution" (22).

Giddens sees structure as comprising rules and resources. In societal terms this implies that actors since they know 'how to behave', contribute through their actions to the continuous production and reproduction of the social structure of rules which actors know, which order much of their action and without which social life would be impossible. Yet in every action there is the potential for actors to participate in changing the 'rules' or structure which in turn they may know and realise in further action.
In this way Giddens is able to deal with a recurrent difficulty in sociological theory, accounting for both continuity and change which he sees as inherent in all moments of social reproduction.

6.3.1 PRACTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Integral to Giddens' theory of structuration is a discussion of consciousness in which he distinguishes consciousness in terms of the two modes of consciousness: practical consciousness and discursive consciousness (23).

Practical consciousness is particularly significant for the continuity of social reproduction since it is the mode in which "routinization or the continual regrooving of established attitudes and cognitive outlooks" is most likely to occur (24). On the other hand it appears that production of new structures is more likely to follow from discursive consciousness in action since it is only in this mode that routinization can be questioned or challenged.

In Giddens' terms the over-socialised concept of teachers would be represented by a low degree of discursive consciousness. Similarly, the data on teachers that may be collected by sitting in on staff room talk, as in the Hargreaves and Woods researches can largely be seen as 'regrooving' of established attitudes which actors achieve by operating at the level of practical consciousness.

The analysis by Giddens of consciousness, routinization and continual regrooving of established attitudes serve to hold down potential sources of anxiety. The familiar, Giddens defines as reassuring and the familiar in social settings is created and recreated through human agency itself.
For example, "the staff room can be seen as the locator of a fairly intensive collective regrooving of established attitudes which is made necessary by the anxieties peculiar to teaching" (25). Such an analysis would embrace Woods' analysis of the functions of staff room laughter.

We might think of practical consciousness as the stratum wherein the "teacher finds familiar recipes for coping in the classroom which include categorizations of knowledge, of pupil's ability and behaviour. It is also where the teacher finds those sentiments and kinds of humour which are the currency of the staff room solidarity and with which may be bought a sense of security and the esteem of colleagues" (26). It seems also that in practical consciousness teachers experience most of the intrinsic and extrinsic rewards of teaching that sustain them from day to day, year to year. In relation to intrinsic rewards teachers would ask, do I enjoy teaching and in relation to extrinsic rewards they ask, is it worth it?

It is at the discursive level that teachers might ask themselves the question, do I believe in what I am doing as a teacher? "At this level teachers might compare the practices in which they are daily constrained to indulge with their personal belief systems. It is also at this level that teachers might personally experience the contradiction or ambiguities of their structural location" (27). Schools and staff rooms are the setting for a great deal of routinization so that teachers rarely exercise the discursive mode of consciousness.
By viewing teachers in terms of Giddens' concept of consciousness, we may avoid the temptation that has tended to reduce teachers to mere 'cultural dopes', passive products of socialization, unreflective and incapable of comprehending their actions rather than in purely pragmatic terms.

Instead we are able to see them operating mostly in the context of practical consciousness, within which all of us conceive most of our social behaviour, as a response to the day to day activities endemic to teaching. These anxieties, in part, derive from the structures of schooling which are able to be reproduced from year to year because teachers operate in the practical mode of consciousness. Thus teachers are able to sustain themselves at the practical level of consciousness while the system of education is able to sustain itself because teachers think in that way. To repeat Giddens' tenet: "social structures are both constituted by human agency and yet at the same time are the very medium of this constitution" (28).

6.3.2 RELEVANCE FOR RESEARCH

6.3.2.1 PAUL WILLIS
Giddens in his publication "The Constitution of Society", uses Paul Willis' research "Learning to Labour" in his analysis of strategic conduct (29). Giddens uses this study to show how it conforms closely to the empirical implications of structuration theory. Willis' research shows on the level of discursive and practical consciousness that it is the conformist children who more or less accept the authority of the teachers and their educational goals. Rather than rebel against them, these children would be more knowledgeable about the social
system of the school. 'The lads', have an almost imprecise awareness of aspects of the wider society that influences the contexts of their own activities.

Giddens also uses this research to show how the activities of the 'lads' within a restricted context, contribute to the reproduction of larger institutional forms. This is done by showing the relation between the school counter culture and wider institutions. The boys seek the financial independence which work will provide with no particular expectations about any other types of reward the work might offer.

The aggressive joking culture which they have developed within the school milieu resembles that of the shop-floor culture of the work situations into which they tend to move. "Their partial penetration of the limited life chances open to them is actively to perpetuate the conditions which help them to limit those very life chances" (30).

Another useful aspect of the research is that it reinforces Giddens' concept of the duality of structure. Giddens show how the practices followed in a given range of contexts are 'embedded' (31) in wider reaches of time and space, that is, its relation to institutionalised practices. 'The lads' in developing an oppositional culture within the school, draw upon rules and resources more broadly involved in the immediate contexts of their action.

The school as a locale is physically separated from the workplace and is temporally separated from the experience of work in the life spans of children. While school and workplace share overall patterns of disciplinary power, they are not aspects of a single institutional form. The school has a strong moral
tone which influences the nature of the rebellious sub-culture.

The staff are 'resource' centres for the distribution of knowledge, recognised as a scarce commodity by the conformist children and they have more direct control over the timing and spacing of activities that make up the organisation of classrooms of the school time-table as a whole. In all this the teaching staff are drawing indirectly upon entrenched sources of institutional support in the wider society.

'The lads' draw upon a fund of experience built into their lives outside the school and built up in working class communities in general. Those who disaffiliate themselves from the norms and expected behaviour of the school environment are able to make use of their fund of experience and so help to reproduce these very characteristics of the wide context.

Willis also shows how in the situated contexts of action of 'the lads', "structural relations are sustained in and reproduced, by that action" (32). This reinforces Giddens idea of structural sets which he sees as "a useful device for conceptualising some of the main features of a given institutional order" (33).

6.3.2.2. GAMBETTA

In discussing the relevance of structural constraint for education, Giddens used the research report by Gambetta (34). Gambetta's report shows the influence of structural constraint within the immediate situation of action which confronts school leavers. Gambetta's study is concerned with the influence of structural constraints within the immediate situation
of action which confronts the school leavers. "Structural constraints in other words operate via agents, motives and reasons, establishing conditions and consequences affecting options open to others and what they want from whatever option they have" (35).

In discussing constraints on action, Giddens says firstly that constraints do not 'push' anyone to do anything if he or she has not already been 'pulled', secondly constraints are of various kinds - that deriving from differential sanctions and structural constraint and thirdly to study the influence of structural constraint in any particular context of action implies specifying relevant aspects of the limits of agents’ knowledgeability.

Gambetta’s research illustrates the third point by specifying that children and parents are likely to know about labour markets in their local areas. The same is true of knowledgeability in respect of the school milieu. Gambetta is able to show the sorts of knowledge children and parents have about the 'cash value' of education.

The second point of Giddens' discussion of constraints on action is illustrated by showing how school attendance and minimum school leaving age are fixed by law. Children are also subject to informal sanctions on the part of parents and of other figures in the school. "Since parents have to support those of their progeny who stay at school, they have a strong economic sanction with which to influence whether or not their children go into further education" (36).

Finally identifying structural constraint in a specific context or type of context of action demands consideration of actors' reasons in relation to the motivation that is at the origin of preferences.
When constraints so narrow the range of alternatives that only one option or type of option is open to the actor, the presumption is that the actor will not find it worth while to do anything other than comply. Where only one option exists, awareness of such limitation, in conjunction with wants, supplies the reason for the agents’ conduct.

This can be illustrated by Willis’ research where an ‘economic model’ will make some sense of ‘the lads’ reasoning. Seeing that formal education has little to offer them in respect of work prospects, they decide to cut losses by getting out to work as soon as they can.

6.3.3 POSITIONING
Another concept used in structuration theory and which has implications for education is that of ‘positioning’. Positioning in the time-space paths of day to day life, for every individual, is also positioning within the ‘life cycle’ or ‘life path’. The child forms the capability of becoming a reflexive agent through the positioning of the body in relation to its image. In the school situation, this reflexivity with regard to positioning is important with regard to the development of the child’s personality. The child, as a pupil, is able to reflect on school life and family life and draw from both in the formation of his self.

6.3.4 SERIALITY
Another important concept is that of seriality. Encounters are sequenced phenomena which give form to the seriality of day to day life. There are two principle characteristics of encounters: opening and closing and turn-taking. An example of the first one
would be, at school where the opening of the day is signalled by prayers in an assembly and the closing of the day by a bell or siren. Even in the drawing of the same object in an art class, the individual does not expose the art in the presence of others nor does he conceal it in the presence of the class at the conclusion of the encounter. When the teacher presents the object to be drawn, individual pupils interpret this object in their own way and show off their interpretation only at the end of the lesson.

The second aspect "turn-taking" is expressive of the nature of interaction. It is a major feature of the serial character of social life, hence connecting with the overall character of social reproduction. For example talk is seen as a single order medium implying that if communicative intent is to be realised, contributions to encounters are inevitably serial.

In the classroom pupils learn to raise their hand if they wish to express themselves or to be quiet when the teacher is talking. Sartre as quoted by Giddens uses the example of a bus queue to show how seriality relates to turn-talking. The queue for the bus is used to demonstrate mutual coupling of time-space relations of presence and absence.

"These separate people form a group, in so far as they are all standing on the same pavement, which protects them from the traffic crossing the square, in so far as they are grouped around the same bus stop. They are all, or nearly all, workers and regular users of the bus service; they know the timetable and frequency of the buses; and consequently they all wait for the same bus. But this present interest since they all live in the same district refers back to fuller and deeper structures of public
transport, freezing of fares etcetera. The bus they wait for unites them, being their interest as individuals who this morning have business on the 'rive droite', but as the 7:49 it is in their interests as commuters; everything is temporalized: the traveller recognises himself as a resident and then the bus becomes characterised by its daily return. The object takes on a structure which overflows from its pure inert existence; as such it is provided with a passive past and future, and these make it appear to the passengers as a fragment of their destiny" (37).

One can use the same example and relate to education by seeing the pupils of a class as representing a group that attends the same school and are in the same class, say Standard Two A. They are all pupils who come to school everyday and are familiar with the daily workings of the school. Going to school is in their present interest since they are all dependent on it providing an education that would enable them to get a job. This present interest refers to deeper structures of general interest perhaps the improvement of sporting facilities, less homework and so on.

Going to this particular school unites them as individuals who want to learn for personal fulfillment and being in the same class unites them as pupils (classmates). The child realises that going to school is something he will have to do everyday until he is able to leave or successfully complete. The school then becomes a structure which has ramifications for wider societies and pupils see their 'going to school' as a part of their destiny.
6.4 CONCLUSION

From the discussion, it would seem that structuration theory has great potential for education. Giddens was able to invalidate many of the criticisms against him by the explanation provided in "Constitution of Society". He showed how the notions of structure and agency as being dualistic was unfounded. He says structure as comprising rules and resources should be accepted because it is 'recursive' - implying that it can occur again, there is a way of coming back to the original form. To show that structure is both enabling and constraining, Giddens discusses Durkheim's conception of constraint.

Giddens clarifies his position on the notion of agency by stating that to suppose that the 'I' is the agent is mistaken. In other words there is no decentring of the subject and human agency cannot be seen as being prior to the subject-object dichotomy. Similarly Giddens, by drawing extensively from Marx's account of private property in modern capitalism and the division of labour is able to invalidate Gane's criticism of him and also shows how Thompson's criticism of Giddens falls flat because his account tends to return us to subject-less, underlying structural imperatives and constraints to which agents have no access and over which they have no control.

We have seen how Giddens has exposed the dualism in social theory between interactionists and structuralists with regard to the sociology of teachers and teaching. Despite the merits entailed in researches conducted by Andy Hargreaves and Peter Woods, these accounts still fall short in vital areas which Giddens has attempted to fill through his theory of structuration.

Giddens also uses Paul Willis' research and Gambettas' study to reinforce the applicability of certain concepts of structuration theory to education namely, that of
practical and discursive consciousness, dialectic of control, the school contributing to the reproduction of larger institutional forms, duality of structure, regionalisation, structure as rules and resources, concept of time-space, structural constraints and structural relations.

The educational implications of other concepts used by Giddens were assessed for example that of 'positioning' which we saw as having tremendous potential with regard to the development of the child's personality in the school. Another important concept discussed was that of seriality. Through Sartre's example it was shown how this concept has implications for education.

The greatest applicability to education in my opinion comes in the concept of practical consciousness. If the applicability of the concepts to education were correctly used then it would imply that a growing inability to come to terms with the daily lived experience at the level of practical consciousness may lead in future to a higher degree of discursive consciousness in pupils and teachers of the contradictions in contemporary schooling and of the tensions that exist between educational ideologies, practice in schools and social structures. Pupils and teachers therefore can provide a receptive audience for the efforts of raisers of consciousness. Any serious challenges to the routinization of schooling which might result from discursive consciousness amongst pupils and teachers would bring schools into open conflict with other elements of the social structure.

However, to use a cautionary note by Graaff: "the fact that people experience tension, even anger, with regard to their different roles in society is not, to me, the sign of rising discursive consciousness. It might be the cause of decreasing legitimacy with regard to the existing order and, after that, of rising discursive consciousness, which
is something quite different. But, then, it might not. Insight does not necessarily result from anger or tension" (38).

In the final analysis, I would like to reiterate the relevance of structuration theory for education. Giddens through the publication of "The Constitution of Society" (1984) provided possible solutions to earlier criticisms of his theoretical synthesis.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


10. See (9), p. 17.


(b) See also:


17. See (16a), p. 55.


19. (a) See (16a), p. 56.


20. (a) See (16a), p. 56.

(b) See also:


21. See (16a), p. 56.

(b) See also:


23. Practical consciousness refers to what actors know about social conditions including especially the conditions of their own action; but cannot express discursively.

Discursive consciousness is what actors are able to say or to give verbal expression to, about social conditions including especially the conditions of their own action.


25. See (16a), p. 60.


27. See (16a), p. 67.


29. (a) See (1), p. 289.

(b) See Also:


30. See (1), p. 293.

31. For a further explanation of this concept see article by Graaff.
32. See (1), p. 303.

33. See (1), p. 304.

34. The individuals interviewed in Gambetta’s research were registered in lists set up by an Act of Parliament which had the objective of aiding school leavers in finding employment. The Act offered benefits to employers taking on young people and allowed for various forms of training on the job and so on. The research project was an attempt by authorities to influence conditions of social reproduction reflexively.

35. (a) See (1), p. 310.

(b) Gambetta, Diego, Were they pushed or did they jump?. Ph.D.; University of Chicago.


37. See (1), p. 78.

38. Personal correspondence with J. de V. Graaff.
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