Regional Conflicts and Policy Shifts in the Post-apartheid Era: Impact of Domestic Politics on South Africa’s Foreign Policy

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ABSTRACT

Despite its rhetoric about prioritising Africa and the need for an African Renaissance, South Africa's leadership is severely constrained by domestic political factors in its ability to engage and lead the continent. To date, the ANC-led government has been criticised for its incoherent foreign policy. Most criticisms have centered on South Africa's failure to engage the SADC region effectively. This research, examines the importance attached to South Africa getting involved in the region and the rationale guiding its involvement. Employing realism as a technique of assessment, the study examines the factors that influenced South Africa's actions or inactions.

The ANC(African National Congress)-led government must concern itself with several issues that can muffle efforts by the state to intervene or act in concert with members of the region. Such issues include a historical (apartheid-induced) antipathy toward Africa, a 40 percent unemployment rate amongst its main racial constituents, a very vocal and demagogic opposition, large minorities with little or no interest in developing extensive links with the region, and the ever-present need to contest and win domestic elections. Given this internal context as well as the general desire to lead and effect change within the region and to improve her international prestige (for instance, by securing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council or bids for major sporting events), South Africa will find herself torn between domestic and external imperatives. As such, the ability or capacity of the South African government to act effectively in conflict resolution missions within Africa will be shaped substantially by how well it is able to attend to, and reconcile, those tensions.
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DECLARATION:
Unless specifically indicated to the contrary, the ideas contained in this thesis are my own.

Nontobeko Hlela
ABBREVIATIONS:

ACDESS: African Centre for the development and Strategic Studies.

ACCORD: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes.

ANC: African national Congress.

Cosatu: Congress of South African Trade Unions.

DFA: Department of Foreign Affairs.

DP: Democratic Party.

GEAR: Growth, Employment and Redistribution.

IFP: Inkatha Freedom Party.

MPLA: Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

NP: National Party

OAU: Organisation for African Unity

PAC: Pan Africanist Congress.

RDP: Reconstruction and Development Programme

SACP: South African Communist Party.

SADC: Southern African Development Programme.

SADF: South African Defence Force.


SWAPO: South West African People’s Organisation.

UNITA: the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.
CHAPTER 1

1.1 Introduction

The end of the Cold War has initiated a new era in global politics. Pivotal conflicts on the world stage are no longer waged as a result of diametrically opposed ideological visions (for example, capitalism versus socialism). Rather, it is the ever-widening chasm between the industrialised North and the underdeveloped South that undergirds many of the conflicts and, hence, discussions in the international arena. Issues now include, amongst others: development, human rights, the environment, South-South co-operation, North-South relations, multilateralism, peace, security, and disarmament. There has thus been a shift from the previous focus on the risk of super-power nuclear confrontation to other forms of insecurity, often more regional or domestic in nature. The focus of this work will be on how domestic political factors have influenced South Africa’s foreign policy in the southern African region.

The African continent has been profoundly affected by global changes. Although political issues seem to reveal progress, as manifested by the number of evidently successful democratic elections which have taken place in different parts of the continent over the past few years, the outlook on the economic front remains gloomy despite more positive fortunes for the region since the mid-1990s. Aid fatigue is increasingly evident, shown by the growing reluctance of the West to involve itself meaningfully within Africa, particularly in regard to efforts towards containing new and old regional conflicts. Furthermore, some Western countries have allegedly been dissuaded from investing in Africa due to the volatile and unstable nature of political systems in the continent. To try to ensure that more investment comes to the continent than is currently happening, Africa has to combat these negative sentiments. This can be done by transforming its economic base and fostering greater co-operation between states in order to reshape trade networks.

In forging allies with its neighbours, South Africa seeks to draw on an African tradition of promoting greater continental consolidation in which the country and the
region are placed on a path of rapid economic development. While South Africa wants closer-regional co-operation and economic integration, she is conscious of her history as a "hegemonic" power in the sub-region. Therefore, the ANC-led government aims to refrain from imposing its ideals on southern African countries in order to avoid a similar scenario. The relationships it envisions in southern Africa are those oriented towards diplomacy and peace-keeping rather than military intervention.

For over four decades, South Africa's foreign policy was dogged by the apartheid issue, which led to her being one of the most isolated countries in the world by the end of the 1980s. The task of reversing this legacy and replacing it with one which is representative of the country's new political dispensation will take time to emerge. The ANC acknowledged this and made provision to become involved in developing policies necessary for South Africa to find her niche in the new world order (www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1993/nm9311.html). The ANC maintained that South Africa's foreign policy under its government was to be built on the following assumptions:

- that issues of human rights are central to international relations and an understanding that they extend beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental;

- that just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come through the promotion of democracy worldwide;

- that considerations of justice and respect for international law should guide the relations between nations;

- that peace is the goal for which all nations should strive, and where this breaks down, internationally agreed and nonviolent mechanisms, including effective arms-control regimes, must be employed;

- that concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in our [South Africa's] foreign policy choices;

- that economic development depends on growing regional and
international economic co-operation in an interdependent world
(Mandela,1993:1).

The above-stated sentiments show how the ANC government aimed to conduct the
country's international relations. Its views are clearly in direct contrast to the manner
in which the National Party governments' had tackled foreign policy issues.

In spite of the above-stated objectives of the new government's foreign policy
towards Africa, and particularly the southern African region, South Africa’s
leadership is severely constrained by domestic political factors. The ANC-led
government needs to address several issues that can muffle efforts by the South
African state to intervene or act in concert with members of the region. Such issues
include the historical antipathy towards Africa which also has its roots in colonial
mentalities of superiority. These mentalities delegated blacks as “the other” and
their cultures as barbaric. Apartheid reinforced these ideas amongst black South
Africans, making them believe that South Africa, being a “white state” was superior
to black Africa. The high unemployment rate in South Africa, the strident opposition,
the presence of large minorities with little or no interest in developing extensive links
with the sub-region, and the ever-present need to contest and win domestic
elections have all combined to influence the contours of current national policies
towards the sub-region and the whole continent. Given this internal context, as well
as the general desire not only to lead and effect change within the sub-region but
also to improve its international prestige, South Africa finds herself torn between
domestic and external imperatives. Thus, the South African government's ability
and capacity to act effectively and decisively in conflict resolution missions within
Africa will be shaped substantially by how well it is able to attend to, and reconcile,
those tensions.

It is in these circumstances that the nature of South Africa’s involvement in the sub-
region will be examined. Furthermore, the domestic political factors which have
shaped the South African intervention policy, as well as her actual interventions, will
be assessed in order to determine whether they reflect the ideals of the country’s
new democratic dispensation. Democratic South Africa has committed herself both
to resolving disputes with other states through peaceful means, and to joint efforts with its neighbours to promote the establishment of regional fora and units for crisis prevention and management.

The new government aims to pursue the establishment of common security arrangements in the southern African region so as to build mutual trust, share information and develop a co-ordinated approach to issues such as disarmament, small arms proliferation, foreign military involvement, and refugees in the sub-region. South Africa has proposed ways to facilitate disarmament on the sub-continent, ease debt, and release resources for development which would promote internal and sub-regional security as part of the regional peace process (www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/foreign.html).

1.2 Methodology

This work covers the post-apartheid period - specifically, 1994 to 2000. The principal focus of the argument centres on the post-apartheid ANC-led government's formulation and implementation of its foreign policy choices. An effort is made to examine those choices by bringing in some aspects of the apartheid legacies which helped to give shape to some of those policies. Also, examined are the tensions resulting from the new democratic dispensation, and the plethora of competing choices which the ANC-led government has had to grapple with. Concerned about domestic political imperatives, Pretoria's foreign policy choices have shifted in response to those competing claims. Shifts are also observable in the post-apartheid administrations of Mandela and Mbeki. Mandela's international moral stature and his personal charisma influenced most of his administration's foreign policy decisions. At times this led to relative lack of consultation and an "off-the-hip" policies. Comparatively, Mbeki had greater experience when it comes to foreign policy (he was the ANC's foreign correspondent during its years in exile). Mbeki's experience comes through in his more realistic and professional approach to foreign policy. This work hopes to examine whether Mbeki can escape Mandela's moral pedestal and pursue a more assertive and coherent foreign policy.
To logically organise the cognitive map of the topic undertaken, a specific framework of reference within which to organise the points of reference and targets of analysis is necessary.

1.2.1 Realism vs Idealism

The contrast between these two paradigms is relevant for the South African situation as realism and idealism have to some degree informed South Africa's foreign policy. Regarded as some of the greatest thinkers and realists of all time, Thucydides, Niccolo' Machiavelli, and Hans Morgenthau, (unlike Kant, an idealist) championed a separate morality for the private, and a different one for the public, sphere (Jackson & Sorenson, 1997:77). Realists view as ludicrous the notion that the same moralities can be applied for the private and public spheres.

Machiavelli alleged that no nation had “God on its side”. Therefore they all had to base their actions on prudence and practicality (Goldstein, 1994:49). To follow good ethics, therefore, would propel a leader towards grief since there is no way he could ensure that his rivals would follow the same path as he had followed. Acting on good ethics would then result in an irresponsible and ill-advised foreign policy being followed. In the course of pursuing foreign policy, especially in times of crisis, it might be necessary to engage in behaviour which is contrary to good principles, and which might actually be seen as being bad or even evil when put on the morality scale (Jackson & Sorenson, 1999:77).

E. H. Carr advocates a notion of pragmatic realism, maintaining that existing legislation cannot be substituted for rumination and circumspect decision-making since the outcome of the policy cannot be known. He argues that foreign policy decision-making is a matter of adapting to present circumstances through discovering and formulating the ends and means. According to Carr, agreements entered into or decisions made during a crisis are dependent on the circumstances. This is because the end result cannot be realised until it has occurred. This is why he advises that decisions should be entered into when the practitioners have the
fullest knowledge possible at their disposal (Jones, 1998:49).

The state is seen as being the most important actor within the realist paradigm, realism is the theory used in international relations to explain the actions of states. Pragmatism is at the centre of realist thought. Realists see the world as it is and not as it should be. Morals and ideology are used as a means to an end, and are not meant to restrict the actions of a rational political actor (humans are perceived as being rational beings, purporting to advance their interests at all times) (Orwa, 1985:8).

Linklater (1990) maintains that at the core of realist theory is necessity. This necessity acknowledges constraints on political choice and takes into account that what has a possibility of being done, has to be within the scope of the limits. Acknowledging this makes it possible to plan for what can be achieved while keeping in mind the changes that can occur to affect decisions. This makes for a more flexible policy as decision makers act not against the circumstances but in consonance with them. This survival imperative makes it possible to concentrate on achieving the “immediate goals of security and survival” in lieu of pursuing “the international good life”.

Jones (1979:52) concludes that necessary action is dictated by circumstances which might limit alternatives to actions which can be taken. When this happens, moral judgements do not count, they become a non-issue. South Africa’s foreign policy has not been particularly restrained by moralistic considerations. For instance, following necessity and the country’s economic survival, Pretoria chose to cut off ties with Taipei and opt for co-operation with Beijing.

Idealism, on the other hand, places a lot of emphasis on law, international organisation and morality. Power is then not seen as the key influence on international events. Idealists perceive human nature as basically good (unlike realists who see humans as bad and driven by their own self interests) and maintain that, with good habits, education and the correct structures, human nature can be
the basis of peaceful and co-operative international relationships. According to idealists, the international system is based on a community of states with a potential to work together to overcome mutual problems (Goldstein, 1994:47). Idealists like Frost (1997:237) argue that South Africa has an ethical obligation to the continent and, as such, policy-makers should identify problems which might confront the government. He maintains that an "enquiry into ethical matters" is of the utmost importance (1997:231-2).

While both realism and idealism have been discussed, it should be noted that this is merely to clarify South Africa's foreign policy, as both these paradigms appear to have influenced the country's foreign policy. However, in the final analysis realism is the more apposite paradigm. Supporting argument of this statement is discussed more fully in chapter three.

1.3 Brief Summary of Chapters

Chapter one gives a brief introduction of what informed the work undertaken as well as the objectives guiding South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy. An outline of the provisional chapters and the methodology applied in the study are presented in this chapter.

Chapter two employs the works of experts (such as Jaster, 1989; Johnson & Martin, 1989; Barber & Barret, 1990) to examine critically the foreign policies of apartheid and post apartheid governments. It is argued that apartheid South Africa's foreign policy was designed to destabilise the region in order to protect the Republic from perceived instability brought about by the decolonisation process in Africa. Apartheid South African policies were aimed at curbing external support by the neighbouring countries for the liberation movements fighting for fundamental changes within the country. The post apartheid state which followed the 1994 general elections resulted in an altered policy environment. Although national interest remains a major policy influence for the new policymakers, its exact contours and manifestations have been comparatively different from the apartheid-
era policies. This chapter attempts to examine those differences. It also explores the contradictory policy tracks which have become salient features of the post-apartheid era. Although keen to insert itself within the African geo-political mix by engaging the continent directly and proactively, Pretoria, finds itself severely constrained by domestic social, political, and economic imperatives. Experts such as Nkuhlu, 1995; Mills, 1997; Gwexe, 1999, and others are used to illuminate the contradictions in Pretoria's post-apartheid foreign polices.

Realism is used instrumentally in chapter three to explain the basic influences on South Africa's foreign policy. The approach is used to examine not only the important aspects of constraints on policy preferences but also how South Africa's policy decisions have been shaped and influenced. Examples are given throughout the chapter of situations where South Africa failed to show succinctly what informed her policy decisions. Driven by a moral ideological outlook and chastened by a domestic reality of assorted social needs, post apartheid South African government officials have struggled with delimiting the exact extent of her capabilities and limits. The net result has been a seemingly confused decision environment marked by policy shifts. This absence of clarity has led to perceptions that Pretoria's policies are being made in a vacuum - an implied suggestion that government decisions reflect an absence of vision and experienced leadership.

Chapter four looks specifically at the domestic constraints which have restricted Pretoria's ability to effectively pursue a coherent foreign policy. This chapter examines how South Africa is finding herself 'between a rock and a hard place'. The ANC-led government has maintained that its foreign policy is to be dedicated to ensuring that Africa is not forgotten by the world. The legacy of apartheid, however, means that the government is faced with daunting challenges of economic upliftment to remedy the inequalities brought about by apartheid. Issues such as crime, unemployment, poverty, lack of basic needs, such as housing and water, are examined as some of the constraints on the government. Also, the demagogic opposition and its stance on issues is examined. Despite having to contend with this at home, South Africa is under external pressure to take on a leadership role within
Africa on assorted issues such as peacemaking endeavours in Southern Africa.

Chapter five looks briefly at the conflicts which plague Africa. The reasons behind these conflicts are examined using a case study to illustrate how domestic issues impeded the government’s ability to formulate a coherent interventionist foreign policy for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Issues such as the oppositions’ criticisms against the use of force in the DRC are examined. Also, the chapter looks at the difficult task of justifying having to use scarce resources on missions abroad.

The concluding chapter looks at South African foreign policy and makes recommendations for a more effective and coherent future foreign policy process. It is suggested that South Africa should persist in following a foreign policy which prioritises Africa. This could only serve to improve South Africa’s bid for an African renaissance in the economic, political, social, and cultural spheres. A realisation of this vision presupposes an Africa that is not only self-sufficient but which adopts more peaceful mechanisms for addressing conflicts, and which emphasises the collective well-being of its inhabitants.
Chapter 2
Literature Review and Background

2.1 Background on South Africa's Foreign Policy

Before 1994, South Africa's foreign policy makers were deeply absorbed in efforts to protect the republic from sub-regional instability brought about by the decolonisation process in Africa. Later, the turmoil centred not so much on the sub-region as a whole but on country itself, where the struggle to dismantle the apartheid system raged on until the early 1990s. In its bid to entrench and protect the apartheid system, South Africa intervened in the continent not only to safeguard its territorial integrity but also to weaken her neighbours. This was intended to render them less able to aid its domestic opponents who used neighbouring states to organise and mount diplomatic and military strikes against the South African state. The end of the apartheid system in 1994 saw the birth of a new political dispensation. Rather than organising itself to fend off and destroy neighbouring governments and states, South Africa's new foreign policy sought to work with, and integrate itself into, the rest of Africa. Military interventions in the southern African region became preoccupied not so much with weakening governments but rather with strengthening state capacity to promote development. The goal was to create and nurture enabling environments within which peace, justice, and respect for human rights could be attained.

To secure the apartheid Republic from perceived sub-regional instability, Pretoria introduced the "Total Strategy" which was an attempt at countering the perceived "total onslaught". The total onslaught had its roots in the political upheavals of the 1970s, Portugal's abandonment of Angola, as well as in the real or imagined Soviet threat to the South African state. It was believed that Moscow saw South Africa as strategically vital to the West and therefore high on the Soviet Union's priority list (Cawthra, 1997:35). At the heart of the total strategy policy was the notion of holding back sub-regional liberation movements which were aiding Pretoria's domestic opponents in organising and mounting diplomatic and military strikes.
against the Republic. For example, Pretoria sought to undermine Moscow’s influence in the sub-region by escalating the war in Angola in its bid to wipe out the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and the African National Congress (ANC), which were operating within Angolan borders and receiving military assistance from the Soviet Union (Cawthra, 1997:39-41).

According to Johnson and Martin (1989:xxi), the total strategy mobilised political, economic, diplomatic, and military resources in defense of apartheid. To this end, Pretoria manipulated its economic relations with other African states through economic co-operation or punishment as part of its foreign-policy goals and domestic-security concerns (Bienen, 1985:76). This illuminates the fact that economic policies were utilised as instruments for political influence. As Johnson and Martin (1989:xxviii) argue, the collapse of the colonial barrier led to a new policy being sought “on sub-regional economic co-operation, mutual security, and a resistance to external pressure, [this policy used] military force beyond its (South African) borders to achieve its political and economic objectives.” Barber and Barratt (1990:176-177) agree with this assessment and concede that the total strategy was in response to the increasing hostility which was being directed against Pretoria.

The increased military and economic coercion employed by South Africa against her neighbours who harboured ANC members led to severe constraints in the movement’s abilities to infiltrate into South Africa as they were pushed back to Zambia. Zambia’s geographical location meant that the ANC had to find new ways of making its presence felt within the Republic (Jaster, 1988:121). The military was at the core of South Africa’s foreign policy during the total strategy years. This was especially so when P. W. Botha came into office. As a military man, Botha gave the South African Defence Force (SADF) more leeway in the affairs of the country than any of his predecessors. This leeway was employed especially in interactions with the country’s neighbours. Cross-border raids were not only employed but also regarded as a legitimate means of protecting the national interests of the country.

The SADF’s actions were aimed at "persuading the governments of neighbouring
states to prevent South African insurgents . . . from using those countries to stage 
attacks against Pretoria and forcing neighbouring countries to follow Pretoria's 
dictates" (Sullivan, 1989:202). Through the continued use of the carrot and stick 
policy, Pretoria succeeded in keeping its neighbouring states dependent on her for 
their economic and political security. For instance, the migrant labour policy made 
many countries within the sub-region dependent on South Africa for employment 
and foreign exchange earnings, whilst her military might ensured that her directives 
were followed with minimal resistance. As Brittain (1988:4) states, the chaos, wars 
and economic failures in the continent were used by the South African regime to 
justify the maintenance of white rule and its attempt to dominate the continent from 
the South on behalf of its Western allies. Barber and Barratt (1990:1) argue that 
Pretoria's aim between 1945 and 1988 was to preserve "a white controlled state." 
Furthermore, this aim shaped and dominated domestic and foreign policy, as 
Pretoria fought to ensure the security, status and legitimacy of the state within the 
international community.

Despite the force and power of the apartheid regime, it failed in its efforts to stop the 
liberation struggle and movements. Although liberation movements were hindered 
in their efforts, this did not stop them from fighting the inhumane state in South The 
1994 democratic elections in the country, which culminated in the emergence of a 
new dispensation, is a clear indication of the apartheid regimes' failure. Africa.

While living in Africa as exiles, many of those now in power experienced first hand 
how the brutality and the destabilisation of the National Party governments affected 
people. Key players within the present government also received direct financial, 
diplomatic, military and logistical support from the current leaders of neighbouring 
governments. Foreign policy makers therefore cannot ignore problems within the 
sub-region or callously turn their backs on old friends like Mugabe and Kaunda. 
Given that South Africa can now legitimately trade with these countries [and given 
her greater industrial capacity], a visionary foreign policy in southern Africa can be 
shaped. This policy would aim to develop trade within the sub-region and the rest of 
the continent and, it is hoped, will foster free trade within the sub-region and the
continent and be able to build an effective economic bloc. Clearly, the ANC-led
government's policies towards the sub-region and continent are qualitatively different
from those of the apartheid regime. They do not aim to destroy; rather, they seek to
build and foster development.

2.2 Literature Review

2.2.1 Influences on Policy

2.2.1.1 Continental Obligations

Historical and geographical links with the southern African region have been greatly
influential on South Africa's foreign policy initiatives. Indeed, South Africa's socio-
political and economic future is closely connected with that of the continent because
of the historical links with the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
region and the rest of Africa. If the rest of Africa is enmeshed in economic and
political instability, prosperity will not be possible for South Africa on a continuous
basis. Because of the formation of economic blocs and the increase in the use of
protectionist measures by most developed countries, the sub-region's potentially rich
markets remain South Africa's best hope for industrial development. South Africa's
manufacturing capacity, her technology, proximity and cultural closeness to other
states in the sub-region give her a comparative advantage over European and Asian
manufacturers.

Although South Africa is in a comparatively disadvantageous position as a player on
the global stage, she does wield considerable power within SADC and Africa. Yet,
and despite the leadership's rhetoric of an African Renaissance, it is severely
constrained in its ability to lead and engage the continent. The domestic context,
marked by a very high unemployment rate amongst its major constituency and a
vociferous opposition, present major difficulties and challenges to the ANC-
government. Beyond those, South Africa hopes to lead and effect change in the
southern African region while also improving her international prestige. Given these
circumstances, South Africa finds herself torn between domestic and external
imperatives. In keeping with realist thought, it is in South Africa's interest to intervene in the sub-region. Considering that she hopes to be a "first among equals" in the sub-region, and a leader in the continent, together with her aspiration to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, she needs the goodwill and support of her neighbours to achieve these goals. Successful conflict resolution missions will go a long way towards ensuring such positive attitudes. South Africa also has a moral obligation to a southern Africa which harboured her exiles and without whose help in the liberation struggle she might still be under apartheid rule. Failure to intervene in crisis areas might hamper her success and operation in the sub-region. To safeguard her position, therefore, she needs to engage the southern African region in a meaningful and effective manner.

When South Africa joined SADC in 1994 she was expected to become the economic engine in the sub-region and to facilitate peace initiatives. The socio-economic destruction and misery seen in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Angola make it apparent that there is a dire need for the sub-region to act in a concerted fashion on the joint security needs of southern Africa. Were such a consensus to be reached, leaders could resuscitate and reassess present sub-regional economic and political structures. Political and economic mechanisms, or structures which lack adequate domestic support, will remain incapable of redressing sub-regional economic and political problems (www.igd.org.za/publications/global-dialogue/foreign-policy/burden.html).

In many instances, political differences and the crisis of the nation-state have been at the root of the conflicts on the continent. The most devastating effect of these conflicts is that they spill over onto the economic and social lives of the people. As a result, violent conflicts have become the major hindrance to development in Africa: they displace millions of people, impose immeasurable suffering on vast communities and populations, and create a feeling of insecurity within countries. Basically, the conflicts disrupt production, lead to the pillaging of scarce resources or in their wastage on war-making equipment rather than for the infrastructure and development of the countries (Toure, 1999).
2.2.1.2 Apartheid South African Foreign Policy: Pursuing the National Interest

Foreign policy could refer to a single situation and the state's effort to achieve its set goals for that particular situation. This leads the state to pursue a number of policies, to identify many goals and set out various strategies, assess different capabilities and instate clear-cut decisions and actions. Goldstein (1994) defines foreign policy as the strategies employed by governments to guide their actions in the international arena. Foreign policies refer to objectives leaders have resolved to pursue in a given relationship or situation, and the manner in which they intend to pursue their objectives.

It is also largely accepted that foreign policy is the strategy developed by decision-makers within a state with regards to other states in order to attain certain goals defined as national interest. This can be done through the process of collecting information, writing memoranda which outline possible courses of action, discussing the matter, and lobbying by interest groups to steer issues in certain directions. Foreign policy outcomes are a result of multiple forces working at the same time on various levels of analysis (Goldstein, 1994:97). Rationalised and represented in terms of national interest, foreign policy decisions are translated into goals and objectives, so as to construct a course of action. The foreign policy process includes determining the international and domestic factors which are related to policy goals. Also, it involves the analysis of the state's ability to achieve the sought goals, making the plans to put the state's capacities into action, and taking the necessary action (Ziring, Plano & Olton, 1995:1).

The process of foreign policy making is also one of decision-making. For its part, decision-making is a process in which adjustments are made as a result of feedback from the outside world. Goldstein (1994:98) maintains that decisions are carried out through actions taken to change the world; information from the world is then monitored to evaluate the effects of those actions. The evaluations then go into the next round of decisions. This is known as the steering process which is dependent on external feedback and is based on the goals of the decision-maker. In order to
achieve the desired outcome, objectives have to be set.

Jaster (1988:xiii) maintains that South Africa’s foreign policy had been “essentially reactive and defensive” and focused on the search for security. From the 1940s to 1994, South Africa’s foreign policy was strongly dominated and constrained by its internal policy of white superiority which forced the country to be preoccupied with defending the system against external pressures (Jaster, 1988:42). Albert Venter (1989:18) concedes that South Africa’s international relations were characterised by a policy of isolation as a result of its apartheid policy. Even the attacks that were made on ANC quarters in neighbouring capital cities were, according to Jaster, driven by “a strong domestic political imperative” (1988:119-120).

This resulted in conflict between Pretoria and the international community since their views on South Africa’s domestic politics did not coincide. There was strong international condemnation against the apartheid state that eventually led to a scaling down of cross-border attacks (Jaster, 1988:122-124). A new approach for the country’s external policy was sought to retaliate against the domestic opponents in neighbouring countries. It was thought that solutions for sub-regional problems could be found by concentrating on a specific issue at any given time. Pretoria hoped that through such actions southern Africa would slip from the international agenda (Barber & Barratt, 1990:216). The country’s ‘split image’ made it possible for its leaders to emphasise one or the other aspect at any time (Jaster, 1988: 84). This is why, with the failure of détente with African states, Pretoria portrayed herself as an ally of the “American-led anti-communist alliance system and as an outpost of Western Christian civilisation on the African continent” (McGowan, 1993:36).

In the late 1970s the United States of America sent resources to help South Africa and UNITA to “stabilise” the sub-region and contain the spread of communism on the continent. In 1986, the US provided UNITA with $10 million in direct military aid which reportedly rose to $30 million annually for the remainder of Reagan’s rule (Pycroft, 1994:244). The Reagan administration’s “constructive engagement” policy incorporated South Africa in the talks, and treated her as a legitimate partner in the
process of change for southern Africa, rather than as the accused. Constructive engagement aimed to show South Africa that the only way forward for her would be through changes in her domestic politics. Chester Crocker, who facilitated these discussions, wanted to impress upon the South Africans that their continued forages into the sub-region were not helping her domestic situation.

Change in domestic politics was cited as the avenue to stop internal strife. There was, however, nothing ‘constructive’ about the United States’ policy which was supposed to foster diplomacy instead of military action in the southern African region. However, the US became directly involved in trying to overthrow the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government (Johnson & Martin, 1989: xxvi-xxvii). Johnson and Martin argue that the United States’ engagement reflected a failure within the Reagan administration to distinguish between its animosity towards the Soviet Union and the real issue in southern Africa. This failure led to the US being firmly allied with apartheid South Africa which suited Pretoria’s intentions perfectly. For Pretoria, constructive engagement characterised a resuscitation of the good relationship South Africa had once enjoyed with the West and afforded the South African government relative freedom to destabilse the southern African region, while violently suppressing political opposition in the country.

Chester Crocker, then US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, acknowledges that South Africa’s diplomacy during “constructive engagement” reflected the National Party’s needs, “changes of mood, and internal preoccupations” which sent its neighbours mixed messages. In portraying the integral role he and the United States played in the peace process, Crocker downplays the role the US performed in the conflict in Angola with its support of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) (Crocker:1993). Marga Holness (1989:133) states that UNITA was a protégée of Washington and Pretoria. William Minter (1989:434) concurs that the US had a dual policy towards southern African states. On the one hand, the US condemned apartheid and on the other it assisted the SADF in its fight against the MPLA.
Sullivan (1989) shows that Pretoria used its military might and economic superiority in the sub-region to keep its neighbours in line and limit their capacity to assist anti-apartheid movements. Barber and Barratt (1990:5) explore South Africa's foreign policy between 1945 and 1988 and the domestic and international pressures placed on the government's foreign policy decisions. They maintain that Pretoria's foreign policy was a product of, or response to, internal events. Jaster (1988:175) also asserts that the apartheid regime's foreign policy had domestic political constraints to contend with, one of them being the pressure to continually portray itself as being tough and resolute in the face of external security threats and economic pressures. He maintains that the National Party was faced with a situation where it had to slow down domestic race reforms, which began with the introduction of the Tricameral Parliament, and reduce worthwhile concessions on foreign policy issues in order to placate its constituents and assure the National Party continued domestic support in Botha's tentative race reforms. Clearly, national interest played a role in the apartheid government's formulation of foreign policy. The present government's foreign policy has also shown that it is dictated by the country's needs and interests.

2.2.1.3 Post Apartheid South Africa: Internal Imperatives - National Interest

National interest is the fundamental objective and essential determinant which guides the state's decision-makers in their formulation of foreign policy. National interest can be described as the elements which make up the state's most vital needs. These include self-preservation, independence, territorial integrity, military security and economic well-being. A government's well-being is closely related to the prosperity levels of its constituents. Not surprisingly, the citizens' welfare ranks high on the government's policy objectives (Ziring, Plano & Olton, 1995:6-11).

It is such sentiments which inform Spence's (1998) advocacy of pragmatic decision-making. At the top of his list is survival. He maintains that though moral issues have to be taken into consideration, they should not dictate policy. Other more practical issues, like the economic well-being of a country and its citizens, and a country's international standing are what dictate policy.
The preservation of the state's economy is amongst the universal needs of foreign policy. This need is one of the most important set of domestic sources of foreign policy. Although decision-makers and the foreign policy making bureaucracy have to consider a wide variety of choices when making decisions, economic needs are consistently amongst the most important sources of a state's foreign policy. This is because the state is often faced with tremendous pressures to satisfy individual or group economic needs through foreign policy. The country's foreign policy has been shaped particularly by the needs of its constituents, millions of whom are unemployed (further conditions which impose constraints on the government will be identified below and in chapter four). A rational decision-maker will, therefore, be concerned with maintaining or possibly increasing his state's capability such that the intended objectives can be achieved (Legg & Morrison, 1981:57).

Apartheid South Africa's foreign policy was shaped by its national interest of preserving the Republic from external and internal forces attempting to break down white minority domination in the country. The new regime's foreign policy is still informed by national interest. However, the issues have changed; direct political and economic interests are the factors that drive the new dispensation's policies.

2.2.2 Domestic Constraints

By the mid-1980s, foreign critics as well as politically influential white South Africans agreed that for South Africa to have durable security she would have to bolster the stability of southern Africa (Bienen, 1985:3). Thus, when South Africa got her emancipation in 1994, it had to develop and follow a foreign policy reflective of its new and constructive political dispensation. The new government's foreign policy seeks to work with and integrate itself with the rest of Africa. The state hopes to play an integral role in developing the continent, such that people will have incentives to remain in their own countries and build a future for themselves and their children.

The late 1980s saw southern African leaders proposing that they should work
together to settle the sub-region's problems, without the participation of outside states. This was in the hope that situations which reinforced the perception that black African lives were less valuable than white European ones could in future be avoided. The push towards the "Africanisation" of peacekeeping also emanates from a largely disinterested international community, which seeks to cut ties with Africa, and from the realisation by Africans that if they do not act nobody else will.

Despite South Africa's military and economic strength, she lacked the legitimacy to enable her to lead sub-regional conflict resolutions (Jaster, 1988:181-182). Since 1994, however, the emphasis in Pretoria's foreign policy has switched from Europe to Africa and away from the distant power blocs of the northern hemisphere to the neighbouring states of the southern African region (Jaster, 1997:75). The new leaders appear keen for the sub-region to play an important role in its foreign policy, especially when considering that the people of the sub-region also suffered under apartheid. While South Africans were being discriminated against and repressed, not only were the peoples of Africa suffering under the rule of dictators like Idi Amin and Mobutu Sese Seko, they were also experiencing destabilisation policies from the apartheid government which left almost two million people dead, millions displaced, and damage of approximately US $65 billion inflicted on their economies (www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/foreign.html).

South African decision makers have not always been clear on what influences the country's foreign policy, which has lead to criticisms being leveled against the country's policy. In the ANC's bid to redefine its approach to foreign relations it has left "confusion" amongst observers as to the direction and shape of its future foreign policy (Alden, 1993:63). Critics claim that since 1994, South Africa's policy towards the continent has become "ambivalent" and that Pretoria appears to be distancing itself from Africa (Adedeji, 1996:231-233; Gwexe, 1999:105; Hanekom, 1997:7; Vale, 1994:83; Diescho, 1996:2). Cilliers and Malan (1996) insist that the country's foreign policy is "schizophrenic" and "lack[s] focus", causing the country to "flounder and rapidly squander the goodwill and prestige" it enjoyed after the 1994 elections. Mills(1994) has criticised the country's foreign policy for being "twin-track", in that it
pursues national interest above all else while outwardly displaying concern over human rights and democratisation elsewhere.

The two-pronged approach to foreign policy might be caused by the country's contradictory history. It has displayed its emulation of the previous government's traditional assumptions, this was demonstrated by; the sale and buying of arms, displaying preoccupation with the bottom line and, the country's protection from possible threats (Spence, 1998:157). Amongst other factors influencing its decision-making is that of its recent record of diplomatic, and relatively peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy (Malan, 1991:1). Certainly, the past does exercise power and influence over the ANC government's capacity and ability to act as it might wish. Socio-economic conditions in the country are a major inhibitor on the government. Arguably, most of the conditions causing problems for the present government can be traced back to the policies of the apartheid regime.

Spence (1998) believes that the irresolution in South Africa's foreign policy is due to contradictions between 'liberal' perceptions and realist assumptions based on finance and growth imperatives. Nkuhlu (1995:53-54) and Mills (1997:3), however, maintaining their moralistic rather than pragmatic stance, assert that Pretoria needs to take a stand and can ill-afford to have a "rainbow policy" or follow a policy shaped by "universality." It should also be kept in mind that there are tremendous internal challenges facing the country which will continue to be a drain on her resources for some time to come (Gwexe 1999:105) - nevertheless, this should not exempt Pretoria from being urged to fulfil her continental obligations.

Contemplating South Africa's foreign policy decisions Tjonneland and Vraalsen (1996:199) emphasise that they do not foresee South Africa concentrating much of her energies on the sub-region in the immediate future. They contend that the ANC government might have to "concentrate its efforts and resources on domestic issues" which resulted from the apartheid legacy. This will place great demands on the government. The tremendous difference in living standards between the white and black populations in the country puts pressure on the government. The matter
is exacerbated by the limited budget with which the government has to work in the face of expectations of immediate delivery in narrowing inequalities and eradicating poverty from its constituencies. Mills (1997:3-4) cautions that continuity with the "wide-ranging variety of self-appointed roles" by Pretoria might lead to its foreign policy remaining undefined and "insolvent". The extent to which South Africa has successfully been able to address her domestic challenges and problems will be the measure of the success of the country's reintegration into the global community and economy.

Elling Tjonnelan and Tom Vraalsen (1996) further confirm that South Africa's sub-regional policy in the near future will indeed be minimal as a consequence of her domestic imperatives requiring Pretoria's immediate attention. They state, as do Calland and Weld (1994:9), that her hegemonic status in the sub-region and the continent, as well as southern Africa's fear that South Africa might dominate sub-regional politics, have also worked to restrict South Africa's intervention.

Spence (1998:157) claims that the present government's foreign policy is continuing in its predecessors footsteps. This is marginally so, especially when what informs the foreign policy choices of the present government and the apartheid government's (like national interest) are taken into consideration. The differences are seen in what informs these national interests. Also, the discrepancies in the comments of Mandela and Pahad in 1996 as to the course of action to be followed in the Congo showed elements of non-consultation between the executive and the bureaucracy. All that notwithstanding, current foreign policy-making is more open and participative unlike before when things were cloaked in secrecy, narrow interests were pursued, and policies were influenced by an overbearing and cynical military with a prejudiced world view (www.igd.org.za/publications/global-dialogue/foreign-policy/burden.html).

The ANC government's foreign policy approach is primarily based on the promotion of wealth creation and security for South Africans, however, southern Africa and the African continent also feature as priorities in its policy. The new government's
dedication to becoming a real partner in southern Africa and supporting sub-regional economic development processes is driven by economic logic and political solidarity - not by a desire to become a hegemon or to destabilise or dominate the continent (www.igd.org.za/publications/global-dialogue/foreign-policy/burden.html).

Tjonnelan and Vraalsen (1996) assert that South Africa’s involvement is essential and that differences between the present regime and the previous one have become apparent. The former regime worked to destabilise, terrorise, and dominate the southern African region, whilst the present regime seems eager to work with the sub-region for mutual benefit. Therefore, Pretoria should not be overly apprehensive about her role. Calland and Weld (1994) warn that Pretoria’s fear should not culminate in a complacent attitude since sub-regional co-operation is not very likely to occur in the absence of overt leadership. Leslie Gumbi and Jakkie Cilliers (1994) advocate a cautious role for South African intervention in the SADC region where the state’s interests and the economic constraints of the country should be seriously considered in the decision-making process.

Having looked at the ANC government’s objectives for the country’s foreign policy and having seen the manner in which the apartheid regime had engaged the sub-region prior to 1994, this paper aims to analyse the nature of South Africa’s involvement in sub-regional conflicts after her emancipation, to examine domestic political factors which have shaped the South African intervention policy, and to assess whether South African interventions reflect the policies of the new democratic dispensation.
CHAPTER 3
REALISM IN DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA's FOREIGN POLICY

3.1 Contextualising South Africa's Foreign Policy

A coherent theory should clearly explain what it is based on, and should be unbiased, i.e. it should be honest about its premises and values. It should also be relevant to a number of important issues and have a depth which enables it to explain and understand the phenomenon it hopes to tackle (Jackson & Sorensen, 1999:62-63). Such a theory can be utilised to explain what influences people's and governments' actions.

Although realism and idealism have been repeatedly used in the explanation of foreign policy, neither of these theories has won the day. Proponents of each paradigm continue to explain foreign policy with particular bias towards their own ideological preferences. Realism explains international relations in terms of power and anarchy within the international state system. Realism proposes that the state is the most important actor and that states act like rational individuals when pursuing national interests, and that they act in the context of an international system which lacks a central government (Goldstein, 1994:49).

Realist thought is integrally empirical and pragmatic, whilst idealism tends to be abstract and based on traditional foreign policy principles. These principles embody international norms, legal codes and moral values. Idealists maintain that foreign policies based on moral fundamentals are more proficient since they further unity and co-operation, unlike the competition and conflict fostered by the power relations of realism (Ziring, Plano & Olton, 1995:9).

At the core of realist thought is a pessimistic view of human nature, a belief that international relations lead to conflict and that the inevitable way to resolve these conflicts is through war. National security and state survival are thus at the top of the agenda (Jackson & Sorensen, 199:68). In this chapter, it is argued that South
Africa’s foreign policy since 1994 has been informed, in the main, by the realist paradigm. This contradicts what was expected, given President Nelson Mandela’s virtuous (near icon) standing, his “moral high ground,” as well as the ANC’s seeming preoccupation with human rights issues which it claimed to advocate and aimed to foster. The government was faced with the complex task of advancing some of the idealist underpinnings of its foreign policy.

The ANC-government has shown evidence of both realism and idealism in its foreign policy decisions. The Taiwan-China issue shows realist and idealist thought. On the realist front, South Africa could have chosen to continue relations with Taiwan not least because the latter had invested heavily in South Africa, but also because Taiwan is said to have donated substantial amounts of money to the ANC prior to the 1994 elections (Spence, 1996:122). Moreover, Taiwan is a multiparty democratic state and it is feasible to conclude that as champion of democracy South Africa would have chosen to keep relations open with Taiwan. China on the other hand also held strong appeals for Pretoria. Primarily, economic potential for South African interests is greater than in Taiwan. Moralists wanting to justify South Africa establishing relations with a country known for its human rights violations, could argue that increased trade with China would contribute to that country’s political transformation (Spence, 1996:122).

The sale of arms to Rwanda [which were said to be used in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conflict]. It is possible that other rationalisations other than financial gains influenced South Africa’s arms sales to Rwanda. However, taking into account the situation in the Great Lakes region, South Africa could have been more prudent in her actions and anticipated that human rights abuses might occur as a direct consequence of her selling arms to Rwanda. Pretoria’s action, therefore, was in direct contrast to the government’s idealist advocation of upholding human rights and stopping wars in Africa.

Idealism, however, showed its head on Nigeria when then President Mandela tried to facilitate talks and stop the executions of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his companions.
The attempt to broker talks between Mobutu Sese-Seko and Laurent Kabila also showed idealist influences. Mandela was trying to follow on South Africa's recent record of talks between rivals which ended in relatively peaceful negotiations, after about half a century of apartheid hostilities. The recent Zimbabwe conflict again showed that idealism also influenced Pretoria. Despite calls for harsh actions towards Mugabe, Pretoria remained resolute in its decision to adopt quiet diplomacy.

Yet, even in this scenario, realism prevailed, as the President continuously assured the business community that Zimbabwe-style invasions would not be tolerated in the country. Furthermore, Pretoria might have thought that following any other policy might be detrimental to what it hoped to achieve with a "quiet diplomacy" policy. President Mugabe is a man who does not take kindly to public accusations and threats; "behind closed doors" talks accomplish better results with him. Therefore, realism would appear to be the more appropriate theory for explaining South Africa's foreign policy since she has used national interest as her bedrock and, in the process, has taken actions, such as the proposed sale of arms to Syria which raised the wrath of the US, relations with Fidel Castro and Muammar Qaddafi, which might be considered "immoral".

South Africa's foreign policy since 1994 has been distinctly similar to that of the United States which, according to Minter, has followed "conservative Realpolitik" since the 1960s. He argues that this was especially evident in the United States' policy of sticking with familiar allies even if they were colonial powers, white-settler regimes, or right-wing dictatorships. This reveals that US administrators clearly viewed concerns over racism or human rights as being "sentimental distractions from the real business of defending US interests" (Minter, 1989:390). South Africa's foreign policy has followed the American model by maintaining relations with "pariah" states like Cuba, Libya, and China. These countries were ANC allies during the liberation war years. The ANC-led government thus feels honour-bound to "repay" its allies through maintaining relations with them, despite international condemnation.
According to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, there are three assumptions which are integral to the realist vision. They maintain that states, as coherent units, are the dominant actors in world politics and that force is a usable and effective instrument of policy. It is assumed that there is a hierarchy according to which issues are viewed in world politics. This hierarchy is headed by questions of military security, known as ‘high politics’ and seen to dominate the ‘low politics’ of economic and social affairs” (1993:406). Since 1994, South Africa has sought the good life for her citizens through her foreign policy by guaranteeing the means and conditions of security and prosperity for her people. Issues on the foreign policy agenda are no longer confined to war, but have become “larger and more diverse”. They now include socio-economic, environmental, humanitarian and many other issues (Keohane & Nye, 1993:409). This leads to an increase in the complexity of actors and issues in international politics. Dr Nkosazana Zuma, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, confirmed this when she stated in an address to the South African Institute of International Affairs that South Africa’s foreign policy objectives are an outward projection of the nation’s domestic imperatives, which are to create economic and social development as well as to promote peace and stability (www.southafricahouse.com/documents/ZUMA-SAIIA.html).

The policy problems which Pretoria has faced in the post-1994 period regarding Nigeria, China, Cuba and Libya may be instructive. The South African government, it seems, was trying to create a foreign policy in a vacuum. This reflected an absence of vision and experienced leadership, as well as the lack of a clearly defined national interest. It seems that South Africa and her leadership are merely grappling with finding their proper role in the world; hence their inability or confusion about their ideological stand, that is, whether they are idealists or realists.

The White Paper on the country’s foreign policy and intervention claims that, “in principle, the level and size of the South African contribution to any particular peace mission will depend on how closely the mission relates to national interests and the type of demand that exists for [South African] contributions...” Clearly, national interests are at the forefront of policy decision makers and the situations in which the
country will become effectively involved will be those where South Africa's interests will be furthered.

Hoffman (1993) argues that, despite the so-called 'New World Order', power politics has retained significant importance as states fight for advantage in their effort to settle old quarrels or create regional hegemonies. Within this new global environment, domestic turbulence is gaining enormous importance due to power rivalries, ethnic conflicts, tyranny, poverty and many other issues. This is why Cilliers and Malan (1996:343) argue that not only is Pretoria (by virtue of its position of 'economic and moral strength') 'expected to be responsible and portray leadership in the continent, but "it is clearly in [the Republic's] own economic interest . . . to do all within its power to stabilise the region."

There have been no perceived external threats towards the sub-region since the end of the Cold War. Instead, threats are perceived as originating internally and intra-regionally (Breytenbach, 1994:30). Peace-keeping in the southern African region might, therefore, help stem the tide of refugees fleeing uninhabitable conditions within their countries. It could prevent the rise of crime within South Africa, which is partially caused by refugees' selling small arms, which are rampant in the sub-region after a legacy of long-term war and destabilisation after independence. Narcotics sales might also be curbed, as refugees' only source is sometimes the sale of drugs. Such "action [would be] in direct pursuance of [the Republic's] national security and economic interests" (Solomon, 1997:96; Venter, 1995).

Powell, Dyson and Purkit (1987:206) are of the opinion that decisions are taken because of an individual's personal cognitive process. Therefore when political perceptions are informed by an individual's beliefs and expectations, they can be influential in foreign policy decision making. How a leader views governments's role, as well as his nation's role, in the international arena shapes the way he deals with foreign policy problems (Hermann, Hermann & Hagan, 1987:313). These authors thus maintain that the question which needs to be asked in order to determine the importance of a leader's personality in making foreign policy is whether or not the
leader's orientation to foreign affairs leads him to be relatively sensitive or insensitive to information from the political environment (Hermann, Hermann & Hagan, 1987:314). The individual's unique personality may therefore be important in the world of foreign affairs. South Africa's intervention in the Nigerian debacle leading to environmental rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa's death demonstrated this. President Mandela may have relied on his near icon personality in addressing the Saro-Wiwa issue.

Charles Reynolds (1992:63) maintains that a state cannot be expected to act contrary to its own interests. However, what these interests are is as much dependent on "the perceived need to compromise" as they are on the "pursuit of relative advantage". Wight (1991:112) holds that "whatever national interest is, it is likely to be in conflict with other national interests; and thus the basic national interest is to maintain freedom of action . . .". To be able to pursue national interest one needs to have the power to be able to act accordingly as the circumstances dictate. This makes power relative and the question then becomes whether, encountered with an aggressor, one would be able to deal with the aggressor. Wight holds that the objective of national interest is "national security" (1991:114).

In a similar vein, Mills (1997:6) attests to the fact that the country's national interest could be said to be reinforced by the values preserved in the constitution. Included in 'national interest' is the state's security, the citizens' security and the promotion of their social and economic well-being, "as well as the encouragement of global peace, regional stability and development."

3.2 Policy Shifts

According to Robert Jervis (1993:292-294), there is no clear agreement between scholars as to whether the domestic politics of a country determine its foreign policy. Some hold that during election campaigns there might be promises of change in the foreign policy, but once in power continuity becomes the dominant policy. Others argue that it is more complicated than that since different governments are faced with different challenges. Jervis concludes that it is difficult to generalise concerning
decisions of policy, because “in many instances the outcomes will be influenced by factors that, from the standpoint of most theories, must be considered accidental” (1993:300). Viotti and Kauppi (1993:235), on the other hand, insist that decisions are made by individuals, and as a result, “life experiences influence an individual’s foreign policy behaviour and orientation”.

In some ways South African foreign policy experienced continuity in the decision making process following the country’s emancipation in 1994. For example, the continued presence (until 1998) of Rusty Evans as the Director General of Foreign Affairs could have been due to the need to assure some continuity. Restructuring is a rigorous and difficult task when the structures are deeply entrenched in civil service and the majority of the civil servants represent an old regime, as in South Africa, the situation could be even more precarious. More pronounced change and implementation of policy in the Department of Foreign Affairs became apparent when Jackie Selebi took over the reins in 1998. Selebi appeared to set himself three main tasks: (i) to set clear goals for the department by translating domestic priorities like wealth creation and democratisation into foreign policy, and included identifying strategic partners among the countries of the world - on the basis of the economic, diplomatic or other advantages they could offer South Africa; (ii) to restore the department’s functions taken away by the apartheid government, especially under Botha when security forces were given a free hand, and; (iii) to reorganise the department to pursue stronger links with independent researchers and “civil society” and boosting departmental expertise on particular world regions (Barrel, 1999:31).

Maxi van Aardt (1996:108) asserts that within the realist frame of thought “foreign policy is summed up as the objectives and actions, or decisions and policies of a state regarding its external environment, based on certain values which determine these goals.” Kalevi Holsti (1977:451) maintains that foreign policy outputs cannot be explained merely as being a choice between good or bad or simply complying with realism. Holsti states that moral consideration is also taken into account. This, however, does not imply that decisions are made on this basis and it alone. Morality
is not the start-off point for governments and decision-makers, although it is consistently kept in mind. Should there be a conflict in the alternatives open to governments, it is not unusual that the path followed will be that which is seen to arrive at or protect national interests (Holsti, 1977:451-452). Morgenthau voiced similar sentiments when he stated that in trying to understand foreign policy, we put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances, and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose... and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose. It is the testing of this rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that gives meaning to the facts of international politics and makes a theory of politics possible (Morgenthau: 1966:5).

It becomes clear that "the actual process of choice may not be a clear, clean occurrence [but could be] a gradual, incremental process that transpires over an extended period date", because the different factors which influence decision-making have to be "channeled through the political apparatus of a government which identifies, decides and implements foreign policy" (Hermann, Hermann & Hagan, 1987:309 - 310).

This becomes even more so within the New World Order, in which foreign policy agendas are continuously changing. Contrary to traditional realist thought, where only issues of state and war were regarded as high politics, in the New World Order of interdependency "issues of economic productivity and distribution have been elevated... to the realm of high politics" (Rosenau, 1987:3).

As a result, political scientists argue that traditional paradigms of analysing foreign policy such as realism can prove inadequate at times. Van Aardt concurs when she maintains that realism "offers insufficient scope for grappling with new issues" (1996:117). Keohane (1993:187) also agrees, stating that the realist paradigm is weak when dealing with change, "especially when the sources of that change lie in the domestic structures of states". Despite its weaknesses, van Aardt admits, that realism goes a long way towards simplifying matters, that is, it limits the issues on
the foreign policy agenda. It could be argued that this is why some critics perceive the country's foreign policy as having failed, since it followed outdated paradigms when the situations they were applying it to had drastically changed from the traditional ones for which it was designed.

When theories like realism first came to the fore they were meant to explain the causes of war between nations and how these wars could be stopped. Most acclaimed realists were influenced by the “world” wars in Europe in the Twentieth Century. However, neither Africa nor the international community is threatened by inter-state wars within the present international system. Although about sixteen countries were at war in 2000, most of the conflicts were predominantly domestic in nature. Contemporary conflicts, it seems, are more regional and, (in most cases) occur within a state’s borders. The greatest challenge for South Africa is how to diffuse these conflicts so as to build the continent’s, and especially southern Africa’s, economy. This would help reduce the increasing gap between the industrialised North and the underdeveloped South.

In trying to pursue its national interest which, according to van Aardt (1996:114), is often “materially based and concerned with tangibles”, Pretoria’s foreign policy shows contradictions as morality and altruistic concerns are brought to the fore. Van Aardt (1996:107) claims that the incoherent co-ordination of events and strategies leading to the death of the Ogoni Nine were a reflection of problems within South Africa’s foreign policy. She admits that there are “problems experienced by the new government in formulating and implementing foreign policy”, and that “there is an apparent discrepancy between The country’s’s foreign policy ideals, what it considers to be its national interest, and its ability to put these ideals into practice. There is also the difficulty of building coalitions or securing support for initiatives involving criticism of a fellow African state’s conduct . . . [and] unrealistically high expectations by the general public of what foreign policy can achieve”. Van Aardt (1996:114) concludes that these discrepancies are not caused by the opposing forces of economic interests vis-à-vis moral obligations. She maintains that, at the core of the dilemma, is the failure to distinguish between government and party and
an inability to reconcile “economic interests with moral principles”.

Some idealists claim that the realist game of power politics and military strategy has become obsolete. This, they claim, is because security dilemma has become confined within failed state systems, rather than between states. The problem has thus moved from that of national security and national defence since states do not have to protect themselves from outside forces. Instead, danger emanates from within (Jackson & Sorensen, 1999:99). Nowhere is it more true that conflicts are internal, and usually a result of the failure in the state system, than in Africa. Conflicts within a state do, however, tend to spill over into neighbouring countries and, at times, engulf regions. Surely, in such situations neighbouring countries have to look out for their country’s and citizens’ interests, even if that means taking up arms.

Failure of states to achieve good governance has not detracted from the fact that the state remains the political voice of the people. In spite of idealist claims, the state system will not be easily discarded given the suffering and pain which precede national independence. It is very unlikely that Africa will soon experience a cosmopolitan style of global security. This is despite the fact that regional formations are being constituted to deal with conflicts. Yet, countries still want to have their sovereignty respected and be recognised as independent entities which are able to make decisions on behalf of their citizens. Were this to be taken away and resolutions forced on the people, failure would follow, as evidenced by the DRC case, when South Africa attempted to intervene without the agreement of the rival parties, Mobutu and Kabila.

To date, South Africa’s foreign policy has been a mixture of realist and idealist thought. Policy makers set out an idealist foreign policy, one which was all-embracing and universalistic in its approach. This was seen in the enunciations of a policy guided by human rights. When the actual situation arose, however, realism set in. Pretoria’s turnabout in embracing Beijing is a case in point. The recent difficulties in Zimbabwe also, reflect this fact. Arguably, the actions of the Zanu-PF
members and war veterans contradicted human rights accords. Farmers were forcibly removed from land in order to compensate those without land. South Africa maintained a policy of quiet diplomacy and sustained relations with Harare. This was seen by some as being contradictory to the government's proclamations as defenders of human rights. However, this is not the case if you consider the human rights of those without land. Pretoria can claim consistency - that its focus pertains to the historical dimension of the injustice. The majority of Zimbabweans without land became landless because their ancestors had their land taken away from them unjustly by the fore-fathers of those who now claim ownership. As such, Pretoria could claim that it is working towards securing a more permanent solution which necessarily must address the historical violations.

Realism has shown the means of achieving goals while idealism has justified and attempted to win support for the policies. Post-Mandela foreign policy has been reassessed, with the government acknowledging its global capabilities. This has led to a settling down in foreign policy as priorities have been transformed into geo-ideological terms and become firmly embedded in an emergent "South" identity. South Africa's role in the sub-region, the continent, and in multilateral institutions provides a more reliable policy stronghold and a more circumspect guide to action (www.igd.org.za/publications/global-dialogue/foreign-policy/burden.html).
CHAPTER 4

Domestic Constraints: Where to, South Africa?

4.1 Domestic Political and Social Conditions

Domestic affairs were at the forefront of Mbeki’s 1999 election campaign. Yet, it is Pretoria’s international relations which will have a direct bearing on her ability to deliver her electoral pledges. There no longer exists a clear divide between domestic and international issues. Issues are more “intermestic”, that is, dominant issues in political discourse within pluralistic communities tend to merge actors from international and domestic contexts.

It has been the ANC government’s contestation that its foreign policy is to be dedicated to ensuring that “Africa’s people are not forgotten or ignored by humankind” (Asmal, 1996: 32). It insists that the country’s foreign policy be firmly embodied in its domestic policy. However, the legacy of unequal social and economic conditions within South Africa means that the government is faced with daunting challenges of economic upliftment to redress the gaping inequalities. It is these challenges which must be tackled by the ANC government and its foreign policy. Therefore, Pretoria’s foreign policy priorities should be determined, at least in part, by its domestic needs.

In this chapter, it will be argued that to date South Africa has found itself ‘between a rock and a hard place’. On the one hand, Pretoria has had to fulfil its international obligations. The pressure on South Africa to take a leadership role in the continent’s peacemaking process, especially in regard to the countries which Pretoria hopes to engage in its Renaissance ideal (Malan, 1993:3), does not only emanate from the continent. The pressure sometimes comes from the Western leaders who wish to see Pretoria “take up its rightful role and obligations as a regional superpower” (Baynham, 1994:42). On the other hand, she has to see to her constituents’ numerous needs. The South African domestic political economy is severely stressed by a plethora of problems - high unemployment rate; high and rising crime rates; inadequate housing; poor access
to portable water; weak health care, and education infrastructure in much of the country. These are among many of the problems which combine to weaken the ability of South Africa's government to pursue many of its preferred foreign policy goals within the sub-region and throughout the continent.

Cable (1994:10) acknowledges that no government “enjoys complete freedom to pursue the foreign policy of its choice”. Scarce resources, and economic and domestic imperatives might constrain and influence foreign policy. Policies which have been entrenched in the system are difficult for a new government to change as it might run into stiff opposition from those entrenched in the inherited state structures. The President, and the Minister and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs might make decisions; yet, those decisions might not be carried out. Acts of sabotage have been known to happen within the realm of international relations policy-making and implementation. Persons who survive the change from the old guard at times subvert a new government’s policies by not implementing or translating them to embarrass the government, or by forcing it to retract its agreements. At times, this may prevent the state from acting as a unitary actor with a single set of coherent interests. In this way state, behaviour is moulded by internal bargaining within bureaucracies and between other actors who often have divergent goals and interests. This affects the way in which decisions are made (Goldstein, 1994:270-1). Furthermore, decision-makers and implementors of foreign policy are ‘role players’. As government officials, they conform to the legal limitations of a particular office and the expectations of numerous constituents. Consequently, their roles inevitably influences their individual attitudes and values so much so that they are not always free to use their official position to institute their personal ethics, beliefs, or prejudices (Holsti, 1955:314).

A new government is also faced with the legitimate expectations of its constituents who want to see proof of reallocation of resources after resistance has been fought and won (Adedeji, 1996:4). The unemployment rate has reached astronomical proportions, with
nearly 5 million South Africans, a third of the work force being unemployed and within the black community about 40% are jobless. The government is faced with other major concerns: approximately 2 million families lack adequate housing; and 86% of the black population still owning less than 20% of the country's land. The crime levels in the country are said to be the highest in the world, and the AIDS pandemic has found fertile ground in the country, reportedly infecting 1700 new individuals daily. The social impacts caused by these problems, are certainly not conducive to the government spending its resources externally rather than internally to alleviate the problems (Boroughs, 1996, & Stremlau, 2000).

The ANC-led government has sought effective ways of addressing these problems. In June 1996, the government launched a new economic policy GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) to replace, the RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme). This was done after it was realised that a 3% growth in 1995 failed to stem the growing unemployment. GEAR aimed to attract foreign investors, stimulate 6% annual growth, and create 400 000 jobs a year. Dissent from the ANC's allies - the South African Communist Party (SACP) and Cosatu (the Congress of South African Trade Unions) - could be heard with the implementation of the new initiative. The allies felt betrayed by the inclination towards a free market economy. They perceived this as a betrayal of their principles, linked to socialism. Despite GEAR, thousands of jobs have been lost - approximately 500 000 jobs were lost between 1995 and 1999, (SouthScan, 1999:115) - and the expected foreign investment has not occurred at the anticipated rate. Clearly, the worsening problems do not encourage meaningful commitment of resources to Pretoria's African policies.

Allocating resources for conflict resolutions in the sub-region would also require the approval of the allies. The sour relations within the alliance, however, do not make for a situation where the other members of the alliance are likely to approve that resources be distributed externally when their members are becoming unemployed. Don Boroughs (1996:41) may be correct in saying that the government will stick to its plan of a macro-
economic policy, as it sees it as the best one for the country's economy, while giving unions the impression that they are making a compromise with them. He loses the point, however, when he states that "after all, South Africa's fastest-growing political constituency is not union members but the unemployed." This implies that the government has to stick to its plan to provide jobs for the people. On the surface this is so; however, many of the unemployed are also union members and are represented by the unions. Unions do not want to lose their members; yet, they continue to do so due to the rise in unemployment caused by the government's macro-economic policy.

Coupled with the massive unemployment and the poverty this generates, a welfare system has been introduced to try and alleviate the predicament. Corrupt and ineffective bureaucrats, however, do not make the situation any easier. Large sums of money earmarked for social spending sit in the coffers without reaching the intended destinations. According to the Economist (2000:42), in March 2000 the auditor-general revealed that R 51 million allocated for social spending since 1997 had not been spent, and in 1999 a R 204 million special poverty-relief fund had been left 99% unspent. Government housing subsidies, which finance about 200 000 new homes a year, do not appear to hold the solution for poverty stricken communities either. Though they might rejoice at having a safe place to come to at the end of the day, having to pay for services also digs into their meager incomes. Although living in squatter camps is not ideal, there is no payment for services as the water is communal and paraffin stoves are used for cooking. The general feeling of dissatisfaction is what might have prompted the different political parties to promise free basic services to the populace on the run up to the local elections of the 5th of December 2000. Clearly, such demagoguery belie the fact that the real costs of such services would have to be borne by somebody - particularly the more affluent citizens and the various levels of government. Ultimately, this reduction in government resources could result in reduced resource commitment for external activities.

In recent years, South African society has showed great tendencies of xenophobic
behaviour towards people from the rest of Africa. The Department of Home Affairs has also shown these tendencies in the way it has treated immigrants and refugees. Identification of foreigners by Home Affairs officers, reflects the discourse of the oppressor. For decades political, social and economic life in South Africa was determined along racial lines. In Post-apartheid South Africa, black South Africans have taken the discourse of the oppressor and are exploiting those they perceive as undesirable and "uncivilised" as they once were. This perception of viewing the African continent and its people as barbaric and backward can be traced back to colonial times.

As the apartheid regime used colour to determine who was "white" enough to be classified as white, so black South Africans are identifying people as "foreigners" based on the pigmentation of their skin and inoculation marks on their arms. Operation Crackdown, the Department of Safety and Security's attempt to curb crime in the country, has resulted in the 'rounding up' of hundreds of "illegal immigrants" who are then detained on suspicion of having entered the country illegally and of trafficking in narcotics and arms.

The ANC-led government has been slow to react to such behaviour by its citizens and ministries against its neighbours. This is partly due to political sensitivities over foreigners' rights in a society struggling with unemployment, poverty, and crime (Edmunds, 1998:11). It is better for the masses to believe that immigrants are depriving them of their jobs, rather than to acknowledge or accept that their liberators have not fulfilled the social contract they had pledged to fulfil after emancipation. Immigrants are therefore used as scapegoats for people disgruntled by the slow pace of service delivery from the government.

The local elections of the 5th of December 2000 further illuminated the crisis and constraints facing the government. The low registration rate among young people (i.e. people between the ages of 18 and 29), was so troubling to the government that the
National Youth Council (NYC) convened a forum of youth organisations. However, no resolutions were reached, as the forum adjourned without any solutions as to how to mobilise the youth being reached. It became apparent that mobilisation of the youth has become more difficult since the end of apartheid. The “born free’s” are said to be showing an apathy whose cause is baffling their leaders. There have been suggestions that the apathy is a result of disillusionment with the government and politicians in general. The youth is faced with tremendous social pressures such as AIDS, unemployment, and a lack of faith and belief in themselves. The perceived failure by the government to address their woes, has cost it considerable loss of support. According to the Human Sciences Research Council, only 25% of the youth bothered to vote at the 2000 local elections (Jubasi, 2000).

Unlike in mature democracies, South Africa’s is still in its infancy, and still has to contend with issues such as piped water and electricity in every household as well as the collection of refuse. These are some of the problems the country faces and which have to be addressed. The failure of more than half of the registered voters to vote, indicates a loss of faith in the delivery ability of the government. Coalitions of independents to the left of the ANC, made up of ANC sympathisers and community activists unhappy with the pace of service delivery, were observed at the 2000 local elections. Though, they had no major impact, their existence has jerked the ANC out of its complacency. The potential threat they pose, is just one more thorn in the government’s side as it grapples, simultaneously, to deal with an assortment of issues in southern Africa and the rest of the continent.

These are some of the issues the present government has to contend with. The issues might have intensified somewhat since emancipation as seen in negative sentiments shown by the polls towards the government. In 1994, the issues were similar; the only difference then was that people were more open and trusting towards the government and its ability to make good on its promises. The present situation, however, poses even more constraints on the government and its ability to justify having to utilise the
country’s meager resources elsewhere (Barron, 2000).

Anwireng-Obeng (1996:137-139) states that with regard to the debate on the role of the South African state in foreign policy decisions, internal conflict is sure to intensify. This is seen as a direct consequence of removed restrictions on access to social infrastructures which have increased demands for resources. The apartheid regime had put in place a system which prevented black people from being able to compete in business and, in the same vein, had protected white business from internal and external competitiveness. At the same time that Pretoria has to contend with these domestic issues, it is expected to align itself with Africa and, in doing so, commit the Republic to the continent. This is only fair given that Africa demonstrated beyond any doubt a strong commitment to the fight for South Africa’s liberation (Adedeji, 1996:23).

Spence contends that states’ foreign policies “reflect the values that inform their domestic societies” (1998:159). Hermann, Hermann & Hagan (1987:309) maintain that domestic factors influence foreign policy, arguing that making and implementing these policies is dependent on the means or instruments available to a state to enable it to attend to its objectives (van Aardt, 1996:109). The constraints imposed on the government’s ability to provide for its people include slow economic growth (which constricts its ability to expand the budget), limited margins for tax increases, and increases in social spending and rapid population growth. These exacerbate income disparities and serve only to add further restrictions to Pretoria’s ability to effectively engage the sub-region (Anwireng-Obeng, 1996:118). Along similar lines, Venter (1996:167-8) asserts that Pretoria should not be expected to play a leadership role when her taxpayers want cutbacks in what they perceive as being “wasteful foreign intervention”.

The process of formulating foreign policy objectives is not a simple one. This is because people are affected differently by foreign policy decisions. The costs and benefits of most foreign policy decisions are not equally distributed. As a result, there might be
internal conflict as to what foreign policy is to be followed (Legg & Morrison, 1981:54). Policy-makers have to continually choose amidst courses of action which represent conflicting values. What is perceived as the “best” solution might not always be the one chosen. Often a solution which requires the least sacrifice of direct interests and values is the one that is chosen. Faced with difficult and critical situations, general principles are not always followed. This elucidates the fact that foreign policy-making is not just a matter of choosing between self-interest and morality. Conditions might constrain choices, leading to good and noble intentions ending in disaster. The options are often about choosing the lesser of two evils. Despite the ethics especially advocated by idealists, policy makers cannot always listen to their conscience (Holsti, 1995:324-5).

4.2 Foreign Policy Choices

South Africa has become renowned for her “quiet diplomacy”, the latest case being the ongoing Zimbabwean crisis which erupted prior to the 2000 Zimbabwean parliamentary elections. President Robert Mugabe had announced that all land taken from the African population by the British Colonial Government and which now belongs to white farmers would be appropriated and given to veterans of the war of liberation which led to the independence of that country in 1980. The spate of violence which followed this announcement and the consequent “illegal seizures” of land led to widespread international condemnation and became a leverage point for opposition parties in Zimbabwe and South Africa. The Democratic Party (DP) of South Africa exploited the Zimbabwe issue for political gain. A day hardly went without a denouncement of Mugabe or the ANC government’s quiet diplomacy stance. The opposition used this issue to incite South African citizens and to attempt to discredit Mbeki’s government by playing on the fears of its white constituents who were led to believe that a similar scenario was on the horizon for South Africa. Policies such as that followed by the ANC government in this instance, according to Hagan (1987:380), are derived “from the imperative that highly constrained governments must avoid controversies that could disrupt tenuous public support and interfactional/intergroup balances".

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According to Tjonneland and Vraalsen (1996:196), “domestic issues remain the main challenge to peace and stability in the region . . . all countries in the region . . . suffer from poverty, material scarcity, economic stagnation, and inadequate and poor provision of social services;” and this, they argue, might lead to conflict between a country’s foreign and domestic interests. Sometimes a compromise is reached; other times it can be elusive. It is in such circumstances that conflicting policies might be carried out in the name of the state in order to achieve such different objectives.

There are fears in some quarters of southern Africa about South Africa’s economic dominance which imply that Pretoria may start to relish her role as a “regional giant” and thereby utilise her position to promote her own political, diplomatic, and economic power (Venter, 1996:169). The scepticism reflected by African countries towards Pretoria’s involvement in the sub-region is also due to the past and the manner in which Pretoria’s involvement has been viewed by the West. This would include the way in which the West has endeavoured to “subdue Southern Africa to white South Africa” (Brittain, 1988:7, Tjonneland & Vraalsen, 1996:197).

Baynham (1994:42) states that the perceived threat of the SA[N]DF might also hinder peace-keeping processes as it has the largest and best-equipped military force in the subcontinent. This contributes towards fears of South African domination in the sub-region. South Africa is equally concerned that she should not be viewed as a bully. Pretoria would prefer to be seen as a true peacemaker and constructive power in the sub-region and in the entire African continent. The fear about the SANDF being the largest sub-regional army might have its roots in the historical atrocities which were committed under its auspices. This fear and uneasiness about South Africa’s involvement could also stem from jealousies originating from countries such as Nigeria and Zimbabwe who might feel that their powers and spheres of influence are being eroded (Malan:1999).

There are further dilemmas for South Africa’s foreign policy-makers. Tom Wheeler
(1995:14) asserts, for example, that South African policy-makers have to contend with new scenarios like the multiplied number of internal political stakeholders. As a result, complications arise since the stakeholders do not share the same objectives nor view the same issues as important.

In the international sphere, the bipolar world has been replaced by the "New World Order" which encapsulates more issues in its agenda. These include security, economics, democracy, human rights and other global issues. Uzodike (1999) explains that in the current world environment developing countries operate from a weakened position resulting in the current practice by Western governments of withholding financial resources and aid on the grounds that these states do not show sufficient movement towards free market economic reforms and democratisation. The arduous task of development is made even more difficult under circumstances where there is no political and economic stability. It is in this context that South Africa finds herself compelled to intervene in the southern African region. Here she is expected to lead by example and to encourage other southern African states towards democratisation. Equally, she is expected to foster a spirit of political and economic stability, with the aim of achieving prosperity throughout the sub-region.

Luiz acknowledges that the democratic government has "inherited an insidious past of economic mismanagement, racial and social oppression, an enormously complicated and costly bureaucracy, and extreme poverty and inequality"(1994:230). A demagogic opposition does not help the situation in the least because, as in other plural societies, the governing and opposition parties tend to reflect specific sections within society. This leads people to offer or withdraw their support, not because of what the government does, so much as because of who the government is and what group it seems to represent (Cachalia, 2000).

Such perceptions have led to isolationist tendencies within the country. Dissension with regards to Pretoria's sub-regional interventions is most vocal from the opposition. They
complain that South Africa's pressing problems at home, such as the rise in the levels of crime and unemployment, demand the government's attention at home. Opposition parties have also been a hindrance to the government's ability to intervene in southern Africa. On 17 March 2000, leader of the United Democratic Movement (UDM) posed questions to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on whether South Africa has committed or intends to commit any material resources in support of initiatives in the Great Lakes region? The questions as to the nature and extent of the resources to be put into the DRC show the pressures being put on the government. Implied in the inquires was the idea that the government was prepared to spend money outside her borders whilst the plight of her people went from bad to worst.

The renewed Israeli-Palestine conflict, once again, has brought to the fore the differences between political parties in the country and the way they respond to situations. Debate in the National Assembly on this issue saw the leader of the opposition, Tony Leon, dismissing the Middle East issue as being of no particular relevance to South Africa. He maintained that parliament had far more pressing issues at home to contend with such as the AIDS pandemic afflicting the country. Parliament, he said, was wasting its time deliberating about issues occurring thousand of miles away. This move by the opposition showed the lengths politicians would go to for political gain. It is public knowledge that the leader of the opposition has close personal ties with Israel. Leon realised the contentious situation he could find himself in, were he to be seen to be entertaining the Middle East debate. Also, moving attention away from his comments or lack thereof about the Middle East to highly emotive issues like AIDS, worked to his benefit. [President Thabo Mbeki had already been demonised by the South African press on his AIDS stance in 2000.] Deviating attention from himself on this issue towards the president and the ANC-government, on the AIDS issue which was considered the government's weak point, was a calculated move to further dismantle support for the government.

Furthermore, Leon had no qualms when it came to outbursts on the government's
silence on events across the Limpopo. Clearly, attacking the government on the Zimbabwe issue worked to his advantage as it worked to refute the ANC-government to DP supporters and the rest of the West which saw the "invasions" as a violation of human rights. Maintaining that issues in the Middle East have no relevance for South Africa is naive, for it is undeniable that, due to globalisation, events anywhere in the world affect every country. The Middle East debacle is of paramount importance to South Africa. This has been made apparent by the marches and voluntary pledges by thousands to fight with the Palestinians, should the need arise. Emotions among communities throughout the country are high, since South Africa has a large Muslim population.

Could it be that the opposition's concern about Zimbabwe is not really about Zimbabwe at all, but about South Africa? The land distribution patterns in South Africa are similar to those of Zimbabwe. Hardly anything has changed in the ownership of land in South Africa, since land was divided according to the Natives Land Act of 1913, when about 76% of the population (blacks) was given 13% of the land and the rest was given to the white minority. We should also keep in mind that many white South Africans first settled in Zimbabwe before coming to South Africa. Consequently many white South Africans still have relatives and some even own land in Zimbabwe. Clearly, the opposition was not just looking out for the interests of Zimbabwe and the abuse of human rights and rule of law occurring in that country. The opposition clearly has vested interest in the outcome of the Zimbabwe situation as it impacts directly on its constituency despite claims of being a party "for all the people".

Were the opposition really concerned about issues in South Africa's neighbouring countries, why then the silence when it comes to Swaziland. The people of Swaziland are experiencing vast human rights abuses, with democracy suppressed, political parties and trade unions banned, and advocates of multiparty politics seen as trouble makers (The Economist, 2000). The end of November 2000 saw the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU), call for a strike and blockades of border gates to South Africa, its
main trading partner, to once again draw the world's attention to the plight of the people of Swaziland. The government responded harshly, organisers and demonstrators were beaten by the police, and road blocks set throughout the country to prevent activists from getting to borders (Barron, 2000). Despite these occurrences Mugabe's critics remained silent. It is tempting to wonder about and consider a double standard, or some form of hypocrisy, on the part of the opposition. Why was it so outspoken about Zimbabwe and so silent about the Middle East and Swaziland? What are the opposition's genuine interests?

Robert Davies (1996:188-190) argues that the opposition's perspective concerning the importance or lack thereof of Africa for Pretoria can be attributed to the following phenomena. There could be a perception of Africa as being of no primary importance. This viewpoint sees South Africa as being part of the First World with her future resting on her ability to develop relations with the countries of the North. Another perception would admit Africa's importance but remain stuck in the paradigm of the past wherein Pretoria is viewed as "the engine of growth' for the region, or the 'natural gateway' for investments throughout the region". Davies (1996:188) maintains that "implicit in such notions is the idea that mutual benefit will be ensured merely by linking up with and accepting South African hegemony".

The ANC government's approach acknowledges the imperative need for significant restructuring of South Africa's role within sub-regional economic relations. This is seen as an integral part of placing the country on a new growth path. It recognises that there may be great gains were South Africa to form closer links with the rest of the sub-region and the continent. The ANC government realises that the above cannot be actualised unless "there is growth and stability throughout the region" (Davies, 1996:190).

In spite of its seeming attempts to 'fit in' with the rest of Africa and its alleged desire to contribute towards an improved standard of living for the people of the continent, Pretoria appears to embrace the West's dictates as to how it should act towards its
African contemporaries on issues such as human rights. This makes it appear disloyal
to pan-Africanist unity and solidarity (van Aardt, 1996:115) which some interpret as
attacking “one of its own”.

South Africa is trying to go beyond her pariah status of being a hegemon and a
disruptive presence in southern Africa. In fact, transition has not been as smooth as
one would have thought since, despite governmental changes; Pretoria remains
relatively stronger, richer, and more developed than other African countries. In dealing
with the continent, therefore, South Africa has to ensure that she does not come across
as a hegemon. On the one hand, South Africa has to voice opinions about humanitarian
issues which lead her to engage with the West. On the other hand, some of her stated
goals imply a commitment to stand by, and with, the South vis-'a-' vis the North. Pretoria
is faced with the predicament of achieving all its goals without alienating either the West
or its own neighbours (van Aardt, 1996:115).

Pretoria’s ‘sympathy’ for its liberation struggle allies and hence its propensity for debt
repayment has also shaped her foreign policy. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
has been harshly criticised for its stance which is perceived to be perpetuating its non-
aligned foreign policy terms. Spence (1994) maintains that this posture is inconsistent
with Pretoria’s recognition that the West is its most crucial source for obtaining wealth for
its people. He warns that, were South Africa to pursue its non-aligned tendencies,
support from the West might dwindle.

Adedeji (1996:217-218) highlights the tension in this attempt to placate both the old and
new. He argues that if Pretoria’s seeming commitment to the southern African region
remains mere rhetoric, and the Republic continues its romance with the North, it will
certainly be “selling the continent short”. Black (1995:88) confirms this dilemma,
exposed by Spence and Adedeji, maintaining that it is indeed a challenge to execute
both international responsibilities while simultaneously promoting the interests of South
African citizens in regard to taking up a leadership role on promoting human rights.
issues, and North-South issues, and so forth.

While there have been fears that the inclusion of South Africa into SADC and other sub-regional organisations might result in domination in the economic realm, Gavin Maasdorp (1994:10) maintains that investor confidence in countries like Zimbabwe has been growing and they feel that they are “able to compete with South Africa, mainly because of a feeling that South Africa’s internal challenges will be so enormous that the country will not be able to dominate the region or act as an engine of growth”. The recent events in Zimbabwe, which have depleted its economy, lead one to wonder how effectively Zimbabwe will be able to compete in the near future.
CHAPTER 5
Domestic Constraints on Foreign Policy: The Democratic Republic of Congo - an illustration

5.1 Conflicts in Africa

Africa and the southern African region have been afflicted for decades by conflicts. Some of these began with the wars of independence and extended into civil wars between rival liberation groups. These wars have debilitated the continent's resources, leaving thousands dead and millions more displaced. The decade leading to the end of the twentieth century saw some of the worst atrocities this continent has ever witnessed, with the Hutu-Tutsi, Rwanda-Burundi genocides causing devastation that were much more pronounced because of their ethnic motivation.

Liberia's civil war invited minimal, if any, Western intervention. The 1992 civil war in Somalia left the state ungovernable. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), formerly Zaire, collapsed, war in Angola persisted, Lesotho was engulfed in a coup, and farm "invasions" grew exponentially in Zimbabwe. All these are just some of the conflicts which have erupted in the sub-region in the past decade. Some argue that some of these wars are a result of previous wars, either in those countries or in their neighbouring states. One of the legacies of earlier wars is the feeling of 'unfinished business' which hangs in the air. Eventually, this can lead to a spillage into neighbouring states, thereby dragging them into the conflicts (de Waal, 2000:3-4).

Escaping the "war trap" is difficult. Indeed, it is a major challenge facing the continent since these conflicts result in humanitarian crises, like mass displacement and famine.

The recurring wars in southern Africa can be traced to old grievances and pervasive inequalities and impoverishment of whole communities. Reduction in arms spending by states might build the confidence of countries and lead to greater sub-regional co-operation and development. Since South Africa is the dominant military power in the
sub-region and the one which instigated attacks against her neighbours in the 1970s and 1980s, she should "lead by unilateral action to reduce military spending and its offensive capabilities" (Tjonnel & Vraalsen, 1996:206-7). Yet, in recent years Pretoria has been on a mission to build up her arms reserves.

5.2 *South Africa in the sub-region: Domestic constraints to Pretoria's DRC policy*

With the end of apartheid, South Africa is perceived by some as southern Africa's powerhouse. As such, South Africa is expected to help alleviate the plight of the sub-region's people. Such action is also to the country's advantage and interest as negative sentiments about the sub-region affect her too. This was observed in the crisis leading to the 2000 Zimbabwean elections when valuation of the South African currency fell due to perceived instability in the sub-region. The refugee crisis, the increase in illegal immigration, and drug trafficking are just a few of the reasons why South Africa has to take an active role and effectively participate in events within the sub-region.

With the new political dispensation, it has become apparent that instability in the sub-region has a direct correlation to the welfare of the Republic. Under apartheid, the Nationalist Party government was also affected by events occurring in South Africa's neighbouring states. When Robert Mugabe's Zanu-PF won the elections of 1980 in Zimbabwe, a hole was pierced in "South Africa's protective shield of friendly states . . . [which] could not be reconstructed" (Minter, 1994:38-39). The independence of Zimbabwe led to a surge of political resistance in South Africa as political movements realised that emancipation was an achievable goal. This led to increased and more profound attacks being carried out by the SADF against Angola and Mozambique, who were affiliated with South Africa's political movements. Attacking these two countries was Pretoria's way of demoralising growing ANC morale within the country (Minter, 1994:46).

The conflicts in the DRC and Angola constitute some of the biggest challenges facing...
South Africa’s foreign policy in the sub-region. Without peace, economic and social regeneration of the sub-region will be impossible. It is the ANC government’s assertion that the primary focus of its foreign policy is southern Africa and the African continent. However, the prosperity and growth for which the government strives cannot be fostered where strife prevails. The country also cannot prosper if its neighbours suffer from conflict, strife, and deprivation. It is against this background that South Africa has sought peaceful resolutions for conflicts in the sub-region. Considering this background, it is imperative that South Africa effectively and successfully engage the sub-region. Clearly, peace in the sub-region is in Pretoria’s interest.

However, several domestic political factors constrain the ANC-government’s intervention in the sub-region. For example, the policy process followed by South Africa in the Zairean situation demonstrates how domestic factors can constrict a government from following a policy of its choice. Zaire is a country rich in natural resources. It has gold, and diamonds and the world’s most productive cobalt deposits. During the Cold War Mobutu enjoyed US, French and Belgian aid. One of the continent’s worst dictators, he pillaged the land, and used up the resources leaving the people in poverty. Yet, his personal assets were estimated at $4 billion in money, with villas in Portugal, Switzerland and France (Whitelaw & Moulier, 1997: 41). After about three decades of Mobutu’s rule, Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire rebels under Laurent Kabila sought to end the years of Mobutu’s dictatorship.

Kabila’s uprising was set off by events outside Zaire. It originated with an attempt supported by Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda to eradicate Hutu extremists from refugee camps in eastern Zaire. Using the Banyamulenge, a group in the region related to the Tutsi’s of Rwanda and Burundi, these government’s together with Uganda, embarked on an association against Mobutu (Economist, 1997:23).

There appeared to be no end to the fighting as Mobutu would not admit defeat. The sub-region’s leaders saw a need for intervention in the Zairean war, for the sake of the
people of that country and their citizens. South Africa's intervention in Zaire has been characterised by diplomatic relations. In 1997 South Africa hosted Zairean envoy Honroe Ngbanda (who represented Mobutu’s government) and then opposition leader (and now late) Laurent Kabila. Although, the Zairean peace talks taxed Pretoria’s negotiating skills, she grappled to rise to the occasion. These secret preliminary talks focused on four items: (i) the status of the resolutions taken, (ii) a cease-fire between warring factions, (iii) the combination of a South African-led initiative with the OAU and the UN peace efforts, and (iv) the role of external forces in finding a solution (Hartley, 1997:27). The talks failed - exposing, once again, Pretoria’s lack of bargaining chips. With little or no interest in committing troops or resources, Pretoria’s diplomacy lacked any means by which to compel Kabila whose armies were already on the verge of uprooting Mobutu and his unpopular government. Had South Africa’s domestic situation been more favourable, troop and resource commitments would have provided important instrumental support for the diplomatic effort.

In order to avoid situations such as where Mobutu and Kabila showed indifference to South Africa’s intervention (Spence, 1994:162) it would be better if Pretoria were to continue being a watchful and interested participator, championing diplomacy, where its “presence is invited”. According to Malan (1999:5), unless South Africa has the UN’s mandate and is “accepted by the conflicting parties as their peacemaker of choice” in the DRC conflict, it would be best that she “not . . . force [her] hand at the peacemaking game . . .”.

After about a year in power Kabila had alienated just about everyone who had helped put him in power. Family and cronies dominated government positions. He did not honour his end of the bargain of ensuring that there was no fighting on the borders; instead, civil war persisted for the duration of his rule. The popularity he enjoyed on ousting Mobutu diminished as the people felt poorer than before. Within government, corruption was once again rife, some popular politicians whom Kabila needed were imprisoned or tortured (Economist, 1998:33). Also, aid from the UN was not forthcoming
as Kabila failed to assist the UN investigation into the deaths of thousands of Hutu's who had died at the time Kabila was coming into power. Envisioned new investments by international mining companies did not materialise as not only Kabila developed a reputation as one who could not be trusted but also as a person who continually broke agreements (Economist, 1998:33).

The continuing war in the DRC which spilled over into nine of that country's neighbouring states led South Africa to rethink her position and manner of intervention. More recently, South Africa's contribution and intervention in the DRC came to the fore when president Mbeki announced in July of 1999 that agreement to a cease-fire had been reached in the DRC and that South African troops were to be deployed on a peacekeeping mission to that country. At the OAU summit on the DRC, on 29 April 2000, South Africa and Nigeria signed an agreement whereby they pledged their troops to active involvement in peacekeeping. Nigeria and South Africa promised to contribute the bulk of the UN observer mission (Monuc) troops in the Congo. Mbeki assured parliament that such an operation would be funded by the UN. However, the leader of the Democratic Party, Tony Leon, warned that the UN could take up to nine years to reimburse South Africa. This assertion from the opposition is contrary to its views on what the government should have done or must do in other countries where there is unrest. The Zimbabwean situation is a case in point. South African domestic opposition sought to compel president Thabo Mbeki to impose South Africa's might on Zimbabwe to stop the "illegal land invasions". The same opposition which expressed concerns about the costs of the DRC operation seemed remarkably unconcerned about the huge costs that South African intervention would entail in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, would badly needed resources not have been used if South Africa had adopted a hardline policy towards Zimbabwe, when as the opposition rightly states, they are needed in the country? Why is there a continuing trend of duplicity in statements from the opposition party?

If South Africa is to deploy her troops to the DRC there are bound to be casualties incurred from the peacekeeping mission in the DRC and the government has yet to
convince the South African public why it should let its soldiers go to the DRC (Mthembu-Slater, 2000:10). As yet, South African troops have not been deployed to the DRC as per UN instructions that no peacekeepers be sent until there is a relative decrease to the carnage and some semblance of peace in the DRC. ¹

The continuing intervention of Pretoria in the DRC indicates that South Africa has shed her apologetic African attitude and begun engaging the continent economically, politically and socially. Her African initiatives are indicative of the government’s notion of African interdependence. However, president Thabo Mbeki, was cautioned against sending troops to the DRC in fear of a repeat of the Zimbabwe intervention (Barrell, 1999:3). Zimbabwe is reportedly spending approximately US $1 million a day for the upkeep of the 3000 troops fighting on Kabila’s side and people in Zimbabwe are disgruntled as they do not understand the purpose of this mission in which millions are being spent when they are faced with poverty. The political climate in South Africa cautions against any major operations which might lead to the government being further discredited.

Yet, a peaceful DRC and southern African region which is able to realise its economic and security potential is most certainly in South Africa’s interest. This is why President Thabo Mbeki proposed that “Renaissance peacekeeping” be employed in the DRC. At the core of this peacekeeping is the notion that the parties involved in the conflict support a multinational operation in bringing about peace. This approach was put forward in the hope that the UN and the OAU would pledge their resources. To date, the UN has not financed a multinational peace operation which does not fall under its jurisdiction. The OAU, on the other hand, does not have disposable funds to enable it to

¹At the time this work was being completed President Laurent Kabila of the DRC had just been assassinated (18 January 2001), reportedly by his own bodyguard at the Presidential Palace in Kinshasa. The future of that country looked uncertain. The possibility of a UN peacekeeping force being sent to the DRC did not look very promising, as renewed fighting between rebel forces and the government’s was being reported, and the US was evacuating its citizens from the DRC in light of the new developments.
engage in such an undertaking (Malan, 1997:7). For Malan, possibilities of a successful “Renaissance peacekeeping” operation are minimal as there are no assurances that peacekeepers would be impartial. He fears that they would have vested interests in the outcome which would impede its viability. The possibility of the peacekeepers being unwanted should not be discounted. Nevertheless, there are strong points in favour of the success of this undertaking since it “offers the enterprising and truly committed country an opportunity to reverse the trend towards perceived international impotence when challenged with the need to resolve violent conflicts in Africa” (Malan, 1999:8).

SADC’s position on the DRC saga has proved indecisive due to differences of opinion within the community. Harare, for example, has pulled one way whilst Pretoria has pulled the other. The incoherence in SADC’s stand on the DRC was exacerbated by Angola’s active involvement in the civil war when UNITA forces joined Mobutu and MPLA soldiers joined Kabila’s rebels (Handley, 1997:18). This only exacerbated already volatile emotions within the Angolan camp.

South Africa’s turnabout and acceptance of the Kabila regime, after initially showing disapproval, has been severely criticised by some writers. Spence (1994:162-3) warned that South Africa’s position might prove embarrassing for Pretoria since its foreign policy is based on the upliftment of human rights. However, at the time of Pretoria’s volte-face, Kabila had not clarified his political intentions. Malan (1999:9) insists that Pretoria’s acceptance of Kabila’s government led to a lost opportunity for South Africa to ensure lasting peace and stability in the DRC. He might have been correct in his assessment because under Kabila the DRC has again been plunged into civil war. Rebels who fought with him against Mobutu fought to remove him from power. The envisaged benefits from the DRC’s potential wealth have not materialised and instead SADC has been divided by its membership.
5.2.1 Domestic Political Constraints

It must be an arduous task for the Department of Foreign Affairs to consider asking for funds to be used in interventions outside the country. This would be exacerbated by the department's knowledge and awareness of the enormous internal tasks facing the government and for which those monies could be used. It becomes difficult for the DFA to justify funds for missions when more than 40% of the people live below the poverty line. Not surprisingly, South Africa's internal problems have served to limit the government's external commitments and efforts. Christopher Clapham (1997:332) correctly surmises that South Africa has shied away from direct military engagement in the DRC conflict and has opted to show its face on the "diplomatic front". Spence (1994:162-163) argues that South Africa needs to change its strategy if it is to exert substantial influence on the continent.

The South African government might have wanted to engage the DRC militarily, as was seen in the contradictory comments made in 1996 by President Mandela and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad (Brummer, 1996:13). The change in the government's stance in the DRC from military intervention to diplomacy can also be attributed to South Africa's intervention in Lesotho which received much criticism. The South African government was seen to have used excessive force in attempting to stop the coup. There was also a feeling of dissatisfaction with regards the behaviour of the soldiers as there were reports of them pillaging and raping those they were supposed to protect.

Also, business interests of some of the major mining companies in the country were at stake. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) therefore had to "walk the tightrope of not appearing to compromise its role as disinterested peace facilitator, but still to give South African companies . . . the necessary back-up to secure their interests" (Brummer, 1997:11). As a result, the DFA tried to make a distinction between the country's involvement in the peace process and its bilateral relations with the DRC.
The approach adopted by the government towards peacekeeping has been cautious because South African forces are said not to be trained for such missions. Much needed restructuring of the defence forces to make them more representative of the dynamics of the country implied that, were intervention to be attempted earlier, only a limited force would have been available (Cleaver & May, 1998:40). Restructuring has to occur within the SANDF. Numerous public reports now exist about ill-treatment, favouritism, and discrimination within the ranks. Surely, South Africa does not want to be sending a "house divided" on missions to pull people together. If there is separation and feelings of ill-will between those who are supposed to be peace-keepers, what kind of peace will they keep, when they cannot keep it amongst themselves.

Prior to President Mbeki's announcement of sending troops to the DRC, South Africa had concentrated most of her efforts on transforming the SANDF because she realised that she was expected to engage the continent. Therefore officers and diplomats were sent all over the world on peacekeeping courses (www.igd.org.za/publications/global-dialogue/africa/helmets.html). The approach also stipulates that intervention will not occur unless there is domestic and international political and public support, that the mandate is clear, and that there is a possibility of acting in conjunction with allies.

Though there has been a change in what informs South Africa's foreign policy, continuity remains evident. The very fact of the country's foreign policy having to take account of domestic needs and constraints is evidence of this. The apartheid governments' foreign policy started at home. It was concerned with defining domestic policy (apartheid) against hostile attack (Spence, 1996:122).

As mentioned in the preceding chapter, members of the old guard within a new dispensation can sabotage the new government's policies. South Africa is no exception, especially with regard to relations with Africa. Prior to 1994, relations between South Africa and southern Africa can be described as having been characterised by the "baas" mentality. South Africa interfered with the sub-region's people as she pleased and in
any manner.

Moreover, bureaucrats within the department of foreign affairs, were not particularly interested in what made the countries and the people what they were, or in a proper way of dealing with them. Their interest in Africa was minimal; proper relations with the West were sought and preferred. In the post-apartheid era, this has led to a situation where the bureaucracy is still not particularly concerned with Africa or for that matter knows very little about the continent when in reality “the government needs carry with it an informed opinion when making foreign policy which is not always the case at present” (www.igd.org.za/publications/global-dialogue/interviews/pahad.html). This situation led Jackie Selebi, the former Director-General of Foreign Affairs, to assert that ways had to be found to “deal with the bureaucratic mindset which is sometimes so strong that it suffocates and inhibits initiative and progress” (www.igd.org.za/publications/global-dialogue/interviews/selebi.html). To be able to have decisive, insightful, and far-reaching policies, the department needs people “who have an intimate knowledge of Africa.”

It is in South Africa’s interest to defuse the situation in the DRC in order to ensure that the bipartisan US-African free trade initiative is a success. Washington is dependent on Pretoria to organise African politics to accommodate greater market integration. As an African power South Africa has to live with the realities of a continent which can either undermine its prospects or enhance them in the global economy. The US is not the only economic power interested in Africa. Countries in the Asia/Indian Ocean region, Latin America-South Atlantic and Europe have all shown interest. Benefits, however, will not be forthcoming if Africa’s political and security environment remain unstable (www.cean.u-bordeaux.fr/polis/vol4n2/arti3.html).

Indisputably, South Africa’s relations with the DRC reflect that her foreign policy is now informed by different ideologies to those which influenced the apartheid governments’ policies. The ANC-government’s policies are informed by attitudes advocating the political, social and economic development of the sub-region and Africa. Arguably,
South Africa’s interest in the sub-region is to serve her own interests. Be that as it may, her intervention in the sub-region is vital not only for Pretoria, but for the well-being and continued growth of economic and political relations of southern Africa.
CHAPTER 5
Conclusion: The Future of South African Foreign Policy

The aim of this thesis was to find out the impact of domestic politics in South Africa on the government's ability to construct foreign policy. The preceding chapters have looked at the historical perspectives of South Africa's foreign policy and the policy shifts which have occurred as a result of the new dispensation's policy imperatives. Realism and idealism were used as theoretical exponents to explain Pretoria's policies. It was argued that, despite the country's desire to follow a moralistic foreign policy, the dictates of national interest and realism have prevailed. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was utilised in an attempt to delineate how domestic factors in the country affected its ability to effectively intervene in this country.

In conclusion, recommendations which might lead to a more holistic framework for future South African foreign policy will be outlined. It will be inferred that a more coherent policy which focuses more on Africa is consistent with President Thabo Mbeki's vision of an African Renaissance. The African Renaissance is aimed at a rebirth for the African continent in the cultural, social, political, and economic spheres. It aims to foster a positive attitude amongst the African people, a belief that they are capable of doing things for themselves and do not have to look to the West for approval or for assistance.

A South Africa which is flourishing in a sub-region and a continent afflicted by poverty, wars and underdevelopment will certainly be fertile ground for problems of illegal entry, small arms proliferation, drug trafficking, and many other similar problems. It is, therefore, imperative that South Africa become deeply involved not only in bringing about peace but also in reviving and promoting economic growth in the continent. There are expectations from Africa that South Africa should contribute significantly towards peace and development on the continent. Despite the stature awarded to
South Africa by the world and the continent, she cannot be solely responsible for the revival of Africa.

If progress is to be accelerated then the countries of Africa have to start working together in a more coherent and organised manner. It has become apparent that acting on its own (as in the case of Nigeria and Rwanda), South Africa cannot act in a way which satisfies everyone. At times, the guidelines of the country’s foreign policy, especially with regards to human rights, clash with those of other countries on the continent. It is important, therefore, that South Africa asks herself how she is to build her capacity in order to make an effective contribution towards the continent whilst not exaggerating what she can realistically achieve (www.anc.org.za/ancindex.html).

Pretoria should define and prioritise her objectives and take into account her limitations, as well as the nature of the world of states. Furthermore, she should learn discretion and aspire for consistency in the international arena. To be able to cope with global changes, Pretoria must be able to understand and monitor the perpetually changing international environment. This will only be possible if Pretoria defines her foreign policy goals and priorities clearly (Mills, 1997:4-5). It is of paramount importance that South Africa defines her place in Africa positively and affirmatively. Rather than furtively looking at the rest of the world, she should become a self-confident force. South Africa has to help reinvigorate Africa’s drive and resourcefulness and play a leadership role in the endeavour to put Africa’s house in order (Adedeji, 1996:13).

For South Africa to be more effective in her sub-regional initiatives there is a need for the Department of Foreign Affairs to become stronger, more concise and decisive, and be seen to be taking its sub-regional commitments seriously. This can be done by developing the necessary skills within SADC sub-directorates and hosting regular discussions on developments within the southern African region and throughout the continent. In this way the Department might be able to improve the analytical capabilities within its walls. Support for research on the causes of ongoing conflicts
within the sub-region might enhance the ability of domestic Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to contribute to policy debates (www.igd.org.za/publications/global-dialogue/foreign-policy/burden.html).

Thabo Mbeki's ideal of an African Renaissance also informs and will continue to inform South Africa's foreign policy in the future. Entrenched in the African Renaissance ideal is the President's resolution to reverse the pervasive Afro-pessimism, yet another consequence of the demise of the Cold War. The African Renaissance aims to foster a mentality of finding solutions to African problems, the African way, by Africans. To achieve these ideals South Africa will have to distance herself from the West's agendas and self-serving interests in the continent which more often than not are to the detriment of the continent. South Africa also has to guard against following the US trend of laying down demands for a 'textbook case' democracy which African countries have to follow before they can be seen to be on their way to recovery or be perceived as legitimate. South Africa should rather view democracy as a process, the first stage of which is guaranteeing conditions for civil and political organisations to operate. An election can follow after a lengthy process of transition, but it should not be seen as the 'be all and end all' of political revival (Mandani, 1997:10). South Africa should rather concentrate on acting as the voice and conscience of Africa rather than as an "on-the-scene" manager for the US.

Under Mbeki, South African foreign policy has shifted from the radical pledges the ANC had made while in exile. The new leadership's inclination has been towards a foreign policy based on interest, one which is led by pragmatic activity instead of as an exercise in the projection of ethical values or ideological principles. Mbeki does not carry the weight of Mandela's sainthood; instead, he is perceived as a man and a president no different from others. His policy choices should therefore be more receptive to rational co-benefit assessments unencumbered by fixed normative principles or grand populist expectations (Evans, 1999:624-9).
Despite maintaining relations with Western Europe and North America, it becomes clear from Pretoria’s policy documents that her main focus is on Africa and the rest of the South. The North is more an instrument which Pretoria is using to further her domestic interests as well as those of the rest of the South, in their bid to develop their countries’ economic, political, and social environments. As far as the southern African region is concerned, Pretoria seems set on continuing its diplomatic shuffle. Considering the domestic constraints the country faces, this might be the appropriate route to follow. Playing a mediatory role helps South Africa make diverse foreign policy more compatible and assists in thwarting criticisms leveled at its foreign policy (van der Westhuizen, 1998). Diplomatic intervention will also ensure that South Africa does participate in resolving conflicts in the sub-region, while being spared the financial and human sacrifice a military intervention might require.

Future South African policy is likely to be pursued through a combination of quiet diplomacy and assertive multilateralism. The leadership is conscious of its domestic priorities and the need to approach with caution actions which increase the country’s risk-taking opportunities and diminish prospects for international investment in the country. While adhering to the demands of its international obligations, it is clear that Pretoria will not abandon her domestic duties. It is in situations where there is no contradiction between the country’s foreign and domestic policies that coherent policy formulations will be witnessed. However, if there are discrepancies between the two, it is likely that the policy and decisions that will be taken will be those that clearly correspond and further the interests of the country.

It is clear that a sub-region and a continent that is in turmoil will be to the detriment of the well-being of the people of South Africa. Progress and growth for the country will be encumbered if such violent actions persist. Therefore, it can be deduced that Pretoria will continue its present policy towards the sub-region, whereby it is the facilitator for peace. Any other kind of intervention will be under the auspices of the OAU or the UN as such moves will also imply that the costs of intervention will be borne by these
organisations.

The domestic landscape in the country has changed drastically since the end of the 1980's. People are now aware of their rights and expect them to be fulfilled. If the ANC-government hopes to continue in office, it has to ensure that it keeps its constituents happy. This will be possible if the government delivers on its promises to the people. Excursions in the sub-region to further other people's well-being while conditions of its citizens remain dire, will meet with resistance and loss of support from the masses.
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