BETWEEN SCyllA AND CHARYBDIS:

SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY DILEMMA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

By

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Submitted in fulfilment of the academic requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science) in the Faculty of Humanities, Development and Social Sciences of the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa

2010

Supervisor

Prof NI Okeke-Uzodike
Declaration

I, Varusha Naidoo (Student Number 962081338), declare that

(i) The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original research.

(ii) This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

(iii) This thesis does not contain other persons’ data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons.

(iv) This thesis does not contain other persons’ writing, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written sources have been quoted, then:
   a) their words have been re-written but the general information attributed to them has been referenced;
   b) where their exact words have been used, their writing has been placed inside quotation marks, and referenced.
Dedication

For my daughter, Danisha.

Because I know that the foreign policy choices that we make will determine the trajectory of our country in the international arena; ultimately impacting on the world that you grow up in…
Acknowledgements

My first words of appreciation go to my supervisor, Professor N. I. Okeke-Uzodike: it was his mentoring and guidance which led me down the path to higher studies and it was, indeed, his nagging which motivated me to complete the journey I had begun. His understanding of my need to take a longer than usual route and his support until the very end has earned him both my deep respect and sincere gratitude.

I would also like to thank my parents whose unwavering belief in my abilities inspired me not only to aim high but also to bring those ambitions to fruition. I have been fortunate in terms of the support received from my family in general and from certain aunts in particular – for this I am thankful.

It would be remiss of me not to mention the numerous colleagues from whose insight I benefitted or whose reverse psychology spurred me to finish this degree. In addition, I want to acknowledge the participants in my study who shared their time and thoughts. It is their contribution which underpins the distinctiveness of my research.

I save my final words of appreciation for my husband and daughter who were hijacked into accompanying me on this journey. Thank you for being such willing victims.
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<thead>
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<th>Acronyms/Abbreviations</th>
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<td>AU</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
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<td>COSATU</td>
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<td>DIRCO</td>
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<td>DTI</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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EPAs Economic Partnership Agreements
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FTA Free Trade Agreement
FOCEM Fund for Mercosur Structural Convergence
G4 Brazil, Germany, India and Japan
G7 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States of America
G8 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States of America and Russia (EU also represented)
G20 Group of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of 20 major economies: South Africa, Canada, Mexico, United States of America, Argentina, Brazil, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Turkey, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Australia and European Union
G77 Largest intergovernmental organization of developing states in the United Nations
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEAR Growth, Employment and Redistribution
HCTs (British) High Commission Territories
HIV Human immunodeficiency virus
IBSA India, Brazil, South Africa
ICC International Criminal Court
ICTS Cluster International Cooperation, Trade and Security Cluster
IRPS Cluster International Relations, Peace and Security Cluster
IFIs International Financial Institutions
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIRSA</td>
<td>Initiative for the Integration of South American Regional Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Information Networks which focus on humanitarian stories in regions that are often under-reported, misunderstood or ignored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Import Substitution Industrialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIFA</td>
<td>Fédération Internationale de Football Association (The International Federation of Association Football)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-aligned Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICs</td>
<td>Newly industrialized countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCRD</td>
<td>Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUDEMO</td>
<td>People's United Democratic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWV region</td>
<td>Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RISDP</td>
<td>Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>South American Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
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<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern Africa Customs Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADPA</td>
<td>South African Development Partnership Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SASS</td>
<td>South African Secret Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West African People’s Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNASUR</td>
<td>Union of South American Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCED</td>
<td>UN Conference on Environment and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEF</td>
<td>World Economic Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract

Africa is at the cross roads as it redefines itself within a new framework of political and economic linkages. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States illustrate both the dangers of reckless foreign policy choices as well as the need for cooperation with regard to transnational threats. From the exclusive policies of ‘total onslaught’ to the inclusive policies of the African Renaissance, South Africa has tried almost everything but remains unable to find an acceptable niche for herself in Southern Africa. Deep suspicions about South African intentions and commitment persist despite the reality of shared fears of further marginalisation, and aspirations of more propitious integration, within a rapidly globalising international environment.

In understanding these dynamics, this study traces the evolution of South Africa’s contemporary relationship with the Southern African region and rationalizes this relationship within a broader theoretical framework based on development, discourse and hegemonic stability theories as well as the middle-power and pivot-state paradigms. In addition, the study assesses South Africa’s foreign policy options in light of both domestic constraints and the perceptions of other countries within the region.

In essence, South Africa’s regional foreign policy dilemma is a product of the country’s inability to adjust timeously its strategic compass in the mercurial world of foreign policy where a country seeking to advance an ambitious foreign policy agenda will always be confronted with powers arrayed against it, forces that it cannot manage and battles that it cannot win. As this thesis argues, South Africa’s inability to
convince other states that her vision is complimentary to their needs has inhibited her ability to engineer a process of transformation and development in the region.

The challenge for the South African government is to shift the power dynamic against which projections of South African dominance trigger fierce rejection or reluctant cooperation by regional governments. This foreign policy drive has to be underpinned by a clearly defined developmental strategy that is able to compromise between high ideals and stark realities, between a preference for paternalistically reshaping regional relations and realising that given internal challenges and international expectations, South Africa needs the region perhaps even more than the region needs South Africa. In order to restore some balance to this trend, regional relations grounded in transformative development must be seen as a critical component of South Africa’s national interests.
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Chapter 1

Introduction: Understanding South African Foreign Policy

Claude Ake, the legendary doyen of African studies, once observed that African countries were poised between a discredited past and a future which refuses to arrive. Considering South Africa’s foreign policy relations with the Southern African region, it is an apt assessment. From the exclusive policies of ‘total onslaught’ to the inclusive policies of the African Renaissance, South Africa has tried almost everything but remains unable to find an acceptable niche for herself in Southern Africa. Rather than a happy marriage of mutually interested partners, it appears that many of the states in the region may now be harboring deep suspicions about South African intentions and commitment. It is almost as if there is a feeling of non-complementariness between the interests of the regional states and South Africa. This is despite the reality of shared fears of further marginalization, and aspirations of more propitious integration, within a rapidly globalizing international environment.

1.1 Background to Study: The Fundamentals of South African Foreign Policy

The principles of South African foreign policy -- as articulated in May 1994 by the then Foreign Affairs Minister, Alfred Nzo, to Parliament and later captured in a 1996 Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Foreign Policy Discussion Document -- encapsulates the Republic’s commitment to:

- the promotion of human rights, specifically the political, economic, social and environmental circumstances conducive to these;
- the promotion of freedom and democracy throughout the world;
• principles of justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations;
• international peace and internationally agreed mechanisms for the resolution of conflict;
• the promotion of Africa’s interests in global affairs; and
• expanded regional and international economic cooperation in an interdependent world.

In August 1994, Mr Nzo also expounded guidelines regarding South Africa's foreign policy:
• the conduct of South Africa's international relations should be transparent and take place in close consultation with Parliament;
• the national interests of South Africa should always dictate its policies;
• South Africa must expand its participation in regional, continental and global multilateral organizations;
• the security and the quality of life of South Africans, as well as justice and the international rule of law, peace, economic stability and regional cooperation were some of the fundamental principles underlying the foreign policy of South Africa; and
• South Africa could not become involved in all laudable initiatives and issues in international politics, because of a lack of adequate resources.

More recently, the DFA produced a Strategic Plan 2007-10 which outlined South Africa’s priorities as:
• Consolidation of the African Agenda;
• Strengthen South-South cooperation;
• Strengthen North-South cooperation;
• Participate in global system of governance; and
• Enhance bilateral political and socio-economic relations.

The Jacob Zuma administration has since introduced an outcomes-based approach for Government which was adopted by Cabinet in 2009. Outcome 11 identifies the overriding objective of South Africa’s international approach as “Creating a better South Africa and contributing to a better and safer Africa in a better world.” It is premised on an understanding that South Africa’s developmental prospects are enhanced in a regional and global context characterized by peace, security and prosperity. Outcome 11 promotes four priorities with set deliverables:

Table 1-1: Outcome 11 Priorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTCOME 11 PRIORITIES</th>
<th>DELIVERABLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced African Agenda and Sustainable Development</td>
<td>• Deepened contribution to Regional, &amp; Continental Security &amp; Stability and Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Contribution to Peace Missions and Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Enhancing Technical and Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced Regional Integration</td>
<td>• Regional Economic Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Regional Political Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformed Global Governance and Peace &amp; Security Institutions</td>
<td>• Enhanced Representation in and Strengthening of Regional, Continental &amp; Global Platforms and Governance Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced Trade and Investment</td>
<td>• Increased Export Growth to Targeted Economies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increased Inward Investment from Targeted Countries</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Arguably, one of the most visible shifts in the post-apartheid South African government's foreign policy orientation has been its commitment to become a true developmental partner in Southern Africa. The then-Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, reminded South African ambassadors during a September 1995 conference that, “Despite our own limitations and problems, it is our objective to make a significant contribution to ensuring peace, democracy, respect for human rights and sustained development. These principles are fundamental to our foreign policy.”

This thinking is not only driven by economic logic, but also political solidarity - many peoples and governments in the Southern African region supported the South African liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC), during the apartheid years. Therefore, politically, especially in multilateral forums, South African representatives have made an effort not to set South Africa apart from the region. In fact, they have often labored to insert the needs and interests of the Southern African region as a priority on the agendas of forums such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The ANC’s 2007 foreign policy discussion paper, *International Policy: A Just World and a Better Africa is a Possibility*, affirms that South Africa’s foreign relations are based on a pro-African, South-South orientation, which seeks a ‘strategic partnership’ with the industrialized North with the goal of consolidating an African and South-South agenda. The document reminds South Africans that “our security and prosperity is linked and co-exists with the consolidation of the African Agenda.” It is, therefore, not surprising that South Africa has been actively engaged in developmental activities that aim to improve the general socio-economic conditions of the people of Africa in general and Southern
Africans in particular. By providing neighboring and other states with technical assistance in respect of economically viable and sound projects, South Africa aims to achieve a number of objectives, namely:

- improved bilateral and multilateral relations;
- exchange of technology, information and expertise;
- cooperation between police and armed forces to combat cross-border crime;
- improved two-way trade and the formation of joint ventures;
- joint cross-border projects to combat the spread of diseases, both human and animal;
- the creation of conditions that allow people to become economically active in their own countries, thus discouraging illegal migration; and
- assistance with democratization.

(www.gov.za/yearbook/foreign.htm)

At the heart of such objectives, are the reality that integrated political, economic and security structures and processes will promote sustained growth and development in the region, laying the foundations for intra-regional trade and infrastructural development. It is an indicator that South Africa’s foreign policy objectives are, in essence, an outward projection of the country’s domestic imperatives.

Despite such principles and priorities, it has not been easy to translate the government’s aspiration to break with the legacy of the apartheid era into policy, especially given the dual nature of the imperative of transformation. Johnston (2001: 11) succinctly identifies these:
The first is the internal dynamic of democratization which imposes its own priorities and creates its own opportunities. The second is the changing international terrain, on which the new political configurations of the post cold war world, and the developing patterns of social and economic relationships usually described under the rubric of ‘globalization’, make themselves felt.

Indeed, the capricious international order challenged South Africa to not only establish solidarity with other similarly challenged states, but also to placate and harness global forces (in competition with other states) in order to finance the country's reconstruction. As Janis van der Westhuizen (1998) puts it,

South Africa's seemingly inconsistent foreign policy reflects the obstacles and frustrations facing many states in the developing world. It has to maintain its linkages with the global economy, yet ensure that these linkages do not further exacerbate existing inequalities.

The burden of negotiating this treacherous path of promoting national interests in a competitive global environment was acutely felt by South Africa’s newly constituted democratic leadership whose active foreign policy engagement was necessitated by the country’s emancipation from longstanding international isolation. Foreign policy in the Mandela era was driven by a “heady mix of idealist principles and grandiose objectives” which threw into stark relief the serious limitations a middle-level country such as South Africa faces in advancing an ambitious foreign policy agenda (Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk, 2004: 132). During this period, the post-revolutionary fervor associated with liberation policies resulted in normative and theoretical confusion
about proper foreign policy goals and objectives. The Mbeki era concentrated on establishing a new set of priorities and normative principles that would be more in keeping with South Africa's interests and its capabilities on the global stage (Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk, 2004: 132). This resulted in a move away from universality to a conciliatory pragmatism; a more carefully calibrated definition of how South Africa would concentrate its international energies and diplomatic resources. A broad and embracing framework of 'active multilateralism' provides the conceptual underpinnings for a strategic focus on Southern Africa, Africa, and the countries of the Southern Hemisphere, while not neglecting important bilateral relations with countries of the North. It is argued that:

in the implementation of foreign policy, financial, commercial, political and defense interests supplanted the new government's carefully crafted ethical dimension. This reflected the government's adoption of an eclectic synthesis of neo-realist and neo-liberal principles which remained cognizant of a globalizing world economy (Spence, 2004: 39).

Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk (2002b) succinctly capture some of the most salient differences between pre-apartheid and post-apartheid foreign policy making in South Africa.
### Table 1-2: Comparison of Pre and Post Apartheid Foreign Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OLD (Pre-1994)</th>
<th>NEW (Post-1994)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Locus of decision making</strong></td>
<td><strong>Locus of decision-making</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• State Security Council</td>
<td>• Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• President</td>
<td>• The Office of the Presidency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense</td>
<td>• Department of Foreign Affairs,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Department of Trade and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marginalized Sectors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Involved Sectors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Parliament</td>
<td>• Parliament and the portfolio committee system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Public opinion and the media</td>
<td>• Public opinion and the media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Political Parties</td>
<td>• The ruling party and alliance partners (ANC, SACP, COSATU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Most external actors except fellow pariah states</td>
<td>• Extensive interaction with states, multilateral institutions, and the global economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideological Orientation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ideological Orientation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Apartheid mentality, racism</td>
<td>• Ongoing contest between idealist and ‘neoliberal schools’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Anti-communist – defense against the ‘total onslaught’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decision-Making</strong></td>
<td><strong>Decision-Making</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Authoritative</td>
<td>• More democratic, open and transparent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Secretive</td>
<td>• More inclusive and consultative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reactive</td>
<td>• However, still plagued by intra-state competition and conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undoubtedly, with the passage of time, the ‘miracle’ that has been the negotiated settlement in South Africa has started to give way to a more balanced and sober</td>
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</table>
assessment of South Africa, its foreign relations and particularly its engagement in Africa (Cilliers, 1999). There has been a growing realization by ‘idealists’ within the RSA government as well as the expectant region that post-apartheid South Africa as a model for transformative development and an engine for growth through trade and investment would not be motivated by altruistic sentiment only. South Africa would need the rejuvenation of the region to provide it with untapped markets for its business sector, thereby underpinning its own domestic growth that was vital for addressing the economic backlogs inherited from the apartheid state.

1994 marked the beginning of the march of South African capital into Southern Africa; driven by the conviction that ‘unless there is growth and development throughout the region, not only will trade opportunities be constrained but destabilizing shocks from crises in neighboring countries could well impact in various ways on efforts to promote growth in democratic South Africa’ (Davies et al., 1993: 33). Unfortunately, perceptions of Pretoria’s domination of Africa were augmented by the dynamic role played by South African corporations in exploiting the natural commercial advantages offered by new post-apartheid relations with the region. In fact, this became a key obstacle to the South African foreign policy strategy of development as a goal and regionality as the means.

However, Jeff Radebe, former Minister of Public Enterprises (1999-2004), argues that only “a short-sighted response” to South Africa’s dominance across the continent would lament “how South African business can use its dominance to entrench itself as a new-style commercial mercenary force that benefits from its economic activity on the continent but also relies on Africa to remain undeveloped to feed the hunger of the
new pirates.” He, in a sense, affirms a central contention of this thesis: transformative development in Southern Africa is impossible without South Africa playing a leading role (immediate concerns over hegemonic dominance will subside in the long-term with the region’s realization that South Africa needs it as much as it needs South Africa as an anchor and driver of mutually beneficial integration). Of course, the challenge facing South Africa is how to contribute to such mutually-needed development in a way that addresses short term concerns without impeding the long term vision. In this regard, this thesis contends that the acquiescence and understanding of the region (with its overview of post-apartheid government pronouncements, Chapter 5 shows that there is already an understanding within South African government circles that the country cannot be isolated from the region) of South Africa’s role is critical to a prosperous Southern Africa: development, like democracy, cannot be exported or imposed by an external agent, however benign, without the acceptance and participation of those affected.

1.2 Conceptual Clarification of Key Terms

In research designs, terms should be defined to facilitate the readers’ understanding of intended meaning. It is not important that the reader subscribes to this designed meaning, but as long as the reader knows what the researcher means when employing a particular term, the reader is able to understand the research and appraise it more or less objectively (Castetter and Heisler: 1977, Creswell: 1994). Four potentially illusory terms, ‘Southern Africa,’ ‘foreign policy,’ ‘national interest’ and ‘transformative development’ are employed throughout this study and are defined below:
1.2.1 Southern Africa

Southern Africa, according to McGowan (2002: 267), is more often than not defined as comprising of the fourteen members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC): “Twelve members are on the Southern part of the African continent with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) being the most northern. Two members are tiny islands in the Indian Ocean – Mauritius and the Seychelles.” Naidu and Roberts (2004: 1) concur that the southern African region is made up of all countries south of and including Tanzania and the DRC. However, this division of the continent into East Africa, Southern Africa and so forth hardly rests on stout foundations. SADC’s original membership was defined by the apartheid state’s economic, political and military destabilization campaigns and therefore reflected both South Africa’s historical economic ties on the continent and its military reach. For example, Tanzania was a founder member of the Frontline States grouping and of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) and SADC.

Table 1-3: Differentiating between SADCC and SADC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SADCC</th>
<th>SADC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CREATION</td>
<td>Decision by a political grouping, the Front Line States (FLS).</td>
<td>Evolved out of the SADCC Conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOTIVATION</td>
<td>Achievement of regional autonomy outside a South African sphere.</td>
<td>Consolidation of Southern Africa’s position in a changing world economic environment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is, and can be, no unique definition of the region in the sense either of an uncontested boundary or a set of one or more meanings with which it might be invested and would set it apart from others which lie immediately across that
boundary or further afield. The definition of Southern Africa adopted is essentially instrumental, that is, one of convenience and common usage (Simon, 1998: 244). Although other countries may be included for specific purposes or in certain institutional contexts, the ten countries of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are those most widely considered to make up the region, by virtue of contiguity, important elements of shared environment and history, and many common interests which include deeper regional integration, political stability, food Security and HIV Aids. In this study, these ten countries are regarded as constituting the Southern African region, a categorization which conforms to that of the African Union (AU) (AU Profile, www.africa-union.org). Annexure 1 contains a snapshot of the relevant economic, military and socio-economic indicators for these Southern African countries.

1.2.2 Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is viewed as an instrument through which a country and its government structures conduct relations with the rest of the world - politically, economically and socially. It is the art of building for the long term, the careful nurturing of relationships, the elaboration of policies that enhance available options while constraining those of potential opponents. In this sense, it is the “output of the state into the global system” (Russet and Starr, 1992: 179). Foreign policy implies a “conscious image of what is or ought to be the country’s place in the world, or some general guiding principles or attitudes determining or influencing decisions on specific issues” (Wallace, 1971: 11). Whilst some regard foreign policy as a set of actual measures taken by leaders representing national entities with specific interests
and needs, many others consider it the pursuit of universal purposes in a global field of human relations. Moreover, there are those who regard it as a ‘boundary’ activity (Evans and Newnham, 1990: 123). They suggest that those who engage in the making of policy straddle two environments: an internal/domestic environment and an external/international one. Policy makers and the policy system itself stand at the juncture between the two and must therefore seek to mediate between them (Evans and Newnham, 1990: 123).

The analysis of foreign policy involves an understanding of both the domestic and international environments and the relation of one to the other. This presents a particular challenge; in Rosenau’s words, “the foreign policy undertaking is the most delicate of political actions and the most fragile of political relationships” (Rosenau, 1971: 93). The domestic environment forms the context against which foreign policy is made and reflects factors such as prevailing ideology and national interests. The international environment is where foreign policy is actually implemented. Vale and Mphaisha (1999: 89) maintain that foreign policy is “the sum total of all activities by which international actors act, react, and interact with the environment beyond their national borders.” In a globalizing world, foreign policy is no longer the exclusive prerogative of states and governments. Foreign policy is both a reaction (response) to the environment and an action (initiative) directed at the environment. This implies that the foreign policy of states can be conditioned by both their internal properties such as the dominant domestic societal actors and the structural properties of the international system. Kegley and Wittkopf (1993: 60-70) posit that “there are several national attributes which are important for a country’s foreign policy and these include its history, geo-strategic location, economic prowess, military power and
resource endowments.” These taken together permit and constrain a country’s ability to act and interact with its external environment.

Van Nieuwkerk (2010: 84) also draws an important distinction between international relations which “is about the central question of how societies co-exist” and foreign policy which he refers to as a subsidiary question of “how states inter-relate.” In this regard, he draws on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU to show that increasingly even collective of states tends to pursue activities which resemble foreign policy. Van Nieuwkerk’s arguments echo that of Webber and Smith (2002) who observe that contemporary foreign policy is focused on the ways in which, and the extent to which, national governments have succeeded in dealing with the challenges of a substantially transformed world. Indeed, as technological advances reinforce the idea of a ‘global village’ in an increasingly interdependent world, foreign policy assumes new significance: the values and principles that a country promotes through foreign policy will not only determine its survival and prospects in the international arena but also will shape its relationships with other actors. In this sense, the values and principles that drive foreign policy are especially critical to a South Africa which has reclaimed its position on the international stage after a period of apartheid isolation.

In essence, it can be deduced that any country’s foreign policy represents how its domestic values and priorities are translated onto the international stage. It is the link between activities inside a state and the world environment outside it. Rosenau (1987: 1) notes that “the analysis of foreign policy is a bridging discipline that takes as its focus of study the bridges that whole systems called nation-states build to link
themselves and their subsystems to even more encompassing international systems of which they are a part”. Johnston (2001: 12) posits that:

Foreign policy is made and executed in the realm of contingent events, imperfectly understood motives and broad, long-term movements which are difficult to chart. In a policy-making environment like this, principles which are unduly numerous, narrowly drawn or rigidly applied may have to be frequently sacrificed to the effects of unpredictability and misinterpretation. The consequence is considerable damage to the credibility and integrity of policy, especially where the principles concerned are supposed to reflect not only the interests but the values of the state concerned.

Foreign policy-makers are thus faced with the unenviable task of constructing a coherent set of principles which is defensible in terms of broad visions such as achieving democracy and human rights without neglecting classical yardsticks of national interest. In this regard, Hamill (2001: 49) argues that foreign policy outcomes are normally a trade-off between “what justice demands and what circumstances permit.” Essentially, this decision-making process involves a rational reconciliation or balancing of ends and means or, more specifically, of the desirable with the possible, in respect of foreign policy. (Du Plessis, 2002: 118)

Foreign policy, in Morgenthau’s famous formulation, is about the “national interest defined in terms of power;” therefore, its proper or ‘normal’ conduct requires the virtual exclusion of variables such as ideological values or moral principles (Morgenthau, 1951: 242). ‘Normal’ states conduct their policies with due regard to
geo-political realities and maximize their gain potential by eschewing potentially
divisive and, therefore, weakening, internal ideological considerations (Evans, 1991: 7). In foreign affairs all is relative - relative to one’s own needs, position, dangers, hopes and purposes. In essence, the making of foreign policy is founded on ego-centricity: given the character of the contemporary international system, of sovereign states and the conventions upon which they rest, foreign policy can only make sense in so far as it is calculated to advance, or at least to defend, the interests of the state concerned.

One may conclude that foreign policy is a multidimensional set of policies, objectives, principles, strategies and plans which cannot easily be packaged into a neatly described ‘formula’. It is indeed questionable whether there is such a thing as a single, coherent and rational foreign policy. It may be argued that we are really dealing with a series of disjointed, finite and often mutually conflicting policies emerging from different governmental levels and divisions that are responding piecemeal to their own narrowly-focused problems (Couloumbis and Wolfe, 1990: 115).

More than a decade and a half after South Africa’s transition to democratic rule, the scope and substance of the country’s foreign policy remains a contentious issue. There is still no official document on South Africa’s foreign policy. Instead, the speeches of relevant politicians and officials as well as DFA foreign policy discussion documents, strategic plans and the policy documents of the ruling party give broad direction. In advising Parliament against the need for a codified foreign policy doctrine Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo once pointed out in 1995 that “…our
current foreign policy, in which each decision is made on its merits within a prescribed normative framework, is adequate enough for our circumstances.” While foreign policy in this study is understood as a multidimensional set of objectives, principles and strategies which cannot easily be packaged into a single neat ‘policy’, the disadvantages of South Africa’s current foreign policy orientation is manifest in the much-publicized criticism of its ambiguity. What has emerged is a policy package that seeks to communicate to all key stake-holders (domestic constituency and regional neighbors) without fully addressing the concerns raised by each constituency.

1.2.3 National Interest

Stephen Krasner, in his 1978 classic *Defending the National Interest*, unpacked the concept of national interest in terms of general societal goals which persist over time, and have a consistent ranking of importance in order to justify using the term. The ‘consistent ranking of importance’ can best be explained by the Commission on America’s National Interests which in 1996 identified national interests as “vital interests that justified the unilateral use of force” (Ellsworth et al: 12). In addition, Jessop (2009: 373) emphasizes the notion of choice by arguing that national interests are strategically selective since “there is never a general interest that embraces all possible particular interests.”

There is even the view that the national interest should be largely inward-looking: “a function of our duty to ourselves in our domestic problems” (Kennan, 1951: 730). Nuechterlein (1978) complicates the notion of national interest even further by differentiating between public interest (the way in which a government deals with the
internal environment of the state) and national interest (the way a government deals with the external environment). Of note is the postulation by J. David Singer, President of the International Studies Association (1985-86), that “‘the national interest’ is a smokescreen by which we all too often oversimplify the world, denigrate our rivals, enthrall our citizens, and justify acts of dubious morality and efficacy” (cited in Clinton, 1994: x). Indeed, the pre-democratic South African state used the concept of ‘national interest’ in its defense of apartheid policies and practices, including the destabilization of the Southern African region.

Interestingly, despite the context (policy justification) in terms of which the concept of national interest has been used, South Africa has not defined, developed or unambiguously articulated its national interests. At the same time, South African foreign-policy makers continue to articulate that “South Africa’s foreign policy is premised upon its national interests …” (Pahad, 2003). Without a shared understanding of the country’s long-term interests, it is not surprising that South Africa’s foreign policy is often criticized for lacking basic coordinates and a clear sense of priorities.

Attempts to identify South Africa’s national interest are usually inferred from official documents and statements which have fostered a generally muted discourse aimed at seeking clarity about the issue. The ‘terminological inexactitude’ (to use Winston Churchill’s colorful phrase) that has since crept into the discourse of national interest is well captured by Van Nieuwkerk (2004: 92):

For the ANC and government, the state’s strategic policy priorities, as determined annually by the Cabinet lekgotla (and announced during the
president’s annual state of the nation address in parliament), equals the national interest. In the longer term, some level of predictability is provided in the election manifesto with which a party campaigns the elections, and in the case of the ANC the 1956 Freedom Charter provides the guiding light. In the view of the opposition, government often blurs the lines between party and national interests.

While the process of conceptualizing the country’s national interests has been initiated at the international relations cluster level, such views affirm that it is likely to take another five years before consensus is reached on such ‘general societal goals’. Currently, national interests are conflated with more short-term foreign and domestic strategic policy objectives as articulated in the Medium Term Strategic Framework: 2009-2014, Cabinet Lekgotla documents or the 2010 Outcomes Document. The danger of confusing more enduring national interests (linked to survival of the country) with such short term objectives is that there is a deceptive focus on domestic imperatives (linked to survival of a particular government). Without a clearly articulated long-term vision, South Africa will not be able to convince other Southern African states that her regional foreign policy is complimentary to their needs (which are important if the integration roadmap that the region has agreed to, is to be successfully implemented).
Fig1-I: Unpacking RSA’s National Interests

For the purposes of this study, South Africa’s national interests is considered as being constituted by the following key components:

- **National security/sovereignty**: The stability of the Republic and its constitutional order, its institutions and the safety of its people as well as preservation of the territorial integrity of the state.

- **National prosperity**: Sustainable and inclusive economic growth and development.

- **Core values**: South African national objectives, as reflected in the preamble of country’s Constitution.

It is a conceptual framework that is informed by the paradigm of human security, which looks at security as being more than just the self-preservation of the state but also the safety and prosperity of the citizens and the values that they hold sacrosanct. Even if South Africa’s national interests are anchored in national sensitivities and historical imperatives, its geo-strategic projection must extend beyond the borders of the country if they are to be secured in a globalizing inter-dependent world. In this regard, South Africa’s national interests should be closely linked with a set of ancillary interests that encompass:

- Regional stability and prosperity

- Continental stability (peace, good governance and socio-economic development)

- A just international environment (which can only be achieved through global Governance reform driven by strengthened South-South relations)

This conceptualization reflects the reality that, in an inter-dependent foreign policy world, the advancement of South Africa’s national interests is invariably linked to the regional, continental and international environments within which such interests play out.
1.2.4 Transformative Development

In 1885, the Englishman Allan Octavian Hume made the statement that you cannot have separate, unequal peoples living alongside one another in great riches and deep poverty, without inviting catastrophe (cited in Mathoma, 2001: 28). This is even truer in a globalised, interconnected world. Uruguayan Foreign Minister Luis Almagro, at the close of the 65th session of the UN General Assembly on 29 September 2010, affirmed that the current international economic and financial crisis marks the closing of a cycle of growth and demands a new way of thinking about development.

Africa’s erratic economic performance since the 1990s, along with the political turmoil which has plagued or still plagues many countries, has brought into sharp relief the need for a comprehensive rethink of the development-related problems of the continent and of the region. Davies, Keet, and Nkuhlu (1993: 1) concur that regional economic relations can no longer be an ‘optional extra’: “The economic destiny of a democratic South Africa will be inextricably linked with that of the rest of the Southern African region”. In fact, the country is already deeply involved in a range of economic relations with neighboring countries (the context of which is unpacked in Chapter 2), with considerable significance for the current economy. But does this constitute transformative development?

The Nobel-Prize winning economist, Amartya Sen (1999: 3), observed that “Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic deprivation, neglect of
public facilities as well as intolerance or over activity of repressive states.” Indeed, issues of poverty and social inequality have become serious points of contestation in an era where the prominence of market fundamentalism undermines such development imperatives. South Africa is an apt example of a country torn between the seduction of free market capitalism and its concomitant unfettered economic growth on the one hand and the appeal of broader human development that prioritizes social equities and advancements in quality of life through education, health-care etc on the other hand. This dichotomy between economic transformation and social transformation has invariably led to a failure to appreciate the mutual interdependency and complementarities between these two forces of transformation. Recent studies, such as the World Bank 2006 World Development Report, entitled Development and Equity, acknowledge the synergy between social and economic transformation. In this regard, the World Bank’s Senior Vice President for Development Economics and Chief Economist (2003-2007), Francois Bourguignon, observed that “Equity is complementary to long-run prosperity. Greater equity is doubly good for poverty reduction. It tends to favor sustained overall development, and it delivers increased opportunities to the poorest groups in society” (http://web.worldbank.org).

Unless South Africa makes fundamental structural changes and shifts its narrow focus from competitive economic growth to inclusive and shared growth, the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion will continue, and further entrench itself at a regional level. Currently, South Africa is still trapped in the mode of managing the economy with the hope that the surplus derived will be the basis upon which internal social justice issues are dealt with and external regional relations are improved. The country has not articulated a developmental strategy to transform the apartheid economy and has
failed to acknowledge the systemic institutions in the economy that produce and reproduce inequality and poverty. In this regard, South Africa simply conforms and replicates the contested post-Washington consensus concessions, which suggest that more ought to be done to address poverty and unemployment, without altering the basic architecture of the competitiveness strategy. The failure to more concretely link social development (within the country and the region) to South Africa’s economic growth strategy has resulted in it being conceived as a deduction from growth rather than as a central feature of the growth strategy. This is despite the reality that such social development is important both in the narrow sense of building human capital but also in the broader economic sense by providing skilled labor, new markets and new producers, which ultimately contribute to economic efficiency and equity.

For the purposes of this study, transformative development represents a development path that recognizes that it is not the extent of economic growth that matters but the quality of such growth to advance human development within the country and the region in a sustained manner. In this regard, transformative development cannot be achieved by simply manipulating outcomes of political processes such as regional integration or through the super-imposition of such a process by the preponderant regional power(s). Only by extending opportunity in a process of regional institutional and/or capacity building can such a sustainable form of people-centered development become entrenched. In this regard, transformative development is about enhancing economic security by bridging the gap between global market processes and social justice.
For such development to be truly transformative, it has to be sustained on two planes: the internal as well as external. Indeed, Castells (1992) contends that the promotion and sustainability of development requires a combination of steady and high rates of economic growth and structural change in the productive system, both domestically and in external relations. Interestingly, Landsberg (2005) argues that domestic attempts to establish a new socioeconomic model at home, will translate into increasing foreign policy pressure to show its contribution to a new development trajectory for the country. Such contribution can manifest itself in three ways:

- **Resources:** Transformative development will require massive amounts of resources and resource transfers. In South Africa this is necessary to address domestic imperatives such as redistribution that targets current apartheid-created socio-economic inequalities. In today’s interdependent world, securing such development will require that South Africa extends this initiative beyond her immediate borders to the rest of the Southern African region, which also suffered under the suffocating aggression and tentacles of apartheid. In addition, these resources should not be confined to finances but should extend to more sustainable technological and infrastructure resources.

Of note is the recent contention by Higher Education Minister, Blade Nzimande (2010: 2) that South Africa was still largely perceived as an adopter rather than an innovator of technology (ranked 39th out of 162 countries in terms of technological achievement):

> To retain our global-player status, we must do more to augment the imported and implanted technologies with technologies developed in South Africa. We must also develop technologies which others
are keen to import from us...clearly we need to do more to create and sustain competitive advantage in the international marketplace.

- **Partnership**: Partnership with Southern Africa as well as with other Southern partners (South-South relations) is imperative if such development is to be sustained. Such partnership will be critical to ensuring that human security and development concerns are prioritized in the global agenda.

- **Global Reform**: For Transformative development, the exploitative nature of the current global order has to be dismantled – root, branch and leaf.

The need for such transformative development stems from the complex web of structural, institutional, human capital, technological and infrastructural constraints on sustainable growth in Southern Africa which is heightened by the current momentum towards the creation of a SADC Free Trade Area. For trade integration to be viable and sustainable:

- Cross-border infrastructural development will have to be prioritized (to support trade in goods); and

- Cooperation in regional industrial policy to identify complementarities and build regional value-addition production chains will be necessary to maximize the benefits of each country’s comparative advantage.

In this regard, transformative development will be the basis for economic convergence and structural complementarities to emerge within Southern Africa. A more integrated Southern Africa will in turn augment the region’s bargaining power.
vis-à-vis the developed North and the emerging Southern (such as Brazil, China and India) economies. The current divisions over the EU EPAs show the importance of structuring a common negotiating platform for multilateral trade negotiations on the basis of formal cooperation.

Landsberg (2005) contends that the nature of the South African state (a developing country with significant international influence) provides the country with plenty of scope to drive such transformative development. However, South Africa has often underutilized this authority by acting guardedly and warily -- even at times when it could have pushed the diplomatic envelope more insistently. In fact, caught between the tensions of, on the one hand, a values and a principle-driven foreign policy and, on the other, a pragmatist foreign policy that prioritized economic growth, transformative development imperatives were often side-lined. Neither approach prioritized transformative development which did little to assuage deeply-

**Fig 1-2: South Africa as a key driver of growth and regional integration in Southern Africa**

South Africa is a hub for growth and regional integration in Southern Africa. It accounts for 71.5% of regional GDP and is a key player in NEPAD and SADC. About 70% of intra-regional investment flows in the region is conducted by South African firms. South African investment played a large role in neighbouring countries, accounting for between 9% and 20% of GDP in Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland (IMF: 2005) A number of South African financial institutions are also expanding their reach across the region. This, *inter alia*, facilitates production and trade financing, allows for goods purchased in one country to be paid for in another, and provides a common and accessible financial service network.

ingrained regional suspicions. This study contends that with the neo-liberal ‘Washington Consensus’ in crisis (discussed further in Chapter 5), the time is now opportune for South Africa to take up the challenge of articulating a truly progressive foreign policy, one that would make it difficult to allow others to label it politically progressive, but economically neo-imperialist.

1.3 Research Task
This research study primarily seeks to understand why South Africa’s regional foreign policy has not achieved its stated objectives of advancing regional security and prosperity. Although Southern Africa is the key foreign policy priority for the post-apartheid South African government, it has been difficult to convince Southern African states that South Africa’s regional foreign policy is complementary to their needs. Chapters 4 and 5 explore why South Africa’s neighbors remain somewhat jittery despite the post-apartheid government’s efforts to assuage concerns about South Africa’s hegemonic ambitions. The implications are far-reaching and the study contends that the lack of mutually beneficial partnership has inhibited the region’s ability to engineer a process of sustainable transformation and development.

In addition, this study seeks to determine whether South Africa’s political relations with Southern Africa dovetails with corporate South Africa’s economic relations with the region and whether it can be construed as part of the overall foreign policy strategy. Intersecting concrete needs and interests make it possible, in Robert Davies view, “to envisage a mutually beneficial, negotiated restructuring of regional economic relations which will address several of the key problems of the inequality and longer-term unsustainability of existing relations” (cited in Poku, 2001: 2). It is
axiomatic that the fate of the region as a whole cannot be separated from the fortunes of its individual countries and the challenge today is to reshape regional relationships in ways that yield mutual benefits. Currently the dialectic which generates tensions between the interests of the actors in this region and the concrete historical circumstances that determine the possibilities for action and influence its course undermines a mutually beneficial form of integration. As Hein Marais (1998) observes:

South Africa’s quest for a successful post-apartheid growth path will reinforce other SADC countries’ neo-colonial location in the world economy and prevent the revision of regional economic relations along more equitable lines. It is not unlikely that the outcome could closely resemble regional trade patterns that closely resemble those of the apartheid era.

Marais succinctly captures the concern that expectations for South Africa to play a positive role in the region are unrealistic given the historical structural imbalance between South Africa and its neighbors. This historical reality is likely to perpetuate the country’s regional dominance, regardless of who is in power in Pretoria. Given such concerns, how does South Africa cultivate mutually-beneficial regional relations? Can it afford to balance domestic expectations with regional commitments?
1.3.1 Hypothesis

The defining parameters of South Africa’s regional foreign policy will remain largely indeterminate as long as its Southern African neighbors retain their ambivalent perceptions regarding South African motives and plans. On the one hand, the region is fearful of South Africa’s economic and growing cultural dominance. On the other hand, it sees South Africa both as a launch pad into, and as a solution to the region’s current and growing marginalization within, the international political economy.

1.3.2 Research Objectives

The intention of this study is four pronged:

- First, it traces the evolution of South Africa’s contemporary relationship with the Southern African region. The study rationalizes this relationship within a broader theoretical framework based on development and hegemonic stability theories as well as the middle-power and pivot-state paradigms. It further seeks to make sense of South Africa’s relationship with the region within the parameters of discourse theory.

- Second, the study assesses South Africa’s foreign policy options in light of both domestic constraints and the perceptions of other countries within the region.

- Third, the study analyses the changing South African foreign policy environment since the early 1990s. It does so in order to determine the extent to which the policies of the new South Africa could be regarded either as catalysts for mutual cooperation and transformative development for Southern
Africa or as merely a disguised mechanism for actualizing South Africa’s supposed hegemonic ambitions towards the region.

- Finally, the study maps out an optimal policy framework within which South Africa’s foreign policy objectives in Southern Africa can best be realized.

1.4 Research Design

Given the research task, this study adopts a predominantly qualitative approach. The significance of qualitative research consists in the focus on describing and understanding complex phenomena. Such an approach is useful in investigating the relationships and patterns among factors or the context in which the activity happens. It’s concentration on understanding the many-dimensional picture of the subject of investigation makes qualitative research an appropriate choice of research method for this particular study. More specifically, the sociological approach termed ‘triangulation’ was employed to cut across the qualitative-quantitative divide and to minimize the inadequacies of single-source research.

According to Cohen and Manion (1986: 254), “in social sciences triangulation is an attempt to map out, or explain more fully, the richness and complexity of human behavior by studying it from more than one standpoint.” Altrichter et al. (1996: 117) affirms that it [triangulation] gives a more detailed and balanced picture of the situation. The approach was deemed critical for the deepening and widening of the current understanding of South Africa’s foreign policy in Southern Africa. There are several types of triangulation (Miles and Hubermann: 1994; Patton: 2002). In the
research process on which this thesis is based, triangulation was achieved mainly in two ways.

Firstly, methodological triangulation was reflected in the use of multiple methods to understand South Africa’s foreign policy in Southern Africa. The study primarily draws on the vast foreign policy literature on the subject matter and supplements this with an analysis of government documents which include discussion papers, annual reports and official statements. The ensuing analysis is verified and subjected to a process of deeper reflection (resulting in a more robust understanding of issues) by a number of interviews and observations. As outlined in section 1.2.1, this study recognizes Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe as the ten countries that constitute the Southern African region. The broad sample of interviewees, selected randomly, can be tabulated as follows:

Table 1-4: Interview Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Embassy Reps in RSA*</th>
<th>Other Govt Officials</th>
<th>Civil Society</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>*(RSA Ambassadors abroad) 62</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Embassy Reps: 25 | Total Govt Officials: 131 | Total Civil Society: 135 | Total interviews: 291
Random selection was necessitated by the desire to gather the broadest spectrum of views as possible on South Africa’s foreign policy in Southern Africa. It also addressed the issue of access to the views of the Southern African region. The interviews assumed the form of four standard questions which generally satisfied the basics identified by Neuman (1997: 228) in his delineation of appropriate research questions for a survey, including attitudes/beliefs and opinions; characteristics; expectations; self-classification and knowledge.

**Fig1-3: Standard Interview Questions**

Question 1: How would you characterize South Africa’s relations with Southern Africa?

Question 2: Assess South Africa’s foreign policy options in Southern Africa.

Question 3: How important, if at all, is South Africa for the development of the region?

Question 4: How would you like to see South Africa managing her regional relations?

The structure of personal interviews with more open-ended questions was deliberate and based on Neuman’s (1997: 253) contention that they have a higher success rate than all close-ended questions. Secondly, data triangulation was achieved through multiple data collecting and the use of a variety of sources. In this regard, an attempt was made to balance the South African perspective (114 interviews) with the regional angle (177 interviews). While
the interviewer’s access to government is reflected in the greater number of interviews within this authoritative foreign policy circle, cognizance was given to the argument that “…too much reliance on authorities can be dangerous to a democratic society…when we have no idea of how the experts arrived at their knowledge, we lose some of our ability to make judgments for ourselves” (Neuman, 1997: 3). Therefore, some interviews were conducted with members of civil society organizations (both in South Africa and the region) comprising of non-governmental organizations, business, and academic/research institutions, and the general public.

The research sample which broadly ranged from government to civil society was necessitated by the role of such diverse actors in post-apartheid South African foreign policy making. As the nucleus of foreign policy-making, the largest sample group was South African government officials, particularly from the DFA. While cognizant of the increasing role of the Presidency, the interviewer acknowledged existing findings that even in periods of flux (the DFA had five different DGs - Rusty Evans, Jackie Selebi, Sipho Pityana, Abdul Minty [acting] and Ayanda Ntsaluba – in the period 1997 to 2003), the DFA was “held together by a cohort of experienced and highly professional officials who not only effectively run the day-to-day operations, but also make discreet input into policy formulation” (Hughes; 2004:21).

In addition, the wide-ranging civil society interviews were deemed important giving the mushrooming role of this community in post-1990 policy thinking. The engagement of civil society in South Africa’s post apartheid foreign policy thinking is manifest in their involvement in a number of DFA conferences, workshops, position papers and policy documents on rethinking South Africa’s role and positioning in the
global environment (the most recent engagement - October 2010 - on a foreign policy white paper includes DFA consultations with academic and research institutes as well as business). In addition, there are a number of consultative groups such as the Black Business Working Group and presidential advisory groups such as the International Investment Advisory Council which impact on South Africa’s foreign policy arena. The business voice in South African foreign policy is also heard through the relevant parliamentary portfolio committees (although this restricts their role to lobbying on, and influencing, foreign policy rather than formulating it). For example, the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB) has a Parliamentary Liaison Office that articulates member-interests through input to parliamentary committees. In terms of trade unions, COSATU enjoys institutional input into foreign policy formulation principally through ANC party structures. Of interest, however, is that such input (for example, on Zimbabwe) is not necessarily aligned to the position of the party and government and has not really been effective. The role of the media (South African and regional) in foreign policy making is equally unbalanced. Its success in shaping the foreign policy thinking of the electorate (particularly during the Mbeki era when foreign policy was increasingly centralized) has not been matched by a decisive influence in foreign policy formulation.

The Policy Coordination and Advisory Service (PCAS) within the Presidency interacts with civil society on matters of policy formulation as well as with “international experts” to ensure policy relevance and efficacy. In fact, the opportunities for experts from foreign policy research institutions/“think tanks” has increased in post-apartheid South Africa, largely due to the lack of requisite skills within departments but also linked to existing relations with the ruling ANC party.
For example, the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) (formerly the Foundation for Global Dialogue), which was originally founded as an ANC think tank on foreign policy, retains close links with the ruling party and enjoys preferred access to South African foreign policy formulators. Such “think tanks” play a role in policy formulation through formal government-sponsored research or through academic and public engagement with governmental policy makers. In essence then, this research draws significantly from interactions with scholars, researchers, business people, and commentators from a broad range of civil society groups and organizations.

1.5 Significance of Study

Africa is at the cross roads as it redefines itself within a new framework of political and economic linkages. The events of 11 September 2001 illustrate both the dangers of reckless foreign policy choices as well as the need for cooperation with regard to transnational threats such as terrorism. Clearly, given South Africa’s legacy of aggression, exploitation, and pauperization of its neighbors, (what Black [2001: 86] describes as “South Africa’s historically aggressive and sub-imperial orientation towards its Southern African neighbors in particular; and these same countries’ not-unjustified suspicions of the motives and interests behind the current government’s ‘renaissance rhetoric’ and regionalist aspirations…”) it cannot pursue a business-as-usual regional policy with its nervous and distrustful neighbors. Effectively, its policy parameters have been constrained severely by that legacy. Vale and Maseko (1998: 12) concur that “South Africa’s leadership of Africa is condemned by its unhappy past”, as well as the deep inequalities reflected and perpetuated by its residual power. Ironically, although her economic superiority makes South Africa the one country in Southern Africa that can contribute most painlessly to regional security, its past and
present domestic predisposition have fuelled potent fears by neighboring states. Chapter 4 and 5 debate whether such fears are well-founded.

The perception that South Africa’s foreign policy further seeks to advance and consolidate that country’s political and economic hegemony not only in the sub-region but also on the continent as a whole, is compounded by the fear that the behavior of South Africa's corporate sector could render the new democratic regime more aggressive than its predecessor. Although South Africa is now a proud member of the reshaped SADC, which has replaced SADCC, the rapid invasion of the African hinterland by South African corporate capital (arguably to the detriment of local Southern African business) is opening it to charges that it is becoming an economic hegemon. There are even references to “the South Africanisation of Sub-Saharan Africa” (McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng, 1998: 165).

The difficulties in wider relations with Africa were brought home starkly to the government by the failure of the South African bid to secure the staging of the 2004 Olympics in Cape Town. Mills (2000: 281) points out that:

South Africa picked up just 16 votes in the opening ballot from the 107 on offer. Very few of the promised African votes materialized, illustrating to RSA that notions of African solidarity counted much less than national and sometimes personal economic self-interest among the African delegates to the International Olympic Committee, in spite of the South African attempt to capture the label of ‘Africa’s bid’.
The failure of the Cape Town bid illustrated that most African countries - especially those in the neighborhood - are still suspicious of South Africa. Moreover, although South Africa has been careful to locate its regional political initiatives in terms of SADC policies, false moves - such as the bungling of its military intervention to shore up the elected government in Lesotho in 1998 - have opened it up to the charge from some that it is all too disposed to throw its weight around. Moreover, the leadership of the peacekeeping force by white South African officers from the apartheid army (the force commander had been part of South Africa’s destructive forces in Angola) further fuelled regional negativity (Adebajo, 2006). South Africa has learnt from experience that “power measured in resources rarely equals power measured in preferred outcomes...” (Nye, 2010: 4). Whether South Africa’s inability to achieve its preferred foreign policy outcomes is due to the strategies of regional states protecting their national interests or to the belief that South Africa’s foreign policy objectives are not very different, in essence, from the foreign policy of the previous regime is the basis of Chapter 4’s introspection.

In essence, South Africa remains trapped between a desire to develop the region (necessitated by South Africa’s internal domestic imperatives as well as the reality that Southern Africa’s problems have domestic repercussions) and not to appear to dominate the region. Enthusiasm for a more visionary regional policy is tempered by a cautious approach to the thin line between leadership and hegemony. However, although the ruling ANC is interested in negotiating a regional understanding, not dictating one (as discussed in Chapter 5); the pendulum may be swinging from domination towards doing nothing. South Africa’s unwillingness to support regional diplomacy with military or other means has nurtured perceptions of it as a toothless
bulldog. It is clear that the hegemonic thrust of South African capital into the region has not been matched by a corresponding political intrusion.


Cognizant of these varying parameters which are not necessarily mutually reinforcing, this study seeks to comprehensively unpack South Africa’s dilemma in Southern Africa and to chart an optimal framework within which the quandary can be successfully addressed.

1.6 Overview of Study

There is definitely a recognition in South African government circles that the way regional relations evolve will have a considerable impact on the growth prospects for
post apartheid South Africa and vice versa. Undoubtedly, South Africa will be affected in various ways by the overall regional ambient. Indeed, as Mathoma (2001: 31) points out, “Environmental degradation, transnational crime, refugees and international drug trade know no borders. Only by co-coordinating our efforts and by acknowledging our interdependence can we effectively forge partnerships to fight these destructive tendencies.” Continuing stagnation and crisis in neighboring countries would only fuel and possibly exacerbate these trends. Under such a scenario, not only would stagnation in neighboring countries mean lost opportunities for trade or cooperation, it could also undercut the possibilities of creating the kind of non-militarized and peaceful regional ambience that would be essential to optimize the prospects for growth and development. Davies, Keet, and Nkuhlu (1993: 33) maintain that: “Unless there is growth and development throughout the region, not only will trade opportunities be constrained but destabilizing shocks from crises in neighboring countries could well impact in various ways on efforts to promote growth in a democratic South Africa.” Certainly, for South Africa, the benefits of closer cooperation with other countries in the region are manifest. Davies, Keet and Nkuhlu (1993: 19) reason that:

- Increased trade with the region (and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa) could boost South Africa’s manufactured exports, help it escape its status as a primary commodity exporter and create sorely-needed jobs. Energy drawn from the region could augment its efforts to develop the economy.
- Regional investments that target viable industrial sectors can boost the income earning potential of other countries, thereby sustaining their role as markets for South African products and services. In short, it is in
South Africa's own interests to work for a climate of growth and development throughout the region and wider continent.

Given these dynamics, Chapter 5 unpacks South Africa’s commitment to regionalism both in terms of government pronouncements as well as actions (depicted by Figure 5-1 which illustrates the doubling of South African foreign direct investment in the period 1996-2001).

It is widely accepted both within the region (affirmed by the empirical research of this study which is captured in Chapter 4) and beyond that the development of new forms of relationships between all the countries of Southern Africa could make a significant contribution to growth and transformative development in a post-apartheid era. Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, observed when he addressed the South African parliament in Cape Town in October 1997:

> When we were struggling here, South Africa still under apartheid, and you being a destabilize of your neighbors instead of working together with them to develop our continent….It was a terrible thing. Here was a powerful South Africa, and this power was a curse to us….We wished it away, because it was not a blessing at all….but that has changed….South Africa is no longer trying to destroy the others…..What you build here because of your infrastructure and relative strength of your economy, you are building for all of us here.

However, simply juxtaposing a ‘developed’ South Africa with its ‘underdeveloped’ neighbors is simplistic and simply serves to reinforce the paranoia and/or regional sensitivities with regard to South Africa’s intentions in Southern Africa. A post-
apartheid South Africa could also, unintentionally if not deliberately, send into the region what Susan George (1992) has called ‘boomerangs’ – actions or inactions by a more developed country with negative consequences for less developed countries, but which eventually rebound on the more advanced countries in various negative ways. They include the possibility that by reproducing or exacerbating current imbalances, or through failing to recognize the importance of acting to promote a more balanced regional growth, illegal immigration, arms smuggling and other destructive trends could all be fuelled to the detriment of growth and development in South Africa. In addition Mfundo Nkuhlu (interview, 2001: 15) argues that “Development can’t just be economic, or just political, it has also got to be social. Development has to make a difference to the conditions of ordinary people”. Such thinking could inform a number of innovative solutions to old problems, for example that of illegal immigration. An alternative to simply policing borders is to employ a developmental approach towards other countries thereby negating the need for people to cross borders. There is also a need to strengthen the element of reciprocity given the dilemma whereby neighboring countries battle to sustain their own development because they are net exporters of the necessary skills to South Africa or passive recipients of South African economic benefits (the dilemma of SACU as articulated in Chapter 4 is instructive in this regard).

The timing for such a re-evaluation of South Africa’s approach to the region could not have been better with countries in the region moving towards consolidating regional integration and cooperation under the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). Approved in 2003, the RISDP is designed to provide SADC member states, their institutions and policy makers with a coherent and comprehensive development
agenda for social, political and economic policies over the next 15 years (http://www.sadc.int/english/documents/risdp/summary.php?media=print). The need for such strategies is indisputable in a continent that has the lowest development index scores. Unfortunately, South Africa’s ability to effectively contribute to such initiatives has been constrained by the fact that the country has always been viewed negatively in terms of the military-dominant conception of security. However, it must be argued that countries of the region have reached a stage in international relations (as articulated in Chapter 5) which necessitates that they move beyond this narrow conception to other forms of security such as human and environmental security. Dan Henk (2001: electronic) argues that:

The concept of ‘security’ has had a particularly noxious reputation in modern Africa. In part, this is a legacy of colonial administrations, which tended to view it in the very narrow sense of ‘establishment and maintenance of colonial hegemony’, resulting in extraordinary coercion and violence directed against subject populations. The notion that the regime, not its subjects, was the appropriate referent object survived the transition into independent Africa. Here, it combined with the equally unfortunate legacy of a state system — the so-called ‘Westphalian model’ — that encouraged a ‘military-dominant conception of security’ that held the principal challenge to security to be posed by the military forces of other nations.

Henk (2001: electronic) also draws on other studies to illustrate that newly independent African states did little to “understand or define security beyond
what was bequeathed to them by the colonialists.” In this regard, he contends that

The colonial legacy had obvious implications for foreign and domestic policy. Writing from southern Africa about their region, Larry Swatuk and Peter Vale argue that the ‘practice of Westphalian state foreign policy [tended to entrench] regional elites whose antidemocratic tendencies were justified in terms of defending the national interest’. They conclude that this focus ‘has rarely been about people or fostering human security; it has always been about ensuring the security of material things’.

The need for a reconceptualisation of security to incorporate its developmental dimension is highlighted by Nadir Mohammed who posits that “the ultimate goal of security is to create . . . [an] environment conducive to . . . development plans” and by Baffour Agyeman-Duah who argues that “national security [should be redefined] in human development terms” (cited in Henk, 2001). In a prescient article published in the early 1980s, Richard Ullman made a general case for broadening the concept of security. He insisted that national security is threatened by the consequences of events that quickly degrade the quality of life of state and non-state actors alike, thus narrowing significantly the future range of political choice (Ullman, 1983: 130-135).

However, the historic role of South Africa's security apparatus seems to blind some foreign policy commentators to the potential role of a post-apartheid South Africa in meeting the broad security and development needs of the region. With the end of the policy of destabilization, Southern African countries, especially the member states of
SADC, will no longer have to devote a substantial portion of scarce resources to military spending, border patrols and repairs to damaged infrastructure. Such resources can now be channeled towards much needed transformative development. In addition, South Africa's defense assets could be used to support regional forces in peacekeeping roles which would afford resource-challenged, democratizing states the opportunity to begin to stand down their engorged military establishments and devote greater effort (and resources) to socioeconomic development. South Africa’s ability to play such a role was highlighted by Angela King, who headed the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) in 1994 and noted that “…this country [South Africa] will soon become a catalyst for the rapid development of not only the southern African region but the rest of the continent.” The Mozambique flood of February 2000 is illustrative of such capabilities. The widespread devastation wreaked by the floods required an urgent and major operation to save the many people threatened by rapidly rising floodwaters. Coordinated at Government level, many operators from around South Africa participated in the early days of the emergency before international assistance could arrive. The South African National Defense Force (SANDF) and Denel’s Military Aviation division were integral to the success of the operation dubbed ‘Operation Litchi’ which turned out to be the largest scale emergency rescue and humanitarian initiative that Southern Africa has seen (Africa First, Ministry of Public Enterprises, 2004).

Like the growth triangles of Southeast Asia, there is also the possibility of South Africa contributing its own creative form of regionalism by promoting development corridors along with cross-border peace parks. The most advanced instance of the former is the Maputo Development Corridor: an energy, rail, telecommunications,
toll-road, and pipeline system between Maputo, Mozambique (especially its port) and Gauteng, South Africa, which links provinces, communities, and companies, notably the Mozal aluminium smelter mega-project outside Maputo (Parpart and Shaw, 2002: 302). Other historical and contemporary examples include the Kgalagadi Trans-frontier park between Botswana and South Africa’s Northern Cape, as well as areas around South Africa’s Kruger Park (with Gaza in Mozambique and Gonarezhou in Zimbabwe) (Parpart and Shaw, 2002: 302). These corridors and transborder parks may provide the basis for ‘security communities’ that can advance human development as well as security.

Although Pretoria’s economic dominance has the potential to influence regional development positively (it could be a driver of transformative development as opposed to the negating of regional development during apartheid), its motives, especially in the areas of security co-operation, continue to be viewed with profound suspicion. South Africa was never able to convert its military and economic dominance into African recognition and acceptance and its forays into the continent and the region have not always been met with open arms. Greg Mills, National Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs, observes that, “Given its dominant economic, political and military positions, South Africa has often been expected to take a regional policy lead in Southern Africa, but in turn has been singled out for criticism over its perceived hegemony. A case of damned if it does and damned if it doesn't” (IRIN Special Report, 1999). South Africa has begun to realize that it is not always possible to act in a way that satisfies the expectations of other countries in the region. Further complicating the South African role in the region, are perceptions that its government is ‘too close’ to Washington. Perceptions of ‘neo-
colonialism’, both economically and politically, undermine South Africa’s foreign policy and its efforts to achieve sustainable development for itself and the region. There remains an understandable aspiration to avoid the stigma of being either an outpost of Western capitalism and influence or a peripheral player on the edge of the global political system (Spence, 2001: 6). In this regard, Chapter 5 alludes to various attempts by the post-apartheid government to eschew such categorization, the dangers of which are discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 3, with the later unpacking the implications for South Africa as a regional hegemon, middle power and pivot state.

South African foreign policy makers have, thus, sought to inculcate a sense of mutually beneficial transformative development in the region. It is in this context that South Africa’s national stand in the Expo 2000 Hannover in Germany (an event where the South African government joined hands with SADC partners and with the private sector) was themed ‘Faranani – Towards the African Century’. Faranani in TshiVenda means ‘moving forward together’, and this philosophy encapsulates the government’s approach to the African Renaissance (Mathoma, 2001: 31).

While these are lofty ideals articulated by policy makers, the South African government has often found it difficult to implement the African Agenda and Renaissance doctrine successfully. For example, while the post-apartheid government has regarded its domestic and foreign economic policies as a challenge to neo-liberalism, critics, including civil society at home and in the region have often labeled the South African policies as neo-imperialist (Landsberg, 2008). While South Africa has encouraged free trade and development agreements between countries of the region, its economic and trade dominance have lent credence to the
accusations of it being an economic imperialist power in the region. At the same time, attempts to address this inequity and disequilibrium clash most intensely with South Africa’s own domestic challenges. There is an emerging realization that having a progressive all-embracing vision does not necessarily translate into its implementation, particularly if such implementation, competes with domestic priorities and, undermines the very government that seeks to advance it. Indeed, South Africa as the leading regional power is less important than how it chooses to use that power and convince the rest of the region that such power can be used to mutual benefit. This is a central deliberation of this study.
Chapter 2

Literature Review

As Neuman (1997: 89) notes aptly, research is not an activity of isolated hermits who ignore the findings of others. Reviewing the accumulated knowledge about an issue is an important precursor to studies being compared, replicated or criticized. In this regard, the plethora of literature on foreign policy creates conducive prospects for comparative study.

2.1 Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis

Cross-national comparisons of foreign policy extends the focus of this study beyond idiographic accounts of South Africa’s foreign policy processes thereby providing a more nuanced understanding of the country’s foreign policy choices and decisions. While fully cognizant of historical differences and other country-specific factors, a review of Brazil, United States of America (USA), United Kingdom (UK) under the ‘New’ Labor Party and African foreign policies were deemed instructive for the purpose of this study on the basis that:

- Brazil’s paradoxical growing international stature and waning regional influence parallels South Africa’s own foreign policy dilemma.

- South Africa’s foreign policy in Southern Africa is often perceived as a microcosm of USA foreign policy towards the rest of the world.
• Attempts by the New Labor Party to pursue a more progressive foreign policy for the UK have encountered the same challenges faced by South Africa in promoting its vision of transformative development in the Southern African region.

• A general review of African foreign policy literature provides the broad context within which South Africa’s own foreign policy can be situated.

2.1.1 Brazil: A Review of Recent Foreign Policy Positioning

Brazil’s return to democracy and the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s initiated a more diversified approach to Brazil’s international relations. The shift from the USA as the country’s main point of reference was accompanied by the rise of South America as the anchor for Brazilian foreign policy. The prioritization of South America was premised on the belief that Brazil’s regional leadership would serve as a springboard to global recognition and influence. The focus on regional relations was therefore a common thread that linked Brazil’s presidential leadership of President Luiz ‘Lula’ da Silva and his immediate predecessor Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Both these Presidents served for two terms, and Hakim (2010: electronic version) has attributed Brazil’s expanding international stature to their stewardship.

Under President da Silva, Brazil’s foreign policy has become more assertive: presidential diplomacy has dominated an active foreign policy aimed at expanding the country’s presence in global economic negotiations, multilateral institutions and regional affairs (Hirst, 2009- electronic). Pushing a ‘south-south’ agenda, Brazil has strengthened its ties with other emerging powers such as China, India, Russia and
South Africa. The da Silva government has opened 35 embassies since taking office in 2003, most of them in Africa and the Caribbean. (www.newsweek.com). In fact, Brazil now has more diplomatic missions in Africa than Britain (www.economist.com, 2010).

The nominal priority of Brazil's present foreign policy, the promotion of economic prosperity and integration in South America, is underpinned by the country’s domestic reality: ‘Brazil remains a relatively poor country confronted by pervasive poverty and social injustice, widespread political corruption, and rampant crime and violence’(Hakim, 2010: electronic version). Among other factors, the election of Luis Inácio da Silva to the Presidency of Brazil can be attributed to the dissatisfaction within Brazilian society over the socio-economic performance of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s second administration (1999-2002). Vaz (2004: electronic) affirms that “with the gradual fading of the economic dynamism brought about by the successful macroeconomic stabilization plan introduced in 1994, and the need to respond to mounting financial domestic and external constraints, Cardoso’s government did not meet the expectations of large sectors of Brazilian society as to economic and social development.”

It is therefore not surprising that President da Silva argued for trade liberalization to go hand in hand with social justice. The elucidation of this objective by Maag (2005: electronic) is instructive: “Seeing foreign trade as an essential instrument for economic development and the reduction of external vulnerabilities, Lula’s main concern is to achieve a more equitable international order through an active engagement in regional and global partnerships.” Regional economic integration and
export diversification become key policy targets in a process whereby trade policy is used to nurture sustainable economic growth and reducing a country’s vulnerability to global financial markets. The role of South-South cooperation in diversifying Brazil’s export markets was also critical to President da Silva’s plan and is succinctly captured by Maag (2005: electronic):

Lula is promoting third world solidarity because developing country markets are increasingly important to an export boom that helps recover the Brazilian economy. Lula needs to fight large income inequalities in his own country by increasing Brazil’s GDP. Therefore, he needs more gains from foreign trade. At the same time, he needs to pay Brazil’s substantial debts.

However, the socio-economic thrust of President da Silva’s foreign policy has not been without criticism. Hakim (2010: electronic version) alludes to the argument that Brazil’s foreign policy lacks a moral center—that it seems mostly designed to satisfy narrow economic interests and the nation’s vanity. In this view, Brazil has not been helpful in advancing international norms or values. Instead, it is a country that avoids taking stands on sensitive issues and has established close and uncritical relations with western-perceived pariah countries like Iran, Cuba and Venezuela (www.economist.com, 2010).

Nevertheless, with Brazil hosting, both, the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, President da Silva’s determination in extending Brazil’s international footprint is undeniable. There is also a growing acknowledgement that Brazil has gained particular influence on international trade issues. In two major cases in 2004, the
World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled in favor of Brazil, ordering the USA to drop subsidies to cotton farmers, and directing Europe to end its protection of the sugar-beet industry (www.newsweek.com). In 2008, Brazil was also active in the exclusive negotiations with the United States, the European Union, and India that characterized the end of the Doha Round (Malamud, 2010: electronic). This dynamic was reiterated at the Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change in December 2009, at which the leaders of China, India, Brazil and South Africa negotiated the final declaration with USA President Barack Obama, excluding the European Union, Russia, Japan and other global powers. Brazil has also been included in the Outreach or Plus Five grouping (inclusive of China, India, Mexico and South Africa) of the Group of Eight (G8 - Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, plus the European Union) which has become an influential voice on global economic issues. Moreover, Brazil is a member of the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors from the world’s largest national economies plus the European Union (Malamud, 2010: electronic). This group met twice at the heads of government level in November 2008 and March 2009 in the wake of the world financial crisis with Brazil hosting the former event.

Arguably, one of the factors that most boosted Brazil’s foreign reputation was its sudden promotion as a ‘BRIC’ country (Armijo 2007). Brazil has been categorized as an emergent power at least since 2001, when a Goldman Sachs report defined it as a BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China coalition) – one of the four emerging markets that are forecast to run the world economy by 2050 (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003). The report hinted at the possibility of the four BRIC countries forming a ‘political club’ and thereby converting their growing economic power into greater
geopolitical stature. Notably, the presidents and foreign ministers of the BRIC countries have held exclusive meetings on the sidelines of a variety of fora, especially since 2008. Interestingly, Brazil has also been associated with Russia, India, China, and the United States, in a grouping called ‘monster countries’ (Kennan 1993). There is also IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa), a more limited and ‘principle-oriented’ grouping (publicized as a South-South initiative) that refers to the trilateral developmental initiative between India, Brazil and South Africa. Brazil convened the first trilateral meeting which officially launched, on 6 June 2003, with the adoption of the Brasilia Declaration, the IBSA Dialogue Forum. Malamud (2010: electronic) traces the origins of the bloc of twenty-odd developing nations (variously called the G21, G22 or G20+) that came together at the fifth ministerial WTO conference in Cancún, Mexico (bringing together 60 percent of the world’s population, 70 percent of its farmers and 26 percent of world’s agricultural exports) to the “IBSA foreign ministers signing of the Brasilia Declaration, which stated that their major trading partners were acting to protect their less competitive sectors, and emphasized that their goal was to promote the reversal of such protectionist policies and trade-distorting practices.”

Paradoxically, Brazil’s growing international stature is not matched by a corresponding regional standing. The relationship is, in fact, inverse with Brazil’s regional influence even being disputed. The failure of Brazil to provide effective regional leadership has been attributed to both the structural deficiencies of the country’s foreign policy implementation and to regional rivalries.
In terms of foreign policy implementation, Burges (2008) argues that in the absence of hard power instruments to pursue foreign policy goals Brazil has had no choice but to resort to instrumental (or ideational) ones. Sotero and Armijon (2007: 43; see also Lima and Hirst 2006; Gratius, 2007) also characterize Brazil as the ‘quintessential soft power.’ In contrast to other BRIC countries, Brazil has traditionally devalued its military, instead emphasizing multilateral cooperation within international institutions and framing its great-power claims in almost entirely economic terms. Brazil’s last major war was fought in 1865-70, when it aligned with Argentina and Uruguay to defeat Paraguay. Although it sent troops to Europe during both World Wars, the country never again engaged in military conflicts within its own region. Brazil’s military expenditures have remained stagnant at about 1.5 percent of GDP, a quarter of China’s defense spending and about 60 percent of India’s and Russia’s (www.newsweek.com). Rather than military might, it is argued that Brazil has influenced the region through trade and enjoys a trade surplus with every country in the region (www.newsweek.com). Stewart (2010: electronic version) observes that the country’s ‘diplomatic GDP’ is source of pride for its foreign policy makers. However, Malamud (2010: electronic) contends that Brazil lacks the economic leverage to buy its way to regional or global leadership. Although it is the largest Latin American economy, it is not the richest: Argentina, Chile and Uruguay rank consistently higher in terms of GDP per capita and human development, and Mexico and Venezuela do so intermittently depending on oil prices (Malamud, 2010: electronic). This makes it virtually impossible to justify to a domestic audience large money transfers from Brazil to neighboring countries.
At the same time, it has long been argued that regional support was necessary to bolster Brazil’s global ascendance (Hurrell, 2000; Almeida, 2007; Lima, 2008). This is consistent with the idea that “it is the neighboring countries which have to sign up to the lead of emerging powers … in order to give them the power base necessary for regional as well as global power projection and international coalition building” (Schirm, 2007: 6). In this regard, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) has been a cornerstone of Brazilian foreign policy since its inception in the early 1990s. Bouzas, Veiga and Torrent (2002: 145) contend that the underlying formula of Mercosur has been to obtain “preferential access into the Brazilian market in exchange for Argentine support for Brazilian international trade strategies.” In this regard, Hakim (2010: electronic version) points out that while Mercosur has helped ease some of the political tensions between Brazil and Argentina, it has failed as a trade bloc. The launching of the Initiative for the Integration of South American Regional Infrastructure (IIRSA) in 2000, and the creation of a Committee of Permanent Representatives in 2003, a permanent Court of Appeals in 2004, a Fund for Mercosur Structural Convergence (FOCEM) in 2005, and a common Parliament in 2006 have not only had little impact but also have actually served to disguise the significant shortcomings of the bloc, among them the absence of a regional budget and of an agency that can represent common interests. The perception that Mercosur is becoming a burden rather than an asset has led some senior politicians, among them aspiring presidential candidates such as José Serra, to call for it to be downgraded to a mere free trade zone (Malamud, 2010: electronic). The argument is that Brazil will be more capable of pursuing its foreign goals on its own rather than depending on costly agreements with unpredictable partners.
Parallel to the MERCOSUR initiative, in 2000, Brazil’s regional ambitions crystallized in a new regional concept: South America (Malamud, 2010: electronic). Brazil tacitly recognized that it was unable to exert a significant influence upon the Latin America configuration which cut across both North and South America, and was thereby ready to focus on a smaller area which excluded Mexico; a Latin American giant and potential rival. Brazil’s elites consider this sub-region to be within its natural sphere of influence hence, the Cardoso administration organized the first Summit of South American presidents in Brasilia in September 2000 (Lima, 2008). President da Silva deepened this strategy, leading to the creation of the South American Community (SAC) at the Cuzco presidential summit of December 2004. The name was later changed to the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the constitutive treaty of which was signed in Brasilia in May 2008. Mercosur arguably constitutes the inner circle of UNASUR which has become an embryonic attempt to establish a European style integration scheme, including an economic community, core political arrangements, and a mutual defense mechanism. However, Hakim (2010: electronic version) contends that like its predecessors, UNASUR appears more of an aspiration than a practical goal.

Regional rivalries remain the Achilles heel of Brazilian attempts to nurture closer regional ties. Malamud (2010: electronic) observes that there are two countries in Latin America that are in a structural position to dispute Brazilian claims to leadership: Argentina and Mexico. Both have sizeable economies, large territorial landmasses and populations, rich natural resource endowments, and a record of intermittent international activism. Moreover, both have relentlessly rejected the notion that any single country can ‘represent’ the whole region. Their leading role in
the Uniting for Consensus group that disputes the right of Brazil and others to occupy a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and their participation in the G20 with Brazil (the only Latin American countries in the forum), testifies to their international standing as well as their determination not to be left behind by their bigger neighbor.

As previously mentioned, one of Brazil’s responses to this has been to exclude Mexico from a redefined regional grouping -- ‘South America’-- which naturally excludes the geographically North American state. However, it is not so easy for Brazil to similarly dispatch Argentina. Argentina is Brazil’s main regional integration partner although for Argentina this partnership is based on equality of standing rather than on Brazilian supremacy. Indeed, Argentine leaders have even considered their country as a legitimate contender for regional leadership, and have promoted closeness with the United States or other circumstantial allies (Venezuela most recently) in order to counterbalance Brazil’s power (Russell and Tokatlian 2003).

Such regional rivalry has prevented Brazil from achieving, arguably, its most enduring foreign policy ambition: a permanent seat in the UNSC (Almeida, 2007). Brazil currently occupies one of the council’s rotating, two-year seats—for a record tenth time—but this has been a poor consolation prize. In 2004, a high level committee submitted to the UN Secretary General a proposal that called for the establishment of new permanent members. Four countries -Brazil, Germany, India and Japan (the so-called G4) – joined efforts in lobbying for the new seats (Stewart, 2010: electronic version). However, a large group (called Uniting for Consensus) which brought together the regional rivals of the G4 (with Argentina and Mexico
among the leaders) formed to oppose the creation of any new permanent seats. It is noteworthy that aspiring Security Council members could not sell to their home regions their bids for international recognition. The fact that Argentina, Brazil’s main regional partner, was the staunchest opponent of its main international aspiration dealt a heavy blow to the country’s image as a regional leader. In addition, under the da Silva administration, Brazil put forward a candidate for the post of Director-General of the WTO. Early in 2005, there were four contenders: one from France (Pascal Lamy, representing the European Union), another from Mauritius, a third from Uruguay as well as a Brazilian candidate, Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa (Malamud, 2010: electronic). This not only showed that Mercosur was unable to agree to a joint candidate, but also that Brazil could not even gather majority support for its position (as Argentina supported the Uruguayan candidate). To add insult to injury, the Brazilian nominee was eliminated in the first round, while the Uruguayan made it to the last (Malamud, 2010: electronic).

Generally, Brazil’s non-interventionist posture has also limited the country’s regional influence. Malamud (2010: electronic) observes that Brazil has refused to be drawn into the acrimonious feud between its fellow MERCOSUR partners: Argentina and Uruguay; refrained from any involvement in Chile’s long-standing disputes with Peru and Bolivia; turned a blind eye to Venezuela’s meddling in other countries; and remained on the sidelines as neighboring countries Colombia and Peru battled guerrillas and drug traffickers. While it could be argued that Brazil’s reluctance to influence regional tensions reflects a realistic appraisal that its intervention would not always be welcome, Hakim (2010: electronic) maintains that the country’s leadership
is constrained by its modest capacity and limited willingness to pay the financial and political costs of more assertive involvement.

These challenges notwithstanding, Brazil has been recognized increasingly as an emergent global power by the established world powers. However, it is argued that because of regional power rivalries and a relative paucity of resources, Brazil is more likely to become a global middle power than an accepted leader in its region (Malamud, 2010: electronic). Perhaps, it is the appreciation of this reality which has motivated the shift in Brazil’s foreign behavior from being regionally oriented to being globally oriented. Although sub-regional integration has not ceased to be a goal, it is no longer a priority. Cason and Power (2009) argue that the increasing pluralization of actors with a stake in foreign policy may also be making Brazil more globally – as opposed to regionally – sensitive.

Although Brazil has not become indifferent to the region, its ambitions are increasingly defensive rather than offensive. Malamud (2010: electronic) affirms that “The name of the game is to keep quiet rather than lead the neighborhood…As Brazil is not a revisionist power that intends to upset the system but rather a reformist one that wishes to enter the system, damage control has become its central task.” As The Economist aptly remarked, “it may be the rising power in the Americas but Brazil is finding that diplomatic ambition can prompt resentment” (The Economist, 2008: electronic). In terms of Brazil’s foreign policy objectives, global success has proven to be antithetical to regional leadership.
Generally, the scant literature on Brazilian foreign policy is skewed towards the analysis of the country’s two key but, seemingly, antithetical foreign policy objectives: regional integration underpinned by Brazilian leadership and global prominence. In this regard, contemporary Brazilian foreign policy, particularly under the da Silva administration shows a strong congruence with post-apartheid South African foreign policy. Some of the most salient features of this similarity include:

- Brazil’s regional strategies were perceived as hegemonic attempts rather than as evidence of an enlightened leadership based on the pursuit of shared interests. Such perceptions, in part, also inform South Africa’s inability to achieve her vision in Southern Africa; that is the crux of this thesis.

- Argentina and Mexico’s contestation of Brazil’s regional influence is analogous to the Southern Africa regional rivalry between Angola, Zimbabwe and South Africa.

- Pushing a ‘south-south’ agenda is a foreign policy priority for both Brazil and South Africa.

- Akin to South Africa’s foreign policy objectives in Southern Africa, economic prosperity and integration in South America, is underpinned by Brazil’s domestic reality. Both countries have battled to balance trade liberalization with social justice.

However, there are also nuanced differences:

- Unlike Brazil, South Africa’s foreign policy goals are pursued with both hard and soft power instruments. In this regard, it is noteworthy that South Africa’s foreign policy implementation is criticized more than Brazil’s.

- Although a source of much debate, South Africa is more willing than Brazil to pay the financial and political costs of more assertive involvement.

- While analysts see a shift in Brazil’s foreign behavior from being regionally -to globally-
oriented, SADC remains a priority for South Africa. Interestingly, Brazil’s curbing of its regional sphere of influence from Latin America to South America is at variance with South Africa’s broader prioritization of SADC (inclusive of DRC, Tanzania, Madagascar and Seychelles) rather than Southern Africa.

- Brazil’s foreign policy is perceived as lacking a moral center. By contrast, while South Africa’s foreign policy is underpinned by human rights considerations, it is often perceived as weak in terms of actual implementation of such considerations.

A study of Brazil’s foreign policy holds critical lessons for South Africa. The words of Celso Amorim (2010: electronic), Minister of External Relations of Brazil (1993-1995, 2003 to present), are particularly instructive:

Good foreign policy requires prudence. But it also requires boldness. It should not be shy or based on an inferiority complex. It is usual to hear that countries should act in accordance with their means, which is almost too obvious, but the greatest mistake one could make is to underestimate them.

2.1.2 USA Foreign Policy: Unilateral-Multilateral Fickleness?

There is no dearth of literature on American foreign policy, which remains one of the most widely-studied international relations policy framework of a particular nation state. The centrality of foreign relations to the existence and survival of the USA is underscored by the writings of authors such as George C. Herring (2006) who have used foreign relations as the lens through which to tell the story of America's dramatic rise from thirteen disparate colonies to a world superpower. It is a story of foreign policy vacillation between unilateralism and multilateralism in the service of USA national interests (see box below). Arguably, the nature and timing of such foreign policy vacillation continues to determine both, the way in which USA foreign policy
is perceived as well as the possibility for successful realization of its objectives. It is therefore, an area of interest to this study.

**Fig 2-2: America’s four enduring national interests:**

- **Security:** The security of the United States, its citizens, and USA allies and partners.
- **Prosperity:** A strong, innovative, and growing USA economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity.
- **Values:** Respect for universal values at home and around the world.
- **International Order:** An international order advanced by USA leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.

*As articulated in the USA National Security Strategy (2010: 17)*

The twentieth century marked a major transition in the rationale of American foreign policy. While America’s nineteenth-century wars (except for the Civil War) had been largely about territorial expansion or the protection of trade routes its motives in the Great War were more idealistic (Prestowitz, 2003: 173). In this regard, USA twentieth century foreign policy centered on three crusades to save the world from militarism, genocidal fascism, and totalitarian communism. In addition, the creation of international bodies such as the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank after World War II, represented an important evolution of American foreign-policy thinking. The USA, which had long focused on the unilateral pursuit of its interests, now began to define such interests in terms of improving global economic conditions and establishing a community of nations on the basis of global rule of law and due process (Prestowitz, 2003: 174).
Of course, the USA retained veto power in all these newly-created multilateral bodies and with the end of the Cold War and its bipolar global power configuration, the USA emerged as the only global superpower. Nye (2002) observes that this superpower status induced a sense of complacency in Americans and an over-confidence in the country’s unsurpassed global military, economic, and cultural power. In this regard, he argues that, “… Americans were largely indifferent and uncertain about how to shape a foreign policy to guide this power. Polls showed the American public focused on domestic affairs and paying little attention to the rest of the world…” (Nye, 2002: ix)

Recall the words of the philosopher Edmund Burke, who said of Britain’s power in an earlier era, “I dread our being too much dreaded” (cited in Richie, eds., 1990: 174). As with the empires of old, the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 illustrated that imperial prestige and glory is not without costs. The attacks occurred eight months into George W. Bush’s (2001-2009) first presidential term and brought a rapid change in USA foreign policy; marking a defining moment in the so-called ‘Bush revolution’ in foreign policy. With the subsequent rise in neo-conservative political ideology (which extols the virtues of American hegemony), the USA grew increasingly short-tempered about the international legal norms and institutions that seem to come into conflict with its national interests or preferred policy positions. The neo-conservative belief that the USA is a benign empire coupled with its schizophrenia towards international institutions and caginess with regard to alliances, informed the conviction that preserving USA dominance and exercising American power to spread democracy is the best route to long term world
peace. The Bush administration’s “expansion of the ‘unipolar moment’ as far as possible in the interests of USA security” was characterized by a global War on Terrorism and invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (Wenger, 2008: 1). The European Union’s External Affairs Commissioner, Chris Patten, noted with concern that the USA Administration had switched to what he referred to as ‘unilateralist overdrive’ (cited in Kennedy, 2002: electronic). The Doctrine of Preemption, expressed in Bush’s own words, “You’re either with us (USA) or with the terrorist,” encapsulates this USA ‘unilateralist overdrive’ (Speech on 20 September 2001).

Jervis (2005: 138) observes that Bush’s policy has left the United States looking neither strong nor benign, and with the realization that the only thing worse than a successful hegemon is a failed one. By stressing unilateralism over cooperation, preemption over prevention, and firepower over staying power, the Bush administration has alienated the United States' natural allies and disengaged from many of the world's most pressing problems (Berger, 2004: electronic). Instead, unilateral economic self-defense premised on the protection of domestic economic and trade interests has been the preferred strategy and is epitomized by the USA refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol. As the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, the United States would incur the highest costs in cutting down emissions as mandated by the Kyoto Protocol. Calling the Kyoto Protocol a ‘fatally flawed’ treaty with ‘unrealistic targets not based on science,’ President Bush explicitly stated that he would not comply with mandates that “would have a negative economic impact, with layoffs of workers and price increases for consumers” (www.whitehouse.gov). The European Parliament was equally explicit in their condemnation of USA, “We are appalled that the long-term interests of the majority of the world population are being
sacrificed for short-term corporate greed in the United States” (cited in Prestowitz, 2003: 112). Prestowitz (2003: 113) observes that “the Kyoto decision appeared to epitomize a profoundly anti-environment spirit within the administration and became a metaphor for American profligacy, unconcern, and arrogance.”

Ironically, in an October 2000 Presidential debate, President George W. Bush contended that, “if we (USA) are an arrogant nation, they’ll (rest of the world) view us (USA) that way, but if we’re a humble nation, they’ll respect us” (http://www.pbs.org). Unfortunately, many non-Americans saw the United States as arrogantly concerned with narrow American interests at the expense of the rest of the world. Nye (2002: xii) argues that while effective leadership requires dialogue with followers, the United States used consultations for talking, not listening. Prestowitz (2003: 08) affirms that “many people abroad feel that despite all our (USA) talk of democracy, human rights, and free trade America’s real aim is to control the destiny of other nations in pursuit of its own short-term interests or ideological preoccupations.” The tendency by the USA to establish strong legal rules for other states while seeking for itself the right to be exempt from or even above these rules is a case in point. On the one hand, the USA took a leading role in the writing of treaties such as the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the United Nations Charter, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the Human Rights Covenants. On the other hand, as the histories of the League Covenant, Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and Havana Charter on the International Trade Organization suggest, the USA recoiled from adhering to the far-reaching obligations of these multilateral treaties. Moreover, while the USA continues to play a major role in encouraging treaty negotiations, it has increasingly retreated from the
resulting treaties, usually by refusing to ratify them. The International Criminal Court (ICC), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the amended Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Convention on Biological Diversity testify to this reality. In 2000, Condoleezza Rice (later National Security Advisor: 2001–2005 and Secretary of State: 2005–2009) campaigned that Americans should “proceed from the firm ground of the national interest and not from the interest of an illusory international community” (Speech at 2000 Republican National Convention). The ties that bind the international community may be weak, but they matter. Nye (2002: xii – xiv) affirms that “... learning to define our (USA) national interest to include global interests will be crucial to the longevity of our (USA) power and whether others see the hegemony as benign or not.”

In this regard, conscious of the damage to USA international image under the Republican Bush administration, President Obama had to review the emphasis and approach of the country’s foreign policy. The Obama administration has adopted a more diplomatic foreign policy approach by moving away from the unilateralism of the Bush era and through greater cooperation with the UN and other international bodies. However, the Obama administration is continuing the USA 3D strategy in foreign policy, in prioritizing Defense, Development and Diplomacy as the three pillars of USA foreign policy. But, in doing so, the administration is adopting a ‘smart power’ approach by foregrounding diplomacy and development alongside a strong defense. This is different from the previous administrations where defense was prioritized with diplomacy and development assumed a lesser role.
President Obama’s re-prioritization of foreign policy objectives is not just a response to the faux pas of the Bush administration, but also denotes a necessary foreign policy readjustment in light of a rapidly evolving international environment. The USA National Security Strategy (2010: 1) recognizes the challenges of advancing American interests “in a world that has changed—a world in which the international architecture of the 20th century is buckling under the weight of new threats, the global economy has accelerated the competition facing our people and businesses, and the universal aspiration for freedom and dignity contends with new obstacles.”

Ironically, in December 2007, the USA (the most ardent promoter of the ‘Washington consensus’ which determined the neoliberal, free-market ideology of the global economic order) entered its longest post-World War II recession. Such vulnerabilities and insecurities are becoming more evident as the curtain of history closes on what some commentators (Starobin: 2009, Zakarias: 2008) have identified as the end of the ‘Age of the America.’ In this regard, USA hegemony is challenged on two fronts:

- Firstly by rising nations, such as China, that are not only ambitious and able to establish themselves as world powers but also strong enough both in economic and military terms to present an individual challenge.

- Secondly, by emerging economies forming alliances (such as BRIC and IBSA) to assert themselves against American dominance.

The USA’s National Intelligence Council’s, *Global Trends 2025: Transformed World* (2008: vi), notes that:
Growth projections for Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the BRICs) indicate they will collectively match the original G-7’s share of global GDP by 2040-2050. China is poised to have more impact on the world over the next 20 years than any other country. If current trends persist, by 2025 China will have the world’s second largest economy…

In addition, Goldman Sachs projects that China’s economy will surpass that of the USA in 2027 (http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/book/BRIC-Full.pdf)

However, as Nye (2010: 4) argues, “Even if overall Chinese GDP passed that of the United States around 2030, the two economies, although roughly equivalent in size, would not be equivalent in composition. China would still have a vast underdeveloped countryside...” Moreover due cognizance needs to be given to the reality that while the USA is challenged economically and politically by emerging powers, the USA far outstrips these countries in military might. On the military front, it is the only country with both nuclear weapons and conventional forces that can act quickly in any part of the globe. Undoubtedly, this will ensure that the USA remains an important global player, albeit less dominant because of the shifts in global power configurations. Goldstein (1988: 281) puts it more eloquently:

If hegemony means being able to dictate, or at least dominate, the rules and arrangements by which international relations are conducted, then the United States is hardly a hegemon today. If hegemony is defined more modestly as a situation where one country has significantly more power resources or capabilities than others, then it simply signifies American preponderance, not necessarily dominance or control.
However, Nye (2002: 111) identifies a further challenge to American influence in the world:

A nation can lose power as a result of being overtaken by rising nations, but …this is not the most likely challenge. The barbarians did not defeat Rome; rather, it rotted from within. People lost confidence in their culture and institutions, elites battled for control, corruption increased, and the economy failed to grow adequately… Could this nation (USA) lose its ability to influence world events positively because of domestic battles over collapse of institutions, and economic stagnation? If our (USA) society and institutions appear to be collapsing, we will be less attractive to others. If our economy fails, we will lose the basis for our hard power as well as our soft power.

His concerns have merit, especially given the effects of the global economic crises which has increased domestic pressure on issues such as unemployment and health care reform. In this regard, the latest National Security Strategy (2010: 2) acknowledges that:

- At the center of our (USA) efforts is a commitment to renew our economy, which serves as the wellspring of American power.
- …what takes place within our (USA) borders will determine our strength and influence beyond them.

In essence, “the paradox of American power is that it is too great to be challenged by any other state, yet not great enough to resolve global problems such as international
terrorism and nuclear proliferation. America needs the cooperation and respect of other countries” (Sebastian Mallaby cited in Nye, 2002: 40). As Henry Kissinger argued, “the test of history for the United States will be whether we (USA) can turn our current predominant power into international consensus and our own principles into widely accepted international norms. That was the greatness achieved by Rome and Britain in their times” (Kissinger, 2000: electronic). The National Security Strategy (2010: 9) clearly articulates a multilateral strategy to achieve unilateral USA foreign policy objectives:

In the past, the United States has thrived when both our nation and our national security policy have adapted to shape change instead of being shaped by it. For instance, as the industrial revolution took hold, America transformed our economy and our role in the world. When the world was confronted by fascism, America prepared itself to win a war and to shape the peace that followed. When the United States encountered an ideological, economic, and military threat from communism, we shaped our practices and institutions at home—and policies abroad—to meet this challenge. Now, we must once again position the United States to champion mutual interests among nations and peoples.
Fig2-3: USA Foreign Policy-Lessons for South Africa

Given South Africa’s sub-regional dominance, its foreign policy in Southern Africa is often perceived as a microcosm of USA foreign policy towards the rest of the world. In this regard, the following issues necessitate deeper reflection:

- Pre-9/11 USA’s indifference and uncertainty on how to shape its foreign policy to guide its unsurpassed power parallels South Africa’s unpreparedness to effectively utilize the unique foreign policy opportunities that its post-apartheid status presented. Such policy was underpinned by personality (Nelson Mandela) and ideology rather than strategy.

- The USA vacillation between unilateralism and multilateralism is based on short-term objectives which are inimical to the long-term interest. There are strong similarities with South Africa’s use of hard (1998 intervention in Lesotho) and soft power (quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe).

- As resentment towards their foreign policy choices grow, both the USA and South Africa are realizing that effective leadership requires dialogue with followers, not an imposition of a unilateral vision. Effective use of power resources requires skillful management of perceptions. A multilateral strategy to achieve unilateral foreign policy objectives is not impossible.

- Domestic stability is critical to successful foreign policy implementation.
2.1.3 UK: New Labor and the Old Challenge of Ethical Foreign Policy

The profound changes in the global environment had far-reaching implications for the UK’s approach to foreign policy. Clark (2007: 18) contends that:

The twentieth century played to the natural strengths of the UK and bolstered its international position for the best part of 70 years, even as its relative power and capacity in the world declined. The UK played key roles in the world wars and greatly influenced the peace-making and economic arrangements that followed. The country’s imperial and post-colonial status and its maritime advantages in a world of burgeoning international trade gave the UK a central role as one of the pillars of international security and world order throughout the century…..

While the traditional security threats of the twentieth century magnified the UK’s strengths as an effective military ally and a diplomatic voice of experience, it is clear that the twenty-first century with its floating coalitions, decentralized threats and transborder flows of all kinds requires a more collective strength. In this regard, it was the New Labor Party (an alternative branding for the Labor Party, derived from a conference slogan first used by the Labor Party in 1994, and later popularized in a draft manifesto published by the party in 1996, called *New Labor, New Life For Britain*) which took up the challenge of determining how the UK could contribute to and harness such a collective strength. Wheeler and Dunne (2004: 01) point out that the New Labor solution was “to replace the old siren of rule Britannia with a new vision of moral Britannia.”
Indeed, with global interdependence blurring the distinction between national and international security, there was an understanding that “More than ever before, our (UK) security now depends on achieving greater security for others” (Wild, 2006). The thinking about how Britain should seek to balance the traditional goals of foreign policy (national security and commercial prosperity) with broader collective security objectives was initiated by the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, only ten days into New Labor’s term in office. In May 2007, Cook set out a new mission statement for the Foreign Office and for the incoming government. In introducing the new statement, Cook notably asserted that the UK foreign policy should have ‘an ethical dimension’ and that the Labor government would “put human rights at the heart of foreign policy” (Cook, 1997). Pilger (1999: electronic) points out that this announcement was at odds with the historical record, which shows that since 1945 Conservative and Labor governments have had almost identical foreign policies, none of which have upheld human rights.

Nevertheless, in addition to the focus on ethics and human rights, Prime Minister Tony Blair promoted the notion of a ‘third way’ as a means of marrying together an open, competitive and successful economy with a just, decent and humane society (Blair 1997). For Anthony Giddens (1998:26), one of the concept’s main proponents, the ‘third way’

.. refers to a framework of thinking and policy-making that seeks to adapt social democracy to a world which has changed fundamentally over the past two or three decades. It is a “third way” in the sense that it is an attempt to transcend both the old-style social democracy and neo-liberalism.
During his visit to South Africa in 1999, Tony Blair stated that the ‘third way’ not only combines economic dynamism and social justice, but also that each depends on the other. In essence, “If a country generates no wealth, it cannot afford social justice” (Blair, 1999). Such views have led New Labor to endorse not only the structural adjustment measures advocated by the World Bank and the IMF, but also to praise the African National Congress’ shift away from the socialist principles that guided its thinking during the liberation struggle towards the neo-liberal economic policies it pursues today. According to Blair, South Africa’s ‘Growth, Employment and Redistribution’ (GEAR) strategy has set the country “on a course to tackle the needs of the disadvantaged, while retaining the confidence of the market” (Blair, 1999).

From 1997 to the beginning of 1999, the New Labor government’s ‘ethical’ ‘third way’ foreign policy was reasonably well received. The architects of the policy were regularly praised for their substantive policy commitments to combat poverty and promote development across the developing world, particularly in Africa, which were thought to be progressive. These included the establishment of a Department for International Development (DFID), significant increases to the aid budget as well as establishment of the Commission for Africa, (also known as the Blair Commission for Africa) to examine and provide impetus for development in Africa (Wheeler and Dunne, 2004: 17). Notably, the government also used the UK’s presidency of the EU and the G8 in 2005 to assert the case for a fairer global deal for Africa (Held and Mepham, 2007: 8). Global interdependence became a recurring theme in New Labor’s policy discourse and it was frequently argued that “in an increasingly
globalized world, Britain’s ethical and practical commitments can no longer stop at the water’s edge” (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2002: 309).

However, the New Labor government’s success in ‘branding’ itself and refocusing UK foreign policy was not matched by a similar triumph in actual foreign policy implementation. Despite credible attempts to inject progressive ideas about human security into the UK’s foreign policy, it was not long before New Labor’s human rights-centered policy became mired in accusations of hypocrisy in relation to arms sales and was over-shadowed by the debates on the Iraq War. Such issues starkly illustrate how adherence to an ethical foreign policy could necessitate political choices that might jeopardize Labor’s prospects for re-election.

The biggest challenge for the New Labor Party was resolving the clash between domestic responsibilities and commitments to promote human rights abroad which manifested itself in the need to protect jobs in Britain’s large defense industry (the country is the second biggest exporter of arms in the world) on the one hand and the desire to support peace through arms regulation on the other hand. Barkham (2000: electronic) best captures the dilemma facing the New Labor Party by juxtaposing the party’s pre and post election manifesto pledges. Before its election in 1997, the party manifesto indicated that the party would not permit the sale of arms to regimes that might use them for internal repression or international aggression. However, once in government the party followed a subsequent manifesto pledge that maintained the party’s support for a strong UK defense industry as a strategic part of the country’s industrial base and defense effort.
The tension between New Labor’s two manifesto promises reached its climax over the sale of arms to Indonesia as well as the issuing of arms export licenses to Pakistan, which became the source of a serious cabinet dispute (Barkham, 2000: electronic). It was soon apparent that any ethical considerations in the UK’s foreign policy approach had been resolutely displaced by domestic considerations. In fact, under the leadership of the New Labor Party, a Defense Sales Organization at the Ministry of Defense was established, specifically to boost the arms trade (Pilger, 1999: electronic). Moreover, Pilger (1999: electronic) argues that “arms manufacturers are more likely to have their export licenses approved under Labor than they were under the Tories. Fewer than one per cent of applications were turned down between August 1997 and August 1998.”

Attempts by the New Labor to instill an ethical dimension in the UK’s foreign policy was further derailed by the government’s close military relationship with the USA and Tony Blair’s ill-judged support for the war in Iraq and for George Bush’s badly executed war on terror. Under the New Labor leadership of Blair, the UK government was embroiled in the controversial invasion of Iraq which was not internationally sanctioned. Moreover, the UK was also extremely muted over the human rights violations perpetrated by its American ally, including the abuses committed at Guantanamo (Rogers, 2006: electronic). The fact that the edifice of the ethical foreign policy was crumbling was graphically illustrated by Robin Cook’s momentous decision to resign from the Cabinet over Blair’s decision to join the USA and Australia in the war against Iraq. In an electrifying resignation speech to the House of Commons, Cook argued that the government’s decision to use force – in the face of opposition from three permanent members of the Security Council –
represented a fundamental challenge to the authority of the UN: “If we believe in an international community based on binding rules and institutions, we cannot simply set them aside when they produce results that are inconvenient to us” (Cook, 2003).

Cook’s resignation also underscored the manner in which the nature of foreign policy-making under the New Labor administration further eroded the possibility of a ‘third way’ becoming entrenched in UK foreign policy. Wheeler and Dunne (2004:33) contend that Blair preferred to make policy in proximity to a few close advisors and there was no significant cabinet involvement in the decision to go to war against Iraq. The danger of such foreign policy-making is that of group-think where those around the Prime Minister filter information in such a manner that it only serves to reinforce his preferred outcome. With Blair the situation was compounded by the fact that he was elected with a landslide 179 seat majority largely based on Labor’s domestic priorities and had ‘less knowledge or experience than any incoming Prime Minister since the Second World War’ (Kampfner, 2003: 9).

Blair’s former foreign policy advisor, Robert Cooper (in his book: The Breaking of Nations) claims that governments will not only have to compromise their values in diplomacy, they may need to abandon them altogether (Cooper, 2003). Whatever the reasons for compromise or abandonment, the New Labor Party has realized that it is easier to ‘talk the talk’ than to ‘walk the walk.’ Foreign policy considerations such based on ethics or human rights, become relative values in the face of economically-lucrative arms sales.
Cook’s pledge that the Labor government would “put human rights at the heart of foreign policy” is analogous to Nelson Mandela’s assertion in a 1993 *Foreign Affairs* article that “human rights will be the light that guides our (South Africa’s) foreign affairs”. Both, the New Labor administration in the UK and South Africa’s post-apartheid governments, have since come to appreciate that it is easier to articulate a more progressive foreign policy than to implement one. For example, South Africa’s voting patterns during its two-year tenure in the UN Security Council in 2007-2008 (voted against resolutions on Myanmar, Iran and Zimbabwe) were heavily criticized by human rights activists. In 2009, South Africa’s refusal to grant the Dalai Lama a visa to address a peace conference, further elicited accusations from human rights activists that South Africa was prioritizing economic interests in China over the human rights of Tibetans.

In essence, the success of a progressive foreign policy will be dependent on the manner in which the clash between domestic realities and foreign policy ideals is managed. This necessitates a more profound analysis of the dichotomy between:

- Human rights and economic interests
- Social justice and market growth
- Traditional strategic alliances and moral obligations.

2.1.4 Review of African Foreign Policy Literature

There have been relatively few studies of foreign policy activities of African states and even fewer in a comparative vein. Wright (1999: 1) attributes this dearth in foreign policy literature to “difficulty in collecting information, a disinterest in African studies by many scholars who study foreign policy, and a caution on the part
of some African scholars not to move too closely into an area traditionally considered by governments to be beyond the bounds of inquiry.” Equally problematic is the fact that existing African foreign policy studies are dominated by an analysis that reflects a preoccupation with the lack of foreign policy autonomy for African states.

Wright (1999: 3) acknowledges that ‘significant emphasis’ has been accorded to the influence of former colonial powers on shaping the foreign policy orientations of the newly emergent African states. Khadiagala and Lyons (2001: 3) affirm that “African elites had only tenuous control over postcolonial states, external actors, particularly the former colonial powers, retained considerable influence over most facets of African life.” Although there are some examples to suggest that a state’s resources can influence foreign policy options – as with oil diplomacy in Nigeria, gold diplomacy in South Africa, or diamond diplomacy in Botswana – the resource base of Africa has not brought it significant leverage within the global economy. In addition, as a consequence of the need to consolidate power and meet socioeconomic demands at home, African governments were shackled by the chains of International Financial Institutions which significantly shaped indigenous foreign (and in particular economic) policy initiatives. In this regard, the technocratic prescriptions of the World Bank and IMF came to be regarded as a form of neocolonialism that reinforced ‘dependency’ relationships for developing African states which could not afford to de-link from such exploitative ties with the West.

Kaunda (2002) aptly illustrates the effects of domestic political and economic circumstances on foreign policy decisions by explaining how underdevelopment and external economic dependence constrained Malawi’s capacity to determine
autonomous foreign policies. In this regard, Kaunda draws a link between Hastings Kamuzu Banda’s (Malawi’s first President) choice of national development strategy and acceptance by Western donors. He argues that this locked Malawi as a subordinate actor in a Western-dominated international economic order which “perpetuated Malawi’s economic dependence as well as the influence of Western considerations in foreign policy” (Kaunda, 2002: 79). The example of Banda can also be used to show how African foreign policy as the prerogative of presidents and prime ministers dovetailed with the postcolonial patterns of domestic power consolidation. In fact, most post colonial African foreign policy studies correlate the state’s foreign policies with its president. Often a Head of State was considered the only decision-maker, with one-or no-party systems reinforcing the centralization of foreign policy decision-making (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982). In what is commonly referred to as the idiosyncratic big man hypotheses, it is assumed that the state’s and the ‘big man’s’ interests are intertwined (McKay, 1966 and Thiam, 1963). In essence, African foreign policies have essentially been regarded as a matter of deliberate actions by elites. Such notions were generally reinforced by Cold War politics which created an enabling environment for African leaders to hold on to power by promoting a particular foreign policy orientation.

However, it could also be argued that the colonial influence, classic dependency and ‘big-man’ theory understanding of African foreign policies are simply caricatures of more complex and dynamic processes. As Wright (1999: 4) correctly observes, the desire to maintain sovereign control of policy “has remained consistent within the continent, though the ability to do so has often been weak.” Nevertheless, Khadiagala and Lyons (2001: 2) argue that through the promotion of sovereignty and national
identity “African states sought to maximize individual political autonomy, strengthen territorial borders and guarantee unilateral advantages from privileged relations with external actors.” The manner in which the Cold War was played out on the continent is an apt reflection of how African governments were able to use foreign policy as a means for African states to gain some form of leverage in the international arena.

A comprehensive understanding of African foreign policy is also limited by the one-dimensional focus on Africa and the global system. The intra-African element has to a large degree, simply been ignored in African foreign policy studies. This lacuna undermines the reality that for many African states, “regions are sources of authoritative foreign policies, places where power is displayed and exerted” (Khadiagala and Lyons, 2001: 2). It could also be argued that the profound changes in the international arena necessitate that intra-African and regional dimensions of African foreign policy be given greater prominence. This is more so since regional integration is perceived as a pre-requisite for a ‘United States of Africa’; a continental integration project currently underway that would undoubtedly revolutionize the nature of foreign policy making in Africa.

Indeed, the current global environment has altered the topography of power and institutional arrangements across the continent. Wright (1999: 1) affirms that the foreign policies of African states are “being shaped by rapidly changing international and domestic environments to the extent that it is difficult to isolate purely foreign policies.” It is an era where common threats such as climate change, spread of infectious disease and transnational organized crime magnify the need for collective action and where marginalization in global arenas of power necessitate that African
countries negotiate internationally as an integrated force to strengthen their bargaining power. Meanwhile, the wave of transitions to democracy in the 1990s and the dynamics of globalization have had a profound influence on the structure and process of foreign policy-making; expanding the roles played by parliaments, interest groups, civic organizations, and the mass media in what Christopher Clapham has termed the “privatization of diplomacy” (Clapham, 1996).

In essence, African foreign policies have been witness to several shifts in terms of actors (from elitist decision-makers to multiple players), issues (from narrow national priorities to broader areas of common concern), and levels (from national to regional and global). Bischoff and Southall (1999: 237) argue that “now more than ever, after a decade and a half of neoliberalism and half a decade of post-bipolarity, the discredited and diminished African state has no monopoly over foreign relations, which are increasingly economic in content and transnational in character.” Khadiagala and Lyons (2001: 12) affirm that “Internal and external policy environments have become increasingly complex, testing the mettle of policymakers and limiting their authority to routinely manage these competing claims.” They also point out that “Ultimately, foreign policy in Africa, as elsewhere, is about opportunities and burdens of participating in transnational affairs.”
Fig. 2-5: African Foreign Policy literature - Lessons for South Africa’s Foreign Policy

Although South Africa’s post-independence history took the country down a different foreign policy path than her other African counterparts, the following issues that flow from the review of African foreign policy literature necessitate deeper reflection in the context of this thesis:

- For many African states, regions are sources of authoritative foreign policies.
- Foreign policies of African states are being shaped by dynamic international and domestic environments in a manner that makes it difficult to distinguish nationalistic foreign policies.

2.2 Contextualizing South African Foreign Policy Literature: From conflict to contested cooperation

One cannot properly understand the significance of Pretoria’s current Africa policy without examining its past destructive military and economic role. This explains why so much of South African foreign policy literature engages with the Republic’s past policies of destabilization as well as her perceived attempts to dominate. Furthermore, post apartheid writing in this field has been obsessed with how South African foreign policy reflects continuity rather than change. It is this fixation which is responsible for the superfluity in versions of South Africa’s diplomatic history at the expense of realistic assessments of the Republic’s post apartheid foreign policy options.
2.2.1 Apartheid’s Legacy

South Africa's struggle to develop cooperative and mutually beneficial relationships with states in Southern Africa is not surprising considering the nature of past South African visions for the region which were essentially geared towards serving South African interests (Davies and O’Meara: 1985, Price: 1984, Minty: 1989, Barber and Barratt: 1990, Crawford: 1995, Chossudovsky: 1997, Vale and Maseko: 1998). The notion that South Africa should play an assertive role in African affairs seems to have been a constant thread in the rhetoric of successive South African leaders. Each epoch has appeared to open exciting possibilities of engagement across the continent. In a speech to the country’s premier agricultural and industrial show in April 1940, South Africa’s then Prime Minister, Jan Smuts, urged an adjustment in the country’s approach to African affairs:

If we wish to take our rightful place as the leader in pan-African development and in the shaping of future policies and events in this vast continent, we must face the realities and the facts of the present and seize the opportunities which these offer. All Africa may be our proper market if we will but have the vision... (Smuts, 1942: 250).

Undoubtedly, the most ambitious of these engagement proposals was launched in early 1979, when the then Prime Minister PW Botha and his foreign minister, Roelof ‘Pik’ Botha, suggested a grand scheme of regional cooperation which envisaged a constellation of states with South Africa at its centre (see Geldenhuys, 1981). It was a brazen response to the breaching of the formerly impervious white buffer zone around apartheid South Africa (a product of the late decolonization of the Portuguese
colonies of Angola and Mozambique), and a desperate attempt to woo her Southern African neighbors away from Soviet and Western influence and, in particular, to stop them giving support and sanctuary to the ANC and South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO).

Caught in apartheid’s cross-fire, the Southern African region was devastated by the political, economic and military destabilization which constituted South Africa’s ‘total strategy’. In its bid to entrench and protect the apartheid system, South Africa intervened in the continent not only to safeguard her territorial integrity but also to weaken her neighbors. Southern Africa’s vulnerability to the apartheid state’s pernicious regional foreign policy has been well documented (for example, Bienen: 1985, Davies and O’Meara: 1985, Ajulu and Cammack: 1989, Holness: 1989, Johnson and Martin: 1989, Manning and Green: 1989, Barber and Barratt: 1990, Jaster: 1992). The evidence is also patent, both in the uneven (and in most cases, deeply stunted) development levels in the region and in the immense devastation wrought by apartheid destabilization as Pretoria sought to extend the economic dependence of countries that had adopted overt anti-apartheid stances. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has estimated that one million people died as a result, while the former SADCC countries suffered losses amounting to about US$60-billion (see, for instance, Hanlon, J., 1986, *Beggar Your Neighbors*, James Currey, London for an overview of that strategy and its effects). Moreover, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) acknowledged that “the majority of the victims of the South African government’s attempts to maintain itself in power were outside of South Africa” (1998, Vol. 2, Ch.2: 43).
Davies and O’Meara (1985) argue that apartheid strategists divided states in the region into three categories in the application of their destabilization tactics which included direct military action, indirect support for dissident movements, and pressure on the state’s economic lifelines, notably the transportation routes, the flow of trade and investment, and the migrant labor system. Firstly, there were conservative states, which were seen as active or potential collaborators (for example, Swaziland); secondly, there were uncooperative states which were vulnerable to pressure (such as Lesotho and Zimbabwe); and thirdly, there were those states whose political systems and development strategies were viewed as offering a fundamental challenge to apartheid capitalism and therefore incurred the greatest wrath of the apartheid state (notably, Angola and Mozambique). Undoubtedly, “the overriding objective [of destabilization] was to bring about a regional détente on terms imposed by South Africa….in short, nothing less than a Pax Pretoria” (Jaster cited in Blumenfeld, 1992: 110).

Mills (1994) acknowledges that the greater part of the existing literature on Southern African security has been concerned with Pretoria’s destabilization of its neighbors, and has thus assumed a basically conflictual relationship between South Africa and the other states in the region. Wariness and/or cynicism over the post-apartheid state’s commitment to regional development therefore needs to be contextualized in terms of the country’s history in the region. The dilemma posed by Southern Africa’s political hostility to the apartheid state on the one hand and the region’s economic dependence on South Africa on the other inspired the creation of the SADCC which had the twin goals of strengthening economic cooperation and development among the independent states of Southern Africa and reducing their dependence on South
Africa. It is unfortunate that debates over the success of SADCC as a counter-dependency strategy (see Maasdorp: 1985, Rotberg: 1985 and Weisfelder: 1989) have a tendency to distract from Jaster’s (1992: 19) pertinent observation that “…South Africa – whose defense of white rule and sense of siege formed the core of its relations with the region – was unable to convert military and economic dominance into African recognition and acceptance.” Whilst South Africa’s neighbors have long been portrayed as helpless victims of the actions of a regionally omnipotent South Africa, the Republic’s overwhelming economic strength in relation to other states in the sub-region, has not always translated into significant clout. One could argue that this past failure continues to haunt South African regional foreign policy and has important implications for the role of the country in the region.

Jaster (1988: xiii) maintains that South Africa's foreign policy was “essentially reactive and defensive”. This is an area of South African foreign policy that has been well documented in the works of, for example, Bienen (1985), Jaster (1988), Johnson and Martin (1989), Venter (1989), Barber and Barratt (1990) and Cawthra (1997). Nevertheless, by the mid-1980's it became evident that for South Africa to have durable security she would have to bolster the stability of Southern Africa (Bienen, 1985: 3). However, given that most literature on Southern African regional relations perceived apartheid as the single most important factor in shaping relations and that some views of post apartheid South Africa have continued to doubt South Africa’s reputedly benign intentions for mutually-beneficial development, it is easy to see how the rest of Southern Africa would have difficulty or misgivings about South Africa’s regional role. It has been argued that merely because the government of South Africa has changed the color of its skin is no reason to think it will change its spots. In
essence, there is no reason to believe that a black government will be any less hegemonic than a white one (Cilliers, 1999). With the continuing resilience and betrayal (domestically and externally) of some vestiges of the apartheid era, many African countries – especially South Africa’s neighbors - continue to look at Pretoria and its relationship with the region not only through the fog of their bitter past relationship but also very warily.

Negative perceptions of South Africa’s role in the region have also been nurtured by the historical patterns of interaction in the regional economy. Essentially the main poles of accumulation were located in South Africa, while the economies of the other countries were incorporated into subaltern roles as labor reserves, providers of cheap and convenient resources (like water, electricity and some raw materials) and as ‘captive markets’ for higher priced South African exports. Keet (1993) notes that the deliberate structuring of labor flows from Southern Africa to South Africa, particularly to its mines, nurtured interdependencies between South Africa and its neighbors as well as dependencies of the latter on South Africa. The effects were not only the development of the South African economy, but also the underdevelopment of its neighboring countries. In fact, it is difficult to overstate South Africa’s dominant position in much of Southern Africa, whether it is with reference to telecommunications, transport infrastructure, the military, or its successful assertions of commercial suzerainty. This pattern of regional economic interaction established an effective South African hegemony and created relations of acute dependency. Petersson (1998: 1) maintains that there has always been an unhealthy asymmetry between South Africa and the rest of the sub region in terms of population size, economic growth and
performance, transport, energy capacities and financial resource availability. This unequal relationship has always worked in favor of South Africa and at the expense of its neighbors.

Jaster et al (1992: 60) affirms that:

Throughout most of the 1980s, SA’s relations with its neighbors were characterized by the paradox of cross-border violence and business-as-usual contacts. With the exception of Malawi, SA had no diplomatic ties with the countries of the region. But it had trade missions in several of them, including rhetorically hostile Zimbabwe…. Pretoria encouraged the private sector to invest in and trade with its neighboring states. Its motives were mixed. The expansion of trade demonstrated goodwill and brought economic advantages, but it also tied the black states most closely to SA and provided Pretoria with a way of evading sanctions.

Misperceptions at the social level also constrain the prospects for more co-operative intra-regional relations. There are xenophobic strains of chauvinism and parochialism among South Africans capable of generating a sense of both superiority and hostility towards their Southern African neighbors (further explored in Chapter 4). South Africa’s dominance has exacted heavy costs and its legacy is an undeniable challenge for any regional project that envisages cooperation and /or integration. For example, the massive disparity between South Africa’s Contribution to Regional GDP and that of other Southern African countries in 2009 (as reflected in Annexure 1, Fig.2) is revealing. It is thus not surprising that people from neighboring countries keep streaming in. The South African Police Service, in its 2008/09 annual report,
estimated that there could be as many as six million ‘undocumented’ foreigners in the country (Mail and Guardian online, 13/11/2009). However, Nelson Mandela had long cautioned his SADC allies that South Africa was not a gold mine or a bastion for employment but was “equally beset with unemployment” (Cilliers, 1999). Mandela’s remarks at the September 1997 SADC summit meeting that he chaired followed only two weeks after South African street vendors had attacked ‘foreign’ hawkers in downtown Johannesburg. The issue of South African xenophobia which is at variance with the country’s prioritization of the African Agenda is explored further in Chapter 4.

Many of the Republic’s neighbors are also highly critical of what they regard as its bullish economic policies, accusing South Africa of deliberately dwarfing their small economies (Annexure 1, Figures 1 and 3, contain comparative economic data for countries in the region). Le Pere, Lambrechts and van Nieuwkerk (1999) capture the severe imbalance of the regional economy by alluding to South Africa’s accounting for three-quarters of the region's total gross domestic product and manufactured production. In fact, a former Zambian Prime Minister observed that “South Africa would always be an elephant surrounded by chickens” (Economist, 10/03/98). Robert Davies (1992) describes the situation as one of negative interdependencies – to put it more nonchalantly, when South Africa sneezes the region catches cold. Not surprisingly, South Africa’s economic dominance has created some political tensions with regional partners. At a 1995 trade and investment conference at the Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe, speaker after speaker shook metaphorical fists at South Africa and urged the governments of the region to raise local tariffs in response to South Africa’s penetration of the region (Rotberg, 1995). It was clear that synergetic effects based
on mutual neighborly exchange relations were difficult to obtain as the strength of the South African economy enabled the pursuit of parasitic policies that fed off regional economies whilst protecting itself from those areas where it found itself at a competitive disadvantage. A post apartheid South Africa is likely to remain the dominant force in the region, on the one hand capable of contributing in a decisive fashion to its security, but on the other perpetuating the existing fears of neighboring states about South African regional pre-eminence. Most literature in this regard catalogues the asymmetrical relationship between South Africa and other states in the region and portrays the countries of Southern Africa as so completely dependent upon the South African economy that politically they are ‘hostage’ states. The net result of such folly has been an underdeveloped political analysis of South Africa in Southern Africa.

A number of post apartheid, post-Cold War scholars, such as Keet (1993), Vale (1991), Mills and Boulden (1997), and Bischoff (1995) have stressed that it is advantageous for South Africa to develop relations with her neighbors as it was strategically important to improve her bargaining position in the global economy: as part of a broader region, she would be in a stronger position to negotiate the terms of her integration into the international economy. However, considering that “…the chaos, wars and economic failures in the continent were used by the South African regime to justify the maintenance of white rule in her attempt to dominate the continent from the South on behalf of her western allies”, there is much fear and hostility regarding South Africa's motives (Brittain, 1988: 4). Similar convictions are explored in the work of Spence (1994), Tjonneland and Vraalsen (1996), van Aardt (1996) and to an extent Davies (1996). There is a general fear that Pretoria would
start to relish a role as a 'regional giant' and thereby use her position to promote her own political, diplomatic, and economic power (Venter, 1996: 169). Tjonnelan and Vraalsen claim, as do Calland and Weld (1994: 9), that South Africa's hegemonic status in the region, as well as Southern Africa's fear that South Africa might dominate sub-regional politics, have worked to restrict South Africa's ability to play a meaningful role in Southern Africa. Nonetheless, Calland and Weld (1994) warn that this should not culminate in a complacent attitude since regional cooperation is not very likely to occur in the absence of overt leadership. While it is clear that South Africa has the muscle to drive such regional cooperation, the new government's bid to redefine its approach to foreign relations has only succeeded in leaving 'confusion' amongst observers as to the direction and shape of South Africa's foreign policy (Alden, 1993: 63). Critics claim that since 1994, South Africa's policy towards the continent has become 'ambivalent' and that Pretoria appears to be distancing itself from Africa (Vale, 1994: 83; Adedeji, 1996: 231-233; Diescho, 1996: 2; Hanekom, 1997: 7; Gwexe, 1999: 105). Cilliers and Malan (1996) insist that the country's foreign policy is 'schizophrenic' and 'lacks focus', causing the country to 'flounder and rapidly squander the goodwill and prestige' it enjoyed after the 1994 elections. Moreover, scholars such as Nkuhlu (1995: 53-54) and Mills (1997: 3) assert that Pretoria can ill afford to have a 'rainbow policy' or follow a policy shaped by 'universality' due to the cost of internal restructuring.

2.2.2 Post-apartheid paradox

It is evident that most South African foreign policy scholars have viewed and continue to examine regional relations from the perspective of South African hegemony. They have patently ignored the positive aspects of southern African
relations with South Africa and have instead generally perceived such ties as detrimental to their developmental goals. As Poku (2001: 5) observes:

…the region’s economic ties were evaluated in terms of how they strengthened the South African state. There were no considerations given to how these ties might weaken the regime; equally, there was no consideration given to how they might strengthen other states in the region.

However, it is interesting to note that the Southern African regional economy has been substantially integrated since the latter decades of the 19th century, with South Africa acting as the hub and main beneficiary of these economic ties. Dan O’Meara (1991) expounds:

competing European colonialisms fashioned a Southern African region marked by a fairly high degree of what can be called skewed integration - an essentially regional economy in which the central pole of accumulation was the mining and later the agricultural, industrial and service sectors of the South African economy. All other economies in the region, except that of Angola, were locked into this regional economy as suppliers of cheap migrant labor, certain goods and services (water, energy, transport, etc.) to the South African economy, and as markets for its manufacturer and capital.

Moreover, six of the twelve countries are landlocked, integrated physically within and dependent on their neighbors. Equally, if not more fundamental are the structural interdependencies: even at the height of apartheid destabilization, rail, road, and air links were truncated but never sundered completely; historic ties were downplayed
but never successfully denied; and commercial ties between southern African states and South Africa were weakened, but never broken. Ranging from hydro-electric projects such as Cahora Bassa in Mozambique, to water initiatives in Lesotho, and mining and natural gas projects in other countries of the region, there is a history of interdependence and cooperation between South Africa and the Southern African region. In fact, a 2005 book by Roger Pfister, *Apartheid South African and African States: From Pariah to Middle Power, 1961-1994*, effectively details the extensive, secret contacts between South Africa and her neighbors during the apartheid years.

While the legacy of conflict and shadow of South African dominance have tainted sub-regional co-operation, the fall of apartheid and the end of the Cold War have made conceivable an unprecedented level of cooperation on a wide range of issues. The South African government is cognizant of the dangers of isolating its regional neighborhood in an interdependent international system, where countries are easily affected by each other’s actions. Patrick Lekota, a former South African Minister of Defense, noted that: “It is a given fact that we need to secure and stabilize our own country. But we cannot do that without also participating in the stabilization of the region as a whole” (South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2000/01: 133). Nevertheless, interdependence is not the magic wand that levels the playing field in Southern Africa and one needs to appreciate that “interdependence does not exclude asymmetrical relations of dependence” (McGowan, 2002: 5). The Keohane and Nye, Jr (1989: 10 -13) distinction between two dimensions of interdependence is useful in this regard:

- Sensitivity involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework—how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes
in another, and how great are the costly effects? The vulnerability
dimension of interdependence rests on the relative availability and
costliness of the alternatives that various actors face….In a sense, it
focuses on which actors can set the rules of the game.

One can infer that while South Africa is sensitive to choices made in the rest of the
region, the region is vulnerable to decisions taken in South Africa. Countries in
Southern Africa share what is called ‘mutual vulnerability’ (McGowan, 2002: 282).
Although South Africa dominates the region economically, issues such as water and
small arms proliferation have transnational consequences and give countries within
the region some bargaining strength.

Oden (2001: 91) alludes to the development of “increased South African dependency
on resources from the rest of the region.” Obvious examples are water and
hydropower energy. The South African government also has a strong interest in
increasing cooperation in order to control organized crime involving drugs, cars, and
arms. Issues with regional security implications such as migration, environmental
issues, AIDS and other diseases, illustrate that the interdependence between South
Africa and its neighbors is not as unbalanced as elsewhere. South Africa is
particularly dependent on neighbors for water and this vulnerability is expected to
worsen. It is therefore not surprising that the South African government has made
strenuous efforts to develop cooperation in this field. The protocol on *Shared
Watercourse Systems* was the first SADC sector protocol to be agreed upon in 1994.
Moreover, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project launched by Mbeki in March 2004,
derlined the mutual interdependence between the two countries, thus undermining

Shaw (2001: 115) points out that about a quarter of the 800 criminal syndicates identified by the South African Police Service as operating in South Africa has a regional focus. It becomes apparent that the problems and challenges to security are, to varying degrees, shared by every country in the region and across national borders. The countries in the region are increasingly interdependent and problems and threats to security transcend national borders. A coordinated response is therefore imperative. Regionally, it would be in the interest of South Africa to help create the conditions that will accelerate less polarized economic development and a more democratic political environment throughout the region. Significantly, the South African government has been negotiating an 'asymmetrical' free trade agreement with the rest of SADC - South Africa will therefore eliminate existing tariffs on imports from the rest of SADC much faster than the latter is required to do in return (Le Pere, Lambrechts and van Nieuwkerk, 1999). There is a realization that if the whole region fails economically, these problems will threaten not only social order and social services within South Africa, but also the security of states and communities within the region. Cheru (1996: 70) observes that “electrified fences, which failed to halt mass movements of people to the Republic under apartheid, will not in future prevent poverty-induced migration from countries north of the Limpopo.” It is therefore in South Africa’s national interest to make her relatively advanced facilities and resources available for the regional good such as improving border controls, monitoring territorial waters, and providing maritime air patrols and sea rescue operations. So whilst apartheid South Africa destabilized the region to suppress the
internal opposition who sought refuge there, interdependencies in a post apartheid world necessitate that South Africa play a role in supporting the region or risk being a magnet to those escaping destabilization. This reflects the paradox of South Africa’s relations in the region, and the shift from apartheid South Africa and weak regional neighbors to post-apartheid South Africa and a strong regional neighborhood.

2.3 Current Assessment: Post-apartheid South African Foreign Policy Literature

In his extensive writings on South African foreign policy, Peter Vale (1991) has highlighted the need for more comprehensive study on South Africa's post apartheid foreign policy. The mushrooming interest and concomitant proliferation of literature in this field attest to the robust manner in which academics and scholars have engaged and continue to engage with Vale’s proposition. In this regard one can discern three broad patterns of writing.

focused on the prospects for South Africa’s future foreign policy. However, it was the seminal paper *South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy* by Nelson Mandela in 1993 in *Foreign Affairs* that gave post apartheid South African foreign policy its most distinctive albeit most criticized and controversial characteristic: its adherence to moral values such as a commitment to human rights.


The third genre of writing beginning in 1997 and which continues today has tended to institutionalize the idea of an ambiguous South African foreign policy. Such cyclic evaluations of South Africa’s foreign policy provided somber reflections on the clash
between principle and practice. Articles by Mills (*Leaning All Over the Place? The Not-So-New South African Foreign Policy*: 1997), Ryall (*Caught Between Two Worlds: Understanding South Africa’s Foreign Policy Options*: 1997), Solomon (*In Search of a South African Foreign Policy*: 1997), Henwood (*South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Principles and Problems*: 1997), Le Pere, Lambrechts and Van Nieuwkerk (*The Burden of the Future: South Africa’s Foreign Policy Challenges in the New Millennium*: 1999), Vale and Taylor (*South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy Five Years on – From Pariah State to ‘Just Another Country’?*: 1999) were overtaken by more comprehensive studies in the post 2000 period. There are four noteworthy contributions in this regard. Taylor’s (2001) *Stuck in Middle Gear: South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Relations* zeroes in on the contradictions and ambiguities within South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy while *Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future: South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1994-2004* (Sidiropoulos ed: 2004) as well as *South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era* (Adebajo et al eds: 2007) broadly analyses some of the challenges faced by South Africa’s foreign policy. Despite its superfluous conclusions (in comparison to the studies of Sidiropoulos and Adebajo et al as well as the findings of this thesis) one of the most interesting evaluations can be found in *In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy after Apartheid* (Carlsnaes and Nel eds: 2006) which assesses the conduct of South African foreign policy since 1994 against the background of the six principles articulated by Nelson Mandela in 1993.

In addition, one can also differentiate four favored areas of focus that cut across the three broad patterns of post-apartheid foreign policy writing. The first and most prolific area of focus is with regard to South Africa’s regional foreign policy. Post-

The second area of interest for post-apartheid foreign policy scholars is linked to regional issues and pertains to trade and investment. What began with assessments of South Africa’s economic prospects (see Leistner [Post-Apartheid South Africa’s Economic Ties with Neighboring Countries: 1992], Keet [International Players and Programmes for and Against Economic Integration in Southern Africa: 1994] and Kuper [Trade Issues in South Africa’s Foreign Policy in 1996:1997]), has now
evolved into a growing study of post-apartheid corporate expansion (see Daniel et al: *The South Africans have arrived: Post-apartheid corporate expansion into Africa*, 2003) and a new focus on trade diplomacy (see Draper: *Reconfiguring the Compass: South Africa's African Trade Diplomacy*, 2005).


The fourth and, arguably, the most dominant area of focus for post apartheid foreign policy scholars has been the preoccupation with what type of role a post apartheid South Africa should be playing. The arguments for South Africa as a middle power, as articulated by Solomon (*South African Foreign Policy and Middle Power Leadership*: 1997, *Middle Power Leadership vs. Cooperative Leadership : Some Reflections on South Africa’s Foreign Policy*: 1998), Le Pere (*South Africa: An ‘Emerging Power‘*:1998), Van der Westhuizen (*South Africa’s Emergence as a Middle Power*: 1998), and Schoeman (*South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power*: 2000) are tied to the post apartheid government’s affinity for multilateral initiatives which is well captured in Nel et al (*Multilateralism in South Africa’s Foreign Policy*: 1998).
In fact, one would argue that the number of options and alternative paths open to South Africa in the construction and re-construction of her relations with the rest of the Southern African region has been a particular obsession of post-apartheid foreign policy writers. Foreign policy scholars have contemplated both the possibility that South Africa’s economic power would render it even more interventionist and imperialist than its apartheid predecessor as well as the prospect of an already hegemonic South Africa becoming a driving partner in the region. Whatever their preoccupation, there was consensus that each of these possible paths would involve some trade-off between potential benefits and costs. There have been a number of scenario-building exercises (most notable the 1992 article by political economist Rob Davies) which sought to define post-apartheid South Africa’s behavior in Southern Africa. The many contours of South Africa’s presence in the region can, crudely, be summarized into four scenarios for the country:
Table 2-1: Scenarios on RSA’s presence in the region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Prognosis</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>South Africa is the pioneer of a regional cooperation and integration project largely shaped by its own narrow interests and aspirations to regional hegemony. Southern Africa represents a regional political economic system centred on South Africa with structural imbalances in the latter’s favor. McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (1998) posit that this position allows South Africa to behave as a regional hegemon rather than a mutually beneficial partner within Southern Africa, engendering possible marginalization and fragmentation of the region and lop-sided regional development. One could argue that this reflects the current ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ policy of asymmetrical integration under which Pretoria engages in African Renaissance rhetoric while South African companies pursue a rapacious policy of self-enrichment in collaboration with local elites in select African countries – much like other firms from Europe, North America, and Asia.</td>
<td>While this strategy may have enormous short term benefits, its medium and long term value appear questionable given the resultant hostilities as well as the risk of undermining Pretoria’s regional and global political goals and ambitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exploitation</strong></td>
<td>The South African state and business pursue narrow economic interests at the expense of the region. This neo-mercantilist path involves South Africa promoting its own partisan interests while remaining resistant to the needs and demands of the rest of the region, and indifferent to the longer term implications of reproducing or exacerbating existing imbalances or inequities. Davies, Keet, and Nkuhlu (1993, 61) predict that the main policy thrust would involve South Africa one-sidedly seeking to ‘penetrate African markets’ and gain access to profitable contracts or ventures in neighboring countries, while being resistant or lukewarm to admitting additional imports from or addressing other concerns of the rest of the region.</td>
<td>This is the least compatible path in creating the kind of regional environment conducive to growth and development in South Africa. The immediate benefits that would accrue would not be sustainable in the long term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partnership</strong></td>
<td>The South African state pursues a policy of symmetrical integration and partnership under which South Africa allows itself to integrate with the sub-region in a way that enables other states to benefit unevenly in the short term in the hope of mutual benefits for all parties over the longer period. The goal here would be to build sub-regional capacity and infrastructure.</td>
<td>This dovetails nicely with the rhetoric of current government officials, “…we address our own problems as part of a family of Southern African nations, our destiny inextricably linked by geography, history and our huge collective potential”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
nurture an enabling political and economic environment for autochthonous transformative development and prosperity over the medium and long terms. (ANC Foreign Policy Perspectives, 1994).

| Strategic Autarky | There has been a shocking unwillingness among most foreign policy analysts to contemplate a fourth option of South Africa not playing any major role in the region. Given her huge domestic responsibilities, limited resources, suspicions by neighboring countries about intentions (intervention in Lesotho) and commitment (non-intervention in Zimbabwe), it is plausible that South Africa could channel her energies elsewhere. South Africa could focus on its trade links with Europe, North America, and Asia but make no effort to engage the rest of the sub region in close collaborative endeavors such as integration schemes. | While this may work in the short term, the long-term implications for South Africa would be highly negative and cost ineffective. Cheru (1996) explains that a “selfish hegemonic relationship will facilitate South Africa’s integration into the world economy but will undermine the possibility of reversing the century-old structure of dependence and marginalization and is unlikely to bring development to Southern Africa.” |

These four scenarios provide a useful, albeit basic, framework for examining what South Africa’s role in the region is, what it can be, and what it should be. However in doing so, it constrains South African foreign policy analysis in a way that undermines its attempts to go beyond conventional categories and assumptions about sovereign states and their interrelationships. As Henry Kissinger (1994: 62), the former USA National
Security Advisor and Secretary of State, observed: “What no leader must ever do is suggest that choice has no price, or that no balance needs to be struck.”

2.4. Towards a more robust South African foreign policy literature

South African foreign policy literature is not indigent. The voluminous collection of books, articles and discussion papers in this field of study attest to this. However, I would argue that it is a deceptive literary cache: quantity is no substitute for strategic analysis. The literature survey on South Africa’s foreign policy supports Adam Habib’s assertion that “post-apartheid South Africa has not taken kindly to critical scrutiny.” While this in itself should be a cause for concern, perhaps even more worrying is what O’Meara (1996: 26) and Williams (2000: 7) identify as a tendency toward ‘intellectual inertia’ in relation to foreign affairs within the ruling ANC. Despite the plethora of post-apartheid foreign policy literature, which one is able to trace back to 1990, South Africa’s foreign policy continues to best be described as ‘ambiguous.’ The extent to which critical foreign policy studies have been able to influence policy formulation is minimal. Where foreign policy has been influenced by particular studies, it can be traced to ‘think-tanks’ and writers that uncritically rationalize post-apartheid foreign policy in terms of the ruling party’s early idealist foreign policy objectives.

The country’s commitment to regionalism and regional integration in southern Africa continues to be fraught with differing and contradictory interpretations. In the words of Winston Churchill, foreign policy operates “… in strange paradox, decided only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerful to be impotent” (cited in James, 2008: 4). In this regard, South Africa
remains unable to engineer a process of transformation and development in the region.

This thesis attempts to reinvigorate the foreign policy lassitude identified by O’Meara and Williams. Its strategic value lies in the original research gathered from South Africa’s regional neighbors as well as its ‘Allison–model’ (a theoretical paradigm for understanding decision making developed by American political scientist, G.T. Allison) assessment of South Africa’s foreign policy making. The insight gained from the interviews with policy-makers within South Africa and the region qualitatively supplement the existing South African foreign policy literature which has for long been dominated by the quantitative analysis from a motley collection of academic and policy institutions (almost all concentrated in Johannesburg and Pretoria). The timing is equally opportune, coinciding with the fourth post-apartheid elections in South Africa (April 2009). As South Africa reviews its internal values and priorities, there is no better time to assess how these are translated onto the external stage in the service of its national interests.
Chapter 3

African Renaissance or Consolidation of South African Hegemony?

Robert Cox has argued (1995: 31) that “theories follow reality in the sense that they are shaped by the world of experience. But they also precede the making of reality in that they orient the minds of those who by their actions reproduce or change that reality.” In this regard, theories are useful constructs for understanding the shifting dynamics of international relations. This chapter uses development and hegemonic stability theories as well as the middle power and pivot state paradigms to understand South Africa’s foreign policy vacillation between promoting the African agenda and consolidating South African hegemony in Southern Africa. It deviates from traditional international relations theoretical frameworks such as the realism, idealism and globalism, which have long been the primary lenses through which South African foreign policy is understood. The idea is not to dispute the relevance of these theories for South African foreign policy (indeed, aspects of the thesis still draw on the core assumptions of such theories: the discussion on Allison Models in Chapter 4 is rooted in realist theory while the discussions on dependency and dependent development in this Chapter touch on globalist thinking). The intention is to provide an alternative, more nuanced theoretical understanding of South Africa’s foreign policy dilemma in Southern Africa.

3.1 Development Theories

Many development theories are premised on the belief that the foreign policy of states is dictated by the structure of the international system. This is supported by the
writings of development economists such as Myint (1954) and Myrdal (1957: 7) who alluded to the growing sense of political urgency concerning the promotion of economic development in the underdeveloped regions in order to maintain international stability after World War 2. In this regard, South Africa’s post 1994 foreign policy in Southern Africa parallels Rostow’s An American Policy in Asia (1955: 43), “The United States must develop a more vigorous economic policy in Asia. Without such a policy our (American) political and military efforts in Asia will continue to have weak foundations…” While this school of thought focuses on an unequal international system and links development to broader political goals such as stability, pluralists contend that the structure of the international system reflects an interconnectedness and interdependency which impels development. A number of development initiatives in the Southern African region, particularly in the areas of transport, water and hydropower energy such as the Maputo Corridor project linking South Africa’s Mpumalanga province and Mozambique as well as the Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme between Lesotho and South Africa mirror such thinking. Nevertheless, the mushrooming cooperation among countries in Southern Africa has not been able to dispel fears over the large degree of uneven development and unequal relations between the supposed interdependent ‘partners.’ Dependency theory and the flying geese paradigm are useful explanatory tools for analyzing such a dilemma.

The primary concern of dependency theory is the pattern of dominance and dependence that characterizes the unequal relationship between the world’s rich and poor nations. If one accepts the analysis of dependency theory, then the questions of how poor economies develop become quite different from the traditional questions concerning comparative advantage, capital accumulation, and import/export
strategies. The success of the advanced industrial economies does not serve as a model for the currently developing economies. Indeed, in the 1950s and 1960s there was a paradigmatic consensus that growth strategies were universally applicable, a consensus best articulated by Walt Rostow (1960) in his book, *The Stages of Economic Growth*. Dependency theory suggests that the success of the richer countries was a highly contingent and specific episode in global economic history, one dominated by the highly exploitative colonial relationships of the European powers. A repeat of those relationships is now highly unlikely for the developing countries of the world. Dependent states, therefore, should attempt to pursue policies of self-reliance. Contrary to the neo-classical models endorsed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, greater integration into the global economy is not necessarily a good choice for poor countries and is perceived as an endorsement of autarky. The failure of such experiments as was the case with China’s Great Leap Forward and Tanzania’s policy of Ujamaa dispute autarky as a preferred option. Instead it is argued that developing countries should only endorse interactions on terms that promise to improve the social and economic welfare of the larger citizenry.

While generally directed to an analysis of the North-South nexus, dependency theory also reflects South Africa’s pre-1994 relationship with the region. According to Dos Santos (1970), dependence is a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. Dependency theorists such as Gunder Frank (1978) maintained that because of the hierarchical and unequal global division of labor and the various political mechanisms that maintain it, including collaboration between metropolitan and satellite comprador elites, Southern countries could never escape
underdevelopment unless they cut their ties with the North and underwent revolutionary change internally. Such thinking continues to shape the perceptions of Southern African governments which remain suspicious of South Africa’s attempts to play a transformative role in the region.

The flying-geese economic development model also has important lessons for our Republic given that Japan’s role in Asia’s regional development has strong parallels with the role expected of South Africa in the Southern African region. The model (see Akamatsu: 1962, Kitamura and Tanaka: 1997) was based on a V-shaped technological formation where, as ‘head of a flock of flying geese’, Japan played the leading role as the technology designer and delegated work to other countries in the region in different layers according to their level of development (for example, the immediate followers behind Japan would be technologically advanced countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore; and the next layer would be Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia). Walter Hatch (1998: electronic) argues that “together these countries became the surrogates of Japan, building up their manufacturing bases in a network to support the Japanese keiretsu, an integrated web of finance, production, trading and services…” He attributes the economic woes in Asia to a breakdown in this ‘flying geese’ pattern of regional development and maintains that the crisis is not likely to abate as long as the region’s political economies rely so heavily on Japanese capital and technology. Such correlation between dependency and development is very much in line with the body of literature that developed in the 1970s based on the thesis that not only is dependent development possible and, in some countries, occurring, but that this may also lead to the new form of dependency relations. Berberoglu (1992: 26) in an argument
supported by the work of Cardoso and Faletto (1979) as well as Warren (1973 and 1980), posits that:

The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-starting, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or negative effect on their immediate development.

In this regard, a South Africa that unconsciously promotes dependence rather than independence risks stifling development in neighboring countries which is the key to its long-run commitment to the region. On the other hand, if the South African profile was so low that neighboring countries could neither obtain the assistance they needed nor rely on South African investment, it could undermine development, creating still more dangerous choices.

Dependent development suggests that some nations are able to impose unequal exchanges on others and thus retard the economic development of these nations or make their development dependent on stronger or more economically advanced nations. Theorists such as Cardoso and Faletto (1979: 22) move beyond the dependency theory contextualization of dependence as an external imposition to examine the internal social struggles which define the structure of dependent nations. Economic relations, including the impetus for development, are a product of the different class struggles to change or preserve interests (Cardoso and Faletto 1979: 14). One could argue that the lack of significant change in South Africa’s economic
relations can be attributed to the dominant class preserving their interests by accommodating elements of the marginalized class. This tallies with studies on the emergence of a ‘black’ elite in the country and as Iheduru (1996) pointed out, there are no guarantees that the foreign policy of a black government would be friendlier than its white counterparts when the interests remain the same.

Although dependency theorists argue that quite often the interests of transnational capital can cause the ‘development of underdevelopment’, they do not see the solution as nations dividing economic labor and interacting as equal partners. Warren (1973: 4) argues that the obstacles to periphery country development are internal as the core countries’ policies and their overall impact on the periphery actually favor its industrialization. Development in newly industrializing countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Mexico and Brazil confirmed that under certain conditions capitalist development can be forged in the periphery. Cardoso and Faletto (1979: 199) rationalize such development in terms of the accords and alliances between the state and business enterprises which exclude the majority. They point out that friction between the state and big business are not as antagonistic as the contradictions between the dominant and marginalized classes. The sections on domestic challenges in Chapter 4 and on post apartheid corporate expansion in Chapter 5 attest to the validity of such contentions. In addition, Peter Evans (1979: 10-12) as well as Cardoso and Faletto (1979) insist that the new form of development is an associated or dependent type of capitalistic growth, which is fundamentally different from core-country development. In this regard, the marginalization or exclusion of the masses from participation in development which characterizes classic dependence relationships remains pervasive under dependent development as does the substantial
financial and technological dependence by the peripheral state. While such arguments support the reservations of Southern African countries over the ability of South Africa to play a transformative role in the region, such static assumptions about the continuing validity of the centre-periphery paradigm preclude further questions about the forms of reciprocal influence the ‘peripheral’ economies may exert (or have already exerted) on the core countries as the former become relatively more powerful economically than they were previously. Angola is a case in point.

3.2 Theory of Hegemonic Stability

The asymmetries which are at the centre of the core-periphery paradigm and which the development theories decry have always been negatively construed. However, the theory of hegemonic stability goes beyond such normative arguments to appreciate that such asymmetries could also be utilized to provide a degree of stability. Theorists of ‘world society’ from different approaches agree on the necessity of hegemonic power to maintain a liberal world order. The central tenet of such arguments is that the stability of the international system requires a single dominant state to articulate and enforce the rules of interaction among members. In this regard, security efforts are perceived as more likely to be successful when they are dominated by a preponderant power that can establish multilateral security regimes that provide collective goods, reduce transaction costs among members, engender trust among states, and check rogue state leaders. Such cogitations are consistent with the general arguments of Keohane (1984) and Gilpin (1987) which posit that the presence of asymmetries in the distribution of material and economic capabilities among states in a region is often more conducive to regional stability, a product of the preponderant power's (or hegemon's) establishment and maintenance of international regimes to
coordinate interstate activity in some issue area(s). In other words, even though the burden of providing the public goods will disproportionately fall on the hegemon (in the most extreme cases, the hegemon may assume the entire costs of the public good), it still is better off with the provision than without the provision of these public goods.

Furthermore, Krasner (1976), Gilpin (1987), and other scholars from the realist tradition have identified the distribution of power among states as a central factor in explaining the openness and stability of the international economy. Their arguments parallel that of Charles Kindleberger (1973: 305) who in the 1970s, was among the first to propound the theory of hegemonic stability. The theory explicated that the overwhelming dominance of a country (the hegemon) ensured an open and stable world economy since it served to coordinate and discipline other countries so that they could feel secure enough to open their markets and avoid beggar-thy-neighbor policies. Conversely, the theory associated the decline of a hegemon with economic closure, instability, and the creation of competing regional blocs. In this regard, theorists were able to use Great Britain in the 19th and the United States in the 20th centuries to illustrate how changes in the distribution of capabilities affect the world economy. During the nineteenth century, Britain’s hegemonic status sustained the globalization of markets, the openness of international trade and capital movements, the rise of multinational corporations, and the general economic and political stability that characterized Europe. World War I brought an abrupt end to both British hegemony and the conditions that it had promoted, replacing the latter with economic instability and the depression. Although the US was, at the end of World War I, the world's strongest economic power, it steadfastly refused to assume the leadership role that Britain could no longer play. Instead, the United States closed its markets to
foreign goods while the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff (1930) raised the average tax on imports to the United States by about 40 percent. The unwillingness of the United States to coordinate its monetary and currency policies with other countries propelled the world economy into a downward spiral. Learning from the negative consequences of such an isolationist posture, the US was quick to don the leadership mantle after the end of World War II by underpinning the creation of an open international trade system based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as well as a stable monetary system founded on the Bretton Woods system. Moreover, the United States’ Marshall Plan was a direct antithesis of the Smoot-Hawley tariff and initiated the conditions responsible for the steady economic growth and development experienced by the industrial countries up to the 1970s.

However, scholars such as Robert Keohane (1989) and David Lake (1993) dispute the relationship between hegemony and an open, stable world economy. While, the arguments advanced thus far are premised on the idea of a hegemon as a preponderant power, one of the difficulties of evaluating hegemonic stability theory is the absence of agreed criteria for measuring hegemony. The theory was developed against a backdrop of a perceived decline of American hegemony and a dramatic rise in Japanese power. Since the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the prolonged recession in Japan has forced many scholars to re-evaluate their estimates of hegemonic decline. Moreover, as US behavior during the interwar period illustrates, the possession of superior resources by a country does not translate automatically into greater influence or beneficial outcomes for the world. Such scholars view the role played by international institutions as mitigating why the distribution of power among countries is not the exclusive factor shaping the
international economy. Keohane acknowledges that hegemony might be necessary for initiating such institutions but maintains that once begun, they take on a life of their own. Multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, IMF, World Bank and WTO provide information to states about each others' behavior, reduce the cost of negotiating agreements, and can expose, and sometimes even punish, violations of agreements by states. The claim is that without these institutions the international economy - and international politics - would be much more unstable, less open, and more conflictual. However such claims are debatable given the current impetus for reform of such institutions based on their control by a few powerful hegemons.

Hegemonic stability theory emphasizes the need for hegemonic underwriting of cooperative efforts. In this regard, one can argue that there is a symbiotic relationship between multilateral institutions and hegemons. No institution evolves and functions on its own. Institutions are driven by key actors and reflect their interests. Such key actors (often with hegemonic attributes) shoulder a disproportionate share of the immediate costs of maintaining the institution– from which, in a much less explicit and less easily quantified way, they also stand to gain the greatest benefits. Multilateral institutions absorb some of the responsibility for stability from hegemonic powers, preventing their ‘relative decline in global power’ as articulated by Paul Kennedy (1987). Kennedy (1987: 438–9) contends that military over-stretch and a concomitant relative decline is the consistent threat facing powers whose ambitions and security requirements are greater than their resource base.

Such arguments justify South Africa’s use of multilateral forums such as the African Union to promote her broad objective of peace and stability. However, given the
The deficiencies of the AU’s security architecture, it does not explain why South Africa does not rely on like-minded strategic partners such as Nigeria to advance broad continental objectives. Gill (1993) affirms that in the absence of an obvious hegemon (as is the case with the African continent) states form coalitions to make up for their shortcomings in certain respects, implying that hegemony may be shared. Alden and Veira (2005: 1080) also refer to a situation where the international community confers the status of regional power on a middle power to shepherd weaker states into acceptance of the regional pecking order. However, caught between the international and regional contexts and needing both to garner legitimacy, the regional power’s ambivalent identity impedes its ability to consolidate its hegemony. South Africa is a case in point.

This brings one to the issue of legitimacy which John Ikenberry views as the primary gains from multilateral institutional cooperation. In explaining why a hegemonic power may still seek multilateral cooperation despite uncertain returns and loss of autonomy, Ikenberry posits that ‘material dominance alone is unlikely to last in the absence of a social framework that legitimates the power and leadership of the hegemon’ (Milner, 1998: electronic). Multilateral institutions provide a potent avenue for such legitimacy. Through them, hegemonic powers consent to ‘bind’ themselves to specified restraints in dealing with their weaker partners, in return for the latter’s
acceptance of their primacy (Milner, 1998: electronic). Robert Cox (1986), in fact, defines international hegemony as the formation of a coalition of top-down forces activated by a common consciousness in which those at the bottom are able to participate. International orders that ensure such ‘institutional-binding’ last longer and are generally more stable than those which are simply based on unilateral or bilateral relationships between the hegemon and the weaker states. Wohlfarth (2004: 199) affirms:

"Legitimate hegemonies are far cheaper and safer to maintain over the long run than illegitimate ones. Institutionalized hegemonies are far cheaper and safer to maintain than over the long run than non-institutionalized ones. And hegemonic powers that find ways to accommodate the status drives of lesser states face fewer costs over the long run. Aggressively unilateral policies undermine legitimacy, corrode institutions and heighten status anxieties, generating higher costs and greater instability over the long run."

The difference between South Africa’s bilateral efforts in Zimbabwe and her SADC-mandated mediation role is instructive in this regard. It was the latter effort that was credited with facilitating conditions for the 2008 elections.

Any serious evaluation of the role played by a hegemon or the ability of a hegemon to play such a role needs a deeper understanding of the source of such preponderance. Hedley Bull’s (1977:214) delineation of the three forms of preponderance provides a useful starting point:

(i) Dominance: […] characterized by the habitual use of force by a great power against the lesser states comprising its hinterland […]."
(ii) Hegemony: The great power prefers to rely upon instruments other than the direct use or threat of force, and will employ the latter only in situations of extremity [...] 

(iii) Primacy/Leadership: A great power’s preponderance in relation to a group of lesser states takes the form of primacy when it is achieved without any resort to force or the threat of force [...] The position of primacy or leadership which the great power enjoys is freely conceded by the lesser states within the group concerned [...] 

Such delineation is useful in exposing the manner in which such concepts have been abused through interchangeable use. Schoeman, for example, confuses the concepts of dominance and hegemony. She (2002: 228) notes that “hegemons are considered to be ‘natural leaders’ within particular international systems, such as a region and/or sub-region and this position of leadership is based on their relative strength (economic and in some instances military) vis-à-vis other states in the same system” but later argues that a “hegemon in the pejorative sense belongs more to the idea of a behemoth: a big and powerful state (militarily and economically) that has very little sense of, or shows little care for, the effect of its actions on other states (2007: 93).” In this regard, one could understand hegemonic stability theory as a variant of international relations realism, where the emphasis is placed on the role of power (Guzzini 1998: 142-60). Preponderant power allows those possessing it to coerce those who do not, but it is becoming less and less clear wherein such power resides (Holsti 1977: 164-82). Kenneth Waltz (1979: 131), for instance, refers to size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence, as “aggregate capabilities” (although he does not
clarify the formula for aggregation). Michel Foucault (1980: 39), on the other hand, draws a clearer distinction between domination and hegemony:

It differs from simple domination by being based on consent and legitimacy and thus presupposes a certain commonality of values. A prospective hegemon needs to behave in a manner deemed acceptable by those actors whom it wishes to lead, and it has to present its own objectives and strategies as furthering the public good. Such an ability to persuade is not so much an antithesis of power, but rather an integral element in power...

Equally noteworthy is the link between hegemony and leadership that is drawn by Habib and Selinyane (2004: 54):

a hegemon is a global or regional leader in military, political, economic and often cultural affairs. Hegemons not only aspire to leadership, and are not only endowed with military, economic and other resources: they have a political and socio-economic vision for their transnational environments, and a political willingness to implement it. If that vision is one of security, stability, and development, as is often the case, then the hegemon will underwrite the implementation of those goals. Again, that does not mean that a hegemon does not have partners in this enterprise. It often does, but it takes responsibility for ensuring that the contents of its vision are given concrete form in the region it sees as its sphere of influence.
A hegemonic status can also constrain the hegemon, as it cannot afford (to be seen to) behave too selfishly, but must show concern for the common good, or at least appear to be doing so. In essence, one can conclude that to be a hegemon, a state must have three attributes:

(i) Capability to enforce the rules of the system based on a large growing economy, dominance in a leading technological or economic sector and political power reinforced by projective military power.
(ii) Will to do so based on commitment to a mutually beneficial system.
(iii) Ideology acceptable to others in the system.

Janis van der Westhuizen (2010: 20) affirms that “effective hegemony requires consent among weaker states – or their elites – constructed around the norms and ideas espoused by the leading regional power and expressed in collectively based institutions.”

Evaluating South Africa’s hegemonic potential against such criteria shows that the country possesses palpable capability, schizophrenic commitment and will to act but lacks the all important acceptance by others in the system. A quick survey of the latest statistics allows one to gauge South Africa’s economic and military strength in relation to the rest of the region (see annexure 1). Its ability to enforce the rule of the system is undeniable. In terms of commitment to a mutually beneficial system, the post apartheid South African government has worked tirelessly in the building of institutions for regional and continental integration as well as in representing regional and continental interests on the world stage. President Mbeki has played a leading role in lobbying for NEPAD to the G8, the EU, and the UN. South Africa has also used its position in the UNCTAD, NAM, and the international finance institutions to
advance third world and African concerns over the international political and economic order. However, this commitment has on occasion been displaced by national interest as seen in its rejection of demands for reparations for slavery, colonialism and apartheid at the World Conference Against Racism in 2001; and in breaking ranks with the Third World against the 'Washington Consensus' at the UN Conference on Development Finance in Monterrey, Mexico, in 2002. Perhaps the most tangible example is the tension felt between Zimbabwe and South Africa over the latter’s use of its economic muscle in trade negotiations – a tension which was all-too-often portrayed as a simple personality clash between Robert Mugabe and Nelson Mandela. Currently, there have even been perceptions of rivalry between South Africa and Angola, which is seen as harboring strong regional ambitions of its own.

South Africa’s wavering commitment underscores the concerns of the Southern African region that a hegemonic South Africa would use its role to further narrow national interests. However, Habib (2003) points out that “…as the US relations with Western Europe in the post World War II period indicate, national interests of hegemons can under certain circumstances coincide with those of particular regions.” In this regard, Habib (2003: electronic) argues that “…a hegemonic role has to be undertaken by South Africa if we are committed to the realization of stability, security, and development in South Africa, in Southern Africa, and in Africa. Lesotho is the example we need to learn from. Zimbabwe is the example to avoid.” One could counter that the examples used by Habib in fact justify South Africa’s reluctance to assume a hegemonic leadership role: The country was heavily criticized for the Lesotho intervention while its quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe was more productive in engaging the Mugabe government than the confrontational position adopted by Britain. Although South Africa’s quiet diplomacy was slated as
ineffective, it allowed the country the space within which to engage Zimbabwe right until the signing of the Global Political Agreement in 2008. The South African President, Jacob Zuma (in a 2008 interview with Patrick Smith: 23) affirmed that:

People who have criticized South Africa have done nothing – they can’t say they have done anything that has succeeded… We needed to engage the Zimbabweans on both sides; it would not have been prudent to criticize them. How would we have engaged them on both sides if we did so…

Nevertheless, the post-apartheid South African government has slowly and painfully learnt that the country’s preparedness to drive the regional agenda clashes with the region’s willingness to have South Africa play this role. The central paradox of leadership – that it requires followership – explains why, however desirable it might appear for South Africa to undertake the responsibilities of a regional leader, it cannot and dare not do so. One has to draw a distinction between hegemony (the capacity of a powerful state to dictate policies to other states) and leadership (the capacity to engage less powerful states so that they adopt the goals of the leading state as their own). While South Africa’s status in the region is often described as ‘hegemonic,’ this has not enabled the country to deliver on its Southern Africa vision. Marais (1998) observes that South Africa’s hegemony is literally true to the extent that the country economically dominates much of the region, but in the Gramscian (Gramsci 1971: 323-77) sense of the term -- that of winning the active consent of other actors – South Africa dominates, but neither controls nor enjoys hegemony in the region - a state of affairs that inhibits its ability to drive regional development initiatives. One could even argue that South Africa is more a primus entre pares than a leader in the
region. Indeed, traditional attributes of power such as economic and military strength are necessary but not sufficient to become a hegemon. Although these aspects of power undoubtedly contribute to the creation of hegemony, sufficiency would seem to lie in the acceptance of the hegemon’s goals, objectives, rules and values. Unless the ‘hegemon’ is accepted as such within its sphere of influence, it is doubtful that its strategies and tactics of achieving its goals will be successful. Evans and Newnham (1998: 221) put this well when they stress that “a hegemon’s ability to lead is derived as much from what it stands for as from how it seeks to achieve its goals.” In this regard, the ‘appearance’ of being a hegemon is often wrongly associated with a state’s ability to necessarily act as a hegemon. Once again, the furor over South Africa’s policy towards Zimbabwe is instructive. South Africa’s perceived failure to take more decisive action against the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe has been criticized severely by both domestic and international observers. Alden and Schoeman (2004: electronic) rightly conclude that ‘obvious hegemony’ (being a much more powerful country than Zimbabwe in terms of tangible indices such as military strength and economic power) does not mean ‘genuine’ hegemony and that unless the dominant country’s values are acceptable, it cannot exert its influence on weaker neighbors. This was also reflected in South Africa’s inability in 1995 to convince the SADC Summit (which it had called for) to take collective action against Nigeria, following the brutal hanging of Nigerian activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, and eight of his Ogoni campaigners by the Abacha regime. Adebajo (2006: electronic) points out that even the then President, Nelson Mandela’s, “iconic status failed to rally a single southern African state to take action against Nigeria.” Notably, it was Pretoria that was accused by many African leaders of becoming “a western Trojan horse sowing seeds of

Adebajo contends that

It is probably not an exaggeration to say that this single incident greatly
influenced Mbeki’s policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ towards Zimbabwe.
African efforts to depict Pretoria as a western stooge over Nigeria were a
painful experience that Pretoria was determined never to repeat.

There are other alternatives. However, in seeking to be politically correct, policy
makers have eschewed the hegemonic possibilities as envisaged by scholars such as
Rob Davies (which maps three scenarios of South Africa’s role in the region: a South
Africa first approach, an integration under South African hegemony, and a non-
hegemonic and regional cooperation approach) as well as a two-part article by
McGowan and Ahwireg-Obeng (which rationalizes South Africa’s option as
between hegemony and partnership) to highlight the common assumptions that
hegemony and partnership are mutually exclusive options, with the latter often being
romanticized. He astutely observes that “any careful study of hegemonic behavior, in
both global and regional contexts, would demonstrate that partnership is as much a
modality of engagement as other, more aggressive interventions” (Habib, 2003:
Africa’s aggregate capabilities in terms of economic, diplomatic and military
capacities, in relation to other African nations, automatically defined it, at least for
now, as a regional power or hegemon. This status imparted to it a set of privileges,
obligations and responsibilities that separate it both from its African counterparts and
other middle powers. Just as importantly, it progressively defined South Africa's
foreign policy agenda and practice. One could concur that as a benign hegemon, South Africa could sustain equitable regional development on the condition that regional actors are prepared to voluntarily accept South Africa's leadership. The long-term dividend could be mutually beneficial regional partnership leading to sustained development.

However, one could also argue that Habib’s vision is based on a gross caricature of South Africa’s abilities. Any hegemonic-driven regional system will be shaped not only by South Africa’s posture but also by other regional members. An issue paper produced by the Inter Africa Group and Justice Africa schematizes four different responses to hegemony:

1. Smaller states may seek to contain the hegemon within a wider system, thus diluting its power and obliging it to act according to a set of wider rules. The dominant power thus becomes the core of the regional system. (One could argue that this explains the current status of South Africa in Southern Africa, particularly with regard to SADC.)

2. Smaller states may align with a dominant power in order to obtain some of the benefits of its hegemonic status, including security protection and/or economic band-wagoning. (Lesotho’s relationship with South Africa is a case in point.)

3. The dominant power may itself see a wider coalition as a means of sharing the burden of its role, distributing the economic, military and diplomatic costs among other members of the community. (South
Africa’s support for multilateral rather than unilateral peace initiatives is indicative of such thinking.)

4. Smaller states may mobilize an alliance to provide a counter-force to the hegemonic threat. In this case the dominant power is outside the regional system. (The Southern African response to apartheid South Africa is a prime example.)

In essence, hegemony does not translate into unbridled power. States in a system may acquiesce to or resist a hegemon, depending on the form and nature of that hegemony as well as their own interests. For example, South Africa’s diplomacy in the DRC was undermined by Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola which sent troops to the country in 1998. Moreover, Adebajo (2006: electronic) contends that with states such as Angola and Zimbabwe harboring their own regional leadership aspirations, South Africa will be unable to assert leadership effectively in Southern Africa. He attributes South Africa’s need for alliances outside its own sub-region (such as that with Nigeria) to the failure of its regional leadership ambitions.

3.3 Of Pivot States, Middle and Emerging Powers

Hegemonic stability models preclude preponderant powers from leading roles other than a hegemon. In this regard, an alternative model, one that has been relatively unexplored in theoretical musings, is that of a pivot state (what the Germans refer to as ‘anchor’ states). According to Landsberg (2003: electronic),

A pivot state is one that in comparison to its neighbors is, *ipso facto*, a powerful state. From such relative powerfulness flows the capability to
influence other states, events and regions. The pivot state is influential in a region because internal developments in such states or lack thereof, are so significant that it typically holds major implications for states in its immediate region.

It differs from a hegemon in the sense that “while a regional hegemon is a powerful state that sees itself as capable of laying the law down to others through its dominance, the pivot state is one that acts in the regional interest in collaboration with others” (Landsberg, 2003: electronic). In this regard, Landsberg falls into the trap identified by Habib, where hegemonic leadership is perceived as excluding collaborative work and partnership-building. Such consideration leads one to the realization that in its broad conceptualization, there is not much difference between Habib’s hegemonic leadership and Landsberg’s pivot state. Habib and Selinyane (2004: 54) even suggest that every hegemon is a pivot state but needs to be more. A more nuanced analysis shows that the key difference between a hegemonic and pivot state is the latter’s inherent vulnerability. Landsberg (2003: electronic) notes that:

the pivot state is delicately poised between potential success and possible failure: it has the potential to work a significant beneficial or harmful effect on its region. While such a state might be stronger and more developed vis-à-vis others, it also suffers from its own significant socio-economic challenges, such as deep inequalities and massive levels of poverty.

It is such internal impediments which inform the pivot state’s reluctance to assume the leadership role that is so critical for a hegemon. In this regard, the pivot state
paradigm is most useful in explaining South Africa’s preference for multilateral action rather than a unilateral exercise of its power.

However, as noted earlier, the concept of pivot state has been relatively unexplored. This is not surprising given the extensive literature on middle and emerging powers (Spence, 2004: 42-45; Cooper et.al, 1993: 402; Habib and Selinyane, 2004: 51) which is grounded on similar conceptual underpinnings:

Table 3-1: Differentiating between Middle and Emerging Powers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Middle Power</th>
<th>Emerging Power</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>eg. Canada, Norway, and Sweden,</td>
<td>eg. India and Brazil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically well developed and democratic states whose governments aspire to a role in international politics.</td>
<td>Reasonably secure stable domestic base, military capability and sizeable economic capability with sufficient resources to deliver on goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use their standing as good citizens to influence outcomes in areas such as the protection and assertion of human rights; peacekeeping; mediation. For example, Norway and the Oslo Accords.</td>
<td>Have proactive, assertive foreign policies that sanction a leading role in initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usually have a moral dimension to their foreign policy which strikes a positive chord with their electorate. For example, Sweden's anti-apartheid record.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-powers rely on multilateralism and networking to advance a vast array of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
common issues where they believe they cannot act alone effectively, but may be able to have a systemic impact as part of a small group or through international institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common issues</th>
<th>Systemic impact</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do not necessarily seek to be regional hegemons or to exert influence on a global scale or to transform the global political system.</td>
<td>Have wider aspirations and expectations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They focus on particular issues, choosing appropriate arenas where their intervention can make a difference, or support the initiatives of likeminded colleagues.</td>
<td>They seek an effective and constructive regional role, and possibly, in some instances a global one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They do not pursue over-ambitious goals.</td>
<td>Aspire to be great powers.</td>
</tr>
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| Often plays the role of catalyst in providing intellectual and political energy to trigger initiatives and build coalitions as well as facilitator in developing agendas for action, cementing coalitions to leverage power, planning, convening formative meetings and setting priorities | Role is more managerial, assumes the lead in building institutions and undertaking initiatives. |

| Traditional middle powers of the Cold War chose the global arena as their plane of action and were not regional powers. | Emerging powers are regional and they shoulder responsibility for stability and order in all of their member countries. |
Scholars such as Schoeman (2003) maintain that South Africa may not meet all the criteria of being an emerging power. They posit that the internal dynamics in the country are not stable, and there is no indication of willingness and a capacity to take on the role of an emerging power. Furthermore, South Africa’s lack of credibility as a leader in the region contrasts with an emerging power’s acceptability to its neighbors. South Africa’s inability to assume the mantle of emerging power has also often been rationalized in terms of the country’s broader geopolitical status. Chase et al (1996, 44-46) argue that:

in global geopolitical terms, South Africa is a rather small country. For example, its total GDP is about the same size as Ford Motor Company’s global sales. It has variously been labeled as insignificant, at worst and as a middle power or pivotal state, at best.

Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk (2002, 254-255) concur that while South Africa dominates the Southern African region economically, in global terms it is a middle-income economy which maintains a medium human development ranking on the UN Development Programme’s index, placing it below Cuba and next to the Dominican Republic and Sri Lanka. McGowan (1993, 37) affirms that South Africa is semi-peripheral in the world system but, because of its regional dominance, is often compared to Mexico and Brazil in Central and South America, Indonesia and Malaysia in Southeast Asia, and Israel and Iran in the Middle East. Thomas Scott (cited in Marais, 1998) goes even further by describing the country as “a pedestrian middle income developing country which does not add up to a great deal in global economic league tables.” Annexure 2 which provides a comparative perspective of BRIC/IBSA countries’ Foreign Direct Investment Outflows and Inflows is instructive.
in this regard. The evidence advanced decry the possibility of South Africa being an emerging power and instead allude to its suitability as a middle power.

Robert Cox (1989:827) notes that middle powers are to be found in the middle rank of capabilities, both military and economic, and they seek to bolster international institutions for co-operative management of common problems. In this regard, there is a close affinity between middle powers and multilateralism. Essentially, the concept of middle-power diplomacy provides a central role to multilateral institutions (see Cooper et al, 1993: 19; Nel et al, 2001). It is an anti-hegemonic approach to the conduct of international relations and focuses on a collaborative instead of a competitive world. Keohane (1969: 296) affirms that “a middle power is a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systematic impact in a small group or through an international institution.” South Africa’s involvement in multilateral diplomacy is therefore a function of its realistic assessment of its limited power resources, but also its desire to contribute to a collaborative world order. Interestingly, it was precisely in this area that the pre-1994 apartheid regime was weakest: having withdrawn from the Commonwealth in 1960, and having been prevented from occupying South Africa's seat in the UN General Assembly and most specialized agencies of the UN from 1974, the South African state was unable to impact on the majority of global (and even regional) issues for over 20 years.

Multilateral diplomacy has since become the biggest growth industry in South Africa’s foreign policy. A former South African Director-General (DG) of Foreign Affairs, Jackie Selebi, noted in 1999 that “South Africa attaches immeasurable
significance to its multilateral engagements. Indeed, multilateralism is the cornerstone of this country’s foreign policy” (cited in Nel et al, 2001: 1). Since 1994 South Africa has joined, re-joined, or acceded to some forty-five inter-governmental organizations and multilateral treaties (see Van Der Westhuizen: 1998; Nel, et al: 2001; Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk: 2002; www.gov.za). In addition, the country accepted a wide range of multilateral leadership responsibilities at a global, continental and sub-regional level. The most notable of these leadership positions are the Chair of the Southern African Development Community from 1995 to 1999, the Presidency of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development between 1996 and 1999, the Chair of the Non-aligned movement from 1998 to 1999, and the Chair of the Commonwealth, 1999-2002. South Africa has also chaired the Oslo Diplomatic Conference on an International Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Land Mines; the 1998 Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights; as well as accepted election to the Executive Boards of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Furthermore, in 1999 South Africa was also appointed to the G20, a multilateral body of eighteen finance ministers and central bank governors of leading countries of the world, the EU and the Bretton Woods institutions, created by the G7 most industrialized nations. The country has also played a key role in a number of multilateral initiatives such as the re-negotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, the multilateral ban on the production, stockpiling and distribution of anti-personnel landmines (1997), and the signing of the Rome Statute in 1998 which created the first-ever International Criminal Court. In addition, South Africa’s name has consistently
appeared on the Secretary-General’s ‘Roll of Honor’ of countries that pay their dues timeously. South Africa’s assessed contribution to the regular budget of the UN for 2010 was US$ 8,141,212 or 0.385% of the total budget (http://pfcmc.com/en/ga/contributions/honourroll.shtml).

Nel, Taylor, and van der Westhuizen (2001: 5) aptly summarize South Africa’s multilateralism as characterized by:

- high levels of activism in multilateral institutions in general, an increasing use of such institutions to achieve broader foreign policy goals, and an endorsement of multilateralism in general as a preferable institutional form in global interaction;
- attempts to revive or further strengthen existing multilateral institutions, both on the continent of Africa and globally, that are supposed to look after the interests of the developing countries; and
- concerted efforts to institute some changes in the way institutions of global governance deal with and handle the concerns of the developing countries, and to offset, in particular, the marginalization of Africa.

At the ministerial meeting of the Co-coordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in Colombia, the former South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo, committed South Africa to “... a global system of social security that is created and operated through the vehicle of multilateralism” (cited in Cilliers, 1999: electronic). This sentiment was echoed most notably by President Mbeki in his budget address to the National Assembly on 13 June 2000, when he justified South
Africa’s engagement in multilateral affairs (which he termed global governance) as being the main contribution that the country could make to off-setting the negative impact of globalization on the poorer nations of the world. As chair of the G-20 of Finance Ministers, South Africa has played an increasingly important role in shaping the political discourse and policy discussion on reform of the Bretton Woods institutions — the World Bank and the IMF — as well as improving the institutional underpinnings of the global financial governance architecture. In addition to its active participation in such multilateral bodies, South Africa has committed itself to the reform of the UN and to the possibilities of South-South cooperation in the framework of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation and the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic. In a speech about multilateralism in South Africa’s foreign policy, Mr Jackie Selebi noted that:

> It is a known fact that multilateralism allows for gains to be equitably shared amongst all in the world, whilst also equitably spreading the risk associated with it. It empowers the weak, whilst constraining the untrammelled ambitions of the powerful and greedy (Nel et al, 2001: 12).

In this regard, promoting the developmental agenda of the South has been a key element in President Mbeki’s participation in a number of meetings such as the OAU-EU Summit in Egypt, the meeting of the Nordic Prime Ministers in Denmark, the G-77 Conference in Cuba, the Berlin meeting on Progressive Government in the Twenty-First Century, the EU Summit in Portugal, the G-8 Summit in Tokyo and the UN Millennium Summit in New York. Commenting on President Thabo Mbeki’s emerging role at the end of his first year in office, a journalist, Howard Barrell,
claimed that “as a result of his recent interventions, Mbeki has emerged over the past six months (January – June 2000) as the developing countries’ single most important voice in the world economy” (Van der Westhuizen et al, 2001: 111).

Black (1997: 1) notes that middle power leadership is often based on implicit or explicit assumptions of moral superiority. In this regard, RSA qualifies as a middle power because of the 'moral thrust' of its foreign policy, with its emphasis on Third world economic and social deprivation. However, a critical examination of middle power foreign policies, including South Africa, often contradicts these assumptions of occupying the moral high ground. For example, reluctance on the part of middle powers to take a stance in a conflict situation (while sometimes related to their national role conceptions of mediator) has often led to the charge of ‘fence-sitting’ leveled against them. Cooper et al (1993: 17) effectively illustrate this moral relativism of middle powers by comparing Australian and Canadian rhetoric on Kuwait's sovereignty in the Gulf conflict of 1990-1991 with their silence on Indonesia's invasion and annexation of East Timor in 1975. South Africa is viewed in a similar light. The examples provided illustrate the danger of conceptualizing middle powers in benign terms and in equating their national interests with the general interest. Instead, such examples confirm that national self-interest and realpolitik concerns still largely influence the foreign policies of middle powers. While middle powers seem to be committed to collective interests, at least at the rhetorical level where such interests conflict with the national interest, it is the latter which prevails (see Solomon, 1997). Cox (1989) and Black (1997) agree that middle powers are not simply middle powers because of their participation in mediation or
cooperation but because it suits their long term interest vis-a-vis world order, the world economy, and the pursuit of dominant societal values and interests.

Van der Westhuizen et al (2001: 116) observe that whilst Pretoria has been a foremost proponent of a system of global governance that would be more accommodating towards the interests of the South, its (albeit reserved) support for trade liberalization serves to strengthen its own hand in Southern Africa as well as the rest of the continent. In addition, Naidu (2004: 217) alludes to the perceptions that South Africa's role in multilateral forums like the WTO, G8, Bretton Woods institutions, and even within continental initiatives like NEPAD is based on a sub-imperial agenda: “South African authorities are negotiating to further their country's national agenda and to advance market access for their corporates into Africa and the developed markets, with little concern for their neighbors and the continent”. Furthermore, Keet (2003:12) argues that:

it is...not lost on other African countries that South Africa - with its banks, private companies, and even parastatal corporations keenly looking for investment opportunities in Africa and elsewhere - has its own 'national interests' in promoting the kind of 'global rights' of corporations in all countries and (almost all)sectors that an investment agreement in the WTO is aimed at.

In this regard the dilemma that South Africa faces in its multilateral engagement is very similar to the quandary facing another middle power, Australia: John McKay (2004: 401) uses the issue of Australian solidarity with the USA war on terrorism to show the disjuncture between the government position that it is ‘punching above its
weight’ in the international arena and the broader perception that Australia is in fact ‘shooting itself in the foot’ by destroying many of the key regional relationships that have been carefully nurtured over several decades. In essence, South Africa’s middle power status proves just as contentious as that of emerging power or hegemon as the country’s multilateral diplomacy could easily be perceived as maintaining a fundamentally flawed global order instead of contributing to its transformation. This reinforces the perception of South Africa as a selfish hegemon, maintaining a system that advantages it.

3.4 Discourse Theory

The analysis of hegemonic, middle power, emerging power and pivot state statuses illustrate that states may have many different social identities which can be cooperative or conflictual, and that state interests vary accordingly. Adler (1997) and Wendt (1999) are both proponents of such thinking which advocates that the international system consists of social relationships as well as material capabilities. In this regard, the identities and interests of states are tied to how states relate to one another. Collins (1986: 6-8) points out that:

When social actors acquire resources, they seek to convert them into something that has more value to them than the mere possession of material things: social status. When this conversion process is blocked, the tension builds and status hierarchies become unstable.

This provides useful insight into the South Africa-Southern African relationship and the inability of South Africa to successfully implement her transformative development agenda. Turner (1988) uses the term ‘status dissonance’ to describe
such a situation where the inability of actors to sort out their rank in a prestige hierarchy is due to the fact that on some dimension of status they are peers but not on others.

In essence, this is the importance of discourse theory to the study being undertaken: such issues of status, identity formation, and the structuring of societies by a plurality of social imaginaries are central objects of investigation of discourse theory. According to Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 6), “discourse theorists are not just concerned with the way in which social actors understand their particular worlds, but attention is focused more on the creation, disruption and transformation of the structures that organize social life.” The construction and experience of social antagonisms are central for political discourse theory. As Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 4) put it, “antagonisms show the points where identity is no longer fixed in a differential system, but is contested by forces which stand outside or at the very limit of that order.” Social antagonisms occur because social agents are unable to achieve fully their identity. This, it could be argued is at the root of South Africa’s inability to find a niche for herself in the Southern African region which in turn has inhibited her ability to promote transformative development in the region.

Laclau and Mouffe (1985) attribute the failure to fully achieve one’s identity to ‘dislocation events’ which on the one hand threaten identities and on the other, are the foundation on which new identities are constituted. In other words, as Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 13) observe, “if dislocations disturb identities and discourses, they also create a lack at the level of meaning that stimulates new discursive constructions, which attempt to ‘fix’ the dislocated structure.” Chapter 5 of this thesis explains how
the dislocatory effects of the external environment along with post-apartheid internal dynamics provoked a temporal suspension of South Africa as a selfish hegemon in Southern Africa (the dominant discourse during apartheid). Both these factors brought the limitations of the dominant discourse to the surface, allowing a space for the search for alternatives. The lack of consolidation of other new forms of political identification such as partner is attributed to the inability of Southern African countries to alter their perceptions of South Africa (Chapter 4), a situation that is not helped by the self-seeking activities of South African corporates in the region. To an extent, the discrepancy between South African pronouncements (very reconciliatory with regard to regional relations) and practice (with regard to economic and domestic interests) accounts for the transitory nature of post-apartheid South Africa’s identity discourse. Moreover, in the absence of a viable post-apartheid identity, South Africa was unable to sell its vision of transformative development to a region that was still suspicious of its intentions.

Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 9) also contend that discourses and the identities produced through them are inherently political entities that involve the construction of antagonisms and the exercise of power. This is particularly true for the study being undertaken in this thesis which illustrates that identity plays a significant role in how South Africa is perceived by the region and how the region is perceived by South Africa. During the apartheid years, the region drew an antagonistic shield by which the minority white government in South Africa was radically excluded from the domain of the legitimate. The side beyond the shield was more and more discursively constructed as a source of domination and exploitation fuelling a regional identity molded by resentment and resistance. The period that marked the end of the Cold
War and the dismantling of apartheid constituted a ‘dislocation’ opportunity for the region’s antagonistic shield to be removed and for South Africa to forge a new more affable identity. Discourse theorists regard new identities as important elements in terms of establishing (or not) equivalent chains with other groups or organizations. The equivalential identities created, express a clear negation of a discourse system (the existing discourse system in this case being apartheid). In this regard, discourse theorists also highlight the role of leaders and political entrepreneurs who, during the dislocation moments, are identified to build new identities and equivalential chains between antagonistic groups. One could argue that the discourse on the African Renaissance, as articulated and promoted by Mbeki, represented such an attempt to craft a new post-apartheid identity that linked South Africa more closely with its neighbors and the rest of the African continent (as opposed to apartheid which was isolationist in nature). It was the ambiguities of this and other initiatives (such as NEPAD) coupled with domestic challenges (as captured in Chapter 4) which prevented a more conciliatory South African identity from taking root and forming an ‘equivalential chain’ with the region. In fact, many countries in Southern Africa remain suspicious of what they perceive as old apartheid dominance clothed in new post-apartheid rhetoric. This clearly constitutes a failure by the South African state to unequivocally negate (or convince its regional neighbors that it has negated) the old discourse which shaped its regional relations. Herein lies the current challenge facing South Africa’s foreign policy in Southern Africa.

However, one could also argue that political discourse theory as an alternative approach to understanding the structuration of socio-political spaces provides South African policy makers with a means to address this challenge. According to Howarth
and Stavrakakis (2000), the articulation of a political discourse can only take place around an empty signifier that functions as a nodal point: “nodal points are those privileged signifiers or reference points through which the rest of the elements of a discourse acquire their meaning.” In this regard, it is the contention of this study that the building of a sustainable ‘equivalential chain’ that links South Africa to Southern Africa rests on the promotion of transformative development as an ‘empty signifier’ that functions as the nodal point for Southern African regional relations.
Chapter 4

Beyond the rose-tinted glass: Constraints in cultivating a more efficacious

Southern Africa foreign policy

Undoubtedly, efforts to reconfigure South Africa’s foreign policy towards Southern Africa in the post apartheid period has brought with it exciting possibilities as well as serious problems and challenges. Increasingly, foreign policy analysts and government officials alike have called for the country to take a leadership role in Southern Africa — to move beyond the consultation and consensus-seeking patterns of engagement that have stymied progress in the region thus far. Yet, there are clear limits to the ability of South Africa to impact upon the region. One could argue that South Africa’s potential leadership of the region is condemned by its unhappy past. The idea that ‘what is good for South Africa is good for Southern Africa’ revisits a series of uncomfortable historical encounters between the country and the region. Herbst (1995: 148) cautions against the assumption that the ANC regime has a ready largesse for SADC and Africa, since this is based on the familiar cliché that the old South Africa was destabilizing and the new South Africa will therefore be an unmitigated good.

The country’s residual power, particularly its economic muscle and military strength, skew (not balance) the prospects of sustainable and equitable development in southern Africa. Given its dominant economic, political and military positions, South Africa has often been expected to take a regional policy lead in Southern Africa, but in turn has been singled out for criticism over its perceived hegemony. Mills (1994) aptly
sums up South Africa’s dilemma regarding any regional action as “a case of damned if it does and damned if it doesn't.” South Africa’s response to the Zimbabwe crisis is a fitting reflection of this ‘lose-lose situation.’ While the Republic has been lambasted for not doing enough, a decisive military intervention (even if SADC-mandated as in Lesotho in 1998) would have been criticized as an exercise of bully-boy tactics. Such contradictions hint at the unrealistic hopes and ambivalent expectations on South Africa’s revamped foreign policy.

Despite South Africa’s newly avowed commitment to the sub-region, the reality on the ground remains that of lingering reservations or hostilities about the actual South African objectives and intentions in Southern Africa. As has been illustrated, despite scholarly analyses to the contrary, the fear and antagonism toward South Africa continues to be driven by justifiable concerns about the latter’s predatory policies and perceived lack of tangible commitment to collective sub-regional agreements. For example, South Africa’s SADC-mandated mediation in Zimbabwe was undermined by the unilateral action of President Mbeki: his announcement at a press conference that there was ‘no crisis in Zimbabwe’ (captured in most newspapers, for example see telegraph.co.uk as well as Harper and Mkhabela, 2008) was premature and preceded his meeting with the SADC Chair who publicly averred otherwise. The then-chair of SADC, the now late President Levy Mwanawasa of Zambia openly criticized Mbeki for not briefing him on his meeting with Robert Mugabe and further stated that: “It’s scandalous for SADC to remain silent on Zimbabwe…The current political situation in Zimbabwe falls far short of the SADC principles…” (http://www.sokwanele.com/thisiszimbabwe/archives/1085). It would be safe to
assume that the putative diplomatic snub that this entailed would have been duly noted in other SADC capitals.

In this regard, the chapter unpacks the disjuncture between theory and practice within South Africa’s foreign policy (as recognized by Diescho: 1996, Evans: 1991, Mills: 1997, Williams: 2000, Le Pere, Lambrechts, and Van Nieuwkerk: 1999). Drawing on interviews with various internal and external foreign policy players, it exposes the controlling domestic shackles, the yoke of reality-distorting perceptions as well as the conflicting interests and needs of other regional states which inhibit South Africa’s ability to craft an efficacious foreign policy. In doing so, the chapter responds to the question raised by Adebajo et al. (2007: 17) in the introduction of *South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era*: “To what extent has South Africa been liberated to play a leading role in Africa, and to what extent is it still crippled not only by the past, but by the widely varying priorities of its 47 million people?”

4.1 Domestic Constraints

Selebi (1999) once pointed out that “foreign policy is nothing other than the pursuit of domestic policies and priorities internationally.” One can infer that the cleavages of domestic politics often color the foreign policy agenda and to a considerable extent dictate the constraints upon, and opportunities open to government. In this regard, South Africa’s pursuit of transformative regional development has been tempered by a realistic assessment of her domestic limitations. Makoa (2001: 40) concurs that South Africa’s inability to weave a clear, unambiguous and coherent foreign policy towards Africa “seems to be neither a deliberate strategy nor an accident…the domestic context limits RSA’s policy choices, suggesting that the country’s role in the
continent’s affairs may be confined to addressing sporadic political episodes and ad hoc mediation efforts.” Indeed, Hamill (2001: 43) observes that the “sheer scale of the domestic challenge – addressing the backlogs bequeathed by four decades of apartheid – served as a sobering backdrop to all discussions on future regional policy.” With social and economic reconstruction within South Africa competing with regional ventures for the same scarce resources, it was often argued that such resources should not be used beyond South African borders until the lives of South African citizens, who had so long been denied are improved. Such internal development imperatives remain a huge challenge more than a decade after the end of apartheid. According to the Southern Africa Labor and Development Research Unit, seven out of 10 South Africans are poor….the poor represented 72% of the population in the last year of apartheid in 1993…it now stands at 70% (cited in Pressly, 2010: 1).

There is broad consensus (see Oden: 1996, Spence: 1998, Ralinala and Saunders: 2001) that any aspiration to play a role in the development (encompasses both economic investment and peacekeeping) of Southern Africa will be accompanied by costly responsibilities. One could add that this is irrespective of whether that role assumes the form of a benign foreign policy god mother or a regional hegemon. Mills (2000:1) underscores the cost of foreign policy forays by drawing on the example of Zimbabwe’s military deployment to the DRC – in 1998: “Zimbabwe’s annual rate of real economic decline of 0.7% during the 1990s was exacerbated by its military operations in the DRC, involving more than one quarter of its 40,000-strong armed forces and costing an estimated US$1 million per day”. Neethling (2004: 139) attributes South Africa’s preference for the role of diplomatic peacekeeper (to that of military peacekeeper) to the fact that the South African National Defense Force has
seen many consecutive years of cuts in defense allocations since the end of the 1980s which has produced a discrepancy between peacekeeping requirements emanating from national policy and the capability of the SANDF to meet such requirements. Neethling (2004: 146) further alludes to suggestions that “South Africa’s leadership is letting its enthusiasm outrun its military capacity.” This line of thinking finds support in a report (carried by BBC International), by the military analyst and Jane's Defense Weekly correspondent for South Africa, which argues that the SANDF is seriously overstretched due to its peace support obligations in Africa and that it faces the danger of becoming a ‘hollow force’ without the capability to conduct sustained operations. It contends that while the defense force's operational commitments have steadily expanded since 1998, its operating budget has steadily declined in real terms over the same period, affecting the military’s ability to train and recruit personnel and to maintain equipment and infrastructure. It is a situation compounded by the reality of the usual drain of technical and other skilled personnel that all armed forces suffer in times of peace and economic growth, a situation that has been aggravated by the affirmative action policies of the government. The much publicized protests by SANDF over conditions of service, in August 2009, are indicative of the problems highlighted.

Such problems have also led to various initiatives to re-evaluate South African participation in continental peace missions. In this regard, one of the most stimulating discussions took place during an inter-departmental workshop on the outcomes of a research project on ‘Best Practices and Lessons Learnt during South Africa’s Participation in International Peace Missions.’ Three pertinent observations during the 17 November 2008 workshop in Pretoria were:
• It is unclear what informs South Africa’s involvement in conflict areas on the continent.

• The deployment of troops should be preceded by strategy formulation. The challenge is that countries request RSA troops and pledge resources but often do not live up to their commitment. Consequently, South Africa ends up bearing the costs, without budgetary provisions.

• There should be coordination between political diplomacy, peace missions and economic diplomacy in order to avoid a situation whereby South Africa bears the costs of the peace mission and stabilises a country, but withdraws thereafter. Coordinating these three components as well as developing an economic engagement strategy will prevent foreign powers and other external players in the conflict from benefiting economically through investments.

The last observation in particular is a sore-point among most South African foreign policy-makers interviewed who lament the resources poured into the DRC with no visible benefit to South Africa. Such policy-makers are cognizant of the prioritization of national interest given the pressures from the electorate for their basic needs to be met; pressures which have even resulted in the government being taken to court over its socio-economic responsibilities. The Grootboom judgement (see http://www.esernet.org/caselaw/caselaw_show.htm?doc_id=401409) on the state’s failure to comply with its housing obligations and the Treatment Action Campaign's successful court case against the government for its delays in providing effective measures to cut mother-to-child transmission of HIV are notable examples in this regard. Dlamini
(2004:2) points out that those who advocate for minimum foreign engagement reinforce their position with the argument that, “Pretoria would serve itself well by sorting domestic socio-economic problems and perfecting democracy and governance at home, so that it can be a role model for others to emulate.” In addition, Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk (2002:260) question:

whether the government can draw on the required domestic strengths that will allow it to play an activist regional and international role, especially as far as continental peacemaking and peacekeeping, and the reform of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the UN Security Council are concerned. Conditions of continuing and rising poverty, unemployment, slow economic growth and increasing xenophobia among its population act as a damper on these ambitions.

As Greg Mills (2000: 263) puts it, “the need to develop common positions in harmony with African and other developing nation groupings was rhetorical rather than a blueprint for action.”

One would recall that former South African President, Thabo Mbeki’s various continental trips were often accompanied by criticism that domestic socio-economic challenges should be addressed first rather than wasting time and scarce resources on issues that have no direct and immediate connection to ordinary South Africans, who want jobs, housing, health care and education. It underscores the reality that one of the biggest challenges facing South Africa was ‘domestic under-reach’ rather than ‘regional overstretch.’ In a perceptive analysis report, Jonathan Clayton (2008) pointed out that “at the moment of his greatest diplomatic triumph (a reference to the power-sharing deal in Zimbabwe which was facilitated by Mbeki), a man often
accused of being more interested in foreign than domestic affairs faces political ruin at home” (a reference to Mbeki’s removal from office by the ANC following his replacement at the party helm by Jacob Zuma in December 2007). In a sense, the power struggle between the politico-ideological blocs of Mbeki and Zuma was symptomatic of the growing divide between the elite and masses within the ruling ANC’s own constituency which further translated into strains in the Tripartite Alliance (ANC, COSATU, and SACP) over macro-economic policy. Taylor (2001) affirms that the accession by leading fractions of the ANC to the ongoing discourse of neo-liberalism has led to the policy making elite playing to two distinct audiences: its leftist-inclined constituency and externally oriented domestic and international capital.

The shift from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy to the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) bears testament to the vacillating economic priorities within the ANC. These various economic policies also affirm Mkandawire’s (1999: 2) contention that South Africa is not a ‘choiceless democracy.’ The changing policies reflect the South African government’s choices in responding to the difficult task of balancing economic growth and redistribution. Gumede (2005: 82) observes that the apartheid government had built its economy on cheap black labor and a modern South African economy would have to be constructed around a highly skilled workforce which was problematic since the vast majority of blacks had been prevented from acquiring such skills due to the inferiority of ‘Bantu Education.’ While the initial RDP attempted to combine measures to boost the economy with socially-minded social service provision and infrastructure projects, it
did not last long and within two years was abandoned in favor of open markets and
privatization. RDP delivery targets could not be met and in 1995, the country was
engulfed in strikes by students, nurses and municipal workers. This manifested in the
change towards a more neoliberal economic strategy, which was introduced by
Finance Minister Trevor Manuel in June 1996, to achieve sustained annual real GDP
growth of 6% or more by the year 2000 while creating 400,000 new jobs each year

So for much of the first decade of South Africa's democratic transition, its
macroeconomic agenda was captured in the policy programme of GEAR which was
defined by conservative neo-liberal principles that emphasized containing government
expenditure, low fiscal deficits, low inflation, privatization, deregulation, minimal
state intervention, and a stress on the importance of foreign capital inflows for
development. Although the Asian Financial crisis had opened up the space for
developing countries to pursue alternate strategies, Mbeki and his allies defended
GEAR by insisting that South Africa had no choice but to play by the rules of the
globalised economy. ANC members and critics on the left were told that GEAR was
a stabilization package that the government was forced to adopt following the collapse
that:

GEAR was a structural adjustment policy, self-imposed, to stabilize the
macroeconomic situation (to deal with) the realities of an unmanageable
budget deficit, high interest rates and weak local and foreign investor
confidence.
In November 1996, (at the annual President’s Award for export achievement) Mbeki told business leaders:

The policies and objectives embedded in GEAR are a pragmatic balance struck between our domestic economic demands and the realities of the international context. These policies and objectives emerged after a thorough analysis of global trends and the specific conditions in our economy.

However, Gumede (2005: 88) points out that “in the end, GEAR was remarkably similar to the National Party’s Normative Economic Model, released in 1993”. While GEAR brought greater financial discipline and macroeconomic stability, formal employment continued to decline and the country's wealth remained unevenly distributed along racial lines. With the realization that economic growth was not enough to eradicate poverty and inequality in South Africa, the challenge became how to share the fruits of economic growth more equitably while combating the unfair manifestations of structural poverty, underdevelopment and marginalization that continued to characterize post-apartheid society. Of note is that this redirection of economic policy thinking within South Africa, from a neo-liberal economic perspective towards a more developmental orientation, did not extend to the region. Government rhetoric in term of broader regional development priorities was undermined by the unregulated march of South African corporates on the continent (an issue that is unpacked in Chapter 5).

The subsequent launching of ASGISA in 2006 was premised on the selective funding of programmes that were supposed to act as catalysts for economic development, aimed at promoting the country’s capacity to meet its development objectives with
respect to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): namely, halving poverty and unemployment by 2014. In this regard, ASGISA is expected to drive the economy at a higher rate of growth (4.5% from 2006 to 2009, and 6% from 2010 to 2014), while expanding its redistributive benefits towards the majority of South Africans (Media Briefing by Deputy President, 6 February 2008). It is clear that ASGISA was introduced as a pragmatic strategy to confront binding constraints and not as a development strategy. In this regard, ASGISA does not link social development and poverty eradication to growth; instead they are conceived as deductions from growth rather than central features of the growth strategy. Bodibe (2007: 77) affirms that continuing on such a trajectory is unlikely to halve unemployment and poverty in 2014; at best, it can stabilize levels of poverty and unemployment. Political analyst Steven Friedman concludes that while the dominant language of the government is left-leaning, the reality is very different: “…we are witnessing the emergence of social conservatism…there is no turn whatsoever to the left” (quoted in Mabotja and Cullinan, 2009: 36). Undoubtedly, the South African government’s continued failure to provide a developmental strategy to transform the country’s apartheid-colonial economy will impede any effort to promote transformative development in the wider region.

Indeed, from 1994, the South African government’s political commitment to a more equitable framework for sub-regional relations clashed with its attempts to revive economic growth within the country itself. David Ryall (1997) sums it up as a competition between two visions for supremacy: the ANC’s internationalism and the Department of Foreign Affairs’ neo-realism. It is the net-effect of such competing visions which is ultimately responsible for the ambivalence that characterizes South
African foreign policy. The contradictions emanating from the very department responsible for such foreign policy is illuminating:

In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 23 June 1994, Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo stated: “Uppermost in our minds…are the responsibilities which our Government of National Unity has towards the people of South Africa. Our primary goal is to strive to create a better life for all our people … [as a result] South Africa will have extremely limited resources for anything which falls outside the Reconstruction and Development Programme.”

This view was further entrenched by Pierre Dietrichsen (1994: 212), a senior Department of Foreign Affairs official, who wrote that “South Africa is a medium military power with limited resources at its disposal for use in the international arena, for example, for peacekeeping operations. Although South Africa's foreign debt is low by world standards, the country's own development needs are such that South Africa could not become a substantial donor of development assistance.”

At the same time, Mr Aziz Pahad, Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister (1994-2008), was quoted as saying that a leadership role was being thrust upon South Africa, and South Africa could no longer sit on the sidelines (cited in Solomon, 1997).
Despite the contention of Pahad, the assertions by Nzo and Dietrichsen reflect a growing realization among foreign policy makers that the expectation of South Africa as the region’s benefactor ignores the structural weaknesses of a South African economy which is itself still recovering from the isolationist trauma of apartheid. DFA, as the primary implementer of the country’s foreign policy, has accepted that the nature and orientation of the South African economy is a key determinant of the parameters of the country’s engagement in the region (a realization that came out strongly in interviews conducted). Foreign policy needs to be formulated against the background of what South Africa can realistically hope to achieve and budgetary issues will ultimately influence South Africa's membership of international organizations, the number of embassies the Department is able to establish abroad and the number of personnel assigned abroad. Nzo (cited in Mills, 2000: 264) noted the dangers of being stretched too thin in trying to meet expectations:

I often think that our successful domestic transition has created perceptions that we are capable of miraculous interventions which would instantly solve the many conflicts in our region and beyond. The reality is more complex and demands more painstaking commitment rather than instant quick-fix solutions.

In fact, Landsberg (2003) best captures the argument by attributing South Africa’s pivot state (rather than hegemonic) status to the country’s precarious domestic characteristics. He contends that South Africa remains a deeply uneven society with significant development challenges: it has both first world and third world characteristics. He further underscores the serious disparities that exist in the society,
marked by one of the most unequal distributions of income in the world (measured by the Gini coefficient), as well as the gross discrepancies in terms of access to basic services such as clean water, sanitation, education, health and welfare, employment and economic opportunities. It is a concern echoed by South Africa’s Deputy President, Kgalema Motlanthe, who spoke in 2010 of two economies in South Africa embracing ‘a First World and a Third World’: “The rural areas tended to be underdeveloped while the urban areas, particularly the metros, were a magnet for development...” (cited in Pressly, 2010: 17)

Barber (1994: 46) aptly underscores South Africa’s straddling of both first and third worlds with his assessment that “in global terms South Africa is a small/medium-sized state. In Southern Africa it is a giant.” Interestingly, he argues that the combination of economic weakness and conflict has left several of Southern Africa’s states with fragile and unstable governments, creating a setting that exaggerates South Africa’s wealth and strength, and which produces unrealistic expectations about its capacity to stimulate regional development. Stoneman (1994: 44) concurs that South Africa’s pre-eminence is exaggerated:

Although its higher per capita income in principle gives some room for maneuvering (thus redistribution is a theoretical option, even though most thinking seems to be going into how to avoid it), it is far below that of the newly industrialized countries (NICs) and barely a tenth that of developed industrial economies. Furthermore, its internal inequalities are amongst the worst in the world, so that it is not clear that the average figure has any significance because few people receive it. Rather there is a minority, predominantly white, of course, but in principle increasingly multiracial,
who earn about US$10,000 annually, and a majority who have income levels more typical of the rest of the region.

In addition, Stoneman (1994: 44) contends that even references to South Africa as a distinct geographic entity is misleading:

..over 70 per cent of its GDP is produced in the PWV region. Rather than referring to `South Africa and the rest of the region', it makes as much sense economically to talk about the (Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging) PWV region and the rest of South Africa, with the Western Cape or Natal being entities of rather similar population, wealth, size and problems to those of Zimbabwe.

In short, the feasibility of South Africa shouldering the costs of furthering economic development in one of the world’s poorest regions when it suffers from some of the same socio-economic problems including substantial poverty among most of its citizens, is questionable. In 1997, cognizant of domestic pressure to improve the imbalances that beset South Africa, Nelson Mandela cautioned his SADC allies that the country was not a gold mine or a bastion for employment: “We are equally beset with unemployment’ and illegal immigration into the country is ... sensitive and needs to be tackled with caution ...” (cited in Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan, 1998: 188-189). Significantly, the remarks made at the September 1997 SADC summit meeting that he chaired, followed only two weeks after South African street vendors had attacked ‘foreign’ hawkers in Johannesburg. Audie Klotz’s (2000) analysis of such issues is interesting and pertinent. She maintains that (as in the apartheid era) South Africans presume their superiority to the rest of the continent, in both economic
and political terms. In this regard, domestic debates over employment, crime and migration still demonstrate a near consensus on the need to keep the rest of the region at bay. This is particularly problematic in a region that is characterized by high mobility such as Southern Africa: It is estimated that there are between one and three million cross border migrants in South Africa or 3% of the total population (Parker, 2010: 17).

In contextualizing the May 2008 xenophobic attacks that swept across South Africa, Dr Adrian Hadland (2008: 2) alludes to the “nearly 6000 protests” that took place during 2004 and 2005 “…around service delivery, several of which became violent, mainly in Mamelodi, Khutsong, Alexandra, Phumelela and Embalenhle near Secunda, all sites of xenophobic conflict…” From Gauteng to the Cape Peninsula, the link between service delivery protests and xenophobic attacks were palpable. The key findings (as captured in The Star supplement, 2008: 5) of the Human Sciences Research Council in the hotspots where the May 2008 violence occurred are instructive:

- A lack of faith in the government’s capacity to deliver services;
- Unhappiness over migration policy that is ‘corrupt, unregulated and out of control’;
- Competition for housing and jobs with a staggering unemployment rate among 16-30 year olds;
- Hardship arising from rising fuel and food prices.
The Star supplement on the May 2008 xenophobic attacks in South Africa highlighted a number of other interesting statistics:

**Fig4-1: Xenophobia Statistics**

In a Southern African Migration Project Survey carried out in 1997:
- 25% of South Africans wanted a total prohibition of immigration;
- 22% wanted the government to repatriate all foreigners living here;
- 45% called for strict limits to be placed on foreigners;
- 61% believed foreigners were putting strain on the country’s resources

In a 2006 survey:
- 66% said foreigners were using up basic resources;
- Two thirds believed that foreigners were guilty of crime;
- 49% say they bring diseases such as HIV into the country.

In a 2007 survey (Independent Newspapers):
- 76% of respondents said they want to see the influx of foreigners restricted.

The 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup which was hosted for the first time on African soil in South Africa further typifies the clash between foreign policy objectives and domestic priorities. In his 2006 State of the Nation address, the then South African President Thabo Mbeki pointed out that the World Cup would make a huge contribution, not only to South Africa's socio-economic growth, but also to the development of the continent as a whole. Standard Bank economist, Goolam Ballim, affirmed that “there will be a big direct injection for the economy, but the indirect impact may be more meaningful for a sustainable economic lift in subsequent years ... it will help change the perceptions that a large number of foreign investors hold of Africa and South Africa.” However, South Africa which is still grappling to provide
adequate housing, health and educational facilities (issues which are notably covered in the government’s Medium Term Strategic Framework and recent outcomes based approach to governance) is expected to spend an estimated R5-billion on building and renovating 10 World Cup stadiums, R5.2-billion on upgrades to the country's airports, and R3.5-billion on improvements to the country's road and rail networks. COSATU has further expressed concerns over the reality that with the manufacture of T-shirts and the Zakumi mascot outside the country, the use of public funds to build the stadiums cannot be justified as citizens are not benefitting from the promised economic spin-offs such as the creation of jobs.

In summary, the domestic issues highlighted are an integral part of the foreign policy cycle which shapes our relations with the Southern African region. It is in the quest to address her domestic challenges that South Africa strives to improve her economic competitiveness. This escalates the demands for it to contribute to regional peacekeeping efforts and the country increasingly finds itself the locus for people seeking jobs or fleeing regional conflicts. These external challenges then compete with domestic issues for the very resources that are the product of the latter’s initiation. The situation is compounded by the fact that more often than not, the state’s ambitions clash with the systemic operations of the market. For example, global economic pressures make redistributive policies increasingly difficult as such pressures undermine the ability of states to provide both security and welfare to their populations. Given these dynamics, it is tempting to argue that domestic interests are so immediate and pressing that the government has no choice but to put South Africa’s interests first at the expense of its neighbors. Schoeman’s (2007: 104) conclusion that “in order to attain and maintain credibility and legitimacy and to
mobilize the resources necessary for acting as both a hegemon and a partner, the
greatest challenge lies in South Africa’s domestic transformation” is echoed by
Adebajo et al (2007) who maintain that an effective post-apartheid South African
foreign policy can only be built on a strong domestic base. However as Barber
(1994: 48) and a number of South African foreign policy makers have argued, South
Africa’s domestic interests are best served by a stable, flourishing region.

4.2 Perceptions from the rest of Southern Africa

“The prestige of a nation is its reputation for power…What others think
of us is as important as what we actually are.”


The assertion by Morgenthau aptly captures the dilemma faced by South Africa in the
Southern African region. In this regard, the pronouncements and activities of the
post-apartheid South African state (captured in Chapter 5) have not been successful in
addressing the perceptions of its regional counterparts which continue to be
negatively colored by their experience with the old apartheid state. In essence, this
thesis argues that the failure of the South African state to implement its
developmental agenda in the region is rooted in its inability to convince its
neighborhood that such a vision is complimentary to their needs.

A senior South African foreign policy maker explained his understanding of South
Africa’s role in the region using the analogy of an owner of a large and expensive
mansion surrounded by more modest homes who pays to have security guards
patrolling the street. The presence of security guards will serve to protect the neighboring houses as well, even though their owners contribute nothing to the costs of the guards. South Africa was likened to the owner of the mansion, bearing the security costs of the neighborhood. One could argue that the very analogy used justifies the latent regional resentment towards South Africa that is at the heart of the country’s predicament in Southern Africa. The analogy likens Southern African countries to the modest homes which begrudge the wealthy owner of the mansion and regards the security guards as a symbol of power over them. Countries such as Angola and leaders such as Mugabe would, understandably, not take kindly to being portrayed as so unexceptional in a regional context. The sentiment reportedly aired by President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe that neighboring countries are treated like ‘a province of South Africa,’ is widely shared in the rest of the region and aptly attest to such resentment (Marais, 1999: electronic version). Basically, the inability to reconcile what the region thinks of South Africa’s intentions with South Africa’s actual intentions renders the Republic’s foreign policy goals in Southern Africa problematic.

Barber (1994: 47) affirms that South Africa’s post-apartheid ‘respectability’ may attract increased international aid and private investment at the expense of its neighbors and this could be a source of deep resentment. Not surprisingly, South Africa’s economic dominance has created some political tensions with regional partners. A major source of the tension stems not from the trade imbalance per se, but from a perception within the region that South Africa’s economic dominance is being achieved on the back of unfair trade practices. For instance, South Africa stands accused of economic closure and resistance to SADC liberalization measures that
place its businesses at comparative disadvantage. In the words of President Mugabe (cited in McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng, 1998), “South Africa cherishes the notion that because it is the most developed country in the region it can use other SADC countries as receptacles for its goods while protecting its own industries.” Indeed, many of the Republic’s neighbors are highly critical of what they regard as its bullish economic policies, accusing South Africa of deliberately dwarfing their small economies (Landsberg and Kornegay, 1998). In an interview in 1997, Namibia’s then Trade and Industry Minister, Hidipo Hamutenya accused South Africa of hampering industrial development in the neighboring states by deliberately pursuing policies that sabotage industrial production plants in these states, and sticking to a protectionist industrial policy that made it difficult for these countries to penetrate her market. At the same time, South Africa was perceived as dumping her manufactured goods in Namibia using ill practices, including the selling of goods at unfair price advantages, often ignoring profit, transport and other costs in order to conquer and dominate the Namibian market (Mail and Guardian, 2 August 1997).

One could argue that this is not deliberate but emerges by default due to South Africa’s export and investment drive into the rest of Southern Africa. Oden (2001: 84) attributes it to: “The pressure on South African firms to expand, the devaluation of the Rand, the lifting of sanctions and trade boycotts, and the lowering of trade barriers (as demanded by the WTO) have created a situation where South Africa’s regional dominance was probably even greater in 1996 than a few years earlier.” In this regard, South Africa's foreign policy objectives are viewed as not being very different in their essence, from the foreign policy of the previous regime as it remains marked by a desire to further consolidate and advance its political and economic
dominance. For clear historical reasons, the old regime could not exploit the vast market of the rest of the continent, except indirectly and in the few client states it cultivated. The new South Africa has been far less inhibited in this regard. Iheduru (1996), Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan (1998), and Oden (2001) focus on the historical irony that what the apartheid state failed to achieve through its political and military designs from 1974 to 1990, is currently being accomplished economically through the structural power of South Africa’s finance, industrial and merchant capital in the post-apartheid era. However this translates into a regional ‘love-hate’ attitude toward Pretoria, driven by a resentment of the dependence on South Africa’s economy and infrastructure as well the reality that there is no practical alternative to even more trade and investment with South Africa, as long as the region wishes to develop its countries and businesses. Even the most casual conversations with foreign policy makers of other African countries bring out this wariness, if not antagonism, in respect of South Africa in the rest of the region.

Not surprisingly, the negative attitudes have had the net effect of demonizing, isolating, and casting aspersions on South Africa’s intentions in Southern Africa. This has led to the emergence of alliances and pacts aimed at isolating South Africa politically and having a prevailing counter-balance to South Africa’s perceived strength. A senior South African government official recalled the 1995 trade and investment conference at the Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe where the governments of the region were urged to raise local tariffs in response to South Africa’s penetration of the region. Furthermore, neither President Mandela nor Deputy President Mbeki was invited to the August 1998 Victoria Falls meeting of SADC on the crisis in the DRC. Even beyond the continent, South Africa’s resentment by its peers is a source of
interest. For example, *The Hindu* (10 July 1999) reports that at the official reception hosted to mark the inauguration of the South African President, Mr. Thabo Mbeki, the Angolan President, Dr. Jose Eduardo dos Santos was a notable absentee. Schoeman (2000: electronic version) argues that such ostracism and weariness about South Africa can seriously undermine South Africa’s ability to play a positive or leading role in managing conflict or pursuing peace and security in the region. This was clearly evident when the then President of the DRC, Laurent Kabila, not only accused South Africa of duplicity but also remained resolute in his opposition to South African attempts to broker a peace deal with rebel forces (www.dispatch.co.za/2000/01/24/southafrica/ITIS.HTM).

Given such sensitivities throughout the region about South Africa’s alleged unfair dominance, the country is often forced to adopt a modest approach in its regional foreign policy (as evidenced by its approach to Zimbabwe as well as the skewed SACU arrangements which are supposed to address past imbalances). In this regard, Landsberg and Kabemba (1998: 2) pose a crucial question: ‘how modest can Pretoria afford to be?’ Before attempting a response one should also consider the alternatives. For example, Habib (2003: electronic) has long maintained, in no uncertain terms, that South Africa should stop pussy-footing in the region and assume a vibrant hegemonic role. Du Plessis’s (1995: 37) delineation of the country’s strength lends credence to Habib’s position:

South Africa has the economic power and military capability that would probably enable it to exercise influence over the continent and its political direction. Its Defense Force is the best equipped in Africa. It has wealth and the biggest and most developed economy in the continent, accounting
for about 79 per cent of the GNP of Southern Africa and 60 per cent of that of subequatorial Africa in 1994.’ Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad (cited in Kabemba and Landsberg, 1998), also warned of the possibility that, ‘if RSA continues to hide behind the rhetoric of not wanting to play a leadership role, Africa will indeed suspect a hidden agenda.

Nevertheless, one could point out that such arguments ignore the reality that leadership roles for South Africa have not been generally welcomed, accepted or solicited by the region. Economic and military dominance has not been enough to endear South Africa to the broader Southern African region: South Africa has not yet found a way to harness these resources so as to lead and serve the region decisively and with the support of its neighbors. As Van Nieuwkerk (1998) puts it: “South Africa’s preparedness to lead Africa clashes with Africa’s willingness to be led by South Africa.” The central paradox of leadership – that it requires followership – explains why South Africa’s regional developmental vision has been fraught with so many implementation obstacles. Landsberg maintains that despite attempts to assert its dominance in the region, in reality South Africa is a regional hegemon without much power: “it has limited influence in the region and its international profile as an emerging power is largely based on its economic strength relative to its very small neighbors not relative to other emerging powers” (http://www.worldpolicy.org/epowers/southafrica/papers/). It would be profoundly misleading to assume that the country’s economic and military muscle automatically translates into political clout. Many foreign policy makers and analysts refer to the unsuccessful efforts to have Cape Town endorsed as the host city for the 2004
Olympic Games as a critical test of Africa’s failure to follow South Africa’s lead. Although the campaign was championed as the ‘African Bid’ and was frequently presented as integral to the African Renaissance (Mbeki argued that the time has come for the rest of the world to demonstrate its commitment to the African Renaissance by awarding the Games in the year 2004 to the African Continent) it appeared that Cape Town lost the bid because, in the first round of voting, African delegates failed to support South Africa (Southern African Report, 1997: 10). It illustrated typical power politics play where smaller states may seek to contain the hegemon within a wider system by diluting its power and obliging it to act according to a set of wider rules.

Such wariness of Southern African countries towards South Africa can also be attributed to lack of trust of a perceived ‘puppet of the west.’ Landsberg (2000: 107) notes that Pretoria has been accused by African leaders of “pursuing a Western project and, in fact, of being little more than the West’s lackey on the southern tip of Africa.” Interestingly, it is rumored among South African foreign policy makers that President Mbeki’s motives for not criticizing Zimbabwe are based on his fears of being labeled ‘The George W. Bush of Africa’ and that he might become alienated from other continental leaders. Makoa (2001: 47) affirms the same points: “deeply distrustful of RSA and competing for regional influence, the Zimbabwean government believes that the South African government is not just a US surrogate but has misconceived Africa’s political agenda.” In this regard, the ideology of the North-South struggle dovetailed neatly for Mugabe with a nationalist-liberation ideology that portrayed his rule as continuing the liberation struggle against Western forces (at present the British government and international financial institutions) bent
on thwarting and destroying the gains of liberation. With its unsuccessful balancing act of capitalist economic growth and social redistribution needs, South Africa became an easy target for being branded a traitor to such a ‘struggle’.

Based on a history in which apartheid’s leaders defined the country as a European outpost, it is clear that South Africa still struggles to shake off the identity as a western Trojan horse in Africa (Adebajo, 2006). This is not surprising given the impact of the USA, World Bank and other Western powers on the economic policy debate in South Africa. It is noteworthy that by 1994, the year of the first democratic elections, the USA had become South Africa’s largest bilateral donor of political aid (Davis, 1997: electronic). In 1993, the USA Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, George Moose, reported to Congress that “over the past several years we have provided training and information to the ANC and others on various aspects of free market economics” (Davis, 1997: electronic). By 1995 USAID reported that funding for private-sector initiatives had achieved a decisive effect on ANC economic policies and “have led the Government of National Unity leadership to endorse pragmatic economic policies and a fiscally conservative approach to the RDP, contrary to prior expectations that an ANC-dominated government would opt for statist [government-run] solutions and fiscally unsustainable social programs” (Davis, 1997: electronic). Indeed, corporate pressures within South Africa and from the USA and other western governments led to the elimination of a separate RDP office in 1996. South African writer, Daria Caliguire, concluded that such a move will in effect downgrade the importance of reconstruction and development in government policy discussions. In essence, the dismantling of the RDP office was an indicator that economic growth,
rather than redistribution, had become the primary national tool for driving post-
apartheid change.

In this regard, it is argued that South Africa is ill-placed to canvass for progressive
regional development. Instead, South Africa's neo-liberal economic orientation is
seen as having the potential to undermine a developmental agenda from emerging in
Africa. Without the trust and confidence of its counterparts, South Africa will find it
difficult to achieve any progress in terms of regional developmental goals.
Undoubtedly, South Africa’s renaissance diplomacy, along with other regional
projects, and attempts at leadership, faces serious public relations challenges in
convincing Southern African states that its interests and needs run parallel.

4.3 Southern African interests versus South African interests
At an academic workshop on formulating a draft white paper on South African
foreign policy, hosted by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation
in October 2010, Ambassador Mo Shaik (Head of the Foreign Branch, State Security
Agency) noted that “our survival depends on us being less South African and more
Southern African.” He was making the point that in an era of mutual vulnerabilities,
South Africa’s interests should not be seen as merely complimentary to Southern
African interest; these interests should converge. However, the weight of the
apartheid state’s baggage continues to impede South Africa’s interaction with the
region. A critical element of the new South Africa’s policy in reducing the apartheid
baggage was to confirm and emphasize its African identity – that it was part of the
region, not simply an appendage of Europe or the West. Barber (2004: 173) points
out that the continent treated the new South Africa in the mid-1990s with a degree of suspicion because the implication was that

[...] despite its claims to a common identity, the new South Africa accepted Western values and interests, to the detriment of its African heritage. Having a foot in different camps was an asset as an international bridge-builder, but in Africa it could be interpreted as having split loyalties.

Schoeman (2003: 364) explains that South Africa’s adoption of liberal democratic values that are usually associated with the West is perceived as contrary to the African way. Instead it is argued that the nature and structure of South Africa’s macro-economic policy compels it to compete with its African counterparts and locks it into the very global capital system that it purports to reform. South Africa is perceived as a willing captive of its white business sector and as such, an agent of international financial institutions, including the IMF and World Bank. As Paul Williams (2000) observes: “In spite of some enticing rhetoric, South Africa has demonstrated little practical solidarity with countries outside of what Selebi referred to as a G-8 of the South.” These perceptions are reinforced by the exclusive status accorded to South Africa by the West which has the indirect effect of isolating the country from the region. President Yeti Boni, at the opening ceremony of the African Peer Review Mechanism Extraordinary Summit on 26 October 2008, condemned Africa’s absence from the global summit on the international financial crisis on 09 November 2008 in New York, observing that South Africa was the only African country invited to the meeting. Part of the dilemma for South Africa arises from its neighbors wanting to reap the benefits of its leadership role (a voice for Africa in critical international
deliberations determined by the current global power configuration which generally accords Africa a marginal role) but resenting when South Africa attempts to speak or intervene on their behalf.

South Africa thus set out to reaffirm its Africanness and its prioritization of the consolidation of the African agenda was at the heart of this project. This included strengthening Africa’s institutions regionally (SACU and SADC) and continentally (the AU); supporting the implementation of Africa’s socio-economic development programme, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD); and contributing towards post-conflict reconstruction and development in Africa and towards peace, security and stability more generally (as contained in the 2008/9 International Relations, Peace and Security Cluster Programme of Action). The idea of consolidating the African agenda has its roots in the South Africa-driven African Renaissance which has, ironically, turned out to be one of the most contested foreign policy issues. South Africa’s emergence as a post-apartheid champion of African issues has clashed with the waning stars of its regional neighbors (particularly Zimbabwe), who’s leading role in fighting the apartheid state was abruptly eclipsed. Moreover, the limited extent with which other Southern African countries have embraced the concept of African renewal is linked to their belief that it is not integral to their interests. Van Nieuwkerk (1998) infers that the African Renaissance is perceived as an empty policy vessel; its essential features remain deliberately vague – high on sentiment, low on substance:

like Roosevelt’s New Deal and Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, it exists as an unsettled policy goal propounded by a political leadership which faces a particular set of challenges... Simply put, the African Renaissance
seeks to maximize South Africa’s foreign policy options in Africa...similar to Bisschoff and Southall's judgment, namely that it (the African Renaissance) is a foreign policy in search of suitable allies and partners.

In this regard, many have questioned the motivation behind South Africa’s championing of an African Renaissance given that its economic interests on the continent were not always in harmony with its neighbors.’ Among the more cynical interpretations, it is seen as a veiled attempt by South Africa to impose its hegemony on the continent. Landsberg and Kornegay (1998) underline the suspicions that it is “a Pax Pretoria thinly disguised as a Pax Africana” by arguing that “the much publicized African Renaissance is seen in some circles as a Hitler style ‘lebensraum’ coercive expansionism in which South Africa endeavors to establish her hegemony in the African continent.” Vale and Maseko (1998) surmise that the enthusiasm with which South African capital has embraced the African Renaissance may explain the deepening nervousness over the country’s goals in the region. Mandaza (1998: 28) calls the use of the African Renaissance as a foreign policy tool under the guise of a new developmental vision, an ‘ideology of self-deception’ which refuses “to acknowledge the current realities that parameter even our own political space as Africans – nationally, regionally, and globally.” He also quotes Jonathan Moyo’s argument that the term poses the danger of masking realities in South Africa itself while also speaking to a kind of exceptionalism that sets South Africa apart from the rest of the continent. This kind of conduct only serves to conjure up feelings of dissent and grudge. It portrays South Africa as arrogant and insensitive and affirms the limitations of an elite-centred construction of African cooperation.
Programmes such as NEPAD have been similarly contested, more so since the NEPAD secretariat has been based in South Africa. Habib and Selinyane (2004: 72) allude to the efforts made by South African officials to emphasize that NEPAD is a continental programme rather than one led by South Africa. However, Habib and Selinyane concede that much of the administrative structure as well as precepts; commitments and programmes presented by NEPAD reflect the concerns of South African foreign policy. While this inspires a greater sense of responsibility towards ensuring the success of the programme, it could also be destabilizing if viewed as hegemonic imposition as it does not reflect the foreign policy concerns of other countries. Patrick Bond (2004b) has censored that imperialism is facilitated in Africa by the Pretoria-Johannesburg state-capitalist nexus, in part through Mbeki’s NEPAD and in part through the independent (though related) logic of private capital. Indeed, the perception that NEPAD is simply an ‘Africanisation’ of South Africa’s macro-economic policy of GEAR has made it difficult for South Africa to convince states to integrate NEPAD into their domestic policy regimes. In addition, Landsberg (2007:203) points to the need to urgently address the anomaly that “to date, partnership between NEPAD and the outside world has been much stronger than that between NEPAD and African people.” In fact, the Southern African region perceives partnerships with South Africa as exploitative rather than beneficial: “South Africa consumes 80% of the water resources of Southern Africa yet accounts for only 10% of the renewable water sources of the region” (Landsberg, 2007: 202). Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe has long dismissed Nepad as a neo-colonial strategy (Ndayi, 2010:2). Such regional perceptions are even more difficult to overcome when South Africans themselves are not united in terms of foreign policy
programmes. For example, socio-economic development activist, Trevor Ngwane, also refuted the notion that Africa’s development would be facilitated by an integrationist and renegotiated relationship with the international community. So despite policies based on principles of equity and mutual benefit, many actors in the region (as well as some critics within the country) regard South Africa as an imperialist regional power and a stumbling block to accelerated integration.

South Africa’s history has also colored its foreign policy outlook in a very parochial way. It can be argued that South Africa has tried to export its model of conflict-resolution based on its political settlement (i.e. the transitional government or government of national unity) without trying to understand the realities in other countries. This reinforces the impression of South African ‘hegemonic imposition’ or ‘bullying’ and shows that South Africa is out of touch with the rest of the region’s needs. The controversy over the South African-led mediated Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe is a case in point. A more telling example is the response by the Swaziland Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mabili Dlamini, to the offer of assistance to Swaziland contained in the ANC manifesto (released prior to the 2004 elections): “the Swazis are capable of formulating their own system of democratic governance, which does not have to be similar to the South African model” (www.irinnews.org). There is a definite rejection of the myth (in many academic and media circles) of South Africa as Africa’s messiah (Makoa: 2001; Evans: 1991; Vale and Maseko: 1998). There is little doubt that the turbulent history of South Africa in Southern Africa has scarred the region’s political psyche.
Black (2001) concludes that the Mbeki government’s ‘African Renaissance’ project to promote ‘democracy’, ‘good governance’ and ‘growth’ on the sub-continent is premised on what might be described as a ‘limitationist’ conception of both democracy and governance, which above all serves transnational hegemonic interests and those of related, dominant fractions of capital in South Africa itself. Schoeman (2002) concurs that South Africa’s attempts to promote investment by South African business in neighboring countries is not really the ideal solution to the region’s economic woes as banking, supermarket and other service and commercial oriented investment activities, do not necessarily promote industrial development and production capacity in the recipient countries and therefore do not stimulate economic growth and development. In essence, the stated goals of South African foreign policy have not matched the reality of how these goals have been implemented and received by the rest of the region.

The fact that the region has not been consistent in its position towards South Africa’s regional projects further heightens the conundrum facing South African foreign policy-makers in understanding the regional psych. The SADC Early Warning Centre is a case in point. Although it is a project that has long been on the regional radar, it is largely through the lobbying and financial contribution of South Africa that the Centre was finally launched in 2010. In March 2010, during a briefing on the International Cooperation, Trade and Security (ICTS) Cluster’s plans for the year, Lindiwe Sisulu, Chair of the Cluster, noted that:

> We are mindful that the prosperity we seek in the region can only be achieved by providing the necessary security guarantees. In this regard, we have been at the forefront of the conceptualization, establishment and
operationalization of the SADC Early Warning Centre in Gaborone, Botswana.

On 12 July 2010, Mozambican President Armando Guebuza inaugurated the Regional Early Warning Centre of SADC in Gaborone. He acknowledged that setting up the centre took a long time and was fraught with difficulties. Nevertheless, in celebrating this important step towards strengthening mechanisms to prevent, manage and solve conflicts, the region was silent on the contribution of South Africa which galvanized what had become a fading regional objective.

4.4 Data Presentation and Analysis

As many as 291 interviews (114 from South Africa and 177 from the Southern African region) were conducted with government officials and civil society over a period of three years. The South African officials interviewed include former and current Ambassadors to various countries on the continent, senior officials from DFA, DTI, and intelligence services as well as the secretariats of various government committees. In addition, senior members of several large South African corporates that are active on the continent as well as academics, activists and ordinary South African citizens were interviewed. The 177 Southern African interviews comprise of Embassy representatives in South Africa, government officials and intelligence officials with knowledge of the respective country’s foreign policy positions as well as academics, journalists, activists, business people (formal and informal) and Southern African citizens employed in South African companies or working in South Africa.
The interviews affirmed Neuman’s (1997: 253) contention that open-ended questions generate better success (as noted in Chapter 1 discussion under research design). Open-ended questions facilitated more expansive discussions on responses provided by interviewees as well as fruitful engagement on characterizations provided by interviewees with regard to hegemony, partnership and domination. Given the wide-range of interviews conducted and diversity of opinions expressed, the data has been collated under the four key questions that guided the engagement of the interviewer. This allows for a structured analysis of the general data obtained from the interviews. The overarching assessment of the interview data is that it provides concrete affirmation of the contention of Chapter 4 that domestic realities and regional perceptions constrain South Africa’s cultivation of a more effective Southern African foreign policy.

4.4.1 How would you characterize South Africa’s relations with Southern Africa?

*Fig 4-2: Characterisation of South Africa’s relations with Southern Africa*
**Interview Excerpts:**

*Director of a South African NGO*: Have you ever been to Windhoek’s city centre? It is like you have not crossed any border! Do you know that in Maputo you can pay in rands? Of course, South Africa is hegemonic, and not just politically and economically, I would argue increasingly culturally too...

*South African academic*: ...if it is a partnership, it is a partnership of elites.

*Zambian citizen*: Go to the Shoprite and see for yourself...do you sell expired products in South Africa? There are different standards for South Africa and for us, maybe you think we are so poor we will not care...I don’t know hegemonic, South Africa is just bad.

*Angolan government official*: Our relationship with South Africa has matured over the years. But being partners does not preclude dominance in certain areas, for example South Africa is very prominent in the region’s interaction with the international community.

*Zimbabwean reporter*: A partner in lots of areas and a hegemon in others. I guess it also depends on which side you belong. South Africa has supported the ZANU-PF’s calls for less western pressure but as MDC argues, the resultant prolonging of the Zimbabwean crisis serves the interests of the South African business community well. My own opinion is that the current state of the country opens it up to South Africa’s hegemonic tentacles. I don’t believe this is necessarily the fault of South Africa...

*Botswana government official*: 100% hegemonic. If you attend SADC meetings, you will see what I mean. They are always trying to influence the agenda in a particular way. But Botswana does not have memory loss: it should never be forgotten that SADC evolved from SADCC which was a regional challenge to South African dominance.
Swaziland government official: It is not a difficult call. Interfering in the sovereign affairs of a country as South Africa does by housing PUDEMO and giving them support through solidarity in destabilizing protests is without a doubt hegemonic behavior.

Lesotho government official: South Africa is more than a partner, it is our extended home.

Of note is that there is no homogeneous response to the South African government belief that its relations with the region are best described as partnership. Equally interesting is the split between official government position and civil society perception in both South Africa and Zambia: officials in both South Africa and Zambia describe South Africa as a partner while the civil society in both these countries, predominantly view South Africa as hegemonic.

It is not surprising that both Angola and Zimbabwe characterize South Africa as a partner with hegemonic elements: both these countries have been considered rivals (by RSA foreign policy makers) in terms of leading the region (Zimbabwe, traditionally and Angola, emerging). It is also worth mentioning that interviews in Angola were initially conducted in 2006. However, a second round of interviews was necessitated by the perceived tightening of relations between Angola and South Africa under the Zuma administration. Of note is that apart from a more diplomatic response from Angolan government officials, there was no perceptible shift in perceptions towards South Africa, particularly in civil society circles.
Botswana’s position is not surprising: the country under Ian Khama, is increasingly becoming a thorn in South Africa’s attempts to foster a cohesive regional policy. Its obstructive role in the negotiations of economic partnership agreements with the European Union as well as Khama’s anti-SADC position with regard to Zimbabwe is instructive in this regard. However, the October 2010 visit of Khama to South Africa could well bring a shift in such relations.

The response from Swaziland was also not surprising, given the Monarchy’s displeasure with South Africa’s perceived interference in its sovereign affairs. COSATU’s unilateral stance on alliance with pro-democracy groups such as PUDEMO in Swaziland is as much a sore-point for South Africa’s tri-partite alliance as it is for the Swazi government. Although getting interviews with the muzzled civil society in Swaziland was difficult, the one representative that was prepared to share views was clear in articulating the position that “South Africa is a hegemon but selfish in not wanting others to enjoy what its people already have...Why else is it so inconsistent, leaving COSATU to put pressure on the oppressive regime in Swaziland.”

With less than half the region considering South Africa a partner, it is obvious that South Africa’s foreign policy in the region will need to be reconceptualized or undergo a major public relations overhaul if South Africa is to successfully promote a common vision of transformative development in the region.
4.4.2 Assess South Africa’s Foreign Policy Options in Southern Africa

**Interview Excerpts:**

*Malawi government official:* With all that political and economic might, even military if needs be, what else can South Africa be but hegemonic? And who will challenge South Africa if it chooses to exercise its power selfishly? Such power even determines South Africa’s partnerships in a selfish way: I am sure it has a better partnership with Angola than Malawi. These things are about what you can get...

*South African government official:* In a globalised world and rapidly integrating region, all sustainable options point towards partnership....

*Lesotho civil society:* South Africa is well-positioned to underwrite the region’s integration project........the big brother, partner.

*Zambian citizen:* A selfish giant that will always protect its interests above all else.

There is an alarming consensus among all countries of the region (including South Africa) as well as between government and civil society that there are only two feasible options: selfish hegemony or partnership. Such responses affirm the narrow conceptualization of South Africa’s role in the region and effectively pigeon-holes the country into an unmitigated good or a resolutely bad neighbor. Moreover, the narrow-minded focus of the interviewees has blinded them to the possibility of South Africa not playing a role in the region and focusing on its broader regional alliances (as with Nigeria, Algeria etc.) and/or international relations (such as IBSA). Although some Southern African countries criticize or are wary of South Africa’s role in the region, they cannot imagine South Africa not playing such a role and simply being a regional bystander.
Neuman (1997: 435) reminds us that “Many researchers emphasize positive data and ignore what is not explicitly in the data, but being alert to absences is also important.”

The fact that the notion of benign hegemony was not raised (even from the South Africans interviewed) and that ‘hegemony’ and ‘partnership’ are viewed as mutually exclusive options, is noteworthy. In a sense, it explains why South Africa is so easily perceived as maintaining a fundamentally flawed global order instead of contributing to its transformation: as a selfish hegemon, South Africa will maintain the system that advantages it. The research results are also an indictment against South Africa’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ which has been the benign hegemonic response from South Africa to address the perceptions of it as the ‘bully-boy of the region.’ There is no appreciation from the region that partnership can actually be a modality of engagement for hegemons as is other more aggressive interventions. In addition, the failure of South Africa’s own government officials to capitalize on and promote such thinking shows that the South African foreign policy position with regard to the region remains defensive rather than offensive. It is disappointing that most South African government officials do not see and therefore cannot champion the benefits of South Africa being both a hegemon and a partner or a pivot state (as articulated by Landsberg and captured in Chapter 3).
4.4.3 How important, if at all, is South Africa for the development of the region?

*Fig 4-3: RSA’s importance to the development of the region*

**Interview Excerpts:**

*Angolan government official:* Important how? Angola is also increasingly being touted as a key regional player. Each country has its own strengths. No country, I think, is exceptional.

*Botswana editor:* It is not the most important country. Botswana is recognized as having the most stable economy in the region and is even ranked higher than South Africa in the 2009 World Bank Human Development report!

*Zimbabwean government official:* South Africa is no doubt a regional driver but is as important as every other country in the region. You are only as strong as your weakest link, especially in the current globalised world.

*Namibian researcher:* South Africa is a significant voice for Africa in global forums but is just as important as Namibia or Lesotho when it comes to regional integration.
Malawi government official: South Africa is critical to the region achieving its goals. South Africa is the strongest country in the region. We need its support for the successful implementation of projects. Just look at its contribution to SADC ....

While South Africans believe that their country’s great importance to the region is reflected in the fact that Southern Africa is the apex of South Africa’s foreign policy priorities, more than half of its regional neighbors believe this is not the case. Interestingly, the United States and especially China have been identified as significant developmental partners by such countries. Even a cursory review of the foreign policy focus of both the USA and China will show that Southern Africa is not a priority. This harsh reality aptly underscores the dilemma that South Africa faces in Southern Africa. The preference for external development partners is a testament to the damage caused by apartheid to the regional psyche. While it is true that such external partners can facilitate development, their own national interests militate against such development being transformative. However, in terms of the momentum towards regional integration, it is in South Africa’s long-term interests to ensure that the focus from competitive economic growth is shifted to inclusive and shared growth.

The divide between the smaller economies (Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi) and the rest of the region in terms of South Africa’s importance for development is also an observation that warrants deeper reflection. That Swaziland and Malawi find South Africa critical for development in the region; despite labeling it as a hegemon in question one is noteworthy.
The contradictory positions of Angola and Zimbabwe are also significant considering that they are viewed as current and future strategic partners by the South African government. The choice of these countries as strategic partners, in a sense, affirms their positions that they are just as important in driving the regional agenda as South Africa. Their responses show that the challenge to South African foreign policy makers is not only convincing the region that the South African vision is complementary to their needs; but also internalizing the reality that South Africa needs the region and its foreign policy should complement the regional integration vision or face the risk of alienation.

4.4.4 How would you like to see South Africa managing her regional relations?

**Interview Excerpts:**

*South African academic:* South Africa’s regional relations need to be premised on the country’s national interests rather than foreign policy ideals.

*South African government official:* We spent a lot of resources in DRC and got kicked out of the Inga Dam project in return. We need more mutually beneficial relations not the current ‘parent-ungrateful teenager’ dynamics.

*Lesotho government official:* Relations need to be founded on current and historic realities. SACU relations are a good example of a system that works. A review of such relations will be a serious mistake.

*Zimbabwean citizen:* South Africa’s regional relations should be rooted in the regional goal of integration. South Africans treat us like Somalis...
The divide between South Africa and the rest of the region over this issue reflects the challenge confronting South African foreign policy. South Africans, whether in government or civil society, are unanimous in their belief that the country needs to benefit more from her costly regional investments (whether economic, diplomatic or peacekeeping). South Africa’s failure to capitalize on post-conflict reconstruction initiatives in resource-rich DRC is an often quoted example in this regard. The development of Inga III hydro power project had initially been granted to SADC countries (Angola, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa) which intended to build the hydro power plant under a joint venture (Westcor) and share the electricity generated. The DRC has since decided to de-couple Westcor from the construction of Inga III, and has offered Inga III to a private investor (Australian company, BHP). This is perceived by almost all South African government officials interviewed as a huge slap in the face for South Africa which actively supported the finalization of the peace process in the DRC and which continues to play a major role with regard to Security Sector Reform. Crudely put, their point is that South Africa was unable to benefit from an environment which it helped stabilize. The expectations from such officials are interesting given that South Africa’s prioritized involvement in the DRC was defended in government documents (such as the IRPS Cluster Programme of Action) in terms of South Africa’s advancement of the African Agenda. In a sense, it affirms the suspicions of Southern African countries that South Africa’s foreign policy vision is not as altruistic as it is made out to be.

In contrast, the region is of the view that the country should focus on more equitable, less self-beneficial hegemonic regional relations. Along with the findings of question three, it affirms this study’s hypothesis that South Africa’s inability to convince other
states that her vision is complimentary to their needs has inhibited her ability to engineer a process of transformation and development in the region.

4.5. An Allison–model Assessment of South Africa’s Foreign Policy Making

The research above shows that there are clear inconsistencies in how South African foreign policy is perceived by the other countries of the Southern African region. However, this is not surprising when one considers that the data also reveals that there is no homogenous understanding of South Africa’s foreign policy within the country itself. Given the broad disparities in the conceptualization of what South Africa’s role can and should be in the region, how have decisions been taken?

Recognizing that foreign policy output is a function of the interplay of numerous actors, G.T. Allison in 1971 developed a three-pronged model to explain the extent to which elements of choice, routine and contest influence foreign policy decisions. By using the Allison models, foreign policy decision-making processes can be ‘mapped’ or framed in three ways to explain what happens when groups in a government meet, deliberate and recommend options. These are known as the rational actor model, the organizational process model and the bureaucratic politics model and are a useful way for the government to rationalize the options available to it. While the Allison models do not provide all the answers to the questions around the foreign policy making process; they provide a useful analytical tool to probe and investigate the nature and intricacies of the policy process and to ultimately understand the interlocking and conflicting interests at play and the decisions taken when a variety of alternatives are available.
4.5.1 The rational actor model

This model maintains that foreign policy making occurs between identified players who have set goals and who make clearly-defined and informed choices about how to achieve them. A range of assumptions underlie this approach: the existence of a centrally controlled, informed and value-maximizing government; behavior which follows calculated choices from informed and rational leaders; and a government which will act on the basis of either opportunities or threats originating from the international environment. If one assumes that the South African state acted as a central actor, that its leaders were well-informed and that they made a rational choice between competing alternatives, then one can argue that the South African foreign policy makers were faced with a fairly straightforward situation. They had to consider four scenarios (Fragmentation, Exploitation, Partnership and Strategic Autarky – as illustrated in Chapter 2) and choose a common way forward. As part of the decision-making process, the South African government would have had to consider the implications of these four competing alternatives (see summary of alternatives in Chapter 2), before coming to a final decision. However, the reality is that South African foreign policy continues to be branded as ambiguous, an indicator that foreign policy makers vacillate among the various alternatives. In this regard, it would be grossly inaccurate to assume that decision-makers act ‘rationally’ or with full or complete information at hand. Moreover, the South African government is subject to unique pressures in that it is dominated by a ruling party that is constituted by a tri-partite alliance (see section 4.1 on domestic constraints).

While the model refers to ‘informed and rational leaders’, it does not cater for the personalized foreign policy that has characterized South Africa from 1994 to 2008
Personality is one of the few non-rational aspects of foreign policy making. For example, the celebratory rhetoric around the ‘miracle’ of Nelson Mandela’s ‘long walk to freedom,’ conveyed by the popular concept of ‘Madiba Magic’, promises that all things are possible if and when he becomes involved. While having a leader of the caliber of Nelson Mandela had its advantages, Aziz Pahad (interview) pointed out that it put greater pressure on the country to deliver: “This is something no other country has to wrestle with; our president symbolizes everything everyone in the world aspires to, and while we are happy to be called a political miracle, those who create miracles are supposed to deliver on everything - internally and externally.”

Moreover, a 2008 analysis of global media coverage on South Africa (100 newspapers from 15 geo-politically representative countries) – undertaken by research group Media Tenor - shows that when Mbeki looks bad, South Africa looks bad. The report notes that “Western media have grown particularly intolerant of President Mbeki and the country’s foreign policy in relation to Zimbabwe, and they are increasingly linking crime, xenophobia and the power outages to a crisis of leadership in the government as well as the ANC” (De Lange, 2008: 8). Interestingly, the party-internal coup that removed South African President Thabo Mbeki from power has provoked concern among African leaders regarding South Africa's future foreign policy. The 2008 AU chairman, Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete noted that: “It is a big loss for Africa to lose such a prominent leader…[who has]strong commitment to Africa's development…the New Partnership for Africa's Development was his
brainchild” (cited in Heitman, 2008). It was under Mbeki, initially as deputy president, that South Africa took on a leading peace-making and peacekeeping role in the region and there are concerns that a populist successor might curtail South Africa's strategic engagement in Africa in favor of short-term social programmes to satisfy the left wing that toppled Mbeki. Indeed, Robert Schrire (interview), head of the political science department at the University of Cape Town, forecasts that after Mbeki leaves office, there will likely be a ‘depersonalization’ of South African foreign policy and a turn to domestic issues such as social inequality and HIV/AIDS. However, Zuma has taken a more nuanced position with the appointment of prominent presidential advisors who have experience in managing international relations. These include Welile Nhlapo as National Security Special Advisor (former Ambassador to Ethiopia [1995] and the US [2007], Special Envoy to Burundi [1997], Deputy Director-General for Africa at DFA [1998], Head of Presidential Support Unit on conflict situations in Africa and Middle East [2001] and Lindiwe Zulu as International Relations Advisor (former Ambassador to Brazil, Chief Director in DFA). The rational actor model does not cater for such informal dynamics in foreign policy making.

Kegley and Wittkopf (2001: 40-41) concur that rational decision-making is more of an idealized standard against which policy decision-making is made, rather than an accurate descriptor of behavior in the real world. In reality, foreign policy making takes place in circumstances that are far from ideal. Furthermore, the rational actor model also does not cater for the possibility that foreign policy is formulated not only in the pursuit of interests but also in the advancement of beliefs and values. Though less tangible than, for example, trade interests, belief systems and values are by no means less significant in the arena of South African foreign policy making.
Ideas continue to play an influential role in South African foreign policy. Since 1948, apartheid ideology had a determining effect on South Africa’s foreign policy options and instruments. In post-apartheid South Africa, the values of foreign policy were captured in 1993 by former President Mandela (1993: 87) in a *Foreign Affairs* article:

“*The issue of human rights is central to international relations and an understanding that they extend beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental.*

- That concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be in our foreign policy issues.
- That economic development depends on growing regional and international economic cooperation in an interdependent world.
- These convictions stand in stark contrast to how, for nearly fifty years apartheid South Africa disastrously conducted its international relations.”

The African Renaissance and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) are other notable ideas that have shaped South Africa’s foreign policy but which are ignored by the systemic rational actor model.

### 4.5.2 The organizational process model

According to this model, the pursuit of policy is determined by the routine behavioral habits of the organization involved in the decision. In contrast with the rational actor perspective, governments are not unitary actors in the making of policy. Governments consist of a number of loosely allied organizations, each with a life and experience of their own. One could argue that this model caters for the dynamics of
the tri-partite alliance that informs the policies of the ruling party. This is especially critical in South Africa where the distinction between the ruling party and state is often blurred. It cannot be disputed that the approach of the post-apartheid government has its roots in the experiences of the ruling party. The model could explain why the influence of the military and intelligence in apartheid foreign-policy making has been balanced by civilian input in a post-apartheid era.

The model also accounts for the role of interests outside the state such as the media and business. The impact of business interests on foreign policy in South Africa is particularly visible with regard to post-apartheid corporate expansion on the continent. In South Africa, the media has often been ignored with regard to foreign policy, largely because of its tendency to send conflicting messages to government, depending on the issue being sensationalized, whether it is the African Renaissance or refugees.

However, like the rational actor model, there is a failure to recognize the impact of personality on foreign policy (as discussed in 4.5.1). This is despite the contention by Jacob Zuma that “there is no difference in policy. Mbeki does not have a policy of his own. Zuma does not have a policy of his own, we all belong to the ANC, we all subscribe to the ANC policy” (interview with Smith, 2008: 20). In this regard, Habib (2010: 50) is on the mark when he argues that “post-apartheid foreign policy cannot be understood outside an analysis of the ANC, its character, the hopes and political aspirations of its leadership, and ultimately their strategic orientations.” It is worth noting that the ANC’s Polokwane Conference in 2007 generated a number of
resolutions relating to foreign policy. Van Nieuwkerk (2010: 102) summarizes these as:

[re-affirmation of] the ANC’s commitment to progressive internationalism as a response to the challenge of imperialism (where the system of capitalism is seen to be dominated by one ‘hyper-power’; support for the establishment of an AU government via processes of regional integration, for example, following a developmental approach to SADC’s consolidation; support for India, Brazil and China as strategic partners; the ‘intensification’ of economic diplomacy; and a name change from DFA to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO).

However, the role of DFA under the Mandela and Mbeki administrations is instructive in this regard. Under Mandela, the DFA (specifically the multilateral section responsible for issues around disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation) played a leading role in the drafting of South African policy on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and related matters. In contrast, DFA played a facilitative rather than a policy role with regard to NEPAD issues. Under Mbeki, it was the Presidential Policy Unit and other technocratic experts that were largely responsible for formulating the South African NEPAD input.

In fact, one of the strengths of the organizational model is its ability to explain such role and influence of political parties in foreign policy making. It should also be noted that such analysis is not confined to the ruling party and will also encompass the role of opposition parties which in South Africa have often been vociferous on foreign policy issues. The Democratic Alliance’s position on Zimbabwe attests to
this. The DA has often exploited the negative media perceptions of the government’s handling of the crisis. In December 2003, the DA even released its policy alternative for Zimbabwe entitled, “Road map to democracy in Zimbabwe” (http://www.wits.ac.za/saiia/LeonSpeech.htm). Of note, though, is that there is no evidence to suggest that any South African opposition party has successfully played any major role in shaping or altering South Africa’s policy on Zimbabwe.

4.5.3 The bureaucratic politics model

The central focus of this model is the conflict and cooperation between departments charged with the decision-making and administration of foreign policy. There is recognition that specialized bodies (in government) have different interests and powers, and the policy process is about power relationships and bargaining between them. One could argue that at the level of departments, Foreign Affairs and Trade and Industry compete for the ‘right to frame the policy question’ and for the right to inform and advise cabinet and the president on the position to take. However depending on the issue, Defense (peace-keeping) and even Science and Technology (NEPAD Projects) can play a more prominent role. The function of Intelligence in advising on the threats to and opportunities for the realization of South Africa’s foreign policy goals should also not be ignored. Interestingly, Pfister’s study (2005) shows how different apartheid governments relied on different departments with regard to foreign policy. He details how Verwoerd relied on the experts of the Foreign Affairs office, Vorster used intelligence to compensate for his ‘serious lack of decisive leadership’, Botha shifted responsibility to the military and de Klerk once
again turned to the foreign affairs professionals to lay the foundation for the dismantling of apartheid.

The post-apartheid system is vastly different – the cluster system of governance-compels government departments to work together. For example, the International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS) Cluster is responsible for foreign policy and brings together departments such as Foreign Affairs, Trade and Industry, Intelligence, Defense, the Presidency and Home Affairs among others. However, the greater impetus for cooperation does not discount the possibility of conflict. A project initiated in 2006 to identify strategic partners on the continent for South Africa was abandoned largely because of the failure of the IRPS Cluster to reach consensus on the countries. The different interests of the departments subjugated the ability of the Cluster to streamline South Africa’s foreign policy by identifying common strategic partners.

While this model caters for the different departmental interests, it fails to take into account differences within a particular department. Van der Westhuizen (1998: 444) alludes to such differences within South Africa’s DFA by differentiating between an ‘internationalist’ and ‘neo-mercantilist’ camp. Officials representing the previous apartheid government belong to the latter group which, consistent with the logic of neo-realism, emphasize the importance of trade and self interest over all else. The ‘internationalists’ are mainly those with exile experience that were in favor of a demonstrably greater degree of solidarity with the collective problems of the developing world. The ambiguity that often characterizes South Africa’s foreign policy is attributed to these competing interests.
Any analysis of South African foreign policy with regard to the Southern African region will have to involve an understanding of both the domestic and international environments and the relation of one to the other. James Rosenau (1987: 1) notes that “the analysis of foreign policy is a bridging discipline that takes as its focus of study the bridges that whole systems called nation-states build to link themselves and their subsystems to even more encompassing international systems of which they are a part.” This section explores the changes in South Africa’s internal and external environment which provided material for the construction of new bridges as well as the extent to which the linkages created by such bridges remained the same.

5.1 Catalyst for Change: New foreign policy environment

5.1.1 External Environment

We cannot understand our own process of liberation without understanding the general conditions of the period in which we live. Having realized political liberation, how will global transitions impact on our ongoing search for economic and social emancipation?

(Lenin collected works, 1964: 36)

Lenin’s question was particularly relevant for a post-apartheid government that had to acclimatize to the changes in the broader system within which it found itself. The most far-reaching of the major shifts in the global order was the disintegration of the Soviet empire and the unprecedented impact of globalization on the world economy. This impacted on South African post-apartheid foreign policy in two ways.

Firstly, there is much consensus that with the end of the Cold War, Africa has become increasingly marginalized and lost its prominence as an ally in either supporting or stemming the advance of communism (Clapham: 1994; Bischoff: 1995; Callaghy: 1995; Harbeson: 1995; Vale: 1995; Okeke Uzodike: 1996). In fact, Jack Spence (Business Day, 1994) has warned that South Africa and its neighbors are in danger of being marginalized in the cutthroat world of international politics unless they succeed in establishing strong regional links. It is a point that Fantu Cheru (1996: 46) aptly captures in his exposition of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) negotiations when African needs were never addressed. In the UNCED process, issues of particular importance to Africa – the dumping of toxic
waste, debt and commodity prices, and desertification – were given scant consideration. This can be contrasted with the considerable international concern expressed over deforestation, ozone depletion and global warming. Edigheji (2007: 9) attributes such social inequalities to “the triumphalism of liberal democracy and market fundamentalism, especially following the collapse of the former Soviet Union…” Edigheji (2007: 10) points out that “the era of market fundamentalism has witnessed rising inequality within nations, across nations, within regions and across regions, with the most compromised and impoverished being the African continent and its people.” In essence, South Africa was forced to craft her new post-apartheid developmental agenda within such an unreceptive external environment. It was such conditions that shaped her championing of the reform of the international system, that propelled her to use her newly acquired moral stature to be the voice of the developing world, and which underscored her focus on South-South co-operation. Habib (2009: 143) concludes that “The transition has occurred when a particular configuration of power prevailed in the global order that not only established the parameters which governed its evolution, but also determined which interests prevailed within it.” Jeremy Cronin (interview with Gumede, 2005: 76) affirms that the ANC came into power at a time when there was not much space to maneuver:

The triumph of neo-liberalism was at its zenith in the early 1990s. So for a combination of reasons, including the sheer power, the ideological and hegemonic power of the neo-liberal model and the weakness of the left…whether from panic or deep concern, laden with the responsibilities of governing, they were persuaded of certain aspects, not necessarily the whole package. The core aspects of the neo-liberal paradigm became very influential in government circles and in leading parts of the ANC.
Landsberg (2005: electronic) concurs that South Africa’s transition coincided with what could be termed “heightened globalization, the drift toward free market orthodoxies as the only and best ways to address poverty and underdevelopment, and liberal democracy as the only democratic alternative on offer.” In the eloquent words of Fukuyama (1989: electronic):

> The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism...What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.

The second post-cold war feature that re-defined the international system and compelled South Africa’s foreign policy to respond through integration dogma was the impact of globalization and its concomitant ‘compression’ of the world into new patterns of production, integrated financial spheres, homogenization of cultures etc. With its tendency to fragment, differentiate, and marginalize social forces and countries incapable of catching up with its processes, uneven development, long associated with capitalist expansion, is probably the most visible trade mark of globalization in its contemporary form. However, social democrats such as Sachs, Held, and Stiglitz, believe that the benefits of globalization outstrip the costs. They argue for an ‘enlightened globalization’ where global market integration is one that is managed fairly and is accompanied by a progressive global social integration. For
countries on the periphery of the global order such as those in Africa, the task of humanizing such a globalist project is near impossible. The immediate challenge remains simply contending with the forces of globalization.

Hirst and Thompson (1996) observe that with globalization, unfettered and uncontrollable market forces have become the principal agents and forces of change, further eroding the primacy of states in the international system. Developing countries, such as those in Africa, are particularly vulnerable to the pernicious effects of unbridled market forces and have turned to regional integration as a mechanism for redressing some of the negative effects associated with a world that is globalizing without much African role or input. Mittleman (1999: 25) even claims that, “regionalism today is emerging as a potent force in the global restructuring of power and production.” Many developing countries see regional integration as a strategy for overcoming the deficiencies of small and poor domestic markets in an increasingly liberalizing, globalizing, and competitive world economy which has been shaped by the Washington Consensus positioning of the unfettered market as the driver of development.

The need for cooperation between South Africa and the region, the need to think together, act together and build together, had never been more compelling. As Klaus Schwab, the then-president of the World Economic Forum (WEF), argued at the 1999 Southern Africa Economic Summit in Durban, South Africa: “In the global economy, regional strength is paramount” (http://www.weforum.org/pdf/SummitReports/africa1999.pdf). In fact, the conclusion to the 1993 African Development Bank study on economic integration reads: “so serious are the
challenges facing Southern Africa that governments cannot afford to ignore…the limitations which national boundaries impose on their prospects for economic recovery and growth…Regional integration is not an optional extra; it is a matter of survival.” It is within this context that we can better understand the evolution of post-apartheid South Africa’s effort toward the transformative development of her region by strengthening regional organizations such as the SADC. For example, while the relatively small individual sizes of SADC countries constrain their efforts to deal with the immense challenges posed by globalization, their combined weight represents a market of 190 million people and a $180 billion economy (Mills and Sidiropoulos, 2001: 2). The conclusion of a February 2000 study on *Economic Cooperation and Regional Integration Policy* by the African Development Bank African Development Fund affirms that:

Regional economic integration has an important role to play in the pursuit of accelerated economic growth and sustainable development in Africa. Regional integration will permit:

- The expansion of market size which will facilitate greater specialization and industrialization through economies of scale, thereby helping to overcome the small size problem of African economies;
- Improved donor coordination, leading to a systematic exchange of information and mutually beneficial efficiency in the use of scarce development resources;
- The acceleration of domestic and foreign direct investment and competitiveness of African economies in a globalizing world economy;
- Greater trade among member countries through removal of trade barriers; and
• Rapid and extensive improvement in allocative and dynamic efficiency through enhanced competition among the participating countries and increased incentives for the adoption of new technologies and methods of production alongside rapid innovation.

In essence, South Africa’s alignment with the region would in the long run provide the opportunity for strengthening the bargaining power of Southern Africa on economic issues of contemporary significance such as external debt, commodity prices, and technical assistance, to name but a few.

Regional integration is also critical in terms of South Africa’s broader support for the AU agenda and its related commitment to a process of gradual continental integration. The Abuja Treaty (1991) lays the ground work for the creation of an African Economic Community, with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) serving as the building blocks. The RECs are expected to merge into the African Common Market between 2019 and 2023. Southern African countries are members of COMESA and/or SADC. Of note is that these two RECs, in particular, are taking major steps towards this continental vision. The CES Tripartite Arrangement, launched in October 2008, currently defines the vision and regional strategic objective of Southern and Eastern Africa. The CES tripartite arrangement covers a major part of the continent, involving 26 countries, accounting for about 56% of the population and about 58% of the combined GDP of Africa in 2008. The Tripartite Arrangement is a bold initiative to expand intra-regional trade, promote inter-REC collaboration and facilitate joint planning, resource mobilization and project/program implementation.
It will also help to address the challenge of multiple memberships. The key provisions of the CES Tripartite arrangement include:

(i) establishment of the CES Tripartite FTA to promote deeper trade integration;
(ii) development of joint infrastructure programs, financing and implementation (a good example of which is the CES North South corridor - a model aid for trade pilot program launched in April 2009);
(iii) development of joint programs for agricultural development and food security;
(iv) development of programs to enhance movement of business persons, labor and services across the region; and
(v) preparation of common regional positions and strategies in multilateral and international trade negotiations.

However, it should be noted that scholars and analysts are not unanimous in their assessment of the efficacy of regional integration. A number of questions have been raised regarding the utility of the regional integration route as a panacea to Africa’s marginalization in the global system (Davies: 1991; Gibb: 1998; Clapham et al eds: 2001). The most extreme thinking in this regard is that regionalization might be a double-edged sword, entrenching a few islands of development in the region thereby compounding the suffering and deprivation of the majority of its inhabitants. Davies (1992) summarizes that the fundamental issue facing Africa’s regions is the extent to which disparities and inequalities can be addressed in an integration project: “to what extent… will integration aim to transform existing patterns of interaction in the region, rather than merely quantitatively extend existing ties…” South Africa’s history within its own region (explained in Chapter 2) typifies the challenges facing countries as they attempt to deal with political differences and economic insecurities.
At the same time, one could argue that the critique of the efficacy of regional integration is premised largely on the misleading assumption that regional integration would be foremost a matter of economic issues.

However, the reality is that the contemporary wave of regionalism is a heterogeneous, multidimensional phenomenon which involves state, market and society actors and covers economic, cultural, political, security as well as environmental aspects. In this regard, it is a comprehensive response to the broad array of issues over which globalization has heightened interdependence. This new reality has compelled a broadening of the security agenda, in particular, and reinforced the philosophy popularized by Salim Ahmed Salim, the OAU Secretary-General between 1989 and 2001, that “the problems of my neighbor are my problems.” Contested state borders and competition for scarce resources have now been exacerbated by new challenges that have not been part of the traditional understanding of national security, for example, climate change. One can add to this, the soaring food and oil prices amidst a global financial crisis. Indeed, countries find themselves in a world of old rules but new threats which forces them to re-conceptualize or abandon existing paradigms. At the conclusion of the April 2009 Summit of the G20 Heads of State in London, the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, started his media briefing by announcing that the Washington Consensus had been declared dead, and suggested the dawn of a new consensus era—akin to a London Consensus. As Brown put it:

The old Washington consensus is over. Today we have reached a new consensus that we take global action together to deal with the problems we face, that we will do what is necessary to restore growth and jobs that
we will take essential action to rebuild confidence and trust in our financial system and to prevent a crisis such as this ever happening again. (http://www.pressrun.net/weblog/2009/04/old-washington-consensus-is-over-gordon-brown.html)

Indeed, transnational and rapidly changing threats necessitate regional and international collaboration. In addition, the events (terrorist attacks in the United States of America) and post-events (creation of the coalition of the willing to fight the scourge of terrorism) of 11 September 2001 further reinvigorated the notion of the regional security complex, associated with Barry Buzan (1991: 190), where security complex is defined “as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national security cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.” Global economic crisis has taught us that the prosperity of national economies is now acutely dependent on economic developments in other parts of the world and on the overall health of the global economy. In a prescient article published in the early 1980s Richard Ullman made a general case for broadening the concept of security. He insisted that national security is threatened by the consequences of events that quickly degrade the quality of life of state and nonstate actors alike, thus narrowing significantly the future range of political choice (Ullman, 1983: 130-135).

In this regard, issues of illegal migration, terrorist networks, water scarcity, food insecurity and diseases such as cholera bind the countries of the Southern African region together. As the South African industrialist Dr Anton Rupert put it over thirty years ago: “If they [RSA’s neighbors in the sub-region] don’t eat, we won’t sleep”
Minister Alfred Nzo, in September 1995, was more eloquent in describing the global environment and its impact on South Africa,

Our operational environment has changed dramatically. The end of the Cold War has created a new global situation in which our young democracy must find its feet. The new world order, if it exists at all, is fraught with uncertainties and insecurities. Ideological conflict has to a large extent been replaced by economic competition, the rules for which have not yet been fully agreed upon. The ground beneath our feet is not firm: It is volatile and unpredictable. Yet it is our primary task to secure and promote the sovereign integrity of the South African State, as well as the security and welfare of its citizens. These are the considerations which ultimately determine everything we do in the conduct of our foreign relations.

The underlying argument of this section is, therefore, that the geostrategic consequences of the end of the Cold War have required South Africa to prioritize and sharpen the focus on its foreign and security policies towards the countries in its immediate neighborhood. The challenge of re-aligning domestic and foreign policies in a global environment was aptly captured by former Botswana President Festus Mogae in his 1998 Budget Speech:

We are facing much more competitive regional and international environment, which rewards those countries which adapt to the dictates of market discipline and marginalize those that fail to do so. Our timely and adequate response to the opportunities and challenges of globalization, will, to a very large extent, determine our future prosperity as a nation.
Co-incidentally, the broad changes in the external environment of 1989 were followed by propitious internal changes within South Africa. While the Southern African region was divided for decades by bellicose rhetoric and active hostility between the South African apartheid regime and the rest of Southern Africa, in February 1990, the then-President de Klerk called for a new era of reconstruction and reconciliation in the region. Moreover, as early as the 1990s, the ANC made no pretences that Africa represented an important sphere of strategic relationships. This was reflected in the ANC’s policy documents which repeatedly committed itself to “actively seeking to promote greater regional cooperation along new lines which will correct imbalances in current relationships” (Davies et al, 1993: 2). In 1993, an ANC foreign policy discussion paper further noted that:

South Africa cannot escape its African destiny. If we do not devote our energies to this continent, we too could fall victim to the forces that have brought ruin to its various parts.[...] We are inextricably part of Southern Africa and our destiny is linked to that of the region, which is much more than a mere geographical concept.

the fate of democratic SA is inextricably bound up with what happens in the rest of the continent…our foreign policy should reflect the interests of the continent of Africa.

In this regard, both Southall (1994) and the 1994 ANC Foreign Policy Perspective allude to South Africa’s days as ‘a militaristic rogue elephant in Africa’ being replaced by a more cooperative philosophy and a professed intention “to become part
of a movement to create a new form of economic interaction in the region based on principles of mutual benefit and interdependence.” The Department of Foreign Affairs have distilled the ANC's commitments down to two primary objectives which cannot work in isolation of the region: wealth creation and security (www.dfa.gov.za). This is underpinned by the thinking that creating sustainable wealth in a globalizing world needs the region as it gives it a stronger voice to challenge the international structures that disadvantage it. At the same time, such security will be threatened if wealth is achieved in isolation and people within the region gravitate towards it, exacerbating problems such as illegal migration.

As during the apartheid period, the centrality of the Southern African region to South Africa’s foreign policy is unquestionable. However, in the post-apartheid period it is marked by a distinctive shift from policies of destabilization to those of cooperation (as captured in Chapter 2). In 1992, Peter Vale argued that the challenge to those who have traditionally made South Africa's regional policy “is to liberate themselves from the narrow threat-based understanding of the country's regional priorities and to understand that South Africa's real interests in Southern Africa can only be determined by the interests of all those who have helped to create it.” South African foreign policy-makers and government officials rose to this challenge:

We have a special relationship with the peoples of Southern Africa, all of whom have suffered under apartheid. While South Africa's people experienced discrimination and repression at home, the peoples of other countries fell victim to barbaric destabilization policies which left nearly two million people dead, displaced millions more, and inflicted damage estimated at $65-billion on the economies of neighboring countries. The
region sustained us during our struggle and our destiny is intertwined with the region; our peoples belong with each other.

*(1994 ANC Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa)*

A democratic South Africa …should seek to become part of a movement to create a new form of economic interaction in Southern Africa based on principles of mutual benefit and interdependence… We are conscious of the need for any plan or programme seeking to promote greater cooperation and integration in Southern Africa to take account of the acute imbalances in existing regional economic relations…. South Africa should avoid using regional cooperation or integration as a vehicle for the one-sided promotion of its immediate interests. Instead, it needs to recognize that balanced and mutually beneficial cooperation and integration can be of considerable significance to the efforts of a democratic South Africa to place its economy on a new growth path.

*(1994 ANC Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa)*

…We are part of the region of Southern Africa and of the continent of Africa. As members of the Southern African Development Community and the Organization of African Unity, and an equal partner with other member states, we will play our role in the struggles of these organizations to build a continent and a region that will help to create for themselves and all humanity a common world of peace and prosperity.

*(President Nelson Mandela, UN General Assembly in October 1994)*
The promotion of economic development of the Southern African region is of paramount importance as the economies of the countries in the region are intertwined to such an extent that, for South Africa to believe that it could enter a prosperous future in isolation without taking neighboring countries with her, would be unrealistic and hazardous. (Minister Alfred Nzo, address to the Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committee of Parliament on 14 March 1995)

Among the fundamentals of any future foreign policy would be for South Africa to support the needs and aspirations of the African continent and the promotion of the economic wellbeing of the people of the Southern African region. (Jackie Selebi, Director General of the DFA in 1999).

The RDP White Paper (RDP White Paper, 1994) also recognizes that:

It is impossible to rebuild the economy of South Africa in isolation from its Southern African neighbors. It would also be dangerous for South Africa to dominate its neighbors, as it would restrict their growth, reduce their potential as markets which will worsen their unemployment and lead to increased migration to South Africa. It is therefore important for South Africa to participate in regional development through multilateral forums such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).

It is important for South Africa to co-operate with its neighbors to develop an effective growth and development strategy for Southern Africa, in
order to overcome the negative results of World Bank and International
Monetary Fund programmes which had been forced on the region.

In addition to such policy and pronouncements, it was Mbeki’s (1999 – 2008) notion of an African Renaissance (as articulated in his ‘I am an African’ speech as vice president of South Africa on behalf of the ANC in Cape Town on 8 May 1996, on the occasion of the passing of the new Constitution of South Africa as well as his speech on 13 August 1998 at Gallagher Estate) that unreservedly linked South Africa’s foreign policy and its fortunes to Africa. The idea of an African Renaissance was rooted in the premise that progress in South Africa’s international and domestic position was impossible without an improvement in the position of the whole continent. Despite this, the African Renaissance was regarded by many countries as an elitist project that was ‘high on sentiment, low on substance’ (Vale and Maseko, 1998: 277). Once again, the South African government was forced to reassure African leaders of South African intentions as well as counter the fears of some that the new ANC-led government might continue the old hegemonic policies in new economic guises:

  The construction of a new regional order will be a collective endeavor of all the free peoples of Southern Africa and cannot be imposed either by extra-regional forces or any self-appointed regional power. Militaristic approaches to inter regional security and cooperation should have no place in the reconstruction of Southern Africa’s regional relations…

(www.gopher.anc.org.za/00/anc/policy/foreign txt)
…a democratic SA will...resist any pressure or temptation to pursue its own interests at the expense of the subcontinent.

(Nelson Mandela cited in Herbst, 1995: 91)

Our own freedom as a people is diminished when another people are not free. Thus we have a continuing responsibility to make whatever contribution we can to the struggle for the birth of the new world order that is so spoken of, so that the peoples of the world, including ourselves, live in conditions of democracy, peace, prosperity and equality among nations. In pursuing these objectives, we must be careful to avoid great power arrogance and conferring ourselves a misplaced messianic role.

(Nelson Mandela cited in a speech by Mr Alfred Nzo, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa in 1996)

The Southern African region expects a positive contribution from South Africa in terms of their own development. They expect that we interact with them as a partner and ally, not as a regional super power, so that what we achieve, in terms of political, security and economic relations are balanced and mutually beneficial.

(Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, in his address to South African ambassadors during the September 1995 conference)

I...assure our neighbors and the peoples of the rest of Africa that the government we lead has no great power pretensions. We claim no right to
impose our will on any independent country. We will not force anything on anybody….

(President Thabo Mbeki, 18 February 2003)

In addition to such pronouncements, the actions of the South African government during the early phases of post-apartheid South Africa also reflected the country’s good neighborliness policy. For example, President Mandela declined an invitation to Britain in July 1994 for a ceremony marking South Africa’s return to the Commonwealth and instead chose to go to Mozambique for his first overseas visit as a Head of State (Mwangi, 2002: 131).

Clearly, the post-apartheid government’s reformulated foreign policy framework, buttressed by various policy initiatives and pronouncements, provide important insights about her determination to nurture her African relationships in a way that is reassuring, non-threatening, and mutually beneficial. Arguably, one of the most visible shifts in the new South African government's foreign policy orientation after 1994 has been its commitment to become a true partner in Southern Africa and where possible, to support regional economic development processes. In fact, the severe imbalance of the Southern African regional economy (with South Africa accounting for three-quarters of the region's total gross domestic product and manufactured production), has compelled South Africa to negotiate an 'asymmetrical' free trade agreement with the rest of the region. A senior official in the DTI (interview, 2008) pointed out that South Africa accounts for roughly 92% of the revenue of BLNS (used to describe Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland collectively) but only takes 48%.
Moreover, although not a donor country, development cooperation with countries in Africa forms an integral part of South Africa’s foreign policy. Technical and financial assistance, with a view to capacity-building, especially to SADC countries, is regarded as a major instrument for promoting economic development, peace and stability, democracy and the African Renaissance on a regional basis (www.gov.za/yearbook/foreign.htm). Such support was grounded in the thinking that reconstruction of the region ‘must be a collective enterprise’ in which Pretoria will shoulder responsibilities “not in a spirit of paternalism or dominance but with mutual cooperation and respect” (Barber, 1994: 44/45).

5.2 Post apartheid corporate expansion

Interestingly, despite changes in the external environment which encouraged closer regional relations and the internal changes which underpinned new South African intentions in the region, South Africa’s inability to convince other states that her vision is complimentary to their needs has inhibited her ability to engineer a process of transformation and development in the region. In this regard, a quick exposition of post apartheid corporate expansion reveals that the current dichotomy between government intentions and actions (a reflection of the disjuncture between regional vision and national interest) is at the heart of the arrant flop of the South African regional recipe for transformative development. Regional visions of a post apartheid South African engine of economic growth and recovery in Southern Africa ignored the reality of South Africa’s own national interest of positioning itself as a ‘first world’ player in international markets rather than as a ‘third world’ country confined to regional markets (Marais, 1998).
In the early 1990s it was a foregone conclusion that the end of apartheid would open up the African market to South African corporates (Daniel et al, 2003). South Africa’s Financial Mail (7 February 2003) posed an interesting question in this regard, ‘Will the nations of Africa be able to look back and say that South African companies played a critical role in their recovery? Or will they be regarded as exploitative and neo-colonialists?’ To this one could add, is there a difference between western capital and South African capital? If so, should there be? As Nye (2002: 11) argues:

The values our government champions in its behavior at home (for example, democracy), in international institutions (listening to others) and in foreign policy (promoting peace and human rights) also affect the preferences of others.....But softer power does not belong to the government in the same degree that hard power does. Today popular [U.S] firms or non-governmental groups develop soft power of their own that may coincide or be at odds with official foreign policy goals.

This dilemma has become a reality over which the government has less control than it would like: South Africa’s carefully constructed and nuanced diplomatic position of ‘unassuming leadership’ is being increasingly threatened and undermined by the aggressive dominance of South African companies. In this regard, Landsberg (2008: electronic) articulates South Africa’s twofold challenge:

How to ensure first that the country’s economic roles are aligned with political foreign policy; and related in the second instance that South African business – which remains primarily in the hands of the white population in South Africa – does not undermine the policy position and
diplomatic practices of the continentalism project that the government has so assiduously and sensitively cultivated over the years.

Indeed, many countries in Southern Africa did not anticipate the speed with which business in the region would leapfrog its politics and, therefore, were not in a position to make the most of post-apartheid corporate expansion (using it to drive infrastructure development). While post apartheid foreign policy makers championed the common theme of “transformation from the scorned …economic storm troopers of white-minority rule and rapacious Western capitalism…” countries in the region continued to perceive the ‘South Africanization’ of their economy as deleterious to their interests (Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan, 1998: 166). Instead of taking advantage of the new employment opportunities, the rehabilitation of infrastructure, competitive pricing that reduced the costs of consumer goods and the availability of an African partner, the region has viewed South African post apartheid corporate expansion as a new form of core-periphery relationship. It is believed that the constellation of states “which the apartheid regime could not achieve politically is now increasingly being accomplished through the structural power of capital….South African hegemony is being spread by profit-seeking South African businesses who are establishing a constellation of Southern African economies” (Iheduru, 1996). In this regard, the well-known 1892 cartoon in Punch magazine of the Colossus of Cecil Rhodes astride the African continent from the Cape to Cairo which captured the triumphalistic British imperial mood of the time (South Africa had been the springboard for the gradual British conquest of much of southern and central Africa) was ironically reproduced by The Economist (12 August 1995: 17) under a modified caption, ‘The Cape Crusader’.
The cartoon was intended to illustrate the post-apartheid resurgence of South African commercial investment in the rest of Africa and was prompted by the article’s opening quote, in which one of the South African businessmen involved claimed that they wanted to ‘succeed where Cecil Rhodes failed.’ Such thoughts were symbolic of the reality that a change of government in South Africa had not necessarily resulted in a change of attitude in some quarters.

Nevertheless, Nelson Mandela, South Africa’s immediate post apartheid president, claimed that “it was the colonial economy which had entrenched South Africa’s regional pre-eminence, and subordinated surrounding states to act as labor reserves and client markets” and committed his government to offsetting the skewed apartheid trade imbalance through investment in critical sectors (Barber, 1994: 44). It is estimated that South African investment represents close to 20% of total foreign direct investment in Africa and comes at a critical time when investment flows to Africa have declined steadily (DBSA, 2003: 115). For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, there has been a decrease in FDI from $8bn in 1999 to $6.5bn by the year 2000 (DBSA, 2003: 115).
Essentially the graph illustrates that South Africa’s foreign direct investment in the rest of Africa has more than doubled in the period 1996 to 2001. South Africa is now the largest foreign direct investor in Africa with an annual average of $1.4bn since 1991 (DBSA, 2003: 115). Moreover, between 1994 and 2000 South Africa outstripped former colonial powers and other countries engaged in major sectoral investment by topping the list of FDI into SADC, with US$5,424 million of actual and intended investments (Naidu et al, 2001)

This process received further impetus from NEPAD, a vision for the continent’s renewal which stresses the need for partnerships amongst African countries in pursuit of a common goal of extricating themselves from underdevelopment and global marginalization. Cognizant that a key barrier to African countries securing investment has been the absence of adequate supporting infrastructure such as
telecommunications, transport, power supplies, and road and air links; NEPAD has prioritized the bridging of the infrastructural gap and South Africa’s parastatals have taken a lead in this regard:

- rail, road and ports (parastatals Transnet and its divisions Spoornet and Comazar),
- aviation (Airports company of South Africa and South African Airways)
- power and energy (Eskom Enterprises, PetroSA and Sasol)
- information technology (Arivia.kom)
- telecommunications (Transtel and Eskom Enterprises)
- financing for African projects (Industrial Development Corporation and the Development Bank of Southern Africa)

With such parastatals there is also a significant shift from the past practice of mergers and acquisitions in favor of joint venture arrangements which not only helps assuage the resource/capacity void in African countries but also mitigates against the notion of an ascendant and influential South African dominance. Jeff Radebe (2004), South African Minister of Public Enterprises, gave substance to the idea of South Africa as a ‘development partner’ by affirming that:

We do not want South Africa to be perceived as the new colonizer of Africa. We aim to work together with our fellow Africans for an equal development of the continent….We have to ensure that we build partnerships, to avoid an imbalance of economic development. We will not be happy if South Africa develops in isolation, while there is poverty in the rest of the continent.
Such assurances were not matched by a similar public political behavior and South Africa’s role in the region continues to be viewed through the negative lens of the past, a problem that is compounded by the behavior of some of her private sector companies (an affirmation of the earlier point that a change in government has not resulted in a change of attitude that has permeated all levels of South African society). Warigi (2000: electronic) argues that “counterpoised to South Africa’s official commitment to more equitable forms of integration, is a one-sided commercial expansion that fortifies current inequalities.” Her article taps on genuine regional concerns that South African business has shown little interest in locally sourcing products (opting to import most or everything from down south), has undermined local business with their competition, and has pursued an economic game-plan that is selfishly geared towards creating a captive consumer markets for South African goods. In addition, Mlambo (2000: 71) alludes to perceptions that while South Africa’s trade and investment policies are arguably undermining these countries’ economies, its higher wages and better job opportunities are fuelling a crippling brain drain in the region. Indeed, there is an ingrained perception in the region (which was clearly evident in some of the interviews conducted) that South Africa has used its foreign policy objectives and NEPAD priority plans as a passport to gain market access and penetrate other African markets with the sole aim of profiteering. McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (1998: 191) aptly capture this sentiment with their assessment that

the rest of Southern Africa is currently paying part of the cost of South Africa’s restructuring.’ Not surprisingly, such perceptions have churned up memories of apartheid destabilization and hostility invariably resulting
in resentment and the stereotyping of all South African businesses as ‘neo-colonial invasions.

Unfortunately, more often than not, the attitudes of South African companies to the rest of the region fail to negate such perceptions. Like business anywhere, the South African business sector is driven by typical corporate interests – profits, market share, elimination of competition, and the urge to dominate and to monopolize. The New York Times (2002) quoted Absa’s Rupert Pardoe as pointing out that Absa was “…not investing in Africa for altruism. We’re investing in Africa to make some money.” “Every continent needs an America….” is how another South African investor responded when questioned about the importance of South African investment in a country like Mozambique (cited in Grobbelaar, 2004: 5). Despite the South African government’s best attempts to play down its economic strength in relation to the rest of the region, such assertions reinforce the hegemonic thrust of South African capital. In this regard, South Africa has also suffered the same criticism as the United States in terms of the exercise of economic power not being matched by a shift in social responsibility. The 2002 United Nations report which highlighted the questionable practices of twelve South African companies operating in the DRC, including De Beers, ranks among the most notorious examples of South African private sector exploitation of other African markets. In their special report that assesses the impact of South African business in Africa on development, Kapelus and Diaho (2003) further unpack regional accusations of discriminatory labor practices exported from South Africa, the adverse impact on local supply chains by retail stores, environmental destruction by mining companies, arrogance and lack of integration with local business networks, and corrupt business practices. The 2003
special report by the Naledi and African Research Labor Network which questions whether South Africans are ‘new colonialists on the block’ also exposes the flouting of competition laws in some countries by South African companies:

In 2003, reports were received from Zambia about the possible impact on local business of the importing of cheaper goods from SA and Zimbabwe…

In December 2001 allegations of restrictive business practices were brought against Game stores, a South African chain operating in Zambia: there were complaints that Game stores had unfair trading terms designed to make it difficult for Zambian suppliers to supply Game stores…

Arguably, the case of Shoprite-Checkers operations in the region best typifies the clash between the post apartheid South African government’s vision and the business practices of her private sector companies. Extensive research by Miller (2003) and Muneku (2003) into Shoprite’s operation in Zambia exposed a strong belief that South African companies were ‘exporting apartheid’ to Africa. This emerged from the interviews of trade union members during which the racial structure of management at the stores was highlighted. Accusations of Shoprite Checkers exploiting labor in six Southern African countries by under-paying and overworking, crowding out local markets and securing a retail oligopoly in some African countries are a stark contrast to the company’s stated commitment to development plans such as NEPAD and visions like the African Renaissance.
In the spirit of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad), African countries are nurturing an economic union, which will allow Africa to grow to greater self-sufficiency and economic stability. Shoprite wants to play a meaningful role in building a ‘United States of Africa’, dominated not by foreigners but African companies… Apart from offering consumers quality products at the lowest prices, the respective local economies also benefit from… retail property infrastructure, job creation, the upliftment of local producers.

(Shoprite’s African Vision as cited in the Shoprite Checkers Annual Report 2003)

versus

[excerpts from the studies conducted by Miller (2003) and Muneku (2003)]

They (these investors) are not helping Zambia to develop. Shoprite, whatever they sell, the monies are transmitted to SA right away. Even the government is aware that that these people, they are just using Zambia as a market, just to sell their things and send all their profits to SA. So Zambians are not benefiting from it…

If we look at all the products, the merchandise they have, they all come from South Africa, which means that manufacturers in South Africa are on the benefit side, because they are the ones that receive the money …

Control of Shoprite Zambia lie firmly with head office in the Western Cape and the six top jobs – such as general manager and finance manager – are held by white expatriates…
However, one could also argue that such a clash derives from the inability of post-apartheid foreign policy makers to separate national interest from idealistic visions and to appreciate the role of business in furthering such interest as well as the regional and external forces who seek to undermine this. Daniel et al (2003) observe that while South African investment brings precious foreign currency into a region that is much in need of foreign exchange, South African capital represents a real threat to the ownership and property rights of Africa's political elites. Goldstein (2003) affirms that political opposition to FDI is not uncommon in the rest of the world and “is often the result of the manipulation of public opinion by groups that previously benefited from the rents created under previously oligarchic economic systems and who now feel threatened by more efficient foreign competitors.” Grobbelaar (2004: 75-76) points out that it was the superior technology, business knowledge and (relative) financial strength of South African companies in the Mozambican market that contributed to the domination of the local industry (the South African economy is 40 times as large as that of Mozambique). While this is also the case with other foreign investors, the sheer volume of South African investment in the market meant that South Africans were singled out as responsible for the crowding out of local business. Such beliefs have also been cultivated by foreign powers that have been overtaken as leading investors by South African companies. The forays that the South African business community is making into the rest of Africa have tilted the balance of power and influence wielded by foreign investors in the continent in South Africa’s favor. South Africa’s surpassing of former colonial power, Britain’s investment in Zambia is a case in point. Senior members of DTI (private discussions in 2008) also point to the current wrangling among Southern African countries with the European Union over Economic Partnership Agreements as a strategy to dislodge South Africa from the
region and to provide SACU countries with a degree of independence from South African economic dominance (discussed further in section 5.3 below).

South Africa’s Finance Minister Trevor Manual (cited in Mills, 2000) once observed with regard to regional sensitivities that “If you want an omelet, you have to break the egg…” Despite regional sensitivities with regard to South African investment, transformative development in Southern Africa will not succeed unless South Africa plays a leading role. The involvement of other major players in the region such as China and India is unlikely to promote the region’s integration agenda which will be the best means of achieving sustainable transformative development. In fact, the narrow agendas of these countries will often work at cross-purposes with the region’s integration agenda. At the same time, South Africa needs to take cognizance of the reality that investment of capital in the region will not automatically lead to development. Grobbelaar (2004: 3) points out that: “South African FDI is primarily capital intensive and highly knowledge-based, making it difficult for local business to link into the opportunities created.” Whereas top officials in Pretoria pontificate on their intentions and champion an African Renaissance, the profiteering interests of top business officials drive actual investment policies. In this regard, Pretoria’s political vision and expressed solidarity with the region, serve merely as useful tools for creating the right enabling environment for securing preferential access to those markets. Drawing on the expositions of Chapter 4, one could also argue that this state of affairs is underpinned by South African current economic strategy which pivots on rapid growth in manufactured exports. As a result, South African firms continue to aggressively penetrate the other, weaker economies in the region - where their goods and services currently enjoy comparative advantages. Hein Marais (1998: electronic)
aptly captures the apparent contradiction that seems to exist, therefore, “between the RSA government’s political commitment to a more equitable framework for regional relations and its attempts to revive sustained economic growth in RSA on the basis of an economic strategy that conforms in the main to neo-liberal orthodoxy.” Ironically, the regional response to South African business is also contradictory: generally welcoming inward investment, but concerned about South African imports flooding its markets.

Clearly, without the trust and confidence of all the states in the region, it would be difficult for South Africa to play a more effective role in Southern Africa’s development. The current tussle between South African government visions, regional interests and business priorities has meant that post apartheid South Africa has so far been unable to weave an unambiguous and coherent foreign policy towards Africa. Landsberg (2007: 205) contends that,

…one of the greatest challenges faced by South Africa, and thus by the ANC, is to address the contradictory ideological strands in foreign policy. It should take up the challenge of articulating a truly progressive foreign policy, one that would make it difficult to allow others to label it politically progressive, but economically neo-imperialist.

On the one hand, the brusqueness of South Africa's current regional trade and investment patterns have hampered its ability to engage productively with the region’s development and integration priorities. On the other hand, in their quest to dispel negative images of perceived South African hegemony, the country’s parastatals have inadvertently generated idealistic, impractical expectations of South
Africa’s role in the region, thereby placing greater strain on her foreign policy. In essence, whether these issues are real or perceived, they constitute a serious risk to South Africa’s reputation in the region and threaten South Africa’s ability to engage in transformative regional development.

5.3 The Tussle between Economic Interests and Political Realities: The Southern African Customs Union (SACU)

As the world’s oldest custom union, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) dates back to the 1889 Customs Union Convention between the British Colony of Cape of Good Hope and the Orange Free State Boer Republic which was extended in June 1910 to the Union of South Africa (which also administered Namibia at the time) and the British High Commission Territories (HCTs) of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (http://www.sacu.int/about.php?include=about/history.html). Under SACU, the promotion of a very one-sided economic development through free trade captured the essence of the mercantilist approach that South Africa adopted towards its neighbors. As early as 1925, South Africa adopted import substitution industrialization (ISI) policies, backed by the common external tariffs on non-SACU products. These measures guaranteed a regional market for South African manufactures, while relegating the HCTs to producing primary commodities (http://www.sacu.int/about.php?include=about/history.html). Far from promoting industrial development within SACU, South Africa often blocked its neighbors’ industrialization efforts. Moreover, under apartheid, South Africa was the sole administrator of the common SACU revenue pool, setting SACU import duties and excise policy. Even after the 1969 SACU Agreement, signed with the sovereign
states of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (BLS), South Africa retained the sole
decision-making power over customs and excise policies. It also retained open access
to the BLS market, while the high common tariff raised barriers for the exports of
Southern African neighbors’ to SACU which benefited South African manufacturers.

With the independence of Namibia in 1990 and the end of apartheid in South Africa in
1994, SACU members embarked on new negotiations in November 1994, which
culminated in a new SACU agreement in 2002 (http://www.sacu.int/about.php?include=about/history.html). Transformation of
SACU, which was regarded as a ‘colonial tool’, resulted in a Common Negotiating
Mechanism: Article 31(2) was put in place to ensure a consultative decision-making
process so that decisions would not be made by one member alone. In addition, the
new agreement also reviewed the revenue sharing formula, unfair trade practices, and
protection of infant industries. Revenue sharing was officially devised as a way of
compensating Southern Africa’s smaller economies for South African tariff policy
and its virtual monopoly on attracting external investment because of its sheer size.

Less than a decade since the 2002 transformation of SACU, there is consensus among
South African government officials that the country cannot afford to indefinitely carry
the fiscal burden imposed on it by the revenue-sharing formula. According to a senior
government official:

At the heart of challenges confronting SACU is the vast differences in
levels of economic development and aspirations combined with a system
of consensus decision-making. Defining policy and strategic priorities by
consensus among countries with differing imperatives is a recipe for
policy gridlock. South Africa’s membership in SACU is becoming an impediment to pursuing our strategic regional and global economic objectives.

Donnelly (2010: 35) is more frank but undiplomatic in his observation that:

Think of South Africa’s economy as a car. Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan is in the driver’s seat, lugging our neighbors in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) behind him in a heavy trailer that drains our fuel.

It is noteworthy that after more than 90 years of benefitting from a profoundly skewed customs arrangement, it is South Africa that is protesting the sustainability of a reviewed regional relationship that is not more than a decade old. Of course, this is not surprising given SACU’s colonial history: SACU’s establishment was not a proactive initiative by a group of independent neighbors but a practical colonial arrangement of convenience between separate political entities sharing an integrated economic space. This, in part, explains the strained relations between SACU countries at a time when regional integration is gaining momentum in Southern Africa. The strain in relations is best reflected in the discord among SACU member states on how best to approach negotiations with the EU regarding the signing of the Economic Partnership Agreements. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland signed the agreement with the EU, while South Africa and Namibia refused. South African President Zuma, speaking at the celebration of the 100th anniversary of SACU, held in Namibia on 22 April 2010, reminded SACU member states to “remain true to our commitments particularly upholding Article 31[of the 2002 renegotiated SACU
agreement, where we agreed to negotiate as a single bloc as a cardinal principle of our existence.”

However, it is clear from engagement with government officials from the BLS states that the signing of the EPAs was an assertion of their sovereignty. South African government officials in contrast, see the move as a blatant reflection of the resentment of these states to South Africa’s dominance in the SACU region. A senior South African official from the Department of Trade and industry pointed out that “in as much as they assert their sovereignty, it is difficult to speak of BLS sovereignty when South Africa is responsible for over 90% of the region’s gross domestic product and finances about 70 % of smaller member states' budgets.” Donnelly’s (2010: 35) unpacking of the percentage of budget revenue that Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland derive from SACU is also instructive in this regard:

Fig5-3: Percentage of revenue received by BLNS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Botswana: 35%</th>
<th>Swaziland: 89%</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Namibia: 50%</td>
<td>Lesotho: 90%</td>
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Njini (2010: electronic) affirms that “this year alone [2010] South Africa will pay R15 billion from tariff incomes to SACU member states.” Draper and Dube (2010: electronic) observe that with South Africa subsidizing the BLNS States’ national budgets – heavily so, in the case of Lesotho and Swaziland, “an abrupt withdrawal of the revenues would have dire economic, social and political consequences for the BLNS States and would effectively create two failed States in Swaziland and Lesotho.”

There is no doubt that the crafting of a regional development agenda that takes into consideration the different development priorities of each SACU country with a view to creating sustainable economies in the BLNS States and reducing their dependence on the revenue pool, will be central to resolving the current regional strains. In fact, trade across regional borders has often been identified as one of the weakest points in the efforts against underdevelopment on the continent. So what are the challenges to a transformative development in Southern Africa that will address simultaneously regional integration and infrastructure development by strengthening regional industrial complementarities?

South African government officials argue that it is difficult for South Africa to take this high road when the overriding interest of BLNS in SACU is revenue. While RSA contributes around 98% to the revenue pool, BLNS draws around 50% of the pool (interview with DTI official). This is an implicit aid transfer from South Africa to BLNS and is seen as compensation for BLNS membership of a Customs Union with a much larger and diverse South African economy. As shares of revenue are calculated on the basis of intra-SACU imports, it impedes expanding membership of SACU as
new members may reduce individual shares of revenue (which explains the reluctance of BLNS to include Mozambique). Interviews with South African government officials also revealed that:

- BLS seek to attract low value industries built on full access to South Africa to the detriment of South Africa and regional industrial development/capacity.
- BLS have stalled South Africa’s efforts to build economic relations with emerging economies in the South that are the new sources of global trade and investment as their trade is locked in to the North. For example, BLS has repeatedly delayed engagement on the proposed trilateral engagement between MERCOSUR, SACU and India.
- Botswana and Swaziland have imposed bans on South Africa’s imports of sorghum and wheat flour, respectively, to build up their own industries. There is a growing and indiscriminate use of protection among BLS against imports from South Africa.

Undoubtedly, any proposed change will have to be handled carefully. However, it is also clear that there needs to be change. Such change should not be based on the current complaints of South African disadvantage in the existing arrangement but should be motivated on the basis of mutually beneficial regional development. One of the ideas being advanced by senior officials within South Africa’s DTI is the creation of a development fund derived from the revenue pool which is tied to investments in public goods. It is argued that this would facilitate a more equitable revenue-sharing formula that takes account of the BLNS countries’ legitimate shares of customs revenues so that South Africa does not have to meet the burden of funding the large chunks of the BLNS countries’ national budgets which in turn, would reduce the
resentment of South Africa’s dominance in some quarters and facilitate a more equal partnership.
“But that’s our business: to arrange ideas in so rational an order that another person can make sense of them…” (Becker, 1986: 133)

6.1 Summary of Findings

So how do we rationalize the conundrum facing South African foreign policy makers with regard to Southern Africa? Is it an exaggeration that transformative development in the region is impossible without South Africa playing a leading role? What is at the heart of the country’s inability to play such a role? The preceding chapters have attempted to answer these very questions. Chapter 3 uses theory to debate the leading role that South Africa can play in the region. Chapter 4 unpacks the various constraints inhibiting South Africa from achieving a more effective regional policy, key of which is the inability to reconcile South African vision with regional beliefs and needs. There is a palpable incongruity with regard to the expectations that Southern African states have of the role that South Africa should play and South Africa’s own conception of its role. Chapter 5 captures the impact of the challenges raised in Chapter 4, by illustrating that despite a changed policy environment, South Africa has been unsuccessful in entrenching transformative development in Southern Africa.

One can conclude that South Africa’s post – apartheid reintegration into the Southern African region has been beset by many difficulties. This is partly due to an apartheid history of destabilization in the region which has been followed by multiple
sensitivities and misapprehensions among regional neighbors of being dominated and overwhelmed by South Africa’s post-apartheid economic presence. Ironically, such issues have in fact stalled the regional development agenda as evidenced by the desultory progress made with regard to achieving the benchmarks embodied in SADC’s RISDP. Although the RISDP identifies a number of interlinked priority intervention areas (such as poverty eradication; combating HIV/AIDS; gender equality; the environment; trade and economic liberalization; infrastructure development; and food security), many of which dovetail with the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the prospect of the region realizing either its RISDP or achieving the MDGs remain bleak. For example, roughly five years after the launch of the RISDP (approved by SADC Heads of State and Government in August 2003 but launched in March 2004), the poverty situation in the SADC region (poverty eradication is considered one of the major objectives of the RISDP) is a serious policy challenge for Southern African states individually and collectively as depicted in the table in annexure 1 (figure 1-4). A September 2010 draft African Development Bank Strategy paper affirms that approximately 45% of the Southern Africa population lives below the poverty line and lives on less than one dollar a day.

I would argue that robust South African leadership (as articulated in Chapter 3) is the key to unblocking the current inertia which threatens the region’s prospects of transformative development. However, given the current schism between South African vision on the one hand and regional beliefs and needs on the other hand, South Africa’s position as the leading regional power is less important than how it chooses to use that power. Former Mozambican President, Joaquim Chissano’s
contention at the 1999 Southern Africa Economic Summit in Durban, South Africa is instructive in this regard:

…leading sometimes means commanding and on other occasions to show the way. To show the way you do not always have to command. South Africa cannot command me: I would reject its command. You, South Africa, have so many problems: you will lead me by solving your problems. I believe you are capable of solving your problems, and we may follow (http://www.weforum.org/pdf/SummitReports/africa1999.pdf)

One could argue that the problems alluded to by Chissano are two-fold in nature and impact on South African foreign policy in very specific ways. The first set of problems (covered in Chapter 4) is domestic in nature and influences South Africa’s ability to engage externally. How does South Africa play a leading role in regional development without advancing her own internal socio-economic growth? The point by Adebajo et al (2007) that an effective post-apartheid South African foreign policy can only be built on a strong domestic base is worth repeating. The second set of problems can be attributed to the contradictions and ambiguity in South Africa’s foreign policy which can be traced to the foreign policy decision-making process. Given that South Africa has perhaps one of the most advanced foreign policy coordination mechanisms (the Cluster system), the rest of this chapter is devoted to examining why this has not translated into more effective foreign policy making and what can be done.

6.2 Recommendations

6.2.1 Reviewing the Cluster System of Foreign Policy-making
In trying to understand and explain society, Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Karl Marx, and other writers of their eras assumed that economics was political and that politicians attempted to control economic outcomes. [It was] around the turn of the twentieth century, [that] the development of the academic disciplines of political science and economics separated the two topics.

(Passé Smith, Roe Goddard, and Conklin, 1996: 2)

As criticism mounted with regard to the ambiguity of post-apartheid foreign policy, South African foreign policy-makers began to appreciate the disservice that such academic disciplines had done to their craft. In this regard, Professor Marie Muller (2000) alluded to the closeness of the linkages between the functions of the departments of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and Trade and Industry (DTI) and called for proper coordination and integration of South Africa’s economic diplomacy efforts. One of the early solutions suggested has been to merge the two departments. It was argued that the merger would facilitate policy homogeneity and would enhance the department of foreign affairs expertise in foreign trade and multilateral economic issues. Those in favor of a merger argued that this would bring about rationalization and greater productivity as evidenced by the successful amalgamation of the two departments in Canada (1985), New Zealand (1989) and Australia (1987). Nevertheless, the dominant sentiment in South Africa’s DFA (as reflected in interviews with senior members) is that the primary political focus of South Africa’s foreign policy should not be diluted, but should remain its first priority. It is pointed out that neither Canada nor Australia has a strong political identity in international politics and therefore should not serve as models for South Africa. Interestingly, Van
der Westhuizen (1998: 444) characterizes the different positions as a clash between apartheid-school ‘neo-mercantilists’ (favoring trade and self-interest over all else) and post-apartheid ‘internationalists’

So instead of a short-term response to specific post apartheid perceptions (for example, that post apartheid corporate expansion was a new form of imperialism), the DFA and DTI established a special committee to study how more regular and formalized liaison could be implemented (revealed in interview with senior members). However, the departments were quick to realize that a better working relationship did not necessarily translate into improved coordination at policy level, especially in a globalised world where interests extended beyond the scope of DFA and DTI. Indeed, foreign policy agendas now include issues as diverse as investment, migration, energy, inflation, food security, human rights, the environment, and so on. It was clear that the historical compartmentalized approach which in practice differentiated between aspects of policy (trade, political, military, etc.) was no longer feasible and that the nature and extent of cooperation within the various government departments would have to be expanded. Beginning in 1999, the machinery of government (including its foreign policy-making) was overhauled to provide for greater coherence and better coordination among the various government departments, by means of integrated governance through the clustering of policy areas, with the Presidency as the primary locus of policy. Currently, the International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS) Cluster is responsible for all matters related to international relations, including trade and peace and security.
However, the IRPS Cluster has proven that a forum for multiple bureaucratic players does not necessarily translate into effective foreign policy making. In practice, competing departmental visions transcend the objectives of government’s idealistic ‘experiment’ in coordinated policy-making. The failure of the IRPS Cluster to identify strategic partners to streamline South African government’s foreign policy attests to this. The base document, prepared by the Cluster’s supporting sub-committee in 2006, was abandoned because the Directors-General of the various departments could not agree on common partners in the continent, let alone globally. The inconsistent participation of the DGs in monthly Cluster meetings has also been a sore-point. Often, departmental priorities appear to be regarded as supplanting the broader Cluster priorities, and non-attendance by DGs has meant that there is no quorum for decisions to be processed for Cabinet. The failure of all DGs to attend also defeats the purpose of the Cluster and the comprehensive, collective coordination of foreign policy issues. Moreover, as the lead department in much of the implementation of foreign policy decisions (and Chair of the IRPS Cluster), some members of the DFA argue that it is unfair that they have to compete with other departments in shaping foreign policy (which such members regard as trampling on their terrain). My conclusion is that in an attempt to control the diversified foreign policy agenda created by globalization, post-apartheid foreign policy decision-makers have replaced the problems of reconciling competing issues (such as post-apartheid corporate expansion and political vision) with the difficulties of managing competing governmental departments. The upshot is that the multiplicity of seemingly conflicting departmental interests has further complicated the initial conundrum of how best to coordinate the politics and economics of the DFA and DTI
respectively, resulting in continued incoherence, inconstancy and opaqueness in foreign policy formulation.

However, in all fairness to the Cluster System (its participants and the progressive thinkers behind the idea), the proper functioning of the system has never been prioritized. As noted in Chapter 4, the primary locus of foreign policy decisions has been the President. Many analysts forecast a ‘depersonalization’ of South African foreign policy following the 2009 elections. It was expected that such a situation would ultimately shift the focus of foreign-policy formulation back to the IRPS Cluster and would be a more accurate test of whether the Cluster can deliver on a coherent, coordinated foreign policy as was envisaged.

This has not been the case. Instead, the Presidency has announced a new ‘outcomes based’ system to boost the government’s delivery and ensure that departments and other role-players all pull in the same direction. At the ANC’s September 2010 National General Council, business people were told that the government’s cluster system has created a riddle of contradictions and time wasting activities and that it was changing significantly to produce efficiencies (Pressly, 2010: 17). The new system provides for coordinating Ministers to take the lead in critical areas of delivery (based on ‘12 Outcomes to Guide the work of government, 2009-2014’) and to ensure that all departments, parastatals and other entities know exactly what to do. Minister in the Presidency responsible for monitoring and evaluation, Collins Chabane, explained that coordinating Ministers would head groups of delivery agents or partnerships, including government departments and other entities like the office of the premiers, state-owned enterprises and private agents. The key difference from the
IRPS Annual Programme of Action is the focus on measurable outputs which are the cornerstone of the delivery agreements that coordinating Ministers have to sign. However, almost all the bureaucrats working on Outcome 11 (which pertains to foreign policy and is unpacked in Chapter 1) would attest to the difficulty of assigning measurable outputs to foreign policy objectives. For example, while the promotion of Africa’s positions in multilateral fora is a key activity of the goal of deepened contribution to regional, and continental security and stability and sustainable development, evaluating it as a measurable output may distort reality. Pushing a common African position 24 times in various multilateral fora may not necessarily lead to regional and continental security and development, especially if other countries in the region and the continent continue to view South African actions with suspicion. This thesis shows that such a possibility is highly likely. So while the outcomes approach attempts to foster greater accountability within government in general, it remains to be seen whether this blanket approach will produce the desired output for South Africa’s international relations: a better-coordinated, less ambiguous foreign policy that is able to deliver on the articulated objectives.

6.2.2 Managing regional perceptions: Revamping the role of Intelligence

Competing departmental interests and the personalization of foreign policy issues have also undermined the role of intelligence which I want to argue is the key to South Africa coping with negative regional perceptions. This thesis recognizes that such perceptions are at the heart of South Africa’s failure to achieve an effective regional foreign policy.
Why intelligence? As James Der Derian (1992) has observed, intelligence is the least understood and most under-theorized area of international relations. It is point well-captured by Sir Alexander Cadogan (British Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs from 1938 to 1946) who averred that intelligence was the missing dimension of international affairs (cited in Andrew and Dilks, 1984). In 2003, the British government and intelligence community became embroiled in one of the most serious political controversies amid charges that intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was politicized in order to bolster support for the government’s bellicose posture towards the regime of Saddam Hussein. The Government’s unprecedented public use of intelligence to support its foreign policy attest to the fact that intelligence is more deeply and visibly embedded in the conduct of international relations today than ever before.

The neglected role of intelligence in enhancing post-apartheid foreign policy implementation can be attributed to two factors. Firstly, there is an argument within some sectors of the South African Secret Service (responsible in terms of the 1994 Intelligence Act for foreign developments) that a focus on foreign policy limits the organization’s broad protection of national interests (foreign policy is regarded as only one element of national interest). However, as illustrated in Chapter 1, a foreign policy geared towards pursuing the broad national interest is the foundation of the realist school of international relations: foreign policy, in Morgenthau’s famous formulation, is about the national interest. In foreign affairs all is relative - relative to one’s own needs, position, dangers, hopes and purposes. In terms of the 1995 White Paper on Intelligence, SASS promotes South Africa’s ability to face foreign threats and enhance its competitiveness in a dynamic world by supporting the policy and
decision-making processes pertaining to the country’s expressed national interests of stability, security and development. In this regard, foreign policy is the key, not just a component, through which South Africa’s national interests are promoted at an international level. Secondly, the insidious role of intelligence during the apartheid era has devalued its importance in a post-apartheid context. Pfister (2005: 68) shows how the apartheid state used the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) to implement a foreign policy of ‘buying, bluffing or bribing’ to balance the paucity of diplomatic successes by the DFA. However, I would argue that instead of undermining the role of intelligence, post-apartheid foreign policy-makers should have drawn a distinction between intelligence as a guide to policy rather than a tool of policy. While the apartheid state used intelligence as a form of state power, post-apartheid policy-makers need to appreciate intelligence as a guide to the use of power -- that is, as an aid to policy-makers in understanding their environment and options, what tactics to apply (force, leverage, diplomacy, etc) and against whom.

The example of the British government’s use of intelligence in 2003 vividly illustrates that intelligence can act as a mechanism for reinforcing a country’s misconceptions of the outside world. It can be argued that intelligence can also be employed inversely as a mechanism for exposing a country’s misconception. Therein lies its value to South African foreign policy-makers concerned with managing negative regional perceptions of the country. Often intelligence has a predilection for threats rather than opportunities and we need to re-conceptualize how we use it or the prospect for more effective regional relations will be lost. The United States’ Central Intelligence Agency’s (1995: 38) definition of covert action is instructive in this regard: “an operation designed to influence governments, events, organizations, or persons in
support of foreign policy in a manner that is not necessarily attributable to the sponsoring power; it may include political, economic, propaganda, or paramilitary activities.” The point is not that South Africa should engage in covert action in the region but that the value of intelligence in positively influencing human beings and the decisions they make has been a grossly ignored dimension of post-apartheid foreign policy implementation. In essence, with a mandate to jointly and separately provide information on internal and external security and related matters to decision-makers in government, intelligence is in a unique position to substantially influence how a particular foreign policy problem is understood, conceptualized and resolved.

6.2.3 Balancing economic imperatives and political realities: the advantage of a corporatist approach

In a world where governments are no longer the sole arbiters of policy and interstate relations, the activities of non-state entities -- in particular business and civil society networks -- have become more pronounced. It is important to recognize that other actors (such as business or NGOs) have their own foreign policies which they follow with as much dexterity as do states. For example, in the South African context, Anglo American or Checkers have their own foreign policies which are not necessarily the same as South Africa’s foreign policy, but need to operate alongside it. In this regard, South Africa’s Cluster system has been short-sighted: the current integrated governance system does not necessarily leave much room for voices from outside the government to be heard when it comes to policy-making. In addition, the mechanisms to address these inadequacies in the system such as the Presidency’s Consultative Groups (which cater for non-state sectoral interests such as trade unions)
and Advisory groups (such as the International Investment Advisory Council) have had no real impact on foreign policy thus far.

However, the perceptions generated by post-apartheid corporate expansion (chapter 5) highlight the need for a more constructive business-government nexus in foreign policy. Moreover, the vociferous but often anti-DFA position taken by COSATU with regard to foreign policy issues is also indicative that the government ignores such interest groups at its own peril. For example, the Swazi government has repeatedly appealed to the South African government to curtail the activities of its alliance partner who overtly supports ‘The People's United Democratic Movement’ (PUDEMO), an opposition group that has been banned (November 2008) in Swaziland. Prime Minister Sibusiso Dlamini, reacting to the presence of COSATU officials (who Swazi police detained on the eve of a declared two days of protest strikes in September 2010 led by the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions, a COSATU ally) pointedly observed that: “Each person should mind the politics of his own country and not come here to meddle in our affairs, especially if that country has a lot of its own problems (alluding to South Africa’s own public-sector strikes)” (Hall, 2010: 6).

A more nuanced tripartite consultative relationship between business, labor and the state whereby business and labor have their interests represented and in turn contribute to the state’s implementation of its foreign policy objectives, would be a swift means of resolving some of the current tensions. The adoption of such corporatist structures of representation would promote consensual consultation and bargaining between labor, capital and the state on various foreign economic policy
issues and would go a long way towards creating a coherent framework for South Africa’s engagement with the Southern African sub-region.

South Africa’s current system of interest representation which includes the Presidency’s Consultative and Advisory Groups is more pluralist than corporatist; and the distinction is important in terms of the impact it has on foreign policy formulation and implementation. Pluralism, by definition, is a system of representation where an infinite number of groups compete with minimal or no government direction or control; interest groups exhibit autonomy from the state. Corporatism is unlike pluralism in that interest groups’ relationships to the state are part of a more formal and limited system of interest representation; interest groups are incorporated into the state and often regulated by it. Philippe Schmitter’s (1974: 93) definition of corporatism is one of the most frequently cited and utilized:

Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.

It aptly captures the notion of corporatism as a patterning of relationships between the state and particular groups representing specific functional interests in society. However, corporatism is not merely about guaranteeing representative monopolies to the incorporated groups. In return for the state subsidies, recognition, representation and protection, the groups are explicitly engaged in assisting the state to carry out its
policies and programmes. Often, the incorporated groups are the institutional methods by which the state can guarantee conformity, loyalty and adherence to state policies and laws, as well as a national consensus regarding economic or social policy. Although COSATU is part of the government’s tri-partite alliance, it has often been undermined in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy and the duality that characterizes South Africa’s foreign policy externally is palpable when such interests have not been catered for internally. The furor over the disputed March 2008 elections in Zimbabwe is a case in point. In April 2008, Mbeki declared that he was "very pleased" with the manner in which the election had been conducted without any violence or restrictions on freedom of movement but admitted he was concerned about the slow release of results (www.iol.co.za). In a July 2008 address to the preparatory meeting for a trade union and civil society international solidarity conference, COSATU General Secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi, demanded that “the leaders of the SADC and AU governments withdraw their recognition of a ‘government’ that has no mandate to rule following their defeat on 29 March 2008, but is clinging to power by brute force.”

Similarly, the implications of post-apartheid corporate expansion (see Chapter 5) also point to the need for a specific corporate strategy to enhance the state’s ability to articulate and defend its national interest in the international system. Miller (2003: 3) argues that South African companies are a primary agent of regional perceptions in host countries and as such post apartheid South African investors influence the way that host countries perceive South Africa’s regional role. Like business anywhere, the South African business sector is driven by typical corporate interests – profit, market share, elimination of competition, the urge to dominate and or monopolize (Daniel et
Miller’s case study of workers from food supermarket chain, Shoprite (one of the largest investments in retail in Southern Africa, with 384 supermarkets) is revealing. Despite the odd comment that ‘South Africa is our Europe,’ the perception of the majority of workers is that South Africa, not Zambia, benefits the most from Shoprite’s investment: “…they are just using Zambia as a market to sell their things and send all the profits to South Africa…” (Miller, 2003: 14). This is indicative of the strength of South African corporate executives who have essentially created their own system of relations with the sub-region without taking into consideration the post-apartheid government’s reformulated foreign policy towards Southern Africa as reflected in various policy documents (see Chapter 5).

Moreover, Dlamini (2004: 170 -171) argues that “economic strength is more important and indeed more respected than military or other forms of power in a globalizing world economy in an era marked by the primacy of economics over politics” and alludes to Japan, France, South Korea, the US, the UK, and Germany as examples of the benefits of strategic cooperation between government and business. One of the core strategic objectives of the South African government is to “promote security and a better life for all South Africans through wealth creation” (www.gov.za/yearbook/foreign.htm). Businesses are an important facet of wealth creation. The government can foster or hinder wealth creation through the policy choices it makes and the relations it forges with business. Business should therefore be a natural strategic ally of government in wealth creation. Already, the business deals that have been signed by South Africa during several state visits to countries in Africa such as the DRC are indicative of the increasing link between Pretoria's foreign
policy initiatives and the creation of a climate conducive to investment by South African companies.

Despite their interrelated importance to national interest, the connection between business and government in foreign policy-making is poorly thought out. As Mills (1998: 85) puts it: “We need to implement and sustain, not just articulate, commercial diplomacy.” Indeed, South African based business is a fundamental, yet employed, asset in the government’s foreign policy. Business has a wide range of contacts and experiences in the region and continent that can be more influential than those possessed by government alone. For example, in some instances certain companies tend to be more knowledgeable about particular regions than their home governments are, because their operations embed them in the communities and countries where they are based. This gives them an advantage over diplomatic missions, which tend to be located in capital cities, or in some cases do not exist, in the country concerned.

Indeed, it is highly unlikely that the South African government can pursue an effective regional policy outside a corporatist framework. The business community and the ANC’s key tripartite alliance partner, COSATU, must be co-opted into accepting such a sub-regional vision. This is largely because both partners would be expected to accept potentially unfavorable short-term policy outcomes in order to ensure a more balanced sub-regional economic growth and transformative development. The respective short-term tradeoffs for business (reduced profit) and labor (increased unemployment) would be made up with vastly improved sub-regional economic conditions and capacity over the medium and longer terms. In this regard,
corporatism would facilitate the reconciliation of the investment ventures of South African firms with the South African government’s regional development priorities.

6.3 Concluding Remarks

South African foreign policy over the past fifteen years has been one of the most high-profile and contested aspects of government decision-making. It is a reflection of the tensions and contradictions that were from the onset present in post apartheid foreign policy principles. In deciding on the choices available to South Africa, the country’s foreign policy makers were constrained by the difficulties of balancing departmental pragmatism against the post apartheid government’s idealism, national interest against the collective good, and the limitations of capacity and resources against regional expectation. In essence, South Africa’s regional foreign policy dilemma is a product of the country’s inability to adjust timeously its strategic compass in the mercurial world of foreign policy where a country seeking to advance an ambitious foreign policy agenda will always be confronted with powers arrayed against it, forces that it cannot manage and battles that it cannot win. As this thesis argues, South Africa’s inability to convince other states that her vision is complimentary to their needs has inhibited her ability to engineer a process of transformation and development in the region.

It is clear that any regional anti-South Africanism would make it even harder for South Africa to achieve even mutual developmental objectives in Southern Africa. Moreover, such sentiment could develop a momentum of its own and become an easy and simplistic axis of division for any country to exploit, not just within the region but even external actors. The example of the EU and the EPAs are a case in point. The
challenge for the South African government is to shift the power dynamic against which projections of South African dominance trigger fierce rejection or reluctant cooperation by governments. This foreign policy drive could be underpinned by a clearly defined developmental strategy that entails an active role for the soon-to-be-established South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) as a development assistance mechanism that includes donor transfers and infrastructure development. The SADPA mechanism in particular could constitute a crucial component of South Africa's foreign policy in the region: it could ensure that the country continues to play an appropriate developmental role and is committed to building relations of mutual benefit in the region. As Nye (2002: 10) observes:

If a country can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes........If it can help support institutions that encourage other countries to channel or limit their activities in ways it prefers, it may not need as many costly carrots and sticks.

Nevertheless, there needs to be recognition that the idea of SADPA and development is not unique and if such relations with the region are to be sustained, it has to be anchored in the interest of both South Africa and Southern Africa. After all, South Africa established the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF) in 2000, just one year into Mbeki’s presidency, which strategically positioned South Africa to challenge the hegemony of established western donors. The fund was aimed at promoting cooperation between South Africa and other countries through financial assistance for development projects. The Mbeki government was even
committed to allocating as much as 0.7% of annual income to aid by 2015. However, Mbeki’s unceremonious removal from office was as much an indicator of internal political dynamics within the ANC as it was an illustration that such projects were not sustainable in a country with its own socio-economic development backlogs, including a major service-delivery crisis.

One can conclude that South Africa’s regional foreign policy requires a coordinated strategy that is able to compromise between high ideals and stark realities, between a preference for paternally shaping regional relations and realizing that given internal challenges and international expectations, South Africa needs the region perhaps even more than the region needs South Africa. In order to restore some balance to this trend, regional relations grounded in transformative development must be seen as a critical component of South Africa’s national interests. Without a long-term strategy or perspective, regional foreign policy will simply be reactive to agendas set elsewhere (China or EU). Moreover, in crafting such a long term strategy South African foreign policy makers need to accept the reality that ‘we talk on principle but we act on interest’ (observation by the English author, William Savage Landor [1775-1864], http://www.joesphsoninstitute.org/quotes/quoteprinciple.htm). If South Africa is to address the ambiguity that plagues her foreign policy and regional relations, the familiar adage that ‘nations have no permanent friends, only permanent interests’ needs to become the cornerstone of South African foreign policy.
Postscript

“Without continual growth and progress, such words as improvement, achievement, and success have no meaning.” (Benjamin Franklin)

The contours of South African foreign policy have evolved and continue to evolve since the inception of this study. One of the most salient changes has been the change of name from Department of Foreign Affairs to Department of International Relations and Cooperation. According to Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane (14 May 2009), “the renaming of the Department as Department of International Relations and Cooperation is a deliberate decision on the part of government to ensure a holistic approach to foreign relations which reflects on the developmental agenda.” She further explained (August 2009) that the decision was in accordance with the 2007 ANC Polokwane Conference decision and elaborated:

The renaming was largely motivated by international trends which require states to put greater emphasis on cooperation than competition, and on collaboration rather than confrontation. The globalised nature of the world necessitates that states continue to forge ways of cooperating better with each other. Through the renaming of the Department, our government desires to give more clarity and focus to the role of the Department in meeting our domestic priorities through international partnerships and cooperation.

(Speech included in Zondi and Masters, September 2010: 12)
Such articulation points towards a more inclusive pursuit of common interests. There is also an acknowledgement that:

Power in the world is more diffused than ever before. We know, for example, that our freedom of 1994 created opportunities for our companies to expand into the African continent, but this has not been without posing serious challenges to our foreign policy. Many of our policy think-tanks are also players on the continent...we need to...think deeply about the role of these non-state actors -- who are they and what challenges do they pose to us?

(Minister Nkoana-Mashabane’s speech in Zondi and Masters, September 2010: 12)

This reflects a definite shift away from statist notions of foreign policy. In essence, Nkoana-Mashabane’s August 2009 speech links the department’s name change to its more nuanced focus on the correlation between political diplomacy and the management of development cooperation. Despite the rhetoric of development and cooperation, Nkoana-Mashabane admits in the same speech (in Zondi and Masters, September 2010: 14) that “...we have not missed the opportunity to play a role in our SADC neighbors to promote some of the principles we treasure.” There is a patronizing assumption that South Africa’s SADC neighbors do not have such principles, need such principles and will therefore graciously accept them. This resonates with some of the concerns raised in Chapter 4. In spite of the implementing department’s name change, one can expect South Africa’s foreign policy dilemma in Southern Africa to remain unresolved in the short term.
Nevertheless, there are currently a number of attempts to refine South Africa’s foreign policy approach through a conceptualization of the country’s national interests, the articulation of an international relations strategy and the drafting of a foreign policy white paper. However, the impact of these strategic documents on foreign policy making in the country will be dependent on two key issues: the speed with which they are processed through the government’s bureaucracy (which will ultimately influence implementation) and more importantly, the consultative process which shapes it (which will determine the buy-in from government departments and other non-government stakeholders).

- Paradoxically, the conceptualization of the country’s national interests has taken a top-down approach. Discussions initiated at a departmental level are currently trapped at the highest echelons of the Cluster system. However, without the engagement of broader civil society, the very idea of ‘national’ interests remains debatable. Without such moorings (as well as the possibility of acquiring such within at least the next year), South Africa’s foreign policy will remain adrift; responding to short-term challenges rather than positioning the country for long-term, sustainable security and development.

- In contrast, the foreign policy white paper process has taken a bottom-up approach. Consultations, led by DIRCO, began in October 2010 with the country’s academics and research institutes, and are expected to continue until the end of the year with engagements with business, broader civil society, and other government departments. However, it is clear that the process is at an infant stage. Consultations are currently centred on a non-paper, not a draft document.
The proposed International Relations Strategy is also at a developmental stage and is currently the subject of a planned workshop by the Minister of DIRCO.

In this regard, the infamous epigram from the French novelist, Alphonse Karr (1808-90), provides an apt summation of South Africa’s foreign policy ‘the more things change, the more they stay the same.’
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ANNEXURE 1

Ann1-1: Economic Indicators

![Figure 2. Per Capita GDP in 2009 (Current US$)]

Source: AfDB Devel. Data Platform

Ann1-2: Military Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td>1,560</td>
<td>8.8% (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>9,5</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>11,200</td>
<td>25,8</td>
<td>1.0 (2000est)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>15,100</td>
<td>42,6 (2003)</td>
<td>0.9 (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3.8 (2006)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Ann1-3: Southern Africa Socio-economic Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>TOTAL AREA (Sq km)</th>
<th>TOTAL POP (Thousand) 2009</th>
<th>GDP CURRENT (Million; US$) 2009</th>
<th>GNI PER CAPITA (US$) 2008</th>
<th>INFLATION (%) 2009</th>
<th>CURRENT A/C BALAN (% of GDP) 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1,246,700</td>
<td>18,497.63</td>
<td>65,462.78</td>
<td>3,340.00</td>
<td>14.05</td>
<td>-3.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>581,730</td>
<td>1,949.78</td>
<td>11,808.20</td>
<td>6,760.00</td>
<td>8.25</td>
<td>-4.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>30,355</td>
<td>2,066.92</td>
<td>1,282.80</td>
<td>1,060.00</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>118,484</td>
<td>15,263.42</td>
<td>3,333.07</td>
<td>260.00</td>
<td>8.49</td>
<td>-8.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>801,590</td>
<td>22.894.29</td>
<td>11,008.20</td>
<td>380.00</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>-14.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>825,418</td>
<td>2,171.14</td>
<td>9,201.40</td>
<td>4,210.00</td>
<td>8.78</td>
<td>5.65</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1,221,037</td>
<td>50,109.82</td>
<td>277,791.25</td>
<td>5,870.00</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>-4.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>17,364</td>
<td>1,184.94</td>
<td>2,905.24</td>
<td>2,560.00</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>-2.63</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>752,618</td>
<td>12,935.37</td>
<td>13,390.92</td>
<td>960.00</td>
<td>13.41</td>
<td>-3.96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>390,757</td>
<td>12,522.78</td>
<td>3,556.42</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>-22.95</td>
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### Ann1-4: Incidence of Human Poverty in the SADC Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% newborns not expected to live beyond 40 years (1998)</th>
<th>% adult illiteracy rate (1990-98)</th>
<th>% population without access to safe water (1981-93)</th>
<th>% population without access to health services (1990-98)</th>
<th>% population below income poverty line- US$1 a day (1993 PPP$) (1989-98)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>37.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>72.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: UNDP/SADC/SAPES, 2000.*

### Ann1-5: Regional GDP contributions

- **RSA:** 71.5
- **Angola:** 9.8
- **Others:** 18.7

*Country Contribution to Regional GDP in 2009 (constant 2000 US$)*

*Source: AFDB Data Platform*
ANNEXURE 2

FDI Outflows (BRIC/IBSA)
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2010

FDI Inflows (BRIC/IBSA)
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2010