Muslim Identity and Gated Community Development in Durban

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it is hoped that my thesis will contribute to continuing debates on the topic.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The first South African all-inclusive elections marked a turning point and introduced a new era of democracy. In the aftermath of political transition, the country still faces many social and spatial changes. Although social transformations relating to racial issues are undeniably occurring, previously disadvantaged groups are still struggling with the consequences of former apartheid rule (Habib & Southall, 2003). Despite efforts by the new South African government to create an equitable and non-racial society, a separation along class and racial lines has intensified (2003). One manifestation of this division is the emerging reinforcement of gated community developments. These environments are popularly understood to be “suburbs whose uniqueness and exclusiveness are defined by the amount of safety measures” (Jurgen & Gnad, 2001). In the case of enclosed neighbourhoods, existing areas are closed-off through booms and gates across roads. Many are fenced off or walled off as well, with a limited number of controlled entrances/exits and security guards at these points in some cases (Low 2003).

Specific spatial characteristics contribute to the particular urban pattern present in most South African cities. Urban environments are typified by fragmentation and spatial dislocation, separation and mono-functional zoning, and by low-density suburban sprawl. Among other reasons, these spatial characteristics also contribute to opportunities for crime (Landman, 2003). One of the goals of the proposed study is to challenge these popular conceptions of gated community environments by highlighting the nature and impact of these neighbourhoods on the privatisation of public space as well as to probe the ‘real’ reasons for the move to gated enclosures especially as regards fortress mentalities and ethnocentric tendencies (Durington, 2004). My research examines issues related to Muslim/Indian identity with regard to spatial environment in Umhlanga Halls, a gated community established in Umhlanga located north from the city centre of Durban in the KwaZulu-Natal province. Although the majority of residents of gated communities in Umhlanga are white, the community is also made up of various racial groups who were previously segregated in

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1 From a general point of view, gated communities are characterized by a number of security apparatuses including high walls, boom gates, razor wire, electric fences and armed security companies (Low, 2003). Gated communities take the idea of crime prevention through environmental design to its extreme, by applying the principles of territoriality, defensible space, access control and image (Landman, 2003).
separate urban spaces under the apartheid system (Durington, 2004). Thus, my research seeks to explore if the same motivations for moving and purchasing homes in Umhlanga exist for the Muslim/Indian\(^2\) racial group within these developments while examining the existence of social tensions between these groups within the community.

**Reasons for research**

A motivation for doing this research is my own perception of crime in South African cities. Five years ago, when I came to South Africa for my tertiary studies, I was taken aback by the paranoia that many of my friends exhibited regarding security and crime. Indeed, crime has been determined to be a major social problem in post-apartheid South Africa (Schonteich, 2002) and it is high levels of crime that are giving rise to major changes in the urban landscape, such as defensive architecture and urbanism. Fear of crime as an influential factor has in turn led to an international resurgence of crime prevention through environmental design approaches, including harsher law enforcement, and increased focus on crime prevention (Landman, 2003). As a result, gated community developments have expanded during the past five years in South Africa due to perceptions relating to high crime rates. However, despite a lack of valid crime statistics, the majority of people in enclosed neighbourhoods feel safer (Booyzen, 2000). According to Booyzen, "peoples’ perceptions of crime rates are closely linked to their perceptions of safety. People inside the enclave definitely feel that crime rates are lower in their area” (2000: 61).

Another major motivation was the issue of housing in the ‘new South Africa’. Although the division of those living in gated areas from those living in less protected settings is increasingly along economic rather than merely racial lines (Kruger et al., 1997), these divisions defer largely to the structural socio-historical opportunities left behind by apartheid\(^3\) (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2001). With current housing problems being dealt with by the government in an effort towards creating sustainable communities, the question of what suburban development means in post-apartheid South Africa becomes developmentally and ethically problematic. This is especially relevant in regards to private-land developers such as Moreland Developers, who, actively promote the development of elite suburban areas similar

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2 My reason for using the term ‘Muslim/Indian’ is because I am focusing on the Muslims of Indian origin only. There are other Muslims of Malaysian origin primarily located in the Western Cape and commonly known as the Cape Malays. However, the majority of Muslims in the KZN province are of Indian descent.

3 Reference to the Group Areas Act passed during the 1960s whereby spatial and symbolic segregation was widespread. During that time, the Indian community was stuck in between and invariably became partly invisible and subsumed by the binary oppositions of black and white concentration (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2001).
to Umhlanga\textsuperscript{4}, in an attempt to privatise space and create new places\textsuperscript{5}. As such, the Durban Municipality’s role in the perpetuation of these spatial inequalities is also explored.

Thirdly, I am interested in deconstructing the reasons for which a minority of Indian Muslims who have ‘fled’ from previously segregated areas have chosen to settle in predominantly white enclaved areas. The move of Indian Muslims to enclaves located far away from their previously segregated areas raises the concern of population movements in the ‘new’ South Africa. To avoid reductionism, the Muslim community in South Africa is considered in terms of its subgroups. Taking the Muslim ummah\textsuperscript{6} as marker, I examine the historical migration of Indian Muslims to South Africa and investigate the reasons for population shifts that have occurred in gated communities in an attempt to gauge the identity variables of that community. In seeking to unpack three main issues dealing with the inter-relatedness of the categories of space, power and identity, its manifestations among Muslim residents in Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest and the reasons for which the minority rich Muslims seek to segregate themselves in enclosed spaces, I hope to understand the identity markers that inform the behavioural reasons for their move.

**Structure**

The dissertation is structured in three sections. Chapter 2 deals with issues relating to the anthropology of space and urbanization to introduce concepts such as urban design, architecture and urbanization. Chapter 3 introduces discourses of globalisation and identity formation. The theories presented in those two chapters form the theoretical basis from which my data collected is comprehended and analysed. Chapter 4 details fieldwork while illustrating the theoretical arguments concerning the inter-relatedness of the categories of space, power and identity and its manifestations among Muslim residents in Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest, the motivations of my subject community’s choice to segregate itself along class and ethnic lines in fortified gated developments; and, the factors in identity

\textsuperscript{4} Since its inception in 1992, the leading private leading private-land developer Moreland, the property division of London and Johannesburg-listed Tongaat-Hulett group has developed the Zimbali Coastal Resort, Mount Edgecombe Country Club Estates, Umhlanga Ridge, La Lucia Ridge, La Lucia Ridge Office Estate, Umhlanga Ridge New Town Centre and the Empangeni Old Mill Industrial Estate.

\textsuperscript{5} Space refers to the surrounding environment that people inhabit. Places, however, are socially constructed or manipulated spaces that are deliberately politicized, culturally relative and historically specific to match the needs of people inhabiting those meaningful spaces.

\textsuperscript{6} The Ummah is the community of Allah (God) for Muslims. The Ummah transcends boundaries, frontiers, nationalities, citizenship, linguistic differences and all other forms of cultural, political, economic or social differences.
formation among Muslim/Indian inhabitants of gated communities. The main methodology used in this chapter is informed by ethnographic techniques as the research is of a qualitative nature. The data gathering process includes participant observation, contextual research, interviewing, and, archival research. The first phase examines the developmental history of Umhlanga in order to elicit how companies, such as Moreland Developers, and political entities that enable the construction of these fortified enclaves initiate development. Archival research is used as a background to compare interviews and participant observation amongst a small number of seven families selected for intensive participant study. The second phase involves regular visits to Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest, making contacts, participating in some of the women’s activities in order to establish a relationship between my subject community and myself.

Historically, ethnographic research has developed out of a concern to understand the worldviews and ways of life of actual people from the ‘inside’, in the contexts of their everyday, lived experiences. The method of participant observation is the means by which researchers have often done this. As its name suggests, it involves researchers moving between participating in a community – by deliberately immersing themselves in its everyday rhythms and routines, developing relationships with people who can show and tell them what is ‘going on’ there, and writing accounts of how these relationships developed and what was learned from them – and observing a community – by sitting back and watching activities which unfold in front of their eyes, recording their impressions of these activities in field notes, tallies, drawings, photographs and other forms of material evidence (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). Its basic form can be described as a three-stage process in which the researcher somehow, first gains access to a particular community, second, lives and/or works among the people under study in order to take on their world views and ways of life and, third, returns back to the academic context to make sense of this through writing up an account of that community’s ‘culture’ (1995).

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7 As a scholar, my intention is to be honest and self-critical and to keep my results as tangible and intelligible as possible. I have had the privilege of meeting and interacting with interesting people during my research, who have given me permission to use their thoughts and opinions in my work. I honour their presence in the research process. I do not presume to speak on their behalf, but to tell a story of my own experience with them and my own interpretation of their circumstances, which may (hopefully) be of use to them.
Chapter 5 forms part of my data analysis whereby I take on a personal voice, the voices of my interviewees, and a professional voice. The three voices (active participant, biased researcher and academic commentator) are employed so as to convey the immediacy of the field by providing texture and variety in the style of writing. While I neither claim to speak on behalf of my subject community nor make generalizations about peoples' opinions and behaviour, I do undertake the difficult task of attempting to understand the reasons that inform my subject community's choice to live in Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest. The dissertation is interspersed with a few photographs depicting settings, personal anecdotes, fieldwork notes and quotes from known fellow academics related to the field. A bibliography and a list of appendixes are provided at the end as reference. Furthermore, following the rules of ethnographic practice, I make use of pseudonyms instead of using the real names of the people I had the opportunity to work with. Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest are also substitute names for the two gated communities I studied. All information provided by the people I interviewed and interacted with has been approved and confidential information has not been divulged.

**Theory used**

My research engages with Pierre Bourdieu's (1997) concept of 'habitus' and 'cultural capital' in an attempt to highlight the various dynamics involved in the creation and perpetuation of spatial segregation in identity formation. 'Habitus' is the word used by Bourdieu to define a person's socially acquired 'dispositions', whereas cultural capital refers to the cultural knowledge that people acquire through their upbringing, as well as through the socio-economic status of their family environment, amongst other factors (Bourdieu, 1997). In keeping with anthropological approaches to space and place, it is implied that various sites are endowed with meaning only when they are invoked in practice, the combination of meaning and action as expressed by Bourdieu (1997). In contemporary South Africa, the cultural memory of apartheid and the institutional policy of demarcating space and establishing boundaries by race under this institutional racist regime has been sidetracked by a new set of politics that binds conceptions of space and place by race and class (Durington, 2004). Hence, in using 'habitus' and cultural capital as conceptual frameworks, I attempt to unpack the motivations for which spatial relocation is a need for my chosen community.
Another theoretical marker used employs Arjun Appadurai’s (1990) notion of global ethnoscapes and globalisation, and its impacts on the restructuring of various socio-spatial configurations. Global ethnoscapes correspond to global flows of people (transnational migrations) and are inscribed as the restructuring of matrices of power in which social groups are embedded. However, global ethnoscapes can also refer to the world’s virtual communities that are created through information and communications technologies. Hence, in addition to transforming class relations, ethnoscapes can be interpreted as a series of gendered and racialized processes. As the nodal points of global webs, urban locales constitute the socio-spatial arenas within which ethnoscapes and capitalscapes meet, combining to produce distinctive power configurations. To conceive of urban cities as socio-spatial articulations of ethnoscapes and capitalscapes, Foucault’s (1986) notion of “heterotopias” is employed. The term heterotopia provides a rich metaphor with which to imagine cityscapes, the microcosms where global movements of people and capital are condensed (Soja, 1989).

Thirdly, my dissertation uses Hall’s (1996) theory of identity to explore the ways in which the concept of identity “raises fundamental questions about how individuals fit into the community and the social world and how identity can be seen as the interface between subjective positions and social and cultural situations” (Hall, 1996). Under apartheid Muslims had ‘hybrid’ identities that were situationally specific. Since 1994, Durban Muslims have been repositioning themselves, in the context of an African-ruled democratic South Africa (Vahed, 2000). Using Hall’s notion of symbolic marking, that is, the way people make sense of social relations and practices through inclusion and exclusion, I explore the underlying dynamics that inform Muslim identity in gated communities.

Finally, I make use of Ruby’s argument for reflexivity, which was developed from Fabian’s (1971:27) concept of the “dialectical unity between producer, production and product”. Fabian argues for the need for a “unity of theory and praxis”, that the “study of a people...must be ‘communicative’ rather than ‘observative’, i.e. research works two-way, involving the researcher’s own involvement in the research process. Reflexivity stems from

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8 Capitalscapes refers to the global movements of capital. The globalization of the circuit of productive capital has enabled certain transnational corporations to become deterritorialised, essentially eliminating national social-spatial considerations. Identified by Appadurai as the “finanscape”, the formation of transnational networks of money capital represents the most striking feature of globalization.

9 Heterotopias are spaces that have been converted to utopic places in an attempt to reproduce the utopia aspired and desired by people inhabiting those places. Heterotopias are sites of difference, “capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible”.

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the acknowledgement that we rely on our own presuppositions of the world, in our daily lives, none of which is subjected to test. Most of the time this reliance on our instincts, thoughts and personal perceptions do not hinder our understanding and interpretation of events occurring around us, and social research is no different from other activities in this respect. Reflexivity entails the conscious reflection on what seems problematic, while leaving open the possibility that what currently is not problematic may in the future become so. Similarly, the fact that as researchers, we invariably affect the dynamics of subject community relationships does not mean that the validity of our findings is restricted to the data elicitation situations on which we relied. One can minimize reactivity and/or monitor it, but also exploit it: peoples' responses to the presence of the researcher may be as informative as how they react in other situations. Another significant trait of the reflexive approach is the recognition that data collected cannot be regarded as the 'final word of God', but rather, treated as a series of inferences in which hypothetical patterns can be identified and their validity tested (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995).

Before formally beginning research for my thesis, I had (and still have) several ideological misgivings. My main concern was twofold: firstly I was apprehensive about immersing myself into a community that was, on many levels, very different from my own background and, as a result, I was concerned about making some faux pas that could be irreparable. I did not want my subject community to feel I was a probing academic, who was only using them to get information that would be used for my own personal gain – my thesis. Secondly, I was torn between my Islamic and secular values and was not sure how to negotiate my own identity in relation to my subject community. As a Muslim woman, coming from a middle-class intellectual background, I had always identified myself more in terms of my personal achievements rather than as being Muslim. I was therefore apprehensive about having to de-contextualise my own identity during my trips to Umhlanga where I felt the need to conform to the rest of the women with whom I interacted. At the same time, I did not want to compromise my integrity by projecting myself as someone I was not. Finally, I was concerned with being involved in a research project where I might become one more in a long line of often well intentioned academics, filmmakers, photographers, tourists whose presence serves no purpose but to highlight social differences. By locating my position as a researcher, as a

10 Some like Abu-Lughod (2000) argue that there is a need to find ways to write that work against the typifications of communities that make them into distinct and alien cultures because of the way such distinctions are inevitably hierarchical and tied to larger geopolitical structures of power. She suggests that in our own socio-
Muslim woman; an ethnic and religious insider, but at the same time, as a local outsider, I managed to gain internal access in the community in order to examine the dynamics and tensions involved in data gathering, and eventually, in the final outcome.

**Methods employed**

During my data gathering process, I took part in some of the weekly religious activities organized by the women of Umhlanga Halls. The activity concerned was called a *Taalim*, and involved the collective recitation and reading of *Hadiths* and *Surahs*. Because I was considered to be a guest and wanted to give the activity my full attention, it became practically impossible for me to carry out formal interviews. In an attempt to avoid disrupting the smooth flow of conversation, which usually took place after the recitations, I resorted to using semi-structured interviews as a research strategy. This way, I was able to participate in conversations without ostracizing myself as the researcher versus the insiders. In a case like this, formal interviews would have come across as opportunistic and I did not want to make the women feel that I had come to the *Taalim* only to gather data, but rather to partake in their weekly activities in an attempt to integrate more with the community. Very few structured interviews were carried out with some women on few other occasions, although I never used a tape recorder, once again in my attempt to reduce distance between researcher and researched. Very often, when the subject of caste and religious background was being discussed, I felt compelled to share information about my own background as well in an effort to connect more with some of my interviewees. I also interviewed the Imam of the Umhlanga Mosque, located at the end of Emerald Park, another enclosed condominium, inhabited by several Muslim families as well as non-Muslim families. I was however unable to have any in-depth interviews with any of the men frequenting the mosque as the idea of a non-married woman talking to unknown men would have been deemed inappropriate. The bulk of my information was therefore from the women with whom I worked.

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*cultural worlds, whatever objectification takes place in forms of social-scientific representation is countered by what I call the discourses of familiarity. In other words, although ethnographic and reflexive accounts sometimes encompass peoples studied as a whole, it is crucial to consider the various intricacies and differences that peoples of a community have, as it is impossible to consider the subject community as an entity in its own right due to the countless variations involved. The main focus of working with the Muslim residents of the gated communities was on the interplay between social structure, sentiment and ideology. I began to explore more systematically what difference it would, might, or should make to be a religious insider but a local outsider – both particular positions and identities – doing ethnography. By reproducing some conversations coupled with my own fieldwork notes, I tried to recreate the immediacy of being in the field.*
Contextual research to understand the developmental milieu in which gated communities are imagined and created was carried out through interviews with the relevant surrounding institutional entities that facilitate their construction (Durington, 2004). As such, semi-structured interviews were conducted with members of Durban's Municipality Management, and city planners responsible for the planning and marketing of Durban. The main focus of those interviews was to gauge the Municipality's plans regarding the sustainable urban development of the greater Durban area. I was referred to several websites reiterating the Municipality's plans over the next ten years. Finally, newspapers, television presentations and conversations with friends and colleagues provided data for the broader cultural context of public life.

The ethnographic descriptions presented in the case study and data analysis that follows is based on short-term fieldwork that I conducted in Umhlanga, from June to November 2004, focusing on two gated communities, namely Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest. I was concerned that participant-observation in the private spaces of peoples' homes would not capture the 'real' nature of interactions and activities because of the fact that I was infringing on the privacy of my subject community's homes. The data gathering methods I used were very effective in providing various kinds of data that could be compared and analysed. The content analysis of the field notes, interviews, maps and historical documents generated a series of themes and theoretical insights into the cultural underpinnings of gated community design and use. The observations, interviews, archival documentation, and spatial and architectural maps and drawings provided distinct “texts” that I could read in relation to one another in the search for breakdowns and incoherence that in turn reveal areas of cultural conflict and contestation (Geertz, 1973). Lastly, my fieldwork notes provided insightful anecdotes that allowed me to unpack various behavioural and trends that inform identity and choice to live in gated communities.

One of the problems I encountered during my research included the relationship, during my anthropological theorizing, between place, comparison, and generalization. Appadurai (1986) argues that anthropological theorizing has been unwittingly affected by the shifting loci of its production, such that comparison becomes difficult, for a critical dimension of variability (not just in the data but in the relationship between observer and observed) is left unexamined. Where comparisons (and generalizations) have been successful in anthropology, they have occurred most often in the context of small-scale societies and have involved highly
schematised aspects of social life, such as kinship terminology. However, as the societies under consideration become more complex, literate, and historical, the kind of de-contextualization that facilitates generalization becomes harder to accomplish. Comparison becomes difficult when theoretical interest focuses on qualitative, subjective, and experiential aspects of social life, rather than on quantitative, objective, or structural phenomena (Appadurai, 1986). Therefore, in an attempt to avoid losing myself in generalizations, I state clearly that the data gathered on my subject community does not necessarily represent a larger community living in gated communities located in other parts of South Africa and the world.

My case study of Umhlanga is a tale of a place somewhat different from the more popular studies done on global cities such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, London or of the central (economic) mechanisms of global transformation. However, the urban trend in South Africa is not unconnected to the trajectory of cities in the West as well as if its transformation. Histories of cities ‘out there’ are also histories of the West. Not just reflective of the ‘dark side’ of modernity, then, the apartheid city is perhaps archetypically modern – contrary to popular claims as to the archaic character of racism. The landscapes of racial segregation in South Africa, for example, were described, created and managed by well-intentioned citizens, not very dissimilar from those who housed the poor in Western cities and certainly strongly influenced by these earlier reformers. Similarly, as some writers have demonstrated, the styles and influences of colonial planning also found their way back to the centre (Rabinow, 1989a; King, 1990). I have focused on the historical emergence, socio-political and economic development, patterns of social use, and experiential meanings of gated community life and design as a means of empirically working out the implications of the broader social production of space and social construction of space perspectives. Although the research I conducted was not a classic ethnography 11, the ethnographic illustrations highlight socio-political factors, spatial practices, and efforts at social control that provide insight into the conflicts that arise as different groups attempt to claim and define these urban spaces. Furthermore, these processes elucidate the ways in which the forces and limits of the social production of space and social construction of space are engaged and contested in public arenas.

11 The research I conducted did not involve long-term participation with the subject community and therefore does not qualify as a classic ethnography. However, I employed ethnographic techniques of analysis to illustrate my arguments.
CHAPTER 2

SPACE, URBANIZATION, GATED COMMUNITIES & HETEROTOPIAS

The anthropology of place and space.

Space is not a "reflection of society," it is society... Therefore, spatial forms, at least on our planet, will be produced, as all other objects are, by human action. They will express and perform the interests of the dominant class according to a given mode of production and to a specific mode of development. They will express and implement the power relationships of the state in a historically defined society. They will be realized and shaped by the progress of gender domination and by state-enforced family life. At the same time, spatial forms will be earmarked by the resistance from exploited classes, from oppressed subjects, and from dominated women. And the work of such a contradictory historical process on the space will be accomplished on an already inherited spatial form, the product of former history and the support of new interests, projects, protests, and dreams. Finally, from time to time, social movements will arise to challenge the meanings of spatial structure and therefore attempt new functions and new forms. (Castells, 1983:4)

Understanding the development of particular spaces such as gated communities requires the unpacking and analysis of suburban and urban space. Chapter 2 does just that by using the notions of space and spatiality as background to understand how space is not devoid of political and social meaning. A discussion of the anthropology of space and place is engaged in so as to establish a working analytical vocabulary and address issues relating to the importance of theorizing the city in spatial terms, and, the role of space in forging identities. Furthermore, by discussing issues of space as unstable and moving, space as not transparent, the importance of location and locatedness, and, spatiality as an incomplete process of identity formation (Pile & Keith, 1997), this chapter seeks to understand space and its manifestations in the suburban area of northern Durban.

Indeed, while anthropologists have traditionally employed the concepts of space and place by using spatial dimensions of cultural beliefs and practices to exemplify cultural contexts and provide conceptual frameworks from which to situate their subject communities, they have increasingly started to examine space and place as revealing entities of their own (Low et al., 2003). As a result, notions of space and place have become an ardently enquired subject by geographers, anthropologists and philosophers during the past decade and many have highlighted the inherent relationship between landscape and meaning (2003). Cultural geographers, traditionally concerned with the morphological characteristics of landscapes, have increasingly turned to the symbolic and cultural meanings invested in them, recognizing
that “the place is inseparable from the consciousness of those who inhabit it” (Daniels, 1985: 151). Landscapes can be explored as “symbolic fields”, as “maps of meaning”, as “ways of seeing”, indeed, read as texts, all of which rests on the presumption that social groups actively produce meanings but do so in ways that can ‘pinch’ out emancipatory impulses (Thrift, 1989: 151). Some like David Harvey (1990), for instance, suggests that in highly urbanised Post-Fordist societies, whereby social, political and economic barriers constantly fluctuate in unpredictable ways, time and space are being re-structured into what he terms as a “time-space compression” phenomenon. According to Harvey (1990), spaces can no longer be understood merely in terms of physicality but should be perceived more in terms of cultural expressions whereby conventional meanings attached to geographical locations can now be easily overthrown by new technologies and rapid turnovers of goods. It is largely due to the changing realities of the 21st century’s post-Fordist societies that have led to the rethinking and re-conceptualising of culture in spatialized ways. Michael Watts (1992) identifies four broad areas of spatial/geographical inspection; the social production of space, the new regionalism, locality, globality, and modernity, and landscapes as ways of seeing or maps of meaning. In discussing the society-space question, geographers geared towards a Marxist tendency have attempted to analyse the inner dynamics of capitalism with uneven development and spatial differentiation, what Soja (1985: 176) calls the “encompassing process” of the social production of space. However, as Watts (1992) suggests, David Harvey is probably the one geographer who has been able to outline the theoretical linkages between space and capitalism with near-perfect precision and is worth quoting at length:

“Capitalism also “encounters barriers with its own nature,” which force it to produce new forms of geographical differentiation. The different forms of geographical mobility (e.g. capital, labour power…) interact in the context of accumulation and so build, fragment and carve out of spatial configurations in the distribution of productive forces similar to differentiation in social relations, institutional arrangements and so on. In so doing, capitalism frequently supports the creation of new distinctions in old guises… It is important to recognise, then, that the territorial and regional coherence that…is at least partially discernible

12 Flexible production, in other words the flexible version of industrial urbanism, has been investigated from three paradigmatic realms: technological, organizational, and territorial or spatial. New technologies are seen as promoting flexibility through computer-processed changes in product lines, just-in-time delivery systems, reduced inventory costs, and many other labor and fixed cost-saving devices and strategies. Corporate organizational structures have become more flexible in various ways. Corporate mergers have formed huge conglomerates with many diverse specializations that, when successful, can be flexibly expanded or closed down depending on performance, without having negative effects on other units. Much more attention, however, has been given to the vertical disintegration of the production process and the externalization of risk through subcontracting, outsourcing, more effective control of labor-management relations, and many other forms of flexible specialization. The accumulating impact of these technological and organizational changes is viewed as generating new patterns of territorial development, driving the restructuring of the geopolitical economy of city space, and shaping the formation of the postfordist industrial metropolis (Soja, 2000).
within capitalism is actively produced rather than passively received as a concession to “nature” or history. The upshot is that the development of the space economy of capitalism is beset by counterposed and contradictory tendencies. On the one hand spatial barriers and regional distinctions must be broken down. Yet the means to achieve that end entail the production of new geographical differentiations which form new spatial barriers…” (Harvey, 1985: 11).

A particular regime of capitalist accumulation produces a particular landscape whose very fixity becomes a barrier to be overcome in the next wave of inevitable restructuring triggered by the relentless, competitive pursuit of profit on a global scale (Watts, 1992). According to Harvey (1985), periods of re-composition or mutation, which in effect have attempted to annihilate space with time, involve massive devalorization, what he calls “creative destruction”. Capitalism’s periodic mutations are, in this view, forms of “space-time compression” - a sort of speeding up, a new, faster form of capitalism, in which capitalism “constructs objective conditions of space and time sufficient to its needs and purposes of material and social reproduction” (Harvey, 1990: 419). The recurrent, serial production of new spaces, practices, and patterns is accompanied by, in other words, new experiences of space and time. To the extent that space and time are constitutive elements of what is broadly termed modernity, then to the same extent the history of capitalism is the story of multiple capitalisms and multiple modernities (Soja, 1989). With these arguments in mind, I investigate how the focus on spatial issues has challenged anthropologists to examine their own ‘modern’ urban surroundings instead of studying cultural phenomena in faraway and isolated places (Low et al., 2003). The remaining part of this chapter explores the meaning of space and place in anthropological study as well as provide examples of spatial theorizing, especially as regards to urban space.

Marcuse & van Kempen (2000) suggest that within developing and developed cities alike, co-exist various ‘cities’ in a quartered fashion; the luxury city of the inherited class with erected walls, the city of the gentry, the suburban city of the middle-classes, the resident city of the working class (blue and white collar) and the abandoned city of the migrants and excluded poor, all of which are differentiated along levels of development, income classes, racial zones, and socio-political importance. An example of this division is the Group Areas Act passed in South Africa during the 1960s and having the purposeful aim of confining racial groups into specific regions in an attempt to avoid and reduce any possibility of social interaction between
different races. In this way, the economic and political power of the Afrikaner white ruling minority could be upheld without any interference (Zegeye et al., 2003). In addition to this, Hannigan (1998) describes the post-modern ‘fantasy city’ to allude to the tremendous commercialisation of leisure and the metropolis itself in selective middle-class ‘eateertainment’, ‘shopeertainment, and ‘edutainment’, in centres of wealth and conspicuous consumption, ignoring realities as homelessness, unemployment, social injustice, crime, and disease (Hannigan 1998: 90). It is therefore no coincidence that the phenomenon of ‘sanitised’ and privatised spaces to the full enjoyment of a minority of the world’s population is represented by the epitome of commercialised capitalism, in the form of the twentieth century ‘fortified shopping mall’, which is more often than not, located in rich suburban areas. The hypotheses of Harvey (1990), Marcuse & van Kempen (2000), Hannigan (1998) and many others, aptly summarise the opinion that cities have and are still becoming increasingly polarized internally with public space privatised as the “…triumph of market over place, as brand identity and protection is extended from manufactured goods to the spaces of the city” (Hannigan 1998: 194). Social polarization, as explained by Hannigan (1998), is not only the result of spatial divisions, but also due to economic transformations of cities as globalisation takes over and the gap between poor and rich gets bigger, while the middle class is slowly eroded. This is captured more succinctly relating to residential divisions in:

“Boundaries between divisions, reflected in social or physical walls among them, are increasing. The result is a pattern of separate clusters of residential space, creating protective citadels and enclaves on the one side and constraining ghettos on the other, in a hierarchical relationship to each other. The market produces and reproduces these divisions, but the state is deeply involved in their creation and perpetuation. The state can also ameliorate them, and will tend to do so under specific conditions.” (Marcuse & van Kempen 2000: 3).

13 The Group Areas Act (no. 41 of 1950), adopted on 7 July, determined and controlled the space in which each population group – as defined by the Population Registration Act – was to be relocated and live, and reinforced the effects of the Amended Immorality Act. This law, which guaranteed the physical separation of Blacks, Coloureds and Whites by confining each groups to different geographic areas, was meant, as its subtitle indicates, to ‘provide the establishment of group areas, for the control of the acquisition of immovable property and the occupation of land and premises, and for matters incidental thereto.

On the one hand is the fear of the loss of economic and political power and the fear of seeing their race disappear through miscegenation. One the other hand, there seems to be the fear of the unknown. It is the fear of the ‘Other’ which underlies the willingness to live in separate spheres. Thus, through locking up each group in a geographically confines area, Whites in general, and Afrikaners in particular, hoped to live hermetically and become impenetrable to invasion by other groups. The Group Areas Act locked and bolted South African society in such a tangible and objective manner that communication between individuals from different groups became almost impossible (Ebr-Vally, 2001).
Some conceptual structures accounting for spatial dimensions

Amongst the various spatial dimensions that Low et al. (2003) identify, contested spaces and trans-national spaces are the most relevant to my research. The study of contested spaces addresses social conflicts that are focussed on particular sites. ‘Contested spaces’ is defined as “geographic locations where conflicts in the form of opposition, confrontation, subversion, and/or resistance engage actors whose social positions are defined by differential control of resources and access to power”, such as is the case in the dialectic of rich and poor (Low et al. 2003). Whereas those meanings mainly centre on the meanings invested in particular sites, or derive from their interpretation, they disclose broader social struggles over profoundly held collective myths (McDonough, 1992). Low and others (2003) argue that spaces are contested precisely because they concretise the fundamental and persistent ideological and social frameworks that structure practice, a practice that in turn informs peoples’ ‘habitus’. The urban milieu provides many opportunities for spatial contests due to their complex structures and differentiated social entities that collude and compete for control over material and symbolic resources. Macro level analyses of such spaces have centred on scuffles to control the outcomes of urban redevelopment schemes related to housing and neighbourhood (Castells, 1983) and ‘urban sacred space’ (Harvey 1985) where local residents organize themselves to oppose the dominant classes and political elite. These investigations of class-based struggles emphasize how space is constitutive of power, and how people can resist and object against state-imposed regimes. The study of contested spaces allow me to analyse the power dynamics involved in the choice to move to richer, ‘sanitised’ neighbourhoods, away from what Davis (1992) calls downtown, to more uptown urban markets in North Durban.

The second spatial trope relevant to my study is ‘trans-national spaces’ which comprises of global, transnational, and translocal spatial transformations produced by the economy of late capitalism, focusing on people on the move. In discussing these three perspectives to transnational spaces, and their utility in formulating an anthropological approach, Low et al. (2003) highlight the movement of peoples rather than the flow of capital and commodities. Global spaces is conceived as the flow of goods, services and people, as well as capital, technology, and ideas, across national borders and geographic areas, resulting in not only the compression of space, but also its deterritorialization. Anthropologists have challenged the view of globalisation as taking over every part of society, by studying ‘the local’ and examining the articulations of the global and the local (Low 1999; Ong, 1999). Fran Rothstein & Michael Blim (1991) and others for instance, investigate how global industrialization
reforms the everyday lives and localities of factory workers, and how new workers rebuild meaning and community in the context of their transformed lives. Studies of transnational spaces, on the other hand, focus on the movement across spaces and formations of new relationships between nation-states and capital. While some people consider borders as increasingly potential sites of crossing, others see them as militarised sites of “immobility and surveillance, controlling and restricting movements of individuals by race, gender, and class” (Elder, 1998). These migration studies challenge conventional notions of borders, boundaries, nations, and community by redefining the relationship of the global, transnational, and the local. As a result, they reformulate social and political space, overthrowing traditional concepts of centre and edge, as well as cultural core and difference at the margins, to create fluid, transnational space produced by ‘ordinary’ people (Marston, 1990). On the other hand, the studies of translocal spaces deal with the way anthropologists write about their subjects as located in ‘one place’ and speaking with ‘one voice’. The lack of multi-vocality and multi-locality very often present in ethnographical research leads to a number of problems: an incapacity to deal with people who live on the borderlands and account for cultural difference within a locality; an assumption that countries embody their own unique culture and society; and a lack of understanding of hybridity in post-coloniality (Gupta & Ferguson 1992). All of these three perspectives, the global, the transnational and the translocal, offer a key approach to spatiality and the production of space.

Particular representations emerge from specific material spatial practices and from certain forms of domination and control of space, yet they can become material forces in their own right (Watts, 1992). These dimensions of the material (flows, patterns, movement), presentational (spatial signs, codes and maps), and the imaginary dimensions of space can be, as it were refined along certain axes of spatiality: access/distanciation, appropriation/use, domination/control, and social production (Watts, 1992). The strongest geographical suit has been in material spatial practices, what Peet & Thrift (1989) have called the political economy approach in human geography, documenting the uneven development of capitalism, the social production of spaces and regions, the changing spatial divisions of labour, and the means by which spaces, for example cities, are appropriated (e.g. gentrification), controlled, and regulated (Watts, 1992). Another dimension of locality that takes off from the reality of wider economic, cultural, and political processes being worldwide in scope, and the individual being automatically enmeshed in global webs in historically unprecedented ways is the “critical cosmopolitanism” as Paul Rabinow (1986: 258) calls it, that speaks to the lack of fit
between the local and the global. Communities become locations in which trans-national
circuits of capital, labour, and information intersect with one another and with local ways of
life, obscuring identities and imploding the Third World into an experience in which “the
space of flows...supersedes the space of places” (Henderson & Castells, 1987: 7).

Space is not static, nor is time spaceless (Keith & Pile, 1993). It is crucial to recognize space
and conceptualise it as constructed out of interrelations, as the concurrent coexistence of
social interrelation at all spatial scales, from the most local level to the most global. In human
geography, the recognition that the spatial is socially constituted and that the social is
necessarily spatially constituted too. One the one hand, all social (and indeed physical)
phenomena/activities/relations have a spatial form and a relative spatial location: the relations
that bind communities, whether they be ‘local’ societies or worldwide organizations; the
relations within an industrial corporation. The spatial spread of social relations can be closely
local or widely global, or anything in between. Their spatial extent and form also change over
time. But, whatever way it is, there is no escaping the fact that the social is inescapably also
spatial. My intention here is that this social aspect of space be used to define the spatial. Thus,
the spatial is socially constituted. ‘Space’ is created out of the vast intricacies, the incredible
complexities, of the interlocking and the non-interlocking, and the networks of relations at
every scale from local to global. What makes a particular view of these social relations
specifically spatial is their simultaneity. It is a simultaneity, also, which has extension and
configuration (Keith & Pile, 1993).

As the above arguments suggest, in assessing their interaction for any particular period, or in
regard to any particular problem of theory or method, the nature of particular places is an
important and under-appreciated factor. The central fact here is that what anthropologists find,
in this or that place, far from being independent data for the construction and verification of
theory, is in fact a very complicated compound of local realities. In the cases of anthropology
and history, given their idiographic, qualitative, and narrative orientations, place is not just a
trivial contingency associated with data gathering, but a vital dimension of the subject matter
of the disciplines (Appadurai, 1986). There is also the question of identity, what it means,
how we approach it. Watts (1992) argues that a significant weakness of the postmodernism
debate in geography is the relatively little consideration given to how people define
themselves, how identities are stitched together to act in the new spaces of post-Fordist
economy. Amidst the debris of modernist fragmentation and disengagement, how can identity be constructed at all, especially in the context of multiple identities?

**Urban space and the city**

Low (1996) argues that the cultural meaning of urban space reflects an attempt to understand "the meaning of urban spaces through the knowledge of the people who live within them". Studies of the relationship between space, culture and the city are characterized by the search for the underlying social and cultural values and power politics that give form and meaning to the cityscape and the built urban environment. Low (1996) argues that theorizing the city is an integral part of understanding the changing post-industrial, advanced capitalist, post-modern movement in which we live. The city, being a site of everyday practice, provides "valuable insights into the linkages of macro processes with the texture and fabric of human experience. The city is not the only place where these linkages can be studied, but the intensification of these processes – as well as their human outcomes – occurs and can be understood best in cities" (Low, 1996).

In *Imagining and Theorizing the City*, Low (1996) gives us some conceptual metaphors and images with which to conceptualise the various types of cities that have been and are emerging. These include the divided city and the fortress city. The divided city is described as evoking hidden barriers of race and class encoded in metaphors of uptown and downtown, upscale and ghetto. Explorations of the economic, social, and political consequences of racism include the concept of ‘white public space’ to analyse how ‘white’ institutions control even the production of ‘blackness’ and how race, class and gender relations through the organization of capitalism, which she defines as a materially based and state-reinforced social and cultural construction. In other words Low (1996) explains the divided city through the unequal distribution of ‘cultural capital’; the symbolic repertory whose meanings individuals learn and use as members of particular social networks – and ‘social capital’; the relations of reciprocity between individuals and groups. The fortress city, on the other hand, is what Davis’s (1992) calls the militarization of the public space. The fortress city is drawn from its radical history of the development of Los Angeles, in which Davis (1992) traces the control of media, seizure of land, busting of unions, rigging of water rights, and exclusion of minorities from political participation, all of which has resulted in the destruction of public

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14 Cultural and social capital are defined by physical vectors such as urban space and by collective constructions such as social class, race, and gender, and thus are toponomical, dependent on physical and social location (ref).
space. The fortress city refers to not only the uneven distribution of city space, but also to the
privatisation of certain spaces for the purpose of certain social groups within society. These
two conceptual metaphors allow me to compare and contrast the gated community within the
larger metropolitan area of Durban.

Furthermore, Low's (1996) two metaphors of imagining cities allows us to gain a
comprehensive understanding of the complexity of the cities and their accompanying social,
cultural and economic baggage. It has already been established that city space is not devoid of
the social. In the remaining section, I discuss city space in terms of economic capital in a
post-Fordist society in an attempt to provide a clear framework with which to understand the
geography of our metropolis in crisis. Harvey (1978) describes the city as an economic hub in
which:

Capital represents itself in the form of physical landscape created in its own image, created as
use values to enhance the progressive accumulation of capital. The geographical landscape
which results is the crowning glory of past capitalist development. But at the same time it
expresses the power of dead labour over living labour and as such it imprisons and inhibits the
accumulation process within a set of physical constraints.... Capitalist development has
therefore to negotiate a knife-edge path between preserving the exchange values of past
capitalist investments in the built environment and destroying the value of their investments
in order to open up fresh room for accumulation. Under capitalism, there is then a perpetual
struggle in which capital builds a physical landscape appropriate to its own condition at a
particular moment in time, only to have to destroy it, usually in the course of crises, at a
subsequent point in time. The temporal and geographical ebb and flow of investment in the
built environment can be understood only in terms of such a process. (Harvey, 1978: 124)

In response to Harvey's critique, it is argued by Soja (2000) that these cultural and
consumption issues and problems are not only very important, but that they can also be better
comprehended and reconceptualized through a thorough rethinking of the dynamics of social
production and divisions of labour, especially in relation to the dramatic industrial
restructuring that occurred in the last third of the 20th century. Soja (2000) particularly argues
that the industrial restructuring process is having the effect of using up out and polarizing
urban labour markets, the latter being one of the primary expressions of the social divisions of
labour in city space. The previous middle sector of the labour market as well as the middle
class more generally are now being squeezed, with a select few rising above economically
into managerial positions, while much larger numbers, mostly unionised blue-collar workers,
are feeling the effects of severe reductions of household income and edging toward what has
recently come to be called the welfare-dependent urban underclass. Needless to say, the deconstruction and reconstitution of Fordism has had a significant disciplining effect on all three components of the Fordist social contract. Big Business, Big Government and Big Labour have all been drastically "downsized" to become, in Bennett Harrison's pungent phrase, increasingly "lean and mean". As Harrison (1994, rev.edn. 1997) argues, this has allowed the Fordist trio to survive in the Age of Flexibility but at an enormous economic, political, and social cost to the general population. It is also becoming clear that the new post-fordist economies and geographies, rather than relieving these costs, are compounding them in what increasingly appears to be a vicious cycle of social polarization and widening economic inequalities.

The Post Metropolis

What Soja (2000) calls the post metropolis is represented primarily in terms of its reconfigured empirical geography, the new 'patternings' and specificities or urban form, function, and behaviour that have emerged with the advent of globalisation and post Fordist economic restructuring. The focus shifts to the synchronized and interdependent reshaping of the urban social order and the new patterning of social stratification and socio-economic inequality. What is emphasized here are the geographical outcomes of the new urbanization process and their concrete effects on everyday life, the planning and design of the built environment, as well as the uneven patterning of 'intra-urban' economic growth and development (Soja, 2000).

In most of the literature of urban historians, the notion of suburbia was viewed primarily as a product of intentional residential decentralization, primarily of a wealthy elite but soon followed, closer to the city centre, by workings-class inner suburbs and further out by mostly white middle-class "pioneers" pushing ever outward the suburban "frontier". This hunt for 'better' housing, supported by improved public transport facilities and backed by ambitious real estate developers, was seen as the major driving factor behind suburbanization. As a result, a sprawling landscape of detached and privately owned homes and a culturally homogenous and "consumerist" suburbia where most jobs remained outside the local milieu developed (Soja, 2000). One of the main features of this new trend was a simulacrum of the

15 Charting the social and spatial impact on industrial restructuring on urban labor markets and their segmentation by gender, race, and ethnicity, as well as occupation and location has been a major research focus for the industrial urbanists (Soja, 2000).
old dichotomy of city and countryside, now reproduced in the modern metropolis around the
division between urban and suburban landscapes or worlds, each with their distinctive “ways
of life”, very much characterised by gated community developments located in wealthy
peripheral suburban areas.

**Urban Apartheid**

Following this theoretical framework of the city discourse, it is important to consider the
urban situation during the pre and post Apartheid eras by discussing the spatial geography of
apartheid and analysing the historical nature and physical characteristics of the Apartheid city.
Spatial segregation can be traced back to the 19th century and the strictures that colonial
society imposed upon southern Africa’s urban areas. Case studies indicate that many South
African suburbs consisted of heterogeneous racial groups to a much larger degree than is
generally acknowledged by Apartheid historians, and despite the fact that black and white
were uneasy neighbours, they were generally known to have shared urban facilities with
relative success (Frescura, 2001). A major change in this state of affairs happened however in
1923 when the Union Parliament passed the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, which laid down the
principles of racial segregation and reinforced the myth that the African population had no
permanent rights in the towns. Despite the Act’s propositions, the now ‘white’ suburbs
remained more or less integrated to varying degrees until 1948 when the Nationalist Party
came to power. From then on, the process of separating various racial communities was put
into practice by placing upon it an ideological traction, and was given necessary importance
by a variety of inter-linking residential, squatting, labour and security legislation (Frescura,
2001). Although, the dialectic under which Apartheid principles were based has changed over
the years, its concrete effect upon the black community has led to the dispossession of their
homes and land, often with no reparation. They have also been denied access to markets,
infrastructure, and civic amenities, leading to their impoverishment and increased economic
hardship.

While many other authors have emphasized capital accumulation, a docile workforce, white
agitation or just plain racism, it has been suggested that the organization of urban space into
racially segregated living areas was central to the persistence of the racial state and, indeed,
that it was one of the key technologies/strategies which facilitated the effective
implementation of state power in South Africa’s urban areas (Robinson, 1996). Urban
apartheid, then, was a particular historical form of a spatial technology of power, which emerged in the arena of state intervention in the city (1996). Without a gathering of the racially defined Black African population into spatially contained areas and the evolution of specific methods of administration and governance in these areas, the implementation of various racial policies would have been at the mercy of the racial and physical ‘chaos’ of the early 20th century city. The power of apartheid and the setting apart of racial groups, was therefore much more than simply an expression of a political order, the spaces of apartheid constituted and sustained that order (Robinson, 1996).

Apartheid city planning was marked by a number of features which, if read in historical context, could be interpreted as part of a segregation residential policy. Franco Frescura, (2001) discusses some of the characteristics of this segregation. He illustrates how buffer zones were used to create and reinforce racial segregation, the land was owned by the white controlled municipalities and consequently these areas were often developed as industrial townships. Thus, although businesses in these areas employed workers from the nearby black suburbs, their rates and taxes were paid to the white municipality under whose control they fell (2001). Another spatial strategy included extended city planning whereby, black residential suburbs were invariably removed from the Central Business District (CBD), an obvious link with the colonial ‘Segregated City’. Extended road links were also one of the most obvious features of the Apartheid City with its wide spread residential suburbs linked by relatively long travel links. An integrated city on the other hand, would probably have developed along more compact lines. Finally, radical street planning by city architects was used in many black towns to facilitate military operations within their other streets. This dated back to the time when Verwoerd was Minister of Natives Affairs. The planning of radical roadways and the provision of limited access to an area was not the invention of the architects of apartheid, but was a salient feature of mine compounds planning (2001). Urban racial segregation has created blatantly divided landscapes with sprawling, infrastructurally poor black townships disconnected from the high-rise commercial city centre and suburban areas. These different places ‘mattered’ not only as contrasting contexts for social life but because

16 Apartheid, a universal signifier of political and racial domination, has a specific literal meaning as well, “apartness”. It is a social system founded upon the “setting apart” in space of different race groups. The power of apartheid was crucially dependent upon this spatiality, Apartheid – setting apart – was itself constitutive of the power of the South African racial order. But the spatial technology upon which this political order rested was invented long before the term ‘apartheid’ became popular – indeed, even before its predecessor, segregation, emerged as a coherent political platform. And unfortunately, the spatiality of apartheid persists to confound post-apartheid urban managers in their project of repairing the damages of the past (Robinson, 1996).
they also constituted a making of state power. As opposed to most other accounts of urban segregation, which have focused on racism or economic interest to explain this urban phenomenon, the reasons for which the state itself chose to intervene in the urban arena in this way is worth investigating.

All these groups contributed to the construction of a discourse or urban native administration, which greatly influenced the shaping of the form and content of state interventions in 20th century South African cities. It is interesting to note that these discourses were not only outside modernity but also that the tactics and rationalities, which materialized to regulate urban space in South Africa, were closely in parallel to modernizing strategies throughout the West. Needless to say, urban segregation had already been established long before (during the colonialist era)\(^\text{17}\) it was articulated as part of a relatively coherent ideology of Apartheid segregation. The general neglect in South African studies on the state's own interests and the importance of spatiality in power relations has served to conceal the early history of the location strategy in South Africa (Robinson, 1996). By focusing on the country's economic demands in describing the history of urban segregation, the continuity of purpose (effective government and political domination) in the location strategy has been understated\(^\text{18}\).

Therefore, apartheid did not become merely the means of plundering the wealth of the country, and of placing it in white Afrikaner hands. It was also a social system, which ensured that, once racism has abated, class would replace race as the primary means of social

\(^{17}\) Whereas the formal and legal political ideology of segregation only materialised after the turn of the century, it was only in the 1880s that white racist agitation over African living conditions has emerged in towns. The location strategy was first implemented in the 1830s in rural areas and the late 1840s in urban areas in the eastern Cape. The particular theoretical and empirical lenses they have adopted have inevitably, influenced the search by historians for the 'origins' of segregation in South Africa.

\(^{18}\) Robinson (1996) has identified 3 phases in the evolution of state interventions in the urban arena. The first, he suggests, was primarily associated with public health and disease control, and was embodied in the Public Health Act (No. 36 of 1919) and the Slums Act (No. 53 of 1934). Under these provisions, housing could be declared 'unfit for human habitation' and the occupants removed or the buildings demolished. A second phase of legislation was more directly concerned with achieving control over African people living in towns. One of the main problems faced by the state in enforcing both this and the public health legislation was the lack of available alternative accommodation for those whom they wished to remove from certain areas. This problem was not successfully resolved until the 1950s, although the state persisted in its efforts to improve its capacity to implement these policies. It was agreed that African settlement in urban areas should be limited in order both to secure better control and to effects some state regulation of the distribution of the labor supply. The third phase of urban intervention - the apartheid state - was in many respects a consolidation and streamlining of previous urban policies, and it saw the apartheid government finding solutions to the severe constraints on urban intervention and housing provision that has disabled the pre-1948 state. Legislation requiring African residence in locations could then be fully enforced for the first time. However, segregated housing for defined 'coloured' and 'white' people was also to be legally required under the Group Areas Act. There had been forerunners to this Act, both legislative and customary. Under the Housing Act, for example, finds and planning approval were only provided for segregated housing schemes; racially restrictive clauses were frequently inserted into title deeds of private housing developments and the Pegging Act in Natal had been designed to resolve Indian-White competition for residential and commercial in favour of whites (Robinson, 1996).
demarcation. Apartheid therefore set out to create in perpetuity a proletariat, which, by no coincidence was also black (1996). It turns out that this is exactly what happened.

Until the Soweto unrest of 1976, and the ensuring gradual loosening of apartheid laws and ordinances, security measures to protect private houses from intruders and, in particular, gated communities, were largely unknown in the predominantly European-style cities of South Africa. Instead of building walls or fences aimed at separating mini-communities from the outside world, apartheid policies were designed to segregate ethnically defined parts of the population on a large scale in order to contain generally the so-called 'swaart gevaar' (The Black danger) (Bahr & Jurgens, 1993), which had been a constant concern of the white population. During the 1980s, and particularly after the abolition of the Group Areas Act in the early 1990s, an obvious shift in population structure took place (Jurgens, 1991). This development took place on a larger scale in the inner cities. Non-whites (Africans, Indians, Colored) moved into residential areas that had been originally predominantly occupied by whites. At first, this urban move was done in an illegal way (the development of so-called 'grey areas') (Tomaselli & Tomaselli, 1998), although the police often tacitly chose to ignore it. However, in 1991 legal restrictions were lifted (Jurgens, 1991) and the new dwellers moved into vacant apartments in the previously ‘white’ sector of real estate into apartments, which they would never have received in the townships. In some areas, the long-term result was a distinct change in atmosphere from the original European one towards a more African urban environment.

With this new urban development, the perception of a society in transition as well as the very real fear of crime and falling real estate prices increased, particularly among the white population. Whites not only found themselves confronted with an increasing number of squatters, both in the outskirts of the cities and in municipal parks but also had to deal with the new race groups that were ‘invading’ their properties. This infiltration created much more than just an image problem. Needless to say, the politically motivated unrest of the black population against the apartheid system in the mid-1980s, and the state’s implicit acceptance of violations of apartheid rules which had begun in the late 1970s had triggered a ‘paranoia’ of personal insecurity and political uncertainty as well as the development of various construction measures designed to protect citizens in the predominantly white cities (Jurgens, 1991). From the mid-1980s, the security business developed into the fastest growing sector of the South African economy. In the mid-1990s, up to 150 000 people worked in this field
CSIR, 2000). Today, South Africa is amongst the few countries, which has more private security personnel than the state’s police (2000).

In 1991, when all apartheid laws were finally abolished, mobility control over non-whites stopped. However, the obvious social contrast between ‘rich’ white residents and ‘poor’ black street merchants, beggars, and taxi drivers became a daily sight in residential areas that had originally been declared as exclusively ‘white’. After the democratisation of South African society, the predominantly white police force could no longer concentrate on the protection of these residential areas in their daily routine. This in turn led both to a sharp increase in crime in general and to its even more distribution among formerly black and white residential areas (Mills 1991: 92). In a survey conducted in 1998 on crime rates, it was indicated that 62% of 1266 interviewed persons from all population groups in Johannesburg stated that either they personally, or family members, had become crime victims between 1993 and 1997; nationwide, the figure was 44%. Some 28% suffered more than one incident (Statistics SA, 1998: 41). Although white persons are victims of serious crime less often than are non-whites, on a nationwide basis they are almost twice as often victims of property offences as are people from the middle-income stratum and this figure rises with increase in annual household income (1998).

This fear of crime has led the population to react defensively by hiring ‘paid-for protection’ (armed response) or by ‘mob justice’ in order to compensate for the perceived inactivity of the police force and the penal system (CSIR 2000). It has been said that fear of crime has become an everyday concern in South African society. ‘Rich’ people in particular react to this with ‘target hardening’ – “physical strengthening of building facades or boundary walls to reduce the attractiveness or vulnerability of potential targets” (2000: 6). The growing expansion for security-enforced neighbourhoods was further enhanced after the first democratic elections of 1994 (Roberts, 1996). Although a new stable system of government was established, one which allayed fears for the future among the white population, those who could afford it preferred to take matters in their own hands and move to communities which were enclosed and had restricted access, using the crime factor as official pretext. Crime drove the market, analysts concluded (Cohen, 1997). Therefore people from upper classes as well as people from the white and the aspiring new black middle class fuelled the demand for walled communities.
Gating in South Africa

The result of this spatial segregation has left the country riddled with huge social, economic and environmental disparities amongst the various race groups existing in South Africa. As a consequence, the present government faces two particular challenges regarding those inequalities: to upgrade existing underdeveloped areas through the provision of sufficient infrastructure and services and to integrate these areas with the rest of the city. This integration might also indirectly contribute to crime prevention\(^\text{19}\) as the government speculates in a number of crime prevention strategies. Meanwhile, many citizens are responding in their own way in disregard to the government’s intentions of creating a more integrated society. High levels of crime\(^\text{20}\) and the fear of crime, are giving rise to major changes in the urban landscape, such as defensive architecture and urbanism. The emergence of gated communities is transforming the face of South African cities (Landman, 2000).

Spatial responses to crime in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban, have varied from interventions to buildings (burglar bars, security gates, steel shutters etc.) and physical protection of properties and street blocks (fencing, alley-gating, etc.), to the closing-off of entire neighbourhoods (gated communities) (Landman, 2000). The implication of this deliberate and overt spatial segregation raises the question of whether these interventions should be viewed from a single perspective or whether they call for a multi-dimensional interpretation, both in terms of spatial manifestation and institutional responses.

Once Apartheid crumbled, and spatial barriers were removed, various race groups started moving out of their previous residential areas. For instance, a large proportion of blacks started to move to the inner cities where jobs were more available (Frescura, 2001). However, being from lower economic groups, they often resorted to live in cheap housing, known as townships, offered by the government such as Chesterville, informal settlements and squatter camps. This infiltration in turn led to a transformation in the urban landscape of the cities. Blacks seeking jobs now populated certain areas in central Durban, such as West Street,

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19 Dramatic political transition is often followed by social, economic and spatial transition as well. Comparisons of the links between political transitions and the growth of crime have indicated remarkable links between political transition, rising crime levels, and socio-economic and spatial changes (Shaw 1997; 2000). South Africa faces huge challenges in terms of poverty, unemployment and high crime levels. It is estimated that more than 50% of the population lives below the poverty line and that more than 30% of the population is unemployed. Overall crime levels increased by almost 5% between 1997-1998, 7% in 1998-1999, and 7.6% in 1999-2000 (Shonteich 2002).

20 Crime is an everyday reality in South Africa and a major concern of the majority of the South African. Overall crime levels increased by almost 5% between 1997-1998, 7% in 1998-1999 and 7.6% in 1999-2000 (Shonteich 2002). Many people are reaching out to find additional ways to prevent crime. One such a response is gating communities.
which had been mostly frequented by Whites and Indians during Apartheid. As a result, the levels of crime in the CBD increased for many reasons ranging from poverty, invasion of gangs, to unemployment. This sudden change was perceived as a threat to Whites and Indians, and those who could afford it, chose to move out from the in the inner cities and settle in suburban areas (Ebr.-Vally, 2001). Private developers took the opportunity and did not hesitate to supply to demand for safer and homogenous residential areas. As a result, the most affluent families resorted to move into gated condominiums in areas like Umhlanga, La Mercy, and La Lucia, all located in northern Durban. Needless to say, these gated condominiums and complexes had specific target markets and demographics (2001).

The Gated Community

Most of the works on gated communities have been in the United States and about the United States. Blakely & Snyder (1997) have systematically analysed the motives for this type of planning and they distinguish various types of communities including lifestyle communities, which attract prospective residents with a variety of leisure activities and other aspects of personal comfort; prestige communities, which are characterized by the elitist social standing and the corresponding public image of their inhabitants; and security-zone communities whose inhabitants, because of either fear or paranoia of the outside world, base their decision to live there on the various security measures. Gated communities are essentially residential areas with restricted access such that normally public spaces have been fortified from the rest of the city through walls, gates and high technology surveillance systems, yet sustained through guarded, dedicated highway gates, customized water and energy connections, and telecommunications grids, that selectively connect them to the wider urban constellation and the universe beyond (Garham & Marvin 2001: 4). This is contributing to a condition that Garham & Marvin (2001) refer to as Splintering Urbanism. Across the world, residential neighborhoods, commercial centers, retail spaces, entertainment districts and office parks are fortified and privatized in this way as a result of actions of private business, large corporations and wealthier citizens and sometimes those of local authorities as well (Marcuse 2001; Blakely & Snyder 1997). The result is that many residents are now living in "fortress cities", brutally divided into 'fortified cells' of 'affluence and places of terror' (Davis 1995).

21 Neighborhoods or precincts that are fortified from the rest of the city through walls, gates and high technology surveillance systems, yet sustained through guarded, dedicated highway gates, customized water and energy connections, and telecommunications grids, that selectively connect them to the wider urban constellation and the universe beyond (Garham & Marvin 2001: 4). This is contributing to a condition that Garham & Marvin (2001) refer to as Splintering Urbanism. Across the world, residential neighborhoods, commercial centers, retail spaces, entertainment districts and office parks are fortified and privatized in this way as a result of actions of private business, large corporations and wealthier citizens and sometimes those of local authorities as well (Marcuse 2001; Blakely & Snyder 1997). The result is that many residents are now living in "fortress cities", brutally divided into ‘fortified cells’ of ‘affluence and places of terror’ (Davis 1995).

22 Gated communities take the idea of crime prevention through environmental design to its extreme, by applying the principles of territoriality, defensible space, access control and image. In the case of enclosed neighborhoods, existing neighborhoods are closed-off through booms and gates across roads. Many are fenced off or walled off as well, with a limited number of controlled entrances/exits and security guards at these points in some cases. The emphasis is on security. In fact, applications for neighborhood enclosures can only be approved for security reasons. The roads within these neighborhoods were previously, or still is public property and in many cases, the local council is still responsible for public services to the community within (Landman, 2003).

23 An important aspect in the functioning of security villages is their internal organization. For instance, in the gated community I focus on, known as Umhlanga Halls, the owners of property within the compound are obliged to abide by conduct rules, as are their tenants. In Umhlanga Halls, the rules prohibit behaviour and illegal modifications to the buildings. Trustees and a chairman serve as representatives and spokespersons of the community. There is also a homeowners association. These people are obliged to make their decision balancing the private interests of individuals and the interest of the community as a whole.
privatised and where internal access is controlled by physical barriers: walled or fenced perimeters and gated or guarded entrances (Blakely & Snyder, 1997). Gated communities are more than just apartment or condominium buildings with a doorman controlling access to the lobby, instead they “preclude public access to roads, sidewalks, parks, open space, playgrounds – all resources that in earlier days would have been open and accessible to all citizens of a locality” (Blakely & Snyder 1997: 62).

It was Marcuse (1995) in particular, with his concept of the quartered city, who pointed out that there are also other, invisible or symbolic, forms of social segregation. The aspect of ‘community’ emphasizes the integration of interacting individuals into a social network. As far as gated communities are concerned, the success of such networks does not necessarily depend on a mutual emotional understanding between neighbours (Johnston et al., 1994); rather, it is guaranteed through the ‘control’ of the neighbourhood by means of codes of conduct – covenants, conditions and restrictions as well as by organizational structures – (homeowners’ associations). Such are the instruments designed to defend the desired harmony and stability of secluded private residential areas against the disordered and fragmented society outside. In essence, although there are many other influences, the increasing trend towards fortification and privatisation is strongly related to perceptions of fear and insecurity among urban residents. As such, Ellin (1997) argues that “form follows fear” in the contemporary city, resulting in people in perceived high risk areas constructing defensive enclaves of various forms and nature to protect their range of interests. In this sense, the ability of pay is essential in many cases, which also incorporates a second theme, closely related to the first, namely that of “form follows finance” (Ellin 1997). In developing and developed cities, gated communities proliferate. Many of these focuses on residential land use and reflect responses from citizens to modify their living environments to prevent crime and reduce the fear of crime. Such tendencies are increasingly visible across the world, including the USA, Brazil, South Africa, and India etc. (Landman, 2003).

The two main gated communities that I focus on are known as Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest, both located north of the city of Durban. Large walled-in and security-riddled community living spaces, Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest accommodate the homes of typically elite and demographically homogenous group. Constructed on land that
had been previously owned by Tongaat-Hulett\textsuperscript{24} (a predominantly white company and used for the plantation of sugar-cane fields, the gated communities in Umhlanga (Mount Edgecombe, Zimbali Lodge, Umhlanga Manors, Umhlanga Ridge) are not only symbolic sites of previous racial exploitation, but also epitomize the principles of racial superiority through their very outward power of repressive force. A general description of Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest would include the pretentious aspect of the neighbourhood, the high walls which, appear as severe concretisations of both the unbending authority of apartheid’s power, the unquestionable presence and prerogatives of its supremacy, and not to mention the extreme warrants and control. All in all, the two gated communities could be interpreted as being assemblages of economic power, idealised values, indexical natural elements, with simulated happy-looking, feel-good houses. This overt simulacrum of the ‘perfect’ and ‘safe’ residence brings us to the issue of what Foucault (1997) calls the heterotopia.

The heterotopia

Foucault’s (1997) notion of the heterotopia is a way of conceiving social space, a model, as Lees (1997) puts it, of contemporary socio-spatial life. It acts as a spatial frame for analysis, from which larger commentaries may be drawn about the values, practices, and discourses of a particular social site. It will be helpful so as to inform the analysis to come, to provide a brief characterization of this spatial-political concept. Foucault (1997) argues that the heterotopia posses a precise and well-defined function within society. According to Foucault (1997), the study of heterotopias leads the analyst to the over-arching schema of political practices and discourses of the society in which it is localized and makes for a viable theoretical tool for linking space and power, politics and place; as analytic node through which one might deduce greater networks of power. Hook & Vrdoljak (2001) make the distinctions between two major forms of the heterotopia; the heterotopia of deviance are those places occupied by individuals who exhibit behaviour which deviates from current or average standards of a society; the asylums, psychiatric clinics, prisons, rest homes, schools for delinquents, old people’s homes etc. and, the heterotopia of crisis is recognized as that “privileged or forbidden place reserved for the individual or society in a state of upheaval, difficulty or breakdown with reference to the greater environment in which he lives” (2001: 70).

\textsuperscript{24} Tongaat-Hulett has been a major company dealing in sugar cane and sugar production. The company owned and still owns a large part of north Durban’s land. Together with Moreland Developers, the property arm of sugar giant Tongaat-Hulett, the company has brought about large economic revenues to the whole area over the past fifty years.
As such, the gated community qualifies as heterotopic by virtue of its precise and well-defined function within society, a functioning which, typically, links it to presiding structures of power (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2001). The three main functions of a heterotopy place include: exclusion, separation and avoidance. In this sense, the heterotopic gated community is not only about providing security, crime prevention and a new sense of community, but is also about etching a historical structure of into space. Although at some level these pragmatic rationales for gated community development would hold, as would such given reasons, in a superficial sense, in the case of the psychoanalytic symptom, they detract from a more fundamental function. This inscribing of privilege and power means that the political prerogatives of exclusion, separation, and avoidance have been effectively institutionalised and legislated existence in the apartheid era (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2001).

A further characterizing feature of the heterotopia is that it is directly related to other spatialities. Although the heterotopia is markedly distinct from the spaces around it, it does connect and link with other spaces, even if such connections work to enhance effects of contrast and difference more than anything else. Following Foucault (1997), the role of the heterotopia is either to create “a space of illusion that exposes real space as still more illusionary”, or, to create a space that is “other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well-arranged, as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled” (1997: 356). The heterotopia then, by definition, is a differential space, extremely similar to, but always fundamentally different from, the places that surround it, a sort of simulacra of an aspired utopia. Given this quality, it is not surprising that, as Foucault (1997) reiterates, the heterotopia “has the power of juxtaposing in a single real place different spaces and locations that are incompatible” (1997: 354).

We have already noted that heterotopias are differential spaces; the fact that they are typically sites of crisis and deviance only strengthens this differential quality. Indeed, it is from this difference, their very ‘otherness’ that stems their ability to offer critical perspectives on other places. Similarly, the heterotopia is a “place that lies outside all places and yet is localizable” (Foucault, 1997: 352). One assumes from this that the heterotopia is a place able to transcend its basic social function and to thereby subversively mirror the typical kinds of social intercourse of a society (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2001). As both spaces of ‘otherness’ and highly specified social function, it would seem that the heterotopia should be able to demonstrate a certain amount of friction between its normative and extraordinary identities. This would in
turn precisely illustrate the condition underlying its “ability to represent a point of slippage, or destabilization, for current socio-political or discursive orders of power” (2001). It is this factor of the heterotopia that renders the prospects of meaningful forms of resistance and political action realizable. Hence, in Lees’s (1997) terms, the heterotopia is a spatially discontinuous ground that opens a critical space that provides a real site of heterotopias as “socially-constructed counter-sites embodying…form[s] of resistance” (1997). In this way one may understand how the heterotopia stands as Foucault’s (1997) theoretical conversion of the idealized notion of the utopia into pragmatic, ‘real-world’ terms. However, whereas utopias are ideal sites with no real place, therefore remaining imaginary and fundamentally unreal, heterotopias are “real sites” of “effectively enacted utopias” (1997: 24). Heterotopias are then potentially transformative spaces of society from which meaningful forms of resistance can be mounted. These are the places capable of a certain kind of social commentary that may be written into the arrangements and relations of space. Following on this, Lees’s (1997) claims that the practical politics of the heterotopias would not be merely analogies or figurative comparisons of resistance, as in the case of the imagined space of the utopia, but would instead constitute real-world interventions within the political fabric of society, acted upon rather than simply spoken forms of criticism commensurate with realized and actual field of political action and power (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2001).

Given that the heterotopia arises around points of crises (particularly those of living spaces), the gated community could qualify as a heterotopy, especially considering the fact that much of the upper-class South Africa perceives the current crime problem as of attaining crisis proportions (2001). The characteristic of the heterotopia, as a ‘spatial answer to a problem’ is, apparently, exactly what provides the gated community with a rationale for its extreme and highly structured control of space. The gated community could also qualify as heterotopy by virtue of its specifically well-defined function within society characteristically linking it to presiding structures of power; i.e. the gated community as a place of superbly secured community domicile, certainly serves a necessary function (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2001). Furthermore, the way in which the security park serves a well-defined socio-political function, in particular, that of housing a homogenous class demographic in a residential complex where that demographic maintains a large degree of self-governance and autonomy, is a noticeable function of the gated community. On a similar level, these same social demographic groupings are those that are increasingly non-participatory in schemes of national unity, reconstruction and reconciliation. In this connection, the spatial autonomy of
gated communities contributes largely to removing this elite grouping from a sense of equitable political responsibility (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2001). In more than one ways, the privatisation of the gated community domain, and the prerogatives it accordingly cedes to its inhabitants (to exclude undesirables, to protect oneself with force, to choose a removed geographical location) suggests the extent to which the upper-class has decided that national (or macro) politics is no longer their prioritised choice through which to pursue their interests. As Foucault argues (1997), the functioning of the heterotopia is most often than not indicative of more wide sweeping changes across a social sphere. In this respect, the gated community serves as a model to how the elite engages with their political concerns in the supposedly ‘new’ rainbow nation South Africa.

The gated community may certainly be read as utopian in the sense that it is the realised compromise-formation of utopian ideals. In fact, in many ways, the heterotopia is the closest permissible version of a homogenous and sequestered mini-society. One should be wary however of pushing such comparisons too far; gated communities do not always exhibit as homogenous cultural and demographic make-ups as one might imagine, furthermore, they seem to bring together far less explicit political objectives and agendas. In this respect it becomes clear that the gated community is a particularly reactionary variation of the heterotopia, that is, if by ‘heterotopia’ one is assuming some kind of progressive politics of space. In many ways, the gated community is an embodiment of exactly the kinds of spatially infested power, of exactly the increasingly surveyed, segregated and simulated socio-spatial order that Foucault (1997), and more progressive heterotopic spaces take as their object of criticism. Furthermore, the production of heterotopic places follow a global trend in the sense that post-modern urbanism is closely informed by the creation of utopic spaces for the benefit of a global middle-class to upper-class elite who seek to inhabit ‘perfect’ spaces. The globalisation process invariably affects and influences the restructuring of various socio-urban/architectural spaces in local cultures and, as a result, has an underlying impact on cultural identities, which brings us to the next chapter dealing with identity formation in a global world.
CHAPTER 3

DIASPORIC IDENTITIES, THE UMMAH & GLOBALISATION

Introduction
In trying to unpack the reasons for which South African Muslim Indians adopt a western culture, while promoting Islamic beliefs of humility and conservativeness through regular religious practices, this chapter discusses issues of identity in an attempt to understand the negotiation between Islamic identity, Western influence, diasporic attachments and caste purity. The theory presented in Chapter 3 tries to lay a theoretical framework from which to comprehend the choice of South African Indian Muslims to segregate themselves in gated communities, as well as their need to establish their differential social space through segregation while maintaining their Islamic values. This chapter uses the discourse of diaspora as a marker to discuss the various factors informing Indian Muslim identity in Durban, by tracing the migration history of Indian Muslims to South Africa. Using their migration history and migration patterns in general, the chapter engages in a discussion on globalisation and how global processes affect the city and its people at a local level, especially in the context of the South African political and urban past. Issues that are raised include Arjun Appadurai’s (1990) notion of ethnoscapes and their impacts on the restructuring of various socio-spatial configurations at the urban level. Stuart Hall’s (2000) explanation of identity and how space informs identity is also used to support the arguments made about diasporic identities.

Understanding Diasporas
The concept of diaspora is a highly contested issue. According to Safran (1991), diasporas are ‘expatriate minority communities’ that are dispersed from an original ‘centre’ to at least two ‘peripheral places’; that maintain a ‘memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland’; that ‘believe they are not - and perhaps cannot be fully accepted by their host country; that see the ancestral home as a place of eventual return; that are committed to the maintenance or restoration of this homeland; and of which the group’s consciousness and solidarity are ‘importantly defined’ by this continuing relationship with the homeland (1991: 83-84). These, according to Safran (1991), are the main features of diaspora: a history of dispersal, myths/memories of the homeland, alienation in the host country, desire for eventual return, ongoing support of the homeland, and a collective identity importantly defined by this
relationship (Clifford, 1994: 304-305). In other words, a diaspora could be seen as a transnational network of dispersed political subjects. One important feature of some kinds of diasporas (Jews, Muslims, Armenians) is that ties of co-responsibility connect them across the boundaries of empires, political communities or (in a world of nation-states) nations (Clifford, 1994). Diasporas are therefore deterritorialised imagined communities which conceive of themselves, despite their dispersal, as sharing a collective (very often geographical) past and common destiny, and hence also a simultaneity in time. One crucial point relating to the notion of diaspora however is that it is dependent upon the discourse of nationalism. The idea that nationalism is a pre-condition for the construction of diaspora, given the fact diasporas tend to take the form of the nation (for example, Palestinians, Armenians, Assyrians) is most often than not true. In a sense, diaspora could refer to a nation in exile. The boundaries that the discourse of nationalism draws around a community are that which prevents the dissolution of that community once it is displaced from its locality. Nationalism constitutes both nations and diasporas - that is a peoplehood that is territorially concentrated (nation) and territorially displaced (diaspora) (Clifford, 1994).

The term diaspora may be used in a descriptive manner to refer to an empirical situation in which settler communities are relocated from their ordinary homes (Sayyid, 2003). While the term diaspora was originally employed to describe the experience of the Jewish displacement, Indian and African diasporas have now become templates for the understanding what constitutes a diaspora. Clifford (1994) outlines that modern diasporas are very often ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin - their homeland. Consequently, the notion of diaspora rests on three inter-linking co-ordinates: homeland, displacement and settlement. In other words, a diaspora is constituted when communities of settlers articulate themselves in terms of displacement from a homeland. The homeland acts as a point of reference around which the community frames its collective subjectivities. A diaspora is therefore formed when a group of people are displaced but continue to narrate their identity in terms of that displacement. For example, the Jewish diaspora exists because unlike other groups that were deported by various ancient conquerors (Assyrians, Neo-Babylonians), the Jews managed to maintain their collective identity even when they were territorially displaced and politically subordinated (Sayyid, 2003). However Clifford (1994) also puts forward the argument that borderlands are distinct in that they presuppose a territory defined by a geopolitical line: two sides arbitrarily separated and
policed, but also joined by legal and illegal practices of crossing and communication. Diasporas usually presuppose longer distances and separation more like exile. It is worth holding onto the historical and geographical specificity of the two paradigms, while recognizing that the concrete predicaments denoted by the terms border and diaspora bleed into one another.

Castells (1998) argues that for a variety of reasons we are now living in a world of flows that relate to diasporic movement. He argues that these flows are unsettling because they disrupt the continuities that allowed collective identities to be formed, maintained and projected. Globalisation is one way of summing up the transition to this world of flows since it is a process that is fundamentally linked to the formation of dislocated communities, populations that no longer fit within the Westphalian “vacuum”. The vacuum is unable to contain not only due to increased mobility but also because its own walls are becoming blurred and flexible. Castells (1997) identifies five main processes, which seem to be characteristic of globalisation. First there is the emergence of a nascent global civil society through not only a propagation of NGOs which operate across national state boundaries, but also the beginnings of an attempt to construct a “consensus” on issues such as human rights, economic management, gender issues and so forth. As a result, the institutional framework for this consensus is provided by elements that are not restricted to a particular national space; these elements often take on roles such as “intellectual and moral leadership”, which are more often than not, being very critical of Westphalian notions of state sovereignty. Second, the development and increasing integration of the world political economy acts to link disparate economies. For instance, the formation of supranational state-like structures such as the European Union (EU) also contributes to the over-taking of the Westphalian paradigm. These “super state” structures dangerously serve to undermine the relationship between national forms and sovereignty. Third, there is the rise of cosmopolitan significant international capitalist nodes and provide the terrain where many of the trends associated with globalisation can be manifested. These global cities are spaces from which attempts to articulate a global culture is sited but also to large extent, cut-off from the nation-states in which they are situated. In many ways, however, they have a distinct identity. Fourth, the generalisation of the experience of distant travel (whether it takes the form of labour migration, the compulsory movements of refugees or tourism) has led to a situation in which very large numbers of people are on the move or have moved. In this movement, one can trace the implosion of the Western colonial empires as well as the imperatives of the world economy. And fifth, there is
the availability of modern technologies of transport, communication and labour migration which leads to previously dispersed peoples, once separated from homelands by vast oceans and political barriers, increasingly finding themselves more at ease to maintain a link with their original land. Airplanes, telephones, tape cassettes, camcorders, and mobile job markets reduce distances and facilitate two-way traffic, legal and illegal, between the world's places (Clifford, 1994). It is in the context of these processes of globalisation, that the need to find a vocabulary to describe political/cultural communities that transcend the limits of the Westphalian model becomes necessary. One such community is that of the Muslims.

The Muslim Ummah - a case of Muslim diaspora?

Muslims all over the world are linked to what is known as the Muslim *Ummah* - the *Ummah* being the symbolic link to Islam itself and to other Muslims. The *Ummah* is the community of Allah (God) for Muslims and transcends boundaries, frontiers, nationalities, citizenship, linguistic differences and all other forms of cultural, political, economic or social differences. Theoretically speaking, there are three main factors that point towards the formation of a Muslim *Ummah*. Firstly, there is the assumption or rather assertion of an explicit Muslim subjectivity. This feature is Islam has pervaded in all Muslim communities (Rahman, 1979). Secondly, Islam is heavily represented through the presence of immigrant Muslim communities throughout the developed world. The reason for this fact is two-fold; it is due partly because of migration that has been attended upon decolonisation, but also due to the large percentage of Muslim refugees since the 1980s. Thirdly, like most recent migrants, Muslims have tended to concentrate in urban areas, the latter that happen to be the nodes of the new developing planetary networks (Castells, 1997). The resulting effect of these developments has been to create situations in which Muslims from different traditions converge around commonalities. In turn, this constant juxtaposing of various Muslim populations has the effect of producing the conditions for the articulation of a Muslim Ummah. What is crucial here is that the idea of nationhood in Islam is interpreted by

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25 Diasporic subjects are, thus, distinct versions of modern, transactional, intercultural experience. Thus historicized, diaspora cannot become a master trope or 'figure' for modern, complex, or positional identities crosscut and displayed by race sex, gender, class and culture (Clifford, 1994).

26 The Muslim makes the conscious decision of turning away from everything that is his or hers and supplanting it with the memory of Arab Islam. In this way, the holy lands of Islam: Mecca, Medina, (often the whole of Arabia is regarded as sacred by many Muslims) Jerusalem (known as Al-Quds) and so forth, become the locations of memory instead of the country of which he or she is a citizen. The sacred language of the Muslim is Arabic and though he or she may not communicate in Arabic, the Muslim's language is regarded as being inferior to Arabic. In rejecting their own story, converts become, whether they like it or not, a part of the Arab story. They then develop fantasies about who and what they are (Ebr.-Vally, 2001).
highlighting the problem of integration; i.e. how to include various populations within the boundaries of a nation, while focussing on the problem of their loyalties to an edifice larger than the nation. In other words, Islamism undermines the logic of the nation and at the same time it seeks to transcend the logic of the nation. However, on a conceptual level, the notion of the Ummah is to create a collective, a large united community of believing men and women, much like the idea of nation, but without the physical boundedness that nationhood implies. In other words, the Ummah is a way of transcending national state boundaries and instead linking all Muslims to this symbolic community (Rahman, 1979).

Although Islam can offer a sense of attachment elsewhere, to a different temporality and vision through the concept of the Ummah as the space outside Islamic geographical space has a lesser importance for Muslims, the Ummah cannot be regarded and interpreted as representing a nation (Sayyid, 2003). The main reason for this is that while the nation is at most an enterprise based on an exclusionary universalism, by its boundedness, the idea of the Ummah rejects all such Cartesian limits as its universalism and implicit expansionism is constantly reiterated. Nor is the Muslim Ummah a common marker. In spite of supposedly pious statements from organizations such as the ICO (Islamic Conference Organization), it has been argued many times that Muslims do not necessarily trade with each other, nor do they co-operate with each other about other economic matters. My point here is that the Ummah cannot be conceptualised as a structure arising out of economic integration. The unifying feature of the Ummah does not owe itself to global networks of labour and capital flows, although these flows do exist to a certain extent. These flows are not, however, the factor that helps in suturing the Muslim Ummah. Nor is the Muslim Ummah a common way of life or a linguistic community. There have indeed been arguments that the Ummah could be seen as a collective base around a more or less homogenous elite culture; for instance the Arabic language very often functioned as the lingua franca of the elite. Despite some practices, which are common among Muslims (e.g. all Muslim pray towards the direction of Mecca, and read their prayers in Arabic), it is impossible to conclude that these common features in Muslims’ way of life constitute the Muslim Ummah. In a manner of speaking one can look at the Ummah as a cause for a Muslim diaspora, as all Muslims around the world are linked to that Muslim community through the Ummah. However, in the case of the Muslim experience (which should not be seen as a homogenous experience, unaffected by division and diversity, but that still forms a unity) the idea of the Ummah being ‘the’ symbolic homeland is inadequate. Although it is the case that there are many Muslims living as
minorities throughout the world, the idea of a diaspora demands both a displaced population and a physical and therefore geographical homeland - the point from which the displacement originates. Such a homeland is clearly lacking in the Muslim Ummah case. Moreover, Muslims do not have a place of redemptive return, in spite of the fact that Mecca is the direction that all Muslims across the world turn to when they pray. “The Universalist urge within many Muslim discourses makes it difficult to locate a unitary point of origin, and so there is no homeland, imagined or otherwise” (Sayyid, 2003). Therefore there is no act of displacement. For the Muslim Ummah is not only reducible to displaced population groups but also includes the Muslim population in Muslim countries. It is due to the reasons mentioned above that the notion of diaspora is an incorrect metaphor for describing the Muslim Ummah. Thus, while the Ummah is not a diaspora itself as it transcends territoriality, the Muslim Indian community that came to settle in South Africa is very much a diaspora, as shall be explained in the following section.

The Muslim Indian diaspora in South Africa.

To understand how South African Indian Muslims use religion to conceptualise their identity, we have to analyse the Muslim community from a historical point of view. The first wave of Muslims that came to South Africa was during the late 1800s when Muslim Indonesians immigrated to Cape Town. Today they are known as the Cape Malays. The second wave of Muslims was from India during late 1800s and early 1900s, some time after the Indonesians arrived. On close examination of the entire Indian diaspora, we notice that it falls into two distinct phases. I call them settler and visitor diasporas. The first category refers to all those who were forced to migrate on account of slavery or indentured labour, otherwise known as the ‘British Indians’. Most of the Indians that came to work in sugar cane plantations arrived from Calcutta, Madras and Hyderabad. The second category, which arrived much later in the 1870s, encompasses the voluntary migrations of businessmen and professionals who came to

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27 Identity formation, it is argued throughout this chapter, is a two-way dynamic process in which the presence of the other is an essential component. Talking about ‘Indian’ identity implies also talking about past and present stereotypes. The specific physical features of Indians make them recognizable as such anywhere in the world. This stereotyping is necessary for it allows the non-‘Indian’ as well as the ‘Indian’ to display their likes and dislikes of the other. Within the ‘Indian’ community differences are articulated to allow sub-groups to identify their members and to place other ‘Indians’ into specific groups. These groups may be based on religious, linguistic, or geographical criteria. These principles of differentiation were active within the community during the colonial period and the Apartheid era but, in general, the predominant image of ‘Indians’ was one of a group defined through a supra-identity. The advent of democracy in South Africa and the recognition of diversity became a reason for the ‘Indians’ to claim their specificity. Though the arguments to recognition are situated within the realm of religion, the effect is to consolidate the sub-communities as an integral part of South Africa’s diverse society.
South Africa in search of fortune. Most of them came from the state of Gujarat in India and needless to say, the second category had much more economic capital. Among them were Indian traders from established cities in India wanting to expand their commercial operations in South Africa. Since the latter paid their own fare to South Africa, they were known as 'passenger Indians' because they had no legal and financial obligations to the South African state in this regard (Vahed, 2000).

These two very distinct groups may be defined not just by the causes and patterns of their migration, and the geographical areas from which they migrated, but also by the historical period in which the migrations took place. Furthermore, these two diasporas may also be contrasted by their destinations and class backgrounds, attitude to the mother country, economic status, language of creative expression, market access, and so on. As Mishra (1996) puts it:

"This narrative of diasporic movement is, however, not continuous or seamless as there is a radical break between the older diasporas of classic capitalism and the mid- to late twentieth-century diasporas of advanced capital to the metropolitan centres of the Empire, the New World and the former settler colonies." He calls these two “interlinked, but historically separated diasporas” as the “old ('exclusive') and the new ('border')” diasporas (Mishra, 1996: 422).

I argue that these two diasporas produce two different kinds of migrant communities in the host country. In the case of the older diaspora (those of indenture ancestry), there has been a significant break with the motherland (India). This break, far from being voluntary, but rather enforced by the distances between India and the migrant settlement, the much slower modes of travel of the time, and, above all, the lack of economic means to make frequent journeys, made the older diaspora invariably lose contact with their fellow Indian acquaintances (Ebr.-Vally, 2001). In fact, the labourers who were shipped out rarely had enough money to make the journey back to India; for most, it was a one-way ticket to another land. In other words, the distance, both physical, but more so psychological, was so vast, that the motherland remained frozen in the diasporic imagination as a sort of sacred site or symbol, almost like an idol of memory and imagination. The poverty of the homeland, which caused the diaspora in the first place, was forgotten or overwritten with the feeling that it was home, a place where the present alienation of the diasporic person did not exist. Because a physical return was virtually impossible, an emotional or spiritual renewal was an ongoing necessity. This was done through a process of replication, if not reproduction (Ebr.-Vally, 2001). As Mishra
(1996) puts it, “the old Indian diaspora replicated the space of India and sacralized the stones and rivers of the new lands” (1996: 442). To put it differently, the old diaspora carried with it a sort of “Hindu toolbox” or frame of reference to Indianize its new surroundings:

Their homeland is a series of objects, fragments of narratives that they keep in their heads or in their suitcases. Like hawkers they can reconstitute their lives through the contents of their knapsacks: a Ganapati icon, a dog-eared copy of the Gita or the Quran, an old sari or other deshi outfit, a photograph of a pilgrimage or, in modern times, a videocassette of the latest hit from the home country (Mishra, 1996: 68).

It is also important to note that the old diaspora, which constituted of mainly subaltern and underprivileged classes, hardly produced any literature at all. Theirs was still mostly an oral culture. This oral cultural feature is still very inherent among the Muslims of indenture ancestry living in South Africa today. Due to their close geographical but also class and economic association with mostly Hindu and Tamil Indians dating back from long ago, they have internalised some Hindu and Tamil religious practices and have adapted those to their own interpretation and practice of Islam. Today the Sunni Sufis, which follows the tradition of the Saints, is proof of this religious assimilation and adaptation, a religious trend amongst Durban’s Muslims informed by the Barelwi school, founded in India by Ahmad Raza Khan (1856-1922), of Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh. In South Africa this tradition found expression through Soofie Saheb and his family (Vahed, 2000). The main followers are amongst Urdu-speaking descendants of indentured Muslims and this folk religion is a more populist form of Islam. It involves the public celebration of important occasions such as the birthday of the Prophet, the holding of Mawloods, and the recitation of communal salutations (salaam) during which followers stand as a mark of respect for the Prophet. On the other hand, the new diaspora followed the Deobandi school of thought, which was established in India from the 1860s at Deoband near the Saharanpur in the United Provinces. They focused on ministering to the educational and religious needs of Muslims. Deobandi Ulema in Durban have always been closely aligned to the Gujarati trading class. In this tradition emphasis is placed on the central role of the Ulema in defining the ‘correct’ practice of Islam. Closely allied is the role of the Tabligh Jamaat, founded in India by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas (1885-1994). The focus of this movement is on ‘an unquestioning loyalty to a literal interpretation of Prophetic authority. Followers of the Jamaat go from mosque to mosque and house to house to preach a ‘purified’ form of Islam. The movement first made inroads in South Africa in the early 1960s amongst Gujarati traders.
One of the major factors that differentiated the indentured labourers and the passenger Indians was the fact that the passenger Indians kept a regular and lively correspondence with their Indian counterparts living in India. This was a result of two factors; firstly the passenger Indians had the financial means to post letters, or travel back to India for visiting their families and friends, unlike the indentured labourers who were not allowed to leave South Africa due to contractual obligations and lack of money; secondly the passenger Indians were educated and consequently had the cultural capital that allowed them to keep contact (Ebr.-Vally, 2001). Unsurprisingly enough, this supposedly superior characteristic of the passenger Indians allowed them to predominate over the other Muslim Indian migrants. The passenger Indians further differed from their indentured counterparts by the way they formed and organised sub-communities. Unlike indentured labourers who were forced to compromise on religious and social values due to their restricted quarters, which in turn, forced Muslims, Hindus and Tamils to co-habit close to each other, the passenger Indians could use their values to form different sub-communities, much like is the case in Indian Gujarati social structure (Vahed, 2000). The obvious purpose of this exercise was to re-create the social and religious structures with which they were familiar. In this way, people from the same villages in Gujarat could re-group together and speak their common language in an attempt to re-establish the systems of network that pervaded in India and stratify social classes. For example the indentured Indians spoke Urdu, which was regarded as inferior by the passenger Indians, whereas the latter group spoke Gujarati, which was seen to be more refined. This also functioned as a means of determining the status of a family in terms of lineage. An important result of this stratification was to openly differentiate between languages spoken by Muslim Indians in order to recognize which were/are of indentured origin and who of passenger Indian origin.

An interesting phenomenon is that the Gujarati language acquired a different status from that in India. Whereas, in India, Gujarati is a means of communication, in South Africa it was and is still viewed as the language of Hindus. This is largely due to the high literacy rate of Gujarati prevalent amongst the Hindus who originated from the State of Gujarat. As a result, Indian Muslims who came from Gujarat tend to associate the language with Hinduism. They therefore send their children to madrasahs, or Islamic schools, where their children learn about the precepts of Islam but also learn Arabic. Strangely enough, the curriculum is such that children learn about Islamic geographic spaces and not those of India, once again highlighting the importance of the Ummah in Islamic teachings.
Another fascinating phenomenon is that Indians in South Africa were regarded with contempt by the Blacks and Whites alike, where proficiency in English and/or Afrikaans improved their levels of adaptation. Their survival in South Africa did not depend on how well they spoke their own vernaculars, but on how proficient they became in some of the South African languages. Thus the quasi-disappearance of the vernacular languages impacted not only on the image and memory they retained of India but also on the form that Islam would take, more so amongst the passenger Indians (Ebr.-Vally, 2001). The fading of Indian in their memories was also seen as the purging of their 'Hinduness', or 'Indianness, in their practice of Islam. Although this in contradiction to the level with which Indian Muslims maintain the caste system, their religion, Islam, as an identity marker is a trope that allows us to comprehend how they have modified their identity to construct a distance between them and India, and in so doing implant themselves more firmly in South Africa. Though, as pointed out earlier, Islam being an essentially egalitarian and equalising religion, rejecting the caste system, forms of social stratification resembling the caste system still pervade among the Indian Muslims in Natal-Natal to this day. The most striking example was/is the arranging of marriages that is based in many ways, on kinship ties from India. In spite of strongly denying the presence of a social class system, Muslims acknowledge that marriages are often done according to the biradari (fraternity), the kutum (joint household), as well as specific marital rituals practiced by well defined groups in South Africa. This transpires clearly when for example, Sunni Sufis would read the salaam (praise of the Prophet) in jamaat (congregations), whereas the Tabliquis condemn that practice as being haraam (un-islamic), thus showing how converts to Islam in India transformed and Islamified erstwhile Hindu practices.

Moreover the manner in which the new diaspora imagines India is consequently to be comprehended in terms of the logic of this dominant culture, of which it is an ambivalent or unwilling part. While the old diaspora was cut off from the motherland, the new diaspora has unprecedented access to it by virtue of its privileged Non-Resident Indian status. What transpires then is a narrative logic of continuous incorporation and appropriation, which reinforces the self-validating logic of the new diaspora. Not forced to leave the motherland, these traders have chosen to relocate themselves in the metropolitan centres chiefly for economic gains. Some like Sayyid (2003) argue that choice of voluntary detachment from Indian breeds a certain anxiety, if not guilt towards the homeland. In the international academic and literary marketplace there is, and has always been, a niche market for fictional representations of India. Whereas English, European and American writers previously
occupied this Anglo-Indian slot, the Indians have now moved in. If the older indentured somewhat subordinate culture of the old diaspora wants to be recognized in the same way, it will have to reinvent itself in the image of the dominant culture of the metropolis. As Rushdie (1991) argues:

Diasporic representations of India can be harmful and misleading in at least two related ways. First, they might end up usurping the space, which native self-representations are striving to find in the international literary market place. Secondly, they may contribute to a continuing “colonization” of the Indian psyche by pandering to Western market-tastes, which prefer to see India in a negative light. Both these dangers arise not necessarily from a design on the part of the expatriates to “sell” India, though the latter possibility cannot be dismissed too easily. Rather, they are born out of the peculiar cultural politics of the diaspora (Rushdie, 1991: 19).

Therefore, in an attempt to avoid reductionism, it is vital to analyse and consider the Muslim community in South Africa in terms of its subgroups. The selected parameters that illustrate mutations and beliefs and practices that subgroups use to consolidate and propagate their Islam points to the fact the Muslims community is not a homogenous entity. These beliefs and practices are meaningful to members of a subgroup as well as to the larger Islamic community. For, in such instances, the beliefs and practices act as ‘markets of mutual recognition that determine the cohesion of the subgroup’ (Ebr.-Vally, 2001) as well as informing their daily religious behaviour. In doing this, we can understand how Indian Muslims make use of religion as their fundamental identity parameter to negotiate their space in South Africa. The ‘new’ space negotiated through the prism of Islam can become either inclusive or exclusive; in other words only Muslims can be members.

Yet, as in other religions, the implementation of Islam in specific places (geographies) with specific cultural norms, necessitates that Islam is practised in tandem with a specific cultural identity28 (Rafudeen, 2002) in spite of a supposed aversion of cultural characteristics that are considered as being ‘un-islamic’ (related to beliefs that human-made cultures taints the practice of ‘true’ Islam). Culture, is defined by Hall (1995) as meaning “the systems of shared meanings which people who belong to the same community, group, or nation use to help them

28 Hall’s theory of identity to explore the ways in which the concept of identity “raises fundamental questions about how individuals fit into the community and the social world and how identity can be seen as the interface between subjective positions and social and cultural situations” (Hall 1996). Under apartheid Muslims had ‘hybrid’ identities that were situationally specific. Since 1994, Durban Muslims have been repositioning themselves, in the context of an African-ruled democratic South Africa (Vahed 2000). Using Hall’s notion of symbolic marking, that is, the way people make sense of social relations and practices through inclusion and exclusion, I aim to explore the underlying dynamics that inform Muslim identity in gated communities.
make sense of the world” (Hall, 1995:176). Therefore, group identities of those who keep a balance between culture, nationality and Islam need not always be negative (Rahman, 1979; Ebr.-Vally: 2001b). For instance, as Rafudeen (2002) explores, culture was the major determinant that gave the Indian group in South Africa a sense of belonging and commonality especially during the apartheid era, which was often needed to uphold one’s individual identity. Within the confined spaces allocated to Indians (Hindus and Muslims), the apartheid system caused Indian Muslims to identify more with their Indian cultural markers, over and above their Islamic identities, due to the need to identity a specific racial group. With the advent of globalisation and identities of resistance, the dynamics of identity formation have undergone significant paradigmatic changes amongst the South African Indian Muslims.

**Muslim Diaspora in Durban**

Today Durban is the most cosmopolitan city in South Africa in racial and cultural terms. Islam is a minority religion in contemporary South Africa. However Muslims are far more conspicuous and have a much more prolific profile than their numbers suggest. This is partly due to the fact that large mosques dominate the skyline of every major South African city, while men adorning traditional Arab dress and Muslim women in hijab (veil) are found everywhere. In 2000, it was estimated that there were 79,630 Muslims in the Greater Durban area. Most are third and fourth generation. Although Indian Muslims are removed to the migration experience to a large extent (Statistics show that 93% consider English as their first language) (Vahed, 2000), a large proportion of them still use their Indian languages at home. An examination of their second language reveals that around 59% regard Urdu as their second language, 28% Gujarati and Memon, and the rest declare Arabic, Telegu, Hindi, Tamil, Koknee, Afrikaans or English as their second language. These language distinctions coincide with class divisions. Table 1. illustrates the percentage distribution of Gujarati- and Urdu-speaking Muslims in Durban by monthly income in year 1996.

**Table 1. Percent distribution of Gujarati- and Urdu-speaking Muslims in Durban by monthly income, 1996**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Income</th>
<th>Urdu-speaking</th>
<th>Gujarati-speaking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R 6000 +</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R 2500-5900</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R Less than 2500</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An important step in reconstructing religious life among the Muslim community was the building of mosques. Mosques became the centre of Muslim worship and congregational prayer and became the means to build community spirit (Vahed, 2000). The first mosque was built in Grey Street in 1881 by the Indian traders Aboobakr Jhavery and Hajee Mahomed Dada and is today the largest mosque in the southern hemisphere. There are approximately 80 mosques in Durban, which are linked formally or informally into either the Deobandi or Barelwi networks. As the differences in these networks suggest, linguistic, regional, social class and socio-economic status formed an inevitable part of Muslim identity as they generated intrinsic differences in belief and practice. It is therefore incorrect to speak of a Muslim community; it is more appropriate to speak of ‘communities’ in the plural. Differences were not so much in what Muslims believed in but how they practiced.

Furthermore, prior to 1994, Indian Muslims in Durban were officially classified as ‘Asian Indian’ (Vahed, 2000). Merchants and indentured Indians were drawn together because the government promoted a pattern of stratification in which race shaped individual and communal life experiences. This neutralized the impact of class and religion. Politically, this forced a ‘made in Natal’ consciousness and consolidated the ‘Indian community’. Festivals and rituals were important in consolidating religion. They were very visible markers of identity, distancing Indians from Africans and whites and strengthening the links between individuals and the ‘community’. Many Hindus also participated in some of those rituals, such as the festival of Muharram. The joint participation of Hindus and Muslims abridged disparities between them and led them to focus on their common origins, a common history and a common (Indian) identity, so much so that Muslims and Hindus celebrated the independence of India together, as characteristic of diasporic communities (Vahed, 2000).

**The Globalisation Discourse**

Globalisation is conceived by Soja (2000) as:

"The compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole, bringing with it the deepening and widening of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away and vice versa". (2000)

Much of the concept of diaspora can be linked to the local community I am analysing. Globalisation and its accompanying dichotomies of being a carrier of both opportunities and
complexities (Castells, 1996) especially on the socio-cultural arena, plays an important role in (re) shaping identities of global citizens. Within the age of globalisation, the domination of nature by culture is at its height (Castells, 1996). The metaphor of living in the global village results not only in questioning the validity of geography as a discipline itself, but also in an inevitable acceleration of life, experienced in particular in the urban areas, where the process of ‘de-traditionalization’, as elucidated by McLuhan (in Leyshon, 1995: 32), dominates in terms of “rolling social life away from fixities of tradition”. Indeed, it is argued that we have entered an era of global capitalism that is marked by a new international division of labour in which industrial production/urbanism has become more widely distributed over the inhabited world than ever before (Soja, 2000). The rising status of the NICs (newly industrialized countries) and the creation of new industrial spaces which had previously never undergone major significant industrialization (for example, Silicon Valley), combined with the de-industrialization of many old Fordist manufacturing regions, are interpreted as embodying the emergence of a new and restructured global space economy. Some of the reasons for this change in the new Age of Globalism are the accelerated movement of people, goods, services, and information across national borders and the growth of global markets for labour and globally networked commodities, the space-spanning and networking effects of the telecommunications and information revolution and, the concentration of political and economic power in a re-ordered hierarchy of global cities acting as command posts for controlling the changing financial operations of the world economy (Soja, 2000).

Each of these processes of change has provided a focal point in studying the geopolitical economy of globalisation and is the subject of a large and growing literature. To explain the geopolitical economy of globalisation, one has to consider two encompassing categories; the globalisation of capital and the globalisation of labour. The globalisation of capital is usually measured by indicators such as foreign direct investment, the growth of foreign investment in the domestic economy, the increasing importance of import and export trade, and the

29 It is precisely this ordered configuration of international relations, which has lasted in relatively stable forms since the late 19th century, that is currently being substantially restructured in what some have called an era of flexible accumulation and “disorganized” capitalism. While the commercial and financial circuits of capital are playing a vital role in this restructuring, it is the expanding geographical scope of productive industrial capital that most distinguishes the present era of globalization. Formerly confined to the core industrial countries, urban-based industrial capitalist production has spread to many more parts of the world that ever before, exemplified most directly in the growing list of NICs. This has been associated with a breakdown of the old international (or interstate) capitalist world economy and its distinctive spatial (or territorial) divisions of labor based primarily on nation-states; and its reconfigurations as an intensified global or transnational capitalist economy with a “new world order” of networked flows and linkages that are no longer as confined by national boundaries as they were in the past (see Soja, 2000).
intensification of other “flows (of money, jobs, services, and workers) across national borders. When viewed from a broader perspective, the globalisation of capital has traditionally been studied with respect to three interlocking circuits of capital flow: commercial trade, financial investment, and industrial production. As suggested earlier, it is the expansion, diffusion, and networking of industrial capital and industrial urbanism on a global scale that can be seen as the most distinctive feature of the current phase of globalisation (Soja, 2000). It is precisely the latter occurrence that concerns most geopolitical economists.\(^{30}\)

The other side of global capitalism is defined by the globalisation of labour. Capital is more flexible and able to ‘move’ more than labour, the latter remaining linked to national localized labour markets. However, the globalisation of production has induced by its very nature, an increased globalisation of labour, and larger-scale migrations of people towards the major globalised nodal cityscapes of the world. As a result, the past thirty years has witnessed an increasing volume of migration across national boundaries, including both voluntary and involuntary migration. Moreover, the nature of this migration has involved significant numbers of people from more countries and cultures than ever before, thereby populating global cities with what Appadurai (1996) calls ethnoscapes. This process has led to the production of a truly global proletariat, but one that remains highly fragmented, difficult to organize, and not yet conscious of its potential global power (Soja; 2000). However, this intensified migration of people is geographically haphazardly developed in its impact and intensity, as well as open to many different interpretations of its causes and consequences. Global flows of capital investment, labour migration, information, and technological innovation are reshaping city space and local capital-labour relations, creating new industrial spaces, a reshuffling of class identities, different urban divisions of labour, and a re-polarized and re-fragmented pattern of social and spatial stratification (Soja, 2000).

\(^{30}\) The general academic and policy discourse, however, has focused more heavily on either the commercial circuit, viewing globalization primarily in terms of the growth and repatterning of world trade; or the technology-led new phase of transnational financial integration and electronic networking that is reshaping the flow of money, credit, and investment in what some observers describe as an increasingly borderless world. On can crudely categorize the discourse on the globalization of capital according to which of these 3 emphases is given the greatest priority: Production, Trade, or Finance (Soja, 2000).
Appadurai (1996) outlines a basic framework to explore “global cultural processes” based on five interrelated cultural-economic landscapes, which he also calls ‘imagined worlds’. “The suffix scape”, he writes, “allows us to point to the fluid, irregular shapes of these landscapes, shapes that characterize international capital as deeply as they do international clothing styles” (1996: 33). Ethnoscapes, his primary interest, are formed by global flows of people (tourists, refugees and immigrants such as the Muslim Indians), now intensified to an unparalleled level of scale and scope both in material terms and in the global imaginary. Appadurai’s (1996) trans-national anthropological study of ‘scapes’ and flows, characterizes the advent of a potent postcolonial cultural perspective that reflects more on the disruptive, conflict-filled heterogeneity of this disordered post-modern world than on the homogenizing effects of global interdependence and consciousness. The globalisation discourse is seen not simply from the dialectic of homogenization-heterogenization but around what is expressed as multiple scales of hybridity, the places and people who are most involved in the tensions and cultural manifestations arising from what Appadurai (1996) terms as cultural “glocalization” or trans-nationalism. Two of these scales feature most notably in the post-colonial critiques: the nation-state and nationalism on the one hand, and the production of locality and local identity on the other, but it is the interaction and hybridisation across many different scales, from the most global to the most local and individualized, that is of primary importance as well as the interplay between deterritorialization and reterritorialization.

This recipe suggests the complex simultaneity of two intermingled processes of restructuring. One the one hand, deterritorialization, involving the collapse of Fordist means of production and traditional spatial divisions of labour, and established patterns of real-and-imagined cultural and spatial identity at every scale from the local to the global, and one the other hand, reterritorialization, being the critical response to globalisation and post-fordist restructuring,
generating new efforts by individuals sectors, cultures and nations, to reshape their territorial behaviour, their fundamental spatiality and lived spaces, as a means of resisting and/or adapting to the contemporary condition (Appadurai, 1996).

**Space and the Identity discourse**

As argued above, globalisation refers to social, economic, cultural, and demographic processes that occur within nations but also transcend them, such that attention limited to local processes, identities, and units of analysis yields incomplete understanding of the local” (Kearney, 1995: 548). In other words, globalisation is a process whereby the intensification of worldwide social relations helps to link far-away localities so much so that local activities are shaped and influenced by events occurring many miles away and vice versa (Kearney, 1995). Globalisation, being a process generated through migration, commerce, communication technologies, finance, tourism, etc. leads to a restructuring of the bipolar metaphor of space and time of modern worldview. The spatial correlate of this time has metropolitan centres and peripheral sites linked together by lines of communication. As a result, the process of globalisation involves a shift from two-dimensional Euclidian space with its centres and peripheries and sharp boundaries, to a multidimensional global space with unrestrained, often sporadic and interpenetrating sub-spaces (Kearney, 1995). As a result of this virtual proximity of centres and peripheries, local cultures are becoming increasingly deterritorialized. Not only does deterritorialization blur any notion of bounded cultures, but so does the constantly increasing volume and velocity of global dissemination of information, images, and simulacra that is a diffusion of cultural traits gone wild, and creating a nightmare for contemporary cross-cultural correlational studies. Such flows require a reconsideration of presumably bounded culture areas (Kearney, 1995)

Spatiality is a key concept in the present context of globalisation. Knowing where one is placed is fundamental to an understanding of self and it is therefore relevant to explore the ways in which space is able to inform identity. Spatiality may in theory bear a huge

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33 Identity matters, both in terms of social and political concerns within the contemporary world and within academic discourses where identity has been seen as conceptually important in offering explanations of social and cultural changes. The following chapters will explore the ways in which the concept of identity raises fundamental questions about how individuals fit into the community and the social world and how identity can be seen as the interface between subjective and social and cultural situations. Identity gives us an idea of who we are and how we relate to others and to the world in which we live. Identity marks the ways in which we are the same as others who share that position, and the ways in which we are different from those who do not. Often, identity is most clearly defined by difference that is by what it is not. Identities may be marked by polarization,
influence on the identity of groups or individuals. Dixon & Durrheim (2000) have recently explored how the environmental concept of ‘place-identity’ may be framed within a critical discursive approach. Such an approach focuses particularly on the collective practices through which specific place identities are framed, reproduced and modified, in addition to how constructions of place are oriented to the performance of social actions (blaming, justifying, excusing, excluding, etc) (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000). One of the features that emerges in recent studies of human geography are non-essentialist and constantly evolving concepts of culture and identity, and how the two usually combine to impact upon individuals and groups in society (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992; Clifford, 1994). In the case of Islam, however, group/community identity, as well as a preference of religion over culture and nationality is viewed as the ideal over and above individual and situated identities as discussed earlier (Vahed, 2001).

Resistance identities

Drawing from the writings of Pile & Keith (1997: 14), a series of resistance strategies can be drawn through which people in the contemporary world express themselves, ranging from ear-splitting music and following outrageous fashions, from sit-ins to outings, all of which provide the individual the possibility to change things through finding their own ways to ‘struggle’, and avoid the forces in power that are seen as oppressive. According to Castells (1997), resistance identities arise from defensive reactions to three main trends, namely reaction against globalisation (which erodes the sense of control and autonomy of the marginalized), secondly against networking and flexibility which blur social relationships, and thirdly against the crisis of the patriarchal family which forms the basis of many societies worldwide but which is in rapid transition. Consequently, following Castells’ logic, it is unsurprising that “these defensive reactions become the sources of meaning and identity by constructing new cultural codes out of historical materials” (Castells, 1997: 66). Due to the fact that the more intangible flows and the virtual realities of the Information Age encapsulated within the network society is beyond the mastering of the marginalized, resistance finds better breeding grounds in the space of physical places, or what Castells (1997) calls ‘reverse information flows’.

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for example in the most extreme forms of national or ethnic conflict, and by the marking of inclusion or exclusion – insiders and outsiders, ‘us’ and ‘them’.
As argued earlier, the construction and establishment of identity involves the process of individuation, as the individual is engaged in a private process of finding him/herself, as opposed to accepting societal identity roles. Out of three types of identity formations proposed by Castells (1997) namely; ‘legitimising identity’, ‘resistance identity’, ‘project identity’, resistance identity is seemingly most relevant for Indian Muslim identities in Durban. Contrary to legitimising identities, which generate a civil society in the form of organizations, institutions and social actors that rationalizes the sources of societal power relations through consent, ‘resistance identity’ is mainly concerned with the formation of ‘cultural communes’ or communities of resistance. Inscribed within identities of resistance, lie the questions of spatiality and the politics of lived spaces (Pile & Keith, 1996: 27). In other words, struggles that occur regarding issues of identity formation and political claims making, involve clear identified spatialities of struggle. This is in turn closely linked with one of the most important concepts within cultural geography; the sense of place that informs the ‘rootedness’ of identities (Rose, 1995). Identification with or against certain places and spaces on varying levels (local, national or global) is said to involve human emotions and memories but also politics and representation as social interactions and power relations define as individual’s sense of place. The same is true when it comes to the human placedness of ‘cultures’ because they are socially constructed and imagined (Hall, 1995). Despite the localization of identities, it has been argued that in an age of globalisation where geography is being questioned, the trend is increasingly towards both the virtual and physical erosion of boundaries. Thus the ‘rootedness’ and the ‘placedness’ of identities (especially communal) is the subject of heated debate among scholars (Rose, 1995).

The politics of identity is consequently invariably linked with the politics of place and space, as with the geography of location and territorialization. Resistance involves the spatialities of location and boundaries, the process of movement from one place to another. What Robins (cited in Massay, 1995: 79) calls a ‘geography of rejection’ may entail a purification process, that is social groups desiring the maintenance of their exclusive and purified identities in space as a defensive strategy. This is precisely the space where the politics of identity is said to be fertile whereby the processes of claiming power through different sense of place is made, and as the insider-outsider dichotomy is played by different social groupings through the process of ‘othering’ (Rose, 1995). Scholars thus argue for a contextual understanding of resistance, as not always situated and emanating physically through spatial practices or places, but also through emotions or experiences often termed as ‘power’ such a desire, anger,
happiness, fear and dreaming. In advocating geographies of resistance from this perspective whereby resistance involves spatialities that lie beyond ‘power’ in alternative grounds, Keith & Pile (1996) claim that tactics of resistance are inscribed into spaces that are only partly controlled by the powerful. This is in turn means that while the spaces of resistance are dislocated from the spaces of the powerful, resistance seeks to recreate new meanings out of imposed meanings and to “re-work” and divert space to other ends” (Keith & Pile, 1996: 16). Keith and Pile’s use of the highly dynamic concept ‘psychic resistance’ is offered as another type of resistance, expressed out of sense of threat to one’s identity and thereby through feelings of fear, desire, and nostalgia amongst others.

We have seen how identity and location are inseparable: knowing oneself is an exercise in mapping where one stands. Consequently, it is fair to suggest that spatialities, especially post-modern spatialities, have produced landscapes that are loaded with ethical, epistemological and aestheticized meanings. An articulation of identity is only momentarily complete, as it is always partly constituted by the forces that oppose it (the constitutive outside), always contingent upon surviving the contradictions that it subsumes (forces of dislocation). In such a malleable world of identity formation, subjects are articulated through “moments of closure that create subjects as surfaces of inscription, mythical and metaphoric, invariably incomplete” (Keith & Pile, 1996). Thus, identities and their conditions of existence are inseparable. Identity cannot exist outside of its context. “Identity depends on conditions of existence which are contingent, its relationship with them is absolutely necessary” (1996:20). It is crucial to understand that identity is always an incomplete process. Sometimes, while trying to make sense of a particular moment or a particular place (synchronic analysis), this process is stopped to reveal an identity, just like capturing a photograph of a racehorse at full gallop. While the photograph may be a ‘true’ representation of a particular moment by its frozen nature, it does not reveal the full identity of that horse as the photograph represents a momentary stop in this gallop, simultaneously real and unreal, it is a moment in time that has been captured and cannot be interpreted as being an accurate representation of the horse or that moment. On a more technical level, synchronic analysis is necessarily a process of sometimes justifiable misrepresentation (Keith & Pile, 1996). This is why identity is always incomplete, always subsumes a lack, and perhaps is more readily understood as a process rather than an outcome. Identity should always be a process, never an artefact.
The post-modern position is that identities, which provide individuals with concrete spatial locations as social individuals, are fluid and changing. According to Hall (2000), identities are constantly being negotiated in the ‘interaction’ between individual and society. The inner core of an individual (the real me) is adapted in ‘dialogue with the cultural worlds outside and the identities which they offer’ (2000). Consequently, identity becomes moveable: formed and transformed constantly in relation to the ways we are represented or addresses in the cultural systems that surround us. As far as South Africa is concerned;

“There is no fundamental identity that any South African clings to in common with all, or even most other South Africans. South Africans have multiple identities in common contexts (e.g. political party) and common identities in multiple contexts...a Muslim, may span many religious, political, social and cultural contexts and thus link them together into a social universe. These identities, then, can be said to be multiple and crosscutting in that each overlaps a range of contexts, or a common context or institution may contain many identities within it”. (Thorton, 1996: 150-151).

The people living in Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest epitomize an Indian diaspora, which has maintained some aspects of its homeland culture but which has also joined the global capitalist marathon by advocating the existence of social and class disparities between themselves and the ‘others’. By using the concepts of globalisation and identity formation, I analyse the markers that inform the identities of the people living in Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest, while taking to account their contribution in the re-shaping of the urban pattern of the city of Durban through their decision to uphold and move in suburban-gated neighbourhoods.
I tap my feet impatiently on the pavement as I wait for the bus that goes to Umhlanga. The bus is 15 minutes late. I am going to Umhlanga for the first time. Beside me, stands a tall white girl, looking extremely lost and flustered. I hesitate a brief moment, I have never been one for talking to strangers but I smile all the same. She tells me that she has a job interview in Gateway and sighs in relief when I tell her that I’m waiting for the same bus. She says: “Oh thank goodness, it’s my first time going on my own to Umhlanga and I am totally lost”, and immediately moves away from me. Her reaction makes me smile internally; I had experienced the same relief a week earlier when catching the mini taxi to Umgeni to renew my study permit. I had met this black woman, asked her for directions, and then quickly withdrew to establish my differential space. Ethnocentric fear is entrenched to such a large extent in South Africa that it is practically impossible not to see it. But then I had withdrawn because I wanted to avoid any familiarity between the black stranger who was obviously of a lower social class than I was and who I wasn’t sure I could trust.

Such is my first field note entry.

I watch the scenery from my window seat in the bus. As we enter Umhlanga, I see a golf course, one that is beautifully mowed and maintained. Unsurprisingly, the players are all white. The houses gradually become bigger and bigger. I am nervous – this whole area is so well kept and laid out... neat – so neat like I have never seen before. The bus occasionally stops to pick up passengers, a couple of young yuppie white passengers get into the bus; to my pleasure and surprise, the surfer-looking white lad greets a black mama sitting next to him in Zulu... a smile. Could it be that the younger generation is less ethnocentric that the older generation? We pass by “Our lady of Fathima Government School”. The name Fathima is like a relief... a sort of instant recognition.... A feeling of warmth washes over me... there is no doubt that I have found some kind of connection with this Muslim name.

I worry about not being properly dressed to meet my host, I look down at my shoes, old unfeminine black shoes.... the same shoes that I wear everyday to go to campus because they’re comfortable. I wonder whether I should not have dressed differently – maybe in a more formal way. This is silly.... and I feel silly...for being so self-conscious.

We reach a valley-like area populated by green-roofed houses, pretty and ornately designed. This is obviously not a squatter camp urban planning... I even come across a mini gated condominium. Somerset Park, I cannot help myself from marvelling at the beauty of the landscape of that community – sort of like the gated area I had in my imagination.... I wonder what it would be like to live like this.... Ten minutes later, I jump out of the bus and go to meet my first host. Bilkis.
Introduction

Understanding how Muslim residents make sense of living inside gated communities requires connecting the experiential and psychological levels of explanation with a critical analysis of society. Interviews and participant observation provide data on individuals, families, neighbourhoods, while comparative studies, theoretical treatises, and reviews of advertisements, television and radio transcripts, and newspaper reports generate a broader view of the societal impact. Bringing these levels together without losing the complex reality of individual experience can be accomplished by examining how social and political forces — through ideology and practice — are manifest in everyday behaviour and conversations. Another difficulty is portraying myself as an active participant in the creation of this work. Often, the author is presented as an uninvolved, anonymous observer without gender, class, tastes, or preferences. In critical analysis as well as in ethnography the author is sometimes obscured, as if he/she were not the narrative’s producer, interpreter or guide. I address these concerns by using three narrative voices — a personal voice, the voices of the interviewees, and a professional voice — to present residents’ lives, motivations and concerns. Through my eyes, thoughts, academic musings, and interpretations, the reader learns about my subject community. By interposing memoir and interviews, I elucidate the interconnection between the experience of me and my subject.

Due to the nature of the methodology used, results rely to a large extent on material, conversations, and observations as they were presented to me. For this reason, information gathered from women in Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest does not follow identical formats nor constitutes an equal quantity for all issues examined. I hope that respect for each research partner’s opinion is conveyed, although it should be remembered that all data has been either consciously or subconsciously been submitted to my own reasoning and theoretical framework. I will examine these instances where possible. The opinions expressed by research partners are in the present tense to convey the immediacy of the field even though the data collected has a definite historical specificity, as the notion of changing circumstances and relations in identity construction is central to this research work. The oral expressions recorded here, however, are equal if not more valuable than the literary texts, which are cited in the present tense. First names are used (instead of surnames) for research partners to avoid repetition because several interviewees have the same surname. I begin this chapter with my own personal field note. I then examine the evidence and explore the conflicts — conscious and unconscious — in what is said, as well as in what is left unsaid. I am interested particularly
in how political and economic perspectives illuminate the psychological, and how personal experience sheds light on the social.

**Heterotopia - The Case of Umhlanga Halls**

As has been previously established, the difference between space and place are that ‘places’ are to be understood as spaces that have become imprecated with social values, meanings and identity, whereas space is engaged in as principally as an element of discourse. In other words, space is used to refer to the surrounding environment that people inhabit. Places, however, refers to socially constructed or manipulated spaces that have been/are deliberately politicised, culturally relative and historically specific to match the needs of people inhabiting those meaningful spaces.

Ellin (1997) argues that although post-modern architecture and urbanism are very diverse, they can be understood simply as “a coherence...based on the heterogeneous substance and nature of modern society” (1997: 113). In other words, post-modern urbanism can be conceptualised as a re-action against modernism and its images of perfection and utopia (Giddens, 1990). It becomes a specific approach to urban design in a specific period of time: Furthermore, Ellin (1997) provides us with a summary of the characteristics of post-modern urbanism: historicism (reaction to modernism’s break with the past), contextualism (character of peace and identity), use of symbolism, apoliticism, anti-autocratic, art as a commodity, traditional building and use of familiar elements. In short, whereas in modern design “form follows function”, in post-modern design, “form follows fiction, fear, finesse and finance” (1997:133). In this sense, the phenomenon of gated communities in South Africa are a typical example of this post-modern feature as they are the creation of secured and peaceful spaces (form follows fear) with a distinctive identity and style (form follows fiction and finesse) to ensure a specific lifestyle and provide social and economic control. This is done through the privatisation of public space, services and governance (form follows finance) (Landman, 2002). As a result of these post-modern urbanist interventions, such as the emergence of gated communities, there has been a growing decline of public space and desire to control one’s space, whereby the notion of space is now becoming increasingly transformed in a compartmentalized way (Ellin, 1997). It is evident from the discussion of the privatisation of space, manifested through various forms of gated communities, often leads to the privatisation of local control as well. This is often enforced by fortification and access control.
The autonomy, which the Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest so outwardly strive to achieve, is indicated by the fact that these areas of development maintain not only their own bylaws, but also the ‘architectural mandate’ over their own areas to a very large degree (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2001). Unlike the large majority of building projects that are spread across the city of Durban, the eThekwini city council has only limited powers of intervention within such gated community complexes (2001). An obvious sign of the gated community’s autonomy is given in its lack of engagement with national architectural and city-planning debates on how best to restructure South African cities in ways that will facilitate the desegregation, racial integration and overall urban renewal of cities (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2001).

The main priority of the gated community developers is to build on the ever more northerly outskirts of Durban, beyond the traditional limits of the city, to escape by as far as possible the feared urban centre. The agenda of the gated community developers is the creation of severe and inviolable security, where one’s right to property and personal privacy is sacred. The zeal of the attempt to fortify against the threat of crime has meant that gated community developers have placed an inordinate emphasis on familial and personal security, on efficient and safe-proof crime prevention. In a sense, these collaborations of local governance and building industry innovation have thus far outstripped any contribution by the state in respect of successful crime prevention (Kruger et al., 1997).

Furthermore, the guards who are employed to uphold security measures are typically well-trained and are often attired in para-military garb, prepared to strike in defence of the gated community space and to rebuff crime in an ‘armed response’ capacity. In line of this, it is no coincidence that private security personnel in South Africa now outnumber the police by two to one (Bremner, 1999). The separation of the gated community from the rest of the South African suburban/urban society is also a ‘concrete’ question of barred-off roads, impassable walls, electrified fences, booms and razor wire. This is a situation whereby suburban fortification has become so highly desirable that it has faded and fused into fantasy and pastiche (Bremner, 1999). The gated community is reminiscent of the game lodge, or the theme park, in its attempt to get ‘closer to nature’ and by virtue of its electrified fences and patrolling guards - in the way it attempts to ensure that an inner core of cleared space is sealed off from the country at large (Ndebele, 1999). The stark contradictions of nature against sophisticated surveillance technology, of safety despite urban detachment manifests very clearly in Umhlanga Manors. Security, manufactured and computerised to the utmost degree,
becomes synonymous with this ‘natural environment’, and along with it, a pre-requisite for peaceful living (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2001).

Analysing the data
Umhlanga is located some twenty kilometres north of the city of Durban, in the KwaZulu-Natal province in South Africa. Umhlanga, known for its beautiful scenery, protected natural environment, upper class citizenship, and economically stable government – has become not only an eco-tourism scene but also a desirable retirement for high-income Durbanites, and a highly sought-after ‘safe’ area in which higher-middle class people can buy property and be away from the city centre. Located in central Umhlanga, Umhlanga Halls is a gated condominium made up of large single detached houses, built on land that was previously owned by Tongaat-Hulette. A security guard controls the entrance gate and does not allow any unannounced visitors to go in without thoroughly scrutinizing them carefully. Houses are situated along a winding thoroughfare with dead-end streets branching off, leading to groups of houses clustered quite close together on small lots. The whole community includes approximately seventy houses. The houses are attractively neat, green-roofed with perfectly mowed lawns in front of each house and closely aligned to one another.
Meeting Bilkis

I am meeting Bilkis for the first time. She meets me in Gateway, a very high-flying shopping centre. She is an attractive thirty-something woman, wearing khaki pants, t-shirt and her head of covered by a scarf. I hop into her large white BMW. She smiles and says hello. She is not what I expected at all. We start chatting right away and I instantly feel comfortable around her. She is articulate and gets right to the point. We talk about her reasons for moving to Umhlanga - she tells me she was located in La Mercy prior to 1994, and emphasizes that La Mercy was the only Indian community living near the beach during the apartheid era. She also points out that the Indians of La Mercy had privileges of use of the beach.

“I moved to Umhlanga because it was more convenient for my children, for school purposes. I never sent my children to the schools in La Mercy because the black kids started coming in and it became too rowdy and I preferred to send them to Umhlanga where I knew the schools were better and less mixed. When I was living in La Mercy, I had to drive some ten to fifteen minutes every morning to drop them, so now it’s just around the corner and much safer too”.

I wonder about the real reasons for which she moved. Could it be the fear of inter-racial mix? Despite the demise of Apartheid, it is quite common to find ethnocentric attitudes still prevailing among people in South Africa. People still define themselves according to race in contemporary South Africa. Somehow I have always been torn between trying to explain to my friends that being wary of black people does not help much in bringing about the ‘rainbow’ nation that is very much talked about, and, trying to overcome my own fears, fears that are largely based on stereotypes.

“I was attacked twice. My car was stopped and I was robbed...you can never be safe in South Africa nowadays”, she says, emphasizing her reason for moving to Umhlanga Halls. I cannot help but wonder what it would be like to be South African. The fact that I’m only a transient international student here does not allow me the luxury of fully understanding that inherent fear that seems to pervade in this country since the demise of Apartheid.

She takes me to the mosque and introduces me to the Imam who, I’m told is a black man from Malawi. I greet the man who looks rather friendly and approachable. Bilkis is very involved in the community. She is directly involved in the mosque as her husband sits on the directing committee. She is also in charge of the ladies’ side of the mosque – she sees to the management and maintenance. We take a look around as the maid arrives. Bilkis reprimands the maid for not cleaning properly and tells her to go clean the marble floor again.

We talk briefly about the people that come to the mosque. “The mosque is for everyone in Umhlanga. When we moved here, the community decided that it was important for us to have a mosque because there was no other place that everyone could meet. So the men got together and built it with their own funds... unfortunately there are some people in the community that have disagreements with others... you know the Tabligh Jamaat and the Sunni Sufis have different ways of doing things, but the Imam has been asked to read for everyone. It was agreed by the committee that the mosque would be used by everyone”.

34 Appendix 1 for location of the Greater Durban Area
35 See Appendix 2 for location of Umhlanga
36 As part of its reconstruction plan, the government has promoted the notion of the ‘new’ South Africa being a ‘rainbow’ nation, whereby people of all races (and therefore all colours) join together side by side to form a symbolic ‘rainbow’.
“My own husband is from a Sunni Sufi family, and he used to live downtown when I first met him. I hated the place he lived in, and my in-laws are totally oblivious to the situation. I just don’t agree with their Sunni practices, and that’s why I couldn’t live with them. Of course I also wanted to have my own space. Besides, most of the Muslims living in Umhlanga are Tablighi”; they are the ones who have the money”.

I have to admit, I can identify with some of the things she says. Coming from a Muslim background, I have also been torn between the two schools of thought myself and am very acquainted with the numerous contentions between the opposite views.

A few minutes later, we leave the mosque and drive to her house. “Now you will see where I live, the servants quarters!” I look up in surprise, I am somewhat aghast by her comment. “The people living in Umhlanga Crest see us as living in servants quarters. All my friends joke and ask me why I chose this gated community – it’s less up-market than Umhlanga Crest, but I told them that I liked it better there, it is quieter and there are less people poking into your affairs”. We drive through the gate.

“The Indians in Chatsworth and Phoenix are very different from us. I have been to Chatsworth a few only and I hated it, it’s disgusting there... you know how people live their lives there, the houses are so close to each other and it’s so dirty. People have no class at all”. We both laugh. I am a bit uneasy about my own position regarding her comment about Chatsworth and Phoenix being different.

**Markers of cultural capital**

Bilkis’s comments raise a few important questions regarding the reasons for which she decided to move to Umhlanga Halls, one of them being the ongoing choice to segregate oneself from the rest of society. Drawing on Caldeira (1999), fortified enclaves represent a new alternative for the urban life of the middle and upper classes. As such they are codified as something conferring high status. The construction of status symbols is a process that elaborates social distance and creates means for the assertion of social difference and inequality. As such, the image that confers the higher status and is most seductive is that of an enclosed and isolated community, a secure environment in which one can use various facilities and services and live only among ‘equals’. The advertisements of those luxury communities present the image of islands to which one can return every day, in order to escape from the city and its deteriorated environment and to encounter an exclusive world of pleasure among peers. The image of the enclaves, therefore, is opposed to the image of the city as a deteriorated world pervaded by not only pollution and noise but, more importantly, confusion and mixture, that is, social heterogeneity (Caldeira, 1999)
Another important issue that is raised is Bilkis's inherent class-consciousness. Social wealth in the context of the suburban South Africa is not only about race, but is a class position and normative concept. Social wealth is measured by a person's "cultural capital" – that is, the accessibility of things such as higher education and social graces, vocabulary, and demeanour that allow one to prosper or at least compete within the dominant culture. It is also a sense of entitlement to certain privileges that are out of the reach of others. This upper-class social wealth is defined as much by mainstream acceptance of norms, values, and life expectations as by race or ethnicity (Low, 2003). Seemingly insignificant comments like "I live in the servants' quarters" are insightful anecdotes about how humour obscure social tensions and become the mechanism for determining one's views and political leanings as well. As the conversation progresses, Bilkis's comments about people living in Chatsworth become indicators of where she stands in relation to a number of cultural and social views. Her comments are also indicators of her habitus and cultural capital. I cannot help but think that by subjugating herself as living in "servants' quarters" Bilkis was unconsciously seeking to get reassurance of her social position from me, as she knew I would react and deny the remotest possibility of community being servants' quarters-like. That particular comment also leads to issues of differences between the two opposing communities as well; the difference between the 'nouveau riches', like herself, and the established rich like Aisha, as well as the inherent the tensions involved there.
Aisha's car

Aisha is a tall woman, in her mid forties. She has bony but strong facial features and shows signs of affluence by the stylish clothes she wears and the conspicuous diamond rings she wears on her fingers. She smiles hesitantly and invites me in her huge two-storey house almost reluctantly.

“I am sorry for not being able to talk to you for long, but I have to fetch my kids from madrasah in fifteen minutes. You can accompany me in the car if you want. I don’t let my kids walk on the streets by themselves although the madrasah is just down the road. I ask her the reason for this and she replies that she doesn’t want them to meet all kinds of strange people because it’s dangerous. Besides, we have a car, there’s no reason for which we shouldn’t use it!”

We chat for a short while. Aisha tells me that she married a poor man although she came from a rich family. Her parents helped Faizel with his job, giving him the capital to start his own business. Now they are prospering in wealth and have two children. They have been living on the Ridge for almost five years.

“I like living on the Ridge. I wouldn’t want to live anywhere else. I mean where else could I possibly go anyway? There’s no other decent and safe place in Durban. Besides all my friends living around here, so there’s no point in me leaving this place. Faizel and I have considered moving abroad, but then we decided against it. I like it here, we have a good life and I don’t want to have to start all over again in a strange place”.

A few minutes later, I bid Aisha goodbye and decline her offer to accompany her to the madrasah. I get a sense of reluctance around this woman and I do not want to push my luck.

My short conversation with Aisha proves to be very enlightening in unpacking the dynamics of how upper class Muslims in Umhlanga view places that they are accustomed to. On the one hand the new residential enclaves of the upper classes, associated with shopping malls, isolated complexes, and other privately controlled environments represent a new form of organizing social differences and creating segregation in Durban and many other cities around the world. As a result, public streets become spaces in which the elite circulate by car and poor people circulate on foot or by public transportation. To walk on the public street is becoming a sign of class in many cities, an activity that the elite is abandoning. However, despite this tendency to look at social reality as the direct product of elite intentions, Davis (1992) elaborates a remarkable critique of social and spatial segregation and associates the emerging urban configuration with the crucial themes of social inequality and political options. For him, not only is there nothing inevitable about “fortress architecture”, but also it has, in fact, deep consequences for the way in which public space and public interactions are shaped. People attach meanings to the spaces where they live in flexible and varying ways, and the factors influencing these readings and uses are endless. However, cities are also
material spaces with relative stability and rigidity that shape and bound peoples’ lives and determine the types of encounters possible in public space. When walls are built up, they form the stage for public life regardless of the meanings people attach to them and regardless of the multiple “tactics” of resistance people use to appropriate space (Davis, 1992).

On the other hand, Aisha’s reluctance to immigrate and ‘start all over again in a strange place’ reflects the comfort zone, which she has appropriated for herself and her family. Her unwillingness to move does not arise out of financial concerns, but rather out of fear of having to start from scratch. The status that she has acquired over years of living in affluence before and after she got married will be hard to establish again in a new place.

The second issue that Aisha raises by her refusal to detach herself from her ‘friends’ is the consequences of this segregation for the Muslim Ummah? If the Ummah itself is a representative of the symbolic belonging to a larger Muslim community, then the caste divisions which pertain within the Muslim community in Durban is in direct contradiction to what the Ummah proposes. The caste divisions amongst the Sunni Sufis and the Tablighi Jamaat, which arises out of diasporic attachment to India and the social divisions prevailing there, contradicts the very core of the Islamic belief. In Islam, caste and class do not exist and do no matter since all Muslims, irrespective of their social status belong to a ‘brotherhood’ epitomised by the Ummah. The divisions occurring amongst Muslims in Durban and the deliberate spatial separation, which masks itself under pretexts around safety, property value, niceness etc. illustrate how the affluent Muslims, especially those of the Tablighi Jamaat, choose to re-fashion this understanding of the Ummah to suit their own purposes. Cultural capital takes precedence over the belief of equality on many levels. Caste, class and race consciousness become important markers of this community’s identity.
The Taalim

It is a solemn atmosphere. We are about ten women sitting on a mat that has been laid on the clean marbled floor of Zaynab's house. I flip through the pages of the book that has been handed over to me. The book is without a doubt promoting the Tabliqui Jamaat ideology. I am uneasy; I have never liked gatherings of this sort. The women around me are all dressed in beautifully embroidered jilbabs. Underneath their garbs, I can see their jeans, high-heeled shoes, and gold bracelets. Although all of them are middle-aged, they all have carefully manicured hands, wear flashy diamonds on their fingers and their athletic bodies suggest regular visits to the gym. Needless to mention, they all arrived in BMWs and have the latest cell-phones, some of which ring during the congregational readings. The explicit markers of cultural capital ranging from the enormous houses and their accompanying BMW cars parked in front of doorways or in garages, to the glittering diamond rings adorning the women's fingers are all signs of luxury and habitus.

The reading starts. Tasneem, one of the richest of the lot, asks me to read. I read and make the fatal mistake of daring to question what is written in one of the books. The women are not happy about my question at all and I get a curt reply about my mistake in questioning the book. Whatever is in the book should not be questioned I'm told.

One woman in particular, Dilshad, seems to lead the whole reading Taalim. She is the one who does the speeches, reads by heart, while everyone else listens to her. She also cautions everyone in the audience to be humble, to be generous in giving to the poor and to avoid being flashy about one's riches. Occasionally, Tasneem's cell-phone rings and she proceeds to take the calls, chatting away in front of everyone. Tasneem, I'm told later by the other women, 'came with the money'. She married a middle-class man and made him what he is today - a rich one. Tasneem is also the one who has the most issues with the other members of the community as well as with the Imam. However, all the other women remain 'friends' with her, she is highly regarded in the community because of her status.

The Taalim ends. I am formally introduced to everyone as the Mauritian student who is studying 'rich Muslims' in Durban! While most of the women just smile and say hello, Dilshad on the other hand, engages more and asks me questions about my background, what I'm studying and even invites me to her house for lunch. She also tells me that she and her husband often organize Jamaat groups, which travel all over the world to propagate Islam. Her charisma and passionate character makes a huge impact on me.

Identity markers: Hierarchy, Women, religion and the veil.

My experience with the Taalim proved to be very instructive in unpacking the hierarchy prevalent amongst the women residing in Umhlanga Halls. Although the women are or more or less the same economic status, it is Dilshad in particular who comes across as the one who maintains discipline in the group. Another interesting factor is the tensions present amongst the well established rich families, characterized by Tasneem's outward self-confidence in breaking the flow of things, and the nouveau riche, characterized by the other women's obedience to Dilshad's summons. Another interesting factor is the dialectic between the
acceptances of western values of materialism, revealed by the clothing labels and expensive
cars, and the values of humility being promoted during the readings.

One of the main identity markers of the Muslim women of Umhlanga Halls is the wearing of
the hijab. As Hall (2000) argues, identity is maintained through social and material
conditions. If a group is symbolically marked as the enemy or as taboo, that will have real
effects because the group will be socially excluded and materially disadvantaged. Ironically,
while the ruling of the Tablighi Jamiat is that women should cover their hair, the Sunni
Ulema Council, whose main support lies amongst working class Muslims, is far less strict on
matters of dress codes (Vahed, 2000). It seems that the more affluent classes have embraced
the veil/hijab in greater numbers. Paradoxically, the same hijab has become a passport for
freedom for the Muslim women living in affluent families. This is characterized by the
women’s freedom to move around in shopping malls, surfing competitions, flea markets and
so on. The wearing of designer clothing and jewellery such as Cats shoes and Nike T-shirts,
the carrying of cellular phones and the driving of luxury cars also accompany the embracing
of the cloak and veil. The women of Umhlanga Halls freely embrace all the benefits of
modern Western technology, without seeing the contradictions involved in their actions. The
women’s prominent participation in religious public arenas, in an attempt to propagate
Islamic values amongst themselves and to their children through Taalims and Tablighs for
example, is another feature of women’s roles in affluent societies. Muslims attempting to
grapple with the questions posed by modernity and social diversity feel a sense of
vulnerability and weakness in the face of these challenges and have found strength in Islam as
a source of stability and identity. More and more Muslims are holding on to a ‘system of
beliefs and practices that treat scriptural absolutism as the way to counter the pluralism and
relativism engendered by modernity (Vahed, 2000). While Islam, on the one hand, has
become one of the cores of their identity; ethnicity, language, class and regionalism still
remain issues of contention amongst them.

Indeed, according to Hall & Held (1990:175), ‘from the ancient world to the present day,
citizenship has entailed a discussion, and a struggle, over the meaning and scope of
membership of the community in which one lives’. Therefore, ontological commitments to
race or ethnicity, far from being denied, should be placed in the richer context of these
identity markers. In addition, ‘ethnicity cannot be divorced form other changes of the 20th
century: urbanization, communication networks, new relationships of production, the increase
in migratory, and, commercial movements (Maxted & Zegeye, 1997). These communities provide an apt focus for understanding the variegated ways in which Muslims in particular localities have been negotiating the unfolding post apartheid democratic landscape. They are an expression of a confluence of global and local Islamization discourses, mediated by changing discursive and material circumstances. The communities can be regarded as a response to moral anxieties experienced by communities after 1994. The protagonists of these communities have chosen ‘splendid isolation’ as a means of producing moral propriety among the community. A spirit of self-help, ideologically produced during mosque sermons, through the mobilizing role of the Imam serves to galvanise members around the need to retain communal cohesion and support. These mosque-based ideologies play a central role in reproducing a discourse that distances their adherents from the surrounding community. Their mode of action is thus based on a desire to establish a relatively isolated identity insulated from external influences and processes.

Another crucial point that arises out of this gathering is the female diasporic experience. The activism, which Dilshad displays, reveals clearly how the local micro politics of the diasporic public sphere come to be intertwined with transnational diasporic political activism. It is noteworthy that women in general have been very active in transnational movements, either on their own or in alliance with men (Sayyid, 2003). In transcending a possible construction of their local identity as 'victims' - as a doubly oppressed racialised minority women's group – the South African Muslim women I studied are very active in redefining their social positioning not only in South Africa but also globally and transnationally. By travelling in Tablighi congregations to other parts of South Africa, Mauritius and Fiji, amongst other countries (countries where Indian diasporas are present), they are rewriting the political and religious terms of their citizenship - from passive to active, from the private sphere to the public sphere, from racialised minority to an elite cadre of global citizens seeking to propagate Islam in their understanding; the Tablighi ideology. One of the ways in which they try to achieve this is the building of the pre-school at the mosque and through the regular Taalims they hold in Umhlanga. However, while on the one hand their intentions are genuine and heartfelt, their choice of segregation contradicts their very actions. This process of playing on multiple citizenships, Muslim but of the Tablighi School coming from Mehmon and Gujarati decent, is what typifies contemporary diasporas and makes the chaorder they represent quite different from that of earlier, pre-national diasporas.
Imran - The ‘new’ South African debate – race, class and caste.

Imran is a short stout man of black origin. He is dressed in simple clothes, clothes that have no doubt been worn over and over again. His manner is shy and he is obviously surprised by my willingness to talk to him. I am not sure if it is because of my gender or just because he is associating me with one of the community residents. I introduce myself and he shrugs his shoulders indifferently saying that he can spare me a few minutes.

“I’m a Masters student at the University of Natal-Natal and I am doing some research on Muslim residents in gated communities, well let’s say rich areas like Umhlanga and since you know the people who come to the mosque, I thought it would be a good idea to talk to you”.

As the conversation progresses, he starts to warm up towards me. His manner changes totally when I tell him that I’m from Mauritius. He smiles immediately and opens up. Is it my identity as an outsider that makes him less wary of me? Probably yes. The remaining transcripts are pieces of conversation between Imran and I.

Imran: “You know most Muslims living in Umhlanga are rich, that is what makes them think that they can behave as they wish. Sometimes they are rude to me, but most of the times, they do not even have long conversations with us. There are a few black men that come to the mosque, especially on Fridays for Jummah, but the black men stick together and the Indians do too. There are also a few white Muslims that come, and many people from outside, those who do not live in Umhlanga but who work here”.

Me: Who comes to the mosque? I mean in terms of Sunni Sufis and Tablighi Jamaat? Does everyone use the same mosque?

Imran: “Yes everyone uses the same mosque, but sometimes I am embarrassed. The two sides accuse me of not giving them enough attention and they have some issues amongst themselves. Both groups complain that I favour the other side, but I’m only the Imam here, and they pay me, I cannot say anything, I have to do things as they wish. I’m a poor man after all and I have to think of my family”.

Me: What about the women? Do you get along well with them?

Imran: “Some women I talk to. Most don’t talk to me. I think someone should talk to them about wearing the jilbaab. Many come to fetch their children from the pre-school and they come wearing tight jeans, it’s a lack of respect. I don’t like some of the women, they treat me as if I’m invisible”.

Surprisingly, the interview takes an unexpected turn when Imran starts asking me questions.

(i) “How do you think we can make the people, especially the women living in Umhlanga come to the mosque more often for prayer?” (ii) “What is your advice on how we can make the men come together and stop squabbling about issues such as caste/schools of thought?” (iii) “Who can tell the women to dress more appropriately when they come to mosque to fetch their kids?”

37 Imran is the Imam from Malawi. The committee, which has helped build the Mosque, employs him under a contractual basis. His family is in Malawi and he goes back to his home a few times during the year.
Forty-five minutes later, I leave Imran with my phone number. The meeting had turned out to be an eye-opener.

My conversation with Imran highlights an important factor informing Muslims identities in the ‘new’ South Africa. Hall (2000) has pointed out that identities are not unified. There are often contradictions within them, which, have to be negotiated. For example, the black Muslims’ ideologies may be religiously similar to that of the Indian Muslims’, but culturally different in fundamental ways. The fact that identity is relational, and difference is established by symbolic marking in relation to others (Hall, 2000), the process of identity making is therefore an ongoing process. Imran sees himself as an Imam, someone who is supposed to have authority over the rest of the community by virtue of his religious status. However, because of his economic and racial status, he is not allowed by members frequenting the mosque to affirm his identity as a figure of authority. He therefore chooses to adopt the same identity that many other disadvantaged South African black people have. This almost ‘forced’ repressed identity reiterates the class dynamics prevalent within the Muslim community.

Imran’s own identity is largely attributed to racist ideology amongst Indians and Blacks. Racism has been shown to be a contributor to patterns of urban and suburban separation and exclusion in South Africa (Vahed, 2000). Even though Apartheid has ended, cities, such as the greater Durban area, continue to experience high levels of residential segregation based on discriminatory real estate practices and mortgage structures designed to insulate whites and Indians from blacks (2000). Blacks are less likely to move to the suburbs in the first place, and then more likely to return to the city. Residential proximity to blacks intensified fears of crime and those who are racially prejudiced are even more fearful. However the fear factor is not the only cause of Imran’s subjugation by the Muslim community. The condescending manner with which he is treated by the men and women indicate signs the racist belief that ‘black is inferior’. The Imam is not allowed to assume the social and religious status, which he is entitled to by virtue of his race. Things might have been different is the Imam was a rich Indian man.

Furthermore, the mosque’s failure in bringing about a united Muslim community in Umhlanga is typified by the internal clashes that occur amongst the Sunni Sufis and the Tablighi Jamaat groups. Ironically, whereas the mosque was initially built under the premise that everyone would use it, it has turned out to be a source of conflict amongst the Muslims
residing in Umhlanga, conflict arising out of caste differences. Furthermore, the lack of interaction and integration amongst black and Indian Muslims in the mosque once again highlight race consciousness and demarcation permeating in this community. In many ways, the mosque is a reflection of the Muslim community in terms of its sub-groups, as it is in Durban. Built with the capital of the rich, it is mostly used as a ground for the imposition of the upper class’s ideologies and beliefs.
The Case of Umhlanga Crest

I smile to myself. I am used to this scenery by now... the big houses, the golf course, and the cleanliness.... Today I'm going to meet Shameema. She lives in a gated condominium very much like Umhlanga Halls. I jump out of the bus and walk towards the gated area. The layout of the community is outstanding in neatness. All the houses are arranged in a parallel manner, green-roofed and similar gardens. I reach the front gate, it is slightly open and the security guard is nowhere to be found. Intrigued by the absence of the guard, I buzz Shameema's house number. A few minutes later, the security guard appears, and asks me to come in, without checking my identity card and no questions asked.

Shameema's maid meets me at the front door. Her house exhibits an air of classy minimalism, few ornaments, yet beautifully set up. I sit on the leather couch and wait for her. A few minutes later, she comes wearing a bathrobe. Shameema is in her early thirties, has short black hair and is easy-going. I like her immediately. We chat a bit and she shows me some of the books that the women use for the Taalim, apologizing for leaving me alone as she goes to get dressed.

When she comes back from her room, we talk about her reasons for moving to Somerset Park. "I have been making duahs for a long time to find a nice and safe place to live since I got my kids. Alhamdulillah I found this place. I like it here although the property was slightly expensive, but it was worth it. I mean it is safe here and you have all the peace and quiet that you want. Nobody interferes in your affairs. You can still have social life, through the Taalims and you also meet the other women at the gym sometimes. Besides it is near my husband's place of work, so it's suitable".

"It is pretty here, I like it. It is very pretty. You know these days you have to move in safe areas, you cannot afford to live in places where everyone else is coming to buy houses. It's not easy these days".

When I tell her about the guard's absence at the front gate, she says, "Yeah I know I have to tell my husband to report him. These guards are not always there, it's annoying because it makes the place unsafe. You might think you're safe all the time... but when the guards are slack, you never know who might come in".

Dualistic thinking is a form of social splitting used to cope with anxiety and fear. It oversimplifies and dichotomises cultural definitions and social expectations to differentiate the self from the other. Psychological splitting, as by Melanie Klein's (1975) argument, can be used as a form of denial and resistance, providing a means of distancing oneself from a undesirable self-image and projecting it onto another. Social splitting is often used to project social fears onto a more vulnerable group. The advertisements for gated communities evoke this social splitting and even go a step further by envisaging what is being defended against, thereby reinforcing the reverse process that designates those living outside the walls as being outsiders (Low, 2003).
Shameema’s annoyance at the guard’s lack of vigilance highlights her fear of crime but also the fear of privacy invasion. The connection between a place and a person also resides in symbolic meanings of the landscape. When these symbols are threatened, as with the crime rates in South Africa, place-protective behaviours occur. Indeed, the cultural markers of the fear throughout South Africa in the form or razor wire and high walls surrounding residences are obvious everywhere in the condominium she lives in as well as in Umhlanga Halls. They are represented in the numerous security companies’ ‘Armed Response’ notices that ‘decorate’ closed gates and are emblazoned on patrol cars that outnumber local police. The culture of fear manifests its largest indicator of cultural capital in the development of gated community environments such as Umhlanga Halls (Durington, 2004). Yet, residents claim that those communities are merely retirement homes, or spacious environments, of cleaner areas – anything that what they really are. While this conversation supports the cultural disposition that informs the habitus referred to earlier (a fear of crime as rationalization for moving to a gated community), the conversation also flushes out the larger issue of what residents call “forced removal” (2004). Such allegations are not only destructive to the process of creating a ‘new’ rainbow South Africa, but, are also ideologically laden and culturally loaded considering the socio-political history of South Africa (2004).

Another interesting factor is the issue of niceness. Shameema reiterates her likeness of a ‘nice’ and ‘pretty’ environment even though the property she bought was rather expensive. Constance Perin (1977), a cultural anthropologist who writes about peoples’ need to live in ‘nice’ and ‘neat’ environments argues that all land use practices, planning, and zoning are value laden. They act as moral codes for unstated rules governing what are widely regarded as correct social categories and relationships (Low, 2003). Image and investment, along with safety and hassle-free living, are what many gated community residents look for (Low, 2003). The aesthetic control of the landscape is one strategy by which ‘niceness’ is expressed and used to mark a residential development and the people within it as upper class. Elite families to demarcate their estates and buffer their property boundaries have long used aesthetic management (2003).
Surayah

Suraya’s house is probably the biggest one I have seen since I started my fieldwork. Located on the Ridge, as residents of Umhlanga Crest call it, her property gate opens up on a beautiful fountain, surrounded by greens and ferns. The rather long path leading up to the front door is paved with white marbled tiles and as I enter the lobby, I cannot help but admire the perfection with which the house is adorned. Suraya is in her mid-fifties, and her quiet manner displays signs of tiredness. Somehow she looks rather preoccupied. I greet her and introduce myself.

“I am not sure what kind of information you’re looking for but I’ll try to help you in any way I can”.

I thank her and start chatting. She tells me that she has been victim of some horrible crime and that she does not feel safe anymore because of what happened.

“You know when you are rich and you live in a place like that, people take advantage of you. Even people you think you know they are the ones that you cannot trust the most. You never know what’s on their minds, and to think that they work for you! They are jealous of us. I came to live here because I wanted my children to be safe, just like we were when we were kids. Although we had to live in specific areas, at least we knew we could be safe. Now I don’t know what to do anymore. I am disturbed by what happened to my family and I can ever stop worrying, especially for my children”.

“We have more alarms since this thing happened, we have employed security personnel and I have told my children to always carry their cell-phones with them in case they need to contact us urgently”.

She starts crying. She is obviously disturbed by the event that took place in her house and sees it as a violation of her rights. I smile, thank her for her time and leave the huge house.

Low (2003) argues that one of the most common reasons for the choice of living in gated communities is residents’ desire to re-create a childhood place with the feelings of emotional security and protection of childhood. Gated community residents want to recapture physical elements of their childhood landscapes, just like other people, but this desire is entangled with an unconscious longing for security they identify with living behind gates and walls, by being protected. Even though people grow up in the same place and time, they live in their own psychological worlds and perceptual environments. Different aspects of a place become emotionally salient. The same is true for re-creating the past – only fragments and defining moments of a childhood landscape survive for each person – but these memories are powerful and influence preferences about where to live and how. The link between emotional security and the built environment is forged in a number of ways. Enlarging Marcus’s (1976) idea that home is a symbol of self to encompass the house and its physical surroundings, gated communities provide another layer of symbolic identification by adding a boundary created
by gates, walls and guards. The social impact of gating provides the same paradox. The degree of control restricts participation and limits aspects of interaction and struggle important to furthering local democracy. Suraya's wish to regain the security that she felt when she was younger exemplifies her unconscious aspiration to live in a place in which she can be distanced from 'others' that she does not 'trust' so that she and her children can be safe. The event that took place in her home has only served to reinforce her fear of invasion and lack on control over it.

One explanation for the gated community's popularity is that it materially and metaphorically incorporates otherwise conflicting, and in some cases polarized, social values that make up the moral terrain of upper-class life. For example, it reflects urban and suburban tensions in the 'new' South Africa regarding social class, race and ethnicity and at the same time represents the perennial concern with creating community. The gated community's symbolic power rests on its ability to order personal and social experience. Architectural symbols such as gates and walls also provide a rationale for the moral inconsistencies of everyday life. For instance, many residents want to feel safe in their homes and argue that walls and gates help keep criminals out, even in areas such as Umhlanga where crime rates are the lowest in Durban. Living in a gated community represents a new version of the upper-middle class South African dream precisely because it temporarily suppressed and masks, even denies and fuses, the inherent anxieties and conflicting social values of modern urban and suburban life. It transforms South Africans' and especially Muslims' dilemma of how to protect themselves and their children from danger, crime, and un-Islamic influences by reinforcing the norms of the upper-middle class lifestyle in a historically segregated urban environment (Low, 2003).
The end

This is my last field note entry. I would like to believe that I have been to deconstruct the reasons for which Muslims choose to live in gated communities. Of course I have managed to scratch only the first surface layer. The Muslim women with who I worked with have chosen to segregate themselves behind walls for a particular reason, and they know it. I wonder whether they admit it to themselves. Has any of them ever asked themselves what the point of holding Taalims promoting togetherness and belonging is, when they choose keep up boundaries between themselves and others? Has Apartheid not taught them to realise how spatial segregation can be harmful to the bigger society?

It is not my place to judge although my findings make me uneasy. I don’t really like what I discovered as I’m aware of the negative implications involved in spatial segregation. But I would lie to you and to myself if I said that I would never have considered living in a gated community. On the one hand I have thought about this for a long time. I have wondered how it would be like to live in those wonderfully clean, spacious and meticulously groomed environments. And on the other hand, I understand the rationale of the need to create and sustain a non-segregated society since I’ve lived in this country for 5 years now. I understand the implications of my own understanding of the Ummah and how it contradicts the very logic of separating oneself from others. But I also know that deep inside of myself I want and aspire to raise myself to the upper-middle class section of society.

As I leave Umhlanga Halls for the last time, gazing at the ‘perfect’ life I’ve always aspired, I smile in retrospect. The choice to live in a gated community, especially for a Muslim who believes in the Ummah, is a choice to forget about that very Ummah.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

As argued in Chapter 3, globalization and economic restructuring weaken existing social relations and contribute to the breakdown of traditional ways of maintaining social order. Social control mechanisms and their associated institutions, such as the police and schools, are no longer seen as effective. This breakdown in local control threatens some neighborhood residents, and the gated residential community becomes a viable and socially acceptable option. The creation of gated communities (and the addition of guard houses, walls, and entrance gates to established neighborhoods) is an integral part of the building of the fortress city, a social control technique based on the so-called militarization of the city. In South Africa, it is a strategy for regulating and patrolling an urban poor comprised predominantly of black people living in townships.

Furthermore, crucial to the analysis of identity (as well as any encounters that occur) in contemporary southern Africa is the complex and ubiquitous process of globalisation. The term ‘globalisation’ is described not only as the space-time compression of the world, but also as an intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole (Robertson, 1992). As discussed in Chapter 3, globalisation does not entail the elimination of space, but rather its transformation, the creation of a system where increasing areas are linked through new technology, but certain nodal points where power is centralised, are strengthened (Mosco, 1996: 205). Within such a globalised system, the global order’s centres are no longer the capitals of nation-states but rather “pulse points of complex networks” (Comaroff, 1996: 172).

In Abu-Lughod’s (1991) words, one gains a sense of ‘multiple cores’ (1991: 131). In the cultural study of identity, Lawrence Grossberg (1996) replaces the logic of temporality, which emphasises the acquisition of new identities through time, with one of spatiality. He states, “Subjectivity as spatial... involves taking literally the statement that people experience the world from a particular position” (Grossberg, 1996: 100). The politics of space is vital to the process of globalisation and identity construction. It is especially relevant to the Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest residents’ situation. The link between living a Muslim life whereby every other person is considered to be equal and the need to affirm one’s own identity in terms of one’s social background, leads Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest residents to use their diasporic attachments of the Indian caste system as a pretext to join the
race for capitalist gain and support. This is demonstrated through, on the one hand, their practice of preaching Islam during the Taalims and, on the other, and their refusal to integrate with the Muslims of Sunni Sufi origin.

Although the greater Durban area is not as big as global cities like Los Angeles or London, its people are very scattered and differentiated along lines of class and race, as illustrated by the obvious dialectical disparities manifesting in the urban geography. As such, Geertz (1973) underscored how contemporary people who live in close proximity often do not share a common culture, but instead interact with people who are dispersed, resulting in an increasingly interconnected world: “we are trying to find our field in a seriously scrambled world that does not divide itself cleanly at the joints into societies or traditions...such identities escape in part from either-or classification and become defined more by a logic of ‘both—and—and’ in which the subject shares partial overlapping identities with other similarly constituted decentred subjects that inhabit reticular social forms” (Kearney, 1995:558). In other words, remoteness in the global context does not mean exclusion from global political, economic, social and cultural networks, although in Africa, it might well coincide with subordination. Global social interaction is perhaps less active in Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest and therefore they have potentially less agency. The new technology of communication is lauded as providing new and unlimited possibilities of access to people from different temporal and spatial zones to the ‘joys’ of the modern world. The greater potential, which it offers is countered with the reality that this will not be available to all, especially in the ‘new’ South Africa.

Furthermore, Bilkis, Zaynab, Aisha, and all the other women living in Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest illustrate how important place identity and place attachment can be when making decisions about where to live. Questions of “who we are” often relate to “where we live” because place is such an important component of how people define themselves. Low (2003) argues that place identity figures prominently in determining where a person lives, and contributes to feelings of satisfaction and a sense of security. A component of place identity is “place attachment” – the social, psychological, and cultural bond that forms between individuals or groups and their environment. Place attachment developed over time through personal experience and through cultural habitus. Those experiences could include factors such as living in a particular location, buying or decorating a home, telling stories about a particular landscape, and learning about religious or cultural importance of a site all
contribute to sense of place attachment (Low, 2003). Place attachment is also developed from cultural capital. The example of Bilkis’s disdain for other Muslims of lower social class than hers demonstrates her inability to relate to ‘these people’ through her social upbringing. As a result, in order to differentiate herself from ‘these people’, she chooses to live in a place that she knows they cannot ‘infiltrate’ by virtue of ‘their’ economic ‘disadvantage’.

The Municipality and urban sustainability
As far as the eThekwini Municipality’s plan to create an integrated Durban area is concerned, geographic and demographic factors point to its potential failure in those regards. Developers such as Moreland and others are continuing on their mission to create a Northern Durban, which is technologically friendly, architecturally safe and aesthetically appealing to a small upper-class segment of the Durban population. At the present moment, current land use management in the eThekwini area is fraught by institutional fragmentation. Different parts of the Durban area are managed through different legislation, authorities, procedures and plans. Delivery of the land use management service is fragmented. Some areas of Durban are covered by complex formal systems of land use management, while others have no land use management system at all (eThekwini Municipality, 2003). Municipal officers’ claims that the Mayor intends to distribute ten percent of the Durban North to the poorer classes neither shows any sign of concretisation, nor any sign that such a plan could work. The urban and economic pattern of Umhlanga is tailored for an elite class by virtue of its housing schemes, business enterprises, property values, and distance to ‘downtown’. Heterotopic environments do not suit the lower classes that cannot afford the luxury of embellishing their housing situations.

Consequences of gated community developments
As established throughout this study, gated community developments have many consequences on the urban landscape but also on the social landscape. The combination of the four main social trends that gated community developments reflect, namely segregation in search for stability and control of the neighbourhood; privatisation; militarization (that is, private armament); and architectural separation (Bremner, 1998; CSIR, 2000) is determining the development of the contemporary South African urban landscape. Not all of these processes are new: the wish, or the thrust, for segregation can be linked to the apartheid experience. An entirely new aspect, however, is that of the state or the municipality becoming
redundant for certain functions such as the preservation of law and order, and the maintenance of infrastructure.

One of the consequences of the increased development of gated communities is the loss of a liveable urban centre. The upper classes are not attracted to the ‘grimy’ downtown of Durban with its small-scale office parks, narrow asymmetrical streets and run down infrastructure. As a result, they opt for spatial fragmentation and segregation, which immediately comes evident due to the scale of intervention. It also starts to exclude potential users from previously or current public open spaces or facilities. They may contribute to safer environments, but also to many social divisions in cities. Privatisation is also another consequence. In cities fragmented by fortified enclaves it is difficult to maintain the principles of openness and free circulation that are the most significant organizing values of modern cities. As a result, the character of public space and of citizens’ participation in public life changes. A new aesthetic of security shapes all types of constructions and imposes its new logic of surveillance and distance as a means for displaying status (Low, 1999), and it is changing the character of public life and public interaction. Among the diverse elements changing the city, the new enclaves for residence, work, and consumption of the upper classes are provoking the deepest transformations. Although they have different uses and many specializations (some for residence, others for work, leisure, or consumption), all types of fortified enclaves share some basic characteristics. They are privatised property for collective use; they are physically isolated, either by walls or empty spaces or other design devices; they are turned inward and not to the street; and they are controlled by armed guards and security systems that enforce rules of inclusion and exclusion. (Caldeira, 1999, in Low, 1999).

Another huge consequence of gating has been the huge influence of property prices all around South Africa. Prices depend on the extent on security measures. At the present moment, a detached one-storey house in Umhlanga Crest is selling from R 2 million upwards. In prestige communities in particular, where security and lifestyle are two sides of the same coin, land and house prices have multiplied (Roberts 1996). Particularly for the white and black middle class, for the first time homeowners, and for single-person households who flee urban blight and inner-city flats, gated communities are becoming the most important housing alternative in ‘desirable areas’ (Cohen 1998). As such architectural separation has come to fore. Many, such as Davis (1992), have noted how peoples’ obsession with security has transformed urban regions into literal fortresses. This shift is most often than not manifested in the physical
dissemination of city space, which is divided into fortified cells of affluence and places of terror where police battle the criminalized poor. A common feature of closed condominiums is isolation and distance from the city, a fact that is presented as offering the possibility of a better lifestyle. The latter is expressed, for example, by the location of the development in “nature” (green parks, lakes etc.), and in the use of phrases inspired by ecological discourses. However, it is clear in the advertisements that isolation means separation from those considered to be socially inferior, and that the key factor to assure this is security. This means fences and walls surrounding the condominium, guards on duty 24 hours a day controlling the entrances, and an array of facilities and services to ensure security. In other words, this area clearly represents the new trend of movement of wealthy residents as well as services and commerce to the periphery of the city and to enclosed areas.

**Identities of resistance**

Could the choice to live in gated communities be acts of resistance emerging from identities of resistance? Pile & Keith (1997) suggest that the spatial practices of resistance are not just the mobilization of a class across space, nor the mobilization of an interest group in a particular place, but about insinuation. Thus, resistance, then, not only takes place in place, but also seeks to appropriate space, to make new spaces (1997). As argued earlier, identities of resistance stem from previous acts of domination or subjugation, which are more and less obviously political, and political identities have been closely associated with the politics of resistance. However, Fanon’s (1986) work for instance proposes that a recognition that political identities are not just made out of siding either with the oppressor or against the oppressor. Subjectivities are about feelings – fears, desires, repulsions – which are not so easily contained within a narrowly structural analysis of politics. The dialectic of repositioning is fought not only in overt political spaces, not only through self-consciously manipulated deceits, but also in inner spaces too, as is characterized in the Taalims held in Umhlanga Halls. Fanon’s argument that it may be necessary to overcome resistance in order to achieve resistance, tallies well with the Taalim being overtly against any potential Sufi Sunni ideological endorsement. “The colonized must conquer parts of themselves in order to liberate themselves” (Fanon, 1986); that is, power colonizes internally as well as externally, and achieving the overthrow of external power is more easily conceived of than the idea of shedding the guilt and shame induced by internal colonization, as had happened during Apartheid. Political resistance seeks to overthrow the perceived dangers in the practices of the powerful, while psychic resistance seeks unconsciously to maintain the repression in of
traumatic or potentially dangerous memories, feelings, or impulses. Having been previously 'colonised' by the Apartheid government, both on a political and spatial level, the predominantly Tablighi Muslims living in Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest may be projecting the same pattern upon less Sunni Sufis and those of a less economically advantaged Muslim community.

Accordingly, it becomes clear that spatialities are constitutive not only of domination, but also of resistance\(^{38}\), that struggles for power are spatialised and constituted in space in specific ways – from opposition to repositioning; that power relations intersect in specific ways, that resistance in one direction can be oppression in another, and that resistance occurs in spaces beyond those defined by power relations; that acts of resistance have to be understood not only in terms of their location in power relations but also through their intended and received meanings (Pile & Keith, 1997). Pile & Keith (1997) argue that political subjectivities are constituted through political struggles, but also that there are many spaces of struggle through which people become political. The effects of these geographies of resistance are multiple, fluid, dynamic and in some ways uncontrollable or at least unintended. The material effects of power are physically and literally everywhere in Umhlanga Halls. It matters that power seems to be everywhere, but wherever one looks, the same power is open to gaps, inconsistencies, ambivalences, possibilities for inversion, parody and so on; open, that is, to more than one geography of resistance, as characterized by the social tensions inherent amongst those living in Umhlanga Halls and those living in Umhlanga Crest.

\(^{38}\) It has been a key feature of the arguments presented that resistance is analysed and theorized as a diagnosis of, and a reaction to, the injurious effects of power relations, although the idea that resistance is merely an oppositional stance has been interrupted by a sense that political identities are strategic, tactical, mobile, multifaceted, blurred, awkward, ambivalent. Further, once passive, inert and singular notions of spatiality and identity are abandoned, then it becomes clear that resistance is as much defined through the struggle to define liberation, space and subjectivity as through the elite's attempts to defeat, prevent and oppress those who threaten their authority. At the heart of questions of resistance lie questions of spatiality – the politics of lived spaces. The politics of location involves not only a sense of where one is in the world – a sense gained from the experiences of history, geography, culture, self and imagination – mapped through the simultaneously spatial and temporal interconnections between people, but also the political definition of the grounds on which struggles are to be fought. In this sense, location has more to do with the active constitution of the grounds on which political stances, than with the latitude and longitude of experiences of circumscription, marginalisation and exclusion. The idea of location does not suggest, therefore, that the grounds on which struggles are defined are permanent, fixed and universal. Instead, underlying this idea is a sense that space is discrete and discontinuous, but also relational and close. Location is both the ground which defines struggle and a highly contested terrain, which cannot provide any secure grounding for struggle. Location is simultaneously about unity and difference, about definitions of who occupies the same or a similar place and who does not, which do not presume – and, further, undermine the presumption – that there is a sameness of their struggle. Engagements in the politics of location, further, involve the definition of boundaries – but once more, these are not to be seen as fixed, impermeable and permanent. Neighborhood territorializations can form the basis or re-forging identity across the national borders of global diasporas. The politics of identity is undeniably also a politics of place (Pile & Keith, 1997).
The Muslims living in Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest have various reasons for their decision to move to gated communities and each person has his/her own individual psychological justification. Some say their reasons are purely societal and that they move for security reasons and fear of crime. Others claim that the resale value of their properties is the reason why they move to gated neighbourhoods. On a personal level, reasons varying from control of environment, sense of security and safety and exclusion are prevalent. The need to remain ‘pure’ by living far away from those ‘other’ Muslims living in Chatsworth or downtown indicate that the rich Muslims of predominantly Tablighi Jamaat use social splitting to remove the bad ‘things’ from their living environment as much as they can by means of urban segregation. Whatever their reasons, the Muslims residing in gated communities have defied the norm by choosing to locate themselves in areas which not only resemble very closely those of the Apartheid system, but which are also still very much predominantly white. By adopting the urban residential values of a minority of rich white elite South Africans, the Muslims are unconsciously or consciously re-creating the past, only this time the segregation and separation takes place closer to home, amongst their fellow Muslims. While I do not claim to speak on behalf of the people with whom I had the pleasure to work during my fieldwork, I hope that the insight provided by my research will enable readers to understand some of dynamics involved in Muslim identity formation in South African gated communities.
GLOSSARY

Aljaff – Low people

Ashraf – Noble class

Azaan - The formal call to prayer in Arabic

Barelwi - The Indo-Pakistani version of the ideological branch characterising Indian diaspora globally. The Barelwi branch advocates for a more cultural and populist adherence to Islam with its various reference and practice of cultural festivals.

Bid'ah - Innovations in Islam as per Islamic orthodoxy

Biradari - Fraternity of Indian Muslims based on their Indian village of origin

Daawah – Public propagation of Islam

Deobandi - The other major Indo-Pakistani ideological branch which calls for a strict adherence to Islamic principles and lifestyle, without giving much weight to cultural customs and traditions.

Dhobi - Washerman

Duah - Individualised or collective prayers to God

Hadiths – Sacred Islamic texts

Haraam - Forbidden by Islamic Law

Hijab - Female Muslim headscarf

ICO – Islamic Conference Organization

Imam - Religious head of a mosque and its congregation in general, but also understood as a leader in a community

Jilbabs – Long dress for Islamic wear

Jummah – A special Friday prayer

Kabaria – Greengrocer

Kutum – Joint household

Madrasah - Islamic school/institution from where Islamic knowledge is partaken

Maulana - Priest

Mawloods – Group gatherings of people belonging to the Sufi Sunni School
Muharram – A Month in the Islamic calendar

Pirs or Peers - In popular Islam, living saints or mystics who claim divine powers to solve problems miraculously

Qassab - Butcher

Quran – Holy Book

Salaam – Paying respects to the Prophet

Sufi - Muslim mystic

Surahs - Divine verses from the Quran

Taalim – Congregational reading of religious texts.

Ulema - Traditional clergy as the custodians of Islamic knowledge

Ummah - Global community/brotherhood identification or brotherhood of Muslims, and adhered to by Muslims
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