Master Thesis

Development Communication and the Paradox of Choice: Imposition and dictatorship in comparing Sámi and the SanBushmen experiences of cultural autonomy.

Author:
Øyvind Edman Mikalsen
Student no: 204513359

Culture Communication and Media Studies
Howard College Campus

Durban, South Africa
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Supervisor: Professor Keyan G Tomaselli
Declaration

I hereby declare that the following thesis is my own work and has not been submitted to any other university for examination.

Oyvind Edman Mikalsen
Durban 16.1.2006
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Abstract.

This research project examines the relevance of Kenneth Arrow's (1951) Impossibility Theorem as a criterion for assessing post-modern critical approaches to development media theories (Servaes, 2001; Melkote and Steeves, 2000). Comparing two distinct indigenous minorities' experiences with struggles for cultural autonomy, those of Norway's Sámi and Botswana's Basarwa, it was found that the media discourses used by NGOs frequently exploit a narrative that validly permits development to be treated as a species of social welfare implementation. Applying Arrow's (1951) conditions for the democratic summation of diverse preferences, and treating cultural, political, and civil society groups as 'voters', it was found that indigenous minority concerns may be best accommodated by linking them to broader issues that exploit historical ties between peoples, with a special emphasis on episodes that have led to coordination in achieving independent ends. Popular memories of such coordination appear to moderate relations between minorities and their national co-habitants, reducing the need for radicalization of indigenous issues and smoothing the path to autonomy.
Glossary

Basarwa  Official name for several indigenous San groups in Botswana.
CKGR  Central Kalahari Game Reserve, Botswana.
Ditshwanelo  Botswana Centre for Human Rights.
ETA  Euskadi ta Askatasuna - a terrorist organization organized in 1959 by student activists who were dissatisfied with the moderate nationalism of the traditional Basque party; want to create an independent homeland in Spain's western Pyrenees.
FKP  First People of Kalahari also called “Kgeikani Kweni” by Basarwa.
IRA  Irish Republican Army - a militant organization of Irish nationalists who used terrorism and guerrilla warfare in an effort to drive British forces from Northern Ireland and achieve a united independent Ireland.
Nissan Sani  4X4, South African assembled vehicle.
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization.
NEPAD  The New Partnership for Africa's Development.
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
RAD  Remote Area Dwellers (SanBushmen of CKGR).
Ramsar  The Convention on Wetlands – an intergovernmental treaty which provides the framework for national action and international cooperation for the conservation and wise use of wetlands and their resources. Adopted in the Iranian city of Ramsar in 1971.
Sámi  Indigenous group in Scandinavia and North West Russia.
SI  Survival International (UK-based non-governmental organization).
SWF  Social Welfare Function. To be distinguished from a social welfare choice and a social welfare decision.
TC  Time Code. Time marker information on recorded Digital Tapes.
WIMSA  Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa.
#Khomani  Indigenous group (Bushmen) in South Africa.
I. Introduction.

Minority: a culturally, ethnically, or racially distinct group living within a larger society. When used to describe such a group, the term carries with it a web of political and social implications. (Encyclopediæa Britannica)

From my grandmother, I first got to hear stories about a nomadic people living on the tundra among dangerous animals as well as under conditions of extreme Arctic weather. Then as a little boy watching Jamie Uys’s much-criticized film The Gods Must Be Crazy, I understood there was another indigenous group facing problems and struggles of a kind different than my grandmother’s people—the Sámi. The film portrayed the Bushmen as far away from civilization. I remember it looked peaceful compared to my people’s situation, in the middle of a campaign against the construction of a hydro-electric dam (see below). Although heavily criticized, and often stereotyped as an example of bad film-making (cf. e.g., Tomaselli, 1996), this film in fact sparked my interest in other indigenous groups around the world. It follows that the present thesis begins from a position that is based on the experience of myself being from an indigenous group. I will therefore proceed with a short comparative history of my people, the Sámi, and the San Bushmen to illustrate how two democratic regimes, Norway and Botswana, have dealt with more or less the same ‘problem’.

My first working experience with the Bushmen of Botswana took place as an assistant to a Norwegian Masters student who had conducted her research in Inalegolo, Botswana, among the Tshase people (or Basarwa). Later, my own research took me to Botswana’s Okavango Delta, where my observations sharpened the desire to investigate further. However, due to recent political events in Botswana (see later), this project is not what I thought it was going to be after I left the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR), the area upon which this research is based. My research assistant requested me not to use her name, neither her recorded voice, nor her image in this report, for fear of repercussions related to these occurrences. Additional data was also collected during June 2005 at the “Midnight Sun Conference” in Sommarøy, Tromsø Norway about indigenous law and the Sámi people, as well as other indigenous people’s rights. In this respect, I had to produce this paper without the photographs or first-hand comments I originally wanted to use, in addition to changing my angle of investigation. By the same token, all dates are left out to be sure that sources are protected.

In pursuing this project, I have employed the methods of

(1) auto-ethnographic elicitation, using subject-communities’ own construal of their conditions and origins as primary data and as a source of analysis;
(2) reflexive analysis of the relation between researcher and subject-community, taking special note of the common political environments of indigeneity within, and the very notable distinctions between, my own context and that of the subject-community; and

(3) logical and phenomenological (i.e. phaneroscopic, see Tomaselli 1997) interpretation of the key concepts of development. The original hypothesis for the research was developed from theories of media (Siebert, Lerner and Schramm, 1956), diffusion research (Rogers, 1995), and social welfare economics (Arrow, 1951).

In brief, the present research tests the idea that development theories, whether of the modernization or participatory kind, overlook the necessity for beneficiary communities to have already developed both (1) a habit of ordering their perceived options into preference rankings (Arrow, 1951); and (2) possessing sufficient internal diversity for at least some individuals to be indifferent about one or more options available to the community at large. Both these conditions for development, as it were, are based on Amartya Sen's (1981) approach to socio-economic breakdown. In seeking to provide better analytical methods for understanding the kinds of breakdown that lead to massive deprivation in the form of famines, Sen develops and tests the concept of entitlement (Sen, 1981: 45-51). This in turn depends on a logical relation between command and endowment, such that the conditions for famines, or deprivation in general, arise from social or political relations that affect either the command, or the endowments, or both, of an identifiable section of a national population.

This is of special relevance when considering the case of Botswana. Long proclaimed as a “shining beacon” of liberal democracy in Africa, events inside the country often contradict this perception. During the field research for this project, we encountered widespread deprivation, even starvation, among the Bushmen communities visited. As Kenneth Good (2003: 22) has remarked, “ethnic minorities in the country are increasingly critical of the established 'Tswanadom' ... and their inferior position within the supposedly 'homogeneous society.'” The presence of a liberal constitutional dispensation, with a commitment to market principles for the economy, does not seem to guarantee democracy in a practical sense. This was recognized by Kenneth Arrow, as far back as 1951, who used the analogy between personality integration and social integration to compare methods of aggregating social preferences: “[t]he formal existence of methods of aggregating individual preferences ... is certainly a necessary condition for an integrated society. ... but whether the existence of such methods is sufficient or even forms an important part of the sufficient condition for integration is dubious” (Arrow, 1951: 2, n.2). Indeed, Arrow receives little attention from theorists in visual anthropology, cultural studies, and development studies. It was only by following up Sen’s numerous references to Arrow as a source in welfare economics that directed me to the work of Arnold Shepperson, a PhD student in the University of KwaZulu-Natal’s Philosophy
department, who showed me the decisive concepts of imposition and dictatorship that brought a semblance of order to the confused data gathered from the field.

Arrow's work makes it possible to develop a rigorous qualitative methodology, building on a mathematical foundation that is \textit{ordinal}, but not \textit{cardinal}. The rationality of this approach is relational and not computational. In this way the researcher can avoid the \textit{a priori} need to assign values to choices, as happens in game theory, for example (see Lewis, 1968), or to assume that it is possible to assign cardinal values to wholly emotional experiences like happiness or pain, that are indifferent to the diversity of individual circumstances and preferences (Arrow, 1951: 9). Analysing samples of auto-ethnographic data in which subjects express preference rankings thus avoids the pitfalls of the researcher having to assign values prior to further analysis. People's declared orderings of preferences are the data and any prior (mis)conceptions in research design are thereby avoided.

This study concludes with some considerations concerning subsequent research possibilities that account for the issues found in both Sen and Arrow, as these affect commonly used development anthropology models, theories, and methods. At the same time, these same issues can be found in media and cultural studies and subjected to comparable revisions in accounting for them. In brief, it may be that democracy is a consequence of development, in contrast with the doctrines espoused by both progressive and conservative actors in the globalization debate; neither question the convention that democracy comes first, each merely argues for a different model of democracy (Servaes, 2001; Kerr, 2003; Riker, 1982). The evidence indicates, however, that over a relatively short period of development, there arise the \textit{conditions for democracy} within which true progressive development can be realized.

\section*{II. Indigenous Diversity: Scandinavia's Sami and Botswana's Basarwa.}

\textbf{Sámi:} Any of the descendants of ancient nomadic peoples who inhabited northern Scandinavia. 
\textit{(Encyclopaedia Britannica)}

\textbf{San:} Also called \textit{Bushmen} an indigenous people of southern Africa, related to the \textit{Khoekhoe} (Khoikhoi). They live chiefly in Botswana, Namibia, and southeastern Angola. 
\textit{(Encyclopaedia Britannica)}.

The ten Sámi groups inhabit three of the Scandinavian countries and north-western Russia (Figure 1). The \textit{Germania} (AD 98) of Tacitus contains the earliest mention of the Sámi by a European historian. Of the early Scandinavian sources, the most prominent is Otere's story of English King Alfred (AD 890 \textit{(Cultural Profiles)}). The distribution shown is based on the disposition of the
language groups, the largest of which, the Davvi-Sámi (North Sámi), is shown in dark green. The smallest group, shown in red, are the Ter-Sámi, whose language is very nearly extinct. The Sámi are a minority throughout almost the whole of the area they inhabit, with the exception of the municipalities Kautokeino and Karasjok in Norway and Utsjoki in Finland (Eriksson 1997:24). Throughout Scandinavia, Sámi are found outside the traditional areas shown in Figure 1, because of recent urbanization (including the search for work) and earlier colonization processes in which the Sámi people were forced north of their homeland. A significant part of the Sámi population resides outside core area in major cities like Stockholm and Oslo: “There's a joke among the Sámi's that Oslo is the largest Sámi colony in the world” (The Sámi Homeland).

As in the case of Botswana’s Basarwa, providing exact statistics on the size of the Sámi population poses methodological problems.

This follows earlier nation state policies of assimilation and repression of the indigenous minorities. However, it is estimated that 5,000-6,500 Sámi live in Finland, 17,000-20,000 in Sweden, about 2,000 in Russia and 40,000-45,000 in Norway. Just less than 10% of the Sámi are engaged in reindeer herding. Parts of the Sámi population gain their livelihood from agriculture, fishing and wilderness industries while many Sámi are employed in the general labour market. (Myrvoll 1999: 11).

The policies of the Nordic states towards the Sámi, from the 19th century until after World War II, were based on assimilation. This meant that the Sámi were expected to replace their own cultural characteristics and language with those of the majority culture. Sámi culture and language, and their
perceived traditional economy, were considered obstacles to the consolidation and social development of the national states formed from the earlier Swedish and Danish Kingdoms, Norway attaining independent statehood in 1905. Based on a variant of social Darwinism, this policy led to the Norwegian authorities introducing “reforms that restricted the use of the Sámi language in schools and forbad (sic) the sale of land to people that could not speak Norwegian. The Sámi culture was oppressed and the people ‘Norwegianized’” (Kinsten, 2000), as well as many Sámi lost their language during this period due to the assimilation policy (The Sámi Homeland).

After 1945, there was a new wave of Sámi mobilisation, this time through the establishment of national Sámi organizations, beginning in Sweden in the 1950s and 1960s.¹ By 1973, an elected Sámi Parliament was established in Finland. “In Norway, a major change occurred in public opinion about the Sámi situation during the conflict between the Sámi and the Norwegian state over the construction of the Alta/Kautokeino dam” (Magga 1994:43). This hydro power dam was planned and constructed in 1979-1981, in the heart of Sámi territory and created a political crisis due to massive demonstrations from environmental organisations and the Sámi people (including a hunger strike). Archaeological researchers from the University of Tromsø had discovered ancient Sámi rock paintings in the Alta River valley and led the campaign to preserve them from being covered by the proposed dam’s waters (Hood, 1996). The conflict engaged most of the Norwegian population as well as newspapers and TV stations from all over the world whereby the demonstrators actively used the international media during this period to argue for their opinion. This construction was, and still is an important symbol for both the environmental interests in Norway and for the rights of the Sámi population.

However, their arguments were not efficient enough to stop the construction. Today you can see the 110-meter high dam; however, although the “actors lost the case ... in many ways they won the future” (Myrvoll, 1999: 12). Yet the campaign for preservation of the rock paintings drew a compromise from the state, in that the dam wall was constructed about 400 metres upstream (see Figure 3) from its originally planned location so that the Alta Valley paintings would not be drowned. A further unexpected benefit to the Sámi reindeer herders was that they could migrate across the dam wall instead of taking the long way round the deep glacial valley as they had done before. The Alta-conflict, with the active help of media, stated some important principles regarding the rights of Norwegian Sámi people. A Sámi Parliament was established in 1989 to recognise their rights, and today one can even see bilingual signboards, both inside buildings and in open public spaces like roads. In sum, the controversy directed much attention to the Sámi fight for their own

¹ Post-War Norwegian Sámi mobilization begins in 1948, with the foundation of Sámi Reindeer Herders Association. Later groups include the National Association of Norwegian Sámi in 1968, and in 1979 the Norwegian Sámi Union was established in response to the ongoing Alta protest action (Josefsen, 2003).
rights and the legitimacy of the Norwegian authorities which all together improved the political climate for raising Sámi issues (Magga 1994:49).

The Basarwa are commonly understood to be the first inhabitants of present day Botswana, and base their claim to the indigenous first peoples of Botswana on this. Historically organised in nomadic bands consisting of a few extended families (ranging from 20 to 50 people), the Kalahari Bushmen subsisted previously almost entirely by hunting and gathering:

Out of a population of 1.7 million, an estimated 50,000 people are Basarwa and a similar number are spread through Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Angola. The exact figure of the Basarwa is difficult to determine since Botswana does not differentiate on ethnic grounds, therefore numbers of minorities are not recorded in the national census (Le Roux 1999: 15).

Band territories are sometimes as large as 1,000 square kilometres" though for part of the year a particular band would set up camp near a ‘waterhole’ (Barnard, 1992: 4). Unfortunately, today this description of their area is more or less history. In southern Africa, the various groups of foragers are known as ‘Bushmen’, ‘San’ or ‘Khoe’ (also ‘Khwe’) and these include numerous distinct linguistic and identity groupings (Hitchcock, 1996: 15). The various terms used to name this people have problematic histories, and in 1992 the indigenous NGO Kgeikani Kweni (First People of the Kalahari or FPK) suggested the use of ‘/Noakhwe’ (which means ‘First People’). In Botswana, the Bushmen are also known as Basarwa, although the latter term is often deemed to be pejorative as it means ‘those who don’t raise cattle’, indicating a primitive way of life (Barnard and Taylor, 2002: 230-246). In Southern Africa, WIMSA² representatives have decided to use the term San “until such time as one representative name for all groups will be accepted by all” (Le Roux 1999). While giving due recognition to the difficulties associated with all these terms, in the present thesis paper I will use the term ‘San Bushmen’ to distinguish the Botswana bands from other groups in southern Africa. This specific term refers to the Gwi and Gana Bushmen of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve in Botswana in particular (Appendix 4 and 5), the people visited by Professor Tomaselli and undersigned, and who recently have suffered evictions and as a result have gained some prominence in the media.

Figure 2 shows the location of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR), within which are also indicated the principal settlements visited during the research phase for this thesis. In the 1950s, the British colonial administration of Bechuanaland undertook a ‘Bushman survey’ and in 1961 created the CKGR. The reserve, covering an area of roughly 52,000 square kilometers, was primarily set up to “protect the food supplies of the existing Bushmen population in this area which has been estimated to approximately 4,000 from the activities of the European farming community at Ghanze”

²WIMSA - Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa
(Taylor, 2000: 19). In other words, the ‘game reserve’ was, amongst other things, intended to ensure that there was sustainable numbers of game for the Bushmen to hunt (Survival International: 2005). After independence in 1966, however, the government of Botswana first restricted the hunting practices of the Bushmen by issuing licenses limiting the number of animals that could be killed annually. In 2002, the year after they charged Bushmen for ‘over-hunting’, the Botswana Department of Wildlife and National Parks said that “it would no longer issue hunting permits to San for use within the reserve” (Maroleng, 2002: 9). Indeed, many of these groups have become dependent on small scale farming in small extended-family settlements, along with hunting and gathering (Associated Press, 2002).

Since January 2002, the government has evicted – or, in its own terms, ‘relocated voluntarily’ (Government of Botswana, 2005) – a number of groups from Old Xade and Molapo within the CKGR, resettling them in permanent settlements, such as New Xade, outside the reserve. In these ‘settlements’ the Bushmen have no land to roam for hunting and gathering, or to raise cattle. Limited to a small allocation of land, the Bushmen have become reliant on government rations, and many are said to have turned to alcoholism (Appendix 4/Tape 1. TC:12:42:15). These settlements have become for many international observers ‘places of death’, due to the rise in alcoholism and HIV/AIDS (Gall, 2001: 236-9). In 2001 the government’s own estimate of Bushmen was 687 living inside the reserve, and 1647 living outside after being ‘relocated’. There are no reliable estimates of the present population in the reserve, but visiting those 3 settlements during the research phase, we...
met or saw fewer than 60 people in total (the research itinerary excluded one more settlement, Gobe; it is therefore uncertain whether anyone still lives there. We were told by residents at the settlements we did visit that there was no one left in Old Xade).

III. Development, Media, and Public Attitudes to Minorities.

Making sense of the respective political development trajectories of the Sámi and SanBushmen requires a prior analysis. The Bushmen are unable to claim differential treatment or exemption from the Botswana government’s policies of modernization and development; on the other hand, the Sámi have attained to considerable cultural autonomy. Under International Law, if the Bushmen were able to claim that they are an ‘indigenous’ group with distinct historical traditions which they wish to preserve, then they could argue for special rights, protection, and exemption from the developmental agendas to which the government is committed (Thornberry, 2002: 33-60). However, the government rejects the notion that the Bushmen are ‘indigenous’ to the area, therefore precluding them from claiming specific rights or exemption from modernisation. The government argues that the term ‘indigenous’ should not be applied only to the SanBushmen, claiming instead that “all residents of the country are indigenous” (Hitchcock, 1996: 15). Although this particular reasoning is not the main argument supporting the Government’s policy, denial of the Bushmen’s indigenous status ensures that development-related policies are not variably applied to the Bushmen as a distinct cultural group. The government justifies the rejection of the Bushmen’s indigeneity on the grounds that it has always tried to “avoid ethnic identification in its programs, since in its eyes, this is suggestive of the kinds of terminology used by those espousing apartheid (separate development)” (Hitchcock, 1996: 15). In its “documents and policies the government consistently talks of the Remote Area Dwellers (RADs), like any other poor rural Batswana” (Special Report, 2004). “Since 1978, the government of Botswana prefers to use the term ‘Remote Area Dwellers’, ‘defined on the basis of their; (1) spatial location (remote areas outside villages); (2) socio-political status (marginalized); and (3) socioeconomic status (impoverished and subject to discrimination)” (Hitchcock, 2004).

This strategy entrenches the Botswana government’s insistence on maintaining its sovereign right to define nationhood and belonging. In classifying the Bushmen as ‘poor’ – but not as ‘culturally distinct’ – and then devising and implementing policies meant to target poverty, such policies show little concern as to the ‘cultural’ or ‘identity’ erosion that result from the Bushmen’s separation from their land and traditions. Quite naturally, analysts of ethnicity and identity suggest that this approach is problematic: Maureen Akena, a programme officer at Ditshwanelo – the Botswana Centre for Human Rights – is reported as noting that, “the Basarwa need a place where they belong. But how do
you recognise their need of a sense of belonging if you don’t recognise their right to their identity?” (Special Report, 2004, see also Appendix 4 and 5)

In Norway, Sámi demands for collective rights were also based on their claim to the status of an indigenous people, in response to circumstances not of group members’ own choosing. The most important grounds for their claim were (1) that they share cultural bonds; and (2) that “their historical areas of habitation have been incorporated into the nation state through the use of varying degrees of force” (Oskal 1998: 149). Together, these facts imply that indigenous peoples had previously been collectively incorporated into the nation without their consent. In parallel with developments in the perception of the relationship between state and indigenous people, there was a change in the way in which representation through majority election was understood. It was recognised that if votes in an election in a multi-cultural society were given equal weight, ethnic minorities would always be in a minority position, always at the mercy of the will of the majority. Attempts were therefore made to find ways to ensure that the Sámi had a voice and were heard.

With the establishment of the national Sámi parliaments, the states accepted the principle of group rights. Not only did the newly established Sámi parliaments lead to a structural change in the national political systems, they also led to a widened understanding of representative democracy (Broderstad 1999: 66).

A feature of the campaigns against the Alta hydro-electric dam project was the intense involvement of international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) – amongst others, Greenpeace International – in their mobilization and communication aspects. In the case of the Botswana SanBushmen, the organization Survival International, which specializes in advocacy issues affecting
indigenous minorities, is by far the most vocal in terms of challenging the actions of the government of Botswana’s action against Basarwa, particularly those in the CKGR. It has published extensively to very wide audiences, especially on the web. Survival’s publicized mandate is to work closely with local indigenous organizations, employing direct personal contact with the tribal communities to provide a platform for them to talk directly with those invading their land: “Tribal peoples must be allowed to speak for themselves. Their own experience is the most persuasive testimony in their defense – that is why governments strive to deny them their voice. Survival breaks the silence by helping them take message to the outside world”:

For over thirty years Survival International has been involved in what it defines as championing tribal peoples’ rights in imaginative ways. Through writing letters to relevant Governments, companies, banks, lobbying, media, United Nations, educating the public, raising funds, discerning information, demonstrations, bringing in tribal representatives to face governments, companies and banks, challenging legal systems, they have been able to change the lives of Tribal peoples across the world (Survival.org).

The organization identifies Botswana’s Basarwa as one of the many tribal peoples with whom it works. Despite Survival’s claim that “there is no more powerful weapon” than the media (Survival.org), they report little on the Basarwa’s efforts to speak on their own behalf. Saugestad (2001:34) recounts her shock back in 1992 when she attended a workshop and heard for the first time a Bushman speaking on a public occasion. It was Komtsha Komtsha, who made her aware for the first time that indeed the Bushmen do speak out against the injustices they suffer. Indeed, Komtsha has gone to the length of petitioning Queen Elizabeth II of England; the letter is reproduced as Appendix 1. On the other hand, Survival claims that it was the first organization to draw attention to the destructive effects of the World Bank structural adjustment policies, the major cause of suffering in many poor countries. While Survival is operating from ‘outside’, Ditshwanelo, the Botswana Centre for Human Rights, operates ‘locally’. Indeed, there is sufficient overlap between the two movements’ messages to narrow the divide between local and outside. Both Ditshwanelo and Survival communicate in almost the same narrative style and tone, reporting the alleged human rights abuses the government of Botswana has perpetrated against the Basarwa.5

3 The organization’s website (http://www.survival.org.uk/bushmanpr0108.htm) uses strongly-worded headlines in reporting on the issue. Amongst others, these include “The Bushmen peoples – the hidden face of racism today”; “Last Kalahari Bushmen tortured and facing starvation”; “Botswana Ignores Kalahari ‘Bushman’ land ownership”; “Botswana: last ‘Bushmen’ in Kalahari Reserve resist eviction”; “Botswana squeezes Kalahari peoples out”; “Diamonds for land”; “Botswana persecutes Bushmen”; and “Botswana: Bushmen persecuted to drive them off their land”.
4 Komtsha was one of the leaders of the Central Kalahari Bushmen. There is no record of the letter ever having been delivered to the Queen. The text was published for the first time in Africa Reports, 29 April 2005 (Bridgland, 2005) under the heading “Bushmen to be Denied Homeland.” This article reports that Komtsha was unable to persuade anyone to deliver the letter before he died. During our journey through the CKGR, we heard more than once about letters written to the Queen of England.
5 Ditshwanelo released a 28-page report to the media, accusing the government of forcefully moving the Basarwa from the game reserve. They alleged that there had never been proper consultation on the resettlement (Malema, 1997).
Ditshwanelo states that the reason that some of the Basarwa had moved could only be due to enticement from government, because they had been promised better facilities and access to basic needs. The ‘enticement’ of which the government is accused (see Malema, 1997) alludes to the issue of modernization; interviewed for a news programme, Local Government Minister Margaret Nasha argues that the Basarwa will achieve their demands through education, and will “represent themselves and represent themselves convincingly” when they have “the right and access to education” (Carte Blanche, 26 February 2002). By further arguing that the Survival-Ditshwanelo campaign against the evictions has the result of keeping the Bushmen away from the mainstream, and away from politics, the government position appears to be that the access to and exercise of rights is tied to place of residence. Indeed, the government has encouraged the resettlement of the SanBushmen since 1986; however, the decision to remove all residents from the CKGR was only taken in late 2001, on the grounds that the state could not permit a section of the people to live without access to modern facilities. (Carte Blanche, 26 February 2002).

The SanBushmen question this argument, as one told us “I don’t want to live in a land that is not mine. Those things, if we want them, they must bring them to us here” (See Appendix 5/ Tape 2, TC: 13:39:10; see also Appendix 6); or as Anderson (2002) confirms “if they really want us to modernize why don’t they bring the schools and development to us in our ancestral lands?” On the other hand, some challenge the ‘drive to modernity’ altogether: Daoxlo Xukuri of FPK argues that “Government relief is another way of killing a person; in the Reserve we knew how to provide for ourselves”. Analysts tend to agree: Alice Mogwe of Ditshwanelo explains that “the government gives but does not empower. Its progress is based on dependency” and that Bushmen have gone “from being resourceful to being dependent” all “in one move” (Special Report, 2004). Furthermore, the government claims that relocating the SanBushmen is less problematic than suggested by indigenous rights groups, such as Survival International, on the grounds that their ways of life are no longer distinct and unique, and therefore they no longer need the reserve to protect their cultural distinctiveness. The denial of cultural distinctiveness by the government would make it extremely difficult to claim rights to land and its natural resources, when the Bushmen challenge the legality and legitimacy of current law, as did the #Khomani community in South Africa.

There is a tension between development and identity at work in the SanBushmen case, comparable with that which appears to have been resolved amicably – if not to the complete satisfaction of everybody – in the case of Norway’s Sámi. Clearly, the statutory resolution of the problem of Sámi identity in a national setting occurred after a considerably longer period, beginning 1905, than has been available in the case of the SanBushmen since Botswana’s independence in 1966. In some
measure, the Botswana minority may be seen to be subject, in somewhat more practical terms, to
the methodological tension facing anthropologists: a scientific order of knowledge (Foucault, 1970,
1974) may be conceived as 'vanquishing' an order of 'Priest-craft' (Rorty, 1980: 327; Shepperson
and Tomaselli, 1998) founded on religious, spiritualistic, animistic or other systems based on an
enchanted conception of reality. By analogy, development brings forms of social and political order
to societies in which some or other enchanted conception of reality has customarily formed the basis
for the conduct of everyday life. The problem in both cases lies in the ongoing status of the
supplanted epistemology or social order after their replacement (whether with science in the former
case or with the socio-political order of the national state in the latter). For instance,

When the ... scientific order is faced with cultures predicated on other kinds of world-views, it
responds through two mutually exclusive avenues. Either it treats the world-view and behaviour
of the Other as 'Priest-craft' and consequently something to be vanquished. Or it views it as an
autonomous object of study and manipulation, which needs to be preserved (conserved) as such.
... If, however, ... the scientific gaze sees the behaviour of the Other as 'primitive' and
undesirable, then conservation fails because of the Other's being relegated into irrelevance.
When science is chosen, conservation is impossible because the Other has validity only as an
object of study in its 'raw' form (Tomaselli, 1996: 124-5).

Much the same may be said of the problem facing practitioners in the development communication
field: if we understand the culture of the Other, it is only so we may replace it with something
modern. If we impose modernity irrespective of whether or not we understand what is replaced, then
it becomes impossible to preserve the continued identity of the subject-community because within a
short time nobody will remember what was worth conservation. Epistemologically speaking, then,
the only choice for development would seem to be no development.

IV. Media and the Problem of Development and Choice.

Although the foregoing assumes a state of affairs in which the epistemic distinctions between
cultures are conceived to be extreme to the point of incommensurability, the basic point should be
noted: orthodox development theory tends to view the beneficiaries as choosing between
development and stagnation (or regression). Criticism of development policies almost universally
proceeds from the position that beneficiaries need to be provided both with the means of choosing freely when taking strategic decisions about development issues, and with the relevant information
about the options or alternatives between which they must choose (Servaes, 2002; Melkote and
Steeves, 2001). The objection made against existing policy usually implies that programmes are
imposed without due acknowledgement of cultural issues; Tomaselli's (1996) point being that
scientific thought is inherently incapable of grasping either (1) the frequently ideological
assumptions that allegedly inform development strategy; or (2) the 'cosmological' or 'ontological'
grounds of 'culture' that shape the ways beneficiary communities 'make meaning' of their worlds. In the present case, the issue takes on an additional developmental dimension in that much of the debate occurs in the media (much of it sourced to Survival International), with rival positions being publicized in both print and electronic media. Non-Governmental Organizations frequently base their advocacy strategies on the claim that indigenous minorities lack the means, power, or resources to present their side of the decision-making debate to the broader public (ibid), and that expert outside assistance – which, of course, includes public relations – will overcome this shortcoming. The NGO sector thus claims a specialist communication function – “giving a voice to the voiceless”, for example – in the environment of ameliorating the exigencies of subsistence in national areas lacking the infrastructure and organizational capacity to ensure social security across the entire country.

This functional relationship between media, communication, and development has its origins in the major expansion in Communication Science during the 1950s (cf., e.g., Tomaselli, 2005). Below I examine a representative example of the material upon which much development communication relies either directly or indirectly: Siebert, Peterson and Schramm’s seminal *Four Theories of the Press* (1956). This text established the dominant paradigm for analyzing global media systems and, in particular, in assessing levels of press freedom in countries and regions of the world. The four theories they identified were (1) the authoritarian; (2) the Libertarian; (3) the Soviet system; and (4) the Social Responsibility paradigm.

(1) In the authoritarian state system governments take direct control of media. This system is especially easy to recognize in pre-democratic societies, where the government consists of a restricted, sometimes aristocratic, ruling-class. The fundamental assumption of the authoritarian system is that the government is infallible. Media organizations and practitioners are therefore not allowed any independence, although governments may enforce an authoritarian profile without being openly totalitarian. A state that seems to come close to this media system today is Botswana (see Appendices 2-4). The authoritarian system “has been most pervasive both historically and geographically”; the goal of the media under such a system is to support and advance the policies of the government so that it can achieve its objectives (Siebert, 1956: 18). Control mechanisms include

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6 It is unclear from Tomaselli’s (1996) treatment of the problem faced by documentary and ethnographic filmmakers, whether the incommensurability between development policy and local knowledge is based on any prior logical analysis of relations other than the economic. Tomaselli’s arguments are essentially of a linguistic nature, arguing that ‘meaning’ (i.e. the semantics of words and propositions) arises from prior ontological differences between the respective worldviews of development agencies and beneficiary communities. Proceedings from the main source for Tomaselli’s theory, C.S. Peirce, then meaning is essentially a first-order phenomenon, whereas ontology is elaborated from second-order reasoning about the object of meaning. Effectively, Tomaselli’s treatment may be similar to a category confusion as has been noted in Placide Tempels’s (’58) *Bantu Philosophy*: that the use of language assumes either that speech “was made for the philosophical mind only, or that stupid people who nevertheless can talk and who speak grammatically are also philosophers” (Masolo, 1994: 102). This may also be seen as the foundational mistake in Antonio Gramsci’s (1971) political theory (I am indebted to Shepperson for this critique).
but are not limited to licensing systems; state censorship; special taxes; and anti-treason and anti-sedition laws in the name of national security. Never the less, authoritarian governments do not object to a discussion of political systems in broad philosophical terms, but stop short of allowing direct criticism of current political leaders and their projects, or overt attempts to unseat the authorities themselves (Siebert, 1956: 26.)

(2) Contrary to the authoritarian theory, libertarian theory holds that man is rational and an end in himself. The happiness and well-being of the individual is the goal of society (Siebert, 1956: 40). The “Enlightenment” gave an impetus to the concept with its call to free man from all outside restrictions to use his reason. Siebert and his collaborators (1956: 44-47) cite John Milton, John Stuart Mill and Thomas Jefferson as the major philosophical influences behind this concept. The function of the libertarian media is to inform and entertain and to act as a watchdog over the government. Libertarian media are mostly private. Control of the libertarian media is mostly exercised through the “self-correcting” process, the civil courts, and even through licensing, censorship or seizure of offending material; injunctions against the publication of a newspaper may also be used. Voluntary censorship is sometimes practiced while the right of access to government sources is avidly pursued.

(3) Social responsibility theory was an outgrowth of the libertarian theory and was first developed in the 20th century United States by the Commission on Freedom of the Press, which emphasized social responsibility of the press. In addition to inform, entertain and sell, the press should also “raise conflict to the plane of discussion.” (Severin and Tankard, 2001: 310). Press control is mostly in the form of community opinion, consumer action and professional ethics. The main difference between the libertarian theory and the social responsibility theory is that the latter suggests that someone must see that media perform responsibly if they do not do so voluntarily.

(4) Soviet Communist theory focuses on the value of unity – unity of the working class and unity of the Party. For the sake of unity, there is only one right position and only one truth, the absolute truth: the doctrine and policies of the Party. Wilbur Schramm (1964: 114) saw the Soviet political system as “one of the most complete dictatorships in modern history”. Media in communist societies are state-owned and should be a “collective propagandist, collective agitator... and collective organizer” (116). The Soviet system defined the function of mass communications positively and removed the profit motive from publishing and broadcasting. Under the Soviet system, the government had a division of censorship. Other means of control included the appointment of editors, a large number of directives regarding press content and press reviews and criticisms. Soviet systems also differ from the authoritarian ones in that the media organizations have a certain responsibility to meet the wishes of their audience.
Other theories on press systems followed as the decades passed. These include developmental journalism (popular in the Philippines and South Asia), revolutionary media (Hachten, 1999), and democratic-participant media (McQuail, 1994). These successors mostly complement perceived gaps in the established four-theories model. The fundamental objection against Siebert's approach is its lack of flexibility. In order to avoid this weakness, the following relational model may be proposed (Figure 3):

![Figure 3. Relational model for press systems.](http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/2152/siebert.htm#vivian#vivian)

The advantage of this representation of the model lies first of all in its starting-point. The two coordinates represent the two elements required for a communication event to occur: context (the medium itself) and content (the message). The diagram, adapted from the original, permits one to conceive the breakdown showing the relationships between strictly given categories as having a spatial character, opening space for conceiving new ideas that relate independently to the existing theoretical models in so far as these new conceptions themselves relate to content and context. A further weakness is also apparent when the four-theories model is treated on a purely discursive basis: it does not clearly display its essentially retrospective foundation: Siebert et al are effectively discussing an existing set of dispensations in the context of a contemporary historical trajectory – the Cold War – that was apparent to their readers of all persuasions. Represented spatially, however, each theory can be seen as having a certain epistemological and ideological distance from the others, permitting the analyst to consider innovative alternative press dispensations in prospect. The same coordinate set, that is, can be viewed looking forward in time so that any innovative theory of media can be seen in its relation to existing theories; if the present-day media landscape no longer contains a particular theory, one may simply exclude it from the diagram.
Denis McQuail (2000: 161-162) offers an expanded typology of media theories, revising the 1956 theories under the heading of **normative theory paradigms** that consider press dispensations in just this prospective manner. Indeed, if one considers that normative approaches have been common in economics for decades (see, for example, Sen, 1982: 432-449; Arrow, 1951, 1963) it would seem almost that McQuail is playing catch-up in as much as his predecessors follow a largely **descriptive** theory of the press. The five paradigms, in no particular order, are:

1) Liberal-pluralist: essentially Siebert et al’s (1956) model reworked as a prescriptive theory;

2) Social-responsibility: based on norms developed around the pairing of rights/freedoms and responsibilities;

3) Critical: theories that prescribe freedoms in terms of media production and reception that are free of dominant or hegemonic influences;

4) Administrative: norms prescribing ‘media of record’ that provide information, analysis and news to an audience of leaders/administrators in developed nations; and

5) Cultural Negotiation: norms for media practice and goals, based on more or less radically relativistic conceptions of culture, that eschew notions of universal rationality and encourage more or less populist or communitarian notions of solidarity.

Because the present study is principally concerned with the African situation, most attention will be paid to the suggestion that “we need to have a category for ‘development theory’ alongside the liberal and Marxist variants” of media theory (McQuail, 2000: 155). Because of the extent to which it has been embraced in African perspectives following UNESCO’s McBride Commission (1980), McQuail’s media theory paradigms all enumerate more or less special conditions, values, and aspirations that developing countries may use to call for a particular media orientation that prescribes roles serving development goals. However, analysis shows that most of these roles have already been prescribed in some of the earlier four-theories models anyway. But more importantly, the development support role is given precedence to the extent that it takes priority over other rights and freedoms, especially media freedom, where the latter is defined as “the basic principle of any theory of public communications from which other benefits flow”, the protection of which is why there is need to regulate media (McQuail, 2000: 166). This contradicts what McQuail claims is the theory’s other concern: respect for democratic communication as expressed and entrenched in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Skogerbø, 1991: 144-146).
McQuail (2000: Chapters 7 - 8) outlines a number of components that can be referred to as the "public interest", including plurality of ownership; freedom of publication; diversity of information; diversity of expression of opinion; universal reach; support for the democratic system; respect for the judicial system; and respect for individual and general human rights (McQuail, 2000: 142-144). When viewed in aggregate, these criteria effectively identify development media as a species of public sphere, a neutral space within society, free of both state and corporate control, in which the media should make available information affecting the public good, and facilitate a free, open and reasoned public dialogue that guides the public direction of society (Curran, 2000: 135). Objectivity is a prerequisite to quality information and helps to increase public confidence and trust in what they receive through the media. Objectivity deals with facts, and facts are essential in discourses that take place in the public sphere (McQuail, 2000: 173). These standards entail mixed and divided responsibilities for media, in order to reach alternative social groups and subcultures, and reflect fairly the expression of conflicts and inequalities of society (McQuail, 2000: 175). Media ownership concentration, therefore, threatens the right to uncensored information and freedom of speech of the individual journalists.

V. Media, Development and Welfare: General normativity in society and culture.

Looking back at the various approaches used in media theory and to develop theories of the press, it becomes clear that all theorists have certain things in common. For all of them, media act to foster democracy. What largely divides them into different camps is their conception of democracy. For Siebert et al (1956), democracy means mainly the US model of two-party representative government with a strict separation of powers. For the more critical school of thought, democracy means participatory democracy in various forms. I have not examined dependency theory in any detail, mainly because this paradigm essentially uses a rhetorical strategy of redefinition to argue that development actually 'means' (see Note 6 above) dependency on the developed world. However, the development communication and media theories of Servaes (2002) and of Melkote and Steeves (2001), amongst others, prescribe certain development benefits that flow from free, democratic, and participatory media, also found in the four-theory model. These include:

1) Social stability (authoritarian model);
2) Curbing excesses of the State (libertarian model);
3) Raising conflict to the level of discussion, to reduce public violence (social responsibility theory);
4) Protection of rights (Hamelink, 2001; McQuail, 2000);
5) Developing the public sphere (Hamelink, 2001; McQuail, 2000; Servaes, 2002); and
6) Preserving the cultural integrity of communities (Melkote and Steeves, 2001; Servaes, 2002).
If these are considered broadly in relation to the goals of development, they are conditions that can be seen as promoting a certain kind of non-oppressive social state. Arrow (1951: 17) defines a social state generally as:

... a complete description of each type of commodity in the hands of each individual, the amount of labour to be supplied by each individual, the amount of each productive resource invested in each type of productive activity, such as municipal services, diplomacy and its continuation by other means, and the erection of statues to famous men. It is assumed that each individual in the community has a definite ordering of all conceivable social states, in terms of their desirability to him. It is not assumed here that an individual's attitude toward different social states is determined exclusively by the commodity bundles that accrue to his lot under each. It is simply assumed that the individual orders all social states by whatever standards he deems relevant.

It is obvious that this model shares the basis used for earlier economic modernization approaches to development, since the definition does not take account of indigenous cultural factors. However, one can exploit this definition in the context of Sen’s (1981) broad concept of entitlement and its collateral concepts of command and endowment. In general, entitlements are defined in terms of the legal ability of persons to command due access to or consumption of the basic goods, services or commodities covered by reigning conceptions of Right; for example, ownership of food...

... is one of the most primitive of property rights, and in each society there are rules governing this right. The entitlement approach concentrates on each person’s entitlements to commodity bundles including food, and views starvation as resulting from a failure to be entitled to a bundle with enough food (Sen, 1981: 43).

Food entitlements are part of a person’s broader endowment bundle, that includes land, labour power, and so on (ibid.). In the foregoing, the supposed benefits of the press and other media may not be understood in the same kind of economic terms, although there is no reason to exclude from persons’ endowment bundles such conditions for enjoyment of press and other freedoms as literacy and access to a reasonable education (however the latter may be defined). 8

One will not, of course, starve because of illiteracy; but one’s endowment bundle could well be restricted as a result of inadequate literacy skills. Similarly, it is not inconceivable that, as with the Sámi before their lobbying had its effect, adequate literacy in an indigenous minority language would not add to one’s endowment bundle relative to formal system of rights and welfare benefits

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7 Strictly speaking, Sen considers command as a property of the exchange entitlement mapping (EEM), a “function that specifies the set of alternative commodity bundles that the person can command respectively for each endowment bundle” (Sen, 1981: 46). For the present thesis, however, I will use ‘command’ instead of EEM, because this can help with classifying the forms of entitlement ascribable to different actors in the development environment. The reason for this will become clear, because I am specifically interested in the role of non-citizen actors in the fields of both development and of indigenous minority rights, and discuss this in more detail toward the end of the thesis.

8 In 1998 Amartya Sen received the Stockholm Prize in Economics (often mistakenly called the Nobel Economics Prize) for his work on the formal economic nature of poverty. In much of his work Sen acknowledges Arrow as both a predecessor and as a colleague (both were active at Harvard University), and Sen’s relationship with Arrow may be seen as all of protegé, critic, colleague, and elaborator. This does not in any way detract from the enormous intellectual scope of Sen’s inquiries, and Sen may equally be seen as having influenced Arrow’s later work.
available in a country in which another language enjoys priority. To account for these
considerations, Arrow’s basic idea can be rewritten to refer to a cultural state visualised for
development, as:

A complete description of the symbolic power at the disposal of each individual both within and
outside his or her community, the quality of critical engagement available to individuals in
relation to power, the knowledge, learning, and cultural resources at the disposal of individuals as
far as these will facilitate authentic contributions to the symbolic life of communities and
societies. It is assumed that each individual in the community has a definite ordering of all
conceivable cultural states, in terms of their desirability to him or her. It is not assumed here that
an individual’s attitude toward different cultural states is determined exclusively by the symbolic
bundles that accrue to her lot under each. It is simply assumed that the individual orders all
cultural states by whatever standards he or she deems relevant.9

Thus the media and communication sides of the development problem can be understood as
involving how individuals can know and understand the choices available to them in their own
context. Each of these conceptions of State may be related to Sen’s (1992) discussion of Freedom.
Arrow’s social state is applicable in the context of Well-being Freedom, to “achieve those things that
are constitutive of one’s well-being” (Sen, 1992: 57-72). On the other hand, my proposed cultural
state is relevant to the question of Agency Freedom, to “bring about the achievements one values and
which one attempts to reproduce” (ibid.). All but Siebert et al’s Soviet theory of media and
journalism meet some or even most of these requirements, even though it may be that none presently
meet them all. Essentially, then, attainment of the entitlements empowering command over the
preferential choice of a valued cultural state is a definition of cultural autonomy that complements
the economic autonomy embodied in Arrow’s definition of a Social state.

It is obvious that in the libertarian theory, an individual’s command over symbolic power depends on
how he or she disposes of wealth – the richer one is, the more one can draw on exchange
entitlements to command social and cultural goods (for instance, for purchasing the technology and
bandwidth for communicating on the internet). Under the social responsibility theory, the media
institutions ensure access to symbolic power, but the knowledge and learning available to exercise
one’s well-being or agency freedoms become limited to that which the organization can pay for. The
development support communication model ensures the cultural integrity of indigenous
communities, but at the price of communities’ own critical voice. This is mainly (but not only)
because development bodies or civil society dispose of agency freedoms that often draw on other
cultural resources to make the case for local agency freedom empowerment, often at the expense of
their supposed beneficiaries’ well-being freedom (the case of Survival International in Botswana is a
good example). In the Another Development model (see Servaes, 2001; Melkote and Steeves, 2000;

9 My thanks to Arnold Shepperson for his interpretation of Arrow that avoids the economic models of development
thinking.
Rogers, 1995; Ross and Usher, 1986), the attention is paid to protecting or enhancing traditional or customary agency freedom in an existing cultural state without thinking about symbolic choices that media in democratic societies offer to communities: to protect and enshrine a community's existing culture more or less unchanged would seem to hinder their broader democratic symbolic power and not strengthen it.

Thus the non-authoritarian theories of media and communication each have some necessary cultural contribution to make, but none is both necessary and sufficient to ensure the accomplishment of development. In the following section I will look at the case of Australian academic Kenneth Good's expulsion from Botswana. This can be seen as a study in authoritarian press practice even though the Botswana constitution is supposed to support libertarian values, especially from the point of view of entitlements defined under the idea of well-being freedom.

VI. The Fragility of Media Freedom: the Kenneth Good affair.

For all that Botswana has had a lot of attention from the developed world because of the stability it has provided to investors, things are not as settled as this perception suggests. Electoral turnout is low, and opposition parties are disorganized and lack capacity. Media workers are restricted from getting information from Government sources by strict anti-whistleblower provisions (Good, 2003: 1). Various other impediments and technical factors limit newsgathering and dissemination of the Botswana media. Lack of mobility and of suitable telecommunication facilities hinder journalists from fully acting as watchdogs for society. On the one hand, this could be ethnically-based, or politically motivated, where a journalist in an editorial position in a media organization is there because of considerations independent of journalistic criteria and therefore cannot criticize the political leaders who appointed them. On the other hand, government officials are reluctant to release information that would help the journalists educate the public on critical issues, (Mogekwu, 1995: 312-313; 318; Zaffiro, 1999). Thus the ostensibly libertarian constitutional basis for Botswana's media is contradicted by two elements identifiable from both Siebert and McQuail. In the first instance, media practitioners are either beholden to the Government for their positions, or restricted by underdevelopment from pursuing their roles; these factors put an authoritarian face on media that are in no way at odds with policy implementation. In other words, development and communication are effectively imposed on the citizenry and minorities. In the second, media are not consumed to their full potential because of the limited level of adult literacy in the media consuming public. Media, that is to say, may well entertain through radio or television; but their capacity to inform and educate is restricted, respectively, by the influence of authorities with agendas based on the maintenance of power, and by the incapacity of citizens at large to follow up on topics of importance by other means. Put differently, to hear about a problem of national importance without
being sufficiently literate to find further information to read does not broadly constitute communication in the sense that either Siebert or McQuail conceived it.

An example of how this effect plays out in reality may be seen in the recent (July 2005) expulsion of academic Kenneth Good from Botswana, on the grounds that media reports of his work had undermined the credibility of the state. An example of his work is the report he prepared (Good, 2003) for the Nordiska Afrikainstitutet on the state of political and economic democracy in Botswana. In the report, Good notes that the country has developed into a largely presidentialist political system, with considerable power concentrated in the hands of the President and the Chief of the Defence Force, while the processes of Government are largely kept secret under the terms of the National Security Act (Good, 2003: 9-10). Economically, the country relies heavily on diamond exports for foreign exchange and employment outside the State structures, a situation that potentially leads to instability (Good, 2003: 24). Most relevant for this thesis is that there remains persistent inequality between the ethnic Tswana elite and other groups, including the SanBushmen, that excludes minorities from the full benefits of development (Good, 2003: 14-16). Although Good had been Professor of Political Science at the University of Botswana for fifteen years, and could hardly be considered an 'undesirable alien' after such a lengthy residence, his record of critical research and international connections were to be of no help when word got out that he was to present a public speech on Presidential succession in Botswana (See Appendix 2c).

Good had prepared a paper critical of state policy on the problem of development and political succession in African states, which included criticism of the handling of the SanBushmen of CKGR. When word got about that Good was to present the paper to a public gathering, the state issued a deportation order with a 48-hour deadline. The order was issued on a Friday, effectively prohibiting Good from presenting his paper as scheduled on Monday. However, by appealing immediately against the order, Good was nevertheless able to deliver the paper at the University of Botswana the following week pending the outcome of the appeal. The details of the episode are presented as Appendix 2a/2b; the present point is that aside from Good's local work as an academic, he was known to have been in contact with other academics and civil society organizations globally. Whether the prospect of unfavourable reports resulting from the proposed speech was the principal reason for Good's deportation is not the issue here, however. What is of some interest, however, is that Good was known for his media profile and contact with the NGO sector. Indeed, one may well stop to consider how much of a media event Good's expulsion became; the point is not that there was some conspiracy, or any concerted policy involved, but that the added media attention to the CKGR SanBushmen in the context of other sensitive issues changed the profile of the affair.
The prospective role of media discourse in this context has definite parallels with what occurred in Norway during the Alta/Kautokeino protests of 1979-81. Among these parallels are (1) the use of celebrity media messages and activism to draw public attention to socio-political issues of certain business practices, like whaling (Norway) or diamonds (Botswana); (2) the mobilization of indigenous minority concerns in connection with these practices (the Sámi in Norway and SanBushmen in Botswana); and (3) NGOs raising single issues in media reports to act as a proxy for wider local issues that would not gain international public attention if reported in normal journalistic styles. The general response to the Norwegian-Sámi issue was the ultimate establishment of an autonomous Parliament for an indigenous minority. To date, the SanBushmen of Botswana have experienced nothing that has actually diminished their marginality in the land of their birth. Their situation mirrors exactly the problem with earlier conceptions of development that the process must apply to

... to all levels of all societies, not just the poor of the non-aligned world. It grew from dissatisfaction with the 'consumer society', with what is sometimes termed 'overdevelopment' or even 'maldevelopment' as well as the growing disillusionment with the modernization approach. The central idea, which is pointed out by almost everyone who is searching for newer approaches towards development, is that there is no universal path to development – it must conceived as an integral, multidimensional and dialectic process that can differ from one society to another (Servaes 2002:78).

However, the Sámi experience suggests that there may be something left out of this statement of the problem: after all, barely 10% of their number engages in the traditional economy of reindeer herding, and their attainment of autonomy as an indigenous minority hardly depended on the preservation of the practice. Indeed, one would hardly distinguish a Sámi from other individuals in terms of their consumer patterns, despite the dictum of the 'Another Development' paradigm that national constitutions ought to “enshrine cultural freedom as one of the pillars on which the state is founded” (Servaes, 2002: 128).

The critique of development, that it did not solve the problem of “the one sided economic strategy of unbalanced growth” associated with earlier projects (Servaes, 2002: 21), does not invalidate the necessarily economic innovations that accompany a society’s shift from subsistence to exchange systems of production, distribution, and consumption. As Good (2003: 33) showed, the “foundation for a widening and deepening of democracy remain extremely frail” in countries where indigenous status excludes people from the benefits of development. This is not a situation where development is either economic or culturally sensitive, however. Taking Sen’s (1981: 43-4) discussion of entitlement and command into account, the situation indicates that both cultural and economic factors are equally indicators of a deeper condition that very clearly involves the ways that different people’s endowments are acknowledged by, and accommodated in, the rules of society. People’s
endowments may be perfectly adequate to a given environment of conduct, a 'space of action' so
to speak, within which their abilities enable them to command social and cultural goods that are
themselves adequate to the continuation of their communities' ways of life. On the other hand, it is
doubtful whether accommodation and acknowledgement, sufficient conditions for some sort of co-
existence between minorities and majorities, constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for
some measure of mutually satisfactory welfare.

Thus another way of considering the economic dimension, that perhaps encompasses Servaes's
concerns, would be to recall, and account for, the fact that the economies of developed national states
also incorporate a strong element of welfare. The Sámi had become part of the Norwegian welfare
system from an early stage; the indigenous peoples of Botswana, especially the SanBushmen, are
actively excluded from the welfare system (Good, 2003, Kerr, 2001). The widely disparate
accomplishments of these two indigenous minorities certainly shows that where the former clearly
enjoy growing measures of both social and cultural welfare in Norway, the condition of the latter,
regrettably, exemplifies radical illfare (Arrow, 1951: 25). If the state and quality of development are
to be seen as leading to the implementation of both economic and cultural benefits, therefore, then it
may be worthwhile treating development in general as a broad kind of welfare provision. Welfare
economics, as noted above, provides a way of defining the cultural state of countries that is logically
the same as Arrow’s (1951) economic definition. Although Sen (1981, 1982, 1992, amongst others)
has done impressive logical work on the roles, causes, and effects of poverty and inequality on
welfare economic theory, and on developing the formal conditions for the deep analysis of why
economics has tended to be more of a dismal art than an exact science, he never the less
acknowledges that Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is “a remarkable result, of great analytical
beauty”, and “also surprisingly robust” (Sen, 1982: 337). In the following section, therefore, I will
examine Arrow’s handling of the logical problem of welfare economics, much neglected in the
development communication literature, in order to throw some light on why the choice of
development seldom leads to any accomplishment of development.

VII. Formalising Development and Choice.

In any situation of social choice, the method of summing up the preferences indicated in the public
act of choosing runs up against a paradox. This is Kenneth Arrow's (1951) celebrated General
Theorem of the Possibility of Social Welfare Functions, commonly known as the “Impossibility
Theorem”. Informally, the theorem states that “the only methods of passing from individual tastes to
social preferences which will be satisfactory and which will be defined for a wide range of sets of
individual orderings are either imposed or dictatorial” (Arrow, 1951: 59). By imposition Arrow
means merely that a definite set of individual preferences is taken to constitute the overall social
preference. More specifically, this refers to a situation where a definable group within a society effectively defines what shall constitute the form and delivery of a social good after society has gone through the act of choosing. In practical terms, this merely means that the method of deciding the form of the desired social good rests with a political party or professional expert opinion.

On the other hand, a social welfare function is dictated if a single definite individual preference trumps all the corresponding ordering of preferences among choosers other than that specific individual. Given that those who choose may be viewed collectively as an individual (much like corporate respondents are treated as individuals in many legal systems), this means that when a single faction orchestrates the preference for some good within a broader coalition or other social collection irrespective of whether a majority are indifferent to that preferred good, that preference is dictated. For example, if a small Trotskyist revolutionary grouping within a larger socialist trade union grouping threatens to wreck consensus unless their agenda is given equal weight in public communications, then the union grouping’s stated preference for Trotskyite programmes has been dictated by a faction that does not actually command a majority in the organization.

Arrow’s theorem is based on two Axioms, one essentially logical that refers to a general property of weak ordering, the other essentially mathematical, stating the property of transitivity of ordinal relations. The first Axiom establishes the property of quasi-commutativity of the relation $R$, for alternative social goods $x$ and $y$:

**AXIOM I:** For all $x$ and $y$, either $xRy$ or $yRx$,

where $R$ denotes the relation “prefers or is indifferent to” (Arrow, 1951: 12), and represents a weak ordering relation. A strong ordering is a preference, denoted $P$, and is effectively non-commutative in the aggregation of choices. This is because, from Axiom I, it is necessary that indifference between $x$ and $y$ also imply indifference between $y$ and $x$, given that the relation $R$ is ordinal in either order of completing the set $<x,y>$. In another format, one may denote this property as defining preference as if $xPy$, then $\neg yRx$, and if $yPx$, then $\neg xRy$, in relation to the weak ordering relation $R$.

**AXIOM II:** For all $x$, $y$, and $z$, $xRy$ and $yRz$ imply $xRz$.

A relation satisfying Axiom II is said to be transitive (Arrow, 1951: 13).

10 Arrow’s formal definition of an imposed social welfare function relies on the correspondence between weak ordering relations, $R$, within a set of choosers, and the anticipated corresponding relation $\mathcal{R}$ such that society at large either prefers or is indifferent to some social good. Formally, “A social welfare function will be said to be imposed if, for some pair of distinct alternatives $x$ and $y$, $xRy$ for any set of individual orderings $\mathcal{R}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{R}_n$, where $\mathcal{R}$ is the social ordering corresponding to $\mathcal{R}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{R}_n$” (Arrow, 1951: 28).

11 Formally defined, a dictated social welfare function relies on the relation between an individual preference ordering, $P$, and the overall social preference indicated in the act of choosing. Formally, “A social welfare function is said to be dictatorial if there exists an individual $i$ such that, for all $x$ and $y$, $xP_iy$ implies $xPy$ regardless of the orderings $\mathcal{R}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{R}_n$ of all individuals other than $i$, where $P$ is the social preference relation corresponding to $\mathcal{R}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{R}_n$” (Arrow: 1951: 30).
This axiom enables one to analyse the preferences expressed in a social environment as a series of pair-wise comparisons. Since the question of social choice is considered specifically in relation to "democratic capitalist" society (Arrow: 1951: 1-2), the only relevant method of aggregating individual choices into a social choice is that of majority voting (Arrow, 1951: 46). In any general process of voting, however, once the environment of social choice expands to contain more than two choosers among three or more options, the well-known phenomenon of a cycling majority appears, also known as the Voter Paradox, which is readily demonstrated in the case of three options available for three choosers:

Let A, B, and C be the three alternatives, and 1, 2, and 3 the three individuals. Suppose individual 1 prefers A to B and B to C (and therefore A to C), individual 2 prefers B to C and C to A (and therefore B to A), and individual 3 prefers C to A and A to B (and therefore C to B). Then a majority prefer A to B, and a majority prefer B to C. We may therefore say that the community prefers A to B and B to C. If the community is to be regarded as behaving rationally, we are forced to say that A is preferred to C. But in fact a majority of the community prefer C to A (Arrow, 1951: 3). In effect, Table 1 merely displays the fact that a society of three choosers may express no overall preference from among three options from which to express their individual priorities. Of course, these expressed priorities also reflect a system of preferences, in that (for example) voter 1 prefers A to B, B to C, and, by transitivity, A to C, as Arrow demonstrates. The same kinds of rankings apply to voters 2 and 3. On the other hand, each voter’s prioritization represents an individual selection from a much wider set preference rankings, which I will designate C(S), drawn from the set of all possible pair-wise preferences that may be expressed from the set <A; B; C> (the collection being that from which selections are to be made). The full range of possible alternatives expressed as preferences (that is, for the present ignoring indifference) is therefore:

![Table 1](image)

Table 1. Sample of voter paradox for three actual choices from three options among three choosers.

In reality, the nine pair-wise preferences shown in this demonstration are a composition of the six (3! = 6) possible orderings of three items. Although Arrow (1951: 3, n.3) cites one E.J. Nanson as the source for this in an article of 1882, the phenomenon was first noted formally by the Marquis de Condorcet in 1785. See Green-Armytage (2003) for a
\[ APB = R_i \]
\[ BPC = R_{ii} \]
\[ CPA = R_{iii} \]
\[ BPA = R_{iv} \]
\[ BPC = R_v \]
\[ CPB = R_{vi} \]

Where \( P \) denotes the relation "prefers", for example \( APB \) means "prefers A to B", and so on. If one tabulates the expressed priorities as expressed preference rank-orderings (Table 2), therefore, a somewhat different meta-ranking (or, perhaps more correctly, a second-order ranking) is obtained:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( R_i )</td>
<td>( R_{ii} )</td>
<td>( R_{iii} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R_{ii} )</td>
<td>( R_{iii} )</td>
<td>( R_i )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R_{iii} )</td>
<td>( R_{iv} )</td>
<td>( R_{vi} )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.** Second-order ranking of sample of priorities expressed in Table 1.

It is immediately clear that already there are five rank-orderings between options expressed in Table 2. The pair-wise orderings \( R_{iv} \) and \( R_{vi} \) both refer to alternatives validly chosen from the set \( C(S) \), but which by virtue of Axiom II (the principle of transitivity) actually broadens the range of expressed preferences. Thus the point that Arrow is making is not merely that cycling majorities are still not eliminated by aggregating individual preferences into a function that validly represents the collective social preference for the overall collection of choosers: in effect, Arrow’s Theorem states the conclusion that imposition or dictatorships are the only two fair or logical methods for breaking a cycling majority, respectively.

It should also be noted that although Arrow’s deduction proceeds from an axiom of transitivity in much the same manner as in Game Theory, the theorem is not a variation on the latter. Most commonly, Game Theory is taken to refer to situations of conflict, in which strategies are pursued until players either win or lose according to the rules of the game in question. But there are also games of coordination, in which optimal strategies are directed at accomplishing some common end. David Lewis (1968) notes that different coordination strategies may be ranked as preferences such that certain combinations reflect a range of possible cultural viewpoints (he used the status quo, lone disobedience, and the State of Nature as examples of environments within which coordination is

summary of methods used to break cycling majorities. It is notable in Green-Armytage’s summary that such methods can become extraordinarily complex, while never being wholly satisfactory.
more or less readily attainable). In some respects, then, Arrow defines the method of choosing such that methods of aggregating individual preferences into a social choice cover both competitive and coordination solutions in a given environment.

The logical mechanism whereby Arrow accommodates this is the idea of a *quasi-ordering*, a preference ranking, designated $Q$, that would obtain if society were to consider itself adequately compensated after having adopted the goods chosen (Arrow, 1951: 34-35). The very terminology of this concept explains its relevance: a quasi-ordering is such because it denotes an ordering $R$ that does not *as yet* obtain, but which *would obtain* once implementation is accomplished. The properties of $Q$ are almost identical to those of $R$, with the exception that for alternatives $x$ and $y$, $xQy$ for any individual does not imply $xPy$ for the society at large; it merely implies that *at least one individual* is expected to be better off under $x$ than under $y$. Since the establishment in the present of a future dispensation of preference is not admissible under a strict doctrine of Nominalism, therefore, an expected ordering is necessarily a quasi-ordering, an *arbitrary* forecast about what *should be the case* if $x$ and not $y$ were to obtain. It follows from this that if we can say of only one individual that they would no longer prefer $y$ to $x$, then if that individual’s ordering is implemented as the social choice, the decision has been made as a dictated function. Similarly, if some set of individuals coordinate their ordering such that they would no longer prefer $y$ to $x$, and that coordination acts to aggregate the ordering of the social choice, then that coordination is accomplished as an imposed function (Arrow, 1951: 28-31).

**VIII. The Development Paradox? Impossibility, Choice, and Participation.**

It is notable that Arrow’s conception of an environment of choice (the formalities of which are not necessary for the present thesis) is based on a strictly *modernistic* characterisation of the nature of society:

To the nominalist temperament of the modern period, the assumption of the existence of the social ideal in some Platonic realm of being was meaningless. The utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham and his followers sought instead to ground the social good on the good of individuals. The hedonist psychology associated with utilitarian philosophy was further used to imply that each individual’s good was identical with his desires. Hence, the social good was in some sense to be a composite of the desires of individuals. A viewpoint of this type serves as a justification of both political democracy and laissez-faire economics or at least an economic system involving free choice of goods by consumers and of occupations by workers (Arrow, 1951: 22-3).

The reigning (self-proclaimed) post-modern media and communication studies paradigm – following the collapse of the bipolar superpower system (see Kennedy, 1988-89) – makes much of how critically-based collectivist or communitarian systems of thought have supplanted the supposedly
individualistic conceptions of human value and political-economic strategy of the earlier era (see, for example, Mudrooroo, 1997). However, the replacement of earlier collective conceptions like 'class' and 'nation' with more ethnographically derived terms like 'community' and 'culture' merely shifts the individualist analysis to the level of the collected members of each aggregation. Put more simply: the post-modern state of nature pits singular 'cultures' or 'communities' against each other in a purportedly politico-symbolic state of nature, in place of Thomas Hobbes's (1963) early modern conception of the individual in a politico-economic state of nature against every other individual. Effectively, one could say that classical modernist theory in politics and economics admitted of no 'shades of grey' between the existent individual and the existent national state; post-modernism identically insists on a comparable gulf between individual existent communities only. All this indicates that the 'post' in 'post-modern' may more validly be replaced with a qualifier like 'Hyper'.

Logically, one may treat any given 'community' or 'culture' as an individual, especially in the context of contemporary notions based on what Charles Taylor (1991) defined as the “ethics of authenticity”, or of theories that inherit the late Enlightenment philosophies of expressivism (see Taylor, 1989). Each individual culture or community has an identity which members are obligated (more or less) to express in their interactions with other groups' members. At the limit, there is consequently nothing particularly contradictory in positing that in an environment of communitarian social choice each community will express as singular a set of preferences and values as did individual persons under the circumstances Arrow has defined. Most importantly, if one considers that the expressed preference rankings of a community - as asserted in, say, an environment within which is to be chosen amongst alternative development strategies - may be the result of prior coordination solutions internal to the cultures or communities being called upon to choose, then Arrow's Theorem will hold, irrespective of the transparency and openness of the internal processes by which each community came to its express preference. In the present thesis, this phenomenon is of particular interest in respect of how participatory development communication models seem not to deliver results that are any more acceptable than earlier top-down methods. In the following, I discuss some of the ways these considerations affect the comparative conditions of the Sámi and SanBushmen.

It is not widely known that many Sámi were active in the resistance movement against Norway's Nazi occupiers between 1940 and 1945; however, as early as 1957 the Norwegian film "Ni Liv" (Nine Lives, nominated for the Oscar category of Best Foreign Language Film in 1958), based on the true story of Jan Baalsrud, a member of the Norwegian resistance during World War II. In 1943, he and numerous other resistance fighters embarked on a dangerous mission to destroy a German air control tower and recruit for the resistance. The mission was compromised, and their boat was
attacked by a German vessel. Baalsrud was the only one to escape the Nazi onslaught, and evaded capture for roughly two months, suffering from frostbite and snow blindness. “He failed in his bid to reach the border of neutral Sweden and took refuge with some Norwegians who happened to have access to the Norwegian underground. While hiding in their barn, he amputated a significant number of his own frostbitten toes with an ordinary knife. These civilians managed to move Baalsrud close to the Swedish border, but were forced to leave him in a snow cave for roughly two weeks before they returned and delivered him to a reindeer herder who finally took him over the frontier to safety”. (Wikipedia; International Movie Database).

The Norwegian resistance being a relatively coherent national resistance force, with many operations involving action (either armed or reconnaissance) against installations well inside traditional Sámi areas (see Figure 1), it would not be out of place to suppose that many ethnic Sámi resistance fighters soon developed a habit of coordinating with their ethnic Norwegian comrades on operations.

It is not clear whether resistance units were integrated, or whether ethnically-distinct groups cooperated on single operations (or, for that matter, whether there was a mixture of units); in either case, coordination would have been crucial, and a habit of such coordination is not inconceivable on the part of either component. Although Sámi representatives had been elected to the Norwegian Parliament prior to 1940, and there was probably some expectation that these would have coordinated more or less freely with their Norwegian colleagues, the experience and habits of coordination in combat are a very different matter. Not least, veterans would have had memories simply not possible for a generation that had not undergone the same experiences. These same veterans, therefore, could have had some measure of influence a generation later, when the Alta/Kautokeino dam protests got underway. The shortfall in the record of Sámi-Norwegian resistance co-ordination is finally being addressed officially: on October 10, 2005, the Norwegian president of the Sami Parliament Sven-Roald Nystø, announced that finally, “the work done by the Sámi border guides was to be recognized by the Norwegians”. Amongst other actions, a Documentation Centre is to be set up to acknowledge the Sámi contribution during World War II (Hivand, 2005).

The role of the international NGO Greenpeace in the Alta/Kautokeino protests, and their mobilization of global media to publicise the issue, may therefore be viewed from the point of view of Arrow’s Theorem in so far as – given a memory of cross-ethnic coordination a generation before – this campaign accurately reflected the situation on the ground. Greenpeace hardly can be said to have started anything in connection with the Alta/Kautokeino protests, because this was not the first

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13 The German Kriegsmarine maintained several bases in this area, and the Luftwaffe also pursued operations against Allied convoys to and from Archangel and Murmansk from this region.
dam against which Norwegian environmental groups had protested. The main group involved was “Folkeaksjonen mot utbygging av Alta-Kautokeino-vassdraget” (Public Subscription Association Against the Alta-Kautokeino Dam) which short time after being established, had 20 000 members (Jhar, 2004). The Youth and Nature Organization, a branch of the Green Party, also carried out a major mobilization drive (Natur og Ungdom). The main problem to be faced in this context lies not in the nature and radicalism of the Sámi autonomy or independence movements. Instead, I want to look at the degree to which the Greenpeace strategy might have led to representations that contradicted Sámi experience of Norwegian nationality through 1945 and beyond. There were some Sámi splinter groups who called for an armed struggle (see, for example, Bjørgo, 2003, for a summary of Sámi extremist links to other armed groups like ETA and the IRA), but their influence was small. More important is Greenpeace, who was the major international NGO involved with increasingly radical opposition to Norwegian whale and seal hunting. They piggy-backed their own agenda onto the established local environmental activism. Although this may have added to the international publicity it did not really change the strategies already being used. The point then, would be to see how far Greenpeace strategists needed to depart from their focus on maritime environmental activism, because that was an issue toward which Sámi were (and remain) largely indifferent.

It is probable that combining the mainly environmental and cultural Alta/Kautokeino campaign with practices unfamiliar to the Sámi, could have largely have made actual Sámi concerns appear marginal, because the whole object of Sámi activism was rooted in more local issues. Thus, the lead-up to the stage when Sámi community and activist leaders could have agreed to argue alongside Greenpeace for a particular cultural choice would possibly have involved (a) more effort in convincing the indifferent that an environmental angle to the cultural issue would improve the Sámi bargaining position; and (b) that such a rhetorical tactic would improve the chances for a more equitable outcome for the implementation of any future autonomy or independence policies. While the first option hardly differs from any text-book situation involving voter persuasion in a settled electoral system, the second in combination with the first introduces a quasi-ordering into the choice environment: Arrow’s Theorem will hold, and the issue becomes one of whether any function for aggregating preferences will be imposed or dictated.14

(2) The present controversy over the CKGR SanBushmen involves far less extensive historical relations than in the case of the Sámi in Norway. Firstly it needs to be recognized that the Sámi question involved a very different form of historical interaction with their state of residence, some considerations on which I have already outlined. The SanBushmen have related to the state of

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14 Recent Greenpeace initiatives in Scandinavia seem to have adopted a more co-operative strategy than that employed in the Alta/Kautokeino protests; see Pitkanen (2005).
Botswana for a relatively paltry 39 years, less than half the time Sámi have related to the state of Norway. If one includes the earlier relation with Sweden prior to Norway’s independence in 1905, it is clear that the SanBushmen have little comparable history upon which to draw. It is because of this that the relation between the CKGR communities and Survival International must be seen as more decisive than had been the case with Greenpeace and the Sámi; Survival very much calls the shots in terms of strategy and intervention programme design, having little immediate reason for compromising in the way Greenpeace did. Indeed, there is little about which the SanBushmen can actually form preference rankings: their situation involves something closer to a dilemma than an environment of choice. On the other hand, I have already noted that the CKGR Bushmen do not themselves oppose development (Andersson, 2002); it is, rather, the NGO FPK\(^{15}\) that mobilises mainly post-modern (hyper-modern) theory to claim that the SanBushmen do not really need development.

The issue is such that there is little that can be characterised as a viable quasi-ordering for the Bushmen in their relation with the state. On the other hand, the response of the Botswana government suggests that their political security is high enough for them not to consider any alternatives that might conceivably act to reduce their apparently secure hold on power. But this situation may be more artificial than the marker of some 'authentic’ quality in Motswana culture\(^{16}\). In the first instance, the state is signatory to a very restricted set of international Declarations. Although signatory to the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, the Ramsar Declaration, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, there are other such conventions that Botswana has yet to ratify. In the present context, the most noteworthy of these is ILO Convention No. 169, concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989). In large measure, it is possible to consider the range of ratified conventions as a proxy for the range of choices from which a developing state and its citizens could propose social and cultural choices for which individuals (classical or hyper-modern) might express a preference ordering, or toward which they might be indifferent. Decisively, if there are more options from which choices might be made, it is easier to make a credible case for the quasi-ordering of any possible social or cultural choices based on issues covered by such conventions.

(3) Reading Arrow’s (1951) arguments, it would be easy to dismiss the conclusions as irrelevant in a post-national environment. However, I have noted that it is possible to consider much of the 'post' in these objections to be 'hype', in the sense that the 'posted' concept (the nation, modernity, the War, or whatever) may in fact have shifted into a sort of hyperbolic mode of expression without any

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\(^{15}\) FPK – First People of Kalahari

\(^{16}\) In Tswana linguistic custom, Motswana is the common noun predicable of all persons who are citizens of the country Botswana. Most will speak the language Setswana, and in the plural people of Tswana origin are called Batswana.
fundamental change in the logic of the concept in question. Never the less, nations still occupy most of the land surface of the planet. They still enter into, maintain, and extend relations with other nations through more or less credible multilateral arrangements (for example, the credibility of British Commonwealth membership may not be the same as membership of, say, the OECD; each organization nonetheless has clout in its more or less restricted sphere of influence, and members do well not to sniff at this). The exaggerated individuality assigned to collectives in post-modern theory applies as much to nations as to cultures and communities: all that has changed is that there are more entities that may occupy the state of nature than the nations and economic classes of classical modernity. The system of organizing social and individual preference rankings in classical modernity exploited easily understandable choices like peace and war, on the one hand, and habitually understood choosers like industrial classes and individuals on the other. That is: choices were usually made between two understandable alternatives offered to two or more choosers between them. Under these conditions, a cycling majority is not possible, and the Impossibility Theorem is effectively bypassed (Arrow, 1951: 46-48).

However, the post(hyper)modern environment of political, social and economic choice not only ensures the plurality of choosers necessary for a cycling majority, it practically guarantees a sufficiently diverse range of existing cultural and social goods, unevenly distributed, between which any regional or local society might be required to choose. In other words, the concept of development must somehow accommodate both the permanent possibility of cycling majorities if it is to meet the norm of democracy; and deal with the many, if not indefinitely so, ways that functions might be imposed or dictated in breaking the cycles. Media and civil society as major elements of the communication aspect of development are, naturally, by no means exempt from this condition. Clearly, the presence of a plurality of single-issue NGOs, news services, news media, and even entertainment media, further adds to the possibility that those involved with development are likely to have an increasingly difficult task distinguishing the wood from the trees.

In the case of the Sámi in Norway, certain issues close to Greenpeace (the effect of the Alta/Kautokeino dam on salmon spawning, for example) were effectively irrelevant as far as the Sámi were concerned. By contrast, issues close to the CKGR SanBushmen are effectively irrelevant in terms of the Botswana Government's interpretation of its own constitution. Yet neither locally irrelevant issue will go away; their irrelevancy is practical and not logical, in that the former qualifier refers to issues of immediate concern, whereas the latter applies to reasoning that stands or falls with the test of reality in the long run (see Peirce, 8.12). However, the additional influence of general-issue conventions governed by multilateral bodies, whether social, economic, or political, may act to stabilise the process of formulating alternatives proper to given local or regional
development. The parties faced with the task of introducing new institutions, services, policies, practices, and commodities, are effectively designing a quasi-ordering; indeed, they are offering to impose a method of summing up the preferences expressed by those party to the implementation of a new basket of goods (social, political, economic, cultural, or otherwise). At the same time, and here is where the presence of single-issue movements can complicate matters, there will be much communicational activity (not to mention activism) aimed at raising to prominence the quasi-ordering of singular participants, whether individual persons, communities, cultures, or other relevantly associated groups. This activity has the possibility of leading to the summation of preferences being dictated, at the expense of other preferences or indifference. Logically speaking, the preference ordering of the CKGR communities, as a single-issue campaign, may readily be interpreted as a potentially dictated quasi-ordering in relation to the broader policies and projects of the State; the absence of a relevant statutory foundation in a ratified convention essentially renders this issue irrelevant at worst, or at best a matter of State indifference. In the following section, I relate the foregoing to the specific topic of how development theories may give rise to irrelevant demands, and whether the nominalistic custom of treating development needs as single-issue problems hampers development instead of facilitating it.

IX. On the Conditions of Development and the Logic of Impossibility.

It is entirely reasonable to expect of development programmes that they meet the needs of the broadest possible constituency of beneficiaries. Indeed, it would not be too much to say that the principal criticism of development theory, diffusion theory, development communication theory, and other related subjects, is that they provide insufficient guidance as to how development should be structured to meet the needs of all (see, for example, Melkote and Steeves, 2001: 332-334). An element of this criticism, then, has comprised various analyses of shortcomings in reigning concepts of democracy as this has been used in diverse ways to specify how development needs should be assessed and their fulfilment carried out. Early theory tended to attract the criticism that theories took specific models of representative government too much for granted; in general, given the prominence of US power in the post-1945 era of national liberation struggles and subsequent programmes for Third World development, critics have noted that the US model of two-party government frequently does not serve the development needs of newly-independent states (Melkote and Steeves, 2001: 6; Servaes, 1999: 22). In response, various variations on the theme of participatory democracy have been mooted as more relevant systems for developing nations, often on the grounds that local custom and tradition are informal versions of this model, anyway (Kerr, 2001; see also Donnelly, 2001).
However, one could equally validly argue that such participatory models require considerable sophistication on the part of electorates, and that such capacities are not present in newly-liberated societies. In the present thesis I duck this issue by considering not specific models, but seeing the extent to which the matters considered above may be applicable in the cases reviewed, by applying as criteria the conditions for free choice that Arrow outlined for his analysis of social choice in modern nations. This is justifiable mainly because there is no logical contradiction involved in seeing development as a species of welfare implementation subject to the same constraints discussed above. Thus, the five conditions that Arrow imposed on the environment of choice could be considered as a reasonable set of touchstones for assessing both the formulation and the implementation of development strategies and projects. I have already discussed the two conditions that tend to define the impossibility of strictly individualistic choice models, those of non-dictatorship and non-imposition, and how readily these can logically be violated in practice. In context, they are ranked among the other three conditions defining the freedom of choice for social welfare functions as follows:

Condition 1: Sometimes labelled the 'condition of unrestricted scope', this merely states that any social welfare function should aggregate some sufficiently wide range of three or more permissible individual preference rankings into a true social ordering (Arrow, 1951: 23-24).

Condition 2: The condition of Positive Association of Social and Individual Values: if one alternative social ranking rises or does not change in the preference ordering of individuals, then the same alternative should not fall in the corresponding social ordering after implementation of the welfare (here, development) function (Arrow, 1951: 25-26).

Condition 3: The condition of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: we shall not permit an alternative social state to include alternatives not already in the environment of choice before choosing occurs (Arrow, 1951: 26-28). The most common example used for illustrating this condition is that of the election candidate who dies or is otherwise incapacitated before the result of an election is announced; the dead candidate necessarily must be treated as irrelevant, so that voters' preference rankings without the deceased candidate must remain the same when aggregated into a social choice.

I have already covered Conditions 4 and 5, and merely repeat them here under the headings Arrow used in his discussion.

Condition 4: The condition of Citizens' Sovereignty: this is the condition, based the definition reproduced in note 7 above, that a social welfare function is not to be imposed (Arrow, 1951: 28-30).
Condition 5: The condition of Non-Dictatorship: this is derived from the definition reproduced in note 8 above (Arrow, 1951: 30-31).

Each condition considered separately is highly reasonable from the point of view of the minimal requirements for a democratic state, albeit restricted to libertarian models. Using majority voting as the means of aggregating citizen preferences into a Social Welfare Function (SWF), however, although each condition “looks innocuous enough, … taken together they seem to produce a monster that gobbles up all the little SWFs in the world” (Sen, 1979: 38).

It can readily be seen that Condition 1 does not hold in environments where fewer than three preferences are offered. A two-party system in which two choices of policy or social good are offered cannot yield a cycling majority, and therefore conditions 2-5 will be met without dictatorship or imposition. In other words, the classical US system (electoral college, party primaries and all) is inherently stable, if somewhat restricted in how social goods are to be construed; welfare debate readily descends to either-or rhetoric at the expense of potentially more viable alternatives for which no party exists. Any such alternative will only enter the environment of choice at the expense of an already institutionalised welfare system. Similarly, the appearance of a third choice that garners enough support to establish a third party and three options that can be ranked, destabilises the system. There is still much that is likely to be written and said about how Ralph Nader’s candidacy affected the outcome of the 1999 Presidential election.

In other contexts, however, and very particularly in the developing world where multi-party proportional-representation systems are the norm, more than two choosers (in the form of party memberships acting as voting blocs) and more than three options are invariably available. Development goals, conceived as social goods to be adopted by choosing from an ordered ranking of alternatives, become subject to one or more of the following unstable outcomes: (1) cycling; (2) stasis through indifference to imposition; and/or (3) one-party rule as a dictated function finds favour with a majority. So far, the present thesis has described two fundamentally distinct examples of how states have accommodated, on the one hand, and effectively ignored on the other, an indigenous minority under their constitutional jurisdiction. I have also reviewed in outline, some of the relevant theoretical approaches to the kinds of media and communication tasks that researchers consider relevant to the business of development in contexts where indigenous minorities are present. To bring these two parts in relation to each other, I have drawn on the problem faced in an environment of social welfare choice – that is, the logical paradox stated in Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem – to suggest that development communication theory and practice must confront this paradox in order to

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17 Former administration activist in USA, who formed an independent political party in the presidential elections of 1999 and 2003. Well known for interventions on consumer issues in the 1960s and 1970s.
have any confidence of accomplishing their ends in a non-dictatorial manner at least. I now conclude with a preliminary sketch of how these considerations apply to the situations covered earlier.

(1) The Sámi experience of attaining to cultural-political autonomy within the ambit of the Norwegian state indicates that minorities might best accomplish this sort of end if they can link their needs to some wider issue that is independent of their specific situation. In this particular case, the attempt by Greenpeace to impose on the Sámi campaign the environmental dispute over the Alta/Kautokeino dam’s effect on salmon spawning would effectively have introduced an irrelevant alternative into their autonomy campaign. By the same token, had Sámi activists adopted some or other Greenpeace issue, they would have imposed an irrelevant alternative onto whatever processes were already underway between themselves and the Oslo government; from the latter’s viewpoint, it would not be too much too say that the unprecedented adoption of the salmon spawning issue by Sámi negotiators and activists would have effectively meant that a Greenpeace quasi-ordering had come to dictate any possible autonomy dispensation (if, of course, the latter is construed as a social good in Arrow’s sense). However, the mobilization of cultural issues like the rock-paintings that the dam’s waters would have covered, is readily interpretable as a relevant good, and thus not in violation of Condition 3; in this matter, then, the publicity and communication capacity of Greenpeace made a positive contribution, albeit not one that would arguably have been decisive in the long run.

The Kalahari SanBushmen, quite literally, have no comparable issue to mobilize in support of their cause. The media and advocacy campaign of Survival International does not place the Botswana government under any political obligation to respond in any way at all: they have not ratified the relevant convention, and hence are not obliged to act. In effect, this leaves the Kalahari community in a kind of limbo. On the one hand, they have experienced a certain level of international academic and development support, and have some precedent in appealing to outside agencies (as, for example, Komtsha did in appealing to Elizabeth II in a manner proper to Botswana’s pre-independence status as a British protectorate). On the other hand, these forms of support have been informed by what might best be called ‘mythical’ conceptions of Bushman identity, the perception of the community as a people trapped in time (see, for example, Tomaselli, 1996, for a critical review of these perceptions). As such, their condition leaves them caught between having to abandon what the outside world treats as their most characteristic identity mark, and preserving this identity at the expense of participation in the social goods available to other communities. When an organization like Survival assumes an advocacy role on the part of this community, therefore, it must give primacy to those elements of Bushman identity that put a heavy burden of coordination on other
prospective development beneficiaries who are not part of the SanBushmen community, while actively shielding the latter from sacrificing their perceived uniqueness through the adoption of innovative social goods. In other words, the SanBushmen only benefit from development in so far as they do not benefit from it. This is sufficiently illogical not even to register as a dictated social welfare function, let alone an incomplete or insufficient one. It is a choice that practically violates all Arrow's conditions.

(2) The dilemma that the CKGR SanBushmen face actually has little in common with the situation in which the Sámi were able to treat their autonomy as a viable social welfare alternative. Possibly the most glaring difference between their respective conditions is the lack of precedent: Bushmen have no record of coordination with any state upon which to draw, other than some limited operational alliances with South Africa's apartheid military in Angola (Godwin, P. 2000); the Sámi could, at the very least, draw on the relatively recent experience of coordination in combat with the Norwegian anti-Nazi resistance. The longer history of Sámi coordination in Norway’s elective politics simply reinforces the precedents of any other coordination relationships that may have been forged. The Sámi situation, therefore, permitted their autonomy campaign to include continued coordination with Oslo as an option, such that this condition would have remained an element of people's ordering after any prospective autonomy resolution. In other words, Sami cultural autonomy would not have violated Arrow’s Condition 2. For the Kalahari communities and the Botswana state, on the other hand, any prospective coordination would effectively be an innovation, sufficiently radical to disturb the preference orderings of at least those Motswana who would be called upon to rank such coordination as an option. Effectively, this is interpretable as a change that would violate Condition 2, because to add this alternative to people’s existing ordering is to change that ordering. Another strategy is therefore necessary, which, naturally, is likely to violate either Condition 4 or Condition 5, if not both.

(3) The Botswana government is in the interesting situation that they have no option but to consider any form of targeted development, whether benefiting the SanBushmen or any other minority (indigenous or otherwise), as an irrelevant alternative that violates Condition 3. Were government analysts to recognize this, however, they would also have to acknowledge their failure to coordinate with other nations constitutes an individual quasi-ordering that defines what preferences other nations ought to hold; that is to say, to acknowledge Bushmen’s development as violating Condition 3 requires that the Botswana government violate Condition 5. They are effectively dictating an indigenous-minority welfare function to the international community.
X. Conclusion.

Analysing development communication by conceiving 'development' as a species of social and cultural good institutionalised through a welfare function, permits one to proceed from the logical basis of Arrow's Theorem. This has the added advantage that Arrow (1951: 21) explicitly acknowledged the philosophical doctrine of Nominalism as the basis for modern conceptions of society, welfare, and community. Since the post-modern paradigm is itself in practice radically nominalist, therefore, there seems to be no reason for excluding Arrow's somewhat disconcerting conclusion from consideration when confronting Africa's generally disappointing experience of development since the first wave of independence in the 1950s. It was Arnold Shepperson, who is exploring features of Arrow's deduction that show a remarkable parallel with the logical work of C.S. Peirce, who suggested the logically persuasive isomorphism of the process of development implementation with the process of social welfare choices. There is some risk in having followed this line of analysis, of course, because the development communication literature has no references to Arrow. It may be too easy, for example, to accept Arrow's five conditions without asking if these do not reflect too much of a bias in favour of American political ideals. But, as we developed the analysis of a mountain of development theory it became clear that the often fractiously contradictory positions taken by theorists frequently reflect norms that by no means depart from Arrow.

Thus the contemporary focus on the necessity for establishing and nurturing participatory practices in development quite reasonably follow from Arrow's Conditions 2 and 4, that is, of the positive association of individual and social values, and of citizens' sovereignty, respectively. The Sámi experience, by the same token, has shown some reason to accept as valid Condition 3, the independence of irrelevant alternatives. It was somewhat surprising, therefore, to discover that the attitude of the Botswana government in respect of SanBushmen development needs, can also be logically described in terms of Arrow's conditions: a state that is not signatory to some international or multilateral convention, agreement, or protocol is logically indifferent to the issue the relevant agreement covers. There is no violation of Condition 3 if the Botswana government chooses to ignore the SanBushmen development problem; but this is accomplished at the price of violating Condition 4.

An odd outcome of the present analysis has been that Arrow's five original (1951) conditions seem to work better in the broader context of development, than the four he proposed in the second edition of his classic (1963). It is clear when viewing the original conditions 2 and 4 together, that they represent a weakened version of the Pareto Principle (which essentially states that if everybody prefers some $x$ to some $y$, then $x$ is to be chosen – or $y$ excluded – as a social decision). Even these reduced conditions still conclude with the Impossibility Result. As Sen (1982: 288-290) has noted,
however, attempts to weaken this and other conditions, particularly 3 and 4 enumerated above, often lead to even more outlandish results that defy any attempt at fitting them into anything remotely resembling a modern democratic dispensation. It would appear that keeping the original conditions 2 and 4 instead of combining them into the weakened Pareto Principle accommodates the logical status of agencies that fall outside of the classes, individuals, and states that comprise the actors in classical welfare economics. Especially in respect of the relations between states and indigenous minorities, the role of civil-society and non-governmental participants can be understood as influencing the preferences of minority groupings generally. However, because such bodies are generally constituted around single issues instead of a more or less complete basket of welfare goods, there are two possible outcomes that are best analysed under Arrow’s original second and fourth conditions:

1) whether, for a development-welfare organization $A$ that advocates around any given issue $x_i$ in relation to a minority $M$, contradictions might arise if other organizations $A_1, A_2, \ldots$ and so on, advocate single-issue alternatives $y, z$, and so on in the same environment of choice; and

2) whether such situations as encountered in practice in contexts like, amongst others, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, the Balkans, and East Timor, also exhibit the logical properties I have elaborated above.

There seems, therefore, to be some value for the development sector in adopting Arrow’s Theorem as a touchstone for assessing providers’ and facilitators’ qualitative compliance with norms of democratic practice in the broad modern constitutional sense common among developing nations. At the same time, however, the logical consequence of these proportional multiparty systems is the permanent possibility for cycling majorities to occur in the aggregation of social choices; in respect of development, Arrow’s conclusion that this paradox is only avoided by imposing or dictating a summation of preferences has to be confronted. That a given grouping within a community – like the Sámi Reindeer Herders’ association, for example, or the group associated with Bushman leader Dawid Kruiper in South Africa (McLennan-Dodd 2003: 29) – may appropriate to itself the role of the ‘public face’ of all members of an indigenous minority, should also be analysed through the lens of the Impossibility Theorem. To close, then, I would suggest that development advocates and activists consider it an imperative that dictated functions be treated as unacceptable, in line with any form of democratic practice. On the other hand, and this was the most unexpected conclusion reached, it may be best that the civil society sector accept that development goals, as social goods introduced as innovations in previously marginal societies, can only be institutionalised by imposition. A marginal community towards whom a state is indifferent, may therefore benefit more directly from solutions imposed more explicitly for the benefit of other communities. This is,
simply, because their marginal status renders their needs as irrelevant alternatives in the overall ordering of government preferences (perceived as violating Condition 3). On the other hand, some measure of coordination between their interests and those of their neighbours is easier to accomplish, in so far as these neighbours' interests have a presence on the state's radar screen. The task for the development agencies, then, is to assist those closest to all the communities in a given environment of choice, to facilitate adoption of innovations within the most marginal communities, and ameliorate the disruption such innovation necessarily brings. Put differently: a dictated solution entails a single community's interest being elevated to the status of determining what will be the interest of all; an imposed solution has the potential at least to account for a range of interests, even if not immediately satisfying any one of them completely:

If we are to live our lives in peace and harmony, and if we are to achieve our ambition of improving the conditions under which we live, we must have both freedom and discipline. For freedom without discipline is anarchy, and discipline without freedom is tyranny (Nyerere, 1974: 34).
XI. References.

Primary Sources.

Tape 1. Interview, Kukama Village. (Names of the respondents withheld to protect their identity).
Tape 2. Interview, Molopo Village. (Names of the respondents withheld to protect their identity).

Secondary Sources.

1. Books and Articles.


2. Internet Sources:


3. Film.


Appendix 1. The Komtsha Komtsha letter to the Queen of England

Her Highness,
The Queen of England,
England.

Dear Great Queen,

My name is Komtsha. I am an old man. I am a Bushman. If we are too small, or if you have forgotten, you must ask other people what a Bushman is and where they live.

When I saw a man from England, I asked him to give message to you. It is the message of our pain and suffering. The [Tswana] people are stealing the land from my people. I must answer my people. I say I do not know why they [the Tswana] can come and do so. The Great Woman from England will know. She will know the truth.

Not very long ago you gave the Tswana people their land [at independence in 1966]. At that time when you came here what did you see? Were there only trees and black people here? Is that why you did not talk to us? The Tswana people think you have given us to them. They do not understand you did not see us and that is a mistake.

If you did not give us to them, then you must tell them now that they must let us go. They are killing our land. They do not understand the animals or the land. They are wasting everything and soon nobody will be able to live. We have always lived with the animals. They are our friends. The Tswana people are chasing us away from the animals.

You must not answer the Tswana people. This is my word to you. You must send your word to me.

I must first see your answer before we can talk to the Tswana people.

Please do not wait too long,

Komitsha Komtsha

This letter was written by one of the leaders of the Central Kalahari Bushmen. It was never delivered to the Queen and was published for the first time in Africa Reports, 29th April 2005 (Bridgland, 2005) with the heading “Bushmen to be Denied Homeland” According to this article, Komtsha was unable to persuade anyone to deliver the letter before he died. During our journey through the CKGR, it was more than one time we heard about letters written to the Queen of England.
Hero’s welcome as Good delivers paper

MAUREEN ODUBENG
Staff Writer
2/24/2005 11:28 PM (GMT +2)

Professor Kenneth Good, University of Botswana’s political science lecturer who was declared a prohibited immigrant last Friday, delivered his paper on presidential succession in Botswana to a packed audience yesterday afternoon. Before Good appeared at the University of Botswana lecture hall, there was anxiety whether he would make it after spending the morning at the Lobatse High Court where he is fighting his deportation.

His lawyers successfully applied for his case to be postponed to today. With speculation that he was declared a prohibited immigrant because of the paper he co-authored with fellow academic Dr Ian Taylor, the crowd that turned out for the seminar was so huge that the event had to be moved to a bigger lecture hall. By 2pm it was obvious that the original venue - Room 240/285 - was too small for the crowd attending a lecture meant to start two hours later.

Interestingly, there were a good number of MPs, politicians across the political divide, lecturers and students. When Good walked into the fully packed lecture hall, he was given a hero’s welcome, mostly by his students.

The students had definitely reached their conclusion about the reasons behind Good’s deportation order - his criticism of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and government. The public has been left to speculate since the reasons for the deportation order have not been given.

The students and for most part the crowd at the seminar shared sentiments that the deportation is unfair and proves that “Botswana is moving towards authoritarianism”. Good started his presentation by declaring that he is not a member of any political party in Botswana or anywhere else. He said he is a believer in criticism and quoted other critics who said, “silence is a threat to democracy”. He said there is no model for transition in Botswana, adding that it is too flawed and complicated. He said problems in Botswana’s democracy are shown by a number of factors which include the historical and
cultural background of the country. He explained that wealth and power co-exist in a culturally legitimate inter-relationship in Botswana. He added that leadership in the country has been associated with wealth. He said colonial masters were comfortable leaving power in the then newly formed Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), with the belief that wealth shows responsibility.

“It is important that Tswana elites are historically distinctive from most others in Africa in their direct engagement in production, and in their being individual accumulators of wealth before-as well as during-their succession to high,” Good and Taylor said in their paper. The two academics said the constitutional and political power is highly centralised on the executive. The paper attacked the founding president, the late Sir Seretse Khama, saying he did not like democracy, as he changed the constitution to suit his interests.

They said that when former president, Ketumile Masire lost elections twice in Kanye, Khama changed the constitution to get him to Parliament. The paper pointed out that BDP presidents have always manipulated the country’s constitution to best suit their personal interests.

They accuse President Festus Mogae of failing to solve factionalism in the BDP and conclusions have been reached that he manipulated the constitution and favoured the inexperienced Vice President Ian Khama, by getting him elected into office, so that he could help him with the party problems.

Good said the country is definitely marching towards authoritarianism and automatic succession is out-dated and is not good for the people. After the presentation, the first to ask a question was the executive secretary of the BDP Dr.Comma Serema. He tried to discredit Good’s presentation on the basis that his research is based on media reports, which are not always a true reflection of the real situation. Good replied that he relied on other sources and not just newspaper reports alone. Serema however met a lot of criticism from Good’s supporters.

One person asked Good why the paper he presented is not balanced. He sought to know why the presentation lacked academic evidence, including the advantages and disadvantages of automatic succession.

However, all the students seemed in agreement that the country was moving towards authoritarianism.

One student termed the possible deportation of Good as a threat to freedom of expression. She said if the trend continues, the future of social scientists in the country is threatened because they will not engage in free criticism of government in fear of victimisation.

“This is not a good platform for political scientists of tomorrow,” she said.

A good number of students who stood up to ask questions were in support of Good and Taylor’s arguments.
Appendix 2b. 24 Feb 2005 article on Kenneth Good in Mmegi.

Thursday 24 February 2005
2/24/2005 4:10:13 PM (GMT +2)

Yesterday, PROF. KENNETH GOOD presented his critical analysis of Botswana’s democracy to a packed audience at the University of Botswana. Below is an abridged version of the paper

What democracy?

What democracy? The dynamics of Botswana’s celebrated democracy must be investigated if the idea that the country represents a model of presidential transitions in Africa is to be properly assessed. The proposition is doubtful primarily on the basis that the country’s democracy is highly elitist, power is centralized in the presidency, and the country’s two presidential transitions, in 1980 and 1998, both took place without reference to the wishes of the people, determined by very few, and involved successors who had no popular constituencies whatsoever.

Impermanency in high office is a fundamental democratic principle. In the participatory form of democracy that existed in all reality for two centuries in Athens, where popular organisation and equality were paramount, a “president for a day” held office and the position circulated widely among the citizenry. In the participatory aspirations of the United Democratic Front in South Africa in the 1980s, principles of “organizational democracy” were developed to try to achieve, against destructive odds, collective leadership, frequently re-elected. The criticism of leaders—notably of the touted Mother of the Nation, Madikizela-Mandela—themselves accountable, and their reporting back to the membership on the fulfilment or otherwise of the mandates entrusted to them, was something that was striven for.

Liberal democracies however are built in sharp distinction on elitism and nourish inequalities. But even the United States ensures that a “Mister President” serves at most two four-year terms of office, and assumes the replaceability of even the most celebrated. Liberal elitism entails the circulation of elites, the concomitant of competition. Margaret Thatcher in Britain became known as the Iron Lady, and even constructed a new ruling ideology in her own name. She won re-election three times, but her end was swift and rather total. Public pre-eminence for ten years was succeeded by anonymity and silence, outside the House of Lords and the American lecture circuit.

As is well known, permanency of tenure and the absolute reluctance by most presidents to voluntarily hand over power— even after losing elections—is a striking feature of Africa. Presidentialism and clientelism stake out the continent’s politics. Widespread networks of clients receive services and resources in return for support. This is well understood and even expected in many African countries.

Crucially, resource extracted from the state or the economy in this clientelism are deployed as the means to maintain support and legitimacy in the political system, with the concomitant effect that the control of the state is equivalent to the control of resources, which in turn is crucial for remaining a Big Man. Control of the state serves
the twin purposes of lubricating patronage networks and satisfies the selfish desire of elites to self-enrich themselves, in many cases, in a quite spectacular fashion. That lies at the heart of the profound reluctance by African presidents to hand over power voluntarily and why very many African regimes end messily, sometimes in coups. In most cases, the democratic option is either absent or is not respected by the loser. The stakes simply are too high as once one is out of the loop vis-à-vis access to state resources, the continuation of one's status as a Big Man and the ability to enrich oneself becomes virtually impossible. Politics in Africa thus tends to be a zero-sum game. As of the time of writing and nearly fifteen years after the democratisation wave supposedly washed over Africa as the Cold War ended, 39 per cent of Africa’s rulers have been in power for over ten years, whilst 28 per cent have been presidents for fifteen years or more. A resilient 19 per cent have sat on the throne of power for twenty years or more whilst three have been heads of state for over thirty years.

Encouraging Africa’s Big Men to relinquish power is imperative, but if Botswana offers lessons, they are of a restricted and limited nature.

Botswana is indeed exceptional, but it is so in ways more complex and restricted than its uncritical admirers have realised. It is important that Tswana elites are historically distinctive from most others in Africa in their direct engagement in production, and in their being individual accumulators of wealth before - as well as during - their succession to high office. Wealth and power co-exist in a culturally legitimate inter-relationship in Botswana. Other factors are also at work today. An obvious one is that constitutional and political power is highly centralized in the executive and the person of the state President, who has also been the president of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). Additionally, the president of Botswana is not directly elected by the people and constitutionally he decides alone. He need consult no one in making a decision, not cabinet, Vice-President or party caucus. Through the Office of the President he has direct control over important levers of power; the military and police, the public service, the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), and Information and Broadcasting (encompassing the country’s major daily newspaper - distributed free and nation-wide - plus Radio Botswana and Botswana Television). The president can constitute a commission of inquiry into any matter, determine whether it sits in public or in private, and whether their report is made public or not. The flow of opinion is carefully controlled in this democracy. Public servants are prohibited from speaking to the press, there is no Freedom of Information, and no whistleblower laws exist for the protection of an ethically minded bureaucrat. Rather the opposite. A leading minister told parliament in 1995 that an “erring” official who gave information to an opposition MP about corruption in the Central Transport Organization would be traced and charged under the National Security and Public Service Acts.

When a series of scandals occurred involving senior ministers and the President in the early 1990s, President Masire responded in part by tightening controls further. A number of parastatals introduced punitive confidence laws to restrict the availability of information to the public.

The National Security Act symbolises the secretive and authoritarian tendencies within the state. It provides for imprisonment of up to 25 years regardless of public interest in the matter in hand, and its provisions are both vague and sweeping.

Secrecy and non-accountability is pervasive. For instance, the government initiated a very large military expansion programme in the early 1990s, characterised by a failure to explain, justify and account. It got underway with the construction of the large Thebehatshwa Airbase west of Gaborone, officially opened in 1995. Seven months later, reports appeared in the Netherlands and the local press that Botswana was seeking to purchase 50 Leopard 1-V battle tanks. Asked for clarification, the BDF's only response was that “the information is classified”. While lengthy debate took place in Holland over the proposed sale to a small developing country, the National Assembly in Gaborone failed to discuss the matter. Even a parliamentary question was ruled out of order; the Minister for Presidential Affairs, Ponatshego Kedikilwe, told the deputy leader of the opposition that it was “unacceptable...to expect me to reveal such sensitive
information”.

The expansion, and the secrecy surrounding the military, goes on. German laws against the export of its military equipment outside the NATO area had stymied the initial purchase of the Leopards, but newspaper reports in July 2001 indicated that Botswana had succeeded in purchasing 20 tanks from Austria, and that some or all of these had already arrived the previous year. The cost to Botswana, an Austrian diplomat based in Pretoria confirmed, was S32.5 million. An option for a further purchase existed. A BDF spokesman would neither confirm nor deny the report. By 2001 the outlay on the military in Botswana still represented 3.5 per cent of GDP, again greater than its neighbours.

This was significant in the specific sense that military expansion in the face of no known enemy could promote regional de-stabilisation, and constitute also a weakening of the country’s proclaimed reputation for economic and political rationality. But it was significant also in the broad and general sense. Secrecy is a preserve of ruling elites, and it stands in sharp opposition to democracy. Information helps to empower people, while secrecy weakens them. The Ombudsman, Lethebe Maine, called for the enactment of a Freedom of Information Act in late 1999. Fulsome words about the Ombudsman as a pillar of democracy meant very little, he said, unless the right to complain and raise issues was fully available to all sectors of the public.

Access to information is tightly controlled because it supports stability and the status quo in liberal Botswana. Even questioners are summarily dismissed, and may be portrayed as “abusive”, as “breeding a culture of contempt”, or of being involved in “a witch-hunt” if they endeavour to persist.

The leadership of the democratic government, like more authoritarian counterparts elsewhere in Africa, does not readily engage with criticism. In April 2001 the Botswana Ombudsman took notice of the fact that Vice-President Khama had participated in BDP election meetings accompanied by public officers. He found that this practice was not only “against the spirit” of General Order 38 of the Public Service Act, but that it also “gives the perception that such public officers are furthering the interests of [the ruling party]”. He recommended that President Mogae “issue a new directive to all public officers” in the light of these concepts. The Vice-President also had a practice of arriving at BDP meeting in a BDF helicopter piloted by himself. One issue here, noted in the media, was the possible impact of such an arrival on rural voters in the governing party’s heartland and Khama’s home-base in Central District, and another concerned the fact that as a civilian, the Vice-President was no longer covered by the provisions of the Botswana Defence Act regarding offences relating to property. He was neither authorised by the Act, nor could he be disciplined by the Commander of the BDF in the event of loss or accident. The Ombudsman concluded that only persons subject to the Act can properly be authorised to use service property and recommended that the President brings to the attention of the Vice-President “the inadvisability of personally flying [BDF] aircraft”.

Criticism here touched on substantive aspects of the powers and prerogatives of the ruling elite, but the Ombudsman’s findings were deflected, apparently ignored. The Permanent Secretary to the President, Molosiwa Selepeng, said later that President Mogae had authorised the Vice-President to fly BDF aircraft, and that Mogae’s action was in Selepeng’s view, perfectly lawful.

Commanding both the state and the predominant party, all three presidents to-date have readily exercised their powers. Seretse Khama, we are told by his biographers, had never been really happy “in the rough-and-tumble of constituency politics and parliamentary debate”, so the constitution was changed, as early as October 1972, to accommodate the indirect election of the president “the first step on the way to autocracy”. Ketumile Masire surprised and opposed his BDP ministers when he publicly and arbitrarily announced his support for lowering the voting age to 18 - many senior colleagues saw youths as subordinates, dangerously volatile and irresponsible - and much the same occurred when he announced his retirement. Festus Mogae made a number of personal, seemingly ever secret decisions, favouring the inexperienced Lt.
General Ian Khama, eldest son of Seretse, as his Vice President — his initial appointment, his deputy's almost immediate, unprecedented "sabbatical" leave, and Khama's continued piloting of BDF aircraft against the express recommendations of the Ombudsman. The latter step expressed the presumption that he and the Vice-President were above the law. During the October 2004 elections Mogae publicly announced three times that, if parliament rejected his re-nomination of Khama as his deputy, and thus apparently, he would dissolve parliament. In other words, a president without any popular constituency would dismiss the newly elected legislature. He supposedly backed up this threat by declaring his personal assurances that Khama did not have the authoritarian intentions that even BDP members, on good evidence, suspected him of holding.

Presidential arrogance is repeatedly displayed in the immediate re-appointment of BDP MPs and ministers rejected democratically by their constituencies. The appointment of (four) so-called Specially Elected Members of parliament was a constitutional provision intended to assist weak communities to gain representation, but the provision was "blatantly used" for getting ruling party members back into parliament against the wishes of their constituents.

This practice is a norm in Botswana politics. In October 2004, Margaret Nasha, an old BDP stalwart, was kicked out by her Gaborone Central constituents, only to be immediately returned to parliament, and to her Ministry of Local Government, by Mogae-again, in direct contradiction of the wishes of the electorate. These presidential prerogatives, it must be recognised, were used by Masire in the 1990s to see able young professional women, such as Joy Phumaphi, uplifted into Parliament and cabinet—so improving the BDP's modernising, meritocratic image - but no trade unionist or representative of subordinate ethnic minorities, for example, have ever been so favoured.

The dominance of nomination over election is extensive. In November 2004 Nasha announced the names of nominated councillors. Out of 101 nominated local government councillors only three came from the opposition. Given that the BDP gained 52 percent of the popular vote while the opposition accounted for 48 percent, the nominations were described by the press as "a monstrosity".

There seems to be a growing call to avoid a repeat of the Masire-Mogae transition. Some prominent party officials now openly call for the president of the BDP to be directly elected. Botswana on the evidence is a poor model for African presidential transitions. As the Vice-President under Masire, and when he was the head of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, Mogae declared, in December 1997, that it was time to stop blaming colonialism, when it was the policies of the new leaders which were responsible for Africa's current predicaments. The following June, soon after becoming President, he said in Burkina Faso, that autocrats who oppress their own people should be barred from high office in the Organization of African Unity. It was Mogae too who pushed for the establishment of the DCEC (with its investigatory strengths, but its prosecutionary powers in the hands, of course, of the President), saying that corruption was a serious problem requiring serious solutions.

Mogae as President in immediate tandem with Khama seems a less rational, principled and perspicacious person. The President and his deputy are essentially two managers, not politicians - one a financial bureaucrat and the other a soldier. They believe, to a varying extent, in control and loyalty, rather than performance, discussion and principle. The temperament and actions of the latter in particular are autocratic and prone to order-giving, rather than debate and argument, "the stuff of democracy". The recent decision to ignore a government task-force's strong recommendations for the country's second university to be sited in Selebi-Phikwe, and instead locate it in Serowe, something of a dorpie by comparison but Khama's fiefdom, is seen by many as a portent of things to come: favouritism and the overruling of law, professionalism and procedure in the service of personal agendas. Ian Khama had earlier announced that he expected his younger brother, Tshekedi, to inherit his parliamentary seat in Serowe North West. Even the BDP secretariat expressed objection to such an abrogation of
democratic procedures. Its executive secretary, Botsalo Ntuane, said that Khama could have made the statement in jest, and that party primaries chose parliamentary candidates.

The rising opposition to Khama automatically becoming the next president is partly fuelled by the fact that President Mogae has been irrationally, privately and secretly, accommodating of Khama. This began with his appointment to the Vice-Presidency, extended to his almost immediate sabbatical, and other matters noted already, and seemingly goes on.

The preference accorded Khama is to a man who has no ministerial job and whose education credentials are seemingly a secret within the country. Furthermore, Ian Khama has made no secret of his intense dislike of the compromises of politics and of his contempt for politicians. Indeed, he has previously attacked members of his own party as "unprincipled, intolerant, selfish vultures and monkeys". This is the person who is about to take over the "African miracle".
Appendix 2c. 16 June article on Kenneth Good in Mmegi.

Mogae’s explanation on Good is lacking

Thursday 16 June 2005 Vol.22 No.91

WHITHER BOTSWANA? DAN MOABI
6/16/2005 11:35:52 AM (GMT+2)

"President Festus Mogae says Professor Kenneth Good was deported because he teamed up with Survival International (SI) to sabotage the diamonds for development campaign."

This is the opening paragraph of a front-page story in the 13 June 2005 issue of the Daily News, concerning a press conference given by Mogae on Saturday. A correction appeared in the next day’s issue of the paper, stating that the statement quoted above was misleading because the reasons for Good’s deportation were not raised or divulged during the president’s press conference. The correction further explained that the comments by Mogae “on Good’s efforts to tarnish the international image of Botswana’s diamonds” were made in response to recent press reports that a link between Good and SI might have been established from two laptops stolen from the professor.

Reporting on the same press conference on the same date as the Daily News, the Monitor said the president "gave a hint of the reason why he deported the Australian scholar. He said Good and British based Survival International director, Stephen Corry, had written numerous documents in which they described Botswana’s diamonds as blood diamonds.” The paper quoted President Mogae as having said of Good: “To his credit, the man was open about his campaign.” It then added: “Given that Botswana’s diamonds are the mainstay of the economy, it appeared from the president’s remarks that an attack on the diamonds was an unpardonable sin for which Good had to go.”

It’s clear, therefore, that even if the correction made by the Daily News was genuine (and not imposed on the paper by some government authority) the message conveyed by the president’s remarks was understood in the same way by the two newspapers quoted above. The Daily News might indeed have overstated the president’s remarks, but the meaning of the Monitor’s more subdued interpretation of the presidential comments is no different from that of the government’s mouthpiece.

One can, therefore, safely conclude that whatever the reasons for deporting Kenneth Good were, his alleged collaboration with the government’s archenemy, Survival International, was probably the decisive consideration that persuaded Mogae to declare him a prohibited immigrant. Unfortunately, it’s difficult to verify the president’s allegations against Good because he didn’t say precisely what the professor wrote about the relocation of Basarwa from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR). I, for one, find it difficult to believe that Good would try to argue that the relocation was driven by
the desire to mine diamonds in the reserve. I would be surprised if he did, because he ought to know better than that. Nevertheless, given the exploration for diamonds that was carried out in the CKGR some years ago, it should be acknowledged that it is understandable that some people believe this theory.

But even assuming that Good did write what he's alleged to have written about Botswana diamonds, would this justify the way the president treated him? I don't think so, for he's entitled to his views about it, as about anything else; and those of us who disagree with him are equally free to put forward our opposing views on the subject. This is the democratic way of dealing with such issues. However, in the unlikely event that there were a law that made it an offence to express such views about Botswana diamonds, it would be a different matter. Even then, however, his deportation would still have been unjustified because the courts would have been able to deal with him. So, whichever way the government may try to dress-up its actions against Good, the actions remain intolerable and undemocratic.

Also disappointing about Mogae's press conference were his allegations that those who criticised Good's deportation do so because he's a white man. Is the president finding it so difficult to defend his actions that he has to resort to using racial slurs against his critics? Unfortunately, this won't work, for I'm sure race is one issue that leaves all the government's critics on this matter absolutely cold. Indeed, I recall similar criticisms of previous governments when they deported residents of this country who were not white, such as Mxolisi Mxlashe, Naz Kader (who's still in this country) and others. Surprisingly, the president wondered why the press writes so much about Good when it never writes anything when his government deports illegal immigrants from Zimbabwe!

Finally, it was wonderful to learn (Monitor) that at his press conference, Mogae acknowledged that the country's deportation procedures needed to be changed to make them more transparent. No time should be lost in working towards this. It is long overdue.

BOTSWANA : 17 Jun 2005

Botswana's President Mogae has said that he decided to deport Australian Professor Ken Good as a 'threat to national security' over his links with Survival International.

President Mogae described the international concern over the Professor's deportation as a 'big hullabaloo over the deportation of a single, solitary white man'.

The President has falsely alleged that Good and Survival's Director Stephen Corry have 'written numerous documents in which they described Botswana's diamonds as blood diamonds.'

Professor Good, who had worked at Botswana University for fifteen years before his deportation, had both his computers stolen in separate incidents within ten days of each other.

The Botswana newspaper Mmegi reported this week that Mr Mogae ended a recent press conference by 'volunteering information on a question nobody had asked, [and] denying that his operatives might have broken into Good's house and stolen his computer.'

In a statement today Professor Good said, 'I have never described Botswana's diamonds as 'blood diamonds', nor have I ever 'teamed up' with Survival International to sabotage Botswana's 'diamonds for development' campaign. I have certainly exchanged correspondence with Survival, as I have with a huge number of academics, journalists, and other NGOs. The only way Mr Mogae would know of my email correspondence is if the government had seen the contents of my computers

Press room
http://www.survival-international.org/press_room.php?id=735

BOTSWANA : 29 Jul 2005

Australian Professor Kenneth Good, who was deported from Botswana last month as a 'threat to national security,' over his criticism of Botswana's democracy and his correspondence with Survival, lost his appeal in the Botswana courts on July 27.

Professor Good, who has taught political science at the University of Botswana for fifteen years, was deported from the country on 31 May, and is now in London. He had written and spoken against the evictions of Bushmen from their ancestral homes in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve.

In a recent statement Good said, 'My deportation is another sign that the government of Botswana is heading in an increasingly autocratic direction. It is a defeat for democracy and free speech.'

Botswana's President Mogae said on BBC TV's Newsnight programme on Monday, 'Professor Good] is a rogue and a vagabond, he's not a gentleman... I am determined to keep him out of this country.'

Press room
http://www.survival-international.org/press_room.php?id=915
Appendix 4. Log Tape 1: Kukama Settlement (translated from Setswana)

Time inn (TC): Kukama settlement

12:33:00 Them: What did the wildlife authorities say to you?
US: They did not say much, they just asked if where we were going to pass, which gate. Then we went in (CKGR).

US: Do you guys often get people passing here and asking you guys questions?

12:34:32 Woman in Red: Not many people come around and ask questions except some American tourist who come around and ask questions.

US: Have you heard of an organisation called Survival International?

12:35:44 Woman in Red: We know some but we don’t know others, they all look the same, they are all white! But we have heard about that organisation.

US: Is this the place were you guys grew up, has you family always been here?

12:36:48 Woman in Red: This is our home, this is our mother and our father was also buried here and so did our grandparents whose graves are also here. I can just say it’s a place of my ancestors have lived (comments the woman with a green head cloth). In general the family history is here.

US: back in time, has the Botswana government tried to remove you or tried to sabotage your way of living here.

12:38:24 Them: ever, we have never heard of such a thing, the reason why we are surprised is because now, it’s the very first time we ever hear that we have to move

US: what reasons did the government give them for moving?

12:39:45 Woman in red: they say we should move for the wild animals, and I don’t understand because our grandparents stayed here with these wild animals and we grew with them and its just the way of our lives. Now all of a sudden we are told to move.

US: where are you supposed to move to?

12:41:05 They, (the Government officials) say we should move to New Xadi and Kaudane, but we don’t want our kids to come back to the reserve to see the animals with money because we don’t. Have the money; we want them to grow up with the privilege of experiencing to live with the wild animals as we did
Us: so do you want the life which is outside of the reserve, with TV., schools, hospitals etc.

12:42:15 Them: no, no, no! We really can’t cope being out there, being alcoholics and that’s what we are not used to here, and people who have gone out there are alcoholics.

Us: what about the hospitals that have been built outside the reserve for you?

12:44:05 Them: well if we can still move when we are sick, we’d rather just ride our donkey’s from here and back, but moving, no! -even if you die we die on the way.

Us: so what is this paper on the tree for? (Government sticker in the nearby tree with information of survey with a plane in low altitude)

12:45:15 Woman in red: Ah, we were just told that an aeroplane will be in the area soon, so we shouldn’t be afraid when we see it.

Us: do u guys know what it (the plane) is coming to do here?

12:46:10 No, we only hear that its here to survey the soil, weather they are looking for diamonds we don’t know.

Us: Does u know that there are diamonds in the area?

12:47:03 Woman in red: We do not know really, but we are saying that since we are people who reside here, we deserve to be politely asked and not just be walked upon as if we are not human. We should be respected, even if they survey and find these diamonds they should not just take us by storm. The least that can be done is tell us that we found something in your land and politely step aside, like they would do for everybody. Like u see how you guys came here and asked us politely if u could talk to us, which was the way, not just coming here to the CKGR forcing cameras in our faces just because we are Basarwa’s. No, that approach doesn’t work.

Us: when was the first time u heard that you had to move out from the reserve?

12:48:30 Them: we had water drums here and they are now taken.

Us: how does u get water now? (The question started a long section of statements; the following is an abstract of repeated monologues from most of the group gathered around “our” tree).

12:49:30 Please we beg you people as you go around please tell your fellow people about us, well not the government coz that will just be a death sentence. Please voice our complaints.

12:50:30 They (the government) has served us with death sentence, I mean when you take water, medical facilities, it means that even if you die it does not matter. I’m afraid of saying this.

12:51:43 Our grand parents did not drink water often, only when it rained. Their bodies were used to that. Even we could have been like that, we don’t know what thought the government to come and give us water, food and medical facilities.
If I was to give you an example now: If u bring me something today and I eat it and bring it again tomorrow, I'll get used to it and think this is the person who can help me live better. That what the government did, he made us get used to water and that a person got medical facilities and food. Now that we are not getting those things we are really struggling.

I am surprised by the fact that I used to get pension money from the government and it suddenly stopped.

They stopped the money in 2002. They don't give the money until she moves out.
Appendix 5. Log Tape 2: Molapo Settlement

Time Inn (TC): Molapo Settlement

US: How come that you are still inside CKGR
13:27:45 We had left and came back. There was nobody here, we had all gone and came back. We left that summer and came back the same winter.

US: Why did you come back?
13:28:55 We never wanted to leave from here.

US: Then why did you move initially?
13:29:22 Because we were pressurised/forced.

US: Are you not afraid to be here since you had left the park (the question brings discussion)?
13:30:28 This is our land; we don’t know it as a park because we originated here. This is just a new generation thing. Back in Seretse Khama days we never heard this.
13:30:49 The Government says we went and asked to move which is not true
13:31:28 They were saying we should move from here because it is a place for wild animals when we did not want to move. That’s why we are back; now it is a case we don’t even know who is going to win.
13:33:55 They don’t want white people coming here, -initially they had locked the gates, we went and told people who are representing us, and then they were opened.

US: Where do you get your water from?
13:35:14 initially, the government gave us water then they took everything away.

US: did you have water tanks here or what?
13:36:05 They used to deliver water to us.

US: How do you get your pensions?
13:36:52 We get it outside. Before, they brought the money to us.

US: Where do you get the water from now?
13:37:30 Nowhere, only when it rains. We plough and get watermelons and drink.
US: If you are allowed to live here. How do you earn a leaving?

13:38:10 When I am here I don’t need a lot of things.

US: Why don’t you want to go and live in a settlement with hospitals, schools and modern facilities?

13:39:10 I don’t want to live in a land that is not mine. Those things, if we want them, they must bring them to us here.

US: How many people are living in this settlement?

(No answer)

US: Are you allowed to hunt?

13:44:35 No, we are afraid.

US: The same question I asked before to someone, they said that the animals are dangerous for you.

13:45:06 What do they kill? There is no animal dangerous to us. That’s a lie. There are lions here, they are our pals, when they kill we go to their pray and take the rest of what the lions kills.

US: Why does not the government see this?

13:45:00 I don’t understand because what you are talking about. I was thought by god, not a human being.

US: So the government never discussed with you the developments that would occur outside the park?

13:47:54 They said we were going to find white houses there build for us.

US: So no schools were there

13:48:29 The schools are there but they are theirs not ours.

13:49:50 Before they made schools for us at Xadi and said they were ours, so how did it happened that they moved them so fast. Again they said the new Xadi area was the hunting place, and then they turned around started taking people in, beating them, so who will we believe them.

US: Why does not the government want to talk to us?

13:51:10 Because they are crooks, if you are not careful they will take you down but WE have realised that know.

US: So you were born here, just like your generations before you?

13:53:00 This is the place, their grave are here.
US: So where do you kids go to school?

13:53:57 They go to school in Ganzi, and they live at school. They were taken yesterday.

13:56:27 The only car that comes around here is the car that comes to get the kids when they go to school, and then if you ask to get a lift they refuse.
Appendix 6. The research assistant comment.

Never a chance for a holiday. It felt like this year just stated as last ended. I was really looking forward for the trip to this part of my country I had never been to before. To see another fellow tribe which said to be a minority, the Basarwa? Growing up in Botswana I’ve always thought of them as an interesting tribe which has still held on to theirs roots, (lifestyles wise), and I feel they are real to themselves unlike to rest of us in urban areas, who are moving towards western culture as we never had a culture of our own. I really admire these inhabits of the Kalahari who are said to be the first people of our country.

The trip began and the excitement accelerated. I had heard a lot about these people, from their life to the case they are facing now with our government about their eviction. It is a pity I won’t see most of them in Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) since it is roomed that almost all of them have left the reserve to go out to our “civilisation”.

(Anyway what is civilisation? Is it the infrastructure, alcoholism, westernization?)

Our arrival there passed into the gate and there it was the feeling of being in total wilderness, the pure beauty of Mother Nature with fresh air and no pollution in any kind. I could not ask for more and felt proud of being a Botswana and showing such a beauty to foreign visitors. I felt like a true holiday away from the city and its noise, wow not even network on the phone, what a great get away. It was almost down when we arrived at the campsite, only to be greeted by a flog of giraffes, what a beauty! As most of my friends I was not an experienced “camper”, here I was, amazed about these foreigners skills in survival “techniques” and how relaxed they was in the middle of nowhere, among dangerous animals. The tents and the food were prepared in no time as well as the weather to come. That night in this open area I was scared the tent was gone flyaway with me inside. The wind was just something else than home and this time without concrete shelter I felt small, surrounded and trapped by Mother Nature.

We started in the early morning on the sandy roads with the cars in constantly 4x4, it was an experience to see and hear a 3 litre engine working on maximum power when necessarily. Deep sand is just very deep I realised. Before lunchtime we came to the first settlement called Kukama. We were greeted by the women there who made me wonder where the men was. Politely we greeted and asked to have a talk with them. What great people just welcome strangers into their homes? The men had gone for the past few days to get water which to my surprise was not there. They confirmed that they had water supplies before which the government took away from them as the pressure of the eviction enwalled.

I was amazed by the simplicity of their lifestyle, and as the conversation dwelled on I was saddened by their tragic story. They were devastated to hear that they had to move from the only homes they had ever known and their grandparents ever had. Who would not, but the government is doing it for their “good course”. What good will comes from putting a person through a transition that they never deemed necessary? Then, the big issue of the truth: From what I gathered these people feel that they were owed the truth about their eviction, as it is rumoured that that their moved because of the discovery of diamonds in their land, which the authorities claim is not true.

Mid day, after 3-4 hours driving and 150 km, we suddenly saw 3 vehicles parked and we went and said hello. It was South African tourists having a lunch break with beers and good food. They really know how to enjoy themselves. The journey moved on across the reserve to the next settlement and just around dawn we made a stop after the tiredness of sand which consumes even more hours.
This was at the heart of the reserve and really the only thing we were looking forward to was a meal and good sleep as the next campsite was hours away. Just like the first settlement everybody gave us attention, only this settlement as bigger the previous on, but I could sense reluctance in them talking to us. Politely we asked them if we could pitch our tents on an open space closer to their settlement which they flatly refused. And that was quite alarming. The reason for that was that they were horrified by the thought of wildlife authorities who they claimed sometimes patrols their settlements and nights and they could get into trouble if they discovered they talked to white people which apparently was a sin.

Well as far as I knew here in this country we live in a democracy where I am free to do and welcome whoever I want in my home as long as they are in the country legally and no one will tell me otherwise, but then there it was the fear in their faces. We sensed that it was not a good idea and we decided to move on. By then my head was pumping with questions I didn’t have answers to, I was simply seeing a different side of the country.

The trip to the next campsite took much longer than anticipated as we got lost on the way, and just before the next settlement in out of darkness there it was, fire light appearing from a distance which as we approached was a settlement called Molapo. We made stop to ask for directions to the nearest campsite. This was a different crowd from the last one we met. They were very relaxed and even gave us someone to take us to the campsite only to find grass as high as me! Where are the facilities meant for us (not to mention for people living here!)? Our “guide” thought it was quite dangerous to arrive this late and try to pitch out our tent on this place with all this grass. I was delighted when he invited us to put up the tent nearby their huts in the settlement. At their place there was no grass or wilderness! Thank good this people was here! We gladly accepted the invitation.

The next morning, our last day in the reserve we woke up and had a peaceful breakfast on our cadac stove. Two 4x4 Toyotas there, obviously not in condition to move. We later found out they had bought them for the compensation money they got from the government. P5000 or about R6000 was all they got to start a new life outside the reserve. How can you leave your home and living for a month salary? We were just about to leave them when we went to them to thank for letting us use their land for the night. We ended up chatting around the fire! We learned that this was the village where the Bushman spokes person Roy Sesana originated from. During our talk I could not leave the feeling of unfair treatment; to be told to evacuate the land you ever known, the land that bears the graves of your grandparents, all for money that less than a monthly salary. One of them actually commented “if the government want to see transitional change on us, perhaps they must bring the change to us, just as it is done to all other parts of the country”. Another said that this transition also had to carried out truthfully; “if we are moving for the diamonds be mined here, let it be and lets be compensated accordingly as it would have been done for any other tribe here in Botswana.

His statement was quite startling as I asked myself if all this was done to these people because they are considered as undermined and inferior minority somehow. Well most of the Basarwa origin people are not as illiterate as most Botswana’s, thus they felt their rights were being walked upon for reasons like this. They felt that somehow the other cultures, i.e. those in authorities are not giving the respect they deserve they believe, they are the first people of Kalahari. Well I don’t know if it is so, simply because there are no people of Bushmen in high positions/ranking places who could have stood up for their rights, or it is so because of their high illiteracy level that the elite can dictate to them what to do. What I ask myself after this journey in remote, exotic Botswana is if these people wanted to move from the reserve, why are they back? Was it so that they were forced to leave because of devastating situations like no water and no pension rights etc. given a situation like this a person will leave not out of their own will but because of the fear of remaining.
In that case my country are not speaking the truth to its people, neither the majority nor a group like this one, all Botswana's. I tend to ask myself were the rights of these people went since it looks like a sin for them to voice out their opinions. Where is it leading us as the citizens we are around this fire, seeing deportations of intellectuals (Kenneth.Good), trying to show us a bit of light in this dark chapter in Botswana's history. Who will remain to question the authorities about their rights and the Motswana's in generally. Is this Botswana's Zimbabwe?