Development Frameworks
and
Implementation Problems:

A Study of the Ubombo/Ingwavuma
Development Framework

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Abstract

This dissertation is concerned with the extent to which development frameworks are valid tools to guide development within a region, and makes use of the Ubombo/Ingwavuma development framework as a case study. Through the use of this case study, the dissertation uncovers factors that influence the implementation of development frameworks.

The context of the study is established firstly through the exploration of the literature surrounding regional planning, how it is undertaken, and the reasons for its successes and failures; and secondly, through an examination of implementation problems and lessons learnt from other development frameworks implemented during the same time frame.

It is hypothesised that integrated regional development frameworks, like the Ubombo/Ingwavuma development framework, are a necessary part of regional planning but by themselves however, are not sufficient to lead to regional development and are inherently flawed by implementation problems. The areas for immediate action which are outlined in the Ubombo/Ingwavuma development framework, are systematically examined to ascertain the extent to which specific plans and projects were implemented, as well as to uncover the reasons for non-implementation on the part of implementing agencies and government departments. Both the client and the planners involved in the formulation of the plan, as well as planning experts, are consulted on the reasons for plan failure and lack of implementation.

From this research, it can be concluded that regional plans are necessary mechanisms to lead to development of a region per se, but are not sufficient in themselves. Other factors important for the success of regional plans include a high degree of community participation, departmental collaboration, political buy-in, and people motivated to ‘drive’ the planning process forward, to mention a few.
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNR</td>
<td>Bureau of Natural Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBSA</td>
<td>Development Bank of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDA</td>
<td>Department of Development Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Department of Economic Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DET</td>
<td>Department of Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNC</td>
<td>Department of Nature Conservation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOA</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DWAF</td>
<td>Department of Water Affairs and Forestry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>Inkhata Freedom Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INR</td>
<td>Institute of Natural Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSB</td>
<td>Joint Services Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFC</td>
<td>KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>LED</td>
<td>Local Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJD</td>
<td>Mseleni Joint Disease</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRDPC</td>
<td>Maputaland Regional Development Planning Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPB</td>
<td>Natal Parks Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTO</td>
<td>Permission to Occupy</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Spatial Development Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMME</td>
<td>Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises</td>
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<td>UIDF</td>
<td>Ubombo/Ingwavuma Development Framework</td>
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Chapter One
General Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This dissertation is broadly concerned with the extent to which development frameworks are valid tools to guide development within a region. The dissertation will seek to uncover what factors influence the implementation of development frameworks by using the Ubombo/Ingwavuma development framework (UIDF) as a case study.

1.1.1 Regional Context

The Maputaland region lies in the north of KwaZulu-Natal and borders on Swaziland to the west, Mozambique to the north, and the Indian Ocean to the east. (See Figure 1.1.). The region consists of fourteen tribal authorities within the magisterial districts of Ubombo and Ingwavuma. The main land uses within the area are rural settlements coupled with subsistence farming and nature conservation. Spatially the region is structured around the small towns of Jozini, Ubombo, and Ingwavuma and the emerging centres of KwaNgwanase, Mseleni and Mbazwana. The principal infrastructural facilities are the dam at Jozini, the Makathini irrigation scheme, two timber plantations and a saw mill, four hospitals, schools, and a rural water supply scheme. The present population estimate for the region is around 270 000 people, or some 40 000 households. The most pervasive problem facing the people of Maputaland relates to lack of access to particularly transport, roads, water, shops, schools, clinics and telephones (Robinson, 1997, p 1).
Figure 1.1 Location Map

- Mozambique
- Zimbabwe
- Republic of South Africa
- Namibia
- Botswana
- Indian Ocean
- Durban
- Natal/KwaZulu
- Lesotho
- Swaziland
- Study Area
- Maputo
- Johannesburg
1.1.2 The Ubombo/Ingwavuma Structure Plan

The plan was commissioned in 1987 and was completed in 1989. It emerged from a process involving a wide range of stakeholders in the public, private and community sectors, and set out to ‘fulfil the basic needs of the people of the region within as short a time as possible and to promote sustained development’. According to Robinson (1997, p 1), the plan can be summarised into seven points:

- The approach was to be one of integrated rural development.
- The region’s natural and human resources were to be used to meet basic needs as a short-term priority, but in such a way as to be sustainable in the longer-term.
- The plan focused on households as the main producers in the region, and on transforming households from subsistence to market oriented and more diversified producers.
- Small-scale production (agriculture and consumer goods) was to be encouraged, along with its distribution of products and internal marketing.
- Large-scale schemes (water, agriculture, tourism and forestry) were similarly to be encouraged, but were to be oriented to perform service and support functions for the region in addition to their primary production and income generating roles. Eco-tourism partnerships were also to be encouraged.
- Local community organisation was to be promoted in order to enable people of the region to play a greater part in all facets of the area’s development.
- The region’s spatial structure was to be organised in support of these activities. In the short and medium term, the plan was to locate infrastructure and socio-economic opportunities so as to encourage people to move into towns, rural centres and corridors, thereby relieving pressure on environmentally sensitive areas and improving access to basic facilities and opportunities.
These seven elements were designed to unlock Maputaland’s considerable development potential. Although the plan was termed a structure plan on the insistence of the client, in today’s terms it would be classified as an integrated regional development framework.

In 1986 the KwaZulu Government published a White Paper on Development Policy in KwaZulu. In the context of KwaZulu’s regional diversity, implementation of this macro development policy required specific investigations into particular circumstances of each region. The UIDP (1989) served this purpose. The Ubombo/Ingwavuma White Paper took the UIDP (1989) one step further by providing a legally binding policy for the guidance of development within the Ubombo/Ingwavuma region. The white paper was published in 1992, three years after the UIDP (1989).

1.1.3 Implementation Problems
A study in this field is pertinent in that little research has been done surrounding the evaluation of development frameworks some years after their implementation and completion. Research into development frameworks is usually concerned with whether the plan is itself valid or implementable, with little research being done on completion of the plan to evaluate its effectiveness. A plethora of implementation problems exist which stymie the realisation of development framework’s goals. Through the analysis of the UIDP (1989), the shortcomings experienced in the implementation of this development framework will be compared to those experienced in the implementation of regional plans in general. This analysis also offers an ideal opportunity to examine a pre-election regional plan in South Africa and the effects recent changes, predominately nationally but also global, have had on it.
1.2 Research Question

The question to be answered by this research, is whether development frameworks like the Ubombo/Ingwavuma development framework, are relevant as mechanisms for the promotion and management of development within regions in the medium to long terms, or whether factors pertaining to their implementation render such frameworks ineffective.

Of particular interest to this dissertation is the question regarding which parts of the Ubombo/Ingwavuma development framework were implemented and why, and which parts have not yet reached the implementation stage. The research seeks to find out whether these problems are generic to development frameworks or limited only to the Ubombo/Ingwavuma development framework. This dissertation also seeks to examine the role that development frameworks play as mechanisms of development. Are they sufficient, in themselves, to result in development, or are other factors like institutional support, organisational resources, inter-government relations, and goals consensus, to mention a few, fundamental in ensuring plan implementation?

The research question is therefore:

**To what extent are development frameworks, like the Ubombo/Ingwavuma development framework, valid tools to guide development within a region, and have factors pertaining to their implementation rendered such frameworks obsolete?**
1.3 Research Sub-Questions

The sub-questions of the research process can be summarised as follows:

1. To what extent are regional plans and their mechanisms of development frameworks in particular, valid mechanisms to develop a region?
2. What are the main impediments to the implementation of plans in general, and to development frameworks in particular?
3. What factors cause regional plans to fail?
4. What effect does administration have on the implementation of plans and development frameworks?
5. With reference to the Ubombo/Ingwavuma development framework, what factors, other than the plan itself, are critical for regional development?
6. Have development projects in the Ubombo/Ingwavuma region occurred when and where they were intended?

This set of sub-questions will be answered by both the literature review, and the primary research.
1.4 Assumptions

This research is based on three main assumptions which can be summarised as follows:

1. Integrated development frameworks are a part of the regional planning process.

2. Plans rarely reach fruition due to a plethora of implementation problems including a shortage of funds, institutional environments, inter-government relations, and participatory processes to mention a few.

3. Regional planning as a field has been on the decline since the 1970s although it has shown signs of revival in the 1990s.

The first of these assumptions assumes that development frameworks are employed as tools in the regional planning process to achieve regional development. It assumes that development frameworks are an essential part of regional planning.

The second assumes that plans, including development frameworks, often never pass the completion of the ‘issue identification’ and ‘planning’ phase of the process. As a result, plans do not reach fruition or get implemented to the extent intended.

The third assumes that regional planning as a field in most countries around the world, has been on the decline starting in the 1970s and continuing into the 1980s. It also assumes that a resurgence of interest in the field has occurred around the world in the 1990s, offering regional planning a ‘window of opportunity’.
1.5 Hypothesis

It is hypothesised that integrated regional development frameworks, like the Ubombo/Ingwavuma development framework are a necessary part of regional development, but integrated developments are however, not sufficient to lead to regional development and are inherently flawed by implementation problems.

1.6 Definition of Terms/ Glossary

1.6.1 Integrated regional development framework

In situations of great need as experienced in KwaZulu-Natal, demand for development resources massively outstrips those resources that can be supplied. It is thus in the interests of groups in need that resource allocation occurs rationally. For this reason it is essential that there is an agreed framework for resource allocation that is based on broader issues such as fairness and equity. A regional development framework is such a framework (Kiepiel and Dewar, 1996). An integrated regional development framework takes the development framework one step further. The preparation of the framework involves inputs from experts from a variety of fields and disciplines, looks at a wide spectrum of variables as resulting in development, and not just economic growth, and is thus integrated.

An integrated regional development framework is a plan used to guide all envisaged future development within a demarcated region. It encompasses three time scales namely the short, medium and long terms. It indicates all proposed schemes and projects within each of the sectors, it allocates responsibility for them, identifies the budgets needed to implement them, as well as where they are to occur. This document will refer to a plan integrating different development
spheres with several implementation time frames, and indicate intended schemes and projects to achieve the aims and objectives of the study.

1.6.2 Ubombo/Ingwawuma Structure Plan

The plan was commissioned in 1987 and although called a structure plan, in today’s terms it is an integrated regional development framework. Comprehensive research and planning was undertaken by a multi-disciplinary team which led to the formulation of an integrated development plan for the region.

1.6.3 Region

A region is a sub-national space defined in terms of economic production, physical geography, political history, and social and cultural character. There is no technically objective definition of a region as it is a socially constructed concept. Depending on the purpose for which regions are defined, different factors are weighed differently when decisions are made on what constitutes a region. Regional boundaries are socially and politically constructed, and may therefore change as different pressure groups are represented in the decision making structure (Driver and Platsky, 1992, p iv).

1.6.4 Development

Development has been defined as the satisfaction of people’s material and strategic needs. Satisfaction of material needs results in an improvement in standards of living and a decrease in absolute and relative poverty. Satisfaction of strategic needs involves empowering people and enabling them to take control of their lives. Equity and democracy are therefore aims of the development process (Driver and Platsky, 1992, p iv).
1.6.5 Regional development

An important distinction must be made between development in and development of a region. Development in a region occurs, for example, when a new capital is invested in a region; however there is no guarantee that the benefits of the investment will accrue to the inhabitants of the region. Development of a region occurs, for example, when the inhabitants of a region benefit from the opening of a mine. Such investment may originate from within the region or from outside it. This distinction highlighted by Driver and Platsky (1992, p iv) shows that there is no simple linear relationship between development and geographical space. The impact of national policies is furthermore likely to differ from region to region, and the policies of one region are likely to impact on other regions. Therefore forces outside the region and beyond the control of its representatives impact on its development.

A coherent policy for development of regions therefore requires national co­ordination and planning, and clear identification of needs and priorities by the regions themselves (Driver and Platsky, 1992, p iv).

1.6.6 Plan

A plan is a tangible product of the planning process. It is a concrete statement, often in the form of maps and reports, on what planning identifies, devises, measures and adjusts. Because planning is an ongoing process, dimensions of a plan produced at any point in time have a limited life-span. Therefore plans are periodically revised in the ongoing process of planning (Kiepiel and Dewar, 1996, p 7).

1.6.7 Implementation

Implementation refers to the procedure whereby plans become reality on the ground. Implementation is one stage of many in the whole development process
and is placed after the plan formulation stage and before the monitoring and review stage. Figure 1.2 outlines a process of regional planning as outlined by Kiepiel and Dewar (1996, p 46).

Figure 1.2 A process of regional planning (Kiepiel and Dewar, 1996, p 46).

1.7 Chapter Outline

Chapter 1 will firstly examine the regional context within which the UIDF (1989) was released, and what the plan broadly entailed, and this will be followed by an examination of implementation problems in general. The research question, a list of sub-questions, assumptions and the hypothesis will then be examined. The
chapter will end with the definition of key terms to be used throughout the dissertation.

The second chapter will examine the methodology to be used in the dissertation and will highlight both the primary and secondary research methods to be used.

Chapter 3 will be the first of two chapters which survey the literature. Chapter 3 will firstly examine recent trends in regional planning theory and practice and will be followed by an examination of the positive roles regional planning fulfils. The chapter will also examine the substantive reasons why regional plans often fail.

The fourth chapter will examine the dynamic factors at play that lead to the success and failure of plans and projects in general. The chapter will focus on reasons why plans fail brought forward in the literature by Morah (1996) and Bowden (1986). The chapter will end with an analysis of problems experienced in the Upper Tugela Catchment initiative, a regional plan undertaken roughly at the same time as the UIDF (1989).

Chapter 5 will serve to provide readers with a general background to the UIDF (1989) and how the plan was to be implemented. The chapter will firstly outline criticisms of regional planning that arose from the Spatial Development Framework for the North-Eastern Region of the Transkei (1983), as well as possible ways of overcoming these problems. The chapter will then go on to outline the context and approach to the UIDF (1989) planning initiative, outlining strategic decisions, the approach and planning process adopted, the phasing of the plan, institutional structures and functions, the role of the plan and the time scales adopted.

The sixth chapter will examine the extent to which the short-term actions identified in the UIDF (1989, pp 218-220) were implemented. This will involve
the systematic analysis of each of the short-term projects to ascertain whether or not they were implemented.

Chapter 7 will examine the responses given by the VARA planning team, KwaZulu Planners, and planning experts, to the questionnaires administered as part of the primary research.

The eighth chapter will compare the fourteen reasons why plans and projects fail, as outlined by Morah (1996), with the reasons given by the respondents in Chapter 7, as to why the plans actually failed. The chapter will also compare typical problems that arise out of the implementation of individual projects as outlined by Bowden (1986), with the data gathered in Chapter 6 on the implementation of the short-term actions.

Chapter 9 will examine the future of the UIDF (1989) in light of recent changes including the 1994 elections, the establishment of the Ingonyama trust, and the Lubombo SDI. Responses given by the VARA planning team, and the KwaZulu planners as to the future of the plan will also be examined in this chapter.

The tenth chapter will answer the research question and its set of six sub-questions. It will also examine the research hypothesis and whether the research undertaken has proved it to be true or not. The chapter will end off by making recommendations about the future of the plan itself, and regional planning in general.
Chapter Two
Methodology

2.1 Introduction

This chapter of the dissertation will briefly highlight the research methodology adopted. Two broad categories of information were used namely primary research in the form of interviews, and secondary research in the form of a review of the current international literature. Each of these sources of information and the way they were approached, will now be examined.

2.2 Secondary Research

The literature surrounding regional planning’s recent past and where it currently finds itself in the international literature, will be surveyed. This will be used to answer the first research sub-question of whether or not regional plans and development frameworks are valid tools to guide development. The methodology of regional planning will then be outlined which will serve to provide the reader with a background as to how regional plans operate. The reasons for the importance of regional planning will then be examined which include regional planning’s ability to mediate between different kinds of evaluation; provide a framework for the rational allocation of resources; manage negative externalities; optimise the performance of the whole; deal with aggregation and disaggregation; and its ability to respond to changing time and spatial scales. This analysis will show why regional plans are important structures to ensure regions function optimally.

The second and third research sub-questions of ‘what the main impediments of plans in general and development frameworks in particular’, as well as ‘what
factors cause regional plans to fail', will be answered through the analysis of the substantive aspects of regional plans, as well as through the analysis of implementation difficulties as highlighted by Morah (1996) and Bowden (1986). These implementation difficulties will be used in Chapter 7 in a comparison with the difficulties experienced in the Ubombo/Ingwavuma region.

The literature review will then examine what McIntosh (1994) terms 'the lessons from the upper Tugela planning initiative'. The upper Tugela planning initiative was a regional plan prepared roughly at the same time as the UIDF (1989). Lessons learnt from this planning initiative will be compared to problems experienced in the UIDF (1989) in Chapter 7.

2.3 Primary Research

This research consists largely of qualitative data obtained from interviews with four broad categories of participants in the planning process namely: KwaZulu planners, members of the VARA planning team, planning experts, and members of government departments involved or previously involved in the Ubombo/Ingwavuma region.

2.3.1 KwaZulu Planners

Contact was made with four previously KwaZulu government employed planners and one hour long interviews were held with each of them. Mr D. A’Bear was interviewed on June 6, 1997; Mr D. Totman on July 2, 1997; Ms W. Forse on July 17, 1997; and Mr R. Davis on September 26, 1997. A copy of the open-ended questionnaire used in these interviews can be seen in Appendix I. These planners were interviewed to ascertain what had happened from the client’s perspective and to find out what their views were on why the plan had failed to develop the region to the extent intended.
2.3.2 VARA Planning Team

Contact was made with three of the planners previously involved in the VARA planning team and one hour interviews held with two of them. Open-ended interviews took place with Mr T. Gcabahe on July 2, 1997; and Professor P. Robinson on August 28, 1997. Due to the fact that Mr P. Wakelin no longer resides in KwaZulu-Natal, he was contacted by fax on October 30, 1997 with a questionnaire which was returned on November 10. See Appendix I for a copy of the open-ended questionnaire used in these interviews. These planners were involved with the formation of the UIDF (1989) and they were interviewed to ascertain their explanation of why the plan did not succeed in leading to development within the region.

2.3.3 Planning Experts

Interviews took place with planning experts and members of the Institute of Natural Resources (INR). Open-ended interviews took place firstly with Ms A. Todes, a senior lecturer in Town and Regional Planning at the University of Natal and an author on regional planning issues in the international literature, on September 3, 1997. Ms Todes is currently a member of the KwaZulu-Natal Town Planning Commission. An interview also took place with Mr P. Harrison a senior lecturer in Town and Regional Planning at the University of Natal and an author contributing to the international literature on regional planning, on September 9, 1997. An open-ended interview also took place with Dr A. McIntosh of McIntosh, Xaba and Associates. This partnership specialises in social surveys and survey analysis, institutional analysis, social impact assessment, project appraisal, evaluation and facilitation to mention a few areas of intervention. Dr McIntosh has also written extensively in the international literature on development and regional planning. The interview with Dr McIntosh took place on September 4, 1997.
Two members of the INR were also contacted namely Professor C. Breen who is currently the Project Development Director for the INR and who has had over twenty-five years of experience with work in the region, and Ms J. Manders who is a Programme Manager for the INR. An open ended interview took place with both members in attendance on July 31, 1997. See Appendix I for a copy of the open-ended questionnaire administered to the planning experts.

2.3.4 Departmental Representatives
An attempt was made to contact each of the Departments with specific responsibilities outlined in Table 19 (UIDF, 1989, pp 218-220) of the UIDF (1989). Unfortunately, due to the dramatic changes in the institutional structure of the province that followed the 1994 elections, many of these Departments had subsequently changed and members been absorbed into other departments or joined other organisations.

Representatives from various government departments were contacted during the period July to November 1997 and roughly forty-five minute interviews held with each of them. See Appendix I for a copy of the type of open-ended questions that were used in the interviews of departmental representatives and see Appendix II for a list of their names and the departments they came from. From the interviews it can be see that representatives were asked questions relating to what had happened in the region during the period 1989 to the present, and whether or not these developments were as a result of the plan or not. The questions also tried to ascertain, in the event of non-compliance, why the departments had ignored the UIDF (1989).

2.3.5 Field Work
Several trips to the region were undertaken throughout the 1997 year. These trips involved visits to several of the conservation and tourism facilities including the Ndumo and Tembe Elephant reserves, and the Maputaland Marine Reserve as
well as several of the areas for potential development including Rocktail Bay, Manzengwenya, and Nine Mile Reef. The urban centres of Jozini Mbazwane, and KwaNgwanase, as well as the smaller centres of Phelindaba, Ndumo, Makanes, Sibongile, and Tshongwe, were also visited during these field trips.

2.4 Weaknesses of Research Design

The first weakness relates to the choice of respondents in the various government departments involved in the region. Much time has elapsed since the UIDF (1989) was published and many of the departmental representatives have either left their postings or proceeded up the departmental hierarchy. Difficulty was thus experienced in contacting some of the relevant departmental representatives for interviews. Departmental representatives contacted on some occasions, lacked a detailed knowledge of the region and developments within it due to them being some distance from the region, although the region was often under within their area of responsibility.

After the first democratic elections in South Africa, the institutional structure within the country underwent dramatic changes. Many of the government departments involved in the formation of the plan either amalgamated or were dissolved. Difficulties were thus experienced in tracing some individuals for interviews.

Difficulty was also experienced in identifying residents of the region who had a detailed understanding of the UIDF (1989) and its workings. Due to the plan never being fully implemented, few residents encountered had an in-depth understanding of the plan and its workings.
Chapter Three
Recent Trends in Regional Planning Theory and Practice

3.1 Introduction

The literature review will be divided into two parts. The first part, Chapter 3, will identify where regional planning currently finds itself in the international literature, the methodology it uses, and the roles and functions it plays.

The second part of the literature review, Chapter 4, will deal with the issue of plan implementation and reasons why plans often fail. This chapter will highlight reasons for failure outlined by Morah (1996) and Bowden (1986), and examine lessons learnt from the upper Tugela catchment experience- a regional planning exercise that occurred at the same time as the Ubombo/Ingwavuma development framework.

The literature review will address the research sub-questions namely: to what extent regional plans and their tools of development frameworks are valid mechanisms to guide development?; what are the main impediments for the implementation of plans in general, and development frameworks in particular?; what factors cause regional plans to fail?; and what effect does administration have on the implementation of plans and development frameworks?
3.2 Recent Trends in Regional Planning Theory and Practice

This section will examine regional planning’s recent past, the pressures that have been brought to bear on the discipline regarding its relevance, and the possible ways forward for the discipline, as outlined in the literature.

According to Harrison (1995b, p 3), the 1970s and the time of uncertainty it ushered in, brought a disillusionment with regional plans. The period saw a general shift away from the centralism of regional planning to ‘bottom-up’ development with a direct concern for overcoming poverty. By the beginning of the 1980s however, the trajectory of development theory and practice had taken a sharp turn.

The economic crisis of the 1970s led to the emergence of the radical ‘New Right’ who were a curious amalgam of political and social conservatism and economic liberals. Concerns for equity and overcoming poverty, which were dominant in the 1970s, gave way to an overriding concern for economic efficiency. Under Thatcher in Great Britain for example, a full scale retreat from regional planning and a dismantling of much of the administrative apparatus associated with regional and metropolitan planning occurred. In the third world, structural adjustment programmes were imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to try to lead to debt repayment. This forced many third world governments to abandon regional planning exercises. By the early 1980s, according to Harrison (1995b, p 3), the death of regional planning was being loudly proclaimed.
The next part of the literature review will seek to uncover whether regional planning and regional plans in particular, are still valid in the current post-fordist period.

A problem for planners seeking to intervene in regional development is that regions are continually being transformed and reconstituted in response to wider processes and are constantly in the process of ‘becoming’. In the 1960’s, regional planning was a coherent programme based on a particular body of theory. It was essentially a programme by central government to accelerate the evolution of a mature space economy and reduce spatial inequalities, and the programmes were centrally planned and spatially focused. It becomes increasingly apparent that this conception of regional development is outdated in the current context. The world today is inherently different from that which it was three decades ago (Harrison, 1995b, p 4).

The ability for national government to plan for regions has declined significantly as power has seeped away from national governments downward towards provincial and local governments, and upwards toward emerging multinational economic blocks such as the European Community. Internationally the initiative for development has shifted decisively from the national to the regional and local levels. Regional planning has evolved from formal regulations at a national level, to a series of territorial policies at lower levels (Harrison, 1995b, p 4).

The rise of neo-liberalism has also had a significant impact on regional planning. The rise of neo-liberalism has brought about a new style of administration and government that is less concerned with equity and welfarism, and more focused on competitiveness and entrepreneurialism. The unstable and rapidly changing economic context is forcing government at all levels to give greater attention to these issues. According to Harrison (1995, p 5), nations, regions, and localities are easily marginalised in the sharply global economy of the 1990s.
Left wing theorists, according to Todes (1993, p 22), have also mounted a systematic critique of the conceptual base of regional planning as well as with its validity in terms of its practical effects. In these critiques, there is a sense that regional planning has no firm base. Gore (1984) in Todes (1993, p 22) suggests that regional planning is concerned with spatial distribution and patterns within a region which are not really a problem in their own right. Left wing theorists see social issues being of greater importance than spatial concerns. Substantial resources were often devoted to strategies aimed at dispersing development within national territories, but all too often the benefits accrued remained localised. Urban policy makers from a variety of perspectives increasingly agree with the view that many of the ‘spatial’ concerns of the past were irrelevant (Todes, 1993, p 22).

These challenges and trends have, according to Harrison (1995b, p 5), fragmented regional planning into at least three approaches namely the traditional spatially-focused approach; the promotion of globalisation, competitiveness and economic integration; and the promotion of regional identities. Each of these will now be elaborated on to shed light on where regional planning is heading.

With regard to the traditionally spatially-focused approach, although it is no longer broadly favoured and is arguably less and less appropriate in today’s changing world, it is still promoted in some quarters. With regard to the promotion of globalisation, competitiveness and economic integration, this approach is aimed at building conditions for dynamic regional competitive advantages. The traditional spatial focus of regional planning is replaced with economic analysis, regional marketing, and the strategic planning methodologies developed by the private sector. Recently, the focus has been on the development of regional networks through telematics which are new technologies, and which combine telecommunications with information processing. This approach has however encountered problems in terms of equity as globalisation and new
technologies are often associated with deepening inequalities. With regard to the promotion of a new regional identity, the recent work of John Friedman, according to Harrison (1995b, p 5), falls within this category. Ideas generated in the 1970s have resurfaced in different forms. The ‘flexible specialisation school’, for example, refers to the development of communities of trust, strengthening the inter-relationships between local firms, and furthering the creation of local labour markets. According to Harrison (1995b, p 5), it is arguable that this approach could lead to peripheralisation from the global economy, divisiveness, and isolation.

From the literature it can be seen that regional planning was in its hey-day in the 1960s and 1970s. Regional planning then came under an intense period of questioning and society as a whole underwent several marked changes which altered the relevance of the then current regional planning. These changes including economic, political, social, intellectual, and technological ones, led to a questioning of planning in general, and of regional planning in particular. A failure in traditional regional planning approaches like growth poles and other spatially based regional plans further compounded the problem. Challenges to regional planning also emerged from locally-initiated projects like Export Processing Zones (EPZs) and Free Enterprise Zones (FEZs). These projects and schemes like them challenged the need for structures, other than those present at the locality, to plan for it. Regional planning therefore found itself in a predicament and facing criticisms from all sides.

Harrison (1995b, p 4) however points out that the death notice for regional planning was in fact premature, and a new interest in regions was emerging. Much of this new interest was due to the revival of regionalism as a political sentiment in places like Eastern Europe and with increasing calls for greater autonomy coming from Scotland and Wales where referendums on this issue have
recently been held. According to Harrison (1995b), the revival of regionalism was largely due to the alienating forces of globalisation.

Todes (1993, p 22) believes that regional planning still has validity in the short to medium terms and should thus not be rejected, but its aims and methods should be reformulated and restructured. According to Todes (1993), much of the criticism of regional planning, including its focus on producing spatial balance, are valid. Todes (1993) also believes that issues that might form its focus, like addressing processes of uneven development and restructuring, are being neglected. Todes (1993, p 25) sees uneven development and its consequences as being the major issues regional planning should be concerned with. The value of planning at a regional scale is its ability to understand and act upon the complexities of regional and local conditions. An adapted form of the traditional methodologies of regional planning that attempts to understand the specificity of areas in an integrated way can be useful in assessing the nature of the problems in the area, and the possible responses. Whereas conventional approaches to regional planning were generally oriented to producing plans to guide spatial development, the approach suggested here would focus on understanding development dynamics and the problems within the region (Todes, 1993, p 25). The new approach to development needs to be based on an integrated understanding of the context, while the intervention needs to occur on a more strategic basis with public participation occurring right from the start of the process.

Regional planning therefore is presently offered a window of opportunity in which it can either embrace and modify itself to fit in with global changes, or it can continue to fall out of favour with decision makers and ultimately face its demise. If modified sufficiently, **regional plans can be valid tools to develop a region.**
3.3 The Practice of Regional Planning

The discipline of regional planning, as can be seen from the literature, has been in an intense period of disarray and self questioning over the last two decades. A particular problem is that regional planning has tended to become increasingly sectoral in focus, focusing largely on selected aspects of a region's economy like the manufacturing sector for example. As a result of this, vital relationships at play within the region are overlooked or down-played.

This section of the literature review will firstly outline a typical methodology for the preparation of a regional plan, which will be followed by an analysis of the functions regional planning can play in developing a region.

3.3.1 The Methodology of a Regional Plan

The answer to the question 'how is regional planning undertaken?' can be answered through an analysis of the methodology of regional planning. The methodology of planning is however not the same as the methodology of science although it does utilise dimensions and techniques of scientific analysis. The sciences utilise methods which are essentially linear and move through the sequence of: hypothesis formation; data collection; analysis; hypothesis confirmation or rejection; and if rejected, the hypothesis is reformulated. Planning on the other hand uses methodology which is cyclical and not linear and moves through a methodological sequence of need; performance; idea; context. It is cyclical in the sense that while planning necessarily engages in all stages, it does not necessarily do so sequentially. Thus for example, contexts frequently prioritise needs or hint at ideas, leading to understandings gained in one stage being fed back into the system, leading to adjustments in the others (Kiepiel and Dewar, 1996, pp 31-32).
A Process of Regional Planning

Kiepiel and Dewar (1996) identify the following stages that regional planning processes generally move through:

**THE PLANNING PROCESS**

**STEP 1** Locating dominant issues

**STEP 2** Establishing vision

**STEP 3** Developing ideas

**MONITORING AND REVIEW**

**THE ACTION PROCESS**

- Detailed design, programming and budgeting
- Implementation
- Monitoring and review of implementation

**RESOLUTION**

- Formulate or revise regional plan.

**DOMINANT ISSUES**

**REGIONAL EVALUATION AND INTERPRETATION**

**VISION**

**PERFORMANCE CRITERIA**

**IDEAS**

**INTEGRATED REGIONAL PLAN**

**IMPLEMENTATIONAL STRATEGY**

**MONITORING AND REVIEW STATEMENTS ON**
- Implementational strategy
- Integrated Regional Plan
- Regional dynamics

Figure 3.1 A Practice of Regional Planning (Kiepiel and Dewar, 1996, p 44)
The first stage of this regional planning process is called the ‘issue identification’ stage by Kiepiel and Dewar (1996) and involves the identification of the dominant issues as well as a regional evaluation and interpretation. The first of these involves the identification of the most important regional issues, identifying who should be involved, and the identification of how to proceed. The second of these processes focuses on identifying international, national and regional forces impacting on and thus shaping the region, as well as possible changes to these, and the probable outcomes.

The second stage identified by the authors is termed ‘giving direction’ and involves establishing a vision and identifying performance criteria. The establishing a vision stage seeks to be as inclusive as possible including all interested parties. It also seeks to express a common direction in a form which is meaningful for the populace at large and captures the desires and concerns of all stakeholders. Identifying performance criteria involves identifying normatively-driven performance criteria which, if met, move towards implementing the vision.

The third phase identified by the authors is termed ‘establishing the path of regional development’ and this step answers the questions of ‘what could be’ and ‘what should be’. The three parts incorporated in this phase include idea formulation, plan formulation, and the identification of implementation strategies.

The final phase is that of ‘monitoring and review’ and involves the on-going adjustment to achieve what was intended. Monitoring is an on-going process that measures regional dynamics and the achievement of the plan, and evaluates these. This enables ongoing adjustment to, and fine-tuning of, the plan and thus ensures that it is a dynamic, enduring management tool. Review on the other hand is the periodic assessment of the regional plan or the implementation package in order to confirm the integrity of these or to recommend their revision.
Regional plans, like the UIDF (1989), typically move through such a process. This dissertation however seeks to uncover why regional plans do not get implemented to the extent intended in the plan. It will therefore focus primarily on the implementation strategy, monitoring, and review stages of the plan, and try to uncover the problems inherent in these stages which impede the plan materialising.

3.3.2 Reasons for the Importance of Regional Planning
This section of the literature review will outline the different functions regional plans play within a region. These functions include: mediating between different kinds of evaluation; providing a framework for the rational allocation of resources; managing negative externalities; optimising the performance of the ‘whole’; responding to changing time and spatial scales; understanding the value of resources; and aggregation and disaggregation.

3.3.2.1 Mediating between different kinds of evaluation
Regional planning plays an important role in mediating between different kinds of evaluation. Frequently decision makers are required to mediate in conflicts about different values. This problem arises because of different ways of placing values on something like a resource, an experience, an activity or an opportunity for these. The importance of a regional plan in mediating conflicts lies in providing a framework for evaluation that is greater than those of the conflicting interests. Because a regional plan is a multi-dimensional framework, it is a statement of consensus on the various values derived from ecological, social, economic and other considerations. Regional planning shows the value of a resource in the bigger pattern and it locates an issue in a wider pattern of events or places. It also shows how a particular resource gives rise to a greater opportunity, through being included in a broader set of circumstances it evaluates over longer time-frames (Kiepiel and Dewar, 1996, p 10).
3.3.2.2 Providing a framework for the rational allocation of resources

In situations of great need, demand for developmental resources massively outstrips those that can be provided. It is therefore in the interest of groups in need that resource allocation occur rationally. For this reason, it is essential that there is an agreed framework for resource allocation that is based on broader issues such as fairness or equity, and efficiency of resource usage. A regional plan provides such a framework and has the primary function of providing a rational approach to resource allocation (Kiepiel and Dewar, 1996, p 11).

3.3.2.3 Managing negative externalities

The term ‘externality’ comes from the field of economics and refers to the spill-over or external effect, both positive and negative, of actions of individuals. They reflect the consequences of welfare that are not fully accounted for in the pricing and trading system involving individuals. Negative externalities occur when individual actions worsen the circumstances of others and often give rise to conflicts between groups, or between individuals and groups. Regional planning provides a framework for mediating these conflicts (Kiepiel and Dewar, 1996, p 11).

3.3.2.4 Optimising performance of the ‘whole’

At the heart of regional planning is the concern with the ‘whole’. Regional planning is about natural systems, life styles, and economics. It involves developing a commonly shared vision; understanding the role of the parts in contributing to that vision; and promoting and facilitating the co-ordination and integration of the parts towards agreed outcomes. Particularly important is the way in which regional planning considers the whole as a totality, rather than focusing on the parts. The importance of this is that when the performance of the whole is optimised, no one part is maximised. The best performance of the whole
results from trade-offs and compromises in terms of the parts and how they are
connected. An important skill in regional planning is understanding the nature of
these trade-offs.

While regional planning considers the region as a totality, it also views it as a part
of a greater totality, such as a province or nation, or the international system of
human affairs. In its understanding, it cannot stop at the jurisdictional boundaries
of the region (Kiepiel and Dewar, 1996, p 13).

3.3.2.5 Responding to changing time and spatial scales
An important aspect of viewing the region as a totality involves seeing it in terms
of its multiple time and spatial scales. Seen in time, regional planning is not
simply concerned with the present and imminent future. The natural environment,
the original basis of the region, is overlain by civilisations of prehistory and
history, and is the basis of those of the future. Regional planning has regard for
these multiple time scales. Each generation has a responsibility to future
generations and in turn, is the inheritor of past legacies and the custodian of things
of value of the past.

In a similar way, the region is viewed in its multiple spatial dimensions- the
overall entity simultaneously comprises places within the region, and the region is
also a part of larger places in the world. The ability to hold these multiple time
and spatial scales in mind is essential to regional design, and this is what makes
regional planning of importance to individuals and interest groups. Commonly,
most individuals and interest groups are concerned and informed, mainly about
issues that immediately affect their lives- issues that are close to them in time and
space. Where conflicts of interest between these individuals or groups arise, there
is no assurance on what decision-making will result without a broader perspective
of an issue. It is the responsibility of regional planning to provide a broader time-
space framework for decision making (Kiepiel and Dewar, 1996, pp 13-14).
3.3.2.6 Aggregation and disaggregation

It has become increasingly recognised internationally that in situations where enormous changes are faced, the concept of disaggregation, which is breaking down very large problems into manageable bits, is fundamental. In this regard, the regional level is one appropriate point at which national and provincial strategies can be given substance. National and provincial strategies include concerns that span the entire urban-rural-primeval continuum, and the regional scale embraces the entire span of this continuum.

The converse is true with the process of aggregation. Needs and priorities identified on the ground are a primary input into the allocation of resources by higher levels of government. Regional planning can play an important role in technically integrating inputs from stakeholders in the region in a way that these inputs are mutually supportive and consistent. In this manner, regional planning is an important tool for local involvement in drawing up and monitoring provincial and national plans (Kiepiel and Dewar, 1996, pp 15).

3.3.2.7 Conclusion

From the literature surveyed, it can be seen that regional planning is of great importance and fulfils several important roles. Regional planning provides a way of mediating between different kinds of evaluation, provides a framework to determine how resources are to be allocated, and provides a way to deal with negative externalities. Regional planning also seeks to optimise the performance of the ‘whole’ thus looking beyond regional and national boundaries, which makes regional planning holistic in its approach. Regional planning also plays a role in responding to changing time and spatial scales and is thus not simply concerned with the present and imminent future. Regional planning also seeks to address the phenomena of aggregation and disaggregation as well as
understanding the relative value of resources. Without regional planning’s intervention, society would not function in an optimal manner.

3.4 Conclusion

From the first part of the literature review, it can be seen that regional plans are in fact valid tools to guide development within a region and are currently offered a window of opportunity to further develop the field, through increased international interest. Important functions performed by regional plans include: mediating between different kinds of evaluation; providing a framework for the rational allocation of resources; managing negative externalities; optimising the performance of the whole; responding to changing time and spatial scales; and aggregation and diaggregation. Without regional planning or regional plans, it is argued that regions will not function optimally.
Chapter Four
Plan Implementation

4.1 Introduction

Time will now be spent examining the dynamic factors at play that lead to both the success and failure of plans and projects in general. This analysis will seek to answer sub-questions two and three of ‘what the main impediments to the implementation of plans are’, and ‘what causes regional plans to fail?’ This analysis will be used at a later stage to make sense of what has happened due to the UIDP (1989) in the ten years following the completion of the report. The work of two authors, namely Morah (1996) and Bowden (1986), will be examined to ascertain why plans come into difficulty when implemented. Morah’s 14 categories of implementation problems make a useful checklist to compare difficulties experienced in plan implementation in the study area. Bowden on the other hand examines the implementation literature and generates typical implementation problems relating to government ministries. Although it can be seen that the work of the two authors overlaps considerably, the categories of implementation problems they both outline will be kept separate. Bowden’s (1986) categories will be used to examine the implementation of initiatives by government agencies, while Morah’s (1996) categories of implementation problems will be used as a checklist to evaluate implementation problems in general.

The plan for the Upper Tugela catchment will then be examined. The Upper Tugela catchment study was undertaken at the same time as the UIDP (1989) and many of the KwaZulu planners were involved in both initiatives. Lessons learnt from the Upper Tugela situation will be compared at a later stage to what was experienced in the Umboombo/Ingwavuma region.
4.2 Implementation Difficulties

In developing countries, and in Africa in particular, public policies often do not end up getting implemented at all, and those that do manage to get through the tortuous process of implementation, often look very different from what their framers initially intended. Programme implementation and administration are the critical problems in the development of plans in developing countries and thus the problems of the process deserves the greatest attention in these countries than anywhere else in the world (Morah, 1996, p 79).

The following analysis of the ‘policy implementation’ stage examines works directly related to application of policy in the public domain outlined by Morah (1996). Non-implementation’ is defined by McLaughlin (1976) in Morah (1996, p 81) as when programmes never get adopted, or get adopted but break down due to a lack of interest by the target population. Except in the case of ‘non-implementation’, programmes rarely fail to cause an impact but may encounter problems in optimally achieving expectations. The term ‘implementation problem’ is thus preferred in referring to any problem with a proven track record, no matter how much has been achieved. On one level it refers to the missing link or the myriad of missing factors that act to constrain the optimal achievement of the policy goals. On the other hand, it refers to the object reality of a programme in terms of gaps or shortfalls in both the intended or unintended impacts (Morah, 1996, p 81).

Below are 14 categories of the implementation literature highlighted by Morah (1996), which constitute a useful check list for development planners to anticipate implementation difficulties. This checklist will be used to evaluate the shortcomings of the projects put forward for implementation in the UIDF (1989).
4.2.1 Administrative control

The issue of control in a bureaucracy is perhaps the oldest and most prevalent explanation for implementation problems. This concept can simply be defined as that of control and accountability in the bureaucracy and can have several different causes. Downs (1967) in Morah (1996, p 82) believes that this behaviour of lower-level bureaucrats not carrying out the instructions of higher level officials, originates from the ‘leakage’ of authority inside a bureaucracy. What this means is that a ‘leakage’ occurs because implementation officials have different goals and each uses his/her discretion in translating ‘orders from above’ into commands going to those lower down in the hierarchy. In most developing countries, where the large majority of implementing bodies are either weak or yet to acquire the years of experience in checks and balances of their counterparts in the developed world, administrative control is said to present a natural problem to successful implementation. Rampant bureaucratic and political corruption are frequently among the weaknesses presented by this lack of a strong administrative control culture. Remedying the problem of implementation becomes primarily a question of controlling discretion and maximising routine and compliance in the bureaucracy.

4.2.2 Organisational resources

Problems related to resources have tended to be the mainstay of explanations for the policy implementation gap, especially in the developing world where resources are generally scarcer than elsewhere. A certain threshold of policy resources is necessary for there to be any possibility of realising policy objectives. By ‘policy resources’ it is meant the cumulative effort necessary to achieve policy aims. This consists of several elements including the amount of capital and funds allocated to the policy, the availability of qualified personnel to operate the policy, and the time available to get things done. Political support to see a policy initiative through is probably of greatest importance and usually consists of what
Bardach (1977) in Morah (1996, p 83) refers to as a ‘fixer’. This is a person of authority or a legislator who is personally interested in a policy and who will guide it through the playing out of the various implementation games until the goals are realised. This has been referred to by authors like Patton (1978) in Morah (1996, p 83), as the ‘personal factor’ in policy.

4.2.3 Inter-government relations

Relations between different levels and departments of government can have a profound effect on the implementation of projects and plans. Government line departments, be they at national, provincial or local levels, often operate in isolation of each other with minimal co-ordination of functions. This is inherently inefficient with wastage of funds occurring through duplicated research and uncoordinated implementation of plans. Ministries often see themselves as fiefdoms, and representatives are often unable to adapt their own ministry plans to fit with others due to varying service areas or relations.

4.2.4 Substantive nature of policy

Depending on the kind of policy that is pursued, different types of pressure are brought to bear on the policy making process. Lowi (1964) in Morah (1996, p 84) postulates three types of policy: distributive, redistributive, and regulatory. The last of these types of policy induces the highest level of conflict as it involves the participation of numerous groups of clear winners and losers. Recognising the fact that certain policies, by virtue of their nature, are candidates for certain types of implementation problems, scholars have undertaken to identify additional significant characteristics of policy including, in addition to the substantive matter of policy, the imbued goals and expectation, the tractability of these, and the way in which these are formulated. The smaller the scope of the behavioural change to be made by a policy or project, the less problematic its successful implementation. In such a case, losses to stake holders are minimal and implementation can be programmes along existing lines of operation. However, when policy aims entail
major behavioural changes, losses would not only be greater, but existing routines have to be redesigned, replaced or side-stepped, thereby making resistance more likely (Berman, 1980 in Morah, 1996, p 85).

4.2.5 Pressure politics
Murphy (1971) in Morah (1996, p 85) advanced the view that the inability of poor people and their allies to exert their demands on the system cannot be ignored when explaining the implementation problems of social policies, a conclusion very similar to that which gave rise to advocacy planning in the United States in the 1960s. Davidoff (1965, pp 331-338) in his work on advocacy planning, foresaw transferring expert knowledge to poor people as a means to bring them into the group pressure system. Murphy (1971) similarly proposes the empowerment of the poor as the only real method of overcoming the problems of the implementation process. In the substantially different politico-institutional characteristics of developing countries, it is argued that interest aggregating structures for presenting collective demands to the political leadership are either inefficient or non-existent. Politicians and administrators of developing countries often tend to view public participation in policy processes as being illegitimate or inefficient. As a result, they deliberately attempt to institute technocratic or apolitical approaches to policy making and implementation, thus making the process that much more remote and inaccessible to most individuals.

4.2.6 Goals consensus
Often problems arise out of the fact that consensus cannot be reached among key role players within the planning or decision making group. In this particular brand of politics, participants in the process engage themselves in isolated manoeuvres principally concerned with what they might lose individually, rather than what might be gained collectively.
4.2.7 Goal clarity and communication

Ambiguity or contradictions in policy goals, whether caused by political design, misunderstanding, uncertainties, lack of knowledge or value conflict, is held by nearly all implementation researchers to be a significant part of the implementation problem. Without guidance of programme goals, it is assumed that evaluators will flounder and not be able to ask relevant and insightful questions about the programme. Implementation officials would therefore be left with inadequate guidance, not only of what is expected of them, but most likely to fill the gap using their own discretion which is most often at odds with the original intention (Kaufman, 1973, p 3).

4.2.8 Disposition of actors

Another significant diagnosis of the implementation problem is the behavioural obstacle arising from the commitment or policy orientation of implementing officials. According to Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981) in Morah (1996, p 88), unless a policy is introduced into a supportive environment, not just a neutral one, the administrative agents responsible for the policy execution are likely to derail it and undermine the process. This will be either because the officials are unaware that they are not in full compliance with the general intent of the policy; or their values and sense of self-interest, or preferred course of action, are offered by the goals contained in the policy; or the officials' negative disposition may cause them to defy programme objectives by surreptitious diversion and evasion.

Thus under conditions of cognitive dissonance, officials may unknowingly impede implementation by screening out a clear message when it seems to contradict deeply cherished beliefs, or they may attempt to redefine the message to fit familiar patterns. The major explanation for the implementation problem is failure on the part of the implementing officials to overcome their natural resistance to change and to develop enthusiasm and widespread acceptance for the
policy's standards and objectives. To ensure that implementing officials develop this commitment, Sabatier and Mazmanian suggest selecting senior implementing officials from a pool of policy supporters, or assigning responsibility for implementation to agencies whose policy orientation is most consistent with the policy and that will accord it high priority. But it is arguable that a well-constituted bureaucracy, with sufficient power to operate sanctions and incentives, may be in a position to cause implementers to execute a policy obediently without having to alter their disposition.

4.2.9 Complexity of joint action
This refers to the implementation difficulties that can arise from having too many actors of different vertical and horizontal levels in the process which may result in the blurring of lines of authority. The consequences of this include a muddling of policy objectives because of diverse perspectives, inter-group rivalry and divided loyalty, poor co-ordination, and a diversion of energy in playing out a number of loosely interrelated implementation games (Bardach, 1977 in Morah, 1996, p 88). In the end, disagreement and delays almost always result. Either that or no one may be willing or able to exercise final authority and consequently, no one does anything or each group or actor does as he/she wishes, pursuing their own goals and established routine. This problem of multiplicity of organised interests is less likely to be a factor in the implementation efforts of developing countries.

4.2.10 Theory of causation
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) in Morah (1996, p 89) believe that every policy implies a causal relationship. This means that a policy is an 'if-then' statement in the sense that if 'x' is done, then 'y' will result which has led to many theorists viewing the implementation process as hypothesis testing. Conceiving implementation as hypothesis testing does provide an extremely useful method for focusing research on the process. The problem with this approach is, however,
that it treats implementation as a clinical academic exercise and equates knowledge with effective action.

4.2.11 Evaluation design
Almost all analyses of the implementation problem presume a top-down perspective in that they take substantive policy to be the starting point from which implementation and everything else flow. Any study design which presumes a standard measure of effectiveness based on policy statements is likely to produce a systematic bias towards identifying implementation problems. The net result of rejecting this top-down approach to implementation analysis is that those who deliver policy become the primary actors in the process, while others in the arena mainly provide the context for their discretionary judgements and actions. Recent trends have shown a move toward goal-free evaluation which accepts that programmes have goals, but they deny that these goals have any relevance for understanding outcome. In ‘backward-mapping’ of implementation, Elmore (1982) in Morah (1996, p 90) and other proponents argue that the less known about a programme’s goals, the less tunnel vision will develop regarding its character, which is most discernible at the local point of service delivery, which is where much of the evaluation should take place.

4.2.12 Participatory process
The chief assumption behind this interpretation is that people like to obey laws if they believe in them and feel part of them (Zeleny, 1982 in Morah, 1996, p 90). Despite the fact there is no established causal relation between the level of participation and the acceptance of change, support has been found for the following related arguments (Gross et al, 1971 in Morah, 1996, p 90). Participation leads to higher levels of staff morale, and high levels of staff morale are necessary for successful implementation. Participation leads to greater commitment, and a high degree of commitment is required for effecting change.
Beginning with the postulate of basic resistance to change, participation will reduce initial resistance and thereby facilitate successful implementation.

A problem with participation is, however, that the wider the range of participation, the less likely consensus is on decision making due to the wide range of views and beliefs of the people and groups participating.

4.2.13 Uncertainties
Policies of any nature invariably involve substantial uncertainties, and it is frequently in the implementation stage that these uncertainties must be resolved or are at least shown to exist. Sources of uncertainties in policy implementation include not knowing what the political and socio-economic future might bring, a change in government and hence in policy commitment and orientation, and the death or the neutralisation of a prominent proponent of the policy.

3.6.14 Political and socio-economic conditions
This encompasses questions like what the resource picture will look like throughout the implementation period, what the nature of general public options is on the policy, or whether there is partisan or elite support for the policy. In developing countries, several factors reflecting their unique politico-institutional or regime characteristics, have been advanced as making as important difference in accounting for their atrocious record of implementation. Factors in these countries include nepotism and ethnic politics, bureaucratic corruption, political and economic instability, and imitation culture.

4.2.15 Conclusion
Problems with development initiatives in general can be caused by a combination of any of the fourteen factors mentioned. In order to have any chance of seeing wider spatial planning policies implemented, planners therefore need to address these problems as far as possible before implementation takes place.
4.3 Typical Implementation Problems Relating to Government Ministries

Bowden (1986, pp 61-71) examines problems that arise out of the implementation of individual projects instituted through operating ministries of the government. He undertook a survey of the implementation literature and identified and ranked the eight most frequently mentioned problems.

The eight most frequently mentioned problems, in rank order, were:

1. Involvement/ motivation of target group (a frequency of mention which may only reflect the preponderance of articles on agricultural development in the sample).
2. Necessity for institutional or legal change.
3. Co-ordination and co-operation between contributors.
4. System of on-site managing of the project or programme.
5. Political will, or political consensus necessary for the support of the programme.
6. Monitoring and evaluation leading to re-evaluation and redesign of the project or programme.
7. Knowledge and attitude of target group.
8. Availability of local currency funds.

Two implementation problems that rank high on the list and which merit mentioning, are a necessity for institutional or legal change, and co-ordination and co-operation between contributors. As can be seen from Bowden’s (1986) analysis of the literature relating to the implementation of projects by government agencies, these problems are two of the greatest causes of non-implementation.
Bowden’s (1986) eight typical problems overlap almost completely with what Morah (1996) has laid out as the fourteen causes of implementation problems. For example target group involvement is similar to Morah’s concept of participatory process, and the concept of availability of funds is similar to political and socio-economic conditions being supportive to policy, as well as the availability of organisational resources. Bowden (1986) does not however statistically see the substantive nature of policy as being of major importance which Morah (1996) does mention. Bowden (1986) also places a large amount of blame for project failure outside of the project manager’s or parent agency’s control. Both authors, through their analyses, create a comprehensive check list outlining causes of implementation problems.

4.4 Lessons from the Upper Tugela Catchment Experience

Time will now be spent examining the experiences of a development planning and environmental management initiative in the Upper Tugela region. This initiative was undertaken during the same time period in South Africa’s history as the UIDF (1989), although after it, and thus criticisms levelled at the Upper Tugela initiative may shed light on the short comings of the UIDF (1989). Many of the planners within the KwaZulu government were involved in both the UIDF (1989) and the Upper Tugela catchment plan. Lessons learnt from the UIDF (1989) were employed to shape the formulation and development of the Upper Tugela initiative. The Upper Tugela initiative therefore forms a good reference with which to compare the UIDF (1989).

At the time of the commencement of the planning process, the South African government was unwilling to make the land within the region available to KwaZulu, but it did however respond to lobby groups directed towards stopping
the deterioration of the catchment. A steering committee was appointed from representatives of the white commercial farmers and the different official agencies involved, with the objective of planning and promoting a strategy for the co-ordinated socio-economic development of the Upper Tugela catchment area, to ensure the optimal utilisation of the natural resources of the area on a sustained basis, and to improve the quality of life of all the inhabitants (McIntosh, 1994, p 396). Problems with the implementation of the initiative arose primarily out of administrative problems at a local level. The fragmentation of authority and the absence of developed local political institutions, or mechanisms to ensure local political institutions, prevented central and regional agencies from responding with flexibility to particular local conditions.

McIntosh analysed the Upper Tugela planning initiative and highlighted several existing institutional limitations that curtail planning and development. The initiative adopted an interdepartmental committee system to try and overcome difficulties caused by fragmented administration systems. This failed, however, to generate efficient channels of participation among departments as well as with the affected communities. The continued practice of centralisation with numerous functional agencies, forced the planners into adopting and following a blueprint planning process. Comprehensive planning was therefore required right from the onset so that agencies could allocate additional funding and staff to the initiative. Although the planners argued for a participatory approach, processes had to be entered into and structure established before communities were able to absorb them effectively. For the planners this meant attempting to act as custodians for communities which had legitimate reasons for scepticism and non-participation.

The priority given to the project by the KwaZulu government was insufficient to change the practices of departments or to foster the extensive co-ordination required by the initiative. This was reflected in that only a few departments actively co-operated in the initiative and in the fact that other departments were
unable or unwilling to adapt their practices to its broad aims. A further problem arose due to the planners involved trying to participate directly in planning and in consultancy liaison, canvassing activities, implementation and fund-raising, in addition to their other responsibilities in KwaZulu. The problem arose out of them being based some 250 kilometres away from the area thus insufficient time could be spent obtaining the active co-operation of other departments and agencies. Where the ability to canvass support was limited, the forums provided by the co-ordination/action and steering committees were used instead. The problem that arose here was that these committees spent large amounts of time attempting to resolve jurisdictional issues and in trying to get various departments to commit themselves to the initiative’s projects. The absence of a strong executive within KwaZulu was even more significant in explaining the difficulties which were encountered. Problems were also experienced with the various co-ordinating structures, and although the various co-ordinating committees were effective in getting certain things done, they remained highly cumbersome and expensive mechanisms. Problems were also experienced with field officers. These officers were too thinly spread and too distant from their supervisors to be able to effectively co-ordinate their activities in the different sectors (Mc Intosh, 1994, pp 395-408).

The implementation problems that arose out of this initiative correspond to many of the ones outlined by Morah (1996) which further adds validity to Morah’s study.

4.5 Conclusions

From this chapter, it can be seen that a large number of reasons exist for the failure of plans and failure can be attributed, according to Morah (1996), to administrative control, organisational resources, inter-government relations,
pressure politics, goal consensus, and the substantive nature of policy. Other factors include goal clarity and communication, disposition of actors, complexity of joint action, evaluation design, participatory processes, uncertainties, political and socio-economic conditions, and the theory of causation. Bowden (1986) highlights eight commonly listed implementation problems identified in the literature related to government ministries and their handling of plans, and these bear a striking resemblance to the implementation problems highlighted by Morah (1996). The upper Tugela experience also sheds light on implementation problems typical to the late 1980s within South Africa. These implementation problems will be compared to the implementation problems identified in the UIDF (1989) at a later stage.
5.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to provide the reader with a background into the workings of the UIDF (1989), the approach it took to planning, its phasing and time scales, the nature of the institutional structures and functions, and the role of the plan. The chapter will also outline reasons why plans fail, as outlined in the Spatial Development Plan for the North-Eastern region of the Transkei (1983), as well as steps that should be taken to ensure their success.

5.2 Criticisms of Regional Planning

The Spatial Development Plan for the North-Eastern region of the Transkei (1983), set out several reasons why regional plans fail and identified developments that need to occur to ensure regional plan’s success. The next part of the chapter will briefly examine why regional plans often fall short thereby answering the sub-question of why regional plans as a whole often fail. This analysis will also serve to provide a background to explain the form and nature of the UIDF (1989) has taken.
Criticisms of regional plans outlined in the north-east Region of Transkei Spatial Development Plan (1983) include:

- They often describe in detail what could be grown/located/mined/produced in certain areas without any structured response as to the relative feasibility of such decisions or the relationship between such decisions and ‘development’.
- They attempt to understand, theoretically, the conditions underpinning development without actually talking about strategy.
- They disregard space or are unduly determined by spatial considerations.
- They overemphasise one or a few socio-economic sectors to the neglect of others.
- They advocate for the most part, further studies and do not advocate specific interventions.
- They make recommendations that are sufficiently vague to be generally acceptable but not resulting in any action.

In attempting to address these pitfalls, the north-east region of Transkei Spatial Development Plan (1983) suggests plans tackle these problems by:

1. Identifying those fields of action in which planning can be effective and concentrating the plan on those issues only.
2. Translating the overall, long-term spatial strategy for the region being planned for, into specific, implementable projects.
3. Spell out what departments and agencies should do in the region and tabulate the sequence in which these actions should take place.
4. List the highest priority actions for urgent attention.
The UIDF (1989) built on to the foundation established by the Spatial Development Framework for the North-Eastern region of the Transkei (1983) and as a result, the UIDF (1989) undertook to tackle the problems the Transkei plan identified. As will be seen in Chapter 6, the UIDF (1989) identified the fields of action in which planning could be effective, and translated the overall long-term spatial strategy for the region being planned for, into specific implementable projects. As Chapter 6 will show, the UIDF (1989) spelt out the highest priority actions for urgent attention and what departments and agencies should do in the region, as well as the sequence in which these events should take place.

The next part of this chapter will outline the context of the plan, its objectives, the process involved, and the phasing of the plan.

5.3 The Context and Approach to Planning for the UIDF (1989)

5.3.1 Strategic Decisions

The government of KwaZulu and other development agencies working in the Ubombo/Ingwavuma districts, according to the UIDF (1989, p1), recognised the need for a co-ordinated approach to development in the region. In order to establish a platform for planning in the area, KwaZulu undertook three strategic actions. Firstly, it created a Maputaland Regional Development Planning Committee (MRDPC) and a Working Group which was to be responsible for the preparation and implementation of a Regional Development Plan.
Secondly, it indicated the overall direction and thrust of the plan by setting the goal of:

"fulfilling the basic needs of the people of this region within as short a time period as possible as well as to promote sustained development in the long, medium and short term within the broad confines of the KwaZulu policy" (UIDF, 1989, p 1).

Two objectives were set for the achievement of this goal:

1. ‘To involve the leadership of the people of the region, the various government departments and private bodies active in the area in a planning programme following the broad confines of KwaZulu government policies’.

2. ‘To plan regional development in Maputaland, co-ordinate implementation of regional departmental development policies and monitor the implementation of co-ordinated regional development in Maputaland’.

Thirdly, on the basis of high level discussions between KwaZulu and the Department of Development Aid (DDA), the KwaZulu Cabinet supported the principle of accepting financial and technical assistance for planning Maputaland’s development from DDA (KZ Cabinet Resolution 109/87). Arising from this, a joint Steering Committee was appointed to perform the following functions:

- Appoint planning consultants
- Prepare terms of reference
- Manage the consultants.

(UIDF, 1989, p 2)
5.3.2 Approach and planning process

The approach adopted for planning within the Maputaland region was influenced by several problems within the region including:

- the high levels of uncertainty about a number of fundamental issues;
- the large number of organisations active in the region;
- the complexity and inter-relatedness of the issues to be addressed;
- the goal and objectives set for Maputaland’s development;
- the need to involve local people as well as supplier agencies; and
- the urgency of preparing a framework within which decisions about the region’s development could be made.

The approach selected was strategic in nature, issue based and participative, with a view to creating an environment within which decisions could be taken progressively from an early stage (UIDF, 1989, p 2).

This approach was based on the concept that planning is a process, designed to facilitate a wide range of developmental actions in the region by providing a framework within which decisions can be taken. Emphasis was therefore placed on:

1. Establishing a capacity building process and structures through which appropriate decisions, together with implementation of specific projects/programmes could emerge progressively.
2. Adopting a multi-level approach that would bring together local, regional and national inputs in the development process.
3. Creating the forum, attitudinal climate and institutional mechanisms whereby the people of the region and local organisations could participate in providing inputs for the region’s development.
4. Adopting a multi-disciplinary and integrated approach linking governmental, professional and community inputs in such a way as to meet the full range of needs and opportunities in the region.

5. Focusing attention on the implementation of co-ordinated development in the region and on monitoring its effect in terms of the goal and objective.

(UIDF, 1989, p 2)

5.3.3 Phasing

In order to work towards the goal, within the given parameters, it was envisaged that the overall planning process would need to evolve through the following broad phases:

- **Pre-planning**
  - Assessment of the existing situation and preparation of a detailed brief.

- **Phase I**
  - Initiation of consultation procedures.
  - Formulation of alternative development scenarios for the Ubombo/Ingwavuma region.
  - Preparation of a structure plan.

- **Phase II**
  - Motivation of specific projects and programmes.
  - Implementation.
  - Monitoring and revision of the Strategy and the Development Plan as future circumstances dictate.

(UIDF, 1989, p 3)

See Figure 5.1 for details of the phasing of the plan.

5.3.4 The Institutional Structures and Functions

A number of institutional structures were created for the purposes of this development initiative. The main reasons for creating structures was to link the top component (mainly government), with the bottom (mainly local people) to
ensure strong lines of communication in the development process. The intention was that structures would play an ‘enabling role’ in the development process, but not to be a substitute for the normal activities of the private sector, corporations, and government departments. Instead they were to help in co-ordinating respective activities and in focusing on the priority needs of the region. Implementation was to be carried out by the departments and corporations with line responsibilities for specific functions, non-governmental organisations, and the private sector. See Table 5.1 for the institutional structures created and their functions, and Figure 5.1 for a time scale of the implementation process.

Table 5.1 Institutional Structures and Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structures</th>
<th>Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MRDPC</td>
<td>Obtaining funding, policy level decisions, co-ordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Group</td>
<td>Involvement of people in decision making, local level decisions, obtaining funding, problem solving, co-ordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Reference Group and Tribal Authority</td>
<td>Identification of key issues and interest groups, identifying channels for resolution of problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local People and Interest Groups</td>
<td>Local people to form committees for identification of issues and means of resolution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: UIDF, 1989, p 6)

5.3.5 Role of the Plan

The planners involved realised, from the outset, that the plan ‘per se’ would neither solve all the problems, nor realise the full potential of the region. What it
Figure 5.1  Planning process - phase 1

Field base established October 1987

Terms of reference and MRDPC in operation June 1987

Pre-Planning Working Group in operation September 1987

Field work and investigations by Planning Team

Identification of key issues

Formulation of alternative scenarios

Preparation of Structure Plan September - November 1988

Report to MRDPC on Pre-Planning stage (June 1987) Decision to proceed with Phase I

Interim report to MRDPC: Development concept for Maputaland September 1987

Report to Steering Committee and MRDPC (May 1988) "A Development Rationale for Maputaland"

Decision by DDA and KZ to expand Scenarios A/B into a Structure Plan for the region (August 1988)

Presented to Steering Committee December 1988

Decision to proceed
sought to achieve was to indicate, in relation to those fields of action in which planning can be effective, a range of actions that are open to decision makers; the likely consequences of those actions, and a set of recommendations as to the combination (and sequence) of actions that would encourage development in the region in the short and longer term. It was intended that the structure plan be used in this way by implementing agencies, decision makers and other participants active in the region.

5.3.6 Integration of Spatial and Sectoral Aspects

The planners involved acknowledged that any plan drawn up to meet social and economic objectives must have a spatial component for the simple reason that human activities are carried out at and between certain places, and because resources and needs are not uniformly distributed across the region. The purpose of the spatial input to the planning process was, therefore, to provide locational criteria for sectoral planners, who could in turn, co-ordinate their projects in accordance with the principles set out by the spatial planners (UIDF, 1989, p 10).

5.3.7 Concerns of the Structure Plan

The Structure Plan sought to address the following matters:
- an overall development philosophy for the region;
- the spatial strategy;
- the type and range of services and opportunities to be available in settlements of various sizes throughout the region;
- access of the population to basic public services such as clean water for domestic use, education, health, administrative services, public transport; as well as access to consumption needs like food, clothing, shelter;
- communication networks appropriate to the needs of settlements and activities within the region and with centres beyond the region;
the region's potential for forestry, agriculture, manufacturing and marketing;
- institutional arrangements for co-ordinating, administering, implementing and maintaining projects.

(UIDF, 1989, p 10)

5.3.8 Time Scales

In order to obtain a long term view of the region’s potential, but simultaneously to take account of budgeting requirements and of projects needed, three time scales were identified for use:

Long term 10 to 20 years
Medium term 5 to 10 years
Short term 1 to 5 years

The short term actions outlined and examined in Chapter 6, fall into the third time-frame of ‘short term’ plans, and were scheduled to run from 1989 to 1994. These short-term actions therefore form part of a larger plan, and are not by themselves, the complete plan.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to highlight the workings of the UIDF (1989) and provide readers with a background to the approach the planners used in developing the intervention. As has been mentioned, and will become apparent in Chapter 6, the UIDF (1989) has sought to address the criticisms raised of regional plans identified by the Spatial Development Plan for the North-Eastern region of the Transkei (1983). In doing so, a plan was created that attempts to address the needs of the region in a co-ordinated and integrated manner.
Chapter Six

6.1 Introduction

This chapter will answer research sub-question of whether development projects in the Ubombo/Ingwavuma region have occurred when and where they were intended. The chapter will also examine the research sub-questions of ‘what factors other than the plan itself, are critical for regional development’, and research sub-question on ‘the effects administration has on the implementation of plans and development frameworks’. The analysis of the current situation in the region will also shed light on the success of the plan and whether or not it achieved its goals.

Criteria were identified to assist in the choice and selection of sectoral and spatial projects and they included:

1. Building upon and reinforcing the existing potentials within the area.
2. Providing basic services to the most needy areas.
3. Optimising the use of existing facilities and infrastructure.
4. Investment into projects taking place at areas where greatest multipliers and benefits can be achieved with the least wastage occurring.
5. Project investment and identification involving the local communities as much as possible.
6. The basic principle of development based on the endogenous potentials inherent in the region and as such, project priority was to be given to those areas where local skills and inputs were greatest.
7. The provision of ways whereby individuals and households can advance from basic subsistence to diversified and a more specialised economic base.
8. Encourage projects that favour high labour to capital ratios.

9. Support for projects that meet the demands of local, informal markets.

10. Large scale projects that can provide, either directly or as a spin-off, services to the region.

(UIDF, 1989, pp 90-91)

These criteria were used to identify actions and interventions necessary to develop the region and ‘to fulfil the basic needs of the people in the region within as short a time as possible as well as to promote sustained development in the long, medium and short term within the broad confines of KwaZulu policy’ (UIDF, 1989, p 1). It must be borne in mind that the interventions analysed in this chapter form the short term actions of the UIDF (1989), and were scheduled to be implemented within the five years following 1989. The successful implementation of these plans was to act as the foundation for the implementation of the medium and longer term plans.

The chapter will outline each of the action areas for immediate attention identified in Table 19 of the UIDF (1989, pp 218-220) which appears below as Table 6.1 and in Figure 6.1. These action areas will be examined sector by sector, identifying what the plan intended to occur, and comparing this to what has in fact occurred. From the interviews with the representatives from each of the Departments involved, it was ascertained whether the relevant departments did or did not comply with what the plan had laid out, and these reasons will be examined at the end of each sectoral intervention.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Action Area</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Dept/Agent</th>
<th>Date/Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Makhatini irrigation</td>
<td>Conference meeting</td>
<td>DBSA</td>
<td>1989</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Assistance to small farmers</td>
<td>Policy document</td>
<td>STK</td>
<td>1989</td>
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<td>Extension</td>
<td>KFC</td>
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<td>Training</td>
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<td>Marketing</td>
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<td>Finance</td>
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<td>Tourist revenue</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>Intensive facilities</td>
<td>Motivation to est policy</td>
<td>Econ Affs</td>
<td>1989</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small resorts</td>
<td>Develop facilities 30-35 000 p.a.</td>
<td>BNR</td>
<td>1989</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Develop at proposed areas</td>
<td>BNR</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<td>Conservation</td>
<td>Integrate all bodies</td>
<td>Implement intended policy</td>
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<td>Action to integrate all bodies</td>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td>BNR</td>
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<td>Undertake social impact study</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
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<td>Zero-based regulation areas</td>
<td>Implement</td>
<td>KFC</td>
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<td>Provision of manuals</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior secondary schools</td>
<td>Increased scope of subsidies</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1989-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tertiary training</td>
<td>Establish 11 more schools</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1989-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Undertake study</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Clinics</td>
<td>Establish 7 more clinics</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>1989-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns</td>
<td>Town Planning</td>
<td>Prepare structure plans and layouts</td>
<td>Econ Affs/ Works</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Task/Plan Description</td>
<td>Responsible Party</td>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corridors</strong></td>
<td>- Bulk Services</td>
<td>Eskom</td>
<td>1989, 1989</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Electricity</td>
<td></td>
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<td>- Water</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Road upgrade Works</td>
<td>Works</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural Centres</strong></td>
<td>- Development Plans</td>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>1989-1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facilities/activities required</td>
<td>Minister's dept to appoint consultants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Water</strong></td>
<td>- Regional Water Supply</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Study to investigate sources and costs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Establish principle of bulk supply</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Jozini Dam</td>
<td>Agriculture &amp; MRDPC</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Establish principle of water to be used by people in region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power</strong></td>
<td>- Substations</td>
<td>Eskom</td>
<td>1989-1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Provision at specified areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Cost of Supply</td>
<td>Econ. Affs</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Est principle of cost recovery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administration</strong></td>
<td>- Task team and Development facilitator</td>
<td>KZ Depts</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Govt office and accommodation</td>
<td>Local Govt</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Study to est demand</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
6.2 Agriculture

6.2.1 The plan and Phase I projects

The vast majority of households within the region are engaged and dependant upon some form of agricultural production, thus the overall agricultural policy for the region, according to the UIDF (1989, pp 93-94), was to improve and increase household production. Five inputs were identified as being necessary to achieve this objective namely: a well co-ordinated extension programme; the need to improve local infrastructure and services; increased research into local conditions and potential crops; and representation, communication, organisation and participation of small scale farmers. Of these five inputs, the UIDF (1989, p 194) identified two action areas for the agricultural sector namely: the redirection of the focus and emphasis of the Makhatini irrigation scheme; and the increase in assistance and technical knowledge to small scale and subsistence farmers.

6.2.2 What has happened subsequently?

Redirection of the focus and emphasis of the Makhatini irrigation scheme

The Makhatini irrigation scheme was previously production oriented in its approach and consequently its impact on development within the region as a whole was very limited. The ‘spread effect’ of the scheme’s technologies and infrastructure has traditionally been confined to a zone of no more than 30 km, with the bulk of the finance being invested into commercial production rather than social and smaller scale inputs (UIDF, 1989, p 95).

A policy document indicating the future expansion, objectives and operation of the Makhatini irrigation scheme was to be formulated (See Figure 6.2). In order to produce an overall policy, the UIDF (1989, p 194) believed that it was necessary to call together all interested parties to discuss the issues and future
direction of the scheme. The plan identified a number of topics that needed to be covered in the discussions including:

- Overall direction,
- Spatial development,
- Model of development,
- Land ownership,
- Tribal boundaries,
- Cattle,
- Management,
- Health,
- Resettlement,
- Provision of facilities,
- Finance,
- Distribution of water to non-scheme users,
- Markets, and
- Research

Time will now be spent outlining developments that have occurred with regard to the afore listed topics that were to be discussed by the various interested parties, as well as uncovering whether a redirection in the focus of the Makhatini irrigation scheme has occurred.

It could not be ascertained from Mr Kruger, the Head of Department of Agriculture for KwaZulu-Natal, whether or not a meeting, as anticipated in the UIDF (1989, p 194) under the responsibility of the DBSA, had in fact taken place. It was however indicated that such meetings happen all the time between the Department of Agriculture and different departments and groupings of individuals, to discuss issues and challenges facing the Makhatini irrigation scheme. Professor Robinson believes there was a conference on these issues but was unsure whether or not a document had resulted or been acted upon.
With regard to ‘overall direction’ being established for the Makhatini irrigation scheme, this has been completed and a clear conception of the direction for the current and future development of the scheme exists. With regard to ‘spatial development’ occurring, spatial development studies have been undertaken. A ‘model of development’ has not however been completed due to development at present being of a collective nature. People therefore do not have the power to individually irrigate and for effective development to occur in the future, individual responsibility is needed.

With regard to ‘land ownership’, there are still problems. The Department of Agriculture is currently waiting for the Department of Land Affairs to come up with a policy to give title deeds to the people in the irrigation scheme who occupy state land. Individual title deeds are necessary to ensure that people fully invest in the land and this will only occur if the land belongs to them. Mr McKenzie the Chairman of the Agricultural Portfolio Committee, according to the Natal Witness (June 24, 1997), says that the private sector can play a major role by bringing in desperately needed financial muscle to sustain the project but few people are however prepared to invest in a project where farmers do not own the land. There are also land claims from the AmaKhosi who claim the land is theirs and this is currently being dealt with by the Land Commission. With the land restitution process being in place, there is no guarantee that land claims will not be instituted. The department concedes that the current land arrangement needs to change but warns that such change can only occur after the 1998 Land Claims deadline (The Natal Witness, Tuesday, June 24, 1997).

With regard to the issue of ‘cattle’, as far as the irrigation scheme is concerned, cattle are not permitted to graze within the irrigation scheme, but areas are provided for them away from the scheme. The possibility for freed-lots has not been explored or developed. ‘Management’ of the scheme is currently undertaken by a company and its functions include dealing with leases, water
provision and the collection of tariffs, as well as some agricultural extension.

'Resettlement' has been a problem due to people settling in an ad hoc manner and not as the plan indicated in several nodal developments. Six settlements have, however, been established and they are currently fully settled. According to Mr Kruger, the 'provision of facilities' has occurred and communities have benefited, but the impact has been limited due to a shortage of capital on the part of the Department of Agriculture.

'Finance' has also been a problem. Credit was obtained from both the Credit Board and KFC, but difficulties have been experienced with the disbanding of the Credit Board. A further problem has been due to farmers inability to afford the interest rates charged by KFC which often leads to high debt arrears. With regard to the issue of the 'distribution of water to non-scheme users', this has occurred with new users including people in the surrounding townships as well as small scale farmers, who now draw potable water. 'Markets' are a major problem as the region is far from any of the major markets within the province. Produce like cotton is not a problem as it can be stored for great lengths of time, but vegetables on the other hand are a problem, and people within the region tend to plant a lot of vegetables. No parties are willing to invest in a processing plant for the region as the quality of the crops varies greatly and one needs good quality vegetables for such an operation. The new SDI initiative is expected to have a major impact on creating a market within the region for produce. Within the next five to ten years, the section of road from Hluhluwe to Ponto do Ouro will be completed and large volumes of traffic are expected to pass through the region as vehicles travel between Durban and Maputo, and Richards Bay and Maputo. A market is expected to be created by the through flow of traffic (The Natal Witness, Tuesday, June 24, 1997). Small scale farmers within a 5 km strip adjacent to the road are expected to benefit from the sale of produce to passers-by.
With regard to ‘research’, the Department of Agriculture has a full research station on the farm which researches problems that the farmers encounter as well as issues like irrigation methods, drainage, and fertiliser requirements. Extension also takes place from the station in order to rectify the problems on the ground and to transfer skills. This information, through the efforts of the extension officers, is now more readily available firstly, to the managers of the Makhatini irrigation scheme, to farmers involved in the scheme itself, and to subsistence farmers.

With regard to the anticipated redirection of the focus of the Makhatini irrigation scheme, from an emphasis on production to that of service based support, such a redirection has occurred. The scheme, according to Mr Kruger, has undergone this change in emphasis and this can be seen through the research station undertaking research for the region as a whole and not just for its users.

The increased assistance and technical knowledge to small scale and subsistence farmers

With regard to increased assistance and technical knowledge being provided to small scale and subsistence farmers, the Makhatini irrigation scheme was, according to the UIDF (1989, p 196), to undergo a redirection in its focus from an emphasis on production, to that of service based support.

Two tasks were to occur for the intended increase in assistance and technical knowledge to small and subsistence farmers. Firstly, infrastructure, especially that related to water was to be improved, and secondly, extension and access to finance were also to be improved. Infrastructure will be dealt with in a later section.
Extension officers have been provided for the area by the Department of Agriculture with one extension officer to about every twenty-six farmers involved in the agricultural scheme. It was also proposed that a regional extension support service be established that would incorporate several structures. This development does not fully realise the intent of the plan. The UIDF (1989) intended that the extension service should reach out beyond the scheme to assist other farmers in Maputaland.

Firstly, the Makhatini Research/Irrigation Scheme was to act as a central core providing:

- **Two extension workers to each tribal authority area, located in either the towns or rural centres.**
  
  This has not happened in the way the report intended it to. The Department of Agriculture has district officers in each of the tribal authority areas who undertake extension. The district office is in close co-operation with the research station and they also assist the extension officers.

- **The provision of transport, accommodation and back-up services to the extension workers.**
  
  This is currently being undertaken, but Mr Kruger was unsure of the whether this was occurring up to standard intended. Extension workers do have transport and accommodation.

- **Training and information courses at both the core area and in the field.**
  
  This is being done with extension officers giving short courses in subjects like planting dates as well as with assistance with seed.

- **Formation of farmers associations**
  
  There are currently three farmers associations which the Department of Agriculture assists. There has however been a lot of infighting at a political level between the different associations. This has resulted in problems arising with regard to the smooth running of the association. The associations are therefore in place but are currently experiencing problems.
• **The provision of basic agricultural inputs, seed, fertilisers, etc.**

The Department of Agriculture established a retail section to provide inputs to the farmers. The farmers however wanted to launch their own company and did not want any competition from the existing company. The government then stopped their agricultural retail enterprise and let the farmers proceed with their own initiative. Due to a lack of capacity and the relevant skills to run the business effectively on the part of the farmers, the business venture collapsed and a retail vacuum resulted. Some white entrepreneurs have subsequently seen the opportunity this situation offers and are now providing the services to the farmers.

Secondly, the Makhatini irrigation scheme was to act as a financing source providing access to finance to any small farmers through KFC, as well as access to bulk purchases of agricultural machinery. This has occurred to some extent and there has been an improvement in access to finance for the farmers through the involvement of both KFC and the Credit Board. Farmers have, according to Mr Hannington, been provided with seasonal credit but have been unable to repay their debts which now amounts to about two million rands.

6.2.3 *To what extent has the Department of Agriculture made use of the UIDF (1989)?*

Some of these developments have resulted directly from the report while others have resulted as circumstances have dictated them, and not directly due to the report. Many of these developments, according to Mr Kruger, are due to normal government functions. The success in moving to a small farmer orientation rather than large scale agriculture, according to Mr Totman, was already in place before the report and the report served just to reflect on the trends. The report has however served to shed more light on the situation in the region and the Department of Agriculture has used it extensively as a reference in the preparation of further studies and plans.
Makhatini Irrigation Scheme

Outline plan of existing and possible new areas for irrigation

Department of Agriculture

KwaZulu Natal

Date: 20/05/96

Scale: 1:100,000

Figure 6.2

Makhatini Irrigation Scheme

Secondary Roads
Existing irrigation areas
Possible new routes
Possible new canals
Existing pump stations
10 m contour levels
Balancing dams
Existing irrigation plots
Approximate irrigation areas
6.3 Tourism

6.3.1 The plan and Phase I projects
The UIDF (1989, p 105) identified that the area has considerable tourist potential which could provide an important contribution to the region’s economy in the short, medium and long terms. The main emphasis within the region has been on environmental protection and conservation, rather than on tourism development which has resulted in the potential being under utilised and marginally developed.

Three action areas were proposed for the development of tourism in the region including: a re-investment of tourism revenue in local development programmes; the development of a high intensity tourism facility; and the development of smaller tourist resorts. See Figure 6.3 for a map of the current and proposed tourism initiatives.

6.3.2 What has happened subsequently?

The re-investment of tourism revenue into local development programmes
The report intended that a principle be established that all net revenues accruing from tourism be put into a trust fund to contribute to the development of the region. A motivation document from the KwaZulu Cabinet was required to establish this principle.

Revenue from tourism has been put into a trust fund to contribute to the development of the region. The Department of Agriculture established ‘Isivuno’, a Section 21 company, which is entirely owned by the Department. ‘Isivuno’ is a Zulu word which means ‘to harvest’ and Isivuno has been the vehicle to achieve
this goal of the report. Through Isivuno, the people of the region are receiving a share of the money earned from tourism.

The development of a high intensity tourist facility

In order to maximise tourism as a potential revenue base for the region, it was proposed that at least one large scale tourist facility be developed with a potential to accommodate 30-35 000 people per annum. The UIDF (1989, p 199) proposed that this happen at one of three locations namely Manzengwenya, Rocktail Bay or Lala Neck. The three sites were chosen due to the existence of launching capabilities for ski boats, suitable environment for camping and chalet development, and good access from the Phelindaba-Mbazwana route, existing at the sites.

According to Mr Marlin, this has not materialised largely due to ecological reasons. Rocktail Bay is currently for high income and low intensity tourism, while Manzengwenya is currently being looked at for a launch site. These developments will be nothing like the intended developments for 30-35 000 people. The only area along the coast line currently being looked at for high intensity development is that of Nine Mile Reef. This development is intended to include chalets, camping facilities, as well as a launch site. The other sites indicated in the report are quite unsuited for boat launches due to the nature of the coast line.

The need for a high intensity tourism facility has subsided considerably. At the time of the UIDF (1989), the NPB was administering Sodwana Bay and generating funds to further its own operations. The BNR/DNC sought to develop a high intensity tourism facility within the KwaZulu region so as to generate revenue for KwaZulu. With the amalgamation of the two bodies, namely the NPB and the DNC, revenue generated from facilities will be used to better the entire region.
Figure 6.3

Date: 13 August 1997
Source: Dept of Transport
Development of smaller tourism resorts

According to Mr Marlin, smaller tourism developments have largely continued to be developed in the way indicated in Table 5 of the UIDF (1989, p 107).

Table 6.2  Tourism Developments over the last Ten Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Intended Development</th>
<th>Actual Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kozi Bay</td>
<td>15 campsites, 3 lodges.</td>
<td>16 campsites, 3 lodges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First 12 bed trail camp.</td>
<td>3 eight bed trail camps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second 12 bed trail camp.</td>
<td>KwaDapa (private) 20 beds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Third tented camp.</td>
<td>Kosi Lodge (private) 30 beds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16 bed lodge at 3rd lake.</td>
<td>Kosi Forest Lodge (private) 18 beds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 bed tent camp at mouth.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thembe Park</td>
<td>20 bed tented safari camp.</td>
<td>8 bed tented safari camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other facilities (rest camp)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Rock</td>
<td>16 bed tented camp</td>
<td>Proposed development- 20 beds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocktail Bay</td>
<td>20 bed wilderness camp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lala Neck</td>
<td>40 bed camp,</td>
<td>Proposed development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>self contained lodges</td>
<td>Proposed development- 20 beds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Island Rock</td>
<td>30 bed camp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mabibi</td>
<td>20 bed camp site</td>
<td>Proposed development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sibaya</td>
<td>20 bed wilderness camp</td>
<td>Proposed development- 40 beds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>70 bed camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20 bed wilderness camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Data from Ms Looke - DNC)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from Table 6.2, the development of smaller tourism resorts has continued but not to the extent intended in the UIDF (1989, pp 107 & 200).
report does, however, indicate that these resorts should only be developed after the intensive facility has been implemented. With the intensive facility never materialising, the delay in the development of many of the smaller resorts can be rationalised, if the Department of Nature Conservation were fully following the report and not their own agenda. The delay in the development of the smaller resorts has however not been as a result of postponement of the development of a high intensity resort.

The UIDF (1989, p 200) also indicates that the Tembe Elephant Park needs to be fully developed and the accommodation at Ndumo increased. According to Mr Marlin, neither has been developed to the extent intended. Due to insufficient funds within the DNC, external sources were sought. Once a donor had been identified, proposals were generated and plans drawn up. These were however unsuccessful in delivering the development due to the donor, Land Rover, terminating their relationship with the DNC. The DNC has subsequently found it hard to secure the appropriate donor funding to carry out the proposals. The plans included the building of a community camp site outside of Ndumo, facilities inside of Tembe, and 4-by-4 vehicle paths within Tembe.

6.3.3 To what extent has the Department of Nature Conservation made use of the UIDF (1989)?

Many of the changes suggested in the UIDF (1989), according to Mr Marlin, would probably have occurred inevitably, even in the absence of the report. The Department of Nature Conservation has largely been following its own agenda and using the UIDF (1989) for referential purposes.
6.4 Conservation

6.4.1 The plan and Phase I projects

According to the UIDF (1989, p 109), conservation and the approaches toward conservation is one of the most controversial issues in the region. The ecological wealth and diversity of the area and its significance at the national and international scales has attracted a number of divergent and vested interests, some of which work against each other. The responsibility of conservation planning and administration has traditionally fallen under three different bodies, namely the BNR/ DNC, NPB, and DDA (conservation). Their areas of spatial jurisdiction differed, and in some instances their approach to implementation also differed. Some communities have derived benefits from conservation measures and projects, however, people's attitude towards conservation has generally been one of scepticism and fear. The fear is derived from the removals of people, and therefore, loss of land (UIDF, 1989, p 109).

The UIDF (1989) proposed three action areas for conservation, namely: the implementation of a holistic conservation approach; the co-ordination and full integration of all conservation bodies; and the postponement of all future schemes until the above have been achieved.

6.4.2 What has happened subsequently?

Implementation of a holistic conservation approach

The DNC has attempted to take into account both human and conservation needs in its approach to the conservation of natural resources. Examples of this occur outside of Ndumo and the Kosi Mouth where the DNC has sought to involve the communities. The DNC has provided the communities with facilities and created
infrastructure as can be seen at Ndumo where a Laundromat and car park have been created outside of the gates. The community benefits from the Laundromat both through funds generated through its use by tourist and the local community, and through better access to services.

With regard to the DNC involving all the members of the community and not just tribal authorities in decision making, companies have been set up at both Rocktail Bay and Ndumo, and communities have selected representatives to sit on the boards of these companies. These structures do, however, have their problems and the DNC often has to mediate between factions. Not only are there differences amongst the community members, but there are also political differences within the community, resulting in a lot of in-fighting within the community. According to Mr Marlin, the process has worked out well, and funds have been placed in trust with the trust administering them. The DNC has nothing to do with the trust funds nor their administration. These funds have been used to further develop the community and this can be seen through the use of funds to upgrade clinics and school buildings within the tribal area.

With regard to social impact studies being undertaken in the planning and consultation stage as the UIDF (1989, p 201) suggested, within the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), a social impact assessment is undertaken. This has, according to Mr Marlin, occurred for some time and has not resulted from the report. It is part of the standard procedure of the DNC to undertake social impact assessments if communities are to be affected by conservation initiatives. The DNC does not own the land in the region and thus intensive interactions are essential with the surrounding communities before any ventures are launched.

With regard to the establishment of a full-time team, possessing communication skills and providing education programmes for the whole community, being established, the DNC does have a group of people fulfilling this role. The DNC
works closely with the DEAT who has a team of consultants who undertake this function. According to Mr Marlin, this has of late stopped due to limited budgets. The DEAT does however still have a team of field officers in the region and the DNC makes use of them quite to workshop conservation issues and initiatives.

With regard to communities in the area seeing and accruing benefits from conservation initiatives, the communities benefit through the companies that have been established as well as through receiving a percentage of the gate takings. Mr Dixon indicated that, through agreements signed between developers and local communities, the developers have a percentage ownership of the tourism development for up to twenty five years. Thereafter, the development gets handed over to the local communities, by which stage they should have acquired sufficient skills to manage the developments.

The co-ordination of conservation agencies
The UIDF (1989, p 202) intended the integration of all conservation bodies operating within the region, including the BNR, the NPB, and the DDA (conservation), into a single overall responsible agent. The report identified that a decision would have to be taken by the various bodies concerned to operate jointly as one overall body. The report proposed that the body be under the control of the BNR, and motivation be written by the BNR to the RSA (DDA) and KwaZulu to propose such a body. The motivation was to include the present problems arising from the region being under different management policies and the advantages of including all conservation issues under one body.

The context has changed markedly since 1994, with the former separate administrations of both KwaZulu and Natal, amalgamating. The NPA has taken over from the DDA (conservation), while the NPB and the DNC were to amalgamate in August of 1997. According to Mr Marlin, this amalgamation has been in the pipelines for the last three years. According to the Ms Gowans
The long awaited new conservation system will give local people a significant say in the management and development of protected areas. The primary function of the new board, according to the Natal Mercury (Natal Mercury, Thursday, July 31, 1997), will be to direct the management of protected areas, the development and promotion of ecotourism areas, as well as the promotion and control of the sustainable wildlife resources within the province. As many as 4 000 employees will join forces in the new merger but this will be done in accordance with the provincial government’s commitment to civil service efficiency and leanness. The head office’s location is officially undecided with the NPB’s headquarters outside Pietermaritzburg offering greater facilities than that of the KDNC in Ulundi.

According to Mr Marlin, the new body will not be under the management and control of the DNC as the UIDF (1989, p 202) suggested but instead the NPB will be the dominant body. The NPB are a bigger organisation and have bigger infrastructure. A lot of the DNC staff have taken retrenchment packages which has left the department very lean. A Department of the Environment has also been created to operate at a regional level and a lot of individuals have opted to go this route.

The report also suggested that until a holistic conservation approach and the co-ordination of conservation agencies has occurred, the development of all proposed conservation areas should be postponed. Some schemes have been put on hold while others have continued. Mr Marlin pointed out that Rocktail Bay/ Banzi has continued throughout the amalgamation process. Initially it was thought that the amalgamation process would be a quick one but it has dragged out over three years- “thank goodness they did not stop all developments” (interview with Mr Marlin).
6.4.3 To what extent has the Department of Nature Conservation made use of the UIDF (1989)?

Mr Marlin was unsure if the report influenced the current developments and changes, or whether the people that had inputs into the report influenced it. The amalgamation of the conservation bodies at a provincial level at not merely at a regional level. The amalgamation of the bodies did not occur entirely due to the report but because such a merger made sense for operational efficiency at a provincial level.

6.5 Trade

6.5.1 The plan and Phase I projects

The UIDF (1989, p 203) identified the need to introduce and agree upon the concept of zero-based regulation areas. These areas would occur especially along the corridors and around the rural centres. The report believed it would be essential to implement such action to enable local initiatives to take full advantage of the proposed spatial structure of the region. The report proposed that the concept be accepted in principle and a motivation be written to the KwaZulu Cabinet by the KFC requesting initial implementation of the concept in the corridor and in rural centres of the proposed structure plan. See Figure 6.6 for a map of proposed 'zero-based' trade zones.

5.5.2 What has happened subsequently?

According to Mr Hannington of KFC, nothing has happened in this regard. Traders come into the nodes and sell their wares as is the present case in Durban. In the past the police would probably have thrown the traders out of the urban areas, but now they are freely permitted to sell their goods. Informal traders are now a prominent feature in towns like Jozini and can be seen selling their goods.
on the road reserves and pavements throughout the town. See Figures 6.4 and 6.5 which both show informal traders selling their wares in Jozini adjacent to the road through the town.

Figure 6.4   Informal traders at the roadside at Jozini

Figure 6.5   Informal traders amongst formal businesses at Jozini
UBOMBO / INGWAVUMA STRUCTURE PLAN

KEY

- BORDER
- RIVERS
- TOWNS
- NATIONAL ROADS
- PRIMARY ROADS
- SECONDARY ROADS
- CLINICS
- SCHOOLS

Proposed Phase I Corridors and Zero Based Trade

Figure 6.6

Date: 13 August 1997
Source: Dept of Transport
6.5.3 To what extent has KFC and the DEAT followed the UIDF (1989)?

KFC has no formal reason why the plan was not adhered to and zero-based regulation areas established. An explanation for the tolerance of traders in and adjacent to major nodes within the region, is the increasing tolerance shown nationally for SMMEs and informal traders and the recognition of the role they can play in providing employment for poorly or under skilled people.

The DEAT is now considering zero-based trade options along the new road to Ponto do Ouro included in the Lubombo spatial development initiative examined in Chapter 9 and outlined in Figure 9.1. According to Mr Cele of the DEAT, little has been done to establish zero-based trade areas adjacent to the three corridors as mentioned in the UIDF (1989). The current primary focus of the DEAT is now on the Lubombo SDI. Little attention has been paid to the UIDF (1989).

6.6 Education

6.6.1 The plan and Phase I projects

According to the UIDF (1989, p 114), a socio-economic study of the area revealed extremely low levels of education as well as high levels of illiteracy. The poor education, according to the UIDF (1989, p 114), is a function of two major factors, namely, the scarcity of facilities; and the poor quality and lack of teachers. In general the schools are of a low standard and the facilities are limited.

The plan proposed three actions within the short term for the region including: increased assistance to community schools; the establishment of eleven more senior secondary schools; and a study to investigate the possibility of a vocational centre.
6.6.2 What has happened subsequently?

Assistance to community schools

Four steps were suggested to increase the support to community schools, namely: the provision of manuals containing relevant information on topics like budgeting and building materials; the creation of a more efficient means of processing applications for classroom subsidies; increased scope for subsidisation of teacher accommodation, recreational facilities and teaching aids; and the provision of subsidies for schools willing to provide adult literacy classes.

According to Mr Sabisie, the principal at Zenzelenie High School at Mseleni, the schools in the region have not been provided with manuals containing information on topics like budgeting or on building materials for classrooms. To the best of his knowledge, an efficient means for processing applications for classroom subsidies has not been created, nor has there been increased scope for teacher accommodation, recreational facilities and teaching aids. The provision of limited subsidies for schools willing to provide adult literacy classes has, however, occurred.

High schools

The plan envisaged the development of six senior secondary schools within the five years following the plan’s completion. At this point, the report contains some discrepancies. Figure 48 which indicates ‘Physical Development Proposals for Phase One’ contains five schools while Table 6 (UIDF, 1989, p 115) indicates six schools. The schools were to be built, according to Table 6, at Mjindi, Mboza, Mnqobokazi in the Ubombo region; and at Makanes, Phelindaba, and Mlambongwenya in the Ingwavuma region. The school to be built at Mnqobokazi does not appear in Figure 48 of the physical development proposals for Phase 1 of the UIDF (1989). From the Department of Transport’s data base on the existing
schools within the region, it was ascertained which of the schools were in fact completed. Schools were built at all six of these locations. The school at Mnqobokazi did not however materialise in the new rural centre as UIDF (1989, p 204) intended, as such a centre was never completed. Dr Fredland, a resident in the region and the superintendent at Mseleni Hospital, pointed out that the development of these schools has been an on-going process and it is difficult to say whether or not these schools arose due to the plan or not. The DET was, however, part of the plan making and plan approval process for the UIDF (1989), and it would thus follow that the building of schools at the identified locations in the region, was a direct result of the plan. See Figure 6.7 for the location of High Schools within the region.

Vocational training centres

The plan identified the need to investigate the demand and feasibility of establishing tertiary or vocational training centres.

Dr Fredland said that a lot of work has been done in trying to establish a tertiary centre with applications being made from the Working Group to the DET. Each time the Working Group went to the Department with the identified need for teacher training in the region, they came back saying that there are already too many trained teachers in the country. Most of the teachers in the region are currently under-trained, but this is starting to change. It was proposed that the Working Group go outside the country to secure funds for these initiatives in 1996, but no funds were obtained.

A technical school was set up in 1994 in the Ndumo area which has subsequently been expanded. The Ndumo Educational Centre was established by the Directorate of Nature Conservation to educate the community both practically and theoretically in the ethics of managing resources in a sustainable manner in order for people to derive economic benefits from them. The centre was funded by the
World Wildlife Fund (WWF)/ South Africa Goldfields Benefactors Scheme, and the one million rand scheme comprises of three buildings. The DNC conservation head Khulani Mkhize believes that still more funding is needed if the Centre is to pursue its four basic programmes of school children education, adult learning, conservation outreach, and resource production programmes (The Natal Witness, Wednesday, August 13, 1997, p 5). See Figure 6.7 for the location of the Ndumo Centre.

6.6.3 To what extent has the Department of Education and Training made use of the UIDF (1989)?

Many of these developments, like the building of schools, would have happened even in the absence of the UIDF (1989). Dr Fredland indicated that the UIDF (1989) did increase the awareness of specific needs like the need for a tertiary education centre. From the developments within the region it appears that the DET and the now KwaZulu Department of Education have very much carried on with their own agendas, developing schools where needs arise and paying little heed to the UIDF (1989).
6.7 Health

6.7.1 The plan and Phase I projects
Four hospitals are located in the region at Ubombo, KwaNgwanase, Mseleni and Ingwavuma with 18 clinics scattered throughout the area. The Department of Health also operates an effective malaria control unit for the region. Relative to other rural areas, child mortality is low and there are few reported cases of malnutrition. Malaria and other tropical diseases are the more serious health problems in the area, and this has been exacerbated by the development of the irrigation scheme and the lack of control in the surrounding countries. Although the area is well supplied with hospitals, the access and distribution of clinics, according to the UIDF (1989, p 116), is not sufficient to deal with day-to-day problems.

In the short term, the UIDF (1989, p 205) proposed that the most essential action area under health, was the provision of clinics. It was intended that four additional clinics were to be established in the region at KwaMlamela, Mlambongwenya, Mnqobokazi, and Ophande. The report indicates that the Department of Health, both KwaZulu and National government, were responsible for the development of these clinics. See Figure 6.8 for a map of the location of the four additional clinics.

6.7.2 What has happened subsequently?

KwaMlamela
A residential clinic was not built at this location. There is however a ‘visiting point’ at KwaMlamela and its structure, which was built by the IDT, precedes the UIDF (1989). A visiting point is a clinic that is not manned by a resident staff, and clinics occur at these points on specified days each month. KwaMlamela did
not receive a resident clinic due to the fact that it is within a relatively short distance from Mseleli hospital. KwaMlamela did have a valid claim for a clinic in that they have a lot of disabled people with up to fifty percent of the adult population having Mseleli Joint Disease (MJD).

**Mlambongwenya**

Mlambongwenya did not get a residential clinic as the UIDF (1989) intended. To date, very few clinics have been built on the western bank of the Pongola river with the only one occurring at Shemula to the north of Mlambongwenya.

**Mnqobokazi**

A residential clinic has been built at Mnqobokazi as this is the best position to serve the surrounding area. The area was however visited, through the use of a visiting point, for many years prior to the clinic being built by the Department of Health. The clinic was built in 1994 and was only occupied in 1996 with the time delay being due to a shortage of funds.

**Ophande**

Ophande is a settlement to the south of Jozini. To date no clinic has been built at the locality identified by the UIDF (1989).

**6.7.3 To what extent has the Department of Health made use of the UIDF (1989)?**

The plan intended that eventually people within the region would settle along or adjacent to the designated corridors with services being provided along these corridors. These corridor developments never materialised and few services were provided along them. If the Department of Health had provided their services along the corridors as the plan intended, large numbers of people would have been left without services due to the distance between their places of residence and the corridors. A large percentage of people would be at distances of greater than
25km from a clinic which is not acceptable for national government terms. Appendix 2 (UIDF, 1989) indicated that at the time of the report, 66% of people took two or more hours to get to a clinic. People in the region are not rich nor do many possess cars to drive long distances to health care. According to Appendix 3 (UIDF, 1989), 70% of people employed work outside of the region with the main area of employment being in Natal. Non-wage employment rates are also high including 35% of males, and 85% of females. People residing in the region therefore do not possess much money and thus cannot afford to travel long distances to facilities such as clinics or hospitals. Facilities therefore need to be placed close to the people and the Department of Health was thus unable to follow the plan to the extent intended (interview with Dr Fredland).
Health Facilities in Ingwavuma and Ubombo
KwaZulu-Natal, 1995

Figure 6.8

Indian
Ocean

MOSVOLD
HOSPITAL

Gwaliweni

Manyiseni

Ndumu

Kwandaba

Shemula

Zamazama

Mboza

Madonela

MSENLENI
HOSPITAL

Jozini

Makhatini

Tshongwe

Mbazwane

Mhleka\n
Ophansi

Mqobokazi

Nibela

Mduku

Lake
St Lucia

10
20
Kilometers

International
boundary

Roads

Rivers

Hospitals

Residential Clinics

National Malaria Research Programme, MRC, 1997
6.8 Towns

6.8.1 The plan and Phase I projects

The region has five small towns or centres (Ingwavuma, Jozini, Ubombo, Mbazwana and KwaNgwanase) with the majority of the population living in scattered villages throughout the region. According to the UIDF (1989, p 118), these five towns offer no more than the most basic facilities and are not of sufficient scale to provide higher goods or services. As a result, Pongola and Mkuze (out of the region) fulfil part of this function. A number of villages, especially along movement routes, have developed into small concentrations of activity and are potential future rural service centres.

The plan intended structure and layout plans to be drawn up for each of the five towns making provision for ten year population targets. The report proposed that no new towns be developed in the region at least for the short term. Provision was however to be made for the improvement and input of certain infrastructure and the report proposed that plans be drawn for each of the small towns. These plans were then intended to inform all government departments in their allocation of sites within the area. Draft plans already existed for Jozini, Mbazwana and KwaNgwanase and UIDF (1989) recommended that these be accepted and updated where necessary. The report realised that these towns had grown to a size where it was essential that spatial organisation within the town be managed by allocation of certain sites for specific land uses. The report also proposed that a study be undertaken to look at the future management and administration of the towns.

Refer to Figure 6.9 for the location of the five towns within the region.
6.8.2 What has happened subsequently?

According to Ms Forse, the Department of Local Government and Housing realised in about 1989 that they had to intervene in the growth of towns as the issue was at crisis management levels. Steps for this were however clearly set out in the UIDF (1989, pp 206-208). According to both Mr Totman and Mr A'Bear, the Department of Local Government and Housing is presently commissioning consultants to undertake Integrated Development Frameworks (IDFs) for both Mbazwana and KwaNgwanase.

6.8.3 To what extent has the Department of Economic Affairs and the Department of Works made use of the UIDF (1989)?

The KwaZulu Department of Works was responsible for the development of the proclaimed towns within the region, but with the changes 1994 brought with it, the Department of Local Government and Housing took over this responsibility. The Department of Local Government and Housing is tasked with creating capacity and establishing self-governing structures within designated nodes. Of the five towns identified in the report, the department is only focusing on the development of three, namely Jozini, Mbazwana and Kwangwanase. The reason for the focus on the development of these three nodes is a lack of resources.

At present Jozini is in the last stage of formalisation, while development frameworks are being prepared for both Kwangwanase and Mbazwana. These development frameworks entail the creation of spatial organisation within the centres through the preparation of detailed layouts.

According to Ms Marais, the Department of Local Government and Housing has attempted to use the UIDF (1989) in all ways possible, through attempts to build on to the interventions specified in the report. The department has not however tried to implement the plan in its entirety.
Figure 6.9

Date: 13 August 1997
Source: Dept of Transport
6.9 Corridors

6.9.1 The plan and Phase I projects

In terms of the proposed spatial plan for the region, three corridor developments were proposed for phase one of the plan. The plan spelt out how infrastructure such as electricity, water, and roads were to be dealt with along with zero-based regulation zones for each of the corridors. See Figure 6.6 for the location of the corridors.

Table 6.3 Corridors

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<th>Infrastructure</th>
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<td>transformers at designated rural centres</td>
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<td>-Along road, 2km reserve</td>
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<td>3. Jozini to Ingwavuma</td>
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<td>(mountain route)</td>
<td>Electricity</td>
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<td>-Bulk supply along road with step down</td>
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<td>-Along road, 2km reserve</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
6.9.2 What has happened subsequently?

Electricity
According to Mr Venkatasen, the corridor developments along the eastern and western banks of the Pongola river as well as the one along the road from Jozini to Ingwavuma along the mountains, have not materialised. These lines were proposed to run alongside the corridors with step down transformers occurring at designated points. According to Mr Venkatasen, although the theory behind such developments was good, such developments would not have been the most cost effective for Eskom. See Figure 6.12 for details of the current power grid for the region.

Water
Water pipe lines, according to Mr A’Bear, Mr Swart and Mr Hannington, are to some extent following the roads which will promote the corridors. The water line from Jozini to Mbazwana, as well as the water pipe lines that run north and south on the east and west banks of the Pongola river as part of the Shemula water scheme, follow the roads.

Roads
The roads within the region have not been upgraded to the extent intended. The road from Jozini to Ingwavuma (D 1837) is a gravel road which is rough and rocky and can only be travelled by 4-by-4s in places. This is hardly the standard of road intended for a priority action corridor. The road along the west bank of the Pongola river (D1836) is also a gravel road and has a relatively good surface which is however rough in some places. The road along the east bank of the Pongola river (D1834) is a gravel road and is in a better condition that (D1837). The roads in the region are graded on a six week cycle with the more frequently used roads being graded more regularly (interview with Mr Marshal-Goodrich).
Zero-based regulation
As mentioned no official policy exists with regard to zero-based regulation and thus a 2 km reserve along any of the corridors does not exist.

6.9.3 To what extent did the Departments involved follow the UIDF (1989)?
Eskom, in its function to provide electricity to both commercial and private users within the region, did not follow the UIDF (1989) due to the added expense such diversions of power lines would place on the organisation.
The provision of water, through the Shemula and Jozini-Mbazwana water schemes, have generally followed the roads which complies to an extent with the plan.
The Department of Transport has not complied with the plan due to the department defining its own hierarchy of roads within the region. The roads identified by the UIDF (1989, p 210) as priority action corridors are identified by the Department of Transport as being secondary roads.

6.10 Rural Centres

6.10.1 The plan and Phase I projects
Rural centres, according to the UIDF (1989, p 120), are places that have emerged as having a significant degree of centrality either on account of their location, or because of public or private investment there (a clinic), or because of transport networks. The UIDF (1989) identified that at the time of the report, these places had no designated role in the region, nor were they linked to a co-ordinated infrastructural or service delivery system. In order to enable these centres to perform the role envisaged and to function in conjunction with transport routes to
establish development corridors, concerted action was identified as being needed to set the centres identified for development in Phase I in motion.

Five rural centres were identified for phase one of the report and development plans were to be drawn up for each of them. These plans were to be drawn up in consultation with the local people to indicate what activities and facilities were required and areas for future expansion within each of the centres. See Figure 6.9 for the proposed development of rural centres.

6.10.2 What has happened subsequently?

According to Dr Fredland no action has occurred here and the growth of existing centres occurs in a haphazardous manner and following no predetermined plans. Services like post offices and public telephones have, however, been located at the majority of these rural centres by both Postnet and Telkom.

6.10.3 To what extent has the UIDF (1989) been made use of?

Like the development of towns, the development of rural centres falls under the control of the Department of Local Government and Housing. The UIDF (1989, p 219) indicated that the development of rural centres should fall under the management of the Chief Minister’s Department, and the department was to appoint consultants to undertake the work. With the changes 1994 brought with it, this function was taken over by the Department of Local Government and Housing. The development of rural centres has not occurred due to the Department of Local Government and Housing focusing on the development of Jozini at one level, and Kwangwanase and Mbazwana at the next level. Limited resources on the part of government, has led to the current focus on the three larger towns within the region, at the expense of the rural centres.
6.11 Water

6.11.1 The plan and Phase I projects

Although the region would appear to have an abundance of water from a number of sources, according to the UIDF (1989, p129), there is a severe shortage of water for the majority of households. This shortage is largely a function of poor distribution and not much the lack of water. According to the UIDF (1989), the major potential water supply for the region comes from the Jozini Dam; Pongola, Mkuze and Ingwavuma rivers; Lake Sibayi; part of the Nhlanga system (Kosi Bay); and ground water. At the time of the UIDF (1989), the Jozini dam was the only source being marginally exploited with all other sources being under-utilised. The Jozini dam offers a potential guaranteed supply of water for the development of the region.

The provision of water on a regional basis to households within the region was regarded as the priority programme for the region by UIDF (1989, p 212). At the time of the report, the majority of households did not have access to water even though the resources within the region were sufficient to supply a population ten times the then present population. The report identified four action areas namely: a regional water supply investigation; use of the Jozini dam; provision of bulk services and responsibility for reticulation; and the Makhatini canal system.

The report suggested that a regional water supply investigation be undertaken. The report acknowledges that in 1987 a proposal was submitted by the Ubombo Regional Authority to the Working Group to investigate the resources and costs of providing water on a regional basis, and the report suggests that urgent attention be paid to the proposal. A brief was submitted to engineering consultants to detail resources and possible cost estimates, bearing in mind the need to provide
infrastructure on a rational and cost effective basis. This report was due for completion early in 1989.

The report also advocates the establishment of a principle that water from the Jozini Dam be used for domestic and agricultural purposes. The report indicated that a potential of 2.4 million people could be supplied with thirty-five litres of water per day from the dam, but at the time of the report, only a fraction of the people were obtaining direct benefits from the dam.

6.11.2 What has happened subsequently?

Regional water supply investigation
The Shemula water project, both Phase I and Phase II, was proposed as the answer to providing a regional water supply. Some R30 million has been injected into the Shemula scheme in order that the peoples of the four wards on the west bank of the Pongola river as well as a number on the east bank, in the Tembe ward, could enjoy a vastly improved quality of life. Plans are now at an advanced stage to double the cash injection and size of water service in order to bring this improved quality of life to thousands more people residing on the east bank of the river in the Mashabani area, as well as to the town of Ingwavuma.

KFC (KFC News, 1997, pp 1-2) acknowledges that the planned and structured development of this area dates back to 1988 when the structure plan for the Ubombo and Ingwavuma region was completed with the ultimate appointment of KFC to facilitate the implementation of development projects in the area. A later Resource Development Study in the four tribal wards, now the beneficiaries of the present water scheme, proved to be the seed that has germinated and blossomed into the Shemula Community Water Supply Scheme. Andrias Malwane the project facilitator has, from the onset, been integrally involved in initiating the project with some 39 communities in these wards. A community trust, Amanzi
Trust, was created and assisted by the Department of Water Affairs as funders, Mhlathuze Water as implementing agents, and the KFC as project managers, through Rural Development’s Gary Swart and assisted by Andrias, Bheki, Mthembu, and Dumisani Malwane.

To test the viability of a regional water supply, a pilot project was implemented on the request of the Ndumo community with KFC, Mhlathuze Water and the then KwaZulu Department of Agriculture playing a supportive role in the Ndumo Development Committee. According to KFC (KFC News, 1997, p 2), such was the success of the pilot project that the rest of the areas needed no further encouragement to pursue the objective of implementing the larger regional scheme which will be further expanded, bringing development to still more people in the area.

To provide an idea of the magnitude of the project, it is interesting to note that it includes a low-lift pump station on the Pongola River which sees raw water abstracted to a nearby purification works. The purified water is pumped to a storage reservoir from where it is gravity-fed through more than 230 km of pipes, feeding 117 water dispensing kiosks. The project covers some 570 square kilometres and is playing a major role in reducing the occurrence of water-borne diseases.

The Shemula Community Water Supply Scheme is noted as one of the most, if not only, successful RDP Presidential Lead Projects in the country. The development process is described as being largely unproblematic and as being managed effectively, such that the project has neither fallen significantly behind schedule nor beyond its budgetary constraints, in relative terms (Swart; Dyer; Bosch, Interview 1995, in McCann, 1995, p 146).
Figure 6.10

Key

- SCWSS boundary
- Tribal ward boundary
- Sub-ward boundary
- Scheme site office
- River
- Water pipeline
- Purification Works
- Dispensing kiosk
- Reservoir

Title:
SHEMULA COMMUNITY
WATER SUPPLY SCHEME

Figure 6.10

SCALE
1 : 250 000
There is also a water scheme serving KwaNgwanase with Phase I, which serves the town, being completed, while Phase II will serve the areas surrounding the settlement. Both the Shemula and KwaNgwanase schemes are operated by the DWAF.

Smaller schemes which have made use of JSB funding occur at Mseleni, with water being pumped out of Lake Sibaya to the communities surrounding the lake; and from Jozini to Tshongwe.

**Jozini Dam**

With regard to the Jozini Dam, a principle that water from the dam was to be used for both domestic and agricultural purposes for people within the region, was to be established. The issue here relates to water rights and the prevailing agreement about the allocation of water for different categories of users. Currently the water from the dam is largely used for the day-to-day running of the Makhatini irrigation scheme.

Mr Swart indicated that the use of water for both domestic and agricultural purposes has not occurred. Water for Shemula Phase I and the intended Phase II, which supply large amounts of water to households throughout the region, is pumped from below the dam wall. The advantage of this is that the dam constantly has water in it which can be released if the river runs dry. The water purification plant for the scheme is situated in the Ndumo region which is near to the people but some distance from the dam itself. According to Mr Swart of the DWAF, if water were to be pumped from the dam to the purification works, this would cost a considerable amount of money.
**Bulk supply services**

The report indicated that a principle of joint government and community responsibility for the provision of water be established. Mr Swart indicated that the DWAF abides by this principle which is a basic principle of the RDP.

**Makhatini canal system**

The report also indicated that a principle of multi-functional usage of the Makhatini canal system be established. Mr Kruger indicated that this has not really occurred with the water in the canal system being largely used to irrigate lands within the Makhatini irrigation scheme.

**6.11.3 To what extent did the Departments involved follow the UIDF (1989)?**

The DWAF has made use of the UIDF via a long route. KFC made use of the UIDF in its preparation of Resource Development Plans, and these led to the preparation of the regional water supply projects.
Figure 6.11

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

LEGEND

- EXISTING WATER SCHEME
- PROPOSED WATER SCHEME
- ROADS
- OTHERS
- WATER RESERVOIRS
- NORTH / SOUTH DIVISION
- SETTLEMENTS
- CONTOURS - INTERVAL 50A
- POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT

SCALE 1: 200,000

NOTES:

- Shimula II
- Proposed Shimula I
- Proposed Shimula II
- Shimula Extension
- Shimula Village
- Shimula Town
- Shimula East
- Shimula West
- Shimula Extension
- Shimula Village
- Shimula Town
- Shimula East
- Shimula West
- Shimula Extension
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6.12 Power

6.12.1 The plan and Phase I projects
According to the UIDF (1989, p 134), the supply of electricity to the region has been limited and isolated to a few users. The demand for electricity has however increased significantly with the establishment of the irrigation scheme and other social and commercial inputs.

Three main developments were identified by the report namely: the provision of a bulk network for the entire region by Eskom; the establishment of several proposed substations by Eskom; and the establishment of a principle of cost responsibility by the Department of Economic Affairs.

6.12.2 What has happened subsequently?

Bulk Supply
A bulk supply network was to be provided for the entire region which was to provide power to the region's main centres as indicated in Figure 46 and in Appendix 22 of the UIDF (1989). The DDA and the KwaZulu Department of Works, with assistance from Eskom were to establish the infrastructure.

The introduction of electricity infrastructure into the region took place in 1989 covering the four towns of KwaNgwanase, Ingwavuma, Mseleni and Ndumo. See Figure 6.12 for details on the power grid within the region. Due to the lack of economic growth in the region, the electricity infrastructure did not expand. Eskom currently supplies bulk power at 22 Kv through a ‘U’ shaped network. Part of this system, namely the line from Jozini to Mbazwana, is built at 33 Kv. Eskom, according to Mr Venkatasen, intends eventually to link these two lines.
together to give a greater quality of power to users in the region once this becomes viable. At present the users at the top end of the 22 Kv line at Manguzi receive a poor quality of power supply due to the distance of the line.

In 1995/1996 the KwaZulu government funded electricity supply to several identified sites which resulted in some 69 km of line being handed over to Eskom. These new lines include a line of about 10 km from Manguzi to Kosi Bay, a 17 km line from Mbazwana to Baya Camp, and the Dlamahlahla line of about 8 km. Sojiyisa received a 12 km line, a 25 km line was built from Nongoma to Dlamahlahla, a 15 km line was built from Vazi to the Coastal Cashew initiative, and a 12 km line was built from Dlamahlahla to Nyokeni. Two of the lines intended to be built within the financial year never materialised.

Tourism, social and economic initiatives, and not areas of settlement, are largely the determinants of where power lines run. Of the lines built during the 1995/1996 period, two of these lines were constructed to tourism facilities while one was built to a major agricultural scheme, namely the Coastal Cashew initiative.

Substations
The report intended the formation of a possible network of substations through the region. With regard to the establishment of these substations, one has been built at Jozini. The intended substations on the western bank of the Pongola River and at Mbazwana have not however materialised as the plan intended.

Principle of Cost Responsibility
With regard to the cost of supply, the report intended the then Department of Economic Affairs to establish a principle of cost responsibility. According to Mr Cele of the DEAT, not much has been achieved in this regard. The region has very few high electricity users and this, together with resident’s low levels of
Figure 6.12

UBOMBO / INGWAVUMA STRUCTURE PLAN

KEY
- BOUNDARY
- RIVERS
- TOWNS
- NATIONAL ROADS
- PRIMARY ROADS
- SECONDARY ROADS
- CLINICS
- SCHOOLS

Power Lines
Substations

Date: 15 August 1997
Source: Dept of Transport
income, has made sustainable electricity supply very difficult. Eskom is unwilling to commit large amounts of resources to the region if this is not economically viable.

6.12.3 To what extent did Eskom make use of the UIDF (1989)?
According to Mr Venkatasen, “the plan is good in theory but does not make optimal sense from the ‘cost’ side” and “it would be nice for power lines to run adjacent to corridors with step down transformers at various places as the report suggests, but this does not always make the most economic sense” (interview with Mr Venkatasen). Eskom has made use of the UIDF (1989) and references have been made to it and the concepts therein in the document prepared by Eskom for the DEAT (1994) on the identification of bulk users within the region.

6.13 Management

6.13.1 The plan and Phase I projects
In order to implement the proposed policies and to assist communities in their own development, the report identified two priority actions that were needed namely the appointment of a regional facilitator, and the provision of government staff housing and office space.

The regional facilitator was to be appointed to carry out functions like: establishing and maintaining channels of communication between departments and agencies; being a source of information and advice to communities and tribal authorities as well as locally based departments and the private sector; providing guidance on planning matters to communities, departments and the private sector if required; and facilitating small scale projects. According to the report, the facilitator would respond to requests for assistance by one or other actor in the region but implementation would remain the responsibility of the departments and
agencies with line functions in the region, or the private sector. The report intended that the facilitator would be based in one of KwaZulu’s departments with administrative, management and planning responsibilities, like the Departments of the Chief Minister or Economic Affairs. The report also desired the facilitator to have appropriate training and experience of working across all sectors and at different levels. The report also indicated that logistical support for the facilitator was crucial for the facilitator to be able to move around the region. The report also identified the importance of such an appointment and the need for it to occur as soon as possible. In the absence of such a person, the report believed the effectiveness of the Working Group would be limited.

6.13.2 What has happened subsequently?

Development facilitator

With regard to the employment of a development facilitator, Ms Forse pointed out that tenders were called for but due to the procedures in place at the time, members of the Department of Economic Affairs could not be employed and someone from outside the agency could only get the post. The KFC was awarded contract and it was made clear right from the onset that the facilitator was to work for the Ubombo-Ingwavuma working group and KFC’s role was merely to pay the salary and make sure the facilitator’s vehicle ran sufficiently. According to Ms Forse, this was not taken too seriously and KFC eventually took over the post entirely. The facilitator often ended up doing KFC jobs, and with the possibility of advancement up the KFC hierarchy existing, the facilitator tried to please his superiors and facilitate his promotion. The Ubombo-Ingwavuma working group on the other hand did not offer such opportunities so, according to Ms Forse, it was understandable for his favourance of KFC jobs.

Mr Andrias Malwane was appointed by KFC to undertake the role of development facilitator within the region with two individuals assisting him. Mr Malwane has
had considerable experience in the field of development having previously worked for the KwaZulu Bureau of Community Development and for KFC before receiving his posting. According to Mr Hannington Mr Malwane and his two assistants have largely been involved in the Ndumo pilot project and the Shemula water scheme and have liased considerably with the local communities.

According to Ms Forse, Mr Malwane complied with the requirements of the report and did create linkages between the different departments at a local level. He did this through possessing a knowledge of what was happening in each of the departments involved, and was able to inform interested departments on any new developments and initiatives. He also provided information to the communities, tribal authorities, departments and the private sector as the report specified he should do, and this was facilitated by the fact that he was a member of the community and having lived in the region his whole life. When meetings were held at Mbazwana, the Working Group used him as both a facilitator and translator. As the report specified, he also responded to requests for assistance by the various actors within the region- this is where many problems arose.

According to Ms Forse who was managing him through her position in the KwaZulu Department of Economic Affairs, his resources were stretched enormously and he was often unable to spread his resources due to the large number of requests for assistance he received from the community.

Mr Malwane did receive logistical support from KFC as the report suggested. Housing for KFC members is provided if they already do not have an abode within the region, and each of the facilitation officers is provided with a 4x4 vehicle.

**Government staff housing and office space**

This entailed the investigation of the present and future demand for government staff housing and office space within the region. At the time of the report,
government staff housing was extremely limited and was hindering the expected functions of officials. A study was proposed to be undertaken by the Department of Local Government to investigate the current and future demand for accommodation, and this information was to be supplied to the town planning section for inclusion into the town planning layouts.

6.13.3 To what extent have the Departments involved complied with the UIDF (1989)?

**Development facilitator**

With regard to the development facilitator, the appointment of Mr Malwane of KFC did not comply with the plan as the plan intended a person to be appointed from one of the KwaZulu departments. Although KFC received the contract, they attempted to the best of their ability, to meet the brief they had received. Difficulties were however experienced due to KFC’s past experience with the community in the region through its debt collection. The KFC facilitators soon overcame this stigma through the successes they experienced on the ground with the Ndumo pilot project and the Shemula water scheme.

**Government staff housing and office space**

As far as could be ascertained from the interviews with the role players in the region, this study never took place and as a result, nothing ever materialised. Government staff housing is provided on an *ad hoc* basis with the Department of Health providing accommodation for its workers on its hospital grounds.
6.14 Conclusion

The plan was initiated by government, the responsible agency at the time, but due to a lack of internal capacity, the work of producing the plan was done by consultants acting on behalf of government. All departments were involved at all times in the planning and approval process and the final report was seen as their vision for the future development of the region. The consultants final report went through six months of refinement by a Governmental Steering Committee in order to be accepted as the joint South African and KwaZulu Government’s plan for the region. It was then formulated into a white paper which, in the normal course of events Government Departments are required to follow and implement.

It must be borne in mind that the plans and projects outlined in this chapter form the short-term actions for the UIDF (1989) and not the plan in its entirety. A summary of the present situation and the objectives that the planned intervention were based on were however outlined at the start of each of the short term sectoral interventions.

With the above in mind, the and as can be seen from this chapter, very few of the short-term actions ever materialised as the UIDF (1989) intended. Departments have largely followed their own agendas with little co-ordination occurring between the departments in spite of the fact that the plan tried to overcome this through the use of the development facilitator and the working group. The departments, as mentioned, were extensively involved in the planning and decision making phase of the UIDF (1989) and the plan reflected the way they saw their services developing into the future. In spite of this, the plan was poorly implemented.
Many departmental representatives did, however, indicate that they made use of the UIDF (1989) as a reference in carrying out further plans or studies in spite of its status as a White Paper.

Limited resources within departments also played a major role in limiting the implementation of the short-term actions. Again this should not have played a major role due to the UIDF (1989) existing in the White Paper form.
Chapter Seven
Analysis of Data

7.1 Introduction

Chapter 7 will outline and examine responses to questions relating to the strengths and weaknesses of the UIDF (1989), implementation problems that have led to the plan not being implemented to the extent intended, as well as preconditions for the success of regional plans. This chapter will also examine responses to the question of whether or not a future exists for the plan.

Two of the groups of people interviewed, namely the KwaZulu Planners and the VARA planning team, were asked questions relating to the strengths and weaknesses of the plan. The value of examining the strengths and weaknesses are that the strengths shed light on the possible future of the plan, while the weaknesses lead into the implementation problems associated with the development framework. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the plan was initiated by government, but due to a lack of internal capacity, the work of producing the Plan was undertaken by consultants acting on behalf of government. The consultant’s final report then went through some six months of refinement by a government Steering Committee in order to be accepted as the Government’s plan for the region. Data collected from both the KwaZulu and VARA planners will therefore be combined in the analysis.

Once the strengths and weaknesses have been outlined, time will be spent examining what both the KwaZulu planners and the VARA planning team saw as the problems that affected the implementation of the UIDF (1989). As will be seen, the weaknesses overlap a great deal with the problems affecting the implementation of the UIDF (1989). The responses to the question of whether or
not the plan has been implemented to the extent intended will also be examined. Responses to this question will highlight which aspects of the plan were implemented and why, and which were not and why; and what role the plan played.

The preconditions for the success of regional plans will then be examined. The KwaZulu and VARA planning team, along with a group of regional planning experts, were asked to outline what they believed were the preconditions for the success of regional plans. The preconditions listed by the respondents attempt to address both the weaknesses and the implementation problems identified.

Finally, the possible future of the plan will then be examined from the responses generated by both the VARA planning team members and the KwaZulu planners.

7.2 Strengths and Weaknesses

7.2.1 Strengths

Responses as to the strengths of the plan were generated from interviews with four KwaZulu planners and three of the VARA planning team (N=7). Three broad categories of strengths were identified from the responses.

Respondents indicated that the plan provided, at an overall level, a specific vision for the development of the region. The plan was also not a ‘blue-print’ or comprehensive plan in nature but was instead strategic and able to adapt to unforeseen changes. A further strength of the plan was that it made use of specialists in the formulation of the data base which lead to a greater perceived legitimacy of the plan. The use of specialists in the formulation of the data base led to the accurate identification of the major problems facing the region which stimulated reliable means to resolve the problem. This data base has subsequently
been a useful source of information, and has been extensively referred to and used as a starting point in other studies for the region including the KFC Resource Development Study for the Siqakatha Tribal Ward, and the DEAT’s Ubombo/Ingwavuma Electrification Initiative study, to mention a few.

Secondly, the plan made use of relevant and up-to-date concepts like the settlement hierarchy concept through the designation of rural villages and towns; and the concepts of nodes and corridors. A further strength of the plan was that it made use of sector specific action plans and allocated responsibility for funding and the time frame in which the interventions were to occur. The plan also combined sectoral and spatial dimensions through the designation of locations at which different sectoral activities were to occur. Both the DEA and the DDA reported that the scenarios outlined in the plan could easily and effectively be translated into actions and tangible elements. The engineering section within the DDA also reported that the plan translated well into budgets for the plan. A further strength of the plan was that it sought to integrate line departments within the region through the Working Group, the MRDPC and the Development Facilitator.

Thirdly, the plan was one of the first to embrace the principle of participation, and although it did not occur to the extent it occurs in plan formulation today, it was at the ‘cutting edge’ in this area of planning in the mid-1980s. Respondents also indicated that the plan looked at what the people of the region wanted and thus was not just a paper exercise. A further strength of the plan was that it introduced a ‘win-win’ situation between the dominant interest groups within the region namely, nature conservation, subsistence and commercial agriculture.

7.2.2 Weaknesses

Responses as to the weaknesses of the plan were generated from interviews with four KwaZulu planners and three of the VARA planning team (N=7). As can be
seen from the responses of the planners, many of the weaknesses identified relate more to the institutional environment the plan was released into rather than the plan itself. Five broad categories of weaknesses were however identified.

Respondents indicated that a major weakness did not really lie with the plan itself but instead with the political and institutional climate of the 1980s. According to Mr A'Bear, in the KwaZulu government at that time, no one department had overarching control and responsibility which often resulted in departments following their own agendas. KwaZulu lacked the Natal equivalent of the Provincial Secretary who possessed the power to make individual line departments conform to the plan. As a result of this, there was insufficient buy-in from the government departments of the time.

Funding was identified as being a major weakness of the plan. Due to departments following their own agendas and not conforming to the plan, difficulty was experienced in securing funding within departments for priority projects within the region. The inability to secure ‘seed capital’ to implement projects while the planning process was underway, was also identified as being a major problem. Seed capital could have been used to show people tangible evidence of development on the ground during the planning process. This was identified as a further weakness of the ‘system’ and not the plan itself.

A shortage of human resources was identified as being a weakness of the plan. Although the needs for implementation could be identified, sufficient human resources were often hard to get to make the plan a reality. Implementation of the plan therefore often did not follow from the sectoral intervention identification stage of the plan.

The process of participation incorporated into the plan was also identified as being a major weakness by respondents. The whole notion of community participation
in the late 1980s was a relatively new concept with the UIDF (1989) being a pioneer in this field. Respondents therefore pointed out that the planners entered into the process in rather a naïve way with regards to what they could achieve. According to Mr Gcabashe, participation was also limited due to a lack of trust brought on by the partnership and close association between the DDA and the KwaZulu government in the preparation and implementation of the UIDF (1989).

Respondents also indicated that the planning process occurred at the height of ‘Pretoria’s paranoia’ when participation and consultation were quite novel and thus generated fair amounts of suspicion from central government. According to the respondents, the National Party government was not partial to consultants participating in the planning process if they did not conform and adhere to the National Party ideology. The possibility also existed that plans would not be funded if consultants did not conform with the government’s desires. The existence of a suspicious government therefore limited the extent to which planning could be undertaken.

7.2.3 Conclusion

The strengths identified shed light on the possible future of the plan, while the weaknesses lead into the problems associated with the development framework to be dealt with next in the next section of the chapter.

From the responses it can be seen that the plan provided a specific vision for development of the region which was grounded on a good data base compiled by experts, and from this data base the major problems could be identified and ways of solving them could be generated. The plan also consisted of several sectoral interventions which were closely tied to a spatial component; and the plan also attempted to link and integrate the different departments involved. The plan was also at the fore-front of efforts to involve the community in the plan itself and sought to create a ‘win-win’ situation between competing parties.
The weaknesses of the plan largely relate to the institutional and political environment the plan was released into. These weaknesses include a shortage of funding for projects and the inability to secure seed capital; the shortage of human resources; a suspicious central government; and the relative novelty of community participation in the late 1980s.

7.3 Implementation Problems

The planners from both the KwaZulu government and the VARA planning team were asked to list, in their opinion, problems that limited the implementation of the UIDF (1989). The list of responses generated will be outlined and will be followed by a section summarising them into six categories of implementation problems.

Multiple role players

The Uhombo/Ingwavuma region is a complex one in that four bodies initiated development within the region including the DDA, the NPA, KwaZulu line departments, and the national government. Administration within the region was therefore very fragmented.

The KwaZulu administration, according to Mr Totman, was centred in Ulundi with several line departments undertaking functions within the region. Some of these line departments had regional offices but this was largely the exception. According to Professor Robinson, the majority of the departments involved in the implementation of the plan, including the KwaZulu Departments of Economic Affairs, Education and Health, did not possess the ability to implement the plan resulting in different sectoral interests pulled against each other all the time. Prior to the plan there had been little co-ordination between departments and this did
not change much with the preparation of the plan. The UIDF (1989) attempted to co-ordinate these line functions through the establishment of three institutional structures namely the Working Group, the MRDPC and the Development Facilitator. Greater co-ordination was also sought through the provision of a list of priority actions which spelt out responsibilities for tasks, and through attempts to establish government offices and staff housing space within the region.

The variety of departments and organisations involved in the implementation of the plan can be seen in Chapter 6 in the list of short term plans for immediate action.

**The Working Group**

The MRDPC, which later became the Ubombo/Ingwavuma Regional Development Planning Commission, was the main institutional structure set out to co-ordinate the planning and development process within the region. The Working Group, which reported to the MRDPC, was, in a sense, the localised version of this structure. The Working Group was created as a structure where local people could be involved in decision making and in which local level decisions could be taken. Other functions undertaken by the body included obtaining funding, problem solving, and co-ordination.

According to Ms Forse, the Working Group was a good concept in that it was like an ‘Area Planning Forum’ which is currently set out in the Interim Planning and Development Bill. It was a useful structure in that it provided information on important issues within the region for all role-players and government departments. Its weaknesses were, however, that it had no ‘teeth’ and many departments chose not to bring key issues to the Group for discussion. The Working Group did not have the statutory power to insist on co-ordination or that issues be discussed within the group. To have more power, the Working Group
would have to have been made into legislation thus enabling it to force departments to co-ordinate their actions (interview with Ms Forse).

**Budgeting**
The main issue is that budgets are allocated and managed by individual departments making it difficult to secure a group of budgeted proposals within any region.

KwaZulu budgeting previously occurred in Ulundi with Maputaland being one of several regions, thus forcing regional competition for funds. Securing funds from departmental budgets for action plans within regions was therefore a slow and difficult process. The UIDF (1989) was designed to overcome these problems by indicating to all role players what had to be done year by year. Regional councils today address this problem through compelling departments by law to re-organise themselves within the regional boundaries. Regional Councils are given their own budgets to prioritise and distribute within a given region.

**The DDA and KwaZulu government partnership**
The DDA was seen by many people as being closely allied with National Party ideology and not having the best interests of the people in mind. The DDA, according to Ms Forse, saw the UIDF (1989) as a political document to indicate to onlookers that they were in fact undertaking development within the region. The partnership of the DDA and the KwaZulu government in the preparation of the UIDF (1989) was thus accepted with a degree of scepticism and an amount of questioning relating to the motivation for the planning process itself, by residents of the Maputaland region.

**Change in government**
The change in governance of South Africa commencing in the period preceding 1994, had a profound impact on the UIDF (1989) and the KwaZulu White Paper
on Development Policy in the Ubombo/Ingwavuma region. This period led to
great amounts of uncertainty relating to where the country was heading and what
the provincial and political situation would look like after the first democratic
elections. Dr Buthelezi and the IFP were calling for federalism while other
political groupings like the ANC, were calling for stronger central government
control.

In this period, the White Paper on Development Policy in the Ubombo/
Ingwavuma Region (1992) was released. The White Paper was a declaration of
intervention which spelt out the basis for the KwaZulu Government intervention,
the responsible departments, and a framework for other participants, communities
and the non-government sector. The white paper also provided a development
policy for the region which included a spatial and physical framework, sectoral
policies, and criteria for project identification. The white paper also identified
institutional structures, sources of finance for development, phasing of
development, and an identification of the highest short-term priorities.

With the macro-level changes occurring in South Africa from 1992 onwards,
decision makers within departments and organisations were largely unwilling to
commit themselves to any major decisions and tended to adopted a ‘wait and see’
attitude. This happened with the release of the white paper and very few
departments were willing to adopt it or the measures it suggested until they were
sure of what the future held for them (interview with Ms Forse).

How governments overcome problems
According to Professor Robinson, problems arise with implementation through
the manner in which government departments deal with problems. Government
departments often respond to problems in a locality by transferring staff to other
areas. Key people are often transferred for a number of reasons including their
inability to deal with the nature of the problem. New skills acquired in solving
problems that arise can also lead to promotions or re-deployment resulting in a degree of discontinuity.

7.4 The extent to which the Plan was implemented

The question of whether the plan was implemented to the extent intended was posed to both the KwaZulu planners and the VARA planning team. All respondents indicated that, in their opinion, the plan was not implemented to the extent intended and gave reasons for this lack of performance relating to the aforementioned implementation problems.

7.5 Pre-conditions for the success of a Regional Plan

This section will briefly outline what both the KwaZulu and VARA team planners, as well as planning experts believe are the pre-conditions for the success of regional plans in general (N=10). Respondents were asked to list in their opinion, what the preconditions for the success of regional plans were.

7.5.1 Community participation

Community participation was seen as being of fundamental importance to the success of regional plans. Respondents indicated that the plan needs to be people driven, and all the local leadership and community need to be well informed of all aspects of the plan and see it as belonging to them. Consultations must occur with local organisations spanning both civil society and local government. The plan must go beyond just consulting the local Inkhosi and his headmen although their input are important. Considering the people’s culture is fundamental as the prevailing culture continues in spite of any planning initiatives.
The UIDF (1989) tried extensively to involve the local community through regular report back and consultation sessions. According to Ms Forse, however, this process was not pushed far enough and at the end of the day, an elite group within the region had an understanding of what the plan entailed and sought to achieve, while the majority of the residents of the region remained ill-informed.

### 7.5.2 Departmental collaboration

Institutional linkages and inter-departmental collaboration were seen as being of fundamental importance for the success of regional plans. Institutional linkages are important for the success of regional plans. Governments are vertically structured with little co-ordination and collaboration between departments. The barriers against co-operation at the bottom of the line-departments are sometimes very strong and thus limit plan implementation.

### 7.5.3 Political ‘buy-in’

Plans need to be taken seriously by the various government departments if they are to be successful. Regional plans either have to be fairly narrow with specific interventions, or they have to have ‘buy-in’ from departments. The client must also want to do something with the plan and not see it as a mere political solution which will inevitably gather dust on the shelf.

### 7.5.4 Economic driving forces

Economic driving forces and areas of economic potential must be identified by the plan if the plan is to succeed. Government and business commitment to the development of these sectors is essential. Although regional plans are attempting to address public sector spending, business takes the government’s lead. Two of the respondents indicated that planning does not really drive investment. Investment occurs first at areas of economic potential and planning later channels this. According to Professor Breen, not much economic development is or has been happening in Maputaland, and the existence of a plan has not really made
things happen. Investment is needed in an environment that supports it. Once this happens and growth is occurring, a plan can be developed to steer and support the economic growth (interview with Professor Breen and Ms Manders).

7.5.5 Capacity of implementing body

In the development of regional plans, there needs to be a realism relating to the capacity of the implementing body to make the plans happen. If the capacity is limited and there are only a few areas where the agency can intervene, comprehensive planning will not be of much use.

7.5.6 Legal ‘teeth’

Regional plans need to be given legal ‘teeth’ through an Act so that Line Departments can be forced to comply with the plans. The KwaZulu Government’s White Paper on Development Policy in the Ubombo/Ingwavuma Region does this at best in theory. Regional Councils now have this power and are thus able to overcome these problems.

7.5.7 Seed projects

The existence of seed capital to undertake projects while the planning process is underway, was also identified as being of importance. A number of projects need to be underway across the region in which people can participate and learn what their responsibilities are and the process involved in development. Seed capital projects can serve to capture the interests of the people on the ground and at the same time feed something back into the region in return for information gathered.

The planning team involved in the preparation of the UIDF (1989) drew up a seed capital funding moratorium which was submitted to the DBSA. According to Professor Robinson, the DBSA were sympathetic to the need for seed capital but they did not have an existing budget line for that type of funding.
7.5.8 Broad-brush planning

Respondents indicated that effective regional planning needs to start with a quick scan of the region, the identification of areas of possibility and possible intervention, followed by the development of a framework for intervention. A danger does however exist that regional planning may be too broad-brushed and not adequately understand the dynamics at play within the region. A balance therefore needs to be struck.

In order to work towards its goal, within the given parameters, it was envisaged that the overall planning process of the UIDF (1989) would evolve through three broad phases, namely, the pre-planning stage, Phase I, and Phase II. The pre-planning phase involved the assessment of the existing situation and the preparation of a detailed brief; while Phase I encompassed the initiation of consultation procedures, the formulation of alternative development scenarios for the Ubombo/Ingwavuma region, and the preparation of the structure plan. Phase II involved the motivation of specific projects and programmes, implementation, and the monitoring and revision of the Strategy and the Development Plan as future circumstances dictated (UIDF, 1989, p 3).

The UIDF (1989) therefore undertook a scan of the existing situation within the region but in a more comprehensive way than the above criteria indicated should be the case. The formulation of alternative development scenarios for the region indicates the plan’s identification of areas of possibility and possible intervention which was followed by the preparation of a structure plan which encompassed the framework for intervention.

7.5.9 In-house planning and staff

Respondents indicated the importance of regional planning taking place within government and not being sub-contracted out to consultants.
7.5.10 Person to take planning issues forward

Respondents indicated the importance of an individual to take planning issues forward. The ‘driving’ of planning issues needs to occur at a relatively high level within each of the departments involved. For this to occur, commitment by the relevant KwaZulu Government Departments in terms of budgets and staff is needed and this is where the White Paper (1992) would play a role. The White Paper would force all government departments and parastatal agencies to accept the White Paper (1992) and its content as representing the Government’s development policy for the region, and thus force departmental compliance.

7.5.11 Conclusion

As can be seen from these responses, a variety of factors are at play in ensuring the success of regional plans. These factors include: community participation; interdepartmental collaboration; political buy-in; making use of economic driving forces; the capacity of the implementing body; statutory powers being granted; and seed projects being put in place. The approach would also need to be broad in nature; make use of staff within government departments and not use consultants; and make use of an individual, like a development facilitator, to drive the process forward.

7.6 The Perceived Future of the Plan

Both the VARA planning team and the KwaZulu planners (N=7) were asked what they believed the future held for the UIDF. All of the respondents indicated that the plan should not be re-done. One respondent pointed out that at a regional scale, one is unlikely to come up with anything hugely different unless there are major changes in land ownership and land allocation. For example if the DNC secured additional large areas of land for nature conservation, this could change
things at a regional scale. If things like this do not happen, the principles embued in the plan seem quite sound. The development needs within the region have also changed very little over the last ten years. Respondents also indicated that the plan may require some review to update it to current changes. This will not however require the plan to be redone or re-prioritising to occur.

7.7 Conclusion

From the data generated in the interviews, several key issues emerge that determine the success of regional plans and their development frameworks including the institutional environment into which the plan is released, and the need to formalise regional plans into law.

The institutional environment at play is critical for the success of a regional plan. As mentioned, the shortage of human resources within government departments, the absence of funding for projects or the inability to secure funding from departmental budgets, poor co-ordination between departments, and a suspicious central government, are all institutional limitations and lead to the non-performance of plans. If these factors are relevant, regional plans need to take cognisance of them and adapt their programmes to work around these problems.

There is also a need to convert regional plans into law thus forcing the compliance of governmental departments. In theory, once the plan becomes a white paper, the relevant KwaZulu Government Departments are required to commit their staff and budgets to the implementation of the plan. As becomes apparent in the analysis of the short term actions identified in Chapter 6, very few departments, however, complied with the plan.
Chapter Eight
Data Synthesis and Conclusions

8.1 Introduction

This chapter will draw together Chapters 3 and 4 of the literature review which examines regional plans and common reasons for their failure, and Chapters 6 and 7 which analysed the extent to which the UIDF (1989) was implemented. The fourteen categories of implementation problems identified by Morah (1996), followed by the eight typical reasons why plans fail identified by Bowden (1986), will be compared to the findings from the research in Chapter 7. The work of these two authors will be kept separate in that Bowden (1986) offers typical implementation problems relating to Government Ministries, while Morah (1996) offers a broad analysis of the different categories of implementation problems.

8.2 Experiences from the literature- Morah (1996)

This section will briefly sketch the points put forward by Morah (1996) as to why plan implementation often fails. This will be followed by a systematic comparison of the fourteen points raised by Morah (1996) and the categories of implementation problems that emerged from the interviews in Chapter 7.

Morah (1996) identified fourteen classifications of why plans fail to get implemented in Chapter 4 from his survey of the implementation literature. These reasons included administrative control; organisational resources; intergovernment relations; the substantive nature of policy; and pressure politics. Goals consensus; goal clarity and communication; the disposition of actors; complexity of joint action; theory of causation; evaluation design; participatory
process; uncertainty; and political and socio-economic conditions were also explained as causes of implementation problems for plans.

8.2.1 Administrative control

It must be acknowledged that in the interviews with representatives from each of the government departments, representatives were often unwilling to ‘run down’ or give a negative impression as to why their departments had not complied with the short term actions indicated in the UIDF (1989). As a result, the implementation problem of administrative control, which was identified by Morah (1996), did not feature in the reasons for the short term actions not being implemented. Departmental representatives did not indicate if there was a ‘leakage’ of authority within their bureaucracies or whether lower level officials followed orders from higher levels, common reasons for a lack of plan implementation identified by Morah (1996). It was therefore difficult to ascertain whether poor administrative control lead to plans and projects not being implemented.

8.2.2 Organisational resources

A member of the VARA planning team indicated that organisational resources were one of the reasons why the UIDF (1989) did not get implemented to the extent intended. Discontinuity within government, caused by the transferring of key people or government employees leaving the public for the private sector, led to the KwaZulu government at times not being able to achieve the cumulative effort necessary for effective plan implementation.

The shortage of capital for projects within the region has also been a major reason why the plan has not been implemented to the extent intended. The Ubombo/ Ingwavuma region has, according to information gathered in the interviews, been viewed as being one of the least important regions within the old
KwaZulu. Budgeting therefore favoured other regions at the expense of developments within the Ubombo/Ingwavuma region.

Some departments like the DNC have had relatively good organisational resources and possessed what Morah (1996) termed a ‘fixer’ or a person driving the plans forward. Mr A’Bear indicated that the much of the DNC’s success within the region in achieving the goals of the report has been due to a few very committed individuals within the organisation.

Problems with organisational resources within government departments were fairly common in the late 1980s and early 1990s at the time of the intended plan implementation. These problems, like the shortage of capital and discontinuity in government through staff transfers, still persist today.

8.2.3 Inter government relations

The interviews indicated that there was in fact a problem with intergovernmental relations. South Africa and its past homeland administrations were characterised by minimal co-ordination of functions between line departments. The UIDF (1989) attempted to overcome this through its usage of the MRDPC and the Working Group, but as Ms Forse indicated, this body did not possess statutory powers necessary and thus did not have the necessary legal ‘teeth’ to make the plan work. Many of the departmental representatives on the Working Group therefore neglected to bring key issues to the group for discussion and debate amongst the members.

Inter-governmental relations therefore contributed to the plan never reaching fruition.
8.2.4 Substantive nature of policy

None of the respondents of the interviews indicated that the substance of the plan resulted in its shortcomings. When asked questions about the future of the plan, respondents indicated that the plan should still be implemented as the substance of the plan was still valid. They also indicated that the plan may require some minor modifications to bring it up to date with recent national and global changes.

8.2.5 Pressure politics

Pressure politics, where poor people are unable to exert their demands on the system, was indicated as playing a role in the plan's failure to be fully implemented. Respondents indicated that the Ubombo/Ingwavuma region was given a low status within the regions of KwaZulu, and was seen as a rural backwater by many of the politicians and decision makers within the KwaZulu government. This would have had a negative impact on the ability of the residents of the region to exert their demands on the system of governance and resource distribution.

8.2.6 Goals consensus

None of the respondents indicated that a lack of consensus between any of the key role players on the goals of the plan played a major role in limiting its implementation. Consensus was achieved on the goals informing the UIDF (1989) right from the onset of the planning phase.

8.2.7 Goal clarity and communication

None of the respondents indicated that a lack of clarity or communication of the goals embodied in the UIDF (1989) led to implementation problems. The UIDF (1989) clearly spelt out what its goals were and these were approved by all involved in the planning process including both the clients, namely the DDA and the KwaZulu government. Regular report back sessions were undertaken by both
the VARA planning team and the KwaZulu planners throughout the region with interested parties and members of the public. Ms Forse indicated that if more funds and time had been available, this process could have been taken further and to more people thus ensuring greater goal clarity.

8.2.8 Disposition of actors
Morah (1996, p 88) indicated that for a plan to succeed, the plan needs to be released into a supportive environment and not just a neutral one. If this does not occur, administrative agents responsible for the policy execution are likely to derail and undermine the process. From the responses of the departmental representatives it can be seen that the plan was released into a neutral environment where departments were 'doing their own thing'. Due to the UIDF (1989) not possessing legal status, departments were not compelled to comply with the plan and many indicated that they merely used the report as a basis for further research they were to carry out.

8.2.9 Complexity of joint action
This refers to the implementation difficulties that can arise from having too many actors of different vertical and horizontal levels of the process which may result in the blurring of the lines of authority. The existence of multiple role players within the region was indicated by respondents as leading to problems with the implementation of the plan. Respondents indicated that Central, Provincial and the Homeland government of KwaZulu had responsibilities for land within the region as well as with the delivery of services within the region. This has lead to many problems occurring with interdepartmental co-operation.

Apart from being given White Paper status which forced co-operation and co-ordinated implementation between departments in theory, the plan made use of a Development Facilitator, the MRDPC along with the working group, to overcome these problems and to lead to greater co-ordination.
8.2.10 Theory of causation

None of the respondents indicated the theory of causation as leading to problems with implementation.

8.2.11 Evaluation design

None of the respondents indicated that evaluation design led to implementation problems.

The evaluation design for the report was a sound one. The UIDF (1989) indicated that the plan needed to be monitored in terms of the overall objectives of the region’s development and the spectrum of issues outlined in Chapter 3 of the report (UIDF, 1989, pp 43-63). It also indicated that a continual process of updating and monitoring is required to meet changes in government policies, changes in financial manpower resources, and to accommodate future changes whose impact cannot be assessed during the preparation of the plan. The plan was also to be updated to incorporate the knowledge gained from implementing the initial phase. The report did prescribe responsibility for the monitoring and updating of the plan, and this rested with the Working Group, the Maputaland Regional Development Planning Committee (MRDPC), and the KwaZulu cabinet.

8.2.12 Participatory process

Respondents indicated that problems did arise in this area of the plan. Due to the UIDF (1989) being at the forefront of participatory planning processes, some of the respondents believe that the plan may have been too over-ambitious in what it attempted to achieve within the parameters of the mid to late 1980s. In today’s terms, the levels of participation may have been conservative in that participation did not fully penetrate to grassroots levels, but in the context of the 1980s, it was seen to be revolutionary. This can be seen by the DDA’s sceptical response to the whole participatory process.
8.2.13 Uncertainties
Respondents indicated that the high levels of uncertainty at play in the late 1980s and early 1990s played a major role in limiting the implementation of the plan. Respondents indicated that the changes in this period created high levels of uncertainty within many government departments leading to their unwillingness to commit themselves or their budgets to many of the short term actions.

8.2.14 Political and socio-economic conditions
According to Morah (1996) this encompasses questions like what the economic resource picture will look like throughout the implementation period, what the nature of general public options are on the policy, or whether there is partisan or elite support for the policy. Respondents indicated, with regard to budgeting, that the Ubombo/Ingwavuma region was seen as one of the least important regions in KwaZulu at the time. Residents of the region are often referred to as ‘Tongas’ or as being more aligned with the Swazi’s to the west and the Mozambiquens to the north. As a result of ethnic politics, the region has not been fully developed or received funds with the urgency other more ‘Zulu’ regions have.

8.2.15 Conclusion
Of the fourteen categories of implementation problems indicated by Morah (1996), only seven were seen to coincide with the responses given by the departmental representatives, the KwaZulu Planners, and the VARA planning team. The areas of similarity include: organisational resources; inter-government relations; the disposition of actors; complexity of joint action; the participatory process; uncertainties; and political and socio-economic conditions at play within a region.

From this analysis, it becomes apparent that one area of similarity between the primary research and Morah’s (1996) categories of implementation problems,
relates to the institutional environment a plan is released into (i.e. the disposition of actors, the inter-government relations, etc.). This further confirms the point of the importance of a supportive institutional environment for the success of regional plans.

8.3 Experiences from the literature- Bowden (1986)

Bowden (1986) in Chapter 4, examines the problems that arise out of the implementation of individual projects instituted through operating ministries of government. From the implementation literature Bowden (1986) identified and ranked the eight most frequently mentioned problems as: involvement/motivation of target group; necessity for institutional or legal change; co-ordination and cooperation between contributors; system of on-site managing of the project or programme; political will or political consensus necessary for the programme; monitoring and evaluation leading to re-evaluation and redesign of the project or plan; knowledge of the attitude of the target group; and availability of local currency funds. Time will now be spent examining each of the eight categories of implementation problems in terms of the data collected in Chapter 7.

8.3.1 Involvement/motivation of the target group

As mentioned, respondents indicated that participation at a macro level was critical for the success of the plan and that the plan was at the forefront of participatory planning in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Bowden (1986, p 64) indicates that the involvement and motivation of the target group at micro levels is also fundamental and this will be examined through an analysis of some of the short-term action plans.

None of the departments indicated that the involvement of the target group in individual projects was a major problem, but this may be due to the numerous
government departments involved in the region making use of extension workers, field officers and development facilitators. The Department of Agriculture, Economic Affairs and Tourism, and Water Affairs and Forestry, through their usage of extension workers and field officers, have tried to involve the target populations within the region in both the planning and implementation phases of projects. Although the UIDF (1989) suggests that such officers be used, it is hard to say whether their emergence has been due to the report or out of necessity. The appointment of Mr Malwane, the KFC development facilitators, has been as a direct result of the plan and he has enjoyed considerable success within the region in his consolatory role. An example of where he has succeeded at the micro level has been the Shemula water supply project.

8.3.2 Necessity for institutional or legal change

As can be seen from the macro level previously alluded to, where government departments actively interact with each other, many of the respondents indicated the need for institutional changes to occur to result in greater co-operation and lower levels of fragmentation between government departments. Legal changes were identified as being of significant importance to ensure departmental compliance with the UIDF (1989). It was anticipated that the conversion of the UIDF (1989) to the KwaZulu Government's White Paper on development policy for the Ubombo/Ingwavuma region (1992), would lead to higher levels of co-ordination, co-operation and lower levels of fragmentation between government departments and parastatal agencies. Section 5 of the White Paper (KZ White Paper, 1992, p 7) deals with the commitment to the White Paper and indicated that all relevant KwaZulu Government Departments must commit their staff and budgets to the realisation of the Paper. This did not, however, occur with the publishing of the White paper in 1992 and there was minimal compliance of government departments with the paper.
The period preceding the elections brought with it high levels of uncertainty as to which direction the country was taking in the post-election period. Respondents reported that, due to these levels of uncertainty, departments were unwilling to commit large sums of money for the short to medium terms to any projects. As a result of this, individual projects and plans were not implemented as the UIDF (1989) intended.

8.3.3 Co-ordination and co-operation between contributors

This necessity for co-ordination and co-operation was identified by many departmental representatives as resulting in implementation problems. An example of this was within the conservation field. At the time of the compilation of the report, three agencies were responsible for conservation within the region namely the BNR, the NPB and the DDA (conservation). The report identified that an amalgamation of these bodies was needed to lead to greater efficiency within the conservation field, and this was scheduled to occur in August 1997. A Bill called the KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation Management Bill, was passed on November 28, 1997 in the provincial legislature in Ulundi. According to the Natal Witness (Natal Witness, Friday, November 28, 1997, p 2), the bill is the concrete and final result of the amalgamation between the Natal Parks Board and the Department of Nature Conservation. Again respondents interviewed could not say whether the drive for amalgamation between the bodies was due to the UIDF (1989) or whether such changes were inevitable.

The appointment of a Development Facilitator, the formation of the MRDPC and the Working Group, were designed to overcome these types of problems and lead to greater co-operation and co-ordination between line departments and parastatal agencies.
8.3.4 System of on-site managing of the project or programme
Due to interviews largely taking place with individuals relatively high up the relevant government departments and organisations, it could not be ascertained whether or not a system of on-site managing of the projects or programmes was a major issue or not.

8.3.5 Political will, or political consensus necessary for the support of a programme
Whether or not there was a political will for the projects indicated within the UIDP (1989, pp 218-220), can be seen in Chapter 6. The list of short term actions and projects was compiled with inputs from the numerous government departments involved in the region. At the time of the plan formation, there was a significant political will and consensus for the support of the programmes. Unfortunately due to the plan taking some time to reach White Paper status, the plan could not be enforced and departments largely 'side-stepped' their responsibilities.

The residents of the region, as has been mentioned, were consulted extensively in the preparation of the plan. Departmental respondents, members of the VARA planning team, and the KwaZulu government planners indicated that the residents had political will to see the plans and programmes reach fruition. Unfortunately however, collectively they lacked the capacity to see these plans become reality.

8.3.6 Monitoring and evaluation leading to re-evaluation and redesign
None of the departmental representatives indicated that the process of monitoring and evaluation leading to a re-evaluation and redesign, was a problem leading to lack of implementation of specific projects. The lack of delivery or the emergence of projects, may have led to the monitoring and evaluation stage of the
Appendix

I. Questionnaires
II. Departmental Representatives
Appendix I: Questionnaires

Questionnaire for VARA Planning Team

1. What regional plans have you been involved with?
2. What was your involvement with the Ubombo/Ingwavuma structure plan?
3. What was your exact role on the VARA planning team?
4. What were the major problems experienced in this phase of the project?
5. Was the plan a useful tool to guide development in the region?
6. In your opinion, what were the strengths of the plan?
7. In your opinion, what were its weaknesses?
8. What could have been done to overcome these weaknesses?
9. Were you aware of any implementation problems?
10. In your opinion, was the plan implemented to the extent intended?
11. Did the projects listed in Table 19 occur when and where they were intended?
12. In your opinion, what are the preconditions for the success of a regional plan?
13. How do your experiences on the Ubombo/Ingwavuma structure plan compare to other regional plans you have been involved with?
14. What is the future of the plan?

This questionnaire was administered to three principle members of the VARA planning team.
Questionnaire for the KwaZulu Planners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What regional plans have you been involved with?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. What was your involvement with the Ubombo/Ingwavuma structure plan?</td>
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<td>3. Was the plan a useful tool to guide development in the region?</td>
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<td>4. In your opinion, what were the strengths of the plan?</td>
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<td>5. In your opinion, what were its weaknesses?</td>
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<td>6. What could have been done to overcome these weaknesses?</td>
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<td>7. Were you aware of any implementation problems?</td>
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<td>8. In your opinion, was the plan implemented to the extent intended?</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Did the projects listed in Table 19 occur when and where they were</td>
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<td>intended?</td>
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<td>10. In your opinion, what are the preconditions for the success of a</td>
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<td>regional plan?</td>
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<td>11. How do your experiences on the Ubombo/Ingwavuma structure plan</td>
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<td>compare to other regional plans you have been involved with?</td>
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<td>12. What is the future of the plan?</td>
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This questionnaire was administered to five KwaZulu planners who were involved with the plan in a substantial way during the plan formulation and implementation phase into the early 1990s.
**Questionnaire for Planning Experts**

1. What is your current position?
2. The literature suggests that regional planning is in crisis. Is there still room for regional planning or has planning gone beyond this?
3. Are regional plans, like the Ubombo/Ingwavuma structure plan, useful tools to guide development within a region?
4. Do you think there are any alternative forms of planning that would perform better than regional planning?
5. Why do regional plans often fail to deliver?
6. In your opinion, what is the future of regional planning?

This questionnaire was administered to a group of five regional planning experts and people who work with the implementation of regional plans on a daily basis. Dr McIntosh, Ms Todes, Mr Harrison, Professor Breen and Ms Manders were all interviewed.
Questionnaire for Departmental Representatives

No standard questionnaire was used for these interviews as exact information, relating to each of the departments, was extracted. A questionnaire used to interview one of the representatives from KFC will be highlighted below.

1. What is your current position?
2. Are you aware of the Ubombo/Ingwavuma structure plan?
3. Was it a useful tool to guide development?
4. In your opinion, what are the strengths of the plan?
5. In your opinion, what were the weaknesses of the plan?
6. What could have been done to overcome these?
7. Are you aware of any implementation problems?
8. Has KFC complied with the roles set out in the plan?
   • These roles included the providing of a development facilitator who would communicate with the tribal authorities, working group, departments and agencies, and the private sector and government groups.
   • KFC was to provide finance to small scale farmers.
   • With regard to zero-based trade, KFC was to write to the KwaZulu government requesting initial implementation of the concept in the corridors and in the rural centres.
9. In your opinion, what are the pre-conditions for the success of a regional plan?
10. In your opinion, what is the future of the plan?

Questions 1-7 and questions 9 and 10 were used as standard questions for each of the departmental representatives, and question 8 was informed by Table 19 (UIDF, 1989, pp 218-220).
## Appendix II: Departmental Representatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
<td>Mr Kruger</td>
<td>Head of Department, DOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr E. Kouch</td>
<td>Chief Engineer, Engineering Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Nature Conservation</td>
<td>Mr A. Marlin</td>
<td>Head of Tourism Development Manzengwenya</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ms Looke</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Education</td>
<td>Mr Sibusie</td>
<td>Principal of Zenzeleni High School (Mseleni)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Economic Affairs and Tourism</td>
<td>Mr I. Dixon</td>
<td>Director- Tourism Division Development Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr E. Cele</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Local Government and Housing</td>
<td>Ms E. Marais</td>
<td>Assistant Town and Regional Planner, Utungulu Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal Tourism Authority</td>
<td>Mr E. Apelgren</td>
<td>Senior Manager Development Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFC (KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation Limited)</td>
<td>Mr R. Hannington</td>
<td>Senior Land Use Planner, Rural Development</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr A. Milwane</td>
<td>Development Facilitator</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of Health</td>
<td>Dr V. Fredland</td>
<td>Mseleni Hospital Superintendent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eskom</td>
<td>Mr K. Venkatasen</td>
<td>Key Customer Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr T. Gcabashe</td>
<td>Ex-VARA team and currently employed by ESKOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Transport</td>
<td>Mr Klem</td>
<td>Chief Director, KZ-NPA Roads Hluhtuwe District</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mr Marshal-Goodrich</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of Water Affairs and Forestry</td>
<td>Mr Kempen</td>
<td>Engineering Technician</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mr G. Swart</td>
<td>Deputy Director and Programme Co-ordinator of DANIDA</td>
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<td>Support Programme to KZ-N</td>
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projects never emerging. Another reason for this may have been that the
departmental representatives interviewed were relatively high up the departmental
hierarchy and may not have had exact knowledge of whether monitoring and
evaluation was a major problem.

8.3.7 Knowledge and attitude of target group
Some departmental representatives indicated that the lack of knowledge of
residents within the region led to individual plans failing. The provision of basic
agricultural inputs in Section 6.1.2 is an example of this. Farmers involved in the
Makhatini irrigation scheme started their own retail initiative but due to a lack of
capacity, skills, and knowledge, were unable to remain solvent and continue
supplying the service.

The other sectors interviewed did not indicate this to be a problem. None of the
departmental representatives interviewed indicated that the attitudes of the target
groups interfered with plan implementation.

8.3.8 Availability of local currency funds
Many of the departmental representatives indicated that the lack of availability of
capital led to specific projects not being implemented. Two examples of this
include the building of Eskom’s power lines, and the construction of clinics by the
Department of Health.

Due to a limited budget, Eskom lines deviated from the positions indicated in the
UIDF (1989) adjacent to the corridors, and were built in the most cost-effective
positions. As with Eskom, due to a limited budget, clinics were not built at all the
locations indicated on the plan. Clinics were built at locations seen to have the
greatest need and where people had the poorest access to facilities. If more funds
had been available, permanent clinics would have been built at all sites indicated
in the UIDF (1989).
8.3.9 Conclusion
From the responses given by departmental representatives in Chapter 6, it can be seen that problems were experienced in five of the eight categories indicated by Bowden (1989, p 64). Problems were experienced due to a necessity for institutional or legal change; a lack of co-ordination and co-operation between contributors; a lack of political will or consensus on various issues; problems with the knowledge and attitude of target groups; and the lack of availability of local currency funds. The reason for the other three problems mentioned by Bowden (1986, p 64) not featuring is probably due to departmental representatives being moved from the region and not fully aware of the dynamics at play within each of the plans and projects on the ground.

8.4 Comparison to Lessons learnt from the Upper Tugela Catchment Experience- McIntosh (1994)

8.4.1 Introduction
This section will examine the lessons learnt from the Upper Tugela catchment experience which were outlined in Chapter 4. A comparison will now be made between problems experienced in the Upper Tugela initiative, and those encountered in the UIDF (1989).

8.4.2 Comparison of the Upper Tugela initiative with the UIDF (1989)
Like the Upper Tugela catchment experience, problems with the implementation of the UIDF (1989) largely arose due to administrative problems at a local level as can be seen in Chapters 6 and 7. The fragmentation of authority and the absence of developed local political institutions prevented central and regional agencies from responding with flexibility to particular local conditions. Like the UIDF (1989), the Upper Tugela initiative adopted an interdepartmental committee
system to try and overcome difficulties caused by fragmented administration systems, and like the UIDF’s Working Group, this failed to generate effective channels of participation among departments as well as with the effective communities. The continued practice of centralisation within numerous functional agencies involved in the Upper Tugela initiative, forced the planners to adopt and follow a blueprint planning process. Comprehensive planning was thus required right from the onset to ensure that agencies could allocate additional funding and staff to the initiative. The UIDF (1989) was not comprehensive in its approach to the extent that the Upper Tugela experience was, in its attempt to force compliance. It did however spell out short term projects and responsibilities for them to get development within the region started.

The KwaZulu government gave insufficient formal priority to the Upper Tugela initiative to change the practices of departments or to foster the extensive co-ordination required by the initiative. This was reflected in that only a few departments actively co-operated in the initiative and in the fact that other departments were unable or unwilling to adapt their practices to its broad aims. The same problems were experienced with the UIDF (1989) in that it took three years for the UIDF to become a White Paper. As a result of this, and as can be seen in Chapter 6, very few departments actively complied with the plan.

A problem also arose with the Upper Tugela catchment experience in the distance (250 km) the region was from the KwaZulu planners responsible for its management. Similar problems were experienced with the UIDF (1989) with the Ubombo/Ingwavuma region being some three hours drive from Durban. Mr Gcabshe indicated that large amounts of the planning budget was used up in travelling to and from the region to conduct meetings and research. It was to avert this situation, partly, that a field base was established in Maputaland. The field base, however, identified several problems and the maladministration of funds by several members of government, which placed the DDA and the KwaZulu
government in an awkward position. As a result of this, the DDA and KwaZulu government refused to set up a field base within the Upper Tugela region, although a person had been selected for this purpose.

Like the Upper Tugela initiative which experienced problems with its coordinating committee, the UIDF (1989) experienced problems due to the Working Group and the MRDPC’s inability to force departments to comply with the plan and its short-term projects.

As can be seen from the above comparison, many similarities exist between the Upper Tugela initiative and the UIDF (1989) which lead to both plans not being implemented to the extent intended. Both plans encountered problems due to the fragmented nature of the institutional framework prevalent in South Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s; both attempted to facilitate co-operation and coordination through structures like the Working Group and the MRDPC, and working committee, with limited success; and KwaZulu planners for both initiatives were some distance from the regions thus further resulting in fragmentation and decreasing the ability of the plans to succeed.

8.5 Conclusion

From the comparison of the implementation problems outlined in the literature by Bowden (1986) and Morah (1996), with problems experienced in the implementation of the UIDF (1989), it can be seen that the problems experienced in the implementation of the UIDF (1989) were fairly typical of problems experienced in the literature. The major issue that arose out of the comparison of the primary research to Morah’s (1996) categories of implementation problems relates to the need for a supportive and integrated institutional environment. Areas of overlap between these two sources that relate to a supportive institutional
environment include: inter-government relations, the disposition of actors, the complexity of joint action, and political and socio-economic conditions at play within a region.

The comparison between the primary research and Bowden’s (1986) implementation problems relating to government ministries also highlighted the importance of the institutional environment into which plans are released. Issues relating to the need for a supportive institutional environment that emerged from the analysis include: the need for institutional or legal change, the lack of co-ordination and co-operation between contributors, a lack of political will or consensus on various issues, and the lack of availability of funds.

The primary research therefore confirms the need identified by both authors, for an institutional environment that supports the implementation of the plan through co-ordination and co-operation between line departments and parastatal agencies, and the existence of a political will and consensus to see the plan implemented.

From the comparison of the UIDF (1989) to the Upper Tugela initiative, it appears that the problems experienced by the UIDF (1989) were not unique but instead fairly typical of regional plans of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Although the Upper Tugela initiative followed on from the UIDF (1989) and attempted to learn from the mistakes encountered by the UIDF (1989), it largely failed to perform for the same reasons.
Chapter Nine
The Way Forward

9.1 Introduction

This chapter will examine the possible future of the UIDP (1989) in light of recent changes within the region and the country as a whole. Changes include the changes in administration within the region following the 1994 elections, the declaration of the Ingonyama Trust, and the Lubombo Spatial Development Initiative (SDI).

9.2 Recent Changes

9.2.1 The 1994 Elections
This has already been dealt with in Chapter 6. Major changes have occurred with the absorption of KwaZulu and its line departments into the KwaZulu-Natal government departments. Many of the agencies responsible for the implementation of short-term actions therefore no longer exist.

9.2.2 Land and Tenure Delivery
Land tenure in the region falls largely into two groups namely freehold land, and land vested in the Ingonyama Trust. This section will briefly outline the effects the Ingonyama Trust will have on development within the Ubombo/Ingwavuma region.

With regard to land held in the Ingonyama Trust, the bulk of land which comprised KwaZulu is now vested in the Trust including the original reserves created by the colonial authorities and, via the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, formed the spatial area on which the homelands were established. This land never came
into private ownership and was always vested in the state until the creation of the Ingonyama Trust.

Superimposed on that land were areas designated as tribal areas under the Amakhosi and Iziphakanyiswa Act, 1990, which apply the provisions of that Act and the traditional laws and customs of the relevant tribes to the land.

- The basic allocation of use rights to the land is the traditional right vested in the Inkhosi and tribal authority of the relevant tribe. This right is tenuous and can be overridden by the state. It is not enshrined in the law, but is recognised as a policy.

- The statutory allocation device was the Permission to Occupy (PTO) which, until the Bill to amend the KwaZulu Ingonyama Trust Act becomes law, would seem to be no longer available. However, it is known that the KwaZulu-Natal government issues PTOs on Ingonyama Trust land. The proposed amendments, it would seem, if adopted, will have the effect of making the provisions of the KwaZulu Land Affairs Act and other legislation with similar intent applicable to the Trust land.

- There is no constraint, save a procedural constraint, on the Trustee disposing of land by sale, lease, exchange, donation or otherwise, but he must obtain the prior consent of the relevant tribal authority or person holding rights to the land. The procedural constraints will be eased by the proposed amendments.

- The rights of persons holding informal rights to tribal land are protected by the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act, 1996.

Superimposed on the land, and on the rights and interests of the tribal authorities are further designations such as the protected areas under the conservation laws, forests established with the consent of tribal authorities, other agricultural projects, tourism facilities and the like.
Many of these rights and interests are unrecorded in any official registries and care needs to be taken to make reasonably extensive local enquiries prior to investing in such land (Draft Lubombo SDI- Land Evaluation, 1997, pp 32-33).

**Impact on the UIDF (1989)**

The Ingonyama Trust creates a complicated system of land tenure where individuals do not have title deeds to the land they occupy. Permission to develop land follows a complicated route and is sometimes difficult to get and this whole process slows down development and increases the expenses and uncertainties incurred by developers. The Ingonyama Trust therefore forms a major stumbling block to any form of development within the region, particularly tourism developments (interview with Mr Dixon).

The Natal Witness (Thursday, October 30, 1997, p 2) indicates that the delivery of housing in tribal areas under the management of the Ingonyama Trust is severely limited. National housing policy prevents those living in tribal areas from accessing the R15 000 housing subsidy, as the title deed to the property lies with the local Inkhosi.

**9.2.3 Lubombo Spatial Development Initiative (SDI)**

The governments of Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland have recently adopted the Lubombo SDI as a major programme to deliver development to their countries. The initiative is designed to promote private and state sector investment in areas of these countries that, because of their symbiotic cross-border linkages, have a unique ability to become an integrated commercial zone for vibrant new industries, especially in the fields of tourism and agriculture (Draft Lubombo SDI, 1996, p 1).
The SDI strategy was devised by the national Departments of Transport, and Trade and Industry in South Africa. It describes a set of interventions that aim to unlock the productive potential of key geographic regions in South Africa thus creating an outward oriented and internationally competitive economy in the region. SDIs in South Africa include:

- The Maputo Development Corridor involving South Africa and Mozambique (which also impacts on Swaziland, Botswana, and Zimbabwe).
- The Trans-Kalahari Transport Corridor between South Africa’s North West Province, Botswana and Namibia.
- The Lubombo Initiative between South Africa, Mozambique and Swaziland. (Draft Lubombo SDI, 1996, p 1)

The Lubombo SDI has been labelled an agri-tourism development programme. This is due to the fact that the area has unprecedented potential for tourism to emerge as a lead economic activity and, at the same time it can be the site of significant agricultural commerce. The regions of Swaziland, Mozambique and South Africa that fall under the ambit of the SDI have similar social conditions and economic potential. At present the rural populations in all three countries experience severe poverty and high unemployment. Recent conflicts and geographical isolation have caused the lack of economic development, and yet the region possesses a special variety of environmental and cultural assets with local and international significance (Draft Lubombo SDI, 1996, p 3). See Figure 9.1 for details of the Lubombo SDI.
Proposed Concept

Maputo Province (Mozambique)

- Mlawula/Nlane (Transnational)
- Ndumu-Tembe-Futhi (Transnational)
- Ndumu A and B (Agriculture Pilot Extension)
- Agriculture Pilot Extension
- Pongolapoort (Transnational)
- Makatini (Agriculture Anchor)
- Railway Valley (Agriculture Anchor)

Lake Sibayi (Including 3 Nodal Tourism Projects)
Rio Maputo (Agriculture Anchor)
Ponta do Ouro/Kosi Bay (Tourism Including Transnational Zone)
Lake Sibayi (Including 3 Nodal Tourism Projects)
Greater St Lucia Wetland Park (Anchor - & nodal projects)

Project Type:
- Potential Transnational Tourism Anchor Projects
- Potential National / Anchor - Tourism Projects
- Potential Agriculture Anchor Projects

Source:
Various

Date:
May 1997

Prepared by:
Lubombo SDI Technical Team
Infrastructure

The competitive advantage of the region will be enhanced through the upgrading of the existing N2 national road from Lavumisa to Maputo and through the development of a low order tourism route from Hluhluwe, past Ponta do Ouro, to Maputo. The latter route is envisaged to follow existing road alignments as far as possible along Primary Roads 466-2, 444, 522-2, and the secondary road of D852. (See Figure 6.6) These two infrastructural developments will strengthen the possibility and performance of local economic development (LED) initiatives that link into anchor investments (Executive Summary, Lubombo SDI, 1996, p 4).

Tourism

Potential tourism clusters within the Ubombo/Ingwavuma region include:

- eManguzi-Kosi Bay-Ponto do Ouro.
- Lake Sibayi and Coastal Forest Reserve.
- Pongolapoort Dam (Jozini Dam).
- Sodwana and the St Lucia/Maputaland Marine Reserve.
- Tembe, Ndumo, Futi.

The creation of institutional support packages for SMMEs and downstream community tourism ventures will enable communities to profit from the anchor and cluster developments without creating a dependency. This will be done through the process of joint ownership of bottle stores, and the upgrading of supply shops, etc. (Executive Summary, Lubombo SDI, 1996, pp 8-9).

Agriculture

Agricultural development within the region will be targeted at further developing the Makhatini irrigation scheme and its research station. At present the Makhatini irrigation scheme includes a 1,200 hectare central estate, and an allocation of
2,800 hectares to 259 farmers. Individual holdings are part of a block serviced through five pump stations.

While the average maize yield for KwaZulu-Natal was less than three tons per hectare (1980 census), yields at the research station have realised 7.9 tons per hectare for summer maize and up to 11.5 tons per hectare for winter maize. Similar relative potentials have been shown for wheat, dry beans, and shelled groundnuts.

Investment into the agricultural development of the Makhatini flats as an anchor project would realise more efficient household agricultural production in neighbouring dry-land farm areas and support local economic development (Executive Summary, Lubombo SDI, 1996, pp 12-13).

**Impact on the UIDF (1989)**

The construction of the lower order tourism route from Hluhluwe past Ponta do Ouro to Maputo will impact on the proposed corridors for the region. As was indicated in Chapter 6, three corridors were intended to emerge in the short term along the east and western banks of the Pongola river and from Jozini to Ingwavuma along the mountain route. A further two phases of corridors were intended to be built, but as Chapter 6 pointed out, none of these corridors have emerged in the short to medium terms. The new road will alter the proposed corridor system for the region focusing development along the Philendaba-Mbaswana-Hluhluwe axis thus rendering the proposed corridor structure for the region obsolete. Adjustments would therefore need to be made in this regard if the plan were still to be implemented.

It can be argued that the SDI and the UIDF (1989) have different roles and operate at different scales to one another and thus the development of the SDI corridor would have a minimal impact on the further development of the other corridors.
It is true that the SDI and UIDF (1989) corridors operate at different scales with the UIDF (1989) corridors operating at a local level, while the SDI corridor operates as a high intensity traffic route between Mozambique and Durban and Richards Bay. The reason why development would focus along the SDI corridor is that this road would be a tar road while the UIDF (1989) corridors would remain gravel and would require constant grading with access being limited to when the roads are dry. It also seems unlikely that the Department of Transport would spend large sums of money upgrading the three UIDF (1989) corridors to black top roads once the SDI corridor has been built.

With regard to the further development of the agricultural sector in the region through the extension of the Makhatini irrigation scheme, this development is not contrary to the UIDF (1989) and will thus not render the plan obsolete - minor modifications would be needed. The same goes for the proposed further development of the tourism sector within the region. The further development of this sector will not radically affect the UIDF (1989) and minor modifications will be needed for the plan.

9.3 The Future of the Plan according to Planners

As indicated in Chapter 6, both the VARA planning team and the KwaZulu government planners indicated that the plan should not be redone but instead it should be modified to take into account recent changes and developments. Respondents indicated that the ‘development needs’ of the region have not changed significantly over the past decade and that it would be a waste of much needed funds to attempt a further study and the creation of a new development framework for the region.
9.4 Conclusion

Recent changes have had a profound affect on the region and its development. The period prior to 1994 saw the proclamation of the Ingonyama Trust and thereby the transfer of all tribal land to the control of the king of the Zulus. This development has significantly slowed down the development process in rural areas like Maputaland. The period following the first free and fair democratic elections saw the absorption of many of the KwaZulu line departments into the old-Natal line departments. This led to the side-lining of the White Paper for development in the Ubombo/Ingwavuma region which potentially had the power to reduce fragmentation and facilitate co-ordination. Other developments like the Lubombo SDI have also had significant impacts on the region. This has led to the area’s development potential being opened up but also had the affect of out-dating some of the key aspects of the UIDF (1989) like the spatial focus of the plan. As pointed out, it may be argued that these spatial elements will in fact not be rendered obsolete due to the scale at which the corridor developments occur.

Although these changes have collectively had significant impacts on the region, the majority of the planners interviewed indicated that the plan is still valid and merely needs updating to still be applicable to the region and have a potential impact.
Chapter Ten
Conclusions and Recommendations

10.1 Introduction

This chapter will firstly examine the answers generated to the research question and its set of sub-questions by both the primary and secondary research. This will be followed by an examination of the hypothesis and the extent to which it was proven. The chapter will then examine the future for both the UIDF (1989) and regional planning in general and end off with recommendations for the future of regional planning and development frameworks.

10.2 The Research Question and Sub-Questions

This dissertation set out to uncover whether or not development frameworks are valid tools to guide development within a region using the UIDF (1989) as a case study. The question to be answered by the research was to what extent development frameworks like the UIDF (1989), are valid tools to guide development within a region, and whether factors pertaining to their implementation have rendered such frameworks obsolete? Six research sub-questions were identified in Chapter 1 to further develop this question.

The next section of this chapter will examine the answers generated by the primary and secondary research, to each of the six research sub-questions.

10.2.1 Are regional plans and development frameworks valid tools to guide development?

The first of the sub-questions was ‘to what extent are regional plans and their mechanisms of development frameworks, valid tools to guide development?’
From the literature review it can be seen that regional plans are in fact valid mechanisms to guide development within a region. Although regional planning fell into disrepute in the 1970s and early 1980s, primarily in response to criticisms from right-wing or neo-liberal theorists, the discipline has managed to weather the intellectual onslaught and adapt its focus and direction. Recently there has been a resurgence in interest in regional planning from both the international and local context due to the number of functions the discipline can potentially serve.

Regional planning, according to Kiepiel and Dewar (1996, pp 10-15) can actively mediate between different kinds of evaluation, provide a framework for the rational allocation of resources, manage negative externalities, optimise the performance of the ‘whole’, deal with aggregating and disaggregating forces, and respond to changing time and spatial scales.

Regional plans are therefore valid tools to guide development within a given region.

10.2.2 What are the impediments to regional plans and development frameworks, and what causes them to fail?

The second research sub-question was that of ‘what are the main impediments to the implementation of plans in general, and to development frameworks in particular?’ while the third sub-question was ‘what causes regional plans to fail?’ The literature review and Chapter 5 answer both these questions. The Spatial Development Plan for the north-eastern region of Transkei (1983), outlined in Chapter 5, highlighted the substantive aspects of regional plans and development frameworks that often cause them to fail as well as providing normative criteria that regional plans should comply with if they are to be successful. The literature review examined fourteen reasons why plans fail offered by Morah (1996) as well as the eight most frequently mentioned implementation problems for individual projects mentioned by Bowden (1986).
An elaboration on the exact nature of both Morah and Bowden’s reasons for plan failure can be found in Chapter 4.

The primary research gathered from the VARA planning team and the KwaZulu planners on the reasons why the UIDF (1989) was not implemented to the extent intended, largely coincides with the fourteen problems identified by Morah (1996) and the eight identified by Bowden (1986) as can be seen in Chapter 8. The primary research therefore upholds the findings in the literature.

10.2.3 What affect does administration have on the implementation of plans and development frameworks?

The fourth research sub-question was that of ‘what affect does administration have on the implementation of plans and development frameworks?’ The literature review again answers this question. Morah (1996, pp 82-84) identifies administrative control, organisational resources, and intergovernmental relations as being critical to the success of plans. Morah (1996, p 88) also identifies the complexity of joint action and the disposition of actors, which both include administration, as playing a major role in the success of plans. Bowden’s (1986, pp 61-71) eight most frequently mentioned reasons for plan failure also ascribe importance to effective administration of plans and individual projects. The examination of the lessons learnt from the Upper Tugela catchment experience also highlight the criticality of good administration for the success of regional plans and development frameworks.

The primary research also emphasises the importance of good administration on the success of regional plans. In Chapter 7 when asked what are the preconditions for the success of regional plans, respondents indicated the importance of departmental collaboration, as well as the importance of the capacity of the implementing body, two factors synonymous with good administration.
10.2.4 What factors other than the plan itself, are critical for regional development?

The fifth sub-question was ‘with reference to the Ubombo/Ingwavuma development framework, what factors other than the plan itself, are critical for regional development?’ Chapter 7 examines, amongst other things, the implementation problems and weaknesses of the UIDF (1989) identified by both the VARA planning team and the KwaZulu planners. Reasons why the UIDF (1989) did not reach fruition according to the planners included the institutional climate of the 1980s, discontinuity in government, the effects of politics on plans and their implementation, political change, funding, and the use of a participatory approach.

Factors other the plan itself that are critical for the plan’s success include firstly an institutional climate that is supportive of a regional plan and an institutional climate that is not fragmented. Institutional fragmentation leads to difficulties in the co-ordinating of role players in plan implementation as well as problems with effective budgeting. Secondly, a continuity in government, where people remain in their posts for the duration of the plan implementation, is critical. Discontinuity results from state employees regularly changing posts within or between departments and organisation, and time delays often result from the training of individuals to the standard demanded by the tasks at hand. The political climate a plan like the UIDF (1989) is released into is also critical for its success. If the political powers at play in a country are hostile to the plan, as was the case with some officials involved with the UIDF (1989), there is little chance of the success of the plan. Political change also adversely affects regional plans and their implementation. Uncertainty created by political change can lead to departments and organisations responsible for the implementation phase of the regional plan, adopting a ‘wait and see’ attitude rather than committing their budgets to specific initiatives. This has a detrimental effect on plan
implementation. **Securing adequate funding** from funding sources can also inhibit plan implementation. The ability to secure seed capital for specific project implementation during the planning phase is crucial to ensure the support from local inhabitants. The use of seed capital allows residents to see tangible evidence of change within the region and ensures a greater support on their behalf for future initiatives. **Participation** of all role players is also critical for the success of plans. Participation must go beyond negotiations and talks with a few selected individuals occupying positions of power within regions. To ensure legitimacy of a regional plans, the local inhabitants of regions must receive feedback within reason to the greatest extent possible.

The factors of an institutional climate that is supportive of the plan; continuity in government; a political climate that is supportive of the plan; minimal radical or unexpected changes within the region or nation as a whole; the availability of funds; and a participatory process; are factors other than the content of the plan itself, that are critical for the success of the regional plan.

**10.2.5 Have development projects outlined in the UIDF (1989), occurred when and where they were intended?**

The sixth sub-question is that of ‘have development projects in the Ubombo/Ingwavuma region occurred when and where they were intended?’ Chapter 6 offers a detailed examination of each of the proposed short-term projects as outlined in Table 19 of the report (UIDF, 1989, pp 218-220). As can be seen from the analysis, very few projects occurred when and where they were intended to. Generally speaking, very few of the proposed projects in fact have occurred at all. Departments on their own admission merely used the report as a guideline and a data base for other interventions within the region.
10.2.6 Conclusion

From both the primary and secondary research carried out it can be seen that 
regional plans and development frameworks are valid tools to guide development 
within regions and they perform certain critical roles and functions that lead to 
regions operating efficiently. Various factors do however confound their levels of 
success and can lead to plans not being implemented. These factors have been 
mentioned in Chapter 7 and in Chapter 10. These problems are however not 
limited to regional plans, and limit the implementation of any plan where several 
departments or implementing bodies are involved. The question therefore needs 
to be asked of whether regional planning should be abandoned due to the effects 
of these negative or confounding factors, or whether these problems should be 
identified, accepted, and regional planning modified to fit in with this kind of 
environment. The latter seems more plausible and acceptable in light of the 
benefits regional plans and development frameworks offer. Development 
frameworks should identify the possible confounding variables and develop 
programmes and actions that take these factors into account and work around 
them.

10.3 Hypothesis

It was hypothesised that integrated development frameworks, are a necessary part 
of regional development, but by themselves are not sufficient to lead to regional 
development and are inherently flawed by implementation problems.

This hypothesis was upheld through the research undertaken. From the case study 
of the UIDF (1989) it can be seen that development frameworks, through their set 
of actions, actively seek to bring development to regions in line with their overall 
goals. The UIDF (1989) clearly identified the developmental needs of the region
and outlined strategies to achieve them. Other forces however, like the institutional climate, discontinuity in government, funding, etc., limit the ability of the plan to deliver. Integrated development frameworks are therefore not sufficient on their own to develop regions and depend on the effects of dynamics at play within regions, provinces, nations and the entire global system.

10.4 The Way Forward for the UIDF (1989) and Regional Planning in General

The UIDF (1989) provides a valid tool to guide development within the Ubombo/Ingwavuma region as it takes into account the needs of the residents within the region, and as has been mentioned, these developmental needs have changed little over the last ten years. With regard to the future of the UIDF (1989), as was mentioned in Chapters 7 and 9, there is a potential future for the UIDF (1989) if it is updated and modified to take into account recent changes. These changes include the consolidation of the old KwaZulu and Natal government departments, the effects of the Ingonyama Trust and the affect this has on the development of land held in this trust, and the Lubombo SDI. Although these changes have collectively had a significant impact on the region and led to parts of the plan being outdated by the change, all the planners interviewed indicated that the plan should not be redone. The planners indicated that the development needs of the region have not changed much over the past ten years and thus the plan is still valid. They indicated that the plan merely needs updating to still have an impact on development within the region.

With regard to regional planning in general and according to Mr Harrison, South Africa has witnessed a revival of interest in regional planning due to the establishment of sub-national institutional structures. These structures do not necessarily understand regional planning or see its full benefits, but they see
regional planning as an instrument to secure funding. According to Ms Todes, the future of regional planning depends on the future of these institutional structures and whether or not regional councils are permanent features or not. In the short-term, given the requirement for integrated planning before funding can be secured, regional planning appears to have a future.

Regional planning has the potential to deliver development within regions, but if it fails this time, due to plans remaining too general and not resulting in significant change or the lack of capacity in regional councils, there will be a renewed disillusionment with the discipline as was the case in the 1970s and early 1980s. According to Mr Harrison, there is therefore a ‘window of opportunity’ for regional planning in the South African context in which the discipline can flourish, but the discipline must act in such a way that its interventions are not too general. The discipline of regional planning can thus play a critical role in the development of regions.

10.5 Recommendations

As was seen from the literature review in Chapter 3, regional planning plays an important role in ensuring regions function optimally and is thus an important part of everyday life. Criticisms have however been levelled at the tradition and its relevance due to its traditionally spatially focused approach to planning.

According to Todes (1993, p 22), regional planning should not be abandoned but instead its aims and methods should be restructured, leading to more strategic interventions and greater public participation occurring right from the start of the planning process.

As has been shown in Chapter 6 and 7, development frameworks are not sufficient in their own right to guide development within regions due to a range of factors.
These factors should not lead to the abandonment of development frameworks, but instead planners should take cognisance of the confounding variables and plan their interventions to take them into account. If this occurs, regional planning and development plans will have a future. If not, however, regional planning could enter a second era of criticism which could lead to its ultimate demise. Regional planning and development frameworks must therefore adapt to present circumstances or face a premature decline.
References


