BETTERMENT PLANNING IN SOUTH AFRICA

by

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INTRODUCTION

Betterment Planning is the major form of rural development planning which has been implemented in the Reserve areas of South Africa. The first Betterment schemes were begun after 1939. Whilst Betterment Planning has undergone certain modifications in theory and implementation over the past 42 years, it is still being implemented by the 'homeland' governments.

This paper is of necessity only a preliminary study or working paper, the aim of which is to explore the theoretical and concrete issues which a comprehensive evaluation of Betterment Planning would need to confront in detail.

I have chosen to analyse Betterment Planning for a number of reasons. First, whilst preparing a report on settlement patterns in KwaZulu/Natal for the Buthelezi Commission early in 1981, I found that there was very little published material on Betterment Planning. Further, in the course of this research, I was surprised to find that practising planners and academics in Natal seemed to know little about it.

Second, reports on development planning for the homelands ignore Betterment Planning entirely. For example, the "Towards a Plan for KwaZulu" (1978) makes no mention whatsoever of the Betterment Planning in KwaZulu, let alone undertakes an analysis of the successes/failures of its implementation. Yet it stresses that:

"the reform and development of the agricultural sector should be accorded the highest priority. Failure to make progress in this area will jeopardise all the objectives of the Plan." (Thorington-Smith et al 1978 : 22).

To undertake rural development planning without an analysis and understanding as to why it is necessary, can only result in the proposed plans being at best superficial and, at worst, ones which
exacerbate the problem they set out to solve. All too often development planning is nothing more than problem-solving oriented: the problem is identified and described, and the planners put forward a solution to solve it. However, for a solution to have even a chance of being successfully implemented, the causes and history of the problem must be fully analysed and understood. It is just as crucial to analyse and evaluate previous attempted solutions to the problem. For, in failing, they may have become additional constraints, i.e. in themselves the previous solutions may have become part of the problem.

Third, most of the homelands are politically 'semi-independent' or 'independent'. They have their own agriculture and planning departments which have realized that rural development is a priority in any homeland development. Consequently in recent years, these homelands have been looking for new rural development strategies. In the light of my second point above, it is therefore important that Betterment Planning is analysed and evaluated.

Fourth, the writings of neo-Marxist and Marxist theoreticians on South Africa have almost completely failed to address the role and function of Betterment Planning in the transformation of the South African social formation. Most of their attention has been focussed on the white agricultural areas.

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Development is an illusive concept (see Fourie 1981), yet it is one which planners often use without clear theoretical definition. Furthermore, development theory consists of at least two competing paradigms, each having concepts of development at its core. These different concepts of development have given rise to different prescriptions for development, and consequently differing programmes and schemes. As Datoo and Gray have noted: "failure to ground ... analysis within a viable theoretical framework leads perforce to inappropriate planning." (1979 : 247)

The first chapter, therefore, undertakes a critical review of the two major development paradigms in order to provide a 'viable'
theoretical framework for the analysis of Betterment Planning. Further, it seeks to clarify and advance beyond the most recent debate - the articulation of modes of production debate - and develop clearer analytical concepts.

Particular emphasis is given to Banaji's (1977) and Cleaver's (1976) contributions to the debate paper. Banaji's (1977) paper provides insights into Marxist historical materialist analysis of concrete social formations by showing that the CMP can contain more than one form of exploitation. Cleaver's (1976) paper redresses a serious inadequacy in Marxist and neo-Marxist development theory by re-emphasizing the concept of class, and the centrality of class struggle as the dynamic force of change in a social formation.

Given that Betterment Planning was aimed at the Reserve peasantry, the second chapter, using the theoretical framework developed in the first chapter, investigates the role and functions of the peasantry under a CMP. The peasantry are shown to be characterised by a different form of production from that found in the pure capitalist model. Nevertheless, through the processes of commoditization and monetization, the peasant form of production has become part of the relations of production of the CMP. The second chapter analyses these processes in some detail in order to further develop the theoretical framework.

This paper uses the Marxist method of "successive approximations". This consists of:

"moving from the more abstract to the more concrete in a step-by-step fashion, removing simplifying assumptions at successive stages of the investigation so that theory may take account of and explain an ever wider range of actual phenomena." (Magubane 1976 : 171).

Thus, the first chapter develops the conceptual framework on the abstract level using such simple categories as 'the mode of production' and the relations of production. The second chapter
moves to the more concrete exploration of a particular form of production, within the relations of production of the CMP. In turn, this theoretical framework is applied to an analysis of the transformations of the South African social formation, in the third chapter. An analysis of the period preceding the implementation of Betterment Planning shows the changing role and functions of the peasantry and the Reserves in South Africa. This chapter shows that as the CMP has been restructured, and as the political requirements of the State have changed, so too have the roles and functions of the peasantry and the Reserves.

The fourth chapter undertakes the concrete analysis of Betterment Planning and its implementation. This is the final step in the 'successive approximations'. It shows that Betterment Planning was initially an attempt to halt the declining Reserve economy which until then had provided the subsistence base for cheap labour. In terms of the Tomlinson Commission Report, Betterment Planning is shown to be an attempt to reconstitute a peasantry able to produce a cheap marketable surplus for consumption by a rural-based migrant proletariat. Chapter four also analyses peasant resistance to the implementation of Betterment Planning in order to explain its failure.

Finally, chapter five outlines the major conclusions of the study and the implications these have for planners and planning. The limitations of the study are also outlined, as are areas for future research.
"Before a deliberate and purposeful transformation can be effected in the structure of [the underdeveloped countries] ... economics, a necessary condition, is an objective analysis of the forces which have shaped the present configuration. This in turn pre-supposes a theory of underdevelopment through which to inform the mode and content of analysis ... failure to ground the analysis within a viable theoretical framework lends perforce to inappropriate planning." (Datoo, B.A. and Gray, A.J.B. : 247)

"... the theoretical issues raised ... are of very real importance, not least politically - in contemporary Marxism there are unfortunate tendencies towards a symbiotic -- 'grand theory' and 'abstracted empiricism', each despising but nonetheless mirroring the defects of the other. Both these extremes must be rejected. Theory is both necessary and useful. As for political relevance ... suffice it to note that Frank's main theoretical adversaries, in "Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America" were men such as Max Nolff and other advisers to the then Chilean presidential candidate, Salvador Allende ... The fate of Chile surely shows that, like bad medicine, bad theory can kill. It is therefore worth talking about." (A. Foster-Carter 1978 : 51-52)
This chapter sets out to review the two major development paradigms. It outlines the most recent theoretical advances in development theory with a view to establishing a conceptual framework and method of analysis with which to undertake a study of the South African social formation and Betterment Planning.

A major problem, at the outset, is that so many of the concepts used in the paradigms, have their counterparts in everyday language. Words such as "modern", "develop", "dependence" are loosely used in everyday language and have acquired a wide range of value-laden meanings. In order to prevent such meanings from invading the concept, it should be rigorously and scientifically defined. Thus, one measure of a paradigm's usefulness is how rigorously its conceptual framework is defined, for "the function of scientific concepts is to make the categories which tell us more about our subject matter than any other categorical sets." (Tipps undated: 1; see also Merton 1967: 143-147). Further, importance is added to rigorous and scientifically defined concepts if one accepts that "our conceptual language tends to fix our perceptions and, derivatively, our thought and behaviour." (Merton 1967: 145). Therefore, the paradigm that the planner operates in, will be the major influence in determining his/her perceptions, thought behaviour, and how he/she detects, defines and analyses problems and consequently, the plans to solve these. This is nowhere more obvious and striking than in the field of development planning. Hence, the need for an understanding and critical analysis of the development paradigms.

The first development paradigm to be considered is the "diffusionist" or "modernization" perspective. The origins of this perspective are multidisciplinary. From anthropology it adopted the "acculturation thesis", which is evident in its theories on rural/urban migration, migrant labour and the reaction of Africans to the "modernizing process." From sociology, there is the influence of Talcott Parson's structural functionalism. This perspective has utilized, in particular, his theories of action and of social change. Furnivall's
notions of the plural society have also been incorporated into the perspective (see Brookfield 1977: 77). Political science has contributed notions concerning the evolution of nationalism.

"These strands were interpreted through a particular view of change which is essentially dualistic: tradition and modernity are seen as opposed forces, the latter growing at the expense of the former." (Brookfield 1975: 77)

Tipps notes some characteristic features of modernization theory as being, first, a search for definitional inclusiveness. Thus, its concepts tend to summarize rather than to discriminate; to describe rather than define. A second feature concerns the question of "units of analysis". The diffusionist/modernization perspective, whether focussing on industrialization, economic growth or political development uses concepts primarily relevant to the level of the nation-state. Most conceptualizations of modernization fall into one of two categories. They are either "critical variable" theories in that they equate modernization with a single type of social change, or they are "dichotomous" theories in that modernization is defined in such a manner that it will serve to conceptualize the process whereby "traditional" societies acquire the attributes of "modernity" (Tipps, undated: 3-4). The critical variable approach does have certain advantages over the dichotomous approach in that it conceptualizes modernization as an open-ended rather than a goal-directed process. Hence, it avoids the problem of teleology. Yet, the critical variable approach has its problems in that the variable indentified tends to become synonymous with the term modernization. Hence, problems of tautology arise.

A related feature of this paradigm is its concept of the "original state" or concept of unilinear change. (1) Hoselitz has expressed this as follows:
"If there are 'developed' and 'advanced' countries in the present, they must have been at some time and 'undeveloped'. Two related historical arguments can be opposed to this view:

1. that it is distorting to classify today's underdeveloped countries with the pre-industrial societies of the West;

2. that underdevelopment was created as an intrinsic part of the process of Western capitalist 'expansion'." (quoted in Bernstein 1971: 152).

Brookfield comments on this problem and raises a point which needs to be borne in mind when discussing the dependency paradigm and the Marxist response to it. "There is a clear link between this Western conception of modernization and the Marxist-Leninist view, and the link is Marx himself ... the single path evolutionism applied by the 'pure' modernizers owes an immense debt to Marx's interpretation of the historical sequence from medievalism to capitalism, and which was in turn based on the single-nation experience of Great Britain." (Brookfield 1975: 80). Thus it is argued that the teleological problem present in the diffusionist paradigm is traceable to the theorist who most influenced the dependency paradigm.

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Thus far, the problems of the diffusionist/modernization paradigm have been raised on the general theoretical level. In reviewing the economic perspectives within this paradigm, it will be noted that these general problems, such as the dualistic or dichotomous mode of conceptualizing, are found on the specific prescriptive level. The idea that the economies and societies of Third World countries were characterised by dualism, arose from superficial analyses on the level of appearances:

"It is a matter of simple observation that the economies of a great many developing countries are organised in two parts, structurally and behaviourally so different that they deal with one another largely on a basis of trade - almost as though they formed two
different societies and economies."... "The essence of the theory of economic dualism is the attempt to combine in one system, theory for an advanced and for a backward economy. The former is assumed to be capital intensive and mainly industrial; the latter is assumed to be labour-intensive and overwhelmingly agricultural." (Brookfield 1975 : 58 and 32)

Economic dualism is part of a larger body of economic theory - growth theory. This has its base in classical and neo-classical economic theory: the objective of such theory being to develop a model for the "non-developed" countries whereby growth might be initiated. Prior to the 1950's the attempts to apply growth theory to these countries had, to a large degree, failed. An important reason for this failure was the insufficient attention in these growth theories to the differences between developed and underdeveloped countries.

Economic growth theory that focussed on the Third World attempted to initiate growth largely on the basis of the country's own resources. "The basic argument was that it was necessary to make a 'big push' in order to overcome the vicious cycle of low production, small market, small savings, little capital, low production and so on." It was believed that the subsistence sector could not generate savings and therefore it was the capitalist who could initiate growth. The important measurements of growth as seen by this group of theorists are Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross National Product (GNP) and National Income (NI). (see Seers 1972; Browett 1980(a) : 67-8; Friedmann 1979 : 126-7)

An economic modernization theorist who has had a considerable influence is W.W. Rostow. In a paper, first published in 1956, Rostow explored the following hypothesis:

"that the process of economic growth can usefully be regarded as centering on a relatively brief time interval of two or three decades when the economy and the society of which it is a part transform themselves in such ways that economic growth is, subsequently, more or less automatic." (Rostow in Agarwala and Singh (eds) 1958).
Rostow went on to propound his five evolutionary stages whereby an underdeveloped country became a developed country. Browett has noted that: "Rostow's stages are generally regarded as being the most famous or infamous, and hence are often referenced as the most typical, the norm or the 'quintessence' ... of the diffusionist paradigm in general." However, he concludes that: "This is unfortunate in that Rostow's stages have little foundation either in previous empirical observation or in development stages theory." (1980(a) : 61)

Rostow, along with other growth theorists, believes that aggregate material productivity is the indicator of economic welfare. This can be contrasted with theorists in the dependency paradigm who question how the product is distributed and, more importantly, the social and political structures required for economic productivity. They also question whether the indices CNP, GDP and NI are indicators of development. Such queries as the following inform the dependency theorists' analyses: Does increased economic productivity mean that growth and development take place? Who benefits from such increases? Does an increase in one sector lead to an increase in other sectors? What are the social and political effects of such economic growth?

These questions have also been raised within the diffusionist/­modernization paradigm, and essentially, reformist positions within the paradigm have been developed. A.O. Hirschmann, an American economist, developed the concepts of "backward linkage effects" and "forward linkage effects". "The former arise from inputs needed to supply production in the industry in question ... the latter ... arise from the utilization of the output of the industry as inputs in new activities." (Brookfield 1975 : 94). Hirschmann reacted against "balanced" growth theory. Briefly, he argued that development focused on certain industrial sectors which would promote development in other sectors, industrial and non-industrial, through backward and forward linkages. This growth will be unbalanced and hence "growth poles" will develop.

Apparent in Hirschmann's framework are the themes of economic dualism and urban-industrial bias. His book written in 1958, had a powerful influence on the First Development Decade. (2) (Hirschmann 1958)
There is another important figure in the growth of development paradigms - the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal. His importance, for this paper's purposes, is his analysis of unequal growth and the fact that many of his general notions are to be found in the initial conceptualizations of underdevelopment or dependency theory. In one sense, he provides a link between the diffusionist and dependency paradigms in that economic diffusion/modernization theory, and its many revisions, are shown to fail in the field. An impasse was reached and the need for a new development paradigm became apparent.

Myrdal felt that "the play of freemarket forces works towards inequality between regions and such inequality is reinforced by the movements of capital, goods and services." (Brookfield 1975: 100). However, the non-growth regions stagnate and when there is a downward turn in the business cycle in the growth regions, the other areas are far more seriously affected. Myrdal attacks all notions of equilibrium inherent in economic growth theory. However, by the end of the 50's the diffusionist notions had come to form a fairly coherent body of theory which was to underpin development programmes and plans in Third World Countries in the next decade.

By 1961, the process of decolonization was underway. Five years earlier, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) had shifted its focus to the underdeveloped countries. Statistics showed that the rate of growth of GDP was slowing down in these countries, and that agricultural production was just keeping ahead of population increase. In 1961, the U.N.O. adopted a programme for the sixties with the goal that each country attain a substantial increase in its rate of economic growth. Each country was to have its own specific target. To a large degree this Development Decade failed, although results in East Asia and Latin America were better than in Africa and South Asia, if one looks at growth statistics alone. Yet, as previously noted, such indices are highly questionable. These, in many instances merely served to obscure the problems. (4)
The other major development paradigm to be considered is the dependency or underdevelopment paradigm. This developed alongside and in response to the diffusionist/modernization paradigm.

The paradigm was first given wide currency through the writings of two Latin American theorists Celso Furtado and Andre Gundar Frank. Frank and Furtado were by no means the first to use a Marxist framework for the analysis of development. However, it is their use of, and meaning which they give to, the concept of centre-periphery which makes them important.

This concept had first been used in the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in its reports of 1949 and 1950. These attacked growth theorists' notions concerning international trade, and industrialization-first policies. One of the ECLA economists, Celso Furtado, published a series of collected essays in the early sixties, which showed

"at once a growing concern with the historical analysis of underdevelopment as a discrete process, and also his problems in isolating the structural insights of Marxism from its unacceptable teleology, on the one hand, and of the value of Keynesian economics in opening up the new vistas of the role of the State, while concealing the necessary structural transformations on the other. It was in this collection that he presented a 'theory of underdevelopment'.” (Brookfield 1975: 144).

Furtado was concerned that the Latin-American countries be seen not as merely peripheral, but as dependent, and that the penetration of the dependent economy by the capitalist system had brought about disequilibrium in the economy.

Andre Gundar Frank is possibly the best known of the early dependency theorists. Synthesizing the writings of the radical Latin Americans and drawing on his research in Mexico, Chile and Brazil, he arrived at a theory of "the development of underdevelopment". Like Furtado, he calls for an analysis of the underdeveloped countries' history for:
"our ignorance of the underdeveloped countries' history leads us to assume that their past and indeed their present resembles earlier stages of the history of the now developed countries."

[He concludes that:]

"The now developed countries were never underdeveloped, though they may have been un-developed." (Frank 1966: 405).

This idea has stood at the core of the dependency paradigm and is a direct refutation of the "original state" notion of the diffusionist paradigm, in that it maintains that underdevelopment is something peculiar to a specific historical period:

"Contemporary underdevelopment is, in large part, the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now-developed metropolitan countries. Furthermore, these relations are an essential part of the structure and development of the capitalist system on a world scale as a whole." (Frank 1966: 5).

The form these relations take is indicated by the satellite-metropole concept. The nation-state is a satellite of the metropole, i.e. a third world country is dependent on an advanced capitalist country. The capital of the third world country is relatively developed compared with the rest of the State. Hence, it is the metropole and the region capitals that are satellites. In turn, these are metropoles to the sub-regional centres which are metropoles to the rural villages. Each metropole expropriates part of the satellite's surplus, and therefore serves as a conduit to the final metropole in the advanced capitalist countries. Thus, Frank envisages a chain of constellations of satellite-metropole relationships, characterised by dependence reaching from the community level to the world system level. His description of these relationships leads him to attack the concept of dual economy.

"Evident inequalities of income and differences in culture have led many observers to see "dual societies and economies in the underdeveloped countries ... I believe on the contrary, that the entire dual society thesis is false and that policy recommendations to
which it leads will, if acted upon, serve only to intensify and perpetuate the very conditions of underdevelopment they are supposedly designed to remedy." (Frank 1966: 5-6).

Thus, Frank accuses the diffusionists of perpetuating and increasing the dependency through their very prescriptions for development. In summary then, the dependency paradigm sought

"to establish necessary and causative inter-relationships not only between underdevelopment and dependency (underdevelopment is a process induced and constantly reinforced by dependency) but also between underdevelopment and development (they are opposite sides of the same coin)." (Browett 1980(a): 1).

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In the seventies, the dependency paradigm was in turn subject to increasing criticism. Just as in the diffusionist paradigm, dependency theorists have responded by attempting to revise or reconstitute dependency theory.

"Early critiques ... focussed upon (a) the maintenance of the colonial structure - relations of transfer of value across space - in a position of pre-eminence over class structure and (b) the domination and definition of relations of production by exchange relations and the consideration of distribution as somehow independent of the mode of production." (Browett 1980(b): 2).

Another criticism was that the very origin of dependency theory as a critique of the diffusionist paradigm traps it in a "mirror-image trap of attempting to create a new paradigm through direct polemical opposition to the old one whilst remaining in the same problematic." (Browett 1980(b): 2)

For example, Bernstein noted that

"the very dissidence of the 'radical' takes its terms of reference from what is already 'given' by its opponents. Thus, a certain group of historians have argued that colonialism set Africa on the path of development. Their radical critics argue that colonialism underdeveloped
Africa. ... The very notion of a 'balance-sheet' of colonialism is an ideological (as opposed to theoretical) conception ... The theoretical framework (should not) ... take questions that are 'given' elsewhere, thus supplying only different answers or interpretations; a scientific alternative to bourgeois development theory cannot be achieved by turning the latter on its head." (Bernstein 1973 : 10-11).

Even more pertinently, Leys noted that "what is needed is ... a theory of underdevelopment and its liquidation" (Leys 1975 : 21) rather than just a theory of underdevelopment.

The dependency paradigm theorists responded to such criticism by recognising that "its abstract and generalised macro-economic framework needed to be reconstituted - to be made more specific, concrete and diagnostic ... (and that) what was required was the more detailed explication of why, how and under what conditions underdevelopment has been, and still remains, a necessary and inevitable consequence of capitalism." (Browett 1980(b) : 2)

The dependency paradigm has concentrated on trying to determine differences between the economic base of the dependent and advanced capitalist states and the reasons for these differences. There are four general viewpoints of which the fourth is predominant.(5)

This view holds that the dependent countries do have a capitalist mode of production. However, its distinguishing characteristics and varying state or level of dependency is a result of its unique 'articulation' (i.e. interaction/interconnection) with the mode of production of the world economy, the mode of production of specific advanced capitalist countries and of other (i.e. non-capitalist) modes of production within the country.

Browett summarises a third viewpoint which "suggests that a dependent capitalist mode of production is different from an advanced capitalist mode of production" (Browett 1980 : 4). The theorists who represent this viewpoint are Alavi (1972, 1975) and Magubane (1976) and Banaji's early position (1972).
In separating these last two viewpoints, Browett makes an error which in turn leads him to gloss over the modes of production debate, and ultimately, to prematurely seek a way "out of the dependency perspectives." The third viewpoint is essentially part of the more general modes of production debate. This debate does not fall within the dependency perspective. It, of itself, constitutes a new conceptual formulation, attempting to situate itself in mainstream Marxist theory.

Browett does not undertake a critique of the theoretical foundations of the Modes of Production debate, but is content to summarise three theoretical criticisms:

"The focus of attention has remained almost entirely upon structure and so insufficient consideration has been given to relations of exploitation between classes. Class formation, class domination and class struggle are not an intrinsic part of their analysis."

In addition, the debate has largely been inappropriate to the historical position of the dependent nations and has failed to "formulate alternative prescriptions for social change." (Browett 1980 : 5).

Browett appears to be unaware of certain crucial critiques of the mode of production debate. Banaji (1977) undertakes a comprehensive theoretical critique and reconstitutes a methodological form of analysis as a result. Cleaver (1976) similarly critiques the debate, but develops a different theoretical basis for analysis. He also situates Banaji and Alavi's earlier works in the context of the modes of production in agriculture debate. It is this paper which indicates that Browett was wrong in separating the third and fourth viewpoints and thus missing the essential 'wholeness' of the debate and its importance.
In short, Browett recognises neither the theoretical complexity of the modes of production debate, nor the importance of the critiques it has engendered. This chapter will deal at greater length with the debate in order to develop a coherent conceptual framework for the analysis of the South African Social formation and Betterment Planning and through this, to establish a methodological approach consistent with such a framework.

There is a necessity for this in order that crucial questions might be correctly posed and answered. For example, the following question would obscure the real functions of Betterment Planning: Was Betterment Planning an attempt to reconstitute a feudal/colonial mode of production and if so, how did it articulate with the Capitalist mode of production? As will become apparent when I have worked through the debate, and from the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4, the clearer and more pertinent question is: Was Betterment Planning an attempt to reconstitute a 'middle' peasantry as a form of exploitation and if so, in what way would it have been functional to the South African political economy? In addition, I am able to incorporate clearer concepts of class formation, class domination and class struggle and bring these to bear on the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4.

Although Browett cites Foster-Carter (1978) as one of his references (and appears to summarize him at points, particularly the three criticisms of the modes of production debate) he ignores at least one crucial point - which is my point of departure from Browett. Foster-Carter points out that the conceptual differences between the dependency and modes of production theorists are that the former focus on the sphere of circulation and exchange of commodities (market relations), whilst the latter focus on the production of commodities (relations of production). (See Foster-Carter 1978: 50-51; Laclau 1971). Marx has argued that the relations and forces of production constitute the mode of production. Further it must be noted that:
"... production is a social process in which the relations of production between individuals are articulated (my emphasis) with the productive forces operating between them and nature. The relations of ownership upon the means of production are the basis of the relations of production and affect the distribution and consumption of material goods."
(Berdichevsky 1979: 8).

It would appear that the Capitalist Mode of Production (CMP) is therefore characterised by wage labour which in turn is part of the relations of production. These relations are in turn part of the definition of the CMP. Simple observation of the 'Third World' or dependent/underdeveloped countries indicated that whilst the capitalist form of production (and therefore the CMP) was dominant, there existed other forms: in Latin America, the Latifundia was a prime example; in Africa, Asia and Latin America peasant farmers are highly visible examples.

Cleaver, in his critique of the debate, poses the question, thus:

"The Political Economy of Agriculture necessarily includes the question of the relation between local agrarian structures and the world capitalist system. How can we analyse social structures which have been shaped by, and are still part of the world capitalist system, and yet have structures which are not those generally thought to characterise capitalism: wage labour and capital accumulation?" (Cleaver 1976: A-2)

Laclau therefore argued that, whilst Frank could be right that the social formation was capitalist at the level of market relations, there were in fact feudal elements at the level of production, and that these were subordinated by the CMP. The next logical step was to propose that there existed not a single mode of production - the CMP - but at least two, and possibly more, with the CMP being dominant and the precapitalist modes subordinated to it. Furthermore, the underdeveloped countries' histories consisted of this very process of
Cleaver labels this modes of production debate as part of a "third phase of theoretical development", i.e. he attempts a periodisation of Marxist development theory. The first phase took place in the 30's and 40's in the form of national independence struggles mainly in Asia. The Marxist theoreticians using "orthodox interpretations of historical materialism" supported these struggles as bourgeois revolutions. Given their teleological analysis, it was logical that these had to precede popular, socialist revolutions. (see Cleaver 1976: A-3, A5). The second phase was linked to "an internationalisation of the struggle against both the remaining colonial holdings and against the new neo-colonial governments." (Cleaver 1976: A-3):

Capital's response was the development decade, the 'end of ideology' thesis, aid, direct investment and a focus on rural development in order to diffuse and contain these struggles. Within Marxist theory, there was a split. The orthodox theorists maintained their position, whilst another group - e.g. Frank, Sweezy, Baran developed their theoretical position discussed earlier in this paper. However, their focus on market relations and surplus, left them open to criticism - e.g. Laclau. The orthodox theoreticians with the communist partners (e.g. Althusser and Balibar) reassessed their positions and returned to the debate armed with a re-emphasis on the mode of production and on Marxist value theory. (see Cleaver 1976: A3-A5). This notion of the articulation of the modes of production has become the dominant one in the modes of production debate. (6)

It was P.P. Rey who used the concept of the 'articulation of the modes of production'. Rey is of great importance because he moved beyond the rarified Althusserian theoretical atmosphere in an attempt to deal with 'concrete social formations'. He saw theory as necessarily being tested in political praxis, and being derived from that praxis. More importantly:
"his focus is on modes of production in order to understand the material basis and workings of class alliances. In contrast much subsequent work has tended to treat modes of production as entities occupying the totality of explanatory space either omitting the political level (let alone others such as the juridical or ideological), or relegating them to a minor and preordained place. The inevitable result is not only economism but reification. It is already one level of abstraction to have "classes" (rather than 'people') as the subject of history; but to endow so conceptual an entity as 'mode of production' with this role is idealism indeed." (Foster-Carter 1928 : 55).

Even though later in this paper I shall undertake a critique of the 'modes of production' and their 'articulation' concepts, the above points remain of central importance, namely:

1. to aptly develop one's theoretical framework through the analysis of 'concrete-real' social formations;
2. the relationship between theory and praxis and the prime importance of the concept of class for theory and praxis.

Given Rey's emphasis on the material basis and workings of class alliances, Browett's first criticism - that insufficient consideration has been given to class formation, class domination and class struggle - is incorrect, or rather over generalized. (see Browett 1980 : 5).

Rey raises further points which must be objects of our analysis, even though our critique will move us beyond the modes of production perspective. He has stressed the inherent violence in the transformation of social formations dominated by the CMP. Further, he has stressed the resistance displayed by its dominated classes (see Foster-Carter 1978 : 55-58).
Cleaver, too, has noted this, but has stressed that an analysis of class struggle all too often stresses the victories of capital. Such an analysis would be incomplete and would give a false understanding as to why capital's plans have failed and it has been forced to adapt or adopt new ones.

"All the initiative is seen to lie with capital and the exploited workers ... are almost invariably seen as passive or at best reactive victims." (Cleaver 1976: A-8).

Such an analysis would be incomplete and give false understanding of why sometimes the State and Capital's plans have failed and they have been forced to adapt, or adopt new ones.

Significantly, as will be shown in Chapter Three, the South African social formation's CMP has relied on violence as a basis for capital accumulation. The above concepts will also guide and inform my analysis of the resistance to Betterment Planning's implementation. Further, they will provide an insight into the problems of implementing the Tomlinson Commission's recommendations and the adapted strategy which was subsequently implemented. Therefore, my theoretical framework and method of analysis must incorporate concepts which assist in the explanation of resistance, i.e. concepts concerning class and class struggle.

Rey introduces another concept which he never defines, yet which is at the core of the weakness of the whole modes of production debate, namely that of "the relations of exploitation".

"Capitalism can never immediately and totally eliminate the preceding modes of production, nor above all the relations of exploitation which characterize these modes of production. On the contrary, during an entire period it must reinforce these relations of exploitation, since it is only this development which permits its own provisioning with goods coming from these modes of production, or with men driven from these modes of
production and therefore compelled to sell their labour power to capitalism in order to survive." (Rey 1973: 15-16; quoted in Foster-Carter 1978: 59, my emphasis).

The argument can be rather crudely summarized as follows: a mode of production consists of forces of relations of production. Relations of exploitation are constituent of the relations of production. Therefore, if one has different sets of relations of exploitation, one has different relations of production and hence, a different mode of production.

Foster-Carter recognises (1980: 63) this as the 'Archilles heel' of Rey's argument. However, he refers only to earlier critiques by Alavi (1975) and Banaji (1972).

He seems to be unaware of both Banaji's fully developed and cogent critique of the debate (Banji 1977), and Cleaver's (1976) critique — even though he cites references from the Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay) journal in which Banji and Cleaver developed their positions.

Yet in his summing up of the debate, Foster-Carter recognises that "Banaji's 'relations of exploitation' may point the way here: although it still needs to be spelled out how a single mode of production can combine so large a number of variant "forms", (which is exactly what Banaji does in his 1974 paper) if the term is not to be merely residual." (1976: 76).

Banaji's (1972) earlier paper merely distinguishes differing relations of exploitation in the underdeveloped countries' social formations. On the basis of seemingly common relations of exploitation which are not yet fully capitalist he posits a transitional mode: the colonial mode of production between precapitalist and the CMP. However, in his later (1977) paper he returns to Marx's materialist conception of history in order to develop a cogent critique of the modes of production concept. He notes that Marx's conception has not led to a specifically materialist history. Rather, there has been a long period of "vulgar
Marxism" and this developed from the Second International at which Stalinism prevailed. Stalinism proposed "laws" which were laws of the historical process in general and not historically determined laws. Yet Marx had indicated "that the scientific conception of history could be concretized only through the process of establishing these laws", historically determinate laws, "specific to each epoch and their corresponding categories". (in Banaji 1977 : 3).

On the contrary, Vulgar Marxism and Stalinism built up a tradition of abstract historical formalism which passed for 'Marxism' and which decisively shaped all later discussion of the 'mode of production'" (Banaji 1977 : 4).

The Marxists guilty of "abstract scholastic formalism" believed that all that was necessary to define the different epochs of production was a careful and close examination of their "specific 'relations of production', which were nothing else than the various forms which the subjugation of labour assumed historically". (Banaji 1977 : 5-6).

They were therefore able to conclude that the CHP was characterised only by wage labour. But this is a vulgar definition using a 'simple category'. (Banaji 1977 : 6).

Simple categories are common to several 'epochs' of production and Banaji notes that wage labour was 'found in the feudal mode of production (1977 : 31).

"But the historical specificity of wage-labour, its character as a specific bourgeois relation of production, its position as an historically determinate abstraction equivalent to the abstractions "capital" and "commodity fetishism" - derived from quite other mechanisms than this mere generalization of the labour-power commodity. At this deeper level of abstraction where it now figured in the process of Marx's analysis, as a "concrete" category, wage labour was for Marx capital-positing, capital-creating labour". In a methodology of forced abstractions which identified relations of production with particular forms of exploitation, the concept of 'historical specificity' was radically impoverished." (Banaji 1977 : 6-7, my emphasis).
Thus, the level of abstraction of the simple category wage-labour was misunderstood. If wage-labour was not the only "relation of exploitation" then others must be representative of other relations and hence, by "virtual identity" other modes of production.

One final theoretical point needs to be discussed at this theoretical level - the concept of the relations of production:

The substance of Marx's analysis [in Capital Vols. I, II, III] lies in its definition of the laws of motion of capitalist production: the production and accumulation of surplus-value, the revolutionization of the labour process, the production of relative surplus-value on the basis of a capitalistically-constituted labour process, the compulsion to increase the productivity of labour, etc." (Banaji 1977 : 10).

The expression and realization of these laws of motion through the social process of production are what constitutes the 'relations of production'. Therefore, in order to determine what the relations of production are for any mode of production, the laws of motion of that epoch must themselves be determined. One can certainly not follow a simple set of equations: different forms of labour = different forms of exploitation = different relations of production = different modes of production!

I have not been able to find in any of the modes of production literature any attempt to uncover the laws of motion of the non-capitalist modes of production, which are held to 'co-exist/are subordinate to' the CMP.

It is this, covert or overt, deductive simple equation method that Banaji labels the 'abstract scholastic formalism' of Vulgar Marxism and Stalinism. (See Banaji 1977 : 11). The correct theoretical task and method is one of "true abstraction". This involves the analysis of concrete social formations with a view to moving beyond simple categories and concretizing their historical expression.
Cleaver in his review of the modes of production debate in Indian Agricultural, written a year prior to Banaji's paper, reaches similar fundamental conclusions to Banaji about the debate:

"All of the authors correctly recognise the basic social relations of capitalism: capitalists and workers. They also recognise that this arises with and contributes to the development of generalised commodity production and the expansion of the market. But ... [they] failed to recognise the relation between the lack of accumulation and the drain of the agricultural surplus characteristic of imperialism. This reflects their attempt to define mode of production without taking into theoretical account the international situation." (Cleaver 1976 : A-7).

Therefore, inadequate attention has been given to concepts of class, class struggle and the reduction of the working class reduced "to a variable labour quantity". (Cleaver 1976 : A-8).

Cleaver's project is to correct these theoretical mistakes/inadequacies and his theoretical position moves beyond that of Banaji's. He agrees with Banaji that mere wage labour is not the definition of capital.

"Unlike the usual definition of capital which confuses the sale of labour power with the wage relation, the .... notion of the waged/unwaged division reminds us that the working class inevitably is divided by capital into two parts, only one of which is waged. The wage does not define the capitalist relation of exploitation, it hides it. It hides not only the unpaid work in the factory, but also the unpaid work of the unwaged outside the factory." (Cleaver 1976 : A-9).

He too is looking for a broader understanding of the forms of exploitation which take place under capitalism. In so doing he overhastily, I believe, rejects the concept mode of production and opts for a 'class theory of value'. His argument justifies a re-
emphasis and redefinition of important concepts relating to class struggle. (9) I would argue that these do not necessarily preclude the inclusion of the concept of mode of production in our theoretical framework.

He then makes a point which is absolutely central to this paper's analysis of Betterment Planning:

"The reproduction schemes provide an essential insight into the problem capital faces on a world scale. It needs to ensure control over the balance of production of the means of further production and those commodities essential to the accumulation of the working class. ... Production of the means of subsistence it should be noted must provide not only for the waged but also for the unwaged - especially when the poverty of the unwaged producers makes it difficult for them to provide for themselves ... it must be seen that capital tries to plan these balances. It is not a question of leaving it to the fabled anarchy of capitalist production." (Cleaver 1976: A9-10, my emphasis).

I set out to show in Chapters 3 and 4 that Betterment Planning was an attempt to ensure the provision of at least a portion of the 'means of subsistence' of the migrants' families, in the face of the declining Reserve peasant economy.

Cleaver's relevance or importance is enhanced by the fact that he draws upon the (then) latest Marxist feminist literature. Whilst this is located in, and its ideas are essentially derived from, an advanced capitalist context, these writings make two points pertinent to this paper:

"The Third World agrarian structures, like the homes of the First World, become the producers and reproducers of an actual (emigrant) and potential reserve army for capital ... Second, besides subsistence production which maintains this reserve army in an impoverished state of waiting, there is often a surplus which is drained off in many ways to finance capital's point of view, the so-called pre-capitalist areas and structures are part of itself and integral to its accumulation process. Wagelessness is not outside or alongside accumulation; it is part of it. The unwaged must be accumulated right along with the waged." (Cleaver 1976: A-10, my emphasis).
In order to summarize this paper's exploration of development theory so far - and more specifically Cleaver's and Banaji's position - it is necessary to state that:

"The whole process of capitalist development must be thought of, not as the working of some automatic machine (in abstract mode of production), which sometimes breaks down, but as a series of initiatives and counter-initiatives by the two classes which make up the social totality. ... The only laws of motion today are those of capital, and they are nothing more than the tendencies generated by the class struggle itself." (Cleaver 1976: A 11-12; my emphasis).

This chapter has attempted to construct a primary conceptual framework for an analysis of Betterment Planning. It has established that:

- underdevelopment is a process that goes hand in hand with the capitalist development of the Third World areas;
- the social formations of the Third World have been thoroughly penetrated and transformed by the CMP;
- any analysis has to deal with a CMP and its varying forms of exploitation rather than with other modes of production;
- and therefore class formation is on the basis of a definition of groups relations to the ownership of the means of production;
- class struggle is centred on these relations.

Therefore, I am in a clearer position to undertake an analysis of the transformations of the South African social formation (the context in which Betterment Planning has been implemented) for the conceptual 'instruments' have been 'sharpened' by clearing away the 'dubious speculative juggling'. Furthermore, this conceptual clarity enables me to better identify, describe, analyse and evaluate why Betterment Planning was implemented in the capitalist South Africa, and why it was resisted.
FOOTNOTES

1. Browett (1980(a) : 63-4) uses the term "unilinear change" and links the original state concept to that of the critical variable approach discussed above.

2. Hirschmann's ideas can be traced to T. Scitovsky's paper "Two Concepts of External Economies" in Agarwala and Singh (eds) 1958. Hirschmann's ideas continue to have a powerful influence in spite of the criticisms of the dependency theorists and others. For example, the Prime Minister's speech at the Rand Show reaffirmed the growth pole policy as propounded by the National Physical Development Plan - see The Sunday Times, 12 April 1980.

3. The equilibrium assumption is a static analysis which is predicated upon a series of non-interacting individual tastes, the aggregate of which constitute an equilibrium clearing price formed by the intersection of demand and supply.

4. For an insight into the complexities of the 1st Development Decade programmes in Latin America, see Petras and la Porte (1970).

5. Browett (1980(b) : 3-4) discusses the first three. However, in view of the focus of this paper, only the third and fourth predominant viewpoints will be discussed.

6. Foster-Carter has undertaken a detailed linguistic and conceptual analysis of the term 'articulation'. (1978 : 502-4) which, whilst important in general theoretical terms, is not of sufficient importance for this paper's development of a theoretical framework to warrant a discussion of the term.
7. The modes of production debate is a lot more complex than the few brief points outlined above. It involves several issues and numerous theorists: Bradby and Post who extend the concept of articulation; Alavi, McEachern and Roxborough who critique the concept but are not able to effectively move beyond it; and issues such as the primary of exchange of production. (See Foster-Carter 1978).

Foster-Carter concludes with "clarion call for class (to be) seen as the key mediator between (to oversimplify) modes of production and human action." (1978: 77).

Whilst unease with the concepts of 'modes of production' and 'articulation' developed in the Indian debate, this was also being felt amongst the 'Africanists'.

Le Brun and Gerry (1975) in an analysis of labour in urban Senegal felt constrained to note that their studies 

"require at the outset an analysis of the dialectical relationship between the dominant capitalist mode of production and the subordinate forms (their emphasis) of production in underdeveloped countries. The term form of production is deliberate. Mode of production seems to the writer inappropriate since it refers to a totality which is self-sufficient at both the superstructural level and at the economic base. (my emphasis). Forms of production exist at the margins of the capitalist mode of production, but are nevertheless integrated into and subordinate to it." (1975: 20).

It is interesting to note that the RAPE editorial working group in an editorial of the same issue, ignore this strong hint at the inadequacy of the modes of production concept when operationalized in 'concrete-real' analysis of a social formation. (RAPE Editorial 1975: 3-7). Further, both they and Le Brun and Gerry seem totally unaware of the Indian branch of the debate, particularly Banaji and Alavi's work.
8. It is interesting to speculate as to whether Banaji was influenced by Cleaver's paper - no reference is made to it is his 1977 paper, yet it was written in the same journal in which Banaji made his 1972 and 1973 contributions to the debate.

9. Cleaver argued that:

"Marx held not a labour, but a class, theory of value." This is a highly debatable distinction which is not necessary to enter into in this paper. However, some possibly oversimplified preliminary points (to a debate) must be made: Marx implied a class theory of value by virtue of the rest of his theoretical framework, viz. the labourers constitute the working class, those who labour are the ones who create value, and therefore a labour theory of value necessarily implies a class theory of value. (I am indebted to Charles Meth, Lecturer in the Economics Department for the clarification of this point.)
"If we want to analyse effectively the nature of peasantries in the Third World today, it is necessary to employ the theory of the capitalist mode of production ... to investigate how pre-capitalist modes of production are destroyed in this process and pre-capitalist forms of production (such as peasant production) subsumed in the circuit of capital."

- Bernstein 1979 : 422-3; my emphasis.
Betterment Planning has been implemented in the Reserves, as the major attempt at rural 'development' in these areas. In its earlier period, Betterment Planning attempted to reorganise peasant farming. In attempting to rationalize and further develop Betterment Planning, the Tomlinson Commission and the Native Affairs Department explicitly hoped to establish a 'stable peasantry' in the Reserves. Therefore, it is the aim of this chapter to analyse the concept of a peasantry as a form of production and exploitation, within the capitalist mode of production. In addition, the inter-relationships between the concepts of the peasantry, class, class struggle and the state, and their appropriateness in a study of Betterment Planning are further explored.

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In the analysis of the concept of the mode of production in the previous chapter, the concepts of class and class struggle were shown to be intrinsic to the analysis of the CMP and the concrete analysis of a social formation.

They raise questions which guide my analysis at the next stage of "successive approximations". (Magubane 1976: 171). These are: What are the classes in the rural areas of Africa? How have these developed and what have been their relations with other classes and with the state? Such questions have been raised for two reasons. First, because Betterment Planning attempted to restructure the peasant areas and create a stable peasantry in the Reserves. Second, the analysis of the South African social formation (see Chapter 3) shows that during the late 19th Century and early 20th Century, there was the creation, the rise and the decline of a peasantry. These in turn raise the crucial question as to whether Betterment Planning was an attempt to reconstitute a peasantry in the Reserves, and if so, why?

In order to attempt to answer these questions it is necessary to consider the African peasantry in general theoretical terms, the
process of its creation and role within the CMP as well as general aspects of the relationships between capital, the state and the peasantry in Africa. This discussion in turn will raise more specific questions to guide an analysis of Betterment Planning.

---oOo---

An assumption that has been made so far is that the concept of class is applicable to the social scientific study of African social formations. Bourgeois theorists and African politicians have long sought to deny its relevance. However, other writers have effectively and comprehensively criticised such a position and established the concept's applicability and relevance to such a degree that I feel able to make such an assumption. (See Shivji 1976: 13-28; Wallerstein 1973; Kitching 1972; Cliffe 1977; R.A.P.E. Editorial 1975).

The rural cultivators of Africa have been called peasants, but the definition of the concept has been endlessly debated with little consensus (Cooper 1981). Most of the definitions have been confined to a descriptive and ahistorical level. However, what is needed is a definition of the peasantry which is more historically and socially specific. (R.A.P.E. Editorial 1975: 3; Bernstein 1979: 421). Attempts have been made to overcome these problems by theorising a "peasant mode of production". However, these attempts have focussed on the peasant household as a unit and examined the social relations of production and reproduction internal to it. (Cooper 1981: 284-5; Bernstein 1979: 422; Barker 1981: 2-4). They fail to analyse the social relations of production, i.e. those which are external and are "the relations between various units of production, between various classes, and the relations of the process of social reproduction". (Bernstein 1979: 422). Cooper notes that this failure is traceable to the general conceptual inadequacies of underdevelopment theory (reviewed in Chapter 1) and earlier peasant studies. These have attempted to:

"derive economic and social structures as well as a direction of change directly from a relationship of
household to market without a specific analysis of relations of production". (Cooper 1981: 288; [my emphasis] see also Barker 1981: 3-4).

As has been shown in the previous chapter, and above, the various forms and units of production, and the social classes are constituted through the social relations of production of the CMP. Therefore,

"if we want to analyse effectively the class nature of peasants in the Third World today, it is necessary to employ the theory of the capitalist mode of production ...
... to investigate how ... pre-capitalist forms of production ... [are] subsumed in the circuit of capital". (Bernstein 1979: 422-3; my emphasis).

Given that the penetration and domination by the CMP took place at different times under different conditions in the various parts of Africa (and, of course, the rest of the world – see Chapter 1), it can be expected that the peasantry will differ widely.

"Capitalism developed in some cases by eliminating non-capitalist forms of production, in other cases by adapting them to the requirements of capitalism, and in yet others by developing new forms of production to serve its needs." (RAPE Editorial 1975: 3; see also Shivji 1975: 11-12; my emphasis).

The above points raise then the following questions which need to inform an analysis of Betterment Planning: In what way did capitalism develop in South Africa? How did it penetrate the precapitalist formations? What forms of production did it adapt or develop? However, more specifically: What was the nature of the South African peasantry and how did the CMP in the South African social formation adapt or create its form of production? Or did it eliminate it, and if so, why? And, most important, is the question whether Betterment Planning is an attempt to reconstitute a peasantry, and, if so, why?
However, such questions can only be answered by, first, the further development of theoretical framework for analysis of African peasantries, and second by the concrete analysis of the development of the South African social formation.

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Historically, the penetration of capitalism in Africa and the domination of the CMP has involved the destruction of the "natural economies" in which the production of use-values was dominant. In order to acquire labour, capital had to break the reproduction cycle by forcing labour to be withdrawn from it and simultaneously monetizing more and more of the material elements necessary for reproduction of the rural producers. The role of the colonial state was a crucial one in this process.

This process of commoditization of the peasantry occurred in different ways. Bernstein distinguishes the following:

a. taxes were imposed, thus requiring peasants to have a cash income;
b. forced labour in public works was used;
c. "frequently an initial use of coercion in the recruitment of labour for production enterprises - plantations and mines ...";
d. "the imposition of cash-crop production on the peasantry". (Bernstein 1979 : 424)

Chapter 3 will show that a and c were the two processes of commoditization that were used in South Africa.

Saul and Woods add a further dimension by noting that the form of incorporation, resulting from this commoditization process, was influenced by four variables:

"1. The presence, or otherwise, of centres of labour demand such as mines ...;"
2. The presence, or otherwise, of a suitable local environment for the production of agricultural crops for sale, combined with the degree of availability of marketing opportunities for these crops;

3. The presence, or otherwise, of an immigrant settler group of capitalist farmers who would be [their] competitors;

4. And, at a later stage, the presence, or otherwise, of an indigenous elite ... " (1971: 108).

The first three variables will be shown, in Chapter 3, to influence the form of incorporation of the South African peasantry into the CMP. The above are general indicators aggregated and abstracted from a number of studies of African peasantries. The relevance of one or more of these factors or variables will vary according to the historical nature of an area's penetration and domination by the CMP. It is not necessary, in terms of this paper's aims, to review these processes. Amin (1972; 1974) and Hagubane (1976) have done so very comprehensively. Suffice it to note that Amin divides the continent into three macro-regions on the basis of nature and forms of exploitation resulting from the continent's incorporation into the world capitalist system. Amin labels the eastern and southern parts of Africa as "Africa of the labour reserves" in which

"capital at the [metropolitan] centre needed to have a large proletariat immediately available ... [and] ... in order to obtain this proletariat quickly, the colonisers dispossessed the African rural communities — sometimes by violence — ... [and] forced [them] to be the supplier of temporary or permanent migrants on a vast scale, thus providing a cheap proletariat for the European mines and farms, and later for the manufacturing industries ...". (Amin 1972: 519)

Magubane notes the effect this has on class formation:

"The 'partial' employment in wage labour hampered the formation of a full-fledged proletariat and caused intensive pauperization in the labour reserves" (1976: 183-4)
Therefore, for this paper's purposes, those processes and variables which concern the proletarianisation of African peasantries and migrant labour are of major importance. The above points, therefore, indicate the need for an analysis of the development of the South African social formation (in Chapter 3) to look at the process, forms and variables of commoditization of the peasant economy, the role of the migrant labour system, and the role that Betterment Planning has played in relation to these.

Prior to penetration by the CMP, the peasantry were engaged in simple commodity production, i.e. to meet the needs of simple reproduction as opposed to the "appropriation and realization of surplus-value and the accumulation of capital". (Bernstein 1979: 225). But following the penetration of capital, commodity production was restructured in forms necessary for the CMP.

"Commodity production becomes an economic necessity for the peasantry. In order to meet its needs for cash the household produces commodities which become, through the process of circulation, material elements of constant and variable capital." (Bernstein 1979: 425-6).

On the one hand in certain historical instances the peasants

"production of commodities for sale was held in check so as to eliminate any productive alternative to labour migration ... but, on the other hand, the tendency to destruction of the indigenous mode had to be halted before the point where it ceased to provide for the reproduction of the labour power itself". (Cliffe 1976: 115; my emphasis).

Thus, the commoditization process has two general forms: namely, commoditization via commodity production - i.e. peasant cultivation for the market - and commoditization via labour and the consumption of commodities - i.e. with the cash earned by migrant labour. The emphasis on either will change according to needs of capital and the balance of forces (resulting from the class struggle) on the state at any particular time.
Another important concept is that of the simple reproduction 'squeeze' which the peasant suffers (see Barker 1981: 11-12; Bernstein 1979: 427-429). This results from the decreasing returns to labour whilst there are increasing costs of production. These can be caused by a number of factors such as the declining productivity of the soil, or the incorporation of peasants into rural 'development' schemes which entail relatively expensive means of production such as fertilizers and tools.

This simple reproduction squeeze results in the devalorisation of peasant labour-time and hence of the values of the commodities produced. Whilst the peasant might have put more labour into each commodity produced, the value of that commodity is established in capitalist agriculture. This is because it has the higher productivity of labour - given its more advanced forces of production. Therefore, in order to realize the value embodied in the commodity which the peasant has produced, he/she has to accept the value determined by capitalist agriculture.

Conversely, the commodities which the peasant purchase, - eg: ploughs, utensils, clothing - are produced by the industrial sector and embody a higher organic composition of capital and therefore higher returns to labour.

"It is likely that the peasant will have yielded surplus, because the labour content of his marketed output will be higher than the labour content of the commodity he purchases in exchange. In value terms, surplus will have been extracted from the peasant producer." (Keyder 1975: 223; my emphasis).

A third way in which peasant commodities are 'cheapened', is through the production of use-values for their own consumption and hence reproduction.

"The exchange-value of the commodities is lowered to the extent to which the reproduction of the producers is "subsidised" through use-value production drawing on the labour of the household." (Bernstein 1979: 436).
It is this process which underlies Wolpe's argument (outlined in Chapter 3) that the South African economy relied on the migrant labourer's family to subsidise its reproduction, thus increasing the rate of surplus extraction from the migrant.

Peasants thus produce commodities which embody surplus-value which is appropriated by capital and the State and is therefore the basis for profit and capital accumulation. However, the devalorization process inhibits the peasant from being the full beneficiary of this process of accumulation. Rather, capital in general benefits. It has not been necessary (see Barker 1981: 9-10) or possible for capital to fully separate the producers from the means of production (i.e. proletarianize them). Bernstein seems to think that it has not been possible since "the content of the relations" between peasants and capital has been one of a struggle over the conditions of labour, over the distribution and realisation of the value of the product.

"This struggle is possible only because the producers have not been fully expropriated and capital does not control production directly ... The resistance of peasant producers is manifested in a number of ways: refusal to adopt new cultivation practices or their sabotage ... bearing in mind that such measures introduce further elements of risk in the already precarious material basis of household production ... as well as political actions, including individual or collective acts of violence, against agents of capital and state functionaries in the rural areas."

(Bernstein 1979: 432-33; my emphasis)

These forms of resistance have characterised peasants' response to Betterment Planning. Peasant resistance has, then, its basis in the struggle between it and capital over the defining of the social relations of production, i.e. over the increasing commoditization process, (see Barker 1981: 8) the relations of production, appropriation and distribution (the latter two as a result of the process of unequal exchange). Whilst these are relations of the CMP,
the forms of exploitation and production are not those of 'classic' capitalism whereby full proletarianization has taken place and a socialized production process instituted. Furthermore, rural development programmes can be seen to assist in the commoditization process and the peasant is likely to resist where this increases the element of risk or further increases the simple reproduction 'squeeze'. Further, the basis for conflict between agricultural capital and the peasantry has also become apparent: namely the setting of the value of a commodity by agricultural capital; the ability of the peasant to compete as a result of the simple reproduction squeeze; and the process whereby the peasants reproduction is partially subsidised by their own use-value production. For the same reasons it is apparent why, for other capitals, the forms of production of the peasants have been 'adapted'.

However, these forms of exploitation have given rise to a contradiction. In the process of the intensification of commodity relations, the peasant agriculture stagnates and its productivity declines. The intensification of labour has been the general form

"without any significant development of the productive forces in peasant agriculture. Such intensification can soon result in the exhaustion of both the producers relying on instruments of production fuelled mainly by human energy, and of the soil cultivated with grossly insufficient inputs of irrigation, fertilizers, etc". (Bernstein 1979 : 435; see also Cliffe 1976 : 114-115).

The peasantry however are not undifferentiated. In order to determine whether the peasantry can be seen as a class, it is necessary to look more closely at the differentiation process within the peasantry. (Saul and Wood 1971 : 104; Shivji 1976 : 111-115; Barker 1981 : 4-6). The nature of the pre-capitalist social formation and the historical process of the penetration of capital has resulted in differentiation being an uneven and non-uniform process (see Cliffe 1978 : 335), i.e. the impact of capitalist penetration on indigenous social groups differed according to differences present within the group at the time.
Three broad groups of peasants have been differentiated in Africa. (Cliffe 1978; Bernstein 1979; Saul and Woods 1971). The 'poor' peasants, who in effect constitute a rural proletariat, are those who lack sufficient means of production or family labour and regularly sell this labour power. The rich peasant is one who has accumulated sufficient capital to invest it in production by buying better means of production or labour, or both. Where this is able to serve as a basis for further accumulation, the the peasant moves into the group of capitalist agriculturists. However, some writers have noted that capital accumulated by this group is not likely to be reinvested as agricultural capital but rather as commercial capital, i.e. shops, buses, since these yielded a better rate of return. This would also explain why the formation of agricultural capital in peasant areas has been so limited. (Shivji 1976: 113; Bernstein 1979: 431-2).

The last group is the middle peasantry who are able to:

"reproduce themselves mainly through family labour and land but in specific relations with other forms of production. It is these relations through which middle peasant households are constituted that determine the relative stability or instability of the reproduction of a middle peasantry". (Bernstein 1979: 431).

The Tomlinson Commission explicitly set out to reconstitute a middle peasantry through the implementation of a rationalized form of Betterment Planning. It can be seen then that the peasants do not constitute a class per se. Rather their location in the CMP is less determinate than the proletariat. Some writers have argued that this makes the peasantry a 'transitional' category:

"in so far as capitalism does have the inherent strength to fully transform African societies the existence of a peasantry could be viewed all the more as a transitional phenomenon,"

but nevertheless they realize that

"the possibility of a realization of this kind of transformation is of course most problematic and, in any event, remains a very long-term proposition." (Saul and Woods 1971: 107)
Thus, this is a general tendency of capitalism, but the very nature of its penetration of African social formations has resulted in widely differing structures of exploitation.

Peasant forms of production have been adapted to the basic accumulation process of the CMP, and its social relations of production predominate, but they still have control over one of the means of production - land. Capital may attempt to further incorporate the peasantry through the intensification of the commoditization process. Here the role of the state is important. It may do this through actions which increase the labour supply to the various capitals or through rural development programmes. This process also increases the basis for appropriation and accumulation. This in turn increases differentiation within the peasantry, i.e. that "development strategies themselves have an essential class content". (RAPE Editorial 1975 : 7).

"Such rural development schemes represent an alliance between the state which organises the political, ideological and administrative conditions of this form of penetration of capital into peasant agriculture ... and the provision of the technical and financial means of penetration by either private capitals or the particular forms of finance capital ... Alternatively, differentiation may be encouraged with incentive to 'progressive farmers' which consolidates and develops further private property in hand and other means of production. Again, the effect may be to reproduce a relatively stable peasantry engaged in specialized forms of commodity production in particular relations with productive capitals." (Bernstein 1979 : 434)

An analysis of Betterment Planning as a form of rural development needs, therefore, to deal with the following issues and questions: What is the nature of the South African state as it has developed during the period of Betterment Planning? To what extent has Betterment Planning served the interests of particular capitals? or has it served particularly the state's interests? or has it served, as it claims, the interests of the peasantry? To what extent has
Betterment Planning resulted in differentiation of the peasantry? If it has, to what extent has this created a rural proletariat? To the extent that this might be so, the issue of migrant labour also needs to be dealt with. What form(s) have peasant resistance to Betterment Planning taken?

Given the preliminary nature of this paper, such questions and areas of concern would need to be dealt with in further research into Betterment Planning. These and the other questions and issues raised in this chapter are of a general nature since they have been prompted by abstract 'simple category' concepts. In order to refine such questions, and generate others, it will be necessary to undertake a review of the development of the South African social formation with particular reference to the role of the state, various capitals and the reserves' peasannies. This in turn will refine, redefine and add to the conceptual framework but on a more concrete level. Only then will it be possible to frame the questions and issues more precisely for an analysis and evaluation of Betterment Planning.
Most importantly, the commoditization process brought about by Betterment Planning must be analysed and evaluated. The process of monetizing the means of production would also have to be evaluated, e.g.: the types of crops that are recommended by agricultural extension officers, how these are sold, and to whom, and are distributed.
"I am all by myself because little children have been made to pay taxes; they have to go out and work" ...

"We have lost our herds, and the only thing you can do is to say "Do this! Take that away!" and we obey your orders" ...

"I think that the Government fears that the natives would, in the future, become white men" ...

"I can judge by your answers that you did not quite understand. You have talked about your children at work, about the punishments inflicted upon them, about dog taxes and other taxes - all matters to which Sir William Beaumont made no reference whatever. He told you we were here about land."
The aim of this chapter is to trace the development of the South African social formation by applying the theoretical framework developed in Chapters 1 and 2. This in turn will provide the context in which to analyse Betterment Planning (in Chapter 4).

Most of the literature on the South African social formation has been produced since the 70's, and contains many internal debates about a number of issues. This chapter will focus mainly on those aspects of the South African social formation which are of primary importance to an understanding of Betterment Planning - namely the role of the reserves, migrant labour, agricultural capital, and the role of the State. Whilst it will deal with the development of the South African social formation prior to the first attempts at Betterment Planning, it is beyond the scope of this paper to deal in any detail with the very early period of the domination of the CMP.

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Prior to colonial conquest, the indigenous South Africans were Khoisan hunter-gatherers and Bantu-speaking pastoralists and agriculturalists. Any surplus was produced and distributed through a variety of kinship networks. However, by the mid-nineteenth century "there had been changes in the mode of surplus extraction and the manner in which the surplus was distributed" as a result of colonial conquest which had used "military power to contribute to the alteration of the relations of production". (Legassick 1974(a) : 257)

In effect a peasantry had been created (see Bundy 1972 : 371; Bundy 1979) through the penetration of the CMP. Legassick has characterised this period as one of Mercantilist Colonial conquest (1974 : 257-259). As we have noted (in Chapter 2), merchant capital operates primarily at the level of exchange and distribution, but it also encourages commodity production. This in turn leads to changes in the existing social relations. Just how substantial and significant these were in this period of the development of social formation has not been investigated. If a peasantry is "created" (Bundy 1972), then it is not a matter of confronting a pre-capitalist
mode which is 'articulating' with the CMP, but rather a different form of exploitation which was constituted by merchant capital. That this form does not appear to have relations of production which are of the CMP is due to the contradiction inherent in merchant capital: namely it encourages commodity production and also, through exchange, appropriates value which it accumulates (and either invests in exchange or remits to metropolitan capital) but does not invest in that sphere of production. Therefore, "merchant capital itself is unable to effect the transition to capitalist commodity production" (Bernstein : 53; see also Kay, 1975).

Therefore, whilst the level of the forces of production might have been low in this period (Legassick 1974 : 253), the CMP was dominant in the social formation. It was the nature of the capital itself which had to be transformed. If it is accepted that:

"A mode of production cannot effect its reproduction/transformation in and of itself. This can only be ensured as the outcome of specific class struggles conducted within those very conditions. The class struggle in social formations is the only site in which the existence/reproduction of a mode of production can take place." (Morris 1976 : 308).

Therefore, then, my concern here is to trace the transformation of the CMP in the South African social formation, rather than be caught up in tracing the articulation of modes of production. I must also focus on the class struggle and the role of the dominant class expressed through its various capitals and the state, and the dominated class. Further, this chapter must trace the class struggles involved in the transformation of the CMP and their expression in the South African social formation, since this is the context in which Betterment Planning was developed and implemented.

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Bundy has detailed the 'emergence and decline' of the South African peasantry (1972; 1979). He argues that the peasantry essentially
emerged during the period 1830-1870, particularly in those areas of
greatest contact between the colonists and the indigenous people.

On the one hand the peasants added to the economy in that they were a
market for commodities and a source of produce, and were seen in the
political context as providing "a buffer against hostile tribes". On
the other hand, national capital was weak and the level of the forces
of production was low. Machinery was expensive and had to be
imported. Therefore white farmers needed masses of cheap labour.
Various taxes and fees were levied on the Blacks in the hope that
this would force them to labour and laws were passed to control this
labour. However, the peasants' main response was to increase their
produce and market it for the necessary cash surplus required.

In Natal for example, the 1852-53 Native Affairs Commission noted
that the peasants were:

"rapidly becoming rich and independent ... [and that]
they] preferred the most independent state, and hence
has arisen the most uniformly insufficient supply of

In confronting the penetration of the CMP, the rural Africans had
three choices: outright violent resistance - which was bloodily
overcome; the peasant option; or wage labour. Even the second option
represented a form of resistance - if only to the third.

"African peasants displayed a tenacious preference for
a life that drew subsistence from a family plot rather
than from wage labour at low levels of remuneration."
(Bundy 1972 : 371).

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The mineral discoveries (diamonds in the Cape in 1867 and gold on the
Witwatersrand in 1886) led to a substantial transformation of the
CMP. Massive inputs of foreign capital were required. Essentially,
this led to the development of mining capital in South Africa. Whilst
new markets and opportunities were created, so too were heavily
increased demands for cheap labour. Initially the peasantry responded by expanding production to meet the increased taxes, (see Bundy 1979 : 91-2) imposed by the Cape Government in order to force labour onto the market. In Natal, the response was similar and "peasants competed with white settlers at sales of Crown land". (Bundy 1972 : 377).

The government responded by increasing the pressures on the peasants. In Natal, the government in 1903 ordered the Lands Department to prevent sales of crown land to Africans. In 1905, it imposed a Poll Tax. This imposed

"an extra toll of over £76,000 on Natal's African population out of a direct contribution by them to the Colony's revenue in 1905 of £306,484. Konczacki comments on the fact that Africans 'were forced to pay a higher percentage of their income in taxes' than whites, and adds that 'in the last years of colonial rule it [the burden of taxation] tended to grow heavier'." (Bundy 1979 : 190).

However, there was a process of differentiation taking place. Further wars of conquest, drought, and the recession after the diamond boom, led to great pressures on the peasantry.

"At the one end of the spectrum was the class of landless young men ... who had no other resource to dispose of than their labour. One can identify various other strata - peasant migrants, marginally self-sufficient small peasants, better-off 'middle' peasants using family labour - all the way up to the group of farmers who consolidated early peasant successes, and became small commercial farmers." (Bundy 1972 : 378).

This last group became part of the petit-bourgeoisie. They used certain instruments such as the Cape's Masters and Servants Act to control their labour, and were 'loyal' to the government. However, in the Transvaal the coercive apparatus was not so well developed and the pressures on the peasantry were not so marked. Where they had been dispossessed of their land, many bought it back where possible.
The discovery of gold brought further transformations in the CHP and the social formation in establishing the early industrializing period. The mines required cheap labour and also cheap food - as the basic constituent element in that labour's reproduction. Given the form of production that the peasant is engaged in - i.e. the labour intensity - peasants were able to respond to this latter requirement. This in turn put pressure on agricultural capital, which was exacerbated when cheap food was imported to meet the demand. Legassick has noted that:

"With the initial phases of mining and the huge market for food which was consequently opened up, agricultural capitalists found themselves caught in a squeeze between cheap imported food and low-cost peasant producers responding rapidly and effectively to the market: from net agricultural export South Africa became a net importer." (1974(a): 261).

The value of agricultural land increased. However, African squatters - paying rent to the owners - occupied vast areas of white farms, and the farmers needed to move them off. By raising rents and other fees farmers began to force them off. The rinderpest of 1896-97 devastated African cattle herds (in excess of 80 per cent in some districts), further adding to the pressures for proletarianization. But the migrants went mainly to the mines, who paid higher cash wages, not the farms, and this further exacerbated the agricultural capitalists' position. (see Morris 1976: 309).

One response by agricultural capital was to secure labour by means of labour tenancy arrangements. This was defined by the Native Economics Commission of 1932 as

"the giving of services for a certain period in the year to the farmer by the Native and/or his family in return for the right to reside on the farmer's land, to cultivate a portion of land, and to graze his stock on the farm." (quoted in Morris 1976: 294).

Agricultural capital was certainly not the dominant fraction in the dominate class but it certainly was able to pressure the state into taking a number of actions against the peasantry in order to secure labour for it and to reduce peasant competition. The actions against the peasantry were also in the interests of mining capital.
Some of the measures were:

In Natal
* 1901, the Identification of Native Servants Act
* 1901, amended the Masters and Servants Act
* 1903, amended the Squatters' Rent Act
* 1904, further amended the Identification of Native Servants Act
* 1904, Sale of Crown Land to Africans suspended
* 1905, imposition of a Poll Tax on all male adults - which resulted in a 400% increase in revenue for the government and consequent need for a greater cash income on the part of the peasants;

In the Cape -
* the Location Acts of 1892, 1899 and 1909 stepped up control over squatters
* 1905, the Cape Mounted Police enforced the anti-squatting measures;

In the Transvaal -
* 1908, Natives Tax Act imposed a levy of £2 on squatters (but significantly only £1 on labour tenants).

Agricultural capital also used its access to, and influence over, the state to have capital invested in its interests, eg: in railway construction and tariffs, credit through a nationalised land bank.

However, the above measures were unequally and not all that rigorously enforced (see Morris 1976 : 243) and the 1913 Native Lands Act of the unified South African state, brought in turn a unified set of measures to bear and a unified system of enforcement. Whilst the above measures may not have been completely successful, they had certainly taken their toll.

Bundy has noted (1972 : 386) that by 1913, once-productive peasant areas which used to export food had been transformed into rural
slums. These were characterized by peasant families who subsisted largely on cash remittances of migrant labourers.

"By 1913, the peasant sector showed serious signs of agrarian degeneration, and the transformation of the once fertile reserve areas into teeming rural slums was well under way ... Areas which had been food exporting, then grimly self-reliant, now needed to import grain, and peasant families could only subsist with the remittance of wages of migrant labourers."
(Bundy 1972 : 386).

It must be emphasized that these transformations were trends and evidenced themselves in different places at different times, i.e. not all areas were in such a position by 1913.(1)

The 1913 Native Lands Act defined and set aside areas for African occupation — the African Reserves (see Davenport and Hunt 1974 : 42-43). In areas outside the Reserves, the Act prevented Africans from purchasing or occupying land, and terminated all hiring and leasing arrangements by Africans concerning land. (see Wolpe 1972 : 436; Morris 1976 : 293). Conversely, non-Africans were prevented from occupying and/or acquiring land in the Reserves. In effect this halted the transition towards a complete proletarianization of the peasantry. Therefore the development of the South African social formation and the transformation of the CMP took a different 'road' in the twentieth century. The 'normal' tendency in capitalist development is "for ownership of land to become concentrated and the consequent development of a landless class 'free' of means of production". (Wolpe 1972 : 436).

Wolpe sees the 1913 Act as

"an attempt to remedy the shortage of African labour on White farms and to prevent Africans, utilizing communal or private capital, from repurchasing European owned land which had been acquired by conquest."
(1972 : 436-7)
Thus, it sought to contain and minimize peasant access to lands. This in turn, reduced its competitiveness with agricultural capital and the landless and the 'poor' peasantry were forced into migrant labour.

"The peculiar feature of this labour force is that it is migrant and temporary, returning to the Reserves in between periods of work, and retains means of production in the African economy or has a claim on such means. The exploitation of migrant labour-power of this kind enables the capitalist sector to secure an increased rate of surplus value." (Wolpe 1972: 433; (my emphasis)

Wolpe, in his now classic and controversial paper, goes on to argue that capital was able to pay the migrant worker a wage which was below the cost of his reproduction, since his family was being supported by the subsistence peasant economy in the Reserves. Further, capital did not have many of the social security costs of a 'normal' permanent urban proletariat. Therefore, only wages which meet the subsistence needs of the individual worker need be paid by capital. (see Wolpe 1972: 433-36). This process was also clearly understood by mining capital, as is revealed in the following quote from the Mine Native Wages Commission:

"It is clearly to the advantage of the mines that native labourers should be encouraged to return to their homes after the completion of the ordinary period of service. The maintenance of the system under which the mines are able to obtain unskilled labour at a rate less than ordinarily paid in industry depends upon this, for otherwise the subsidiary means of subsistence would disappear and the labourer would tend to become a permanent resident upon the Witwatersrand, with increased requirements ..." (quoted in Moss 1978: 54).

Further he argues that the preservation of the traditional kinship network is essential if the Reserves are to bear the social security costs. Consequently the state has attempted to retain and reinforce such elements as African law and custom, and chiefs.
On the more overt political level, labour which was migratory was put in a weak bargaining position viz-a-viz capital. The difficulties of developing cohesive working class organisations were substantially increased. Hence the development of a class for itself, a class consciousness is inhibited. Consequently, migratory labour weakens the strength of the working class in the class struggle.

Wolpe illustrates how the Reserves enable this super exploitation to take place - and hence increased profit and capital accumulation.

Figure 1: The Relative Proportion of Surplus to Necessary Labour in the Capitalist Sector where:

(a) The working-class is wholly dependent upon Wages for its Reproduction.

(b) The working-class derives a portion of its means of Reproduction from the Reserve Economy.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
S \\
N \\
\end{array}
\hspace{1cm}
\begin{array}{c}
S_1 \\
N_1 \\
\end{array}
\]

(Note: This figure is not drawn to scale.)

Where: 

\[S = \text{surplus labour time/product.}\]
\[N = \text{labour time/product necessary for reproduction of labour-power.}\]
\[N_1 = \text{the decreased proportion of labour time/product devoted to the reproduction of labour power by the capitalist sector where portion of the necessary means of subsistence is provided by the Reserve Economy (N}_2\).
\[S_1 = \text{the increased surplus labour time/product.}\]

Wolpe concludes that:

"in the early period of industrialization in South Africa (the period of gold mining) the Reserve economy provided the major portion of Africans employed in capitalist production, at any given moment, with supplementary subsistence and was thus a crucial condition of the reproduction of the migrant working class." (1972: 439)

As noted above, Wolpe's paper has provoked considerable debate. The debate takes place within the theoretical framework of the 'articulation of modes of production' debate. All parties assume that the Reserves are characterised by pre-capitalist mode(s) of production, (see, for example, Wolpe 1972, 1975; Fransman 1975; Kaplan and Fransman 1975; Moss 1978) which articulate with the dominant South African CMP. The debate revolves around whether value and commodities can be produced by the non-capitalist mode(s). On the one hand it has been argued that the law of value can only operate under conditions of capitalist commodity production (see Fransman 1975: 16; Kaplan and Fransman 1975). On the other hand, it has been argued that it does (Wolpe 1975; Morris 1977). If the law of value were not to operate in pre-capitalist modes, then this would undermine the whole explanation of the role of the Reserves in the South African social formation as enabling super-exploitation (i.e. an increased rate of surplus extraction).

However, I would argue that the theoretical insights developed in Chapters 1 and 2 and the analysis of the South African social formation thus far in this chapter, obviate parts of this debate. It is not a matter of various modes articulating with one another. Therefore the object of research is not the detailed study of the nature and effects of such articulation - i.e. whether commodities and surplus value are produced. Rather, the penetration and establishment of the CMP in the South African social formation resulted in the creation of a peasantry which was characterised by a different form of production. Chapter 2 showed how this form of exploitation produced commodities and value and was therefore integrated into and functional within the CMP. Therefore, in the
South African instance, the peasantry are part of the CMP and functional within it - they produce commodities and are subject to the law of value. Therefore, my concern is to trace the changing functions and role of the peasantry within the transformation of the South African social formation's CMP. The essentials of Wolpe's argument remain important: namely that the location and later the Reserves functioned in the general interest of capital by partially subsidizing migrant labours reproduction - hence increasing surplus, the rate of profit and capital accumulation - and limiting competition from a peasantry with agricultural capital.

As the South African social formation entered the 20's and 30's, it was with a declining economic base in the Reserves and a developing agricultural capital. Kaplan has argued that agricultural capital developed during the 20's and 30's as a result of a redirection of a surplus from mining capital appropriated by the State. In addition, legislation was passed aimed at more efficient agricultural production and ensuring high prices for its commodities. The state also was instrumental in diverting capital for the development of secondary industrialization under the control of 'local' or national capital.

"It is this redistribution coupled with the exploitative domination of the precapitalist mode [sic] that was the motor of South African capitalist development." (Kaplan 1977: 106-113)

Thus, it is not simply a matter of 'cheap' labour, but also of redirection of surplus by the state. This redirection is the result of struggles within the dominant class (see Kaplan 1977; Frausman and Davies 1977).

The decline in the Reserve's economy was due to the transformations discussed above and the process of underdevelopment that was initiated. Thus, by the 30's the Reserve areas were unable to meet the reproductive requirements of labour power. This led to pressure on capital for increased wages by the workers. This threatened the
basis of super exploitation and hence, capital accumulation. (Wolpe 1972 : 444). However Morris (1977) disagrees that this is necessarily so, and quotes Marx in support of his argument:

"a fall in the rate of surplus value leaves unaltered the mass of surplus value produced, if the amount of the variable capital, or number of the labourers employed, increases in the same proportion." (Capital : 305 in Morris 1977(b) : 81).

Morris argues that capitalist agriculture and manufacturing capital produce those commodities which go to make up the means of subsistence in labour power's reproduction. The higher productivity of these capitals means that their commodities are a "major means of reducing necessary labour time - of producing relative surplus value". Thus, the value of labour power is lowered through producing relative surplus value and therefore, on a mass basis, this might counteract the declining reproductive power of migrant labour. Morris does not say whether this is done by either (a) reducing the cost to capital in feeding, clothing, housing the migrant, or (b) reducing the cost to capital of subsistence goods bought by Reserve families with migrants remittances or both. Rather he is concerned to explain

"the important relationship that the mechanisms of control and labour direction contained in influx control, labour bureaux, etc., have to the value aspect of the commodity (African) labour power. They are of major importance in regulating the limits between necessary labour time and surplus labour time - in maintaining an increased rate of surplus value in the context of an increasingly productive and complex capitalist mode of production." (Morris 1977(b) : 85)

I believe his point can be applied to this crucial period in which the crisis was one of a need to ensure the rate of capital accumulation. Or as Legassick has noted:
"the rise of secondary industry and the coinciding decline in the capacity of the African 'reserves' to sustain or subsidise labour reproduction costs posed new problems for South African capitalism in terms of control and exploitation of a labour force."

(1974(a): 274)

Therefore, towards the end of the 30's, capital and the state were faced with two basic options. The Second World War meanwhile merely served to intensify the problem to crisis point by the late 40's - i.e. rapid development of manufacturing took place and there was the massive movement of rural people to the peri-urban slums.

Before discussing these options it is important to pause and note that during this period, the first crude attempts at Betterment Planning took place. The first formal evidence of Betterment Planning comes in the form of Proclamation 31 of 1939. The first Betterment Planning legislation was therefore initiated under the Smuts Government. This periodization of the genesis of planning is important when we consider the options facing capital and the State.

The options faced by capital and the State both assumed continued accumulation of capital and the control of labour force by political means. However, the first option argued that the situation of rapidly increasing African urbanization should be accepted. This was:

"Given that the 'reserves' were increasingly unable to subsidise labour-reproduction, given that secondary industry required Blacks with higher skill levels, and correspondingly less job turnover, more Blacks should be allowed permanent residential rights in cities and should have labour-reproduction costs (housing, welfare, pensions, amenities, etc.) financed through the State in the urban areas: for secondary industry and commerce at least, the migrant labour system should be gradually phased out." (Legassick 1974(a): 275)

Labour would still be controlled through labour bureaux, pass laws, legislation prohibiting strikes and so on. However, the problem was
one of a large urban proletarianised work force which could present political challenges to the State and capital. "The answer to this problem was perceived in terms of retaining a proportion of the Black population in their existing areas, through agricultural development of the reserves". (Legassick 1974(a): 275-6; my emphasis)

This option was that argued by the official opposition after the 1948 change of government. The first attempts at Betterment Planning were, I would argue, the result of early moves to implement this option and were carried over into the Nationalist government period.

There followed then an interim period of Betterment Planning which was relatively limited in its implementation - "Traces of these early efforts may still be observed in the Black States where they played, and still play, a role in combating soil erosion." (Malan, undated: 2)

Therefore, in the first period of Betterment Planning, attention was paid to conserving the reserve areas. The emphasis was on soil conservation and this involved an "engineering planning" approach which largely neglected the agricultural development aspects. However, even this approach could incur large costs and could therefore only be implemented on a limited scale. Such an approach would have had to be limited for

"the large scale investment in the Reserves would ... make cheap labour-power costly in the sense that the accumulative advantages to capitalism deriving from such labour-power would be lost or reduced if the surplus was utilized in the African rural areas." (Wolpe 1972: 440)

The second option was to be taken up by the post-1948 Government. It argued that the migrant labour system should be extended to manufacturing; that Africans should have no urban residential rights; that Africans should have no access to industrial bargaining structures; that the pass laws etc. be strengthened; that a system of labour bureaux be established to control and allocate labour. Legassick has noted that:
"This system did however pose the problem of how labour reproduction costs were to be sustained in a situation where reserve agriculture was no longer able to fulfill the function ... [Part of the solution was] the elaboration of African self-government in the reserves (as has emerged: the 1960's: the Bantustans) [in which] mechanisms could be developed whereby the black community taxed its own small petty-bourgeoisie (farmers, traders, professionals, etc.) to subsidise the workforce." (1974: 276-7)

Whilst this is an inadequate explanation, it does provide some insight into the role of the Reserves and their new political structure in the Apartheid period. Legassick also seems to see the role of the farmer in the Reserves as one of producing a small surplus, part of which is appropriated by the local authority "to subsidise the workforce". The class position of the farmer is that of a "petit-bourgeois" - "it is possible that a class of full-time peasant farmers will be encouraged, completing the transformation of migrant labour into peasantry and the proletarianised." (Legassick 1974: 280).

Legassick does not mention Betterment Planning, but it appears that he has this in mind when he makes such statements. He is therefore implying that it is merely the final part of the process of peasant differentiation. (It must be noted at this point that I will argue in the next chapter that this is not altogether correct, but that, in terms of the Tomlinson Commission, Betterment Planning was an attempt to mainly reconstitute a 'middle' peasantry.)

That Legassick's explanation is inadequate is apparent in the many omissions he makes in describing the development of the South African social formation in the 50's and 60's. He does not elaborate on the complex system of labour control and the changing qualitative needs for labour in the Apartheid period.

Morris (1976; 1977) has dealt with this issue in some detail. He argues that agricultural capital by the late 40's urgently needed labour, which had been lost to mining and industry. Almost
immediately the new government instituted rural labour bureaux, although the comprehensive network was begun in the mid 50's. The Native Labour Regulations Act of 1911 was amended in 1949 to allow farmers to recruit and distribute labour.

"It was also emphasized that the new distribution of labour required more than regulating labour within the 'white' rural areas and between them and the urban areas. The Reserves could not just be left as they were for their reorganisation was critically important in the overall distribution of labour. "It has become obvious that it is uneconomical and also impossible to provide the great majority of Natives with a home on a farm in the Native Territories. Only a portion of them may farm there and that on a full-time basis. The others must make a living in a different way without and within these areas." In other words they were to be the principal alternative to migrant farm workers in the towns." (Morris 1977: 62; my emphasis)

Whilst Morris does not source the quotation above, he earlier makes reference to an "introductory letter" by the new Secretary for Native Affairs, Eise1en, to the Minister in the Department's Report for 1949-50. Eise1en was one of the principal architects of Apartheid philosophy. The above quote is also significant in that it came at the time the Tomlinson Commission was appointed. It was the Tomlinson Commission Report in 1956 that outlined the basic policy of Betterment Planning. (This is dealt with in Chapter 4.)

In order that the reorganisation of the Reserves - Betterment Planning included - be understood, it is necessary to look at it in the context of the 'overall distribution of labour'.

The 50's and 60's were characterised by a sustained assault on squatters and labour tenants to eliminate the former and to redistribute the latter or fully proletarianise them. The squatters were mainly congregated in the peri-urban areas. The whole influx-efflux apparatus was established to channel labour to where it was required. The Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952 divided the African population into urban and rural labour groups. Section 10 of the
1945 Urban Areas Act was amended in 1952 to apply influx-efflux control automatically to all urban areas. Section 13 was amended to prevent Africans avoiding influx control by saying they were proceeding to employment on the mines. By 1957 there were 512 labour bureaux and by 1971 the number stood at 797. These diverted labour to wherever there was a shortage.

Agricultural capital's requirements were also dealt with. Mechanisation proceeded rapidly in the agricultural sector in the 50's and 60's. This meant a changed form of labour was required. Labour tenants became an obstacle. Full-time wage-labour was needed. In their evidence to the Tomlinson Commission, the South African Agricultural Union argued that:

"The farmers' main requirement is not necessarily always more labour, but rather more efficient labour, that is greater productive capacity of the available labour ... No industry, least of all agriculture, can be built up on a system of part-time, migratory labour, because an absence of six months from farming lowers his efficiency." (quoted in Morris 1977(b) : 67)

This need was not uniform in time and space and certain farmers in Natal, until last year, had labour tenants. However, the point is that the changing nature of production in capitalist agriculture called for a changed form of exploitation. This is indicated by the following: between 1960 and 1970, 340,000 labour tenants plus 656,000 squatters and 97,000 squatters in "Black Spots" were estimated to have been removed. From 1971-74 a further 400,000 labour tenants were removed.

Morris concludes that:

"The intervention of the State in its ideological and political forms post 1948 ... was not in any sense a return to a feudal [sic] system of coercion in the countryside, but the specific outcome of a definite struggle between fractions of the dominant class(es) within the State over the manner in which the further development of capitalism, in South Africa generally and in agriculture specifically, would proceed. The result was the decisive intervention of the State to
establish a definite relationship between town and country, industry and agriculture, to restructure the relations of production in the rural areas, and push the capitalisation of agriculture onto a higher plane."

(1977(b): 71; my emphasis)

In this chapter I have attempted to explain the development of the South African social formation and the transformation of the CMP. The early struggles between the peasantry and capital lead to the special confinement of the former and their undevelopment. The particular role these reserves have played in the South African social formation provides an understanding of the context within which Betterment Planning must be located and analysed. It is this task which is undertaken in the next chapter.
Recently, the periodisation of the decline of the Reserve peasantry has been the subject of some debate. For example, Simkins (1981) has reassessed the empirical evidence concerning agricultural production in the Reserves. One of his conclusions is that:

"Taking the reserves as a whole, one finds that their inhabitants were far from able to provide for their subsistence requirements from agricultural production as early as 1918. However, the proportion of requirements they were able to meet remained substantially constant between 1918 and 1955, declining rapidly after that date." (1981; 264).

However, this does not take account of the uneveness of the process of decline. The rapid decline after 1955 could be accounted for by the massive resettlement of labour tenants and squatters in closer settlements.
"the overall aim [of the development of the Reserves] should be human welfare, ... [that this] should be constantly kept in view ... [and] any other aims should be subordinated to this."

"Had they not observed that every visit of a white official to bring them "progress" had meant some further encroachment or restriction such as the prohibition against cutting trees, the dipping of cattle that weakened and killed their stock, the limitation of their legal competence, the survey of their forests that among the Mamathela threatened and eventually led to the removal of that tribe from the watershed in the mountains to the unhealthy lowlands?"
- (Krige and Krige 1956 : 12)

"'Why is it called a betterment area when nothing looks any better?' a tribesman asked us."
- (Alcock 1977 : 21)
This chapter undertakes the analysis of Betterment Planning, and its implementation, by focussing on the attitudes and responses of both the State (and its officials) and the Reserve peasantry. By means of the description and analysis of case studies, I shall attempt to show that Betterment Planning - as a form of rural development planning - has failed. Further, I shall attempt to show through an analysis of the resistance by the peasantry, that any further or new attempts at rural development planning will confront a peasantry and a rural proletariat, bitterly suspicious of planning.

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Whilst the Beaumont Commission of 1916 - amongst others - had pointed to the decline of the Reserves, the 1932 Native Economic Commission was the first government commission to talk about the need for developing the Reserves:

"In the economic development of the reserves must inevitably be sought the main solution of the Native Economic problem ... Our problem is therefore not only as it is in agriculture to teach the Native how to use their land more economically, but it is also a race against time to prevent the destruction of large grazing areas, the erosion and denudation of the soil and drying up of springs." (quoted in Yawitch 1981: 1).

Officials thus became concerned with 'reclamation' and/or 'rehabilitation' of the land in the Reserves.

Following the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, the Secretary for Native Affairs issued a "Statement of Land Policy under the Native Trust Land Act 1936" in which he argued that:

"Undoubtedly the crux of the whole matter lies in the limitation upon the number of the stock carried by the native population in the Native areas." (quoted in Yawitch 1981: 1).

It is important to note that official attitudes in this early period were that the primary cause of the decline of Reserves was
overstocking of the land beyond its carrying capacity. If this was a cause then the answer, quite simply, was to limit the stock by various means. This overstocking was seen by officials to lead indirectly to poor methods of cultivation:

"the reserves have been overstocked and in consequence, when the time arrives to plough, the animals are too weak to draw a plough, resulting in the lands being prepared too late, and just the surface scratched and naturally a very poor crop is reaped." (Report of the Department of Native Affairs 1944-45)

In none of these reports is there any attempt to understand the role of cattle in the Reserve communities. Nor is any scientific evidence presented to justify the belief that the reserves were overstocked. The anthropologists Professor, J.D. Krige and Dr E. Krige, when commenting on the likely impact of the Tomlinson Commission proposals on the Lovedu people, noted that:

"The 90 per cent of the population ousted from the land and relegated to towns will have no cattle or other livestock. This will seriously effect the lobolo exchanges and the stability of marriage. The cattle links between chains of families, between lineages and districts, between all the strategically important groups and individuals in the tribe will be broken. For nothing but cattle can maintain these relations ... Cattle are durable and tangible, can easily be followed in the chain of exchanges, are not easily lost or dissipated. Money cannot play this role ... the reformer who suddenly and ruthlessly knocks down the cattle-built pillars of the social structure will cause the whole cultural edifice to crash and in its fall to tear down the welfare work he has attempted ... "Commodities will become impersonalised ... The new interdependencies will be economic, leading to entirely different conceptions of human relations, new institutions, new alignments and loyalties." (1956: 19-20, my emphasis).

Krige and Krige thus indicate the objective effect of any major stock limitation and more particularly – as I shall show later in this chapter – the implementation of Betterment Planning, the intention of which was to dispossess large numbers of people of their stock. The objective effect is: cattle represented the last major economic good of the peasantry's that was not yet fully commoditized. Stock
limitation by forced sales and culling under the Betterment programme, were attempts to commoditize the peasants' stock. There are numerous references in the Native Affairs Department's (N.A.D.) reports of attempts to get the 'Natives' to enter more fully into the livestock market. Various magistrate's reports are sprinkled with what appear to be mandatory livestock sales' tabulations (eg: NAD report 1945-7). Yawitch notes that:

"The official records maintain that ... people got a fair price for their stock. The other side of the story is vastly different. People maintain that stock sales provided a captive market for speculators and [white capitalist] farmers; that prices were often determined at an artificially low level and that nothing could be done about it." (1981 : 11)

Thus, the capitalist farmers also appear to have benefited directly from the implementation of stock limitation procedures, through the controlled and enforced appropriation of surplus value in the form of cattle as a highly cheapened commodity.

In turn, the commoditization process spreads to those few social relations not fully affected in the early peasantization process (see previous chapter). The stock limitation process finally forces an even larger number of peasants into being rural proletarians dependent largely, if not completely, on migratory labour. The implementation of stock limitation has been a mechanism for the differentiation of the peasantry (discussed theoretically in chapter 2). When Betterment Plans were drawn up, stock assessments were done for the tribal areas as a whole.

"This meant that often no account was taken of stratification within areas and of the fact that there was a large disparity in the distribution of stock, with some families owning fairly large herds of cattle and others only a few head. In a blanket assessment it was obviously the poorest who stood to lose the most." (Yawitch 1981 : 11, see also Rogerson and Letsoalo 1981 :89.

The Tomlinson report, on the basis of its surveys, concluded that:

"approximately 85 per cent of the cattle-owners possessed 20 head or less; 75 per cent, 15 or less; 57 per cent, 10 head or less; and 28 per cent, 5 head or less." (UG 61/1955 : 80)
These statistics in themselves, indicate very little. However, a 1980 study of cattle in Botswana (see Simkins 1981) indicates their importance in relation to peasant differentiation. If a peasant has less than 10 cattle it is unlikely that he will be able to plough, he will get little milk, and not be in a position to sell a single animal. With 15-20 head, the long term prospects of the herd reproducing itself are precarious. With 21-40, the owner can plough, sell or exchange a few cattle. Only at 40/plus head can the peasant be regarded as achieving self-sufficiency. Thus a peasant who owns 20-40 cattle could be described as a middle peasant and one who owned 41/plus, could be a rich peasant. (Simkins 1981 : 276).

Using such criteria, Simkins found that in 1951, 6.6% of reserve households - or 47,000 - were 'middle' peasants, and 0.5% - or 3,500 - were 'rich' peasants. (Simkins 1981 : 276).

This was the case in 1951 after 12 years of rudimentary Betterment Planning. Whilst I do not have comparative statistics for the early 30's (and earlier), the above do give some indication of the process of differentiation that was reinforced. A negligible number of Reserve households belonged to the 'rich' category. As I shall indicate later in this chapter, these were probably chiefs and head indunas.

It would appear then that the official assessment that stock limitation was an answer to the problem - as perceived by state officials - of the declining Reserve economy, and the response through Betterment Planning, resulted in an increasing differentiation of the peasantry. This has resulted in an increasing proportion of dispossessed peasants - the rural proletariat - who became migrants or joined the rural reserve army of the unemployed. Further, it has resulted in the creation of a small group of middle peasants who have barely sufficient cattle to subsist and produce agricultural commodities.

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The concerns of the early 30's and the policy statements of the mid 30's of state officials, were finally encapsulated in Proclamation 31 of 1939. This was the first piece of Betterment Planning
legislation. It made provision for any Reserve area to be declared a "betterment" area once the local population had been consulted. There was no clear definition as to requirements of consultation. The proclamation enabled stock limitation measures such as cattle culling, and measures to limit the areas of arable land, to be implemented.

However, the recipients of the attention of the state's planners were by no means passive. Resistance was both passive and violent. However, officials viewed this resistance as irrational and as the result of trouble-causers. It was merely something to be overcome by zealous implementation, backed by the forces of law and order. Officials always seem to have believed that if the chief was consulted, this meant that 'the people' had been consulted. There appears to be no realization that the disruptive Betterment Planning process needed careful explanation, discussion with and agreement from those who were being planned for.

For example, the Chief Magistrate, Transkeian Territories, in his report for the NAD, July 1945-June 1947, reports that:

"In the Mount Ayliff District, as the result of continuous propaganda by the Magistrate, the Natives had voluntarily reduced their stock by 15,000 head. The Chief of the District was who\(\text{\textae}\)heartedly behind the movement for the reduction of stock and rehabilitation, which unfortunately received a check as a result of strong opposition from certain elements, which were interested in the undermining of the Chief's position and his removal from the Chieftainship ... Later on, representations made by the affected section to the effect that rehabilitation be stopped and that the Chief be removed from the Chiefship, I held a meeting at Mount Ayliff attended by approximately 1,000 natives. The meeting was informed that ... the government would not consider the Chief's removal ... After the meeting had closed and I had left, an assault was committed by a number of the malcontents upon another Native. Three of the persons concerned were subsequently brought to trial ... Since then a start has been made on the rehabilitation of the Elubaleko Location and all remains quiet in the district." (UG 14/1948 : 21).
In a similar vein, the NAD Review 1943-44 notes that:

"The same hostility to measures to protecting the land (as to culling) is apparent and in one district the Department has been obliged to enforce its regulations in the face of opposition in open defiance of the law." (quoted in Yawitch 1981: 13).

Whilst the above quotations are not particularly instructive as to the form and organisation of resistance, they do give a strong indication of the official attitudes to Betterment Planning. The administrators acted in terms of a policy determined by higher officials in the NAD. Administrative officials saw themselves as implementing a set of regulations for the betterment of backward and at times, obstinate natives. They operated in terms of regulations and had technical objectives to reach - numbers of cattle culled, livestock to be sold, or contours to be ploughed. Those 'malcontents' who objected and reacted were transgressors of the law and were beaten into submission by the enforcement of the law.

These officials found that there were loopholes in the regulations and proclamation and appealed for further legislation to close the gaps (see Yawitch 1981: 14). Proclamation 116 of 1949 revamped the legislation and introduced harsher penalties for transgression of the law. It also broadened the powers of the Native Commissioners. They were given the power to declare and implement Betterment schemes; fine or imprison those who transgressed the law; to call on any adult African male to provide his labour to construct dams, erect fences, burn firebreaks. Once declared a Betterment area, "any rights to occupy land, graze stock, etc., were terminated until a stock-assessment had been made and a planning report drawn up". (Yawitch 1981: 15). It also gave the authorities, in the person of the Native Commissioner, "the right to demarcate land into 4 areas, residential, arable, forestry and grazing. Although people were to be moved in accordance with its provisions, in practice little was done, and by about 5 years later [i.e. just before the Tomlinson Commission's Report] only 3% of Black areas had been dealt with in this fashion, mostly in Transkei." (Anonymous: 1980: 1-2).
Whilst only a small percentage of areas were actually planned over this period, a much larger number were declared Betterment areas and therefore the rights, described above, were suspended. This left the people in an uncertain state, especially when they heard of the results of the implementation of Betterment Planning in other areas. Not surprisingly, resistance reached a violent and widespread level.

Before discussing the resistance to the Betterment Planning resulting from the 1937 and 1949 Proclamations, it is important to note that it differs from that from the mid-50's onwards in that it is focussed almost entirely on the implementation of Betterment Planning. In the latter period it becomes intertwined with broader resistance to developments within the social formation.

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There are very few documented accounts of rural resistance in South Africa. The newspapers, commentators, researchers and authorities have tended to report only those incidents in which police have been killed or injured. H. Basner, a senator at the time, is quoted as saying;

"Cattle culling, squatters, ploughing allotments, chiefly powers versus trust-officials were the main issues. Most of the struggles were in the Northern Transvaal, and some were even fiercer and crueler than Witzieshoek, but unreported because only Africans and no police were killed. I received constant reports of bombed villages and had no reason to doubt the reports." (in Hirson 1976/77 : 120).

Witzieshoek provides an insight into the implementation of Betterment Planning in the early period, as well as into the people's response to that planning. It was declared a betterment area in terms of Proclamation 31 of 1939 and under this proclamation, a limit was placed on stock and the extent of land that could be ploughed by an individual. It was usual for 20 to 30 morgan to be ploughed by a household. In Witzieshoek this was restricted to 3 morgan per man, with widows getting only 1 morgan, irrespective of the size of their
families. This meant that families could not even nearly meet their basic food requirements, let alone a surplus for exchange for other subsistence requirements.

"It was estimated that the new small strips could not possibly yield half the required mielie (maize) crop under optimum conditions (given farming methods available at the time). Nor were these lands allocated on the basis of previous holdings. The division in Witzieshoek ... was decided by Chiefs, indunas or members of the Board of Management: those favoured friends or compliant followers who received the best (and largest) plots; others were removed from their land and given smaller plots or poor soil." (Hirson 1976/77 : 118).

This indicates that this early phase of Betterment Planning encouraged differentiation of the peasantry, by rewarding with access to larger amounts of land, the tribal leaders who co-operated with the authorities. Thus, this is the beginnings of the co-optation of 'traditional' leadership by giving these leaders the opportunity to become a relatively rich peasantry and to serve a political control and authority function.

In 1939 estimates were made by the authorities of the carrying capacity of the area and the Witzieshoek people were "persuaded" to cull their stock from 13,500 to 12,500 (Alcock 1977 : 25). Further estimations followed and a cull was ordered in February 1942. The leader of one of the smaller tribes in the area refused to cull cattle and was fined. Further culls were ordered and opposition mounted. Leader of the opposition was a sub-Chief, Paulus Howell Mopeli. The government commission of enquiry into the subsequent violent revolt in Witzieshoek quotes one resident as saying:

"In 1942 it was announced that only inferior cattle would be culled. New stock was being culled in order to reduce it. The tribe had been deceived. It did not accept the limitation of the stock." (quoted in Hirson 1976/77 : 123).
Evidence by a white storekeeper in the area seems to confirm the prejudicial implementation of stock culling:

"Much of the soil conservation work in the area was a scandal and a waste of money. The culling of stock was carried out haphazardly and many of the poorer Natives were prejudiced by it ..." (quoted in Moroney 1976)

In 1949 another assessment was made of the stock-carrying capacity of the area. This time the authorities set it at 10,000, i.e. 2,500 less than the first assessment 10 years previously. There is no indication of the methods whereby these standards were set and they were certainly not explained to the Witzieshoek people. However, Alcock notes that the assessments were made by

"European officials who had paid a fleeting visit to the Reserve, visiting only a few sections of the vast area. The Africans, who had watched the movements of the expert with interest, felt that these brief inspections were insufficient evidence for reducing their stock, and the Commission agreed with them. To add to the confusion, the commission obtained three other estimates which showed that the Reserve was in fact understocked." (1977: 25; see also Bowbrick 1970: 7-8).

The Witzieshoek people elected a three-man delegation to go to the Minister in Cape Town to ask for the implementation of Betterment Planning to be stopped. He refused and they returned to lead a resistance campaign which was both passive and violent. The chief and his headmen, who also stood to lose some cattle, in the end chose to side with the administration. Herson sees this as an expression of their "class interests" (1976/77: 124). However, as I have argued before (see chapter 2), the rich peasantry does not constitute a class, and certainly not in the South African social formation. Rather, it constitutes a very small group who occupy a position similar to that of managers and foremen in capitalist industry and
commerce. The state has co-opted them into serving as functionaries for political control and administration.

Led by sub-Chief Paulus, the majority of the population resisted Betterment Planning. Plantations were burnt, fences destroyed, cattle which had been impounded were rescued and very few took their cattle for culling in February 1950 — following the 1949 reassessment. Clashes with the administration and increased sabotage took place. There were threats to the workers engaged on government construction work in the area. The tribe split into two 'factions' and there were a number of fights between the two when, for example, the Chief's men prevented the opposition group from ploughing. A Commission of Enquiry was appointed. When it sat to hear evidence in the Magistrate's Court, 1,300 peasants demonstrated outside and then refused to give evidence and returned to the Reserve. Paulus travelled to Johannesburg where he met various members of the Communist Party of South Africa. This was interpreted by the commission as evidence of a conspiracy. The authorities then declared three people illegal in the Reserve under proclamation 31 of 1945. (see Hirson 1976/77: 123-124).

Groups of people gathered and there followed a clash with police during which 14 were shot dead and about 100 injured.

"Search planes and columns of police scoured the countryside and arrested everyone found in the surrounding area. Eventually 75 were brought to trial, and sent to prison for periods ranging from three months to five years. Witzieshoek was quelled, another labour force controlled, and chief Chale's rule was upheld" (Hirson 1976/77: 125) and, I might add, Betterment could be implemented.

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In 1945 there was a qualitative change and a broadening of the special focus of the Betterment Planning policy. A 1944 Proclamation had made Betterment Planning compulsory on all trust farms — i.e. those purchased by the Native Trust in the released areas described
by the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act (see Yawitch 1981: 14; Davenport and Hunt 1974: 42-46). Betterment areas had been declared in scheduled areas - i.e. those areas described in the 1913 Act - but the main focus seems to have been on the Trust areas. This focus was broadened in 1945 when the Secretary for Native Affairs, D.L. Smit, outlined his department's policy to the Native General Councils in Transkei and Ciskei. The scheduled areas - i.e. the Reserves proper - were to be 'rehabilitated'. This involved more than mere stabilization and reclamation.

"The scheme involved the demarcation of sites inside the Reserves for cultivation, for rotational grazing, and for land to lie fallow. At the same time rural villages were to be established for the families of Africans regularly employed in industry. No stock would be allowed in these villages but vegetable plots would, where possible, be made available. All surplus population would be settled in these villages, or removed to sites where rural villages could be established. In exchange the government would provide afforestation of the Reserves, the erection of fencing and soil conservation, stock limitation and preservation of water supplies." (Hirson 1976/77: 125; Yawitch 1981: 18-19, my emphasis).

This is the first time that rural villages, without an agricultural base, are mooted as being part of Betterment Planning. These are the 'closer' settlements which were to be an integral part of the NAD's and Tomlinson's plans for the 'development' of the Reserves and the complement to the Betterment Planned areas. They are the spatial expression of the Betterment Planning process and the migrant labour system - i.e. the poorest peasants who are finally dispossessed of even the 1 morgan of land in a Betterment Scheme are relocated into 'closer' settlements/rural villages. Betterment Planning, closer settlements and migratory labour are integrally linked. In the previous chapter, I argued that the early period of Betterment Planning represented attempts to carry out the "second option" facing the state and capital in restructuring the South African social formation in the post World War II period. Smit's rural village and relocation scheme for dispossessed poor peasants seems to me to be evidence of this.
Initially the Chiefs rejected the scheme. However, six months later after considerable pressure from the authorities and a devastating drought which reduced cattle by up to 40% - they accepted the scheme.

Resistance to the scheme was swift: Government surveyors were attacked; protests were organized; 'people's committees' were organized to defend those arrested; a secret organisation, the Kongo, was formed which was affiliated to a national political organisation, the All African Convention\(^1\); people were arrested, fined and banished from their areas; Betterment Planning officials were threatened and routed; the ANC Youth League became involved in Nqutu, Natal, where resistance was growing. A group of migrant workers in Port Elizabeth and East London put out a 'manifesto' which clearly and succinctly sums up the attitude of the people for whom Betterment Planning was designed:

"The scheme seems to be another cattle killing episode modernised.
The scheme is designed to impoverish, suppress the economic and social growth of the African in the Native Reserves. It is a means of preserving white superiority ..." (quoted in Hirson 1976/77 : 126).

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The above examples provide some insights into this period of Betterment Planning. First, land was inequitably redistributed in such a way that it reinforced peasant differentiation. Second, the majority of peasants were allocated land portions which were insufficient to meet merely their food subsistence requirements. Thus, they were forced into a greater dependence on migrant labour. Third, the system of implementation of Betterment relied on co-opted traditional leaders. This co-optation led to rifts between the peasants and increased pressure on their social relations within the tribe. Conversely, the mass of the peasants, by being reduced to virtual rural proletarians, had a common interest in resisting Betterment. In doing so they developed links with urban-based working class organisations. (See in particular Hirson's discussion of events in the Zoutpansburg area : 120-122).
The peasants were thus to become highly politicised and as I will show in the discussion of the later period of Betterment Planning - this led to resistance to Betterment Planning becoming incorporated into general political resistance and vice versa. Fourth, the significance of this is that Betterment Planning attacked - the limited access to the means of production that the peasantry had left - land and stock. The process of proletarianization led to fierce, but scattered and unco-ordinated resistance and in turn, this placed Betterment Planning firmly in the political arena. Fifth, and of greater significance, was that once 'consultation' had taken place with the political leaders, planning was implemented by the authorities by force, using the military and the police. Sixth, planning seems to have been 'engineering planning' (Malan, undated: 1), mechanistically implemented according to inflexible policy, using unspecified and unexplained standards.

The 50's saw a new phase of Betterment Planning, namely that outlined by the Tomlinson Commission. Although the state did not accept all its recommendations, nor implement those it accepted in a comprehensive manner, the Commission's report and guidelines have remained the source and inspiration of the later period of Betterment Planning. However, certain important events, which might have been influential in the Commission's appointment, preceded it. (The precise events, circumstances and issues leading to the Tomlinson Commission are severely under-researched. It is essential that any further study should research this period in detail.) I can only speculate that the state's choice of the "second option" (see previous chapter), the resistance by the Reserve peasantry, and growing general politicization of the Reserve and urban proletariat which was spurred by the implementation of legislation, such as the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, served to create a need for the planned 'development', i.e. control, of the Reserves. It was precisely this that Tomlinson set out to do, i.e. produce a blueprint for the planning, control and administration of the Reserves. (The context has been outlined in the previous chapter.)
A cornerstone of Tomlinson's blueprint was Betterment Planning, as he redefined and rationalized it. I find myself in complete agreement with Yawitch when she argues that:

Tomlinson's solutions were by no means revolutionary. They instead reflected and gave coherent form and rationalisation to the solutions that had been proposed since the war ..." (1981 : 29)

However, before preceding to a review and analysis of the Tomlinson Commission, it is necessary to discuss, briefly, the legislation which preceded Tomlinson, and its effects.

Proclamation 116 of 1949 updated the 1939 Proclamation. It set out to close the loopholes which the NAD officials had complained of, and introduced harsher penalties for infringement of Betterment measures. The implementation of the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act, in combination with 116 of 1949, ushered in "a new phase of the struggle". (Hirson 1976/77 : 127).

This Act essentially made explicit and further entrenched trends which were apparent in the early period of Betterment Planning, namely the co-opting of the traditional leadership and the finer differentiation process.

"For what the Bantu Authorities Act contained in embryo was the seeds of one of the most sophisticated divide and rule strategies ever devised. Chiefs were not to be salaried officials of the government; they could be deposed and removed by government authorities if it was felt that they were not carrying out their duties well enough, and a new chief chosen by the administration could be put in their place --- The initial period of Bantu Authority rule was marked by the deposition of many of the chiefs who refused to accept such legislation and their replacement by men chosen by the administration." (Yawitch 1981 : 23).

The relationship between the Bantu Authorities Act and Betterment Planning was quite simple: the state needed compliant chiefs, chiefs
who would agree to the Betterment Planning of their areas. Those who did not were dismissed by the authorities and replaced. On the other hand, those who did, were often killed (see Yawitch 1981: 23-24; NAD Report for the year 1950-51: 14) by those who opposed Betterment.

Given that the best documented and (possibly) the most severe resistance to this later phase of Betterment Planning broke out after the Tomlinson Commission reported, I shall first consider the Commission and its report before discussing and analysing the peasant's response.

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The government appointed a commission in November 1950, with Professor F.R. Tomlinson as chairman. The Commission's brief was to:

"conduct an exhaustive inquiry into, and report on, a comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the Native areas with a view to developing within them a social structure in keeping with the culture of the Native and based on effective socio-economic planning."


The Commission's report was published in summary form in March 1955 (UG 61/1955) and is probably the most comprehensive government study of the Reserves ever undertaken. It is neither possible nor necessary for this paper to review all the findings and recommendations of the Commission; but I will concentrate on those most pertinent to Betterment Planning. (For a summary of the recommendations and the government response to them, see NAD Report 1954-7: 62-67).

The Commission found the Reserves to be severely underdeveloped with up to half the males of working age away from the Reserves at any one time. Furthermore,

"farming in the Bantu Areas is conducted on a sub-maintenance or poverty basis ... The result is that the vast majority of families ... are obliged to supplement
their income from farming, by selling their labour, not only outside agriculture, but outside the Bantu Areas as well. A genuine farming class practising progressive agriculture does not exist." (UG 61/1955:112).

The Commission argued that this form of migrant labour resulted in low productivity in the subsistence agriculture sector and in wage employment. Therefore, it argued, the answer to both problems was to create two separate groups: full-time farmers and full-time migrants. In order to create full-time farmers, it was necessary to allocate certain families land for cultivation and stock which would provide them with enough food and income to be self-sufficient and have a small surplus. Those families which were not full-time farmers would be allocated residential sites in closer settlements (rural villages). These would provide the migrant labour. The Commission also proposed that rural industrialization schemes be started adjacent to those settlements.

The Commission quite explicitly set out to reconstitute a 'middle' peasantry — i.e. one which was not 'rich' (commercial farmers) nor 'poor' (part subsistence farmer, part migrant) — and a rural proletariat. The farmer would also be functional for the latter by supplying them the necessary subsistence commodities. This point was clarified and made explicit by Eiselen, Secretary of Native Affairs, in a report after the Commission reported:

"the surrounding regions must be planned in such a way that they can provide for the main requirements of the inhabitants of the townships (Bantu Rural Townships). This means, inter alia, that local Bantu farmers will be expected to supply dwellers in the townships with such necessities as milk, eggs, butter, meat, vegetables, fruit, firewood, building timber and so on, which will be paid for from the cash earnings of these new customers." (quoted in Board 1964:44).

The Commission turned to the Betterment Planning schemes as the basis for the full-time farmers. All that was needed was to rationalize it
and determine the minimum land and stock necessary to attract and
create a 'middle' peasantry, i.e. a suitable 'economic unit' needed
to be determined. The Ninth Report of the Social and Economic
Planning Council of 1946 had already recommended the division of land
into 'economic units', but it was the Tomlinson Report which actually
set out to determine them.

Before embarking on a discussion and analysis of the technical aspect
of the Commission's Report, the Commission's proposals reviewed
above, will be evaluated.

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The Tomlinson Commission report is undoubtedly a blueprint plan and
one which sets out to plan the Reserves in a coherent and
comprehensive manner in a way which is even more functional to
capital and the state's requirements than ever before. By
reconstituting a middle peasantry, separating out the poor peasantry
into a pure rural proletariat and having the peasantry supply the
rural proletariat with its subsistence commodities, this plan set out
to lower the necessary labour time of the migrant, by lowering the
value of the commodities necessary for his and his family's
reproduction. I have already described in chapter 2 the processes
whereby surplus value is extracted at an increased rate from the
peasantry. However, in terms of this plan, this surplus would be
consumed by the rural proletariat, thus lowering the value of their
necessary labour - and thus increasing the rate of surplus value that
could be extracted by capital.

This reconstituted peasantry does not mean that capital magically
recreated a feudal (or any other) mode of production. There are no
modes of production 'articulating' with one another. (as I have
argued in Chapter 1). Such an analysis would obscure the clear
objective set of relations that this plan set out to constitute: namely, the reconstitution of a form of exploitation in order that
the rate of exploitation (i.e. the rate of the appropriation of
surplus value) be increased.

On the political level, the plan was intended to create a stable
group - the 'middle' peasantry whose interests would lie in co-
operation with the authorities—the providers of infrastructure, credit, etc., and the guarantors of access to such means of production as land. The rural proletariat would send migrants to the urban areas for certain periods, but the political problems and economic costs of a permanent urbanised proletariat would be avoided since their families would remain in the rural areas. Once they had finished labouring, the migrants would be dumped back in the rural towns.

These rural areas would also be politically and administratively controlled by the co-opted 'traditional' leadership (who could be summarily replaced in terms of the Bantu Authorities Act should they prove unco-operative). This group came to constitute a miniscule petit-bourgeoisie in that they were salaried officials of the state and they were given access to economic units larger than the minimum.

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Betterment Planning in the early period of implementation had allocated land far smaller than that able to support a middle peasantry.

"The general pattern of planning as proposed by the Commission, for the agricultural development of the Bantu Areas, is much the same as that of the present "Betterment areas". Like the latter it provides for—

(i) residential areas divided into plots;
(ii) arable lands divided into units; and
(iii) common grazing grounds.

The essential difference between the two systems is that the present betterment areas have been planned to provide all families on them with an equal share in the use of the available arable and grazing land, while the Commission insists in the future, all stabilized land shall be divided into economic farming units, and that the number of families to be settled as farmers, shall not exceed the number of such units. Sub-maintenance farming cannot be allowed." (UG 61/1955 : 114 para 15)

The Tomlinson Commission therefore determined the minimum size of an economic unit and rationalized Betterment Planning into three phases.
1. Stabilization. This stage was designed to prevent further deterioration of the land and physical resources involved. It would protect grazing areas, improve water supplies, prevent further soil erosion and take measures to prevent floods ...

2. Reclamation. Whereas the above phase was essentially a static [sic] one, this envisaged a more active role for the government. This phase usually involved unused but potentially successful areas, or areas which had been stabilized and closed off as above, due to harmful agricultural practices. Such areas were treated with fertilizers, etc ...

3. Rehabilitation. This phase required the co-operation and aid of the people in the administration area decided upon. The provision of economic farming units was the final aim. This phase was intended to uplift the people educationally, socially and economically, by persuading them to adopt better farming practices and cash crops."

(Anonymous 1980: 2-3; see also Official Year Book No. 29/1956-7: 370-371)

The writer quoted above exposes (unwittingly) the more obvious faults in this conception of Betterment Planning. The first two phases, by implication, are thought not to require the "co-operation and aid of the people". Yet, (as I have shown in my review of the early period of Betterment Planning) it is during these phases that stock limitation is undertaken and access to arable land is curbed. These are the phases when co-operation and aid are most vital (see Cooper 1977: 2) and where experience had shown that fierce resistance resulted. I find it difficult to understand how the authorities thought they could implement the first two phases 'through the power of the barrel of a gun' and then expect 'co-operation and aid' in the final phase.

In trying to determine the size of an economic unit for a Betterment Planning scheme, the Tomlinson Commission was brought face to face with the degree to which the Reserves were underdeveloped and overpopulated. The Commission also implicitly took account of the impact of their recommendations and the likely resistance they would meet from the Reserve population.
First, the Commission set out to determine the minimum income that an economic unit would have to provide if "a class of contented, full-time Bantu farmers" was to be created (UG 61/1955 : 113). The summary of the report states that:

"Several witnesses suggested to the Commission minimum income figures with which to determine the size of farming units. The figure varied from £100 to £200 and most witnesses put forward a figure in the region of £120 [these are per annum]. Although no scientific reasons were given for these recommendations, the Commission carefully considered the figure of £120.

If £120 were to be adopted as the standard for determining the future size of the Bantu farming unit, this would mean that at least 80 per cent of the present number of families in the Bantu areas would have to be removed from the land. Not only would this be impossible to carry out in practice but, from a broad sociological standpoint, it would be wrong to uproot so large a portion of the rural population. Great population problems would be created."

VG 61/1955 : 113; aras 7 and 8; my emphasis).

The Commission halved the amount to £60, thereby reducing the proportion to be fully proletariarised to 50%. It does not attempt to justify how it is acceptable "from a broad sociological standpoint" to uproot 50% of the people "but unacceptable to do it to 80% of the people!" Nor does the Commission say on what basis people will stay peasants or proletarians.

"Nothing is said of the criteria to be used in the unenviable task of deciding who will be the fortunate people to be given farm units and who are to be dispossessed of the lands they hold at present, except that Boards will be constituted to make recommendations. In areas where there are Bantu Authorities ... these will be used." (Krige & Krige 1956 : 16).

The manner in which the Commission arrived at the figure of £60 is also hardly scientific. (2) A survey of 900 peasants produced 111 who apparently make their "full living" from farming. The Commission then added up their gross income and divided by 111. This yielded the princely sum of £56.6 per farmer. The Commission then went on to assume that when Betterment succeeded, farming practices would improve and this figure could double. Then, I presume, the NAD could claim it had "developed" the Reserves.
The determination of an economic unit is by a most abstract and mechanistic process: Economic units are calculated by the following formula:

\[
E = \frac{Aq + St}{B}
\]

where

- \( E \) = Number of Economic Units
- \( A \) = Factor A: obtained from table A
- \( B \) = Factor B: obtained from table B
- \( q \) = Total area of available arable land
- \( t \) = Total area of planning unit after deduction of villages, plantations, and any other land which is not available for grazing, etc.

Cattle units per economic unit are calculated by a similar formula. No account is taken of varying soil fertility or other agro-ecological differences. The planner simply applies quantitative statistics obtained from the report of the area to a set of standard tables and conjures up an economic unit.

There are two alternative determinations of a household subsistence level for this period. Krige and Krige found that in the Lovedu Reserve, it was - for a family of 5 - £150.15 (1956: 22-25) and even then, some families relied on migrant remittances to meet their subsistence requirements. Simkins has determined it to be £93.19 in 1952, £100.81 in 1953, £99.07 in 1955 and £105.94 in 1958. (Simkins 1981: 282). It would seem then that Tomlinson's economic unit would have to at least double the recommended size in order to produce a subsistence peasantry. To enable a 'middle' peasantry to produce a small surplus, even larger economic units would have to be allocated.

I have dwelt on these technical and empirical aspects of the Tomlinson Commission Report because I believe that they are the very core of its recommendations - insofar as Betterment Planning is concerned (see also Rogerson & Letsoalo 1981: 7). I have tried to show that, even had the full economic units been planned on the basis of an income of £60 per annum, they would not have provided for the basis of a middle peasantry. I think it is reasonable to speculate
that the threat of peasant resistance must have pressured the Commission into setting the necessary income for a middle peasant as low as possible. This in turn would enable more economic units to be allocated and therefore a smaller percentage of peasants would be dispossessed of their land and stock. (That resistance would take place anyway further points to the lack of foresight on the part of the Commission). I have tried to show how mechanistic and technicist the blueprint approach to planning was evidenced to be in the Tomlinson Commission's report.

I therefore conclude that Betterment Planning, had it been implemented as proposed by the Tomlinson Commission, could not have succeeded in its declared aim of creating a middle peasantry.

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I have shown in the review and analysis of the early period of Betterment Planning, that there is a vast gap between the written official perceptions of Betterment Planning and those of the recipients of such planning. In the final part of this chapter I shall therefore attempt to review and analyse the implementation, and the responses this provoked, of Betterment Planning in the Post-Tomlinson Commission period.

Two anthropologists, Prof. J.D. Krige and Dr. E. Krige published an assessment of the likely effects of Betterment Planning on the Lovedu Reserve, should the Tomlinson Commission's recommendations be implemented. I have already quoted their comments on the role of cattle in the Lovedu economy at the beginning of this chapter. The Commission had argued that the Reserves were 51% overstocked and stock would have to be culled. (UG 61/1955 : 114, para 19). The Lovedu were pastoralists. If their cattle were to be culled at this level, the Kriges concluded, the whole social structure of the Lovedu would be destroyed.

Using the economic unit criteria, they concluded that up to 90% of the Lovedu would have had to be removed into closer settlements -i.e. there would be 600 units for 6,600 families. They noted that those families to be rehoused - both in the closer settlements and in the residential areas of the Betterment scheme - would have to bear the
costs of relocation both in material and labour. The sum of £30 is their estimate, i.e. 20% of the family's annual income. The break-up of the Lovedu's village system would undermine family life.

"Today, when the husband is away at work, his wife remains under the watchful eye of her mother-in-law and other relatives of the village, his children in the general care of the adults and group of older boys and girls of the village. In the new settlements and villages, this control over the conduct of the wife and children in the absence of the father, will be greatly weakened. Greater disintegration and delinquency will follow." (Krige & Krige 1956: 19).

They concluded that there was nothing in the Report that would develop "a social structure in keeping with the culture of the Native", but rather, it would destroy the culture of the Lovedu by "breaking down and sweeping away the whole social order". (1956: 21). They conclude that the perceptions of the Lovedu to such Betterment Planning would be completely negative.

"At best it will be viewed by the people as the fantastic vision of a misguided, if benevolent despotism, at worst the ruthless imposition by a tyrant of a new way of life in which everything that is most valued will be trampled underfoot ..." (1956: 21) and that to implement the Betterment scheme: "a large and permanent police force would be required." (1956: 18)

This case study is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, two highly respected anthropologists were able to run through a scenario of the implementation of a Betterment Scheme before it was in fact implemented. Their warnings were ignored by the authorities. Second, another anthropologist has carried out a study - in the Transkei: - which bears out all the worst predictions of the Kriges. Other studies also indicate that their predictions were correct. Further research into Betterment Planning would be most fruitfully conducted at the 'anthropological level'.

A second case study is the Transkei Study referred to above. It was carried out by Professor M.C. O'Connell of UNITRA who lived with the people of Nzongisa, Mount Ayliff District in the north eastern Transkei, for 13 months (February 1978 - March 1979).
O'Connell draws attention to certain aspects of pre-Betterment scheme peasant life, which the planners have consistently ignored. The spatial arrangement of the homesteads engendered socio-economic relations which were functional and essential to peasant survival.

"Despite [sic] the scattered homestead pattern people were interrelated by an intricate network of ties which had been established and maintained over the years. A neighbourhood - and its inhabitants - was in fact autonomous in several respects. Living in a spatially discrete area, neighbours cultivated neighbourhood land and herded cattle on commonly owned pastures. Neighbourhood residents shared a unique history and common traditions which generated a powerful spirit of unity vis a vis people in other neighbourhoods ... From the human perspective resettlement threatens to disrupt these alliances, distort spatial - aesthetic experiences, replace something old and acceptable with something new and undesirable."

In 1961 the area was 'stabilized' and people from the adjacent neighbourhoods of Qabeni and Beqhuqhi were relocated in the residential village. It appears that officials attempted to have neighbours settle next to each other, but this was not always possible. The original Nzongisa residents still regard the Qabeni and Beqhuqhi people as aliens and strangers. They in turn claimed that the land they were allocated when resettled was inferior to their original land.

"The aliens ... brought their own bitterness to the new settlement, a bitterness which was accentuated by the sudden loss of space and privacy." (O'Connell 1980: 3).

Criminal activity rapidly increased. Theft and trespass, which had been minimal in the pre-Betterment period were the most common crimes. The regrouping of homesteads under the stabilization phase actually led to the ritual sanctions and secular control mechanisms of the pre-Betterment period being weakened. Conflict increased, often necessitating intervention by the police.

O'Connell also found that adultery has increased and, consequently, divorce. Migratory labour - which has increased since Betterment was implemented - further exacerbated the pressures on the social fabric of Nzongisa.
"In pre-Betterment area, adultery is curbed by several factors. ... It is inhibited by the fact that brothers, living in the same vicinity, can maintain a watch on an absent brother's wife. The spatial arrangement allows people to monitor the movements of everyone ... In a Betterment area such as Nzongisa the distribution of the brothers' homes, the close knit housing arrangement and the proximity to strangers all facilitate adultery." (O'Connell 1980: 4)

The new concentrated spatial arrangements of the stabilized residential areas have disrupted kinship structure and moral norms. Families have come more nucleated and isolated.

"People became and remain suspicious of neighbours and ... have grown reluctant to offer assistance with agricultural work. The social importance of commonal work has consequently waived ... With the erection of fences, people have erected social barriers which did not exist in the past." (O'Connell 1980: 4).

These effects of Betterment Planning are functional to the State and capital. Individualism breaks down unity thus facilitating political control. Agricultural production is also made more precarious, more vulnerable to drought and disease, and the family is forced to seek additional income from migrating labour. O'Connell found that migration had "increased steadily" from 1961 to 1980.

"Between May and June 1977 over half (54.9%) of all men between the ages of 18 and 65 were absent from Nzongisa. The 'migratory' rate for certain age groups was higher - 67.3% for men between 26 and 35, 68.9% for men in the 36 to 45 age groups."

These anthropological studies of Betterment Planning hint at another dimension of planning implementation that has yet to be properly researched. For example, increased migrancy and proletarianisation might not only be caused by a reduction in one of the means of production, namely land area per household. Betterment Planning in attempting to restructure the relations of production, has also disrupted and weakened particular sets of social relations. It is possible that this has led to increased vulnerability of peasant agriculture and increased dependence on selling their labour in the cities.
In the Nzongisa case study it is apparent that none of the residents had access to economic units as envisaged by the Tomlinson Commission. (In fact most had land which could only produce up to a five months food supply for a family of five.)

Other writers have also observed this discrepancy. Board in a survey of 9 'locations' in the King Williamstown district, found that only 41 families (3.7%) out of 1,090 had full economic units. The vast majority, 66.5%, had access to little or no land:

- 63 families (5.8%) had between 1/3 economic unit and 1 morgan
- 549 families (50.4%) had 1 morgan holdings
- 112 families (10.3%) had no arable land

(see Board 1964: 48-49).

Therefore, within a few years of the Tomlinson Commission, the implementation of Betterment Planning had failed to produce a stable full-time farming group.

The next set of case studies provide evidence of how and why the authorities did not and were unable to implement 'economic unit' Betterment Planning.

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Ceta is a betterment area, 16kms from Keiskammahoek in the Ciskei. It was declared a betterment area in 1947 under Proclamation 31 of 1939. A 1952 government survey concluded that it was overstocked and that large tracts of land were not suitable for cultivation. In 1958 a Betterment report was compiled by the NAD. It found that Ceta had a population of 1 880 people - 328 families, 90% of whom had arable land and stock, and only 1.5% had neither. The report stated that only 39% (193 morgan) of the 495 morgan under cultivation was suitable and that cattle-units would have to be reduced from 1 660 to 992. It recommended that half economic units be established. Quite why full economic units were not recommended is not clear. I can only speculate that the threat of resistance must have been
influential and that authorities decided to minimise this likelihood. Local 'Bantu Authorities' had already warned that the headmen and villagers were not in favour of the plan (see de Wet 1981(a) : 25).

The report recommended that 128 families be allocated half economic units, 30 families on an irrigated area and that the 170 "surplus" families be removed to a rural township to be sited adjacent to the scheme.

"The families to be moved would be selected by the advisory committees in the various villages subject to the approval of the Native Commissioner. It was implied ... that the poorest families and those least interested in agriculture [sic] would be moved." (de Wet 1981(a) : 26).

The report's recommendations were, however, not implemented. de Wet offers no explanation nor does it seem that anyone else offered such an explanation. In 1961 a revised scheme was put forward in which no families were to lose their access to the land. Also the idea of culling cattle seems to have been dropped. de Wet notes that his studies of the oral history of Ceta have not turned up any mention of cattle culling (1981(a) : 28; 1981(b).

de Wet argues that "the scheme ... had to adapt so as to minimize the potentially harmful effects of its own partial implementation." (1981(a) : 28). Comparing data from his 1980 study of Ceta, with that of the 1958 report, in addition to his detailed interviews with residents, de Wet concluded that the people were worse off and were more dependent on migrant labour (1981(a) : 28-29, 34). However, de Wet does not attempt an analysis of why Betterment Planning was only partially implemented.

These were substantial qualitative alterations to the theoretical 'ideal' of Betterment Planning as outlined by the Tomlinson Commission and the N.A.D. It appears that the authorities had almost completely retreated from the consequences of the implementation of full economic units.
Why so soon after the 'blueprint' had been produced, was it so substantially altered? I believe there are at least two major aspects to an answer. The first aspect was the massive political resistance - in which Betterment Planning was one of the major grievances - which grew steadily through the late 50's and very early sixties. The second was the changing role of the reserves in the 60's and 70's.

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The first part of this chapter has shown how the Betterment Planning has resulted in fierce resistance from the peasants. During this period resistance was largely sporadic and spontaneous. The major opposition political organisations were only marginally involved. When they were involved, it was usually after the resistance had begun. Links with urban organisations were largely confined to migrant organisations (see Hirson 1976/77; Yawitch 1981).

In the 50's, the peasants' grievances were gradually incorporated into the more established black opposition groups' demands. By the 60's rural dissent gave rise to its own organisations and revolt (Lodge 1978; 1981).

In a letter to the Prime Minister in 1951 the ANC called for a repeal of various laws and policies, amongst which they included the "cattle-culling policy on the Reserves" (Horrell 1971 : 22). Betterment Planning was incorporated as one of the issues which became part and parcel of the Defiance Campaign launched in June 1952.

The Bantu Authorities Act was passed in 1951. Its implementation went hand in hand with the Betterment Planning - as I have discussed previously in this chapter - and provoked resistance in all the Reserves (see Horson 1976/77; Horrell 1971; Yawitch 1978; 1981). The state also granted itself the power to serve banishment orders on Africans in rural areas.
The Bantu Authorities Act was only extended to the Transkei in 1956. However, the use to which it was put and the response to it is illustrative of the experience throughout the Reserves:

"... some of the leaders who initially accepted the new system became disillusioned and resentful ... widespread opposition ... developed, especially in Thembuland; a deportation from that area went to Pretoria to protest to senior officials; and the people boycotted the installation ceremonies of three newly-appointed minor chiefs. Four leaders were banished ... the Government decided to divide [the tribe] into two sections ... During the year that followed [1957] general unrest mounted, particularly in East Pondoland, the main grievances being high-handed actions by certain chiefs in accepting betterment schemes ... and in appointing members of Bantu authorities in a manner which was not in accordance with tribal custom. Influx control and increased taxation appeared to be contributory causes" (Horrell 1971 : 35-6).

The Kongo seems to have been revived. Government chiefs were murdered, kraals were burnt and betterment infrastructure and services were destroyed. The Chiefs built up their own private armies of bodyguards, and retaliated. The Reserves were wracked with internally focussed violence - what is often dismissed as "faction fights". At times these coalesced and became rebellions and revolts of which three have been documented - the Mpundo, Sekhukuneland revolts and the 1959 Natal riots.

Unrest in Natal had occurred before the '59 riots. Chief Cyprian Dinizulu had accepted Betterment Planning for the Tokazai location in the Nongoma district (Yawitch 1981 : 26). This was totally resisted by the people who refused to move into the new settlement area.

However, after some period a group agreed to move, and fighting broke out between them and the resisters. Yawitch does not indicate why this group agreed to move, whether they were families of headmen or families who previously had little or no land and stock. The class basis of such groups needs further research for this change in attitude led to resistance being internally focussed:
"The anger of the people was turned inwards and members of the Community began to fight each other ... the resultant trial of 29 men charged with murder broke the back of resistance." (Yawitch 1981: 26)

The 1959 Natal riots mainly involved women. It was a response to Betterment schemes, the extension of passes to women, the Bantu Authorities Act, etc.

Dipping tanks were often the target of the women's ire. This may seem inexplicable at first. However, dipping tanks, as part of 'betterment' were an important element in the control of cattle by the government. They were the points at which officials could get access to the cattle.

"Dipping was compulsory and had to be carried out once a fortnight, those who did not bring their stocks to the dips being subject to a fine of £5.00. It was widely believed throughout Natal at this time that dipping was responsible for the poor condition of cattle, and that it made bulls impotent. Rumours were also rife that if people would not voluntarily let their cattle be culled, they would be poisoned during dipping." (Yawitch 1978: 212)

The authorities also compelled the women to fill the tanks, heavy, exhausting work, without payment. The unrest continued for some months. It involved about 20,000 persons of whom 1,000 were arrested and convicted.

In 1960, the resistance in the Transkei boiled over in a widespread revolt and the Poqo organisation emerged. At one stage the revolt was so strong and widespread that an alternative form of government emerged in the districts of Bizana, Lusikisiki and Flagstaff. This was called the Hill Structure. The peasants met in secret in the hills to organise and co-ordinate resistance and day to day affairs.(2) The revolt was eventually put down by the police, acting under legislation passed in terms of the State of Emergency declared for the area.
Faced with such response to their measures to restructure the economic and political control mechanisms in the Reserves, it is apparent why the authorities were forced to only, at best, 'partially' implement Betterment Planning. As I have shown, this meant that very few economic units were ever delimited. A stable middle peasantry was never created. Only the privileged few (mainly) Bantu Authority collaborators were given sufficient access to land. These failures are concealed in the reports of the relevant government departments and bodies. They are concerned only with reporting quantitative data, eg: the area planned in morgen; area planned as a percentage of total area (Reports of the Soil Conservation Board 1961-62: 11; and of 1962-63: 14-15). However, these figures conceal whether Betterment Planning has in fact been implemented. Whilst the Soil Conservation Board report that by 1962, 22.07% of KwaZulu had been planned, my own research shows that by 1980 only 25% of the tribal areas had had Betterment Plans actually implemented (Seneque 1981: table 2).

Further, my discussions with officials of the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, have elicited that even these figures conceal the true state of affairs in the planned areas. Many of them were planned over 20 years ago and some schemes have broken down altogether with people moving back to their pre-Betterment settlement and agriculture pattern.

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The second aspect of the answer as to why Betterment Planning has not been implemented according to the Tomlinson and NAD formula, is that of the changing role of the Reserves in the transforming South African social formation in the 60's and 70's. I have dealt with this towards the end of the previous chapter. However, the importance of these changes is now apparent in the context of this analysis of Betterment Planning.
To recapitulate: Capital's, and particularly agricultural capital's labour requirements have changed. Full-time labour as opposed to tenant labour is needed. Industrial capital in its period of secondary industrialization required a stabilized workforce. Political unrest resulted in the state choosing the 'second option' — namely permanent/long-term migrant labour. One aspect of this option was the increased implementation of Betterment Planning which involved the creation of a rural proletariat. In addition, between 1960 and 1970, 1 million people were forced to resettle in the Reserves. If these people were to also be crammed into areas alongside the 50% made landless by the implementation of full economic betterment units, the potential political costs would have been far too high. As it is, the closer settlements have turned into vast, seething rural slums of discontent (see Rogerson and Letsoala 1981; Freimond 1981).

By re-allocating miniscule portions of land to all residents of Betterment areas, the State has avoided the high political costs. In doing so it has co-opted a small political group who act as state functionaries to ensure administrative control. The migrant labour system has been reinforced and control decentralized to an expedient degree. As Yawitch noted:

"The Reserves, or rather their population, were never intended to be supported and propped up by the state. Always throughout South African history it is they who have had to serve the needs of the rest of the country." (1981: 39)
FOOTNOTES

(1) For a discussion of the AAC, see Horrell 1971: 14-16. It appeared that, at this time, the AAC had a far more 'radical' opposition stance than did the ANC.

(2) It is neither necessary nor is there the space to detail this interesting and relatively ignored period of South African history. For further details see Lodge 1978, Yawitch 1978, 1981, Horrell 1971.

(3) This and other calculations of the Tomlinson Commission have been comprehensively criticised by Lipton (1977). This article sparked a lively but not altogether enlightening debate. See Tomlinson (1979); Lipton (1979), Tomlinson (1980); Lipton (1981). What the debate does indicate is the difficulty of obtaining sound data concerning agricultural production in the Reserves. See also Simkins (1981), and Westcott (1977) for further agricultural data.
CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Modernization theory has been shown to have an inadequate conceptual framework. The Dependency theory with its neo-Marxist concepts has been unable to move beyond an explanation of underdevelopment to provide a theory to inform praxis, i.e. the 'liquidation' of underdevelopment. The Marxist critique of underdevelopment theory, whilst providing a more rigorous infusion of conceptual categories, became entangled in the rarified atmosphere of abstract grand theory.

The articulation of modes of production debate was also unable to develop theory for action for practice. First, it used abstract simple categories in a vulgar Marxist manner. This led to forms of exploitation and production being equated with relations of production. Hence social formations were found to be characterised by numerous non-capitalist modes of production which 'articulated' with one another.

This confusion was compounded by the omission of concepts of class and class struggle. The social formation is characterised by the CMP and is transformed through the class struggle, and not through various modes articulating with one another. The debate reduced the casual explanation of historical change and development, to the interaction of abstract concepts. Banaji's and Cleaver's insights have however provided the conceptual framework for the concrete analysis of the social formation, for understanding the causes of its transformations. Any form of practice, including Betterment Planning, must therefore be located in the context of the class struggle.

The penetration of indigenous social formations during the colonial period, and even before, by the CMP, resulted in the alteration of the relations of production to those of the CMP. However, certain forms of production functional to the CMP as the social formation
transformed, were maintained. One of these is to be found in the creation of the peasantry. Through the processes of commoditization and monetization, indigenous agriculturalists came to form a peasantry and were incorporated into the capitalist system. The form of production, where it was functional to the basic dynamic of the CMP - capital accumulation - was adapted as a form of exploitation.

The rise and decline of the South African peasantry is evidence of these processes at work in a transforming social formation. The historical development of the class struggle between capital on the one hand and the working classes on the other resulted in the delimitation of the Reserves, to which the poor peasantry and rural proletariat have been confined. Originally the role of the Reserve economy was to provide for certain subsistence needs for the migrant labourer, thus depressing the worker's necessary labour time and increasing the rate of exploitation. However, the processes of underdevelopment resulted in the decline of the subsistence base of the Reserves. Consequently, there were pressures at the rate of exploitation.

The State from the late 30's made attempts to halt the decline of the Reserves. Early Betterment Planning can be seen as part of these attempts. The rapid development of industrial capital during the 40's led to many workers moving to the urban areas. The political threat and economic cost of this change to capital and the State led to the attempt to 'develop' the reserves by creating a stable 'middle' peasantry and a large rural reserve army of the proletariat. This second or later phase of Betterment Planning led to even greater resistance than in the earlier phase by the peasantry. In addition, the role of the Reserves was changing to that of providing a social security and political control function. Consequently, Betterment Planning was forced to adapt to these pressures.

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Betterment Planning was first implemented in order to halt the declining ability of the Reserves. The peasants were seen by the
planners as obstacles, as constraints to the conservation of the land and to increasing its productivity. Right from the beginning, Betterment Planning has been infused with the "engineering" approach to planning. Even then the criteria by which certain standards were determined, such as stock-carrying capacity of the land, seem to have been arbitrary and unscientific. Similar mistakes were made by the Tomlinson Commission when it attempted to determine the economic unit necessary to reconstitute a middle peasantry.

The planners have been consistent in ignoring the very people they are supposed to be developing. Their mistakes which were highlighted by the Commission of Inquiry into the Witzieshoek incidents, were repeated. The Tomlinson Commission worked out a formula for determining the stock-carrying capacity of land in Betterment schemes. This is mechanistically applied to all Reserve areas with only minor adjustments to take account of their broad agro-ecological differences.

In similar fashion, the size of arable lands to be allocated to each family, has been arbitrarily determined. I have found little evidence that the Betterment Planners have ever attempted to understand the socio-economic and socio-political circumstances of the people for whom they are planning. No understanding of the importance of cattle to the peasantry has been displayed by any state official or planner. Similarly, I have found no evidence to indicate that the planners made any attempt to understand how the peasants perceived their environment, and perceived what their needs were. Betterment Planning was conceived and implemented in a top-down way.

Furthermore, the evidence suggests that it was conceived in terms of the political and economic requirements of capital and the State. Hence, the harsh and determined implementation by the authorities in the face of strong resistance. Rural development planning for these purposes is certainly not likely to result in the development of the rural people, but rather their further underdevelopment. For the process of underdevelopment to be reversed, rural development planning must be geared to the needs and aspirations of the poor
peasantry and proletariat. They must be an integral part of and have control of the planning process, or else the planning will be geared or co-opted towards the needs of the state and capital. Such rural development planning is highly unlikely in the present and foreseeable future, given the structures and relations of production of the South African social formation.

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The resultant resistance to Betterment Planning was inevitable. Yet the authorities' response was to crush and control any resistance, and continue to implement Betterment Planning where possible, and in a modified form if necessary. Another response was to 'consult the people'. Yet this merely consisted in many cases of informing the chief. It ignored the tensions and conflicts between groups. It assumed a homogenous group and ignored the developing class tensions between rich peasants and aspirant petit-bourgeois elements on the one hand, and poor peasants and rural proletarians on the other.

Even when the 'traditional leaders' rejected Betterment Planning, the authorities were able to replace them with a nominated chief, and forcefully implement Betterment Planning, with the police in attendance to ensure compliance. Any rural development planning which has to be implemented under the barrel of a gun (or the threat of one) can only fail.

More importantly, the harsh implementation of Betterment Planning has left a deep bitterness and suspicion in the minds of the people in the Reserves. Planning has only negative connotations. Whilst I was on a field trip, a Betterment Planner explained that up to the 60's the Zulu word for planning was "Ukudabula". However, the resistance to planning and the consequent negative perceptions of it, led to Betterment planners trying to introduce a new word for planning. This is the word "Uhlelo", which has connotations of "putting things in order". However, the planner noted that his department's agricultural extension officers were careful not to use this word in describing their tasks, so that they would not be associated with planning in any way.
No future attempts at rural development planning in the Reserve areas of South Africa can afford to ignore the bitter legacy of Betterment Planning. No plan can be put together in an office and imposed on people who perceive their environment and needs quite differently to the planner.

My analysis of Betterment Planning has suffered from a number of limitations, some of which may be overcome by further research. At various points in this paper, I have alluded to these and it will be useful to summarize these and through them, indicate the limitations of this study.

There is a need for further research into the period preceding the early period of Betterment Planning. This would involve applying the conceptual advances of Banaji and Cleaver in order to develop a clearer understanding of the changing forms of exploitation, and the process of underdevelopment which led to the Betterment Planning being implemented. Further research is needed on the State's perception of what functions Betterment Planning was to have played in the late 30's and early 40's. Betterment Planning appears to have been largely confined to SADT released areas. Quite why this was so, needs explanation. My analysis of the detailed circumstances has been limited by the lack of published historical research of this period. Consequently, the level of explanation has been confined to the general explanation that Betterment Planning was initially a response to the declining subsistence production in the Reserves.

Similarly, research is needed concerning the period immediately prior to and after the appointment of the Tomlinson Commission. I believe that a more detailed explanation is required of the failure to implement the Commission's recommendations. It is possible that the nature, and the State's perception of, the restructuring of the social formation during this period, changed markedly during the Commission's tenure. Consequently, it might have been 'out of date' by the time it reported. More detailed studies of the Betterment
planning reports submitted during this period, and after the
Commission's Report was tabled in Parliament, would enable a better
understanding of conditions in the Reserves, as perceived by State
planners.

Much of my evidence of peasant resistance to Betterment Planning has
been drawn from government reports and secondary sources. In order
to gain a greater insight into the peasants' reasons for resisting
Betterment Planning, a possible avenue for further research is court
records of those brought to trial as a result of clashes with the
authorities.

Whilst such studies as those by Yawitch (1978; 1981), O'Connell
(1980); Krige and Krige (1956) and de Wet (1981a and b) do cast
valuable light on particular instances of the implementation of
Betterment Planning and the peasants responses to and perceptions of
it, further research needs to be informed by planning criteria.

---oOo---

Planners on the subjective level, are so often obsessed with "tidying
up the landscape", in creating neat grid layouts and reordering the
environment to fit the various colours they have daubed on a map in
the splendid isolation of their offices. For them the quintessence
of creativity and design must be a Mondrian painting. The ability of
planners to recognise the multi-dimensionality of other social
groups' perceptions of their environment, is severely limited. The
history of the conception and implementation of Betterment Planning
in South Africa bears testimony to this. Planners who ignore this
history, who do not understand it, who are not able to plan without
the power of the gun, will fail.
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