FACULTY OF HUMANITIES, DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

PUBLIC PERCEPTION ON PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN ABUJA, NIGERIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY

By
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Submitted in Fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree, Doctor of Philosophy in Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies, School of Social Sciences University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College Campus, Durban.

Supervisor: Dr. Gerelene Jagganath
June 2018
DECLARATION

I Ola Adegboyega Adedolapo, declare that:

1. The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original research.

2. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

3. This thesis does not contain other persons’ data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons.

4. This thesis does not contain other persons’ writing, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written sources have been quoted, then:
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Student: Ola Adegboyega Adedolapo

As the candidate’s supervisor, I certify the above statement and have approved this thesis for submission

______________________________
Supervisor: Dr. Gerelene Jagganath
DEDICATION

This research work is dedicated to the Almighty God, the Author, Knower and Finisher of my faith. In whom I return all glory.
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<th>ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>AMAC</td>
<td>Abuja municipal area council</td>
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<td>AMISON</td>
<td>African Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>ATT</td>
<td>Arms Trade Treaty</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>DICON</td>
<td>Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSS</td>
<td>Department of State Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Council</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<td>IANSA</td>
<td>International Actions Network on Small Arms</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improved Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGP</td>
<td>Inspector General of Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPCR</td>
<td>Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic States of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEND</td>
<td>Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJTF</td>
<td>Multinational Joint Task Force</td>
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NATCOM                                  National Committee for the Control of Small Arms and Light
Weapons
NATO                                        North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBS                                           National Bureau of Statistics
NCAPISA                                  National Commission against Proliferation of Illicit Small
Arms
NCM                                      Nigerian Custom Service
NCPSALW                              National Committee on Proliferation of Small Arms and
Light Weapons
NDC                                      National Defence Collage
NEMA                                      National Emergency Management Agency
NGO                                          Non-governmental Organisation
NIS                                      Nigerian Immigration Services
NPF                                      Nigerian Police Force
NSA                                      National Security Adviser
NSCDC                                     Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps
OECD DAC                                  Development Assistance Committee
PDP                                      Peoples Democratic Party
RECSA                                    Regional Centre on Small Arms
SADC                                      Southern African Development Community
SALW                                      Small Arms and Light Weapons
SMJTF                                    Special Military Joint Task Force
SPSS                                      Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
START                                    Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism
STF                                       Special Task Force
TPA                                       Terrorism Prevention Acts
UN                                      United Nations
UNCTAD                                United Nation Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP                                      United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO                                United Nations Educational Social and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR                                    United Nations High Commission for Refugees
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPoA</td>
<td>United Nations Programme of Action to Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNROCA</td>
<td>United Nations Register of Conventional Arms</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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ABSTRACT

Small arms, having the attributes of being readily available and easy to use, have been the primary tool of the terrorist attacks in every part of the world including those of Abuja, Nigeria. Wide availability, accumulation and illegal flow of small arms tends to escalate conflict, terrorism and insecurity; and hinder development, social stability and good governance. The main objective of the study was to examine public perception on proliferation of small arms and light weapons and it’s the impact on peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria. The specific objectives were to examine the factors that stimulate the proliferation of small arms and light weapon in Abuja, Nigeria; examine the relationship between small arms, terrorism and insecurity; assess the nature of the threat posed to peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria; examine the strategic options that were utilised by the Nigerian security sector to enhance peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria. The study adopted a mixed method research approach involving a descriptive survey design. A sampling of 113 and 20 respondents was adopted quantitatively and qualitatively in the Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC).

The major findings were that: (i) the ineffective control of small arms led to their proliferation, accessibility and availability in the possession of unauthorised users in Abuja, Nigeria causing various terrorist attacks and great havoc in the city; (ii) rogue military and security personnel aided the proliferation of weapons to the possession of illicit users; (iii) lack of a national database and registration of small arms and light weapons, along with the absence of an effective marking, recording and tracing system for SALW also contributed largely to the proliferation of small arms; (iv) there is a positive correlation between the availability of small arms and terrorist attacks, it was also discovered that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a major cause of terrorism in Abuja; and (v) terrorism is a major factor that threatens peace and security in Abuja, which led to the death of many civilians and loss of properties.

Based on the findings, it was recommended that: (i) the Nigerian government should increase the strength of the regulating agencies in charge of the Nigerian borders such as the Nigerian Customs Service, Nigerian Immigration, Nigerian Police, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency and other security forces, which should be provided with adequate and functional modern technical equipment for arms detection; (ii) establish an arms bearing national body or agency that will monitor and guard the stockpile, diversion and misuse of small arms and light weapons in the country; (iii) the 1959 Nigeria Fire Act should be reviewed and amended in accordance with the Economic and Community of West African State Convention (ECOWAS).
and the United Nations Programme of Action to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects (UNPoA); (iv) the Nigerian government should seek assistance and cooperate with foreign countries and relevant agencies towards resolving the issue of illegal arms trade into the country in order to reduce and control the problem of small arms proliferation; (v) the civil society groups should cooperate better with the government in terms of arms control and the fight against illicit arms.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction
This study investigates public perception on proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja and its impact on peace and security. This chapter presents the background of the study and is followed by the statement of the problem. The specific objectives emanating from the overall objective of this study are highlighted and the research questions derived from the problem statement are stated. This chapter further outlines the scope and significance of the study. Finally, it presents the basic concepts used in the study, and the structure of the thesis is also presented in this chapter.

1.1 Background to the Study
There has been consensus for the past 20 years about the devastation caused by small arms and light weapons (SALW) around the world, especially in African states (Stohl & Hogendoorn, 2010). There has also been a disturbing increase in terrorism due to the illicit proliferation of SALW in Africa, which poses a great security challenge. Small arms and light weapons could be regarded as any portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, or may be readily converted to expel or launch, or is designed to expel or launch a shot. Such weapons include everything from revolvers and pistols, machine guns, light anti-tank weapons, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and recoilless rifles (Small Arms Survey, 2014). Anders (2007) states that small arms could be regarded as the weapons of choice for terrorists, insurgents, as well as crime syndicates, which have the potential to undermine stability and security, bringing about domestic violence and armed crime in developed and developing nations of the world. From conflict to crime and from acts of terrorism to the countless acts of violent repression by states, all these are caused by the illicit and misuse of SALW. Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter provides for the right of states to use force, exercised through the instrumentality of arms in defence of their sovereignty. These rights allow states to manufacture arms locally or acquire arms through arms trade for the purpose of national security and defence of territory against foreign invasion. However, the continuous diversion, illegal manufacture of small arms and light weapons and leakages from national stockpiles has given rise to the proliferation and misuse, thereby posing a threat to human development, peace and security of a nation. According to Secretariat (2015), about 8.5 million SALW are manufactured every year in the world, 12 billion bullets are manufactured every year, and about 308,000 people were killed by arms between 2007 and 2012. It was also estimated globally, that between 640 and 750
million SALW are in distribution around the world, 100 to 160 million in Africa, where they are mainly in possession by the civilian population and non-combatants (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2009).

Klare (2014) notes that uncontrolled and illegal transactions of small arms is the major cause of terrorism and violent crises all over the world. Small arms are widely used in various terrorist attacks across different countries and regions, such as Abuja, Nigeria, owing to their perceived advantages, being unsophisticated, small, light, cheap and portable. Various armed conflicts have resulted in the death of civilians who are victims of indiscriminate warfare and terrorism. Moreover, LeBrun (2016) and Gunaratna (2002) believe that SALW are the main tools of terrorist violence. The scholars explain that most terrorists use firearms and explosive weapons, and by controlling their availability the scale of terrorist violence could be reduced. Access to illicit SALW contributes to the development of terrorism and can also represent a crucial challenge to a nation’s security (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2015). Between 37 and 47 weapon industrials are producing small arms and light weapons in sub-Saharan Africa. The major manufacturing amenities are situated in more advanced African countries, such as South Africa (Small Arms Survey, 2013). Proliferation of small arms and light weapons in African countries has not only caused the death of millions of both civilians and non-civilians, and has undermined development, humanitarian delivery and economic aid in the region (Stohl & Tuttle, 2009, p.22). Similarly, Edeko (2011) believes that there have been about 6 million casualties recorded in Africa alone for the past five decades due mostly to the availability and misuse of small arms and light weapons. Causalities of small arms crimes have led to the deaths of about 30,000 people in the western part of Africa every year (Chelule, 2014; Ero & Ndinga-Muvumba, 2004). The illegal transaction of small arms contributes significantly to the violence in the West African region specifically as criminals and terrorists are free to use the weapons to maim, injure, kill civilians and destroy properties (Ochogwu, 2015).

The widespread of illicit small arms and light weapons is a menace to peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria, causing great security challenges. The Nigerian military and other security forces have focused their efforts, for instance the occurrence of Islamic extremism and domestic terrorism of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria (Ayuba & Okafor, 2015). These terrorist activities were responsible for the twin bomb blasts in Abuja on the 1st of October 2010, when Nigeria was celebrating her 50th independence anniversary, in which 12 people were killed (Onuah, 2011). The Boko Haram group, with the aid of small arms, has staged several bombings in Abuja, which have resulted in the loss of many lives. The presence and continued
increase in illicit small arms threatens peace and security, as it contributes towards the destruction of lives and properties whilst exacerbating terrorism, crime and anxiety in Nigeria’s federal capital territory, Abuja, upon which this study is based.

1.2 Statement of the Problem
For the past few decades, proliferation of small arms and light weapons has been one of the major threats to peace and security across the globe. In Africa, SALW promote and sustain various conflicts and crimes (Chelule, 2014). In West Africa particularly, the easy access and availability of small arms to unauthorised persons and groups is a major security threat (Stohl, 2014). Bashir (2014) states that the illicit proliferation of small arms does not only destroy human lives and their properties but also exacerbates ethnic conflicts in the western region of Africa. Abuja, Nigeria is not an exception. The incidences of terrorism and crime perpetrated by individuals, suicide bombers and organised criminal groups in Abuja were carried out through the use of illicit weapons in circulation. Illegal availability of SALW caused a major security threat in the Abuja region.

Previous research and existing literature seemed to dwell on the effects of small arms proliferation on the Nigerian national security of various regions and states. While scholarly contributions on the discourse from Ugwuja (2016); Osimen (2015); Usang et al. (2014); Obilor (2013); Saroja (2012); Nte (2011); Obuoforibo (2011); Edeko (2011); Badmus (2010); Naagbanton (2007); Thom-Otuya (2009); Onuah (2006); Ojakorotu and Okeke-Uzodike (2006); Garuba (2007); and Hazen and Horner (2007) examines the proliferation of small arms in the Niger/Delta region of Nigeria primarily, little attention has been given on the Rivers and Delta State.

Ukwayi et.al (2017) examines the public perception of small arms epidemic and conflicts in Oke-Ogun area of Oyo State, Nigeria. Okeke and Oji (2014) discuss the Nigerian state and the proliferation of small arms in the northern part, while Gyong and Ogbadoyo (2013) investigated public perception of the proliferation of illegal small arms and ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna metropolis, Kaduna State, Nigeria. Also, Ochogwu (2015); Ibrahim (2015); Ayuba and Okafor (2015); Jekade (2005) researched the general perspective of small arms and their impact on Nigerian national security. These are indications that no study has focused specifically on small arms proliferation and its impact on peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria.

Furthermore, previous studies on Nigeria indicate that the accessibility and abuse of small arms in ethnic, religious crises, violent conflicts and armed robberies have killed and displaced
Nigerians without considering SALW as a cause of terrorism. Researching Abuja, as a case study has not been explored based on the terrorist attacks; it presents another area for the researcher to consider, in terms of the challenges and impact for peace and security. The study attempted to contribute positively to the existing literature on arms control by expanding the frontier of research to a specific locale in Nigeria and to find meaningful solutions in achieving a peaceful society. This has been the motivation to embark on this research.

1.3 Research Objective
The main objective of the study is to examine the public perception on proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja (Nigeria) and what the implications were for peace and security. To achieve this objective, the sub-objectives included:

- To examine the factors that stimulated the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja (Nigeria).
- To examine the relationship between small arms, terrorism and insecurity in Abuja, Nigeria.
- To assess the nature of threats to peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria.
- To examine the strategic options that were utilised by the Nigerian security sector to enhance peace and security in Abuja (Nigeria).

1.4 Research Questions
In trying to assess the issues raised by the research objectives, there was the need to answer the following questions.

- What were the factors that stimulated the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja, Nigeria?
- What is the relationship between small arms, terrorism and insecurity in Abuja, Nigeria?
- What was the nature of threats posed to peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria?
- To what extent were the strategic interventions of the Nigerian security sector effective in enhancing peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria?

1.5 Scope of the Study
Abuja is the capital city of Nigeria and it is also located in the centre of Nigeria. It has a land area of 8,000 sq. km and it falls within latitude 7 45’ and 7 39’ (Abubakar, 2014). Abuja is situated in the north of the confluence of the River Niger and the River Benue. It is bounded on the north by Kaduna State, on the west by Niger State, on the east and south-east by
Nasarawa State and on the south-west by Kogi State. Abuja comprises of six area councils namely; Abaji, Abuja Municipal, Bwari, Gwagwalada, Kuje and Kwali area council. While Grawi people, also referred to as Gbagyi or Gbari are the original inhabitants of the area (Abubakar, 2014). The study examines public perception on the various threats to peace and security in Nigeria, using Abuja as a reference point in relation to the widespread and availability of small arms and light weapons. In view of this and due to the time constraints, it might not be appropriate for a researcher to contemplate covering the whole of Abuja. This study, therefore, was designed to concentrate on Abuja municipal area council, which is the administrative hub of Nigeria. In addition, the decision for the selection of Abuja municipal area council (AMAC) was informed by the illicit proliferation of small arms and threat to peace and security.

1.6 Significance of the Study
The findings emanating from this study will add to the body of knowledge on the gap identified in the factors that stimulate the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria, using Abuja as a reference point. The study will clarify the link between small arms, terrorism and insecurity, utilising threats to lives and properties as mediating variables. The significance of the study is centred on an attempt to interrogate the nature of the small arms proliferation and its effect on peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria. The study will thus enable us to examine the role and strategies put in place by the Nigerian government and security sector in the control of SALW and enhancing peace and security in Abuja. Therefore, the outcomes of this study will extend the frontiers of knowledge and research in the field of conflict transformation and peace studies. Also, it will serve as a relevant policy mechanism that will bridge the existing gaps of ideas and knowledge for policy makers and security practitioners in the fight against illicit small arms proliferation and its control in Nigeria. Finally, this study will also be an advocacy tool for civil society groups and non-governmental agencies who are actively involved in the political liberation in Nigeria, but who ignored the issue of small arms proliferation, to enable them to see reasons why they should also support and fight along with government in arms control and prevention of the widespread of illicit small arms, in order to secure peace and security in the country.

1.7 Conceptual Clarifications
Any meaningful conceptualisation of a concept must begin from a context-based approach which cannot be independent of each other (Osaghae, 2009). It is, therefore, necessary to clarify the following concepts in this discourse in order to enable an in-depth understanding of the
relationship between these concepts (Ogunnibi, 2013). In the following, the study attempts a conceptual discourse of some concepts central to this thesis; such as small arms and light weapons, terrorism, arms possession, accessibility of arms, arms control, arms proliferation, state, peace, security, national security, human security, Nigerian security sector. The above is to bring clarity to the researcher’s use of a particular term.

1.7.1 Small Arms and Light Weapons
There has been no established general or universal definition by various scholars and researchers on small arms and light weapons (SALW) (Kalashnikov, 2012). There is no consensual literature on the definition of small arms and light weapons. A variety of attempts at defining SALW which were encountered in works of literature reviewed show that small arms are defined either by configuration, size or user perspective (Chigozie, 2010). The Encarta Dictionary defines small arms as firearms that may be both carried and discharged by one person, while New Lexicon Webster’s Dictionary of English describes small arms as guns manufactured to be held with one or both hands while being used. The Small Arms Survey (2014) classifies small arms and light weapons as any portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, or is designed to expel or launch a shot. These include everything from revolvers and pistols, machine guns, light anti-tank weapons, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, recoilless rifles, single-rail-launched rockets and 120mm mortars. Similarly, Renner (1997) describes small arms as dangerous weapons that could be handled by an individual. This, according to Renner, includes all forms of weapons ranging from revolvers and pistols to machine guns, light anti-tank weapons, and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. The United Nations General Assembly (2005) defines SALW as weapons that are designed to explode or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive. Diarra (2005) also maintains that small arms include: pistols; sub-machine-guns; portable anti-tank guns; recoilless rifles; assault rifles; light machine-gun; heavy machine-guns; portable launchers of anti-tank missiles and rockets system; portable launchers of anti-aircraft missiles systems; and mortars of calibres less than 100mm. The Regional Centre on Small Arms (2004) defines small arms as a designed tool for personal use, which includes light machine guns, machine pistols, fully automatic rifles, assault rifles, and semi-automatic rifles. The UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (1997) considers SALW as weapons ranging from knives, clubs and machetes to weapons particularly below the calibre of 100mm-small. Small arms are those weapons manufactured to military specification and designed for use by one person, whereas light weapons are those used by several persons working as a crew. Likewise, Klare (2004) classifies small arms as
weapons for individual use, and believes that light weapons are manufactured for a crew of people. According to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2017), SALW are all crew-portable direct weapons of a calibre less than 50mm and which include a secondary capability to defeat light armour and helicopters. The United Nations Economic and Social Council (1997) define small arms as clubs, knives, machetes, revolvers, self-loading pistols, rifles, rifles, carbines, submachine gun, assault rifles, and light machine guns. While light weapons are being classified as heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft and anti-tank, guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missiles systems and mortars of calibre less than 100mm.

From the categorisation and definition above, SALW embodies a vast spectrum of different kinds of weapons and are not as ‘small’ and ‘light’ as their name may suggest. Small arms and light weapons have the potential to inflict pain and threaten lives that could lead to the death of civilians.

1.7.2 Terrorism
At the most immediate and least disputable level, terrorism is the most fundamental source of insecurity in world today including Nigeria. Terrorism, which is a global phenomenon where no one is safe, is defined by Onuoha and Ezirim (2013) as “the premeditated use of violence by a person or group of individuals to cause fear, destruction or death, especially against civilians, and destruction of properties in a nation, intended to force those in authority to respond to the demands and expectations of the individual or group behind such violent acts” (p.3). Article 1 (3) (a) of the OAU/AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism defines terrorism as any act that violates the criminal law of a state party and which may put the life of an individual in fear, or cause injury or death to a person and the occupants of a region; destroy properties, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage; and is calculated or intended to intimidate, put fear, coerce or include any government body institutions, or the general public to do or take a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or upset any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or create general insurrection in a state.

The United States Department of State defines terrorism as politically motivated violence perpetrated against civilian targets by subnational groups, usually intended to influence an audience (US State Department, 2001). Using the criteria model, the definition ascertains three events that distinguish terrorism as political violence: political motivation, non-combatant and subnational group or clandestine group. The use of non-combatant as a criterion in the
definition refers to both the civilian and the military. An attack on the military personnel and installation in a time of peace or absence of conflict can be regarded as terrorism. Such acts include the bombing of the United Nations Office in Abuja in 2011. The definition reveals that terrorists are goal targeted; they are invariably intended to influence government policies. Such policies could be social, religious, ideological and nationalistic. This is quite different from personal and criminally motivated violence such as robbery and homicide. Meanwhile, what makes terrorism unpredictable and alarming is its covert nature.

Similarly, Stern (2000) argues that terrorism is “an act or threat of violence against civilians, with the aim of intimidating or otherwise influencing an attention” (p.11). The non-combatant in both the US State Department and Stern’s definitions seems to be a terminology that is subjective, bearing in mind that the subjective term cannot deal with an objective concept like terrorism (Ganor, 2012). Hence, Stern’s definition is obvious on the concept of non-combatant and indistinctness inherent in terrorism. Enders et al. (2011) posits that terrorism is the deliberate use, or threat to use, violence by individuals or groups against non-combatants in order to achieve political or social aims through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of immediate victims. In a similar opinion, Hoffman (2006) also describes terrorism as a deliberate instigation of fear through violence, or threat of violence, in the pursuit of political gain.

Likewise, Pojam (2003) observes that terrorism is the deliberate killing of civilians and military personnel to purposefully instil fear for political aim. To corroborate Pojam’s position, Chomsky (2001) argues that terrorism is the use of coercive means aimed at the populace in an effort to achieve political, religious or other aims. According to Ehiane (2016), deliberate civilian targets is a contentious argument and it actually separates terrorism from other forms of political violence, such as guerrilla war.

However, at the continental level, the African Union (AU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (AU Convention, 1999):

…delineates terrorism from an African perspective as an infringement of the criminal laws of a state party and which may threaten the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number of group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to intimidate, put in fear, coerce or induce government (AU Convention, 1999, p.3).
1.7.3 Arms Possession
Arms possession in this study means ownership of arms regardless of how the weapons were acquired, stored, carried or used.

1.7.4 Accessibility of Arms
This means an immediate availability of weapons at the scene or sight of violence. Accessibility depends on how weapons are acquired, stored and carried. This study recognises the fact that some accessible arms could be stolen, illegally transferred or captured.

1.7.5 Arms Control
Arms control is a means of reducing and controlling the use of arms. It also advocates efforts that are taken to monitor availability and utilisation of arms by various actors. Schmidt (2010) notes that arms controls are efforts, through international agreements, to limit or reduce war-making capabilities by restricting the quantity and quality of arms. Viotti (2012) similarly opines that arms control can be described as a deliberate action with a view to ensuring peace and a secured society by reducing the danger of armed conflict and war, or limiting its consequences, as well as minimising the dangers inherent in the existence or future deployment of modern weapons. Okodolor (2005) states that arms control is any plan, arrangement, or process, resting upon explicit or implicit international agreement, governing any aspect of the number, types, and performance characteristics of weapon systems. There are several national (National Commission of Arms), regional (Economic Community of West African States) and global instruments (United Nations) aimed at controlling the proliferation, trafficking and illicit use of small arms and light weapons in order to reduce armed conflict, crime and terrorism in the world. According to the Small Arms Survey (2010), arms controls should be regarded as the regulatory measures and controls governing small arms and light weapons. Most of the arms in society nowadays are diverted to unauthorised, non-combatant and illicit end-users, such as civilians. Various small arms measures, therefore, serve to strengthen the physical control over the storage or illicit trade of arms and ammunitions (Ochogwu, 2015).

1.7.6 Arms Proliferation
Arms proliferation in this study means illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of arms, either within or without a state.

1.7.7 State
State in this study means a geographical entity that is controlled by authorities in government through governance. State has been recognised as the supreme power within a defined territory for the past few centuries (Mayrl and Quinn, 2016). State sovereignty institutional authority
within a set of clearly demarcated boundaries is self-justifying; historical possession of legitimate continued jurisdiction (Barkin and Cronin, 2010). It is further argued that legitimation requires that power be converted into authority, competence be supported by jurisdiction, and possession be validated as ownership. State are concerned with the social wellbeing of its citizens, as well as ensuring peace and security of her sovereign territory against internal and external invasion. According to McElroy (2008) peace and security can only be sustained if state authorities perform their basic functions, control their territory and maintain law and order in the society.

1.7.8 Peace
Peace can be defined as the state of harmonious relationship, absence of violence or war, and freedom from disputes, ensures justice and social stability, and prevents mental stress or anxiety between individuals, groups, states or nation. Peace could also be described as the absence of dissension, violence or war; a state of concord, harmony and tranquillity (Miller & King, 2005). According to Galtung and Webel (2007), peace is a state of absence of hostility, disturbance or agitation. In other words, peace reigns where there is a state of justice or goodness and a balance or equilibrium of powers, or where natural respect for one another’s rights, ideas, views or citizens are observed and taken into consideration. Peace is primarily concerned with the creation and the maintenance of a just order in society. Miall (2000) tries to define peace by analysing it in six different ways:

- The absence of war
- Justice and development (absence of structural violence)
- Respect and tolerance between people
- Tranquillity or inner peace (spiritual peace)
- Gaia (Harmony or balance in, and with, the ecosystem-ecosphere)
- Wholeness and ‘making whole’ (being complete)

1.7.9 Security
Security is a delicate and significant issue, which conveys different meanings to scholars, analysts, policymakers and organisations across the globe. Fundamentally, security has to do with the presence of peace, safety, gladness and the protection of human and physical resources, or the absence of crisis or threats to human dignity, all of which facilitate development and progress of any human society. The concept of security has become a
preoccupation for the decades following the end of the Cold War, which could also be referred to as a landmark for the diverse schools of thought regarding security studies. Security, as a concept, has diverse dimensions. It is aptly used in psychology, finance, information access, public safety, defence and military matters.

According to Nwolise (2009), security has to do with the process connected with assuaging any threat to people and their precious values. It is in line with the above that Buzan (2008, p.57) asserts that security is about freedom from threat and the ability of states to maintain an independent identity and their position.

Over the years, the meaning, concepts and general architecture and outlook of security have continued to change from a state-centred apparatus and monopoly to a more deregulated field, where the new perspective and inclinations have challenged the otherwise monopoly and status quo. The concept of security is multidimensional, and those analysing the security usually define security depending on their analytical purposes and practical problems. There was a time when security was purely seen as defence and security forces a prepared or physical and empirically discernible item that can be seen and felt. To this extent, emphasis was placed on physical security protection and a show of strength. Apart from security being an art of physical defence, it was viewed to be synonymous with acquisition/procurement, retention and usage of military hardware as well as prosecution of wars and protection of sovereignty of a country. Security could also mean the capability to repel external threats and maintain law and order within a territory. While none of these may be outside the scope and realm of security, its understanding can further be expanded to include new constructs, assumptions, and perspectives. This is encapsulated in the views of Seiyefa (2009) who notes that the emerging concepts in security (management) de-emphasise the use of force as the primary mechanism of response. These concepts further minimise the prominence of state actors as the primary medium for threat appreciation, security planning, security implementation and monitoring/evaluation. These models stress the evolvement of creating relationships between states and non-state actors towards peacebuilding.

Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution, Section 14 (2a) for instance, declares, “Sovereignty belongs to the citizens of Nigeria from whom state, through this constitution derives its power and authority”. This presupposes that whatever security plan or design that has to be put in place for the protection and effective running of the state must, as a matter obligation be aligned to suit the positive aspiration and good of the common people. This is in cognisance of the
people’s belief that the state will protect them adequately and effectively when they have transferred their right of self-defence and protection to the state. Fayeye (2011) argues that security is not the business of security agencies (and perhaps government) but the responsibility of every Nigerian. Remarkably, he notes, "the people are the country’s first line of defence and its most valuable resource. He further maintains that Nigerian security planning must give priority to gaining widespread support and gaining a mass base for the safety awareness of citizenry. This is the crux and significance of security as a pivot for development by way of enthroning an atmosphere of peace for the common good of all. This also emphasises the human component of security as essential and inevitable in the new world order. Security can be regarded as a pursuit of freedom from various threats and the ability of governments and societies in general to ensure peace, security and development against all forms of threat. Security is survival, but it also includes a substantial range of concerns towards human existence. Buzan (2008) in his work, ‘People, States and Fear’, veers towards a broader understanding of security-based levels and sectors. The three levels that are referenced and addressed in detail in his work are individuals, states and international systems. The sectors, which he also addresses are societal, political, military, economic, societal, and environmental. These concepts cannot adequately address the issue of security separately, each one is intricately and complexly linked with the next forming a web of information that a security analyst or international relations authority must detangle to understand each concept individually in order to be able to see how they affect each other as a whole. Afolabi (2015) refers to security as a situation that occurs as a means of ensuring the protection of persons, information, and property against hostile individuals, influences and action. It is the existence of conditions within which people in a society go about their daily activities without any fear or threat to their lives and properties. It encompasses every method of ensuring the protection and safeguarding the citizenry and the resources of every individual, group, business and the nation against sabotage or violent occurrence. According to Igbuzor (2011) the ultimatum of security is the safety from continued threats and protection from harmful disruption. He believes that security can be described as the stability and continuity of livelihood, and protection from harm, danger and threats from criminals and terrorists from the neighbourhood. He goes further to believe that security could be said to be a psychological sense of belonging to a social group in order to ensure safety, peace and security.

The above conceptions hold that security is an essential aspect of life. It is the basis of all forms of likelihood in any society; it only means assurance of self-preservation, stability, and a
predictable environment where people perform their activities without destruction, harm, danger and without fear of molestation and injury. Security of a land ensures internal and international solidarity while its absence pushes the world into the abyss of friction and insecurity. Nigerian security is, therefore, the sum total of security of all individuals, ethnic groups, communities and all institutions within the territory called Nigeria. It is thus the safety and security of the property of the individuals and institutions that exist within Nigeria and outside the country.

1.7.10 National Security
According to Anyadike (2013) for a state to possess national security, it needs to possess economic security, energy security, environmental security, and particularly human security. A security menace entails not only the threat from other states but also non-state actors, which include violent non-state actors, multi-national corporations and non-governmental organisations, narcotics cartels, some authorities even include natural disasters and events causing severe environmental damage in this stage. Measures to ensure national security include: marshalling economic power to facilitate or compel cooperation; maintaining effective armed forces; using diplomacy to rally allies and isolate threats; implementing civil defence and emergency preparedness measures, including anti-terrorism legislation; ensuring the flexibility and redundancy of critical infrastructure; using intelligence personnel to detect threats and espionage, and to protect classified information; using counter-intelligence services or secret police and the private security sector to protect the nation from internal threats.

The national security question involves many issues, which include food security, environmental security, old age security, health security, education security as well as securing the territories and borders of a nation against external threat. National security is a multi-dimensional process of protecting the lives and properties of citizenry and the nation from internal and external threat (Asiegbu, 2015). A nation that is free of threat to peace and security will experience development. Therefore, national security and national development are interchangeable. National security is a concept that the authorities of a state should ensure, by protecting its citizens against any form of national crisis and threat. The concept developed majorly in America after the Second-World War. Initially focusing on the armed forces might, it now encompasses a broad range of facets, all of which impinge on the non-military or economic security of the state and the values embraced by the nation at large. In addition, to ensure national security, a state needs to be well grounded in economic, energy, environmental security, and human development and so on. Security threats are not only conventional foes
such as other nation-states actors, but narcotics cartels, non-governmental organisations, multi-national corporations, and some authorities include natural disasters and events causing severe environmental damage in this category:

1. Using diplomacy to rally allies and threats.

2. Marshalling economic power to facilitate or compel co-operation.

3. Maintaining effective armed forces.

4. Implementing military defence and emergency preparedness measures (including anti-terrorism legislation).

5. Ensuring the resilience and redundancy of critical infrastructure.

6. Using intelligence agencies to detect and defeat or avoid threats and espionage, and to protect information.

7. Using security personnel to protect the nation from internal threats.

1.7.11 Human Security
Since the early nineteen hundreds, the concept of human security has been the focus of many debates in the political system, in international and regional organisations and governments of different regions, as well as in the academic and intellectual fields. The 1990s witnessed the emergence of new security concepts such as human security, indicating a paradigmatic shift from the dominance of national (and international) security to the growing importance of transnational, subnational and individual security. Whereas previously security had been defined as national security, understood as the state’s ability to defend itself against external threats, it now came to encompass the notion of human security, which moves away from governance to focus on the protection of individuals. Despite consensus regarding the main goal of human security, proponents of the concept disagree on its scope – that is, the types of threats individuals need protection from. The narrow understanding of human security confines it to violent threats to individuals. According to former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, it is the “protection of communities and individuals from internal violence”. Others advocate a broader understanding of the concept, moving beyond protection from armed conflict to include protection from economic insecurity, natural disasters, disease, food insecurity and threats to human dignity. In its guidelines on helping to prevent violent conflict, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistant Committee (DAC) notes that security is:
...increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the governance of their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and the basic necessities of life, and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and wellbeing (p.13).

Since the early 90s after the Cold War, there has been an awareness of the multiplication of civilian threats to security, be it at international, regional, national or local levels. A great deal of theoretical and practical efforts have been made to detect the most suitable modalities to deal with threats, given the compounded impact of intra-state conflicts, the degradation of the region, worsening of extreme poverty, spreading of pandemics and political exploitation of cultural and ethnic differences, particularly on the most vulnerable populations. Human security focuses mainly on the human welfare. Hence, different scholars point out definitions and explanations of human security for better understanding and clarifications.

The phrase ‘human security’ is most often associated with the 1994 Human Development Report on Human Security. The intent of human security is to bridge the freedom from want and freedom from fear, freedom that lays at the heart of the United Nations. The phrase ‘freedom from fear’ is intended to indicate freedom from violence, and the phrase ‘freedom’, freedom from poverty.

Human security is the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and persuasive environmental, food, economic, health, personal and political threats (United Nations Development Programme, 1994).

In a somewhat more modified definition of the concept of human security, Annan (2001) maintains that:

Human security does not only mean the absence of violence. It covers good governance, human rights, healthcare, access to education and ensuring that each person has opportunities and choices to fulfil his own potentials. Every step in this direction is also a step towards the reduction of poverty, preventing conflict and achieving economic growth. Freedom from threat, freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment- these are the interrelated building blocks of human- and therefore national security (p.1).
Since threats to life, health and safety are essentially threats to human dignity, this definition can be further simplified. A succinct definition of human security is useful and necessary, and while running the danger of semantically closing the door on the manifold concepts embraced by the concepts of human security it can better focus on the academic (and practical) debate on the essential aspects of human security of people against threats to human dignity. The United Nations Educational Social and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) (2000) proposed that the important enrichment of the notion of security in international law by an individual dimension has been instrumental in paving the conceptual way forward for human security. The need for states to accept responsibility for global citizens is essential (Thomas, 2000). Before the evolution of human security, national security was often founded in an absolute reading of national sovereignty and equated with the security of the regime in power, protected by the military. The international community’s commitment to provide for peace not only between, but also within states, and by a new interpretation of sovereignty, has put an end to this. Human security is a condition of existence which entails basic material needs, human dignity, including meaningful participation in life of the community, and an active and substantive notion of democracy (Thomas, 2000).

Karim (2014) posits that human security can be described as the protection of individuals from risks to their physical or psychological safety, dignity and well-being; it also debunks the question of ‘security’ from its traditional conception of the safety of states from military or revolts to concentrate on the safety of people and communities. Yoneda (2014) notes that small arms and light weapons are becoming a serious threat to human security. Based on the fact SALW are easily available and accessible, the proliferation and misuse of these weapons has contributed to the aggravation of armed violence, not only in times of violent conflict situations but also in peace time, causing a threat to a nation’s security. Regarding the impact of SALW on human security, the OAU report (2000) states that:

The proliferation and illicit trade in small arms and light weapons have adverse effects on human security, especially women, children and other vulnerable groups, and on infrastructure. Furthermore, the misuse of arms promotes a culture of violence and destabilises societies by creating a propitious environment for criminal and contraband activities. Violence caused by small arms undermines good governance, jeopardises fundamental human rights, and hinders economic development. It exacerbates armed conflicts, the displacement of innocent populations and threatens international humanitarian law (OAU, 2000, p.14).
1.7.12 Nigeria Security Sector
The security sector is comprised of armed forces, paramilitary units, the police and the intelligence service. It also includes the judicial and penal systems, as well as civil society, which plays a significant role in democratic control. The security sector thus comprises all those organisations that have the right to protect the state, as well as the civil structures responsible for their management. The key fault in this definition is that it is confined to the state sector. Non-statutory security actors such as liberation armies and private military and security companies, if not considered as part of the de facto security sector, must at least be acknowledged as key factors that influence this sector. As for the literature, particularly focused on security sector issues in the African context, it appears that definitions of what comprises the sector are in line with the norm. In the words of Ball and Fayemi (2004) the security sector could be said to be:

All the institutions of the state responsible for securing the state and its population from fear of violence. The security sector consists of the military, the police, and intelligence agencies, related ministries/departments, paramilitary forces, and governmental oversight organisations (p.15).

Ball and Fayemi acknowledge that several other actors, both official and non-official, form part of a security community that affects the quality of governance of the sector. Hence, an analysis of security sector reform should focus on this entire security community to include non-state security organisations as well as non-statutory civil society bodies. Ball and Fayemi distinguish between state and non-state security organisations by describing the former as those groups that can legally use force to protect the state and its population. Again, this is a state-centred approach.

Also, Hanggi (2004) defines the security sector in a slightly broader context to include not only ‘groups with a mandate to wield instruments of violence’ and those institutions that have managing and monitoring responsibilities, but also the judiciary, penal system and human rights ombudsmen. According to Hussein et al. (2004), the OECD Development Assistant Committee describes the security sector as a terminology used in the security system, which encompasses the traditional set of actors associated with the sector, namely the security forces and the relevant civilian bodies and processes needed to manage them:
state institutions which have a mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against violence and coercion (e.g. the military, police and paramilitary forces, the intelligence personnel; judicial and penal institutions; and duly elected and appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight like the Parliament, the Executive, and the Defence Ministry (p.2).

The OECD DAC has since revised this explanation to encompass four sets of actors. The UNDP defines the security sector in a more encompassing way, which includes non-statutory civil society groups – professional groups, the media, advocacy organisations, research organisations, non-governmental organisations, religious organisations, and community groups, as an integral part of the security sector (Hussein et al., 2004). The above definitions move away from the state-centric approach, as it tends to include all other sorts of various non-governmental actors in the state. Hänggi and Tanner (2005) describe the security sector from two perspectives namely: the security perspective and the state perspective. From the state perspective, security is all those state institutions with a formal mandate to ensure the safety of a state and its citizen against an act of violent coercion. Yoroms (2014) discusses the security sector from the perspective of state that cover the element of public sector responsible for the exercise of state monopoly of coercive power and includes the elected and appointed civil authorities responsible for the management and control of security forces; such as the executive leadership of government, the relevant ministries, such as the Ministry of Defence and Interior. Ebo and Powell (2010) note that the security sector refers implicitly to those bodies, which challenge the authority of the state through force. Ehrhart and Schnabel (2005) also postulate that security sectors refer to the intricate network of an institutional instrument or bodies of people that can either positively or negatively affect public safety and the rule of law. The security sector comprises the state, and its allied agencies as well as non-state actors whose functions and overall activities interrelate and affect security outcomes, results and dimensions. This touches on policy, law enforcement, justice administration, and general oversight and control. The security sector in Nigeria includes, but is not limited to, the following agencies: the Presidency, the National Assembly, the Judiciary, Ministries of Defence, Interior, Finance, the military, Nigeria Police Force (NPF), Nigeria Customs service (NCS), Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), National Intelligence Agency (NIA), Department of State Security (DSS), Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), Nigeria prison service (NPS), the Civil Society Organisation (CSOC) and development agencies etc. According to Ochogwu (2015), there have been several reported cases of leakages from official arms stockpiles because of
theft by corrupt personnel, armed robbery/terrorist attacks on police/immigration/customs outposts in some parts of Nigeria. Also, Iwori (2012) reports that a serving comptroller of Nigeria Customs, Mr Jack Bot, was arrested for gun running after allegedly buying arms and ammunitions from the Niger State Police command. Also, the case of Major A.S Akubo and five others court-martialled in 2008 for the theft of over 7000 small arms and light weapons from the Nigerian Army ordnances unit at Jaji Military Base in Kaduna State of Nigeria. The above concepts connote the meaning of the terms used in this study. This concept is arranged based on the importance of the specific terms of the thesis.

1.8 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is organised into the following six chapters:

1.8.1 Chapter One: Introduction
Chapter one serves as an introductory chapter. It presents the background of the study, the statement of the research problem, research objectives, research questions, the significance of the study, the scope of the study and conceptual definition of terms, such as small arms and light weapons, terrorism, arms control, peace, security, national security, human security and the Nigerian security sector.

1.8.2 Chapter Two: Literature Review and Conceptual Framework
Chapter two presents a literature review on arms trade and its motivation among states, proliferation of small arms and light weapons at international level, Africa and Nigeria in particular. The sources and consequences on peace and security in Nigeria are also examined. In addition, the chapter presents the conceptual framework guiding the study.

1.8.3 Chapter Three: Research Methodology
Chapter three explains the methodology and research design adopted for this study and justifies their use. The study adopted a descriptive research approach. This is necessary to adequately examine public perception on proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja, Nigeria and the implications for peace and security. A cross-sectional approach was adopted to collect data, utilising the principles of concurrent transformative mixed methods. Chapter four also presents the population of the study, the sampling technique, the research instrument, procedures for collection and processing of data, validity and reliability, ethical requirements, as well as the strength and challenges of the research instruments.
1.8.4 Chapter Four: Quantitative Data Analysis and Presentation of Finding
This chapter presents the quantitative results. Quantitative data is analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS) version 23.0. It employs descriptive statistics in the analysis of the results. Descriptive statistics are employed to analyse the demographic data of the respondents in terms of sex, age, educational background, years lived in Abuja, as well as marital status.

1.8.5 Chapter Five: Qualitative Data Analysis and Presentation of Data
Chapter five presents the results of the qualitative study. Qualitative data is analysed manually. It employs ‘content analysis’ in determining or identifying the various themes.

1.8.6 Chapter Six: Discussion of Findings, Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation.
This chapter presents the discussion of both the quantitative and qualitative results, as reported in chapter four and five. It begins with the discussion on the quantitative results and is followed by the qualitative results. The discussion is presented in relation to the research objectives and questions. The findings are discussed in order to provide an adequate understanding of the focus of the study, and expand the frontiers of knowledge on the consequences of small arms and light weapons. Furthermore, the chapter provides a summary, recommendations and conclusion based on the findings of the study in line with its stated objectives. A conclusion of the entire study is presented, and its scholarly contribution to knowledge in the fields of conflict transformation and peace studies are highlighted, as well as limitations and suggestions for future studies.

1.9 Conclusion
The chapter provided background information on the effects of illicit small arms on peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria, constituting a major source of destruction to lives and properties. This laid the foundation for the problem statement, research objectives and questions, the scope and significance of this study which were presented. This chapter also provided the basic understanding of small arms and light weapons, arms control, peace, security, national security, human security and Nigerian security sector. Finally, the structure of the thesis was also presented.

The following chapter focuses on arms trade and proliferation of small arms and light weapons at an international level, Africa and Nigeria.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 Introduction

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section is a review of relevant literature and contributions from scholars related directly to the study. It aims to summarise key points already covered and to identify the existing gaps which this thesis intends to fill. The review of literature covers the works of scholars on the following issue areas: global perspective of arms trade, challenges of small arms to peace and security, African perspectives of small arms and challenges, illicit proliferation of small arms and sources in Nigeria. Accessing empirical studies and information on SALW in Nigeria is a challenge as most works has most of the previous studies largely depend on secondary research. Quantitative and qualitative research involving fieldwork has been significantly fewer. However, the chapter gives an account of the various challenges of small arms in Africa including Nigeria and examines the various sources of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria. The second section critically examines the conceptual framework upon which study is grounded - Small Arms Survey Group framework and Krause’s concept of arms proliferation and control.

2.1 Literature Review: Global Perspectives of Arms Trade

The international arms trade is a global enterprise that is very crucial to states, private security companies, and various individuals. The purpose of arms trade might be for political, security or financial gain depending on the motives. Noronha et al. (2013) analyse two categories of arms transfer, legal and illegal. The legal part is the transfer/trade that is accepted by the law of a state or by international law, while the illegal aspect is an illicit method of arms transfer, based on the fact that the transfer is a violation of national or international laws without formal consent or control. According to Lamb and Dye (2009) arms trade can be executed through land, sea, transport agents, intermediaries or brokers. They go further to state that arms deals, whether legal or illegal, are very difficult to analyse and capture in an international sense. Both the developed nations of the world as well as the developing world, which includes some African nations that produce arms and ammunitions, find it difficult to provide information on arms transactions through the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms Database (UNROCA) for public notice, simply because of the covert nature involved in the transactions. Similarly, Bourne (2007) highlights that the legal international trade in small arms between
states was developed at the end of Second World War, where two typical images or categories of global SALW spread were recognised. The first emphasises a large illicit market; whilst the second reveals the ‘major producer’ states as the primary culprits in the arming of autocratic governments and brutal rebel movements. He adds that the spread of SALW to conflict zones, is caused by the illicit diversion of small arms. This is in line with the conceptual framework, referred to as a stock analysis of the Small Arms Survey (2008). Bourne states that the international legal market in SALW has developed through three key phases, characterised by a loose and decreasing supplier oligopoly. In the first phase from the post-World War II period until the mid-1960s, the foundations of the global legal SALW trade were established. As suppliers traded surplus arms and built SALW industries, a structure of core and periphery markets emerged. The core being “the world power associated blocs and China” that accounted for major transfers, which occurred basically within the emerging trading blocs between states (Bourne 2012:3).

In the second phase, from 1962 to 1988, the major suppliers shifted their attention towards southern States, thus generating a global SALW trade. During the Cold War period, supplier attitudes in the major conventional arms trade had a major effect on SALW availability. However, supplier-client patterns were looser than for other types of weapons. This was due mainly to the range of suppliers outside of the central supplier blocs, looser bloc discipline in trading relationships for SALW, and the importance of national production for many major recipient nations (Bourne, 2007).

There was a drop in the primary conventional arms trade between the manufacturer and client in the third phase, especially after the Cold War. The end of the Cold War signified a low transaction of small arms, as a result of broader market structure in the major conventional arms trade, such as technology transfer, links with a broader geo-political division, and industry privatisation. Bourne (2007) however maintains that this explains the evolutionary process in the transaction of SALW.

Furthermore, Bourne and Berkol (2006) postulate that nations have secretly carried out transfers of SALW. Any transfer not approved by the officials of the recipient nations could be classified by that nation as interference in its domestic issues and therefore illegal. The supply of arms to regions of conflict and violence is normally characterised by unlawful means that are due to the characteristics of SALW being easy to transport, in a disguised method.
techniques used involve concealment, smuggling, mislabeling and false documentation in conveying various kinds of illicit weapons.

Illicit actors in this trade include particular groups in exile and private arms dealers, whose motives may be politically agitated. Various allied groups and organisations that are not based in their country finance criminals and terrorists in procuring arms and ammunitions through the black-market. In January and September 2017, the Nigerian customs service seized over two thousand arms and pump action rifles illegally imported into the country from China and Turkey (Kingsley, 2017). Criminals also acquire SALW by means of exchange with unauthorised civilians who possess arms illegally (Obilor, 2013). Another dimension that is used to obtain small arms is the loss of weapons by security personnel. Often, weapons resulting from legal transfers between governments end up in the illegal market because of corrupt government officials.

In addition, the illicit trafficking of SALW as a significant proliferation channel, is a transnational and global activity, which has been able to operate outside national and international regulatory institutions. The illicit transactions are undertaken through the black-markets with highly clandestine operational networks. Naylor (1995:48) maintains that the high-level technology and commercial sophistication has resulted in illicit operations spreading and nearly dominating the international socio-economic environment:

From recreational drugs to counterfeit credit cards, from fake designer watches to stolen diamonds, it is no longer a case of the operation of this or that isolated black-market, but rather the emergence of an international underground economy. The economy consists of a set of interrelated black-markets supported by their own systems of information, their own system of supply, their own distribution network, and their own modes of financing (Naylor, 1995:48).

Commenting further on the complex networks in the global environment, Naylor (1995:49) states:

The general results of the combination of new arms dealers and spread of economic activity is that secret arms deals are likely to take place within a matrix of black-market transactions. Weapons might be sold for cash; bartered for teakwood, hostages, heroin, and religious artefacts; or counter-traded for grain and oil. The deals may be transacted
by go-betweens who are equally at home in smuggling gold to India, trafficking in counterfeit computer chips to the United States, or shipping toxic waste to Somalia (Naylor, 1995:49).

Naylor’s work critically addresses the phenomenon of the global black-markets on small arms and light weapons, the complexity of the illicit market and its intricate nature. It is this complex and intricate nature of the global black-market that makes African nations, especially those in the Western region, most vulnerable to the illicit trade; thereby increasing the control of the inflow and outflow of arms into the sub-region.

In a similar opinion, Stohl (2005) states that in the illegal transaction of small arms and light weapons, the understanding of the legal aspect of the trade is important. Stohl believes that most small arms on the black-market begin as part of the legal trade. In an independent project, The Small Arms Survey distinguishes between licit and illicit trade in SALW as:

A transfer is legal if it follows the international law and national laws of both the exporting countries. An illegal transfer breaks either international or national laws. This simple division often blurs in practice, especially in ambiguous cases where legal policy exceptions are exploited. Another source of controversy arises from transfers that are legal by these criteria – for example, those which do not violate international arms embargoes or sanctions – but breach the international humanitarian law (Small Arms Survey, 2002:111).

Stohl maintains that the lines between legal and illegal trades are blurred as a result of the lack of rigid international criteria and controls. She argues that the resulting weak national and international controls and oversight for the legal trade in arms is a significant contributor to the illicit trade as evidence indicates that the primary method by which actors obtain arms for misuse is through diversion. Diversion is the act of shifting small arms from legal to illicit markets and it can be authorised or unauthorised, intentional or unintentional. Stohl further argues that legal transfer is diverted to the illicit market in a variety of ways, but few of these movements would be possible without the complicity of government actors. Either through genuine corruption or wilful neglect, government agents allow millions of weapons to enter the black-market, and even without explicit government involvement, small arms and light weapons enter the black-market.
On the other hand, Kinsella (2006) states that to understand the nature of arms trade it is necessary to view it from two perspectives, which are, the state sanctioned arms transfer and black-market transfer. (i) In state market transfer, the demand and supply of SALW between states is basically a marital relationship from both the supply and recipient states. He further explains that the supply of finished weapons system can be followed by an order in the utilisation and maintenance of the weapon and other forms of support facilities and technical assistance. The cordial relation of the military of both states may also help in the areas of military training and joint exercises, basing and overflight rights, the co-ordination of strategy and tactics, also more importantly, the collaboration of military intelligence (overt and covert) in order to boost the state security of both parties. (ii) Unlike the state market transfer, black-market transfers are mostly perpetrated by private dealers, whose main interest is focused on a profit-oriented purpose, which is the main reason why people go into illegal arms trade/black-market transfer; not minding who the end-user is going to be. The author further states that transferred weaponry in the black-market is not in itself indicative of shared interest but the individual interest of both the parties (both the supplier and the recipient) which may be political, economic or an ideological goal in the illicit market transfer. Furthermore, Biswas (2008) postulates that the continuous spread of illicit trading of small arms and light weapons has attained a new dimension since the demise of the Cold War in the early 90’s. According to Biswas (2008) the illegal trade of small arms threatens states in several ways. Firstly, it undermines democratic institutions as the state authorities seek to control the threat posed by SALW. Their attempts sometimes result in the enacting of strict laws that could pave the way for the military to take over power from the civilian government. Secondly, the availability and accessibility of illicit arms in society may encourage criminal and terrorist groups in a country to challenge and antagonise the state authority by creating turmoil and becoming a threat to national security. Biswas further notes that the continued proliferation of small arms around the world as a contributing factor to increased violent acts from armed conflict to terrorism.

Likewise, Fayeye (2011) also notes that the illegitimate trade of SALW has been in existence, since the beginning of arms manufacture. He further states that the process of time and history have shown that unchecked arms trade has led to millions of unnecessary deaths. He believes that with the role of civilians in politics, thuggery, and kidnapping, more weapons will give illicit users the opportunity to initiate the process of using arms to instigate more deaths in Nigeria. It was also noted that the manufacture and sales of ever-more sophisticated weapons causes regional arm races that are costly and destabilising. Stohl (2005) also states that illicit
arms fuel regional instability and destroys the lives of between 450,000 to 550,000 civilians yearly across the world. He further states that most of the weapons circulating in the illicit/black-market business were previously produced and legally traded; he identifies seven phases in which weapons are being traded. In the first phase, Stohl believes that illegal arms are first transferred legally through debarred countries down to the illicit end-users. He believes that state officials also collect bribes in exchange for ineligible parties in arms trade. In the second phase, criminals and terrorist could be in the possession of arms through unscrupulous arms dealers, because of the failure of government in the handling of arms stockpiles. Thirdly, arms can get into the possession of criminals and quickly disseminate during periods of instability. Fourthly, weapons that are simply misplaced by government or military personnel often end up in the black-markets, which will eventually be in the possession of civilians. Fifthly, there are situations where corrupt government officials like security personnel deliberately sell or lend arms terrorists and criminals’ weapons in order to meet daily needs. Next are weapons that are stolen from civilians who own arms legally.

One of the major reasons why there is a large illicit market in arms deals is because of the lack of strict regulations guarding small arms. Several factors motivate states to acquire arms. However, Aminu (2016) notes that weapon systems acquisition is the process by which nations acquire arms and equipment for defence purposes. Production and procurement are two different ways through which arms could be obtained by the state. On the one hand, weapons production simply means that arms are being manufactured within a particular country for its own use. It could be privately owned or controlled by the government of the nation. While procurement refers to the legal procurement of arms, equipment, and weapons through arms trade.

World War I and II signalled the need for states to acquire arms in order to protect their territory against foreign invasion. This became necessary as weapon systems were being used in large measure to determine the national capabilities of states, especially in this century. Thus, this gave both developed and developing states the desire to acquire weapons. The need for new and sophisticated weapon systems therefore hastened technological changes in this direction. This was very significant in the area of ammunitions whereby old weapons were continually being improved upon and newly invented on a regular basis (Olusanya, 2000).

The sale and transfer of arms and weapons in the international system is used by states to achieve their psychological, economic and political goals. Some developed states in the world
that manufacture arms, use its sale as a political tool in making some critical decisions. For instance, the former Secretary of the United States of America, Dr Henry Kissinger once used the sale of US F-15 fighter jets to Israel to secure Israeli leaders’ approval for the 1975 Sinai Agreement between Israel and Egypt (Sivard, 1987). Also in 1980, the United States government used the sale of weapons to Iran in a clandestine means to negotiate the release of American-held hostages in Iran (Gliksman, 1986). Arms sales could also feature as a symbol of diplomacy and bilateral relationships between nations. This was the case between President Nasser of Egypt and the Soviet Union, and Presidents Sadat and Mubarak of Egypt and the United States of America. Arms sales and or procurement could also provide a means of manipulating some decision-making processes in the recipient nation by suppliers. Weapons and arms sales also enable suppliers to have an advantage over some specific national and or external policy decisions of the recipient states; this used to be a case where the nation that received arms relied disproportionately on a particular supplier nation for weapons. An example of this was the diplomacy and bilateral relationship that existed between the USA and the Shah Palavi of Iran (Gliksman, 1986). Weapons acquisition in most cases was used to define the relationship between states and a cluster of states. According to Aminu (2006) the case of the Middle East and the West African sub-region presents a good example. The possession of certain categories of weapons by a country could define what other countries aim for or attempt to achieve even better in order to outmatch each other; the example that existed in this regard was the relationship between Israel and the Arab States.

The indication of all these is that the use of weapons and equipment in the international system is unlikely to diminish for a long period of time to come, because of the false sense of national security with which they are associated. Weapons and equipment will continue to serve some national goals and interests despite the urgent need for restructuring of national priorities, especially in the developing regions of the world where the heavy debt burden, political extremism, inter-ethnic confrontations, hunger, disease, illiteracy, disillusionment, underdevelopment and unemployment are major features.

2.2 Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Challenges to Peace and Security

It is conceptually problematic to attempt to identify a link between international small arms trade and its misuse by criminals and the consequences to peace and security. It should also be noted that the uncontrolled cross-border trade between various nations in the world, especially in African states could result in the proliferation of small arms, which is widely facilitated by
illegal activities. Virtually all illicit small arms are originally legally produced or acquired, eventually fall into the possession of unintended recipients. Ordinarily, proliferation is the rapid increase of an object in number, but when the term applied to small arms it describes the widespread of arms, generally from one state to another. Signs of identifying the proliferation of SALW in society are the frequent reoccurrence of conflict and violent crimes; activities of traffickers and black-market operations; activities of local goldsmiths and blacksmiths; increased budgetary allocation to defence and procurement of SALW; stockpile management; flow of weapons; increase in terrorist acts and arms seizures across borders, conflict and crime locations (Marsh, 2002; Krause, 2000). Okoro (2007) describes the proliferation of small arms and light weapons as the spread of weapons from one group of owners and users to another. This he elaborates, could be vertical as in the case of different actors within states already possessing particular weapons, where the acquisition involves a spread to states not previously possessing them. Certain intermediaries, based on legal or illegal demands coming from lawless or restricted environments, facilitate the proliferation of small arms. The previous Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), Kofi Anan, in the Millennium Report (2000) to the United Nations General Assembly brought the phenomenon of the SALW proliferation to the forefront of the UN’s agenda in the following manner:

The death toll from small arms dwarfs that of all weapons systems and in most years greatly exceeds the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In terms of the carnage they cause, small arms, indeed, could well be described as “weapons of mass destruction” (Small Arms Review Conference, 2006:1)

The Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva (2001:11) also maintains that:

Small arms and light weapons do not proliferate themselves… rather, they are sold, resold, perhaps stolen, diverted, and maybe transferred in a lawful or illicit way and method. The chains of legal and illegal transfer, people-brokers, insurgents, criminals, government officials and or organised groups are active participants in the transmission.

The United Nations (UN) Charter, Article 51 recognises the right of sovereign states to use force, exercised through the instrumentality of guns in defence of their sovereignty. The Charter also recognises the right of states to manufacture and acquire weapons for internal as well as for external defence. It is against this background that Nna and Pabon (2012) argues
that national security of a state can only be secured with the procurement of arms. To illustrate further, Fayeye (2011) notes that the legal possession of SALW by states is essential in order to secure the land and defend the sovereignty, but that SALW becomes dangerous for the state if the weapons and ammunitions are in the possession of illegitimate users like criminals and terrorists. He further states that the weapons industries have become the greatest source of illicit arms and terrorist organisations by producing SALW without taking into consideration who the end-users are going to be. Similarly, Oche (2005) assert that the proliferation of SALW refers to the excessive accumulation and illegal spread of dangerous weapons that could easily kill, destroy lives and have a destabilising effect on various nations of the world. He believes that the weapons industry that produces small arms has deceived the academics, intelligence and security personnel into viewing small arms only from the defence perspective of the state, which constitutes the legal and lawful holding of SALW by security personnel of the state. The relationship between small arms and security can be seen in the use of weapons to preserve, deter or protect the needs, values and interests of individuals, groups or organisations. Security is derived from a Latin word “securitas” which means safe, secure and without care. In other words, it could mean the sense of being secure, of being free from anxiety or free from having the perception of threat or uneasiness (Echeverri, 2010). However, Che (2007) states that small arms and light weapons threaten the security of various individuals and nations at large more so than biological, chemical or any other types of weapons of mass destruction. Small arms are readily available, transportable and easy to use. The ready availability of small arms escalates violence and leads to social threats, insecurity, crime, and could easily trigger war. Small arms also endanger the lives of humanitarian workers. Small arms are misused within both domestic as well as public spheres, and they affect everyone in the community, though in different ways and for different reasons (Farr, 2008). Similarly, the Nairobi Declaration, which was adopted in 2004 and enforced in 2005, aimed at combating the spread of illegal small arms and light weapons in Africa and concluded that “the accessibility of SALW can intensify conflicts and threaten the political settings, peace and security of a state”.

Biswas (2008) opines that an uncontrolled spread of SALW has been in existence for so long, but attained a new dimension in the early nineties after the Cold War. Small arms trafficking undermines democratic rule and governance because the government will be more focused on the control of the various threats caused by small arms rather than focusing on democratic rule and governance of the state. She goes further to state that the availability and accessibility of small arms and lights weapons fosters domestic criminals and terrorist groups that challenge
and threaten the governance and authority of a state. To illustrate further, Ochogwu (2015) illustrates that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons could be noticed, known or easily identifiable through the following indicators in the society: (i) Ease of availability and spread of SALW as evident in registered SALW, (ii) activities of traffickers and black-market operations, (iii) activities of local goldsmiths and blacksmiths, (iv) frequency and recurrence of violent conflicts and violent crimes, (v) increased budgetary allocation to defence and procurement of small arms and light weapons, (vi) stockpile management, (vii) arms seizures - records and trends at borders, in conflict and crime zones, (viii) movement or flow of weapons, (ix) rise in insurgency acts. Bashir (2013) asserts that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a great challenge to both urban and rural areas in terms of development, because it makes people fearful of conducting their daily business and discourages trade and foreign investors to develop an area. It also leads to the illegal trading of natural resources such as oil, minerals and timber. An estimated 508,000 deaths between 2007 and 2012 were linked to armed violence, and direct conflict has occurred globally (Small Arms Survey, 2015). Additionally, Bourne (2007) claims that unlicensed production is one of the key features of the spread of SALW causing human and property destruction. Bourne (2007:84) maintains that China and Croatia are the two countries that produce the highest number of unlicensed small arms and light weapons. Lamb and Dye (2009) also note that South Africa and Egypt are the largest producer of small arms in the African region despite the fact that they are not economically significant. Sri Lanka as a nation suffers greatly due to the high level of illicit proliferation of SALW which is motivated by the insurgent secessionist group led by the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Elam (LTTE) and has become known as one of the most feared terrorist groups globally (Biswas, 2008). Klare (2014) believes that the uncontrolled availability of such arms can escalate a simmering ethnic dispute into a full-blown war and terrorism. The proliferation of small arms sustains and worsens terrorism, endangers the lives of peacekeeping troops and charitable personnel. It also erodes the esteem for global humanitarian rule and threatens various states across the globe (Annan, 2001).

Conversely, Hwang and Villarreal (2007) opine that the problem of small arms spread is not because of mass production, but one of illegal trafficking, meanwhile Krause (2007) maintains that the control of SALW is essential to stopping the spread of armed violence in the world. Saroja (2012) believes that most of the conflicts nowadays are intra-state conflicts that cause terrorism, unlike in the past when most conflicts arose from inter-state conflicts. Accordingly, most of the conflicts that happen within a state are based on different religious beliefs and
various ethnic backgrounds resulting in violence. For instance, there are numerous areas of
armed conflicts in South Asia and it is estimated that there are about 40,000 illicit arms in
the availability of SALW has also been shaped by various reasons arising from the change of
the transnational order and influenced by globalisation. The end of the Cold War in the early
90’s created a surplus in the arms industries of Europe and North America, resulting in an
excess of used arms. The move to trade the surplus in an illicit method has caused the
widespread of SALW across the globe. Also, Bolton et al. (2012) ascertain that the spread of
SALW can be ascribed to the rapid growth in science and technology. Therefore, weapons are
easy to use as they are now cheap, light and portable. The global village of today is the primary
reason why there is a proliferation of SALW, due to the global interrelation and
interdependence that has spurred the world into an era of unprecedented small arms trade.

Reacting to the menace which small arms and light weapons have subjected society to, the
International Action on Small Arms (IANSA) observes that, “the widespread of small arms is
endangering personal security, undermining good governance, contributing to violations of
human rights, and undermining social justice, development and peace in all parts of the world”
(IANSA, 2000). The observation of the International Action on Small Arms only highlights
the proliferation and misuse of small arms without explaining the sources and factors
responsible for this proliferation which has made SALW easily accessible to end-users who
use these arms for conflict or crimes and threaten peace and security. Mustafa (2010) also states
that the legal trade of SALW is essential for ensuring the national security of a state. If SALW
is not controlled, terrorists could come into possession thereof and peace and security could be
threatened. The weapon industry that produces small arms and light weapons has become the
greatest basis for terrorist organisations around the world (Robinson et al., 2006) Gunaratna
(2002) opines that the easy accessibility of SALW aids terrorism. He believes that terrorists
are increasingly procuring standoff weapons such as mortal-weapons and surface-to-air-
missiles that can easily explode and cause death and the destruction of properties across the
globe.

2.3 Small Arms: African Perspectives and Challenges

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons across the globe in general and Africa in
particular has gradually developed over the years to a rate that is currently quite alarming and
has put the security and stability of the entire African continent in the balance (Schroeder &
Lamb, 2006). Proliferation of small arms is a major problem that has caused conflicts in the Horn of Africa conflict system and its epicentres. According to Musah (2001) the previous Soviet Union, United States of America and their allies, based on their interest and support during the interstate wars, pumped arms and ammunitions into the African region between 1970 and 1990. He noted that private military companies, rogue arms brokers and so on within the African region, have covertly diverted left-over weapons. Therefore, arms that were initially from legal sources are now in the possession of civilians because of the breakdown of state structures, lack of good welfare packages for military and other security personnel, and weak control over state armouries.

Small arms and light weapons have very evidently become useful instruments in the hands of terrorist groups and other criminal groups and non-state actors to inflict considerable damage on the state, and more importantly on the individuals whom the state has a responsibility to protect, reducing the capacity of the state to fulfil its security mandate. African nations have experienced various consequences and impacts of small arms proliferation. Many civilians are murdered or injured each year on the continent. Yet, even when loss of life or damage is avoided, small arms proliferation and misuse can dramatically affect a community, region, landscape or nation. In other words, Banko (2016) states that the illicit spread of small arms has a serious effect on the national security of various states in the region, along with various threats to the lives of millions of civilians. Likewise, Enuka (2012) illustrates that the illicit proliferation of SALW causes the persistence and complication of the violence crisis in Africa. Consequently, Boutwell and Klare (2000) opine that the relationship between small arms and the outbreak of violence is mainly found in the African region. Based on the fact that once competing groups have been armed with weapons and ammunition, any minor disagreement or misunderstanding can escalate into violence or terrorist act. The threat and misuse of small arms can be a great challenge to development, thwarts the support of humanitarian and economic aid, and contributes to refugees and increases the population of internally displaced persons (Stohl & Tuttle, 2009).

The African region is also known as a producer of local arms and a major location for small arms trade business by the developed nations and the major producers of SALW in the world. Arms proliferation generates income for manufacturing countries or companies, but African people are always negatively affected, due to the lack of inadequate small arms control, accountability and international regulations to address the issue of arms (Enuka, 2012). This
portent threatens African security and development, along with other third world nations of the world. For the past few decades, illicit arms trade in Africa has resulted in the destruction of many lives and properties. These deaths could have been averted if policy makers and security agencies in the various nations had instituted more effective arms control and management processes (Dube, 2008). Proliferation of SALW in the African region has a negative impact on human rights and international humanitarian law, development and governance (Nganga, 2008). According to him, individual human rights could be tampered with, when a person or a group seek to acquire arms and ammunition in order to control others, which could result in the escalation of conflict, crimes against women and strengthening of criminal activities. The spread of small arms also has a direct cost to humans, which usually leads to death and injuries in Africa and an indirect cost which also hinders economic growth and development.

Muggah (2010) argues that armed conflict causes a serious economic breakdown for underdeveloped and developing nations. He further estimates that about 53,000 civilians lose their lives in wars and terrorist attacks in the world annually, and that these attacks are mainly in Africa and as a consequence of illegal trade and the widespread of SALW. The proliferation of SALW causes much damage to human lives, property and the society. It has also promoted and sustained various conflicts in African states over the past decades (Ayuba & Okafor, 2014). Dangerous weapons such as – G3 rifles; RPG-7, AK-47 rifles, LG-40 recoilless rifles, pistols and other arms and ammunitions have been used to destroy many lives and properties in Africa (Nganga, 2008). SALW have been the motive behind a range of armed conflicts in the African continent. Hence, Gramizzi (2014) believes that between 640 and 750 million SALW are in circulation around the world, with 100 to 160 million of those in Africa, where they are mainly in the possession of the civilian population. In eastern Africa, armed conflict has contributed not only to the death toll and high rate of injury among civilians but also to the impoverishment of entire communities (Little et al., 2007). The crises in Somalia, South Sudan, and Darfur created preferable situations for the flow of arms and ammunition to the Western and Eastern parts of Ethiopia. During the Dreg regime, civil war and frequent political hitches in neighbouring Somalia were further prompts for the easy inflow of illicit arms to Ethiopia (Wepundi & Sam, 2010).

Mustafa (2010) illustrates that many lives and properties have been destroyed in central and eastern African countries, and it is estimated that between 780 and 820 thousand civilians were killed in intra-ethnic violence in Rwanda. About 301,000 lives have also been destroyed in
Burundi, just like Rwanda. Between 1994 and 2004, the northern region of Kenya lost over three thousand lives in armed conflict-related issues (Wepundi et al., 2012). Consequently, Mucyo and Napoleon (2016) notes that the widespread of SALW in Kenya, especially the northern part of the country has caused underdevelopment, human rights violations, exacerbated armed cattle rustling and conflicts in the geographical area that has increased the number of criminals and crimes against the vulnerable groups. The inability of the Kenya’s State authority to control arms flow to the country has done much to facilitate the illegal trade and proliferation of weapons in the country and the African continent in general. The flow of small arms from one nation to the other becomes more difficult to control because neighbouring countries have relatively small security budgets, in addition to the lack of adequate structures and the high level of corruption in the region (Menkhaus, 2008). In Sudan, many lives have been destroyed in warfare, including local and international relief workers. Children are also recruited or compelled to be child soldiers (Nna & Pabon, 2012).

Sishi (1998) believes that the widespread of SALW are very significant in southern Africa, mainly because of the Cold War, but that some arms originated from the southern area of Africa. In some southern African countries, small arms such as the AK-47 is more than a tool of war, because it features on the coat of arms of Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and also appears on the Mozambican currency and flag (Kalashnikov, 2012). To illustrate further, Keegan (2005) states that the independence struggle of southern African countries like South Africa, Angola and Mozambique is a result of the widespread of ammunitions that have been circulated in the region. He further estimates that the presence of small arms in South Africa has fed the growth of armed conflict, armed robberies, vehicle hijacking, murder, among other crimes in the country. The crime rate cost South Africa 31 to 33 billion rand, about 5.6 per cent of the estimated Gross Domestic Product for 1996 (Oosthuysen, 1996).

The West African sub-region has also witnessed devastation caused by the illicit trade in SALW (Bashir, 2013). The United Nations Committee of Experts on Liberia affirmed that both Burkina Faso and Togo are channels for illegal SALW. Keili (2008) notes that:

SALW are extreme tools of violence in West Africa for several reasons. Small arms are durable, highly portable, easily concealed, simple to use, extremely lethal and possess legitimate military, police and civilian uses. In West Africa, these weapons are cheap and widely available; they are also lightweight, and so can be used by child
soldiers, who have played such a significant role in recent conflicts in West Africa (Keili, 2008:5).

Bah (2014) states that there are about 501 million dangerous weapons around the world, with between 6 and 9 million in circulation across the western part of Africa, and it is also believed that close to 78,000 dangerous weapons are in the possession by some West African insurgent groups, such as Boko Haram of Nigeria and Al Qaeda of Mali. Krause and Security (2001) note that the availability and use of SALW have contributed to the erosion of state authority, which has been particularly evident with the high level of crimes in the society. It is widely debated that dangerous weapons are not the immediate cause of crime and violence, but rather that crime and violence are rooted in the form of sustenance of human security. It is obvious that small arms are being proliferated in order to ensure the personal security of individuals and groups when normative social relations collapse or are seen to be on the brink of collapse. It is also evident that the widespread availability of small arms hastens and exacerbates dysfunctional trends. They also claim that the absence of functional and efficient government in the Western part of Africa has led to the spread of lawlessness and criminal violence in the region. Small arms have predominantly fuelled various armed conflicts in West African nations, such as the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Niger, Liberia, and Togo. The western region of Africa is still facing a lot of terrorist attacks despite the efforts of the military in the region in which SALW contribute a major and fundamental part in some parts of the region like Nigeria. Between 1992 and 1997, the northern region of Ghana suffered ethnic violence that killed more than 1,000 people and resulted in over 1,500 internally displaced persons (Mazzitelli, 2007). It is against this that Bashir (2013) opines that the widespread of small arms does not only destroy human lives and their properties alone, but also exacerbates ethnic conflicts in the western region of Africa. About 101,000 lives have been destroyed and almost 55 ethno-religious crises have been recorded in Nigeria over the past 18 years, since the country’s return to a democratic process in 1999 (Ebo, 2013). Thom-Otuya (2009) maintains that the widespread production of small arms has caused the crisis in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria, which has led to the death and kidnapping of many civilians. Since 1999, the spread and misuse of various ammunitions and weapons in community violence, religious crises and armed robbery attacks on Nigerians has threatened the security of the Nigeria State (Nte, 2011).
2.4 Illicit Proliferation of Small Arms in Nigeria

According to the Nigeria (2006) population census, Nigeria is the most populous nation within the Western African region with a population of 140,431,790 and the only nation in the region officially producing small arms and ammunition. Aminu (2016) state that the main reason and purpose for the establishment of the Nigeria Defence Industries Cooperation was to make Nigeria a self-sustaining nation in arms and ammunition, but unfortunately, Nigeria still depends largely on foreign sources/arms trade for the accumulation of SALW, which was contrary to the primary purpose of the Nigeria Defence Industries Cooperation (DICON). For the past four decades, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons has become one of the endemic challenges to peace and security in Nigeria (Obilor, 2013). According to the Nigeria Fire Act 1959 Law, section 13 sub-section (1) states as follows:

No person, whether a registered firearms dealer or not, shall sell or transfer any firearms unless there shall have been stamped (marked) permanently thereon the makers name and particular as may be prescribed, and unless such details are specified in any permit or licence.

Similarly, sub-section (2) of the section 13 states that:

No person, whether a registered arms dealer or not, shall alter or render illegible the makers name or number or the prescribed particulars stamped upon a firearm without getting an approval from the Inspector-General of the Nigeria Police.

Despite this, the origin of the spread of SALW in Nigeria can be traced to the 1967-1970 civil war, which made arms easily available to unauthorised end users, as the end of war was never followed with any conscious policy of disarmament. Prolonged years of military dominance of the country’s political scene and the enculturation of the civil populace with the rule of might and a Hobbesian attitude as a way of life made the majority of people resort to “might is right” and that “power issues from the barrel of the gun” attitudes. From the early 1990s to date, incidences of armed robberies, assassination, terrorism, cultism and ethno-religious conflicts have become a recurring decimal and the defining characteristic of Nigeria as a nation.

The conscious and unconscious militarisation of Nigeria by the politically inclined military class coupled with the stringent regulation of arms holding or arms-bearing licenses by those who wish to legally own one, the frustration to process and acquire arms licenses, suspicion by
the military and security apparatuses of applicants, and the general sense of insecurity of life and property as a result of high rates of crimes and conflict in the country culminated in the increased demand for arms in the society thereby providing a ready market for illicit weapons traffickers. In the words of Obasi (2002:69-70):

Regulations on gun ownership in the country were stringently revised after a bloody inter-ethnics’ clash in the northern city of Kaduna in 1989. As highlights of that revision, the General Ibrahim Babaginda administration recalled the licenses that had been granted to all arms dealers and owners in the country and enacted laws that made the restoration of licenses difficult. The new rules stipulated that the only guns available to citizens through a license, were double-barrelled shotguns for use in game hunting and sports, and that even these must be licensed by the commissioner of police of a state, with a requirement that the applicants must be above the age of 18, of good address and with a verifiable source of income (Obasi, 2002:69-70)

Obasi (2002:69-70) further states that:

Also, while retiring officers of the armed forces and security agencies were still allowed to go with their service pistols, this was now subject to the discretion of the President and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces or the Inspector General of Police. Those who wished to deal in guns were required to meet some conditions before they could obtain a license of approval, particularly the establishment of a satisfactory, secure armoury to which the police would be granted access for thorough inspection at any time

The gun ownership regulation in Nigeria, though well intended, created unintended consequences as bureaucratic bottlenecks and rapid corruption made it difficult to obtain a licence to own arms. The proliferation of SALW is increasingly becoming a transnational organised crime in Nigeria with Boko Haram’s insurgency, the re-emergence of the Niger Delta crisis and escalating kidnappings, communal crises and armed robberies as a centre for arms trafficking (Onuah, 2011). Some border towns, particularly in the North-Eastern part of the country, serve as a locus for trafficking of arms as well as centres for stolen goods, drugs and hostages perpetrated by criminals, terrorists and their collaborators. Also, arms and ammunition of various types, sizes and calibre have been identified and seized by the security forces. Musa (2013) argues that the discovery of ammunition and improvised explosive device
materials by the Joint Task Force (JTF), showed the role of the Nigeria security agency in reducing in arms trafficking or trading through the covert and deceptive use of the porous Nigerian borders of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.

Obilor (2013) asserts that the Nigerian Immigration Services indicate that they have uncovered a lot of illegal routes in Nigeria that link to some neighbouring African countries. Nigeria’s borders are massive with hundreds of footpaths crisscrossing to the neighbouring countries of Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and Sudan with links to Mali, and Libya. The Controller General of Nigeria Customs states that there are over 250 footpaths from Damaturu or the Maiduguri axis in Nigeria that lead to Cameroon, Chad or Niger. These paths are mostly unknown to security agencies, are unmanned, unprotected and thus serve as leaky routes for arms and ammunitions trafficking into Nigeria (Sagir, 2013). Onuah (2010) argues that one of the major factors motivating the flow of SALW in Nigeria is the crude nature of politics in the country. He notes that the ways and methods that politicians approach elections are alarming and dangerous, they regard election into positions of power as a do or die affair. Because of this, many politicians recruit thugs and specialists in violence and equip them with small arms. Unfortunately, after the elections, they never bother to get the weapons back from the thugs and these continue to circulate in the possession of civilians, causing unnecessary threat to the nation’s national security.

Nigeria has one of the highest numbers of illicit SALW in the African region. It is estimated that around 500 million weapons are in the Western part of Africa, and out of this amount, about 350 million are in Nigeria (Ige, 2016). Between 1999 and 2010, an estimated 190 ethno-religious violent outbreaks occurred in Nigeria, causing the loss of lives of thousands of people. The ethno-religious crises were aided and prolonged with the availability of small arms, and this incidence undermined peace and devastated the economic livelihoods of individual citizens and their communities (Philip, 2010). The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2010) noted that about six hundred thousand Nigerians were estimated to have been internally displaced due to the various conflicts and armed violence across the nation. Proliferation of SALW contributes to the high rate of violence and crimes in Nigeria (Ibrahim, 2015; Edeko, 2011).
2.5 Sources of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Nigeria

The source of small arms and light weapons proliferation varies in Africa as in many other continents. From demand and supply of weapons both in and out of the region, to the leftover weapons shipped into Africa in the early 70's, and 80’s by the former Soviet Union, the United States and their allies to facilitate different interstate and intra-states proxy wars. The proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in Nigeria has external and internal sources and has been linked to both legal and illegal arms trade along with the local manufacturing (Bakut, 2015). The legal acquisition of SALW for security agencies by the Nigerian government eventually find their way to militia groups (Nte, 2011). The following are the sources of SALW in Nigeria:

2.5.1 Nigerian Civil War Residue

The Nigeria civil war was fought between July 6, 1967 to January 15, 1970. This period marks the beginning of arms spread in Nigeria, with the rate at which federal government imports arms into the country changing drastically in 1967 with an increase of about 60 percent (Fyanka, 2013). The spillover of small arms from the civil war era leads to the destruction of about two million lives and constitutes the first major cause of arms proliferation in Nigeria, as there was no comprehensive disarmament and arms control measure from any organisation including the federal government (Fyanka, 2013). To illustrate further, Akande (2017) postulates that during the civil war, the Nigerian government troops perpetrated the Asaba massacre, where over 750 civilians were shot dead in full view of their families and their community as a result of the widespread of ammunitions. The federal government accused the southerners of illegal smuggling of arms into the region. Similarly, Onobanjo (2012) opines that the presence of small arms during the civil war fed the growth of the armed conflict, robbery and kidnapping in the area and Nigeria at large. He further explained that these weapons were largely smuggled in through areas, such as Idi-Iroko and Seme in Ogun State, the port city of Warri in Delta State, and the north-eastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe that share common borders with Niger Republic and Cameroun.

2.5.2 Cross-Border Smuggling

The Nigerian government procures arms from other countries for legitimate use in connection with state security obligations. This constitutes a significant source of small arms and light weapons proliferation. Additionally, Nigeria is vulnerable to illicit small arms and light
weapons access from outside the country because of its geographical location. Nigeria shares a long stretch of land bordering with the Republic of Niger and Chad in the North, Benin Republic in the West, and Cameroon in the East; in addition to a long stretch of Atlantic coastline (Golub, 2012). It is also believed that each of the frontiers provides entry points for systematic smuggling of arms into the country. Seventeen of the thirty-six constituent states (Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Kwara, Niger, Kebbi, Zamfara, Sokoto, Jigawa, Katsina, Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Taraba, Benue, Cross River and Akwa Ibom of the Federal Republic of Nigeria) abut directly onto one or another of the nation’s international boundaries, which is the land borders. The maritime border includes River, Delta, Bayelsa, Ondo, Lagos, Cross River and Akwa Ibom states. The three most famous arms smuggling frontiers are Idi-iroko and Semen in the South-Western States of Lagos and Ogun, the Niger Delta Region, and the border posts in the North-Eastern region (Adeola & Fayomi, 2012).

Smuggling is also aided by the increased number of potential suppliers as a result of the end of the Cold War and weak international controls of armament flows. These factors have created opportunities for illicit end-users to access sophisticated weapons, which were previously accessible only by members of the armed forces (Nganga, 2008). It is in line with this that Edeko (2011) argues that Nigeria is estimated to host over 70 per cent of about eight million illegal weapons in West Africa. Due to the porosity of Nigerian borders, an unwarranted influx of migrants from neighbouring African countries such as Republic of Chad, Niger and Benin has become possible. Adeola & Fayomi (2012) notes that most of the illegal migrants are youth between the age of 25 and 40, most of the crimes in Nigeria are being perpetrated by them. Nigeria also has many borders, a number of airports both local and international, airstrips and numerous seaports along the southern coast that make it difficult to monitor effectively, and control and detect small arms and light weapons trafficking (Ochogwu, 2015).

Some sources and transit countries have been identified as key areas from which trafficking in arms starts and makes entry into the Nigeria state. These countries include Nigeria’s immediate neighbouring countries like Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, as well as Gabon and Gunea-Bissau (Hazen & Horner, 2007; Ikelegbe, 2005; Ojudu 2007). Other countries of origin from which it is believed arms are sourced into Nigeria are; the Ivory Coast, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine and Russia (Hazan & Horner, 2007). Burkina Faso is believed to be a major ‘black-market’ point in West Africa from where various non-state actors trade in small arms and light weapons (IPCR, 2015). Spencer (2007) describes border control as the major issue to be
considered in arms control and terrorism, it is against this background that Raheem and Babalola (2015) believe that effective monitoring and control of a nation’s border is paramount if a state wants to secure its national security. The Nigerian security which monitors and controls the nation’s borders are: the Nigeria Custom Service, the Nigeria Police Force, the Nigeria Military, the Nigeria Port Authority, the Nigeria Immigration Service, the Department of State Security and the Nigeria Drug Law Enforcement Agency. The diagram below explains Nigeria’s various international borders and the effect of small arms and light weapons proliferation:

Figure 2.1 Map showing Nigeria’s International Borders as well as Locations of Terrorist Attacks

Source: (Onuoha, 2013) Porous Borders and Boko Haram’s Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria
It was observed from the above diagram that the activities of insurgent and terrorist groups in the Northern part of the country including Abuja have further compounded the problem of SALW proliferation in Nigeria.

2.5.3 Security Sector Black Racketeering

Illicit firearms consist of leakages from members of the military and police force, both serving and retired. This includes remnants from the Nigerian civil war and leakages from returnees of peacekeeping operations (Hazen & Horner, 2007). They believe that most of the arms that are in the possession of criminals and terrorists all over Nigeria are from the security sector in the country; sometimes it might be a bargain between the security forces and the criminal. In an interview with Collins on 3 March 2016, he said, “there are rogue government officials that use their position as the representative of the state to perpetrate crimes and proliferate small arms in Nigeria. Incidences like that in Nigeria are that of Major Akubo who looted the ordinance in Jos, Jahal in Kaduna and Jaji in Jos, Nigeria and sold it to the Niger/Delta militants. There is also the case of a police officer lending guns to criminals to perpetrate crimes in Nigeria”.

2.5.4 Arms Theft and Sabotage

For the past few decades, there have been several cases of stealing or individual absconding with small arms that were legitimately licensed or assigned to private individuals and security operatives. In addition, reports abound about arms pilfered from government armories. In 2002, it was reported that the Nigerian Police lost about 200 weapons in three years between 1998 and 2000 (Obilor, 2013). In Owerri, the arms store of the Nigerian Customs Service was broken into and a large quantity of arms carted away by unknown persons (Zakaria, 2006). According to Ochogwu (2015), armed robbers in Nigeria have, during their operations seized arms from arms-bearing police officers on duties with little likelihood of recovery, particularly from those robbers who invade banks and prisons. During the first half of 2001, police arms recovery and losses were as follows:
Table 2.1 Arms and Ammunition Recovery and Losses in Nigeria between January and June 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>Recovered by Police from Robbers</th>
<th>Lost by Police to Armed Robbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arms</td>
<td>Ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>NIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>NIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>20.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Obilor (2013) The Influence of Small Arms Proliferation on Violent Conflicts in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria

Arms Lost by the Police in Nigeria from 2001-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quantity of Arms Lost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibid

In the first half of 2001 alone, as shown in the above tables, the Nigerian Police lost 243 arms against the 129 declared by the Nigerian Police Headquarters for the whole period 2001-2003.

2.5.5 Local Manufacturing

Nigeria has a significant local supply of legitimate and illicit small arms and light weapons through local manufacturers (Bakut, 2015). Section 22 of the Nigeria Firearms Act prohibits the manufacture of firearms. However, the government established the Defense Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) set up in 1964 through the Defense Industries Corporation of Nigeria Act, which is legally empowered to produce arms and ammunitions in the country mainly for the use by the military and the police. Given the legal status of its mandate, this does not constitute a significant source of illicit small arms. Meanwhile, this is not the case with the cluster of unlicensed local craft men located in different parts of the country, who produce on the aggregate, a substantial quantity of illegal guns (Hazen & Horner, 2008). In contravention of Section 22 of the firearms act, the clandestine nature of their activities negates due diligence, transparency, and regulation as required by international flow. These factors have created
opportunities for militant groups and other private actors to access sophisticated small arms and light weapons, which were primarily accessible only by members of the armed forces (Nganga, 2008).

2.5.6 Cattle Rearing and Possession of Small Arms
Herdsmen who traverse the Mali, Chad and Niger routes with their cattle are usually in possession of quantities of arms and ammunition as they come into Nigeria to either feed or sell their livestock. There are no specific control measures aimed at restraining the movement of the herdsmen. According to Mutwiri (2014) proliferation of small arms, which is one of the greatest threats to peace and security in countries like Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, all in the eastern part of Africa, is being caused by cattle rearing across borders in the area. It is against this backdrop that Emanuel and Ndimbwa (2013) attribute the large number of illegal small arms in Tanzania to cattle rustling.

In an attempt to curb the illegal proliferation, a national survey on small arms and light weapons is currently in progress within the 36 states in Nigeria, including Abuja. The survey is in line with the vision and purposes for the establishment of a Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons by the Nigerian government in 2013.

The above sections discuss and analyse the flow of small arms, its effects and the various sources of arms proliferation in Nigeria, in relation to previous studies. Hence, an attempt is made to conceptualize this study within a conceptual framework directly relevant to the field of study. This will be elaborated in the section to follow:

2.6 Conceptual Framework

This section presents the conceptual framework that guides this study on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja, Nigeria and its impact on peace and security. A conceptual framework provides the directional path for engaging the research discourse, and the most suitable way of explaining and understanding the research problem and addressing the research questions raised in this study. A conceptual framework is used in a research study to outline the possible course of action or to present a chosen approach to an idea or thought. Obilor (2013) describes a conceptual framework as a system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs, and theories used to support and inform a research study. He believes that a conceptual framework is a vital part of the research design. Imenda (2014) describes a conceptual framework as the outcome of related notions to explain, give a broader
understanding or predict a given scenario of a research problem. A conceptual framework can be described as a graphic or written product that explains the relationship or link between concepts/variables to be studied in a research project (Roger, 2008). Relating this to the current study, both visual and written forms will be adopted to explain the concepts in relation to small arms and light weapons proliferation and its implication on peace and security in Abuja. According to Yosef (2009) a conceptual framework could be regarded as a network of interlinked concepts or analysis that brings about a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon that explains a subject matter. He also notes that a conceptual framework is not merely a collection of ideas or concepts, but rather a construct in which each concept plays a vital role. The study adopts the use of a conceptual framework because there is no theoretical framework that has been adequately developed fully in relation to the above subject matter (Morgan, 2012). As suggested by Morgan, an elaboration of small arms proliferation and control is necessary (Morgan, 2012, p.15). Various scholars and researchers (Ukwayi et al., 2017; Saldner, 2013; Obilor, 2013; Nna et al., 2012; Thom-Otuya, 2009) have tried to use different types of theoretical frameworks, such as frustration aggression theory, security dilemma theory, regime theory, deprivation theory, conflict transformation theory etc. in their study on small arms. However, these theoretical frameworks do not fully explain nor underpin the current study. Scholars have also relate small arms to diverse theories and perceptions without explaining the impact of small arms on peace and security. However, Ochogwu (2015) adopts the conceptual framework of the Small Arms Survey to guide his study, “Small Arms and Light Weapons in Nigeria: An Evaluation of the National Control Strategies” rather than a theoretical framework. Therefore, this study adopts the conceptual framework of the Small Arms Survey and Krause traditional model of arms proliferation and control concept on small arms flow/linkages and its effects on peace and security, because of its direct relevance to this study. It is in line with the above, that this study adopts a Small Arms Survey Group framework on the flow of arms from national stockpiles and civilian stockpiles, which constitutes the link from legal markets to illegal markets. The study also uses the primary “circuit” and “secondary circuit” concept of arms proliferation and control by Krause to describe the various ways and methods of arms flow and its impact on peace and security.

Using stock analysis, the Small Arms Survey (2008) refers to stockpiles as any kind of arms and ammunition, of any scale, under the possession of any actor analytically distinguished as: the state owned or ‘national stockpiles’ and civilian stocks – the ‘civilian stockpiles’. The national stockpiles encompass all items of SALW meant for a state in order to secure its
national security and territories against external invasion. Its components range from munitions stored in manufacturing facilities to large arms and ammunition issued to security personnel of a state. On the other hand, civilian stockpiles include arms that are meant for unauthorised civilian users (which may be the same as those that supply the security forces); arms stored by wholesale firms which supply smaller businesses in the arms trade; weapons and ammunition held in guns shops and sport shooting associations; and those stored by private users at home (civilian holdings). Ochogwu (2015) states that both national and civilian stockpiles are sometimes subjected to distribution of arms to illicit users causing havoc in the society. This is in line with Nganga (2008) who claims that legitimate arms increase in society when private security companies get approval and authorisation from the state authority to acquire arms. This further increases the supply for the illicit market and subsequent distribution thereof, as the stockpile management is internally corrupt or lacking in effective control. There are various sources for the diversion of small arms from state owned or legitimate civilian stocks (Small Arms Survey, 2008:45). Cukier and Bandeira’s (2011) state that there are different ways and methods in which small arms in civilian possession are diverted to illicit markets, such as: illegal manufacture and modification; unlawful sales and transfers (primary, secondary, via brokers); illegal resale and nominee purchases (buying arms for a person or a group wo is prohibited by law from possessing one); theft; diversion from surplus (illicit or unsolicited weapons); and fabrication of documents and illicit importations.
The diagram below provides a graphical analysis of the avenues of diversion of arms and ammunition from both national and civilian stockpiles:

Figure 2.2 Avenue of Diversion from National and Civilian Stockpiles

Source: Small Arms Survey (2008:44)

The above diagram illustrates the illicit diversion of arms and ammunitions by ‘state actors’ from the national stockpiles and civilian stockpiles to criminals and insurgent groups in Nigeria, which is a major threat to peace and security in the country.

In addition, the study draws on the traditional model of arms proliferation and control concept, which was proposed by Krause in 2000. He identifies the traditional model of arms proliferation and control, the primary circuit, secondary circuit and the effects of small arms and light weapons proliferation, which is discussed in the section below:
2.6.2 The Traditional Model of Arms Proliferation and Control
This is premised on three major assumptions, which are stated below:

a. Majority of the arms that are produced are being approved and controlled by the state authority;

b. Most of the arms trade is being carried out based on a government-to-government basis;

c. The receiving states only import arms without producing or transferring any significant product.

According to this concept, arms transfer is being carried out by a direct sale from producer to recipient state or with the assistance of the armed forces. Ochogwu (2015) notes that some prefer to use military assistance rather than a direct sale from the producer.

2.6.3 Primary Circuit of Small Arms Proliferation
There are similarities that are comparable between the traditional model and the primary circuit of small arms proliferation. The primary circuit explains the chain of diffusion that leads to small arms proliferation, which can be found in the traditional model. The primary circuit includes mostly legal or illicit transfer between production firms and domestic and international clients, and it starts with the design and consequent production of weapons. According to Krause (2000) there are four significant variances between small arms and light weapons production, and other major conventional weapons systems. Firstly, SALW can be manufactured in more than 65 nations. Secondly, the production is grounded on relatively advanced technologies. Because of this, the products are widespread, as they are within the technological reach of states all over the world, including developed nations. Lastly, there are three types of clients who purchase the produced SALW namely; national arsenals (which includes the armed forces and the police), non-state actors (both domestic and extra-national circumstances) and other international state governments, unlike the major conventional weapons systems, which are traded among nations. He further explains that the entire process of the primary circuit of small arms transfer remains within the legal framework. However, under certain conditions all of these can be of concern for the proliferation of small arms, as they may contribute to conflict, instability and the insecurity of a nation. In order to ensure that the primary circuit, (which is a legal way of small arms transfer) does not become illegal, there are several policy intervention controls. These include national or multilateral export policies (including “codes of conduct”); national policies on weapons possession; control and oversight of production and stockpiles; controlling and/or reducing weapons stockpiles; weapons marking and transparency; regional codes of conduct and registers.
2.6.4 Secondary Circuit of Small Arms Proliferation
Unlike the primary circuit, the secondary circuit of small arms and light weapons circulation includes all arms transactions that are not authorised by relevant state authorities, or they could also be state-authorised but carried out in a clandestine way. Krause (2000) notes that the actual illicit nature of the secondary circuit may be both legal and illegal in two model methods. The first model is that nearly all the illegal arms transfers were, at some stage in their life, legally manufactured or procured. In the second model, a transfer to private security organisations or weapons dealers could be a legal method. The ambiguity in these types of transactions makes it difficult to make a distinction between legal and illegal transfers or transactions. The complexity of the secondary circuit gives rise for policy intervention by state authorities to limit and control the illicit flow of arms and ammunition in their respective states. The various control measures according to Krause (2000) are; to tighten and harmonise export and border controls; increase international transparency; establish tighter control over private arms dealers, brokers and transporters; prohibit international transfers to non-state actors and to build the capacity of weak states to monitor activities within their own territory. Having discuss the primary and secondary circuit of arms proliferation, the next subsection explains the effects of illicit proliferation of small arms on the society.

2.6.5 The Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation and Use
Proliferation of small arms and light weapons and their misuse has a seriously devastating effect on states and society, which leads to deaths and injuries, destruction of properties, undermining of human rights and development, and increase in terrorism and crime in the society. Krause (2000) describes the various effects and control of small arms and light weapons use on states and societies as follows:
**Effects** | **Control**
---|---
Conflict and Insecurity | Post-conflict disarmament and gun buy-backs
| Demobilisation and re-integration
| Regional co-operation measures

Human Rights and Humanitarian Concerns | International and national embargoes
| Transparency and accountability
| Grassroots monitoring
| Humanitarian law

Development and Governance Issues | Post-conflict reconstruction
| Security sector reform and reduced military spending
| Security-building development efforts

Public Health, Crime and Society | National and international firearms regulation
| Police and customs co-operation against illicit trafficking

The above illustration examines the effects of SALW on individual and the society in general, it also provides the basic measures to control small arms. To further illustrate this, the diagram below provides an additional picture of the complex pathways through which arms are proliferated, their effects on society and control measures.
Figure 2.3 Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons and their Effect on Society

The above diagram shows the several lines in which arms and ammunitions can flow from manufacturer down to the four different quasi-licit or illicit sectors. The first (lower left yellow) involves the illegal transfer of arms from the producer in the state of manufacture to local non-state actors, where arms get into the possession of criminals who specialise in arms trade or are linked to border crime activities.

Another pathway (the yellow box in the middle of the figure) concerns the sale or diversion stockpiles of the recipient state to non-state actors with the country (Ochogwu, 2015). This supports the assertion of Krause (2000) that the rate of leakage from the stockpile of a recipient state is more that the leakage of arms from the producing or exporting state. Because the recipient state has more than the producing state and arms control is relatively high in most major producer states, weapons entering this circuit can be used for both domestic crime and insurgent activity, and as part of cross-border activities.

The other set of pathways could be said to describe the transfer of arms to non-state actors outside the territory of the producing state (the two yellow boxes along the bottom of the chart). In addition, the yellow box (bottom right) is the most significant source of global concern, as it captures the weapons transfer to most of the non-state combatants in ongoing communal conflict around the world. Lastly, the circles (right hand side of the diagram) explain the effect of small arms and light weapons on the society, along with the control measures (pentagon box).

Krause’s framework of SALW proliferation was carefully selected based on the underlying objectives of the study. The concept facilitates an understanding of the complex nature of the various pathways along which arms are circulated. It also showed the differences between legal and illegal arms in the proliferation pathways, along with the effect on the society and control measures. Small Arms Survey framework on the flow of arms from national stockpiles and civilian stockpiles, and Krause traditional model of arms flow and control helped to underpin the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja, Nigeria and its impact on peace and security.

2.7 Conclusion
This chapter provided a basic understanding of small arms proliferation from a global, regional and local perspective, the historical development of arms trade among states. This explains the implications of small arms proliferation on peace and security in general, and Nigeria in particular. The chapter also included an introduction of the conceptual framework guiding the
study. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons has been adjudged by various researchers as the most immediate security challenge to individuals, societies, and states worldwide, fuelling civil wars, organised criminal violence, insurgency and terrorist activities and posing a great obstacle to sustainable development. Often, small insurgencies tend to develop into larger civil wars and could possibly destabilise an entire region. This trend especially in Nigeria could be attributed to the weakness and fragile nature of the states and their attendant failure to deliver in governance and border control. From the extant literature reviewed, there are gaps that require filling. One such gap is the limitations and inability to investigate the motives behind this proliferation of small arms in Abuja, Nigeria. Most of the reviewed literature focuses on the effect of SALW on society in general with specific emphasis on violent conflict and crime in other parts of Nigeria. Existing research works also indicate that the accessibility and abuse of small arms in ethnic, religious crises, and violent conflicts have killed and displaced Nigerians without considering small arms as a cause of terrorism, as there is a dearth of literature on the linkage between small arms and terrorism in Nigeria (particularly Abuja). There is also a limited study on government intervention regarding the proliferation of small arms and the impact on peace and security in Nigeria. However, this study set out to examine the negative effect of small arms on peace and security in Abuja and aims to identify the weaknesses that have made the proliferation of SALW persist. The following chapter will focus on the research methodology adopted to investigate public perception on proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja, Nigeria and examine its impact on peace and security.
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the research methods considered relevant for data collection and analysis to empirically investigate the subject matter. It highlights the research design and the research approach used in the study. Careful selection of a research methodology is necessary to avoid selecting inappropriate research methods. Creswell (2012) describes research methodology as an approach or strategy of action that connects methods to outcomes and guides a researcher’s choice and use of methods such as experimental research, survey research, ethnography etc. According to Creswell, methods are techniques and procedures the researcher proposes to use (e.g. questionnaires, interviews or focus group discussions). This study adopts a mixed method research, where a quantitative method was applied to the analysis of questionnaires using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), while a qualitative method namely content analysis was applied to the interviews. The chapter addresses the research design, research approach, population of the study, sample size, sampling techniques, instrumentation, procedure for data collection and method of data analysis.

3.1 Research Objective

The main objective of the study is to examine the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja (Nigeria) and what the implications were for peace and security in the period. To achieve this objective, the sub-objectives included:

- To examine the factors that stimulated the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja (Nigeria) up to and including.
- To examine the relationship between small arms, terrorism and insecurity in Abuja, Nigeria.
- To assess the nature of threats to peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria.
- To examine the strategic options that were utilised by the Nigerian security sector to enhance peace and security in Abuja (Nigeria).
3.2 Research Questions

In trying to assess the issues raised by the research objectives, there is a need to answer the following questions:

1. What were the factors that stimulated the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja, Nigeria?
2. What is the relationship between small arms, terrorism and insecurity in Abuja, Nigeria?
3. What was the nature of threats posed to peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria between?
4. To what extent were the strategic interventions of the Nigerian security sector effective in enhancing peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria between?

3.3 Research Design

A research design is a blueprint that addresses the plan, structure and strategy of investigation conceived as appropriate to the research. According to Flick (2011) a research design is the analysis of the principles of methods, rules and postulates employed by a discipline, or the systematic study of methods that are applied within a discipline. The importance of illuminating a research design as a strategy is to increase the validity of the research (Creswell, 2012). Similarly, Saunders et al. (2009) state that a research design is the major principle that a researcher adopts in order to guide the study. In addition, Bryman and Bell (2015) describe a research design as a tool that provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data. A research design could be regarded as the fundamental principles that guide the process of carrying out research. It sets out the methodology utilised by the researcher to acquire sources of information, such as participants, elements and units of analysis, to facilitate planning, collecting and analysing of data in order to eventually interpret results (Brink et al., 2012).

There are many approaches to research design namely: exploratory, explanatory, causal, descriptive, evaluation, intervention and participatory action research. Each of the above designs is used in a specific study depending on the nature of the study. The current study adopts a descriptive research design. The rationale for this choice is elaborated below.

3.4 Descriptive Study

The study adopts a descriptive research approach because while it seeks to discover facts, it also places much emphasis on describing an event or phenomenon accurately as it exists or occurs in its natural setting (Monette et al., 2013). Scholars agree that the primary reason for
conducting descriptive research is to describe the phenomenon under study (Pierson & Thomas, 2010; Dane, 2010; Strydom, 2011). The use of a descriptive research design in this study enables the researcher to obtain the opinion of the representative sample of the target population so as to be able to make inferences about the entire population. According to Sekaran and Bougie (2009) a descriptive study ensures an adequate description of the features of variables or groups in the phenomenon of interest. Additionally, Atiku (2014) postulates that a descriptive study provides additional information on the features of numerous variables or social groups because such a study may employ quantitative and qualitative approaches. A descriptive study can be utilised for both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies within the same study (Creswell & Clark 2007; Sandelowski, 2000). This study seeks to provide knowledge on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and its impact on peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria. It focuses on the analysis of available records of incidents and associated impacts through information sought from the security agency, Centre for Strategic and Research Studies (National Defence College) and the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution as well as the inhabitants of the Abuja municipal area. The next section focuses on the discussion of the research paradigms adopted and their relevance to the study.

3.5 Pragmatism

Pragmatism, as a branch of research philosophy rests on actions, situations and consequences in contrast with other research philosophies (Creswell, 2009:10). As opposed to focusing on information about truth and reality, it relies on multiple methods to provide solutions to research problems and questions. It emphasises mixed or multiple approaches to arrive at better outcomes. Pragmatists see the universe as completely diverse in nature which demands different techniques to find better explanations and solutions to its challenges (Hanson et al., 2005; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). This suggests the need for multiple techniques for data collection and analysis in order to overcome the shortcomings of adopting a mono-method. It does not necessarily mean that researchers adopting mixed or multiple methods should not provide strong justification for their choices. In other words, a pragmatic world view offers an opportunity for different perceptions, approaches, and assumptions, leading to improved data collection, analysis and interpretation of results to produce outstanding research outcomes (Creswell, 2009:11).

In addition, Saunders et al. (2009) proposes that a specific philosophy may be more suitable than another in the quest to answer or provide an adequate solution to research problems or
questions. This resulted in the choice of a mixed research methodology for this study. The nature of this study requires the researcher to use a mixed method research approach, that is, a combination of quantitative and qualitative research. The reasons for using such a methodological approach are provided below.

3.6 Quantitative research
According to Tuli (2011) a quantitative research method seeks to quantify or measure social phenomena by gathering and analysing numeric data focusing on the relationships between a smaller number of attributes or characteristics across many cases. Looi (2014) expresses the view that quantitative research brings forth a general area of the study or matters of professional or personal interest. Furthermore, Castellan (2010) states that quantitative researchers are more concerned with an objective reality which is out there to be discovered, and the researcher is not identified with the research in the way he is in qualitative research. In addition, Choy (2014), claims that there are several advantages that can be derived from using quantitative research, as it can be easily administered and evaluated. Thus, it allows the researcher to not spend too much time on the participants before administering the questionnaire, and the feedback can be tabulated within a shorter period of time than in qualitative research. The author adds that another strength of quantitative research is that numeric data collected from the respondents helps to facilitate comparison between groups, thereby establishing the extent to which the respondents agree or disagree. In this study, quantitative research allowed the research to gather quantitative data regarding the impacts of small arms on peace and security in Abuja. It is affirmed by the aforementioned scholars that a quantitative research method allows the research to involve a larger number of participants in the study than that of qualitative.

3.7 Qualitative research
Unlike quantitative, qualitative research produces findings without using any form or means of quantification or statistical procedures. According to Devetak et al. (2010) qualitative research is a kind of exploratory approach to research which aims at emphasising words rather than quantification in terms of data gathering and analysing. Castellan (2010) describes qualitative research as the situation or circumstance relating to how individuals perceive their own world and the extent to which the researcher interacts with them regarding what is being researched.
Qualitative research could also be described as a research process which is based on a clear methodological tradition of research where the researcher builds up a complex framework in analysing narratives and observations in order to conduct the study in the habitat (Creswell, 2012; Lyons et al., 2013). Furthermore, Creswell (2012) opines that a qualitative research method enables researchers to explore the opinions of homogenous as well as heterogeneous groups of people in order to unpack the different perspectives within a community. Choy (2014) suggests that another strength of a qualitative approach is that the investigation is broad and open-ended, thereby allowing the respondents to raise the issues that concern them most.

Conversely, Jeanty and Hibel (2011) maintain that because qualitative research is time-consuming, important issues could be ignored or overlooked. However, despite the above limitation, this method is relevant to this study. The application of qualitative research in the current study allows the research to elicit the views of the respondents through face-to-face interviews regarding the effects of small arms and light weapons in Abuja.

3.8 Mixed method research
Mixed method research is the third research methodology that has recently gained popularity in recent studies (Wisdom et al., 2012). According to Caruth (2013), mixed method research evolved out of the limitations observed in both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies. A mixed method design is an approach to research which involves the art of collecting and analysing both qualitative and quantitative data in a single study (Ponterotto, Jaya & Brigid, 2013; Bishop & Holmes, 2013). Mixed method research is an approach that offers researchers the opportunity to carry out an in-depth investigation into a particular problem and to gain more insights into the research problem and questions, and to make informed decisions about whether to use both quantitative and qualitative methods independently or not (Frels & Onwuegbuzie, 2013; Creswell, 2012; Hong & Espelage, 2011). Authors such as Frels and Onwuegbuzie (2013) state that mixed method research provides more insight and a better understanding of the research than when relying on only one approach. In addition, Zhou and Creswell (2012) believe that the combination of both the quantitative and qualitative approaches in a single study will have the potential to provide more robust research than a single method. The use of the mixed method approach allows the researcher to gather much needed information from the participants regarding the topic under investigation, which otherwise cannot be provided using either a qualitative or quantitative approach on its own. Cronholm and Hjalmarsson (2011) are of the view that mixed method
research is used to handle more complex and wider research questions, because the researcher is not restricted to using only one research design. It is for this reason that the present study uses a mixed method approach. The combination of both quantitative and qualitative (mixed method) approaches enabled the researcher to address a broad range of research questions, as outlined in chapter one.

3.9 Population of the study

Research population could best be described as an aggregate or totality of all the objects, subjects or members that conform to a set of specifications. A population is a gathering of objects, actions or individuals having some mutual characteristic that the researcher is interested in investigating (Mouton, 2011). Sekaran and Bougie (2016) define a population as the entire group of people, events or things of interest that the researcher wishes to investigate. Similarly, Wiid and Diggines (2009) claim that the research population is the entire group of people or entities from which information is required. A targeted population is described as the population to whom the researcher wants to generalise about his selected sample for the study in question (Babbie & Mouton, 2002; Polit & Beck, 2012).

The entire population of Nigeria is 140,431,790 while that of Abuja is 1,405,201 (Nigeria Population Census, 2006). In the context of this study, the population refers to all the inhabitants of the six local area councils (comprising men, women and children) that make up the Abuja geographical environment, who in one way or the other have experienced or were affected by the chaos in the city. Below is the geographical map of Abuja:
Abuja area council consists of Abaji, Abuja Municipal, Bwari, Gwagwalada, Kuje and Kwali. As shown in the above diagram, the targeted population refers specifically to the Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC). AMAC is located between latitude 80 401 and 90 201 north of the equator and longitude 60 401 and 70 401 east of the Greenwich meridian. Abuja has a land mass of approximately 8000 sq km of which the federal capital city (AMAC) occupies about 250 sq km with a population of 778,567 for the Abuja Municipal Area Council (Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette, 2007). The choice of AMAC was because of the occurrence reportage of the terrorist attacks and crime syndrome. The targeted population and research sample comprised Abuja inhabitants (of Abuja Municipal Area Council), members of the Nigerian security agency, Centre for Strategic and Research Studies (National Defence College), security experts and scholars at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja as attached in the appendix. This is further elaborated below.
3.10 Sample and Sampling Technique

Sampling is a method of selecting a number of individuals or groups as a sample, which represents the population. A sample is a portion of the target population selected to participate in the research study. The essence of sampling is to allow for even representation of the selected population (Polit & Beck, 2012; Mouton, 2002). Once the target population has been identified, the researcher needs to select individuals from the target population to be part of the sample that participates in the research. In this study, twenty (20) interviewees were selected using a simple random sampling method from the Nigerian Police (ten), Centre for Strategic and Research Studies (National Defence College) four, and researchers working in the area of defense, peace and security at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (six), Abuja. The targeted respondents were purposely selected based on the nature of their work in a security outfit and as scholars in relation to the subject matter. Also, a targeted number of 113 respondents out of 160 staff at Abuja Municipal Area Council were also selected for the distribution of the questionnaire. The detailed gatekeepers letter is contained in the appendices for clarity. The local council area staff was selected because they are the inhabitants of the area. The researcher arrived at this sampling figure by using Krejcie and Morgan’s (1970) table model, which maintains that there is a necessity for a representative statistic sample in conducting research for a study. This model provided an order in the way of determining sample size as it makes possible the creation of a table for any given population as shown below.
## Table 3.1 Determining sample size from a given population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
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<th>S</th>
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<td>201</td>
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<td>302</td>
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<td>306</td>
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<td>132</td>
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<td>310</td>
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<td>313</td>
<td>15000</td>
<td>375</td>
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<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>140</td>
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<td>317</td>
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<td>550</td>
<td>225</td>
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<td>320</td>
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<td>66</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>234</td>
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<td>322</td>
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<td>90</td>
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<td>256</td>
<td>2600</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>100000</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Note:**
- “N” is population size
- “S” is sample size.
3.11 Data Collection Procedure
Data collection procedure refers to the process of gathering or collecting data for the purpose of measuring or proffering solutions to the variables embedded in the problem statement, research questions and hypotheses (Creswell, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009). According to Plooy-Cilliers and Cronje (2014) data collection is a very crucial aspect in the research process that must be taking seriously in order to achieve valid results and findings of the research objectives. Based on the opinion of Plooy-Cilliers and Cronje, the researcher chooses data collection procedures in line with the study’s research objectives. This study has used both primary and secondary data sources. The primary sources of data collection were carried out using a structured questionnaire and in-depth interviews with structured and unstructured questions. The gaps identified in the review of related literature and the study’s objectives were carefully aligned to the design of the questionnaire and interview questions. The researcher also used secondary sources of data to fulfil its objectives in terms of a literature review and the conceptual framework underpinning the study. This included information from media reports; such as Sahara reporters’ newspapers, books, various defence and security sources (including defence and security journals), scholarly journals, newspapers, relevant and published theses, as well as resources from the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja, library. These sources allowed the researcher to critically examine and supplement the findings and materials collected. Wilson (2014) state that triangulation is a process of using multiple approaches in doing research with a view to getting richer, fuller data and/or to reaffirming the findings of the study. The main reason for the use of triangulation in this specific study is to obtain confirmation of the main findings through convergence of different perspectives (Hayes & Scharkow, 2013). Data triangulation is a technique that the researcher used to collect data by multiple sources and multiple collection methods to investigate the subject matter in a better and deeper understanding. The researcher sought to complement the findings of both quantitative and qualitative data by seeking elaboration, enhancement and clarification of the results. The use of triangulation in this study allows the researcher to cross check the validity of the findings. It also helps the researcher to ensure confirmation and completeness by increasing the validity and reliability of the data collected.

3.12 Research Instrument
The study predominantly used quantitative research methods, with qualitative data collection methods to supplement the findings. The rationale was to utilise concurrent transformative mixed methods for data collection and analysis. Bamberger (2012) states that a mixed method
research design enhances the strength or reliability and assessment of research findings by contrasting facts acquired from various methods of data collection, and using the findings of a method to facilitate the sample or instrumentation for the other data (quantitative and qualitative). Also, Creswell (2013) states that mixed method research is a way by which a researcher incorporates or focuses on collecting and analysing both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study. He also goes further to say that researchers employ a mixed method design for their studies to expand an understanding from one method to another and to converge or confirm findings from different data sources. Mixed method research involves the collection of both qualitative (open-ended) and quantitative (closed-ended) responses to research questions or hypotheses, along with the analysis of both forms of data (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2014). Instruments employed in this study comprised a self-administered questionnaire and interview schedule, as explained below:

3.13.1 Questionnaire

Before the questionnaires are administered, the researcher wrote a letter to the administration of Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC) informing them of the researcher intention to conduct the study. Once permission has been granted to do so. The researcher was introduced to the municipal communities, who were informed about his mission in AMAC. Meetings are scheduled with all the participants to discuss how the study will be conducted and thereafter the questionnaires are administered to 57 males and 56 females, between January 18 and February 29, 2016. Time factor was a major challenge encountered in retrieving the questionnaires, as most of the respondents keeps telling the researcher to come back for their respond. However, the researcher was able to retrieve all the 113 questionnaires. The questionnaires were designed to elicit answers to the stated research questions. The questionnaire consists of five sections. The respondents were required to either choose strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree. Each of these options was graded as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Points</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The researcher used a four-point Likert-type rating scale; ranging from one (strongly disagree) to four (strongly agree). This rating scale was developed in 1932 by American psychologist, Rensis Likert (Wilson, 2014). The reason for adopting the Likert rating scale was that it is very practical and easy to construct and interpret (Hartley, 2014; Treiblmaier & Filzmoser, 2011). The choice of the four-point Likert-type rating scale over the five-point rating scale and others was based on the fact that it reduces the ability of respondents to ‘sit on the fence’ by having the option of being neutral (Saunders et al., 2009).

The questionnaire was designed with five sections. Section A consists of personal and socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents such as sex, age, academic qualification, years living in Abuja, and marital status. Section B requests information about the factors that influence the proliferation of small arms in Abuja, Nigeria. In addition, inquiry is also made to find out the role of government officials and representatives in the spread of small arms. Section C investigates the link between small arms, terrorism and insecurity in Abuja. Inquiry is also made to investigate whether the lapses of government inflates the proliferation of small arms. Section D covers questions, which will elicit answers on the factors that threaten peace and security in Abuja, along with the effects of small arms proliferation. The questions are designed to derive specific information on threatening factors, such as socio-economic, physical and psychological effects caused by small arms in Abuja. Specifically, inquiry is made to ascertain the connection between small arms and terrorism. Section E examines the strategies and steps to be taken to control small arms proliferation, need to reduce the threat to peace and security in Abuja. The detailed questionnaire is contained in the appendices of this study.

3.13.2 Interviews

The qualitative method involved conducting interviews. An interview is a method of data collection whereby the researcher garners information from the interviewees or respondents about the subject matter under investigation (Turner, 2010). The interview were in-depth, structured interviews with open-ended questions, which was conducted face-to-face. The participants proposed for this study were twenty. Eighteen were accessible and consented to participate in the study were finally drawn across the section. The participants comprised of the following: 9 - Nigeria Police Force Abuja, 3 - Centre for Strategic and Research Studies “National Defence College” Abuja, 6 - Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja. The interview was carried out at Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC) between November 25 and February 26, 2016. 11 of the participants were male, while the remaining 7 were female.
The interviews were conducted in the English language and each lasted between twenty to thirty-five minutes, which comprised of eleven questions that was aimed at answering the research questions. The participants were allowed the leverage to express themselves freely on the topic. Some interviews were tape recorded (with the participant consent) for better interpretation and analysis. The qualitative (in-depth) interviews were analysed using content analysis.

3.14 Procedures for Data Analysis

The study analysed both quantitative and qualitative data separately. Harris and Brown (2010) state that it is significant to analyse quantitative and qualitative data separately when using a mixed method approach in a study. During the initial stages of the study, the data gathered from the respondents are processed and analysed. The data analysis is done in two phases: phase one focuses on the quantitative data analysis, while the second phase deals with the qualitative data analysis.

The primary data collected under section A of the questionnaire (quantitative) was analysed using descriptive statistics. The descriptive statistics included frequency counts, simple percentages, and mean and standard deviation, which are presented in frequency distribution table in Chapter 4 of the study. The Regression analysis and Pearson product moment correlation are also contained in the appendices for clarity. Primary data collected under sections B-E of the questionnaire (quantitative) were first captured in Excel and later exported into the SPSS for analysis, and later captured in the IBM Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 23.0. This software package was used to run the descriptive statistics highlighted above, such as Pearson’s correlation coefficient and multiple regressions analysis. Green and Salkind (2010) describe SPSS as a set of data manipulation and statistical analysis programmes used in a research study to understand the significance of data.

Data received from the interview schedule (qualitative) from participants were non-numerical data that was analysed using content analysis. According to Krippendorff (2012) content analysis focuses on the assessment of the contextual implications of a transcript. It is a non-numerical method of data analysis commonly used by researchers to examine narrative information (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Twycross & Shields, 2008). The aim of content analysis is to explain the characteristics of the document’s content by examining respondents’ views and opinions to a particular incidence under investigation (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). This study
used content analysis to interpret the content of the transcript via the application of codes to
the various themes and patterns identified to be relevant to the present research aim and
objectives. Grouping the information into themes and sub-themes or patterns was instrumental
in the analysis and interpretation of non-numerical data. The thematic analysis assists the
research study to classify and present the themes that emerge from the data (Alhojailan, 2012).
It also helps to illustrate the data in detail and it deals with different topics via interpretation.
The use of this approach enables the researcher to link the various concepts and views of the
scholars and compare them with the information solicited from other respondents in different
situations at different times when conducting the study.

3.15 Validity and Reliability

Validity refers to accuracy, trustworthiness, authenticity and credibility of the research method
were observed throughout this study’s research method (Drost, 2011). Carmines and Zellers
(1979) in Wilson (2014) refer to reliability as the extent to which a measuring instrument
produces a stable and consistent result. It is the ability of a measurement to produce the same
result under the same conditions repeatedly (McBurney & White, 2009). Also, Atiku (2014)
opines that reliability has to do with the consistency, stability and dependability of the
measuring instrument adopted in a study. While, validity tests on the other hand are necessary
to determine whether research measures what it intended to measure and to be sure of the
truthfulness of the results. Furthermore, Obilor (2013) opines that conclusions drawn from
analysing survey data are only acceptable to the degree to which they are determined valid.
Validity is the extent to which a measuring instrument assesses what it was designed to assess.
Validity encompasses the relationship between a construct and its indicators (Wilson, 2014).
According to Key (2007) one of the characteristics of a good research is that it should be valid.
He maintains that an instrument is valid if it measures truly and accurately the quality and
ability one wants to measure. According to him, content validity ought to deal with the content
of the instrument while face validity would deal with experts’ opinions on the face value of the
instrument. However, Key (2007) notes that face validity refers to the apparent reasonableness
of the test in the eyes of the people testing or being tested, while content validity is concerned
with whether the items actually covered all areas that the test is supposed to cover. This study
therefore used the content and face validity to validate information on small arms proliferation
and its impact on peace and security in Abuja between 2010 and 2015. Content validity was
achieved by evaluating the face validity of the instrument through expert opinions and the academic knowledge of professionals in the field of study.

3.16 Ethical Requirements

The researcher meticulously followed the research ethics policy of the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) (2013). The University’s Ethical Clearance Application Form was completed and a copy of the research instrument and Gate Keeper’s letters from the participating organisations are attached. The questionnaire was pilot tested and approved by the Humanities and Social Science Research Committee of the University of KwaZulu-Natal before embarking on the fieldwork. This was done to ensure that the sequence of the questions was appropriate, and to assess the reliability and validity of the research instrument (Van Teijlingen & Hundley, 2015). The researcher received permission to embark on fieldwork in a letter of approval (HSS/1268/015D) from the Humanities and Social Science Research Committee of the University of KwaZulu-Natal dated 3th November 2015. The field survey ran from the end of November 2015 to the end of February 2016. The purpose of the exercise was properly communicated to respondents before questionnaires and the interview schedules were administered. Respondents were informed of the purpose and procedures of the research study prior to the commencement of data collection. A consent form was attached and signed by all respondents in the study areas before they engaged in the study. The following basic principles were strictly observed by the researcher:

1. The research instrument was personally administered by the researcher to the respondents, and the purpose of the study was communicated to the respondents before administration of the instrument.
2. There was no pressure on individuals to participate, as they were informed at the outset that participation in the study was voluntary and that they could withdraw at any stage of the research.
3. The participants/respondents’ autonomy was taken very serious.
4. Due to the nature of the subject matter, the researcher maintained anonymity and confidentiality of the respondent.
5. All data collected in the course of this research work will be deposited with the School of Social Sciences at the University of KwaZulu-Natal for safekeeping.
6. All secondary sources of data collected for this study are adequately cited and referenced, thereby avoiding plagiarism.
3.17 Strengths of the Research Instrument Utilised

The major strengths of the questionnaire and interview schedule used in this study as the main instruments for data collection are highlighted below:

(a) Participants’ consent was sought as required by the University of KwaZulu-Natal.

(b) Questions were worded in simple language for ease of understanding by respondents. This enabled the respondents to answer the questions as clearly as possible.

(c) All the objectives of the study, research questions and hypotheses were well-aligned with the questionnaire and interview schedule.

(d) Open-ended questions enabled participants to express their own opinions.

(e) The questionnaire was an excellent approach to collecting primary data from a large group of respondents, enabling the presentation of results in tables, percentages, bar charts and histograms, among others for accurate interpretation of results.

(f) The interview questions also helped the study and supported the findings of the questionnaire.

3.18 Challenges of the Data Collection

The major challenges experienced were obtaining permission from the security agencies, research institute and the municipal area council to administer the research instrument. In order to overcome these challenges a series of meetings were held with the administrator of the selected agencies where the questionnaire and interview schedule were presented. Another challenge that the researcher encountered was during the field research where some of the respondents insisted that their names should not be disclosed due to the sensitivity of the information given, based on the fear of being victimized and convicted for breach of highly confidential information. The respondents initially declined to sign the informed consent form but later agreed to do so after further discussion of what anonymity meant, as well as reassurance of confidentiality. One of the respondents insisted on two conditions, namely, that he had access to the questionnaire beforehand and that there be no deviation from the specified questions. Another challenge encountered by the researcher was that the data collection was time consuming because the quantitative (questionnaire) and qualitative (interview) data were
collected and carried out at different times from different groups of respondents at Abuja municipal area council (AMAC). Another major challenge was the unforeseen financial and travel constraints experienced, as the researcher needed to travel to Abuja and spent a lot of money on accommodation and meals. Despite all these challenges, the aims of the research work were achieved.

3.19 Conclusion

This chapter described and justified the research methodology adopted for this study. A descriptive research approach was utilised for the study. Mixed research methodology employed in this study gave higher priority to numerical data than non-numerical data. The main data collection instruments used in the study were self-administered questionnaires and face-to-face interviews. The selection of the sample size for the study was based on a simple random sampling method for the qualitative purpose, while Krejcie and Morgan’s (1970) table model was used for the quantitative aspect of the study. The strength and challenges of research were addressed along with the ethical codes of conduct in research being observed by the researcher, the results of the collected data will be presented and interpreted in graphical and tabular form in the following chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR
QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the data analysis and interpretation of the results based on the responses collected from the respondents during the fieldwork. The analyses of the respondents are presented in two sections, the first section examines the socio-demographics of participants such as academic qualification and years living in Abuja. The second addresses research questions such as the factors that influence the proliferation of small arms in Abuja, links between small arms, terrorism, the factors that threatened peace and security in Abuja and measures adopted by the Nigeria security sector in combating the spread of small arms and ensuring peace and security. The data collected was analysed, described and summarised using descriptive statistics, including percentage and frequency tables where applicable. Frequencies are represented in table form, while the regression analysis and Pearson product moment correlation are used to test both effects and relationship of the variables.

4.1 The Response Rate

A total of one hundred and thirteen responses were obtained in the Abuja Municipal Area Council. The data was first captured on an excel spreadsheet and later exported into the SPSS version 23.0.

Table 4.1: Demographic Distribution of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Educational Qualification</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Certificate</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HND/B.Sc.</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>61.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.Sc.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ph.D.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years of stay in Abuja</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-5 Years</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 Years</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15 Years</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-20 Years</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Years and Above</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Survey (2016)
Most of the respondents (n=87, 77%) had a post-secondary school qualification. This is an indication that the cross-section of the respondents are literate, knowledgeable about current national issues and competent enough to respond to any given questions i.e. they are adequately equipped to give accurate information on the given questions.

Also, one third (35.4%) had only recently arrived in Abuja, nearly half (n=51, 45.1%) had lived there for more than 10 years. This shows that majority of the respondents have lived in Abuja for a long enough period of time to provide relevant opinions.

4.2 Objective 1. To examine the factors that stimulated the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja, Nigeria

To test the hypothesis, the respondents’ scores on five variables, namely unemployment, political influence, border control, economic resource, self-control and proliferation of small arms and light weapons were computed and subjected to multiple regression analysis, which were found to be significant at 0.946 for unemployment, political, border control, economic resource and self-control (Table 4.2). The adjusted r-square showed that the five independent variables caused approximately 88.9% (0.889) variance in proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

Table 4.2: Factors that influence the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja, Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Co-eff.</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.750</td>
<td>.143</td>
<td>-.224</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.992</td>
<td>.323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political factors</td>
<td>.219</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>3.144</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boarder Control</td>
<td>-.031</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>-.283</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Resource</td>
<td>-.182</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>-2.325</td>
<td>.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political self Interest</td>
<td>.296</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>2.980</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government official</td>
<td>.344</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>3.481</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired Security</td>
<td>.192</td>
<td>.123</td>
<td>1.564</td>
<td>.121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R = 0.946
R Square = 0.895
Adj. R Square = 0.889
F Stat. = 128.515(0.000)

Dependent variable: Proliferation of arms
The unstandardized beta co-efficient of unemployment is 0.073 with $t= 0.992$ and $(p= 0.323 > 0.05)$, indicating that there is no correlation, and therefore a negative relationship $(p > 0.05)$, between unemployment and proliferation of small arms and light weapons (Table 4.2). As this is insignificant, the null hypothesis is accepted that says unemployment is an insignificant influence in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja, Nigeria.

The unstandardized beta co-efficient of political factors is 0.219 with $t= 3.144$ and $(p= 0.002 > 0.05)$ (Table 4.2). The result showed as a positive relationship between political factors and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and is significant, the alternative hypothesis was accepted. This suggest that the significance of political factor in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, which is associated with the politician recruitment of the youth to get into power by force using the youth to cause crises in order to campaign against the government in power.

The unstandardized beta co-efficient of boarder control is -0.031 with $t= -0.283$ and $(p= 0.001 < 0.05)$. The result showed a positive relationship between boarder control and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. As this is significant alternative hypothesis is accepted that says boarder control is a significant influence of proliferation of small arms and light weapons. This suggest that the porosity of the boarder and inability of the government to secure and control the boarder has led to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria.

The unstandardized beta co-efficient of economic resource is -0.182 with $t= -2.325$ and $(p= 0.022 < 0.05)$. The result showed a negative relationship between economic resource and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. As this is significant alternative hypothesis is accepted that says economic resource is a significant influence on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The implication of this is that the economic met down in Nigeria gave rise to illicit spread of arms.

The unstandardized beta co-efficient of political self-control is 0.296 with $t= 0.099$ and $(p= 0.004 < 0.05)$. The result showed a positive relationship between political self-control and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. As this is significant alternative hypothesis is accepted that says political self-control is a significant influence in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. This suggest that the stakeholders of the nation do not have self-control and are not concerned about the lives and properties of the citizen.
The unstandardized beta co-efficient of Government official is 0.344 with $t= 3.481$ and $(p= 0.001 < 0.05)$. The result showed a positive relationship between government officials and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. As this is significant alternative hypothesis is accepted that says government officials are significant influence in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. This suggest that state officials do contribute to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

The unstandardized beta co-efficient of retired security personnel is 0.192 with $t= 1.564$ and $(p= 0.121 > 0.05)$. The result showed that there is no relationship between retired security personnel and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. As this is insignificant, the null hypothesis is accepted that says retired security is an insignificant influence of proliferation of small arms and light weapons. This implies that the retired security personnel are not involved in the proliferation of small arms.
4.3 Objective 2. To examine the relationship between small arms, terrorism and insecurity in Abuja, Nigeria

The correlation of the four variables of terrorism, insecurity, failure of government and small arms were analysed. Data was obtained from 113 respondents using a questionnaire survey, with the results being analysed using Pearson Product moment correlation.

Table 4.3: Relationship between terrorism, insecurity, failure of government and small arms in Abuja, Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1.</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
<th>4.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Terrorism</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.910**</td>
<td>.880**</td>
<td>.842**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Insecurity</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.958**</td>
<td>.814**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Failure of Government</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.778**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Small Arms</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 (2-tailed)

The result in Table 4.3 showed that there is significant positive relationship between terrorism and small arms ($r\ [113] = 0.842, p<0.01$). Obtaining a probability of 0.000, which is less than the 0.01 significance level required for a two-tailed test, indicates that terrorism and SALW in Abuja is significant. The alternative hypothesis is therefore accepted, that there is significant relationship between terrorism and small arms in Abuja, and suggest that the act of terrorism are perpetrated by terrorists with the aid of small arms. This resonates with the work of Gunaratna (2011), who concluded that terrorist violence cannot occur anywhere in the world without the use of small arms.

The correlation of two additional variables, namely, insecurity and small arms were analysed, with the data being analysed using Pearson Product moment correlation. The result showed that there is significant positive relationship between insecurity and small arm ($r\ [113] = 0.814, p<0.01$). Obtaining a probability of 0.000 which is less than 0.01 significance level for a two-tailed test, the insecurity and small arms in Abuja metropolis is significant. The alternative
hypothesis is accepted, that there is significant relationship between insecurity and the proliferation of small arms in Abuja, which implies that insecurity in a nation could be as a result of the widespread availability of arms and ammunition. This relates to the findings of Hazen and Horner (2017), who claim that the atmosphere of insecurity has prevailed in Nigeria due to the general availability of small arms.

The correlation of two variables, failure of government and small arms was analysed using Pearson Product moment correlation. The result showed that there is significant positive relationship between failure of government and small arm \((r [113] = 0.778, p<0.01)\). Obtaining a probability of 0.000 which is less than 0.01 significance level for a two-tailed test, the failure of government and small arms in Abuja metropolis is significant. The alternative hypothesis is accepted, which indicates a significant relationship between the failure of government and availability of small arms in Abuja. This suggest that the failure of a government to provide basic amenities and protect the lives and properties of its citizens could led to illicit proliferation of small arms. This corroborate with Luckham’s (2017) study, which states that government’s attitudes in approaching or addressing have influenced the agitators to resort to bearing arms.
4.3 Objective 3. To access the nature of threats to peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria

The correlation of seven variables: terrorism, crime, poor presentation, threat to live, threat to properties, threat to social disorder and proliferation of weapons and arms were analysed to establish the nature of threats to peace and security in Abuja. Data was obtained from 113 respondents using a questionnaire survey and analysed using Pearson Product moment correlation. 0.01 significance level for a two-tailed test,

Table 4.4: Establishing the nature of threats to peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.522**</td>
<td>.153**</td>
<td>.306**</td>
<td>.160**</td>
<td>.522**</td>
<td>.365**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
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<td>113</td>
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<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.180**</td>
<td>.264**</td>
<td>.165**</td>
<td>1.000**</td>
<td>.623**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.697**</td>
<td>.530**</td>
<td>.180**</td>
<td>.186**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
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<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Pearson Correlation</td>
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<td>.591**</td>
<td>.264**</td>
<td>.246**</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.165**</td>
<td>.135**</td>
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<td>113</td>
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<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.623**</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
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<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>7. Pearson Correlation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 (2-tailed)

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 (2-tailed)

The result in Table 4.4 shows that there is significant positive relationship between terrorism and proliferation of weapon and arms in Abuja (r [113] = 0.306, p<0.01). Obtaining a probability of 0.000 which is less than the terrorism and proliferation of weapon and arms in Abuja is significant. The alternative hypothesis was accepted, that there is significant
relationship between terrorism and proliferation of weapon and arms in Abuja metropolis. This implies that the act of terrorism could only be carried out with the aid of small arms.

The correlation of two variables, crime and proliferation of weapons and arms were analysed. The result shows that there is significant positive relationship between crime and proliferation of weapon and arms in Abuja, Nigeria (r [113] = 0.264, p<0.01). Obtaining a probability of 0.000 which is less than 0.01 significance level for a two-tailed test, the crime and proliferation of weapon and arms in Abuja metropolis is significant. The alternative hypothesis was accepted, that there is significant relationship between crime and proliferation of weapon and arms in Abuja metropolis. This suggest that crime does occur if arms are in the possession of criminals.

The correlation of two variables, poor presentation and proliferation of weapons and arms were analysed. The result shows that there is significant positive relationship between poor presentation and proliferation of weapon and arms in Abuja, Nigeria (r [113] = 0.697, p<0.01). Obtaining a probability of 0.000 which is less than 0.01 significance level for a two-tailed test, the poor presentation and proliferation of weapon and arms in Abuja metropolis is significant. The alternative hypothesis was accepted, that there is significant relationship between poor presentation and proliferation of weapon and arms in Abuja metropolis. This implies that state authorities must truly represent the entire citizen of a nation, in order to avoid the widespread of arms and ammunition.

The correlation of two variables, threat to life and proliferation of weapons and arms were analysed. The result shows that there is significant positive relationship between threat to life and proliferation of weapon and arms in Abuja, Nigeria (r [113] = 0.591, p<0.01). Obtaining a probability of 0.000 which is less than 0.01 significance level for a two-tailed test, the threat to life and proliferation of weapon and arms in Abuja metropolis is significant. The alternative hypothesis was accepted, that there is significant relationship between threat to life and proliferation of weapon and arms in Abuja. This shows that the proliferation of small arms is a threaten factor to the lives of Abuja resident. The findings support the report of Small Arms Working Group (2016) that proliferation of small arms has caused the death of many civilians along with the destruction of their properties.
The correlation of two variables, threat to properties and proliferation of weapons and arms were analysed. The result shows that there is significant positive relationship between threat to properties and proliferation of weapon and arms in Abuja, Nigeria ($r = 0.264$, $p<0.01$). Obtaining a probability of 0.005 which is less than 0.01 significance level for a two-tailed test, the threat to properties and proliferation of weapon and arms in Abuja metropolis is significant. The alternative hypothesis was accepted, that there is significant relationship between threat to properties and proliferation of weapon and arms in Abuja. This implies that the widespread of small arms has led to the destruction of various properties in Abuja. The findings support the report of Small Arms Working Group (2016) that proliferation of small arms has caused the death of many civilians along with the destruction their properties.

The correlation of two variables, threat to social disorder and proliferation of weapons and arms were analysed. The result shows that there is significant positive relationship between threat to social disorder and proliferation of weapon and arms in Abuja, Nigeria ($r = 0.264$, $p<0.01$). Obtaining a probability of 0.009 which is less than 0.01 significance level for a two-tailed test, the threat to social disorder and proliferation of weapon and arms in Abuja metropolis is significant. The alternative hypothesis was accepted, that there is significant relationship between the threat to social disorder and proliferation of weapon and arms in Abuja metropolis. This reveals that the society is in a dilemma due to the proliferation of small arms.
4.4 Objective 4. To examine the strategic options that were utilised by the Nigerian security sector to enhance peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria

The respondents’ scores on six variables, consultation, intelligence, arrest of terrorism, road block, security operative and crisis management were computed and subjected to multiple regression analysis.

**Table 4.5: Strategic options that were utilised by the Nigerian security sector to enhance peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Co-eff.</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.409</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td>3.078</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>.549</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>6.586</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence gathering</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>.115</td>
<td>.517</td>
<td>.607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrest of terrorist</td>
<td>.331</td>
<td>.353</td>
<td>4.081</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road blocks and search</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>.298</td>
<td>.766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security operative</td>
<td>.666</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>16.614</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R = 0.935
R Square = 0.874
Adj. R Square = 0.868
F Stat. = 148.900(.000)

The unstandardized beta co-efficient of consultation is 0.549 with t= 6.586 and (p= 0.000 < 0.05). As the result showed a positive relationship between consultation and crisis management and is significant, the alternative hypothesis is accepted, which says consultation has a significant influence on crisis management. This indicates that consultation with various stakeholders is an important strategy employed by the security operatives to ensure peace and security in Abuja.

The unstandardized beta co-efficient of intelligence is 0.059 with t= 0.517 and (p= 0.607 > 0.05). The result showed a positive relationship between intelligence and crisis management and is insignificant. As this is insignificant, the null hypothesis is accepted that says intelligence is an insignificant influence of crisis management. This implies that intelligence gathering was not a substantial role played by the security agencies.

The unstandardized beta co-efficient of arrest of terrorist is 0.331 with t= 4.081 and (p= 0.000 < 0.05). The result showed a positive relationship between arrest of terrorists and crisis management and is significant, the alternative hypothesis is accepted, which says arrest of
terrorist is a significant influence of crisis management. This indicates that the arrest of terrorists has played an important role in sustaining peace and security in Abuja. This finding was recently corroborated in a media report by Daniel (2017) that the Department of State Security (DSS) had made an arrest and foiled a planned terrorist attack in Abuja and six other states between September 1 and 4 in 2017.

The unstandardized beta co-efficient of road blockage is 0.034 with $t=0.298$ and $(p=0.766 > 0.05)$. The result showed a positive relationship between road blockage and crisis management and is significant, the alternative hypothesis is accepted, which says road blockage is an insignificant influence of crisis management. This reveal that road blockage by the security personnel’s is not an effective factor in ensuring peace and security.

The unstandardized beta co-efficient of security operative is 0.666 with $t=16.614$ and $(p=0.000 < 0.05)$. The result showed a positive relationship between security operative and crisis management and is significant, the alternative hypothesis is accepted, which says security operative is a significant influence of crisis management. This is an indication that the roles of security operatives’ in ensuring peace, security and arms control has been effective in Abuja.

In Table 4.5, the results of the analysis were found to be significant at 0.935 showing that consultation, intelligence, arrest of terrorism, road block and crisis management. Adjusted r-square showed that consultation, intelligence, arrest of terrorism, road block is about 87.5% variance in crisis management. An estimated 0.875 of crisis management is accounted for by the independent variables of consultation, intelligence, arrest of terrorism, road block, security operative and crisis management. The remaining 12.5% are explained by error term in the model.

4.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented the results of the research objective. Regression and correlation, along with descriptive method were used to present and analyse the data. The results show that there are some significant factors that stimulate the proliferation of small arms in Abuja, such as: porous border control, political, state failure and the involvement of state officials in the proliferation of SALW. This study also revealed that there is a significant relationship between terrorism, insecurity, failure of government and the proliferation of small arms. The study empirically corroborated the nature of the threat posed to peace and security in Nigeria, using
Abuja as a reference point. The quantitative findings in this chapter also revealed the role of the security operatives in safeguarding peace and security in Abuja. As the study is a mixed method research, the next chapter presents the qualitative data findings.
CHAPTER FIVE
QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

5.0 Introduction

The previous chapter presented the quantitative findings of this study, while this chapter presents the qualitative findings for the objectives of the study. The purpose of the qualitative component is twofold, namely, to provide substantive detail and to complement the quantitative findings with respect to the study objectives. Other recent studies have followed a similar approach, such as Obilor (2013), in his study on the influence of small arms proliferation on violent conflict in the Niger Delta region. In addition, Zhou and Creswell (2012) contend that the use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches in a single study has the potential to provide robust research, where one of the approaches can be used to supplement the findings of the other. As indicated in Chapter 3, 20 participants agreed to take part in the interviews, with 18 being available to participate in the interviews, which accounted for a 90% response rate. The interviews were conducted with the full consent and willingness of the participants, in English, with each lasting between 20 - 35 minutes. Table 5.1 presents the educational and occupational backgrounds of the 18 participants who participated in the qualitative component of the study.

Table 5.1 Demographic Background of the participants (n=18)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of Education</td>
<td>PhD</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B.sc/HND</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SSCE</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Security Agent</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scholars/Researchers</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Survey 2016

The interviews were structured to elicit information on the participants’ perceptions on the following issues:

1. Factors responsible for the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja.
2. Relationship between small arms, terrorism and insecurity in Abuja.
3. Factors that threaten peace and security in Abuja.
4. Strategies employed by the Nigerian security sector to ensure peace and security in Abuja.

The interview questions were intended to evoke the participants’ thoughts, opinions and beliefs, and provide further details that were not possible to ascertain in the quantitative format. The open-ended questions engaged the participants’ points of view on the various challenges to peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria, regarding the spread of small arms and light weapons. Using content analysis, broad and sub-themes were identified under each of the interview questions. The interviews were conducted in various locations, and the participants were given equal opportunity to comment on the research questions in the interviews.

5.1 To Examine the Factors that Stimulated the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Abuja, Nigeria (Objective 1)

The participants claimed that the socio-economic factors contributing towards arms proliferation were porous borders, service delivery failure by the state and corrupt government officials. Other factors that emerged were: political motivation, religious fanaticism, and ethnic imposition, all six themes being elaborated below.

5.1.1 Porous Borders

The majority of the participants (15 of 18) maintained that small arms proliferated in Abuja due to the porosity of the Nigerian borders, which provided an enabling environment for non-combatants to emerge and become active. Some of the participants’ responses are indicated below. According to respondent 10:

One of the factors that contributed to the weakness of the Nigerian borders is that the security personnel in charge of the border are so corrupt. Sometimes they seize arms and ammunitions at the border, but the perpetrators of SALW will still smuggle in the arms into the country by bribing the officers in charge (Participant 10).

This participant blamed the security agencies on porosity of Nigeria borders arguing that as a result, the county is vulnerable to all sorts of smuggling arms by bribing the security personnel’s in charge. Another comment on porous border came from participant 13:

Many of the arms and ammunitions use by the terrorist came into the country through the weak border on the North, and possibly from countries like Niger and Chad (Participant 13).
According to participant 13, the porous border has led to the inflow of arms and ammunitions into the country from Niger and Chad, which facilitates terrorism and crime. In a similar comment, participant 1 noted:

*Previously, the Nigerian state as a whole thought she had only eighty-five borders, but later research of the veracity of Boko Haram activities, it was discovered that there are over 1,400 open accesses points into the Nigeria territory (Participant 1).*

The participant noticed that the Nigerian state does not have firm control and knowledge of its borders as a result of the Boko Haram activities. Furthermore, participant 3 stated that:

*The legal tools to check arms flow in Nigeria is very weak, and people take advantage of the weakness to acquire arms. The arms rule in Nigeria is very weak, for instance, since 1959 when the arms control act was entrenched it has not been changed (Participant 3).*

The participant believes that the law to address the issue of arms proliferation in Nigeria is weak, as the country still relies on the 1959 fire arms act to regulate the control arms.

Some of the participants believed that the international community contributes to the illicit spread of small arms because the major arms producing countries are not based in Africa, but are rather situated in Europe, the Americans and other countries. Participant 6 stated that:

*“In as much as there is a high demand of small arms in African countries, like Nigeria, the producers will want to supply arms without observing or following the international standards of not supplying arms to non-state actors”.*

The interviewees believe that the international community supply arms without knowing who the end users are going to be. The following additional comments were made:

*Major sources of small arms in Nigeria are from the western world (outside Nigeria), the only government institution that produces weapons in Nigeria is the Defense Industry and the weapons that the institution produced are being measured (Participant 7).*

Participant 7 observed that most of the arms and ammunitions in Nigeria are not produced in the country.

*Weapons that are being used to perpetrate crime, violence and mostly terrorism in Nigeria are all exported to the country, based on the fact that both border control mechanisms, legislation with the performance of the security agencies, and equally, weapons that were used in countries closer to Nigeria are being imported to Nigeria (Participant 4).*
Participant 4 further, emphasised the point that illegal weapons that were being used to perpetrate crime are all smuggled into the Nigeria.

*Illegal importation and massive inflow of arms into the Nigerian state from Central Africa, Mali, Libya, Chad, and Niger, among others (Participant 13).*

The above participant noted that a number of African countries were involved in arms proliferation for both internal and expert reasons? specified the various nations where illegal importations were being carried out to Nigeria.

In an attempt to solve the issue of illicit arms importation and trade, participant 5 noted that:

*The international communities should ensure that nations and companies that manufacture arms follow the international standard protocols of limiting or refraining the supply of arms and ammunition to non-state actors in order to secure the proliferation of small arms to some extent (Participant 5).*

This participant noted that the international communities should make sure that arms producing nations and industries do not supply ammunitions to non-state actors.

The above comments indicate that a significant number of the participants (11 of 18) are of the opinion that illicit arms in Nigeria are being bought by non-state actors. Participants also claim that arms producing countries do not follow the international standard protocols of limiting or refraining from supplying arms to non-state actors. Some participants (14 of 18) have the belief that the porosity of the Nigerian border contributes to the spread of SALW in the country. However, in addition, a smaller number of participants (4 of 18) expressed a different view, and indicated that the illicit manufacture of SALW within Nigeria contributes to the widespread of small arms in Abuja. An illustrative voice noted as follows:

*Local arms producers and manufacturers in Nigeria are also responsible for illegal activities of SALW (Participant 16).*

The results of the above discussion correspond with that of the quantitative data, as most of the participants (14 of 18) indicated that the porosity of the Nigerian border is a great source of small arms and light weapons into Nigeria. The opinion of four participants who raised the issue of local arms producers correlates with that of Bakut (2015), who maintained that the capacity of local artisans to replicate and produce categories of SALW and other weaponry (such as swords, machetes, axe, poisonous spears/arrows and cudgels) are equally deadly, and contribute to crime-related mortality.
5.1.2 State Failure in Service Delivery

With regards to state failure, many participants (13 of 18) indicated that the failure by the government to provide basic services for its citizens has led to the proliferation of small arms, as they express their frustration through acts of violence. All 18 participants held the view that unemployment and corruption is a serious challenge in Nigeria, where citizens are not gainfully employed and government officials embezzle public funds that are meant for the Nigerian people. The following experts from interviews are:

*To a large extent, when there is bad governance or state failure, the incidences of small arms proliferation will be high. When the capacity of the government or the capacity of the state constitution cannot meet the yearnings and aspirations of the people and carry out its basic responsibility, then citizens will always resort to self-help, which is the major problem in Nigeria. Where there is government failure, people resort to self-help and when people resort to self-help, the use of small arms will be obvious (Participant 15).*

This participant noted that there is the likelihood of arms proliferation in the country due to the failure of government to meet the expectation of its citizenry in providing basic amenities and security. Participant 8 also note that:

*As much as government do not provide basic amenities, such as creating employment and elevating poverty in the land, the issue of arms proliferation will always occur (Participant 8).*

Similarly, another respondent noted that the presence of poverty in Nigeria indicates the failure of the government, therefore people resort to possessing arms, as indicated below:

*When there is an advent of poverty, unemployment and corruption in a country, citizens will begin to think that their government have failed in providing basic amenities. Therefore, they (the citizens) can contend against the government through the instigation of illicit SALW. All these can be said to contribute to the proliferation of small arms in Abuja (Participant 7).*

This participant believed that the failure of Nigerian state and the presence of corruption, unemployment and poverty contributed to the proliferation of small arms in Abuja. In a similar dimension, participant 12 also notes that:

*The fact that there is poverty and unemployment in the country means that the people, especially the youth, who most rely on a means of income to survive, therefore they believe that the proliferation of small arms and committing crime could be a source of living (Participant 12).*
The above participant indicates that people, especially the youth have capitalised on the proliferation of small arms and are using crime as a source of income. This shows in the terrorist’s physical condition and clothing when they are arrested for criminal offences, as expressed by participant 18:

When you look at the arrested terrorist in the possession of small arms and ammunition in Nigeria, it is obvious that they are not healthy: the clothes they wear and their shoes are of different colour and patterns. These guys look hungry and very poor and some of them do not even wear shoes, not because they do not want to wear but they cannot afford it, because of poverty (participant 18)

The above participants believed that the presence of poverty in Nigeria is responsible for the proliferation and illegal possession of small arms. This supports the findings of Merrell (2015), who noted that failed states increase the illicit trade and spread of small arms.

5.1.3 Corrupt Government Officials

The participants reported a common view regarding the role of government officials in the proliferation of small arms in Abuja, Nigeria. Most participants (16 of 18) were of the opinion that security personnel sell or transact government arms to terrorists and other non-state actors. Arms that are meant to maintain the security of the nation end up in the wrong hands. Some excerpt are presented below to illustrate the perception and feelings of the participants regarding their mistrust of security personnel in the country.

There are rogue government officials who use their position as the representative of the state to perpetrate crimes and proliferate SALW in Nigeria. Incidences like these in Nigeria are like that of Major Akubo, who looted the ordinance in Jos, Jahal in Kaduna, and Jaji in Jos, Nigeria and sold it to the Niger/Delta militants (Participant 6).

Participant 6 was of the view that some government representatives engaged in the proliferation of small arms, and gave an instance to support his argument:

State officials compromise national security by giving/supplying arms to criminals and giving more loyalty to their primordial identity against the nation state. A customs officer in Nigeria was arrested for supplying arms to his people (Participant 18).

Furthermore, participant 18 noted that state officials are not committed to ensuring the national security of Nigeria when they give state arms to criminals.

Other participant also buttressed the above view by stating that:
There are instances that police officers lend guns to criminals to perpetrate crimes in Abuja (Participant 9).

Yes, there are corrupt officials within the law enforcement agencies that lend their weapons to criminals to perpetrate criminal acts (Participant 2).

The comments made by all the participants implied that state officials were one of the agents that proliferate small arms and light weapons in Nigeria, including in Abuja. The participants’ observed that there are corrupt security personnel. This affirms the opinion of Ochogwu and Aku (2011), that there are rogue government representatives who release their weapons to criminals. This finding further supports the quantitative results, as most of the respondents agreed to the statement that the illustrate activities of serving state officials contribute to the widespread of SALW in Nigeria.

5.1.4. Political Motivation

Political motivation emerged as one of the themes identified by the participants in an attempt to understand the factors responsible for the emergence and spread of small arms and light weapons in Abuja.

Political interest is a major factor that contributes to the proliferation of small arms in Abuja, most politicians, especially those from the opposition party, believe that one of the ways to discredit an incumbent government is to cause chaos in a city with the aid of arms and ammunitions. (Participant 11)

Participant 11 opines that most of the crises that occurred in Abuja were politically motivated, being orchestrated to discredit and campaign against a particular government. This could be related to the various crimes that occurred in Abuja towards the 2015 general election. Participant 17 noted that:

The illicit spread of small arms are mostly politically motivated in Nigeria. For example, it was so obvious that the issue of abducted girls in Chibok town could be linked to the 2015 general election in order to show that inability of the government to secure the lives of citizens.

This participant was of the view that the issue of the abducted Chibok school girls, with the aid of arms and ammunition, was orchestrated to discredit the activities of the government in securing the lives and properties of Nigerians. He further linked the abduction of the school girls to the 2015 general election. In a similar comment, participant 10 stated that:
All the incidences of crime and terrorism that occurred in Abuja was to dislodge the then government in power by 2015. During electioneering campaign, various incidences of crimes could be noticed (Participant 10)

The participant noted that the occurrence of the 2015 election in Nigeria possibly influence the various crime and terrorism in Abuja.

5.1.5 Religious Fanaticism

Religious fanaticism was a frequent theme appearing among the socio-economic and political factors, being considered significant by the participants for the spread of small arms and light weapons in Abuja. In the interviews conducted among the 18 participants, the respondents were of the opinion that political elites over the years have misused religion. Some participants recounted how politicians and political office holders were using religious belief to campaign against each other towards the 2015 election in Nigeria. The following view by participant 10 was expressed in his narrative:

Shortly before the general election, there was a religion crises in Nigeria, politicians were using religion to campaign against each other, believing that some politicians like Buhari were planning to make the nation Islamic (participant 10).

This created religious crises in the country, such as the campaign against the Buhari in 2015, that he had a mission to turn Nigeria to an Islamic nation. This was in consonance with the view of participant 14, who stated the following:

The situation was so tense, when religion crises was witnessed in some northern part of Nigeria before the 2015 general election. Hence the Nigeria security sector needs to intervene in the crises (participant 14).

According to the participant, the intervention by the internal security operatives became necessary to control the religious crises in the northern part of Nigeria. Interviews with participant 8 and 16 further confirmed that the religion crises were aided with the availability of small arms. Participant 16 observed that:

The illicit proliferation of small arms aided the religion crises that occurred in some part of Nigeria in 2015 before the general election.

The participant further buttressed the view of other respondents, that the illicit spread of arms escalated the religion crises expressed in Nigeria. In a similar opinion, participant 2 noted that:

The issue of arms proliferation can be linked to religion and politics.....you can recall that the believe of the terrorist group going on in Nigeria that “any one that
Based on the view of the participants, there is an indication that religious beliefs and groups influence the culture, habits, ideology and perceptions of individuals. The participants noted that religious manipulations become easier when the followers are ignorant of their belief. People become vulnerable because they are submissive to their manipulators and religious leaders. This corroborates the findings of Olomojobi (2013), who noted that armed conflict in northern Nigeria, among others, is the blend of religious and ethnicity identities. This indicates that religion and ethnicity have become a foundation for individual identification in the northern part of Nigeria.

5.1.6. Ethnic Imposition

As revealed in the interviews conducted among the 18 participants, some participants expressed their view on ethnic differences as a cause of small arms proliferation in Abuja, Nigeria. In the narrative report by participant 4:

A major problem that cause armed violence and conflict in Nigeria is the issue of ethnicity. For example, when an ethnic group believes that it is their turn to produce the president of the country, this could result to violence and loss of lives and properties (Participant 4).

The narrative of the interview showed that ethnic conflict is considered a contributing factor in armed violence. In a similar view, participant 15 noted that:

Nigerians are so fanatic and violence oriented, when it comes to the issue of ethnicity. This is one of the factors that caused electoral violence in the northern part of the country in 2011, after the declaration of the presidential election in favour of a southerner.

The above participant noted that Nigerians could get engaged in violence because of ethnicity, and gave an example of the post electoral violence that occurred in the northern part in 2015.

5.2 To Examine the Relationship Between Small Arms, Terrorism and Insecurity in Abuja, Nigeria (Objective 2)

The aim of Objective 2 was to identify the link/relationship between small arms, terrorism and insecurity. The interviews revealed that the availability of small arms and light weapons causes
violence, terrorism and insecurity, which is a serious threat to Nigerian national security. The following comments indicate the perceptions of the participants:

*The proliferation of small arms is the main cause of violent crises and insecurity, which has led to the death of many civilians and destroyed a lot of properties* (Participant 6).

Participant 6 showed the extent to which the availability of small arms causes a great threat to Nigerian national security, and also indicated that many lives and properties have been lost, with people taking the law into their own hands.

*The availability of small arms causes terrorism, violence and insecurity. Once small arms are accessible and available, people tend to use them. Issues that are supposed to be resolved amicably have people going into it and resolving their crises through violence because small arms are available and accessible* (Participant 10).

Furthermore, the participant noted the availability of small arms escalated issues that were supposed to be solved amicably. The view was supported by participant 17 stating that:

*This is one of the reasons why violence and conflict occur. If small arms are not in the midst of the civilian population, they will tend to settle their differences amicably. However, because of the availability the civilian population tends to use them to settle disputes and commit crimes* (Participant 17).

Other comments offered by the participant were:

*The immediate cause of terrorism in Abuja is small arms and light weapons* (Participant 1).

*The availability of small arms and light weapons caused terrorism and insecurity, which is a big threat to Nigerian national security* (Participant 3).

Participants expressed their opinion that the availability and the illicit proliferation of small arms has the potential to escalate conflict, cause terrorism, violence and insecurity.

### 5.3 To Access the Factors that Threaten Peace and Security in Abuja, Nigeria

**(Objective 3)**

The third objective of the study was to identify the nature of threats posed to peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria. Most of the interviewed (15 of 18) participants expressed their concerns and views that terrorism was a key threat to peace and security in Abuja, as indicated in their opinions:
One of the greatest problem encountered in Abuja was the issue of terrorism, about nine terrorists attacked occurred in the city (Participant 2). Illicit small arms are likely to be used for a variety of purposes, including the terrorist attacks that took place in the city of Abuja.

People go out in Abuja with a fear that terrorist attacks can happen anywhere and at any time, and the immediate cause of terrorism in Abuja is small arms and light weapons (Participant 18).

Residents of Abuja are afraid of moving around city as they feared terrorist attacks, which could occur at any time. Another participant noted that:

With the occurrence of the twin bomb attacks in late 2015, both at Kuje and Nyanya, gave people the notion that Abuja is not a safe place to live again, just like the core northern part of the country, such as Borno, Adamawa and Yobe State (Participant 7).

Participant 7 believed that Abuja is no longer a safe environment to live in, based on the two-terrorist attack that occurred at the same time in Kuje and Nyanya. This twin bomb attacks on Kuje and Nyanya prompted the Nigerian government to call an emergency security meeting with the various security chiefs in the country. In a similar comment, participant 4 observed that:

Many lives and properties has been destroyed in Abuja due to the various terrorist attacks and crime that occurred in the city. (Participant 4)

From the illustrative voices above, the participants showed that the main factors that threatened peace and security in Abuja revolved around the fear of random terrorist activity and violence.

5.4 To Examine the Strategies that were Utilised by the Nigerian Security Sector in Ensuring Peace and Security in Abuja, Nigeria (Objective 4)

The last objective of this study is to examine the measures and strategic options that were used by the Nigerian security sector to enhance peace and security in Abuja. This section therefore uncovers the efforts made by the Nigerian government to ensure peace and security, as indicated in the following comment:

In spite of some lapses, the security sectors have done well in Abuja in terms of some of the terrorist threats they face in Abuja and from other states. They have tried substantially to avert it (Participant 1).
The narrative of the participant indicates how the government has relied on the military to prevent attacks in Abuja. The illustrative voice of participants 12 further confirmed that security agencies are attempting to ensure that Abuja does not experience further threats. Participant 12 observed that:

*The physical presence of the security operatives across Abuja, particularly the city capital (Abuja Municipal Area Council), where police and other security agencies are positioned in very strategic areas (Participant 12).*

The participant justified the use of security operatives to reduce the threat to national security, being placed at strategic locations. The government and other security agencies have made an effort to in ensure the safety of lives and properties. Participant 9 showed that government also employed the use of information technology skills to ensure peace.

*Public education – government uses information technology communication skills like internet, telephone, public bulletins, churches and mosques to educate people on how to prevent terrorism and report suspicious movements to the security operatives (Participant 9).*

The above position of participant 9 showed how the Nigerian government used various means to educate the public on how to report suspicious movements to the relevant security authorities. In a similar opinion, participant 16 noted that:

*We have a history of inflow of arms across the border, especially at the Northern border post and the sea port in the south into the country. Our men are working intelligently with modern technology to track the inflow of weapons, and I think all these arms are being imported by terrorist and militant (Participant 16)*

This participant indicated the effort of security forces in controlling the flow of small arms and light weapons in the country with modern technology. Participant 11 and 14 showed that security has been enhanced in Abuja with the aid of stop, search and seizure mechanism that area employed by the security agencies.

*The security operatives in Abuja sometimes do “Stop, Search and Seizure” (Participate 14)*

*The role of the security sector in Abuja has been effective to stop illicit small arms and terrorist attacks in Abuja (Participant 11).*

Similarly, participant 18 opines that road blocks are another significant effort by the security operatives to ensuring peace and security.

*Road blockage has really enhanced the security of Abuja, because most motorist are now aware of the presence of security operatives (Participant 18)*

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According to the participant, the deployment of security operatives and blocking of some roads in Abuja is an important measure to control small arms. Again, another participant commented that:

*Training and equipping the security forces with arms in Abuja was a great achievement in ensuring peace and security (Participant 3).*

Participant 3 noted that appropriately trained and equipped security forces were an important part of making Abuja a peaceful state.

The participants’ comments indicate the initiatives and efforts made to improve security measures towards securing peace and security in Abuja. This included improved security presence, use of information technology, training and public education. This is done in an effort to reduce the high number of small arms and light weapons that are used for various terrorists’ attack.

**5.4.1 Measures to Reduce the High Rate of Small Arms and Light Weapons**

The participants indicated that arms control and disarmament are major steps that should be taken in Nigeria, as indicated by participant 3:

*It is important to do a lot of public enlightenment to mop up illicit arms in the hands of end users, to encourage them whether to license it or give it up. It is also important to burn arms weapons once they are mopped up instead of allowing them to stay, so that they do not recycle back into the society (Participant 3).*

Participant 3 indicated two mechanism that could be used, namely public enlightenment and destroying the illegal arms to limit the number of weapons in circulation and their use in criminal activities. In a similar opinion, participant 9 indicated that:

*It is important to enhance the processing, licensing and registration of small arms and light weapons by private owners (Participant 9).*

The above participant indicated that government should make sure that the process of accessing small arms to private individuals should be well documented and managed to reduce their circulation and identify the total number of legal arms in the possession of private owners. Participant 15 stated that:

*Government should ensure that all weapons in the possession of the state security operatives, and the ones legally acquired by private individuals, should be marked and officially tagged with a barcode, so that illicit weapons are easily detected.*
Registering small arms and marking them would enable those that were legally acquired and owned to be identified, and those not legal to be removed from use. The above view expressed by the participant was supported by participants 16 and 2 who commented as follows:

*It is important to have a national database of SALW (Participant 16).*

*Yes, arms control measures are very essential in other to reduce the unnecessary death and destruction of properties (Participant 2).*

Both participants believe that the Nigerian government should create a national database that will make it easier to know the total number of arms in the country and ensure the safety of lives and properties.

5.5 **Comparison of Results from the Quantitative and Qualitative Data**

The presentation, analyses and interpretation of the results emanating from the quantitative and qualitative data sets utilised in this study reveal the four crucial areas of data or methodological triangulations illustrated below. Each sub-section to follow refers to the major comparison findings of both qualitative and quantitative in order to fulfil the research questions of the study.

5.5.1 **Objective 1. Factors Responsible for the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Abuja, Nigeria**

The analysis of both the qualitative and quantitative data collected for this study reveal that political factor, porous border control, political self-interest. Specifically, porous borders, and the illegal involvement of some state officials in arms trade has contributed to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja (see section 5.1 and table 4.2). Both the qualitative and quantitative findings also showed that representatives of the state contribute to the proliferation of small arms. As this was indicated in subsection 5.1.3 of the qualitative analysis and table 4.2 of the quantitative data that most of the state officials do sell state arms and ammunitions to illegal actors. Conversely, quantitative findings revealed that unemployment is not a factor that contribute to arms proliferation. The quantitative data further showed that economic resources is a factor that instigate the proliferation of arms. In another dimension, qualitative data revealed how ethnic imposition, religious fanaticism and political motivation also contributed to the spread of small arms. These results fulfil the aim of using both quantitative and qualitative approaches together to get a better understanding of research objectives and issues rather than using either of the approaches alone (Creswell & Clark, 2007).
5.5.2 Objective 2. Relationship between small arms, terrorism and insecurity in Abuja, Nigeria

Quantitative data identified the interplay between small arms and terrorism. Further analysis of the quantitative data reveals that the availability of small arms strongly influences violence and insecurity (see table 4.3). This implies that there is a significant correlation between the availability of small arms, terrorism, violence, and insecurity. Similarly, a significant relationship that exists between small arms, terrorism and insecurity within the Nigerian state was implied by the sample as the direct consequences of state failure. The interplay between small arms, terrorism and insecurity is also supported in the qualitative findings with all the participants’ affirming that the proliferation of small arms is the main cause of terrorism and insecurity in Abuja, which is a serious challenge to Nigerian national security (see section 5.2).

5.5.3 Objective 3. Nature of Threats to Peace and Security in Abuja, Nigeria

The quantitative data investigated the interplay between small arms, terrorism and insecurity in Abuja, Nigeria due to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The results show a strong and positive nexus between small arms and terrorism as a threatening factor to peace and security in Abuja. In addition to crime, poor representative, threat to lives, properties and social order. All these indicate that small arms, to a large extent, cause threat to peace and security in Abuja (see table 4.4). Qualitative data shows that the majority of the participants not only subscribe to the fact that terrorism, crime, poor representative and political instability are threatening factors to human lives and properties in Abuja, but also lamented about the way people do believe in religious fanaticism, ethnic imposition, and political motivation (see section 5.3). Both the qualitative and quantitative findings show that the availability of small arms and light weapons aid and abet terrorism, which is a factor that threatens peace and security in Abuja to a large extent.

5.5.4 Objective 4. Strategic Options that were Utilised by the Nigerian Security Sector in Ensuring Peace and Security in Abuja, Nigeria

The significant strategic role of the Nigerian security sector in enhancing peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria emerged strongly in the quantitative data analysis presented in Chapter 4. This shows the effectiveness of security sector in stopping illicit arms and terrorist attack in Abuja (see table 4.5). The qualitative data analysis also supports the findings of quantitative data (see
The advantage of the qualitative data analysis is that it revealed the physical presence of the security operatives across Abuja particularly the city capital (Abuja Municipal Area Council) where police and other security agencies are positioned in very strategic areas. Furthermore, it is important to educate, inform and seek the cooperation of the public in a bid to retrieve illicit arms that are in the possession of end users. It is also important to destroy arms once they are confiscated instead of allowing them to stay in circulation, so that they do not recycle back into the society. Another suggestion for the control of small arm is to enhance the processing, licensing and registration of small arms and light weapons by private owners (see section 5.4.1).

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter presented the results of the qualitative study in relation to the four objectives, as outlined in Chapter 1. The qualitative data were analysed using content analysis to enable the data and methodological triangulation to explore the public perception on the proliferation of small arms and its impact on peace and security in Abuja, Nigeria. The results showed that there are some significant factors that stimulate the proliferation of small arms in Abuja, such as: porous border, political motivation, religious fanaticism, ethnic imposition, state failure and the illegal involvement of state officials. This study also revealed that there is a significant correlation between small arms, terrorism and insecurity. The study empirically corroborated the nature of threat posed to peace and security in Nigeria, using Abuja as a reference point, and indicated the role of the security operatives in safeguarding peace and security. Furthermore, it discussed various measures to reduce and control the spread of small arms and light weapons.

The next chapter presents the interpretation and a comprehensive discussion of the study’s findings in relation to the research questions and objectives, as well as previous studies in the discourse of small arms and light weapons.
6.0 Introduction

This chapter consists of the discussion of findings, a summary of chapters, conclusion and recommendation. The discussion of the findings is presented according to the four research objectives, each of which consists of a number of themes that were distilled from the participant quantitative and qualitative responses. The initial quantitative data was supplemented with a further in-depth exploration obtained from interviews with relevant stakeholders. The intention is to discuss the results obtained for the four objectives, and to answer the research questions, which will indicate the extent to which the aim was achieved. This is followed by a summary of each chapter, the conclusion and recommendation. The contribution to knowledge in the field of conflict transformation and peace studies is also outlined. Finally, the limitations of the study as well as suggestions for further studies are highlighted and discussed.

6.1 Objective One: Factors that Stimulate the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Abuja, Nigeria

Objective 1 is discussed in relation to the following factors, namely: unemployment, political factor, porosity of borders, government officials’, retired security personnel, religious fanaticism, ethnic imposition weak legislation, international community and state failure on service delivery.

6.1.1 Unemployment

The quantitative results (0.073 with t= 0.992, and p= 0.323 > 0.05) indicated that unemployment is an insignificant influence on the proliferation of small arms, with no direct connection nor positive relationship between the two variables. This result opposes the findings of Johnson-Rokusu and Enobi (2016) and Awodola and Ayuba (2015) that the absence of employment opportunities in Nigeria is an important reason why civilians, especially the youth, resort to small arms, thereby escalating terrorism and crime. The literature acknowledges that the illicit proliferation of small arms by the unemployed civilians cause loss of lives, livelihood and the destruction of properties.
6.1.2 Political Factors

The results of both data sets revealed that political factors do contribute to small arms proliferation. The findings of the quantitative result (0.219 with t= 3.144 and p= 0.002 > 0.05) show a positive relationship between political factors and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The qualitative results indicated that most of the participants (11 out of 18) believed that political factors are very important in the proliferation of small arms. They contended that the proliferation of small arms is politically inspired in order to discredit the current government and gain popularity so as to replace them. Politicians may acquire additional small arms for their bodyguards to protect them during election campaigns, and the loss of control of the guards after the elections often lead to diffusion of the arms into the population.

The results of these findings relate to the studies conducted by Aver et al. (2014) that most politicians in Nigeria were elected through electoral malpractices and intimidation of political opponents, possibly with the aid of small arms. The author found that with availability and accessibility of small arms, politicians and political office holders do not gain political power through the electorate, which is a threat to the country’s democracy and sustainability of peace and security. Soetan (2017) notes that a politician vying for the post of Edo state governor, Lucky Imasuen, was arrested in possession of arms and ammunitions. In addition, a politician and a senator, Dino Malaye, representing Kogi West Senatorial District at the national assembly, was interrogated by the Nigerian police for supplying arms to illicit users for political gain, and to aid the political campaign against the 2019 general election (Azania, 2018). Similarly, Onuah (2011) states that the nature of Nigeria politics is a key factor driving the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, as Nigerian politicians promote disorder in the country in order to disrupt the government and win an elective position. He further explains that due to desire to win an election, politicians recruit thugs and equip them with arms and ammunitions. This has become a norm for politicians in order to achieve their political goals (Haruna & Jumba, 2011)

6.1.3 Porosity of Borders

Both sets of data indicate that the porosity of borders is a serious and contentious issue in small arms proliferation. The quantitative results (-0.031 with t= -0.283 p= 0.001 < 0.05) indicates that the lack of border control has led to the worsening of the proliferation of small arms. This was supported by the qualitative study, with most of the participants (14 out of 18) agreeing that this was a problem. The results indicated that the issue of border control must be considered
by state authority to reduce the widespread proliferation of arms and ammunitions in Abuja. The data suggests that the movement of arms across the border is no longer being regulated. While blaming the proliferation of arms on porous borders, some participants linked porous borders and arms proliferation with the failure of the state to guarantee peace and security.

The above results supported the Small Arms Survey Group report on the flow of arms from national and civilian stockpiles, which constitutes the link from legal to illegal markets. Additionally, it was recognized that the lack of specific regulation on brokering and transfers of SALW, as well as the poor border management and the complicity of border regulating officials, worsens the problem of SALW proliferation. The report also details the various routes through which arms are being smuggled into the country, which include the creeks and rivers that can be accessed from the ocean in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

Small arms are said to pass through the seaports and airports due to the relatively lax surveillance and security, and possibly with the complicit officials, which might otherwise serve as a deterrent to smugglers. Nigeria has porous borders and a number of local and international airports, airstrips and seaports along the southern coast which make it difficult to monitor, detect and control small arms and light weapons trafficking. This finding affirms the studies of Schroeder and Lamb (2016) and Raheem and Babalola (2015) that porous borders are a threat to peace and security of a nation.

There are an estimated 1,000 illegal smuggling routes that form a network of roads around Idi-Iroko in the Egbado area of Ogun State, Nigeria (Ochogwu & Aku 2011). In November 2010, a few weeks after the October 1, 2010 bombing at Abuja, the Department of State Security Services (DSS) intercepted a container holding rocket launchers, grenades and other explosives in the main port of Lagos (Schroeder & Lamb, 2016). Similarly, Raheem and Babalola (2015) state that the Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria took advantage of the country’s porous borders to smuggle arms, especially the Borno and Yobe borders in the northern part of the nation. Nigeria’s porous borders and proliferation of SALW has also led to the illegal production of arms, which complicates the security challenges that the country is experiencing. The above findings on the porosity of the Nigerian borders is supported by Krause’s (2000) conceptual framework on the various pathways along which arms are circulated, from manufacturer, to sale or diversion stockpiles of the recipient state, to non-state actors.
6.1.4 Government Officials Involvement in the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons

Both the quantitative and qualitative data revealed that state representatives contribute to the proliferation of small arms in Nigeria. The quantitative data showed that government officials are involved in the illicit proliferation of small arms (0.344 with t= 3.481 p= 0.001 < 0.05). The qualitative result indicates that the majority (16 out of 18) expressed the view that the manner in which state officials release stockpiled arms to civilians and illegal users contributes to SALW proliferation. Participants also reported that SALW are distributed through the security agencies who lease and sell arms to criminals and insurgents.

The findings suggest that some security representatives have been caught in this act, which is a challenge to peace and security in Nigeria. The data confirms that the culpability of rogue military and security officials in the trafficking of SALW in Abuja makes it difficult to control the supply to the illicit civilian end-users. Official arms stockpiles of security agencies have become a major source of the domestic flow of arms to illicit end-users, as official armouries are not strictly documented, monitored, controlled and secured. Thus, legally possessed arms now circulate illegally, and arms brought for official use are being diverted for illegal use, which indicate that government officials are involved in arms proliferation.

The findings correlate with the conceptual framework report of the Small Arms Survey Group on the legal and illegal flow of arms from national stockpiles and civilian stockpiles. The findings of the quantitative and qualitative data resonate with the study of Ochogwu and Aku (2011), which refers to an incident involving an army officer and five soldiers who were sentenced to life imprisonment. They sold over 7,000 military ammunitions belonging to the Nigerian Army to the Henry Okah-led Movement for Emancipation of the Niger-Delta (MEND) for 100 million naira. Agbor (2014) also relates how a prominent official, Major Akuboo and his gang, illicitly sold several military type weapons from the Nigerian army depots at Jagi and the One Division Base Ordinance in Kaduna between 2000 and 2006. The data from this study, together with seminal studies in the discourse on SALW and recent media reporting, foregrounds the corruptive role of government officials in the proliferation of small arms.

6.1.5 Retired Security Personnel

In addition to the involvement of government officials in arms proliferation, the study examined the role of retired security personnel in the proliferation of small arms and light...
weapons in Abuja. The quantitative result (0.192 with t= 1.564 p= 0.121 > 0.05) indicated that retired security personnel are not involved in the proliferation of small arms. This suggests that retired security personnel’s, based on their experience, should be engaged in the state security system to assist in preventing state ammunitions from getting to the possession of illicit users.

6.1.6 Political Motivation
It was reiterated by the participants in the interviews that political gain instigates the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Participants discussed that most politicians, especially those from the opposition party, believe that one of the ways to discredit an incumbent government is to cause chaos in a city with the aid of arms and ammunitions. As such, arms proliferation is mostly politically motivated (Ayuba and Okafor, 2015). In addition, some participants also reported that almost all the incidences of crime and terrorism that occurred in Abuja was to dislodge the then government in power by 2015. It was also believed that the abduction of the Chibok girls in 2014, with the aid of SALW, was politically motivated for the same reason. Hence, the attitudes and aims of the political class instigate the proliferation of small and light arms which has led to the illegal spread of arms and complicates the present security situation the country is facing.

6.1.7 Religious Fanaticism
The literature on religious fanaticism as a causality for arms proliferation was examined by many authors. According to Bar (2008) and Hoffman (2016), religious ideology has been a motivator for the spread of illicit arms. Moghadam (2016) postulates that most of the acts of terrorism in Nigeria are committed in the name of Islam. Based on the perception of the participants, one of the foremost problems in Nigeria lies in its religious divisions and conflict between Islam and Christianity. This allows the politicians and political office holders to use religious beliefs to divide people and campaign against each other. Aguwa (2007) sheds more light in this regard when he notes that politicians may use religious identity as a mobilisation tool by the government to acquire and retain power. Religious manipulation becomes easier when the followers are submissive to their manipulators and religious leaders. With the proliferation of small arms, people become highly vulnerable to manipulation. This submission is in line with Moghadam (2016) and Michael (2007), who argue that religion gives a moral justification for killing and equally promotes arms proliferation. This is an indication that religious identity is a contributing factor to arms proliferation in Abuja.
6.1.8 Ethnic Imposition

The responses indicated that ethnicity is an important factor that is manipulated to divide people and promotes arms proliferation and armed conflict. Most of the participants revealed that the promotion of ethnic consciousness has resulted in the increasing demand for SALW for executing ethno-religious violence in Nigeria. This factor was repeatedly mentioned during the interviews, where it was linked to the aspiration of acquiring power by ethnic groups in the region. As reported by participant 15, Nigerians are fanatical and violence oriented when it comes to the issue of ethnicity. He further explained that this caused electoral violence in the northern part of the country in 2011, after the declaration of a southerner (Goodluck Jonathan) as the president elect. This corroborates the findings of Olomojobi (2013) that armed conflict in northern Nigeria, among others, is the blend of religious and ethnic identities. This shows that ethnic identity and affiliations, such as the Yoruba’s, Hausa’s and Igbo’s, is a major cause of armed violence in Nigeria.

6.1.9 Weak Legislation

It was apparent in the participants’ response that the Nigerian Firearm Act of 1959, which identifies the capacity and expertise of the law enforcement agency to control arms proliferation, is outdated and requires review, taking into cognisance the provision and regulations in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention. There is no strong legislation in Nigeria to address the issue of arms proliferation, and the country still relies on the 1959 Firearms Act to regulate and control arms, which is now obsolete. This is affirmed by Okeke and Oji’s study (2014) that Nigeria continues to rely predominantly on the National Firearms Act of 1959 as the legal instrument governing small arms possession, manufacture and the use in the country.

6.1.10 International Community

The qualitative data showed that the international community contributes to arms proliferation, with most participants (13 out of 18) claimed that developing countries and arms producing industrial countries contribute to the arms proliferation in Nigeria. The respondents contend that the major arms producing countries are not in Africa, but in Europe and America countries. Avila et al. (2017) maintains that because of the state of insecurity and economic underdevelopment in most developing nations, small arms are being proliferated illegally from developed countries. The researcher believes that the demand for arms in Africa nations, such as Nigeria, has resulted in the international arms producing industry supplying ammunitions
without observing or following the international conventions of not supplying arms to non-state actors. It was acknowledged by the participants that the international marketers sail into Nigerian waters in the guise of doing legitimate business, and buy and exchange crude oil enticements, such as small arms and other weapons. These results also complement the conceptual framework guiding this study, which contends that some arms transactions are being carried out in a clandestine way, not authorised by relevant state authorities. Thom-Otuya (2009) stated that most of the small arms in the Niger-Delta were bought and sold by the international black marketers. The study indicates that the arms trade between the supplier and recipient states depends on their political relationship.

6.1.11 State Failure on Service Delivery
It was also evident in the qualitative results that civilians take to arms due to the state failing to provide basic amenities and security, with 13 of the 18 respondents noting this to be a factor that proliferates small arms. This mean that the incidences of small arms proliferation will increase, if the government cannot meet the expectations of the people to carry out its mandate. The result also revealed that arms proliferation does force state authorities to listen to the demands of its citizenry. This supports the assertion that the demand for SALW is a surrogate for a demand for social justice and welfare (Hansen, 2016).

6.2 Objective Two: The Relationship between Small Arms, Terrorism and Insecurity in Abuja, Nigeria
The second objective of this study was to examine the relationship and connection between small arms, terrorism and insecurity, with the quantitative results findings a correlation between them (0.01 2-tailed) as well as the qualitative findings. The qualitative data threw more light on the link between small arms and terrorism, as terrorism can only be perpetrated if small arms and light weapons are easily available and accessible, LeBrun (2016) maintains that small arms are significant risk for terrorism, violence and insecurity in general, while scholars such as Chelule, (2014) and Nwanolue and Iwuoha (2010) highlight how the availability of small arms increases the lethality and insecurity in any given society, resulting in human rights abuses, and the rise of terrorism and destruction in Nigeria.

This resonates with the findings of Onuah and George (2016), who stated that criminal and terrorist acts in the northern region of Nigeria, including Abuja, has caused insecurity and panic among civilians. According to the authors, Boko Haram attacks have claimed between 16,000
and 18,000 lives, and displaced approximately 2.6 million civilians in Nigeria. It is against this background that Agbiboa (2015) ascertains that many Nigerians are fleeing their home because of the fear that Boko Haram. The above findings correlate with the framework of the traditional model of arms proliferation and control by Krause in 2000 (referred in sub-section 2.6.5). Terrorism in Abuja is due to the availability and accessibility of arms in the possession of illicit users, these attacks were political motivated, in order to discredit and dislodge a government as discussed above.

Having addressed Objective 2 the study also suggests how the lapses of government leads to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, terrorism and insecurity in Abuja. It is the government’s responsibility to provide basic services and good governance, such as road networks and protecting its citizens and their properties. The results show that the governments appear reluctant to address issues related to arms bearing among civilians, specifically weapons that are illegal. This corroborates the findings of Onuah (2011) that internal security and protecting the lives of its citizens results in some people taking responsibility for their own safety, and therefore equipping themselves with arms. The participants believed that illicit SALW are also used in ethnic-religious conflicts, communal clashes, sectarian violence, cultism, political violence, electoral violence, vigilantism, militancy and criminality.

6.3 Objective Three: Threats Posed to Peace and Security in Abuja, Nigeria

The third objective of this study was to identify the various threats posed to peace and security in Abuja. It is apparent in the results of both the quantitative and qualitative data that there are several threats to peace and security in Abuja, namely terrorism, threat to lives, properties and social disorder, and crime.

6.3.1 Terrorism

The results of both quantitative and qualitative data have shown that terrorism is a factor that caused chaos in Abuja, with the quantitative study \( r [113] = 0.306, p<0.01 \) indication a relationship between the two. Access to illicit small arms and light weapons contributes to the development of terrorism and represents a challenge to a nation’s security, as was indicated by most (13 out of 18) of the participants, including in Abuja. It was reported in the findings that people are fearful of leaving their homes, as nobody knows the next point of a terrorist attack in Abuja. The results of the qualitative data support the previous findings of Onuah (2011) that terrorism is a threat to Nigerian national security. He elaborates that Abuja witnessed the first
terrorist attack on October 1, 2010 at the Eagle Square when the nation was celebrating its 50th anniversary of independence. Between 2011 and 2015, the Boko Haram group claimed to be responsible for nine terrorist attacks in Abuja, which resulted in the destruction of lives and properties (Onuah & George, 2016). Fung (2017) and Blomberg and Tocoian (2013) state that terrorism is the direct outcome of illicit arms in the society. Ayuba and Okafor (2014) acknowledge that the widespread availability of illicit small arms and light weapons is a major focus of the Nigerian military and other security forces, in an attempt to fight terrorism in the country.

6.3.2 Threat to Lives, Properties and Social Disorder

The results of the quantitative findings (r [113] = 0.591, p<0.01) reveal that the proliferation of small arms and light weapon is a strong and persistent threat to human lives in Abuja. The majority of the participants (10 out of 18) in the qualitative findings expressed the concern that human loss of life is due to the availability of illicit arms in the possession of civilians. This shows that more efforts should be made to curb and control the proliferation of small arms in order to secure the lives of individuals. These results supplement the findings by Onuah and George (2016) that between 16 June 2011 and 2 October 2015, Boko Haram carried out nine terrorist attacks in Abuja causing the deaths of approximately 191 civilians. Similarly, Adeniyi (2017) observes that a lot of human lives have been lost because of illegal and uncontrolled arms that are used in gender-based and religious violence, armed conflict and terrorism and on internally displaced people and refugees. The findings also reveal that Boko Haram, and the growing number of armed groups in Nigeria, have placed the lives of people under threat. Since 1999, the widespread misuse of various ammunitions and weapons in community violence, religious crises and armed robbery attacks on Nigerians has resulted in the deaths of approximately 13,000 people (Nte, 2011). In addition, the Integrated Regional Information Networks (2007) report stated that the accessibility and widespread of small arms and light weapons pose the greatest threat to peace and security, especially in Africa. These findings also affirm the framework of Krause (2000) on the effects of small arms and light weapons proliferation and their use in the society.

6.3.3 Crime

The results from both the questionnaire and interviews suggest that crime and political differences impacted on the emergence and widespread use of small arms. The results corroborate that of Thom-Otuya’s (2009), who identified that the widespread production of
small arms are used for the criminal activities witnessed in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria. Such activities led to the death and kidnapping of many civilians, the loss of lives and destruction of properties. The author examined the role of small arms in the Niger/Delta crisis, which create a conducive environment for kidnapping activities, this being a growing trend and national security issue in Nigeria.

6.4 Objective Four: Strategic Interventions that were Utilised by the Nigerian Security Sector to Enhance Peace and Security in Abuja, Nigeria

The last objective of this study was to identify the various strategic interventions used by the Nigerian security agencies in ensuring peace and security in Abuja. Under this objective, numerous measures were identified, such as: consultation with various stakeholders in Abuja, intelligence gathering, arrest of terrorists, road blockage, stop search and seizure. This section also discusses the role of security operatives’ in promoting peace and security, as well as the measures used to reduce the high number of small arms and light weapons in circulation.

6.4.1 Consultation with Various Stakeholders in Abuja

The quantitative data revealed that consultation with various stakeholders, such as the state authorities and government officials, traditional rulers, indigenes and resident of Abuja, was a strategic measure used to enhance peace and security in Abuja. The quantitative findings showed that consultation with various stakeholders was one of the measures utilised to enhance peace and security in Abuja, as indicated in the result ($t= 6.586$, $p= 0.000 < 0.05$). However, in the case of the qualitative study, there were no findings to this effect. The results affirmed the work of Ola (2011), who stated that consultation with various stakeholders was one of the measures used by security operatives in the crisis that rocked Ekiti State in 2006.

6.4.2 Intelligence Gathering

Intelligence gathering as a strategy is generally used by the security sector to enhance peace and security, but was not considered a significant ($p= 0.607 > 0.05$) part of the strategy used by the Nigerian security sector in enhancing peace and security. However, the results of the qualitative data show that 10 out of 18 participants believe that intelligence gathering was a good strategy to use to enhance peace and security in Abuja.
6.4.3 Arrest of Terrorists

The results of both quantitative and qualitative data reveal that the arrest of terrorists is another factor that enhances peace and security in Abuja. The quantitative data (0.331 with t= 4.081 and p= 0.000 < 0.05) indicates that there is a significant relationship between arrest of terrorists and sustainability of peace and security in Abuja. In the case of the qualitative study, 10 out of the 18 participants stated that the arrest of terrorists an important method used by the Nigerian government to ensure peace and security. The interviews revealed that the military operation was the “stick” option in the arrest of terrorist, and it started at the early stage of 2003. These findings agree with those of Daniel (2017) that the role played by the Department of State Security (DSS) in arresting a suspect led to preventing his planned terrorist attack on Abuja and six other states between September 1 and 4 2017. The Nigeria security sector also justify the military option after the arrest of Idris Ibrahim Babawo, a commander of the Boko Haram terrorist group on the 24th of September 2017, by the Ondo state police command.

6.4.4 Road Blockage, Stop Search and Seizure

The quantitative result indicate that stop and search measures by the security agents was not significant in achieving peace and security in Abuja, (0.034 with t= 0.298 and p= 0.766 > 0.05). However, the qualitative data revealed that the physical presence of security operatives in Abuja and the continuous road blockages, stop and search measures has enhanced peace and security in the city. Based on the qualitative findings, the presence of police and other surety agencies in strategic locations in the Abuja Municipal Area Council was highlighted as a means of counter-terrorism in Abuja and the fight against illicit small arms. The findings supplement the work of Onuah and George (2016), who maintained that the various terrorist attacks in Abuja has inspired the state authorities to improve security through the use of road blocks and searches in order to enhance peace and security.

6.4.5 Security Operatives’ Role in Promoting Peace and Security

Both the quantitative and qualitative findings reveal that the security sector has made an effort to sustain peace and security in Abuja. The quantitative result showed that the respondents perceived there to be a significant relationship between the Nigerian security sector and peace in Abuja Municipal Area Council. This was confirmed by the qualitative findings, which also indicated that the security operatives have been effective in stopping illicit small arms and terrorist attacks. These findings are in line with the report by Abubakar (2017) that the Nigerian
police had arrested 47-year old John Philips and two others over the alleged manufacture of locally made guns at a village in Abuja.

6.4.6 Measures to Reduce the High number of Small Arms and Light Weapons
The results of the qualitative analysis indicated some measures to reduce the number of small arms and light weapons, which will promote and ensure peace and security. With reference to the interviews, 10 of the 18 participants cited various ways in which to control arms, such as providing a national database for SALW, marking small arms, and destroying illicit arms that had been seized to prevent them from finding their way back into society. However, in the case of the quantitative study, there were no findings to this effect.

These participants regarded Nigeria as having adequate security arrangements for ensuring peace and security in Abuja, and combating small arms proliferation in the country. They identified five measures for combating arms proliferation, namely: legislation and regulations, and operational, legal and administrative mechanisms. The main regulatory mechanism is the Firearms Act (1959), which empowers the Inspector General of Police and State commissioner of Police to issue licenses to arms holders. The National Committee on Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (NCPSALW), adapted from the UN Resolution 56/24, is tasked with preventing and combating illicit small arms trafficking, and involves the use of the Police, Customs Services, Immigration Services, Department of State Security and National Drug Enforcement Agency Officials. The findings established that although these arrangements are in existence, the majority of the respondents believe that they are outdated and ineffective. The results also reveal that there should be a national database of SALW and a measure to ensure that small arms and light weapons are marked. There is an absence of effective marking, recording and tracing systems, therefore, small arms that are missing from both official and civilian stockpiles are seldom traced, and the weapons keep being recycled amongst illicit end-users causing a great threat to peace and security.

The findings also reveal that the security operatives, especially the Nigerian police, should review its basic security methods by evolving a more pro-active crime management system and an intensive public relations campaign in order to achieve greater efficiency in providing and promoting security in Abuja. The result affirms the previous findings of Obilor (2013) that the Nigerian security sector should devote greater attention to enhancing its intelligence gathering capabilities. He believes that this would help to have a better knowledge of the emergence,
growth and activities of irregular groups, and thus enable them to anticipate their intentions correctly. He further explains that urgent consideration should be given to the idea of establishing a joint security information database through which all security agencies could exchange information.

6.5 Summary of Major Findings

The following are some major findings:

a) The study found that the ineffective control of small arms led to their proliferation, their ready availability and accessibility allowing them to fall into the possession of unauthorised users in Abuja.

b) The participants reported on the porosity of the country’s national border, political motivation, religious fanaticism and ethnic imposition as being major factors that contributed to the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja.

c) The study further described how the international and national dealers use the nation’s sea, land and air borders to import and move arms, in addition to the porous nature of its borders, this caused the proliferation of small arms in the country.

d) The study highlighted the role of rogue military and security personnel who aided the proliferation of weapons into the possession of illicit users, as legally possessed arms now circulate illegally, and arms bought for official/state use are now being diverted for illegal use.

e) The study found that the lack of a national database and registration of small arms and light weapons, and the absence of an effective marking, recording and tracking system for SALW, also contributed to the proliferation of small arms in Nigeria. Due to the above findings, it will be difficult to trace missing weapons from security officials, which might be circulating among illicit users.

f) The control of SALW is further hampered by the Nigeria Firearms Act of 1959, which is the legal instrument for the national control of small arms, and is outdate.

g) The study revealed that there is a strong connection between small arms, terrorism and insecurity.

h) The study affirms that that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a major cause of terrorism, which exacerbates lawlessness and insecurity in Abuja.

i) The findings showed that the security operatives played a major role in ensuring peace and security in Abuja, but that given the above factors, they were unable to prevent the proliferation of small arms.
j) Closely related to the above finding is that strategies employed by security agencies in sustaining peace and security in Abuja include arresting terrorists and using intelligence gathering. It was also revealed that the physical presence of the security operatives across Abuja, particularly the city capital (Abuja Municipal Area Council), where police and other security agencies are positioned in very strategic areas and conduct stop, search and raid black spot.

6.6 Conclusion
The increasing rate of small arms proliferation in Nigeria, especially in the northern part, has a serious impact on peace and security in Abuja. Major amongst the factors was the ready availability of small arms and their role in exacerbating terrorism and crime. Effective monitoring and control of state borders is very important to secure a nation, as once a state loses the control and regulation of this, such a state becomes insecure. Although, there are few state initiated measures to seriously prevent the growing proliferation of small arms, the relevant legislation has not been changed from 1959, and no measures have been put in place, despite the necessary technology being available, to manage the outflow from within the state security services. The current situation would appear to benefit politicians, who use various tactics to get into and maintain power, or do destabilise part of the country for their political gain. The rights of the citizens have not been put first regarding their safety and security, despite this being the mandate of their elected leaders. While some measure has been taken, such as roadblock and searches, there would appear to be no overall strategy to prevent the proliferation of small arms.

6.7 Recommendations
Based on the findings of this study, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons has implications for peace and security in Nigeria in general, and Abuja in particular. Therefore, the following recommendations are therefore made:

a) The study shows that high level of illicit proliferation of small arms in Nigeria is caused in part by the lack of efficient border control. It is recommended that the regulating agencies in charge of Nigeria’s borders, such as the Nigeria Customs Service, Immigration, Police, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, and other security forces should be provided with adequate and functional modern technical equipment for arms detection. This will enable the security agencies/forces to collaborate, work
together and share intelligence on issues relating to small arms trafficking, and to apprehending traffickers and rogue national and international arms brokers.

b) The Nigerian government should monitor and ensure that there are proper records regarding the acquisition, storage and distribution of arms and ammunitions, including those used by the security officials, in order to reduce the incidences of arms leakages from officials’ stockpiles arising from looting and theft by rogue armoury officials. This could be achieved by establishing an arms-bearing national body or agency that will monitor and guard the stockpile, and prevent their diversion and misuse in the country.

c) Both the quantitative and qualitative data showed that state representatives and security personnel are engaged in the act of small arms proliferation. The study found that arms that are meant to secure the nation against internal and external threats end up in the possession of criminals and terrorists. Hence, the study recommends that the Nigeria government should mark all the state ammunitions.

d) The qualitative results showed that the legal tools to check and monitor arms flow in Nigeria is very weak, and people take advantage of the weakness to acquire illegal arms. The study found that the Nigeria Fire Act, which was enacted in 1959, is outdated, and it is recommended that it should be reviewed and amended in accordance with the Economic and Community of West African State Convention (ECOWAS) and the United Nations Programme of Action (UNPoA).

e) The international community also contributes to the issue of small arms, as the major arms-producing countries are not in Africa, but are situated in Europe, American and elsewhere. While there is demand in African countries, such as Nigeria, arms are imported without observing the international standards of not supplying them to non-state actors, or legal distributors. Therefore, the Nigerian government should seek assistance and co-operate with foreign countries and relevant international agencies towards resolving the issue of illegal arms trade into the country in order to reduce and control the problem of arms proliferation.

f) Since its political liberation 58 years ago, Nigeria has had a strong civil society, which are seldom involved in advocacy against illicit small arms and light weapons issues, despite their being a threat to peace and security in the country. The study recommends that the civil society groups, such as Nigerians Networks on Small Arms (NANSA), Mop up the Arms campaign (MAC) and others should co-operate better with the government due to the increasing threat posed by the proliferation of small arms in
Nigeria, and Abuja in particular. This will also assist in arms control and the fight against illicit arms in the country.

6.8 Contributions to Knowledge in the Field of Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies

This study extends the frontiers of knowledge in the field of conflict transformation and peace studies, and presents various strategies to reduce the proliferation of SALW in Abuja, and Nigeria in general. Rather than the effects of SALW on humankind in various parts of Nigeria and abuse of small arms in ethnic, religious crises, and armed robberies that have killed and displaced many Nigerians, the current study analysed the factors that contributed to the illegal widespread use of small arms in Nigeria’s federal capital territory, Abuja, and extended the model on the link between small arms and terrorism. The study revealed SALW as a cause of terrorism, which showed that the proliferation of small arms is a major threat to peace and security that has given rise to the loss of lives and properties. Based on the findings, this study also indicated the need for a new national regulation that will strengthen the existing outdated law on strategies to control of arms proliferation. The study therefore suggests the formation of a National Commission that will be established mainly to control of illicit small arms and light weapons in Nigeria, as in the neighbouring nation, Ghana. The empirical data also expands the literature in the field of peace and security studies.

6.9 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Studies

The outcome of this study is limited to the perception of a limited number of stakeholders on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja, Nigeria, and the implications for peace and security. Due to their busy work schedules and the secret nature of arms research, people are not always open to discussion issues related to arms for fear of being arrested for controverting the law.

The following research limitations are recommended

- Future studies should undertake a comparative analysis of the supply-side and demand-side of small arms proliferation in Nigeria in order to develop a holistic approach to addressing the problem of SALW, a longitudinal approach could also be adopted for data collection.
- One of the major findings of the study is that some security officials are engaged in the diffusion of small arms. Further studies should focus on the role of security agencies in
the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, as well as its control measures in Nigeria.

- This study also investigated the relationship between small arms and terrorism. Further studies may explore the role of SALW as the main tools of terrorist attacks. This would further extend the knowledge on the link between small arms and terrorism.
References


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Daniel, S. (2017). *Terrorism: DSS Foils ISWA Plot to Bomb Abuja, 6 states* [Vanguard Newspaper]


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Nganga, F. (2008). *Efforts of Proliferation of Small Arms in Sub-Sahara Africa*. Army War College Carlisle Barracks PA


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APPENDIX A

Section A

Socio-Demographic Background

1. Education Qualification

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2. How many years have you lived in Abuja

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SECTION B: This section requires of you to mark the option that best suits your opinion with an ‘X’, in accordance to the scale provided. The following rating scale applies:

Rating system:
Strongly disagree: 1
Disagree: 2
Agree : 3
Strongly agree: 4

1. **What is the main cause for the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja:**

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</tr>
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<td>b Political</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>c Boarder Control</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>d Economic Resources</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>e Political Self Interest</td>
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</table>
2. Government officials are involved in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

3. Retired security personnel’s use their influence to escalate the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

SECTION C: This section requires of you to mark the option that best suits your opinion with an ‘X’, in accordance to the scale provided. The following rating scale applies:

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<tr>
<td>Agree : 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree: 4</td>
</tr>
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</table>

1. Relationship between the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and terrorism in Abuja

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

2. The widespread availability of small arms and light weapons leads to violence and insecurity in Abuja

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

3. Failure of Government to Provide Basic Amenities Could Lead to the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Abuja

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
SECTION D: This section requires of you to mark the option that best suits your opinion with an ‘X’, in accordance to the scale provided. The following rating scale applies:

**Rating system:**
- Strongly disagree: 1
- Disagree: 2
- Agree: 3
- Strongly agree: 4

1. **What major factor threatens Peace and Security in Abuja**

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>b  Crime</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>c  Poor Representative</td>
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2. **Proliferation of small arms and light weapons is the major causes of terrorism in Abuja**

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3. **What are the effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Peace and Security in Abuja**

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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b  Threat to Properties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c  Threat to Social disorder</td>
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SECTION E: This section requires of you to mark the option that best suits your opinion with an ‘X’, in accordance to the scale provided. The following rating scale applies:

**Rating system:**
- Strongly disagree: 1
- Disagree: 2
- Agree: 3
- Strongly agree: 4

1. **What strategy did the security use in crisis management and arms control in Abuja**

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<tr>
<td>a  Consultation with various stake holders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b  Intelligence gathering</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c  Arrest of terrorist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d  Road blockage and Search</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
2. Security operative played a major role in promoting peace and security in Abuja
APPENDIX B

Research Interview Questions

**Question 1:** What do you think are the factors responsible for the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja?

**Question 2:** Do you believe that government officials and personnel enhance the proliferation of small arms?

**Question 3:** What are the major sources of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria between 2010-2015?

**Question 4:** How can you describe the level of proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Abuja between 2010-2015?

**Question 5:** Based on your experience, do you think that the availability of small arms could cause violence and insecurity.

**Question 6:** Do you think that governance in Nigeria instigate the proliferation of small arms in Abuja?

**Question 7:** What are the factors that threaten peace and security in Abuja?

**Question 8:** In your own assessment, do you think that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons cause terrorism in Abuja?

**Question 9:** What method does government employ in their intervention in ensuring peace in Abuja?

**Question 10:** Do you think that arms control and disarmament are essential in order to reduce the high rate of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria?

**Question 11:** How can you describe the role of the security sector in Abuja between 2010-2015?
APPENDIX C

Ethical Clearance Letter

05 May 2016

Mr Adegoke A Ola 215068618
School of Social Science
Howard College Campus

Dear Mr Ola

Protocol reference number: HSS/1268/015D

Expedited Approval

In response to your application dated 09 September 2015, the Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee has considered the abovementioned application and the protocol have been granted FULL APPROVAL.

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaires/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment/modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number. Please note: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

The ethical clearance certificate is only valid for a period of 3 years from the date of issue. Thereafter Recertification must be applied for on an annual basis.

I take this opportunity of wishing you everything of the best with your study.

Yours faithfully

Dr Shenuka Singh (Chair)

/cc: Supervisor: Dr Goleke Jagganath
Cc: Academic Lead: Research: Professor Sabine Marschall
Cc: School Administrators: Ms Ndhlanhla Radibe & Ms Nozipho Ndluvu
03 November 2015

Mr Adegoye A Ola 215068618  
School of Social Science  
Howard College Campus  

Dear Mr Ola  

Protocol reference number: HSS/1268/015D  

Expedited Approval  

In response to your application dated 09 September 2015, the Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee has considered the abovementioned application and the protocol have been granted FULL APPROVAL.  

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Yours faithfully,  

Dr Sijeneka Singh (Chair)  

/px  

cc: Supervisor: Dr Gelene Jagganath  
cc: Academic Leader Research: Prof. Sabine Meshal  
cc: School Administrators: Ms Nonhlanhla Radebe & Ms Nozuko Ndlovu
APPENDIX D

### Unemployment

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Regression

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a. Predictors: (Constant), Retired_security, Political_Self_Interest,
Unemployment, Political, Economic_Resources, Government officials,
Boarder_Control

ANOVAa

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a. Dependent Variable: proliferation
b. Predictors: (Constant), Retired_security, Political_Self_Interest, Unemployment, Political, Economic_Resources, Government_officials, Boarder_Control

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a. Dependent Variable: proliferation
**Correlations**

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∗∗. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Regression

Model Summary

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a. Predictors: (Constant), Security operative, Arrest of terrorist, Road blockage and Search, Consultation, Intelligence gathering

ANOVA

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Model</th>
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a. Dependent Variable: crisis management and arms
b. Predictors: (Constant), Security operative, Arrest of terrorist, Road blockage and Search, Consultation, Intelligence gathering

Coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
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<th>Sig.</th>
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a. Dependent Variable: crisis management and arms
### Correlations

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**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
## Correlations

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<tr>
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<th>Crime</th>
<th>Poor Representation</th>
<th>Proliferation</th>
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## Correlations

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**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Regression

Model Summary

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a. Predictors: (Constant), Road Blockage, Intelligence, Consultation, Arrest of terrorism

ANOVAa

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a. Dependent Variable: Security Operation
b. Predictors: (Constant), Road Blockage, Intelligence, Consultation, Arrest of terrorism

Coefficientsa

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<tr>
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a. Dependent Variable: Security Operation