The Secession of States as a Strategy for Resolving Intra-State Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of South Sudan

CLAYTON HAZVINEI VHUMBUNU
214580483

Supervisor: Dr Rudigi Rukema Joseph
2017

A Thesis Submitted to the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), Durban; South Africa in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in International Relations
PLAGIARISM DECLARATION

I, Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu declare that:

1. The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original work and does not involve plagiarism or collusion. I know plagiarism is wrong and contravenes Rule 9 (e) (i) (ff) of the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) Student Disciplinary Rules Handbook (2004).
2. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.
3. This thesis does not contain other persons’ data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons.
4. This thesis does not contain other persons’ writings, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written sources have been quoted, then: (a) their words have been re-written but the general information attributed to them has been referenced; (b) where their exact words have been used, their writing has been placed inside quotations marks and referenced. In all instances, a recognized convention for citation and referencing has been accurately used.
5. Where I have reproduced a publication of which I am an author, co-author or editor, I have indicated in detail which part of the publication was actually written by myself alone and have fully referenced such publications.
6. This thesis does not contain text, graphics or tables copied and pasted from the internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and the sources being detailed in the dissertation and in the references sections.

Signature of Student

Date

As the candidate’s Supervisor, I certify the above statement/declaration and have approved this thesis for submission

Signature of Supervisor

Date
DEDICATION

I dedicate this study to my family, my parents and the Lord Almighty.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The financial assistance of the National Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences - Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (NIHSS-CODESRIA) towards this research through the African Pathways Scholarship Programme, is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the NIHSS-CODESRIA.

I am also grateful for the NIHSS-CODESRIA academic mentorship services extended to me through several capacity building workshops and regional doctoral workshops mostly at UKZN Howard College Campus in Durban, together with multitudinous doctoral writing-up retreats and national doctoral conferences held in Johannesburg and Pretoria, South Africa. The institute’s support towards “ensuring excellence, integrity and dynamism of the Humanities and Social Sciences” in Africa is very encouraging and highly commendable. The continuous engagements and interactions with fellow PhD candidates and highly distinguished scholars from across Africa through the various African Pathways Scholarship Programme platforms facilitated by NIHSS-CODESRIA assisted me reflect on the past, present and future of Africa, and the enriched my pursuit of African-centred and oriented solutions and interventions to continental challenges within the realm of socio-economic and political development.

I acknowledge the moral support of my family, my parents, and all my brothers. My wife Charity Mawire was supportive from the beginning to the end.

I further acknowledge, with so much appreciation and gratitude, the unwavering support and guidance of my supervisor, Dr. Rudigi Rukema Joseph. The inspiration and motivation kept me working hard and on course. I am very grateful.

I am also indebted to Dr. Alison Jones from the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) Pietermaritzburg Campus, who worked with me during the nascent stages of my PhD proposal development. Your input and advice is very much appreciated.

To my friend, Dr. Blessing Simura, I value and cherish your encouragement, inspiration and motivation. You played a very influential role. I am indebted to you. Be blessed. I am also grateful to friends and brothers Tigere Muringa and James Ndlovu for their supportive role. Kudzaishwe Marecha and Mukoma Felix Makonye, and many other friends and colleagues, I thank you for the encouragement and motivation.

The Discipline of Public Governance at Westville Campus within the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), where I Lectured and provided Post-Graduate Assistance/Consultancy & supervision services during my studies, assisted in building my capacity in the process and broadening the scope of my research focus. I thank the Academic Leader - Dr. Fayth Ruffin – and all the academics in the Discipline for their support, encouragement and inspiration.
ABSTRACT

The secession of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011, after a protracted and seemingly intractable conflict which started in 1955 on the eve of the county’s independence from colonial rule; presents a pertinent question on whether secession should be considered as a viable and sustainable strategy for resolving conflicts with ethnic and religious dimensions. This comes against a background of several secessionists movements in Africa, as in Algeria (State of Kabyle), Angola (Republic of Cabinda), Cameroon (Democratic Republic of Bakassi), Comoros (Anjouan), Ethiopia (State of Oromia and Ogaden), Mali (Azawad), Nigeria (State of Biafra), Senegal (Casamance Republic), Somalia (Republic of Somalia-Somaliland), Tanzania (Zanzibar), and Zambia (Barotseland), among others. These are by grievances such as marginalization, discrimination, oppression and different forms of injustices. Five years after secession, the conflicts in South Sudan and Sudan are still raging on and even intensifying, despite commendable regional and international mediation efforts through the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU). Using the 2011 secession of South Sudan as case study, this study sought to examine the extent to which secession can be considered as a strategy to sustainably resolve intra-ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial African states. Methodologically, the study adopted a mixed methods research design which combines both qualitative and quantitative research methods, relying on interviews with experts, academics and researchers based in Zimbabwe as well as questionnaires administered to officials working in peacebuilding, humanitarian, media and development agencies in South Sudan. It used the Protracted Social Conflict Theory, Realist Conflict Theory and Conflict Transformation Theory as theoretical framework of analysis. The findings of the study revealed that whilst South Sudanese secession was a legal success as evidenced by the legitimate recognition and acceptance of the state as a member of the AU and the UN, there was no evidence of success of secession in South Sudan in as far as the securing of lasting peace and stability is concerned as there is continued inter-communal violence, inter-ethnic fights, unresolved border demarcation issues with the Republic of Sudan, and border disputes in Abyei, Blue Nile and South Kordofan states in post-secession South Sudan. The study concludes that secession cannot be regarded as a sustainable and viable strategy to resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts as it usually over-simplify a conflict along ethnic, religious and regional identity lines thereby failing to address the underlying substantive causes of secessionist conflicts. The study further argues that at regional and continental level, the secession of states may threaten African unity and integration. However, in extreme cases where secession maybe unavoidable due to self-determination pressures, the study suggests that secession should be supported by effective transitional mechanisms accompanied by conflict transformation interventions aimed at transforming the power structures, institutions, systems, triggers of violence, attitudes of conflict actors, and transforming mindset of the elite/leadership so as to secure sustainable peace and stability. In order to sustainably resolve seemingly intractable protracted intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial African states, the study highly recommends that multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies should consider ‘non-secession’ alternatives such as Federalism, Consociational Democracy, Devolution, and Confederation which embrace and uphold the sacrosanct values and principles of democracy, diversity, plurality, tolerance, equal access to opportunities and fair distribution of national resources so as to promote national integration and social cohesion. The nature, form, substance and structure of these national governance frameworks should be defined and determined by national contexts and circumstances.

Key Words: secession, ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts, South Sudan
CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM DECLARATION ................................................................. i
DEDICATION .................................................................................. ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................. iii
ABSTRACT .................................................................................... iv
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................... viii
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................... ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ................................... x

CHAPTER 1 .................................................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY ........................... 1
1.0 Introduction ............................................................................ 1
1.1 Background to the Study ......................................................... 1
1.2 Outline of the Research Problem .......................................... 4
1.3 Research Questions and Objectives: Key Questions to be asked . 6
   1.3.1 Central Research Question .............................................. 6
   1.3.2 Key Research Questions ................................................ 6
1.4 Research Objectives ............................................................... 7
1.5 Research Problems and Objectives: Broader issues to be investigated: 7
1.6 Research Methodology .......................................................... 8
1.7 Structure of Dissertation ....................................................... 8
1.8 Conclusion ............................................................................. 10

CHAPTER 2 .................................................................................... 12
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .................... 12
2.0 Introduction ............................................................................ 12
2.1 Defining Secession ................................................................ 12
2.2 Perspectives on Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Africa ............ 16
   2.2.1 Defining Ethnic and Religious Conflicts .......................... 17
   2.2.2 Religious Conflicts and Ethnic Conflicts: A Myth or A Reality? 20
2.3 Why Demand for Secession? .................................................. 24
2.4 Theories of Secession .............................................................. 27
   2.4.1 Primary Right Theories ................................................... 28
   2.4.2 Remedial Right Only Theories ........................................ 30
2.5 Causes of Secession ............................................................... 32
   2.5.1 Colonial Legacy of arbitrary partition of Africa ............... 33
   2.5.2 Politics of Economic and Political Exclusion ................... 35
   2.5.3 Ethno-Religious Suppression and/or Discrimination ....... 37
2.6 Debating Secession: Arguments for and Against ..................... 40
2.7 The African Union’s Position on Secession of States .................. 47
2.8 Post-Session South Sudan Dynamics ...................................... 50
2.9 Theoretical Framework of the Study ....................................... 51
   2.9.1 Protracted Social Conflict Theory .................................. 52
   2.9.2 Realist Conflict Theory .................................................. 55
   2.9.3 Conflict Transformation Theory .................................... 58
2.10 Conclusion ............................................................................. 63

CHAPTER 3 .................................................................................... 64
THE SUDANESE CONFLICT: ORIGINS, HISTORY AND EVOLUTION .......... 64
3.0 Introduction ............................................................................ 64
3.1 Profile of the Sudan ............................................................... 64
   3.1.1 Geography of Sudan ..................................................... 64
   3.1.2 Ethnic and Religious Configuration ................................ 66
3.2 Why Origins, History and Evolution of the Sudanese Conflict? ... 67
3.3 Pre-Colonial Sudan (Pre-18th Century - 1820) ......................... 68
3.4 Colonial Sudan (1821-1955) .................................................... 69
3.5 Turko-Egyptian Conquest and Rule (1821-1882) ...................... 70
3.6 The Mahdiyyah Rule (1881-1898) .......................................... 73
3.7 Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899-1955) ......................... 74
   3.7.1 Indirect Rule Policy ........................................................ 77
   3.7.2 The Southern Policy ...................................................... 78
   3.7.3 Policy of Arabisation and Islamization ........................... 82
CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.0 Introduction

7.1 Summaries of the Study Chapters

7.2 Summary of Research Findings

7.2.1 Resolving Intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in Post-colonial Africa

7.2.2 Challenges faced during and after the secession of states

7.2.3 Sustainability and Viability of Secession as strategy to resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial Africa

7.2.4 Position of the African Union towards secession in Member States

7.2.5 Possible Strategies to Resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in Post-colonial Africa

7.2.6 Possible precedence set by, and key lessons learnt from, the secession of South Sudan

7.3 Recommendations of the Study

7.4 Suggestions for Future Research

7.5 Conclusion

REFERENCES

APPENDIX 1: Permission Letter to Interviewees

APPENDIX 2: Permission Letter to Questionnaire Respondents

APPENDIX 3: Informed Consent Form for Interviewees

APPENDIX 4: Informed Consent Form for Questionnaire Respondents

APPENDIX 5: INTERVIEW GUIDE

APPENDIX 6: QUESTIONNAIRE
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Causes of Protracted Social Conflicts and Basis of their Protractedness ........................................... 54
Figure 2.2: Essential Components of the Conflict Transformation Process ................................................................. 61
Figure 3.1: Map of Sudan with borders adopted at Independence in 1956 ................................................................. 65
Figure 6.1: Description of Interview Participants ........................................................................................................ 163
Figure 6.2: Description of Questionnaire Respondents ................................................................................................ 164
Figure 6.3: Interviewees’ views on the AU’s ‘anti-secession’ position ........................................................................ 175
Figure 6.4: Questionnaire respondents’ views on the AU’s ‘anti-secession’ position ..................................................... 176
Figure 6.5: Interviewees’ Views on the Justifiability of AU’s Support for South Sudan secession ............................... 183
Figure 6.6: Questionnaire Respondents Views on the Justifiability of AU’s Support for South Sudan secession ............ 184
Figure 6.7: Responses from Interviewees on Success or Failure of South Sudan Secession .......................................... 191
Figure 6.8: Questionnaire Respondents’ Views on the Success or Failure of South Sudan Secession ........................ 192
Figure 6.9: Total Study Participants’ Views on the Success or Failure of South Sudan Secession ............................... 193
Figure 6.10: Interviewees’ Views on the Need for a National Educational Programme before South Sudan Secession Referendum .................................................................................................................. 201
Figure 6.11: Questionnaire Respondents’ Views on the Need for a National Educational Programme before South Sudan Secession Referendum .................................................................................................................. 202
Figure 6.12: Total Study Participants’ Views on the Need for a National Educational Programme before South Sudan Secession Referendum .................................................................................................................. 203
Figure 6.13: Interviewees’ Responses on the ‘Best’ National Governance Model for Resolving intractable and protracted intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts ................................................................. 208
Figure 6.14: Questionnaire Responses on the ‘Best’ National Governance Model for Resolving intractable and protracted intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts ................................................................. 209
Figure 6.15: Total Study Participants’ Views on the ‘Best’ National Governance Model for Resolving intractable and protracted intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts .................................................................................................................. 210
LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1: Main Active Secessionist Movements in Africa as at February 2016 ........................................... 25
Table 6.1: List of Interviewees ......................................................................................................................... 166
Table 6.2: List of Questionnaire Respondents ............................................................................................... 166
Table 6.3: National Governance Models for Resolving intractable and protracted intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts ............................................................................................................ 207
### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Abyei Boundary Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APCLS</td>
<td>Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM</td>
<td>Anjouan People’s Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCSS</td>
<td>Agreement of the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Africa University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUHIP</td>
<td>African Union High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan and South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAMOSD</td>
<td>Bakassi Movement for Self Determination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPF</td>
<td>Barotse Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSRF</td>
<td>Board of the Special Reconstruction Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSE</td>
<td>Bindura University of Science Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFTA</td>
<td>Continental Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPC</td>
<td>China National Petroleum Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Corruption Perception Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRA</td>
<td>Compensation and Reparation Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTRH</td>
<td>Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>Civic United Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUZ</td>
<td>Catholic University of Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFLR</td>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPOC</td>
<td>Dar Petroleum Operating Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community for West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>El-Obeid Refinery Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDs</td>
<td>Former Detainees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLEC</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLEC</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRPI</td>
<td>Front for Patriotic Resistance of Ituri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNPOC</td>
<td>Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Governments of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPI</td>
<td>Global Peace Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPOC</td>
<td>Great Pioneer Operating Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GZU</td>
<td>Great Zimbabwe University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCSS</td>
<td>Hybrid Court for South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEC</td>
<td>High Executive Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>International Displacement Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IGADD Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development
IGs Inclusive Governments
IMF International Monetary Fund
JEM Justice and Equality Movement
JIP Joint Integrated Police
JIUs Joint Integrated Units
JMCC Joint Military Ceasefire Commission
JMCC Joint Military Ceasefire Commission
JMCT Joint Military Ceasefire Team
JMEC Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission
JOC Joint Operations Centre
KRC Khartoum Refinery Company
M23 March 23 Movement
MAK Movement for the Autonomy of Kabyle
MASSOB Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
MDFC Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance
MEND Movement for the Emancipation for the Niger Delta
MLF Mthwakazi Liberation Front
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MRC Mombasa Republic Council
MSU Midlands State University
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDF National Democratic Front
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
NIF National Islamic Front
NLA Sudan National Legislative Assembly
NMLA National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
NUP National Unionist Party
NUST National University of Science and Technology
OAU Organization of African Unity
OCHA United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OLF Oromo Liberation Front
ONGC Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited
ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front
PC Peace Commission
PCA Permanent Court of Arbitration
PDOC Petrodar Operating Company
PDP People’s Democratic Party
PETRONAS Petroliam Nasional Berhad
POC Petrodar Operating Company
PSCs Protracted Social Conflicts
PSR Port Sudan Refinery
RC Refugees Commission
RECs Regional Economic Communities
RRC Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
SADC Southern African Development Community
SAF Somaliland Armed Forces
SAF Sudan Armed Forces
SDSRB Strategic Defence and Security Review Board
SINOPEC  Sinopet International Petroleum Corporation and China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation
SPLA  Sahrawi People’s Liberation Army
SPLA  Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SPLM  Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
SPLM/A  Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM-IG  SPLM-In Government
SPLM-IO  SPLM-In Opposition
SSIM/SSIA  Southern Sudan Independence Movement/Army
SSLA  South Sudan Legislative Assembly
SSRC  South Sudan Referendum Commission
TFNF  Tiger Faction New Forces
TGoNU  Transitional Government of National Unity
TI  Transparency International
TNLA  Transitional National Legislative Assembly
UK  United Kingdom
UKZN  University of KwaZulu-Natal
UN  United Nations
UNECA  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF  United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
UNISFA  United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMISS  United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
US  United States
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UTS  United Tribes Society
UZ  University of Zimbabwe
WCC  World Council of Churches
WNPOC  White Nile Petroleum Operating Company
ZEGU  Zimbabwe Ezekiel Guti University
ZOU  Zimbabwe Open University
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.0 Introduction

This study assesses the extent to which secession can be considered as a sustainable and viable strategy to resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial Africa. The secession of South Sudan from the Republic of Sudan in July 2011, following a protracted conflict which started in August 1955 mainly pitting the Southern Sudanese and the central Government based in Khartoum, is used as a case study for the research. The study undertakes empirical investigation using face-to-face interviews and questionnaires as well as secondary data sources in order to establish the sustainability and viability of secession as a conflict resolution strategy in post-colonial Africa. This Chapter is basically introductory in nature. It examines the background to the study and presents the outline of the research problem. Further, the Chapter outlines the research objectives and the research questions that will guide the study. A brief research methodology of the study is also presented in this Chapter. Finally, the Chapter presents a summarized structure of the thesis.

1.1 Background to the Study

The dawn of political independence in Africa in the early 1960s and 1970s was celebrated across the continent as ushering in a new era of stability and creating opportunities for freedom, peace and prosperity. There was a general consensus that fostering African political unity and integration would enhance socio-economic and development. That is partly why the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963 was formed to decolonize Africa, “promote unity and solidarity among African states”, coordinate continental development and safeguard Member States’ sovereignty (AU, 2015: np). Its transformation to African Union (AU) was motivated by the desire to achieve greater unity and solidarity amongst Member States in a more dynamic way whilst pursuing economic integration for global competitiveness (AU, 2015: np).
The urge for African unity was against a background of a post-colonial continent that had permanent scars of artificial boundaries, fragmentation, balkanization, disunity among the divided clans, ethnic groups, and religious groups since its partition at the Berlin Conference in 1884-85 by the 14 European imperialist countries who were motivated by their determination to advance colonial interests (Nkrumah, 1963; McNamee, 2012; Ndulo, 2013). According to Taras and Ganguly (2015), 90 percent of the nearly 192 states in the world are multi-ethnic, consisting of more than two ethnic groups. Multi-ethnicity, coupled with multi-religiosity, has provided the basis of polarization and ultimately identity-based conflicts.

Using the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Englebert in Herbst et al (2012:35) posits that most countries have “multiple and overlapping fissures” nationally which polarize social life based on religion and ethnicity among other differences. It is the ethnic diversity of DRC, with over 200 ethnic groups, that has been exploited by the various rebel movements to pursue their political, military and economic ambitions and interests through ethnic mobilization to wage a war against the central government resulting in prolonged conflict (Karbo and Mutisi, 2011). These rebel movements include, among others, the M23 (the March 23 Movement), Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS), the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (DFLR), the Front for Patriotic Resistance of Ituri (FRPI) which are of the Tutsis, Hundes, Hutus and Ngiti ethnic groups respectively (Neethling, 2014).

Two classic examples, of scars left by artificial colonial boundaries, presented by Griffiths (in Thomson 2010:15) are Burkina Faso which “cut across the traditional territory of 21 cultural and linguistic groups” whilst Somalis were scattered into five different states of “British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland, Kenya and Ethiopia”. In addition, people of different ethnic groups were, and are still, organized (or disorganized) together by such colonial circumstances. For instance, the Hausa are found in West Africa and Central Africa, the Amhara and Oromo people are not only confined to Ethiopia but are also found in the country’s neighbouring states, whilst the Fulani ethno-linguistic group of people are spread across the majority of West African states. Such a phenomenon left most African communities facing future challenges of intra-state conflicts emanating from ethnic, religious and political identity crisis and clashes. Adebajo (2010:8) prefers to call this “the curse of Berlin” or the “Bismarckian curse”.
Notwithstanding the colonially imposed borders, African leaders at independence embraced the existing inherited colonial boundaries as they believed this would foster continental unity and integration. African leaders of newly independent states, in their quest for unity, peace and integration, agreed at the OAU Meeting in 1964 that “border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissention” and further declared “to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence” (Resolutions of the OAU Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 1964). There is a general agreement that this decision was made to preserve peace on the continent. The resolution has also been argued to be inconsistent with the international law principle of uti possidetis which states that “territory or other property remains with its possessor after a conflict, unless otherwise stipulated by treaty” (Ndulo, 2013: np).

Despite the OAU Resolution to uphold the inviolability and sanctity of state boundaries, which is also reflected in Article 4 (b) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU), July 2011 witnessed a departure from such a decision after the adoption of the secessionist strategy to resolve the long standing Sudanese intra-state conflict after a referendum in January 2011 which led to the secession of South Sudan from the Republic of Sudan. McNamee (2012: np) understandably fears that this might be “the first crack in Africa’s map”.

The secession of South Sudan was largely motivated by the Sudan’s diverse ethnic and religious composition with over 500 tribes speaking around 400 languages in the then united Sudan (Commonwealth of Australia, 2007). The colonial policy of Arabization and discrimination against a predominantly Christian population in the South deepened ethnic and religious cleavages in Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan (Sharkey, 2008). The coming of the Ottoman Empire/Egyptian rule (1821-1885), and later, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1889-1955), entrenched a system of colonial rule that was highly centralized and militarized which sustained a policy of perpetuating religious and ethnic divisions (Collins, 2008).

The post-independence Sudanese Government is argued to have perpetuated ethnic and religious conflict by failing to manage the expectations of the previously marginalized South Sudanese (O’Ballance, 2000). The author cites decisions made by the centralized Khartoum Government in 1967 under President General Ibrahim Abboud to ignore the diversity of Sudanese religion and ethnicity by forging and forcing national unity through creating an Arab state with Arabic, Islam and Arab-Moslem as the national language, religion and culture for all Sudanese respectively (O’Ballance, 2000). In addition, the December 1957 decision by the
Sudanese Government to reject the Southern Sudan quest for federal status led to what Deng (2001:13) terms “possibly the longest civil conflict in the world”.

Further, the distribution of oil revenue, socio-economic development, and representation in national governance structures was unfairly skewed against Southern Sudanese regions. It is from such demographic diversity, religious discrimination and uneven resource distribution that socio-economic and political divisions emanated, resulting in prolonged conflict that manifested itself through political, economic and religious and ethnic differences.

Despite the Addis Ababa Accords of 1972 and Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, ethnic wars have erupted whenever parties fail to honour the agreements. As Iyob and Khadiagala (2006:13) observe, “Sudan is a land where peace always seems to hover on the horizon while numerous destructive wars scar its inhabitants” and peace agreements are “as numerous as the wars fought”. The ultimate resolution of the Sudanese conflict through territorial secession in July 2011, was thought and considered appropriate and suitable especially considering that the conflict had claimed “more than 2,5 million people and displaced more than 5 million human beings” (Genocide Watch, 2013). The CPA of 2005 later culminated in the referendum in January 2011 which led to the secession of South Sudan on 09 July 2011.

1.2 Outline of the Research Problem

The secession of South Sudan in 2011, which intended to bring lasting peace and stability to a state that has been at war since the attainment of political independence in 1956, provokes several complex questions when viewed from a broader and wider perspective of regional and continental initiatives for African unity, peace, security, stability and prosperity.

Previously, the only case of secession of states in Africa had been that of the State of Eritrea which seceded from the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in May 1993 and was accepted by the then OAU as a suitable strategy to resolve a 30 year-long protracted conflict between the Ethiopian Government and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) in which an estimated “160 000 fighters and 40 000 civilians died in the fighting” (The Independent Newspaper, 1993; The New York Times, 1993). The secession of Eritrea from Ethiopian
followed a referendum that was conducted and monitored by the United Nations (UN) in February 1993 wherein 99% citizens voted for independence of Eritrea.

In an earlier case, attempts by Biafra State to secede from Nigeria in 1967 had been rejected by the OAU on the grounds of preserving the “territorial integrity of Nigeria” (Fourth Ordinary Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of OAU, 1967). Further, the OAU reasoned that if allowed it would persuade other secessionist movements to clamour for independence (Ndulo, 2013: np).

The legitimate expectation was that the AU would have been consistent with its Biafra decision when it came to the Eritrean and South Sudanese cases, both of which were in line with the legal principles of ratio decidendi and stare decisis. Given such a background, the secession of South Sudan therefore signals legitimate fears and expectations that separatism may now be regarded as a viable and durable strategy for resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial Africa.

Post-secession South Sudan and Sudan have continued to experience an escalation of conflict. According to the UN News Centre (2015: np), “the security situation in South Sudan has deteriorated steadily” over time since the eruption of political power tussles and divisions within the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in December 2013 and “[t]he hostilities [have] turned into a full-fledged conflict that sent nearly 100 000 civilians fleeing to UN bases around the country” whilst “the crisis has uprooted an estimated 1,9 million people and placed more than 7 million at risk of hunger and disease”. It was further reported that the UN was “sheltering over 110 000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) with an additional 1,5 million others displaced through-out the country and 500 000 outside the country” (UN News Centre, 2015: np).

Currently, South Sudan is ranked second on the Fragile States Index (FSI), behind Somalia (Messner, ed, 2016). In the year 2015, it was ranked the most fragile state (Report of Fragile States Index Rankings, 2015). The rankings consider various indicators such as refugees, IDPs, state of human rights and rule of law, poverty and economic decline, among other social, economic and political indicators.

Therefore, the key focus of this study is to thoroughly examine the secessionist strategy by unpacking its rationale, purpose and intention, and by analysing it empirically and theoretically.
against its likely impact on resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa, using South Sudan as a case study.

1.3 Research Questions and Objectives: Key Questions to be asked

Research questions and objectives that are central to the study will be presented with the intention to guide the research whilst also determining the scope of issues to be investigated. The central research question serves the dual function of guiding the research and determining the foci of the study.

1.3.1 Central Research Question

In an attempt to analyse the suitability and appropriateness of the model of secession of states to resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts, the following constitutes the central research question: Drawing on the experiences of, and lessons from, the South Sudanese case, to what extent does secession of states sustainably resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial African states?

1.3.2 Key Research Questions

The following key research questions will guide the study:

1) What specific challenges are faced during and after the secession of states in resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts?

2) What is the African Union’s (vis-a-vis the OAU’s) position with regard to the secession of states to resolve ethnic and religious conflicts, and under what circumstances does the AU consider such secession justifiable?

3) To what extent to date has the secession of South Sudan in 2011 resolved the existing ethnic and religious conflicts among the warring groups?

4) What precedent does the current situation in South Sudan set for future resolution of intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa?
1.4 Research Objectives

The following constitute the central objectives of this study;

1) To establish the extent to which the secession of states sustainably resolves intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial African states.

2) To identify specific challenges faced during and after the secession of states in resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts.

3) To ascertain the position of the African Union (previously the OAU) with regard to the secession of states in resolving ethnic and religious conflicts and the circumstances under which the AU justifies such secession.

4) To establish the extent to which the secession of Sudan in 2011 has resolved the existing ethnic and religious conflicts among the warring groups.

5) To demonstrate the precedent which has been set by the secession of South Sudan in as far as future resolution of intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa is concerned.

1.5 Research Problems and Objectives: Broader issues to be investigated:

Many post-colonial African states are increasingly finding themselves faced with intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts. The decision to resolve the Sudanese conflict using the secessionist strategy influenced the prospects for peace within South Sudan and between Sudan and South Sudan. It also had a bearing on the discourse of African conflict resolution. The secessionist strategy, as applied in Sudan, which entails physical division of warring parties, appears to contradict the AU’s decision to foster continental unity and preserve territorial integrity. The study seeks to contextually examine the Sudanese conflict and assess the efficacy, appropriateness, suitability and sustainability of the secessionist strategy in resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts. The broader issue that will be of concern to the study is a contextually situated analysis of the resolution of identity-based conflicts within the context of the desire to achieve continental peace, security and prosperity.
1.6 Research Methodology

The research methodology adopted by this study is presented and explained in detail under Chapter Five. The study utilized qualitative and quantitative research designs in a mixed method approach. This suited the study as it is both exploratory and explanatory. As a research strategy, a case study approach has been employed, with South Sudan being the specific case of focus. The data collection tools and instruments used were questionnaires and an interview guide for semi-structured in-depth interviews (see Appendix 5 and Appendix 6).

Given the on-going serious conflict and instability in South Sudan, the researcher could not travel to conduct field interviews and administer questionnaires in South Sudan. Instead, the in-depth interviews targeted lecturers, experts, academics, and/or researchers working in Universities and/or Think Tanks in Zimbabwe whilst questionnaires were administered to individuals working in NGOs specializing in peace building, development, humanitarian initiatives, post-conflict reconstruction and research based in South Sudan. Purposive sampling method was used to determine the interviewees and questionnaire respondents. The justification for the sample focus and sample size is presented at length under Chapter Five. The aim was to solicit views, perceptions and opinions with regard to the extent to which the secession of states can be considered as a viable or sustainable strategy for resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial African states, with specific reference to the case study of South Sudan, which seceded from the Republic of Sudan in 2011.

Data quality control measures were taken at each and every stage of the study to ensure trustworthiness, credibility, validity and reliability of the findings. Thematic analysis and content analysis were used in data analysis as thoroughly explained and justified in Chapter Five. The study duly abided by all the ethical principles that govern research as presented in Chapter Five.

1.7 Structure of Dissertation

Pursuant to the research objectives, and in an attempt to respond to the research questions that guide the study as presented earlier on above, this thesis is organized into seven Chapters with related, but different themes.
Chapter One presents an introduction and overview of the study. It provides a detailed background to the study within which attention was paid to the roots and emergence of intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts have emerged in post-colonial in Africa. The chapter further presents and elucidates the statement of the problem which discusses secessionism as a strategy to resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa, with reference to South Sudan as the case study of the research. Research objectives, research questions and research methodology of the study are also presented in Chapter One.

Chapter Two presents literature review and theoretical framework of the study. It provides an in-depth exploration and review of relevant literature on state secession and its role in resolving conflicts that are ethnic and religious in nature. This reveals the different perspectives on the secession of states in resolving ethnic and religious conflicts in general, and post-colonial Africa in particular. Additionally, the chapter draws on the literature on the Sudanese conflict and cases of secessionist conflicts in other parts of Africa and globally for the purposes of comparative analysis. This gives context to the study and justifies the need for the study through presenting existing gaps in the literature. Chapter Two further outlines and elaborates the components of the major theoretical frameworks that underpin the data collection, data analysis and data interpretation process. The principal theories that provided a framework of analysis for this study are the Protracted Social Conflict Theory, Realist Conflict Theory and Conflict Transformation Theory.

Chapter Three focuses on the origins, history and evolution of the South Sudanese conflict. It thus analytically traces the root causes of the Sudanese conflict and further examines the evolution of the conflict since the pre-colonial period from a multi-dimensional perspective, exploring the ethnic, religious, socio-economic and political dimensions of the conflict from a historical, and later contemporary, perspective. Thus the Chapter clearly accounts and explain the historical phases of the Sudanese conflict up-to the phase of the South Sudanese secession, namely pre-colonial Sudan, colonial Sudan and post-colonial Sudan. In so doing, the Chapter thus assists in situating and contextualizing the South Sudanese secession matrix.

Chapter Four discusses conflict dynamics in post-secession South Sudan. It assesses and interrogates secession as a strategy applied to resolve the Sudanese conflict in 2011. Focus is on examining the context, background, rationale, motive, intended objectives, and the modalities of secession of South Sudan. The Chapter also locates the South Sudanese secession
matrix as part of the post-colonial African question with regards to the resolution of intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts on the continent. Further, the Chapter assesses the suitability, appropriateness, sustainability, impact and implications of the decision to separate Sudan based on the actual state of conflict, peace and security in the separated states of Sudan and South Sudan.

In Chapter Five, focus is on presenting the Research Methodology of the study in detail. The Chapter explains and justifies the research design and research methodologies that will be employed in the study to collect, interpret and analyse data. The specific instruments that will be utilized for data collection are also be identified and justified. On the other hand, the applied samples, sample sizes, sampling methods or techniques, research instruments used during field work are itemised with their merits and demerits explained.

Chapter Six focuses on data presentation, data interpretation and data analysis. It presents and analyse data collected during fieldwork through face-to-face interviews and questionnaires as well as through secondary data sources. The findings from the data gathering process was discussed and analysed in light of the principal theories upon which the study was constructed.

Chapter Seven presents the summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations of the study based in line with the research objectives and research questions. It also outlines the identified areas of further research emanating from the study. The discussion of the study findings was grounded in responses from interviews and questionnaires, as well as documentary data collected through secondary sources during the study. Focus was on how, why and if secessionism, as applied in Sudan, will sustainably resolve conflicts that have an ethnic and religious dimension. It also focuses on the extent to which state secession secures peace, security and prosperity, and how the secession of South Sudan may influence future conflict resolution models and decisions on the African continent. The Chapter also presents key implications of the study findings on the on-going conflict in South Sudan, and other intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa in general.

1.8 Conclusion
This Chapter has presented an overview of the research topic, explaining that the study assesses the extent to which secession can be considered as a sustainable and viable strategy to resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial Africa, using the July 2011 secession of South Sudan from the Republic of Sudan as a case study. The Chapter has presented the background to the study and the outline of the research problem. Further, the Chapter outlined the research objectives and the research questions that will guide the study. It also briefly outlined the research methodology of the study and summarized the structure of the thesis. The next Chapter presents literature review as well as the theories that formed the framework of analysis for the study.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 Introduction

This Chapter reviews literature on the thematic strands situated within the broad question of the sustainability of secession as a strategy of resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts with specific focus on post-colonial African states. It provides a synthesis, analysis and critical discussion of the relevant literature focusing on different insights, arguments, theories, approaches and perspectives around secession and ethno-religious conflicts in post-colonial Africa. Key concepts of secession, ethnic conflicts, and religious conflicts will be defined in order to inform a broader understanding of the concepts as they are critical to the study. Relevant literature is reviewed following a thematic approach. The chapter analyses the controversies associated the key concepts and discuss the causes of secession within the thematic framework of multi-ethnicity which characterise post-colonial African states. The Chapter also discusses the debate around secession, focusing on the main arguments presented in support, and against secession as a strategy for resolving identity-based conflicts that are ethno-religious in nature. A discussion and review of literature on post-secession conflict dynamics in South Sudan was also presented with a view to get different perspectives on how secession has been evaluated by different authors as well as appreciate the nature and direction of conflict in Sudan since secession in July 2011. Lastly, Chapter Two further explored and explained the major theories that have been used to provide the framework of analysis for the study. These comprised the Protracted Social Conflict Theory, Realist Conflict Theory and Conflict Transformation Theory.

2.1 Defining Secession

Secession has been agreed to be a very contentious subject and a lot of definitions have been proffered by different scholars. Perhaps, the absence of a common definition of secession which is internationally accepted might be explained by Anderson (2013:343)’s reasoning that “[t]he concept [of secession] remains undefined by treaty law and the United Nations (UN) declaratory General Assembly resolutions” and is “conspicuously absent from virtually all international legal instruments.” Thus to date, there has been a plethora of definitions of
secession that have been suggested in the field of Political Science, Political Sociology, International Relations, and International Law.

It is always imperative to invoke etymology when searching for the meaning of words and concepts through tracing their roots, origin, formation and history. Of course, due caution has to be exercised all the time given the fact that language, words and concepts often evolve, their usage is also dynamic and modified over a period of time (Booij, 2005; Burling, 1992; Hoff, 2009; Nowak et al, 1999; Trask, 1994).

Etymologically, the word secession, according to the *Concise Etymological Dictionary of the English Language*, originated from two Latin words; *se*, which means “apart”; and *cedere*, which means “to go” (Skeat, 2013:472). Thus, secession can be inferred to literally mean ‘going apart’.

In the domain of International Relations, International Politics and International Law, scholars have attempted to define secession in different ways. Writers such as Buchanan (1997), Crawford (2006), de Villiers (2012), Kohen (2006), Pavkovic and Radan (2008), Siroky (2009), Trzcinski (2007), among many others, have all had their definitions of secession cited in many instances.

Tomz (1994:3) defines secession descriptively as a situation which occurs when “an individual, or a collective, gains political independence by re-drawing state boundaries.” To Tomz, the hallmark of secession is independence of an entity or population that was previously dependent or subservient to another. On the other hand, Tir (2005) offers a definition of secession that is process-oriented and outcome-based. The author states that secession entails “an attempt to resolve a domestically-based territorial dispute by dividing a country’s home land territory into new secessionist and rump state” (Tir, 2005:1). He adds that such a process should ultimately create a state that is independent, with rights entitlement and recognized under international law by the community of nations.

Tir (2005) thus adds another dimension and concept related to secession, which is state recognition, as a necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, condition of secession outcomes. This will be explored further and discussed later in this Chapter. Likewise, Tir’s perspective with regard to state recognition as a key factor in secession is consistent with Frankel’s (1992)
assertions. Frankel (1992:528) defines secession as a situation when a “distinctly identifiable group” leaves a political arrangement in which it is incorporated “in order to establish a new politically independent state” with control over its people, economy, politics, culture, international relations and army; and recognized by the international community as a legitimate state.” Two salient factors emerge from Frankel’s definition. Firstly, that seceding groups exhibit distinctiveness of their shared culture or sub-nationality. And secondly, that seceding states should meet two conditions of statehood, that is, sovereignty and state recognition from the international community.

Some scholars, however, argue that the position of the host state (that is, the state from which seceding state was once part of before secession) matters in defining secession. Definitions by the preceding authors (Tomz, 1994; Tir, 2005; Frankel, 1992) are silent about this factor. In a different way, Crawford (2006), as cited in Cismas (2010:537), refers to secession as “the creation of a state by the use or threat to use force from without the consent of the former sovereign”. Thus, by implication and deduction, Crawford’s definition will inexorably lead one to logically conclude that successful and complete secession can only take place when, and only if, the host state is opposed to it. In the event that the host state has consented to secession intentions by a seceding state, then that is outside the scope of Crawford’s definition of secession. There is a disagreement amongst a number of scholars on this view.

Another definition of secession is from Radan who defines secession as “the creation of a new state upon territory previously forming part of, or being a colonial entity of, an existing state” (Radan, 2007:1). His definition considers coloniality as possible condition that gives rise to secession, and the creation of a new state as a manifestation of secession.

In addition, Radan (2007) extends his definition of secession by explaining the different forms of secession. His typological contribution clearly assists in closing the loopholes and gaps that are evident in most of the definitions of secession. The author identifies five (5) forms of secession, which according to him are based on the consent and unilateral conduct of both the seceding state and the host state. These are colonial secession (where colonial entities attain statehood by virtue of breaking down the colonial bondage and achieves independence as was the case with most African states in the 1960s and 1970s); unilateral secession (when a state chooses to secede and claim independence despite continued opposition by the host state); consensual secession (when a host state consent to the secession of a state that was part of its
territory), dissolving secession (where a state secedes and result in the dissolution of the host state), and devolutionary secession (where a host state consent to the secession of a state that was part of it, irrespective of whether it initially opposed such secession, and the host state continue to exist) (Radan in Tir 2005).

According to Anderson (2013:344), secession is “the withdrawal of territory (colonial or neo-colonial) from part of an existing state to create a new state”. His definition of secession is almost similar to that posited by Radan. So as to avoid a restrictive definition, Anderson qualifies secession and categorizes secession into two types. These are consensual secession and unilateral secession. To Anderson (2013), consensual secession can either be constitutional whereby the host state consent to secession by a state that was part of it and the act of secession does not involve the use, or threat of the use of, force; or politically negotiated secession whereby the host state consent and does not necessarily use force (Anderson, 2013:351-352). Unilateral secession, on the contrary, takes place when the host state does not consent to secession and there may involve the use of force, or threat of its usage (Anderson, 2013).

This study will be guided by Crawford’s definition given that it is descriptive, explanatory, extended and comprehensive. It clearly distinguishes different forms of secession and does not leave room for speculative judgement or uncertainty. The secession of South Sudan from Sudan on 9 July 2011 aptly fits into Anderson (2013)’s definition of secession and typology of consensual secession. This is because a referendum was conducted in January 2011 whose outcome was consented to and accepted by both the host state of Sudan and seceding state of South Sudan. In his 09 July 2011 speech at the event of celebrating the secession of South Sudan, the President of Sudan, Mr. Omar Hassan al-Bashir stated:

“I would like to congratulate our brothers in South Sudan on the occasion of the declaration of their new state and the creation of the State of South Sudan in this dear part of our homeland. I have come because deep rooted conviction that unity cannot be realized through war and that Southern Sudanese people must be respected” (Sudan News Agency, 09 July 2011; see also BBC News, 09 July 2011; Reuters, 09 July 2011; The Sudan Tribune, 09 July 2011; The Guardian, 09 July 2011).

With regard to the forces behind secession, there have been different perspectives from different scholars. Most post-colonial states in Africa have been plagued by intermittent conflicts. There has been numerous explanations, but the empirical fact is that these conflicts
have largely manifested in clashes along ethnical, religious and regional/geographical divisions.

2.2 Perspectives on Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Africa

The history of the (generic) African post-colonial state has been punctuated by several intractable and insoluble intra-state ethno-religious conflicts. As Mazrui (in Adebajo 2010: xiv) points out “[w]hile the worst conflicts in Arab Africa are at least partly religious, the worst conflicts in black Africa are ethnic (so-called ‘tribal’ conflicts)” and these “often leave deeper scars, and are often more indiscriminate and more ruthless than inter-state conflicts.” Arguably, this attests to Huntington (1993) assertion that “the most pervasive and dangerous conflicts will be between people belonging to different cultural identities” in the post-Cold War era. Cases in point include on-going conflicts in DRC, Chad, Central African Republic (CAR), Cote d’Ivoire, Niger, Somalia, Uganda, among others.

Oyeniyi (2011) attests to this. The author argues that the majority of African conflicts are internal and further points out that “inter-ethnic animosity will obviously grow where religious and custom are clearly distinguished among groups” (Oyeniyi, 2011:4). Thus whilst the causes of the conflict may be different, the conflicts usually manifest along ethnic, religious and regional/geographical identities.

According to McNamee (2012: np) intra-state ethnic and religious conflict in post-colonial Africa is the product of “the weak social cohesion”, failure of political organization and distribution of resources. On the other hand, Fearon and Laitin (2013:75) argue that “the root cause of most of the [post-Cold War] conflicts has been ethnic and religious antagonisms”. Failure to prevent ethnic and religious diversity from mutating into conflict has been the one of the greatest undoing of the typical post-colonial African state, leading to loss of lives, infrastructure destruction, human suffering, retarded economic development and increased debt levels (Steyn, 2007; Kah, 2012; Maitre, 2009).

It is undisputable, that the majority of African intra-state conflicts have tended to have ethnic and religious dimensions. The post-colonial African reality factor of ethnicity and religious diversity has been key in driving intra-state conflicts in Africa. Most studies have concluded that the root cause of this phenomenon can be traced back to the Berlin Conference of
1884/1985 where European countries arbitrarily partitioned Africa into colonies without paying attention to the local culture, religion, custom, language and community organization (see Asiwaju, 1985; Badru, 2010; Dersso, 2012; El-Khawas and Ndumbe, 2014; Haynes, 2007; Ongáyo, 2008; Onuoha, 2012; Byrne and Englebert, 2014; Cilliers and Schunemann, 2013; Thompson, 2012; United Nations, 1999).

The argument is that colonialism forcibly lumped African people together, and later administered them under divisive colonial policies that deepened and widened ethnic and religious cleavages which later culminated into instability and conflict after the attainment of independence. Ahmad (2013) notes that there are currently 110 inter-state boundaries in Africa. These boundaries, according to Asiwaju (1985) as cited in Ahmad (2013:14), have “dissected 177 culture areas and groups” across the continent.

2.2.1 Defining Ethnic and Religious Conflicts

Ethnic and religious conflicts have been defined different by various scholars. Ryan (1990:1) offers a definition of an ethnic group as “a group of people who defines themselves as distinct from other groups because of cultural differences”. The author further cites Gellner (1988) who defines culture as “the set of concepts in terms of which a given population thinks and acts” (Ryan, 1990:1). The term is etymologically traced back to ancient Greek word “ethnos” which denotes a number or class of people, animals, tribes, caste, living together (Jenkins, 1997; Fenton, 2003). Cordell (1999:14) asserts that “the core of ethnicity resides in myths, memories, values and symbols.” Thus ethnicity encompasses shared culture, beliefs, values and some form of genealogy.

Almost along the same lines with Ryan (1990) and Cordell (1999), De Vos (1995:18) argues that:

“An ethnic group is “a self-perceived inclusion of those who hold in common a set of traditions not shared by others with whom they are in contact. Such traditions typically include ‘folk,’ religious beliefs and practices, language, a sense of historical continuity, and common ancestry or place of origin”.
The author further expands his definition of ethnic groups and ethnicity, arguing that racial uniqueness, territoriality, economic bases, religion, aesthetic cultural patterns and language are fundamental elements that underlie ethnic description (De Vos, 1995: 18-23). Thus religion, whilst by definition and practice it is distinguished from ethnicity, De Vos (1995) definition expound the fact that religion is part and parcel of a cultural system that constitute behaviour and social organization of groups. Along similar lines, Taras and Ganguly (2015:2) presents a comprehensive definition of an ethnic community as:

“[A] large or small group of people, in either traditional or advanced societies, who are united by a common inherited culture (including language, music, food, dress, and customs and practices), racial similarity, common religion, and belief in a common history and ancestry and who exhibit a strong psychological sentiment of belonging to the group”.

On the other hand, Kaufmann (1996:137) defines an ethnic group as “a body of individuals who purportedly share cultural and racial characteristics especially common ancestry or territorial origin which distinguishes them from members of other groups”. These were also labelled as tribes. Most scholars have now discarded the use of the term tribe on the basis of its racial connotations, preferring ethnicity whilst in some literature tribe is viewed to harbour strong and divisive attitudes of alienation along family, blood, kinship and clan (see Bannon et al, 2004; Carola, 1995; Parker and Reid, 2013).

A very comprehensive definition of ethnicity was presented by Udogu (2000), citing Schermerhorn (1978). To the author, ethnicity is:

“A collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood. Examples of such symbolic elements are: kinship patterns, physical contiguity, (as in localism or sectionalism), religious affiliation, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliation, nationality, phonotypical features, or any combination of these. A necessary accompaniment is some consciousness of kind among members of the group” (Udogu, 2000:14).

Wamwere (2003) argues that ethnicity can be either negative or positive. The author states that positive ethnicity is innocent, ethnic pride is positive whilst negative ethnicity has hatred and bias. In distinguishing these two types of ethnicities, Wamwere (2003:23) asserts:
“Negative ethnicity manifests itself when we begin to imagine that we are superior to others because of our religion, food, language, songs, culture, or even looks are better...It also applies to one community feeling worse and inferior than others.”

When ethnicity begins to manifest itself this way, then the outcome is ethnic hatred, animosity and ultimately result in ethnic conflicts.

Religion, on the other hand, often manifests itself through religious ideas. As defined by Basedau et al (2014:4), religious ideas are “shared values and norms that commonly include appeals for appropriate behaviour on the part of believers.” Mainly due to its colonial experience, Africa is now blessed (or cursed) with religious diversity, with main religious affiliations being Christianity, Islam, African Traditional Religions (ATRs), Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism, Rastafarianism and several other populations that are atheist.

Perhaps, Boucher et al (1987:18) were spot on when they hinted that “conflict between language, religion, physical appearance and customs of people from different ethnic groups has been – and probably will continue to be – a primary source of unrest in the world.” Solomon and Matthews (2001) also concurred that religion and ethnic nationalism are now key drivers of conflict in Africa. But there is a strong debate on whether indeed ethnicity and religion are the real causes of conflicts or they are just smokescreens of hidden struggles? Do the two exist or they are mere imaginations?

In differentiating religion from conflict, one can easily note that ethnicity is biologically defined in as much as it is sociologically defined, whilst religion has nothing to do with biology as it concerns beliefs and faith which are acquired through socialization. One’s ethnic identity is acquired by virtue of being born within a specific ethnic group and this cannot be changed. When it comes to religion, this is by one’s choice and can be changed anytime depending on one’s conviction, faith and beliefs. A Christian believer can easily become a Muslim by mere conversion. This cannot be the same with a Yoruba, Hausa or Igbo, using the case of Nigeria, or with a Shona, Ndebele or Tonga using a Zimbabwean case. However, the fundamental common denominator is that both ethnic and religious conflicts are identity-based conflicts. This is because religion and ethnicity are an innate and structural part of an individual’s culture and identity.
2.2.2 Religious Conflicts and Ethnic Conflicts: A Myth or A Reality?

As pointed out above, the generic post-colonial African state has been punctuated by several intractable and insoluble intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts. Whilst the root causes of identity-based conflicts in Africa have been traced to the 1884/1885 Berlin Conference partition of the continent, the triggers of what are termed ethnic and religious conflicts cannot be sufficiently explained by simplistic and oversimplified references to colonial divisions.

Taras and Ganguly (2015) present three main schools of thought that explain how ethnic identities are formed, and how these manifest into conflicts. The three schools of thought are premodernism, instrumentalism and constructivism. The Primordialists view ethnic identity as biologically established; instrumentalists consider ethnic identities as tools for elite manipulation, whereas constructivists argue that ethnic identities are a social construction (Taras and Ganguly, 2015:5; see also Aboh, 2014; Amone, 2015; Badru and Nwaorgu, 2014; Conversi, 1995; Gil-White, 1999; Heilman and Kaiser, 2002; Lane, 2015; Tilley, 1997; Thananithichot, 2011). These schools of thought have their own shortcomings, ranging from the non-consideration of historical factors, economic factors and power dynamics that give rise to ethnic and religious conflicts around the world.

The above schools of thought have been subject of debate as scholars appear to disagree on the formation of ethnic identities and whether indeed there is anything called “ethnic conflict”, and by extension, “religious conflict”. Whilst scholarly debate over these schools of thought rages on, the empirical fact is that there are conflicts that manifests in, and are characterised by, confrontations between one ethnic group against another, or one religious group against another. Such conflicts have often been termed “ethnic” or “religious” based on this characteristic.

The above schools of thought may not sufficiently explain the root causes of ethnic or religious conflicts, especially within the African context. According to McNamee (2012: np) intra-state ethnic and religious conflict in post-colonial Africa is the product of “the weak social cohesion”, failure of political organization and distribution of resources. Fearon and Laitin (2013:75) argue that “the root cause of most of the [post-Cold War] conflicts has been ethnic and religious antagonisms”. Failure to prevent ethnic and religious diversity from mutating into conflict has been the undoing of the typical post-colonial African state, leading to loss of lives,
infrastructure destruction, human suffering, retarded economic development and increased debt levels (Steyn, 2007; Kah, 2012; Maitre, 2009).

Authors such as El-Khawas and Ndumbe (2014) and Badru (2010) hold primordialist views. They maintain that ethnicity and religion constitute an integral part of the structure of all societies in Africa. However, some scholars within the disciplines of anthropology and philosophy have tended to argue over the reality of ethnic and religious conflicts from an ontological perspective. Fenton (2003:2) notes that the debate has often been on whether ethnicity is “socially constructed” or it is “profound and real”.

On whether ethnicity and religion are by themselves the real causes of conflict in Africa, or they are simply drivers or instigators of conflict, the common argument is that these are used, abused, mobilized and manipulated by political elites in pursuit of their narrow parochial and sectoral interests. In light of this conundrum, Bujra (2002:18) argues that ethnicity and religious conflicts are often triggered by “elite manipulation of grievances and use of sectarian ideologies for political mobilization purposes”. He prefers to calls this “base manipulation” (Bujra, 2002:27). He hails from the instrumentalist school. As Markakis (1999) puts it, such conflicts are thus resultantly labelled “ethnic conflicts” or “religious conflicts”. Aaapengnuo (2010) agrees with Bujra (2002) and Markakis (1999). In his study, the author examines ethnic conflicts in Africa, using the case study of the post-election violence in Kenya in December 2007, and the ethnic genocide in Rwanda experienced in 1994, as well as ethnic clashes in Ghana. Aaapengnuo (2010) concludes that African conflicts are misdiagnosed. He posits that:

“There is a perception that Africa is trapped in a never-ending cycle of ethnic conflict…Infact, ethnicity is typically not the driving force of African conflicts but a lever used by politicians to mobilize supporters in pursuit of power, wealth and resources…it is the politicization of ethnicity and not ethnicity per se that stokes the attitude of perceived injustice, lack of recognition, and exclusion that are the source of conflict…People do not kill each other because of ethnic differences, they kill each other when these differences are promoted as the barrier to achievement and opportunity” Aaapengnuo (2010:13-14).

In line with Aaapengnuo (2010), Bujra (2002) and Markakis (1999); Basedau et al (2014:4) also argues that ethno-religious conflicts erupt due to “the existence of institutions that discriminate against particular religious communities risk conflicts” since “political and religious entrepreneurs can capitalize on such grievances which will escalate conflicts.” In
addition, if religions are forced on other groups of the society as dominant and/or superior, or religious minorities are offended, marginalized or deprived of certain rights, then it can resultantly sow the seeds of conflict and can result in inter-religious or theological conflicts.

In his comparative study on ethnic conflicts in post-colonial Africa in the DRC, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda and Burundi; wherein he examined the dynamics and effects of ethnicity on the afore-mentioned states, Badru (2010:167) stresses that “political instability cannot be blamed solely on ethnicity” adding that many factors result in political mobilization by leaders which trigger conflict. These factors are misgovernance, corrupt tendencies by leaders, and mismanagement of public institutions and public resources, which all “intensify bad blood amongst competing ethnic groups with dire consequences” Badru (2010:167). Considering that the case studies focused on by Badru (2010) are amongst the hotbeds of protracted intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts, it is worthwhile to note the significant influence of the ethnicity factor in intra-state conflicts. This has been the case in CAR, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan and other countries.

Thus it should be stated that ethnic and religious conflicts are mostly witnessed when the existing ethno-religious cleavages are tempered with politically, socially or economically. The African conflict narrative has largely been inclined towards ethnic conflicts, although some conflicts do have a religious component.

As argued by a considerable number of scholars, most ethno-religious conflicts emerge when a particular ethnic group or religious group is unfairly treated or disfavoured against others, cases of political misrepresentation and bias in national governance structures; persecution of a particular ethnic or religious group; attempted unfair imposition of religious, ethnic or linguistic practices upon a selected group against its will; and exclusion of certain ethnic or religious groups from benefiting from national resources, public services and/or development outcomes; alienation of fundamental human rights based on a group ethnic or religious affiliation; and miscarriage of justice against a particular religious or ethnic group (Aapengnuo, 2010; Badru, 2010; El-Khawas and Ndumbe, 2014; Festus, 2015; Fox, 2013; Singh, 2000; Stareike, 2013; Thompson, 2012). Therefore, the reasoning is that religious and ethnic diversity are not a source of conflict per se. Rather, there are factors behind such conflicts that ultimately result in these conflicts manifesting in religious and ethnic forms or dimensions.
Most of these intra-state conflicts in post-colonial Africa that are either ethnic or religious in nature have proven to be insoluble and interminable. Mazrui (2010) observes that “[w]hile the worst conflicts in Arab Africa are at least partly religious, the worst conflicts in black Africa are ethnic (so-called ‘tribal’ conflicts)”. Perhaps, this attests to Samuel Huntington’s (1992) thesis on “the Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order” in which he argued that in the post-Cold War era, “the most pervasive and dangerous conflicts will be between people belonging to different cultural identities”. In Chiozza (2002:252), the author adds that “fault line [ethno-religious] conflicts are interminable…[and] they tend to be vicious and bloody, since fundamental issues of identity are at stake.” This has been the case if one looks at the past and on-going conflicts in countries such as DRC, Rwanda, Somalia, Ethiopia, Mali, Sudan, Chad, CAR, among others.

Kamaara (2010:126) attests that ethnicity is “the single major threat to national identity in Africa resulting in ethnic violence”. Coupled with the religious factor, ethno-religious conflicts have ravaged the continent since independence in the 1960s and 1970s resulted in a lot of instability. Perhaps, this has been due to the fact that Africa is regarded as “the most religious country” and also records the highest religious and ethnic diversity (Møller, 2006:6). In most of these cases, these conflicts have culminated into demands for secession. This happened in the Ethiopian/Eritrean Conflict which led to the secession of Eritrea in 1993, and then recently in the Sudanese Conflict which led to the secession of South Sudan in July 2011.

Notwithstanding the various perspectives with regards to ethnicity, the reality of the social world is that societies are not homogenous or unstratified. In the book On the Fault Lines: Managing Tensions and Divisions within Societies, Herbst el al (eds., 2012) underscore the fact that societies all over the world are characterized by divisions which they refer to as “fault lines”. These divisions, which according to the authors are visible and evident along among other fissures, ethnic and religious lines; are more hidden and can explode often times without warning. This is very serious in Africa given the continent’s political sociology and theology.

Clearly, the proliferation of secessionist movements across Africa seem to point to the reasoning that if there appears to be failure to ensure peaceful co-existence and compatibility between and among different ethnic and religious groups within a state, then ethno-religious conflicts can be resolved through secession.
2.3 Why Demand for Secession?

The Heidelberg Conflict Barometer (2015) made revelations that by the year 2015, there were 48 secessionist conflicts the world over. Of the 48 secessionist conflicts across the globe, four were “highly violent, 21 low violent and 23 non-violent cases” (Heidelberg Conflict Barometer, 2015:33). With reference to Sub-Saharan African, the report notes:

“In Sub-Saharan Africa, eight conflicts were fought over a territory’s secession from a state. Nigeria and Senegal both saw the escalation of conflicts to a violent level. In Nigeria, the Igbo-based Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra demanded an independent state of Biafra in the oil rich Niger delta region since 1967. The Diola-based Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance demanded independence for Senegal’s Casamance region. The Oromo Liberation Front continued its violent struggle for the secession of the Oromiya region in Ethiopia…[T]wo conflicts over the secession of the Kenyan coast and the Tanzanian island of Zanzibar [together with the secessionist conflict in Angola’s enclave Cabinda] de-escalated to a non-violent level. No settlements were reached in the disputes between the self-declared government of Somaliland and the Government of Somalia as well as in Cameroon’s Bakassi region…” (Heidelberg Conflict Barometer, 2015:33).

Similarly, Siroky (2009:14) attests that since the early 19th century, “there have been roughly 70 de facto and de jure independent secessionist states” adding that secessionism is now a “world-wide phenomenon”. Keller (2011) also agrees, particularly with reference to African secessionist movements. The author points out that Africa is home to several secessionist movements demanding independence from their host governments as shown on Table 1 below.
## Table 2.1: Main Active Secessionist Movements in Africa as at February 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Secession Movement(s)</th>
<th>Dominant Ethnic/Religious Group(s) and Location</th>
<th>Secession State Intended to be formed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Movement for the Autonomy of Kabyle (MAK)</td>
<td>Kabyles, in Northern Algeria</td>
<td>State of Kabyle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC)</td>
<td>Cabindans, in an exclave in Northern Angola</td>
<td>Republic of Cabinda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Bakassi Movement for Self Determination (BAMOSD)</td>
<td>Calabars in Eastern Cameroon</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Bakassi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>Anjouan People’s Movement (APM)</td>
<td>Anjouan in Northern Comoros</td>
<td>Anjouan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>Mai Mai Kata Katanga Movement</td>
<td>Luba in Katanga, DRC</td>
<td>State of Katanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>• Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)</td>
<td>• Oromia in Central and Northern Ethiopia</td>
<td>• State of Oromia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)</td>
<td>• Ethnic Somali and Muslims in Eastern Ethiopia</td>
<td>• State of Ogaden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Movement for the Self-Determination of Bioko Island</td>
<td>Bubi in Bioko Island, Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Bioko Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Mombasa Republic Council (MRC)</td>
<td>Mainly Kiswahili Muslims and Christians</td>
<td>Mombasa Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA)</td>
<td>Tuaregs, Songhai, Fula and Arabs in Northern Mali</td>
<td>Azawad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Sahrawi People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)</td>
<td>Sahrawi in Western Sahrawi</td>
<td>Western Sahrawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Caprivii Liberation Army</td>
<td>Lozi People in Caprivii in the Eastern tip of Namibia</td>
<td>Free State of Caprivii Strip/Itenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)</td>
<td>Igbo in South-Eastern Nigeria</td>
<td>Sovereign State of Biafra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MDFC)</td>
<td>Diola in Southern Senegal</td>
<td>Casamance Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Somailand Armed Forces (SAF)</td>
<td>Somali and Islam in Northern Somalia the Coast of the Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>Republic of Somailand-Somaliland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Civic United Front (CUF)</td>
<td>Swahili in Eastern Tanzania (island in Indian Ocean)</td>
<td>Zanzibar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Barotspe Patriotic Front (BPF)</td>
<td>Lozi in Western Zambia</td>
<td>Barotseland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Mthwakazi Liberation Front (MLF)</td>
<td>Ndebele in Southern Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Mthwakazi Free State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation based on information sourced from Peace Research Institute Oslo Database, 2008; Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset, 2016; Heidelberg Conflict Barometer, 2015; Dersso, 2012; Minja, 2013).

As shown on Table 2.1 above, there are several active and not-so-active secessionist movements across the continent. Whilst their formation, modus operandi, strength and extent of recognition differs, the common denominator across all the secessionist movements is that they are fighting against, perceived or real, marginalization and injustices waged by the...
incumbent governments. These secessionist movements share an almost similar history of formation and origins, as well as their relations with the central government, reliance on support from foreign-based institutions and individuals, with the majority having at one point in time declared a government in exile.

In Algeria, the MAK has been pushing for secession of the Northern Algerian province of Kabyle to establish the State of Kabyle since independence in 1962. The Kabyle, who account for 10 percent of the Algerian population and around two-thirds of Algerians that identify themselves as Berbers or Amazigh, have a history of resisting assimilation into the Arab identity as was the case with other tribes in Algeria during the period of Islamic conquest and conversion between 642 and 711. With French colonization from the 19th century, the Kabyle were subjected to central rule and in 1962 when the country attained independence, the new government led by President Ahmed Ben Bella proclaimed that Algeria was Arabic and adopted policies that “forbade the use of the Berber language in the media, schools, and government offices and banned names for children” whilst “Berber leaders were arrested and killed” which created “[a] united Algeria divided” (Ahmed and Martin, 2013: np).

Since independence, there have been secession protests and insurgency, with remarkable ones being the Berber Spring of 1980, the 1982 rebellions and the Black Spring of 2001. The government strengthened Arabization policies to “Arabize” the Berber community whilst continuing to suppress the secessionist movement through violent crackdown, torture, massacres and arrests. With a Provisional Government of Kabyle in exile proclaimed in 2010 in Paris, France, the Kabyle continue to push for regional autonomy and ultimate secession.

In Angola, the FLEC has been demanding secession of the Cabinda Province of Angola through the establishment of the Republic of Cabinda whose independence was proclaimed in 1975 when Angola attained its independence from Portugal. However, Cabinda was annexed to be under one central Government of Angola in January 1975 just before the country’s independence and this was backed by the OAU. Although the main group of FLEC signed a ceasefire agreement with the government (the Cabinda Peace Accord) in August 2006, some of the movement’s forces are still actively fighting for secession (Allix, 2010).

Most of the movements, thus, share notable similarities. In almost all the above cases of secessionist movements, the OAU, and later AU, have not offered any form of support. Instead,
it has maintained its commitment to unity and territorial integrity of member states. The AU’s stance appear caught up in a dilemma between two seemingly contradictory norms of international law, that is, the right to self-determination and the obligation to respect the territorial integrity of its member states. In the case of Biafra, the AU rejected its call for secession from Nigeria in 1967 on the grounds of preserving the “territorial integrity of Nigeria” (OAU, 1967).

However, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in Morocco which has been treated differently by the African Union. Morocco withdrew from the OAU after the continental organization recognized Western Sahara and admitted it into the OAU in November 1984. However, through the majority votes of AU member states, Morocco was admitted back into the AU in 2017. The position of the AU to recognize SADR was that it had been included on the list of territories classified under Article 73 of the UN related to the Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960 on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. On the contrary, Eritrea and South Sudan’s calls for secession have been granted on the basis of their respective right to self-determination. These may be identified as possible contradictions. However, a closer analysis of the complexity of the cases, background and contexts present different perspectives as exposed later in sections below.

In the overall, the prevalence of secessionism on the continent has been explained differently by scholars in an attempt to understand the phenomenon. Allen Buchanan’s works, *Toward a Theory of Secession* (1991), *Theories of Secession* (1997), and *Federalism, Secession and the Morality of Inclusion* (1995) are very instructive and insightful in search of the drivers of secession and have been a point of reference for various scholars on the subject (see Copp, 1998; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Lehning, 1998; Radan, 2000; Shorten, 2014; Webb, 2006; Wellman, 2005).

### 2.4 Theories of Secession

Buchanan (1997) adopts a human rights approach and normative theoretical perspective in explaining motivations for secession. The author suggests two main types of theories to explain the right to secession, that is, the Primary Right Theories and Remedial Right Only Theories. These are used here in an attempt to identify and explain the causes of secession.
2.4.1 Primary Right Theories

Primary Right Theories, according to Buchanan (1997:35), suggest that “certain groups can have a (general) right to secede in the absence of any injustice.” Thus regardless of having experienced any injustices in the past, groups are still entitled to general rights to demand for secession. The essence of secession, in this regard, is to advance a right even if a state is effectively governing or legitimately carrying out its state functions to the satisfaction of the generality of its citizens.

Buchanan (1997) classified Primary Right Theories into two main groups of theories, namely, Ascriptive Group Theories and Associative Group Theories. Ascriptive Group Theories aver that groups, defined by ascriptive characteristics, have a right to secede even without having faced any previous injustices (Buchanan, 1997). In this respect, ascriptive characteristics are distinct group characteristics that are non-political which include shared culture, history, language, and tradition, among others. As Buchanan (1997:38) puts it, “certain non-political characteristics of groups…ground the group’s right to an independent political association.” The right stems from the right of political association, and the secession right in this regard therefore extends to the group the right to form a political unit.

In his work, The Parade of Sovereignty: Testing Theories of Secession in the Soviet Setting, Hale (2000) examines why some regions with distinctive ethnic groups demand secession while others are contented with co-existing within similar conditions. Hale (2000)’s conclusion is in agreement with Buchanan’s inference that ethnic distinctiveness propels regions to call for secession as groups consider themselves distinct from the rest of the country.

Conversely, Associative Group Theories “do not require that a group have any ascriptive characteristic in common such as ethnicity or an encompassing culture, even as a necessary condition for having a right to secede” (Buchanan, 1997:38). According to the author, a group of people have the right to make a voluntary decision to form an independent state of their choice. In other words, homogeneity is neither a requirement nor a necessity for a group to advance secessionist demands. Instead, voluntary wish and desire matters. This theory is in line with McGee (1994)’s libertarian position on session. In response to the question when is
secession justified, McGee (1994:2) retorts that “[t]here is no legitimate reason for preventing people from having a government of their choice, even if their choice is a poor one.” The essentiality of his argument is that the people’s will will be the sole determinant of secession regardless of the existence (or non-existence) of a good cause. In other words, the people’s will suffices as a sufficient justification for secession.

Associative Group Theories are also referred to as Plebiscitary Theory which declares that the right to secede is obtainable when the majority of people in a specific territory democratically consent to secede by a “substantial majority” (Buchanan, 1997). Thus Associative Group Theories and Plebiscitary Theory are essentially about majoritarianism which is the hallmark of liberty and democratic principles that affirm the right of individuals to be masters of their own destiny. It is on the legitimate basis of the Associative Group Theories and Plebiscitary Theory that secession referendums, such as that of South Sudan in 2011, are conducted to establish whether a state should secede or not.

Primary Right Theories, therefore, is the pillar upon which the arguments for self-determination, sovereignty and nationalism rest on. As Bereketeab (2012:2) puts it, self-determination “centres on the free will of a people who are legally as well as politically entitled to decide their destiny.” Scholars in International Law (see Anderson, 2013; Koch and Colin, 2008; Etzioni, 1993; Copp, 1998; Frankel, 1992; Brilmayer, 1991) would invoke the United Nations Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 which declared that “[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”, and the United Nations Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970 which provides for “the promotion of self-determination of peoples and establishment of a sovereign and independent state…”. The same self-determination rights are enshrined in Article 1 of the UN Charter of 1945 and Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993. However, as Koch and Colin (2008) hint, the pursuance of the principle of self-determination and sovereignty would infringe the territorial integrity of states from which secession is sought, yet these are all sacrosanct principles of international law. The principle of territorial integrity respects and values state borders.

In principle, self-determination should be pursued to achieve and strengthen justice via self-governance (Etzioni, 1993). However, Buchanan and other proponents of Primary Right Theories, appear to advocate for self-determination as an end in itself, not as a means to an end.
This makes Remedial Rights Only Theories less attractive than Primary Right Theories in justifying secession. Labuschagne (2008:78) even warns: “self-determination should be handled with caution, because it is a gravitational pull that potentially fragments national states and creates instability in the international order.” The author’s assertion is certainly appreciative of the danger of fragmentation that may be a consequence of unbridled and irrepressible secessionism triggered by the mere demand for self-determination. Indeed, in Africa this can be viewed as unnecessary, destructive and non-progressive, especially if viewed from the perspective of African unity, integration and nation-building.

2.4.2 Remedial Right Only Theories

Remedial Right Only Theories postulate that “a group has a general right to secede if and only if it has suffered certain injustices, for which secession is the appropriate remedy of last resort” (Buchanan, 1997:34-35). In analysis, two key salient features of the Remedial Right Only Theories emerge. Firstly, it is the fact that secession can only be pursued as a remedy for past injustices. The common injustices identified by many scholars to be very prevalent in the post-colonial African state can be grouped into social, religious, cultural, political and racial injustices. Secondly, that secession has to be demanded only if it is an appropriate remedy of last resort. The immediate implication of Buchanan’s submission is that other options have to be exhausted prior invocation of the secession strategy.

Seymour (2007) concurs with Buchanan’s argument that nations do not have a general primary right to secede. Instead, the author further argues that what states possess are special rights do secede through a negotiation process only to restore injustices meted against them in the past or present. On the specific forms of injustices that warrant recourse through secession, Seymour (2007) also agrees with Buchanan that only three kinds of injustices justify secession, namely human rights violations, unjust annexation of territories, and systematic violations of previous agreements of self-governments. Clearly then, to Seymour and Buchanan, secession can only be resorted to as a remedy to correct and address past injustices. True to Seymour (2007) and Buchanan (1997), a closer analysis of the history and events before, during and after most cases of secession experienced so far in Africa and beyond such as India and Pakistan (1948), Norway-Sweden (1905), Croatia-Slovenia (1991), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992), and
Yugoslavia-Kosovo (1999), Indonesia-East Timor (2002), among others were prompted and precipitated by grievances located within the three injustices identified by the authors.

Inconsistent with Buchanan (1997)’s theoretical propositions, Costa (2003) suggests three a classification approach in the categorization of secession theories. The author posits that secession theories should be classified into three classes, *viz*, ‘National Determination Theories’, ‘Choice Theories’, and ‘Remedial Right Theories’ (Costa, 2003:64). According to the author, National Determination Theories assumes that territories can demand secession to fulfil their nationalist objectives; Remedial Right Theories require just causes as a basis for secession, whilst Choice Theories have the proposition that territories can only push for secession under certain conditions (Costa, 2003).

With respect to National Determination Theories, it is imperative to note that the right of statehood or nationhood which is pursued by secessionist groups through remedial right theories explanations secession can be very difficult to consider as a strict group right given the fact that secessionist movements often comprise groups of people from a defined territory who may be of different and varied ethnicities, cultures, religions and with linguistic diversities. This may present post-secessionist animosities resulting in further demands for secession. The case of secession of India-Pakistan in 1948 and the further disintegration of Pakistan into Bangladesh in 1971 is a typical case in point. Perhaps, this is why Buchanan (1999), cited in Costa (2003:66), cautioned that Remedial Rights Only Theories [or Just Cause Theories] may “allow limitless political fragmentation” where “secessions within secessions” are experienced consequently resulting in “anarchy and violence”.

Contrary to the arguments that secession ought to be remedial by motivation, there are scholars such as Patten (2002) who adopt a liberal route in explaining secession causation. The author cites Gauthier (1994), arguing that people are entitled to rights “to determine democratically [their] own political status, so long as any change is peaceful and orderly, consistent with standard liberal rights, and does not involve any unjust taking of territory or unfair terms of separation.” This is along the same reasoning with the plebiscitary rights to secession posited by Buchanan. However, Pattern (2002) was quick to acknowledge that the pursuant of such democratic right might be a recipe for disaster in as far as peace, stability and unity is concerned. The author observes that it may result in the uncontrolled proliferation of secessionism which can be destructive.
In an attempt to examine whether groups have liberal rights to secede from liberal states, Webb (2006) adds his own classification of secession theories. To the author, the right to secede is classified into Nationalist Theories and Just Cause Theories. Nationalist Theories grants secession rights to groups that qualify as nations whilst Just Cause Theories grants secession rights to groups that have been or are victims of specific injustices (Webb, 2006). This classification is more or less similar to propositions by Buchanan (1997) and Costa (2003).

Various theories have been posited by different scholars in a bid to explain secession from a human rights perspective and there have been different reactions to their possible merits and demerits. Copp (1998) offers a possibly balanced and unquestionably constructive approach in the evaluation of such secession theories. He notes that in assessing the strengths and weakness of the theories of secession, the best theory “would combine the deontological, procedural and consequentialist aspects – that is, the core principles, the procedures, and considerations about the potential results – of all of them” (Copp, 1998:66). Certainly, such an approach will be multi-dimensional and comprehensive enough to identify the merits and demerits of the theories.

### 2.5 Causes of Secession

The above theories partly explain the causes of secession from a normative rights perspective. These have assisted to comprehend and appreciate the fundamental rights and moral justifications for secession. There appears to be a preponderance of opinion and evidence amongst scholars that the majority of post-colonial African states have been characterized by misgovernance, redistributive injustices, social and political discrimination on ethничal or religious grounds, atrocities targeted at particular ethnicities, human rights violations, disempowerment of selected social or political groups, partisanship or favouritism in government appointments which favours certain groups of citizens, among others (see Bereketeab, 2015; Check, 2008; Ewusi et al, 2014; Hatchard, 2014; Mbao, 2002; Sungi, 2015; Waziri, 2013; Zenker, 2015). From here, it may be easy to trace some of the causal factors behind secessionism in post-colonial Africa.
2.5.1 Colonial Legacy of arbitrary partition of Africa

A prominent feature of the discussions and literature on the root causes of secession in Africa has always been the issue of colonial borders in Africa. This has been a recurrent theme in most secession literature (see Ahmad, 2013; Ahmed, 2015; Bamfo, 2012; Bereketeab, 2014; Bujra, 2002; Keller, 2007; Ndlovhu-Gatsheni and Mhlanga, 2013; Oyeniyi, 2011; Onuoha, 2012; Roethke, 2011). The political and geographical partitioning of the continent into fifty states at the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885 by the 14 European countries cannot be ignored in discussions around the secession discourse in Africa.

The cultural, linguistic and ethnical boundaries that existed in Africa then, which Bamfo (2012:38) terms the “demographic, ethnographic and topographic imperatives” were completely disregarded at Berlin. This left most African communities naturally facing future challenges of intra-state conflicts emanating from ethnic, religious and political identity crisis and clashes. The fact that no attention was directed towards understanding of the African cultural context by colonial map-makers is evident in a remark made by Lord Salisbury, head of the British delegation at the Berlin Conference, in an interview with the London Times on 07 August 1890, as cited by the African Union (2013:13):

“We [the British and the French] have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s foot ever trod: we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediments that we never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes were.”

The implications of Berlin will never be under-estimated in light of the post-colonial African question on stability. Today, as Keller (2007) stated, Africa now comprise “more than 54 ethnically and linguistically diverse nation-states, some of them deeply divided.” The author cites examples of countries such as Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, South Africa, and DRC as clear cases of countries with multi-cultural diversity and multi-ethnicity. Adebajo (2010:8) prefers to call this “the curse of Berlin” or the “Bismarckian curse”. Conflict that are ethnic or religious in nature have been prevalent after the de-colonization of Africa and it appears the continent is struggling to remain intact since Berlin. Ikome (2012:1) also observed, “[s]ignificantly, many intra-state conflicts in Africa have been sparked by the
forceful fusion of incompatible national groups into one state by the imposition of artificial boundaries by the colonial powers.”

Scholars such as Spears (2004) tend to accept the above argument but are quick to argue that the probabilities and possibilities of peaceful co-existence in post-colonial Africa were attainable. The author contends that it would have been possible to engage in viable state or nation-building since de-colonization by “identifying pre-colonial entities and rebuilding states on top of them”. Likewise, Ongáyo (2008)’s argument, citing Annan (2008), expostulates the African border thesis, and maintains that the adoption of centralized political and economic governance systems to force national unity in most post-colonial states in Africa, and retention of colonial legislations and institutions for the suppression of pluralism are the root cause of African conflicts.

Although the colonial legacy of imposed boundaries is very popular factor to have generated secession movements, Thomson (2012) offers a counter-argument. Thomson (2012) examines the local government system in Gambia with a view to establish how colonial legacies have shaped national policies. Focusing on the constitution-making process in a village community with a population of 2,500 people, limited infrastructure, and multi-ethnic group comprising Mandinka, Fony, Jola and Karon whilst 90 percent of the village are Muslims and 10 percent being Christians; Thomson (2012) found that there was ethnic and religious tolerance in the Gambian village despite the diversity of ethnicity and opinions. His study concludes that “colonial legacies have actually helped to create multi-ethnic communities that explicitly value and protect [ethnic and religious] diversity” (Thomson, 2012:287).

On whether African countries should tolerate secession so as to allow for the re-drawing of the colonially-imposed state boundaries, Ramutsindela (1999) offers a regional integration approach and dismisses secession. The author notes:

“Perhaps, the question for Africa is not whether or not to draw new boundaries but how to transcend the limitations imposed by colonial boundaries...the new map should be left to ‘evolve’ from the (possible) success of regional integration” (Ramutsindela, 1999:195)
Such an approach may appear viable and pragmatic, but a cursory look at regional integration schemes in Africa such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), among others, reveals that even when African countries integrate themselves into regional groupings, they still maintain their borders and are very protective of their frontiers. Thus the “regional maps” suggested by Ramutsindela (1999) may take long to address the issue of internal disharmony at national levels.

2.5.2 Politics of Economic and Political Exclusion

According to Siroky (2009), secessionist movements are motivated by economic discrimination, unequal access to opportunities by all national groups, political under-representation in national governance structures, inequalities in terms of development of regions, and ineffective functioning of federal or devolved structures. The author’s conclusion is based on a study of 60 secessionist states in the world that were formed prior and after the World War II. Trzcińska (2004) agrees that political and economic factors are paramount in motivating secession. With specific reference to post-colonial African states, Keller (2007:25) observes that in post-independence Africa, “ethnically-based competition over scarce resources…occurred immediately almost everywhere.” It may not be surprising that most of these conflicts later culminated into secessionist movements.

Indeed economic grievances matter in provoking secessionist demands. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) examine the political economy of secession. They argue that the sense of political identity of secessionist movements is designed to support perceived economic advantage. Using a case study of Scotland and Britain, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) assert that “at times natural resources make contiguous parts of a national population come to imagine itself as a political community” just as Scotland harbour secession sentiments as they would see themselves benefiting more from their oil endowments over a lesser population than having the same benefits spread across a huge British population.

The findings of Collier and Hoeffler (2002) are consistent with Keller (2007). In his study on secessionist movements in Africa, Keller (2007) avers that “secession movements are more
likely in countries where abundant natural resources are concentrated in certain regions.” This assist to explain the general fact that groups of people confronts their governments when they feel that they are not fully and fairly benefiting from the exploitation of natural resources within their own locality.

Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Keller (2007)’s conclusions may then, to a considerable degree and extent, explain secessionist movements such as the Movement for the Emancipation for the Niger Delta (MEND) which has been fighting for the establishment of the Niger Delta Republic is the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea in Southern Nigeria, or FLEC which is demanding secession and establishment of an independent Republic of Cabinda in the oil-rich enclave endowed with two huge oil fields in Malonga North and Malonga West, and additional four oil fields that are off-shore (that is, Wamba, Takula, Numbi and Vuko) in Northern Angola. However, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Keller (2007)’s conclusions may not sufficiently explain several secessionist movements in Africa by groups which inhabit areas without any substantial natural resource endowments such as the case of Anjouan in Comoros, Biafra in Nigeria, Casamance in Senegal, Zanzibar in Tanzania, and Mthwakazi in Zimbabwe, among others.

However, the findings of Hale (2000)’s study on the propensity of groups to secede appear to differ slightly from Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Keller (2007). He argues that regional wealth is one of the significant factors in triggering secession. Hale (2000), using the secession of the 15 independent states that were formerly part of the Soviet Union in 1991, concludes that poor regions are likely to secede than richer ones since richer regions have more to lose after state rapture as they benefit more in terms of economic activity and trade.

When it comes to the distribution of economic resources across the society, exclusion on the basis of ethnicity or religion often appear which arouse demands for secession by the discriminated groups. As Kalu (2000:55) observes in his study on ethnicity and political economy of Africa, “[e]thnicity, without political and scarce economic resources, is atavistic and latent in nature”, and further maintains that ethnicity “comes alive as a basis for a politicized search for distribution of scarce resources.” Thus unequal and unfair access to national resources by some ethnic and religious groups can infuriate targeted groups to demand secession especially if the exclusion and discrimination is systematic and protracted.
Bujra (2002) conducted a study on African conflicts. His focus was on examining the causes of African conflicts, their political and social environment. The author concluded that competition for the control of economic resources is the key driving force of African conflicts. Oyeniyi (2011) agrees and considers this as the greatest cause of most conflicts in post-colonial Africa. He asserts that “nearly all tribal or ethnic conflicts are rooted in competition between individuals, for the scarce resources of wealth, state and power” Oyeniyi (2011:3). As a solution, Bujra (2002) stressed that post-colonial African governments need to embrace national building through democratic governance based on equality and equity, whilst educational systems should be utilized to foster national identity, unity, tolerance and peace, and thereby reduce the likelihood ethnic conflicts. Just as Bujra (2002)’s suggested, Oyeniyi (2011) concluded that this can solved through establishing representative systems of governments that protect minority rights.

In light of the politics of economic exclusion as a causal factor behind secession, Buchanan (1995) identifies equitable redistribution as a solution. In his study on federalism, secession and morality of inclusion, the author examines the possible measures to avoid secession. He argues that a redistributive state “whose fundamental functions include redistribution of wealth from the better off to the worse off citizens” (Buchanan, 1995:57). However, he warns that this redistribution process should not be discriminatory, or else it would defy the essence of redistributive social justice. Indeed broad-based redistribution that values democratic principles of equity, equality and inclusivity may reduce the likelihood of secession. As Keller (2007:4-5) notes, all this depends on the will of political leaders to implement such policies decisions that “assuage fears and distrust among aggrieved groups and reduce conditions that give rise to culturally-based grievances.” From the authors, the argument is that striking such a balance will assist in keeping communities intact.

### 2.5.3 Ethno-Religious Suppression and/or Discrimination

Some scholars have maintained that ethnic suppression and discrimination of ethnic or religious minorities may provoke groups to demand secession. Buchanan (1991) calls this the “soft paternalist argument.” This has been the case in some countries in Africa. As the United Nations Secretary General Report on Africa (UN, 1999), as cited in Bujra (2002), states, most post-colonial states in Africa failed to engage in state-building yet they were faced with the
challenge of governing multi-ethnic societies emerging from colonialism. Instead, as the Report further adds, post-colonial states established highly centralized systems of governance that suppressed pluralism and failed to cater for competing communities. As Oyeniyi (2011) argues, when particular ethnic minorities rights are not respected and protected within a state, it stokes fires of secession. The author avers that “[c]ommunities will [seek] independence and self-determination when they consider that their value systems are no longer taken sufficiently into account by the society in which they have formed a part and the elites which ruled it” (Oyeniyi, 2011:5). To deter secessionism in such circumstances, Kwaja (2011), based on the findings of a study on inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts in Nigeria, suggests the need for strengthening security institutions, prioritize minority rights protection, and embark on community-based peacebuilding initiatives.

This was argued to be one of the causes of the secession of South Sudan from Sudan. The failure of Sudan to exercise ethno-religious tolerance and non-discrimination after the attainment of independence from the British in 1956 to a certain extent provoked secession demands. Bamfo (2012) cites Deng (2006) and Barbour (1964)’s arguments that the development between the North and the South in Sudan before secession was very unequal. The authors maintain that the North, which was dominated by Muslim Arabs in Khartoum, discriminated their Southern citizens which were predominantly African Negroid people, and the South was characterised by “high gross reproduction and death rates, high infant mortality rates, poor diet, medical services and low level of education” (Bamfo, 2012:40). This worsened ethnic hostility, which was long stocked by the British colonial administration policies that disfavoured the South.

Onuoha (2013) examines the causes, trends and patterns of ethnic and religious conflicts in West Africa, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan, Chad, DRC and Great Lakes Region, Burundi, Rwanda, and Kenya since independence. The author contends that post-colonial African states were confronted with ethno-religious conflicts. Instead of instituting good governance that would promote national integration and de-ethnicization of national identity, post-colonial African governments sustained the inherited colonial system of governance that was characterised by skewed power structures which favoured certain ethnic and religious group in terms of political representation and resource allocation (Onuoha, 2013). This results in social and political frustration thereby forcing victimized groups to push for self-determination and secession as strategy to rescue themselves. Whitehead (2013) agrees to this. In the argument
on “separatism anxiety”, the author attests that most post-colonial governments in Africa such as Nigeria, Kenya, and Tanzania; are highly centralized which leave peripheral societies/communities less developed which generate secessionist tendencies. Whitehead (2013)’s conclusions may be well-grounded, especially if one considers that with genuine federalism in Nigeria, MEND or Biafra secessionist claims may have been averted whilst perhaps, the secessionist forces pursuing the establishment of an independent Mombasa Republic Council (MRC) in Kenya would have been avoided if the devolution translated to equal and equitable development counties spread across all parts of the country.

In his analysis of Nigerian ethno-religious conflicts, Onuoha (2013) notes that Nigeria, which consist of the Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups and predominantly Muslims in the North, with Igbo and Yoruba ethnic groups with predominantly Christians in the South; has been riddled with ethno-religious conflicts in its history. The author’s study reveals that over 20 major ethno-religious conflicts occurred between 1980 and 2010 in the form of religious riots in Kano, Bulunkutu, Maidurguri, Jimeta, Yola, Gombe, Ibadan, Kafanchan, Kaduna, Bauchi, and Borno. He argues that “Muslim perception that their religions values are threatened by Christians or Muslim insistence on the adoption of Muslim religious values by everyone” nationally has been the cause of ethno-religious conflict in the country although in some cases these have been triggered by political grievances relating to misallocation of public resources, poor service delivery and misgovernance (Onuoha, 2013:8-9).

The findings by Onuoha (2013) are similar to those by Englebert (2013). Englebert (2013) empirically reviews secessionist conflicts in Sub-Saharan African countries of Angola, Comoros, DRC, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, and Sudan. One of the key findings of his study was that secession in Africa has been a result of a situation where the state has been defined in ethnic, religious, and linguistic terms in a manner that creates quasi-governmental ownership by one or few groups at the exclusion of others which has led elites of excluded groups to seek secession (Englebert, 2013). He cites an example of the Ethiopian state which is ‘largely owned’ by a minority of the Amhara and the Tigrinya whilst the adoption of the Orthodox Christianity as state religion made it even harder for the majority Muslim Ogadenis and Eritreans which resulted in secession movement, and successful secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993 (Englebert, 2013:151).
The causes of, and justification for, secession are therefore varied. They are largely social, political, economic and legal. This has managed to provide the foundational basis for debate on whether secession should be embraced as a strategy to resolve conflicts or conflict management practitioners should search for more viable alternatives.

2.6 Debating Secession: Arguments for and Against

A review of literature on secession would reveal marked divisions between and among authors with some expressing hidden or concealed favour or disfavour of the concept and practice of secession. Hence, it is not very uncommon to find definition terms used with reference to secession being pejorative, disparaging and deprecatory whilst others are adulatory and commendatory. Explanatory phrases and nouns such as “dismemberment”, “division”, “slicing off”, “rapture”, “dissolution”, “dissociation”, “detachment”, “multiplication of states”, “state breaking”, “disconnection”, “amalgamation”, “divorce”, “territorial separation”, “disunion”, “severance”, among an assortment of phrases have been used to describe secession.

Undoubtedly, the above clearly shows that there has been, and there is still, a fierce and polarized debate with regard to the adoption of secessionism as a strategy to resolve intra-state ethno-religious conflicts in Africa between proponents of secession (such as Robert Dahl, 1971; Kaufmann, 1996; Beran, 1998; Walzer, 1983; Caney, 1998) and opponents of secession (such as Galtung, 1985; Fearon, 2004; Jenne, 2011) whilst a few “moderates” (such as Baldwin, 2010; Lijphart, 1977; Bereketeb, 2012; Okojie, 2013; Downes, 2006; Byman, 1997; Sambanis, 2009) have adopted a middle-line argument that secession can be justified, but only under certain circumstances. The authors’ propositions are based on case studies of secessionism as adopted and applied to resolve ethnic and religious conflicts in cases such as Norway-Sweden (1905), Croatia-Slovenia (1991), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992), Ethiopia/Eritrea (1993), Yugoslavia-Kosovo (1999), India-Pakistan (1948), Pakistan-Bangladesh (1971), Indonesia-East Timor (2002), among others.

Often scholars advance arguments in support of, or against, secession, exposing the rightness or wrongness of secession; justification or non-justification of secession; progressiveness or non-progressiveness of secession; vitality or non-vitality of secession; consequentiality or inconsequentiality of secession; constructiveness or destructiveness of secession; and whether
secession is injurious or non-injurious. All these debates are situated and located within the context of conflict management, and conflict resolution. The extent of mixed views and opinions with regard to secession is expressed in de Villiers (2012:1) assertion in his work *Secession – the Last Resort to Minority Protection;*

“‘Secession’ is a word that brings fear to nations. It reeks of conflict, violence and instability. It is also a measure of last resort. It sometimes brings hope to minorities that are in despair and who feel permanently excluded from policy making”.

In classifying proponents and opponents of secession, Johnson (2015) uses two main theoretical categories, that is structural-realists and institutionalists. Structural-Realists “focus on security dilemma and agree that separating ethnic groups into new states is critical for peace” whilst Institutionalists “focus on the problem of civil war recidivism and argue that partitioned states that receive full recognition (*de jure* independence) are less likely to experience conflict re-escalation because of the constraining influence of institutions” (Johnson, 2015:28-29). Empirical studies on secessionist cases in Africa and beyond have discredited some of the arguments for and against secession.

Chaim Kaufmann is by far one of the strongest proponents of the secession as a strategy to resolve ethnic conflicts or identity-based conflicts for sustainable peace. This is evident mainly in his works *Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts* (1996), and *When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century* (1998). He contends that secessionism “reduces both incentives and opportunity for further combat” and it is a humanitarian strategy to reduce the loss of human lives in ethnic conflicts thereby reducing the suffering of people (Kaufmann, 1996:137). His premise is that continued ethno-religious conflict entrenches irreconcilable deep-rooted social fissures within societies. He opines that “multi-ethnic societies create real security dilemmas that intensify violence, motivate ‘ethnic cleansing’ and prevent de-escalation unless the groups are separated” (Kaufmann, 1996:137).

Security dilemma, according to Lindley (2007:276), occurs “when actions taken by one side such as buying arms or building fortifications hurt the security of the other side”. The ethnic security dilemma is such that previously fighting groups cannot be integrated as they will no longer trust one another to the extent that they fear they will be attacked once they disarm. However, secession by itself not sufficiently resolve conflicts, as reasoned by Kauffman
(1996). He suggest that during and after secession, the international community of states need to assist with state recognition, providing assistance to refugees (and internally displaced peoples), and avail aid to the weaker state in the form of development assistance, military support and possibly sanctioning of economically stronger groups that may not be cooperating. Johnson (2015) also subscribe to Kaufmann (1996) in this regard, adding that support to build state capacity is critical in post-secession periods.

Through studies on Iraq and Lebanon hostilities, Byman’s (1997: 22) conclusion attests to Lindley’s (2007) and Kaufmann’s (1996) reasoning, acknowledging that “attempts to build a common identity” after cessation of conflicts always prove to be difficult. Downes (2006:59) advances the same argument and posits that “civil wars generate intense mistrust, fear and hatred that make the future maintenance of multi-ethnic societies through negotiating settlements and power-sharing institutions difficult.” Thus, as argued by some scholars, secession risks the recurrence of war and inter-communal violence in the newly created “rump states” (Kaufmann, 1998:122). The argument by Kaufmann (1998) conforms to Etzioni (1993)’s findings. In his study on the demerits of self-determination and secession, Etzioni (1993) examined self-determination movements in Yugoslavia, India, Czechoslovakia, Quebec in Canada, Soviet Union, Belgium, among others. His conclusion was that solving ethnic conflicts through secession will never be exhausted since several sub-ethnic groups will always emerge after secession and seek to establish their own state (Etzioni, 1993). The case of post-secession Sudan makes this argument defensible.

The findings and arguments by Kaufmann and Etzioni are buttressed by Jenne (2009) who stressed that secession “has the paradoxical effect of reproducing war-time ethnic cleavages in the post-war period.” The authors seem to agree that integrationist approaches to resolving ethno-religious conflicts are more preferable. Johnson (2015) agrees with Kaufmann (1998), Etzioni (1993) and Jenne (2009). The author’s examines secession as a solution to ethnic conflicts through a comparative study of post-secession Georgia-Abkhazia, and Moldova-Transnistria. The conclusion by Johnson (2015) is that “strong institutions are more important than demographically separating ethnic groups to achieve an enduring peace.”

Siroky (2009) also attests to Kaufman (1998) and (Etzioni, 1993)’s arguments. The author conducted a study on how to peacefully resolve secessionist ethno-religious conflicts. He argues that “secession is rarely a solution to ethnic conflict” as it often “compounds problems
of governance” and “does not assure protection of remaining minorities and produce new forms of violence” (Siroky, 2009:1-3). This is because, as Siroky (2009) explains, secession has a tendency of creating a new balance of power between and/or among ethnic groups – both in the host state or in the new state – thereby forcing the ethnic groups to reconsider their prior positions, alliances and interests. This argument is plausible if one assesses post-secession cases such as Sudan and South Sudan where there was renewal of conflict in the post-secession period after 2011 between the Nuer and the Dinker although it may be argued that there was political manipulation of ethnic groups by the elite. Cyprus, Ireland, and India are also clear cases of states that experienced post-secession ethnic violence.

When it comes to the possibility of post-secession violence and instability, Siroky (2009) asserts that modest heterogeneous states with few ethnic groups are highly likely to experience post-secession violence whilst fractionalized states with many small ethnic groups are less likely to experience post-secession violence. On the hand, homogenous states composed of one overwhelming majority group are less likely to experience post secession violence (Siroky, 2009). The author provides that secession often re-order conflicts instead of resolving them.

Through an examination of 60 secessionist conflict cases across the world in Asia, Africa and Europe that occurred prior and post World War I and World War II, Siroky (2009:5-6) posited that secession can either result in “downward re-ordering” whereby new violent secessionist conflicts emerged in newly created states or “upward re-ordering” wherein tensions are escalated to the inter-state level. He cites Abkhazia and South Ossetia as examples of downward re-ordering of post-secession conflicts whereas Eritrea-Ethiopia inter-states conflicts after the 1993 secession together with the Greece-Turkey post-secessionist conflicts are clear cases of upward re-ordering. Siroky (2009) study concluded that the majority of secessionist cases experienced recursive secessionist violence after secession in the form of ethnic clashes, coups, military disputes and riots although at varying durations after secession. However, Johnson (2015) disagrees that secession per se instigate post-secession ethnic conflicts. Rather, the author pointed out that it is the structure of secession that leaves behind a substantial population of minorities together state weakness which allows for post-secession ethnic conflict recurrence.

However, the argument on post-secessionist violence may be considered as implementation weakness of the secessionist strategy. Pischedda (2008) warns that criticizing secession based
on post-secession violence cases misses the point, and does not in any way concludes that secession fails to secure sustainable peace and stability. Instead, the author notes that the most fundamental imperative is to devise on secession can be implemented in such a way that “high levels of cooperation between formerly opposing belligerents” is guaranteed. Pischedda (2008) thus suggests that alternatives to secession may be “military victory” or “power-sharing agreements” although the former may cost human lives. In secession debate, a tricky question that may need to be answered by anti-secessionists is what if integrationist approaches have been tried and fail to produce desired peace against a background of continued massive loss of lives, should secession not be given a chance? Perhaps, this attracts the response that secession should be the option of last resort.

Stroschein (2005) examined the Bosnia-Hezergovina ethnic conflict from 1992 to 1995. He concludes that secession cannot be a viable and appropriate conflict resolution strategy when faced with the challenge of ethnic conflict as it “misidentifies ethnicity and demographics as the cause of conflicts” and assumes that “ethnic unmixing” will address the root causes of the conflict (Stroschein, 2005:49). The author concludes that secessionism should not be a solution to ethnic conflict. Instead, as Stroschein (2005:60) suggests, conflict practitioners and peacemakers should be sensible enough to “examine more contingent sources of conflict, in the form of a variety of interacting conditions.”

It has also been argued that secession only succeed in turning civil wars into international wars in the post-secession period. Cases of post-secession wars between the host state and seceding state such as the Eritrea/Ethiopia War of 1998-2000, India/Pakistan Kashmir War of 1948, are used as empirical evidence to validate such claims. Woldemariam (2015) examined the causes of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War of 1998-2000 with a view to establish the circumstances under which secession results in post-secession wars between the seceding state and the host state. He concludes that the post-secession inter-state conflict between Eritrean and Ethiopian in 1998-2000, which occurred five years after secession, was a result of the disagreement by the successor regimes on the balance of power due to difficulties in the bargaining context, and the divergent memories maintained by the elites about their former secession struggles (Woldemariam, 2015). Thus the likelihood of post-secession inter-state conflicts may be reduced when peace agreements are carefully negotiated and structured.
It has also been argued that secessionism encourages secessions elsewhere which may result in chaos and disorder. Here, the argument is that once a group succeed in fighting for secession and is granted independent statehood, it encourages and motivates other secessionist movements elsewhere. A number of scholars, such as Temin (2010), McNamee (2012), Newbury (2012), Wassara and Muhammed (2014), and others subscribe to the domino theory\(^1\) in this regard. However, Temin (2010) differs with the argument that secessionism encourages other secessionist movements elsewhere to clamour for secession in a domino fashion. The author argues that secession will not have a domino effect in Africa given the limited strength of secessionist movements on the continent. Drawing on the Sudanese case, Temin (2010: 1) stresses that:

> “Whilst there are many secession movements in Africa, most are weak and few stand a real chance of success, or have the international support they would need to advance their cause. This minimizes the likelihood of a wave of follow-on secessions if South Sudan chooses to secede.”

Without specific reference to African secessionist movements, Keller (2007) adds to Temin (2010)’s argument on the success of secessionism. He identifies five factors that determine whether secession movements succeed or fail. These are level of development of the state, contiguity factor, military strength, role of international community and existence of visionary leaders to drive and inspire the secessionist movement. In his study of secessionist movements in Africa, Englebert (2013)’s findings concur with Keller (2007)’s fifth factor relating to visionary leadership of secessionist movements. He considers that most secessionist movements in Africa have not succeeded because they harbour “more ambitious goals” and “[i]n several cases, access to sovereign institutions of existing state (rather than separation from it) seems to have been a dominant goal” (Englebert, 2013:155). An analysis of the examples given by the author makes his assertions appear to be valid. Indeed, as he observes, secessionist movements such as the Casamance in Senegal, the MEND and Biafra in Nigeria have of late been engaging in acts that are synonymous with banditry than genuine pursuit of political goals of secession. The MEND’s fight for self-determination and secession has been characterized

---

\(^1\) The domino theory has been attributed to Dwight Eisenhower (1954) and was predominant in the Cold War era. It assumed that if one state comes under the control of Communism, this would have the effect of spreading Communist rule in neighbouring states. Generally, the domino theory can be applied to mean that a political event in one country leads to a chain of similar events in neighbouring or nearby countries.
by terrorist acts, banditry and limited coherent organization that is expected of serious secessionist movements (see Abang, 2014; Onuoha, 2015; Sampson, 2009).

For authors such as Onuoha (2012), African governments do lack the leadership capacity to effectively govern pluralistic societies made up of people with different languages, religion, race and ethnicity. He holds that “the incompatible amalgams and divisions of ethnic nationalities” within defined states in Africa thanks to colonialism, would require capable governments that can sustain democratic political integration. The only two options are to institute democratic governance, which is difficult task in Africa, and to grant self-rule [secession] given the fact that heterogeneity would be highly unattainable in light of the existing leadership capacities across the continent (Onuoha, 2012:6-7). Onuoha (2012)’s argument appears to be valid if one reviews the experiences of most post-colonial states in Africa. Countries that are often cited as success stories in managing inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts are experiencing challenges in that respect. Even Tanzania, for instance, has been experiencing increasing conflict between Christians and Muslims since 1985 (Wijsen and Mfumbusa, 2002 in Rukyaa, 2007:189).

That said, the security dilemma-motivated arguments for secession by the afore-mentioned scholars seem to under-estimate the role of engagement and integrative reconciliation which should be augmented by the necessary infrastructural institutions and goodwill. Lijphart in his book *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands* and *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (1968) argues for an integrative approach termed “consociationalism’ which proportionally accommodates warring ethno-religious groups in power-sharing coalition governments. As Galtung (quoted in Ryan, 1990:57), rightly puts it: “[n]o peace story ends with dissociation [secession], it is too negative, too uncooperative, non-integrative - even if there may also be harmony in dissociation.” Thus, alternatives to secession are consociationalism, federalism, confederations and unitary states with sub-national autonomy (Lehning, 1998).

Such conflict resolution strategies “de-ethnify” national politics in plural societies and “change the ethnic balance of economic opportunities” (Harowitz quoted in Hughes and Sasse, 2001:6). However, Hughes and Sasse (2001:17) warn that consociationalism has the danger of making “cultural boundaries more rigid” which can make ethno-religious cleavages more permanent and visible. Some form of consociationalism was attempted in Sudan between SPLM/A and
the Government of Sudan, albeit on a transitional basis between 2005-2011, upon the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) at Naivasha in Kenya. To its credit, there was temporary stability and relative peace. This study will explore the practicability and applicability of these and other strategies in resolving post-colonial African intra-state ethno-religious conflicts.

2.7 The African Union’s Position on Secession of States

The secession of South Sudan in July 2011, after the affirmative referendum of January the same year, was the record second case of state secession in post-colonial Africa. The position of the African Union was very critical since it had far-reaching implications in as far as secessionist movements and legitimacy of secession are concerned.

At its 16th Ordinary Session Meeting of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on the 31st of January 2011; the AU made a Solemn Declaration of the Assembly of the Union of Sudan, noting in part:

“Drawing inspiration from Resolution 1514 (XV) on the Declaration Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples...We acknowledge Sudan represents an exceptional case, which, in no way, calls into question the sacrosanct principle of respect of borders inherited at the accession of African countries to independence. We reaffirm our determination to ensure full respect of this principle and forge ahead with our agenda of integration and greater unity among our countries, as foreseen by the founding fathers of the OAU and enshrined in the AU Constitutive Act...The separation of southern Sudan, in no way, dilutes the African identity of northern Sudan. Both entities will move forward in the Sudanese tradition of building strength from diversity.”

Three outstanding issues are imperative in the Solemn Declaration. Firstly, that the AU had consented to secession of an African state (South Sudan) if voted for by the majority in the then upcoming referendum to secede but acknowledging that Sudan was an exceptional case. Secondly, that the AU affirmed that it values the right to self-determination of peoples. Thirdly, the continental body reaffirmed its determination to push for African unity and integration despite allowing for secession of states. On the surface, there appears to be inconsistencies on part of the AU, considering founding principles and values laid down in the AU Charter.
The secession of states appears superficially inconsistent with the 1964 OAU Cairo Summit which “solemnly declared that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence” (OAU First Ordinary Session Resolution AHG/Res.16, 1964). Article 4 (b) of the AU Constitutive Act of 2000 also obligates the organization to “respect [the] borders existing on achievement of independence”. This was an embrace of the international law principle of uti possidetis. According to Black’s Law Dictionary (1979:1386), the principle is derived from Latin “as you possess, so you may possess” and is used in international law “to signify that parties to a treaty are to retain possession of what they have acquired by force during the war” (see also Ahmed, 2015; Brownlie, 1998; Fagbayibo, 2012; Labuschagne, 2008; Mnyongani, 2009).

Further, Article 3 (a) and (b) of the AU Constitutive Act of 2000 asserts its determination to “defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity” of Member States whilst aiming to achieve “greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa”. The same is reiterated in the Accra Declaration for Uniting Africa in July 2007.

AU’s backing of the decision on the secession of South Sudan from Sudan appears to signal a departure from the AU Charter and principles. This perhaps accounts for Bereketeab’s (2012:4) question: “should the map of Africa be re-drawn to reflect ethnic, cultural and geographic diversity?” Whilst the vision of African unity (which has often been criticized as idealistic) as articulated by Kwame Nkrumah in 1963 aimed at having a central Union Government, common foreign policy, unified military and defence strategy, the AU’s decision to approve the secession of South Sudan seems to be paradoxically echoing the unconventional wisdom that “united we fall, divided we stand”.

If one considers the AU’s position on the secession of South Sudan, the impression is that secessionism is tolerable and can be accepted depending on the justifications of secessionist movements. Whilst the Biafra Case (1967-70) was rejected by the then OAU, the AU acceptance of secession of South Sudan may have been motivated by pragmatism and future cases may be similarly treated. Perhaps, as Solomon and Sally argued in defence of the AU’s position, “[e]xtreme conflicts may at times require extreme solutions.”

Perhaps the AU’s position is explicable in terms of Byman’s (1997:28) argument that “state borders are not sacred.” Byman adds that there is no justification to respect them absolutely if
they “foster more hatred, oppression and violence”. He bases his argument on case studies of what are termed success stories of partition in Scandinavia, USSR and Czechoslovakia, and concludes that secession can be best suited to resolve bloody and prolonged intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts whilst relatively small conflicts can be resolved through other means.

There are a number of conflicting viewpoints on whether secession of South Sudan was the appropriate strategy. Just before the January 2011 referendum to decide on whether South Sudan should secede from Sudan, Muammar Gaddafi, the late President of Libya, cautioned that “[w]hat is happening in Sudan could become a contagious disease that affects the whole of Africa” further noting that “[t]he partition of Sudan is likely to change the map of the country [b]ut other (African countries) will change too” (Khaleej Times, 2010: np). Paradoxically, Gaddafi’s warning was issued just after he had made a suggestion (in March 2010) to partition Nigeria between the predominantly Muslim North and largely Christian South after inter-religious conflicts in Nigeria’s City of Jos, in the Plateau State (Souare, 2010: np). He cited the case of the secession of Pakistan from India, dominated by Hindus and Muslims respectively, arguing that it was “historic, radical solution” that succeeded in saving “the lives of millions of Hindus and Muslims” (Khaleej Times, 2010: np). However, this was rejected and criticised by some critics in Nigeria and beyond on the premise that it worked against the unification of Africa (Campbell, 2010).

Nonetheless, Gaddafi was not alone in apprehension and trepidation. Even the then AU Commission Chairperson, Jean Ping was quoted to have stated, in one interview with a French Radio Station; “Will independence of Southern Sudan not lead other players in Darfur and in other places, which are currently not asking for independence, to seek independence as Southern Sudan will have done?” (see LeRichie and Arnold, 2013:28; Ekwe-Ekwe, 2011:70). These were fears of the likely domino-effect that the South Sudanese secession would assume. Whilst Ekwe-Ekwe (2011) dismissed these sentiments as “shocking and sad comments” coming from “a highly placed African public official”, such misgivings and reservations cannot be dismissed or disregarded as their basis maybe understandable and reasonable.

Given the reality of Africa’s numerous ethnic and religious faultlines, there are compelling arguments both for and against the AU’s stance with regard to secession of South Sudan. These arguments expose the inherent dilemma with which the AU is faced when it comes to answering the policy question on secessionism, given its complexity. Achieving peace and
unity when faced with strong secessionist movements appears to be a mammoth task. Deng (1978: 173) terms this a “delicate equation”. Referring to the Sudanese scenario, he argues that “there has been doubt about the reality and durability of unity and therefore of peace, and without peace there can be no unity” (Deng 1978: 173).

The seminal question therefore is whether the AU should approve the secession of African states in order to manage ethnic and religious fault-lines or whether the continental body should closely work together with Member States to manage the fault-lines? McNamee (2012:59) aptly notes that “[i]t is somewhat paradoxical to argue that the formal slicing of Sudan in two constituted a successful management of a fault-line since it represented the failure of a state, but maybe it was”. He further cautions that “[c]hanging the state of borders to create new states will always carry grave risks, as the new triggers for violence in Sudan and South Sudan attests. Drawing a new international border will never be panacea” (McNamee, 2012: 59-60).

2.8 Post-Session South Sudan Dynamics

Given the intensification of conflict and inter-ethnic clashes in post-secession Sudan, especially in South Sudan, the wisdom of secessionism comes under scrutiny. As Copnall (2014:6) asserts, what happened in post-secession problematics “have led some people to question whether South Sudan should have become independent”. However, Mamdani (in Zambakari 2012: 524) looks for a solution that is beyond border-lines and argues that “[f]or no matter how much we re-draw boundaries, the political crisis will remain incomprehensible until we address the institutional-political-legacy of colonial rule”. The thrust of Zambakari’s argument is that the continuous fragmentation of African states to follow cultural maps contradicts inclusivity and unity, and this can breed “violence and instability” (Zambakari, 2012: 522-524).

Since secession, South Sudan has been experiencing conflict, especially after December 2013 when Vice President Rich Machar was reported to have attempted a coup against President Salva Kîr which culminated into army mutiny and triggered conflict with ethnic dimensions (AU, 2015). Since then, there are reported attacks on civilians, rape, arbitrary arrest and detentions, disappearance and loss of lives (UN, 2016). As Mustafa (2013:76) remarked then, “the future appears bleak for post-secession Sudan,” adding that “the politics of map-making
and border drawing may be drawing Sudan into a vicious cycle of violence and ethnic divisions.”

This is the heart of this thesis. To dig deeper into secession as applied in South Sudan, and establish the extent to which the secessionist strategy can be embraced as a sustainable strategy that can deliver lasting peace in the face of ethno-religious conflicts in post-colonial Africa.

Neither the literature cited above nor other literature consulted by this researcher utilises the combination of principal theories upon which this research project will be constructed. Deployment of a combination of principal theories, namely, realism, protracted social conflict theory and conflict transformation theory supplies an ingredient currently missing in this area of research. Additionally, there is a dearth of literature about post-secession Sudan. It will dig deeper to examine the concept of state secession and assess its viability and appropriateness as a strategy for resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial African states. The planned thesis will address this gap, particularly in relation to South Sudan.

2.9 Theoretical Framework of the Study

Three major theories of conflict were used to form the theoretical framework of analysis for this study. The theories assisted to explain and understand conflicts, present different perspectives and insights into conflicts that have ethnic and religious dimensions whilst at the same time also unpacking the relationship between identified variables relating to the causes of conflict, actors involved in conflict situations, dynamics of the conflict ecosystem, and conflict resolution mechanisms.

The principal theories upon which this study was constructed were the Protracted Social Conflict Theory, Realist Conflict Theory and Conflict Transformation Theory. Given the fact that social conflicts are always complex, unique and manifest differently based on their circumstantial and contextual peculiarities; it can be difficult to have a single theory that sufficiently explain the phenomenon under investigation and its accompanying variables. Accordingly, the above three theories complemented each other in providing a collective and comprehensive study of conflict causes, conflict processes, conflict consequences, conflict
implications, conflict resolution interventions, and conflict dynamics at micro and macro levels.

2.9.1 Protracted Social Conflict Theory

The Protracted Social Conflict Theory was propounded by Edward Azar to explain protracted social conflicts. Azar is regarded as one of the “founding fathers” or “forefathers” of the field of conflict resolution (Groom, 2013).

According to Azar, Protracted Social Conflicts are generally those types of conflicts that often continue for long time and are seemingly irresolvable. The author notes;

“Protracted conflicts are hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity. These are conflict situations in which the stakes are very high – the conflicts involve whole societies and act as agents for defining the scope of national identity and social solidarity…they linger on in time and have no distinguishable point of termination…one cannot expect the conflicts to be terminated by explicit decision” (Azar et al, 1978:50).

From Azar’s definition, the essential characteristics of Protracted Social Conflicts are that they are very protracted; the conflict intensity fluctuates from time to time; there is interaction of different groups and players in the conflict; and there is no distinct termination of the conflict. Going by Azar’s definition, one can deduce that Protracted Social Conflicts persist, cause a lot of costly socio-economic destruction (in terms of human life, social relations and infrastructure) and also seem to be characterised by groups that resist any conflict resolution attempts. Hence, Protracted Social Conflicts are often intractable and complex.

In terms of categorization, Azar (1978) classifies these conflicts into three broad categories, namely; “clearly international conflicts or wars”, “clearly civil wars”, and “a mixture of international and civil wars”. Examples of Protracted Social Conflicts, according to the author, include the India-Pakistan Conflict (1947-1949) which involved China as an extended party; the China-Taiwan Conflict (1949) which involved the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), and the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR); and the North Korea-South
Korea Conflict (1950-1978) which included the US, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), China, USSR and other state parties.

With regards to underlying causes; Azar identifies a “cluster of [four] variables” or “pre-conditions” for Protracted Social Conflicts. These comprise communal content (degree of ethnic heterogeneity); human needs (when people are deprived of their human needs, such as political access needs, security needs, acceptance needs and expression needs, usually manifested through levels of human development); governance (states that experience Protracted Social Conflicts tend to have incompetent, repressive, parochial, fragile and authoritarian governments that monopolize political power at the expense of public interests); environmental factors (these are factors that constrain policy capacity such as natural resources depletion, environmental degradation, and demographic pressures); and international linkages (weak states are porous to international forces and are “economically and politically compromised” by their economic and military dependent on richer and stronger states which may trigger Protracted Social Conflicts through increasing volume of arms imports and cross border fomentation) (Azar, 1990; Azar et al, 2003; Ramsbotham, 2005).

According to Azar, Protracted Social Conflicts are often concentrated in developing countries with limited resources; economic underdevelopment; distributive injustices; limited political capacity; disintegrated social and political systems; and dominant or hegemonic identity groups that perpetuate disparities along ethnic cleavages based on the colonial legacy of divide-and-rule on communal groups; and unequal access to opportunities (see Azar et al, 1978; Azar, 1985; Azar, 1986; Azar, 1990; Azar, 1991; Azar et al 2003; Ramsbotham, 2005). Factors such as “colonial legacy, domestic historical setting, and the multi-communal nature of the society play important roles in shaping the genesis of protracted social conflict” and enforcing integration or co-operation usually “retards the nation-building, strains the social fabric and eventually breeds fragmentation and protracted social conflict” (Azar, 1990:2; Azar, 1990:12).

The main causes of protracted social conflicts, according to Azar, are summarized in Figure 2.1 below.
Figure 2.1: Causes of Protracted Social Conflicts and Basis of their Protractedness

Source: Author’s construction based on Azar (1978)’s ‘causes of protracted social conflicts and reasons behind their protractedness’

In resolving Protracted Social Conflicts, these factors explained above should be addressed, especially the human needs factor. Azar, as quoted in Ramsbotham (2005) proffers;

“[R]educing overt conflict requires reduction in levels of underdevelopment...Conflict resolution can truly occur and last if satisfactory amelioration of underdevelopment occurs as well. Studying protracted [social] conflicts leads one to conclude that peace is development ‘in the broadest sense of the term’” (Ramsbotham, 2005:115).

Critics of Protracted Social Conflict Theory have presented a prescriptive analysis that extent the ‘limited’ scope of Protracted Social Conflict Theory’s suggested economic interventions. They suggest that protracted conflicts can be addressed through the use of force to bring stability (Realist Paradigm); integrating social structures in a way that promotes harmonious group interactions (Human Relations Paradigm); working with groups through a national healing and conciliation mechanism as well as preventive diplomacy, conflict mitigation and post-conflict reconstruction (Medical Paradigm); dialoguing with conflicting parties (Post-Morden Paradigm); and through addressing all the factors driving the conflict by focusing on
all the institutions within the conflict environment (Systems Paradigm) (see Coleman, 2004; Fetherston, 2000; Miall, 2004; Remann, 2002).

However, whilst Protracted Social Conflicts can be resolved through the above means, Azar (2003) points out that the outcomes of resolution interventions in protracted social conflicts can be unpredictable. As Azar notes;

“The outcome of PSCs [Protracted Social Conflicts] is negative sum. There are no winners or losers...There is no clear end-point, each outcome being the possible cause of another conflict spiral. PSCs carry devastating physical, psychological, economic and political costs...Physical security deteriorates, with not only a tragic loss of human life but also destruction of physical and social infrastructure, as economic retrenchment to support excessive military expenditure leads to discarding of welfare and development programmes. A vicious cycle of underdevelopment and poverty is institutionalized, depriving all groups of human needs and economic well-being” (Azar in Davis and Kaufman, 2003:20).

The Protracted Social Conflict Theory provides a localized, globalized and internationalized explanation of Protracted Social Conflicts, and assists in explaining the causality, determinants, nature, characteristics, manifestation, and possible solutions to, Protracted Social Conflicts. Therefore in this study, the theory assisted to explain and contextualize the Sudanese conflict and also guide the interpretation of study findings. The Sudanese conflict (Sudan civil wars) which began in August 1955 fits well into the mould of Protracted Social Conflicts. Similarly, the post-secession South Sudan conflict may also be fittingly considered as a Protracted Social Conflict given Azar’s criteria and description. This enables the study to explain and link the underlying causes of the Sudan and South Sudan, and also appreciate the inter-play of factors behind South Sudan secession in 2011.

2.9.2 Realist Conflict Theory

The Realist Conflict Theory is also referred to as the Realist Group Conflict Theory. The theory is often attributed to Donald Campbell, and later on was articulated by other theorists in the 20th century. Muzafer Sherif, a Turkish-American social psychologist, also popularized the Realist Conflict Theory within the domain of social psychology through the famous ‘Robbers Cave’ experiment (see Cargile et al, 2006; Coenders et al, 2008; Jackson, 1993; Sherif, 1958; Sherif et al, 1961; Sherif, 2010).
The proponents of the Realist Conflict Theory explain how conflicts between groups emerge as a result of competition for resources and pursuit of conflicting goals. Members of social groups develop and express prejudices, negative stereotypes and discrimination due to the tension, friction and polarization that generates between and/or among them. Coenders and Scheepers, as cited in Coenders et al (2008:271), explain;

“Realist Conflict Theories argue that conflicts are over material and economic group interests can result in negative out-group reactions. The core proposition is that (perceived) competition over scarce resources, such as houses and jobs, induces the desire to protect in-group interests, which is considered an underlying motivation for (the endorsement of) discriminatory behaviour”.

Thus, the theory, according to Bornstein (2003:129), “maintains that inter-group conflicts are rational in the sense that groups do have incompatible goals and are in competition for (actual or perceived) scarce resources”. It presumes that “people [and groups] are selfish and will try to maximize their own rewards” (Genest’s, 2004:41). Accordingly, the Realist Conflict Theory holds that ethnic relations entail competition over limited (either real or perceived) resources that are scarce and group identities and groups. The Realist Conflict Theorists contend that whenever an identified social group gains control of resources that another group may also want, there is a likelihood that the owners (and controllers) of this resource are blamed for being responsible for causing their socio-economic distress and suffering (Coenders et al, 2008). Thus, according to the Realist Conflict Theorists, accusations and counter-accusations then characterise conflicts centred on resource ownership and control.

As defined by Realist Conflict Theorists, ‘scarce’ or ‘limited’ resources are those resources that will be in limited or insufficient quantities. These can be in the form of water, land, grazing land, political power, military protection, social status, and finance, among others (see Cargile et al, 2006; Coenders et al, 2008; Jackson, 1993; Sherif, 2010). Coenders et al (2008) further notes that resources may not be limited per se, but may be perceived by a particular group as limited. The severity, intensity and longevity of the conflict is contingent upon the value (or perceived value) and scarcity (or perceived scarcity) attached to the resources by the respective conflicting groups (Stephan and Stephan, 2000).
As a solution, proponents of the Realist Conflict Theory argue that social conflicts can only be resolved through cooperating between conflicting groups that is usually necessitated by the identification of ‘superordinate’ goals (Coenders et al, 2008). Superordinate goals, according to the author, are neutral goals that are viewed by conflicting parties as of paramount importance to achieve through joint cooperation or collaborative efforts than having each group pursuing its own goals on its own (Sherif, 1958; Sherif, 1965; Sherif, 2010; Sherif, 2015). Consequently, positive relations and inter-group solidarity can be reinstated once superordinate goals are jointly pursued in a non-zero sum fashion. In practical terms, negative inter-group prejudices, tensions, stereotypes, and discrimination can be overcome through the setting up of joint and representative institutions or mechanisms to allow for equitable allocation of resources between and/or amongst conflicting groups.

It is through the famous Robbers Cave participant observational study/experiment conducted by Muzafer Sherif that the Realist Conflict Theory was demonstrated. In 1954, Sherif organized a three weeks experiment in a 200 acre Summer Boy Scout Camp at Robbers Cave State Park, in Oklahoma, in the US, focusing on inter-group behaviour using 22 boys aged between 11 and 12 years who had never known each other before (see Fine, 2004; McNeil, 1962; Sherif, 1961; Sherif et al, 1961; Sherif, 1965; Sherif et al, 1988; Sherif, 2010). The experiment had three phases. In the first phase, participants were put into two groups of equal number using similarities (the Eagles and the Rattlers) and were geographically isolated from each other. In the second phase, the participants were made to compete in camp games with prices awarded to winners. Lastly, in the third phase, superordinate goals were introduced to participants wherein situations were created which required the mutual and cooperative effort of the Eagles and Rattlers.

The findings of the experiment were that in the “Experimental In-group Formation” phase, there was cohesion within the respective groups as they became friends and established group norms, and the participants “solidified themselves into identifiable and meaningful groups” (McNeil, 1962:77; see also Fine, 2004; Sherif, 1961; Sherif et al, 1961; Sherif, 1965; Sherif et al, 1988; Sherif, 2010). It was also observed that the “Inter-Group Relations - Friction” phase was characterised by hostilities between the two groups, stereotypes, negative attitudes, prejudices, jeers, name-calling, insults, vandalism, provocations, war-like and aggressive behaviour, derogatory labels, and outrages as participants were frustrated due to intensified competition (McNeil, 1962:77; Fine, 2004; Sherif, 1961; Sherif, 1965; Sherif et al, 1988;
In the “Inter-Group Relations - Integration” phase, the observation was that there was reduced tension and “inter-group enmity” between the Eagles and Rattlers as the two groups cooperated through teamwork during experimentally planned interactive episodes in pursuit of established “desirable and compelling superordinate goals” (McNeil, 1962:77; see also Fine, 2004; Sherif, 1961; Sherif, 1965; Sherif et al, 1988; Sherif, 2010).

As Sherif et al (1988) confirm, the Realist Conflict Theory hypothesis that inter-group conflicts are a consequence of competition over scarce resources, and that cooperation between social groups is usually compelled by the desire to work towards superordinate goals, reduces existing tensions, frustrations, attitudes and hostilities. In essence, superordinate goals become the unifier or social glue that binds conflicting groups.

The Realist Conflict Theory therefore provided a very useful theoretical framework of analysis which guided the examination and explanation of the causes and course of the intra-state secessionist conflict in the Republic of Sudan, post-secession South Sudan intra-state conflict, and post-secession conflict between South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan. The theory was critical in untangling the web of ethnic and religious dimensions of the Sudanese and South Sudanese conflicts involving the Sudanese Arabs, Moslems, Christians, and ‘animists’ as well as ethnic groups of Dinkas, Nuer, Shilluk, Azande, Murle, among others.

On the other hand, the theory further assisted to explain the factors and drivers behind the conflicts in Sudan and post-secession Sudan, specifically the dimension and perspective of competition for notable ‘scarce’ resources such as political power, natural resources in the form of oil deposits, oil transportation infrastructure, national development funds, grazing land, water reserves, among other resources that were at the epicentre of the conflicts in Sudan and South Sudan. It also assisted in the discussion and assessment of the attempted conflict resolution mechanisms or interventions made since the conflict in Sudan started in August 1956, as well as the post-secession conflict resolution attempts in South Sudan.

### 2.9.3 Conflict Transformation Theory

The Conflict Transformation Theory is often attributed to John Paul Lederach and Johan Galtung. Proponents of the Conflict Transformation Theory advocate for conflict
transformation instead of ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘conflict management’ since the former does not consider a comprehensive understanding of the nature of conflicts whilst the latter is more conflict-reduction oriented with little consideration of conflict sources (Lederach, 1995). The Sudanese Civil Society Capacity Building Initiative (2007:13) presents a compendious definition of conflict transformation;

“Transforming a conflict is a long-term strategy that addresses the broader socio-political sources (root causes) of conflict to transform the negative forces of war into positive change. It is not only to suppress conflict but also to allow it to develop and foster its expression in a constructive and non-violent way to help foster a sustainable peace”.

On the other hand, Lederach (2015:n.p), also presents an equally extensive definition of conflict transformation;

“Conflict transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real life problems in human relationships”.

Thus from the Conflict Transformation Theorists’ perspective, conflicts are never viewed as destructive or unwanted. They are viewed as opportunities for growth instead of being regarded as threats. In light of this, Lederach (2015:n.p) posits that “conflict also creates life: through conflict we respond, innovate and change…[it] keeps relationships and social structures honest, alive and dynamically responsive to human needs, aspirations and growth”. This, according to the Conflict Transformation Theory, is the functionalist and constructionist dimension of conflicts.

Conflict Transformation Theorists, therefore, assume that sustainable conflict resolution can only be successful through conflict transformation. The assumption of the theory is that conflicts are a consequence of injustices and inequality within societies as meted by one group against another (Lederach, 1995). These are structural causes of conflicts that should be addressed in the conflict transformation together with the grievances and needs of the conflicting societies. Lederach is cited in Miall (2014:4);

“Conflict Transformation must actively envision, include respect, and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given setting. This involves a new set
of lenses through which we do not primarily, see the setting and the people in it as the problem and the outsider as the answer. Rather, we understand the long-term good transformation as validating and building on the people and resources within the setting”.

According to Conflict Transformation Theorists, conflicts can be transformed into peaceful outcomes through fundamentally changing the relationships, patterns of social organization, social structures, communications, perceptions, attitudes and behaviour of conflicting parties and promoting peace, justice, equality, reconciliation, forgiveness, and recognition (Francis, 2002:27-28). Thus the focus in addressing conflict, as proposed by the Conflict Transformation Theory, should be capacity building and structural transformation with specific focus on pre-conflict and post-conflict stages of the conflicts as well as the causes and consequences of conflict with the objective of transforming conflicts from violent and destructive confrontations to constructive, sustainable and peaceful outcomes (Galtung, 1996; Lederach, 1995). Elucidating on the same argument, Lederach (2015:2) avers;

“Conflict transformation lenses suggest we look beyond the dishes to see the context of the relationship that is involved, and then look back again at the pile. Not satisfied with a quick solution that may seem to solve the immediate problem, transformation seeks to create framework to address the content, the context, and the structure of the relationship”.

The Figure below attempts to explain the conflict transformation process as applied in conflict situations. It presents the essentials elements and overaching facets of conflict transformation as ideated by Galtung (1996) and Lederach (2015).
As depicted in the graphic illustration above, conflict transformation is a very comprehensive and systematic process that transcends beyond conflict management (that is the control, containment and mitigation of conflict and its damage) and conflict resolution (that is attending to the structural, behavioural and attitudinal root causes of conflicts aimed at just resolving the conflict). Thus, as Gultang (1996) and Lederach (2015) asserted, the essential components of the conflict transformation process include developing a positive orientation towards conflict, inclusivity in terms of stakeholder engagement, creating a shared language, developing communicative capacities for constructive engagement, and addressing the underlying root causes or grievances to the conflict.

The Conflict Transformation Theory stresses the importance of conflict transformation which entails “an improvement of the whole context of the conflict, a positive change in the disputants’ relationships or complete behavioural and attitudinal changes of the disputants” (Abdul-Jelili, 2008:101). It assumes that key conflict grievances or contested issues should be sufficiently addressed, post-conflict communication should be shaped constructively, and structural barriers to positive peace should be eliminated.
In terms of transforming conflicts, proponents of Conflict Transformation Theory (see Miall, 2014:10) argue that there are five types of transformers, namely context transformation (which entails change in the international and regional environment); structure transformation (which refers to changes in power structures and markets of violence); actor transformation (which is about changing actors in the conflict, the leadership, and the party); issue transformation (which is about changing contested issues); and personal/elite transformation (which is about changing you will be). The author further adds that conflict transformation consist of four broad categories of actors, namely the state and inter-governmental organizations, development and humanitarian organizations, international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) working on conflict prevention and transformation, and parties to the conflict and other societal groups affected (Miall, 2014:12).

In other words, no conflict, according to Conflict Transformationists, can be resolved without involving all the relevant parties and stakeholders to the conflict. Thus the proponents of the Conflict Transformation Theory believe in inclusivity of the peace process and that peace-making is about ensuring that all these players’ relationships are transformed within the broad spectrum of societal relations.

Thus unlike the Realist Conflict Theory, the Conflict Transformation Theory does not employ force or violent interventions in order to address conflicts. Conflict Transformation Theorists maintain that conflict transformation should ensure participation of all the stakeholders involved in the conflict, equalization of all parties to the conflict, addressing deep-seated injustices and traumatic experiences of affected people, attending to the root causes of the conflict, and building the capacity of stakeholders so that they comprehend the political, social and economic system within which the conflict is contextualized (Galtung, 1996; Lederach, 1995).

The Conflict Transformation Theory, thus, assisted in providing a theoretical framework of analysis in the examination of conflict resolution mechanisms and challenges faced in pre-secession and post-secession South Sudan. Analysing these interventions from Conflict Transformation Theorists’ perspectives facilitates a comprehensive assessment of the intervention against the benchmarks of viability and sustainability. It is through Conflict Transformation Theory lenses that the researcher managed to establish the transformative
nature of the major peace agreements signed in Sudan such as the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, and the Agreement of the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) of 2015. In addition, the Conflict Transformation Theory was useful in the formulation of recommendations for the study that sought to find a lasting solution to the conflict in South Sudan.

2.10 Conclusion

This Chapter has reviewed relevant literature following a thematic approach and explained the theoretical framework of the study. Firstly, the concepts of secession, ethnic conflict, and religious conflict were defined and discussed. The chapter attempted to analyse the controversies associated the concepts and discuss the causes of secession within the thematic framework of multi-ethnicity which characterise post-colonial African states. The Chapter also discussed the debate around secession, focusing on the main arguments presented in support, and against secession as a strategy for resolving identity-based conflicts that are ethno-religious in nature. Literature on the post-secession conflict dynamics in South Sudan was reviewed with a view to get different perspectives on how secession has been evaluated by different authors as well as appreciate the nature and direction of conflict in Sudan since secession in July 2011. Lastly, the Chapter further explored and explained the major theories that have been used to provide the framework of analysis for the study. These comprised the Protracted Social Conflict Theory, Realist Conflict Theory and Conflict Transformation Theory. Chapter 3 will present an analysis of the Sudanese conflict, its origins and history as well as its evolution.
CHAPTER 3

THE SUDANESE CONFLICT: ORIGINS, HISTORY AND EVOLUTION

3.0 Introduction

This Chapter analytically traces the root causes of the Sudanese Conflict and further examine the evolution of the conflict from a multi-dimensional perspective so as to provide and lay the foundational basis and context for substantive discussions on South Sudanese secession matrix and the South Sudanese post-secession conflict developments in Chapter 4. The essence is to provide a comprehensive background and context to the conflict. Thus, it digs deep into the roots of, and contributing factors to, the conflict in pre-colonial Sudan, and post-independence conflict trajectory in Sudan. In this light, the Chapter assesses the relevant factors, actors, institutions and players that have been involved in the conflict with a view to unpack the nature of the conflict, its causes, its evolution, identifying linkages and inter-state/inter-group relationships, geography and ecology of the conflict, conflict management and resolution attempts, related and relevant events and how they gave rise to secession in 2011. Thus, this Chapter presents an analysis of competing interpretive narratives and perspectives on the Sudanese conflict based on a wide range of evidence from different secondary sources of information. Given the complexity of the Sudanese conflict, the Chapter explores the various multiple-causation explanations of events, incidents, political processes and outcomes that shaped the course and evolution of the Sudanese conflict. In doing so, a phased approach is adopted in a historical analysis and the Chapter is organized into three phases, viz; Pre-colonial Sudan (pre-18th Century - 1820), Colonial Sudan (1820-1955), and Post-Colonial Sudan (1956-2011).

3.1 Profile of the Sudan

3.1.1 Geography of Sudan

At independence on 01 January 1956, Sudan was the largest in Africa in terms of geographical coverage, covering an area of 957,500 square miles (about 2.4 million km²) bordering Chad, Central African Republic, Egypt and Libya, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda (Voll, 1978). The Government of Sudan (2015:n.p), states that it stretched nearly “nearly one million miles an area seven times the size of California [the third biggest state of the United State by area]
and five times the size of Texas [the second largest state in the US by area]” (emphasis mine). Given its sheer size, the state merged different cultures and regions, in East, West, South and North Africa. The White Nile and the Blue Nile Rivers, whose confluence is at Khartoum, constitute a key feature of Sudan’s geography because of its economic, commercial and strategic nature.

**Figure 3.1: Map of Sudan with borders adopted at Independence in 1956**

3.1.2 Ethnic and Religious Configuration

In terms of ethno-religious and linguistic configuration, Sudan at independence was very diverse. The multiple identity nature of the Sudan is evident in the over-cited results of the population census of 1955 in Sudan which revealed that the total population in Sudan was 10,252,536 (just over 10 million), with 7,469,400 being Northerners whilst 2,783,136 were living in the South (O’Ballance, 2000). This colonial census is said to have categorized Sudanese ethnic groups into two broad categories, viz, (a) indigenous African Sudanese (whose mother tongue was other than Arabic) constituted 69% of the population, and (b) Arab Sudanese who constituted 31% of the population (Garang, 2005:8). The same census revealed that there were 56 ethnic groups in Sudan, further divided into 597 sub-groups with around 115 languages being spoken across the country. More than half of the Sudanese spoke Arabic as their native tongue. About 70% of the national population were Muslims, 5% being Christians, and 25% practicing traditional African religions. (see Voll, 1978:5; Musa, 2010:555; Okojie, 2013:421-422). In terms of linguistic composition of Sudan, the census found that 51% of the population spoke Arabic whilst 48% spoke non-Arabic languages (Krotki, 1958).

The general distribution was that Arabs, Arabized Nubians, and the Beja were concentrated in the North of Sudan, whilst Negroids and Nilotic tribes (Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk and Anuak), the Nilo-Hematic and the Sudanic tribes were in the Western, Eastern and Southern parts of Sudan (Okojie, 2013; Voll, 1978). Thus Sudan is usually referred to as “the fault line of Africa” as it constitutes the frontier between the Muslim North and the Christian South regions (Voll, 1974: 85).

However, there is a glaring fact ignored in most narratives, the fact that there are more indigenous Africans in the north than in the south. In his address at the signing off ceremony of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Nyayo Stadium in Nairobi, Kenya on the 9th of January 2005; Dr John Garang hinted;

“Another fact that many people do not know and/or do not want to know is that indigenous Africans are more in the North than in the South (39% of the total population compared to the South’s 30%)” (Sudan Tribune, 10 January 2005).

This shows that Sudan was a melting pot of people with different ethnic, religious, cultural, racial and linguistic distinctions. Khalid (2010: xxiv) uses a fittingly descriptive phrase, a
“multi-coloured political panorama”. With time, the diverse identity of Sudan, as Musa (2010:554) puts it, has became a product of “socialization and acculturation developed during a process of historical, political and socio-economic adaptation”.

An appreciation of the geography and basic sociology of Sudan at independence assist in giving an overview, background and brief context to discussions on the origins, history and evolution of the Sudanese conflict.

3.2 Why Origins, History and Evolution of the Sudanese Conflict?

As highlighted above, this Chapter will set the stage and context for the discussion of secession of South Sudan from Sudan. By unpacking the origins, history and evolution of the Sudanese Conflict, a solid and concrete foundation is laid for substantive discussion on interrogating secession as a strategy for resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial Africa, using the South Sudan case. It is only through revisiting the footprints of a conflict will always allow a better understanding of the conflict context and conflict dynamics. As Jeffrey Helsing of the United State Institute of Peace (2016: n.p) posits;

“A nuanced understanding of the context and dynamics of a conflict can determine the effectiveness with which you intervene in a conflict, prevent further harm from being done, help determine priorities for program development and lead to understanding better the consequences of any actions or policies.”

This is the whole essence and quintessence of conflict analysis. Indeed the conflict analysis dimensions of content, actors and stakeholders, institutions, interests, motivations, incentives, positions, perceptions, needs, issues, causations, dimensions, dynamics, events, processes, structures, strategies, relationships and inter-relationships, et cetera, at all levels from grassroots, sub-national, national, regional, continental and international level; are key focus of the discussion on conflict history which is germane in assessing the efficacy of conflict resolution strategies.

Tracing the origins, history and evolution of the Sudanese conflict will build the conflict profile. Nicaise (2014)’s guide can be valuable in pursuing the historical analysis of the Sudanese conflict. The author submits that a comprehensive analysis of any conflict ought to examine the political, and socio-economic and cultural context of the conflict, its history, affected areas,

In light of the above, no comprehensive understanding of the Sudanese conflict can be attempted without tracing the history of the State of Sudan, from which South Sudan seceded on 09 July 2011. It is only through unpacking of the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial economic, social and political history of Sudan that the Sudanese conflict can be contextually comprehended.

3.3 Pre-Colonial Sudan (Pre-18th Century - 1820)

The state of Sudan has a long socio-economic and political history that spans several years back before the advent of colonialism on the continent. It has been stated that the name “The Sudan” was derived from “bilad-al-Sudan”, an expression originated by the medieval Arab historians, geographers, and travellers to mean “the land of the blacks”, in reference to the land in Africa south of the Sahara desert which straddles from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ethiopian plateau (see Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006; Voll, 1978; Pierre, 1969; Stephanie, 2004; Muhammad, 1972). This is one pointer that the Sudanese past has been heavily influenced by its extensive contacts with the Northern neighbours, specifically Egypt, and the Middle East than with the South. Perhaps, this was largely influenced by its geographical location. Voll (1978: 1) notes of morden Sudan;

“The Sudan straddles a number of significant cultural frontiers as well as ethnic ones: it is on the frontier between Muslim and Christian Africa, Arab-speaking and English speaking Africa and, at the same time, between English speaking and Francophone Africa. It is a transitional zone between the cultural units of West Africa and East Africa, and it is a bridge between the Arabian Peninsula and Africa.”

Voll (1978) further classifies pre-colonial Sudanese history into three distinct periods, namely; Years Before Christ (BC), Medieval era, and Post-Medieval era. The area that later became Sudan was inhabited by the Neolithic culture in the first millenium BC on sedentary basis, surviving through farming, hunting, fishing, and cattle herding; and later moved to the Nile Valley being pushed off by the dryness of the Sahara Desert, and motivated by the desire to practice agriculture (Edwards, 2007; Government of Sudan, 2015; Voll, 1978).
Thus before the coming in of the Turko-Egyptian rule, Sudan was a collection of Kingdoms and tribally-organized communities. Historically, the Egyptians have had a political, religious and economic influence on Sudan, especially the northern part of Sudan the geographical proximity of the two states along the Nile River (Fadlalla, 2007). There is always reference to ancient Cush, the land presently occupied by northern Sudan, which was inhabited by the Sudanese in 2700 BC. It was incorporated into the Egypt’s New Kingdom as a province from around 1570 BC to 1100 BC. However, Cush later conquered the upper part of Egypt in 730 BC and administered it upto 590 BC when it was over-run by the Egyptians and pushed off Meroe in the south along the river Nile.

In the 6th century, Meroe had broken down into Christian kingdoms which were collectively named Nubia, and it is Egyptian clergymen who ministered to Nubians. The Christian Nubians had contacts with Arabs through trade as Sudanese produced ivory, gold, gum and cattle which they sold to Egypt and the Arab world.

Later, Nubia was conquered by the Mamluk rulers of Egypt in 1276 and was brought under Muslim rule. These resulted in the gradual conversion of Nubians into Islam gradually whilst the majority of them kept their Christian religious faith upto the 15th and 16th century. From the 16th century upto the early 19th century, Muslim brotherhoods ruled northern Nubia whilst the Ottoman Empire controlled the area through military leaders for that period.

It should be noted that prior colonization, religion was not at the centre of conflict in Sudan. Poggio (2002:67) accounts that “[f]or a long period of time, religion was not an element of conflict between the predominantly Muslim Northern Sudan and largely traditional Africans of the Southern Sudan”. The coming in of colonialism, ignited divisions bordering on ethnicity and religion as a divide and rule *modus operandi*.

3.4 Colonial Sudan (1821-1955)

The colonial history of Sudan had a very influential role in terms of shaping post-colonial conflict dynamics. Kebbede (1997:16) argues that “Sudan’s North-South conflict owes its genesis to the colonial past”. The colonial period is punctuated by two main colonial regimes, namely the Turko-Egyptian rule, which took place from 1821 to 1882, and the Anglo-Egyptian
Condominium which ruled Sudan from 1899 until it attained its independence on the 1st of January 1956. Thus the Sudan endured almost two centuries under colonial rule.

3.5 Turko-Egyptian Conquest and Rule (1821-1882)

It is under the Turko-Egyptian colonial administration that “Sudan’s ethnically and religiously diverse people were brought together for the first time under a centralized government and administration” (Kebbede, 1997:16). This was after the conquest of the Sudan by the Turko-Egyptian forces which were under the command of the Ottoman Governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali’s son, Ismail. They managed to defeat the Sudanese armies that was scattered, poorly equipped, divided and politically disintegrated under the Funj Kingdom (Voll, 1978; Stephanie, 2004; Muhammad, 1972). The motive behind the invasion was the Ottoman Empire was searching for gold, ivory, timber, gum Arabic, slave recruits for the Ottoman colony of Egypt, and to open new markets (Collins and Tignor, 1967; Smith, 2009; Holt, 1967; Metz, 1991). As Machar (1995) precisely puts it, it was in search of “wealth and markets”. However, the Turko-Egyptian forces could not find these and they later established Fort at Khartoum (O’Ballance, 2000).

It is said that when the Turko-Egyptian forces invaded Sudan in 1821, the state had “[o]ver 500 tribal groups and sub-groups speaking nearly 150 languages” (Khalid, 2010: xxviii). The significance of the Turko-Egyptian colonial government was that it sowed seeds of divisions amongst Sudanese. In this light, there are mainly four fundamental dynamics that are relevant to the successive North-South conflict in Sudan that were a consequent of the Turko-Egyptian rule. These are related to, (a) colonial administrative structure, (b) establishment of indirect rule, (c) religion, and (d) slave trade.

In terms of the colonial administrative structure, the Turko-Egyptian colonial administration is credited for establishment of the first modern form of government in Sudan, whose model was consolidated by the Anglo-Egyptian Rule from 1899-1955, and later inherited by many post-colonial governments in Sudan. Kebbede (1997) posits that “Sudan’s ethnically and religiously diverse people were brought together for the first time under a centralized government and administration during the Turko-Egyptian colonial rule”. Firstly, the Turko-Egyptian imperialists set up a very centralized “civil military and administration” with its capital at
Khartoum (Machar, 1995). The Turkiya also divided the state of Sudan into regional provinces, and smaller administrative units largely on tribal lines, that is, Berber Province (in Northern Sudan), Al Taka Province (in Eastern Sudan), Kordufan (in the West), and Khartoum, Sinar and the White Nile (in the Middle). Later, by 1874, additional provinces had been established in Equatoria, Upper Nile, Bahr al Ghazal and Darfur when the Turko-Egyptian colonial administration was controlling almost the whole of Sudan except some parts of southern Sudan (Metz, 1991; Voll, 1978). Commenting on the far-reaching implications of the setting up of a centralized capital at Khartoum, Basha in Raftopoulos and Alexander (2006: 9) notes;

“[W]hen Khartoum became the Capital of Sudan in 1833, a pattern of centre-periphery began with it [Khartoum] being the centre and politically and economically dominant, while the rest [Kassala, Darfur, Blue Nile, Kordofan and Southern regions] were marginalized in a discriminatory way”.

The provinces were ruled by General Governors, with Khartoum being the seat of the Governor General (referred to as the hakimadar), whilst the traditional tribal chiefs assumed leadership of the administrative units at a local level. The use traditional tribal chiefs, in an attempt to govern indirectly, was later perfected by the British as their colonial modus operandi when they took over in 1899. This was the beginning of the politics of centralization and militarization when it came to political governance and economic development in Sudan, in a core-periphery fashion. The colonial Government used Turkish as the official language of communication, and latter switched to Arabic. The linguistic Government policy, according to Smith (2009), “accomplished little to disturb the ethnic and linguistic diversity of Sudan”. Perhaps, this was due to the fact that the Turko-Egyptian rule never controlled the larger parts of southern Sudan which were inhabited by non-Arab speaking and non-Muslim ethnic groups.

On the other hand, there was a religious dimension that characterized the Turko-Egyptian colonial administration whose implication on the state of religion in Sudan, within the context of religious diversity has to be taken note of. The colonial rulers revised the Sudanese legal system and introduced commercial and criminal codes applied in secular courts of law, whilst at the same time encouraging the Orthodoxy religious practices which were the norm across the Ottoman Empire. According to Metz (1991) this “reduced the prestige of the qadis (Islamic judges) whose Sharia courts were confined to dealing with matters of personal status”.

71
author further notes that this was despised by the Muslims in Sudan as it was against their religious practices and faith.

One of the legacies of the Turko-Egyptian’s 60 years of colonial rule in Sudan was that it presided over the era of heightened slave trade which entrenched deep hatred for the North by south Sudanese people. The people of the South, consisting of the Nilotic peoples, mostly the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk who had settled in the south as tribal migrants in the 10th century and established their traditional monarchs there; were brought into close contact with the Northern Arabs in the 19th century during the Turko-Egyptian rule, when slavery of southerners intensified, was very profitable (Bankie, 2006; Berry, 2015; Beswick, 2006; Metz, 1991; Muhammad, 1972).

This was despite pressure from the Europeans in general, and Britain in particular, especially those in Egypt, to abolish the trade in humans. As Metz (1991) reckons, “[a]nnual raids resulted in the capture of countless thousands of southern Sudanese, and the destruction of the region’s stability and economy”. Kebbede (1997) puts the figure higher, stating that around 2 million southern Sudanese, mostly Dinkas were sold as slaves to the Arabs, Europeans, and Egyptians during the Turko-Egyptian rule. Machar (1995) also states that millions of south Sudanese were enslaved, and even further implicate northern Sudanese of complicity, arguing that northerners collaborated with the Turko-Egyptian rulers to sell southerners as slaves to the Arabs and other slave markets.

Even after the abolition of slavery, slave descendents, and the southern Sudanese (mainly blacks) in general, were regarded as “slaves” in terms of social status whilst the northern Arabs were regarded in high status (Sharkey, 2003: 19). In the final analysis, one can deduce that slavery was going to have more or less permanent implications on prejudices, stereotypes and racial relations between northern Sudanese (Afro-Arabs) and southern Sudan (black Africans). What would matter is how the regimes that succeeded the Turko-Egyptian colonial administration would manage to reconfigure the social hierarchy and race relations in Sudan with a view to ensure stability and smooth inter-race, inter-ethnic, and inter-religious co-existence. This was the herculean, but achievable, task of the future governments.

The prevalence of Arab-African slave relations was to affect the nature of relations between northern Arab Sudanese and southern Sudanese. Sharkey (2003) indicates that by the year 1898
when the Anglo-Egyptian conquerors came to Sudan, “slaves accounted for approximately one-third of the northern population”. This gives credence to Volt (1978)’s assertion that slave trade created “violent relations and mistrust between Southern tribes and outsiders” (see also Ahmad, 2010; Berry, 2015).

Given the magnitude of socio-economic and political damage posed by slavery, these seeds of mistrust planted by this practice were definitely going to manifest for as long as the memories of the inhuman treatment lasted. As Akyeampong (2001) opines, the historical experiences and evils of slavery can never be easily “deleted” from racial memories. However, this may not, in any way, make it a key reference point of grievances that triggered hostilities between the North and the South, in as much as it cannot be wished away as a contributory factor to the heralding of the north-south animosity in Sudan. As Jok (2011:8) opines, the “history of victimization”, whose beginning was marked by slave raiding of the south, may have been a key factor to unite southerners against the north (see also Ahmad, 2010).

3.6 The Mahdiyyah Rule (1881-1898)

The Turko-Egyptian 60-year colonial reign ended in 1881, after it was overthrown by a movement led by Muhammad Ahmad ibin Abdallah in 1881. Declaring himself the al-Mahdi (or the “the Rightly Guided One”), Abdallah was a holy man (faqir) and religious zealot who regarded himself as God-ordained to mobilize northern Sudanese to expel the Turkish and Egyptian imperialists through waging a jihad (holy war) in order to restore Islam and Islamize the North (Holt and Daly, 2014; Holt, 1967; Sharkey, 2003). Under the Mahdiyyah, Sharia courts applied Islamic laws. The Government of Sudan (2015:n.p) considers the Mahdist as the “first truly national movement organized by the Sudanese people against colonial rule”.

The Mahdist victory over the Ottomans was perceived to be a threat to regional stability by the British which led to a decision to send Charles George Gordon-led forces, and later Herbert Kitchener, to fight off the Mahdi in Sudan. Their successful expedition led to the defeat of the Mahdi successor, Khalifah Abdallah, and ultimate establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium that ruled Sudan from 1899 to 1955.
The Mahdiyyah rule thus proved the strength of Islam as a religious force in Northern Sudan. Its significance in terms of the north-south relations in Sudan cannot be underestimated. Given the fact that the Mahdi established the first theocratic state in Sudan, using Islam as a unifying force, this set a foundation and precedence for future attempts at replicating the same policy despite the diversity of Sudan (Kebbede, 1997). Further, the Mahdi had imposed Sharia law on the south which attracted revolts from the south. It is not surprising that the successors of the Mahdiyyahist rule, that is, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, acknowledged the potential force of Islam to spread to the South if left unchecked (Smith, 2009; Arkell, 1955). Voll (1978) also credits the Mahdi for laying the foundation for future Sudanese Islamic nationalism.

Again it should be stated that the Mahdi rule was never reconciliatory with the southerners. His system of government was Islamic in outlook. It retained the centralized system of governance and the administrative structure that had been established by the Turko-Egyptian rulers; abolished civic education and replaced it with Quaranic schools (Khalwas); abolished civil laws and replaced them with Islamic Sharia laws and other traditional/customary conventions; abolished the Governor-General position and replaced it with the position of the Caliphate; and replaced Provincial Commissioners with Regional Governors (Walis) (Government of Sudan, 2015). Kebbede (1997) asserts that the Mahdi was brutal on the southern Sudanese, and perpetuated slave trade with “greater vigour”, despite fierce opposition and calls for abolition. This surely further created fissures and hostilities between the northern and southern Sudanese.

3.7 Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899-1955)

Various scholars identify the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899-1955), established after the reconquest of Sudan in 1881, as a key part of the complex and complicated historical roots of the conflict between northern Sudanese and southern Sudanese (see for instance; Ahmad, 2010; Collins and Deng, 1984; Daly, 2002; Holt and Daly, 2014; Sabet, 2005; Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012; Okojie, 2013; Powell, 2007; Sharkey, 2012; Fadlalla, 2007; Sharkey, 2003; Smith, 2009). The recurring common argument is that when it came to the policy matrix, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium designed and implemented policies that deepened and widened the regional, ethnic and religious cleavages that existed in Sudan which gave rise to serious conflict.
In unpacking the origin, history and evolution of the Sudanese conflict, one cannot avoid an in-depth dissection and examination of the role played by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium’s more than half a century rule, and its implications of the future of the Sudanese conflict even way after Sudan had proclaimed its independence. In an attempt to respond to a self-imposed question: “What is the problem of Southern Sudan (conflict)?” Alier in Wai (1973:11), points sharply to the colonial fingerprints and footprints of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, albeit acknowledging other relevant factors;

“Some of the aspects of the problem [conflict] are historical, others are cultural and yet others are economic. Some of it has become psychological. But the problem was essentially one of neglect by the British administration between 1898 and 1952 to develop the Southern Sudan”.

Having a state conquered and administered by two partnering colonial powers was in itself political circumstance that should have signalled future challenges. Such a ‘colonial joint venture’, as one may put it in morden corporate jargon, perhaps led Sharkey (2003:4) to note, “[t]he Sudan after 1898 was something of a legal anomaly: a de jure territory of two countries, Great Britain and Egypt”. This was notwithstanding the decision made at the Berlin Conference in 1885 by colonial powers to merge southern Sudan with the rest of Sudan as a single entity (Elimam, 1998). The Condominium was established following the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement (“Agreement for the Administration of the Sudan”) in Cairo, Egypt; on 19 January 1899 by Lord Cromer (the British Counsel-General in Egypt) and Boutros Ghali Pasha (the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs).

According to the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement, the “supreme military and civil command” in the Sudan was vested in the Governor General of Sudan who was appointed on recommendation from the British colonial authority in Cairo, Egypt; with each province having a Provincial Governor, two inspectors and various district commissioners to assist the Governor General (see Daly, 2002; Fadlalla, 2007; Holt, 1961; Shibeika, 1986; Metz, 1991; Smith, 2009). One may not be very mistaken to conclude that whilst on paper the British and the Egyptians co-ruled Sudan, real political power and control was in the hands of the British, in this apparently unequal condominium partnership. Perhaps that is why Deng, in Heleta (2008), adjudged the Condominium to be a “British rule with Egypt as a rubber-stamp half”. Abdelhay et al (2011:466) also agree, asserting that that “the British governed singlehandedly” in Sudan during the Condominium era.
However, one has to keep in mind that by then Egypt was under British colonial rule. It may also then be necessary to understand what the British really wanted in Sudan, and how the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium wanted to govern its colony in pursuit of its colonial interests. Of course, the just like in any of its colonial empire in African, Asia and all over the world, the British colonial policy, as Lugard (2013) puts it, had a “dual mandate” to economically exploit colonies to oil Europe’s industrial development and for the social (poverty reduction, literacy, and civilization, et cetera) and economic benefit to the natives. In line with this colonial philosophy, the work of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium was cut out as follows, as chronicled by Roden (1974: 504);

“The administration set up over the Sudan in 1899 by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium was primarily concerned with building up local government, with subduing recalcitrant tribes in the west and in the south, and with establishing a basic infrastructure, especially in the northeast.”

However, some scholars like Daly (2002) have maintained that the British questioned the political and economic viability of the Sudan as a colony. Lord Cromer, who was the British Consular in Egypt is said to have once commented that the colony comprised “large tracts of useless territory which it would be difficult and costly to administer properly”, whilst Lord Salisbury, the British Premier described it as “Wretched stuff” (Deng and Ruay, 1994:30). Therefore, as Daly (2002) argues, the British interests in occupying the Sudan were driven by the desire to control the Nile Waters so as to dominate Egypt and control the strategic Suez Canal – a key trade route to India and the Far East (see also Deng and Ruay, 1994; Hubbard, 2012; Louis, 2006, Metz, 1991). It is surprising to note that these and other writers quickly ignore the fact that Sudan was heavily endowed with a plethora of natural resources such as gold, chrome ore, iron ore, copper, mica, silver, tungsten, zinc, and hydro-power and agriculture potential along the Nile Rivers (CIA World Factbook, 2015). This made Sudan a British priceless possession. The fact that the British committed itself to fight off competition from the French and King Leopold II of Belgium who were also interested was a clear indication of the colony’s value. Thus, followed to its logical political conclusion, the Condominium policies would naturally be motivated more by the desire to keep the Sudanese colony intact and governable in order to secure British strategic interests, than anything else.
A closer analysis of Sudan’s colonial history under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium from 1899 to 1955 would reveal that the root causes of the Sudanese conflict can be said to be embedded within this period. Using what most scholars identified as root causes, one cannot escape the apparent role played by the Condominium in mid-wiving the ethnic, religious and other identity clashes between and among the Sudanese. Zambakari, in Adejumobi (2015:89) posits,

“The root causes of the war [in Sudan] included political, social and economic marginalization of the peripheries, the role of religion in the state, self-determination, the distribution of power, forced Arabization and Islamization, mismanagement of diversity, national crisis of identity, and the institutional legacy of colonialism”.

This has been alluded to by the majority of scholars who have written on the Sudan conflict (see Basha in Raftopoulus and Alexander, 2006; Collins and Deng, 1984; Kebbede, 1997; Idris, 2006; Khalid, 2010; Machar, 1995; Mamdani, 2009; Musa, 2010; Okojie, 2013; Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012; Powell, 2007; Roden, 1974; Voll, 1978; Sharkey, 2003; Smith, 2009).

The effect of the colonial factor can certainly not be underestimated given its significant and far-reaching implications during the colonial era itself, and far into post-coloniality. All this came packaged in Condominium policies, programmes, projects, institutions, and laws.

3.7.1 Indirect Rule Policy

The British resorted to the system of indirect rule in Sudan whereby they would use traditional indigenous leaders. Zambakari (2013:9) terms this the “technology of [British] colonial governance” which was “initially devised in Asia and perfected in Nigeria and Uganda”. Of indirect rule instituted during the Condominium period, Heleta (2008) posits;

“Like in other colonies across Africa, they [the British] had to institute the “divide-and-rule” policy in Sudan...In order to prevent educated urban class and religious leaders from influencing social and political life in southern Sudan, the British authorities gave “power” to the tribal leaders and ruled through them...They wanted Sudanese to distrust, fear, and fight each other, instead of their colonizers.”

Through indirect rule, the shaykhs would preside over villages, tribes and districts in northern Sudan, whilst tribal chiefs were in charge of the same in the South. The shaykhs would be responsible for dispute resolution at a local level and oversee local area administration (Daly,
2002). However, Daly (2002:5) comments that the indirect rule was “stridently proclaimed but haphazardly enforced” and had too many contradictions that even threatened the preservation of colonial peace and stability in Sudan. Metz (1991) argues that the indirect rule was despised by the elite as preventing the unification of Sudan through worsening tribalism in the north, and insulating the under-developed south from Arabian influence. Likewise, Ali (2014: 381) makes connotes;

“[I]n Sudan colonialism used cultural diversity for negative objectives, namely to help its colonial project by entrenching tribal affiliation and thus be able to ‘divide and rule’. Since the very beginning, the colonial administration promoted the regional self-administration system (or indirect rule) that cedes certain powers to local sheikhs and leaders. However, regardless of how it appeared on the surface, the real objective behind decentralization was to place administrative obstacles that make national integration more difficult to achieve.”

The “divide-and-rule” policy also separated southern Sudanese provinces from the rest of the country and slowed down their economic and social development (Heleta, 2008). On the contrary, the southern Sudanese, at least for that time, would be understandably content with indirect rule as it protected them from the influence of Islam from the North, whilst allowing their traditional leaders to remain in charge of their areas. One can argue and interpret this as a triumph to indirect rule: managed to divide the ruled, expressed colonial control through localized/indigenous structures, and prevented any unity or integration against the Condominium authority. This is because in the end, the Sudanese ethnic groups ultimately saw themselves as separate nationalities, and as nations within nations with access to resources such land, water, and grazing pastures; being defined by one’s affiliation to a specific tribal homeland (Zambakari, 2013). With the passage of time, the Condominium authority started to apply policies that bordered on separating the north Sudanese from the south Sudanese.

3.7.2 The Southern Policy

The Southern Policy is said to have been instituted by the British Colonial Administrators, through a series of laws and administrative regulations, in the 1920s and 1930s. In pursuit of the Southern Policy, a separate administrative system was adopted whereby the British “severed virtually all relations between the northern and southern regions” (Kebbede, 1997: 17). The southern region (designated as for “Blacks”/“Negroids”/“pagans”) was
geographically and administratively separated from the north (designated as “Arabic”/ “Middle-Eastern”/ “Islamic”). The south thus was made up of the three provinces of Bahr el-Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria as well as Nuba Mountains in Southern Kordofan and some parts of the Blue Nile province.

The main policy thrust and objective was to culturally and administratively isolate northern Sudan from southern Sudan with the ultimate end being to reduce the spread of Islam and “subversive” ideas that instigate uprisings against the colonial establishment (Daly, 2002; Metz, 1991; Sharkey, 2003). The North-South detachment served three distinct purposes, viz; (a) preventing the spread and influence of Arab and Muslim southwards; (b) preparing the southern region from eventual integration into the British East Africa Federation/Union; and (c) to control the sources along the length of the Nile (see Ahmad, 2010; Arkell, 1983; Bashir, 1968; Deng and Ruay, 1994; Holt and Daly, 2014; Kebbede, 1997; Wei, 1980; Raheem, 1970; Shibeika, 1986). Thus the Southern Policy would reduce, and avoid, contact and communication between the North and the South (Abusharaf, 2013).

The Southern Policy was premised on the fact that “the Negroid Africans of the south were culturally, and to some extent, racially distinct from their northern Arab Sudanese” (Wei, 1980:378). As read out to the Southern Provinces’ Governors by Sir Harold MacMichael, the Civil Secretary of Sudan, the Southern Policy was meant “to build up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units with the structure and organization based on whatever extent the requirements of equity and good government permit upon the indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs” (Government of Sudan in Wei, 1980:378, see also Deng and Ruay, 1994:41). As Deng and Ruay (1994:39) put it, “[t]he application of this policy was aimed at eradicating everything Arab in the South”. Whilst it served colonial interests, the Southern Policy, in this regard, was clearly a ‘dismemberment project’ or ‘fragmentation initiative’ in as far as Sudanese unity and integration was concerned.

The success of the Southern Policy was hinged on the institution of measures meant to remove all the elements of Arabism in southern Sudan, and preservation of southern customs, traditions and beliefs in the south. It was contained in immigration laws, trade laws, language policy and administrative regulations. Pursuant to this, the colonial government designed and adopted an Education Policy for southern Sudan that encouraged the use of English language in schools and offices, recognized African customary and traditional practices, recognize local indigenous
southern languages (namely the Bari, Dinka, Ndogo, Kresh, Lotuko, Nuer, Madi, Moru, Shilluk and Zande languages) whilst prohibiting Arabic language, Arab dresses and Islam (see Wei, 1980: 378; Khalid, 2010:21). To ensure that the south was guarded from any Islamic influence, missionaries in the south were left to spread Christian faith, promote education and health-care. The raison d'être for missionaries' confinement to the south was the fear that if they were allowed to proselytize in the pre-dominantly Muslim North, the Northerners would be forced to believe that the Condominium was after converting them to Christianity which would provoke resistance (Deng and Ruay, 1994).

This motivated Alier in Wei (1980: 379) to conclude that “[t]he South was left a huge fertile land for anthropologists, where modernization, social and economic development were frowned upon by the British Administration”. The author argues that the Southern Policy was smoothly implemented except minor glitches in Western Bahr el Ghazal Province where there were inter-marriages by slave traders; hence a considerable Arab influence remained visible. However, it also has to be stated that there were challenges faced in implementing the Southern Policy in Nuba Mountains given the fact that the inhabitants of Nuba Mountains “had historical links with the northern provinces” and that the Baggar resisted, insisting that they preferred to be reintegrated with the people in Kordofan (Aleksi, 2009:2).

The British also promulgated a number of laws and regulations that were meant to further cut-off north Sudan from south Sudan. Northerners were prohibited from entering the South, with those northerners - such as Arab merchants who had stayed in the south for so many years – were forcibly moved whilst southerners were barred from travelling to search for employment in northern Sudan (Kebbede, 1997).

First, the Closed Districts Order/Ordinances were passed between 1920 and 1946. These had the effect of sealing off the southern provinces of Darfur, Equatoria, Gezira, Kassala, parts of northern Kordofan, and Upper Nile. This thus set up an administrative system that separated the predominantly Arab/Muslim North from the predominantly black/Christian South (Khalid, 2010).

Then the Passports and Permits Ordinance, and the Passports and Licences Act both adopted in October 1922, together with the Permits to Trade Order of 1925 empowered the Governor General and his representatives to prohibit non-southerners from entering into Southern Sudan
and declared it a ‘closed district’. The southerners were also not permitted to enter northern Sudan although very few had desire to do so (Wai, 1980). Only Arab merchants from the north would be exceptionally permitted to enter the south after rigorous screening, and only confined to designated towns and specific trade routes on the condition that they were issues with permits. The Southern Policy, provided thus:

1) All administrative staff speaking Arabic whether Arab or Black, were to be gradually eliminated in favour of the local recruits from missionary schools.

2) Greek and Syrian traders to be encouraged rather than the Jallaba whose permits ought to be decreased ‘unobtrusively but progressively’, leaving only the best type whose interests were purely commercial.

3) British administrators should avoid speaking Arabic and try to use local languages and, if impossible to do so, must use English. (Deng and Ruay, 1994:39)

The Permits to Trade Order legislation further restricted the hiring of cheap labour from the south by northern Sudanese. The implication of all this was to erect an ‘iron curtain’ on the border between the North and the South, thereby preventing any form of interaction and exchanges between Sudanese from Northern region with those in the Southern region.

Later, the Traditional Chiefs’ Courts Ordinance and the Native Court Ordinance were promulgated in 1931 and 1932 respectively. The law “recognized the tribal structure of the Sudanese society and the importance and effectiveness of customary rules” (Fadlalla, 2009:22). The laws established chiefs’ and native courts presided over by judges, chiefs and elders; with the Native Courts having their jurisdiction in the north whilst the Chiefs’ courts were for the south although they served an almost similar function (Bashir, 1968; Deng, 2011; Ahmad, 2010; Abdel, 1970). One of the significance of the Traditional Chiefs’ Courts Ordinance (1931) and the Native Court Ordinance (1932) was its implications regarding the jurisdictional decisions relating to the people living in Abyei and Kordofan regions. Very few would have thought this was to be a future source of conflict and/or contention. The Ngok Dinka in Abyei and Northern Province of Kordofan were all put under the jurisdiction of chiefs’ courts in the southern region. The Southern Policy reduced the borderline grazing areas to the minimum (Zambakari, 2013; Khalid, 2010).

There was a proclamation made in 1921 to the effect that Governors of the three Southern Provinces were no longer obligated to be in attendance at annual meetings of Provincial
Governors (Zambakari, 2013). These annual meetings had been historically meant for both Southern and Northern Governors. The encouragement for Southern Province Governors to forge and strengthen relations with British East Africa and Uganda brought the north and the south further apart in line with British interests (Zambakari, 2013).

The British, just like any other colonial powers did in Africa and beyond, worked on integrating its colony nationally so as to be able to govern effectively and maximize on economic activities. Sharkey (2003: 9) highlights that “to integrate colonies politically and economically into larger imperial systems, British regimes built communication and transport networks within their domains…” Thus in Sudan, the British built roads, rail lines, schools, agricultural schemes, telecommunications, postal systems and other development projects “to link important areas of economic interest” along the White Nile to control Upper Nile in the north and central region whilst “very few economic, social and administrative structures were built in the South” (Kebbede, 1997:17). However, in this whole process, two key imperatives emerge. Firstly, the South was marginalized and never benefited from any national infrastructural development project. Secondly, it was mostly the educated northern Arabs and Muslims who benefited from opportunities created through this window.

3.7.3 Policy of Arabisation and Islamization

In 1946, the British colonial administration discarded and reversed the Southern Policy. They embarked on an onslaught to reopen the closed North-South boundary and forcefully unite the two regions into a single administration within which Arabic would be the lingua franca and both Northerners and Southerners would participate in national governance structures and institutions. This formal North-South administrative unification followed the decision made at the Sudan Administrative Conference (SAC) in 1946, and the decision was later endorsed at a conference in Juba (the Juba Conference) where the Southern leaders accepted the proposal for Sudanese unification. Most scholars agree that the Southern Policy reversal by the British was a result of the rising tides of nationalism especially from the educated Northern elite and “growing political consciousness” towards unification of Sudan for eventual independence (see Aleksi, 2009; Collins and Tignor, 1967; Fadlalla, 2007; Idris, 2006; Holt, 1961; Khalid, 2010; Sharkey, 2012; Voll, 1978).
It is during these phase that the terms ‘Arabism’, ‘Islamism’, and ‘Sudanism’ were common. Iyob and Khadiagala (2006) provide a clearer understanding of the terms. They define Arabism as “the ideology of ethno-cultural superiority that manifested itself in Sudan following the Ottoman rule in 1821” whilst Islamism “provided the theological and economic justification for the continued subjugation of unbelievers (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 20). On the other hand, Sudanism, according to Iyob and Khadiagala (2006:20), “is a territorially centred nationalist formulation that rejects both the radicalisation of Arabism and sectarianism of Islamism”. Arabization and Islamization obviously had ethnic, racial, religious, and regional significance in as far as the Sudanese polity was concerned.

The idea of the British was to unite the Sudanese through Islam. The education policy of Sudan was thus Arabized. Sharkey (2003: 11) notes that the Sudanese First Minister of Education declared in 1949 that:

“[A]s the Sudan is one country sharing one set of political institutions; it is of great importance that there should be one language that is understood by all its citizens. The language could only be Arabic, and Arabic must therefore be taught in all our schools.”

Moreover, as part of the Arabization of education policy, enrolment at educational institutions excluded the people from the south, mainly non-Arab southerners. For instance, admission at Gordon Memorial College [a training institute for bureaucracy set up by the British colonialists in Khartoum in 1902 and named after the British General, Charles Gordon] privileged those who were male, Muslims, Arab-speaking, Arabs and of “high status” (Sharkey 2003). Technically, the Southerners were excluded on the basis of this discriminatory admission criterion. Thus Arab, Arab culture, Arab language and Islam all had been elevated to superior status with the southern ethnic languages regarded as inferior. Such a policy created hostilities between the South and the North, deepened divisions along the geographical divide, and worked against national unity in diversity.

Authors such as Wai (1980:375) have fiercely argued that the British Southern Policy applied during the Condominium was “essentially right”, further arguing that “the major mistake” and “crime committed against the Southerners, was its abandonment and political unification of the two disparate regions on the eve of the imperial withdrawal”. The author dismisses arguments that blame the Condominium for erecting artificial barriers between the North and the South.
through its separatist Southern Policy asserting that the Condominium never found the relations between the north and south harmonious as their relations were already characterized by tensions and animosities as the previous colonial administrations had not achieved any unity in Sudan (Wei, 1980).

Again the author contends that criticizing the insulation of the south from Arabization would imply that the south wanted Islam and Arabism yet they did not. Lastly, it is argued that the promotion of southern customs, tradition, beliefs, and indigenous languages was laudable considering that the south Sudanese social fabric had been destroyed by foreign influence such as slave raiders. The author also argues that the northern traders were vulgar and ruthless in their dealings with southerners; hence their prohibition from entering into the region was a welcome development (Wei, 1980).

The argument that the South was less developed before and after the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium left is taken as a mere ‘assumption’ and completely erroneous by Deng and Ruay (1994). Deng and Ruay (1994: 33-34) opine;

“It is often assumed that Northern Sudan was more advanced than the South before and after the British conquest. This is simply not true. During the thirteen years of Khalif á Abullahi’s rule, progress in the whole country was brought to a standstill….In the North, the Mahdists destroyed every trace of the old Egyptian administrative institutions and every tribal harmony was either wiped out or greatly weakened….Trade was at its lowest ebb and poverty reigned supreme. The state of things in the North and the South was in every way deplorable. If Southerners had suffered slave-raids and tribal feuds, the Khalifa had drained the Northern population by its Jihad, nocturnal lynchings and starvation. If education had come to a standstill, then it had merely joined the South which never enjoyed any education”.

The arguments propounded by Wei (1980) and Deng and Ruay (1994) are noteworthy. However, the latter part of Deng and Ruay (1994)’s argument is not very substantiated. They do not provide the relevant facts to dismiss the fact that the North was far advanced than the South at independence when the British left Sudan. Nevertheless, what cannot be disputed or dismissed again is the submission that the Southern Policy, together with other colonial laws and programmes implemented during the Condominium widened and deepened the North-South divide in Sudan. Even development was skewed in favour of the North, being concentrated in Khartoum and ignoring the periphery, particularly the South. Voll (1978: 15)
comments; “[b]y the time of independence, there was considerable morden economic activity in the North, but little had been done to encourage morden economic development in the south.”

There is general consensus amongst scholars that the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium’s Southern Policy, which was later reversed only around ten years before Sudanese independence due to the rising forces of nationalism especially in Northern Sudan, left the country more divided that ever before. Even if the Condominium inherited an already ravaged and divided polity, the fact still stands that it left it worse that it was. Khalid (2010:21) concludes that the colonial system “is often regarded as a watershed of civil discord in the Sudan”. Likewise Abusharaf (2013: 75) comments;

“The colonial resolve to separate the South from its Northern counterpart on racial and religious grounds was nearly absolute and unbreakable. Consequently, Sudanese lost opportunity to embrace the differences between themselves and fellow citizens as inherent to the human condition”.

Thus the ethnic and religious politics that created the Afro-Arab, Muslim-Christian, and North-South dichotomy through colonial policy pronouncements and promulgated legislations whilst ignoring the diversity and plurality of Sudan was to be central and pivotal as one of the key drivers of the Sudanese conflict. Again the divisions had been worsened by perceptions, especially perceptions held by the Southerners. The Southerners viewed the British as “their protectors from slavery and exploitation” by the Northerners (Abusharaf, 2013:75). This narrative is very critical in explaining the foundations of the North-South relations. This is because perceptions matter for the reason that they are the basis upon which people make decisions, construct stereotypes and develop attitudes that shape social relationships and/or political interactions.

Given such a background and context, the development of a shared national consciousness in Sudan was going to be an insurmountable and herculean task. The task lay squarely in the hands of the post-colonial governments, to address grievances bordering on, inter alia, both perceived and real; ethnic hostilities, religious intolerance, political subjectivities, inequalities, injustices, social identity, racial animosity, divisions, marginalization, and resentments. Granted, one should also not lose sight of other factors that contributed to the Sudanese conflict
other than the colonial legacy of separation. Such factors will be unpacked during the course of this discussion given that the Sudanese conflict evolved over a long period of time.

3.8 Pre-Independence Arrangements in Sudan

After the World War 1, Sudan witnessed a rise in Islamic nationalism launched mostly from Northern Sudanese provinces which detested indirect rule, policies of the centralized Condominium government Khartoum, and the Southern Policy with the aim of establishing an independent and united Sudan where locals genuinely participate in national governance (Metz, 1991). From 1921 when the United Tribes Society (UTS) – a political nationalist movement founded by Ali Abd al Latif – was formed, many movements followed years later such as the National Unionist Party (NUP) and the Umma Party (Metz, 1991).

From then the British colonial administration undertook actions that can be interpreted as preparations for Sudan’s independence. The Juba Conference of 1947 was attended by 28 delegates, headed by Secretary James Robertson, 3 colonial Governors of the Southern Provinces and other 2 British officials. The Northern Sudan was represented by 5 educated elites, whilst the southern Sudan was represented by 17 officials (comprising 7 tribal chiefs, 2 church representatives and 8 junior civil servants and administrators) (see Ahmad, 2010; Bashir, 1968).

From the minutes of the Conference, one can read that the southerners and northerners mistrusted each other with the idea of unifying Sudan. Even Khalid in Hopkins (2007:191) notes that the minutes of the meeting “are replete with expressions of fear, distrust and eloquent objections to North-South Unification”.

The Southerners requested more time to appreciate modern parliamentary governance and preferred to be apprenticed under the British colonial administration but their pleas could not win the day against the “highly educated and sophisticated Northern delegates” (see Gurtong Trust, 2016; Khalid in Hopkins; 2007:192; Johnson, 2014:6). The Juba Conference agreed to have unity in Sudan, with “vague references to the protection of the political and economic interests of the South” (Khalid in Hopkins, 2007:192). However, the Southerners later petitioned the British authorities stating that in absence of a federation they preferred being
administered by a British Foreign Office-appointed High Commissioner placed under the United Nations Trusteeship until such a time they were capable of deciding their own future, or else they would resort to “other alternatives to determine their own future” (Johnson, 2014:9).

After the Sudan National Legislative Assembly (NLA) was formed in 1948 to provide guidance to the establishment of self-rule in a unified Sudan, the South got a ‘token’ and ‘symbolic’ representation, after only 13 individuals were picked to represent the south in the in the NLA out of a total of 75 seats (see O’Ballance, 2000; Ylonen in Oberg and Ostrom, 2008). Motions moved by the South to codify the Juba guarantees were objected by the Northern majority.

In February 1953, at a Cairo Conference attended by Northerners without Southern representatives, the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement was signed between the British and Egyptians affirming the right to self-determination for the Sudanese and provided for a transitional period of three years from Condominium rule to self-governance in Sudan (Voll, 1978; Metz, 1991, Khalid in Hopkins, 2007; Ylonen, in Oberg and Ostrom; 2008). The civil service was to be Sudanized in the transitional period, and the new Constitution had a clause that obligated Sudanese to have a referendum to choose whether they wanted independence or having unity with Egypt.

After the Constituent Assembly elections, Ismail El Azhari was elected the first Prime Minister. In the new Government, the South, as Khalid in Hopkins (2007:193) puts it, was given a “pitiful representation at the humblest echelons of the civil service” forcing them to form the Liberal Party to fight for Federalism. The Constituent Assembly made a unanimous decision to declare independence in Sudan, and decided not to have a referendum as was provided in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement.

Khalid in Hopkins (2007:193) posits that the Sudanese had two pertinent questions, that is, “what was there for the South in this independence?”, and “what were the guarantees for the protection of its rights in the new political dispensation?”. The Declaration for Independence had a commitment to “give due consideration to the demands of the South for a federal status” (Khalid in Hopkins, 2007:193). The first parliamentary elections of 1954 were won overwhelmingly by Northern political parties, opening the stage for the domination of national governance by the northern elite. Moreover, Sudanization (or nationalization of jobs through replacing colonial administrators with Sudanese) unfairly and unjustly favoured Northerners,
who occupied 800 civil service positions compared to 8 occupied by Southerners, since most Southerners could not get civil service positions as they were disadvantaged by the replacement of English with Arabic as the official language of communication, and also lacked experience and requisite qualifications (Abdel, 1970; Ahmad, 2010; Badal, 1976; Deng and Ruay, 1994; Johnson, 2014; Abusharaf, 2013; Ylonen in Oberg and Ostrom, 2008). Hence, they called for the Africanization of the civil service, national army and police, especially in the South (Badal, 1976).

Southerners saw themselves as unrepresented fairly in Government and other national institutions. Further, Johnson (2003), as cited in Ylonen, in Oberg and Ostrom (2008:133) posits:

“There was thus widespread discontent in the South as a result of the outcome of the 1954 elections and the Sudanization process. The rapid increase of Northerners in the South as administrators, senior officers in the army and police, teachers in government schools and as merchants, increased Southern fears of Northern domination and colonization”.

This led to the army mutiny in August 1955 when the Equatoria brigade/corps revolted, sparking the First Civil War in Sudan.

3.9 Post-Colonial Sudan

The landmark unanimous vote for the Declaration of Independence made in Parliament on 19 December 1955 by both the northern and southern Sudanese political parties basing on the promise that federal status will be conferred to the South upon the attainment of national independence remained an unfulfilled promise for long. Multi-party democracy came to Sudan on 1 January 1956 but the post-colonial Governments neglected and brushed aside the calls for federalism by Southerners resulting in protracted civil wars (O’Ballance, 2000). The Sudanese conflict history was marked by the First Civil War in Sudan (1955-1972) which led to the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement (1972); the Second Civil War in Sudan (1983-2005) which led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) and the Government of National Unity (2005-2011).

3.10 First Civil War in Sudan (1955-1972)
The rebellion in Torit, Equatoria by army troops marked the outbreak of the First Civil War in 1955. They targeted army garrisons, administrators and merchants who, in their view, personified the Northern domination (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006). As Voll (1978:18) described the development, “one cloud had risen on the horizon”. To Iyob and Khadiagala (2006), two fundamental issues were unresolved when the British left upon independence, that is, whether Sudan will be unitary or federal, and whether the country will be Islamic or secular. The British had left “hastily without rectifying their wrongs” (Government of South Sudan, 2015). Machar (1995:np) describes the British actions as “one of the greatest blunders ever made in the diplomacy of the British colonial history”. To the detriment of the situation, post-colonial governments failed to address the ‘Southern Question’, specifically the promise for federalism. With reference to the post-independence Governments, Voll (1978:19) notes;

“The issues relating to what the permanent form of the political system should be…were never resolved to the satisfaction of the political forces. The problem of the South remained unsolved and southern leaders began to withdraw in discouragement…[E]ven among the northern politicians, the minimum consensus for effective government was not achieved, with politics becoming little more than an arena for personal, factional, and sectarian feuds.”

The drivers of the First Civil War centred around federation claims by the Southerners, although many grievances were at play. There is a general consensus amongst scholars, that the key driver of the civil war that was waged by different rebel groups from southern Sudan against the central Government of Sudan (GoS) between 1955 and 1972 was the failure of the northern-dominated Sudanese governments to satisfactorily address the Southern grievances, chief among them, the issue of regional autonomy, against a background of a people that had endured so many years of geographic, political, social and cultural marginalization as well as under-representation in national government structures (see Abusharaf, 2013; Basha in Raftopoulos and Alexander, 2006; Deng and Ruay, 1994; Fadalla, 2007; Garang, 2005; Government of Sudan, 2015; Government of South Sudan, 2015; Holt and Daly, 2014; Idris, 2005; Insight on Conflict, 2015; Johnson, 2014; Kebbede, 1997; Khalid, 2010; Machar, 1995; Metz, 1991; Musa, 2010; Smith, 2009; Voll, 1978; Ylonen, 2008; Zambakari, 2013). Hence the terms “marginalization”, “monopolization”, “under-representation”, “exclusion”, “deprivation”, “inequality”, “isolation”, “domination”, “suppression”, “oppression”, “hegemony”, and related descriptions feature prominently in Sudan conflict literature with reference to the North-South relations in the country.
3.11 Immediate Post-Independence Rule (1956-1958)

In July 1956, a Sovereign Council was set up in Sudan to replace Ismail al-Azhari’s National Unionist Party (NUP) government. The five-member Council, which was headed by Abdallah Khalil as the Prime Minister, ruled for the two years up to 1958 when new parliamentary elections were conducted (Johnson, 2014). In the 1958 elections, the Umma Party, a northern Islamic political party, got the majority votes and it formed a coalition government with the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) – a party formed by a splinter group from NUP - which had second highest number of votes (Deng and Ruay, 1994). In November 1958, Lieutenant-General Ibrahim Abboud, the Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan Armed Forces carried out a coup and established a military government (Voll, 1978).

It is imperative to consider how the immediate post independence authority in Sudan treated the Southern question. The southern members of the National Assembly had voted for Ismail al-Azhari’s NUP government as they had been promised “full consideration of the Southern federal status” (O’Ballance, 2000:10). However, they continued to be outvoted in the National Assembly given their numerical inferiority whenever the issue was brought up for consideration. Al-Azhari’s government in 1956 only had two Cabinet ministers from the South, Bullen Alier and Buth Diu, who were later relieved of their duties for opposing the government’s southern policy (O’Ballance, 2000).

A series of radical policy measures adopted by the immediate post-independence authorities, including Prime Minister Abdallah Khalil, were met with disfavour and worsened the North-South relations. For instance, missionary schools were nationalized by government in 1957, much to the chagrin of the Christian missionaries and southerners, in a move interpreted as a precursor to Arabization and Islamization (Breidlid, 2011; Breidlid et al, 2014; Deng and Ruay, 1994; Poggo, 2002). Unjust policy measures, such as the imbalance in budget allocation for development programmes skewed in favour of the north persisted, for instance, funds meant for the Azande Development Scheme were reduced during al-Azhari’s tenure but southern voices on the matter were never considered (O’Ballance, 2000).

There was general resentment and dissatisfaction with the performance of the characteristically “artificial and opportunistic” Premier Khalil-led coalition government, which was riddled with
“unending political squabbles, chaos and factionalism” (Deng and Ruay, 1994:88). This made southerners to lose trust in the northern-dominated governments and resolved to continue the struggle for self-determination against long-term social, economic, political injustices (Basha in Alexander and Raftopoulus, 2006).

Premier Khalil rejected the recommendation of the Constitutional Committee of 1957 with respect to the federal state of South Sudan (Johnson, 2014; Voll, 1978). As a result, southerners resorted to armed struggle, and political parties such as the Southern Federal Party (SFP) – founded by Izbone Mendiri in 1957 - were formed to push for southern grievances, among them federalism (and later autonomy) for the south, independence of the army, separate economic development programme for the south, and the equality of English and Christianity vis-à-vis Arabic and Islam (Deng and Ruay, 1994; Basha in Alexander and Raftopoulus, 2006; O’Ballance, 2000). Thus from 1956, the northern-dominated government pushed for Arabization and Islamization of the South through its ideological position and policy direction, thereby succeeding “to put an Islamic stamp on the nation” (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 80).

3.11.1 General Ibrahim Abboud Military Rule (1958-1964)

Lieutenant General Ibrahim Abboud, the Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan Armed Forces staged a coup against the civilian government of Prime Minister Khalil on 17 November 1958 and went on to suspend the constitution, dissolve the parliament, suspended all political parties, and establish the first military government in Sudan. The coup was argued to have been necessitated by the failure of the post-independence governments to address “economic problems and the problem of national unity” as well as factionalism within the coalition political parties Umma Party and PDP, and failure to deal manage the country’s foreign policy (Arik, 2007: np, Breidlid, 2014: 206).

General Abboud’s reign continued upto October 1964 when he was forced to relinquish power after a popular uprising thereby paving way for a Supreme Council. He could not manage to restore economic and political stability, ruled by military decrees and curtailed civil liberties, and oversaw further economic decline in Sudan (O’Ballance, 2000; Voll, 1978).
With regards to the Southern Question, General Abboud continued with the policies of Islamization and Arabization in Southern Sudan as implemented by the Sudanese leaders who came before him, and he did this essentially via the education system (Breidlid, 2014: 205; Poggo, 2002: 72). His government promulgated the Missionary Societies Act of 1962 which obligated foreign missionaries, concentrated in the South, to only operate in Sudan upon being granted residence licences by government, and disallowed them from proselytising on the pretext that missionaries were assisting Southern rebels and opposed government’s policy of national integration (O’Ballance, 2000). As a result, over 300 Christian missionaries were expelled from South Sudan whilst the abolition of Christian Sunday as a Sabbath holiday and its replacement by Muslim Friday in the predominantly Christian South together with the discouragement and forced replacement of Christian names by Arabic/Islamic names was met with disfavour by Southerners (Deng, 2001; Okojie 2013; Salman, 2013; Sharkey, 2012).

Islam began to be compulsorily taught as a subject in all schools, missionaries denied access to schools, and schools were Islamized and nationalised in southern provinces. Poggo (2002: 73) stated that during Abboud’s rule from 1958-1965, 18 Islamic intermediate schools and one secondary school was built in Sudan through a government programme of building mosques, ma’ahads and Khalwas (Qu’ranic schools) with all children expected to attend the Khalwas regardless of their religious affiliation. Thus Arabization and Islamization policy sought to spread Arab identity, Arabic language, ideology of Arab cultural supremacy and Arab domination into the southern frontier so as to politically unify Sudan through language and religion (Poggo, 20002; Sharkey, 2008, Badal, 1990).

The abolition of all political parties by General Abboud meant that Southern politicians no longer had any political platform to express their voices, organize and mobilize which ultimately “rendered them mute” whilst at the same time existence of a de facto media censorship policy had the implication that Southern views and report of events in southern Sudan was suppressed (O’Ballance, 2000: 16). As the author puts it, “a blanket of silence or grass curtain descended on the south” due to the arrest of many Southern political movements, forced withdrawal of Southerners from their civil service positions and Southern politicians flew into exile in the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (O’Ballance, 2000: 16). Moreover, the Military Council that was in charge during Abboud’s era was unrepresentative in terms of regional balance given that it had only one Minister in Cabinet, that is, Santino Deng who was the Minister of Animal Resources. The first Minister of Interior
after independence is reported to have said: “Sudan is an Arab country and whoever does not feel Arab should quit” (Deng and Gifford in Kebbede, 1997:18). This was against a background where Southerners were being barred from government and Foreign service if they could not speak, write or read Arabic (Poggo, 2002: 75; Salman, 2013: 356). It may be surprising that “in 1961 General Abboud was welcomed to the White House by President Kennedy, who praised Sudan for having set a good example for living in peace with its neighbours” (The New York Times, 1983: np).

Against their demands for greater autonomy and freedom, Southerners were disillusioned and dissatisfied with General Abboud’s regime thereby resorting to intensified political movements and rebellions. As the Government of Sudan noted, “the General [Abboud]’s term in office witnessed escalation of the war in south Sudan, too, which began to take on ever more complicated dimensions” (Government of Sudan, 2015: np). Over and above the highlighted grievances, the southerners were infuriated by the regional disparities in terms of economic development. Badal (1990) notes that the colonially-laid foundations of “educational and socio-economic imbalances” that were skewed in favour of the North-Central areas was perpetuated under General Abboud with Western and Southern parts of Sudan being neglected, justifying their calls for autonomy and freedom. The regional economic disparities were unattended to despite General Abboud being credited for improving economic growth, industrial capital, developing hydro-electric schemes and irrigation projects (O’Ballance, 2000: 25).

All this gave birth to the formation of political movements by the southerners to wage a war against injustices perpetuated by Northern-dominated governments. This started with the formation of the Sudan-African Closed Districts National Union in 1962 by the trio of William Deng Nhial (the party Secretary General), Joseph Oduho (the party President) and Father Saturnino Lohure (the party patron) who were exiled in Kinshasa, Zaire (Badal, 1976; Gurtong, 2016; Poggo, 2002; Voll, 1978). The party was later renamed Sudan African National Union (SANU) in 1963 and it moved its headquarters to Kampala, Uganda. SANU’s principal aim “to obtain complete independence for the South, to be achieved by diplomatic and peaceful means” hence its initial actions were that of sending petitions to the UN and OAU although they never got any support (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006; O’Ballance, 2000; Salman, 2013; Voll, 1978).
From 1963, the Southerners organized under SANU and other political groupings united to form the Land Freedom Army (LFA), and adopted the name Anya-Nya (which means “snake poison/venom”/ “poisonous insect”/ “poisonous concoction” in the Madi, Moru and Loyuko dialects) to wage a guerrilla war against the central Government of Sudan (see Basha in Alexander and Raftopolus, 2006: 11; O’Ballance, 2000: 19; Metz, 1997: np). The Anya Nya established bases and training camps in southern Sudan frontiers and attacked Government of Sudan troops and those southerners collaborating with the Government, using guerrilla tactics and scortched earth policy (Arik, 2007; Breidlid et al, 2014; Breidlid, 2011; Musa, 2010). The Government forces reacted through burning villages, hospitals, medical centres, huts and punishing those accused of harbouring the Anya-Nya fighters in the south especially in Equatoria, Juba, Wau, Bahr al Ghazal, Upper Nile, among others (O’Ballance, 2000).

Thus there was instability in Sudan: guerrilla warfare in the south, atrocities, strikes and student protests in Khartoum, lawlessness, banditry, insurgency, and widespread chaos. The “October Revolution” (the mass demonstrations in Khartoum) finally led to General Abboud’s downfall in November 1964, paving way for the establishment of a Supreme Council of State led by Sir al-Khatim al-Khalifah on an acting basis before the coming in of Colonel Jaafar al-Nimeiri.

In assessing General Abboud’s tenure, O’Ballance (2000: 25) argues that Abboud’s greatest undoing was his inability to unite his subordinates and failure to resolve the southern problem, referring to the latter as the “last straw in his downfall”. Likewise, Kebbede (1997: 18) states that Abboud’s policies that “undermined the identity, cultures and customs of the South” and “despised [their] indigenous beliefs” forcefully.

### 3.11.2 Jaffar Nimeiri Regime (1964-1985)

The period after General Abboud’s fall was ruled by a none-month transitional government headed by Sir al-Khatim al-Khalifah at first, then later by Muhammad Ahmad Mahgoub and Sadiq al-Mahdi (all through NUP-Umma Coalitions) before the ‘May Revolution’ and coup of 25 May 1969 brought to power Colonel Jaafar al-Nimeiri as the head of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) with Babiker Awadallah as the Prime Minister (Fadlalla, 2007; Government of Sudan, 2015; Johnson, 2014; Smith, 2009; Voll, 1978).
It is during period that notable attempts were made to attend to the Southern grievances, notably, the Commission of Enquiry of the South (set up to examine the unrest in the South on 7 September 1964); the Khartoum Roundtable Conference of 16-29 March 1965; and the Roundtable Conference Report produced in September 1966. The Commission of Enquiry’s recommendation for a Southern autonomy were ignored whilst at the Roundtable Conference the Government, which was also attended by Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda; rejected the Southern proposals for a federation and Southern referendum to decide on self-determination; and only resolved to give Southerners governmental and administrative posts (Kebbede, 1997; Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006; O’Ballance, 2000). The South Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG) for the south formed in 1968 by Aggrey Jordan and deputized by Gordon Mayen, and later changed to the Nile Provisional Government (NPG), did not succeed as it was affected by factionalism resulting in splits into Zande separatist movement (in Zande Region), Anyidi Revolutionary Government, Sudan-Azania Government (in Eastern Sudan) and Suer River Revolutionary Government (in Western Equatoria Region) (O’Ballance, 2000; Voll, 1978).

Political groups continued to proliferate in the South including the Southern Front, Southern Unity Party, Liberal Party and Southern Peace Party, whose formation was also working to the advantage of the Government’s divide and rule strategy (O’Ballance, 2000). They also split, for instance some SANU leaders split to form Azania Liberation Front (ALF), Sudan African Liberation Front (SALF), and Sudan African Freedom Fighters Union of Conservatives (SAFFUC) – some of the parties in exile and at home preferred complete independence of South Sudan some opted for a united Sudan whilst some wanted federal status (Johnson, 2014). The few goodwill political gestures under Khalifa and Mahgoub’s governments such as the release of Southern political detainees, declaration of Sundays and Christmas days as holidays, offers of southern autonomy, and calls for freedom and equality, reconciliation through the signing of the National Reconciliation Agreement in April 1978, creation of “peace villages” did not stop the civil war from the South (see Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006; O’Ballance, 2000).

The Anya-Nya fighters took advantage of the Cold War dynamic as they seized some ammunition transported by Britain, France, US and Soviet Union meant to arm various African opposition groups in Africa (O’Ballance, 2000). Israel is said to have trained Anya-Nya recruits, the South Sudanese exiled community in Middle East, Europe and the US assisted in
arms purchase, and the Soviet Union delivered vast quantities of military equipment and armoured vehicles in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Metz, 1997).

Nimeiri’s rule, marked by the establishment of a party state (the Sudanese Socialist Party), censorship and military repression, faced opposition from both Northerners (Umma Party, Muslim Brotherhood, Democratic Unionist Party, and Communists) and Southerners as evidenced by failed attempted coup led by Lieutenant Hussein Osman and another by Major Hashim al-Atta, in 1966 and 1971 respectively (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006). He, however, was convinced that the North differed from the South geographically, historically, socio-culturally and economically; hence his willingness and readiness to grant autonomy to the southern region within the framework of a united socialist Sudan as outlined in the June Declaration of 1969 (O’Ballance, 2000; Salman, 2013; Yokwe, 1997). Nimeiri’s approach to the Southern problem has, however, been interpreted as being motivated by the desire to consolidate power in Northern Sudan through alliances in the South (Wakoson in Shin, 2004:241).

With the intensification of the Anya-Nya offensive, especially after the formation of the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) in August 1971 led by Joseph Lagu; Nimeiri realized that the war was unwinnable and that it was claiming over 500,000 human lives, draining national resources and arresting economic development hence the decision to engage in peace talks (see Johnson, 2014; Metz, 1997; Voll, 1978). It is these talks that culminated into the signing of a peace agreement in Addis, Ethiopia on 27 February 1972 and ratified on 27 March 1972.

3.11.3 Addis Ababa Accord/Agreement on the Problem of the Sudan (1972)
The negotiations, which started in May 1971 between Northern and Southern delegations, were facilitated by the then leader of Ethiopia, Emperor Haile Selassie, together with the OAU, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Catholic Relief Agencies, All Africa Council of Churches, and World Council of Churches (WCC), with Government represented by Abel Alier (Vice President and Minister of South Affairs) whilst the southern team led by Izbone Mendiri with Mading de Garang representing SSLM and Colonel Frederick Magot representing Anya-Nya Armed Forces (ANF) (Abusharaf, 2013: 77; O’Ballance, 2000: 86; Salman, 2013: 364).
Details of the Addis Ababa Agreement were enshrined in the Constitution of Sudan through the Southern Provinces Self-Government Act of 1972, and according to Article 2 of the Addis Ababa Agreement, 1972, were issued as “organic law which cannot be amended except by a three quarters majority of the People’s National Assembly and confirmed by a two-thirds majority in a referendum held in the three Southern Provinces”. The South was recognized as a self-governing Region (comprising the three provinces of Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile) and given political leadership and control through a House of Assembly, a High Executive Council (HEC) headed by a President who will be a Vice President of Sudan, and a Regional Development Corporation to steer socio-economic development in the southern region, all head-quartered in Juba.

The Agreement, which accorded Southerners representation in the national parliament and all spheres of national government, also guaranteed Southerners their rights to fundamental human rights, religion, equal opportunity to education, employment, commerce, and profession as well as provisions governing issues of revenue management, national army composition (formation of the Southern Command, a national force of 12,000 army men with the South and the North contributing an equal number of officers, within 5 years), ceasefire terms, and refugee resettlement modalities (Addis Ababa Agreement, 1972). According to the agreement, the central government in Khartoum retained control over three main aspects of governance, namely national defence, foreign policy and what the Government of Sudan (2015) termed “sovereignty matters”, that is, economic and social development planning, international trade, and home affairs’ issues of immigration and citizenship.

In examining the Addis Ababa Agreement, Badal (1976: 472) remarked that the Agreement managed to take “some of the heat out of the North-South conflict, allowing belligerent parties ample opportunity to re-examine their attitudes toward each other”. Indeed, the Addis Ababa Agreement brought relative peace to Sudan which lasted for 10 years before the outbreak of another war (the Second Civil War) from 1982 to 2005. Malwal, as cited in Shin (2004:244), hinted that long lasting peace in Sudan was affected by “the role of religion in national politics, the system of government and the pace, and equitability of economic and social development” together with the inequitable distribution of wealth and need for multi-party system. For instance, the author indicates that in its Six Year Plan (1976-1983), the Government of Sudan allocated US$225 million yet by 1982 only US$45 million of this had been spent.
The Addis Ababa Agreement’s failure is also attributed to the failure of government to smoothly integrate Anya Nya forces into the national army, especially the transfer of soldiers from the South to the North which was taken as driven by the desire to neutralize power of the Southern soldiers, and the recruitment, training and deployment of more Northern soldiers than Southerners against the Addis Ababa Agreement agreed ratio, hence counter mutinies in Juba (1974), Akobo (1975), and Wau (1974 and 1976), and other garrisons in Pibor, Pochalla, Rumbek, Kapoeta, and Upper Nile; which ultimately resulted into Anya Nya II movement (Shin, 2004). This was critical especially considering that security had been the centre of power struggle during the peace negotiations (Alier in Shin, 2004).

It has been stated that the newly autonomous Southern Sudan had political leadership structures dominated by the Dinka tribe which then resulted in discontentment amongst other southern tribes (Government of Sudan, 2015). In June 1983 the Government abolished the elected regional government and its assembly in Juba, ostensibly to resolve ethnic imbalances, with Nimeiri as the Governor-General and a few non-Dinka southerners were rewarded with “political posts and material largesse” in what Kebbede (1997:23) terms “a prurient effort to ‘divide and rule’ the region” through playing the Southern leaders against each other. Joseph Lagu, a Madi from Equatoria in the South, who was serving as the Vice President, is argued to have been involved in the idea to sub-divide the south into 3 regions in an effort to prop up his political power and control over Southern ethnic groups (Kebbede, 1997). Most southerners perceived the division, which was unconstitutional through the Republican Order Number 1 of 5 June 1983, as an attempt to neutralize and weaken the power of the newly autonomous regional government which then resulted in civil unrest and opposition against government (see Basha in Raftopoulus and Alexander, 2006:13; Machar, 1995: np; Salih in Kebbede, 1997: 24; Shin, 2004:254).

Most scholars attribute two key decisions by Nimeiri’s Government as triggers of the 21 years long Second Civil War in Sudan, that is the introduction of Sharia law for the whole of Sudan and the attempted demarcation of North-South boundary after the discovery of vast oil reserves by the US-based Chevron Corporation in Bentiu District in 1978, Southern Kordofan and Upper Nile in 1979, Unity Oilfields in 1980, Adar Oilfields in 1981, Heglig in 1982 (see Basha in Raftopoulus and Alexander, 2006; Kebbede, 1997; Machar, 1995; O’Ballance, 2000; Shin, 2004; Voll, 1978). The re-demarcation of the boundary, facilitated by the enactment of the
People’s Regional Government Act of 1980, was meant to ensure that the oil reserves in the Southern region estimated at 5 billion barrels come under Northern territorial control which contravened the Addis Ababa Agreement which stressed the sanctity of southern borders as inherited from the colonial government in January 1956. Over and above that, the Northern government declared plans to construct oil refineries in the north instead of refining it near the oilfields in the south. When this was resisted by the Southerners, the Government of Sudan compromised by creating the Unity State to administer the oilfields (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006:88). This brings a resource control dimension to the Sudanese conflict. The imposition of Sharia law, through decrees referred to as the ‘September Laws’ in 1983 contravened the 1973 secular constitution of Sudan whilst the declaration of Arabic as “the exclusive official language of the whole country” was an assault on Article 6 of the Addis Ababa Agreement which stipulated that English was to be “the principal language for the Southern Region” (Addis Ababa Agreement, 1972). To Kebbede (1997:25), the imposition of Sharia laws was “[t]he final rebuke to the Southern people” as those who opposed this were imprisoned and/or executed.

Other than the two trigger issues of oil and imposition of Sharia law, the Second Civil War was also caused by the expropriation of farming land in the south by Government and its tempering with the autonomy of the southern region. In pursuit of a capitalized export-oriented agriculture initiative to turn Sudan into the ‘bread basket’ of the Middle-East; the Government of Sudan, complemented with funding from pro-sectarian parties’ Islamic banks, facilitated the expansion of large-scale mechanized farming into the southern region, especially around Upper Nile and Southern Kordofan provinces thereby taking away farming and grazing lands from indigenous farmers and native pastoralists which all attracted “resentments and hostilities” in the South (see Kebbede, 1997:23; el-Battahani in Simmons and Dixon, 2006:12).

Economic decline is also argued to have contributed to the rising forces behind Anya Nya II uprisings. Nimeiri initially well-managed the economy through a strategic foreign policy as he shifted alliance from Soviet Union to the West thereby attracting investments and financial assistance (Kebbede, 1997). Sudan is reported to have “received the largest US economic and military aid in Africa after Egypt for its support of the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt in the late 1970s whilst international leaders collectively “poured more than US$2 billion into Sudan’s agriculture between 1975 and 1985” (Voll cited in Kebbede, 1997:20). However, the economic progress was reversed due to world recession, rising oil prices,
economic mismanagement, corruption, and the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), resulting in unemployment and widespread poverty, which all provoked uprisings. As the southern Sudan was less developed, it was always more affected by any economic shocks.


The above-discussed factors all angered Southerners giving rise to Anya Nya II or the Second Civil War in 1983 initially in Kordofan, Bar el-Ghazal and Upper Nile. Rebellions were organized under the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), which had renamed from SSLM, in 1983 under the leadership of Dr. John Garang De Mabior whose agenda was to create a “New Sudan” with a reformed and plural political system. The chief objective of the SPLM/A, as stated in its manifesto was “to prevent Sudan from the inevitable disintegration by providing a correct solution to the nationality and religious questions within the context of a united Sudan and establish a new cultural order within a new Sudan” (Basha in Raftopoulus and Alexander, 2006: 13).

During the course of the Second Civil War from 1983 to 2005; Nimeiri was deposed by a military coup on 6 April 1985 paving way for civilian governments led by Al-Jazuli Dafallah (Prime Minister from 1985-1986) and Sadiq al-Mahdi (Prime Minister from 1986-1989). Lieutenant General Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir and his National Islamic Front (NIF) Party removed Sadiq al-Mahdi through a military coup backed by Hassan el-Turabi and the Muslim Brotherhood thereby assuming office on 30 June 1989.

Bashir’s reinforcement of Sharia, alleged human rights abuses, the NIF’s pan-Islamist stance which claimed to resist the US’ ‘reconquest of the Islamic world’, and the SPLM/A’s diplomatic offensive in the region and beyond resulted in the isolation of Sudan, especially by the Western world as the US suspended bilateral trade, foreign assistance whilst the International Monetary Fund (IMF) suspended Sudan’s membership (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 102). This isolation was to continue even into the early 21st century when Sudan was accused of harbouring terrorist groups after Osama bin Laden stayed in the country in the early 1990s and was later implicated as one of the architects behind the September 11 Attacks (see Bergen, 2001; Cilliers, 2006; Deng et al, 2008; Government of Sudan, 2015; Kepel, 2002; Max and Elbushra, 2006). This left it with limited option other than engaging the Eastern Asia
countries, namely China, Malaysia and others. Bashir’s government, especially from the early 1990s, according to Khalid (2010: xxviii), “ceased to see Sudan’s historic fratricidal conflict as a civil war” and “recreated it into a *jihad* (holy war)” via the deployment of the Peoples’ Defence Forces (PDF) troops with “Northern adversaries” seen as *mujahideen* (fighters for Allah’s cause) and those who died were seen as *Shuhada* (martyrs) “who would reside in heaven and be instantly rewarded”.

It attempted to turn back the clock through spreading Islamization and Arabization in Sudan. Bashir also divided Sudan into 9 states, 66 provinces and 281 local government areas on the pretext of devolving power and closing the North-South gap much to the chagrin of Southerners. The blocking of international aid to reach Southerners by the Khartoum government resulted in humanitarian crisis and famine up until the collaboration between the UN, Government of Sudan and SPLM/A to establish Operation Lifeline Sudan in 1989 for UN agencies and other NGOs extended food aid to drought-stricken and war-ravaged Southerners (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006; Schafer, 2007).

In the midst of civil war, attempts were made to bring together the Southern rebel leaders and the Government of Sudan for peace talks. The Government of Sudan (2015) maintains that the Southern political movements were forced to accept negotiations after the realization that Khartoum had been steadfast against isolation and economic challenges. It should be stressed that the positions of the southerners fronted largely by the SPLA were evolving and at times differing amongst the Southerners hence the conflict was characterised by factionalism, disagreements and splinters. The uniting cause was the fight against the Government in Khartoum. Johnson (2014:20-21) notes;

> “Southern political leaders disagreed about their objectives. The most common proposal was a return to the provisions of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the resurrection of a single Southern Region as a means by which southerners themselves could resolve their differences. The SPLM/SPLA, though, maintained its position that a return to the pre-1983 constitutional structure was out of the question. In their analysis, the Addis Ababa Agreement had failed to address the fundamental inequalities in the country, leaving the Southern Region vulnerable to manipulation from the centre”.

This saw the split of SPLM/A in August 1991 which led to the emergence of the two SPLM/A factions, *viz.*, SPLM/A (Torit or Mainstream) led by John Garang and SPLAM/A (Nasir or
United, named after the Nasir Declaration of 28 August 1991) led by Riek Machar with Lam Akol and Gordon Kong. The split was caused by differences in opinion as the Nasir faction favoured secession of South Sudan from Sudan whereas John Garang preferred “a united secular Sudan” whereby “the South secure equal status to the Muslim north” (O’Ballance, 2000:172; also see Ahmad, 2010:7; el-Battahani in Simmons and Dixon, 2006:12; Johnson, 2014: 22; Rogier, 2005:22; Schafer, 2007:5).

Later in October 1994, the SPLM/A United further split to form the Southern Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/SSIA) led by Riek Machar and the SPLM/A United led by Lam Akol in West Central Upper Nile. This fractionalization and factionalism within Southern political movements mostly led to the ethnicization of conflict largely between the Dinka and Nuer. For instance, when Machar broke away from SPLM/A in August 1991, there was the Bor Massacre wherein the ethnic Nuers aligned to Machar massacred the ethnic Dinkas aligned to Garang (O’Ballance, 2000; Kebede, 1997; Voll, 1978).

It should also be noted that during the course of the Second Civil War, a conflict erupted in the Darfur Region in Western Sudan in February 2003, commonly referred to as the Darfur Conflict. Combined forces of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) fought against the Government of Sudan for alleged political oppression; land disputes between the sedentary and nomadic Arabs and non-Arabs in Darfur arising from changing land ownership patterns and environmental pressures; social disruption; water access conflicts; and economic marginalization of the non-Arabs in the Darfur region following the drought-induced migration of many nomadic ethnic groups in search of farmlands and grazing areas; and their settling into Darfur lands which were regarded as ‘Dar’ meaning ‘homeland’ by the Darfurians (De Waal, 2005; Hagan and Raymond-Richmond, 2009; Hassan and Ray, 2009; Insight on Conflict, 2015; Mamdani, 2009; Prunier, 2008, University of Khartoum Peace Research Institute, 2006).

The Government of Sudan is reported to have extended financial assistance and weapons to the nomad Arab indigenous African pastoralists, specifically the Rizeigat (Darfur’s largest Arabic group) and Misseriya Janjaweed (translated to ‘devils on horseback’) militia, to fight against the sedentary non-Arab Fur (Darfur’s largest ethnic group), Zaghawa (Darfur’s second largest ethnic group) and Masalit ethnic groups in Darfur resulting in atrocities, massive displacements.
of over two million people and hundreds of thousands lost their lives (see Cockett, 2010; Daly, 2010; Insight on Conflict, 2015; Mamdani, 2009; Sikainga, 2009).

Although the Darfur Conflict was not entirely part of the North-South civil war, the SPLM/A also fought in Darfur on the side of rebels against the Government of Sudan. The conflict drained the resources of the Government of Sudan, thereby pressuring the Government to commit to peace negotiations with the South. However, negotiations for peace were also necessitated by the heavy losses being incurred in terms of human lives, and these had begun way before the eruption of the Darfur Conflict, later culminating into the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Naivasha, Nairobi, Kenya between the Government of Sudan and representatives of the SPLM/A.


Several attempts were made by various actors in the region and beyond to resolve the conflict between the Government of Sudan and the Southern political movements led by the SPLM/A. The UN blames the “immense complexities of the war and the lack of political will” as stumbling blocks that prevented an early resolution to the conflict (UN, 2016: np).

The Koka Dam Declaration, a list of demands proposed at a Conference at Koka Dam in Ethiopia on 20 March 1986 held between the SPLM/A and Umma Party and representatives of professional organizations and trade unions, were used as the basis of engagement in future peace talks. Peace talks chaired by Jimmy Carter, the former US President, between the Government of Sudan’s President Bashir and SPLM/A’s John Garang in December 1989 in Nairobi, Kenya; broke down resulting in the continuation of civil war (Schafer, 2007). The US Assistant Secretary of State, Herman Cohen and the National Council of Churches also attempted negotiation between the two in Nairobi, Kenya in 1990 and 1991 respectively but they were unsuccessful as the Government could not compromise on Sharia laws and the SPLM/A-demanded “secular and broad-based national unity government” (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006:93).

The involvement of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) as mediators in the conflict from 1993 was influential. IGADD, later transformed to the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), had been founded in 1986 by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda to coordinate development and environmental management issues (IGAD, 2010). The US and the European Union (EU) were involved in bolstering the peace talks through the US deployment of Ambassador Melissa Wells as a Special US Envoy to Sudan and the EU’s launch of “Friends of Sudan and Uganda” which convened talks between President Yoweri Museveni and Bashir in Australia in May 1994 “to ease bilateral tensions and remove all obstacles to a peace settlement” (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006:106).

A Peace Charter signed between Machar’s SSIM and Col. Kerubino Kuanyin Bol’s SPLM/A-United had agreed to preserve the unity of Sudan but the pact was rejected by Garang’s SPLA-Torit faction (O’Ballance, 2000). However, all the other SLM/A splinter groups, except Garang’s SPLM/A-Torit faction, re-united themselves through the Peace Agreement of 1996 and resolved that their position was self-determination for the south, suspension of Sharia law and amnesty for their members (O’Ballance, 2000).

As war raged on, the Abuja I Talks and Abuja II Talks of 1992 and 1993 respectively were brokered by Nigerian President and the then OAU Chairman, Ibrahim Babangida but there was no compromise between the two parties as Garang insisted on secession and a secular government whilst President Bashir preferred southern autonomy under an Islamic central government with fierce contention over power and resource-sharing arrangements (Verney, 1995). This made the US to consider diplomatic sanctions on Sudan through the ‘Frontline Strategy’ in which the Clinton Administration engaged Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda to isolate Sudan which they did in December 1994, April 1995 and 1995 respectively (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006). These were followed by UNSC sanctions on Sudan in 1996, withdrawal of embassy officials by the US, and provision of weapons to Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda by the US as the SPLM/A launched their attacks from bases in these countries.

Later IGADD further facilitated talks between the Government of Sudan and SLM/A mediated by Nelson Mandela on 29 October 1997 and November 1998, but did not succeed. The Egypt-Libya Initiative which started in 1997 through to 2001 could not yield results. The peace talks brokered in Switzerland in January 2002 by John Danforth, the US Special Envoy to Sudan achieved ceasefire pacts and paved way for IGAD supported mediation with observers from the troika of UK, Norway, and Italy. This, together with the enactment of the Sudan Peace Pact in
October 2002 by the US, coupled with the US’ assumption of presidency in the UNSC, brought progress to the negotiations which culminated into the CPA ratified in Naivasha, Kenya 2005.

The negotiations for peace in Sudan were a protracted process. This is understandable especially if one considered the complex nature of the conflict, its involvement of various players with divergent and seemingly incompatible interests. The main parties to the conflict, that is, the Government of Sudan, northern political parties, southern political parties, IGADD Member States, the US, AU, UN, EU Member States, China, Libya, and Egypt all had their individual interests and motives. As Schafer (2007: 7) aptly noted, the Government of Sudan represented northern interests for peace and security, oil, resources, Islamic law, and power (political, economic and social) whilst the southern political movements wanted peace, self-governance, freedom of religion, recognition, economic growth/development, oil, resources, equality, and representation in government.

On the other hand, IGAD, AU and the UN were motivated by the desire for peace, regional security, legitimacy, trade relations, curbing terrorist threats, regional development, power and border control whilst the US, EU, and China were interested in thwarting terrorist cells in Sudan, ensuring regional influence, border control, trade relations and securing oil/resources (Schafer, 2007: 8-9). To Iyob and Khadiagala (2006:124), “the convergence of multiple actors helped the process as they played complementary and oftentimes competitive roles, to steer the complex process and help parties to gradually rediscover points of agreements”.

This made the whole peace negotiating process difficult as progress would only be defined by the extent to which parties were willing and ready to compromise.


Through IGAD mediation, the CPA’s six Protocols were signed between the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A. These included the Protocol of Machakos signed in Machakos, Kenya on 20 July 2002; and The Protocol on Security Arrangements signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 25 September 2003; The Protocol on Wealth –Sharing, The Protocol on Power-Sharing, and The Protocol on the Resolution of the conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and the Blue

The Protocol of Machakos, among other provisions, stipulated the 6 year interim period after which the Southerners would conduct a referendum to decide on whether they would secede from Sudan or remain part of a united Sudan. It stated that Sharia law would be applied in the North and that peace was to be implemented during the transitional period in a way that would make unity attractive. The Protocol on Power-Sharing provided for equitable regional representation in Government of National Unity (GoNU) and formation of a separate Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) with Government positions to be shared based on a 70%:30% ratio in favour of NCP in northern states, and 70%:30% in favour of the SPLM/A in southern states whilst the ratio of 55%:45% would apply in Abyei, Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains (CPA, 2005). Similarly, the representation in the bicameral legislature was such that the NCP, SPLM and other southern parties had 52%, 28% and 6% respectively, with elections to be conducted within three years of the interim period (CPA, 2005).

Through the Protocol on Security Arrangements, Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) were to be set up with equal forces from SAF and SPLA. These would be deployed to sensitive areas and operate separately yet being considered as part of the SAF. Demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) programmes were to be implemented under UN monitoring and the SPLA was given eight months to withdraw from the North whilst SAF troops were to be redeployed from the south to north within two years (CPA, 2015). The Protocol on Wealth –Sharing was to establish commissions to manage land and petroleum. It was agreed 2% of oil revenues would be channelled to the oil producing states in the South in proportionality to their output whilst the remainder will be equally shared between the national government and GoSS (CPA, 2005). Further, GoSS would personal income taxes, business taxes and luxury taxes whilst the national government collects customs duty, corporate tax and personal income. National currency adoption modalities were spelt out as well as funding mechanisms for reconstruction and development through multi-donor trust funds (CPA, 2005).

The Protocol on the Resolution of Conflict in Abyei granted Abyei a special administrative status, and be represented legislatively in the two states of Southern Kordofan and Warap before they are given the opportunity to vote to decide whether they wish to be part of the North or to join Bar al-Ghazal in the south (CPA, 2005). Oil revenue was to be shared between the north
and the south based on a 50%:42% ratio respectively with the remaining 2% allocated to the Ngok Dinka, Misseriya and Bahr al-Ghazal people whilst 1% each would be allocated to South Kordofan State and West Kordofan State.

With regard to the Protocol on the conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile States, Southern Kordofan State was to contribute 36 members to the national legislature whilst Western Kordofan State would contribute 18 members. These would be revised once a population census was conducted in the respective areas. In the interim period, the Governorship position was given to be rotational between the NCP and SLM/A whilst 2% of Abyei’s oil share would be equally divided between Southern Kordofan State and Western Kordofan State (CPA, 2005).

Whilst it led brought peace after a taxing war regarded as the longest running conflict in Africa, the CPA has been criticized as “a narrow elite pact between NCP and SPLM/A” which excluded other parties across Sudan (Iyob and Khadiagala (2006:174). Rogier (2005: vii) agrees, asserting that although it “undoubtedly represents a historic achievement” in ending the war, and “provides for a fair settlement of the Southern Sudanese”, the CPA however “fails to be ‘comprehensive’ in its representation” as it is mainly restricted to political two parties. The SPLM/A was also affected by the death of Garang on 30 July 2005, who was then Vice President in the GoNU.

Young (2005:99), has argued that CPA was an outcome of “a flawed process leading to a flawed peace” further stating that CPA was not the best peace pact as most Sudanese were denied access to the IGAD peace process and that Western states pursued their interests instead of those of the Sudanese. Further, Young (2005:99) adds that the CPA does not “adequately address fundamental issues of power sharing, equity and human rights” and that the instruments established by the security arrangements “lack accountability, transparency and professionalism” (also see Elke, 2010; Dagne, 2012; Deng, 2005; Rogier, 2005)

For the duration of the implementation of the CPA in the interim period between 2005 and 2011, there has been struggle for power between the SPLM/A and NCP Leaders in Khartoum over and above the in-fighting within SPLM/A itself. SPLM/A withdrew from the GoNU in October 2007 alleging that the NCP dominated all structures of government and later announced its comeback in December 2007. There were also delays in undertaking the census
stipulated in the CPA, and commissions that were provided for to champion economic development were also formed late and did not actualize their work whilst the redeployment of SAF and SPLM/A was also delayed until 2008 resulting in tensions (Grawert, 2010).

There have been challenges in the implementation of the Protocol on the Resolution of Conflict in Abyei. The Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) set up “to define and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905” as agreed in the CPA but its findings were rejected by the Government of Sudan (Johnson, 2008). The ABC Report found that SPLM/A-aligned Ngok Dinka had been historically “forced to flee and then occupied by the Humr Misseriya” and this was rejected by the Government of Sudan as it prefers to have the three oilfields in Abyei under Sudan not Abyei (Gebrekidan, 2013:93). Even after agreeing to refer the case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) for “a final and binding decision”, the Government of Sudan again rejected the PCA judgement that gave the Humr Misseriya the right to graze their cattle in Abyei and assigned two oilfields of Heglig and Bamboo to South Kordofan (Gebrekidan, 2013:94). As a result, the Government of Sudan’s SAF and the Humr Misseriya attacked and displaced the Ngok Dinka resulting in the UNSC Resolution 1990 passed on 27 June 2011 establishing the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). The interim period of the GoNU was characterised by instability and power struggles.

3.14 Referendum and Secession of South Sudan (January–July 2011)

As mandated by the CPA, the referendum for Southerners to decide on self-determination was conducted from 9-15 January 2011. According to the South Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC) as cited in Dagne (2012:1), 3,9 million were registered to vote including those residing in other countries and an estimated 3,8 million voted. Of these, 98.83 voted for secession and 1,1% voted for unity in a plebiscite endorsed by international community and Sudan as free and fair (SSRC as cited in Dagne, 2012:1). This was way above the 60% turnout threshold that was needed for a valid vote as stipulated by the Southern Sudan Referendum Act of 2009. Thus, South Sudan seceded from Sudan on 09 July 2011.

3.15 Conclusion
This Chapter has analytically traced the root causes of the Sudanese Conflict. It has analysed how different political, economic and social factors in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Sudan have caused, perpetuated and sustained conflict within Sudan. The chapter has examined all the phases of Sudan’s history, key events, actors, institutions and players that culminated into the Sudan peace process. It can be noted that the Sudanese conflict was a result of interplay of a motley of factors, namely colonial legacy of geographical, social, economic and political separation; economic marginalization by post-colonial governments; ethnicity politics or politicization of ethnicity; competition over scarce resources, religious intolerance, and struggle power, among others. The next chapter will substantively discuss the secession South Sudan in 2011, post-secession conflict developments and the possible implications of South Sudan secession in future conflict resolution in Africa.
CHAPTER 4
POST-SECESSION CONFLICT DEVELOPMENTS AND PEACE PROSPECTS IN SOUTH SUDAN

4.0 Introduction

The previous Chapter discussed the historical root causes of the Sudanese conflict and presented an analytical explanation of how the different political, economic and social factors in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Sudan have instigated, perpetuated and sustained conflict within Sudan. This Chapter therefore seeks to discuss the secession, conflict developments and dynamics in post-secession South Sudan, as well as the possible implications of South Sudan secession in future conflict resolution in Africa. It first examines the turn of conflict events in the post-secession period in Sudan up-to July 2016. The essence is to analyse how the nature of the conflict and its dimensions have evolved in the period under examination. Focus is on establishing the social, humanitarian, economic, and political effects of post-secession conflict in South Sudan. The prospects for peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction will be assessed.

4.1 Comprehending Post-Secession South Sudan Conflict Dynamics

For the purposes of analysis, the post-secession period can be categorized into four critical phases, namely:

1) Phase One (July 2011 to December 2013; which was a period of attempted stabilization and nation-building);
2) Phase Two (December 2013 to August 2015; which was a period of civil war outbreak and peace negotiation attempts);
3) Phase Three (August 2015 to July 2016); which was a period of national unity government and post-civil war stabilization and reconstruction); and
4) Phase Four (July 2016 to Present); which was a period of Second Civil War outbreak and conflict resurgence and peace re-negotiation attempts).
The analysis of post-secession conflict dynamics and peace prospects in South Sudan in this Chapter may not necessarily follow this phased approach. However, the analysis will be guided by key themes related to the post-secession South Sudan era, viz; conflict between South Sudan with Sudan; South Sudan internal conflict dynamics, post-secession economic development initiatives, South Sudan foreign relations, and peace prospects in South Sudan.

4.2 South Sudan Secession: High Hopes and Optimism

When South Sudan seceded on the 9th of July 2011, the nation was legitimately recognized into the community of nations without any difficulties. On the occasion of inaugural independence celebration on 9 July 2011, the President of Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, immediately recognized the secession of South Sudan whilst declaring the country’s respect of the will of South Sudanese in voting for secession (Sudan News Agency, 09 July 2011; see also BBC News, 09 July 2011; Reuters, 09 July 2011; The Sudan Tribune, 09 July 2011; The Guardian, 09 July 2011). The United States and other Western countries immediately recognized South Sudan after the official announcement of the referendum results in January 2011. Accordingly, the African Union (AU) also formally accepted South Sudan as Africa Union’s 54th state on 15 August 2011 following the satisfaction of the minimum requirements set in Article 9 of the AU Constitutive Act governing the admission of new states into the continental body (Ping, 2011). Likewise, on the 14th of July 2011, the United Nations (UN) also welcomed South Sudan as its 193rd member state (UN News Centre, 2011).

In all the celebrations and speeches, there was a visible signs and evidence of jubilation, hope, optimism and high expectations amongst the people of South Sudan, regional and international state and non-state actors, in terms of post-secession peace, stability, unity and prosperity. President Salva Kiir Mayardit, in his inaugural independence speech on 09 July 2011, declared;

"Now that we have obtained the proverbial political kingdom, we are called upon to do what it takes to sustain a sovereign nation. We now have to focus on economic development as the key to prosperity and satisfaction of all the human needs that make life worth living...We will not shy away from seeking outside support in areas that we are in need at this critical juncture…I will work with my brother president Al-Bashir and the international community to find a just and lasting peace.” (Association of Christian Resource Organizations Serving Sudan, ACROSS, 2016: n.p; Gurton Trust, 2016: n.p).
However, at and just after the proclamation of independence by South Sudan, several scholars prognosticated the difficult task that lay ahead of South Sudanese government in terms of post-conflict development, peace and security restoration, peacebuilding, oil sharing mechanisms, citizenship issues, economic revitalization and development, public service delivery, foreign policy management, resolution of conflict in unstable regions, resolution of outstanding contested border disputes in Abyei, Blue Nile and South Kordofan, among other issues (see Belloni, 2011; Dagne, 2012; Johnson, 2012; Jok, 2011; Mills and McNamee, 2011; Mohamed, 2011; Natsios and Abramowitz, 2011; Olowu, 2011; Panozzo, 2011; Popiden, 2011; Totten, 2011; Wolff, 2012; Zachary, 2011; Gettleman, 2011). Even the then Chairperson of the Inter-Governmental Authority (IGAD), Mwai Kibaki, also hinted:

“The declaration of South Sudan’s independence is an important and significant step in the search for lasting peace and stability for the people of the entire Sudan…The people of South Sudan will understandably be harbouring high expectations of delivery of services by the Government of their brand new state…However, amidst the declaration of independence and the attendant celebrations, I wish to point out that the difficult task of nation-building has just begun.” (Daily Nation, 10 July 2011: n.p).

Upon independence, it appears that the Government of South Sudan was also sceptical about the situation that would obtain in the post-secession era. In a short summary of the history of the country’s history, the Embassy of the Republic of South Sudan in Washington DC, in the United States suggested, with foresight, that the new state needed to avoid post-secession ethnic conflicts by translating its ‘negative unity’ against the North Sudan into positive unity that preserves cohesive statehood through building stable institutions, establishing systems of political decentralization, and ensuring more equitable distribution of resources (Republic of South Sudan, 2011). Perhaps, this was the opportune time to take heed of Olukoshi and Laasko (1996)’s instructive prescriptions on post-colonial state-building and nation-building in Africa. The authors had essentially reckoned;

“[T]he path to the re-invention of a viable nation-state project in Africa must involve the negotiation of a new social and national bargain, which takes full cognisance of ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious diversity, the requirements of social equity, and the importance of effective and efficient public institutions in a democratic framework that is fully representative” (Olukoshi and Laasko, 1996:11).
On the same subject of post-secession nation-building, with specific reference to South Sudan, Bereketeab (2014:52) aptly warns that “by definition multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious societies are precarious and fragile”, hence what South Sudan needed to set up modern political, economic, social and security institutions and accommodate traditional institutions whilst transitioning from a liberation revolutionary political culture to civic governance political culture against a background of mistrust, suspicion, fracture and social upheaval. Upon secession in 2011, South Sudan had Dinkas (38.5%), Nuers (15.6%), Shilluk, Azande, Bari, Kakwa, Kuku, Muré, Mandari, Didinga, Ndogo, Bviri, Lndi, Anuak, Bongo, Lango, Dungotona, and Acholli whilst the languages include English (official), Arabic, and regional languages that include Dinka, Nuer, Bari, Zande, and Shilluk (World Fact Book, 2015:689). Thus, as Bereketeab (2014) observes, the transformation process would be a practically daunting task for a nascent state of South Sudan’s stature with so much diversity especially considering its historical reality of difficulties in ethnic accommodation and co-existence.

Despite being endowed with so many opportunities to restore peace, stabilize and foster national development due to an avalanche of favourable factors such as the abundance of oil resources, and unlimited pledges of regional and international support; post-secession South Sudan was however faced with a plethora of governance challenges, conflict and hostilities with Sudan. It proved difficult to achieve the South Sudan ‘which is at peace with itself and its neighbours’ as envisaged by the founding President Salva Kiir in 2011 and the international community.

As Belloni (2011) predicted, post-secession South Sudan was to face an uphill state-building task and was to be seized with challenges such as internal political conflict and security challenges; state fragility; the contested Abyei border and border demarcation issues with Sudan; oil revenue sharing challenges with Sudan; establishment of a visa regime; development challenges; and lack of regional and international support (see also Nyong’o, 2011). Indeed, these later proved to be complicated to deal with for a nascent state that South Sudan was.

In line with Belloni (2014)’s prognosis, authors such as Nyong’o (2011) also agreed that the post-secession era in South Sudan needed massive investment of nation building effort. The author asserted;
“Now, let the celebrations halt and the nation building begin. The journey ahead is laborious and all key stakeholders should brace for it. Nation building is no doubt an enormous task. If anything, the ruling class has an overwhelming task ahead of them. Voting for secession was actually the straightforward part; nation building will be a toll order…Many challenges lie ahead for this new state…Dedication and lots of patience is required from all the concerned parties, including the entire populace” (Nyong’o, 2011:1).

It was these foreseeable and other foreseeable future challenges that complicated the hopes, dreams and aspirations of South Sudanese upon secession. In analysis, one can appreciate the complexities and complications that waited in the path of post-session nation building in South Sudan.

4.3 Post-Secession “Contentious” and “Outstanding” Issues from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

Whilst there has been a fierce debate amongst scholars, as discussed in the literature review, on whether secession generates internal violence within the seceding states and/or between the seceding state and the rump state, the findings in Siroky (2009)’s study are quite applicable to the South Sudan and Sudan case. The author insisted that secession is usually succeeded by intra-state ethnic violence and inter-state conflicts between the seceding state and the rump state (Siroky, 2009: 276-277).

At South Sudan secession, Mohamed (2011) predicted three scenarios. The first scenario was that an open war would erupt between the two states. The second scenario was that a proxy war and/or attrition war in the disputed areas whilst the third scenario was that there will be total cooperation and coordination. The author termed the third scenario as “the most likely option” given the geographic, ethnic and biological connections of the Sudanese and the South Sudanese (Mohamed, 2011:22-23). It appears Mohamed (2011)’s “most likely option” was based on faulty assumptions. Instead, his unlikely first two scenarios have turned to be true given the post-secession conflict dynamics in South Sudan, and the border conflicts with Sudan.

Related to Mohamed’s scenarios, Temin (2009) outlined his ‘six most important issues for Sudan and its future’ which needed immediate attention in post-secession South Sudan. These included consulting citizens around the contested areas of Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, agreeing on citizenship issues between the two Sudans, choosing a strong leader for the
SPLM/A, decentralizing South Sudan for effective public service delivery, working on post-secession security and stability, and citizen disarmament. Indeed, these appear to have been some of the thorny issues impacting on post-secession conflict dynamics in South Sudan.

On the other hand, Chimankire (2011:10) identified “at least four challenges” that South Sudan was to face in the “immediate future” after secession. There were the Abyei border puzzle, oil revenue sharing disagreements, addressing the issue of integration and citizenship, and political reforms to necessitate the movement from the traditional one-party model to multi-partyism. Just as pointed out by Chimankire (2011), Mulima (2011) also asserted that the five challenges that South Sudan was foreseeably likely to confront centred on borders, oil, integration and citizenship, political reforms and development. Undoubtedly, these identified issues by Chimankire (2011) and Mulima (2011) constitute the conflict agenda in South Sudan to the present day.

When President Salva Kiir promised the world, in his inaugural independence speech on 09 July 2011, that he would work with “his brother” president Al-Bashir and the international community to find a just and lasting peace” (see ACROSS, 2016; Gurtong Trust, 2016), it sounded as if it was easy to cooperate in resolving the outstanding issues emanating from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in January 2009 between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM). The AU, Sudan, IGAD, UN and other actors who addressed the inaugural independence gathering in Juba on the 09th of July 2011 also implored the need for close working relationship between the two countries to resolve the CPA issues (see ACROSS, 2016; Daily Nation, 10 July 2011; Gurtong Trust, 2016; Ping, 2011; Reuters, 09 July 2011; Sudan Tribune, 09 July 2011; United Nations, 2011). However, upto now, the ‘outstanding’ issues in the CPA are still outstanding. Hasan al-Turabi, as quoted in Ottaway and El-Sadany (2012:1), argues that these CPA issues sufficiently explain why South Sudan moved from conflict to conflict. He further stresses that “separation [secession] took place while a host of major problems remain unresolved”. That is why South Sudan and Sudan went to war less than a year after secession.

4.3.1 Conflict over Abyei Region

In CPA’s Chapter 4 (1.1) 1.1 of the Protocol on the Resolution of Conflict in Abyei (signed on 26 May 2004), the Abyei Region is referred to as “a bridge between the north and the south,
linking the people of Sudan...the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905.” As discussed in previous Chapters, this transfer of the Ngok Dinkas from Bahr el Ghazal (now Southern Sudan) to Kordofan (now Sudan) was made by the Anglo-Egyptian colonial administrators due to the frequent conflicts between the Ngok Dinka and Arab nomads. The former fought with the Southerners during the first civil war whilst the latter sided with Northerners. In the Abyei Protocol, it was agreed that the Abyei region was to be put under joint administration and the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) of experts was to be constituted to establish the exact boundaries of the region, which were being disputed by the parties. The ABC was to present a “binding and final report” within 6 months after the signing of the CPA.

As discussed in the previous Chapter, the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) Report submitted to the Sudanese Presidency on 14 July 2005 defined the Abyei area as comprising 18,559 km², assigning the two oilfields of Heglig and Bamboo to South Kordofan, and giving Humr Misseriya the right to graze their cattle in Abyei (ABC Report, 2005). However, this was rejected by Sudan on the basis that the ABC experts exceeded their mandate in determining the region’s borders, their Terms of References, and Rules of Procedure (Von Muhlendahl, 2009). The case was then referred to an Arbitral Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to establish whether the ABC experts had indeed exceeded their mandates, and also delimit the Abyei area. The Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A signed the Arbitration Agreement on 7 July 2008 committing to accept the PCA decision as “final and binding” (Arbitration Agreement, 2008).

The PCA ruled that the ABC experts had not exceeded their mandate by delimiting the Abyei area. It further ruled that the experts had opted for “tribal interpretation” (focusing on the Ngok Dinka people transferred in 1905) instead of a “territorial interpretation” (focusing on territory involved in the transfer) (Von Muhlendahl, 2009). This the PCA Tribunal concluded that the ABC experts had “exceeded their mandate by failing to give adequate reasons for their conclusions” and “adequate reasoning with respect to the Northern shared boundary and the Eastern and Western boundaries” (International Courts of General Jurisdiction, 2009). The PCA award gave greater territorial control of oil producing areas of Heglig and Bamboo to Sudan. It should be noted that these oilfields, according to Von Muhlendahl (2009), produced revenues worth USD1.8 billion between 2005 – 2007 constituting 26.6% of Sudanese oil output in 2005.
In a Joint Statement on 22 July 2009, National Congress Party (NCP) of Sudan and the SPLM/A accepted the PCA decision and committed to abide by the decision as final and binding (Republic of Sudan, 2009). They further committed themselves to fully implement the tribunal’s decision, demarcate the Abyei border and create a Joint Task Force to support the implementation process (Republic of Sudan, 2009). Von Muhlendahl (2009:8), however, noted that the “ensuing reaction of all the stakeholders involved [in the Abyei conflict] was ambiguous”. Since the signing of a temporary agreement for the setting up of a joint administrative arrangement in Abyei and demilitarization of the region, between Sudan and SPLM in June 2011, nothing has been implemented up to now.

SAF has troops continue deployed at Diffra, an oilfield in Abyei against UNSC Resolutions and prior agreements on demilitarization of Abyei signed between Sudan and SPLM/A (UN Security Council, 2016). Thus Sudan continue to benefit from oil production without sharing the proceeds with South Sudan, over and above the Heglig (Panthou) and Bamboo oil fields, whilst the Arab Misseriya continue to graze their livestock in the area without the consent of the Ngok Dinka (Small Arms Survey, 2015).

Bockenförde (2010) calls the PCA’s award as an attempt at “fitting a diplomatic peg into a legal round hole” given its legal ambiguities hence the failure to conclusively resolve the matter. The Abyei region referendum provided for by the CPA for Abyei residents to determine whether they wanted to be part of South Sudan or Sudan, has been post-poned from the initially set date of January 2011. Upto now, there are disagreements as the Ngok Dinka insist that the “residents” criteria determining eligibility to vote should be defined by principal or “permanent occupancy” thereby disenfranchising the seasonal migrants and nomadic Arab Misseriya whom they argue to be already holding residents status in South Kordofan (Craze, 2011). The African Union Commission, the African Union High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan and South Sudan (AUHIP), chaired by Thabo Mbeki, which has been mediating the conflict between Sudan and SPLM/A, proposed to allow only Abyei permanent residents to vote in the referendum but this was only accepted by South Sudan but rejected by Sudan as biased. The Ngok Dinka held a unilateral referendum in October 2013 whose outcome was an overwhelming vote to rejoin South Sudan, but this was never recognized by both Sudan and South Sudan.
The Abyei region, thus remain violently contested, with armed conflict between SAF and local communities resulting in loss of lives and displacements. Johnson (2011) fittingly terms it “the West Bank” of Sudan whilst Prendergast and Winter (2008) prefer to call it “Sudan’s Kashmir”. This, together with Blue Nile and South Kordofan (commonly known as “the Two Areas”) being fought for between Sudan and the SPLM/A-North (allegedly supported by South Sudan), whose grievance since June 2011 was that they were unilaterally included as part Sudan without consultation, have soured the relations between Sudan and South Sudan. This has resulted in serious armed attacks. For instance, the Amnesty International (2015) reports that SAF carried out aerial bombardments and ground attacks in Blue Nile and South Kordofan through “Operation Decisive Summer” in April 2014. The organization states that;

“Over the course of four years of conflict [from June 2011], hundreds of civilians have been killed and thousands injured in attacks, particularly by bombs and rockets launched from Antonov planes and MiG and Sukhoi fighter jets as well as from long range artillery shelling on the ground. For instance, between January and April 2015, the Sudanese Air Force dropped an estimated 374 Antonov planes and MiG and Sukhoi bombs in 60 locations across South Kordofan. The aerial bombardments and ground shelling resulted in the deaths of an estimated 35 civilians and injured a further 70 individuals, and damaged civilian objects including villages, schools and mills...[and] 26 health facilities” (Amnesty International, 2015:7)

The AUHIP and IGAD have invested mediation efforts since 2011, with respect to the “Three Areas” now referred by the NCP as ‘the North’s New South’, but the conflict still persists. AUHIP mediation initially resulted in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Non-Aggression and Cooperation between the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 10 February 2012 wherein the two states committed to peaceful co-existence and mutual respect to each other’s sovereignty. The conflict stakeholders include the Abyei Special Administration Area (comprising the Executive Council, Abyei Joint Oversight Committee and Abyei Area Security Committee), which is the de facto Abyei government; Ngok Dinka; Arab Misseriya and Misseriya militias; the SAF; NCP; and SPLM/A. The United Nations Interim Security Force (UNISFA), whose current force establishment is 5,376 military and police personnel, was deployed following UNSC Resolution 1990 of 2011 to monitor the security within the Abyei border area and facilitate humanitarian aid delivery and protect civilians (UNISFA, 2016). Its efforts are assisting in the demilitarization of the border zone. The UNSC has extended UNISFA mandate up to November 2016.
The impasse in Abyei is, however, unlikely to be broken as Sudan and SPLM continue to defiantly maintain their respective positions on voter eligibility of the Arab Misseriya pastoralists and the Ngok Dinka. As the impasse stands, fighting perpetuates. The killing of the Deng Kuol Deng, the Paramount Chief of the Ngok Dinka in 2013 led to conflict escalation whilst SAF offensive attacks and Ngok Dinka-Misseriya clashes over grazing lands, cattle raids, revenge attacks, abductions, militia fights and inter-communal tensions have been worsening the hostilities (Small Arms Survey, 2015). The UN Security Council (2016) also revealed the existence of a serious humanitarian crisis in Abyei with the situation of an estimated 139,000 people classified as ‘vulnerable’ and in need of food assistance, safe drinking water, education and shelter. This is likely to continue especially considering the assertion made in 2015 by the Sudanese President Omar Hassan al Bashir that “the contested Abyei area belongs to Sudan and will remain Sudanese territory” (Sudan Tribune, 13 March 2015).

4.3.2 South Sudan – Sudan Conflict over Oil

Post-secession conflict dynamics were also influenced by oil production and processing. Historically, oil has been one of the primary causes of the Sudan-South Sudan conflict (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012; Sanders, 2012). Upon secession, there was hope that oil would not only fuel rapid socio-economic development in South Sudan, but also act as a unifying or peace incentive between South Sudan and Sudan as both states would thrive to ensure peaceful relations given their mutual inter-dependence on the oil resources (Billon and Savage, 2016). This is yet to be the case. Perhaps, this gives credence to the claim that in Africa oil is a curse rather than a blessing, especially considering the elite and covert hands in fuelling conflicts in pursuit of their personal enrichment agendas.

When South Sudan seceded, the state gained ownership of 75% of the oil reserves which produced an estimated 490,000 barrels per day, and all the oil revenues funded 98% of its national budget (Sanders, 2012; Moro, 2012:2). The majority of the oil blocks are in Unity and Upper Nile States. One stark legacy of South Sudan marginalization was that despite the fact that the majority of the oil fields are in the Southern parts of Sudan (now South Sudan), all the oil transportation facilities and refinery infrastructure were located in, and controlled by, the North. Sudan had three main refineries, namely Khartoum Refinery Company (KRC) in
Khartoum, Port Sudan Refinery (PSR) at Port Sudan on the Red Sea, and El-Obeid Refinery Company (ERC) in Kordofan.

Within six months of independence, there were conflicts between the two countries as Sudan started to charge what was viewed by South Sudan as exorbitant transit and transportation fees. The post-secession oil questions centred on how much South Sudan would pay for transit charges, transportation fees through the Sudanese pipeline, and marine terminal usage (export facilities) costs at Port Sudan and whether the revenue-sharing mechanisms provided for by the CPA Protocol on Wealth-Sharing signed in 2004. Sudan demanded $36 per barrel which South Sudan rejected as exorbitant arguing that they were prepared to pay charges consistent with the international rates of between $0.40 to $1 per barrel, in addition to the $1.7 billion compensation to Sudan for their loss of oil revenue (Sanders, 2012). This was consistent with Sudan’s Petroleum Transit and Service Fees Act enacted in 2011.

The main pipelines used by the South Sudanese were the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) and Petrodar Operating Company (PDOC) which are all consortiums of different companies with China having the largest stake but Sudan claims ownership of these pipeline facilities. Following the disagreements on between the two Governments, Sudan had to detain and confiscate South Sudan oil and prevented ships from docking at Port Sudan which were collecting South Sudan oil purchases, thereby resulting in the stoppage of oil production in South Sudan in January 2012 (Moro, 2012; Sudan Tribune, 28 July 2012). Stephen Dhieu Dau, the then South Sudanese Minister of Petroleum, Mining and Industry (MPMI), reported that between 24 December 2011 and 19 January 2012, the country lost a cumulative total of 4,743,896 barrels of crude oil worth millions of dollars through confiscation of oil vessels, illegal pipeline oil diversions and illegal detention of tankers (Sudan Tribune, 30 January 2012, see also Sudan Tribune, 22 January 2012). This made the relations between Sudan and South Sudan hostile.

Negotiations mediated by the Thabo Mbeki-chaired AUHIP took long to resolve the dispute, with Sudan leveraging its oil infrastructure to secure South Sudan’s agreement and commitment on security arrangements in conflict areas of Abyei, Kordofan and Blue Nile. The mediation eventually led to the signing of the Agreement Concerning Oil and Related Economic Matters signed by the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan on 27 September 2012 consequently leading to the resumption of oil production in South Sudan in May 2013 (Government of South
Sudan, 2013). The Agreement provided for the two countries to cooperate in resuming oil production, for the provision of passage for oil transportation and processing in Sudan. Sudan undertook to charge transportation, transit and processing fees that reflected the special circumstances of the two states such that the oil will be competitive on the international market and fully contribute towards economic development in the two countries.

According to Article 4 of the Agreement, South Sudan committed to pay is $1.60 per barrel as processing fee, $8.40 per barrel as transportation fee, and $1 per barrel as transit fee for oil transported through GNPOC facilities whilst further committing to pay $1,60 per barrel as processing fee, $6.50 per barrel as transportation fee, and $1 per barrel as transit fee for oil transported through Petrodar facilities (Agreement Concerning Oil and Related Economic Matters, 2012). Over and above these user fees, South Sudan was obligated to pay. The same agreement obligated South Sudan to pay $3,028 to Sudan as part of the “Transitional Financial Arrangement” for 3½ years whilst directing Sudan to repay the costs of oil from confiscated vessels. With the alternative crude oil pipeline envisaged under Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor project, connecting South Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya, being a long-term project and expensively costing around $3billion, South Sudan had no option but to negotiate with Sudan for the usage of its facilities. One needs to note the transition by South Sudan from “oil-wealth sharing” to “compensation” as the South Sudanese stressed that the oil was now theirs, unlike during the CPA-era, hence they can only be obligated to “compensate” not to “share” (Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2013).

Whilst the Agreement Concerning Oil and Related Economic Matters assisted to resolve the conflict between the two countries over oil, the relations between the two Sudans remained hostile due to other issues related to the “Three Areas” and security-related matters explained above. This is despite the existence of the Cooperation Agreement signed on 27 September 2012 wherein the two Sudans pledged to maintain peaceful and cooperative relations necessary to create mutually viable states.

The other agreements signed by Sudan and South Sudan on 27 September 2012 laid the foundational legal basis of cooperation between the two states on a wide array of issues. These include the Agreement on Border Issues (adopting peaceful integrated border management approach on the border between the two countries); Agreement on Trade and Trade-Related Issues (for trade policy cooperation); Agreement on a Framework for Cooperation on Central
Banking Issues (for cooperation in the management of their respective monetary and fiscal); the Framework Agreement to Facilitate Payment of Post-Service Benefits (obligating the two states to cooperate on the continuation of pension benefit payments for retired civil servants), and the Framework Agreement on the Status of Nationals of the other State (for the two states to allow for freedoms of movement, residence, property ownership and economic activity engagement by citizens from either of the two states).

However, despite the existence of these agreements, the relations between Sudan and South Sudan is still characterised by hostilities, accusations and counter-accusations, mistrust and non-cooperation on a host of issues with both sides, more often than not, unwilling to engage in constructive dialogue to resolve disagreements. Sudan insist that South Sudan is supporting rebels and inciting violence in Sudan’s Kordofan, Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Abyei States with military equipment and weapons, whilst South Sudan alleges that Sudan is also providing the militias and rebels in South Sudan states with arms especially in Unity State, South Kordofan and Jonglei (Blanchard, 2014; Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2013; Reuters, 28 June 2016; Small Arms Survey, 2015; Sudan Tribune, 11 May 2016, UN Security Council, 2012). This brings to the fore the issue of proxy wars in both Sudan and South Sudan. Although it can also be interpreted as lack of capacity by Governments on both sides to resolve their internal conflicts and inability effectively govern.

It now appears that even the AUHIP is not succeeding in untangling this Gordian note. Both Sudan and South Sudan appear to be extremely obdurate, intransigent and uncompromising. Perhaps, that is why Jumbert and Rolandsen (2013), realistically argue;

“Abyei and other contested border areas only have zero-sum solutions: one party wins and other loses...the border disputes must be resolved separately and be rooted in local processes to ensure the highest degree of local legitimacy. The other alternative is to leave the issues unresolved and to find some kind of temporary mechanism to govern the contested areas until there is more conducive environment for solving the disputes” (Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2013:6).

Thus the Sudan-South Sudan Relations remains sour and the sources of such conflict are very complicated. Mediating this dispute has proven to be a herculean task, and it has been worsened by intra-state conflicts within South Sudan. One fact that is undisputable is that resolving the Sudan-South Sudan conflict will be a giant step in resolving the intra-state conflicts and security challenges currently being experienced within these two countries.
4.4 Post-Secession Intra-State Conflict in South Sudan

As highlighted above, post-secession South Sudan has not seen a period of total peace. An analysis of the post-secession South Sudan intra-state conflict dynamics would force one to understand why Copnall (2014:1) averred that “South Sudan secession was not the conclusion of a long and frequently tragic story; it was merely the end of a chapter.” The author considers secession of South Sudan as a “bitter and incomplete divorce”, hence the emergence of many conflicts in the post-secession period.

The period immediately after secession in July 2011 upto December 2013 witnessed relatively less internal fighting in South Sudan. This is the period that the world expected South Sudan to engage in post-secession stabilization and nation-building. In December 2013 to August 2015, there was a civil war in South Sudan punctuated by peace negotiation attempts mediated by IGAD. The period between August 2015 and July 2016 was the era of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) which was a culmination of the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) signed between the leaders of SPLM-In Government (SPLM-IG), SPLM-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) and Former Detainees (FDs). The current phase from July 2016 is underlined by the conflict resurgence and current re-negotiation attempts following the flight of the First Vice President Rick Machar Teny Dhurgon from Juba after a clash between SPLM-IG and SPLM-IO forces.

4.4.1 Inter-Communal and Inter-Ethnic Fighting (2011 - 2013)

In addition to the conflict in the “Three Areas”, South Sudanese have been engaged in what have been termed “inter-ethnic clashes” or inter-communal conflict/violence” in which different ethnic groups and/or communities engage in armed confrontations over political grievances upon elite mobilization, or fighting over disputes arising from cattle raids, access to scarce natural resources such as grazing land and water resulting in heavy loss of human lives, human suffering, massive displacements of people, destruction of property and livelihoods (see Astill-Brown, 2014; AU Commission, 2014; Blanchard, 2014; De Waal, 2014; Gordon, 2014; Deng et al, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2014; Lacey, 2013; Nyok, 2014; O’Byrne, 2014; Pendle, 2015; Pinaud, 2014; Radon and Logan, 2014; Selby and Hoffman, 2013; Shulika and

As Jambert and Rolandsen (2013) puts it, the post-secession years in South Sudan, just as in Sudan, have been “a bumpy ride” due to struggles “with periphery rebellions and political turbulence and strained economies”. With particular reference to South Sudan, the author adds that the country has lacked internal cohesion as “the frequent manifestations of internal dissent” continue to threaten “regime stability”.

Securing peace in post-secession South Sudan has been elusive, discarding high hopes for peace and stability held by many South Sudanese at secession. Hutton observes;

“The newly independent state has fractured, pitting communities against each other, splintering the factionalized security forces and setting up a dichotomized political space in which hard boundaries have drawn between pro- and anti-government camps…The ” (Hutton, 2014:6).

The post-secession conflicts have been interlocking. For instance, resource-based conflicts have transformed to identity-based conflicts after some communities resisted government’s attempts to implement the disarmament policy due to security-dilemma effects (Yoshida, 2013). As Gordon (2014:ix) notes, “ethnic identities in South Sudan are not static, nor are they neutral” as they are also “constructs without clear origins and boundaries”. Thus from the time of secession, there has been incessant clashes between the different ethnicities and villages of South Sudan over political power struggles, cattle economy, land and water.

The Dinkas, as discussed in the previous Chapter, are the majority of the over 60 ethnic groups in South Sudan largely concentrated in the States of Bahr el Ghazal, Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity, Lakes and parts of South Kordofan. The Nuers are the significant minorities in Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile States which they inhabit with Dinks, Murles, Shilluks and other minority ethnic groups. With Kiir being a Dinka, and Machar being a Nuer, they, together with the subordinate SPLM/A and Government leadership, have used elite mobilization to prop up support thereby deepen rivalries and hostilities between the two ethnicities (Gordon, 2014; see also Blanchard, 2014; De Waal, 2014; Jok, 2014; Johnson, 2014; Pinaud, 2014; Rolandsen, 2015; Rolandsen et al, 2015). Kiir and Machar, as Gordon (2014) argues, appear to be still harbouring the rift created after the 1991 Bor Massacre of Dinkas and subsequent split between the SPLA along ethnic lines.
Thus the period between July 2011 and December 2013 saw the government of Kiir and Vice President Machar managing a transitional period that was marred with inter-communal conflicts before the general elections initially scheduled for 2015. Gordon (2014) stated that between 18 August 2011 and 20 October 2013, there were conflicts in Jonglei State counties of Pieri, Uror, Upper Nile, Pibor, Likiangole, Duk Padiet, Akobo, Nyril, Gumuruk, Payam, Ethiopia, Walgak, Twic East and Maar Payam which resulted in the death of 3116 Nuers, Luo Nuers, Dinkas, Bor Dinkas and Murles as well as 12 UNMISS peacekeepers and civilians. During the same period, approximately 240,000 cattle were stolen in Jonglei counties.

Human Rights Watch (2012) also reported that Jonglei has witnessed inter-ethnic clashes pitting mostly Dinkas and Nuers, with 3,000 people being killed during the 23 December 2011 attacks and retaliatory attacks alone whilst 14,000 people were affected by the attacks. Further, in January 2012, there were reported fights in Jonglei’s Pibor town between the Luo Nuers and the Murles allegedly over cattle rustling resulting in 3,141 people dead, 1,293 children abducted, and between 20,000 to 50,000 people displaced (Garang, 2012; see also Gettleman, 2012; Sudan Tribune, 03 January 2012). Such attacks have also been common in Bahr el Ghazal, Wau and other states (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, ACLED, 2016).

It should be noted, however, that the clashes within and between communities also have a political dimension. The power struggles within SPLM/A, as well as unsuccessful military integration initiatives within the SPLA and disarmament programmes have all resulted in mutinies and armed rebellions across many states in South Sudan (ACLED, 2012; Gordon, 2014; Shulika and Okeke-Uzodike, 2013). ACLED (2016:7–9) explicates;

“The South Sudan ‘relational’ space is best thought of as a national elite competition core, surrounded by a number of militias that operate both as local and supplemental troops for both core members (SPLM-In Government and SPLM-In Opposition), surrounded by a much larger group of militias who operate solely within a communal, local space”.

The inter-communal clashes and militia movements have been sustained by SPLM/A defectors and renegades who have mobilized followers to instigate insurrection against the South Sudanese government leadership in pursuit of political capital, and/or seek redress in specific grievances. For instance, the late George Athor Deng, a former SPLA Lieutenant General rebelled against SPLM/A after losing the governorship elections to Kuol Manyang Juuk in Jonglei State. He then formed his own armed political movement, the South Sudan Democratic
Movement/Army (SSDM/A), which, before his death in December 2011, organized rebel forces and Nuer youths in Jonglei and Upper Nile against the South Sudanese government (Gordon, 2014; HSBA, 2013). Even after the Presidential amnesty and pardon announced by Kiir at independence on the 9th of July 2011, and signing a ceasefire agreement between his SSDM and Government of South Sudan on 19 November 2011, Lieutenant General George Athor Deng continued to rebel against government.

Other than Athor, a considerable number of SPLA commanders also dissented, such as David Yau Yau (Jonglei), Johnson Olony (Upper Nile), Gatluak Gai (Unity State), and Alyuak Ogot (Upper Nile). Yau Yau, had also defected after losing elections in 2010 and formed his ‘Cobra Faction’ before re-joining the SPLM-IO on 11 January 2016 following the May 2014 Peace Agreement between the Cobra Faction and the Government of South Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 13 January 2016). However, all these rebel leaders or defectors attacked SPLA installations/garrisons claiming that they were aggrieved by SPLM/A’s electoral fraud, marginalization and under-development of their counties and states (HSBA, 2013; Sudan Tribune, 13 January 2016). However, there has been reports suggesting that the rebels were receiving weapons and ammunitions from the Sudanese government premised on the similarity of the weapons used by the rebels to SAF stocks (HSBA, 2013). This has been a divide and rule tactic, and this should be easy for the Government of Sudan considering the prevalence of too much factionalism within SPLM/A and even within the rebel movements in South Sudan (Gordon, 2014).

Rebels such as Alyuak Ogot Ak (SSMD/A-Upper Nile), Gordon Kong (South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF), Bapiny Monit, Karlos Ku, Matthew Puljiang and Bipen Ma (all SSLM/A-Mayom) accepted the President’s amnesty, whilst a number of SSDM/A Cobra Faction remained fighting (HSBA, 2013). These, together with other new militia groups that continue to emerge, or re-emerge such as the South Sudan Armed Forces (SSAF) led by Anthony Ongwaja, Tiger Faction New Forces (TFNF) led by Yaones Okij, the Arrow Boys in Western Equatoria, and the Nuer White Army, National Revolutionary Movement for the Salvation of South Sudan, National Democratic Front (NDF), cause instability even during periods where there is no full scale war in South Sudan (Gordon, 2014; ACLED, 2016a; ACLED, 2016b; Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012).

Thus due to political power contests within SPLM, the Government of South Sudan leaders express their intention to disarm militias whilst at the same time clandestinely and covertly
protect the same. As ACLED (2016) observes, some of the South Sudan leadership arm and militarize Dinka cattle herders, ostensibly to empower them to protect their cattle against rustling by Nuer militias (White Army), and then unofficially incorporate them into the national army. ACLED (2016:9) further state that “[t]he presence of armed militia is not simply a product of local disputes”, but it is government forces arming cattle herders to create “legitimately armed” proxy fighters to ally or affiliate with government forces (such as the SPLM/A Dinka-sponsored Duk ku Beny, which means ‘Rescue/Keep the President’, and the Mathiang Anyoor, which means “brown caterpillar”) against any emergent “illegitimately armed” opposition forces (see also Pendle, 2015; Enough Project, 2015).

In addition, rebels and militias are difficult to exterminate as these are “loose coalitions of political defectors and rebellious elites” (ACLED, 2016a:7). This is so especially given that the South Sudanese government is a ‘big tent’ of politicians with divergent interests and ideologies. In light of this observation, Gordon (2014:8) avers;

“The GoSS [Government of South Sudan] is not a singular actor, however, but an amalgamation of players and interests from various ethnic, social, economic and political backgrounds. Managing competing loyalties, grudges and expectations has been the constant challenge of its leadership... [T]he very existence of the big tent illustrates the lack of unity and plethora of competing interests present in the government from its inception”

The International Crisis Group (2014:5) terms this “the illusion of a big-tent”, adding that the SPLA’s multi-ethnic “constituent groups and the divides between them reflect the bitter internecine history of the liberation struggle”. Such context has been one of the key factors behind the persistent power tussles and factionalism within the party.

Given this, the period between July 2011 and December 2013 can be best described as a period in which the government attempted to remain intact whilst putting efforts to stabilize and reconstruct within the new state of South Sudan. Despite the various inter-communal fighting episodes and incidences across all the states of South Sudan, what should be stated is that there was no breakdown in Government authority and that the inter-communal and/or inter-ethnic fighting was not national in outlook. Rather, it was localised violence and conflict. The events of December 2013 witnessed an outbreak of fighting across many states, and breakdown of the Government authority.
The 'First Civil War' (December 2013 – August 2015)

The fighting that broke out on 15 December 2013 in South Sudan, starting in Juba and then spreading to the other states, has been regarded in almost all literature and media reports as a civil war. Indeed, the conflict fits into the frame of civil wars. By definition, civil wars;

“[C]onsists of one or several simultaneous disputes over generally incompatible positions that (1) concern government and/or territory in a state; (2) are causally linked to the use of armed force, resulting in at least 500 battle-related deaths during a given year during the conflict; and (3) involve two or more parties, of which the primary warring parties are the government of the state where armed force is used, and one or several non-state opposition organization” (Cockayne et al, 2010:43).

Even Small and Singer (1982:210)’s definition, a civil war is: “any armed conflict that involves (a) military action internal to the metropole, (b) the active participation of national government, and (c) effective resistance by both sides”. Thus the conflict, unlike the inter-communal violence or conflict that characterised the period between South Sudan independence and December 2013, was a full-scale civil war as it passes the ‘national outlook’ test and the ‘number of casualty’ test.

As has been common with the estimation of conflict casualties in South Sudan, different reports present different figures. By May 2014, Amnesty International reported that the conflict that had erupted on 15 December 2013 resulted in approximately 950 000 internally displaced people (IDPs), 290 000 refugees and forced 80 000 into UNMISS ‘civilian protection sites’ with “little or no access to clean water, food or humanitarian assistance” (Amnesty International, 2014:7). On the other hand, the Human Rights Watch (2015: n.p) claims the same conflict killed “[t]housands of civilians” and displaced an estimated 1,5 million people with 100 000 seeking refuge in the UN compounds.

The International Crisis Group (2014) reported that by April 2014, the conflict had resulted in the death of over 10 000 people and created 1 000 000 IDPs. The UN, by June 2015, hinted that the conflict had caused 1,95 million IDPs, 293 000 refugees and forced 120 000 to seek refuge in UN compounds (UN News Centre, 2015). The Global Conflict Tracker (2016) puts the in-between that reported by Human Rights Watch and the UN. It reports that between December 2013 and the signing of ARCSS, an estimated 50 000 were killed in South Sudan, and 1,6 million IDPs recorded. In addition, ACLED (2016) states that 15 000 people have been killed since the outbreak of the December 2013 civil war.
4.4.2.1 Causes of the Civil War

The conflict is reported to have been triggered by the fighting that broke out in Juba between the Presidential Guard soldiers loyal to President Kiir, identified as a Dinka, against those loyal to the then Vice President, Riek Machar, identified as a Nuer. There have been many reasons cited to have caused the first shoot outs. Jok, in Watkins (2014), postulates that there are three “competing narratives of the events” leading to the December 2013 civil war outbreak. First, the Government’s version was that the conflict was triggered by an attempted coup by Machar against President Kiir. The second narrative was that it was a unified offensive of the SPLM/A cabinet members who has been dismissed by Kiir after they declared their intention to challenge the President in the upcoming elections initially scheduled for 2015. The third interpretation was that the fight was a manifestation of disagreements within the Division 8 (referred to as Tiger Division) of the Presidential Guards in Juba which later spread to other units across South Sudan. However, the AU Commission (2014) proclaimed that from the available evidence, there was no evidence of any attempted coup in South Sudan.

It should be noted that the December 2013 civil war was preceded by a series of political events that may assist to explain the origins of the conflict. The political relationship between Kirr and Machar in Government and in the SPLM/A were reported to have been discordant and incongruous political relationship between President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar both in government and within the SPLM since the CPA days when they backed different candidates for the 2010 elections (AU Commission, 2014).

There were also reported factional political contestations within SPLM especially in the run-up to the elections that had been scheduled for 2015. These were heightened when Machar, Pagan Amum Okiech (SPLM Secretary General) and Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior (SPLM Political Bureau member and the late General John Garang de Mabior’s widow), openly declared their intention to contest against Kiir in the impending elections, with the support of prominent SPLM/A members including Deng Alor Kuol, John Luk Jok, and Taban Deng Gai, arguing that Kiir was exhibiting tendencies of dictatorship, human rights violations, corruption and ethnicization of politics (Blanchard, 2014; HSBA, 2014; Rolandsen et al, 2015). In addition, there was also reported friction between the two over allegations and counter-allegations of irregular army recruitments (AU Commission, 2014).

The trigger to the first shots was when Kiir reportedly ordered a Presidential Guard Commander, Marial Chanuong, to disarm the Guards in Giyada military barracks in Juba.
suspecting that a coup led by Machar and some SPLA elements was imminent (HSBA, 2014).
This exercise was perceived as “selective disarmament” by the Dinka and Nuer Presidential
Guard forces resulting in the civil war that was characterized by “heavy fighting along ethnic
tlines”, mostly Nuers against Dinkas (HSBA, 2014:5; see also Amnesty International, 2014:7;
Human Rights Watch, 2014:2; Human Rights Watch, 2016:520; Watkins; 2014; UNMISS,
2015). The conflict, which force Machar to flee from Juba to a base in Gambella Region in
Western Ethiopia, citing personal security fears, rapidly spread to Bentiu, Jonglei, Malakal,
Unity, Upper Nile, and other states.

4.4.2.2 Peace Efforts, Peace Deal and Transitional Government

The civil war was fought for 20 months up to 2015 when relative was brought after the signing
of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS),
which was signed between the Government of South Sudan (also referred to as the SPLM/A-
IG), the South Sudan Armed Opposition (SSAO, also referred to as the SPLM/A-IO), and the
Former Detained (FDs). The GoSS was represented by Kiir, whilst Machar represented the
SSAO, and Pagan Amun Okiech, the SPLM Secretary General, represented the FDs (who
were mostly SPLM officials arrested and detained after the outbreak of conflict in December
2013 on charges of attempting a coup against Kiir). The peace pact was signed on the 17th of
August 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and later on the 26th of August 2015 in Juba, South
Sudan, before its ratification on the 10th of September 2015 by the South Sudanese National
Legislative Assembly.

The conclusion of the ARCSS was after a protracted negotiation process that started on the 04th
of January in Addis Ababa under the mediation of the Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development (IGAD).

As the parties to the conflict failed to compromise on contentious issues of the agreement,
largely centred on disagreements over power sharing formula, leadership structures,
federalism, transitional security arrangements, institutional reforms, and transitional justice
mechanisms, among other issues; the killing of civilians continued and the humanitarian
situation worsened by the day. It was not surprising that by June 2015, the Report of the
Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in South Sudan presented at the 515th meeting
of the AU Heads of State and Government in Johannesburg on the 13th of June 2015 revealed;
“As of 30 April 2015: 1,52 million people were internally displaced, while 552,000 have sought refuge in neighbouring countries. Nearly 121,400 people were sheltered inside the protection sites of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). About 300,000 people were affected by the upsurge in the conflict in the first days of May 2015, as active hostilities and insecurity continue to disrupt humanitarian response activities and restrict road and air access” (AU Commission, 2015:4).

The fighting was despite the fact that the warring parties signed several Cessation of Hostilities and Ceasefire Agreements in January, May and August 2014, and February 2015, committing to end offensive attacks and civilian killings. The UN Security Council had to pass the Resolution 2206 (2015) that threatened sanctions on those engaging in actions that had the effect of “expanding or extending the conflict in South Sudan or obstructing reconciliation or peace talks or processes, including breaches of Hostilities Agreement” (UN, 2015:5). Thus despite reservations by the two parties, they finally signed the peace deal.

It has to be stated that the hurried manner in which the peace deal was signed may have had future implications on its sustainability, durability and ability to secure long lasting peace in South Sudan. The ARCSS provided for a 30 month-TGoNU which was later established on 29 April 2016 after 8 months of disagreements over conditions set for Machar to return to Juba from Gambella, where he had stayed for over two years. In the TGoNU, Kiir served as the President, Machar was First Vice President, and James Igga Wani was the Second Vice President. The agreement as provided that GoSS, SSAO, FDs and other political parties would share Council of Ministers positions on a ratio of 53%, 33%, 7%, and 7% respectively whilst in the seven States of South Sudan (other than Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile), GoSS would be allocated 85% of the State Council of Ministers positions whilst SSAO would get 7% (ARCSS, 2015). The same agreement also provided that in the States of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile, the GoSS, SSAO, FDs and other political parties would share State Council of Ministers positions using a ratio of 46%, 40%, 7% and 7% respectively (ARCSS, 2015).

In addition, Chapter VII (3) of ARCSS had provisions for the creation of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) comprising South Sudanese political parties and stakeholders, the Troika countries of Norway, UK and the United States, UN, AU, EU and IGAD; whose duty included “monitoring and overseeing the implementation of the Agreement and the mandate and tasks of the TGoNU, including the adherence of the parties to the agreed timelines and implementation schedule”. It was also one of the key provisions of ARCSS ton
demilitarize Juba, allow for the formation of a Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) to investigate and prosecute war crime perpetrators and international law violations; as well as the formation of a Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH) to facilitate truth, reconciliation and national healing.

4.4.2.3 ARCSS: Hurried Marriage that Never Lasted?

As discussed above, the IGAD-brokered mediation talks between Kiir’s SPLM/A-IG and Macher’s SPLM/A-IO took more than 18 months, reaching deadlocks and impasse on several issues. It took the threat of US and UN sanctions to pressure the parties to finally agree in August 2015. It would be understandable why there was intense pressure for the parties to accede to the peace agreement if one takes cognisance of the conflict casualties and humanitarian suffering of the civilians in South Sudan. Despite all the conflict casualties, Kiir and Machar continued to be intransigent and uncompromising, forcing some sections to label them “selfish”, “inconsiderate”, “egocentric”, “self-centred”, “power hungry” and “heartless” (Chinyanganya and Mhlanga, 2015; Gerenge, 2015; Ubwani, 2016). This is because the conflict inflicted a lot of pain on South Sudanese due to deaths, rape and sexual violence, IDPs, property destruction, looting and pillaging of villages, disturbance of farming activities, cattle raids and resultant food shortages, hunger and starvation (Global Conflict Tracker, 2016).

One should not escape the fact that both sides had serious reservations upon signing the peace pact. An analysis of the implementation complexities of the ARCSS would force one to conclude that the parties did not fully own the deal and peace arrangement. It was more or less like an imposed deal or hurried marriage. Perhaps, that is why Africa Confidential (2015) referred to the ARCSS as “a last minute deal”.

Kiir had 16 reservations to the ARCSS but signed the deal under pressure whilst Machar confirmed that he had undisclosed reservations (The Guardian, 2015; Sudan Tribune, 2015; Reuters, 2015). He objected over the redeployment of military forces within Juba outside a 25km radius from the capital city describing this as “de facto demilitarisation of Juba” and an affront to South Sudan sovereignty against a background wherein the army is needed to “protect the nation, its people and leadership” (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2015:4-12). Kiir was also against the “overseeing” function conferred to JMEC as this, according to him, would make it “the governing authority of the Republic of South Sudan” and “the actual ruling body in South Sudan” without involving the Government and Parliament.
This is despite the fact that IGAD mediators arrived at the decision to make JMEC independent and insulated from destructive political interference and manipulation in its monitoring of ARCSS implementation (IGAD, 2015:49).

Another reservation held by Kiir was against the procedure to amend ARCSS, as provided under Chapter 8 (4), that the Agreement required at least two-thirds majority in the Council of Ministers and at least two-thirds majority votes of JMEC. Kiir termed this “neo-colonialism” as JMEC (chaired by a foreigner) would thus be deciding South Sudanese affairs. Such reservations may sound reasonable from a nationalist point of view. However, one needs to contextualize this arrangement. An arrangement adopted against a background of polarization and deep suspicion and mistrust bred by a long period of fighting. This may be considered as a prudent arrangement, durable enough to technically withstand unilateralism in politically motivated legislative amendment that is very common in coalition governments.

Over and above these reservations, Kiir was also against the establishment of a Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA) provided for under Chapter 5 (4) to manage the Compensation and Reparation Fund for the compensation and reparation of crime victims arguing that the funds should be re-directed to national development. He argued that this will be prone to abuse and that instead, the funds should be channelled to “the reconstruction of the infrastructure and rebuilding of livelihoods of communities in the states most affected by the conflict. He objected against the idea of having two Presidents. To him, having the FDs represented in the presidium will be tantamount to rewarding rebellion (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2015). He was against the power-sharing ratios proposed for the State Council of Ministers in Unity, Jonglei and Upper Nile States amongst GRSS, SSAO, FDs and other political parties. Whilst Kiir maybe reasonable in his reservations which he claimed were in the interests of protecting South Sudanese sovereignty and territorial integrity, a further analysis may lead one not to dismiss hidden desires to retain and further secure more political power, influence and control.

Machar also had his own reservations. He claimed that dropped them “in favour of peace” (Tekle, Tesfa-Alem, 2015:n.p). In the end, Kiir declared;

“With all those reservations that we have, we will sign this [ARCSS] document...some features of the document are not in the interest of just and lasting peace. We had only one of the two options, the option of an imposed peace or the option of a continued war” (Tekle, Tesfa-Alem, 2015:n.p).
Perhaps, this made it difficult for the TGoNU to maintain total peace between the period of its formation in April 2016 and July 2016 when another civil conflict broke out in South Sudan. The implementation progress of ARCSS has been slow and patchy. Conflict was still being experienced especially in Upper Nile, Jonglei and Unity States despite the existence of cessession of hostilities agreements signed in 2014 and 2015, and the ARCSS itself. The Global Conflict Tracker (2016:n.p) revealed that “[a]fter signing the agreement [ARCSS] in August 2015, violence continued and both sides blamed the other for violating the ceasefire”.

Due to disagreements over how to fill in parliamentary seats in the event that seats become vacant was one of the reasons cited for delayed formation of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) which, according to ARCSS, needs to be expanded from the existing 300-members to 368 members through 50 members from the SSAO, one member from the FDs, and 17 members from other political parties. There were also disagreements in the selection of the TNLA Speaker, appointment of Presidential advisors, and reviewing the 28 states that were unilaterally established by Kiir through Presidential Order 6/2015 of 2 October 2015 (JMEC of South Sudan, 2016). The states had created after dissolving the existing 10 regional states on the pretext of “devolving power and bringing resources closer to the people, reduce government expenditure and promote development” (UNSC, 2016:2). However, SPLM/A-IO counter-argued that Kiir’s motive was “to grab other communities’ land in Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal and annex them to the Dinka lands” (Sudan Tribune, 2016:n.p).

By July 2016, the Transitional Institutions and Mechanisms provided for under Chapter 1 (14.1) of ARCSS, namely the Peace Commission (PC), Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), Refugees Commission (RC), as well as the CTRH, HCSS, Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA), and the Board of the Special Reconstruction Fund (BSRF) were not yet formed yet the agreement stated that they should be formed within one (1) month of the formation of the TGoNU. Further, the National Architecture and Joint Military Ceasefire Commission, Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC), Strategic Defence and Security Review Board (SDSRB), Joint Integrated Police (JIP), Joint Operations Centre (JOC), Joint Military Ceasefire Team (JMCT), and SDSRB were all either not formed or not fully operational (JMEC, 2016).

Conflict with ethnic dimensions still persisted in South Sudan, for instance, in February 2016, Dinkas and Shilluks were involved in inter-ethnic violence in Malakal (UNSC, 2016). The US Security Council Report (2016) also revealed that inter-ethnic clashes took place in Central
Equatoria, Western Bahr el Ghazal States, Western Equatoria, Malakal and Upper Nile State around March 2016, whilst rebel forces loyal to Kiir and Machar clashed in Bentiu, Juba and Wau which all affected national stability and peace efforts promised under ARCSS (UNSC, 2016). However, it was on the 8th of July 2016 that the Second Civil War broke out in South Sudan which started with members of the SPLA-IG and SPLA-IO in Juba.

A critical analysis of the negotiating framework, timing and players involved around ARCSS will reveal challenges of lack of ownership and buy-in by the warring parties, hence the peace deal’s fragility. Given the several reservations that the parties had, one was sure that it was going to be difficult for parties that have a long history of mistrust and suspicion to implement fully the peace pact. It was not surprising that tension started to build up few months after the formation of the TGoNU. The inability of ARCSS to bring a mutually agreed mechanism for transitional security arrangements had implications in the stability of the TGoNU and peace in South Sudan especially given the historical sensitivity of the security sector in South Sudan.

Of course, it has to be acknowledged that there are other critical factors that contributed to this outbreak of war other than the cited weaknesses of ARCSS. A lot of rebel movements had been left out of the peace process. ACLED (2016) asserts that by 2016, there were three rebel groups and 40 active political and communal militias in South Sudan. The report further argues that the creation of 28 states in South Sudan had the effect of “changing the political geography of the country” thereby provoking new grievances, disputes and resource wars thus raising tensions between the SPLA-IG and SPLA-IG due to their competing affiliations (ACLED, 2016:5).

4.4.3 The ‘Second Civil War’ (July 2016 – Present, 2016)

The Second Civil War in South Sudan, which started on the 8th of July 2016 broke out after the fighting between the SPLA-IG and SPLA-IO in Juba, three months after the formation of the TGoNU. It was reported that fighting started when the Presidential Guard started to fire at Machar’s security forces within the Presidential Palace in Juba where Kiir and Machar were having a Presidency meeting, and this forced the First Vice President, and his troops, to flee from Juba citing personal safety and security reasons and was reported to have crossed the border to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (see Al Jazeera, 18 August 2016; Reuters, 18 August 2016; Sudan Tribune, 29 August 2016; The Guardian, 18 August 2016). This war, according to the AU Commission (2016), had been preceded by fights in Wau and Raja towns
which displaced 40,000 people, and conflicts in Bar el Ghazal, and Equatoria regions around June 2016.

Kiir quickly announced a 48-hour ultimatum for Machar to return before the SSAO was requested to choose Machar’s replacement. The SSAO chose Taban Deng Gai, and Kiir appointed him as the First Vice President. However, there have been calls from organizations such as IGAD and the UN for Gai to step down so as to encourage Machar to re-join the peace process in the interest of peace and in the spirit of the ARCSS (see IGAD, 2016; Sudan Tribune, 12 August 2016). This is against a background of worsening security challenges in South Sudan as a result of the Second Civil War's outbreak. It was reported to have led to “huge loss of lives, displacement of the civilian population and destruction of property” as well as “widespread sexual violence” in South Sudan (IGAD, 2016:2).

In attempting to explain the reasons behind the Second Civil War in South Sudan, ACLED (2016) postulates that the conflict is due to the ineffectiveness of ARCSS; the contentious nature of the politics of South Sudan; the prevalent militarization of the country; elite discontentment; political wrangling and opportunism; presence of several ‘defence’ militias ready to fight for the national elite; and the continued emergence of national grievances due to unpopular decisions such as election postponement; politically motivated decentralization; among others. Whilst the international and local communities are searching for the lasting solutions for the conflict, conflicts continue to erupt across South Sudan states. This has had wider implications on the economic state of the country and development prospects.

4.5 Socio-Economic Development in Post-Secession South Sudan

Post-secession South Sudan has struggled to deliver socio-economic development that uplifts the livelihoods of the people. Currently, South Sudan is ranked second on the Fragile States Index (FSI), behind Somalia (Messner, ed, 2016). The ranking of states on fragility relies on social indicators of water shortages, mortality rates, food scarcity, refugee and IDP problems, as well as economic indicators of Gini coefficient, slum population, public service delivery, unemployment, GDP growth and inflation levels. Thus by measure of these stated indicators, South Sudan is an extremely fragile state. It is a Herculean task to deliver socio-economic development in the midst of conflict.
Peace is a sine qua non for national development and nation-building process. Dobbins et al (2007: xxiii) opine that “the first order priorities” for any nation building exercise is to address “public security and humanitarian assistance” and then follow on governance, economic stabilization, democratization and development. Given the nature of the security situation in South Sudan since July 2011, one would understand why it has been very difficult to sustain a performing economy. The first order priorities, though attempted, were not completed successfully. This is despite the existence of huge oil reserves in South Sudan which can be a game changer in terms of socio-economic growth and transformation.

South Sudan has the abundance of oil reserves, gold, diamonds, iron ore, limestone, chromium ore, copper, mica, silver, timber, tungsten, hydropower potential along the Nile River tributaries, and fertile agricultural land (World Fact Book, 2015:689). However, the economic indicators in South Sudan have been unattractive. By the year 2015, the population of South Sudan was estimated to be 12,34 million (World Bank, 2016). It had a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $9,015 billion, negative GDP growth of -6,3%, a Gross National Product (GNP) of $790 and high inflation rate of 50,2% (World Bank, 2016). These reflect an underperforming economic and the living standards of South Sudanese thus characterize a country that is perpetually at war. Of course one cannot dismiss the potential failure of the country’s fiscal and monetary policies.

In terms of infrastructure, South Sudan has not done much in terms of developing its physical infrastructure thereby arresting development. It is a fact that all forms of social and economic infrastructure be it telecommunications, roads, railways, water, energy and other forms of infrastructure opens up opportunities for national development, rural development and modernization. Perhaps, John Garang, the SPLA founder and first Vice President of Sudan was over-ambitious in his speech at the signing ceremony of the CPA in Nyayo Stadium on 9 January 2005 when he stated;

“[T]he SPLM shall exert all efforts to build physical infrastructure – roads, rail and river transport and telecommunications. There has never been any tarmac road in the new Sudan since creation, since the days of Adam and Eve, and this is an area the size of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi put together. The SPLM’s vision for transport infrastructure is at three levels – to develop regional linkages within southern Sudan and with the neighbours and with northern Sudan and to involve the state and local communities in this infrastructure building” (Sudan Tribune, 10 January 2005).
Five years after independence, South Sudan has never attempted to translate the ‘Garang Vision’ into meaningful development on the ground. Varela (2016) reveals that the transportation infrastructure is poor in South Sudan which makes transportation costs higher thereby inhibiting both domestic and international trade. The author adds;

“South Sudan has more than 7 000km of primary roads, which makes for an extremely low road density of 15km of road per 1000km² of arable land, compared to more than 45km of road in other low income countries…Only 5% of the roads are in good condition and accessible all seasons” (Varela, 2016:4).

The same is also stated by Gibendi in “Tough Decisions for South Sudan after the Vote” (2011). The author presents a comparative analysis of South Sudan and Uganda with respect to infrastructure development vis-à-vis the respective countries’ area sizes. Gibendi (2011:5) notes;

“For a territory that is three-and-half times the size of Uganda, South Sudan has only 42 kilometres of tarmac roads (all in Juba) compared to about 4,000 kilometres in Uganda. Many other regions of Southern Sudan are only accessible by air because of the dire state of the roads”.

South Sudan has potential for high agricultural production. However, out of the 47 million hectares of arable land that the country has, only 2.7 million is under cultivation and the country’s yields per hectare is low at 0.8 to 0.9 tons per hectare when compared to its neighbours Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda which produce 3 tons, 2 tons and 1.6 tonnes per hectare respectively (Varela, 2016). This creates a cyclical poverty and underdevelopment. It will be a very monumental task to construct both large scale physical and social infrastructure in South Sudan given its capital deficiency and state of security in the country. Most investors will therefore continue to have a high risk perception of South Sudan due to the conflict whilst a number of them will be discouraged by the poor infrastructure which increases the cost of doing business.

In terms of Human Development, poverty levels in South Sudan are high. The World Bank (2016) revealed that by 2015, the poverty levels in South Sudan was more than 58.5% as compared to 44.7% recorded at the time of secession in July 2011. This shows the incidence and depth of poverty is worsening. At independence, the country’s illiteracy rate stood at 80% whilst a huge population had no access to electricity (Nyong’o, 2011).
In as far as life expectancy at birth is concerned, both the World Bank and the UN put the life expectancy of Sudanese at 55.7 years, ranking the country at number 169 out of 188 in the world (World Bank, 2016; UN Human Development Report, 2015). The South Sudan Human Development Index (HDI), which measures “a nation’s longevity, health life, education and standard of living”, is 0.467 which is below the HDI and life expectancy average of Sub-Saharan countries of 0.518 and 58.5 years respectively (UN Human Development Report, 2015). This shows that human life is under threat in Sudan. And it is threatened from two ends: by war and by lack of basic needs, food, health services and sustainable income.

The country has not managed to observe good governance. There is high corruption in South Sudan which has seen it being ranked on number 165 out of 168, only ahead of Afghanistan, North Korea and Somalia, on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by the Transparency International (TI, 2016). Scholars such as Moro (2013:8) have argued that it is because of corruption that the benefits of oil production will never trickle down to the ordinary Sudanese. The author points to the massive corruption in Government institutions in charge of managing oil revenue arguing that South Sudanese government elites take advantage of “poor record keeping, lax accounting procedures, absence of procurement laws, and the pending status of corrective legislation”.

With Sudan even ranked number 162 out of 163 on the Global Peace Index (GPI), ahead of violent conflict-ridden countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia, it will be very arduous to deliver economically within such an unconducive environment (Institute of Economic and Peace, 2016). Now with the outbreak of the Second Civil War, the prospects for economic development have been blurred. Even JMEC (2016: n.p) advised;

“The economy continues its descent to complete failure. Further deterioration of the security environment could lead to the cessation of oil production, which would eliminate the one viable source of income to the government. Of course, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the IMF [International Monetary Fund] to move forward with assistance in the current situation. This too exacerbates what is a state on the cusp of economic collapse”.

Thus a stable and peaceful environment is crucial in setting the foundation for economic growth initiatives, which has been lacking in South Sudan since secession. However, South Sudan Government’s bloated parliament and cabinet may not be appropriate in light of the fiscal constraints. Currently the TGoNU has 40 Cabinet Ministers. Of course, from a political perspective one may understand that coalition or unity governments are usually bloated as they are in pursuance of national unity through the sharing of government positions on agreed
quotas. However, even by 2013, South Sudan was reported to have a “supersized” parliament with the South Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) having a total of 382 Members of Parliament (MPs), making the country to be ranked on top as the ‘most-over-represented population’ in the world with the highest number of MPs per population (Garang, 2013). With regard to its Cabinet, South Sudan stood as the second highest number of ministers per one million people in the world. Such a bloated government translates to huge financial expenditure in civil service wage bill and related support services. The World Bank (2015:18) stated that South Sudan’s wage bill for the public service constituted 60% of the national budget expenditures.

4.5.1 Oil and the External Factor

Just like elsewhere in Africa and beyond, oil is one of the drivers of the South Sudanese conflict that cannot be ignored. It is not surprising that most of the fatal clashes and fierce armed conflicts are common in oil rich States such as Upper Nile, Unity, Haggling, Bentiu, and where there are rich oilfields. Since the early 1990s, Chinese, Indian and Malaysians have been investing in the oil sector. It has been reported that there are two oil grades in South Sudan, namely Nile Blend, which is sweet crude oil sold at higher prices; and the Dar Blend, which is waxy, acidic and corrosive to oil infrastructure equipment, and therefore has limited market and reduced market price (see Beri, 2010; D’Agoot, 2009; Patey, 2010; Pedersen and Bazilian, 2014; Sanders, 2012; Shankleman, 2011).

Oil companies in South Sudan comprise mostly consortiums (such as Great Pioneer Operating Company (GPOC); Petrodar Operating Company (POC); White Nile Petroleum Operating Company (WNPOC); Dar Petroleum Operating Company (DPOC) that are in joint ventures between the GoSS’ Nilepet, and foreign corporations from countries such as China, India, Malaysia, Kuwait, and Turkey. These include China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Sinopet International Petroleum Corporation and China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC) from China; PETRONAS from Malaysia; Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC) from India; and Tri-Ocean Exploration and Production Company of Kuwait. These came around the mid-1990s, long after the US and French oil companies, Chevron and Total respectively, had started oil production already. These foreign companies have their tentacles all over the major oil fields in South Sudan, including oil fields such as Heglig, Unity,
Toma, Mala, Munga, Moleeta, Palogue, Paloich, Warrap, Jonglei, Fal, Fula, Adar-Yale, and Thaar Jath. Some fields are still being explored by companies such as Ascom from Moldova, Total from France, Exxon Mobile from the US, Kufpec from Kuwait, Star Petroleum from Luxembourg, Hemla from Norway.

What one needs to realise is the fact that all these, but Tri-Ocean Energy of Kuwait, are state-owned enterprises. This in itself presents the complicated nature of the influence of politicians at national, regional and international level in as far as protection of commercial interests is concerned. In “The new kings of crude: China, India, and the global struggle for oil in Sudan and South Sudan”, Patey (2014) lays bare the covert and underhand dealings that have characterized oil exploration, oil production and oil trade between investors and the political elite resulting in the continued proliferation of weapons and what may be regarded as proxy wars. Perhaps, it is because of these and other foreseen foreign interests by different foreign players in South Sudan that Nyong’o (2011:2) warned;

“Like all babies, South Sudan will require dexterous nurturing and jealous protection against the marauding beasts that come in the form of lopsided commercial propositions or destructive political interests. All babies need care and good partnering”.

In as far as internal fighting dynamics within the SPLA army wing is concerned, oil has also proved influential. James (2015:37) argues that Kiir “relies on oil revenue to keep the army and government running” whilst Machar, whose home area is near the Thar Jath Oilfields “can strengthen his military and political position by threatening the oil fields”. This creates instability.

Currently, South Sudan is one of the most oil-dependent countries in the world. Oil exports constitutes almost of its exports whilst about 60% of the country’s GDP is contributed by oil (World Bank, 2016). Whilst Fick, in Moro (2013) is of the view that the ability of South Sudan to leverage its oil resource will determine the country’s economic development path, this is now difficult considering the plummeting global oil prices. Because of the plummeting world oil prices, the prices of South Sudan’s Dar Blend fell by 40% from the price of $29,75 per barrel obtaining in December 2015 to $18 per barrel in January 2016 (World Bank, 2016).

Whilst the fall in the global oil prices can be dismissed as just temporary, more fears come into consideration. For instance, Jumbert and Rolandsen (2013:5) make a revelation that South
Sudan’s “[e]xisting oil fields in production have a limited lifespan, while exploration of new sources has not gained momentum” (see also World Bank, 2016). It thus appears that this, when considered within the context of a very complex and complicated web of factors, actors and players involved in the South Sudan conflict, with all their overt and covert divergent interests, the hope for resuscitating economic development in South Sudan becomes very indiscernible and impalpable.

4.6 Peace Prospects in South Sudan

It can be very difficult to establish peace prospects in South Sudan. The country has had a long history of several conflicts. In South Sudan, what is now predictable is war than peace. Conflicts erupt, negotiation marathons are conducted, peace agreements are signed and celebrated. But before the dust settles, another war erupts.

Nield (2016), citing UN, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Displacement Centre (IDC); stated that in the five years since independence in South Sudan, 50 000 people have been killed by the civil wars, 1 697 000 people have been displaced internally, whilst 850 619 people have been registered as refugees in neighbouring countries with an additional 272 261 registered as refugees in South Sudan. This can make easily make anyone pessimistic and despondent. IGAD (2016:4) indicated that by August 2016, South Sudan had 6,1 million people in need of humanitarian assistance including 1,6 million IDPs and 900 000 refugees.

Further, the UN, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as cited in Nield (2016), states that out of a total population of 12, 3 million people in South Sudan, 3,9 million people are at risk of starvation, 4,7 million people are in need of emergency health care whilst only 27% of the adult population is literate. According to the UN and the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), as cited in Nield (2016), one in three schools has been destroyed, damaged, occupied or closed as a result of the war, at the same time one in four children under the age of five is malnourished. UNICEF, in Laccino (2016: n.p), reports that, with more than 51% of its school-going aged children out of school, South Sudan “has the highest number of children out of school [1,8 million children] due to the ongoing unrest” in the whole world.
This state of affairs in South Sudan will force even those who may want to be optimistic and sanguine to suddenly become despondent and dispirited. Some scholars such as Lijn (2016) appear to paint a very gloomy and doomy picture for South Sudan, and appear not to see any prospects of peace even within the distant horizon. The author observed:

“Although a peace agreement [ARCSS] that includes important steps to build a stable and peaceful South Sudan was signed in 2015, the future of the country remains highly uncertain. Violent confrontations and human rights abuses continue and frequently it appears that parties have more faith in victory after a renewed offensive, than in peace” (Lijn, 2016:10).

One may be tempted to vindicate Lijn (2016), especially considering that not long after his observations, South Sudan experienced the Second Civil war in July 2016. In his “Scenarios for South Sudan in 2020”, Lijn (2016) submits that by 2020, South Sudan may be united in diversity; may have divided leadership; maybe fragmented; maybe divided into ethnically determined kingdoms; or the country will slide into dictatorship of the SPLM/A-IO with SPLM/A relegated to an insurgent movement. The author recommends more inclusive dialogue, mediation, peacebuilding, democratization, de-ethnicization, decentralization and crafting a vision that will attract peace and respect for peace agreements (Lijn, 2016).

In retrospect, one may need to re-listen to Kiir’s sentiments echoed in his independence speech in Juba in July 2011:

“It is my ardent belief that you are aware that our detractors have already written us off, even before the proclamation of our independence. They say we will slip in to civil war as soon as our flag is hoisted. They justify that by arguing that we are incapable of resolving our problems through dialogue. They charge that we are quick to resort to violence. They claim that our concept of democracy and freedom is faulty” (Association of Christian Resource Organizations Serving Sudan, ACROSS, 2016: n.p; Gurtong Trust, 2016: n.p).

This may point to the perennial challenge of South Sudanese leadership. Their destructive use of rhetoric when the situation on the ground is absolutely obverse. And as Hutton (2014:8) notes, in South Sudan, “there is a major gap between the language of politics and the practical application of power”. Such a leadership culture undermines peace prospects in post-secession South Sudan. Thus, at the centre of the peace prospects discussion should be the SPLA/M as a ruling party since independence in 2011, and way before that.

It appears the SPLA/M is struggling to use its liberation experience to mobilize and pull the nation towards the direction of peace, tranquillity, unity and prosperity in a visionary manner.
Hutton (2014) argues that this supposed failure may be due to its failure to transform as a political organization. The author asserts;

“The SPLM has struggled to transform itself from an armed rebellion into a liberation movement and then into a popular government. This dynamic is further complicated by the fact that the SPLM/A has delivered liberation, and therefore opposition to the party, as in many post-liberation contexts, is seen as opposition to independence and the sovereignty of the state, language that is used widely by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS)” (Hutton, 2014:11).

More or less similar to Hutton (2014)’s observations, Astill-Brown (2014:9) also describes the SPLA as “an armed liberation movement with a strict, top down hierarchy, which has yet to transition fully into a plural party in government”. The author argues that Kiir has a habit of offering amnesty to most defectors and rebels without proper integration which then threatens the stability and cohesion of the army which threatens peace (Astill-Brown, 2014). Perhaps, just like most post-liberation parties across Africa, the SPLA is also developing self-preservation tendencies due to pressures that come with waning legitimacy when movements fail to deliver against high expectations. Hence the party’s use of violent suppression of dissenting voices within the ranks, which often creates rebels in the form of defectors or sacked army generals.

As Blanchard (2014) observes, the SPLM/A has a reputation of mobilizing support on the basis of ethnicity and has tendencies for ‘ethnic favouritism’ when it comes to implementation of security sector initiatives. Such ‘ethnic favouritism’ leads to failure of any programmes of demilitarization and reintegration, and often result in continued fragmentation of the party, and in the process churning out revenge-seeking rebel movement leaders. Thus the culture of military violence, which the SPLA superintends, destroys any ray of hope and peace prospects in South Sudan. As Oluoch (2016: n.p) observes, “South Sudan is a militarized society where political differences are solved through the gun. The high illiteracy level leaves the majority of the population susceptible to manipulation by warlords seeking to settle political grievances by armed means”. Likewise, Blanchard (2014:9) sarcastically concludes that “South Sudan is not a country with a military. Rather, it is a military with a country”.

On the other hand, the involvement of several players who appear to have vested parochial interests in South Sudan complicates the peace prospects. Campell, as cited in Garrison (2015), hinted that expecting IGAD to mediate with utmost good faith in the South Sudanese peace process will be unrealistic given the fact that the IGAD leadership is also pursuing and
protecting individual interests. The author declares that the IGAD member states Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda are compromised given the fact that they collaborate with “looters” as Ethiopia invest heavily in the hotel industry with Kenya involved in the banking and telecommunications sector whilst Uganda invests heavily in South Sudanese food industry (Campell in Garrison, 2015). He adds that peace will be difficult to secure in South Sudan on the premise that there are no strong and people-centred institutions of governance in the country, over and above the fact that South Sudan’s peace and development agenda in pushed by the NGOs and the military.

Campell’s views can be comprehensible if one considers the heavy presence of the NGO sector in South Sudan. In “Who is ruling in South Sudan? The Role of NGOs in rebuilding socio-political order”, Riehl (2001:4) avers, “it seems that INGOs [International Non-Governmental Organizations] and international agencies have captured ‘rights’ and obligations which normally would be part of state administrations”. This certainly may become a national security fear, and has potential to undermine state legitimacy and dilute the government’s role and influence as a policy driver. As Riehl (2001) argues, one cannot dismiss the fact that NGOs can be war-mongers under the guise of peace-makers, pushing hidden agendas.

Prospectively, the attainment of peace in South Sudan remains difficult to predict given the unpredictability of the South Sudanese political leadership and its political landscape. The contentious issues with Sudan, and key grievances of the people of South Sudan appear to remain unresolved thereby perpetuating conflict with Sudan and within South Sudan. At the same time, the ability of the mediators to tactically facilitate negotiations that brings a sustainable peace pact will also matter. This brings to the fore the grand question on how sustainable and viable was secession of South Sudan as a strategy to end the protracted and seemingly intractable Sudanese conflict that had started in August 1955.

4.7 Conclusion

This Chapter discussed the conflict developments and dynamics in post-secession South Sudan, as well as the possible implications of South Sudan secession in future conflict resolution in Africa. It examined the turn of conflict events in the post-secession period in Sudan up-to the present and presented an analysis of how the nature of the conflict and its dimensions have
evolved in the period under examination. The Chapter established the social, humanitarian, economic, and political effects of post-secession conflict in South Sudan. The prospects for peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction were also critically assessed. Chapter Five thus presents, discuss and justify the methodology that has been adopted to gather, present and analyse the data collected during the study.
5.0 Introduction

Chapter Three and Chapter Four provided the necessary analytical background information and conflict dynamics, which all have contextual importance in pursuit of the main research question of establishing the extent to which the secession of South Sudan can be considered a sustainable strategy to resolve the protracted conflict. This Chapter presents the methodology that has been used to gather, present and analyse the data collected during the study. The study used both quantitative and qualitative research designs. Thus the focus of this Chapter is to present, discuss, explain and justify the research methods, research design, research techniques, research procedures, and data collection instruments that have been adopted and utilized to carry out the study in light of the research questions and objectives. In addition, the approaches and techniques used during the study to present, interpret, and analyse data are also described and explained whilst the ethical considerations of the study are presented.

5.1 Research Design

Social science research is systematic and therefore involves specific processes and procedures. A research design was therefore key in ensuring that the study is guided and systematic. Generally, a research design entails the overarching blue print used to collect and analyse data in research.

A research design, according to Creswell (2009:3-5), refers to “plans and the procedures for research that span the decisions from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection and analysis” and this “involves the intersection of philosophy, strategies of inquiry, and specific methods”. The author further states that there are three types of research designs, namely, qualitative research design, quantitative research design and mixed methods that combines both qualitative and quantitative research designs. Similarly, Durrheim in Blanche et al (2006:34-35), defines a research design as a framework that links research questions with the actual undertaking of research, adding that a research design need to be planned with details on how it will be conducted to answer the stated research questions. As the author notes,
designing a study entails "multiple decisions about the way in which the data will be collected and analysed to ensure that the final report answers the initial research question". It is through answering the "four questions" about data collection, as suggested by Punch (2005:142), that a research design can be decided upon, namely: "following what strategy [will the data be collected]?, Within what framework [will the data be collected]?, From whom [will the data be collected]?, and How [will the data be collected]?"

The choice of the research design is also dependent upon the nature of the research questions which guide the study since a research design is significant in defining the methods used in collecting data, analysing data and preparation of the research findings and research report. As Matthews and Ross (2010) postulates, "[t]he decision to take a qualitative or quantitative approach should be based on your research question and the nature of the data you need to collect and analyse in order to address the question".

All the above considerations defined and determined the nature of research design that was adopted for this study. This study, therefore, adopted the mixed methods research design, which combines both quantitative research and qualitative research. Of the mixed methods research design, Creswell and Clark, in Creswell (2009:4) explain;

"Mixed methods research is an approach to enquiry that combines or associates both qualitative and quantitative forms. It involves philosophical assumptions, the use of qualitative and quantitative approaches, and the mixing of both approaches in a study…it involves the use of both approaches in tandem so that the overall strength of a study is greater than either qualitative or quantitative research".

The mixed methods allowed for the utilization of in-depth semi-structured interviews and questionnaires in the collection of data through the use of a case study. According to Corbin and Strauss (2008:12), qualitative research “allows researchers to get at the inner experience of participants, to determine how meanings are formed through and in culture, and to discover rather than test variables.” In terms of data collection procedures, qualitative research involves the collection of data in the form of written text or spoken language, whilst in terms of data analysis it involves the identification and categorization of themes (Durrheim in Blanche et al, 2006:47).
A more comprehensive and extended definition of qualitative research is presented by Creswell (2009:4);

“Qualitative research is a means for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem. The process of [this type of] research involves emerging questions and procedures, data typically collected in the participant’s setting, data analysis inductively building from participants to general themes, and the researcher making interpretations of the meaning of the data”.

The advantage of this design is that it allows researchers to understand the facts of a research investigation and insider’s views from an outsider’s perspective through documents, journals, records, case studies, photos, interviewing the subjects, and observing their behaviour or through first-hand experience (Welman et al, 2005:9). Thus it allows the use of a variety of sources, both primary and secondary, which assist in providing for thorough investigation of a phenomenon. Durrheim in Blanche et al (2006:47) also mentions that qualitative research “allow the researcher to study selected issues in depth, openness, and detail as they identify and attempt to understand the categories of information that emerge from the data”. Thus from the author, one can deduce that with qualitative research, the merits are that there can be in-depth exploration of a phenomenon whilst complex research questions and issues can be examined in detail.

Qualitative research also assists in the soliciting of qualitative data. Patton (1990), as cited in Newman and Benz (1998), posited that qualitative data comprise “detailed descriptions of situations, events, people, interactions, observed behaviours, direct quotations from people about their experiences, attitudes, and beliefs”. This explains the “natural setting” characteristic of qualitative research explained by Mouton and Babbie (2001). The authors, in conjunction with Newman and Benz (1998)’s description, articulates that “[q]ualitative research is especially appropriate to the study of those attitudes and behaviours best understood within their natural setting, as opposed to somewhat artificial settings of experiments and surveys”. This, as Burns (2000:11) puts it, provide “deeper levels of meaning and understanding” to phenomenon under investigation.

Thus, the natural setting of this study was South Sudan, and the research managed to gather primary and secondary data on the research questions, analysed and interpreted it based on the views, perceptions and opinions of participants with respect to South Sudanese secession
through the use of a combination of interviews and questionnaires. This was very appropriate given the nature of the research questions of the study which centred on assessing the extent to which secession can be considered as a viable and sustainable strategy to resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts, using the case of South Sudan.

On the other hand, quantitative approaches have also been utilized in the study, since the research, as stated above, used a combination of both qualitative and quantitative approaches. Quantitative researchers “focus on the causal aspects of behaviour and the collection of facts that won’t change easily” and they also “use specific measurement instruments to collect data” (Welman et al, 2005:9). In defining quantitative research, Creswell (2009:4) states:

“Quantitative is a means for testing objective theories by examining the relationship among variables. These variables, in turn, can be measured, typically on instruments, so that numbered data can be analysed using statistical procedures”.

The use of quantitative research approach facilitated objectivity and allows researchers to measure and analyse data (see Beauchamp, 1982; Blanche et al, 2014; Creswell, 2009; Dominguez and Hollstein, 2014; Somekh and Lewin, 2005). This assisted in the study as it involved the collection, interpretation and analysis of numerical data in some areas such as conflict casualties, racial and ethnical composition of regions, South Sudan economic indicators, number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, among other variables that required quantitative descriptions. This is because the nature of the research questions involved the “counting and quantifying patterns” which characterize quantitative methods, as stated by Mouton and Babbie (2001). The quantitative nature of research assist in improving decision-making considerations and also in better understanding the scope, impacts and implications of certain events, processes and major decisions than in cases where words are just used to describe a phenomenon. This is one of the reasons why the quantitative approach was employed as part of the broader mixed methods research design.

The use of the mixed methods research design, which combines both qualitative and quantitative methods, assisted in ensuring complementarity between the two methods. This was in line with Bryman’s assertion, as cited in Punch (2005:240), that “the methodological justification of bringing quantitative and qualitative methods together” is “to capitalize on the strengths of the two approaches, and to compensate for the weaknesses of each approach”.

150
The mixed methods approach was employed within the context of a case study research strategy. As indicated above, South Sudan was the case study of focus in the research.

5.2 Case Study

This study used South Sudan as a case study research strategy. Since the central research question of the study was: Drawing on the experiences of and lessons from the South Sudanese case, to what extent does secession of states sustainably resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial African states?, the use of a case study approach was key to achieve the set research objectives.

Many definitions have been presented to define a case study in social science research. A comprehensive definition of a case study is presented by Theodorson and Theodorson, cited in Punch (2005:145), as:

“A method of studying social phenomenon through the thorough analysis of an individual case. The case maybe a person, a group, an episode, a process, a community, a society, or any other unit of social life. All data relevant to the case are gathered, and all available data are organized in terms of the case. The case study gives a unitary character to the data being studied by interrelating a variety of facts to a single case”.

Burns (2000:459-460) defines a case study as “a portmanteau term” that “typically involves the observation of an individual unit” and “is used to gain in-depth understanding replete with meaning for the subject, focusing on process rather than outcome, on discovery rather than confirmation”. The author adds that a case study “can either be quantitative or qualitative-or even a combination of both due to the constraints of a sample of one or a single unit being studied” (Burns, 2000:460). Therefore, the case study employed in the research combined both quantitative and qualitative approaches within the framework of mixed methods. This ensured that the analysis of the details was intensive, thorough and in-depth.

The characteristics of a case study make it significant in research. Punch (2005) identifies four characteristics of case studies, namely, that case studies have defined boundaries, are a case of something, are “an explicit attempt to preserve the wholeness, unity and integrity of a case” holistically, and that they allow for the use of “multiple sources of data and multiple data
collection methods”. These characteristics exude the strength of adopting a case study approach and its utility to this study.

Since this study sought to interrogate the extent to which the secession of states can be considered as a viable or sustainable strategy for resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial African states, the use of the case study of South Sudan, which seceded from the Republic of Sudan in 2011, allowed the researcher to probe deeply and intensively analyse the various variables related to the phenomenon of secession, with specific reference to the conflict events, processes and other relevant dynamics in South Sudan that can be applied to post-colonial African states.

Whilst this study recognized and acknowledged the historical and contemporary complexity of the Sudan and South Sudanese conflict, a better understanding of the South Sudanese case of secession, its context and complexities as successfully presented by this study, the use of case study as a research strategy brings out practical observations, perspectives, and evidence that can significant in assessing the extent to which secession is a viable and sustainable strategy for resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial African states. This is despite the fact that political, economic, social, legal and geo-strategic contexts and circumstances vary in determining the success of state secession, as well as determining the nature, direction and form of post-secession dynamics. As Stake in May (2011:224) argues, in his defence of the use of case studies against criticism of generalizability, “singularity is seen as a strength that enables a focus on the particularity and complexity of a single case and coming to understand its activity within important circumstances”. Thus this case study, as Burns (2000) puts it, assisted to ensure that the study to provide “anecdotal evidence that illustrates more general findings”.

So as to ensure effectiveness of the case study research strategy, the researcher ensured that different sources of data are utilized from different targets. Thus interviews and questionnaires were utilized in the study. As principles of case study data collection, Burns (2000:469) suggested that researchers need to use multiple data sources “to allow for triangulation through converging lines of enquiry, improving the reliability and validity of the data and findings”; build evidence from multiple sources; and record data. This was the guide for this study as data sources were varied and these were recorded in manuscripts during the course of the study.
5.3 **Data Collection Methods**

As hinted above, in terms of data collection, the study used both primary and secondary data. In this study, semi-structured interviews and questionnaires were used to gather data. Semi-structured interviews “define the line of inquiry” and “requires the participant to answer a set of pre-determined questions” (Nieuwenhuis in Maree 2007:87). They are interviews in which the interviewer asks major questions in a similar way whilst allowing room for the interviewer to alter their sequence and also probe more whenever necessary (Gilbert, 2008). Probing facilitate clarification and elaboration of details so as to get a clear and accurate picture of responses (Nieuwenhuis in Maree, 2007:88).

These types of interviews “follow a common set of topics or questions for each interviews, may introduce topics or questions in different ways or orders as appropriate for each interview and allow the participant to answer the questions or discuss the topic in their own way using their own words” (Gilbert, 2008:221). Semi-structured face-to-face interviews are suitable for collecting qualitative social data and also allow researchers to collect in-depth information, explain complex and sensitive questions to interviewees before they respond, probe interviewees and seek clarifications and reach a wider audience (Kumar, 2011:49-150; see also Matthews and Ross, 2010:221). They allowed for greater autonomy, gather in-depth information, and provided room for respondents to express themselves freely and comfortably. An interview guide was used during all the interviews and it contained a total of ten questions.

On the other hand, questionnaires were also used as an instrument of data collection. The questionnaires contained similar questions to those that were asked to interviewees. Questionnaires are defined by Matthews and Ross (2010:201) as “list of questions” or “a set of questions” which “can be answered by the research participants in a set of ways” and these can be structured or unstructured depending on the phenomenon under investigation. This research used questionnaires with a combination of both open-ended questions and closed-ended questions. Closed-ended questions have alternatives from which interviewees and questionnaire respondents choose from whilst open-ended questions “supply a frame of reference for respondents’ answers, coupled with a minimum of restraint on their expression” (Burns, 2000:572). The author adds that whilst the former allow for uniformity of measurement, more reliability, easier coding and categorization of responses, the latter assist in ensuring richness of the responses. Email questionnaire were utilized given the fact that the
targeted respondents were individuals working for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) based in South Sudan specializing in peace building, conflict management, post-conflict reconstruction and research. These were sent as part of email and the questionnaire was attached to the email. This was cheaper, easier, faster, and more convenient. Questionnaires also assisted to validate data gathered through interviews and other secondary sources.

For the purposes of ensuring validity, all the email correspondences were documented and the affiliation of the respondents was verified before they were requested to complete the questionnaires. This assisted in ensuring that data was collected from individuals who fit into the sample. As Babbie and Mouton (2001) posited, validity is concerned with whether a measure accurately reflects what needs to be measured. The verification was done through checking with the United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) South Sudan database which is available on its website. OCHA coordinates all humanitarian activities in South Sudan, and it keeps a cumulative record of all Cluster meetings which includes all meeting participants, their contact details and organizations of affiliation.

Interviews were targeted at lecturers, experts, academics, and/or researchers working in Universities and/or Think Tanks in Zimbabwe. On the other hand, questionnaires were administered to individuals working in Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) specializing in peace building, development, humanitarian initiatives, post-conflict reconstruction and research based in South Sudan. Whilst the researcher had intentions to visit South Sudan to conduct interviews with identified respondents and interviewees on the ground, the continuation of conflict in South Sudan was viewed as a security risk to field research hence the decision to proceed by way of interviews targeted at experts in Zimbabwe and email questionnaires targeted at peacebuilding, conflict management and research experts working in South Sudan.

5.4 Research Sample

A sample, in research, generally refers to a unit of a population that represents the larger whole. Bless and Higson-Smith (1995:86) defines a sample as “[t]he subset of the whole population which is actually investigated by a researcher and whose characteristics will be generalized to the entire population”. Thus samples should be representative of the target population. The
author adds that sampling is advantageous in that it facilitates data gathering in a “less time-consuming” and “less costly” manner whilst making data collection in research practical in situations that may have been almost impossible or in circumstances where the sample maybe “infinite or extremely large” (Bless and Higson-Smith 1995:86-87). As Miles and Huberman in Punch (2005:101) put it; “you cannot study everyone everywhere doing everything”, hence the logic of sampling.

As mentioned above, in-depth face-to-face in-depth interviews targeted at lecturers, academics, experts and/or researchers working in Universities and/or Think Tanks in Zimbabwe specializing in International Relations, Political Sciences, Religion, International Law, and Conflict Management and Peace Studies\(^2\) whilst questionnaires were administered to individuals working in NGOs based in South Sudan specializing in peace building, conflict management, post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian initiatives and research.\(^3\)

To decide on the sampling frame, the study has employed purposive sampling. Purposive sampling is the “most important type of non-probability sampling” whereby “researchers rely on their experience, ingenuity and/or previous research findings to deliberately obtain units of analysis in such a manner that the sample they obtain may be regarded as being representative of the relevant population” (Welman et al, 2005:69). It is based on “the judgement of a researcher regarding the characteristics of a representative sample” and “[t]he strategy is to select units that are judged to be typical of the population under investigation” (Bless and Higson-Smith, 1995:95). As Babbie and Mouton (2001) held, “[s]ometimes it’s appropriate for you to select your sample on the basis of your own knowledge of the population, its elements, and the nature of your research aims”.

The advantage is that it assists in studies where respondents or targeted interviewees may be difficult to identify. Babbie and Mouton (2001) submit that the consideration of purposive sampling include quality and accessibility to respondents that are manageable.

\(^2\)The targeted experts were working in the following universities that offer the afore-stated programmes, viz; Africa University (AU), Bindura University of Science Education (BUSE), Catholic University of Zimbabwe (CUZ), Great Zimbabwe University (GZU), Midlands State University (MSU), National University of Science and Technology (NUST), Solusi University, University of Zimbabwe (UZ), Zimbabwe Ezekiel Guti University (ZEGU), Zimbabwe Open University (ZOU).

\(^3\)Identification of questionnaire respondents was based on internet search of NGOs working in South Sudan, South Sudan conflict publications, and links through snowballing references.
Having interviewees based in Zimbabwe does not in any way affect the quality and validity of the research findings given the independence and impartiality of the targeted interviewees. Zimbabwean-based targeted interviewees are distanced from the issues related to South Sudan conflict and therefore are less likely to be emotionally attached to the conflict unlike experts who are resident in South Sudan. This assisted in reducing the likelihood of biases. The possible limitation was that the interviewees may not have experienced the conflict empirically which may limit the practical influence of their analysis and responses. However, to complement and counter this limitation, the majority of the targeted questionnaire respondents were resident in South Sudan or had lived and worked in South Sudan for a long time during the conflict. This assisted in enriching their responses from an empirical perspective.

At least 15 participants were purposively identified for face-to-face interviews in Zimbabwe. The total of 15 was arrived at considering that the targeted relevant universities and institutes with experts on the subject of study in Zimbabwe were 15. Hence, the plan was to interview at least one expert from each of these 15 universities/think tanks and even interview more via snowballing. On the other hand, at least 15 questionnaire respondents were targeted. The minimum number of 15 was decided upon after considerations of making the number of questionnaires equal to the number of interviewees. The researcher also wanted to avoid enlarging a sample that may not add much value to the study, hence targeting a manageable number that would be of quality in terms of the experience profile of the respondents. Again, more questionnaire respondents were identified through snowballing.

The snowballing technique is whereby informed individuals or existing respondents assist in recruiting more respondents through referrals from among their acquaintances (see Babbie and Mouton, 2001; Krishnaiah, 1988; Remler and Ryzin, 2011; Thompson, 2012; McNabb, 2002). In snowballing, “the researcher chooses a few respondents using any other method of sampling and asks them to recommend other people who meet the criteria of the research and who might be willing to participate in the project” (Sarantakos, 2005:165). In this study, this assisted in getting more interviewees and questionnaire respondents. Lecturers, academics and experts in the fields targeted knew each other through their interaction in symposiums, colloquiums, conferences, workshops and professional networks in Zimbabwe. On the other hand, questionnaire respondents in South Sudan made referrals based on their networks created in their field meetings, cluster workshops and professional interactions.
The choice of having interview respondents based in Zimbabwe has been motivated by considerations of convenience. Being a Zimbabwean by nationality, it was relatively easier for me to secure the consent of experts and academics in Zimbabwe. However, the likelihood of interviewer bias as a result of this has been dealt with in the structuring of questions in the Questionnaire and Interview Guide as they are objective and do not steer particular responses. Neither were the questions structured in a way that will make interviewees understand the situation in a certain way as there were no leading questions. Over and above that, the researcher strictly adhered to the ethical considerations of research, and was open-minded and impartial throughout the process of soliciting, recording and interpreting data such that the research outcome was accurate, reliable and ensured that the truth remained undistorted.

Respondents participated in the study in their individual capacities not as representatives of their organizations. This prevented interviewees and questionnaire respondents from being constrained by the rigidities of their organizational positions and also encourage them to present their honest opinions. It also assisted to eliminate the burden of bureaucratic red tape in securing gatekeepers’ letters or approvals for interviews since there was the likelihood that the subject of the topic was generally regarded as sensitive to national politics and foreign policy of host institutions in Zimbabwe. The question of agency and representation was likely to arise, however, the interviewees and questionnaire respondents were asked about the possibilities of any potential cases of conflict between respondents and their organizations based on their participation in the research, or responses to certain questions. There were only six such cases, and the researcher invoked the principle of anonymity in data analysis and presentation since data coding has been used. For the purposes of uniformity, blanket anonymity was then applied to all the interviewees and questionnaire respondents through coding and this was to be maintained in the publishing of the thesis.

The study sample was appropriate and sufficient enough when weighted against the study objectives. Interviewees in Zimbabwe were experts on the subject whilst questionnaire respondents based in South Sudan are, and/or have been, practically involved in peacebuilding, conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction in South Sudan. Since the subject of the study focuses on a highly technical subject of interrogating the sustainability of secession of states, and its implications on African integration and unity, the research questions were thus very difficult to solicit valuable input/response from the ordinary citizens, hence the exclusion
of the ordinary citizens. Moreover, the inclusion of ordinary non-expert citizens would have complicated the sample especially given the fact that the researcher could not travel to South Sudan as initially intended for reasons explained above. However, since the study managed to get questionnaire respondents who have worked with the ordinary citizens in South Sudan, the voice of the ordinary citizens was therefore indirectly represented and reflected in the responses. Secondary sources such as official reports by the UN, AU, Government of South Sudan, newspaper reports, among others will also provide the view of the ordinary citizens.

5.5 Data Analysis

The data collected in the study was presented in textual format as well as in the form of pie charts and tables with the quantitative aspects of the data summarized. The study took Nieuwenhuis in Maree (2007:100-101)’s view that “[d]ata analysis should be guided by the rigour and procedures of the specific type of analysis” that is followed which then determine the data collection method and type of data collected which all influence the perspectives from which the data is approached.

Thematic analysis and Content analysis were used to analyse qualitative data gathered during the study. According to Grbich in Matthews and Ross (2010:373), thematic analysis is “a process of segmentation, categorisation and relinking of aspects of the data prior to final interpretation”. Matthews and Ross (2010:373-374) further postulates that thematic analysis follows a systematic process that involves describing the data, getting to the meaning of the data for the interviewee or questionnaire respondent, exploring the data for meanings, identifying relationships between different parts of the data, and tentatively explaining the similarities and differences and the apparent relationships. Data gathered through questionnaires and interviews was analysed through thematic analysis. Thematic analysis assists in making data interpretation more precise whilst allowing for the determination of relationships between recurring themes, and make comparisons to explain phenomenon (Ibrahim, 2012). This was the strategy used in the study during thematic analysis as data was classified and categorized under major themes related to the research questions.

Content analysis, on the other hand, is defined by Riff et al (2014:19) as “a method of studying and analysing communications in a systematic, objective and quantitative manner to measure
To Nieuwenhuis in Maree (2007:101), content analysis “is a systematic approach to qualitative data analysis that identifies and summarises message content” and “a process of looking at data from different angles with a view to identifying keys in the text that will help us understand and interpret the raw data”. This, according to the author, involves the analysis of books, brochures, documents reports, responses from questionnaires and interviewees.

Thus the focus in content analysis is on the “form and substance” of communication (Yang and Miller, 2008). Content analysis was used to analyse data gathered through documentary research to allow for complementarity and cross-checking of facts, reliability, authenticity, and validity.

The other advantage of content analysis is that it is reasonably and flexibly applicable to most forms of data even unstructured data, and allows replicability of study (Matthews and Ross, 2010:397, see also Pickard, 2007; Yang and Miller, 2008; Young and Schmid, 1966; Riff et al, 2014). Whilst content analysis is often criticised on the basis that “incorrect selection of categories or codes can reduce validity and reliability” as argued by Matthews and Ross (2010), there was extreme care and due diligence exercised in analysing data during the study and there was thorough verification to prevent any possible categorisation and coding errors.

5.6 Ethical Considerations

This study duly considered the ethical principles that govern research and abided by the research ethics as expected in social science research. Ethics, according to Mle (2012: 21) entails:

“[A] process by which we clarify right and wrong and act on what we take to be right, that is, a set or system of moral principles that are generally accepted. Ethics simply means what is right and wrong, what is acceptable or unacceptable and is intertwined with the value system of people”.

In social science research, ethical issues arise and these have to be dealt with in such a way that researchers protect their participants. Mouton and Babbie (2001:520-528) points out that the most important ethical agreements that prevail in social science research include voluntary participation, avoiding harm to participants, anonymity and confidentiality, avoiding deceiving research participants, non-falsification or manipulation of research findings, avoiding
plagiarism, and acknowledgement of sponsorship. Isreal and Hay, as cited in Creswell (2009:87) also notes;

“Researchers need to protect their research participants; develop a trust with them; promote integrity of research, guard against misconduct and impropriety that might reflect on their organizations or institutions; and cope with new, challenging problems”.

The researcher was fully aware of the ethical principles that govern research, mainly beneficence, autonomy, the right to withdraw, protection of anonymity and confidentiality, as well as avoiding deceptive practices. Thus the researcher, as per procedural requirement, submitted the research proposal to the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee for consideration for approval, and it was duly approved (with Protocol Reference Number: HS/0455/016D).

The issue of South Sudan secession is considered by some institutions, organizations (both national and international), and some Governments as being very politically sensitive. Some views and opinions expressed in this regard may affect foreign relations between some governments and South Sudan and/or Sudan, whilst there was likelihood that relations between organizations/institutions and their host governments would be affected too by opinions/views of their employees/representatives on the subject matter. The principle of anonymity was therefore adhered to, hence the strategy to code questionnaire respondents and interviewees.

Respondents were first asked whether they need their identification to be anonymous or their interview to be recorded given the above sensitivities. Since some indicated that they would want to remain anonymous and some were free to be identified, the study used a system of coding all interviewees and questionnaire respondents so as to ensure uniformity. On the importance of anonymity in research, BERA in Walford (2005:84), stated;

“The confidential and anonymous treatment of participants’ data is considered the norm for the conduct of research. Researchers must recognise the participants’ entitlement to privacy and must accord them rights to confidentiality and anonymity, unless they or their guardians or responsible others, specifically and willingly waive that right”.

Consent of respondents was sought, confidentiality maintained, and highly sensitive questions in interviews and questionnaires were guarded against. Participants willingly and voluntarily
responded to questions without any threats, use of force or incentivization. In as far as plagiarism is concerned, every material borrowed from other publications were accurately cited and referenced accordingly with all sources acknowledged.

5.8 Conclusion

This Chapter presented the methodology that was used to collect, present and analyse the data gathered during the study. As presented and discussed, the study used a mixed methods research design which combined qualitative and quantitative research methods. The Chapter presented, discussed, explained and justified the research methods, research design, research techniques, research procedures, and data collection instruments that have been adopted and utilized to carry out the study in light of the research questions and research objectives. In addition, the approaches and techniques used during the study to present, interpret, and analyse data were described and explained whilst the ethical considerations of the study were also highlighted. The next Chapter will present, interpret and analyse the data gathered during the field study through in-depth face-to-face interviews and questionnaires.
CHAPTER 6
DATA PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS

6.0 Introduction

The objective of this Chapter is now to present, interpret and analyse data collected during the study through interviews and questionnaires. The data was collected through interviews conducted with lecturers and researchers in Zimbabwe. This was complemented by data collected through online questionnaires administered to respondents working in peacebuilding organizations, conflict management and development institutions, think tanks and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) based in South Sudan. Thus the analysis in the Chapter combines qualitative and quantitative analytical approaches. In particular, the analysis describes and summarizes the gathered data whilst identifying relationships between identified variables. In some instances, pie charts are used to present the data whilst in other cases textual presentation of data is employed. In terms of outline, this Chapter breaks down the data along the research questions of the study, and so as to allow meaningful thematic categorization and classification of the interview and questionnaire responses for effective data interpretation.

6.1 General Description and Profile of Interviewees and Questionnaire Respondents

As detailed in Chapter Five, this study was based on face-to-face interviews with respondents in who are lecturers, researchers and experts in the field of International Relations, Political Science, Conflict, Security and Peace Studies within universities, think tanks and/or institutions based in Zimbabwe.

It was also based on questionnaires that were distributed to respondents who are based in South Sudan as workers who have been working on peacebuilding, development, humanitarian and civil society engagements in that country, and/or experts in the field of International Relations, Political Science, Conflict, Security and Peace Studies based in South Sudan. These questionnaires were distributed through email, and were completed and returned using the same medium of communication.

Out of the 18 individuals interviewed, 12 were lecturers from Universities in Zimbabwe, specializing in teaching political science, international relations and conflict management.
Modules at undergraduate and/or post-graduate levels. Thus 67% of the interviewees were academics. Five were involved in research and capacity building in the field of conflict and peace building. These constitute 28% of the interviewees. The remaining one interviewee was involved in conflict capacity building and peace training, making up 6%. The description of interview participants is depicted in the bar graph below;

**Figure 6.1: Description of Interview Participants**

![Description of Interviewees](image)

*Source: Author’s computation based on field interviews*

As for questionnaire respondents, 13 were working in international peace building, development, humanitarian, advocacy and capacity building organizations based in South Sudan. These constitute 81% of the questionnaire respondents. The remaining 3 comprise 2 from a University and Think Tank based in South Sudan whilst the other respondent worked as a consultant in the area of humanitarian law based in South Sudan. Collectively, the 3 respondents constitute 19% of the questionnaire respondents.

In terms of nationality, 16 out of the total 17 interviewees are Zimbabweans by nationality, making up 94%. Only one interviewee was a Zambian national. This, perhaps, was largely due to the fact that the criteria for selecting interview targets was defined and determined by the choice of sample which was that of lecturers or researchers based in Zimbabwe.
Questionnaire respondents comprised 11 South Sudanese, 2 Kenyans, 2 Zimbabweans and 1 Spaniard who were all working with different organizations in South Sudan. South Sudanese constituted 69% of the questionnaire respondents, whilst Kenyans and Zimbabweans constituted 13% each to the total questionnaire respondents with Spanish respondent making up 6% of the questionnaire respondents.

Figure 6.2: Description of Questionnaire Respondents

Source: Author’s computation based on questionnaires

This diversity was key in diversifying perspectives and viewpoints. Having the majority of South Sudanese also assisted in providing empirical responses, which also bore empirical insights punctuated by real life experiences of the Sudanese and South Sudanese conflict.

6.2 Interview and Questionnaire Responses

In as far as the response rate is concerned, out of the targeted 25 interviews, the researcher managed to conduct 17 interviews which constituted 68% of the initial target. The other 8 interviewees rendered apologies that they were no longer available for the interviews as scheduled due to “pressing commitments” elsewhere. To make up the 17 interviews, the researcher managed to get more references through snowballing.
Questionnaire responses were quiet low. The researcher distributed around 25 questionnaires and managed to get 16 responses, constituting a response rate of 64%. One of the main reasons why the response was generally low was due to the instability in South Sudan. Most respondents delayed returning completed questionnaires citing conflict climate, unreliable internet connectivity and disruption of their work activities (especially those whose work is based in Juba, Upper Nile and Unity States) due to incessant conflicts and the fighting that broke out in July 2016. This forced some officials that had been targeted as questionnaire responses to suspend their work activities pending stabilization of the situation. This affected contributed to the failure of some respondents to complete the questionnaires as initially agreed. As one targeted respondent who works for an international organization based in Juba wrote to the researcher through an email correspondence just after the outbreak of the ‘Second Civil War’ in Juba in July 2016 expressing a sigh of relief and assuagement:

“Thank God I am alive although we have lost a lot of loved ones. Another deadly tragedy in South Sudan my country, since then I was not able to complete the questionnaire…The security situation in my country is not quite okey [sic]. I only have little time access to our facilities… to do my work” (Questionnaire Respondent 1, 22 July 2016, and 03 August 2016).

Another prospective questionnaire respondent also intimated to this researcher the insecurity situation obtaining in Juba around July 2016 and the period after that which not only disrupted his project assignments but also threatened his personal and family security. On the 22nd of July 2016, the prospective questionnaire respondent, through electronic correspondence, advised:

“I hope you are following the situation in South Sudan, we are on the run for safety… [our] staff have evacuated South Sudan, I am on ground with limited time to torch everywhere…I am moving my family out and I may leave South Sudan, if the situation continue to deteriorate” (Prospective Questionnaire Respondent).

However, despite the above, the interviews which constitute 68% of the initial target together with the questionnaires responses which constitute 64% of the initial target were sufficient enough to facilitate analysis in light of the research questions.

Questions posed during interviews as well as those contained in the questionnaire were both open-ended and closed-ended. A number of themes emerged from the interviews and questionnaires which will be theme analyzed with a view to solicit a wide range of opinions
from interviewees and questionnaire respondents relating to the key research questions and also aligned to the key objectives of the study.

Table 6.1: List of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think Tank</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think Tank</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think Tank</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think Tank</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Institute</td>
<td>Senior Training Officer</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think Tank</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s computation based on field interviews

Table 6.2: List of Questionnaire Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International NGO</td>
<td>Protection Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International NGO</td>
<td>Technical Assistant</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International NGO</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGO</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International NGO</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International NGO</td>
<td>Unarmed Civilian Protection Officer</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGO</td>
<td>Programme Director</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGO</td>
<td>Reverend</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University/ International NGO</td>
<td>Lecturer/Consultant</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International NGO</td>
<td>Media Content Strategist</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGO</td>
<td>Development Analyst</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Researcher/Consultant</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGO</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGO</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGO</td>
<td>Programme Coordinator</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGO</td>
<td>Head of Programme</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s computation based on questionnaires
6.3 Research Questions

Both the Interview Guide and the Questionnaire of the study had similar questions. The full Interview Guide and Questionnaire is attached as Appendix 5 and Appendix 6 respectively. In light of the research objectives, the questions that the interviewees and questionnaire respondents were asked were those attached in the afore-mentioned appendices.

6.4 Analysis of Themes Emerging from Interviews and Questionnaires

So as to ensure analysis of the responses that came out of the study interviews and questionnaires, the information gathered from the interviews and questionnaires was organized and categorized into relevant themes. Since questionnaires were administered in order to complement interviews, the analysis was combined so as to enable comprehensive analysis. Again this is appropriate given the fact that the questionnaires contained the same questions that were asked during interviews, except that interviews allowed for follow-up questions which facilitated further probing, elaboration and elucidation as well as emergence of more themes.

Seven themes came out of the responses gathered from both the interviews and questionnaire responses. The themes are arranged and organized for the purposes of thematic analysis without following the order of the questions since in some instances there were common themes emanating from responses to two or more questions. The following were the themes, (i) The distinction, causes and nature of ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa; (ii) Causes of the protracted conflict in South Sudan, (iii) viability and sustainability of secession as a conflict resolution strategy in Post-Colonial Africa, (iv) the justifiability of the African Union (AU)’s position on secession of its member states, (v) assessment of the success or failure of secession in the South Sudanese case, (vi) ‘Best way’ to viably and sustainably resolve protracted intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts, and (vii) Implications, precedence and lessons of South Sudanese secession to the future resolution of secessionist conflicts in post-colonial Africa.

In as far as Question 1 was concerned; respondents to questionnaires and interviewees expressed and demonstrated their extensive knowledge and wealth of experience in dealing with intra-state conflicts in general. Almost all the interviewees stated that they deal with
conflict issues as part of their academic work of lecturing and research, whilst those in training institutes had intra-state conflicts listed as part of their thematic areas of training and capacity building. About 90% of the targeted interviewees specialized in lecturing Conflict Management, Political Science and International Relations Modules, over and above having studied conflict transformation-related programmes at post-graduate level. For instance, Interview Respondent 13 answered;

“In terms of academic familiarity, I have studied my Masters in Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies. My PhD [Doctor of Philosophy] research was also in the area of Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies. As for what I teach you can read for yourself there [pointing to his Office Door Sign which read “Lecturer: Conflict Theory and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Modules”].”

With regard to Questionnaire respondents, all of them have worked and/or are still working in South Sudan attached to organizations that operate within the fields of peacebuilding, development, humanitarian and civil society engagements, academia, and research. Thus they indicated that they were very familiar with intra-state conflicts in general, and South Sudan conflict in particular. Responding to Question 1 on the questionnaire, Respondent 5 hinted,

“[I was] born and raised during the Sudanese civil war”.

Likewise, Respondent 16 also expressed familiarity to intra-state conflicts in general, and South Sudanese conflict through experience, over and above professional and academic knowledge;

“[Intra-state conflict] is a term many African children have grown up with including myself. I personally was born during the Sudan civil war which was a pure intra-state conflict”.

This combination of personal experiences of the Sudan civil war, and evolution of the conflict upto secession of South Sudan in 2011, and the post-secession conflict dynamics by most of the questionnaire respondents made their contributions empirical and informed by real life experiences. This broadened the perspectives of respondents and enriched the responses.
6.4.1 The nature of, and distinction between, ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa

Both interviewees and questionnaire respondents had interesting and wide ranging views with regard to the distinction between ethnic and religious conflicts. The causes and nature of ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa emerged as a related theme within the responses to Question 2.

First and foremost, there was a general agreement that conflicts can take an ethnic or religious dimension. They distinguished ethnic conflicts from religious conflicts in terms of manifestation, characteristics and instigating factors.

There were captivating views with regard to the nature and causes of ethnic and religious conflicts. On whether there are any meaningful distinctions between intra-state ethnic conflicts and intra-state religious conflicts, all respondents stated that whilst the two types of conflicts were identity-based conflicts, intra-state ethnic conflicts differed from intra-state religious in terms of their nature and grievance orientation, source identity, and effects. The distinguishing factors were that ethnicism bordered on bloodlines, language, and culture whilst religion entails shared spirituality and common belief and faith. As Respondent 13 hinted;

“The first [intra-state ethnic conflicts] are obviously motivated by ethnic bigotry, while the second are driven by religious bigotry. Unlike intra-state ethnic conflict, intra-state religious conflicts are ideological, as they are launched to either impose religious ideas on others or resist imposition. They are more complicated, and finding a solution for them is more difficult.”

The above views were consistent the literature reviewed in Chapter Two. The majority of literature reviewed distinguished between ethnic and religious conflicts based on the characteristics of the types conflicts such as culture, beliefs, kinship, clan, values, racial uniqueness, aesthetic cultural patterns and language, and genealogy (see Bannon et al, 2004; Carola, 1995; Cordell, 1999:14; De Vos, 1995:18; Fenton, 2003; Gellner in Ryan, 1988; Jenkins, 1997; Kauffman, 1996; Parker and Reid, 2013; Ryan, 1990:1; Schermerhorn in Udogu, 2000). As argued in the literature reviewed, religious identity is acquired, whilst ethnic identity is biologically transmitted.

Respondents exhibited mixed explanations in terms of causality of ethno-religious conflicts, as some interviewees and questionnaire respondents adopted a primordialist school of thought.
whilst other preferred the instrumentalist and/or constructivist explanations. As Interviewee 3 remarked;

“I believe that even ethnic differences or ethnic identities are actually more of created consciousness...When it comes to religious distinctions, the two religions that are called ‘world religions’ [Moslem and Christianity] are relatively late-comers. All these are sort of inherited identities and now that they might create ethnic or religious conflict...they are received or imported creations, they are colonial not indigenous creations” (see also Interviewee 12).

In the responses, there seemed to be an emerging theme that the underlying principal cause of both intra-state ethnic conflicts and intra-state religious conflicts concerned inequitable resource distribution amongst citizens and injustices. Interviewee 4 opined that;

“[Intra-state ethnic and intra-state religious] conflicts are always about competition for resources, especially in Africa...Like Mencius [Chinese Philosopher] said ‘when resources are available [to all citizens], conflicts are very few’...Ethnicity and religious conflicts are emphasized when people have no access to opportunities, inequitable resource distribution, active participation in governance” (see also Interviewee 8; and Interviewee 13)

This perspective was also expressed by Interviewee 12, who asserted that;

“Conflicts, we may want to term them religious, ethnic, or whatever..., are caused by basically three or four reasons, especially if we look at conflicts in Africa, [these are], the struggle for power, misuse or abuse of power, and struggle for resources”.

The sentiments by Interviewee 12 were also re-echoed by Interviewee 5 who stressed that the “primary factor in ethnic and religious conflicts is usually centred on resources and the issue of power” whilst Respondent 10 mentioned that the two types of conflicts, both ethnic and religious conflicts are triggered by “elements of deprivation”. Overall, respondents and interviews appeared to agree that intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts as identity-based conflicts not exclusively caused by ethno-religious composition, diversity and/or differences. Rather, they argued that ethno-religious animosities in Africa are invigorated by skewed resource distribution, unequal access to opportunities, targeted marginalization and discrimination, oppression; and elite manipulation in the midst of power struggles (see interviews with Interviewee 1; Interviewee 3; Interviewee 4; Interviewee 5; Interviewee 8; Interviewee 12; Interviewee 13; see also responses from Questionnaire Respondent 1; Questionnaire Respondent 5; Questionnaire Respondent 7; Questionnaire Respondent 8; Questionnaire Respondent 11; and Questionnaire Respondent 14). In analysis, what cannot be
ignored about ethnicity and religion, just as Taras and Ganguly (2015: xi) affirms, “ethnicity, religion and nationalism are some of the most powerful forces shaping contemporary politics”.

Whilst this may be true if related to most conflicts across the continent, there may be need to also consider that the ethnic and religious conflicts may also be borne out of factors beyond resource competition. Suppression of religious rights will definitely trigger conflicts as those affected will be forced to rise against the violation of their rights. As reviewed in the literature, this has happened in countries such as Sudan and CAR. However, as most interviewees and questionnaire respondents indicated, ethnic and religious conflicts should be explained from a multi-causal point of view.

### 6.4.2 Causes of the protracted conflict in Sudan

There was a theme that emerged on the causes of the Sudan conflict amongst interviewees and questionnaire respondents. This surfaced in response to the Question 6 on the main factors contributing to the longevity of the Sudanese protracted conflict which began in 1955 on the eve of independence from colonial Britain.

The complex nature of the Sudanese conflict history and its evolution was evident in the interviews and questionnaire responses. Most interviewees and questionnaires admitted that the Sudanese conflict that eventually led to secession of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011 was very complicated and intricate. With regard to the causes of the conflict, most of the interviewees and questionnaire respondents mentioned the colonial factor as one of the most influential root cause of the Sudanese conflict. The explanation was that the divisive nature of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in Sudan sowed seeds of conflict and secession as it developed the North and excluded the South from the development matrix. As Interviewee 4 submitted:

“The colonial factor played a big role…The Anglo-Egyptian colonial administration ruled through a centralized governance system dominated by the North…which treated the Southern part differently”. (see also Interviewee 1; Interviewee 3; Interviewee 5; Interviewee 7; Interviewee 9; Interviewee 10; Interviewee 11; Interviewee 13; Interviewee 14; Interviewee 16; Interviewee 17; Interviewee 18; Questionnaire Respondent 7; Questionnaire Respondent 8; Questionnaire Respondent 14; and Questionnaire Respondent 16).

Likewise, another participant commented;
“The history of colonization from the Turko-Egyptian rule 1821-1885, the Mahdist Revolution 1885-1898 and the British rule until independence in 1956 and the political trends including military actions in the preceding years until 2005 may have warranted the AU to give South Sudan an exception to secede” (Questionnaire Respondent 9).

The interviewees and questionnaire respondents were, however, in clear acknowledgement that the conflict prolonged due to a multiplicity of reasons. For instance, Questionnaire Respondent 6 listed “[greed, ethnicity, political affiliation, inequality in terms of economy, religion” as pivotal in prolonging the Sudanese conflict. To Questionnaire Respondent 5, the Sudanese conflict was prolonged due to the following reason:

“[T]he various regimes in Sudan always thought of their own survival rather than looking into development of the periphery. Political and economic power was always at the centre in Khartoum”.

Thus the contribution of leadership failure and successive marginalization of the South was common amongst interviewees and questionnaire respondents. The post-colonial successive governments in Sudan were singled out as being insensitive to all the citizen needs and demands, with a general agreement amongst respondents and interviewees that the Southerners were excluded from both the governance process, and from equally accessing the benefits of national resource exploitation, development projects and service delivery. To most interviewees and respondents, the religious and ethnic dimensions of the conflict were real, but there were underlying economic instigators of the conflict which should not be ignored given their prominence and significance. Interviewee 18 remarked;

“There was poverty of leadership [in post-colonial Sudan]…the inauguration of myriads of measures that upset the fragile equilibrium between the largely Muslim north and predominantly Christian and Animist South by the Sudanese President, Gaafar Numeiry, led to the outbreak of war in Sudan in 1983…[There was] unfair natural resource distribution, particularly oil…It was control and use of oil resources that soured relations and led to continued conflict between the north and south…Poverty in [the] south and its resonance with vertical, horizontal, ethnic and religious grievances was central in causing and prolonging the Sudanese conflict”.

The arguments by Interviewee 18 were in line with remarks made by Questionnaire Respondent 7. The latter noted that;
“...the discovery of the oil in the country helped to prolong the [Sudanese] conflict since the mineral economy normally has a high return in a conflict environment” (Questionnaire Respondent 7).

Similarly, Questionnaire Respondent 10 and Questionnaire Respondent 11 mentioned the issue of resource distribution inequality, with more emphasis on oil discovery and its impact (or lack of it) on national development in Sudan. This was stressed within the framework of the “model of governance” adopted by the Khartoum Government “[s]ince the beginning of Sudan’s oil production” which marginalizes peripheral areas such that they remain poor and underdeveloped (Questionnaire 11). These questionnaire respondents concurred with a most literature reviewed in Chapter Two. For instance, Keller (2007) together with Collier and Hoeffler (2002) argued that natural resources distribution along ethnic and regional lines was one of the influential causes of most prolonged and secessionist conflicts.

Thus amongst respondents, the north-south divide was predominantly explained as a consequence of misgovernance, unequal resource distribution, religious and ethnic oppression, economic and political marginalization of the South and leadership deficiencies characterized by intensive power struggles motivated by personal greed. Whilst acknowledging all these factors, there were some respondents and interviewees who also identified the “invisible hand” as aiding the conflict in pursuit of respective interests (see Interviewee 3; Interviewee 6; Interviewee 11; Interviewee 12; Interviewee 15; Questionnaire Respondent 2; Questionnaire Respondent 10; and Questionnaire Respondent 16).

Unfortunately, it appeared from the interviews and questionnaire responses that there was no firm and tangible evidence to buttress and reinforce the claims. Perhaps, as one of the interviewees posited, the outside hand is almost always “invisible” and “hidden” hence it is difficult to evince (Interviewee 3). However, such arguments cannot be wished away and they corresponded with secondary sources reviewed in Chapter Four which pointed to the fact that different regional and international players and/or actors were involved in the conflict with divergent geo-strategic, economic, regional hegemonic, and security interests which also contributed to the protractedness of the conflicts. The identified actors, as discussed in Chapter Four, included the US which was part of the troika including Norway and Italy, Egypt, Libya, IGAD member states, Uganda, the AU, and the UN.
6.4.3 Justifiability of the African Union (AU)’s ‘anti-secession’ declaration/position of 1964

Questions 3 allowed interviewees and questionnaire respondents to provide their views and opinions on the merits of the AU position on the secession of its member states within the context of conflict management and conflict resolution. As stated earlier, the AU (then known as the Organization for African Unity), through made a decision at the First Ordinary Session of the Summit of Heads of State and Government in Cairo, Egypt in 1964 wherein they solemnly declared that “all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence” (OAU Resolution AHG/Res. 16, 1964). Further, Article 4 (b) of the AU Constitutive Act of 2000 also obligates the continental body to “respect [the] borders existing on achievement of independence” and “defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity” of Member States.

In response to whether the AU’s ‘anti-secession declaration’ was realistic in avoiding secession as a strategy to resolve protracted conflicts, interviewees and questionnaire respondents had mixed opinions based on different premises. Out of the total 18 interviewees, 12 were in support of the stance taken by the AU in the 1964 declaration to avoid secession. They described the AU’s position as “realistic”, “justified”, “reasonable”, “wise”, “right”, “sensible”, “prudent”, “practical”, “rational”, “good”, and “shrewd”, among other affirmative adjectives (see Interviewee 1; Interviewee 5; Interviewee 6; Interviewee 7; Interviewee 8; Interviewee 10; Interviewee 12; Interviewee 13; Interviewee 14; Interviewee 15; Interviewee 17; and Interviewee 18). This made up 67% of the interviewees.

However, a total of five interviewees were of the view that the AU made a mistake in their declaration and thus its stance was “unrealistic”, “unreasonable” and “a mistake” (see Interviewee 2; Interviewee 3; Interviewee 4; Interviewee 9; and Interviewee 11). This constituted 28% of the interviewees. Only one respondent indicated that the AU stance was “both realistic and unrealistic” (see Interviewee 16). All interviewees based their judgement and assertions on the likely implications that the declaration or stance had the resolution of prolonged intra-ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial African conflicts. The pie chart below is a representation of the views made by interviewees regarding the AU’s ‘anti-secession’ position.
When it came to questionnaire respondents, again there were varying responses with regard to the extent to which the AU’s position on secession as enshrined in the Cairo Declaration was realistic. Out of the total 16 questionnaire respondents, eight respondents were in support of the AU ‘anti-secession’ declaration whilst six respondents viewed the AU stance as unrealistic. The former represented 50% whereas the latter constituted 38% of the total respondents. Responses from two respondents, which made up 13%, both supported and objected to the AU decision (see Questionnaire Respondents 11; and Questionnaire Respondents 13). The pie chart below depicts the views made by questionnaire respondents with regard to the AU’s ‘anti-secession’ position.
The majority of the interviewees and questionnaire respondents, from the analysis of the responses above, regarded the AU stance as realistic in avoiding as a solution to future protracted intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts. One respondent maintained;

“The position [by the AU] was one of the wisest…and well thought decision…made by educated and schooled nationalists such as [Kwame] Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Robert Mugabe and others. They had seen colonial injustices perpetrated on them…What would have happened if they had said ‘let’s re-draw our borders’? Another question that would have come was that people had migrated…look at the case of Zimbabwe, there were some Ndebeles who had already established in Mashonaland…South Africa had Xhosas who had moved out of the Northern Cape and other parts of Eastern Cape, to other parts of Gauteng…some are in KwaZulu-Natal…how were you going to draw the border-lines?” (Interviewee 12).

The argument bordered on the fluidity of state borders and mobility of African ethnic groups which would have made it difficult to re-draw state borders hence the ‘justifiability’ of the AU in adopting the declaration that was against any possible secession or attempt to re-draw state borders in the name of conflict resolution. Some respondents who supported the AU’s stance argued from a nation-building and state-building perspective whilst positing that a contrary
declaration would have signalled the disintegration of the continental body’s member states (see Questionnaire Respondent 5; Interviewee 7; Interviewee 10). As Interviewee 7 insisted;

“The AU stance was okay if one considered that it was motivated by the desire to maintain peace and security in post-colonial African states...Whilst the boundaries were arbitrary, and some African tribes had been moved and removed from their rightful areas; maintaining state borders as inherited from colonialists was realistic as a basis of nation building. Allowing state borders to be re-drawn on ethnic, tribal, linguistic, cultural or religious lines was against nation/state building since a state is not defined by its religion, tribe or ethnicity...it is defined by population, geography, citizenship...as key features of a state...hence it was proper for the AU to make the decision”

This was also echoed by other respondents who argued that the AU stance assisted in discouraging the “discourse” and “discussions” around “ethnic rights” which would have been detrimental to the post-colonial state-building projects and social cohesion (see Interviewee 8; Interviewee 13). There were those that supported the AU ‘anti-secession’ stance on the basis of Africa’s multi-ethnic composition which would have made it almost infeasible and inconceivable to re-draw state borders in line with future secession demands. For instance, one interviewee attested;

“At that point [of Cairo Declaration] the OAU founding fathers were correct. Africa is a cosmopolitan...and multi-communal. If the founding fathers had allowed each state to design its own country, other states would have formed over 500 states...state building would create nation states” (Interviewee 10).

The perspective on pragmatism was also re-emphasised by other participants who argued that colonialism has altered pre-colonial establishments to the extent that revisiting the same was going to be a mammoth task whose success was realistically difficult to attain. Interviewee 18 averred that;

“It [Cairo ‘anti-secession’ declaration] was the most pragmatic and realistic approach taken considering the long history of colonial experience and the worse conflicts and difficulties that would have emerged by trying to resurrect the ever-changing pre-colonial states. History is surely not static and any attempt to resurrect pre-colonial states in 1964 would have been almost a mission impossible. This is not to justify the artificial borders created by the colonialists cutting across ethnic ties, but an acknowledgement that their maintenance, though problematic, was a lesser evil than an attempt to move the clock backwards to the pre-colonial period”.

Indeed, one may need to consider the longevity of colonial rule in Africa. This, in a way, had created new social configurations and political communities, which were not going to be dismantled easily. For instance, the social and political re-organization of the Zulu, Xhosa, and
Tsonga kingdoms had metamorphosized since the arrival of the Dutch colonial administrators at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 (see Cameron and Spies, 1986; Fage and Tordoff, 1969; Landau, 2010; Ross, 1999; Wilson and Thompson, 1969). This, may therefore be sufficient enough to justify the OAU’s Cairo ‘anti-secession’ declaration on the basis of pragmatism.

However, the question of feasibility as a factor of consideration in redrawing state borders after independence in post-colonial Africa attracted mixed reactions from participants. Interviewee 10 and Interviewee 12, as presented above, explicitly maintained that redrawing of state borders was going to be impracticable and unrealizable. However, research participants such as Interviewee 17 argued that whilst this assisted to maintain peace and security in post-colonial African states, the OAU declaration was “a miscarriage of justice” and “legitimization of Berlin [Conference of 1884/85]”. Interviewee 17 expostulated that;

“[R]edrawing state borders was going to be feasible...post-colonial African governments needed to use the boundaries of Kingdoms that existed prior colonialism...and this was going to be of benefit to post-coloniality”.

Whilst agreeing that the AU decision was reasonable and commendable, there were some participants who blamed the AU for not putting in place accompanying measures to ensure that its declaration assisted in maintaining continental peace and security. Interviewee 4 postulated that;

“The stance [by the AU] messed up a lot of things...the AU at that time tried to address boundaries but the organization failed to support its stance with the necessary structures given the fact that the maintenance of colonially-inherited borders was going to be problematic since some African countries like DRC [Democratic Republic of Congo], Angola, and others alike are so vast to the extent that maintaining peace and order was inevitably going to be problematic. The necessary structures came late, for instance the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; the African Peer Review Mechanism (PRM), the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and others”.

All in all, it can be noted that a majority of the participants cited the need for nation-building and state building in the immediate post-colonial African states, infeasibility of allowing the redrawing of state borders, and likelihood that a contrary declaration was going to trigger border conflicts as reasons to justify the “reasonableness or “realistic” nature of the AU’s ‘anti-secession’ declaration.
As stated above, questionnaire respondents were almost equally divided on their views regarding the AU’s ‘anti-secession’ declaration of 1964. A considerable number of questionnaire respondents argued that the declaration assisted in maintaining the African continent intact, saving it from potential disintegration (see Questionnaire Respondent 09; Questionnaire Respondent 10). As Questionnaire Respondent 10 maintained;

“I think there is justification for this stance, and it’s reasonable when the levels of ethnic and religious diversity in Africa are taken into account. If every disenfranchised minority sought secession, the African map may as well be discarded”.

The predominant view was that the OAU declaration was reasonable then, given the immediate post-colonial context in Africa. The respondents, however, averred that the declaration is no longer relevant in the contemporary African context given the building forces of self-determination and strengthening calls for the promotion and protection of human rights on the national and international plane (see Questionnaire Respondent 12). In line with this argument, Questionnaire Respondent 12 contended that;

“The stance [taken by the OAU through the ‘anti-secession’ declaration] was realistic in the past and was a reflection of a general trend in the world and in international law that post-colonial state borders are sacred and should therefore be respected. However, the stance is [no] longer realistic, given the developments that both Africa and the world are witnessing. At the African level, there are examples that self-determination up to and including secession is gaining ground...International human rights principles are also in favour of allowing nationalities and peoples within already existing states to form new states if there are strong reasons to do so”.

The human rights and self-determination perspective was very common amongst participants who questioned the prudence of the OAU ‘anti-secession’ declaration. The participants argued that the ethnic, cultural and religious communities that made up the post-colonial states, which were forced to live together in respect of colonially inherited borders, had their will and collective rights infringed as a result of the OAU decision (see Questionnaire Respondent 8; Questionnaire Respondent 12; Interviewee 17). To these participants, self-determination was, and is still, a fundamental international law and human rights principle recognized and granted by the United Nations Charter as well as the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, hence it never deserved to be suffocated through the 1964 Cairo Declaration. Questionnaire Respondent 8 even stated that the OAU’s stance was analogous to forcing a marriage between unwilling partners. The respondent remarked;
“In my opinion the stance taken by the AU is not practical nor realistic, because you cannot force unity against odds, as you cannot force marriage couple to stay together against their will. The right of self-determination should be given freely to any group of people who think they can be better off on their own. We have some many small countries living peacefully as they are able to find a common objective binding them together” (Questionnaire Respondent 8).

The above ran counter to perspectives adopted by some interviewees and questionnaire respondents above who maintained that the OAU ‘anti-secession’ declaration fostered unity of purpose amongst different ethnic, cultural and linguistic communities bundled together through colonial boundaries. Questionnaire Respondent 8’s argument concurred with the Associative Group Theories and National Determination Theories discussed in the literature review in Chapter Two which state that groups are entitled to a fundamental right to self-determination, and are entitled to form a state or nation of their choice. The extended argument is that people should not, as Questionnaire Respondent 8 posited, be forced to live together against their wish and will.

The viewpoint by Questionnaire Respondent 8, and those by many interviewees and questionnaire respondents who criticised the OAU ‘anti-secession’ declaration, was opposed by a number of research participants who argued that the AOU erred in its position. It was argued that the OAU declaration was too absolute and should have allowed for exceptions. For instance, Interviewee 03 asserted that the declaration was an attempt to build nation-states in Africa based on “a colonial set up”. This, according to the Interviewee, was not a victory of Pan-Africanism, rather it was a victory of nationalism which was unfortunate given the fact that nationalism by nature is laden with “ethnic chauvinism” (see Interviewee 03). The argument by Interviewee 03 was in consistent with Interviewee 11’s submission that the OAU made a mistake and should have taken an affirmative stance towards secession. Interviewee 11 posited:

“It [the OAU ‘anti-secession’ declaration] was one of the fundamental mistakes made by the OAU…the OAU chose to work within the colonial territorial framework…having too many nations belonging to a state led to ethnic particularism…redrawing of state borders should have been given a chance through a chosen agreeable methodology”.

The OAU ‘anti-secession’ declaration was also criticized by some respondents who argued that the founding fathers, upon making the declaration, were oblivious of, and insensitive to, the
multi-cultural and multi-ethnic diversity of the continent. Questionnaire Respondent 4 opined that;

“Avoidance of secession is not a solution to any of the above conflicts [ethnic and religious conflicts]. Therefore, it is not realistic. Rather, secession is more likely to be a solution because secession may provide freedom, hence remove the reason which prompted the demand for secession in the first place. With modern drive for democracy, freedom, rights, etc, it is becoming increasingly difficult to force people of different beliefs to live together if they do not want to. Their rights can sometimes be granted by secession, particularly, in the case of ethnic conflict... It may, however, not resolve religious conflict because\, as explained above; members of a religious group may be composed from more than one ethnic group”.

An analysis of this assertion may perhaps force one to conclude that the OAU declaration needed to be accompanied with flexibilities in light of future potential cases of secession. As Interviewee 03 put it, “the OAU should have seen the implications [of its declaration]...and should put a certain qualification” to allow for secession or deviation from the declaration principles. Some questionnaire respondents even went further to state that the ethno-religious conflicts in several post-colonial African states were a manifestation of the “unrealistic” OAU ‘anti-secession’ declaration which failed to ‘re-organize’ African states along their pre-colonial political, ethnic, cultural and linguistic boundaries (see Questionnaire Respondent 01; Questionnaire Respondent 02). The respondents thus regard this as more or less like a misguided artificial scheme.

All in all, the majority of questionnaire respondents and interviewees maintained that the OAU ‘anti-secession’ declaration passed in Cairo, Egypt in 1964 was to a larger extent realistic and, in a way, assisted in preventing identity-based conflicts future post-colonial Africa. On this assertion, one interviewee argued in contradistinction, the OAU declaration “did not assist in preventing ethno-religious conflicts”, rather “it only succeeded in providing the legitimate basis for the suppression of identity-based conflicts and secessionist forces” (Interviewee 02).

6.4.4 Justification of the Secession of South Sudan in 2011

The interviewees and questionnaire respondents had a chance to present their views and perspectives on whether secession of South Sudan was justified or not, through assessing the decision of the African Union (AU) made in January 2011 to support the secession of Sudan
the views and perspectives were expressed in response to Question 4 and Question 7 on both the interview guide and questionnaire (see Appendix 5 and Appendix 6).

The AU Heads of State and Government made a Declaration at their 16th Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in January 2011, that they respected the will of the South Sudanese should they vote for secession. The AU Solemn declaration read;

“We commend the people of Southern Sudan, whose choice [of secession] has been clearly, freely and credibly expressed in a referendum...Recognizing the unique nature of its national question...Drawing inspiration from Resolution 1514 (XV) on the Declaration on the Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples...We acknowledge that Sudan represents an exceptional case, which, in no way, calls into question the sacrosanct principle of respect of borders inherited at the accession of African countries to independence...We re-affirm our determination...to forge ahead with our agenda of integration and greater unity among our countries...” (AU, 2011)

Thus the AU justified its support for secession on the premise that the South Sudanese case was exceptional given its uniqueness, and the fact that South Sudan secession was consistent with the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples as provided for in the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) passed on 14 December 1960. These were the two reasons that were presented by the AU to justify its affirmative position with regard to the secession of South Sudan.

Out of the 18 interviewees who participated in the study, 12 interviewees agreed with the AU, indicating that the continental body was right in backing South Sudanese secession, adding that its supporting reasons were justifiable. The total interviewees agreeable with the AU position in this regard constituted 67%. Antithetically, three interviewees disagreed with the AU position, and its supporting reasons (see Interviewee 2; Interviewee 6; and Interviewee 12). These constituted 17% of the interviewees. In addition, three interviewees (17%) neither supported the AU decision nor objected it. Their views were neutrally located (see Interviewee 8; Interviewee 9; and Interviewee 13).
As for questionnaire respondents, the majority of them were in concurrence with the affirmative position taken by the AU towards the secession of South Sudan. Out of the total 16 questionnaire respondents, 14 respondents agreed that the AU was right in supporting South Sudan secession, with many of them describing the AU’s supporting reasons as “justifiable” and “convincing”. These affirmative respondents make up 88%. Only two questionnaire respondents disagreed with the AU, describing its decision as “unrealistic” and “wrong” (see Questionnaire Respondent 7; and Questionnaire Respondent 12). These only constitute 13% of the respondents.
Altogether, the majority of the interviewees and questionnaire respondents agreed with the AU’s support for secession of South Sudan, and the accompanying justifications provided by the continental body. However, the basis of their agreement was not totally uniform, there were different reasons presented in supporting the AU’s decision. This was also the case with those who opposed the AU’s affirmative decision on South Sudan secession. Apart from contending that the arguments presented by the AU in support of South Sudanese secession were very much convincing, most participants in the affirmative argued that the South Sudanese case was justified largely due to the protracted nature of the conflict (see Interviewee 4; Interviewee 5; Questionnaire Respondent 6; Interviewee 7; Interviewee 10; Interviewee 11; Interviewee 16; and Interviewee 18).

Indeed the Sudanese conflict preceding secession had been very protracted. It started on the eve of independence in August 1955, and continued to be complicated by its identity-based characteristics and manifestations, with the involvement of different internal and external players with varying interests (see Jok, 2016; Idris, 2005; Shanmugaratnam, 2008; Holt, 1988). The intractability and protractedness of the Sudanese conflict was identified as one of the
worthy causes justifying secession. Interviewee 4 argued that “[f]or almost 40 years attempting to bring an end to the Sudanese conflict…the AU [African Union] had been really out of option other than embracing secession”. The interviewee added that “the longevity of the conflict was enough justification for secession…had it been a normal day for the AU, they would have not supported it”. Thus secession, according to the interviewee’s reasoning, should be considered as an option of last resort, after all conflict resolution avenues have been pursued with little or no success and/or compromise to grant Southern autonomy by the Northern government (see also Questionnaire Respondent 6; Questionnaire Respondent 9; Questionnaire Respondent 10; Questionnaire Respondent 12; and Questionnaire Respondent 13).

The above views were also consistent with those expressed by Interviewee 7. The interviewee averred that “due to the fact that the conflict between the Southern Sudanese and the Northern Sudan was prolonged, secession was the only escape route to the conflict”. The heavy casualties of the conflict also justify the secession option, and moreover, the option for unity had failed after numerous attempts and pro-unity dialogue processes had been frustrated by non-commitment to signed peace agreements (see also Interviewee 16). This was in reference to the dishonoured peace pacts and decentralization/autonomy arrangements signed between the central government in Khartoum and the Southerners since Addis Ababa Peace Agreement of 1972.

There was also a humanitarian argument to justify secession. It was raised by some participants that the secession of South Sudan was a necessity on humanitarian grounds. This is because the protracted conflict had resulted in the heavy enormous of human lives, colossal destruction of property, mass rape, impeded the national social and economic development, and tremendous disruption of social life (see Interviewee 4; Questionnaire Respondent 6; Interviewee 7; Questionnaire Respondent 9; Questionnaire Respondent 10; Interviewee 14; Interviewee 18). Secession, according to these participants, was a necessity to bring to an end the human suffering endured as a result of the conflict. Interviewee 18 pointed out;

“Sudan attained its independence in 1956, conflict between the north and south predate independence. The period 1955-1972 witnessed civil war between the north and south that killed more than 500 000 people, while the 1983-2005 war left 2 million people killed, 42 000 refugees and 4 million displaced”.

Granted, various literature and reports have always presented contrasting statistics on human casualties, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees in the Sudanese conflict
(see Mamdani, 2009). However, it is axiomatic that several people lost their lives since the conflict started in 1956. As the participants explained, this context may justify the secession of South Sudan.

Whilst also agreeing that secession was a justified solution for the Sudanese conflict due to its longevity and humanitarian suffering, there were some participants who further argued that the differences between the Northern Sudanese government and Southerners were irreconcilable. Interviewee 18 asserted;

“It [secession] was a brilliant decision taking into cognizance the irreconcilable differences between the north and the south and the extensive difficulties of administering such a gigantic state”.

The same point of view on the irreconcilability and Sudanese conflict longevity was also echoed by Interviewee 10; who further presented an interesting dimension to the argument, postulating that;

“The two reasons [given by the AU] were quite convincing in the sense that the long period in which the conflict had sustained itself, actually pinpointing to the fact that those in South [Sudan] and those in North [Sudan] were like oil and water...the African Union now was to do is to find reasons to justify a case, and probably this was in order to prepare for the secessionist, say fine you are saying you have got reasons but your cause do not fulfil these two [exceptions applied in the Sudanese case]”.

Thus the extended argument was the exceptions presented by the AU were interpreted by Interviewee 10 as a subtle preventive measure to deter future secessionist movements from seeking legitimacy at continental bodies such as the AU. This is because the secessionist movements’ legitimacy will be measured against its merit as benchmarked by the South Sudanese ‘exceptional criteria’. The argument sounds valid in light of proliferating secessionist movements being experienced across the continent such as in Algeria (State of Kabyle), Angola (Republic of Cabinda), Cameroon (Democratic Republic of Bakassi), Comoros (Anjouan), Ethiopia (State of Oromia and Ogaden), Mali (Azawad), Nigeria (State of Biafra), Senegal (Casamance Republic), Somalia (Republic of Somalia-Somaliland), Tanzania (Zanzibar), and Zambia (Barotseland), among others, which sooner or later, may want to seek recognition by the AU.

To some participants, the AU’s justification that it supported secession of South Sudan because Sudan faced exceptional national challenges inherited from its unique colonial past was very
logical and prudent. These participants contended that Sudan’s colonial history of North-South divide presented adequate raw materials for post-colonial divisions, disunity and secessionism. Interviewee 11 submitted that “precession Sudan” was so vast to the extent that it was difficult to administer or govern, hence the perpetuation of the conflict (see also Questionnaire Respondent 3; Interviewee 4; Interviewee 6; Interviewee 7; Interviewee 10; Interviewee 16; Interviewee 18). The line of argument pertaining to the vastness of the Sudan as presenting a serious challenge of effective governance due to lack of administrative and political capacity appears sound and valid. Questionnaire Respondent 3 also stated that “Sudan was such a huge country and this resulted in the South being neglect resulting in unequal distribution of resources as well as imbalances in power sharing”.

Interviewee 4 was also in agreement, giving an example of the DRC, another geographically vast African country that faced internal conflicts that were ethnic in nature up to the present day. A cursory analysis of the largest states on the continent will reveal that amongst the top 10 largest states by geographical size, namely Algeria, DRC, Sudan, Libya, Chad, Niger, Angola, Mali, South Africa, and Ethiopia; only two countries (Algeria and South Africa) are enjoying relative peace and stability. The rest have been experiencing intra-state conflicts with an ethnic and/or religious dimension in the post-colonial era. Thus is can be very difficult to be oblivious to the fact that the geographical vastness of Sudan also worsened an already existing challenge of effective governance and equitable distribution of resources which deepened the North-South cleavages, and gave rise to secession (see Interviewee 4; Interviewee 6; Interviewee 7; Interviewee 11; and Interviewee 15).

Interviewee 11 further maintained that secession also made sense “given the ethnic heterogeneity of the Sudanese population and given their differences in religious convictions” as well as the divisive history of entrenched marginalization of the South by the North (see also Interviewee 4; Questionnaire Respondent 4; Interviewee 6; Interviewee 7; Interviewee 10; Interviewee 16; Interviewee 18; Interviewee 16). The previous Chapters have presented and substantiated the fact that Sudan was a melting pot of several ethnic and religious identities. The history of the Anglo-British Condominium, as presented in Chapter Three largely attests to this. Similarly, Questionnaire Respondent 4 commented;

“First of all, the creation of the entity ‘Southern Sudan’ during British colonial times had a lot to do with the problems South Sudan was to experience thereafter. Up to the time the British decided to leave Sudan, they had ruled Southern Sudan as a separate entity from Northern Sudan. Southern Sudan was treated as a closed
district which had a little relationship with Northern Sudan. What I am trying to say here is that the case of South Sudan is rather unique and requires a unique solution. So the AU was right to make an exception.”

There were some participants who invoked the principle of self-determination to justify their affirmative views towards secession of South Sudan secession (see Questionnaire Respondent 10; Questionnaire Respondent 13; Interviewee 15). This international and human rights law principle was one of the basis provided by the AU as a reason why it considered the Sudanese secession as an exception. Interviewee 15 insisted that “self-determination is a fundamental principle” embodied within the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960 as explained above. Thus, as Interviewee 15 posited, the South Sudanese were “free to choose a state of their own with territorial boundaries of their choice”. This appeared valid and plausible if understood within Buchanan (1997)’s “Remedial Rights Theory” as explained under Chapter Two, especially considering the fact that South Sudanese had suffered injustices, marginalization, and oppression under the Khartoum government since 1956. This was also mentioned by Questionnaire Respondent 4 who attested;

“Affirmative action to give South Sudan autonomy was reasonable. It was meant to end suffering and oppression of the people of South Sudan. It was to give South Sudan authority to manage its own affairs”.

As Interviewee 18 also concurred, “since federation, devolution, autonomy and other forms of decentralization had either been ignored and/or not granted, the secession of South Sudan was a prudent option”, and the AU-provided self-determination justification were rational and well-founded (see also Questionnaire Respondent 4; Interviewee 12; Questionnaire Respondent 15).

Whereas self-determination stood as a key consideration by identified participants in justifying South Sudan secession; there were criticisms directed against the principle. For instance, Interviewee 6 avowed that “let’s refute self-determination and adopt our own African philosophy of Ubuntu which should be the campus to direct our own interests and/or decisions”. As put by Murithi (2006: 25-30), Ubuntu societies, espoused through the Ubuntu philosophy, aim at consensus building, amicable resolution of disputes or conflicts, promoting reconciliation, restoring harmony, embracing peaceful co-existence, promoting unity and cohesion, maintaining positive relations, committing to principles of empathy, sharing, cooperation and placing high value on communal life (see also Burger, 1996; Marks, 2000; Meyer and Ndura-Quedraogo, 2009; and Zartman, 2000). However, whilst the suggestion appears to be very noble and progressive in theory, its practical application is complicated by
the fact that Ubuntu is largely based on the assumption and presumption that every community member, politician and leadership is humane, rational and is guided by virtue. This cannot be the case, the reality of national and international interactions is that they are guided by individual and/or collective group interests.

Again, the basis of invoking the self-determination principle recognized and granted by the United Nations Charter, to justify the secession of South Sudan was criticized as misplaced and misguided by some participants. Interviewee 12, for instance, avowed;

“The principle or resolution [1514 (XV) on the Declaration on the Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples] cited by the AU is a bit unclear. From the way I interpret it, it refers to people under colonialism. Where the South Sudanese under colonialism [after 1956]? Where they colonized? They were not under any colonial rule…It was a struggle for resources…and power”.

Premised on the above, Interviewee 12 argued that secession was not a suitable and merited strategy to resolve the Sudanese conflict. He further suggested that “there was need for dialogue and reconfigure economic and political structures in Sudan” (see also Interviewee 2; Interviewee 6). To Interviewee 6, secession can never be a viable solution or else it would result in the sub-division of African states into very small entities. The interviewee questioned;

“Since there is now post-secession conflict, can we then further sub-divide South Sudan into smaller states if secession is the solution? If that is the case we will end up having ‘family states’” (Interviewee 6).

On the other hand, there were participants who were of the view that AU’s exceptional justification for supporting South Sudan secession was not sincere. Rather, it was just driven by the spirit of brotherhood on the part of African leaders within the AU. One respondent maintained;

“My feeling is that they [AU Heads of State and Government] were driven by identity attachment since South Sudan is predominantly black Africans and Christians which majority of AU’s members will easily identify with against Muslim Arabs from north who were getting support from their Arab league brothers and pre-dominantly Muslims which presented a case of identity sympathy” (Questionnaire Respondent 7).

It is also worthwhile to note that a considerable number of participants made a disclaimer that they were personally against secession, but declared their support for secession in the case of
South Sudan. When probed further, they maintained that this was not contradictory or inconsistent. Rather, they invariably explained that their positions were persuaded by the merits of the South Sudanese case which deserved to be granted secession (see Interviewee 3; Interviewee 6; Interviewee 7; Interviewee 8; Interviewee 13; Interviewee 17; Interviewee 18). By interpretation, one can deduce that the participants favour secession only in situations when it is sufficiently justified by necessitating context and circumstances.

Over and above the above reasons suggested to justify the secession, one participant argued that some of the Heads of State and Government of AU member states were pressured by external forces to accept or support the secession of South Sudan. As Questionnaire Respondent 5 postulated;

“The AU was under massive pressure from the US government which was also under pressure by its Christian conservative groups which viewed the Khartoum regime as oppressing Christians. Some powerful AU heads of state such as [President Yoweri] Museveni of Uganda had always supported the Southern case for secession. The oil exploration by the regime in Sudan left out powerful western countries. These countries which were excluded from oil exploration contracts formed a powerful international support base for South Sudanese independence”.

The same was also pointed out by Interviewee 6. Indeed, as explained in the previous Chapters, the argument that there were covert pressures for secession from powerful nations with commercial interests in Sudan’s oil sector cannot be wished away. There has been claims in this direction in several literature (see Brookes and Shin, 2006; Carmody and Owusu, 2007; Huliaras, 2006; Klare ad Volman, 2006a; 2006b; Lujala and Thieme, 2007; Shin, 2009; Volman, 2003).

6.4.5 Assessment of the success or failure of secession in the South Sudanese case

There were different views in responses to the question on whether there is any evidence of success of secession in the South Sudanese case, five years after secession in July 2011. Participants made their assessment considering a broad gamut of factors, inter alia, legal considerations, political considerations, socio-economic development considerations, peace and stability considerations, infrastructure development considerations, national unity and social cohesion considerations, national governance considerations, among other factors.
Out of the 18 interviewees, 11 of them were of the view that there is no evidence of secession success so far in South Sudan. These interviewees made up 61% of the total. On the other hand, 6 interviewees stated that “legally” South Sudan secession was successful notwithstanding the post-secession conflict developments and instability. These made up 33%. The remaining one interviewee indicated that five years was too short a period to allow for an objective evaluation of whether secession had succeeded or not in the case of South Sudan. These comprise 6% of the total interviewees. The pie chart below shows the responses from interviews on whether secession of South Sudan can be considered as a success or failure.

**Figure 6.7: Responses from Interviewees on Success or Failure of South Sudan Secession**

With regard to questionnaire respondents, there were mixed views on whether there is evidence of success of secession in the South Sudanese case so far. Out of the 16 total questionnaire respondents, 10 held the conviction that there was no any evidence of success in South Sudan secession. These represent 63% of the total questionnaire respondents. On the contrary, six questionnaire respondents stated that there was evidence that the secession of South Sudan has succeeded so far. These form 38% of the total questionnaire respondents. The pie chart below shows the viewpoints from questionnaire respondents on whether they regard the secession of South Sudan as a failure or success so far.
All in all, the majority of interviewees and questionnaire respondents made the verdict that there was no evidence of success of South Sudan secession. Out of the combined total of 34 participants, 21 participants stated that there was no evidence of success of South Sudan secession. These constitute 62% of the total participants. On the contrary, 6 participants indicated that “legally”, South Sudan secession was successful despite the post-secession conflict developments and instability, whilst the same number of participants also indicated that there was evidence that the secession of South Sudan has succeeded so far. These constitute 18% of the total participants each. The remaining one participant indicated that five years was too short a period to allow for an objective evaluation of whether secession had succeeded or not in the case of South Sudan. The participant constitutes 3% of the total participants.

*Source: Author’s computation based on questionnaires*
Study participants, as stated above, expressed different viewpoints on whether there was evidence of failure or success in the secession of South Sudan so far. Most of the participants based their judgement on the premise that post-secession South Sudan has experienced, and is still experiencing, conflict internally, and clashes with the Republic of Sudan. This is against a background where secession was thought to be a solution to bring to an end to the destructive protracted conflict that had started since 1955. In explaining why there is no evidence of success of South Sudan secession, one participant commented:

“There has been no peace and stability, let alone development in South Sudan but incessant warfare. It's largely because of poverty of leadership, grasping kleptocracy, quake revolutionaries, crocodile liberators, economic bandits, self-centred egocentric leaders who have pulled innocent populace in useless civil war, carnage, use of children as cannon fodder, and unprecedented rape of women by rampaging militias. South Sudan’s civil war is not the result of a blood feud between two men, conventional explanations notwithstanding.” (Interviewee 18).

This, according to the participant, warrants the secession of South Sudan to be considered a monumental failure of secession. On the reasons why he concludes that secession has failed in...
South Sudan, the participant identifies leadership failure as a key contributory factor. He posited;

“The key catalyst of South Sudan’s civil war has been competition for the grand prize —control over state assets and the country’s abundant natural resources — between rival kleptocratic networks led by President Kiir and Vice President Machar. The leaders of South Sudan’s warring parties manipulate and exploit ethnic divisions in order to drum up support for a conflict that serves the interests only of the top leaders of these two kleptocratic networks and, ultimately, the international facilitators whose services the networks utilise and on which they rely” (Interviewee 18).

Some participants argued that the secession of South Sudan cannot be considered a success since it neither addressed the underlying causes of secession, or forces that drove the South Sudanese to demand secession from Sudan, nor facilitated reforms necessary to bring equality, peace, and stability. One participant hinted;

“There is no success in the secession [of South Sudan] because underlying causes were not given considerations. The new state has had historical injustice in terms of development. The country has limited capacity to run the state. For example the security systems have not been transformed from its guerrilla methodologies to dealing with security concerns. This could have contributed to heightening tensions when they deal with “rebels” or criminal elements. There are other underlying issues like inequality where some “tribes” are seen to dominate certain positions. The fragile economy has not helped matters” (Questionnaire Respondent 6).

The argument was that the issues of contention raised against Khartoum, are still prevalent, and arguably worse as they are now being committed by ‘fellow comrades’ this time in Juba. As Questionnaire Respondent 4 stated;

“It is true that the secession has failed to bring the desired outcome because the people of South Sudan fought their oppressors from Khartoum for many decades in order to free themselves from oppression, being considered second class citizens and to gain freedom and independence where they would be free to manage their own affairs…and to be the drivers of their own destiny…This dream has not materialized because one tribe has high jacked power and is using it to oppress other tribes and preventing development from taking place.”

Similarly, Questionnaire Respondent 7 submitted that;

“No there is no evidence of success of secession because since South Sudan seceded from Sudan there is still conflict, marginalization, unfair distribution of resources, dictatorship, political marginalization and high level of poverty. Since the above factors were major reason for secession of south Sudan from Sudan and they are
still there and far worse, this is a clear indicator that secession was not the solution for solving Sudan problem, it should be known that problems have no identity, poor governance was the major issues and still remains the major problem in South Sudan”.

The continued internal inter-ethnic conflicts were also singled out as sufficient evidence why secession of South Sudan was adjudged as a failure. Related post-secession security challenges, Questionnaire Respondent 3 even inserted an additional comment at the end of the Questionnaire which read;

“Please take note that from unreliable sources but South Sudanese Nationals, succession was a mistake as they feel they were safe before the separation”.

The sentiments from respondents such as Questionnaire Respondent 3 should be understood within the context of the post-secession conflict recurrence in South Sudan. Given the magnitude of loss of human lives, property destruction, disruption of economic activity and livelihoods, hunger and starvation, humanitarian suffering, loss of freedom due to conflicts and inter-communal violence, et cetera, it may not be surprising to find a lot of South Sudanese, as Interviewee 13 puts it, regretting secession as they find “the Khartoum devil better than the Juba devil”. Indeed, the high hopes and huge expectations of South Sudanese at secession cannot match with the results on the ground in as far as the conflict situation and economic indicators are concerned.

One participant also made reference to the ‘Second Civil War’ that had just broken out in Juba on the 7th of July 2016, triggered by the clashes between the Presidential Guards of President Salva Kiir and those of First Vice President Riek Machar (see Interviewee 14). He stated that;

“There is no evidence of success of secession...as we speak war has erupted in South Sudan...and Machar has left Juba”.

The views by Interviewee 14 were also noted by Questionnaire Respondent 2 who postulated;

“[There is] [n]o success at all. Active fighting and killing of civilians is ongoing in different geographical areas; heavy dependence on international donors to run the minimum basic services; destruction and lack of maintenance of the existing infrastructure prior to secession has taken place at large scale after the creation of South Sudan; there is currently a severe economic crisis and inflation plus a bankrupt government. All the development indicators are going down. The presence of international NGOs delivering basic services operating in the country is appalling” (Questionnaire Respondent 2).
Those interviewees and questionnaire respondents who argued that there was no success of secession took the five-year period in the post-secession era in South Sudan as sufficient enough to have ushered peace, freedom, stability, equality and prosperity, which were the core grievances of the secessionist movement of the South. Instead, to them, the intensifying inter-communal violence, economic deterioration, loss of freedom and absence of equality was now the order of the day. Thus secession without the above was therefore ‘unsuccessful’ and “a betrayal of the secessionist revolution” (see Interviewee 15)

In an attempt to explain further why there has not been any success of secession, as claimed, some participants were of the view that this has been a result of poor leadership. One participant moved;

“[T]he kleptocratic elite running the country, the patronage system, the lack of governance and accountability systems, the majority of inhabitants could be considered as uneducated/illiterate, weak civil society fabric and population and social groups organized following family and tribal lines, rather than knowledge/feelings of belonging to a country called South Sudan” (Questionnaire Respondent 2).

Within the same thread, Questionnaire Respondent 5 advances the same argument, citing the lack of visionary leadership needed to steer national development, unity and cohesion in post-secession South Sudan. The participant stated;

“The 2013 ethnic civil war is an indicator of secession failure. The failure is because of lack of vision by the political leadership which instead of developing the country moved to ethnic politics to ensure political survival leading to massive corruption and nepotism within the state structures. State control through ethnic politics has become a means to self-enrichment to the same people who once fought Sudan’s regime on religious grounds” (Questionnaire Respondent 5).

Whilst most participants presented conflict considerations as evidence of secession failure in South Sudan, there were also considerations given to the state of the economy in South Sudan, over and above post-secession conflict dynamics. Questionnaire Respondent 3, for instance, contended;

“I think there has not been any success in succession. Barely two years after succession, war broke out and South Sudan now faces a lot of challenges. Inflation has risen to unacceptable and unreasonable level and tribal as well as civil war continues. People continue to suffer despite the country’s 2011 independence.
There are no proper structures in place. The country is in emergency situation just a few years after gaining independence. Tribal conflicts still occur and people continue to be marginalized in terms of their tribe.”

Thus, over and above conflict issues, the poor service delivery and heavy reliance on donor funding by the South Sudanese government are signs and symptoms of failure of secession to bear anticipated fruits of stability, development and sovereignty. The participant explained that this was caused by “lack of early, skilful, and integrated application of political, diplomatic, economic and military measures” (Questionnaire Respondent 2).

It is the socio-economic development basis that is also forwarded by Questionnaire Respondent 13 as evidence of secession failure in the South Sudanese case. The participant averred;

“[There are] no roads, no health, no schools. There is too much corruption in all three of government. Seventy-five percent [of the population] is uneducated in South Sudan due to poor education systems…[There is] poor leadership, weak institutions, corruption, tribalism, no separation of powers, no human rights, rule of law, freedom of movement, constitutionality and constitutionalism” (Questionnaire Respondent 13).

Although there all the above participants maintained that there was no evidence of success of secession in South Sudan, there were participants who counter-argued that from a legal point of view, South Sudan is a clear case of secession success (see Interviewee 3; Interviewee 7; Interviewee 8; Interviewee 12; Interviewee 13; Interviewee 16; Interviewee 17; Questionnaire Respondent 8). Their views are in line with the Constitutive Theory of state recognition which stipulates that a state can legitimately claim statehood in the legal sense only when it is recognized by other states within the international community of states (Brownlie, 2008). As Interviewee 13 explained;

“[T]here is evidence of success of South Sudan secession legally, since South Sudan is now a sovereign state, accepted by the United Nations as its 193rd member states whilst the African Union accepted and recognized it as its 54th member state”.

However, most of the participants who moved this argument were quick to point out that whilst legally secession has succeeded; there was need to also focus on the other dimensions of successful secession. For instance, Interviewee 7 asserted;

“South Sudan secession succeeded in the legal sense in that they managed to realize their dream of nationhood…they now have a seat at both the AU and UN. However, in terms of viability, South Sudan has failed to project itself as a viable state…post-
secession conflict continues...politics of patronage, inequitable distribution of resources, limited access to opportunities...all still prevalent...about 80 percent of the national budget in concentrated in Juba...weapons proliferate, militias groups sprout everywhere whilst the national leadership manipulate ethnicity to advance selfish interests...the SPLM/A engages in destructive internal fights instead of transforming to a governing party”.

Besides the legal argument, there were participants who insisted that there was evidence of success of secession of South Sudan. These had different facts to support their points of view. Some stressed on the importance of self-determination and liberty. It was stated by Questionnaire Respondent 12:

“The failure or not of the secession depends on what the people of South Sudan primarily wanted when it exercised its right of self-determination. In my perspective, the people of South Sudan primarily wanted to liberate itself from the domination of the North. In that sense, the secession was a great success”.

Similarly, Interviewee 1 also commented; “[t]he fact that there is war does not mean it [secession of South Sudan] failed. Self-determination is the overarching issue”. The interviewee further adds that the conflict will eventually end, citing the case of the Hundred Years war between England and France which was fought from the 14th to the 15th century. The same hope is expressed by Questionnaire Responded 8, albeit in an analogous and figurative fashion, in the comment; “Yes, it is true that South Sudan have gone through bitter trials in its early age. Having a sick child in early does not mean that child will die. South Sudan will survive the test”.

Other participants identified the return of refugees to South Sudan upon secession as evidence of success of secession. Questionnaire Respondent 5, for instance, hinted;

“The evidence of success of [South Sudan] secession has been the return of many South Sudanese from refugee life in neighboring countries. The infrastructure development, though mainly limited to Juba, has gained momentum like any African state after independence”.

However, the argument is being advanced against reports that South Sudanese refugees fleeing from conflict to neighbouring countries of Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, DRC, and Central African Republic (CAR), have now surpassed one million following the conflict that erupted in on the 8th of July 2016 in Juba (UNHCR, 2016).
Although a considerable number of participants mentioned lack of equal opportunities as one of the core evidence of failure of South Sudan secession, there were participants who presented the same as evidence of South Sudan secession. Questionnaire Respondent 9 opined:

“Yes, to some extent there is success [of South Sudan secession]: Firstly, there are expectations of equal opportunities for all in the available sectors. Secondly, sovereignty and there are opportunities to participate in development for all”.

One view that came from one of the participants was that if South Sudanese still exist, then there is enough evidence of success of secession as they constitute the symbol of secession. Questionnaire Respondent 8 mentioned:

“In the first place I do not admit the secession has failed, because the main pillar of the secession still standing and these are the people of South Sudan. I can take it the politicians failed the country terribly. Look at; Libya, Iraq and Somalia are still surviving because the people are determined. The question that we sometime we forget to ask and define is who determine that a certain country has failed, and against whose standard are we equating it to? When a political system failed to function that does not the people of such country failed.”

Unlike the rest of the participants who had their assessment of the possible evidence of success or failure of secession so far in South Sudan, two participants held the view that a five-year was too short to allow for meaningful evaluation of success or failure of secession. Interviewee 10 declared:

“[T]he success of secession cannot be measured in the short-term…what is happening in South Sudan are teething problems of a new state…in time they will find each other”.

Interviewee 11 also concurred; “[f]ive years might be too short to make an objective evaluation” but added that “there is no evidence so far [to suggest success of secession] but a lot might need to be done”.

In sum, all participants who indicated that there was no evidence of success of secession pointed to challenges of conflict, instability, slowed economic growth and unfavourable economic and social development indicators, corruption, inequality, lack of opportunities among others. On the other hand, participants who felt there was evidence of success advanced a legal argument of statehood attainment, self-determination and rays of hope of peace. The main cause of all this, most participants felt, was poor leadership that lack vision, insight and direction.
Did South Sudanese comprehend the broader implications of a Secession Vote?

The implications of secession were very broad as secession was obviously going to affect, either positively or negatively, the state of the economy, politics, stability, foreign policy, governance and social organization of the new seceded South Sudan. The question therefore was whether the South Sudanese were fully aware of these implications as they voted for secession in the January 2011 referendum.

The context was that it was reported that voter education was insufficient in preparation for the Referendum to decide on secession. The Carter Centre (2011) reported that the South Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC), the South Sudan Referendum Bureau (SSRB), the Government of Sudan, referendum taskforces, local chiefs, women’s groups, churches, SPLA/M, among other players involved did not adequately engage in voter education as guided by the Referendum Act. Moreover, the voter education conducted was not carried out within the confines of meaningful engagements and detailed discussions guided by principles of objectivity and impartiality as legally provided since there were reported biases by civic educators in favour of secession ahead of unity whilst some political parties in Southern Sudan which intended to conduct voter education were hindered by unavailability of resources (see Carter Centre, 2011; Curless, 2011; The Sudan Tribune, 22 October 2010; The Sudan Tribune, 8 February 2011).

To elicit such information, participants were questioned on the extent to which they agreed that a comprehensive national education programme for citizens about the implications of secession was essential before the secession referendum in South Sudan.

Out of the 18 total interviewees, 15 interviewees were of the view that a comprehensive national education programme for citizens about the implications of secession was essential before the secession referendum in South Sudan. These represented 83% of the interviewees. The remaining three interviewees, which made up 17%, maintained that there was no need for any national education programme for the South Sudanese citizens. The distribution of interviewees’ views on the need and necessity for a comprehensive national education programme for South Sudanese is shown in the pie chart below.
As for questionnaire respondents, 15 out of 16 questionnaire respondents concluded that a comprehensive national education programme for South Sudanese citizens about the implications of secession was essential before the secession referendum. These made up 94% of the respondents. Only one questionnaire respondents did not see any reason why a comprehensive national education programme was a need for South Sudanese citizens prior secession referendum. The pie chart of this distribution is depicted below.
Altogether, out of the total of 34 participants (combining both interviewees and questionnaire respondents), 30 participants agreed that there was need for pre-secession referendum conscientization for South Sudanese whilst four participants disagreed. These constituted 88% and 22% respectively. This distribution of views is depicted on the pie chart below.
Study participants presented different reasons why they thought there was need and necessity for a comprehensive national education programme prior to the secession Referendum in South Sudan. The majority of the participants who agreed that a comprehensive national education programme was needed based their view on that South Sudanese needed to be well informed about the post-referendum scenarios, and the broader implications of a vote for secession and/or a vote for unity.

It is always necessary to understand the advantages and disadvantages of a choice in a voting process, as some participants argued (Interviewee 2; Interviewee 6; Questionnaire Respondent 12; and Interviewee 15). The participant commented;

“People always need to have enough knowledge about the pros and cons of voting yes or no, although in prolonged ethnic or religious conflicts, people normally know the implications of their yes or no vote. But the more education, the better” (Questionnaire Respondent 12).

Questionnaire Respondent 7 also agreed with the above participants, and commented;
“[Y]es this is essential so that people can understand the implications of the decision they make and be in better position to manage the outcome without blaming the consequence instead of the cause”.

This avoids situations whereby citizens regret decisions that they make in the post-referendum phase. Thus Questionnaire Respondent 5 asserted;

“[Citizens] must be educated on what they are asked to commit to. Today, in South Sudan some people are saying had we known that independence would bring us ethnic domination? We could have voted No to independence. There was no education on the type of governance that would come after independence despite calls for Federalism”.

The issue of literacy also emerged in the reasons given by participants on why education programmes are needed in secession referendums. Questionnaire Respondent 14 averred;

“Of course this is necessary, education program is so imperative activity to carry on for example in a situation where you find majority of people are illiterate that make it hard to ticket appropriately and sometime you could not even find the word “referendum” in local languages but through education program everybody can understand and decide in person if message is disseminated respectively. Second, millions of people may not have voted in their life time but through education program that can help such a person on what to do afterward.”

In line with the above, Questionnaire Respondent 16 mentioned that;

“[T]he civic education program can help voters in knowing what to vote for since South Sudanese people majority do not know how to read and write and they can be taught using pictorial display for them to get the information”.

In addition, Questionnaire Respondent 9 affirmed, “[y]es, I strongly agree. Initially, South Sudan’s referendum was mainly done out of ignorance most South Sudanese were illiterate until now”. Correspondingly, Questionnaire Respondent 6 submitted that; “I agree because most people vote without understanding the reasons”.

It also came out from participants that if there is no sufficient information, referendums are likely to be driven by emotional votes that are not informed by reason, facts and objectivity. Interviewee 18 posited that “more often than not the yes vote was an expression of hatred of exploitation in the unitary state than a quest for secessionism”.

The literacy factor may have been highlighted due to the levels of illiteracy in South Sudan at the time of referendum. For instance, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFP), as cited in
the Carter Centre (2011:6), revealed that at the time of referendum in 2011, the overall illiteracy rate in the then united Sudan was 61.1% whilst the illiteracy rate in Southern Sudan region was 24%. Such low levels of illiteracy definitely had a potential impact on the level of comprehension of secession matters, implications of secession and informed decision-making. As Questionnaire Respondent 8 moved;

“[I]t is absolutely essential that a comprehensive national education program is launched. It should not be just voting for either of the options which is targeted but that the citizen are made aware about the implication and options behind their decision so that once they take a decision it would be from an informed base”.

However, there were other participants who held fears that national education programmes, despite being well-thought out, are prone to abuse and manipulation by political leaders in pursuit of their narrow parochial interests (see Questionnaire Respondent 2; Interviewee 4; Questionnaire Respondent 10). In this light, Questionnaire Respondent 10 cautioned; “[y]es, it is essential, but unfortunately the information provided to citizens is usually misused by politicians and economic groups prioritizing their own interests”. In furtherance to this argument, Interviewee 1 and Interviewee 11 then critiqued that in advancing the argument of voter education in referendums, it is always essential to establish who will be conducting the civic education exercise. For instance, Interviewee 11 asked rhetorically; “the tendency of who would be engaged to conduct the referendum, how partial are they, wouldn’t they influence the outcome of the referendum?”. Interview 12 thus suggests that such education programmes need to be carried out by independent organizations and scholars.

Those participants, who indicated that national educational programmes are not necessary in secession referendums, argued that secession referendums usually come after protracted struggles of self-determination. Hence it will be unnecessary to educate people who have been pushing for independence about a contrary option as they would be conscientised already about their preferred referendum decision (see Questionnaire Respondent 4; Interviewee 10; Interviewee 14; Interviewee 17). This ran counter to the primary arguments raised in support of civic and voter education in the run up to secession referendums.

Aligned to the above argument, Interviewee 10 stressed;

“That [experiences of South Sudanese] was enough education, experience is actually the best teacher, yes, I don’t think there was any education which was going
to be more important than the real experience that they had experienced under the so-called United Sudan... Because when you are saying you want to educate people, then you take them then you sit under a tree then you tell them that no, these are the implications of voting a yes or no, I think people knew exactly what they had undergone, and they were saying we don’t want this marriage any way... I think the life experiences of the people are a good education”.

Other participants adopted the same line of thinking, adding that South Sudanese had been educated during the military orientation sessions as they fought the Northerners. Interviewee 14 commented;

Well, these South Sudanese, they had structures, education was being given to them in those structures, so there was just a waste of effort to go again and try to educate them [before the referendum], they were already educated, they knew what they were doing, they were not just fighting without a purpose, so the education was there, the commanders used to tell them why they are fighting plus also the issue of education, who was going to educate them?... and also sometimes there is bias with these organizations. I think personally it was a waste of effort... because these people had education guaranteed throughout their war”.

To sum up, the participant maintained that citizens are always decided on secession referendums given the usually long history of secession movements, as opposed to the majority participants’ view that civic and voter education stands key in shaping informed choices ahead of ‘emotional’ choices driven by accumulated hatred, political polarization, and socio-cultural and linguistic fissures.

6.4.7 ‘Best’ model to resolve intractable and protracted intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial Africa

There were interesting patterns emanating from the response to Questions 9 which asked participants about what they consider to be the best model to viably and sustainably resolve seemingly intractable and protracted intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial Africa. The question was guided, with provided forms of governance arrangements, namely Secession, Federation, Confederation, Consociational Democracy, Governments of National Unity (GNU)/Inclusive Governments (IGs), and option for any other form of governance of the interviewees’/questionnaire respondent’s imagination and preference.
For the purposes of contextualization and discussion, the table below shows a description of the models as conceptualized in the question.

**Table 6.3: National Governance Models for Resolving intractable and protracted intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Secession:</strong> Is the formal withdrawal or breaking away of part of a state from another state (host state) to form a separate independent country.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Federation:</strong> Is a system of government that consists of a union of states or provinces or regions all within the same geographical territory that are partially-self-governing under a central (federal) Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Confederation:</strong> Is a form of federalism where the individual regions that make up the sovereign state exercise a larger degree of autonomy. In a confederation, the central government is usually weaker as compared to that in a Federation. The essence is administrative convenience whereby the confederal states voluntarily cooperate and/or collaborate on some form of critical activity/issues (be it political, economic, such as international trade, foreign relations, common currency, et cetera.) and the central government will be there to support all the confederal states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consociational Democracy:</strong> Is a form of democracy that is meant to regulate power sharing in a state that is made up of nationalities deeply divided along distinct ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic, racial, political, regional segments, and national groups according to an agreed formula/mechanism in order to achieve political stability wherein all the groups are allocated collective rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governments of National Unity (GNU)/Inclusive Governments (IGs):</strong> Is a broad coalition government that consist of all the major political (in most cases adversarial) parties in the Legislature usually in periods of war, instability, national emergencies, et cetera.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s construction based on general standard definitions*

Whilst almost all questionnaire respondents were clear on choosing their ‘best’ model amongst the presented alternative forms of governance, this was not the case with interviewees. Instead, the majority of the interviewees indicated, with accompanying explanations, that there was no best model to viably and sustainably resolve seemingly intractable and protracted intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial Africa.
Out of the 18 interviewees, only five interviewees selected “their best” model of national governance amongst those provided. These made up 28% of the interviewees. Eight interviewees indicated that there was no best governance model; rather, national governance models differ with situations and circumstances. These constituted 44% of the total interviewees. Two interviewees stated that the best governance model would depend on the causes or drivers of the conflict in question. These represented 11% of the total. Lastly, one interviewee indicated that there is need for an “African system of governance” whilst another interviewee stated that focus should be on accepted international norms and practices. These two represented 6% of the total interviewees each. Of the five that selected the provided governance model choices, three selected Federation, and the other two interviewees selected Consociational Democracy and GNU respectively. Figure 16 below depicts the distribution of views from interviewees on the question.

Figure 6.13: Interviewees’ Responses on the ‘Best’ National Governance Model for Resolving intractable and protracted intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewees' Responses on the Best Model of Governance for Resolving Protracted Intra-State Ethnic and Religious</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is no Best Model of Governance, it depends with circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected Federation, GNU and Consociational Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Models depends on causes of conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is need for an African System of Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus should be on accepted international norms and practices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s computation based on field interviews*
Unlike interviewees, questionnaire respondents were precise and unambiguous on their choice of the ‘best’ governance model for viably and sustainably resolving seemingly intractable and protracted intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial Africa. Out of the 16 questionnaire respondents, 15 respondents selected what they considered the best model. These constituted 94% of the total questionnaire respondents. Only one questionnaire respondent did not select any model, indicating that the choice of models is dependent upon conflict circumstances. This made up 6% of the total questionnaire respondents. In terms of distribution of ‘best’ model choices, five questionnaire respondents favoured GNUs, four questionnaire respondents favoured Consociational Democracy, another four questionnaire respondents favoured Federation, two questionnaire respondents favoured Confederation, one questionnaire respondent favoured Secession, whilst the remaining one questionnaire respondent did not select a choice. These represented 31%, 25%, 25%, 13%, 6% and 6% respectively. The Figure 17 below represents the distribution of questionnaire responses’ choices.

Figure 6.14: Questionnaire Responses on the ‘Best’ National Governance Model for Resolving intractable and protracted intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts

Source: Author’s computation based on questionnaires
Altogether, the majority of the study participants (both interviewees and questionnaire respondents), preferred not to select any provide alternative models as they reasoned that governance models depends with circumstances. Out of the 34 combined study participants, 11 did not chose any provided model (32%); seven chose Federation (21%); six chose GNU (18%); five chose Consociational Democracy (15%); one chose Seccession (3%); one presented a guide one international norms and practices (3%); and another one did not make any choice nor offer any alternative explanation (3%). Figure 18 below presents a representation of the distribution of the participants choices on the on the ‘Best’ National Governance Model for Resolving intractable and protracted intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts.

Figure 6.15: Total Study Participants’ Views on the ‘Best’ National Governance Model for Resolving intractable and protracted intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts

Source: Author’s computation based on field interviews and questionnaires
There was an almost striking consensus amongst those participants did not select any choice of the ‘best’ national governance model to viably and sustainably resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial Africa. They reasoned that circumstances, contexts and conflict situations are always different hence each case should be treated on its peculiarities. Questionnaire Respondent 2 was clear”, mentioning that “I don’t have an opinion; I feel that every country is different”.

This was also pointed out by Interviewee 17;

“My presentation would be that we cannot have blueprint solutions, let’s have custom solutions, maybe some that we haven’t even listed there… I would say hybrid solutions that we can think of depending on that particular conflict, so in any conflict we need a lot of background study of that single conflict. Of the given ones, I don’t have one that I would say is good”.

The participant explained further that the challenge with having a particular blue print is that it ignores the complexities and uniqueness of different conflict cases, suggesting that “hybrid custom solutions for different conflicts” is the best approach to viably and sustainably resolve protracted and intractable identity-based conflicts. In a similar way, Interviewee 5 also argued that “it depends on area by area, some situations need Devolution, others Federation”. In the same vein, Interviewee 11 also added that;

“[I]n my view I can say I cannot prescribe what approach to adopt because the circumstances throughout Africa are different, then it’s the type of circumstances that will detect the kind of approach to adopt given the situation, and of course there other strategies that could work”.

Interviewee 12 also held that “[i]t’s not a straight jacket…it depends with situation and nature of conflict”. This also came from Interviewee 7 in the response that;

“It [best model of governance] depends, it’s situational… it depends with key variables or causes of the conflict… a solution may work somewhere but elsewhere it fails… it depends with the problematic areas or issues at stake. If the issues are very complex, a Federation will work… if the issues are of temporary nature, then a GNU would be a solution”.

The participant brought out the dimension of causation as related to the model of national governance that can be prescribed to sustainably and viably resolve identity-based conflicts.
To the participant, a governance model for intervention can only be informed by the causes of the conflict. Interviewee 10 was in agreement with this, stating that;

“I don’t think here we can come up with a one-size-fits-all position because it depends on the circumstances and the situation in each particular conflict...because I think there are some secessionist movements right now where they are now using a threat of a secession as a trump card for them to get attention...if their concerns are to be addressed some of them keep quiet, you will be surprised...So I wouldn’t think that there is a one particular way that we can say that it is a universal response to deal with secessionist movements”.

On this particular point, the participant brought out the suggestion that the best way may also be to attend to the grievances of a particular conflicting group that is aggrieved. The issue of conflict drivers also emerged from comments by Interviewee 8 and Interviewee 13.

There was reference made to the adoption of an African-oriented governance model to resolve conflicts sustainably and viably. Interviewee 6 suggested that “[l]et’s try to coin something that is African and not Western-oriented...this will be in consistent with the ‘African solutions to African problems’ concept”. However, the participant did not further suggest that ‘African model, other than providing the guideline that the ‘African’ solution may be “a hybrid system of governance” that fuses “capitalist ideological orientations with socialist ideology”. A more or less similar broader guideline is presented by Interviewee 1, who recommended that “[t]he best way is to identify certain accepted international norms, systems and practices” instead of focusing on selected models as these may not be guaranteed to work.

In analysis, one can note that the different interviewees and questionnaire respondents had their different opinions on what can be considered the “best” alternative model to secession with others indicating that there was no ‘best’ model as these depend with circumstances and context of the conflict at hand. Indeed, from the literature reviewed and theories on which this study was constructed, it can be stated that these models have been tried and tested across Africa and there was no guarantee of success in preventing or resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts. For instance, Ethiopia and Nigeria have attempted Federalism. However, the two countries have, and are still, experiencing secessionist movements in Oromia and Biafra respectively. Perhaps, as Interviewee 8 hinted, any alternative model of governance and conflict resolution should be supported by “conflict transformation measures, inclusivity, good governance, equitable resource distribution, democracy, and justice”.
6.4.8 Implications, precedence and lessons of South Sudanese secession in future resolution of secessionist conflicts in Africa

The investigation into the implications, precedence and lessons of South Sudanese secession in future resolution of secessionist conflicts in Africa led to the surfacing of contrasting views and perspectives from participants. There were interesting insights into the broader implications of the secession of South Sudan whilst a plethora of lessons were identified by participants. The overwhelming response from the participants was that indeed, there were both good lessons and bad lessons from the South Sudanese secession.

As Interviewee 8 observed, the South Sudanese secession was a “significant” event in the African conflict history whose implications and lessons will be “long lasting” and “instructive” not only in the discourse of African conflict narrative but also in the “management and resolution of secessionist conflicts with an ethnic and religious dimension”. In analysis, it could be deduced that some lessons applied to the South Sudanese themselves, the Government of South Sudan, the SPLM/A, the Government of Sudan, African states in general and African states that are experiencing secessionist movements, on-going secessionist movements in Africa, future secessionist movements, sub-regional organizations in Africa, the AU, the UN, and other countries beyond the African continent.

Given the fact that South Sudan experienced post-secession conflict, the most common theme that emerged in the discussion of lessons derived from the secession pointed to the direction that African states should learn a lesson not to be tempted to opt for secession. Questionnaire Respondent 7 mentioned:

“The fundamental lessons which can be learnt from South Sudan secession is that secession cannot be a solution to governance problems because we have countries and region which share similar identity and are in deep crises e.g. Somalia and we have countries with divergent values, identity and religion and are living harmoniously e.g. Tanzania, Kenya and South Africa but that does not mean that there are no challenges but there are mechanism to deal with them.”

To the participant, the most important intervention is to resolve identity-based conflicts through mechanism that allow conflicting communities, groups and/or identities to peacefully co-exist without separation. In agreement with this, Interviewee 12 also recommended that “there is
need for dialogue” to resolve secessionist conflicts, and with specific reference to South Sudan, the participant further added that there was need for “the reconfiguration of economic and political structures in Sudan” and address “the unfair distribution of resources” since these are usually the primary issues of concern and principal grievances of secessionists. The same was articulated by Interviewee 6 (see also Interviewee 2; Interviewee 15). The participant posited;

“One lesson emerging from the South Sudan secession is that secession is not the way to go…it is not an answer at all…it has not managed to resolve the conflicts. Because conflicts are insinuated by resources…Issues of marginalization a reality. African states should learn from this” (Interviewee 6).

Indeed, inequitable distribution of resources has been part and parcel of the whole gamut of South Sudanese principal grievances. Almost similarly, Questionnaire Respondent 6 suggested that the South Sudanese secession may allow other African states to learn that secession may not be the right strategy. The participant emphasised;

“Secessions are not way forward in addressing unrest in Africa. Underlying causes need to be considered. Before a state can fully function its key that governance structures and requisite systems are given priority” (Questionnaire Respondent 6).

In another criticism of secession, there were participants like Interviewee 18, who singled out national leadership lessons from the South Sudanese case. To the participants, a monumental lesson may be that effective leadership is always needed as a panacea to identity-based conflicts instead of secession. Interviewee 18 underscored;

“[S]ecessionism is not the panacea to challenges faced in Africa but good leadership, good management of resources and corporate governance epitomized by accountability, transparency and equity. An improvement of calibre of African leaders, governance and resource management is a panacea to conflicts in Africa…”

The lessons offered by the South Sudanese secession to the leadership in African states were also suggested by other participants (see Interviewee 11; Questionnaire Respondent 10; and Questionnaire Respondent 16). According to Questionnaire Respondent 16, one of the lessons that can be learnt is that the leadership of Sudan failed to reconcile conflicting communities during the long term civil war and also failed to de-tribalize the state which deepened ethnic divisions causing disunity. In the same line, Interviewee 11 argued;

“The other lesson we can learn is that leaders who rely so much on patronage politics might regret their actions they find it difficult to govern its people when
they want to free themselves, not from colonial bondage but from black bondage, they decide to leave and do their own things. It’s a lesson that actually inform government actions particularly when it’s a government that is dominated by one ethnic group. Another lesson is that whenever governments are formed everybody must be involved” (Interviewee 11).

The lesson from the above participant is both cautionary and prescriptive, urging state governments to ensure inclusivity in national development processes and equal opportunity considerations. The leadership-targeted lessons were also identified by Interviewee 17 and Questionnaire Respondent 4, delving into the essentiality of broad-based economic governance and shared development. Interviewee 17 noted;

“The lesson that we learn in Africa is that we need to treat the indigenes of a given country equally. Why we have the secessionist movement…I would say [it is] not limited to ethnic issues but to economic issues,…so the moment we have a group that is marginalized is the moment we start to hear maybe a desire to leave [secede] because they don’t see any good in staying [unity]…so the lesson we take in this is that every group in any country must be given a fair chance…if we don’t want problems in Africa let’s have equality” (Interviewee 17).

However, other participants felt that for this marginalization to be avoided practically there may be need for interventions that foster social cohesion, integration and unity (see Interviewee 8; Interviewee 13; and Interviewee 10). This will allow multi-ethnicity, religious tolerance and diversity to thrive. In this respect, Questionnaire Respondent 10 held; “I think the lesson [from South Sudan secession] is that there should be more efforts put into healing rifts and consolidating national identity, as this will not happen simply organically”.

There were some participants who expressed the view that other secessionist movements and secession leaders across Africa as well as AU should learn a lesson from the secession of South Sudan. Interviewee 12, for instance, argued that other secessionists movements will learn that the road to, and life after, secession is not as easy as they would want to imagine. The participant explained;

“The good lesson is that to any leader who wants to deal with secession and statecraft, this [post-secession conflict in South Sudan] is what happens after secession. Are you going to manage this secession? It’s a good lesson to the AU and secessionist movements. That the AU which you think can support will not…”

According to the participant, secessionist movements should be aware that some players in the form of external actors, African countries and the AU may just render their support and
solidarity to secessionist movements without any sincerity as they will be using these as pawns in the regional or global arena of politics. Citing the AU, the participant stated that soon after secession, the supporting countries or entities never extended any tangible support as expected or anticipated (see Interviewee 12).

Still related to secessionist movements in Africa, there were participants who strongly felt that the secession of South Sudan had set a precedent that secession is attainable, permissible and achievable. This, according to these participants, sends a lesson to other secessionists across the continent. Interviewee 3 indicated that “secession [of South Sudan] came after a lengthy conflict and it killed many” thus this presents a “negative lesson”. However, the same participant further added that whilst the causalities experienced in the South Sudanese secessionist war with Sudan may be taken to be a feature that will scare away potential secessionist movements in Africa, one needs to appreciate the fact that “[o]nce people are convinced about secession, it is difficult to convince them otherwise”. Given this reality, the participant concluded that “the victory of secession obviously inspires other secessionist movements”. Thus, from the submission, one can deduce the argument that secessionist movements across Africa, may be more emboldened and energized to pursue their respective self-determination dreams by the South Sudan successful secession than they will be discouraged by the enormous loss of lives experienced in the South Sudanese struggle.

The same view was shared by Interviewee 5 who argued that “[t]he precedence has been set…movements across Africa have been encouraged and emboldened. They now hope that their case will be one day ‘unique’”. The reasoning was that since the AU recognized the South Sudanese case as unique and exceptional, on the basis of, other than colonial question, self-determination, they will harbour a determination, ambition and legitimate expectation that the same will be granted to them at one point in time. This is the same reason why Interviewee 16 moved that “the AU is now in a dilemma” as it has set a “wrong precedence” that may force a lot of the secessionist movements in its member states to rise up and approach it demanding recognition and legitimacy. Interviewee 7 also shared the same viewpoint, but questioned the viability of the secessionist movements in Africa. The participant resolved;

“Of course, secessionist movements will be emboldened by the South Sudanese secession. However, the question is: will secessionist movements be viable? SPLM/A was a viable movement and [was] represented in countries outside Sudan….which kept pressure on the Northern Sudan government. Viable secessionist movements should have a strong army, diplomatic capacity, resources, etc…this may be lacking”.

216
Thus the point was that whilst the secessionist forces in Africa may be admittedly energized to pursue their secessionist vision, the key determinants may be the viability variables of having a competent armed force, diplomatic machinery and sufficient resources. Nonetheless, Questionnaire Respondent 7 still maintained that regardless of the viability of secessionist movements, the secession of South Sudan “sets a very dangerous precedence because when similar situation arises many will demand for secession...[and] feel they should have their own autonomy because political marginalization and unfair distribution of resources especially where oil is being produced”. Other participants added the dimension of seriousness and commitment to the secession struggle as key in establishing what lessons South Sudanese secession presented to secessionism on the continent. Participants such as Interviewee 10, for instance, commented;

“[F]or those who are not really pushing a real serious agenda of a secession, I think it might be a lesson for them but there are some like those who are fighting for their...I don’t think they will give a damn for what will happen after secession...if they are those who were not serious they will keep quiet and say look at what is happening now in South Sudan, we wouldn’t want to go that way, or they may still push to that agenda and say to themselves okay, we need to be very careful so that we avoid becoming another South Sudan. They may say let’s push for our independence but we are taking notes from South Sudan, we will not do like what they have done”.

In essence, the participant implied that the implication of secession on secessionist movements on the continent is dependent upon the seriousness or resolve of that particular secessionist group. Perhaps, as Interview 3 stated above, it may be a herculean task to convince a serious secessionist movement to abandon its cause when it comes to whether the secession of South Sudan will trigger other secessionist movements elsewhere on the continent. Interviewee 4 also granted;

“It [South Sudan secession] will encourage secessionist movements elsewhere. However, there are secessionist movements led by leaders who are just targeting power but with no idea of economic survival after secession like generating revenue, building infrastructure...the movements may think it’s very simple...to these, they may take the wrong lessons”.

Such, and similar, line arguments have been dismissed by a number of participants who maintained that secession history in Africa has revealed that seceding successfully requires back-breaking and exhausting efforts, and is often characterized by long struggles, hence the
success rate is very low (see Questionnaire Respondent 5; Questionnaire Respondent 14). Questionnaire Respondent 5 therefore disagreed that the South Sudanese secession will ignite continental secessionism, noting:

“I personally doubt if there will be any cases of further secessions in Africa in the near future. South Sudanese relapsed into conflict barely 3 years into its independence. Somaliland tried to push for their own independence to build on South Sudan’s success but the enthusiasm has died down”.

There were, however, some participants who felt that one of the most remarkable and fundamental lessons that can be derived from the South Sudan secession was the way in which the transition process was managed. As Interviewee 16 stressed, “[o]ne of the lesson is that there is always need to prepare the ground for transitional period and put institutions and constitutions in place for successful post-secession governance”. Such preparations, as Questionnaire Respondent 2 argued, should always be punctuated by a clear understanding and consideration of the “implications for the majority of population [to be] affected by the secession” whilst international organizations such as the AU must be in a position to “carefully monitor the secession process as well as the immediate period after secession in both countries” so as to allow for smooth transition. Participants such as Questionnaire Respondent 14 further suggested that a lesson to be learnt in the South Sudan case scenario would be that the constitutional process in a secessionist transition mechanism should be smoothened to avert chaos and anarchy in the post-secessionist period as was not done in South Sudan.

In this respect, the secession process should not be haphazard and reactive. It should rather be systematic and managed through a supportive transitional process. According to some participants, this is one of the related lessons that should be learnt from the South Sudanese secession case (see Interviewee 3). The participant suggested:

“It is always good to evaluate the capacity of the country to be independent after having been under another Government for years. I would also consider staggering the plan after succession. For example, South Sudan could have been under a transition and fall under Sudan for a year and if all was well, then it could become independent. Assessments would have revealed the failures and measures would have been put in place” (Interviewee 3). The idea of a smooth transition was also backed by participants such as Questionnaire Respondent 10 who believed that this was to be best superintended by an independent transitional authority. Questionnaire Respondent 10 averred;
“Perhaps South Sudan should have had a transitional authority upon its secession, one that would have, as a priority, the creation and consolidation of a national identity that can supersede the ethnic identity. While ethnic tensions will always exist, they need not lead to conflict as has happened there. Also, any new elites needed to learn the task of governing, while under the transitional authority”.

The proposition of a ‘secession transitional management authority’ appears to respond directly to the fact explained in Chapter Four that South Sudanese leaders in particular, and SPLM/A leadership in general, was very green in as far as the mechanics of practical governance, public administration and foreign policy management was concerned (see Questionnaire Respondent 4). This was to impact on the prospects of post-secession stability, security and prosperity in South Sudan.

Whereas most of the lessons above appeared to paint the South Sudanese secession as projecting negative lessons, there were participants who felt that it presented very positive lessons to Africa, the AU, other secessionist movements and the world over. Questionnaire respondent 8, for example, attested;

“Lessons that can be derived from the secession of South Sudan is that the will of the people must be respected, and their self determination should be granted. Because it is the people that matter not the land and colonial boundary, that should dictate. It is not also politician’s opinion that matter, it is the masses’ opinion that counts, and the recent referendum on the separation of Ireland from the UK is explaining that better”.

In the same manner, unlike most participants, Interviewee 7 identifies a positive lesson from the secession of South Sudan on the part of the AU. The participant stated that “from a Pan-African perspective, the most impressive lesson that can be plucked [from the South Sudanese secession]” is that “Africa managed to deliver the independence aspiration of South Sudanese”. This, according to the participant, should be “a triumph worth celebration”.

This may therefore be interpreted to mean that other secessionist movements may get encouraged and motivated to push for secession with renewed hope and strength. Questionnaire Respondent 16 also mentioned that one of the lessons to be deduced from the secession of South Sudan is that this will be a “reference for other marginalized groups to demand their rights in a peaceful mean or none violent way”.

219
Still on the broader implications of South Sudanese secession in future resolution of secessionist conflicts in Africa, there emerged an insights and foresights around the future resolution of secessionist conflicts in Africa. Questionnaire Respondent 12 asserted that the implication of the Southern Sudanese secession may be that the Cairo Declaration of 1964 discussed above might now “become irrelevant and because there are reasons that could be depended upon to justify the creation of new states and borders”. Without falling trap to the slippery slope, the realistic interpretation of Questionnaire Respondent 12’s observations maybe that secessionist movements may easily find justifications and easily mobilize to secure the much needed legitimacy. Questionnaire Respondent 11 took it further, and summed up the possible economic and regional integration implications of South Sudan secession in the near or far future;

“If secession is allowed to go uncontrolled we might end up in Africa having too small states that might only get their sovereignty through the United Nations, they become too small that they don’t become viable states, so I think if secession is allowed to progress...we have to be very cautious”.

This economic argument views the South Sudanese secession in the broader picture. It criticizes secession on the basis of economic viability of states especially at a time when Africa is intensifying its regional integration drive to bring the disparate 54 states into bigger and economically viable regional economic communities (RECs) for the eventual formation of the envisaged Continental Fee Trade Area (CFTA) and the African Economic Community (AEC) so as to enhance the economies of scale on the continent (UNECA, 2013).

Thus there were contending different views and perspectives with respect to the implications, precedence and lessons of South Sudanese secession in future resolution of secessionist conflicts in Africa.

6.5 Conclusion

This Chapter managed to present, interpret and analyse data collected during the study through interviews and questionnaires. This followed the breakdown of the data along the research questions of the study, and meaningful categorization and classification of the interview and questionnaire responses for effective data interpretation. The gathered data was described, analysed and summarized gathered data. Relationships between identified variables were explained. In some instances, pie charts and graphs were used to present the data whilst in other
cases textual presentation of data was employed. The next Chapter will discuss findings of the study. It will also present recommendations and conclusion of the study.
CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.0 Introduction

The principal objective of this study was to establish the extent to which secession can be considered a suitable and viable strategy for resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial African states. South Sudan, Africa’s newest state, which seceded from the Republic of Sudan in July 2011 following a very protracted and seemingly intractable conflict spanning from August 1956 on the eve of independence from the British colonial establishment, was used as a case study. The experiences of the South Sudanese case of secession, and lessons drawn from the conflict and governance dynamics prior and post-secession, were valuable in informing conclusions of the study over and above the data gathered through interviews and questionnaires which was presented and analysed in Chapter Six as well as relevant literature reviewed in Chapter Two. This Chapter therefore presents a summary of the study findings and conclusion of the study. In addition, it also proffers recommendations of the study as informed by the findings of the study in relation to the data gathered during the study, relevant literature reviewed and the theoretical framework upon which the study was constructed. The recommendations are relevant to sustainable and viable resolution, management, and transformation of conflicts that have an ethnic and/or religious dimension particularly in Africa and in other parts of the world in general. This Chapter also identifies and suggests potential areas where further research can be carried out. This was based on new questions and ideas that emerged during the course of this study as well as some findings of this study that may warrant further detailed exploration and investigation by other researchers as they could not be pursued given the fact that they were situated outside the main scope of this study.

7.1 Summaries of the Study Chapters

The first Chapter was introductory. It provided the background and context of the study. The main argument was that intra-ethnic conflicts that have a religious and ethnic dimension are on the increase, and are protracted and seemingly intractable as compared to inter-state conflicts. These, as argued by Mazrui (in Adebajo 2010: xiv), are leaving very deep scars, and are often
more indiscriminate and more ruthless than inter-state conflicts. Most of the conflicts have transformed into secessionist conflicts, which has persuaded conflict management practitioners to suggest secession as a strategy to resolve conflicts of this nature. The first Chapter also identified the two main foundational and guiding legal instruments which form the decisional basis upon which the continental position on secession is anchored. Firstly, the AU position on secession as articulated at the Summit of OAU Heads of State and Government in Cairo, Egypt in 1964 whose declaration (AHG/Res. 16) was that “all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence” (OAU First Ordinary Session Resolution, 1964). Secondly, Article 4 (b) of the AU Constitutive Act of 2000, which was adopted at the Lome (Togo) Summit and entered into force in 2001, obligates the organization to “respect [the] borders existing on the achievement of independence” and “defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity” of Member States. These two legal instruments, as argued in Chapter One, are largely interpreted as “anti-secession” clauses. Any support of secession will be inconsistent with, and in contradistinction to, both the Cairo Declaration and the AU Constitutive Act given the fact that the practice of secession seeks to re-draw colonially-inherited state borders and consequently violates the territorial integrity of states.

Chapter One also presented an outline of the research problem. The research problem or the problem statement was based on the question whether secession can be considered as a an appropriate, viable, durable and sustainable strategy to resolve protracted and seemingly intractable conflicts that have an ethnic, religious and regional dimension in post-colonial Africa. The Chapter presented the brief background of the Sudanese conflict history; post-secession South Sudan’s political, social and economic organization and conflict profile; as well as the evolving positions of the OAU and AU towards secession; with a view to situate the context of the study.

Further, Chapter One presented the research objectives together with the research questions which guided the study. The study, as presented in Chapter One, sought; (1) To establish the extent to which the secession of states sustainably resolves intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial African states; (2) To identify specific challenges faced during and after the secession of states in resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts; (3) To ascertain the position of the AU (previously the OAU) with regard to the secession of states in resolving ethnic and religious conflicts and the circumstances under which the AU justifies
such secession; (4) To establish the extent to which the secession of Sudan in 2011 has resolved the existing ethnic and religious conflicts among the warring groups; and (5) To establish the precedent, if any, that has been set by the secession of South Sudan in as far as future resolution of intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa is concerned. These were pursued as guided by the set research questions.

The central research question was: Drawing on the experiences of and lessons from the South Sudanese case, to what extent does secession of states sustainably resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial African states? The other five key research questions were as follows; (1) What specific challenges are faced during and after the secession of states in resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts?, (2) What is the AU’s (vis-a-vis the OAU’s) position with regard to the secession of states to resolve ethnic and religious conflicts and under what circumstances does the AU consider such secession justifiable?, (3) To what extent to date has the secession of South Sudan in 2011 resolved the existing ethnic and religious conflicts among the warring groups?, (4) What precedent does the current situation in South Sudan set for future resolution of intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa? Thus, summarily, Chapter One introduced the study, its background, research questions and research objectives, and the organization of the study.

Chapter Two focused on literature review and theoretical framework of the study. The Chapter critically reviewed literature that was relevant to the study and connected to the outline of the research problem/problem statement, research objectives, and research questions. From the literature reviewed, it became evident that the research focus on interrogating the sustainability and viability of secession as a strategy for resolving ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial Africa, approached from the perspective informed by the recent case of the secession of South Sudan, does not have a detailed study as yet. In the process, the literature review assisted to determine what has been researched and published within, and around, the research theme of secession and identity-based conflicts in Africa; identify gaps existing body of literature, and also allowed for familiarization with key concepts and aspects related to secession and identity-based conflicts.

From the literature reviewed in Chapter Two, the different perspectives from different scholars that assist to explain how ethnic, and religious, identities are formed, and thus manifest into conflicts, were presented and discussed. These are premordialism, instrumentalism and
constructivism. Primordialists view ethnic identity as biologically established; instrumentalists consider ethnic identities as tools for elite manipulation, whereas constructivists argue that ethnic identities are a social construction (see Aboh, 2014; Amone, 2015; Badru and Nwaorgu, 2014; Conversi, 1995; Gil-White, 1999; Heilman and Kaiser, 2002; Lane, 2015; Taras and Ganguly, 2015; Tilley, 1997; Thananithichot, 2011). The aim, in this thematic section of the literature review, was to lay the foundation and theoretical underpinnings that assist to answer the research question on what specific challenges are faced during and after the secession of states in resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts.

Chapter Two also reviewed literature on the causes of secession. From the literature reviewed, it was revealed that the main grievances being harboured by most secessionist movements on the continent include economic and political marginalization that have been a perpetuation of the colonial legacy of divide and rule tactics, identity-based politics and economics of exclusion, injustices with regards to the distribution of the benefits of natural resources, and ethno-religious suppression (see Ahmad, 2013; Ahmed, 2015; Bamfo, 2012; Bereketeab, 2014; Bujra, 2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Englebert, 2013; Keller, 2007; Ndlovhu-Gatsheni and Mhlanga, 2013; Oyeniyi, 2011; Onuoha, 2012; Onuoha, 2013; Roethke, 2011; Trzcinski, 2004; Siroky, 2009).

In the literature, it emerged that scholars, however, differed on what are considered as the main driving forces of secessionism. Overall, the works of Allen Buchanan, specifically Toward a Theory of Secession (1991), Theories of Secession (1997), and Federalism, Secession and the Morality of Inclusion (1995) have been examined as part of the literature review given their salience and instructiveness in the search and explanation of the drivers of secession. From the review of Buchanan’s literature on secession theories, it came out that social groups can push for secession as a legitimate right for self-rule in the absence of injustices, or can be forced to pursue secession as a result of injustices meted against it. These explain most of the secessionist movements across the continent that are clamouring for the establishment of their autonomous states such as in Algeria (State of Kabyle), Angola (Republic of Cabinda), Cameroon (Democratic Republic of Bakassi), Central African Republic (Republic of Logone), Comoros (Anjouan), Equatorial Guinea (Movement for the Self-Determination of Bioko Island), Ethiopia (State of Oromia and Ogaden), Kenya (Mombasa Republican Council), Mali (Azawad), Namibia (Free State of Caprivi Strip/Itenge), Nigeria (State of Biafra), Senegal
(Casamance Republic), Somalia (Republic of Somalia-Somaliland), Tanzania (Zanzibar), and Zambia (Barotseland), among others.

As part of the reviewed literature, Chapter Two also explored the scholarly debate around the arguments for and against secession. From the literature, it could be noted that some authors consider secession as desirable, whilst others opposed it with a considerable number of scholars adopting a “middle line” stance. The scholars’ arguments for and against secession were based on case studies of secessionism as adopted and applied to resolve ethnic and religious conflicts in cases such as Norway-Sweden (1905), Croatia-Slovenia (1991), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992), Ethiopia/Eritrea (1993), Yugoslavia-Kosovo (1999), India-Pakistan (1948), Pakistan-Bangladesh (1971), Indonesia-East Timor (2002), among others. None of the reviewed literature has focused on the recent and unique case of secession of South Sudan. Again, none of the studies have also pursued secession with an extended focus on the role and position of the AU towards secession, considering that the continental body has always stood for the advancement of African unity and integration of African states. That has been the main gap identified in the literature.

In light of the above, Chapter Two also reviewed literature related to the AU position on secession as this also has a bearing the future resolution of intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts that may have secessionist tendencies given the significant influence on conflict resolution and management within its member states. This aimed to address the research question on: What is the African Union’s (vis-a-vis the OAU’s) position with regard to the secession of states to resolve ethnic and religious conflicts and under what circumstances does the AU consider such secession justifiable? Additionally, this thematic section of the literature review attempted to address the research question: What precedent does the current situation in South Sudan set for future resolution of intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa?

Within the same Chapter Two, the major theories upon which the study was constructed, namely the Protracted Social Conflict Theory, Realist Conflict Theory and Conflict Transformation Theory were presented, explained and discussed. These three theories, in a complementary manner and from different perspectives, explain the nature of identity-based conflicts; their causes; their manifestations; the relationships and inter-relationships between and amongst the different actors related to the social conflicts; possible mechanisms that can be adopted to sustainably resolve identity-based conflicts; and the different roles of the
stakeholders involved in, and/or related to, the conflict. The theories provided a framework of analysis that was needed to address the key research questions pursuant to the research objectives.

Chapter Three comprehensively explored the Sudanese political and socio-economic history since the pre-colonial phase and further examined the evolution of the conflict from a multi-dimensional perspective up to the stage of secession in 2011. This laid the foundational basis and context for substantive discussions on South Sudanese secession matrix in Chapter Four.

The Sudanese conflict, which assumed an ethnical and religious dimension on the onset of colonialism in the 19th century when the colonial administrative systems employed the *divide et impera* as it colonial *modus operandi*. It was revealed that Sudan was subjected to three colonial phases under three different colonial administrations, namely the Turko-Egyptian Rule (1821-1882), the Mahdiyah Rule (1881-1898), and the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Rule (1899-1955). It is under the third phase that the famous ‘Southern Policy’ was effected in the 1920s and 1930s wherein the Southern region was administered separately from the North based on ethnicity and religion (see Abusharaf, 2013; Ahmad, 2010; Arkell, 1983; Bashir, 1968; Daly, 2002; Deng and Ruay, 1994; Holt and Daly, 2014; Kebbede, 1997; Khalid, 2010; Metz, 1991; Sharkey, 2003; Wei, 1980; Raheem, 1970; Shibeika, 1986).

The discussion of the post-colonial Sudanese history in Chapter Three, however, presents another dimension critical in the examination of factors giving rise to the Sudanese conflict, and ultimately to secession demands by Southern Sudan. Chapter discussions revealed that the post-colonial Sudanese governments led by General Ibrahim Abboud (1958-1964), Jaffar Nimeiri (1964-1985), Abdel Rahman Suwar-al Dahab (1985-1989), and Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir (1989-present); at one point in time dishonoured peace agreements and perpetuated the system of marginalizing the South, inequitable distribution of natural resources, political under-representation of the south in the national governance structures, imposition of religious practices on the southern population specifically Sharia laws, and failure to attend to the long-standing grievances of the Southern Sudanese. As instrumentalists view ethnic conflicts being a tool of elite manipulation, indeed both Northern leaders (specially within the National Umma Party, Democratic Unionist Party, and the National Congress); and Southern leaders (specifically SPLM/A leaders) manipulated ethnic emotions to advance their political
ambitions and agendas as northern leaders sought to maintain a united Sudan whilst the southerners insisted on secession.

Also instigating the Sudanese conflict, were the different regional and international players and/or actors involved in the conflict with divergent interests. This was deduced from the manner in which these different players were involved in the peace negotiations that later culminated into the CPA of 2005. These actors’ interests, as explained in Chapter Three, ranged from geo-strategic interests, economic interests, regional hegemonic interests, security concerns, among other interests. The countries included the United States which was part of the troika including Norway and Italy, Egypt, Libya, IGAD member states, Uganda, the AU, and the UN. Thus Chapter Three managed to unpack the nature of the Sudanese conflict, its causes, its evolution as well as identifying linkages and inter-state/inter-group relationships, geography of the conflict, conflict management and resolution attempts, and relevant events that gave rise to secession in 2011.

Chapter Four explored the secession, conflict developments and dynamics in post-secession South Sudan, as well as the possible implications of South Sudan secession in future conflict resolution in Africa. The Chapter examined the turn of conflict events in the post-secession period in Sudan up-to July 2016 with a view to analyse how the nature of the conflict and its dimensions evolved in the period under examination. Focus was on establishing the social, humanitarian, economic, and political effects of post-secession conflict in South Sudan as well as assessing the prospects for peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. The intention of the Chapter was to address the research question: To what extent to date has the secession of South Sudan in 2011 resolved the existing ethnic and religious conflicts among the warring groups?

The Chapter revealed that whilst there were very high hopes after the majority of South Sudanese voted for secession, post-secession South Sudan faced a plethora of challenges ranging from governance and nation building issues, security, economic development, social instability, and non-harmonious relations with some states within the region and beyond. It largely sought to address the central research question of the study: Drawing on the experiences of and lessons from the South Sudanese case, to what extent does secession of states sustainably resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial African states? Chapter Four unpacked post-secession South Sudan in an expository manner through a
'critical phase analysis' that categorized South Sudan into four phases, namely, the period of attempted stabilization and nation-building (July 2011 to December 2013); the period of civil war outbreak and peace negotiation attempts (December 2013 to August 2015); the period of national unity government and post-civil war stabilization and reconstruction (August 2015 to July 2016); and the period of Second Civil War outbreak, conflict resurgence and peace re-negotiation attempts (July 2016 to present).

The unresolved outstanding issues emanating from the transitional CPA-era proved difficult for South Sudan to resolve in the post-secession establishment. These included border demarcation issues in the Abyei Region, Blue Nile and South Kordofan; sharing of oil resources and oil infrastructure; security issues; and citizenship. Thus post-secession South Sudan has been witnessing internal strife characterised by inter-communal clashes and two civil war outbreaks in December 2013 and July 2016; infighting and factionalism within SPLM/A which consequently resulted in discordance and inter-departmental disarticulation in government; and inter-state conflict between South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan. Despite the ARCSS signed by the conflicting parties in August 2016, there was resurgence of conflict in July 2016, and to date conflict still persists.

Further, Chapter Four also makes it clear that over and above the post-secession conflict dynamics, the economic performance of the South Sudanese economy in the post-secession era was way below average if measured against all economic indicators. The country experienced high mortality and relatively low life expectancy, poor physical and social infrastructure development, very limited agricultural production and productivity, burgeoning external debt, and high illiteracy.

It is therefore extremely difficult to predict the attainment of peace in South Sudan in the near future given the unpredictability of the South Sudanese political leadership, its political landscape and the attitude of the Republic of Sudan leadership with regard to the outstanding border demarcation issues. This brought to the fore the grand question on how sustainable and viable was secession of South Sudan as a strategy to end the protracted and seemingly intractable Sudanese conflict that had started in August 1955.

Chapter Five discussed the research methodology employed by the study and at the same time explored and explained the major theories that have been used to provide the framework of
analysis for the study. The study mixed both qualitative and quantitative research designs. It utilized face-to-face interviews and email questionnaires as instruments for data collection. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 18 respondents in Zimbabwe who are experts in the field of conflict management and international relations. These were lecturers and/or researchers working in Universities and/or think tanks in Zimbabwe. On the other hand, email questionnaires were administered to individuals working in organizations specializing in peace building, development, post-conflict reconstruction and research based in South Sudan. The data gathered through these instruments, as well as that gathered through secondary data, was analysed using thematic analysis and content analysis in order to arrive at conclusions and research findings from which the study recommendations were derived from.

Chapter Six undertook presentation, interpretation and analysis of data gathered during the study through face-to-face interviews, questionnaires and literature reviewed. It examined the extent to which secession of states sustainably resolves intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial African states, drawing on the experiences of and lessons from the South Sudanese case. The Chapter also analysed the position of the AU with regard to secession as well as the extent to which the current situation in South Sudan sets a precedent for future resolution of intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa.

7.2 Summary of Research Findings

With the study having assessed the extent to which secession can be considered as a sustainable and viable strategy for resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in Post-colonial African states, the findings of the study, in relation to the interviews, questionnaires, literature reviewed and theoretical framework analysed as guiding the study; revealed the following;

7.2.1 Resolving Intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in Post-colonial Africa

The study revealed that protracted, and often-times intractable, intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa, most of which emerged as a manifestation of ethno-religious nationalism just after independence, have polarized societies along social cleavages and bred an identity-based force that is often used as a rallying point to clamour for secession. As explained through the primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist paradigms presented in the literature
reviewed in Chapter Two, intra-ethnic and religious conflicts in the heterogeneous post-colonial African states cannot be explained from a mono-causal and uni-dimensional point of view and therefore are so difficult to resolve given their intricacy and complicatedness. This has been the case in identity-based conflicts of this nature in Angola, Burundi, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, among other African states.

Grievances that give rise to protracted ethnic and religious conflicts, as revealed by the study, are both horizontal and vertical in as much as they are economic, political, social and cultural. The Protracted Social Conflict Theory together with the Realist Conflict Theory, which constituted part of the theoretical framework of the study, explains that such conflicts are caused by deprivation of human needs; economic marginalization; unequal access to opportunities; competition for scarce resources; distributive injustices; misgovernance; pressure and competition on resources (see Azar et al, 1978; Azar, 1985; Azar, 1986; Azar, 1990; Azar, 1991; Azar et al, 2003; Bornstein, 2003; Coenders et al, 2008; Ramsbotham, 2005; Sherif, 2010). It was also revealed from the study that ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa have also been a colonial legacy of divide et impera, a political administrative tactic initiated and sustained by colonial establishments to ensure economic exploitation and political control by favouring, and playing, one ethnic group against the other in terms of national governance and access to opportunities. This was the case with the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium’s Southern Policy in Sudan as explained in Chapter Three.

The case of the Sudanese conflict, which was the focus of the study, revealed that resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in Post-colonial Africa can be arduous and back-breaking. This is because ethnic and religious cleavages continue to deepen and widen as such conflicts become protracted. The Sudanese conflict, mainly pitting the Southerners against the Northern government started in August 1956, and had to be resolved through secession in July 2011 after efforts to resolve the conflict in 1972 through the Addis Ababa Agreement, and the CPA in 2005 failed to bear fruits of peace and stability.

The study found that despite the conflicts being internecine, as evidenced by heavy loss of human lives, massive destruction of property and infrastructure, prolonged human suffering, disruption of social life and interruption of economic activity; ethno-religious conflicts remain too complex to resolve since grievances usually continue worsen, differences between warring parties become entrenched and embedded within the political culture, hostilities, stereotypes,
prejudices and antagonism between warring parties deepens with time, collective identities become polarized whilst mutual trust is lost and replaced by mutual suspicion. This consequently result in vulnerabilities of parties to disarmament due to security fears further prolonging confrontations which makes compromise, cooperation and accommodation arduous and back-breaking to secure. Such situations may make it very difficult for conflict mediators to facilitate reconciliation, peace agreements and accommodative arrangements thereby resorting to secession as a strategy of resolving the prolonged conflict and bring to an ending the war induced human suffering.

7.2.2 Challenges faced during and after the secession of states

Based on the examination of the concept of secession and its causes, mainly in Chapter Two on literature review, the study revealed that secessionist demands are usually harboured for a prolonged period of time. Secessionist movements in Africa in particular and other continents in general, have engaged in confrontational and non-confrontational conflicts with their host governments for considerable periods of time before secession is granted. Very few are granted secession or self-determination, with Africa having experienced only a single case of secession, which is the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993, over and above the South Sudanese case of secession in 2011.

From the cases of secession reviewed in the literature such as Norway-Sweden (1905), Croatia-Slovenia (1991), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992), Ethiopia/Eritrea (1993), Yugoslavia-Kosovo (1999), India-Pakistan (1948), Pakistan-Bangladesh (1971), Indonesia-East Timor (2002), among others as well as the South Sudanese case of secession included, the study has revealed that secession is laden with challenges both during the actual process of creation of new states, and after states have seceded. Whilst most of the sessions maybe smooth through the conduct of a secession referendum, secession processes have often been preceded by very complex and complicated negotiations related to natural resource sharing, border demarcation issues, and citizenship questions, among others.

In the case of South Sudan, the study revealed that these issues still remain outstanding and far from being resolved even now, five years after secession. The study found out that such outstanding issues add to a gamut of questions that emerge as thorny in the post-secession
period. Seceding states, as the data from this research as confirmed, usually face challenges related to limited capacity for national governance, national security, existence of weak institutional infrastructure for public governance and economic management, limited capacity to optimally utilize natural resources for national development, bureaucratic incapacity, foreign policy management challenges, national re-integration, post-conflict reconstruction and peace consolidation complexities, and failure to effectively manage disarmament, demobilization and re-integration (DDR) and other elements of peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery.

The data gathered in this research revealed that South Sudan was faced the above challenges and the literature reviewed also confirmed capacity deficiencies on the part of the new South Sudanese government to deal with national governance, economic management, national security, foreign policy and post-conflict stabilization and recovery (see ACLED, 2012; ACLED, 2016; Belloni, 2011; Gordon, 2014; Gorurl, 2014; Hutton, 2014; Jambert and Rolandsen, 2013; Le Billon and Savage, 2016; Shulika and Okeke-Uzodike, 2013; Sørbø and Ahmed, 2013; Temin, 2009; Wolff, 2012).

7.2.3 **Sustainability and Viability of Secession as strategy to resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial Africa**

Drawing lessons from the South Sudanese case of secession, the study found out that secession cannot be regarded as a sustainable and viable strategy to resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts. Based on the data gathered in the study, and literature reviewed, there is no evidence of success of South Sudanese secession in as far as conflict management and resolution is concerned. It is only from the legal point of view that the secession of South Sudan was successful as a new state now exists with international recognition since the AU and UN have both approved its membership. This is despite the fact that conflict resolution and conflict transformation is more than just securing international state recognition.

The data gathered from the study and literature reviewed also indicated that the only way and circumstances under which secession can be regarded as a sustainable strategy to resolve intra-ethnic and religious conflicts would be when institutions, structures, and systems are put in place to ensure smooth transition of seceding states whilst cooperation between the seceding
state and the host state is also guaranteed in terms on economic, political and diplomatic cooperation. The case of South Sudan proved that without the above essentialities, seceding state can easily slide back into cycles of endless conflict and fail to ensure efficient and effective governance and national security.

Further, the study revealed that secession cannot be a viable strategy to resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts as it usually simplifies such conflict along ethnic, religious and regional lines thereby failing to recognize, acknowledge and address the root causes of secessionist conflicts and related grievances that trigger the demands for secession. The data gathered in the study concluded that secession remains unsustainable and unviable if it fails to and resolve. From the South Sudan secession case, it was revealed that the fundamental issues that constituted the core drivers of the Sudanese conflict and/or grievances that gave rise to secession were never resolved. These include historical grievances of economic marginalization, political under-representation, suppression of religious rights, unequal access to natural resources and opportunities, among others. The above finding concur with Azar’s “four variables” or “pre-conditions” for Protracted Social Conflicts, discussed in Chapter Two as part of the theoretical framework, namely communal content, human needs, governance, and environmental factors (see Azar, 1990; Azar et al, 2003; Ramsbotham, 2005). The failure of secession to emphasize on addressing the underlying causes of conflict also contributed to the resurgence of conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, and also inter-communal conflict and violence, retarded socio-economic growth, limited development and governance challenges in South Sudan. Sudan and South Sudan are still at conflict over the contested states of Abyei, Blue Nile and South Kordofan; oil-revenue sharing mechanisms, and citizenship issues.

The study also found out that secession cannot be a sustainable and viable strategy to resolve conflicts if it is not accompanied by conflict transformation interventions. The data gathered in the study revealed that there is no ‘best model’ to resolve protracted intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts given the fact that the nature and contexts of conflicts differ. Rather, it was found out that conflict transformation interventions will be germane in resolving such conflicts since seceding states, such as the state of South Sudan, would be very fragile as they will be emerging from a protracted conflict. Thus, what was essential in pre-secession and post-secession South Sudan was to transform the protracted social conflict, and inter-communal conflicts as well as the inter-state conflict between South Sudan and the Republic Sudan,
through changing the power structures, institutions, systems, triggers of violence, attitudes of conflict actors, and transforming mindset of the elite/leadership. The nature, form and substance of conflict transformation interventions, as found by the study, should be defined and structured in a way that takes into account the context, peculiarities and circumstances of the conflict.

In addition, the study further revealed that whilst secession leads to the realization of self-determination rights, and may appear to be the only remaining option to resolve protracted social conflicts that have an ethnic, religious and regional dimension, it results in disunity which can be detrimental to the continental project of African unity and integration as it “divides to unite” which normally breeds non-harmonious inter-state relations between host states and seceding states, diminishing the likelihood of cooperation and integration. As found out in the study, pre-secession and post-secession conflict dynamics are likely to reconfigure regional inter-state relations and may create tensions as states adopt clashing foreign policy positions with regard to regional interventions driven by their respective socio-economic, commercial, political, and security interests. They either take positions in support of the host state or at odds with the seceding state. In the case of South Sudan, Uganda for instance, has shifted its position and alliances from the pre-secession to post-secession South Sudan for its own regional security expediency. This has been detrimental to the cohesiveness and unity of the IGAD. Thus the study found out that secession can have detrimental effects to the continental integration programmes and African unity initiatives.

7.2.4 Position of the African Union towards secession in Member States

The study found out that the OAU, and now AU’s decision pertaining to the secession within its member states has not been clear in terms of implementation. Whilst on paper, the OAU Cairo Declaration of 1964 can be regarded as an ‘anti-secession clause’, the continental body’s acknowledgement, support and recognition of Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia, and now South Sudan’s secession from the Republic of Sudan, can be interpreted as an affirmative stance, tolerance and acceptance of secession on the part of AU. However, the conditions under which secession can be accepted and recognized appear to be circumstantial. The Sudanese secession case was accepted as an exceptional case on the basis that Sudan had a unique colonial past and that secession of South Sudan was consistent with the UN Resolution 1514
(XV) on the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples which values self-determination for people of non-self-governing territories. The study revealed that the AU is now deviating from its position as contained in the Cairo Declaration and AU Constitutive Act of 2001 relating to the integrity of state borders, even if the AU’s stance can be justified on the basis of dynamism and political expediency. The study also revealed that secession of states in Africa may be detrimental to the continental regional integration project for two main reasons. Firstly, that it contradicts the values of African unity given its philosophy embodiment of paradoxically ‘dividing to unite’ is feasibly difficult to attain empirically. Secondly, that it sub-divides already fragmented states whose geographical size affect their economic viability hence the rationale behind regional economic integration and the ultimate objective to form the African Economic Community and the vision for a Union Government of Africa.

7.2.5 Possible Strategies to Resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in Post-colonial Africa

The study found out that resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflict in Post-colonial Africa requires a system of national governance that suits the context and circumstances within a particular state in consideration of a political culture, conflict history, religious, linguistic and cultural composition, demography and social structure, nature of grievances, and local preferences. As data gathered during the study suggested, there is ‘no best model’ of governance. Rather, the following systems of governance, that is, Federation, Consociational Democracy, Government of National Unity (GNU) were preferable than secession as they are accommodative and allow for plurality and more representation necessary in resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflict in Post-colonial Africa. By themselves, these models will not guarantee peace, stability, national cohesion, integration and prosperity. Durable peace and stability will only be assured when the root causes of intra-state ethnic and religious are fundamentally addressed to the satisfaction of all parties. For instance, Ethiopia and Nigeria are federations, but they have secessionist movements in Oromia and Biafra respectively. The above models of governance should be implemented with measures that are aimed at ensuring minority representation in national governance through power-sharing, autonomy for some minority communities, balance of power, decentralization and devolution, proportional representation and meaningful participation, inclusivity, cooperation, accommodation, and
justice. Whilst these models of governance are often criticized for solidifying ethnic and religious cleavages and divisions, and open avenues for elitism, the study found out that the models provide for viable and sustainable alternatives whose adoption is dependent upon the contextual and circumstantial considerations as well as supportive political will since there is no one-size-fits all or cooker-cutter approach in resolving intra-state ethnic and religious conflict.

7.2.6 Possible precedence set by, and key lessons learnt from, the secession of South Sudan

The research findings revealed that the secession of South Sudan may present valuable lessons to other secessionist movements on the continent, the AU, other African states, and the broader international community. On the other hand, the South Sudanese secession may set a precedent for future resolution of similar conflicts on the continent.

The data gathered in the study revealed that the secession of South Sudan was a legal success in that South Sudan gained sovereign statehood and secured state recognition as it was consequently accepted in July 2011 as the UN’s 193rd Member State, and AU’s 54th Member State. It has all the attributes that constitute the essential basis of a state that is, it is sovereign, has an established and recognized government, defined geographical/territorial borders, and a defined national population. Thus it is from such a legal perspective that the secession of South Sudan may probably and possibly present a lesson to secessionist movements on the continent that successful secession is achievable, which can energize other movements to continue to clamour for secession.

Further, the criteria under which the AU acknowledged and supported South Sudanese secession is largely applicable to many secessionist movements. This is because the cited UN Resolution 1514 (XV) on the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which values the right to self-determination of people of non-self governing territories, and the given justification that the Sudanese challenges were unique and exceptional due to its inherited colonial past could apply to any secessionist movements. For instance, the Movement for the Autonomy for Kabyle (in Algeria), Bakassi Movement for Self-Determination (in Cameroon), Oromo and Ogaden Independence Movements (in Ethiopia),
Mombasa Republican Council (Kenya), Biafra Movement (in Nigeria), Casamance Republic (in Senegal), Movement for the Self-Determination of Bioko Island (in Equatorial Guinea), Zanzibar (in Tanzania), Republic of Somalia-Somaliland (in Somalia), all have unique colonial history in their own individual respect and are equally entitled to the right to self-determination. This may place the AU in a very difficult position in future to justify its non-recognition of secessionist movements that may seek audience with the continental body based on similar claims.

The study revealed that given the manifestation of conflict and inter-communal clashes in post-secession South Sudan, as well as challenges relating to economic misgovernance, retarded socio-economic growth, weak institutions of governance, limited infrastructure development and post-secession inter-state conflicts between South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan; the South Sudanese secession case may attract negativity and portrays secession as an unviable and unsustainable strategy to resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts. The possible implication is that this may discourage, unnerve and demoralize potential secessionist movements across the continent as the movements begin to practically appreciate the complexities and intricacies of not only setting up and operationalizing the critical national governance infrastructure upon secession but also effectuating post-conflict reconstruction, nation-building, re-integration and conflict transformation initiatives.

From the research findings, the post-secession conflict dynamics in South Sudan may present a valuable lesson to Governments, conflict practitioners and other stakeholders that the adoption of secession, without consideration and undertaking of conflict transformation essentialities will not sustainably resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts. In South Sudan, secession came with very little conflict transformation interventions which contributed to the non-durability and unsustainability as conflict was, and is still, experienced in the country. Thus there was no fundamental change of the relationships, patterns of social organization, perceptions, attitudes and behaviour of conflicting parties and promoting peace, justice, equality, reconciliation, forgiveness, and recognition (as suggested by Francis, 2002:27-28). Secession, devoid of the above, does not sufficiently resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts.
7.3 Recommendations of the Study

As the study sought to assess the extent to which secession of states sustainably and viably resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial African states, using the case of the South Sudanese secession in 2011, it will proffer recommendations based on the findings and conclusions of the study discussed above.

The study recommends that states resort to conflict prevention rather than perpetuating conditions that breed and brew intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts. In multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies such as was the Sudan, it is recommended that Governments embrace diversity, plurality and tolerance. These should be celebrated as sources of strength and inspiration for national prosperity than be used, abused and manipulated for elite mobilization. State governments should therefore formulate and implement public policies that are targeted at national development without being skewed in favour of a particular ethnic and religious group. Non-discrimination, equal access to opportunities, just distribution of national resources, fair representation of all ethnicities and regions in the national governance structures, and promotion of national integration policies are all pro-nation building initiatives that work in preventing intra-ethnic and religious conflicts as well as secessionist tendencies.

Based on the empirical data gathered during the study, secession was not considered as a sustainable and viable strategy to resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts. Rather, the emerging narrative was that efforts and energies should be invested towards conflict transformation processes. This study therefore recommends that conflict transformation be employed to resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts that are usually intractable and whose root causes fuel the protractedness of these conflicts. As explained through the Conflict Transformation Theory by Johan Galtung and John Paul Lederach, when states are faced with protracted intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts, it is recommended that they deal with these through positively and constructively transforming the conditions underlying the root causes of the conflicts, attitudes, perceptions and behaviour of conflicting parties as well as nation building, national healing and reconciliation. Such a process should be very inclusive, involving all the warring parties, Government, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and other relevant stakeholders. From the findings of the study, it was the absence of this which prolonged the Sudanese conflict since 1955 up to the ultimate stage of secession in 1955.
The study further recommends that when faced with intractable and protracted ethnic and religious conflicts in the midst of plurality, consideration should be made to ‘non-secession’ alternatives such as Federation, Consociational Democracy, Devolution, Confederation, and Government of National Unity. The options should be informed, defined and determined by the contexts, circumstances and peculiarities of the conflicts at hand. However, greater emphasis should not be on the governance model of resolving the conflict per se since this will not guarantee peace, stability, unity and prosperity. For instance, Ethiopia and Nigeria have Federalism but are having secessionist movements in Oromia and Biafra respectively. Therefore as hinted above, more emphasis and efforts should be invested in addressing the root causes of the conflict, and transforming the conflict itself.

The examination of the AU’s position on secession of states relating to its member states revealed that by recognizing and supporting the secession of South Sudan, having supported the secession of Eritrea in 1993, the continental body is deviating from its policy position as clearly stated in the Cairo Declaration of 1964 and AU Constitutive Act of 2001. This study recommends that the AU reformulates or re-visits its position and makes it clear in light of these Eritrean and South Sudanese cases of secession. Clarifying its position on secession will ensure certainty when it comes to approaching secession issues and it will also presents a clear criterion which is essential for consistency whilst it also guards against political opportunism and political expediency in the AU’s consideration of secessionist movements.

The study empirically found that in some instances secession maybe inevitable and unavoidable due to self-determination pressures from secessionist movements. It is thus recommended that in such instances host Governments, including other stakeholders, should put in place mechanisms and arrangements to smoothen the transitional process. In this regard, governments need to set up constitutional arrangements to manage the transition process through the establishment of strong governance institutions, representative leadership, nation-building, national unity and state-building initiatives, national reconciliation and national healing, national re-integration interventions, revenue sharing and resource distribution as well as decentralization and devolution mechanisms. These are the main issues that may be triggers in the resurgence of conflict in post-secession societies.

Lastly, the study the AU is also recommended to come up with a firm and clear position on secession, which is not ambivalent to ambiguities and different interpretations as is the Cairo
Declaration. This can be in the form of a binding declaration or a protocol with an express, rather than implied, provision on secession. Such a declaration or protocol will assist member states in dealing with intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts that are secessionist in nature. It may also bring certainty in the manner in which the AU treats secessionist movements across the continent whilst also ensuring consistency in the recognition of seceding states, and acceptance of their membership into the continental body.

7.4 Suggestions for Future Research

From the study, it can be noted that insights have been provided on the extent to which secession can be considered as a sustainable and viable strategy to resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial African states, using the South Sudanese case of secession. There is latitude to broaden the scope of the area of investigation by focusing on the two cases of secession in Africa, namely South Sudan (which seceded in 2011) and Eritrea (which seceded in 1993). Such will allow for comparative analysis and immensely contribute to the broader understanding of the respective experiences of the two countries as they have different political, economic, social and cultural peculiarities in their respective pre-secession and post-secession historical backgrounds. This will therefore expand the scope of the findings which furthers the understanding of secession within the post-colonial context.

Whilst the research design and research methods of combining both qualitative and quantitative methodologies adopted by this study were very appropriate for the pursuit of the study objectives as explained in Chapter Five, it is recommended that further research may need to broaden the study sample by employing more face-to-face interviews both in South Sudan, Republic of Sudan and other African countries. Such an approach may also broaden the thematic narratives emerging from the gathered data beyond those presented in this study which may produce new and valuable knowledge.

Further studies may also be conducted on the complexities of transforming secessionist movements into ruling governments. In reviewed the study findings and literature reviewed, it was concluded that the SPLM/A as liberation movement was very forceful, visionary and combative in its fight for the self-determination rights of Southern Sudanese, eventual secession from Sudan. The SPLM/A has been criticised for its inability to effectively transform
from a guerrilla movement to a ruling party that can foster unity, stability, peace and prosperity. It is imperative that future research may focus on the complexities and challenges faced by secessionist movements in this transformational process. Such a study will also further focus on the SPLM/A and perhaps, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), which are the only two liberation political movements that have successfully pushed for secession on the continent.

7.5 Conclusion

This Chapter presented a summary of the research findings and recommendations. The study findings emanated from the empirical data gathered during the study and literature reviewed whilst the recommendations of the study, which were informed by the research findings, centred on the extent to which secession can be considered as sustainable strategy to resolve intra-state ethnic and religious conflicts in post-colonial Africa. The Chapter also identified and suggested potential areas for future research based on new questions, themes and ideas that emerged during the course of this study as well as study findings.
REFERENCES


Crawford, J. (2006). The Creation of States in international Law. 375 (2nd Ed.)


Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (2015). Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan; Addis Ababa, 17 August 2015.

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (2010). History. Available at: http://www.igad.org/ [Accessed on 22 May 2016]


Koos, C. and Gutschke, T., (2014). South Sudan’s Newest War: When Two Old Men Divide a Nation. German: GIGA.

Krotki, K. J. (1958) "Demographic Survey of Sudan", in The Population of Sudan. Report on the Sixth Annual Conference (Khartoum, Philosophical Society of Sudan, 1958) [a digest of the first census's findings], pp.36-7.


Laccino (2016). South Sudan has highest number of children out of school due to conflict warns Unicef. 13 January 2016. Available at:


Sudan’s President Congratulates independent South. Reuturs. 09 July, 2011.


The Speech of President Omar Al-Bashir before the celebrations marking the birth of South Sudan on 09 July 2011. Sudan News Agency (SUNA), 09 July 2011.


Turse, N. (2016). Next time they'll come to count the dead war and survival in South Sudan. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books.


UN (2011). Remarks at the independence ceremony of South Sudan [as prepared for delivery], Ban Ki-moon. 9 JULY 2011. Available at:


Dear Sir/Madam

Researcher: Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu (+263-733 877 950/+27-781941723)
Supervisor: Dr. Joseph Rukema Rudigi (+27-312602440/Email: josephr1@ukzn.ac.za)
Research Office: Ms P Ximba (+2731-2603587)

I am a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) student in International Relations at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (Durban, South Africa) and am hereby seeking the permission to interview you as part of my Doctoral research process.

The title of my thesis is: The Secession of States as a Strategy for Resolving Intra-State Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of South Sudan. The aim of this study is to explore and interrogate the extent to which the secession of states can be considered as a strategy to sustainably resolve intra-state conflicts that are ethnic and religious in nature in post-colonial African states. The secession of the Republic of South Sudan from the Republic of The Sudan in 2011 is used as a case study in the research.

The requested interview will take an estimated 45 minutes. Participation of individuals in the study will be on a voluntary basis and there are no risks associated with your participation in the study. You will be given the option not to take part in the study if you so wish and to withdraw from the study at any point in time during the interview process. You are also free to withdraw consent to be interviewed even after accepting to be interviewed and this does not attract any penalty.

Information collected in this study will be used solely for the purpose of this study. It will not be made available to any persons or organizations not involved in this study. All data will be kept secure, in safe box, where no one else will have access except myself and my supervisor. A summary of the study’s findings will be made available to you at the conclusion of the study. The findings will not present results targeting individuals but will combine all the participating respondents.

If you agree to take part in the study, please kindly sign the Informed Consent Form below. Should you require further clarification pertaining to any aspect of this study, feel free to contact me or my supervisor through the contact details listed above.

Thank you.

Yours Sincerely,

Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu

Signature: [Signature]

Date: July 2016
APPENDIX 2: Permission Letter to Questionnaire Respondents

UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Dear Sir/Madam

Researcher: Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu (+263-733 877 950/+27-781941723)
Supervisor: Dr. Joseph Rukema Rudigi (+27-312602440/Email: josephr1@ukzn.ac.za)
Research Office: Ms P Ximba (+2731-2603587)

I am a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) student in International Relations at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (Durban, South Africa) and am hereby seeking your consent to be a questionnaire respondent in my Doctoral research process.

The title of my thesis is: The Secession of States as a Strategy for Resolving Intra-State Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of South Sudan. The aim of this study is to explore and interrogate the extent to which the secession of states can be considered as a strategy to sustainably resolve intra-state conflicts that are ethnic and religious in nature in post-colonial African states. The secession of the Republic of South Sudan from the Republic of The Sudan in 2011 is used as a case study in the research.

My Questionnaire has ten (10) questions. Participation of individuals in the study will be on a voluntary basis and there are no risks associated with your participation in the study. You will be given the option not to take part in the study if you so wish and to withdraw from the study at any point in time. You are also free to withdraw consent to be a questionnaire respondent even after acceptance and this does not attract any penalty.

Information collected in this study will be used solely for the purpose of this study. It will not be made available to any persons or organizations not involved in this study. All data will be kept secure, in safe box, where no one else will have access except myself and my supervisor. A summary of the study’s findings will be made available to you at the conclusion of the study. The findings will not present results targeting individuals but will combine all the participating respondents.

If you agree to take part in the study, please kindly sign the Informed Consent Form below. Should you require further clarification pertaining to any aspect of this study, feel free to contact me or my supervisor through the contact details listed above.

Thank you.

Yours Sincerely,

Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu

Signature: [Signature]

Date: July 2016
APPENDIX 3: Informed Consent Form for Interviewees

UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Researcher: Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu (+263-733 877 950/+27-781941723)
Supervisor: Dr. Joseph Rukema Rudigi (+27-312602440/Email: josephr1@ukzn.ac.za)
Research Office: Ms P Ximba (+2731-2603587)

I ____________________________________________________________________________________________ (optional and may be replaced by initials) hereby declare that I am fully informed about the nature of the research titled: The Secession of States as a Strategy for Resolving Intra-State Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of South Sudan by the researcher.

Yes……… No………

I have also been well-informed about the role that I stand to play if I am to participate in this project, which is participating in a one to one interview. I am also aware that participation is voluntary and I can choose to withdraw from the process at any stage without any consequences to my withdrawal.

Yes……… No………

I am aware that all information obtained from me in the course of this project will remain confidential and that my identity will be well guided in the case of any publication of the obtained information.

Yes……… No………

I agree that the interview process will be electronically recorded and all collected information will be kept with confidentiality and high security.

Yes……… No………

-------------- --------------- --------------- ---------------
Initials  Signature  Date  Place

I Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu state that I have fully informed the above participant of the nature and purpose of my research and the demands involved in his/her participation. I also state that I will do all in my power to maintain confidentiality and anonymity of the participant as I fully keep to the ethical conduct requested of me as a researcher.

-------------- --------------- --------------- ---------------
Initials  Signature  Date  Place

284
APPENDIX 4: Informed Consent Form for Questionnaire Respondents

UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Researcher: Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu (+263-733 877 950/+27-781941723)
Supervisor: Dr. Joseph Rukema Rudigi (+27-312602440/Email: josephr1@ukzn.ac.za)
Research Office: Ms P Ximba (+2731-2603587)

I ________________________________ (optional and may be replaced by initials) hereby declare that I am fully informed about the nature of the research titled: The Secession of States as a Strategy for Resolving Intra-State Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of South Sudan by the researcher.
Yes…….. No…….

I have also been well-informed about the role that I stand to play if I am to participate in this project, which is participating as a questionnaire respondent. I am also aware that participation is voluntary and I can choose to withdraw from the process at any stage without any consequences to my withdrawal.
Yes…….. No…….

I am aware that all information obtained from me in the course of this project will remain confidential and that my identity will be well guided in the case of any publication of the obtained information.
Yes…… No…….

I agree that all collected information will be kept with confidentiality and high security.
Yes…… No…….

----------------- ----------------- ----------------- -----------------
Initials       Signature       Date       Place

I Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu state that I have fully informed the above participant of the nature and purpose of my research and the demands involved in his/her participation. I also state that I will do all in my power to maintain confidentiality and anonymity of the participant as I fully keep to the ethical conduct requested of me as a researcher.

----------------- ----------------- ----------------- -----------------
Initials       Signature       Date       Place

285
APPENDIX 5: INTERVIEW GUIDE

UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

PART I
[The unstructured interviewing approach was chosen given the qualitative nature of the issues under investigation. There will be free discussions during the in-depth interviews.]

Please state your nationality and briefly describe your occupation before we start the interview.

PART II: GENERAL QUESTIONS

1. How familiar are you, in terms of your knowledge and experience, with intra-state conflicts?

2. What, in your view, are the meaningful distinctions (if any) between intra-state ethnic conflicts and intra-state religious conflicts?

3. How realistic, in your opinion, is the stance taken in principle by the Organization for African Unity (OAU)/African Union (AU) on the avoidance of secession as a solution to long-term conflicts? Please explain your answer.

4. Please comment on the AU’s reason/s for making an exception in the case of South Sudan.

5. South Sudan has been an autonomous state for approximately four years now. In your opinion:

   a) Is there evidence of success of secession? If so, please state reasons for your opinion.
   b) What is the evidence that to date the secession has failed to bring the desired results? What in your opinion are the reasons for failure?

PART III: SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

1. Given that Sudan attained political independence in 1956, and that independence was followed by over 30 years of intra-state conflict, what do you think were the main factors contributing to the longevity of the conflict?

2. Do you believe that the AU’s affirmative response to South Sudan’s request for autonomy from Sudan was the best available solution to the conflict? Please explain your answer.

3. Would you agree that a comprehensive national education programme for citizens about the implications of a YES or NO Vote is essential prior to a referendum? If you agree, please elaborate. If you disagree, please elaborate.
4. Intra-state conflicts in post-colonial Africa have often manifested themselves along ethnic identities and religious identities and have historically been very protracted. In your opinion how can seemingly intractable conflicts of this nature best be viably and sustainably resolved?

(a) Secession
(b) Federation
(c) Confederation
(d) Consociational Democracy
(e) Governments of National Unity (GNU)/Inclusive Governments (IG)
(f) Other (Please specify)

5. The secession of South Sudan in 2011 quite possibly will set a precedent in the resolution of similar intra-state conflicts in Africa. What do you consider to be the fundamental lessons that can be derived from the South Sudanese experience to date?

Please let the interviewer know if you have doubts about his questions, and feel free to ask for clarification.

If you have any other issues or information that you wish to express in relation to the conflict in Sudan and South Sudan, please feel free to do so

Thank you for taking your time to participate in this interview.
APPENDIX 6: QUESTIONNAIRE

UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Section A
1. Please state your designation and nationality by ticking the appropriate columns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Tick</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Embassy Official</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Professor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Lecturer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Researcher</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Analyst</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Journalist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Other (please specify……………………..)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section B
PART II: GENERAL QUESTIONS

1. How familiar are you, in terms of your knowledge and experience, with intra-state conflicts?
   ..................................................................................................................
   ..................................................................................................................

2. What, in your view, are the meaningful distinctions (if any) between intra-state ethnic conflicts and intra-state religious conflicts?
   ..................................................................................................................
   ..................................................................................................................
   ..................................................................................................................
   ..................................................................................................................
   ..................................................................................................................
   ..................................................................................................................

3. How realistic, in your opinion, is the stance taken in principle by the Organization for African Unity (OAU)/African Union (AU) on the avoidance of secession as a solution to long term conflicts? Please explain your answer.
   ..................................................................................................................
   ..................................................................................................................
   ..................................................................................................................
   ..................................................................................................................
   ..................................................................................................................
   ..................................................................................................................

4. Please comment on the AU’s reasons for making an exception in the case of South Sudan to accept South Sudan to decide whether it should secede or not.
   ..................................................................................................................
5. South Sudan has been an autonomous state for approximately six years now. In your opinion:
   a) Is there evidence of success of secession? If so, please state reasons for your opinion.
   ........................................................................................................................................
   ........................................................................................................................................
   ........................................................................................................................................
   ........................................................................................................................................

   b) What is the evidence that to date the secession has failed to bring the desired results? What in your opinion are the reasons for failure?
   ........................................................................................................................................
   ........................................................................................................................................
   ........................................................................................................................................
   ........................................................................................................................................

PART III: SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

1. Given that Sudan attained political independence in 1956, and that independence was followed by over 35 years of intra-state conflict, what do you think were the main factors contributing to the longevity of the conflict?
   ........................................................................................................................................
   ........................................................................................................................................
   ........................................................................................................................................

2. What is your opinion of the AU’s affirmative response to South Sudan’s requirement for autonomy from Sudan?
   ........................................................................................................................................
   ........................................................................................................................................
   ........................................................................................................................................

3. Would you agree that a comprehensive national education programme for citizens about the implications of a YES or NO Vote is essential before a referendum on secession?
   a) AGREE (please elaborate)
   ........................................................................................................................................
   ........................................................................................................................................
   ........................................................................................................................................
   ........................................................................................................................................

   b) DISAGREE (please elaborate)
   ........................................................................................................................................
4. Intra-state conflicts in post-colonial Africa have often manifested themselves along ethnic identities and religious identities and have historically been very protracted. In your opinion how can seemingly intractable conflicts of this nature best be viably and sustainably resolved in Africa? Please tick the appropriate box.

(a) Secession  
(b) Federation  
(c) Confederation  
(d) Consociational Democracy  
(e) Governments of National Unity (GNU)/Inclusive Governments (IG)  
(f) Other (Please specify) …………………………………...……………………

5. The secession of South Sudan in 2011 quite possibly will set a precedent in the resolution of similar conflicts in Africa. What do you consider to be the fundamental lessons that can be derived from the secession of South Sudan?

If you have doubts about the relevance or usefulness of this questionnaire, please feel free to express your opinion, or to ask the interviewer for clarity.  

If you have any other issues or information related to the conflict in Sudan and South Sudan that you need to put to my attention, please kindly state here  

Thank you for taking your time to answer this Questionnaire.