Analysis of the radicalisation of Islam: Case Studies from South Africa and the United Kingdom

By

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In the SCHOOL OF APPLIED HUMAN SCIENCES

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DECLARATION

This research has not been previously accepted for any degree and is not being currently considered for any other degree at any other university. I declare that this Dissertation contains my own work except where specifically acknowledged.

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Signed………………………………………..

Date…………………………………………..

25/08/2017
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ABSTRACT

Radicalisation is a problem to which no country is immune. It is a dramatic shift in behaviour and attitude that carries undesirable consequences such as the breakdown of families, communities, and democracies – with the ultimate consequence being terrorism.

The growing concern of Islamic radicalisation and the impact it can possibly have underscores the focus of the current study. It also speaks to issues around religious freedom and the broader fight against terrorism. It will be looking into the commonly cited causes of radicalisation and the psychological processes involved in an individual’s path to radicalism.

The research was approached from a constructionist orientation meaning that individuals shape their reality based on their beliefs and interactions with other people and the world. The study examines radicalisation within a paradigm focused on a combination of criminological and psychological principles, to produce a contextualised study on Islamic radicalisation. Case studies from South Africa and the United Kingdom will be assessed with the theoretical frameworks of Moghaddam’s Staircase to Terrorism (2005) and the Root Cause Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) to demonstrate the universality of the phenomenon of radicalisation.

The study rests on the idea of instrumental rationality found in rational choice theory with the objective of assessing South Africa’s risk to radicalisation based on micro and macro factors.

The research found that the factors, which result in radicalisation, are many and complex, and may not be reduced to a single cause. Although one factor that seems to play a very significant role is identity, more specifically the need to belong, be accepted and to have a purpose. In other words, the radical religious ideology provides vocabulary and a bolstered identity, whereas politics provide the stimulus. The ideology of the group is not as important as what the group is offering the individual in terms of acceptance and a platform for expression. This study, as previously stated is about Islamism due to global concern, although it could have been about any radical organisation or movement.

It is recommended that discussions about religion, identity, foreign policy and politics be encouraged especially amongst younger people. These discussions should not be
weakened by political correctness, or when a radical view is expressed, the fear of censure. All ideologies are, and should be open to questioning and investigation. The researcher understands that this topic may be misunderstood – implying that there is a heightened risk posed by specific groups. It is hoped that the substance of the study will prove otherwise, with the researcher maintaining a secular view throughout.

*Keywords:* Radicalisation, South Africa, Islamism, Radical
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### CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

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In accord with the historical chronicle of human atrocities: It requires conducive social conditions rather than monstrous people to produce atrocious deeds. Given appropriate social conditions, decent, ordinary people can be led to do extraordinarily cruel things.

(Bandura, 1999, p.200)
1. CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Islamist terrorism is a problem worldwide – the United States, France, Copenhagen, Baghdad, Nigeria, Afghanistan and Pakistan are a few of the many places which have experienced cases of Islamist inspired violence in 2015 alone. Given the nature of radicalisation and terrorism, no country should be considered immune. As Defence and Military Veterans Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula said “The truth is South African young people are being recruited by Isis (the Islamic State), and the reality is we must be vigilant – we must be alert” (Hans & Stolley, 2015). Echoing this sentiment is Police Minister Nkosinathi Nhleko, who stated “In today’s terms, there is no country in the world that is not vulnerable when it comes to issues of terrorism” (Merton, 2015).

This study will be organised around the following questions: What is radicalisation, what are the psychological processes involved in radicalisation, what makes an individual vulnerable to radicalisation, what the causal factors that could contribute to radicalisation among Muslims in South Africa are. The objective is to analyse South Africa’s risk to radicalisation based on micro and macro factors – from the individual, to the social and to the structural. It is better to study the phenomenon of radicalisation in this way, as all individuals have a different path towards radicalisation, and no pattern or profile can be applied universally (Aly, 2012). The study will be approached from a constructionist orientation and rely on the content analysis of four case studies from South Africa and the United Kingdom, as applied to Moghaddam’s Staircase to Terrorism model (2005) and the Velduis and Staun Root Cause model (2009) in order to illustrate the universality of the process of radicalisation.

Though there is contention amongst academics with regards to the definition of radicalisation (Borum, 2011; Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) - what can be agreed upon is that radicalisation is a process. The process can be viewed as socialisation leading to extremism, which may culminate in terrorism (Borum, 2011) – the point being, that one does not become a violent extremist overnight. Furthermore, not all radicals are terrorists, however all terrorists have gone through a process of radicalisation.
Essentially radicalisation is a fundamental change in a person’s belief system; therefore in order to understand how people progress from thoughts to action, we must look into what they think, and why they think it (Borum, 2011).

According to Solomon (2012) modern-day terrorism is largely driven by radical Islamist ideology. The words ‘Islamist’ and ‘Islamism’ are used instead of ‘Islam’, largely because the traditional ideas of Islam (harmony and tolerance) have been commandeered by a “twentieth-century totalitarian ideology that seeks to serve the narrow political ends of domination” (Solomon, 2013, p. 18). South Africa plays a large role in the global jihad network. Unfortunately many studies about radicalisation seem to focus on Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaed in North Africa (Solomon, 2013).

The study of radicalisation is important, as it is often viewed as a predictor of violent behaviours (Aly, 2012). The following chapter will discuss literature pertinent to the study of radicalisation.
CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review

2.1 Radicalisation

*What goes on before the bomb goes off* – (Neumann, 2008)

Research with regards to radicalisation often focuses on the radicalisation and subsequent terrorism, which is committed by a few known terrorists (Bartlett & Miller, 2011). Furthermore there is contention with regards to the definition of radicalisation. Neumann (2013) points out two areas related to the ambiguous definition of radicalisation. Firstly, there is the “end-point”, meaning the culmination of the radicalisation process. Some believe it to be purely cognitive where the individual holds radical ideas about society and governance. Whereas others believe it should be defined as a behavioural phenomenon and be acknowledged for its aspect of violence. One then must consider the link, if any, between cognitive radicalisation and behavioural radicalisation (Neumann, 2013). The process of radicalisation often starts when individuals are frustrated by their lives, government policies or society. The typical pattern involves them meeting other like-minded individuals, and together they go through phases that may ultimately result in terrorism (Precht, 2007; Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Moghaddam 2005).

Every individual’s path of radicalisation is different, and not all radicalised individuals become terrorists – however all terrorists go through a process of radicalisation. Therefore a distinction between radical beliefs and extremist action should be noted, because radical beliefs or ideologies are not necessary for violent action (Borum, 2011; Wilner & Dubouloz, 2011; Lakhani, 2013). “There is no inevitable link between (extremist) political beliefs and (violent) political action, and [the] two phenomena should therefore be studied separately” (Neumann, 2013, p.879). Cognitive radicalisation (adopting a radical viewpoint) should not be conflated with behavioural radicalisation (viewing and utilizing violence as a solution or statement) (Aly, 2012), however cognitive radicalisation is one pathway to behavioural radicalisation (Neumann, 2013). The second ambiguity is related to context and normativity. The concept of radicalisation is highly contextual and in most situations one would have to consider what it is radical in relation to. The concept of what is “radical” is dependent on what is normative. One may compare the
definitional ambiguities to that of terrorism however, “with terrorism, there is an objectively definable core—a violent tactic, sometimes a strategy, which can be distinguished from other means and modes of pursuing violent conflict. Radicalisation, by contrast, is inherently context-dependent, and its meaning will always be contested” (Neumann, 2013, p.878).

Waldmann (2010) notes that the word “radicalisation” is derived from the Latin word *radix*, which means “roots”. With this understanding, one derives that a radical seeks to solve their problem by going to the root cause of said problem. An individual who may be considered radical questions the status quo and tries to replace it by means of reaction or revolution. These individuals act in accordance with absolute truth with regards to an ideology or religion and make no acceptance for restrictions or concessions. Radicalised individuals are not willing to hear counter-arguments or take into consideration the social context in which they attempt to spread their ideology. Essentially there are two sides – those who prescribe to the radical view (friends and followers) and those who do not (non-believers or enemies) (Waldmann, 2010).

According to Bartlett and Miller (2011) being radical involves rejection of the status quo, not necessarily in a violent way. *Radicalism comprises the possibility of violent action but should not be equated with violence. It is first of all a psychological syndrome and construct, an attitude* (Waldmann, 2010, p.8). Radicalisation generally has two approaches – the pursuit of goals through violence, or trying to obtain far-reaching goals in society not necessarily with the use of violence. Therefore a distinction is drawn between ‘radicalised’ and ‘radical’ – the latter not carrying negative connotations (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009; Lakhani, 2013). Some radicals may support terrorism while others do not and advise against it. In their study, Bartlett and Miller (2011) compared samples of violent radicals with non-violent radicals. They examined the following factors; political, social, and personal characteristics, ideology, religious concepts and beliefs, the emotional pull of joining the jihad (simply understood as ‘holy war’ however according to Silke (2008) it is far more complex. The phrase comes from the Arabic word for ‘struggle’ and there are two types of jihad: the Greater and the Lesser, referring to those who struggle to live a life of charity guided by Gods commands and those who are involved in the violent struggle on behalf of Islam, respectively. Those involved in the Lesser jihad are also
known as **Mujahideen** (holy warriors), adventure, status and peer pressure. Their results suggested that violent radicalisation is not necessarily a religious, rational, or intellectual choice. There seems to be an emotional pull towards joining the crusade against the West. It exemplifies the counter-cultural and anti-establishment traditions adopted by many youth subcultures. Furthermore, in-group pressure as well as the acquisition of respect and personal meaning seem to play a role (Bartlett & Miller, 2011). Awan (2013) proposed that radicalisation is influenced by a culture of violence whereby people seek to re-enact those feelings and perceptions of anger and hate. Slootman and Tillie (2006) assert that young people are particularly at risk to radicalisation at “fracture points” (p.51) in their life, for example the death of a family member. Essentially young people desire acceptance, encouragement and confidence in oneself. When they lack any of these features, they may develop a negative self-concept that changes their attitude to society. When individuals become defensive and rigid, they may retreat into their own groups and increase their risk of victimisation and alienation. According to their study radicalisation is largely limited to individuals between fifteen and their late twenties. The reasoning for this is that young people want to be accepted so discrimination and exclusion have a greater affect on them as opposed to older people who want to carry on with their lives.

Kruglanski, Gelfand, Bélanger, Sheveland, Hetiarachchi and Gunaratna (2014) assert that radicalisation involves a move towards supporting or sanctioning radical behaviour. Radical behaviour may be viewed as behaviour against the norm, or behaviour that undermines what is important or meaningful to most people. Radicalism is therefore seen as *counter final*, meaning the behaviour may serve individual desires, but at a price (personally or to others) (Kruglanski et al., 2014). For example: a suicide bomber may attain their desire for significance or personal meaning (Post, 2010) by taking the lives of others.

Wilner and Dubouloz (2011) view radicalisation as a psychological and emotional process, as well as a personal and interpersonal process whereby individuals embrace religious, political or social ideals. Furthermore, the attainment of the aforementioned ideals may justify the use of violence. The authors stress the importance of radicalisation being a learning process whereby an individual internalises and rationalises certain ideas. Essentially radicalisation would constitute a fundamental
change in one’s belief system. Furthermore it is not always negative – one could be radical by wanting to return to a purer form of religion. This radical behaviour becomes a problem when it is combined with intolerance, segregation and the promotion of violence. However not all individuals who radicalise – even if they vocally support the use of violence – partake in violent action themselves, herein lies the critical distinction (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2011).

Lakhani (2013) is in agreement with Wilner and Dubouloz (2011). He asserts that radicalisation is a process whereby individuals change their attitudes, values, beliefs and actions; and relinquish one worldview for another. Furthermore, this change will involve them going through a process whereby their perception of their social and personal identity will change. Al-Lami (2009) builds on this idea, viewing radicalisation as a gradual transition from one condition to another – a growing of readiness to support and pursue changes in society that may conflict with democratic order (Al-Lami, 2009; Slootman & Tillie, 2006).

Slootman and Tillie (2006) expand on the idea of radicalisation in striving for changes in society, by speaking of it in terms of legitimacy. Radicalisation decreases legitimacy in a democratic society, whereby radicalised violence (extremism) is viewed as the antithesis of democracy. Democracy is based on ideas of equality and freedom, whereas extremism rejects the values of democracy and presents its own ideology. Legitimacy is based on the confidence citizens have in their political system and government - citizens need to know that their basic needs are catered for, and problems dealt with. Legitimacy is necessary for democracy to prosper. It is not necessary for all citizens to accept and display democratic values, but a large portion of the population should. Therefore one could look at radicalisation as “a process through which individuals are exposed to, and ultimately adopt, a violent ideology justifying attacks against the state” (Rappaport, Veldhuis & Guiora, 2012). In this understanding, radicalisation is the process of alienating oneself form society – a process of de-legitimisation. The process is characterised by mistrust of the political and social situation, where individuals lose confidence in their government, and retreat to their own groups looking for a (sometimes extreme and violent) solution in pursuit of change. This extreme behaviour is the “polar opposite of democracy” (Slootman & Tillie, 2006, p.22).
Savun and Phillips (2009) note that states, which are actively involved in international politics, have the potential to create resentment abroad, becoming the targets of those who prefer an isolationist foreign policy. Their findings suggest that democracies are not necessarily more vulnerable to terrorism, it is dependent upon how they interact with other states in the international system – participation in crisis events, assisting and intervening in civil wars and alliances with the US increase a state’s vulnerability to transnational terrorism.

Joffé (2011) notes that the conditions often cited for encouraging Islamic radicalism include social isolation, poor political and personal aspirations and unemployment. Precht (2007) has divided the factors which influence radicalisation into three categories – background, trigger and opportunity factors. Background factors consist of personal trauma, issues surrounding identity, discrimination, relative deprivation and alienation. Trigger factors are those incidents that are provocative in nature – unhappiness with foreign policy, a desire for activism and sometimes the presence of a charismatic leader. Lastly, opportunity factors include locations for individuals to meet like-minded people, such as Mosques, prisons, schools, cafes, universities, and the Internet (Precht, 2007). The difficulty lies in assessing why only some individuals exposed to these factors are driven to violence. Though there are many factors, which could contribute to the radicalisation of an individual, the reason why some are affected negatively and others not, is far more complex (Precht, 2007; Veldhuis & Staun, 2009; Joffé, 2011).

Radicalisation can be viewed as a sociological phenomenon where issues such as belonging, identity, group dynamics and values are important elements in the transformation process. Religion plays an important role, but for some it rather serves as a vehicle for fulfilling other goals. A common denominator seems to be that the involved persons are at a cross road in their life and wanting a cause (Precht, 2007, p.7).

Slootman and Tillie (2006) recognise that radicalisation is not “characteristic of ‘irrational madmen’” (Slootman & Tillie, 2006, p.4). In their study on the potential radicalisation processes of Muslims in Amsterdam, they posit two possible reasons for radicalisation. The first reason may be an orthodox religious stance and the second
being the idea that politics and society, respond and deal with matters relating to Muslims and Islam in a threatening or unjust fashion. The most critical conclusion they have drawn from their research is that the religious and political dimensions of radicalisation are independent of each other. In other words, orthodoxy does not necessarily lead to political dissatisfaction, thereby increasing the risk of radicalisation (Slootman & Tillie, 2006).

According to Alonso, Bjørgo, Della Porta, Coolsaet, Khosrokhavar, Lohlker, Ranstorp, Reinares, Schmid, Silke, Taarnby and Vries (2008), one must further inspect the term “violent radicalisation” which encompasses embracing ideas and views that could lead to terrorism. This term may cause confusion as the socialisation does not need to be violent – furthermore committing acts of violence as well accepting violence as a rational option may both be construed as violent radicalisation. The term “radicalisation” may also be problematic in its relationship to “radicalism” (which is an expression of political thought – associated with left and right-wing political parties).

According to Miller (2013) the words “radical”, “terrorist” and “extremist” are used as if they were synonymous. Furthermore, “extremist” is automatically assumed to infer the acceptance, encouragement and action of violence. By using the aforementioned concepts interchangeably one risks implying that individuals who are radicalised become terrorists. According to Neumann (2008, p.8) extremism may be defined as:

political ideologies that are opposed to a society’s core values and principles, which – in the context of European liberal democracies – could be said of any ideology that advocates racial or religious supremacy and/or opposes the core principles of democracy and human dignity. The expression can also be used to describe the methods through which political actors attempt to realise their aims, that is, by using means that ‘show disregard for the life, liberty, and human rights of others’. In the absence of a consensus, it makes sense to qualify the concept – where necessary – by adding the appropriate adjective, that is, ‘violent extremism’ or ‘ideological extremism’

According to Borum (2011) ideologies and actions are sometimes linked, not always. Like Neumann (2008) he argues as to whether one should separate ‘extremism’ from
‘violent extremism’, suggesting that the former may not be of importance to safety and security given its lack of support for, and encouragement of violent actions.

Radicalisation according to Neumann (2008, p.6) is “about the change in attitude that may lead individuals to embrace extra-constitutional methods of bringing about political change, including – ultimately – the use of violence”. For the purposes of this study the term “radicalisation” will be understood as socialisation into extremism, where if it is violent extremism, it **may** manifest into terrorism.

The feared end result of radicalisation is terrorism (violent extremism). Terrorism is a complex phenomenon, and can be viewed as a crisis event that is traumatic in nature (Waldman, Carmeli & Halevi, 2011). According to Richards (2014, p.230) “terrorism is the use of violence or the threat of violence with the primary purpose of generating a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims or object of attack for a political motive”, therefore terrorism can be seen as meaningful communication enacted through violence (Meloy & Yakeley, 2014). Terrorism has existed before the dawn of recorded history. However there are specific trends, which have changed the nature and extent of the threat, such as the ease travel, and accessibility to information that has allowed like-minded individuals to connect and spread their extremist ideology (Victoroff, 2005). It is fundamentally about the systematic inducement of terror aimed at civilians as a means of intimidation, committed within a religious, political or philosophical context (Danilović & Manojlović, 2013). Terrorism may be viewed as a goal specific activity, and should be (regardless of its success) viewed as different from radicalisation. Participation in terror activities, according to Staun (2008) requires an active, mindful decision, as opposed to radicalisation, which is a gradual process without a clearly defined beginning and end. Radicalisation is a process whereby the state of mind, attitude and behaviour shift, which serve a less specified function.

There is a lack of consensus in the academic world with regards to a definition for terrorism. It is difficult to form a universal definition due to this phenomenon’s heterogeneous nature. Defining terrorism is a complex phenomenon as “Today’s terrorist is tomorrow’s freedom fighter” (Onwudiwe, 2005). One would have to take into account the varied assumed and stated motivations, psychopathology or lack thereof, as well as the point of view. However there are two universal elements.
Firstly, the use of violence against non-combatants/civilians, and secondly the goal of the perpetrator may be to influence and change a target audience’s behaviour to suit the terrorist (Victoroff, 2005).

There is a need to discuss why ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) is so successful. According to Coolsaet (2015) is currently one of the most successful Jihadist groups. He asserts that the Western media helps IS build its reputation as an unstoppable force by emphasizing their threat to Western world. By doing this, they are unknowingly increasing the appeal of IS – representing them as winners – and if one were to be a part of that, one would also be a winner. As mentioned earlier, there are some individuals who want to be known as heroes, and this image attracts many young fighters. He argues further that IS seems to offer a solution for any personal motivation and individual may have. IS offers a sense of belonging, respect, comradery, adventure, acknowledgment, heroism and martyrdom. There are some who are given an alternative to petty crime and drug use, as well as being part of a society that has very clear rules and roles, including moral absolutes. For others, there is wealth, dominance over others and perhaps even sadism all within the name of a higher goal.

Troubled young men thereby imagine a land where they can start anew, commanding respect as upholders of God’s law. Unhappy women dream of attaining happiness for the first time – or the second or third, if husbands they take are lucky enough to achieve martyrdom. The fantasies ignore a very vicious reality, of course – but as long as thwarted personalities imagine that ISIS can make them true, people will kill and die in their pursuit (Kadri, 2015).

IS will continue to grow in strength if they maintain their territories and position in the media spotlight. With this understanding, they may only become more brazen and brutal only to guarantee attention and entice new recruits (Coolsaet, 2015). One may attempt to restrict travel and control propaganda, which may be counterproductive, because they may be actively seeking the information. Furthermore, one may also consider it to be a community and family issue (Kadri, 2015). According to Nawaz (2011) Islamism may be viewed as a social movement, an agent of change, due to its
main goal of spreading ideas and creating the demand for change. Social movements such as Islamism depend on narratives, ideas, charismatic leaders and symbolism. By taking advantage of a globalized world, radical groups have developed trans-national identities based upon trans-national ideas and narratives. While many are stuck with a nation-state mind-set, these radical groups have developed an identity that is not based a nationality or ethnicity, but rather ideas that form loyalties between people all over the world – they have evolved into a global brand that appeals to the youth in particular (Nawaz, 2011). Like other movements, propaganda offered by Islamist organisation such as ISIS offer an alternative way of living, and capture the imaginations of their target audience. Brutality is often seen in the footage, however the idea of utopianism is also prevalent. Social media has become the “radical mosque” of the globalized world. Radicalisation generally begins offline, with online material serving and nurturing the curious minds. Individuals are not radicalized with propaganda – the propaganda concentrates an already held sympathy (Winter, 2015). Furthermore, the reason the Islamist narrative is successful, according to Nawaz (2011), is due to political correctness and the fear of challenging ideas that are in stark contrast to a democratic way of life. Ideas matter. But let us not forget that there are good ideas and bad ideas. Currently bad ideas are fighting harder for survival. Most who become terrorists, genuinely believe they are righteous. They dedicate their lives for their cause, and are fully prepared to die for it (Nawaz, 2011).

In summation radicalisation may be viewed as a process of alienation, characterised by distrust of the social and political system and may view, or support acts of terror as a viable option.

There are various ideologies found within radical Islam, offering ideas, support and group membership.

2.2 Ideologies

The central message of the radicals is that Islam is threatened and that it is the duty of every true believer to do something about it. Extremists think that all means are justified to achieve this goal (Slootman & Tillie, 2006, p.28).

Kruglanski et al. (2014) assert that social bonds and ideology are related and important to each other. This is because some type of social bond will bring individuals into contact with an ideology (which is a shared reality). According to
Kruglanski et al. (2014) there are generally three elements, which make up a terrorism-justifying ideology: grievance, a culprit and an effective method (terrorism) of relieving the dishonour caused by said culprit. McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) note that ideology is often seen as the driving force behind political radicalisation and action, however they view this as being too simplistic to fully understand the process of radicalisation.

According to Bale (2013) there are different beliefs or perspectives with regards to the Islamist ideology and its role in the perpetration of jihadist violence. Firstly, there is the belief that ideology and religious doctrine do not effect or influence the behaviour of terrorists, whereby other factors such as psychology, politics and economics amongst other factors are responsible. The second view is that religious doctrine and Islamist ideology sometimes affect the behaviour of terrorists. The third, he argues, is that Islamist ideology and religious doctrine do affect terrorist behaviour, however it is best not to admit this. Nawaz (2016) takes the middle ground with regards to the above –

The Crusaders weren't pious. But they had something to do with Christianity, right? Right? That something was the desire impious religious peasants had for martyrdom and the religious promise of redemption that Pope Urban II gave them. Now switch out white Christians with brown Muslims and kindly cease with this bigotry of low expectations. This has something to do with Islam… No terrorist represents the values of all Muslims, of course, but we have allowed hard-line Islamism to permeate our communities and mobilise the vulnerable. To stop it we have to make it less attractive, and that is a long-term struggle, similar to those against racism, homophobia and anti-Semitism. So please stop denying the nature of jihadism. Please stop ignoring the narratives which drive these attacks. Instead of aiding extremists who insist Islam today is perfect, perhaps you should aid us beleaguered reformist Muslims who are attempting to address this crisis within Islam against all the odds.

Slootman and Tillie (2006) summarise the convictions that characterise Islamic radicalisation are firstly, a perception that Islam is threatened. Secondly, marginalisation is partly the doing of the political elite therefore resistance to them is
justified, and thirdly, the religious leaders who condone this situation are guilty of treason to the faith. Fourthly, there must be a return to the religion through a literal interpretation of the Quran whereby, fifthly, this religion is viewed as superior and should form the basis of society and its principles. Lastly, true believers should play an active role in bringing about this change in society. The next three convictions take radicalism towards Islamic extremism- the realisation that a utopian society is the ideal goal; pursuing this goal by any means necessary (violence included) and the activists see themselves as combatants whereby the ‘enemy’ is demonised (Slootman & Tillie, 2006).

2.2.1 Islamism

The Islamist ideology is based on the premise that Muslims are falling behind the West because they are not ‘good’ Muslims. In order to live a fulfilling and meaningful life they should therefore adhere to Shari’a. Shari’a is sacred law that regulates almost every aspect of an individual’s life. The law can be challenging to follow as it is usually in contrast to Western norms and modern practice. The Islamist ideology seeks a life based purely on Shari’a, whilst rejecting all influences of the West (customs, values, politics and philosophy) (Pipes, 2000). Mozaffari (2007, p.21) defines Islamism as “a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final aim is the conquest of the world by all means”. Timmerman, Hutsebaut, Mels, Nonneman and Van Herck (2007) similarly view Islamism as an ideology that aims to appropriate the political space by using religious resources and social action to orchestrate acts of terrorism. “Islam does not recognize the secular concept of separation between state and religion. Political Islam has two objectives which are closely linked: establishing solidarity with the umma and restoring Muslim political regimes under the authority of the Caliphate” (Joffé, 2011, p.95).

Islamists are selective in their interpretation and choice of Islamic principles and sources. Furthermore Islamists see the western world as repressive and immoral as it does not adhere to Islamic law or principles; Islam is not the dominant political power and non-Muslims occupy what Muslims consider to be their territory, for example: Palestine and Kashmir. To rid themselves of these unwanted conditions, Islamists see two options. Firstly, the restoration of the world to the ‘Medina model’, in other words society as it was shaped by Muhammed and secondly, the establishment of a
2.2.2 Salafism

In order to understand Salafism, one must understand why modelling the Salaf (ancestors) is important to the Muslim population. In normative Islam the best display of faith was to follow the example of Muhammad. The teachings and life of Muhammad are of central importance to the religion of Islam. These teachings and way of life were mediated to the world via Muhammad’s companions and the first few generations of Muslims. Therefore Salafism is considered the purest and most esteemed form of Islam to follow (Durie, 2013).

Jihadi-Salafism is a movement with global reach, which commenced in an armed struggle to defend the umma (community of believers), based on a selective interpretation of Islam and its history. Violence is a defining characteristic of this movement and like other religious movements there is internal division (Karagiannis, 2014). Egerton (2011) advises that Salafism be understood in terms of the religious and the political, whereby militant Salafism can be seen as a means of defending the Muslim community from aggression and crimes against Islam. A lot of the Salafist narrative is drawn from the perceived suffering and persecution of the Muslim community, inflicted by the West. Many militants then see violence as a rational choice (Egerton, 2011).

It is important to grasp that Salafism is a reform movement in the sense that it aims to bring Muslims back to the purity of Islam's origins. It is overtly anti-Western to its bootstraps because it opposes everything which is not based upon the 'best example' of Muhammad, and it explicitly rejects appeal to intellectual concepts associated with western thought, whether from economics, education, ethics or politics (Durie, 2013).

It must be noted that while there are Muslims who suffer deprivation and violence at the hand of non-Muslims – each situation must be evaluated in its own capacity, not simply reduced to blaming the West and its people. “Marshalling partial truths and some legitimate grievances, militant Salafists assume for all Muslims the role of victims, and for all non-Muslims the role of aggressor” (Egerton, 2011, p.13). There
are those militants who cite the religion of Islam as an explanation for their acts. The religion of Islam is not at fault in this regard; rather it is the misinterpretation of the scripture. The *ayat*, which militants often cite, is a misinterpretation, which occurs often with religious understandings that depend on historical lessons and the interpretation of text. The text should be read within context and with reference to the lesson trying to be taught. Militant Salafism is therefore informed by religion but shaped with political understanding (Egerton, 2011).

### 2.2.3 Wahhabism

Wahhabism is essentially a form of Salafism; with ‘Wahhabi’ being used a label mainly by non-Muslims to refer to the official religious ideology of Saudi Arabia – Saudi Salafism (Durie, 2013). Wahhabism is a puritanical form of Islam, with its’ name being derived from Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1791), an Islamic scholar. He was frustrated by the moral decline of society and encouraged a return to the pure and orthodox practice of Islam as stipulated by the Quran and the life of Prophet Muhammad (Armanios, 2003). Armanios (2003, p.1) defines Wahhabism as “a movement that seeks to purify the Islamic religion of any innovations or practices that deviate from the seventh-century teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions”.

Many Wahhabists and Salafists do not condone or support terrorist behaviour, and secondly citing ideology alone as the cause for radicalisation and terrorist action is the idea that thoughts are the same as actions. Furthermore, ideology alone cannot be generalised to all forms of terrorism.

### 2.2.4 The Profile of an Islamist

Many studies on Islamic extremism have not yielded a universal profile that can be used to identify potential terrorists. Results have shown terrorists to be more ‘normal’ as opposed to pathological – anyone could be a terrorist (Al-Lami, 2009; McCauley, Moskalenko, & Van Son, 2013). Despite the difficulties in forming a universal profile there are a few commonalities, one of which being that the Muslim youth involved in extremist violence are religious novices – they may be new to the religion, be born-again Muslims or converts, who have a superficial understanding of Islam. Due to their insufficient and superficial knowledge they are unable to assess the legitimacy of
the interpretation of Islam they receive via religious leaders or text, which makes them vulnerable to radicalisation and extremist violence (Al-Lami, 2009). According to Roy (2008; Lynch, 2013) Islamic radicalisation is a generational phenomenon – a youth movement. He asserts that explanations based on poverty, integration, or racism are not specific enough. Accordingly he sees radicalisation as more of a psychological matter than a social or economic problem, because radicalisation tends to occur in small groups (such as friends, at a university or even prison). Furthermore he views the Western-based Islamic radicals as a lost generation – separated from tradition and culture whilst being frustrated that Western society does not meet their expectations (Roy, 2008). Coolsaet (2015) notes that the young foreign fighters of today are a product of the society they live in. He asserts that the young people of the 21st century experience more pressure than that of their parents approximately forty years ago. At a much earlier age, young people of today are have to make decisions and are given more choices in every aspect of life. Essentially the youth of today have demanding lives. They are also struggling with their identity, which has now been given the label of ‘teen angst’, however they have very little in terms of reference as the environment has changed so dramatically.

With regards to Africa, specifically Nigeria and Boko Haram, a study by Onuoha (2014) suggests that unemployment, poverty, weak familial structures and illiteracy make young men vulnerable to radicalisation and terrorist recruitment. Travelling preachers communicate an extreme version of religious texts and portray the government as weak and dishonest – this allows armed groups to recruit and train vulnerable individuals. Freddes, Mann and Doosje (2015) conducted a longitudinal evaluation of resilience training as a means of preventing violent radicalisation. The sample consisted of 46 young Muslim adults (male and female) with a migrant background. Results showed that training significantly increased their sense of agency. A small increase was found in self-esteem, perspective taking, empathy, but also narcissism. Attitudes towards violent ideology and personal violent intentions decreased. These results suggest empowering individuals and bolstering their ability to empathise can prove to be successful in countering violent radicalisation.

For the purposes of this paper Islamic radicalisation or Islamism will be used to refer to any extreme understanding/version of Islam with a violent ideology.
The following section will discuss various phase models and ideas about the processes and steps involved in radicalisation. These models will illustrate that although there are many ideas about the path towards radicalisation – each of these share commonalities that give insight into the process.

2.3 Phase Models

2.3.1 Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) Four Stage Model of Radicalisation

Silber and Bhatt (2007) propose a four-stage model of radicalisation. The steps consist of pre-radicalisation, self-identification, indoctrination and jihadisation. Each step is unique and individuals need not follow the steps in a linear manner and they may abandon the process at any stage. They assert that individuals who complete the entire process will most likely be involved in the planning or execution of a terrorist act. Pre-radicalisation is the phase before the individual is exposed to the jihadi-Salafi ideology (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

The self-identification phase is where individuals are influenced by a variety internal and external factors leading to the exploration of Salafi Islam. This religious seeking and homophile is often the result of social, political, economic or personal crises. The indoctrination phase is where the individuals beliefs intensify and they accept the radical ideology that militant jihad (holy war) is required to support their cause. Jihadisation is the final phase and occurs in a few months or weeks (whereas the other three may take years). In this phase the individual accepts their duty to participate in jihad, and proceed with planning, preparation and execution. There is no universal profile that can assist in the identification of an individual who is vulnerable to radicalisation. These individuals are often unexceptional; rather the search for identity and a cause is commonplace (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

2.3.2 Borum's Four-Stage Model of the Terrorist Mind-set

Borum (2003) proposed a four-stage model to aid investigators in analysing and assessing the behaviours and activities of individuals and groups associated with extremist ideas. The process begins by identifying a situation or condition as unjust (“It’s Not Right”). An economic condition such as unemployment or poor living conditions, or a social problem such as a restriction of freedom can be viewed as
unjust conditions. Thereafter the identified condition is framed as an injustice, meaning that it does not apply to everyone (“It’s Not Fair”). The next step involves blaming this injustice upon a nation, policy or person, vilifying them (It’s Your Fault”). The last step is making them responsible for the injustice and facilitate the justification of violence (“You’re Evil”). Violence can be justified when it is aimed at ‘bad’ people, furthermore extremists label the chosen party as ‘evil’, which dehumanises them. Violence is justified further, because people who see themselves as suffering or unfairly treated, do not see their actions as ‘bad’ (Borum, 2003).

2.3.3 Wiktorowicz’s al-Muhajiroun model

Wiktorowicz (2004) identifies four main processes that increase the likelihood of an individual being attracted to and eventually joining a radical Islamic group. The first process is ‘cognitive opening’ whereby an individual becomes open to the idea of a new worldview or new ideas (Wiktorowicz, 2004). This opening occurs when the security of an individual’s existence is threatened by personal or social events, which trigger the individual to search for new meaning (Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009). The second process is ‘religious seeking’ whereby an individual searching for meaning through religion. The third process is called ‘frame alignment’; this is where the public representation of the radical group makes sense to the individual and aligns with their beliefs. The last process is ‘socialisation’ where the individual undergoes changes in the value system, identity and experiences religious lessons which aid indoctrination.

If an individual is not open to new ideas, does not encounter the movement message, or rejects the movement message after initial exposure, he or she will not participate in the kinds of movement activities necessary to fully disseminate the ideology and convince an individual to join (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p.1).

This study shows that individuals do not join extremist groups or terrorist organisations easily. Membership is preceded by a process of events whereby emotions are directed by individual experiences of the socio-political environment. The behaviour of radicalised individuals who later turn to terrorism, is inherently referential – they are not shamed, they are shamed by someone or something (Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009).
2.3.4 Precht’s Conversion to Terrorism Model

Precht’s (2007) four-stage model includes pre-radicalisation, conversion and identification, conviction and indoctrination and lastly, action. It is assumed that these are the typical steps in the radicalisation process. The four phases are separated yet they do overlap. There is no linear progression associated with this process, there is no definite time allocation to this process, and furthermore individuals may exit and re-enter at any phase – or stop altogether, without resolving the process with terrorist action.

Phase One: Pre-radicalisation
This phase describes the background factors which make an individual vulnerable to radicalisation – this includes a variety of factors such as perceived injustice, relative deprivation, family and friends, alienation, living conditions etcetera. Many people are exposed to the aforementioned background factors, however only a few become radicalised. Therefore, these background factors may not explain why a minority and not the majority of people become radicalised – they do however, provide a general idea of the common backgrounds where radicalisation takes place. Some individuals may not be of the Islamic faith at this stage (Precht, 2007).

Phase Two: Conversion and Identification
Precht (2007) acknowledges the importance of a shift in an individual’s religious identity at this stage. They may adopt a religious identity, adopt a radical interpretation of religion from a previously normal observance, or shift from one faith to another. This stage is greatly influenced by individuals who are frustrated with their lives, politics or international events. They are seeking answers and often radical Islam offers solutions. Individuals start to shape their identity around their newly found faith and show an increased social commitment (wearing traditional Muslim clothing where previously there was no inclination). According to Iannaccone (2006, p.3):

Religious extremism typically manifests itself in distinctive dress and grooming, restrictive diet, voluntary poverty, ceaseless worship, communal living, rigorous chastity, liberal charity, and aggressive proselytizing. Such behaviour may strike outsiders as bizarre and irritating, or even fanatical and
illegal, but rarely does it involve violence, much less murder…extremist
groups of all kinds display similar attributes, experience similar problems, and
adopt similar strategies
The prospect of being part of something bigger than oneself and import is a major
contributing factor towards the radicalisation process (Precht, 2007).

Phase Three: Conviction and Indoctrination
In this phase of the process, individuals begin to distance themselves from their
former life and immerse themselves further into radical Islam. Overseas travel and
training camps facilitate group bonding. Individuals fully accept the ideology of
Islamism and begin to view violence as a legitimate and necessary means to advance
the cause of radical Islam. Identification with likeminded individuals and/or a
charismatic religious leader can heavily influence the process of radicalisation
(Precht, 2007).

Phase Four: Action
This last phase is where the target selection, planning and implementation takes place.
In this phase, each individual accepts their responsibility to partake in the terrorist act.
This part of the process is relatively short (compared to the rest of the radicalisation
process). Group bonding is intensified by further alienation from their previous life,
as well as training and overseas travel. Individuals become more orientated towards
fulfilling the goals of the group, and seek moral support for their actions from the
Internet or extremist media (Precht, 2007).

According to McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) the study of mass psychology is
needed to understand radicalisation. Individuals who are involved in terrorist violence
depend on others sympathising and supporting their cause or grievance.

All people operate on their own internal “map” of reality… If people
understand their opponents’ “maps,” it becomes easier to understand and to
anticipate their actions (Borum, 2003, p.8)

According to Sik Hung Ng (2005) there is a psychological need for individuals to
verify and enhance the value of their self-concept. They will do so, by individual or
collective means, even if it means committing emotional or physical harm to others. Though it may be simplistic, the self may be analysed as consisting of the personal identity and the social identity in order to analyse intergroup behaviour. The personal identity is formed by individual successes and failures, personality traits and experiences that form a unique individual. The social identity is formed by group membership (willingly or externally imposed). This membership carries social emotional meaning that defines the individual as part of a collective. When the group an individual identifies with is undermined, shamed or devalued, they feel personally hurt. Sometimes people are willing to go to war, or sacrifice themselves in order to elevate the status of the group (Sik Hung Ng, 2005).

2.3.5 McCauley and Moskalenko: Individual Radicalisation

McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) identified seven mechanisms of radicalisation at an individual level: personal grievance, group grievance, slippery slope, love, risk and status seeking, and unfreezing.

Personal Grievance

With regards to personal grievance, Individuals may commit acts of political violence because they believe they or those they love have been treated unfairly. It rests upon the premise that when a wrong is committed, there is a need for justice or revenge. Justice meaning the wrongdoers should be punished, whereas revenge implies the wronged party should be the one doing the punishing. The core emotion underpinning revenge and justice is anger – directed at the cause of the injustice. Anger can originate through the perception of insult or injustice leading to the desire for revenge. On the other hand people who have had to experience pain, frustration and discrimination may have an increased and undiscerning aggression.

Group Grievance

Group grievance involves identifying with others (a common human behaviour) and caring about their wellbeing. Positive identification means that one wants the others which one identifies with to be happy and safe, and do not want them to suffer. Negative identification is the inverse – one desires the other to fail or be endangered, rather than prosper. Individuals can identify and care for groups they are not part of,
individuals (celebrities) or groups (sports teams) they do not know in a personal capacity and companion animals (McCausley & Moskalenko, 2011). According to Wright-Neville and Smith (2009) identity has no spatial boundaries. One does not need to be in close proximity to the group or individual they identify with. People can become politically and emotionally engaged with individuals and events that are taking place outside the space or environment. Furthermore, emotional attachment is not restricted to an individual’s nation of origin or its people. Individuals can have multiple loyalties, which extend beyond nations, and this varies depending on the issue at hand and the individual (Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009). A great deal of money, time and emotions are spent on ensuring the welfare of groups that one identifies with. Personal and group grievances are often related, in that the personal and political reasons for anger are soon joined (McCausley & Moskalenko, 2011).

**Slippery Slope**

The slippery slope encompasses individuals doing something they do not necessarily want to do. Milgram’s ‘Obedience to Authority’ is an example of such behaviour. Milgram’s study (1963) focused on the affect of authority on obedience. The study aimed to measure the willingness of an individual, instructed by an authority figure to commit acts that were in conflict with their conscience. The study consisted of a subject (volunteer), a learner (confederate) and a teacher (the experimenter/position of authority). Subjects were to give an electrical shock to learners for each wrong answer given in the test. Though some were hesitant to continue with the test due to the pained sounds coming from the learners – the authority figure instructed them to continue, and not to worry as they would not be held responsible – some did so even after the learners had gone quiet (Milgram, 1963). This experiment provides an example of cognitive dissonance whereby humans change their opinions to fit their behaviour; and try to justify their behaviour in order to excuse it. In this case, it wasn’t their fault if anything happened to the learners because the authority figure had told them to continue. Furthermore, the levels of electric shock were in small increments, with each shock forming a justification for the next. “…they nevertheless proceeded to commit progressively more violent acts because a person of authority told them to do so and because the slippery slop of closely graded violent behaviours made it hard to find a place to stop” (McCausley & Moskalenko, p. 155). Terrorist groups rely on the nature of the slippery slope in order to desensitize people to
violence via a slow escalation of assignments. Waller (2007) asserts that killing is easier when there is a distance between victim and perpetrator. As the range between victim and perpetrator shortens, killing becomes more difficult. Distance should not be understood purely as a physical construct, it is also a psychological and moral construct. Therefore distance can also imply the perpetrators perceptions of the victim.

Love, Risk and Status Seeking
Love for friends and family can often pull individuals into the process of radicalisation. Furthermore individuals are often recruited via personal relationships and connections they have to existing members – this is because they are working around the idea of trust. They need to reduce the chance of members betraying them to the authorities. Trust is often a determining factor with regards to who will be recruited – but love is often the determinant of who joins. After becoming a member of a radical group, cohesion within the group is likely to increase due to the escalation of common goals and threats (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011).
Risk and status seeking is most common amongst young men and boys, as it is seen as a fast route to money and respect. By engaging in high-risk activities a man displays bravery, strength and appears self-assured.

Unfreezing
Unfreezing refers to the loss of assurance in relationships and everyday routines, for example a parent dying. Unfreezing is a state of personal crisis and disconnection that leaves the individual with less to lose, and in search of new pathways (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011).

2.3.6 Conclusion
There are many different ideas about the path to radicalisation, the steps and number of stages involved, what can be agreed upon is that it is a process. Inherent in this process is a change in one’s beliefs, ideas and orientation in the world. Radicalisation should not be confused with terrorism or being a “terrorist”. Radicalisation may be viewed as a shift in ideology whereas terrorism is purposeful act of violence.

With regards to phase models, one must acknowledge the constraints in attempts to
form a chronology of radicalisation because there is an unsatisfactory amount of data with regards to the causes. Although phase models offer valuable insight, there are considerable shortcomings. Phase models may have a methodological error known as *selection on the dependent variable* (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) whereby the researcher selects cases with a certain value attached to the dependent variable, in order to create a pattern that produces the same outcome. “Just as it is impossible to explain why books become bestsellers by examining only bestsellers, it is impossible to explain radicalisation only by cases of radicalisation. Phase models, however, do exactly this” (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009, p.17). Phase models work backwards to describe what might have happened. This is why phase models cannot explain why some individuals radicalise and others do not. Phase models may apply statistical discrimination. Statistical discrimination occurs when one makes use of general traits to identify a particular group (in this case those who are vulnerable to, or in the process of radicalisation), the group in this case is small and politically sensitive. The percentage of people that actually reach the point of violent radicalisation is very small; however using phase models that attribute characteristics such as “a change in behaviour” or “becoming more interested in religion” can raise red flags where there are none. Statistical discrimination may also result in creating radical identities for people who would otherwise not have engaged or had an inclination towards violent radicalisation (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). According to Moro (2009, p.1):

> Statistical discrimination is a theory of inequality between demographic groups based on stereotypes that do not arise from prejudice or racial and gender bias. When rational, information-seeking decision makers use aggregate group characteristics, such as group averages, to evaluate individual personal characteristics, individuals belonging to different groups may be treated differently even if they share identical observable characteristics in every other aspect.

The use of general characteristics may unintentionally single out a particular race, or religion, and create a self-fulfilling prophecy for individuals who share those characteristics. Furthermore these individuals may appear to pose a threat, limiting an individual’s ability to live free of discrimination. The feeling of being victimized or vilified may undermine one’s loyalty to that society and its authorities and increase
one’s susceptibility to radicalisation rather than diminish it (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).

The following chapter will discuss the theoretical frameworks for this study - the Root Cause Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009), Moghaddam’s Staircase to Terrorism (2005) and the Rational Choice theory.
3. CHAPTER THREE
Theoretical Framework

3.1 Introduction

The following models and theory will provide a means of analysis and interpretation for this study. The Root Cause Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) categorises the most cited micro and macro causes of radicalisation; Moghaddam’s Staircase to Terrorism (2005) assesses the psychological processes an individual goes through on their journey towards terrorism; and the Rational Choice theory explains why individuals make the choices they do.

3.2 Veldhuis and Staun - Root Cause Model

The Root Cause Model analyses the most frequently cited causes of radicalisation, whilst categorising these causes into macro and micro (social and individual) levels. By distinguishing between macro and micro level factors, one may explain why some individuals radicalise and others do not (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). The root cause model provides a framework with which to analyse how causal variables at different levels relate to each other and how they shape the circumstances under which radicalisation is more – or less – likely to occur. Hence the model serves as a starting point from which to further investigate and counter radicalisation processes (Veldhuis & Staun 2009, p.21). At the centre, one examines the individual - whose attitude and behaviour is subject to a variety of influences over time. One the outer circle, one explores macro-level factors which include social and cultural structures, politics, education and unemployment.
Figure 1: Causal Factors of Radicalisation (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009, p.24)

Macro-level factors alone cannot sufficiently explain radicalisation. One must take into account the micro-level defined by the individual and the way in which they are embedded and interact with social structures. The micro-level is represented by the two inside layers of the model, taking social factors into account – or the way the individual interacts with relevant others. These “others” do not only include in group members but also members of an out-group. Generally how individuals perceive and react to macro-level factors depends on where they live, what they believe, who their friends are, what kind of family they have, how they compare themselves to others, etcetera (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).

The innermost layer represents the individual, accounting for psychological characteristics, beliefs, experiences and opinions. The factors on the outer circle facilitate radicalisation, with the author’s arguing that there are specific trigger events or precipitating factors that precede violent group activity (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). Individuals are influenced through their experiences and perceptions of the social world. Analysis at the individual level is important because through a model like this, one can see how micro-level factors are activated and sustained within specific social environments (Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009). Political, economic and social conditions change over time. Personal experiences are also dynamic – therefore it is about when and how factors have a radicalisation effect. Catalyst events are unpredictable and can occur on the micro and macro level. Catalysts vary in effect across individuals and accelerate the radicalisation process (but cannot initiate the
radicalisation process alone). The authors differentiate between recruitment and trigger events (“incidents that tip an individual from being a passive yet angry observer into an active and motivated terrorist” (Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009)). The levels and causal factors do overlap however the classification used in their study is a comprehensive and useful way to integrate and organise the frequently mentioned contributing factors towards radicalisation (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).

“Any useful framework must be able to integrate mechanisms at micro (individual) and macro (societal/cultural) levels. It must account for the fact that "one size does not fit all" when it comes to creating a violent extremist” (Borum, 2011).

### 3.3 Moghaddam’s Staircase to Terrorism

Moghaddam (2005) applies the metaphor of a narrowing staircase to terrorism. This metaphor appears to be more applicable to the development of political terrorism, relative to the origin of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. It is an attempt to explain why only a few individuals in a society commit acts of terror. Naturally the staircase leads the individual to different floors – all of which have different doors (choices). Each step is influenced by a different psychological process, and is fundamentally about how the individual views the building and options available to them; with the variety of choice becoming smaller as one ascends the staircase. “As individuals climb the staircase, they see fewer and fewer choices, until the only possible outcome is the destruction of others, or oneself, or both” (Moghaddam, 2005, p.161). Moghaddam’s (2005) Staircase to Terrorism is a useful metaphor to explain the processes or stages an individual goes through on their path to terrorism. The individual can move up and down the staircase, but must complete process on the previous step in order to progress. Their discontent, leads the individual up the staircase, where they begin to distance themselves from out-group members and accept terrorism as a solution to their problems, culminating in an act of terror.

The staircase is constructed as having a ground floor, and five higher floors. Moghaddam (2006) argues that the ground floor is the same across all cultures, as the source of terrorism is related to the conditions on the ground floor. Therefore, he asserts that if issues at the ground floor are addressed we can reduce the occurrence of terrorism. Similarly, the chances of an individual climbing down the staircase after
reaching the fourth or fifth floor, is unlikely across cultures. In this theory terrorism is viewed as a rational problem-solving strategy for those who go through the psychological processes on each step in the staircase. The terrorist act is not seen as an irrational emotional impulse, but rather as a rational choice given the limited range of alternatives on the different stages of the model.

The importance of the psychological processes on each floor varies across cultures. The author uses the example of post-war Iraq – as a lot of the inspiration for terrorism is derived from displaced aggression onto the United States and its’ army. “Terrorists are made, they are not born. Terrorism arises from societal conditions, not individual characteristics” (Moghaddam, 2006, p.45).

3.3.1 The First Floor

On the first floor, there are the perceptions of fairness and feelings of relative deprivation. According to Lygre, Eid, Larsson and Ranstorp (2011) the ground floor of the Staircase Model (Moghaddam, 2005) relates to Relative Deprivation Theory. It involves how the individual psychologically interprets their material conditions, and an increasing dissatisfaction with the social world. If the individual interprets their material conditions as an injustice, the individual continues to the next step. It involves the individual’s motivation to improve living, to attain justice, and a pleasing identity. Apart from impoverishment and a lack of education, Moghaddam (2005) notes that perceptions of injustice can also relate to political conditions and threats to personal or collective identity; this is of particular importance with regards to religious fundamentalists due to religion’s ability to serve the needs of identity (Moghaddam, 2005). According to Slootman and Tillie (2006) assert that individuals do not need to belong to the lowest social group to feel deprived – it is about the perception of deprivation. Individuals can feel deprived when their current situation does not meet the level of effort they put in, or their expectations. These feelings form part of the integration paradox – the more an individual tries to integrate with the majority of society, the more aware they become of cultural conflict and expressions of exclusion (Slootman & Tillie, 2006). This phase essentially speaks to Terror Management Theory (TMT). Terror Management Theory (TMT) is used to look into the psychological forces that encourage or deter support for terrorism. Shame,
degradation or perceived injustice threaten the cultural views and self-esteem which protect people from anxiety related to death. Cultural worldviews come from one’s sense of reality and external culture which provides purpose, value and meaning, including a literal or symbolic connection to something greater than oneself – something that surpasses mortal existence (Pyszczynski, Rothschild & Abdollahi, 2008). Furthermore sharing a worldview with others increases self-esteem. Cultural worldviews provide individuals with a sense of order and an understanding of what is acceptable and expected of them (Savage & Liht, 2008).

When one feels threatened, the anxiety could manifest as hostility or violence towards the threatening group. From the perspective of TMT human behaviour stems from the need to maintain faith in one’s worldview thereby reducing anxiety. Those who share similar beliefs increase faith or confidence in one’s worldview – conversely those who challenge or hold other views with disdain undermine faith and the ability to manage anxiety. In order to manage anxiety people derogate the out-group or try to convert them to their worldview. Should the threat of the out-group become significant, extermination is an option (Pyszczynski, Rothschild & Abdollahi, 2008). Defence of one’s worldview is about reducing death anxiety as well as thoughts associated with death (Savage & Liht, 2008).

Individuals with rigid, authoritarian worldviews, who crave structure, construe the world in terms of absolute good and evil, and believe they hold the singular truth—such as religious fundamentalists—are especially prone to respond to threat with hostility toward those with opposing worldviews. Religious teachings seem an especially effective way of justifying violence, perhaps because of the central role that morality plays in providing self-esteem and death transcendence (Pyszczynski, Rothschild & Abdollahi, 2008, p.320).

3.3.2 The Second Floor

Those who reach the second floor, but do not find solutions feel a great deal of anger and frustration. Sometimes individuals on this floor, develop a readiness to physically
displace aggression and actively seek out opportunities to do so (Moghaddam, 2005). At this stage, these individuals begin to adopt a morality that condones terrorism. When there are no viable options available, these individuals eventually find themselves on the third floor seeking a solution.

3.3.3 The Third Floor

Those who reach the third floor now see terrorism as a logical, justifiable option, and sometimes they are influenced to displace their aggression onto others, an “enemy”. “Having started from the ground floor, where they share feelings of frustration, injustice, and shame with vast populations… dedicated to changing the world by any means available to them” (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 165). This is the floor where moral engagement is discussed – from the view of the terrorist, they are the one’s who are morally engaged; the “enemy” government and their agents are morally disengaged. With regards to moral disengagement, violence against members of an out-group may soothe temporal grievances however it is not an easy task to undertake. According to Bandura (2004) self-sanctions are important for the regulation of inhumane conduct. Through socialisation individuals develop a set of moral standards that serve as a guide for behaviour. Applying the aforementioned standards to oneself regulates behaviour. Individuals behave in a way, which gives them a sense of satisfaction, conversely going against one’s set of standards results in self-condemnation.

A complex combination of de-individuation and dispersion of responsibility is needed to create a framework in which killing members of the out-group can be justified – a progressive emotional detachment from other people (Bandura, 1999; Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009).

Bandura (1999) notes that the disengagement of moral self-sanctions is a growing concern at a group and individual level. Moral agency is viewed as the ability to resist inhumane behaviour, whilst proactively behaving humanely. Moral disengagement centres on the reconstruction of inhumane conduct into something worthy or defensible by means of moral justification, sanitizing language, displacement and diffusion of responsibility, dehumanizing the victims of violence and disregarding the effects of one’s actions. Disengagement cannot be viewed as indifference, it is a
gradual process of detachment whereby some individuals of groups eventually do not receive the same considerations of fairness and fall outside the boundaries of rules and moral values (Waller, 2007).

Moral Justification
People generally do not engage in hostile conduct until they have justified the morality of their actions to themselves. The behaviour then becomes socially and personally acceptable by portraying it as worthy or purposeful (Bandura, 1999). Perpetrators of mass violence can rationalize their violence by framing their actions as the right thing to do, if not a moral imperative. It can become an essential means of protecting their values, community, defending against oppressors or reverence to their national commitments. Sometimes the vulnerability of perpetrators comes from experiencing victimisation in the past, with these groups more likely to respond with violence towards a threat, viewing their aggression as defensive. In this way, violence may be viewed as benevolent because it is preventing further suffering – this is how violence can be normalized and exonerating for perpetrators (Waller, 2007). In this way acts of violence are “accomplished by cognitively redefining the morality of killing so that it can be done free from self-censure” (Bandura, 1999, p. 195).

In times of conflict, one group’s terrorist activity is another group’s liberation movement. Each side feels morally superior, sanctifying their actions while condemning those of the out-group.

Euphemistic Labelling/Sanitising Language
Language has the ability to shape thought patterns, which then have an effect on actions. Activities can have very different appearances based on what they are called. Harmful behaviour is often made more acceptable through the use of euphemisms. For example, military attacks are called “surgical/tactical strikes” implying that this is a necessary curative activity. Agentless passive linguistic styles are used to frame shameful acts of violence as the work of unknown forces rather than that of people, imparting respectability to an illegitimate act (Bandura, 1999).

Displacement and Diffusion of Responsibility
It is easier for individuals to exercise moral control when they acknowledge that their actions may or are causing harm to others. People generally repudiate their part in a
situation if an authority figure steps in and takes the responsibility upon them. By placing the responsibility on someone else, and viewing their actions as based upon the instruction of an authority figure, individuals do not feel personally responsible for their actions and are free from self-condemning reactions (Milgram, 1963; Bandura, 1999). The division of labour can assist with the diffusion of responsibility. Many people run terrorist organisations and once the jobs are subdivided, each individual’s job seems harmless. Once their job becomes a routine activity, there is a shift in focus from the morality of what they are doing, to the operational efficiency of their job. Making a decision in a group is another means of getting people to behave inhumanely. If everyone made a decision, no one feels personally responsible. Collective action is means of weakening moral control (Bandura, 1999).

Disregarding the Consequences of One’s Actions
Another means of weakening moral control operation is ignoring the effects of one’s behaviour. When an individual partakes in shameful behaviour they avoid acknowledging the harm it caused by minimizing it, or discrediting the evidence of the harm. Harming others is easier when their pain is not visible and when the actions are physically distant from their effects; which is made easier “in the era of faceless warfare, in which mass destruction is delivered remotely with deadly accuracy by computer and laser-controlled systems” (Bandura, 1999, p.199). When people can see the pain they have caused it can serve as a means of self-censure.

Dehumanisation
According to Bandura (1999) moral self-censure is dependent on the way perpetrators view their victims. In cases of mass killings for example, humanisation of victims may involve labelling people as inhuman- likening them to animals or using non-human creatures such as monsters or demons. This type of behaviour is more likely when the target group can be easily identified as a separate category of people, for example, racial or religious groups that may be regarded as inferior or intimidating (Waller, 2007). Once dehumanised, victims are no longer viewed as people with hopes or fears – they are subhuman. It is easier to kill something that is not human; therefore dehumanisation is an essential step towards the perpetration of atrocities (Bandura, 1999).

The conditions of modern life are conducive to dehumanisation – computerisation,
urbanisation and high geographic mobility allow individuals to relate to each other in an anonymous and impersonal fashion. Furthermore, social conditions, which encourage people to form in-groups and out-groups, produce schisms that encourage dehumanisation.

Bandura (2004) states that the turning socialized individuals into fighters does not involve altering personality structures, moral standards or aggressive drives. It is about cognitively redefining what the morality of killing so it may be accomplished outside one’s self-imposed restraints.

Through moral sanction of violent means, people see themselves as fighting ruthless oppressors who have an unquenchable appetite for conquest or as protecting their cherished values and way of life, preserving world peace, saving humanity from subjugation to an evil ideology, and honouring their country’s international commitments (Bandura, 2004, p.124).

Recruitment into a terrorist organisation takes place on the fourth floor where an “us-and-them” mentality is adopted.

3.3.4 The Last Floor

On the last floor, specific individuals are trained to ignore or push past inhibitions that prevent them from hurting themselves or others; thereby being able to carry out the act of terror. The technique of psychological distancing is used; they exaggerate the difference between in-group and out-group members and believe that their act of terror will make everyone realize the truth and revolt against those in authority.

Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Identity Theory (IT) are interested in group dynamics and how individuals shape their identity. This theory focuses on the way in which groups of individuals construct their reality and self-conceptions. In other words, individuals take themselves as objects and categorise themselves socially in relation to other categories. In SIT this is known as self-categorisation and in IT it is known as identification (Hogg, 1995; Stets & Burke 2000; Al Raffie, 2013). Social identities are echoes of social categories, groups and networks. Large-scale social
categories are religion and gender, for example. These form the pretext for smaller and community level groups and networks. Social categories create invisible boundaries, which separate members (in-group) from non-members (out-group). Therefore social categories are innately biased – not necessarily in a negative way, as it is simply a means of describing membership criteria in terms of norms and values, making them different to other social categories (Al Raffie, 2013). According to Waller (2007) the human mind is compelled to define the boundaries of their “tribe” (group). Knowing who is, and is not part of out social group is important to humans – a means of categorizing into “us” and “them”.

One of the main functions of SIT is to boost the self-esteem of in-group members because internal stereotypes and norms favour the in-group. This also serves the purpose of boosting the status of the in-group in relation to the out-group. Self-categorisation is a cognitive process where individuals strengthen their social identity by emphasizing intragroup likeness and intergroup differences. This is a means of self-enhancement whereby individuals like to position themselves in a positive way when compared to the relevant out-group. These processes emphasise group boundaries and sets group standards for behaviour (Hogg, 1995; Al Raffie, 2013). Waller (2007) views this process as ethnocentrism, whereby individuals differentiate themselves from others (resulting in in-groups and out-groups) whilst boasting their superiority and looking upon the ‘other’ with contempt. He asserts that ethnocentrism is generally harmless, and from an evolutionary perspective it is advantageous in terms of strengthening communal identity. Complimentary to ethnocentrism is xenophobia – the fear of strangers or outsiders – because in order to define what constitutes part of the in-group; one must also define what it is not. These two aforementioned social instincts can promote conflict by allowing for in-group alliance and out-group aggression. “We cooperate to compete. There is no “us” without a corresponding “them” to oppose” (Waller, 2007, p.201).

Stets and Burke (2000) affirm that the consequence of self-categorisation may be an accentuation of the perceived likeness between members of the in-group, as well as an accentuation of differences between members of the in-group and the out-group. Furthermore accentuation may be applied to those areas, which have self-enhancing dimensions (Stets & Burke, 2000).
In IT identity involves categorizing oneself into a role, and incorporating the meaning and expectations associated with that role, all of which form standards, which guide behaviour. Hogg (1995) asserts that social identities are not only descriptive; they are also prescriptive and provide meaning. Individuals exist in a structured society, existing in relation to other contrasting social categories. Each category has more or less status, prestige or power. And these categories precede individuals – because people are born into a pre-structured society, thereafter individuals derive their identity from the social categories to which they belong. Over the course of a lifetime each individual will form a unique combination of social categories making up their unique self-concept (Stets & Burke, 2000).

When a group is threatened, those who identify strongly with the group will fall further into it. This suggests that individuals who have a strong religious identity are likely to become more religious in a crisis. Efforts will be made to further distinguish him or herself from the relevant out-group, increase in-group self-esteem and raise in-group homogeneity, thus strengthening the group (Al Raffie, 2013).

According to Waller (2007) terrorist organisations provide a quasi-family environment. Individuals who may feel alienated, powerless or shamed by a real or imagined enemy find this quasi-family cathartic as it provides a link between how one feels and how one should act. Waller (2007) notes that though an individual may join a terrorist organisation to fulfil their needs, the organisation begins to shape them. In other words “once an individual is socialised into a context of rage, rage becomes an emotional requirement of the individual. Furthermore, once this rage is cognitively connected to violence, violence itself becomes a need” (Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009). Lethal violence can have a brutalizing effect within a group. After the initial act of violence, killing becomes progressively easier. Within a group the desire to be liked, accepted and esteemed by fellow in-group members is strong. The fear of abandonment or ostracism can lead an individual to censor their behaviour in order to secure the integrity of the group they belong to. Furthermore this fear of ostracism can lead to the acceptance of violence as a legitimate tool. Refusal to participate or questioning the violence (in terms of strategy or morality) can undermine the existence of the group and lead to divisions within, or dismissal from the group
Thinking in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’ does not inevitably lead to hatred against all out-groups. However once an individual identifies with a group it is easy to exaggerate inter-group differences and intra-group similarities, enhancing in-group cohesion whilst increasing hostility towards other groups (Waller, 2007).

3.4 Rational Choice Theory
Moghaddam’s Staircase Theory as whole may be viewed in terms of rational choice - Kruglanski and Fishman (2009) conducted research on the psychological factors in terrorism at an individual, group, and organisational level. They endeavoured to understand terrorist behaviour as a form of psychopathology and/or as the unique gathering of personality traits. The study yielded no results as to psychopathology or a unique personality construction for terrorists. Results revealed the normality of terrorists. Moskalenko, McCauley and Van Son (2013) further affirm that a terrorist is no more likely to suffer from psychopathology than any other individual from a similar background. They are also no more economically deprived or underprivileged. If most terrorists do not suffer from a major mental illness one may have to consider rational choice theory.

Rational Choice Theory (RCT) identifies a unit of analysis (in this case, an individual who is vulnerable to radicalisation and the subsequent commission of a terrorist act) and attempts to rationalize their decision (Lindauer, 2009). Terrorism is about the systematic inducement of terror aimed at civilians as a means of coercion, committed for religious, political or ideological goals (Danilović & Manojlović, 2013). As such it is a planned event that is carried out in a logical and systematic fashion. By recognizing these occurrences as logical – and by default the terrorist’s as rational actors – one attempts to understand what the preferences of these individuals are, and why they choose to commit acts of terror (Lindauer, 2009).

According to Moskalenko and McCauley (2011) when attempting to apply rational choice theory there is a lack of understanding in relation to ethnic and national conflict and its connection to suicide bombings, for example. It must be noted that in opposition to the rational choice theory some individuals will sacrifice their self-
interests for the good of others. This is in opposition to the cost-benefit analysis method found within RCT – individuals attempt to minimize their efforts (cost) whilst trying to maximize the return (benefit) (Lindauer, 2009). Soldiers in armies, for example, are motivated to fight for their country, by a system of rewards and punishments by the state. The state may bring soldiers to the battlefield, but the love for their comrades makes them fight. Moskalenko and McCauley (2011) explored the psychology behind self-sacrificing behaviours in conjunction with Olson’s (1969, as cited in Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011) “free-rider problem”. The basic premise is why should an individual sacrifice anything for the good of the public at no benefit to them? It may seem better to let others sacrifice and share in their efforts – “to free ride on their efforts rather than let them free ride on mine“ (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011, p. 119). From this perspective an individual who sacrifices for the general good may be viewed as irrational. While it may not seem rational to sacrifice oneself for others, one must take into account the power of group identification, as making positive and negative identifications with others is natural (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011). There can be a dark side to caring and being empathic towards others. It is possible for individuals can kill for love, even for the love of strangers seen as victimized. Perhaps the idea of being a ‘hero’ is attractive to some. Perhaps it is the realisation of the finality of life which brings up the desire to go out having done something honourable – or to be remembered. In any event, the idea of self-sacrifice trumping self-interest requires further investigation. In addition, Staun (2008) notes that although rational choice may give some insight into the strategic benefits of terrorism, the theory cannot fully explain the phenomenon of radicalisation.

This theory advocates that terrorist actions are a conscious and rational decision – a rationally chosen strategy to accomplish a specific goal (Victoroff, 2005) even though it may appear to be irrational (Scott, 2000). Individuals all have specific goals or preferences and make choices within given constraints on how to obtain the most desirable outcome. Rational choice theory asserts that individuals will consider the outcomes of various courses of action and decide which is most beneficial (Scott, 2000). With regards to this study, one would have to look into instrumental rationality. This type of rationality holds no judgement about preferences, meaning that it does not matter if a choice seems “evil” or “irrational” – in this light Adolf Hitler would be just as rational as Nelson Mandela. Acknowledging rationality in this
fashion simply means that individuals make a choice based on their preference, whatever it may be (Quakenbush, 2004).

Crenshaw (1981) notes that many events of terror were purposeful activities based upon a rational political choice. Individuals and organisations have particular values, beliefs and perspectives with regards to their environment. Taking this into consideration, an act of terror may be seen as a logical method to make an environment or predicament more favourable. This does not mean however, that every extremist group or radicalised individual has a clear objective. Terrorism is a tool that allows for intimidation and destabilisation, which may only be viewed as a logical choice if the group enacting terror has a similar power ratio to the government or society it is challenging (Crenshaw, 1981). There are some individuals who believe that terrorism will advance their cause (Victoroff, 2005; Lakhani, 2013). A minority that believes there are no other means for change usually adopts this strategy; terrorism becomes attractive because it is simple with a high potential for reward (Crenshaw, 1981). According to Schmid (2013) terrorism is prevalent today because modern circumstances make terrorists methods and acts exceptionally easy to undertake. Terrorism may be viewed as the outcome of a learning process that incorporates personal and social experiences.

3.5 Conclusion
In summation, radicalisation may be viewed as shift in one’s thinking and behaviour in accordance with an ideology that need not advocate violence. The two aforementioned theories look into who is susceptible to radicalisation, whether they are in the process or have already become radicalised. These individuals are relatively socially, politically and/or economically deprived as compared to those around them. Whether this disadvantage is perceived or not, this leads to frustration, and this anger has the potential to be turned into terrorism (Lakhani, 2013). The Staircase model (Moghaddam, 2005) unlike other phase or stage models does not discriminate against or stigmatise minorities. The Root Cause Model (RCM) (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) looks at the commonly cited causes of radicalisation – the (socio) psychological and sociological circumstances under which radicalisation is more likely to occur, while the Staircase Model (Moghaddam, 2005) looks at the course of action or radicalisation in response to the circumstances found in the aforementioned model.
Lastly with regards to the rational choice theory, the course of action an individual chooses and their rationale cannot be viewed as irrational as it is based upon their worldview and preferences.
CHAPTER FOUR
Methodology

4.1 Introduction
This research paper will be approached from a constructionist orientation, whilst utilizing academic literature to compare and contrast the views of different authors as well criticise and highlight specific studies and cases, in order to build a comprehensive account of radicalisation. Four case studies will be used to illustrate how radicalisation could possibly occur and the elements or factors that may influence the process. Content analysis will be used, whilst the theoretical framework serves as a blue print for relating the various themes or elements that contribute to radicalisation.

4.2 Research questions
1. What is radicalisation?
   1.1 What are the psychological processes involved in radicalisation?
   1.2 What makes an individual vulnerable to radicalisation?

2. What are the causal (micro and macro) factors – from the individual, to the social and to the structural that could contribute to radicalisation among Muslims in South Africa?
   2.1 How do causal factors relate to each other and how do they contribute to radicalisation when combined?

4.3 Research Methods
A. Research design
The research will be approached from a constructionist orientation, which assumes that people create and shape what reality is for them. Constructivism is a methodology that allows researchers to investigate the beliefs of individuals rather than an external reality. Perception is not reality – because reality is a blend of perceptions and external reality (Christie, Rowe, Perry & Chamard, 2000). Constructivism allows for the complexities of the human experience - the idea of each facet of an individuals life intertwining. Human beings are intricately involved
together in the construction of their worlds. There is an absence of an absolute truth and an importance placed upon context (Roller & Lavrakas, 2015). In this regard, the researcher is interested in the value within the answers (Christie, Rowe, Perry & Chamard, 2000). The constructionist orientation allows the researcher to look at how individuals define their behaviour and their circumstances. Furthermore this approach emphasises human agency and voluntarism, meaning people have the ability to make choices within their social and subjective context. “People have their own reasons for their actions, and we need to learn the reasons that people use. Individual motives are crucial to consider even if they are irrational, carry deep emotions, and contain mistaken beliefs and prejudices” (Neuman, 2011, p. 104).

B. Data collection techniques

This study will be making use of four case studies in order to demonstrate the psychology involved in radicalisation. When conducting a case study:

[the] researcher explores in depth a program, an event, an activity, a process, or one or more individuals. The case(s) are [bound] by time and activity, and researchers collect detailed information using a variety of data collection procedures over a sustained period of time (Cresswell, 2003).

The researcher will make use of narrative inquiry to research and collect data about Mohammed Sidique Khan, Imam Anjem Choudary, Mustafa Mohamed as well as Brandon-Lee and Tony-Lee Thulsie, including relevant documentation derived from secondary sources. A purposive sampling approach was used to select the data for the case studies. The documentation will consist of mass media records and non-personal documents. The advantage of using a document study method is that it allows for easy access to inaccessible subjects; it is low cost and easy to replicate (Stocks, 1999).

D. Data analysis

Content analysis will be used in this study. The Root Cause Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) will be applied to South Africa and the United Kingdom to show the causes of radicalisation or points of vulnerability for each country. This application will then tie in with the case studies, where Moghaddam’s Staircase to Terrorism (2005) model will be applied. The purpose of this is to show the possible causes for
radicalisation and the subsequent course or path of each individual towards radicalism.

E. **Validity, Reliability and Rigour**

It is difficult to assess the validity or rigour of a qualitative study; therefore one must look at towards a set of criteria under the acronym TAPUPAS to assess the merit of the research. TAPUPAS stands for: transparency (are the reasons for the research clear?), accuracy (is it based on relevant evidence), purposivity (is the method used suitable for the aims?), utility (does it provide answers to the questions it sets?), propriety (is it legal and ethical?), accessibility (is it easy to understand?) and specificity (does it meet the standard as set by the knowledge in its field?) (Porter, 2007). The reasons for research in this area are clear, there are very few studies related to radicalisation in South Africa – despite the evidence of training camps and individuals fleeing to join ISIS, for example. The methods being used for this study are the most effective at this stage, and it is hoped that they will provide answers to the questions posed. The study will be legal, ethical and easy to understand. The researcher aims for the study to meet the standard of knowledge as set by its field. It is important to mention that there are some limitations associated with this methodology. The information may depend partly on biographical accounts, which may undermine the research analysis. Furthermore, document studies can suffer from a sampling and journalistic bias (Stocks, 1999). Because the Staircase Model (Moghaddam, 2005) is supported by empirical evidence – the questions that will be used are based on the steps in the model.

F. **Anticipated Problems**

The researcher was unfortunately unable to interview current members of violent radical groups, and will be making use of material that would provide insight into the current dynamics and developments around radicalisation in South Africa. The researcher acknowledges the sensitive nature of the study and the potential it has to offend others. The utmost care will be taken to present information about religion and its followers in a neutral fashion. This study is not about the religion of Islam – It
is how the religion is interpreted and misused in combination with a variety of other factors.

4.4 Conclusion

This research paper will be a document study approached from a constructionist orientation. Moghaddam’s (2005) Staircase to Terrorism Model and The Root Cause Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) will be applied to the case study of Mohammed Sidique Khan, Imam Anjem Choudary, Mustafa Mohamed as well as Brandon-Lee and Tony-Lee Thulsie. Purposive sampling was used to gather information for this study, thereafter the data will be analysed using thematic analysis.
5.1 Introduction

The following section will consist of the British case studies of Mohammed Sidique Khan and Imam Anjem Choudary, followed by the South African case studies of Mustafa Mohamed and Brandon-Lee and Tony-Lee Thulsie.

5.2 British Case Studies

5.2.1 MOHAMMED SIDIQUE KHAN

Mohammed Sidique Khan (MSK) was the eldest of the four suicide bombers responsible for the 7/7 bombings in London. He was born in 1974, the son of Pakistani immigrants Tika Khan and Mamida Begum (Laville & Aslam, 2005). He was raised in relatively poor circumstances, and lived in low-income immigrant neighbourhood in Beeston, Leeds. MSK’s first school was mainly white, but he did not have trouble integrating. He was purportedly quiet and scholarly, and sometimes vulnerable due to the occasional bullying at school. In his youth, MSK considered himself Western and encouraged his non-Muslim friends to call him “Sid” (BBC News, 2007; Staun, 2008). He was also known for wearing a leather jacket and cowboy boots whilst praising American life after a short visit to the United States at the age of 15 (Kirby, 2007). Furthermore in his teens, he did not show an inclination towards religion and rarely went to mosque (BBC News, 2007; Staun, 2008). It was in his teens where he began to show an interest in religion and supposedly became a Wahhabi (Malik, 2007).

While studying business at Leeds Metropolitan University he met his future wife Hasina and became involved in assisting disadvantaged youth. According to a friend, MSK’s family ostracized him because Hasina was an Indian woman. This situation was not acceptable to them and they wanted nothing to do with him (Kirby 2007). After University, he become a school youth worker, and began to show a clear and distinct interest in his faith as a Muslim. He turned to religion after his blemished youth where he was involved in fights, drugs and drinking. His colleagues at the time reported no suggestion of extremism in the way he spoke about his faith (BBC News, 2007; Staun, 2008). In retrospect, some now recall a change in MSK’s character. It was said that he had become more introverted and at times, had displayed an
intolerant attitude that contrasted with his generally easy-going manner. MSK’s time was invested in the mosques and Islamic groups of Leeds, Huddersfield and Dewsbury, comprising of voluntary work and youth activities planning. It was said that MSK became a figure that the children looked up to. One may speculate that he used this opportunity to identify and recruit individuals for the radical version of Islam that he was now advocating. MSK, Shehzad Tanweer and Hasib Hussain (two of the other 7/7 bombers) reportedly spent a great deal of time together in the months preceding the attack (BBC News, 2007).

MSK was dismissed from his career in education in 2004 due to poor attendance, which concluded in a period of sick leave from 20 September to 19 November. He then went to Pakistan with the aforementioned Tanweer. It is thought that the pair made contact with members of the Al-Qaeda network. After the 7/7 bombing it was revealed that MSK was also involved in another terror operation, which included the building of a fertilizer bomb. In the trial of the men accused of building the fertilizer bomb, it was revealed that MSK had been to the same terror training camp as members of that operation and maintained those connections upon his return (BBC News, 2007).

MSK’s commitment to the 7/7 bombings seems to have stemmed from a resentment of Western powers in conflict with the Muslim world, and the Muslim casualties as a result of these conflicts. Two months after the deaths of the four bombers a video emerged and aired on Al Jazeera that shows MSK making a statement in which he explains his motives.

Our words are dead until we give them life with our blood…I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe. Our driving motivation doesn’t come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer…Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation (Mohammed Sidique Khan, 2005 as
5.2.2 IMAM ANJEM CHOUARDY

Anjem Choudary (AC) is a British social and political activist, as well as a known radical Islamist preacher. AC studied commercial law at Southampton University. In his student days he was known as “Andy”. He was known to be a social drinker, was popular with women and though he dismisses accounts of his drug use, there are some who claim he experimented with Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD) (The Guardian, 2006) with an old friend recalling “I used to get stoned with Andy. He was a really lovely bloke, funny and warm”.

The ex-friend recalls that AC did not openly show an interest in religion, however Salman Rushdie’s *The Satanic Verses* riled him (Anthony, 2014). Although the publication of *The Satanic Verses* was one of the political events which served as a springboard for Islamist activism and recruitment (the others being the Iraq War, the genocide of Muslims in Bosnia, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) (Whine, 2009), AC’s ex-friend suggests it was his inability to get a job in a legal firm after graduating that lead him down the path of radicalisation and towards the virtues of Salafism (Anthony, 2014).

A chance meeting with Sheik Omar Bakri Mohammed (at that time the leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a radical pan-Islamic organisation which aims for the establishment of an Islamic State) was the beginning of AC’s study of Sharia law and his current understanding of Islam (The Guardian, 2006; Anthony, 2014).

AC was a founding member of Salafi-Jihadist organisation Al-Muhajiroun (Arabic for “The Emigrants”) infamous for celebrating 9/11, which was banned in 2010 (Nawaz, 2012; Kern, 2015). The organisation has reinvented itself under the names of Call to Submission, Islamic Path, Islamic Dawa Association, Need4Khalifah, Muslim Against Crusades and the London School of Sharia (Kern, 2015). AC formed two other organisations, Ghurabaa and Islam4UK that have both been proscribed – meaning that membership to these organisations is a criminal offence, whereby that organisation may not operate lawfully within the UK. AC uses social media such as Whatsapp and Twitter (where he has approximately 30 000 followers) to criticize Western governments and promote the ideals of radical Islam. He also makes use of cited in BBC News, 2005a).
video chats and uploads audio lectures online (Aridi, 2015). AC has managed to avoid imprisonment by walking the fine line between the right to free speech and provocative Islamist dialogues (Kern, 2015). On the 5th of August 2015 AC was charged under the Terrorism Act 2000 for enticing support for ISIS through his lectures (Aridi, 2015). AC is not afraid of going to prison as he views prison as the perfect place to gain more followers. "If they arrest me and put me in prison..." he said, "I will radicalize everyone in prison" (Kern, 2015).

AC claims to be well liked within the British Muslim community. He sees and represents himself as a campaigner for Sharia Law – which he believes will be implemented in Britain by 2050- he also opposes laws that aim to clamp down on radical mosques and incarcerate those who return from Iraq and Syria. AC sincerely believes that Sharia is the solution to every problem faced by the Western world. When asked whether he believes stoning a woman to death for adultery seems like an suitable punishment, he says, “For people who have had adultery committed against them, people who have had their wives taken, a lot will say 'I think stoning to death is appropriate'. I was like you; I was completely oblivious to Islam and the Islamic civilisation because I was educated in this system. But when you look at the rationale and benefits of it, you realise that it is, in fact, superior”. AC stresses that Westerners misunderstand Sharia Law, he insists that it is a system of social and economic justice (Anthony, 2014).

He has been asked if he has plans to go to Syria – a question asked because he actively dismisses democratic Britain – he responds by saying that he would be arrested and his passport confiscated if he were to even contemplate travelling to Turkey or Syria. Despite the difficulties posed by traveling he asserts his attraction to ISIS –

From what I understand from people living there, they have security, schools are now being set up where their children are taught about Islam, and they have the basic needs of food, clothing and shelter. They don't see in the public arena things like alcohol, drugs, gambling, these kinds of vices. They've been completely wiped out. I think in many respects it's the kind of society I'd love to live in with my family. Many people I know think the same. That doesn't mean that we're going to train and come back and carry out operations here.
In a more recent interview, after having his passport confiscated, AC has said in relation to Islamic State “I would love to go and live there, if the British government would give back my passport. People are flocking to the Islamic State, [...] people are loving it there. You can see the parties in the streets in Raqqa and Ramadi” (Crowcroft, 2015). AC sees his British passport being similar to a travel card with no legal or social significance (Anthony, 2014) stating "We are Muslims first and Muslim last. Passports are no more than travel documents. If you are born in a barn that doesn't make you a horse!!" (Kern, 2015).

AC, his wife and four children live comfortably in Britain with a lifestyle supported by British taxpayers – reportedly more than £25000 a year in welfare benefits. In 2013 AC encouraged his followers to quit their jobs and claim unemployment benefits. He believes that Muslims are entitled to welfare payments because they are a type of jizya (a tax imposed on non-Muslims in Islamic State) – a reminder that non-Muslims are subordinate and submissive to Muslims. He states, “We [Muslims] take the jizya, which is ours anyway. The normal situation is to take money from the kuffar [non-Muslim]. They give us the money. You work, give us the money, Allahu Akhbar. We take the money” (Kern, 2015).

Similarly to MSK, AC has a strong focus on religion and his identity as a Muslim. He believes that following the religion of Islam would be following one’s “natural disposition”. AC does not identify as British -

What is Britishness? Eating fish and chips? Standing in a queue? Singing ‘God Save the Queen’? If that is Britishness then no, I’m not British. I have no affiliation to the -monarchy or the laws of this land. If you’re born in a barn it doesn’t make you a horse. A British passport is just a common document. It’s like a bus ticket to me (The Clarion Project, 2014).

Unlike MSK one cannot find evidence for possible feelings of relative deprivation. AC lives comfortably in a first world, democratic country on welfare benefits. As stated earlier he seemed to gravitate towards religion after he failed to acquire a job he desired. AC seems to be dissatisfied with British society as it runs contrary to Sharia Law, which he believes is a necessary and vital component of Islam. – “As a Muslim
you cannot live side by side with other beliefs; you continue to strive for sharia” (Anthony, 2014). AC asserts, “under the Shari'ah, the false Gods that people worship instead of Allah will be removed, like democracy, freedom, liberalism, secularism etc” (Kern, 2015) and that “If we have enough authority and power, we are obliged as Muslims to take the power away from the people who have it, and implement sharia law” (Moon, 2013).

5.3 South African Case Studies

5.3.1 MUSTAFA MOHAMED (also known as MUSTAFA JONKER)

Mustafa Jonker (MJ), his brother-in-law Omar Hartley and Sedich Achmat were under suspicion of attempting to start a terror campaign in South Africa by means of detonating bombs at specific targets (Solomon, 2013). The other men involved were Mohamed Davids, Abdul Rasheed Davids and Rafiek Osman. In 2008 the police raided two houses in Muizenberg. The charges being faced were serious – treason, terrorism, unlawful possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, and conspiracy to commit murder. None of the aforementioned were arrested. Furthermore, the Davids brothers left South Africa shortly after. The police confiscated chemicals (hydrochloric acid, acetone and peroxide) that could be used to make bombs, instructions on how to produce explosives and literature from various Jihadi websites and videos of violent beheadings. The case was dropped after the state negated to provide the source and reasoning which prompted the raid (Solomon, 2013; Piper, 2015). During an interview conducted by Khadija Abdul Qaheer, MF states:

I, like thousands of Muslims like me am concerned at the plight of the oppressed in general and the Muslim Ummah in particular, which over the last century has witnessed an unprecedented onslaught from global disbelief. I realized from an early age that America is the main source of this global tyranny by her directly invading Muslim lands and killing their people and also by supporting apostate governments that subdue their people on her behalf. We returned to South Africa in 1999 [from Saudi Arabia] and I soon realized that while the racist apartheid regime had been removed, this new ‘democracy’ had come about by the ANC [African National Congress] selling South Africa to multi-national corporations. The ANC has a history of concern
for only the middle and upper class blacks. The result of this treachery is a symbolic multicultural government which is dictated to by and passes laws on behalf of mainly European and American companies, the same Crusader nations pillaging Afghanistan and Iraq today. Today South Africa has the biggest gap between rich and poor in the world; a direct result of the government’s neoliberal capitalist policies. A wealthy elite own South Africa’s wealth, while 30 million people suffer from poverty. Resulting from this poverty is crime of which South Africa has the highest statistics in the world as well. I began advocating as Allah commanded direct action against the Crusader-Zionist alliance and her pawns in power and this is the background behind my being labelled a terrorist. As far as this word goes, it is a label placed on anyone challenging the greedy bloodthirsty agenda of the West and I therefore take a pride in it. Ours is a blessed terror that desires to see an end to America’s oppression ... it is a fact that the Jews around the world using the Crusaders are the main benefactors of the global campaign against Islam .... Jews like the Oppenheimers have a monopoly over South Africa’s resources and their banks ensure that the ‘goyim’ as they call the suffering masses are kept in a state of debt slavery. They use Usury, which Allah forbade them from practicing, to turn free people into slaves. Africa in particular is suffering from great debts owed to these prophet murderers and it is therefore not surprising that the bulk of attacks on Jews outside the Holy Land have been in Africa. Over the last few years, Mujahideen have attacked the Jews in Mombasa in East Africa, they attacked them in Tunisia and Egypt in North Africa and they attacked the Israeli embassy in Mauritania in West Africa and we don’t consider the Muslims here in South Africa to be any less determined to punish the Jews for spreading corruption over Allah’s earth. The Muslims in South Africa hold a special place in their hearts for their suffering brethren in Palestine and perhaps amongst them are those who pledged to fight until the Bastard State of Israel is eradicated and have pledged to pray in Masjid al-Aqsa as conquerors or to meet Allah on the way .... We are witnessing the prediction of Sheikh Osama bin Laden come true when he said, ‘America by picking a war with the sons of the Arabian peninsula will experience things that will make them forget all about the horrors of Vietnam and that America will turn into a shadow of her former self’.
5.3.2 BRANDON-LEE AND TONY-LEE THULSIE

Identical twins Brandon-Lee and Tony-Lee Thulsie (BLT and TLT, respectively) have been charged 2004 Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Other Related Activities Act. According to their provisional charge sheet, the twins "conspired to commit the crime of terrorism by planning to cause explosions at a Mission of the United States of America and Jewish institutions" and "conspired to leave South Africa to join IS in Syria for the purpose of participating in acts of terrorism being committed by IS" as well “incite persons” to assist them. Their family, neighbours and friends were shocked by the news of their arrest (Hoskens & Smillie, 2016). The twins allegedly planned to set off explosions at a US embassy and several Jewish Institutions in South Africa (Shange, 2016). It was revealed that TLT was in regular contact with IS under the pseudonym Simba. According to Detective Warrant Officer Wynand Olivier:

Simba discussed sending money to facilitate the commission of a terrorist attack to be executed outside the borders of South Africa. Thereafter Simba changed his intention and began discussing a timeline for himself to carry out an attack inside South Africa. Simba requested instructions on how to create a device. He indicated that he had people in mind for the attack and that he intended to blow himself up in that attack and that he was seeking funds to finance the attack. Simba indicated that he found an easier formula to manufacture explosives and that he referenced a cell phone detonator to set off an explosive device. He also made enquiries on how to create a car bomb. On June 16 Simba enquired about a list of supplies and materials he would need to construct an explosive device and he further indicated that he intended to conduct a small arms attack (Henderson, 2016a).

From the above information given by a source (that shall not be named at this stage due to the sensitivity of the investigation), Simba’s activity and the danger posed by IS, Detective Olivier believed there was a chance that a terrorist attack could occur. This led to acquisition of a warrant and the subsequent search of the brother’s house in Newclare, Johannesburg on the 9th of July 2016. After their arrest, evidence confirmed the identity of Simba as TLT. According to Detective Olivier, upon questioning TLT said, “he believed in what he had done and was prepared to go to
jail” (Henderson, 2016a). Photographs lifted from the brothers’ digital devices shows them posing with a bomb belt, detonator and a rifle. There were also photographs of an IS soldier, mutilations, public executions, and recruits being trained. A press release claiming the attack on Bangladesh was also found, instructions on how to destroy a building, as well as a guide on how to access IS’s websites and publications were all in their possession (Henderson, 2016b). It was later found that the rifle in the photograph with the twins was a paintball gun (Pretorious, 2016).

Deidre Sissoon, who went to school with the twins, said “They were perfectly normal at school, outgoing and social. They had girlfriends, played sport. Brandon tried to get into film casting”. However, she does recall a change in them since last year, when they converted to Islam (Hoskens & Smillie, 2016) changing their names to Ibn Hernani and Yaqeen, respectively (Hoskens, 2016). “We then heard that they tried to go to Syria but were stopped. When they got back the mosque banned them from attending because its elders didn't want trouble” (Hoskens & Smillie, 2016).

An Islamic scholar from Newclare, Muzaffar Begg noted that the twins had initially followed a mainstream and moderate understanding of Islam “But from the way the twins began to speak months later you could see something had changed. They became conservative, insulting our imams whom they accused of not fulfilling their duties. They spoke about how a good Muslim had to speak up about the abuse of ‘our people’ [in Palestine and Syria]” (Hoskens, 2016). In conjunction with this, a relative of the family said, “When they converted, they changed a lot. They stopped partying, clubbing and deejaying. They left their friends and became very religious and started getting rid of all their worldly things. They wouldn't talk any more and became quite secretive” (Hoskens & Smillie, 2016). Begg had asked the twins where they had learnt the ideology they adopted, to which they answered “Sheikh Musa Jibril” (an Arab-American Islamist preacher) and “the internet” – “we [later] learnt they attended class at a Mayfair school, which deviated from the mainstream teachings. They followed the conservative Salafi teachings”. Begg says the twins told him that they chose that school as they were looking for a “greater” purpose – they “wanted to be soldiers for their religion” (Hoskens, 2016).
5.4 Case Study Discussion

There are various similarities and differences amongst the aforementioned cases, which upon comparison will reveal the complex nature of the causes of radicalisation.

5.4.1 Similarities

Firstly, MSK and the twins both came from relatively low income backgrounds or, like MJ felt a sense of relative deprivation. AC differs, as he was well educated and provided for in his youth, and is living very comfortably as an adult.

Secondly, MSK, the twins and AC all demonstrated a distinct change in, or a move towards their faith – Islam. All four of them had previously indulged in what would be considered un-Islamic – partying in the case of the twins, and with regards to AC and MSK, partaking in casual drug use and alcohol consumption.

Thirdly, one finds feelings of resentment towards Western powers or the perceived inadequacy of one’s government, which was found in all the cases. AC and MJ in particular find fault or feel wronged by their own government, British and South African respectively, and are very vocal about their beliefs.

Fourthly, MSK, AC and the twins shared the factor of youth. These individuals were relatively young when their changes became noticeable to family and friends.

Lastly, is the use of the Internet and Jihadi literature / websites. The twins found Sheik Ahmed Musa Jibril online and learnt his interpretation of Islam and adopted his attitudes. In a similar manner MJ used the Internet to learn how to produce explosives, and was also in possession of violent Islamist videos.

When I visited these Jihadi sites, I downloaded everything. This information that I downloaded, is information that everyone has access to and is freely available. They are legal to download. The pictures downloaded reveal how Muslims throughout the world are being killed and how they are killing those who are attacking them (Solomon, 2013).
5.4.2 Dissimilarities

AC, unlike MJ and the twins uses the Internet and social media as a tool of provocation and means of gathering followers.
MSK was the only one of the five individuals mentioned who chose the path of suicide terrorism.

5.5 Conclusion

In summation, all cases showed evidence of issues with identity, relative deprivation, resentment of Western powers, the use of the Internet (indicative of globalisation) and the complexities of social/group dynamics. Interestingly, the factors, which all the cases have in common, are not something that the respective governments can control per say – the issues leading to radicalisation are found mainly on a social and individual level, making the experience, perception, interpretation and resolution of problems subjective.

The following chapter will demonstrate the application of the Root Cause Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009), Staircase to Terrorism model (Moghaddam, 2005) and the rational choice theory to the aforementioned case studies.
CHAPTER SIX
Application of Theories

6.1 Introduction

The Staircase to Terrorism model (Moghaddam, 2005) will be applied to the British and South African case studies, respectively. After each application, a table will show which factors of the Root Cause Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) are applicable to the respective cases, following with an explanation of those factors. Factors that apply to both British and South African cases will be explained cumulatively after all four applications.

6.2 British Case Studies

6.2.1 MOHAMMED SIDIQUE KHAN

Although the Staircase to Terrorism (2005) is primarily about a group terrorist situation, it can be used to describe MSK’s situation. According to Malik (2007) MSK was raised in a community that struggled with drugs, racial issues and education aspiration difficulties. It is possible to assume that under these circumstances he would feel a sense of injustice.

Moghaddam (2005) emphasized the importance of religion and identity (as mentioned previously).

Our religion is Islam – obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following the footsteps of the final prophet and messenger Muhammad… This is how our ethical stances are dictated… I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters (Mohammad Sidique Khan, 2005; BBC News, 2005a)

Muslims, who feel alienated by or resent Western policies, may find the Islamic framework to be a means of rejecting those societies. The frustration and resentment can lead individuals into a literal and radical interpretation of Islam that serves as a legitimisation for radical behaviour. It is possible that in his attempts to better his community and uplift the Muslim youth around him, MSK became frustrated – he was upset with foreign policy and noticed further injustices closer to home.

Jihad is an obligation on every single one of us, men and women, and by
staying at home you are turning your backs on jihad which is a major sin. Our so-called scholars today are content with their Toyotas and their semi-detached houses… If they fear the British Government more than they fear Allah then they must desist in giving talks, lectures and passing fatwas and they need to stay at home – they’re useless – and leave the job to the real men, the true inheritors of the prophet (BBC News, 2005b).

From the above quote, it is clear that MSK considered himself best suited to deal with the injustices faced by Muslims in the UK. He ridicules the religious leaders, essentially saying they are cowards who are happy with mediocrity, and are sinners for turning their backs on Jihad. By the use of “real men” and “true inheritors of the prophet” one may assume that he was proud of himself and considered his stance to be noble. Furthermore, when there are many people feeling oppressed and relatively deprived, some individuals will climb to the second floor to seek a solution; as stated earlier Kruglanski and Fishman (2009) support this observation.

On the second floor, the individual seeks a solution. On this stage in the process, individuals perceive themselves as unable to influence decision-making processes in society. One could assume not having any power or influence in matters he considered to affect his life and identity, lead to frustration. Rational Choice Theory on the second step therefore explains terrorism as a result of a conscious, rational and deliberate decision to use terrorism to achieve certain socio-political goals (Lygre et al., 2011). The decision MSK made may not seem very rational – he is not around to benefit from his action, as only in death is he given recognition. What is “rational” in this case is what MSK chose given his subjective opinion and worldview. Putting aside the free-rider problem, one must take into consideration feelings of responsibility (to his people and what he interpreted as his religions ethical duties), emotions and martyrdom.

Step three in the Staircase Model is about the displacement of aggression. The displacement of aggression is about individuals directing anger and frustration towards an external enemy, who they perceive as responsible for their situation (they may not be, however) (Lygre et al., 2011). MSK was openly angered by the interference and influence of Western powers in the Muslim world. MSK considered himself to be holy warrior, someone who was defending the Muslim identity. He
viewed Europe as opponents and believed he was saving Islamic culture from the West (Pantucci, 2011).

On the fourth floor, one finds recruitment into the terror organisation. According to Staun (2008) MSK spent a lot of time with other young Muslim men discussing religion and politics at his workplace, the Hamara Youth Access Point (HYAP). He also frequented the local Islamic bookshop and the “Al-Qaeda gym” (p.44), a boxing gym in Beeston that drew radicals. Furthermore, MSK and Tanweer reportedly spent a lot of time at Finsbury Park Mosque. Essentially social networks played a significant role in MSK’s path of radicalisation. These social circles may have played a part in shifting his attitude towards Islamic radicalism. It is alleged that on his trips to Pakistan and Afghanistan, MSK attended a military training camp. It is alleged that the video statement released in 2005 was recorded on one of these trips (Staun, 2008).

On the last floor, individuals become psychologically prepared and motivated to commit acts of terrorism, sometimes resulting in multiple civilian deaths. Psychological distancing is achieved partly through the adoption of terrorist myths, for example, by attacking civilian targets, social order will be disrupted and this can be used as a way to make people see the truth and rebel against authorities (Moghaddam, 2005). One cannot be certain as to how these trips to Pakistan and Afghanistan affected MSK however they may have functioned as catalysts, hastening and strengthening the process of radicalisation. It is a possibility that he encountered acquaintances that inspired him to carry out his attack in Britain. There was a short period of time between his trip to Pakistan and the 7/7 attacks – perhaps these trips solidified MSK’s commitment to Jihad, and provided him with experience and education to carry out the attack.
Table 1: Table showing factors of the Root Cause Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) and the Staircase to Terrorism Model (Moghaddam, 2005) applicable to MSK.

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<th>Table 1:</th>
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<td>Mohammed Sidique Khan</td>
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<td>PROGRESS ON THE STAIRCASE</td>
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<td>Macro: Social</td>
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<td>Step 3 ✓</td>
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<td>Self Categorisation and Social Identity</td>
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<td>Recruitment</td>
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<td>Collective Emotions</td>
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<td>Micro: Individual</td>
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<td>Step 4 ✓</td>
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<td>Emotion</td>
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<td>Rational Choice</td>
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<td>Step 5 ✓</td>
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6.2.2 IMAM ANJEM CHOUDARY

AC’s father was a Pakistani stallholder at the Deptford market in south-east London in the 1980’s and 1990’s. He would walk his father to work every day, however the one day that he was too busy to do so, his mother did – that day his father died at the market (Crowcroft, 2015). As mentioned previously McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) made note, unfreezing which refers to the loss of assurance in relationships and everyday routines. This state of personal crisis and disconnection may leave an individual feeling they have less to lose, therefore they go in search of new pathways. Perhaps AC found comfort in embracing his faith.

On the second step one looks at the RCT that sees terrorism as a conscious and rational decision to achieve one’s goals. Although AC has not committed an act of terror – he has encouraged others and always provides a rationale for terror attacks. With regards to the attack of Charlie Hebdo, AC released an open letter that was published in USA Today. An extract from the letter read, “although Muslims may not
agree about the idea of freedom of expression, even non-Muslims who espouse it say it comes with responsibilities. In an increasingly unstable and insecure world, the potential consequences of insulting the Messenger Muhammad are known to Muslims and non-Muslims alike…Why did France allow the tabloid to provoke Muslims?” (Nianias, 2015). From this extract, it is clear that AC sees the attack as retaliation with a just cause. “Why did…provoked Muslims?” insinuating that one should know the consequences of provocation. He also referred to the terrorists who orchestrated 9/11 as “magnificent martyrs” (Nianias, 2015). Furthermore, he called Central News Network (CNN) present Brian Stelter “shallow” because Stelter took offense to jokes AC made about 9/11 and the 7/7 bombings – AC maintains that "Under divine law it is allowed to [joke about] 9/11, whereas insulting the prophet is not allowed " (Anthony, 2014).

On the third step one is again looking at the displacement of aggression. With regards to AC, one cannot see it entirely as anger or frustration – he berates the non-Muslims and British lifestyle for not accepting what he sees as natural and logical. AC seems to focus on Britain. He asserts, "Britain is double haram [forbidden] because they are anathema to God's law," said Choudary. "They're not implementing it. They are violating its sanctity and therefore this is war against Allah and his messenger” (Moon, 2013). AC views the British way of life as inferior, and believes that the Islamic State has more to offer, despite facts proving otherwise.

Everybody gets about $500 a month free of charge, no questions asked. Iraq and Syria can afford it as they have oil. You’re given free food, clothing and shelter. You get a free house and electricity, gas and water. You also get income support, I mean, you don’t even get housing free of charge here. It’s a much better society there. Alcohol, gambling, pornography and drugs, are completely eradicated (The Clarion Project, 2014).

AC referred to the British army and Muslims in that army as ‘apostates”. AC seems to consider himself a holy warrior who is saving the UK and its citizens by advocating Islam and trying to implement Sharia Law.

On the fourth floor one finds recruitment into the terror organisation. AC’s path to radicalisation began the day he met Omar Bakri Mohammed. He was radicalized and
has now formed his own groups. AC is now infamous for spreading his radical opinions – his tweets are proof of this. He has stated: “Non-Muslims associate with God: OBJECTS: Sun, cow & cross etc PEOPLE: Kings, Presidents & Prime Ministers etc IDEAS: Democracy, Freedom etc”, “The only true monotheists are Muslims. Hence, we call Christians, Jews, Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists to give up their polytheism and embrace Islam”, “There is nothing called a Muslim in the British army, they are apostates, it's an oxymoron. As Allah says [EMQ 5:51]”, “If you differ any aspect of the Qur'an or Sunnah (actions of the Prophet) then that means your Fitrah (natural disposition) has been polluted!”, Under Shari'ah, no one can propagate falsehood openly eg Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism, Democracy, Freedom, H Rights, Atheism”, “Apostates from Islam also include: British Police, British Army, Navy & Airforce, Judges judging by kufr, MP's, Those helping in "Prevent"” (@anjemchoudary). There are many more examples of AC views as shared on Twitter, however in order to provide a succinct account, only a few have been used.

Approximately 70 people associated with AC’s network have been convicted of terrorism or related charges in the UK, other have been killed in acts outside the UK in the last 14 years – it is also reported that the 7/7 bombers were connected to AC’s associations (The Clarion Project, 2014).

On the last floor one becomes psychologically ready to commit an act of terror. AC does not seem to want to be involved directly in the holy war he punts. Waldmann (2010) notes that very few individuals join and partake in the violence of a armed radial organisation, however there are many people willing to support the violence via delivery of weapons, financial aid, supporting the fighters morally and with physical sustenance, offering them sanctuary and making use of propaganda for their cause. AC seems more comfortable encouraging others - “I believe you can support your brothers and sisters verbally and financially. If I really believed it was an ideological obligation to travel abroad and wage jihad, I would do it. I had many opportunities” – (Crowcroft, 2015). Despite this observation, one should not neglect AC’s exceptional psychological distancing. With regards to the murder and attempted decapitation of British soldier Lee Rigby, AC praised his attacker (Adebolago) as a “martyr” and said Rigby would “burn in hellfire”. He went further to say:
Allah said very clearly in the Koran 'Don't feel sorry for the non-Muslims.' So as an adult non-Muslim, whether he is part of the Army or not part of the Army, if he dies in a state of disbelief then he is going to go to the hellfire. That's what I believe so I'm not going to feel sorry for non-Muslims. We invite them to embrace the message of Islam. If they don't, then obviously if they die like that they're going to the hellfires (Kern, 2015).

On the 6th of September 2016, AC was sentenced to five and a half years in prison for soliciting support for ISIS (Castle, 2016).

**Table 2:** table showing factors of the Root Cause Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) and the Staircase to Terrorism Model (Moghaddam, 2005) applicable to AC.

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<th>Anjem Choudary</th>
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<th>PROGRESS ON THE STAIRCASE</th>
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<td>MACRO: SOCIAL</td>
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<td>RELATIVE DEPRIVATION</td>
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<td>SOCIAL INTERACTION AND GROUP PROCESSES</td>
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<td>MACRO</td>
<td>STEP 1 ☑️</td>
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<td>INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS</td>
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6.3 Causal Factors at the Macro Level

6.3.1 Poor Integration

In Britain, it is often said that Muslims need to embrace British values whereby radicalisation is constructed as the result of youths who are alienated and live in segregated communities. “In the public sphere, terrorism, radicalism and extremism
became entangled with notions of integration, segregation and multiculturalism, and because terrorism was the number one national security priority for Britain” (Lynch, 2013, p.243). According to Inglehart and Norris (2009) the UK was particularly upset that the perpetrators of events such as the Madrid (2004) and London bombings (one of the bombers being MSK) (2005) were British-born second-generation Muslim youths. These events raised fears that second-generation Muslims living in isolated urban communities were separated from democratic societies. These events “also played on deeper anxieties about Britain’s growing diversity and apparent loss of a cohesive identity” (Briggs & Birdwell, 2009). MSK was the son of Pakistani immigrants and lived in a relatively poor, immigrant populated area BBC News, 2007; Staun, 2008). It is thought that alienation may lead to the development of sympathy with extremist Islamic movements (Inglehart & Norris, 2009). According to Haider (2015, p.2) “The separation of religion from culture of origin has led some Muslim diasporas to identify with the global Islamic community and show solidarity to Islamic war victims worldwide. This could lead to radicalisation when combined with anti-Imperialistic phraseology”. In an effort to distinguish possible extremists from the rest of British society, the focus fell upon an individual’s parents’ or grandparents’ country of origin. By trying to understand radicalisation, immigration history became the focus of attention. By focusing on the foreign heritage of individuals, their loyalty to Britain and its’ values were questioned. In order to understand radicalisation, the focus fell on their otherness. By focusing on the Muslim youth and their perceived vulnerability to radicalisation, immigrants were constructed as problematic with regards to terrorism and radicalisation (Lynch, 2013). According to Inglehart and Norris (2009) cultural integration theories propose that immigrants absorb the norms and values that dominate their host society – especially with regards to inter-generational cases. On the other hand there are theories of divergence, which suggest that there are prevailing norms for each nation that are shaped by collective history, language and religious traditions. Therefore, some migrants are not likely to forsake these values when they settle elsewhere. According to an opinion poll (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006, as cited in Briggs & Birdwell, 2009) based on a religious-cultural negativity index of seven characteristics, British Muslims were more likely to view a conflict between Islam and modernity, thereby identifying firmly on religious rather than national lines which AC and MSK both share.
According to Choudhury (2007) the devaluation and vilification of Muslims and the religion of Islam is an external factor that has increased in-group solidarity and identification based on religion. For young Muslim men, the “Muslim” part of their identity may provide a sense of masculinity, and be a way to ward off the appearance of weakness or docility – “We are at war and I am a soldier” (Mohammed Sidique Khan, 2005; BBC News, 2005a). The politics inherent in Muslim identity can encourage integration. Actions surrounding the demands for religious accommodation have mobilized Muslim communities towards political engagement. Due to this mobilisation being based in religion and ethnicity, it may be seen to perpetuate segregation. Choudhury (2007) asserts that this form of political engagement encourages other forms of civic and political engagement.

As stated earlier it is difficult to achieve assimilation and multiculturalism. When the parallel society is developed, coupled with the marginalisation of immigrant groups this may result in the growth of “ghettoized diaspora communities” (Haider, 2015, p.6). It is important to note that a lack of integration is more likely the result of political, economic and social exclusion as opposed to religion or culture (Hemmingsen, 2010). The isolation of these communities allows for well-thought-out recruitment by radical to go unnoticed for long periods of time (Haider, 2015). The difficulties of forming a cohesive identity may be what makes young people vulnerable to radicalisation (Briggs & Birdwell, 2009; Aslam-Motala, 2011).

For young people the search for their identity is how they define their relationship with the world. This process does not necessarily lead to radicalisation, as the path towards radicalisation requires interpersonal interaction with those who may influence the radicalisation process (Choudhury, 2007), however it is also possible to self-radicalise.

In his study of the literature surrounding radicalisation and identity, Choudhury (2007) makes note of four important aspects. First, radicalisation coincides with the search for identity at a moment of crisis in one’s life. Second, this crisis involves a sense of not belonging or being accepted, which may be intensified by experiences of discrimination, racism or feeling that one has no social mobility. Third, the appeal of radical organisations may reflect the ineffectual nature of religious organisations to connect with the youth, and help them address their concerns. Fourth, those who are
drawn to radical groups appear to novices to the faith, and are unable to accurately evaluate the legitimacy of the groups understanding and interpretation of Islam.

When discussing her research on Muslim youth and Jihad at a TEDxExeter conference, Deeyah Khan (2016) stated:

I found broken people… these young men were torn apart trying to bridge the gaps between their families and the countries they were born in. And what I also learnt is that extremist groups, terrorist groups are taking advantage of these feelings of our young people and cynically channelling that towards violence. “Come to us!” they say, “Reject both sides – your family and your country because they reject you. For your family, their honour is more important than you. And for your country – a real Norwegian, Brit or a French person will always be white – never you”. They are also promising our young people the things that they crave – significance, heroism, a sense of belonging and purpose – a community that loves and accepts them. They make the powerless feel powerful, the invisible and the silent are finally seen and heard.

6.4 Causes at a Macro Level: Social Factors
6.4.1 Self-categorisation and Social Identity

The Western-based Islamic terrorists are not the militant vanguard of the Muslim community; they are a lost generation, unmoored from traditional societies and cultures, frustrated by a Western society that does not meet their expectations (Roy, 2005).

At the heart of Islamic radicalisation and its collective actions lies the problematic issue of group membership and identification with others. One must take into consideration the effects of not having a positive social identity – the struggle to find an identity, the need to belong and to avoid rejection. This is a problem many Muslim youth face in the western world. The crisis may lie in the conflict within their ethnic and cultural background whilst having the fear of being rejected by western society (Roy, 2005; Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).

According to Fukuyama (2006) issues surrounding identity are not found in Muslim societies. In a traditional Muslim society, one is given an identity by one’s parents
and social environment – one’s identity is linked in particular to a branch of Islam faith and it is not a choice. Islam is a legalistic religion conforming to externally determined localised social rules. Identity becomes a salient problem when these individuals leave their societies and enter the western world. One’s identity as a Muslim is not externally supported, instead one is encouraged to conform to western norms, resulting in a disconnect between one’s inner identity and one’s behaviour in the new environment. This may account for the constant questioning of what is allowed (Halal) and what is not (Haram) – individuals are not able to conduct themselves free of doubt, in these new and unprecedented situations. According to Grattan (2009) the indigenous and migrant community may have different concerns – the uncertainty of a communal, cultural and economic nature, and the other concerned with issues of faith, community, culture, religion and identity, respectively. Grattan (2009) argues, with reference to contemporary Great Britain, that these concerns may give rise to ethnocentrism, hatred, violence, xenophobia and nationalism. Radical Islam often attempts to clear up this confusion and answer the question of identity, therefore it should be viewed as a form of identity politics. First-generation immigrants, for example, generally carry their traditions and cultural nuances to their new homes. Their children however, may be at odds with their roots whilst not having fully integrated into their new society. This confusion can be the catalyst for an interest in the universalistic ideology of jihadism – “you are a member of a global umma defined by adherence to a universal Islamic doctrine that has been stripped of all of its local customs, saints, traditions and the like” (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 3). According to Haider (2015) adhering to religion among second and third generation groups is seen as a choice, as opposed to a feeling of loyalty towards the country of origin. These conditions allow for the separation of religion from the cultures of origin. Cultural continuity from one generation to the next, including the challenges of gaining access to the culture of the host country can result in a cultural void. Ethnicity without culture can provide the foundation for radicalisation whereby culture is replaced with violence.

Abbas (2012) argues that radicalisation is fuelled by Islamophobia and vice versa.

Since the 1960s, governments in Britain shaped policy and practice for ethnic minority groups based on various strategies of anti-immigration and anti-
discrimination legislation on the one hand, and with a programme of assimilation, integration and, most recently, multiculturalism on the other hand. In the 2000s, various attempts were made by outspoken political commentators to suggest that ‘multiculturalism is dead’ (cf. Lentin and Titley 2011) (Abbas, 2012)

In response, he argues, British Muslims were motivating each other to participate in, and integrate into society. One may argue that the Islamophobia – the fear of Muslims – stems from a fear of multiculturalism and the inherent incompatibility of such differences. Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010) argue that Islamophobia combines the dislike of a religion and the active dislike of individuals who affiliate with that religion. Furthermore, it involves Islam being viewed as a static religion, resistant to change; Islam is viewed as ‘other’ as well as inferior, primitive, sexist, aggressive, militant and irrational; Islam is viewed as political ideology used for militancy, and anti-Muslim hostility is viewed as normal/natural given the circumstances (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010). Integration and acceptance has proven difficult due to racist hostility, giving British Muslims little choice but to retreat into their communities (Abbas, 2012). According to Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010) there has been a rise in Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crimes, which can create divisions throughout Europe, “alienating friends, neighbours and political partners” (p.7). They assert that negative portrayals of London as Londonistan; Muslims as terrorists and/or terrorist sympathisers are the motivation for anti-Muslim hate crimes and Islamophobia. Haider (2015) asserts that counter-terrorism measures that disproportionately affect Muslims and encourage anti-Muslim sentiment contribute to feelings of exclusion and vilification, which may only serve to strengthen their identification with Islam. Abbas (2012) argues that one must then consider the notion of Islamic revivalism. This is a means of protest against injustices towards Muslim identity and culture, whereby Muslims assert an identity and recognition, using language or slogans that are seen as typical of Islam. According to Hemmingsen (2010) when individuals come together in this way and engage in conflict, they are forming under a shared ‘shared language’ (p. 35) whereby they can share and relieve the tension of their lack of recognition, whilst gaining acknowledgement from the group and their surroundings. This type of protest is liberating “because they are now a group causing conflict – and narrate themselves as living in a future in which they are recognised for what they are. This
represents a way to restore the positive self-relation” (Hemmingsen, 2010, pp. 35-36). The primary grievances include barriers to social mobility, economic hardship, and a lack of political and or legal freedoms. These revivalisms are seen as a panicked reaction by Muslims who feel their religion and identity are being threatened, the Rushdie Affair is an example. Muslims all over the world have to deal with negative representations in the media and popular culture. According to Haider (2015) social media-propaganda can play an important role in the spread of radical ideology, with one of the most popular means of spreading radical messages being Youtube. One must also take into account the possibility of vilification. This occurs when the actions of a minority create widespread negative feelings and discriminatory responses towards specific groups. The process of vilification facilitates the alienation of groups and radicalisation. Events such as 9/11 and the resistance to the occupation of Iraq and Palestine portray Muslims as terrorists (Abbas, 2012). A survey on several Muslim groups found that since 9/11, 80% of Muslim respondents felt they were subjected to Islamophobia; 68% felt they had been seen and treated differently; and 32% felt discriminated against at UK airports (FAIR, 2004, as cited in Briggs & Birdwell, 2009). Islamophobia can be viewed as the fuel of radicalisation. Fear as a product of the media as well as social injustices are forcing individuals to retreat into their secular communities, continuing the cycle of racism and increasing the chance of radicalisation (Abbas, 2012).

6.4.2 The Role of Prisons

AC’s threat to “radicalise everyone in prison” (Kern, 2015) may be perceived as an intimidation technique, however recruiting prison inmates for terrorist organisations is not a new phenomenon (Cuthbertson, 2004; Cilluffo et al., 2007; Mulcahy, Merrington & Bell, 2013). “The prison environment is an incubator for creating a dedicated and hardened terrorist, offering ideal conditions for both the initial recruitment and radicalisation of new members and for the further indoctrination and training of existing cadres” (Cuthbertson, 2004, p.19). It is however a phenomenon that is poorly understood due to the limited information available to researchers (Mulcahy, Merrington & Bell, 2013).

Prisoners are particularly attractive targets for extremists because they form a captive
audience that displays traits that make them vulnerable to radicalisation, such as anti-social attitudes, violent propensities, social isolation and alienation. Reasons as to why prisoners are susceptible to radicalisation in prison involve the very nature of life in prison - despondency, isolation and a sense of uncertainty (Brandon, 2009; Mulcahy, Merrington & Bell, 2013). One must also take into account that prisoners may need to join gangs for protection, allowing extremists to influence them further (Cilluffo et al, 2007). Furthermore Awan (2013) asserts that the search for identity may lead to inmates allying themselves with those who seem to have more power or influence within the prison environment. Those who lack an identity may begin to feel isolated and feel the need to join a gang where acts of violence are justified.

A study by conducted by the Quilliam Foundation (Brandon, 2009) found that the cause of radicalisation in prisons is the result of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors – the ‘pull’ factors involve existing radicals to pull others into their worldview, while the ‘push’ factors are those which lead ordinary people, Muslim and non-Muslim towards radicalisation (Brandon, 2009). According to Precht (2007, p.60) “Prisons are “crisis” environments that create a desire for belonging, group identity, protection and religious guidance”. Extremists actively seek out new members, with new arrivals in prison being approached and offered social and moral support. This companionship may lead to the offer of spiritual advice or religious guidance, which inevitably turns to radical ideology. Concurrently, some extremists will aim to become the leaders of a given Muslim prison population. Abu Hamza, a convicted terrorist, for example, led food and other injustice protests in Belmarsh. This behaviour gives them a moral authority over the other Muslim prisoners, and grants them the appearance of role models (Brandon, 2009). Mulcahy, Merrington and Bell (2013) concur with Brandon (2009) and credit the vulnerability of new prisoners to physical and emotion trauma. When an individual is incarcerated they experience acute and chronic of stress, quite possibly resulting in them becoming more impressionable and vulnerable. In this state it is easy for recruiters to evaluate their likeliness of conforming to the extremist group. Furthermore, unbalanced emotional states – hate, anger, fear doubt, humiliation, etcetera – make an ideal target for recruiters (Mulcahy, Merrington & Bell, 2013). There are also some issues within the prison system itself that help bolster the appeal of radical Islam. One of these issues is the disconnect between the religious sensibilities of Muslim prisoners and the security needs of Correctional
Services, for example, strip searches, the presence and use of canines and the provision of Halal food. Some other errors involve training and using other inmates (suspected terrorists) as ‘listeners’ to mentor others, and using some known radicals as ‘go-betweens’ for prison staff and other Muslim inmates (Brandon, 2009).

Once individuals have adopted extremist ideologies in prison, their radicalisation becomes increasingly entrenched as they distance themselves from less extreme inmates, begin reading hard-line Islamist literature and holding small study circles with their fellow extremists (Brandon, 2009). One must however, acknowledge a different angle. Some prisoners will adopt Islamism during their sentence in order to benefit from the protection and support it offers them, better food, or longer time out of cells (which should be used for prayer) (Jones, 2014). Upon release those who had converted to Islam may not follow the path to extremism – a small percentage will become radicalized with an even smaller percentage joining terrorist organisations (Brandon, 2009; Mulcahy, Merrington & Bell, 2013). Furthermore, not all adoptions of the faith are unscrupulous. Religion is a way to help people abandon unbeneficial behaviours and adopt a new lifestyle. The idea that the adoption of a religion will lead to radicalisation and terrorism is unsupported. Furthermore, it would be ignoring the differences between religious observance, radicalisation and terrorism (Brandon, 2009; Jones, 2014).

The concept of radicalisation in prison is complex and there is no discernible link between radicalisation and prison Imams, or converting to Islam. Little is known about radicalisation in the prison system. One could even call it conjecture in light of little evidence. This is not to say there is no risk – As dynamic and charismatic as AC is, research shows it is more a case of whether there is a significant risk (Precht, 2007; Rappaport, Veldhuis & Guiora, 2012; Jones, 2014). As stated earlier, the nature of prison life can make one receptive to radicalisation – frustration, discrimination and sadness. One of the greatest concerns is what happens to prisoners who have converted or are attracted to radicalized ideologies once they leave the prison environment (Precht, 2007). Vulnerability to radicalisation does not cease after one is released from prison. Upon leaving prison some individuals find they have little monetary, emotional or familial support. Individuals can find support through community and religious groups. Without these vital aspects of support – keeping in
mind it is possible for an extremist group to appear as a legitimate support organisation - they may reoffend or go further down the path to radicalisation. (Cilluffo et al, 2007; Precht, 2007). With regards to those who do commit acts of terror upon leaving prison such as Richard Reid, it is difficult to ascertain whether their radicalisation occurred primarily due to their incarceration (Jones 2014).

6.5 South African Case Studies

6.5.1 MUSTAFA MOHAMED (also known as MUSTAFA JONKER)

Without a history of MJ, it is not entirely possible to apply the stair case theory. One is able to see that, like MSK, on the first step MJ perceived injustices with regards to the South African government (the African National Congress (ANC)). He views the ANC as treacherous, serving only the needs of middle and upper class black South Africans, whilst being puppeteer by Europe and the United States. Accordingly, the result of this betrayal, according to MJ, is a widening gap between the rich and the poor, with the accompanying crime statistics.

MJ sees Islam as a means of combating the “Crusader-Zionist alliance and her pawns in power”. One may assume from this interview that MJ adopted a radical interpretation of Islam. According to Solomon (2013) upon inspecting the views of MJ one will find traces of Wahhabist ideology, anti-Semitism, the commitment to violent change, an inaccurate view of history and a limited understanding of economics and politics. It is likely that the resentment he feels towards the government and Western powers legitimize his feelings of injustice and choice to advocate a radical view of Islam.

On the second step one seeks a solution, or a means to correct the injustice – perhaps viewing terrorism as a feasible option. “I began advocating as Allah commanded…pride in it” shows that being labelled as a terrorist does not phase MJ. He views it as the outcome of a honourable deed – “Ours is a blessed terror”. His rationality is that acts of terror are committed for a great cause under a sense of responsibility whereby one should feel proud. He may like AJ, not be guilty of, or perpetrate an act of terror however; the support of this rationale may encourage others to do so, whereby the supporters receive the “benefits”.

The third step may be viewed in his displacement of aggression towards the United
States and the Jewish community. He views the US as oppressive and as the cause of suffering for Muslims in South Africa and all over the world. There is not enough information available to take MJ to the fourth step. From this interview one can recognize how passionate he is in his beliefs. Even though one cannot ascertain whether MJ is part of, or trying to develop a terror organisation/movement, his views and vocal nature should be cause for concern. This interview should not be dismissed as representing a powerless or insignificant minority (Solomon, 2013).

**Table 3:** table showing factors of the Root Cause Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) and the Staircase to Terrorism Model (Moghaddam, 2005) applicable to MJ.

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<tr>
<th>Mustafa Mohamed</th>
<th>FACTOR FOUND WITHIN THE RCM</th>
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6.5.2 BRANDON-LEE AND TONY-LEE THULSIE

On the first step on is looking at feelings of relative deprivation, as well as perceived injustices or dissatisfaction. Begg, in reference to the twins, said “they had problems with South Africa, specifically with the upcoming elections. Their new teachers said voting was forbidden” (Hoskens, 2016). The twins also felt that “imams [were] not fulfilling their duties” and said “good Muslim [’s] had to speak up about the abuse of ‘our people’ [in Palestine and Syria]” (Hoskens, 2016). The twins seemed to be upset about the way Muslims were being treated all over the world, and felt that the imams
in South Africa were not doing enough to aid them. As mentioned previously, Al-Lami (2009) notes that Muslim youth who partake in extremist violence are religious novices – the twins were new to the religion, as they had converted. Their superficial understanding of Islam left them unable to assess the legitimacy of the interpretation of Islam offered by their chosen teachers and the internet, which makes them vulnerable to radicalisation and extremist violence (Al-Lami, 2009).

On the second step one would begin to look for a way to address the perceived injustice or dissatisfaction. Begg had said that the twins were looking for purpose and wanted to be soldiers for their religion (Hoskens, 2016). The source of knowledge they chose, Sheik Ahmed Musa Jibril, is an Arab-American Islamist preacher based in the US. Jibril does not actively call for violent but he does support foreign fighters and validates the Syrian conflict with great emotion in an articulate and compelling fashion utilizing religious or sectarian idioms. Jibril’s attitude towards the West is combative and distrusting – he fuels the idea of a conspiracy against Muslims and Islam. Jibril is entitled to his opinion, however others may view his opinion (coupled with his status as a religious leader) as a legitimisation for joining a jihadist group (Cater, Maher & Neumann, 2014).

The third step is about the displacement of aggression. It has already been stated that the twins were unhappy with South Africa and its’ imams. On the last step one is looking at recruitment into a terrorist organisation. There is not enough information to ascertain if the twins were members of IS, although TLT was in regular contact under the pseudonym Simba (Henderson, 2016a).

The case of the Thulsie twins is an important trial for South Africa as the way in which it is handled will have an impact on the way the country is viewed, especially by the Muslim community and IS – as Martin Ewi (Security Analyst and Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies) pointed out, Islam is not on trial – “People want to see justice being carried out, because if they don’t see justice, some might see this as a blatant attack on Islam…government has to remove religion from this case because it is not about Islam. They were not arrested for being Muslim. Once people feel that injustice has been done, that too could radicalize some people to go to the extent of actually carrying out the attacks” (Udeh, 2016).
Opperman (2016) points out a few mistakes that have been made in the case against the Thulsie twins. Firstly, the photographs used as evidence to show the accused as posing with a rifle and bomb vest, turned out to be paintball equipment. Secondly, the state had admitted to using foreign intelligence with regards to the evidence of TLT making contact with members of IS – Opperman (2016) states that it is rare for foreign intelligence to be used in a court of law. Thirdly, the single witness, Ronaldo Smith has since claimed he was coerced into making a statement about the twins, is not in a witness protection programme. Fourthly, bank statements were used as an argument to show financial support towards IS and the enactment of the supposed terror attack. Lastly, and the most troubling is that no experts of terrorism were consulted, with Detective Warrant Officer Wynand Olivier stating that one could Google “Jihadists”. This statement shows a lack, of not only understanding, but also a lack of procedure and experience with terror related crimes.

Opperman (2016) notes a lack of knowledge with regards to IS and its potential to orchestrate acts of terror in South Africa. As mentioned previously South Africa is more at risk for the acts of a lone wolf (Piper, 2015). According to Opperman (2016) if foreign intelligence does indeed reveal contact with a high-ranking member of IS South Africa should be deeply concerned. However current information reveals a focus on the Middle East, Asia and Europe. And with regards to the bank statements, it is unlikely to link a cash transfer to planning or execution of an act of terror. The on-going investigation may give the impression of a lack of damning evidence. Essentially, Opperman (2016) views this case as a “watershed case, [possibly] for all the wrong reasons” as the evidence presented does not fit the modus operandi of IS. This case will be publicized and scrutinized by many considering that South Africa has not had any prolific terror threats or plots unearthed on a large scale.
Table 4: Table showing factors of the Root Cause Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) and the Staircase to Terrorism Model (Moghaddam, 2005) applicable to BLT and TLT.

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6.6 Causal Factors at the Macro Level

6.6.1 Poor Integration

According to Haider (2015) assimilation and multiculturalism are the most common models of integration. The goal of assimilation is to form a national identity that minimises religious or cultural differences. Multiculturalism on the other hand, aims to allow groups to maintain their distinct identities. It is difficult for both of these models to be achieved, the result of which is a lack of social cohesion- and much like in the UK the formation of a homogenous parallel society.

According to Vahed (2013) in South Africa, approximately ninety-per cent of Muslims can be classified as either ‘Indian’ or ‘Malay’ Muslim; with the remaining ten per cent being classified as African. According to the racial classification system in South Africa, the Malay’s would form part of the coloured community. According to Vahed (2013) “South African Muslims are deeply divided by race, class, ethnicity,
language, politics, education, and beliefs”, a sentiment, which is shared by MJ.

Division and a lack of integration are found within the Muslim community. There is a perception amongst African Muslims that Islam is predominantly an Indian religion. The Africans who do embrace Islam are viewed as “colonized” by the Indians, and wonder why the Indian Muslim community do not extend a helping hand to matters closer to home than they do with Muslims from other countries faced with natural disasters, wars and misfortune (Vahed, 2013). African Muslims sometimes feel alienated from the Indian and Malay Muslim circles, with many converts finding they are not welcomed the way in which they were expecting (Aslam-Motala, 2011).

Muslims in South Africa have only recently begun to negotiate their identities as South African Muslims. Many being fourth generation or more have no ties to India or Pakistan, therefore they must begin to form their identity. For many years in Europe and the United States there has been a struggle to form a cohesive identity around Muslim culture and tradition and Western ideologies. Being a good Muslim may constitute following tradition – traditions set in the country of origin. The younger generation may be in a state of confusion, on one hand there are the traditions explained by scholars and organisations and on the other, Muslims who say they are bi-cultural and have combined Western discourse with Islamic tradition and practice. There seems to be a gap whereby the information they receive via traditionalists is in contradiction with reality – for example, the Thulsie twins believed that South African imams were doing a disservice to Muslims around the world by not speaking up about the violence that is being experienced by the global Muslim community (Hoskens, 2016). There are scholars who believe in, and are becoming more relevant, speaking about current events, political participation and social problems affecting Muslims in South Africa today (Aslam-Motala, 2011). South African Muslims have integrated well, in contrast to some British Muslims. According to Hellyer (2015) South African Muslims form an integral part of society – they are patriotic and do not find difficulty in assimilating this with their specificities as Muslims. Due to the long history of Muslims in South Africa, there may an established precedent that prevents these individuals from feeling alienated. This does not mean the risk of radicalisation is not present. There are undoubtedly others who share the views of individuals like MJ who believes the South African government has sold itself to multinational corporations and is solely interested in the welfare of
black South Africans.

It is not clear as to how many South Africans are already fighting alongside radical groups in Syria and Iraq. A young girl from Cape Town was stopped at the airport on her way to Syria to support ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). Therefore, even though South African Muslims have integrated well into society, the threat of radical groups must not be underestimated (Hellyer, 2015). For example, once the Thulsie twins had developed an interest in the radical Islamists ideology, they began to pull away from friends and family, and adopted views in line with the Islamist ideology – they began to separate themselves from their old lives.

One may argue that the lack of a terrorist attack may be an attempt of these radical groups to not ruin the current arrangement they have with South Africa. It would make little sense to attack the country which provides safety, funding and travel documentation. (Piper, 2015).

6.6.2 Poverty

According to Bhui, Warfa and Jones (2014) there are two main hypotheses that could explain the sympathy or support for radical thoughts and behaviours. The first posits that inequality (social and health), poverty, discrimination, unemployment and poor social networks produce grievances, which enable people to sympathise with radical behaviours. MJ was particularly aggravated by the gap between the rich and poor in South Africa, which according to him is “a direct result of the government’s neoliberal capitalist policies” resulting in crime which led him to “advocating as Allah commanded direct action against the Crusader-Zionist alliance and her pawns in power and this is the background behind my being labeled a terrorist” (Solomon, 2013).

The second suggests that radicalisation and the consequent support it receives are political processes shaped by influential people. Many authors (Krueger & Malecˇkova´, 2003; Piazza, 2006; Bhui, Warfa & Jones, 2014) support the latter theory, stating that the connection, if any, between poverty, education and terrorism is weak.

Krueger and Malecˇkova´ (2003) assert that terrorism is a form of violent political engagement, whereby those who participate are more likely to be wealthy and
A study by Bhui, Warfa and Jones (2014) supports this, by finding that those who are young, wealthy and educated are more likely to sympathise with radical thoughts and behaviours. One cannot assume that poor political conditions or poverty alone, are enough to lead an individual towards terrorism. If material conditions alone were the cause of terrorism, the poorest individuals living in the most impoverished areas would be responsible for many acts of terror - and this is not the case (Moghaddam, 2005). Berrebi (2007) offers an explanation as to why those who are educated and wealthy would sympathise with radical ideologies and partake in terrorist activities.

Education may increase the likelihood of terrorist activity as it may advocate a certain political message, increasing individual’s chances of joining a terrorist organisation. In such a case it may encourage radical thought whilst “only on the margin increase productive opportunities in the labour market.” Furthermore, highly educated individuals may be more aware of, and be agitated by the implications of odd instances of injustice and discrimination. In a similar way, a sense of social responsibility is developed whereby those who are educated may feel the need to assist with a certain cause. Accordingly, one could reverse the connection between education and terrorism – an individual may be interested in joining a terror organisation, but may need to educate themselves further to be a valuable member of an organisation. Conversely, terrorism may be the response to limited opportunities with regards to occupation – this would apply to qualified individuals who cannot succeed for reasons such as their social standing or heritage. One must also consider that participation may not be a case of differential motivation but rather a choice by the terror organisation itself. Apart from education, wealth is attractive to terror organisations in terms of monetary investment. Lastly, poorer individuals may be concerned with more pressing daily worries such as supporting their families to devote themselves to the terror organisation (Berrebi, 2007).

It is suggested that terrorism (the possible result of radicalisation) be viewed as a response to long-term feelings of indignity and the resultant frustration, as opposed to a response based on ignorance or lack of opportunities.
6.7 Causes at a Macro Level: Social Factors

6.7.1 Self-categorisation and Social Identity

According to Achmat (2014) South Africa appears to be a symbol of peaceful coexistence with an engaging Muslim community. This situation was not achieved instantly nor easily. In the twentieth century, the Apartheid system which was introduced by the National Party, decided that the ethnic and religious identity of Muslims in South Africa were inferior. From institutionalised racism, deprivation of rights – including the right to practice Islam – discrimination and prejudice, there has been great progress for South African Muslims as they, like all South Africans are now free and equal contributors to their society. MJ on the other hand believes that democratic South Africa is a “symbolic multicultural government which is dictated to by and passes laws on behalf of mainly European and American companies, the same Crusader nations pillaging Afghanistan and Iraq today” (Solomon, 2013).

There have been a few notable experiences of discrimination in South Africa in 2016, two of which will be discussed. In June 2016, a Christian school in Gauteng was accused of Islamophobia. The schools’ head of student affairs (Bob Fuller) had sent a letter to the students’ parents, which activist Yusuf Abramjee found quite insulting. The letter had outlined the newly built mosque nearby, thereafter he urged parents to pray for Muslims to come to the saving knowledge of Jesus Christ…[The mosque] was recently finished, and every day around 1:00 (sic) we hear the voice of the Imam calling all faithful Muslims to prayer with the mournful stains of his song broadcast via loudspeaker throughout our suburb…can’t help but think of the vast difference between Muslim and Christian prayers…Muslims pray in the hope that it might earn them salvation, while Christians can pray anywhere at any time in any words we may choose with the assurance that every word is heard because of our personal relationship with God…I could go on, but I think you get my point. I am actually grateful for this daily reminder to pray for Muslims to come to a saving knowledge of Jesus Christ and to intercede for Christian missionaries, some of whom I know personally, who are daily reaching out to Muslims – often at the risk of their lives…Especially with Ramadan happening 11 July through 9 August, I invite
you to do the same. And why not encourage your children to also participate? Our prayers can and do make a difference! (Singh, 2016).

Abramjee considered this letter to be offensive and encouraging of hatred and intolerance – essentially Islamophobic. The school later apologised, with Fuller stating that Christians have their right to pray for the salvation of those of other faiths. He did apologise for his insensitivity stating "The spirit behind the letter was one of compassion for individuals, and my prayer is that as Christians, we will continue to engage in a positive way with people of all faiths and in a way that will build bridges and not create divisions. Once again, if I was unsuccessful in expressing this understanding, I apologise" (Singh, 2016b).

In Cape Town, Jess Mouneimne claims the need to hide her Muslim identity from prospective clients in order to procure business. On one occasion a man had asked where her surname was from – she stated she was Lebanese and her husband was from Lebanon. The prospective client then said “‘Yeah but he is a Christian right so we can do business together still. It's those 'Mozzies' that are the problem!” He then rambled on for about 10 minutes about how he has done business with Muslims countless times and how every time they screwed him over. He also told me how the Christian Lebs may be Arabs but they were okay because they helped the Israelis kill the Muslim terrorists” (Mouneimne, 2016).

According to Readings, Brandon and Phelps (2011) there is confusion around the term islamophobia as anti-Muslim prejudice has been conflated with criticizing or questioning aspects of the religion, with both aspects being depicted as unacceptable. Conflating scrutiny of a religion with prejudice and hatred for its followers is problematic as this undermines freedom of speech, furthermore this lack of clarity is what Islamists may use, by arguing their critics are irrational and victimising them, instead of allowing their political ideology to be criticized. They suggest using the term “anti-Muslim prejudice/bigotry/hatred” instead of Islamophobia to avoid confusion, they do however assert that:

It is important that the freedom to criticise religions is preserved – as long as that criticism is not used, or understood, to incite hatred, violence or prejudice against the individual followers of that religion. It is important for a liberal,
democratic society that people are able to publicly criticise Islam and aspects of it, just as they are able to criticise Christianity, Buddhism or Scientology, if they wish to do so (Readings, Brandon & Phelps, 2011, p.15).

Hussain (2015) fears that intolerance is spreading in South Africa. On the 18th of March 2015, Zainub Prya Dala, a South African author, was attacked after the Time of the Writer festival in Durban, after expressing her admiration for the writing style of Salman Rushdie. When she stated her admiration for Rushdie’s work, numerous teacher and students left the venue. Dala was followed from the festival and harassed by three men who proceeded to run her vehicle off the road. When her car had come to a halt, two of the men approached her, one holding a knife to her throat. They proceeded to hit her in the face with a brick and refer to her as “Rushdie’s bitch”. Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses was not received well by the Muslim community, leading to a fatwa (Islamic order considered to be the law) being issued to kill him.

In addition Dr Taj Hargey opened an “Open Mosque” in Cape Town, in 2014 based on the founding principles of gender-equality, independence, being inter-cultural and non-sectarian. The mosque is not concerned with sexual orientation and has combined prayer services (no separation of men and women). According to Hargey “South Africans have become Arabised, they think they must wear the burka, must have face masks, that men must wear pyjama dresses,” said Mr Hargey. "They think that is the only version of Islam" (Findlay, 2014). The mosque has been fire-bomber three times since opening in 2014. Hargey has received multiple death threats (Haynes, 2015) and the Muslim Judicial Council does not consider the open mosque to be a place of worship (Findlay, 2014).

6.7.2 The Role of the Internet

According to Post (2010) the media and especially the Internet play a vital role in the radicalisation of individuals, creating a virtual community of hatred. Weimann (2012) asserts that online social networking platforms have become an impressive terrorist tool for attracting potential members and followers. The Internet is inexpensive, anonymous, ubiquitous, unregulated and uncensored. Any individual or group may establish a web presence, with a professional- looking website which would provide the appearance of legitimacy (Cilluffo, Cardash & Whitehead, 2007). The Thulsie
twins not only made use of online Islamic teaching from Sheikh Musa Jibril, but found information on how to bring down buildings and access IS’s webpages (Henderson, 2016b). MJ also found and accessed information on the creation of explosives (Solomon, 2013). AC on the other hand, makes use of social media like Twitter, Whatsapp and video sharing to amass his own following (Aridi, 2015).

The popularity of these types of virtual communities is growing, particularly among younger demographics, such as the Thulsie twins. According to Torok (2013) institutions of radicalisation such as training camps are becoming increasingly difficult to operate because they are often targeted. Therefore, the Internet has become an essential means of recruitment, radicalisation and training. Jihadist terror groups are targeting younger individuals in particular for propaganda and recruitment purposes (Weimann, 2012). According to Cilluffo et al (2007) these extremist websites are often well designed, ostentatious and visually appealing. Many of these websites have chat rooms, music, films, and sometimes even online stores. Correspondingly, terrorist groups and their supporters are exploiting predominately Western online communities, such as Facebook, MySpace and their Arabic counterparts, to spread their message. The purpose of the website is to attract an audience which can be exposed to extremist ideas – predominantly that Islam is under attack in an environment where the West is relentlessly hostile towards Muslims – therefore there is a moral and religious need to assume Jihad (Cilluffo et al, 2007) – a view that was common in all the above mentioned cases. According to Meloy and Yakeley (2014) because cyber relationships are largely fantasy based, attachments to people are not anchored by talking, touching, seeing or feeling, therefore these people may not be seen as real objects. The availability of cheap smartphones with affordable Internet access means that individuals all over the world can browse and contribute to extremist websites without having to be at a desk or have their Internet usage patterns detected. Hussain and Saltman (2014) maintain that the majority of terrorist cases evolve from a real-world experience that introduces the individual to extremist ideology. This does not mean that social media and the Internet do not play an important role in the radicalisation; it is just not the origin of the radicalisation process. The majority of individuals who visit extremist sites did not stumble across them by accident they were likely to have been heading in that direction. In this case, the Internet is aiding an already established journey; allowing for the indoctrination
and teaching of an ideology (Hussein & Saltman, 2014).

Miller and Bartlett (2012) assert that though the Internet is a useful and fundamental tool for education and communication, there are many non-discerning users. “The key to harnessing and exploiting the Internet is to spot the fakes: to know how to tell the truth from the lies, and how to negotiate the grey areas of comment, opinion and propaganda in between” (Miller & Bartlett, 2012, p.36). There are many ways in which individuals are deceived by the information they find on the Internet. Generally, information is given credence based upon who supplied it. Unfortunately on the Internet, information is sometimes provided anonymously – or under a fake identity (and resulting authority). A generational divide also exists, whereby parents do not provide the necessary supervision for their children’s’ Internet usage, because some believe their children know more about it than they do. In addition, the quality of information is often judged by the design of the site, rather than a more rigid quality inspection. Essentially the way in which individuals find, comprehend, produce and share information has changed drastically, resulting in information of a significantly differing quality and agenda (Miller & Bartlett, 2012).

According to Piper (2015) South Africa may be under threat of lone wolf terrorists. The lone wolf terrorist is an individual who acts on their own, without orders from or connections to an outside organisation. These individuals may be inspired by a particular group but are not under their control (Bakker & de Graaf, 2010). Phillips (2011) concurs with Bakker and de Graaf (2010), while further asserting that the lone wolf terrorist may or may not identify with a specific terrorist organisation. They may also be motivated by an ideology or objective that is not unique in its nature. The Internet allows not only for the lone wolf to express their hatred, disdain and disgust for the out-group. It also provides a convenient platform for the psychological defences of projection (others are at fault), projection identification (others are threatening him/her) and splitting (everyone else is bad) (Meloy & Yakeley, 2014). Torok (2013) asserts that the lone wolf is not driven by poverty or religion – but rather a sense of ostracism and the search for significance. Ramakrishna (2013) asserts that the operational decentralisation of terrorist planning and action, as well as the ideological emphasis on small-cell and lone-wolf endeavours, depend on the Internet and social networking to function efficiently. Piper (2015) asserts that an
extensive movement of extremists is not a requirement for a lone wolf attack. These individuals are difficult to catch (Piper, 2015; Weimann, 2012) and if they are disciplined they require no help to carry out their plan.

Conway and McInerney (2008) conducted a study on Jihadi videos on YouTube in order to explore the support for political violence. This study looked into the support for martyr-promoting material, in terms of comments and posts on YouTube. Their results reveal that majority of those who show support were in between the ages of 18 and 35, and reside outside the Middle East and North Africa. The largest percentage of supporters was found in the United States, followed by the UK. Though this was a small exploratory study, what is evident is that Jihadist content has moved beyond the traditional website or chat room. Islamist groups are now making use of social networking and video sharing which extends their reach substantially to “diaspora populations, converts, and political sympathisers” (Conway & McInerney, 2008, p. 10).

Similarly, Bermingham, Conway, McInerney, O’Hare and Smeaton (2009) conducted a study on how social networking and sentiment may have the potential for online radicalisation. According to them, a closer inspection of a media and networking platform such as YouTube may reveal content and interaction that is aimed at radicalizing individuals who had little or no prior interest in Islamism. Their results showed that the group was not functioning as a tool of radicalisation (in line with their research questions), but was more inclined towards religious discussions. They assert that their study was very focused on a targeted group and they would like to expand the breadth of the study in order to build a more complete depiction of the social network. The lexicon analysis they utilized made use of the 50 most used terms, therefore is subject to the problems of polysemy and synonymy. Conversely, Conway and McInerney (2008) noted that video sharing and social media might facilitate the acceptance of violence with regards to those who have already chosen a stance and actively seek the material. It may also target vulnerable youth who have no prior interest in the ideology or politics.

6.7.3 Recruitment

The Islamic State’s propaganda is no less effective in South Africa than in other parts of the world, and has already turned the heads of dozens of young South African
Muslims who have gone to join the Caliphate in Iraq and Syria (Opperman, 2016b).

According to Ranstorp (2005) there are three main areas, which have been identified that assist with the path to radicalism. Firstly, the radical mosque environment and study groups; secondly, prisons are viewed as centres for radicalisation; and lastly the Internet. According to Veldhuis and Staun (2009) recruitment is determined by social and individual dynamics, including identity, social networks and personal motivations. They assume that an individual who is attractive to top-down recruiters has shown interest in the ideology or at least susceptibility. With this understanding, recruitment is viewed as a process that overlaps with the already occurring process of radicalisation – recruitment therefore accelerates the radicalisation process, it does not initiate it.

Bokhari, Hegghammer, Lia, Nesser and Tønnessen (2006, p.10) are in agreement with Veldhuis and Staun (2009) by noting, “there is no or little organisational push from above in the recruitment process. Rather, the push, comes from below, in the sense that sympathizers of the global jihad actively approach militant milieus and want to join”. They argue further, that the decisive factors that drive an individual towards Islamism are social bonds and networks. It is most important that a link is made to the Islamist narrative/organisation via friends, family or people that the individual trusts as seen in all the cases. Individuals are also more likely to join an organisation or movement in groups rather than alone.

Tables 1-4 are representative of the factors found within the Root Cause Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) and the progress along the Staircase to Terrorism Model (Moghaddam, 2005) applicable to the respective case studies. On inspection of the tables, one will notice that the factors leading to the radicalisation of each individual are different. They do share similarities with regards to macro and macro social factors, namely: globalisation and modernisation, relative deprivation, collective emotions, self-categorisation and social identity, as well as social interaction and group processes. This sheds light on the importance of group dynamics and identity with regards to radicalisation.

6.7.4 Globalisation and Modernisation

Globalisation is an international system with its own laws and logic, which have the ability to influence the environment, politics and economy of a country. In addition,
Globalisation has its own technology – the Internet, optic fibre, computerisation, digitalisation, miniaturisation and satellite technology. The defining feature of globalisation is speed – in other words, the speed of communication, innovation, travel and commerce (Stibli, 2010). Globalisation is not only advantageous for the business orientated. It is a system that allows for the emergence and spread of transnational ideologies, which are used to gain followers and encourage collective or single action.

According to Wictorowicz (2001) the Salafi movement is the fastest growing Islamic movement, heavily influencing Islamic practice and ideological orientations of Muslims all over the world. “Such extensive diffusion of radical interpretations of Islam is a by-product of globalisation and symbolises the rapid expansion of transnational, virtual networks that serve as platforms for transnational opinion formation and recruitment into radical movements” (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).

Just beyond the horizon of current events lie two possible political futures—both bleak, neither democratic. The first is a retbralisation of large swaths of humankind by war and bloodshed: a threatened Lebanonisation of national states in which culture is pitted against culture, people against people, tribe against tribe—a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of interdependence, every kind of artificial social cooperation and civic mutuality. The second is being borne in on us by the onrush of economic and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity and that mesmerize the world with fast music, fast computers, and fast food—with MTV, Macintosh, and McDonald's, pressing nations into one commercially homogenous global network: one McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, communications, and commerce. The planet is falling precipitately apart AND coming reluctantly together at the very same moment (Barber, 1992).

According to Barber (1995, as cited in Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) as a result of this “McWorld” (1992, 1995) Muslims everywhere in the world are faced with consumerism, liberation and modern technology. Economic deprivation increases for the lower class as a result of globalisation. Furthermore, Muslims are confronted with values, images and an ethos that is in contrast to Islamic culture. According to Pipes...
(2000) the Islamist ideology rejects all influences of the West. There is no way for Islam to co-exist with the West’s idea of modernisation. Rather it is perceived that westernisation is an attempt to gain control over the Islamic world (Barber 1995, as cited in Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).

6.7.5 Relative Deprivation

Precht (2007) asserts that relative deprivation encompasses factors such as poverty, discrimination, alienation and social dissatisfaction. When this is take into account, Islamism may be seen as a chance to attain dignity or respect. The concept of relative deprivation is used, rather than absolute deprivation because the former refers to one’s subjective perception of deprivation in contrast to one’s chosen reference groups, an abstract ideal or even an ideal espoused by a leader. Furthermore individuals may act on behalf of others; they need not be personally deprived – such as the case with AC and the Thulsie twins. Relative deprivation may then be described as incongruity between what individuals believe they are rightly entitled to, and what they are actually able to obtain. Individuals may feel deprived regardless of whether their basic needs are met; furthermore being in abject poverty does not necessarily result in feelings of deprivation (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).

Feelings of relative deprivation may cause frustration and despair, though it does not always lead to radicalisation, as a frustration-aggression hypothesis would suggest. It may lead to individuals withdrawing, becoming depressed or finding a means of escape, this is because most people who live in poorer areas or are not financially stable do not become terrorists (Moghaddam, 2005; Precht, 2007).

6.7.6 Collective Emotions

Intergroup emotions theory (IET) aims to comprehend and mend intergroup relations by looking at the emotions that are inherent in belonging to a particular social group, from which one derives an identity. All of the aforementioned cases shared this factor. Intergroup emotions are shaped by the ways in which members of different groups view events and objects relevant to them. Those emotions become part of the group membership through repetition. These emotions regulate certain intergroup behaviours (Mackie, Smith & Ray, 2008). “It is the anger, anxiety, pride, and guilt
that other groups evoke in our own that drive our social, political, and physical responses to them, and it is only by changing such emotions that intergroup behaviour can change” (Mackie, Smith & Ray, 2008, p.1867).

IET posits that individuals have different emotions depending on the way the feel as individuals versus the group they belong to, and identify with. In the cases above, the Muslim identity has taken precedence over the South African or British identity – as AC stated he “[is a] Muslims first and Muslim last. Passports are no more than travel documents” (Kern, 2015). Individuals can belong to multiple groups – one can be a Muslim and a South African, and feel differently about each one. There may be some overlap but one can be content and proud of themselves and their achievements as an individual, but not a proud South African, for example. When people start to see themselves as part of a group, they also begin to view themselves as sharing characteristics typical of the group. Furthermore, this leads them to feel general emotions and reactions typical to the group, with soccer fans for example, being a fan of Manchester United is to refute Liverpool (Hogg, 1995; Mackie, Smith & Ray, 2008, Al Raffie, 2013). The consequences of this behaviour are that individuals can feel anger on behalf of the group they identify with and this anger involves the same arousal as if one was personally insulted. MSK and the Thulsie twins for example, felt very strongly about how Muslims were being treated all over the world – “Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters” (Mohammed Sidique Khan, 2005; BBC News, 2005a).

This anger will dissipate should the angered individual direct the ill feelings to another source. The most important aspect of intergroup emotions is that it has the ability to affect judgment and behaviour. Particular emotions are associated with certain behaviours – for example the feeling of anger invokes the intention to act against the source of anger. Intergroup emotions need not be negative alone - sometimes feeling guilt as a group allows members to act kindly to the affected out-group. Intergroup emotions can be viewed as integral to adaptive functioning as a group, such that it regulates actions within the context of significant group memberships (Mackie, Smith & Ray, 2008).
Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus and Gordjin (2003) conducted a study on the impact of social identification and categorisation on emotional reactions and behavioural tendencies. Their study showed that individuals identify with the victims of harmful behaviour – seeing themselves as part of the same group. The emotional experience that is felt has an impact on one’s tendency to act, for example, anger may not only cause an offensive action but also one of avoidance. Actions are not to be confused with an individual’s actual behaviour.

*It is the emotions evoked by human beings’ social identities that explain why people fight and what they die for* (Mackie, Smith & Ray, 2008, p.1877).

### 6.7.8 Social Interactions and Group Processes

Individuals are part of a system of interactions that will ultimately shape their attitude and behaviour. How one feels, believes and behaves is greatly influenced by the people they interact with. Social networks, when examined, give insight into how ideologies can spread, how radical communities are formed, and how certain individuals become involved in these groups and violent behaviour. On closer inspection, one may discover the hierarchal structure of the network (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).

Zierhoffer (2014) echoes the sentiment of Wiktorowicz (2004) by noting that the typical terrorist makes contact with others who share similar interests. This is how MSK and AC started their journey towards radicalism. MSK often socialized with Shehzad Tanweer and Hasib Hussain – the two other 7/7 bombers (BBC News, 2007). When AC met Omar Bakri Mohammed that sparked his interest in Sharia law, furthermore this encounter is responsible for his understanding of Islam. MJ, Omar Hartley and Sedich Achmat, apart from being related, also have shared interests and understandings. Furthermore, the Thulsie twins discovered Sheikh Musa Jibril and his online community which shaped their understanding of Islam. It is imperative to acknowledge that individuals adopt the attitudes and behaviours of those around them (Milgram, 1963).

As mentioned previously “frame alignment” is important when attempting to attract supporters or future members. The movement or ideology must resound with an individual’s personal framework in order to enable participation. “Alignment is
contingent upon fidelity with cultural narratives, symbols, and identities; the reputation of the frame “articulator”; the consistency of the frame; the frame’s empirical credibility; and the personal salience of the frame for potential participants” (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p.5). In other words, an individual will be more likely to join if the ideological representation of the group fits the interests of the potential member.

Behaviour on a whole is strongly affected by the social context in which it occurs – for example; the presence of an authority figure can have great bearing on the decisions individuals make (Milgram, 1963). Similarly in the Asch (1951) conformity experiment (studies showing if and how individuals yield or defy a majority group contrary to known fact) some individuals would conform to the majority despite the fact that they did not believe in or subscribe to the behaviour or attitude. One of the factors that determine yielding and independence is the character of the individual. It was proposed that it is functionally dependent on enduring character differences; particularly those related to an individuals social interaction, such as confidence, for example (Asch, 1951).

Whilst studying at college in the UK, I met others who showed me how I could channel that desire and help through my religion. And I was radicalized enough to consider violence correct even virtue under certain circumstances. So I become involved in the Jihad in Afghanistan, I wanted to protect the Muslim Afghan population against the Soviet army. And I thought that, that was Jihad – my sacred duty which would be rewarded by God. I became a preacher. I was one of the pioneers of violent Jihad in the UK. I recruited, I raised funds, I trained. I confused true Jihad with this perversion as presented by the fascist Islamists (Ali, 2016).

Through social mechanisms like homophile (the tendency for individuals to gravitate towards and bond with those who are similar to them) and social influence, it is rather easy to develop and spread radical ideology. In the same way, however, these mechanisms have the potential to hinder the spread of violent ideology. Social networks can be a source of support and positive information (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). As stated earlier majorities have the ability to influence others (Asch, 1951) but the same applies to leaders and charismatic individuals (Milgram, 1963). Positively orientated leaders and peers have the ability to prevent radicalisation, as
well promote social bonding, health and integration (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).

Individual characteristics cannot be fully examined with the use of a case study because it is not possible to know every experience or thought of an individual. The following individual factors/characteristics may be said to have a universal application.

6.8 Causal Factors at the Micro Level: Individual Characteristics
6.8.1 Personal Characteristics

There is a tendency to label a terrorist as “crazy” or assume they must be suffering from some type of mental illness. The truth is however, healthy, well adjusted and social individuals are also open to radicalisation and terrorism. Personality traits or environmental conditions are relevant contributing factors to terrorism but there is no single cause (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009). Currently there is no socio-demographic or personality profile of radical groups and their members. This is largely due to the heterogeneous personality profiles of known terrorists and the complex nature of radicalisation (Victoroff, 2005; Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009; Post, 2010; Phillips, 2011; McCauley, Moskalenko, & Van Son, 2013).

Generally, radical groups have many diverse personality and cognitive profiles within their ranks. Individuals who are suffering from severe mental illness often have difficulty fitting into groups – this is true whether it be a corporate group or terror group. There are exceptions however and these typically seem to be lone wolf terrorists (Spitaletta, 2013). Hussain and Saltman (2014) assert that mental illness seems to be particularly common amongst lone wolf perpetrators. Spaaij’s (2010) research findings support the aforementioned statement. The lone wolf’s mental illness manifests and/or intensifies in the lead up to the attack (ranging from delusions and obsessive fantasies to severe schizophrenia). It is therefore important to consider whether the attacks are based in extremist ideology or if these are troubled individuals who are trying to justify their feelings of isolation. In the study conducted by Gill, Horgan and Deckert (2014), a little under a third (31.9%) of their sample had suffered from mental illness or a personality disorder. For the majority of these individuals the diagnosis came before their acts of terror. For example, Naveed Afzal Haq had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and Ted Kaczynski was found to be a paranoid
Spitaletta (2013) notes a dispositional characteristic that may place one at risk of radicalisation – intolerance of uncertainty. This is a cognitive bias that affects the way an individual responds to uncertain situations physically and psychologically. This is associated with anxiety, leading to perceptions of certain situations as stressful and having a subjective sense of unfairness. While intolerance of uncertainty is a risk factor for anxiety, there is no evidence to support it as a risk factor for radicalisation. When looking at the propensity of specific personality types to engage in terrorist behaviour, the authoritarian personality (rooted in personal conflict and childhood experience) is submissive to authority and takes orders well. Individuals with this personality type desire stability and can become anxious and insecure under conditions, which are not in line with the worldview. Interestingly, in Milgram’s experiment (1963; 1974 as cited in Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) individuals who scored high on the F-scale (Fascism questionnaire designed to identify authoritarian personalities) were more obedient to the authority figures and administered stronger electric shocks. This relationship should not be overemphasized – other participants who did not score high on the F-scale also acknowledged and obeyed the experimenter. Further attempts to relate narcissism to terrorism proved infertile. There is no research that can provide a personality profile of a potential radical – they seem to be in no way extraordinary or different to general populace (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).

6.8.2 Personal Experiences

The decisions that people make are often a result of their personal experience with others and their world (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). There are some researchers who argue that vulnerability to radicalisation and subsequently terrorism are the result of an abusive childhood. De Mause (2004) asserts that the developmental life history of terrorists can give insight into why they perceive terrorism as an option. He asserts, “children who grow up to be Islamic terrorists are products of a misogynist fundamentalist system” (p.194). The system he refers to is one of segregation – a separating of men from women – where a child grows up in an environment wherein the father is rarely present. According to De Mause (2004) countries that are fiercely misogynistic produce the most terrorists. He emphasizes the abuse and ill treatment of
girls who are raised in fundamentalist families, drawing the conclusion that those girls will grow to make “less than ideal” (p.195) mothers by inflicting their pain upon their children with a very punitive upbringing. This upbringing, he argues, results in the need for their parents’ approval. The West and all it stands for is the embodiment of the “bad boy” that would lose the approval of their mothers – they are taught to deny themselves personal pleasures and freedoms. Accordingly, these children have a rage that can only be placated by being inflicted on others (De Mause, 2004).

Broekhuis (2016) posits that personal experiences could be the reason for an individual to become radicalized, as after experiencing a negative life-event they are more vulnerable to religious/extremist ideology. Unfavourable life events are often seen as the precursor to violent behaviour. A distinction must be made however between normal life events, such as moving to a new home or school (which can be disruptive) as opposed to being attacked or discriminated against - “anger can lead to contempt, and thus to legitimisation of non-normative actions” (Broekhuis, 2016, p.7). According to Baumeister, Twenge and Nuss (2002) an experience of discrimination or exclusion can cause anger and aggression. The assumption of their study is that individuals place great value upon stable, lasting relationships, as the need to belong is an essential human trait. Rejection and discrimination threaten one’s self-esteem and decreases positive social behaviour. According to Moss (2011) self-esteem facilitates a sense of meaning. Sometimes vulnerability to radicalisation is fuelled by the quest for significance or personal meaning as a result of lost significance due to a traumatic experience or frustrations. This may lead to individuals turning to ideologies that offer a way to restore significance (Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman & Orehek, 2009). Kruglanski and Fishman (2009) posit that a subsequent act of terror or suicide bombing, is the result of an awareness of our mortality, the fear of living a trivial existence without making any noteworthy contributions to others, or not being remembered motivates one to be a “good” member of society. The ultimate “good” would be a self-sacrificing act for others. By putting the group first, one becomes highly valued and recognised as the hero or martyr in the groups’ collective memory. A suicidal act of terror therefore is quite ironical as it is driven by the desire to live forever.

6.8.3 Cognitions
Lloyd (as cited in Hamm, 2009) suggests that there may be a generic psychology to extremism on an emotional level that allows individuals to blame an out-group who is deemed less worthy. Commonalities range from personality disorders, depression and suicidal tendencies. Rigid thinking and polarizing of ideas and others is also common – individuals have a black and white understanding of the world. Significant life events, trauma and victimisation are also found (geographical displacement, loss and death of family members and poor parenting, for example). Depression, low self-esteem, a longing for identity and a need to belong as well as a sense of injustice may be present. Conversely many researchers (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009; Post, 2010; Phillips, 2011; McCauley, Moskalenko, & Van Son, 2013) affirm that there has been no firm evidence with respects to a relationship between mental illness and radicalisation or terrorism.

Victoroff (2012) asserts that the risk of radicalisation and subsequent terrorism is almost always determined by a combination of innate factors; including biology, early development and cognitive factors, as well as temperament, environmental influences and group dynamics. According to him, any theory that claims the dominance of one of these factors over the others is premature. Furthermore, these individuals are psychologically heterogeneous. “Whatever his stated goals and group of identity, every terrorist, like every person, is motivated by his own complex of psychosocial experiences and trait” (Victoroff, 2012, p.35). According to Spitaletta (2013) psychopathology is rarely the determining factor in the conversion from law-abiding citizen to violent offender. It should be viewed as a combination of some underlying psychopathology (major or minor) and specific environmental conditions, which push the individual towards radical behaviour.

6.8.4 Emotions

As mentioned previously, individuals do not need to be directly affected by circumstances to feel emotionally moved or involved (Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Al Raffie, 2013). According to Davies (2009, p.190) “Individuals are driven by a combination of certain experiences (trauma or humiliation, fear of outside groups, alienation, frustration, globalisation) and psychological predispositions (the need for cognitive closure, respect for authority, the need for uniqueness)”. Shame, honour and insult are issues that require
investigation. There has been great controversy, for example, with regards to the cartoons of the Prophet Mohamed which appeared in *Jyllands Posten*, the backlash of *The Satanic Verses* and the Charlie Hebdo shooting. Staun (2008) asserts that emotional experiences contribute to radicalisation, for example feelings of shame, guilt and the desire for revenge contribute to occurrences of suicide terrorism. In his Fatwa, Osama Bin Laden stated:

> The walls of oppression and humiliation cannot be demolished except in a rain of bullets. The freeman does not surrender leadership to infidels and sinners. Without shedding blood no degradation and branding can be removed from the forehead… Death is better than life in humiliation! Some scandals and shames will never be otherwise eradicated (Osama Bin Laden, 1996; PBS News Desk, 1996).

If one assumes that individuals who feel humiliated will search for (sometimes violent) ways to restore their dignity, one should be aware of the role of humiliation and similar emotional experiences with regards to the study of terrorism (Staun, 2008).

Raine (2015) posits that there should be no polarisation between emotion and reason, as very often, emotion is one of the most important aspects of rational thought – reason does not require emotion however all social actions have some aspect of emotional input. Emotions can be private, occurring within an individual or sometimes a collective phenomenon that can be found, for example, in areas of conflict. Collective emotions are significant in politics and religion.

According to Haider (2015) the actions of a radial minority create the conditions for widespread negative sentiment and discrimination toward a moderate non-offending majority thereby facilitating radicalisation and feelings of alienation. Schmid (2013, p.2) states that “a culture of alienation and humiliation can act as a kind of growth medium in which the process of radicalisation commences and virulent extremism comes to thrive”. Humiliation, according to Linder (2001, as cited in Raine, 2015) is a social process that needs to be understood as it may give insight into the social order of a society. By acknowledging and trying to understand the emotion behind an action, one can provide a more holistic review of the problem. The roots of terror can
be found in political discontent whereby the desire for revenge against repression may be motivation enough. “The complexities of social action are better understood when one recognises that actions (both in their material presentations and symbolic representations) are infused with emotion” (Raine, 2015, p.5).

6.9 Conclusion

In summation, issues such as alienation, discrimination and social exclusion bolster the radicalisation process. Individuals look towards religion to inform their identity and give them a sense of purpose or meaning. The Internet is a product of globalisation, which has had a major role in the process of radicalisation, and the dissemination of information. Furthermore prisons, universities and schools are environments that have the potential to foster radicalisation. Foreign policy grievances related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, are the used as the driving force for recruitment. Incidents such as the Charlie Hebdo shooting show the power of human emotion and what can come of provocation. The presence of a charismatic individual or leader should also be acknowledged as they help many down the path of radicalisation.

At the individual level there are many factors that could accelerate the process of radicalisation. All individuals have different coping mechanisms and strategies for major life events and this may have a great impact on an individual who has the potential to radicalise. Furthermore, the interpretation of social phenomenon and interpersonal interaction is based on one’s individual perception of reality. Individuals may view the same article or speech in a very different way – some may see it as provocation, while others are able to ignore it. Events at this level that could catapult an individual into radicalisation are varied at this level and depend greatly on the world-view of the individual. Social factors and group dynamics have a great effect on one’s susceptibility to radicalisation. Macro-level conditions may lay the foundation for grievances or feelings of injustice, but one must account for the social and individual characteristics, which combine, in a unique fashion to allow for radicalisation.

The following chapter will discuss the research questions and main findings of the study.
CHAPTER SEVEN  
Discussion and Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

This chapter is dedicated to the discussion of the research questions, the implications of the findings and the limitations of the study.

7.2 Discussion

What is radicalisation?

Radicalisation may be understood in two ways. Firstly, it may be viewed as an individual holding radical ideas and beliefs about society or government (cognitive). Secondly, it may be viewed as behavioural, whereby violence is accepted and used as a solution. It is important to acknowledge these as separate because not all radicalized individuals are terrorists – however all terrorists have been through a process of radicalisation. What is understood as radical is also dependent upon what is normal, and cognitive radicalisation can turn into behavioural radicalisation.

Essentially radicalisation is a learned process that involves a change in the way one thinks, feels, the way they view the world and how they orientate themselves in it. It is a change facilitated by elements such as the need to belong, identity and group dynamics.

I went through this process and I think it is essentially a process that involves an individual feeling a sense of grievance, whether real or perceived, and thereby leading to an identity crisis about whether one is, in my case, British or Pakistani or both or Muslim. Those grievances and that identity crisis are capitalised upon by a recruiter, usually a charismatic recruiter. Finally, that recruiter sells to the vulnerable young individual, who in most cases is educated … an ideology and a narrative, a world view (Nawaz, as cited in House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee, 2012, p.11).

This paper could have focused on the radicalisation of any religion, however, Islam was chosen because the fear and nature of Islamism (an ideology based on a life based
on Sharia Law and the establishment of a Caliphate) is rampant. There are many paths towards radicalism, and many different phase models, which illustrate the various stages involved. Although these models differ, there are two ideas that are generally accepted. Firstly, radicalisation is a process. One does not become radical overnight. Secondly, there is no universal profile for a radicalized individual; there are many factors and reasons that result in the radicalisation of an individual, all of which are particular to that individual in their specific combination. This was illustrated through the case studies. Although all the cases shared issues with identity, relative deprivation, resentment of Western powers, the use of the Internet (indicative of globalisation) and revealed the complexities of social/group dynamics, each individual was raised under different circumstances and their life experiences were not the same, nor could one attribute the few instances they share to be the sole cause of radicalisation.

What are the psychological processes involved in radicalisation?

The process of radicalisation is psychologically and emotionally orientated. Individuals who have suffered significant trauma, have difficulties surrounding identity and the need to belong, experiences of discrimination and alienation all play a part in the radicalisation process. One of the psychological processes involved in radicalisation is Terror Management. This involves the need to maintain one’s worldview in order to reduce feelings of anxiety, specifically about existence and the fear of death. When others challenge or endanger this worldview, this may cause discomfort or provoke anxiety. An example of this may be an individual questioning or poking holes in a firmly held belief. Another example may be someone pointing out inconsistencies or illogical aspects of one’s beliefs, thereby triggering anxiety and the need to defend one’s position. Another aspect one has to take into account is displacement, more specifically the displacement of aggression. Individuals who are unhappy with their situation may try to find a person, race, country or organisation to blame, justly or unjustly, for their predicament. In the case studies, all four individuals place blame upon Western governments, particularly the United States.

Another psychological aspect involved in radicalisation is moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999; Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009). This is essentially reconstructing inappropriate behaviour or inhumane ideologies as legitimate through the use of
language, displacement, and the diffusion of responsibility, disregarding the victims and effects of violence. AC provides an example of this behaviour when he insinuated that the Charlie Hebdo attacks were the result of unnecessary provocation. He rationalizes the attack by justifying it as being something that should be expected and accepted as a means of retaliatory justice (Nianias, 2015).

This process enables individuals to distance themselves from people they do not consider to be part of their in-group (Bandura, 1999; Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009). The process of identifying one’s ‘group’ or place in society forms the basis of Social Identity Theory (Hogg, 1995; Stets & Burke 2000; Al Raffie, 2013), quite possibly the most important psychological aspect involved in radicalisation. This process involves finding a group that one identifies with, whereby bonds are formed over cultural, religious, familial, and ethnic lines or sometimes over leisure activities or hobbies. The groups that one identifies and affiliates with (in-group) are representative of social networks and communities and are not geographically limited; for example, one may identify as Muslim and feel a strong bond with other Muslims around the world – which all four individuals shared. One can have more than one identity – for example, one may be a South African Muslim who is a professional soccer player. With regards to the case studies, all four individuals seem to have placed their Muslim identity above their national identities quite possibly jeopardizing their loyalty to the latter.

Having an out-group is not necessarily a negative thing, the process of identifying the group one fits into and those one does not are a natural and unavoidable means of categorisation. The product of this type of social categorisation is an increase in self-esteem and a subsequent increase in the perceived differences between one’s in-group and one’s out-group. The identities one holds are not only descriptive; they are prescriptive, which can be quite dangerous. If one finds belonging and acceptance in a radical group, for example, being a member may not just involve having the same grievance or dislike. Part of being in that group, and being accepted, may involve accepting and spreading hatred, or even inciting or committing an act of violence. MSK, for example, believed it was his duty to defend and avenge his fellow Muslims. He viewed himself as a soldier (Mohammed Sidique Khan, 2005; BBC News, 2005a) therefore he found righteousness within his plans.
What makes an individual vulnerable to radicalisation?

Younger people seem to be more at risk of radicalisation (Slootman & Tillie, 2006; Roy, 2008; Lynch, 2013; Coolsaet, 2015), more specifically individuals in their teens to late-twenties, evidenced by MSK, AC and the Thulsie twins. This is probably because being accepted is more important to younger people as they are still coming to terms with who they are, and want to avoid feelings of discrimination or isolation. Furthermore, radical groups are representative of a counter-cultural group that may be attractive to younger, more impressionable individuals who feel the need to be different, rebellious or relevant.

With regards to second and third generation immigrant families one is confronted with difficulties in forming a cohesive identity that incorporates one’s faith and national identity – for example, being British and being Muslim. There may be difficulty in trying to balance these two identities, because leaning towards, or favouring one part may result in alienation in the other. The fear of, or feelings of alienation may lead individuals down the path of radicalism because they are looking for acceptance, understanding, meaning or a greater purpose – which radical groups offer in abundance coupled with camaraderie, infamy and glory.

When looking towards converts/ previously non-Muslim youth who join Islamist groups one may see a vague understanding or superficial knowledge of the religion, which is evidence by the Thulsie twins. Their understanding of Islam was formed online through Sheik Ahmed Musa Jibril known for his orientation towards Islamism. Very often these individuals, like the Thulsie twins, are looking for a way to become relevant. They want to find meaning or purpose in their lives and do something worthwhile or heroic. Radical Islam is dangerous and pervasive because it is not only Muslims who are drawn to it. Individuals of every nationality, creed and colour are drawn to the ideas of these radical groups. This is precisely what makes radical groups successful – they prey on lonely, alienated, impressionable individuals who are found all over the world.

There are undoubtedly those who relish the thought of modern warfare and
dominating others through fear mongering. And mental illness is rarely cited as a cause for radicalisation or acts of terror. This is probably what makes it so difficult to understand as those affected are comparatively normal, experience a range of factors found in relatively every individual’s life – yet only a few become radicalized. There may be one event in a string of facilitating factors that triggers one’s path to radicalism; it may be a charismatic preacher, the loss of a parent or a headline in the news, whatever it may be, it starts the process of radicalisation for some individuals and not others. Those particularly vulnerable may be those who have issues with identity, suffer from relative deprivation, and harbour resentment towards Western powers as well as those who are victim to the complexities of social/group dynamics. The challenge may not be finding out what makes someone vulnerable to radicalisation, but finding what makes someone resilient and what factors keep him or her away and disinterested in radical group membership – both of these approaches are however multifaceted and inherently complicated.

**What are the causal factors that could contribute to radicalisation among Muslims in South Africa?**

When considering South Africa’s vulnerability to radicalisation, one cannot say there is no risk. Radical Islamist groups prey on very common human desires – to feel understood, to belong and feel as though you are important in some way. The South African population is not devoid of these universal longings – as clearly shown by the Thulsie twins. South African Muslims have integrated well into South African society, and as a whole the country seems to have a good grasp on tolerance and acceptance with regards to diversity. There have been incidences of discrimination, or instances of radical speech, however this happens all over the world. The cases of MJ and AC raise questions about free speech. Believing in a radical ideology does not make one a terrorist – neither does sharing those opinions with others. Radical views and opinions of a few do not represent the sentiments of an entire population, however the difficulty lies in accommodating extremist views in a plural society. To address the problems of radicalisation one could aim to silence and ban organisations like Islam4UK, preventing membership and demonstrations. If this is the route taken, one runs the risk of infringing upon the rights of free speech and essentially going against democracy. The real obstacle is whether free speech comes with a
responsibility or a line of appropriateness – if this is the case, the problem is now about who draws that line. Furthermore, one can expect everyone to not have the same ideas and not get along completely – with the right to say what you want and question anything; one is bound to offend someone. Offending someone should not be the concern however, as Chris Moos said “Offence is taken, not created. Just to say that some people might be offended – [is] not an argument [for] people [to] demand that you not exercise your basic right” (Bland, 2014). Modood, Hansen, Bleich, O’Leary, and Carens (2006) assert that being part of a liberal democratic society means that one will be offended at times, and one has the right to ignore that offense or protest peacefully. One does not have the right to demand criminal sanction or react with violence. The part of the democratic framework that allows individuals to freely practice their religion and culture is the same framework that protects freedom of speech, which is not a negotiable addition.

When one considers the dangers inherent in allowing for the open support of, and invitation to join proscribed organisations like ISIS, perhaps the limit to ‘free speech’ is reached as this becomes the incitement of violence and may at times, border on treason. As mentioned earlier AC was arrested under Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which covers individuals who support proscribed organisations, with support not being restricted to finance or property. South Africa’s Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004, Part 2, section 4, covers the “threat, attempt, conspiracy and [inducement of] another person to commit an offence”. Part 1, section 3 of the same act covers “Offences associated or connected with terrorist activities” covers soliciting or supporting of an organisation which one “ought reasonably to have known or suspected that such weapons, soliciting, training, recruitment, document or thing is so connected, is guilty of an offence connected with terrorist activities”.

South Africa has been fortunate enough to not have similar experiences to that of France, the United States and the UK, which has resulted in intolerance, discrimination and fear – which form the fuel for radicalisation. The identity of South African Muslims, in terms of how one feels about one’s group, like all other identities, is subject to fluctuation in terms of how a particular part of that identity is viewed by others. As stated previously, group identity has no geographical limit, the
attitudes towards, and suffering endured by Muslims around the world may have some bearing on the way South African Muslims feel about the world and their place in it – one may constantly have to defend one’s faith, whether they openly question or not. The Thulsie twins, for example, were new to the religion of Islam, though their identity was strongly linked to that of Muslims around the world – they felt that their suffering was unacceptable. This is an example of how emotion and identity work together – the suffering of Muslims around the world is comparable to one feeling personally insulted by those actions.

The Internet is a risk that should be considered by every country. It plays a crucial role in the lives of countless individuals worldwide. As reliance and usage of the Internet increases, it may be natural to assume the increase of extremists using the Internet to spread their message. The Internet allows individuals to access anything at anytime from anywhere in the world on multiple devices. As MJ stated:

> When I visited these Jihadi sites, I downloaded everything. This information that I downloaded, is information that everyone has access to and is freely available. They are legal to download. The pictures downloaded reveal how Muslims throughout the world are being killed and how they are killing those who are attacking them (Solomon, 2013).

He was not incorrect by saying it was his right to view and watch the information that was freely available to anyone, should they choose to watch it. The products/chemicals that were seized could easily be written off as household products – pool cleaner (hydrochloric acid), paint cleaner (acetone) and bleach (peroxide). With the views he shares one could understand the reason for concern. It seems that one does not stumble upon radical material online – the Internet is aiding an already established path towards radicalism. One can find an abundance of information that is true and verified on the Internet, but there is equally false, exaggerated or manipulative information. Sheik Ahmed Musa Jibril for example, is a radical preacher who has managed to inspire many individuals like the Thulsie twin, which some would argue is a false interpretation and teaching of Islam. One has to acknowledge the risk of online recruitment into terrorist organisations, as well as the threat of the lone wolf – which many have said South Africa is vulnerable to. These individuals may have no
affiliation with an organisation however they do have a personal motive or inspiration. Terrorist groups have learned how to appeal to potential lone wolves, to attract and seduce them, to train and teach them and ultimately to launch them on their attacks – all via online communication, through platforms such as chat rooms, Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. The Internet seems to function as a surrogate command and control network. It may be that opinions and support they encounter via the Internet is able to push them towards carrying out actual terrorist activity. If the processes of recruiting, supporting and training lone wolves are dependent (even partly) on online platforms these sites should be monitored and studied to gain further insight into the lone wolf’s psychology and motivation. Furthermore researchers need to identify weaknesses in extremist ideology and exploit them; take control of the monopoly that extremists hold over certain topics.

There is not enough information available to confirm the severity of risk with regards to prison radicalisation. What is known is that Islam is the fastest growing religion in South African prisons – this is not necessarily a bad thing. Religion definitely has its place in the correctional services environment, providing prisoners with a means of spiritual and psychological healing. The concern would lie in who is teaching the religion, and what version of Islam they are receiving. As previously stated, frustration or disenchantment is not enough to lead a person into adopting radical ideologies. Contact with others who advocate radical ideologies is sometimes needed, although individuals are able to self-radicalize (as is the case with lone wolves). The risk in prison may be elevated due to many dissatisfied, and possibly angry individuals being in one space, allowing for daily contact. The UK will attempt to implement new housing arrangements for radicals to reduce their contact with other prisoners. South Africa does not have the need to adopt this approach, however if the need should arise they may take the lead from UK.

South Africa’s vulnerability to a terrorist attack may partly be due to their lack of acknowledgement of a problem. The main question of this paper however deals with South Africa’s vulnerability to radicalisation. It may be said that South Africa is vulnerable to radicalisation just like any other country, because these radical organisations target very human vulnerabilities – the need to belong, to solidify one’s identity, to have purpose and meaning, and to feel like one matters in the grand
scheme of the world. Whether this radicalisation may result in an attack on South African, or foreign soil, it is definitely a phenomenon worth investigating and dedicating time to. One must also take into consideration South Africa’s poverty and rampant corruption, which could lead to feelings of relative deprivation. The known presence of training camps, as well as the verified reports of Al-Shabaab support in Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Roshnee, the constant recruitment efforts of ISIS in the cities of Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth, and the Al-Qaeda-aligned Jahbaht al-Nusra supporters in Port Elizabeth must be acknowledged (Opperman, 2016b). As stated earlier, South Africa’s involvement is generally about financial support and recruitment. However according to Opperman (2016b) there is an estimated 20 – 50 individuals, including families who have moved to Iraq and Syria in support of ISIS. The reason for their move is not one of resentment towards South Africa; rather it is a way to prove that they are good Muslims by responding to the call for jihad. This reason may change because of South Africa’s Middle East policy that prioritizes relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran, who are taking action against ISIS.

South Africa may not have an open problematic display of radical thought or recruitment efforts, like the UK does, however therein lies an opportunity for learning. South Africa definitely has legislation that is on par with that of the UK, however there are no counter-radicalisation programmes or efforts currently in place. In order to intercept radical groups and their ideology, South Africa needs to see what countries like the UK are doing about it (like the PREVENT Strategy, for example) and try to implement similar approaches tailored to the specific needs of the South African context.

According to Solomon (2011, p.3) “political correctness, shaped by South Africa’s unique history, continues to characterize the perspective of many in the country’s political establishment and undermines the fight against the scourge of terrorism”. Remaining cautious about portraying the Muslim population in a bad light, or seeming to target a religion and its people, is a noble endeavour, however there needs to be a formal analysis of the threat South Africa faces with regards to radicalisation. It is not possible to point out exactly which societal group is vulnerable to radicalisation, and it would be unwise to try. The proportion of individuals exposed to
the commonly cited factors of radicalisation is many, although the proportion of people who become radicalized is small. It would be ill advised to apply crude statistics to a population, as it may be counter-productive resulting in discrimination against, and resentment from those who are falsely painted as potential terrorists.

How do causal factors relate to each other and how do they contribute to radicalisation when combined?

One’s vulnerability to radicalisation seems to rest heavily on micro-level factors, particularly issues around identity. Furthermore, the causal factors bolster each other – individuals who disapprove of their government’s policies and feel that it is corrupt and not serving the needs of its people may feel relatively deprived and frustrated. This frustration leads individuals to seek solutions and find others who share similar views, leading to group membership and the subsequent group dynamics. The people one identifies with, who one prioritizes, personal experience and social influences greatly affect one’s choice of interactions and the direction in which one chooses to seek answers or comfort. Due to these factors being so varied for each radicalised individual, one may look towards demographic characteristics like religious, cultural or indigenous background to form a risk portfolio. Assessment that relies on collective aspects such as the above may result in governmental bias and/or social sanctions towards specific demographics. Instead of considering which groups are more vulnerable to radicalisation, one should address factors that may cause grievances or discontent such as a lack of political participation, restricted access to social and financial resources, corruption, poor border control, etcetera.

Identity and social relationships are at the centre of radicalisation. In order to address vulnerabilities on this level, a simple start would be to acknowledge the threat formally and have an open discussion about what it means to be ‘radicalised’, to discuss why the ideology of these groups is problematic and to offer parents, teachers and friends advice on how to help those they think may be vulnerable. This discussion needs to be had without the fear of appearing bigoted, and without targeted the religion of Islam. An analysis or exploration into possible strategies for policies or de-radicalisation programmes is beyond the scope of this study.
7.3 Implications of the Study

This study offers suggestive evidence that radicalisation is a threat for South Africa. Future research into radicalisation, with a focus on compiling detailed background profiles (inclusive of characteristics and circumstances) of known terrorist would be beneficial – not to form a ‘universal profile’ but rather building an understanding of risk factors.

7.4 Limitations of the Study

This study was focused on the radicalisation of Islam due to its topical nature and global concern, however due to the sensitive nature of this topic, the study relied on case studies. The data sources used may not have been entirely reliable due to journalistic bias.

7.5 Conclusion

There is a large body of information with regards to individuals who have followed a radical path- but there is little information on those who reject that radical path. It has been established that very few people progress to violent action. Rather than focusing solely on people who have adopted a radical ideology, it may be useful to look into those who have been exposed to it, and chosen otherwise. In other words, looking into the receptiveness to violent ideology. By looking into both kinds of people, comparing and contrasting them, one may gain more insight. Furthermore, current knowledge about radicalisation and its processes are quite limited. Although there is an extensive amount of literature around the subject with regards to the causes and consequences, information about who these individuals are and why they commit to violent ideologies is absent. What makes this particularly difficult is that these individuals do not come from a specific age group; socio-economic group or cultural background and they also by and large do not have any psychological idiosyncrasies.

Radicalisation is an individual process. The combinations of factors, which make an individual vulnerable to radicalisation, vary per person. Some factors may have a greater effect on some, for example some people may be struggling with finding their identity while others are not. Taking this into account – designing measures aimed at preventing radicalisation (based on ‘high risk’ groups) may alienate said group
further, increasing intergroup conflict. What can be noted is that individuals who are exposed to causal factors are more likely to undergo radicalisation – people who belong to politically and/or culturally marginalized groups, or those who are poorly integrated, for example. One may assume that the more causal factors one is expose to, the higher one’s vulnerability – an individual may have lost a loved one, going through a state of depression and is experiencing discrimination, may be considered more vulnerable than someone who feels relatively deprived. Perhaps when looking into preventative measures, attention must be given to those who are affected by many causal factors. One important point is that individuals who see themselves as part of a minority group and feel persecuted are more likely to respond with aggression or negative attitudes which may eventually lead them down the path of radicalisation. Kruglanski and Fishman (2009) propose that the overall social situation may have some influence over one’s path towards radicalisation. When exploring factors such as socioeconomic status, age, education, relative deprivation, religion, foreign occupation, or poverty, one encounters two problems. Firstly, many individuals share similar oppressive environments, but not all these people are radicalized. So, environmental conditions do not automatically produce radicalized individual. Secondly, empirical research has failed to provide a “root cause” for radicalisation – to find a correlation between a causal factor and an outcome, one would require a control group of people who have been exposed to all the potential factors and were not radicalized - there are common factors that have the potential, in certain combinations, at certain time in an individual’s life, to lead them down the path of radicalisation. Essentially one can say that it is neither possible nor ideal to define a group that is more susceptible to radicalisation – because all the commonly mentioned ‘causes’ may be considered a product of life, whereby not everyone becomes a violent radical. One can however look towards addressing problematic areas inherent in the aforementioned factors to reduce the potential an individual may have towards radicalisation.

As long as there are people to inspire – the lonely, the lost, the wronged, the grieving, maybe the ill, radical ideologies may hold the answer to their challenges and the complications of modern life. There is no top down solution with regards to fight against Islamism – guns and legislation will not solve the problem. One cannot simply kill the head of an organisation and hope for a diminishing in its followers, this is
because radicalisation is born of, and breeds through an idea; and ideas cannot be killed. The way forward may be to allow individuals and communities to challenge, and question radical ideologies, whilst promoting not tolerance, but an acceptance of differences and the celebration of diversity.

The Islamist narrative – that “the West” is engaged in a war against Islam – is a quintessential one. It has taken root and gained power. It has done what narratives are supposed to do – give ideas a way to spread...Ideas are like water: they take a while to reach boiling point, but as soon as they do, they erupt. We are still at the heating stage of our ideas; we require patience for our work to embed itself into society. Ever so slowly, we will start to see the boil (Nawaz, 2012, p.254).
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7.7 Appendices

Appendix 1 – Ethical Clearance

February 2016

Miss Annika Maharaj 210516559
School of Applied Human Sciences
Howard College Campus

Dear Miss Maharaj

Protocol reference number: HSS/0030/016M
Project Title: The Radicalisation of Islam: Comparing South African and the United Kingdom

Full Approval – Expedited Application

In response to your application received 23 December 2015, the Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee has considered the abovementioned application and the protocol has been granted FULL APPROVAL.

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment/modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number.

PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

The ethical clearance certificate is only valid for a period of 3 years from the date of issue. Thereafter Recertification must be applied for on an annual basis.

...take this opportunity of wishing you everything of the best with your study.

Yours faithfully

Dr Shenuka Singh (Chair)
Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee

Cc Supervisor: Dr Jackie De Wet
Cc Academic Leader Research: Dr Jean Steyn
Cc School Administrator: Ms Ayanda