Thesis Title

Vertical integration peacebuilding in transforming African conflicts: Peace mechanisms in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Somalia.

By

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Supervisor:

Prof. Suzanne Francis

December 2016
Declaration of Authorship

I Gilbert Tinashe Zvaita, declare that this dissertation titled, “Vertical integration peacebuilding in transforming African conflicts: peace mechanisms in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Somalia” is an outcome of my own independent research work. This work has not been submitted to any other institution for a degree program or publication or examination. I maintain that all the information referenced, cited, and derived from the works of others is clearly confirmed and acknowledged.

Signed: ...............................    Date: ............................
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Dedication
In loving memory of my beloved mother Faustina T. Chadya, you always believed in me.
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I give much glory to God Almighty for the wisdom and strength to conduct this research study. I am very much thankful and grateful to Professor Suzanne Francis for her selfless guidance and support. Thank you Prof, for the priceless and invaluable experience you invested to this end. More so, I would like to express my utmost gratitude to my family for their heartfelt support and love. Without their constant encouragement and support, the journey could have been more difficult. I also would like to acknowledge all my colleagues and friends for their confidence in me, and tireless support to this end.
Abstract
Different parts of the African continent have been subject to conflict. Over the years, both state and non-state actors to provide lasting solutions to peace have embarked on various peacebuilding initiatives. Despite different programs, projects, and peace agreements that have been signed and established. It however, remains a challenge in most post-conflict countries to secure lasting peace. In most cases, there has been relapse of conflict within a period of 5 years after the peace accord, or within a decade of peace programs. This research approaches the African conflict problem from a theoretical standpoint, to challenge the dominance of liberal concepts of peace that remain an impasse in grounding necessary structures that may be of significant help to build sustainable peace. Vertical integration peacebuilding is engaged as a hybrid peace theory in analyzing the various peacebuilding procedures that have been applied over the years by international organizations, state actors and regional actors in the continent. DRC, Somalia and South Sudan are the relevant case studies. The main argument is not to dismiss the progress achieved so far. Rather it seeks to engage on a corrective analysis of the strategic impasses that have been sabotaging the transformation processes that can be of much significance in dealing with the conflict problems. There have been repetitive liberal/top-down/paternalistic peacebuilding approaches in the past two or more decades in Africa’s conflict countries with little or no significant changes in the transformation of peace. Therefore, vertical integration as a peacebuilding approach is engaged to expose the weaknesses of the dominant liberal peace mechanisms that guides various institutions of peace in Africa. The researcher outlines the importance of developing more local peace ownership programs and establishing a legitimate support for peacebuilding programs from below as an effective and alternative way of ushering in sustainable peacebuilding programs. Henceforth, sector security reform, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs, which are particular to peacebuilding, can therefore gain more local support if they are designed through the perspectives of the local communities.
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>National Congress for the Defense of the People</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDRRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of South Sudan</td>
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<td>GPI</td>
<td>Global Peace Index</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>MUNOC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>MUNOSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>RoS</td>
<td>Republic of Sudan</td>
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<td>RoSS</td>
<td>Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa development Community</td>
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<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan’s People Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<td>UNOC</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in the Congo</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<td>UNPBC</td>
<td>United Nations Peacebuilding Commission</td>
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CHAPTER 1: Orientation of the Research theme

Background and outline of research

Since the 1970s, peacebuilding in most African countries was characterized by top-down approaches. These approaches mostly focused on strengthening and stabilizing state institutions around the principles of addressing past wrongs so as to promote nation building and unity (Ncube, 2014). In the post-Cold war era, there has been prominence in the efforts of building peace in most conflict-ridden countries. There has been a renewed emphasis on peacebuilding by the international community, which has received more attention since Agenda for Peace\(^1\) in 1992. Considering the development of these new propitious trends in promoting the building of peace in the early 1990s much hope was assured as peacebuilding activities expanded, institutions focusing on peacebuilding projects proliferated and support in the peacebuilding scholarship increased (Curtis, 2012). Whilst peacebuilding seemed to have amassed considerable experience, acquired much funding, and support over the years, conflict trends in Africa are still far from being stable with new conflicts taking shape in countries such as Burundi, Central African Republic, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) etc.

Tracing Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa

Tim Murithi in Adebajo and Scanlon (2006: 244) clarifies that conflict crisis in Africa requires, “effective post-conflict reconstruction processes and the institutions to back them up.” This prognosis follows a trend of past challenges engaged in post-conflict peacebuilding. This research seeks to add value to the post-conflict peacebuilding literature and clarify some theoretical guidelines that can assist in creating effective institutions. The emergence of African Union’s defined peace frameworks between the years 2002-2006 and its clear support for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) to improve the African countries support and promotion for peace proved their desire to consolidate post-conflict reconstruction. On the other hand, in September 2005 the United Nations (UN) established the Peacebuilding Commission with a clear mandate of assisting countries in consolidating peacebuilding processes in post-conflict countries. Murithi (2006; 2007; 2008) advocated for a strong relationship between these two fronts of peacebuilding if effective outcomes where to be reached in the

\(^1\) An Agenda for Peace on Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Report of the Secretary-General (Buotros-Buotros Ghali) pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992
process. However, Murithi (2007; 2008) warns that in as much as the relationship between the two entities is important, the AU should remain vigilant in declaring total ownership of their processes in representing local values to peace or else they may end up in a “hybrid paternalism”\(^2\) instead of “hybrid partnership”\(^3\). However, the terms of the relationships between UN Peacebuilding Commission and AU Peace and Security Council remain limited. The foundation, laid by the *Consultative Meeting between the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the African Union Peace and Security Council* in 2010, stipulates several key factors that are important in peacebuilding today. It outlines that member States emphasized the “importance of a strengthened partnership”, “establishment of joint mechanisms”, “the promotion of coherence of action between national actors and international partners in support of peacebuilding” and “affirmed the principle of national ownership of the peacebuilding process”. However, the question is how far have these factors been put in place? Alternatively, they remain a mystery and farfetched in the peacebuilding processes that are taking place.

Whilst there is, celebration that there is an increase in the practice of building peace in Africa there is still need for much work to achieve sustainability in the process. In the twenty-first century, Africa has witnessed the fruition of the African Union’s (AU) [unlike its predecessor OAU]\(^4\) active role, participation and contribution towards peacebuilding through various forms of intervention with the support of United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and other significant International donors. Since the anchoring of the Peace Support Architecture in 2004 by the AU, various divisions have been put in place to bring forth solutions to the conflict challenges at hand (Vorrath 2012). These divisions of peace where forged under the AU’s Peace Support Department (PSD) and they include: Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division, Conflict Management and Post Conflict Reconstruction Division, Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), Peace and Security Council Secretariat, and Defence and Security Division (DSD) (AU Commission). In 2006, the AU created Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) framework that was fashioned in the same manner with the UN

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2 Hybrid Paternalism refers to the dominance of one institution’s ideas and practices over the other, in this case the dominance or imposition of the UN policies and structures over the AU (Murithi 2008).

3 Hybrid Partnership refers to equal representation and contribution of either involved parties or institutions without imposing each other’s ways. (Murithi 2008)

Peacebuilding architecture aimed to support and “help countries consolidate peace and prevent a relapse into conflict” (de Carvalho, 2014). However, considering this dedication and commitment to better the outcomes in African conflict cases, the continuity of conflict following peace agreements tellingly expose the huge gap in the strategies used to address the conflict problems. Vorrath (2012) takes a stand to clarify that despite all these structures put in place; African states have shown little commitment in supporting the peace fund making only 2 per cent, contribution from 2008 to 2011 period whilst international donors contributed 98 per cent. Thus, she extensively argues that if lasting peace is to be achievable on the continent, various strategic plans that are inclusive and considerate of various approaches have to be put in place. This backdrop provides a clear platform to figure out the various loopholes in understanding why sustainable peace has been failing to materialise in African conflict cases and may remain as such if proper mechanisms are not put in place.

**Conflict problems**

In understanding the contemporary shortcomings in conflict transformation in which “intractable” and “protracted social conflicts” have become dominant, it has become much more difficult for peace organizations, governments and communities to work on sustainable peace independently of one another. The practice of building peace has been dominated by (imposed) liberal frameworks, which have attracted more top-down (institutional) approaches in the process (Hoffman 2009; Lederach 1997; Ramsbotham et al 2011). There does exist, a range of grassroots (bottom-up) approaches that include people-to-people approaches to peacebuilding, which have also been the dominant practice in Sudan, Mindinao and Israeli-Palestine processes of peace (Akwanda & Harris 2009; Ramsbotham et al 2011). The field remains divided between these approaches with the former practice being labelled as ‘paternalistic’ and ‘standardized’ in nature hence neglecting local participation which is vital in peacebuilding (Eriksen, 2009; Hoffman, 2009; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). The latter, has received much attention from the critics of the former, but Ramsbotham et al (2011) in agreement with Hoffman (2009) clearly warns that the bottom-up approaches which embraces local participation need to be engaged without romanticising the processes.

In most peacebuilding interventions and participation, international institutions and organisations have focused more on ensuring liberal structures through their peacebuilding practices. Most
African conflict countries have received peace support from various organisations guided by liberal approaches and mechanisms. The neglecting of local and grassroots peacebuilding initiatives in the practice of peacebuilding has weakened various frameworks of diplomacy and negotiation in the building of sustainable peace in African states (Hoffman 2006). Therefore, the reality of sustainable peace has remained a challenge in most African countries with lists of failed peace agreements and some conflicts going on for more than two decades. Conflict transformation engages conflict problems on a more inclusive platform which advocates for a deeper inquiry and endeavours to enrich peace research through “creating constructive change processes that reduce violence” (Lederach 2003). It provides avenues of addressing deep-rooted conflicts; through identifying every possible means which ensures the bridging of barriers in communication and clash of ideas (between international/governmental institutions/actors, civil societies and local actors) to address the forces that continuously generate the conflict (Garwerc 2006). Thus, it contests the idea of imposing strategies of both liberal peacebuilding and grassroots peacebuilding (such as peace agreements and people-to-people initiatives) which have dominated most peace initiatives all over the world.

**Purpose of the Study**

Tellingly, research on effective peace mechanisms for African conflict cases are a *sine qua non*, if prevention of armed conflict and the establishment of sustainable peace it to be achieved. This research explores aspects of peacebuilding, both as a concept and as an effective tool, for conflict transformation that will provide a foundation for long term/sustainable peace mechanisms in addressing Africa’s conflict problem. The researcher posits that there has been more of negative peace\(^5\) than positive peace\(^6\) following many peace agreements in African conflict countries such as the Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and Somalia. Therefore, the research focuses on promoting effective outcomes in peacebuilding practices by institutions, governments and (both international and local) organisations before, during and after conflict to ensure the building of sustainable peace. The research also seeks to outline the factors hindering the building of sustainable peace after the signing of peace agreements. Scholars agree that, there

\(^5\) The absence of direct conflict usually based on signed or verbal agreements driven by institutional stakeholders.

\(^6\) Positive peace implies more than the absence of direct violence or conflict. It also considers tackling all forms of structural violence and systems, which perpetuate inequality in all economic, social and political spheres. Therefore, it is characterized by the “presence of social justice through equal opportunity, a fair distribution of power and resources, equal protection and impartial enforcement of law” (Galtung, 1967: 22).
has been resurgence of latent violence (into manifest violence)\(^7\), asymmetric conflict and relapse of civil wars within a period of five years or less of peace after the signing of peace agreements (Belloni 2007: 99; Ramsbotham et al 2011).

Understandably, peacebuilding strives to ‘transform societal relationships’ (Haider, 2014). The purpose of this research is to portray the weaknesses exposed in political, social and economic relations in building sustainable peace in African conflict zones and post-conflict reconstruction environments. Therefore, this research aims to outline the limitations in political governance and policy approaches [especially the drafting of peace agreements] concerning the resolution and transformation of conflicts in Africa and how that gap can be bridged. Despite some of the conflicts, having been resolved through peace agreements in Africa, cases of conflict resurgence are continuously high (Ramsbotham et al, 2011). In recent history, the Northern Ireland peace processes, the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and the end of apartheid South Africa, influenced the emergency of new diverse tools and institutions of managing and intervening in conflicts. Henceforth, these various platforms have dominated the new face of building peace by ushering in multi-dimensional approaches to peacekeeping, witnessed the formation of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC), and the increase of state and non-state actors’ operations in complex security environments (Carayannis et al, 2014:2). Today, there is much better information, resources and lessons learnt from past peacebuilding interventions on their successes and failures to better both the theoretical framework of the subject and practices in transforming conflict situations effectively.

Many scholars have come to agree that to build effective peace one should consider cultivating the local cultural and traditional values of a given society that can be of great significance in establishing governing, negotiating and cooperative capabilities, which can sustain peacebuilding measures in the long-run (Orjuela, 2003; Pugh et al, 2008; Liden et al, 2009). Hoffman (2009) clearly articulates that, “a peace that is built on the ground needs to reflect the interests, needs and aspirations of local populations rather than those of the international peacebuilding

\(^7\)“Manifest violence is that which is observable whether or not it is recognized as is the case for some forms of structural violence. Latent violence “is something which is not there, yet might easily come about”. Latent violence is the underlying potential for violence which may lead to manifest violence”. http://allmyneighbors.org/2013/12/09/johan-galtung-six-dimensions-of-violence/ accessed 11 Aug. 15
community”. There are various loopholes and challenges of peace mechanisms which have been transplanted from one society to another which can be identified in tracing the history of UN peace missions in Africa, AU peace operations and international organizations that provide support and intervention programs. Henceforth, there is much need in Africa peace support missions to desist from a system of “monocropping” liberal peace approaches that were used successfully in other conflict contexts in Europe, without considering the different and varied contexts in many African states (Hoffman, 2009; Ramsbotham et al, 2011).

This research takes a hybrid peace\(^8\) approach in unpacking ‘\textit{vertical integration peacebuilding}’ as a relevant theory to use in addressing African conflict problems. The main argument pushed forward is that the blending of both institutional and grassroots approaches is a relevant tool in the practice of building peace in Africa [some scholars refers to it as hybrid peacebuilding\(^9\)]. Considering that each conflict setting is unique, the concept of vertical integration acknowledges the differences of various societal conditions and demands of each conflict community before engaging any peace initiative (Burt & Donias, 2014). Therefore, the researcher posits that peacebuilding actors and practitioners need to find an expanse of complementing both grassroots and institutional approaches to harness and create effective mechanisms of addressing the conflict problems at hand. The process of peacebuilding demands ‘friction’ between global and local encounters for the emergency of refined peace approaches (Bjorkal and Hoglund, 2013). The use of the term ‘friction’, refers to localization (vernacularisation\(^{10}\) and hybridization), in which foreign ideas are constructively engaged by local actors (through discourse, grafting, cultural selection and framing) to develop and identify congruent trends with local practices and beliefs that can benefit in constructing effective peace mechanisms which are localised.

Scholars agree that contemporary theories of peacebuilding approaches have become dominantly guided by the rubric of ‘hybrid peace’ (Belloni, 2012; Boege et al, 2009; Chandler, 2013; Lederach, 1997; Mac Ginty, 2011; Murithi 2006, 2007,2008; Raeymaekers, 2013; Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Richmond & Mitchell, 2012; Tadjbakhsh, 2011; Yamashita, 2014). This interplay of

\(^{8}\)“Hybridity in peacebuilding is used to capture the intertwined relationship between the global and the local, the formal and the liberal and the illiberal”. (Bjorkdahl and Hoglund, 2013: 293)

\(^{9}\)Ramsbotham et al, 2011

\(^{10}\)“A process of appropriation [(set aside by formal action) global ideas being deliberated for/] and local adoption”( Bjorkdahl and Hoglund, 2013: 293)
various approaches from both global and local seeks to address intractable and protracted conflicts through the most relevant holistic ideas. It is within this framework that this thesis examines three of Africa’s longest contemporary conflicts in the DRC, South Sudan and Somalia.

**Delineating the Research Problems and Arguments**

This study seeks to “strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict” ([*Agenda for Peace*, 1992])\(^{11}\) in most African conflict countries. Despite there being much research on peacebuilding in Africa, most of the literature on conflict and peace studies has limited information that articulates viable strategies and mechanisms for building peace in intractable and protracted conflicts. Unfortunately, most conflict challenges in Africa have a history of long and complex conflicts, which are, yet to be resolved. However, the research maintains a strong position that intractable conflicts in Africa can be transformed into peace if proper coherent mechanisms are translated into practice. Intractability in most African conflict countries is maintained through the reproduction of positions of power by those in leadership at all levels\(^{12}\) thus they tend to revert to strategies that ensure the sustenance of their positions. Henceforth, the research explores the various local and global practices that have potential in harnessing a striking balance to ensure the process of social transformation that can yield sustainable peace.

DRC, South Sudan and Somalia are amongst the most complex conflicts that have received much attention from the international community and regional organizations. There is much challenge in comprehending the historical facts of all these conflicts. Therefore, this research will limit itself to understanding the factors surrounding the failure of peace agreements and reconciliation processes in the case. Curtis (2012:18) comments how “peace agreements themselves are replete with tensions”. Which means peace agreements can be viewed differently by international (outside) actors and by local political actors (competitors). Whilst the former may view them, as binding the latter may view them as instruments and contextual tools to enhance their own agendas [of legitimizing some illegitimate systems and actions] (see Chapter

\(^{11}\) A/47/277 – S/24111, para. 21

\(^{12}\) See Lederach’s Leadership Pyramid in Chapter 3 of the research
4). DRC, Somalia and South Sudan share a common crisis of peace agreements and reconciliation conferences, which have been taking place with an increasing number of factions participating and have yet failed to deliver peace so far. The Fragile States Index indicates that for the past four years these countries have been in the top five countries tagged with the highest alert. Even though, Sierra Leone is one of the few celebrated successes of peacebuilding in Africa it goes unnoticed that prior to the final successful agreement in 2002, three consecutive peace agreements had failed dismally since 1991. Scholars agree that the conflict in Sierra Leone was highly intractable and required the proper peace mechanisms to ensure some successful peace agreement outcomes.

Many African cases of building peace in conflict zones and post-conflict zones are faced with various setbacks leading back to conflict. More so, most peacebuilding initiatives in post-conflict recovery strategies run as ad hoc programs. Therefore, most peacebuilding practitioners agree that whatever form of peacebuilding should never be an ad hoc but a permanent process, incorporated in state-building governance and institutional missions and projects (Donias, 2014).

Research Problems
The main problems, identified are that of ineffective peace approaches that have resulted in more complex conflict situations in Africa. Profound scholars such as Mark Hoffman (2006; 2009), Devon Curtis (2012), Ramsbotham et al (2011) have argued that the fatal failure of most African peacebuilding inventions are due to the ‘mono-cropping’ of western liberal peacebuilding strategies. Therefore, the researcher critically engages the concept of liberal peacebuilding in an effort to address the challenge and to forge in alternative salient frameworks that are more flexible. The research zeros in on “vertical integration peacebuilding” as a strategic conflict transformation theory, which suggest that peace-building is not just an issue of international actors addressing conflict issues but also a case for the government, and the communities affected by the conflict to get involved (Donias & Burt, 2014). Hitherto, Lederach’s analysis of peacebuilding envisioned as a model which is suitable for the building of sustainable peace thus, constructing a peace process in deeply divided societies and situations of internal armed conflict requires an operative frame of reference that takes into consideration the legitimacy, uniqueness, and interdependency of the needs and resources of the grassroots, middle range, and top level (1997: 60)
Lederach’s argument provides a platform for defining new operative frameworks, which are adaptive to African environments. This remains a challenging fact to address in this research, but as identified in the researcher’s main arguments the consideration of inclusive and transdisciplinary approaches allows a more flexible platform for critically engaging the discourses in peacebuilding and bridging the parameters of intractability and peace failure.

One of the problems considered in this research is the challenge of stakeholder participation in the process of building peace. Stakeholders in conflict includes civilians, civil societies, conflict actors (rebels, militias and government or state military), third parties (NGOs, international organisations and institutions, foreign governments consultants). In light of this, the OECD (2010: 7) report stipulated that peace building together with state building require sustainable efforts from all stakeholders; the G7+\textsuperscript{13} proposed that this aims “to improve governance, strengthen economic and social development, and promote peace and security”. This is a cause which requires both the recognition of the central state-society relations which includes the vulnerable and excluded groups (women, children and youths [civilians/stakeholder communities]); and the consideration of international actors or organizational actors which focuses on strengthening national capacities for conflict management and laying down foundations for sustainable peace and development (un.org -ECOSOC). In outlining such issues, there is need for a breaking ground for feasible mechanisms that enact development and support capable, accountable and responsive functional states. This demands international actors, the government and the affected communities to work together without any hindrances. Thus, this research advances the need of hybrid peacebuilding initiatives and transdisciplinary support systems in bringing forth the desired sustainable peace in Africa.

Research Arguments
This research presents two main arguments:

\textsuperscript{13} “There are currently 20 member countries of the g7+. Members span across the globe from different regions, cultures, traditions and historical contexts in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Pacific; they are amongst the world’s most mineral rich, yet least developed and low-income economies. Despite coming from diverse backgrounds, member countries identified significant commonalities in their dealings with international actors, and in the impediments restricting the process of peacebuilding and statebuilding.” (Retrieved at: http://www.g7plus.org/en/who-were-are/member-countries Accessed on 08/06/2016)
**Argument 1:** by employing flexible [inclusive and constructive] and transdisciplinary\(^{14}\) approaches in the building of peace [in order to approach each community as unique and embrace the local pragmatic systems through holistic measures as a way of ushering in participation and effective engagement from all actors at all levels to contribute to the ending of the conflict], effective peace mechanisms can emerge in solving complex conflict situations and building sustainable peace.

**Argument 2:** the instituting of permanent peacebuilding processes before, during and after the conflict as opposed to *ad hoc* peacebuilding projects can assist in eliminating conflict resurgences. The approach of each African conflict relating to its experiences can assist in acquiring more peacebuilding skills that are useful in drafting peace agreements, promoting state-building governance as well as establishing strong institutional frameworks and conduct, which promotes legitimate, coherent, reliable and sustainable outcomes.

**Unpacking the Broader issues to be investigated in Research**

In understanding the facts of the Global Peace Index (GPI) as of 2015, six (6) of the eleven (11) least peaceful countries belonged to Africa. These countries include Nigeria, DRC, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and Central African Republic (CAR). In tracing the trend of GPI, back to 2008 there is always an average of 17 African countries in the 32 least peaceful countries\(^{15}\). The main aspect promoted in this study is to identify various channels to deliberate on in broadening mechanisms to peace practice in Africa. In the twenty-first century NEPAD, the African Development Bank (AfDB) and AU have adopted similar peacebuilding approaches to their international counterparts to put in place mechanisms and structures of building peace in conflict countries (Khadiagala, 2012). These approaches are guided by liberal governance packages, and have so far failed to produce the best of results. Henceforth, the study interacts and comment on the limitations of liberal peacebuilding in addressing African conflict problems but does not dismiss the concept as ineffective. Rather it clarifies that the concept need reviewing in relation to African countries, which have unique societal structures and values.

\(^{14}\) Transdisciplinary approaches may refer to “research efforts conducted by investigators from different disciplines working jointly to create new conceptual, theoretical, methodological, and translational innovations that integrate and move beyond discipline-specific approaches to address a common problem”, <http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/trec/about-us/definitions/> accessed 19/11/2015.

Institutional Paternalism Vs Institutional Partnership: The barrier to sustainability

The UN has always been at the forefront in guiding and leading the route of building peace. In 1992, the *Agenda for Peace* published and three notable changes began to take effect in peacebuilding and these include “an expansion of peacebuilding activities, a proliferation of institutions tasked with peacebuilding and an increase in peacebuilding scholarship” (Curtis, 2012: 5). In fact, since the early 1990s, most UN peacekeeping operations were dominant in Africa and most of the initial stages of peacebuilding practices trailed on the continent. Peacebuilding has attracted much support from international institutions and donors and various governmental and intergovernmental bodies have become very active in the process. Barnett et al (2007), argues that these bodies have no common approaches they agree on in building peace but their organizational mandates and interests control them.

In addition, Curtis (2012: 15) posits, “peacebuilding programming is often driven by external ideas and by the disciplining power of external norms rather than by the meanings and values from within African countries and locales”. From this background, one of the biggest issues the research investigates is how UN has become a paternalistic source of peacebuilding knowledge to AU and other international organizations involved in African peace. As good as it may sound, Murithi (2006; 2007; 2008) clearly posits that what the AU or any other peace organization involved in Africa need is a partnership with the UN not a paternalist or father-figure who acts as all knowing and imposes strategies. With the latter being the norm of the peacebuilding world, local ownership of peacebuilding can remain a mantra without any power. This suggests that new ideas of peace in local conflict zones need enough support from actors and stakeholders to achieve a pragmatic outcome (Tshirgi, 2004). This indicates how organizational misdiagnosis of issues at hand propagate conflict problems, as they try to forge their agenda to a different situation [for instance forcing the signing of peace agreements in which the primary actors are not ready to comprehend with]. These factors result in failure of peace agreements, continuity of conflict and breeds complexity.

A shift for effective peace

The 2003 national report on German policies argued that there was much need for the support of peacebuilding explores that goes beyond the diplomatic level (Kievelitz, Kruk and Frieters, 2003). Their emphasis was on encouraging a shift in the approaches towards the building of
peace in conflict and war ridden zones. The paper clearly articulated how the UN, World Bank and other bilateral organisations began to rethink their approaches for crisis prevention, conflict transformation and peacebuilding as a way of promoting the emergence of effective and sustainable peace solutions. In the 2004 UN High-Level Panel report *A More Secure World*, highlighted some key important aspects, which needed consideration to ensure effective peacebuilding. It emphasised the respect of individual rights and state sovereignty. Curtis (2012:5) comments that from that instance an expansion took place in peacebuilding and its borders stretched “to include not only the cessation of hostilities and the rebuilding of infrastructure, but also the protection of human rights, the reconstitution of individual identities and the reforging of individual and community relationships”. Thus, approaches in peacebuilding have been evolving in order to come up with effective mechanisms and structures of rebuilding communities affected by war over the years.

Literature on peacebuilding shows that emphasis in the process of building peace has been placed more on liberal peacebuilding approaches (Curtis, 2012; Hoffman, 2006; Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Richmond et al, 2012). Consequently, various peace approaches have received limited attention by organisations, practitioners and academics in engaging viable options that may be effective in some unique platforms of conflict. This has resulted in the failure of proposed initiatives of peace agreements, reconciliation and negotiations in various African conflict zones such as South Sudan, Somalia and DRC. For instance, the unwillingness of the UN to implement and support the TRC in DRC robbed the process a platform that could have been effective in promoting reconciliation and preventing further violence (Tunamsifu, 2015). The international community in neglecting some effective strategies that could lead to successful peace engagements has often repeated same mistakes over the years.

**The various alternative routes to peace**

There are various alternatives to explore in addressing African conflict problems. Effective mechanisms in building sustainable peace should be able to promote the building of trust, rehabilitating conflict ridden society, promoting reconciliation and social justice, promoting dialogue, and the interaction of all stakeholders involved in conflict (Gawerc, 2006; Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Richmond et al, 2012). Hence the mechanisms should be a package of
inclusive negotiation, peace education, people-to-people initiatives, ideas and practices, that are constructively engaged through the interaction between “local communities and international, national, and regional actors” (Curtis, 2012; Gawerc, 2006; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). The research promotes the idea that there should be adequate consideration of all stakeholders (religious groups, ethnic groups, militia groups, civil societies, government etc.) involved in conflict to have representation on the negotiation platform to ensure a balanced representation towards peace.

The ‘Spoiler’ Problem

Some key issues that have hindered much progress in the peacebuilding process are spoilers and the lack of capacity by the authorities to execute their agreements and promises. Most African peacebuilding processes have always faced a crisis of spoilers resulting in various setbacks. In most cases, spoilers are encouraged by the exclusion of various stakeholders in the participation towards peace, the fear of peace consequences by perpetrators of war crimes, and the assumed unjust outcomes the peace processes. For instance, the exclusion of the Sudan’s People Liberation Army (SPLA) a major rebel group in the conflict in the Khartoum Peace agreement in 1997 failed to bring the war to an end but rather incited more violence from the SPLA. Scholars agree that there is need to approach each conflict problem with much care to reduce the level of spoilers at all cost. Hence, though bringing all conflicting parties together may be effective in eliminating spoilers in some cases, in some it may not work.

Ensuring legitimacy and competence

Furthermore, the process of peacebuilding requires the passing of legitimate and sound decisions that are binding to avoid macro-institutional dictates of peace decisions that are poorly implemented or never implemented at all. For instance, the failure to implement the mission of disarmament proposed in the region of Abyei following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2008 by the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the Sudanese government. This research, therefore, propounds that each peacebuilding intervention strategy should ensure a coherent interaction at all societal levels and institutions, to ensure coordination in the chain of relationships that link international, state and local actors in peacebuilding efforts (Donias & Burt, 2014). This research’s investigations aim to emphasise the need for competence and coherence in structural approaches to peace in addressing African conflicts.
The researcher acknowledges that peacebuilding demands some wide considerations of approaches and perspectives. However, the focus of the research is to harness simple frameworks that can be utilised in yielding effective results in working towards peaceful societies and state building. It seeks to provide alternative thinking that can assist in creating practical platforms of building sustainable peace which has been a failed reality following most of the peace agreements (Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Henceforth, the foundations of this research study draws from conceptions that are inclusive in their approach and should be emphasised more in yielding better results in peacebuilding processes. It draws on Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali’s (1992) definition of peacebuilding in his Agenda for Peace, as an “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. In the understanding of this background, the study of DRC, South Sudan and Somalia shows that there has been much lack of ‘order and coherence’ in institutional policy initiatives, and limitation in understanding and consideration of local values in the peace process. These have resulted in the implementation of peacebuilding strategies with very few changes and constant resurgence of conflict.

**Contextualising Research Case Study**

Considerably, the research investigates complex conflict situations in an African setting. In witnessing the contemporary trend in some ‘post-conflict’ countries such as Angola and Ethiopia, there has been remarkable proof of high growth rates and have become ‘much-vaunted’ sites, which attract huge influx of global investments. However, other African countries such as the DRC, South Sudan, Somalia, Mali, Chad, Libya, Central African Republic and recently Burundi continue to show signs of uncertain future with high insecurity and a series of serious violence taking place in different communities (Curtis, 2013: 80). The case studies in this research serve to provide a wide understanding of the limitations in African post-conflict peacebuilding. The research seeks to offer various alternative approaches discerned from literature in analysing some popular approaches, which have resulted in more failures than successes in Africa. Therefore, three of Africa’s most famous conflicts, which have been persistent for more than two decades, were selected as a point of departure to learn from and highlight possible solutions that can be applicable in the continent at large.
Somalia, DRC and South Sudan are testament of both elements of intractability and protracted social conflicts. The conflicts in these states that are Africa’s longest conflicts are characterised by high levels of hostility and intense sporadic violence. Somalia has a consistent trend of warlord clashes [territorial and ethnic], conflicts and acts of terrorism. The DRC has trends of episodic violence by rebels, crimes against humanity and resource related conflicts. South Sudan has a history of continuous territorial and religious conflicts which are episodic [genocides and tribal wars] in nature. Peace agreements signed over the years in all these countries with very little effect. Despite very well meaning intentions and plans from various organizations, the evidence from these cases questions their utility in these conflicts, as peace remains elusive.

This research will not reiterate the entire history of the given case studies but will only refer to specific processes of peace interventions and agreements (their outcomes, the involved stakeholders and the geographical territories in question). This research does not regard the involvement of the international community as obsolete and unnecessary and neither will it romanticize local approaches. This study, intends to pinpoint various pragmatic, enterprising opportunities that brings understanding through multi-disciplinary perspectives in the social sciences, which include peace-psychology and development (etc.). The aim is to draw on the strongest values of communities and societies that may identify in traditions, culture, leadership and communication. This meant to empower the involvement of multi-disciplinary entry-points for building effective peace mechanism that are relevant to African conflict settings. This research considers a new approach in peacebuilding (vertical-integration peacebuilding) as a strategic and effective way to yield the sustainable effects of lasting peace in “deep-rooted conflicts”, “intractable conflicts” and “protracted social conflicts” (Kaldor, 1999).

The Main Objective of Research

Wherefore, this study purposes to help create phases of interaction, learning and correction of different procedures and approaches that may be detrimental to future peace prospects in African conflict countries/zones. Paul Collier (2004:6) in explaining the short comings of various peacebuilding strategies that has been engaged in most African countries vehemently argues that, none of the different types of intervention has shown any systematic effect in shortening conflicts. He further argues that, “this does not imply that particular interventions have not been
effective, but rather that no type of intervention has proved to be systematically effective”. Zooming into the world of peacebuilding there is one main aspect that is rarely focused on as a limitation that is ‘ad hoc peacebuilding projects’ which is mainly advanced by liberal peace reforms (Vorrath 2012). These short-term projects inhibit a full cycle of transformation to take place, as they are too rapid for conflict / post-conflict societies to manage (Paffenholz & Spurk 2006; Hoffman, 2006). Therefore, the processes of reconciliation, rehabilitation, communication, reformation and cohesion of societies, which are vital in the building peace, are cut short. It should be noted that short-term missions in peacebuilding are sometimes enemies of sustainability. Giving a timeframe to peacebuilding process is reducing a social issue to a mere technical problem hence it is bound to suffer consequences in the end.

In the process of ending conflicts, priority is placed on rushed peace agreements with little or no feasible sustainable strategies this limits the effectiveness of most peacebuilding engagements resulting in conflict resurgence. Peace agreements have been treated as the “modus operandi” of ending conflicts under Track 1 Diplomacy. Track 1 Diplomacy refers to official governmental diplomacy, conducted by official representatives of a state or state-like authority and involves interaction with other state or state-like authorities: heads of state, state department or ministry of foreign affairs officials, and other governmental departments and ministries\(^\text{16}\). Whilst Track II diplomacy, seeks to promote effective communication and dialogue amongst all stakeholders involved and affected in the conflict to eliminate spoilers and ensure effectiveness in the process of building sustainable peace. The primary goal is to make sure that all procedures and initiatives from all angles including smaller community initiatives towards the building of peace have been recognised.

In their effort to end conflicts immediately, various issues of legal virtue have been neglected in peace agreements (consideration of some territorial aspects, crimes against humanity and issues of displacement) hence justice and coherence have been less considered in most peacebuilding processes resulting in the short circuiting of the progress per se. The effort here is to ensure the building of sustainable peace in Africa’s intractable and protracted social conflicts. Therefore, the research focuses on providing a transformative perspective of how complex conflict

\(^{16}\) Nan (2003) [http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track1-diplomacy](http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track1-diplomacy)
situations can be engaged to ensure the building of sustainable peace. With the main objective to provide a transformative channel of identifying opportunities to address unique conflict environments.

**Key questions to be answered:**

- What comprises intractable and protracted conflicts and how can peace mechanisms serve as a solution to such conflicts?
- How does vertical integration peacebuilding serve as an effective framework in grafting peace mechanisms suitable to African conflict problems?
- How can barriers between top-down and bottom-up approaches in peacebuilding be bridged?
- In what ways are the conflicts in the DRC, South Sudan and Somalia intractable and protracted conflicts? What effective measures should be taken to enable sustainable peacebuilding in these countries?
- What action can be taken in African conflict situations for sustainable peacebuilding to take place?

**Understanding Conflict and the components of Intractable and Protracted conflicts**

**Defining conflict**

Conflict can be defined as, an active disagreement between people with opposing opinions or principles. Conflict differs in many ways, as it is an inevitable aspect of human life. There are different kinds of conflicts, which include family conflicts, company/cooperate conflicts, labour-management conflicts and inter/intra-state conflicts just to mention a few. According to Lederach in Maiese (2009: 7), “in common everyday settings we experience social conflict as a time when a disruption occurs in the “natural” discourse of our relationships”. This leads one to perceive and understand conflict through various angles. Peter Wallensteen (2002: 16) concludes that conflict consists of three components, which guides one to understand, and these are “action, incompatibility and actors”. Therefore, he goes on to define it, “as a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources” (Wallensteen, 2002:16).

In political studies and international relations, conflicts are often distanced from just being personal but as deep societal and community challenges that are driven by political, economic
and social consequences, which can be either local, national or internationally catastrophic if not addressed in time (Crocker, Hampson and Aall, 2014). Therefore, conflicts can be either inter-state (between states) or internal/intra state (within states [e.g. civil war]. Scholars have turn to perceive and define conflict through these lenses as a way of understanding the factors behind the concept. Armed (intrastate) conflicts are the primary subject of concern in this case. Understanding perceptions of conflict helps in defining the complex nature of some scenarios, referred to be protracted and intractable.

Tellingly, in Africa, conflict studies have gained much popularity with often-polarised characteristics in which conflict is described interchangeably as civil war, political instability, war, hostility, civil strife and violent conflict. Abdalla Bujra in his paper on development policy to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in 2002 defines conflict as a “violent and armed confrontation and struggle between groups, between the state and one or more groups, and between two or more states. In such confrontation and struggle, some of those involved are injured and killed. Such a conflict can last anything from six months to over twenty years” (2002: 3). Curtis (2012) simply defines conflict as “a generative force that alters social norms and institutions” in any part of the world and in this case Africa. Thus, this understanding provides a clear platform for understanding the defining of intractable and protracted conflicts.

**Understanding Intractability in Conflicts**

There are various challenges in the disciplines of conflict transformation, conflict resolution and conflict management when it comes to defining intractable conflict. Henceforth, it is important to understand the concept of intractability in conflict situations. To comprehend the meaning of intractability, one can start by interpreting protracted social conflicts, which are just a specific way of either explaining deep communal group conflicts, which may be ethnic, religious, racial, or culturally driven (Azar, 1990; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). This explains the essence of intractability in various societal levels in which it influences situations of a zero-sum nature. Kriesberg (2005) argued that there was still very limited theory and research on intractable conflicts, and over the years, the studies on various social conflicts have helped in contributing to the understanding and development of the concepts, which have filled in some of the missing knowledge spaces. Kriesberg (2005, cited in Gray, Coleman & Putman, 2007) argues that intractable conflicts are those that are persistent and destructive despite much repeated efforts for
resolution. Therefore, understanding intractability as protracted social conflicts tellingly brings out the aspect of prolonged interlocked conflict situations, which might have been going on for decades.

Coleman et al, (2007: 3) attests that “most protracted conflicts do not begin as intractable, but they become so as escalation, hostile interactions, sentiment, and time change the quality of the conflict”. In retracing, the history of intractability, various scholars label it differently. John Burton (1987) labelled it as ‘deeply rooted conflicts’, whilst Goertz & Diehl (1993) termed it ‘enduring rivalries’, and Pearce & Littlejohn (1997) labelled it as ‘moral conflict’. All these aimed to explain the difficult nature of some conflict situations, which seem insolvable. Edward Azar (1990) provides an elaborate analysis as he explains intractability through his protracted social conflict (theory). Thus, protracted social conflicts (PSCs) became a dominant term in the contemporary study of International relations, conflict and peace studies.

Various scholars have put forward several definitions for intractable conflicts. This study values and adopts the definition given by Gidron et al, who posit that intractable conflicts, “include being protracted, continual, violent, perceived as irreconcilable, zero-sum, central to the lives of the identity groups involved, and total in that it is about the needs and values essential for the conflicting groups’ survival” (cited in Gawerc, 2006: 437). Azar (1978 in D’Estree 2009:150) furthers the aspect of intractability and defines PSCs as a “mixture of socio-ethnic and interstate elements that defy traditional settlement methods, and generate escalating perceptions and behaviours”. Therefore, it is the constant effort of the conflicting groups to maintain their perceptions of the status qou, which has become the driving force of continuous clashes and unsolved conflicts.

**Intractability Debate**

From a realist perspective, intractable cases are situations of zero-sum nature as an outcome of threatening causes to individual or group interests; they often attract the need for the individual or the group to protect their respective identities (Crocker, Hampson and All, 2014; Northrup, 1989). In trying to channel a clear understanding of what intractability is Ramsbotham et al, (2011:374), argues that, “intractable conflicts are those in which attempts at settlement and transformation have so far failed”. This argument does not dismiss intractability as insolvable, but rather emphasises how difficult it is to solve such cases. These conflicts require mechanisms
that are different from some general peace approaches, they need multi-faceted (hence the adaptation of transdisciplinary approaches see Chapter 2) and prolonged approaches to building peace [not ad hoc peace mechanisms] (Burgess and Burgess, 2003).

Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2014: 11) posits that “a substantial portion of the most intractable cases derive from the circumstances and decisions made when things fell apart”. This means the challenge lies within the decisions that are made by conflicting parties, on whether they are willing to reach consented efforts or not. Once they have come to a point of behavioural actions, whereby they do not yield to negotiated efforts there is always a guarantee even in situations of less violence there is always a potential for violence resurgence.

In addition, there are various deformed social functions, which perpetuate intractable conflicts in most African communities. African intra-conflict cases are influenced by multiple factors which include colonial legacies [varied forms of divide and rule policies], border disputes, entrenched social and political privileges and the creation of racial hierarchies, ethnicity, citizenship, religious differences, uneven development and, neoliberal and identity construction (Uzodike and Moolakkattu, 2013). In a general analysis of issues causing civil conflicts in many African countries, one might find five or more of these factors as contributing factors in any one case. It is the concentrated combination of these various factors in one territory or state, which has made conflict territories in Africa complex to deal with in building peace. These factors are very much evident as the main attractors of conflict intractability in DRC, South Sudan and Somalia, which are Africa’s contemporary examples of conflicts, which have resisted with tenacity efforts of building sustainable peace for more than a decade. As case studies, they outline fervent features of intractability, labelled as deadly, deep-rooted and protracted conflicts by both peacebuilding organizations and scholars alike. Thus, they present horrors of both complexities, which have preoccupied conflict resolution specialists for decades (Kriesberg et al, 1989).

Accordingly, Coleman (2006:534) argues that the biggest challenges leading to intractability in most African countries lies in the power dynamics whereby the powerful parties within a state/community oppresses, exploits and abuses the less powerful. Thus the quest of conflict is always driven by the mission of addressing the imbalance of political, economic and social power existing. He further clarifies that, in such cases ‘power holders’ often uses the various
intergroup distinctions such as ethnicity, race, gender and class to endorse and ensure their positions of power.

Conflict transformation scholars have justified that intractable conflicts and protracted social conflicts are not, insolvable, but just different from other conflicts that are tractable (Burgess and Burgess, 2003). The researcher clearly tries to analyse grounding factors of intractable conflicts and protracted social conflicts to aid the development of new constructive peace processes in African conflict settings.

The methodology and meta-theories of the Research

Qualitative Methodological Paradigm

This is a qualitative research study. It is a social science research, which studies people, groups and institutions in the environment of conflict and in post-conflict situations, hence the “laboratory of community life” (Babbie & Mouton, 2001: 56). A qualitative research style is more suitable to this study since it provides an inclusive approach for the research to understand and interpret particular patterns and experiences of human behaviour (Schurink, 1998). Therefore, it provides the researcher with various alternatives of interpreting the phenomenon under investigation, and allows various considerations of facts in reaching the best possible conclusion (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). Qualitative research methodology has various investigative/research traditions or meta-theories, which helps guide the design of any study. The meta-theories that are key in qualitative research include constructivism, phenomenology or interpretivist, and critical theory (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). As a social science, qualitative research that seeks to advance the discovery, learning and provide solutions to challenges of conflict and peacebuilding this study adopts phenomenology and critical theory as the guiding tradition.

Phenomenology or Interpretivist Tradition.

This study adopts phenomenology or the interpretivist tradition as a meta-theory to interpret the meanings of social realities in peacebuilding. This allows an exploration of various ontological and epistemological analysis of events in understanding the way in which ‘negotiated perspectives that continually redefine reality’ are built up in the social worlds (Mouton, 1988:7). Peacebuilding as a subject is broad, and calls for more discoveries and learning. Thus, phenomenological approaches in every study enable exploration and discovery of patterns that
defines particular outcomes in society (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). This research seeks to consider useful approaches in addressing conflict situations in Africa. Therefore, this explains the adherence to phenomenological perspective with a critical outlook of how to implement peacebuilding in an African setting. In adopting an interpretivist approach, this research can establish an understandable background of the relationships that exists in the theoretical worlds of conflict and peacebuilding. It also allows for an analysis of the relationship between the metaphysical conceptions of theory into coherent description and exploration of the societies in question.

**Critical theory as a meta-theory**

This study uses critical theory tradition to inform certain changes in the peacebuilding approaches in an African context and especially in preventive peacebuilding. Critical theory as a met-theory adheres to participatory research, and in this context, it emphasizes the importance and necessity of involving the people in communities affected by conflict in peacebuilding processes since they are the main beneficiaries in which their voices and participation requires legitimization (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). It is necessary to use critical theory to add various defining strategies that can be of value in achieving sustainable peace. Considering that the research deals with “everyday reality and the structural logic that produces and reproduces that reality” (Babbie & Mouton, 2001:58). It will discuss the frameworks that are important for effect practical approaches and changes that are impactful in African peacebuilding strategies.

**Research Technique**

This is a desktop research project that relies on primary and secondary analysis. Primary sources refer to “first-hand accounts of an event, a life, a moment in time. They are in their original form (diaries, letters, photos, etc.) usually without explanation or interpretation” (Tennessee Government, 2015). The use of these documents in this research is to provide “the essential building blocks for the historian's reconstruction of a moment in time” (Tennessee Government, 2015). Secondary sources refer to “documents written at a later time than the event being researched, by someone who did not experience the said event” (Concordia Library, 2015). The reason for this secondary data is to analyse the rational, historical and normative behaviour of human beings in dealing with conflict situations. This shall be done in order to understand, interpret, and define events which inform proactive actions on how to act towards what is
“desirable and proper” when dealing with intractable conflicts in the African context (Mouton and Marais, 1996).

This research mainly explores and describes various impasses of man and society; it also explains some empirical facts given in original documents (peace agreements), books, journals, news and internet sites of the ongoing conflict problems and limitations in peacebuilding processes. Thus, it aims to broaden the knowledge of African approaches in dealing with intractable conflicts and empower frameworks in peace mechanisms. *Vertical Integration Peacebuilding* is still in its early stages of application in addressing African conflicts. Thus, this research shall adhere to reliable sources such as peer reviewed books and journal articles.

**The Research Structure outline**

*Chapter 2:* Provides a literature background of peacebuilding. It deliberates on defining the concept, engaging the models and key aspects that makes up the concept and idea of peacebuilding and how it is being interpreted in this research.

*Chapter 3:* It engages the theoretical phenomenon that guides peacebuilding approaches and peace mechanisms at a global, national and local scale. The chapter critically engages some theories that are considered in peacebuilding research and clarifies the reasons why they are not used in analysing in this research. It also clarifies why some theoretical ideas are borrowed in justifying some discourses in the building of peace.

*Chapter 4:* Critically investigates the concept of liberal peace as an inhibiting factor to sustainable peacebuilding in Africa’s intractable conflicts. It deliberates on the aspect of intractability and how liberal peace approaches have become the source of conflict continuity more than building of peace. It exposes the weaknesses that lies in the liberal structures through critique of the liberal peacebuilding frameworks and its limitations in engaging indigenous peace.

*Chapter 5:* Elaborates on the importance of legitimacy, inclusiveness and coherence in peacebuilding processes. It outlines on the key challenges of spoilers in the peace process and critically engages the various alternatives that can be utilised in addressing the relevant case studies.
Chapter 6: Provides a concluding analysis through a theoretical perspective. It engages on the effectiveness of the perspective in establishing peace mechanisms in post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa. It finally offers recommendations to the peacebuilding processes in Africa.

Concluding remarks

This research takes into account the strong dissent for critical engagement in African peacebuilding. As Devon Curtis (2012: 2) vehemently posits that “in light of the new global and African institutions, initiatives, and activities set up in support of peacebuilding efforts, the time is ripe for a reassessment of peacebuilding concepts, practices, and implications in Africa”. This study aims to add literature on African mechanisms and approaches towards the building of sustainable peace on the continent. It seeks to outline possible strategies that can be of impact in addressing intractable and protracted social conflicts. Most post-conflict countries face challenges of diffuse authority and marred by fractured and weak governance. These factors influence the resurgence of conflict, affect sustainable peace settlements and hinders opportunities for effective peace negotiation (Crocker et al, 2014; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Thus in order to harness proper frameworks in recovering conflict situations in Africa there is much need for a “diverse portfolio of instruments and actors to deal with a wide array of different security challenges” (Crocker et al cited by Ahtisaari, 2014: ix).

This chapter provided a foundational platform for the research project by illuminating the key components that are peculiar to this study and to bring out the core arguments to be presented. The research points out that Africa has been riven with conflict for decades and the fact that some of these conflicts have become complex and seem insolvable might be due to some counter interventions which are labelled by Sandole (2010) as “minimalist interventions”. On the other hand, maybe it is due to the lack of effective knowledge developed through pragmatic and holistic thinking of approaching each conflict environment as unique to harness the local, national and international skill and support in addressing the conflict problems at all levels and across all actors. In many African peace interventions of building peace, the key focus has been on maintaining a conflict free environment (negative peace). Therefore, this chapter has identified and summarised the important aspects, which provide the foundations of this research study.
CHAPTER 2: Literature Overview on Peacebuilding

“Our review of literature says this appears to be bigger than in the past.” Bob Dietz

Introduction

Peacebuilding has become one of the most important concepts in the fields of conflict transformation, resolution and management. There are various competing views due to the complexity and continuous changes in defining and understanding the concept. De Coning and de Carvalho (2013) points out that factors surrounding peacebuilding are not just in the definitions, but guided by key determining characteristics. Therefore, the unique qualities that characterize peacebuilding are the “long-term nature of the process, the interdependence of the actors, the multidimensional nature of the process and its concern with the consolidation of peace” (de Coning and de Carvalho, 2013: 11). Paffenholz (2009) explicates how peacebuilding, is interpreted practiced and understood through different schools of thought, which include conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. In the understanding of such a broad spectrum of factors pertaining to peacebuilding, it is important to consider a wide range of literature that surrounds the subject. Most importantly, the enterprise of building peace is an intricate matter, which requires clearly defined and robust approaches. Therefore, considering aforementioned schools of thought in peace and conflict studies, the approaches of peacebuilding in conflict transformation evolves on the different understanding of the term and channeling each and every effort into transforming, “deep-rooted armed conflicts into peaceful ones” (Paffenholz 2009: 4). Henceforth, there is much need to investigate the background of peacebuilding as a term and its practice to influence solving intractable and protracted conflicts in the African context.

Understandably, peacebuilding strives to ‘transform societal relationships’ (Haider, 2014). Literature exposes various weaknesses in political, social and economic relations in building sustainable peace in African conflict zones and post-conflict reconstruction environments. Africa maintains a high percentage of civil wars. Elbadawi and Sambanis argued a decade ago that, “Over the last 40 years nearly 20 African countries (or about 40 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)) have experienced at least one period of civil war…” (2000: 1). Therefore, this research

17 Bob Dietz is the Asia Coordinator Committee to Protect Journalists
aims to understand the limitations in political governance and policy approaches concerning the compacting of conflicts in Africa and ways of bridging that gap. Despite some of the conflicts having been resolved through peace agreements in Africa, the resurgence of conflict is evident in many cases. Thus, research in peacebuilding has often pointed to different peace mechanisms that can be of use in building sustainable peace in the continent.

Most literature on peacebuilding emanates from western views and thus most dominant peacebuilding approaches developed from guiding principles based on examples in European models of peacebuilding (Lederach, 2005; Richmond et al, 2011; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). For example, the European Union has emerged as the major actor in regional and global peacebuilding in the past decade and has spent millions of dollars in supporting the framework of “liberal peacebuilding” (Richmond et al, 2011). Most models have seemed to be a success in their own right, but in African platforms where many structures of European peacebuilding strategies have been put in place they have resulted in conflict resurgence in less than five or ten years of negative peace (Belloni, 2009; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Scholars agree that African peacebuilding requires a flexible and inclusive approach both in theory and in practice. Such a platform may be a beacon for more successful programs and endeavors in the building of peace. Therefore, revisiting the various theoretical frameworks can allow a clear juxtaposition of models and theories in peacebuilding. This can assist in building strong approaches in solving intractable conflicts and at the same time avoiding resurgence of conflict in an African context.

**Defining ‘Peacebuilding’**

The term ‘peacebuilding’ firstly appeared in the field of peace and conflict by Johan Galtung in the mid-1970s (Galtung, 1975). It has maintained its core reputation in the field of conflict resolution (Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Nevertheless, it became much more significant in the field of conflict management, resolution and transformation when Boutros-Boutros Ghali the Secretary-General of United Nations in 1992 adopted it in the Agenda for Peace. Therefore, from the 1990s ‘peacebuilding’ has received very much attention as a significant tool and strategy of ensuring sustainable outcomes in building peace.

At present, there is still no definite definition of *peacebuilding*. In the literature of conflict resolution, conflict transformation and peace studies, the concept has been defined in terms of a

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wide range of issues, relations, activities and structural changes and this conceptualization has become universal at all levels including grassroots groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and UN bodies (De la Rey & McKay, 2006). According to Gawerc (2006:439), the concept is dynamic “having something to contribute in every phase of a conflict, and always moving/changing in response to the situation and the stage of the peacemaking efforts”. For this reason, various scholars have regarded it as often confusingly defined. Elizabeth M. Cousens (2001) emphasises that some definitions are so general that they include all forms that are important in addressing armed conflict without elaborate emphasis; some are very precise and targeted to a specific area; and others provide complicated situations of tough questions and comparative value of international efforts.

Peacebuilding is concerned with ending or preventing the recurrence of violent conflict and supporting sustainable peace (Curtis, 2013; Ramsbotham et al, 2008). According to the UN system adopted by the Secretary General’s Policy Committee in May 2007, “Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development”. It is a rich concept, with highly contested issues. Various approaches in of the subject have been embarked upon to address the bitterness, memories and images, and structural sources that generate conflict in contemporary peace processes (Gawerc, 2006). Most wars in the late 20th century shifted from being inter-state wars into intra-state wars, attracting new ways and forms of addressing peace, hence peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding as stages of rehabilitating conflict zones into peaceful ones (Ramsbotham et al, 2011). It is in this framework that peacebuilding has been credited as an approach that explores a deeper understanding of conflicts in various schools of thought which are conflict resolution, conflict management, conflict transformation and contemporary issues. Hence it carries the capacity for “designing more comprehensive approaches” to address conflict through mechanisms that, “take into account the need for both systematic and relationship change” (Gawerc 2006:438).

According to Thania Paffeholz (2013:13), “Peacebuilding is a long-term multi-track transformative contribution to social change, helping to create a just and sustainable peace beyond the narrow definition of a post-conflict period”. Peacebuilding is in two forms, which are
preventive peacebuilding and post-conflict peacebuilding. The latter is the most dominant form of peacebuilding in most instances. Twenty-first century research in peacebuilding has brought much understanding in portraying the concept as tool for restoring stability in security threat (crime and violent) environments (Donias & Burt, 2014).

Elizabeth M. Cousens (2001) offers an introspective approach in understanding peacebuilding by conceptualising it into two axes, “deductive” and “inductive” definitions. The former refers to conditions in which the definition deduced from existing abilities and dictates of international organizations and agencies. The United Nations Former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peacebuilding in his Agenda for Peace as “the process by which an achieved peace is placed on durable foundations and which prevents violent conflict from recurring by dealing with the underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems responsible for the conflict” (UN 1992, paragraph 57). Peacebuilding officially incorporated as a form of new multidimensional peacekeeping operations for the UN, thus deductively defined as a concept. This definition also distinguished peacebuilding from peacekeeping and peacemaking and became the model for most structural approach definitions (De la Rey and McKay 2006).

More so, in an inductive context, its defined according to the content determined by a “matrix of needs and capacities in individual cases” hence definition might be a “problem” or a guided “solution” which could be more or less effective in guiding policymaking. For example, Wendy Lambourne in her addition to post-conflict peacebuilding in support for long-term effective policies, which promotes justice and reconciliation, defines the concept as “strategies designed to promote secure and stable lasting peace in which the basic human needs of the population are met and violent conflicts do not recur” (2004:4). Thus, the definition addresses issues related to both short-term achievements through negative peace (absence of conflict) and long-term achievements of positive peace (absence of structural violence).

Furthermore, one can view peacebuilding as an “effort that can be pursued at different stages of a conflict… might take place in the absence of a peace settlement, for instance, as in the Haitian19

19 Haiti has a history of dictatorship and subsequent military governments, which were replaced with a democratically elected president Jean Bertrand Aristide who was inaugurated in 1991. Aristide was overthrown in eight months’ time through a military coup and forced to flee.” Turmoil followed, including a mass outflow of refugees, economic sanctions mandated by the OAS and the UN Security Council, an aborted UN mission, failed mediation attempts, and finally, a UN sanctioned, US-led multinational military intervention in 1994 to restore Aristide to power”. Following this background, the UN and other various organizational stakeholders engaged in supporting the interests of Haitian development and development and as such supported indigenous/
Peacebuilding is a flexible process that can happen anytime, and its occurrence cannot be limited or tied to a specific timeframe. Cousens et al (2001:14), emphasises that peacebuilding mechanisms does not necessarily require conflict to be put in place, thus, they can be done in “advance, alongside, or even in the absence of a peacekeeping operation or a formal peacemaking effort”. Therefore, in a peacebuilding process challenges and constraints met in the different timings can actually differ. Thus, this gives a glimpse of the different entry points in engaging peacebuilding and enables one to understand how the concept is understood or can be understood in different forms in literature.

The definition that offers a substantive meaning is given by the Alliance for Peacebuilding (2012: 7):

“...a set of long-term endeavours undertaken continuously through multiple stages of conflict (before, during and after) and involving collaboration at several levels of society ... peacebuilding emphasises transformative social change that is accomplished both at the process-oriented level, and through tools such as negotiation, mediation, and reconciliation, and on the structural level, through the development of resilient institutions and social processes that allow conflict to be resolved through political, rather than violent means.”

Wherefore, this gives the subject different broader perspectives and clearly acknowledges that there is still much to be learnt in peace research. In this case, it opens up channels, which still need exploration in African post-conflict peacebuilding. Hence, to give a broader and explorative framework of the subject, which incorporates the approaches in this research a new definition, put together from various scholastic views. Thus, peacebuilding is the task or process in which achieved peace settlement followed by various initiatives that promote a conflict free environment and ensure sustainable peace. Through democratic institution building; the maintenance of order and coherence; implementation of peace agreements; and deal with domestic cultural, ideological, economic, social and political dynamics which undermine the resurgence of conflict (Dawson, 2004; Smoljan, 2003; Tziarras, 2012; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). This definition is a structure from different views since there is no absolute definition of the concept.
Peacebuilding Debate

Peacebuilding approaches have been subject of debate amongst scholars, these include top-down approaches (paternalistic or institutional or elite approaches) and bottom-up approaches (‘peacebuilding from below’ or grassroots approaches) (Lederach, 1997; Maïssé, 2003; Lederach, 2005). In most cases, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), non-governmental organizations, inter-governmental institutions, regional organizations, various international institutions, government institutions and civil societies have found themselves channeling their contributions to peacebuilding by either of the two approaches. Scholars are agreed that for many years peacebuilding norms have been operated mostly from a liberal peacebuilding perspective in which most international institutions or elite organizations subscribe to (top-down approaches) (Lederach, 1997; Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006; Hoffman, 2009; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Following various failures [through resurgence of conflict and violence in communities] in top-down peacebuilding approaches, others have resorted to ‘peacebuilding from below’ as the panacea for sustainable peace. In tracing the course of peacebuilding, it has become clear that both approaches need to complement each other if effective results in building sustainable peace is to emerge (Lederach, 1997; Joeng, 2005; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). It is important to note that no single explanatory model of peacebuilding is capable of capturing the complex reality of what can and has to be done in addressing intractable conflicts (Dahre, 2008). John Paul Lederach (1997) and Devon Curtis (2012) agree that peace processes require a broad and flexible frame that is legitimately grounded and unique for each conflict environment, also interdependently guided, and supported at all societal and leadership levels.

With all the various theoretical concepts, which have been pushed forward in guiding the peacebuilding framework, scholars and practitioners of peace have remained unsatisfied with the outcomes on the ground. The twenty-first century literature on peacebuilding has witnessed the development of a new concept and approach, which is “Hybrid Peace”. Nadarajah and Rampton (2015) argues that hybrid peacebuilding has developed a counter measure to quench the problems that have emerged through liberal peacebuilding frameworks. Ramsbotham et al (2011) emphasizes that ‘hybrid peace’ pulls together the end of both top-down and bottom-up approaches in peacebuilding without romanticizing either of the two. Tim Murithi (2006; 2007; 2008) gives a different thrust of hybridity in peacebuilding. He argues that if peacebuilding is to
bring forth effective outcomes there should be ‘hybrid partnerships’ not ‘hybrid paternalism’ amongst institutions of peace. Building on this argument, Murithi (2007: 2) explains that, “given the asymmetrical relationship that the UN had with Africa, particularly in the early years, a culture of paternalism [dominance of UN ideas over African conflict problems] developed between the organization and the continent. Since then Africa has been trying to challenge and dispense with paternalistic attitudes from, and within, the UN system. Today, Africa is attempting to forge an identity as a collective entity capable of functioning as an equal partner [not just a recipient or receiving end but a recognized independent equal actor] in the international sphere”. Thus, the peacebuilding debate in the twenty-first century has developed a new framework, which requires a close attention and refinement in order to maximize on its strengths. This research adopts this discourse and seeks to elaborate on the various sentiments that can be of much use in Africa.

Approaches and concepts in peacebuilding
Sandole (2010:8) looks at ideas around the “building of peace” and provides anecdotes of understanding negative and positive peace as a way of understanding the purpose of peacebuilding. The concept has been utilised by organisations from a minimalist approach and have mainly focused on negative peace outcomes. However, Sandole (2010) argues that real peacebuilding includes both minimalist approaches for immediate peace outcomes creating room for maximalist approaches, which adheres to positive peace, hence long-term peace initiatives. There is consensus among scholars that in complex problem conflict situations, peacebuilding requires patience, commitment and, strong communication and dialogue among all stakeholders (Sandole 2010; Spector 2012; Cousens et al 2001; Ramsbotham et al 2011). More so, Cousens et al (2001:13) clearly emphasise that peacebuilding efforts can be pursued at different stages of a conflict and can take place even in the absence of a peace settlement (the case of Haiti is a testament to this).

Twenty-first century literature on peacebuilding has reviewed and assessed various problems encountered in peacebuilding in the previous decades and has come up with various frameworks. Since the terror attacks against the USA on 11 September 2001, much concern has been on “statebuilding and regime-change interventions ‘peacebuilding’” especially with the support, which comes from the US administration (Ramsbotham et al, 2011:232). According to
Richmond et al (2011), the European Union, as one of the major actors in regional and global peacebuilding, has come up with a framework for ‘liberal peacebuilding’. It suggests that their overall goal is to “prevent violent conflict, and to facilitate the construction of the liberal state, a social contract, democracy, the rule of law, civil society and development” (2011:455). A new perspective on effective peacebuilding has been dominant in recent literature in which the concept has been divided into generational approaches. The key focus has been on the third-generation approach transitioning to the fourth-generation approach which is termed “liberal cosmopolitan peacebuilding” (Richmond et al 2011:459) or “cosmopolitan conflict transformation” (Ramsbotham et al, 2011).

Various concepts in peacebuilding include, people to people, peacebuilding from below, civil society-led discourses, multi-track diplomacy and John Paul Lederach’s leadership pyramid (Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Sandole, 2010). These are just a few of the most used concepts in peacebuilding, which have been used since the 1990s and 2000s. This concept is described as a “transformative and cosmopolitan model” (Ramsbotham et al, 2011:233). Thus, literature in peacebuilding portrays the various concepts and how they have been used to influence the structure of peacebuilding.

Peace education is one of the key approaches in peacebuilding that is engaged to transform various societies into peace. According to Bar-Tal and Rosen (2009), peace education is a tool for social construction. The argument endorses the approach as a way of ameliorating conflict-ridden societies since it involves both the youth and the old. Thus in the event that peace settlement is not achieved in the present generation, there is still much hope from the youth. Brantmeier (2013) notes that there is need for peace practitioners (through peace education), “to deconstruct power dynamics and understand the intricacies of place in order to conserve and to protect ecosystems from which they derive sustenance. We have the power to choose status quo and the power to choose change”. In the process of peace education communities are socialized in ways which facilitates reconciliation processes and cultural reconstruction through their own traditional values and strengths as Lederach (2005) demonstrates and argues for in his book “The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace”. It carries various unique qualities of sustainability, which include building tolerance of the other (especially in identity related conflicts), promotes participation of locals in the process of building peace, and it draws learning
from the local cultural and traditional values of peace. Bar-Tal and Rosen present it as a mechanism which deals with societal orientation in societies involved in conflict by giving meaning to “its societal life now and directs its goals for the future” (2009:557). Therefore, as an approach in peacebuilding literature, peace education is an effective mechanism in solving situations of intractable conflicts.

The Dynamics of Understanding Peacebuilding: Different Schools of Thought
A myriad of issues across various literature shed much light on the conception that stimulates the practice of peacebuilding. Paffenholz (2009) provides the various lenses of glancing through the different theories that governs in the practice of building peace. These schools of thought include, conflict management, conflict resolution, conflict transformation and the complementary school. The practice of peacebuilding adopts various elements from these different schools though each school has different influence in peacebuilding (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006). There is no clarity on the origins of these terms and there is much confusion often created with these terminologies and conceptual frameworks in understanding their influence on practice. In the 1990s, the practice of peacebuilding characterized by the testing of many approaches in building sustainable peace. The past two decades has provided many answers to different conflict issues. That has led to the conclusion, “that only the involvement of a variety of different actors and approaches can succeed in sustainable peacebuilding, including grassroots organizations or other civil society actors” (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006: 18). Various scholarly views, organizational reports and discourses agree that building sustainability in peace processes require extensive deliberations and participation of different stakeholders and approaches (Lederach, 1997; 2005; Sandole, 2010; Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Curtis, 2013; Donias & Burt, 2014). Understanding these schools of thought can give much clarity on the evolution of peacebuilding and the need for various approaches in the practice of peacebuilding. The unpacking of these theoretical frameworks provides a platform to develop a new discourse of building peace in an African context.

Conflict Management and Peacebuilding
According to Ra him (2002: 208), “conflict management is the process of limiting the negative aspects of conflict while increasing the positive aspects of conflict”. Paffenholz (2009) notes that the conflict management school depends more on diplomatic channels and initiatives when
ending conflict. The largest contribution of the Conflict Management School is its focus on those in power who have the ability to end large-scale violence through a negotiated settlement. John Paul Lederach’s (1997) work blames conflict management thought for institutionalizing peace. His argument bases on the role of mediation, which only concentrates on engaging the top leadership of conflicting parties. Commenting on the same note, Paffenholz (2009: 3) clarifies that the process often ignores the “need for facilitation by different internal and external actors before, during and after the negotiations”. The approach also overlooks the deep causes of conflicts (Hoffman 1995). According to the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) (ISS Africa.org), conflict management approaches in peacebuilding have been interested more in assisting governments, regional and international institutions in developing peace support policies and operations, implementing regional protocols, and training for peacekeeping deployments and regional standby capacities in Africa. Paffenholz (2009: 3) highlights that “peacebuilders, according to the logic of this school [conflict management], are external diplomats from bilateral or multilateral organizations”. Its focus is on short-term negotiation phases as a source of securing peace thus peace agreements/accords falls under this school of thought.

**Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding**

Conflict resolution focuses mainly on the termination or elimination, and reduction of all forms and types of conflict. Conflict resolution school relates to the process of rebuilding relations between conflict parties or resolving disputes through addressing the interests of the parties in conflict. According to Lederach (2003), conflict resolution is much more interested in reaching immediate agreement. Therefore, its primary focus is on producing content rather than relationships. This school of thought relies much on power-based approaches [for the purpose of influence] and interest-based approaches [the actor who is likely to gain something or benefit more from the settling of the disputing parties is the best arbitrator]. Most international NGOs are the main promoters of conflict resolution approaches in the modern days. They are building a network of peace co-ordinations between national and local NGOs, in which they conduct conflict resolution, training workshops, peace education and dialogue projects. Paffenholz (2009) points out, that the critique of conflict resolution school of thought as an approach in peace building peace is twofold. Bercovitch (1984) mentioned the first issue as he argued that the improvement of communication between conflicting parties does not necessarily mean the parties would agree to end the war. The second critique dismisses the thinking that work done by
civil society and at the grassroots can easily spill over to the national level (Richmond, 2001). Thus, such misconceptions in the conflict resolution school of thought have misguided the building of peace in many instances.

The Complementary School and Peacebuilding

The complementary school of thought is a congruence of both conflict resolution and conflict management thought. It argues that in building a strong entry point for building sustainable peace there in need to acknowledge the strengths of the two schools and put them together. Scholars who pay much allegiance to this though argue that approaching peacebuilding from both ‘top and down’ is a much logical step. Therefore, Paffenholz (2009) shows that peace theorists in the 1990s worked on trying to develop approaches, which addresses the dichotomous gap between conflict management and resolution. However, the main limitation with this school of thought is its failure to account on the issue of coordination. Paffenholz (2009: 4) notes that scholars are agreed that, “different types of interventions can take place at the same time” in the building of peace but they cannot be fully coordinated. Thus, this has become a pitfall in the practice of peacebuilding through this approach.

Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding

The conflict transformation school values more of relationship-centered approaches in building peace. The primary focus of this school of thought is on transforming deep-rooted armed conflicts. It seeks to outline strategies for effective building of peace through consideration of various perspectives and understandings. Ramsbotham et al (2011: 9) tries to explain it as the “the deepest level of the conflict resolution tradition”. However, the main difference between the conflict transformation school of thought and the other schools is that “it does not only focus on ending an undesired conflict, or creating endless communication opportunities but also focuses on how to create greater future outcomes” (Paffenholz, 2009: 4). For this reason, scholars agree that this school of thought does not only allow different frameworks (or multidisciplinary20 approaches), but also sustained platforms to pursue long-term change. It admits the various challenges encountered, and that they are different scenarios, which require dynamic initiatives to solve. As a framework in building peace research, it embraces the assessment of each conflict

20 Multidisciplinary engagement includes drawing significant approaches from other fields such as politics, international relations, strategic studies, development studies, individual and social psychology in order to learn how to address complex conflict systems adequately. (Ramsbotham et al, 2011: 8).
environment situation in order to apply the most necessary approaches rather than a one-size-fits-
all kind of approach. Thus, “such a framework emphasizes the challenge of how to end something not desired and how to build something that is desired” Paffenholz (2009: 4).

**Peacebuilding Models**

Since the mid-1990s, the focus of peacebuilding research has shifted its attention from the role of external actors and their influence in the building of peace. John Paul Lederach’s work, “Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies” (1997) changed much perceptions and influenced a shift of focus from “external actors to the important role of actors from within the conflict country” (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006:18). In tracing this history, there is a birth of new models in the practice of peacebuilding. New scholarships on the building of peace mushroomed to focus on international, national and local initiatives in the field (Curtis, 2012). This informed a wide range of both theoretical and practical views of monitoring, practicing and analyzing the progress of peacebuilding in post-conflict states. It is important to note that every approach or model in peacebuilding requires careful consideration before practice. Scholars warn against ‘romanticizing’ approaches and models, which may result into traps or entrenchment of the existing structures of conflict or violence (Hoffman, 2009; Ramsbotham et al, 2011).

**Peacebuilding as development and politics**

Peacebuilding is as a platform for development and politics (Smoljan, 2003; Cousens et al, 2001). Smoljan (2003) argues that there is a strong synthesis between peacebuilding and development, and in order for long-term /sustainable peacebuilding to emerge, there is need for a close relationship between economic policy and peacebuilding. The *Agenda for Peace* by the UN from 1992 developed with this kind of thinking in making policies towards building peace. With the understanding that there is a huge shift from inter to intra state conflicts, new approaches to building peace have been directed to relate more with development and also to influence structural reforms to “expend material and political resources in societies where needs are perceived to be chronic” (Cousens et al, 2001:10). In giving an elaborate role of the concept and its functional relations to politics and developments, Cousens et al (2001:13) posits that peacebuilding should not be just be, “equated to the entire basket of post war need… Rather, it should be seen as a strategic focus on conflict resolution and opening of political space, to which these other needs may or may not contribute”. 
There are many implications encountered when addressing international peacebuilding efforts. Thus, international assistance is often burdened by a certain knowledge base of the frailties and strength of societies they need to support (Cousens et al, 2001). Peacebuilding models in international policy are then, shaped by the intentions of international organizations. For instance, the World Bank has peacebuilding programmes, which are organised in three thematic concerns that include gender-based violence, youth empowerment and employment, and community-led development (Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Hence, most literature in peacebuilding has been influenced by deductive perceptions. As Cousens et al (2001) argued, in many cases these international actors lack sufficient knowledge of local terrain, history, habits and languages yet they define the models to fund in peacebuilding processes. States are building blocks for international security. Hence, whether the state is democratic or autocratic has become less of a threat than lack of state capacity [that is the fragility or how strong the state is] (Houton, 2014). In fact, peacebuilding has been driven [by certain actors] through ‘politics of stabilisation’ in which the “donor” actors may favour certain interests and groups over others hence creating complexity. Houton (2014: 6) clearly exhibits that, “peacebuilding interventions remain largely ad hoc, piecemeal and insufficient scale to address sustainable political change”.

Twenty-first century literature has witnessed the mainstreaming of peacebuilding models in international policy and various governance strategies in post-conflict states (Ramsbotham at el, 2011). Since 1992 with the United Nations’ (UN) Agenda for Peace various international organizations have taken a center-stage in defining their positions in influencing the building of peace and resolution of conflicts. Ramsbotham at el (2011) highlights how the World Bank created the Post-Conflict Fund21 (PCF) in 1997 and emerged as a leading player in post-conflict peacebuilding. Its focus is on funding projects that address the problems and issues that maybe effective in limiting the chances of relapse into war. On the same note, the UN was involved in building various networks and institutions of channeling initiatives for peacebuilding such as the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)22 in 2006. By September 2011, the PBF had generated US$400 million and was funding 193 projects in 22 countries.

21 Post-Conflict Fund was formed through the World Bank’s Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit.
22 “Following a request from the General Assembly and the Security Council, the Secretary-General established a Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) for post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives in October 2006. The PBF is managed, on behalf of the United Nations Secretary-General, by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, supported by the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). The UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTF Office) is the PBF fund administrator.” http://www.unpbf.org/
According to the UN Peacebuilding architecture the most immediate and frequent needs in recovering a country from conflict and ensuring sustainable peace includes, “safety and security, including rule of law; support to political processes and reconciliation; basic services such as water, health and primary education; institution building and public administration; economic revitalization, including jobs and livelihoods” (UN PBSO, 2010). This builds on Paul Collier’s arguments about the value of socio-economic and development advancement in post-conflict recovery as the key to sustainable peace. Thus most liberal peacebuilding strategies [which have become dominant in most current peacebuilding missions] by international institutions/organizations has become much more focused on accelerating economic recovery in post-conflict zones as a model for building sustainable peace.

**Peacebuilding as “top-down” and “bottom-up” processing**

There are various diverse theoretical approaches to peacebuilding in the fields of conflict transformation, resolution and management. These comprise top-down (institutional) approaches and bottom-up (grassroots) approaches (Maiese, 2003). In understanding the contemporary shortcomings in conflict resolution in which “intractable” and “protracted social conflicts” have become dominant, it has become much more difficult for peace organizations, governments and communities to work on sustainable peace independently of one other. Therefore, various approaches to peace have attracted more top-down approaches. There is a range of grassroots approaches and the field remains divided between these approaches. This separation has led to failures in the resolution of conflicts. The adaptation of conflict transformation [an inclusive term] serves as a way of bridging the barriers of communication and clash of ideas (institutional leaders versus civil societies) to address the forces that generate the conflict (Garwerc 2006). This has led to the new embrace of national/local ownership in the building of peace. However, some scholars in the late twentieth century were quick to ‘romanticise’ the ‘local’ as the only possible way for ensuring sustainable peace. On the same note, twenty-first century approaches have become more cautious and investigative in finding various ways, which are suitable to the conflict environment, if bottom-up approaches are to yield a long-term outcome.

Orjuela (2003) informs the modeling of peacebuilding practices by suggesting an extensive consideration of cultural and traditional values of a conflict society. This argument has been shared by Lederach (2005) and Joeng (2005) who values the understanding of the ‘local’ as an
entry platform for effective peace and establishing governing, negotiating and cooperative capabilities which can sustain peacebuilding measures in the long run. UN peace missions in Africa and international organizations before the new millennium placed little or no value to local capacities that are useful in providing support for intervention programs in building peace. In 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon urged national ownership as a central theme in post-conflict peacebuilding (UN 2009). According to Timothy Donias, such a conclusion reflects, “the common sense wisdom that any process not embraced by those who have to live with it is likely to fail” (2014:1). Importantly, embracing the ‘local’ in social science research has become the talk of the day in the 21st century literature, however, Donias (2014) like Hoffman (2009) warns on the “romanticism of the national ownership/ local”. Thus in as much as domestic knowledge, practices and resources can be utilized or mainstreamed in peacebuilding, the international capacity should not be sidelined or regarded as insignificant (Donias, 2014; UN 2011). Henceforth, this knowledge drives a bargain to the African Union’s (AU) peace practices and intervention missions which seem to have adopted more external (borrowed) approaches from their European counterparts and the UN (Ramsbotham et al, 2011).

**Peacebuilding as Statebuilding?**

Curtis (2013) argues that peacebuilding in Africa has been used more as a template for state building, thus in many instances institutions have prioritized state reconstruction measures and governance. In as much as, state reconstruction and governance are important in reorienting a fractured and divided state there has been various loopholes. Many problems and limitations identified in post-conflict state reconstruction are a concentration of institutional rehabilitation and re-building of institutional frameworks without community interaction and civil society engagement. In most instances in many post-conflict African countries, peacebuilding efforts are often pushed on elections rather than efforts that are “sustainable and comprehensive to empower actors within civil society” (Kamniski, 2011: 5). Curtis articulates that

…many of the countries that are sometimes heralded as current postconflict ‘success stories’ are countries with strong state apparatuses, such as Rwanda and Ethiopia. Strong, well-institutionalized states therefore seem to be necessary for peaceful development, with the ensuing logic that international donors should assist with statebuilding efforts following civil war (2013: 80).

Thus in most cases, peacebuilding and statebuilding have been regarded as synonymous in some literature. Houton (2014: 2) basis such a standpoint on the fact that, “the state is the
primary vehicle through which domestic and international peace is sought”. Thus, scholarly views often describe peacebuilding and statebuilding as inseparable. This is problematic since statebuilding is more of a sub-component of peacebuilding, which has its own goals. Peacebuilding aims to prevent the recurrence of violent conflict. Henceforth, statebuilding contributes to that notion by establishing and strengthening political, administrative and governmental institutions.

**Communication, dialogue and legitimacy in building peace**

Some of the issues, which are valued much in the process of building peace, are communication, dialogue and legitimacy. Arguably, these three factors are the most significant courses in post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding. However, they have received very little attention in peace research practice. Lederach (1997 & 2005) advocates for the participation of different stakeholders [aside of those in government and leaders] in the process of building peace. Many scholars share these same sentiments as John Burton’s (1990) concerns are noted by Joeng that,…representatives of states often do not resolve conflicts, but tend instead to arrange settlements that ‘paper over’ underlying grievances which will be the source of escalating conflict in the future. This is because representatives of state sometimes do not adequately represent the needs of all that will be affected by the settlement. To overcome this shortcoming, problem solving parties assemble both governmental and non-governmental people who can widely represent the needs of all parties, including those not adequately represented by representatives of the states. The workshops consist of meetings between these people and social scientists who help them probe deeply into the basic roots of conflict, stimulate dialogue between the parties in search of mutually acceptable solutions and introduce social science insights where they are deemed to be useful (1999: 31).

These values adhere to Track II diplomacy, as they emphasise on communication and dialogue amongst all stakeholders involved in the conflict to deal with the challenge of spoilers and ensure a sustainable peace building process. This means to encourage the recognition of all possible avenues across all social and leadership levels in engaging the peace processes.

**The Story of Wajir Women and their role in legitimate local peacebuilding.**
The story of the Wajir women remains the most ideal scenario for understanding the influence of different actors [even community ones] in mobilising peace or conflict. Wajir district is in the

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23 “Wajir district in the North-Eastern Province of Kenya. The population is in its majority formed of nomadic pastoralists who need extensive areas to move with the animals in search for pasture and water. The conflict potential of the region is extremely high because of the rivalry between the different clans for controlling and using those scarce natural resources. The society is
northeastern part of Kenya, near the Somalian and Ethiopian borders. Somali clans mostly dominate the district. Wajir just like most parts in those regions suffered from the internal wars and conflicts in the neighbouring Somalia and Ethiopia. With the collapse of the Somali government in 1989 there was a large influx of refugees into Kenya. The increase of refugees in the Wajir region stirred up interclan fighting, increased the flow of arms and fighting groups making life difficult. The government of Kenya declared the region as a state of emergency as it had developed into the worst case of violence that has ever happened in the region. When the violence was at its peak, there was increase of crime and most women feared for their children, for their market businesses that kept their families fed, and they were tired of the violence, which made them feel unsafe. This triggered their common fears, encouraged them to gather first in small quantities, and agreed on a common idea. The idea was that the market place should be a safe place everyone. Lederach narrates how the market place quickly developed in a safe place,

“…for any woman of any clan background to come, to sell, and to buy. Women were looking out for their children. Access and safety to the market was an immediate right that had to be assured. Since women mostly ran the market, they spread the word. They established monitors who would watch every day what was happening at the market. They would report any infractions, any abuse of someone because of her clan or geographic origin. Whenever issues emerged, a small committee of women would move quickly to resolve them. Within a short period of time, the women had created a zone of peace in the market. Their meetings and initiatives resulted in the creation of the Wajir Women’s Association for Peace.” (2005:11).

The women’s initiative in eliminating violent conflicts from market places managed to attract government attention and influence initiatives towards building peace. There was dialogue between the women and the men of the community with the community authorities who took the matter to the government authorities and arranged a meeting for the women. This art of communication and dialogue through understanding their values and traditions managed to yield much legitimate results for their community (Lederach, 2005). The story of Wajir women has remained a symbol of effective local participation in building of peace.

The importance of Communication and Dialogue in building peace
Therefore, scholars of Track II diplomacy posit that, consistent communication and dialogue, which is inclusive of all stakeholders, gives room to legitimate support and a voice to the vulnerable in conflict (local communities, women and children). It is imperative to note how

traditional, the leading role is played by the elders, the so-called wise men” (http://www.irenees.net/bdf_fiche-documentation-639_en.html accessed 04/08/2015).
communication and dialogue have been neglected as a catalyst, which bridges both institutional, and grassroots approaches in peace research. Erzurum and Eren’s (2014) acknowledges communication as the driving force, which keeps the process of peacebuilding moving.

More so, communication as a catalyst in synthesizing top-down and bottom-up approaches allows integration between the macro-level (national and international organs) and micro-level (local and regional communities) to interact without bureaucracy in order to build peace together. Twenty-first century literature on post-conflict peacebuilding has presented how uniform approaches to peace have been at an impasse due to exclusiveness. Wherefore a call for inclusive ways of building peace (Lederach, 1997; 2005; Joeng 1999; 2005; Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Richmond, 2011) strategies which gives a conscious consideration to grassroots issues which influence institutional decisions or vice versa for positive peace outcomes. Notably, the process of building peace is very long and thus requires much commitment and patience.

Literature has presented strong theoretical and concrete perspectives in peacebuilding, which include the tracks of diplomacy, types of negotiation and intervention, and people-to-people approaches. It has become apparent that all these perspectives are effective in their own dimensions but years of research and observation have proved that each theory and perspective in building peace cannot operate independently from the other (Gawerc, 2006; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). History has recorded how institutional decisions for peace agreements are resulting in negative peace, yet this peace is short lived. In various instances in South Sudan region of Abyei, DRC and Somalia, some effective initiatives in peacebuilding, such as people-to-people processes, have proven to be effective and yet their effort in some instances are thwarted at institutional level and lacked legitimacy. As such, the landmark for sustainable peaceful means becomes obsolete without full legitimate support.

Legitimacy of people-to-people initiatives and various grassroots peace support programs in conflict communities or villages have always been in precarious position with governments. There has been difficulty in translating local people-people peacebuilding initiatives to state levels despite local successes. Their adaptation at state-level may be suppressed if they do not have buy-in from a legitimate authority. Therefore, organisational support without government support may suppress the development of the initiatives and thus they need to be legitimimized (Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Therefore, to yield much success, governments and international
organizations (as legitimate authorities) are required and needed. For instance, various people-to-
people initiatives adopted between the Palestinian and Israeli communities lacked legitimate
authority and the whole peacebuilding process was undermined (Maoz, 2004).

Scholars have noted that local/national ownership [grassroots or people-to-people initiatives] in
the building of peace requires effective communication and dialogue which keep all stakeholders
from local, state and international levels in the loop (Donias, 2014). This ensures cohesion with
all legitimate figures for the legitimisation of the process. Therefore, leading to the
implementation of an effective process on a large scale with enough support. This builds an
influential legal and acceptable capacity in all political, social, cultural, traditional and economic
platforms in building peace. The lack of legitimate voice to micro-level peace initiatives due to
‘institutional rhetoric’ (bureaucratic barriers and red tape) has been the main cause of
peacebuilding failures.

**Generational approaches in Peacebuilding**

In the peacebuilding literature, scholars articulate that there are “generations” of peacebuilding,
which have evolved and developed over the years (Roberts, 2011). Since the Cold war, there are
four generational approaches to ending conflict recorded in the literature on the subject
(Richmond et al, 2011). The first generation approach, which is conservative in nature,
subscribes to top-down approaches, which are hegemonic and impose statebuilding and peace
strategies. It attests that peace can be achieved through military force, rather than through
negotiations and agreements, as has been the case in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq (Roberts,
2011; Richmond et al, 2011). The second generation approach has been referred to as an
orthodox form of the first-generation approach since it is also top-down in approach but mainly
focuses on liberal institutional reforms [pluralism and democratic reforms] (Ramsbotham et al,
2011). These focus on state economic engagement as the main foundation of post-conflict
recovery. Thus Richmond et al, argues that it “relies on military presence and coercion or
conditionality to build ‘proper’ state institutions for liberal-market-oriented states, as was seen in
the early years of international engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo” (2011: 454).
Second generation peacebuilding has paved the way for orthodox liberal peacebuilding which is
the third generation approach to peacebuilding.
The third generation peacebuilding approach, unlike the first two generations, is sensitive to micro-level (local) involvement in participation and considers local ownership and culture in peacebuilding. In peacebuilding literature, it is referred to as “orthodox liberal peacebuilding” for its values of democratic reforms and pluralization in political participation, and the protection of human rights (Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Roberts, 2011; Richmond et al, 2011). In theoretical terms, with these liberal strategies, the framework is able to undermine intra-state conflict through peace negotiations and agreements reached at a macro or elite level, with the aspirations of involving citizens more directly into the peace processes (Richmond et al, 2011). However, these third generational approaches, still remain top-down in approach as they remain influenced by the perspectives of donors, organizations and institutions rather than the local people they intend to serve (Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Roberts, 2011; Richmond et al, 2011). Most international practices to peace building such as that of the United Nations (UN) “family”, the European Union (EU) and the World Bank are guided by this generational approach (Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Richmond et al, 2011).

Finally, there is the fourth generation approach. In their analysis of the EU peacebuilding framework, Richmond et al (2011) clearly argued that the third generation approach had various weaknesses; hence, the need for a new emancipatory framework, which is just and durable, as well as integrative of both macro (government and international organizations), and micro (local/community) level initiatives. Various scholars of conflict transformation advocate for this fourth generation approach Lederach as one of its proponent notes,

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An infrastructure for peacebuilding is oriented toward supporting processes of social change generated by the need to move from stagnant cycles of violence toward a desired and shared vision of increased interdependence. Such an infrastructure must be rooted in the conflict setting. It must emerge creatively from the culture and context, but not the slave of either (1997: 84).
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Scholars in conflict transformation in the first decade of the new millennium agreed that to ensure effective peacebuilding there is need to privilege local/community involvement to give priority to the negotiation of local and international perspectives (Richmond, 2008; Ramsbotahm et al, 2011; Richmond et al, 2011). More so, they suggest that methods of peace should be built from different spheres which include grassroots (bottom-up) and various social ontologies; in relation to governmental, institutional and legal frameworks with “consent and an engagement with difference and hybridity” (Richmond, 2008: 163). Therefore, in simple terms, conflict
transformation theories in the twenty-first century, such as vertical integration peacebuilding (Donias, 2013), the transformative cosmopolitan model (Ramsbotham et al, 2011) and liberal cosmopolitan peacebuilding (Richmond et al, 2011), are protégés of this fourth generation perspective.

**Concluding Remarks**

This chapter paid a competent follow-up on various foundations in peacebuilding. It is imperative to note that many scholars agree that peacebuilding is one of the most dominant concepts across all disciplines in the study of conflict and peace. However, as popular as it is, it remains a learning process. It does not have a one-size-fits-all solution. Notably, there is still much to pursue in the African scholarship on the theory of building peace. Through most peacebuilding practices have been (and are still being) engaged on the continent, most of the approaches in the past decades have been alien and evasive to the conflict environment to ensure lasting peace.

The arguments that propelled in the conflict problem-solving literature by scholars such as John Burton, Edward Azar who are specialists in International Relations and war emphasised on various ways of addressing conflicts. Since 1970s, their work received distant consideration because it was not focusing on ideological conflicts, which were dominant at that time (Ramsbotham et al, 2011). However, literature in the past two-decades seemed to have revisited their roots in realising that the various kinds of conflicts, which have become dominant are intractable, deep-rooted and socially protracted (Burton, 1987; Azar, 1990). Hence, this has triggered an evolving thought framework based on the conception that there is always a need to think beyond the circumstances at hand in order to harness effective mechanisms that guide post-conflict peacebuilding. Ramsbotham et al (2011:233), endorses the standpoint of evolving and effective mechanisms as they argue that, “effective and sustainable peacemaking processes must be based not merely on the manipulation of peace agreements made by elites but, more importantly, on the empowerment of communities torn apart by war to build peace from below…” (Ramsbotham et al, 2011: 233). Therefore, it is clear that peacebuilding in the 21st century is faced with the new nature of conflicts which are ever involving into complex and deep-rooted situations. Thus, there is much need for strategic and constructive approaches that are holistic and transdisciplinary in approach to incorporate the dynamic social differences that
require much attention in order to ensure sustainable building of peace. Fourth generation peacebuilding offers various channels which need exploration especially in African peacebuilding strategies. The background offered in this chapter has evidently provided the foundations of the thinking behind more than 50 years of peace research, and yet still Africa seemed to be maintaining an appalling standard of conflict since the 1960s.
CHAPTER 3: Concepts and Theories for building peace in conflict transformation

“Blind commitment to a theory is not an intellectual virtue it is an intellectual crime.” Imre Lakatos24

Introduction
Conflict is an endemic determinant that affects human societies extensively. From a normative point of view, conflict is condemned and denounced; viewed as a disease, which necessarily require eradication. Such, normative thinking has been abstract for different concepts and theoretical entry points in addressing conflict problems. In Patrick Chabal’s perspective, taking a normative approach is ‘ahistorical’ and limits interpretative focus on understanding the foundations of conflicts “in their local context and what their long-term consequences are likely to bear” (2009: 160). Considerably, various approaches to peace have focused on boosting civil society participation and improving communication between conflict parties through conflict resolution practices. On the other light, diplomatic initiatives in which negotiations and peace agreements are drafted has been the backbone provided by conflict management landmarks. Lederach (1997) and Paffenholz (1998 & 2000) problematizes these thought frameworks for having a blinkered focus in limiting the building of peace to mediation, negotiation (between leaders of conflict parties) and communication (of conflict parties) only. Paffenholtz clearly outlines that there is often a side-lining of most internal and external actors in the peace processes, “before, during and after the negotiations” (2009: 3).

There is much evidence of limited conflict transformation theory, concepts and practice in most African conflict research. Conflict in Africa is viewed as a virus that requires eradication, thus much intervention has been done through conflict resolution and management strategies. Many scholars and organizations in peacebuilding view conflict transformation as ‘idealistic’, and ‘too new age’ thus dismissing it in preference to conflict resolution (Lederach, 2003). Scholars such as Ramsbotham et al (2009 & 2011), view conflict transformation as an extension of conflict resolution strategies. It is a sad reality that various scholars are still trapped in defining the semantics of conflict transformation. Respectively, one should note that the trap has been

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24 Imre Lakatos was a Hungarian philosopher of Mathematics and Science
sustained for more than a decade simply because there is still a dependency on normative ideals of addressing conflict in a changing world, which requires constructive engagement. In consideration of the intractable and protracted social conflicts of South Sudan, Somalia and DRC, it is no gain saying that there is much need to harness our deepest critical reflection prowess as social scientists with a clear understanding that social life is never stable.

Social psychologists argue that social patterns are transient and yet requires cumulative engagements (Gergen, 1996). In reference to conflict, one can clearly note that conflict transformation theoretical framework embraces various scopes and praxis that can be applicable and relevant to the changing (unstable social patterns) and complex (unpredictable sources of conflict) nature of conflicts in Africa. This research study is designed under the theory of vertical integration peacebuilding. Vertical integration is a reflection on peace practice adopted from an intense study of peace building effectiveness for over a decade and analysis of its cumulative impact across 16 different empirical cases since 2007 (Donias, 2013:2). Peacebuilding needs to be flexible to consider various approaches and adopt mechanisms, which are suitable to address specific localities particularly in complex and multifaceted conflicts. Vertical integration offers a flexible platform for approaches from both elite-levels and bottom-levels (Donias, 2013; Donias and Burt 2014). In other words, it is an approach structured from a hybrid peacebuilding perspective.

The thinking behind the concepts and theories discussed in this chapter is to create a critical distance from a crisis mentality. A crisis mentality focuses on treating a conflict scenario as a disaster that requires an immediate management solution. Resulting in the scheming of “quick political solutions” to address the escalation or continuity of conflict through peace accords and intense negotiations. Lederach (1997: 74), warns that the biggest challenge is that, “little preparation is made for sustaining the peace process over the medium and long term”. Hence, the evaluation of the various theories and concepts in this chapter will point out on the various weaknesses of some approaches in addressing intractable conflicts and the limitations as far as theory is concerned. Thus, the main intention is to provide researchers with the necessary and feasible frameworks and mechanisms to penetrate the conflict environment and engage on an effective peacebuilding process, which may yield sustainable peace in [Africa’s] longstanding conflicts.
Understanding Conflict Transformation (Theory)

Conflict transformation seeks a thorough engagement for a conflict overhaul to inhibit perpetual violence and social unrest in deeply rooted conflict situations. Since the 1990s, though the term conflict transformation was not popular amongst various scholars, some of the ideas gained much attention as an alternative strategy of addressing the increasing number of civil wars. In a growing reality that most wars are no longer inter-state but intra-state, most scholars in peace studies have argued that, “contemporary conflicts require more than the reframing of positions and the identification of win-win outcomes” (Miall, 2004: 4). Therefore, this gives a more thorough understanding of the contemporary approach in conflict transformation which outlines the need for “(re)construction and/or (re)conceptualization” and transformation of “existing conflict intervention measures” (Ramsbotham et al, 2009:22 cited by Shulika 2013: 13).

In addition, advocates of the conflict transformation school of thought have identified opportunities for effective peace in engaging the cultural and human resources in the given conflict setting. The people and the materials in the given society base their argument on investigative frameworks to highlight the complementary roles that can be played in transforming communities. To magnify the lenses of creating opportunities for constructive change in order to reduce violence, promote justice in the social structures and interactions, and addressing problems that threaten human relationships in the long-run (Miall, 2004; Lederach, 1995 & 2003). Therefore, this gives an understanding of how conflict transformation as a term has been used to “indicate a comprehensive and long term approach to social change in situations of violent, often intractable conflict, and reference will also be made to development and aid, security and ecology as being relevant to the conflict transformation processes” (Hendrick 2009: 4). Tellingly, this clarifies the need for a wide-ranging approach which is able to consider various transdisciplinary networks which support groups within society in addressing conflict problems with a variety of actors playing important roles rather than outsiders (playing key roles in) mediating and constructing platforms for the future outcomes (Maill, 2004).

Before conflicts can be successfully managed, there is need for transformation to be engaged in addressing various societal issues, which can easily escalate violence. Shulika (2013:10) in her research, hypothesized that “the exclusion of the problem of fragmented ethnic groups, which continues to create a lack of trust and cooperation in the society” will remain the platform for
elusiveness in ensuring peaceful dialogues and reconciliation dialogues aimed at national healing in South Sudan. The continuity of conflict (civil war) and disruption of process of both state-building and peacebuilding in South Sudan even unto this day has been based on ethnic fault lines.

In Somalia, one can refer to how the clan based civil wars developed into complex cases of terrorism and spread into proxy wars with countries such as Ethiopia. The foundations of the DRC wars are also found in the enclaves of ethnic divisions though resources have been justified to be the major drivers of conflict resurgence. This picture, explains the various complexities in each conflict situation and the uniqueness of each case though very similar elements maybe identified. In conflict transformation perspectives there are different attitudes and behaviours (political, economic, or cultural oppression, lack of participation within government or society, corruption, marginalization and authoritarian governing principles and exclusion) towards certain emerging societal contradictions that can perpetuate conflict (Nicolaides, 2008:11). Hence, this calls for strategic peace mechanisms that are flexible in setting the trends of transformation [which include reconciliation] for the building of sustainable peace.

Conflict resurgence or relapsing of conflict following peace agreements is one of the key issues being investigated in this research. This draws much needed attention to how sustainable peacebuilding can be engaged. According to Warnecke and Franke (2010: 75) “Stimulated by the "Agenda for Peace" (Boutros-Ghali 1992), the international community broadened its post-conflict portfolio with the development of a more comprehensive conception of multidimensional peacebuilding in an effort to actively promote a sustainable peace process”. Multidimensional approaches form the essence of conflict transformation theories, which aims to identify each barrier to peace outcomes. They draw attention to more pragmatic and holistic strategies in pin pointing the concepts and theories that can be borrowed and applied for effective practical transformation outcomes in a given conflict society.

Conflict transformation theories endeavour to identify the root causes of conflict and influence a peaceful change in the existing patterns of behaviour. According to the United States Institute of Peace (2011:15-16) the structural roots of conflict are changed by “creating a culture of nonviolent approaches that proposes an integrated approach to peace-building aimed at bringing about long-term changes in personal, relational, structural, and cultural dimensions”. Conflict
transformation seeks to address underlying political, social and economic systems in which there can be a symbiotic social upgrade for both ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ transformation. In which peace approaches from below can easily influence the decisions at the top, and the decisions at the top are clearly made from an informed position of all actors involved in the conflict. In this situation, conflict transformation can happen intentionally or even unintentionally. The latter may be, “a by-product of the broader social and economic changes that the actors within a conflict neither planned nor could avoid, but to which they have to adjust” (Botes 2003:8). With this background, one can clearly indicate that conflict transformation theories and concepts of addressing conflicts and building peace accentuates to constructively develop mechanisms which are adequately effective to conceive meaningful platforms of addressing conflict recurrence and chronic episodic violence from re-emerging. A few of the models and concepts in conflict transformation that has been used include Complexity Theory, Johan Galtung’s Positive and Negative Peace Paradigm, Ripe Moment Approach of William Zartman and Kumar Rupisinghe’s Eleven Points Model. A brief explanation of these theories and concepts shall be given below; however, they do not possess the mechanisms required to tackle the intractable problems in South Sudan, Somalia and DRC.

**Theories and Concepts in Solving Conflicts**

**Complexity Theory:** is a theory that has its roots in the natural sciences. It has been adopted in the field of various social sciences faculties in order to bring much understanding in the difficulties that may be encountered in translating deep and sharp situations. This theory has become widely accepted in the field of peace and conflict studies to strike a balance in ushering in the concept of transdisciplinarity in peace research. According to Hendricks (2009:4) “complexity theory begs integration at theoretical and practical levels and it is possible that transdisciplinarity could spur this development within the peace and conflict filed and for this reason it receives attention here”. In conflict transformation research, Complexity Theory has been focused on transcending the intra-personal level relationships between the conflict parties and conflict interveners into inter-personal and inter-group levels.

Complexity Theory has been commended for its effectiveness in analysing intractable conflicts. In this case, it builds its foundations on a multi-framework research approach adopting and engaging samples of conflict settings to devise strategies of addressing conflict situations at
hand. Aesthetically it is an attractive idea, but in reality it is more technical (top-down in practice) in approach and adheres to elite approaches as the only source of hope in enhancing peace. Complexity theory departs from an all-knowing angle, such that there are mostly under-resources to engage with local actors in addressing conflict problems. This makes it vulnerable for practitioners to gain much trust and support from the locals they intend to help. For instance in the Abyei\textsuperscript{25} region some of the smallest initiatives of building trust between the Messariya and Ngok Dinka ethnic groups such as the Abyei Common Trust\textsuperscript{26} which could have been utilised by the authorities in easing the complex conflict situation were neglected and lacked support from the other key international and state level stakeholders. Lederach (1997, 2005) and Joeng (2005) agree that all stakeholders involved in conflict and in the peace processes need a ‘political space’ to engage and forge relations as they operate from different views. Therefore, it is apparent to note that complexity theory could have been plausibly used in engaging this research but due to the above-mentioned factors, some important issues would be at the risk of being left out. More so, it is more effective to understand its effectiveness in a fieldwork research in which its abilities are weighed and tested.

**Ripe Moment Approach:** William Zartman clearly posits that conflicts are effectively resolved through timing the efforts of resolution. His argument focuses on the various conditions and opportunities in peace processes that can be utilised by mediators in negotiating to end conflicts. Zartman (2001:8) outlines that “parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so—when alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament”. It is at this instance when conflicting parties reach a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ that ripeness is regarded as due. In international relations, the ripe moment approach has gained much credibility for third-party intervention in the resolution of conflicts. Northern Ireland and Cambodia have recorded a success story on this approach. Logan and Croft (2004) identifies the different ripe moments that were missed in securing peace between India and Pakistan. With all these factors in place, one can look at DRC, Somalia and South Sudan.

In consideration these three African cases, various factors can be brought to light in trying to determine the ripe moment for negotiation and engaging in the process of ending the continuous

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\textsuperscript{25} A disputed territory between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan. It is located in South Kordofan State

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conflicts. The first thing to understand, is that all these cases presents deep situation of intractability in which all the conflicting parties “seem [very] unable to extricate themselves---either alone or with outside help” (Burgess and Burgess, 2003). For instance, South Sudan as the newest state is still trying to define itself. And it is holding out on its neck for breathe in a suffocating conflict zone fuelled by ethnicity (Ngok Dinka vs Nuer [and other minority groups]), resource control (grazing lands, oil and water) and territorial disputes (contest over control of Abyei Region by both Republic of Sudan (RoS) and Republic of South Sudan (RoSS)). Perceiving the Somalian clan and warlord conflicts since 1991 and the territorial contest, which goes back beyond that age, and coupled with the emergency terror attacks, it is clear that all the conflict trends are deeply regenerating into worse situations. This then poses questions on when was the ripe moment supposed to be for these countries. Was it 25 years ago [For Somalia before the warlord and clan clashes], or 16 years ago [For DRC when the Lusaka accord was signed]? The truth in this instance is that these conflicts are puzzling and complex. Rather intractable cases have higher if not absolute chances of spoilers if a ripe moment opportunity is to arise in one of the many factors influencing conflict. Henceforth, the question will remain. Is there ever going to be a ripe moment for DRC, Somalia or South Sudan?

**Johan Galtung’s Positive and Negative Peace Paradigm:** In the philosophy of peace research, the concepts of positive and negative peace are the core of peace theory. Sandole (2010) emphasises that the purpose of peacebuilding can be clearly understood through comprehending the concepts of positive and negative peace. According to Johan Galtung (1964:2), negative peace is “the absence of violence, absence of war” whilst positive peace means “the integration of human society [the removal of injustice/structural violence amongst all political, economic, and societal levels from individual to international levels (Ramsbotham et al, 2011)]”. Johan Galtung in the 1960s builds three models that give much insight to his positive and negative peace paradigm and these include the model of conflict, violence and peace (see Galtung 1969; 1990; 1996). Ramsbotham et al (2011:10) identifies that through understanding how conflict is influenced by contradiction, attitude and behaviour, one can be able to define conflict as a “dynamic process” which can be transformed into positive or negative peace. This process can either escalate into violence (when parties in society or structure begin to pursue their interests with hostile attitudes and conflictual behaviour leading to growth and intensity of conflict
formation) or be de-escalate (when dynamic changes occur [through intervention] in attitude, conflict behaviour and transformation of relationships begin to occur in a conflict society).

In Galtung’s view, the best level of addressing conflict is when the society eliminates structural violence. In this instance, his argument transcends that accumulation of negative peace is not guarantee for sustainable peace, since it is simply suggest that everything is normal when peace agreements are signed and unity governments have been put in place. It is important to understand that in the building of peace, the level of negative peace that is mostly associated with signing of agreements, ceasefire and disarmaments is just but the beginning of the process. Thus in most cases peacebuilding ends before it has even begun hence continuous resurgences and rebellions have emanated in DRC regions, South Sudan communities and Somalian territories. Aspects of reconciliation, social transformation and re-integration have been totally neglected. People have usually become vulnerable in post-conflict societies because they are not given a purpose in rebuilding their country because the society has remained idle on principles of negative peace.

Grewal (2003:2) notes that, “the theory of peace has undergone changes since 1964 and Galtung’s views on peace and violence have changed to a broadened focus on the causes and effects of violence and peace”. With the new knowledge evolution, there has been disagreements on the various aspects of issues that can be labelled under negative peace and positive peace. Haessly (no date) clearly outlines that there is always a contest of focus amongst peace researchers when it comes to the factors to be engaged on when addressing issues of peace and violence. For instance, some may focus on negative peace whilst others put an effort to aspects that can put an end to structural violence. These factors have created much room for strong critics from some scholars such as Kenneth Boulding (cited in Atack, 2009:41) who dismisses the basis of the theory of negative peace regarding it as confusing in defining and understanding. Some scholars have further argued that, it is “impractical” to have a total absence of war especially in a post-conflict environment (Furley and May 2006). Atack (2009) challenges the actual fruition of positive peace, in pointing out how some scholars argue that, there is no guarantee or absolute removal of the causes of conflict in positive peace. In witnessing the constant resurgences of conflict in DRC and South Sudan, there is much evidence to how the theory of negative peace and positive peace has its challenges as a framework.
**John Paul Lederach’s Pyramid Model:** This model stands as one of the most successful models in the building of peace and transformation of broken relationships in conflict environments. Ssentongo and van Raalten (2007) came up with a Conflict Intervention Model that was developed from Lederach’s peace pyramid. They acknowledge the pyramid model for setting up successful components of restoring and transforming communities in conflict. Michelle Maiese (2003) commenting on Lederach’s pyramid model, posited that it made it easier for actors to determine the right approach to focus on in the building of peace and also help in providing the simplest ways of describing the numbers of people involved at each level.

John Paul Lederach (1997) argues that in internal armed conflict situations, the leadership in every level of the affected communities requires a proper platform for negotiation and implementing accords in transforming society into peace. Lederach therefore, presents the leadership pyramid for addressing conflict. The leadership pyramid consists of three levels, the top leadership (military/political/religious leaders with high visibility), middle-range leadership (ethnic/religious leaders, academics/intellectuals, humanitarian leaders (NGOs) and Insider-partial teams) and the grassroots leadership (local leaders, leaders of indigenous NGOs, Community developers, local health officials and Refugee camp leaders). Scholars are agree that in managing conflicts in various situations in countries, progress should be achieved at all levels if conflicts are to be completely resolved in both international and internal situations.

Looking at Diagram 1 below, one can understand that the top-level leadership emphasises on high-level negotiations on ceasefires in conflicts. In most intractable conflicts such as the ones addressed in this research, most negotiations were engaged in by top-level leadership to work out plans for peace. However, it has become apparent that in most cases the peace agreements that have been negotiated in some instances neglects or downgrades the legal responsibility of the peace agreements. For example, the Lusaka ceasefire agreement (DRC v Uganda), which attempted to end the 2nd Congo war in 1999 on territorial conflicts, witnessed the document being labelled as the ‘modus operandi’ of ending conflicts. Lang (2007) clearly indicates that the treatment of peace agreements as a particular way of ending conflicts is problematic if the documents are to overlook some issues that undermine the rule of law such as crimes against humanity. Most importantly, legal virtue is one of the most aspect mainly overlooked by officials, government actors and opposition leaders in an effort to strike a deal for peace. The
dangers of such actions are in reducing chances for future reconciliation processes (at grassroots levels) in transforming society into peace. This gives much understanding of why Lederach emphasises that conflict problem solving requires the comprehension of all three levels.

In addition, Lederach (1997:41) endorses the middle-range level (level 2) leadership to be in the position of understanding the top leadership functions as well as the plight of the grassroots level. Therefore, in an effort to build peace this level 2 provides phenomenal information and skills that are relevant to the building of effective peace in bridging both the top-level leadership and grassroots level. According to Sandole (2010: 47) level 2 players are “nongovernmental actors whose objective is, in the presence of trained, experienced facilitators, to share perceptions with one another about the conflict and how it might be dealt with”. They pave the way for effectiveness in bringing all actors in the process of peace by creating opportunities for “cross-track communication, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration” (Nan cited in Sandole 2010: 47). The grassroots leadership receive much of their training from level 2. Thus, their association with the middle-range leadership helps in reducing prejudice and ensuring the survival of reconciliation and post-conflict trauma commissions. Therefore, the coordination of these three levels ensures a flow of relevant information to reduce the resurgence of conflict. However, in most cases creating such a network in most intractable conflicts has suffered, as most top leadership seems to disregard or ignore the information or the initiatives from both the middle-range leadership and worse still grassroots initiatives.

**Diagram 1**: Peace-building Levels in Conflict Societies: Actors and Approaches to Peacebuilding (Lederach, 1997: 39)
More so, Lederach’s pyramid model is one of the most effective and recommended theories in peacebuilding. Therefore, it is important to reflect on both vertical integration peacebuilding and Lederach’s leadership pyramid. The latter focuses on the importance of communication of people across all leadership levels to allow representation of ideas at every level. However, the former does not only focus on improving communication and relationships across all hierarchical levels of society but seeks for the legitimisation of decisions and initiatives across all levels (particularly grassroots level decisions and initiatives towards peace). It seeks to provide mechanisms that empower and endorses holistic decisions and strategies through a coherent, inclusive and legitimate process at all levels.

**Understanding the Concept of Vertical Integration in building peace**

In considering the various theoretical concepts above, it is important to acknowledge that this research aims to inform the building of constructive mechanisms to address issues of conflict resurgence and ensure sustainable peace in intractable situations. The study explored concepts above in order to identify the various frameworks that have dominated the peacebuilding world.
However, this research adopts hybrid peace approaches and pays particular attention to vertical integration perspective. Vertical Integration theory is not a new concept, but its use and practice in conflict transformation and peacebuilding is a recent phenomenon. Thus, it has been adopted as vertical integration peacebuilding. In conflict transformation, vertical integration peacebuilding can be regarded as an extension of conflict transformation theories, which include “cosmopolitan conflict transformation theory” (Ramsbotham et al, 2011) and “liberal cosmopolitanism” (Richmond et al, 2012). These theories can be regarded as fourth generation peacebuilding for they show an emancipatory approach to peacebuilding and acknowledge the impact of peacebuilding from below (Ramsbotham et al, 2011). There is much hubris in previous approaches to peacebuilding as they maintain a static notion in practice. They ignore some conflict realities such as resurgences, direct violence and crimes against humanity, which are common in most intractable conflicts. Considerably, there is need for an approach that does not only focus on ending conflict per se but also rebuild the state by establishing the rule of law, rehabilitating societies and rebuilding state structures.

The foundation of vertical integration

The concept of vertical integration peacebuilding embraces hybrid peace approaches and accommodates various perspectives through its inclusive representation approach. It acknowledges the participation of governments, NGOs, civil societies, local communities and international communities to engage on a legitimate platform (Donias and Burt, 2014). Just like lederach’s leadership pyramid the concept of vertical integration peacebuilding, aims to bridge communication across all societal structures or levels. There is still limited literature on vertical integration peacebuilding. On 17 October 2013, a workshop titled “Towards Vertically Integrated Peacebuilding: Bridging Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches” was held. In the report of this workshop Timothy Donias noted that “the concept of “integrated” peace building could be expanded to include not just international actors - as has been the practice to date - but also the governments and citizens of states affected by conflict” (2013: 1). There is an understanding that there has been a lot of confusion among scholars and practitioners of peace building, which has disturbed ‘order and coherence’ in the peace building system. This theory

27 The “Balsillie School of International Affairs and organized in conjunction with the 2013 annual conference of the Peace and Justice Studies Association” held this workshop. It brought together scholars, activists and policy-makers to address both challenges and opportunities of vertical integration in peacebuilding contexts”. It was held at the CIGI Campus in Waterloo, Canada on the 17th of October 2013. More information is available on the CIGI website: http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/rethinking-peacebuilding/towards-vertically-integrated-peacebuilding-workshop
draws its value from an emancipatory perspective that values local ownership of peace. It negotiates and legitimizes local community values in statebuilding and peacebuilding and at the same time does not ignore the impact of global and high-level forces on local communities. It acknowledges “dialogue and communication” as the centre of every process in building peace. The World Summit Outcomes (2005: 21) various states emphasized and agreed on,

the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace, recognizing the need for a dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict towards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in laying the foundation for sustainable development.

The objective of this study is to clarify how vertical integration peacebuilding offers a theoretical framework for inclusive peacebuilding. Hence, this is a potential approach for structuring integrative mechanisms and holistic way to address contemporary complex conflict situations in Africa.

The values of an effective peace process

Scholars agree that inclusive approaches are the backbone of effective peacebuilding (Lederach, 1997; Crocker et al, 2014; Donias and Burt, 2014). They aim to break the barrier of uniform and bureaucratic structures imposed at the top and desensitize local conditions and initiatives (Hoffman, 2009; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Paternalist structures which are fuelled by imposed strategies and red tape exists between international institutions/organisations, government institutions, civil society organisations (CSOs) and the people in post-conflict peacebuilding bearing a 50% chance of conflict relapsing in the first post-conflict decade (Collier 2004; Murithi 2007). This explains most of Africa’s conflict zone countries. This study relies on a thorough analysis of text data and numeric data on how elite-level approaches have been imposed in African conflicts resulting in the constant eruption of latent conflicts, even in cases where peace agreements have been signed. Thus, it seeks to expose the bias towards liberal peace approaches that has produced tentative or deeply flawed peace.

According to Donias and Burt (2014), Haiti presented a case of unsolvable and complex insecurity until the UN adopted a vertical integration strategy with a decentralised coordination from international, national and local levels in which the security system has been reformed completely since 2007. Donias and Burt (2014) further buttresses that, in adopting various strategies of vertical integration in peacebuilding the most promising vehicle for effective
change, in local-national and international engagement, is through interactive dialogue among all stakeholders, thus there is a need to establish forums for such interaction. There is much need to explore the various options and strategies that can be utilised in Africa’s longest and intractable conflicts.

Vertical integration can be related to fourth generational theories of peacebuilding in the conflict resolution frameworks. These theories include the “cosmopolitan conflict transformation theory” or “transformative cosmopolitan model” which has been suggested in the literature of conflict transformation by scholars such as Ramsbotham et al (2011) and “Liberal Cosmopolitanism” suggested in the European peacebuilding framework by Richmond et al (2012). In fourth generation peace-building, Richmond et al (2012), Ramsbotham et al (2011), argue there is an embrace of an emancipatory paradigm of peace and the building of integration from various theoretical frameworks of peace that are drawn from peacemaking strategies and technical processes on the ground. They portray communication as one of the central agents of effective peacebuilding in which all ideas are shared openly amongst everyone involved in the conflict (peace organizations, governments and communities) to achieve sustainable peace (Ramsbotham et al, 2011). The most effective quality to be harnessed interpretively from this theory is its holistic manner, adaptive analytic frameworks, a broad communication network and a strong inclusive policy to avoid spoilers to the process. This ensures a close monitoring process to all stakeholders and attracts multi-disciplinary or transdisciplinary engagement in devising solutions to the core problems at hand. The transdisciplinary notion has become much useful in most social sciences disciplines in 21st century, with the understanding that society is made up of various social components that can be traced through sociology, anthropology, social psychology, and many more disciplines, which explains societal structures. Vertical integration peacebuilding harnesses all societal prowess in rebuilding a functional and peaceful society.

**Concluding Remarks**

This chapter has looked through various theoretical concepts that have been guiding the building of peace over the past decades. The main aim is to identify, learn and separate the various loopholes and strengths in the new trend of hybrid peacebuilding. Lederach (1997) clearly admitted that there is much need for more inclusive approaches in the process of building peace and the various concepts identified in this chapter clearly highlighted why Lederach’s demand
and proposition back then is much more relevant in this day. There has been a clarification on the adaptation of hybrid peacebuilding approaches in this research. A particular reference to the use of *vertical integration peacebuilding* as a theoretical concept guiding this research framework clearly explained. Therefore, these theoretical perspectives inform how the issues raised in this research are analysed.
Chapter 4: A defective strategy, repulsive outcomes: the consequences of Liberal Peace approaches in addressing African conflicts.

“A less optimistic variation on this theme is that the push for a liberal peace represents naivety and misunderstanding about the nature of politics in most post-conflict societies.” Mark Hoffman 28

Introduction

This chapter illuminates the consequences of liberal peacebuilding frameworks in an African setting plighted with intractable and protracted social conflicts. It highlights the various aspects that defines intractability. David Keen (2012) clearly articulates that most conflicts experienced in Africa seem to be endless situations and involve various armed groups, which have consistently proliferated into many conflicts. This study critically engages phenomenon in building peace in African post-conflict countries. Literature in conflict resolution, conflict management and conflict transformation points out various foundational causes of continuous and relapse of conflicts all over the world (Burgess and Burgess, 2003) 29. Necla Tschirgi (2015:477) highlights that considering, “the tragic consequences of failed peace agreements in Angola, renewed conflicts in Haiti and Rwanda, and protracted wars in Afghanistan, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) highlighted the need for new instruments and approaches to support sustainable peace in complex emergencies and intrastate conflicts”. These outcomes are testament to some of the various ill prepared and inadequate peace approaches by the UN & AU peace operations, and other international agencies of peace. Since the 1990s, peacebuilding interventions operated as ad hoc, piecemeal and highly fragmented programs. They have disguised themselves in the mantra of local ownership and yet crowded with external driving factors; with alien principles to the local factors, they represent (Tschirgi, 2015). Considering these circumstances and the consequences of relapse into violent conflict experienced over the years in countries such as Somalia, Haiti, Timo-Leste, DRC, and South Sudan etc. It is clear that alternative strategies are required not only in addressing African problems but at a global scale.

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29 http://www.beyondintractability.org/
In order to find an entry point to new constructive peace mechanisms, which can be of much use in Africa’s conflict predicament there is, need to deliberate on the conceptual framework that defines our approaches. The researcher opposes the inhibiting frameworks that are associated with liberal peace approaches. The argument is that, they exacerbate intractability and contribute to post-conflict resurgences than peace in most African situations. The conflict problem in most post-colonial African states perceived through liberal ideological (‘liberal democratic peace’) standpoint (Doyle, 2005). Henceforth, logically, the solutions to the conflict problems regarded to be in correcting or addressing the ideological misnomer through inducing the necessary liberal values. Therefore, by understanding such a foundation, various scholars have identified that the demands of successful peace transformation processes lies in addressing ethnic diversity, democratizing political systems, building state capacity and liberalizing economic institutions (Curtis, 2013). Thus in as much as the aspect of addressing ethnicity and building of state capacity may be very considerate (though with the means remain questionable), it is important to note that the same cannot be said on the aspect of democratization and liberalization of economic institutions.

The researcher argues that various reports provide mistakenly blanket solutions to peace to be in the supremacy of the agencies, which overestimate the ideas, and strategies of liberal peace. Such circumstances have resulted in dangerous consequences as some strategies are incentivizing to rebel groups in countries such as DRC where violence and conflict has always gained them a seat on the negotiating table (Keen, 2012). In Somalia, the United Nations and various western donors, which include the World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the European Community, have pushed for the development of a strong and powerful civil society, which has reigned as the sole provider of service delivery and employment, but it has little state building initiatives. This has become an incentivizing platform for the managers of these civil societies such that they engage in obstructionism to hinder the reestablishment of the state (Mahomed, 2010). Hence, the dominant adherence to specific engagements by International agencies of peace has even blinded and diverted some national and civil society agencies into betraying the value of local peace ownership, therefore, stalling the process of sustainable peacebuilding. Bjorkdahl and Hoglund (2013) clarify how the prowess of liberal peace in international peacebuilding has witnessed the criticism of the local as impotent to engage constructively, as well as to respond with urgency and mobility. This chapter outlines
how such a perception in the arena of peacebuilding neglects transdisciplinary and pragmatic fundamentals of peace in Africa that might be harnessed to “reduce the risk of overt violent conflict and pave way for durable peace and development” (Bjorkdahl and Hoglund 2013:291).

**Building new blocks for peace debate**

Sadiki Koko (2009) assessed that the transformation processes of building peace are always “a recipe for competition, heightened contestations and, if not well managed, violent confrontations”. This assessment poses an interesting rhetoric to revisit if various African conflict transformation processes, which may include services such as security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization, rule of law and reintegration are receiving proper support. The purpose being to deduce the liberal theoretical functions which (might) have weakened and alienated management and transformation strategies for peace in a given conflict environment. This forms the basis to identifying the importance and essence of holistic and pragmatic approaches to peace through local initiatives and empowerment of civil societies. It edifies the role they may play in building the capacity for sustainable local peace. Re-tracing such steps helps in outlining the important roles played by both international actors and local actors; and in gleaning the relevant ideas, strategies or new insights that can be utilised from both internal and external facilitators of peace. This may allow for proper consideration of the informal political rules and power networks that command social influence into developing local strategies to peace ownership as well as allowing international actors to view the different patterns of relationships and understand the reactions required in the conflict context to bring in the urgency and mobility required for effective outcomes (Hendrick, 2009). Of course, various outcomes in history and in this present day are the benchmarks, which informs research, and inspire the building of new blocks to advance knowledge on the effectiveness of certain practices in addressing the long-standing problem of conflict relapse in post-conflict states.

In addition, the researcher endorses Ducasse-Rogier’s (2004) assessment that intractable conflict situations have not only enhanced by the history and complexity of the societies in conflict situations. But also by the wrong peacebuilding prescriptions and diagnosis (approaches and mechanisms) by the third parties and actors (organizations and states) leading to ill-effects in the process (Coleman et al, 2007; Eriksen, 2009; Hoffman, 2009; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Though the main attractor(s) of intractability lies in the former, it is the inconsistencies of the latter
approaches to effectively evaluate and stabilize the situation, which keeps on attracting new conflict elements that further deepens the conflict into complexity. In considering, the various peace initiatives that have embarked on in Africa with hundreds of peace negotiations and agreements signed in countries such as South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan and the DRC. It remains a worrying phenomenon that for the past four years the fragile states index has subsequently ranked these countries with a Very High Alert status even after more than decades of peace intervention for some (Fragile States Index 2012-2016). Muruthi (2006:9) posits, “Vast amounts of resources have been utilised to craft peace agreements which have often collapsed under the weight of competing interests”. To offer a compelling argument this chapter exposes the setbacks of liberal peace and the limitations of its paternal approaches in institutional relations and its weaknesses when it comes to support local ownership in peacebuilding. This outlines the incompatibility of liberal peace in ensuring sustainable peace in the African conflict crisis as they lack the value-added elements of “local cultural assumptions, norms and values as well as traditional and grassroots notions of justice and community-based political dialogue” (Murithi 2008:28). The findings discussed in this research chapter deliberates on this thinking and affirms to the shortfalls of liberal peace through the case studies in question.

**Underlining the Continuity of Conflict problems in African countries.**

In following African history, there is no doubt that it records the most damaging conflict atrocities of all times. Chabal (2009) tellingly explains that factors surrounding such kind of outcomes lay behind the fact that civilians are deliberately the primary targets during the conflict. Armies and militaries directly or indirectly attack them as a way achieving their aim. Patrick Chabal (2009: 159) in explaining the nature of African conflict attests that it, “is not an episodic calamity but an endemic condition, which affects a large proportion of the continent’s population”. As such, many African countries have recorded deadly conflicts and witnessed atrocious calamities in countries such as Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia, DRC, Rwanda, Angola, Central African Republic, Burundi, Liberia and Eritrea amongst others. The consequences of these internal conflicts are much fearsome when sustainable peace settlements seem far from being a reality. There is no doubt that both local and international communities remain morally challenged by such situations due to grave security threats posited by each conflict case.
For instance, the DRC has been in conflict for over a decade and half, following the end of a despotic era under President Mobutu. Despite the extensive involvement of various international organizations of peace and different regional state actors there are still no effective conditions that allow peace to endure. Eriksen (2009) clarified that United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)\(^\text{30}\) failed because of one-size-fits all strategies, contradiction between UN policies and the key domestic actors and, the use of a flawed and contradictory model in the state building process. This case demonstrates how peace processes engaged with a clear assumption that all the strategies would ensure a smooth social progress and stability without any proper consideration of the “problematic nature of transition” (Chandler 2013:6). Following such an outcome Paris (2004:40-51) emphasises that the challenge for such detrimental outcomes is the focus to liberalise the state before building up the necessary institutions that can support the process. Tellingly, these feeble institutional frameworks cannot handle the ‘competition and conflict’ that is build up at the same moment; therefore, they cannot sustain the friction at hand. Somalia, DRC and South Sudan share these sentiments and demonstrate a burden by international donors to democratize the countries without proper institutional frameworks leading to continuous abortion of the peace building processes. In such circumstances, conflict relapse is but an inevitable course.

Critical analysis of this matter poses questions on the virtues of various elements of liberal peace that are dominant in most African conflict countries as a way of building peace which have been deliberated on in the previous chapters. Hoffman (2009) argues that there is much evidence that in post-conflict societies most organizations involved in peacebuilding push for “individual rights, obligations and accountability”, which are far-fetched concepts to the culture of the communities, which value family over the individual. Interestingly, most African countries have communities, guided by strong traditional beliefs and societal values; as such, this may needs strong consideration in structuring peacebuilding approaches, which can yield sustainable outcomes. Northern Somalia or Somaliland is a perfect example of how indigenous mechanisms and social structure utilized to make peace through their community concept known as the Xeer\(^\text{31}\). Murithi (2008:18) articulates that, “all societies around the world have both indigenous


\(^{31}\) The Xeer (Pronounced “Hair”) is an unwritten but loosely accepted code of conduct. It governs relations amongst members of different clans in regards to sharing of common pool of resources (water and grazing land)). It emphasizes on the values of
and endogenous values, resources and institutions”. He outlines that the main challenge in the processes of peace making or peacebuilding in Africa is that they are dominated by distinctive Western and Eurocentric bias; hence, there is much need to rectify such asymmetrical growth of knowledge in theoretical paradigms of approaching peace on the continent. In this regard, it is important to understand that very little attention has been paid in acknowledging the fact that some conflict communities do not necessarily require a “rapid democratization” characterized by partisan (party-politics) elections in most cases but indigenous social structures/systems of election.

In addition, the practice of early (party-contesting) elections has proven to be highly destabilising in most African cases as tensions (‘competition and conflict’) exacerbate during the electoral processes (Hoffman 2009). The case of Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 and that of Burundi in 2015 are some of the latest clear testaments of the African conflict plight, ignited following issues of democracy and elections. Elections have become a point of weakness for conflict relapse in most African states. Snyder et al (2014: 190) concurs that, “early elections typically take place when the rule of law is weak, making it more likely that elections will suffer from irregularities and that losers will refuse to accept the results peacefully”. Though democratisation sounds good and interesting, there should be consideration of the social cleavages that guides the attitude and reaction of people towards certain political actions. This demands for extensive civil education, and the building of strong and integrative institutions to sustain, the major political changes that may need to take place in fragile conflict societies. Nevertheless, this remains an elusive cause amongst the international and local peace agents in Africa. Thus following cases such as that of DRC, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste have recorded very active large-scale peacebuilding participation in the past decades but little tangible outcomes have emerged with rather recurring conflict or increase in the fragility of the state (Yamashita, 2014). This questions the process and strategies of the peacebuilding paradigm at hand. It also calls for the need to investigate on the necessary measures that can be taken to maximise better peace outcomes not only in Africa, but also across the world.

interdependence and inclusiveness and it is the basic foundation for social contracts or covenants between lineage groups (Murithi 2008: 20).
Challenging the influence of liberal frameworks in conflict continuity

The focus here is to investigate and interpret the various factors that have perpetuated intractability leading to recurrence of the conflict problems. The interpretation of these cycles of violence and relapse of war following peace agreements, ceasefire or post-conflict peacebuilding has been blamed on weak peace mechanisms (alien approaches to peacebuilding which lack reconciliation, legitimacy, and inclusiveness) and weak institutions (which are guided by processes alien to a particular conflict society/community in question). Therefore, since the late twentieth century the peacebuilding scholarship had started to question the ability of liberal peace in building sustainable peace in non-western countries. In fact UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s reflection on broader issues in peacebuilding in 2009 emphasised the theme of national ownership of peace with a clear understanding that peace processes that are guided by those who are not likely to live with it will likely fail (UN 2009).

Timothy Donias (2014: 2) buttresses the ownership of peace by observing that, “the inherent limits on the breadth, depth and duration of any external peace-building mission suggest that deep-rooted, sustainable change of the kind peace building seeks to bring about requires the long-term support and commitment of a critical mass of domestic actors”. However, the implementation of the broad-based national ownership peacebuilding remains troubled unless equal institutional partnership than institutional paternalism has been built (Murithi, 2008). For instance, the UN remains the most powerful and most resourceful institution in spearheading peace support operations in the world, its engagement with AU peace support operations should always carefully consider the temptation to easily impose ideas and yet with clear consequences of frustrating the development of new and local ideas that may be locally owned. However, scholars note that the UN and AU trapped in forging a syncretic system of specific peace ideas and strategies of addressing peace in the past decade32 but their conduct has remained paternalistic in practice though both actors prefer to regard it as a partnership.

However, liberal peacebuilding remains a dominant framework consistently used since the Agenda for Peace as a guiding principle by international organisations such as World Bank, EU, UN, AfDB, AU and various international non-governmental organisations in addressing conflicts. It is important to clarify that even though in 2009 the UN invoked a new approach of

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32 Through the Annual Joint meetings by the UN Security Council and AU Peace & Security Council with the first meeting engaged in April 2007.
national ownership in peacebuilding, it remained a rhetoric, which lacks effective practice as was emphasised in the 2011 UN peacebuilding workshop (UN PB Workshop 2011). In consideration of such a background, it remains clear that proper mechanisms to put in place various national peacebuilding ownership have not been identified as yet since pro-western interventions and initiatives are still dominantly practiced in addressing most conflict challenges in Africa. In light of this the researcher delineates the limitations of liberal peace in African conflicts (which are still practiced in this day) in order to forge alternative salient patterns that need to be considered in setting up strategic (nationally/locally owned) peacebuilding frameworks that inform sustainable peace mechanisms in conflict transformation. There is much need to critically engage the various standpoints of liberal peace frameworks and expose their weaknesses in delivering sustainable solutions in Africa’s intractable conflict situations.

Most liberal peace scholarships have argued that these peacebuilding failures and setbacks in African countries “had more to do with improper sequencing or a lack of coordination or insufficient commitment by outsiders, not problems with the liberal idea itself” (Curtis 2012: 11). In idealistic terms, one can stand to believe such an assessment. However, Sriram (2007) notes that such an assessment is driven by various under-examined assumptions of the African communities and which has resulted in various unintended consequences. Tim Murithi (2006) argues that it is a necessity to examine and consider alternative practices of peacebuilding on the continent, which fall beyond the parameters of liberal peace. These alternative practices of peace maybe identified within indigenous approaches to peace, informal economy, and social solidarity (within people-to-people initiatives, within community groups engagement, within representation of ethnic communities in structures, or within religious groups). Such alternatives may help in building up effective institutions that are necessary for a fully functional state.

Coleman et al, (2007) clearly posits that intractable and protracted social conflicts are cancerous such that they are always mutating hence maintaining a malignant conflict state. Thus in most cases the greatest fault line has always been the generalization of regarding conflict challenges as the same. Therefore, there has been an application of standardized liberal approaches by international and regional actors in addressing all African conflict problems resulting in horrible and difficult experiences (Coleman et al, 2007; Hoffman, 2009; Joeng, 2005; Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Piecemeal peacebuilding intervention and construction reforms that
are subject to weaknesses and detrimental outcomes (exclusive of indigenous approaches) have been the foundation of many peace missions in Africa. The resistance to approach the conflict environment with sensitivity limited its opportunities to only standardized liberal approaches.

**Incentivized Peace as the rubric for Conflict continuity in Africa**

Several unique issues that identify with liberal peace approaches weakens the process of building peace. These are inhibiting factors to successful building of peace in these complex conflicts. Various scholars on African conflicts such as Curtis (2012), Keen (2012), Ducasse-Rogier (2004), Eriksen (2009), and Ramsbotham et al (2011) agree on these factors.

Firstly, the trends of most conflict or post-conflict environments reveals that there are always multiple warring parties, which actually jeopardizes and distorts the role of mediation. Immediately, one may acknowledge that most African (colonial) liberation wars where fought from many fronts by different groups, but the continuity and increase of such conflict fronts in the so-called independent states is a clear sign of both government and peace actors’ incompetence to set-up effective institutions that are key to sustainable peace. The increase of warring parties is encouraged by two major factors, which include the slowness of actors to build an effective security sector reform in a post-conflict peace process and the adherence to ‘blinded’ political mediation as the source of legitimate peace.

For instance, the International Centre for Transitional Justice posits that the Congolese army is underfunded and ill-equipped, which has resulted to its incompetence to effectively provide security and commit criminal acts which include grave violations of human rights (ICTJ 2016). This incompetence in the security sector reform has become the source of conflict enhancement as the military cooperates or compete with rebel groups in victimising civilians and exploiting the natural resources of the country (ICTJ 2016). More so, international actors in peace have resorted to political mediation aided with peace agreements as the route to successful peace outcomes. The idea standing behind this strategy has been to forge political and economic liberalization as way of branding sustainable peace but with little or no success amongst African countries (only Mozambique [’s proxy war] is recorded to have had a successful intervention [however, with very unstable circumstances even to this day]). Countries such as Angola, DRC

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33 A proxy war refers to a war, which is indirectly created and support by a major power, which does not get directly involved.

“Mozambique’s civil war was noted for its brutality, meted out in particular by Renamo, a rebel group that was founded,
have endured failed peace agreements, and Sierra Leone’s three peace agreements signed between 1996 and 1999 successively failed due to the multiplicity of warring parties.

Secondly, in some situations warring parties are more driven by greed (power, territorial control and exploitation of mineral resources) than grievances hence continuation of war is more beneficial to them than peace (if peace is to be pursued there are ensured structures of legitimizing corrupt and disreputable interests that are forged through peace agreements). Peace agreements are the most formidable documents in liberal peace, however, they often been abused and narrowed to concentrate on those who have access to the negotiating table. David Keen (2012) notes how such a procedure has become so much predictable and subject to abuse. Keen articulates that those with the intentions of a securing seat at the negotiating table or feels that the negotiations are not going their way, have resorted to incentivizing violence as a tool hence promoting a continuous cycle of conflict. Once the process of peace seems to be rewarding for rebels, opposition warring parties or perpetrators of violence (who might be the government), it encourages the resurgence and emergence of new groups and renewed conflicts in the hope of scoring a stack on the negotiation table. For example, the M23 rebel group, which led the DRC 2012 conflict resurgence against the government, received amnesty from the government under the 2013 Nairobi Declaration. They have pushed since then to get political legitimacy in the government structures and in the failure of such recognition war and violence is the threatened consequence (Kagire 2016). Amos Sawyer (2004: 451) commenting on the Liberian Peace Talks (1996) and that of Sierra Leone (1998) clarifies that peace agreements “substantially, if not totally, controlled by armed groups whose leaders could hardly find in such arrangements sufficient incentive to blunt their greed and ambition”, are not sustainable at all.

Thirdly, in instances where neighbouring countries are involved in supporting rebel conflicts complexity is most likely to be edified. The Global Policy Forum (online website) clarify that Ugandan and Rwandan militia groups have been supporting and influencing continuous conflict in the DRC. The invasion of the eastern Congo (North and South Kivu) by Rwandan troops

�financed, and armed by foreigners bent on destabilizing the country: first by white Rhodesia, then apartheid South Africa. A peace agreement ended the war in 1992 and led to multi-party elections in which Renamo came second, as it has done in every election since. But the rebels retained an armed force despite agreeing to disarm, claiming that Frelimo, the ruling party, has also reneged on its promises.” (Bowker et al, 2016). This conflict was recently renewed in 2013 as Renamo blamed the government’s political elites (largely Frelimo) for looting the country’s economic wealth at the expense of common citizens. However, the government forces have responded with brutal force affecting many civilians and villages. This instability clarifies how peace agreements without proper transformation and effective peacebuilding strategies is detrimental to sustainable peace.

http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/06/mozambiques-invisible-civil-war-renamo-frelimo-dhlakama-nyusi/ [Accessed 20/01/2017]
furthered the crises in the already destabilised environment. Swart (2011) clarifies that Rwanda’s continued desire to keep its influence in the Kivus, continuously undermined the political transition, which had started in 2003. However, though there were suggestions made before by the UN Security Council in 2003 to sanction such countries, there was no effective stance taken to effect such an action.

Lastly, states that suffer from weak security and political systems prior to the outbreak of the conflict are most likely to end in intractable and protracted conflict situations. Practitioners in peacebuilding have often emphasised that success in the process of building of peace in areas such as these is in engaging systems, which ensures that violence declines over time (Jones, 2015). Somalia was under a brutal dictatorship of President Said Barre for two decades, which disrupted and divided the clans such that when he was removed from power in 1991, the clans could not come together and form a government. The DRC demonstrates a history of dictatorship, which ended through a war that weakened the entire security sector of the state. South Sudan presents more of a unique situation of a newly independent state created after a long civil war with various ethnic, religious and resource tensions. Such challenges, mainly ethnic tensions have remained the centre of conflict in this new state. It is clear that the DRC, Somalia and South Sudan share destabilized backgrounds though they are unique in their own ways. However, they also share a history of weak conflict restructuring or recovery strategies, which are a cause of endless conflict challenges.

**Lessons learnt from the conflict haunted houses (DRC, South Sudan & Somalia Cases)**

In understanding the facts provided above, the issues pertaining to the cases in this study are vast and have a lot of historical qualifications and analysis. Considering the fact that this study seeks to illuminate the various theoretical grounding in the building of effective peace in Africa, it is important to identify some of the aspects that are of note. These aspects reflect the shortfalls of most liberal peace approaches in African peacebuilding processes. The challenges experienced in this day of conflict relapse in these countries are not because state actors or non-state actors are not acting enough to address the conflict problem, but it is because there are some local factors side-lined regarded as irrelevant or have just not been incorporated. The DRC, South Sudan and Somalia have a history of conflict that goes back to more than two decades. In addition, despite
the involvement of NGOs, and various regional and international actors in trying to build peace their efforts have been in contempt. There are different factors, which have and may continue to hinder the sustainable peace if not approached differently. Therefore, the plight of civil society in Somalia, the UN peace mission in the DRC and the AU mission in South Sudan highlighted below clarify on the problems that are incentivizing conflict relapse and continuity. The argument is that even if multi-dimensional approaches developed with a pure liberal perspective they remain ineffective in an African setting rather there is need for integrative multi-disciplinary approaches that values local ownership of peace.

A Civil Society in Obstruction: The case of Somalia

The demise of Barre’s authoritarian rule witnessed the reinforcement of clans “...as central providers of public goods to their members” (Lake 2014:303). This immediately pushed clans from egalitarian societies into hierarchical structures, in which warlords manipulated and dominated as they had access to weapons and stolen food. This scenario alone has fought and blocked the re-emergence of the state whilst allowing the increase of terrorist organizations and criminal activities. With this picture in mind, it remains an interesting phenomenon that despite challenges and setbacks Somalia had gone through in establishing a functional state, the private authorities’ remains major role players in service provision and as such remains the major unifying factor amongst citizens (Abdulle, 2008). The civil societies are a perfect example of the private authorities, which has amassed much influence in the state. Surprisingly, public authority is still virtually silent and ineffective despite the efforts of consolidating state structures. Thus, this section offers a critical analysis of the consequences of over-dependence on liberal perspectives.

The civil society in Somalia has demonstrated a distinct cultural context. In other words, it is the only civil society in history, which has taken shouldered state duties of service delivery and engage on day-to-day governance of stately issues. The role of the state has been overtaken and overshadowed. David Lake (2014:304) posits that,

“Although Somalia, through its decentralized structure, may be one of the sovereign polities best able to cope with the absence of a state, the larger point is that the continued vibrancy of private authorities and their further entrenchment into society continues to prevent the consolidation of the Somali state”.
The civil society in Somalia has taken an active role in channelling in service delivery of resources provided by donors. However, the active role of civil society in this case has been more of distributing resources instead of mobilizing the public on participating in building an effective governance system as well as working on channels of ending conflict. Thus, the role of civil society in Somalia are restricted to service delivery only, instead of educating people on peace initiatives that can be used as basic platforms for building tolerance and consolidating the state, so as to usher in the expected peace outcomes. However, their role has been regarded more as a source of income and power than representation as the sole distributors of service delivery, hence the very own existence of civil society has become the hindrance for state re-establishment. These are the loopholes, which have distorted the role and the position of civil society in rebuilding the state and building sustainable peace in the country. The major destabilizing challenges to the effectiveness of the civil society are its overdependence on external support, lack of coherent and coordinated strategy, and their distinct cultural context (Shane and Farah 2008).

The donors have entrusted the duties of the state to civil societies. Ibrahim (2008) outlines how the international community has tried to re-build the state through a two-track method in Somalia. He posits that the first track is top-down process, which intends to build a transitional government through power sharing agreement between the political elites and warlords, which has resulted in consequential failures. The second track is a bottom-up approach, which focused on funding civil societies for local project initiatives. This track received various support and funding from the World Bank, European Union and USAID just to mention a few. Most of these institutions favoured the idea of engaging state building through civil societies arguing that it is a pillar of democratic values and will eventually lead to effective governance. These efforts have made the civil society to be “more powerful and reliable in delivering goods and services than the national government institutions that exist in Somalia” (Ibrahim, 2008: 9). It is important to understand that the existence of such a strong civil society has weakened the consolidation of the state. Scholars are agreed that the existence of powerful private authorities outside the national structures in a state building process may lead to various competitions, and destabilizes the legitimization processes of service provision (see Chapter 5) (Lake, 2014:305; Ibrahim, 2008:10).
The development of different private authorities has created various challenges such that there is no distinction between profit driven organisations and civil societies in Somalia. This environment has become a problem in creating more divisions that distort peacebuilding and state building processes. A stateless society has not only incentivised civil societies but also warlords and criminals who have attained public support through provision of basic services such that it weakens the advocacy for a strong central government.

**From Monuc to Munosco**: traces of a haunted peace process in DRC

The presence of the UN in the Congo (then- Republic of the Congo, now-DRC) can be traced to its first peacekeeping mission from 1960-64 (United Nations Operation in the Congo ONUC). Since then the UN’s presence in Africa has stretched to “promote democratic institutions, supporting economic and social development, establishing peace between aggressive nations and promoting and protection of human rights” (Global Issues 2014). The aftermath of the 1st Congo war (1996-97) witnessed the toppling of President Mobutu Sese Seko from power through a coup by a coalition Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL) which was led by Laurent Kabila. The conflict left the country which had already been plagued with weak security and governance institutions in a devastating state.

In 1999 the UN made its second mark in DRC through its mission known in French as the ‘Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Cong’ (MUNOC). MUNOC’s main mandate was to protect civilians from under circumstances of imminent threat of violence. According to the UN, after the signing of the Lusaka peace agreement the first initial role of MONUC when launched by resolution 1279 was ‘to plan for the observation of the ceasefire and disengagement of forces and maintain liaison with all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement. Later in a series of resolutions, the Council expanded the mandate of MONUC to the supervision of the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and assigned multiple related additional tasks”.

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34 MISSION DE L'ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LA STABILISATION EN RD CONGO
35 Zaire's (now DRC) longtime dictator from 1965-1997.
36 AFDL was a “coalition of Rwandan, Ugandan, Burundan and selected some Congolese dissidents, disgruntled minority groups and nations that toppled President Mobutu Sese Seko”
37 Laurent Kabila was “the president of DRC from 17 may 1997 who overthrew Mobutu Sese Seko through a Coup”
Civilian Loss & The Ghost of Failure

It is important to note that the judgement of success or failure of the UN Peace Mission in the Democratic of Congo is not in the institutions that were set up but in the effectiveness of the mission in protecting the civilians. The loss of civilian confidence, support and respect reduced MUNOC into a debacle and a ghost of a disastrous failure. Chapter VII of the UN resolution 1291 (2000) the Security Council gave MUNOC the authority to protect civilians through all necessary means (including the use of force) in a moment of imminent threat (Reynaert, No Date: 14). For a mission mandated with such a task, MUNOC had limited security personnel and inadequately trained peacekeepers. As a result, in May 2002 RCD-Goma\(^38\) attacked and killed more than 180 people in Kisangani near a UN base. Despite the early alert of the news to the UN, they could not respond due to the lack of military capacity to challenge the crisis. Reynaert (No Date: 16) clarifies a widely shared view by various scholars that “the Kisangani massacre illustrated the gap between MONUC’s mandate and the capacity to support it and the UN’s inclination to tone down civilian protection when it feels that the use of force might offend parties to the peace process”.

The Eastern part of DRC has experienced endemic violent conflicts that has been fueled by political leaders who manipulate ethnic differences, rebel attacks who seek political relevance and recognition, local land disputes and clashes over resources (food and minerals). These violent outcomes have witnessed thousands of killings and displacement of many families. MUNOC could not contain the attack of civilians in Ituri and South Kivu in 2003 and 2004 soon after end of the 2\(^{nd}\) Congo war. Rebels attacked the capital of Ituri, Bunia when the Ugandan troops withdrew from the territory. However, the Uruguay MUNOC battalion URABATT, sent, did not protect civilians who were under threat, which resulted in the kidnapping and killing of more than 400 civilians close to the MUNOC compounds within a period of two weeks. The failure of MUNOC in these areas particularly in Bunia (Ituri) and Bakavu (South Kivu) resulted in the first anti-MUNOC protest by the people. In 2008, North Kivu was continuously threatened by rebels, and witnessed the massacre 67 civilians in Kiwanja by CNDP\(^39\). Despite the presence of 120 MUNOC peacekeepers who were camping within a three-kilometer radius of the

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38 “Rally for Congolese Democracy–Goma is a rebel group based in Goma during the Second Congo War (1998-2003)”

39 \(\textit{Congrès national pour la défense du peuple},\) CNDP (National Congress for the Defence of the People)
massacre, they could not protect the local civilians. The massacre marked the end of the Nairobi\textsuperscript{40} and Goma Peace Processes\textsuperscript{41}, which had instilled so much confidence that conflict, will cease. These outcomes clearly demonstrate the inconsistencies of the international community in fulfilling the mandate of civilian protection. Such consequences resulted in the disregard of UN peace mission in the Congo as Dizolele (2004) wrote in the New York Times that even “Children throw rocks at the UN mission trucks as they pass on the road”. Erikson (2009: 659) observes that in the DRC, MONUC failed because it was “hampered by a lack of knowledge of local conditions and unwillingness to adapt policies to local context”.

The main mandate of MUNOC was to protect civilians. However, it did not devote any resources, time or effort in checking out any rumors of local violence by rebels, and or investigate any of the massacres that where committed in various local communities until this day (Human Rights Watch, 2014). One can clearly stand to confirm and endorse the argument that the government, international actors (UN staff and diplomats) consider the local-level as an “outside the perimeter of their legitimate responsibility, and thus as being unimportant, unfamiliar, unmanageable and not legitimate” (Matagne 2011:81). This has become the source of numerous and very serious obstacles that affect the development of peacebuilding initiatives at multi-level. In just one decade (1996-2006), the conflict in the Congo had witnessed “three Congolese rebel movements, 14 foreign armed groups, and countless militias; killed over 3.3 million Congolese; and destabilized most of central Africa” (Autesserre, 2008).

**Democratization and the loopholes of crisis**

In trying to fulfil its mandate, MUNOC focused on establishing a democratic government through elections; and disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR). Scholars agree that the main challenge that has haunted the DRC peace process since 1999 is the extensive democratization of the process. The structures of building peace in the country neglected the different social dynamics, which include ethnicity, cultural and traditional values, as well as social hierarchies that make up the backbone of the communities (Autesserre, 2011; Matagne 2011). The purpose of this section is to outline the various factors that have caused the failure of MONUC and how MUNOSCO is mostly likely to suffer the same

\textsuperscript{40} Nairobi Communique of 9 November 2009
\textsuperscript{41} Goma Peace Agreement
consequences if various approaches remain trapped within a liberal peace framework and neglects inclusive local peacebuilding initiatives.

It is important to clarify that the DRC is characterised by various polarities, which are mainly ethnic. The bedrock of both 1st and 2nd Congo wars was mainly driven by various ethnic forces, which support and promote their own agenda. Dijkzeul (2008) contends that the establishment of an election mechanism often marks the end of peacebuilding process and the establishment of a package for economic recovery. The DRC however, has proven to be a unique case. Menodji (2013) notes that, “After ceasefires, peace building organisations placed precedence on creating a stable electoral process. However, in the DRC, elections increased instability in a fragmented society which had not yet solved antagonisms”. The aftermath of the elections resulted in the increase of ethnic driven conflicts in the eastern Congo. For instance, Laurent Nkunda42 unleashed violence portraying himself as the defender of the Tutsi minority from the FDRL rebels whom he declared rallied intentions of perpetrating genocide against the Tutsis. Despite the fact that millions of people in the Eastern Congo had voted for Kabila for promising them peace. It is clear that the promise alone was not enough, as it required a strong institution to back the promise up. The lack of strong institutions that control and secure the rule of law created much room for violent perpetrators. Therefore, it is clear that though the election process was regarded a success and peaceful, it was not the end of peacebuilding process.

Democratization process in the DRC has been a distraction that has robbed effective peacebuilding process. It is only when the election was about to take place in 2006 that MUNOC engaged in direct confrontation of the threats towards civilians. The very same force was enacted in Ituri and South Kivu when civilians were being murdered. When the 2nd national elections were conducted in 2011 they were posing more danger and the aftermath witnessed clashes erupting between protesters and security forces with the former declared the polls to be fraudulent and mismanaged. Scholars contends that the international community has been so much focused on establishing democratic values in the DRC such that it ignored various local factors that perpetuates violence. The obsession of democratising through the ballot diverted all

42 Laurent Nkunda is “former General in the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo and is the former warlord operating in the province of Nord-Kivu, sympathetic to Congolese Tutsis and the Tutsi-dominated government of neighbouring Rwanda”.
the attention of MUNOC from the various local conditions and grievances, such that within a year after the elections, Eastern Congo was in full-swing crises.

The transition of MUNOC to MUNOSCO in 2010 the latter still remains trapped in the former operational framework despite the better facilities and increased number of personnel to “a maximum of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 members of formed police units” excluding the judiciary, civilian and correction components. Though Munosco’s mandate is twofold, protection of civilians, and that of stabilization and consolidation of peace; it remains a worrying phenomenon that MUNOSCO’s operations are still alienated to local decisions. The democratization process in the DRC has remained largely focused provincial and national level changes whilst neglecting the challenges at grassroots level, which are likely to promote the democratic intent. The UN, international organisations and diplomats ignored the various rumours of local violence and causes of local conflicts, which include land, and identity issues that were and are still very evident in the Congolese local communities today. Autesserre (2011) vehemently posits that the failure of international intervention in the DRC is their blinkered focus on national and regional levels of conflict whilst they blindsided the various causes of violent conflicts in the local grassroots. Matagne (2011:80) in his review of Autessere’s assessment emphasises that “local conflicts over land, food and mineral resources as well as political power fueled continued and widespread violence, especially in the eastern parts of the country”.

**Violence and the social cleavages of power in South Sudan**

The history of South Sudan is that of endemic violence which driven by multiple causes that include territorial disputes, resource conflicts, ethnic tensions and inter-state conflict. In the post-independent state of South Sudan ethnic tensions and differences have emerged as the centre and major driver of conflict in the youngest African state. Ethnic tensions have always been party and parcel of the entire Sudanese crises but they have often been overshadowed by the bigger conflict challenges which prioritised the independence of the South from the Arab North due to various disputes which include territorial dispute, unequal distribution of resources (oil, water and land), and extensive religious differences.

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43 The assessment made by Séverine Autesserre in her book “The trouble with the Congo”
44 Inter-state conflict between the republic of Sudan and Republic of South Sudan.
When the Republic of South Sudan attained independence in January 2011, the suppressed political and social differences, which widely believed to be ethnic oriented amongst the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), began to emerge. Within a period of three years following independence, a civil war broke out triggered by the political differences between President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar. Vhumbunu (2016) confirms that the political relationship between these two has been strained and uneasy both within the party and in government. With the increasing tension amongst the two individuals in 2013. Vhumbunu (2016: 5) outlines that, “the non-cooperative relations between the Office of the President and that of the Vice President, and contestations over skewed and irregular army recruitments in 2013, were also factors in the civil war, which was triggered by disagreements within the presidential guard over alleged orders to disarm Machar-aligned Nuer members as a result of an alleged coup.” The tension, which started as a political squabble between Kiir (of the Dinka ethnic group-the largest group in the country) and Machar (of the Nuer ethnic group-second largest ethnic group) quickly, escalated into ethnic violent clashes. The BBC news (2014) posits that in as much as ethnic killings have been evident since the outbreak of the civil war, both Kiir and Machar command prominent supporters from each other’s communities. Machar’s supporters are believed to have instigated violence against Kiir’s regime labelling it as corrupt and seize the oil-producing capital town of Bentiu. Therefore, the political leaders in South Sudan have resorted to the use of violence as a means of attaining their desired end.

**Ethnicity and the legacy of violence**

The Republic of South Sudan consists of 10 states, which divides the nation. It is a culturally diverse country with multi-ethnic groups. Shulika and Uzodike (2013:24) argued way before the outbreak of the civil war that “While this ethnic diversity speaks to the country’s rich national heritage, it has also always been a source of internal ethnic discord in South Sudan.” South Sudan has more than 60 ethnic groups but the most dominant one is the Dinka, followed by the Nuer and the Murle. These groups have long-standing tensions, traced back beyond Sudan’s independence in 1956 (New Sudan Council of Churches 1999). These inter-ethnic clashes portray the bigger picture of the local threats that stands in the way of an effective and successful transition of the country from conflict to sustainable “post-conflict recovery and long-term peacebuilding”. The major ethnic tension between the Dinka and Nuer triggered by the political
tension in December 2013 as soldiers belonging to these ethnic groups fought against each other resulting in massive ethnic killings in Juba as the latter suffering huge causalities.

The loopholes of relapsed conflict in South Sudan

Following the independence of the country, the Government of South Sudan, and the various key stakeholders (internal and external) which include the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the African Union (AU); the United Nations (UN); civil society organizations (CSOs) and different individual countries engaged in joint efforts to establish the institutions that sustains South Sudan as an independent state. Da Costa & Karlsrud (2012) tellingly posited that United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) engaged on a local peacebuilding approach in trying to address the challenges that might stir conflict in the future. The authors clarify that though the engagement of UNMISS was in the name of local peacebuilding, the engagement was only done with the local elites. The Government of South Sudan and the stakeholders were virtually absent in the rural areas that exacerbated the wide divide between the centre (top leaders-government) and the periphery (communities-rural area), which makes up the large percentage of the country.

The international community was quick to focus on building a state without addressing the crucial challenges of internal conflicts and political reconciliation (Tran 2014). Both the government and international actors failed to establish effective security sector reforms, which could have been the bulwarks to withstand the outbreak of a civil war in 2013. It is important to note that the such weakness are still evident and the division amongst IGAD45 on the way forward concerning the peace agreements of South Sudan in 2015 and 2016 consecutively poses higher chances of failure in the peace process. The assumption by the international community that the new South Sudan’s conflict tensions had ended with the South and North tensions was the biggest mistake, which allowed the long standing ethnic conflict tensions infect the society. It is important to note that peace agreements in the case of South Sudan mostly regarded with suspicions, tensions and mistrust. Thus, there is a deep need for mediators to address the political challenges which lies within the political differences and the needs of both Kiir and Machar through an incorporative strategy that brings all the issues into agreement (Vhumbunu, 2016:11).

45 Uganda and Sudan have acute political differences, Ethiopia and Kenya differ at times on the peace process to engage, and the addition of plus five U.S., UK, Norway, China, the Arab League, and others opened room for more competing interests.
Reaching out to the Conclaves of Hybrid Peace

Scholars agree that in as much as top-down approaches have their impasses in building peace, bottom-up strategies do not possess a magical touch for lasting peace either, and therefore both initiatives are necessary and need to be harnessed (Autesserre, 2011; Matagne, 2011; Rambotham et al, 2011). The consideration of hybrid peace approaches in this research is meant to harness the multi-disciplinary and transdisciplinary facets that enrich the process of sustainability in building peace. An acknowledgement of the various peacebuilding levels that can be of use in addressing the African conflict. This meant to challenge the monolithic and one-size-fits-all peace strategies brought forward by liberal peace frameworks in addressing African peace hence the loopholes and impasses in the cases highlighted in this study. Matagne (2011:80) in his assessment of the failures of liberal peace proponents in the DRC confirms how, “Top-down approaches were therefore implemented and they only allowed for short peace intervals in the eastern Congo because they did not take into account the complex dynamics at the local-level”.

The extensive consequences of peace agreement failure and relapse of conflicts in Africa today requires inclusive approaches that balances practical local knowledge and international efforts to complement the growth of local capacity by supporting the growth of local institutions across all level from grassroots to the top levels of government. Thus, hybrid peace acknowledges the existence of both micro-level and macro-level tensions that affect settlement of peace and as a result, it allows for comprehensive approaches that investigate and scrutinize both local and international causes of peace process failure. Murithi (2008) acknowledges that the use and engagement of hybrid peace approaches in Africa may be of use in endorsing indigenous and endogenous peace architecture that addresses the core conflict problems that stand unique in each African conflict.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter has outlined the various factors that have affected sustainability of peace in Africa. The investigation of Somalia, the DRC, and South Sudan exposed the complexity that challenges the post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. It critically engages the defective nature of liberal peace frameworks in African peace, by outlining how its inflexible nature often neglects the key values that may be of effect to sustainable peace. Wherefore, the emphasis for the need of hybrid peace strategies that mitigate the challenges to the building of sustainable peace. This
allows for the emergence and recognition of some indigenous and endogenous peace practices in African communities that can be of benefit in achieving long-term peace.
Chapter 5: Negotiating Legitimacy, Inclusiveness and Coherence in African peace

“Africa’s story has been written by others; we need to own our problems and solutions and write our story”. Paul Kagame

Introduction
This chapter investigates the challenges to the renewal of conflicts within a short period following peace agreements. There is a confrontational of different peacebuilding approaches and peace agreements that have been strangled due to various loopholes in the peace processes. Distanced and alien principles to African conflict communities by international actors has attracted criticism from various scholars over the past decades. These approaches are criticised for their lack of local knowledge, inclusivity and coherent peace practices. As clarified in the previous chapter, the biggest setbacks to Africa’s sustainable peacebuilding lies within the liberal peace framework. The liberal peace framework in Africa is biased towards western approaches to peace. Little considerations have been made to unpack the various political and social opportunities for building peace within the African conflict-bound societies. Peacebuilding practices has mainly been conducted as *ad hoc* projects by most if not all international and inter-governmental organisations. These approaches have reduced the effectiveness of peace building and limited it to mechanized intentions, calculated outcomes that are within the reach or influence of those who plan it.

Therefore, to negotiate for a better platform of building peace in African setting, this chapter adheres to a conflict transformation perspective, which seeks to redeem local actors, governments, international and inter-governmental organisations, and non-governmental organisations from the trappings of normativity and institutional inadequacies (Jeng, 2012). The research therefore, explores how local and indigenous factors that may be beneficial in building sustainable peace are often neglected. Thus, the analysis endorses the values of national ownership in peacebuilding as a way of provoking thinking toward integrative mechanisms which promote the legitimisation of local/ community peace initiatives or participation,

46 Paul Kagame is the President of Rwanda.
inclusivity of indigenous and cultural practices in the mainstream peace frameworks, and promoting the establishment of coherent peacebuilding programs (Donias, 2014).

A comprehension of challenges to African peace is outlined to show the missing link in ensuring sustainable peace in the continent. Peacebuilding in Africa is surrounded by different challenges in communication and dialogue that may have proven to be illusive to address due to the complexity of their nature. This chapter does not only embrace a hybrid peace approach but also engages transdisciplinary thinking to provide an ultimate platform in addressing the conflict challenges at hand. Scholars in contemporary peacebuilding agree that these various links top-down or bottom-up approaches can never provide solutions independent of each other. In addition, it is important to note that the integration of both approaches is only the foundation of an effective peacebuilding intervention, which still requires more alternative perspectives to ensure maximum output towards building sustainable peace. Most peacebuilding strategies have been side-lined because of singular approaches, which are regarded as normative. As such, governments, inter-governmental and international organisation still limit their focus to national and regional level in negotiating peace whilst neglecting the local (Autessere, 2011).

The investigation in the case studies, establishes a solid ground for negotiation and exposing the loopholes that may require adequate consideration in setting up effective peace structures. Among these loopholes are the lack of adequate political space for local/community participation, rigid peace frameworks, ad hoc peacebuilding programs and the dominance of alien approaches. Considering such factors, most African post-conflict peacebuilding missions have suffered continuous setbacks. Peace scholars, practitioners and organisations have come to revisit their frameworks and approaches to put up effective mechanisms that can maintain sustainable peace. Murithi (2009: v in Abdalla et al, 2009) vehemently concurs that, “indigenous institutions and cultural traditions in Africa are endowed with valuable lessons and insights that can contribute towards the urgent task of building and sustaining peace”. Therefore, this endorses the need to negotiate for the legitimization, inclusivity and setting of coherent local peace frameworks in Africa as outlined below, followed by the importance of communication and dialogue and finally unpacking the importance of recognising local ownership as a pathway to sustainable peace.
Understanding legitimacy, inclusiveness and coherence in building peace

Understanding these concepts helps in transforming the perceptions of building peace in Africa. It embraces the difference that entails in every conflict society and seeks to harness the key values that need consideration in constructing effective peace mechanisms. Uzodike and Moolakkattu (2012: 6) argues that, “the very idea of conflict transformation not only eschews the obstruction of constructive dialogue but also endorses the need for the profound and long term alteration of conflictual relationships or interactions that support violence by tackling the structural, attitudinal, and behavioural dimensions of conflict”. Engaging and defining legitimacy, inclusiveness and coherence for the different processes in building African peace may be effective in establishing the strategies to break free from the continuous conflict trap in Africa. The understanding of the concepts can harness to interpret local aspects and challenges to foster a constructive dialogue that shapes the building of sustainable peace.

Legitimacy in building peace

Legitimacy is the centre of almost all political relationships and yet the most neglected in the state-building [and peacebuilding] literature (Lake, 2008). Building and restoring legitimacy in post-conflict or civil war societies is argued to be the most difficult and important thing (Lake, 2008; Higashi, 2015). The process of building legitimacy is poorly understood in the world of peacebuilding [and state-building]. Despite the mention of considering, local peacebuilding initiatives or local ownership of the peace processes in different literature for the past decade most international stakeholders and governments seldom considers the importance of local initiatives in the context of cultural practices and societal values within grassroots communities when it comes to building peace.

Higashi (2015) in his book “Challenges of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding” confronts how the generation or construction of legitimacy in any ‘host state’ has not received full examination by theorists or practitioner in International relations considering the active role of peacebuilding in world politics. This tellingly, explains how the construction or erosion of legitimacy in peacebuilding plays a critical role in ensuring disastrous future or intended sustainable outcomes. Higashi boldly outlines that the role of legitimacy in peacebuilding has been grossly undermined and yet it has taken a centre stage in all the discussions around world politics in the contemporary debates and studies. It is for this reason that the role of legitimacy in
peacebuilding has to position clearly and outlined to be able to establish all the constructive situations and practices in societies that guarantee sustainable peace.

**Defining Legitimacy**

Zuam (2012:51) outlines threefold important objectives of legitimacy in state- and peacebuilding. These include, firstly to provide security and maintain the rule of law (if the state is seen or regarded as weak by the population or various societal groups, rebellion is likely to be stirred). Secondly, to provide strong institutional structures that support effective provision of public services (social services and public infrastructure reinforces the support and legitimacy of the state). Thirdly, to provide sustainable state institutions established upon the normative structures of the represented societies. The third objective is more revealing for peacebuilding practices, which involve international stakeholders. It posits how legitimacy in any initiative is supposed to come from the moral authority, beliefs and expectations of the particular communities or societies involved (Gulliver, 1971; Zuam, 2012). With this understanding, one can define legitimacy as the authority derived “from a mutually-beneficial contract in which the ruler [state] provides a social order of benefit to the ruled [community or society], and the ruled in turn comply with the extractions (e.g., taxes) and constraints on their behavior (e.g., law) that are necessary to the production of that order. The contract becomes self-enforcing – or legitimate – when individuals and groups become “vested” in that social order by undertaking investments specific to the particular contract” (Lake, 2008: 3).

**Peacebuilding & Legitimacy**

Building sustainable peace requires the setting up of proper legitimate structures from grassroots, middle-level and top-level leadership in political and social hierarchies. Ramsbotham et al (2011) argues that there are various people-to-people peacebuilding initiatives, which have proven to be effective in various post-conflict communities, but they had been short-lived due to lack of support from both middle- and state-level leadership to endorse them as legitimate. With this understanding, one can adopt Baya’s assessment that,

“In Indigenous mechanisms fit in situations of state fragility and failure. In view of the absence of modern state-based institutions and mechanisms for the control of violence and the regulation of conflicts, people take recourse to pre-state customary ways. Due to the fact that indigenous mechanisms are not state-managed or organized, they are credited with legitimacy by the communities in which they are sought. They can be pursued without recurrence to the task of state and nation building. Instead of trying to impose western
models of the state and the nation on societies to whom these models are alien, one can draw upon existing indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution which have proven their efficiency” (2009:98).

It is important to negotiate for the recognition and support of all local peace initiatives by the government and the international community to build a mutual trust in the entire peacebuilding process. This allows the reconciling of similar normative interests and commitments between the local and international efforts to peace, in order to build peace mechanisms that are considered legitimate by the society [if the strategies are imposed they are most likely to fail when the international presence disappears] and beneficial to the course. For instance, in the DRC Erickson (2009) confirms that MUNOC failed because it failed to consider the local factors that could have been helpful in effective in building sustainable peace.

The impact of Legitimacy in building peace

Effective peacebuilding outcomes in Africa need to negotiate a platform of constant dialogue amongst all local, government and international stakeholders. This is required for the purpose of encouraging integration of ideas that are supported and recognised at all levels of leadership. This ensures a legitimate voice for local ownership in the process of building peace and gives room for proper institutionalisation of profitable cultural and traditional values by international communities in their state-and peacebuilding support engagements. This may help in dealing with the spoiler problem in most post-conflict peace processes. In addition, as such ‘institutional rhetoric’ (bureaucratic barriers and red-tape procedures) which resulted in the massacre of thousands in Kivu regions (DRC) and failure of peacebuilding in various African states can be avoided.

Jean Arnault (2015:22-23) explores how domestic legitimacy was constructed in Guatemala to blend in together “international norms and local realities” in the processes of building peace. He outlines that domestic legitimacy was built in three specific ways, which are representation, participation and performance. He posits that, ‘representation’ from wide range stakeholders in government and insurgency allowed the covering of broad interests and issues that ranges from ethnicity, economic and social features that guide the society and state. ‘Participation’ allowed the formation of Civil Society Assembly which broad forward a wide spectrum of social representatives, which helped in consolidating the credential of the peace negotiations. Finally, the parties involved in the peace process performed by engaging pro-actively and tangibly by
showing their openness and willingness to address their differences, which captured the minds of the public and marked a watershed in the peacebuilding process. Learning from this perspective, one can take into consideration the cases of South Sudan, DRC and Somalia. It is important to acknowledge that the ethnic tension in South Sudan, which is the centre of conflict and the spoiler effect to the peace negotiation process, demonstrates the need of a legitimisation process such as that of Guatemala.

**Inclusive peacebuilding**

The concept of inclusive peace traced to Dag Hammarskjöld's principles of peace, which shaped and refined the contemporary process of building peace in the twenty-first century. Melber (2015:11) notes that Hammarskjöld principles “were based on an understanding that it was only by embracing a variety of different interests and actors that a framework for lasting conflict resolution and peacebuilding could be achieved”. In light of this, conflict transformation proponents seek to establish that sustainable peace is an outcome of engaged processes, which negotiates various interests, relationships, discourses, and in some instances, the societal structures that perpetuates violent conflict. This has to be achieved through embracing inclusive approaches to building peace. It endorses the need to consider and give much support to some research perspectives, which investigates how conflict is viewed and defined from different angles. Crocke et al (2014), therefore, assesses that it inspires in guiding the anticipations of the conflict patterns that can affect the world in the future, and in this case Africa.

The idea of ‘inclusive peacebuilding’ has inspired research in trying to address the challenge of conflict relapse in most post-conflict environments following peace agreements or settlements. Peacebuilding literature in the 21st century began to focus on more hybrid peace approaches as a way of challenging the absolute (top-down or bottom-up) approaches, which have continuously failed to secure sustainable peace in Africa. Looking at the literature, Lederach (1997: xvi) establishes that the contemporary processes of building peace in conflicts “calls for long-term commitment to establishing an infrastructure across the levels of a society, an infrastructure that empowers the resources for reconciliation from within that society and maximizes the contribution from outside”. This assessment assures on the need for flexible peace approaches
that are able to tackle the political, social, environmental and economic issues that may hinder sustainable peace.

The impact of inclusivity in the peace processes

Inclusivity in peacebuilding process seeks to mitigate the exclusion of actors in peace agreements, which has resulted in spoilers. Most peace agreements often engage a limited number of actors, which result in limited representation of people’s views and aspirations in the peace process. This has undermined the participation of local, cultural, traditional, minority groups and civil society actors in most peace processes over the years. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon (2009: 5) endorses the need and importance of inclusive peacebuilding as a source of redemption. He argues that, “Local and traditional authorities as well as civil society actors, including marginalized groups, have a critical role to play in bringing multiple voices to the table for early priority-setting and to broaden the sense of ownership around a common vision for the country’s future”. This offers an extensive platform that is critical in addressing spoiler problems, exclusionary policies and absolute peace approaches, which have been detrimental to post-conflict peacebuilding in the DRC and Somalia in particular. Therefore, Hammargren et al (2015:5) concurs to the importance of inclusivity by exposing how, “peacebuilding practitioners, researchers and policymakers have recognized the importance of inclusivity and regularly discuss best practices and methods within various fora at the United Nations, as well as in civil society circles, for increasing engagement in peace processes.”

Scholars such as Stephen Stedman produced extensive seminar work in addressing the complex nature of protracted crises and spoilers in Somalia. The focus of the work addresses various factors, which [has] influence[d] groups and individuals to spoil the peace process in the country. The case of Somalia has telling incidents of reconciliation processes that were blocked and endemic conditions of warfare. Spoilers in Somalia have proved to possess quite a foothold in undermining peace accords, perpetuating violent criminality and lawlessness, protracted warfare, and state failure. In some instances, others have engaged on peace building strategies to undercut crime, violence and increase of conflict in local communities only to undermine the revival of an effective central government. Thus, Stedman’s work anchors the solution to these crises in the inclusion of spoilers in peace negotiation process. Some peace mediators have treated the broadening of inclusiveness in peace with cynicism, however, Thania Paffenholz (2015:3)
provides a solid assessment, which clarifies the effectiveness of inclusive negotiation of peace, “Contrary to assumptions made by many mediators, broader inclusion does not reduce the likelihood of reaching agreements. Only in one case was an agreement not reached when a high number of included actors had significant influence on the process.”

Gender and civil society have gained much momentum in the contemporary peace process due to the rise of inclusiveness in peacebuilding. The role of women in peace process has increasingly been supported to take a centre stage in the DRC due to the increasing use of rape as a weapon of war. Gender consideration entirely breathes some new perspectives in the peace processes as women provide an experience and angle that undermined and left out in the peace and development policies. In their investigation of the inclusivity of women in the UN’s Peace, Support and Cooperation (PSC) framework Reilly and Warren finds out that:

“While women interviewed agree with the Government, for example, that security sector reform and the consolidation of state authority are top priorities and vital to achieving peace, the analysis and solutions the women put forward are different. Women repeatedly point to inextricable links between social, economic, and personal security, backed by the rule of law. These assessments are oftentimes based on their personal experiences and the reality of their lives. In contrast, the DRC Government relegates the social and economic development aspects of the PSC Framework to the bottom of its list of priorities” (2014:7).

Considering that, the conflict in the DRC has exposed the widespread social inequality. The inclusion and greater participation of women at every peace process and peacebuilding level enables the comprehension often left out perspectives in structuring strong security sector reforms, social and economic reforms that are key in building sustainable peace policies.

More so, civil societies have gained much trust from the international actors in the peace process over the past decades (Belloni 2001; Fagan 2005). In Somalia, the civil society has been entrusted with state roles such as service delivery. The role of a civil society in peace processes is to offer an extensive civil education and a voice, which checks the responsibilities of the state and negotiates on the role and relationship of the local community with the international norms in peacebuilding processes. Fischer (2011:300) posits that, “civil society initiatives have been undertaken in peace education, dialogue projects, the empowerment of women and youth”. Civil-based initiatives have played a significant role in bridging various challenges affecting youth, women and even ethnicity challenges. However, it is a huge challenge when the role of civil society is over emphasised by international
organisations and entrusted with the roles of the state undermines the whole process of inclusivity as in the case of Somalia. Thus in Somalia there is need for more educational oriented civil societies that guard and invest the norms of governance and the importance of state-building in ensuring sustainable peace. For instance, in July 2016 the civil society alliance in South Sudan “urged the IGAD\textsuperscript{48} authorities not to interfere or take side in the affairs of South Sudan and not undermine the transitional government of national unity” when they had suggested the handing over of Juba international airport to the UN for protection (Atekdit, 2016). This reaction endorses the missing link in the Somalian civil society that is to safeguard the existence and role of the state if sustainable peace is to be ensured. The inclusion of civil society in processes should be viewed as an entry point for peace education and a driving force behind the formation of strong functional government. This is a platform to reach out to different people [across different levels and diversity] and have them participate in the decisions that pertain to their peace. Also to revisit their local and societal values that they channel into rebuilding a peaceful society.

**Coherent Peace Approaches**

Judy Cheng Hopkins (2014) in a video\textsuperscript{49} on coherent peacebuilding policy explains that, coherence in peacebuilding is having shared and well defined objectives internally\textsuperscript{50} (within a nation) as well as externally\textsuperscript{51} (with the international community). She further clarifies how coherence and coordination are interchangeable terms in which the former explains more on policy formulation and the latter explains more of program intervention. This research explores the limitations by various actors in peace to negotiate on local values that are profitable to peace that are neglected in peacebuilding policing and programs. Thus, it seeks to fill the gaps on the issues and concepts that maybe key in addressing the lapsing and relapsing of conflict in Africa even within five years or less following peace agreements. Henceforth, understanding the effectiveness of coherence in guiding peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery policies and strategies can provide new and strong perspective in confronting the horrors of African conflict

\textsuperscript{48} Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

\textsuperscript{49} A video titled “Towards a More Coherent Peacebuilding Policy Community” made for the ACCORD Peacebuilding Seminar which took place in Johannesburg, on 19-20 February 2014.

\textsuperscript{50} Defined by Internal actors who are all local actors involved in the peacebuilding activities taking place in a conflict system or country

\textsuperscript{51} Defined by all international actors involved in the peacebuilding activities in a conflict system or country
problems. Considering that this research engages Africa’s most intractable conflicts, which are in the DRC, South Sudan and Somalia, there is much need to understand not only the foundations of the conflicts but the strategies of peace which have been engaged so far but had not yielded significant results. These three deadly conflicts in the history of the continent have received the much attention from different actors, which ranges from local, national, inter-governmental, non-governmental and international but with little impact towards achieving sustainable peace. The negotiation of coherent peace approaches in this instance seeks to revisit and challenge organizational values and liberal norms that co-opt the peace agenda, and guide their priorities to correlate with sustainable peace. As such coherent peacebuilding principles in any community systematically challenges the operating in ad hoc, piecemeal and highly fragmented programs which disguise themselves in the mantra of local ownership and yet crowded with external driving factors, with alien principles to the local factors they represent (Tschirgi, 2015: 478).

Most peacebuilding processes in the 21st century have been set forth in *ad hoc* projects. Peacebuilding initiatives in most if not all post-conflict recovery strategies have been run as *ad hoc* programs and as such Houton (2014: 6) emphasises that this remains the greatest impasse as piecemeal engagement seeks to address sustainable political change. Coherent peace approaches in this research refer to strategies that do not only rely on the presence of international community or joint government committees that meant to provide quick solutions to the conflict problems. These engagements are important and have played, and are still playing their role. However, the relapse of conflicts following such engagements calls forth for a deep solution inquiry, which may help in addressing the impasses sustaining such a crisis, and in this case ad hoc peace. *Ad hoc* peace engagements create an invisible barrier amongst the different peacebuilding agents in a conflict community. International peacebuilding systems are often guided by specific [short-term] timeframe projects and specific goals that assume the needs of the conflict community to address the conflict crisis. Peace researchers have come to agree that these short-term projects inhibit a full cycle of transformation to take place, as they are too rapid for conflict/post P conflict societies to manage (Paffenholz & Spurk 2006; Hoffman, 2006; Vorath 2012). Timothy Donias (2014) argues that peacebuilding process should be regarded as a permanent process, which is incorporated in state-building governance institutional missions and projects in all post-conflict peace strategies.
The UN peacebuilding literature in the 21st century began to establish the need for coherent peacebuilding strategies. In May 2007, the UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee adopted a “conceptual basis for peacebuilding for the UN system” which focused on reducing the risk of lapsing and relapsing into conflict through coherent and tailored peacebuilding strategies that address specific needs and build national ownership in the conflict countries. It is clear that most peace actors in conflict countries are driven by different visions and goals but unless they are coordinated to engage on the common goal of sustainable peace, coherent peacebuilding remains a challenge. Cedric de Coning (2008) endorses the United Nations’ integrated approach concept as an effective way to consider in addressing coherence and coordination dilemma in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding systems. He affirms that “Pursuing coherence helps to manage the interdependencies that bind the peacebuilding system together, and coordination is the means through which individual peacebuilding agents can ensure that they are coherent with the overall strategic framework” (De Coning, 2008:85). Coherent peacebuilding meant to assist in pulling together all the resources and actors together in ensuring maximum impact in tackling conflict challenges that may disturb the effective building of peace. De Coning (2008:88) clarifies that “A complex peacebuilding or post-conflict reconstruction system requires a wide range of internal and external actors, including governments, civil society, the private sector and international agencies, to work together in a coherent and coordinated effort.” Various phases of disjointed peace engagements and decisions have been evident in Africa’s longest conflict countries, which include DRC, Somalia, and South Sudan, hence the consistent relapse of these conflicts.

Hammargren et al (2015:5) argues that, “for peacebuilding processes to lead to sustainable peace, participation and engagement from a broad spectrum of society is required over an extended period of time.” Whenever a peace agreement or cease-fire agreement signed, it now marks the beginning of post-conflict intervention and calls for the support of the international community in the peace process and in the implementation of various strategies. This phase chronologically advances in three stages, which are the stabilization phase, the transitional phase, and the consolidation phase in which “the host society has developed the capacity to manage and sustain its own peace process without external support” (De Coning, 2008: 88). Scholars often agree that peacebuilding intervention ends when the society has reached such an accomplishment.
In the DRC, international organisations have consistently failed to assist the internal actors to consolidate the peace process and transform the causes of the conflict. This is largely because international actors have kept their strategies separate from the local values. The UN reports have clarified on several incidences in the DRC where inconsistency on their security intel has resulted in the massacre of civilians by rebels and rival ethnic groups, hence its coherence as an agency of peace in the country has been questioned by both local and some critics even unto this day (Human Right Watch, 2014). In Somalia, the international actors have engaged on an imbalanced focus by engaging civil societies in advancing development and humanitarian dimensions more. In turn this has created more problems for peacebuilding process as security, politics, human rights and rule of law are still separately advanced by some local actors (tribal clans, or warlords) who in most cases oppose the formation of a functional state. In South Sudan, international actors are yet to directly engage the fact that a range of local actors need to be engaged on the foundations of social inequality and injustice that is perceived amongst the ethnic groups. The confrontation of all these issues can assist in addressing many of the potential loopholes of conflict resurgence, and assist in transforming the societies into achieving sustainable peace and development.

**Effective communication and dialogue in building peace processes**

Effective communication and dialogue among stakeholders in the peace negotiation and engagement has to be guided by the three concepts extensively discussed above. Each process of negotiating peace agreements should provide a legitimate platform for local peace initiatives, inclusively engage stakeholders at a broader scale and have coherent structures that are sustainable even in the state governance and local institutions. According to Ramsbotham et al, (2011: 374-80) the focus towards addressing protracted and intractable conflicts shifted in the 21st century with a new interest to constructively engage conflict from all dialogical spheres in which the solutions are not only built in the approaches but also by employing a strategic engagement in communication amongst conflicting parties. To give clarity, Kievelitz et al, (2003) articulates how the UN, World Bank and other bilateral organisations began to distance themselves from mere diplomatic level intervention (in conflicts) into constructive thinking engagement at the dawn of the new millennium. Much support has been given by donors since early 2000 to fully engage in sustainable peace approaches. However, despite the call and widespread literature on national/local peacebuilding ownership, most people oriented initiatives
remain unnoticed. Gender contributions remain in the doldrums with very little practical platforms. In addition, as such there is need for effective communication and dialogical platforms through the inclusion and legitimisation to set up institutional support for those undermined voices trapped by traditional and liberal peace frameworks.

Erzurum and Eren (2014) argue that in every peacebuilding process, communication is the main driving force that ensures the survival of the process. Dialogue is the pivot that holds every peace agreement. Communication and dialogue in peacebuilding processes need to be consistent and inclusive of all stakeholders in order to understand the values and norms that construct legitimacy and ensure a coherent peacebuilding process. In most African peace processes, international organizations and actors have engaged in ‘one-size-fits-all’ strategies, which are monolithic in approach and as such neglected a dialogue between the local and international peace approaches, which has destroyed the foundation of cooperation, and working on complementary peace measures.

Integrative peace approaches and hybrid-peace theories explores on transformative ideas that upholds measures, which promote sustainable peace. They engage on communication as the synthesis that interact top-down to bottom-up, local to international, and grassroots- to top-leadership in every peacebuilding process. It is essential to understand that in some post-conflict environments such as Somalia where trust amongst the clans dismantled under the rule of Siad Barre, these situations place a huge demand on the various actors to engage on consistent communication and dialogue to build an interactive momentum that can drive transformation amongst societies. Communication helps in reducing competition, duplication and waste amongst agencies involved in the peace processes in the same conflict constituency. Thus communication and dialogue can help in harnessing organisations to cooperate in developing strategies, sharing information and mobilising resources that essential to post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding.

Communication and dialogue in peace present itself in various forms and ways in the peacebuilding literature. It manifests in the theoretical concepts and perspectives that guides processes of building peace which include types of negotiation and intervention, top-down or bottom-up approaches and tracks of diplomacy. All these perspectives and concepts have their unique and effective role to play in communicating strategies of building peace in each stage.
Scholars agree that despite the unique attributes of all the concepts and perspectives research clearly outlines that they complement each other to communicate for the effective building of sustainable peace (Garwerc, 2006; Ramsbotham et al, 2011).

The importance of Local Ownership in African peace processes

Having understood the above-discussed concepts, one can notice that they all share the common understanding of how failure in peacebuilding processes is mostly driven by the lack of local support or ownership of the process. They expose failure in building sustainable peace as an outcome of imposed peace strategies, which rarely acknowledges the legitimacy, which lies within the traditional and societal norms of every community. There is lack of understanding on how effective peacebuilding can be built on the altars of inclusive peace strategies. In understanding Zuam’s (2012:55) perspective, African peace is in need for a reconciliation of all top-down post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding strategies “with local needs and conditions and to resolve some of the tensions between vertical and horizontal legitimation efforts”, so as to channel the standard moral imperative that lies within local ownership of peace. The local involvement in the design and setting up of institutions therefore, commands social compliance, which helps in strengthening the effectiveness, and sustainability of the peace processes even in the absence of external/outside support. Scholars on African peacebuilding processes agree that most setbacks and failures are accredited to the “liberal peace frameworks”. They institutionalize western liberal norms and constrict local involvement in the establishment and building of the new social and political institutions (Autesserre 2009, 2010, 2011; Curtis 2012; Donias 2009, 2014; Murithi 2006, 2007, 2008; Tschirgi 2004, 2015; Zaum 2012; Pouligny 2009; Sending 2009).

Local ownership peacebuilding confronts the key challenges within the peace processes with practical knowledge (insider perspective) of issues which constantly cause the lapsing and relapsing of conflict in order to complement the theories of technical knowledge of international actors (outsider perspective) to the conflict problems. Therefore, the local ownership perspective provides an empowering context of understanding political, social, and economic issues that often stir sporadic violence such as land clashes, resource disputes (minerals, oil, water, or grazing land), and tribal clashes. Most international efforts in peacebuilding often approach these issues separately and regard them as a small price to pay in their focus of setting up national
institutions of governance. They pay little or no attention to the different levels of peacebuilding “where local violence might play a significant role in the prolongation of conflict” (Da Costa & Karlsrud, 2012:56). Thus, the engagement of local ownership in literature has sort to redeem African peace from technocratic approaches that have proven to be detrimental to sustainable peace. Özerdem and Lee (2016:146) concludes that “peacebuilding planned and implemented in a technocratic way by envisaging the challenge as different pieces of puzzle in the shape of different programmes and projects would likely fall short in achieving sustainable peace.”

Local ownership is argued to be of help in effective “building and maintenance of local capacity” (Zaum, 2012: 56). Scholars agree that the support of local ownership strengthens the building of local institutions that are often duplicated by parallel bureaucracies of international aid structures that seek to employ peacebuilding and state-building projects. Thus this ‘sucks out’ local capacity by denying the state “financial resources” through parallel bureaucracy and “its most qualified public servants” to international organisations who pay larger salaries. Though most donors have recognised this challenge, which is very evident in Somalia, they increasingly remain channelling their support of aid through projects instigated by non-state actors, which constantly weakens (through replication) the institutions they intend to build and strengthen. It is only Britain’s Department of International Development (DFID), which has realised this impasse and amended its approach to endorse local ownership to support and increase the local capacity in peacebuilding and state building.

**Concluding Remarks**

This chapter explored the fundamental contemporary factors in conflict transformation perspective to peacebuilding. It harnessed the important functions that pull together mechanisms that may be useful in empowering local institutional capacity in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. It demonstrates how the negotiation of legitimacy, inclusivity and coherent peace approaches in African peace can go a long way in reducing the lapsing and relapsing of conflict. The engagement of communication and dialogue helps in identifying the missing diplomatic links in every peacebuilding level in the conflict society. Unless there is proper integration, communication and inclusivity in African peace processes between the international actors and local actors, sustainable peace remains trapped. The value of local ownership in peacebuilding bring forth an empowering strategy that negotiates for practical engagement between the top and
the bottom. It actually clarifies that peacebuilding requires the involvement of all stakeholders, and any engagement independent of other key actors is most likely to overlook important factors that are profitable and crucial for sustainability.
Chapter 6: A Redeeming Strategy: The relevance of Vertical Integration in building African Peace (Recommendations & Conclusion)

“The deepest of level of communication is not communication, but communion. It is wordless ... beyond speech ... beyond concept.” Thomas merton\textsuperscript{52}

Introduction

As identified in this research, the story of Africa tells a troubled history of post-colonial violent political and social transitions which are coupled with civil wars, civil unrest, terrorism and genocide. Cilliers and Schünemann (2013:1) endorses that, such kind of history, “is not surprising considering the divisiveness of the original boundary-making processes, the coercive nature of colonial rule and the messy process of independence”. More than two decades have now passed since the last legacies of colonial political dominance died in Africa with the end of South Africa’s apartheid regime. The post-colonial African state has been characterized by intra-state conflicts, civil unrests, genocides, violent protests and endemic conflict cases. All case situations seem to have acquired a hopeless taste, in which peace seem to be a far-fetched concept. Despite decades of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding participation to address the conflict plight in most countries, sustainable peace changes are yet to materialize. The fault lines to the immaterial consequences of peace strategies are identified within the separate functionalities of both top-down and bottom-up approaches to peace, which have developed competing interests of superior relevance rather than integrative complementary interests to address the problem. Various stakeholders in peace are separated along these frameworks and as such, have remained cornered in their own ideological spaces. This hinders the recognition and involvement of various (local) indigenous and endogenous peace mechanisms from finding their place in the processes of negotiating peace at all political and social (leadership) levels\textsuperscript{53}.

The adoption of inclusive and integrated approaches in conflict transformation meant to ensure effective peacebuilding (Lederach, 1997; Joeng, 2005). The research argues for the use of

\textsuperscript{52} Most influential Catholic author of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.

\textsuperscript{53} See Lederach’s Levels of Leadership Chapter 2.
flexible mechanisms and frameworks that support local ownership. They provide a better platform for expanding the local capacity to effectively harness their potential in yielding more results in the peacebuilding process (Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Donias, 2013). The engagement of integrated frameworks in building peace allows the enhancement of comprehensive techniques that are driven from different perspectives that may be traditional, academic, local, national or international. Most liberal peacebuilding approaches in Africa are driven from different polarized levels (macro-micro) with very little effect in securing a peaceful sustainable post-conflict environment. The case studies engaged in this research present the loopholes that are consistently instigating the relapse of conflict and hindering the sustainability of both state building and peacebuilding. Donias & Burt (2014:5) in their analysis of peacebuilding through vertical integration perspective argues that, “peace must be built simultaneously from the bottom up, the top down and the middle out as well as on the emerging debate on ‘hybrid peace governance’.

Thus to build sustainable African peace, various theoretical standpoints and approaches need to be revisited to challenge their effectiveness in addressing the intractable and contemporary-conflict issues on the continent.

This chapter justifies the analysis and findings of this research by engaging the perspective of vertical integration peacebuilding to provide a flexible platform of engaging ‘hybrid peace’ approaches. According to John Paul Lederach (1997:83), building peace in societies require flexible approaches which traces “how conflict emerges from, evolves within, and brings about changes in the personal, relational, structural, and cultural dimensions” and this helps in building transformative strategies, “for developing creative responses that promote peaceful change within those dimensions through nonviolence mechanisms”. Most African conflicts intractable and protracted in nature such that one conflict case is often driven by multiple factors, which include ethnic tensions, resource conflicts, power dynamics, territorial disputes and ‘incentive’ violence. To offer a redeeming strategy in quietening the continuity of such consequences demands engagement from local, national and international community to combine their efforts and ideas to ensure sustainable outcomes. Therefore, this research concludes by critically engaging the need for effective alternative peace approaches in Africa, explores the effectiveness of vertical integration peacebuilding as a flexible hybrid peace approach to engage local

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54 See Chapter 4, Analysis of David keen’s incentivized violence as a tool for negotiation.
ownership practices in African peace, and finally gives an overall conclusion of the research perspectives.

**The need for effective alternative approaches to African Peacebuilding**

The conflict transformation perspective “brings into focus the horizon toward which we journey, namely the building of healthy relationships and communities, both locally and globally. This process requires significant changes in our current ways of relating” (Maiese 2003:1). In understanding this dynamic thinking one can relate how the history of peacebuilding in Africa is clouded with monolithic and paternalist peace approaches that have enhanced complexity in the process. Peacebuilding meant to revive the political, economic and social fibres that make the society functions again in a well-coordinated and coherent system. For instance, in most post-conflict reconstruction engagement in Africa the liberal peace framework has focused on peace agreements and elections as key peacebuilding strategies, whilst neglecting comprehensive engagement of actors within civil societies and communities to strike a social balance and representation from both the top and bottom (Kamniski 2011).

More so, one can use the example of African Union to clarify on the challenges that have undermined sustainable peace and on the need for alternative peace approaches. In Faføre (2016) investigation of why ‘Africa remains punctuated by violent conflicts’ despite the establishment of African Union peace and security architecture, he highlights the huge gap that exists between the African Union and regional economic bodies (ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD etc.) as one the key hindrances to sustainable peacebuilding. This gap is a consequence of lack in inclusive deliberation of processes, cooperative engagement, and proper coordination amongst actors driving peace and security. The AU’s practical approaches to peace still remains trapped in liberal peace frameworks and though their peace and security architecture remains an African peace structure, the practice on the ground is totally distanced from the desired structure on paper. Most African scholars argue that the lack of funds by the AU remains the biggest challenge to the reality of African peace approaches. However, it is important to acknowledge that both the regional bodies and the AU have the greatest voice in distancing themselves from paternalist peace approaches when engaging with donors, non-governmental organizations and international stakeholders on the need for alternative peace engagement that are driven through local ownership and inclusive perspectives. Thus, this helps to increase the capacity of the local
actors in building peace. Increasing local capacity in peacebuilding processes in Africa is very much needed to ensure a sustainable cause as opposed to “an elite driven, top-down, outside-in, technocratic and overly formulaic experiment in social engineering that lacked local legitimacy” (Hoffman 2009:11).

**The broad perspective**

The research explored the various broad perspectives that are key to learn from in shaping the African peace mechanism. Inclusivity in peace processes requires engaging factors that are particular to your society and community. It is also important to note that there should not be romanticism of any peacebuilding process but rather careful consideration of processes for the purpose of sustainability.

Tschirgi and de Coning (2015) provides a broad analysis in which they establish the various perspectives and understanding of peacebuilding compiled in literature over the years. They clarify on how peacebuilding should be understood firstly as; ‘Context-Specific’ thus it requires tailor-made strategies that are appropriately contextual. Secondly, peacebuilding is ‘Political’ therefore, “peacebuilding strategies need to be firmly grounded in an accurate understanding of the relations among multiple domestic and international actors with different motivations and agendas”. Thirdly, peacebuilding is as a ‘Multi-faceted Enterprise’, which addresses various, issues (governance, rule of law, justice, social reconstruction etc.) and from multiple fronts hence, one cannot address it through a single specific sector. Fourthly, peacebuilding as an ‘Endogenous Process’ which requires representation and guidance from all societal levels (national-led and inclusive strategies [women and civil societies]). Fifthly, peacebuilding process requires anchor and support from ‘Local Structures, Systems, and Processes’ for the purpose of broadening and strengthening capacity in local institutions. Sixthly, peacebuilding should consider ‘Addressing Regional and Transnational Factors’ that drive internal conflicts. Finally, peacebuilding should be ‘constantly changing’ since there are constant radical changes in the “causes and dynamics of contemporary conflicts”. (Tschirgi & de Coning 2015:3-4).

This expresses the flexible and dynamic perspective international organizations, non-governmental organizations, inter-governmental organizations, regional actors, state actors, civil

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55 Transnational and cross-border driving factors of internal conflicts “Factors such as cross-border flow of arms, refugees, natural resources and transnational organized crime and terrorism--along with security strategies designed to deal with them--fuel and exacerbate local level conflicts” (Tschirgi & de Coning 2015:4).
societies and local actors need to consider in engaging in sustainable peacebuilding. Each conflict environment has unique qualities that need understanding and as such requires approaches that are considerate of the social norms, political sensitivities, and factors that constantly and consistently cause conflicts. This endorses the need for new and broad alternative peace building approaches in addressing African conflicts. The research has explored these different dynamics in trying to support the advancement of hybrid and integrated peace frameworks in African peace.

**The impact of Vertical integration peacebuilding**

The adoption of vertical integration peacebuilding in this research meant to provide the most flexible, inclusive and integrated way of penetrating societies and yield effective results. This allows for comprehensive peacebuilding techniques acquired across multiple-disciplines; by trans-disciplinary approaches; or through indigenous and endogenous peace strategies. Integrated frameworks are considerate of the various societal structures that can be of use in advancing and ensuring sustainable peace. Donias & Burt (2014: 5) endorses this view by clarifying that “peace must be built simultaneously from the bottom up, the top down and the middle out as well as on the emerging debate on ‘hybrid peace governance’.” Vertical integration peacebuilding provides a solid foundation for perfect ‘hybrid’ peace frameworks that blend in African societies, since its approach in any conflict environment is to decipher the various factors that undermines positive peace outcomes across all levels of society.

DRC, Somalia and South Sudan presents various setbacks, which have thwarted the success of sustainable peacebuilding. It is clear that in the DRC, citizens have lost much trust and confidence in the international peace supporters for failing to support and protect civilian lives. The case of Somalia presents a contestation between clannism, civil societies and state building. South Sudan shows evidence of a polarized society, which is barely recognized as need for a more inclusive and integrated peace approaches by the key peace stakeholders. Such intra-social cleavages which are curved by tribal and ethnic differences, “points to the need to think more holistically and more strategically about which linkages – across which axis – are especially critical for peacebuilding” (MacCandless et al 2015:4). Vertical integration peacebuilding thinking provides a perspective of how in these countries better coherence and coordination across all actors in international, national and local levels need to be improved. Timothy Donias
(2015:240) clarifies how vertical integration challenges the peace process to build state-society relations, to reconcile national and local ownership, “of engaging the citizens and civil societies of conflict affected states as agents, rather than objects, of peacebuilding initiatives” [which is key in the three countries].

The conflict transformation perspective argues that peacebuilding aspires to create a ‘political space’, where all structural limitations; barriers to peace; and stability and development are negotiated and eliminated (Cousens et al 2001). Various scholars agree that a ‘political space’ in peacebuilding is a strategic platform where all stakeholders from international actors, government actors and diplomats, civil societies, citizens and local authorities negotiate their relevance in the peace process. It is clear that in most peacebuilding processes, particularly those that involve peace agreements, such spaces are rarely there. The peace agreement process often involves the ‘big-men’ and there is always an assumption that their agreement directly trickles down to peace and yet in most cases like in the DRC it has never been the case. Vertical integration advocates for an inclusive and legitimate peace process, which encompasses broad stakeholder participation. McCandless et al (2015: 2) concludes that, “ultimately, just as vertical linkages between the local, national and international drive conflict and fragility, they offer crucial entry points for thinking and practice around building and sustaining peace”.

Vertical integration peacebuilding focuses on empowering the local citizens to participate in building their peace. Scholars agree that most local conflicts (inter-and intra-community) which forms the part of the causes of bigger conflict continuity are rarely (or never) touched by the international dimension of peacebuilding. Thus, Kamatsiko (2015:57) argues that vertical integration provides alternative grassroots peacebuilding engagements, which “reveal that vertical linkages within broader categories such as ‘the local’ can be no less important to the success of peacebuilding initiatives”. This provides a platform for increasing the local capacity to build peace, something that is greatly needed in African peace approaches.

**Recommendations for effective peacebuilding in Africa: an integrative perspective**

Having engaged on the various impasses and challenges in policy and practice of peacebuilding in Africa’s intractable conflict situations, this section seeks to recommend policies and strategies that may help in setting up effective peace mechanisms that ensure a meaningful inclusion across
all political and social structures as identified in the previous two chapters. The task of building peace in the DRC, Somalia and South Sudan is quite a challenging one, as Africa’s longest conflicts they have demonstrated much complexity and tenacity for blinkered and inflexible peacebuilding frameworks. The factors that can transform the challenges peculiar to the continuity of conflict in these three countries primarily lie in comprehending the local, national and international peace structures in confronting the various social, political and security polarities that exist not only in policies but in peace agreements and practice of building peace.

**Comprehensive institutional support to local threats to curtail sporadic violent outbreaks:**
There is need for both international and government actors to take all the local rumors of violent threats seriously. The relevant institutions of peace involved in the countries need to establish a comprehensive structure that integrates the political, social and security challenges from local, national and international levels. For instance, in the DRC, several incidents of civilian massacres have been recorded and are still taking place in the Eastern Congo with very little response from the UN troops and relevant actors in mitigating the continuity of such issues. The government and its stakeholders need to improve on their communication with the local communities in order to create a viable political, social and security framework that seek to avert conflicts and disputes that are instigated by ethnic differences, resource control, land disputes and power dynamics. Programs have to be put in place to facilitate transformative activities that cohere the civilians, civil societies and government actors in establishing community-based peace mechanisms and conflict aversion strategies that are inclusive of local leaders, women and children without resorting to violence.

**Support of State Apparatus by International actors and donors to increase national and local institutional capacity:** There is much need for the establishment of effective local institutions particularly in Somalia and South Sudan. The strength of clans in Somaliland and effectiveness of Civil Societies and warlords in providing service delivery in Puntland has undermined state building and peacebuilding. The international and regional actors involved in state-and peacebuilding need to empower the state apparatus by channeling their resources through it to strengthen its relevance through effective employment and service delivery. The stakeholders need to engage on massive support for skills training within the local and national institutional structures to demonstrate the relevance and need of a state as well as the validity of
the peace process. Such engagement can help quell mistrust of civilians towards their governments, which has become the major driver of conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.

**Inclusive and principled peace mechanisms in the resolution of disputes:** There is need for a revisit of each peace agreement to check the inclusivity of the process and fulfillment of the needs of various stakeholders involved. This helps in addressing the enmity and distrust that is build amongst ethnic diversities involved in the peace processes. There is need for more national peace approaches to quell the various polarities that exist in the DRC, Somalia and South Sudan. Thus, integrated approaches provide an inclusive and legitimization platform that puts the differences into perspective. There is need for peace networks in which communities engage in what they need and desire for a peaceful society. It is important to note that most actors in peace processes are distant from the needs of their hosts when it comes to peace. The UN and AU need to engage the regional bodies in establishing effective and binding structures in monitoring the peace agreement processes that are often undermined.

**Conclusion**

This research provides a comprehensive analysis of the various weakness and loopholes in the peace mechanisms that have been engaged in African peacebuilding. It argues for hybrid peace mechanisms that are driven by integrative approaches in order to bridge the gaps that exists across the international, national and local level peacebuilding policies and practices. Thus, it critically challenges the functionality of liberal peace frameworks as paternalist and monolithic hence the constant undermining of the local ownership in the African peace processes. The case studies explored in this research provides the institutional and social challenges rarely considered in the peacebuilding process and yet are crucial for the sustainability of peace. The use of vertical integration peacebuilding as a theoretical approach serves to clarify that every stakeholder in peacebuilding no matter how small has a role to play. Thus in intractable and protracted social conflicts which encompasses most African conflict counties there is much need for more inclusive peace approaches to ensure sustainable peacebuilding.


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