‘Tapping into the Chaos’

Crisis, State and Accumulation in Zimbabwe

By

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Lastly, I dedicate this work to my late mother (mother in law) – Khanyisile Sheila Hlongwane who passed away on the 22nd of December 2007, barely a month after our wedding. May her memory last and inspire us who remain, as we look forward to the blessed hope.
CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................i
Map of Zimbabwe ...........................................................................................................vi
List of Acronyms .............................................................................................................vii
List of Characters ...........................................................................................................viii
List of figures ................................................................................................................xii
List of Annexure ............................................................................................................xiii
Abstract ........................................................................................................................xiii

Introduction .....................................................................................................................1

Chapter 1: Conceptualizing the Crisis ...........................................................................10
Rethinking the Post Colonial State .................................................................................13
Contradictions within Zimbabwe's Ruling Elite ............................................................19
A Crisis of Primitive Accumulation? .............................................................................24

Chapter 2: State and Accumulation in Zimbabwe – A Historical Overview .................34
The State and Capital in the Colonial State ..................................................................35
The post Colonial State and Accumulation up to 2000 ..................................................42

Chapter 3: The Post 2000 Crisis and the Informalisation of Production ......................49
Informalisation of Production ......................................................................................51
The Deepening Crisis and the Centrality of the ‘Party State’ .........................................59
Violence and Warlordism .............................................................................................66
Crisis and Party State ‘Schizophrenia’ ..........................................................................69

Chapter 4: Disorder, Violence and Accumulation: Case of Totororo Gold Smuggling ....................................................................................................................79
Tunnels of Death ..........................................................................................................83
Structures and Networks in Illegal Gold Mining ..........................................................87
Violence and Warlordism .............................................................................................94

Chapter 5: Conclusion: Whither the State; Progression Towards a Market .................104
Civilization or Regressing to Barbarism? ....................................................................104
Party State and Economic Social Stratification ............................................................106
Crisis Born Class of Accumulators ..............................................................................108
A Labour Force of a New Type? ................................................................................110
The ‘Gold Bank’ ........................................................................................................114
The Uncivilized Market ..............................................................................................116

References .....................................................................................................................119
Appendix .........................................................................................................................125
The area of study (Totororo) is situated on the margins of Empress Mine Township.
ACRONYMS

AAG - Affirmative Action Group
APNAC - African Parliamentary Network Against Corruption
BIPAs - Bilateral Investment Protection Agreements
BSAC - British South Africa Company
CFU - Commercial Farmers Union
CIO - Central Intelligence Organisation
CSC - Cold Storage Company
CZI - Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries
DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo
ESAP – Economic Structural Adjustment Program
GMB – Grain Marketing Board
IBDC – Indigenous Business Development Centre
IBWO- Indigenous Business Women Organisation
IMF – International Monetary Fund
JOC - Joint Operations Command
MDC – Movement for Democratic Change
MMCZ - Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe
NO CZIM – National Oil Company of Zimbabwe
RBZ – Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
UDI – Unilateral Declaration of Independence
ZANU-PF – Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZIMSSBA – Zimbabwe Small Scale Miners and Buyers Association
ZIPA – Zimbabwe People’s Army
ZLP – Zimbabwe Liberators Platform
ZNWVA – Zimbabwe National War Veterans Association
ZRP – Zimbabwe Republic Police
ZUPCO – Zimbabwe United Passenger Company
LIST OF CHARACTERS

Bredenkamp John - A British business tycoon known to have funded and support ZANU-PF and government for a long time. International investor rated the United Kingdom's 33rd richest citizen in 2003. Went on the run from the party on accusation of being the main backer of the ill-fated Tsholotsho Declaration that sought to endorse Emmerson Mnangagwa as President Robert Mugabe's deputy in 2004 (www.zimbabwejournalists.com 7 June 2006).

Chanetsa Peter - Provincial Governor - Mashonaland West
Chebundo Blessing - Member of Parliament (MDC) Kwekwe Urban
Chiyangwa Philip - Zimbabwean Business mogul alleged to be involved in illegal Foreign currency trade; Robert Mugabe's relative, former ZANU-PF Mashonaland West provincial chairperson and former Member of Parliament
Chinotimba Joseph - Self styled Commander in Chief of 2000 farm invasions, founder member of a ZANU-PF backed Labour Organisation, Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU), now vice president of Zimbabwe National War Veterans Association. He also has a farm and runs nation wide security company.

Cluff Algy - UK Business magnate CEO of Cluff Gold Plc. In 1972 Mr Cluff formed CCP to bid for North Sea oil licenses in the UK sector and subsequently Cluff Oil Ltd, which acted as the management company for CCP. He then founded and was Chairman of Cluff Resources. From the early 1980s, Cluff Resources began to focus on mineral exploration in Africa and made several significant discoveries prior to its acquisition by Ashanti Goldfields in 1996. In the same year, Mr Cluff co-founded Cluff Mining Ltd (now Ridge Mining), which was admitted to AIM in May 2000. He was Chairman of that company until his resignation in May 2004 in order to give his full time attention to the Group which he established in November 2003. Opened Freda Rebecca Mine in Zimbabwe in 1988.

Comberbach Stuart - Former Secretary for Industry and International Trade in 2002
Goche Nicholas - Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare (former Minister of State for National Security in the President's Office)

Gono Gideon - Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor, owns at least two farms

Joshi Heena - Joshi's daughter also believed to be deeply involved in businesses linked to Zanu PF (Sunday Mirror April 2004)
Joshi Jayant - Indian Acts as a front and is a Director of strategic Zanu PF holding company, Zidco also sits on the board of First Banking Corporation and a host of other companies aligned to Zanu PF (Sunday Mirror 4 April 2004)

Kanyati - RBZ Security Officer

Makoni Simba - Former Finance and Economic Development Minister and Member of ZANU-PF highest decision making body politburo, critical of ZANU-PF economic policy and the chaotic land reform, expelled from the party after deciding to contest against Mugabe for presidency in the March 2007 election

Manyika Elliot - ZANU-PF Political Comissar, Member of Parliament for Shamva

Mariyapera Pheneas - ZANU PF councilor and deputy mayor for Chegutu used his position to acquire 50 houses and stands with baking of senior party officials in Mashonaland West according to a report, dated June 29 2004 and sent to Local Government, Public Works and National Housing Minister Ignatius Chombo on...

Matonga Bright - Deputy Minister of Information Bright Matonga, related to Mugabe.  
Mnangagwa Emmerson – ZANU-PF Secretary for Administration thus responsible for ZANU-PF Companies. Long tipped to succeed Mugabe he is also minister of Rural Housing and Amenities. Named by Zim Daily Zimbabwe’s richest politician Mnangagwa is involved in various business activities. He is into farming and has been involved in mining, particular in the DRC. He was personally involved in the Zimbabwean army’s mining deals with Congo-based holding company, JFPI Corporation. But there are a lot of illicit activities he has been linked to such as illegal gold panning and DRC blood diamonds. The United Nations Security Council reports in 2002 and 2003 named Mnangagwa as one of the illegal mineral exploiters in the Congo. Mnangagwa and Thamer Said Ahmed Al Shanfari, were both immediately in the spotlight of a long-standing United Nations investigation into the looting of the Congo’s mineral wealth. (warm Africa.com accessed 21 February 2008)

Mpfou Obert – Minister of Industry and International Trade. He at one point accused unnamed ruling party chefs and minister of involvement in corruption at the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO Steel) and had promised to name them in parliament but later withdrew his claims most probably due to political pressure.

Msika Joseph – One of the two vice-presidents, probably the only person in Mugabe’s cabinet known to have been consistently critical of land occupations.

Msipa Cephas – Midlands Provincial Governor

Mujuru Joyce – The other of Mugabe’s two vice presidents. Wife to retired liberation war commander said to be one of the richest people in Southern Africa if not the richest. Together with her husband she is linked to a number of Mining businesses both legal and illegal. They are also reportedly involved in illegal/parallel forex deals.

Mujuru Solomon – Husband to vice-president Joyce Mujuru and former commander of liberation war

Mumbengegwi Samuel – Minister of Finance and recently lost the right to represent the party in the March parliamentary election but registered to contest still against party rules.

Mutezo Munacho - Water and Infrastructural Development Minister

Ndebele Sobuza Gula - Attorney General now suspended for allegedly obstructing the course of justice but embroiled in ZANU-PF succession politics

Nhara William - Late Economists aligned to ZANU-PF and ZANU-PF parliamentary candidate 2005 for Chimanimani

Nkomo John - ZANU-PF National Chairperson and former Speaker of parliament

O’Reilly Tony - former Chairman of H.J. Heinz Company, used to host President Mugabe at his Irish home

Rautenbach Muller – Fugitive Businessmen declared persona non grata in DRC with
South Africa and Interpol after his neck in connection with fraud involving billions of rands is a top ally of Mugabe’s ZANU-PF (www.afdevinfo.com) accessed 21 Feb 2008. Also connected to Munangagwa

Rowland Tiny - Lonrho CEO closely linked to ZANU-PF, funded ZANU PF’s uncontested 1996 presidential poll (Financial Gazette October 9 2003).

Oppenheimer Family - Lead Anglo American Corporation with a number of business interest in Southern Africa and were close to Mugabe until the fast track land reform which saw the Oppenheimers losing some of the land they previously owned. At one point they were said to own land the size of Belgium.

Van Hoogstraten Nicholas - British Business Tycoon with close ties to ZANU-PF and a bad criminal record. Recently arrested for charging a tenant in foreign currency and charged for hording foreign currency and possessing pornographic material.

Zinyowera – Senior ZANU-PF member in Chegutu, got a farm from the chaotic land reform and is involved in business ventures with a government Minister.

Shamhu Webster – Minister of Special Affairs in the president Office and Chegutu Member of Parliament.
LIST OF FIGURES

Fig 1: Minister of Industry and International Trade Obert Mpofu Cartoon
Fig 2: Cartoon on meat shortages and informal sell of meat
Fig 3: Left – Vendors trade sugar to bus passenger at a fuel station just outside Masvingo
Fig 4: Right – Chairs where ‘NOCZIM guys’ sit during the day awaiting for fuel clients
Fig 5: Vantage View presentation of the Totororo underground shafts
Fig 6: Vertical Diagrammatic illustration of the Tunnel
Fig 7-9: Totororo Illegal Gold mining tunnel entrance
Fig 10: Headman Matongo’s Homestead
Fig 11: Mnangagwa’s syndicate and Matongo’s syndicate
Fig 12-13: Accumulation Networks diagrams
Fig 14: Fighting Axe used in illegal miners violent clashes
ANNEXURES

Annexure 1 – Mineral Resource Estimates of Zimbabwe
ABSTRACT

The conjunctural dynamics of the Zimbabwe crisis after 2000 have produced a distinctive pattern of accumulation. Four features are noticeable in this pattern – firstly; disorder and/or violence has become common, both as a general feature and driver of wealth accumulation and the political project accompanying it. Secondly; the State has increasingly become more central and pervasive in driving accumulation and in the distribution of both economic and political goods. Thirdly, the crisis has awakened, reinforced and reshaped a distinctive acquisitive culture peculiar to the period in question, albeit resonating with the historical formation of Zimbabwe’s ruling elite. Lastly, the current crisis has modified and reinforced a culture of ‘strategic contradictions’ within ZANU-PF. This dissertation is an analysis of Zimbabwe’s ‘political economy of crisis’ in the post 2000 period. It examines how the Zimbabwean ruling elite and those connected to the state have benefited from the unregulated forms of accumulation attending the Zimbabwean crisis. A broad combination of a contextual analysis of the crisis and its beneficiaries and a close case-study analysis of an ‘informal’ (illegal) gold-mining site in Totororo, rural Kwekwe’s ‘Empress’ area in Central Zimbabwe are employed to try to distil accumulation patterns that have resulted from the present economic and political crisis.
Introduction

Zimbabwe is in a serious political-economic crisis. The ripple effects of the militant chaotic land reform exercise code named 'fast track' makes 2000 a benchmark year. The chaotic, that is lawless, disorderly, 'free for all' and often violent manner in which land reclamations unfolded set in motion an unregulated form of wealth accumulation that has spread itself beyond the agrarian sector to other aspects of the economy. What occurs in present day Zimbabwe is a highly informalised and pervasive system of production that expresses itself in different forms from illegal gold mining to illegal trade in foreign currency. This informalised production and continuing crisis combine with the nature of Zimbabwe State to create a 'party state' that extends, recreates and reinforces itself by way of 'tapping into the chaos'.

After giving a panoramic synopsis of Zimbabwe's mineral endowment the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) governor Gideon Gono in his April 2007 Monetary Statement interim review speech went notes that:

With such richness, it is indeed unforgivable that as a country we should be having foreign exchange difficulties all because of bureaucracy. I am reminded of what His Excellency The President Cde R.G. Mugabe said on Sunday the 17th of March, 2002, during His inaugural speech, when He said, "We can not afford the luxury of dilatoriness and bureaucratic sloth and indecisiveness." ...The continued unstructured turn of events in the diamond industry was fast becoming an embarrassment to the country, given the clear need for foreign currency to meet the wide-ranging national requirements for funding. It is for this reason that when the Central Bank makes clarion calls for order to be established in the diamonds industry as a matter of urgency, we do so with a deep desire not for the mere sake of wanting to be involved, but a genuine concern that our national heritage is being plundered whilst as a country we watch and most probably are not benefiting from such uncouth acts (Gono, 2007, 46)

The 'clarion call' is in fact a muted attack on those in government engaging in illicit expropriation of diamonds. The governor, ostensibly in agreement with his superior,
blames bureaucracy for retarding 'progress' while simultaneously reproaching the 'unstructured turn of events', and 'calls for order to be established' thus regulating and arresting 'uncouth acts'.

Gono who seems to be saying that the rough and unregulated form of accumulation (or looting) should stop knows he can not do much to stop these activities. Gono's speech, as do finance minister Mumbengegwi's fiscal pronouncements,3 speaks of the inherent contradictions within the state and the internal rivalries for accumulation within the ruling elite. Equally, Mugabe's disgust with 'bureaucracy and dilatoriness' recasts the historically born contradictions endemic within Zimbabwe's ruling elite, which give direction to an emergent form of accumulation that has characterised the post-2000 crisis.4 It is within this context that this study interprets the dynamics of accumulation in the post-2000 crisis moment, in so far as they are presided over and modeled by the Zimbabwe state.

This essay examines how the Zimbabwean ruling elite and those connected to the state have benefited from the unregulated forms of accumulation attending the Zimbabwean crisis. In Raftopoulos and Phimister's (2004) phraseology, this is an analysis of 'the political economy of crisis' emerging in post-2000 Zimbabwe. A broad combination of a contextual analysis of the crisis and its beneficiaries complimented by a close case-study of an 'informal' (illegal) gold-mining site in Totororo, rural Kwekwe's

3 For example both the 2007 monetary and fiscal policies by Gono and Mumbengegwi respectively are characterised by a strong commitment to respect property rights but the fact that the leases given to 'new' farmers are not efficiently regulated, even though they are said to be for 99 years, and that Large Scale Commercial farms are still taken even whilst promises are made to attract white farmers back, does not bode well for property rights. This commitment is rhetorical and indicative of contradictions within the Zimbabwe state. These also manifest themselves through policy discord between Mugabe and some members of his cabinet at various times such as former finance minister Simba Makoni and Gideon Gono on devaluation of Zimbabwe dollar and price controls inter alia (Zimonline, April 27 2007).

4 It is important here to note that this form of accumulation as shall be explained later in the thesis was emerging well before 2000 but has been catalyzed by the crisis.
'Empress' area in Central Zimbabwe (see map) is employed to distill accumulation patterns that have been induced by the present economic and political crisis.

The conjunctural dynamics of (re)distribution, ownership and accumulation attending the crisis are dissected. Four features of the crisis are noticeable – firstly; disorder and/or violence has become common, both as a general feature and driver of wealth accumulation and the political project accompanying it. Secondly; the State has increasingly become more central in driving accumulation and distribution of both economic and political goods though not in a progressive or developmental sense. Thirdly, the crisis has awakened a distinctive acquisitive culture\(^5\) peculiar to the period in question, albeit resonating with the historical formation of Zimbabwe's ruling petty bourgeoisie. Lastly, the current crisis has modified and reinforced a culture of 'contradictions' within ZANU-PF; in actual fact a deliberate though seemingly irreconcilable duality of policy and modus operandi which ZANU-PF has used to its advantage. ZANU-PF has since 2000 walked conspicuously with two sets of policy in its pocket. This duality in the present can be distilled as a "technocratic realism quasi pro-market approach" versus "authoritarian (strategic) populism". ZANU-PF has strategically vacillated between these two extremes (rather contradictions) successfully, to placate both internal and external support\(^6\). While the crisis is clear for everyone to see now it is necessary to go a bit further and trace it in time.

\(^5\) This acquisitive culture refers to having a tendency to accumulate and engage in profit driven commercial activity, though quite often profits are not necessarily reinvested.

\(^6\) It is observed that this argument is in a way a comment on Sam Moyo and Yeros' notion that despite the 'revolutionary situation' of the late 1990s what has emerged in Zimbabwe is a radicalized state. They note what they observe to be a shift from the left towards right as signified by 'policy of normalization with capital' since 2003 epitomized by Operation Restore Order (demolition of informal strictures) in June 2005 as marking an 'interrupted revolution' (Moyo and Yeros, 2007). It is argued that rather than these shifts pointing to an 'interrupted revolution' they actually betray post-2000 ZANU-PF as moving with two sets of dialectical policies inter changing them whenever it is profitable to do so. These contradictions have and
The crisis dates back to the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) introduced by the Zimbabwe government at the instigation of IMF and World Bank in 1990. Far from its intended outcome the program impacted negatively on the economy. Poverty levels increased from 52.8% to 75.6% of the population between 1990 and 1995, (Moore, J., 2003, 6). Moreover the costly 1997 DRC military intervention (Nest, 2001) and the unbudgeted financial gratuities to liberation war veterans had a cataclysmic impact on the economy, eventuating a currency crash on 14 November 1997 otherwise referred to as the infamous ‘black Friday’ (Moore J., 2003, 6). The chaotic land invasions that started in 2000, disputed successive elections and resultant political unrest, international isolation and investor flight further added momentum to the crisis impetus. This set in motion a spiral of decline from which Zimbabwe is yet to recover. By February 2008 inflation was torpedoing 66.212.3%, from a late 2007 figure of 26 470.8% (CSO, February 2008 Statistics), the highest in the world. International Monetary Fund (February 2008) estimates are twice as high – 150 000% for January 2008 and 85 000% by December 2007. Unemployment hovers between 80-90%, the estimated percentage of people living in poverty is plus or minus 70% (Human Development Report 2007, Human Development Indicators, Country Fact Sheet), the annual decline in economic output has been about 7% since 2001, the foreign debt as of December 2006 was more than $5.2 billion, and Zimbabweans had an average life expectancy of 36 years (the lowest in the world) (The Africa Report Quarterly. No. 5. Jan 2007, 147). As of May 2008...
2007 the government had lost 15,000 employees over the past 12 months, translating to about 40 per day (Financial Gazette 16 May 2007).

Special attention in this essay will be given to members of the ruling elite, consisting of state functionaries such as the police, state secret security agents, Chiefs and Headmen - those connected to the ruling party. The study examines how these interact with non-state actors and ordinary people more specifically in illegal gold mining at a site near Totororo Secondary School in rural Kwekwe. The controversies and dynamics surrounding the appropriation of land in and around Chegutu area (100km south west of Zimbabwe's capital city Harare) are referred from time to time in order to shed more light on the thesis, especially in the fourth chapter. The study points to policy contradictions in the Zimbabwe state: the role of violence, disorder, and warlord style politics; a new class of accumulators emerging with the increased centrality/instrumentalisation of the state for accumulation; and what Bayart (1999) might call 'criminalization of the state' in the post-2000 forms of accumulation. The field study was complemented by a desk study of RBZ monetary statements, government pronouncements and publications that have included parliamentary debates, Central Statistics Office (CSO), presidential speeches, both provincial and national newspaper reports and as much complementary literature.

Prior to the crisis, Totororo was largely dominated by rural subsistence farming activities. In the 1990s small scale miners emerged under the Zimbabwean government's

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7 Kwekwe is found in the Midlands Province of Zimbabwe and as a metropole for the surrounding rural areas provides vital trade networks for the illegally extracted gold and other commodities. Some have even suggested that Kwekwe's economy now rests largely on illegal/informal gold trade (Midlands Observer, June, 2005, 3).
8 Although the notion of 'criminalisation' derives from Bayart the usage in this thesis goes beyond Bayart's tendency towards cultural/political analysis. It is invoked from the standpoint of accumulation.
indigenization program after the demise of Falcon Gold’s Empress Mine. The small scale miners had networked peacefully with individual ‘illegal miners’ (largely from the surrounding rural subsistence farming community) who sold gold to them in order to benefit from gold processing mills. The increased economic difficulties and the high levels of unemployment have however seen more and more people from urban areas becoming involved. An accidental discovery of a ‘pebble’ of gold in 2005 in a field not far from Totororo resulted in an unprecedented gold rush. The field was dug up and century old abandoned gold mining shafts within its vicinities were reopened. This heightened the already contested and unregulated process of accumulation involving those within and connected to the state, and those without. At the extreme this has degenerated into a form of warlordism as rival players, especially those connected to the state, clash in order to gain exclusive access to the site.

That smuggling occurs at a large level is indicated by the fact that at the national level minerals smuggling is said to be prejudicing the economy in terms of US$400 million annually (Gono, 2007). In 2005 gold deliveries to Fidelity printers fell by 37% to 13 000 kgs, compared to 21 300 in 2004, largely due to smuggling (Banks and Banking Survey, 2006, B6). The government’s statements and actions against these activities have been contradictory and largely rhetorical. This reiterates the point that the state has been criminalized, and has been instrumental in this new accumulation drive. Those connected to the state have benefited the most from this apparent chaos.

9 Falcon Gold Zimbabwe is a Canadian company operating a number of mines in Zimbabwe. A number of its mines closed due to problems of viability largely due to fuel and electricity shortages. Empress mines closed in 1989 purportedly because ore was said to be exhausted (Zimbabwe Standard, 2005 (no date) accessed online on 12 September 2007).

10 The warlord features in post-2000 accumulation trends in Zimbabwe go beyond contestations for mining sites. Warlord styles of accumulation have been common in the amassing of land by Zimbabwe’s ruling elite. In 2006 for example, two ministers in the Zimbabwe government clashed over a farm in Chegutu.
The author spent one month doing participatory observation with the people involved in illegal gold mining. There are a number of sites close to the study area where similarly contested accumulation processes are taking place but because these places were nearly inaccessible due to the prevalent fuel shortages and scarcity of public transport these could not be visited. Moreover some of the sites were reported to be so characterised by violence that it was too risky to go there. For that reason one had to rely on accounts from those who had been to these places. An attempt to follow and analyse the product (or commodity) chains (Gereffi, Humphrey, Kaplinsky and Sturgeon, 2001) and trade networks was made but this met strong limitations. From the outset, given the sensitivity of the subject the researcher had to rely on personal connections presently and previously involved. This is not a subject one can easily discuss freely to a stranger. At one point there was fear and anxiety in the community as to the researcher’s identity. Some feared the researcher to be a CIO (Central Intelligence Organization) (Zimbabwe’s national intelligence) operative\(^1\) whereas some speculated connection with the pricing commission\(^2\) among other things.

It was difficult to trace the trade networks at higher levels from the point gold leaves the hands of a local buyer because the trade is so secretive – so secretive that at times a local buyer does not know who he/she sells to. Again, to get information about this aspect reliance had to be placed on insiders of the networks who have been or are still involved. This was backed by media reports. With regards to the police, interest was on

\(^1\) It is now common in Zimbabwe to have members of CIO planted almost everywhere to root out dissenting voices. For that reason most people have become skeptical of strangers fearing the victimization which has characterised ZANU-PF’s campaign of intimidation. As well, verbal accounts of people suspected to be opposition members being beaten up are common. In Chegutu, one man was said to have been beaten for complaining that things were expensive in a local shops. Some of the people who beat up people, claiming to be CIO agents, might be merely overzealous ZANU-PF party members.

\(^2\) This was at a time when Mugabe had announced price slashes and price monitoring teams were moving about with police forcing retailers to heed Mugabe’s decree.
how these law enforcers have attempted to arrest these activities and the outcomes thereof.

In order to theorize this activity, this study has relied on literature on the post colonial state in general for broad conceptual aspects (Saul, 1979, Leys, 1976, Moore, 2006, Chabal and Daloz, 1999) and the Zimbabwean state in particular (Mandaza, 1986, Moore, 2004, Kriger, 2006). Additionally, this study tests theories about the post colonial state and primitive accumulation in accounting for accumulation forms attending the crisis in Zimbabwe. It brings to the fore the salient role of the state in the transformation of social relations of production in this unregulated form of accumulation. The investigation and analysis of outcomes is done on three levels: first, within the local community in which this accumulation is taking place; second, between the community/non-state actors and the state; and last, among state actors or members of the ruling elite who have been involved. The thesis notes that what is happening in Zimbabwe manifests certain aspects pointing to a new form of accumulation on one hand, while on the other showing some features of the orthodox theoretical patterns of accumulation. Semblances of the typical post colonial state patronage system and tendencies towards state collapse and its attendant features of warlordism are also noticeable (Reno, 1998, Maclean, 2002).

The first chapter outlines the broad conceptual framework for the study. It elaborates and accounts for the theoretical foundations of the study. This overlaps to a review of relevant literature – for example on the nature of the post-colonial state – and its historical lineages. The chapter also traces the evolution of ZANU-PF's contradictions. It explains why this study is an attempt to make a contribution to the
contemporary questions of primitive accumulation. Light is cast as to what extent can the Zimbabwe crisis be said to be springing from what Moore (2004, 87) regards as primitive accumulation's unfinished task.

Chapter two presents the historical context. This short and very broad chapter traces the processes of accumulation in the pre-colonial state through to the first two decades of the post-colonial state. Chapter 3 gives a panoramic outline of the accumulation trends that have characterised the post-2000 Zimbabwe crisis, its violent turns, and disorders, lack of regulation and involvement of the ruling elite. Having started with a broader outlook this chapter narrows down to the case study in order to locate it within the broader context. Chapter 4 is a follow up to the chapter 3 and is meant to give a micro and incisive view of the vicious processes of accumulation taking place in mineral exploitation by zeroing in more on the Totororo case. It looks at the role of state and non state actors, contradictions in state policy and practices, networks involved, conflicts, processes and outcomes. Together with chapter 3 this forms the main emphasis of the thesis. Chapter 5 concludes the study by interpolating and interposing accumulation trends and networks discussed in chapter 4 with national trends, providing a clearer outline and analysis of how the local processes are interacting with the national ones. Besides being a summary and interpretation of findings, the thesis makes conclusions with regards to the class and accumulation outcomes of the Zimbabwe crisis. It highlights questions arising from the study, raises issues for further study, and makes recommendations.
Chapter 1:
Conceptualizing the Crisis

Introduction

This thesis locates itself within; firstly the neo-Gramscian theories of the post-colonial state for the broader questions of the study and secondly primitive accumulation for both its broad and narrow aspects. Grappling with the nature of the post-colonial state in Africa enables us to locate the state's functions in the process of accumulation and to make sense of the political economy. This means, then, establishing the relationship between the classes that are trying to accumulate – or becoming bourgeois – in Africa and their relationship with the state. In this instance, coming to grips with the nature of the state aids in unpacking the state's behavior with regards to accumulation. It better our understanding of why the Zimbabwe state (more particularly, those who act within the structures of the state) behaves the way it does with regards to the main pattern of accumulation emerging from Zimbabwe's contemporary crisis and its concomitant aspects.

In this analysis the state is viewed as class biased or class subservient. This conceptualization differs from the Weberian 'iron caged bureaucracy', 'ideal state type' (Lefort, 1986, 97) that suggests an officially functional (corporate) state and separable from the private. In Zimbabwe, like most parts of Africa the possibility of a well functioning state is receding. To insist on the 'ideal type' would lead us to talk of a

\[13\] In a review of this work before final submission Moore (2008) pointed out that given the fact that the African ruling class is just emerging, slowly and fitfully, to say this is not to say enough. The state, too, is not a fully developed entity. This is consistent with the following arguments.
country without a state. Of course some extreme views have alluded to such a possibility. To be sure, the crisis has, besides exhuming the hitherto somewhat buried historically embedded questions of ‘state formation’ (Moore D, 2006), threatened the very existence of the Zimbabwean state qua state. Given the limitations of the present discussion I will not delve more into this. Needless to say, and without falling into journalistic sensationalism, Reynold’s assertion (2007, 4) that “the myth of Zimbabwe as a national entity ended in 2004 . . .” may not be too far from the truth.

It is argued here that the nature of the post colonial state accounts for the unmitigated control of the state apparatus by those managing it. For this very reason, one would argue that in Zimbabwe, the idea of state and the state complex in itself is in crisis. Furthermore, and in the Zimbabwean context, the historically evolved ‘contradictions’ within the ruling elite add a unique twist to the nature of the post-colonial Zimbabwe state and its role in the accumulation process. This reality is integrated into this thesis to further unpack and give reason to the state’s inconsistencies and contradictions in .

In light of this formulation it is persuasive to suggest that in most African states ‘the state has disappeared’ if ever it has been there. This formulation might be likened to Mamdani’s (1996) idea of undifferentiated state or Chabal and Dalozi’s (1999) non-emancipated state yet these still entertain the idea of state. The geo-politics that we call states today are nothing, but big organizations of accumulation, either at local or global level. States are becoming less and less embodiments of contradiction, i.e. different classes competing for control which rationalizes bureaucracy. This trend is noticeable not only in Africa but big countries like US where big corporates seem to have taken over, suggesting Robinson’s ‘transnational state’ (Robinson, 2005).

Reynold’s somewhat radical view on Zimbabwe as having ceased to exist as a national entity centres on his observation that with several million Zimbabweans in SA, Zimbabwe is now virtually a province of S.A., that the Zimbabwe dollar is no longer a working currency and that internally people are relying on the rand. This is not the view of this author though. Rather the view in the context of the discussion is that issues of land, legitimacy, sovereignty, human rights, call to revisit and redress the 1980s massacres in Southern Zimbabwe and parts of Midlands by the Mugabe regime, patriarchy, bureaucracy and constitutionalism aroused by the crisis are what bring into question the matter of statehood and state formation. These aspects of the crisis, in a way point to an unfinished business of state formation. The crisis has further impacted on this process. It might be too much for this work to assess whether the impact has been progressive or regressive.
economic policies and the lack of decisiveness in dealing with unregulated/illegal forms of accumulation such as gold mining and smuggling.

The second theoretical premise is primitive accumulation. As noted above, this notion is used to try to understand both the broad and narrower concerns of this study. Though others (Davies, 2004) may argue otherwise, the crisis can be seen in the context of primitive accumulation. This accords us explanation for the emerging accumulating class 'in a mirror dimly' during this age of 'crisis', its violent currencies, and the 'warlord politics' characterizing post-2000 accumulation in Zimbabwe.

The 'political economy of conflict' (Reno, 1998) theory also adds light to understanding these 'crisis patterns of accumulation'. It is alluded to in the course of this thesis from time to time for its analogical value to the Zimbabwean situation. However in its stead, the inference, 'political economy of crisis' a variant but equivalent is used. This is more appropriate since Zimbabwe is not in a state of civil war yet and may never be despite strong suggestions by some analysts to the contrary (Bevan and Pienaar, 2007). Moreover, Zimbabwe does not qualify as a weak or failed state, which a strict application of the political economy of conflict theory would entail. Instead we have an official state that has been turned into a vehicle for private accumulation, behaving like Reno's 'shadow state' in a way 16, enforcing and refraining from enforcing legal provisions to regulate accumulation for the benefit of members of the ruling elite, or their connections. Traces of Anderson's 'absolutist state' that emerged during Western Europe's long periods of primitive accumulation (1974, also Mamdani, 1996, 11-12) are noticeable, yet unlike in Western Europe the Zimbabwean process has not always encouraged more productivity.

16 In Zimbabwe a 'Party State' might be the equivalent of Reno's 'shadow state' for now.
Rethinking the Post Colonial State

"...the problem of the nature of the state created after independence is perhaps the secret of the failure of African independence" (Cabral, quoted in Saul, 1979, 4).

The present scenario in Zimbabwe represents an extreme case of "the state being used as an instrument of accumulation and violence wielded by a dominant social class" (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, 5). Moreover this class may be actually on its way to becoming dominant. Manifestly, to understand the state's nature in contemporary Africa is to engage oneself with the dynamics of the dominant state class not only within national localities but the overall global complex of hegemonic production relations and forces (Cox, 1987). The state thus becomes a geo-specific location of production/power relations. This makes it possible to talk of an internationalized state versus a localized state; the former is however beyond our present scope.

The colonial heritage has produced a state that is 'non-emancipated' and undifferentiated from the ruling petty-bourgeoisie class (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, 4-16) thus susceptible to instrumentalisation for accumulation purposes, mostly for narrow, personal, group or class interests. Such accumulation often takes local/state capital (which may be constituted by the ruling elite itself) versus colonially inherited local white capital and international capital lines. Yet in the Zimbabwe case, colonial and post-colonial, as shall be observed later, these fault lines have not been so sequential and easy to trace.

Alavi (1972) and Saul (1979, 179) have postulated that the problem of the post colonial state rests in its inheritance of an overdeveloped 'super structure'; making it
"over-developed in relation to the 'structure' in the (ex-) colony", as its base lay in the metropole rather than the periphery. It is not suggested here that the state's base still derives from the metropole. In fact unlike in most parts of colonial Africa as shall be seen in chapter two, in colonial Zimbabwe if anything the state's roots have always been in the periphery, largely in the local rural white bourgeoisie, settler capitalists and miners. By and large, this status quo persisted up to late 1990s, eventually shifting in the 2000 aftermath to rest more within the party elites through its ability to appropriate surplus. Because the state directly appropriates economic surplus through a 'bureaucracy' it not only becomes central to accumulation but peculiarly so wherein vests the paternalistic propensities of the state. "The post colonial society inherits that over-developed apparatus of state and its institutionalized practices through which the operations of indigenous social classes are regulated and controlled", (Saul, 1979, 169). According to this theorization the state forms the central part in the production process. This centrality is further consolidated by either the absence of an indigenous economically dominant class (Saul, 1979, 5) or the successful subjugation of potentially rival classes. Further, it has been common for the African ruling elite to align with international production forces. Often in such cases this bureaucracy becomes very strong relative to other local social forces.

17 The 'peculiarity', lies in the fact that whereas in contemporary Western Europe the relation between the state and capital is one where capital uses the state whether directly or indirectly but without necessarily occupying political office, the African case makes it unclear whether it is the state that uses the capital or it is capital that uses the state, as normally the same individuals double as state bureaucrats, politicians and capitalists. This is further complicated by the uninstitutionalised nature of the state structure and as a result these three roles end up functionally intermingling. This however is not historically peculiar as present accumulation trends and state centrality in appropriation of surplus in Africa seem to mirror the processes of primitive accumulation and its complexities of absolutism, patronage and overlap of state and bourgeoisie functions in 15th - 18th century Western Europe, (Anderson, 1974).
In the first decade of post-colonial Zimbabwe the ruling elites engaged in a macroeconomic policy compromise that sought to balance distributive welfarism on one hand versus protection of capital interests on whose material base they relied on the other (J. Moore, 2003, 108) in what Yash Tandon (cited in Mandaza, 1986, 14) would characterize as a 'schizophrenic state'. According to Saul state bureaucracy in post colonial states should be understood alternatively as either "a class in the making or a class of a new type" (Saul, 1979, 5). In our present discussion this bureaucracy is defined broadly to include all state and ruling party functionaries from civil servants to party and government officials. This intersects with Miliband's 'power elite' though the latter is broad, overlapping with the ruling elite to encompass leaders of industry, commerce, public and private sectors (1987, 325-246). Despite Saul's initial, but partial, faith in the *bona fide* nature of this bureaucracy, in Tanzania to be more specific, what this theory implies is that the ruling class, through a colonially bequeathed politico-economic structure, is enabled to manipulate its position in the distribution of political and economic surplus towards its ends, often along lines of patronage. The overdeveloped nature of the state accounts for the elite's monopoly over state resources, distribution and how identity aspects of that distribution such as tribe, party affiliation among others get along.

On his part Colin Leys prefers to call the independent African state underdeveloped rather than overdeveloped (1976, 43). This is probably due to the fact that Saul and Alavi seem to premise their analysis more on the coercive aspects while Leys notes the weak administrative capacity. With respect to the overdeveloped state notion's assumption of a colonially inherited 'larger than' bureaucracy Leys opines that

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18 It is important to acknowledge that Saul's recent works have shown a departure from this faith.
the implausibility of the notion derives from the fact that the colonial state actually disposed of some of its military force and ceased to rely on the metropole once it had overcome initial resistance. The tendency to expand the civil service and armed forces has been more common in the post colonial state than its predecessor (1976, 41-2). In Tanzania for instance the state’s “middle and upper rungs” expanded “from 4,452 posts at the end of 1961 to 12,000 in 1971 to 16,183 at the end of 1974 and well over 20,000 in 1980” (Freund quoted in Moore, 2006, 12). Nevertheless, the divergence between Saul et. al. and Leys seems to revolve around the origin of the ‘overdeveloped state’ rather than the idea itself. To be sure, there is need to rethink Saul’s postulation on the colonial traceability of overdeveloped state complex. But that is as far as we can go. To say bureaucracy becomes more expansive and ramified in the post colonial era than the colonial, is to in fact suggest an even more overdeveloped post colonial state. Moreover, it is a fact that civil society has been weak in the African states, allowing for an unchallenged state. To this extent one is persuaded to stick to the overdeveloped state concept.

On a different premise, Chabal et al (1999, 9) suggests that, “the state (could be) strong and powerless, overdeveloped in size and underdeveloped in functional terms”. The latter might apply to cases where the bureaucracy lacks capacity to perform some of its functions. For instance in South Africa, some government departments are under spending because they lack the human skills to implement envisaged programs. However the post-2000 Zimbabwean case posits a state that is overdeveloped both in size and function. To be sure, prior to the 2000 fallout with white landed capital and its eventual elimination one could say that the post colonial state was not so overdeveloped vis a vis
white capital, as this class managed to have the state protect its interests. This takes into account Leys’ contention that in order to understand the post colonial state class struggle we need to start our analysis at the level of class rather than the state. He argues that by looking at the state as a point of departure, “the idea of an ‘overdeveloped state’ is an apparent reversal of the proper order of procedure” (Leys, 1976, 43). However, it seems by attempting to understand the state we are engaging ourselves in an analysis of class struggles. In the Zimbabwean case it appears more fruitful to look at the state, where the emergent ruling elite/accumulating class distinction is becoming so blurred that it can hardly be understood in reverse i.e. by starting from the concept of class.

Interestingly, Leys asserts that the centrality of the state is no more important in post colonial Africa than it is in the west. This is important in testing the overdeveloped state’s claim of exclusivity to post colonial states. He argues that the state is central in all class societies (1976, 43), save that;

> It may be more ‘embracing’ (i.e. may own more reproductive forces or intervene more directly in various areas of social life) in some societies than others but in this respect it is typically less ‘central’ (extensive would be a better word here) in most post-colonial societies than in most advanced capitalist societies.

In Zimbabwe in particular, the shortages punctuating its crisis demonstrate the centrality of the state, as if to verify the ‘overdeveloped’ thesis. The state’s centrality in managing accumulation has been further entrenched. For instance, the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM), the regulator and/or sole procurer of fuel has become more strategic than before, thus an arena for fierce rivalry between members of the ruling elite, most doubling as business moguls. Ministries of energy and transport have become

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19 Government policy has been characterised by sporadic shifts. This has been so especially more recently as the shortage that has forced the government to liberalize fuel procurement. As is the case with the Grain Marketing Board, fuel sales from NOCZIM have been very cheap, often those well connected buy fuel from NOCZIM and resell it at inflated prices on the illegal – but actually encouraged – parallel market.
more contested in light of the politics of strategic positioning. Procurement of combine harvesters by the Ministry of Agriculture with assistance from the Reserve Bank also saw members of the ruling elite jostling to get them - using their positions within the state to further and secure their business interests (The Standard 9 May 2007).

The shortage of foreign currency has also seen the elevation of the role and power of the reserve bank governor as he literally ‘dishes out’ foreign currency to ‘strategic sectors and businesses’, most of which are linked to members of the ruling elite. Not surprisingly, veiled pleas for discipline directed at the members of ruling elite have become common in Gono’s monetary statements;

In order to instill discipline and sanity to prevail in the oil industry, as Monetary Authorities, we recommend that punitive measures, including possible suspension, be taken on those oil importers who have been found to have abused the Government’s concessional fuel facility. Specifically, those who accessed foreign exchange at official bank rates and went on to charge parallel market related prices must be brought to book (Gono, 2007).

Similar sentiments have also been echoed in finance minister Samuel Mumbengegwi’s fiscal policy pronouncements; one asserting, for example, that “a small proportion of the population is now accumulating wealth overnight, in part benefiting from the price distortions arising from some of the policies and facilities meant to protect the very poor” (2007 Budget presentation). These calls have largely gone unheeded or are at best used to settle political scores, most of which originate in rivalries over accumulation.

Clearly the state, directly or through contacts with state managers, has become integral for those who are intent on accumulating wealth. Even those individuals

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20 Examples of this include the arrest of Chiyanga (Mugabe’s nephew and former MP) after accusations of spying for South Africa, Kuruneri (former MP) for externalizing foreign currency, Charles Nherera (Vice-Chancellor of Chinhoyi University and former Zimbabwe United Passenger Company ZUPCO board) for corruption at ZUPCO. This also implicated Vice President Joyce Mujuru, Local Government Minister Ignatius Chombo and Deputy Information Minister Bright Matonga who were never arrested (Financial Gazette online edition 13-01-2005, 29-04-2004, 22-09-2005) and even Gideon Gono, (NewZimbabwe.com, 18-02-2008). Former liberation war commander Mujuru’s recent house arrest, though linked to ZANU-PF succession politics has also been accompanied with threats of fraud charges against his vast business empire (The Zimbabwean 13-02-2008 accessed at www.thezimbabwean.co.uk).
or power elites who appear to be 'outside' the state, can not survive or prosper without manipulating state's relationship with these unregulated accumulation forms. The state is salient in these 'rags to riches' cases. For instance, in the bread and fuel shortages some individuals, though not directly linked to the state, rely on bribing the police to either access or sell these products at inflated prices, thus making supernormal profits. Some have 'taken off' through this to operate viable and relatively capitalized medium scale businesses.

Of significance in all these conceptualizations and critical in this study is the role of 'governing intellectuals', to be conceived of in the Gramscian mode (Simon, 1982). The thesis asks whether this group in charge of the state can be called a class and to what extent can its actions be construed as confined to class interest. It is these intellectuals who control the ex-colonial state machinery because of their centrality during the struggles against colonial rule. As alluded supra and of material consequence to the nature of the post colonial state is the impact of hegemonic global forces. The behaviors of Zimbabwe's ruling elite are in a significant way a product of their interaction with these forces.

**Contradictions within Zimbabwe's ruling elite**

To understand the post colonial state is to understand those who are in charge of it. As mentioned above, the state is not class neutral but a mere modality of class domination. This "forces one to see the state as a contradictory site of both accumulation (not necessarily productive) and hegemonic construction" (Moore, 2004, 407). The intellectuals assume a very important and central position especially in the context of the
overdeveloped nature of the African state. The evolution of this class, also referred to as the petty bourgeoisie or ‘intellectual elite engaged in trade’ (Fanon quoted in Saul, 1979, 353), maybe more appropriately a ‘power elite’ (Miliband, 1987) owes its position in the state to modern learning, concerns and associated skills (Shils, 1971, 251) rendering it a custodian of political consciousness and central in political transformation. In the contemporary Zimbabwean ruling elite the political discourse of the ‘liberation war credentials’ criterion is used to lay claim on resources and power (Kriger, 2006). As Shils notes, “for the intellectuals to inherit their true estate, they must live in a political society (1971, 276)”. This estate overlaps political office, to include the material appendages that come with it. This explains the tendency by some “intellectuals who have reaped the fruits of the struggle” to become dissociated from active politics in pursuit of business (emphasis added) (Shils, 1971, 272).

In the case of these fruits diminishing the politically inactive intellectuals, some who were concentrating on business may re-enter active politics. Raitopoulos and Phimister indeed note a trend towards the late 1990s of increased intertwining of the ruling party and indigenization pressure groups. ‘Membership of (these) organizations became an important launching pad for aspiring ruling party politicians’, (2004, 361), (in actual fact aspiring towards bourgeois status). This thesis observes this as pursuing economics by political means. It is evident in this study that the ‘constricting cake of the liberation struggle’ (or threat to it) has resurrected political interest within the formerly politically ‘resigned’ elites. It may be that the agitation of former combatants in the late-1990s and the clamour for land reform and economic inclusion found impetus in the economic decline and scarcity associated with the period. Consequently, as elsewhere in

\(^{21}\) The fruits may diminish or simply be threatened in crisis moments.
post-colonial Africa, joining or alignment with incumbent ZANU-PF has become a pre-requisite for those seeking to lay/reassert claim on the 'benefits of the struggle'. The strategy has been to use, "struggle credentials to legitimate themselves and de-legitimate others in competition for power and resources" (Kriger, 2006, 1151). Politics of recognition thus occupy the core of accumulation and (re)distribution modalities in the post colonial state.

Despite the pervasiveness of these features in many post colonial states, the variations need to be accounted for. While the general theory of state and intellectual hegemony is useful in understanding the managerial class in the post colonial state, there are many peculiar cases that cannot be adequately explained by theoretical generalisations. The conjunctural aspects and dynamics of state’s role in primitive accumulation within the context of Zimbabwe’s economic and political crisis render credence to this view. It is at this juncture that Moore’s conceptualization of the contradictions now inherently cogged within Zimbabwe’s managerial class becomes useful. He argues that an understanding of the contradictions that characterize the ideological evolvement of ZANU’s ruling consciousness provides for the ironies and ambivalence that characterize ZANU-PF’s ideological/policy expression. Two phases are notable with regards to this evolvement, namely the “populist versus elitist” tone during 1950 and 60s and the “Marxist versus Capitalist” of the 1970s (1989, 482 & 483). The ZANU in the 1960s is characterised by Arrighi as a “faction of educated, middle class, rather elitist elements” (Ranger, 1980, 72). Prior to independence, “In exile, the parties came to manifest many of the negative features characteristic of petty-bourgeoisie politics in independent, neo-colonial Africa …” (73).
The 1976 crisis within the liberation movement and the subsequent quashing and purging of the young and radical Marxist ZIPA (Zimbabwe People's Army) cadres who were seen by the 'old guard' to have attempted a 'coup' gestated Marxist vs. Capitalism contradictions which seem now to have taken an anti-imperialist/pan-Africanist/redistribution populism vs. neo-liberal/technocrat/realists turn in the post-2000 ZANU-PF policies. The outcome of the 1976 crisis was a victory for the bourgeois, (in actual fact an 'authoritarian populist') faction within ZANU-PF, a victory from which, in John Saul's terms, ZANU-PF has never recovered (2007, 2). The irony emerging out of this historical moment is that the triumphant 'old guard' besides its naturally acquisitive inclinations went on to take a visibly socialist path (Moore, 1989). This probably reinforced the "vicious circle created by the petty bourgeoisie pattern in Zimbabwe's liberation camp", (Saul, 1979, 121) even prior to 1976. It is this 'old guard' consisting of Mugabe and his associates (Ranger, 1980, 72) which emerged dominant in the new ex-colonial government. As Mandaza observes, "It is the petty bourgeoisie which is the inheritor of state power ... thus the internal contradictions break out again", (1986, 1). The 1976 triumph of the 'old guard' was an ideological coup whose ghost rose to haunt Zimbabwe, particularly at the post-2000 crisis conjuncture and foreground(s) the use of a political language in a pattern of appropriation and re-appropriation by those within the ruling party who seek to legitimate their quest for power and resources. Arguably this political language characterises a strand in the politics of African nationalism in Zimbabwe since the 1960s (Kriger, 2006, 1151).

22 It is noted here that though most former ZIPA leaders have formed the Zimbabwe Liberators Platform (ZLP), an oppositional body to the state aligned veterans organisation, the Zimbabwe National War Veterans Association (ZNWVA) and are effectively out of ZANU-PF this sort of binary has persisted. In this thesis this binary has taken the form of "strategic" vacillations by the state to balance the often contradictory interests of Capital on one hand, labour and redistributionist groups on the other. It shows the rhetoric that is characteristic of Zimbabwe's ruling party. This is further explained below.
It is then no wonder the contradictions within Zimbabwe’s ruling elite have baffled analysts of all ideological hues. The emergence and bolstering of a broad and strong opposition movement in the aftermath of 2000 has spurred the resurgence of what is otherwise ‘vulgar nationalism’ in the name of redistributionism. This has been by and large populist, unsustainable and inconsistently pursued and often interjected by ‘technocratic realism’ characterised by an appreciation of more orthodox economics. Not least in this dilemma has been the left with regards to analyses and solidarities;

While the politics of land redistribution has been characterised by some as a key marker of anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal politics, others have been equally concerned about the authoritarian politics that has been the modality for the land interventions of the Mugabe regime (Raftopoulos, 2006, 201).

The analytical dilemma stems not only from redistribution/anti-neoliberal versus authoritarian politics dichotomies but more so the nascent ‘socialist’/populist rhetoric and ideological ambiguities within the policy frame which seems to reinforce “a breakdown of the norms of liberal governance through the machinations of an authoritarian political figure” (201) as a cause of the crisis. The fiscal and monetary policies have often colluded with the popular acclamations of allegiance to the ‘social agenda’. These policies’ clearly declared intention (though with varying tones) since 1980 has been and still is the protection of capitalist interests. The policies of the first decade, for instance, though far from being an outright capitalist endeavor were not socialist either. ZANU-PF seems to always talk left and walk right. More often than not, at the level of fiscal and monetary policy ZANU-PF is ‘very right’ but in certain forums sounds very left23. To be sure, ZANU-PF has shifted positions depending on the audience rather than the ‘blue prints’. This has been useful in camouflaging looting. The rhetoric of sovereignty.

23 To see this one needs to compare RBZ policy and financial statements on one hand and ministers and presidential speeches on the other – see for example 27 2007 April Monetary Policy Interim Review, Financial Statement and Mugabe’s 2007 birthday speech.
redistribution and welfarism has been used as a political driver to galvanize the masses to support and entrench a private hegemonic agenda, as well as to woo public hysteria against perceived enemies ostensibly working in the interests of global hegemonic forces. This masks narrowly focused party/individual driven processes of accumulation.

Bond and Manyama have summed up these contradictions.

We have heard left rhetoric from Mugabe most vociferously when forceful popular challenges arise: the early 1960s resurgence of anti-colonial protest, the mid/late-1970s Left turn within the ranks of exiles and during the brief ZIPA experiment, the 1980 upsurge of worker confidence in the wake of liberation, the mid 1980s dissidents from Matabeleland, the late 1980s student demonstrations against incipient neoliberalism, the 1996-1997 rural and war vet rebellions and the resurgence of protests by workers and genuine democrats since then. Acting right has been observed while Mugabe was in league with motley white tycoons (Rowland, Oppenheimer, O’Reilly, Cluff, Bredenkamp, during the 1980s-1990s), white United States (US) government military advisors (early 1990s), and white economists from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (beginning in 1981 but especially from 1990, until the falling out in 1998) ...


A Crisis of Primitive Accumulation?

That Zimbabwe is in a serious economic and political crisis has become a cliché. As noted in the introduction, the incremental negative effects of the failed Bretton woods economic reforms (ESAP), the financially burdensome Congo military involvement, the financial gratuities given to the country’s liberation ex-combatants and the subsequent November 1997 currency crash form the main sign posts in the build up to the post-2000 political and economic crisis. The state’s reactionary authoritarian populist policies marked by the encouragement of land invasions from 2000 to the current forced price cuts (from July 2007) and successive disputed elections have exacerbated the crisis. Since then the economy has been constricting continually. Corruption soars amidst a thriving illegal market that sees almost everything from fuel to cell phone airtime voucher cards
being sold at inflated black market prices. At the level of economic policy the government seems clogged, literally hopping from one policy to another in as many years after 1997. On the political front there has been increased political unrest against an ever diminishing democratic space, and the country is facing international isolation.

This thesis focuses on the increase in extra-legal informal economic activities, ranging from the informal currency trade, the selling of scarce commodities like fuel at black market, the smuggling of minerals, to the manipulation of state resource distribution and the salient role of the state in managing these activities, to the resultant use of disorder and coercion. The state's dealing with illegal gold trade, as with farm invasions, has abetted rather than arrested this phenomenon. This work will not detain itself with an exhaustive study to establish the causes of the present crisis. There is a wealth of literature on that (Gibbon, 1995; Kanyenze, 2004; Moore J, 2003; Bond and Manyama, 2002; Moore D, 2007; Carmody, 1998). To be sure, however, some of its origins can be explained and accounted for by analyzing the role of the state in the dynamics and the emergent forms of primitive accumulation attending the Zimbabwean crisis. This forms part of this thesis's tasks. The imperative of discerning the emergence of the crisis in the first place is inescapable. However, as of 2007 the crisis has become circular and self reinforcing.

At a superficial level, as well as from that of the Washington Consensus and many in the journalistic profession, the Zimbabwe crisis is a product of bad economic and political governance (Moore J, 2003, 1-2) period! Such a claim finds impression in the

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24 When I went to Zimbabwe in March 2007 Telecel (Zimbabwe's third cell phone operator after Econet and NetOne) cell phone recharge cards were in short supply and were being sold in the streets at inflated prices. A voucher worth ZW$3000 worth of airtime was being sold at between $4000 and $5000, $1500 for $3000.
visible lack of democracy, rampant corruption and blatant disregard of rule of law that characterize Mugabe's rule. The crisis has in this way been attributed to Mugabe's 'big brother gone bovine mentality'. The problem with this view is that it reduces the Zimbabwe crisis, its concomitant violent currents, and ZANU-PF's 'mafiaism' to some irrational, uncivilized and barbaric behaviors. It is tantamount to perpetuating the neoliberal dogma that posits all conflicts located in the 'fringes' of global capital as primitive (in a very negative sense) and based on "essentialist ideas of ethnicity, tribalism, identity, and primordial animosity", (Cramer, 2006, 7) "internal, illegitimate, identity based" selfishly destructive, regressive and characterised by abuse of civilians (Duffield, 2002, 1052). Descriptively, this may be true – but analytically speaking, this cannot be a very fruitful approach.

Instead, the crisis and use of violence can be adequately understood from the vantage point of primitive accumulation and its historical context - not only of capitalist development but of contradictions within the ruling elite traceable to the liberation movement’s formative period, the challenges and the nature of the post colonial state and those running it. This work thus posits the crisis as a condensation point and a moment of truth. To borrow Cramer’s exhortation, “civil war is not a stupid thing”. One can not just kill or hate without a reason (2006, 283, 286); the violence that forms the core of ZANU-PF strategy must likewise not be viewed as a stupid thing. To try and understand it otherwise would be to mystify and miss the point. Without of course falling into Chabal

25 Whereas the Zimbabwe situation may not be regarded as a war case in the magnitude of recent crises in Angola which Cramer discusses more or in DRC and Sierra Leone among others, Cramer does not restrict his analysis exclusively to such highly armed conflicts but uses this in reference to general conflicts associated with primitive accumulation as transformative conflict.
and Daloz's 'Africans are naturally inclined to be Neo-Patrimonial' stereotyping trap, we should speak of the "exploitation of disorder" or a "disorder … which is in fact a different 'order', the outcome of different rationalities and causalities" (1999, 155). Violence and disorder has not only been a vehicle for the reproduction of hegemony/domination but more importantly a tool for a particular form of accumulation.

The other view – John Moore (2003), Kanyenze (2004), Carmody (1998) for example – locates the current crisis in the failed economic structural adjustment program. This view carries weight for two reasons. Firstly, there is a clear link between the failure of ESAP and civil unrest. This economic discord led to calls for civil liberties on one hand and on the other gave birth to both a political and a socio-economic rights discourse, as well as a series of articulations based on indigenous rights for an emerging bourgeoisie and issues around the land redistribution/restitution impasse. The former couplet was championed largely by the constitutional change movement in the form of National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZTCU) while the latter was articulated through indigenization pressure groups such as the Indigenous Business Development Centre (IBDC) and Affirmative Action Group (AAG) (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004, 360) and Zimbabwe National War Veterans Association (ZNWVA). Secondly, the worsening disrespect for human rights and rule of law can be seen as Mugabe's response to civil unrest and threat to his rule. This explains not only the unrest and economic decline but also the repressive political responses.

While reference is made to Chabal and Daloz this is not without reservations, for they seem to suggest that Africans have different 'rationalities'. This feeds in too easily into a 'Africans have a different mentality than "Europeans" or "Europeans" are "Weberian". Africans are "neo-patrimonial"'. Duffield regards this as the 'them' versus 'us' dichotomies, 'their wars ... are internal, illegitimate, identity based' selfishly destructive, regressive and characterised by abuse of civilians, thus implicitly comparing to 'our wars', are between states, 'legitimate' 'show restraint' and civilized frame (2002, 1052). Preference as manifest in this thesis' line of argument is to look at it from a common rationality of accumulation – in different historical contexts.
Moreover it can be argued with ease that Mugabe’s rule in post colonial Zimbabwe was never tolerant of dissent (despite the silence of the west then) as testified by the 1980s Matebeleland massacres\textsuperscript{27} and the violence that has characterised all national elections since 1980 among other things (Kriger, 2005). The rise of the strong MDC opposition in 1999 simply served to expose ZANU-PF’s intolerance and predatory instincts, adding to the political dimension of the crisis. It provoked the rise of reactionary authoritarian populism in ZANU-PF.

The post-2000 Zimbabwe crisis case scenario bears many semblances to a war economy; an unregulated or at best slackly governed process of accumulation by the elite and its cronies. This slack regulation can be attributed to the informalisation of production accompanying the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) and its aftermath (Mawowa, 2006, 2)\textsuperscript{28}. The violent nature that accompanied land reclamations, further extending to (though barely mentioned) militant interventions in manufacturing

\textsuperscript{27} Military clashes between two former liberation movements in Zimbabwe ZANU-PF and PF ZAPU that saw Mugabe’s Fifth Brigade killing up to an estimated 20 000 mainly civilians in a bid to thwart opposition in Middle and Southern parts of Zimbabwe, (Zimonline 16 May 2007) or CCJP Report (1999) – Breaking the Silence.

\textsuperscript{28} In this honours thesis the author observed that the ESAP policy of liberalization and the attendant retrenchments led to unprecedented rates of unemployment, and had a direct bearing on the emergence of a wide thriving informal sector as most redundant formally employed people found solace in informal activities. Liberalisation also provided for the inclusion of new players into the informal economic activities i.e. women. Whilst informal economy suggests ‘deregulation’, deregulation in the strict sense could be misleading. It has been common in most developing countries for governments to try and monitor it in a way or deliberately spear head it to broaden the accumulation base. This inevitably entails a level of regulation, though minimal. For instance legislation that deals with informal sector, municipal by-laws inter alia and legal restrictions on currency trade and other national laws have to be abided with. In Zimbabwe despite having a government ministry concerned with it, the informal sector has not been, at least minimally, regulated thus has virtually formed a parallel economy. Attempts at enforcing regulatory laws, (which are sometimes conflicting) have been half hazard and inconsistent (Mawowa, 2006, 41-42), an example being the Operation Restore Order (demolition of houses and informal structures in June 2005). Its unregulated nature has seen it being susceptible to extra-legal practices. Government official have also been implicated in most of these activities which range from gold trade, forex deal, fuel sales, trade in scarce commodities among others.
industries and other businesses, added impetus to a violent form of accumulation that has at its worst seen gangsterish clashes between top members of the ruling party as they vie for mineral and land resources. This is not uncommon even hitherto, so much that it would not be far fetched for one to try and locate the current succession debate within the ruling party along the fault-lines of resource aggrandizement and accumulation rivalry.

What one sees in ZANU-PF as political camps could be no more than economic rivalry camps. It is in this light that Sandra Maclean (2002) has situated her analysis of the Zimbabwe crisis within Reno's political economy of conflict model (Reno, 1998). Reno invokes the notion of 'Shadow State' consisting of internal and external networks in and around the state bureaucracy. The shadow state thrives in a weak state which allows for a patronage system centered on the ruler's control of resources. In such state liberalisation often provides new entrepreneurial opportunities to individual elites and strongmen whose interests are to counter the ruler thus giving rise to warlord politics. Consequently the survival of the warlords revolves around continued control of resources resulting in fierce contest for strategic resource. In Zimbabwe the obtaining unregulated nature of accumulation accompanied by violence, has seen members of the ruling elite using 'war lord style' coercion to acquire agriculture land, access, acquire and safeguard illegal mining sites and indeed businesses, not only against large-scale commercial farmers, but often in competition with one another.

The Zimbabwe crisis can thus be broadly summed up as conditioned by and epitomizing the challenges associated with "primitive accumulation, nation state formation and democratization in the contemporary age of neo-liberal globalization in...

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For example in the post-2000 period it was not uncommon for ruling party MPs, who were also business moguls, especially Philip Chiyangwa and Saviour Kasukuwere, to storm manufacturers and force them to reduce prices, or threaten to buy them into personal businesses (The Herald, 3 June, 2001).
developing societies" (Moore, 2007). The Zimbabwean case exhibits some features of the 16th and 17th century European 'Absolutist State' (Anderson, 1974), which came as a result of the demise of feudalism and lay the stage for the processes of primitive accumulation. Historically

...the methods of primitive accumulation are anything but idyllic, (as) ... fearful and painful expropriation of the mass of the people forms the prelude to ... capitalism. ... great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of subsistence, and hurled as free and 'unattached' proletariats on the labour market” (Marx, 1972, 432, 437, 433, also see Perelman, 2000, 29-32).

It is this mass that finds itself alienated from the land that provides wage labour for the emerging capitalist class.

By its very nature “state force and non market modalities” are characteristic of primitive accumulation though specific situational variations give variations to the “twists in its [primitive accumulation] tail” (Moore, 2007). In certain instances especially in the weak third world, disorder or a form of it augments or alternates with violence as an instrument for primitive accumulation and is necessary to secure and reproduce a form of political domination that best suits it. In these countries, without external injection of capital which may expedite it, the process has tended to take its normally slow pace30, even becoming stalemated. In a worse scenario the process can turn to be one of 'permanent primitive accumulation'. Violence can become a permanent feature, bound to worsen, more so in the absence of strong democratic institutions31 that may have

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30 The accumulation process takes a protracted route, slow and often riddled with contradictions and counter currencies which might amount to a reversal of the process. In Europe the development of capitalism took centuries, (Anderson, 1974, Perelman, 2000). For Marx too, primitive accumulation was by no means an immediate transformation but should be understood in relation to long histories of feudalism and slavery (Max, 1972, 431-438). This explains why I have decided to position this analysis in the context of primitive accumulation despite some developments within the current crisis which may suggest reversal or stagnancy of the process.
31 This is not to presuppose that erection of democratic institution will inevitably lead to a regulated and ordered process of accumulation. Indeed as IMF and World Economic Structural Adjustment policies’ insistence on widening of democratic spaces have shown, democratic institutionalization has increased the chances of unrest and led to a worse scenario of accumulation (Bienenfeld, 1995). It is however important to
otherwise served to mitigate it. In the Zimbabwean case the unique contradictions within the ruling elite juxtaposed to the current crisis further add more ‘twists’ to the ‘tail’ of primitive accumulation. Not least has been the transformation of property rights that has (at least hitherto) defied the teleological trajectory of capital accumulation (De Soto, 2000).

Further to the peculiar twists to the crisis of primitive accumulation in Zimbabwe is what may be considered the ‘disarticulated’ nature of its emergent forms of accumulation. At the extreme, the post-2000 attempted ‘economic transformation’ can be seen as primitive accumulation in reverse; for primitive accumulation supposes the teething of capitalism. As Rob Davies remarks, “Rather than capital being accumulated, it has been destroyed”, the economic costs have outweighed the gains (2004, 22). The outcome of Zimbabwe’s land appropriation and its concomitant changes in social relations of production, prima facie that is, has been the replacement of or shift from capital accumulation toward more primitive modes of accrual. Most farms that were centers of commercial production have been reduced to fallow lands or areas of subsistence agriculture at best, (with agricultural equipment such as irrigation pipes, and water pumps being taken away and sold, livestock and crops plundered); making a clear case of ‘primitive accumulation in reverse’. Tobacco production is said to have decreased by more than 80% of pre-2000 production, estimated maize yield for 2007 is 600 000 tones, a far cry from the expected 1.8 million tones (Association of Zimbabwe Journalists, May 2007).

have institutions that make it possible to discipline rent seeking behaviors by the state bureaucracy and curtail arbitrary distribution of national surplus. Absence of these has worsened the situation in Zimbabwe. There is need in this respect for a consideration of a philosophy of human rights that equally encompass economic rights of (re)distribution as well as civil liberties (Sen, 2004, 69-88).
Primitive accumulation however, should be understood as a long process and that while many may see the crisis as a setback or counter to the process of primitive accumulation it does not exclude the eventual development of the process. Moreover the period of study is too short to make such a conclusion. The teetering back and forth may be suggestive of the character of the process, the contradictions and struggles that typify it, more so in this case shaped by the nature of Zimbabwe state and its interaction with the transnational hegemonic forces. Whilst one may not exclude the possibility of a stagnated process, primitive accumulation is by no means linear, but constituted by transitional and transformational vicissitudes, continuities and reverses.

By completely wiping away the then pre-existing white capitalist mode the state created a “terrible interregnum between the dying of the old and the birth of the new” (D. Moore, 1990, 41). Such an approach negates the historical tendency of primitive accumulation where nascent capitalism articulates (joining to; giving expression to; linkage to) (Foster-Carter, 1978, 54) to pre-existing modes of production. This ‘disarticulated’ attempt at economic transformation created irreconcilable disharmony resulting in catastrophic economic ramifications. A dominant critique against the nature of land reform process reflects this, as one former Daily News staff remarked (2005), “While land reform was necessary, Zimbabwe did not need to go hungry at the end of the day.”33 Nascent modes of production cannot be erected mechanically, nor without leaning on and/or articulating with pre-existing modes. “Indeed, so far from banishing pre

32 The Daily News was an independent newspaper in Zimbabwe highly critical of the government. It was banned in 2003.
33 The remark was made by a former daily news editor in an interview with this author on behalf of Erin Maccandless in 2005. The name is withheld for the reason that doing so would probably require the interviewee’s prior consent since the interview was conducted for Erin’s research and not for this particular work.
capitalist forms, it (Capitalism) not only coexists with them but buttresses them, and even on occasions devilishly conjures them up *ex nihilo*" (Foster-Carter, 1978, 51). Though banishing a capitalist form dominated by a white minority (and not pre-capitalist forms in this context) the disastrous outcome of 'localization of production' in Zimbabwe can be attributed to this 'disarticulated' attempt to remodel production relations. This cracked the economy as it robbed the transformation process of the structural and infrastructural foundation on which to stand on. Moreover the new form of accumulation has tended to be consumerist which scarcely leads to industrialization. In quite many instances this has been unlike Marx's, 'Accumulate! Accumulate!' instead, it has been 'accumulate and squander and accumulate and squander and ….' without any reproduction of surplus.

Having established our conceptual premise, it is necessary, before entangling the nascent forms of accumulation, the crisis and its beneficiaries, to map out the historical trajectory of Zimbabwe's political economy. The following chapter will trace the processes of accumulation (both formal and informal) in the period of the colonial state through to the first two decades of independence.
Chapter 2:
State and Accumulation in Zimbabwe – A historical overview

Introduction
Zimbabwe's economic development up to the present crisis points to unresolved questions of primitive accumulation. Modern day capitalist development and accumulation began at the close of the 19th century, as the Pioneer Column landed into the area covering modern day Zimbabwe. More than a hundred years on, as in most parts of Africa, the path to a fully fledged and self sustaining market remains elusive. This is because since its inception, capitalist development has been riddled with contradictions, regressive turns and has at least up to now, not banished pre-capitalist modes to the extent that the process has in the developed north. The failure of primitive accumulation to deliver on its 'historical tasks' and conceive an unambiguous 'market civilization' (term used by Moore, 2007, 199) in the 'global margins' (developing world) has protracted the vagaries associated with the process. 'Blood continues to drip from its pores' to this very day.

This chapter provides a synoptic overview of the etiology of Zimbabwe’s present crisis and thus outlines the broad context for the study. It is argued here that Zimbabwe's capitalist development has been regularly interrupted by moments of political-economic

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Prior contacts with external capitalist system (Portuguese merchant capitalist for instance) had of course existed through trade with pre-colonial societies and states such as Great Zimbabwe, Torwa and Mutapa State. Nevertheless the advent of European settlers forms a landmark juncture in Zimbabwe's history of capitalist development. It ushered in a largely state driven process of capital accumulation marked by a process of dispossession and land alienation to produce labour surplus on one hand and facilitate the growth of a white settler accumulating class on the other.

For instance traditional ownership forms and power structures have continued to exist parallel to the capitalist modes, in both the pre-colonial and post colonial state. Not only do they exist parallel to the Capitalist Mode of Production but also are linked to it, with the provision of cheap labour (by for instance allowing subsistence to subsidize wages), a space for the reproduction of labour power, among other things. See Foster-Carter (1974) on 'articulation of modes of production'
crisis. Notwithstanding drought years, five such crises where political economic contradictions became insurmountable are referred to in this chapter namely:

- the crisis of the 1890s and early 1900s triggered by the speculative bubble;
- the slump in the late 1920s/early 1930s connected to the world's great depression;
- the political/economic dynamics of the 1950s and early 1960s that resulted in the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and the subsequent sanctions;
- the problems of slow growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Bond and Manyama, 2002, 1) culminating in the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) and; the present crisis stretching from the mid 1990s.

It is important to point out that - and significantly so - for this study and unlike the previous moments, the present crisis has been markedly sustained and has produced different accumulation types/trends. A consideration of these historical moments provides for a comparison of the political, social and economic outcomes of these epochs with the present.

*The State and Capital Accumulation in the Colonial State*

Ironically and as if to foreshadow Zimbabwe's history of successive capitalist crises the first footing of capitalist development started by way of a crisis. Having missed out on the scramble ensuing from the 1896 discovery of the main reef of Gold on the Witwatersrand, Rhodes' company moved north of the Limpopo River in search of a 'second rand'. This was largely based on extravagant speculative claims, resembling the
myths and legendary ‘Rumours of Ophir’, said to lie between Limpopo and Zambezi.\footnote{The area covering modern day Zimbabwe has been a subject of a number of legendary claims of gold treasures, some of them hidden more than a century prior to colonization. Such exaggerations likely came from pre-colonial Portuguese traders who had traded with successive Shona dynasties of the old Mutapa state and modern day Zimbabwe (Ellert, 1993). Also see Paul Freeman’s novel, Rumours of Ophir (1998).}

Having duped Lobengula (King of the Ndebele State which was located in the southern part of Zimbabwe), Rhodes claimed to have been granted ‘all metals and minerals situated and contained in my [Lobengula’s] Kingdom together with full power to do all things that they may deem necessary to win and procure the same’\footnote{This, as it later turned out, was a facade. Lobengula later denied to have agreed to these terms and even made an effort to raise the issue with the Queen of England. His protests never succeeded. See Phimister (1988, 6).} (Phimister, 1988, 5).

However the amount of gold deposits found proved too small for serious profit generating mining, resulting in serious losses on the part of the BSAC. Besides this disappointment the company had to contend with resistance by local people to land alienation, further compounding the losses. After defeating the Ndebele and Shona people the colony experienced a momentary speculation driven boom in investments and commerce flourished.

In order to recapitalize the company which was responsible for administering (governing) the colony had to go on a propaganda overdrive to woo investments and attract more white settlers. For example the company’s 1895 report claimed Rhodesia had ‘hundreds of miles of mineralized veins’ (Phimister, 1988, 11). This resulted in a speculation triggered crisis that was to affect the settler colony’s development from the late 1890s to early 1930s. A boost in the white settler population however followed. ‘By August 1894, Bulawayo ... already boosted over 100 general stores, 3 banks, 12 hotels, 3 newspapers, 26 share brokers and 9 solicitors’ (Phimister, 1988,10). A solid foundation for the emergence of a strong white indigenous accumulating class, a feature uncommon
in most colonial Africa, had thus been set. It was this class that would dominate the colony's political-economy until its demise in 1980 (Arrighi, 1966, 36). In fact this class outlived the colony and only saw its demise in 2000.

After the 1893 and 1896 wars of resistance, the company moved to end the speculative holding of land. Measures were put in place to discourage speculative holding of land thus compelling capitalist mining industry to begin. In September 1899 gold production increased from less than 7000 oz to 65 000 oz and to 200 000 in 1902 (Phimister, 1988, 22). This initial growth in mining industry led to the development of peasant agriculture as the mines relied on these for farm produce. This trend continued up to the 1930s despite the Company's tax regime and other measures taken to force Africans to provide labour in the mines. Because this mining was marked by low profitability, worsened by a failure to attract cheap labour, a shift towards more permanent and inward-oriented agrarian and manufacturing-based forms of accumulation were adopted. This triggered massive land dispossessions. Meanwhile pressure on the company administration saw legislation being passed to try and promote small white miners, individual prospectors and to give more say on governance issues to settlers, away from the BSAC.

Three significant outcomes can be distilled from the speculative crash of the 1890s. First is the diversification of the Rhodesian economy from mining to include agriculture and manufacturing. The shift to agriculture set the stage for a more aggressive mode of land appropriation. By 1926 manufacturing contributed 13% of the colony's GDP. Second is the reliance on rigidly regulated state managed processes of capital accumulation through laws and physical coercion. Thirdly, and of more consequence,
was the emergence of and growing salience of a white rural bourgeoisie in the colony’s political economy. It is thus not surprising that in 1923 the company administration was replaced by a government dominated by the white rural bourgeoisie.

The rural bourgeoisie consisted of three accumulating fractions. Firstly there was a group of “owner-workers of small and medium-sized mines and farmers, secondly, international capital represented mainly by the BSAC which controlled the railway, most of the mines and also land for mainly large scale plantations. The craftsmen engaged in manufacturing formed the third” (Arrighi, 1966, 36-37). Prior to the Second World War, the non capitalist classes were clearly divided on racial lines. There was a class of white wage earners on one hand and the African peasantry which would invariably take the form of wage workers, middle class and an African bourgeoisie, on the other.

The dominance of the white rural bourgeoisie is reflected in the state accumulation matrix that shaped the colonial state’s economic policies and legislation. A series of legislation and policies were adopted to further this class’s interests. This was meant to give an advantage to the indigenous white accumulating class over the emerging African bourgeoisie and to a limited extent, international capital. The 1930s for example saw the adoption of discriminatory laws such as the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 (LAA), the Maize Control Act of 1931, the Cattle Levy Act of 1931, the Industrial Conciliations Act (1934) and its 1937 amendment, the Tobacco Marketing Act of 1936, the Native Registration Act of 1936 and the subsequent tightening of pass laws. These were intended to create an advantage for white capital, increase the white settlers’ access to land, and ensure a reliable supply of cheap African labour for whites by dividing the economy along non-competiting racial lines. Public works were carried out to provide
supportive infrastructure for white capitalist development. "This body of legislation and policies was well summed up in the prevailing ideology of the period: the doctrine of parallel development or of the two-pyramid policy according to which inter-racial competition ought to be prevented" (Arrighi, 1966, 43). The result was the reduction of African competitiveness on one hand and consolidation of a white accumulating class increasingly reliant on the state on the other.

The aftermath of the Second World War witnessed a boost in the white manufacturing capitalist class in Southern Rhodesia. This rise was by no means linear but an alternation of depression and prosperity between 1950s to early 60s. It is within this period that we locate our second crisis moment. To start with, the disruption of industrial production elsewhere by the war increased demand for locally manufactured goods and farm produce. Challenges of the great depression had seen the white settlers shifting to a policy of what today might be termed ‘deglobalisation’ (Bond and Manyama, 2002, 4) to an explicitly inward-oriented development trajectory. The period also saw a dramatic increase in foreign investment, some of which was fleeing a threat of nationalization under the Nationalist Party government, which had come to power in the Union of South Africa. We see again political transformations happening within these capitalist crisis conjunctures.

On the whole Godfrey Huggins' term as prime minister from 1933 to 1956\(^8\) saw an even stronger shift to a managerially commandist ‘State Capitalism’. This was marked by the introduction of formal racial legislation epitomized by the Land Husbandry Act (1955), increased state credits, subsidies and other forms of support to white farmers.

\(^8\) Huggins was prime minister of Rhodesia from 1933 to 1953. The formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 saw him become its first Prime Minister up to 1956.
International capital's increased influence in the early 1960s saw attempts at legislative reform that would abolish the colour bar in employment and leading to the overthrow of the United Federal party by a coalition of the indigenous bourgeoisie and white workers who wanted to protect their interests. The emergent political formation led by Ian Smith (former Rhodesian Prime minister) worked to consolidate the white rural bourgeois' interests by maintaining the discriminatory legislation and unilaterally declaring independence from Britain in 1965.

As with the previous periods this crisis period had its specific outcomes. Firstly and most clearly is the continued salience of the white rural bourgeois, whose dominance was also maintained by the support of a white middle class who saw more to gain in such an alliance since it felt threatened by the emerging black middle class. Secondly, the post world war industrialization and economic boom had seen the emergence of a proletariat and early traces of a black bourgeoisie. Thirdly, this period witnessed the birth of the black liberation movement, led by the emerging black middle class. This class developed political consciousness and started to demand inclusion in the colonial system of governance. This advocacy for inclusion soon turned into calling for an end to colonial rule.

The overheating of the regional economy due to foreign loan repayments did not spare Rhodesia in the late 1970s (Bond and Manyama, 2002, 7). This, coupled with the international sanctions against the UDI and the intensification of the guerilla war, constitutes the ingredients of the third phase of Zimbabwe's capitalist development. In the wake of this crisis the state reacted with more rigorous central planning, strategic investment and intensified import substitution industrialization. With support from South
Africa and Portuguese-ruled Mozambique, Smith managed to dodge international sanctions and defaulted on foreign debt. “The result was one of the world’s fastest growth rates – 9.5% annually – 1966 to 1974” (Bond and Manyama, 2002, 7). However stagnation eventually set in. The overproduction of luxury goods for the limited consumption of whites and the limitations of a colonially designed accumulation process eventually resulted in stagnation from late 1970s.

Before looking at the post colonial period, it is important to dissect the patterns of accumulation emerging from the colonial state. A command economy under a policy and legal framework meant to promote a narrow accumulating class whilst leaving the large part of the population excluded was common in successive colonial policies. The combination of class forces interplayed to produce the compromise 1979 Lancaster house constitution. This compromise left questions of redistribution unresolved. For instance, that one percent of the farmers (minority white) owned half of the agricultural land (also the most productive) compared to the 98% (blacks) that owned the other half (unproductive land) (Cliffe, 2000, 36) was unsustainable in the long run.

The extremity of the unevenness was best painted by Alex Duval Smith in an article to *The Independent* (UK 9 May 2001) at the outset of the 2000 farm invasions: “Piers Nicolle has a wife and two sons and controls 54,000 acres of prime farmland. Shakespeare Tome has four wives, 28 children and five acres”39. That this imbalance was a product of a colonial state whose dominance was being vigorously contested meant such a configuration would always be contestable, awaiting an opportune moment for rupture. Additionally, traditional power and ownership structures in the communal areas

39 Piers Nicolle is a farmer in Banket Mashonaland West Province in the north eastern part of Zimbabwe.
disharmonious with primitive accumulation's historic 'mission' were maintained especially through the amalgamation of customary and state controlled property areas for natives (Rutherford, 2001, 3).

The inherited political economic structure not only had a lot of unresolved questions of primitive accumulation but had within itself structural limitations that would inhibit the journey towards market civilization. It is this inheritance that forms "the weight of history" to use Freund (1999)'s phrase in examining the chances of democratization in post apartheid South Africa – the "dead hand of past generations" (Moore, 2006, 10) that was to haunt Zimbabwe.

**The post Colonial State and Accumulation up to 2000**

To understand how the post colonial state interacted with economic challenges over the period it is necessary to examine a few factors. The compromises of Lancaster House meant that maneuvers to redress matters of economic injustice, especially in the first decade could only go as far as they did not threaten the white rural bourgeoisie. Secondly and as noted in chapter one, to add to this, Mugabe's 'talk-Left act-Right' art born out of the liberation movement's successive ideological struggles added a twist to the 'schizophrenic state'. In the absence of a strong civil society, the state could vacillate with ease between a policy of appeasement of the white bourgeois on one hand and socialist welfarism on the other. Moreover, Zimbabwe was seen by the west as some sort of bulwark against ANC-Communist influence: capital, both local and external was content in giving plenty of leeway and even buttressing the new regime.
In addition, the ruling petty bourgeoisie that inherited the state having what Freund calls 'private acquisitive instincts' (1981, 490) became umpires in the accumulation game in which they had vested interests. This petty bourgeoisie was also content to ride on the accumulation of the white bourgeoisie making it a sort of 'internal comprador' which in a way would mesh with Joe Slovo's idea of 'colonialism of a new type' (1990). For both its political and economic ends, it had to maintain the colonially bequeathed interventionist economic regime that largely favored local white and international capital. Simultaneously, the promissory nuances of liberation years meant that the state had to be seen to be moving towards a more socialist path. For its private acquisitive instincts the use of the state in a model of appropriation guided by patronage became the order of the day, setting the stage for the development of an accumulating class drawn mainly along patronage lines.

The immediate aftermath of independence was characterised by 'a twin phenomenon' of redistributivist policies and mutual suspicion between government and capital (almost wholly white owned) (Gibbon, 1995, 7). Despite the constraints of the Lancaster house agreement, the first two years if independence saw the resettlement of 10 000 households out of an initial target of 18 000, followed by 15 000 in 1982/83. Despite this early progress, the following years saw stubbornly retarded progress in resettlement. By 1990 48 000 households had been resettled - 40 000 had been resettled by 1985 and 71 000 by 1997 (Cliffe, 2000, 38; Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004, 362). According to Mumbengegwi (cited in Cliffe, 39) the initial progress owes to the 'abandoned (as a result of liberation war) and underutilized land that was the prime target for acquisition', and once this was exhausted the 'willing buyer willing seller' did not bear much fruit.
Others have attributed the stalling of the program to drying of donor funds, especially the British (Cliffe, 39).

There was also internal opposition to the program as championed by the local white farmers through organisations like the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) and the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), parliament, and their influence on/in the ruling party. It is no wonder the Land Act of 1992 and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution met with little political backing (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004, 362). The state thus reflected the dynamics of international and local capitalism, as well as the emerging African bourgeois and petty bourgeois. In the absence of a long term vision on agriculture, a ‘risk aversion strategy’ ‘careful not to upset colonial agriculture’ in particular and the colonially inherited economic structure in general saw technocratic decisions dominating Zimbabwe’s land policy prior to 2000 (Cliffe, 2000, 41).

On the economic front, the first year of independence saw an economic boom although this was not sustained. The 4% average annual growth rate was higher than most African countries and 1% higher than population increase, but the remainder of the decade saw population increase eclipsing economic growth, low export growth, balance of payment (BOP) problems, shortage of foreign exchange and low investments (Carmody, 1998, 320; Gibbon, 1995, 8-10). It is this retarded growth that tempted the state to succumb to the persuasion of IMF and the World Bank and introduce the economic structural adjustment program (ESAP). Another factor behind the adoption of ESAP was the involvement of many state ministers “in commercial farming – the main sector to benefit from ESAP”, (Dashwood cited in Carmody, 1998, 321).
The outcomes of market liberalization under ESAP were disastrous for the general populace and manufacturing sector though contributing to the emergence of more bourgeois actors especially in finance. “Financial liberalization and tight credit policies meant higher interest rates on domestic debt (up to 30%); currency devaluation, increased foreign debt payments; [and] firm closures reduced tax-take” (Carmody, 1998, 327-28). The deliberate measures to orient both the manufacturing and agricultural industry towards export production were at the cost of consumer goods, resulting in increased rate of consumer price inflation. Removal of subsidies and unrestricted competition placed pressure on local industries resulting in closures and job cuts. This, coupled with government’s downsizing of the civil service among other government spending reduction mechanisms saw plummeting levels of employment. Percentage of households living in poverty increased from 61% in 1995 to 75% in 2000 (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004, 358).

Perhaps in anticipation of the negative outcomes of ESAP on the poor, the ESAP policy document had a long annex entitled ‘Assessing and Addressing Social Dimensions of ESAP’. This annex stipulated measures to cushion the populace against the impacts of “retrenchments, higher inflation levels and removal of subsidies”, among other things that would come with the reform (Gibbon, 1995, 11). It set out a gendered program, foreseeing that women would be hardest hit by these negative outcomes of re-training and was later complimented by the setting up of the ‘Employment and Training Fund’ meant to promote and support “self-employment projects in the urban informal sector and public works projects in rural areas” (12). Consequentially, policies that promoted entrance into the informal economy as a ‘survival enclave’ for the retrenched poor
became part of the ESAP reform package. This phenomenon can be ascribed to and was an expression of the 'schizophrenic' nature of the Zimbabwe state. Until its official jettisoning in 1995 the ESAP was thus interjected by partial reversions to welfarist policies, especially on health and education. Subsequent post ESAP economic reforms, especially prior to 2000, though increasingly glossed by a redistributive rhetoric did not significantly depart from the neo-liberal 'common sense' (see Gramsci’s sense of common sense in Simon, 1982, 63-64) that informed ESAP. One could suggest that ESAP was a failed compromise; like most compromises of this sort it was bound to leave both ends of the diametrical opposed sides dissatisfied.

What emerged from the failure of ESAP was a new national consensus around a broad ‘developmentalist agenda’ typified by the emergence of a strong social movement which conceived the MDC. The worsening economic hardships of the late 1990s completed the process of awakening of workers and peasants from the illusions of independence euphoria. For the workers, the high rates of poverty were directly traceable to the state’s alliance with capital that had conceived ESAP. To the peasants the increased rural poverty and other economic hardships served to remind them of the unfinished business of land redistribution and restitution. According to Raftopoulos et al (2004, 362) the “largely spontaneous land occupations in Svosve, Mashonaland East in 1998” was a result of the growing rural poverty. The occupations were squashed by the government.

The encouragement of private accumulation of capital under ESAP had given birth to largely elite indigenization groups such as Affirmative Action Group (AAG), Indigenous Business Women Organisation (IBWO) and the Indigenous Business
Development Centre (IBDC). The increasingly growing militant former liberation war fighters association was aligned to these groups. These, though sharing membership with the ruling party started to put more pressure on the state to do more. According to Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004, 261) these groups became an important launching pad for ruling party politicians. This trend, found at early stages of Zimbabwe's current politico-economic crisis may thus be argued to have given direction to the increased centrality of the party and state in the accumulation process and the blurred relationship thereof in the post 2000 accumulation modes. While for the aforementioned classes, the state did not do enough, white capital still perceived the state's policies as ambiguous at the least and hence could not be relied on.

Though the economy had been on a downward trend the year 1997 was decisive and set in motion an uninterrupted downward spiral from which Zimbabwe has never recovered. The war veterans, workers and peasants became even more agitated as evinced by the unprecedented civil unrest during that year and subsequent years. The failed 1998 donor conference and the 2000 rejection of the draft constitution, which had an 'important' land clause in it, turned out to be the two last opportunities for organized land reform to avert the immanent rupture and descent into a violent and unregulated mode of land acquisition. More and more increasingly;

...a growing black elite with close ties to the government sought greater access to land, with a view towards restructuring ownership in its own interest. After independence in 1980, members of the state elite, including ministers, judges, senior army officers, parliamentarians and civil servants, had all quietly enriched themselves by leasing state land on favourable terms, but, in the changed context of the structural adjustment programme's market driven approach, circumspection was thrown to the wind. ... Class formation no longer needed to proceed behind closed doors (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004, 363).

In fact as the 2000 fast track land reform and the subsequent crisis unfolded this class of accumulators became so intertwined with the state that one can hardly separate the two,
functionally or otherwise. This is not surprising considering the petty bourgeois pattern historically embedded in Zimbabwe’s ruling elite and now “as the moral legitimacy of this elite has been eroded, so its core economic ambition has come to dominate the state’s political imperatives” (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004, 362).

This chapter has thus drawn the broad context within which the post 2000 situation unfolded. The year 2000 was a tipping moment for the state-white capital relationship. One outcome of the 1990s economic downturn and state’s response to the challenges thereof was a realignment of social classes. This is explored further in the next chapter. This will demonstrate how the breakdown of state alliance with white capital and the dominance of the petty bourgeois culture in ZANU-PF have interacted with Zimbabwe’s economic crisis to produce a highly unregulated form of accumulation characterised by the increased salience of the state and ruling party in an authoritarian populist fashion. The chapter does this on a broader panoramic plane thereby laying the foundation for the subsequent chapter that looks more incisively at how these unregulated forms of accumulation have fertilized illegal gold mining and trade.
Chapter 3:  
The Post-2000 Crisis and the Informalisation of Production  

Introduction  
Historically, and as noted in the previous chapter, the state's responses to crisis moments, more specifically in the colonial period, were characterised by reliance on commandist rigidly regulated policy/legal interventions designed to advantage a white accumulating class. Various enabling laws were enacted, state led coercive measures taken, production targets set, protectionist measures implemented and other interventionist measures established to commandeer a racially configured wealth accumulation pattern. Alluding to the need for the present government to regulate economic activity and learn from Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) government's handling of economic sanctions, Zimbabwe's reserve bank Governor Gono pointed out that Rhodesians were disciplined as economic actors and had law and order regulations which people defied at their own peril in those dark days... there was a big whip for indiscipline, there was intolerance for ineptitude, dislike for the lazy and an abomination for the corrupt regardless of position in society. There was total obedience to authority and accountability for one's day in the office, in the field and the factory floor. We need the same entrepreneurial values even today (July 2006, 20).  

Notwithstanding Gono's uncritical glorification of the UDI system, the rigid formalization and regulation which he calls for has been absent in the post-2000 crisis period. Instead, the state's populist measures initially meant to ensure ZANU-PF's continued stay in power in the wake of pressure from labour and war veterans as seen in Mugabe's approval of farm invasions set the tone for a violent and unregulated form of accumulation characterizing the period. ZANU-PF responded to pressure from the ex-liberation fighters by assenting to their demands and co-opting them into a militant
political survival and economic strategy. This has dominated Zimbabwe’s ruling party
modus operandi since 2000. The post-2000 period has been dominated by informal and
extra-legal wealth making activities, serious policy inconsistencies with respect to these
activities on the part of the Zimbabwe government and the involvement of those
connected to the state in these activities. Accumulation rivalry lines within ZANU-PF
and among those connected to the state have deepened.

That the war veterans managed to bulldoze their demands set an important
precedent that powerful social forces outside the state exist. The liberation war
credentials and allegiance to the ruling party became synonymous with this power. To be
sure, a state of a different type emerged; an ‘ultra party state’, an intricate intertwining of
party and state and individuals within party and state. A new generation of ‘war veterans’
emerged; unemployed and redundant ZANU-PF youths soon found a new vocation in
seizing white owned commercial farms (not necessarily for themselves but in many cases
for government ministers, party leaders, and powerful new forces within the ‘war
veterans’ association) and subsequently in terror campaigns against party opponents thus
‘zealously saving the party’, in effect a ‘party state’. Most of these young members of
party militias40, too young to have participated in the 1970s liberation war called
themselves war veterans of the ‘Third Chimurenga’ (a name used by ZANU-PF to refer
to 2000 land invasions).

This degeneration into unregulated, informalised and often violent modes of
wealth accrual did not end with land grabs but was soon to spread to other sectors. By
sidelining the rule of law during the 2000 land grabs the state lost the moral stand to

40 Whilst it has been common to state that these are party youth it is worthwhile to interpose that this has
not been always the case, in some instances these may just be unemployed youths rented for specific acts of
violence by specific individuals in ZANU-PF.
consistently enforce laws and policy, especially when it came to war veterans and some of the petty bourgeois elements within its ranks. The centre of power in Zimbabwe shifted to the party from the state – though now it is seemingly slipping away to the military, as epitomized by the establishment of the Joint Operation Command (JOC) (Mugabe’s think tank comprising of the army, intelligence, prisons service and police) and its increasingly central role in policy formulation and implementation. Nevertheless, and because the party runs the state, the state has been maintained as an instrument of both economic and political reproduction. It is for this reason that I invoke the notion of ‘party state’.

This chapter looks at the events characterising the post-2000 period to make a case for an argument centered on the increased centrality of the ‘party state’, the informalised pattern of accumulation, its violent turns, and disorders, lack of regulation and very importantly, the involvement of the ruling elite in this process. Having started with a broader outlook the chapter will narrow towards the Totororo Illegal Gold mining case study and establish its place within this broader context.

**Informalisation of Production**

Prior to the teething of the crisis in 1997, the ruling ZANU-PF/white capital alliance may (with some qualification) befit Gramsci’s ‘historic bloc’, a hegemonic alliance between classes, (Morton, 2003, 155; Simon, 1982, 26-27) that had evolved in the aftermath of 1980. It may be said that the rise of indigenization movements in the mid to late 1990s

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41 The invocation of Gramsci’s notion of ‘historic bloc’ suggests a hegemonic construction. This is not without potential misgivings. As Moore (2006) argues ZANU-PF has hardly ever ruled with ‘active consent of Zimbabwe’s contending classes and groups’ which hegemony would entail. On strict application, the usage of the ‘notion’ thus accepts this limitation. It is restrictedly referred to, ‘in passing’, for its utility in
was a challenge to this ‘historic bloc’ (Phimister and Raftopoulos, 2004, 360-361). This alliance had seen the ruling party doing little to alter the colonially bequeathed accumulation structure. Some members of the elite entered into accumulation pacts with capital to either further their private accumulation projects or for ‘technocratic realistic’ reasons. The links between the ruling party, its companies and some white capitalists such as Tiny Rowland, the Oppenheimer family, Jayant Joshi, Tony O’Reilly, Algy Cluff, John Bredenkamp, Muller Rautenbach, Nicholas van Hoogstraten (see list of characters on page viii) continue to this day, ironically at a time the party is said to have fallen out with white capital: this process is residual of the post-1980 ‘historic bloc’. Interestingly, a counter alliance was emerging involving labour and the country’s liberation fighters. The ZANU-PF/labour alliance had been strained since the attempt to create a one party state in 1989, and worsened after the ESAP disagreements. The white farmer’s support for the MDC marked the end of their alliance with ZANU-PF\textsuperscript{42}, while ZANU-PF’s desperate populist embrace of war veterans’ demands saw it aligning with war veterans and peasants through the Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU)\textsuperscript{43}. Two formations’ ‘blocs’ emerging from the crisis can be drawn as the ZANU-PF/war veterans/peasants on one hand and MDC/Labour/civil society/White Commercial farmers on the other.

portraying the shifts in ZANU-PF class alliances. Considering the authoritarian populist modus vivendi one may refer to it as minimal hegemony, not society-wide but within the elite (Femia, 1980). However this is fracturing as well as signified by the cracks within ZANU-PF and former finance minister Simba Makoni’s decision to challenge President Mugabe for the March 29 election.

\textsuperscript{40} The white farmers’ alliance with the MDC started in the campaign against the draft constitution towards the February 2000 referendum. The NCA and newly formed MDC were campaigning for a NO vote which coincided with the farmers’ position against the land clause in the constitution, which was going to see government having more power to acquire land from them.

\textsuperscript{42} ZFU was established to represent mainly black rural farmers. It was active alongside war vets in the land reform. In any case the union is largely controlled by war vets.

- 52 -
It is argued here that the cessation of ties between ZANU-PF ruling elites and white capital marks the first instance towards the informalisation of production. To start with, ZANU-PF’s reluctant shift to ally with ex-combatants and peasants created an ideological dilemma for a party hitherto dominated by a more or less liberally inclined petty bourgeois tradition. Simultaneously the ex-combatants, having been galvanized upon the platform of redistribution, exuded *prima facie* leftist propensities, making the alliance a disharmonious mix. Mugabe had to resort to his talk-left-walk-right mastery; this, bearing in mind that hitherto white capital had relied on a formalized structure of production whose contours had been drawn in their favour. The alliance got to be sustained by a rhetoric that meant refraining from enforcing the obtaining legal order that had protected white capital. The often contradictory statements coming from ZANU-PF leadership in government at the onset of land invasions are indicative of these contradictions. For instance, Vice-President Joseph Msika would order the land-grabs to stop while Mugabe would justify the seizures, though sometimes giving contradictory signals. At one point in 2000 Msika, in Mugabe’s absence, ordered the invasions to stop only to see his order ignored at Mugabe’s return (Winter, 2000). Despite Mugabe not saying anything publicly, there was speculation that he secretly gave a go ahead to the invasions.

Besides the impetus set by the 2000 land grabs, the liberalization tenets of ESAP and the negative effects thereof had also set in motion a trend towards a more informalised mode of wealth accrual. It has been noted earlier that the high levels of unemployment and the accompanying ‘liberalization of production’ saw the redundant workers being accommodated into the informal economy (Meager cited in Gibbon, 1995,
As mentioned above, though the gradual swelling of the informal sector from ESAP years is noticeable, the post-2000 growth of this sector was unprecedented. A study of Mbare women vendors in 2006 for instance revealed that “most of the women entered into vending after the year 1997 and progressively ... towards 2006” (Mawowa, 2006, 27). Cross border trade became more common with most people opting out of formal employment to engage in trade into neighbouring countries South Africa, Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana, while company executives resorted to hawking in order to supplement their inflation eroded salaries (The Standard, 8 July 2007, 8).

Increases in parallel market activity such as foreign currency dealing, illicit gold mining, and trade epitomize this trend. Other activities include trade in basic commodities such as bread, maize meal, cooking oil and sugar market’ to airtime voucher cards on the ‘black market’. For example, reports are that while ZANU-PF’s Bulawayo leadership was denying claims that the party was selling cell phone lines on the black market, Net-one cell phone lines were sold at between Z$6 – Z$8 million on the parallel market compared to the Z$300 000 official price (Chronicle, 13 July 2007, 2). Parallel forex dealings have been steered by ruling party stalwarts. The unregulated sale of consumer commodities has been exacerbated by the incessant shortages of basic commodities. For instance, the limited supplies of electricity and resultant power cuts accentuated by the state’s diversion of supplies to winter wheat crop farmers in June 2007 increased the reliance on and selling of firewood, mostly from farms acquired under the land occupations. Instead of concentrating on farming as the core business, some of the

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44 Net-one is a parastatal mobile cellular phone provider and for that reason has a close link to the state. It is one of the three mobile and cellular phone operators, which include Econet and Telecel.
beneficiaries resorted to spending most of their time selling firewood (IRIN, 1 July 2007, 8).

This trend has not escaped the attention of newspaper cartoonists. Below is a caricature of an emergent informal marketer selling meat, resulting from meat shortages due to disruption of commercial farming activities. The cartoon mocks Obert Mpofu’s (Minister of Industry and International Trade) decision to allow the entry of private unlicensed abattoirs into the meat trade. This is an admittance of the collapse of the Cold Storage Company (CSC), which is legally responsibly for all meat business in the country. It speaks the eclipsing of formal production by the informal.

**Fig 1**

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**TRANSLATION:**
The defunct CSC has failed to function, and they will now have to use unlicensed private abattoirs to do their job for them, giving the impression that without CSC, these abattoirs wouldn't be back in business.
It would be beneficial at this point to illustrate how this economy of shortages has played out, and the dominant mode of wealth accumulation it has produced. The disruption of commercial farming activities led not only to low beef production but dairy and wheat production fell as well. Over the past seven years shortages in meat, bread and milk products have thus been a common feature. In 2002 a man in Chegutu (102km southwest of Harare) then working as a driver and salesman for Dairibord Zimbabwe Limited\textsuperscript{45} was making more money from the bribes than through his wage. Retailers paid him to ensure he constantly supplied them with dairy products then in short supply. He started to divert some of the milk supplies for his own private parallel market sales.

The man was earning enough from the unofficial sales to quit his job and start his own grocery business. Links with his former company employees ensured him a continuous supply of milk. At the same time, while bread was in short supply he struck a deal with a Central Bakery (based in Kadoma, 30km south of Chegutu) bread delivery truck driver, who was also operating informal grocery shops of his own. The former

\textsuperscript{45} DZL is formerly government owned, now privatized (to a member of the ruling party elite) with a near monopoly over the production and distribution of dairy products in Zimbabwe.
businessman would pay in cash or by bartering milk products. This arrangement was so lucrative that he would earn as much a 300% – 500% in profit selling bread and milk at informal market rates. For example, he would buy bread for $13 and sell it for $50. His advantage spread to other commodities that were in short supply such as sugar, cooking oil and mealie meal. When the police tried to clamp down on the parallel market selling of bread he would pay them off. Before the 2007 price control blitz he had purchased a farm (for which he recently received a tractor from the government under the agriculture mechanization program), a trucking company and six grocery shops, gained directly by manipulating the crisis. Unfortunately for him the groceries shortages emanating from the price blitz since June 2007 has forced him to close four of his supermarkets.

The above case is just one of several of the rags to riches – and sometimes back again – stories that have dominated Zimbabwe’s economy of crisis. Similar patterns are found in the illegal gold trade. Other cases include those of fuel attendants who have made a fortune from bribes and selling the scarce fuel at inflated prices in the parallel markets. At face value, it may be said that not all of these cases have had help from the golden hand of the ‘party state’. A closer look, however, points to the salience of the state. Where the party-accumulation-nexus has not been conspicuous, the role of state functionaries such as the police has been clear. In fact in the bread and milk sales case above, the operator brags about having good links in political circles, thus ‘hapana zvavanondita’ (they will do nothing to me). Moreover, that this man benefited from the

46 Mealie meal is a powder made from ground maize grain and is used to make Sadza, Zimbabwe’s staple meal.
47 On 18 June 2007 the Zimbabwe government decreed prize freezes on all commodities predated to 14 June 2007. Since 2000 the government has half-heartedly relied on imposing price controls to try to contain inflation. This is more of a 'public relations' exercise whose effects has been to worsen the problem of shortages.
highly patronized state’s agricultural mechanization program owes to a combination of merit and his connectedness, now that he is among the top ten highest grain producers in Mashonaland West. However, the above case poses questions as to the regression or otherwise of the new patterns of accumulation unfolding in the post-2000 crisis. Are these cases exceptions to the generally perceived and evinced trend toward the destruction of capital as Rob Davis would suggest (2004)? There appears, as shall be demonstrated in the concluding chapter, to be a new type of capital generating from the ruins of the former.

Besides what seems to be an effort by the state to formalize and order these accumulation trends through police clampdown and half hazard insistence on trading licenses and registration, *inter alia* these trends are far from decreasing. They are blooming. Clearly thus, the legacy of the farm invasions has been to set in motion a disordered mode of accumulation, wherein party allegiance is central in laying claim to property and economic means. As shall be shown below the state/party state has become increasingly centralised with the deepening of the economic and political crisis.

Fig 3: Left – Vendors trade sugar to bus passengers at a fuel station just outside Masvingo. Fig 4: Right – Chairs outside Patsime Bar in Chegutu where ‘NOCZIM guys’
The deepening crisis and the centrality of the 'party state'

"[There are] three vices weighing down the economy ... indiscipline, corruption and speculation ... added to these, another vice called bureaucratic inertia" (Gono, July 2006, 14).

The endemic crisis has seen the state becoming a crucial and central vehicle for accumulation in an unprecedented manner. This centrality has expressed itself fivefold;

1. Shortages characterizing the crisis have forced the state to intervene in order to moderate the appropriation of goods/'basics' in short supply to try to ensure even distribution and that such appropriation is in line with 'party/national priorities'.

2. Allegiance to the ruling party, a legacy of the politically driven violent land invasion of 2000 and previous patterns of client-patronage, has been used as pre-conditionality for one to benefit from this appropriation.

3. This state's centrality has seen those connected to it seeking to further instrumentalise it. This has often not been without internal competition (in the form of factions within the party and military), making dependency on the state for accumulation self reinforcing and more entrenched.

4. In a state defined, as and by the ruling party, those that have instrumentalised the state have further — and deliberately — fused the ruling party with the state. The state and the party have become more and more undifferentiated. The privileged access to the state is used to legitimate claims based on a narrow exclusionist doctrine of patriotism meant to disqualify those in the opposition.
5. The increased centrality of the state in the appropriation of scarce economic and political goods has served to sustain a patronage based form of accumulation and retention of power by the ruling party.

The state's salience expresses itself through Gideon Gono's appropriation of foreign currency, as well as state acquired farming seeds and implements such as combine harvesters, tractors *inter alia*, down to Chiefs demanding party cards while giving donor food hand outs, and ZANU-PF youths controlling a bread queue. It goes even further to Mugabe's youth militia and police distributing civic goods like the right to worship, ordering people to chant party slogans, or produce party cards in order to pass through road blocks. This breaks into organized and individualized militia for ZANU-PF party chiefs controlling access to resources like panning sites and farming land. One may note this is a sign of a decentralized authoritarian political economy. In food distribution to the starving masses, membership and connection to the ruling party has become a prerequisite for would-be beneficiaries. The same goes for fuel distribution and farming inputs. For example in May 2007 Water and Infrastructural Development Minister Munacho Mutezo ordered twenty MDC supporters who were members of an irrigation scheme to halt winter planting as part of a purge of opposition supporters in the area (Nyathi, 2007). One of the victims recounted: "We were ordered not to plant any crops this winter season. They are saying we should get land from [MDC leader Morgan] Tsvangirai and start our own schemes and stop benefiting from ZANU PF's revolutionary sweat".

The above scenario is indicative of the 'hegemonic' notion that for one to be a 'beneficiary' [of 'liberation'] one must adhere to the ideology that ZANU-PF cadres have
exclusive ownership of ZANU-PF's 'revolutionary sweat'. This doctrine is enforced invariably through Zimbabwe's military and police on one hand, and ZANU-PF youth structures on the other. It is a doctrine that resonates with threats of a coup if MDC wins the March 2008 elections, as army Brigadier General David Sigauke reminisced on his retired chief Zvinavashe's similar threat in 2002 (Kaseke, 2007). The same doctrine saw John Nkomo (ZANU-PF National Chairperson and former Speaker of parliament), replicating George Orwell's *Animal Farm* notion that 'other comrades (animals) are more equal than others', when he muscled out a black farmer and ZANU-PF member, Langton Masunda from a 611.79 hectare game-rich formerly white owned farm, situated in Lupane area, some 200km north west of Bulawayo (Ian Nhuka, 13 July 2006). In another of these many cases, a high ranking member of the ruling party attempted to seize a fuel station in Chegutu owned by a black Zimbabwean. The owner was only saved when the ruling party official realized that he also had top connections in the party (Anonymous 8, Interview, 2007).

The above trend can not be divorced from Finance Minister Mumbengegwi's (2007, 6-7) complaints in parliament about those making a fortune out of Zimbabwe's misery.

One of the consequences of the above challenges, Mr Speaker Sir, is the emergence of very large income disparities, with the majority of the lowest paid workers earning below the Poverty Datum Line. This, Honourable Members, is happening at a time when a small proportion of the population is now accumulating wealth overnight, in part benefiting from the price distortions arising from some of the policies and facilities meant to protect the very poor. Regrettably some of the wealth accumulation is a direct product of the prevailing indiscipline in our economy. We have amongst the citizens, individuals benefiting from abuse of public resources and thereby contributing to unnecessary public expenditures and economic hardship.

Ironically, not long after this budget announcement the Zimbabwe government went on an ill-planned price control blitz of a form comparable to the June 2005 'Operation
'Restore Order', further compounding the problem of 'price distortions'. Just after a government directive for fuel to be sold at Z$60 000 per liter, shortages ensued with the liquid only easily available on the parallel market at prices as high as between Z$400 000 and $500 000 a liter (*Zimbabwe Independent*, July 13-19, 2007, 11). Mumbengegwi's "small proportion" known to be "accumulating wealth overnight", and more apparently those "benefiting from abuse of public resources" are largely those within the state. These are people with access to cheap foreign currency – only available with connections to the state, who buy the American dollar from RBZ at a controlled rate of US$1 to Z$30 000 and resell it on parallel market at US$1 to Z$2, 5 million (*Daily Mail*, January 19 2008). These are the same people also able by virtue of their positions to connive with the price monitoring agents to take advantage of price distortions emanating from the raids on shops.

In July 2007 the *Sunday Mail* reported that foreign currency dealers were making as much as Z$30 million (approx R2000 at parallel market exchange rate) a day when most professionals were earning less than Z$5 million (approximately R333) a month (Moyo, 2007, 5). If these dealers, most of whom act as agents of big party and government chefs are making this much, it is not difficult to imagine how much the 'comrades in business' like ex-liberation war commander Solomon Mujuru and former ZANU-PF provincial chair, and former Chinhoyi (town about 102km east of Harare) Member of Parliament and Mugabe’s relative Philip Chiyangwa are making through their parallel market foreign currency dealers in the streets. With the price blitz that started on the 26th of June 2007, those connected to the price monitoring commission were alerting their friends and relatives of the next business they were going to 'invade' and force to
sell goods at ludicrously low and unprofitable prices. Many of ZANU-PF’s ‘politically corrects’ bought these goods at these give away prices, only to later sell them at inflated prices on the unofficial market.

The state’s system of distribution of goods in short supply is so skewed and easy to manipulate that each attempt seems to have been designed to ensure benefits for members of the party elite. For example, in 2005 the state run Grain Marketing Board (GMB) was selling grain to millers at a lower rate than it was purchasing from farmers. In a mode of appropriation defined by patronage lines, only those millers connected to the party could easily access this cheap grain. It soon emerged that most of these were disguised millers, who accessed this grain from the GMB only to repack and resell the very same grain to the GMB at a profit.

Similarly, at a time when fuel takes more forex than any other commodity (Gono, 2005, 16), those connected to the state are getting fuel ostensibly for priority programs like public transport and agriculture only to sell it at inflated parallel market prices. As one informant put it, “with fuel in short supply the war vets/CIOs (Central Intelligence Organisation operatives) now owning farms around Chegutu, though spending all their time sitting here [at a beer bar], claim government fuel ostensibly to use at their farms, only to sell it here through these ‘NOCZIM\(^48\) guys’ on the black market” (Anonymous 10, Interview, July 2007). As a result, “NOCZIMs” (as seen in Figure 4), abound in Chegutu and across the country where fuel is consistently available, albeit at exorbitant parallel market rates, despite shortages in official channels. A similar trend is noticeable.

\(^{48}\) ‘NOCZIM’ is now local \textit{lingua franca} for illegal and parallel market fuel dealers, derogatorily derived from the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM), which is officially responsible for all national oil procurement. In effect these have become the de-facto National oil supplies because they always have fuel to sell.
in the RBZ allocation of foreign currency at a very cheap "official" rate. This limited currency is accessed by party "heavies", who in turn make huge profits by selling the same money at the higher parallel market rate. Commenting on this, Mutumwa Mawere notes that "... selected individuals can benefit from buying foreign exchange at Z$15,000 to US$1 and then sell the same US$1 at Zim$25,000 or more" (2007).

Reports abound about people connected to the state's involvement in the parallel money market. In mid-2007 the Standard reported a senior police official employing five young men to sell foreign currency on the streets at a time when police "play[ed] cat and mouse with illegal dealers" (8 July 2008, 8). One of the young men is quoted as saying:

We sell the foreign currency openly because we are untouchable. Some constables arrested me at one time, even though I had informed them that I was working for their boss. They have been transferred from Harare and after that no one dares to touch us.

The article goes on to note that besides dealing in foreign currency the police official also has other 'employees' who vend vegetables, cigarettes and cell phones confiscated from unauthorized vendors during police raids.

An incident in Chegutu in which a son of a ZANU-PF stalwart and former Chegutu acting town clerk, Zinyowera, who acquired a farm under the fast track land reform exercise, shows the dirty game of accumulation in Zimbabwe politics. Zinyowera's son had drawn out a pistol during a quarrel with a friend over the sharing of dividends from fuel sales on the parallel market, leading to the police investigating where he had obtained the gun. The investigation revealed a number of issues. The farm, thought to belong to Zinyowera, was actually owned by a government minister; the former was being used as a front. When the son discovered that the farm was not his

49 Mawere is a Zimbabwean businessman and former owner of two mining companies in Zimbabwe. He was forced to flee to South Africa after a fall out with ZANU-PF, which had helped him start his mining business.
father's he with assistance from friends in Chegutu town, started stealing implements. They smuggled about 1800 liters of diesel fuel and seven electric motors - leading to the collapse of the water system. He also stole his father's pistol. The minister and the father ordered the arrest of his son and his friends. They were arrested and beaten, but were released without being charged after the son threatened to divulge more information.

A former farming hub, Chegutu has now seen most of its agro-businesses being closed as most of its surrounding farms and mines have been taken over by CIO operatives, War Veterans, ministers, and ZANU-PF heavyweights. Savana Mine and Chakari gold mines are now being run by an alliance of CIO operatives, ministers and War Veterans. So is the Game Park and Reserve Farm in Mhondoro Ngezi, also in the proximity of Chegutu town. It has been reportedly taken over by Vice President Mujuru and her husband, who have also been allegedly involved in illegal gold panning in the same area (Anonymous 9, Interview, 2007). Currently, the ZANU-PF scheme of beneficiation in Chegutu has been extended to party activists who are now being given small scale mining licenses to mine gold in areas around Chegutu. This started under the women in mining initiative but is now 'open to everyone'. This is, however, a power retention project - it appeases party supporters and lures the general citizenry through a delusive promise of income generation. The levels of production have in these farms and mines fallen drastically. It is this destructive and apparently regressive outcome of the 2000 land invasions that has given reason to designate this process 'dis-accumulation' (Davies, 2004).

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50 Also see the list of characters for a more detailed list of members of the ruling elite and their connections have benefited from party-state and their involvement in extra legal economic activities.
Violence and Warlordism

The violent manner through which the 'land reform program' was carried out set the tone for the violence that has characterised accumulation in the post-2000 crisis period. Though 'blessed by the state', the land occupations (even the recent ones) were not regulated by formal state structures. Informalised violence has been central in gaining and retaining property. This deregulated nature of appropriation means that there is no clear coordination on the part of those in the party. This makes clashes unavoidable. Moreover the invasions were not always led by party activists per se, or even the war vets and peasant masses. Rather, there has been a tendency for ZANU-PF's high ranking officials to hire 'party activists' (or youths in the name of the party). In Mashonaland Central for instance, soon after conquest several of the white farms occupied by the so-called party activists/war vets/peasants were delivered to the respective ZANU-PF officials, the real force behind this process. Now many farms are named after their new 'owners', such as Goche Farm (former minister of state security), Manyika Farm (ZANU-PF political commissar), Mahachi Farm (late defense minister), Chihuri Farm (police commissioner) and Makasha Farm (a ZANU-PF provincial leader). Some of the people who led the invasions work for these officials on these farms.

Not only has this use of militia and violence been targeted at white owned farms. Increasingly, senior ZANU-PF leaders are clashing among themselves. In 2006, two government ministers clashed over a citrus plantation in Chegutu. The white owner of the plantation, popularly known as Biti, was a ZANU-PF supporter. He often sponsored ZANU-PF campaigns, rallies, meetings and feasts, slaughtering cattle at party functions. In 2005 he nearly represented the ruling party in Chegutu's mayoral elections, had it not
been for his skin colour. He was later dropped in favour of Alois Majiri. This was said to be a ‘strategic move’ that would show consistency for a party that often plays the racial card against its main rival the MDC, criticizing it for aligning with ‘whites’. The Deputy Minister of Information Bright Matonga (a nephew of President Mugabe) organized a militia gang to occupy Biti’s plantation. Instead of using the police to stop him, Webster Shamu (a close ally of Mugabe and then Minister of Special Affairs in the President’s Office) organized youths – paying them Z$1000 each – to drive off Matonga’s gang at night. The group burnt down the makeshift grass encampments of Matonga’s sponsored invaders and damaged a car. They were arrested after one of them was caught by police and leaked information. However, they were released on Attorney General Sobuza Gula Ndebele’s orders (Anonymous 8, interview, September 2006). The issue drew in a lot of ZANU-PF stalwarts who took different positions, though they would not come out publicly. Eventually Matonga managed to wrestle half of the orange farm from the original white owner Biti, who remained with the other half. This has negatively affected the quality of oranges being produced. Formerly grown for export, the oranges are now being sold in the informal markets in Chegutu.

In April 2007 Gideon Gono’s farm was burnt. Media speculation contends that this was orchestrated by those within his party ZANU-PF involved in illegal currency deals and opposed to his currency reforms.

The fire broke out at Gono’s farm in Norton, 40km from the capital Harare on Friday, four days after Gono said Zimbabweans had less than a month to hand in small amounts of old banknotes to the banks. The [Sunday] Mail also raised fears for Gono’s life by reporting on a mystery "armed gang of smartly dressed men" driving in a "4x4 double cab vehicle" which is said to have caused chaos at Gono’s flower project in Norton on Thursday. The men are said to have asked for the governor’s residential address before beating a hasty retreat following confrontation with security staff. A day after the incident, the paper reported, a fire swept its way through the bank chief’s maize crop, spreading to neighbouring farms (Newzimbabwe.com accessed on 1 May 2007).
The style of attack mirrors those on opposition members by state secret agencies. A month earlier, the publication observed, Mugabe had remarked that there were senior party officials who wanted Gono dead because of his anti-corruption and anti-inflation drive. In the previous year Gono, who owns another farm on the north eastern fringes of Harare, had prophesied, "... some will use their ill gotten wealth to sponsor general disorder and target malice at the Governor and his team as a way of venting anger at our policies" (July 2006, 18). However Gono was adamant, "... there is no amount of intimidation that will force me to abandon the task at hand. I will not let the presidium and the majority of the people of Zimbabwe down", and for that he paid. This suggests that whoever is/are locked in the accumulation 'war' with Gono also has links with and can use the national secret service to their personal ends. If not, then it is even more worrying that individuals within the ruling party are having not only organized militia, but secret mafias and intelligence units with the capacity to carry out covert acts of terror.

In some cases the warlordism-accumulation connection may not come out so obviously. An example is the Mukono case, in which a ZANU-PF war vet was killed, allegedly by fellow party members referred to as Mutasa 'supporters'. However, this group consisted of more than party members. It was also a personal militia belonging to, funded, and supported by Mutasa. This is a feature now endemic within ZANU-PF (Manyukwe, July 12-18 2007, 4). These militias can be permanent individual supporters and party activists, or are hired for a particular 'mission'. The war vet murdered by 'fellow ZANU-PF members' was accorded a provincial hero status\(^{51}\). He had been

\(^{51}\) One may wonder why he was accorded provincial hero status when he was an enemy of Mutasa. Principally, being enemies with Mutasa would not take away his Hero status. Moreover the factions in ZANU-PF mean that Mutasa would not have easily had his way. In addition this must not be surprising in a country where three brigadiers, all suspected of involvement in a foiled military coup (Brigadiers General
accused of stealing from a farm belonging to Mutasa’s close colleague obtained under the land grabs.

The wave of farm seizures in Karoi and Macheke in the year 2007, by the military, with junior soldiers occupying farms in behalf of senior commanders underscores the salience of informal coercion in the post-2000 accumulation trends. It is indicative of an unending process of primitive accumulation. These invasions have not only driven off the few remaining white farmers but also black Zimbabweans and other low ranking ZANU-PF members that had occupied the farms at the height of land invasions in 2000 and 2001. As shall be seen in the next chapter these trends of warlord type accumulation manifest more viciously in the illegal gold mining activities. This ranges from miners clashing with police as the latter attempt to stop illegal activities, to clashes between local residents and ‘outsiders’ over mining rights, to conflicts between gangsters over access to mining sites.

Crisis and Party-State ‘Schizophrenia’

Earlier in this work reference has been made to Ibbo Mandaza’s 1986 analysis of post colonial Zimbabwe in which he invoked Yash Tandon’s ‘Schizophrenic State’. The schizophrenia emanated from the fact that the ruling petty bourgeoisie had to safe guard white capitalist interests on whose material base it relied on, on one hand, and the need to live up to the promissory nuances of liberation which would entail a redistributionist welfarist approach on the other. To add to this, the acquisitive interests of the state managers had to compete with their umpire role. The sum of all this has been a state that

Paul Armstrong Gunda, Brigadier General Fakazi Muleya and Brigadier General Gideon Lifa) died in a space of one month and are accorded national hero status (Zimbabwe Standard 22 July 2007, 1).
wavers back and forth in its policies and actions. As the present analysis of the post-2000 crisis continues, it can be said with certainty that the 'schizophrenic state' lives on. This however ought to be put into perspective as it now transcends protecting white capital. It can be better accounted for by the elites' bid to tap into the prevailing chaos against the moral and political imperatives to enforce order and accountability.

It is this schizophrenia that informs contradictions and inconsistencies regarding the party state's position and action on illicit economic activities. Contradictions have largely fallen under the rubric of authoritarian populism versus technocratic realism. The techno-realists/authoritarian populist dichotomy is represented by the concern for "land and factory capacity underutilization ... indiscipline and deliberate sabotage and disruption of productive land, (and economic activity)". This side of the binary extends to "call (for) law enforcement agencies to 'continue with their demonstrated resolve' to deal decisively with offenders who may want to reap where they did not sow" (Gono, 2004, 4). One can contrast this with the, "Which law are you talking about...?" retort from Mugabe when asked about the legality of price controls (Zimbabwe Independent, 13-19 July, 2007, 8) or Mutasa's "land reform would not be complete if some farms remained in the hands of whites" (Gonye, 2007) a sentiment shared by Manyika and Goche among others who want Gono's 'prime ministerial powers' and 'wings clipped'.

Not least riddled with contradictions has been Zimbabwe government's chaotic land reform program argued in this study to have given momentum to subsequent unregulated and disordered styles of accumulation. These contradictions as Michael Hartnack observed in July 2002 exist on every policy and action "from salvaging the crumbling economy, to food shortages and the seizure of white-owned farms". He notes
"political schizophrenia" permeating "Mugabe's cabinet, politburo and the ZANU-PF central committee".

Commercial Farmers' Union president Colin Cloete this week pleaded with Mugabe to end confusion, particularly over public pledges flagrantly disregarded in practice that each farmer would be left with at least one property to sustain production. In one breath officials tell white farmers to grow all the wheat they can, regardless of the looming August 9 eviction deadlines, in the next to get off their 5 000 "former" properties immediately to make way for 354 000 black Zimbabweans. Finance Minister Simba Makoni talks of rebuilding relationships with international financial institutions, while Mugabe and other hardliners say the country has washed its hands of them forever. ...  

Hartnack further connects these contradictions with Makoni's "technocrat colleague", former banker and finance minister Nkosana Moyo's, decision to quit the Cabinet and flee with his family. He concludes:

... all this reflects growing conflict between the "hawks" who have Mugabe's ear and the pragmatists looking, unblinkered, at the prospect of 7.8 million Zimbabweans (on their own figures) starving to death. Information Minister Jonathan Moyo, Agriculture Minister Joseph Made and Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa are leaders of the "hawks" while Makoni, known to have the sympathy of the South African government, is seen as the principal pragmatist. These contradictions have also been reflected in the lower levels of the party state. There were differences in land reform policy application in provinces, with widest in areas such as Chinhoyi - "where hard-line governor Peter Chanetsa holds sway - and in Gweru - where the notably amenable Midlands Provincial Governor Cephas Msipha has power - for the moment - to ameliorate decrees" (Zimbabwe News, July 20, 2002).

The confusion on land reform continues to express itself as Didymus Mutasa alongside the military clash with Vice President Joseph Msika over farm invasions by the military in 2007. Msika wants the invasions to stop and is keen on having farmers produce, but the military have disregarded him. It is also probable that even without Mutasa's backing, the army chiefs would still go ahead with invasions. In the wake of a failed coup\textsuperscript{52} the army generals may be holding the party at ransom. Thus the state on one hand is an 'accomplice' to the new wave of farm occupations by the military, yet it is, on

\textsuperscript{52} Several army chiefs and low ranking officers were taken for questioning on allegations of plan a coup to oust Mugabe. Six were taken to court and the issue has been dragging on up to now.
the other hand enthusiastic to seize any opportunity to debunk the ‘mysticism of land reform as racially driven’ by showing off remaining white farmers like Taylor-Freeme as among the beneficiaries of the government’s agriculture mechanization program (Zimbabwe Independent, July 13-19, 2007, 11). Unfortunately those in the military, formerly left off; now want to benefit from the disorderly form of accumulation before it is too late.

The contradictions, inconsistency and crisis mix has provided a fertile ground for corruption, Where parliament has formulated the Zimbabwe Chapter of the African Parliamentary Network against Corruption (APNAC) such initiatives have not been carried out to the letter. As noted in the introduction to this thesis Gono has said the uncouth acts need to be arrested. The Anti Corruption Commission’s mission statement pledges to fight “abuse of power” (Anti Corruption Commission of Zimbabwe charter) hence acknowledging that there are people in power taking advantage of their positions. Yet the commission is poorly resourced and there is little evidence of serious commitment. It is doubtful if the commission is meant to have teeth. Indeed as Gono notes, “it is as if Central Government is undecided on whether or not to allow these (anti-graft) arms of government to discharge their mandate” (July 2006, 16).

Government actions on accountability, regulation and fairness have been inconsistent and selective. For instance, in a letter dated 30 April 2007 the Masvingo governor was asked by Didymus Mutasa (Minister of State Security and a close confidante of Mugabe) to surrender two of the three farms he acquired under fast track land reform on the basis of the government’s one man one farm principle (Marwezu, 2007). This is in spite of the fact that several ministers in Mugabe’s cabinet have more
than one farm (Usenet.com archive, 9 May 2007; Dongo, 2001). Businessmen James Makamba and Mutumwa Mawere, former Finance Minister Kuruneri, economist and ZANU-PF apologist the late William Nhara have all been at one time incarcerated on different charges of economic nature. This has been selective as some in government were spared. For instance, Nherera was arrested with the omission of Chombo who was working with him in stealing from Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO). This selective application of justice exists in its extreme on the street, were vendors and forex dealers working for big chiefs are arrested and assaulted by police. The police seem unbothered with the prominent ZANU-PF leaders for whom the vendors and dealers work for.

The concerns over "...inadequate measures to deal with rising levels of corruption in both the public and private sectors", "inconsistent policy pronouncements", ... "lack of commitment to effectively deal with the challenges facing the economy"; and "increasing indiscipline" "price distortions", (Mumbengegwi, 2007, 6) are well founded. In his 2007 budget speech Mumbengegwi criticizes;

...ill-timed and often contradictory policy pronouncements and decisions which, not only impact negatively on confidence, but also increase uncertainty among economic agents. A notable example would be resorting to the re-introduction of unsustainable price controls which, however, can only worsen the supply situation (2007, 53).

It was hardly a month after this pronouncement that the price blitz was initiated. Alleged to be a brainchild of the Joint Operations Command (Muleya, 2007, 1), it was described by one journalist as being "the same template of harassment, bullying and threats [to retailers] the state unleashed against commercial farmers in 2000 under the guise of land reform" (Standard, 8 July 2007, 10). Previous price controls, at various times between
2003 and 2006 have been unpopular due to the serious shortages in basic commodities that they caused\textsuperscript{53}.

One needs not go far to prove how well founded Mumbengegwi's worries of inconsistency are. In one breath, Mugabe pledges to use his security forces to protect foreign investors (Sapa-dpa-AFP, Business Day 15 August, 2007). As an 'aside' and without diverting too far from this discussion one might ask, 'protection from whom by the military'? Probably unwittingly, Mugabe accepts that violence and disorder has become a Zimbabwean order of accumulation hence the need for the army to come in if foreign investors are to operate without hindrance. Important to note for now is that in this instance Mugabe's promise resonates with Mumbengegwi's pledges to restore business confidence. Ironically this came at a time, when his government was working on an indigenization law that threatened foreign investment in the mining sector\textsuperscript{54}.

The statements below, whether by sheer coincidence or otherwise, show more clearly how contradictions within the ruling party have taken a techno-realist versus authoritarian populist dichotomy. In 2002 Secretary for Industry and International Trade, Stuart Comberbach and Simba Makoni, then Finance and Economic Development minister, were accused of sympathizing with bakers in a bread price row. The state owned daily newspaper The Herald (25 February 2002) quotes a government spokesperson calling on Comberbach to resign “because his attitude showed that his position was to represent industrialists rather than populist views”. Notably the

\textsuperscript{53} One reporter wondered about the specificity of the 18\textsuperscript{th} of June date of 'effect' of the price freeze when the state run newspaper Herald had just increased its price from ZS15 000 to ZS25 000 on the 14\textsuperscript{th} of July only four days before the date of the edict's date of effect (Zimbabwe Independent, July 13-19, 2007).

\textsuperscript{54} The new mining indigenization bill is similar to land grabs in that it forces all foreign mining firms to cede 25% of their shares to the state or 'indigenous Zimbabweans' for free. The bill limits foreign ownership of mining companies to less than 50%.
government spokesperson uses the word 'populist', referring to government view and policy. The same article goes on to quote Philip Chiyangwa (then ZANU-PF MP for Chinhoyi) in addition to attacking Comberbach saying:

"we do not get instructions from secretaries but we are members of a legislature. How can a secretary ask us about a particular business when we have visited several of them? This shows that they are conniving to fix the Government by representing views of the few rather than populist views."

The Herald (25 February 2002).

Again Chiyangwa uses the word 'populist' in this statement in more or less similar sense as above.

Chiyangwa's cohort Kasukuwere's statement on the issue betrays the acquisitive agenda behind this vitriol. "If Lobels close we will buy it and ensure that indigenous blacks with expertise run the company for the benefit of the people". Kasukuwere, a business mogul, was promising to 'buy it' for himself and employ blacks. On his part Comberbach accused the two of abusing business. These two MPs went on to propose that price controls be extended to other products such as timber, steel and building materials. Chiyangwa has business interests in these products since he runs a property development company.

The technocrat-realist strand that is largely pro-'neo-liberal' common sense is easy to distill regarding both fiscal and monetary policies. In monetary policies the need to boost both local and foreign investment is not minced. More clearly, in a secret dossier of advice to the government, Gono warns against price controls, urges privatization of parastatals and cautions against continued land invasions and infringement of property right (Zvomuya and Gedye, 2007, 2). The monetary policies call for safeguarding land tenure and honouring Bilateral Investment Protection Agreements (BIPAs) to safe guard these investors and "remedying those BIPAs which were inadvertently infringed upon during the emotive stage of the land reform" (Gono, 2005, 23 and July 2006, 9). As has
become the style of Gono's policy pronouncements, always alluding to Mugabe's support for his policies, he went on to note that "our leadership share the same vision, as reflected by His Excellency, The President during His address to the nation on the occasion of the opening of the Sixth Parliament ..." (Gono, 2005, 23). Gono goes on to talk of remedial measures being implemented to restore good relations with the International Monetary Fund. In 2003 Gono quoted Mugabe as speaking against "the futility of trying to build our economy in an environment poisoned by pointless conflict and finger pointing" to show that his policy of international engagement is congruent with the President's. To this end Gono even set up a foreign direct investment unit to help promote and facilitate foreign direct investment (2003, 23). These however have not been successful because very few foreign investors have been forthcoming due to the prevailing political environment.

Where his policies are likely to clash with those of his populist peers in the ruling party, Gono appears to have learnt the art of his survival. His allusion to the President agreeing with him has more to do with flattering Mugabe's egomania than any material convergence of ideas. When it comes to sensitive issues where he may not easily find agreement with Mugabe, he resorts to this appeasement. One media report has pointed out that Mugabe is said to have told Gono "I am not stupid", in response to the latter's "devaluation [of the foreign exchange rate] by other means". Gono, knowing that his superior is not always in agreement with his techno-realist stance, has struggled to withstand, or circumvigate the ZANU-PF's authoritarian populist path. In this particular instance (when Mugabe is said to have told Gono "I am not stupid"), Gono had opted for a 'smart devaluation' in the name of the Drought Mitigation and Economic Stabilisation...
Fund, ostensibly to raise foreign currency to import food for drought relief (Gono, April 2007, 18). Under this fund a seller of foreign currency to RBZ would be paid 60 times more than the official rate value. This, like his "carrot and stick Export Retention Scheme" (Gono, 2003; 2004, 18-19; 2005; 2006; 2007), which rewards exporters who 'faithfully' repatriate export proceeds with a higher and more favorable exchange rate, or the "favorably higher" diaspora rate (July 2004, 23) is a polite way to devalue, knowing his superior is against devaluation.

The RBZ itself has not been without its own contradictions. On one hand Gono makes an avowed pledge to amputate "'deals' and speculative mentality' and inflict heavy loses on those "who had developed near cults in subversive dealings" hence "drill the death nail on the head of the foreign exchange parallel market'" (July 2006, 22). On the other hand, the RBZ is involved actively in promoting parallel market foreign currency dealings by deploying as many as 40 buyers in the streets of Bulawayo and 80 in Harare to buy foreign currency from the parallel market. In fact as it emerged it is RBZ's official secret policy to buy cash from the parallel market as seen by the firing of its CIO member responsible for buying of forex on parallel market for failing to remit to the Bank all the money he was getting from the parallel market. In June 2007 there was a near shortage of forex on the black market with the rand and US dollar gaining against the Zimbabwe currency. There was speculation that ZESA had bought large amounts of forex on the parallel market in order to settle its debt with external suppliers.

It is in this context – of the instrumentalisation of the state (Chabal and Daloz, 1999) – in which the increased deregulation, disorder and contradictions in the pronouncement and execution of state policy that the state has had to confront the increasing illicit trade in minerals such as gold and, most recently, diamonds. In the case
of diamonds in Marange, Lloyd Sachikonye notes the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe's (MMCZ) as a handicap in curbing illicit diamond mining and trade. Where it has attempted to stamp its authority, those efforts have been undermined by politicians with vested interests. Sachikonye quotes the *Mail and Guardian* as noting that; “At least three Ministers in Manicaland mobilised villagers to pan for diamonds after prospecting rights to the area expired. The diamonds were subsequently sold on the black market, bypassing the MMCZ” (2007, 5).

Gold constitutes more than 50% of Zimbabwe's total minerals exports (Gono, 2004, 15). In Gono's maiden monetary statement, the RBZ chief promised to raise gold deliveries by 30 tones annually. This saw a rise of 22 tones the following year but the deliveries have decreased in the subsequent years (Gono, July 2006, 27). During the first quarter of 2007 gold deliveries were 2, 76 tones marking a decline of 19% from 2006 over the same period (Gono, April 2007, 15). “Instead [Gono notes], the underworld markets of smuggled gold are reportedly flourishing, right under the country’s collective noses ... let us declare war against smugglers irrespective of who they are” (July 2006, 27). Who they are refers to the likes of Mnangagwa who works with the country’s most notorious gold dealer, Mac Milan, the Vice-President’s husband Solomon Mujuru, army brigadiers, Ministers, Senior police chiefs, members of the CIOs among other high ranking and low ranking state functionaries.

This chapter has entangled the context and factors leading to the highly unregulated production within which we can locate the increased illegal extraction of gold. It gives sense to what follows as it amounts to answering the question, how did we get here in the first place? The next chapter makes a closer inspection of how this accumulation process is unfolding in illegal gold mining. Broader themes and hypotheses for this study are impressed on and reinforced notwithstanding few overlaps. It
underscores the increased (ever increasing) informalisation of production, increased centrality of the party state and its contradictions and the outcomes thereof. The level, form and frequency of accumulation wars (violent clashes) at mining sites is alarming to say the least. Never to be fully measured by this study are also the social and environmental impacts of uncontrolled gold extraction.
Chapter 4
Disorder, Violence and Accumulation: The Case of Totororo Gold Smuggling

Introduction
The previous chapter has surveyed the unregulated nature of accumulation dominating Zimbabwe’s political economy. This chapter narrows to give a micro view of the same. It looks at the role of state and non-state actors, contradictions in state policy and practices, emerging accumulation networks, conflicts, processes and outcomes. A close study of gold panning in Totororo area, rural Kwekwe, is examined. In so doing, the chapter will highlight the empirical reality of accumulation and the illegal gold trade as it relates to the crisis and party-state. Conclusive analysis is carried out in the next and final chapter.

Illegal gold mining and trade have virtually eclipsed formal mining and agriculture as the main economic activity in Kwekwe and its surrounding rural spaces. The prevalence of panning is reflected in local language with prostitutes for instance being referred to as ‘sex panners’ (The Midlands Observer, 24 October 2003, 4). The emerging picture mirrors and epitomizes the unregulated and disorderly accumulation pattern unfolding in post-2000 Zimbabwe. So extensive and unordered has been gold panning in Kwekwe that trenches have been dug on national roads, railway lines, public and private premises. Indeed, the city of Kwekwe has earned the title ‘Makorokoza (illegal gold miners) capital’. In October 2001 the Midlands Observer estimated the number of people involved in gold panning activities in Kwekwe and surrounding areas

Whereas prostitution is one of the social vices that has flourished due to economic hardships in general across the country, the predominantly male dominated gold panning activities have made Kwekwe a thriving market for prostitution in comparison to other centers.
to be +/-600 000 (24 October, 2001). The paper further quoted Blessing Chebundo, Member of Parliament for Kwekwe Urban (MDC), as expressing concern over the exploitation of gold panners by ruling party politicians.

The Totororo area lies approximately 60 km north east of Kwekwe, close to the ghost township of the former Empress Mine. Empress mine was owned by the Canadian Company, Falcon Gold Zimbabwe Limited. Though extracting mainly nickel, Falcon’s Empress Mine also obtained chrome, copper and gold. Falcon Gold had several mines in Zimbabwe, namely Venice Mine lying between Kadoma and Empress Mine, Dalny in Chegutu, Golden Quarry Mine in Shurugwi and Old Nic Mine in Bulawayo. Empress Mine closed in 1989 while Venice and Dalny mine were closed in 1998 (see map on page iv). The closures are said to have resulted from viability problems (former mine worker, July 2007).

The outcome of these closures has been increased illegal gold mining activities and informal settlements in the former mines. Most of the mine workers continued to stay at the mine’s township, eking out a living from farming and informal merchandising. Also, after Empress Mine’s demise the government started allocating land for small scale mining as part of the indigenization initiative. This program had started slowly in the 1980s but got a renewed impetus in the 90s with the swelling of the indigenization movement (Phimister and Raftopoulos, 2004, 360-361, former mine worker July 2007). However, because mining proved costly and less rewarding than gold buying most of these small scale miners ended up acting as middleman, buying gold for resale to RBZ

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56 This 600 000 figure might be an exaggeration and should be treated with caution considering that KweKwe Metro in 2005 had a population of 60 000 according to Central Statistics Office. However it points to the level of increase in panning activities.
from local subsistence farmers who would engage in alluvial gold panning during the off-agricultural season (Cheater, 1984; fieldwork interview, 2 July 2007).

As the economic crisis worsened towards the end of the 1990s it became relatively easy and profitable for the small scale miners to buy from illegal miners encamped at Falcon Gold’s closed Empress and Venice Mines57. These illegal miners were mostly former mine workers at these mines. It is worth noting that the scattered nature of gold deposits in the area makes it unprofitable for capital intensive medium to large scale commercial mining ventures. Such a precondition thus advantages illegal mining over settled, long term mining. A relationship of interdependence thus ensued between the small scale miners and illegal panners, as the latter also relied on the former for mills to crush the gold-bearing stones.

While the increase in panning activities around Totororo was noticeable towards the late 1990s, the post-2000 period is without precedent. A number of factors stirred a wave of heightened illegal mining and trade of gold. Increased economic decline and a high rate of unemployment meant that gold panning provided a survival alternative for both subsistence farmers and the unemployed. Secondly the poor climatic and geological58 conditions of the Totororo area predisposed local rural subsistence farmers to other survival strategies. Seasonal crop cultivation alone can never be a reliable and adequate sole means of subsistence. The drought years, such as in 1992, hit Totororo so hard that gold panning activity increased.

57 That these former mine workers remained encamped at the closed mines does not necessarily mean that they carried out illegal mining activities at them. Their activities started from the mine’s vicinity to surrounding areas, using the former mines as bases for shelter and convenient settlement. The former mine’s pits and tunnels have since been exhausted.

58 The area is too rocky for crop cultivation and rainfall patterns are poor.
Thirdly and conjuncturally decisive were the unregulated forms of accumulation that came with the chaotic land reform and the ruling party's emergent authoritarian populist power retention strategies. This authoritarian populism saw ZANU-PF allowing illegal miners to take over the disused Globe and Phoenix Mine, about 20 kilometers from Totororo, as part of the 2002 presidential election campaign. Though state policies later changed and started to enforce order in these areas, the early intervention gave confidence to panners, and spurred similar activities in Totororo and surrounding areas. Farm workers made redundant by the fast track land reform and those made jobless due to the subsequent closure of industries joined former mine workers in gold panning. Approximately two out of every five panners involved at Totororo were formerly employed, either in town or at a farm. The other component among illegal miners is constituted by employable youths from both near and far, and former Venice mine workers.

In 2003 an approximately five gram stone of gold was discovered in a maize field in Navhata (a rural village nearly 9km from Totororo). The news spread, triggering a scramble. The field was dug up and left disfigured, with trenches and pits all over. A reasonable quantity of gold was obtained, but was exhausted quickly. This triggered a gold 'rush' leading to extensive gold hunting by locals, mostly through the use of copper wire to detect the presence of gold. In the same year a trench believed by Totororo villagers to have been formerly dug and later abandoned by Germans was discovered. The man who initially discovered the tunnel claimed, falsely, to have exclusive mining

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59 This is derived from the field work, which surveyed 57 illegal miners.
60 Two copper wires are held parallel in the arms above the ground. One moves around holding them. Once they come to a place with gold deposits the wires will automatically come together as if through a magnetic pull.
rights to the tunnel. It was soon discovered that he did not have any entitlements, and another gold rush ensued. This tunnel was so lucrative that it attracted hundreds of people from all over Zimbabwe. At its peak in 2005, every province of Zimbabwe was represented at the site (Anonymous3, Interview, 2007).

*Tunnels of Death!*

The year 2005 marked the peak of gold panning in Totororo. Operation 'Restore Order', or *Murambvatsina*, which saw the destruction of illegal shacks and informal business structures in towns (Potts, 2006) added to the increase in panning activities. Hundreds within Totororo’s closest urban center Kwekwe and Kadoma were left jobless and homeless (*Midlands Observer*, 3 June 2003, 1). These joined the ever swelling numbers of squatters at former Falcon mines of Venice and Empress who were surviving on illegal gold panning. The tunnel soon extended to about 100 m in length. It started as a single tunnel but because there were too many people, the survival of the fittest rule set in. The strongest, known as *Mbimbo* (strongman, mafia leader/warlord) started to use their power to muscle others out. The weak had to either work for the *Mbimbo as pamuza/pamupamu* (forced labourer) or had to seek approval from them to assess the tunnel.

Alternatively those too weak to physically contest the main and more lucrative tunnel (referred to as Kunyanga) started to open a different shaft (later referred to as Kwamainini) along the same gold belt (see diagrams below). The two tunnels later merged as panners continued digging, creating a ‘mine’ ceiling of more than 8000 square meters of land mass suspended underground. Except for the first few meters at the mouth of the tunnel the distance between the floor of the tunnel and the roof is between 50cm
and 1 meter. This means that miners working inside the tunnel have to crawl for most of the time. It has literally become a death trap. Below are diagrammatic representations of the tunnel.

Fig 5: Vantage (Arial) View presentation of the Totororo underground shafts

Fig 6: Vertical (Side) Diagrammatic illustration of the Tunnel

Fig 7, 8 and 9 Tunnel Entrance
During the gold rush's peak as many as 60 panners would be underground at a given time (anonymous 2, 'interview, 3 July 2007). This further widened the underground mine roof area. Given that there are no support pillars to support the suspended mass of earth this is very risky. Hundreds of people were involved in this rush, mostly in panning gold bands known as Makorokozas. They consisted mainly of locals, but ranged from as far away as Venice, Gokwe, Kwekwe, Mberengwa and several other parts of the country as news of the gold finds spread. With a density of 90%-98%, the quality of the gold in this area and rural Kwekwe in general is said to be the country's best (anonymous 5, interview, 10 July 2007). As occurrence of higher quality gold increased the tunnel was further widened, extended and deepened until it reached the water table. So determined are the panners that they even dive into the water forming at the end of the tunnel to set dynamites to crack the gold-bearing rock.

Claiming he had a license to mine the tunnel, a man identified as Camfort (whose wife is ZANU-PF Secretary for administration Emmerson Mnangagwa’s sister-in-law) hired a compressor which was used to draw water out of the tunnel. Comfort later withdrew his compressor because people were not paying for fuel and other charges to use it. Moreover he feared that the tunnel would collapse anytime (Anonymous 3, Interview, 9 July 2007). After withdrawing the compressor in February 2007, he started developing his own tunnel just beside the main tunnel. Those who did not have a compressor continued digging the old tunnel despite the pool of water that had formed. Tragically on the 7th of July 2007, at the time of this research, a 20 year old gold panner drowned in this pool. His death was never registered.
The young man, a son of the ZANU-PF youth coordinator in the area was only discovered dead the following day. News of his drowning came from a distant village, which suggests that a fellow miner who had accompanied the young man had fled after the tragedy. It is likely that he broke the news while managing to hide his identity. The parents had of course started to worry after the boy did not return home. The father together with other members of the community then went to the tunnel. Three panners went into the tunnel where they found the dead body. In such circumstances the procedure according to Zimbabwean law is to call the paramedical police, or police sub aqua unit to extract the drowned body and write a scene report. This was not followed. Despite the insistence by one Kraal Head and some sections of the community who included a school Headmaster and some teachers that law be followed, the body was retrieved by fellow miners and carried home for burial. The father – who also serves in the police reserve force – insisted that the matter be covered up and so it was.

The death was never reported or registered. The two local police officers present were also keen on having the matter put to rest unceremoniously. This was because they feared any investigation would find them culpable because they had failed to execute an earlier order from their superiors to close the shaft. The police had justification for this hastily and unprocedural decision. They argued that there was only one police officer at the Empress station. Lack of fuel also made it unlikely that specialized police units would come in time, if at all. Nor was there a telephone to phone them to come. All this is not without truth. More importantly it points to the lack of order characterising post-2000 accumulation patterns. A similar tragedy had occurred a month earlier at another illegal mine in Bhamala. Police officers manning the mine fled after the incident because they
were not officially supposed to be there. They were manning the area unofficially and outside their normal duty in order to control access to the tunnel, taking bribes in the process.

*Structures and Networks in illegal Gold Mining*

The form, structure and organisation of illegal gold panning activities are opaque. On face value one may easily dismiss gold panning in Zimbabwe as merely an activity for rural dwellers battling to cope with poverty. On the contrary, to analyse this phenomenon means going further than the fact that for some, the benefits of gold panning go beyond rural survival. To limit it thus would conceal the role of Zimbabwe’s party state and those connected to it. Moreover, going beyond such a perspective would, though outside the present scope of this thesis, enable us to start to envisage the role played by international trade links in fueling illicit activities. Within our present limits, it is safe to conclude that as in the land reform exercise and other policies, those connected to the party state have benefited. Nonetheless, it may be prudent to suggest in passing that since most of the gold does not enter Zimbabwe’s formal market, but is smuggled out of the country, external connections in this illicit gold trade might be the ultimate beneficiaries. Without a ‘Kimberly Process’\(^{61}\), it is easy to smuggle ‘blood gold’ out of the Zimbabwe border and for it to enter the international formal trade system.

Yet the opacity of illegal gold mining can be dissected by examining its organization. There are ‘syndicates’ consisting of a group of miners working together\(^{62}\).

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\(^{61}\) That is, an internationally instituted mechanism to curb illicit diamond trade by making sure every diamond in the market can be traced back to its source. Although this process is imperfect and diamonds continue to be smuggled, it has been argued that it has gone a long way in reducing and making difficult illicit diamond trade.

\(^{62}\) A cursory examination of the illegal gold mining language uses reveals a lot about the social relations evolving out of illegal gold mining. For example terms like ‘front’ suggest someone is secretly behind the illegal mining deals, whereas terms like *Mbimbo* (a feared strong man leading a mafia) suggest conflicts of
These groups are distinguishable from individual miners who may have made illegal mining a permanent vocation or those who engage in the practice infrequently. In most cases, those making illegal gold mining and trade a permanent vocation operate in groups unless they are gold buyers. Permanent panners operating individually are mostly local youths. People from other areas travel and operate in bands. These are nomadic panners which, as shall be proposed in the next chapter, suggest a labour force of a new type. These move from one area to another when gold is exhausted or once they hear of a place that has high gold deposits. At the time of this study in mid-2007 these bands had migrated from Totororo to a new place called Bhamala, about 9km away, because more lucrative gold finds had just been discovered.

Syndicates vary from organized and permanent ones to impromptu alliances of convenience. Impromptu syndicates normally arise where local gangs need to withstand or muscle out 'intruders'. These are also common among the nomadic panners as a way to deal with police and competition over access to panning sites by rival groups. There are estimated to be more than eighty organized permanent syndicates in Kwekwe alone. These are characterised by claims of legality, suggesting an elitist formation. They are often relatively stationary and involve a big chief connected to the state working in alliance with a regional business partner and/or local individuals. These syndicates are often known to have distinctive leaders, who either operate openly or as front men for a government or party official.

In the case of the above tunnels in Totororo, there were two organized syndicates competing for access to the gold belt. These are the 'Mazenge' or 'Mnangagwa' and
'Matongo' or 'Razor wire'. Emmerson Mnangagwa is the ZANU-PF Secretary for Administration. He is responsible for managing the ZANU-PF companies, a position which gives him enormous power in the ZANU-PF accumulation matrix. It is this position that has given him good links in the 'capital world' (Africa.com, 2008) especially with ZANU-PF's white capitalist friends. Matongo is one among several Totororo area Headmen. The tunnel is situated in his kraal. Mazenge is the local villager who occupies the homestead within which part of the gold tunnel lies. He has been 'incorporated' into the Mnangagwa syndicate as a strategy to give legitimacy to the Mnangagwa claim against the Matongo claim. Comfort, the Mnangagwa syndicate's 'front man', is Mnangagwa's brother-in-law. Unlike most panners, this syndicate does not sell gold to local buyers. It has been suggested that its members take the gold to Mnangagwa, who ensures that the gold is smuggled to the more lucrative South African market through Zimbabwe's most famous gold dealer Mac Milan and other connections (Anonymous 1, 2007). This claim has been difficult to validate.

The other syndicate is known unofficially as the 'Razor Wire' because of the Razor Wire fence that was erected, ostensibly by RBZ's gold buying arm, Fidelity Printers. It is clear that there is intense competition between the two syndicates. Circumstances surrounding the erection of the fence point to the manipulation of RBZ by individuals connected to the bank and the regional mining commissioner. For over a year since the erection of the fence no official buying has been conducted by Fidelity. In fact, despite the fence being put up in June 2006 Fidelity has not been present and there is no indication that it will establish itself anytime soon. The area is guarded by Fawcet Security Company, which is linked to the Gweru businessman working with Matongo.
The fenced area is in fact the Headman’s homestead lying just about 50 meters opposite
to Mazenge’s homestead, on which Mnangagwa’s syndicate is camped. The Matongo
syndicate is digging a parallel tunnel to the Mnangagwa syndicate and structures to crush
gold have been erected. The erection of the fence is not uncommon for Fidelity. It has
been RBZ policy to establish such gold buying stations at gold mills and places were gold
is mined informally so that panners will be forced to bring the gold to Fidelity once they
have panned.

While local people think that RBZ is establishing a gold buying centre, according
to the Headman this is not the case (Matongo, Interview, 5 July 2007). In the first place
the fenced area is the Headman’s homestead. According to the Headman, he is in a
mining syndicate (partnership) with James, a gold dealer based in Kwekwe. He claims that initially RBZ wanted to establish a gold buying centre, but that changed. As proof he has a prospecting license and claim registration certificate obtained from the mining commissioner. The involvement of a Kanyati RBZ security official, and one Patrick Madzorere, linked to the security company Fawcet, which is known to have links with the ruling party, further raises eyebrows. What shows upon serious scrutiny is that the two competing syndicates are in fact involving members of the ruling elite. The Matongo syndicate has the support of RBZ senior officials, a Gweru businessman who is a ruling party member, and a former Midlands provincial mining commissioner once based in Gweru who probably fast tracked the legal paper work to legitimize the claim in order to counter the Mnangagwa group. The Mnangagwa syndicate is undoubtedly backed by Mnangagwa. A similar scene in this prevailing chaotic mode of accumulation has been noted in the previous chapter, where members of the ruling elite clashed on a farm. More recently the media has reported on clashes in Mashonaland West were ruling party provincial leadership has clashed with National Security and Land Affairs minister, Didymus Mutasa.

From this case, it is possible to draw networks of accumulation flows as shown below. A simple commodity chain analysis (Gereffi et al, 2001) would reveal the following:

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63 In what could be a case of accumulation rivalry in ZANU-PF, the mining commissioner was once arrested for corruption on the awarding of mining claims certificate. He was released and later transferred to Masvingo.
Fig 12 - The Blue arrows represent the expected 'official' flow of gold when it is fed into the formal state system, while the black show the most common, but unofficial flow.

However the above gold flow representation is simplistic and _prima facie_. The illicit trade network is more complex than a simple flow diagram would allow us to contemplate. It is more revealing to talk of accumulation networks as shown below.

**ACCUMULATION NETWORKS DIAGRAM**

Fig. 13.
Away from the simplistic flow represented supra, the network is complex. Players at a given stage may not be what they seem to be. They may be mere representatives. For example, the so-called local buyers are more often than not front men acting on behalf of big chiefs in government, party or business. As a result, the stages of production may or may not flow as depicted in a straight line. Whilst elites employ buyers, they can also buy either directly or through conduits in regional centers. Furthermore, they can be involved in illegal gold mining on the ground, as noted in the case of the Mnangagwa and Matongo syndicates above. The same Mnangagwa, for instance, is said to be closely connected to 'Mac Burden and Mac Milan', reported to be some sort of national buyers responsible for exporting virtually 'all illegal' gold out of Zimbabwe (Anonymous 1, Interview, 17 June 2007). Also, independent buyers often export directly to neighboring countries especially South Africa, making the accumulation network even more complex.

It may also be noted that these networks are being constructed within the context of a party-state and an environment of crisis characterised by a thriving black market and selective enforcement of law and order. In all accumulation interactions, the party-state has become ever more salient; either in its enforcement of regulation or as elites manipulate positions of influence in their own or their clients' favor. The salience of the party-state is attributed to the fact that unlike in other degenerate states where a political economy of conflict obtains, in spite of the crisis, Zimbabwe has retained a coherent and functionally cohesive state superstructure. This superstructure can be used by those connected to the state to selectively apply laws or refrain from doing so to their and their
clients' advantage. It has thus become a rule that, for one to successfully engage in illegal gold trade or any other informal economic activity reliance has to be on the state's monopoly on coercion characterised by selective enforcement of the laws.

**Violence and Warlordism**

Spontaneous and organized violence is a common feature as rival panning groups contest for access to mining sites or resist police raids. The lines of contest manifest a local - 'foreign' (from other regions or villages) dichotomy, registered syndicates against unregistered or even between registered syndicates (which we have said are normally controlled by elites) themselves. These violent clashes can involve as many as 400 panners and often result in serious injuries and deaths (*The Midlands Observer*, 3 October 2003, 1). On the last week of November 2003 Amaveni residential area in Kwekwe was turned into a 'war zone' as local panners fought with the 'Vampire group' of gold panners from Zhombe (near Totororo) (*The Midlands Observer* 7 November 2003). They were fighting over mining rights granted by council. The Vampire group, which is said to derive its name from its mode of operation, has allegedly 'caused havoc and instilled fear in the registered syndicates'. Notably, the Vampire group is alleged to have links with "powerful individuals within the police force" and thus "does its activities without fear of reprisals from law enforcers" (*The Midlands Observer*, 2003). This explains the locals' resort to taking law into their own hands.

Conflicts and subsequent violence have not always manifested at the gold mining sites, but through other social platforms. In Totororo most violent clashes at local shops have been traced to 'the tunnel'. It has not been uncommon for panners to be beaten to
death by communities for alleged involvement in criminal activities (The Times, February 28-March 6, 2003). In a letter, a Midlands Observer reader expressed concern over Chipinda, a mafia leader in Kwekwe. He alleged that Chipinda had been terrorizing residents of Kwekwe. Before his arrest and three year conviction for murdering his girl friend “Chipinda had become so powerful … and so untouchable that the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) would even ‘salute’ him”. The fighting groups normally act under the guidance of a leader (Mbimbo). Some of the leaders have even gone to the extent of hiring private security companies or even the ZRP, to wipe out rival panners.

The above scenario, where police are sometimes hired by individual illegal miners against rivals, has left the force bereft of respect from the miners. As a result police have suffered at the hands of determined gold panners, even where impartial action is taken. Over the last five years the police have carried out not less than twenty raids at the Totororo tunnels. In a number of instances, especially in 2005, panners have mobilized and violently resisted police raids. In one incident a police officer held a meeting with panners only to afterwards find his bicycle tires deflated (Anonymous 3, Interview, 9 July 2007). Violence against the police is by no means unique to Totororo. Recently an online Zimbabwe news publication reported the beating up of two policemen by illegal diamond miners in Chimanimani, eastern Zimbabwe, resulting in the death of one of the officers.

Fig 14: Mthombeni (Axe used in violent clashes by Gold Panners).
The violent contestations have not been met without an attempt to order and create a harmonious coexistence between panners. It is at this instance that one sees the salience of the party-state again. Notwithstanding that violence in itself is an attempt towards ordering, attempt towards order have mainly been through the police, chiefs and Headman and ZANU-PF party structures. This attempt at order and regulation has not been without contradictions. In fact as shall be observed in the following section, it has saved to reinforce contradictions that have strategically benefited those connected to the party state.

**The Party State and Illegal Gold Mining**

The state's attitudes and actions on illegal mining activities have been haphazard and at best ambivalent. This mimics a national pattern, as with the case of diamonds in Marange (Sachikonye, 2007). At the initiation of the government with sponsorship from local businessmen meetings are held between the police, the Zimbabwe Small Scale Miners organisation, the Buyers Association (ZIMSSBA) and the Ministry of Mines and the local government authorities ostensibly to deal with illegal gold trade (The Midlands Observer, 3 June 2003 and 27 May 2005, 1). All these have come to naught. After one such meeting there was an instruction from police to close the Totororo illegal mining tunnel, but at the time of writing (31 December 2007) this had not happened.

Police have sworn to be tougher with illegal miners. According to the Midlands Observer, by May 2007 ten people had died in police raids and 26 000 had been arrested since the launch of operation Chikorokoza Chapera (literally meaning 'illegal mining has ended') in 2006 (Zimonline, May 14, 2007). The 14th February 2003 edition of the
*Midlands Observer* (pp1) reported a police crackdown on illegal gold panners in an operation code named “operation *Mariyawanda* (too much money) nabbing as many as 900 panners, destroying illegal settlements and burning over 300 shacks at Venice mine”. This operation was in fact carried out by members of the Military Police, Soldiers and the Prison Service jointly. Of note, the paper suggested that at least one of the raided areas was a support base for Zimbabwe’s opposition MDC. Police were heavy handed, firing teargas into the tunnels. Despite these efforts gold panning thrives.

At one point in 2005 a police raid led to the arrest of 33 at the Totororo site. These people included Chief Samuel Samambwa. The previous week 30 miners in Amaveni in Kwekwe had been arrested. Chief Samambwa and the 32 other accused were sentenced to three months imprisonment but the option of a fine saw none of these spending even a day in prison. The fine for illegal gold panning falls far short of acting as a deterrent, given the limited survival alternatives faced by most people. In one instance 99 gold panners were arrested and sentenced to one month imprisonment or a Z$100 000 fine. By end of the same day they had all paid the Z$100 000 fine (*Midlands Observer*, 1 March, 2005). This raises questions about the seriousness of law enactors in discouraging illegal mining and trade. Moreover, government efforts to end gold panning have been reactive rather than proactively setting up institutions to deal with minerals trafficking permanently. In the same way most police raids are reactions to violence between miners rather than crackdowns on illegal gold activities.

In a typical case of instant taxation, far from cracking down on illegal gold mining the police are now cashing in on miners by managing access to mining sites. At the time of this research a tunnel in Bhamala, had become the new centre of gold rush
and was heavily guarded by the police. The police were charging $3 million (equivalent to a policeman's monthly salary) in July 2007 - approximately RSA R200 per hour spent in the tunnel. Panners, grateful to the police for managing access, thus creating order and averting violent conflict, pay and enter in groups of eight to ten each turn. Police presence at the tunnel increased drastically from the first day of manning the place. Starting as three, the police officers increased to six the second day and fourteen the third (Anonymous 2, interview, 3 July 2007). So lucrative has been this arrangement that police officers started to compete. They operated in two day shifts in order to accommodate each other.

Spending as much as twelve hours manning the pit translates to ZW$36 million. When shared among ten officers each can take home an untaxed ZW$3.6 million more than a police officer's monthly salary. Thus in this case, the police, while not selling or extracting gold, have become beneficiaries because of their position in the state. The policemen were also deserting official duty to guard yet another mining tunnel at St George, about 12 kilometers from Totororo. These appear to have made an arrangement with their immediate superiors. While these superiors do not go out to man the mines, they get remittance from juniors who have to keep them pleased in order to be ‘ redeployed’ to the lucrative tunnel. More than once these police officers have run away when other more senior superiors arrive from Kwekwe (Anonymous 3, interview, 3 July 2007).

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64 The high rate of inflation and exchange rate make this figure vague. With a July 2007 parallel rate of Z$15 000 to R1 the 36 million is reduced to R2400 and 3.6 million is reduced to R240.
65 The tunnel at St. George hospital was left after its owner committed suicide. Sakala, the deceased owner is said to have been directed to the once abandoned mine by a German national whose grandfathers operated the mine long ago. Sakala was making a fortune until he committed suicide after being tricked off 1 kg of gold by some Nigerians. He had even managed to electrify Chief Samambwa's home (Anonymous 3, interview, 3 July 2007).
This system goes further to net in some in the ruling party provincial leadership.

One ex-combatant wrote to the *Midlands Observer* as follows,

> I am writing in connection with corruption happening at Gaika Mine. I am a war veteran. The recently posted Support Unit Police boss is making hefty amounts of money through the Amakorokozas. He is said to be charging about ZS$3 000 000 per syndicate and getting a monthly lump sum of ZS$50 000 000. This is a circle involving some ruling party members, it’s so boring when I am making a living from the only ZS$1 000 000 gratuity I am being paid ... (War Vet, Kwekwe, in *The Midlands Observer*, December 2 2005).

One can not help noticing the emphasis, ‘I am a war veteran’, and the writer signs off as ‘War Vet’. On a close scrutiny the ‘war vet’ seems to be saying ‘I must not be left out, being also a wars vet and member of ZANU-PF’. ‘How can I continue to survive on a meager ZW$1 000 000 when others are making as much as $50 000 000?’ Again the salience of the party state in accumulation is evinced in the language of the letter.

Where the police have not acted to order access to mining sites, ZANU-PF party structures have been used to bring some order. In Totororo the ZANU-PF youth leader Machazo has been active in managing access to the tunnel in the name of organizing youths. He is also a member of the local police reserve. Machazo’s imposed authority on the tunnel derives from his position in the party. For him and many others like him, ‘our resource that is everyone’s resource’ excludes those not members of ZANU-PF. He was instrumental in covering up the death of his son in a tunnel to avoid specialized police investigation. Similarly ruling party projects in the name of the state such as ‘Women in Mining’, have without shame, excluded those in the opposition.

While the above scenario of instant taxation by the police is criminal, it is congruent with the obtaining state practice regarding illegal mining activities. The general direction of practice seems to be that of finding means to accommodate these illegal mining activities rather than arresting those who carry them out. At a meeting
involving the Ministry of Mines secretary, the city of Kwekwe Mayor, small scale gold miners, and buyers, the Ministry of Mines promised to overhaul the mining legislation to “empower the historically disadvantaged small scale miners” and to regulate illegal gold mining and trade, (The Midlands Observer 3 June 2003). “We are not saying that they should cease their activities forthwith, but that they should be wary of the dangers associated with disused mines and shafts especially now that the rain season has started”, (Midlands Observer, 24 October 2003, 2) the police spokesperson for Kwekwe commented after a miner had drowned in a disused mining tunnel at Turtle mine in Silobela.

This apparent practice of accommodation is however contradicted by police heavy handedness on illegal miners, as well as state pronouncements from the national to the local level (Midlands Observer, 14 May 2007). At a more formal level, the state has vacillated between banning the illicit minerals trade altogether and controlling and managing it. That in 2007 all small scale miners were ordered to stop mining until the Ministry of Mines sorted out issues of registration suggests a shift towards regulation and accommodation of those likely to be in the illegal mining trade.

The city of Kwekwe Executive Mayor, while applauding small scale miners’ contribution to the national economy also called upon buyers and miners to sell their gold in the formal channels through Fidelity Printers to avoid smuggling of gold. This will not succeed because of the wide disparities between parallel market price and official prices offered by RBZ. Miners and buyers argue that they can only sell to RBZ at a loss. In July 2007 RBZ was buying at $1, 2 million per gram while the parallel market buyers were
paying $3 million per gram. The RBZ offer price was even lower than the local buyer’s purchase price from illegal miners, yet RBZ expected the buyer to sell to it.

Furthermore, when the buyers and miners sell to RBZ, unlike parallel market buyers it has not been swift in its payment. In August 2007, RBZ was struggling to pay US$17 million to miners because it lacked foreign currency. According to the Chamber of Mines by end of June 2007 gold producers had not been paid since May 2006, forcing them to operate below 20% capacity (The Standard, 1 July 2007, B1). Moreover the support price quickly loses value due to inflation, with some commodities’ prices increasing by 818% in less than two months (B1). As a result even though the RBZ has been increasing the gold support price with every policy statement, this has not helped much. The July 2004 monetary policy increased support price from Z$71 000, to Z$85 000, (21), which was further increased in July 2005 from Z$175,000/gram to Z$230,000/gram, but this has not helped in curbing the gold parallel market. As long as these disparities exist, coupled by policy contradictions illegal gold trafficking will persist.

The RBZ position on gold panning activities, Chikorokoza (illegal gold miner), is less satisfactory for a bank known for its avowed hard line stance against illicit economic activities. The bank’s practice of giving special licenses to designated agents to buy gold where the activities are concentrated in the name of ‘decentralization of Gold buying’ is self-contradictory and self defeating (Gono, 2004, 28). In his July 2004 statement Gono notes that “176 custom millers and 38 Agents are working together with Fidelity Printers and Refiners (the gold buying arm of RBZ)” (Gono, 2004, 20). The rationale was that this would ‘reduce grey market activities’ but by giving buyers – most of whom are
surrogates for senior ZANU-PF officials – licenses the bank is tolerating illegal miners and thus encouraging panning, effectively contradicting its clampdown on gold trading activities. Moreover, most of the buyers remain unregistered. According to one buyer based in Totororo (who works closely with a ZANU-PF councilor and deputy Mayor for Chegutu) there are very few if any registered buyers. Ironically, the RBZ has no problems accepting gold from these buyers during the rare times they sell to the bank.

In sum, the case of informalisation of production in gold mining poses intriguing questions, some of which potentially create a dilemma for the state. These questions form part of the business of the next chapter.

A lot of what is manifesting in the crisis is a result of political decisions. It is a result of a patronage based mode of appropriation which stems from problems of primitive accumulation. It is thus compelling to devote the coming final analysis to make an incisive assessment of the central premise of this work, that Zimbabwe's crisis has much to do with the uneasy road to market civilization as presided by a party state whose acquisitive instincts have further entrenched the resultant informalisation of production. It is hoped that in so doing, the paper will address the question of whether what is occurring is a case of disaccumulation rather than accumulation. To do more than is called for, in the interest of further research the same chapter will comment briefly on the socio-environmental outcomes of the crisis and its concomitant forms of accumulation.
Chapter 5:
Conclusion:
Whither the Zimbabwean State?
Progressing Towards Market Civilization or Regressing to Barbarism?

The burden of this chapter is to juxtapose the empirical survey presented in the last three chapters with the theoretical postulations made in this study’s formative chapters. This is by no means an easy task. As with any social science research, much of what has been presented herein will remain subject to manifold interpretations. However, this epilogue, in fact this whole study - owes answers to specific questions that have been raised at the outset. For that reason the prime focus will be to unpack those questions as reflected in the chapter title.

The evidence presented hitherto makes the above question a vexatious one, more so given the limited time span for the study. Questions of whether the direction of present economic phenomena indicates progress towards or regress from ‘market civilisation’ requires more time than the present study can afford us. For that reason the contradictory motions evinced are to be expected, albeit making this assessment even more cumbersome. Nevertheless, this does not render futile this exercise. In fact, it aids in understanding how specific conjunctures like political and economic crisis combine with the nature of the state to shape dynamics of accumulation. It is the aggregate sum of such moments spread across the historical plane that define accumulation in the long run. The author recognizes some overlaps to the objects of this study. These are briefly highlighted...
below. The aim is to shed light if not placate interest for further research on the social and environmental impacts of gold panning activities.

The socio-environmental impacts of the unregulated mode of wealth accumulation can never be fully measured by a study such as this one. Yet, in the course of the study, albeit more concerned with dynamics of accumulation and how those connected to the state are benefiting, the visibility of the social and environmental impacts of the processes is too glaring for one to overlook. Both operational and disused mining pits are all over the land surface. These pits are merely abandoned after use and the likely erosion would create gullies but for the very low rainfall the area receives. More so the unclosed pits are a hazard to livestock normally left to graze in the open. The open cast mining of gold also comes with wanton destruction of vegetation in this predominantly semi arid area. As mentioned in chapter four efforts involving the Ministry of Mines, local government and panners to try and rehabilitate the environment have been restricted to in and around the city of Kwekwe. Yet even this limited effort has had minimal success.

There are social vices that come with a high population concentration. Sexually transmitted diseases have been prevalent among panners. This is even more worrying among local female school children. Clinic data suggests that young school girls were having unprotected sex for money with illegal gold miners (Sidhakeni Clinic Log Chart, January 2004 – December 2006 and January-June 2007). At the height of gold panning in Totororo in 2005 prostitution became so rampant that a local businessman had to construct booking houses to accommodate prostitutes flocking to Totororo from other areas (Anonymous 4, Interview, 2007). Teachers complained of increased absentions,
especially for boys who would go to mine for gold instead of attending school. According to the headmaster this was both good and bad: good in that the children would thus raise money to pay school fees; bad in that they would fail to attend school, with some completely ceasing to attend and get married at a young age. Parents and teachers complained about youth indiscipline. Teachers, expected to be an affluent middle class and traditionally commanding respect if not envy in Zimbabwe, especially in rural areas, lost the respect of their pupils who suddenly found themselves more economically empowered than their teachers. Incidents of theft within the community were also common. For these impacts the community associates panning with moral degeneracy.

**Party State and Economic Social Stratification**

The mode of appropriation that has dominated the current crisis period in Zimbabwe expresses itself more eloquently in the unfolding social configurations. These configurations have been contradictory in many ways. This reflects the chaotic manner in which accumulation has taken place over the past eight years. The first contradiction stems from the growing lack of distinction between party or political office and accumulation. Political office corresponds with accumulation more and more. The party state thus collapses into a localized capitalist oligarchy. When one can accumulate wealth overnight, one can pass from one class to another. Overnight one can wake up a land owner, though this can be an illusion as long as the property rights are not secured.

As the economic situation has worsened the party-state patronage system has become more entrenched. The party and its beneficiaries are increasingly growing conscious of the utilitarian value of managing appropriation as a method of control and
buying the electorate. In this sense, and when restricted within the scope of the Zimbabwe party-state accumulation mode, a triple-layered socio-politico-economic stratification can be envisaged. One has on its apex a class, somewhat difficult to define but combining business, public, private and political office be it in party or government - ‘comrades in business’ (Capps, 2007, 30) - involved in both legal and illegal accumulation activities. This class might also fit Miliband’s definition of a ‘power elite’ (see Chapter 1 page 15).

Below the ‘power elite’ is a stratum that could tentatively be labelled a ‘middle class’. This group does not meet the conventional definition of middle class. One would think here of business managers and public servants, positions which come with the requisite learning this group lacks. That this group lacks these attributes underlines the contradictory alignment of classes that has come with the Zimbabwe crisis. However this group’s function in Zimbabwe’s political economy of crisis imitates that of a ‘normal middle class’ or the conventional ‘new petty bourgeoisie’ (Poulantzas, 1975, 209). In it one finds the linkman or front man, a conduit managing illegal deals for the elite. Sometimes this is a managing partner. Often this is the village based gold buyer, local Chief and Headman. This group is also identified by its location at the or close to the resource site where it represents the big chef who is either ashamed or too busy to be there. In a few cases members of this group have ended up being serious accumulators in their own right. The lower strata consist of gold panners and militia on one hand and subsistent farmers who double as infrequent panners on the other.

Note that Gavin Capps uses the term ‘comrades in business’ in reference to ANC Struggle notables benefiting from Black Economic Empowerment specifically in Diamond Mining.
A Crisis born class of accumulators

The crisis born accumulating class or perhaps what the Zimbabwe Independent columnist Muckraker has termed a ‘vulturine class’ (July 13-19, 2007) no longer appears subliminally but out in the open. Since the genesis of the Zimbabwe crisis and its accompanying ‘grab and take’ economics this class has become self-reproducing and self-perpetuating and thus self-expanding. This expansion owes to the informalised and deregulated mode of production such as the chaotic land reform that saw a lot of ZANU-PF members and war veterans getting farms. Added to this is the selective enforcement of laws on criminalized economic activities which has widened access to rents by those connected to ZANU-PF. The outcomes of the party’s primary elections conducted to choose party candidates for the 29 March 2008 national elections suggest that this class now shapes politics in ZANU-PF (The Standard, 2008; NewZimbabwe, 2008). For the ruling elite and their network of beneficiaries the economic utility of political office has become starker than ever. In that regard, political contests have collapsed into a form of what Bayart has famously called la politique du ventre (the politics of the belly) (Bayart, 1983; Bayart et al, 1999, 8).

The new/crisis-born class of accumulators suggested in chapter one of this work to be embryonic and perceivable ‘in a mirror dimly’ is thus no longer in the distance. In the case for this study one local gold buyer (an ex-mine worker at the former BHP Hartley Platinum mine in Chegutu) has accumulated a considerable number of assets and opened grocery shops. In the initial stages of his business he had the support of Mariyapera, a prominent ZANU-PF member, businessman and councilor in Chegutu well known for terrorizing residents and opponents with his militia. There are many other
cases of people who have broken new ground out of the Zimbabwean economic chaos. In Totororo alone, there are more than five buyers who have had similar success, all connected to party and big chefs in the government. The gold buyer referred to above, once a political novice, is now reportedly becoming more active within the party local structures.

As noted in the third chapter, these majestic rags to riches stories go beyond illegal mining to all unregulated economic activities that have come out of the Zimbabwe crisis. In a case of agglomeration of economies other businesses have arisen and thrived with the blooming of illegal gold mining. In the peak of Totororo’s 2005 illegal gold mining activities, the local shopping centre saw the construction of booking houses for accommodation as demand arose due to the influx of migratory panners and prostitutes targeting them. One local businessman, a headmaster, constructed two new grocery shops and a bottle store. However, with the passing of the gold boom these businesses are now on a decline. With panners having moved to other areas, the businesses lack a basis for continuity. The discontinued demand that had been generated by the gold rush has left ghost structures.

It is safe thus to suggest that one challenge in these accumulation stories is their sustainability. At the lower levels of the party state evidence of both accumulation and disaccumulation run concurrently. These crisis connected accumulation opportunities seem to be incidental and transitory. The case of Totororo businesses dwindling after the gold rush is identical to case of the former Zimbabwe Dairy Board worker–come–businessman, who after having been thriving for more than three years was forced to close some of his shops due to government price control blitzes. In the long run, the
informalisation of productions which has conceived this new class of accumulators may be the very threat to its continued economic survival. No matter their reliance on the ruling party, the livelihoods of these entrepreneurs can never be certain and guaranteed unless laws are applied more consistently. It is no wonder the ruling party has virtually become a platform for accumulation contests. In this context the assumption of party and/or political office becomes a means to ensure economic certainty, as fragile as that is.

That the ruling party has collapsed into an arena for accumulation battles manifests itself through court battles over the ownership of grabbed farms, politically motivated economic crime charges and counter charges involving party chefs, verbal and violent militia clashes at accumulation sites, and more recently, violent clashes during party primary elections. In a typical case of old elites hanging themselves with their own rope (Moore, 2004, 159) a number of senior ZANU-PF officials have lost the right to represent their party to some members of this new class they created. Increased economic and political contestation in an unregulated context has made recruitment and hiring of militias a necessity for senior party members. In the gold panning these militias have often double as partial employees and part chief militias.

A Labour force of a new type?

One may not finish discussing progress towards or regression from 'market civilization' without looking at the issues of the labour force. Historically one characteristic of the take off to capitalist development is the alienation of a majority of people from the means of production - land. This alienation creates surplus labour since the alienated are left with no resource to reproduce from but the sale of their labour. Is there such a process in Zimbabwe? The racialized land reform exercise which saw Mugabe grabbing farms from
minority whites and redistributing to 'landless blacks' would have us believe otherwise.
If land was taken from a few white capitalists to a black majority, who hypothetically were formerly sellers of wage labour since they had been hitherto alienated from land, effectively a reverse of primitive accumulation or 'disaccumulation' occurred. On the other hand, some got land and thus started on the road to small commodity production – in principle.

However the redistributive extent of Zimbabwe's land reform exercise still remains debatable. In effect the process has been contradictory. Thousands of blacks were reportedly given land (Moyo, 2007) while at the same time thousands of farm workers were left jobless and excluded from land. From this study a considerable number of these have found solace in illegal gold mining. Moreover the government cronies and party heavy weights have been the main beneficiaries, some becoming multiple farm owners. Land grabs instigated by top members of government and military have not halted despite pronouncements at several times that the process has successfully ended. Characteristically these grabs have not targeted white owned farms only but even ones owned by blacks and ruling party supporters.

It is possible to rethink the position of the illegal gold miner and the illegal gold buyer in the informalised and unregulated production cycle in the context of the question of surplus labour and the logic of access to and alienation from land resources. Indeed, one must spread the analysis to include not only the gold miner, but the also militiaman and even the parallel market forex dealer working for and enjoying the protection of the ruling elite. However, the gold miner serves better in this illustration because of his interaction with the land resource. An analysis of those involved in illegal gold mining
and the nature of their involvement persuades one to contemplate a labour force of a new type. It is mostly young people aged between 17 and 30 who form this group. Children as little as 14 years make isolated but extreme cases. Clearly the overwhelming involvement of the active age group which under normal circumstances should be employed elsewhere suggests that panning has become a long term vocation for those unemployed. The qualification of these as a labour force rests in that though they have access to, they do not own any means of production.

The nomadic panner depends on access to a resource i.e. a panning site that is not his. Though communally accessible, this resource is not even communally owned as is often made to appear the case. On the part of the state it is in fact the unresolved and/or often conflicting postulations with regards to issues of such property rights that result in lack of clarity and often haphazard and half hearted enforcement of rights. The 'communal' aspect to 'everyone's property' makes it possible for 'anyone' to access these sites. This lack of clarity stems from the conflict and ambiguity between traditional ownership structures and capitalist norms as a nation titters back and forth between retention of pre-capitalist modes or transforming into a fully fledged market (Rutherford, 3, 2001, Cheater, 3-14, 1984). In our case study, at one point the local chief Samambwa found himself at odds with the police and mining ministry when he encouraged locals to access the mining tunnel in Totororo on the basis that it is 'their land' from the traditional norms standpoint. In the untrue, rather hypocritical sense which conflates with ZANU-PF populist rhetoric a mining site is portrayed as a people's resource.

Whereas these sites are accessible to 'everyone' making them seem public goods, they are in fact not owned by anyone in the local community. Even though the
ZANU-PF populist rhetoric has often taken a form which implies everyone's property, practice shows it is the ZANU-PF ruling elite that really has assumed ownership of 'everyone's' property. On the basis of its capacity to use coercion to regulate access to these sites as it will, the Zimbabwe party state becomes the de-facto owners. The panner is thus dispensable. Access to 'every one's' resource can be restricted or forfeited altogether whenever the party-state decides.

By having this controlled access to the means of production (mining sites) at the grace of the party-state the miners do not own anything but their labour power. In selling the small grams of gold, what the panners are selling is in fact their labour. This makes more sense when one considers that quite a significant number of these miners are former mine and farm workers who, whether by choice or exclusion have not gained land from the fast track land reform. For that reason, the 'real' capitalists are the members of the ruling elite who have control of the means of production through the party-state. The elite can either choose to operate more directly at the mine through a syndicate or have bands of nomadic miners to mine for him and pay wages in the name of buying, without entering a formal work contract. The miners have little or no control over both the selling price and access to means of production. The 'real capitalist' permits the illegal miners to access 'his' resource without hindrance thus making them a labour force of a new type. To make this plain one may argue that if the panned gold was not reaching the employer (ruling elite or those connected to the party-state) they would have been more purposeful in curbing these activities. This 'labour force of a new type' forms one of the several unique twists to the tail of primitive accumulation suggested earlier in the first chapter.
The 'Gold Bank'

While there is no doubt that the disordered style of accumulation dominating the Zimbabwe crisis has been tapped into mainly by those connected to the party and state, one may argue that it has also provided survival nets for the general rural population. For instance, one may note a phenomenon that may be regarded as the 'gold bank'. Rural subsistence farmers have been able to tap into gold panning when ever they want cash in case of unforeseen financial requirements. For instance when a homestead receives a visitor, the host simply asks a young adult man, to go 'kumwena' (the hole/tunnel) or 'kumari' (literally to money), meaning to go and pan and sell a few milligrams of gold to buyers at the local shops so that they can have cash to host a visitor. In this case, it may be suggested that they are literally cashing in on the tunnel, withdrawing from a gold bank.

In this context one may need to locate the rural subsistence family within this unregulated production circle. In the area of study gold panning is not a new trend, but the years of economic crisis have further increased the activity. The increased illegal mining owes more to the migratory miners and involved members of the ruling elite than to the traditional rural subsistence farmers. There is no doubt that in drought years there has been a trend towards relying on illegal gold panning. However this has often been more restricted to alluvial river bank panning. It has already been noted that the groups mainly involved from the local village are the youths.

In the case of the elderly – male and female – household and homestead headers, involvement in gold panning comes as a result of poor rainfall and shortage of farming inputs for which they have relied on the state. In recent years the ZANU-PF government
has rarely been able to provide these. Where it has, distribution has been based on party allegiance. The reduced crop production has meant increased reliance on donor hand outs, but these have not been enough. Moreover the present political environment has constrained donor activities, as noticeable in Totororo. The result has been to force villagers to rely more and more on the cash economy than before. This abets the emergence of what is suggested to be the 'gold bank phenomenon'.

The presence of gold and mushrooming activities in the panning has not transformed the majority of villagers into wealth accumulators. They have remained essentially subsistence producers. When they go to extract gold this has been to meet a specific house-hold demand like school fees, to buy basic food necessities, or to prepare a 'nice meal' for a visitor from town among other incidental needs. Most rural dwellers do not run any bank accounts (few Zimbabwean still do, due to hyper inflation). The way villagers relate to the gold resource amounts to making the local gold tunnel a bank from which to withdraw money when they need cash.

Although stated above in a limited sense the gold bank phenomenon can be applied to Zimbabwe’s general economy of crisis or what may be a ‘survival economy’ \(^6\). The picture that unfolds is that the unregulated production has favored a hand to mouth mode of survival (Mawowa, 2006, 5). In as much as rural dwellers resort to *kumwena* for subsistence, subsistence ‘business’ economic activities have become common in urban areas especially through illegal marketing activities. These activities are not done consistently or to generate profit *per se* but to raise cash for a particular moment. The

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\(^6\) The term ‘survival economy’ was used Lubna Nadvi, a lecturer in UKZN’s Political Science department, to describe the Zimbabwe case. She was commenting on the November 6, 2007 presentation I did on Zimbabwe’s political economy of crisis.
only difference between the urban case and the rural case is that the urban dwellers rely more on cash than do rural dwellers. As a result subsistence urban marketers engage in their activities more frequently. In that sense, the unregulated mode of production that came with the crisis and the high levels of unemployment have provided for a gold bank mode of survival both in rural and urban areas.

The gold bank phenomenon further adds to the ambiguous nature of the direction of accumulation trends emerging at the behest of the current Zimbabwe economic crisis. It portrays a growing class of accumulators alongside a concurrent increase in subsistence economic behaviour. The trend to increase subsistence economic activities signifies a domestication of production which is the opposite to the classical development of capital. In the build up to industrialization, domestic/cottage industry gave way to big industry. The opposite of this seems to be happening in Zimbabwe. Closure of industries is resulting in unemployment, which in turn, given Zimbabwe’s open informal market, has seen most redundant workers and those never employed resorting to subsistence entrepreneurship. This is appears to be a clear reversal of capitalist development, while at the same time the formation of an accumulating class indicates ‘something’ comparable to development of capital. Thus appear the contradictions.

**Last Word**

Zimbabwe appears locked in a winding process of primitive accumulation and state formation. The obtaining unregulated ‘illegal’ mode of accumulation and appropriation, initiated in the absence of vital political national consensus, as has been the case in the past phases of Zimbabwe’s capitalist development is subject to reversal and reordering.
With questions of property rights still unresolved, gains of the current process are not beyond reversal. With the MDC repeatedly promising to reverse the order, bring to book and return business to normalcy a new political order may be set to banish the system (Tsvangirai, 2008). This partly explains the tendency by war veterans, pro-ZANU-PF business people and other beneficiaries to coalesce increasingly around the political establishment.

Even with a new leadership in ZANU-PF, the possibility of reordering seems inevitable. Recent developments that saw former finance minister Simba Makoni challenging Mugabe for the 29 March 2008 election suggest a challenge to the disorder that has been allowed to dominate accumulation in the past eight years. There is therefore a growing consensus in respect to issues of protecting property rights both within and outside ZANU-PF. Any post-Mugabe leadership is thus likely to challenge the current system of patronage and Zimbabwe not long from now is likely to see a return of international capital. The return is slowly taking place behind the cries of the crisis as seen by recent activities by the 'oldest capitalist' Lonhro (Mberi, 2007; Kaseke, 2007).

While the unregulated nature of accumulation has favoured the new party state club of accumulators it is not good for them in the long run. Historically primary/primitive accumulation has been characterised by hook, crook and violent dispossessions (Marx, 1972, 432). This is comparable to what is obtaining in Zimbabwe. The difference however is that in the former case the state has often moved in to provide institutions to support regulate and protect legally and coercively these gains (Perelman, 2000; Anderson, 1947). Once taken off this class need protection institutionally and otherwise. This is lacking in Zimbabwe because the state is unstable. It is difficult at this
stage to legitimate whether politically or legally accumulation processes that have taken place thus far. That is the greatest handicap of the post colonial state.

Questions of property ownership mean that there can be no full embrace of the logic of markets. The contradictions in government policy on empowerment and legal enforcement mean that question of property rights and capturing of the so called parallel economy into the formal economy will remain unresolved. The sustainability of the class and accumulation outcomes of the current crisis will thus rely more on the legal structure that will emerge in the next political dispensation. There are chances that not all will be reversed but there is also no doubt that the current situation will be subject to reordering. A radical shift towards established large (international) capital that may blend with the new class of accumulators is a possibility. Of course this new class of accumulators risks being swallowed or elbowed out by the more established capital – constituted by former white capitalists and international capital, depending on whether the state will protect it or not.

It may be that as the problem of state formation rages on, Zimbabwe is in for an elongated process of primitive accumulation. For long blood will continue to drip. On the other hand the disillusionment with Mugabe’s redistributionist rhetoric might lead to an extreme embrace of the market – as suggested by the open arms approach to dealing with international capital by Simba Makoni ZANU-PF group and MDC. In the end it may be that after all the dust settles the real winner will be the ‘international capital’ which will return to ‘rebuild Zimbabwe’ from the ashes of crisis.
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