University of Kwa-Zulu Natal

Peacekeeping Bodies’ in Africa: An analysis of MONUSCO and SADC in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

By

Nokulunga Luthuli

(206520548)

Supervisor: Kalpana Hiralal (Associate Professor)

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Social Science in the Postgraduate programme in Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa

2016
DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own work. All citations, references and borrowed ideas have been duly acknowledged. It is being submitted for the Degree of Master of Social Sciences in the College of Humanities, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa.

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Nokulunga Luthuli                                           Kalpana Hiralal (Associate Professor)
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Date                                                        Date
DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to the people of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

“Mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to mankind.” –John F. Kennedy
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to first and foremost acknowledge my parents, my father Mr Phillip Mzwakhe Luthuli and my mother Mrs Patricia Bakhani Luthuli, for their unconditional love, words of encouragement and unwavering support. My siblings, my sister Zandile Princess Luthuli and my brothers Thamsanqa Cyril Luthuli, Zamani Luthuli and Bongani Luthuli, for their motivation and understanding throughout the writing of this dissertation. I will never forget the sacrifices my sister made for me.

My appreciation goes out to my supervisor, Professor Kalpana Hiralal, for her kindness in her willingness to supervise me following a few hiccups with my previous supervisor(s). Thank you ever so much for your guidance, patience and dedication from the very first day we met.

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A special mention to Samukelisiwe Dube and Thabisile Gwamanda for being my greatest cheerleaders and number one supporters, your support even when I felt like all odds were against me is immensely appreciated.

Last but not least, I would like to thank God my creator, he who knew me before he planted me in my mother’s womb. Indeed nothing is impossible with God.
ABSTRACT

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a nation characterized by severe armed conflict. The first phase of conflict began in 1996, resulting in the overthrow of Mobutu in 1997 by Laurent Kabila. While the second phase of conflict began when Rwandans invaded the DRC and backed new rebellion forces against Kabila. Kabila then turned to members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for support. Subsequently, in August 1998, SADC intervened for the very first time in the DRC and its intervention resulted in the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999. A month later the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) by its resolution 1258. MONUC’s initial mandate was to observe the ceasefire; ensure the disengagement of all forces; and maintain close liaison with all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement. However, through a series of subsequent resolutions, the UNSC expended MONUC’s area of responsibility to include supervising implementation of the agreement, and performing multiple additional tasks.

On 1 July 2010, UNSC by its Resolution 1925 renamed MONUC the United Nations organization stabilization mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). MONUSCO was mandated among other things to protect civilians and support the DRC government in its stabilization and peace consolidation effects. Nevertheless, the DRC continues to be mired in intractable conflicts. The security situation remains extremely volatile and peace remains elusive. While the western part of the country enjoys relative calm, the eastern regions consistently experience high insecurity and repeated incidences of violence. Therefore, this study examines the role of peacekeeping bodies’ in Africa. In particular, the study analyses the role of MONUSCO and SADC in the DRC conflict. It examines the socio-economic and political conditions in the DRC prior to their arrival. The study identifies and explains the factors that gave rise to their deployment. It evaluates their successes and failures as per their mandates and responsibilities towards combating conflict in the DRC. The analysis of both peacekeeping bodies’ highlights new insights into peacekeeping partnerships between local and international peacekeeping bodies’ and the challenges and constraints they endure in conflict ridden areas. The study concludes by establishing lessons from the research to contribute to policy making and initiatives.
The study argues that in situations of conflicts in which regional and international bodies’ such as SADC and the UN intervene in order to ensure peace, these bodies’ need to make clear as well as develop their operational doctrines and not allow differences and divisions to hinder their conflict resolution initiatives in order to help facilitate more lasting peace and security. It argues that partnerships between local and international peacekeeping bodies’ are vital for the success of peacekeeping operations and combating African conflicts. These bodies may have different roles but they play an equally important, sometimes mutually re-enforcing role in peacekeeping and conflict resolutions in countries such as the DRC. The study concludes that there is a need for solid and practical relationships between local and international bodies’ in order to be effective in curbing both intrastate and interstate conflict that characterize the African continent.
### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>ALLIED DEMOCRATIC FORCES</td>
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<td>ALiR</td>
<td>ARMY FOR THE LIBERATION OF RWANDA</td>
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<td>AMIB</td>
<td>AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN BURUNDI</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>AFRICAN UNION</td>
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<tr>
<td>BINUB</td>
<td>UN INTEGRATED OFFICE IN BURUNDI</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNC</td>
<td>BI-NATIONAL COMMISSION</td>
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<tr>
<td>BTI</td>
<td>BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG TRANSFORMATION INDEX</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEI</td>
<td>INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION</td>
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<td>DDRR</td>
<td>DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, REPATRIATION AND REINTEGRATION</td>
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<td>DDRRR</td>
<td>DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, REPATRIATION, REINSERTION AND REINTEGRATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS CEASEFIRE MONITORING GROUP</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WESTERN AFRICAN STATES</td>
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<tr>
<td>EISA</td>
<td>ELECTORAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA</td>
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<td>EIU</td>
<td>ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>EUROPEAN UNION</td>
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<td>FARDC</td>
<td>ARMED FORCES OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO</td>
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<td>FDLR</td>
<td>DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF RWANDA</td>
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<td>FIB</td>
<td>FORCE INTERVENTION BRIGADE</td>
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<td>FNL</td>
<td>NATIONAL FORCES OF LIBERATION</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCTS</td>
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GECAMINES
GNP
HIPC
HRW
ICD
IDMC
IDPs
IGD
IMF
INPFL
IPI
IR
IRC
ISDSC
ISS
JMC
JPT
LNTG
MDG
MIBA
MLC
MOB
MONUC
MONUSCO
MOU
MRC
M23
NIF  NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE
NPF  NATIONAL PATRIOTIC FRONT
NPFL  NATIONAL PATRIOTIC FRONT OF LIBERIA
NUG  NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT
OAU  ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
ONATRA  NATIONAL TRANSPORT AGENCY
ONUB  UN OPERATION IN BURUNDI
OPDSC  SADC ORGAN OF POLITICS, DEFENSE AND SECURITY CO-OPERATION
PKOs  PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
PNC  NATIONAL CONGOLESE POLICE FORCES
RCD  RALLY FOR CONGOLESE DEMOCRACY
RCD-GOMA  RALLY FOR CONGOLESE DEMOCRACY-GOMA
SAAF  SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE
SADC  SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
SANDF  SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCE
SCJ  SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE
SMC  STANDING MEDIATION COMMITTEE
SNCC  NATIONAL RAILWAY COMPANY OF THE CONGO
SSR  SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
SWAPO  SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLE’S ORGANIZATION
TOB  TEMPORARY OPERATING BASE
UN  UNITED NATIONS
UNICEF  UN CHILDREN’S FUND
UNDP  UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
UNDPA  UN DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS
UNDPKO  UN DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATION
<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>UN OBSERVER MISSION IN LIBERIA</td>
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<td>UNPO</td>
<td>UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN SECURITY COUNCIL</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION .................................................................................................................. ii
DEDICATION .................................................................................................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................................... iv
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................... v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................... vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................ xi

CHAPTER ONE .................................................................................................................. 1
INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK....................................................... 1
  1.1 Background and purpose of study ................................................................. 1
  1.2 Statement of problem .................................................................................... 4
  1.3 Literature survey ............................................................................................ 5
  1.4 Aims and objective of the study ..................................................................... 8
  1.5 Theoretical Framework ................................................................................... 8
  1.6 Research methodology ................................................................................... 9
  1.6.1 Data collection ........................................................................................... 10
  1.6.2 Data analysis .............................................................................................. 11
  1.7 Problems/Limitations .................................................................................... 11
  1.8 Structure of the study ..................................................................................... 11

CHAPTER TWO ............................................................................................................... 13
SETTING THE SCENE .................................................................................................... 13
  2.1 Socio-Economic and Political Conditions in the DRC ................................... 13
  2.2 Factors that gave rise to MONUSCO and SADC deployment in the DRC .......... 22

CHAPTER THREE .......................................................................................................... 29
CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS OF MONUSCO AND SADC ......................... 29
  3.1 The SADC in peacekeeping in the DRC ......................................................... 29
  3.2 The MONUSCO in peacekeeping in the DRC ............................................... 33

CHAPTER FOUR ............................................................................................................. 41
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS ............................................................................................. 41
4.1 SADC and conflict resolution in the DRC ......................................................... 41
4.2 MONUSCO and conflict resolution in the DRC .............................................. 45
4.3 Local and international peacekeeping partnerships ..................................... 51

CHAPTER FIVE ........................................................................................................... 56

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................... 56

5.1 Summary ........................................................................................................... 56
5.2 Solutions/Transformation for conflict and policy initiatives ....................... 57

5.2.1 Integration and co-operation between SADC member states .................. 57
5.2.2 Pursuit of regional interests ...................................................................... 57
5.2.3 Clearer mandates ....................................................................................... 58
5.2.4 Provision of sufficient well-trained peacekeeping troops ...................... 58
5.2.5 The integration of rebel groups ............................................................... 58
5.2.6 Proactive responses ................................................................................. 58
5.3 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 58
5.4 Recommendations ......................................................................................... 60

5.4.1 Recommendation based on findings ....................................................... 60
5.4.2 Recommendation for further/future research ......................................... 62

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................... 63
1.1 Background and purpose of study

Peacekeeping is a concept that developed during the Cold War era as a means to authorize neutral military personnel to either physically separate conflicting parties or monitor a peace agreement that is supervised or supported by the United Nations (UN). These neutral military personnel were deployed in civil wars and wars between states as authorized by the UN, in consensus with the states or belligerents. However, the post-Cold War era saw neutral armed forces being sent to lesser inter-state conflicts as civil wars grew to dominate UN attention (Mays, 2012: 167). In similar vein, Fortna (2004) states that in the post-Cold War era, the international community and the UN have shifted further than monitoring the ceasefire of interstates, to monitoring and administering various aspects of intrastate peace processes (Fortna, 2004: 269).

Majinge (2010) argues that the concept of peacekeeping is made up of two major principles, namely the need to stop armed conflict for the creation of an atmosphere that is favorable for negotiations and the need to prevent the sudden occurrence of armed conflict after an agreement to stop fighting (Majinge, 2010: 465-466). In line with Majinge’s principles, Juma (2009) argues that peacekeeping does not bring about an agreement between conflicting parties. But, it always comes in after an agreement has been reached, to assist its implementation. However, this can only be possible if and when all parties to the conflict have agreed to momentarily stop fighting, and allow intervention by a neutral third party. It also creates an atmosphere that is conducive for the implementation of other terms of the agreement. “In the early days, it was anticipated that these objectives could be achieved without the use of force” (Juma, 2009: 6).

However, recent conflicts have witnessed more instances where UN peacekeepers are given authority to use force. Therefore, even though the UN peacekeeping strategy in civil wars has always been negotiated settlements and to persuade conflicting parties that “the use of force to resolve dispute will not succeed”, modern-day peacekeeping has become more than just the stabilisation of a conflict situation (Juma, 2009: 6). According to Okumu and Jaye (2010)
peacekeeping has changed so much over the years, to an extent that it now involves a variety of actors. Therefore, rights and responsibilities of peacekeeping in African conflicts are no longer limited to the UN. For instance, contemporary peacekeeping operations involve local actors and local ownership and partnerships to a very large extent. With earliest examples being the 1990 intervention in Liberia by the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the establishment of a African Union (AU) peacekeeping force in 2003 (Okumu and Jaye, 2010: 11).

ECOWAS intervened in Liberia by deploying its Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The Monitoring Group was deployed in Liberia as a typical traditional peacekeeping mission. Its operation began on August 24, 1990, at the Liberian capital Monrovia, comprising of 3000 West African troops. ECOMOG was mandated to evaluate the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) in administering and guaranteeing stern compliance to the requirements of the agreement to stop fighting by belligerent parties throughout Liberia (Tuck, 2000: 2). In the course of ECOMOG deployment, the mission became involved in a variety of operations that ranged from “protection of humanitarian aid; disarming of factions; cantonment; mediation; and peace enforcement” (Tuck, 2000: 2). However, it was through peace enforcement that ECOMOG was then able to establish a measure of stability that continued for just over two years, with the Monitoring Group in charge of Monrovia and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPF) controlling most of the rest of the country (Tuck, 2000: 7).

The AU intervened in Burundi by deploying the organizations Mission in Burundi (AMIB). AMIB was authorized amongst other things to “act as liaison between the parties; monitor and verify the implementation of the ceasefire agreement; and to facilitate and provide technical assistance to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes” (Boshoff and Francis, 2003: 41). According to Sifolo (2010: 137) AMIB’s deployment played a significant role in resolving tension in Burundi and establishing a favourable atmosphere for sustainable political resolution. AMIB created conditions that ensured the return of immigrants and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and prevented violent conflict through engaging in peacebuilding to lay foundations for reconciliation and reconstruction. Therefore, when the mission concluded its operation it had successfully created comparative peace to most of the country’s provinces, except for Bujumbura’s outer area which was faced with a rebellion by a rebel movement by the name National Forces of Liberation (FNL) (Murithi, 2008: 75).
There are a number of peacekeeping bodies’ that have intervened and are still intervening in African conflicts ever since the beginning of the post-Cold War era. These peacekeeping bodies’ have played different roles. They have had their fair share of successes and failures, depending on their mandates and responsibilities, amongst other contributing factors. Fortna (2004) notes that researchers and experts of peacekeeping have deliberated on the merit of these more “robust” and multidimensional arrangements of peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, and including their effectiveness in conflict ridden areas. But, such deliberations are hindered by the lack of thorough examination of the effectiveness of intervention by these bodies’. Therefore, there is no consensus whether they really resolve conflicts and bring about peace or not (Fortna, 2004: 269).

In light of the above note this study looks at peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It analyzes the role of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the DRC conflict.

The DRC is a nation characterized by two phases of severe armed conflict. The first phase of conflict began in 1996, resulting in the overthrow of the then President Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997 by Laurent Kabila (Yabadi, 2011:1). While the second phase of conflict began when Rwandans and Ugandans invaded the DRC and backed a new rebellion against Kabila (Cilliers and Malan, 2001: 7). Kabila then turned to members of SADC for support and gained backing from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Subsequently, on 10 July, 1999, the Lusaka peace accord was signed following the international community’s escalating pressure for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. However, the agreement was only signed by the six state parties, since the two main rebel movements, namely the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) both refused to sign (Koko, 2007: 33).

Signatories to the ceasefire agreement then requested UN presence to ensure implementation of the agreement, and in August 1999, 90 liaison officers and non-combatant personnel were sent to the DRC. Subsequently, the UN Security Council (UNSC) formed the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) through its resolution 1279 of 30 November, 1999 (Zeebroek, 2008: 1). Amongst other responsibilities, MONUC was mandated “to plan for the observation of the ceasefire and disengagement forces, and to maintain liaison with all
parties to the ceasefire agreement” (UNSC Resolution 1279, 1999: 3). Since then, the UN Security Council extended MONUC’s mandate and expanded its size in an effort to stabilize eastern DRC. The extension saw the mandate evolve to encompass the safety of non-combatants as first priority in an effort to deal with widespread violence against civilians (Holt and Taylor, 2009: 241).

The UN Security Council by resolution 1925 of 28 May 2010 decide that, as from 1 July 2010, MONUC would be renamed to MONUSCO. Amongst other things the mission was authorized “to ensure the effective protection of civilians and support the government of DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation effects” (UNSC Resolution 1925, 2010: 4-5). However, according to a report by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the DRC’s security situation remains awfully unstable. Conflict with multiple armed actors from across the region continues to aggravate mass displacements (UNICEF, 2014).

Therefore, this study’s objective is to examine the role played by peacekeeping bodies’ in Africa. In particular, the study will examine the role of MONUSCO and SADC in resolving conflict and peacekeeping in the DRC. It will examine their successes and failures as per their mandates and responsibilities towards combating conflict in the DRC. The examination of both peacekeeping bodies’ will highlight new insights into peacekeeping partnerships between local and international peacekeeping bodies, challenges and constraints they endure in conflict ridden areas. It will also highlight both successes and failures of peacekeeping bodies’ as opposed to selection bias by both opponents and proponents of peacekeeping, who tend to respectively point out only the failures or the successes of peacekeeping.

1.2 Statement of problem

The UN Security Council played a significant part by deploying peacekeeping missions in the DRC. Equally so, SADC has done a great deal by intervening in the DRC conflict since 1998. However, the DRC is continuously hindered by intractable conflicts. In spite of MONUSCO deployment and SADC intervention there is still ongoing conflict and violence in the DRC. Eastern DRC constantly experiences deepening insecurity and recurrent occurrences of violence.

Even though MONUSCO deployed in the DRC is the largest and most costly peacekeeping mission ever deployed by the UN Security Council in the history of UN missions, it has not
been able to curb the conflict in the DRC. In spite of its mandate to protect civilians, humanitarian workers and human rights protectors in imminent danger of physical violence and supporting the DRC government in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts, peace in the country is still elusive. SADC as a local peacekeeping body which is supposed to have better knowledge of the origins of the conflict and parties to the conflict in their member state has equally not been able to be an “African solution to an African problem”. Both MONUSCO and SADC struggle to maintain peace and security in the country.

Furthermore, if the conflict is not resolved it would then mean that both MONUSCO and SADC have failed to successfully implement their mandates and responsibilities towards combating conflict and creating a peaceful DRC. Therefore, this would serve as an addition to selection bias by opponents of peacekeeping who tend to focus solely on failures of peacekeeping without acknowledging any of its successes.

1.3 Literature survey

According to Dawson (2004) peacekeeping is a concept that is difficult to explain, as it may mean different things to different users. Therefore, owing to the variety of missions being defined, and the understanding and accepted meaning of the word, “peacekeeping” is used to cover an extensive variety of missions that frequently consist of peacebuilding and diplomatic peacemaking components. But most importantly, the core meaning of peacekeeping is the facilitation of a transition from a state of war to a state of ceasefire. Behr (2011: 40) supports Dawson’s view as she notes that peacekeeping is a term commonly used to define a variety of interventions. “Peacekeeping operations differ according to the intervening parties, the reasons for intervention, the methods used to intervene and whether they are initiated on a unilateral or bilateral fashion” (Behr, 2011: 40).

The International Peace Academy cited in Punga (2011: 5) refers to peacekeeping as “the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using a multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace”. According to Onumajuru (2005) the idea of peacekeeping is the intervention of an impartial international force in a conflict situation in order to establish a barrier between belligerent parties. Therefore, peacekeeping missions are basically applied means established
by the UN to control as well as regulate armed hostilities and enable their resolution by pacific means (Onumajuru, 2005: 15).

In light of the above accounts, it can be concluded that peacekeeping is a passage to conflict resolution. Such is also evident in the roles played by the four types of peacekeeping missions, namely observer missions, traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

Fortna (2004: 270) claims that observer missions are usually small in size and comprise defenseless observers. Traditional peacekeeping missions are slightly bigger and consist of lightly equipped armed units, frequently in addition to observers. They are normally mandated to utilize force, but only in self-defense. Multidimensional peacekeeping missions enhance the latter with big non-combatant units to observe elections and human rights, train or monitor police and from time to time temporarily govern the state. Peace enforcement missions are generally the larger and better armed of all four missions, as they are authorized to forcefully enforce peace. Fortna (2004: 270) also claims that the first three missions are founded on the agreement of belligerents and mandated by Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Whereas the forth mission does not require consent and is authorized by Chapter VII.

According to Fortna and Howard (2008) literature on peacekeeping has come in three waves. The first wave was throughout the period before the post-Cold War, concentrating primarily on peacekeeping in interstate conflicts. The second wave was motivated by the development of peacekeeping during early ages of the post-Cold War era. It reflects disappointment and concentrates mainly on failure and dysfunction, even though there are substantial cases of success. The third and current wave equally shows the growth of peacekeeping, however it now has to do with systematic and methodologically thorough examinations of simple empirical questions on the outcomes of peacekeeping as well as its bases. Contemporary empirical examinations have shown the efficiency of peacekeeping in upholding peace; however associated enquiries continue regarding “the use of force, transitional administrations, which organizations most effectively keep peace, perspectives of the “peacekept”, and effects on democratization” (Fortna and Howard, 2008: 283).

Paris (2003) argues that for the greater part of the Cold War era, the study of peacekeeping was something that was isolated in the field of International Relations (IR). However, it was
driven out of obscurity and into the mainstream of International Relations scholarship by a series of new operations that were introduced towards final years of the Cold War and into the early post-Cold War era in countries such as Bosnia, Somalia, Cambodia, Namibia, etc. Much of the early post-Cold War writing on peacekeeping included single case studies that were critiqued for lacking theoretical foundation. Since then, the study of peacekeeping has been motivated in part by the aim of ascertaining and clarifying conditions that make certain peacekeeping operations more effective than others as it has developed into a more clearly theoretical undertaking (Paris, 2003: 441-442).

Dawson (2004: 1) asserts that peacekeeping rests on three political principles, it calls for peacekeepers to uphold consent by the concerned state(s) and belligerents; act impartially; and non-violently. In line with these principles Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter forbids interference in internal affairs of a member state, outside of Chapter VII enforcement measures (UN Charter, 1945: 3). As a result, a UN peacekeeping operation can only intervene in internal affairs of a state that has approved the intervention and the entire peacekeeping operations. Also, if the UN wants to maintain peace, it has to be objective in its peacekeeping operations. It should refrain from using any form of force as it would be extremely difficult for the UN to still be considered as a neutral body if it engages in coercive force. Thus, it is for that reason that UN peacekeepers use of force is only limited to self-defense (Hilmarsdottir, 2012: 19).

Dawson (2004) claims that these principles have remained relevant ever since they emerged during the Cold War. Peacekeeping usually involves monitoring of force separations or ceasefires by military forces under UN command. With a few exceptions, they are positioned between belligerents who have agreed to stop fighting and have accepted the presence of the UN force. Peacekeepers are deployed to stabilize hotspots, defuse tensions, and help resolve disputes, whilst they risk being drawn into the conflict if they do not observe the three principles (Dawson, 2004: 1). In line with Dawson’s claim Van Der Lijn (2009: 3) argues that “an operation has the best chance for success if the parties have underlined their genuine desire for peace with a formal peace agreement”. Therefore, making consent an essential peacekeeping principle since a formal peace agreement is an official consent to end violent conflict by belligerent parties. Hence, in the absence of consent an operation can only implement its mandate by military force and if that becomes the case it is no longer regarded
impartial. It subsequently loses its peacekeeping character, as it would have crossed the line into peace enforcement (Van Der Lijn, 2009: 3-4).

Against this backdrop, it is important to examine the role of peacekeeping bodies’ in Africa. Therefore, in order to examine the research problem this study will pose and address the following research questions:

- What were the DRC’s socio-economic and political conditions prior to the arrival of MONUSCO and SADC?
- What factors facilitated the deployment of MONUSCO and SADC to the DRC?
- What were the successes and failures of MONUSCO and SADC in the DRC conflict?
- What are the lessons learned from the research to contribute to policy making and initiatives?

1.4 Aims and objectives of the study
The aim of this study is to analyze the role of MONUSCO and SADC in the DRC; and its objectives are as follows:

- To examine the DRC’s socio-economic and political conditions prior to the arrival of MONUSCO and SADC.
- To identify and explain the factors that gave rise to MONUSCO and SADC deployment in the DRC.
- To evaluate the successes and failures of MONUSCO and SADC in the DRC conflict.
- To establish lessons learned from the research to contribute to policy making and initiatives.

1.5 Theoretical Framework
This study will adopt the third-party peacekeeping approach. Mullenbach (2013) defines third-party peacekeeping as the deployment of military or civilian personnel by one or more third-party states into a conflict or post-conflict situation. Among other things deployment is for maintaining law and order, monitoring a ceasefire agreement, verifying the disarmament, demobilization, and disengagement of combatants. Fortna (2003) states that “one of the most significant developments in the management of international disputes since the end of the
Second World War has been third-party peacekeeping”. Another theory utilized in this study is the conflict resolution theory. Wani (2011) argues that conflict resolution has immense importance and relevance in present times, as social, economic, political, ethnic and other types of conflicts are prevalent. Conflict resolution as a mechanism of peace building, peacemaking and peacekeeping includes only peaceful methods and techniques for the maintenance of peace and security and to protect the succeeding generations from the scourge of war (Wani, 2011: 104). Therefore, Wani’s arguments are relevant for this study as there is great primacy and relevance of conflict resolution mechanisms to be adopted by both MONUSCO and SADC for the prevention of conflict in the DRC.

1.6 Research methodology

Research methodology refers to the various methods, techniques and procedures that are employed during the implementation of a research project. Methodology in the social sciences requires choosing the most appropriate theories, techniques and explaining models or paradigms which present a clear understanding of a question and phenomenon. The objective is to provide an analytical explanation of facts, realities or a situation that has been initially considered as a problem requiring resolution or raising questions that necessitates answers (Babbie and Mouton, 2001).

In the field of social sciences, two research methodologies are conventionally used when conducting research, namely qualitative and quantitative. Dependent on the type of study, the researcher may use either or both of these methods, known as mixed method. Therefore, this study uses a qualitative approach to investigate and interpret the role of MONUSCO and SADC in peacekeeping in the DRC. Denzin and Lincoln (1994) argue that qualitative research entails interpretation of occurrences in their natural settings in order to make sense of “collecting information about personal experiences, introspection, life story, interviews, observations, historical interactions and visual text which are significant moments and meaningful in people’s lives”.

Merriam (2009) notes that “there is almost no consistency across writers in how (the philosophical) aspect of the qualitative research is discussed” (Merriam, 2009: 8). She also adds that, in true qualitative fashion, each writer makes sense of the field in a personal, socially constructed way (Ibid). The qualitative researcher often is the instrument, relying on
his or her skills to receive information in natural contexts and uncover its meaning by descriptive, exploratory, or explanatory procedures.

According to Liebscher (1998) “qualitative methods are appropriate when the phenomena under study are complex, are social in nature, and do not lend themselves to quantification” (Liebscher, 1998: 669). On that same note Wiersma (1995) states that the strengths of the qualitative method include the fact that it enables researchers to explore complex occurrences in a holistic manner, it decreases the chances of researchers forcing their presumptions or prejudices, and conclusions are derived from the data (Wiersma, 1995: 212). Therefore, in this study qualitative research is most suitable as it will allow the researcher to holistically examine the role of MONUSCO and SADC without any selective bias and base its conclusions purely on the data analysed in the study.

1.6.1 Data collection
Data was collected through a desktop research method, which involved collecting and examining a variety of existing sources. The researcher focused on material related to the research questions and collected data based on both primary and secondary sources. According to Sekaran and Bougie (2010) a primary source is a document or physical object which was written or created during the time under study. Therefore, primary sources will provide more recent perspectives and developments of the DRC peace process in as far as both MONUSCO and SADC are concerned. Amongst other primary sources used by this study are public reports on conflict resolutions and peacekeeping in the DRC produced by both the UN and SADC which assisted in determining the role of MONUSCO and SADC in the DRC conflict.

Secondary sources are used to complement primary sources. They are utilized to get insight on where the conflict in the DRC began, where it is today and what role MONUSCO and SADC have played along the way. The main sources of secondary data for this study are in the form of scholarly works on conflict resolution and peacekeeping, they comprised books, journals, newspapers, internet sources and other documents of historical, political and military significance.
1.6.2 Data analysis
To analyze both the primary and secondary data; the study utilized the content analysis method of analysing data. According to Berelson (1952) utilization of documents frequently involves a specialized analytic approach known as content analysis. Sources for content analysis comprise any form of communication that is usually written, in the form of textbooks, novels, newspapers, etc. It is understood more amply to be a means for describing and interpreting the artefacts of a society or social group (Marshall and Rossman, 1995). The significance of content analysis is that it allows researchers to analyse huge amounts of data in an orderly manner. It also enables them to ascertain and define the focus of individual, group, institutional or social attention (Weber, 1990).

Hsieh and Shannon (2005: 1277) state that content analysis constitutes a very important part of the qualitative research approach and is used to interpret meaning from the context of the data text. Thus, the use of this approach was aimed to simplify and to clearly explain information specific to the study. It also allowed interpretations that can be validated through the use of other data collection methods.

1.7 Problems/Limitations
This study’s limitations are a result of insufficient reference materials and the challenge of retrieving sources on SADC peacekeeping in the DRC, as available material is mainly on peacekeeping in relation to UN peacekeeping missions. Even so, available material is mostly on MONUC and not MONUSCO which is the current UN mission deployed in the DRC. Therefore, it would have been much better if the study was done as a field research study in the DRC to investigate peacekeeping through interviews, focus group discussions and observations. However, due to the unavailability of funds such was not possible.

1.8 Structure of the Study
This study comprises five chapters:

Chapter One: This chapter is an introduction of the study. It gives an overall background and purpose of study; provides a statement of problem(s) so as to highlight why the study was conducted; includes a literature survey with research questions; briefly outlines the aims and objectives of the study; explains the importance of the study, methodology and research design and; outlines the problems and limitations and the structure of this study.
Chapter Two: This chapter will undertake the setting of the scene. It will examine the DRC’s socio-economic and political conditions prior to the arrival of MONUSCO and SADC. It will also identify and explain factors that gave rise to their deployment in the DRC conflict.

Chapter Three: This chapter will evaluate the challenges and constraints of MONUSCO and SADC in the DRC conflict. It will do so through assessing those factors that hamper their role(s) in peacekeeping in the DRC.

Chapter Four: This chapter is the discussion of findings. It will analyze MONUSCO and SADC in conflict resolution in the DRC. It will also highlight peacekeeping partnerships between local and international bodies’ and the challenges and constraints they endure in conflict ridden areas.

Chapter Five: This chapter is the concluding chapter. It will present a summary of the study and suggest solutions and transformation for conflict and policy initiatives. It will draw logical conclusions from research findings and recommend solutions to challenges and constraints faced by MONUSCO and SADC, as well as those of local and international peacekeeping partnerships.
CHAPTER TWO

SETTING THE SCENE

This chapter sets the scene of the DRC conflict. It starts by examining the DRC’s socio-economic and political conditions prior to the arrival of MONUSCO and SADC. It then identifies and explains factors that gave rise to the deployment of the two peacekeeping bodies’ in the DRC conflict. Overall, the chapter aims to provide insight around the origins, causes and context of conflict in the country.

2.1 The DRC’s socio-economic and political conditions

Colonization of the DRC by Belgium ended on 30 June, 1960. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) cited in Erero et al (2014: 3) the DRC was one of the most highly developed countries in Africa in the 1960’s, coming second after South Africa. However, just a few months after attaining its independence it plunged into deep political crisis and social instability (Tshiyoyo, 2012: 11). The DRC had very limited human and institutional capacity for good governance and even for establishing a functional government (Obidegwa, 2004: 4). As a result, it had been mired in conflict for well over a decade, with devastating effects on its civilian population (Carayannis, 2009: 6). Post-colonial DRC has been faced with deep-seated political, economic and social challenges, due to failure by its various governments to provide amicable solutions. Generally speaking, the DRC has not protected its territory and provided peace and security to its citizens, which are its most fundamental duties. (N’Gwambwa, 2011: 2).

According to Weijs et al (2012) when Mobutu took control of the DRC (then Congo Free State) he renamed it to Zaire, and established a system of governance in which he was seen as the centre of authority. As a result, he impersonalized the state by assuming the role ‘Father of the nation’, thus turning it into a neo-patrimonial state and ensured his power through using state resources to reward his supporters. This system of rewarding his supporters entailed placing them in leading positions, thus an accelerated increase in the number of public servants and employees of state companies (Weijs et al, 2012: 4). The Mobutu regime began with an assurance of prosperity and an end to conflict, but it instead became identified with corruption, repression, and failed social and economic programs (N’Gambwa, 2011: 2).
The state operated like a business project for Mobutu and his cronies. In 1990, he announced that Zaire would move towards democracy following political pressure from the international community, but he repeatedly delayed elections (Schoppert, 2013: 76). In the midst of nearly total bureaucratic collapse to form new relations with his followers and foreign actors, Mobutu claimed a growing share of French foreign aid. He manipulated and co-opted illegal trade as means to fund his influence and arbitrated ethnic conflicts in order to promote his cronies (Reno, 1997: 494). However, he did not attract an internal support base as he was a “pro-Western pond” (Cone, 2007: 91). Nevertheless, according to Putzel et al (2008: v-vi) Mobutu’s administration made considerable gains both in education and in health services. In the former it attained a 92 percent enrolment rate in primary schools and had a remarkable development of the secondary and tertiary education sectors. In the latter it radically expended education health personnel, achieve a 95 percent vaccination rate against childhood diseases and formed a primary health care system which was desired in other parts of the region.

Mobutu was succeeded by Laurent Kabila, who gained influence through revolutionary means supported by neighbouring states such as Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. When he took to office of the presidency in May 1997, he also changed the name of the country from Mobutu’s Zaire to DRC. Again like his predecessor, he too had a plan for the DRC and he assured that he would end conflict and developed the lives of his million followers (N’Gambwa, 2011: 2). However, conditions that had previously given rise to Mobutu’s authoritarian and exploitive type of leadership style resurfaced in the Kabila regime (Kabemba, 2001: 11). Therefore, “shortly after taking office Laurent Kabila nullified the Transitional Act, abolished all political parties and took monopoly of executive, legislative and military powers” (Baroncelli, 2013: 4). He also turned his back on his foreign supporters and applied ethnical nepotism by hiring supporters who shared his Katangan ethnicity to top political positions. As a result, his administration did not receive widespread acceptance, as he drew support from only a small base of Katangan backers (Cone, 2007: 91-92).

Laurent Kabila was later succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila following his death in 2001. At the time of his death, Laurent Kabila had not ended conflict in the DRC and therefore misery remained a way of life for the Congolese. Both he and Mobutu did not honor the promises they had made, and part of the reasons for both of them was their incompetence. Another issue was accountability, as the two came to power by force they were not well received by
the Congolese (N’Gwambwa, 2011: 2). According to Tshiyoyo (2012: 13), Mobutu and Laurent Kabila were leaders imposed on the Congolese people by imperialists. In line with Tshiyoyo’s assertion, Mamdani (1998) states that Mobutu “was put in place and kept there by Western interests”. His successor, Laurent Kabila, ascended to power through revolutionary means with the support of neighbor states. Therefore, Congolese had never had the chance to elect any of the presidents into office (Cone, 2007: 91).

The complex history of disorder and weak governance left the DRC as one of Africa’s poorest and least developed countries. This was despite the states opulent endowments of both natural and human resources, and a large economic potential. Out of all African countries it naturally interacted with, the DRC did not only suffer from political instability, but it also suffered from negative economic growth and deteriorating social conditions for almost two decades (Vaillant et al, 2009: 4). Akitoby and Cinyabuguma (2004: 5) argue that despite having rich endowments of both natural and human resources the DRC had a generally awfully poor economic performance. Forty years were lost to complete maladministration of the economy and lack of overall governance. Maton, Schoors and Van Bauwel (1998) cited in Akitoby and Cinyabuguma (2004: 5) claim that the evolution in real gross domestic products (GDP) as from 1960 can practically be separated into five sub-periods:

(a) **1960-65**: political chaos and economic disruption;
(b) **1966-74**: stability and growth;
(c) **1975-82**: economic recession and debt crisis;
(d) **1983-89**: adjustment under the IMF and stop-and-go policies; and
(e) **1990-2000**: hyperinflation and collapse of the economic and political system.

According to Akitoby and Cinyabuguma (2004: 6) the period between 1960 and 1965 experienced a drop in the overall economic output, with real GDP dropping by approximately 4 percent. The decline was caused by interruptions in the transport network as well as the withdrawal of numerous foreign entrepreneurs after a political uproar, civil conflict and the unsuccessful withdrawal from the Katanga province. However, there was stability and growth in the period between 1966 and 1974 as there was an escalated participation by the state in the prolific spheres of the economy. The growing national economic regulation of the
economy was complemented by a remarkable economic development, real GDP increased by an average of 5.1 percent per annum.

Public investment increased by four times because of the La Politique des Grands Travaux\(^1\). In 1971, Plan Decennal 1971-80 (the first Mobutu plan) was introduced with an objective of an increased annual real GDP growth of approximately 7 percent. In light of this background, the government moved towards the nationalization of all small, medium and large foreign enterprises between 1973 and 1974. However, a reversal in copper prices and the 1973 oil crisis both caused adverse terms of trade shocks that shortly revealed the centralized economy’s severe limitations (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004: 6).

The period from 1975 to 1982 witnessed a debt crisis that caused an economic recession with overall real GDP dropping by 12 percent. The crisis was caused by misguided fiscal plans and public investments of the early 70s. In 1975, the DRC ceased repaying its debts and asked for an IMF support plan to rescue the country from its economic crisis. However, due to the general economic decline, the “public investment plan was grounded, money invested in useless expensive possessions was lost, and the upkeep of infrastructure and productive capital was either neglected or suspended” (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004: 7). Consequently, fiscal activity went through serious deterioration that was made worse by the 1977 and 1978 Shaba Province (now Katanga Province) invasions (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004: 7).

However, in the period between 1983 and 1989 the government began implementation of a solid stabilization and liberalization plan in September 1983. Its objective was to improve fiscal conditions and eradicate significant misrepresentations that developed during the previous period. The plan had a positive effect as real GDP improved by an average growth of 2.6 percent per annum from 1984 to 1986, following a 2.2 percent decline in 1982 (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004: 7). In 1987, in cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank, the Mobutu administration introduced a structural adjustment plan that was intended for establishing a foundation for sustainable economic development and external economic position. The plan benefited from improved terms of trade, mostly showing a strong increase in copper prices early that year. Therefore, with a more favourable external environment, the

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\(^1\) According to Akitoby and Cinyabuguma the La Politique des Grands Travaux was a determined strategy for financial growth meant for the implementation of significant projects.
Mobutu administration concluded its adjustment plan. But, the state’s economic performance had a significant decline, with annual real GDP development reduced to an average 0.5 percent between 1987 and 1989 (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004: 7).

From 1990 to 2000, the DRC lost control over its economic policies and fell into the control of an unparalleled circle of hyperinflation; currency devaluation; cumulative dollarization and monetary disintermediation; and deteriorating savings, economic infrastructure, and broad-based outputs. All this happened during unsuccessful political liberalization efforts, as the shocking financial and social condition was compounded by the full-fledged war that took place 8 years into the sub-period (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004:7). In line with Akitoby and Cinyabuguma’s assertion De Castillo (2003: 5) argues that the ruthless war that took place in 1998 put a lot of strain on public funds and public enterprises. A huge share of the DRC’s capital stock was ruined and investments discouraged. Consequently, real GDP contracted cumulatively by about 42 percent from 1990 to 2000. Consumer prices increased an average rate of 684 percent per annum, whilst government revenues dropped by 80 percent, and outside debt increased to approximately 300 percent of GDP (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004: 7).

Furthermore, Erero et al (2014: 3) argue that from 1990 to 2001 the DRC was in an economic recession caused by the absence of political unity and continuous armed conflict. The economy dropped reaching a growth rate of -13.5 percent in 1993. While GDP experienced a growing decrease of over 53 percent and the GDP per capita fell by 37.9 percent from US$ 204.9 in 1990 to US$ 127.32 in 2001. According to Akitoby and Cinyabuguma (2004: 8) considering their contributions to GDP, agriculture, mining and transport were the most significant sectors. The combination of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishing created jobs for over 75 percent of the workforce and was responsible for typically around 45 percent of real GDP. The agricultural sector had great potential as a basis of financial development, export diversification, and gainful employment. However, it’s out-put did not show substantial growth, instead its contribution to exports constantly dropped by more than 30 percent in 2000 from over 40 percent of exports in 1960.
Agricultural growth was constrained by several factors, namely “deterioration of the network of rural feeder roads; dislocation caused by the Zairianization measures of 1973-74; inadequate credit for small-scale producers; lack of foreign exchange for essential imports; insufficient storage and other marketing facilities; and the uncertainties created by the government’s pricing policies” (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004: 8). The DRC had an abundance of natural resources, but its mining potential remained largely unlocked. It had a wide range of mineral resources and most of its mining was done by the biggest government owned company, the Générale des Carrières et des Mines (GECAMINES), that was responsible for more than 90 percent of overall copper production as well as the whole cobalt and zinc output. While the Société minière de Bakwanga (MIBA), a partially state-owned company was in charge of the industrial mining of diamonds. Individual prospectors were responsible for approximately 60 percent of overall diamond production (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004: 9).

The mining sector’s contributions to GDP and export earnings were constantly decreasing. In the mid-80s, the sector was responsible for nearly a quarter of real GDP and it contributed more than 70 percent of export receipts. But twenty years later, even though the sector continued to be the primary source of export earning, it was responsible for only 6 percent of real GDP. Amongst the problems that affected the sector’s development was a lawful and regulatory framework that was not favourable for the growth of the private sector, severe transport problems; and a continuous deficiency of investment (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004:9). According to Erero et al (2014: 3) due to illicit exports of much of its own natural resources, the DRC did not gain anything from international trade. This affected the country’s participation in the world economy, while allowing for neighbouring states and rebel movements to benefit from those resources. For instance, eastern Kasai’s “natural resources were exploited to an excessive degree by both the allied forces and the rebels” (Grega et al, 2008: 21).

At independence the DRC inherited an all-inclusive transport system that comprised tactically interconnected roads, rivers, and railways. The transport sector was responsible for approximately 12 percent of real GDP from 1960 to 2000. Due to the big size of the DRC, its

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2 According to Akitoby and Cinyabuguma the Zairianization was a process made up of nationalization of numerous external enterprises.
restricted admission to sea and the aloofness of its mineral deposits, a sectoral network was of paramount significance to current as well as upcoming financial activity. Nevertheless, the transport performance remained below acceptable, and challenges in the sector constituted major problems to the realization of the country’s huge agro-industrial and mining potential (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004:10).

Akitoby and Cinyabuguma (2004) note that three public agencies; the National Railway Company of the Congo (SNCC), the National Transport Agency (ONATRA), and the Roads authority of the DRC (The Office des Routes) played a significant role as they were respectively in charge of operating road and river transport, as well as constructing and upholding the main highway network. However, the fiscal condition of the first two agencies deteriorated immensely from 1985. Over and above that, the services they provided on the *Voie Nationale*\(^3\), which combined road and water routes from Shaba mines to the Madati harbour, increasingly deteriorated (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004: 10). They also note that the disappointing performance by the SNCC and the ONATRA emanated from several issues comprising interruptions in regulating prices in an overly inflated environment; a reduction, or better yet immobility in traffic; high operation prices; and a protracted lack of upkeep. Furthermore, in the late 90s the civil war had a negative effect on the transport sector, which resulted in an infrastructure collapse. Consequently, farmers had a huge challenge selling any surplus, whilst the cost of food in urban areas was relatively high (Akitoby and Cinyabuguma, 2004: 10).

Therefore, fiscal management, corruption, political chaos and civil conflict, all played part in the awfully low and dwindling per capita income, dreadful living circumstances, human rights abuses, and dismal prospects for human development. The ruthless war that took place in 1998 placed a lot of pressure on public finances and public enterprises. It also resulted in the economy falling into hyperinflation and the currency becoming insignificant, with savings and investment dropping, and fiscal intermediation failing (de Castillo, 2003: 5).

As expected, the DRC’s longstanding economic decline was supplemented by a deep weakening of its social sector. For instance, life expectancy dropped to around 46 years in 2000, after having increased up to 51 years in 1987. Rates in child deaths escalated all

\^3 The *Voie Nationale* is a rail main line into the DRC that runs from Matadi port to Kinshasa
through the 90s and reached 162 per thousand live births in the year 2000. Gross primary school registrations dropped to less than 50 percent in the late 90s from over 90 percent in the mid-80s and 98 percent on the day before DRC’s independence (Englebert, 2006: 56). Furthermore, a report by the World Bank (2014) cited in Erero et al (2014: 3) notes that the number of people who were unemployed rose to nearly 70 percent. The rise was accredited to the failing formal sector and failure by the jobless to get into the informal labour markets. Whereas formal sector job creation failed to keep up with the growing labour force environment. As a result, the unemployed turned to the informal sector, with informal employment accounting for 80 percent of job creation in the 90s.

DRC’s history is characterized by autocracy, violence, economic hardship, and widespread injustice. Its history has led it from the Congo Free State to Zaire and now the DRC. The scars inflicted by its history permeate current conflict dynamics in the DRC (Cone, 2007: 71). “Years after gaining its independence from Belgium, the DRC remains plagued by continuing governance challenges, corruption, insecurity, and widespread poverty. State institutions are generally weak, and efforts to bring lasting peace and security have so far produced mixed results. While the western part of the country enjoys relative calm, violent conflict persists in much of the eastern DRC, perpetrated by armed militias, both domestic and foreign” (N’Gambwa, 2011: 1).

According to a report by the Institute for Global Dialogue (2012) the country’s political culture does not yet offer productive grounds for democratic developments. Its current political situation is comprised of rival claims to the country’s presidency, an effectively illegitimate and paralyzed National Assembly, difficulties in constituting a new government, as well as uncertainty over the organization of provincial and national elections (IGD, 2012: 4). A transformation index by Bertelsmann Stiftung (2012) argues that a lot of institutions and non-states entities, namely political organizations and civil society groups lack internal democracy. A lot of times they are distinguished as the personal rule of individuals. Even the president’s office does not adhere to the democratic processes enshrined in the constitution and prescribed by the political structure. Alternatively, the use of corruption to gain political objectives continues to be a normal technique to sway legislators in important decision-making processes (BTI, 2012: 11).
According to Dagne (2011) bilateral and multilateral contributors made noteworthy investments in support of the country’s transitional developments. The World Bank has various ongoing ventures in the country. The IMF required the country to implement modifications in macroeconomic stability before it began a poverty alleviation and growth facility program. There is a tight economic plan which is mainly concentrated on growing local income and fluctuating government expenditure towards infrastructure and social sector. Also, the DRC’s Central Bank seems dedicated to upholding price stability and constricted regulation of the country’s money supply, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (Dagne, 2011: 12). As a result, the DRC’s fiscal performance has developed significantly in the past few years, although progress in alleviating poverty and meeting the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) has logged. In mid-2010, the DRC obtained debt relief under the enriched heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) enterprise, this followed prudent macroeconomic policies and structural reforms that underpinned the economic performance. The debt relief reduced the DRC’s external debt burden from about over 136 percent of GDP in 2009 to nearly 35 percent at the end of 2010 (IMF, 2013: 4).

Nevertheless, according to a transformation index by Bertelsmann Stiftung (2014) as a result of many years of ongoing violent conflicts, the government’s inappropriate economic governance style and a strong embedded culture of corruption, the DRC continues to face many economic and social challenges. A bulk of the people has been living in abject poverty for years. The government provides only a few services to major cities, for which availability is also limited to those related to those in positions of power and influence. Whilst in most rural areas service delivery is largely nonexistence. As a result, for many people survival is simply guaranteed by subsistence farming and informal small-scale trading, although currently limited due to the ongoing violence. Nevertheless, persons with access to the power controlled largely by the governing presidential alliance and some instances by armed groups, live relatively comfortable lives (BTI, 2014: 17).

Congolese have suffered a great loss of lives and livelihoods as a result of nearly 20 years of war and insecurity. The recent DRC political and economic crisis is somewhat the result of both the 1996 and 1998 wars, and the high levels of insecurity that ensued. However, the process of economic downturn, institutional deterioration, and loss of national assets can be traced back to the 70s (Weijs et al, 2012: 4).
2.2 Factors that gave rise to MONUSCO and SADC deployment in the DRC

SADC and MONUSCO deployment in the country was a result of the Second Congo War that began in August 1998. The war became known as “Africa’s First World War” due to the participation of at least six regional countries. “The war quickly engulfed the country characterised by extreme violence, mass population displacements, widespread rape, and a collapse of public health services. The outcome had been a humanitarian disaster unmatched by any other in recent decades” (Coghlan et al, 2004). According to the International Rescue Committee (IRC) cited in Nangini et al (2014: 3) even though the exact figures are disputed, the Second Congo War is reported to have killed approximately 3.3 million people between 1998 and 2002. It began as relations between Laurent Kabila and his Rwandan and Congolese Tutsi followers faded, causing an attack by Rwanda and Uganda on 2 August, 1998, and an unsuccessful protest on Kinshasa from 6 August to 1 September. Meanwhile, the anti-Kabila Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) was made up of Congolese rebels in the city of Goma (North Kivu), however its lack of a widespread backing encouraged Uganda to support the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) rebel movement in November 1998 (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 231).

Obasanjo and Mills (2014) assert that politically, the DRC conflict was primarily motivated by poor governance, the struggle for control of power and unconstitutional change of government. Economically, factors that triggered conflict included corruption, struggle for ownership, management and control, as well as uneven supply of natural resources. Socially, dynamics that encouraged intervention by international organizations in the country were inadequate capacity for diversity management against minorities, marginalization based on ethnical and religious differences, and alienation and consequent disillusionment of the youth (Obasanjo and Mills, 2014: 5). According to Ahere (2012) various actors in compound arrangements participated in the Second Congo War. There were those who backed Kabila, and those who were against him. The former comprised the DRC, Namibia, Angola, Chad, Zimbabwe, Sudan, the Hutu and Mai Mai allied forces. Whilst the latter comprised Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda, the MLC, the RCD and Tutsi aligned forces (Ahere, 2012: 2).

Dzinesa and Laker (2010) argue that SADC member states intervened in the DRC at a time where the organization was going through an internal struggle for influence. At that particular period, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC) was presided by Zimbabwe, while South Africa presided over SADC. Member states were split
regarding the type of intervention that was to be employed in the DRC, and the divisions worsened the crisis that was instigated by disagreements amongst member states on whether the Organ should operate under, or autonomously from SADC (Dzinesa and Laker, 2010: 20). Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe formed an alliance and decided to employ military intervention in favour of President Laurent Kabila’s administration, and then signed a joint defense agreement with Kinshasa in April 1999. Whilst other SADC members comprising South Africa, Swaziland, Mozambique, Lesotho and Botswana decided on a method which emphasized preventative diplomacy and a negotiated settlement of the conflict (Dzinesa and Laker, 2010: 20).

Three months later, on July 10, 1999, conflict in the DRC was brought to an end, at least on paper when the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola signed the Lusaka peace accord. Facilitated by SADC and the late former President Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, the agreement asked for a Chapter VII UN peacekeeping force “to ensure implementation of the Agreement; and taking into account the peculiar situation of the DRC, mandated the peacekeeping force to track down all armed groups in the DRC” (Fontes, 2003: 158).

Holt and Berkman (2006) claim the UN was surprised by the request of a vigorous peacekeeping force. Therefore, knowing the huge problems that came with ending the crisis in the DRC, the international community was in two minds about the country’s commitment to ending conflict. There was also a commonly shared perspective that the UN did not “own” the treaty; therefore, the organization was not accountable for its application. Furthermore, a certain diplomat complained that “the Congo file started in Africa, not in the United Nations” (Holt and Berkman, 2006: 158). Whilst a UN official asserted that “the Lusaka Agreement called for UN forces. They did not know what they were writing. The UN was not there, it came with a framework that was not theirs” (Holt and Berkman, 2006: 158). Therefore, employing peacekeepers to disarm troops is a difficult task. “It would be difficult, if not impossible, to identify troop contributing countries willing to contribute contingents to be deployed in eastern DRC for forcible disarmament of groups accused of genocide and other serious crimes against humanity, at least in sufficient numbers and with a sufficiently robust mandate” (Holt and Berkman, 2006: 158).
Nonetheless, in August 1999, the UNSC authorized the deployment of 90 UN military liaison personnel to the DRC. Three months later, Security Council Resolution 1279 declared that the previously authorized UN troops would establish the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) (Dagne, 2011: 9). The organization was established as a traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping operation to observe and monitor the Lusaka peace accord. However, because of the multifaceted conflict situation in which the peacekeeping operation was operating, the organization rapidly progressed into a more vigorous Chapter VII operation (Reynaert, 2011: 14). The mission was a Chapter VII UN peacekeeping force authorized to implement its mandate using force, if and when required to do so. Thereafter, to strengthen the mission’s force and its mandate the Security Council approved numerous resolutions from 2000 to 2010. For instance, in 2000 the Security Council approved Resolution 1291 which authorized MONUC to implement various significant responsibilities, comprising execution of the ceasefire accord, confirmation of disengagement and redeployment of forces, and the backing of humanitarian efforts and human rights monitoring. The resolution provided the organization the mandate, under Chapter VII, to safeguard its troops, facilities, and non-combatants facing impending threat of physical violence (Dagne, 2011: 10).

According to Fargo (2006) due to instability and insecurity the authorization was postponed. MONUC also added about 5,000 peacekeepers, as forces backed by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia continued fighting in the eastern parts of the country. In spite of continued violence the UNSC had not passed any resolutions authorizing the withdrawal of external forces from the DRC. Furthermore, MONUC had also not sent any peacekeeping forces to the eastern DRC, even though it was the region with more hostilities and instability. However, four months later, the Security Council approved resolution 1304 that ultimately called for the withdrawal of foreign troops. But the resolution was disregarded as no troops withdrew (Fargo, 2006: 55).

In February 2001, the Security Council adopted resolution 1341 which outlined the time limit for the detachment and redeployment of belligerent parties. The resolution gave them 14 days to vacate the DRC with a time limit of a comprehensive withdrawal of all troops by 15 May, 2001 (Fargo, 2006: 55-56). A year later, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda signed a ceasefire agreement with the DRC that comprised the removal of its own military personnel. To return the favour, the DRC had to disarm and repatriate all troops linked to the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALiR) who were responsible for the 1994 Rwandan genocide. A
few months later, Uganda joined in and promised to withdraw all its troops from the DRC (Fargo, 2006: 57).

According to Bope (2011) MONUC troops were strengthened with 2366 soldiers and 363 more military observers who came from different countries such as South Africa, Uruguay, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia were authorized to monitor the disengagement of different forces to the conflict and the removal of the Rwandan and Ugandan militaries (Bope, 2011: 30). However, UN troops in their positions faced several difficulties for protecting the civilian population and even MONUC personnel from the violent conflict in the eastern DRC (Bope, 2011: 30). Therefore, following difficulties experienced by UN observers and troops in the deployment areas, the Security Council voted for resolution 1355, giving MONUC the capacity of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration (DDRR) processes of the militias group (Bope, 2011: 30). The achievement of MONUC operation with respect to the above process led the Security Council to vote for resolution 1376, allowing the deployment of MONUC troops in all eastern provinces of the DRC (Bope, 2011: 30).

On 14 June 2002, through resolution 1417, the Security Council reaffirmed MONUC’s mandate to explicitly emphasize the necessity to protect “civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” (Punga, 2011: 39). Protection of non-combatants was authorized only “within the mission’s capabilities” (Punga, 2011: 39). In December of the very same year, the Security Council extended the missions mandate by resolution 1445 that approved the expansion of the military component of MONUC’s intervention forces in the DRC and increased the number of blue helmets to 8500. Subsequently, MONUC, without using force, monitored the removal of all external forces from DRC territory, and supported voluntary disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reinsertion and reintegration (DDRRR) process (Bope, 2011: 31).

A year later, MONUC deployed its troops along the front lines in the east of the DRC in order to conduct DDRRR operations. Some of the UN contingents were deployed especially in Ituri where they monitored grave human rights violations while Ugandan troops were withdrawn, a situation which temporarily weakened MONUC. The situation and certain key parts of the DRC led the Security Council to vote for resolution 1493 which gave MONUC a new mandate. Resolution 1493 increased the military personnel to 10, 800 in leading the operation to impose an arms embargo on the one hand, and mandated MONUC to utilise all
required measures to accomplish its mandate in Ituri and in North and South Kivu (Bope, 2011: 31). Resolution 1493 mandated the organization to help the DRC government to disarm foreign troops and repatriate them to homelands. The resolution, under Chapter VII mandated MONUC to use “all means necessary” to implement its mandate (Dagne, 2011: 10).

In 2004, the Security Council extended the organizations authorization by resolution 1565 which increased MONUC’s strength with 5900 personnel taking into account the development of the condition in Ituri and Bukavu. The Security Council decided to give MONUC the mandate of: deploying and upholding a presence in important parts of potential instability in order to promote the restoration of confidence; to discourage violence and allow UN troops to operate freely, specifically in the eastern parts of the DRC; guaranteeing the defence of non-combatants, comprising humanitarian personnel facing eminent danger of bodily harm; guaranteeing the defence of UN troops, facilities, installations and equipment; guaranteeing the security and freedom of movement of its troops; launching the necessary border security within Operation in Burundi; and with the governments of the DRC and Burundi to synchronize efforts to monitor and discourage cross-border activities of soldiers between the two nations (Bope, 2011: 32).

According to Dagne (2011: 10) resolution 1565 increased MONUC personnel, with the purpose of deploying them to eastern DRC in order to guarantee civilian protection and to snatch or collect arms, as was called for in UN resolution 1493. The resolution also mandated the organization to provisionally offer protection to the National Unity Government (NUG) establishments and government representatives. Furthermore, Cammaert (no-date: 105) argues that Security Council resolution 1565 particularly mandated the mission “to support operations to disarm foreign combatants led by the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC)”. MONUC personnel were targeted by militia groups in Ituri, whilst the rebellious General Laurent Nkunda occupied Bukavu. As a result, MONUC troops were forced to retaliate with open fire in protection of their own installation (Bope, 2011: 32).

In October 28, 2005, the Security Council adopted resolution 1635 which increased the operation with 300 military personnel for the deployment of joint operations blue helmets FARDC in Oriental province. MONUC facilitated discussions between a military group, the Congolese Revolutionary Movement (MRC) and the government. As a result, several militiamen were disarmed in Ituri province and integrated into the FARDC (Bope, 2011: 33).
In the following year, as support to the DRC’s electoral process, the Security Council adopted resolution 1671 which authorized European Union (EU) forces to help MONUC to coordinate national and local elections held in July 2006 (Bope, 2011: 33).

On 22 December, 2008, MONUC became the UN’s biggest peacekeeping operation when the Security Council extended the missions mandate through resolution 1856. The Security Council approved the deployment of an additional 3085 troops and stressed “that the temporal increase in personnel was to enable MONUC to reinforce its capacity to protect civilians” (Punga, 2011: 39). However, even though increasingly emphasized throughout MONUC’s mandates, the protection of civilians was only among approximately 50 tasks, until December 2008, when through resolution 1856, the Security Council set it as a priority. Nevertheless, MONUC’s mandate covered roughly 41 different tasks, many of which were contradictory, as highlighted by MONUC’s former Special Representative of the Secretary-General Allan Doss: “ending the crisis is a political task, protecting civilians is a humanitarian task, disarming militias and improving the performance of the Congolese armed forces is a military task with human rights issues as an overlay and background” (Punga, 2011: 41). The complexity of the mandate deters focus from civilian protection, as peacekeepers are divided between the various tasks (Punga, 2011: 41).

According to the International Peace Institute (2011) in November 2009, ahead of the DRC’s centenary of 50 years of independence in June the following year, Joseph Kabila publicly called for the UN peacekeepers to start retreating from the country. His argument was that the stability of the country had hugely developed as most ex rebels had assimilated into the FARDC, and Kinshasa and Kigali had decided to dismantle the remaining militias in the Kivus. He viewed UN personnel as only playing a restricted part in safeguarding the DRC. However, the UNSC counter argued his claims on the basis that over 1.5 million people were still displaced due to uncertainties in eastern parts of the country. Therefore, based on this argument the UNSC resisted the call to close down the peacekeeping mission and eventually an agreement to retain the UN mission was reached (IPI, 2011: 2).

A month later, Security Council resolution 1906 approved MONUC’s mandate till the end of May 2010. The Kabila regime again requested the removal of the organizations forces by mid-2011. As a result, a UNSC delegation visited the DRC in mid-May and met with high-ranking representatives. The delegation was headed by Ambassador Gerard Araud from
France who was captured saying “the mission of the Security Council was to begin a dialogue with the authorities, the population and civil society of the Democratic Republic of the Congo over the future of the United Nations presence” (Dagne, 2011: 10). Subsequently, since February 2010, the organization had a total of 20, 573 uniformed personnel, comprising 18, 645 troops, 760 armed observers, 1, 216 police, 1, 001 international civilian personnel, 2, 690 domestic staff and 629 UN volunteers. Therefore, the organization was presently the biggest UN peacekeeping mission in the world (Dagne, 2011: 10).

Under resolution 1925 of May 2010, the Security Council decided that as of July 2010, MONUC would be changed into the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). As a result of the developing political situation, the latter would largely concentration on stabilization and peace consolidation. However, civilian protection would remain the operations number one priority. The mission would continue focussing on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR). Resolution 1925 also took the DRC government’s point of view into consideration, as the Security Council mandated the removal of a maximum of 2, 000 military personnel in those areas where security situations permitted it. Resolution 1925 differed with the prior resolutions as it did not obviously state that MONUSCO was to prevent efforts of military groups to rupture the ceasefire process. Neither did it mention that MONUSCO was to assume pre-emptive action to defend non-combatants or interrupt the military capacity of military groups (Reynaert, 2011: 19).
CHAPTER THREE

CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS OF MONUSCO AND SADC

3.1 The SADC in peacekeeping in the DRC:

Conflict in the DRC began at a time where the SADC was organizationally divided. SADC was led by the South Africa’s late former President Nelson Mandela, while the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC) was led by Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe. The latter was permitted to function independently from the former, and required no approval to make decisions from its chair or even a bulk of its member states. However, this created tension between the two leaders as they both struggled to attain more control in the SADC (Schoppert, 2013: 66-67). Initially, the office of the OPDSC chair was supposed to change yearly, but that all changed when Robert Mugabe became chair. After taking office he often solely took decisions on SADC’s behalf without communicating with its member states and members of its Organ. However, such an act was a result of the authority given to the OPDSC to function autonomously at summit level, the highest level of power in the SADC (Schoppert, 2013: 67).

Therefore, on 7 and 8 August 1998, Robert Mugabe convened a Summit of Heads of States and Government in Victoria Falls, Zambia, but excluded South Africa because of the tension between himself and Mandela over the Organ (Nathan, 2004: 12). As a result, SADC was divided between peaceful and aggressive methods to regional security. The faction that preferred the latter method comprised Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia; it chose a mutual defense deal and opted for defense collaboration and an armed response to the DRC conflict (Nathan, 2013: 3). Therefore, Zimbabwe spearheaded armed intervention that involved sending troops to the DRC in defense of President Laurent Kabila (Hwang, 2006: 170).

On the other hand, Nelson Mandela was against military intervention, he instead encouraged peaceful negotiated settlement of the conflict. “He insisted that the SADC troops could only intervene in the DRC under the auspices of the UN-sanctioned multilateral peacekeeping force” (Monyae, 2014: 124). Therefore, the peaceful faction comprising Botswana, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa, regarded the OPDSC as a mutual
security organization whose main sources of coordination and peacemaking were political rather than military (Nathan, 2013: 3).

According to Mugadza (2011) the split intervention approaches caused suspicions between SADC member states that stirred up allegations about plots. Zimbabwe was accused of abusing DRC’s mineral and timber resources in return for its intervention (Khan, 2012: 329). According to Schoppert (2013: 68) Robert Mugabe’s motives for leading the SADC’s intervention were politically and economically driven. Politically, his desire to proclaim his leadership as a senior politician and to remove himself from Nelson Mandela’s shadow influenced Zimbabwe’s interests in the DRC conflict (Kapinga, 2015: 105). Economically, Kabila had declared that he would reward states that would assist him, and therefore, with Zimbabwe’s already collapsing economy, Robert Mugabe decided to intervene. The country was able to spend US$30 million per month on intervention in the DRC and while this speeded up the weakening of the economy it also came with benefits, especially for the elites (Schoppert, 2013: 68).

Zimbabwe was rewarded with hundred acres of farmland and its troops were directly given contracts with mining companies and concessions. As conflict persisted, Kabila then rewarded Zimbabwe’s continued assistance with additional contracts with mining companies and concessions and gave its troops permission to take from the DRC land they lived on (Schoppert, 2013: 69). Angola equally had its motives for intervening in the DRC conflict. Similar to Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe, Angola also intervened due to personal reasons. Firstly, it was indebted to Katangan soldiers who ensured that the country gained its independence. Therefore, Kabila’s minister who was a Katangan made sure to remind Angola of its debt. Secondly, Angola was not pleased with its two allies, Uganda and Rwanda, who entered into its neighbor state (the DRC) without informing them. Therefore, this was enough reason for Angola to sends its troops to the DRC in support of the SADC’s military intervention (Schoppert, 2013: 69).

Namibia, which was the third SADC member state to support armed intervention in the DRC did so in reaction to a request by the other two countries to back Kabila, an old acquaintance the then Namibian President Sam Nujoma and lose associate of Zimbabwe and Angola (Kapinga, 2015: 105). Just like Angola to the DRC, Namibia was also indebted to Angola for having given permission to the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) to build
camps in its southern region in 1996. Therefore, Namibia supported SADC’s military intervention in order to establish relations with Angola (Schoppert, 2013: 69). According to Kapinga (2015: 104-105) intervention by the three SADC member states was mostly a result of their personal interests. Each and every one of them had their personal strategic and economic motives for intervening. For instance, their troops were amongst those who were comprised in the illicit abuse of the DRC’s natural resources, although in their defense they claimed their intervention to have been the backing of a fellow SADC member state experiencing external hostility.

On the other hand, others saw South Africa’s peaceful negotiated settlements to the DRC conflict as paving way for the abuse of the DRC’s natural resources by its mining companies and other corporations (Kabemba, 2006: 152). According to Schoppert (2013: 70) Post-apartheid South Africa not only had abundant inequalities of affluence, but it also had stagnant and excessive rates of poverty that it wanted to eradicate through a strong economic community. Therefore, it intervened in the DRC to protect regional stability, essentially for building a strong economy and trade relations, since it had just attained freedom from apartheid. However, in September 1998, Nelson Mandela and SADC changed their position regarding the DRC intervention and declared that SADC backed Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia’s military intervention approach. Nevertheless, Nelson Mandela still wanted to work towards ending the DRC conflict through pacific negotiations, but hoped to unite SADC by backing military intervention (Schoppert, 2013: 70). Instead SADC’s peace and security was threatened and its unity was hampered. Tapfumaneyi cited in Baker and Maeresera (2009: 109) argues that the divisions at some point impaired the OPDSC and caused an idea of ‘two SADC’s’. Therefore, due to the SADC split, only a few member states contributed human and financial resources for armed intervention, most of which went toward pacific negotiated settlements and coming up with means to end the spread of war (Schoppert, 2013: 71).

Also, due to leadership misunderstandings amongst SADC member states the organization failed to respond to intrastate armed conflict that followed an attempt to takeover Bukavu (a city in eastern DRC) in June 2004 (Yabadi, 2011: 43). Moreover, although SADC was a major player in establishing guidelines, norms, and standards that created space for the development and consolidation of open and inclusive governance, it failed to implement its declaratory commitments. For instance, during the 2011 DRC elections the 2004 SADC
Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections were not adhered to and were even overlooked by the SADC itself (Adebajo et al, 2013: 30).

However, Nathan (2004: 14) argues that “although the tension between South Africa and Zimbabwe undoubtedly contributed to the impasse around the Organ, the problems were much deeper than that. SADC’s failure to establish a viable security regime was a consequence of fundamental political and strategic differences between member states; their reluctance to surrender a measure of sovereignty to a security regime; and their economic and administrative weaknesses”. The regional political setting was marked by changes in political systems and methods of administration that posed a challenge for regional collaboration and assimilation. For instance, SADC encompasses autonomous states like South Africa and Botswana, a disintegrated country like the DRC, and dictatorial governments like Zimbabwe (Mulaudzi, 2006: 22). This challenge seriously threatened efforts to deepen co-operation and assimilation in the SADC region.

As a result, there were no common values among SADC member states since there were splits between democratic and authoritarian alignments, and between peaceful and aggressive elements in their foreign policies (Schwager, 2012: 148). For instance, at the end of 1993, Nelson Mandela said that South Africa’s foreign policy would be guided by human rights. Therefore, South Africa promoted human rights and democracy in its external engagement. Much of its foreign policy was driven by its values and it regarded its own negotiated transition as a model that other countries could follow in seeking to end their own conflicts (Sidiropoulos, 2007: 1). As a result, the drafting of the Mutual Defense Pact and consolidation of the Organ struggled because of these splits between camps.

According to Mulaudzi (2006: 22) the splits and SADC’s regulatory principles of making judgements in groups meant that considerable condemnations by other SADC members were disapproved. Therefore, this and the fact that the oppressive era was still recorded in the memories of many gave rise to typical unity among SADC member states, which caused SADC to ignore the systematic violations of human rights in countries like the DRC and Zimbabwe. Furthermore, SADC’s legal configuration hindered instead of advancing the organization’s efforts of establishing a regional plan, because it gave member states permission to maintain their autonomy in a quest for personal interests over those of the region (Mulaudzi, 2006: 22). According to Schwager (2012: 148) owing to political
weakness, the absence of shared values, mutual trust and a mutual idea of the security administration, SADC member states feared losing their autonomy. This fear prohibited any chances of developing and accepting a shared security administration that comprised formal rules, obligatory decision-making and domestic affairs intervention prospects.

SADC’s forums and programmes were hampered by the regions small economies, underdevelopment and weak administrative capacity. The problem was further complicated by the organization’s member states past hatred to integrate the organization of regional programmes in a strong secretariat. Due to the resistance to transfer power to a regional organization, for many years member states preferred a disseminated model with a small secretariat that possess no decision making powers. With regard to collective security arrangements, member states chose an informal and flexible approach over one that was integrated and constructed on static rules and procedures (Nathan, 2013: 10).

SADC’s overall developed member state is South Africa, and it produced nothing less than 71 percent gross national products (GNP). Therefore, the country’s economic dominance and the huge disparities within and among SADC member states were amongst the organizations distinct economic realities. These dynamics cause enormous challenges to market assimilation and overall regionalism (Muladzi, 2006: 15). According to Mhango (2012) due to sporadic collective security arrangements by SADC member states, the DRC is a major SADC peacekeeping failure (Mhango, 2012: 13). SADC is also constrained by its somewhat inadequate peacekeeping experience, as its ability to act is mainly controlled by reactive conflict resolution mechanisms that the organization has established (Gwanyayi et al, 2010: 2).

3.2 The MONUSCO in peacekeeping in the DRC

According to Marks (2005: 67), the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) has integrated civilian protection with great difficulty. Its more inert role failed to protect non-combatants and destabilized the idea of civilian protection, whilst its more hostile actions sporadically led to more civilian abuses. Even though the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1291 had requested the mission to take necessary steps to protect non-combatants facing danger of pending violence in deployment zones of its “infantry battalions”, the mission failed to defend non-combatants in Bukavu when a mainly uneven group of between 1000 to 1500 armed aggressive rebel movements commanded by General
Laurent Nkunda invaded the city in June 2004 without being effectively challenged by MONUC or the Congolese. They entered Bukavu in a sham that the Banyamulenge (their ethnic kin) were facing massacre, and blockaded the city, burnt down the main market, robbed, raped and caused over 2000 non-combatants to seek refuge in the UN mission’s compound (Marks, 2005: 74).

Another let-down of the mission’s peacekeepers was the failure of its peacekeepers to entirely disarm the rebel movements. According to a report by Amnesty International (2005) “Interahamwe (extreme Hutu militia) based in eastern Congo were responsible for hundreds of summary executions, rapes, beatings and civilian hostage taking in the territory of Walungu, South Kivu Province” (Amnesty International, 2005). The Rwandan backed Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma); a primarily Tutsi-led armed group retaliated causing gross human right violations and crimes against humankind in eastern DRC’s Kivu region. Its combatants refused to assimilate into the DRC army and conflicted with other DRC army militaries in South Kivu (Gordon, 2008: 1376).

Towards the end of 2007, Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) plans against General Nkunda with logistical backing from MONUC were a total let-down. In the following year, on 4 November, Nkunda’s armed rebel forces killed approximately 150 non-combatants in the town of Kiwanja, a couple of kilometers away from where MONUC troops were based (Koko, 2011: 35). This created intense aggression and civil strife that caused more than 200 000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) until the beginning of 2009. As a result, MONUC’s ability to implement its mandate became questionable. Furthermore, the UN mission did not prevent terrible states of human rights violations, both in parts that were controlled by rebel forces and those controlled by the DRC government. Therefore, killings, random detentions and sexual assaults continued, although at a decreasing rate (Ogunrotifa, 2012: 290).

According to Terrie (2009: 22) MONUC’s challenges were both particular to the mission itself and indicative of UN missions challenges and constraints, comprising poor administration, doctrinal misunderstanding and an over-stretched force functioning with inadequate personnel. Nevertheless, MONUC progressed and rose to the challenging condition on the ground, but progress was mostly made as a consequence of measures instead of their expectation. Therefore, Congolese suffered the most as progress ordinarily followed a
violent conflict. Furthermore, the biggest problem for MONUC was to successfully utilize available force for the protection of non-combatants, its troops, the broader peace process and sometimes regional stability.

The greatest problem for MONUC was dealing with external rebel forces, particularly the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). The FDLR’s continued presence in the DRC had a hand in General Nkunda’s resistance to leave the DRC, as he claimed to be acting in protection of Congolese Tutsi’s. As a result, MONUC had to adjust its operations in order to maintain pressure on the FDLR. However, the use of Mobile Operating Bases (MOB) was the most noteworthy development that saw MONUC troops leaving their camps and establishing presence in areas that were known to have been previously controlled by the FDLR (Terrie, 2009: 25).

This approach destabilized the FDLR, but it was mostly dedicated to civilian protection while the DRC army implemented operations against the FDLR. Nevertheless, this had inadequate results because of the weakness of DRC forces. While MONUC chose to permit the Congolese government and its army to take charge in handling General Nkunda and FDLR issues, the DRC was short of an ability and political will to come up with resolutions. As a result, such frequently left the UN mission in a state where even though it was the only practical unified security force in eastern DRC, it had submitted to the idea of Congolese independence. This frequently caused the mission to be accused of failing to safeguard those endangered by the rebel movements or the National Army (Terrie, 2009: 25).

Also, in despite of developments in the mandate of civilian protection, MONUSCO remained stationary in its base in order to provide sufficient protection. Numerous instances have shown that the MONUSCO either learns of an attack too late or does not respond in time when it gets information on ending the violence (Lezhnev and Wimmer, 2012: 1). For instance, for four days between late July and early August 2010 over 20 women were raped in Luvungi and its surrounding areas, 30 kilometres within the perimeter of the mission’s peacekeepers camp. The inadequacy and inefficiency of the mandate of the UN peacekeepers to protect civilians also resurfaced in North Kivu around the same time, where about 500 women and children were sufferers of rape and sexual abuses. Therefore, MONUSCO failed to safeguard those defenceless women and children in North Kivu (Koko, 2011: 35).
Again on 1 and 2 January, 2012, the FDLR slaughtered 39 non-combatants in the Shabunda villages of Luyuyu and Ngolombe, and caused displacements to Nzovu. This occurred following the closure of a MOB by MONUSCO troops that were stationed in Shabunda. However, the UN mission only sent its troops to Luyuyu two days after the attack and established a Temporary Operation Base (TOB) to protect IDPs, but it was too late to halt the massacre (Lezhnev and Wimmer, 2012: 1). The mission did not stop assassinations of non-combatants by organized and in some instances government backed armed units. Its peacekeepers failed to intercept directed non-combatant attacks by members of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), FDLR and their partners. In some instances these took the form of political killings. In others, rape and torture were basics for further extensive killings. The Human Rights Watch logged some thousand deaths since 2009, all caused by aggressive units who answered to a chain of command and demonstrated a systematized order. In the case of the FDLR, officers operated on behalf of the political conspiracies of fugitive leaders in Europe. Whilst in the case of FARDC, units revealed a substantial degree of sovereignty which implied incapacity of political leaders, including President Joseph Kabila, to utilize federal power over state militias from Kinshasa. Even more surprising was the fact that the mission’s peacekeepers trained and backed FARDC units who afterwards contributed to, or allowed, non-combatant killings (Copeland, 2012: 60).

Despite the UN presence, the conflict in eastern DRC continued. In April 2012, there was a new rebellion, the March 23 Movement (M23) (Lamont and Skeppstrom, 2013: 6). A month later, 37 people were murdered during an FDLR attack in South Kivu’s Kamananga village. The mission’s base was no more than 2 kilometres away, and troops could apparently hear firing; however a contingent only deployed to the village the following day. This significantly angered the local population who were frustrated by the peacekeepers incapacity to stop the killings. As a result, while Raia Mutomboki troops fired at the UN mission’s local base, non-combatants flung stones and during the process 11 UN peacekeepers were reported to have been severely injured (Lezhnev and Wimmer, 2012: 1). According to Mr. Herve Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, the biggest challenge MONUSCO faced in 2012 was the M23. Since April, after the military group instigated some of the worst sufferings ever witnessed in the eastern parts of the DRC, peacekeepers took robust strides to safeguard non-combatants. After the fall of Goma in November, peacekeepers evacuated lots of activists, state representatives and journalists against the M23 and where lives were in
danger. The crisis reignited regional political efforts and led to the signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, and approval of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) by the Security Council in March 2013, on special terms. Through the FIB, the Security Council approved offensive operations to neutralize and disarm armed groups (UNPO, 2012: 2)

According to (Koko, 2011) the UN is responsible for MONUC’s shortcomings, as it was not intended to do an exceptional job in the DRC in the first place. The conceptualization of MONUSCO failed to deliberate on the intricacy of the conflict, the magnitude of the county and the needs on the ground. The UN had also previously deployed MONUC despite Kabila’s refusal to accept its deployment (Janik, 2014: 155). The very same happened again in 2009, when Joseph Kabila’s government demanded the withdrawal of MONUC before it had even completed its mandate (as alluded to in chapter 2) (Amidala, no-date: 126). However, the UN risked becoming party to the conflict when instead of withdrawing its troops it replaced MONUC with MONUSCO. Therefore, through the change of mandate it was drawn more towards enforcement action and further from its fundamental role of peacekeeping.

Koko (2011: 36) argues that the main parties to the conflict, including the DRC government, Uganda, Rwanda and factions of the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RDC) and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) are also responsible for MONUC’s weaknesses (Koko, 2011). In line with Koko’s argument, Ahere (2012) states that the main parties were directly implicated in nearly all stages of the country’s peace process and played critical roles that were either helpful or destructive. A lot of them had strong preferences with regards to the aftermath of the transitional arrangements (Ahere, 2012: 3). Therefore, the complexity of the DRC conflict is constituted by this large number of conflicting parties. Bamidele (no-date: 130) notes that “at various levels, peacekeepers were faced with approximately 20 armed rebel factions, many of which had unprofessional armed forces, comprised of little more than militias and criminals who rarely respected the laws of war or did not consistently follow chains of command” Over and above that, some rebel groups had members who depended on conflict to make a living, who therefore had vested interests in continuous fighting and frequently resented the presence of peacekeepers (Bamidele, no-date: 130).
These parties continuously disregarded the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement despite having willingly signed it and even assigned MONUC for its implementation. The DRC did not implement security sector reform (SSR) due to fear of losing the dividends that came with then current state of affairs. Instead, they did not neutralize their troops, increased their numbers and sometimes misappropriated funds allocated to related activities. As far as Rwanda and Uganda are concerned, their tendency to disregard MONUC dates back to its deployment. For instance, months after the mission’s observers were deployed to the DRC; Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces fought for the control of Kisangani and continued to abuse MONUC’s weakness to back soldiers in Ituri (Koko, 2011: 36-37).

Furthermore, the responsibility for MONUC’s shortcomings lies with the mission itself. Probably as a result of the laxity displayed by major powers with regard to its performance as well as the lack of sustained commitment to peace by Congolese parties. First and foremost, MONUC’s leadership did not display the necessary operational urgency that should have been required for an emergency situation such as that of the DRC (Koko, 2011: 37). For instance, MONUC was established in 1999, but its deployment was delayed till mid 2001 because of Kabila’s intransigence and partly because the UN did not foresee the lack of progress on the ground. Similarly, the 3 000 reinforcements that were authorized for MONUC in November 2008 took over a year to arrive in the DRC (Bamidele, no-date: 124).

By the same token, MONUSCO has also not only failed to protect the civilian population from gross human rights abuses, but committed serious errors itself, as operations conducted by FARDC along with MONUSCO often led to large numbers of civilian casualties (Janik, 2014: 164).

Again, during the course of MONUC deployment the mission showed low levels of reliability, efficiency and proficiency. As a result, MONUC continuously failed to implement UNSC resolution 1856 of 22 December, 2008, which tasked the mission to guarantee the safety of non-combatants and humanitarian personnel facing imminent danger of physical violence, particularly violence stemming from one of the parties to the DRC conflict (Koko, 2011: 37). This was partly due to insufficient troops on the field to ensure that UN peacekeepers effectively provide protection. For example, although a UN report of March 1999 estimated a need of more than 100 000 troops, fewer than 6 000 were granted (Roessler and Prendergast, 2006: 259). Therefore, despite the authorized numbers, actual deployment was considerably slower, delayed by sporadic conflict between the state and the rebels. For
example, the February 2000 authorization had permitted the deployment of 5,537 military personnel, but MONUC never achieved its authorized strength and, hence, by December 2000, only 224 military personnel had been deployed (Bernath and Edgerton, 2003: 6).

In October 2004, UNSC resolution 1565 granted MONUC only 5,900 of the 13,100 additional troops requested and denied the mission a contingent intended for the south-eastern DRC (Roessler and Prendergast, 2006: 256). Again in 2006, the European Union (EU) armed operation in the DRC was deployed temporarily to the region in support of MONUC because the UNSC declined the then UN Secretary-General’s request that MONUC be given an extra 2,590 troops to deal with safety contingencies throughout the polls (Bamidele, no-date: 124). Protection of civilians has also been challenged by the misconduct of peacekeepers as they were also directly involved in illegal doings ranging from rape, to illicit trade of natural resources and even arms and ammunition (Koko, 2011: 37). For instance, at the end of 2004, in his report to the Security Council the then Secretary General Kofi Annan indicated that “between June and September 2004, an Office of Internal Oversight Services investigation into sexual misconduct in Bunia revealed that 8 of some 72 allegations could be corroborated”. The report also showed that most of the accusations included “soliciting the services of prostitute” (Dagne, 2011: 11). Also, according to the investigation, sexual exploitation and abuse of locals was a regular occurrence that MONUC had turned a blind eye on (Bamidele, no-date: 125).

MONUC has also been challenged by its unclear mandate, which has at times given peacekeepers contradictory instructions. For instance, MONUC was authorized to back President Joseph Kabila’s regime and defend Congolese non-combatants, yet government soldiers were accountable for a substantial amount of the offenses committed against Congolese non-combatants. Therefore, this resulted in MONUC having to withdraw its support from key elements of the Congolese Army after it had been established that they were responsible for a large number of atrocities committed against civilians (Bamidele, no-date: 126). According to a report by Amnesty International (2003: 7) MONUC had been a “hostage to its weak mandate and therefore its record in promoting the security of the civilian population has been little short of disgraceful”. Its mandate was challenged by Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as it technically grants protection for civilians but in the vaguest sense. Therefore, “acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council also decided that MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry
battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect UN and co-located Joint Military Commission (JMC) personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under eminent threat of violence” (MONUC mandate).

However, “a dramatic test of the mandate was the May 14, 2002 crackdown and killings by soldiers of the RCD-Goma, in Kisangani. Where there were about 1 200 MONUC military personnel in Kisangani (approximately 650 Moroccans and 550 Uruguayans), but there was no military response from MONUC to the attack, nor did they offer protection to civilians who came to them” (Bernath and Edgerton, 2003: 2). Thereafter, when giving reasons for their failure to act, MONUC personnel stated that “neither the Moroccans nor the Uruguayans were infantry units and therefore its leaders did not deem it within their capacity to protect those civilians, even though they were certainly under eminent threat of physical violence” (Bernath and Edgerton, 2003: 2).

These challenges and constraints have rendered both MONUSCO and SADC peacekeeping in the DRC a complete failure. The DRC continues to be mired in intractable conflict and till to date peace is still elusive. However, although there is relative calm in the western part of the country, the eastern region consistently experiences high insecurity and repeated incidences of violence. The reason why the DRC conflict has been continuous is because both the UN and SADC are confronted with a situation they do not fully comprehend. The latter’s challenges and constraints are a result of its historical factors, whilst the formers are a result of its ignorance about the DRC, its region and the nature of its conflict.
CHAPTER FOUR

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

This chapter will provide a comprehensive study of the role of MONUSCO and SADC in conflict resolution in the DRC. The analysis of MONUSCO and SADC in the DRC will also give insight into peacekeeping partnerships between local and international bodies and the challenges and constraints they endure in conflict ridden areas.

4.1 SADC and conflict resolution in the DRC

During the two phases of severe armed conflict that characterize the DRC, conflict resolution initiatives can be located in two phases. Phase one is traced back to the outbreak of the Second Congo War on 2 August, 1998, up until the signing of the Lusaka peace accord in July the following year. SADC and late President Muammar Gaddafi of Libya were the key role players throughout this stage (Mpangala, 2004: 18-19). During this stage, conflict resolution initiatives commenced with numerous SADC summits and meetings. The first was a summit of SADC Presidents and Presidents from Rwanda and Uganda, held in Victoria Falls, Zambia, on 7 and 8 August 1998. The second was a meeting of defense ministers that took place in Harare, Zimbabwe. It was called by President Robert Mugabe, under his office as chair of the SADC Organ on Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), and it resolved that President Laurent Kabila should be assisted by any SADC member state that was able to do so, hence the intervention by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia (Mpangala, 2004: 19).

Essuman-Johnson (2009: 141) notes that these numerous summits and meetings ended in the signing of the Lusaka peace accord. According to Essuman-Johnson there were two parts to the agreement, the military and the political. The former explains step-by-step the terms of a ceasefire, establishing a Joint Military Commission (JMC) that involves belligerent parties. Also, there was the issue of the deployment of MONUC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the demilitarization of armed forces and the removal of external forces. The latter part of the agreement comprised the holding of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) and the reinstatement of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. While the latter was
fundamentally national in nature, the former also encompassed foreign actors with troops in the DRC (Essuman-Johnson, 2009: 141).

The second phase of conflict resolution initiatives comprised the period following the signing of the Lusaka peace accord. The accord tried to speak to both national and foreign concerns and acknowledged serious issues and the interdependence of a number of programmes. However, it did not create way for sustainable resolutions to the DRC conflict. Its weakness was a result of implementation being left in the hands of warring parties, and therefore opening space for the disruption of the process (Mpangala, 2004: 19). In line with Mpangala’s claim, Solomon and Swart (2004) note that conflict resolution initiatives began with signatories of the Ceasefire Agreement being tasked with the responsibility to ensure the proper implementation of the agreement. They also had to agree to do their level best to facilitate the ICD, since it was a step towards a new political system in the DRC (Solomon and Swart (2004: 8-9).

Other initiatives taken during the second stage of conflict resolution comprised the installation of former President Masire of Botswana as mediator in the DRC conflict, by what was then known as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (now African Union (AU)). However, he encountered some difficulties as he was rejected by some parties, including Laurent Kabila. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was reaffirmed in February 2001. The agreement was ushered in to deliberate on the concerns of warring factions, namely the DRC government, rebel groups, the Mai Mai, the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALiR), Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda (Mpangala, 2004: 19-20). According to Yabadi (2011: 1) following his ascendance to the presidency, Joseph Kabila committed himself to the supervision of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Therefore, by 2003 he had concluded the ceasefire in the DRC and established a transitional government that ultimately resulted in the coordination of the 2006 free and fair elections (Yabadi, 2011:1).

In a quest to resolve conflict in the DRC, the SADC Heads of State and Government advocated for a pacific and sustainable resolution of the conflict, and vowed to provide troops to be deployed for that reason (Ngwawi, 2013: 7). Furthermore, SADC tried to make a significant contribution to fighting violence in the country and identified a need to set up institutional structures that would take part in vigorous strategies to peacebuilding and
reconstruction in the country. As a result, the organization set up a shared peacebuilding office with the AU in the Kinshasa (Gwanyayi et al, 2010: 2).

At the SADC Summit held in Lusaka, Zambia, from 16 to 17 August 2007, the SADC Brigade was launched. A regional multidimensional peace support operations capability established under the African Standby Force Policy Framework. The Brigade initiated via a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by SADC leaders on the second day of the Summit, to guarantee preconditions for development such as peace, security and political stability (Madakufamba, 2007: 1). At a similar Summit held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 17 to 18 August 2012, it was decided that SADC sends an intervention force to the eastern part of the DRC. The force was deployed to DRC in order to aid the government in demilitarizing all armed groups in eastern DRC, mainly the March 23 Movement (M23) rebels (Malebang, 2014: 159).

Four months later, at the Extra-Ordinary Summit of SADC Heads of States and Government held in Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, it was resolved that the SADC Standby Force be sent to the eastern DRC as a group under the supervision of the Neutral International Force (NIF). South Africa and Tanzania both vowed to contribute one battalion and logistical assistance to the NIF (Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government Communique, 2012: 2-3). Furthermore, to show further commitment to ending the DRC conflict, by the end of 2013, all SADC member states had interchangeably contributed troops to the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). This was done in substitute of the three initial troop contributing member states, namely Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa, when their turn had ended and until the fulfilment of the mission goal (Malebang, 2014: 296).

SADC has also been greatly assisted by its wealthiest member, South Africa. South Africa has played a prominent role as intermediate, organizer and supporter of the country’s peace processes (Dzinesa and Laker, 2010: 22-23) Its earliest contribution in the country was when it attempted to broker a peace agreement between Mobutu’s regime and that of Laurent Kabila (Kibasomba, 2002: 11). Still on the mission of peace, then “Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was sent to Kigali, Kampala and Kisangani with an aim to persuade the rebel forces to join the negotiations for peace. Hence, on 1st of August 1999, Jean-Pierre Bemba (Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) leader) became the first Congolese rebel to sign the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement” (Kibasomba, 2002: 12).
South Africa’s assistance to the DRC was on technical aspects as well. Therefore, after the signing of the Agreement, “the South African Air Force (SAAF) was sent to the DRC, supported by the field hospital and military field engineers” (Kibasomba, 2002: 12). “The South African government was also able to persuade the foreign military personnel to withdraw their presence in the DRC. It was able to convince the participants in the DRC conflict to accept the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Hence, it was on 31 August 1999, on behalf of the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) that the DRC government agreed on stopping the fighting” (Kibasomba, 2002: 11). South Africa was also a main actor in the DRC peace process, when a Global All-Inclusive Peace accord was signed in Pretoria, South Africa, on December 17 and endorsed in Sun City on 2 April, 2003. The peace accord requested “an end to the conflict, an ICD, withdrawal of foreign military personnel and the disarmament of rebels” (Hendricks and Lucey, 2013: 2). South Africa became even more involved in the peace process in 2002, when the ICD resumed in Sun City, South Africa, from 25 February to 12 April 2002. It became “a constant diplomatic presence” and chief negotiator in the DRC peace process, following its initial reluctance to get involved in the DRC crisis (Monyae, 2014: 123-124).

Monyae (2014: 124) claims that reluctance was due to mere fact that following its failed intervention in Lesotho, South Africa did not want to be drawn into another military intervention. As well as Nelson Mandela’s standpoint on the issue of conflict resolution in the DRC (refer to chapter 3). Furthermore, South Africa’s reluctance was informed by the fact that it had limited peacekeeping capabilities and experience (Kibasomba, 2002: 6). Nevertheless, Hendricks and Lucey (2013: 2) assert that South Africa has been an essential donor to UN peace missions, particularly MONUC and MONUSCO. It contributed around 1,250 peacekeepers towards MONUSCO’s 20,519 strength. It also contributed 850 soldiers to the FIB, alongside the other two initial SADC troop contributors mentioned earlier. In line with Hendricks and Lucey’s assertion, Dzinesa and Laker (2010: 22) state that South Africa contributed 1,268 troops to the UN mission, and fiscal, human and logistical backing to the country’s first democratic polls (Dzinesa and Laker, 2010: 22).

The South African National Defense Force (SANDF) engineers worked with the mission’s peacekeepers in the country to keep the airport in the eastern city of Goma operating to make sure that significant armed and non-combatant provisions were able to be flown in. The SANDF contingent was deployed under the command of MONUSCO. This followed seizure
of the airport by fighters of the M23 rebel group, when they sidestepped the national army and the mission’s peacekeepers and marched into Goma (Szabo, 2012). South Africa continues to play a significant role in post-conflict rebuilding efforts in the DRC via the South Africa-DRC Bi-National Commission (BNC) that was initially organized in Kinshasa in August, 2004. Since then, South African companies participate in the DRC’s economy. (Dzinesa and Laker, 2010: 7). According to Hendricks and Lucey (2013: 3), South Africa broadly clustered its assistance to the DRC into three key areas, namely, security sector reform (SSR), institutional capacity building and economic development (Hendricks and Lucey, 2013: 3).

4.2 MONUSCO and conflict resolution in the DRC

Ever since the outbreak of the conflict MONUC contributed actively to the cessation of hostilities and the preservation of peace and security. Established on 6 August, 1999, after the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, its primary mission was to observe the peace process. Thereafter, taking into consideration the political modification in the country, MONUC had experienced numerous changes (Yabadi, 2011: 2). In 2004 the UN Security Council (UNSC) extended the mandate and role of MONUC by Resolution 1565 with more emphases on protecting the citizens, overseeing and taking control of arms embargo and disarming the rebels and foreign combatants (Khan, 2012:332). Therefore, MONUC had to withdraw all foreign groups from the DRC territory under the DDR process. The rationale behind this task was to create an environment that encouraged civilians and their relatives to take a step towards an improved life without arms. Therefore, in a quest to fulfill its responsibilities MONUC created a temporary reception center where combatants could hand in their weapons. But, the mission faced difficulties when dealing with the armed groups operating in eastern DRC. The difficulties were caused by the fact that those groups were not signatories to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreements, meaning that they were not ready to surrender and reintegrate (Yabadi, 2011: 8-9).

Nevertheless, through the use of force, MONUC managed to protect many civilians who were threatened by armed groups or even elements of their own army. For instance, in Ituri District, approximately 18 000 militias handed in their weapons and joined the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process, following forceful actions by MONUC (Cammaert, no-date: 104). The mission also peacefully repatriated close to 12, 000 foreign civilians and their dependents willingly to Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda, and over 1 million
internally displaced persons (IDPs) returned to their homes, predominantly in parts where the UN mission’s peacekeepers were present. (UNPO, 2004: 11).

Subsequently, the mandate was further enlarged by Resolution 1797 which authorized MONUC to assist with organizing, preparing and conducting local polls. The mission’s role was then not only to control violence but also to uphold peace and assist the country to progress socially, economically and politically (Khan, 2012: 332). Therefore, in preparation for the 2006 elections, MONUC provided valuable assistance to the DRC’s Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) in the successful organization of the presidential, parliamentary and provincial elections. Through its Electoral Division, MONUC provided logistical and technical support to the CEI, ensuring that the latter was able to manage a very complex and tension-filled electoral process relatively smoothly (Koko, 2011: 35). MONUC’s important task was to guarantee enforcement of peace accords, facilitation of political transitional processes and to guarantee credible elections, with an aim to restore and maintain political stability in the DRC. Thus, the mission’s accomplishment in this regard was best demonstrated by the successful first democratic elections, with a voter turnout valued at 25 million voters in the countries 53, 000 voting stations (Ogunrotifa, 2012: 918). Which according to Malan and Boshoff cited in Ogunrotifa (2012: 918) was “one of the major achievements of MONUC”.

According to an Institute for Security Studies (ISS) situation report by Boshoff and Yav (2006), although the overall impression from observation teams was that the polls were nonviolent, transparent, credible and well administered. The same cannot be said about the election of 30 July 2006 which was carried out with incidents of violence and logistical problems (Boshoff and Yav, 2006: 1). For instance, in the Kasai province’s two towns of Mbuji-Mayi and Mweka, ballot papers were damaged when polling stations were burnt down. As a result, polls were postponed for the following day, in 172 polling stations in Mbuji-Mayi and 54 in Mweka, “where voting took place in a disciplined way” (Schroder, 2006: 13). The compilation process went much faster and smoother than throughout the initial round, particularly in Kinshasa, where the UN mission had taken over the logistics from the CEI (de Goede, 2006: 2).

Not even one of the contenders received an outright majority, President Joseph Kabila and his vice Jean-Pierre Bemba received 44 percent and 20 percent, respectively. As a result, rerun
was scheduled for 29 October 2006 (de Goede, 2006: 1). A couple of days following the declaration of the election outcomes, heavy clashed erupted between Bemba’s armed forces and Kabila’s Presidential Guard. This was a sign that there were great tensions and the build-up to the rerun would be tense and potentially violent (de Goede, 2006: 1). The rerun campaigns by the two candidates and their alliances were fierce and at times aggressive. However, according to domestic and foreign observers, the polls were administered in a free and fair manner. Both voters and the electoral personnel were extra confident than they were throughout the first round (de Goede, 2006: 1). Polling took place in a generally peaceful environment, despite fears that the elections would be mired by violence, following the tense election campaign (EISA, 2007: 54). An exception was the unfortunate rain in Kinshasa and other areas of the DRC which caused problems in the administration of the polling process, but did not drastically interrupt the elections (de Goede, 2006: 1).

On 15 November, 2006, the CEI announced Kabila as the winner of the election with 58.05 percent against Bemba who received 41.95 percent (Mangu and Budeli, no-date: 7). Subsequently, Bemba appealed the results to the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) claiming huge irregularities and vote rigging. But, the outcomes were already endorsed by the SCJ in its judgement delivered on 27 November 2006, exactly 10 days after they were announced by the CEI. Therefore, the transitional administration was concluded as President Kabila was inaugurated and took office on December 6, 2006 (Mangu and Budeli, no-date: 7). The elections and installation of a legitimate government made way for the post transition phase which led to the DRC into becoming an independent state. This meant that it was now the state’s main duty to defend its non-combatants. Therefore, MONUC’s role from then onward was mainly restricted to supporting the FARDC (Reynaert, 2011: 17).

With regards to Congolese SSR, MONUC played a central role in disarming and demobilizing former combatants, including Ituri district militias, while working closely with other international players as well as the Congolese administration in the creation of a new and integrated national army. MONUC also played a significant role in the brassage process that formed twelve assimilated military contingents in the country from 2004 up until 2007. It was similarly influential during the modification of the National Congolese Police Forces (PNC) comprising the refurbishing of police training centres through the DRC (Koko, 2011: 33). MONUC contributed directly to the training of 10,000 DRC police officers in an array of specializations, comprising police instructors, anti-riot units and flying squads. The
mission also worked in partnership with the European Union (EU) in the process of ‘physical identification’ of members of the Congolese army for salary disbursement purposes. The mission has since been directly involved in the payment of salaries to soldiers in the hope of rooting out corruption and the embezzlement of soldiers salaries by the authorities (Koko, 2011: 33-34).

“MONUC launched important steps in 2009 to improve the protection of civilians. It increased the number of field bases, placing peacekeepers throughout North and South Kivu in locations where they were better able to provide civilian protection. In a further effort to overcome some of the challenges and bridge the divide between MONUC peacekeepers and the civilian population, MONUC also established Joint Protection Teams (JPT) in early 2009” (Swart, no-date: 53). Resolution 1925 of May 2010 then renamed MONUC to MONUSCO in order to emphasize that the peace process had taken a significant step forward. Its mandate was also more confined, namely upholding the importance to protect civilians and contribute to the consolidation of the situation by inter alia supporting the police-reform or the organization of elections (Janik, 2014: 158-159).

A year later, on 28 November, the DRC held multi-party elections for the second time since decolonization in 1960. Therefore, “in accordance with its mandate, MONUSCO provided technical and logistical support to the DRC’s CEI for the conduct of the presidential and legislative elections” (UNPO, 2011: 24). MONUSCO made transport arrangements for about 3,000 tons of electoral materials and over 400 electoral observers that needed to be transported around the country, in support of the electoral process (UNPO, 2011: 24). Furthermore, in conjunction with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the mission provided technical assistance to CEI, including with regard to the voter registration process. They also supported the production, coordination and distribution of materials that were designed to intensify public awareness of the presidential and legislative elections and promote civic education (UNPO, 2011: 24).

Although the organization of the elections was welcomed by the Congolese population, the actual elections took place under unfavorable political conditions, which inevitably undermined their democratic value. The integrity of the electoral process was compromised from the outset by undemocratic tendencies, which were reveled in, among other political actions, the quasi-unilateral amendment of the Constitution to undo the two-round system of
voting for the presidential election, the marginalization of civil society from electoral administrative processes, and the censoring of private media outlets (IGD, 2012: 3). The interplay of these structural irregularities produced an electoral process that lacked transparency, did not enjoy the trust of electoral actors, and was pervaded with diverse elements of contestation. Furthermore, the electoral commission lacked the capacity and will to mitigate the concerns of political parties and other electoral stakeholders over irregularities in some aspects of the process, such as the compilation of the voters’ roll or the setting up of polling stations. Just like in the preparatory phase of the process, voting and the compilation of results were also subjected to the same degree of irregularity, lack of transparency and distrust (IGD, 2012: 3-4).

According to the Human Rights Watch (2013) the worst polling connected was in Kinshasa, where roughly 57 opposition party followers or alleged followers were murdered by security forces, mostly Kabila’s Republican Guard from 26 November up until 31 December. Approximately 150 additional people were murdered in the same period, with their corpses allegedly discarded into the Congo River, in mass graves on the borders of Kinshasa, or in mortuaries away from the city centre. Others who were accused of differing with Kabila were randomly imprisoned by Republican Guard Soldiers and the police. Whilst many were detained in illicit detention centres where they were abused and some even murdered (HRW, 2013: 2).

Furthermore, “Abuse against opposition supporters also occurred in other areas, including North and South Kivu, Katanga, and the Kasai provinces. In some areas, soldiers and militia members backing Kabila used intimidation and force to compel voters to vote for certain candidates” (HRW, 2013: 2). According to the Carter Center observation cited in Schoppert (2013) there were various indiscretions such as voter inflation in parts known to be loyal to Kabila and voter suspension in parts known to be loyal to the opposition. For instance, in some former parts, voter attendance was 99 to 100 percent, which was somewhat impossible considering that only a few roads were paved and every vote was for Kabila (Schoppert, 2013: 77). Nevertheless, “President Joseph Kabila was declared winner of the 28 November 2011 elections, which both national and international election observers criticized as lacking credibility and transparency” (HRW, 2013: 1).
The security situation in eastern DRC got worse between 2011 and 2012. It became increasingly clear that, although the UN had invested heavily into the stabilization of the DRC, it had pretty little to show for it (Dehez, 2014: 3). Therefore, “MONUSCO stepped up its efforts and intensified its support to Congolese forces and multiplied patrols to better protect civilians. On the political front, the UN sought to support ongoing regional diplomatic efforts” (UNPO, 2012: 14). Also, to implement the mandate tasks of civilian protection and providing support to the DRC government with its stabilization and peace consolidation effects, MONUSCO provided meaningful assistance to the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) between 15 and 20 November, 2012. The mission’s assistance comprised 18 attack helicopter operations against M23 bases and direct fighting with its soldiers, in a quest to prevent the rebel movement from capturing Goma. However, following FARDC’s withdrawal from its bases in protection of Goma, the mission’s forces chose not to participate in direct fighting with the M23 to prevent possible civilian deaths in the heavily populated environment (MONUSCO, 2013: 14).

Furthermore, the mission forces, nonetheless continued to protect Goma airport as well as other strategic areas. Its forces also upheld a strong presence in the town of Goma, comprising approximately 80 daily patrols as well as the formation of 17 Quick Reaction Forces for civilian defence and the prevention of human rights abuses and looting throughout the M23 capture of Goma. Additionally, during the period between 15 and 26 November, the mission evacuated 160 people considered to be in danger because of the existence of the M23 in Goma. Amongst those evacuated were the Governor and his vice, other government officials, magistrates, police journalists and human rights defenders. The mission also ensured the safety and protection of more than 3000 locals (MONUSCO, 2013: 14).

“The crisis reignited regional political efforts and led to the signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, as well as the authorization of the FIB by the Security Council in March 2013, on an exceptional basis. Through the FIB, the Council authorized offensive operations to neutralize and disarm armed groups” (UNPO, 2012: 2). The FIB was authorized within the framework of MONUSCO and composed of 3, 000 military personnel from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi (Lamont and Skeppstrom, 2013: 10). According to an assertion made by the UN Secretariat, the FIB was not a peacekeeping mission but a peace enforcement mission. The “first-ever ‘offensive’ combat force,” authorized by the Security Council “on an exceptional basis and without creating precedent or any prejudice to the
agreed principles of peacekeeping” (cited in chapter one) (Sheeran and Case, 2014: 2). Therefore, according to an interview with Herve Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General (USG) for the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), “the Intervention Brigade must be seen in the broader political context as a way of addressing those who attempt to spoil peace efforts” (UNPO, 2012: 3).

In March of the following year, Security Council Resolution 2147 extended the FIB’s mandate within MONUSCO, and there were only minor meaningful amendments to the Brigade’s mandate (Sheeran and Case, 2014: 3). On 26 March 2015, the UNSC extended the mission’s mandate and the FIB by twelve months through resolution 2211 of 2015. UNSC members unanimous decided to decrease the mission’s personnel by 2000 soldiers, which was to be made permanent if and when there was any evidence of substantial progress on the mandates most important tasks. The UNSC mandated the mission to carry on maximizing force compatibility, flexibility and efficiency in implementing its mandate, and decided that the mission’s upcoming reconstruction and mandate should include the DRC government. It reiterated that civilian protection ought to be treated with urgency when making decisions on the use of available capacity and resources, and therefore mandated the mission to anything possible to guarantee the effective protection of non-combatants and UN personnel, facilities, installation and equipment. On the other hand, the UNSC authorized the FIB to implement targeted offensive operations in collaboration with MONUSCO and either separately nor cooperatively with DRC military personnel, within the ambit of international law (UN Press, 2015).

4.3 Local and international peacekeeping partnerships

The end of the Cold War not only increased the need for peacekeeping missions, but it also altered their limits. However, the UN’s role as a key global peacekeeping player did not change, but it introduced a new style of regional peacekeeping. The new style reflects the localization of international relations depend on the mixed efforts of global and regional organizations to resolve post-Cold War conflicts (Baba and Slotter, 2014: 1). As a result, the bond between the UN and Africa organizations has undergone several transformations. The Security Council and the General Assembly have held open gatherings where they made announcements on collaborations between the UN and regional organizations during the last 10 years. The 1992 Agenda for Peace report by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the then UN Secretary General identified the need for greater cooperation. Therefore, two years later the
General Assembly passed a declaration on improving collaboration with “regional organizations” focusing on peacekeeping activities aligned to the Security Council’s endorsement of regional players. Parts identified for probable collaboration include the sharing of information and consultation, membership in UN bodies, and personnel and material aid (Holt and Shanahan, 2005: 51).

A highlight of UN-SADC interaction in conflict transformation in the DRC was in the year 2000 when SADC ambassadors at the UN mounted a diplomatic offensive and secured the involvement of the UNSC in facilitating a peaceful resolution to the DRC conflict. It is the intervention and stabilization role of SADC member states, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in the DRC in 1998 that is in fact credited for making it possible for the later UN deployment of MONUC in the year 2000 (Malebang, 2014: 97). Ten years later, on 21 September, SADC and the UN signed a MoU. The MoU provided a framework between the two organizations, particularly aimed at strengthening cooperation in peace and security. Following which, the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) opened an office in Gaborone, Botswana, where the SADC Secretariat is based in order to fulfil aims of the framework (Malebang, 2014: 97).

Under the auspices of MONUSCO, SADC deployed the FIB comprising Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania, after they had met UN requirements and criteria for deployment in Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) (SADC Media Release, 2014). Malebang (2014: 98) argues that the FIB is wholly owned by the UN in terms of funding and equipment, but led by SADC member states in terms of human resources. Through collaborative efforts by both organizations the FIB successfully managed to defeat the notorious M23 rebel group at the end of 2013 (Malebang, 2014: 98). However, “While the defeat of the M23 rebel group was a magnificent accomplishment, it has not resulted in sustained or increased security in the eastern Kivu region of the DRC. Armed groups such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) (Ugandan-led armed group) and the FDLR are still operating in the region” (ISS Today, 2014). Therefore, rebel groups remain persistent threats to the country’s peace and security.

UN-AU partnerships were evident during the Burundi conflict. During the deployment of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the UN functioned in conjunction with the AU during the Burundi political process and offered MONUC resources. Therefore, when the AU could no longer sustain AMIB it negotiated with the UN to take over its leadership. Their
partnership assisted AMIB to move from being a regionally-led to being an internationally-led mission (Holt and Shanahan, 2005: 41). According to Rodt (2011: 22) the move from AMIB to the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was made possible through the deployment of AMIB troops, but under ONUB control. 2, 612 AMIB troops constituted the initial group that formed ONUB. The UN operation was meant to have a total of 5, 650 armed forces, comprising 200 armed observers, 120 police and close to 1, 000 domestic and global non-combatant staff. But, the operation’s force generation process was hindered by members states delayed responses.

Nevertheless, the change of operations went well, because from the initial stages of AMIB operation the UN and AU had close operations and they established a mutual understanding of the dynamics of the Burundian conflict. It was also because the mission’s deployment was founded on the agreement that the UN would ultimately accept its duty. The mission was ended in December 2006 following a fruitful conclusion of the mandate and substituted by the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) that coordinated international aid. (Chaizy, 2011: 10). There is also evidence of partnerships between the UN and the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), as well in Liberia. The UN backed the efforts of ECOWAS member states in Liberia. The UNSC started showing interest in Liberia on 22 January, 1991, when it commended the efforts ECOWAS presidents. A year later, on 7 May, the Council also praised the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group’s (ECOMOG) Yamoussoukro IV Accord, stating that it presented the finest imaginable framework for the pacific resolution of the Liberian conflict. Therefore, in support of the accord the Security Council imposed a universal and comprehensive restriction on all supplies of arms and military equipment to Liberia, excluding supplies that were exclusively for ECOMOG use (Onumajuru, 2005: 43).

Subsequently, in September 1993, the UNSC established the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) by its resolution 866. UNOMIL was launched to supervise and monitor ECOMOG’s execution of the Cotonou Peace Agreement. It was mandated to support ECOWAS and the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG) in implementing the Cotonou agreement, investigating ceasefire violations, assisting in the demobilization of combatants, and investigating human rights violations (Huangi, 2007: 85). Therefore, UNOMIL worked with ECOMOG in executing the agreement (Onumajuru, 2005: 43). The agreement outlined the distinct tasks for both ECOMOG and UNOMIL. The former was
accountable for the execution of the ceasefire and demilitarization, whilst the latter was given
the role of observing the former’s actions, comprising enforcement activities (Kihunah, 2005:
125).

Each mission was expected to conclude its own manner of operations in consultation with the
other. ECOMOG was accountable for guaranteeing the security of UNOMIL observers and
non-combatant staff. It was understood that if the mission got into conflict operations in a
particular area, UNOMIL would provisionally pull out from that particular area. Also, if
ECOMOG was forced into an unexpected self-defence armed action, it ensured the safety of
UNOMIL observers and other UN personnel in the area (Kihunah, 2005: 125). However, the
working relationship between UNOMIL and ECOMOG quickly deteriorated. The latter’s
lack of resources implicated the effectiveness and morale of its troops who were variously
unpaid or underpaid. This caused tension with UNOMIL staff whose mission was much
better funded, but dependent on ECOMOG to function. ECOMOG’s lack of resources also
led to numerous alleged occurrences of corruption, comprising the sale of fuel to the US and
meant for ECOMOG automobiles; hence the local joke that the mission’s acronym stood for
“Every Car or Moving Object Gone” (Tuck, 2000: 9).

Tension amongst the two missions was on political direction, local command and personnel
on the ground (Huangi, 2007: 85). ECOMOG resented that they required UNOMIL’s
supervision because it implied some level of distrust in the mission’s abilities and intentions
(Tuck, 2000: 10). It perceived the UN to be incapable of dealing with belligerents as it only
came into the scene three years later (Kihunah, 2005: 126). ECOMOG was already deployed
and it was the bigger formation, while UNOMIL was assigned under the Cotonou agreement
with “supervising” execution, and that implied some form of direct role. Thus tension
between leaders of the respective missions on which mission should take the lead (Tuck,
2000: 9).

As ECOMOG was larger in size than UNOMIL it eventually dictated its movements. For
instance, it occasionally restricted UNOMIL observers at roadblocks and required them to
monitor non-combatants evening curfews even though their early agreement was that they
would be allowed to freely travel the whole of Liberia. This resulted in the UNOMIL being
perceived by a lot of people as just being a political mechanism with not much applied
purpose, except for the conciliation of the then Liberian President Charles Taylor (Kihunah,
UNOMIL was simply there to support ECOWAS; UN monitors were completely dependent on ECOMOG for their own personal security and that of their mission as a whole. Therefore, as a monitoring and legitimating mission, this severely hampered UNOMIL’s independence and its ability to carry out its mandate, particularly the investigative tasks (Huangi, 2007: 86).

As a result, there were enormous practical difficulties for both ECOMOG and UNOMIL. The coordination between the deployments of both missions was often very poor. For instance, UNOMIL observers were at times deployed into certain areas without the backing of ECOMOG, thus exposing them to compromising situations. For example, UNOMIL troops that were deployed into Lofa County and Northern Nimba were not protected by ECOMOG. Even when the two missions were deployed together, UNOMIL was at times subjected to numerous ECOMOG restrictions which undermined the mission’s integrity (Tuck, 2000: 10). Therefore, UNOMIL could not implement a lot of its authorized activities and was sometimes forced to remove its troops from Liberia. In November 1995, the Security Council cut down the mission’s presence to 160 personnel and edited its mandate, giving it a lower profile role in support of ECOMOG and the LNTG (Kihunah, 2005: 127). A year later the deteriorating conflict in Monrovia forced further removals which saw UNOMIL’s strength being reduced to less than 20 troops. As a result, the mission’s role was unclear and its existence insignificant, regardless of the renewal of its mandate. This became a constant circumstance till the security situation had developed sufficiently for the polls to take place in 1997, thus concluding the mission’s operation in the country (Kihunah, 2005: 127).
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary:
This chapter is divided into four sections: a section that highlights and summarizes the study’s point of departure; a section which offers possible solutions and transformation for conflict and policy initiatives; a section that concludes the entire study; and a section which offers recommendations.

Overall, the study’s main point of departure is the role of peacekeeping bodies’ in Africa. It specifically analyzes the role of MONUSCO and SADC in the DRC conflict. Chapter one was an introduction to the study. It outlined the background, research questions and objectives of the study. It argued that the investigative and interpretive nature of this study, as well as its objectives of unpacking the role of MONUSCO and SADC in peacekeeping in the DRC required a qualitative research approach. The approach involved techniques of gathering information which are neither quantitative nor numerical, for example, books, journals, newspapers and internet sources. The study used data sourced from both primary and secondary sources in analyzing the role of MONUSCO and SADC in the DRC conflict. It utilizes content analysis as a method of analysing both primary and secondary documents for the research topic. The chapter concluded with the limitations as well as a description of the structure of the study.

The second chapter sets the scene of the DRC conflict. Firstly, it examined the DRC’s socio-economic and political conditions prior to the arrival of MONUSCO and SADC. It was discovered that the DRC plunged into deep political crisis and social instability just a few months after attaining independence. It had very limited human and institutional capacity for good governance and even for establishing a functional government. Therefore, weak governance left the DRC as one of Africa’s poorest and least developed countries, resulting in an overall extremely disappointing economic performance. The economic decline was accompanied by a deep deterioration of the DRC’s social sector. Secondly, it identified and explained factors that gave rise to the MONUSCO and SADC deployment in the DRC conflict. SADC’s deployment was a direct response to Kabila’s call for help after the
beginning of Africa’s First World War when Rwandans invaded the DRC and backed new rebellion forces against Kabila. MONUSCO was deployed amongst other things to implement and oversee the Lusaka accord following its signing.

The third chapter evaluated challenges and constraints of MONUSCO and SADC in peacekeeping in the DRC. It accentuated the factors that hindered the success of peacekeeping operations in the DRC conflict. The chapter notes that SADC’s challenges and constraints are a result of its historical factors, whilst MONUSCO’s are a result of its ignorance about the DRC, its region and the nature of its conflict. Finally, the fourth chapter discussed the findings. Firstly, it provided an analysis of MONUSCO and SADC in conflict resolution in the DRC. The latter called for a peaceful and durable resolution of the conflict through collective means, whilst the former actively contributed to the cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of peace and security. Secondly, it provided insights into peacekeeping partnerships between local and international bodies’ as well as the challenges and constraints they endure in conflict ridden areas. The chapter notes that partnerships between local and international peacekeeping bodies’ are vital for the success of peacekeeping operations and combating African conflicts.

5.2 Solutions/ transformation for conflict and policy initiatives:
Drawing from the challenges and constraints in chapter three and four, this study makes the following solutions/ transformations for conflict and policy initiative:

5.2.1 Integration and co-operation between SADC member states
SADC member states must unite behind one shared vision and develop a clear policy with regards to its preferred type of intervention. Therefore, it needs to deal with issues of fiscal and logistical weakness as well as the absence of political consensus between its commanders on shared security norms and practices.

5.2.2 Pursuit of regional interests
Regional interests must be prioritized over those of individual states because the DRC crisis affects the entire region and not just the DRC or particular states. Therefore, all intervening states must prioritize the resolution of the DRC conflict over what they stand to gain as intervening states.
5.2.3 Mandates must be clearer
Mandates must give peacekeepers clear instructions to avoid giving them contradictory instruction as alluded to in Chapter 3.

5.2.4 Provision of sufficient well-trained peacekeeping troops
The number of UN peacekeepers must be increased to ensure they fulfill the mandate of protecting civilians, with well-trained peacekeepers. Therefore, troop contributing states should consider the intricacy of the DRC conflict, its magnitude and requirements on the ground when contribute their troops to UN missions.

5.2.5 The integration of rebel groups
All rebel movements need to be dismantled and assimilated into the national armed forces in order for the Congolese government to establish its authority throughout the country and so that the conflict is not as complex and intractable. However, members of rebel groups suspected of human rights violations should be excluded in order to strengthen the protection of civilians in the DRC.

5.2.6 Proactive responses
Peacekeeping forces must not be reactive but proactive so as to avoid certain incidents before they take place. This would assist in avoiding the unnecessary killings of innocent civilians and the general perpetuation of the DRC conflict as alluded to in Chapter 3.

5.3 Conclusion:
This research study’s aim was to discover why the DRC conflict remains continuous despite the presence of MONUSCO and SADC, amongst other peacekeeping bodies’. To achieve this goal, the study examined the role of peacekeeping bodies’ in Africa. In particular, it examined the role of MONUSCO and SADC in conflict resolution and peacekeeping in the DRC conflict. It examined their successes and failures as per their mandates and responsibilities towards combating conflict in the DRC. The examination of both peacekeeping bodies’ highlighted new insights into peacekeeping partnerships between local and international peacekeeping bodies’ and the challenges and constraints they endure in conflict ridden areas.
The DRC political crisis and subsequent continuous violent conflict is by no means a result of inactiveness to resolve the conflict by the international community. As matter of fact, the UN has been committed to the DRC’s peace process for almost 20 years. It has facilitated the negotiation and signing of numerous peace agreements, and has also deployed thousands of troops. However, these numerous agreements and thousands of troops have so far not ended conflict in the DRC (Diercks, 2011: 1). SADC’s failure to cease fire and bring stability to the country is a result of a split in the organizations intervention approaches to the conflict. The Zimbabwean-led military intervention in support of the Kabila regime was de facto, as it was neither supported nor rejected by SADC. Whilst the South African-led pacific negotiated settlements also did not receive any broad-based backing from SADC (van Schalkwyk, 2005: 37).

UN missions have also been playing a significant role in the DRC, where international intervention through peacekeeping operations is trying to discover a sustainable resolution of the DRC conflict. For instance, the missions’ mandates as well as contributions by peacekeeping troops were expected not only to end conflict in the DRC, but also to try and transform the conflict into peace, particularly for the Congolese. However, the UN missions have proven to be generally incapable of managing the DRC conflict due to the intricacy of the DRC conflict, its magnitude and requirements on the ground. As supposed impartial missions, MONUC and MONUSCO forces were unable to access critical information about the ongoing DRC conflict. Even though MONUC expended to become the biggest and most costly UN mission ever in the history of UN peacekeeping, the mission was not as equally effective (Diercks, 2011: 31).

Yet again, while democratic elections can be a beacon of hope, this was not the case in the DRC. Kabila’s revisions of the electoral process depicted that his interests are self-centered and not people-centered, that he is more concerned with his personal interests then seeking good governance for the DRC. Furthermore, not much has been done by his regime to find lasting solutions to the primary causes of conflict in eastern DRC (Diercks, 2011: 38-39).

This study has sought to show that the role of both SADC and MONUSCO in peacekeeping in the DRC has not been fully explored since there is still conflict in the eastern DRC. However, the main reason for failure of the peacekeeping strategy is the fact that the SADC has been divided in their response, whilst the international community has not given enough
attention to the primary causes of conflict in the DRC. Nevertheless, it is also equally clear that without their intervention the situation in the DRC would in all likelihood have been much worse than what it is today.

5.4 Recommendation:
Drawing from the findings of the study as well as matters arising from the final remarks, this paper makes the following recommendations that comprise proposals for further research on the topic of peacekeeping in Africa:

5.4.1 Recommendations based on the Findings
The crisis in the DRC illustrates the historical patterns alluded to in Chapter 2 as the root of the current conflict. Therefore, “as long as the Congolese government cannot control its territory, provide basic services or effectively protect its population, and as long as diverse armed groups are able to prosper from illicit trade in natural resources and complex regional alliances, eastern Congo will remain a battlefield and innocent civilians will continue to pay a tragically high cost” (Ngendahimana, 2014: 50). Therefore, the Congolese government and its people should play a key role in the resolution of its own conflict and for the country to achieve democracy and the respect of human rights. Government should be strong enough to provide security to its civilians without relying on peacekeepers. However, its conflict solutions must involve other parties as strategic coordination is crucial since the DRC conflict involves a variety of actors. Therefore, a distinct specialization can be observed between those actors that provide troops, those that contribute financial resources and those that decide about the mandate.

All parties involved must have political will and be committed to the resolution of the DRC conflict. They must be readily willing to “invest the necessary resources to achieve specific objectives and a willingness to make and implement policy despite opposition” (Little, 2010: 3). So as to ensure that ultimately there is peace and security in the DRC. Lezhnev and Bafilemba (2005: 4) argue that “in order to build democratic legitimacy in the DRC after years of war and transition, it is crucial to have a free and fair transfer of power”. Therefore, democratic elections must be considered the most viable solution to the DRC conflict. Both the 2006 and 2011 elections ushered in an elected government, but the elections were not democratic. Therefore, in as much as elections are viewed as part and parcel of conflict
resolution measures, they can equally deepen existing splits if they are undemocratic, as it appears to have been the case in the DRC.

During the post-Cold War era the International structure is faced with more intra and less inter-state conflicts. Therefore, there is an evident shift of roles by international organizations in regional conflicts. The shift has resulted in changes in the nature of conflict, from being conflict of ideas to being conflict of ethnic and religious orientation. African regional organizations have played their part in solving regional conflicts, although they have not yet succeeded in many conflicts. However, all hope is not lost, as regional organizations have their share in the development of African states. Therefore, if used effectively, regional organizations have the potential to resolve the DRC conflict (Ngendahimana, 2014: 48).

Most of the actors in the DRC conflict are either rebel groups from neighbouring states or supported by them. Therefore, the resolution of the DRC conflict requires the full participation of regional actors. Moreover, the very nature of the conflict calls for a regional response. The primary causes of the DRC conflict comprise economic competition over natural resources, the struggle for identity and survival by ethnic groups, and the oppression legacy of rebellious civil movements, which are rooted in the African culture. Therefore, it would be virtually impossible for international forces to comprehend the complexity of the culture and the struggle for social identity. Hence, “practical solutions to the problems with consideration to local needs and situation can be better provided by regional leaders, thus, regional mechanisms to conflict resolution in the DRC can be fruitful” (Ngendahimana, 2014: 85).

However, in order to resolve the current conflict there must be peacekeeping partnerships between local and international actors. Therefore, the UN and SADC need to make clear as well as develop their operational doctrines and not allow differences and divisions to hinder their conflict resolution initiatives in order to help facilitate more lasting peace and security. For instance, SADC will need to develop the ability to observe, assess and guarantee the execution of agreements that it helps to negotiate, “and the international community must support the implementation of agreements with long-term commitments” (Lezhnev and Bafilemoba, 2013: 4). Therefore, the victory of peace treaties is entirely dependent upon the cooperation of all parties.
Peace and security in eastern DRC can only be achieved if and when the DRC government keeps to its commitments and responds to the country’s internal issues (Lezhnev and Bafilemba, 2013: 4). Equally, both its neighbour states and the international community should play their parts in the DRC peace process. The former must start by withdrawing their troops from the DRC and seize backing any of the rebel groups currently involved in the DRC conflict. Whilst the latter needs to back the execution of peace treaties with lasting commitments and also involve the DRC government and regional organizations in their endeavours pertaining conflict in the DRC.

5.4.2 Recommendations for Further/ Future Research
As noted in chapter 1, the desktop qualitative method selected by the researcher was exposed to several methodological limitations due to resource constraints. It is therefore recommended that scholars with an interest in furthering this field of research should cover a more comprehensive scope through field research because it is a necessity for any recent conflicts on which not much research has been done on. Future studies could also employ more data collection instruments such as interviews, focus group discussions and observations in order to generate more comprehensive findings. However, this does not mean that the desktop qualitative method is completely written off as it is relevant for future peacekeeping studies in popular conflicts on which a bulk of literature has already been published. Finally, future research could assess the role played by the Congolese government in the country’s peace process as well as peacekeeping partnerships in overcoming the challenges identified by this study.
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