Analysis of Pretoria’s Peace Diplomacy in Africa

From 1994-2014

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Declaration

I, Hanna Mhlongo declare that,
The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise specified, is my original work. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

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Signature: ___________________    Date: ________________

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Abstract and Key Terms

Pretoria’s foreign policy has undergone evolution since the advent of democracy as the ANC government has moved to take its place in the international relations arena. This evolution has seen South Africa establish itself as a significant role player in peace diplomacy in the African continent.

From the time Pretoria started engaging in peace diplomacy, its efforts have met many challenges. For instance, in the 1990s, the democratic government created enemies in the continent after Pretoria publicly criticised the Nigerian government for executing the Ogoni activists, who included writer Ken Saro-Wiwa. As a result after 1999, Pretoria emphasised respecting other African nations’ sovereignty. South Africa resolved that it would engage in conflict resolution when invited by its counterparts. Through the launch of the African Renaissance, a continent’s renewal programme, South Africa has engaged in peace diplomacy through multilateralism. This way Pretoria has managed to achieve its goal of promoting Africa’s development on the one hand and on the other hand avoid to be seen as meddling in other African nations’ domestic affairs.

Pretoria has also received praise for its peace diplomacy in countries such as Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). And many observers attribute South Africa’s success in peace mediation to the role Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma have played as principal foreign policy actors during their presidencies.

While many foreign policy observers claim that Pretoria’s foreign policy was rooted in the idealistic approach during Mandela’s presidency, Mbeki’s was based on realistic approach and Jacob Zuma has followed in the footsteps of his predecessor, this is not entirely true. There is evidence that classifying Pretoria’s foreign policy as such is a simplistic understanding of the country’s international relations. Many observers also contend that while the post-apartheid government continues to make its mark as a peace mediator in the continent, South Africa’s foreign policy is still full of contradictions.
Key words: foreign policy, peace diplomacy, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, African Renaissance, qualitative research, grounded theory, methodology, idealism, realism, theoretical framework, quiet diplomacy
Acronyms

ANC – African National Congress
APRM – African Peer Review Mechanism
AU – African Union
AU PSC – AU Peace and Security Council
Codesa – Convention for a Democratic South Africa
DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo
Ecowas – Economic Community of West African States
EU – European Union
GPA – Global Political Agreement
ICD – Inter-Congolese Dialogue
ICGLR – International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
M23 – 23 March Movement
MDC – Movement for Democratic Change
UN – United Nations
SADC – Southern African Development Community
SANDF – South African National Defence Force
IRIN – Integrated Regional Information Network
UNSC – UN Security Council
Nato – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Nepad – New Partnership for Africa’s Development
OAU – Organisation of African Unity
PFNL – Paliphehutu-FNL
UK – United Kingdom
USA – United States of America
WWI – World War I
WW II – World War II
Zanu-PF – Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
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Chapter 1

1.1 Background of the Study

When the democratic government came to power in South Africa, it realised that international relations had to change from what it had been during apartheid. Pretoria had not enjoyed harmonious relations with its neighbours during the white minority rule. Although successive white minority governments had terrorised the region, it was PW Botha’s regime that displayed the threat more openly than others. Hostilities took place when Botha’s government was introducing reforms. Pretoria claimed that the reign of terror it unleashed against its neighbours was aimed at fighting communism in southern Africa (Matheba, 2003).

After the turmoil that South Africa had experienced up to the 1994 elections, it was time not for only to rebuild the country but also to normalise its relations with the rest of the world. Pretoria’s start was the realisation that South Africa was intricately linked to the well-being of the African continent. The country’s prosperity depended on the promotion of regional and continental economic and political co-operation which would be guaranteed by peace and stability (Fakir, 2007).

So, as early as in the 1990s, Pretoria knew that for the new democracy to thrive, it had to contribute towards the attainment of peace and stability in Africa (Nibishaka, 2011), (Tjemolane, 2011) and (Landsberg & Khondlo, 2013). While the apartheid state had been aligned with the West, post-1994 Pretoria pledged to become Africa-centred and sought to closely co-operate with its neighbours (Southall, 2006).

Some writers assert that one of the reasons the post-apartheid government sought to build and strengthen ties with Africa is that it felt indebted to African countries because of their contribution in South Africa’s liberation struggle (Boshoff, Vrey, & Rautenback, 2010), (Graham, 2006) and (Games, 2013). After all, many African nations had played a major role in helping the liberation movement defeat apartheid (Olivier, 2006).
After South Africa’s peaceful political transition, which Vickers calls a *cause for célèbre*, the international community was convinced that the democratic government would lead Africa’s economic and political renewal (Vickers, 2002). Matlosa and Hamill state that South Africa “was anticipated to spearhead peacekeeping interventions and mediations, particularly in the southern African region, because of its military (army, air-force and navy) power, resourcefulness and better organisation” (cited in Tjemolane, 2011).

Supporting peace, stability, democracy and economic development were outlined as the foundation of South Africa’s foreign policy and mirrored a broader goal of charting a new path for African development (Beresford, 2013). Pretoria pronounced that its foreign policy would be value-centred and ethical in principle. It expressed commitment to contribute to conflict prevention, peace and security and the promotion of economic development (Tjemolane, Neethling, & Schoeman, 2012).

Pretoria’s peace diplomacy is rooted in the international relations objectives of the governing ANC. In its policy document, *Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa*, the ANC outlines Pretoria’s relations with the rest of the world. It mirrors its long relationship with the international community. Even before the ANC government took office, it had formed strong relations not only with the African nations but the many nations around the world which helped fight white minority domination (ANC, 2012). The document shows how South Africa over the years has nurtured strong bonds with nations such as Sri Lanka, Haiti, the DRC, Somalia, Cuba, Palestine and many others. It also details how South Africa has committed itself to engage in the advancement of the African continent, economically, politically and socially (ANC, 2012).

South Africa realised early that Africa’s socio-economic renewal depended on the ability of continent’s nations to put their hands on the plough, so as to change the continent’s fortunes. This would ensure that South Africa plays its part as a responsible global player (ANC, 2012).
However, from 1994, the new democratic government was careful about overtly leading peace diplomacy in Africa. It felt that seeking that role would cause political backlash if not complete resistance. After all, from the time when the country embarked on forging ties with the rest of Africa, South Africa had faced suspicion from its counterparts in the continent (Alden & Le Pere, 2006), (Barber, 2005) and (Marthoz, 2012).

Pretoria adopted a position of partnership, in a bid to reassure its neighbours of its constructive intentions. It announced that it sought to be a peaceful and reliable partner, no longer determined to seek its interests at their expense (Landsberg, 2012a). Pretoria claimed that it was an equal partner among African nations, which needed to learn from its counterparts (Barber, 2005). That is why South Africa said it aimed to use its comparative strength to benefit all and not to dominate its African counterparts (Landsberg & Khondo, 2013). And the idea of South Africa being a partner to African nations had become conspicuous during the political transition in the 1990s (Molefi, 2003).

True to the pledges Pretoria made just before 1994, conflict resolution and peacekeeping have gained an important place in South Africa’s foreign policy agenda. Pretoria’s peace diplomacy is also rooted in the principles of its foreign policy, which is committed to international peace and resolution of conflicts (Dirco, 2010). Pretoria has carved a role as a potential peace multiplier as numerous involvements in peacemaking in many conflict hotspots in the continent show (Liebenberg & Mokoena, 2014).

1.2 Defining the Research Problem and Hypothesis
Puth breaks the research problem into two levels. The first level involves the detection of the problem while the second includes the tweaking of the problem to a stage where it can be undoubtedly formulated, so that it guides the research course. These levels are crucial in helping the researcher frame a sound research problem because the
success of a research project depends on a well-defined research problem and appropriately demarcated research objectives (cited in Strydom, 2001).

Judging from the relations apartheid South Africa had with the continent, the democratic South Africa knew that it would work hard to thrust itself among African nations as a peacemaker and convince Africa that its foreign relations agenda was constructive compared with that of the white minority government.

However, as much as South Africa has made an impact on peace diplomacy in recent years (Dunderdale, 2013), other African nations still view Pretoria’s leadership and aspirations with scepticism (Alden & Le Pere, 2004). This happens in spite of the fact that Africa has high expectation that South Africa must contribute to peace diplomacy in the region. Wheeler confirms this as he points out that African nations “are ambivalent towards Pretoria, expecting help but also rejecting any ‘meddling’ in their internal affairs” (cited in Marthoz, 2012). Other countries, such as Angola or Nigeria, resent Pretoria’s leadership drive (Marthoz, 2012).

Leys agrees as the author states that even though Pretoria has often emphasised that it had no ambition to become a manipulative hegemon, its interventions in the continent were still inhibited by the fears of its neighbours (Leys, 2008). Lucey concurs as the author states: “Expectations about what Pretoria should do are often clashing. On the one hand, it is expected to play a major role in driving the peace and security agenda in Africa; yet it has been accused of hegemony” (Lucey, 2014). Hengari maintains that South Africa is regarded as a country with indispensable diplomatic capacity to uplift the continent to the international stage (Hengari, 2014).

That is why Pretoria was reluctant to use its military in Africa in the early years of the democratic government. It was during Mbeki’s government that South Africa increasingly engaged its military on the continent to secure stability in war-torn Africa (Nibishaka, 2011) and (Sidiropoulos, 2007).
“This is not only a reflection of Mbeki’s own African and pan-Africanist leanings, but also of South Africa’s growing confidence in engaging with the continent, given the legacy of the apartheid regime and the role of the erstwhile South African Defence Force in southern Africa” (Sidiropoulos, 2007).

After 20 years of democracy, Pretoria has won praise and also faced criticism for its peace diplomacy and that is why its conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Africa continues to be a subject of intense debate. In view of the democratic government’s engagement in peace diplomacy in Africa since 1994, this study investigates the efficacy of Pretoria’s conflict resolution and peacekeeping in the continent. It aims to probe whether South Africa has learnt from its mistakes over the years and, therefore, has become a confident peacemaker. This research is guided by the assumption that while the South African foreign policy is said to have been dogged by inconsistency since the dawn of democracy, Pretoria has made a significant contribution to Africa’s peace diplomacy.

1.3 Objectives of the Study
When the democratic government took office, it sought to formulate a people-centred foreign policy that would reflect the rich history of their international heritage (Institute for Global Dialogue, 2012). This research will discuss Pretoria’s relations with the rest of the continent.

Landsberg notes that there is popular belief that foreign policies of Mandela and Mbeki were characterised by continuity but Pretoria’s foreign policy has changed since Zuma took office (Landsberg, 2012b). This study will seek to show the influence of Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma in peace diplomacy. This research will exclude a discussion on Kgalema Motlanthe because his presidency lasted several months between 2008 and 2009. The other presidents have spent enough time in office for a researcher to be able to conduct a sound investigation on Pretoria’s peace diplomacy under their leadership.
The hostility with which the white minority government treated its neighbour had a huge influence on how Pretoria decided to conduct its peace diplomacy with the rest of the continent after 1994. This research will briefly explore Pretoria’s foreign policy before 1994, so as to show why it had an impact on the behaviour of foreign policy actors after 1994. It will also discuss changes in foreign policy of post-apartheid South Africa.

1.4 Key Questions to be Asked
Defining research questions is critical in driving the research process and is the basis of any research method. It is also one of the first requirements made in any study because it points out the trajectory of the study (Shuttleworth, 2008).

The protection of human rights was high in South Africa’s foreign policy agenda in the early years of the democratic government (Jordaan, 2010). And this became one of the motivations that caused Pretoria to become involved in peace diplomacy in the continent (ANC, 2007). This study set out to answer these primary questions: How has South Africa fared in its peace diplomacy efforts in Africa? How have Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma influenced South Africa’s conflict resolution and peacekeeping in the continent?

Secondary questions are: What have been changes in South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994? How did Pretoria’s behaviour before 1994 affect the way post-apartheid policymakers have responded to peace diplomacy after 1994? How have South Africa’s peacekeeping and conflict resolution efforts been received by other African nations? What challenges has Pretoria’s peace diplomacy faced since 1994?

South Africa chose to engage in foreign relations through working within a multilateral environment so as to promote Africa’s renewal (Mabuda, 2008). That is why Pretoria mainly engages in conflict resolution and peacekeeping working under the mandates of organisations such as Southern African Development Community (SADC),
African Union (AU), United Nations (UN), among others. This study will not provide an in-depth analysis of Pretoria’s working through these organisations. However, it will give an outline of South Africa’s contribution in these organisations.

1.5 Justification of the Study
While many scholars have analysed post-apartheid peace diplomacy, the subject is still a fertile research ground. This study investigates Pretoria’s peace diplomacy after 1994, especially, in the African continent. The prevalence of conflicts in the continent has long been a concern to the international community. According to Southall, the reason for this is that Africa’s conflicts, whether triggered by the Cold War or other local issues, have been problematic and devastating to any prospects for human development (Southall, 2006). So, it comes as no surprise that South Africa has been eager to contribute to bringing peace in Africa.

Stols states that while Mandela’s presidency focused on taking South Africa through the transition phase, Mbeki guided the thriving democracy to play its part as an international relations actor (cited in Graham, 2004). South Africa’s moral authority and willingness to play an active role in the world gave it a unique leverage with both the North and the South and positioned Pretoria as the champion of Africa’s developmental agenda (Sidiropoulos, 2014).

Bowland argues, though, that while the democratic government has succeeded in articulating South Africa’s foreign policy in its official documents, in practice its implementation has been more intricate and at times difficult to read (Bowland, 2013).

Several post-graduate researchers have also contributed to the debate on Pretoria’s foreign policy (in their master’s theses). In his research titled, *Promotion of liberal values in South Africa’s foreign policy: beyond the structural imperatives of international system?*


Studies mentioned above only probe aspects of South Africa’s peace diplomacy; they fall short in offering the full picture of Pretoria’s peace diplomacy since the democratic government took office. Thus this study aims to address this gap by offering a holistic analysis of South Africa’s peace diplomacy from 1994 to 2014. It aims to examine successes and failures of Pretoria’s peace diplomatic engagements and offer recommendations based on lessons learnt from South Africa’s experience. This research will also show the evolution of Pretoria’s peace diplomacy since the advent of democracy and how it continues to change Africa’s peace diplomacy. It also aims to contribute to the existing literature on South Africa’s role as a peace mediator in the continent.

**1.6 Limitations of the Study**

American academics R Snyder, H Bruck and B Sapin lament the lack of access to information for researchers, as they say: “…data are notoriously hard to come by because governments are prone to suppress many things which the scholar must know and wants to know” (cited in Siko, 2014). The main limitation for this study is that not all information on Pretoria’s peace diplomacy is available to the public because some of the government records cannot be accessed for academic purposes or cited even when
they are available in the internet. Because of time constraints, this research will exclude interviews. A study allocated more resources will strengthen this research project.

1.7 Chapter Outline

Chapter 1 – Background, Objectives and Research Questions
The first chapter introduces the historical background of South Africa’s foreign relations before the democratic dispensation. It also discusses how Pretoria committed to contribute to peace diplomacy in the continent after 1994. It identifies the context within which the research will be conducted, states the research questions which direct the study throughout the remainder of the research and discusses the objectives and limitations of this work.

Chapter 2 – Literature Review
This chapter surveys literature on the South African foreign policy. It also examines the various conclusions that foreign policy observers have drawn in their attempt to analyse South Africa’s foreign policy in the area of peace diplomacy. This section also examines Pretoria’s relations with the rest of the continent, especially after 1994 and how South Africans relate to Pretoria’s foreign policy.

Chapter 3 – Research Methodology
This section discusses the methodology used to investigate this study which is qualitative research that is explanatory and descriptive. It also discusses theories of peacekeeping and conflict resolution, idealism and realism. It intends to furnish the reader with the conceptual tools for elucidating the nature of Pretoria's foreign policy.

Chapter 4 – Research results
This chapter outlines the white minority government’s foreign relations with the continent. It also explores how Pretoria has used multilateralism to contribute to promotion of peace in the continent. Last, this chapter analyses Pretoria’s peace mediation in Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe and the DRC.
Chapter 5 – Analysis of Results
This part of the study analyses foreign policy under the presidencies of Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma. It shows how the three heads of state have helped Pretoria contribute to bringing peace in the continent. It also discusses the changes that have taken place in Pretoria’s foreign policy in the past 20 years and the challenges that Pretoria’s peace diplomacy still faces. At the end, this chapter discusses the theoretical analysis which guides this study.

Chapter 6 – Summary and Recommendations
The section summarises the thesis, including the findings obtained in the study. This chapter also includes recommendations and suggestions for further studies.
Chapter 2

Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

A literature review is an evaluative discussion of research found in the literature on a selected topic. The purpose of the literature review, among other things, is to present a background for the study, prove that the research has not been conducted and show that the research is contributing to the body of knowledge of the field (Boote & Beile, 2005).

The aim of this chapter is to present literature on the South African foreign policy with an emphasis on peace diplomacy. The chapter begins with discussing the concepts of conflict resolution, peacekeeping, foreign policy and peacemaking. These concepts are important because while foreign relations has many branches such as economic relations, diplomatic co-operations, among others, this study investigates Pretoria’s peace diplomacy. This section then discusses South Africa’s relations with the continent and ordinary South Africans’ views on the country’s foreign policy.

2.2 When is the Literature Review Conducted?

Polit and Hunger argue that qualitative review can be done either before or after data collection. Researchers who believe the review should be conducted before data collection say doing the literature review first justifies the research, puts it into perspective and familiarises the researcher with the subject investigated. But researchers who believe the review should be conducted after data collection say that saves the researcher from being influenced by pre-conceived thoughts on the topic (cited in Mamabolo, 2006).

In this study, the researcher did the literature study before submitting the proposal. The reason for this was to familiarise herself with background information about the subject
under investigation. The literature study was also aimed at orientating the researcher with the writings on the subject probed. The literature review informed the researcher about the relevant content of the literature. Because of that fact, this research can be correlated to the available knowledge in the literature on the phenomenon investigated.

2.3 Conceptual Clarification

(a) Foreign Policy

A foreign policy “is an activity of a state with which it fulfils its aims and interests within the international arena”. The intention of a country’s foreign policy is to influence the international arena with the aim of fulfilling the objectives of its foreign relations agenda (Petrič, 2013). Governments develop foreign policy agenda so that they can influence the behaviour of other nations in areas such as military, political and trade co-operation (Russett, Starr, & Kinsella, 2006).

Naidoo further states that foreign policy “is the art of building, for the long term, the careful nurturing of relationships, the elaboration of policies that enhance available options while constraining those of potential opponents” (Naidoo, 2010).

Foreign policy is not aimed at the manipulation of other states, but it is an agenda with which a state persuades others to behave in a manner that is desirable to its national interests. In fact, the domestic environment shapes the country’s foreign policy and mirrors the ideology and national interests (Naidoo, 2010). In support of this, Russett, Starr and Kinsella posit that a state pursues foreign policy objectives on behalf of the nation (Russett, Starr, & Kinsella, 2006).

Selebi (then-Foreign Affairs director-general) concurs as he says that foreign policy is nothing other than the pursuit of domestic policies and priorities internationally (cited in
Williams, 2000), while Kissinger says foreign policy starts where domestic policy ends (cited in Landsberg, 2008). Hughes acquiesces as he states that it is conventionally held by foreign policy theorists that foreign policy broadly reflects the predominant interest of the domestic polity (Olivier, 2006).

However, there is debate whether the government always acts on the mandate of the electorate or politicians decide for the nation what will be of national interest (Russett, Starr, & Kinsella, 2006).

A country’s foreign policy develops over time as a result of reviews on a country’s interests. In essence as much as the foreign policy is determined by the domestic environment, it also responds to trends that affect the economy and other issues happening in the international arena (Dietrichsen, 1994). Foreign policies are aimed at increasing interests and values beyond nations’ borders. These policies differ in diplomatic strategies nations use to achieve their goals (Olivier, 2006).

(b) Conflict Resolution
Conflict resolution is the process of stopping a conflict with a result that, in the eyes of parties involved, brings about a permanent solution to a problem. Conflict resolution makes a solution possible because it deals with the root of the problem. Conflict resolution brings warring parties to a settlement that resolves their main dissatisfaction, acknowledges each party’s existence and stops all hostilities among those in involved in conflict (Wallensteen, 2002).

Burton and Onumajuru further note that conflict resolution is a problem-solving process which addresses individual and group needs such as identity and recognition and institutional changes which are required to satisfy these needs (Onumajuru, 2005) and (Burton, 1988).
Kelman sums up conflict resolution as a change of relationship between parties concerned with moving towards reconciliation (Kelman, 2010). The author asserts that conflict resolution results in a deal that is reached interactively, rather than imposed or sponsored by outside powers, and to which the parties fully commit. However, in a case where warring parties seem to ignore calls to stop the fighting, peace-enforcement becomes an answer. That involves direct combat and use of the army to force peace where parties in conflict refuse to agree to a ceasefire (Brooks, 1999).

Conflict resolution addresses the parties’ basic needs and fears and, therefore, ensuring a permanent solution. After all, these are the issues that trigger the conflict. Conflict resolution builds reasonable trust between the parties – a trust in other party’s interest in achieving and maintaining peace – and, therefore, free from monitoring as the guarantor of the agreement. It forms a new relationship between the parties, where each group respects each other’s needs and limitations. This, in other words, brings parties to the understanding of each other’s points of dissatisfaction which caused the conflict in the first place. Conflict resolution also generates public support for the agreement and encourages the development of new images of the parties involved in the dispute (Kelman, 2010).

(c) Peacekeeping
Fetherston and Crichton bemoan the lack of theory on the subject of peacekeeping, whose research comes mostly from diplomats and military staff (Fetherston, 2000) and (Crichton, 2009). Fetherston says: “In essence, we are still largely in the dark in terms of improving analysis, effectiveness and success of peacekeeping” (Fetherston, 2000).

Crichton blames the difficulty to theorise peacekeeping on its considerable evolvement over the past 60 years and the use of the term to describe a wide range of activities. The evidence of this is the fact that the term peacekeeping has no fixed meaning (Crichton, 2009). At best peacekeeping is a tool of peacemaking which aims to build trust and confidence in a peace agreement (Kibasomba, 2002).
The primary goal of peacekeeping is to stop an armed conflict or prevent it from re-igniting. This is achieved by making peacekeepers a physical barrier between warring parties and observing their military actions. The secondary goal of peacekeeping is to create a peaceful environment for talks aimed at resolving the underlying conflict (Diehl, 1988).

The International Peace Academy defines peacekeeping as the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention, organised and directed internationally using multinational force of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace (cited in Diehl, 1988). On the other hand, Fortna and Howard state that peacekeeping refers to the deployment of international personnel to help maintain peace and security (Fortna & Howard, 2008).

An ideal outcome of peacekeeping would be to attempt to resolve the conflict without bloodshed. Peacekeeping also enables warring parties “to cool off” without fear that they will be attacked. This leads to talks aimed at dealing with the root of the dispute with the aim of finding a solution which will be embraced by all parties (Diehl, 1988).

Shaw posits that peacekeeping takes place after a ceasefire has been declared and major warring parties show willingness to accept help from a third party in upholding a shaky peace agreement. Peacekeeping operations should be undertaken without prejudice to any party to the original conflict. They must be undertaken only with the consent of the parties concerned. Armed peacekeepers’ weapons must be fired only in self-defence or the protection of the innocent (Shaw, 1994).

(d) Peacemaking

Peacemaking usually involves processes that address violence, generally, including diplomatic engagement to bring warring factions to a negotiated deal through peaceful
measures as stipulated in Charter VI of the United Nations. Peacemakers may include envoys, governments, regional organisations, prominent personalities, non-governmental organisations or the United Nations (United Nations, undated b). The process of peacemaking should happen with the consent of the warring parties (Robert F Kennedy Centre, undated).

The post-apartheid government has been involved in peacemaking in the African continent since it came to power in 1994. Reasons for this include its economic power and military resources, which give it the capability and influence to lead in this area (Nathan, 2013). These strengths are what have equipped South Africa to be a formidable peacemaker in the continent (Tonheim & Swart, 2015).

Peacemaking takes place in situations where conflict is intense but there are possible conditions to bring peace. It is the process of maintaining peace to the ceasefire situation for which the warring factions are rewarded with incentives and are punished with sanctions if they fail to adhere to deals or decisions reached. Basically, the main difference between peacekeeping and peacemaking is that the former does not normally involve the use of force while the latter includes the threat and actual use of force to stop conflicts (Chigozie & Ituma, 2015). As mentioned above, armed peacekeepers’ weapons must be fired only in self-defence or the protection of the innocent (Shaw, 1994).

The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) sums up three processes of peace diplomacy. It states that in conflict resolution interventions, peacekeeping becomes a temporary exercise initiated to stop a volatile situation and decrease enablers of a violent conflict between warring parties. Peacemaking includes all conflict resolution and mediation techniques aimed at bringing the warring parties to a settlement, while peace enforcement includes methods to force a rebellious party to comply with the resolution of an international body (Onumajuru, 2005).
2.4 Nature of South Africa’s Foreign Policy

In conducting this study, several sources have been analysed. A common accusation that is conspicuous in writings on the South African foreign policy is that although Pretoria has made a mark in peace diplomacy since the birth of democracy, it still lacks direction and that weakness has led to contradictory implementation of the policy, (Nathan, 2005), (Ryall, 1997), (Hamill & Lee, 2001), (Spector, 2013), (Thipanyane, 2011), (Henwood, 1997), (Gilliers, 1999), (Dudley, 2013), (Bischoff, 2003), (Wagner & McLaughlin, 2013) and (Alden & Le Pere, 2004).

Wheeler notes, “it has no substance” and Mills concludes that, “it’s a bit of this and a bit of that” (cited in Leon, 2012). Schoeman and Alden point out that one of the inconsistencies Pretoria has shown is its support of quiet diplomacy in response to state violence in Zimbabwe (cited in Nathan, 2005).

In defending Pretoria’s international relations practice, Spence suggests that sometimes foreign policy decisions are made as issues arise. He points out that enthusiasts “who look for coherence in a well-structured foreign policy underestimate contingent and unforeseen factors and the developments and forces that lie outside the control of even the most skillful bureaucracy and political class” (cited in Nathan, 2005). Presidents’ policies also differ because their priorities and events that take place during their time in office require unique responses towards foreign policy issues (Marthoz, 2012).

Siko, Hamill and Lee and Nathan do not agree that Pretoria’s foreign policy has always been contradictory since 1994 (Nathan, 2005), (Hamill and Lee, 2001) and (Siko, 2014). Siko states that the means by which governments take foreign relations decisions differ; there is no “one-size-fits-all model” (Siko, 2014). Nathan on the other hand says by 2005, Pretoria’s foreign policy had been coherent (Nathan, 2005).

But how have South Africa’s foreign policy principal actors responded to peace diplomacy initiatives in the continent? While many scholars and other foreign policy
observers have debated Pretoria’s international relations, literature search (Hamill and Lee, 2001), (Youla, 2009), (Habib and Selinyane, 2006), (Naidoo, 2010), (Spence, 2001), (Olivier, 2006), (Mkhize, 2008), (Ryall, 1997), (Tjemolane, 2011), reveals that Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma have influenced peace diplomacy substantially since the advent to democracy in 1994. Although there is continuity from Mandela to Mbeki and Zuma, each president has imposed his signature, principles and style on foreign policy (Marthoz, 2012).

Mandela’s presidency was based on peacebuilding and promoting human rights, Mbeki’s continued with peacebuilding but also focused on wealth creation and peace diplomacy and Zuma’s reveals no change from Mbeki’s focus (Manganyi, 2014). Mandela’s government firmly imprinted Pretoria’s moral authority on the world. His successor became known as an African visionary. Under Mbeki, Africa began to gain prominence as he promoted many reforms on the continent. His term is credited with illuminating a vision of African leadership. But under Zuma, although there is continuity, there is vagueness about what the South African foreign policy is, because it lacks strategic direction and as such, it is difficult to predict (Lalbahadur, 2014).

On the other hand, Sidiropoulos describes Mandela’s presidency (from 1994 to 1999) as a honeymoon phase. The author states that at that time South Africa’s moral authority was high, with the human rights agenda dominating. Mbeki’s presidency (1999-2008) was dominated by the African Renaissance where he promoted the African Agenda (Sidiropoulos, 2014).

Mandela accentuated the importance of Africa to Pretoria’s foreign policy in the post-apartheid era. He sought to promote greater regional co-operation to support the continent’s economic development. Mbeki also prioritised economic regeneration as a basis of Africa’s development and promoted the revamping of the regional organisations so as to boost the continent’s political and economic influence. Zuma has continued with these policies, but with a greater focus on promoting the nation’s own national
economic interests as part of the broader development of Africa. The transition from Mbeki to Zuma was also a change from one leader who was regarded as a foreign policy president to one whose agenda is in gestation (Pillay, 2011).

2.5 South Africa’s Position in the Continent

As mentioned in Chapter 1, from the outset, South Africa made it clear that Africa would be high on its foreign policy agenda because the post-apartheid government was naturally connected to the continent (Accord, 2014), (Hendricks & Lucey, 2013), (Nzo cited in Tjemolane, 2011), (Gigaba, 2013), (Blumenfeld, 2010) and (Lalbahadur, 2014). The democratic government showed a desire to make Africa, particularly southern Africa, a theatre of South African activism (Alden & Le Pere, 2006). And, it is this desire that birthed Pretoria’s African Agenda (Accord, 2014).

However, Fakir has reservations about Pretoria’s concept of the African Agenda. He argues that while the definition of the African Agenda appears vague at best and abstract at worst, its application in public communication by policy actors in South Africa usually avoids addressing these conceptual and definitional problems (Fakir, 2007).

At one level, the African Agenda seems to symbolise general debates on processes to promote African democracy and governance and the challenges that these face. At another level, it seems to reflect Pretoria’s own major challenges as the country seeks to play a leading role and advance its own strategic interests in the continent. Therefore, South Africa’s African Agenda serves a critical role of advancing Pretoria’s continental leadership role and that is seen in its participation in various programmes on the continent (Fakir, 2007).

Pretoria’s defence policy had prevented the country from taking a bigger role in African peacekeeping. That is why, in the early years of democracy, Mbeki was not enthusiastic about taking an active peacekeeping role on the continent. The IRIN (Integrated
Regional Information Network) notes that Mandela’s successor was against a more active peacekeeping role in the continent. He loathed peacekeeping, seeing it as intervention (IRIN, 2012). IRIN quotes an expert as saying Mbeki preferred dialogue (cited in IRIN, 2012).

Sidiropoulos concurs as she points out that the democratic government’s second president was sensitive to criticism that South Africa acted as a bully or hegemon in the continent (Sidiropoulos, 2008).

Mbeki preferred persuasion, and talks that he could lead, as compared with the use of confrontation. Mediation and facilitation of negotiation became a form of continuous and energetic engagement, in the continent (Nathan, 2005). However, Landsberg points out that over time, Mbeki’s administration made a significant contribution towards promoting peace diplomacy. He rejects claims made by many commentators that Mbeki’s government sought a hegemonic role in the continent (Landsberg, 2012b).

South Africa believed that non-confrontational conflict resolution was the most effective technique for achieving lasting peace in situations of civil war and other crises on the continent. This could be accomplished when South Africa resisted ambitions of being regional power or hegemon (Sidiropoulos, 2008). However, Sidiropoulos opines that Africa needs a hegemon/s which will lead and help establish stability among neighbouring states (Sidiropoulos, 2008).

As early as Mandela’s presidency, Pretoria discovered that peace diplomacy would not be smooth sailing. Two of some of the cases for which it was lambasted included Mandela’s attempt to mediate in Nigeria in 1995 and Pretoria’s military intervention in Lesotho in 1998. One interesting development about the intervention in Lesotho is that while South Africa was blamed for interfering in another sovereign country’s domestic affairs, there has been less emphasis on how South Africa got involved in this peace mission.
Pretoria had acted on the SADC mandate to restore peace in the mountain kingdom (Neethling, 1999). “The intervention (which was requested by Prime Minister of Lesotho, Pakalitha Mosisili) was based on agreements reached in SADC after all attempts at peacefully resolving the dispute had failed” (Neethling, 1999).

Mandela’s Nigeria mediation fiasco is one of the efforts that changed the way South Africa has pursued African partnerships on peace diplomacy (Van Nieuwkerk, 2013). Pretoria learned that unilateralism would not win it many friends in the continent. Instead it risked being labelled a bully, which the apartheid government was notoriously known for. That is why in its ambition to lead peace diplomacy in the continent, Pretoria has promoted multilateralism based on African solidarity, partnerships and regional cooperation and tried to project an image of a “gentle giant” rather than a “big brother” (Institute for Security Studies, 2004). That has led Ryall to conclude that South Africa is not an African Tiger. The author suggests that observers who think it is, see the young democracy separate from the continent (Ryall, 1997).

However, Hamill argues that although the case for South African leadership is a convincing one, those leadership ambitions are still not received well at home, nor are they always welcomed in the continent. This results in a complicated, even dangerous policymaking setting, worsened by Pretoria’s strategic vision (Hamill, 2013).

2.6 South African Citizens and the Foreign Policy

While it is argued that foreign policy extensive public participation is not possible, Headley and Van Wyk believe that cynicism against public participation has no logic (Headley & Van Wyk, 2012).

Exclusion in policy making disempowers citizens in the seemingly foreseeable forces of globalisation and adds to their lack of interest towards foreign policy (Nel & Van Wyk, 2003). But another view is that decision-makers must sometimes defy the public’s
wishes “saving citizens from themselves” in a bid to defend national interest. Benjamin and Barabas suggest that ordinary citizens are uninterested, inattentive and reluctant to get involved in foreign relations (Benjamin & Barabas, 2000).

But Hudson also points out that the democratic government has an ethical responsibility to serve domestic interests first. Pretoria’s foreign policy should cater for the interest of its citizens before looking at the affairs of others. That is why Hudson states that the life and death of an ethical foreign policy depends on whether the people participate in foreign policy making. “It is necessary to remember that foreign policies advance certain domestic interests at the expense of others. The critical question to ask is how does this affect the citizens of that country? More concretely, what is the link between South Africa’s peacekeeping involvement and domestic interests?” (Hudson, 2010).

But how is Pretoria’s response to public participation in foreign relations viewed in the country? South Africa’s approach in foreign relations is that of guardianship (Pfister, 2004). That means Pretoria acts on what it sees as the interest of the people, rather than what people say they are interested in. Headley and Van Wyk rightly associate that thinking with realism theory. Realists believe that the public should not be involved in foreign policy because they are ignorant or they don’t care. Foreign relations is a sphere that is understood by experts, the writers quote theorist Morgenthau as saying (Headley & Van Wyk, 2012).

Pretoria has fallen short in the duty to communicate the South African strategic bent when engaging in foreign relations, particularly in the continent (Lalbahadur, 2014), although when the ANC government came to power, in many of its documents, the governing party declared that South Africa’s foreign policy was for the people (ANC, 1993).

The South African government has always seen its foreign policy as people-centred, a declaration Van Wyk associates with Mbeki’s presidency. However, the author laments
the fact that South Africans have been largely left out in the formulation of the country’s foreign policy (Van Wyk, 2012).

Vale and Taylor share the same sentiment as they state that discussions of Pretoria’s foreign policy lack any link with the population. This behaviour ignores the fact that international relations engagements will eventually affect the ordinary people (Vale & Taylor, 1999). However, Matshiqi argues that nowhere in the world are citizens informed about every matter of the state. Having said that, the analyst also suggests that Pretoria can improve its public diplomacy (Matshiqi, 2013).

But, it seems that most South Africans believe that Pretoria should play an active role in foreign relations. In a study published in 2013, South Africans say they support Pretoria playing a part in Africa as long as foreign policy actors do not undermine domestic priorities. In this study, the promotion of human rights, which Mandela referred to as “the guiding light of South Africa’s foreign policy”, take a backseat. Fifty percent of South Africans agree that trade should not be hampered by promotion of human rights (Smith & Van der Westhuizen, 2013).

In fact, integrating South Africa’s foreign policy with domestic policies and capabilities was one of the goals of the search for a post-Mandela approach to international relations (Alden and Le Pere, 2006). The reason Zuma’s government changed the name of the Foreign Relations Department to Department of International Relations & Co-operation was that Pretoria wanted to close the gap between citizens and foreign affairs. Landsberg quotes the Minister of Department of International Relations & Co-operation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, as saying: “One of the important areas of our work will be to make South Africans aware of the work that the department is doing” (Landsberg, 2012a).

Siko also agrees that public participation in foreign policy did not increase after the election of the democratic government. He attributes the lack of public engagement to
the failure of the outside actors to use the political space availed by the post-apartheid government. The author points out that it is only the academia who have attempted to influence Pretoria’s foreign policy during the presidencies of Mandela and Mbeki with mixed results (Siko, 2014).

2.7 Conclusion
Before examining existing literature on Pretoria’s foreign policy, this chapter defined foreign policy, conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peacemaking. It also highlighted the different debates and conclusions that foreign policy observers have drawn in analysing South Africa’s relations with the rest of the continent, how South Africans view foreign relations and how accessible Pretoria’s foreign policy is to the ordinary South Africans.

The literature has shown that Pretoria has received both criticism and praise over how it navigates foreign relations in the African continent. It also highlighted the nature of Pretoria’s foreign policy under Mandela (promoting human rights), Mbeki (promoting the African vision) and Zuma (continuing on Mbeki’s agenda).
Chapter 3

Methodology and Theoretical Framework

3.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces two sections of the study. The first deals with the methodology used to conduct this research and how it has guided data collection and analysis. It also introduces qualitative research which the researcher chose to investigate this study. It also elaborates on the background of this method and how a study such as this benefits from it. The rest of the section examines grounded theory, research design, data collection, analysis, reduction and management and document analysis, explaining why the researcher used all these to conduct the study.

The second section of this chapter unpacks the theoretical framework which guides this study. International relations theories of idealism and realism are examined because they have been associated with post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy. Conflict resolution and peacekeeping theories also make up the theoretical framework of this research.

3.2 Methodology

Methodology refers to a model of how things are done (Whitehead & McNiff, 2006). It is a scientifically structured approach used to test constructs. Methodology is vital in a research project particularly to prove the hypothesis. It can also help expand the scope of received theories. For example, game theory offers additional insights into strategic interactions between players (Sprinz & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2007).

Theory and methodology are useful when they work together for the expansion of knowledge. While theory gives explanations for certain phenomena based on specific assumptions, purely accepted knowledge used as theories is seldom useful in elucidating real-world politics. Theoretical debates have to be amplified with systematic
methods of examining that ensure that there is no selection bias (Sprinz & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2007).

Social research methodology is a practice used in research studies to reach sound findings. Methodology for social research includes the practical use of knowledge power to engage the methodological process that proves relevant to the object of study. Methodology, therefore, pre-supposes what systematic method of procedure is being used to gather and receive data relevant to the object of study (Efretuei, 2005).

The methodology employed in this research is the qualitative research, with primary and secondary procedures. The primary sources used are mainly accounts of South African foreign relations actors sourced from speeches, media interviews, government documents and ANC documents on foreign policy.

Secondary sources are relevant textbooks, scholarly journal articles, website articles, conference proceedings reports, media reports and monographs. In a bid to ensure professional quality of the data so as to enhance the study, the researcher used mostly peer-reviewed scholarly writings which were sourced from reputable organisations such as the South African Institute of Race Relations, Foreign Policy Association, Review of African Political Economy, South African Institute of International Affairs, Covenant University Journal of Politics and International Affairs, Review of African Political Economy, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, The Edge Institute, Human Sciences Research Council, International Affairs, Institute for Global Studies, Institute for Security Studies, among others.

The key reason this research employs primary and secondary sources is that the South African foreign policy has been a focus of debates, interpretations, insights and studies which cannot fit in a quantitative inquiry because they are incalculable. The perspective of this research also allows the use of primary and secondary sources of literature inquiries.
Theorists have devised a number of research processes which take place in a number of stages. This denotes that a researcher needs proper planning so as to execute a scientifically acceptable study (Strydom, 2001).

Although not all the steps are applicable to all types of research, sensitivity and application of relevant steps in the research process used by the researcher will enhance the success and quality of the research project – it will assist the researcher in his or her initiative to do “the right thing” in “the right way”, (Strydom 2001).

Blankenship identifies eight phases of the research process. These seem not suitable for this study because they deal with interview-reliant research (Blankenship, 2010). Englen’s framework on research process includes seven steps which seem to be a rather over-simplification of a long and complex research (Englen, 2010) such as the one the researcher is investigating.

Bailey’s stages of research process guide this study because they neatly fit in this type of research. He also moves beyond the dissertation report as being the final stage, through dissemination of the findings (Bailey, 1994).

Using the Bailey model, the remainder of this chapter describes and explains methods the researcher utilised in this study. The stages are as follows: choosing the research problem and defining the hypothesis, drawing research questions, formulating the research design, gathering the data, analysing the data and interpreting the data. The first three stages are discussed in Chapter 1 while the remaining four are discussed later in this chapter.

3.2.1 Qualitative Research

According to Denzin and Lincoln: “Qualitative approach is an activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of principles and material practices that make the
world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a field of representations, including field notes, conversations, photographs, recordings, interviews and memos to the self. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of the meaning people bring to them” (cited in Tavallaei & Talib, 2010).

Miller also states that qualitative research is a window through which we see and form opinions on important social issues (Miller, 1997). This approach is good at examining and formulating theories that deal with the role of meaning and interpretation (Ezzy, 2002). Qualitative research is used to evaluate a wide range of processes such as services, interventions and programmes. It can also be used to advance policy development or implementation, for example, to examine an issue or problem that is poorly understood or to inform the kind of intervention required. It also helps develop and evaluate criteria where these are unclear or where alternative criteria are sought (Spencer, Ritchie, Lewis, & Dillon, 2003).

Qualitative researchers use different tools and procedures to develop an understanding of how people see their social realities and how they respond within the social world. They attempt to make connections between events and perceptions so that their analyses are rounded and have perspective (Hughes, undated). This study endeavoured to examine debates about the post-apartheid government’s peace diplomacy, especially in the continent.

Hughes suggests that qualitative researchers must use key principles of research design such as marrying the research questions to the methodological approaches, seeing issues of analysis and data collection as unified and being clear about the purpose of the research. Qualitative researchers should choose the way they want their research design to pan out and be guided by the mutating context and situations in which the research takes place. They must be always aware of their role in the research process (Hughes, undated).
The author also warns that qualitative methods should not be seen as completely independent from quantitative research because the two in some cases do complement each other. She even asserts that “the ‘divide’ between quantitative and qualitative research is to some extent false” (Hughes, undated). “Qualitative research does quantify. Quantitative research can collect more qualitative data through open-ended questions. All researchers should think carefully about how the choices of method and the potential combinations of approach are appropriate and possible” (Hughes, undated). Rajasekar, Philominathan and Chinnathambi also concur as they add that, in fact, qualitative methods can be used to understand the meaning of the numbers obtained by quantitative methods (Rajasekar, Philominathan, & Chinnathambi, 2013).

Kus also acquiesces as he suggests that the decision to use qualitative or quantitative research should be based on technical matters on suitability of a particular research method for a particular research problem (Kus, 2003). “Both quantitative and qualitative researches have strong and weak points and thus (to find out) which one meets requirements of the research better is a technical decision. The authors who accept the differences between quantitative and qualitative researches as technical differences claim that these two techniques can be used in the same research” (Kus, 2003).

The author concludes that the two approaches, in fact, are not on the opposite end of each other. In actual fact, researchers are not forced to choose only one of them. (Kus, 2003). The choice of approach should depend on the type of erudition the researcher wants to unearth or build not on which approach he or she likes or dislike. The distinction is fallacious and should be avoided (Davies, 2007).

While there are several types of qualitative research, the commonly used ones include grounded theory, phenomenology and ethnography. Grounded theory (which has been used to investigate the research question for this study) is a commonly utilised qualitative method in the social sciences to inductively formulate or discover a theory out of the data (Al-Busaidi, 2008).
The process and method of qualitative research are flexible. The researcher can adapt the schedule as new dynamics arise during the research process (Mkhonto, 2005). The researcher had to change the research plan after literature revealed that one of the reasons the post-apartheid government was cautious about engaging in peace diplomacy was that the apartheid government was hostile towards Africa. The original plan was to exclude a discussion on apartheid government's foreign relations because this study aimed to investigate Pretoria’s foreign policy after 1994.

While the emphasis of qualitative research is on processes and meanings that are not deeply examined or measured in terms of quantity or amount, quantitative research measures and analyses causal relationships between variables, not processes (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998) and (Babbie, 1999).

Whereas many researchers assume that the qualitative research is less complicated than quantitative approach (Lu & Shulman, 2008), this approach is, indeed, rigorous and has its own data collection and data analysis methods that ensure that its findings can be trusted (Borrego, Douglas, & Amelink, 2009).

According to Tewksbury, qualitative methods of research are complex, require a greater emphasis on researchers clarifying and defining what things mean, and rely on the intellectual ability of researchers to organise, manage, analyse and interpret data (Tewksbury, 2009). The researcher spent a greater part of the initial stages of study collecting and analysing data used in this study.

Many researchers opt for this approach because they see it as more manageable, saves time and excludes “doing the sum” and does not include statistics. It is seen as more human and more in line with modern social thinking (Davies, 2007). One of the reasons this study took the qualitative approach is that it is easy to control and would be completed in a fairly short time. However, the quantitative method employs the same scientific principles and practices that have shaped the contemporary world and it gives
the idea that its outcomes have certainty which makes it possible for conclusion to be made to “a specifiable probability” (Davies, 2007).

Qualitative researchers tend to structure their research questions in a style that can only be answered through qualitative research. Such researchers are drawn to the developing and dynamic nature of this approach as opposed to the inflexible and structured format of quantitative methods. They enjoy discovery. Statistics might be fascinating, but it is the limitless possibilities to learn about people that qualitative research resonate to (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).

Qualitative researchers are interested in the prospect to connect with their participants at a human level. They have a natural inquisitiveness that leads them to learn about worlds that fascinate them, that they otherwise would not have access to. For the qualitative researchers, doing research is a challenge that brings the whole self into the process (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). The interest to do this study was born out of curiosity about how South Africa is contributing to ending conflicts which have claimed millions of lives, displaced many people and hindered development in different parts of the African continent.

(a) Limitations

The hypotheses are not easily testable or reproducible in different settings in qualitative research. Results are also more easily influenced by the researcher’s personal bias. The goal of this approach is to find an in-depth understanding of a person’s or group’s experience. Ross states: “Qualitative approaches to research are based on a ‘world view’ which is holistic and has the following beliefs: there is not a single reality, reality is based upon perceptions that are different for each person and change over time and what we know has meaning only within a given situation of context” (cited in Hunt, undated).
contexts, situations, events, conditions and interactions cannot be repeated to any extent nor can overviews be made to a wider context than the one studied with any certainty (Hunt, undated). The viewpoints of both researcher and participants have to be identified and elucidated because of issues of bias (Hunt, undated).

(b) Strengths
The researcher’s close involvement enables him or her to gain an insider’s view of the field. This allows the researcher to identify issues that are often missed (such as subtleties and complexities) by the scientific enquiries. Qualitative descriptions can also play the role of suggesting possible relationships, causes, effects and vigorous processes. Because statistics are not used, but rather qualitative research uses a more descriptive, narrative style, this research method might be of benefit to the practitioner because she or he could turn to qualitative reports to examine forms of knowledge found in these reports, thereby gaining new insight. Qualitative research also adds life to social analysis (Burns cited in Hughes, undated).

Hammersley (cited in Mkhonto, 2005) adds more advantages of using a qualitative research methodology:

The idea of appreciation in qualitative research requires that people’s behaviour be understood as making sense within the context in which it occurs. In this study, the ability to understand the three presidents’ behaviour as foreign relations actors was important. It was particularly vital in the investigation of Mbeki’s foreign policy. The hope of the researcher was that it would give insight, for instance, in his mediation in the Zimbabwe’s political crisis, because this is an issue that has not been fully understood by many ordinary people.

The designatory capacity of qualitative research helps the researcher to capture and present data as distinctly as possible. In this study that capacity gave the researcher an
opportunity to take a closer look at the foreign policy engagements of the three presidents through the literature examined. That helped the researcher collect and present data as clearly as possible.

This method enables the researcher to reflect before, during and after the research to find solutions to the problems in his/her research. This reflective capacity helped the researcher plan the way in which this research should be organised, for instance the areas that needed to be covered so as to produce a thorough investigation.

The corrective capacity in qualitative research refers to the ability of the research methodology to inform and shape existing perceptions of practitioners and political decision-makers. The researcher also wanted to test assertions that have been widely made about the state of Pretoria’s foreign policy (cited in Mkhonto, 2005).

3.2.2 Research Design
Research design refers to the blueprint and processes used to achieve the purpose and precise aims of the study (Tlale, 2007). Descriptive and explanatory methods were chosen because they are the most accurate approaches to investigate this study. Research design is a reasonable framework of proof that permits the researcher to find out whether achieved interpretations can be generalised (Dlamini, 2000).

(a) Descriptive Research Design
Descriptive research refers to the type of research question, design, and data analysis applied to a chosen topic. It does not fit perfectly in the definition of either quantitative or qualitative research methodologies, but rather it can use the basics of both, many times within the same research (AECT, 2001).

A good description is important to a research and it has contributed greatly to knowledge of the shape and nature of our society. Descriptions can be concrete or
abstract. By showing the existence of social problems, a good description can test established assumptions about the way things are and can encourage action (De Vaus, 2002). Fundamentally, the descriptive method answers the questions, who, what, where and how (Sage Publications, undated).

(i) Purpose of Using Descriptive Research Design
In this study descriptive design denotes issues such as styles in Pretoria’s foreign policy, comparative analysis of the three presidents and challenges that South Africa faces in engaging in peace diplomacy. The descriptive approach was adopted for collecting data. This approach was also fitting because a precise and authentic description was needed to investigate whether South Africa’s peace diplomacy has made a difference in ending some of the continent’s conflicts.

(b) Explanatory Research Design
Explanatory research design answers the why questions. While the descriptive research, for an example, will describe the rate of crime in an area, the explanatory research will answer questions as to why the crime rate is high, why some type of crime is high and why the rate is higher in some areas and not in others. Responding to the why question involves developing causal explanations. Causal explanations answer why phenomenon Y (eg, education level) is affected by factor X (eg, race) (De Vaus, 2002).

Customarily, a research presented as explanatory is quantitative in nature and naturally tests the hypothesis by assessing relationships between variables and the data are analysed using statistical techniques. In some cases this term is used occasionally synonymously with experimental research with inference that only experiments are capable of answering causal questions (Maxwell & Mittapalli, 2008).
(i) Purpose of Using Explanatory Research Design
This approach was used in this study to explain some of the reasons behind the post-apartheid government foreign policy decisions. The explanatory design was also used to expand knowledge about the underlying process of Pretoria’s foreign policy and to provide evidence to back or argue and explain opinions and facts (Brotherton, 2008) about South African foreign relations.

3.2.3 Grounded Theory
Grounded theory is a methodology of developing inductive theories that are grounded in systematically gathered and analysed data (Bitsch, 2005). It appeals to researchers using qualitative techniques for the first time and offers easy-to-follow procedures. In this method, definitional properties and categories may be found or generated from the qualitative data by using guidelines. Grounded theory is repetitious, needs a slow movement between concepts and data and requires a frequent comparison across many kinds of proof to control conceptual level of the emerging theory (Lawrence & Tar, 2013).

Grounded theory is rooted in data that have been methodically obtained by social research. In quantitative research, data are collected to test hypotheses. Qualitative research starts with a research question and often little else. Theory develops during the data collection. This more inductive method means that theory is built from data or grounded in the data (Goulding, 2002).

(a) Benefits of Grounded Theory
One of the advantages of grounded theory is that it gives the research the ecological authority. This is the degree to which research findings correctly represent the real world. Grounded theories are normally ecologically sound because they are “close” to the data they came from. Although the paradigms in grounded theory are fittingly
abstract (since their goal is to explain other similar phenomenon), their context is unambiguous, detailed and closely linked to the data (Walden University, undated). Ecological validity was important for this study to ensure that this research paints an accurate picture of Pretoria’s foreign policy.

Because grounded theories are not linked to any pre-existing theory, grounded theories are often fresh and hold the potential for pioneering discoveries in science (Walden University, undated). Although a lot has been written about Pretoria’s foreign policy, the researcher’s aim for this study was to develop a new perspective and insight on the dynamics of Pretoria’s peace diplomacy.

Another advantage of grounded theory is the quality of parsimony. This refers to the use of the most basic description to explain an intricate phenomenon. Grounded theories aim to provide parsimonious explanations about complex phenomena by rendering them into abstract constructs and hypothesising their relationships. They offer helpful and relatively easy to remember schemata for us to understand our world a little bit better (Walden University, undated).

(b) Disadvantages of Grounded Theory

Grounded theory is an exhaustive method and often this can prevent the researcher from seeing the bigger picture in a study. It can be difficult to adopt larger concepts or themes when using grounded theory (Meyers, 2008).

(c) Grounded Theory and Data Collection

As a universal rule, grounded theory researchers should ensure that they have no pre-conceived theoretical ideas before starting the research. Researchers should make sure that they do not introduce concepts to the data – those concepts should emerge from the data (Meyers, 2008). The researcher ensured that she set aside all ideas she had about Pretoria’s foreign policy before she started to collect data.
Grounded theory “provides the researcher with an opportunity of having the data inform the research and consequently discovering the theoretical principles that are relevant to the situation under investigation, rather than the converse relationship which is more customarily applied with conventional research methods”. Grounded theory allows researchers to get into the field, and quickly attain an empirically grounded insight of social phenomena, and evaluate the phenomena without reliance on existing theory. The research allows theory to develop through the inductive process of grounded theory (Jones, Kriflik, & Zanko, 2005).

3.2.4 Data Collection and Analysis

Data collection is led either by predetermined theories and ideas about what is vital or is guided by the clues that avail themselves in data collection process. Examining data from the beginning of data collection is what makes grounded theory “grounded”, (Ezzy, 2002). The researcher was the only instrument of collecting data for this study.

Brink and Wood note that qualitative data collection methods are flexible and unstructured; they capture verbatim reports or observable characteristics and generate data that usually do not take numerical form. Words, films, postcards, art and all sensory data are considered qualitative data unless they are transformed into some numerical system (cited in Mamabolo, 2006).

A researcher makes sense of the deluge of information he or she consults in a study through data analysis. It is a process of separating data into components to show its elements and structure (Dey, 1993). Burns and Grove add that data analysis is a process of codifying data to produce findings that will be interpreted by the researcher (cited in Mamabolo, 2006). The researcher analysed the content of written documents used in this study “to identify patterns that can be evaluated to uncover qualitative meaning” (Reed & Paskocimaite, 2012). “Without analysis, we would have to rely entirely on impressions and intuitions about the data as a whole. While our impressions
and intuitions have their place in analysing data, we can also benefit from the more rigorous and logical procedures of analysis” (Dey, 1993).

**Data analysis** pertains to the separation of elements into component parts. It includes the study of intricate phenomena in order to classify their simple elements. Data analysis requires the researcher to find the major components or universal principles located in a particular phenomenon, so that they can be used to provide a clear picture of that phenomenon (Denscombe, 2007).

There is no strict division between data collection and analysis; the process is a cycle of data collection and analysis which is aimed at finding results of the analysis that will ultimately shape the subsequent collections of data (Macome, 2002).

The main methods used in this approach include interviews, focus groups, observation, collection of documented material such as letters, diaries, photographs, collection of narrative and open-ended questionnaires (Hancock, Windridge, & Ockleford, 2009) and (Yousey & Masek, 2007). The researcher did not do interviews or focus groups because this study used data collected mainly from documents.

### 3.2.5 Data Management

This refers to the consolidation of data from its initial uses in the research cycle up to the publishing and filing of sound results. “It aims to ensure reliable verification of results, and permits new and innovative research built on existing information” (Whyte & Tedds, 2011). The data management system used by the researcher included developing lists of sources of data and categorising information according to the subject discussed in each document. The researcher also used the filing system of both computer-based and hard copy data. This was aimed at navigating the data easily during the review and analysis processes. Categories used to file data included realism
and idealism, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, Mbeki’s foreign policy, Mandela’s foreign policy, Zuma’s foreign policy, Zimbabwe’s quiet diplomacy, the DRC mediation, Burundi mediation, Cote d’Ivoire mediation.

3.2.6 Document Analysis

In a desktop study, a researcher investigates and analyses documents relevant to the study. Some include archival research, legal research, literature and periodicals review, policy review, textual/content analysis, and public records research an (Agbaje & Alarape, 2006) and (Reed and Paskocimaite, 2012).

The documents used in this study


Scholarly sources included, *Introductory Lectures on Research Methodology*, (2001); *South Africa’s Role and Importance in Africa and the Development of the African Agenda* (2004), *An Encumbered Regional Power? The Capacity Gap in South Africa’s Peace Diplomacy in Africa* (2009); *Burundi: IRIN Focus on Mandela Mediation* (1999); *Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments* (2012); *Leaning All Over the Place? The Not-So-New South Africa’s Foreign Policy* (1997); *South Africa’s Regional Engagement for Peace and Security*, (2007); *The AU, Nepad and the Promotion of Good Governance in Africa* (2004); *Is Thabo Mbeki Africa’s Saviour?* (2003); *Studies on South Africa’s Foreign Policy after Isolation* (2006); *South Africa in Africa; Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*; *South Africa in the UN Security
The researcher checked whether the documents used related to the research questions and the purpose of their publication. She also determined if the content of the documents suited the theoretical framework of this study. In the case of previous research projects, the researcher did not only examine the study findings but also checked the design, methods, instruments and conceptual framework, as suggested by Bowen (Bowen, 2009).

Researchers should ensure that the data consulted is of professional quality. Checking aspects such as authorship and reliability of the data forms part of the review process of data. (Nieuwenhuis, 2012) and (Reed and Padskocimaite, 2012). To meet this requirement, the researcher discarded 23 documents from obscure sources, such as those without names of authors and untraceable internet addresses.

For quality control, the researcher verified the authenticity of the documents used in the study – those sourced from the internet and hard copy articles obtained from libraries. About 85% of the articles used were sourced from reputable scientific journals and written by reputable academics, analysts and post graduates. The rest were either government documents/news reports or media reports. In verifying the documents, the researcher wanted to check the motives of writing the documents – that is, who wrote them and why as suggested by Macdonald (Macdonald, 2008).

(a) Characteristics of Document Analysis
Document analysis depends on data observed by others and, for this reason, the researcher has to test the data for genuineness, accuracy and importance. Document analysis is also methodical and comprehensive (Reed and Padskocimaite, 2012).
(b) Advantages
If the researcher has access to the documents in his or her interest area, document review can be a cost-effective method for desk research or projects with limited budgets. It is also a good way to learn about an unfamiliar subject to gather contextual information (Reed and Paskocimaite, 2012).

(c) Limitations
Document review can become time-consuming when the researcher does not delineate clear boundaries. One scholar states that the most common problem with research is “the difficulty of knowing when to stop searching” (cited in Reed and Paskocimaite). The researcher spent a lot of time dedicated to this study on literature review, an exercise that impacted on the time given to the other areas of the study. In the case of archival research, the researcher had to rely on information collected by others, which might not always be accurate and complete (Reed and Paskocimaite, 2012).

3.2.7 Data Reduction
This is a process in which the researcher whittles down the data collected to what is most relevant for the study. Not only data need to be reduced for the sake of manageability, but they have to be transformed, so that they can be made intelligible in terms of the issues being addressed (Berkowitz, 1996). The process helped the researcher select just more than 250 sources out of the 350 that she had consulted.

3.2.8 Trustworthiness
Guba’s four criteria for trustworthiness include the following:
(a) Credibility – All approaches used by the researcher are recognised research methods utilised by many other analysts. The researcher also consulted with four peers to expose the research project to colleagues for constructive criticism. The researcher
also made reference to previous studies not only to present findings but to familiarise herself with what had been published.

(b) **Transferability** — This refers to the provision of background data to establish the framework of study and the thorough description of phenomenon in question to allow assessments to be made. The researcher ensured that the study included background /

(c) **Dependability** — This relates to the methodological description to allow the study to be repeated. The researcher provided a thorough description of methods used in the study.

(d) **Confirmability** — This refers to the in-depth methodological description to allow the integrity of research results to be examined. The researcher spelt out limitations in the methods used in the study (cited in Shenton, 2004).

### 3.2.9 Limitations Associated with the Methodology

Upon reflection, the area that became challenging for the researcher was managing the data. The reason for this is that printing documents became too expensive because the researcher underestimated the number of documents that she needed to examine for this study. The researcher had anticipated using 60 documents but ended up using more than 200 documents and books. Managing data from so many sources became overwhelming, thus requiring a carefully planned system to organise the information.

The researcher used too many sources. Consulting fewer sources could have saved the researcher time so that she could give sufficient attention to other areas of the study such as making notes and gaining more understanding of the subject under investigation, therefore, making the writing process faster.
3.3 Theoretical Framework

3.3.1 What is a Theoretical Framework?

Defining the theoretical framework is important because it is the construct that charts the trajectory of this study. Theory is an intellectual framework that enables a researcher to choose facts and interpret them so that recurrences and regularities in phenomena can be explained and predicted (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999).

Theory is also defined as a network of interlinked concepts that provide a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon or phenomena. Guba and Lincoln state that theoretical frameworks possess ontological (knowledge of the way things are), epistemological assumptions (how things really work in an assumed reality) and are methodological (cited in Jabareen, 2009).

Theories help us understand the avalanche of information that we come across all the time. Even policy makers, who often don’t see the need of theory, rely on their ideas about how the world functions when they want to take decisions. One cannot be able to make a good policy if one’s fundamental organising principles are wrong, just as it is difficult to develop sound theories without knowing the real world (Walt, 2004).

Cox states that while theories follow reality because their formulation is based on previous experience, they come before the reality in the sense that they are used by those who produce that reality (cited in Williams, 2000).

Nossal notes that theory helps us understand the world that shapes assumptions and simplifies complex phenomena that we attempt to examine (cited in Mabuda, 2008). Successful conceptual constructs such as Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs or Bruner’s Spiral Theory of Learning can provide mental images of frameworks that have supported previous knowledge and theory development (Sinclair, 2007).
The following illustrate what international relations theory is.

Theories elucidate the laws of international politics or the recurring patterns of national behaviour (Waltz, 1979). In other words, theories explain why each state behaves in a particular way when dealing with a particular issue.

Without theory, we would be unable to make sense of facts. Theory helps us organise facts so that they can be understandable and they can give meaning to what we are trying to learn (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999).

It is a framework used to test hypotheses about the world we live in. Theory enables us to disapprove a hypothesis or statement through empirical evidence (empirical theory). Theory is a framework of the way the world should be and focuses on the exploration of values and what should be done based on those values. (normative theory)

It criticises forms of domination and perspectives which make the socially constructed and changeable seem natural and unalterable. It is an ideological assessment of how the present leads to future paths to change, freedom and human autonomy (critical theory) (cited in Burchill, 2001) and (cited in Youla, 2009).

The importance of theories lies in the fact that they help us understand the phenomena we investigate (Youla, 2009). Halliday states that there are three reasons why theories are vital: first they help us differentiate significant facts from those which are not, second, any group of facts, even if accepted as true and important, can be interpreted in different ways and third no human being can be satisfied with facts alone because all activities in our society involve the morality which cannot be decided by facts (cited in Youla, 2009).

3.3.2 International Relations Theories

The realist school of thought is one of the two principal theories which is said to have shaped Pretoria’s foreign policy and has been debated by observers since the birth of
South Africa’s democracy. The other theory is idealism – a moral consideration rooted in South Africa’s struggle and its success in bringing political transformation in the country in 1994. The liberation movement did not only find financial support and other resources over a number of decades, but its huge success was in convincing other countries to punish the white minority government with sanctions “on the moral ground that apartheid was a crime against humanity” (Gelb, 2001).

Although real change in Pretoria’s foreign policy took place even before Mbeki became president, it was during his presidency that South Africa instituted real change in the policy, from idealist to realists (Pfister, 2006) and (Petré, 2011). The realities of the international and African arena have (also) driven the way Pretoria thinks of, frames, and implements foreign policy. This evolution has been characterised by three key trends: the move away from Mandela’s idealism towards a national interest-centred discourse on foreign policy; the leaning towards Africa as the centrepiece of foreign policy and the use of multilateralism not merely as a principle but as a tool of realpolitik (Mde & Wilson, 2013).

(a) Realism
Realism is a theory that describes and explains international politics as it is, rather than how we like it to be. Realists see the world as a dangerous and insecure place, where violence is inevitable (Burchill, 2001), (Greene, 2009) and (Slaughter, 2011). Realism appeared partly in response to the failure to maintain peace after WWI (1914-1918) and this era saw the emergence of liberalism. The aftermath of that war caused many to blame realpolitik foreign policies developed by Europe’s major powers (Rourke, 2007) and (Saylor Foundation, 2012).

Realists believe there is no way of avoiding international anarchy. It is impossible to think that a world government could be established because states would not be safe enough to give up power (Weber, 2005). However, not all realists believe that the international relations system has no ethics. “The classical realists do not reject the
possibility of moral judgement in international politics. Rather, they are critical of
moralism – abstract moral discourse that does not take into account political realities.
They assign supreme value to successful political action based on prudence: the ability
to judge the rightness of a given action from among possible alternatives on the basis of
its likely political consequences” (Korab-Karpowicz, 2013).

People who are realists are Westphalians fiercely attached to the principle of
sovereignty, sceptical about the doctrine of liberal interventionism and defending the
claim that the state is the key actor in international relations (Spence, 2011). In recent
years the classic realism of the 20th century has been replaced by neo-realism, which is
an attempt to establish a scientific study of international relations (Korab-Karpowicz,
2013). Mbeki’s peace diplomacy in Zimbabwe is an example of this thinking of realists
because it dealt only with the state and the opposition as the key actors. According to
Mlambo and Raftopolous, Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy ignored the participation of the civil
society initially and that resulted in many Zimbabweans not taking South Africa’s
mediation of that country’s political crisis seriously (cited in Mhango, 2013).

Realists assert that all that is not right with the world, from a rational point of view, are
the forces found in human nature. To make the world better, one must work with these
forces because trying to work against them will be a futile exercise (Chidozie, Agbude,
& Oni, 2013).

(i) Assumptions of Realism

Realism is primarily about power, where power is defined in terms of military strength.
Realists assume that within the hierarchy of international priorities, national security is
usually the most important concern. They focus on actual or potential conflict between
states. Classical realists assume that states – like the “men” who make them up, are by
nature self-centred and hostile and will pursue their interests to the detriment of others
and without regard of the constraints of law and morality. However, contemporary – or
neo-realists – only agree that states are self-centred. They see the state as the primary actor in international relations. Realists assume that actors in state affairs are required to speak with one voice and resolve political differences within the state authoritatively. There really is only one mechanism for peace and that is maintaining a “balance of power” (Benson, undated).

Morgenthau states that the policies aimed at protecting the international balance of power are not only unavoidable but are vital factors in the international community (cited in Toledo, undated). In his work, Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau, who is regarded as the father of realism, states that realism assumes that the world is made up of people who have contrasting interests and conflict is unavoidable (Morgenthau, undated). Morgenthau’s theory is based on the following principles: Politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. This means it is possible to develop a theory that reflects these laws and to differentiate between truth and opinion. We can “put ourselves in the position of a statesman” and predict what he should rationally do (Morgenthau, undated).

Interest is defined in terms of power. This sets politics apart from other spheres of action, such as economics (interest defined in terms of wealth). Because we can assume a definition of interest, we do not have to concern ourselves with questions of “motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen” (Morgenthau, undated).

Nonetheless, Morgenthau also notes that the intellect can affect a statesman’s ability to understand vital aspects of foreign policy and turn them into political action. Not all foreign policies will fit in the framework predicted by realism because of personal shortcomings and irrationality. “Rational foreign policy is a good foreign policy because it minimises risks and benefits and hence complies both with moral precepts of prudence and political requirements of success” (Morgenthau, undated).
The notion of defining interest as power is often valid, although its meaning can change. Morgenthau states that power is “anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man”. Also, the centrality of the nation state can be altered over time. “While the realist, indeed, believes that interest is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed, the contemporary connection between interest and the nation state is a product of history, and is, therefore, bound to disappear in the course of history” (Morgenthau, undated).

Moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in the abstract; the circumstances of time and place determine if this can happen. The state’s survival is above moral good. Thus, prudence – “the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions” is the “supreme virtue in politics”. What a state does is judged by its outcomes (Morgenthau, undated).

There is a huge difference between political realism and other schools. Realism maintains the autonomy of the political sphere and, while acknowledging that knowledge about human nature ("economic man", "religious man", etc.) exists, it asserts that the “political man” is the appropriate facet for the study of politics. “Legalistic-moralist” standards do not fit in politics (Morgenthau, undated).

Realists also believe that states always compete for power, participating in an inevitable battle for survival. This aligns with realists’ pure power construct which assert that, in their bid to enhance power, states can disrespect old friendships. The case of South Africa cutting ties with Taiwan in favour of China is an example of this. Realists assert that it would be disastrous if a country’s foreign policy was formulated on emotions (Naidoo, 2000).

Naidoo concludes that for realists, morality has no room in international relations; all states have no choice but are forced to play by the book of the system to practise power politics (Naidoo, 2000). States are concerned with what is of national interest. If any
moral issue comes in the way of that, they can only abandon an issue concerned with morality. The national interest equals security and survival. A true and wise statesman is the one who is able to promote the country’s national interests, which is a moral duty defined in political terms and guided by the considerations of prudence (Kiseleva, 2014).

However, Naidoo states that modern realists agree that governments cannot ignore moral consideration in foreign policy decisions making. What they need to guard against is that moral dimension does not dictate foreign policy (Naidoo, 2000). Mkalipi adds: “Realists argue that the contradiction between foreign policy discourse and foreign policy behaviour is a product of being self-interested.” (Mkalipi, 2002).

(b) Idealism

Like realism, idealism has also profoundly shaped the way many politicians and theorists in the West think about international relations and world politics, since the time of English philosopher John Locke (Strohmer, 2010).

The Earl of Birkenhead defines idealism as a spirit which calls an individual or group of individuals to uphold higher moral standards than what they would normally practise (Earl of Birkenhead, 1923) and (Wilson, 2011). According to Birkenhead, there is acknowledgement that idealism is highly ambitious and is a theory seen as promoting what should be than the reality (Earl of Birkenhead, 1923). That is why Spence calls idealism a bedrock of moral conviction (Spence, 2011).

Idealistic political beliefs that US president Woodrow Wilson, one of the advocates of an international authority for the management of international relations, spoke about include that democracy should be promoted in all countries because it is one of the accepted generalisations of international relations that democracies do not go to war with one another. The practices of democracy, such as free speech and parliamentary
accountability, are vital controls over the ambitions of national leaders. Interconnectedness between countries encourages interdependence and raises the costs of conflict. When one nation engages in war with another, often their allies also get involved in the way of giving military aid. And upholding international law and creating international organisations will also promote peace and co-operation (Nel cited in Youla, 2009).

While there are many versions of idealism, all idealists agree that human nature is good (Strohmer, 2010). For the purpose of this study, idealism is supported by liberalism because Pretoria’s foreign policy “is also influenced by this ideology” (Jordaan, 2010).

Spence defines liberalism as a tradition that promotes democratic self-determination together with the economic and social goals derived from free market economy (Spence, 2011). It is seen as a tradition of political thought comprised practical goals and ideals, where the individual is the most important actor and possesses rights (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999). Liberalism is about measurement of power through state economies, the potential for peace and consolidation and political liberties and rights. Jumarang opines that liberalism is no longer an aspiration of how politics “ought to be”, but is now a political theory of peace generated in the anarchic environment and even in the state’s quest for power (Jumarang, 2011).

The state’s principal function is to act as an arbiter in conflicts between individuals and ensuring that individuals enjoy their rights (Spence, 2011). “The carnage of the WWI was principally responsible for the upsurge in liberalist thinking. With (Woodrow) Wilson at the vanguard, the belief that conflict could be controlled and eventually resolved through institutional order was applied with the creation of the League of Nations” (Benneyworth, 2011).
Classical and modern liberals concur that the government has a responsibility to be impartial and, therefore, treating people equally is vital and that the government should be disinterested in evaluating what good life is. The liberal aspires for the best form of government which will allow each citizen to pursue life according to his or her frame of reference within a neutral framework (Moseley, undated). Liberalism asserts that protecting and increasing the liberty of the individual are the problems of politics. Liberals believe that the government’s main responsibility is to ensure that individuals are not harmed by others. They must also be watchful that the government does not curtail freedom (Lerner, undated).

However, Best bemoans the other side of liberalism as he says: “We are winning many battles in the fight for freedom, rights, democracy, compassionate ethics, peace, interspecies justice. But we are losing the war. The war against greed, violence, plunder, profits, and domination, the war against corporations, world banks, the US empire, and Western military machines, the war against meta-stasizing systems of economic growth, technological development, overproduction, overconsumption, and overpopulation” (Best, 2010).

(i) Assumptions of Liberal Idealism

Bad human behaviour, such as hostility, is not the product of flawed people but of depraved institutions that expose people to selfish practices and the urge to hurt others (Benson, undated).

War and international anarchy are not inevitable and war’s frequency can be decreased by boosting powers of the institutional arrangements that promote peace among nations (Benson, undated).

A conflict is an international scourge requiring collective or multilateral efforts, rather than national efforts to do away with it. Reforms must be inspired by a considerate
ethical concern for the welfare and security for all people, and this humanitarian effort requires the inclusion of morality in the make-up of the state (Benson, undated).

Countries which have adopted the liberal/idealistic approach design foreign and domestic policies that strive to secure maximum societal welfare and happiness, to promote democracy, human rights and peaceful co-existence. They prefer to interact closely with countries that have similar interest as theirs. They are supportive of democratic governments and movements elsewhere, and are generally critical and non-co-operative, but not necessarily hostile, towards authoritarian regimes” (Olivier, 2006).

Closely related to liberalism is the liberationist approach. This is a theory that puts into practice democratisation and development. The enunciation of human rights, for example, is viewed as a weapon of disenfranchised groups and classes battling for freedom and empowerment (Osaghae, 2005). When illustrating the shifts in South Africa’s foreign policy, Jordaan paints a picture of two positions Pretoria’s policy has adopted since the birth of democracy (Jordaan, 2010). The author tables the following differences between liberal and liberation positions:

Liberals believe in liberal democracy while liberationists can curtail or delay liberties for the sake of political stability and economic development. An example of the latter was seen in Mbeki’s mediation in Zimbabwe. Mbeki’s bid to bring peace in Zimbabwe ignored loud outcries of human rights abuses of ordinary Zimbabweans (Jordaan, 2010). “For Mbeki, the link was between the state and the economy and between peace and development” (Landsberg, 2008).

To liberals, human rights are universal but for liberationists rights are not as important as national sovereignty, especially when there is a conflict between the two. For liberals the Western dominated order is acceptable but the liberationists prefer solidarity with the developing world over the West (Jordaan, 2010).
While liberals aspire to evaluate human relations and universal agreement on moral questions, the liberationists see racial and cultural relations as hostile and laden with hierarchy, power and unfair representations, and seek equal worth of non-Western cultures (Jordaan, 2010).

Liberals believe in the neo-liberal economic order and they look out for the consistent application of international economic regulations and have more concern for the disenfranchised. Although they are unable to define what this order should look like, they believe, it would be accommodative of the interests of the developing nations. Domestically, liberals promote free trade, while liberationists support a greater state involvement in the economy (Jordaan, 2010).

Jordaan blames Mbeki for Pretoria’s foreign policy shift to liberationist thought but also adds that Zuma’s government continued from where Mbeki’s government left off. The author suggests that the liberationist approach is thriving because it is supported by the governing ANC and has been encouraged by the lack of strong diverse opposition and re-racialisation of South Africa’s politics (Jordaan, 2010). Support for Zimbabwe is an example of how Pretoria has followed the liberation approach and abandoned protection of human rights (Jordaan, 2010).

Bogert concurs as he notes: “South Africa, whose democratisation owes much to international pressure on the apartheid regime and support for the ANC during apartheid, no longer speaks up for the liberation struggles in Western Sahara and Tibet and has remained silent about the authoritarian abuses in Burma, even though Burma was vocal in its opposition to apartheid” (Bogert, 2008). Rather than speaking up for human rights victims, as the democratic South Africa set out to do, or defend other liberation organisations, Pretoria keeps solidarity with the serving leaders of the developing nations strong, regardless of how they rule, a reaction that is even sturdier towards its African counterparts (Jordaan, 2010).
The Economist also concurs as it observed that Zuma had become friends with the dictators as his predecessor was. Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Obiang Nguema, Swaziland’s King Mswati III and Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe were invited to his first inauguration. The Economist notes that Zuma has not raised the issue of human rights in the open during his travels overseas. The publication also notes that he was conspicuously silent over the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to a Chinese dissident, Liu Xiaobo (The Economist, 2010).

(ii) Distinction between realism and idealism
Terminologies used in the decisions on foreign relations spell out clearly the difference between realism and idealism. Realist are concerned with order, power and interest while idealists are concerned with peace and how best to secure it through, for instance, collective security stipulated by international institutions. Accordingly, realists are committed to the principle of autonomy (Spence, 2011).

Idealists frown upon the concept of absolute sovereignty; they see it as an old-fashioned principle that should be set aside when gross violation of human rights occurs. While idealists always strive to attain welfare and security for the citizens, realists assert that it is only in its advanced form that the state can provide security, welfare and a sense of identity for its citizens. On the other hand liberals often argue that the idea of sovereign statehood is a declining asset because governments have to cope with the growing pressure of globalisation (Spence, 2011). State leaders act to increase power and will only work together temporarily if co-operation serves their interests (Saylor Foundation, 2012).

(iii) Assumptions of Liberation Theory Articulated by Ricky Sherover-Marcuse
Liberation is the abolition of the effects and the removal of the causes of social oppression (Sherover-Marcuse, undated). In other words it is a process of setting
oppressed groups free. Altman states that liberation refers to freedom for the fulfilment of human potential, a large part of which has been unnecessarily restricted by tradition, prejudice and the requirements of social organisation (cited in Mulé, 2006).

No one is naturally or genetically tyrannical and no human being is born an oppressor. People are not naturally or genetically designed to be oppressed; nor born to be oppressed. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adds: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood” (United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, undated a).

Sherover-Marcuse points out that oppression is the systematic and pervasive abuse of individuals on the basis of their membership in various groups, which are disadvantaged by the institutionalised imbalances in social power in a particular society. Oppression includes both institutionalised or “normalised” maltreatment and incidents of violence. It includes the denial, or the non-recognition of the complete humanness (the goodness, uniqueness, smartness, powerfulness, etc.) of those who are members of the mistreated group (Sherover-Marcuse, undated).

Biological/cultural/ethnic/sexual/religious/age differences between human beings are never the cause of oppression. The use of these differences to explain either why certain groups of people are repressed (or) why certain groups of people behave oppressively, works as a justification of oppression (Sherover-Marcuse, undated). Differences in class, in social and economic power, in educational opportunity and achievement, in health and physical well-being, depict the results of institutionalised inequalities in opportunities. Such differences propagate and increase the social imbalances in power and thereby serve to maintain all forms of oppression (Sherover-Marcuse, undated).
3.3.3 Conflict Resolution Theory

Over the years, the discipline of conflict resolution has established insights into the nature and sources of conflict and how they should be dealt with through peaceful methods to ensure lasting agreements (Dixit, 2004). According to Dixit, Deutsch, one of the pioneers who developed academic writings on benefits of peaceful settlements, noted that factors such as the nature of dispute and the goals aimed at achieving peace are crucial in determining what solutions each party will bring to negotiations in an effort to contribute to resolving the conflict (Dixit, 2004). Each conflict takes a life of its own that changes with time as the warring parties alter strategies and respond to each other’s actions (Coady, 2012).

The Zimbabwe’s conflict is a case in point. Although negotiations were one of the constant efforts to end crisis in that country, the conflict between Mugabe’s government and the opposition factions changed over time. These changes included the government’s use of the media as a propaganda machine to violence against opposition supporters. “The violence came to a climax when, after losing the March 2008 presidential election, President Mugabe carried out widespread state-sponsored violence and terror. Human rights violations, including torture, beatings, mutilations and rape were perpetrated against leaders of the opposition and the supporters of the opposition. Even after Mugabe won the June run-off election, routine and arbitrary arrests and detentions continued as Zanu-PF used repression to back its dubious claim to power” (ICRP, 2008). Another strategy of Mugabe’s government was the announcement that white farmers had to give their land to the government in 2014 (Rotberg, 2014).

Zimbabwean opposition went from seeking support from South Africa’s union federation Cosatu to agreeing to be part of the coalition government, among many of its strategies. “MDC gave in to the arm-twisting of regional heads of state and agreed to become part of an inclusive government, the government of national unity, with Zanu-PF in February 2009” (Sisulu, Richard, & Kibble, 2009).
Since the devastation of WWII, nations and other non-state parties around the world have chosen conflict settlement at the international level. Reasons for this include the threat of nuclear war and the Cold War which ended in the late 80s and gave way to businesslike relationship among international relations role players, characterised by summity between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. These meetings also discussed weapon control, army deployments and other trust-building measures which were directed at decreasing tensions and the potential for war threat in crisis situations (Babbit & Osler Hampson, 2011).

The Human Needs Theory, which is one of principal theories used in this study was formulated in the 80s by theorist John Burton. The reason for choosing this theory is that it fits in the conflict resolution the South African government has engaged in in the past 20 years. Burton’s theory asserts that human beings have basic needs that have to be met in order to have a stable society. In other words, stability has no chance in a society as long as there is a group or a section of that society whose needs have not been met. The theorist believed that people involved in disputes were instinctively battling in their institutional environments at all social levels to satisfy basic and universal needs – such as security, identity, recognition and development. They struggled to gain control of their environment required to ensure the fulfilment of these needs. This struggle could not be restrained because it was fundamental (cited in Cunningham, 1998). This battle for basic needs is theoretically related to the Frustration-Aggression theory, which is based on the stimulus-response hypothesis (cited in Cunningham, 1998).

Burton supported the work of need theorists such as Paul Sites who believed the real source of power was tied to a person’s needs such as those for consistency, security, recognition, justice and a sense of control. (cited in Cunningham, 1998). The pursuit of these basic needs is the cause of many conflicts that have affected many nations around the world. Conventional methods of settlement such as talks, mediation and arbitration deal with superficial interests and do not deal with underlying needs and values (Fisher, 1997).
An example of a war that resulted from unmet basic needs was Sudan’s conflict between the Khartoum government and the Christians of the South. Mbeki was instrumental in leading mediation in that conflict. Grievances of the people of the South included economic and religious oppression. After a conflict that claimed 1.5 million lives and resulted in four million of refugees, a settlement was reached in that country. It resulted in the birth of South Sudan in 2011 (BBC News, 2014).

Although violence between the warring parties could subside because of mediation and ceasefire and the intervention of peacekeeping, there is no guarantee that peace will be permanent, notes Burton. The theorist also adds that it is the frustration caused by the inability to meet these needs that results in aggression which leads to conflict. The theorist notes that the difference between the Human Needs Theory and the Frustration-Aggression theories is that the former deals with basic needs while the latter is concerned with wants and desires (cited in Cunningham, 1998).

Burton cautions that conflict is inevitable as long as basic needs such as identity, equal justice and the pursuit of all other human societal developmental needs are not met in multi-ethnic societies. “It is a frustration-based protest against lack of opportunities for development and against lack of recognition and identity. Whether the tension, conflict or violence have origins in class, status, ethnicity, sex, religion or nationalism, we are dealing with the same fundamental issues,” says Burton (cited in Cunningham, 1998). The theorist reasons that conflict resolution is aimed at changing the political, social and economic systems. “It is an analytical and problem-solving process that takes into account such individual and group needs as identity and recognition, as well as institutional changes that are required to satisfy these needs” (cited in Cunningham, 1998).

**3.3.4 Track-One and Track-Two Diplomacy**

Track-One diplomacy is the official process which deals with reasons warring parties
come together to find solution to a conflict. It is often referred to as official government diplomacy or government technique (Nan, 2003). Government officials, representatives of inter-governmental organisations and third-party governments often make up the Track-One delegation while non-governmental and unofficial groups and individuals are often the actors who make up the Track-Two set-up (Hottinger, 2005) and (Hislaire, 2011).

Track-Two diplomacy is an unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organise human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict (Montville, 1991). Montville is credited for devising this method of diplomacy in the 80s (Chigas, 2003), (Naidoo, 2000), (Coady, 2012) and (Yesiladali, 2005).

Between Track-One and Track-Two is Track One-and-Half. This is a “public or private interaction between official representatives of conflicting governments or political entities such as popular armed movements, which is facilitated or mediated by a third party not representing a political organisation or institution. The aim of such interaction is to influence change of attitudes between the parties, with the objective of changing the political power structures that caused the conflict” (Mapendere, 2000).

While representatives involved in Track-Two interventions are non-officials, they are influential individuals who engage in direct joint analysis of the dispute and joint problem solving (Kotzé, 2002) and (Chigas, 2003). Track-Two diplomacy is required to maintain the balance of public exposure of the process and confidentiality. The reason for this is that this kind of diplomacy serves to influence public opinion so as to encourage acceptance of discussions between representatives from the rival parties. It is hoped that this diplomacy will encourage formal negotiations (Kotzé, 2002).

During the Burundi peace talks, Track-Two diplomacy became an effective tool to bring peace in that country. Yesiladali notes that before Mandela and Zuma got involved,
retired ANC MP Jan Van Eck contributed in paving the way for the eventual peace settlement in Burundi. Although he faced suspicion from the local leaders at the beginning, after confidence building, the warring sides eventually agreed to become part of talks. Because of the progress made at that stage, the warring parties continued with talks under the mediation of former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere who was succeeded by Mandela and eventually Zuma (Yesiladali, 2005).

In many peace missions, it would be a mistake to assume that one track could work independently from the others, or that you can completely separate the track roles to the extent that each level can work on its own, leaving the others (Hottinger, 2005). Montville also concurs as he notes that Track-Two diplomacy does not replace the Track-One set-up, but compensates for the pressure put on leaders by their people’s psychological expectations. Most important, Track-Two diplomacy is intended to boost Track-One negotiations (Mapendere, 2001). Hottinger further notes that Track-Two actors have played a significant role in relation to armed groups and peacemaking (Hottinger, 2005).

One of the types of conflicts that Track-Two diplomacy was developed to deal with was protracted social conflict – a conflict that is based, particularly, on identity-related needs, ethno-national or communal groups (Cunningham, 1998). Azar states that these identity groups wage a campaign to get their distinctive identity in the society. “When they are denied physical and economic security, political participation, and recognition from other groups, their distinctive identity is lost, and they will do whatever is in their power to regain it. In short, this is the origin of protracted social conflict,” (cited in Cunningham).

Traditional negotiations and mediation work well to resolve issues such as poverty, land issues, power sharing and distribution of wealth. But issues of identity survival and other fears can only be dealt with in a process that works directly to change human relationships, promoting mutual understanding and acknowledgement of concerns of a disgruntled group of a section of society (Chigas, 2003).
(a) Strengths and Weaknesses of Track-One Diplomacy

Official diplomatic efforts are often sufficiently funded compared with unofficial efforts. Track-One diplomacy officials also have access to information, security and logistical resources not available to unofficial efforts (Fahim, 2012). The limitation of this line of diplomacy is that it is guided by official policies and, therefore, can be restricted in its flexibility to take decisions. For instance, it could be difficult for officials in Track-One diplomacy to explore new ideas unofficially, unless these ideas have official support. But such support might not be available until preliminary exploratory discussions (Fahim, 2012).

(b) Strengths and Weaknesses of Track-Two Diplomacy

Unlike political leaders, Track-Two officials do not fear losing constituencies because they are often the constituency (Mapendere, 2000). Track-Two parties are less intimidating to armed groups and find it easier to work flexibly, unofficially and off-the-record, and have less to worry about when conveying official/legal recognition. Lacking geopolitical interests and stakes in the conflict, they may be more disinterested, forming relationships with a wider variety of actors in the conflict (Hottinger, 2005).

Like any other process, Track-Two diplomacy has shortcomings. It can take too long to produce results. Its participants have very little chance of making an impact once the conflict has reached a war stage. Participants of this diplomacy often have no resources for bargaining during talks and for the implementations of settlements. Track-Two diplomacy is doomed to fail in authoritarian governments because leaders of such regimes do not take advice from civilian leaders. Track-Two representatives sometime lack co-ordination because they come from various organisations (Mapendere, 2000).

They also lack the capacity to compel or coerce parties, can sometimes have difficulty in becoming part of the peace process (especially, with state actors), and cannot provide the same incentives and guarantees as Track-One actors. Importantly, they often lack resources and financial support, especially for their more long-term work that is “out of the spotlight” (Hottinger, 2005).
3.3.5 Peacekeeping Theory

As mentioned in Chapter 2, Fetherston is not satisfied with the volume of theory generated on peacekeeping. “Peacekeeping’s primary shortcoming is insufficient theoretical work that would allow researchers, policy analysts, and practitioners to address the still highly troublesome issues of increasing effectiveness and success, both in the short and long terms” (Fetherston, 2000). But on a positive note, although the literature as a whole remains largely descriptive and prescriptive, the latest wave of works on peacekeeping has matured considerably, and perhaps, most significant much more methodologically rigorous (Fortna & Howard, 2008).

Peacekeeping is the use of non-confrontational military methods that differ from peace enforcement which falls under conflict prevention through conflict suppression and monitoring coercive methods (Onumajuru, 2005). Although peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter, many theorists describe it as falling between Chapter VI and Chapter VII. Peacekeeping operations have been described by Hammarskjold as “Chapter 6½ initiatives” (cited in Onumajuru, 2005).

Chapter VI of the UN Charter deals with peace agreements of conflicts while Chapter VII relates to actions that need to be taken where there is threat to peace, breaches of peace and acts of war. Both form the norms and principles on which the Security Council acts (Nkiwane, 2001). Nkiwane notes that conceptually, collective security depends on unanimity, especially on the description of aggression and consensus on the course of action to be taken. Collective security depends on the agreement regarding political and military action (Nkiwane, 2001).

The principles of UN Peacekeeping include that the mission should be established after an agreement among the warring parties. And peacekeeping operations should be controlled by the secretary-general (cited in Onumajuru, 2005). UN peacekeeping acts as a third party exercise whose effort is to bring peace in a conflict situation where an external peace force is deployed. This can only happen after the world body has
received consent from the parties that are in conflict, pre-determined ceasefire deal and rules for the non-use of force by the peacekeeping team (Onumajuru, 2005).

Pretoria has followed the above UN principles in engaging in peacekeeping missions. Its *White Paper on Peace Missions* stipulates that the mandate for the peace mission must be agreed to among the UN, regional bodies (where applicable), the host country and conflicting parties and contributing countries (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998).

Adebajo states that chances for successful peacekeeping are greater when the interests and motivations of key actors align (cited in Klick, 2013). This has been true of South Africa’s interventions in peace mission in the continent. For instance in the case of the Burundi mediation, after spending two years in an attempt to persuade Burundi rebels to embrace negotiation with Burundi Transitional Government, Zuma’s efforts bore fruit in 2003 (Miti, 2013).

While multilateralism intervention in conflict was already taking place before the 20th century, the first professionally planned intervention to deal with security concerns was the League of Nations’ effort in 1920. The league punished nations that failed to comply with peaceful means to resolve conflict. The punishment included economic, military and political sanctions (Diehl, 1988). And although peacekeeping was established during the Cold War, its use became prolific only after the Cold War between the superpowers ended (Dunderdale, 2013) and (Fortna & Howard, 2008).

The UN asserts that peacekeeping operations often fall into one of the two classifications depending on the seriousness of the situation. In instances where the conflict is still fairly under control, the UN may use observer operations involving the posting of UN staff in the area on a semi-permanent basis to oversee the ceasefire and settlement and conduct probes of any grievances of violations. If full scale aggressions have erupted, army operations may be required to stop the fighting and keep the peace until a conclusive settlement is reached (Onumajuru, 2005).
A vital requirement of a peacekeeping exercise is that the participants in the mission must not be biased towards either of the parties in dispute. Historically, armies from non-aligned nations were deployed to ensure neutrality. Two rules for selecting armies for peacekeeping have cropped up over the years. One of them is not to allow troops from a country in the conflict to take part in the peacekeeping. The second is not to allow armies from major power nations or their allies to be part of the operation. These rules are aimed at ensuring that parties involved in the dispute will see the operation as neutral, and make conditions conducive to a positive outcome (Diehl, 1988).

Fetherston’s outlook on peacekeeping is not optimistic, as she notes that even with the growth of peacekeeping, the increase of multi-dimensional missions and more structured involvement, particularly in polls, peacekeeping has not resulted in creating long-term sustainable peace. It has not necessarily created opportunities for the establishment of conflict resolution. Fetherston even argues that peacekeeping, in some cases, has not improved the conflict situation (Fetherston, 2000).

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter outlined the research method used to conduct this study. It explained the relevance of the qualitative research for this study, and discussed the descriptive and explanatory methods which were used to investigate Pretoria’s peace diplomacy. This section also elaborated on how the researcher used Bailey’s research process to choose the research problem and define the hypothesis, formulate the research design, gather, analyse and interpret the data. This chapter also presented the overview of the international relations theories, idealism and realism, peacekeeping and conflict resolution. These theories offer a theoretical model from which Pretoria’s foreign policy was examined.

Having examined international relations theories, conflict resolution and peacekeeping, this study reports the results found in the literature studied in the next chapter.
Chapter 4

Research results

4.1 Introduction

This chapter begins with the discussion of South Africa’s foreign policy before democracy. This will help the reader understand why the minority government’s foreign policy impacted on Pretoria’s peace diplomacy after 1994. One of the instruments Pretoria is now using to engage in peace diplomacy in the continent is multilateralism. This section of the study also examines South Africa contribution in organisations such as the UN, AU, SADC, and the Nepad Agency. The latter part of this chapter analyses Pretoria’s mediation in Zimbabwe, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire and the Republic of Congo.

4.2 South African Foreign Policy Before 1994

The apartheid government’s behaviour towards other African countries, especially its neighbours, was aggressive (Olivier, 2006). The minority government terrorised other African nations as South Africa was the economic and military powerhouse not only of southern Africa but the whole African continent. One of the reasons South Africa attacked African nations was that some of these countries had welcomed political exiles who often launched attacks against the minority government. As a result, countries such as Zambia, Lesotho, Mozambique and Botswana bore the brunt of the South African government’s ire as it destroyed their infrastructure and killed many people. Pretoria justified these brutal attacks with claims that its armed forces were fighting the liberation enemies of the state (Baynham & Mills, 1994). That behaviour turned the apartheid regime into a bully of Africa (Prah, 2013).

However, events such as the Sharpeville massacre, the killing of Soweto students on June 16, 1976 and the Rivonia Trial also put South Africa in an awkward place in the international community. The white minority government gradually became a pariah
state because of these tragedies (Pfister, 2006). By the end of PW Botha’s presidency, Pretoria was one of the most frowned upon governments in the world because of its apartheid policy and as a result, Pretoria lost many friends (Machesa, 1997) and (Alden & Le Pere, 2006). South Africa was punished with a wide range of sanctions and eventually was suspended by the United Nations and forced to withdraw from the Commonwealth (Permanent Mission of SA to the UN, 2011) and (O’Malley, undated). Some of the offences for which South Africa was punished with sanctions was Pretoria’s intensified “repeated acts of aggression against Angola and Zambia” (Geldenhuys, 1984). For more than 40 years, South Africa was isolated by the majority of member nations of the United Nations (Spence, 2001).

Pretoria was also chastised in the UN over the treatment of the Indian minority and South West Africa. The Indian government backed a resolution condemning South Africa for denying human rights to its Indian community, an offence New Delhi said was harming relations between South Africa and India. The apartheid government denied that it had violated basic human rights. In the case of South West Africa, South Africa tried to hide behind the legalistic defence of its position but failed to stop criticism (Barber & Barratt, 1990).

Baynham and Mills point out that although the UN had for a long time put pressure on South Africa over its racial policies, it was not until 1976-78 that the call for sanctions against Pretoria intensified. In 1977, a UN resolution dealt with South Africa’s acts of violence and killings of African people. The world body declared that Pretoria’s policies were “fraught with danger” to international peace and security and South Africa’s procurement of arms was a threat to world peace (Baynham & Mills, 1994). Pretoria did not take international pressure lying down. The Nationalist Party used its foreign policy to fight the international campaign to abolish apartheid (Siko, 2014).

But the world had not always been hard on the white minority government. When the National Party came to power shortly after WWII, the West paid no attention to
apartheid and its evils. “Sovereign independence and the rise of Afrikaner nationalism saw apartheid becoming an institutionalised national creed without encountering much international resistance” (Olivier, 2006). It was only when countries such as India and Pakistan raised the alarm on South Africa’s racial policy in the UN that other nations started to condemn Pretoria (Olivier, 2006).

Until 1945, the international law was concerned with states and their relationship with other states. After WWII, that changed as a result of human rights abuses committed by the, Nazis. “This experience compelled statesmen to accept the need for the new world order in which the state was no longer free to treat its own nationals as it pleased” (Youla, 2009).

Pfister, Olivier, Spence, and Alden and Le Pere, agree that Pretoria’s foreign policy makers were pre-occupied with trying to stop further isolation and convincing whoever cared to listen that all was well in South Africa. This obviously failed dismally because the ANC led an international campaign to expose the atrocities that were committed against the country’s oppressed (Alden & le Pere, 2004), (Pfister, 2006), (Olivier, 2006) and (Spence, 2001).

In 1990, the ANC had 28 diplomatic offices overseas whose mission was to campaign for support for Pretoria’s isolation (Mills, 1997). The liberation movement worked tirelessly to tell the world about the effects of the white minority government’s racial policy. Political organisations believed that the world body would support oppressed South Africans because of its Charter’s commitment to equality and justice (Youla, 2009).

However, the case of South Africa was a Catch 22 situation. As the white minority government became an outcast, other nations realised that sidelining Pretoria was not in the best interest of the Western powers. Despite the fact that apartheid was unacceptable, South Africa was still important strategically and economically to the
West. Pretoria was vital in counteracting communism and South Africa’s propaganda exploited Western fear (History Online, undated).

“The Nationalists effectively played up the communist threat to South Africa from the Soviet-backed ANC to maintain consistently high levels of domestic support and win anti-Communist friends abroad” (Siko, 2014). South Africa used every tactic it could find – legalistic means, diplomatic overtures and economic incentives to entice friends and rebuff opponents (Siko, 2014). However, as the circle of international friends narrowed, Pretoria turned to the Far East because South Africa’s political reforms were not high in those countries’ foreign policy agenda (Thomas, 1994).

South Africa’s attempt at détente to woo African countries failed even before it got off the ground. Prime minister John Voster’s intervention in Angola between 1975 and 1976 was meant to persuade the US and African countries, which were opposed to Cuba-Soviet influence in Angola, to stand with South Africa. Pretoria got a rude shock when it discovered that African countries were unwilling to back a white regime which claimed to defend an African neighbouring state against communist influence (South African Democracy Education Trust, 2006).

4.3 South Africa’s Multilateralism

Judging from the history of the apartheid government’s foreign relations with the continent, it is clear why the democratic government had to find a constructive manner through which it would work with the rest of the African continent.

Pretoria has resorted to multilateralism to participate in solving the continent’s economic, political and developmental problems. Kagwanja agrees with this move as he points out that as a strategy of power, peace in a multilateral approach has increasingly enabled nations to participate and even intervene in other nations’ civil conflicts without attracting the wanton criticism of interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries.
Multilateral relations enables South Africa to influence the programmes and policies of its African counterparts without seeming to be domineering (McGurk, 2013).

Mandela said in his early years of presidency that South Africa had to work through multilateral organisations, pointing out that these bodies were central to promoting peace, equality and human rights, (Barber, 2005). As such, Pretoria’s peacekeeping missions and mediation have taken place under the mandates of organisations such as the UN, AU, SADC, Non-Aligned Movement, G77 and others (Mabera & Dunne, 2013).

South Africa’s significant participation in multilateralism took place during Mbeki’s presidency. Mandela’s successor realised that he could use multilateralism to push for Pretoria’s foreign policy position through working under multilateral organisations, especially in the continent. From 2000, the Mbeki administration aggressively embarked on beefing up Africa’s multilateral institutions, specifically the SADC and AU. It was also during Mbeki’s presidency that South Africa played a vital role in the UN (Kagwanja, 2009).

Mbeki led the campaign to transform political institutions such as the UN Security Council, championed the revamp of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to become the AU. He also led the call for the transformation of institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organisation. These efforts were aimed at ensuring that Africa had a voice in these institutions (Landsberg, 2012b). The following section explores Pretoria’s performance in the AU, SADC, UN and Nepad Agency, and how that has helped South Africa contribute to peace diplomacy.

(a) African Union
South Africa joined the OAU in 1994 and chaired the AU from June 2002 to June 2003. OAU’s successor, the AU, had also been launched in 2002. As the Chair, South Africa
played a vital role in the establishment of the AU's institutions, policies and procedures (Landsberg, 2009).

Pretoria is one of the biggest financial contributors to the AU's budget (it was contributing 15% of the funds of the African body in 2011), and pays as much as R30 million to the Nepad Agency and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) (Landsberg, 2009) and (Nepad, 2011a).

Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, one of Pretoria's former senior cabinet ministers, was appointed as the AU Commission’s chairperson in July 2012. However, Pretoria drew criticism from African leaders and analysts for pursuing its ambitions in the AU (Handy cited in Bradfield, 2013), (Habib, 2012) and (Naidoo, 2012). The observers were referring to Pretoria’s aggressive campaigning for the election of Dlamini Zuma as chairperson of the union. Key priorities for her term include greater internal efficiency and effectiveness within the AU Commission as an executing agency of the AU (Presidency, 2014).

South Africa's involvement with the AU has primarily focused on a number of issues. Pretoria has concentrated on promoting the AU as Africa’s institution of governance and development. The aim is that the AU must spearhead the promotion of healthy governance in the continent, so as to promote Africa's renewal agenda (Presidency, 2014).

South Africa has helped establish and bolster the AU Commission to implement decisions which have been made by the AU Assembly and the AU Council. Pretoria has also been hosting the Pan African Parliament since 2005, the Nepad Agency and APRM Secretariat since 2001 and the African Commission on Nuclear Energy. The AU established the Pan-African Parliament so that it increased its public accountability and access to the ordinary Africans. The parliament represents all elected African national legislatures (Presidency, 2014). However, Mbeki has lamented the lack of efficacy in
this body, saying it still needed to be strengthened to become more politically effective (Mbeki, 2012).

Pretoria supported the establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC), which, among other responsibilities, deploys peacekeeping missions. South Africa is also contributing to capacity building by training diplomats and other civil servants from the continent (Presidency, 2014).

(b) Southern African Development Community

SADC’s precursor, Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference, was established in 1980 to fight South Africa’s apartheid. So, to forge good relations with its neighbours, it made sense for the post-apartheid state to put southern Africa at the top of its foreign relations agenda. This demonstrated Pretoria’s commitment to all aspects of SADC agenda, including political, social and economic issues of the region (Saurombe, 2010).

Pretoria showed the prominence it attached to the region by adopting its first foreign policy document called a “Framework for Co-operation in Southern Africa” which got the green light from the cabinet as early as August 1996 (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2003).

Since 1994, South Africa has led the way in the region in addressing issues such as closer collaboration and economic integration. These include the establishment of a free trade area in the region, the development of basic infrastructure, the advancement of human resources and promotion of peace, democracy and good governance in the region. Although southern Africa has looked to South Africa as a pacesetter in SADC’s peace agenda, Saurombe points out that, in the process, Pretoria has tended to bully its regional partners. South Africa attempts to wield its economic power when negotiating with other SADC member states (Saurombe, 2010) and (Mhango, 2013).
It was Mbeki’s government which made a significant contribution to the SADC. His foreign policy pertaining to the SADC was centred on three basic considerations: to keep the organisation unified, resolve institutional challenges in SADC within the organisation’s framework and, where applicable, to employ other multilateral tools to use Pretoria’s conflict resolution strategy (Alden, 2002). The second president of the democratic government also introduced a conciliatory tone that leaned towards quiet diplomacy and consensus building between SADC member states (Alden, 2002).

Pretoria has also recorded a number of achievements in the SADC. Pretoria was instrumental in the establishment of the Berlin Initiative, whose aim is to promote closer co-operation between the European Union and SADC. Among issues that the initiative aims to deal with is the strengthening of democracy in southern Africa, clearance of landmines and promoting trade and investment (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2003).

“South Africa chaired SADC’s powerful Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in 2004/05. During its tenure, Pretoria prioritised the linking of SADC’s institutional capacity by implementing two initiatives: the 15-Year Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan to pursue SADC’s socio-economic goals, and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the organ to address political, peace and security priorities ” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2003).

Pretoria was also instrumental in the establishing, together with other SADC member states, of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. The aim of this organ is to provide a forum to debate and resolve political issues. It also aims to achieve “solidarity, peace and security within the SADC. The emphasis is on the peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, conciliation, mediation and arbitration” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2003).

But the establishment of the organ has been controversial. Challenges for Pretoria became evident when Mugabe and Mandela clashed over the functioning of the Organ
on Politics, Defence and Security (Molefi, 2003). The body was paralysed by political differences between South Africa and Zimbabwe. Pretoria, supported by Botswana, Tanzania and Mozambique, argued that the organ should be a peacemaking body. But Zimbabwe, backed by Namibia and Angola, contended that it should be a military-orientated body which would provide mutual defence.

South Africa was peeved when Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola led the SADC to intervene militarily in the DRC to crush Rwandan and Ugandan forces. South Africa opposed this move because Mandela’s government had been already mediating in the DRC crisis (Bah, 2004).

South Africa’s military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 also aggravated the division within the SADC. Some of the SADC member states felt that South Africa was imposing its power over smaller countries. Zimbabwe and South Africa tried to use the regional organisation to bolster their foreign policy objectives and in the process holding the security tool of the organisation hostage (Alden, 2002).

Perhaps, one of the regrets is that Pretoria’s term came to an end without the approval of the crucial Mutual Defence Pact created to promote co-operation in defence and security matters, which regional leaders agreed upon in August 2003 (Kagwanja, 2009).

(c) United Nations
While South Africa was lauded for becoming a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), Pretoria was condemned for the way it voted in the council. After a first term which was marred by controversy in 2007-2008, South Africa got another chance to serve a second term on the UNSC in 2011-2012. Pretoria came under fire for opposing the criticism of human rights abuses in Myanmar and Zimbabwe; the call for sanctions against Iran over its nuclear programme and the inclusion of the issue of climate change on the council’s agenda (Serrão, 2011).
During its second term, Pretoria’s biggest achievements was the adoption by the UNSC of Resolution 2033, which South Africa initiated to formalise, bolster and encourage the UNSC’s co-operation with regional organisations, particularly the AU PSC (Government Communication, 2014).

Sangqu commended South Africa for leading the Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, a forum which aimed to find ways to prevent and resolve conflicts in the continent and the 1540 Committee, which stops non-state actors from accumulating arms of mass killings. Pretoria also supported the ground-breaking council resolutions on consolidating the strategic co-operation between the AU and the UN Security Council in Resolution 2033 and also promoted its positions with regards to the rule of law at national and international levels, post-conflict development, peace and security. South Africa also championed a Security Council Mission to Africa and led a fact-finding mission of the Council to Timor-Leste in 2012. (cited in South African Government News Agency, 2013).

However, a vote pertaining to the Libyan crisis drew a barrage of criticism against Pretoria. This came after South Africa backed the UN Resolution 1973 imposing a no-fly zone over Libya while Pretoria’s Brics partners, Russia and China, refrained. The UN’s motion was authorising the Nato attack on Libya during the Arab Spring (Mashele, 2012), (Pillay, 2011) and (Petré, 2011).

South Africa voted with France, US and Britain, Gabon and Nigeria in favour of Resolution 1973. Pretoria was slammed for supporting a UN decision to bomb Libya ignoring the AU’s suggestion for mediation between Gaddafi and the rebels (Miti, 2013). Five heads of state were still holding talks on the Libyan crisis in Mauritania when they received news that Nato had started bombing Gaddafi’s positions. Seeing its mistake Pretoria made a U-turn. President Zuma criticised the West for diverging from the goal of Resolution 1973, which authorised a no-fly zone to protect civilians. He accused Nato and its allies of pursuing a government change in Libya (Miti, 2013) and (Nathan, 2013).
But Habib differs from the critics of South Africa’s Libya vote. He opines that Pretoria was right in condemning the attempt by the US, Britain and France to move beyond the mandate of Resolution. The only strategic mistake was that the political intervention should have happened at the point of the stand-off in Benghazi and should have been launched through the AU. (Habib, 2012).

But Pretoria was accused of another policy contradiction when it abstained in the vote to condemn human rights violations in Syria. Three months later South Africa voted in favour of a UN resolution calling for Syrian president to vacate the office (Landsberg, 2012b). The difference between Zuma’s and Mbeki’s foreign policies has been in the way they voted in the UN. While Mbeki’s government was consistent in abstaining in voting concerning countries such as Zimbabwe, Iran and Myanmar, Zuma’s controversial voting behaviour was seen in issues such as those of Syria and Libya (Landsberg, 2012a).

(d) Nepad Agency

Nepad was born from Mbeki’s conceptualisation of the African Renaissance discussed in Chapter 5. Launched in 2001, Nepad is a socio-economic development scheme designed to encourage African countries to take charge of protecting principles of democracy and good governance through the APRM (SouthAfrica.info Reporter, 2006).

Nepad became a foreign policy in essence, guiding Pretoria’s dealings with other African countries. Principles that guide Nepad include economic development that results from promoting capitalism and political stability and peace and security (Dassah, 2009) and (Okokpari, 2004). It was initiated by heads of five African states – South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria and Senegal. The strategic framework of Nepad was adopted by the Assembly of African Heads of State and Government during the 37th Summit of the Organisation of African Unity in July 2001. Its General Secretariat is based in Midrand, Gauteng (Bostan, 2009).
Killander argues that Nepad should be credited, although partly, for putting democracy and good governance at the top of Africa’s development agenda and placing Africa’s development challenges at the top of the EU’s external relations agenda (cited in Obonye, 2012).

Nepad birthed the APRM, which, despite criticism and implementation difficulties, remains a novel tool for building democracy and good governance and is an instrument that can be copied by other regions (Paterson, 2012). An expert states: “This mechanism is an initiative by African leaders which is supposed to be people-centred, people-owned, people-managed, and people-driven” (cited in Obonye, 2012). Nepad’s other successes include the formulation of a framework to restructure capacity development across Africa and the digitisation of the Timbuktu Manuscripts, aimed at preserving them (Nepad, 2011b).

Like many initiatives, Nepad has shortcomings. According to Kavei, Nepad lacks effective co-ordination between and among its many components, partners and projects (cited in Obonye, 2012). There is also the overlapping of roles and functions between the AU and Nepad. This is seen in the AU PSC and the APRM which both oversee the protection of democracy and good governance (Fombad, 2006).

Legwaila argues that weak institutional capacity limits progress in the execution of Nepad at continental, regional and national levels. The problems result in technical capacity in executing programmes, insufficient financial capacity and inadequately developed guidelines to manage collective action (cited in Obonye, 2012).

According to Obonye, the head of state-centered Nepad has the capability of enslaving Africans all over again, therefore, denying the continent the chance of pulling itself out of its socio-economic and political abyss. Conflicts in countries such as the DRC, Mali, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Guinea and Madagascar have been a setback for Nepad’s bid to enhance good governance and image building (Obonye, 2012).
4.4 How has South Africa Fared in Peace Diplomacy in Africa?

South Africa's peace diplomacy has grown considerably since the ANC government took office. Pretoria's record of its peace diplomacy is mixed, but it shows notable successes (Sidiropoulos, 2007). Miti concurs as he says: “What is important is that there has been a willingness and political commitment to address the continental conflicts and national resources have been committed to this end” (Miti, 2013).

From 1999-2014, Pretoria participated in 14 peace missions, as it continued to prioritise efforts to bring peace and security in the continent. South African troops have served in UN and AU missions in countries such as Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, the DRC, Sudan, Comoros and Liberia (Government Communication, 2014), (Ebrahim, 2014), (Van Nieuwkerk, 2013), (Tjemolane, 2014) and (Salifu, 2010). Marthoz lauds Pretoria's progress in international relations, so far. He points out that having taken an important role in forging a new international order, especially in Africa, Pretoria has played a leading role as a peacekeeper and peacemaker in the region (Marthoz, 2012).

Although Pretoria has been engaged in peace missions in many African countries, the section below discusses its peace diplomacy in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe and the DRC. Chief mediators for the Burundi conflict were Mandela and Zuma, DRC (Mbeki and Zuma), Cote d’Ivoire (Mbeki and Zuma) and Zimbabwe (Mbeki and Zuma).

(a) Burundi Peace Mission

South Africa began to engage in the Burundian peace process when Mandela was commissioned by a regional summit in Arusha to lead mediation in that country (Vrey & Rautenbac, 2010) and (IRIN Humanitarian Information Unit, 1999). Mandela, who started leading this mediation process after he had just retired as the president of South Africa, became the obvious facilitator after Julius Nyerere, the mediator in the Burundi peace process, had died in 1999 (Pillai, 2009).
The former Tanzanian president and Mandela had been friends for a long time. The South African president had supported Nyerere to act as facilitator in the Burundi’s peace process. As a result, Nyerere often consulted Mandela during his time of mediation (Pillai, 2009). Even way before these talks, in 1994, Nyerere had urged the post-apartheid government to “commit to resolving the tangled humanitarian crises of the Great Lakes region” (Pillai, 2009).

It was likely that after Nyerere’s death, the Burundi peace mission would have collapsed if Mandela did not take over later that year. He used a lot of moral pressure in the Burundi mediation, but with his experience, was able to do so “authentically and efficiently” (Mason, 2008). The reasons Mandela’s leadership was helpful is that, first, the South African icon and post-apartheid government enjoyed the credibility that resulted from South Africa’s democratic transition from apartheid. Second, the country’s growing “African superpower” status, its apparent disinterest and Mandela’s own international status were crucial in leading the Burundi peace process (Mthembu-Salter, Berger, & Kikoler, 2011).

South Africa had no intentions of engaging in the Burundi peace mission. But the mission gave Pretoria an opportunity to give concrete meaning to the implementation of its foreign policy in Africa, as advocated by Mbeki (Vrey & Rautenbac, 2010). Mandela’s involvement in the Burundian peace mission gave Pretoria a chance to show its commitment to Africa. Burundi lacked sought-after resources, which are often thought to be the motive behind interventions in the continent. All Burundi needed was help to halt a conflict that had claimed thousands of lives. The country was physically far from South Africa and there was thus no direct interest, except the strategic interest to help a fellow African nation on the road to stability (Vrey & Rautenbac, 2010).

Bentley and Southall state that Mandela’s mediation strategy included addressing the Burundian conflict in explicit ethnic terms, something that Nyerere did not give a lot of
attention. This forced Burundians to face the issue of ethnicity more honestly, an aspect that was crucial because it focused the mediation process on seeking ethnic power-sharing solutions, such as the idea of the presidency rotating between Tutsi and Hutu (cited in Pillai, 2009).

The contribution that Mandela, in particular, made to solve the Burundi problem came not only from a peacekeeping formula he learned from the negotiations to end conflict in South Africa, but also resulted from his skill as a negotiator and his shrewdness at getting to the heart of the matter and forcing a way through the key blockages that were preventing progress (Freund, 2006).

Security for leaders who had left the country was a concern for the mediators. To address this issue, Mandela sought help from relevant South African departments to mandate the deployment of the South African Protection Support Detachment in October 2000, to provide protection to returning leaders (Agoagye, 2004).

At the initial stage of the peace process, Mandela allowed the committees to work together, and then applied pressure to get a deal on the open issues (Mason, 2008). He suggested five priorities as a means to eradicate hindrances in the committee negotiations: assurance of security which would encourage peace and reconciliation; incorporation of Hutu rebel fighters into the army rather than civil society, so that the ethnic composition of the army could be transformed; the addressing of the thorny issues before elections are held; the establishment of a transitional regime which would be in place, at least, for five years and addressing of the property rights for returning refugees (Pillai, 2009).

Mandela invited the parties to a signing ceremony in August 2000 although some had not agreed to key provisions in the provisional document nor was there a deal on who would lead the transitional government or a truce with the rebels. This move worked: 14 of the 19 parties signed the Arusha Accord for Peace and Reconciliation which bound
parties into a plan from which peace would flourish. Later Mandela also broke the stalemate over the transitional leadership as he declared that Pierre Buyoya would remain the president for the first half of the transition period (Curtis, 2007b).

But much bigger problems remained. The Arusha Accord was signed without a ceasefire. And two main rebel Hutu parties, Paliphehutu-FNL and the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy refused to take part in the peace process (Miti, 2013) and (Pillai, 2009). Although Mandela acknowledged those setbacks, he believed that the signing of the accord even without a ceasefire would provide a new impetus for the peace process and would put pressure on the militants to join the truce bid (Miti, 2013).

After the signing of the Arusha Accord, Mandela withdrew from the talks and Mbeki, who had become South Africa’s president, assigned (deputy president) Zuma to take over the mediation process in 2001. The implementation of the Arusha Accord would not have been possible without the continued engagement of the South African government. The reason is that Pretoria did not only provide military staff to ensure a peaceful transition but also continued to foot the bill for the negotiations of a ceasefire agreement between the government and the armed groups. Zuma had to oversee outstanding issues in the Arusha agreements which had been signed by Mandela in 2000 (Miti, 2013).

The biggest challenge Zuma faced was to get Burundi’s warring groups to the negotiating table. It took two years for the rebels and the transitional government to reach a deal on two power-sharing issues (Miti, 2013).

Zuma’s mediation method was different from the strategies that were followed by Nyerere and Mandela. He was discrete in his bid and he also directly involved the AU and the UN in the Burundi peace negotiations. He realised early that Burundi rebels’ situation was complex: they belonged to a network of armed groups in the Great Lakes
region. So, they were backed by some of the governments in the region. That is why he sought support from the international community to bring peace in Burundi. Regional leaders and Zuma concentrated on mediation for a new constitution. During this process, Zuma and the other mediators opposed attempts by Tutsi parties to reject key aspects of the constitution in addition to attempts of President Domitien Ndayizeye, Buyoya’s successor, to amend the constitution to postpone the electoral process (Khadiagala cited in Pillai, 2009).

Pretoria’s peace mission in Burundi, which included diplomatic, political and military involvement, was successful. South Africa’s role in the Burundian peace mediation was key to the success of the resolution of the conflict (Pillay, 2013).

(b) Cote d’Ivoire Peace Mission
Cote d’Ivoire plunged into civil war in 2002, after confrontations between insurgents from the north of the country and forces loyal to President Laurent Gbagbo. This had led to a division of the country into north and south (Rametsi, 2006). Mbeki was assigned by the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) to mediate a peace settlement in Cote d’Ivoire in November 2004. Such a decision seemed sensible because South Africa chaired the Peace and Security Council of the AU at the time. Besides, there was belief that the involvement of a plausible third party from outside West Africa was crucial to resolving problems in Cote d’Ivoire (Rametsi, 2006). Pillai states that Mbeki’s participation in the Accra talks also automatically put him in a position to facilitate in the Côte d’Ivoire crisis (Pillai, 2009).

The conflict had erupted in Cote d’Ivoire when New Forces rebels staged an uprising against Gbagbo, virtually dividing the country into a Muslim-dominated rebel north and Christian government-held south (Mantu, 2005). The New Forces is a coalition that had been formed in December 2002 after the signing of Côte d’Ivoire’s first peace accords. The attacks, which included air raids and bombing of rebel forces ordered by Gbagbo,
claimed the lives of nine French soldiers and one American non-governmental organisation official, and many Ivoirians (Williams, 2006).

When Mbeki became involved in the Cote d’Ivoire crisis, peace efforts, namely the Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accords and Accra II and III, which were led by France and Ecowas, had collapsed (Rametsi, 2006). Mbeki’s key role was to secure the amendment of Article 35 of the Constitution, which would resolve a deadlock caused by Gbagbo’s attempt to prevent his key counterparts from contesting the election against him, particularly Alassane Ouattara – who had formed a strong alliance with another leader, Konan Bedie. Mbeki succeeded in convincing Laurent and Simone Gbagbo and Mamadou Koulibally that the New Forces would disarm if this amendment was made (Williams, 2006).

The five leaders, Gbagbo, Prime Minister Seydou Diarra, New Forces rebel leader Guillaume Soro, and Cote d’Ivoire’s main opposition politicians, Bedie and Ouattara, signed what became known as the Tshwane (Pretoria) Agreement. They agreed to continue the peace process to resolve some of the outstanding issues of the Linas-Marcoussis, Accra II and III agreements (Mantu, 2005).

Mbeki emphasised the need for Ecowas and AU to work together to bring peace in Cote d’Ivoire (Dadson, 2008). The Pretoria I and II agreements, signed on April 6, 2005 and June 29 of the same year were a result of this joint effort. The Pretoria agreements sought to address outstanding issues of disarmament and dismantling of the network of rebels based throughout the country who undermined the implementation of Linas-Marcoussis agreements. The failure to address these issues led to the signing of another deal known as the Declaration on the Implementation of the Pretoria Peace Agreement (Dadson, 2008). Among other issues that were introduced was that the AU should impose sanctions on a party that failed to comply with the implementation of the agreement. Up until this point, the rebel leader Soro “had given up on African mediation effort in the crisis because of lack of trust and the supposedly biased stance some of
the mediators had taken and called on France and the UN to mediate the peace process” (Dadson, 2008).

Two years later, however, Pretoria faced criticism from the New Forces which charged that Mbeki supported Gbagbo and called for the replacement of the South African president as a facilitator (Pillai, 2009). Gbagbo, on the other hand, commended Mbeki for succeeding in respecting the positions of all sides (Rametsi, 2006). In October 2006, during an AU Peace and Security Council meeting in Addis Ababa, Mbeki announced Pretoria’s intention to pull out from the mediation in Côte d’Ivoire. The reason for that decision, he said, was that South Africa wanted to avoid conflict of interest because Pretoria was on the verge of assuming the non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council (Pillai, 2009). While the appointment of Mbeki brought fresh momentum to the deadlocked talks between the New Forces and the Gbagbo government, very little progress was made (Miti, 2013).

Zuma found himself again facilitating the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire after he became president in 2009. At that time the conflict was centred on the results of the polls of October/November 2010. These polls were expected to bring peace after the conflict that had divided the country into two. The Electoral Commission and the UN representatives announced that Ouattara had won the second round against Gbagbo. The Constitutional Council, on the other hand, declared Gbagbo the winner of the election. The double results led to each leader being sworn in as president of Cote d’Ivoire (Miti, 2013). Observers called for the removal of the incumbent, a move that Zuma condemned. Instead, he said, to resolve the impasse, parties had to promote reconciliation and national unity. This was interpreted as support for Gbagbo, an accusation that had been levelled against Mbeki (Miti, 2013).

While many observers felt that South Africa’s mediation in Cote d’Ivoire was a fiasco, Pillai blames strong opposition from West African countries and the New Forces for having an influence on forcing Pretoria out of the mediation (Pillai, 2009).
The AU asked Mbeki to help resolve the Côte d'Ivoire presidential dispute after the 2010 elections (Sapa, 2010). When this effort also failed, Mbeki said: “You will not have peace without democracy, and neither democracy without peace” (RFI, 2010).

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s chief of staff, Vijay Nambiar, declared that Pretoria’s mediation in Côte d’Ivoire had failed. In 2011, Mbeki blamed the UN for declaring Ouattara the winner of the elections. This move, Mbeki said, was against the AU’s belief that the solution of the Ivorian crisis depended on a negotiated settlement between the two belligerent factions. The AU believed that such a settlement would bring democracy, peace, national reconciliation and unity. Nambiar rejected this, saying forcing Ouattara to negotiate a power-sharing deal would have undermined the choice of the voters (Charbonneau, 2011). It took the intervention of the France, not Africans, to force Gbagbo out of power (Patel, 2012).

**c) Zimbabwe Peace Mission**

The crisis in Zimbabwe goes back to February 2000 constitutional referendum which sought among other things to allow for land confiscation without compensation (unless financed by Britain); increase of the powers of the head of state and extension of Mugabe’s term in office for 12 more years (Miti, 2013).

Even before that, some Zimbabweans had voiced disquiet over the developing political affairs in the country. Consequently a new movement was born in 1999 – the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) – to challenge the new draft constitution. The MDC defeated the governing party in a referendum on draft constitution. This defeat, however, sparked the violent invasion of white farms by the war veterans, attacks which were overlooked by the state. After chaotic elections which were also marred by violence in 2002, Mugabe was declared the winner (Miti, 2013).

Mbeki started peace diplomacy in Zimbabwe after South Africa’s neighbour had been suspended by the Commonwealth. “Mbeki viewed land resettlement as the core of
Zimbabwe’s political and economic problems and tried as much as he could to convince the UK, US and other Western countries that if the land issue could be resolved by providing funding for compensation of the acquired white farms, things could go back to normal” (Miti, 2013).

Throughout the crisis, Mbeki rejected the use of sanctions against Zimbabwe. He urged the West to lift sanctions against South Africa’s neighbour, saying they were used as a tool for regime change (Nyathi, 2012).

Mbeki’s government opted for quiet diplomacy – as a policy approach to help resolve the political crisis in Zimbabwe (Mkhize, 2008). Quiet diplomacy, a form of traditional diplomacy involving negotiators acting behind closed doors, out of the spotlight of the media, was aimed at encouraging dialogue between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) and the opposition. South Africa’s quiet diplomacy promoted the idea of Zimbabweans dealing with their issues without the interference of outsiders (Mkhize, 2008).

Barber believed the Harare crisis became the hardest problem for Mbeki’s government (Barber, 2005). As the international community screamed for harsh intervention against Mugabe, the Mbeki government never succumbed to the pressure of critics of South Africa’s peace diplomacy in Zimbabwe (Chidozie, Agbude, & Oni, 2013).

Many observers condemned Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy for its slow pace in a crisis that seemed to slide Zimbabwe into chaos (Townsend & Copson, 2005). In return Pahad lashed out at those who opposed quiet diplomacy, saying they did not offer any credible alternatives on how South Africa should help bring peace in Zimbabwe. For instance, Pahad said, the critics had failed to show what megaphone diplomacy had accomplished. He said many naysayers refused to see that Pretoria had worked hard to assist Zimbabweans to resolve the crisis (cited in Chidozie, Agbude & Oni, 2013). Mbeki’s supporters believed that he was the only leader with prestige who would be
able to persuade Mugabe to stop the chaos in South Africa’s neighbour (Townsend & Copson, 2005).

Mbeki’s diplomacy in Zimbabwe was based on the premise that keeping lines of communication with Mugabe was important in bringing peace in Zimbabwe. Mbeki did not care how other leaders treated Mugabe, but he was convinced that his approach to solve the Zimbabwe’s crisis was going to produce results no matter how long it took (Landsberg, 2008).

But in all fairness when the conflict in Zimbabwe’s worsened in 2000, state Schoeman and Alden, Mbeki was also trying to transform his vision of the African Renaissance into what would give birth to the Nepad by the end of 2001. As expected, he was sensitive about how Pretoria was seen by the rest of the continent. He desperately needed the backing for this new economic initiative (cited in Graham, 2004).

While some observers believed Mbeki employed quiet diplomacy because he was soft on Mugabe, others believed there was “no personal affinity between the men” (Siko, 2014) and (Barber, 2005). In fact, Mugabe thought Mbeki was an arrogant upstart who failed to see him as a revered statesman (Barber, 2005). Barber also lists his reasons he believes made Mbeki employ quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe: Mugabe is regarded as a liberation hero in the African continent. His government took on a fight over land, which is a contentious issue among Africans. Mbeki was obsessed with keeping the African unity and when the MDC approached South Africa’s opposition leader Leon for support, Mbeki’s response was to resort to quiet diplomacy (Barber, 2005).

Graham suggests the following reasons as to why Mbeki chose quiet diplomacy to mediate peace in Zimbabwe: post-apartheid government’s second president believed the outcry over the crisis came from people who wanted to protect the interests of the white Zimbabweans, he needed to prevent a complete breakdown of authority and that South Africa was supposed to avoid another “Nigeria situation” (cited in Mkhize, 2008).
All in all, progress in Pretoria’s peace diplomacy toward Zimbabwe was slow. Pretoria endorsed elections in 2002 and 2005 as free and fair despite different views of local and international observers. But Mbeki and his team worked tirelessly throughout his second tenure to help resolve Zimbabwe’s political crisis. South Africa, through the SADC, condemned the June 2008 second round of the Zimbabwean presidential election as not representing the will of the Zimbabwean people. But Pretoria remained committed to that country’s peace diplomacy. The elections had been boycotted by the MDC because of government intimidation (Siko, 2014).

By 2007, Mbeki had recorded successes in the Zimbabwe peace mediation. These included, a draft constitution signed by all parties, an agreement on electoral and legislative reforms and a facilitation of conditions that eradicated pre-election violence (Coady, 2012). After the 2008 election, Mbeki was mandated by the SADC to facilitate a second peace process between Mugabe’s government and the MDC (Miti, 2013). Until then, South Africa had participated in the Zimbabwe’s mediation as a member of the Commonwealth triad (Australia, Nigeria and South Africa) that was set up to deal with the political crisis in that country (Miti, 2013).

Although the South African president had said that his main objective was to ensure Zimbabwe held free and fair elections, early in 2008, Mbeki failed to guarantee that elections were held in a violence-free environment. In March of the same year, Zimbabwe’s talks stalled after the government and the opposition disagreed on the election date and constitution. Mbeki conveniently changed his tune – from pursuing conditions for free and fair elections to merely mediating between warring parties (Coady, 2012).

With an economic meltdown reaching alarming levels, all parties believed that the opposition needed to be involved in the negotiations. “It was this changed scenario that allowed Mbeki to persuade the antagonists to sign an agreement in September 2008, popularly known as the Global Political Agreement (GPA). This opened the way for the
formation of a government of national unity which Mbeki had been pushing for all along” (Coady, 2012).

Mbeki’s peace efforts in Zimbabwe were cut short when he left office in 2008 and was replaced by (President Kgalema) Motlanthe. When Zuma took office in 2009, he took over the task of implementing the GPA (Miti, 2013). Landsberg states that Zuma decided to continue with Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe. The analyst points out that Zuma left much of the negotiations to his mediation team, unlike Mbeki who was hands-on in the peace process in that country (cited in Miti, 2013).

However, Zuma is credited for the successful implementation of the GPA. He put pressure on Mugabe to honour his commitments to the GPA, but also showed solidarity by calling for the unconditional cancellation of the sanctions against the Zimbabwean president and his political associates in the ruling party (Mathye, 2013).

The evaluation of Pretoria’s performance depends on who is assessing South Africa’s peace mediation in Zimbabwe. While the SADC fell short of declaring the September 2013 elections free and fair, preferring rather to pronounce that it was “orderly and peaceful” (Lalbahadur, 2014), the Botswana’s election observers pronounced the 2013 polls as free and peaceful rather than free and fair, the latter being the criteria for credible elections. The Botswanan team based its conclusion on the following reasons: the voters’ roll was released two days before the elections, there were allegations that many people were denied a chance to vote and the inclusion of names of people not eligible to vote (Sokwanele, 2013). Dzinesa and Zambara conclude that Pretoria’s perceived failure to lead Zimbabwe to credible elections damaged South Africa’s credibility as an effective leader (Dzinesa & Zambara, 2011).

But it is important to point out what Pretoria’s mandate was in the mediation in Zimbabwe. South Africa’s mediation met the objectives of the SADC which had mandated Pretoria to mediate in that country. The main goal of the mediation was to
find a solution through a negotiated deal which would be owned by the Zimbabwean people. Zuma succeeded in ensuring that provisions were made for Zimbabweans to come up with their own solutions. That resulted in a constitution which was accepted by Zimbabweans through a referendum. And following that, elections were held on July 31, 2013 (Mathye, 2013). In fact, the Church of Sweden argues that Pretoria’s mediation in Zimbabwe averted an imminent implosion (Church of Sweden, 2013).

The observer mission, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, declared that the 2013 elections were free and fair. Contrary to media reports that the poll was marred by violence and vote rigging, the team found that “the general atmosphere under which the poll was held was peaceful”. It noted that compared with the situation in the past two polls, the 2013 elections had improved (Comesa, 2013).

General Olusegun Obasanjo, the former president of Nigeria, who led the AU Election Observer team in Zimbabwe, endorsed the election as valid, declaring that there had never been a perfect poll. Failure or success should be based on how many violations have been reported. Although there were incidents which could have been avoided, Obasanjo said his team believed that those incidents would not amount to the outcome not revealing the will of the voters. Bernard Membe of Tanzania, who led the SADC election observer mission, also gave the election a thumbs-up (Alemayehu, 2013).

(d) DRC Peace Mission
Since 1999, Pretoria led efforts to end political violence in the DRC. It hosted the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) at Sun City, in February 2002. The ICD borrowed from, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, better known as Codesa, whose building blocks had helped bring about a political resolution from 1991-1994. However, even before that, Pretoria had attempted to broker a deal between Mobutu Sese Seko and Laurent Kabila in 1997 (Calland, 2002).
Pretoria’s role of peacemaker in the DRC bore fruit. Despite continuing violence in the East of the DRC, according to Khadigala and Shillinger, the Sun City talks in 2002 and the Pretoria agreements of 2002-3 began a growing peace process and opened the door to post-war reconstruction of that country (cited in Van Nieuwkerk, 2013). “South African personnel continue to make up a large contingent of UN peace support and enforcement operations in the DRC. If anything, South Africa now plays a key role as interlocutor between the southern and eastern African sub-regions” (Van Nieuwkerk, 2013).

The negotiations in Sun City and Pretoria resulted in the signing of the Pretoria Peace Agreement (Global and All-Inclusive Peace Accord) on December 17, 2002. This, in turn, paved the way for the DRC’s first democratic elections in 2006. During these first elections, South Africa gave financial and logistical support, which ensured that the DRC hosted credible elections. Again in November 2011, South Africa provided critical assistance to ensure that the presidential and parliamentary elections continued as planned. The SANDF transported 1863 tons of ballot papers and other electoral materials from South Africa to the DRC. Pretoria contributed about R126 million to the election process in the DRC to ensure that that country strengthens its democracy (DRC South African Embassy Kinshasa, undated).

The rebellion in April 2012 of what became known as the 23 March Movement, better known as M23, threatened to reverse gains that had been achieved over the years and threatened another re-emergence of fighting and distress that had plagued the DRC for decades. On February 24, 2013, South Africa joined 10 other African countries, and the UN, AU, ICGLR (International Conference on the Great Lakes Region) and SADC, in signing the Peace, Security and Co-operation Framework for the DRC and the region. The framework spelled out national commitments for the DRC, for the countries of the region and for the international community. South Africa is a member of the regional oversight mechanism that is tasked with ensuring that the countries of the region adhere to their commitments (DRC South African Embassy Kinshasa, undated).
South African troops have been on the ground in that country, under a number of mandates, for 15 years (Allison, 2014). “It is worth noting that when we deployed in the DRC, that country had virtually no infrastructure to talk about. Specialist elements such as fire-fighters, engineers, and air cargo handlers, the military police were sent in as well as medical teams who were able to stabilise the situation. That country’s airport in Kinshasa is now one of the busiest in Africa, all because of selfless efforts by our men and women in uniform” (Mapisa-Nqakula cited in Allison).

South Africa’s tenacity in mediating peace in the DRC paid off, notes Van Nieuwkerk, and Sidiropoulos adds that, “this is without question South Africa’s most important achievement” (Van Nieuwkerk, 2013) and (Sidiropoulos, 2007).

4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has shown how South Africa’s hostilities destroyed relations with the rest of the continent, particularly its neighbours. This section also discussed how multilateralism flourished when Mbeki took office and showed how South Africa has contributed in organisations such as the AU, SADC and even the UN. Pretoria has not only provided home for bodies such as the Nepad Agency and the Pan African Parliament, but it is also one of the major financial contributors to a number of regional organisations.

This chapter also showed how South Africa has invested vast sums of money and human resources in peace diplomacy. The latter part of this chapter examined South Africa’s peace missions in the DRC, Zimbabwe, Burundi and Cote d’Ivoire.
Chapter 5

Analysis of the Results

5.1 Introduction

A president’s performance as a foreign relations actor is measured by the successes he or she achieves during his or her term in office. US President Ronald Reagan is, perhaps, regarded as the one president who accomplished many foreign policy successes in the United States of America (Crabb & Mulcahy, 1986). Some foreign policy observers have sought to make similar comparisons on the performance of South African presidents as foreign relations actors. This chapter will outline the influence of Mandela, Mbeki, and Zuma on Pretoria’s peace diplomacy. Added to that, will be a brief analysis of changes on South African foreign policy after 1994, Pretoria’s peace diplomacy in the past 20 years, challenges facing Pretoria’s peace diplomacy, and a theoretical analysis of South Africa’s peace diplomacy.

5.2 South Africa’s Foreign Policy under Mandela

When the democratic government took office, Mandela became a foreign relations tool for Pretoria (Vale & Taylor, 1999). The world became fascinated by a man who, after a 27-year imprisonment, came out to preach peace and forgiveness (Southall, 2006). Hughes notes that both Mbeki and Mandela became foreign policy presidents for different reasons. “By force of personality, history, reputation and the symbolism of his struggle, peacemaking, and national-building achievements, Nelson Mandela was feted by the international community and de facto became South Africa’s foreign policy image.” (Hughes, 2004).

South Africa became personified in Mandela and everything happened when or if he became involved. Among many such examples, was when South Africa used Mandela in the Cape Town Olympic bid, which the country, unfortunately, did not win (Vale and Taylor, 1999). However, Mandela became part of the team which went to Switzerland for the announcement of South Africa’s win of 2010 World Cup (Jamie, 2009).
Mandela entered the international stage as an unrivalled icon and South Africa's image was equated with the president's profile. But Vale and Taylor believed there was limit even for a statesman with a standing such as that of Mandela (Vale and Taylor, 1999). As South Africa has been thriving over the years, the post-apartheid government’s history shows that Pretoria cannot rely forever on what became known as the Madiba magic (Alden & le Pere, 2004). Zondi states that the image Pretoria built through the iconic platform of Mandela and a lauded political transition helped create a positive public perception of South Africa abroad. However, Pretoria is no novice in international affairs, anymore. Its standing puts it in the company of older southern powers such as Brazil and India, (cited in Christie, 2011). South Africa is no longer regarded as a symbol of global righteousness, a status it enjoyed in Mandela years (Olivier, 2006). Cilliers also cautions Pretoria about relying on the prestige that came with the country's peaceful transition in 1994 which was led by Mandela: “Reputation, even that of someone like President Mandela, is a declining asset that is dependent upon renewal for its continued relevance” (Cilliers, 1999).

So conspicuous was Mandela in the international relations that he dominated every major foreign policy decision. “During the Mandela years, South Africa resembled an overburdened state trying to come to terms with the fragile world order. By virtue of its 'miraculous' transition, the international community expected South Africa to ‘punch above its weight’, a view that South African officials tended to encourage” (Alden & Le Pere, 2004).

After his inauguration, Mandela had said South Africa would engage the world with a principled and highly moral foreign policy (Spector, 2013). But before he took office, Mandela outlined the country's foreign policy objective in 1993. They include that:

* Issues of human rights are central to international relations and an understanding that they extend beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental;
* That just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come through the promotion of democracy worldwide;
* Considerations of justice and respect for international law should guide the relations between nations;
* Peace is the goal for which all nations should strive, and where this breaks down, internationally agreed and non-violent mechanisms, including effective arms control regimes, must be employed;
* The concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in our foreign policy choices;
* Economic development depends on growing regional and international economic cooperation in an interdependent world (ANC, 1993).

It is these principles which led to the belief that Mandela’s foreign policy was idealistic (Youla, 2009). Pointing out a contradiction in Mandela’s policy, Youla quotes an author who questioned South Africa’s first democratically elected president’s policy of idealism, saying: “President Nelson Mandela held publicly that countries with a record of human rights violations had been accepted by the UN, Commonwealth and Non-Aligned Movement. ‘Why would we let ourselves depart from what international organisations are doing?’ Mandela asked.” This realistic view of the world where trade and investment took precedence came as a surprise from a man whose foreign policy had always been driven by idealistic principles (cited in Youla, 2009).

Responding to critics of Mandela’s foreign policy, Nzimande stated that the ANC had an open international relations approach which promoted human rights, democracy and peace (cited Youla, 2009). (As mentioned in Chapter 1, Pretoria’s foreign policy is based on the governing party’s foreign relations objectives). Youla concluded that analysts who viewed Mandela’s foreign policy as following the idealistic approach were mistaken. Their assumption was simplistic for what was a much complex and contradictory foreign policy (Youla, 2009).

Every post-apartheid president has added his personal touch to Pretoria’s foreign policy. While Mandela was scrupulous about sticking to the democratic government’s
goals, which he had helped formulate (McNeil, 1997), government officials also became used to his spontaneity when he conducted foreign relations. Evans, then Department of Foreign Affairs director-general, adapted to Mandela’s style of engagement in the international stage as he said then: “He (Mandela) is a major actor in foreign policy. I’m never surprised by anything Mr Mandela does” (cited in McNeil, 1997).

The South African president’s behaviour as a foreign relations actor also depended on who he engaged with. When he tried to persuade Zambia’s president Frederick Chiluba to delay polls and allow former president Kenneth Kaunda to contest elections, the Zambian president quietly ignored him. Mandela left the matter (McNeil, 1997).

The presidency of the democratic government’s first head of state was never going to be easy, given the amount of work that was needed to undo the damage caused by apartheid. Ryall captured Mandela’s challenge as foreign relations actor aptly when he said that the eccentric nature of his interventions into foreign policy and the pre-occupations of domestic reconstruction meant that Pretoria could not offer a viable vision of its role within southern Africa (Ryall, 1997).

Mandela’s peace diplomacy started in 1994 when he attempted to end a civil war in Angola (Landsberg, 2006). Among many peace diplomacy initiatives that Mandela will be remembered for is his call for punishment of Abacha’s government, (Barber, 2005), (Hamill and Lee, 2001) and (Vickers, 2002). The Nigerian government had executed Ogoni activists after a controversial trial (Flood, 2013).

The democratic government’s first president called for punishment for Abacha’s regime. Although the Commonwealth had suspended Abacha’s regime, Mandela sought more retribution for the Nigerian government. He called for the West to shun Nigeria’s oil and appealed to African governments to put pressure on Nigeria. Mandela’s call yielded no consequences; instead African nations accused Pretoria of crossing the line (Flood, 2013).
Analysts’ views differ on what the above illustrated about Mandela as an international relations actor in the continent. Olivier opines that the campaign against Nigeria showed that Mandela never shied away from playing a decisive role in denouncing or acting against injustices or human rights abuses in other countries. He did this without fear to be condemned for interfering in the affairs of other states. This was associated with the fact that Mandela had spent almost three decades in prison after fighting against the abuse of human rights which had brought humiliation to the black population (Olivier, 2006). But Vale and Taylor point out that the Nigeria crisis showed that although the South African icon commanded international respect, not everyone bowed to Pretoria’s desires (Vale and Taylor, 1999).

Another crisis in which Mandela intervened was the contentious issue of the Lockerbie deadlock between Libya and the United States of America. Muammar Gaddafi’s government had been at loggerheads with the United States of America and United Kingdom over claims that Gaddafi was hiding the alleged bombers of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 where many American and UK passengers perished. Mandela managed to convince Gaddafi to send the suspects to stand trial in Scotland where the crime took place (Hamill and Lee, 2001).

According to Burton’s Human Needs Theory (which is one of the principal theories guiding this study), the conflict resolution process must recognise and legitimise the needs of all parties in the conflict. The needs of one party should not be taken care of at the expense of the needs of the other party. This will ensure that a win-win situation is achieved (cited in Cunning, 2008). The Lockerbie breakthrough confirmed Burton’s theory.

The breakthrough is also one of the evidences that showed that South Africa was pursuing a mature policy. This intervention demonstrated that Pretoria had diplomatic resources which could help yield positive results in one of long-running stalemates between Tripoli and the Western countries (Hamill and Lee, 2001). Such an
achievement improved South Africa’s status as a mediator and Mandela saw what South Africa had done in brokering the deal as very important for his country (Hamill and Lee, 2001) and (Kim, 2013).

Elsewhere Mandela recorded many successes. His credentials as peacemaker are unparalleled. Sudan, Congo, Eritrea/Ethiopia, Sri Lanka are some of the countries in which Mandela’s government intervened to bring peace (Vale and Taylor, 1999), and (Adebajo, 2012).

Hamill and Lee add that Mandela overshadowed the then-Department of Foreign Affairs because his unpredictable foreign policy engagements overlooked national interest (Hamill and Lee, 2001). Mandela also took advantage of minister Alfred Nzo’s poor performance in his portfolio. And because Nzo’s deputy, Aziz Pahad, was a junior minister, Mandela used the opportunity to inject his personalised “freelance diplomacy” (Vale and Taylor, 1999). Another example of Mandela’s haphazard behaviour in executing foreign policy interventions was his unilateral decision to cancel Namibia’s debts to South Africa (Hughes, 2004).

Several times Mandela also showed the West that he was no pushover in matters of foreign relations. The West had criticised Mandela for his close ties with Gaddafi whose government was accused of human rights abuses. “The founder of modern South Africa had been under intense Western pressure to shun the troublesome Libyan ruler who Ronald Reagan called a ‘mad dog’. But Mr Mandela would not acquiesce. ‘Those who feel irritated by our friendship with President Gaddafi can go jump in the pool,’ Mandela said.” Shunning Tripoli would have meant that South Africa was unfaithful to an ally who was loyal when the ANC, together with other political organisations, fought the minority regime. Libya had assisted the ANC financially and many other ways (Kim, 2013).

As he was about to leave office, Mandela declared: “It was pure expediency (on the part of the West) to call on democratic South Africa to turn its back on Libya and Gaddafi,
who had assisted us in obtaining democracy. No one can deny that the friendship and trust between South Africa and Libya played a significant part in arriving at this solution" (Kim, 2013).

Olivier described Mandela’s foreign policy theme as “South Africa first”. The author argued that this theme was expected because South Africa was emerging from the long brutal war against minority white domination. Under Mandela it was a case of foreign policy begins at home (Olivier, 2006).

### 5.3 South African Foreign Policy under Mbeki

While both Mandela and Mbeki have been described as foreign policy presidents (Hughes, 2009), Adebajo and Mills also add that Mbeki earned the title because of his passion for international relations which he nurtured while still in exile (Mills, 2008) and (Adebajo, 2012). Mbeki had been the head of the ANC’s Department of International Affairs until 1994 (Pfister, 2000).

Observers agree that Mbeki’s influence on Pretoria’s international relations was second to none. Hughes notes that while Mandela’s foreign policy appeared to be opportunistic, Mbeki became the root and branch of foreign policy (Hughes, 2004) while Pillay asserts that Mbeki is regarded as the father of South Africa’s foreign policy (Pillay, 2011). He is a foreign relations man and there is no doubt that Pretoria’s foreign policy under Mbeki will be remembered for a long time (Magadla, 2011).

Hughes points out that what sets Mbeki’s presidency apart from Mandela’s is the institutionalised vision for the foreign policy (Hughes, 2004). “Mbeki would be remembered for his realistic foreign policy orientation, introducing the ideas of socio-economic transformation at home and in international relations and elevating the salience of development and economic factors in foreign policy” (Landsberg, 2011).
On the other hand, Pillay adds that it was Mbeki’s passion for international prestige that drove him to take a realistic approach towards his foreign policy (Pillay, 2011).

Most people, his admirers and detractors alike, in South Africa, agree that Mbeki excelled in the area of diplomacy during his years in the public service. Others are bold enough to place him in the all-time international diplomatic elite of Lord Castlereigh, Prince Metternich, Prince Talleyrand, Otto von Bismarck, General Marshal, Andrei Gromyko, Dag Haamerskjoldt, Henry Kissinger, Le Duc Tho, Chou En-Lai, Peres de Cuellar and Boutros Ghali (Mogotsi, 2012).

But Adebajo compares Mbeki to one of Africa’s giants, Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s legendary founding leader. The author states that both believed in Africa’s ancient prestige and sought to build modern states that re-established the continent’s past. Both were renaissance men: imaginative intellectuals committed to a pan-African vision. Both were active in the founding of the OAU (Nkrumah) and the AU (Mbeki). While Nkrumah promoted the “African Personality”, Mbeki spearheaded the “African Renaissance”. “Both were accused of monarchical tendencies at home, and in the end were toppled in apparent acts of regicide: Nkrumah in a coup by the military while Mbeki was ‘recalled’ by the ANC” (Adebajo, 2012).

Between the middle of the 1980s until the unbanning of the ANC in 1990, Mbeki, with ANC president Oliver Tambo, became without question the face of the ANC’s international diplomatic work in exile. ANC literature confirms that, indeed, Mbeki’s contribution to the ANC’s diplomacy for freedom against the apartheid regime before 1990 has made him one of Africa’s diplomatic and intellectual colossi of his generation (Mogotsi, 2012). Sidiropoulos applauds Mbeki’s government for its commitment to bringing peace in many African countries. Although many of the peace missions have been costly exercises, Sidiropoulos argues that without South Africa’s efforts, conflict might still be continuing in Burundi and the DRC (Sidiropoulos, 2008).
Before Mbeki became president in 1999, he had been already influential in foreign relations. Mbeki strengthened his foreign relations position by surrounding himself with officials whom he trusted to promote his policy agenda. And one of them was Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma who became the Minister of Foreign Affairs during his presidency. Mbeki’s election as president put him and his trusted lieutenants in control of policy making (Van Nieuwkerk, 1993).

Mandela’s successor had reflected on the weakness in Pretoria’s foreign policy. “Thabo Mbeki, recognised that the contradictions in policy and implementation were too debilitating to be allowed to dominate South Africa’s conduct of international relations.” Under Mbeki the foreign policy was revamped so that it became consistent (Alden and Le Pere, 2004).

He launched a new integrated planning framework to drive the strategic national priorities which included developing and promoting an agenda for the South, an equitable global system and national interest (Alden and Le Pere cited in Youla, 2009) and (Van Wyk, 2012).

The impetus of his diplomacy was to make foreign policy more strategic (Accord, 2014) and (Landsberg, 2012b). "Most importantly, foreign policy in Mbeki’s government reaffirmed South Africa’s new status in international politics and articulated the identity of the country. President Mbeki gave South African foreign policy a different face by introducing a stronger ideological element" (Olivier, 2006).

Mbeki sought to create a distinctive identity, mission and position for Pretoria as a foreign relations actor. His foreign policy was bold, signalling and exploiting the influence of Pretoria’s new prestige in world politics, its economic and political authority in the African continent, its newly attained legitimacy and stature in the developing world, its prestigious status as a partner with the powers of the world and its esteemed status and position in the UN and other multilateral establishments (Olivier, 2006).
His goal was to make South Africa a respected state in the continent. He wanted Pretoria to become a reliable international player pursuing a predictable foreign policy in a bid to formulate a progressive agenda (Landsberg, 2012b).

Olivier states that Mbeki lacked the iconic reputation of his predecessor, Mandela. But the democratic government’s second president compensated by using his experience as a diplomat, negotiator and skilled technocrat. He steered a foreign policy which was obvious and a rational choice for a nation in South Africa’s position which aimed to lead Africa’s renewal (Olivier, 2006).

As far as international relations was concerned, Nathan sees Mbeki as both an ideologue and a realist, with his approach based on three paradigms: democratic, Africanist and anti-imperialist. Mbeki’s Africanist perspective – spanning politics, social relations, culture and history – borrowed from Black Consciousness Movement leader Steve Biko’s thinking. Mbeki like Mandela also slammed military governments and leaders who enriched themselves by stealing from their states, something, Nathan notes, was almost unheard of in the continent (Nathan, 2005).

Olivier outlines three notable policy shifts that took place under Mbeki’s presidency: the Third World, with strong leanings to Africa, became central in South Africa’s foreign policy. While Mbeki’s predecessor initiated this policy approach, Mbeki gave it a significant boost and engaged with developed nations through the G8 on issues of upliftment in Africa (Olivier, 2006).

South Africa chose to forge closer ties with Africa and other nations of the developing world. Mbeki changed the priorities of Pretoria’s foreign policy; relations with Africa were placed at the top of the ANC government’s policy agenda. This did not mean that relations with the West were relegated to the bottom of the foreign policy ladder but they were no longer placed at the top of the agenda as was the case pre-1994 elections (Olivier, 2006).
For instance, Cuba and Zimbabwe became closer partners with South Africa than the United States of America or Belgium. This ignored the reality that South Africa depended more on Western nations for trade ties, job creation, investments and new technology. Although Pretoria’s foreign policy agenda in a way pushed the developed world to a second fiddle status, the West sought to stay engaged with Africa, particularly in areas of global security and the fight against international terrorism. The West saw Mbeki as a significant leader and partner in the fight against the ills such as poverty and underdevelopment in Africa. The South African president became the point man on issues of social ills that affected the continent (Olivier, 2006).

There was also a shift in the moral dimension of South Africa’s foreign policy, one of the pillars of the Pretoria’s foreign policy objectives which Mandela’s foreign policy was centred on. While Mbeki promoted the principle verbally, his actions spoke a different language. To him, ultimate goals, objectives and strategy were more important than morality (Olivier, 2006). He demonstrated this shift by his unwillingness to criticise dictatorship and human rights abuses committed by his African counterparts because such a move would damage African brotherliness, consensus and co-operation (Nathan, 2005).

As mentioned in Chapter 4, Mbeki’s strategic focus on Africa bore a number of initiatives (Nepad, APRM, among others) which he hoped would bring about the continent’s revival. Barber points out that Mbeki was optimistic about his vision for Africa, quoting him as saying, it “will prosper and confound its critics” (Barber, 2005).

Mbeki’s search for Africa’s renewal saw him launch the African Renaissance, which he first spoke about in 1998 (Alden & Le Pere, 2004). While many at home were impressed by the vision, others pointed out that it lacked heft and was deeply rooted in sentiment (Vale & Maseko, 1998). Mbeki’s famous speech “I am an African” linked South Africa’s destiny and development to the continent. Mbeki described the African Renaissance as the rebirth which would consist of the protection of human rights, economic
development and promotion of democracy in Africa (Mandela, 1993) and (Kooiman, 2010). This call for unified action seemed to close the gap between Pretoria and the rest of the continent (Bischoff, 2003).

Through the African Renaissance, Mbeki sought to encourage Africans to assert themselves after years of slavery and colonialism which had diluted their cultures and subjected their institutions to foreign rule (Adebajo, 2012). Mbeki’s peace diplomacy was also rooted in the “African solutions to Africa’s problems” mantra, which falls within the context of the African Renaissance (Mhandara & Pooe, 2013).

However, the continent was not too enthusiastic about the African Renaissance. Reasons for this were that it was the first historical overarching pan-African idiom since Nkrumah’s; many politicians and other elites saw Mbeki as a novice who had not earned his stripes as an African leader; and many did not see the African Renaissance succeeding in the long run (Alden & Le Pere, 2006).

Some saw it as South Africa’s subtle attempt to assume a hegemonic role in the continent. They thought it was a mild way of showing the continent that South Africa will drive Africa’s renewal.

Others thought it as a vision with idealistic, intellectual undertones far removed from Africa’s realities of ills such as poverty, conflict and underdevelopment (Alden & Le Pere, 2006).

Mandela’s successor had said just before he took office: “The African Renaissance demands that we purge ourselves of the parasites and maintain a permanent vigilance against the danger of the entrenchment in African society of this rapacious stratum with its social morality according to which everything in society must be organised materially to benefit the few.” (Mbeki, 1998).
Mbeki’s foreign policy received a lot of criticism over the years. For instance, Mangcu accused Mandela’s successor of running foreign policy as if it was his personal project. Mangcu opined that it became difficult to see the country’s strategic priorities and the president’s personal idiosyncrasies because of the way Mbeki engaged in foreign relations. The analyst quoted Olivier as saying Mbeki’s activities on the global stage became part of an effort to become Africa’s uber-diplomat and world statesman (Mangcu, 2009).

Mills and Mangcu also accused Mbeki of paranoia over criticism. Mills cautioned that as long as the president surrounded himself with people who were always ready to toe his line, Pretoria would not improve the lives of ordinary South Africans through foreign policy (Mangcu, 2009) and (Mills, 2008). Hlongwane concurred as he said: “He (Mbeki) surrounded himself with “yes men”. Under him, criticism no longer became the lifeblood of the movement. Instead, selfish political patronage, nepotism and favouritism flourished” (Hlongwane, 2010).

Mbeki is one post-apartheid president who came to office with a well-thought-out foreign policy vision. He might have become too dedicated to some of his foreign policy programmes he implemented, but there is no doubt that he was passionate about South Africa’s international relations. Mbeki might have come across as a statesman who wanted to tackle many foreign policy initiatives (for Pretoria, Africa and the world) at the same time, but there is no evidence that he did all this for his personal glory. His mission was to put South Africa on the international relations map.

As Mbeki’s international clout continued to grow, so was discontent over his presidency. Many South Africans, especially within the Tripartite Alliance, saw the president as aloof and someone who took little care for aspirations of the ordinary South Africans (Robins, 2012). Magadla suggests that the urgency to save the continent and South Africa at the same time brought about Mbeki’s recall in 2008 (Magadla, 2011).
While Mbeki’s foreign policy was more coherent than Mandela’s, there was disconnection in Mbeki’s global objectives – “reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions, deepening regional integration, the revival of Africa, a better deal for the global South in world affairs – and the normative basis from whence he conducts his crusade” (Alden & le Pere, 2004).

In effect foreign policy making became centralised in the office of the president where a Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Service was established. One of its five chief directorates was responsible for International Relations, Peace and Security (Hudson, 2010). This centralisation made foreign policy even more inaccessible to the ordinary South Africans and strengthened the view that Mbeki’s government was aloof and unresponsive (Suttner cited in Hudson).

5.4 South African Foreign Policy under Zuma

When Zuma took office, many foreign relations observers expected a shift from Mbeki’s foreign policy. The ruling party had promised to transform South Africa’s international relations agenda (Landsberg, 2012a). But from the start, there was evidence that Zuma continued to place significant emphasis on South Africa’s role in Africa, and was as enthusiastic as Mbeki in pursuing this objective (Brueton, 2010).

While Zuma’s reputation differs from Mbeki’s and Mandela’s, he has been more of a foreign policy president than many commentators thought (Pretoria News, 2014). This is partly because when Zuma became president, he brought in a wealth of experience in peace diplomacy since he was already an accomplished negotiator (Shillinger, 2009).

Indeed, Zuma got international experience and exposure in exile. But he seems to also have focused on the domestic policy as he negotiates his space in the international stage (Hughes, 2010). Zuma’s emphasis on the domestic policy will be discussed later.
Although Fabricius agrees that Zuma’s foreign policy is a continuity of Mbeki’s, he notes that Zuma government has new priorities. Fabricius states that this was seen in the department’s name change from Foreign Affairs to International Relations & Cooperation, the marrying of the foreign policy with the domestic policy and a strengthening of relations with the nations in the region and the rest of the continent rather than making partnerships with the whole world, something Mbeki became famous for (cited in Gruzd, 2009).

Even the foreign policy pillars of the Zuma government are the same as those of his predecessor. They include: aligning the domestic policy and foreign policy or national interest. This would ensure that while South Africa engages with the outside world, its engagements do not conflict with the domestic policy and Pretoria gets a maximum benefit from its engagements with other nations and international organisations (Landsberg, 2012a).

While South Africa has been working within the SADC since 1994, evidence shows that there is still a lot of work that still needs to be done, especially in its security organ. Promoting Southern African Development Community integration is one of Zuma administration’s pillars (Landsberg, 2012a).

The advancement of the African continent has been very important in South Africa’s foreign policy, which it has promoted through programmes such as Nepad (Landsberg, 2012a).

While Habib states that Zuma’s government has attempted to compensate for the neglect of rights promotion that happened during Mbeki’s government (Habib, 2012), the Democratic Alliance lambasts Zuma’s government for not doing enough to promote human rights and for not having clearly defined national interest. These issues have resulted in embarrassing gaffes in the international stage and the reversal of achievements South Africa has made since 1994 (Democratic Alliance, 2014).
Zuma's government has only dropped the term quiet diplomacy for the policy on Zimbabwe. The peace diplomacy adopted by Zuma is continuation of what Mbeki started in that country (Landsberg, 2012a). And Zuma has been using non-confrontational and accommodative solutions to intervene in conflicts in the continent, since he took office just as Mbeki did during his mediation in South Africa’s northern neighbour (Government Information System, 2009).

Some analysts have also described Zuma as a hands-off president, allowing his lieutenants to execute his foreign policy agenda (Mangcu, 2009). Zuma’s approach is different from Mbeki’s, who devoted a lot of his time to mediate peace in Zimbabwe (Miti, 2013). Zuma appointed Lindiwe Zulu, Mac Maharaj and Charles Nqakula to mediate in Zimbabwe. Nqakula had already been leading the Zimbabwe peace mission from the time Mbeki was recalled (Gruzd, 2009).

As a result of his hands-off approach, the South African president received a tongue lashing from Mugabe for not personally facilitating mediation in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean president accused Zuma of letting his advisers take charge of the peace diplomacy in his country (Graeme & Ndaba, 2013). This came after Zulu suggested that Zimbabwe should postpone the 2013 elections. An angry Mugabe told Zuma to rein in his adviser (Sibanda & Matenga, 2013).

However, many commentators agree that Zuma has allowed participation of those outside the government in international relations, something that never happened during Mbeki’s presidency. Wheeler commends the International Relations Department for allowing space for business, academia, labour and ordinary citizens. He states that this was unheard of during Mbeki’s government (Wheeler, 2011). “There is a noticeable shift in style. Zuma’s affable, easy-going nature has served him well on the global stage thus far. While not being the master of the sound bite, (neither was Mbeki), he has appeared at ease and has not committed any major faux pas” (Gruzd, 2009).
But other observers describe Zuma’s foreign relations as feeble. Shaw suggests that one of the reasons for weak priorities in Zuma’s foreign policy is the fact that the president has other priorities such as addressing domestic challenges, which include unemployment, poverty and others (Shaw, 1994). Zuma’s presidency has to address internal issues such as an increasingly violent public sector, clashes in the Tripartite Alliance and the impact of the financial crisis which began in 2008 (Pringle, 2010). Giving the nod to Shaw’s assertion, Makekeng quotes Zuma as saying Pretoria does not overlook the importance of shared values and common interests in implementing its foreign policy, also arguing that the securing of its national interests is important for the country’s development (Makekeng, 2010).

National interest areas include speeding up economic growth and creation of decent work; the building of economic and social infrastructure; rural development strategy that will promote land reform and food security; focusing on human resources and strengthening skills; improving health in the country; eradicating crime and corruption, building cohesive and caring communities; fostering regionalism, continental and international co-operation, sustainable resource management and use; and the improvement of service delivery (Makekeng, 2010).

5.5 Changes in South African Foreign Policy after 1994
One of the significant changes in South Africa’s relations after 1994 was that nations around the world welcomed South Africa and began forming relations with the new democracy (Mkalipi, 2002) and (Black & Swutuk, 1997). Barber notes that the post-apartheid democracy also enjoyed an “enthusiastic welcome” from international organisations most of which had contributed to the struggle against apartheid (Barber, 2005).

There was eagerness to assist a nation that had been ravaged by years of apartheid (Mkalipi, 2002). So much was the world optimistic about South Africa that, although
Pretoria was too wealthy to qualify for development aid, children’s rights organisation, Unicef, made an exception: it allocated $20 million to Pretoria (Barber, 2005). Youla and Spector agree that post-1994 South Africa’s advantage was the fact that it enjoyed the recognition of the international community (Youla, 2009) and (Spector, 2013).

Olivier notes that over the years, South Africa’s foreign policy has followed a realistic approach which is tinged with ideological tendencies that sometimes stand in the way of real interest, especially those of the economic sphere (Olivier, 2006). But Valji and Tladi add that Pretoria’s foreign policy at best can be seen as treading a thin line between the expectation that the country should be a leader in promoting human rights and the unavoidable realpolitik of working in a changing geo-landscape where power alliances are taking new shape (Tladi & Valji, 2013).

But the post-1994 South African foreign policy has also assumed a schizophrenic character. On the one hand some analysts heap praise on the democratic government for the strides it has made in international relations while others criticise Pretoria for its inability to formulate a coherent foreign policy agenda (Hamill & Lee, 2001). Pretoria’s foreign policy’s schizophrenic character is seen in the way it is playing a leadership role in the continent and wooing others to join in fulfilling its vision. On the other hand it is forced by the realistic factors to become an equal partner in the region (Habib & Selinyane, 2006). The view of Vale and Taylor of South Africa’s foreign policy is that it portrays a dual picture – that of being “something special” and “just another country”. The authors opine that that is why many analysts are fascinated by Pretoria’s foreign policy (Vale & Taylor, 1999).

Even before the ANC government took office, the country’s foreign policy was a contested territory within the Tripartite Alliance (Evans, 1999). Realists believed South Africa’s foreign policy should prioritise relations with northern America and Europe while idealists and socialists demanded that the policy must be ethical, Afrocentric and solidarist. There were also those who expected the ANC as a liberation organisation to
adhere to the values and objectives in line with its own history of the struggle (Bischoff, 2003). Perhaps, that is why Hamill and Lee and Evans state that Pretoria's foreign policy is characterised by pull-and-push effect (Hamill & Lee, 2001) and (Evans, 1999).

One of the commitments the democratic government made when it took office was to become a good international citizen (Hamill & Lee, 2001), (Marthoz, 2012) and (Landsberg, 2005). But the reality is that the ANC’s idealistic and the realistic leanings of the globalised world brought about tensions in the implementation of the foreign policy, (Alden & Le Pere, 2004) and (Ryall, 1997). To appreciate Pretoria’s foreign policy, one needs to realise that it was a product of the ANC consensus-based politics and, therefore, had many compromises and contradictions, especially on how to balance values with interests (cited in Cawthra, 2011).

5.6 Pretoria’s Peace Diplomacy in the Past 20 Years

The literature consulted for this study leaves no doubt that South Africa has worked hard to strengthen its peace diplomacy over the years. As early as in the Mandela presidency, South Africa was chastised for its peace diplomacy in countries such as Nigeria and Lesotho. But Pretoria has also won accolades from the international community for the role it has played in bringing peace in the continent which borrowed from the country’s own historical negotiations which ended apartheid in 1994 (Malan, 1999) and (Pillai, 2009).

Criticising South Africa for blunders it made during the early years of the democratic government is unfair. The ANC government was still learning the ropes of governing the country at this time. Mandela acknowledged that reality when he said: “We were taken from the bush, or from the underground or from prison, to come and take charge. We were suddenly (thrust) into this immense responsibility or running a highly developed country” (sic) (cited in Barber, 2005). Pretoria’s engagements in different peace missions in the continent have required unique responses and the democratic
government has responded in ways it thought were best for each mission. So it is fair to say that Pretoria’s foreign policy practice is a work in progress.

As much as politicians such as Mbeki had been involved in international relations while in exile, they were not in government at the time. The brand of foreign relations they engaged in was largely that of campaigning for support to fight apartheid at home.

When Mbeki became president, he was heavily criticised for his peace diplomacy in Zimbabwe. Literature shows clearly why the democratic government’s second president chose quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe. He was pre-occupied with keeping the African unity when he started peace diplomacy in Zimbabwe and wanted to avoid another Nigeria fiasco, among other reasons. In other words he wanted to show Africa that South Africa was not going to interfere in another country’s internal affairs.

Not every policy decision presidents take will be popular with all observers. But that does not mean that the policy is weak or wrong. Pretoria supported SADC’s idea of letting Zimbabwe, as a sovereign state, devise its own peace plan that its leaders and people would own. Mbeki showed his critics that he would not be swayed by public opinion on how to conduct peace mediation in that country, as long as he was convinced that his policy would yield results.

The Department of Foreign Affairs sees South Africa’s advancement of peace and security as its priority for its African Agenda goal in addition to promoting democracy and human rights and pursuing development and poverty eradication (cited in Kagwanja, 2006). Pretoria’s distinctive approach for peace mediation is to uphold democracy by mediating between warring parties. Frequently the peace model includes an interim government that involves the warring parties, confidence-building exercises and the overhaul of the inclusive army, provisions to address justice issues, provisions and timeframes to draw a constitution and holding presidential polls (Curtis, 2007a).
But Curtis argues that in promoting democracy in the continent, Pretoria tends to perceive conflict resolution as a narrow frame of reference of South Africa’s “negotiated revolution”. For instance, it fails to consider key political economic factors of the Great Lakes region (Curtis, 2007). Claphman also adds that the down side of this model is that it assumes that the warring parties in the peace process share similar value frameworks, within which differences are negotiable (cited in Curtis, 2007).

Carothers rejects the idea that nations will democratise with the help of external mediations without dealing with underlying political history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, socio-cultural traditions or other “structural” features (Carothers, 2000).

An important tool for South Africa’s peace diplomacy is peacekeeping. In fulfilling its commitment to building peace on the African continent, Pretoria has deployed peacekeeping troops into many of Africa’s most protracted conflicts (Dunderdale, 2013). Dunderdale argues that South Africa remains one of the more attractive options for leading peacekeeping operations. Its thriving experience accumulated from previous missions has helped Pretoria to become a leader in peacekeeping (Dunderdale, 2013).

The above shows that South Africa has imported its brand of peace model to other parts of the continent. This could be partly because Pretoria is still trying hard convince its counterparts that it has no ambitions of bullying Africa. By offering warring nations its peace model, which paved the way for its democracy, Pretoria is showing other nations that if it worked for South Africa, it can work for other African countries. However, this has failed in countries such as Cote d’Ivoire and that shows that this diplomacy tool is not always as effective as Pretoria would like to believe.

Brooks commends the SANDF for launching Operation Blue Crane, which drew 4700 members from the SADC in 2000, after recognising the need for investing in training peacekeepers (Brooks, 1999). The author suggests that it was important for Pretoria to start peacekeeping small in the early years of the post-apartheid South Africa because
of the internal transformation challenges the South African army was facing (Brooks, 1999). This allowed Pretoria to put its house in order before it expanded its peace diplomacy in the continent. It was important for the democratic government to grow gradually as a peacemaker in the African continent.

Paterson and Virk also point out that because of Pretoria’s prominence in African and global diplomacy, institutional capacity limitations have resulted in “diplomatic overstretch”. As a result, South Africa’s engagement with the continent can often seem poorly co-ordinated (Paterson & Virk, 2014). Cilliers concurs as he states that lack of funding, transformation which bedevils discipline – and operational capacity – limits Pretoria’s potential to live up to the expectation of leading peacekeeping in Africa (cited in IRIN, 2012).

South Africa will set it itself up for failure if it continues to overstretch itself in the area of peace diplomacy. This is something it should avoid since it is still trying to convince the African continent that it is a trustworthy peacemaker.

5.7 Challenges Facing Pretoria’s Peace Diplomacy

South Africa’s peace diplomacy in the African continent does not look like it is going to slow down in the near future. As a well-resourced nation, South Africa is still going to support many peace mediation missions in Africa.

Promoting peace in the continent is expected to require more resources, therefore, call for larger investment from countries like South Africa. The reason for this is that violent conflicts remain a problem throughout Africa and show no signs of decreasing. For the imaginable future, intrastate conflicts are likely to continue in poor countries with weak governance, history of war, spillover from bad neighbourhoods and growing youth joblessness and marginalisation. The combination of these prospects will, in all likelihood, lead to longer, more lingering conflicts, which will consequently inflate the cost of peacekeeping operations (Lucey, 2013).
South Africa needs to strengthen its peace diplomacy so as to keep up with the work it is expected to do in the future. This will ensure that the peace diplomacy work it has and is continuing to do in the African continent is not reversed.

Other challenges that pose a threat to Pretoria’s contributions include dealing with ill-behaved members of the army who tarnish the image of the Pretoria’s peacekeeping record (Lotze, De Coning, & Neethling, 2013). In Burundi and the DRC, for instance, South African peacekeepers were found guilty of more than 1000 cases of misconduct between 2002 and 2006. More than half of these violations involved absence without leave, disobeying lawful commands and drunkenness (Lotze, De Coning, & Neethling, 2013).

Reports of shameful behavior undermine Pretoria’s record of peace diplomacy and this is something Pretoria cannot allow to continue. Ill-disciplined army members are ruining the sterling peacekeeping work that Pretoria has done in the past 20 years and South Africa cannot afford to have its reputation tarnished by such soldiers.

Another problem is the prevalence of Aids among members of the SANDF. In 2004, the SANDF’s official figure for HIV/AIDS-infected soldiers stood at 23%, but Aids specialists said a more realistic figure would be 40%, or about 28000, infected army members (Meyer, 2004). Having such a huge number of ill soldiers will impact on Pretoria’s ability to deploy peacekeepers.

South Africa’s political readiness to deploy its army into complex operating environments, such as the DRC, should line up with resourcing considerations for the SANDF. Adjusting this inconsistency will ensure that the SANDF has the operational capability to act competently in peacekeeping missions in which they engage (Lotze, De Coning, & Neethling, 2013).
In 2011, the presidency announced that the Department of International Relations & Cooperation was engaged in talks with the AU on funding Pretoria's contribution to the Sudanese peace mission. Pretoria acknowledged that while it was committed to peacekeeping in the continent, it was unable to fund some of the missions because of a budgetary shortfall (South African Government News Agency, 2011).

South Africa should face the reality that it cannot carry the large part of the load of bringing peace in the continent. As much as peace diplomacy is important, Pretoria has other budgetary needs to attend to.

5.8 Theoretical Analysis

A well-researched political inquiry is based on an accurate theoretical framework. This study aimed to investigate Pretoria’s peace diplomacy from 1994 to 2014 guided by international relations theories of realism or idealism, and conflict resolution and peacekeeping theories. Thus this study has discussed various aspects of Pretoria’s peace diplomacy in the past 20 years. This section analyses a few example to show how South Africa has endeavoured to resolve conflicts and how Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma have guided peace diplomacy in the continent. The aim of this part of the study is to show how Pretoria has played its significant role in peace diplomacy in the continent and that Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma did not strictly follow one particular ideology as international relations actors.

The number of Illegal immigrants has grown significantly in South Africa. Among them are tens of thousands of Zimbabweans who have fled their country because of the political crisis that was at its worst in the early 2000. From the realism viewpoint, Mbeki’s government failed to use its powerful position in the region to demand that its neighbour sorts out its political crisis so that the migration would stop (Youla, 2009).

This study has shown that from the time Mbeki engaged in the Zimbabwean peace diplomacy, he preferred a policy of non-interference. Realists believe foreign policy
should defend the interest of state outside its borders. States are not equal; the power of states determines how important each is in the global stage. The investigation of the Zimbabwe’s crisis shows that Pretoria refrained from using this power. National security is also important to realists; that is why they see the state as the protector of the territory (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003).

Therefore, the above shows that Mbeki did not always act as a realist. According to the realist grasp of foreign policy, a state will protect, promote and maximise its perceived core interests in its interactions with other countries, the international community or other foreign relations actors. An examination of Mbeki’s policy of quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe also showed that his approach on Zimbabwe was that of persuasion rather than the practice of power (Youla, 2009).

Olivier also agrees with Youla that Mbeki dabbled between idealism and realism. He states that the reasons Mbeki straddled between these theories could indicate two realities: an indecisive style of leadership and or the characteristically complex nature of the politically balancing act when engaging in African politics (Olivier, 2003).

The same behavior of bestriding between idealism and realism was seen in Mandela. The Nigeria campaign against the Abacha regime confirmed the idealism the democratic South Africa’s first president adopted in the early years of his presidency (Firsing, 2013). It is also in line with the country’s foreign policy objectives of promoting peace and human rights. However, Mandela’s refusal to condemn leaders such as Cuba’s Fidel Castro and Gaddafi went against idealist beliefs he was known for. The two leaders’ regimes were accused of human rights abuses (Vickers, 2002). Again the above proves that although Mandela’s foreign policy embraced idealism, he sometimes acted as a realist.

Many observers agree that Zuma’s foreign policy has continued with what Mbeki started during his presidency. Like Mbeki, Zuma’s mediation in Zimbabwe ignored human rights
violations, although some observers say Zuma has attempted to compensate for the neglect of rights promotion that happened during Mbeki’s government. Like Mbeki, Zuma has condoned the behaviour of dictators. Mbeki played a significant role in shifting South Africa from Mandela’s liberal to a liberationist direction, a foreign policy path that continues under Zuma (Jordaan, 2010).

John Burton’s Human Needs Theory neatly describes South Africa’s peace bid in the Sudan war. The needs theory asserts that people resort to conflict because of their need for consistency, security, recognition, justice and a sense of control and development (Cunningham, 1998). Sudan’s war, which began in 1955, resulted from the Southerners’ complaints about lack of opportunities to accumulate wealth, demand for southern autonomy and the role of religion in the state (Project, 2014). Southerners protested that Khartoum enforced an Arab identity and broke a promise to institute a federalist system of government (Lucey & Hendricks, 2013). Pretoria was instrumental in the ratification of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that resulted in a ceasefire in 2005. Key conditions in the deal related to regional autonomy for southern Sudan, representation in a national power-sharing agreement and a referendum in the south in 2011 (Mashele, 2012).

Lyman asserts that without the hard work of the Africa Union High Level Implementation Panel, under the leadership of Mbeki, South Sudan would not have seceded as smoothly as it did in 2011 and that there would not be ways of negotiating the outstanding issues between Khartoum and the Southerners (Lyman, 2012). The Sudan/South Sudan breakthrough was testimony to Burton’s assertion that conflict can end only when people’s needs are met. The autonomy enabled Southerners to take control of their affairs and gain recognition as a nation. Although the two nations found a breakthrough which led to the birth of South Sudan, fighting over the ownership of oil resources erupted again in 2013.
5.9 Conclusion

This chapter started by analysing South Africa's foreign policy under the guard of Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma. It examined how South Africa's foreign relations has evolved since 1994, also revealing how South Africa has attempted to influence foreign relations internationally.

For instance this section discussed how Mandela used his reputation in the fight against human rights abuses and attempted to broker peace in Africa. Although diplomacy attempts backfired in the Nigeria episode, the democratic government's first president showed the world Pretoria's stand on issues it cared about. This section also revealed how Zuma's foreign policy has continued on Mbeki's approach of engaging with the world, especially Africa, and how, unlike Mbeki, Zuma left most of the mediation in Zimbabwe to his lieutenants.

This chapter also revealed the challenges that have impacted on Pretoria's foreign relations since the advent of democracy. It revealed how Pretoria has meandered peace diplomacy while also dealing with its own challenges within the South African National Defence Force.
6.1 Summary

This study set out to investigate Pretoria’s conflict resolution and peacekeeping in the continent since the birth of democracy in 1994. When the ANC government took office, it specifically aimed to strengthen its relations with the rest of the continent, particularly southern Africa. It was determined to play a positive role as a contributor to peace diplomacy in Africa.

South Africa has used multilateralism as a tool to engage in peacekeeping and conflict resolution because of scepticism, among other reasons, about its engagements in peace diplomacy. Pretoria has worked through regional and international bodies in its attempt to play its role as a peacemaker. As a result the post-apartheid government was instrumental in creating the AU and has played a significant role in the SADC and other bodies. In boosting reforms in these organisations, Pretoria aimed to encourage African governments to work towards bringing African solutions to Africa’s problems.

Mbeki has been lauded for strengthening South Africa’s peace diplomacy in the continent. His peace diplomacy became deeply imbedded in the African Agenda notion that Pretoria will not meddle in the affairs of its neighbours. Mbeki’s government aimed to inject these changes through the birth of the African Renaissance, the grand programme for Africa’s renewal. The renaissance gave birth to Nepad, an economic vehicle through which Africa’s rebirth would be realised and the APRM became an instrument which aimed to ensure good governance among African governments. While these programmes have received mixed reviews, they have also been lauded for their innovative role in the renewal of the African continent.

South Africa has taken part in many peace missions in the continent. While it has been accused of crossing the line in countries such as Nigeria and Lesotho, it has been commended for helping bring peace in countries such as Burundi, the DRC and others.
Many observers still argue that South Africa’s peace diplomacy has not yielded results in Zimbabwe. But this study proved that Pretoria’s peace mission in its neighbour delivered the SADC mandate to find a breakthrough in its northern neighbour’s political crisis. The Pretoria-led peace mission produced a new constitution and also resulted in elections in 2013.

After years of mediation in Burundi, South Africa’s mediation helped end a conflict which had claimed thousands of innocent lives. South Africa’s mediation helped Burundians establish a transitional government and 50/50 reform of the military. This came after the mediation produced the Arusha Accord for Peace and Reconciliation which set Burundi on a journey towards constitutional democracy and protection of human rights.

South Africa’s peace mission in Côte d’Ivoire showed shortcomings. Mbeki and Zuma insisted on backing the resolution of government of national unity after the 2010 election stalemate. However, this went against the election results. Ivorians had spoken through the vote by electing Ouattara. Suggesting any other way of governing Côte d’Ivoire meant undermining the will of the people.

This study also showed that in its rush to find a resolution in a conflict situation, South Africa mainly uses its power-sharing model as the solution for solving political crisis in the continent. There are many reasons for this rush; one of them is that South Africa often invests millions of rands in these peace missions. That means the longer they continue, the more Pretoria has to pay to help bring peace in nations facing conflicts.

Burton’s Human Needs Theory is one of the theories which guided this study. It asserts that people resort to conflict when their needs, such as security, development and identity are not met. Conflicts that South Africa has intervened in Burundi, Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire and Sudan/South Sudan have erupted because some of the above needs were ignored. This study used the example of the Sudan conflict to show how South Africa helped resolve that crisis, an effort which resulted in the birth of South Sudan.
It is, however, vital to note that, one of the needs of South Sudan people – development – has not been met. That is why fighting for oil resources is still continuing in those two countries. South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa and Mbeki are still involved in mediation in the Sudan/South Sudan conflicts, the former as a South African special envoy to South Sudan and the latter as the AU chief mediator (Fabricius, 2014) and (Tekle, 2014).

Analysts have associated Pretoria with a number of international relations ideologies. However, this study proved that South Africa’s principal foreign relations actors did not follow one ideology.

This study also showed how Mandela chastised those who dared to accuse him of continuing friendship with leaders of authoritative regimes. He showed that he was not willing to cut ties with leaders he regarded as friends just because the West had different opinions about those presidents. This did not only suggest that Mandela was not prepared to succumb to the pressure from his critics who attempted to impose their opinions on South Africa’s international relations, it showed that South Africa wanted to exercise its freedom of choosing who it forged relations with. This research also showed that Mbeki also did not always act as a realist, although he was perceived as one. His persuasive approach towards Zimbabwe departed from realism which was associated with his government.

The above proves that classifying the South African presidents as either idealist or realist was not an accurate analysis. Realities of foreign relations forced them to dabble between these theoretical constructs. They might have sometimes shown leanings towards one particular theory, but that did not mean that events that they responded to required them to stick to one particular construct.

Mbeki and Zuma have been accused of replacing Mandela’s liberal values with liberationist principles. Some observers opine that after the Mandela government which
largely put moral consideration at the top of its foreign policy agenda, the world saw self-interest thrive during the Mbeki and Zuma governments. After Mandela’s government, South Africa started to support dictators who violated democratic principles.

The above assertion proves that South Africa’s behaviour as a mediator in the continent sometimes has shown contradictions. But blaming South Africa for a haphazard foreign policy behaviour would be unfair. Critics should remember that the foreign relations field is constantly evolving like many other fields and foreign relations actors should learn to adapt to those changes.

Having said all the above, this study has proved that despite all the challenges Pretoria has faced, it has made strides in peace diplomacy in the continent. South Africa has invested millions of rands in its bid to meet the expectations of the international community which has encouraged Pretoria to play a meaningful role in leading the Africa’s renewal.

In this analysis, we have seen how Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma have contributed in helping South Africa make its mark in the international relations stage in peace diplomacy. Because of the complexity of the real world, they have adapted their policies to meet foreign relations needs.

6.2 Recommendations

South Africa has faced criticism for selling the power-sharing model to other parts of Africa. As much as this model has helped countries such as Burundi and the DRC, it is also true that not all disputes can be solved this way. Foreign policy actors should now consider revising the country’s peace mediation model so that Pretoria will come up with other options which will offer solutions in a wide range of conflict situations. History demonstrates that stability is not always achieved through negotiations alone.
Sometimes robust action, or, at least, the warning of it, must be applied to resist threats to democracy and constitutional order.

This study has shown that there are many factors which trigger conflicts around the continent. For instance, although conflicts in Zimbabwe and Burundi were both civil clashes, they were each characterised by different dynamics. One of the main obstacles in the Burundi conflict was the involvement of neighbouring government which supported some rebel groups. The situation in Zimbabwe was different in the sense that the clashes were between groups within the country, the ruling party and the opposition party, which split eventually.

Zuma recognised that the situation in the Burundi conflict needed special attention, thus he responded correctly by involving the AU and UN in the mediation of peace in that country. Although Pretoria used the same peace model in both countries, the Burundi and Zimbabwe conflicts show that mediators should not devise a one-size-fits-all peace model because there are many dynamics to consider in every conflict.

South Africa has resisted hegemonic ambitions since the inception of the democratic government. This is one of the ways it has attempted to distance itself from the hostile behaviour of the apartheid government towards Africa. But literature shows that in some cases, South Africa fails to take the lead in peace diplomacy because it hides behind the excuse of non-interference. This undoubtedly hampers the way it works as a peace mediator.

South Africa has relied on quiet diplomacy in some of conflict resolution operations it has engaged in. This often prolongs the process of resolving a conflict, therefore, use up a lot more state resources than necessary in some cases. Sometimes decisive actions must be used to bring completion to the peace process. Not all conflicts should take a short time to reach a breakthrough. But history shows that warring parties which
engage in the peace process sometimes apply delaying tactics for different reasons. South Africa should assess each peace mission regularly to evaluate its effectiveness to ensure that peace missions do not take longer than they should.

Pretoria has invested a lot of resources in peace diplomacy in the continent, a gesture which is commendable. However, this study has also shown that with dwindling finances, South Africa has overstretched itself in the area of funding peace missions. Pretoria should continue to encourage, through the AU, African nations to contribute to financing peace missions in the continent.

The South African army is an integral part of South Africa’s peacekeeping. This study showed that over the years, South African peacekeepers have been found guilty of acts of ill-discipline in some of the countries in which they have been deployed. This research also showed that Aids has also hampered South Africa’s peacekeeping. Pretoria needs to consider applying a stringent policy on who should be deployed in peacekeeping. Soldiers with bad records should be automatically excluded from participating in peace missions. Incidents of ill-discipline among members of the army happen in other nations around the world and many of those nations deal with rebellious members decisively. Applying strict rules for the SANDF will save South Africa from making embarrassing headlines.

Attending to these challenges will go a long way to improve peacekeeping in the continent and ensure that Pretoria is a reliable partner in bringing peace in Africa. That will enable South Africa to lead a peace diplomacy that is maturing, something which will bring Pretoria the respect it deserves.
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