The misconceptions of state failure in contemporary African state:

A case of Somalia.

By

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Declaration

I, Silindile Shabalala, declare that:

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ii) This dissertation has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

iii) This dissertation does not contain other persons’ data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons.

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Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my late mother, Zonke Isabel Shabalala. I love and miss you so much. I wish you were here to experience this.

Acknowledgements

Many praises and thanks giving goes to the Lord Almighty, who has provided strength and continues to keep, guide, protect and bless me in everything. Dr Khondlo Mtshali, for your guidance, mentorship and most of all patience, I can never thank you enough. I pray the Lord Almighty richly bless you, I truly would not have completed this were’t it for your persistence in spite of no responses from me many of the times.

To my big Shabalala family, if I start mentioning names, I run a risk of forgetting some of you or filling up an entire page, it’s thus best to say, thank you all for the love and support.

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Abstract

Contemporary African states make up a substantial number of states that are regarded to be failing. Somalia is moreover considered as the epitome of a failed state; it has been regarded as a collapsed state since 1991. In this view, an important characteristic of a state is its possession of “the monopoly of the legitimate use of force” (Weber 1919:1) in its territory/jurisdiction. States institutions have to be robust to control and provide security to its citizenry. When these state institutions are not robust enough and thus cannot perform their mandated tasks; the society will depreciate into anarchy owing to the lack of order meant to be provided by the state. Expectedly, with a lack of a central government, Somali society was seen to be in turmoil and in a state of anarchy. Contrary to this claim, Somalia has developed effective mechanisms embedded in their local settings to offer services that would ideally be regarded as government’s responsibilities. The provision of education, health services, security and general maintenance of order is assured by interested business men and elders whose authority is reinforced by the governed society. State failure theory does not however allow for this reality since it equates the absence of a central government to disorder in the society. This is owing to its account of a state that is devoid of a society. To remedy this misconception, I propose Migdal’s (1994) state in society approach. In this approach, the state is one of the many organizations of the society. There exists between society and the state continuous engagements which yield struggles or accommodations that are mutually transforming. Seen in this light, Somalia is not a failed state. The condition simply reveals the struggles, accommodations and general interactions between the state and the different Somali social forces.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>ARPCT</td>
<td>Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BET</td>
<td>Borkou-Ennedi-Tibetsi</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CIC</td>
<td>Council of Islamic Courts</td>
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<td>CJTF-HOA</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>United States Department of Defence</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commissioner</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUTM</td>
<td>European Union Training Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
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<td>FPS</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Group</td>
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<td>FSI</td>
<td>Fragile States Index</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GUNT</td>
<td>Transitional Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Courts Union</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>MSSP</td>
<td>Mogadishu Stabilization and Security Plan</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>ONLF</td>
<td>Ogaden National Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRSs</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategies</td>
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<td>RRA</td>
<td>Rahanweyn Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCIC</td>
<td>Supreme Council of Islamic Courts</td>
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<td>SNAF</td>
<td>Somalia National Armed Force</td>
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<td>SRC</td>
<td>Supreme Revolutionary Council</td>
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<td>SRRC</td>
<td>Somali Reconciliation and Rehabilitation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<td>TNG</td>
<td>Transitional National Government</td>
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<td>UIC</td>
<td>Union of Islamic Courts</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>US</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction and topic overview

1.1 Background and outline of the research problem:

Our current international order is essentially dominated by western ideals and standards of living and governing. This dominance has amplified into a norm such that political order is predetermined by and ought to abide by those set of principles. Notwithstanding the fact that some of these principles are useful and are worth to follow, at times, they act contrary to improving or providing an accurate condition of the social, economic, or political affairs of spaces outside the western setting. The theory of state-failure in Africa is a case of such an instance. It has been a norm that when analyses of African states are given, they commonly get compared with the western ideals of liberal democracy (rationally so, given that western standards are considered to be the universally accepted ones). African states are commonly characterized by negative connotations in general sociological or political theories. The state failure literature distinguishes three different but progressively deteriorating stages. The first category is called failing states (states which are in the process of failing); when not rectified appropriately, this stage can progress to the following category of failed states. The final category is a progression of failed states, which are completely collapsed states. Here the state is said to have disintegrated to a point of non-existence facilitating total collapse.

Although existing literature on state failure has been able to outline the above categories; there is still no clear single agreed upon definition of what state failure is. This has allowed for a number of definitions and causes of failure. Owing to a number of divergent historical challenges, it holds true that contemporary African states are faced with a number of social and economic challenges. These states have thus been susceptible to being regarded as weak, failing, failed or completely collapsed. The reason for this failure is often attributed to internal factors. The possibility of external forces and realities causing disruptions and challenges to states is disregarded. The description of failure is also not context specific but merges states from different regions with different history and realities into one description. This arrangement has allowed for single or similar intervention recommendations for diverse problems. The paramount recommendation from state failure proponents being the creation of more order through robust government institutions and the strengthening of the security sector. The concept of strengthening the security sector gained momentum post the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.
in the United States. Driven by the quest to deter future attacks and fight terrorism; interventions were sanctioned to states regarded as weak, failing or have failed already. This was deduced from a supposed susceptibility of failed states to terrorists. It is argued that, since failed states lack complete control of their territories; these uncontrolled territories can be used by terrorists who can perform their operations undetected.

State failure theory describes the state as an entity that is above the society it exists in. It thus disregards societal forces that engage with and can change the nature of the state through this engagement. It equates the lack of a central government to total disorder and anarchy in the society. Somalia existed without a central government for over 20 years, and should have fallen into anarchy in terms of state failure theory. In reality however, the Somali society has been able to devise mechanisms that ensure service delivery, security and general control of social and economic interactions. State failure theory cannot account for this reality since it confuses the lack of a central government with disorder in the society. This is owing to its account of a state that is devoid of a society. To remedy this misconception, I propose a state in society approach. In this approach, the state is one of the many organizations of the society. There exists between society and the state continuous engagements which yield struggles or accommodations that are mutually transforming. Seen in this light, Somalia is not a failed state. The condition simply reveals the struggles, accommodations and general interactions between the state and the different Somali social forces.

1.2 Key questions to be asked:
1) What is the notion of the state that is assumed by the discourse of state failure theories?
2) Does state failure theory provide an accurate account of the status of Somali political terrain?
3) Does state failure theory help understand and consequently resolve issues that cause disputes in Somalia?

1.3 Objectives of the study:
1. To articulate the notion of the state that is assumed by state failure theories.
2. To evaluate the accuracy of state failure theory’s account of Somali’s political terrain.
3. To ascertain whether state failure theory helps resolve the issues underlying the conflict in Somalia.

1.4 Research methodology:
A research methodology is concerned with what phenomenon is being studied and with or through what means. In the field of social sciences, two research methodologies are conventionally used when conducting research. One can make use of either the qualitative or the quantitative research method. In some instances, a number of social scientists have also preferred to use a combination of these two traditions, this is referred to as mixed methods. The mixed method is supposed to be more beneficial for it offers the researcher advantages of both the qualitative and quantitative approach. Quantitative research measures or counts issues so as to generalize these findings to a broader population. The emphasis of a quantitative research is thus on gathering and examining mathematically measurable data. It focuses on measure, scale, range or rate of incidents (Wyse, 2011). Quantitative research is generally comprehensive and organized with findings that can be assembled and presented statistically. The overall objective of a quantitative study is to measure data and broaden findings from a section or part to the population of interest (ibid).

By contrast, qualitative research seeks to understand or explain behavior and beliefs. It identifies processes and appreciates contexts of people’s experiences. It aims at in-depth description through its concentration on particular meaning, process and context (Cohen & Manion, 1994). The purpose of a qualitative study is to understand social phenomena of multiple realities from their point of views. Strauss and Corbin (1990) state that a qualitative research is whatever type of research that produces results without means of numbers. Similarly, Shimahara (1988) holds that qualitative research produces findings that cannot be obtained by means of statistical methods. Qualitative research methods grant extra importance on interpretation and the provision of thorough observations in their contexts and an extensive understanding of concepts. Qualitative research is primarily exploratory in nature (Wyse, 2011). Primarily, it is utilized for purposes of gaining understanding of fundamental motives or reasons, views and motivations. It provides a deep understanding of a problem thus assisting with developing possible solutions and hypotheses for a prospective quantitative research study. Qualitative research is furthermore used
to discover inclinations of thought and opinions (ibid) and thus assists in gaining a deeper understanding of a problem.

The one stark difference between the two traditions is that quantitative research is impartial and objective whilst qualitative research is particular and subjective. Quantitative research provides observed effects and generalizes them to a population. Qualitative research on the other hand describes the difficulty or condition from the standpoint of those experiencing it. This explanation cannot be subsequently generalized into a population without considering the context. The methodology that is used for this research project is the qualitative research method. This research project seeks to understand better the notion of a state as utilized by the state failure theory. To achieve this, I will use and analyze data that already exists in a form of previous research. These secondary sources used include published books, journals, newspaper articles, official statistics, and web or internet information.

The research will also make use of a case study to gain a comprehensive understanding of the state failure theory and its application in Africa. As a research approach, case studies are used where the emphasis of the research is getting a detailed understanding of a specific phenomenon, object, institution, person or an event at a particular period (Willig, 2008). Informed by this; case studies are consequently not characterised by the research method used in conducting the study but by their focus on a particular unit (a case) that is being analysed (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Their definition rests on individual cases and not on the method of inquiry used (Stake, 1995). Case studies can deal with either single or multiple cases. A single case study is used when investigating a single phenomenon whilst a multiple case study is used when investigating more than one cases. Single case studies come in two main types: intrinsic and instrumental case studies. From multiple case studies comes one type: a collective case study. These three main types of case studies, intrinsic, instrumental and collective were identified by Stake (1995). He argued that in an intrinsic case study, a rare or unique phenomenon is studied informed by its uniqueness or difference from other cases. In an instrumental case study, a specific case is used to gain a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon, the chosen case study is not however necessary unique or different from others. Primarily, instrumental case studies are not only used to provide insight on an issue but also to reconsider or redraw a generalization. The case used is
therefore of secondary interest. It takes a supporting role while facilitating for an understanding of something else. The case will still be studied in-depth and its context scrutinized. This is however done for helps in the gaining deeper understanding of an external interest (Yin, 2009). The case used in this research can be referred to as an instrumental type of case study. The case of Somalia is not used as an intrinsic case; the interest is not solely on the case of Somalia but on a general idea of state failure in Africa. Somalia is used instrumentally to show how state failure does not capture the realities of African states. Somalia as a case study supports the argument that the state failure theory does not capture the realities of what happens in African states. In a collective case study, multiple cases are studied either simultaneously or successively to still gain a comprehensive understanding of a phenomena or a particular issue (ibid).

These three categories are not however mutually exclusive. A case study can embody more than one of these categories in the same or single study. It is possible that a case study begins as an intrinsic but develops into an instrumental or collective case study as the investigation or research progresses (ibid). Case studies can be used to test a specific proposition (Lijphart, 1971). As a result, they can either be theory-confirming or theory-infirming (ibid). It is for this reason that a case study method is used in this research. The state of Somalia is used as a case to test the accuracy of the assumptions of state failure theory. The case will either confirm or infirm these assumptions. Lijphart (1971) refers to studies that are theory-infirming as deviant case analysis. Such studies make use of single cases known for their lack of conformity to the established generalizations. Cases are used to show why they deviate from established generalizations. This further helps to uncover additional variables that may have not been considered previously or help in refining definitions of some or all of the variables involved (ibid). This study can therefore be referred to as a deviant case analysis as the case of Somalia is used to infirm and not to confirm the state failure theory in Africa.

1.5 Significance of the study:
In publications of organisations such as The Fund for Peace, The Global Peace, Business Insider and Foreign Policy, which annually publish Fragile States and State Failure Indexes, African states dominate the lists in comparison to other continents. These organisations and state failure proponents use Max Weber’s definition of a state. This definition is sanctioned as the only applicable definition and disregards other forms of state that can exist outside the Weberian
western context. Furthermore, post the 9/11 terrorist attacks, being regarded as a failed state has intervention and policy implications owing to the alleged link between failed states and terrorism. In light of these implications, it is important to evaluate the accuracy of the account of the state provided by the state failure theory. The significance of this study thus rests in the theoretical value it will add concerning the state failure thesis’s applicability in Africa and particularly in Somalia.

### 1.6 Limitations of the Study

Conceivable limitations of this research are informed by the research designed used, which is the qualitative research method. Such limitations are referred to as study design limitations (Hindle, 2015). This design solely uses secondary research sources as research data. These are already existing, published research sources (ibid) such as books, journal articles, internet sources, newspapers, conference papers, working papers and more. What is limiting about these secondary sources is the fact that they may not be accurately appropriate for the need of the study. Conducting research can thus be time consuming as the researcher needs to make proper scrutiny of the information and make suitable modifications where required (Denscombe, 2008). It is also possible that suitable data may not be available (ibid). Owing to the study being library/desktop based, it can lack practicality as opposed to a study conducted on the ground. The quality of the research is greatly reliant on the researcher’s individual skills to interpret data (UK Essays, 2013). The deduced research conclusion can therefore be easily influenced by the researcher’s individuality and biases. The researcher can also fabricate facts. Due to the research being context specific, in this case Africa specific; drawn conclusions are limited to Africa and cannot be extended or generalized to other parts of the world. The complete reliance on secondary sources is also disadvantageous as the available data may be incorrect or outdated (ibid).

### 1.7 Definitions of Important Terms

- **Bureaucracy:** An administrative or social system that relies on a set of rules and procedures, separation of functions and a hierarchical structure in implementing controls over an organization, government or social system.
• **Colonialism:** the policy or practice of acquiring full or partial political control over another country, occupying it with settlers, and exploiting it economically.

• **Extremism:** the holding of extreme political or religious views; also referred to a fanaticism.

• **Jihad:** (among Muslims) a war or struggle against unbelievers, can also be regarded as holy war

• **Regime:** a government, especially an authoritarian one.

• **State:** a nation or territory considered as an organized political community under one government.

• **Terrorism:** the unofficial or unauthorized use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims.

1.8 **Study Overview**

The study consists of four chapters:

**Chapter one** provides an introduction of the research topic. A concise background of the research topic is provided and the context in which the research study will be limited to is explained. The chapter further delineates questions, objectives, significance of the study, limitations of the study and the research methodology utilized to conduct the study.

**Chapter two** provided an in-depth description of the definition of the state embedded in the state failure theory. It also provides a comprehensive description of what constitute to state failure and the various categories of failed states. Policy and intervention implications that accompany state failure are also explained, but limited to the African context. A different approach or definition of a state and how it operates is lastly given and adopted instead of the definition advocated by the state failure theory.

**Chapter three** uses the case study of Somalia to show how state failure theory has been applied in Africa and how interventions and policies drawn from the state failure theory have been detrimental to Somali due to the misconceptions of the African state and how it operates or ought to operate. It also illustrates how these ill-conceived interventions have been detrimental to the Somali society as they fail to capture the everyday realities of the society.
Chapter four provides concluding remarks to the study, reiterating the misconceptions of the state, (especially the African state) embedded in Max Weber’s definition.
Chapter 2: Literature review and theoretical framework

2.1 Introduction
This chapter gives a background and a comprehensive summary of the definition of the state embedded in the state failure theory, which is Weber’s definition of the state. It describes how Weber’s ideal state ought to operate and what the best form of government for this state is. It then describes the opposite of this state which by deduction is held to entail failure. The different levels of failure are then described along with their variant causes. The links a failed state has with both development and terrorism are explained and how these have been used in African states. A different definition and outlook to what constitute a state and how it ought to operate is finally given and adopted instead of the definition advocated by the state failure theory.

2.2 The state in state failure theory
How one defines what is a state or what constitutes statehood is paramount to the understanding of state failure. State failure theorists use a definition of the state developed by Max Weber. Weber did not believe that the definition of a state could be found in terms of its ends but only in terms of the particular means limited to it, primarily, the “use of physical force” (Weber, 1958: 77). Weber believed that the foundation of every state is force. He claimed that, if there was no social institution conscious of the use of force; the idea of a state would be erased and a condition of anarchy would emerge. The exact definition of the state that Weber (1919) developed cited in Gert and Mills (1946:1) is “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” Territory is essential for it demarcates the scope of the state’s authority (Gert & Mills, 1946). Deducible from this description are three pertinent attributes qualifying a state, namely, monopoly/control, force/violence and territory. The second attribute (force/violence) can be assigned to other institutions or individuals but will be limited to the extent to which the state permits or restricts the use of force. In this manner, the state is regarded as the only and exclusive source of the right to utilize violence (ibid).

The society existing within this Weberian state is not homogenous. Owing to unequal ownership of power; people are unequal for they possess and exercise different levels of power or influence.
Karl Marx, a prominent sociologist to write on social inequality or stratification believed that inequality was due to economic factors. Inequality existed because of the unequal ownership of wealth and of the control of material goods. The wealthy have power and control over the poor. This setting consists of only two classes; the bourgeoisie who are wealthy, are rulers, and control the means of production and the proletariat who are poorer, are ruled and are without any means of production. The latter works for the enrichment of the former (Marx & Engels, 1973). Weber claimed inequality is more complex than this. In contradiction to Marx’s position, the possession of power and influence can also originate from other conditions than from just economic terms. According to Weber three factors can account for inequality in societies; class, status and party/political power. Class denotes the individual’s wealth and economic standing in a society. Status denotes the individual’s prestige, honor and the general respect given to an individual. Party/political power denotes the political rank or position of an individual within an organization. Further, these organizations tend to fight for their own interests whilst disregarding others who are not affiliates to their group (Bendix, 1974). Inequality can thus come through the facts that others have more wealth than others and thus can consume more power; others may be regarded as more respectful like priests or poets and thus get afforded more power and lastly; others may have higher rankings in organizations such as political parties, unions or professional associations and therefore can exercise more power or influence over others and affiliates to these organizations may hone more power than non-affiliates. In contrast to Marx’s two classes system. Weber claimed there are four central classes; the upper class (property owners), the white-collar workers/commercial class (intellectuals), the petite bourgeoisie (owners of small businesses), and manual working class (Weber, 1946 cited in Gert & Mills, 1961).

2.3 The Weberian theory of the state and exercise of legitimate power/control within this state
Weber maintained that all political power seeks legitimacy. Therefore, control by the state ought to be a product of a legitimate process. There are accordingly three means that this legitimate control can be ensured. It can be ensured through charismatic domination, traditional domination or through legal-rational domination (Parkin, 2002). Charismatic domination can be characterized by familial or religious inclinations. It occurs when a leader distinctively relies on his charm and appealing abilities to convince the masses to follow him owing to the benefits he can attain and provide for them through his extraordinary powers. The masses obedience is not informed by tradition, statute or legal principles but by the leader’s personality, unusual qualities
and capabilities that inspire them. Whether the charismatic leader does indeed possess power and strength to attain what is promised is insignificant if it remains true that the followers believe that such power and capabilities do exist. This form of domination can be used by people such as a religious leader, a powerful demagogue, a political party leader or a warlord (ibid). Traditional domination can be characterized by patrimonialism or feudalism. In this case, legitimacy is derived from tradition or custom. Authority to govern is thus passed down often through hereditary and does not change over time. Authority held by a leader or a family is not challenged by the governed for they consider the system to be the manner in which their society has always been governed and because there exists a deep reverence for old traditional beliefs and practices. Legal-rational domination is characterized by rational statutes and the bureaucracy. Legitimacy is derived from an enacted law and other agreed upon legal principles. Authority is exercised by a person or an institution as a result of and through the legal office that they hold. Obedience by the followers is to the office and not the individual/leader. Leaders are appointed or elected into their respective positions through a process. Once they leave these positions, their authority ceases; it remains rooted in the office as opposed to the individual. The fundamental feature of this domination is the rationally enacted set of rules. This is important for with a rationally developed legal system comes a high possibility of guaranteeing a rationally developed political system. These systems are important since they provide structure and routine to authority. Linked with this are ordered elections, constitutions, established offices, regularized modes of representation, political procedures, security forces (Giddens, 1971) and other well developed set of rules.

Weber held these three forms of domination or types of authority to be hierarchical in nature. In this view, societies will progress from charismatic domination to traditional domination and finally develop to legal-rational domination which is what characterizes the modern state. In the modern state, this domination or authority is exercised by the bureaucracy. Legitimacy does not however come from the bureaucratic officials themselves but from legal rationality, legal order and enacted laws/statutes. The society accepts the legality of the rules that the bureaucracy applies when governing them. Weber’s conception of the bureaucratic officials is a set of individuals who are appointed on basis of conduct and their technical qualifications. These are qualified individuals appointed to perform impartially attributed responsibilities of the state and are in turn paid a salary for their work (Weber, 1958). Owing to the capacity of the bureaucracy,
Weber considered the legal-rational authority to be the most efficient and rational form of state. Traditional authority always faces vulnerability and inevitably crises when the territorial jurisdiction of the patriarch increases. Overwhelmed by the increased duties of the increased territory, the patriarch will delegate administration responsibilities to his dependents. These dependents are always inclined to try to formalize and codify their privileges and entitlements. Characteristically, the patriarch will resist these more formally inscribed rules as they will reduce his latitude of purely unrestricted and arbitrary powers. This is typical in traditional authority because patriarchs are willing to abide by custom but not conform to laws (Weber, 1958). Another shortfall of this authority is that it creates and preserves inequalities (ibid). Charismatic authority is also predisposed to its own shortfalls. Firstly, it lacks all forms of established organization. It is also challenging for a charismatic leader to retain his authority since his followers must continue to validate or legitimize it. This can be easy during periods of unrest where the leader’s gifts and extraordinary powers are viewed to be relevant and required to resolve a problem (Parkin, 2002). Once this unrest ends, the leader’s popularity begins to decline. When eventually the leader dies or his charisma is lost, charismatic authority will convert into either traditional or legal-rational authority (Weber, 1958).

Contrary to the mentioned shortfalls of charismatic and traditional authorities, legal rational authority is based on impartiality and on intellectual rationality of one objective law which governs all. Unlike in traditional authority where personal considerations, personal connections, favors, and privileges play part, the bureaucracy governing through legal rational conduct their responsibilities without friendship or favors to any individuals (Weber, 1958). The assurance of a bureaucratic authority is its impartiality. Its officials act without prejudice or passion. They apply the same set of rules to all, irrespective of existing differences of social ranks and conditions. Elucidating on this system, Parkin (2002) explained that bureaucracy is a system of laws and not a system of people. The state uses the police and the military as its main instruments of legitimate force/violence. Private force can also be used but it ought to derive its legitimacy from the state. In this view, the state is regarded as a structure of command and obedience. In the character of the state, attention is directed away from individual actors and their perceptions. It is instead drawn to legal principles and robust institutions which will ensure these legal statutes and principles are adhered to. The bureaucratic system presented by Weber takes no heed of personal volition, sentiments or feelings. It is a dehumanized system which is purely about formalized and
inflexible set of rules and their adherence. It is a calculated and rational system affording no space to humans who have the capacity of being irrational.

Concerning the economy, Weber believed that the state’s role in economic growth is largely delineated by the provision of collective goods; the goods being the services provided by the bureaucracy. These can include necessary infrastructure, regulation of business and aid or impediments to entering an industry (Gerth & Mills, 1958; Parsons, 1964; Stinchcombe, 1974). Weber (1968) believed that the bureaucracy can be organized in a manner that encourages economic growth. In an attempt to prove these claims true; a research was conducted by Peter Evans and James Rauch in 1999. They used two of Weber’s bureaucratic principles, meritocratic recruitment and career appeal and concluded that indeed the Weberian bureaucracy can yield economic growth. Meritocratic recruitment refers to the competence based selection of employees as opposed to selection based on connections. If the state employs capable and intelligent people, the state is more likely to be run efficiently. Contrast to this; if it employs people using patronage or nepotism, it is likely to produce corruption and hostility. Career appeal refers to the desirability of elements such as the possibility for progression, the length of employment term, and base salary. A foreseeable career progression in a long term employment can reduce the attractiveness of quick gains emanating from corrupt individual practices (Gerth & Mills, 1958; Parsons, 1964; Stinchcombe, 1974). Collectively, these features affect the proficiency, predictability, and the general efficiency of the state bureaucracy. Private enterprises want to invest in a predictable environment and under a reasonable and understandable bureaucratic environment. Consequently, these factors must have a practically direct impact on private investment which in turn will affect the rates of economic growth (Evans & Rauch, 1999). An effective bureaucracy is consequently a foundation for economic growth. To support this claim, it is held that the successes experienced by the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) in positively transforming their political and economic spheres was achieved through a well-functioning, strong and centralized administrative bureaucracy (Amsden, 1989; Im & Park, 2010; Wade, 1990; World Bank 1993).

2.4 Reasons for state failure
Most of the scholars in the state failure theory discourse agree with and endorse Weber’s definition and understanding of the state. States fail when they lose their legitimacy owing to
their lack of ability to control their territories and perform basic functions (Dorff, 1999). Economically, failure begins when states can no longer regulate their economies and consequently, living standards decline rapidly. This economic reason is propelled by the advocates of economic liberalism like the World Bank, who after unsatisfactory outcomes of Structural Adjustments, now argue that hindrances to growth in the third world are due to the deficiency or lack of stronger states, operational institutions and improved government performance. Politically, state failure begins when leaders undermine democratic norms, coerce the legislature, the bureaucracy and the judiciary and ultimately control over the security and defense forces is taken over by private individuals. This political motive is propelled by western countries owing to the emergence of international terrorism; in particular post the 11 September 2001 (a day that has since been commonly referred to as 9/11) attacks on the United States’ (US) prominent government and military buildings. When these political and economic aspects converge, the state’s provision of services keeps decreasing. The people subsequently begin to protest, loyalty to the state decreases, people shift their loyalties to communal warlords, and mobilization in line with language, religion and ethnicity escalates. Conflict between the government and groups who see a possibility of taking over from the failing government inevitably erupts. Following this, the state’s power and its legitimacy recedes; it loses control over some of its territory to belligerents and anarchy sets in (Rotberg, 2002). Consistent with Weber’s understanding which equated the lack of the monopoly of force by the state to anarchy are proponents of state failure’s reasoning; when the state loses its monopoly of force, when other factions of the society have this power as well, anarchy sets in. The provision of security or other services which are deemed as belonging to the state by other entities other than the state reveals failure on part of the state. This is because the state is seen as devoid of other entities in the society. The Weberian state owes its essence to the exclusive use of legitimate force. Accordingly when the state no longer has this monopoly, it is failing.

A failed state is by definition a contrast of what a strong state is. Strong states can govern over their territories and provide a considerable order of political goods to their citizens. Strong states ensure political freedom, ensure good environments for economic growth and render notable levels of security from violence emanating from political or criminal activities. They are territories free of disturbances, where rules, regulations and order thrive. (Rotberg, 2002). The possibility that these factors may vary considerably between different systems in not heeded to.
If a state fails to imitate or embody the Weberian model of a state, it is failing and inescapably requires external assistance to put it right.

2.5 The spectrum of failed state
There exists no one clear definition of what state failure really is. Definitions have consequently involved a number of situations where the environment in question is in conflict or in some form of turmoil. In the lack of a single precise definition; a range of categories has been described to explain failure. States can either be weak, fragile, failing, failed or collapsed. Although these various situations may signal that there may be a need for differences in approaches to fixing these malfunctioning states or rebuilding them in cases of state collapse; intervention programmes have always concentrated on the inadequacy or lack of structured and functional state institutions which are regarded as the principal holdup to the quest of security, peace and development. Lambach (2004) has argued that there exists no precise threshold for state failure. He instead differentiates between weak states which may still be able to offer limited political goods, and collapsed states which no longer have working governing institutions and therefore cannot offer even an ounce of order. Weak and fragile states depict similar conditions. They can still provide a certain amount of the necessary political goods but not all of them, control of the state is contested and conflicts are endemic. Failing states are those that get overwhelmed by internal violence. The complete intensity of violence does not however denote what a failed state is. Its definition lies in the persistent character of that absolute violence (Carment, 2003; Rotberg, 2002). If a state fails to use physical force to contain or defeat the insurgency, it is a failing state. It is failing to utilize the essence of its existence, its monopoly of violence to control and contain its citizenry.

Failure can be due to a range of factors which can also be used as indicators of this failure. These are flawed institutions, demolishing democratic debate, a weak judiciary, deteriorating or destroyed infrastructure, deteriorating education and health care services, increased inequality between the rich and the poor, the rise of infant mortality, conflicts, decreasing actual national and per capita levels of gross domestic product (GDP) and the AIDS epidemic that overwhelms health infrastructure (Rotberg, 2002). The description basically contains virtually all the challenges being experienced by third world countries habitually due to their colonial history (which state failure theory does not account for). Failure is thus intended to delineate particular
set of situations and to omit states that bear only a few of the conditions of failure. This criterion is designed by a number of questions to be answered to determine if a state is failing or not. Questions cited by Rotberg (2002) are how really nominal are the infrastructure, schools, hospitals and clinics? How less has the GDP decreased? How has the infant mortality risen? “How far does the influence of the central government reach? How little legitimacy remains? Most important yet, because civil conflict is held to be decisive for state failure, can the state still provide security to its citizens and to what extent?” (Rotberg, 2002:11).

Both failing and failed states do not have control in some of their territories, suggesting a lack of capacity to halt internal threats of a rebellion or terrorism. Failing states are those that greatly fail their citizens and or are not able to attain economic growth (Bates, 2008). The environment of failed states is constantly tense and full of hostilities. In most of them, the government troop’s battle armed insurgency. Failure appears when violence escalates into a thorough internal war, when the ordinary infrastructure deteriorates and the leaders’ greediness causes them to neglect their responsibilities to the people (Rotberg, 2002). The extreme case of state failure which is state collapse occurs when the state fails to perform its basic functions as a state. It is a condition where “structure, authority (legitimate power), law and political order have fallen apart” (Zartman, 1995, p. 1) and need to be reconstructed through identified relevant means. Collapsed states have no constituted governments and thus no governance. They are marked by the breakdown of the central government authority to enforce order. This results in the loss of both tangible territorial control and the monopoly of the legitimate use of force. The crucial point here is the state’s inability to reproduce the conditions for its own existence (Brown et al., 2010). The postulation is that states legitimately exist when they can not only exert but also reproduce their monopoly of power to properly and continuously govern and provide security to their citizenry. Since they exist to provide certain governmental needs, when they cannot guarantee an environment to carry out these duties, they are failing.

In Africa state collapse ensued in two waves. The first occurred towards the end of the second decade of independence, when administrations that had succeeded the initial nationalist generation were toppled, taking the entire state formation with them into an empty space or vacuum. In support of this claim, Zartman (1995) exemplifies with the Chad war of 1980-1982, where a war erupted between guerrilla victors and a previous regime which completely destroyed
all arms of government and left empty or vacuumed spaces in the society. The second wave came when authoritative successors of the nationalist group were ousted by new successor regimes that could only abolish but not replace a functioning government (ibid). During this time (1979-1982), Chad was governed through an alliance of armed groups called the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT). GUNT’s rule was however nominal due to fragmentation that characterized Chad since its independence. Worsening challenges faced by GUNT was the ongoing civil war that had erupted in 1965 (Lemarchand, 1986). Furthermore, divisions between the Islamic central and northern regions and the colonially exploited south regions were still prevalent. GUNT suffered intense internal rivalries and external interventions from Libya, France, Nigeria and Sudan respectively also compounded the problem (Nolutshungu, 1996). It is held that weakness, poor state capacity and the lack of a well-established bureaucracy to control rebellion rendered the GUNT incapable of ensuring peace, providing security and controlling insurgents (Fearon & Laitin, 2007). The state was ill equipped to govern the whole country; it did not have the necessary capacity to regulate and implement policies in regions outside the capital, especially the north region of Borkou-Ennedi-Tibetsi (BET) which from colonial times was used to self-governing for the French had always left it to its own rules and regulations (May, 1983). As a result, half of the country fell under the control of insurgents whilst GUNT’s control got reduced to the capital, N'Djamena (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Chad2010.pdf). Triaud (1985:20) argued that “the central problem confronting Chad since 1960 is not so much the north-south opposition, an important pulsation among others, as it is the construction of a modern state; for a number of historical reasons this process has aborted”. Seen in this light, states fail when governments fail to assert their authority and perform what is mandatory and prescribed of them. Consequently, rescuing this state would mean reaffirming the government structure and its authority. As to other key players that might be performing these prescribed governmental roles and consequently closing the vacuum, they are unheeded. This view or its lack thereof is further entrenched by state failure proponents’ outlook and connection of institutional breakdown to societal breakdown. There exists an unyielding view that there are functions and services that can only be rendered by the government. Consequently, when the government can no longer accomplish this, the society will break down for anarchy will thrive owing to a void created by the government which no other entity can fill.
2.6 Failed state in Africa

State failure proponents disregard the role of any external forces, and importantly history, have played in the final product of what constitute to a state. They hold that state failure is man-made and therefore cannot be attributed to merely accidental, geographical, environmental or external factors. It is instead a consequence of poor leadership decisions and leadership failures (Rotberg, 2004). The description of the state failure is sanctioned such that it rules out possibilities of failure coming from external forces. The main forces of failure are to be found only inside a given state. Failure can be due to corrupt leaders, the absence of political will, the absence of proficient institutions, lack of democratic practices or lack of economic development and effective economic policies which cultivates the economy. It can also be as a result of nationalist and later generation regimes that took over established and well-functioning states and ran them to the ground (Zartman, 1995; Rotberg, 2004).

Applied in general, there are a number of misconceptions, flaws and inadequate descriptions in the regard of failure as a consequence of solely internal factors. In Africa, it entails the disregard of the long history of colonialism in the continent and thereby discount the impact colonial legacies have in contemporary African states. Jones (2008) has argued that the current condition and challenges faced by many contemporary African states ought to be located in the history of colonialism and global capitalism. This is due to the fact that contemporary African states are a residue of colonial administrative entities which were designed to be apparatuses of exploitation, oppression and domination (ibid). A description devoid of this history is thus insufficient and unfair as it places culpability on Africans for the difficulties the continent is experiencing whose roots can be traced back to colonialism. The inseparable link with colonialism and its critical effects to contemporary African states cannot be over-stressed. It has shaped the social, political and economic realities of Africa (Diop, 2012). This colonization was profit driven and excluded any democratic system of governing. It was used to take Africa’s raw resources using African cheap labor to increase financial gain. Owing to this purpose of colonialism; it necessarily had to be undemocratic, autocratic and involve the abuse and mistreating of the colonized/subjects. Colonial structures and systems were detrimental to African prosperity, inheriting and maintain
them post-independence as African leaders did, meant continuing and sustaining the detrimental effects they had on Africa.

Through colonialism, African state’s economies were intentionally designed to rely on Europe. The production of raw materials or goods was entrenched. Established industries were not equipped to process these resources but were designed to export them to Europe. Europe would then process it and sell the final product back to Africa at steep prices for profit. African economies have since continued to be financially and technologically dependent on the west (Ake, 1981). Another enduring legacy stems from the haphazard partitioning or the demarcation of territorial boundaries in Africa, which was done without consultation with the inhabitants. This partitioning resulted in the separation of some kins, forcing them to live in different states although being of common ancestry. This has caused perpetual contentions between heterogeneous groups (Ndege, 2009). It has also increased rebellion and decreased government legitimacy when rebels seek to rejoin with their kins in neighboring states and do not recognize the government in states where they were apportioned into. This means the control the government had over this sect decreases as they rebel. This further entrenches the concept of African state failure as an important measure of state failure is how much geographical territory the government genuinely controls. It is argued that failed states cannot govern or regulate their borders; they also lose large segments of their territories with their power regularly restricted to the capital city and one or a few other ethnically specific zones. The territories where the government has no control over may be controlled by insurgence or rebels who are contesting the government (Newman, 2009). Another pointer of state failure is the increase of criminal violence. When the state cannot control other territories, its power starts to weaken and it begins to utilize criminal oppression to manage the citizenry. General lawlessness thrives; gangs and criminal groups become more widespread and end up ruling the streets of the cities. Anarchy becomes a norm and to get protection people look to warlords and other prominent figures who express ethnic or clan unity (Klein et al., 2002). An example of this would be the Darfur region of Sudan where the government could not control the entire country allowing this region to be controlled by rebel groups (Bates, 2007).

The conferring of failure to Africa is done biasedly. For an example, the US Civil War which occurred 100 years after their professed revolutionary war and Independence has never been
referred to as failure but regarded as an important juncture in the development of the contemporary US state. Similarly, during the French Revolution, France was in a constant state of chaos and disorder, disorder and civil conflict; yet this period has never been considered to be an instance of state failure but regarded an important period in the emergence of the modern French state (Wai, 2012). By contrast, African state’s independence is on average 55 years this year, which is nearly half the period it took for both US and France to constitute their individual states, but they are already theorized as failed state (ibid).

2.7 Failed states and their link to terrorism

One cannot expound on the concept of state failure devoid of the fatal 9/11 terrorist attacks. Although the concept is not new, it nonetheless gained more momentum post these 9/11 attacks. The US foreign policy transformed and more resources were dedicated into deterring future terrorists’ attacks, initiatives and partnerships were called for to counter terrorism and a declared mission to combat terrorism termed the Global War on Terror (GWOT) was set to motion. Failed states were held to be offering places of protection, operation and spaces to raise funds for terrorists groups. This is because failed states are not able to control parts or all of their territories. This creates vacuums which make it easy for terrorists groups to operate undetected in these unwatched territories/vacuums (Milliken, 2003). Examples of these are states like Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Somalia who leave portions of their territories governmentally empty through their incapability to exert power and establish authority within their countries (Rotberg, 2002).

Since failed states lack control in some or all parts of their countries; their boarders are usually the key areas where this lack of control most occurs. These porous borders subsequently become breeding grounds for a number of illegal practices. These practices include illegal arms trade, drugs trade, human trafficking, prostitution, customs and tax evasion, smuggling of goods and recruitment and use of child soldiers. Out of this range of illicit practices, a number of other authors have considered failing and failed states as proving safe havens for terrorist groups. Thus, these states are posing threats to the international community because their problems are likely to spill across their boarders (Carment, 2003; Crocker, 2003; Diamond, 2002; Fukuyama, 2004; Hamre & Sullivan, 2002; Kahler, 2002; Mallaby, 2002; Rotberg, 2002; Sanderson, 2004; Takeyh & Gvosdev, 2002).
Terrorist groups thrive in failed or failing states primarily because they are easily penetrated into and have inept and untrustworthy law enforcement capabilities. Failed or failing states lack the ability to police their entire territory. All these conditions grant terrorists leeway to assemble, generate income, train, recruit and establish communication mediums above those possible in non-failed states (Takeyh & Gvosdev, 2002). This situation can be regarded as the exploitation of ‘stateless areas’ which is “the use of actual, spatial regions of a country that are beyond the policing control of the central government and within which non-state actors can set up autonomous political, economic, and social institutions, or the segments of a polity of a country that are impenetrable by state power and provide networks of resistance to state authority” (Piazza, 2008:471). A larger pool of potential terrorist recruits is also offered by failed states. This is because failed states comprise of great numbers of disgruntled, disloyal, insecure and marginalized populace in which political strife is an accepted manner of conduct. Through their incompetence, failed states foster political goods voids or vacuums which can be utilized by terrorist groups and provide personal security, economic support and other services meant to be provided by the government in order so as to win the backing of local people and broaden their undertakings (ibid).

Understanding a state in this manner predisposes institutional centered interventions when a state is held to have failed or is in the course of failing. Remedies advocated for are consequently robust multi or unilateral military interventions and a variety of policies such establishing stable or strengthening democratic institutions and increasing economic support (Newman, 2009). Countering the threats posed by terrorists subsequently requires cooperation between law enforcement and the military instruments of power. The military is to establish protected access into the areas where terrorists operate within failed states whilst the law enforcers will identify, locate and arrest terrorist suspects from these areas (ibid). This demonstrates the importance of the general security forces in salvaging failed states be it in a form of the military, police or the intelligence unit. It is further argued that failed states offer little room for absorbing capacity-building efforts by external players in the absence of a functioning security sector (ibid), hence the significance of the security forces.
2.8 Failed states and development

Not only are failed states a global security threat through their harboring of terrorist groups. They also cause many other contemporary problems such as poverty, illicit economic activities, refugees, human rights violations, causing conflicts, organized crime, humanitarian emergencies, regional instability, and hamper attempts to advance democracy, good governance and economic sustainability (Wyler, 2008). This is ensured through the lack of development in weak, failing or failed states (Fukuyama, 2004).

Strong states are able to provide essential governmental services to their citizens. They can govern their territories, provide civil and political rights, protection, order, justice, infrastructure, and are well developed (Sorens, 1999). The robustness of these states ensures that they can govern their entire territories thereby reducing the possibilities of terrorist groups operating in their countries undetected. On the contrary, weak states are always underdeveloped states. Securing development in weak states will thus progress them into stronger states capacitated to control their territories. The assumption is the same as in curbing state failure through the strengthening of control and security. It is assumed that development can be imported through various mechanisms ranging from importing policies, strategies and enhancing or creating institutions which are prone to development. It is argued that sustainable development requires definite specific preconditions. Since these preconditions are lacking in weak, failing and failed states, there is a need to create them to ensure development; without which development will not be forthcoming (ibid).

Weak, failing and failed states are therefore not only a threat to global security, but are furthermore an impediment to sustainable development. The advocates of weak/failed state discourse argue that the chief reason for underdevelopment in African countries has been the failure of the state. Due to their weakness, these states fall short of delivering basic services, maintaining law and order, supporting basic economic functions and raising significant revenues to develop their economies. They have a weak rule of law and thus weak justice systems and institutions which are fundamental in creating societies that facilitate growth and development (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2012). The economic deficiency in these failing states produces a lack of a rational national economy appropriate for the fundamental wellbeing of all citizens (Sorens, 1999). In trying to assist Africa’s poor performing economies
post-independence; externally recommended economic based initiatives such as the Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs) were embarked on by many African states during the 1980s through to the 1990s. The rationale was that strong economic growth will trickle down to benefit all segments of the society (Riddell, 1992). Although these policies were meant to generate rapid growth and accelerate development, it was recognized that they produced negative impacts for the poor. They failed to integrate environmental and social concerns which worsened poverty, inequalities and environmental degradation. It was therefore concluded that guaranteeing sustainable development would entail using a holistic approach which not only concentrates on economic factors but social and environmental concerns as well. The view that compartmentalized social, economic and environmental factors was discarded for a position that acknowledged the interactions and interlinks between the economic, social and environmental factors of sustainable development (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2012).

Regardless of this change in rationale and policy instruments; the significance of state institutions is still prevalent, reasonably so given that the state (or its weakness) is still regarded as the chief culprit for underdevelopment in Africa. It is held that institutional sustainability is an imperative for achieving sustainable development in Africa. The linking and construction of a holistic approach to sustainable development still need to be done within an environment of well-defined and responsive institutional framework. Although a number of African states have made good progress in incorporating environmental issues in their development plans and strategies, the institutional and legal frameworks for environmental management are still insufficient (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2012). Interventions to remedy this include the establishment of institutional capacity for proper monitoring and evaluation of policies, stimulating political will which includes good governance and reconstructing the economy. The reinforcement of the institutions of democratic governance will increase participation which in turn will warrant transparency and accountability. Reconstructing the economy is meant to revive the foundations of economic development and includes refurbishing the infrastructure, roads, schools and the general public structures (Di John, 2008). Important to note in this holistic approach is that there is a link between security, peace, state capacity and economic reconstruction (Zoellick, 2009). Sustainable development flourishes best in a setting of good governance, peace and security. Africa’s paramount development requirement is consequently the preservation of an environment of peace and security. In Africa’s weak, failing and failed
states; this necessitate that peace building, state building and economic reconstruction ought to occur first before any true quest to development can begin. The state building process enhances institutional capacity and the state’s legitimacy. It ensures the development of an effective government that is founded on law and generally agreed upon legal codes. Through this linkage of security and development, this model facilitates for a smooth transition from instability to peace and stability and finally sustainable development (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2012).

The state is responsible for its own weaknesses and failures. Accordingly, to safeguard development, it needs to overcome the challenges that lead to its weakness such as its failure to provide security, weak governance, limited administrative capacity and lack of viable governmental institutions. It is in this sense that the state still remains important and crucial in ensuring development and promoting economic growth. The state is seen as a unitary actor capable of strategically assessing its situations and act in accordance with maximizing its interests. It is treated as an organic entity and afforded with an ontological status (Migdal, 1994). State failure theory treats states as a homogenous entities; a state in one part of the world will thus be the same everywhere else. Consequently, the notion of building and importing institutions or policies that have strengthened the state in one place is viewed not only as a possibility but also as a practical and sensible quest.

Notwithstanding the realization that the state should not be the engine for growth, its role however has evidently not lessened. It is still maintained that the state ought to be a proficient and credible facilitator of economic development. It should create enough revenue to attract investors to grow the economy and play a guiding and monitoring role in facilitating for the well-functioning of the market. It is well established government institutions that enable this proper functioning of the market, drive and sustain growth in the long term and protect the economy against both internal and external shocks (Rodrik, 2006). Other key needs are a legal framework, taxation systems and a well-developed infrastructure (Di John, 2008). Sorens (1999) contends that successful development has never occurred deprived of the vital part played by the state in this century. He continues to simplify the function or role of the state in development in three relevant features; state autonomy, state capacity and statecraft. State autonomy is the amount of freedom the state and the bureaucracy have to maneuver and operate within the state. State
capacity is concerned with the degree of efficiency of the bureaucracy including the security forces and their machineries which ensure order. Statecraft refers to the state’s capability to formulate proper policy to address development challenges and promote ones that are development responsive (ibid).

In an effort to assist in the entrenchment of development in Africa and to afford Africans a feeling of ownership of strategies and policies that enhance development; organizations such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) were established with support from the United Nations as plans for the continent to provide conducive environments for peace, security, democracy and good governance which are all necessary preconditions for sustainable development (http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/development/international.shtml). The underlying rational behind this argument is that when performed and aligned correctly, certain policies and conditions guarantee development. The argument is that good governance will make democracy thrive thereby reducing the opportunities of a conflict. This democracy in turn makes good government more possible. This good government ought to subsequently bring about institutional consolidation, political consistency and the functioning of the rule of law that is generally regarded as the essential framework for investment. With more investment will come economic growth which provides the bases for development (Chabal, 2002).

Highlighting the difficulty to achieve sustainable growth in weak and failing states; the World Bank has detailed that virtually all states identified as fragile in the 1980s are still fragile today (World Bank, 2006). Due to the rigid notion of the Weberian state; non-compliance to it is seen as a negative and as failure. The state is seen as a structure of command, it is understood as a policing force that watches, regulates and controls the society as opposed to a force that is in interaction with the society. This understanding allows for no other characterization of the state. The World Bank’s findings may be displaying that the so called fragile states represent a different kind of statehood than the classical Weberian state. To have maintained the so called weakness or fragility for so many years may be an indication that whatever conditions are thriving in that state constitute to what that state is and not its lack thereof.
2.9 State in society approach

Contrasting the Weberian concept of the state advocated by the state failure proponents is what Migdal (1994) coined the ‘state in society’ view. He considers the Weberian idea of the state to overestimate the power and autonomy of the state. The underlying understanding being that the state is not a fixed ideological entity but an embodiment of ongoing dynamics. His fundamental argument is that the arrangement of domination (or control in state failure terminology) is informed by significant struggles that are dispersed in society’s several fields of domination and opposition. Officials or bureaucrats operating and interacting at different capacities and levels of the state are the key participants in these struggles. In different cases; these struggles may result in two types of domination, either into integrated domination or dispersed domination. In integrated domination, the state or possibly other social forces establish an extensive power base where they acts in a coherent fashion. In dispersed domination, both the state and other social forces are unable to achieve extensive domination nationwide and components of the state may be pulled in fairly different directions. In this environment stems a recursive relationship between the state and society whose interactions are mutually transforming. People get transformed as they embrace the symbols or codes of the state, and the state as it embrace symbols or codes of the society (ibid).

The Weberian notion is fixated only on one dimension of the state. It is only concerned with institutional composition, codified rules and formidable bureaucracy. The state however cannot be regarded to consist of only this. There exists another dimension of the state, which is “the formulation and transformation of its goals” (Migdal, 1994:12). In the process of the state’s interactions with several social forces; it does not only battle with but also accommodate different moral patterns. The state is but another organization in a given society; as such it also has real limits to its power. It is not constant in nature, opposing views from other social forces together with absorptions or accommodations of these groups result in modifications in its make-up. These engagements of the state and other social forces are revealed in the implementation of policy (Migdal, 1994). To reveal this engagement with the society, Migdal’s interpretation disaggregate the state into four levels, the trenches, the dispersed field offices, the agency’s central offices and the commanding heights. In the trenches operates state officials who must accomplish state’s instructions directly in societies, examples of such officials include but not limited to teachers, police officers, tax collectors and foot soldiers. In the dispersed field offices
are officials a notch higher than those in the trenches. These are local and regional bodies that revise and establish state policies and directives; they include military and police units, courts and legislative bodies. The agency’s central offices act as focal points where the formulation and enactment of national policies occurs and where resources for the implementation of these policies are directed from. The last level is the commanding height which is at highest point of the state. Here reside the top leadership of the state; although they depend on the lower levels for daily functioning of the state, they may not entirely identify with these other units of the state. These units instead become other pressure points amidst many domestic and international forces that seek to influence the state’s top leadership. Granted these patterns; it is clear why states scarcely produce a single homogenous response to problems. At different points, the different officials of the state experiences different pressures from different forces. These different patterns of forces experienced by each component of the state mean these components will have dissimilar histories, interests, determination and biases. Consequently, the idea of an overall autonomy of the state expressed by state failure proponents is questionable (ibid).

It is true that it has become impossible to understand the term society devoid of the state. This does not however entail that the state molds the groups that compose the society (such that if the state weakens, its weakness will trickle down to society). As held above, outcomes of interactions between the state and other social forces are mutually transforming. They seldom reveal the intentions and determinations embedded in either. The struggles and accommodations that occur during these interactions can result in four ideal types of outcomes. The first is total transformation. Here the state succeeds in coopting or overpowering the social forces into the state’s domination or control. The state succeeds in transforming how the people in that setting identify themselves. The second is the state’s incorporation of existing social forces. Here the state is altered as it accommodates and adapts to specific patterns and forces in that setting. The third is the incorporation of the state by existing social forces. Here “the organization and symbols of the state’s components are appropriated by the local dominating social forces” (Migdal, 1994:25) such that the outcome is not what the state leaders had projected. The last is the state’s total failure in its attempt at penetration. This occurs when the state fails to engage with social forces in a certain local setting which results in little transformative effects on the society and vice versa (ibid). In a number of arenas or settings, social forces have reorganized to enable themselves to take proper measures against new realities of ambitious states. In places
where these social forces have found or created spaces and mechanisms to sustain or sometimes increase their own social and economic power outside the state’s moral composition and rules; the character of the society becomes a dispersed domination. Here both the state and the social forces have not been able to establish an overall hegemony. “Domination by any one social force takes place within an arena or even across a limited number of arenas but does not encompass the society as a whole” (Migdal, 1994:27).

Agreeing with Migdal’s argument are authors such as Azarya & Chazan (1987); Boas (2010); Boege et al. (2009); Bokonyi (2013); de Herdt et al. (2012) and Raeymaekers (2005). Although different from the west, practical statehood does exist in Africa through traditional institutions. This reality is however not recognized by the Weberian definition as it mistakenly equates the lack of a central government to anarchy. For an example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the state administration has greatly withdrawn from the public domain. According to the state failure theories using the Weberian definition of a state; the DRC state has failed and is in turmoil for it no longer performs its basic state functions. Research conducted in the city of Lubumbashi of the DRC however demonstrates functionality (de Herdt et al., 2012). Administrative tasks that are ideally deemed to fall in state realms are performed locally, taxes or levies and security are all performed and offered outside the central government but are still as effective if not better. The education sector particularly is also doing significantly well. This domain was traditionally reserved for the state, but is still flourishing without it. This is a demonstration of how the provision of public services and goods is maintained and how the Congolese state continues to endure and transform itself. Albeit no overall regulatory authority oversees the system, books are still provided to schools and teachers still receive their wages (de Herdt et al., 2012). Essentially then, the state’s governmental structure whose function is to provide public services has been redefined instead of being dissipated. This is as a result of a continuous process of negotiation between state and non-state actors of the DRC. It illustrates how this negotiated character of statehood in Africa with its power differences between the different actors advance through continuous renegotiation. This form of regulation does not and cannot produce uniform results. The outcome of such regulation is contingent upon power configurations and upon particular situations at particular times (de Herdt et al., 2012). Social forces continue assuming control of greater number of services traditionally regarded as
functions of the modern state. The absence of government has not meant the absence of governance.

The Weberian analysis of the state is founded on the western liberal statehood and is detached from historical realities on the ground in African states. Thus by default, it is unable to capture and understand the nature of African statehood. Contrary to proponents of state failure argument which holds that when a state fails, it necessarily leads to the failure of the entire society; whose collapse is described as the extended breakdown of social coherence, Raeymaekers (2005) explains that where the state has defaulted in service delivery, non-state actors occupy this space and provide the required serves. This negates the argument that a vacuum is created when the state recedes. Instead of focusing on institutional capacity, Raeymaekers focuses on the state-society struggles for political control. There exists no clear distinction or hierarchy in these struggles, the state itself is an organization within the society and not above it “The implosion of state structures is thus understood, not merely as an institutional ‘collapse’ or breakdown, but as a culmination point in the struggle, between various forces in society, to establish an integrated social control over society” (Raeymaekers, 2005:6). Aligned with Migdal, Raeymaekers (2005) also conclude that possible outcomes of these struggles could either be that one force emerges dominant and thus extend its power to the entire society or no force is able to dominate which yield a dispersed domination and thus fragmented social control. Here the struggle for social control is predicted to pass to always lower levels of the society through the reinforcement of collective limitations to the benefit of more clan based organizations (ibid). It suffices to argue than that whatever the outcome of these struggles become; it cannot be viewed as an abnormality, weakness, fragility, failure or collapse, it will simply be a resultant of struggles in a social space where social forces are constantly engaging each other in struggles for control of their shared social space or territory.

The discourse of both state failure and development are based on the modern western-style Weberian state whose fixation is on institutions. A number of states outside the West do not however resemble this model of a state; in which state institutions are not the sole institutions that accomplish functions which are regarded as the state’s obligations by the Weberian definition of the state (Boege et al., 2009). Moreover, in rural areas, the state habitually has no has relevance to many. In these areas, non-state customary institutions with roots to pre-colonial
past and have considerable resilience and adaptiveness still have an important role in the community’s daily life. Local entities such as indigenous knowledge, customary law, extended families, clans, chiefs, village elders, religious leaders, tribes and healers determine everyday social realities in populations in these areas. Furthermore, state institutions are relatively infiltrated by these ‘informal’ local social forces and institutions. In such countries, often the unparalleled mechanism to make state institutions operational is through the use of traditional systems or networks; in this way a condition of “co-existence, overlap and blending emerges” (Boege et al., 2009:8). The resultants of such a setting Boege et al. (2009) have termed ‘hybrid political orders’, where there is a co-existence of political and social organizations with origins in both non-state traditional societal structures and inaugurated state structures. In these hybrid political orders, different and competing authority structures and claims to power coincide, interact and intertwine, merging western and traditional elements of governance. Here “the state has no privileged monopolistic position as the only agency providing security, welfare, and representation” (Boege et al., 2009:17), it instead has to share its capacity, legitimacy and authority with other institutions (ibid).

To conclude; there stands stark differences in the characterizations of the African state, what it constitutes or ought to constitute of, its functions, struggles and how to overcome these struggles. On the one end stand scholars who view and define the state as another entity within societal political struggles. The state will thus differ in different contexts owing to different societal struggles. This difference does not prove failure, but merely reveals the difference in struggles engaged on by different societies on different challenges. On the other end stand proponents of state failure who use Weber’s definition of the state. Here the state is an entity that has the monopoly of power or force within its jurisdiction (Gert & Mills, 1946). The definition is universal, discounting other societal entities that may not have the monopoly of power but still perform state functions. The discounting of other forms of states results in these other forms being regarded as malfunctioning or failing; the lack of the monopoly of power is equated to failure. Weber’s definition captures Western composition of the state but falls short on capturing realities of the African state. If it is thus used to describe the African state; African states will be viewed as failing for they do not conform to the stipulated definition. To illustrate this further, the following chapter will use Somalia as a case study to show how this state has been regarded
as a failed state albeit other societal entities fulfilling functions of the state and generally maintaining order.
Chapter 3: State failure in Somalia

3.1 Introduction
Using Somalia as a case study, this chapter illustrates the misunderstanding of the state in Africa embedded in Weber’s definition of the state and how it ought to operate. It also shows how conclusions drawn from these misunderstandings have aided to worsen the conflict in Somalia instead of providing solutions to the conflict.

3.2 The composition of the Somali people
Unlike many other African countries; Somalia consists of only one ethnic group. Although with a common culture, language and religion, Somalia has a populace divided by clans and further sub clans within these clans. The distinction between these two being that a sub-clan is derived from a clan. A clan is larger in size and can be defined as a traditional social unit comprised of interrelated or interconnected families. Members or families of this group usually believe and claim to have descended from a common or same ancestor. A sub-clan is a branch of a large clan. It does not exist on its own but within a larger group, being a clan (Hussein, 2007). In Somalia, there are six main clans and then sub clans, which can also branch further into sub-sub clans right down to household level. Four of the six closely share cultural ties and language; they are the Isaaq, Hawiye, Darod and Dir, collectively referred to as Samaale. These are the larger population constituting approximately 75% of ethnic Somalis (Hesse, 2011). The other two are the Rahanweyn and Digil, collectively referred to as Digil-Mirifle. They constitute approximately 20% of ethnic Somalis. The Samaales are historically nomadic clans and inhabit the northern parts of the country whilst the Digil-Marifle are historically sedentary farmers and inhabit the southern parts of the country (ibid), this entails that a substantial number of Somalis are nomadic or semi nomadic herders. The rest of the minority populace are either fishermen or farmers (Lewis et al., 2009). Principally, all Somalis are Sunni Moslems; as a result, Islam and its practices are at the center of everyday life. They form the belief system, the culture and even the structure for government (ibid). It is consequently not surprising that outlooks, gender roles and customs are primarily based or derived from Islamic beliefs in Somalia.

Comparable to virtually all African settings, family is very important in the Somali communal settings. The emphasis of the entire Somali culture is on the family. It is more important than the sole person in all levels and aspects of life. This importance of a collective family structure
extends to the importance of a collective clan structure (Elmi, 2010). Prior to colonization,
Somalis organized themselves through a reciprocal social system, using kinship associations,
unwritten customary law (Heer) and religious laws (Qanoon/Sharia) to manage their political life
(Samatar, 1994). For order and ensuring recompense where it is due; they have historically
ordered themselves into communal insurance associations called diya-groups, which translates
blood wealth (Hesse, 2011). Members of these groups are collectively bound to pay and receive
damages from other groups. Subsequently, in the event of a committed murder, the perpetrator
and his entire group are expected to pay the family of the deceased along with the entire group
that that family belongs to. When compensation is not received, the victims group can in turn
inflict blood revenge not only on the perpetrator but also on any of the family member and group
members of the perpetrator (Hesse, 2011). The group does not only share blood money or guilt
however, members are also bound in other various social areas. The groups have an unwritten or
informal contractual agreement to support other members of the group and share wealth and
payment responsibilities as well. During hardships or emergency situations, members have an
obligation to assist other members in need. This can be done through alms giving, loan sharing,
giving away animals or through mixed herding. Elders are elected and compensated to represent
individual groups (Ahmed & Green, 1999).

From pre-colonial times, the general economic foundations of the Somali society have been and
are still comparable to those of political state institutions and its practices. This is ensured
through a kinship that uses a combination of customary law and blood-ties. Order is not only
maintained at higher levels of groups but is safeguarded at different levels of the society. It
begins from the family level where each household (the Reer) is led by the eldest male, a
grandfather or father who at a certain age is expected to have attained a substantial measure of
competence in local culture, values and history and can thus maintain order and teach acceptable
behavior in his household. The society lives communally abiding to certain unwritten rules and
regulations to ensure fairness and order. These include Miilo, which is a fixed, and transparent
practice used to warrant a fair distribution of a valuable resource, water, agreements and
arrangements on access to planting and grazing pasture, and mutual claim on one another’s
labors (Hoehne, 2009).
3.3 Colonization and independence (1800s-1960s)

Similar to the fate of virtually all African countries, Somalia was a colony since the mid-1800s till 1960 when it’s gained its independence. Unlike other African colonies however, who had one colonial master; ill-fatedly for Somalia, it was colonized by three different powers, namely, France, Britain and Italy. This was profit-orientated occupation for each power was motivated to secure and safeguard the route to India through the Suez Canal (Roth, 2004). France controlled the northernmost region (present day Djibouti) whilst Britain controlled the north naming it British Somaliland (present day Somaliland). Finally, Italy controlled the south naming it Italian Somaliland (Lewis et al., 2009). Other fellow African states also had control over some parts of Somalia; Ethiopia controlled the region of Ogaden which post World War II legitimately fell back to Somalia’s control through a United Nation’s (UN) arbitrated agreement in 1948. To date however, this region is still contested by these two countries. Due to the contentions within Somalia however, the region is still controlled by Ethiopia albeit the fact that a number of Somalis believe it ought to be reunited with the larger Somalia. Lastly, to the west, neighboring Kenya controlled Somali areas that boarded with its northern most parts (ibid).

In 1960, British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland peacefully gained independence from their respective colonizers. Together, they subsequently forged the current boarders that Somalia has and formed a unitary state. In 1977, Djibouti also attained its independence from France. Although keeping close ties with Somalia, it nonetheless opted to be an independent state from the larger Somalia (Roth, 2004). Shortly after their independence in 1960, the Somali civilian government allied its state with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), predominantly as a mechanism to distance itself from its former European colonizers. As has been recognized to be the case in almost all post-colonial Africa, Somalia’s successive ruling class or governments were not well trained to cater for their societies’ needs. Compounding the situation was the inheriting of the colonial systems and administration that were fundamentally created to cater only for a few elite whilst manipulating the masses so as to maximize profits. Similar to the colonial years, there were no true attempts to transform, alter or develop basic infrastructure for the gains of the entire populace. Many resources were instead spent on improving the bureaucratic administration and military capacity which was often used to curb dissatisfied and general populace who would not cooperate with the current government (Ahmed, 1995). Compounding the problem was that more clansmen from Samaale took strategic and better
positions than the clansmen from the Digil-Mirifle, this has sometimes been attributed to the fact that the British offered their northern colony a higher standard of education than that offered by their Italian counterparts to their southern colony. From independence therefore, centers of government and consequently authority came to be associated more with clans than with the state (Hesse, 2011).

Still similar to the rest of post-colonial Africa belief, having waited for independence for a lengthy period, Somalis believed that independence would bring about quick changes, quick improvements and quick better lifestyles and flourishing futures. When this did not materialize quickly, the populace began pronouncing their dissatisfactions and frustrations. The situation intensified in 1969 when President Shermaarke was assassinated. Debates in parliament over who will succeed him were all futile. Contentions consequently continued and in mid-1969, a combined force of Somalia’s military and police staged a coup led by General Mohammed Siad Barre. This combined security force placed the constitution aside, prohibited political parties and dissolved all the three branches of government, the executive, parliament and the judiciary. It established a decision making body, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) which was meant to rid Somalia of all its quandaries (Samatar & Laitin, 1987). The SRC comprised of 24 high ranking military and police officials and held positions in key and strategic government ministries, namely, Department of Defense, Information and National Guidance and Internal Affairs (Farah, 2001). A new military government was fully fledged with General Mohamed Siad Barre as its president. Although fundamentally a military government, it rallied and recruited a number of qualified civilians to assume ministerial portfolios. This assisted it to gain backing, for people appreciated the use of merits as an apparatus to being awarded senior positions. Its pronouncement of socialist and nationalist ideals together with its emphasis on self-reliance and declared war against tribalism also assisted the SRC’s public acclaim enormously (ibid). In its early years therefore, this regime enjoyed popular support and cooperation from the general public.

3.4 State failure in Somalia
As years passed, General Mohammed Siad Barre’s government fell into a trap that its predecessors suffered from. The regime became oligarchic and oppressive. With this, support from the masses waned and criticisms increased including complaints about Barre’s lack of
assertiveness in regaining Ogaden back from Ethiopia. This discontent led to a formation of a number of clan-based militias which aimed to oppose and eventually overthrow Barre’s regime. As this strife continued, Somalia was still engaged in fighting with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region. The USSR then began providing aid to Ethiopia which led President Barre to break off all ties with it (Samatar 1994). With this repositioning, the United States (US) which was still engaged in a cold war with the USSR saw an opportunity to make Somalia an ally to win it over from their enemies, the Soviets (Elmi, 2012). It then began to supply economic and military aid to Somalia. When this aid eventually ceased, Barre could no longer maintain ultimate power and a complete civil war broke out from 1988 – 1991 resulting in Barre ultimately being exiled in 1991 (Lewis et al., 2009).

The year 1991 was a year that initiated a succession of difficulties for Somalia. Various militias were formed and competed for the control of the country. Various regions declared unilateral independence; namely, the Republic of Somaliland in the northwest, Puntland in the northeast and numerous other states in the south also followed suit and declared their autonomy (Hesse, 2011). Expectedly and as common in any conflicting environment; the recurrent fighting caused the infrastructure to break down and the general bureaucratic processes and functions were halted. This is when failure began according to the Weberian definition of the state, which regards the bureaucracy as the main driver of the state. State failure theorist reason that when Barre left, a vacuum appeared (Samatar, 1994); meanwhile there were clan leaders and other dissent groups who took control of the capital and were providing public services albeit some only to their respective regions (Harper, 2012). Explaining this dire failure Pham (2011) argues that Somalia’s state turmoil is no momentary interruption of public institutions; this state cannot even be accurately categorized as a failed state for there exists no state that can be referred to as having failed. The features from which a state has to be constructed from are non-existent. There are no bureaucrats or qualified people who can be used to organize a new government, no system for tax collection, no police or army force. These governmental services are instead performed by local clan structures devoid of any hierarchical structure or order.

The state failure theory is a state centered/centric theory. It regards the fundamental reasons of state failure or collapse to be found only within a given state, external forces are therefore of no significant consequence. As a result, the fact that both the USSR and the US at different
junctures funded the Barre regime and thus assisted in guaranteeing its grip to power longer and its ability to suppress opposition is unduly not considered. The theory is also ahistorical; failure of the state of Somalia is consequently analyzed devoid of its colonial history and the legacies of the colonial state. What is held to be an important measure is how much geographical territory the government presently controls. Rotberg (2002) notes that Somalia is an exemplary of state collapse; it only has boarders but no effective manner to exercise authority within these boarders. Since failed states fail to control their borders, they also lose large segments of their territory with their power regularly restricted to the capital city and one or a few other ethnically specific zones. The territories where the government has no control over may be controlled by insurgence or rebels who are contesting the government (ibid). This depiction befitted Somalia whose successive attempts of establishing a fully functioning government continuously resulted in a unit that could only exercise its powers in the capital of Mogadishu and or in a few other regions.

It is also maintained that the environment in failed states is constantly tense and full of hostilities. In many of them, the government troop’s battle armed insurgency. Failure appears when violence escalates into a thorough internal war. When population’s standard of living deteriorates, basic infrastructure deteriorates and when the leader’s greediness causes them to neglect their responsibilities to the people (Rotberg, 2002). This description also befitted Somalia. Due to the continuous fighting, vicinities have been demolished, hospitals overcrowded by casualties and an estimated 300 000 of populace from the city have been displaced (Mankhaus, 2007). Regarded as another pointer of state failure is the growth of criminal violence; when the state cannot control other territories, its power starts to weaken and it begins to utilize criminal oppression to manage the citizenry. General lawlessness thrives; gangs and criminal groups become more widespread and end up ruling the streets of the cities. Anarchy becomes a norm and to get protection people submit to warlords and other prominent figures who express ethnic or clan unity (Klein et al., 2002). In the absence of a state police force in Somalia, this depiction of failure has occurred as clan based militias have taken over the security service and guard over their kin territories and in some regions get remuneration for these services (Elmi, 2010).
3.5 Interventions to halt failure and resuscitate the state

On June 2015, the Washington DC based non-governmental organization, the Fund for Peace and the Foreign Policy Group published their eleventh annual Fragile States Index (FSI) placing Somalia on number two of this list. Before 2014, Somalia had occupied the number one spot on the list for six consecutive years. It is now however displaced from being the most failed state in the world by the youngest state in Africa, South Sudan (http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/). Being declared a failed state necessitates interventions to rectify and undo the alleged failure. In a quest to end the alleged failure in Somalia; numerous peace talks were held in which a number of transitional regimes were formed but never succeeded in bringing back order. The talks held in Arta, Djibouti cumulated in the creation of a Transitional National Government (TNG). The TNG was however dominated by Mogadishu-based clans (a faction called the Mogadishu Group) specifically the Hawiye and the Gedir/Ayr sub clans and thus failed to serve as a foundation for an administration of national unity. It consequently was challenged by an alliance of clan factions called the Somali Reconciliation and Rehabilitation Council (SRRC) headed by Abdullahi Yusuf, president of the northeast state of Puntland who was supported by the Ethiopian government (Hessse, 2011). Blatant differences existed between the SRRC and the Mogadishu Group. The SRRC was supported by Ethiopia, dominated by families of the Darood clan family, strictly anti-Islamic, federalist and mostly based in regions outside Mogadishu. The Mogadishu Group was backed by the Arab world, strikingly anti-Ethiopian, comprised of Islamists and their allies, dominated by families from the Hawiye clan family and adopted an idea of a strong central government as opposed to a decentralized federal state (Menkhaus, 2007).

Owing to the challenges of the Mogadishu Group dominating the TNG, another set of peace talks began in Kenya in 2002. These were under the sponsorship of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). They culminated in October 2004 with a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (Hoehne, 2009). Parliament was elected in a manner that ensured that all the four major Somali clans were equally represented. The transitional parliament’s election of a president saw the victory of Abdullahi Yusuf (an ally of Ethiopia and a Darood clan member) as president of the transitional government. Allegations however arose that Ethiopia had purchased parliamentarians’ votes to ensure their ally wins. President Yusuf selected Mohamed Ghedi as Prime Minister who was also recognized as a close ally to Ethiopia. Power was concentrated in
the hands of Ethiopian-supported SRRC alliance and in the President’s fellow clan leaders. Leaders associated with the previous Mogadishu Group, which had previously dominated the TNG were noticeably marginalized. What was meant to forge a foundation for national unity was once again a base for contention (Hesse, 2011).

Aware of this marginalization, the Mogadishu Group did not initially dismiss the TFG but persistently attended parliamentary sessions in Nairobi, Kenya. Glaring divisions began when decisions had to be taken concerning the parliament’s move to the Somali capital of Mogadishu. President Yusuf proposed that foreign peacekeepers, including Ethiopia be deployed to Mogadishu so as to pacify the capital before the parliament relocate and that in the interim, the seat of government be temporary located in an interim capital of Baidoa or Jowhar on the reasoning that Mogadishu was still hostile. Both suggestions were rejected by the Mogadishu Group who knew of the leverage they had in the capital (Menkhaus, 2007). Consecutively, cabinet members from the Mogadishu Group did not attend meetings preventing the transitional parliament from reaching a quorum. As a result, parliament did not sit for nearly a year. Fearful of moving to Mogadishu, the Yusuf faction of the TFG ultimately moved to the town of Jowhar, Somali and then Baidoa respectively (ibid).

In state failure theory, failure is meant to delineate particular set of situations and to omit states that only fulfill only a few of the specified conditions. This criterion is designed through a number of questions to be answered to determine if a state is failing or not. Questions cited are “how truly minimal are the infrastructure, schools, hospitals and clinics? How far has the GDP fallen and infant mortality risen? How far does the influence of the central government reach? How little legitimacy remains? Most important yet, because civil conflict is held to be decisive for state failure, can the state still provide security to its citizens and to what extent?” (Rotberg, 2002:11). Applying these sets of questions to Somalia yields a categorical failure. The TFG did not cooperate with each other and consequently could not create a united central force that could control the entire territory of Somalia. Following the relocation of the Yusuf wing, the Mogadishu Group consolidated its power in the capital through loose coalition with other Islamist groups namely shabaab, which translate ‘youth’, and the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC), which operated under the sharia court umbrella (Menkhaus, 2007). In a quest to trap Yusuf’s camp, the Mogadishu Group presented a proposal aimed at improving security and
essential municipal administration in the capital swiftly. This was termed the Mogadishu Stabilization and Security Plan (MSSP). This MSSP was founded on three pillars: “(i) a pre-demobilization cantonment of militia; (ii) improvement of public security through a removal of militia roadblocks in the city and (iii) the formation of district and municipal councils and administration in Mogadishu” (Menkhaus, 2007:366). This proposal meant that Yusuf would have to move the TFG to the capital dominated by the Mogadishu Group and expectedly Yusuf initially rejected the MSSP (ibid).

The residents of Mogadishu motivated by the hope that the MSSP would bring real public order to the city compelled leaders of the Mogadishu Group to implement it. Businessmen and civil society groups offered their support to the initiative and it yielded positive results. With the help of civilians, a number of army barricades in and around the capital Mogadishu were removed. A Mogadishu city council, main city administrators and city district councils were selected by the Mogadishu Group. The security improvements brought by the MSSP were largely due to the successful mass mobilization which came to be known as the kadoon or uprising. The kadoon took the military by surprise by their steadfast involvement in ensuring the MSSP proposals were realized. Women groups were vitalized and constantly sounded militia checkpoints pressing militia youths to dismantle barricades. Predominant radio talk shows were congested with visits and calls from people voicing their dissatisfaction and stern condemnation of militia leaders and others contributing to insecurity in the capital. Fears of this people power and grass-roots reaction to the MSSP began in the Mogadishu-Group; they consequently made certain that it was neutralized. Many of the achievements achieved through the pressure applied by the society were overturned. Militia barricades resurfaced and disbanded militiamen steadily returned to the capital (Menkhaus, 2007). Menkhaus further held that it was realistically far-fetched to believe that this grass-roots movement could reshape the politics of Somalia for the better (ibid).

Zartman (1995) maintained that state failure is man-made and therefore cannot be attributed to merely accidental, geographical, environmental or external factors. It is instead a consequence of poor leadership decisions and leadership failures. This leadership failure in turn causes anarchy in the society that has no institutions to regulate and govern over it. Using Zartman’s description; Menkhaus (2002) explains how the state of Somalia has failed. He holds that the Mogadishu Group’s proposal of the MSSP was never aimed at improving security in the capital. It was
instead a strategy to coerce President Yusuf to move the TFG to the capital where the Mogadishu Group would have veto power over it and enjoy protection from their Islamist military coalition. Notwithstanding the self-regarding interests and failure to put civilian’s interests and security first; the Mogadishu residents were not failing along with their leaders. They were able to mobilize and pressure the Mogadishu Group to implement the MSSP and moreover assisted through protests in reducing instability in the capital by demobilizing militiamen and reducing militia roadblocks. Owing to its statist approach; this societal mobilization that can and did change the political setting of Somalia during this period is disregarded by the state failure theory. Abundant concentration is on the state and its institutions. It is supposed that chaos in the state will automatically lead to chaos in the society. The state is seen as the only force governing the society and is essentially above it. If then the state in not in order as was the TFG government which had Islamists and non-Islamists factions, the society below it will also necessarily not be in order.

3.6 The US’s intrusion in the quest to halt terrorism
As governments of the supposedly failing and failed states lack control of their entire geographical territories; it is argued that this creates vacuums which can be used to harbor terrorist groups who in turn pose threats to international security (Milliken, 2003). Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US foreign policy transformed and more resources were dedicated into deterring future terrorists’ attacks and this necessitated that the supposedly failing states be reconstructed through different types of interventions. That Yusuf and thus the TFG were still outside the capital, meant the Islamist through the Mogadishu Group governed the capital. The US had long standing concerns about Somalia’s lawlessness that could provide safe haven for Al-Qaeda operatives. There was however no functioning central government that the US could work with; it consequently decided to forge alliances with non-state actors in its quest to counter terrorism. These local allies comprised of businessmen and different militia leaders. Together, they formed the US sponsored Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) (Elmi, 2012). Expectedly, this formation alarmed the Islamists who viewed it as a US move to target them (International Crises Group 2006). Shortly after this formation, armed confrontations between the Islamist militias and the Alliance ensued. The Alliance coalition was no match to the Islamists who had the notorious shabbab in their ranks. They had a striking
victory and further expanded their territorial control to a number of regions in south-central Somalia (ibid).

This assisted in further entrenching the Islamist power whilst the TFG power was only limited to Puntland in the interim capital of Baidoa and nearby areas. A dispute between the Islamists and an important Hawiye military leader over a governing of a municipal administration in Mogadishu however erupted. It culminated in a disbandment of the Mogadishu Group and control of the capital fell on the hands of another Islamists group identifying themselves as the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) (Menkhaus, 2007) others refer to it as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) (Hesse, 2011; International Crises Group, 2007; Marchal, 2007). The CIC consolidated its power through its consecutive wins of clashes with local militias and its ability to eliminate any potential platform or persons that could oppose it. One of the failures of the CIC cited by Menkhaus (2007) was the failure to institutionalize authority with itself. They never created a routinized, representative decision-making body. The chief functioning division of the CIC remained the sharia courts (of which some of its principles are regarded as undemocratic by the western world), which offered rudimentary policing and legal services to the capital and surrounding areas. It most powerful branch was however the military which had radical influences from the shabaab youth militia (ibid).

The Courts were nonetheless popular and gained much support from the masses because of their ability to offer security and order in the regions they operated in, particularly in the capital, Mogadishu. The courts were not necessarily extremists in their operations and orientation. They were undoubtedly entirely traditional and completely abode by sharia law. Sentences issued by the courts were in accordance with the sharia (Hoehne, 2009). Abiding by the societal clan based system, all courts operated within their respective clans and sub-clans. Consequently, a court could not arrest offenders or criminals who did not belong to the clan group of the court members. In a way, the courts worked as clan institutions (Harper, 2012). Clan and sub-clan elders would communicate wishes of their respective clans and all courts had to both abide by and respect these specified wishes. They also refrained from getting involved in clan political feuds to ensure neutrality (ibid).

They furthermore helped improve a number of things in Mogadishu as in other various areas they had control over. Life of many Somalis was much safer than in previous regimes, there was
a reestablishment of peace and security (Harper, 2012). The Mogadishu International Airport and harbor were reopened, an achievement that a number of previous transitional governments had failed to accomplish. Squatters were removed from government buildings, the illegal seizing of land was discontinued, and the numerous claims for the restitution of property were attended to through the opening of a number of special courts to deal with the claims (Elmi, 2012). With the help of school children and local people, they cleaned streets, brought an end to piracy, warlordism and political assassinations. In general, unarmed clans, the elderly, women, children and civilians welcomed and cherished this positive change (ibid). The overall successes of the CIC may have been romanticized but they did substantially bring order, security and dramatic improvements in the city of Mogadishu (Harper, 2012).

Alarmed by the successes of the CIC whilst using Islam as a foundation of governing legal codes and in part ill advised by Ethiopia, the US held that the CIC was controlled by Al-Qaeda, which therefore made fit an intervention to halt terrorism. This announcement occurred on 14 December 2006, a date that coincided with a visit from the European Commissioner (EC) Louis Michel who was in Somalia in a pursuit of mending relations between the fighting opponents (Hoehne, 2009). Consequently, whilst the EC perceived a secure and stable environment for negotiation, the US saw a terrorist infested environment. This ambiguity did not halt the Ethiopian-US war on terror, which was in any case was already underway. The CIC may have certainly contributed to the development of this terrorist discourse through some of the union leader’s remarks about jihad and their refusal to permit any observers from the international community to visit Mogadishu to confirm or refute allegations of Al-Qaeda terrorists in Somalia (ibid).

The CIC was overthrown by an invading Ethiopian military backed by the US, which marked the beginning of militant Islamism in Somalia. Al Qaeda capitalized on the platform and began its electronic jihad campaign in Somalia using the internet and television. It issued a response to the Ethiopian military intervention and the general US’s war on terrorism in Somalia by condemning the intervention and calling upon devoted jihadists to help the Somali mujahidin (which are Muslim guerrilla fighters devoted to jihad/a holy war especially against non-Muslim militias) (Hoehne, 2009). The strategy the US used against the CIC only helped create the exact thing it intended to destroy. Its misperception of the CIC aided the ascendancy of violent Islamism in
Somalia. “It might have been more productive if foreign powers had recognized and built upon the positive achievements of the UIC” (Harper, 2012:104). They instead destroyed the most successful attempt to reestablish order in the central and south regions of the country (ibid).

3.7 Interventions from International Organizations
Defeated by the overwhelming Ethiopian forces, the CIC retreated and the Ethiopian military occupied the capital uncontested. The TFG subsequently took control of significant government buildings with substantial protection from the Ethiopian military. This development was held by the international community especially the US as a chance to endorse reconciliation and resuscitate a functional central government. The TFG had to meet three conditions to be considered as a functioning government. It had to ensure security, reconciliation and show ability to govern. These became the foundation of US’s intervention in Somalia during 2007 (Menkhaus, 2007). The TFG however had no capacity to defend itself in a fiercely hostile capital of Mogadishu. Security therefore was of major concern granted Ethiopia’s intention to withdraw its forces from Mogadishu speedily. International ambassadors consequently pushed for the deployment of an African Union (AU) peacekeeping force termed the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to Mogadishu to replace the Ethiopian military that was to leave soon. A proposal of 8,000 peacekeepers was made and approved by the AU. It was only Uganda however who was prepared to send a band of 1,400 soldiers. With the constant and rapid deterioration of conditions in Mogadishu, other African states were further motivated to refuse sending their troops to Somalia. The Ethiopian military consequently stayed in Mogadishu longer than anticipated (ibid). The TFG did not enjoy popularity with the residents of Mogadishu as did the Mogadishu Group and the CIC before it. The second condition the TFG had to meet was reconciliation. This too it could not achieve, for all factions involved in the conflict took positions that guaranteed that no practical progress was achieved in peace dialogues. Leaders from the TFG refused to have any negotiations with the Islamists labeling them as extremists. The Mogadishu opposition on their part rejected all peace talks until the Ethiopian forces have totally vacated the country. It was increasingly becoming impossible to envisage a setting where the TFG and its Mogadishu counterparts would engage in earnest peace talks. International diplomats still pushed for the realization of the third condition, the capacity to govern. The major difficulty was in enhancing TFG’s capacity to afford public security and rule of law in the country (ibid). It was easy to predict that the TFG will also fail to meet the last condition of
capacity. It was barely capacitated to protect itself in Mogadishu; Ethiopian forces had to stay longer to continue providing security to the TFG (ibid).

The elongated stay of the Ethiopian forces and the unpopularity of the TFG which claimed to rule from the capital assured an armed defiance from the inhabitants of Mogadishu. In just two weeks of its relocation to Mogadishu, attacks on government buildings occupied by TFG began. Ethiopian convoys and military installations were also attacked and vital infrastructure was destroyed. The TFG and Ethiopian officials argued that the defiance comprised of Al-Qaeda terrorist and their Somali Islamic radical counterparts. They responded to the recurring attacks ferociously through a strategy they termed the ‘mopping up’ operation. Whole neighborhoods were bombed, resulting in fatalities approximated to surpass 1,000 in the first month of the fighting. Between 200 000 and 300 000 people were also displaced (Menkhaus, 2007). In an attempt reasoned to be a tactic to starve the opposition; the TFG halted humanitarian aid into the country by imposing a chain of regulatory restrictions. Embarrassed international backers of the TFG including the US shifted from quietly expressing their worries to the TFG to publicly engaging in diplomatic means to coerce the government on issues of humanitarian admittance (ibid). With this reaction, the TFG ticked on almost all the state failure criterion set out by Rotberg cited above. It attacked civilians; it had no monopoly of power, could not control the entire Somalia territory, had no functioning government institutions and importantly failed to provide security for itself and the citizenry it claimed to govern. The resulted substantial loss of life, displacement and damage of property and infrastructure are also in line with state failure theory. A remedy for this that is in line with the state failure theory is the formation of stronger governmental institutions, which will enable government to control its entire jurisdiction. The assumed deduction being that, if the TFG had control of its entire territory and had functioning institutions, the Mogadishu Islamists’ would have been pacified and attacks would have been evaded.

The European Union’s (EU) involvement in interventions in Somalia was motivated by the solidarity they had with the US in countering terrorism. They thus contributed towards the interventions as well as the former colonizers of the country, Italy and the United Kingdom (UK). Since its establishment in 2007, the EU has contributed EUR 411 million to AMISOM through the AU’s African Peace Facility and EUR 4.7 million to assist AMISOM’s planning
capacity. It also developed its European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM) in 2010 to offer training to more than 3,000 militias of the Somalia National Armed Force (SNAF) and financed the development and training of the new Somali national police force. During the Djibouti peace talks, western governments also agreed on a provision of $213 million to establish a strong army consisting of 6,000 men and a police force consisting of 10,000 men (Hoehne, 2009).

3.8 The US’s war on terror and how it aided the rise of extremism in Somalia

The US used a strategy of identifying and destroying identified targets in Somalia (Elmi, 2010). In what they reasoned as a mission to eliminate Al-Qaeda cells, they dropped bombs on to the southeastern tip of the country. They closed down Somalia’s leading bank and telecommunications company, Al-Barakaat along with its subsidiaries based on allegations that the company was the money circulator and quartermasters of terror (Elmi, 2010). Managers of Al-Barakaat however denied the allegations and invited the US administration to check its records. There were moreover concerns expressed by UN officials in Somalia who cautioned that the closure might affect ordinary Somalis. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States’ report also found no evidence linking this company to Al-Qaeda. Despite all these, the US retained Al Barakaat in their terrorist list along with Al-Ittihad, al-Islami and Al-Shabaab (ibid). The International Crisis Group (ICG) warned against the US’s counter-terrorism strategy in Somalia. It held that the approach of using unidentified surveillance flights, abducting innocent people suspected of being terrorists for elongated periods and cooperating with detested faction leaders was entrenching public skepticism and resentment against the US. They furthermore warned that the strategy was isolating the Somali people who are vital for the public support they can provide in countering terrorism. These concerns were however unheeded (Elmi, 2010). Through its national Department of Defence (DOD), the US established a Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti to facilitate easy executions of the war against extremists in the Horn of Africa and Al Qaeda (ibid).

In cooperation with Ethiopia, the US further hired warlords and their troops, the ARPCT to either seize or assassinate terrorist suspects hiding Mogadishu (Hoehne, 2009). The US financed the alliance and in the beginning of 2006, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) started directing between $100,000 and $150,000 to the ARPCT monthly. A Virginia based private military...
company was also used for the provision of the needed military equipment. While this support was given under a condition that the ARPCT would deliver terrorist suspects; the Alliance used much of it to fight for Mogadishu’s control. They did however conduct a series of kidnappings and assassinations of religious figures, which only served to increase the popularity of extremists and anti-American attitudes or sentiments. Extremist groups in turn embarked on their own assassinations, targeting Somali opponents, especially journalists and foreign aid workers (ibid).

Still collaborating with Ethiopia during April 2007, more than 200 FBI and CIA agents in created an anti-terrorism base of operations in the Addis Ababa Sheraton Hotel. Terrorist suspects were both detained and interrogated from this base. The dozen suspects provided by Ethiopia were however no Al-Qaeda suspects. A number of them were merely fighters from the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). Thus similar to the ARPCT who used the US’s resources and support for their own interests, Ethiopia also used the US’s anti-terrorist programmes to serve their own interests either to defeat or punish their domestic adversaries. Besides the money spent on the ARPCT and on other local warlords in Mogadishu who were paid to fight the CIC militias, the US has spent $650 million in security operations from 2007 to 2012 in Somalia. A bulk of these funds were directed to the equipping, arranging of military intelligence for defensive purposes, training and supporting the Ugandan and Burundian forces who became the main militia force of AMISOM (Hoehne, 2009). Thousands of Somalis have lost their lives and beyond a million have been displaced due to the war on terror (Elmi, 2010).

Islamic extremists have existed in Somalia from the early 1990s. Interactions between them and other international Islamists and extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda have also existed since this period. Back in 1992, a prominent Al-Qaeda official, Mohamed Atef visited Somalia most probably in an attempt to forge an alliance. A number of other Al-Qaeda authorities were also deployed to Somalia during this period to institute an operational base for the group. All pursuits however failed. Having been declared collapsed and stateless, Somalia still could not be used as a safe haven and terrorist operating grounds. Al-Qaeda was confronted by similar difficulties as those confronted by interventionist from the US and the UN humanitarian and military interventions in Somalia during 1992 to 1995. They were treated with distrust for they were not only foreigners but also followed a different form of Islam than the one prevalent in Somalia. Similar to the UN and US interventionists, they also encountered problems with the constantly
changing alliances between the clans and sub-clans and were limited by Somalia’s feeble infrastructure (Hoehne, 2009). Post the intervention from the US with the assistance of Ethiopia, extremism has increased with more people willing to join and embark on extreme measures to halt these two invading foreign powers (ibid).

Al Shabaab has been the most prominent of the groups to be radicalized in the face of the invasion from Ethiopia and US’s war on terror. This group was initially the military youth wing of the CIC. Post their rejection of the CIC’s participation in the Djibouti peace process; they broke away from the larger CIC to be an independent militia group (Burgess 2013). The group is organized in two wings. It has the military arm referred to as the Jaysh Al-Usra (translated as the army of hardship) and a law and order arm referred to as Jaysh Al-Hesbah (translated as the army of morality) (Elliot & Holzer, 2009). It has been able to provide a number of social and security services in regions they controlled in Somalia. These include food and alms distribution, employment, local-level administration and public works through repairing roads and building bridges, justice and security and education and training. The Islamic schools (madrassas) they have set up have however been alleged to be indoctrinating children through their use of radical teachings and encouraging children to join the movement (Mwangi, 2012).

During food scarcity and drought, the movement played a vital role in distributing money, food and water to the vulnerable and affected communities. This it ensured through setting up food distribution centres and through collecting money from the communities it controlled and subsequently redistributes it to the most deprived (Mwangi, 2012). The group imposed rigorous and strict rules and regulations but still achieved a great degree of stability in areas they controlled. These areas could not thus be designated as anarchic or lawless. It is true that there were severe restrictions and firm control, but there was greater safety and stability as long as people abide by the rules (Harper, 2012). The Al-Shabaab is a very secretive movement and has internal ideological divisions. It is thus difficult to accurately ascertain what they are fighting for and under whose direction (Harper, 2012) or influence. Worsening the situation still, is their ever-changing ideology and leadership. The US has however regarded the entire group to be a terrorist organization and has officially listed it as such in their international terrorist list (Elmi, 2010), a misunderstanding that has helped radicalize the group. This misunderstanding has been captured by Ken Menkhaus in his article titled ‘Misdiagnosis of Collapsed States and Terrorist’.
Menkhaus admitted that as outside observers, they may have been misguided in their assumptions and conclusions made regarding the correlation between failed states and terrorists. Somalia has assisted in revealing this misjudgment. Interventions in a form of nation-building in Somalia are thus based on a misdiagnosed connection between collapsed states and terrorism (Menkhaus, 2003).

The outcome of interventions in Somalia can be compared with the outcome of a similar intervention or an invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001. Still motivated by similar anti-terrorists operations, the US reasoned that to dismantle al-Qaeda which had admitted responsibility for the 9/11 attacks; they needed to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. They achieved this through the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which would supervise military operations in Afghanistan. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the US troops invaded in an effort to achieve three specified goals, to overthrow the Taliban, import security and rebuild the failed state of Afghanistan (Wittmeyer, 2013). The rational used was the same as that used in Somalia. Since Afghanistan was a failed state, it posed terrorism threats to the West and to the world at large as its lacked control over its entire territories which warranted that terrorist groups thrived in uncontrolled territories. A stable, effective, Weberian state regime therefore needed to be established to curb these threats. Their state building logic was however flawed and isolated from the Afghan reality. The foundations of ideas such as the rule of law and civil society “had only the most indirect application to the way justice was administered and accepted in the villages where 80 percent of Afghans lived” (Wittmeyer, 2013:1). During the International Conference on Afghanistan held on December 2011 at Bonn, Germany; the Taliban was deliberately not given a seat, an action which failed to observe that however unpleasant to admit, the Taliban were still representatives of some segments of the Afghan society. There are a number of other inappropriate solutions that the West employed in Afghanistan. These include the abolishing of a respected Afghan monarchy; a decision that a large number of Afghans were against and giving Afghanistan a very centralized constitution. This resulted in a number of Afghans who were initially against the Taliban to turn and support it so as to oppose the invading NATO and US military forces (Greentree, 2013). The solutions applied were incompatible with realities on the ground resulting in negligible changes and a number of lives lost in the military struggle and confrontation (ibid).
Another group that has fallen under the ambits of being regarded as terrorists in Somalia is the Somali pirates. Back in 2008, the International Maritime Bureau reported that Somali pirates had captured 42 ships out of the 111 record number they had attacked (International Maritime Bureau, 2008). International organisations such as the EU, the Combined Maritime Force, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 16 other individual countries consequently sent 24 warships to guard the Somali coast infested by Somali pirates (Elmi, 2010). This increase of piracy at the coast of Somalia has been reported to be a direct reaction to the toxic-waste dumping and illegal fishing in this coastline. Somali pirates have complained about the exploitation and abuses of native Somali fisherman by foreign ships fishing in the region illegally. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization have also reported that over 700 foreign ships have been illegally fishing in the Somali coast since 2005 (www.fao.org/fishery/countrysector/FI-CP_SO/en.). The international community has nonetheless done little to remedy this, which has only served as a motivation to the Somali pirates to continue with their attacks directed against foreign vessels (Elmi, 2010). A Somali writer Mohamud Khalif has questioned the French Navy Commander based in East Africa on whether French forces and other forces stationed to secure the Indian Ocean were going to protect Somali waters against the illegal fisherman and toxic-waste dumpers in the coast who can comparably be regarded as foreign pirates. The commander responded by maintaining that his forces were not mandated to do that (ibid). The Somali pirates’ undertakings do have negative effects to the general Somali population. Among the attacked and captured ships are ships delivering commercial products and food aid resulting in higher prices of domestic food prices (Elmi, 2010).

3.9 The current federal government of Somalia
The TFG’s provisional mandate ended on 20 August 2012, at this same time; the Federal Parliament of Somalia was instated, paving a way for the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to be established. Although the peaceful installation of the FGS is regarded as a major milestone and success; irregularities claimed to be employed by the president and his allies within the government have brought discontent to a number of parties. Words such as corrupt, unreliable, incompetent and dangerous have been used to describe the FGS president and an array of his senior officials (Fatah, 2013). The administration is held to be failing to achieve crucial political, and security objectives and wasting valuable time on clan politics which have a potential to
regress the country back to the 1990s civil war (ibid). Other quarrels have erupted between the FGS and the federal states that have concerns about federalism in Somalia. Disparities about federalism still exist. On one side, there are clans who advocate for a unitary Somali state that can challenge external states like Ethiopia who habitually intrude in their internal affairs. On the other side are clans who are fearful that a unitary state can easily be manipulated and state control become vested in one clan or a certain group of clans whilst marginalizing the rest (Uluso, 2014).

3.10 Maintaining order and general governance albeit being proclaimed as collapsed

As held above, Somalia was declared a collapsed state in 1991 post the demise of Barre’s regime. It is argued that in environments of state collapse, social order is not sustained and societal solidity is not improved. This leads to the beginning of moral decay and accordingly anarchy becomes a norm. The state ought to then transform the society, reinstate and preserve social order and societal solidity in order to re-establish its legitimacy and its right to govern (Mwangi, 2012). This moral decay and societal breakdown has not however occurred in Somalia. Instead, different societal groups have been able to provide governance, security and implement regulatory rules to manage everyday life of the populace. Far from anarchy, since 1991, the Somali society has continued to function on the foundation of kinship, customary law and Islamic law (Sharia). The best results of these are mostly noticeable in the northern part of Somalia. There, Somali elders together with businessmen have produced a functioning democratic state of Somaliland and beside it, an operational self-governing region of Puntland (de Wall, 2012). This they attained through turning their communities’ vibrant business sector, traditional values, their clan system and Islamic law into centers and forces of stability. Furthermore, in Somaliland, there have been a number of democratic events and functioning systems of governance achieved peaceably. These include two nonviolent changes in government post free and fair presidential elections in 1997 and 2003 (ibid), a constitutional referendum in 2001, local and district council’s elections in 2002 and upon the unexpected death of President Mohamed Egal in the same year, accomplished a nonviolent constitutional transfer of power to another president (Hesse, 2011). With substantiate success, the government of Somaliland has also oversaw the demobilization of rival militias, facilitated the reconstruction of infrastructure including functioning hospitals, clinics, schools, universities, power plants, roads and ports (ibid).
Somaliland has been improving economically and has been fairly stable since the 1993 conference in Borama (Walls, 2009). Instead of participating in the number of peace conferences held in a quest to resolve the conflict in Somalia, Somaliland maintained a strategy of non-involvement. It instead pursued an internal consensus-based process of mediation and deliberation (Walls, 2009). It held a number of its own local reconciliation sessions using the elders with authority to represent their clans to negotiate peace-building approaches to be utilized to resolve outstanding issues. The task of conflict resolution has always been the responsibility of the elders in Somaliland. The selection of these elders is based on their personal qualities such as age, proficiency in the region’s politics, negotiation skills, persuasion, debating skills, religious knowledge, faithfulness, courage, cooperation, fairness, and skill as a poet. In this regard, “not all old men are elders, nor are all elders aged” (Ahmed, 2010:28). Somaliland has utilized both modern and traditional or customary institutions of governing, an arrangement that has termed a hybrid political order (Boege et al., 2008). Traditional institutions are through the councils of elders (guurti) whilst modern institutions are ensured through elections, a parliament and a president. Owing to the positive they played in conflict resolution and peace building, clan elders are currently constitutionally inserted in the political system of Somaliland (ibid). While the nationwide peace conferences were highly publicized and sponsored by the UN, local level or grassroots peacemaking processes and initiatives did not receive much attention and in fact many were opposed by the UN and other international agencies (Ahmed, 2010).

While the region of Somaliland is the most improved in terms of provision of security, stability and other public services; other regions are also functioning as practical political units with different degrees of success (Harper, 2012). The southern and central regions have evolved into a range of localized forms of authorities that include clan-based militias, traditional authorities and business people (Bakonyi, 2013). For an example, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) in the south-western regions of Bay and Bakool has managed to perform a number of supposed core governmental functions in these regions. It provides security, implements local legal codes, provide judicial services and has established a taxing system to finance and sustain these services (ibid). The apparent fact emanating from these realities in Somalia is that these local polities, be they be extended families or clans are the major entities regulating the social, political and economic life of Somalis. A constant fact with all these systems of governance is that in all regions where they are used, they come with is a great dependence on non-state actors or social
forces rooted in the configuration of Somali society to maintain security. These particularly include clan elders or sheikhs (which is an Arab chief or leader of a family, tribe or village) (ibid). With all the internal distortions in this conflict-ravaged country, it has been able to respond to the diminished officially recognized state by resuscitating informal, typically clan-based security and ruling mechanisms. In the Republic of Somaliland, there exists a polity possessing all the aspects of a modern nation state except international recognition (Harper, 2012).

The economy throughout Somalia has also been surprisingly booming. In reality, it is stronger than the more stable neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya (Little, 2003). In his book, Economy without state, Peter Little preludes the paradoxes he encountered writing the book. He writes “it has been difficult to match the descriptions of chaos, hunger, and anarchy that frequently appear in the Western media with my own accounts of Somali social and economic life” (Little, 2003: xv). The agricultural sector through livestock in particular has improved considerably; this is owing to the fact that the nomads looking after the camels, goats, sheep and cows maintain a lifestyle that has less to do with the central authority. They have their own traditional social legal and economic structures which ignore a formal centralized state and national borders (Harper, 2012). Consequently, post the fall of a central government, business in the trading of livestock was not affected but instead boomed without any hindrances from a central authority. Herders had always deeply relied on social relationships and kinship for access to markets. Order in these business activities is also maintained without the central government (Little, 2003). Still more surprising for what is regarded as a collapsed poor state, Somalia has been able to attract a number of large corporations. Agricultural based companies from Italy and the US (Dole Fruit Inc.) have invested in Somalia’s agricultural sector; other companies such as DHL, General Motors, and Coca-Cola are all operational in Somalia (ibid). The fact that these and many more multinational corporations are willing to do business in Somalia indicates that Somalia can provide the required basic security of property rights and economic freedom (Powell et al., 2008). It is however still worth noting that there is still infighting and advances accomplished differ from region to region, some still need to improve whilst others are doing reasonably well (ibid). Using Weber’s definition of the state however, all these improvements, no matter their importance in improving the lives of the population are themselves seen as failure for their
attained through social institutions instead of through the state which ought to have monopolized power.

3.11 The shortfalls of the misconceptions underpinning the state failure theory
By 2010, Somalia had had a sum of twenty peace conferences which had not yielded any substantial changes to the political struggles of the country (Elmi, 2010). Recurrent interventions kept insisting on state centric operatives, abiding by the state failure recommendations of strengthening institutional capacities and monopolizing the instruments of power. They have been geared to equip the state and its security forces, a strategy supported by the argument that claims weak governance institutions can lead to both deterioration and a renewal of a conflict, it is thus important to aim for a strong bureaucracy in rebuilding failed states (Mwangi, 2012). Equally essential is the reestablishment of the state’s coercive capacity so as to ensure peace is built. Therefore, the agenda ought to be building the state’s capacity particularly, a professional and meticulous security force (Elmi, 2010). This is deduced from the Weberian definition of the state which operates above the society acting as a policing body which is not influenced by the society. In a country like Somalia, where the state does not necessarily abide by this definition, state centric interventions are likely and have been failing to achieve peace. At a foundation level, nomadic realities of Somalia work against the Weberian form of a state which requires a settled or stable population to work properly. It is challenging to control, tax, represent or generally govern constituencies that are always moving, sometimes even across international borders (Pruner, 1997). With these realities, it is easy to thus see how different the state that emerges from these realities will be compared to a state that would emerge in a Weberian western context.

The failed states thesis assumes that the driving force of failure exists only within the respective state or society. This prejudicially overlooks the fact that states are implanted in the international system (Hagmann & Hoehne, 2009) which means the international political economy and other transnational players affect individual states. The assumption that forces of failure are only to be found within allow for the inaccurate conclusion that institutional breakdown is directly linked to societal breakdown. Therefore, when institutions are eroded, anarchy thrives in the society (ibid), an assumption that Somalia has proved to be false, as explained above. The thesis also comes with culturally specific presumptions regarding what a functioning state ought to look like.
Western states are cast as the model of successful statehood. Therefore whether regarded as having failed or not, in the state failure thesis, African states are contrasted with a model of statehood that is firmly based on western principles, practices and organization structures (Hill, 2007). There is also no distinct definition of what a failed state is. A failed state can be any state which displays a number of but not necessarily all of stipulated indicators of failure. This makes it possible to place any state in this realm undeservedly. The state failure concept echoes similar assumptions as those of the modernization theory which proved to be problematic (Call, 2008). Both theses presume that there exists a specific upright endpoint of which states ought to move or progress towards, and that this progression is somehow natural. Going slightly farther than the modernization theory, the failed state theory presumes that at one point, all states held successful statuses. This we learn in Rotberg’s description of a failed state. He holds it to be “a polity that is no longer able or willing to perform the fundamental tasks of a nation-state in the modern world” (Rotberg, 2004:6). Whilst this description supposes that at a particular past time, all states were able to achieve this, in actuality, many of the so called failed states have never been as efficient as presumed. They never had the monopoly of power; other social services and security in such states have always been provided through other forms of authority like religious authorities, tribes and local strongmen (Call, 2008).

The definition of failed states is furthermore ahistorical, neglecting the far-reaching history of colonialism, its colonial institutions which came with prevailing legacies and the exploitation of resources in much of the states regarded as presently failing (Call, 2008). Although the supposed failing states are from different settings and have different struggles, the theory sees them as homogenous. Consequently, the policy for interventions has been the same producing one size fits all solutions. For instance, the Fund for Peace (FSI) advises that while policy makers have to pursue a variety of solutions for state failure, more attention has to be paid to establishing state institutions mainly, the ‘core five’ institutions being, “the military, police, civil service, leadership and the system of justice” (The Fund of Peace, 2013:1). These institutions are held as the answer for all failed states, albeit the differences in causes of failure in individual states and the 41 different indicators of failure used by the Fund of Peace (Call, 2008). In all cases, what is pursued is reinforcing stability and order, even if the prevailing order is unjust. This blanketing rationale is dangerous as shown by Structural Adjustment programmes that were implemented in poor countries during the 1990s to aid development but achieved the opposite (ibid).
To conclude, Harper (2012) best summarizes the argument put forward in this dissertation, she maintains that the fact that Somalia does not correspond to any familiar paradigm of statehood does not necessarily qualifies it to be in a state of total breakdown. It is true that hardship and insecurity still exists in the country, it ought to, as would be in any environment confronted by a conflict. This however, ought-not utterly conceal the positive improvements that have emerged in the country since 1991 (Harper, 2012). Somalia has helped reveal that the lack of a strong bureaucracy does not inevitably cause anarchy nor does it entail a complete absence of other forms of governing institutions. There exist indigenous social institutions which do not conform to the ideal type western bureaucratic institutions but follow their own rules and logic. In such settings, the state becomes the subject of power battles that various contending social groups and their leaders engage in (Boege et al., 2008). Owing to the misconception of the state advocated for by the state failure thesis however, interventions to assist resolve the conflict in Somalia have only aided to worsen the situation. The obsession the theory has about security, order and control necessitated quick and ‘one size fits all’ resolutions. The swiftest way to create a stronger state is through a military intervention; which has been the most common form of intervention in the supposed failing or failed states. Often, these quick solutions do not necessarily depict the context or circumstance of that specific society (Call, 2008) and therefore rarely assist. Worsening the situation in Somalia was the GWOT, which resulted in a number of Somalis dying as the US and other allies invaded Somalia in a quest to halt Al-Qaida suspects presumed to be hiding in the country. This erroneous assumption was also inferred from the state failure theory which held that failed states have no control over all their territories, and that these ungoverned territories can harbor terrorists. The direct pursuing of terrorist threats backfired as it irritated and radicalized Somalis who consequently turned to Islam as a method to reconstitute a moral order. Whilst extremists or fundamentalists were previously failing to gain support in Somalia; post the foreign military interventions, they have since gained impetus and have been able to mobilize nationalist resistance (de Waal, 2012) and further compounding problems that Somalia is facing. The classification of failed states is furthermore reductive and fails to understand that since its conception, the modern state itself has always been a work in progress (Boas, 2010). The state in Africa and in Somalia specifically is likewise a work in progress. It is possible to see a different state or the same one in the near future depending on the outcome of
the struggles that the various social forces (the state itself being one of these forces) are engaging in.
Chapter 4: Summary and concluding remarks

4.1 Summary of chapters
Chapter one introduced the research topic by providing an overview of the topic. It gave a background of the research question and outlined questions, objectives and the research methodology used to conduct the study. Chapter two further unpacked the concept of the state embedded in the state failure theory. It explained what constitutes to a state according to state failure theory and explained the different categories of failure with their causes and indicators. State failure was initially explained in general terms and then narrowed down to the failure of an African state. The chapter moreover explained how the 9/11 terrorists’ attacks gave momentum to the concept of state failure as terrorists were thought to thrive in failed states. The chapter finally offered another theory to denote what constitute a state instead of the notion used by the failed state theory. This theory is the state in society approach. The theory deems the state as just another institution within a given society and therefore can be influenced for it is subject to influences of other social forces. The state does not exist outside the society or above it. Chapter three provided an in-depth discussion of the supposed failure of the state of Somalia. It provided a brief history of Somalia to show how the state of Somalia historically operated and how the society related and still relate to the contemporary Somali state. It explained the different reasons for external interventions and their effects to Somalia. It then showed how the definition of the state embedded in the state failure theory does not represent the realities on the ground in Somalia. It explained how Somalia continued to operate and evaded anarchy albeit being declared a collapsed state and without a central government or a proficient bureaucracy. The chapter ended with a discussion of the shortfalls of the state failure theory in Somalia.

4.2 Concluding remarks
The misconception or misunderstanding of state failure in Africa is embedded in the misconception of the African state itself. Abiding by Max Weber’s definition of the state; the state failure thesis regards the state to be an entity that monopolizes the use of force or power within a defined territory (Weber, 1919). The state is viewed as a commanding structure characterized by force which is used to administer, control and regulate the society (Mentan, 2010), instead of being viewed as a force that interacts and at times get influenced by the society. This Weberian state differs from that described by Marx. While both Marx and Weber
considered the state as an instrument of force, Marx believed that political institutions, such as the state, arose from the societal mode of production. For Marx, the state is thus a product of the dominant mode of production and will differ according to the differences in this mode of production. Marx argues that the state favours the interests of the economically dominant class. State’s policies are therefore not autonomous but are completely guided by the economically dominant class (Mentan, 2010). Contrary to the Weberian state where the state’s interests are separate from those of the society, the Marxist state can and is influenced by a certain segment of the society (ibid), namely the capitalists/bourgeoisie. This research set to answer three specific questions delineated in chapter one. It set out to find the notion of the state assumed by the state failure theory, whether state failure theory provides an accurate account of the status and realities of the state of Somalia and whether the theory assists in understanding and consequently resolving the issues causing dispute in Somalia. Through unpacking Weber’s description of the state used by the state failure theory, it was made clear what notion of the state is assumed by the state failure theory.

By definition, the Weberian state cannot be influenced by any segment of the society or the society at large. This state is founded on a rationalized bureaucracy that operates with and through general, impersonal and universal rules (Parkin, 2002). The possibility of an influence from the society is fully diminished by these sets of rules (Mentan, 2010). Contrary to the Marxist notion, the state here is not simply one of the social forces within the society and therefore prone to being influenced by other social forces. It is instead a neutral entity, operating according to rational legal principles and rules. Weber delineated three forms of domination or types of authority that a state can exercise its power through. These are hierarchical in nature. The first is the charismatic domination in which the leader uses his/her charm and personal qualities to lead. The second form of domination is traditional domination which utilizes tradition and patriarchy to rule. The third form of domination is legal-rational domination which characterizes the modern state. The essence of this legal-rational domination is its effective bureaucracy. This bureaucracy has a number of characteristics; of importance is its hierarchical nature, being governed by rules and its recruitment of qualified and impersonal employees so as to avoid influences (Weber, 1958).
The Weberian state is meant to control and provide a range of political goods/services to the society. These services are hierarchically arranged with the provision of security being the most fundamental since security is a prerequisite to ensure the delivery of all other services or political goods (Rotberg, 2003). For this reason, security has been proclaimed paramount in states that have been regarded as failing or have failed already. Interventions concentrate on strengthening the state’s security institutions or forces, such as the military and police. There is however no universally agreed upon single term or definition to explain what state failure is. Literature on the subject instead consists of degrees of failure which include but not limited to failing, failed, collapsed, captured, weak and rouge states. Causes of failure are also as vast and a state need not fulfill all of the stipulated conditions but should have a certain number of them to qualify as a failed state (ibid). Exactly how many of these conditions a state ought to have is nonetheless not stipulated. The lack of a standing definition of state failure and the vast range of failure has made it easy to label a number of African states as failing due to their inconformity to the ideal Weberian state concept. The 9/11 terrorist’s attacks in the US gave momentum to the state failure concept and encouraged a number of western countries and organizations to organize under the banner of fighting terrorism, a quest which came to be referred to as the Global War of Terror (GWT).

The state failure theories reason that failed states lack effective control of their territories, cannot provide security, improve their infrastructure or perform other state functions. They therefore produce political goods voids or vacuums which can be utilized by terrorist groups who in an attempt to get backing from the local population and to expand their operations, will offer personal security, economic aid and other services meant to be provided by the state government to the inhabitants (Piazza, 2008). This supposed correlation of terrorism and failed states meant that to fight terrorism, necessitated rectifying failure in the so called failed states which can harbour terrorists due to their lack of capacity in controlling their entire territories. Similar to the correlation with terrorism, state failure is also correlated with the lack of development. Sorensen (1999) argued that successful development requires certain preconditions which do not exist in fragile or failing states. With these conditions lacking, the available alternative is to import development enabling conditions from the western countries into African failed states. This is informed by state failure theory’s reasoning that lack of development is solely a result of internal factors. It can be as a result of corrupt leaders, lack of political will, lack of proficient
institutions, lack of democratic practices or lack of economic growth and effective economic policies which cultivates the economy (Rotberg, 2002; Zartman, 1995). For these reasons, interventions are constantly orientated towards fixing internal institutions and policies or importing them where necessary.

This ahistorical argument of state failure in Africa is biased since it ignores the lasting legacies of colonialism in Africa. It moreover fails to capture the realities of the state in an African setting. The state failure theories neglect and overlook how African states have operated historically and how they have maintained their historical culture and adapted, where necessary, to accommodate the different challenges and realities they encountered. By focusing on state institutions, especially security institutions and the bureaucracy, state failure theories misconceive African states. This dissertation argued that the state in society approach better describes and depicts the realities of the African state. In this approach, the state is not defined in terms of what is ought to look like or what it is deemed to be; it is instead defined by what it is and how it operates in reality. This dissertation used Somali to illustrate the weaknesses of the failed state approach and the strengths of the state in society approach.

While this dissertation argued for the inter-relatedness of the state and society, it should be noted that this does not mean that the state molds societal groups such that if the state weakens, its weakness will automatically trickle down to society. Although the state can influence the society, it also can be influenced by the society for it is simply an institution of society and does not exist outside or above it. These two institutions continually interact and the outcomes of these interactions are mutually transforming (Migdal, 1994), they constantly influence and reshape each other (Migdal, 2001). There exist strongmen, prominent figures or social groups who can exert enough influence to alter state policies. In Africa, there exist local organizations that fulfil government’s functions and negotiate these functions with their governments. This does not imply failure on the part of the state, but is a demonstration of the confrontations and negotiations between these two institutions. Where services of the state cannot reach, local institutions provide these services using traditional methods and institutions. The state failure theory however does not recognize these realities and thus believe that in the absence of the state’s presence, anarchy will thrive in the society since the only institution that can bring order is the state. The case of Somalia shows in the absence of the state non-state actors, such as
traditional leaders, elders, religious leaders or other society representatives, are able to provide basic security, order and governance at their respective local regions. The proponents of state failure declared Somalia a collapsed state in 1991; this logically meant that anarchy was to be a norm within the Somali society. This has however not been the case, for Somalia has continued to function on the basis of kinship, customary law and Islamic law (Sharia). The best results of this are mostly noticeable in the northern part of Somalia, in the state of Somaliland and Puntland. Other southern regions are also functioning through traditional institutions, while in some regions and in some war lords and business men maintain order and provide general governance and security (de Waal, 2012). Presenting this reality offered a response to the second question of this research as it reveals how the state failure theory failed to provide an accurate account of the status and realities of Somalia.

Owing to the enduring conflict, internal distortions are present in Somalia. The country is however not in anarchy for the society has been able to respond to experienced challenges by resuscitating informal, mainly clan-based, security and governance mechanisms. Guided by the alleged link of state failure and terrorism, western policy has however constantly preferred to pursue direct action against alleged terrorist threats, re-creating a central government and establishing formal state institutions to strengthen security. This approach has failed, irritated and radicalized a number of Somalis (de Waal, 2012: Hoehne, 2009). These interventions have worsened the problem instead of providing solutions. They have “not only failed but have undermined local polities in the process, leaving the country worse off than before” (Menkhaus, 2007: 83). The approach therefore does not provide assistance in understanding the causes and consequently possible solutions to the issues causing disputes in Somalia.

Due to the misconceived reality of the African state in the state failure theory; interventions deduced from this definition are inevitably incompatible. In this paper, I have thus concurred with the state in society approach which defines the state as another institution within the society and not existing above it. The state cannot have monopoly of power, as a societal institution, it also has its limits. It cannot also have a static and unyielding nature as it is constantly interacting with other social forces. Counteractions with regards to its makeup that it receives from other social forces along with the absorption of other groups into its organization results in changes or modifications in its social and ideological foundations (Migdal, 1994).
The fundamental reasoning behind the state failure theory is that all states ought to function in the same way, and therefore can be placed on a range from good to bad (Bøas & Jennings, 2005). This is however a misconception of a state. States are a culmination of distinctive historical processes (ibid). With different histories, the final product cannot then be expected to be the same. The intention of this research was not to discount the presence of a number of social, political and economic problems existing in Africa, for it is true that a number of challenges still exist in the continent. It was however to challenge their description and categorization as failure of the state. The presence of these challenges and conflict should not be confounded with the failure of the state, but be viewed as interactions and confrontations between the various social forces existing in any given society.
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