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Faculty of Education at the University of KwaZulu-Natal
ABSTRACT

The University of Transkei (UNITRA) was established in 1976 under the Bantustan regime of the Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima during the Apartheid era. UNITRA had 12 Vice Chancellors (VCs), including the 3 Ministerial Appointed Administrators (MAA) post-1994. An understanding of UNITRA’s institutional issues and its implications for changes to be effected is assessed through the chronological tenures of the Vice-Chancellors and their various relationships. The Vice-Chancellors in traversing the developmental growth of UNITRA faced internal and external challenges to their leadership practices, governance, UNITRA’s structural systems and the prevailing political climate. The past history set in motion institutional patterns that were systemic and structural in nature; which resulted in reoccurring institutional crises. The then university of Transkei ceased to exist in 2005, as a result of merger with two Border and Eastern Cape Technikons which gave rise to Walter Sisulu University (WSU), a comprehensive university.

Organisational theory an interdisciplinary and multi-paradigmatic field of study (Schutz & Hatch, 1996) is used to assess and explain the levels of organisational analysis and transactions of the Vice-Chancellors’ role as a human factor and UNITRA as a case study of a Historically Black University. The first level of organisational analysis is the intra-organisational interactions and characteristics of VCs. The second level of organisational analysis at the inter-organisational level refers to the external interactions of the VCs, government and the impact on UNITRA. Along UNITRA’ history, descriptions and critical assessments of the Vice-Chancellor’s leadership and managerial practices during the Apartheid era and the Transkeian government; and the African National Congress government, post 1994 democratic elections; are critical evaluated. Purposive sampling of
available former UNITRA VCs was conducted along with semi-structured interviews. As a result of snowballing effect, further semi-structured interviews were conducted. Following this, archive documents and quantitative data are used for cross-referencing, providing clarity about UNITRA’s structure and finances during each VC’s tenure. Key findings were the political climate of the day; legislation; the stakeholders’ sub-cultures and needs; UNITRA’s situational variables and bureaucratic structure affected the Vice-Chancellors’ actions, which led to a number of decisions made. These decisions impacted on UNITRA as a rural based university.
DECLARATION OF OWN WORK

I, Sylvia Nompucuko NKANYUZA do declare that

i. The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original work.

ii. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

iii. This thesis does not contain other person’s data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons

iv. This thesis does not contain other person’s writing, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written sources have been quoted, then:

a) their words have been re-written but the general information attributed to them has been referenced; or

b) where their exact words have been used, their writing has been placed inside quotation marks, and referenced.

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Signed: .................................................................
23 JUNE 2009

MS. SN NKANYUZA (207527740)
CENTRE FOR HIGHER EDUCATION STUDIES

Dear Ms. Nkanyuza

ETHICAL CLEARANCE APPROVAL NUMBER: HSS/0186/09D

I wish to confirm that ethical clearance has been granted for the following project:

“Leadership, managerial practices and politics in a Historical Black University: A case study of the Vice Chancellors at the former University of Transkei (UNITRA) from 1976-2004”

PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the school/department for a period of 5 years

Yours faithfully

[Signature]

MS. PHUMELELE XIMBA
ADMINISTRATOR
HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES ETHICS COMMITTEE

cc. Supervisor (Prof. C Mbali)
cc. Dr. P Phoofolo
cc. Mr. D Buchler
In Memory of the late Abyshi Msekeli Nkanyuza

[Dlamini, Mona, Zizi]

‘Dad’, Thank you for instilling ‘education’ in your children to awaken their mind.

“Ask, and it shall be given you; Seek and ye shall find; Knock and it shall be opened unto you;”

(Matthew 7:7)
I wish to thank Prof. M.M. Balintulo, Vice-Chancellor from 2006 to 2011 and Dr. S.Fikeni, former UNITRA student, academic and Chairperson of Council (2005 to 2011); for approval and access of information and documentation, of both the former University of Transkei and the Walter Sisulu University. My thanks also go to Prof Peggy Luswazi for her assistance.

I wish to thank the following individuals as friends, colleagues and elders for agreeing to be interviewed; for their confidence in myself, their support and for their time. My thanks to Prof. E.D. Malaza; Prof. W.L. Nkuhlu; Prof. N.I. Morgan; Prof. N. Cloete; Prof. D. Ncayiyana; Prof. J. Peires; Prof. N. Jafta; Ms Xoliswa Jozana; Mrs Nhlanla Jordan. A special thank you goes to Prof. Nico Cloete. My sincere apologies to willing individuals I failed to interview due to time constraints.

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Dedicated to God in the name of Jesus
For His mercy and love to us all.
“fides quaerens intellectum”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>CESM</td>
<td>Class of Educational Subject Matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHE</td>
<td>Council for Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBSA</td>
<td>Developmental Bank of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>Daily Dispatch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DET</td>
<td>Department of Education and Training (R.S.A)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoE</td>
<td>Department of Education</td>
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<td>DHET</td>
<td>Department of Higher Education and Training</td>
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<td>FTE</td>
<td>Full Time Equivalent</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution</td>
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<tr>
<td>HBTs</td>
<td>Historical Black Technikons</td>
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<td>HBUs</td>
<td>Historical Black Universities</td>
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<td>HDIs</td>
<td>Historical Disadvantaged Institution</td>
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<td>HE</td>
<td>Higher Education</td>
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<td>HEI(s)</td>
<td>Higher Education Institution(s)</td>
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<td>HEMIS</td>
<td>Higher Education Management Information System</td>
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<td>HESA</td>
<td>Higher Education South Africa</td>
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<td>HEQC</td>
<td>Higher Education Quality Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>HWUs</td>
<td>Historical White Universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAA</td>
<td>Ministerial Appointed Administrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCHE</td>
<td>National Commission on Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEHAWU</td>
<td>National Education Health and Allied Workers Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPI</td>
<td>National Education Policy Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFF</td>
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</table>
NMMU  Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University
NP    National Party
NTESU National Tertiary Education Staff Union
NWG   National Working Group
PAC   Pan African Congress
PCS   Programme Classification Structure
PQM   Programmes Qualification Mix
OAU   Organisation of African Unity
RDP   Reconstruction and Development Programme
RSA   Republic of South Africa
SAC   South African College schools
SAPSE South African Post-Secondary Education
SRC   Students Representative Council
TDF   Transkei Defence Force
UCGH  University of Cape of Good Hope
UDUSA Union of Democratic University Staff Association
UFH   University of Fort Hare
UN    United Nations
UNITRA/Unitra University of Transkei
USA   United States of America
VC    Vice-Chancellor
WSU   Walter Sisulu University
• **Ethnicity** refers to shared cultural practices, perspectives, and distinctions that set apart one group of people from another. Ethnicity is a shared cultural heritage. The most common characteristics distinguishing various ethnic groups are ancestry, a sense of history, language, religion, and forms of dress. Ethnic differences are not inherited, they are learned.

• **Historically Black Universities** (HBUs): The term was used to refer to the created Bantustan (homeland) universities, including the University of Transkei. Some texts also refer to HBUs as Historically Black Institutions (HBIs).

• **Historically White Universities** (HWUs): The term was predominantly used for established White Universities during the Apartheid era. HWUs are sometimes referred to as Historical White Institutions (HWIs).

• **Higher Education Institutions** (HEIs): This terminology consists of Universities and Technikons post 1994 and is used more frequently with the progression of time.

• **Ministerial Appointed Administrators** (MAAs): The Higher Education Amendment Act, 55 of 1999, section 41 (A) allows the Minister of Education to appoint an administrator for a public higher education institution where there is financial or other maladministration of a serious nature.

• **Organizational Culture**: In this thesis, the term means a common set of shared values and beliefs that are transformed into attitudes and behaviour of a particular group.

• **Stakeholders**: The reference to stakeholders in this thesis relates to students, unions, senate, executive management and council, unless specified otherwise.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF STUDY

The former University of Transkei (1976-2005), a historically black university (HBU), was established in the homeland of Transkei. Transkei, a Bantustan\(^1\), was granted ‘independence’ by the Republic of South Africa in 1976. Transkei was officially re-united with the Republic of South Africa in 1994. The focus of this thesis analyses the leadership of the Vice-Chancellors (VCs) at UNITRA from a functionality approach (Kotter, 1990) and an approach from ‘new managerialism’ (Reed, 2002, p.148). The University of Transkei (UNITRA) encountered many systemic, structural and leadership changes (as discussed in Chapter 05 and 06), during its 28 years as a Higher Education Institution. The literature review in chapter 3 discusses leadership and managerialism/new managerialism more in-depth. What were the impacts and outcomes of the control techniques employed by VCs on UNITRA’s organisational development and formation? How did the VCs balance the type of governance structure attained at UNITRA and the prevailing political government? Habib’s commissioned report of 2001, serves as an important insight into one of the periodic years at UNITRA, which states, “The institutional crisis of UNITRA is not new” (Habib, 2001, p.03). “UNITRA’s leadership were not up to this task” [citing the VC], “Moleah’s tenure at UNITRA” that “extended from mid-1994 to mid-1999” (Habib, 2001, p.13).

Habib (2001) further states that there are two main contending factors which can be attributed to UNITRA’s crises: “UNITRA’s crisis is thus a product of the dialectical relationship between structural variables and agential behaviour” [my emphasis] (Habib, 2001, p.19). The structural variables identifiable at the intra-organisation level and agential behaviour of

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\(^1\) Bantu Areas Consolidations of 1956 - Appendix I.
(an) identified stakeholder(s) are, however, not the only major contributing factors to the crisis of UNITRA. The crisis of UNITRA, embedded as it is, in the conceptualisation of UNITRA as a Higher Education Institution (HEI), has also to be understood within its political-historical context of its 28 year span.

The 12 VCs at the former UNITRA from 1976 to 2004, including the ‘Ministerial Appointed Administrators’ (MAA) from 2000 to 2002 were responsible for the management and administration of UNITRA. Each MAA appointed by the national Minister of Education by the present Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET)\(^2\), took over the functions of both Council (governance) and Vice-Chancellor (executive management), and was accountable directly to the national Minister of Education.

The Vice-Chancellors of UNITRA by virtue of their “legitimate authority” and differing managerial practices that were based on the “formal position” acquired (Jaffee, 2008, p.84, p.92) were accountable to the institution. The VCs were also accountable to the institution’s Council, which were the employer and governing body. The VCs as the “unique human actor” were the intermediate conduit between the internal stakeholders of the institution and the external stakeholders in “accomplishing specific goals and maximising efficiency”(Barnard in Jaffee, 2008, p.74). The VCs have autonomous power, especially in operational decision making matters. During the apartheid era VCs were also the intermediate conduits to the Department of Native Affairs, the Transkeian homeland government and the DoE/DHET. Prof. M.M.Balintulo captured the essence of the leadership crises in HBUs, in his interview with Fehnel (2001) by stating,

\(^2\) In 2010, the Department of Education (DOE) split into two Departments/Ministries to become the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) and the Department of Basic Education. in 2010
“I think while it is good to come up with some conceptual typologies about leadership, I think those have to be anchored in the specific environment, because the system is very diverse. What could be successful managerial or entrepreneurial leadership style in one context could well be a total disaster in another” (Fehnel, 2001, p.03).

2. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Typologies such as leadership traits and leadership styles do not (Jaffee, 2008) adequately explain and encapsulate the leadership crises at UNITRA. Factors such as politics played a major role in the establishment and continuum of UNITRA that distorted the organisational development and growth of UNITRA as a Higher Education Institution. UNITRA, regarded as a Historical Black University (HBU), ceased as an entity in 2005 with its history of leadership, managerial and governance crises. Prof. M.M.Balintulo, the first VC at Walter Sisulu University (W.S.U)\(^3\) in 2007 encountered problems that resulted in an institutional crisis, as elaborated in the Government Gazette of 28 September 2011. The fundamental problems of W.S.U. VCs’ leadership, structure, systems and politics are similar to those of UNITRA. The reverberating cycle of events resulting in crisis management had not been broken. The problems of the present can usually be located in the past events that over time may spiral out of control. Hence this thesis about the VCs’ leadership, managerial practices and politics at UNITRA, has an additional post script to bring the story up to the present time.

\(^3\) Walter Sisulu University (WSU), a result of the merger of the University of Transkei (UNITRA), Mthatha; Eastern Cape Technikon, Butterworth; and Border Technikon, East London in June 2005.
3. OVERVIEW OF THE HIGHER EDUCATION SECTOR IN SOUTH AFRICA FROM 1853 – 1948

The racially\(^4\) divided nature of the 36 Higher Education Institutions\(^5\) in South Africa, prior to 1994, is sometimes falsely assumed to have stemmed only from the National Party ideology, whereas some Universities pre-date the apartheid era. The South African College schools (SAC) of 1829 for the English speaking community and the Victoria College at Stellenbosch for the Afrikaans speaking community were affiliated to the University of London in the UK.

“The first major Government initiative in higher education came in 1858 with the establishment of a Board of Public Examinations in Literature and Science to examine candidates from the various Colleges, particularly those seeking civil service employment”


The established University of Cape of Good Hope (UCGH) in 1873 (Cooper & Subotzky, 2001, pp. 01-02), which replaced the University of London board, obtained a royal charter in 1877 and had the powers to grant degrees like the University of London. Other early University foundations were Stellenbosch in 1881, Pretoria in 1890, Witwatersrand in 1903, Rhodes University College in 1904, and Natal University College in 1909. These Universities would later be identified as Historical White Universities (HWUs).

\(^4\) Racial groupings of people, a method of physically associating and identifying one group from another group has often been used across societies. The racial grouping of ‘Whites’, ‘Coloured’, ‘Indians’ and ‘Blacks’ in South Africa reinforced later by segregation laws enhanced racism

\(^5\) Prior to 1994, there was a distinction between HBUs, HWUs, HBTs and HWTs. With Higher Education landscape changes and the incorporation of Technikons into the Higher Education sector post 1994, the linguistic term used is Higher Education Institutions (HEIs). Thus, the interchange of terminologies in some articles of HBUs and HBIs post 1994 to that of HEIs.
Formed by Hertzog, the National Party (NP)

“in its programme of 1914 resolved to seek the development of national life in accordance with Christian values, strive for independence, to give priority to national interests over those of any other country or people, and campaign for equal language rights for the Dutch settlers. These became fixed in the South African Act for education and the public service”


SAC and Stellenbosch College jointly agreed to support the University Act of 1916 passed at parliament that granted full university status to the two colleges, in accordance with the NP’s programme. The colleges each had 300 students more than other colleges. They also agreed that the UCGH should become an external examining university through the University of South Africa (UNISA), as the central body. With the creation of UCT, Stellenbosch and UNISA as university colleges, the external examination administrative functions would be based in Pretoria, with all the other university colleges affiliated to it. Higher Education in South Africa was thus now independent of British examinations. UNISA an examining body incorporated six existing constituent university colleges, with agreed syllabuses and accepted university degrees.

“These colleges were Rhodes University College at Grahamstown; Huguenot university College, Wellington; Grey University College, Bloemfontein; Natal University College, Pietermaritzburg; Transvaal University College, Pretoria and the Kimberley College of Mines and Technology which became the Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg”

With the incorporation of the Dutch Reformed Church Christian College at Potchefstroom in 1921 into UNISA as a university college, the Afrikaans dominance strengthened as against the English early influences of UCGH (Ajayi, Goma & Johnson, 1996).

Lovedale Institution, in Alice town of Eastern Cape Province was established in 1841 “for Bantu by William Govan of the Scottish Presbyterian Mission”, and “similar to the Hampton Institute and Booker T. Washington’s Tuskegee Institute of the Southern USA” (Ajayi, Goma & Johnson, 1996, p.32). Lovedale Institution took prominence in arguing for the education of the Africans and non-Europeans (Kerr, 1968). The need for a College specifically for Africans in Higher Education had already taken root since 1878, with the appointment of Dr. James Stewart as Principal of Lovedale. African intellectuals and representatives, dogmatic insistence on the establishment of a “University for Natives” (Ajayi, Goma & Johnson, 1996) added pressure, for the need for a college. However,

“the prevalent racism was compounded by the fear that education would enable the majority Africans to ‘swamp’ the white communities who began to see themselves as defenders of an island of European civilisation in a sea of African barbarism”  

The University College of Fort Hare (UFH) initially referred to as the ‘South African Native College’ in 1915 was built on the site of an old British Fort at Alice in the Eastern Cape (Kerr, 1968).

Following the establishment of UFH was the ML Sultan Technical College specifically for the Indians. “The ML Sultan Technical College was opened in 1930 and funded by ML

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6 The South African Native College re-named the University College of Fort Hare became affiliated to Rhodes University in 1952.
Sultan” (Pittendrign, 1988, pp. 174-175). The ML Sultan Technical College catered for Indian labourers who were initially imported for the sugar industry and supplied the tea-planters with suitable workers; provided much of the necessary labour for railway construction, and coal mining. The ML Sultan Technical College was controlled by the Department of Indian Affairs and operated under Act No 30 of 1923.

It could be concluded that the period 1853 – 1948 saw the initiation and the establishment of Higher Education Institutions in South Africa, which were interlinked with the politics of those in power. When the National Party formed the government in 1948, the shift in government further entrenched the already existing segregated educational institutions continued.

4. **HIGHER EDUCATION SECTOR SYNOPSIS FROM 1948-1994**

The National Party, on assuming power, in 1948, enhanced the segregation policy through legislation to become an inherent Apartheid ideology.

“The realization of Dr. Verwoerd’s vision of a multinational commonwealth filled us with enthusiasm. The government and the National Party invested a great deal of effort and capital in trying to bring it to reality. Multinational commonwealth capital cities built in 10 homelands, each with its own parliament, quite impressive government buildings, several well-endowed universities were founded” (De Klerk, 1998, pp. 38-39).

The National Party planned with a vision at setting up objectives of how South Africa should be constituted, despite their inherent superiority complex and arrogance stemming from the
developmental notion of national life in accordance with Christian values. The debate by the Tomlinson Commission of 1954\(^7\) (White Paper of April 1956) advocated that the National Party (Union Government of South Africa) should consider the establishment of constituent university colleges in the homelands.

The Higher Education sector was divided into rigid cultural and racial groups during the South African apartheid era, effectively from the early 1950’s to the late 1980’s. Higher Education for the Bantu was controlled on the bases of constituted colleges similar to that of UNISA. This fitted into the prevailing societal laws of the apartheid system, such as the Bantu Education Act, Act No 47 of 1953, as reiterated in the Tomlinson Report\(^8\).

“Education must be of the Bantu, by the Bantu and for the Bantu”

The African Universities pre-1950s differed in perception and ideology from the emergence of the African Universities and Technikons in the 1970s. However, both sets of higher education institutions reaffirmed and entrenched the same ideology of racial and ethnic segregation as reiterated by the National Party. An inaugurated new phase of Bantu\(^9\) policy

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\(^7\) Tomlinson’s (1955) Terms of Reference - Appendix 11

\(^8\) In the ‘Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa’ (1955), in the Education section, Chapter 43 (V1)(C)(29) “The Commission proposes that a Bantu University of South Africa will be created as constituent colleges, organised on a federal basis like the University of South Africa. One of the colleges should be in the Transkei, one in the Zulu area in Natal and one in the Sotho areas in the Transvaal”.

\(^9\)The term ‘Bantu’ identifies a linguistic group that is mainly based in the Sub-Saharan region of Africa. The term was used by the National Party in a derogative manner for black South Africans that is akin to the term ‘Negro’. The Bantustans were set up in accordance with the Nationalist government’s policy of separate development where black South Africans could only exercise their political rights.
was engineered along the lines of a racial plan by Dr. H. F. Verwoerd the Prime Minister from 1958-1966. The policy resulted in the promulgation of the Extension of University Act, No. 45 of 1959 that prohibited the “open – universities” (such as University of Cape Town [UCT] and University of Witwatersrand [Wits] and University of Natal from admitting students of other race groups. Through the Act, separate university colleges for the social categories defined as Black, Coloured, and Indian were established\(^\text{10}\). “The University Extension Act of 1959 had control over appointments, admissions, courses offered and the contents of the curricula at Bantu Universities” (Llorah, 2006, p.80).

The University College of the North established in 1960, located in Northern Transvaal was for the Sotho, Venda and Tsonga groups. The University College of Zululand (1960), located in KwaZulu Natal was for the Zulu and Swazi groups. The Minister of Bantu Education controlled these university colleges. For some time, the ‘academic trusteeship’ for the University College of the North and the University College of Zululand was under the umbrella of UNISA (Cooper & Subotzky, 2001). In 1960, the University College of the Western Cape for the ‘Coloured’ group and the University College Durban-Westville for the ‘Indian’ group was established. Both these university colleges were located in the urban centres and oriented to the student population of relatively ‘middle class’ status who had access to comparatively better schooling. This was in contrast with the majority of the African population in the HBUs, who were “generally poorer and confined to the worst schooling” (Subotzky, 1997, p.07).

\(^{10}\) Population Registration Act of 1951 and the Bantu Authorities Act 1958.
Historically Black Universities/Institutions (HBUs or HBIs) and African Technikons\textsuperscript{11} (HBTs) established in the 1970s and 1980s were in essence an integral component of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 (Cooper & Subotzky, 2001). The Act led to the establishment of the ‘Self-governing homelands’ or the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC states).

The establishment of the University of Transkei (UNITRA)’s in 1976 was a function of the Bantustan Policy of the Apartheid government. In 1977, the enactment of the University of Transkei Act No.23 of 1976 gave the Transkeian campus of University of Fort Hare (UFH) the status of an autonomous university. The Transkeian government wanted UNITRA as an empowered higher education institution for the enhancement of administrative staff, civil servants and teachers. By developing the human masses at large, Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima, the head of the Transkeian government believed that the created reserve pool of a strong middle class at UNITRA would enhance the human resources of talents independently of race and heredity. Peires argues,

“the middle class depended on the homeland government for salaries, promotion, housing, licenses and other privileges”. So “even though the Transkei bourgeoisie might privately admit that they benefited from the system, they do not regard themselves as sell-outs nor are they satisfied with what they see as the crumbs which have fallen from the white man’s table” (Peires, 1992, p.382).

\textsuperscript{11} The referral of HBUs, HWUs, HBTs and HWTs to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs), as applied in the HE Act 101 of 1997.
UNITRA, constrained in its degree of autonomy and academic freedom due to the existing racist legislation, and the use of state security, was unlike other Higher Education Institutions (HEIs). The autonomy of UNITRA was not the “relative independence of institutional leadership and management from state control. Autonomy represents the discursive terrain on which relationships between government and higher education are negotiated” (Moja & Cloete, 1996, p. 01).

Prof. Van der Merwe, the founding VC of UNITRA regularly went to the palace of Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima, to account on the activities of UNITRA (Cloete, 2012). The use of state security turned universities such as UNITRA into ideological and physical battlefields, whilst some other higher education institutions acquired a wider variance in their institutional autonomy, discretion of programmes and their curriculum.

By 1988, the South African University system consisted of 5 Afrikaans and 4 English Medium Universities, 10 Black Universities and 2 Distance-Learning Universities (Higgins, 2001).

With the democratic dispensation of 1994, the South African Higher Education landscape was shaped by national policy-makers, influenced by socio-political and economic imperatives.

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12 The researcher had an interview with Professor Nico Cloete on the 25 September 2012. Professor Cloete was a lecturer in the Department of Psychology at UNITRA. He was one of the deported staff members in 1984 by the Transkeian government. Interview verbatim recordings will be discussed as part of the Vice-Chancellor phases.

13 Letter from Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima, Transkeian Head of State and UNITRA’s Chancellor wrote to Professor Van der Merwe, UNITRA VC. “Rebellious Behaviour and Disruption of Classes at UNITRA on 9/5/84” - Appendix III. Letter from the ‘Secretary of State’, to the VC- Appendix IV.
“A new integrated and coordinated unitary structure was envisaged which would be driven by programme-based institutional approach built into institutional plans which should be in line with an overall national plan. While higher education policy mirrored the broader macro-economic tension between equality and growth, the White Paper struck a balance between global competitiveness on the one hand and national development priorities on the other” (Fataar, 2003, p.35).

The significance of this research thesis is to reflect the embedded experiential lessons learnt from the former UNITRA that are interpretive in nature. The knowledge and lessons learnt from an organisational perspective may be applicable to other HBUs and HWUs, presently referred to HEIs.

5. **THESIS CONSTRUCTION OF VICE-CHANCELLORS’ TIME PERIODS: HISTORICAL SCOPE**

There were twelve [12] Vice-Chancellors including the Ministerial Appointed Administrators (MAA) at the University of Transkei (UNITRA), a Historically Black University (HBU)\(^{14}\). The Vice-Chancellors (VCs), as UNITRA’s leaders were operating within the political climate of the day, at any given point over UNITRA’s 29 years as a HBU.

This thesis will be divided into two eras, the Apartheid regime of pre-1994 and the new democratic dispensation of the African National Congress (ANC) of post-1994. There were five VCs at UNITRA during the apartheid regime and seven VCs post-1994. The thesis will use text and testimony from these eras for comparison, contrast and possible explanations of the VCs’ leadership, managerial practices and politics. The post-1994 era of the VCs at

\(^{14}\) Constructed Timeline Tabulation of Thesis - Appendix V
UNITRA will be more focussed on and detailed than the era of pre-1994. That is what shaped and finally determined the merger of UNITRA with Eastern Cape Technikon and Border Technikon in June of 2005, to become Walter Sisulu University, a Comprehensive Higher Education Institution15.

The two eras will be sub-divided further into seven successive phases with the seventh phase overlapping with the establishment of Walter Sisulu University (W.S.U). Each phase will correspond to an event that impacted on UNITRA as a HBU and required the intervention or steering mechanisms of the state. History is not constituted of “linear successions and progressive refinement” (Foucault, 1972, pp. 03-04), but rather by a sense of “discontinuity, break, displacement, gap, interruption, mutation, rupture, shift, threshold” (Foucault, 1972, p.212; Lemert and Gillan, 1982, p.129).

UNITRA’s history is a blending of social forces that can contribute to the knowledge of tendencies in the exercise of power by varying groups or individuals. The conceptual phases are captured frameworks by the researcher that are categorised to allow for detailed explorations of the underlying assumptions about UNITRA as an HBU case study. UNITRA will be assessed from an organisation theory perspective that discusses the research themes, with the VCs as the focal ‘human factor’ who had the “power of choice and purpose” (Jaffee, 2008, p.74). The integration of the “intra-organisation level” and “inter-organisation level” (Jaffee, 2008, p.20) will complete the organisational analyses and specify their mutual influences. The intra-organisation level refers to the internal interactions and characteristics

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15 Comprehensive Higher Education Institutions/Universities was introduced by the Ministry of Education in 2003. Comprehensive Higher Education Universities was the merger of Technikons and Universities to enable a balanced academic and vocational mix of programmes within an institution.
of UNITRA. The conceptual phases also reveal some of the essential causes of change and give possible explanations to the set hypotheses of this research thesis.

**Phase 1 - ‘Bantustan Golden Age’**

UNITRA’s first conceptual historical phase the ‘Bantustan Golden Age’ spans from the institution’s establishment in 1976 to 1986. Prof. Van der Merwe, former Dean of Education at the University of Fort Hare, was the founding Vice Chancellor (VC) under the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act at UNITRA and after the enactment of the University of Transkei Act No.23 of 1976. Prof. Van der Merwe reported to the Department of Internal Affairs of the Republican South African government in Pretoria and to the Transkeian government. The period 1976 to 1984 witnessed instability in management and governance within UNITRA that culminated with the Transkeian government declaration of ‘a state of emergency’.

Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima, head of the Transkeian government, announced on 10 April 1978 that Transkei would break all diplomatic ties with South Africa (New York Times, April 11, 1978). Unilateral withdrawal from the non-aggression pact between the two governments was initiated and all South African Defence Force members seconded to the Transkei Army were ordered to leave. As UNITRA’s main income was obtained from the Department of Internal Affairs of the Republican South African government through the Transkeian government, there were financial implications (Ibid). There was the reduction of financial assistance for Transkei as a homeland and inevitably for UNITRA. Paramount Chief Matanzima, more than a titular Chancellor forced UNITRA in 1984 to close due to political disturbances within Transkei as well as at UNITRA. The closure of UNITRA was
exacerbated by the expulsion of predominantly non-Transkeian students and the deportation of non-Transkeian academics. The academic integrity of the institution and the intellectual diversity of the university community were jeopardised. UNITRA had become a ‘political football field’, rather than a higher education institution. UNITRA recognised internationally for its academic credibility, lost its status in the listing of world universities. As Prof. Morgan\textsuperscript{16} in his interview states, it is perhaps then that “UNITRA lost its soul” (Nkanyuza, 2012c, p.03).

Shortly after the expulsions and deportations, Prof. Van der Merwe became wheel-chair bound after falling from the roof. Following the accident, tensions and allegations of misuse of funds arose. Prof. W. Nkuhlu, who had initiated the accounting programme at UNITRA, acted briefly in the capacity of a VC. He resigned from UNITRA in 1984, stating personal reasons.

**Phase 2 - ‘Bantustan Serenity’**

‘Bantustan Serenity’, with the return of Prof. Nkuhlu, to become a Vice-Chancellor (VC) from 1987 to 1991 constitutes phase two. Prof. Nkuhlu infused cooperative communication links at all stakeholder levels. Stakeholders included the students, UNITRA’s governance bodies, the Union of Democratic University Staff Associations (UDUSA) and the National Education Health and Allied Workers Union (NEHAWU). Trade unions like NEHAWU, were not formally recognised prior to 1989 (Peires, 1992, p.367).

\textsuperscript{16} The researcher had an interview with Professor Nicky. I. Morgan on the 22 February 2012. Professor Morgan was at UNITRA as a Ministerial Appointed Administrator (MAA) and later as a Vice-Chancellor (VC) in 2002. Interview recordings will be discussed as part of the Vice-Chancellor phases.
 Paramount Chief Matanzima’s tenure as Chancellor ceased at UNITRA in 1986, simultaneously as his “term of office as President of Transkei expired, leaving effective power in the hands of the Prime Minister, his brother George” (Peires, 1992, pp. 367-376). Power struggles for the government of Transkei became volatile resulting in martial law and take-over on 30 December 1987 by the Transkei Defence Force (TDF). General Bantu Holomisa, Commander of the TDF and sympathiser of the liberation movements took over the Transkeian government until the re-integration of Transkei into the Republic of South Africa (Peires, 1992). With the military takeover, the Transkeian revenue was under continuous threat of stoppage and reduction. The political tension inevitably impacted on UNITRA and the institution had to find additional means to be financially sustainable, such as donors\(^{17}\).

**Phase 3 - ‘Transitions’**

‘Transitions’, the third phase of VCs at UNITRA will be marked from 1991 to 1994. UNITRA was characterised by acting VCs, up to the advent of South African democracy in May 1994. An acting capacity tends to give limited scope and power to carry out decisions that may impact upon the outcome of an institution. This thesis will analyse the leadership and managerial practices of Vice-Chancellors including Prof. D.Ncayiyana, and Prof. J.Noruwana.

**Phase 4 - ‘New Horizons’**

‘New Horizons’, the fourth phase under UNITRA’s Council’s chairpersonship of Prof. F. Meer, and Prof. A. Moleah the Vice-Chancellor (VC), witnessed tensions and conflicts in the

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\(^{17}\) Selected list of donors and contributions – Appendix V1
institution from 1994 to 1999. The tensions transcended the intra-organisation level of the university, especially at the managerial, governance and finance structure. The consequences of the tensions between UNITRA’s governing Council and the VC resulted in court actions, the dissolving of Council and finally the resignation of the VC. Coupled with the internal UNITRA conflicts were the external challenges of the ANC government adopting, “a more interventionist approach in steering the system” (Fataar, 2003, p.33). In steering the South African tertiary landscape system, educational reforms and legislation changes severely affected UNITRA as an HBU. Prof. Moleah’s response as the first VC post 1994 to the educational reforms taking place in South Africa and within UNITRA led UNITRA into institutional crises. Prof. Jafta acted briefly as the VC in 1997, amidst the institutional crises. Prof. Jafta, rejected by students, in favour of Prof. Moleah, was the first and last female VC of UNITRA. The institutional crises and, a total collapse of management governance structures and UNITRA systems resulted in the Tshombe Commission of Enquiry of 14 August 1998.

The Tshombe Commission of Enquiry, followed by an independent assessor investigation by Advocate T.L.Skweyiya\textsuperscript{18}, as mandated by the Minister of Education, Prof S.M.E.Bengu, culminated with the Skweyiya Report. The terms of the gazetted notice stated that “the general purpose of the investigation was to advise the Minister on the source and nature of the discontent at UNITRA” (Skweyiya, 1998, p.05). The source and nature of the discontent at UNITRA was leadership, financial and managerial problems. Findings by the report indicated that the leadership and managerial approach practiced by Prof. Moleah was authoritarian, lacked transparency and poor communication channels. What was also apparent within UNITRA was an incomplete dysfunctional complement of top/executive management.

\textsuperscript{18} Terms of Reference: Advocate T.L.Skweyiya as the Independent Assessor in 1998 - Appendix V11.
Furthermore, top/executive management there was no accountability of position held or tasks carried out, due to internal conflicts. The source and nature of the discontent lead to group frustrations, which resulted in malfunctions of UNITRA as a HEI (Skweyiya, 1998, p.12[6.1]).

The Skweyiya Report recommended steps to restore proper governance and the promotion of reconciliation. The steps advocated, was a written code of ethics and conduct; functional statutory bodies; a retraction of retrenchment notices by executive management; an approved restructuring plan; an investigation into finances; improved communication lines and a package offered to the principal. From 1998 to 1999, partially implementation of the steps towards restoration and the promotion of reconciliation were adhered to. However, Prof.Malaza as the acting VC saw the growing disillusionment, tensions and unresolved issues, and resigned from UNITRA at the end of 1999.

Phase 5 - ‘Turbulent Waters’

The fifth phase ‘Turbulent Waters’ of this thesis, Dr. M.Nkosi19, Prof. N.I. Morgan20 and Dr. M.Qhobela21, as Ministerial Appointed Administrators (MAA) at UNITRA from 2000 to 2002 will be highlighted. The Minister of Education, Prof. K. Asmal, empowered by Section 41 (A), 44 and 45 of the Higher Education Act, No.101 of 1997 (Government Gazette, Vol. 401, 1998), appointed an administrator. Prof. K. Asmal, the Minister of Education (1999 – 2004) declared that implementation, and not more policy, was a priority (Cloete et al, 2003).

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19 Terms of Reference: Dr. Morley Nkosi as the first Ministerial Appointed Administrator, 2000 - Appendix V111.

20 Terms of Reference: Professor. Nicholas. I. Morgan as the second Ministerial Appointed Administrator - Appendix 1X.

21 Terms of Reference: Dr. M.Qhobela as third Ministerial Appointed Administrator - Appendix X.
HEIs that lacked confidence in higher education leadership and on-going institutional crises would have government invention mechanism put into place, where a more centralised approach in decision-making would be taken. The Ministerial Appointed Administrators (MAAs) would try to please ‘two masters’, by negotiating their way at UNITRA and reporting to the Minister of Education, amidst a number of challenges and conflicts.

A prominent feature of the fifth phase is the National Working Group (NWG)\textsuperscript{22}, a committee set in motion by the National Plan for Higher Education (NPHE) of 2001. The NWG mandated by the Department of Education (DOE), to deliberate on the restructuring of the higher education landscape and the creation of “new institutional and organisational forms” (DoE, 2001a, p.87), met with Prof. Morgan, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} MAA and UNITRA representatives. In a joint meeting to determine the future of UNITRA as an HEI, the terms of reference for the NWG and the MAA were divergent. In 2002, the NWG proposed the closure of UNITRA to the Ministry (DOE) amongst other submissions on the proposed new landscape of Higher Education Institutions (HEIs), whereas Prof. Morgan’s terms of reference were to re-stabilise UNITRA. Prof. Morgan resigned in November of 2002. Proposals from the DoE for the restructuring of Higher Education Tertiary Institutions were released in December 2002. A new institutional type of University in South Africa, termed ‘Comprehensive Institutions’, on the advice of the Council of Higher Education (CHE) was proposed. These new types of institutions were later referred to as, “Comprehensive Universities” (Gibbon, 2004, p.03).

Dr M. Qhobela seconded from DOE was appointed in January 2003 as the 3\textsuperscript{rd} MAA for a period of 4 months. Effectively, Dr Qhobela’s terms of reference were to re-establish a Council with all the necessary processes in place.

\textsuperscript{22} National Working Group ‘Terms of Reference’ – Appendix X1
Phase 6 - ‘Mirages of Hope’

‘Mirages of Hope’ the sixth phase, was the nomination of Prof. Mfenyana as an acting VC from May 2002 to October 2002. During Prof. Mfenyana tenure, advertisements and processes for a permanent VC at UNITRA were underway. Prof. Morgan recalled by UNITRA stakeholders as a permanent VC became effective from October 2002 to June 2005. UNITRA merged23 with Border Technikon (East London) and Eastern Cape Technikon (Butterworth) and submitted the preferred name of “Walter Sisulu University” to the Minister of Education, Minister Kader Asmal. The Minister wrote to Council members indicating his displeasure at the choice of name24. The response by the National Minister of Education to the institutional name of Walter Sisulu University was not taken well.

“I have noted that your preferred name for the new institution is Walter Sisulu University of Science, Technology and Rural Development. I have also noted that Prof. Morgan contacted the Sisulu family to seek their approval for naming the new institution after the late Walter Sisulu. Although the permission of the Sisulu family is clearly necessary, the manner in which this has been undertaken is highly improper. This should have been done after consulting me to determine whether the proposed name would be acceptable in the context of the Ministry’s guidelines, which indicate that it would be preferable not to name institutions after individuals. It is my view that it would be inappropriate to name the new institution after an individual. I would therefore like to request that the three institutions submit alternative proposals for the name of the new institution to me at the latest by end of September” (Asmal, 2003).

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23 Government Gazette of 2003
24 Reaction to Walter Sisulu University name by the Minister of Education – Appendix X11
By the end of 2004, the merger of the three financial bankrupt institutions was gazetted as “Walter Sisulu University for Technology and Science, Eastern Cape”. The merger was postponed by the Minister of Education, due to incomplete merger processes. The three institutions officially merged in June 2005.

**Phase 7 – ‘Post Script’**

‘Broken Dreams’ the overlapping concise seventh phase of thesis. Prof. M.M. Balintulo would be the first Vice-Chancellor (VC) of W.S.U. Following a series of communications from Prof. M.M. Balintulo, to Minister Naledi Pandor in 2006, the ‘awkward’ W.S.U. name changed in 2007 to ‘Walter Sisulu University’. Early 2009, W.S.U was in financial crises and barely managing to pay salaries. The merger of three institutions with differing remunerations, programme-mixes, vast geographical locations, institutional cultures added to the financial crises and mis-management of W.S.U. Prof. M.M. Balintulo and Dr. S.Fikeni, the Chairperson of Council on the 21 December 2010, wrote to Minister Blade Nzimande of DHET for assistance. Prof. D. Ncayiyana was appointed as an Independent Assessor by DHET and made recommendations on how effective financial and proper governance at W.S.U could be restored. WSU Council tabled its resignation to DHET. The resignation of W.S.U. Council was rejected in terms of the governance vacuum and legal procedures stemming from the Higher Education Act No.101 of 1997. Prof. L.R. van Staden, Deputy Vice-Chancellor from Tshwane University of Technology (TUT), was appointed as MAA by

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25 Minister Naladi Pandor became the Minister of Education following Minister Kader Asmal from 2004 to 2009

26 I, the researcher, was an academic Council representative from 2007 to 2011

27 Minister Blade Nzimande of Higher Education and Training from 2009 has had an illustrious career. He was also a UNITRA council member at UNITRA from 1994 to 1997.

28 W.S.U. Council Composition of 2010 - Appendix X111
DHET for 2 years. Prof. L.R. van Staden and his select team consisting of consultants, commenced at WSU in January 2012. Obscured by students’ strikes, staff strike and lock-out by the employer, it was evident that the structure, systems and communication at the intra-organisation and inter-organisation levels of W.S.U. had broken down again.

In conclusion, this thesis will seek to address and analyse the challenges faced by the VCs and the conditions pertaining to UNITRA within the seven successive phases. Against the backgrounds indicated earlier, the researcher will access and analyse how the past has shaped its current responses at the levels of leadership, management practices and governance structures.

6. MOTIVATION/RATIONALE FOR RESEARCH STUDY

As a ‘hybrid researcher’, I regard myself as both an ‘outsider’ and ‘insider’ at UNITRA. An ‘outsider’, as a returning ‘exile’ of Xhosa origins, unable to speak my ‘mother-tongue’ (language), I joined UNITRA as an industrial psychology lecturer in 1995. As an ‘outsider’ and newcomer, I observed UNITRA’s organisational functions, structure and culture and adjusted accordingly. My participant role(s) within UNITRA’s structures, specifically as a union activist from 1998, lead to me being regarded as an ‘insider’. As an ‘insider’, I got involved in different committees, and gained a better understanding of the university dynamics taking place. I sensed that the university dynamics such as the institutional financial and managerial crisis of 1998/1999 were symbolic of how the former UNITRA was conceived, established, structured and governed. Politics played a major role in the establishment of UNITRA. What form did the politics take in shaping UNITRA and how did it affect UNITRA’s developmental growth as a HBU? Had the ‘political flux’ that shaped UNITRA pre-1994 stopped or just changed its’ form in the post democratic elections of 1994.
Simply put, were the Apartheid government, Transkeian government and the African National Congress (ANC) government the contributing ‘political flux’ that distorted the organisational development and growth of UNITRA as a higher education institution? Did the ‘political flux’ invariably affect the leadership and managerial practices of VCs at UNITRA, which subsequently impacted on the academic staff, administrative staff, students and the immediate community? I believed the UNITRA events required an in-depth research, so as to better understand the dynamics at play.

UNITRA is located in a rural area, serves as a socio-economic locus for black developmental growth in the Transkei which has an approximate population of 4 to 5 million. UNITRA’s dominant idea as a university was inquiry into knowledge and truth (Barnett, 1990) and service to the surrounding community. The presence of UNITRA graduates in many prominent positions\(^{29}\) shows that the university helped to develop the intellectual capacity of many students. Much of what can be researched and learnt from the VCs at UNITRA may be applied to other HBUS and/or to HWUs, all presently referred to as HEIs. This thesis highlights the tensions between the traditional academic frameworks and the need for socially useful or practical higher education.

By means of triangulation, the political dynamics between UNITRA as a higher education institution and the State at an inter-organisation level will be illustrated. Do government steering mechanisms and state regulatory inventions address institutional needs that are reflective of the community and the regions’ requirements? The results of the study should demonstrate how actions taken by VCs in positions of power and prominence affect an organisation. Jaffee (2008, p.27) states, “a central tension stems from the ability of the human

\(^{29}\) Sample list of ‘Who is Who’ of former UNITRA graduates in prominent positions and Honorary Graduates – Appendix X
factor (VC) to respond subjectively and behaviourally to organisational arrangements”. In this way, this thesis contributes to international and national debate about the relationship of Higher Education Institutions, Vice-Chancellors and the State. Such analytic research will further clarify concepts and lessons learnt within the framework of organisational theory, of leaders, the types of dynamics at intra-organisation and inter-organisation levels of analyses. Some of the focus themes will be discussed in the literature review.

I queried whether the weak link at UNITRA might lie with the VCs leadership and managerial practices. The resulting study of the VCs as individuals and their ‘unique nature’ would also highlight what Collingwood refers to as, “relative presuppositions” (Hughes-Warrington, 2008, pp. 41-42).

As a black researcher from the Transkei, I also queried the racial category of the VCs. Are ‘black leaders’ flawed, thus perpetuating the racial and ethnic stereotypes, as a form of power discourse within the society? Or regardless of the VC’s leadership style, traits and/or characteristics; were the situational factors overwhelming? After all, specific concepts and methods of thinking were already prevalent at certain points in time, whether at UNITRA, Transkei and the Republic of South Africa. Durkeim and Horkheimer in pioneering an interdisciplinary approach were concerned about the analyses of the “psyche and ideological mechanisms through which class” within “societies contain conflict” (Heywood, 2004, p.279).

Specific contexts may posit the revelation of discourse formation in the struggle for power (Foucault in Hall, 1992, p.292) and the use of rationalisation as “one best way formulation” (King & Lawley, 2013, p.91) to solving institutional problems, as exemplified in the National
Working Group (NWG); a committee set in motion by the National Plan for Higher Education (NPHE) of 2001 and the Ministerial Appointed Administrator (MAA) as mandated by the Department of Education (DoE).

7. **THEORETICAL REVIEW**

7.1. **Theories of Organisation**

Various organisational theories were used to explicate the nature of organisations and the leadership modes brought to bear by senior executives in organisations. To this end, I used the bureaucratic theory, structural theory; human resources and human relations theories; contingency theory; human agency and group dynamic; conflict theory and institutional theory to explicate further the ‘functional machinery’ of organisations with particular reference and application to universities. In using the contingency theory and institutional theory, I used the situational factors to explore the leadership methods of the VCs and Ministerial Appointed Administrators (MAAs) at the University of Transkei from the period 1976-2004. Since a university, like numerous organisations, is constituted of people occupying various tiers within the organisation, I also looked at the role of stakeholders from general staff (mainly non-academic support service), academics in various levels as well as students. To explore this phenomenon I relied on the human relations in human resources theory. The stakeholder terminology for purposes of this thesis was indispensable in so far as trying to elucidate the role of the stakeholders in either thwarting or boosting the leadership practices of the VCs and MAAs (as human actors) at UNITRA. Finally, in zooming down into the VCs’ and Ministerial Appointed Administrators (MAAs) leadership and managerial practices, I utilised the emerging typologies and modes of governance.
7.2. Concepts of a University

There are divergent views with regard to what a university is or should be. Newman (1852), in his pioneering study on the conceptualisation of the university as an organisation, views university as a place where young people can be equipped with the values and ideas that they can carry with them through life. In a similar vein others view a university as a centre for skills acquisition that are of relevance to the communities from which they come or which they will be part of upon completion of their training at university (Kaya, 2006; Niblett, 1974). For others, a university is viewed as an ivory tower that consists of a select privileged group in any given society (Barnett, 1990; Minogue, 2005). Such views as these expressed by Newman (1852), Niblett (1974), Kaya (2006), Barnett (1990) and Minogue (2005), are very useful in understanding the concept of universities as centres of learning and teaching, however such views tend towards a one-dimensional perspective of a university. They fall short of viewing a university as a complex organ constituted of people in various levels who are all striving towards achieving the explicit goals of the organisation. As organisations, universities are also heavily influenced by the leadership, who are the decision makers. This is what has been the thrust of my argument throughout this thesis, that the VCs and MAAs at UNITRA were the key players in determining the trajectory that the University followed in the course of their respective tenures. In turn their decisions and leadership approaches were influenced by the Contingency theories that took into account the situational factors to achieve the “best fit between the organisation and environment, so that all elements are aligned, or congruent” (Linstead, Fulop & Lilley, 2009, p.636). UNITRA, like all organisations, did not operate in a vacuum but was constantly shaped and reshaped by various historical and political climates.
7.3. The Nature of History

In this thesis, I used a diachronic approach to historical investigation of leadership styles of the VCs and MAAs, as opposed to a synchronic study of a particular moment in the historical development of UNITRA. The diachronic approach accorded me an opportunity to investigate the progression of the University over a period of time to fully grasp how those (VCs) associated with the University over that period under investigation here experienced, constructed and represented history (Hughes-Warrington, 2008, p. xi).

As much as the VCs and MAAs wielded some semblance of power, their power was somewhat limited in view of the fact that they were minor pawns in the wider scheme of things, functioning as they were, under the directives and exigencies of various governmental ministerial imperatives. This is coupled with the challenges these significant individuals faced on the ground trying to address the stakeholders’ variegated interests and demands. Each epoch reviewed herein is characterised by the impact national politics played in the shaping of both the general demeanour of the organisation as well as the leadership practices of the VCs and MAAs in question. The historians are in agreement that to study the impact of significant individuals in the past events necessarily entails the study of the socio-political factors, since “the men [sic] whose actions the historian studies were not isolate individuals acting in a vacuum: they acted in the context, and under the impulse, of a past society”(Carr, 1987, p.35). It is for this reason that throughout this thesis the VCs and MAAs are studied not devoid of but in tandem with the historical epochs in which they operated.

8. SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

Research on UNITRA VCs’ leadership and managerial practices, structure, relationships and the agency actors is almost non-existent. There is minimal research on VCs found elsewhere,
nationally or internationally. Rather there has been research and academic articles on students’ throughput rates, performance indicators and bench marks, curricula changes and so on. Thus the analyses of the leadership and managerial practices of the VCs at UNITRA will contribute to research in the field of organizational theory that is inherently interdisciplinary and its application to higher education development. In addition this thesis will pay homage the institutional memory of the former UNITRA and add value to its academic identity and vision.

9. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

- To analyse how the Vice-Chancellors’ managerial and leadership practices impacted on the developmental growth of UNITRA as an organisation. Were there structural problems at UNITRA from the onset that would affect UNITRA throughout its existence? If so, how were they addressed by each of the Vice-Chancellors’ within the organisational climate of each VC’s phase?

- To assess the impact of government intervention and steering mechanisms on UNITRA, using UNITRA’s historical timelines as an educational tool for policy evaluation. This research is purposefully interested in the implications on UNITRA being reincorporated into South Africa. And also interested in the implications of what the national higher education landscape transformation posed for this university’s functioning.

- To identify UNITRA’s governance structures available to the VCs during their tenure. Higher Education Institutions are usually formed of by a complex structure which entails a number of stakeholders such as the academics, students, unions, community and external stakeholders such as government. Within the HEIs structure are ad hoc
and standing committees of Council. The organizational hierarchy structure consists of top management, middle management and those on the lower ranks. So what can we learn from the VCs in their endeavours at UNITRA. How did the VCs perceive the structures in UNITRA?

- To document the institutional memory of UNITRA as a Historically Black University. Much of what can be researched and learnt from the VCs at UNITRA and of UNITRA may similarly be applied to other HBUS and even HWUs, referred to in post 1994 as HEIs. A historical analysis can bring an increased awareness of the past, generate new interpretations for the present and give an insight into future trends.

- To obtain and document the reflective lessons that affected UNITRA as an HBU under the differing Vice-Chancellors. Though UNITRA’s former VCs’ manifested different leadership and managerial practices, all had duties of governance. Governance represents the means by which direction and control are applicable to the stewardship held accountable for an organisation’s assets (Institute of Directors, 2002, 2009). These assets may be tangible and intangible, financial and non-financial. This thesis will have to take account of the method that indicates the stewardship by the VC of the assets of this HBU.

10.1 **KEY RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

1. How far were the leadership and managerial practices of UNITRA’s Vice-Chancellors shaped by prevailing politics of the apartheid system, and of the new democratic government post 1994?

2. What navigational methods of leadership and managerial practices did the Vice-Chancellors use within the given prevailing political climate in dealing with the
internal stakeholder(s) at UNITRA and the external stakeholder(s) such as government?

10.2 Subsidiary Research Questions

3. To what extent did the managerial structures with regard to governance contribute to the crises periods from 1994 to 2004?

4. How did the different leadership and managerial practices of the Vice-Chancellors impact on the governance structure at UNITRA as a higher education institution?

5. How have the South African political events influenced institutional governance at UNITRA?

6. How did the shift in state policies influence the running of UNITRA?

7. To what extent has there been a shift in the state control of UNITRA from its establishment in 1976 to the State Steering mechanisms that resulted in UNITRA’s fate in 2004?

11. CONCLUSION

The socio-political historical phenomena of South Africa have always reshaped Higher Education. The structure, systems and governance of Higher Education Universities has significant implications for individuals such as Vice-Chancellors (VCs) and various groups. This significance is linked to the effectiveness, objectives and goals higher education subscribes to, with regard to what a university is or should be. Chapter 4 dovetails and discusses the establishment of Higher Education Universities in the Eastern Cape, their emergence and how an institution’s structure and system can go hand in hand with the prevailing institutional culture. The former UNITRA as a higher education institution in the Eastern Cape Province was established within a political-historical context and the interplay
of factors at a micro level (internally) and macro level (externally) impacted on its development.

The VCs by virtue of their role and position are leaders in Higher Education Universities. Chapter 5 and 6 discusses in detail the VCs at UNITRA during the apartheid era and the democratic era of post 1994. A leader can have a strong influence on the behaviour and performance of group members. Rollinson and Broadfield (2002, p.360) appropriately state that whilst the influence of a VC is a form of authority, it is a more subtle form of control than that of the use of power. As implied in phase 4 ‘New Horizons’, leaders and leadership differ in context and, at times, meaning. It is for this thesis to describe, discuss and assess the pivotal role of the VCs at UNITRA, and the multifaceted factors that effected the developmental growth of UNITRA as a Higher Education University.
2.1 INTRODUCTION

This thesis discusses and assesses the knowledge interest of the Vice-Chancellors, through interviews with available VCs and MAAs, about the relations between themselves and the institutional human members and within the prevailing political climate around them. Information is cross-referenced through selective secondary interviews and reviewing of various documents. Council documents, including detailed reports and minutes, are used as a primary information source, due to the detailed reports and minutes taken; and this is cross-referenced with information from the interviews. The information obtained from the interviews is verbatim, content oriented and interpretative in nature. This chapter is divided into three main sections. These sections are firstly, ‘the nature of thesis’, secondly, ‘the research design’ and thirdly, ‘the data processes’. Within these three main headings are subsections that are applicable to this thesis. Following the three main subsection headings, is discussion on the ethical consideration of this thesis; the limitations and challenges faced; and the possible anticipated research outcomes resulting from this thesis.

2.2 THE NATURE OF THESIS

2.2.1 Socially Constructed Reality

This thesis is inherently interdisciplinary within the conceptual framework of organisation theory. Organisation theory has multi-approaches with paradigms that are mutually complementary in allowing for “cross-fertilization without demanding for integration” (Schutz & Hatch, 1996, pp. 533-535).
The University of Transkei (UNITRA) as an “artefact” (Rollinson & Broadfield, 2002, p. 03) was brought into existence by the activity of people, thus creating a socially constructed reality. Socially constructed reality is an ongoing, dynamic process, where the VCs (the pivotal human actor(s) of this thesis) acted on their interpretations and their knowledge of UNITRA as a higher education institution. Epistemology is the science of knowing and the enquiry of human activity that sees “knowledge as contextual and ever evolving” (Palmer & Marra, 2004). Thus the epistemology of this thesis derives from the VCs’ interviews and written records from 1976 to 2005. The ontological dimension specifies the nature of the reality to be studied (Terre Blanche, 2007, p. 06), which in this thesis is UNITRA as a historically black university or institution (HBU/HBI). Ontologically, UNITRA as a socially constructed reality functioned within prescriptive political ideologies. The prescriptive political ideologies pertained to “an internally coherent set of ideas designed to persuade people of a particular worldview” (Grieves, 2010, p. 227). These ideologies were that of the Apartheid government, the Transkeian government headed by Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima and the democratically elected government since 1994 of the African National Congress (ANC) government. The social realities of these political ideologies take into account the way social phenomenon are created, institutionalized, and become an accepted trend. Socially constructed reality takes

"the view that all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context"

2.2.2 Graphic Representation of Internal and External Relationships with Vice-Chancellors at UNITRA

The ‘graphic representation’ of figure 1 (see next page) is a set of interdependent sectors that at a glance gives an idea of the complexities and the possible dynamics that transpired at UNITRA, with the Vice-Chancellors as leaders. In creating figure 1, the representations on the diagram shows the types of connections amongst the multiple constituencies that comprised of individuals, groups and external stakeholders (Grieves, 2010, pp. 18-19), who differed in discourses. These discourses were in the form of language, identity and cultural power, which impacted on the structural development of UNITRA as a university. The state as in the Republic of South Africa exercises impersonal authority through the bureaucratic manner in which it conducts itself (Hayward, 1997). The methods used by the government become a means in which the authority of the state is brought into operation through the aims of legislation, policies, statutes and procedures. These aims formed the regulatory mechanism(s) in developing specific objectives within higher education institutions, inclusive of UNITRA that are influenced their institutions’ performances.
Figure 1: Diagram of Graphic Representation of Internal and External Relationships with Vice-Chancellors at UNITRA

POLITICS IN THEORY
(Below Column)

REGULATORY MECHANISM(S)

Higher Education Legislation, Policies, Statutes and Procedures

University of Transkei (UNITRA), a Historical Black University (HBU) 1976 -2005

POLITICS IN PRACTICE
(Below Column)

INSTITUTIONAL TRANSACTION(S)

Institutional Shape of Higher Education

Vice-Chancellors’ Leadership and Managerial Practices

INTER-ORGANISATION DISCOURSES AND DYNAMIC EVENTS

Politics of State Ideology and Governments in South Africa

INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES

REGULATORY MECHANISM(S)

INTER-ORGANISATION DISCOURSES AND DYNAMIC EVENTS

(Created by Nkanyuza, 2012)
2.2.3 Social Constructionist Strand of Post-Modernism

Within the social constructionist strand of postmodernism, the concept of socially constructed reality stresses the on-going global views or worldviews held by individuals in dialectical interaction with society at a given time. Foremost, the postmodernist view proposes that the VCs’ identities are no longer a unified, centred and fixed entity, but rather an amoebic formulation that is “transformed continuously in relation to the ways represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround us” and therefore “[the] subject assumes different identities at different times, identities which are not unified around a ‘coherent’ self” (Hall, 1992, p. 277).

The VCs “came from different races; different ethnic backgrounds; different epistemological perspectives and knowledge domains; had different personalities (Hall, 1992; Barnard, 1938, p.12) and styles of leadership”. Sometimes these clashed with expectations and cultural phenomena of stakeholders and successful transformation was not always achieved. “Stakeholder approach identifies interested groups such as communities, trade unions” (Grieves, 2010, p. 45) and others. The human relation theory emphasises the social needs, interaction and communication of the UNITRA stakeholders (students, academics, unions, management and Council); and a major role for organizational leadership (Jaffee, 2008, pp. 64-88). The themes of “structure and agency, a central debate in social theory” (Jaffee, 2008, p.26) are also contingent on the VCs at UNITRA, who constitute the ‘focal human factor’ in this thesis. UNITRA stakeholders viewed as ‘agents’, repeatedly acted independently of the VCs, as a collective and within their intragroup categorisation. The structural variables limited UNITRA developmental choices and growth due to the historical pattern of events. For example, this tension between agency and structures is shown in this report:
“BLACK universities will have nothing to celebrate when they look back at this turbulent year [2001], in which they literally fought for survival. His bruising battle with the University of SA (UNISA) council chairperson, Advocate McCaps Motimele, and the nasty finger the University of Transkei (UNITRA) is now pointing at him, is enough to give Asmal a headache when he thinks about cash-strapped and mismanaged black universities” (Mboyane, 2001, p.09).

The “nasty finger” was a series of correspondence between the stakeholders, like SENATE and the unions to the Minister on the governance of UNITRA. Transactions leading to different forms of discourses between government and UNITRA at the inter-organisation level, like the “bruising battles” or “nasty finger” resulted in ‘trade-offs’ and ‘unintended consequences’ (Jaffee, 2008, pp. 34-38). Assessment of these themes will be part of the VCs’ periodic assessment.

UNITRA’s division of labour, designation of tasks and hierarchy structure at the intra-organisation level is also indicative of rational-bureaucratic model, where, for instance, “Gouldner’s analysis of bureaucratic rules was based on the assumption that not all organizational members had the same interests or goals” (Jaffee, 2008, p.96). The structure of UNITRA and its systems go hand in hand with the organisation’s culture, (Harrison in Rollinson & Broadfield, 2002, p.695). The systems categorised accordingly into administrative policies and strategies; organisational structure and design; organisational processes and working conditions (Luthans, 1998, p.333). UNITRA’s systems already contained its own potential stress indicators from its establishment in 1976 to its demise in
It is against the nature of the above ‘cross-fertilisation’ of organisation theory that the historical data analysed in this thesis will be assessed and analysed.

2.2.4 A Case study in Social and Historical Research

The research design consists of a set of variable social constructions within a specific real life setting, making it naturalistic in nature. The design is contextualised within a setting that describes past events and activities, a “bounded system” (McMillan & Schumacher, 2001, p.37; Yin, 1984) or a case over time in detail, employing multiple sources of data found in the setting. Weiss (1994) describes a case study as a way of organising data so as to keep the focus on totality. Case studies consider the interrelationships among people, institutions, events and beliefs. Case studies allow variation and individual differences such as the VCs as the unit of analysis to be fully recognised and characterised in detail and within specific contexts. Ontologically, a case study such as this looks at an institution that is characterised by its complexity, unpredictability, risks and uncertainty across different periods. Rather than breaking the interrelationships into separate items for analysis, the researcher seeks to keep all elements of the situation in sight holistically. UNITRA, as a case study investigates its’ phenomenon in a natural setting where the boundaries between the phenomenon and its context are not clear, using multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 1984). The socio-political connotations attached to the construction of the former UNITRA were shaped by historical disparities, differing policies, discourse and power from the apartheid era to post-apartheid era of 1994. One parameter was the Bantu Policy that resulted in UNITRA being a HBU.
Another parameter was the policies, legislation and finances that led to higher education transformation reforms after 1994, which ultimately lead to UNITRA’s amalgamation.\textsuperscript{30}

\subsection*{2.2.5 Theories of History}

This research study utilises historiography, which is a study of how the past is analysed and communicated to others. Historians have various choices to make about what methods to use to investigate past events of interest. They may value oral testimony only, or authoritative texts only or material evidence only, or some combination of these. They may analyse past events in the light of a current ideology (such as Nazi history or Communist history) or a specific topic interest (such as military technology or famous women). The historiographical principles for this research utilises testimony (interviews with past VCs) and texts such as Council Minutes. This research will examine the VCs’ leadership and managerial practices at UNITRA, along the historical-political continuum of UNITRA. This thesis is not a biography of VCs; rather it is “a special type of science that studies events not accessible to our observation” (Collingwood, 1946, pp. 251-252).

Historiography examines the authorship of documentation, sourcing, interpretation, style, bias and audience. In obtaining Council documents, I questioned the evaluation of the source, the inferences attached and what purpose does the source have for the overall study? Council minutes and reports, which constitute Council documents, are not verbatim, nor do they capture the total essence of discussions. Council documents are reformatted by the minute-taker for reading purposes. So would restricting the sourcing only to past Council Documents produce “true” history in terms of its reliability? The initial answer was no. In broadening the

\textsuperscript{30} Data collation are from UNITRA’s institutional crisis resulting in the Tshombe Commission of Inquiry (1998); ‘The Skweyiya Report’ of 1998; Higher Education Act 101 of 1997; Audit reports to the DoE.
scope of sources to include the Transkei Assembly Debates; historical background of Transkei; newspaper articles; memos and letters, allowance was given for consistency and reliability of sources. Concurrent with broadening the scope of sources, were the underlying principles of how to select from sources relevant to and appropriate for the topic. This is despite some limitations to access or unavailability to source, quality of the source(s), time factor; and using the appropriate criterion in assessing someone’s research.

According to Fulbrook (2007), there are three features of analysis of history: theoretical, contextual and the metatheoretical. The theoretical includes the “vocabulary of concepts to capture reality; assumptions about the relationships among these constituent parts; and assumptions about priority, causality, relative importance, weighting and so on” (Fulbrook, 2007, pp. 31-50). In this study, organisational theory gives a framework for the discussion of historical events.

The second feature, contextual may be associated “with particular scholarly or political communities” (Fulbrook, 2007, pp. 31-50) and “with particular connotations which may influence membership in a particular theoretical tradition or scholarly language community”. Thus there could be a Nationalist party view of events in the Transkei in the 1980’s and there could be an anti-apartheid view.

Within the theoretical and contextual features are underlying elements which can be referred to as “philosophical anthropology” that consists of the metatheoretical features (Ibid). The “philosophical anthropology” is general assumptions about human nature. Some of these assumptions are about motor of change, such as social, economic, political and/or environmental impacts. Some of these assumptions can be applied to the relationship between
the VCs and the university; between the VCs and government, and the impact on UNITRA. For instance, in a critical event such as the relationship between Prof. van der Merwe and the striking students that led to student expulsion and staff deportation by the Transkei government in 1984. This event was triggered by allegations of corruption within the institution and the management of the VC, which led to political involvement by the Transkeian government. The VC justified his actions by reference to his ideas of education and the Bantu, while the newspapers reported allegations of management corruption. So the historian is faced with the task of trying to understand the “philosophical anthropology” of ideas within the agents of this incident (Ibid).

2.2.6 Communication and Deconstruction of language

To ascertain the VCs’ leadership and managerial practices, truth values can be obtained through interviews, archives and document verification in making inferences and forming some judgements. This thesis should be able to pursue its enquiries with regards for the interests of knowledge, “develop its own criteria of truth and objectivity” (Norris, 2005, pp. 25-39).

By generating accounts and proffering evidence in support of the VCs’ leadership and managerial practices, the critical analysis of text involves the deconstruction of language in the production of meaning within specific contexts. Through language humans exert control over representational and cultural production, what Foucault referred to as ‘discourse’. The VCs in their communication and interviews convey meaning. For instance, “W.S.U cannot
be closed down. The people of Transkei have been marginalised and that needs to be addressed” (Prof. W.Nkuhlu, 2012).

Every word, act, gesture and object are contributors to communications, which forms the processes of reality construction. So through this “representation or re-enactment of this discursive practice determines the explicit and sometimes implicit policy regarding cultural practices, inculcation of social norms and values for observance” (Hughes-Warrington, 2008, pp. 40-41).

2.2.7 Politics of Social Research

The politics of social research is where the terrain of politics (government) and the terrain of social scientific research concerns meets and intersects (Babbie et al, 2002). The uniqueness about the South African society is that it is not only structured by class and status (Mosca, 1939) but also by race and ethnicity. Power relations implicit in the data collection techniques played a part in determining the forms of influence within UNITRA structures, and between UNITRA and the state. The VCs were of different race and ethnic backgrounds, with differing epistemological perspectives and from different knowledge domains. For instance, Prof. van der Merwe, UNITRA’s founding VC was regarded as one of the best VCs by staff; especially by the academic staff, who were given incentives and resources for studies, overseas conferences and other academic requirements. Race connotations to his leadership and managerial approach were interlinked. Similarly, the ethnicity of the VCs was a contributing factor of inherent intra-organisation level vs. inter-organisation level dynamics.

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31 An interview with Professor Wiseman Nkuhlu, was held in August 2011. Professor Nkuhlu, pioneered the ‘accounting discipline’ at UNITRA and later became a Vice-Chancellor from 1987 to 1990. Interview recordings will be discussed as part of the Vice-Chancellor phases.
at UNITRA. Demonstrative in this thesis is that power relations, race and ethnicity played a role in the governance structures of UNITRA that were either positively or negatively associated with the managerial and leadership approach.

2.2.8 Statistics Data in Qualitative Research

Statistical data are used in South African Higher Educations (HEIs) to determine staff ratios, student enrolment and throughput figures, faculty admissions, benchmarking. The data provides information for the Higher Education Management Information Systems (HEMIS) that are used as a tool towards planning and a basis for calculating institutional subsidies. Patterns and variations of data indicating staff quotas, types of faculties and students that encapsulate each VC’s period in office were indicative of the developmental realities of UNITRA as a HBU. The important revolving variable is the student data\textsuperscript{32}. The students’ data augmented by students’ fee payment determine the institutional decision-making, the university requirements stipulated and the subsidy given by the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET). The FTEs from the student data are broken down into ‘Class of Educational Subject Matter (CESM). The CESM is distinguished by the categorizations of disciplines into certain categories. FTEs, CESM and the PCS (Programme Classification Structure) were components of the South African Post-Secondary Education formulae (SAPSE) for financial subsidies. SAPSE introduced in 1979 was applied to Historically White Universities (HWUs) and later applied to other Historically Black Universities (HBUs), inclusive of Technikons established in the mid-1980s (Bunting, 1995). The VCs used the FTEs of previous years to project the headcounts of students in future.

\textsuperscript{32} Student data translated into Full Time Equivalent Students (FTE). FTEs are a head count of students who are on full time basis at an institution and taking the full required programmes or disciplines for that particular year, which culminates into the end result qualification. A part-time student would count for a percentage of 1 FTE.
accommodate for fluctuations and even plan for other amenities such as expansion of infrastructure and so on. It should be noted that the SAPSE figures are utilised for government subsidies TWO years after the year reported on. For instance, UNITRA student numbers dropped in 2000 to 5,500 and in 2001 to between 4,500 and 5,000. The FTEs student figures of 3,500 to 4,000 indicated by DHET in 2002 were disputed by UNITRA as it resulted in a reduced government subsidy. Was financial planning integrated within the strategic planning of UNITRA as a HBU? How much income was received as against the expenditure? The audited finance report provides access to the income and expenditure of the former UNITRA, as against the social realities. The nature of this thesis, though qualitative in analysis will cross-check some of the above assumptions by reference to any available and relevant statistical data. These data will be in the form of tables, illustrations and figures.

2.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

2.3.1 Research Design

A research design will typically include how data is to be collected, what instruments will be employed, how the instruments will be used and the intended means for analysing data collection. The major mode of this research study will be qualitative in nature that is naturalistic, holistic and inductive. The research study consists of a set of variable social constructions within a specific real life setting, making it naturalistic in nature.

The research design is framed on seven consecutive constructed periodic phased crises events that affected UNITRA, within the two government eras of Apartheid and the democratic elections of post 1994. The analytic focus of this thesis is on the VCs at the former UNITRA. Ten theme areas were selected by the researcher for descriptive assessment and critical analyses. The selected theme areas by the researcher were:
- The Vice-Chancellor’s tenure and brief background history
- The Vice-Chancellor’s form of leadership and managerial practices at UNITRA
- The Vice-Chancellor’s achievements, strengths and weaknesses; and their impact on UNITRA
- The Vice-Chancellor’s relationship with Council as a governance body, Staff/Unions and Students
- The governance and institutional culture at UNITRA
- The finances and the structural-functionality of UNITRA
- The Vice-Chancellor’s relationship with government and/or the Minister of Education
- The prevailing political climate of each Vice-Chancellor
- The policies, statutes and/or legislations that profoundly impacted on UNITRA as a higher education institution.
- The chronological and historical events of UNITRA

Narrative analysis and comparisons of the experiences of the 12 Vice Chancellors (VCs) from 1976 to 2004 (28 years) is expected to reveal how the VCs’ leadership and managerial practices within the prevailing political climate and economic resources were utilised.

2.3.2 Purposive sampling

Purposive sampling allowed the researcher to home in on individuals that were “typical of the population sample” (Terre Blanche, 2007, p.139). The sample size is purposive, small and well suited to a case study such as this thesis. The typical population samples were the former VCs of UNITRA. The VCs are categorised in a non-probability sampling and are non-representative of the overall population (Welman, 2009). The researcher requested ‘face to
face’ interviews (McBurney & White, 2004, p. 244) with available former VCs of UNITRA, which had an advantage of establishing a rapport. Interview responses from the VCs interviewed were used as a primary data source. Primary sources are the basic and original material for providing the raw, initial or original evidence (Babbie et al, 2002, pp. 78-79). The interview material obtained from the VCs was analysed according to the indicated phased crises events that affected UNITRA.

2.3.3 Semi-structured questionnaire

Given the specific tenure time-line, semi-structured list of questions with some open-ended questions were prepared for the former UNITRA Vice-Chancellors, (Welman, 2009, p. 166). Consent for recording the face-face interview(s) was requested (Gomm, 2008, p. 214). Recording of the interview allowed for a full detailed record of the interview without the distraction of note-taking, the attention of the researcher and eye contact. By conducting interviews in this manner, the researcher could “focus on a research question and pursue it in great depth” (Rubin & Rubin, 2012, pp. 05-07).

The questionnaire had a bearing on the given themes and period with the same general questions initially asked (Huysamen, 1994). The researcher adapted the formulation of the questions including some of the terminology to suit the background and context of the former VC. Clarification and/or elaboration on unexpected and interesting information were asked during the course of the interview. This enabled the researcher to have greater discretion to probe beyond the answers and thus enter into a dialogue with the interviewee (Babbie et al., pp. 289-290). This type of interviewing allowed interviewees to answer more on their own terms than the standardised interview permits, but still provides a greater structure for

33 Semi-Structured Questionnaire administered to UNITRA Former Vice-Chancellor’s – Appendix XV
comparability over informal interviews. The intention of this thesis is not to deliberately discredit nor make public, information that is deemed to be detrimental to individuals and/or to the family. Rather, the intention is to determine how far the leadership and managerial practices of UNITRA’s Vice-Chancellors were shaped by prevailing politics and to document the evolution of UNITRA as a historical black university. Specific quoted statements and illustrations from an interviewee in this research thesis were of mutual consent.

2.3.4 Snowballing Interviews

As a consequence of the interviews with VCs, snowballing effect also took place. Selectivity of interviewees, stemmed from individuals being mentioned as a source by a VC and/or by individual(s) being present during a VC’s tenure. Sandelowski (1995) indicates that sample sizes in qualitative research should not be too small that it becomes difficult to achieve data saturation, theoretical saturation, or informational redundancy. At the same time, the sample should not be too large that it is difficult to undertake an in-depth case-oriented analysis. By following a sequence of events, the researcher is lead in a particular direction, so that the research questions can be addressed (Robson, 1993). Selectivity of interviewees served as secondary information in augmenting and cross-referencing the primary source information. Secondary interviews were administered to those, whose experiences at UNITRA permitted an understanding of the case study in question and are therefore valuable. For instance, Prof. Jeff Peires, a former lecturer in the history department, was able to elaborate on his experiences as a UNITRA staff member and provided observations as a historian in Transkei.

On obtaining prior consent, interviewees had the latitude to talk about an issue in any way they chose and to answer questions within their own frame of reference. The essence of these interviews would be for the researcher to discover the meaning of some issues, have a better
understanding of events at UNITRA and clarification on specific events (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2013). With the late Prof. B. De V van der Merwe and the late Prof. A. Moleah, other individuals were interviewed to augment documented information. The data obtained from the unstructured interviews will be regarded as secondary sources or used as supporting collaboration to the primary sources. Nevertheless, there are advantages and disadvantages to this mode of interviewing, as the researcher would have to shift relevant information from what is being said and to take into account the perspective of the person being interviewed.

2.3.5 Council Documents and Reports

Council documents, a collation of meetings, reports and minutes from 1977 to 2007 formed the key factual components of this thesis. Council documents as a primary source also serves as a “systematic collection and criticism of documents that describe past events” and activities “in a set of individuals bounded in time and place” (McMillan & Schumacher, 2001, p. 37; Yin, 1984, p. 23).

Council members are governing bodies that oversee the governance structure and institutional activities as an employer body. They are responsible for employing and approving staff members, inclusive of the Vice-Chancellor. The VCs annual report(s), a direct communication to Council on the governance and management of the institution became a prerequisite of the Council documents from 2001. Council documents are correspondence between the VC and Council; VC and other structures; reports and letters that impacted on UNITRA. Documental description and analyses of Council documents relating to the research questions and themes are part of the results. The Council documents were also used to establish factual material and to support the information obtained from the interviews with the former VC and of the secondary sources.
2.3.6 UNITRA Newsletters and the ‘State of the Address’

UNITRA newsletters and the ‘states of addresses’ were speeches conveyed by the Vice-Chancellors (VCs) to the University Community. The ‘state of address’ was a direct form of communication to the UNITRA community, who were staff, students and stakeholders. Not all the VCs at UNITRA made speeches and not all were recorded. Similarly, not all the VCs gave annual reports. Rhetoric and conveyed mental conventions expressed in these speeches will be regarded as primary sources. The same themes for documental analyses will be taken from these documents as part of the results.

2.3.7 Government Reports, Letters and Legislation

Legislations, policies, government commissions and statutes set the background in which UNITRA as a HBU had to function. The Vice-Chancellors (VCs) had to comply and operate within the government regulations. To some degree the primary source of the above documentations might be a secondary source. The researcher is interpreting someone’s information directly from the factual content, such as a parliamentary document that is subject to the interpretation of the style of writing (Open University, 1993, pp. 102-106). For instance, the parliamentary document of the Tomlinson Commission (1955); Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 (section 55 and 45); the Tshombe Commission of Inquiry (1998), are subject to some form of production and shaping that results in the process of the source coming into being. The use of these documents within this thesis is to understand and analyse the circumstantial situation in which the VCs had to operate and their overall implication for UNITRA as a HBU.
Cross correspondence documents to the Ministry and to the Minister of Education gives an indication of the relationship between a VC and the government. This data source assists in understanding the dynamics of the political arena, the VCs had to navigate, whilst leading UNITRA as a HBU. The same themes for documental analyses will be taken from these documents as part of the results.

2.3.8 Secondary Data Sources

Secondary sources are the re-analyses of data that has been collected for another purpose (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009, p. 256) and usually after the event or period. Some selectivity is necessary, which might require some relatively measurable units, so as to emerge with appropriate concepts, themes and analyses that are relative and fair in representation to the research. The use of newspaper articles, although a form of indirect use of sources (secondary source) with its hidden agendas convey some information. The information can be through the ideals projected, the terminology used and, the images shown. For instance, a bill retrospective from June 04 1980 was introduced in the National Assembly to indemnify the Transkeian government and its officers against civil and criminal actions in the course of state duties.

“Bill to protect State officers”

(Daily Dispatch Reporter, 1984b, p. 01).

The reporter stated that the Transkeian Bar Council expressed concern over the bill that indemnified the government and state officers from prosecution. Mr. T.Letlaka, the Minister of Justice in response “told the Assembly the Bill was meant to save Transkeian taxpayers’ money from being ‘siphoned’ by over 100 University of Transkei students detained for nine days under the Transkei state of Emergency Act” (Daily Dispatch Reporter, 1984b).
The source of information rests on human decisions, emanating from the inferences and premise made on the event or situation taking place. The decisions made by the creator(s) of the documents have some form of motivation, whether conscious or unconscious. Sources need to be carefully contextualised when giving an account of the “reality effect” (Fulbrook, 2007) and attention be given to the linguistic construction of the sources. Such was the case with the unsigned pamphlets circulating at UNITRA stating “Umtata Campus Urged to Join” and “students to join the countrywide boycott” (Daily Dispatch Reporter, 1980b).

In the response article to the inferred possible behaviour of students, “act responsibly students urged” (Daily Dispatch Reporter, 1980a), Mr M.Lujabe the Transkeian State Official stated to 200 UNITRA students on campus that “No state will tolerate subversive surreptitious behaviour”. The context and form of language gives an account of a reality effect in its representation (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 63). Critical questions and underlying principles come into effect when enquiring about the essential nature of the source. Such queries took the form of whether the researcher has used the sources knowledgeably and critically. The researcher notes that sources do not exist in isolation, they are preserved selectively and within a social context; and there could be the “possibilities of censorship, secrecy, confidentiality, particularly if there is something in the sources that discredits someone.

2.4. DATA PROCESSING

2.4.1 Triangulation Data Methods

The research question is addressed by means of triangulation to specific and particular phenomena, as in grounded theory studies; data gathering and analysis are tightly interwoven. “Triangulation has raised an important methodological issue in naturalistic and qualitative approaches to evaluation, controlling bias and establishing valid
propositions because traditional scientific techniques are incompatible with this alternate epistemology”.

(Mathison, 1988, p. 13).

The aim of triangulation is to select sources that have different biases and strengths (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 267); and can also complement each other in the validity of an explanation from the use of different methods. For instance, the corroboration of the VCs’ interviews with the Council documents and/or auditor report for comparison and consistency of data recordings will lead to more valid, reliable and diverse construction of realities (Golafshani, 2003). The triangulation method not only leads to a holistic research picture, it enables the researcher to capture differences that might provide an opportunity to describe a phenomenon with greater accuracy (Denzin, 1989). The methods chosen in triangulation to test the validity and reliability of a study are dependent on the criterion of the research. The researcher is aware that data triangulation as a form of comparative analyses may lead to inconsistencies and in some cases contradictions that may complicate the interpretation of results (Stage & Manning, 2003).

2.4.2 Documental Analysis

Three main features will be utilized, namely, textual analysis, content analysis and discourse analysis. Textual analysis catalogues and determines the source documents. The textual analysis of this research study will differentiate the primary sources and secondary sections. Text is anything written, or spoken that serves as a medium for communication (Neuman, 1997). Prior identification of documents into differing categories would be done by searching for different and similar patterns amongst the categories (Stage & Manning, 2003). The same matters and/or ‘theme areas’ might be raised in different ways in the different types
of texts. These documents will mainly be primary source information as the context will recount the first-hand experience of the VCs’ leadership and managerial practices.

Discourse Analyses refers to the process of analysing the contents, themes, structures, underlying messages and assumptions in speech and writing of people (Love in Stage & Manning, 2003, pp. 83-96). Slembrouck (1998-2003) describes discourse analysis, as language used beyond the boundaries of a sentence, the interactive dialogue properties of everyday communication and the interrelationship between language and society. For instance, “Accusations Rife Over Transkei Campus Unrest” (Herald Reporter, 1984). Prof. Van der Merwe (VC of UNITRA) was accused of criticising certain unnamed members of staff for “teaching Marxism” as a result of student unrest. The dispute about what and who are “Marxists” is the coded language according to which power presents itself and prescribes its conception (Foucault, 1972, p. 72). Mr Morrell, one of UNITRA’s staff members to be deported in 1984, stated that the problem had nothing to do with the teaching of Marxism. Rather it was the inability and refusal of the administration to deal with an increasingly mature student body who were demanding greater freedom that led to the student unrest. Discourse analyses “tend to focus on how particular phenomena are represented” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 16).

In assessing and analysing the VCs tenure of leadership and managerial practices at UNITRA, certain discourses are employed to achieve particular effects in specific contexts (Blanche and Durrheim in Babbie et al., 2002). For instance, as indicated by academics including Prof. Cloete in his interview, Prof. van der Merwe was perceived as being passionate about UNITRA, yet Council told him that he should show loyalty to his staff and students. Prof. Jafta spoke mainly about the high standards of the diversity of academics at
UNITRA, yet a VC should also be a political activist to understand and lead the institution. Prof. Peires on the other hand, highlighted in his interview the tension points of the VC’s race and ethnicity on the acceptance of a VC as a leader at UNITRA, regardless of goodness of the leader’s approach. Such as the case of Prof. Ncayiyana, who was victimised by a group of colleagues for a number of reasons, including he came from UMzimkhulu (therefore not a Xhosa) and had a “white wife” (Nkanyuya, 2012b). The role of the VC’s’ wives also played some importance in the discourses documented. For instance, Prof. van der Merwe’s wife, as his secretary and the Council minutes indicated that the students were opposed to the arrangement of a wife being his secretary; not whether she could do the job or not.

2.4.3 Reliability and Validity Alternatives in Qualitative Research

Though reliability and validity are treated separately in quantitative studies, in essence these terms are not viewed separately (Trochim, 2006) and are related to each other. Validity is described by a wide range of terms in qualitative studies, which is not a single fixed or universal concept, but “rather a contingent construct, inescapably grounded in the processes and intentions of particular research methodologies and projects” (Winter, 2000, p. 01).

Trochim (2006) indicates, the idea of discovering truth through measures of reliability and validity can be replaced by the idea of trustworthiness, which is “defensible” (Johnson, 1997, p.282 in Trochim, 2006). The assuredness of the validity and reliability of the research findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) is sustaining the trustworthiness of this research through the issues assessed and the methods of examination conducted. “Since there can be no validity without reliability, a demonstration of the validity is sufficient to establish reliability of the research” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 316).
As an alternative to more traditional quantitatively-oriented methods for ‘judging the soundness of qualitative research’ Guba and Lincoln (2005) proposed four criteria. The proposed criteria and their equivalents in alternative qualitative research are:

1. internal validity as to credibility
2. external validity as to transferability
3. reliability as to dependability
4. objectivity as to confirmability.

Credibility; transferability; dependability and confirmability criteria form the bases of this research in judging the soundness of this qualitative research. Credibility depends on the trustworthiness of the sources and the consistency of the source, such as the Council documents or the reports to the Ministry of Education. Even, if there is transparency and consistency in the sources, it is possible for another historian and/or researcher to come up with other interpretations of some of the events that took place at UNITRA. However, the transparency of the sources and the consistency of the sources give weight to the credibility of this thesis.

Transferability refers to the degree to which the results of qualitative research can be generalized or transferred to other contexts or HBUs (Trochim, 2006; Terre Blanche et al, 2007, pp.91-92). The validity in this qualitative research is very specific in its application. Transferability can be enhanced through describing the research context and the assumptions that are central to the research. Although the research thesis is a case study, in transferring the results to a different context, the question is whether the results also could hold true across various people, times, and settings (Lewis, 2009, p. 05). At some points in discussion of this
history of UNITRA, the reader may ask, are the points in this thesis generally true of other HBUs or is it unique to UNITRA? There are some features that were common to other HBUs, such as the issue of the redress funds; the geographical locality of being rural-based and the exodus of black students from HBUs after the democratic elections of 1994 to HWUs. Perhaps some of the uniqueness to UNITRA is the scale of infrastructure constructions that took place pre-1994; the diversity of academics due to the adopted ‘open university’ principles by the Transkeian Legislative Assembly in 1972; UNITRA as one of the major employers’ in Transkei; the re-location of government provincial departments to Bisho near East London, post 1994 that accelerated the depreciation of Transkei.

Dependability can be used to examine both the process and the product of the research for consistency and/or reliability (Hoepfl, 1997) through triangulation methods. “Reliability is concerned with the findings of the research and relates to the credibility of the findings” (Welman, 2009, p.145). This is mainly done through the cross-referencing of the interviewees, Council documents, reports and newsletters; and using the ten (10) themes as indicated earlier as a checklist.

Confirmability refers to the degree to which the results could be confirmed or corroborated by others (Trochim, 2006). There are a number of strategies for enhancing confirmability, including documenting the procedures for checking and rechecking the data throughout the study. Cross referencing and verification of activities can be taken from two or more listed catalogues indicated in the primary and secondary source of the research design 2.2.
2.4.4 Data, Results and Conclusion

The analysis of VCs and the organisational development of UNITRA are subdivided into the phased subdivisions, as outlined in chapter 01. Each ‘phased chapter’ will commence with the VC’s brief history, followed by an overview of their tenure. Each phase describes and discusses the selected themes and events at UNITRA during each VC’s tenure. The section also consists of the periodic leadership and managerial practices of the VCs. Descriptive statements by interviewees that were verbatim in content-orientation were slotted according to the themes and sub-titles of each VC’s tenure. Analyses of themes were compared and identification of patterns within the thesis to understand the flow of events and the connection between these events (Welman, 2009, p. 219). The subdivisions are categorised into two major political eras that each denotes a chapter. Chapter 05 comprises of the VCs, as indicated in the subdivision phases above; during the political era of the Apartheid and Transkei government. The chapter starts with the establishment of UNITRA in 1976 to 1993. Chapter 06 comprises of the VCs, as indicated in the subdivision phases above starts from 1994; following the democratic elections of 1994, with the African National Congress (ANC) as government, to 2005. At the end of each chapter will be the conclusion, which would be generalised for similarities and differences of the VCs tenures. These similarities and differences will assess the common elements, relationships and interactions within UNITRA.

Chapter 07 as a concluding chapter will critically reflect on the literature review of chapter 3 that interlinks with chapter 05, chapter 06 and the ‘Postscript’ phase; in answering the research questions. In this chapter, the assessment of the VCs’ common elements, relationships and interactions that constituted leadership and managerial crises within UNITRA will be discussed. Lessons learnt retrospectively and possible recommendations for higher education institutions will also be discussed.
Due to the nature of the case study that comprised of each VC’s narrative during their tenure, the initial idea of using NVivo software as a qualitative analytic tool was not possible. Although, NVivo allows for flexible analysis that can be transcribed or put into digital format Richards (2005); the arrangement of data into case codes that gathers all information under one theme or 'node’ is not applicable to this study. The intention of this study is not to contrast the VCs’ leadership and managerial practices to each other in a hierarchy order, nor about the VCs’ tenures/cases stored as attributes and values, in a number of strings of characters, according to generic leadership and managerial practices. Rather the intent of this case study is to capture each VC’s leadership, managerial practices and the politics climate during their tenure; resulting in UNITRA’s eventual demise as a HEI.

2.5 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

As this study is political in nature, stringent ethical measures will be taken into account, whilst conducting the research (Ryen, 2011, pp. 417-419). All names mentioned in the research are an integral part of the Public Disclosure Act (Republic of South Africa, 2005), but will be treated with respect and dignity. Informed consent was obtained from the Vice-Chancellors (VCs) interviewed and other interviewees34, with an explanation letter35. Written consent and permission was obtained from Prof. M.M.Balintulo36 for access to UNITRA’s Council documents and materials37, and in accordance with the promotion of access to the information act reside at W.S.U. Ethical approval was obtained from UKZN38. Anonymity to some secondary interviewee can be given, should this be requested. Data storage of this

34 Sample of Consent Form to be signed by former UNITRA VCs – Appendix XV1
35 Request for an Interview for PhD Research Purposes letter – Appendix XV11
36 Professor. M.M.Balintulo was Walter Sisulu University’s Vice-Chancellor from 2007 to 2011
37 Consent Letter for Access to W.S.U. University Council documents – Appendix XV111
38 UKZN Ethical Clearance – Appendix X1X
thesis will be kept with UKZN. Original documents, such as UNITRA Council documents and other materials are kept with WSU. What should be emphasised is that the intent of this study is not about individuals, but rather about academic themes that are linked to specific issues, which can be verified. In the event that the researcher deems information from the thesis necessary for other areas of work, consultation with the supervisor(s) and necessary permission would be accordingly sought.

2.6 HIGHLIGHTED LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES

As a researcher; participant; employee from 1995 and later a unionist at the former UNITRA and WSU, I was aware of the access points in obtaining documentation and material. I therefore had to be consciously awareness of selected information to be analysed, due to possible inherent bias and subjectivity. Council documents tended to be repetitious and/or duplicated, which required the researcher to tediously read through, whilst differentiating, “cataloguing and being selective” (Carr, 1987, pp. 10-12). Not all Council documents have been collated sequentially, especially Council documents prior to 1994. This also created problems, as data for instance, relating to staff compositions and/or student numbers were inconsistent or not available. Minimum archiving of documents at WSU had been done and national archiving documentation procedures were not adhered. Difficulties in obtaining reliable information from the WSU HEMIS, due to inconsistent data collation obtained from the institutions. Sensitivity and adherence to the data protection information Act in the recordings of individuals within documented periods is acknowledged and adhered to, especially the deceased Vice-Chancellors. Time duration of the thesis was an on-going concern, especially as the researcher had to track interviewees, agree on convenient interview times and dates. This was further compounded by restricted resources (McBurney & White, 2004, pp. 364-365) due to the instability of WSU research funds and self-reliance. As a
consequence of this, I was unable to complete all interviews, especially secondary interviews emanating from snowballing effect. As a case study of the VCs at the former UNITRA and taking into consideration cultural factors and organizational differences, some tentative generalisation of results can be made (McBurney & White, 2004, pp. 366-367). Finally, I have to be sensitive to the VCs who are alive, still working in prominent positions and the selectivity of the information obtained. Hence as a researcher, I have restrained myself from being completely impassive in conclusions.

2.7 ANTICIPATED RESEARCH OUTPUTS

This thesis should contribute to the understanding of what Vice-Chancellors have gone through at a HBU and/or public HEI in South Africa. At the same time, some form of institutional memory of UNITRA will be documented. Thirdly, possible intervention strategies for the sustainability of former Black Higher Education Universities, especially in South Africa with over two-thirds of the population being black, poorly educated and coming from low-income/poverty households. Lastly, there is a potential for publication and further in-depth research emanating from other areas of the thesis and/or higher education institutions.

2.8 CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed ‘the nature of thesis’, ‘the research design’ and ‘the data processes’ that would answer the research questions. The data collection methods used were interviews and documentary evidence that focuses on the VCs at the former UNITRA, and the interplay of factors that led to the various crises at UNITRA as a HEI. Using the reliability and validity alternatives in qualitative research, results were obtained in the critic of this study. It was
worth noting the interviewees displayed a number of emotions in their recollection of their tenure at the former UNITRA. Emotions expressed by interviewees ranged from detachment, amusement, hurt, anger, avoidance, sadness to regret about actions taken either by them and/or other individuals’ actions concerning UNITRA. Finally ethical considerations in dealing with documents and interviews were acknowledged within the context of the Promotion of Access Information Act, No.2 of 2000.
3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is an overview of related relevant literature themes of the thesis that emphasises literature on leadership typologies and managerial practices within Higher Education Institutions (HEIs). As a starting point, discussion on organisation theories and concepts will be discussed, as this provides a background understanding of the possible factors affecting and impacting on the nature of Vice-Chancellors as leaders. Following this, specific literature on leadership and ‘new managerialism’ in South African higher education spectrum is discussed. Then the concept of a University is analysed historically, including the relationship of higher education and the State. Finally theories of history and historiography are set out, so as to understand how the historical epochs of VCs and MAAs at UNITRA may be interpreted.

3.2 ORGANISATION THEORIES

The essence of organisations as social artefacts is the composition of the human factors towards given organisational goals (Jaffee, 2008, pp. 02-03). Higher Education Tertiary Institutions (HEIs) as organisations in South Africa are hierarchically governed by a Council, Senate, and the Institutional Forum; as indicated in the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 (p.26). Inclusive in these governance structures are the Council and Senate committees and a full complement of top management to oversee the smooth running of operational matters by subordinates. This was also reflected in UNITRA’s amended statute of 1999.
3.2.1 Bureaucracy Theory

The structural design of HEIs are bureaucratic in nature, along the principles advocated by Max Weber’s rational bureaucracy theory (Jaffee, 2008, pp. 89-92). Weber suggested that the decisive reason for the proliferation of bureaucratic organisations has been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organisational structure. He contended that within the organisation’s formal structure is the “legitimate authority”, such as the vice-chancellor and principal. Weber points out that the definition of tasks and responsibilities within the structure of management gave rise to a permanent administration and standardisation of work procedures; rules and regulations; notwithstanding changes in the actual holders of office (Fincham & Rhodes, 2005, pp. 446-451). Critics, like Gouldner (1954) stated that not all human members (staff members) within an organisation have the same interest and/or goals. Nor are the prescribed rules and regulations of a bureaucratic structure always adhered to by the human members (Blau, 1955; Merton, 1968). Another critic, Nkondo states,

“Western cultures are more accepting of impersonality, hierarchy and bureaucracy than African cultures. Attempts to depersonalise administration and policy through rules and procedures have shown, through a number of instances, in African governments and institutions, to be rather ineffective as a means of achieving ends in those systems”

(Nkondo, 2010, p. 15).

3.2.2 Structural Theory

The common elements to HEIs, as in all other organisations relate to the activities, relationships, informal and formal interactions (Scott, 1987 in Jaffee, 2008, pp.02-03) both
within the organisation (intra-organisation) and externally (inter-organisation). The process that links these elements is the transactions undertaken. “A transaction is the exchange relationship between the provider and the recipient of a labour, service, or product” (Tilly & Tilly, 1998 in Jaffee, 2008, p.21). “When individuals or organizations are unable to assume responsibility for all productive activities, they must depend upon and enter into transactions with other parties” (Jaffee, 2008, p. 28), which may be within the organisation (intra-organisation) or to external parties (inter-organisational).

Transactions through memos; policies, and regulations take place continuously within HEIs; between management and Council as employers, management and subordinates, students and staff [human resources/factors]. These forms of transactions are part of the integration between the different jobs and levels in the structure. Integration of the differentiation and the specialisation of duties become critical towards the organisation vision. This becomes more apparent when “conceptualising and implementing organisational changes and strategies” (Jaffee, 2008, p. 28). Integration occurs at a social level, through communication methods, interaction and understanding of the organisational culture. Also integration occurs at the functional level of departments and/or units in the production and distribution stages (Jaffee, 2008, p. 29) of an institution. Tensions in the differentiation of jobs and the integration process can lead to conflict that develops in a distortion of the organisation’s primary goals and mission. The distortions led to the debates on relationships and the balances between the structure of the institution and the human resources who are referred to as “agency” (Brown et al., 2005, p. 255). The debate on structure and agency (human factor) is whether the organisational structure imposes and controls the human factor or whether the human factor shapes the organisational structure. Habib (2001) alludes to this by saying,

“an institutional leadership with an understanding of the structural constraints on the
university, and the managerial skill to chart a strategic plan out of this structural log jam, may have succeeded in averting an institutional collapse. However, the actors (leaders\(^{39}\)) in UNITRA’s saga were clearly unable to do this. Instead they translated this structural potential for crisis into reality.

(Habib, 2001, p. 17).

Giddens (1984) describes the relationship between the ‘actor’ (leader) and the human factor as a “dialectic of control”, where the subordinates influence the outcomes of the superiors, rather than vice versa (Jaffee, 2008, pp. 27-28). “Dialectic of control” easily gives rise to conflict resulting in a disjointed organisational purpose, such as ignoring procedures, insubordination and/or strikes. Tension arises between the ‘actor’ (leader) and the human factor in the responsiveness to organisational arrangements. UNITRA’s organisational arrangements were bureaucratically structured with the division of labour being differentiated and specialisation of duties reflected within academic, administrative work or support staff. So the question arises with regard to UNITRA/WSU is how much agency or leadership could or did a VC exercise within the bureaucratic organisational arrangements of the University? The assumption thereof is that “the structural components of a system must be integrated in order for the system to survive, since the components are interrelated parts of the whole” (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996, p. 176). Thus the structuring, and re-structuring, of any organisation becomes extremely important as will be shown in the case of UNITRA/WSU.

When the establishment of system and sub-systems within the structural components of an institution are not fully unified, the tendency is the exploitation and/or flaws to emerge within an institution. An extremity of structural exploitation and/or flaws is the issue of corruption.

\(^{39}\) Habib’s referral to ‘actors’ were Professor A. Moleah as UNITRA’s Vice-Chancellor and Dr. M.Nkosi as the Ministerial Appointed Administrator to UNITRA.
Corruption “explores the nuances between bribery, nepotism, graft, extortion and so on, and reflects on the relationships between people and bureaucracies” (Harrison, 2007, p. 673).

As Rumyantseva (2005) pointed out, “corruption in higher education may take multiple forms and permeate all areas of the system” (p.84), from the lower level of a structure within a higher education institution such as administrative, academia to the office of the Vice-Chancellor. Corruption manifests in a number of activities, such as

“favoritism in procurement, favoritism in personnel appointments, ghost teachers, selling admissions and grades, private tutoring, and skimming from project grants (to name a few)”

(Rumyantseva, 2005, p. 84).

There are “some types of corruption, primarily those occurring in administrative or ministerial levels forms that may prove harmful for the system’s financial well-being or accreditation status” (Chapman [in press], in Rumyantseva, 2005, p. 86). However there is “slipperiness” (Harrison, 2007, p. 674), about corruption, as invariably, corruption could be incompetence, inexperience and/or negligence. Harrison (2007) further states that “perception of corruption may in fact bear little relationship to its incidence” (p.674), as allegations of fraud, enrichment, embezzlement and/or self-embellishment may be attributed to other factors in leaders [VCs] facing multi-challenges intra-organisation and inter-organisational.

### 3.2.3 Human Relations in Human Resources

The interrelations of human resources in HEIs is critical in the production of knowledge and skills, as human members “are motivated by more than economic reward” (Jaffee, 2008, p.
in their behaviour. Hawthorne’s studies are associated with the human relations theory, where the application of intervention strategies can be applied on the behaviour of the human resources towards the attainments of an institution (Grieves, 2010). The motivational factors of the human resources theory is linked to the human relations theory. The human resources theory was greatly influenced by Mayo’s interpretation of Hawthorne’s studies, reaffirmed human members [human factor] as social creatures with needs; a desire to interact and communicate. “The human factor can be manipulated in a predictable and productive manner to the extent that management practices a particular leadership style, institutes a particular scheme, or enriches and expands the scope of work tasks” (Mcgregor, 1960 in Jaffee, 2008, p. 81). The human factor is referred to as ‘stakeholders’ in the transactional discourse of UNITRA. The structured activities of human resources are usually constituted into groups referred to as stakeholders (Eriksson-Zetterquist, Mullern & Styhre, 2011, pp. 41-42; King & Lawley, 2013, p. 561). “A stakeholder is a person or group who could be impacted by the actions of the organisation. The challenge is to identify who the stakeholders are, what the responsibilities the organisation has to them, and balance the competing interests of these stakeholders” (King & Lawley, 2013, p. 561).

The stakeholders at UNITRA comprise of unions, students, management, academics, the community and Council as a governance body. The interaction and communication towards a common given purpose of an organisation is also determined by the satisfaction of each stakeholder’s needs. Maslow’s human needs hierarchy (1943) “combines a theory of motivation with a model of human development” (Jaffee, 2008, p. 78) Essentially, human needs as advocated by Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is based on a set of assumptions, “the methods for and organisational consequences of need satisfaction” (Jaffee, 2008, pp. 78-79). McGregor (1957 in Eriksson-Zetterquist, Mullern & Styhre, 2011) further developed the

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needs hierarchy of Maslow with Theory X and Theory Y. McGregor first advocated in theory X that the organisation’s attitude towards the identification of satisfying the human resources physiological and safety needs should be an automatic requirement. Through identifying and meeting these essential needs of the human resources, negative labelling of the human resources by the employer and/or VC; and unreasonable demands by the stakeholders and/or human resources does not arise. Preferable was theory Y, which proposed that all human resources and stakeholders “have the capacity and the potential to develop consistent with the organisation’s goals” (Eriksson-Zetterquist, Mullern & Styhre, 2011, p. 120). However, the leadership and managerial skills of the organisation have “to design the organisation, so that the people can reach their goals by synchronizing these goals with those of the organisation”. The failure to identify and synchronizing both the human resources and the organisational goals was evident in the systemic discord arising from the VCs’ leadership at UNITRA and resulting in institutional crises.

3.2.4 Contingency Theory

However, it could be argued that rather than motivational factors, the institutional crises took place due to the combination of the situational factors and context in which the UNITRA VCs as leaders occupied. Contingency theories of leadership take into account the situation or context within which leadership occurs. According to contingency theories, whether or not a manager is an effective leader is the result of the interplay between what the manager is like, what he or she does, and the situation in which leadership takes place (Fiedler, 1967; Fincham & Rhodes, 2005, p. 311; Jaffee, 2008, p. 86). Huczynski and Buchanan (2007) states contingency theorists such as Hersey and Blanchard (1998 in Huczynski & Buchanan, 2007, p. 713) believe that leaders can alter their style to fit with the organizational
environment and they refer to this as ‘situational leadership. Prof N.Morgan\textsuperscript{40} fits this category as a Ministerial Appointed Administrator (2001). He made an assessment of UNITRA’s situation and altered his style accordingly in motivating the staff towards the financial stability and growth of UNITRA as a higher education institution. On the other hand, some leaders may be unable to change their style or approach (Fiedler, 1967 in Huczynski & Buchanan, 2007, pp. 710-713) due to their characteristics. Accompanied with the inability to change one’s leadership style and/or approach are the attributes assigned to the human members.

The Contingency theory can also be applied to the interactions between institutions and their political environments as in the case of mergers in South Africa. The manifestation of “political interactions, conflicts, contestations and compromises that fuel and frustrate the trajectory of a merger” (Sehoole, 2005, p. 164) can be explained within the contingency theory. For instance, during the merger, very diverse HEIs were compelled to operate together as one institution. The University of the North-West (merger of Mafikeng campus, Vaal campus and Potchefstroom) with differing institutional culture, academic capacity, managerial capacity, and financial resources were put into “one” institution (Ibid). Similarly, to form Walter Sisulu University (W.S.U), four campuses with large rural distances between them were yoked together.

On the other hand, the merger of “an urban residential” Johannesburg College of Education (JCE) into the University (Wits), was a combination of “a very strong College of Education and a relatively weaker Department of Education within a large Faculty at Wits University” (Sehoole, 2005, p. 159). Both historically white institutions were relatively stable financially.

\textsuperscript{40} Prof Nicky Morgan was the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Ministerial Appointed Administrator at UNITRA in 2001
So, although the aim of the mergers was to eliminate apartheid inequality of HEIs, in practice these forced institutional re-arrangements

“certainly did not meet the main objectives of the merger in terms of Government Gazette No. 23550 of June 2002. It has not overcome the apartheid-induced divide between historically white and historically black institutions, particularly not in terms of ‘building administrative, management, governance and academic capacity’ nor has it achieved a ‘new institutional culture’ across all campuses” (Cloete, 2008, p. 15).

As HEIs merger and/or incorporation were not optional but decided by the DoE/DHET, “the consummation of the mergers was fait accompli, leaders of these institutions often resisted, and were either ignored or simply co-opted into the senior leadership of the University (Jansen, 2002 in Sehoole, 2005, p. 160). Further discussion is illustrated in section 3.2.7 ‘institutional theory’. As stated by Sehoole (2005, p.176), the instigation and outcomes “of mergers are conditioned by, and contingent on, the specific forms of interaction between institutional micro politics [intra-organisation], on the one hand, and governmental macro-politics [inter-organisation], on the other, especially in turbulent or transitional contexts.

Central to the processes, implementation, success and/or failure of an ‘imposed ‘merger’ are the institutional leadership and management. However, to say the least, the ‘fallout’ of some of the enforced mergers is still causing unintended consequences that might have altered the higher education transformation pathways for the future.
3.2.5 Human Agency and Group Dynamics

The interplay of human individuals within group dynamics resulted in the most significant higher education landscape transformation, after 1994.

“Finally, in October 2003 the rationalisation proposal was listed on the agenda of the following cabinet meeting, and a full Cabinet, including President Mbeki, was expected to be present. President Mbeki stood up and left the room. On his departure Deputy President Jacob moved into the chair. Trevor Manuel – with a twinkle in his eye-said to Zuma, ‘Excuse me, chair, but I think we’ve all heard Minister Asmal speak on these proposals at length. I suggest we accept them.’ Zuma agreed. On 20 October, I announced the changes that were to take place, the identity of the institutions that were to be merged, and the names that were to be given to these new institutions”


Firstly, the group dynamics illustrated the syndromes of “groupthink” as advocated by Janis in 1971. Groupthink occurs when cohesive members of a group “think in a particular way, or not to voice concerns or [have] alternative viewpoints” (King & Lawley, 2013, p. 184). The scenario showed the attributes accorded to persons and the situation. For instance, the success of Asmal’s getting the ‘institutional rationalization proposal’ through could be attributed to Manuel’s shrewd knowledge of the individual politicians in the room; together with the coincidence of Mbeki leaving the room to attend to an international call. Agency theories of history would see the individual politicians as the main cause of the change in Higher education organisation in South Africa at that time. Historians who attribute less causation to individual agents would tend to be more interested in larger analyses of the economic or political forces behind such actions.
3.2.6 Conflict Theory

Conflict theory is based on the assumption that all societies are characterised by on-going conflict between groups and persistent social change. The interface of the organisational structure, human factor and leadership requires sensitive balancing of planning and trade-offs; so as to avoid group polarisation and individual alienation. Conflict theory stipulates that there are 4 main factors which “yield a political system metaphor that emphasises conflict, competition, and the exercise of power” (Jaffee, 2008, pp. 15-16).

The compositions of the human factors at UNITRA did develop different political interests based on racial, ethnic, class, occupational, or regional affiliation. The individuals’ affiliation to interest groupings such as unions was primarily based on political associations that became a reflection within the UNITRA’ organisational climate and culture (Schein, 1992). The second feature is the relative scarcity of resources, which “generates conflict and competition over access to and the distribution of these resources” (Jaffee, 2008, p. 16). Social institutions, such as UNITRA were organised to serve the interests of who owned and controlled the scarce resources. Scarce resources can exist in areas such as “promotions and transfers, hiring; pay; budget allocation; facilities and equipment; delegation of authority” (Huczynski & Buchanan, 2007, p. 821). For instance, there were no promotions for staff from 1996 to 2002 at UNITRA, coupled with factors as indicated by Huczynski and Buchanan. The combination of these factors led to conflict and crises. Thirdly, who then owns and controls the resources of HEIs, particularly UNITRA? Is it the Council, Vice-Chancellors, society and/or government? Karl Marx’s analyses of ownership, labour, the means of production and the working conditions can be related to this factor. The fourth feature leading to conflict is the “struggle between those who possess and those who do not possess the
resources”. According to Johnson and Gill (1993 in Huczynski & Buchanan, 2007, p. 821), political behaviour is a consequence of structural differentiation.

### 3.2.7 Institutional Theory

Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) are “embedded in networks of interdependencies and social relationships” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), as exemplary reflected in Chapter 2 (section 2.2), figure 1. Selznick (in Scott, 1987, p. 495) viewed organizational structure as an adaptive vehicle shaped in reaction to the characteristics and commitments of participants as well as to influences, pressures and constraints from the external environment. Institutional theory assesses the external dynamics that affects the organisation and the types of situation in which the organisation is located. However, institutional theory focuses more on the micro dynamics than the macro events. Already indicated above in section 3.2.2 ‘Structural theory’, is that an organisational structure not only holds relevance intra-organisational, but also “contribute to a social system’s functioning” externally (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996, p. 177). The distortion of the organisation structure can attributed to the habitual “pattern-solving behaviour” of groups within the institution and “the historical continuity of typifications” of creating or transmitting a reality that “confronts the individual as an external and coercive fact” (Zucker, 1977 in Tolbert & Zucker, 1996, p. 181). From 1994, with the rapid transformation changes in the higher education landscape of South Africa, HEIs were “faced with a sudden increase in demands for reform from the government and the society, and an unleashing of market forces, by both the government and a burgeoning local and global private higher education sector” (Muller, Maassen & Cloete, 2006, p.297).
HEIs had to adhere to government legislation due to implicit or explicit prevailing rules and benefits (Miller, 2003), especially as the Ministry of Education has direct control over government grants to public Universities and Technikons. However, there was some resistance with some of the HEIs; and reform or transformation took long. For instance, Historical white English-medium Universities\(^{41}\) (HWU-Eng), such as UCT had a strong ‘academic capacity’ [“professional authority”] and moderate ‘management capacity’, took slightly longer than the Afrikaans Universities counterparts to reform and transform to government legislation, national imperatives and global economic trends (Gumport and Sporn, 1999 in Muller, Maassen & Cloete, 2006, p.297). The reasoning was it is “easier to influence from without when the external signals correspond to their internal criteria of, and learnt capacities for, relevance. When the external signals go against these, the institutions become highly resistant” (Muller, Maassen & Cloete, 2006, pp. 298-299).

Historical White Afrikaans-medium Universities (HWU-Afri), such as Stellenbosch with a strong management capacity and moderate academic capacity were able to legitimatise the reputation of their institution [“institutional isomorphism”] due their swift ability in the authority structure of their organisation for change (Gumport and Sporn, 1999 in Muller, Maassen & Cloete, 2006, p.297).

Historical Black Universities (HBU) were in a precarious position with weak management capacity and academic capacity “that had to rely on a single source of income”, which “in most cases is government funding” (Muller, Maassen & Cloete, 2006, p.298). Government

\(^{41}\) Mode of communication in Historical White Universities (HWUs) were either English or Afrikaans
funding and/or subsidiary calculation as explained in chapter 2, section 2.2.4 ‘Statistics Data in Qualitative Research ‘of this study.

In a number of HBUs the single source of income as a form of “resource dependency” was “primary motivated by organisational survival” (Gumport and Sporn, 1999 in Muller, Maassen & Cloete, 2006, p.297). The inability of HBUs to generate long-term investments, diminished donor funds; reliance on student fees who were mostly from economic disadvantaged sectors of South African society; declined student enrolments; assimilation of a funding formulae pre-1994 that was designed for HWUs and later the ‘New Funding Formulae’ that again favoured former HWUs due to the increased ‘black’ student growth; compounded the situation (Bunting, 2006, pp. 76-94). For instance, the mergers of some institutions as implied in section 3.2.4 ‘Contingency Theory’, did more harm than good. Factored into the HBUs mode for organisational survival was the inability to reform to government legislation and transform to global trends, which in turn gave way to conflict and institutional crisis. For instance, the University of the North-West (NWU) merger in January 2001 consisted of the historically black university (HBU) of the former University of North-West, whose students were mostly black people from rural communities. The second incorporated institution was Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, a historically white university (HWU), whose students were mostly white Afrikaans people from Christian backgrounds. The third institution was the Sebokeng Campus of another mainly black university (Vista), whose staff and students were also incorporated into the merger (NWU, 2014).

Prior to the merger, the former University of North-West, established in the ‘separate homeland’ of Bophuthatswana in 1979 had already its own academic project that was
developed and “driven by a diverse group of academics and administrators” (Cloete, 2008, p. 03). The development of the academic enterprise and the university mission, left in the hands of this diverse group of academics and administrators

“led to the development of a progressive academic agenda. The development of the university was parallel to the development of an emerging town that was to be the capital of the homeland”
(Cloete, 2003, p. 03).

Similarly to NWU, the development of UNITRA was parallel to the development of Mthatha that was the capital of the Transkei as a homeland. Again, in the same vein with NWU, the academics and students participation in political activism, strikes and/or massive protests led to the

“constant harassment that saw work permits denied and withdrawn; beating up of student leaders and the detention of staff members, especially those in the staff union”
(Cloete, 2008, p. 04).

Following the democratic election of 1994, there was an exodus of black academics and students into HWIs and public sector organisations. HWIs were able to achieve their affirmative action targets of both black academics and students; and increase their government subsidy, which was augmented by the influx of black students. In the absence of the new government (post-1994), providing “a rural development policy” (Cloete, 2008, p. 07) for HEIs located in the rural areas, especially former HBUs; HBUs such as NWU became ‘resource dependent’ on government with no redress fund to alleviate the situation (Cloete, 2001b). This invariably led to further deterioration of HBUs, compounded by cuts in their
budgets and the retrenchment of good staff. For instance, at NWU, with the academic capacity drastically reduced and coupled with the

“lack of leadership, the management of the university deteriorated and the systems collapsed or became dysfunctional”

(Cloete, 2008, p. 05).

Of course, increased conflict and institutional crisis was bound to take place with the merged institutions in 2001 of NWU. Conflict in terms of the institutional resources; differing historical backgrounds; differing institutional cultures; language differences; geographical distances; differing academic priorities and of course lack of leadership direction.

3.3 LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT IN ORGANISATIONS

3.3.1 ‘Great Man Theory’

The ‘great man theory’ has been influenced by the qualities and features of leaders that advocates from a historical perspective “that the fate of societies and organizations is in the hands of powerful, idiosyncratic (males) individuals” (Huczynski & Buchanan, 2007, p. 699; Linstead, Fulop & Lilley, 2009). However, any singular claim that leadership is a subject-object relation tends to neglect and suppresses other possibilities, which may open other multiple leadership realities. Realities like the narcissistic leaders who have the “tendency towards the superficiality in the advocacy of visionary leadership” (Linstead, Fulop & Lilley, 2009, p.499) and are usually in positions of power due to their drive and/or intrinsic need. The narcissistic leader’s vision is due to their identity (Brown, 1997 in Linstead, Fulop & Lilley, 2009) and a creation of a culture in their own image, rather than for the organisation. Their approach is based on their own sureness of self rather than information or clarity of insight (Sankowsky, 1995, p. 65), denial of market demands and resource constraints. It could
be argued that rather than the office of the Vice-Chancellor (VC) and principal as a change agent with a the strong driving decisive centre (Cloete, 2003), the VC creates a vision in their own image that resembles the features of narcissistic leader. Some viewpoints of the leadership theories may emerge in this research of the VCs leadership and managerial practices at the former UNITRA that complies with the ‘great man theory’ and the narcissistic leadership. However, there might be a number of other possibilities and factors that could challenge existing assumptions (Sinclair, 2007, pp. 06-08). Such challenges would be the relative culture and prevailing political climate with its power structures within the wider society (Linstead, Fulop & Lilley, 2009, pp. 477-479), and the underlying dynamics that might explain the legitimacy and the outcomes of a VC’s leadership.

3.3.2 Vice-Chancellors as Leaders

Vice-Chancellors (VCs) as leaders from a functional approach could be defined as individuals who occupy a role that involves conforming to a set of behavioural norms and expectations emanating from followers (Kotter, 1990). Group (human) members such as Senate members, academic staff, administrative staff, support staff and executive management within an organisation can be equated to followers. In return the group members confer on the leader a degree of power that (within prescribed limits) allows the leader to influence their action. A leader can operate from multiple bases of power (i.e. coercive power, legitimate power, information power), using different bases in different contexts and at different times (Huczynski & Buchanan, 2007, pp. 701-703). The varied bases of power (French and Raven, 1958 in Huczynski & Buchanan, 2007, p. 701) are useful concepts to explain the social process of interpersonal influences as a critical dimension of leadership. To an extent, the power bases also depend on the group members’ belief. This process becomes
two-way with both sets of needs of the group members and leader being satisfied and also
determined by the prevailing environmental conditions. Group members look for a single
person to focus upon as the cause of “institutional outcomes” and prevailing environmental
conditions (Birnbaum, 1989). So, if prevailing environmental conditions or the state of affairs
is not positively conducive and the group members or stakeholders needs are not satisfied,
pressure is often brought on the leader to change their behaviour and purpose in the face of
critical challenges.

“In such situations presidential [VC] leadership may not be real but rather a social
attribution. Leaders, then, may be people believed by followers to have caused events
that they did not in reality cause”.

(Birnbaum, 1989, p. 133).

This social attribution of great power and influence to the leader may serve the function of
providing a sense of control by group members. Should this fail, attempts can sometimes be
made to replace the leader with someone else. Leaders, as subjects, are the architects of
organisational design and strategy; have vision, diagnose local contingencies, and carry
responsibility for success and sometimes for failure. Leadership would therefore have a moral
aspect that is never value-free, especially in the face of critical challenges (Pedler & Boydell,
2004), and who has an influencing process aimed at goal achievements (Stogdill, 1950 in
Huczynski & Buchanan, 2007).

Critics such as Kulati and Moja (2004) state that group members (as stakeholders in HEIs)
play a critical role in change and to some extent competed with executive leadership for
power to steer change. For instance, from UNITRA’s inception in 1976 to its amalgamation
in 2005, the various challenges to the leaders [VCs] has the created an evolving sequence of “crisis leadership” (Kulati & Moja, 2004, p. 165).

“Crisis leadership emerged through different combinations of historical legacy, inexperience new leadership and structural problems” (Kulati & Moja, 2002, p. 250).

Kulati and Moja (2002) in their assessment of leadership, governance and institutional change in South Africa, classify and discuss three emerging leadership typologies alongside three sets of pressures. These leadership typologies are “transformative leadership”, “managerial leadership” and “crisis leadership” (Kulati & Moja, 2002, pp. 241-248). Alongside these sets of pressures is the “new governance policy insisting on co-operative governance” (Kulati & Moja, 2002, p. 241). Co-operative governance emanated from the NCHE (1996) report and the White Paper on Higher Education. Section 3.5, ‘States, Governments and Higher Education Relationship’ of this chapter discusses the issue more in-depth. Other forms of pressures was acknowledging that “a set of market pressures entered the system” such as competition from emerging private higher education sector and above all “competition amongst public institutions” (Ibid). Critical amongst these pressures was “the institutional culture required that the core values or business had to be defended, or developed. Inevitable the sets of pressures depended on, and were “linked to the academic strength of the institution and its managerial capacity” (Kulati & Moja, 2002, p. 241).

3.3.3 Transformative Leadership

Transformative leadership “combines elements of broadly accepted successful leadership features with aspects of co-operative governance” (Kulati & Moja, 2004, p. 160). The elements covered features such as critical self-reflection as an institution, negotiated
institutional mission through active forums, reconstituted council and role differentiation, trust at all levels, an expanded management and a directive leadership. The features are not rigidly constrained, or constricted in their usage. Rather the features are the overall combination of elements that manages “the tension between leading and consulting” towards the development of the institution (Kulati & Moja, 2004, p. 160). However, the strength or weaknesses of the ‘academic capacity’, an indication of the “academic status of the particular academics, or the ‘strengths’ of the discipline” (Ibid); influences how fast, and the types of changes leadership can effect. Transformative leadership has two approaches referred to as the “Reformed Collegialists” and “Transformative Managerialist” (Kulati & Moja, 2006, pp. 160-162). The ‘reformed collegialist method is to “reclaim and reassert the centrality of the intellect traditions of higher education” by working “within the confines and limits of the prevailing institutional culture, rather than going to war against it” (Birnbaum, 1992 in Kulati & Moja, 2002, p. 243). On the other hand ‘transformative managerialists’ are “leaders that put more emphasis on ‘driving’ transformation centrally” and through democratic means. Or are leaders who manage the academic capacity by being “in line with policy principles and market pressures” by managing academics (Kulati & Moja, 2002, p. 244). Both the “Reformed Collegialists” and “Transformative Managerialist” approach “push the transformation agenda through the” institution’s power base systems that are centralized, decentralised and re-centralisation, as part of institutional changes, to include executive deans and the institution’s directors.

3.3.4 Managerial Leadership

In order for the institution to “become more competitive and market oriented’, the managerial leadership reconfigures the institution “through the vigorous adaptation of corporate management principles and techniques” (Kulati & Moja, 2004, p. 162). Although, the change
agenda is driven by the Vice-Chancellor as a strong decisive centre that is supported with “management-support systems and structures” (Kulati & Moja, 2002, p. 245); the VC’s office also requires “a highly competent middle management layer”. Managerial leadership is “characterised by a rapid response management ethos” with the “buzz being about exploiting niches and developing partnerships. Under the managerial leadership are the “strategic managerialism and unwavering entrepreneurialism” that are made distinct “between the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ approaches to managerialism” (Kulati & Moja, 2002, p. 247). The “soft managerialists” in running “their institutions more efficiently and effectively, still see higher education as distinct from business, governed by their own norms and traditions” (Ibid). Whereas the “hard managerialists” resolution is to “reshape and redirect the activities of their institutions through funding formulas and other mechanisms of accountability imposed” due to external obligations (Trow, 1994, p.12 in Kulati & Moja, 2002, p. 247).

Strategic managerialism maneuver their institution actively in their processes and plans, and “convince the ‘academics’ that ‘being managed’ on sound management principle does not constitute a loss to academic traditional values nor academic freedom (Kulati & Moja, 2002, pp. 247-248). Conveyed by the leadership to the institution as a whole, is that ‘globalisation and the market’ are not threats, rather “as opportunities to be exploited” (Ibid). Although strategic managerialism has a number of similarities to ‘new managerialism’ (discussed in section 3.3.6), a distinct difference is that in strategic managerialism “the centrality of the academics is at least acknowledged, even if not given much substance in practice” (Kulati & Moja, 2002, p. 248).

On the other hand, the ‘unwavering entrepreneurs’ regards higher education as a business that is
“in the business of providing their clients—the students—with goods and services that are sold at a competitive price. The institutions have, or try to develop, strong links with industry, and generally lack a collegial tradition”.


Hence the ‘unwavering entrepreneurs’ in seeing business opportunities, regards the government legislation as an inconvenience in their overt enthusiasm to get the economy going with the production of high-level manpower.

3.3.5 Crisis Leadership

Kulati and Moja (2006, p.165) state that “crisis leadership is more of an institutional condition than an approach to leadership”. Crisis leadership commonly associated with HBUs takes place “in an environment” that is fraught with “challenges to authority”. Similar to some areas of 3.2.7 ‘institutional theory’, the manifestation of crisis leadership revolves on

“various factors such as historical legacy, inexperienced new leadership, and new demands and structural problems emanating from the implementation of new policies combine in different ways”

(Kulati & Moja, 2006, p. 165).

Most HBUs, especially those in the rural areas had problems post-1994 with the transformation changes in the higher education landscape that threaten their very survival (Gibbon and Parekh, 2001 in Kulati & Moja, 2006, p. 165). The problems were due to a decline and movement of students from HBUs to former HWU; diminished academic capacity and ‘acting’ appointments, especially at middle and senior management. In addition, there was poor and/or mismanagement of financial systems and controls; debilitating governance structures and processes; managerial incoherence and strife; the complete
collapse of key university structures and committees such as the Council and Senate (Steele, 2000 in Kulati & Moja, 2006, p. 165).

With an incapacitated executive management and a weak second-tier management that tended to avoid decisions; “the lack of institutional cohesion” with no trust between stakeholders and “role confusion with regard to the scope of responsibility of governance structures” contributed immensely to the institutional crisis that was accompanied by the leadership approach (Kulati & Moja, 2006, p. 166). The “roles played by the management and the leaders of the institutions” cannot be separated from the “crisis faced by many of the historically black universities” (Ibid). For instance, the study of Habib (2001) cites UNITRA’s causal factors as an institution that gave rise to a crisis. The causal factors ranged from “dysfunctional management, governance behaviours and practices, which along with UNITRA’s structural location in the context of Bantustan development, served to undermine the viability and sustainability of the institution completely” (Kulati & Moja, p. 166).

Despite the multi-factors that gave rise to crisis in some of the former HBUs in an economic-driven global market,

“the main challenge facing leadership emanated from tensions within institutions, namely the interaction between leadership, institutional culture, capacity and resources” (Kulati & Moja, 2006, p. 167).

The economic driven global market charted a shift by government of a co-operative approach to an ideological position of Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) in 1996 that
encompassed and emphasised labour demands to service an export led economy. Discussed more in-depth in section 3.6 ‘States, Governments and Higher Education Relationships’. The shift brought in new concepts and approaches such as the “new bureaucrats” (Cloete, 2003; Kulati & Moja, 2006, p. 168). The “new bureaucrats”, with a ‘new hip term’ [my emphasis] of ‘new managerialism and/or managerialism’, came into these positions [VC] with authority and made “statements like, ‘we have been elected to govern and we should govern” (Figaji, 2001 in Kulati & Moja, 2006, p. 168).

3.4. NEW MANAGERIALISM AND/OR MANAGERIALISM

The concept of new managerialism and/or managerialism within higher education is relatively new in that the trajectory and organisational restructuring are “poorly understood” and as with most change catalysts are sometimes resisted (Reed, 2002, p. 148). New managerialism, conceived as “a political, not merely as a technical activity” (Clarke and Newman, 1997 in Deem, 2001; Deem & Brehony, 2005, p. 219) is understood as “configuration of ideas, principles and practices. Some of these configurations can be gleaned from prescriptive guidelines such as the ‘King Report 111’ on aspects of management, accountability and governance. New managerialism externally imposed on HEIs by external agents such as government’s “state policies on funding regimes, government agencies, business sectors and/or consultants seek to establish organisational, managerial and cultural changes through a regime of managerial discipline and control” (Deem & Brehony, 2005, p. 226). Acceptance of new managerialism is usually found in the executive management levels of HEIs, such as the VCs. New managerialism as a theory has three overlapping factors (Reed, 2002, p. 148), which are persuasion to change, organisational formation and control techniques. The first factor is a ‘generic narrative of strategic change’, where others are persuaded to some understanding and actions in relation to established governance and
management of universities. Secondly, there is the distinctive organisational form that provides the administrative mechanisms and managerial process through which the theory of change could be integrated within the development of the organisation. The requirement for this factor is the consistent mode of human behaviour that is part of and conforms to the organisation’s culture and also correlates to the development of the organisation. Culture defined as a set of normative rules (Luthans, 1998), which regulates behaviour through shared beliefs, core values and similar experiences that give rise to attitudes, motivations and a common sense of identity (Hofstede, 2001; Schein, 1992). Usually the culture of an organisation reveals itself when presented with problems and challenges rather than in the routine normalcy of an organisation. What should be also noted is that the structure of an organization and its systems go hand in hand with the organisation’s culture (Harrison in Rollinson & Broadfield, 2002, p. 695). The systems characterised as administrative policies and strategies, organisational structure and design, organisational processes and working conditions (Luthans, 1998, p. 133), which might already contain their own potential stress indicators. The third factor regards managerialism “as a practical control technology potentially transformed into viable practices, techniques and devices that challenge established systems of ‘bureau-professionalism’” (Clarke and Newman, 1997, pp.68-70 in Reed, 2002, p. 165), such as Senate and Faculties within higher education institutions. The concept of new managerialism and/or managerialism, as distinct from leadership, is the incorporation of the organisational forms and systems within the given organisation context or situation. Deem (2001, p.11) states that “one of the strong imperatives for adopting new managerialism in a number of Western economies is to search for new sources of finance” in an attempt to replace declining government funding of higher education (Prichard & Wilmott, 1997 in Deem, 2001; Prichard, 1998 in Deem, 2001). Whether new managerialism works in
its entirety as an approach within South African HEIs’ structure and complexity of systems for effectiveness, efficiency and monetary values is a matter of debate.

3.5 PURPOSE OF A UNIVERSITY

- Concept of a University

Conditions of society are not controlled, nor determined by universities, but rather by the combination of prevailing social and economic policies. Higher Education Institutions particularly Universities, as centres of training for the requirement of complex jobs needed in contemporary societies have evolved slowly. The current pragmatic view of a University is to equip students with knowledgeable skills and qualifications, so as to address societal needs.

The third White Paper of August 1997, reiterates and reminds Higher Education Institutions “to address the development needs of society and provide the labour market in a knowledge-driven and knowledge-dependent society with the ever-changing high competencies and expertise”

(Ministry of Education, 1997, pp. 01-03).

An East African University College Vice-Chancellor advocated at a conference, as early as 1966 that universities should have the principles of “relevance and excellence” (Kaya, 2006, p. 04). Should there be a conflict between the two principles; relevance should have the upper priority, as relevance of higher education to national development and national identity is of paramount importance. University education is expected to address social needs, by providing social relevance (Niblett, 1969, pp. 15-16) within the curriculum. Social relevance responds to demands in areas such as alleviation of poverty, race relations and deterioration of cities. Simultaneously, there have been debates on whether the concept of “modern
Western-oriented education” is relevant to the African continent as this has been considered “too foreign and too rationalistic” due to their educational and academic tradition that have evolved from the Western European Ancestry (Kaya, 2006, p. 05). The link between these debates and the principles advocated is that relevance and excellence are also subject to Western-oriented ideologies. Makgoba (2004) stated that the balancing act required in South Africa is the ability to “evaluate knowledge in relation to the function of achieving the educational purpose” (p.02). The paradox lies in the conception of a university and the contemporary demands of social and economic global trends. So the challenge that is reflective in the curriculum, especially for former HBUs,

“is to find some kind of compatibility between global competiveness and local relevance, cultural congeniality, usefulness and meaning without losing sight of the important fact that universities in Africa have special responsibility to contribute uniquely African dimensions to the ‘international discourse’ in their discipline, based on African experience and creativity, and to apply these dimensions to address the concerns of their own country and continent” (Makgoba, 2004, p. 04).

Needless to say, the above is also dependent on the form of leadership, management practices and the academic capacity within a HEI, as mentioned in section 3.5 of ‘leadership and management in organisations’.

At the other extreme would be theorists such as Barnett (1990a) who views the University as a community of academics collaborating in inquiry into knowledge and truth. Similarly, Minogue (2005) conceives of Universities as institutions for the few who can cope with the knowledge rigours, and not for the masses who need more practical training.
But the history of Universities as training grounds for the professions began in the Medieval time when; the Universities in Europe prepared the young for careers in the Church; as clerks for royal governments (Minogue, 2005); for medicine and law. Agriculture, teaching and nursing colleges of advanced technology to full university status came after the Robbins report of 1963 in Britain. Engineering came into Universities only in the 20th century (Wright, 1990). In the USA, the Land Grant Universities were set up in the 19th century specifically to ensure that the youth of a state got better education for the particular economic needs of that State (US State Dept US State Department Information, 1963–1966; Iverson, 2008) as in agriculture, commerce and so on. As technology grew, more institutions were set up specifically for technical training such as the Fachhochschule in Germany, and Technikons in South Africa (DoE, 2004). The rationale for these Universities would be increased human resources that served the regional and/or national needs.

“The learning relates to the dimension of an interaction of needs approach calls for inter-disciplinarity. Inter-disciplinary knowledge as the solution to the formulation of needs and may cut across traditional discipline-related boundaries and methods. This principle is critical for the organization of the curriculum and teaching, in that teachers often consider objective within the known discipline-oriented framework, and do not consider needs or situations” (Nkondo, 2010, p. 10).

In contrast to this instrumentalist view of higher education, there is the liberal view of a University as the best way to educate the minds of young people so that they are equipped with the values and ideas that they can carry with them through life – the classic exposition of this is Newman’s dialogues (Newman, 1852; 1907). The tension between this liberal view of education and the pragmatic one is to be seen in the debates about what curriculum offerings
a South African University, or an HBU, should develop or be allowed to develop. What should be central to the debates are the institutional educational philosophy adopted and its’ structural fitness within its environment.

Furthermore, the role of the Universities in production and the development of science have also grown (Wright, 1990, pp. 18-28), with corporations in recent decades entering the picture, such as the India corporations who are advocating for the creation of HEIs suited towards them (Sharma, 2007; Kapur and Mehta, 2007). Universities are not of course the only institutions which have science laboratories, there are corporate and patrons who choose to endow research laboratories that are not within higher education. But since the nineteenth century when the Germans took a lead in utilizing their Universities for science, the importance of higher education in increasing the science capacity of a nation has been taken for granted. With regard to South Africa, the extent to which HBUs were resourced for knowledge production in science or engineering can be questioned. Rather, the most they could do in science was the generic foundations (physics, chemistry, biology) in mostly undergraduate degrees (DoE, 2004). So the underlying concept is not a research university, but of one producing education in the key generic subjects. This produces a further tension. In a University system which produces graduates in generic subjects, the more applied training for the high status professions is done after the undergraduate degree, as with law and medicine in some parts of the North American system. But gradually more of the vocational qualifications have been brought within higher education, such as nursing and teaching, as undergraduate qualifications. So within the development of the faculties, and the curriculum offerings, of an HBU such as the University of Transkei (UNITRA) there were tensions between the generic and the vocational.
Transkei; Bophuthatswana; Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) gave rise to the establishment of a new set of universities with distinct systems. The University of Transkei was established in 1977, the University of Bophuthatswana in 1980, the University of Venda in 1982 and the University of Qwa Qwa, later part of the University of the North in 1982. The student orientation geared towards teachers, public administrators, social workers and theology. In addition were two special purpose universities (Cooper & Subotzky, 2001). These special purpose universities were Medunsa in 1978 with the students orientated for doctor careers and Vista in 1982 with their students oriented for student learner ship in politics and teacher training. The student target population would be from the urban areas.

3.6 STATES, GOVERNMENTS AND HIGHER EDUCATION RELATIONSHIPS

The term State can best be identified as a permanent holistic organisation that can be distinguished from the term government (Hayward, 1997). The state exercises impersonal authority through the bureaucratic manner in which it conducts itself, and by using the government as a means in which the authority of the state is brought into operation. Ideally the state represents the “permanent good interests” of society, whereas government on the other hand represents the “partisan sympathies” of those who happen to be in power at a particular time (Hayward, 1997, pp. 65-86). Governments as the apparatus of the state fluctuate in ideologies and can encroach upon the absolute and unlimited authority of the state, by having structures and systems remodelled; reformed and/or repealed. For example, the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 and subsequent amendments repealed earlier Acts, including the Extension of University Act. The political authority of the government usually conscripts people into forms of political obligation (Miller, 2003, pp. 19-36) to obey the law due to implicit or explicit prevailing rules and benefits.
“The Ministry of Education\textsuperscript{42} has direct control over only government grants to public universities and technikons. The Ministry furthermore takes no account of income raised from student fees and other private sources when distributing government grants to individual institutions. These institutions are however required, as public entities, to submit to the Ministry annual financial statements which reflect all expenditures and all income from all public as well as private sources”.


The political situation provides the ideological context within which universities operate. The affirmation of ideology and control proposed by Salter and Tapper (1994) can be understood through three dynamics that affect educational change. These dynamics are the economy and the demand for growth; the state as being the bureaucratic manager; and the political forces or equality of opportunity. For public Universities, the government controls the policies and most of the funding. In determining these policies, government and HEIs continuously have an ongoing struggle of differing ideals and value orientations.

Neave and Van Vught (in Moja & Cloete, 1996) advocated that there are only two policy models in higher education. Firstly, State Control and secondly, State Supervision or Regulation; and that "other models are variations or combinations of these two more or less fundamental models. The ‘State Control’ system as a model is almost completely funded by the state and key aspects are controlled, either by the bureaucracy or political regulations (Moja & Cloete, 1996). Whilst this model has been criticized from the perspective of decision-making theory, its negative effects on innovation and its curtailment of academic freedom and institutional autonomy, in certain countries has brought about a more equitable

\textsuperscript{42} The term ‘Ministry of Education’ and ‘Department of Education’ are the same organisation/body. The term ‘Ministry’ and ‘Department’ is interchangeable.
system. For instance, the Chinese reforms and regulations in Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) have sought to change some of its trends due to the global economic market demands. Such reforms have taken the form of decentralization and privatization, which in turn has reinforced the role of private financing and led to a variety of equity implications (Sun & Barrientos, 2009), such as access, discipline choice and some institutional autonomy. However, HEIs must adhere to the state’s general provisions of law which is enacted in the Constitution and the Education Law of China. A prime directive of the HEIs in its production and training is the educational undertakings, of upholding the Marxism-Leninism; Mao Zedong Thought and the theories of constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics.

On the other hand, State Supervision or State Regulation requires a hegemonic state, strong civil society, professional bureaucracy, and a clear set of policy tools (Moja & Cloete, 1996). The aim is to improve the system with a more prolonged restructuring, such as that of Malaysia where the former features of state control have over the years gradually shifted to that of state supervision (Lee, 2000). In the State Supervisory model of Malaysia, universities are responsible for their own management and generation of their own revenues. The state oversees the higher education system in terms of assuring quality and maintaining a certain level of accountability due to a shift to market-based policies. Similar to the features of state supervision is state steering mechanism, which the Netherlands adopted following the Bologna Declaration. In the Bologna Declaration of 1999, 29 countries pledged to reform the structures of their higher education system in a convergence manner suited to the European needs and market demands. In making any form of a pledge there has to be some understanding and common leverage of the involved and those concerned. It has to be beneficial with some inherent values that are characteristic of human nature. Inherent values
that produce functional and capable individuals for the job market who are competitive within their society and on the global arena in terms of development.

Moja, Muller and Cloete (1996) identified a hybrid model, as ‘State Interference’ (Cloete, 2002, p. 89). In countries, such as the former Russia, state interference followed a certain path that usually invoked student protest with limited staff support; police intervention or the appointment of a commission of enquiry; the resignation or dismissal of the principal; the appointment of a new principal (the president's man); the re-composition of council and security policy surveillance. The State, as in government recognizes the inherent power of Higher Education Institutions to control social and occupational mobility for social change. HEIs’ ideological power is in its’ socio-political power and its’ authority to promote particular sets of values. The use of this power can be used to promote, resist or reject change.

The preliminary established ‘civil society’ of the National Education Policy Investigation (1990 – 1992) fed into the ANC policy initiatives for the education sector (Badat, 2004, p. 08). These initiatives established principles and values for further policy development. Among the principles and values was the issue of equity and redress as exemplified in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) that would have translated into redress funding for HBUs such as UNITRA.

Following the euphoria of the 1994 elections, the ANC government restructured their organisation due to the rising operational costs (Gumede, 2009) and the diminished donor funds. Added to the ANC government internal problems was the country’s depreciation in the market exchange and capital inflows (Gelb, 2010). The ANC government realised that there
was a need for investment growth and developed a sustainable financial strategic. There was a shift to an ideological position of Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) in 1996 that encompassed and emphasised labour demands to service an export led economy. This required restructuring of knowledge, skills and research innovation. This would also translate for higher education institutions (HEIs), a transformation on the basis of a reduced budgetary framework, efficiency and cutbacks (Oldfield, 2001, p.35 in Fataar, 2003, p. 33). The ramifications of the ideological shift of government would affect former historical black universities who expected an increase in the amount allocated to redress through earmarked funding between 1995 and 1999. With the change in economic strategy, the tangible influence on the ANC as a government on issues relating to the higher education sector, emanated from the National Commission on Higher Education report (NCHE, 1996). The NCHE was mandated to investigate all aspects of Higher Education (HE) and policy recommendations. They came up with five key pillars that were largely accepted in the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 (Kraak, 2001, p. 99). The central theme of these key areas were concerns of the high skills discourse for higher education institutions (HEIs) to be more responsive to socio-economic priorities. Additional, the “planning and co-ordination imperative which seeks to effectively steer the total system, using financial, performance and other incentives in directions consonant with national macro-economic and labour market priorities”. Inclusive in the theme was the provision for the development of a single national system of the higher education landscape. The established basis of the NCHE report was to align with higher education institutions the state’s developmental objectives. Debates on the ‘Size and Shape’ of HEIs were to emerge with suggestions that some HBUs be geared towards undergraduate qualifications. Whilst some other HEIs be primarily targeted for postgraduate students and research as part of the transition in the educational restructuring plans. The debates were highly controversial and in some quarters fiercely opposed.
Following the Size and Shape debate was the Green Paper of 1996. The Green Paper was a pre-emblem towards the third White Paper of August 1997. The third White Paper of August 1997, a working document for the state, reiterates that the “South Africa’s transition from apartheid and minority rule to democracy requires that all existing practices, institutions and values are viewed anew and rethought in terms of their fitness for the new era”. Thus the central policy goal (Barnes, 2004) is the development of a single, national co-ordinated higher education system that is diverse in terms of the mix of institutional missions and programmes.

In retrospect, there were subtle indications of what HEIs were later to expect. Examples of such subtlety are highlighted from the first page of the White Paper which states as follows; “to address the development needs of society and provide the labour market in a knowledge-driven and knowledge-dependent society with the ever-changing high competencies and expertise”. The state’s development objectives were expressed and would later be reflected in the creation of Comprehensive Universities that are a mixture of Tecknikons and Universities (3rd White Paper, 1997, para.1.3). Other reflections, are in the state’s attempts to align HEIs to their developmental objectives can be seen in 1.24 of the White Paper that refers to institutional autonomy, and subsequently got endorsed in the amendment of the Higher Education Act 101 1999/2000. Non-compliance with this legislation affected some institutions such as the University of the North; the University of Transkei in the acquisition of mandated ‘government administrators’, who had the responsibilities of management and the role of council. Paragraph 1.25 of the White Paper on public accountability, “requires that institutions should demonstrate how they have met national policy goals and priorities”. Part of the requirement of public accountability of funds by the higher education institutions would be submitting their number of FTEs, 3 year rolling plans, quality of teaching, curricula
and so on. Paragraph 2.70, on the quality assurance system for higher education clearly indicates that the Higher Education Act will provide for the co-ordination of quality assurance in higher education through a Higher Education Quality Committee (HEQC) which will be established as a permanent committee of the Council on Higher Education (CHE). The CHE a major statutory body was “established to provide independence, strategic advice to the Minister of Education on matters relating to the transformation and development of higher education in South Africa, and to manage quality assurance and quality promotion in the higher education sector” (3rd White Paper, 1997, para. 3.15). The CHE was created as another organ for the purposes of achieving the state’s developmental objective of aligning HEIs.

Contrary to some researchers such as Cloete (2002) who implied that the 3rd White Paper of August 1997 was in essence or can be regarded as ‘symbolic’, one would rather state that the White Paper should be viewed as the foundation framework of a partially laid down ‘grand’ policy, on which government had started the implementation of the steering and intervention stage and culminating in the HE Act 101 of 1997 and subsequent policies. Subotzky (2003) cites the White Paper and the HE Act 101 of 1997 as providing the legislative framework for the restructuring of the higher education landscape, in that this framework created co-operative governance between the state (government) and institutions. Within institutions themselves, guidelines and frameworks of statutory bodies such as Council, Senate, Institutional Forums were already set in motion under the HE Act of 1997. Whether all the various stakeholders and representatives understood the implications of the changes in the HE policy and legislation is open to question.
3.7  HISTORIOGRAPHY AND HISTORIOGRAPHERS

3.7.1  Historiography and History

Historiography is basically the processes of history and/or the act of creating written works. Earliest historiographers begun with Herodotus (c.484-c. 424 BCE), with his writings on the ‘Histories’; Thucydides’s writing (c.460-c. 400 BCE) on the ‘History of the Peloponnesian War’ and continues through to the present in trying to understand how historians interpreted the past from the earliest times. History on the other hand is the final product of historiography, such as the “History of Universities” (Perkin, 1991), which is similar to this thesis in its interdisciplinary approach with its central theme being the emergence of higher education in the differing eras.

3.7.2  Historiography

In the exploration of Historiography, (Hughes-Warrington, 2008:xi-xviii) illustrates four main embodiments of historiography. These four main embodiments of historiography are the studies of history as a social phenomenon’; the psychological studies of historical awareness and thinking’; ‘philosophical studies of history’ and ‘synonymous with the history of histories and history-making’.

Firstly, historiography represents ‘the studies of history as a social phenomenon’ through anthropological and sociological investigation of communities. The methods of investigation is to construct and represent history variations beyond the bookshelves and this can be found in cinemas, family gatherings, museums and other social spaces. For instance, ‘Schlinder’s List’ the 1993 American drama film depicted how 1110 Polish Jews were saved from the holocaust that took place during the 2\textsuperscript{nd} World War. Approximately, 6 million people died
from the holocaust based on the grounds of “race, politics, religious belief and/or alleged physical inferiority” (Fulbrook, 2007, p. 07). In the same manner were the documentary films that depicted the ‘Sharpeville Massacre’ of 1960, Sophia town and the forced removals of approximately 3.5 million people to designated group areas (SACC, 1984). Studies of history as a social phenomenon are also recorded in the form of oral stories, integrated into cultural rituals and art form.

Secondly, historiography can be represented ‘as the psychological studies of historical awareness and thinking’ that respond to questions “by focusing on the mental activities of those who make and study history” (Hughes-Warrington, 2008, pp. xi-xviii). For instance, the case of the Durban Murals of 1992 on the prison wall depicting human rights, “as well as social constructions conventionally associated with the term”. Psycho-historians have tended to focus on the development of historical awareness and thinking in children and adolescents, such as the childhood experiences of Leopold von Ranke 1795-1886. Psychological studies of historical awareness and thinking are important to the development of moral awareness as this encourages people to ask questions, debate and speculate about the reasons for people’s behaviour, attitudes and values in other time zones. This aspect of historiography is central to the theme of this research. A brief historical review of Transkei under strenuous political circumstances is described leading to the creation and establishment of UNITRA as a HBU. What could have been the intrinsic and extrinsic leadership factors affecting their attitudinal behaviour? In accepting the position of VC as a leader, were the VCs aware of the socio-political practices governing UNITRA?

43 Selected pictures of Durban Murals of 1992 on prison wall taken by Geraldine McGuiness – Appendix XX
The third typology, philosophical studies of history within historiography, addresses the ‘should’ and what we ‘ought’ to research and communicate. In both past and present settings, writers, including the researcher in the literature review have looked at the philosophical analyses to “address points of debate and to illustrate agreed unquestioned and taken-for-granted principles and assumptions” (Hughes-Warrington, 2008, pp. xi-xviii). The creation of UNITRA was ‘taken-for-granted’ and built on an ‘assumption’ of how universities should generally function. The suggestion in the ‘Size and Shape’ debate of 2000 was that UNITRA should only provide for undergraduates, was due to the pre-assumption that UNITRA was established under a false premise, which served the ruling government of the time. Yet, the intent from the on-start was UNITRA would “be no third-grade university, but it will, on the contrary, be a university having the same objectives as the other universities in the world” (T.L.A., 1972, p.71). Some of these assumptions are subject to historical and cultural variation, whilst others are affirmed so often that they may appear unalterable. Asking questions about history can lead to better understanding of events. How these events come into existence and accompanying concepts and ideas that might go beyond our experience. Thus the historian has to investigate the underlying values and principles that guided the people of the past, as well as being aware of his/her own values and principles that might be influencing the interpretation of the past. For this thesis, as pointed out in the limitations section of Chapter 2, the researcher had to be alert as to how far her own experience in the later events chronicled here, might distort the analysis of the soft or hard data being collected.

Lastly, historiography for a number of researchers is “synonymous with the history of histories and history-making” (Hughes-Warrington, 2008, pp. 03-09). Historical studies of historians and histories range from Bede’s (673-735) valuable work on individuals and saints into the periodic insights of 597 to 731 to contemporary writings. Bede’s uses of materials
were obtained from the works of earlier writers, official records of the lives of the Pope, records and verbal accounts and fitting them into periods according to the ruling Pope. Similarly this thesis has chosen to gather material relating to successive periods (the 12 VCs and MAAs), but the availability of source material is problematic. While official archival material is available from UNITRA, as with other Universities, actual writings by Vice Chancellors themselves on their work is lacking (in contrast to the tendency of Prime Ministers and Presidents to write their memoirs). As with some of Bede’s writings, whose interest in chronology and hagiography are combined in history, this thesis is attempting to present chronologically both materials which come from the two political eras together with a focus on the leading individuals.

3.8 CONCLUSION

The intent of this chapter was not to scrutinise and/or justify the organisational theories used; rather, the theories are used as an ‘instrumental lens’ to explain the multi-factors influencing leadership, managerial practices and politics in South African Higher Education Institutions.

Secondly, South African Higher Education Institutions are large bureaucracies, the discussions above on the social contexts, political history and cultural heritages reveal that most SA HEIs in reality do not conform to the preconceived Weberian ‘ideal’ of Western Higher Education bureaucratic structure(s).

The third point noted was the ‘power-tugs of struggle’ between the state, as in government and HEIs is not a new phenomenon. The requirements of society place an onus on the leadership to transform managerial practices within HEIs in accordance with societal goals.
Lastly, in discussing the various organisational theories, theories of leadership and managerial practices; this chapter also hints at the complexities that may hinder a VC as a leader. Hindrances in the form of effectively maintaining a balance within the institution, between HEIs and society; between HEIs and government, and sustaining the overall knowledge-generating and knowledge distribution mission of Higher Education institution. Having explored the possible underlying theories to interpret the organisational Higher Education leadership of the chosen epochs, it is necessary to put this in context of the actual historical development of the institutions in the region that is the focus of this thesis.
4.1 INTRODUCTION

- **Higher Education Institutions in the Eastern Cape Province**

Subsequent to the partition of South Africa’s four provinces into nine provinces; Eastern Cape Province, the 3rd biggest province post-1994 has a population density per 38.4 [DPA (km²)], with 6,514,500 [PP] in 2008 to approximately 7,500,00 in 2012 [PP]. Eastern Cape Province is mainly rural based and still amongst the largest in ethnic groupings. The four contact Higher Education Institutions in the province were established at different times, for different reasons with differing financial support that were based on socio-political, racial and ethnic factors. Rhodes University was established by the British, University of Port Elizabeth (UPE) was mainly for the Afrikaans (Boers/Dutch settlers), Fort Hare University (UFH) was for Africans and the University of Transkei (UNITRA) mainly for the isiXhosa ethnic grouping. Ethnicity does not only relate to blacks but also to whites, despite the general practice of categorising whites into racial groups rather than ethnic groups. Africans were divided into eight groups in the 1950s and two more groups were later added. “The National Party government put in place legal constraints to prevent institutions designated as being for the use of one race group from enrolling students from another race group” (Cheland, 2001, p. 02). The race and/or ethnic demarcations do impact on the functionality of these groups, power dynamics and their mental aptitude.
4.2 RHODES UNIVERSITY

Rhodes University (1904), a small university in Grahamstown, is the oldest higher education institution in the Eastern Cape Province. Lectures are relatively small for individual tuition and feasible tutorial groups, with approximately 7,000 students to date. Sir George Parkin, the first secretary to the Rhodes Trustees wrote to Sir Lewis Michell, on return from the Republic of South Africa to Britain that the political inclination of the English was “the ideas of Mr Rhodes will be carried out better by building an institution of higher learning at Grahamstown, the educational centre of the Eastern Province” (Currey, 1970, pp. 09-13).

Through the handover of the De Beers preference shares to the authorities of Rhodes University College, Selmar Schöland obtained £50,000 from the Rhodes Trustees (Currey, 1970, p. 12). Selmar Schöland’s son, Sir Basil Schöland was the first Chancellor. The Rhodes Trustees made annual donations of £1,000 to the college finances that commenced in 1924. In addition to the £15,000 promised locally, private investors like Mr Muirhead donated £1,000. So the “economic control remained with whites” (Plaut & Holden, 2012, p. 39).

The Cape government gave a small subsidy of £1,450 at the commencement of Rhodes’ existence, which was earmarked for professional salaries (Currey, 1970, p. 24). The first four professors from St. Andrew staff became the founding professors of the University College, with salaries from £400 to £500 per annum. The Drostdy building negotiated by the Council with the Cape Authorities would become the first property of the Rhodes University College. Government grants following the University of South Africa Act of 1916 were more generous, despite fluctuations (Currey, 1970, p. 53). Rhodes became a constituent college of the new University of South Africa in 1918. When the future of the University of South Africa came under review in 1947, Rhodes opted to become an independent university. Soon
after the passing of the Rhodes University Private Bill of April 1949, funds from the Rhodes Trustees, the Directors of De Beers Consolidated mines, private and public sectors were obtained. The NP government would pledge £1 for each £1 donated, with £100 000 already donated and a further £50 000 promised. Rhodes University College became Rhodes University in 1951, with the first Deans elected in 1952; followed by the establishment of faculties. In terms of the Rhodes University Private Act, the University College of Fort Hare was affiliated to Rhodes University, until the National Party (NP) government decided to disaffiliate Fort Hare from Rhodes with the Separate University Education Bill. Though there were strong objections from the Council and Senate, the Separate University Education Bill was passed and Fort Hare’s affiliation to Rhodes came to an end in 1959.

“Negotiations with the Port Elizabeth City Council culminated in the opening of the short-lived Port Elizabeth Division of Rhodes University in 1961. Rhodes withdrew from Port Elizabeth at the end of 1964 after the government decided to replace the Division with an independent, dual-medium University of Port Elizabeth”

(Rhodes website, 2012).

Rhodes has had a steady growth of infrastructure with the new building linking the main quadrangles and the library in 1985, the Kimberley Hall in 1985 and the new residence that opened in 1993.

In the higher education landscape changes by the Minister of Education, Kader Asmal, the proposal of Rhodes as a historical white university to merge with University of Fort Hare, a historical black university previously was rejected (National Working Group, 2003). Their ability to attract donations due to Rhodes’ heritage and maintain their status nationally and
internationally would have been threatened. Rhodes gave up their satellite campus in East London to the University of Fort Hare (UFH). Rhodes is still a traditional university.

4.3 UNIVERSITY OF FORT HARE

Fort Hare University (UFH) established in 1915 and named after the military Fort in Alice town, was a formation of missionary educators with Christian ideals that created “a recognisable class of westernised elite African” (Massey, 2010, pp. 08-11) and were supported by the Transkei Territories, Glen Grey and Basutoland (Kerr, 1968, pp. 124-125). UFH referred to in the initials stages as the “South African Native College” was not “permitted to become a full affiliate college of UNISA, even though its candidates sat for the degree examinations” (Cooper & Subotzky, 2001, pp. 04-05). The Union Government\(^{44}\) regarded UFH as an ‘African experiment’ and gave a minimum subsidy as from 1923, with the proviso that agriculture be part of UFH’s curriculum. UFH would be recognised as a higher education institution after the Higher Education Act (No.30 of 1923)\(^{45}\) was passed in parliament. With the gradual shift from secondary school curriculum to degrees of UNISA (Ajayi, Goma & Johnson, 1996, pp. 35-36), UFH became entitled to the same annual subsidy from government as other university colleges. Alexander Kerr would be the first principal until his retirement in 1970.

\(^{44}\) The Union Government under the leadership of General Louis Botha was formed on the 31 May 1910. The National Party (NP) on assuming power in 1948 embarked on a policy framework of separate development for South Africa. The NP’s tenure as government to 1994 was referred as the Apartheid Era.

\(^{45}\) The Higher Education Act (No.30 of 1923) was passed in parliament as a means to control the number of technical colleges emerging (Kerr, 1968, p.125).
The first graduates of UFH in May 1924 were Z.K Matthews from Kimberley with BA and Edwin Ncwana from Orange Free State with a L.A.(Kerr, 1968, p.211). By 1938 there were “17 graduands with degrees”. The graduates numbers rose substantially in “1948 to 3 Master in Arts, Science and Education; 5 Honours Bachelor degrees in History, Native Administration, Zoology and African Studies; 38 Bachelor of Arts; 18 Bachelor of Sciences and 12 Bachelor of Science (Hygiene)” (Kerr, 1968, pp. 257, 260). Paramount Chief K.D Matanzima, a law graduate and a supporter of separate development, advocated for the establishment of another African University in the homelands.

Alexander Kerr in his last official congregation alluded that the plans for the establishment of UNITRA were already underway.

“What of the future? As I have indicated, Mr Vice-Chancellor, it was a fortunate thing for us that the University which you represent today had provision in its charter for the certification of external students, as had the great university of London. But recent events have led us to believe that it is the intention of Government to constitute, out of the constituent colleges of the University of South Africa, a series of new and independent universities, to one of which, the nearest geographically and, if I may say so, the one with which our relations in the past have been most intimate, it is suggested that this College should be affiliated” (Kerr, 1968, p. 261).

UFH as a subgroup of historically black Universities (HBU) through the Fort Hare Transfer Act, would be under the control of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (Bunting, 2001, p. 09; Kerr, 1968, p. 281).
UFH played an important part in the ‘nationwide resistance to apartheid’ (Massey, 2010, p.204) with a racial diversity in the student body. “Fort Hare was the first tertiary institution in South Africa to open its doors to Indians and coloureds when residences at the Universities of Cape Town, Natal and the Witwatersrand (Wits) were reserved for whites” (Massey, 2010, p.96). The Apartheid government in their creation of a racially segregated state had paradoxically created an institution where a diversity of individuals could contextualise their experiences and identities into political mobilisation (Massey, 2010, pp. 245-253).

UFH is distinguished as being the first racially diverse higher education institution in South Africa and in the Southern African region. Many distinguished professionals, politicians and leaders graduated from UFH. In the higher education reconfiguration of 2002 to 2004 by the Minister Education, Kader Asmal, UFH remained as a traditional university with the main campus at Alice and satellite campuses in East London and Bisho.

4.4 UNIVERSITY OF PORT ELIZABETH

Port Elizabeth, initially a trading settlement with the seaports established former University of Port Elizabeth (UPE) on the 31 January 1964, after the Parliament of Act 1 (1964).

“Built on 830 hectares of land donated by the then Port Elizabeth City Council UPE was the country's first dual-medium residential university. The first academic year commenced on 1 March 1965”.

(Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, 2009).

Port Elizabeth was a highly racially segregated town, with the NP government viewing ‘blacks’ as workers who would return to their ‘rural homelands’. The NP government’s
apartheid ideology did not view black workers as a permanent component of urban life, but rather a peripheral labour necessity to their lifestyle. In turn, UPE, as one of the 6 Afrikaans universities was compliant to the apartheid government with student orientation geared towards civil servant positions and other professions (Bunting, 2001, p.05). UPE began with 320 students and the teaching mode of medium was Afrikaans dominated, although officially regarded as a dual-medium. Professor E.J Marais was the first principal and Dr. B. Schoman the Chancellor.

In 2004, the merger of the University of Port Elizabeth with Port Elizabeth Technikon and Port Elizabeth campus of Vista University led to the creation of a Comprehensive University (National Working Group, 2003, p. 04), named Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU). The merger was made easier by the fact that the University of Port Elizabeth with Port Elizabeth Technikon had similar institutional cultures, a pool of academic expertise, financially buoyant, strong management ethos and merely divided by a fence. By 2007, NMMU would become one of the fastest higher education institutions in the country to transform the racial component of students, from mainly white to blacks (Cloete, 2004).

4.5 UNIVERSITY OF TRANSKEI

Transkei as one of the biggest compact areas of the TBVC states comprised mainly of Xhosa speaking peoples with the 1960 census indicating 3, 134,265 population density as the largest among the ethnic groups (Hill, 1964, p. 15). Topographically, the former homeland “is a broken landscape characterised by mountain ranges and deeply eroded valleys

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46 Map indicating the Ethnic Demarcations in the Republic of South Africa – Please see Appendix 1
with two veld types, the eastern coastal bush veld and the sour grass veld of the inland region that run parallel to the coast” (Malan & Hattingh, 1976, p. 213)

Prime Minister Verwoerd announced that the Transkei Territorial Authority of May 1961’s request of self-governance had been granted in one of the biggest multi-scattered resettlement areas. Emanating from the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 and following the Tomlinson Commission of 1954, Transkei obtained its status of a territorial authority in 1956. There was opposition by some chiefs and headmen to the Bantu Authorities system (Mbeki, 1964; Evans, 1957), due to the conversion of the chiefs and headmen into administrative factotums of the apartheid system. The van Heerden Commission recorded numerous complaints about brazen corruption among chiefs and headmen, including levies imposed on whole communities and opponents (Evans, 1957, ch.8). The nominated Native Commissioners

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47 The Bantu Authorities Act (No. 68) of 1951 established Bantu tribal, regional, and territorial authorities in the regions set out for Africans under the Group Areas Act, and it abolished the Natives Representative Council. The Bantu authorities were to be dominated by chiefs and headmen appointed by the government. The Population Registration Act of 1950 prior to the Bantu Authorities Act had established a national registration process to classify people according to their race. Whilst the Group Areas Act of the same time physically and spatially separated White, Black, Coloured and Indian people. The Acts would be repealed in June of 1991.

48 The government ignored the Tomlinson Commission of 1954 that stated the areas set aside for Africans would support no more than two-thirds of the African population even under the best of conditions the reserves and began removing Africans from white areas to the reserves/’homelands’. Real income had not risen in the reserves since 1936 and per capita income had actually declined.

49 South Africa had initially been one of direct rule, where ‘White’ government officials sat over the Chiefs. It was known that the white government official as the Commissioner was the boss. In order to devise a scheme that would protect white government officials from anti-government action and have the appearance of Africans managing their affairs, the Nationalist Party evolved a hybrid of the British direct and indirect method of rule practised in colonies. The Native Commissioner was renamed Bantu Commissioner; in vogue with the term ‘Bantu’ which the Nationalists insisted should replace the more compromising word ‘Native’. Other government officials were represented as advisers who would be required only for as long as the Africans needed training and this was regarded as self-development (Mbeki, 1964, ch3).
regarded as Bantu Commissioners by the Nationalist Party resorted to administrative blackmail whenever they were unable to intimidate blacks (Africans) into cooperation. Intimidation could take the form of withholding services unless Reference Books were first produced. The Co-ordination of Documents Act\textsuperscript{50} of 1952 would be an extension of reference books. Due to migrant labour mobilisation of RSA that consisted of males and left women who constituted the majority in Transkei, these acts created hostility within the imposed system of Transkei. Without a reference book pensions could be withheld, marriages would not be registered; mail and money remitted from the urban areas could not be obtained without the new pass. Also, the Bantu Commissioners tended to proceed over judicial matters without the presence of a lawyer. The imposition of Bantu Authorities therefore had the unintended consequence of widening the scope of political vision within the Transkei.

The devolution of authority in the Transkeian Constitution Act of 1963 would become undesirable for many (Mbeki, 1964), as indicated in the outlined constitution by Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima and officials from the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (Evans, 1957, ch. 7-8). The Transkei constitution was identifiable with the separate development policy of the apartheid government. Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima like the National Party believed that the best way to build up black power was through a gradual federation of black-ruled states that would be autonomous; an ideology anchored in the reminiscence of bygone isiXhosa nationalism and usurped lands. This was despite his

\textsuperscript{50} Under the Co-ordination Act of 1952 (Laurence, 1976, p.57), all Africans had to be finger-printed at the age of 16 and issued with a reference book. Whites and other races had to produce a reference book following legislation in 1975. With the democratic election of 1994, the reference book was abolished.
acknowledged statement that “separate development is a white man’s policy. Its primary goal is unashamedly the preservation of white identity and control by whites over their destiny” (Laurence, 1976, p. 09).

Transkei’s first ‘democratic elections’ in 1963 was under a state of emergency. The state of emergency instigated the ban of ‘Promulgation R.400’ of 1960 on all meetings of more than ten persons. The ban also laid down severe penalties for 'statements disrespectful to chiefs', and permitted the indefinite detention, without warrant or trial of political opponents (Mbeki, 1964).

The Transkeian Legislative Assembly, the only one among the TBVC with a functional parliament of only an initial 45 carefully elected members out of a previous 109 member Bantu legislative body was headed by Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima. The Transkei government could legislate only for Transkeian citizens, where a citizen is defined as a native born in the Transkei, or settled there for five years and whose home language is Xhosa or Sotho. The irony is that Transkei initially consisted of twelve different tribes, identifiable by their clan names and belonging to two major ethnic groups, who settled in Transkei from the 1700s (Matanzima, 1977, pp. 19-24). Through shared experiences and events, the collective groupings linguistically adopted isiXhosa and seSotho. Language was a major binding force. The Transkeian government had no jurisdiction over ‘Whites’ and ‘Coloureds’ who lived within the territory and formed a minority. The ‘Whites’ and ‘Coloureds’ who had adapted to

51 Promulgation R.400’ applicable only in the Transkei, had on several occasions been presented to the Transkei Legislative Assembly for repeal or amendment. Due to the unrest in Qukeni, Eastern Pondoland, the promulgation R400 in 1960 was introduced (Transkei Legislative Assembly, fourth session, second assembly, 1971, p.108-115). Promulgation R.400’ could have a person detained from, 30 days to 180 days or even indefinitely. There were adverse implications on the detainee’s work, property and/or family. Promulgation R.400’ was applied to the staff and students at UNITRA in 1984.
cultural expectations in Transkei, were due to other historical complexities. Asians were refused residence in Transkei altogether. The National Party (NP) government had the power of veto and the right of supervision over every act of the Transkeian Legislative Assembly. For instance, the refusal of Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo to approve the first elections held in the Transkei in 1963 and his rivalry with Paramount Chief Matanzima was widely reported and discussed in the nation’s newspapers. Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo would serve as an icon of non-collaborating chiefs (Evans, 1957, ch.8). Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima enthusiasm for the Bantustan system would open him to the charge of supporting apartheid (US State Department Information, 1963–1966) on the ‘political national pendulum’. Transkei amongst the largest compact reserve blocks of area was able to sustain some form of community development (Tomlinson Commission, 1954), but there was control on their education, health and police system.

The Apartheid government and the Transkei government tended to use the terminology ‘Marxism’ or ‘Communist’ obnoxiously in their deterrent of any form of opposition and critics of a system. The Suppression of Communism Act 16\(^{52}\) extended their paranoia of not only taking out all “Marx variety, but included two definitions of communism which enabled the government to use against organisations and men who were not communists in the international accepted sense of the word” (Laurence, 1976, p. 56). Firstly, the banning of

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\(^{52}\) The Government issued "banning orders" on large numbers of people of all races, under the Suppression of Communism Act 16.

The Suppression of Communism Act included the doctrine of “Marxism Socialism”, and any doctrine or scheme which brought about any political, industrial, social, or economic change in South Africa through promotion of disturbances or disorder; unlawful acts or omissions; aims at the encouragement of feelings of hostility between Black and White. The Suppression of Communism Act 16, coupled with the Unlawful Organisations Act of 1960 enabled the Republic of South Africa President to declare the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC) banned.
individuals engaged or equated with communism, as subscribed by the act and secondly, to further the aims of an organisation or individuals who seemingly worked within communist ideologies. Punitive measures included the prohibitions from gatherings (inclusive social gatherings for a period of 5 years), preparation, publication, or dissemination of any book/periodical/pamphlet, confined to house arrest, reporting to a police station, detention without trial (Hahlo & Maisels, 1966, pp. 16-17). Transkei would protract the Suppression of Communism Act 16, the Terrorism Act and Emergency Proclamation 400 and 413, which would invariably affect and impact on the ethos of UNITRA. The arrests of students in 1980 and 1984; the deportation of staff in 1984 utilised the Suppression of Communism Act 16, the Terrorism Act and Emergency Proclamation 400 and 413. Prof. B.D V van der Merwe 53 speech indicated that “an open university did not imply that if the university offered a course in Marxism, it became subordinated to Marxist doctrine” (Daily Dispatch Reporter, 1984a) whereas academic freedom implied a critical student approach in its offerings”. However, “this balance was endangered by the fact that education policy was not decided by educationists but by politicians”.

Self-governance or 'independence' for the Transkei was considered a costly “bold experiment” (de Kock, 1968), supported by legislation passed in the republican parliament and provided “generous financial” aids to the Transkei budget. Despite the “generous financial aids” to the Transkei budget, Mbeki (1964) states, the Republic government had the revenue, held the purse strings, and therefore retained the real power. Indeed, the Nationalist Government spokesmen had made it clear that the territory would have to wait a long time for 'sovereign independence' (Mbeki, 1964), if it ever attains such status at all.

53 UNITRA’s first Vice-Chancellor and Principal
By the 1970s, the policy of Bantu national autonomy and self-rule was supposed to have transformed from a feasible proposition to a social reality. Mr Guzana stated, in the Transkei Legislative Assembly debates of 1971, “Transkei is merely an area for a national group within the RSA and the initiative to metamorphose this insect to the next stage lies with the Republican Government” (TLA, 14th April, 1971 to 18th June, 1971, p.301). The “Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Transkei, which had increased from R85, 4 million in 1960/70 to R131, 2 million in 1973/74” (Malan & Hattingh, 1976, p. 255) gave credence to Transkei as viable homeland. Agriculture was the largest contributor to the GDP with 35.2%. Coupled with this was the marked growth in the manufacturing and construction sectors, community, social and personal services, which was followed by the education and health services (Ibid). The neglect of Transkei post-1994 changed the dynamics of the former homeland as a potential source of revenue towards South Africa’s GDP growth.

At Transkei’s ‘independence day’ in 1976, Paramount Chief K.D Matanzima, as an astute politician stated, “the year 1976 will go down as the most important. Particularly when it refers to Southern Africa, because of the dramatic turn of events in the political and social lives of the people of the Republic of Transkei” (Matanzima, 1977)54.

Transkei was not an independent state, with the Republican embassy within reach and their personnel overseeing the homeland. Transkeians abroad were no longer able to apply for South African passports. Most blacks had been stripped of their South African citizenship both in RSA and internationally. Transkeians within the country had to adhere to requirements such as the possession of a valid travel document to enter and remain in South Africa. The Republic of South African government contended that a passport was a privilege,

54 Address by the Prime Minister Dr. K.D. Matanzima: 14th Congress of the Transkeian National Independent Party, 1977. Held at Umtata, 5-6 March 1977 – Appendix XXI
not a right when the "homelands" became "independent". This was despite the non-recognition of Transkeian by the United Nation (UN) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) of politics of anti-colonialism and liberation, on the other, which regard RSA as the last bastion of racist colonialism” (Transkei Government Annual Report of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information, 1984, p. 03).

Workers in the Republic of South Africa were required to return to the Transkei on expiry of their work contracts (T.L.A, 14th April, 1971 to 18th June, 1971, pp. 330-334), due to the influx regulations labour controls imposed by the Republic of South Africa. Apartheid pervaded South African culture, as well as the law, where Transkeians were regarded as ‘aliens’, but treated differently from other Aliens. In the Secretary-General’s report to the Minister, the Secretary-General contends “since independence Transkeians were regarded as Aliens in the Republic of South Africa and therefore subject to the provisions of section 2 of the Aliens Act, No.1 of 1937” (Transkeian Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs and Information, 1987, pp. 05-06).

Forced removals from Transkei and within Transkei were not an unusual norm, as in the case of the UNITRA staff deportees of 1984. Transkei could not even admit non-citizens to its territory, unless the government of the Republic considered them acceptable. Such as the case of Prof. E. Mphahlele who’s appointment at UNITRA was rejected due to his political affiliations and radical approach (Mphahlele & Company, 2010).

The Republic as a mother country would continue to exploit her colony. Not by extracting minerals or raw materials, but by extracting manpower and the manipulation of the labour

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55 Professor Mphahlele’s letter written to Professor Hodge on the 26 June 1978 – Appendix XX11
force to suit the requirements, not of the Africans within the Transkei, but of the Whites without. With a growing profile of civil servants and teachers, the new rulers would act in a manner pleasing to the Republic so as to get their grants. With the issue of a profile of civil servants and teachers, SIGCAU, the Honourable Miss S.N. - Minister of Education, stated in the Transkei Legislative Assembly;

“I am happy to note that both sides of the House are agreed that there is a need for establishing a university in the Transkei. I am sure it is the wish of every one of us that, should a university be established, it will be such a university as will be up to the standards of any other university”


The announcement of its intention to open the Fort Hare branch in 1974 marked the translation into a reality, first mooted by the Tomlinson Commission in 1954 that the Union Government of South Africa should consider the establishment of constituent university colleges, one of which should be in the Transkei. Likewise, the Eiselen Commission, submitted in 1951 had already set the premise for separate development through the represented “blueprint of government legislation in respect of black education and also served as the basis for its future developments and trends” (Ngubentombi, 1989, p. 17).

The Tomlinson recommendation of the commission was acted upon by the Transkei Government soon after the inception of self-government in 1963, and continued in the debates of the Transkei Legislative Assembly. By 1972, the Transkei Legislative Assembly would pronounce that a “world class university” (T.L.A Debates, 12th April, 1972 to 13th June, 1972, p. 71) that is “open” to all races would be established in Transkei. Staff would be

56 Inadequate staffing of government positions in the departments were frequently mentioned and suggestions for the increased training of qualified personnel nationally and overseas diplomats.
recruited from South Africa and internationally; with the intention of teaching and training Transkeians as the norm in universities worldwide. Mr K.M.Guzana added that “the personnel of such an advisory council could be drawn from all universities in South Africa and not be limited to ethnic university personnel” (T.L.A. Debates, 12th April, 1972 to 13th June, 1972, p. 71).

Requested by Paramount Chief K.D Matanzima and his cabinet, Mr M.C. Botha the Minister of Bantu Education approached the University of Fort Hare (UFH) with a view to establishing a branch of UFH at Umtata in 1975 (UNITRA Prospectus, 1980, p. 09). The rationale presented was “positively implementing the training of Africans in responsible Government and other posts, in order to prepare them for playing their part in the Transkei” (T.L.A. Debates, 14th April, 1971 to 18th June, 1971, pp. 472-476). This would also respond to the Taylor Commission of 1979 that formed the basis of the “blueprint of all educational development where definite objectives for education in Transkei are clearly set out” (Ngubentombi, 1989, pp. 41, 65). The second motivational factor was the over subscription of students’ applications at UFH of which only a specific number could be admitted.

In a change of plans, Paramount Chief K.D Matanzima decided on the establishment of a university that was independent of UFH. A temporary site near the Umtata Technical College in 1975 was used, until the first out the three infrastructural constructions were completed.

57 The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Education in the Republic of Transkei, referred to as the ‘Taylor Commission’ was submitted to the Transkeian government in November 1979. The 253 page report, divided into six parts gave definite objectives for the development and achievement the Transkeian educational system.
Construction of UNITRA

The construction of UNITRA and the additional infrastructure constructions would continue for years. UNITRA as an ‘open university’ transformed Transkei from a rural base into a university hybrid town, with an increase in the middle class economic category; a diversity of racial and ethnic groups; attracted recruitment of professionals from the Republic and internationally; encouraged the return of exiles and became one of the biggest employers for the region. “It is estimated UNITRA brings to Umtata R170 million yearly spending. UNITRA is also the biggest employers in the region” (Mboyane, 2001).

Constructed Buildings of UNITRA pre-1994

(Putters by permission of W.S.U. VC 2007. Copyright W.S.U)
UNITRA’s infrastructure and assets, such as the housing properties were to be commended. UNITRA could not be simply derogated as a ‘non-entity’ placed among ‘shacks’ or as a high school/college building. Even in the report of Walter Sisulu University (W.S.U) by the Working Group (WG) in 2005, acknowledgement was made to infrastructure of the former UNITRA.

“The Working Group argues, however, that ECSA had concerns about current resources and, in any case, the WSU will not be leaving excellent facilities in moving to East London. More residence places should be provided in the unified East London and in Mthatha\textsuperscript{58} to accommodate students” (Ramphele, 2005, pp.37-38[8.3]).

\textit{UNITRA, 1995}

\hspace{1cm}

\textit{(Photographs by permission of W.S.U. VC 2007. Copyright W.S.U)}

\footnote{The spelling of the town ‘Umtata’ was officially corrected to reflect ‘Mthatha’, post-2000.}
UNITRA served and continued to serve for years, as a human resource heaven in a number of human needs requirements. It is perhaps for this that UNITRA would encounter systemic and structural problems post democratic elections of 1994.

4.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter demonstrated that the four Higher Education Institutions in what is now known as the Eastern Cape Province were established at different times, for different reasons, with differing financial support that were based on socio-political, racial and ethnic factors.

As this study is primarily based on the Vice-Chancellors at the University of Transkei (UNITRA) and the outcomes on UNITRA as a higher education institution; a socio-political background history of Transkei was required to contextualise the establishment of UNITRA. UNITRA, located in the Transkeian homeland, was intended “to address the developmental needs of the society and provide the labour market in a knowledge-driven and knowledge-dependent society ”(3rd White Paper, 1997, pp. 01-03) with competencies and expertise.

UNITRA was “State Controlled’ (chapter 03, section 3.6, p.90 of this study) and dependent directly on Paramount Chief K.D Matanzima’s government and indirectly dependent on the finances and the sanctions of the Apartheid government, pre-1994. Detailed discussion and assessment of the Vice-Chancellors pre-1994 at the former UNITRA is in chapter 05 of this study. With the election of the African National Government (ANC) post-1994, the higher educational landscape transformation would take the form of ‘State Supervision’ or ‘State Regulation’ (chapter 03, section 3.6 and pp.90-91). UNITRA, stigmatised by existing in a former homeland, became part of South Africa’s Higher Education Institutions in 1994 and had to adhere to ‘State Regulation’ of the government. UNITRA’s existing problems coupled
with the inability to adhere to the ‘State Regulation’ of the government within an economic-driven global market created tensions within the institution (as discussed in chapter 03, section 3.3.5 ‘Crisis Leadership’). By the end of the 1990s entering 2000, ‘State Interference’ (discussed in chapter 03, section 3.6, pp.91-92) in UNITRA’s operations and administration would result in UNITRA being part of the merged institutions forming W.S.U. Chapter 06 of this study, discusses and assesses the Vice-Chancellors at the former UNITRA with a post script of W.S.U. Overall, the forms of government and resource dependency would affect leadership and managerial practices of the Vice-Chancellors, and impact on the autonomy of UNITRA.

Rhodes University and the former University of Port Elizabeth as Historical White Universities (HWUs) were more advantaged than University of Fort Hare and the former University of Transkei; both latter are Historically Black Universities (HBUs). The advantages gained by both Rhodes University and the former University of Port Elizabeth were primarily their socio-political dominance and links as reflected in the “Overview of the Higher Education Sector in South Africa from 1853 to 1948”, chapter 01. Financially cushioned by their socio-political links, with minimum political interference in the academic ethos of the institutions, both Rhodes University and the former University of Port Elizabeth (presently part of Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University - NMMU) had a relatively smoother ride in the establishment, growth and the sustainability of being a higher education institution, than the University of Fort Hare (UFH) and the former University of Transkei (UNITRA, presently part of W.S.U.).

In steering the higher education landscape, post-1994, the ANC government benefitted the HWUs over the former HBUs by ignoring the historical socio-political ‘birds-eye’ view of all
higher education institutions. Added to this was the unexpected migration of both students and staff to HWUs. Expecting redress funding, the funding stance of government disadvantaged HBUs, which resulted in bankruptcy; such was the case with UFH and UNITRA.
CHAPTER 05    THE VICE-CHANCELLORS’ TENURE AT UNITRA
(1976 – 1994)

APARTHEID ERA AND TRANSKEIAN GOVERNMENT

5.1    INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses and assesses the Vice-Chancellors (VCs) leadership and managerial practices at UNITRA during the Apartheid Era and the Transkeian government. Transkei’s independence in 1976 by the Republic of South Africa was not recognised internationally. Transkei as a ‘Bantustan homeland’ was financially dependent on the Republic of South Africa and governed by Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima.

The Vice-Chancellors (VCs) as the central human actor had to balance relationships at an inter-organisation level with both the Transkeian government and the Republic of South African government. Simultaneously, the VCs as early pioneers of a university had to be responsible for the pooling of human resources that was reflective of a university and accommodated the cultural developmental needs of the region. The differing forms of communication, both formal and informal within the human resources pool led to unreliable and sometimes inaccurate information that affected the hierarchy structures of UNITRA. As in all communication, particularly in management-employee communication, credibility is of utmost importance, especially when considering ‘self-esteem’ and ‘security’ needs of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Communication also affected and impacted upon the organisational culture and climate in which the VCs had to operate.
5.2 ‘BANTUSTAN GOLDEN AGE – CREATED MEMORIES’ (PHASE 1)

Section A: Professor B. De V van der Merwe

Professor B. De V van der Merwe was the first Vice-Chancellor and Principal at the University of Transkei (UNITRA) from 1976 to 1986.

Prof. B. De V van der Merwe was the former Dean of Education at Fort Hare and became the first Vice-Chancellor and Principal of UNITRA. He was deployed to Transkei with the aim of setting up a satellite UFH campus, but he did not endorse the concept of a satellite campus.

(Photograph, Permission of W.S.U VC 2007. Copyright W.S.U.)

Prof. B. De V van der Merwe complied with the concept of an ‘open university’ as advocated in the Transkei Legislative Assembly of 1972. The enactment of the University of Transkei Act N0.23 of 1976 gave the Transkei campus of UFH in 1977, the status of an autonomous university. The University was officially opened on May 6, 1977. Prof. Jafta, one of the first recruits from Fort Hare University in 1976, to teach African languages stated that

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59 UNITRA’s Arms Emblem – Appendix XX111

60 Consent form of an interview with Professor N. Jafta on Vice-Chancellor(s) at the former UNITRA – Appendix XX1IV
“the intention was to improve the civil servants and the teachers here, which was a very good idea, for if you look today at the best lawyers, best judges, principals of schools, have qualified here. UNITRA did a very good job in improving the quality of life of the people”
(Nkanyuza, 2013, p. 02).

UNITRA renowned for its diversity and multi-racial mixture was catalogued in the European list of Universities. Academics were recruited from the Republic of South Africa and beyond. Given incentives, resources for studies, overseas conferences and other academic requirements, Prof. van der Merwe, UNITRA’s founding Vice-Chancellor (VC) was regarded as one of the best VCs by some of the academic staff.

“He [Prof. van der Merwe] would invite us individually to his office for a cup of tea. He knew our names and was interested in us personally. As academics we were respected and given resources to function effectively, unlike what is happening now. We did not have to negotiate for salary increases, as this was done every year in line with inflation. He would go to Pretoria and return with a suitcase filled with money”
(UNITRA/WSU academic, 2011).

Prof. Jafta indicates that “those days it was easy to get study leave to travel for 6 months or get bursary to an institution to study overseas” “(Nkanyuza, 2013, p. 02). With an increase in middle-class status of people, who were educated and sophisticated in mannerisms, UNITRA as university-town also became an attractive employment hub for individuals, especially academics. Prof. Malaza stated work permits could be attainable and there were other

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61 Consent form of an interview with Professor E.D.Malaza on Vice-Chancellor(s) at the former UNITRA - Appendix XXV
dispensations. For instance, the tax dispensation was attractive and supportive towards UNITRA staff. Prof. Nkuhlu, as one of UNITRA’s early pioneers said,

“Prof. Van der Merwe and Prof. Manganyi had and believed in strong views about the role of universities in society; in terms of advancing knowledge. They saw a unique opportunity for them, the two of them, to really develop the university that will be unique in SA in terms of openness to new ideas to academics of diverse background and philosophies, and really make sure that it becomes the thriving centre of academic freedom and excellence, that was the idea”

(Nkanyuza, 2011b).

As Prof. van der Merwe stated,

“Unitra is sensitive to the slightest vestige of any racialism or racial superiority. The fact that staff came from 16 nationalities is clear evidence that openness to the university was not merely a slogan, but a reality”

(Daily Dispatch Reporter, 1984a).

Race connotations to his leadership and managerial approach were interlinked. Prof. van der Merwe, the founding VC at UNITRA was ‘white’ and therefore was perceived as effective and efficient.

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62 Consent form of an interview with Professor W.L.Nkuhlu on Vice-Chancellor(s) at the former UNITRA - Appendix XXV1
However, Prof. Peires\textsuperscript{63} added that

“although Prof. van der Merwe was ‘very passionate’ about UNITRA, he did not put his foot down and there was a very strong academic group, especially Prof. Manganyi, and Prof. Vilakazi. They created something called IMDS (Institute for Management and Development Studies), which was ran by Chris Tapscott. Tapscott had employed a whole group of MK [military cadres\textsuperscript{64}] people as researchers, who would go around collecting information. Prof. Manganyi and Prof. Miller, who were “pretty much the standard liberals but very relaxed persons; they tended to defuse the situation when the tension became too grave” (Nkanyuza, 2012b, p. 02).

Prof. B. De V van der Merwe, as a leader closed his eyes to some of the things going on at UNITRA’s intra-organisational level and the conditional transactions at the inter-organisational level.

The Chancellor position was vacant in 1977. The official opening of the UNITRA was held in the town hall on 6 May 1977 (UNITRA Prospectus, 1980). Paramount Chief K.D Matanzima became the Chancellor of UNITRA\textsuperscript{65} from 1978 to 1986 with Mr D.M. Ntusi as the first Chairperson of Council.

\textsuperscript{63} Consent form of an interview with Professor J. Peires on Vice-Chancellor(s) at the former UNITRA - Appendix XXV11

\textsuperscript{64} The military cadres was under the armed wing of the ANC

\textsuperscript{65} Paramount Chief K.D Matanzima abridged curriculum vitae from UNITRA 7\textsuperscript{th} Graduation Ceremony - Appendix XV111
Seated from left to right: Mr D.M. Ntusi (Chairperson), Chief Dr. K.D. Matanzima (Chancellor), Prof. B. De V. Van der Merwe (Vice-Chancellor), Mr J.de M. Malan (Registrar). Standing from left to right: Mr M.T. Nkungu, Prof. N.C. Manganyi, Prof. W. Mödinger, Prof. J.M. de Wet, Chief Justice G.G.A. Munnik, Dr. R Cingo, Mr P.M. Sobahle.

UNITRA, bureaucratic in nature had a top-down hierarchical structure. The structure had the Chancellor (usually titular) at the upper top, followed by a Council, a Vice-Chancellor with his team of top management, a Senate, academic and administrative staff.; as the human resource pool. Designated positions were assigned to each structural level with guiding rules and policy regulations.
Van der Merwe was “passionate" about Unitra, but at a price. He made reports to Chancellor, Paramount Chief K.D Matanzima, who took a keen interest in UNITRA and would occasionally visit the campus. Prof. Jafta illustrates this by stating:

“I remember assisting at residences, and residences were out of bound to men in the evening. That evening the students both males and females got rowdy and K.D’s daughter was there. Security called K.D, who arrived and asked “why were the students drunk”. Your Excellency (K.D), there was no cool drinks. K.D said, I understand there is a students’ bar here, it must be closed. You know I am very proud of this university. K.D was a forceful person and people wanted what he done to be a success. The bar was closed down, up to this day” (Nkanyuza, 2013).

Paramount Chief K.D.Matanzima, astuteness, hard disciplinarian politician and a law graduate of UFH, envisioned UNITRA as an institution to train, educate and empower the development of his people. Staff would take on extra-curricular work at the bequest of the Transkeian government. The extra-curricular work would for example take the form of working for the Transkeian National Library, the Transkeian Department of Finance, Transkei Road Transportation Corporation and so on. Though the incumbents wrote to Prof. van der Merwe for permission, he rarely refused if endorsed by the government. Van der Merwe also had meetings with the Director-General for Education and Training in Pretoria. For instance, the request made to the Director-General for Education and Training in Pretoria on the 3 September 1980 (University of Transkei Council, 1980), for the secondment of academics from other higher education institutions within South Africa to UNITRA. Van der Merwe complied with the regulations from the Department of Education, such as the termination of Prof. Verhoefs’ secondment contract at UNITRA in 1977. Prof. B. De V van

66 Consent form of an interview with Professor N. Cloete on Vice-Chancellor(s) at the former UNITRA - Appendix XX1X
der Merwe, despite his ‘initial good intentions’ became close to the Apartheid government and would comply with directives given to him. An attempted petition by academics to revoke the terminated contract was submitted to Prof. van der Merwe. Prof. Verhoefs stated that the Transkeian Department of Foreign Affairs had terminated his contract with the instigation of the South African Ministry. He further claimed that “Prof. van der Merwe called him a political instigator and told him, it was his duty to carry out the principles of Bantu education” (Daily Dispatch Reporter, 1980c). This was later refuted by van der Merwe, who urged students to be responsible and not to follow the activities of individuals who might mislead them.

There were allegations of corruption and mismanagement of funds, and this evidenced by the institutional financial problems; Allegations from stakeholders such as the students to Council and allegations from the staff association UDUSA\textsuperscript{67} (Union of Democratic University Staff Association) to management and Council. The allegations included the misappropriation of funds for personal use, including building his house in East London. However, neither Prof. van der Merwe nor anyone else was ever charged for the alleged fraud or corruption by the UNITRA Council. Rather Council ignored and/or turned a blind eye to the allegations made against van der Merwe, as later evidenced (University of Transkei Council, 1986a). With UNITRA’s incomplete organisational structure, there was a strong temptation to exploit the gaps/flaws of the systems and sub-systems. “An extremity of structural exploitation and/or flaws is the issue of corruption” (Harrison, 2007; Harrison, 1972).

\textsuperscript{67} UDUSA, staff association was comprised of academic staff
Tensions between the students, staff and Prof. van der Merwe continued, led to a series of crises in 1984. Moreover, the students as the ‘human capital production’ were politically conscious of the events taking place in the Republic of South Africa and in Transkei. In response to the tensions, Prof. van der Merwe stated that

“it was clear that some of the Bantu Education system was being propagated despite the utterances that ‘UNITRA had assurances from the University of Witwatersrand, they would help out in UNITRA’s geography department if necessary. Transkei is moving away from Bantu education – we have Transkeian education’, which still determined by the subjects taken for human capital production”

(Daily Dispatch Reporter, 1984c).

Within UNITRA, the students had constructed their own beliefs and attached meanings to them (Jones & Brader-Araje, 2002; Mead, 1901). They had their own culture of views of beliefs and often expressed them in strikes and riots. Prof. van der Merwe, as a ‘white’, viewed education in functional terms, whilst the students as ‘blacks’ viewed education both in functional and predominantly political terms.

- **Governance and Institutional Culture**

Prof. van der Merwe in his leadership and managerial practices continued to have clashes with students and academics throughout the 1980s with the functional running of UNITRA. The biggest clash would happen in 1984. The clash first started with the rule of not allowing food outside the dining room, which led to the food boycott. Secondly, the S.R.C’s disagreement of the appointment of Prof. Mbadi the Dean of Students, despite the explanation by Prof. van der Merwe. It was also alleged that Prof. Mbadi made frequent reports to Paramount Chief K.D Matanzima (Nkanyuza, 2012b).
At the S.R.C meeting of students, students were detained by the security police on 09 May 1984. Executive members of Council at a special meeting\(^{68}\) of the 11 May agreed that the Chairperson of Council, Mr A.T.Sigcu should,

“meet His Excellency the State President and request that all students be allowed to return to the University and that as far as possible the University be given a chance to attend to the problems and that the police be withdrawn from the campus and come back when requested by the University”

(University of Transkei Council, 1984b, p.02\[18\]).

Students continued to boycott lectures. The S.R.C tried to have discussions with the ‘Administration’, but

“Mr Makokweni, in particular, on various occasions literally sent S.R.C. members out of his office. The raid into the S.R.C. offices by the Security police in the presence of the Administrative members added fuel to the fire. This was conducted on the night of Sunday 13-05-84. From the start of the unrest the Principal as the Chief Executive Officer was not on campus until Tuesday 15-05-84 for the morning session and only to issue out notices threatening students with expulsion if they did not return to classes by 1.00h of the same day. We, the SRC had thus observed the following: i) that the Principal uses the University Council as a scapegoat when making personal decisions; ii) That the Principal fails to avail himself in times of crisis; iii) when the Administration was faced with the results of its inefficiency as regards student

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\(^{68}\) Minutes of Special Meeting of Executive of Council on 11 May 1984 on student boycotts and tabled resolutions – Appendix XXX; and

Letter from the Minister of Education to the University of Transkei, dated 10 May 1984 and letters to Professor van der Merwe – Appendix XXX1
problems and interests, it decided to call in the State, as if there was an uprising against the State”

(Student Representative Council, 1984).

On the 15 May, Prof. van der Merwe suspended some of the SRC students, pending Council decision. The same day, van der Merwe went “to Butterworth on official business”; the police came onto campus and arrested members of the SRC, and other students. (University of Transkei Council, 1984a, p.02[27]). The Chairperson of Council on campus was issued with a letter from the security police.

“On instruction from his Excellency the State President the students were ordered out of the Campus for the second time and the Chairman of Council persuaded the students to leave the library building peacefully. Four staff members were deported on that day and one detained and one released. On the 22 May 1984, +/- 136 students were detained after holding a meeting in a Municipal Park in town. On 25 May 1984 a further staff member was deported”

(University of Transkei Council, 1984a, p.03[29]).

Again, Council wrote to Paramount Chief K.D Matanzima to state,

“Council expresses its concern at the deportation of members of its staff and requests the Minister of the Interior Affairs [Transkei] to reconsider the deportation orders. Council further expresses its preparedness to deal with any conduct which properly falls within its disciplinary powers should the Honourable Minister be prepared to refer such conduct to Council”

(University of Transkei Council, 1984a, p.04[30]).
The deportation of academic staff and expulsion of students in 1984, publicly curtailed the illusion of a ‘free and open university’. The utilisation of the Suppression of Communism Act 16, the Terrorism Act and Emergency Proclamation 400 and 413; were used for the justification of the arrests of students in 1980 and 1984; and the deportation of staff in 1984. The SRC students stated that “some lecturers had to be deported and many students” had suffered academically as a result of the deportations (Student Representative Council, 1984). They went on to state that the individuals who had perpetrated the unrest decided to shift the blame to students and lecturers. Therefore “it is also our humble and honest submission that the deported lecturers or any other lecturer were innocent concerning the unrest. The role the lecturers played were to be mediators between police and students and also between the administration and students” (Student Representative Council, 1984, p. 03).

A committee inquiry was appointed by Council on the 28 May 1984 to look into the causes of the unrest and recommend what action, if any should be taken. The findings and recommendations did not reflect well on the leadership of Prof. van der Merwe. Prof. van der Merwe as a VC evaded the responsibility of his legitimate-position as a VC through his actions. “An evasion which might be classified within Gidden’s “dialectic of control” (1984). The findings indicated “suspicion of corruption in senior administration; directors of residences should not be appointed permanently; incompetence in administration; belief that the Registrar (Academic) and the Principal were unsympathetic to the needs of students and staff; authoritarian attitude of the Principal; SRC not supported in developing a strong administrative base; the presence of the Principal’s wife as his secretary and driver; the Principal’s graduation address of 1984 with the public attack on Prof. Vilakazi who was popular among staff and student; Prof. Nkuhlu’s unfortunate resignation during the series of

69 Deported Staff members were Professor Herbert Vikalazi, Professor Nico. I.Cloete, Professor Robert Morrell and Professor Mojalefa Ralakgheto
events, as some of them could have been prevented; the apparent complicity of the senior administration with the security police, refusal of permission to hold protest meetings, the Principal’s absence from campus and outside political involvement” (Sigcu et al, 1984, pp. 61-79).

Prof. van der Merwe, informed of the findings was told that he cannot expect the continued loyalty of his staff and students, if he does not show loyalty to them. “It is not enough in such emotional times to say he is working behind the scenes. A principal’s loyalty to his university must be evident to all” (Sigcu et al, 1984, p. 77). In response, Prof. van der Merwe stated that “he is an alien in Transkei and that he therefore has no right to interfere in police action”(Sigcu et al, 1984, p. 71). Following the inquiry, Prof. van der Merwe made an hour’s public speech as part of the agreement with Council to the media and also commented on ‘Marxism’. Marxism or the Marx variety was commonly used against the students and academics in the Apartheid era and the terminology was not communists in the international accepted sense of the word (Laurence, 1976, p. 56).

In his speech, Prof. van der Merwe stated that “an open university did not imply that if the university offered a course in Marxism, it became subordinated to Marxist doctrine” (Daily Dispatch Reporter, 1984a). Rather, “academic freedom implied a critical student approach in its offerings”. However, “this balance was endangered by the fact that education policy was not decided by educationists but by politicians” (Ibid). Prof. van der Merwe did not heed the recommendations of the Council inquiry.

On the 20 August 1984, UNITRA students again boycotted lectures over the coloured and Indian elections taking place in the Republic of South Africa. With security police on
campus, the SRC had to obtain permission to hold a meeting and discuss their grievances on the running of the university. Their main grievance concerned Prof. van der Merwe’s evasion of meeting students and absence from the campus. The Council requested the Transkeian government “not to make it difficult for the Administration to negotiate with students by amending the emergency regulations in such a way that in-house meetings can be held with students” (University of Transkei Council, 1984c, p. 02). Students, staff and UDUSA expressed their loss of faith in Prof. van der Merwe to Council. They called for his resignation. This did not happen, as Council was hampered, firstly by the Transkeian government and by the Department of Education and Training (DET) in the Republic of South Africa.

Prof. Nkuhlu who had resigned in February 1984 was re-appointed in the position of Vice Principal in June 1984. Council “expressed its distress at the recent withdrawal of work permits and deportation of Prof. Grenz, Prof. Beck and others. Representations would be made to the government” (University of Transkei Council, 1984c, pp. 05-06).

Following the above incidents’, Prof. van der Merwe accidently fell off a roof and became wheel-bound in 1985. His house was renovated by the Council, with a stair lift to assist him with mobility (University of Transkei Council, 1986b, p.02[3.1.2]). The students objected to the university funds’ used for the renovation with sparks of strikes and lecture boycotts. In commemoration of the Biko day on the 12 September 1986, students boycotted lectures. Again on the 24 September, in commemoration of Ndondo, who was ‘gunned down in the street’, students boycotted lectures and the following day of the 25 September 1986, for the ‘Transkeian Election Day’. Arrests of students on campus were led by Captain Dlabantu, who was in charge of the state police (Mbadi, 1986). Students were told to produce their IDs on
campus as the continuation of boycotting lectures went on. To compound matters, Council and Management were powerless to do anything, as staff members, Mr P.M. Wakelines was detained by security police and Mr V. Makanjee was deported (University of Transkei Council, 1986b, pp.07-08 [2.2 & 2.3]). By the 30 September, students were told to vacate the campus until further notice. Prof. van der Merwe resigned at the end of October 1986, after 10 years of service to UNITRA.

- **Inter-organisation Spin-offs**

Prof. van der Merwe played a major role in the planning of the physical facilities and the design of a master infrastructural plan for the future development UNITRA. By 1984, two student residences accommodating 500 students and a multi-purpose hall for 2,000 had been completed (Potelwa, 1984, p. 30). The music department building had been completed. The construction for a sports field and bachelor flats were completed in 1985. Consultants and contractors would be appointed for the continuous renovations and constructions of residences, teaching malls, laboratories, administrative blocks and staff housing. The infrastructural costs were high with some of the buildings having structural defects; and costs were not all covered by the Transkeian government. For instance, the minutes of the housing committee of 23 March 1984 stated,

> “Government houses occupied by University Staff are badly in need of renovation. Some have structural faults as well. Requests for attention to these houses have met with no success. The only response from Government over a period of two years has been that funds were insufficient. The Housing Committee decided to refer this matter to Council for a policy decision as to whether all Government houses occupied by University staff could not be renovated from University funds”

(University of Transkei Council, 1984d, p. 08).
The Transkeian Revenue Fund’s annual report of the gross expenditure, presented to the National Assembly indicates the funds allocated to UNITRA, in table 1.

**Table 1: Grants to Transkei University from the Transkeian Government (1977 to 1981)**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grant for recurrent expenditure</td>
<td>690 000</td>
<td>1, 095 100</td>
<td>1, 500 000</td>
<td>3, 589 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant for capital services</td>
<td>6, 750 000</td>
<td>6, 750 000</td>
<td>6, 750 000</td>
<td>2, 324 000 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant for Bursaries and Loans</td>
<td>45 000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1, 000</td>
<td>40, 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>7 485 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>7 845 200</strong></td>
<td><strong>8 251 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>5 953 000</strong></td>
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The allocation for capital services and infrastructure of UNITRA, though costly would change the face of Transkei in its modernisation. UNITRA would also become one of the major employers and a source for incoming revenue for the region.

On several occasions, Prof. van der Merwe wrote to the Transkeian Department of Finances for assistance. Prof. Peires commented in his interview that there were allegations of ‘kickbacks’ (Nkanyuza, 2012b), for the allocation for capital services and infrastructure of UNITRA. However, with the escalating costs of infrastructure and new projects, UNITRA by the mid-1980s began experiencing difficulties with its revenue, expectations, human resources and regional expectations. For instance, the estimated final cost for extension of the East Teaching Mall was R6.9 million. The aborted professional fees came to R175, 000. The

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70 Letter from G.G. van Beers: Transkei Chief Economic Advisor, dated 23 April 1981 to Professor B. de V. van der Merwe – Appendix XXX11
proposed building costs exceeded the SAPSE norms by R87, 648 000 (University of Transkei Council, 1984c, p. 221). Although finances of UNITRA were calculated on the SAPSE formulae, application for UNITRA to be funded according to the Republic of South Africa SAPSE formulae for higher education universities, was still being dismissed by the Transkei Ministry of Finance (University of Transkei Council, 1986b, p.02[3.1.3-3.1.4.1]).

A UNITRA branch in Butterworth (1985) was opened at the request of the Butterworth Mayor, with 211 students (Potelwa, 1985, p. 33). Council received a letter from the Transkeian Revenue Fund that due to the economic climate of Transkei, the budget to UNITRA as from 1985 would be cut by 40%. The UNITRA branch in Butterworth would primarily be the responsibility of UNITRA, with limited resources expected from the Transkeian government.

Table 2: Grants to Transkei University from the Transkeian Government (1984 to 1986)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grant for recurrent expenditure</td>
<td>10 635 000</td>
<td>15 930 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant for Bursaries and Loans</td>
<td>70 000</td>
<td>70 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Faculty</td>
<td>141 000</td>
<td>2 330 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant for recurrent expenditure: Butterworth Branch</td>
<td></td>
<td>723 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 200 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 320 000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Transkei Government Revenue Fund, 1986, pp. 28-29)

The emphasis of the Butterworth branch would be on education oriented courses to supplement the shortage on teachers in Transkei. However, the university in acknowledging
the need of trade and industry extended their programmes in the fields of applied science, industry, trade and commerce. The training of engineering Technicians would become one of the priorities in the extension of the university facilities to Butterworth (Office of the Registrar, 1999, p. 17). Two years later, a University Technikon campus was opened at the Butterworth branch to offer National Diplomas in Civil Engineering, Surveying, Electricity, and Secretarial Studies. The University Technikon campus attained its autonomy in terms of the Decree of the No. 3 of 1994, thereby severing its ties in March 1994 with UNITRA. The UNITRA branch of 1985 would resume its brief to concentrate on courses in education so as to exit with Bachelor of Arts (Education) and Bachelor of Commence (Education) degrees. UNITRA also affiliated itself to ‘Teacher training colleges’ (University of Transkei Council, 1981, p.03[M1]), such as Arthur Tsengiwe training College-Cala; Butterworth Training College-Butterworth; Bensonvale Training College-Umtata; Maluti Training College-Matatiele; Mt. Arthur Training College-Lady Frere; Shawbury Training College-Qumbu; Sigcau Training College; Flagstaff and Clarkebury Training College – Engcobo. Most of these colleges were closed following the democratic elections of 1994.

- **Students at UNITRA**

Faculty of Arts as the first faculty had a student enrolment of 132 on commencement. Under the initial Deanship of Prof. H.W.Truter, the faculty expanded to 13 departments, with lectures held in the evening. Regardless of the concern from the student guidance about the “high dropout rate of first year students” (University of Transkei Council, 1983, p. 167), registered students for degrees and diplomas in 1984 were 2,281. Table 3 below indicates the number and type of degrees and certificates awarded at the 1984 graduation ceremony.
Table 3: Students Through-put Rate for 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Degrees and Diplomas</th>
<th>Student Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelors’ Degrees</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honours’ Degrees</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor of Education</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters’ Degrees</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomas and Certificates</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>271</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Potelwa, 1984, p. 30).

Registered students for degrees and diplomas in 1984 were 2,870, of which 1,615 were full time students and 1,255 were part-time students. Total students that graduated from the establishment of UNITRA to 1984 were 512 graduates and 140 diplomas.

Table 4: Gender Composition of First Time Registered Students in 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Time Registered Students in 1984</th>
<th>Male Students</th>
<th>Female Students</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full Time</td>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>Full-Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>335</strong></td>
<td><strong>171</strong></td>
<td><strong>322</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Majokweni, 1984, p. 279).

The gender composition of full-time and part-time students indicated that females were higher in proportion than males, except the Faculty of Law and to a lesser degree Faculty of Science. The increase of males in these faculties could be associated with the stereotypic
association of males to these professions and/or disciplines. It is possible that there might be a causal link to the decline in students numbers post-1994, with the shift to science and technology, as females tended to go for disciplines in the Arts/Humanities and/or educational professional pathways.

**Table 5**: Gender Composition of Overall Students for 1985 at UNITRA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Time Registered Students in 1984</th>
<th>Male Students</th>
<th>Female Students</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full Time</td>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>Full-Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td><strong>855</strong></td>
<td><strong>647</strong></td>
<td><strong>762</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Majokweni, 1987)

A department of Computer Science was established in February 1984 and a diploma in Nursing Administration and Community Health Nursing Science was introduced. Although Prof. Xaba-Mokoena had already been recruited as the acting Dean for the prospective Faculty of Medicine in 1984, the faculty effectively commenced from the February 1985. By 1 July 1985, there were 12 students.
Table 6: Number of Students in the Faculties following the establishment of the Butterworth UNITRA Branch

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACULTY</th>
<th>Student Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Science</td>
<td>681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>2,870</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Potelwa, 1984, p. 30).

The student numbers initially 2,870 for 1985 dropped to 2,672 (those registered on the main campus) and 211 at the Butterworth UNITRA branch. Mr Potelwa, the Transkei Secretary-General of Education stated the drop in student numbers was due to the opening of the Butterworth branch and the offering of ‘Secondary teachers Diplomas at the Teacher Training Colleges’ (Potelwa, 1985, p. 33).

The debt accrued from the non-payment of student fees in 1981 came to R15,970.81 (in thousands) and in 1982 to R32,932.41. The combination of the students’ debt totalling to R48,903.41 was written off by Council in 1986 (University of Transkei Council, 1986a, p.25 & p.40). The student debt in thousands may have seemed relatively small in proportion to the later student debt of post 1999, as the student numbers increased. However, the writing-off of students’ debts throughout UNITRA life span added to financial crises and severely hampered the developmental growth of UNITRA as a higher education institution.
• **Academic Staff and Managerial Structural Levels**

During the period of 1984, 55 staff members were appointed, whilst 10 had left the university. Despite the high turnover of academics, there were incoming new academics to fill the vacant positions. Academics came to UNITRA for a number of reasons. Some of the reasons pertained to the latitude of teaching a curriculum without many constraints or as an entry point into the Republic of South and/or ‘returning home’ as in the case of the exiles. As a result of the restriction to the Republic of South Africa and the almost non-existent access of academic development and/or skill development, academics especially, had the latitude of further qualification development, workshops and conferences overseas.

“Applications for purpose of pursuing studies and getting vocational training in the Republic of South Africa and overseas are processed by Protocol. It is regretfully observed that the Republic of South Africa has not changed its policy regarding admission of Transkeians to universities. Nationals are still discriminated against and do not enjoy the same considerations such foreigners enjoy, because of the colour of their skin”

(Transkeian Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Information, 1984, p. 15).

Indication from the funding of activities for the period 01 October 1985 to March 1986 showed that expenditure had exceed income and the salaries of staff were at risk. Mr J.P. van der Rede, the Finance Registrar stated that

“an amount of R1.7 million had been placed on a class 11 investment account, with our bankers to enable us to meet January, February and March salaries. This will be increased to cover our full commitment to 31 March 1986. This money however cannot be used for any cash flow crisis and expenditure on controllable items, which
must be closely watched to reduce the pressure on our fund. We are planning to use our creditors to fund some of our working capital requirements”
(Van der Rede, 1985, p. 17).

The table below shows the staff complement of the academic and professionals in January 1985. This excludes the support staffs, who were employed as permanent staff.

Table 7: Faculty Staff (1985)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1985 January</th>
<th>Academic &amp; Professional Staff</th>
<th>Number of Staff</th>
<th>Secretarial or Laboratory Asst.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arts (academic)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Sciences (academic)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science (academic)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (academic)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law (academic)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine and Health Science (academic)</td>
<td>01</td>
<td></td>
<td>01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Management</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute For Management and Developmental Studies</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Centre</td>
<td>07</td>
<td></td>
<td>07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Van der Rede, 1985)
Due to the tense political climate of Transkei, there was a high turnover of academics, especially the academics that came from other countries. Some of these academics especially those from Europe stayed for a while and then returned home. However, there was no vacuum of academics, as the university had the latitude of ‘free curriculum content’, which attracted academics to the institution. The outflow of a number of high calibre academics would leave UNITRA after the democratic elections of 1994 and this added to the already existing problems of UNITRA.
5.3 ‘BANTUSTAN SERENITY’ (PHASE 2)

Section B: Professor Wiseman L. Nkuhlu

Professor Wiseman L. Nkuhlu’s tenure as a Vice-Chancellor and Principal at the University of Transkei (UNITRA) was from January 1987 to June 1991.

Prof. W.L. Nkuhlu was a member of the PAN African Congress and was imprisoned for his beliefs on Robben Island. On being released, he went back to the University of Fort Hare and completed his B.Com degree. In 1976, Prof. Nkuhlu qualified as the first Black Chartered Accountant in South Africa. He left Fort Hare University to become one of the pioneers of UNITRA in 1976.

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As the second Vice-Chancellor at UNITRA in 1987, Prof. Nkuhlu established a climate of free speech and political tolerance. Prof. Nkuhlu states, that the institutional culture at the University of Fort Hare changed in the 1970s and was not conducive to stay. For instance,

“in my Faculty of Economic Sciences at Fort Hare, they started conducting faculty meetings in Afrikaans and there were only two Black lecturers there, myself and Theo Jordan. I felt really marginalized and unable to participate in the deliberations and I felt I was being compromised terribly because students and other staff members were looking to us to actually contribute to the deliberations and to the politics. When I
became aware that a university branch in Mthatha was going to open and there would be a department of accounting, I applied and offered to go to Mthatha to start the department; that’s how I got there”
(Nkanyuza, 2012b, p. 02).

- **Leadership and Governance**

Prof. Nkuhlu commenced at UNITRA in 1977 and established the department of Accounting. He was also allowed to practise as an auditor, as the university classes were only offered at night. With the assistance of Prof. Manganyi, in strengthening and recruiting academics to the Faculty of Economics, Prof. Nkuhlu became the Dean of the Faculty. In 1981, Prof. Nkuhlu went to the United States to complete his masters and returned to UNITRA. He states that when his partner Sabelo Magwentshu died, he resigned in early 1984 to rebuild his firm. Prof. Nkuhlu was asked to come back. He returned in August 1994, following the deportation of students and staff, as a deputy vice principal.

At the Council meeting of 25 March 1986, the approved recommendation of Prof. Nkuhlu as Vice-Chancellor and principal by the Umtata Minister of Education was implemented. He started in the position in January 1987, following Prof. van der Merwe’s retirement. Prof. Nkuhlu stated,

“...I agreed to be a principal and I tried to articulate that in my inspiration track and its subsequent meetings and the addresses of statements at graduations and what I stood for. We believed that education was the typical way to success for most in South Africa. We could see it in Africa everywhere. Again there was this thing among the political activists in South Africa that people were saying freedom first then education later. They were just destroying education. We stood firm and said no this is wrong...
and again there was no guarantee that freedom would come in 5 years’ time or in 10 years’ time”
(Nkanyuza, 2011b, pp. 05-06).

Prof. Nkuhlu initiated the participation of students, academic staff and workers in major decision-making; in the fulfilment of an open administrative policy. At the development society of Southern Africa seminar, he stated that “one of the most significant points about the current interests in development is that we are all much aware that no single organisation or person is able to establish what the best strategy for development is, or should be. Rather, we have to work using different strategies” (Nkuhlu, 1988, p. 23).

“I maintain that UNITRA was the preferred institution as an open university and that was never completely taken away. UNITRA was hurt badly by the deportation in 1984. We were trying to get people who were independent thinkers, who were not compromised by comrade politics and those were kind of things that we were looking for, to head our departments. We recovered and we continued to draft really good academics and people who were returning from exile. A number of them saw UNITRA as one of preferred places to go because of its reputation”. [However], “I was determined to finish five years. By the time 1991 came I had enough that is why when there was an opportunity to go join the independent democratic trust I left, because I felt that like I had made my contribution and because people were not getting better in terms of confrontations”
(Nkanyuza, 2011b, p. 07).
• Creation of Staff Positions

There would be a continuation of positions created and the re-organisation of structures, as the university was expanding (Majokweni, 1987, pp. 04-14). For instance, the approval for two posts at professional levels at the Tsolo College of Agriculture; the increase in academic posts, the up-grading of posts, the recruitment of labourers, gardeners, petrol attendance, drivers, panel beater, transport officers and administrative staff (Majokweni, 1987; Moleah, 1998; University of Transkei Council, 1981). The increase in staff, especially at the lower levels of UNITRA’s hierarchy structure created an ‘over-bloated’ labour force following the democratic elections of 1994. The labour force, were mostly permanent and were unskilled in the technological developmental changes that had taken place. Also due to the high unemployment rate in the region there were no other alternatives for employment with another organisation. The problem of a ‘bloated labour force’ was an added strain in the diminishing finances of UNITRA.

• Students at UNITRA

Prof. Nkuhlu leadership at UNITRA though consultative on all structural levels of UNITRA also encountered problems with students. There was already an outstanding student debt. At the meeting of the Finance Committee of 15 October (in Majokweni, 1987, pp. 32-33), it was resolved that the outstanding amount of R15 831, 65 to 1983 be written off. The balance owed to UNITRA, as of 15 October 1987 was R474, 000 (thousands). The issue of collecting student fees, a reflection of the low income household in region would be a continuous problem throughout UNITRA ‘life-span’.
The students were boycotting lectures in protest with other student unrest in the Republic of South Africa. The student boycott of 19 and 26 May 1986 required the presence of police on campus (University of Transkei Council, 1986a, p.08[3.2.1-3.2.7]). Again in 1988, with the students’ strikes, Prof. Nkuhlu stated that when students went on strike and this was heard on the media,

“a delegation would be sent to me, to ask me what’s going on. There would be senior people from the ANC but of course because as you would understand it will not be an official of the ANC it would be somebody that is known to me. Also Reverend Mxenge of the Anglican Church would call me now and again. You see, when you run a university, from time to time the students become part of struggle. Some of them were genuinely active in the struggle and of course there were some chance takers”.

(Nkanyuza, 2011b, pp. 05-06).

- UNITRA Finances

**Table 8:** Cash flow for the Period October 1987 to March 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opening Balance</td>
<td>823,123</td>
<td>957,913</td>
<td>733,953</td>
<td>717,993</td>
<td>482,477</td>
<td>272,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt Grants</td>
<td>3,807,556</td>
<td>3,807,556</td>
<td>3,807,556</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Grants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>416,000</td>
<td>416,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Fees</td>
<td>482,750</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,113,429</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,181,469</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,957,509</strong></td>
<td><strong>717,993</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,482,477</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,272,401</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure</td>
<td><strong>2,555,516</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,847,516</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,639,516</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,289,516</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,210,076</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,698,276</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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71 University of Transkei Cash flow for the Period August 1988 to March 1989 – Appendix XXX111
Tender costs submitted for construction and repair works, (such as leaks in the roof, guttering, and poor workmanship) at UNITRA escalated, as income from government had decreases. UNITRA would find itself by borrowing more frequently from the bank for functions to run efficiently.

The funds obtained from the Transkeian government in June 1988 for 1988/1989 was R27,580,000. The amount expected to increase to R38,996,229 inclusive of 13.28% increase the total fund for the Medical Faculty was R8,125,827. With the expected increase of 13.28%, the Medical faculty would be given R8,441,221. Butterworth Branch should have received R2,352,818, rather they were given R1,853,078. A dramatic drop in finances that UNITRA had to cater for, from their own internal sources and loans (University of Transkei Council, 1988b, p.35, p.48 & p.50).

- Politics and UNITRA

Paramount Chief Dr K.D. Matanzima was re-nominated as a candidate for Chancellor from the 01 of January 1987 to the 31 December 1996 (University of Transkei Council, 1986b, pp. 224-228). He was the only candidate and his nomination was duly accepted. However, two key events would affect the dynamics at UNITRA.
Firstly, academic salary scales and non-academic salary scales were separated in 1987. The academic salary scales were fixed “within the parameters as recommended by the committee of the University Principals” (University of Transkei Council, 1987, pp. 02-06) of which UNITRA was an affiliate member. The non-academic salary scales were found to be determined by each university, and scales were introduced. Workmen’s compensation and unemployment benefits were introduced. It was recommended that non-academic staff, such as cooks, labourers, operators, messengers, shelves, junior librarians, foreman and artisans; be entitled to the same study leave benefits applicable to other non-academic staff in higher positions (University of Transkei Council, 1987, [annexure 07]). As from 1989, trade unions, like the National Education and Health Workers’ Union (NEHAWU) would be allowed to establish themselves in Transkei. With the increase of staff and re-structuring of UNITRA’s organogram, support staff and administrative staff gained extra protection from the possibility of being retrenched. UNITRA became the main base for NEHAWU, with most of the support staff joining the union. The intended consequence of the above actions was the equalisation of individuals regardless of their position on the hierarchy structure; an increase in take-home salaries that enabled some families to rise into the middle income bracket and an opportunity to study and obtain a qualification. The unintended consequence was an addition burden on UNITRA’s finances, a blurring of positional differentiations and structural positions; academic prestige lowered and a third cohesive sub-culture created. The first being students, the second academics and the third, middle management/administration and support staff.

The second key event was the terms of office as the President of Transkei for K.D Matanzima came to end in February 1986. The staff deportation order of 1984 was lifted. Deported staff could re-apply to UNITRA (University of Transkei Council, 1987, p. 01). The Transkei defence Force (TDF) created in 1975, declared martial law and took over the Transkei
government on the 30 December 1987 (Peires, 1992, pp. 367-369). General Bantu Holomisa, who had already established some contacts with the African National Congress (ANC) leadership, would lead Transkei. Relationships between Holomisa and the Republic of South Africa deteriorated, with the Republic of South Africa government withholding payments into the Transkei revenue funds (Peires, 1992, pp. 372-373). UNITRA’s revenues were also affected, as income came from the Transkei’s government. Paramount Chief Dr KD Matanzima submitted his resignation as to Council72, which was accepted (University of Transkei Council, 1988a, p. 01).

General B. Holomisa was approached for funding assistance to UNITRA. He gave UNITRA some funds. Prof. Peires states, “General Holomisa period was a period of ‘free-for-all’. It was as if discipline had been relaxed and people were trying to get whatever they could get” (Nkanyuza, 2012b, p. 05).

At the same time, Prof. Nkuhlu, a

“much loved and respected, but not a ‘hands-on-person’, tended to allow Prof. Mbadi [deputy vice principal] to run the university. Mbadi was a very conservative person and very much disliked. And then when Holomisa came in, the position Mbadi was controlling could no longer be sustained. At that point a commission of inquiry headed by Skweyiya, T. L was initiated. Skweyiya realised that everybody disliked Mbadi and the expectation was that he would be dismissed. He recommended that Prof. Mbadi and Prof. Miller [special assistant to the vice-chancellor and principal] be dismissed. In Miller’s case, though he had a calming effect on the institution

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climate, but to look better, both Mbadi and Miller had to go. It was in that atmosphere that Dan Ncayiyana came into the picture”
(Nkanyuza, 2012b).
5.4  ‘TRANSITIONS’ (PHASE 3)

Section C:  Professor Daniel J. Ncayiyana

Professor Daniel J. Ncayiyana’s tenure as a Vice-Chancellor and Principal at the University of Transkei (UNITRA) was from 1991-1993

Prof. D.J. Ncayiyana was born in Port Shepstone and raised in the Harding district of KwaZulu Natal (W.S.U Doctoral Award graduation ceremony programme on 16th May 2009). Prof. Ncayiyana joined the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) movement following the Sharpeville massacre of March 21 1960. Elected as PAC regional secretary, he was arrested in 1963 and jailed for 4 months without trial. On bail release,

(Photograph, Permission of W.S.U VC 2007. Copyright W.S.U.)

Prof. Ncayiyana went into ‘exile’, where he obtained his medical degree from the University of Groningen Medical School in 1970. He re-located to the USA for postgraduate training in obstetrics and gynaecology at New York University, where he practiced for the next 10 years. Prof. Ncayiyana73 came to Transkei in 1983 to work as a gynaecologist at Rietvlei Hospital. He was transferred to Umtata General Hospital as a Chief Medical Superintendent in 1986 and became a Professor of Obstetrics and Gynaecology. Following the ousted Paramount

73 Consent form of an interview with Professor D. Ncayiyana on Vice-Chancellor(s) at the former UNITRA - Appendix XXXV
Chief Dr K.D. Matanzima with Stella Stigcu in charge, Prof. M. Xaba-Mokoena was elected as Minister of Health.

Prof. D.J.Ncayiyana with Prof. M. Xaba-Mokoena, the first Dean of the Faculty of Health Sciences and Medicine at UNIRA pioneered ‘Problem Based Learning’ (PBL) and community health. PBL as an innovative curriculum programme introduced in South Africa for the first time and would be acclaimed for its approach in medicine.

(Photograph, Permission of W.S.U VC 2007. Copyright W.S.U.)

Prof. Ncayiyana was appointed at UNITRA in 1986 and became the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine. He went on to be the Deputy Vice-Chancellor to Prof. Nkuhlu in 1989 and acting Vice-Chancellor (VC) of UNITRA in 1991. He would come at a time when a number of academics, such as Prof. Nkuhlu, Prof. Manganyi, Mr A.T. Sigcu (Chairperson of Council) and other seasoned academics were recruited to be advisors, consultants and/or future Ministers following the democratic elections of 1994.

- **Intra-organisational Dynamics**

The intra-organisation dynamics of 1991 to 1993 displayed the power struggles that would take place at UNITRA. Prof. Ncayiyana states “Senate was fine, the Deans were doing well and the academics were doing well. However where the Vice-Chancellor oversees the business side; the business side had problems, Council had problems, the Labour side of the institution had problems”(Nkanyuza, 2012a, p. 02). In 1991, Administration signed a
negotiated agreement with the NEHAWU with the understanding of “a mutual commitment to industrial justice and the maintenance of mutually accepted work and behavioural standards. An agreement with the UNITRA branch of UDUSA was also initiated” (Noruwana, 1993, p. 03).

Prof. Ncayiyana stated “Umtata was the capital of Transkei and you have a whole civil service that is also factored outside of government, UNITRA was the next most important employer. NEHAWU was asserting itself and proving itself to be a strong union and it was a difficult time. So the problem, was that the University got to be seen other than that of an academic provider. There were various constituencies in the University, who were there for different reasons. The academics think they own the University, while the workers, who were not in the academic side seem to think they own the University as a factory; a place for a job. They [staff] don’t seem to see the University as an academic centre of how to make it excel. They look at it and say how can this be expanded, improved and promote the employment side of things. How can we get our contracts improved? They don’t look at the budget of the University, which primary should support the academic endeavours to succeed. They look at the university from their own point of view” (Nkanyuza, 2012a, p. 03).

The signed agreement of 1991 was used as a negotiating tool in 1992, when members of NEHAWU wanted to strike over a ‘pay talk deadlock’. On the other hand, UDUSA insisted that payment for night teaching by academics should be re-instated. The night teaching allowance was revived.
Prior to the above, the students had boycotted lectures over an increase in fees. Prof. Ncayiyana stated the “students themselves come from impoverished rural areas. Many of these students have never really had three meals a day until they get to university. It was just never there, it was never part of their lifestyle. I did not eat three times a day. Maybe eat twice a day. They suddenly have a room to themselves. A lot of them have just come out of the rural areas and from places of deprivation. Then they come to UNITRA and they get into residences and suddenly it is a different lifestyle. A lifestyle different from the one they had previously. And the lifestyle becomes the object and they don’t want to leave the University for that reason. They don’t want to go back to the rural setting of sleeping on the floor and hard times. The students have nothing to do when they leave the university, so their interests become social-economic interests, which overrule the academic interests. And that is why you can have students at the University of Transkei for seven years or more without a degree because of the different lifestyle. And that is why it was very difficult during my term to get students to go home and even today it is difficult to get students to go home. So that is one of the main reasons why they become violent, even on academic grounds, to go home”

(Nkanyuza, 2012a).

The students in 1991 stated that they could not afford to pay the 33% fee increase. An agreement was reached and the fee increase reduced in 1992 (Noruwana, 1993, p. 03). The “legitimate authority” vested in the VC as the ‘driving decisive centre’ and of Council as the governance body; failed to align and to re-design the organisational structures, so that the stakeholders could reach their goals by synchronizing these goals with those of UNITRA (Eriksson-Zetterquist, Mullern & Styhre, 2011).
Leadership and Governance

Prof. Ncayiyana, acting VC and principal informed Council that “in the light of the slow or no progress that has been made by the search committee for a principal, he was prepared to continue in an acting position until end of May 1993” (University of Transkei Council, 1993, p. 18). Prof. Ncayiyana stated that he did not want to be considered for the position of VC and would take study leave beginning of June. He further requested that during this period that the recall service is waived should he resign. Council accepted Prof. Ncayiyana’s terms.

Section D: Professor Justice M. Noruwana

Professor Justice Noruwana’s tenure as Vice-Chancellor and Principal at the University of Transkei (UNITRA) from June 1993 to 21 June 1994.

Prof. Noruwana’s doctorate degree in Education was obtained from the University of Columbia University, New York. He started working for UNITRA in 1981. He left for Lesotho and later to Bophuthatswana in 1983. He returned to UNITRA 1987 and became the Vice-Principal under Prof. Nkuhlu’s leadership. Prof. Noruwana became the acting Vice-Chancellor and Principal in June 1993.

(Photograph, Permission of W.S.U VC 2007. Copyright W.S.U.)
Leadership and Governance

Prof. Peires stated that Prof. Noruwana in the early 1980s at UNITRA was “very popular, very enlightening and intelligent. When he came back, he was narrow and cramped; he would think only of Transkeians and nobody else from outside should be there. It seemed, he was put down because of his ethnicity in Bophuthatswana”.

(Nkanyuza, 2012b).

When Prof. Noruwana became an acting Vice-Chancellor and principal in 1993, he had to deal with the rapid succession of Vice-Chancellors within a space of two years. In his tenure as a VC, Prof. Noruwana had to contend with the threats of strike by the union for salary increase and even was required to go with them as part of the delegation to see the Ministry of Education (University of Transkei Council, 1994, p. 34).

The UNITRA management considered the strike action of NEHAWU as illegal. There was tension between the union and Prof. Noruwana. NEHAWU stated to the Executive of Council that “the acting principal had indicated early in the year that the financial position of the University had eased and membership of the union now found this statement irreconcilable with inability to pay”. The representatives of the union noted the plea of the Executive of Council and requested that they be allowed to discuss the offer with the general membership of NEHAWU. The Executive of Council consented to this”.

(University of Transkei Council, 1994, pp. 33-36).

Following this UDUSA executive resuscitated the demand for night-teaching compensation of R500 extra for those who taught during the day and night. The Executive of Council
(Exco) accepted the recommendation of UDUSA. The implications of what Exco did, was despite the stakeholders’ differences in their display of power (Grieves, 2010, p. 45); the balance of power had shifted more to the stakeholders. Secondly, (Exco) effectively told the stakeholders by their actions that they also did not have confidence in the leadership or managerial approach of Prof. Noruwana.

Although, Prof. Noruwana competed for the position of Vice-Chancellor and principal at UNITRA in 1994; Prof. Alfred Moleah was offered the position. The relationship of Prof. Noruwana and Prof. Moleah created tensions at top management levels. The tensions would later contribute to the instability of UNITRA’s financial and governance structures.

- **Finances and Constraints**

Prof. Noruwana in the report for 1991 to 1992 emphasised concern on the seriousness of the financial situation. The calibre of students had changed and there were more students from the low income and/or poverty homes that were unable to pay the fees. Donors had been decreasing with contributions towards 1994 and would further decrease, as time went on. Cutbacks had been dramatically made with government grants from 1991, with a further reduction of R22m on the 1994 budget request.

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74 University of Transkei Cash Flow Statement for Year Ending 31 December 1992 – Appendix XXXVI
Salary payments for staff over the years had been escalating, with staffing requirements at 74% of budget. This was also despite positions being frozen in 1992 and the restrictions of overseas conference attendance. By May 1994, “the government did not meet its obligation for any of the R18 842 00 outstanding as at the end of March 1994” (Clancy, 1994, p. 164). The NEHAWU demand for salary increase of all staff came to a total cost of R7 872 803, with non-academic staff at R4 484 623.

Table 10: Cash flow Statement for Period Jan to March 1994

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(Clancy, 1994, p. 165)

Despite the re-adjustments made on the forecasted months following March, the expectation was that UNITRA would be left with a deficit of R13m. When new construction work began in 1996, the little reserve gains made would be completely depleted.

Peires stated “one of the strange things about the old Transkei before 1994 was as the ship was going down; people were acting and clinging to their positions as if, as if things were not going to change” (Nkanyuza, 2012b, p. 04).

5.5 CONCLUSION

The fundamental reality is that there was and is still a need for a ‘contact university’ in the region, with an approximate 4-5 million population ratio. UNITRA started with a concept that was knowledge driven and skill upgrade for teachers and civil servants. The ideal of a ‘free and open’ university attracted academics. The University was part of development.

From 1985 political support started to waiver, with varying factions coming into the political scene. The Apartheid government was facing national and international pressure on its policies and deteriorating public finances; particularly, on the issue of homelands. The Matanzima government embroiled with political power struggles and corruption, had been ousted by General Holomisa and the military (Peires, 1992). General Holomisa and the
military were not interested in the overseeing UNITRA or the VCs, as they were pre-occupied with other matters. Politics had some bearing on both the Vice-Chancellor’s leadership and on UNITRA as a university. There were constitutional and structural problems and of course problems with overdrafts. UNITRA was also caught in an ideological fix with its poor geographical location and with students from poor socio-economic backgrounds. Prof Malaza stated that

“after 1994, academics could go anywhere. There was an equalisation of tax and other HEIs changed accordingly. Attracting staff was an issue. The expectations of people were high and a better life elsewhere, especially to the metropolitan areas. Offers were made elsewhere with professionals being marketable, such as chartered accountants. This affected some HEIs negatively, especially UNITRA. The dispensation of the Cuban doctors helped the Medical Faculty. Internal policies did not change much for incentives. UNITRA did not have a large endowment, or strong alumni. There is also a small community base. For instance, the education dependency policy for staff was losing UNITRA a lot of money. Staffs were sending their children to other HEIs. There is limited scope to match the external drivers”.
(Nkanyuza, 2011a, p. 02).

- **Vice-Chancellor’s Challenges**

Changes at UNITRA could not be easily implemented by the Vice-Chancellors because:

a. The understanding of how individuals constructed their personal beliefs and the meanings they attached to them was partially due to the interpretation of the external social and cultural factors. Some these social constructions stemmed from the historical factors leading to the establishment of UNITRA and during the life-span of UNITRA as a higher education university. Prof. Nkuhlu stated that Transkei had and
is still marginalised. Transkei as a former homeland was subjected to rules and regulations of dominating government(s) that affected the needs and aspiration of the people or social groups, whose forms of knowledge were subjected to destruction.

b. In gaining the understanding of the Vice-Chancellors’ constructs as well as one’s own (researcher), through engaging in a dialogue, there is a shared meaning and understanding. For instance, the descriptive dialogue which was reciprocal and explained what was involved in the transactions between the students’ preferences and the requirements of UNITRA’s workers. These preferences based on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs and McGregor’s motivational X and Y factors. The VCs were also constrained to an extent by the prevailing political climate. However, VCs had choices and made choices, whether in the interest of themselves and/or for the preservation of the institution. To be reported and/or to be summoned by a president. ‘State organ’ or political party on UNITRA’s intra-organisational events must have been stressful, to say the least. Prof. Jafta illustrated this point with the ‘political scars’ that Prof. Nkuhlu obtained during his tenure as a VC.

c. There was some lack of internal financial responsibility and accountability due to the dependency and compliance on the ‘ruling government’. Though the VCs subscribed to the framework of the SAPSE formula from the start, the application for the inclusion of UNITRA, according to the SAPSE funding formulae was rejected by both the Transkeian government and the Republic of South Africa government. To some extent, the VCs had to conform and/or were coerced by the demands of the ‘ruling government’ to obtain funds. UNITRA also borrowed from banks, which had long term repayments. For instance, the establishment of a branch in Butterworth and
construction requirements; Medical faculty; staff accommodation and upgrades of UNITRA infrastructure.

d. UNITRA’s formal structure was based on the ‘traditional bureaucracy’ (King & Lawley, 2013, pp. 93-94) format that comprised of different levels of hierarchy with fixed rules and policies. Communication was in a downward flow of the structure and susceptible to authoritarian instructions and mandates. Informal communication amongst the stakeholders was through the ‘grapevine’, such as the events in the transition phase and the phases following post-1994. Informal communication amongst the stakeholders, through the ‘grapevine’ and/or ‘word-of mouth’ was found to be more reliable than formal modes of communication received from management.

e. The differentiation of positions that defined the system of jobs was clear and integration of duties and/or tasks, though rigid were also regulated through committees and statutory bodies that fed into UNITRA’s hierarchy structures levels, including Council minutes. The committees, which were formalised, played a significant role in the operational communication of UNITRA. There were reports from committees such as ‘building committee; catering committee; residence committee; computer committee; time-table committee; research committee; campus control committee; academic planning committee; honorary degrees committee; affiliated board committee; library committee; university personnel committee; housing committee; finance committee and disciplinary committee. The committees comprised of a minimum of 6 members, (inclusive the VC, deputy and registrar) and above. The reflection of committees in the Council documents and university prospectus after 1994 drastically reduced in number and perhaps in functionality.
f. The promotion and establishment of unions such as NEHAWU changed some of the behavioural patterns of the human resources and created a fifth sub-culture group with UNITRA. These groups was firstly, the students, top management, academics (primarily represented by UDUSA), Council and NEHAWU. These sub-cultures had different interests and motivations that were not always in alignment to the ‘concept of a university’ (Barnett, 1990; Newman, 1852). Nor were the interests and/or motivations of these stakeholders always ‘knowledge-production’ driven and in accordance with UNITRA’s mission goals. NEHAWU affiliated to a political party, rightly protected their members. However, as with any other unions, power is also vested in numbers. The freezing of positions, especially, academic positions from 1991 to 1994 adversely affected the core business of the institution. NEHAWU also failed to take into account the changing skills demands resulting in an over-prescribed or ‘bloated’ labour force leading into the integration of UNITRA into the wider national and global markets. This can also be said of the other major stakeholders. With the reabsorption of UNITRA and Transkei into the Republic of South Africa, a number of the labour force who required re-skilling, effectively became ‘redundant’ and additional strain on UNITRA’s finances. Merton (1968 in Eriksson-Zetterquist, Mullern & Styhre, 2011, p.28) stated “the dysfunctional aspects of bureaucracies to deal with changing circumstances and the so called trained incapacity” led to unintended consequences that added to UNITRA’s structural and financial crises.
CHAPTER 06 THE VICE-CHANCELLORS’ TENURE AT UNITRA
DEMOCRATIC ERA OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS GOVERNMENT

6.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses and assesses the Vice-Chancellors (VCs’) leadership and managerial practices at UNITRA, following the democratic elections of post 1994, with the African National Congress (ANC) leading the government. Each [Vice-Chancellor] VC as the central human actor had to balance transactions at an inter-organisation level with government and at an intra-organisation level within UNITRA. Trade-offs led to tensions and organisational paradoxes that had the unintended consequence of financial and managerial mis-management.

UNITRA had reached another crossroads in its history when it had to contend with its own human resources, internal strife, structural changes and institutional progress. Like other institutions, it had to also contend with the external triggered factors and higher education changes. Higher Education regulatory mechanisms like the Education White Paper 3 and the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997) came into place, amongst the ‘Size and Shape’ controversial debates taking place across the Higher Education Tertiary landscape.

After the first democratic elections in June 1994, the Vice-Chancellors at UNITRA were relying on the implementation of the ‘little yellow book’; A Policy Framework for Education and Training in January 1994, produced by the Centre for Education Policy Development. Of paramount importance was the assertion that “the redressing of historical imbalances will be a priority” (Cloete, 2001b, p. 06). The redress did not happen as anticipated due to the
disagreements within the Ministry of Education and between the Ministries of Education and Finance. Rather the introduction of the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) was brought in for students, as a form of redress. The duplicity contention and already existing problems severely handicapped UNITRA finances until the merger of 2005. The combination of this with the increased mobility of students across Higher Education Institutions meant that institutions like UNITRA’s headcount student enrolments fell. Student enrolment numbers linked to the government subsidy fell by 35,600 between 1995 and 2000 (Cloete, 2001a; 2004, pp. 270-271). On the other hand, white Afrikaans-medium institutions gained 54,200 headcount student enrolments over the same period. In rand terms, the government appropriation to the historically black universities dropped by R102-million over the 1999–2001 budget cycles while the historically white Afrikaans-Medium universities gained more than R230-million (22%) in subsidies. The effect on HBUs, such as UNITRA would be hugely felt, as students had the freedom to move to any higher education institution and were supported by government subsidy such as the NSFAS. The profile of students changed dramatically, with mostly middle class family income and students who had excelled in their matriculation marks preferring former historical white institutions. For instance, the former University of Port Elizabeth’s student profile changed from 62% white in 1995 to 87% black in 2000. However more than 41,000 white students left the public higher education system between 1995 and 2000, with the most obvious explanation simply attributed to racism (Cloete, 2004, p. 270). The other explanation was potential students from the white middle class income bracket could not afford “to study at higher education institutions since their parents’ income was too high for them to qualify for the National Student Financial Aid Scheme, but too low to afford tuition and residence costs” (Cloete, 2004, p. 271). The paradox of over-ruling the redress fund policy in favour of the NSFAS created an unintended consequence by government in its education transformation for all.
“The consequence was that the gap between the historically black universities and the historically advantaged institutions widened. Viewed from a statistical and funding perspective, it would appear that the new South Africa benefited not the black institutions, but the historically Afrikaans-medium institutions – a supreme irony for South Africa’s first black majority government but entirely explicable from the perspective of students who, rejecting the ‘second-best’ institutions set up for them by apartheid, embraced the ‘privileged’ institutions from which they had previously been excluded”
6.2 ‘NEW HORIZONS’ (PHASE 4)

Section A: Professor Alfred Moleah

Professor Alfred Moleah’s tenure as Vice-Chancellor (VC) and Principal at UNITRA commenced from July 1994 to 1998.

Prof. Alfred Moleah was born in Johannesburg and went into exile in the U.S.A in the 1960s. He was an assistant Professor and Director of ‘Black Studies’ at Lincoln University and then Professor in the Department of the African American Studies at Temple University (Sunday Times, June 05 2005). Prof. Alfred T. Moleah died age 67 years, 30 May, 2005.

(Photograph, Permission of W.S.U VC 2007. Copyright W.S.U.)

Prof. Moleah an enthusiastic speaker with a charismatic character spoke on the international conference circuit and authored a number of books. Professor Fatima Meer, the Council Chairperson of the University of Transkei\(^75\) (UNITRA) who admired his writings on the comparison made between the Palestinian situation and apartheid, readily accepted Moleah’s application for the Vice-Chancellorship and Principal. In view of the contestation with Prof Noruwana, who had acted prior to Moleah’s commencement in 1994, the recruitment process was not smooth sailing, with even some miscommunication between the USA and UNITRA.

\(^{75}\) Members of the Governing Council, Top Management and Deans (1993-1996)

Appendix XXXV11
On the 6th May 1994, Prof. Alfred Moleah commenced as the Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the UNITRA. Moleah, a returning exile, with some political links, had his own ideas of how the university should be run, what was required to be done and wanted to leave a legacy of his imprint as a progressive VC.

“He was appalled by litter on the campus and the lackadaisical staff. On his first visit to the building labelled “library” he could not find the books and had to ask a student where they were kept. He found them, kept in conditions that were “horrible”, on the third and fourth floors of the building, which was otherwise used as office space. The book stock was inadequate and it was the only university library in South Africa not to have a computerised catalogue. Walking around the library, he noticed students lying on the floor, “eating and talking and everything else”. He assumed that this was because of a shortage of workspace but found that rows of desks and chairs stood empty. What UNITRA needed, he quickly concluded, was not just more resources and more energetic and skilful management but a general reformation of attitudes” (Dagut, 1998b).

- UNITRA’s Spin-offs

Prof. Moleah can be credited with a number of projects, such as the UNITRA Telemedicine unit installed in 1995, which could be linked with similar medical work stations nationally and internationally. There was the launch of the student guidance counselling centre (1998) at the UNITRA Butterworth branch (started in 1985) that ran health workshops, career guidance and personal counselling. Sponsored by the Centre for Science Development (CSD) of the Human Science Research Council (HSRC), the UNITRA research resource centre (UCCR) in September 1998 was opened. Prof. Moleah had the foresight to introduce the Science Foundation Year Programme (SFYP) in 1998, a national skills requirement in years to come.
With the intention of entering the sciences, SFYP a bridging programme catered for students who obtained poor matriculate results and had failed admission to other universities. However, the SFYP programme later encountered funding problems as students were not counted as part of the FTEs in the government subsidy. The construction of administrative building, SASOL library and additional students’ residences was completed by 1998. The intended outcomes were to transform the image of UNITRA to an institution that students would study at. The unintended outcome was the depletion of UNITRA’s reserve funds, mismanagement and the polarisation between staff and himself. For instance, the SASOL library infrastructure costs amounted to an approximate 60 million. Though well intended, a number of the projects became unsustainable due to the depreciation of funds; the lack of ‘buy-in’ from UNITRA staff; the students’ debt and reliance on redress funds that was not forthcoming.

- **Inter-organisation Spin-offs**

Prof. Moleah was an energetic and enthusiastic writer as evident from his publications and frequent commentary in the media.

“It is with dismay that I read in the letter to the editor by Bongani Mqonomo: “Immigrants take the gravy Train” in the Sunday Times of 23 October 1994. The highly xenophobic and misrepresented allegations that “UNITRA is infested with these expatriates”, that they “own smart cars and have big houses”, and are “parasites”, are most regrettable, and are to be condemned.

(Moleah, 1994)\(^{76}\).  

\(^{76}\) Correspondence form Professor A. Moleah to the Daily Dispatch and the Sports Minister – Appendix XXXV111
Moleah also networked politically. For instance, the international political conference hosted annually by UNITRA’s department of political studies in association with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation was well attended in 1998 by political parties, NGOs, national and international academics. As a tribute to Thabo Mbeki, the Chancellor of UNITRA (1995-1999), the Thabo Mbeki multi-media resource centre was launched with 25 multi-media computer work stations in September 1998 by the Faculty of Science. The objective was to encourage and improve secondary education in science and related subjects. The introduction of the final programme to the regional schools was planned for 1999. Coupled with this was the launch of the Centre of Excellence in Distributed Multimedia Applications in October 1998, with its focus on the development of dependable distributed multimedia applications (UNITRA Public Relations Office, 1998, p. 06). This was a joint venture between the department of computer science of UNITRA and the University of Port Elizabeth, in association with Telkom SA, Lucent Technologies and the Technology and Human Resources for Industry Programme (THRIP). The multimedia applications would see students becoming experts in the field of telecommunications.

Prof. Moleah had intended UNITRA to develop on a par with other higher education institutions and decrease UNITRA’s dependency on government subsidy. Through his leadership, the UNITRA foundation office established its office in Johannesburg in 1996, with the main purpose of raising funds. Prof. Wiseman Nkuhlu, former VC at UNITRA with a credited status quo on various other organisations, was the first Chairman of the UNITRA Foundation Board of Governors.

“In April 1998, the foundation in collaboration with the Chancellor of UNITRA, the Deputy President of South Africa, Mr Thabo Mbeki hosted its first Annual Fundraising Dinner to celebrate the launch of the Thabo Mbeki UNITRA Bursary
Fund. The dinner raised over R300,000 which will be distributed as bursaries to deserving students at the University”.


Successful worthy projects received donations from and/or initially funded by organisations and the private sectors such as South African Breweries, Anglo Vaal. Despite Moleah’s political networks and public enthusiasm, the UNITRA Foundation became obscured as UNITRA’s finances diminished. It is perhaps his articulation in the papers, political comments and vigour that enabled him to be appointed Ambassador in Vienna, following his departure from UNITRA.

- **Structural Challenges**

Prof. Moleah publicly reiterated his own ideas of how the university should be run and what was required to be done, stating:

“For UNITRA, a change is imperative. Our very survival calls for change. We have a new South Africa now and must become a new university to fit into and serve this new South Africa. Not all aspects of our enterprise need to be altered, some need refocusing, others need improvement. We ought to clearly differentiate between them so that “we do not fix it if it ain’t broke, as the expression goes”.

(Office of the Registrar, 1995, pp. 03-04).

His ideas\(^7\) were welcomed with enthusiasm by students, but his leadership practices and approach proved contentious. Prof. Moleah on assuming duties brought four individuals to augment his managerial team, a move that was culturally associated with an American style

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\(^7\) Professor A. Moleah’s message (1995) – Appendix XXX1X
of management and a departure from bureaucratic principles in distorting the lines of authorisation, line-management and expected duties of task-specialisation. Prof. Moleah in an unsigned authenticated memorandum “Management Team” stated,

“at UNITRA the management team is made up of top members of administration as determined by the Principal, who is the leader of the management team. The management team is to work together to ensure efficient and effective administration of the university. Under no circumstances are individual positions and differences to be conveyed outside management”.


By putting together a management team, Prof. Moleah had

“little regard for the established bureaucratic hierarchy or the university’s statutory structure of committees that he described as moribund. Moleah felt he had good reason to distrust the established managers of the university. If, for example, he heard on the university grapevine that a full-time lecturer had not been seen on the campus for a month or two, he would write to the dean of the faculty concerned but nothing would be done until he had called the dean to his office and demanded action in person. He chose people he felt would be loyal and efficient. That they were often junior in rank, or inexperienced, or non-Transkeian, was of no interest to him. This arrangement by-passed several university committees and, it seems safe to suppose, well-established networks of convenience and profit associated with the university’s purchasing of goods and services.”

(Dagut, 1998b, p. 10)
On the 5 December 1995, a complaint of appointment irregularities made was tabled to Council. “The case in point was the appointment of the Director of Public Relations. NEHAWU also challenged management on the issue of shortlisting for appointments” (UNITRA Council, 1996, p. 13). Considering “the unique nature of the human factor” (Jaffee, 2008, p. 21) and Moleah’s failure to balance the dual demands for “differentiation” between positions and tasks; and the failure to balance the dual demands for the ‘integration’ of activities within and between departments. More tensions were soon to follow, as higher education institutions are interdependent structurally. The ‘Director of Public Relations’ though qualified for the position had differing task requirements. The position accorded the right that ‘rational legitimate-authority’ had a more substantial power-base than the previous incumbent and reported directly to the VC. The job required the acquisition and co-ordination of information for marketing purposes, amongst other tasks, which would involve “the social and functional integration of the human factor in the production processes” (Jaffee, 2008, pp. 22-23). The human factor being the academic staff as the main production process and the administrative staff as a peripheral to the main production processes. To compound matters, the appointed ‘Director of Public Relations’, a black female, was also an American. Gender and nationality would be a ‘sore point’ in the integration processes of tasks across departments and within the departments. Moleah did not identify with the shared institutional values of most of the staff (Schein, 1992), nor did he assess the subcultures within departments of UNITRA’s hierarchy levels, so as to understand them. Moleah was not a Xhosa and the staff’s self-esteem and recognition, in relation to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs was threatened. Ethnic differences and stereotypes are used against individuals, as a weapon of attack, especially when tensions arise. Such was the case with Moleah and any other non-Transkeian, when in conflict with Transkeians, as an intra-group. Moleah would contend with the Transkeian identity and culture, which “is a powerful rallying point, perhaps most
particularly among the middle class who formed the vast majority of the staff of the homeland’s bureaucracy and, of course, its university” (Dagut, 1998a).

However, to simply say that Moleah had problems with Xhosas only would be erroneous. Jafta states that Moleah stereotyped the Transkeian ethnic groupings on a simplistic mental category (schematic bias), due to the geographical rural location. She further states,

“You cannot undermine my intelligence, because you found me here. Moleah undermined those he found here”

(Nkanyuza, 2013, p. 04).

Resistance to Moleah’s leadership and managerial practices would be a consistent topic in the media.

“By the end of 1995 the unionised non-academic staff [NEHAWU] had become apprehensive about Moleah’s approach but he had not yet estranged Unitra’s rank-and-file trade unionists, probably because he presided over the extension of housing allowances to non-academic workers. What he had done, though, was to severely annoy the NEHAWU leadership, who were also represented in the council. In public, Moleah told UNITRA’s unionised workers that he expected them to be more productive. In private he says, “I was literally horrified by the dominance of the union. I was at Temple University for 23 years. I never knew the name of the union person. He had his sphere. At Unitra, the union was all over. They were dominating council; they were poking their noses in everything”

(Dagut, 1998b, pp. 12-13).

Seemingly, what Moleah failed to comprehend was that staff at UNITRA had overtime built a defensive insular barrier for themselves and the university. The insular barrier was an
integral part of the organisational culture. For the staff at UNITRA were mostly Transkeians, who had fought for inner survival for decades resulting from their historical experiences.

“Current members of the university administration who are not Xhosa-speakers are more circumspect. They report that friendliness is the norm and that overt hostility is rare, but they do have a powerful sense that being a different sort of South African, let alone someone from elsewhere in Africa, creates a permanent barrier to entry into the innermost circles of influence at UNITRA. A senior representative of non-Transkeian academic staff says that while UNITRA’s hard core of self-conscious Transkeians are not racist or Africanist (in a chauvinist sense), they are very intense localists: ‘They don’t like Africans from the other side of the Kei river very much and they don’t like Africans from the other side of the Limpopo at all’.

(Dagut, 1998b, p. 08).

Transkeians, as indicated earlier, are a mixture of IsiXhosa and seSotho speakers of Bantu origin, and mostly identified through their lineages that constitute as clans. This social organisation is a powerful mechanism for maintaining order within a community and of strengthening its survival chances collectively.

Prof. Moleah, an assertive individual, imposed his concepts and ideology within a culture that resisted his form of managerial and governance practices. Prof. Morgan stated that in all respects he had the right qualities of leadership but “made bad leadership decisions” (Nkanyuza, 2012c, p. 03). Although Morgan’s comment concerning Moleah, “made bad leadership decisions” was not further interrogated by the researcher in the interview, references could be made to Moleah’s managerial code of conduct with staff and of UNITRA’s finances, as indicated in sub-title ‘Finances’, pages 184-194 of this chapter.
• **Council and Governance**

From the start Prof. Moleah had already antagonised the Council Chairperson, Prof. Fatima Meer at the first council meeting. An irony, considering that Prof. Meer had praises for his work and was one of those who vigorously recruited Prof. Moleah. In his words, Moleah “recalls that his discomfort began at the first council meeting where he felt that the chairwoman, Fatima Meer, became “visibly angry at any sign of dissent”. Meer is a prominent academic, activist and friend of Winnie Mandela. After the meeting, he warned her that when he disagreed with her, he would make their differences known openly and vigorously. Another influential council member was Brigalia Bam, now Chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission, while Deputy President Thabo Mbeki is [was] the University’s Chancellor.

(Dagut, 1998b, p. 11)

Clearly tensions were building up between Council members and Prof. Moleah by January 1996. In the Council Executive meeting of 09 January 1996,

“Exco expressed concern at the conduct of the principal in leaving the meeting without being released by the Chairperson particularly in view of the fact that the meeting had called at his instance. Exco felt that a special Council meeting should be called to look inter alia, into the matter of the sour relationship between Council and the Principal, the Gumbi matter and the position of Mr Moonieya as well as the City Press release”


As a leader, Moleah had some good ideas, as reflected with some of projects illustrated under the sub-titles of “UNITRA’s Spin-offs” and the “Inter-organisational Spin-offs”. Prof.
Moleah influenced by the American culture and in a position of power had a “tendency towards the superficiality in the advocacy of visionary leadership” (Linstead, Fulop & Lilley, 2009, p. 499). Moleah flaunted his ‘own sureness of self’ (Sankowsky, 1995) in his mannerisms, attitude and behaviour that ignored the interdependent relationship and networks of systems required in a higher education institution.

On occasion between 1995 and 1996, when tensions between himself and top management, and between himself and NEHAWU staff were high; Prof. Moleah would be escorted around the university by ‘armed security’. He alienated the staff and undermined Council as the governing board, over a period, in his actions and behaviour.

Again, the UNITRA Council at its meeting of 17 April 1998 expressed their concerns with the breakdown of communication between Prof. A.T. Moleah and Prof. J.M.Noruwana. For instance, the public dispute over the denial of parking:

“an extraordinary state of paranoia surrounding Moleah, who refused to allow his vice-principal [Prof. Noruwana] to park his car alongside his because this would threaten his safety. Moleah moves around campus with an armed bodyguard and has security guards at his house. He also has a closed circuit television system in his office”

(Carter, 1998).

Clearly there was a breakdown of communication, which impacted on UNITRA’s structural levels and led to the “lack of concerted action over decisions taken in the top management echelons” (Tshombe, 1998, p. 01)78.

78 The UNITRA Council of the 3rd July 1998 resuscitated, the ‘Ramashala Commission’ to investigate the tensions and conflicts at top management level. Ms.N.L.Tshombe chaired the commission enquiry. Selected Council pages 12 to 15: Appendix XL.
The diminishing financial resources of UNITRA and the contentious managerial style compounded with the governance tension between Prof. Moleah and Council led to conflict. Moleah in competing in a power-struggle with Council (1997), thought he could “control the scarce resources” (Jaffee, 2008, p. 16) of UNITRA. Prof. Moleah was suspended by Council and Prof. Jafta acted briefly. During the suspension period, Prof. Noruwana’s contract, terminated by Prof. Moleah was renewed by Council. The students rallied around Prof. Moleah and brought him back onto campus. The polarisation of the groups on campus widen, with the matter taken to court. Council was dissolved and new elected Council members brought in. The discontent continued at UNITRA between management and Moleah; NEHAWU union and Moleah, staff members and Moleah, resulting in communication breakdowns, disintegration of duties by the human resources and structural disfunctionality. The initial “action” of Moleah providing and addressing the needs of the students, such as campus cleanness, new library, up-grading of residences had the “intended consequence” of student support (Jaffee, 2008, p. 35). However, the “intended consequence” became an “unintended consequence”, which the students saw as having negative effects on UNITRA. At the July Council meeting of 1998, the student representative council statement stated “that according to their perception, the Principal regarded himself alone as the management as nothing could be done in his absence by any other management executive member. That should be done away with once and for all” (UNITRA Council, 1998, p.13[5.2.2.1]).

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79 Letter of ‘Terms of Reference’ drafted by Professor V. Dlova on behalf of ‘Ad hoc Council Committee’ dated 07 November 1996 – Appendix XL1

Sibusiso Bengu, the National Minister of Education, on occasion played a mediating role between Moleah and the Council; at the request of Council, sent Advocate Skweyiya to investigate the conflict between Prof. Moleah and UNITRA Council. What was clearly apparent within UNITRA as an organisation was the internal strife and institutional changes at UNITRA due to leadership. Other factors were the financial and managerial problems; non-accountability; lack of transparency and poor communication (Skweyiya, 1998, p.12[6.1]). The Skweyiya report recommended a written code of ethics and conduct; functional statutory bodies (committees had ceased functioning); a retraction of retrenchment notices emanating from the ‘disclosure document; an approved restructuring plan; an investigation into finances (R60 million in credit had become R40 million in the red), improved communication lines and a package offered to the then suspended vice-chancellor and principal, Prof. Moleah. On Advocate Skweyiya’s recommendations, Prof. Moleah ultimately resigned at the end of 1998 and he was subsequently appointed by the ANC government as an Ambassador in Vienna.

- **Finances**

Large numbers of students, especially from the middle black class would explore the accessibility of other HEIs, with the new democracy. Donations from companies and private contributions to UNITRA dramatically dwindled over the years. Prof. Moleah was reliant on the possible financial backing from the newly elected government, particular in light of the policy of the Reconstruction and Development Programme of 1995. He expected financial

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81 Sibusiso Bengu was the first Minister of Education, following the democratic elections of 1994. Prior to being the Minister of Education, he was a Principal at the University of Fort Hare.

82 Council recordings of internal strife (1997) – Appendix XL111

83 Letter from Professor A. Moleah on ‘Severance Package’ dated 13 December 1998 – Appendix XL1V

84 “New Unitra head gears up to drive RDP in rural Eastern Cape” – Appendix XLV
backing from the government, particularly the re-dress fund earmarked for HDI/HBUs. However, with government, “many levers of power were beyond its grasp, notably economic power, which continued to lie in the hands of white business” (Plaut & Holden, 2012, p. 31).

The Minister of Education, Sibusiso Bengu believed in institutional redress for historically black (disadvantage) universities.

“I fought valiantly for institutional redress to be put into operation and I was fully supported and partly pushed by the historically disadvantaged institutions. When I left office I was, however, not a winner because my Department was not as committed to institutional redress as I was. The question of institutional redress was also a bone of contention within the structures of the university and technikon principals and it was a matter that needed to be debated further within those two structures. And, of course, there were vested interests of which we had to take heed. And so it remained a thorny question on which I want to confess that I did not feel I won. Weakness, of course, stemmed from the fact that the Finance Minister and his colleagues had never really been convinced that we needed an item of institutional redress on our budget. It looked as though we were favouring the historically disadvantaged institutions, especially at a time when some of those institutions were guilty of mismanagement. I know the weakness that I had myself towards the last months of my time because I had to chide some of these institutions that were being mismanaged, but not all of them. I must say, there were some institutions that were correctly managed but of course, disadvantage remained. To compensate for the weakness regarding institutional redress, we focused more on the National Student Financial Aid Scheme because this was also a form of redress (individual redress)” (Maassen, 2002, p. 04).
With the realisation of UNITRA’s imploding financial situation, Prof. Moleah presented and submitted the ‘disclosure document on the proposed re-structuring plan for administration and support services’ in 1998. It was too late. The ‘disclosure document on the proposed re-structuring plan for administration and support services’ by Moleah (1998) would be implemented during the era of Prof. Morgan, as a Ministerial Appointed Administrator (MAA).

Moleah in his enthusiasm of re-shaping a university did not pay much attention to the financial sustainability of some of the projects initiated. Nor to the historical fact, that there was an “oversubscribed” (bloated) labour force to contend with from pre-1994 coupled with UNITRA’s diminishing income.

Table 11: Expenditure Pattern and Oversubscription on Labour (1993-1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Salaries</th>
<th>Rand in Millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>R84,884 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supplies and Services</td>
<td>R29,591 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salaries as percentage of Operating Expenditure</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>R86,310 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supplies and Services</td>
<td>R32,911 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salaries as percentage of Operating Expenditure</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>R98,648 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supplies and Services</td>
<td>R31,351 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salaries as percentage of Operating Expenditure</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Salaries for the labour force of 1991-1998 reflected that something was skewed. Was there an ‘oversubscribed’ (bloated) labour force? Yes, there was an ‘oversubscribed’ (bloated) labour force that started pre-1994. If Moleah claimed the deficit of finances was due to the oversubscription of labour, under which VC did the oversubscription of labour take place and why the compliance? Could one VC really be blamed for this?

“The core of our financial woes is overstaffing. We just have too many people on our payroll that we can no longer afford under the new dispensation. This core has to be addressed squarely and the only answer is restructuring”.


Even so, Prof. Moleah exacerbated the situation at UNITRA due to his lack of due diligence as a VC.

On the other hand, Habib (2001) stated that “the primary structural factor informing this crisis is UNITRA’s location in the institutional landscape of higher education” (Cloete, 2001b, p. 29). The geographical location was not the only factor. There were other
contributory factors, such as the lack of structural planning, skilling and developmental upgrades for the middle and lower levels of UNITRA’s human resources.

**Table 12:** Oversubscription of Differentiated Labour Force (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SUBSIDY</th>
<th>ACTUAL</th>
<th>VARIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academic Staff</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration Staff</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Workers</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>162%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>673</strong></td>
<td><strong>1317</strong></td>
<td><strong>96%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Moleah, 1998).

The government benchmark from the subsidy is that of the subsidy 62% is for personnel salaries. Academic staff constitutes the core business in higher education institutions with support staff being administration and service staff. The 96% variance of increased salary allocation for staff exceeded the 62% benchmark norm. The “variance” indicates the extent to which the numbers exceeded the government benchmark, which are fundamentally based on the numbers of students. The actual rand income of subsidy is more per student for expensive subjects and levels (e.g. sciences, Ph.D.) than for cheaper ones, so as to allow for greater material costs and smaller class sizes. This budget commitment is not open-ended and the national ministry can impose ceilings for each institution corresponding to approved numbers of students in the various disciplines and levels. Therefore, an incentive is created for universities to have more post-graduate students. However this also disadvantages institutions such as UNITRA, whose students mainly comprise undergraduates, and the catchment areas are recruited from the surrounding region of 4-5 million.
Histogram (Columns) 1: Illustration of Subsidy Allocation and Actual Expenditure on Oversubscription of labour (1998)

Using the information from table 12 (Moleah, 1998) to visually illustrate in this histogram (columns), the wide discrepancy between the subsidy paid by government for staff and the actual staff numbers at UNITRA; the discrepancy should have been a clear sign as a ‘risk factor’ for the financial sustainability of UNITRA as a higher education institution. The histogram shows that the catering of human resources (staff salaries) over exceeded the government subsidy, the allocation of government subsidy is proportional to each institution (Ministry of Education, 2004b, p. 02). The proportionality of the subsidy also takes into account research contracts, donations and investments. The derivation of the subsidy formulation is discussed in chapter 2, ‘Statistics Data in Qualitative Research’, section 2.2.8. The variance difference between the actual and subsidy for the number of academics was 188, almost double the staff on the ground, as opposed to the proportion given by government. The variance difference between the actual and subsidy for administration academics was 107; a third of the administration staff employed, as opposed to the
proportional given by government. The third category was the support staffs, who were primarily plumbers, carpenters, gardeners, bricklayers, boiler fitter, and artisans. According to the government proportional, they were over prescribed by 349. The combination of both administration and support staff was 456 in total. The administration and support employees were referred to as ‘support staff’. The ‘support staff’ was a historical legacy incurred, and a historical legacy that created financial and managerial problems for UNITRA as a university.

As already indicated, by 1996, UNITRA’s donations had dwindled with non-existent investments. The support from student fees as an additional income had diminished, as a number of middle class students had gone, leaving a large number of students who were unable to pay fees. The oversubscription of full time permanent and temporary groups employed, by 1999 as illustrated in the pie chart below created a number of problems.

**Pie Chart 1: Illustration of Labour Force Differentiation at UNITRA (1999)**

The “Non-Support Staff” (Moleah, 1998), reflected in the above pie chart 1 was a category referred to in the disclosure document. This was a combination of administrative staff in the lower ranks/positions and service workers. The terminology of “Non-Support Staff” would change to ‘Support Staff’ and incorporate occupational positions that was not part of the

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85 Service Staff consisted of a number of occupational positions as contemplated in Appendix XLV1 (a) and (b). For instance: bricklayer, plumber, handyman, artisans, coal trimmer, lamp man, panel beater, cleaner and so on.
academic core. Other/undesignated category was staff employed into non-existent positions. Directors were administrative staff in middle management. The ‘Vice Rector/VC’ sections were top management staff. ‘Professors; associate professors; senior lecturers; junior/assistant lecturers’, as reflected in the pie chart constituted the academic core. Academic teaching loads increased disproportionately (in some faculties) to students; another source of low morale.

Notably in the ‘disclosure document on the proposed re-structuring plan for administration and support services, was the income vs. expenditure, as seen in table 13.

**Table 13:** Income vs. Expenditure from 1993 to 1998 (Amounts in Million Rand)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>R137,647m</td>
<td>R123,569m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>R124,023m</td>
<td>R125,750m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>R177,843m</td>
<td>R141,581m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>R166,741m</td>
<td>R195,976m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>R170,518m</td>
<td>R215,226m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>R159,816m</td>
<td>R186,831m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Moleah, 1998, p.02[3.2])

The discrepancies between the income and expenditure would commence from 1996. Expenditure costs were primarily incurred from the infrastructure constructions. Mr N.J. Bunn employed as part of the service staff would oversee infrastructure. The reliance on Mr N.J.Bunn, an unqualified architect who oversaw UNITRA’s building contracts and infrastructure was alleged to be corrupt by employees. Moleah relied on him. Mr Bunn was one of the main contributing factors that lead to Moleah’s “bad leadership decision-making”.

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86 Mr N.J.Bunn, a white employee, was the Deputy Registrar for the Technical Services Division. He sued UNITRA for R2 million for constructive dismissal following the resignation of Prof. Moleah. An undisclosed settlement was made to him by UNITRA.
Table 14: Retained Income/Reserves from 1993 to 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reserves</th>
<th>Amount in Millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>R25,417 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>R33,154 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>R69,417 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>R40,181 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Shortage</td>
<td>R4,526 million (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Shortage</td>
<td>R31,541 million (-)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Moleah, 1998, p.02[3.1]).

With expenditure exceeding income, compounded by capital expenditure expenses in the form of new infrastructures, UNITRA reserves depleted rapidly between 1996 and 1997.

In 1994/1995, UNITRA had “reached an agreement with the Eastern Cape Technikon that the loan account will be partly paid by having the Technikon take over the balances on the two ‘Development Bank of South Africa’ (DBSA) loans, with the outstanding balance written off” (Malaza, 1999b, p. 98). Deloitte & Touche calculated that total amount due for 1996/197 by the Eastern Cape Technikon as indicated below, was the responsibility of UNITRA.

Table 15: Eastern Cape Technikon Loans and Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eastern Cape Loan</th>
<th>1996/1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Assets sold at cost</td>
<td>44 575 253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current assets taken over</td>
<td>7 139 378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current liabilities taken over</td>
<td>549 580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Overdraft taken over</td>
<td>559 988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagiso Trust Fund</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net cash transfers</td>
<td>750 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNITRA was still paying for the loan of Eastern Cape Technikon, managing its assets and responsible (in part) for the financial sustainability of the institution. UNITRA with its swings in the financial pendulum from 1994 to 1998 would go into a downward financial spiral. Moleah stated,

“the University will run into cash shortage situation in August 1998 if no corrective action is taken. The total cash shortage for August will be R3, 675 million, accumulating to R79, 869 million at the end of March 1999 when the next subsidy is normally received from government. This means that UNITRA will not be able to meet its financial obligation as from August 1998”.

(Moleah, 1998, p.07[3.7]).

Prof. Moleah, rightly indicated that the over subscription of labour was a carryover from the pre-1994 of Paramount Chief K.D.Matanzima’s government, despite the freeze in 1992. UNITRA as an ‘elitist icon’ was one of the biggest employers in Transkei. As an employer of ‘high-level staff’, UNITRA also employed a number of low-skilled staff. Support staff like the boilers, campus petrol attendant (s), gardeners, kitchen staff and so on. The buildings of UNITRA were impressive and the place was clean⁸⁷. Transkei was mainly dependent on UNITRA as an employer, as there were hardly any big businesses. Civil servants had been recruited by the ANC government nationally in bureaucratic positions and in the provincial administrative capital of Bisho. The previous government structures had been in Mthatha

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⁸⁷ See Chapter 04 of pictures of UNITRA
(Umtata), which had provided jobs. The over subscription would have detrimental effects on the core business and the maintenance\textsuperscript{88} of buildings such as laboratories, library.

However, the report of the Auditor-General on the 25 August 1998 stated “the university’s surplus for the new year prior to capital expenditure and transfers was R11 350 494 compared with R47 843 838 in 1995. Government grants reduced significantly in 1996 and this trend is expected to continue in the short term. Furthermore, the University has had to utilise a significant amount of its cash reserves during the year in order to continue operating. This trend has continued during the 1997 and 1998 financial year to a point where the university has utilised all its cash and investment balances” (Malaza, 1999b, p. 65).

- Student Numbers

**Table 16:** Student Numbers according to Faculty Breakdowns and Year (1995-1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACULTY</th>
<th>Year and Student Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>1641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Science</td>
<td>942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Science</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>1059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{88} Maintenance is usually provided by the service staff in designated positions. Appendix XLV1. Re-alignment of the UNITRA’s structure should have been reviewed, especially in light of the many ‘unskilled labourers’ due to societal changes and technological developments.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>6725</th>
<th>7522</th>
<th>6847</th>
<th>5895</th>
<th>4701</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% change with 1996 as base year</td>
<td>+10.6%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-8.9%</td>
<td>-21.6%</td>
<td>-37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change from year to year</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+11.9%</td>
<td>-8.9%</td>
<td>-13.9%</td>
<td>-20.25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(UNITRA Academic Planner, 2000).

Following the democratic election of 1994, the drop in students at UNITRA was not immediate. Students who left and/or did not enrol at UNITRA were mainly from middle class families. These middle class families, mostly professionals, had the means to send their children elsewhere. The disparities’ in student numbers at UNITRA was apparent in 1998. The university disruptions, lack of governance structures, strikes (discussed earlier in ‘Structural Challenges’) and the downturn of student recruitment contributed to UNITRA inept at recruiting prospective students. The Education and Law Faculty numbers plummet, followed by Arts in 1998. Economic Science shows a slight drop, Science and Health Science maintain their numbers. National precedence on Science and Technology were taking prominence. Moleah focused on the Science, Health Science and Economic faculties (see spin-offs above). The decision, with the approval of SENATE in 1998 to the reconfiguration of the faculties into the four faculties was an attempt to adhere to the higher education transformation and national skills requirements. Implementation of the four faculties commenced in 2002.

With the democratic election opening all higher education Institutions (HEI) to all racial categories, it was inevitable that there would be a dramatic decrease in student numbers. Students, who could afford the option of going to other HEI(s), had a wider choice of future education, despite the UNITRA tuition fees being one of the lowest in the country. At the Council meeting of 17 April 1998,
“Enrolments for 1997 stood at six thousand three hundred and ninety three (6,393) which means UNITRA has one thousand and forty four (1,044) fewer students for 1998. All universities, with the exception of Rhodes, have fewer students than last year, with HDU’s [Historical Disadvantaged/Black Universities] experiencing far larger drops. The main reason is increased competition and a wider choice for African students, especially the good ones. In 1998 UNITRA had ten thousand five hundred and eighty two (10,582) applications as opposed to nine thousand eight hundred and thirty one (9,831) for 1997”

(UnitRA Council, 1998, p. 10).

Collecting outstanding student fees was problematic, with debt collectors encountering numerous problems, such as getting addresses for past students. The student debt by “1998 was R11,791,735” (Moleah, 1998, p.12[4.6]). Other HEI(s), such as the former University of Natal, also experienced student debts at this time, but they were able to use their reserves as a supportive measure to their institutional income.

**Table 17:** Student Racial Group Enrolments in 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Racial Group</th>
<th>Number of Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>5819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>5895</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(UnitRA Academic Planner, 2000, p. 08).
The student population recruitment is mainly from the Transkei region. “Tuition fees have remained relatively constant with cash flows from this source of revenue growing from R30,839m in 1993 to R37,276m in 1997” (Moleah, 1998, p.07[3.6]).

Also being of the lowest fee paying Universities in the country, a lot of African (blacks) resorted to UNITRA, as a mean of obtaining higher education qualifications. The Indian students are found in the Faculty of Health. Coloured students usually come from the region. White students may come from the region or are ‘exchange students’.

**Table 18:** Gender Enrolments in 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enrolment Student Population of Gender 1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5895</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


An interesting reflection was the higher ratio of female students to male students. This reflection was also noted on graduation listings.

- **Academic Staff Composition**

**Table 19:** Academic Staff Qualification per Faculty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Staff Qualifications per Faculty 1998</th>
<th>Depts.</th>
<th>Student / staff ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Faculty</strong></td>
<td><strong>Doctorate</strong></td>
<td><strong>Masters</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty</td>
<td>1998 Qualification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>14, 27, 14, 4, 59, 08, 32.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Science</td>
<td>3, 4, 10, 1, 18, 28.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>61, 13, 7, 15, 96, 7.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>25, 28, 18, 21, 92, 5.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>136, 121, 111, 61, 429</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(UNITRA Academic Planner, 2000, p. 17).

The data of the UNITRA 3 year rolling plan in table 19 shows academic staff qualification per faculty. What is significant is that the faculties with staff indicating the most and highest qualifications in 1998 were the faculties to be phased out and/or merged with other faculties by 2004. The Minister of Education, Kader Asmal would ‘play’ on the future weakness of the lack of staff with adequate qualifications for a HEI.

The Faculty of Law, which had introduced a new LLB programme in 1998, whilst phasing out BProc and BJuris was in the greatest demand by students. The Faculties phased out between 2003 and 2006 would be the Faculty of Arts and the Faculty of Law. Incorporated into the Faculty of Education and the Faculty of Economic Sciences, was some of the departments from the phased out faculties. The Faculty of Science would reduce in size, with some of the staff transferred to Faculty of Education. Ironically, the phased out faculties had staff with the most doctorate and master qualifications.
Using the information obtained from the institutional planning figures (UNITRA Academic Planner, 2000, p. 17), The histogram compares and shows the six faculties by staff qualifications. The Faculty of Education was ‘buffered’ by the highly qualified staff incorporated from the phased out faculties. A number of highly qualified staff left UNITRA.

By the merger date of 2005, there were relatively few doctorate academics in faculties, excluding Faculty of Health Sciences. After the phasing out processes, retrenchment of staff in 2001 and retention turnover, there would be no doctorate academic in the Faculty of Economic Sciences and Law for some time.

The institutional crises deepen, as the core business, which was the academic enterprise, diminished in size and quality. The concept of a ‘University’ for UNITRA was marginalised due to mis-management, financial misconduct, structural problems and power dynamics as in the discussions above and with the forthcoming Vice-Chancellors.
Section B: Professor Nompumelo Jafta

Professor Nompumelo N. D. Jafta distinguished for her academic background was nominated by Council to become UNITRA’s first female Vice-Chancellor (VC) and Principal in 1997.

Prof. Nompumelo D. Jafta commenced her career as a teacher at St Matthew’s school, Alice, in the Eastern Cape Province. She was recruited as a Lecturer at the University of Fort Hare (UFH) in 1965. She was the first black female lecturer to be employed in a higher education institution.

(Photograph, Permission of W.S.U VC 2007. Copyright W.S.U.)

Prof. Jafta qualified with a B.Ed. degree from UNISA and later her master degree from the University of Zululand with a cum laude in African Literature.

In 1976, Nompumelo Jafta was seconded from the UFH to the University of Transkei (UNITRA). As the founder of the Department of African languages, she had to contend not only with the challenges of infrastructure, recruitment of qualified staff, but also with the task of building recognition of the important role of African languages. Prof. Jafta’s career at UNITRA spanned from being a Lecturer to becoming Dean of Faculty of Arts; representative on Council; an acting Vice-Chancellor and Principal, Emeritus Professor at UNITRA, to the receipt of an Honorary Doctorate degree for life time achievements by WSU in 2011.
Governance and Students

Prof. Jafta’s tenure (1996) as an acting VC was shortened by students. The students were in support of Prof. Moleah, who had been suspended by Council. Prof. Jafta, a Senate member had been elected to be a representative on Council. Council in nominating Jafta as the acting VC presumed that coming from the isiXhosa ethnic group, being female and known as a long serving academic, her nomination would ease the prevailing organisational tensions. It did not. Prof. Jafta states,

I cannot recall Moleah going to court, but I remember that in that week when the Council asked me to act, the students were extremely hostile at that. There was a time when I had to go to the hall and address them and I said I cannot go there. There was Dlovu and Mtewa who said ‘you have to go, it is your responsibility’. There was another time when I was going out and the students did not want me to go out. I remember; I even asked my churchperson, please pray for me. It was just bad. I was not a political person. I might be an experienced academic, but I was not an activist. So I was not acceptable to the students.

(Nkanyuza, 2013, p. 05)

Based on our perception of causal links (Huczynski & Buchanan, 2007, pp. 227-229), the hostility of the students towards Prof. Jafta, as an acting VC can be attributed to stereotypes, which are discriminating in nature. Jafta is female, had been assisting in the residences, which can be associated with the image of a ‘mother-role’ figure. Additionally, the students knew Prof. Jafta, as an academic, and would have been highly suspicious why she was nominated as a VC; when the situation was highly charged with the suspension of Prof. Moleah. Prof. Jafta stayed a few weeks as an acting VC before stepping down.
UNITRA and leadership

Prof. Jafta as an early pioneer stated that

“UNITRA had such a wonderful standard as a black university, because practically all the staff were people of high intellect. Most of them were trained outside South Africa. Look at the English department, history, geography. According to the academic standard, this university was second to none. By 1994, some had left, but they did not leave a vacuum. The problem came with the administration. There was a collapse of the administration, not with the academic. The situation became so volatile that the administration was so overawed. But the classroom situation did not deteriorate. The problem with the administration is that most of the people there were not administrators. If you look at Moleah, he came straight from exile and possibly filled with the idea ‘am going to the ignorant homeland, which needs change’. They are not ignorant. And naturally Moleah could not dictate to them (academics) for they knew what a university is. Malaza did not have the experience. He left for UCT, not as an administrator, but as an academic. The thing is, with the situation of where University of Transkei was, you needed somebody who could understand the situation [organisational culture]. Nkuhlu could understand the situation, for the student body could look at you and say ‘do you have a political history’. You would find that people like Wiseman, whether a politician or not, had those scars. Noruwana actually left here because of apartheid and only came back later. There was no problem with the academic, but there was a problem with the management. How do you manage that university? Yet the importance of UNITRA and of having a higher education institution is significant in this region”.

(Nkanyuza, 2013, pp. 05-06).
Section C: Professor Enoch Duma Malaza

Professor E.D. Malaza’s tenure as Vice-Chancellor (VC) and Principal at UNITRA commenced from Jan 1998 to 1999. Prof E.D. Malaza has had an illustrious career path, as an academic and in extensive leadership and management positions. He worked at University of Cape Town, University of Pretoria and then University of the North prior to UNITRA.

Prof. Malaza, former Dean of the Faculty of Science was recruited as the academic deputy vice-chancellor. He was nominated as an acting Vice-Chancellor and Principal, following the exit of the Prof. Moleah. Prof. Malaza stated,

“UNITRA at one time could attract academics. Work permits could be attainable and there were other dispensations. The tax dispensation was attractive and supportive towards UNITRA. The external policies that faced UNITRA were from outside. After 1994, academics could go anywhere. There was an equalisation of tax and other HEIs changed accordingly. Attracting staff was an issue. The expectations of people were high and a better life elsewhere, especially to the metropolitan areas. Offers were made elsewhere with professionals being marketable, such as chartered accountants. This affected some HEIs negatively, especially UNITRA. The dispensation of the Cuban doctors helped the Medical Faculty. Internal policies did not change much for
incentives. UNITRA did not have a large endowment, or strong alumni. There is also a small community base. For instance, the education dependency policy for staff was losing UNITRA a lot of money. Staffs were sending their children to other HEIs. There was limited scope to match the external drivers. North-West ideological pool is strong. UNITRA has no ideological base or support. UNITRA was caught in an ideological fix. It had an ideological challenge which goes back to the Matanzima era. UNITRA is located in a geographical area that has socio-economic challenges and with the student catchment from a poor region”
(Nkanyuza, 2011a, pp. 01-02).

Council and Governance

Prof. Malaza went further to state that

“the external situation was changing; UNITRA could not retain staff and provide incentives. There were tensions in some of the appointments of management. There were problems with the students, financial instability, registering at UNITRA. There were management issues. Council was becoming dysfunctional, with Council meetings running longer and longer. Meetings were dysfunctional with quorum eventually not being there. Governance did not function well. Events led to a breakdown. There was the executive [management] versa Council, with the VC (Moleah)’s suspension in 1998. Challenges were immense. Exco [executive] of Council was not functional and UNITRA was operating at a huge overdraft”.
(Nkanyuza, 2011a, p. 03).
In the state of the University Address of May 1999, Prof. Malaza had to deal with the tensions of staff and students on the future of the UNITRA. There was no Council. Following his welcome address, he stated,

“Over the last two months, we have traversed a long road stretching from the confusion and uncertainties resulting from the resolutions of the Council meeting of 27 November 1998 to the present situation of relative calm. Our institution, like all others, is an open physical system... the present state on campus is that of system that is far from equilibrium. For a time, we were tempted into believing that the end of December 1998 meant the collapse of the University. Instead of being orderly and stable it is seething and bubbling with change, disorder and process…. Internally, there are subsystems that are continually fluctuating; the tensions within management; the student discontent; the insecure academic and non-academic staff threatened by the impending restructuring”
(Malaza, 1999b).

- Leadership and Stakeholders

In his address, Prof. Malaza systematically went through the flaws and strength of the structural levels of UNITRA. The address contained numerous emotive words, poems and analogies, as he informed staff and students what they might be required for UNITRA to survive. Malaza believed that the ‘mind-set’ of UNITRA had to foster an ideology and change for the continuation of the institution. He appealed to the staff by saying, “all my thoughts and emotions are captured by a poem of James Baldwin entitled ‘The darkest hour’. The darkest clouds are hanging over our heads in our restructuring exercise; and the uncertainties going with the change in the leadership of our institution. All the agonies, dilemmas, uncertainties and possibilities facing us are
captured in this short poem. This means that in our hands is the power to choose whether this University closes or not. We must face realities”
(Malaza, 1999b).

Prof. Malaza in his interview stated

“there were unrealistic expectations with the stakeholders not realising the challenges. The institution could not function optimally. There was a lack of support and understanding under the circumstances. Others exploited the discontentment. Leadership is inclusive. This also relates to expectations. There was the realisation by stakeholders in that transition that there had to be transformation. The unions defended the institution in workshops during that unstable period. I enjoyed support with the union and staff. I had collegial relations with them. I had support with the students”
(Nkanyuza, 2011a, p. 03).

- **Inter-organisational Dynamics**

An appeal notice of September 1999 from management to the university community, stated among other issues, for stakeholders (staff and students) to be patient. The notice went on to state, it was expected that the Ministry of Education would provide solutions on how UNITRA could overcome their financial crisis. Prof. Malaza stated that

“the ministry were helpful and supportive. We had a series of meetings in East London, although Bengu was not there. The Minister could not assist, as their only power is persuasion. There was bureaucratic support in the ministry where staffs were supportive, sympathetic and willing to assist. Following Bengu was Asmal. There
were financial problems. In order to comply with the receiver of revenue, we had to talk to the bank for overdraft and this also required the ministry’s assistance”.
(Nkanyuza, 2011a, p. 03).

Minister Kader Asmal sent an Administrator (MAA), as per the amended Higher Education Act of 1999. Shortly before the administrator arrived, Prof. Malaza resigned. He later stated, “My greatest achievement was when I held the academic portfolio. Following the White paper, was the implementation of programmes and working on the implications for the academic structure at UNITRA. In those areas, I did well and enjoyed it”.
(Nkanyuza, 2011a, p. 05).

- **Finances**

**Table 20:** Faculty, Student Numbers and Government Subsidy (1997-2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACULTY</th>
<th>Year and Student Numbers</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,555</td>
<td>1,296</td>
<td>1,028</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Science</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,011</td>
<td>977</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,308</td>
<td>1,345</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health Science</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>372</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Law</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>819</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Science</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>328</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>6,193</td>
<td>5,244</td>
<td>4,486</td>
<td>3,793</td>
<td>4,457</td>
<td>4,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part-Time Students</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>209</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Full-Time Students</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>6,193</td>
<td>5,244</td>
<td>3,969</td>
<td>3,448</td>
<td>4,143</td>
<td>4,524</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The low reflection of the Government subsidy in 2002 was based on the actual Full-Time Students (FTE) of 2000, which was disputed by the university. Government subsidy comes two years after the FTE submissions. The overall institutional pass rate for the year 1998 was 71% (Malaza, 1999b, p. 09). The Faculties of Arts and Law were consistently high over a 5 year period. Notably were the low pass rates in department of collegiate Education, Chemistry and Physics. Faculty of health science were the most efficient in terms of attrition and failure rates.

UNITRA’s infrastructure student capacity was made for 5,700 to 6,000 maximum, although this capacity was exceeded in 1996 and 1997; and resulted in overflowing lecture halls and overcrowding in residences. The infrastructure of UNITRA takes into consideration the lecture rooms, teaching malls and laboratories available. In reviewing table 20, the only steady increase of students was in the Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences (FMHS) from 1997 to 2000. In 2001, there was a dramatic jump in student numbers that steadily increased to 1,009 in 2006, almost tripling the numbers of 1997. Could the reason for this be the national skills requirements, changes in the type of students admitted or simply institutional survival? Similarly, the Faculty of Science (FS) had a constant rise steady increase of student numbers that was systematic from 1997 to 2006. The Faculty of Education’s steady decline of students’ numbers of 2,308 to the lowest of students of 667 indicates that there was a problem within the institutional structures and planning. The student numbers would steadily increase from 2003 to 2006. The Faculty of Arts, incorporated into the Faculty of Education in 2006, would fluctuate between the student numbers of 1,555 in 1997 and the lowest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Government Subsidy</th>
<th>110,905,000</th>
<th>136,628,628</th>
<th>108,837,000</th>
<th>128,387,000</th>
<th>80,008,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(UNITRA Academic Planner, 2000, p. 08; Unitra SENATE, 2002).
student numbers of 687 in 2000. The Faculty of Law with its semi-constant flow of students was to be the first to be incorporated by 2006 as a School in the Faculty of Business, Economics and Law, formerly the Faculty of Economic Science.

**Table 21:** Full Time Professional Staff (permanent and temporary) and population group employed for the census period 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>African</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive/Managerial</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruction/research</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialist/Support</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals (academics)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>258</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(UNITRA Academic Planner, 2000, p. 29)

**Table 22:** Full Time Support Staff (permanent and temporary) and population group employed for the census period of 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>African</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical Employees</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Professional Administration Staff</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Employees</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Professional</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Support Staff Sub-Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall TOTAL</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1035</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(UNITRA Academic Planner, 2000, p. 29).
6.3 ‘TURBULENT WATERS’ (PHASE 5)

6.3.1 Introduction - Ministerial Appointed Administrators (MAA)

The Minister of Education, Prof. Kader Asmal, 1999 – 2004, declared that implementation and not more policy was a priority (Cloete et al, 2003). Due to the perceived varied types of institutional crises and lack of confidence in higher education leadership, a more centralised approach in decision-making was to be the trend of the Ministry of Education (DOE) (Cloete et al, 2003, p. 18). The Higher Education Amendment Act allows the Minister to appoint administrators to a higher education institution where there is a financial problem, maladministration of a serious nature that conjures internal strife, flawed and/or collapsed organisational systems. In accordance with the Education White Paper 3, amended Higher Education Act of 1997, (section 45 and 55), and Higher Education Amendment Act of 55 of 1999, Higher Education Act Amendment 54 of 2000 and later the Higher Education Amendment Act 23 of 2001, the Minister could intervene directly within HEIs.

UNITRA for the next two and half years was to be managed and led by Ministerial Appointed Administrators (MAA). The MAAs, Dr D. Nkosi from the Business Economic sector, Prof N.I.Morgan from Technikon of South Africa (TSA) and Dr T.Qhobela, seconded from the Department of Education (DoE) assumed the role and responsibilities of Vice-Chancellors (VC), Council, running of management and chaired senate meetings. The MAAs given term of reference were required to report directly to the Minister of Education. DoE (presently referred to as the Department of Higher Education and Training – DHET) was able to directly intervene in a higher educational institution through the use of laid down legislation, in its attempt to obtain higher education developmental objectives and could instigate the closure of an institution.
The advent of the MAA at UNITRA compounded the organisational behaviour of the individuals due to their differing leadership and managerial practices. This inversely affected UNITRA’s organisational culture, communication and development as a higher education institution (HEI). For instance, the organisational culture as cultivated by Prof Nkuhlu with the participation of stakeholders on major decision-making matters and a democratic administrative policy was adversely affected. Instead what was being introduced is as illustrated in the below figure would be a top down hierarchy approach.

**Figure 2: Reporting Lines of a Ministerial Appointed Administrator**

The implications of reporting lines would be as follows:

Ministry of Education (DoE) → Government/Ministerial Appointed Administrators → Students, Senate, Deans, Executive Management, Unions, Academics, Administrative Management & Support Staff

- Powers to interpret and implement.
- Rather than a ‘Steering approach’
- ‘Direct intervention tactic/approach’ were employed.
- Held the powers and responsibilities of Council. Accountable as Vice-Chancellor & Principal. Held Management responsibilities and authority. No transparent monitoring procedures were put in place, nor check balances.

Lines of communication were ‘downwards’ and authoritarian in nature. With this new form of communication, sometimes there were deliberate misbehaviours of individuals and groups (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999) that undermined the leadership and managerial practices that
was imposed on UNITRA due to “the dialectical interplay of structural and agential variables” (CHE, 2002, p. 101; Habib, 2001). More importantly, the change in the bureaucratic structure with already existing policies, alongside with the procedural processes and/or operations, was not taken into consideration. Ball (1994, p.25) states that changes in practice and/or structure, can create “the first order effects” which impacts on “the second order effects” by creating changes on patterns of social access, opportunity and social justice.

Section A: Dr Morley Nkosi as UNITRA’s Ministerial Appointed Administrator (MAA) from January 2000 to November 2000

Dr. M.Nkosi’ professional career spans from an academic, to an economist and to a businessperson. Dr.Nkosi is an author of a number of publications on transnational corporations, structural changes in the South African economy, the labour structure in South African gold mines, American mining engineers, and the regional economic integration in Southern Africa.

(Photograph, Permission of W.S.U VC 2007. Copyright W.S.U.)

Dr. Nkosi acquired his 1st, 2nd and Ph.D. degrees in Economics, from the United States and is fluent in four languages. Dr. Nkosi was the first ministerial appointed administrator (MAA) as stipulated in the amended H.E. Act was to lead the re-engineering initiative of UNITRA.
He reported directly to the Minister. Dr. Nkosi, in assessing the potential economic viability of the region, had taken a keen interest in partnerships. He could see UNITRA playing a key role, as a developmental university, particularly in the Port St John area. Dr. Nkosi brought in the concept of a ‘social plan’, a critical component in the re-engineering and consensus for restructuring UNITRA. The social plan was intended to provide alternative employment for those who might lose their jobs due to retrenchment during the re-engineering process. ‘Re-engineering Unitra for the Future’ document was supposed to set out a series of processes that would steer the institution in the direction of operating at a level of efficiency. Re-engineering that incorporated right sizing or downsizing terminologies was to be the key procedure in achieving the above goals. The Administrator as a leader was to transform the concept of the social plan into a reality. The social plan would have required resources and could ‘drive’ energies to the development, implementation and management of the plan. For this, the quality characteristics as a leader would contribute and determine the success or failure of the plan. The plan had good merits and was implemented. However, the approach to the plan had some major flaws, which affected its sustainability. One of the major flaws was that the areas and needs to be addressed within the plan were unilaterally decided. For a plan to work, it should be communicated to those being affected, which was the human resources/staff. Also to some degree ‘sell’ the plan to others so as to have ‘buy-in’ participative approach to the plan89. A reasonable ‘plan’ would indicate some rationale, the objectives and the perceived organisational goal to be achieved. The proposed plan had an attached ‘new organo-gram’ that was to be considered as part of the UNITRA Consultation model90. The proposed UNITRA model of 2000 was to have the following segments:

89 Minutes of the stakeholders’ Forum held on 12 October 2000 – Appendix XLV11
The categories within the proposed structure would have a specific set of chain channels and lines. These channels mostly consisted of autocratic downward mode of communication with some interlinking horizontal communication channels and minimum and/or non-existent upward communication flow.

The UNITRA community/staff rejected the model in general, due to the mistrust and overall objectives of the restructured internal and external communication links. More than anything else the model was perceived as an endorsement of power dynamics at play. Power dynamics
were ‘at play’ on an individual level by the VC, at the intra-organisational level of UNITRA and at inter-organisational level of government steering and/or government intervention mechanisms.

The transactional dialogues between staff and Dr. Nkosi, management and Dr. Nkosi were tense. Individuals were selected by Dr. Nkosi, forming a ‘pseudo-management team’. This team was not reflected on UNITRA’s structures. Individuals in top management were either side-lined and/or ostracised. Frequent reference was made to the Minister of Education in meetings about reporting the dilapidated state of UNITRA. Though expenses of MAA were included in the allocated funding of UNITRA, budget allocation of the MAA was not disclosed. At the first senate meeting Dr. Nkosi, indicated his displeasure of the surroundings. Followed by one of the top managers carrying his shoes, Nkosi indicated that he had been doing a walk-around and ‘inzima” (shit) is everywhere, hence his subordinate was carrying his shoes to change into. Dr. Nkosi linguistic nuances, a disregard for cultural norms and professional ethics would alien him from staff. Motivation was at a low for staff. Due to the individual characteristic and leadership style of the ‘Administrator’, there was a recall by the Minister by the end of the year (Habib, 2001, p. 08). A moratorium was served to UNITRA in December. UNITRA with its uncertainty was placed as a HEI in an ambiguous situation.

Section B: Minister of Education, Professor Kader Asmal [Moratorium(s)]

UNITRA in facing the challenges of administrator(s) during this period also faced bigger challenges from the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Education served UNITRA with two moratoriums during a course of two years. With the first moratorium in December 2000,
top management (Prof. Noruwana and Prof. Luswazi\textsuperscript{92}) on attending a meeting with representatives of the Ministry of Education on 21 December 2000 in Johannesburg reported back to Umtata community and UNITRA stakeholders. Two critical proposals were communicated:

a) that there should be no first year intake for the year 2001 in respect of all the Faculties except for the Faculty of Health Sciences

b) that a second administrator had been appointed with effect from 01 January 2001.

Resolutions were made by the community and stakeholders on the 22 December 2000 that

1. a letter to the Ministry of Education be written to persuade the department to stay the implementation of the proposal not to have first year students intake pending further interaction between all affected parties

2. A delegation of five comprised of Proffs. Noruwana, Luswazi, Dr. Nkonyeni, Rev. Mcoteli and Mr Mbali (management and community members) were mandated to interact and negotiate with the Provincial and National representatives on a mutually acceptable option

3. A meeting of the broader community and stakeholders was convened on the 24 December 2000 with the intention of soliciting their views and seeking guidance on the new crisis facing UNITRA. The chairperson Prof. Noruwana welcomed the community and the stakeholders to discuss the “possible implications of the impending announcement from the Department of Education about the future of UNITRA”

(Office of the Registrar, 2000).

\textsuperscript{92} Professor Noruwana was the Deputy Principal and Professor Luswazi was the Registrar Academic.
Stakeholders and the community met again on the 27 December to discuss the Minister’s forthcoming communication. It was decided that it was not in the interest of UNITRA and the broader community to stop the intake of the forthcoming year students. Admission and registration of new students would continue as per planned. Also divulged was the fact that during the period that Kader Asmal was the Minister of Forestry and Water Affairs, his name had been forwarded for honorary nominations at Senate. Senate unknowingly rejected his nomination amongst the many presented and Kader had been pre-maturely informed of the nomination. It was recommended that the “Ministry of Education be invited to address the community and UNITRA Stakeholders as soon as possible” (Office of the Registrar, 2000, p.03[3.3.6]). The meeting agreed that due to the legalities of the appointment of a new administrator, which could not be challenged, the community and the stakeholders would support the administrator. A position paper by the 26 December was drawn up with a re-think on how the university was to run, with a financial management strategy. The UNITRA Transformation Steering Committee had almost completed its exercise of the creation of a ‘New Model’ that would redesign and reform the university as a University for Rural Development, Science and Technology. The position paper was sent to the Ministry of Education with an invite to address the UNITRA Stakeholders. It would be against the above atmosphere and background that the new Administrator, Prof. N.I.Morgan commenced work on the 01 January 2001.

93 ‘New Model’ that would redesign and reform the university as a University for Rural Development, Science and Technology - Appendix X.LV111
Section C: Professor Nicholas (Nicky) Morgan as UNITRA’s Ministerial Appointed Administrator (MAA) from January 2001 to November 2001

Prof. N.I. Morgan’s previous positions included being the Dean of the Faculty of Business and Management at the University of the Western Cape. He also was a Vice-Principal (Academic) at the former Technikon South Africa in Gauteng.

Prof. Morgan holds degrees from the University of the Western Cape, Stellenbosch University and Cornell University in the USA. He was also a Fulbright Scholar. Prof. Morgan finished his university education with a little extended period, as a result of politics. He worked for a number of few years in the private sector and later at the Old Mutual, where he managed a diverse portfolio of people.

Prof. Morgan joined the University of Transkei (UNITRA) as an Administrator in 2000. He was well prepared to deal with student issues because of his prior involvement in student political activities. Morgan states, “I had experience in dealing with institutional disruptions, as well as “having to deal with (what I would call) corrupt authorities politically” (Nkanyuza, 2012c). Morgan stated that

“Asmal gave me an opportunity to go with an open mind and because essentially I know the value of education and educational institutions in our communities and I
thought that if one could make a success of UNITRA situation, then it would certainly be a contribution to the community. Introduction was the first step to begin my engagement with the university. That was my approach. My approach was (as most people would confirm) open. The agenda was very clear and I knew what to do. My first few months, I did not want to talk to anyone or anyone talk to me, so that I would not get blocked into the politics of the past. And I also commented that whatever people talk to me about, they should feel free to talk in the open. Nobody could come to me with a private agenda or secret agenda. Although that was not a deliberate part of my expression, it was simply the way I saw myself surviving without getting drawn into any divided institution. An institution with a few spots of hope, a few spots of what a university could be proud, with a broken university community. A university that had lost its soul, with people who had started to doubt themselves very much; with people who in some ways were very angry but too dis-empowered by the 2nd Administrator appointment to do anything other than try and be nice and follow what the administrator has to say”.

(Nkanyuza, 2012c, pp. 02-03).

The university had gone through a nightmare period during 1999 and 2000. “The UNITRA newsletter headline title stated that “UNITRA subverts collapse and reinvents itself” (UNITRA Public Relations Office, 2001, p. 01) rang true, as UNITRA stakeholders cooperated with Morgan. Prof. Morgan through a number of initiatives, such as workshops, seminars and recreation events, was able to obtain a ‘buy-in’ from all stakeholders towards the objective of UNITRA as a university. He was transparent in his communication and frequently mingled with staff on the ground. His wife from Transkei played an important role through her involvement with the university clinic that catered mainly to the students; as a
hostess to stakeholders for recreation events and her supportive demeanour for Prof. Morgan as a VC. However, UNITRA as a higher education institution was bankrupt, student fees were outstanding, the bank wanted a bank loan guarantee from the Ministry and there was a vacuum in the institutional leadership.

- **Finances**

The financial state of the UNITRA had been exacerbated by the almost total collapse of its government structures.

“The year 2000 was a frozen period with no effort made to resuscitate the institution. Thanks also to the decision of the National Minister of Education to bring yet another Administrator to try and steer Unitra out of the stormy seas”

(UNITRA Public Relations Office, 2001).

Prof. Morgan as the 2\textsuperscript{nd} government appointed Administrator No.2 came with differing terms of reference\textsuperscript{94}. His terms of reference, consisted of 12 listed criteria to fulfil that was longer than his predecessor and the forthcoming administrator. Morgan reported directly to the Ministry of Education with written and verbal reports. The Auditor General’s report sent to the Ministry of Education in May 2001; described UNITRA, “as an institution that has been exposed to the complexities of changing attitudes and demands, been subject to a steady but deep deterioration of systems and controls, increasing expectations of previously disadvantaged people”.

(Morgan, 2001, p.03).

\textsuperscript{94} Professor N.I. Morgan’s terms of reference as a MAA – Please see Appendix 1X
A section in the report referred to the administrator’s terms of reference. The report also highlighted the conflicting and overloaded burden of an administrator fulfilling all the roles of governance and management as required. This meant that the full responsibility generally associated with Vice-Chancellor and Council could not be carried out. “The terms of reference for an Administrator is very slight” and “it goes without saying that its execution has to take place within an on-going concern context” (Morgan, 2001).

Within the terms of reference were the provision of “a budget of the University for the Financial Year 2001/2, for approval by the Minister” (DoE 2001); an actual budget for 2001 and projected cash flow amounts for 2002 to 2005 was presented, as illustrated below.

**Table 23:** University of Transkei 2001-2005 – Cash Flow (amounts in R’000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cash Flow Amounts in R’000</th>
<th>2001 (Actual)</th>
<th>2002 (Projected)</th>
<th>2003 (Projected)</th>
<th>2004 (Projected)</th>
<th>2005 (Projected)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash Balance (Opening)</td>
<td>62,483</td>
<td>75,649</td>
<td>44,458</td>
<td>39,846</td>
<td>28,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Add: Annual Cash Inflow</td>
<td>176,211</td>
<td>201,814</td>
<td>197,763</td>
<td>216,685</td>
<td>229,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Grant</td>
<td>118,387</td>
<td>81,578</td>
<td>96,514</td>
<td>106,100</td>
<td>109,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fees</td>
<td>39,561</td>
<td>43,516</td>
<td>54,187</td>
<td>63,171</td>
<td>72,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital &amp; Interest Redemption Grant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,896</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept of Health Grant- HEPTAR</td>
<td>6,834</td>
<td>61,036</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Income</td>
<td>6,057</td>
<td>5,513</td>
<td>4,127</td>
<td>4,256</td>
<td>4,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less: Annual</td>
<td>189,378</td>
<td>170,623</td>
<td>193,150</td>
<td>204,912</td>
<td>215,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Outflow</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries Gross</td>
<td>125,481</td>
<td>96,353</td>
<td>104,061</td>
<td>111,346</td>
<td>118,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest on Bank Overdraft/Loan</td>
<td>3,777</td>
<td>4,750</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Excess/(Deficit) of cash</td>
<td>13,166</td>
<td>31,191</td>
<td>4,612</td>
<td>11,774</td>
<td>14,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fees</td>
<td>39,561</td>
<td>43,516</td>
<td>54,187</td>
<td>63,171</td>
<td>72,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>5,914</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment-HEPTAR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>9,720</td>
<td>10,400</td>
<td>11,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Excess/(Deficit) of cash</td>
<td>13,166</td>
<td>31,191</td>
<td>4,612</td>
<td>11,774</td>
<td>14,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available Cash Balance-closing</td>
<td>75,649</td>
<td>44,458</td>
<td>39,846</td>
<td>28,072</td>
<td>13,582</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Unitra SENATE, 2002[appendix G]).

The Department of Health Grant-HEPTAR injected substantial amount of monies into the Faculty of Medicine and Health Science (FMHS) as of 2002. The other faculties had previously contributed in resources to the FMHS and this was the case with the student numbers increase of 717 in the FMHS of 2001.

Although the projected cash balance for 2002 had increased, the reality was with a reduced government subsidy, reduced generated income and student debts, the projected available cash balance from 2002 to 2005 had UNITRA in a ‘crisis genre’ grip. Inevitably “crisis leadership, more of an institutional condition than an approach to leadership” (Kulati & Moja, 2006, p. 165) would cast UNITRA’s fate.

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Table 24: University of Transkei 2002 – 2005 (Income Account)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Govt Subsidy</td>
<td>102,651,000</td>
<td>81,578,000</td>
<td>96,514,146</td>
<td>106,099,594</td>
<td>109,390,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrenchment Subsidy</td>
<td>15,736,345</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Contribution</td>
<td>31,119,808</td>
<td>36,750,000</td>
<td>35,000,000</td>
<td>35,000,000</td>
<td>35,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuition Fees</td>
<td>37,968,000</td>
<td>38,495,525</td>
<td>47,241,527</td>
<td>55,622,045</td>
<td>64,435,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence Fees</td>
<td>11,354,293</td>
<td>11,463,343</td>
<td>11,945,378</td>
<td>12,548,458</td>
<td>13,190,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catering Income</td>
<td>6,792,000</td>
<td>4,274,882</td>
<td>4,454,642</td>
<td>4,679,541</td>
<td>4,918,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Income</strong></td>
<td><strong>223,647,446</strong></td>
<td><strong>184,161,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>202,883,845</strong></td>
<td><strong>221,824,527</strong></td>
<td><strong>234,900,137</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Unitra SENATE, 2002).

The ‘actual’ of 2001, shows the retrenchment fund of 15,736,345. Retrenchments were implemented in 2002. The catering income would be a ‘bone of contention’ due to its expenditure as against the income received. The columns ‘budgets 2002 to budget 2005 are projections based on the previous indexes and the expectation for that year.

Table 25: University of Transkei Expenditure Account of 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Staff Compensation</td>
<td>105,669,446</td>
<td>96,353,000</td>
<td>104,061,240</td>
<td>111,345,527</td>
<td>118,026,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Faculties</td>
<td>69,519,350</td>
<td>67,347,835</td>
<td>72,735,662</td>
<td>77,827,158</td>
<td>82,496,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Support Services</td>
<td>36,150,436</td>
<td>29,005,165</td>
<td>31,325,578</td>
<td>33,518,368</td>
<td>35,529,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Supplies and Services</td>
<td>46,138,402</td>
<td>56,323,096</td>
<td>59,786,363</td>
<td>63,511,115</td>
<td>66,930,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>4 Faculties</td>
<td>5 Support Services</td>
<td>6 Equipment</td>
<td>7 Faculties</td>
<td>8 Support Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculties</td>
<td>5,163,365</td>
<td>10,224,929</td>
<td>10,908,023</td>
<td>11,631,291</td>
<td>12,297,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Services</td>
<td>40,975,037</td>
<td>46,098,167</td>
<td>48,878,340</td>
<td>51,879,824</td>
<td>54,632,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>5,913,832</td>
<td>9,000,000</td>
<td>9,720,000</td>
<td>10,400,400</td>
<td>11,575,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculties</td>
<td>3,624,582</td>
<td>9,000,000</td>
<td>9,720,000</td>
<td>10,400,400</td>
<td>11,575,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Services</td>
<td>2,289,250</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publication Funds</td>
<td>1,143,642</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>378,000</td>
<td>404,460</td>
<td>428,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library Books and Journals</td>
<td>1,483,000</td>
<td>1,601,640</td>
<td>1,713,755</td>
<td>1,816,580</td>
<td>1,816,580</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land and Building</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off Campus Housing-staff</td>
<td>4,673,904</td>
<td>4,997,039</td>
<td>5,323,031</td>
<td>5,622,013</td>
<td>5,622,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Fee Remissions</td>
<td>1,700,000</td>
<td>1,832,253</td>
<td>1,957,424</td>
<td>2,072,484</td>
<td>2,072,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBSA Interest</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Costs</td>
<td>3,600,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>3,850,000</td>
<td>3,600,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-ordinary items</td>
<td>8,937,000</td>
<td>6,551,960</td>
<td>6,660,597</td>
<td>6,720,233</td>
<td>6,720,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL EXPENDITURE</td>
<td>213,031,000</td>
<td>183,570,000</td>
<td>193,050,495</td>
<td>204,811,848</td>
<td>215,152,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SURPLUS/(DEFICIT)</td>
<td>10,616,446</td>
<td>591,000</td>
<td>9,833,350</td>
<td>17,012,679</td>
<td>19,747,638</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Unitra SENATE, 2002)

The expenditure gives a clearer picture of costs of sectors. Noted are expenditure costs of faculties as against faculty costs. Incorporated in faculty cost are administrative costs.
Table 26: Analysis of Extra-ordinary items

| Provision for doubtful debts | 17,396,000 | 7,500,000 | 5,000,000 | 5,000,000 | 5,000,000 |
| Net Funds Written Off | 7,328,322 |
| Retrenchment Costs | 19,810,737 |
| Legal Fees | 556,885 | 8,937,000 | 6,551,960 | 6,660,597 | 6,760,233 |

(Unitra SENATE, 2002[appendix H]).

The reduction of UNITRA’s staff expenditure of salaries through the means of retrenchments created “unintended consequences” (Jaffee, 2008, p. 18). Some of these ‘unintended consequences’ was the loss of some staff expertise, inclusive academics and the increased projected liability legal expenses.

The second report of July 2001, to the Ministry of Education included the planning, process implementation and turnaround of UNITRA. In the report the Administrator, as per terms of reference had already put into place some of the requirements. These requirements/issues were related to the retrenchment 282 staff positions as well as the decrease of the deficit budget from R119 million to approximately R 86 million. Prof. Morgan, as a transparent leader, showed the stakeholders (staff and union) the disclosure document. He initiated meetings and kept an ‘open door’ policy. Due to Morgan’s leadership approach and the greater perceived external threat; the stakeholders faced UNITRA’s situation with new vigour, accepted the challenges, and collectively accepted responsibilities in co-operating and assisting the administrator to restructure UNITRA.
Unexpected setbacks\textsuperscript{95} were to emerge with a reduced limit of government subsidy of an initial R70 million. Following a subsequent appeal to the Ministry of Education, an increase to R78 million was given. Additionally, UNITRA was required to pay for a short fall of 17 million to the pension fund and also take into account the 198 retrenchments already made in 1999. An appeal was made to the pension fund for the shortfall and pay-outs of those to be retrenched. These were not the only emerging factors related to the finances of UNITRA that ‘reared its’ head’. Perhaps the most disturbing factor at the time was the ‘grim reality’ that the bank had no confidence in UNITRA’s ability to manage its finances and this was demonstrated by the refusal of the bank to accept cheques issued by management. Hence for a period of time cheques were issued and signed from the Ministry of Education.

\textit{Section D: National Working Group (NWG)}

In August 2001, a meeting took place with the Administrator, UNITRA stakeholders and the National Working Group (NWG) in East London to discuss, negotiate and restructure the proposed new institutional landscape of the higher education systems. It had been decided prior to entering the hotel conference room, that Prof. Morgan as the administrator would be the main spokesperson for UNITRA. The UNITRA delegation entered the room and sat facing the NWG delegation with the NWG Chairperson Saki Macozoza seated slightly to the top of both delegations. The meeting commenced with an opening statement on the institutions’ progress since the advent of the administrator. This was followed by questions on the finances of the institution and the academic viability of programmes. Midway through the meeting, the NWG chairperson took out a ticket with a rubber band round it. I, the

\textsuperscript{95} Selected section of ‘Second Report’ sent to the Honourable Minister of Education, Professor Kader Asmal. Page 2 to 5 – Appendix XLIX
researcher (participant) was part of the delegation as one of the stakeholders (NTESU unionist). I recorded,

“taking off the rubber band from around the ticket holder, he looks and twirls the rubber band around his fingers for some minutes. Our attention was caught by the twirling of the rubber band. The administrator continued talking. He stopped when the NWG Chairperson got up and went to flip chart. Taking a pen, he drew an airport strip with one runway. He pointed at the end of the runway and said, this is where UNITRA is”.

(Nkanyuza, 2001).

There was silence in the room as Saki went back to his chair, sat down and picked up his ticket, whilst looking at his watch. Morgan spoke;

“as you have been mandated by the same person who mandated me, I believe we both need to go and speak to the Minister about our terms of reference, as I believe they are in conflict with each other”

(Nkanyuza, 2001).

The ‘human actors’, both the NWG and the Administrator were reporting to the same Ministry of Education. Key decisions had already been made by the minister and the NWG that did not include the administrator terms of reference being executed in the possible turn-around of UNITRA. Consequential, a second moratorium was served to UNITRA, shortly, after the exit of second Administrator in November 2001.
In an early response of Senate on February 2001⁹⁶, Senate stated that

“the argument that the NWG recommendations are directed at doing away with the inequities in the legacy of apartheid does not hold water. All South African institutions are products of colonialism and apartheid. While apartheid’s divisive policies empowered historically white institutions with enviable financial foundations, it is responsible for the creation of financially weakened structures in historically black institutions, which the NWG cites as cause for their extinction. The NWG has forgotten the necessity to provide redress funding to the HBIs to enable them to independently continue with their missions. Senate’s concern is that the proposed mergers and closures target HBUs and leave HWUs intact’

(UNITRA SENATE, 2001, p. 02[04]).

The NWG’s report was released in December 2001 (Asmal, Hadland & Levy, 2011, p. 278), with the proposed higher education institutions reduced from thirty-six (36) to twenty-one (21).

Section: Minister of Education, Professor Kader Asmal

- Moratorium(s)

The second moratorium was served to UNITRA November 2001. It came as a ‘big bang’, quite public and unexpected, especially to the UNITRA community. Prior to the press release of 28 November 2001, the Minister of Education met with Prof. Morgan to inform him of the decision to “impose a moratorium on all new enrolments in the 2002 academic year at UNITRA. The moratorium does not apply to new enrolments in the Faculty of Health

⁹⁶ UNITRA SENATE as the statutory body of UNITRA responded formally to the National Working Group (NWG) proposals.
and the "moratorium is provisional and does not imply a closing down of UNITRA” (Daily Dispatch Reporter, 2002).

Kader Asmal stated,

“when I proposed a provisional moratorium on the intake of new students at the University of Transkei (UNITRA) in Mthatha in 2002 (excluding the students at the Faculty of Health Sciences). UNITRA seemed to falling apart, and I said no new students should be enrolled while a decision about its future was made, based on the recommendation of the NWG. This fuelled the rumour, which had already started to circulate, that I intended to close UNITRA. I was certainly thinking about it, or rather about using its infrastructure for other educational purposes, but Trevor Manuel, the Finance Minister, whose political judgement I trusted implicitly, said to me, ‘You can’t close UNITRA’. This became evident when Nelson Mandela called me on Christmas morning in 2001”  

Prof. Morgan had already left UNITRA by the end of November 2001. The Minister acknowledged, “the contribution of the Administrator in steering the University through a difficult period” and “long term future of UNITRA will be determined on the basis of the recommendations of the National Working Group, which was established to advise the Minister on the restructuring of the higher education system” (National Working Group, 2003).

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97 Moratorium in the Daily Dispatch ‘Asmal Halts Unitra enrolments for 2002’ – Appendix L
After the announcements, the UNITRA stakeholders\textsuperscript{98} in their unity met to discuss the strategies\textsuperscript{99} on how to combat and possibly reverse the moratorium. Discussions and meetings were held, including the lobbying of politicians, the Educational Portfolio of Parliament and the Province\textsuperscript{100}. Following the agreement with the stakeholders; on the 15 January 2002 an application was served to the Minister of Education, in the High Court of South Africa.

“In the matter between Sindiswa Thelma Mkwebetu as 1\textsuperscript{st} Applicant, Pumla Nokuzola Nakani as 2\textsuperscript{nd} Applicant and The Minister of Education as 1\textsuperscript{st} Respondent, The University of Transkei as 2\textsuperscript{nd} Respondent, stated leave be granted to move this application as one of urgency as the first term. The second term of the application 2(2.1) stated that the First Respondents’ decision placing a moratorium on new admission and internal transfers to other programmes in all faculties, the Faculty of Health Sciences, at the University of Transkei be reviewed. Included within the application, was the cited section 29(1) of the South African Constitution which states ‘Everyone has a right – to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively available and accessible’. The Constitution, nor the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 gives the 1\textsuperscript{st} respondent the right to place a moratorium on admission. On the contrary, in terms of the Act the power to determine the admission policy of a public higher education institution lies with the council of the institution concerned (section 37) of HE Act 101 of 1997. Specifying what new students are going to be admitted to UNITRA in 2002 is a classic example of the determination of the university’s admission policy. That the first respondent cannot do”\textsuperscript{101}.

\textsuperscript{98} UNITRA Response to Freeze Intake - Appendix L1
\textsuperscript{99} Union fights for the ‘Survival of Unitra’ – Appendix L11
\textsuperscript{100} “A Healthy lean Machine: Unitra’s Last and Only Plausible Response” by Professor S.D.Berkowitz – Appendix L111
\textsuperscript{101} Case number 421/2002 in the High Court of South Africa (Transvaal Provincial Division).
Bengu Sibusiso the former Minister of Education commented,

“that the Ministry of Education even today does not fully appreciate the problems facing the disadvantaged universities and technikons. The National Plan, for instance, fails to recognise that the majority of black graduates are produced by these institutions. I have the feeling that this matter ought to be taken to Cabinet with, of course, the Minister's recommendation. My feeling is that whilst we want to work for effectiveness or competition, and efficiency, we ought to recognise that there is disadvantage and at some point it will have to be addressed - the sooner the better. My argument is that you cannot have an efficient system of higher education if more than half of your institutions are not efficient. So, the argument which I believe could be brought to Cabinet is the argument that overall efficiency, competitiveness, effectiveness, would be achieved by the system of higher education in South Africa if we close the gap and jack up those institutions”


The UNITRA court case was taken from the roll, as the Ministry of Education agreed to and re-negotiated the terms for UNITRA through the arrival of the 3rd Administrator, Dr.M.Qhobela.
Section F: Dr. Morley Qhobela as UNITRA’s Ministerial Appointed Administrator (MAA) from January 2002 to April 2002

Dr. Qhobela seconded from the Ministry of Education, as an appointed government administrator came to UNITRA, January 2002. The Administrator had numerous meetings with individuals and stakeholders and kept reminding UNITRA community, not to worry, as his was very short. Four months to be exact.


Dr. Qhobela came to UNITRA with a ‘white flag’. He indicated that his brief was short and he did not intend staying longer than 4 months. Dr. Qhobela’s terms of reference were reduced and simplified into two sections, so as to interface with UNITRA’s organisational structure and manage the human factors. These sections were governance and management. Even with the reduction of tasks, Qhobela as an MAA was unable to complete all the requirements of the terms of reference. Within his terms of reference, was an appointment of a ‘Campus Head’ and also to respond as a higher education institution to the recommendations of National Working Group (NWG)’s report. Though the Stakeholders co-operated with Dr. Qhobela, they rejected the concept of ‘Campus Head’. An outside consultant was also brought in to review human resources and the finance systems of UNITRA.

102 Dr. M. Qobela’s terms of reference – Please see Appendix X
Dr. Qhobela held a series of meetings and consultations with all stakeholders, including students. Rather than alienating any staff, he invited representative staff from different structural levels and union representatives in the same meeting, as to the attainment of his ‘terms of reference’. Contrary to the media, he did not mention the ‘moratorium’. Communication was of an ‘equal footing’ and not a downward approach nor authoritarian approach. Dr. Qhobela also took into account the organisation culture. His tactic worked. Two months later, an announcement from the Administrator stated that UNITRA was to reinstate a Council and processes were to commence as soon as possible. Dr. Qhobela as the MAA left UNITRA in March 2002.

In April 2002, a new Council emerged. Advertisements were placed in the papers for a Vice-Chancellor, which also welcomed applications and nominations. Stakeholders gave their nominations and amongst the candidates was the second Administrator who had earlier come to UNITRA, as a MAA. Approximately five months later, a Vice-Chancellor was appointed.

\[^{103}\] ‘Pro-Asmal director for Unitra’ – Appendix L1V
6.4 ‘MIRAGES OF HOPE’ (PHASE 6)

Section A: Professor Khaya Mfenyana

Professor Khaya Mfenyana’s tenure as the Acting Vice-Chancellor’ (VC) at the University of Transkei (UNITRA) was from June 2002 to October 2002.

Prof. K. Mfenyana’s career path has been prestigious. Prof. Mfenyana did a teacher’s diploma and B.Sc. degree at Fort Hare University. He did his MBChB at the University of Natal in 1971 and a Master's Degree in Family Medicine at Medunsa. Awarded a Fellowship by the W.K. Kellogg Foundation to do a Master’s Degree in Educational Administration, he studied at Michigan State University in USA from 1994 – 1996.

(Photograph, Permission of W.S.U VC 2007. Copyright W.S.U.)

Prof. Mfenyana worked as a Medical Practitioner at Mthatha, Mount Frere and Cala from 1978 – 1986 in the former Transkei. He went on to work at the Medical University of South Africa (Medunsa) and Ga Rankuwa Hospital as a Senior Lecturer and Principal Medical Officer from 1987 – 1988 (Walter Sisulu University, 2008). Prof. Mfenyana was recruited by Prof. D.Ncayiyana and appointed as the first Professor and Head of the Department of Family Medicine at the former University of Transkei (now Walter Sisulu University) and Mthatha Hospital Complex from 1989 – 2005. Prof. Mfenyana served as interim Vice-Chancellor in 2002 and the Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the former University of Transkei at the beginning
of 2005. He was then appointed as the first Substantive Executive Dean of the Faculty of Health Sciences at Walter Sisulu University in January 2008 to date (Ibid). Mfenyana has championed community-based education at this institution and this has made Walter Sisulu University the first medical school in South Africa to introduce a curriculum that embraces problem-based learning and community-based education as the main learning strategies from the first to final year (Mfenyana, 2010).

- **Human Resources**

At the inaugural meeting of Council on the 25 April 2002, the report table stated that the staff complement of UNITRA had decreased from 1,301 to 636 in 2002, indicating a reduction of 51%. The staff in the academic faculties constituted 337 (53%), as compared to 475 (37%) in 1998 (Office of the Registrar, 2002b, p. 01). Though the student numbers over the same period decreased from 5244 to 4437, the ratio of academic staff to students was 1:11 in 1998 and 1:13 in 2002.

Human resources staff (Personnel section) had been reduced from 15 posts in 1998 to 6 persons in 2002. The human resources division (Personnel section) in modern organisations is the engine and network of modern organisations. If the division becomes dysfunctional, the likelihood is a high risk factor of the structural levels of an organisation having problems.

“The appointment of Administrators between 2000 and 2002 has brought its own unique challenges. The university has virtually been run with the help of middle management with modest management skills, experience and leadership qualities. Concomitant with this has been the departure of senior academics, thus decreasing the opportunity for the university to find leadership from within its ranks. Substantial investment must be made by the University and particularly by the executives in
improving the competency and motivational levels of the middle management and staff. The inability of the University to perform some of the most basic functions of a large organization is partly due to this deficiency”.

(Office of the Registrar, 2002a, pp. 03-05).

Prof. Mfenyana as the acting VC had a limited complement of management at the executive structural levels of UNITRA. At the executive levels was the Registrar (Academic Administration; Registrar Finance (there had been a high turnover rate of incumbents in this position since 1996); Registrar Administration (acting in the position) and the Director Human Resources (incumbent was temporary and also a high turnover rate). The position of Deputy Vice-Chancellor (academic), Vice-Principal (administration) and Director Information Technology was vacant.

- Governance

The lack of stable leadership and governance structures at UNITRA left an absence of policies and procedures in relation to the higher education and labour related legislation. There were existing policies and procedures, but the “systems to support these policies and procedures have not been fully implemented and the development of local skills to ensure system maintenance and periodic upgrading is largely absent” (Office of the Registrar, 2002b, p. 01). Invariably the effectiveness of staff in compliance with policies and procedures was hampered. Also effective communication channels and relationships within UNITRA, shaped by executive management towards an organisational goal had almost been non-existent from 1998 to 2002.
• Inter-organisational Spin-offs

Prof. Mfenyana was the first Director in 1991, of the Community Health Partnerships Project (UCHPP), which was funded by the WK Kellogg Foundation. The purpose was of the project was to create “models of academic community-based primary health care centres” (Mfenyana, 2010, p. 20). The project was extended to include the nursing and health promotion students. The UCHPP added the partnership component with local communities, service providers and with the evaluation by the school of Health systems and Public health, University of Pretoria in 2000; the department of family Medicine moved from hospital-based to community health centres. With the progression of time, the faculty totalled seven (7) community health centre and (15) fifteen district hospitals. Nelson Mandela Academic Hospital would be under the management of UNITRA as a teaching hospital. The project became a faculty model that emphasised “Community-Based learning” with the added dimension of “Patient-Centred Care and Holistic Care” (Mfenyana, 2010, pp. 22-23). Prof. Mfenyana’s biggest accomplishments were in the Faculty of Health Sciences and the region that boasted the image of UNITRA. The paradox of the Faculty of Health Science was in the initial proposal of the National Working Group (NWG), to have the faculty transferred to the University of Fort Hare in Alice or semi-managed by Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University; as the faculty had established health resource centres across the Eastern Cape region, inclusive of East London and Port Elizabeth. Secondly, Prof Morgan as an Administrator (MAA), in his 2001 report to the Minister indicated that the Faculty of Health Science was not financially viable as an independent unit and required the financial assistance of UNITRA’s other faculty resources, especially the former faculty of Law and Arts, where the student enrolments were large.
Section B.1: Professor Nicholas (Nicky) I. Morgan

Professor N.I. Morgan tenure as Vice-Chancellor’ (VC) and Principal at the University of Transkei (UNITRA) was from October 2002 to June 2005.

Prof. N.I. Morgan left Cape Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT) to join University of Western Cape (UWC), as senior lecturer. He went on to become an Associate Professor. He served as Dean on the Faculty for one and half terms. Prof. Morgan was familiar with transformation issues and dealing with external political agendas of the university.

(Photograph, Permission of W.S.U VC 2007. Copyright W.S.U.)

Prof. Morgan was appointed as a UNITRA Vice-Chancellor and Principal in November 2004. His involvement in the university was very diverse, from academic issues to students and union issues. During his tenure, he supported the revitalisation of the academic project and growth in its research and publications output. His appointment was welcomed by the stakeholders, who had also nominated him as a candidate for the position\textsuperscript{104}. There was a reduction in the staff complement of 1300 posts in 1997 to 629 in 2002 during his previous tenure and a recovery from an operating deficit of R31 million in 1998 to a balanced budget in 2002, in spite of the reduction in the SAPSE funding of R30 million. A proposal had been sent to the Ministry of Education for the establishment of the ‘International Centre of Rural

\textsuperscript{104} Nomination of Candidate for the Position of Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the University of Transkei, signed by Stakeholders – Appendix LV
Development’ (Office of the Vice-Chancellor, 2002). Morgan re-energised a return to good governance at UNITRA and produced four consecutive unqualified audit reports for the first time in many years.

- **UNITRA Students**

Inclusive was the steady growth of students, as indicated below in Table 27 from 2003 to 2006. The table also shows that 2003 would mark a steady increase in student numbers that was reflective in the government subsidy obtained.

**Table 27:** Faculty, Student Numbers and Government Subsidy (2003-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACULTY</th>
<th>Year and Student Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Science</td>
<td>1,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine &amp; Health Science</td>
<td>871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,783</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-Time Students</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-Time Students</td>
<td>4,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Government Subsidy</td>
<td><strong>94,014,146</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(UNITRA Academic Planner, 2000, p. 08; Unitra SENATE, 2002[annexure I]).
Section B.2: MERGER PERIOD UNDER PROF. N.I. MORGAN

- Walter Sisulu University Interim Phase

The announcement from the Ministry that UNITRA to merge with Border Technikon and Eastern Cape Technikon in 2004 to become a comprehensive higher education institution created a ‘flurry of activities’. The concept of Comprehensive Universities in South Africa was to dismantle the binary divide between the Universities and Technikons. With the intention of meeting a range of goals identified in the National Plan and central to the human resources development strategy. However, the reality was the creation of a ‘Tri-cycle’ alignment of programme-qualification mixes and a new educational ethos. The official merger date of December 2004, for the 3 institutions to become Walter Sisulu University (W.S.U) was postponed to June 2005. The institutions were not ready academically, financially and psychologically. Prof. Morgan had already got the co-operation of UNITRA human resources and the unions (NEHAWU and NTESU) through the agreement of retrenched staff in 2002; followed by the compliance of the freezing positions due to financial constraints; forfeiting salary increases according to inflation for a fifth year running and curtail of promotions. The price was high with staff morale at its lowest and high academic retention turnover rate. UNITRA was to enter another phase of uncertainty. Morgan states, however “there was a turnaround and a break-even budget by the time we entered merger” (Nkanyuza, 2012c, p. 08).

- Interim Governance

The three merged institutions led to having three Vice-Chancellors and a top heavy middle management. Prof. Morgan became the interim VC for the merged institution and an interim
Council led by Prof. Patrick Fitzgerald as the Chairperson. There were compromises on administrative and academic efficiencies and effectiveness during the merger. The issue at W.S.U was which groups and/or stakeholders were willing to compromise, in terms of their jobs, competence and salary. For instance, with three merged institutions resulted in three Vice-Chancellors and a top heavy middle management. The process of aligning the organogram of management started in 2006, with a permanent VC who commenced duties in mid-2007. W.S.U organogram was not completed. The organisation structure was top-heavy at the initial stages of merger. With the assimilation of administration staff, the middle levels of the organisational structure became overloaded laden in terms of human capacity. Costs are incurred with new salary packages, re-training, amalgamation of offices, header paper. The tensions created an institutional climate of insecurity and uncertainty.

- **Human Resources and Stakeholders**

Challenges faced were shortage of qualified candidates for academic posts and skilled support staff and administrative staff. At the former UNITRA, the staffing situation was compounded by the freezing of positions due to financial constraints, management directives and the total salary package offered, from 2000. Most of the Technikon academic staff required upgrading to honours and master’s level to be universally recognised as a university staff. The geographical locations and proximity of campuses posed a great challenge to WSU. Four campuses with the Nelson Mandela campus, the former UNITRA based in Mthatha; Buffalo City campus, the former Border Technikon based in East London; Ibikia campus, the former Eastern Cape Technikon based in Butterworth and Queenstown Campus, which was affiliated to the former Eastern Cape Technikon. The Mthatha campus is approximately 253 kms to Buffalo City Campus; 220kms to Queenstown and 120kms to the Butterworth

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105 Patrick Fitzgerald had previously worked at the former UNITRA in the early 1980s, as a lecturer.
Campus. Scattered across this range were 11 delivery sites. Additionally, the 3 three merged institutions were (technically) financially bankrupt. The student population was approximately 24,000 with staff component of 2,000. Due to the geographic position and location of the 4 campuses, there was inadequate accommodation for students, challenges in the provision of service delivery requirements and community needs (Neil Butcher Report, 2006).

The strains imposed by the geographic locations of 230km between campuses and 11 scattered sites compromised to some degree the ability to offer consistent quality education; difficulties with attracting and retaining high calibre staff to remote areas and rural areas. The organogram structure was increased to incorporate multi-campus management; duplication of duties and tasks; lack or no clarity on job descriptions and some staff members who had to alternate meeting places. The alternative meeting places, so as not to be seen as favouring any of the former institutions, meant staff spent a lot of time on the road. For instance, Prof. Morgan during the 27 months of the merger period reckoned he spent a total of 150 days simply driving between the various sites. Although technology could have reduced some of the strains, integrating a common ICT/technology would have been costly, required constant electricity and a change in the ‘mind-set’/attitudes of people, who prefer to speak ‘face to face’ rather than through a ‘machine’, be it teleconferences, e-mails or videoconferences. The relationship of stakeholders with Prof. Morgan at the initial stages was welcoming. As the interim merger phase processed, organisational cultural differences and expectations started to emerge between the 3 institutions. Discontent, tensions and hostility among the human
members (staff) and Morgan; stakeholders and Morgan started emerging. For instance, the National Tertiary Education of Staff Union\(^\text{106}\) (NTESU) as 1\(^{\text{st}}\) applicant sent the University of Transkei as 1\(^{\text{st}}\) respondent and Nicholas I. Morgan as 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) respondent, court papers\(^\text{107}\) on the issue of salary harmonisation. Though the case was dropped due to the increasing costs of lawyers, the issue of salary harmonisation was not resolved for former UNITRA staff. On the other hand, NEHAWU who were split into three different branches\(^\text{108}\), showed their discontent by strike action and/or coming to the Mthatha (Nelson Mandela Campus) to demonstrate for salary increases and better working conditions. In those instances, property was damaged, as the strike actions had become more volatile in nature. Seemingly, the culture of aggressive behaviour was encouraged by rewards, as the salary increases were obtained due to the reinforced ‘cause and effect’ factors.

- **Programme-Qualification-Mix**

Following the visit to the former UNITRA by the ‘Working Group’, Chaired by Dr. Mamphele Ramphele in 2005, a report was sent to the Minister of Education, Naledi Pandor.

\(^{106}\) I, the researcher was the Branch Chairperson for NTESU at that point in time

\(^{107}\) In the High Court of South Africa (Transkei Division), in the matter between National Tertiary Education Staff Union as first applicant; academic Staff Association of UNITRA as second applicant and Walter Sisulu University and Science, Eastern Cape as first respondent; Professor Partrick Fitzgerald as second respondent; Professor Nicholas Ismael Morgan as third respondent and Mr IB Ravnsborg as forth respondent. Notice of Motion 2005-11-02. Case N0: 1096/2005

\(^{108}\) The former institutions of the merged W.S.U. had NEHAWU internal branch structures, and members operated within the given institutional culture. The institutional culture of the former institutions differed in perspectives and ethos. These differences added to the tensions and power struggles, prior and after the merger of one consolidated W.S.U. NEHAWU branch.
After assessing the WG’s report\textsuperscript{109}, amongst other reports, the Minister delayed the merger date of W.S.U due to some concerns\textsuperscript{110}. The Minister also pronounced on the academic configuration of WSU. In the correspondence\textsuperscript{111} to Prof. Fitzgerald, W.S.U interim Chairperson, the Minister stated that:

“I wish to state, however, that a condition to the merger is that the new institution will be a comprehensive institution offering predominantly (at least 70%) technikon-type programmes, the details of which I will discuss with the Interim Council shortly. In the meantime, it should be noted that no new programmes would be considered by my Ministry. In addition, the institutions are requested not to introduce on existing sites programmes that are currently not offered on the site, including offering university-type programmes in the East London area”

(Minister Pandor, 2005).

There has been a debate about the standard of a Bachelor of Technology (BTech) degree and its equivalence to a bachelor degree from a university. Historically, generic disciplines have been the foundation of knowledge acquisition, leading to specialisation that can be professional based. These disciplines were based mainly on theoretical research enquiry. Most professional disciplines evolved after the industrial revolution (Cooper & Subotzky, 2001). Professional disciples to date are very practically oriented, with research taking place within the field. For example, after the ‘leaped advancement’ of the world wars, medicine

\textsuperscript{109} Working Group to Advise the Minister of Education on the Establishment of Walter Sisulu University (W.S.U) – Appendix LV1

\textsuperscript{110} Letter to ‘Mr L.N.Capa, Chair of Council, University of Transkei’ – Appendix LV11

\textsuperscript{111} Letter to Professor Patrick Fitzgerald, Interim Chairperson of Council, from the Minister of Education, Naledi Pandor on the establishment of the Walter Sisulu University for Technology and Science, Eastern Cape. – Appendix LV111
would become more advanced and knowledge-oriented. Technology careers are a recent phenomenon, with its emerging thrust this century. Technology disciplines within University of Technology are career related and generally non-research based.

**Figure 4: Pathways of Knowledge Acquisition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATION</th>
<th>BINARY SYSTEM</th>
<th>GENERIC QUALIFICATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOCTORS</td>
<td></td>
<td>SCIENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NURSES</td>
<td></td>
<td>HUMANITIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAWYERS</td>
<td></td>
<td>COMMERCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEACHERS</td>
<td></td>
<td>BUSINESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL WORKERS</td>
<td></td>
<td>ECONOMICS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYCHOLOGISTS</td>
<td></td>
<td>SOCIOLOGY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCOUNTANTS</td>
<td></td>
<td>PHILOSOPHY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LANGUAGES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TECHNOLOGY-APPLIED CAREER RELATED COURSES**

ENGINEERING-TECHNICIAN – [National Diploma], HOSPITALITY & TOURISM, ADMINISTRATION, FASHION, SECRETARIAL, FOOD & BEVERAGE, OFFICE MANAGEMENT & TECHNOLOGY, COMMERCIAL PRACTICE.

(Created by Nkanyuza, 2012)

Narrowing the tri-cycle to research production would create a homogeny system in the long term with restrictions on the expansion of knowledge in broad terms. However this is not to state the impossibility of a tri-cycle system, as long as acknowledgement of the co-existing parts are recognised. There is also a question of the appropriateness of higher degrees for some job-related subjects. The old technikon system tended to value industry experience above high academic qualification. Thus to teach a diploma course, it was sufficient to have a
Bachelor of Technology with some industry experience. The primary function of technikons would be training students who are able to apply scientific (or scholarly) principles within the context of a specific career or vocation (Cloete, 2004, 2002). The courses at technikons would focus application of knowledge as indicated in the figure above rather than abstract thinking and scientific or scholarly approaches to knowledge, as with university students. In the interests of chasing the enhanced status as “university” is this industry experience now going to be demoted in favour of more academic experience: PhDs in book-keeping and Fashion Design? There might be a stronger argument for encouraging such industry-experienced staff to get their higher degrees in education rather than in their discipline, so that they can improve the teaching and learning in their part of the merged University.

However, an opportunity lost in the re-configuration of W.S. U. curriculum, would reverberate in the words of Prof. Morgan; as presented at the joint conference on mergers in 2003. Morgan had stated,

“the tragic truth is that many mergers are endangered simply because the leaders cannot set their egos and individual interests aside for the greater good embodied in the new institution. If we cannot be vision and mission driven we will soon be party to dragging the merger processes in which we are involved, into all sorts of petty and personal maneuverings and the scoring of points at one another’s expense. Going into a merger, even having a direction statement with its vision, mission and values framework, without clarity on the curriculum which will give effect to this vision is, in my view, simply inviting trouble. Our staff will simply follow our example and do the same! Staff is in any case going to attempt to fight their own particular turf battles by setting institutional leaderships up against one another.

(Morgan, 2003, pp. 02-03).
• Finances

Prof. Morgan by the W.S.U merger date of June 2005 had managed to turn the financial debt of UNITRA into the black and with audit approval. The finances of W.S.U were under severe strain, as prior to merger, Eastern Cape Technikon had gone ahead with promotions and salary increases. Border Technikon had spent all its reserves and salaries had been increased. Although there was a single bank account, effectively all three institutions were operating independently.

The re-occurring income was the salary disparity and lack of harmonisation of salaries between the three institutions. The merger guidelines does not address the disparities and/or conflict of salaries, differing conditions of services, nor offer ‘blank cheques’ for mergers. Rather government merger funds were specific in usage.

Table 28: Income and Personnel Costs Budget for 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Walter Sisulu University (WSU)</th>
<th>Nelson Mandela Drive (Mthatha)</th>
<th>Buffalo City (East London)</th>
<th>Ibikia (Butterworth)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reoccurring Income</td>
<td>591,690,063</td>
<td>273,700,599</td>
<td>137,902,114</td>
<td>180,087,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Costs</td>
<td>423,776,570</td>
<td>176,737,173</td>
<td>113,588,305</td>
<td>133,451,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of personnel Costs over re-occurring costs</td>
<td>71.62</td>
<td>64.57</td>
<td>82.37</td>
<td>74.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Costs per DOE guidelines</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Morgan, 2006, p. 03).

The 3 institutions merged with differing salary scales and grades. The two Technikons were already on peromnes grading systems and the former UNITRA had its’ salary grading system
that was independent and unique to the institution. The projected cash flow for the year 2007 was highlighted. The reality was that Council and Prof. Balintulo (VC) worked on zero-based finances. The Ministry of Education (DHET) was informed about the financial dire situation of W.S.U. as indicated in table 29.

Table 29: Projections for March 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projections of Institutional Cash Flow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated Cash Flow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mthatha Business Unit (Umtata)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibika Business Unit (Butterworth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffulo Business Unit (East London)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Morgan, 2006, p. 04).

There was a projection deficit of R58 million and a bank overdraft of R34.5 million. Operation costs had been budgeted as tightly as possible, without complete collapse. Banks required ‘bank guarantees’ from the Ministry of education for loans and necessary operational expenditure given to W.S.U.

Table 30: Draft W.S.U Budget Requirements for 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount description</th>
<th>Walter Sisulu University (WSU)</th>
<th>Nelson Mandela Drive (Mthatha)</th>
<th>Buffulo City (East London)</th>
<th>Ibikia (Butterworth)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net Surplus/(Deficit)</td>
<td>58 461 760</td>
<td>15 227 192</td>
<td>27 091 176</td>
<td>16 143 392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After Depreciation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Morgan, 2006, p. 04).
With the establishment of Walter Sisulu University (WSU) on 1 July, 2005 in terms of the Higher Education Act No 101 of 1997, as amended; Prof. Morgan in his capacity as an interim VC led UNITRA through the integrated phase of the merger into WSU. The merger of UNITRA, Eastern Cape Technikon and Border Technikon from July 2005 through to December 2006 had extreme intra-organisational dynamics and within an intensive inter-organisational political climate.
6.5 POSTSCRIPT OF WALTER SISULU UNIVERSITY (W.S.U)

Section A: ‘Broken Dreams’ - Professor Malusi Marcus Balintulo

Professor Malusi Marcus Balintulo’s tenure as Vice-Chancellor’ (VC) and Principal at Walter Sisulu University (W.S.U) was from 01 January 2007 to December 2011

Prof. M.M. Balintulo holds a PhD in Sociology from the University of Warwick. He has worked extensively as a lecturer in Departments of Sociology both in South Africa and internationally. He has published extensively in academic journals on a wide range of sociology topics since 1974 and is on a number of boards nationally. He has contributed to the educational transformation of higher education in South Africa.

(Photograph, Permission of W.S.U VC 2007. Copyright W.S.U.)

• Leadership and Governance

Following his appointment\textsuperscript{112} at Walter Sisulu University (W.S.U), Prof. Balintulo attended and participated in various statutory, institutional and workshop meetings, to get an in-depth of the issues and challenges facing Walter Sisulu University (W.S.U). Top executive management and incumbents for key held positions within W.S.U. were recruited from

\textsuperscript{112}Ex-Peninsula head leads the pack for Vice-Chancellor post at W.S.U - Appendix L1X
outside the former institutions. Key positions such as ‘Dean of Students’, Director of Human Resources, Chief Financial Officer and the top executive management (DVCs) were recruited simultaneously. The recruited incumbents had no insight of the institutional cultures, historical dynamics and needs of the former institutions. This lack of insight and/or knowledge had consequences on the operations of W.S.U., as the new incumbents relied on former employees and union activists/leaders. A number of the union leaders were in positions of middle management and although there was an initial ‘buy-in’ of co-operation, this would diminish. Committees were set up and the process of the institutional corporate organogram (Office of the Registrar, 2008) and the institutional operating plan was to be accelerated. Council, chaired by Dr. Fikeni\textsuperscript{113} and Prof. Balintulo as the VC were euphoric by the prospective new beginnings of W.S.U as a comprehensive institution. Ventures were planned and new policies initiated. Government was expected to assist financially with the enforced mega-merged institution named W.S.U.

However, by 2009, W.S.U in financial crises was barely managing to pay salaries. Retrenchment processes instigated and/or re-skilling of staff was delayed due ‘territorial protection’ by staff and unions. Salary harmonisation by the unions was impeded and then distorted. Salary costs were 72% of the subsidiary provided. The question of frequent trips and costs, to and from East London, by Balintulo and other staff members was raised by the stakeholders; more especially from the unions. Negative media coverage on the Balintulo and the Chairperson of Council emerged. With Council emotions running high from the negative media coverage of Dr. Fikeni as the Council Chairperson (Botha, 2008a)\textsuperscript{114}, Prof. M. Xaba-

\textsuperscript{113} Somadoda Fikeni was a student and later an employee at the former UNITRA.

\textsuperscript{114} Media coverage of Dr. Fikeni from Daily Dispatch – Appendix LX
Mokoena\textsuperscript{115}, one of the ministerial appointee to Council resigned. Similarly, some other council members followed suit, by either abstaining from council meetings or resigning. Council executive and/or Council chairperson held meetings with the Minister/DHET and Council was informed afterwards. Decisions made by the Executive rectified later by Council increased disproportionally. The CFO stopped providing Council with financial statements on the operations of W.S.U. There was lack of transparency at Council, including the question of the numerous bank accounts brought to light and raised in Council. W.S.U was in a predicament. Prof. Morgan stated that

“bad governance brings a university to its knees. All the things on paper can be meaningless, including whether the financial implementations are negative or positive. Marcus (Prof. Balintulo) under estimated the needs of UNITRA. UNITRA is in Intensive Care Unit (ICU) and you have to be constantly on hand to address its needs”

(Nkanyuza, 2012c).

Compounding the above W.S.U crisis was the student unrest and violence in August and September 2010 that resulted “in an unfortunate hostage-taking ordeal of staff members that lasted for 4 hours” (Balintulo, 2010, p.01). The students’ grievances ranged from interference into proceeding of a disciplinary case against a staff member, to complaints about the SENATE exclusion clause of Rule 8 that bars a student from readmission based on academic grounds. Higher Education South Africa (HESA)\textsuperscript{116} in response to the unrest at WSU stated that

\textsuperscript{115} Professor M. Xaba-Mokoena was the first Dean of the Faculty of Health Sciences and Medicine at the former UNITRA

\textsuperscript{116} Higher Education South Africa (HESA) as an organisation, is led by the Vice-Chancellors of all Public Universities
“Prof Marcus Balintulo, as the Vice-Chancellor cannot simply waive rules in order to appease students, especially when there are already appropriate channels in place to deal with grievances. In fact, if he were to do so, he would be transgressing the very principle of sound governance.”

(Balintulo, 2010, p. 25).

However, as Morgan pointed out, Balintulo underestimated the influence of cohesive groups at WSU that required him as a VC to be attentive to their needs, whilst maintaining an academic enterprise.

- **Inter-organisational Relationship with Government**

The merger of three institutions with differing remunerations, programme-mixes, geographical locations, institutional cultures added to the financial crises and mis-management of W.S.U. Prof. M.M. Balintulo and Dr. S.Fikeni, the Chairperson of Council on the 21 December 2010, wrote to the Minister Blade Nzimande of DHET, 2010 for assistance. Prof. M.M. Balintulo and Dr. S.Fikeni, the Chairperson of Council on the 21 December 2010, wrote to the Minister Blade Nzimande of DHET, 2010 for assistance. In the correspondence, Prof. M.M. Balintulo informed the Minister that there is “a deeper structural challenge that arises from the nature of our merger of disadvantaged and under-resourced institutions to form Walter Sisulu University” (Balintulo, 2011, p. 01). A joint statement of

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117 HESA’s Press Statement on the 17th September 2010 – Appendix LXI
118 The researcher (Ms. S. N.Nkanyuza) was an academic Council representative from 2007 to 2011
119 Minister Blade Nzimande of Higher Education and Training from 2009 has had an illustrious career. He was also a UNITRA council member during the tenure of Professor A. Moleah, from 1994 to 1997.
120 Dr. S. Fikeni states “Walter Sisulu Can Be Saved” – Appendix LXII
W.S.U Council and the Minister on the 12 July 2011 confirmed that “many of the problems at W.S.U are structural and systemic, and are historical symptoms” (Balintulo, 2011, p. 02).

Prof. D. Ncayiyana, appointed as an Independent Assessor by DHET (Ministry of Education, 2011a) was required to make recommendations on how effective financial and proper governance at W.S.U could be restored. Prof. D. Ncayiyana investigative duration of 3 weeks stated,

“WSU is not a going concern. The institution has severe cash flow problems and battles to meet payroll from month to month. At its founding on 1 July 2005, two of the three merging institutions were insolvent with the third on the way to insolvency, and WSU has operated on a deficit budget for the last five years. WSU has frequently found it necessary to commandeering ring-fenced funds earmarked for infrastructure and research grants to pay for salaries. The institution has constant difficulties paying its creditors, and has required ever increasing overdraft facilities to stay afloat. Recent investigations by at least two financial management agencies have predicted that, without intervention, WSU is destined for huge and ever-increasing deficits in the coming years. WSU currently spends roughly 80% of its operating budget on personnel costs, which is unsustainable and well above the norm”.

(Ministry of Higher Education and Training, 2011b, p.03).

Prof. Balintulo in response to the Independent Assessor report into the affairs of W.S.U, indicated that the negative portray of the institution was unfounded, particularly as executive management were not interviewed. Furthermore Balintulo stated

“the report has presented an extremely unbalanced view of the state of the state of the University. All the good and outstanding work of the University, resulting from
selfless sacrifice and dedication of many of its students, staff, management and Council over the last six years has been ignored in favour of the negative aspects of the institutional culture”

(Balintulo, 2010, p. 04).

In a special meeting between W.S.U Council and DHET’ representatives, headed by Gwebinkude Qonde, Director-General; discussions rotated on the Assessor’s report. W.S.U Council tabled their resignation to DHET. The resignation of W.S.U. Council was rejected by DHET representatives, in terms of the vacuum of governance and legal procedures stemming from the Higher Education Act of 1997 and subsequent amendments. The Independent Assessor’s report, a source of dispute was agreed by DHET representatives to be toned down. A 2nd joint media statement by DHET and W.S.U Council was announced. UNITRA’s unresolved problems surfaced in W.S.U.

\(^{121}\) Response to the Report of the Independent Assessor into the Affairs of Walter Sisulu University: 12 October 2011 – Appendix LXIII
Section B: ‘Whither W.S.U’ - Professor Lourens van Staden

Professor Lourens van Staden was appointed as the Ministerial Appointed Administrator (MAA) at Walter Sisulu University (W.S.U) from 01 January 2011 to April 2014.

Prof. L. van Staden, Deputy Vice-Chancellor from University of Technology (TUT), was appointed as MAA by DHET to W.S.U for 2 and a half years. He previously had extensive experience in developing policy, played a leading role as an initiator and co-developer of qualifications for Universities of Technology. Prof. van Staden and his select team consisting of Consultants and ‘expertise’ commenced at W.S.U in January 2012.

(Photograph of MAA at W.S.U from 2012-2014: Copyright W.S.U.)

- Leadership and Governance

Prof. van Staden’s role as a Ministerial Appointed Administrator (MAA)\(^{122}\) was to implement a ‘turnaround strategy’ of WSU. The ‘turnaround strategy’ was transforming W.S.U from a crisis mode condition into a viable academic enterprise. The Ministry of Higher Education and Training (DHET) provided van Staden with various expertise and the appointment of external technical persons to augment capacity in four focus areas:

1. Finance
2. Human Resources

\(^{122}\) Prof. van Staden’s Terms of Reference – Appendix LXIV
3. Information Communication Technology and

4. The Academic Enterprise.

Prof. van Staden

“stressed the point that Walter Sisulu University is a national asset; a jewel in higher education that belongs to the people of South Africa, particularly the Youth, and the Province of the Eastern Cape. He reiterated government’s strong support for the Turnaround of Walter Sisulu University and emphasised that this university has to succeed”

(Church, 2011, p. 02).

A turnaround summit was held from the 24-26 October 2012, “where all stakeholders were represented” (Church, 2012, p. 01) and informed that there were 8 targeted projects. These targeted projects indicated was institutional governance; the academic project; the student governance; financial management; ICI infrastructure; human resources management; teaching, learning technology and equipment; and physical infrastructure and resource planning. Government was to inject an estimated R1.7 billion in the realisation of the projects. Rather than demerge, W.S.U was to operate as a federal organisation with each of the four campuses having their own ‘Rector’, managerial positions, human division sector and financial systems.

As indicated in the W.S.U bulletin of June 2013, “WSU Turnaround is not a Quick-fix” (Church, 2013, p. 01) and there was to be disagreements between the Administrator and students, between the Administrator and unions. Disagreements with the students resulted in

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123 W.S.U. Turn a Positive Corner – Appendix LXVI
the strike action of students in 2013 and 2014, and security personnel getting injured. The July to August 2013 disagreement between the Administrator and the unions over salary increases resulted in ‘lock-outs’ and delayed salaries withheld for a month. Co-operation with the Administrator and communication channels though muddled, did not detract from the onward progress of the turnaround projects. The Administrator’s term was extended by 6 months. Some of the team members had already left. With Council in place, April 2014, Prof. van Staden’s term as an Administrator was at an end (Church, 2014).

Incumbents placed in top management and some middle management positions were acting, until substantial incumbents were recruited. Prof. Khaya Mfenyana was nominated as the acting VC. Prof. van Staden’s elected as one of the Ministerial appointee to Council was nominated by Council members to the position of Chairperson of Council. There are two pathways. Firstly, in nominating van Staden as a Chairperson of Council, a move from operational to governance structures, might blur the lines between both levels and proves to be disastrous. An unintended consequence of the action may be a ‘conflict of interest’ between the forthcoming VC and himself as Chairperson of Council. Or the second pathway is the nomination of van Staden as the Chairperson of Council may have been a brilliant move for continuous monitoring of projects initiated, re-configuration of the systems, resource independence from government and institutional accountability of W.S.U’s future. Success or failure, the stakes and costs are high.

- **Inter-organisational Relationship with Government**

The Ministry of Higher Education and Training in committing themselves to the rebuilding of W.S.U sent an Administrator, who was accompanied by a team. The Administrator and the
team were to enable the implementation of targeted projects in the turnaround strategy for W.S.U. Part of the strategy for W.S.U was a new institutional statute (Ministry of Higher Education and Training, 2014b). Innovative and comprehensive in nature, the new institutional statute gave W.S.U. a framework for stakeholders to operate within and creates a possible cultural ethos for the institution. The statute also gives a guideline on the composition, mode of communication, conduct of behaviour and role expectation of all stakeholders, particular that students and unions.

On the 25th of March, the Minister, Dr. Blade Nzimande stated at the joint summit of DHET and W.S.U that a road had been mapped out for W.S.U. He indicated that the institution had obtained a “break-even budget for 2014 and admirably achieved an unqualified audit for 2013” The onus therefore was on all stakeholders to take W.S.U forward its growth and development.

6.6 CONCLUSION

The demarcation of the positions and the structural levels of UNITRA by post 1994 were intertwined with the cultural norms of the stakeholders. Most of the administrative staff and support staff were from Transkei. Transkeians, like any other groupings, required work as a means of getting money and survival. Thus UNITRA as an employer became an employment hub for Transkeians and many others. The cultural references and the shared linguistic commonalities made each stakeholder (students, academic staff, management and support staff) a cohesive group with their own motivations and interests. The auditor-general report clearly points out there were lack of planning and lack of financial controls. This was especially the case with Prof. Moleah. His lack of identifying the key situational variables, 124 Dr. B. Nzimande’s speech at the Mthatha Health Centre in Mthatha on 25th March 2014 – Appendix LVX
the forms of organisational structure and the systems of management added to an already existing problem. Unfortunately his leadership characteristics, bringing in a culturally different form of management style and undermining both superiors (Council) and subordinates made matters worse. He used his ‘legitimate-position’ as a VC and power in enhancing his leadership practices, which were not ‘value-free. Reflective of his leadership practices are the forms of transactions used whilst communicating internally and externally. Unfortunately, the reliance on the redress fund, which did not materialise, whilst new building constructions were taking place at UNITRA speeded the process of deterioration at UNITRA. UNITRA might have recovered following the leadership of Prof. Moleah, however with the educational landscape transforming rapidly, this would not be the case.

Needless to state, the similarity between the apartheid era and the democratic era of post 1994, gives rise to serious concerns, such that “it is striking – though depressingly, how ‘society’ and the ‘needs of society’ become, in the end, code or cover-word for the needs of the economy” (Higgins, 2001, p. 10). The changes in legislations impacted on UNITRA. With an unstable governance structure, UNITRA’s leadership was affected by the changes in legislations, and the inability to change policies and procedures in line with the legislations. The internal organisational arrangements reflected the difficulties the VCs faced, not only at the former UNITRA, but also at W.S.U. The reflected difficulties faced by VCs, were wide-ranging. Such as, the vacancies in the top management structures; the human resources capacity that required training and re-training, competency, accountability and performance appraisals; the stakeholders with competing and sometimes conflicting interests; the students situated within pre-determined contextual features; the existence or lack of existence of a Council and the financial factors.
Noted within the Council documents was ‘the Special Assistant’ to the VCs. Up to 1996, a special assistant had a Ph.D. qualification (chapter 06). The academic expertise of the ‘Special Assistant’ allows the VCs to keep up to date on academic standards as illustrated in the Council documents of pre 1994, the transformational changes and legislation as indicated in chapter 06. Following 1996, ‘the special assistant’ with their qualification at honours level performed various other duties to the VC(s). As perceived by stakeholders, the role of the 'special assistant' shifted from centring UNITRA as an academic enterprise to the appointment of individuals who were less qualified to be an advisor to the VC. Also a reflection on the VCs’ expectations and requirements of what special assistant should be.

Substantive issues that are confirmable and easier to measure are mainly from the Council documents, financial reports, legislation and correspondence from the Ministry of Education. For instance the correspondence of Prof. Kader Asmal to UNITRA on the moratoriums (chapter 06) or on the court cases indicated in chapter 06. Another measurable event was the merger of the 3 institutions that increased the staff complement (see constructed tabulation of time-lines; chapter 06) with a heavy middle management level without specific job descriptions and/or evaluations of the positions, compounded matters. Overall, the combination of events at the former UNITRA and leading to the establishment of W.S.U. created tensions within the organisational structures and unintended consequences that resulted in the lack of development of the institution.

Higher Education Institutions such as W.S.U need to find mechanisms of strengthening their systems of institutional governance, which does not make the institution susceptible to state steering and/or state intervention mechanisms of control. Perhaps, most importantly as Alexander (2003) indicated, is at the very least, HEIs like W.S.U have to ask themselves
which constituencies they can and should prioritise, within their environmental context, and also within the context of local and national development in their pursuit for knowledge.
7.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews the research questions in relation to the case study of the Vice-Chancellors (VCs) leadership, managerial practices and politics at the former UNITRA (University of Transkei) with a post-script of Walter Sisulu University (W.S.U). The case study is interdisciplinary in nature, with subject matters such as politics, history, law, education, economics and organisation behaviour. Due to the complexity of this case study there is ‘no one best fits all’ theory. Therefore the amalgamated theories discussed in the literature review of Chapter 03, reviews and proposes different multi-facets of the VCs at UNITRA, and the implications for UNITRA as a Higher Education Institution. In short the theories seek to reconcile each VC’s behaviour and working conditions to the developmental growth of UNITRA; given the socio-political context in which the VCs had to negotiate.

Among the theories raised in the literature review of chapter 03, was the critical component of human agency, group dynamics and ‘the human relations in human resources’. Even the interplay of individuals within group dynamics, such as (Asmal, Hadland & Levy, 2011)’s comment that “Trevor Manuel-with a twinkle in his eye- said to Zuma”, is an expression that cannot be measured, but rather speculated about, indications the ‘pathway’ of decision-making. It was noted, that it is important for leaders (VCs) to take cognisance of group dynamics and the human relations side (as least as much as the finance), foster a system of communications and consultation stakeholders (including government), so as to enable change interventions when required.
The case study of the VCs at UNITRA is contextualised within the historical continuum of South Africa that chronologies the VCs at UNITRA. The historical continuum is based on the archetypes of Hughes-Warrington (2008), as discussed in chapter 03, section 3.7.2 (p.95-98).

This study sought to answer several research questions. The research questions were subdivided into two parts. The two parts are the key research questions and the subsidiary research questions. The two key research questions were running threads throughout the assessment of the VCs’ leadership and managerial practices at UNITRA. Starting with the two key questions, the research questions sought to answer:

1. How far were the leadership and managerial practices of UNITRA’s Vice-Chancellors shaped by prevailing politics of the apartheid system, and of the new democratic government post 1994?
2. What navigational methods of leadership and managerial practices did the VCs use within the given prevailing political climate in dealing with the internal stakeholder(s) at UNITRA and the external stakeholder(s) such as government?

**Subsidiary Research Questions**

3. To what extent did the managerial structures with regard to governance contribute to the crises periods from 1994 to 2004?
4. How did the different leadership and managerial practices of the Vice-Chancellors impact on the governance structure at UNITRA as a higher education institution?
5. How have the South African political events influenced institutional governance at UNITRA?
6. How did the shift in state policies influence the running of UNITRA?
7. To what extent has there been a shift in the state control of UNITRA from its establishment in 1976 to the State Steering mechanisms that resulted in UNITRA’s fate in 2004?

However, the answers sought to the research questions are not restricted to one section and can be answered in more than one section. Nor are the answers sought for the research question, in sequential order as above.

In addressing the research questions, the format of this chapter is divided into three main segments ‘UNITRA’s structure and Communication’, as the first segment, discusses and reviews this study, with specific reference to the subsidiary research questions of 5, 6 and 7. The secondly segment, ‘The State and Resources Dependency’, again addresses the research questions of 5, 6 and 7, by reviewing the relationship of the State with the VCs at the former UNITRA and W.S.U. The third segment of this chapter discusses and reviews the VCs’ leadership and managerial practices, by using the theoretical framework discussed in the literature review of chapter 3. The application of the theoretical concepts of transformative leadership, managerial leadership, crisis leadership and new managerialism, as discussed in the literature review chapter of 03, section 3.3 and 3.4; speaks directly to the key research questions of 1 and, 2, plus the subsidiary research question 3. In answering the research questions, frequent references will be made of UNITRA’s VCs in chapter 5 and chapter 6 of this study. Again, the theoretical concepts are not ‘one best fits all’ the circumstances of VCs, but rather the theories give an in-depth insight and analyses into what transpired at UNITRA with the VCs. Also noted are some of the evolving leadership and managerial theories are being applied retrospective to events that occurred in the past within differing socio-political contexts.
Finally, by contextualising this case study within a historical continuum of South Africa and Transkei, the research question of ‘how have the South African political events influenced institutional governance at UNITRA?’, is underpinned by the background information leading to the establishment of UNITRA and the assessment of the VCs at UNITRA to date.

7.2. UNITRA AND W.S.U

7.2.1 Structure and Systems

In answering the subsidiary research question of point 4, the structure, systems and governance of Higher Education Universities has significant implications for individuals such as Vice-Chancellors (VCs) and various groups. This significance is linked to the effectiveness, objectives and goals that subscribes to, and with regard to what a university is or should be (chapter 03, ‘Purpose of a University’, section 3.4).

In the establishment of UNITRA, the structure was bureaucratic in nature, which seemed to adhere strictly to Weber’s bureaucratic principles (chapter 03). The lessons learnt was with the increase of creation of posts, the redesign of the structural levels was not addressed (Grieves, 2010). With the instability of the ‘transition phase’ cognisance of university statutory bodies like senate and relevant university committees where consultations and participation of stakeholders took place was not adhered to, as according to a bureaucratic structure. In agreement with Nkondo (2010), a western form of bureaucracy, as according to Weber would not work within the rural-geographical setting of UNITRA. The restructuring of UNITRA was not adequately addressed, as indicated in the disclosure document; VCs (chapter 06) reviewed and prioritised the financial state of UNITRA, as the primary factor. For instance the high turnover of academic, the resignations of senior academic, the
reconfiguration of 6 faculties into 4 faculties and the realisation that the faculty of Health Sciences was interdependent on the other faculties (chapter 06). The government emphasis on science, mathematics and technology also influenced some of the factors above; the student capping; the non-harmonisation of salaries of W.S.U; non-clarity on the merged institutional organogram and the prescribed programme-mix (chapter 06).

Constant changes triggered by the internal dynamics of UNITRA, political flux and changes in the regulatory mechanisms played an instrumental part in UNITRA’s crises. The changes themselves were not the causal factors; rather the combination of uncertainty and non-existent periods of stability to effect new changes were the consequential effect. For instance, there had been insecurity relating to retrenchments of personnel, particularly of unskilled and/or semi-skilled; the ‘constant threats of closure’, late payments of salaries and lack of promotions; as in the case of academics post 1994 (chapter 06). This was most evident during the Ministerial Appointed Administrators (MAA) and forthwith, with regards to the leadership and managerial practices that contributed to the crises periods from 1994 to 2004.

The impact on the governance structure at UNITRA as a higher education institution in the course of 1976 to 2014 left the governance structures wanting in reconciling individuals’ behaviour (students and/or staff), and working conditions. The rationality of a bureaucratic structure also brings irrationality (Blau, 1955; Jaffee, 2008), particularly when a socially constructed entity like UNITRA is about human beings.
7.2.2 Communication

A major factor that binds efficiency and effectiveness is the interactive communication in the different leadership and managerial practices of the VCs. Communication is also a primary source of social interaction that can have both verbal and non-verbal cues. Communication facilitates decision-making by transmitting information and evaluating choices. Failure to communicate about operational matters alienated some of the VCs from the stakeholders. An interface of the ‘Human Agency and Group Dynamics’ theory (chapter 03, section 3.2.5 and 3.2.6) frequently resulted into conflict and crisis, as illustrated during Prof. van der Merwe’s leadership tenure (chapter 05, phase 1 ‘Bantustan Golden Age’) and other VCs’ leadership tenure post-1994 (chapter 06).

Communication breakdown from the ‘driving decisive centre’ as was the case with Prof. van der Merwe (chapter 05), Prof. Moleah and Dr. Nkosi (chapter 06) impacted on the navigational methods of leadership and managerial practices used within UNITRA’s structure, as a higher education university. The latter’s two leadership and managerial practices changed the bureaucratic existing structure (chapter 03, section 3.2.1) with regards to governance, which contributed to the crises periods from 1994 to 2005 (chapter 06). Communication breakdown also gave rise to the stakeholders speculating on events by using the ‘grapevine’ and other forms of communication that led to conflict. Jaffee (2008) purports that groups form a sociological perspective are formed on the basis of the human capacity so as to form a common nucleus through communicative interactions. Communication as a form of social interaction within the group is a fundamental mechanism by which members share frustrations, feelings of satisfaction and receive feedback on their progress in meeting their goals. These communicative interactions give impetus to the systems within the structure, as
evidenced by the ‘Structural Theory’ and ‘Human Relations in Human Resources’ theory of
the literature review in chapter 03 (section 3.2.2 & 3.2.4).

7.2.3 Stakeholders

Staff and students (stakeholders) are an essential part of the operational human mechanisms
of UNITRA. The knowledge production is through the academic enterprise to students. But a
university is not only about academics or the academic enterprise to students. A university is
also about taking cognisance of skill acquisition, critical thinking and socio-economic
empowerment. These elements form the basis of the institutional mission and vision.
UNITRA, located in the Transkeian region, consists of below the poverty lines and/or
relatively low earning house hold incomes (chapter 05 & chapter 06). Furthermore UNITRA
location due to historical factors, in an area that has no big firms, industries and/or
commercial farm lands underscored the socio-economic needs of stakeholders. Most students
at UNITRA come from the geographical location of Transkei, seeking ‘education’ and
opportunities of improving theirs and their family’s status quo (chapter 05). From 1983,
UNITRA was already incurring student debts and students were struggling to pay the
required fees. This caused a major system problem in the running of UNITRA before 1994
and post 1994. Whilst on the other hand, UNITRA staff was primarily concerned with their
physiological needs, such as adequate wages, stable income and a safe working environment
(chapter 05 and chapter 06). The lack of the satisfied needs (Maslow’s hierarchy of needs),
created sub-cultures within the stakeholders that were divergent to UNITRA as an academic
institution. With UNITRA based in a rural environment and reliance on UNITRA as an
employment hub (chapter 05 & 06), the stakeholders with their differing interests
demonstrated their insecurity in a number of methods. The recognition of different
stakeholders’ needs and the subcultures associated with the stakeholders by the VCs was not
identified, nor understood in the context of a university located in a rural environment. The needs of the stakeholders and their respective interests’ needs would have brought clarity on how resources are allocated to satisfy stakeholders’ needs so that they perform at their peak to advance the intended goals of UNITRA as a higher education institution. There was lack of planning on how to balance the needs of the stakeholders and the needs of UNITRA, as an academic enterprise. There was also a need to constantly reskill (chapter 05) and upgrade the staff (chapter 06) to meet the new demands and changing role of the university. Some lesson learnt could have included concepts that pertained to change interventions such the delineation of hard systems (i.e. the technology used in the day-to-day operational running of the university), systems dynamics (i.e. the management of finances, auditing, procurement, recruitment methods), heuristics (i.e. induction programmes, (re)skilling) and postmodern systems (i.e. redefinition of bureaucratic structure, improved accountability through cross-communication methods) (Jackson in Grieves, 2010). The understanding and application of these components would have helped to streamline the UNITRA’s daily functions and cut down on unnecessary bureaucratic clutter, as in the case of WSU (chapter 06); and improve the efficacy of organisational operations (Grieves, 2010).

7.2.4 Schemas and Relations

Issues such as race, ethnicity and even the role of the VC’s wife become important in the struggle for integrity and power. Equally important are the ‘soft’ issues related to the human components; culture; psyche, emotion and identity are of importance. These issues related to the navigational method of leadership and managerial practices used within a given prevailing political climate. For instance, Prof. Morgan related during his interview that “Asmal gave me an opportunity to go with an open mind and my approach was (as most
people would confirm) open” (chapter 06). Another instance, was the meeting between the Prof. Morgan, UNITRA delegates and the National Working Group (NWG), where ‘there was silence in the room as Saki went back to his chair, sat down and picked up his ticket, whilst looking at his watch (chapter 06). The psyche and the emotions of both parties cannot be measured, but was evidential in the conflicting terms of reference, the resignation of Prof. Morgan as a MAA and the moratoriums. These factors also impacted on the governance structure at UNITRA. A comment made by Prof. Jafta (chapter 06) was that Prof. Moleah stereotyped the Transkeians on a schematic premise. “You cannot undermine my intelligence, because you found me here. Moleah undermined those he found here”(Nkanyuza, 2013, p. 04). Prof. Moleah was not Transkeian and the comment evoked shared sentiments by other staff (Dagut, 1998b) that contributed to the breakdown of communication. Ethnicity and race issues are ingrain in the psyche of human beings for a number of reasons. One main reason for the use of an individual’s ethnicity or race is that it’s the easiest method of mentally mapping individuals by attaching attributes onto the individuals; whether rightly or wrongly done. Race issues were brought to the researcher attention. For instance, Prof. van der Merwe being ‘white’, and therefore, because of his race, salaries were paid on time and there was an automatic yearly salary increment. Or the Transkeians gave Prof. Ncayiyana a lot of problems stemmed from him being married to a white. Or Prof. van Staden and team at W.S.U, as ‘whites’ will fix everything. Some of the prescribed attributes are a fallacy, as was in the case of Prof. van der Merwe; or even in the case of Prof. van Staden and his team. Other ‘soft issues’ picked up by myself was in the addresses that related to the navigational method of leadership and managerial practices used. An example of this was Prof. Malaza’s state of address to the stakeholders, which was emotive with analogies and poetry whilst informing the university about the financial and governance crisis (chapter 06). Personal issues and/or the private lives of the VCs come into play. For instance, when the students
indicated to Council their discontent with Prof. van der Merwe, they also registered complaints about his wife also being his secretary. The role of the VCs’ wives also held some importance in the views of the stakeholders. In contrast to Prof. van der Merwe, Prof. Morgan’s wife (chapter 06), from Transkei, her involvement in the university clinic and being a hostess in recreation events was acknowledged by the ‘buy-in’ attitude of stakeholders towards Prof. Morgan.

7.3. THE STATE AND RESOURCES DEPENDENCY

7.3.1 State Legacies

Noted as one of the main challenges faced by HBUs, was the economic stake in the University as a patronage hub for employment, contracts and development that dettracted from its academic mission. Causes for these challenges can be subscribed to some degree to the ‘state legacies’ that shaped the VCs leadership and managerial practices. The relevance of ‘state legacies’ also seeks in part to answer research question 1. Furthermore, highlighted in the contingency theory and the institutional theory, in chapter 03, were the historical legacies of Higher Education Institutions (HEIs); and the effects of these legacies on the development of some of the higher education institutions (chapter 04, 05 & 06). ‘State legacies’ is formatted according to the prevailing government at the time of UNITRA and W.S.U and corresponds to the subsidiary research questions of 5 and 6.

7.3.2 Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima’s government

For UNITRA, reference was frequently made back to Matanzima period and the legacy he left; as reflected in the interviews with former UNITRA VCs, such as with Proffs. Malaza,
Jafta, Morgan (chapter 05 and chapter 06). Paramount Chief Matanzima, a shrewd disciplinarian politician, left a legacy in Transkei, which perhaps created some tensions with the ANC government post 1994. The people of Transkei had a ‘point of reference (identity) stemming from Matanzima. His government developed Transkei, built a number of infrastructures such as the airport and was remembered for building a university in a desolate area (pictures in chapter 04). Matanzima increased the middle class pool; built and sold houses cheaply to teachers (i.e. Northcrest). By the very nature of the debates in the Transkei Assembly (chapter 04), there was a semblance of democracy. However with all that said, this does not take away the fact that Matanzima was ruthless (Laurence, 1976) as indicated in chapter 04 and perhaps had other negative characteristics (chapter 05). Matanzima took a personal interest in UNITRA as stated by Prof. Jafta in chapter 05. “UNITRA was his baby” (Nkanyuza, 2013). Clearly, politicians such as Matanzima not only influenced events at UNITRA, but also controlled the governance structures of the institution. Unfortunately, not properly funded and with maladjusted financial systems, UNITRA already by 1981, was experiencing financial difficulties (chapter 05; appendix XXX11). ‘State Control’ by the Matanzima government had negative effects on innovation of UNITRA, its curtailment of the academic freedom and the notion of institutional autonomy (Moja & Cloete, 1996). Exemplary are the deportation of staff and the exclusion of students in 1984 (chapter 05).

State Control system as a model is almost completely funded by the state with key aspects controlled either by the bureaucracy or political regulations imposed.

7.3.3 National Party government (Apartheid Regime)

The National Party (NP) government usually referred to as the Apartheid regime was prepared to spend money on the development of homelands (rural areas) barring their intrinsic reasons (chapter 01 and chapter 04). Transkei was one of their success stories with a
number of projects sponsored by the RSA (Bunting, 1995; Bunting, 2001). The intention of the NP government was a lesser variation of ‘State Control’ (chapter 03, section 3.6). However the NP government controlled the means of production and finances through the control mechanisms imposed on Transkei (chapter 04). In the case of UNITRA, the NP government with primary directives vetoed “communist individuals” (chapter 04) and others like Prof. Mphahlele (appendix XX11). The NP government oversaw the curriculum of UNITRA and prohibited certain disciplines\textsuperscript{125}. The curriculum was determined by and had to be approved by both RSA government and Matanzima government. The ANC unfortunately developed a negative attitude towards Transkei, even though a number of top ANC members had their beginnings at UNITRA. Indeed a political paradox.

7.3.4 African National Congress (ANC) government

With the incorporation of Transkei into South Africa following the democratic elections of 1994, the shift in state policies severely affected UNITRA. For instance, middle class students were able to enrol into other higher education institution, previously unable to. The loss in some student income of those who could pay and the reduction of government subsidy (chapter 06) impacted on UNITRA as a historically black university. Insecurity in the case of students, is slightly complex, Most of the students come from the immediate ‘catchment region with families living below the living wage and improvised. Prof. Ncayiyana in his interview indicated that the change of lifestyle for students created problems for UNITRA (chapter 05). Some of these problems were reflected through the low ‘through-put-rate’ due

\textsuperscript{125} Exemplary is Mr A.M.Nkanyuza, a Transkeian, returned from exile in 1981 to lecture in the Physics department. Mr A.M. Nkanyuza obtained an Electronic and Engineering degree from Scotland and later specialised in Nuclear Physics. Mr. A.M. Nkanyuza was conditional informed by UNITRA that according to the R.S.A directives, he could only teach maths and fundamental physics.
to longer study duration; student exclusions; student debt; poor initial performance due to the schooling system and low matriculation results in the province.

The VCs reliance on the redress funds from government to level the ‘playing fields’ did not materialise. The shift to the growth, employment and redistribution policy of 1996 (GEAR), with emphasis on new skills and knowledge-production was detrimental to UNITRA with their already existing structural and system problems (chapter 05). The succession of legislation in transforming the educational landscape (see constructed tabulation of time-limes), post 1994 through ‘State Steering and State intervention mechanisms’ had a negative impact on UNITRA. It could be suggested that by not allowing UNITRA to have adequate time to adjust to new policies and/or legislation, the ANC government also contributed to the state of affairs. For instance, the tenure of Prof. Morgan as an administrator (MAA) and the National Working Group (NWG); the moratoriums from the Minister Kader Asmal; the merger of 3 disadvantaged educational institutions with differing institutional cultures.

7.3.5 Finances

The apartheid government in their planning of the demarcation of homelands, such as Transkei funded the Transkeian government in their quest for independence (chapter 04). The Transkeian legislative assembly approved the establishment of a university in Transkei, as indicated in chapter 04. The construction of UNITRA as ‘open university’ catered for professionals, academics, administrative staff and support staff. The massive construction of the UNITRA (photographs in chapter 04) was planned in five (5) phases (see constructed tabulation of time-lines); at a huge cost that kept escalating. Shaped by the prevailing political climate, there were allegations of corruptions and profits being made by contractors
through procurements and tenders (chapter 05). UNITRA incurred some of these costs in the
continuation of constructions, through loans from the bank (see appendix), the cuts to the
budget by 40% from 1985 (chapter 04) and the non-admission to the SAPSE (chapter 05)
placed the VCs from the start in a precarious financial difficulties. These ramifications that
started during Prof. Moleah’s leadership tenure (chapter 05) and the lack of financial controls
sent UNITRA on a downward slope. Among the principles and values was the issue of equity
and redress as exemplified in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) that
would have translated into redress funding for HBUs such as UNITRA (chapter 03).
Furthermore the ANC government was ‘cash strapped’, re-structuring their organisation and
pre-occupied with nation-building (Gumede, 2009). The shift to an ideological position of
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) in 1996 encompassed and emphasized
labour demands to service and export led economy. With the approved 1999 amended Higher
Education Act 101 of 1997 that gave the Minister of Education powers to put any perceived
malfunctioning institution of higher learning under administration; administrators (MAAs)
due to governance and financial maladministration were sent to UNITRA. The advent of
MAAs, a form of state steering mechanisms, bordered on state control mechanisms utilised at
UNITRA. The cumulative result overall was lack of institutional long-term planning and
reliance on government subsidy without sustainable third income revenue. It is questionable
whether the UNITRA trust foundation based in Johannesburg (chapter 05) and later the
established W.S.U Trust (chapter 06) had the capacity or could attract funding on constant
bases as a supplement to the government subsidy.
Finally, hand-in-hand with financial sustainability was the issue of corruption at UNITRA and W.S.U. Jaffee (2008, p. 28) stated that “when organisations are unable to assume responsibility for all productive activities, they must depend upon and enter into transactions with other parties” (chapter 03). In terms of the allegations of corruptions, It is difficult to clearly state that a VC was corrupt without the evidence to validate the accusation(s), and if they were not charged and found guilty. As indicated in chapter 03, under the sub-title ‘Structural Theory’ (section 3.2.2) there is “slipperiness” (Harrison, 2007, p. 674), about corruption, as invariably, corruption could be incompetence, inexperience and/or negligence. Therefore, “corruption may in fact bear little relationship to its incidence” (Harrison, 2007, p. 674). Invariably, allegations of fraud, enrichment, embezzlement and/or self-embellishment have been attributed to the VCs facing multi-challenges intra-organisation and inter-organisational. There were allegations of corruption by students and staff brought to the attention of Council and government at varying periodic times. The issue of perceptions of corruption and corruptive deeds, tangibly touches on the research question sought to answer, is, ‘What navigational methods of leadership and managerial practices did the VCs use within the given prevailing political climate in dealing with the internal stakeholder(s) at UNITRA and the external stakeholder(s) such as government?’ The first instance of the emergence of corruption was that of Prof. van der Merwe’s constructed houses in Umtata (Mthatha) and East London. Students incensed even wrote to Council on mis-use of fund in constructing a lift in van der Merwe’s house following his accident (chapter 5). Council endorsed the alterations and no charges were made against Prof. van der Merwe. Prof. Peires also indicated in his interview that there was corruption during the transitional phase (chapter 05, section C, 5.4), with construction contractors siphoning funds from UNITRA. Prof. Peires stated that UNITRA seemed like a ‘free for all’ in the 1990s. The donations and monetary amounts
given to UNITRA dwindled after 1994. Another highlighted problem was the rapid sessions of CFOs from the 1990s onwards, which impacted the lack of financial accountability of the institution. Again, no-one was charged and/or held accountable for the misappropriation of funds. During Prof. Moleah’s tenure (chapter 06, section A), there were some investigations, court cases paid by UNITRA and State invention mechanisms implemented, which led nowhere, nor anyone being charged or found guilty in court despite allegations of some evidence of misappropriation, mismanagement of funds and of fraud.

Another alleged reference to corruption was during Prof. Balintulo’s tenure from 2007 to 2011. Ear marked funds by the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET)\textsuperscript{126} of approximately 400 million for infrastructure was shifted to staff salaries. Authorised by Balintulo as a VC, signed-off by the Chief Finance Officer (CFO) and those in the Finance division, staff were paid their salaries (chapter 06, post script). Was the misappropriation of funds justifiably ethically or could the incident be referred to as corruption? Allegations of corruption were rife during Prof. van Staden tenure as an Administrator. Forensic investigation was conducted and a report submitted to DHET. Individuals in middle management were suspended on charges of corruption. Some of the individuals were cleared, whilst others left the institution. Perhaps the major problem with charging an individual with corruption reverts back to the structural problems, high turnover of Chief Finance Officers (CFOs) and lack of record keeping. In tangent with the ‘Institutional Theory’ (chapter 03, section 3.2.7), even though ‘fingers’ can be pointed at the VCs and inferences made resulting in ‘blame-games’; charges of corruption are thwarted by lack of circumstantial evidence and cannot be substantiated in the court of law. Blame in most instances of misappropriation of

\textsuperscript{126} DHET was informed that there was insufficient fund to cover staff salaries. DHET was further informed that the intention was to utilise ear-marked funds for salaries. Formal Approval for the utilisation of the ear-marked fund for salaries was not given.
funds must also be shared with Council as the governance body and at times with the politicians.

7.4 LEADERSHIP, MANAGERIAL PRACTICES AT UNITRA AND W.S.U

7.4.1 Leadership Typologies

Emphasis was placed on various leadership typologies and managerial practices within given social contexts that served to some extent, to determine the success or failures of institutions. The need to conceptualise the VC’s role as a leader and manager in a changing environment was noted. In balancing these, factors, it was noted that leaders [VCs] as the ‘driving force’ with a fully capacitated executive and middle management levels were more likely to succeed in reform and/or transformation their institutions than institutions that had power-struggles between the leadership and other stakeholder(s). A number of UNITRA’s VCs with no previous experience of running a university found themselves having to contend with the power-struggles with the institution and the prevailing government at hand. Coupled with this, was UNITRA or W.S.U did not attract ‘potential top-rated’ leaders due to its location. Therefore, UNITRA and W.S.U. had to contend with VCs who may have failed elsewhere. Or VCs with previous detrimental ‘working baggage’ or inexperienced VCs who did not know how to balance the needs of stakeholders, government (politics), and centralising UNITRA as an academic enterprise or VCs using UNITRA as a ‘stepping stone’ to further their career. ‘Working baggage’ regarded as personal conduct during one’s working life. Previous ‘working baggage’ can rightly or wrongly, increase or diminish a VC’s creditability.

Underlining the discussion on leadership was the concept of ‘New managerialism’ or ‘managerialism’ (chapter 03, section 3.4) and the adherence to the ‘King Report 111 on Corporate Governance for South Africa’ (Institute of Directors, 2009). ‘New managerialism’
or ‘managerialism’ insistence on a business approach within the universities has led in some instances, to the rise of territorial protection and unnecessary fear by the general staff members of the VCs, whose role has now come to assume the roles of CEOs. This system fails to understand the concept of a university as centres of skills development for a critical thinking citizenry rather than churning out a mechanical workforce. The corollary to this is the micromanaging of universities by prevailing political systems. This has led to the appointment and retention of VCs who are sympathisers to the prevailing politics of the day and who may have political aspirations beyond their VCs’ tenure (chapter 06). This has also caused problems in the past (Moleah at UNITRA, see chapter 06) where a VC may be protected by political leaders and state apparatuses due to their vested interest in the person rather than the smooth running and future of the organisation. As demonstrated in this thesis, both extremes (i.e. the corporatisation as well as the politicisation of universities) have proved to be detrimental to the proper management of UNITRA with specific target goals. Thus the reciprocal nature of leadership and managerial practices of a VC, as a leader of a higher education institution was discussed in the following section.

The VC’s tenure categorised into phases sought to answer the key research questions as discussed in the following sections below. The leadership approaches, ‘Transformative leadership’, ‘Managerial leadership’ and ‘Crisis leadership’ in chapter 03, (section 3.3.3 to 3.3.5) are applied specifically to the key research questions 1 and 2, and to the subsidiary research question 3.
7.4.2 Phase 1 – ‘Bantustan Golden Age’

- **Professor B. De V van der Merwe**

Prof. van der Merwe was an academic from University of Fort Hare (UFH) driven with passionate and ambition about the prospect of a new institution (chapter 05). He was also involved in the initiation and enablement of UNITRA’s structure and systems, as a higher education institution. Prof. van der Merwe’s leadership approach in the initial stages was ‘managerial leadership’, with principles of a “hard managerialist” (Kulati & Moja, 2006); as he shaped and directed UNITRA’s into an academic enterprise. As the founding VC, van der Merwe was involved in the recruitment of academic staff, with the likes of Prof. Jafta (chapter 05). The early recruited academics, such as Jafta and Nkuhlu, acted as managers, and assisted van der Merwe in establishing a moderate to strong diverse pool of academics.

By 1984, Prof. van der Merwe’s leadership and managerial practices, shaped by the prevailing politics, slide into crisis leadership. Van der Merwe had a close association with both the NP government and Matanzima government (chapter 05, section 3.3.5). Prof. van der Merwe ‘turned a blind eye’ by complying with some of the things going on internally at UNITRA (chapter 05). Whether due to intrinsic motives such as self-interest and/or extrinsic motives like ‘fear’ of government, this could not be determined from the archives. Prof. van der Merwe also ‘turned a blind eye’ to the State Control mechanisms used at UNITRA by Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima. State Control mechanisms dictated that ‘Black Transkeian’ academics were screened. Other academics, if found troublesome or otherwise linked at the leadership levels, had their contracts terminated, or not renewed, or deported. This was also against the background of the rising tensions and influence of Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima at UNITRA and the Republic of South Africa impositions (appendix XXII, XXX,
and XXXI). For instance, an inquiry committee was appointed by Council on the 28 May 1984 (chapter 05), to look into the causes of the unrest and recommend what action, if any should be taken. The findings and recommendations reflected negatively on the leadership of Prof. van der Merwe. Prof. van der Merwe as a VC evaded the responsibility of his legitimate-position as a VC, which Giddens (1984) described as a “dialectic of control” through his actions. Prof. van der Merwe’s navigational methods of leadership and managerial practices used during the periods of unrest and/or disputes internally, was to absent himself from campus; given the prevailing political climate in dealing with the internal stakeholder(s) at UNITRA and the external stakeholder(s) such as government. Evident by the findings of the Committee inquiry appointed by Council on the 28 May 1984, the committee had informed Prof. van der Merwe that he cannot expect the continued loyalty of his staff and students, if he did not show loyalty to them. “It is not enough in such emotional times to say he is working behind the scenes. A principal’s loyalty to his university must be evident to all” (Sigcu et al, 1984, p. 77). Prof. van der Merwe failed to adhere to the committee’s advice, as the crisis escalated. Prof. van der Merwe’ outcomes would be tragic, bearing in mind his initial enthusiasm and passion, when he became a VC at UNITRA. It could be inferred that Prof. van der Merwe’s weak leadership and managerial practices had the semblance of a “hard managerialist” (Kulati & Moja, 2002), who accepted other mechanisms of external accountability imposed on himself as a VC and on UNITRA. For UNITRA, as a newly established institution, the initial systemic shortcomings and structural flaws in its foundations created ‘crisis leadership’ (chapter 03) that became reflective of UNITRA’s institutional future condition (chapter 05).
7.4.3 Phase 2 – ‘Bantustan Serenity’

- Professor W.L. Nkuhlu

Prof. Nkuhlu’s VC leadership and managerial practices came closest to being “transformative leadership” (Kulati & Moja, 2006, pp. 160-162). Some key elements of co-operative processes were incorporated, such as, negotiations with stakeholders through active forums. Nkuhlu was buffered by a strong management team that enabled all stakeholders to participate in a critical self-reflection of UNITRA. Nkuhlu incorporated an expanded leadership core, where he indicated that he was not ‘hands on’ but rather it was Manganyi (chapter 05). Nkuhlu also indicated that when there were student riots, he was called either by the Anglican Church and/or ANC members, concerning the situation, and a discussion would ensue, on how to resolve the situation. Premised on the “reformed collegialist” of “transformative leadership” (Birnbaum, 1992 in Kulati & Moja, 2002, p. 243); Prof. Nkuhlu, worked within the confines of UNITRA’s prevailing culture, rather than going to war with it (chapter 03, section 3.3.3). Considered a ‘serenity phase’ at UNITRA and also using the ‘Contingency Theory’, it could be contended that external political circumstances favoured Prof. Nkuhlu. General Holomisa’s government emanating from a military coup in 1987 was indifferent to the running of UNITRA. Hence there were no direct government steering and/or state interventions imposed on UNITRA.

Active forums and negotiated transformation through different structures was encouraged (Kulati & Moja, 2006). It was also during Nkuhlu’s tenure that NEHAWU (affiliated to the ANC) was recognised as a union in 1987. Prof. Nkuhlu, both an accountant and academic understood that the centrality of UNITRA was the academic mission and enterprise that was non-negotiable. The academics capacity, fairly strong in capacity, grew as the faculties
increased and there was diversity in the academic ethos of the institution. Academics were encouraged to study, nationally and international, and attend conferences. Nkhuulu’s leadership and managerial practices brought in co-operative governance among UNITRA stakeholders.

A contingent factor for Nkhuulu and some of the managerial team was the negotiated political talks between political parties, such as the Apartheid regime and the prospective incoming ANC government and forthcoming VCs. Prof. Nkhuulu, the CFO and some academics left UNITRA prior to the democratic election of 1994, thus, breaking the stronghold at top managerial level. NEHAWU, an affiliate of ANC and consisting of support staff had become militant in nature, was influential and powerful as decision-makers, including strongly advocating for salary increases for staff. This was despite UNITRA’s financial instability (chapter 05). The transformative leadership of Nkhuulu tethered towards crisis leadership in the ‘transitions phase’.

7.4.4. Phase 3 – ‘Transitions’

- Professor D.J. Ncayiyana and Professor J.M. Noruwana

Prof. Ncayiyana, the acting VC stated that “UNITRA had no extra finances, or else they could have been rich”. What seemed clear was that UNITRA’s finances diminished with the ever continuous infrastructures/buildings. This was compounded by the rapid successions of CFOs. The managerial capacity had severely weaken and Council as the governance body was weak (chapter 05). The ‘transition’ phase at UNITRA, characterised by “crisis management and decision-avoidance” (Kulati & Moja, 2006, p. 166) affected Ncayiyana’s leadership and managerial practices. Prof. Peires stated “one of the strange things about the
old Transkei before 1994, was the ship was going down; people were acting and clinging to their positions as if, as if things were not going to change” (Nkanyuza, 2012b; chapter 05, section C & D). The institution theory, which is applicable to the transition phase (chapter 3, section 3.2.7), viewed the systems within organisational structure of UNITRA as unstable in reaction to the influences and pressures internally. For instance, Ncayiyana indicated that he took the opportunity of leaving UNITRA, due to the internal strife and victimisation by some staff from the law Faculty, led by Prof. Dlovu, which had intensified. Prof. Noruwana, as acting VC with previous ‘work experience baggage’ took over from Ncayiyana (chapter 05). Noruwana was sidestepped and undermined by Council in favour of Moleah (ANC member) in 1994.

The academic enterprise, though weaken in academic capacity was capable of continuing the knowledge-production for UNITRA. The tax incentive to work in Transkei was still applicable, and academics could go for studies, conferences and workshops. However, due to weak management and Council structures, UNITRA was in crisis mode.

7.4.5. Phase 4 – ‘New Horizons’

- Professor A. Moleah

Prof. Moleah had some good ideas and some characteristics that initially quantified his navigational methods of leadership as ‘managerial leadership’ (Kulati & Moja, 2002). Full of energy, he initiated new niches, partnerships and projects, as reflected with the spin-off projects in chapter 06 (section A). His managerial approach principled on “unwavering entrepreneurs” (Kulati & Moja, 2002, 2006) saw opportunities for UNITRA. Moleah regarded higher education as a business that is “in the business of providing their clients-the
students—with goods and services that are sold at a competitive price” (Kulati & Moja, 2002, p. 249). He enticed UNITRA students by flattering them, buying cutlery and gadgets for the residences, and building a residential block that later transpired to be structurally unstable.

Starting off on a ‘managerial leadership’ footing, the navigation methods of Prof. Moleah’s leadership transcended rapidly into crisis leadership. Prof. Moleah’s flaw was having a superiority complex, a disregard for Council, conflict with NEHAWU (union) and disregard for the interdependent networks of UNITRA (chapter 06). Moleah, with a semblance of narcissistic leader, had the “tendency towards the superficiality in the advocacy of visionary leadership” (Linstead, Fulop & Lilley, 2009, p. 499). Narcissistic leaders are usually in positions of power due to their drive and/or intrinsic need (chapter 03, section 3.3.1). Prof. Moleah recruited was a VC to a rural base. It was evident that Moleah’s lack of financial accountability, ‘use of discretionary fund arbitrary, absenteeism from Council meetings, ignoring the academic enterprise, conflicts and unilateral decisions; ultimately led to crisis leadership (chapter 05). Moleah thought that the re-dress funds granted indicated by the ANC government would bail him and UNITRA out of UNITRA’s financial mess (chapter 06, section 5.2). Moleah banked on the assistance of his association with Thabo Mbeki then deputy President and UNITRA Chancellor, hoping Mbeki and his ANC membership would be an asset. The prevailing politic atmosphere was not conducive and ANC had their own financial challenges (1993 – 2000), as government (chapter 03, section 3.6). By 1997 the status quo and development of academics had dramatically weakened. Diversity of academics was drastically reduced. However, if it was not for the academic enterprise, with qualifications from different universities, there would have been no UNITRA. State interventions mechanisms were put into place following the Skweyiya investigation (Skweyiya, 1998, chapter 06 [section A]). Crisis leadership, “more an institutional condition
than an approach to leadership” (Kulati & Moja, 2006, p. 165) had UNITRA deeply entrenched in a crisis mode as a higher education institution.

- **Professor N. Jafta and Professor E.D. Malaza**

Proffs. Jafta and Malaza as acting VCs, was short-lived. Both could not contend with the internal strife that ensued at UNITRA. Both were faced with a ‘strong collective culture’ of both the students and NEHAWU that did not centred UNITRA as an academic enterprise (chapter 06, section B, C & D).

Prof. Malaza’s stay as an acting VC was longer than Jafta’s (chapter 06, section B & C). Inexperienced as leader, Prof. Malaza was compelled by Council (1997) to become the acting VC. With an institutional crisis on hand, Prof. Malaza met with Prof. Bengu (Minister of Education) in East London for assistance during the period of 1998/99. Sympathetic to the plight of UNITRA, Bengu was unable to assist UNITRA financially. Redress funding was not granted to HDIs/HBU and the crisis continued. With the prevailing political climate, the ramifications of the ideological shift of government had affected former historical black universities who expected an increase in the amount allocated to redress through earmarked funding between 1995 and 1999. By 1999, with an institution bankrupt, an incomplete top management structure, no Council; Prof. Malaza, Prof. Luswazi (Registrar), Senate and union leaders, in a last ditch effort, attempted to comply with changes in the higher educational landscape. Research funds, infrastructure fund, student fees and government subsidiary went into one centralised ‘account pool’ that was sub-divided into account codes. Money for suppliers had ran out, salaries was taken from the centralised pool and there was a proliferation of theft (chapter 06, section C). Given UNITRA’s circumstances and further shaped by the prevailing politics of the new democratic government post 1994, the
institutional crisis cycle was not broken. To be precise, in answering the research questions of 1 and specifically 2 & 3, there was no Council, an incomplete management structures, and distorted institutional systems. In short, there was ‘no UNITRA leader at the wheel’ and the ‘New Horizons’ phase had become ‘blazing horizons’; leaving Prof. Malaza no choice but to resign in 1999. The collapsed governance structure, mismanagement and financial crises enabled the implementation of the amended Higher Education Act 101 of 1997.

7.4.6 Phase 5 – ‘Turbulent Waters’

The issue of Ministerial Appointed Administrators (MAA) related to effecting credible systems in ‘crisis’ institutions, as determined by the HE Act 101 of 1997 and subsequent amendments. Noted was the reinforced resistance and the habitual misbehaviour of stakeholders, whose awareness of administrators’ powers created power-struggles within the UNITRA; the MAA’s lack of check-balances by government; the lack of transparent evaluation of the university and monitoring mechanisms on MAA, created a conflict of interest with government’s requirements. Factors such as non-disclosure of reports by administrators reinforced ‘grape-vine’ form of communication and the inability of the institution to learn from mistakes.

- Dr. M.Nkosi

Dr. Nkosi, mandated by DoE, as a Ministerial Appointed Administrator (MAA) arrived at UNITRA, an already bankrupt institution. Consequently, bank guarantee cheques were issued by the DoE/DHET (chapter 06, section A). The prevailing political climate dictated that Dr. Nkosi as a MAA reported to Kader Asmal, the Minister of Education on weekly basis. Dr. Nkosi attempted to run UNITRA as a business. Based on the ‘managerial leadership’
typology, Nkosi’s methods of incorporating the “unwavering entrepreneurs” principles (Kulati & Moja, 2006) further compounded the existing crisis of UNITRA. His unorthodox methods met with the resistance by SENATE, academic staff and unions (chapter 6, section A) and his tenure was perceived as ‘crisis leadership’.

- **Professor N. I. Morgan**

Prof. Morgan mandated by DoE, as a Ministerial Appointed Administrator (MAA) found staff morally at their lowest in 2001. It can be said that Morgan abated the crisis temporary at UNITRA. It was evident in the initial stages that Morgan’s leadership could be construed as ‘managerial leadership’ (Kulati & Moja, 2006), with some principles of the “unwavering entrepreneurialism” that are made distinct “between the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ approaches to managerialism. Morgan, with his charismatic approach got the ‘buy-in’ and the co-operation of staff and unions (chapter 06). Morgan incorporated the soft managerialism elements of ‘strategic managerialism’ (Kulati & Moja, 2006, p. 163) by applying management techniques and tactical plans within the institution (chapter 05). Morgan’ managerial practice convinced the staff through a number of initiatives, such as workshops, seminars and recreation events (chapter 06) that retrenchment and restructuring was in the interest of the institution. The finances of UNITRA improved through retrenchment and freezing of positions. There was a cost to the academic capacity, which was further weakened with retrenchment.

However as events unfolded, Prof. Morgan apparently made three major mistakes. Evidently, in response to research question 2 and 3; contingency factors (chapter 03, section 3.2.4) contributed to the crisis leadership that once more dominated UNITRA. The identifiable mistakes were:
a. In the prevailing political climate, Morgan failed to do the task he was sent to do, as an Administrator (MAA). He went against Minister Asmal, by not closing the university as required. The state intervention mechanisms to some degree changed to state interference, especially after government failed to close Unitra as a university and use the infrastructure as a college, FET or University of Technology (chapter 6, [6.3], section C, D & E). Thus, Morgan lost political backing.

b. Morgan got attached to the Mthatha people and vice-versa. Due to the attachment developed by Morgan with UNITRA stakeholders, UNITRA stakeholders later requested Morgan back as a substantial VC in 2002. Asmal responded, by first criticising the finances, enrolment and through-put-rates of students; and finally merging the University with two other disadvantaged institutions (chapter 06). It could also be stated that at this point, that there was a ‘conflict of interests’ within governmental politics. Morgan resignation at the end of 2001 and the crisis at UNITRA resumed with depreciated funds, incomplete top management, no Council and bleak academic ethos.

c. Also there was the relationship of Kader Asmal and UNITRA, relating to the closure of UNITRA and the subsequent moratoriums (chapter 06). Stakeholders speculated that some the motivations, actions and decisions made were personal (chapter 06); especially when informed about the decision of the UNITRA Senate for the non-nomination of the honorarium award.

- Dr. M. Qhobela

The actions of government sending Dr. Qhobela as an Administrator (MAA) speaks directly to the first key research question 1. For government had taken an unprecedented move of
seconding an employee from their ministry to become a MAA (chapter 06). At that time, Dr. Qhobela was the Director-General to the Minister N. Pandor. His terms of reference (appendix X) dictated by the DoE, clearly indicated what operational mechanisms and structures, he was to implement within UNITRA’s systems. The intent of Qhobela’s leadership and managerial practice was to turn the institution from crisis mode to being effective and efficient. In assuming governance and management responsibility at UNITRA, Dr. Qhobela came with a managerial leadership approach that had aspects of a “strategic managerialism and unwavering entrepreneurialism” (Kulati & Moja, 2006, pp. 162-164). He was able to convince the stakeholders that he was not a threat to the institution by infusing trust through a series of meetings and openness about his term of references and what was required to achieve (chapter 06 [.3.1], section F). During Qhobela’s short stay at UNITRA, he was able constitute a new Council, stabilise some of UNITRA’s systems and communicated the importance of the academic ethos for the institution to staff and unions. Dr. Qhobela gave ‘hope’ to UNITRA, by the implementation of Council before his departure. However, his stay of 4 months did not stabilise the institutional systems, rather the crisis mode of UNITRA was abated, but only for a short period.

7.4.7. Phase 6 - ‘Mirages of Hope’

- Professor K. Mfenyana

Prof. Mfenyana as an acting VC had his strongest strength as an academic. Mfenyana’s leadership and managerial practices were within the confines of structural and institutional theory (chapter 03, section 3.2.2 & 3.2.7). With the inauguration of Council, the anticipation of changing UNITRA’s crisis mode to a stable mode was visible. Although Mfenyana managed the crisis mode of UNITRA by allowing the existing systems and structural levels
to continue as the norm, as a caretaker, he also was as a moderator when tensions arose. His top management structure was weak due to the vacancies and compounded by the absence of a CFO. Top management and middle management positions, was filled with incumbents acting in the positions (chapter 06 [6.3], section A). The academic capacity ratio of UNITRA was not proportional to the student numbers. Although there were 2 unions at UNITRA, NEHAWU, with their numbers have always been the dominant union with a combination of support and administrative staff (chapter 06). The process of self-reflection as an institution was re-ignited with Mfenyana, but due to the weak and non-existent managerial capacity, the process was superficial. UNITRA was still in a crisis mode situation.

- **Professor N.I. Morgan**

Prof. Morgan as VC returned to UNITRA in 2002. His leadership and managerial practices was based initially on ‘managerial leadership’ with some principles of the “unwavering entrepreneurialism” (Kulati & Moja, 2006, pp. 162-164). The stakeholders were co-operative with Morgan’s leadership practice. In mingling freely with staff and students (chapter 06), he was able to obtain their co-operation. Morgan supported the revitalisation of the academic ethos and enterprise (chapter 06). Finances improved with an unqualified audit report. The crisis mode of UNITRA was abated and seemed to be turning towards positive outcomes.

As indicated earlier, the meeting of Prof. Morgan, UNITRA delegates and the NWG (chapter 06) was shaped by the prevailing politics of the new democratic government post 1994 and the shift in state policies. Shaped by the prevailing political climate that once again severely impacted on most of the former HDIs/HBUs, including UNITRA, the NWG recommendations were accepted by the Minister of Education with some later adjustments. The adjustments indicated that the non-closure of UNITRA and the merger to form Walter
Sisulu University. The interim merger period was messy; filled with suspicion between the three institutions, differing cultures and vast distances between each campus (chapter 06). In fact it should never have taken place, especially with institutions that had already mismanaged their financial funds by increasing their salaries and promotions prior to merger (chapter 06). The academic variations between the institutions differed with the centrality of the academic ethos marginalised. Interest was mainly in sustaining distorted salary levels and misplaced positions (chapter 06). The combined institutional factors instigated a crisis mode of leadership for Prof. Morgan.

7.4.8 Post script of W.S.U

- Professor M.M. Balintulo

Prof. Balintulo with a reconstituted Council, a full complement of top management, an increased middle management level of mostly administrative staff (chapter 06, post-script); initially had the characteristics of ‘managerial leadership’ with fragments of transformative leadership characteristics (Kulati & Moja, 2006). The sub category of ‘strategic managerialism’ (chapter 03, section 3.3.4) within the managerial leadership typology was utilised. Balintulo got the institution to act strategically, by co-operative governance between stakeholders. Policies, procedures and rules were reformulated in revamping the institutional structure. New partnerships were formed and projects initiated (chapter 06). However with all the above, W.S.U was bankrupt and working on ‘zero budget’. The reality was UNITRA the systems and structure had not been addressed. Hard decision-making was avoided and that was compounded by financial mismanagement. UNITRA effectively was still in crisis mode. W.S.U. as a merged institution was non-sustainable. In hind sight, retrenchment processes should have
planned with a complete over haul of the systems. Appeals to government fell on ‘deaf ears’ (chapter 06). Council resigned. Evident by Kulati and Moja (2006) was the debilitating factors of crisis leadership or crisis mode (chapter 03, section 3.3.5) that resulted in the lack of confidence in the top executive management, a weak second-tier management and “role confusion with regard to the scope of responsibility of governance structures” (Kulati & Moja, 2006, p. 166) contributed immensely to Balintulo’s leadership and managerial practices.

- **Professor L. van Staden**

Prof. van Staden mandated by DHET as a Ministerial Appointed Administrator (MAA) arrived at an already bankrupt UNITRA and with a team. Prof van Staden’s duration at W.S.U lasted two and half years. With a ‘managerial leadership typology’ of a transformative leadership (chapter 03, section 3.3.3), van Staden and his team was to turn W.S.U around. In addressing several areas, Prof. van Staden stabilised some of the systems, especially the finances (chapter 06). His turnaround framework document addressed several areas (chapter 06). By the time van Staden’s term came to an end in April 2014, one major contingent factor was acknowledged, a envisaged turn around strategic was “no quick-fix”; and would likely take a minimum of 5 years to change W.S.U.’s pathway of crisis mode. Evidently, the assistance of government, financially and/or otherwise was necessarily. Despite Prof. van Staden’s leadership and managerial practices abilities and/or intentions, his tenure at UNITRA was also characterised by crisis with strike actions by both students and Staff. However, Prof. van Staden abated the institutional mode crisis with the ‘turnaround framework document’ that saw W.S.U being given a chance of survival and developmental growth, as a higher education institution.
7.5 CONCLUSION

The people in the Eastern Cape historically are renowned for pursuing education: they were the ‘school people’ more than any other Black people in South Africa since mid-nineteenth century. This is due to historical factors, as forms of expression, as means of obtaining recognition and some equity within the societal and global market. Constant changes triggered by the internal dynamics of UNITRA, political flux and changes in the regulatory mechanisms played an instrumental play in UNITRA’s crises and later at W.S.U. The changes themselves were not the causal factors; rather the combination of uncertainty and non-existent period of stability to effect new changes was the consequential effect that resulted in cycles of crisis.

Habib (2001) had stated,

"the failure to arrest crises at HBU’s is one of the more serious failings of the post-apartheid regime. This is because the collapse of institutions like UNITRA does not simply represent a case of institutional collapse, but one of societal collapse. As indicated earlier, HBU’s are not only educational and intellectual institutions, but they are also in most cases the largest employers in the region. Their closure is thus not simply an educational failure; it is ultimately a social catastrophe. Umtata and the Eastern Cape more generally, have been designated by the Department of Trade and Industry as an area intended for economic rejuvenation. Yet there has not been a coordinated governmental response to the social malaise of the Transkei. Had there been such a response, the Department of Education’s intervention would have been far more than the simple re-establishment of administrative systems. It would have involved the establishment of a plan and the investment of resources for the revitalisation of UNITRA, as a catalyst for the economic rejuvenation of the entire region. It would have involved a co-ordinated
intervention from the Departments of Trade and Industry, Education, Health, Tourism, and Transport to not only turnaround UNITRA, but the entire Transkei as well”

(Cloete, 2001b, p. 30; Habib, 2001).

In conclusion, a good leader is as effective as the structure and systems in place. The faulty foundation, systems and structure of UNITRA was unstable from the start. The merged institutions in the formation of W.S.U inherited foundations that were already faulty. W.S.U is not a lost cause, but the institution will require a lot of work, understanding and aspiration of what an educational institution should be.
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Appendix I: Consolidation of Bantu Areas (1956)
Appendix II: TOMLINSON REPORT SUMMARY, Union of South Africa (1955).

TERMS OF REFERENCE AND PROCEDURE

The general terms of the Commission appointed by His Excellency the Governor-General, were: “to conclude an exhaustive inquiry into and to report on a comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the Native Areas with a view to developing within them a social structure in keeping with the culture of the Native and based on effective socio-economic planning”. The Commission found it necessary to give the widest interpretation to its terms of reference, and consequently, made a study as comprehensive as possible of the problem referred to it. This was done, because the Commission very soon realised that the problems relative to the development of the Bantu Areas, could only be thoroughly analysed and studied in the light of the wider economic, social and political framework of the Union of South Africa.

The procedure followed by the Commission was as follow:-

i. Visits to the various parts of the Bantu Areas by pre-arranged tours.

ii. The taking of evidence, both written and oral.

iii. Comprehensive and intensive research.

Besides the Bantu Areas in the Union, the Commission also visited Basutoland and Swaziland, but unfortunately, found it impossible to visit other territories in Africa.

The Commission received approximately 250 memoranda from individuals and institutions. Oral evidence, to which 83 days were devoted, was taken from 322 Europeans and 106 Bantu. This evidence comprises 7,687 folio sheets. The Commission also conducted important interviews with numerous individuals, both on tour and at office; throughout, the Commission was deeply and lastly impressed by the sincere interest shown in this inquiry, by all sections of the community.

In compiling its Report, and consequently also the summary thereof, the Commission relied chiefly on the results of its basic research. In connection with this research, the assistance of these experts from various state Departments and in particular from Universities, was solicited. Without the assistance of these experts the Commission could never have completed its task so comprehensively and in such detail. The lack of available data compelled the Commission to start compiling its facts almost exclusively from rock bottom.
Appendix II (b)

Original research was undertaken in connection with the following: geographical and historical aspects, agriculture, forestry, mining the establishment of towns, labour, social structure, market analysis, national income, health and social services, ecclesiastical affairs, secondary and tertiary activities, population matters, developmental technique and administration.

The Commission endeavoured, where possible, to present its findings and ideas by means of maps, hence the large number of maps incorporated in the Report.

The original fundamental data, upon which the Commission’s report has been based, are bound into 69 volumes which, together with one set of the oral evidence recorded by the Commission, have been handed to the Department of Native Affairs for safekeeping.

As Chairman, I wish to take the opportunity to express my sincere appreciation to, and to thank all the members of and the secretary to the Commission as well as the five main research officers, for their tireless work and faithful support during the period of almost five years. The task submitted to them was accepted as a call.

I consider it a great privilege and honour to have been in a position to guide such a Commission.

F.R. TOMLINSON,
Chairman.

Source: (Tomlinson, 1955a) - Summary Of The Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa
Appendix III: Letter from Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima to Prof. Van der Merwe.

“Rebellious Behaviour and Disruption of Classes at UNITRA on 9/5/84”

The Rector
University of Transkei
P/B X5092
UMTATA.

Dear Mr van der Merwe

RE: REBELLIOUS BEHAVIOUR AND DISRUPTION OF CLASSES AT UNITRA ON 9/5/84.

As a sequel to rebellious behaviour and disruption of classes at the University of Transkei in the afternoon and evening of 9th May, 1984, I, as Chancellor of the University, in consultation with the Executive-in-Council, have decided that the students should leave the University and go home immediately and to report back at the University on Monday 14th May 1984 where a decision about them will be made.

Students whose parents are not resident in Transkei will not be re-admitted. They will be allowed to collect their belongings and leave the University Campus at once.

The parents of the affected students are free to make representations to the Cabinet Committee consisting of the Honourable the Prime Minister, the Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Honourable Minister of Education.

Yours sincerely

[Signature]

PARAMOUNT CHIEF K.D. MATANZIMA : CHANCELLOR : UNIVERSITY OF TRANSKEI.
Appendix IV: Letter from Secretary of State to the Vice Chancellor (date 1984)

Private Bag X5038
Telephone No 4191/2
Telex 728 TT

FILE: 2/1/32

The Rector
University of Transkei
P/B X5092
UMTATA.

Dear Sir,

re: REBELLIOUS BEHAVIOUR AND DISRUPTION OF CLASSES AT UNITRA ON 9/5/84.

I have the honour to advise you that I have been directed by the Chancellor of the University of Transkei to communicate with you and advise you as follows:-

1. That all the students at UNITRA should be screened;

2. That on Monday 14/5/84 all students from outside Transkei should be dismissed subject to scrutiny by the Hon. Prime Minister, the Hon. Minister of Education and the Hon. Minister of Foreign Affairs;

3. The students who have been dismissed should be taken by Army and Police trucks beyond the borders of Transkei;

4. That Transkei students should sign an undertaking of loyalty to the authorities i.e. they will attend classes. They should not hold meetings of whatever nature and that they should ask for written permission before leaving the campus for any reason and the boarders should never sleep out.

Please see also the Chancellor's remarks on annexure.

Yours faithfully,

SECRETARY TO THE STATE PRESIDENT.
### Appendix VI (a): Selected list of Donors and Contributions

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Draft
### Appendix VI (b): Selected list of Donors and Contributions

#### 3. SPECIFIED FUND (Continued)

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<td><strong>3 957 668</strong></td>
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The fund comprises the balance of donations received for specific purposes other than bursaries. In view of the restrictive nature of designated donations, a number of planned projects have been postponed pending the availability of sufficient funds to enable their completion. Interest earned on funds invested prior to their utilisation is accounted for in the income statement and is used, in part, to defray administrative expenses in addition to financing bursary allocations, honours grants and other special projects which are considered by the Board of Governors to be consistent with the Foundation’s objectives.

#### 4. UNSPECIFIED FUND

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</tr>
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Appendix VI (c): Selected list of Donors and Contributions

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Appendix VI (d): Selected list of Donors and Contributions

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5. CAPITAL FUND

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6. FIXED ASSETS

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</tbody>
</table>


General
The general purpose of the investigation has been to advise the Minister on:

1. The source and nature of the discount at the University of Transkei; and
2. Steps required restoring proper governance, including the promotion of reconciliation, at the University of Transkei.

Specific
To enquire into and report to the minister on any issue which may deem of importance, including the following:

1. The reason for the deterioration in the relationship between and among various constituencies and structures at the University;
2. The reason for the serious lack of confidence in the governance structures of the University, in particular –
   a) The management approach of the University’s Vice Chancellor and Principal and Executive
   b) Perceived problems amongst the members of the University’s executive management
   c) The role and functioning of the Council’ and

3. The widespread discontent and tension that exist amongst the various constituencies within the University

   C) To make recommendations on –

   (1) The restoring of effective/proper governance at the University; and
   (2) What action, if any, ought to be taken.
Appendix VIII: Terms of Reference - Dr. D.M.Nkosi as the 1st Ministerial Appointed Administrator in 2000

Dr. D.M.Nkosi

1. The Administrator was to lead the re-engineering initiative of Unitra and reported directly to the Minister.
2. The Administrator introduced the concept of a ‘social plan’, a critical component in the re-engineering and consensus for restructuring Unitra.
3. The social plan was intended to provide alternative employment for those who might lose their jobs due to retrenchment during the re-engineering process.
4. Re-engineering Unitra for the Future’ document set out a series of processes that would steer the institution in the direction of operating at a level of efficiency and excellent.
5. Re-engineering, right sizing or downsizing terms were to be the key procedure to achieving the above goals.
6. The Administrator as a leader was to transform the concept of the social plan into a reality, which would have required resources and could ‘drive’ energies to the development, implementation and management of the plan.
Appendix IX: Terms of Reference - Professor. N.I. Morgan as the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Ministerial

Appointed Administrator in 2001

Prof. N. I. Morgan

1. The Administrator will be appointed in the first instance, for a period of six months commencing 1 January 2001. The Administrator will report to the Minister of Education and provide him with monthly written progress reports, with the first report being due at the end of February 2001.

2. The Administrator will be responsible for the governance of the University, in the absence of a duly constituted Council.

3. The Administrator will be responsible for the management of the institution, and ensure that there are structures, systems and policies in place for the effective management and day-to-day administration of the University.

4. The Administrator may appoint persons with the necessary expertise in order to achieve the effective management of the University.

5. As Chairperson of Senate, the Administrator will oversee the functioning of Senate and all its Committees.

6. The Administrator will present a budget of the University for the financial year 2001/2, for approval by the Minister.

7. The Administrator will manage the necessary staff restructuring processes to ensure that the University is able to function within the approved budget. The restructuring processes will include staff retrenchments. Voluntary retrenchments, where appropriate may proceed immediately.

8. The Administrator will appoint an Interim Governance Committee to advise him on the governance of the University. The interim structure shall consist of the Administrator (Chair), the current Executive Management, a representative of Senate, and a representative of the Ministry of Education.

9. The Administrator will be responsible for undertaking an assessment of all the faculties and department of the University in order to advice the Minister of Education of those faculties/departments which might be viable in the medium to long term.
Appendix IX (b)  Terms of Reference - Prof. N.I. Morgan as the 2nd Ministerial Appointed Administrator in 2001 [Contd]

10. Once an academic restructuring plan for Unitra is approved by the Minister of Education, the Administrator will be responsible for the implementation of the restructuring process, including matters relating to the possible transfer of students to other higher education institutions, staff retrenchments, etc.

11. The Administrator will also advise the Minister of the appropriate arrangements for the governance and management of the University for 2001.

12. With regard to the governance arrangements for the University beyond 2001, the Administrator will advise the Minister following the recommendations of the feasibility study on the long-term reorganisation of higher education provision in the Eastern Cape.
Appendix X: Terms of Reference - Dr. M.Qhobela as the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Ministerial Appointed Administrator in 2002

Dr. M.Qhobela

Introduction

The Administrator is appointed in terms of the Higher Education Act for four months. The Administrator reports to the Minister of Education and is responsible for both the governance and management of the University of Transkei.

Governance

The Administrator

1.4 Assumes the roles and responsibilities of the Council, until such time that a Council is declared fully constituted by the Minister of Education

1.5 Constitutes a structure to advise him with respect to the governance of UNITRA, pending the establishment of appropriate governance structures

1.6. Chairs the Senate and Executive Committee of Senate and provides academic leadership to the University

2. Management

The Administrator:

 Assumes full responsibility for the management of UNITRA

 Appoints a management team, including a Campus Head.

 All members of the management team report to the Administrator

 Presents the Minister of Education with a budget for the financial year 2002/3 and finalise student tuition and residence fees for the 2002 academic year

 Ensures that the University functions within the budget approved by the Minister Communicate all key policy and operational decisions to the campus community
1. **Purpose**

The National Working Group will investigate and advise the Minister on appropriate arrangements for consolidating the provision of higher education on a regional basis through establishing new institutional and organisational forms, including the feasibility of reducing the number of higher education institutions. The investigation forms part of the broader process for the restructuring of the higher education system to ensure that it contributes to social and economic development, as outlined in the National Plan for Higher Education.

2. **Principles**

The investigation must be guided by the principles and goals for the transformation of the higher education system as outlined in the Education White Paper 3: A Programme for the Transformation of the Higher Education System. In addition, the National Working Group must ensure that its recommendations address and promote the following goals:

- Social and educational goals, in particular, the contribution of higher education to social and economic development, both regionally and nationally.

- Access and equity goals in relation to both student and staff equity, as well as institutional redress.
Appendix XI (b): Terms of Reference – National Working Group

- Quality and efficiency goals in terms of economies of scale and scope, both programme and infrastructural, as well as the spread and quality of programmes and graduation and retention rates.

- Institutional sustainability and viability goals in terms of student numbers, income and expenditure patterns and management and governance capacities.

- Institutional identity and culture goals in terms of overcoming the legacy of apartheid (CHE, pp.58-59).

3. Terms of Reference

The National Working Group must:

3.1 Address how the number of institutions can be reduced and the form that the restructured institutions should take, and not on whether the number of institutions can or should be reduced.

3.2 Ensure that the reduction in the number of institutions does not result in the closure of existing sites of delivery, that is, it must be underpinned by the principle that higher education programmes would continue to be offered at all the current sites of delivery, but within new institutional and development, both regionally and nationally.

- Access and equity goals in relation to both student and staff equity, as well as institutional redress.
Appendix XI (c): Terms of Reference – National Working Group

3. Terms of Reference

The National Working Group must:

3.1 Address how the number of institutions can be reduced and the form that the restructured institutions should take, and not on whether the number of institutions can or should be reduced.

3.2 Ensure that the reduction in the number of institutions does not result in the closure of existing sites of delivery, that is, it must be underpinned by the principle that higher education programmes would continue to be offered at all the current sites of delivery, but within new institutional and organisational forms and structures.

3.3 Consider the full range of potential institutional arrangements, including the rationalisation of programme development and delivery through institutional collaboration, as well as different models of mergers.
Appendix XI (d): Terms of Reference – National Working Group

3.4 Consider the role and function of all existing institutions in the development of new institutional and organisational forms, that is, no institution should be exempted from the need to change fundamentally and from contributing to achieving a new higher education landscape.

3.5 Recommend the incorporation of the constituent campuses of Vista University into appropriate existing higher education institutions within each region given the decision to unbundle Vista University. This does not include the distance education centre of Vista University, which will be incorporated into a single dedicated distance education institution through the merger of UNISA and Technikon South Africa.

3.6 Consider the following regional demarcations for purposes of the investigation:

- Eastern Cape.
- Free State.
- KwaZulu Natal.
- Gauteng.
- Northern Province.
- North West.
- Western Cape.

4. Process

4.1 The National Working Group must consult with the appropriate constituencies at both the national and regional levels.
4.2 The National Working Group may commission specialist studies and draw on the experience and expertise of other individuals both within and outside of the higher education sector as and when necessary.

4.3 The Higher Education Branch of the Department of Education will serve as the secretariat to the National Working Group.

4.3 The National Working Group is accountable to the Minister of Education. It is required to complete its investigation and to submit its recommendations to the Minister by no later than the end of December 2001.

5. Members

The National Working Group consists of:


Ms Gill Marcus – Deputy Chairperson; Deputy Governor, South African Reserve Bank.

Prof. Hugh Africa, retired Vice-Chancellor, Vista University and a member of the Council on Higher Education.

Prof. Malegapuru W Makgoba, President, Medical Research Council of South Africa, Member of the National Advisory Council on Innovation and former Deputy Vice Chancellor and member of the Council on Higher Education.
Appendix XI (f): Terms of Reference – National Working Group

Mr. Murphy Morobe, Chairperson, Fiscal and Finance Commission and the National Parks Board.

Prof. Wiseman Nkhu, Economic Adviser to the President; Chairperson, Council on Higher Education.

Ms Joyce Phekane, Deputy Vice President, Congress of South African Trade Unions.

Ms Maria Ramos, Director-General, Department of Finance.

Prof. Jairam Reddy, Chairperson of Council, United Nations University; Chaired the National Commission on Higher Education.

Prof. Hennie Rossouw, retired Deputy Vice-Chancellor, University of Stellenbosch; Served on the National Commission on Higher Education.

Prof. Stuart Saunders, retired Vice-Chancellor, University of Cape Town.
Appendix XII (a) Reaction to Walter Sisulu University name change by the National Minister of Education in 2003

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Rev BB Finca
Chairperson of Council
Border Technikon

Ms N Skenjana
Chairperson of Council
Eastern Cape Technikon

Mr LN Capa
Chairperson of Council
UNITRA

By Fax: 043 742 0948; (040) 635 1337; (047) 502 2970

Dear Rev Finca, Mr Capa and Ms Skenjana

MERGER: BORDER TECHNIKON, EASTERN CAPE TECHNIKON AND THE UNIVERSITY OF THE TRANSKEI

Thank you for your letter of 14 August 2003.

I have noted that your preferred name for the new institution is the Walter Sisulu University of Science, Technology and Rural Development. I have also noted that Prof Morgan contacted the Sisulu family to seek their approval for naming the new institution after the late Walter Sisulu. Although the permission of the Sisulu family is clearly necessary, the manner in which this has been undertaken is highly improper. This should only have been done after consulting me to determine whether the proposed name would be acceptable in the context of the Ministry's guidelines, which indicate that it would be preferable not to name institutions after individuals. The Sisulu family had assumed that I had been contacted and agreed to the proposed name. The fact that this had not happened places the family in an untenable situation.

It is my view that it would be inappropriately name the new institution after an individual. I would therefore like to request that the three institutions submit
Appendix XII (b) Reaction to Walter Sisulu University name change by the National Minister of Education in 2003

alternative proposals for the name of the new institution to me at the latest by the end of September.

Yours sincerely

Prof Kader Asmal, MP
Minister of Education
Appendix XIII (a): WSU Council Composition of 2010 and Stakeholders

**MEET YOUR WALTER SISULU UNIVERSITY COUNCIL**
as at 26 November 2010

**EXTERNAL COUNCIL MEMBERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Designation/Constituency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr Somadoda Fikeni</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Donovan Nadson</td>
<td>Deputy-Chairperson/Ministerial Appointee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Ndabeni Bagosi</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Andile Fani</td>
<td>Councillor/Ministerial Appointee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs Marjui Gourah</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Khaya Mafanya</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Clayton Maniwa</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Phetwwe Matutu</td>
<td>Councillor/Ministerial Appointee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Zwelindumile Mbembisa</td>
<td>Councillor/Ministerial Appointee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Andrew Murray</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Temba Mtusi</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Mphumulo Saziwa</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocate Matholela Sishuba</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Nosipho Skenjana</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Zola Dambuza</td>
<td>Councillor/Ministerial Appointee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INTERNAL COUNCIL MEMBERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Designation/Constituency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professor Marcus Belintulo</td>
<td>Vice-Chancellor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Georgina Buji</td>
<td>Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Planning, Quality Assurance &amp; Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Larry Obi</td>
<td>Deputy Vice-Chancellor: Academic Affairs &amp; Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Sabelo Olamini</td>
<td>ISRC Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Abraham Machinga</td>
<td>ISRC President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Loyiso Mfabe</td>
<td>IF Chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Lundi Mqibela</td>
<td>Councillor/Elected by Academic staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Adele Moodly</td>
<td>Councillor/Elected by Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Mchunu Nzo</td>
<td>Councillor/Elected by Non-academic staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Sidwell Ngubentombi</td>
<td>Councillor/Elected by Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Sylvia Nkanyuzza</td>
<td>Councillor/Elected by Academic staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Mthuthuzeli Emankoto</td>
<td>Councillor/Elected by Non-academic staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Nthoana Tau-Mzamane</td>
<td>University Registrar &amp; Secretary to Council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COUNCIL STRATEGIC INDABA**

**5 YEARS OF MERGER:**

**TOWARDS VISION 2020**

The Walter Sisulu University Council held a very important and ground-breaking Strategic Indaba on the 1st and 2nd October. Following the 5th anniversary of Walter Sisulu University on 1 July this year, it was the ideal time to take stock of how far we have come since merger, to do an honest assessment of where we are and to consider the future path of the University.

The current vision and mission of WSU was developed and finalised in 2004 and the vision forms the core of the strategic direction of the University. Strategic plans are from time to time reviewed with a view to evaluating implementation and impact. The Council Strategic Planning Indaba offered WSU and its stakeholders an opportunity to reflect on its concrete experience in pursuance of its vision and mission over the past five years.

The Indaba was therefore a platform for WSU to candidly, sincerely and intensely look at:

1. What has worked in the past five years?
2. What has not worked in the past five years?
3. New things that the University wants to bring forward?
4. Things the University wants to do in different forms and approaches?
5. Things the University wants to drop?
6. Is there a WSU unique culture and identity emerging?
7. What needs to be done concretely to build WSU as an African Developmental Comprehensive University of First Choice?

A great deal of pre-Indaba work was undertaken such as a detailed Situational Analysis conducted with participation from University Stakeholders, research conducted by Professor Muke Nkondo and an External Stakeholder Perception Audit. Other documents that formed part of the background study included the Student Life Turnaround Strategy; the current Programme and Qualifications Mix, The HIV Aids Turnaround Strategy, Gender Forum inputs, Disability Forum inputs and the draft Transformation Charter. These documents contain some very interesting outcomes and proposals and may be viewed in full on the WSU intranet.

The following structures were invited to participate at the Indaba:

**EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS**

1. Department of Higher Education and Training
2. Office of the Premier – Eastern Cape
3. Department of Education – Eastern Cape
Appendix XIII (b): WSU Council Composition of 2010 and Stakeholders

The Indaba concluded with Dr Fikeni giving a broad overview of the main issues to be taken forward. He concluded that this Indaba had indeed been a landmark exercise. He quoted US President John F Kennedy who on his election, stated: “Ask not what your country can do for you, but what YOU CAN DO for your country.” This was the question he posed for WSU – what can WE DO for our University. Dr Fikeni said that there was no doubt that our merger was an extremely complex exercise and that harmonization of such disparate legacy institutions was no easy task. He called for the commitment of each and every Walter Sisulu University stakeholder to participate in what he called “an emerging roadmap.”

Certain issues were highlighted: performance management, monitoring implementation, reducing costs and exercising resource consciousness, utilizing technology to reduce endemic travelling and aggressive resource mobilization. Resource mobilization was identified as the primary mandate of the Walter Sisulu University Foundation Board and its new Executive Director, Mr Milcho Damianov, who commenced duty on 1 September 2010. Dr Fikeni also mentioned that much of our planning over the past five years was within the confines of post-merger compliance and that we now needed to look beyond this confine and develop a targeted, well-calculated approach to what is right for Walter Sisulu University and its unique environment.

Two key issues of significance for the future of the University are the establishment of the new Faculty of Agriculture and Rural Development Studies and the acquisition of land and infrastructure.

Dr Fikeni’s concluding words were: “I see the future and it is brighter than today.”
Appendix XIV (a):  SAMPLE LIST OF ‘WHO is WHO’ of FORMER UNITRA STUDENTS IN PROMINENT POSITIONS

TERENCE NOMBEMBE  (Attorney-General)
NONKULULEKO GOBODO  (Chartered Accountant)

JUDGE MADALA
JUDGE JAFTA  Constitutional Court
JUDGE MADLANGA

ADVOCATE DUMISA NTSEBEZA
ADVOCATE PATEKILE HOLOMISA  (Traditional Leader and MP)

NOXOLO KIEVIET  Former Eastern Cape Premiers
MBULELO SOGONI

SOMADODA FIKENI  Political Analyst
SONWABILE MANCOTYWA  Former MEC and CEO of the National heritage Council

MAKAYA NTINI  Springbok Rugby Team Twins
NDUNGANE NTINI

LUNGISA FUZILE  Director-General of National Treasury

PROFESSOR KWADIWE KONDLO

Hospital CEOs, Corporation Companies and Public Sectors

346
Appendix XIV (b): **HONORARY GRADUATES of FORMER UNITRA**

Paramount Chief K.D Matanzima, Doctor of Administration (1985)

Mrs Albertina N Sisulu, Doctor of Philosophy (Sociology 1992)

Mr Aggrey Klaaste, Doctor of Literature & Philosophy (1992)

Mr Raymond M Mhlaba, Doctor of Laws (1995)

Mr Chris Hani, Doctor of Literature & Philosophy (Political Studies) Posthumously (1995)

Prof Marina N V Xaba-Mokoena, Doctor of Medicine (1996)

Mr Gerhard S van Niekerk, Doctor of Philosophy

Dr Nkosazana C Dlamini-Zuma, Doctor of Medicine (1990)

Mr Donald M Ncube, Doctor of Commerce (1997)

Mr Archibald S Nkonyeni, Doctor of Commerce (1998)

Mr Hans Jurie Smith, Doctor of Commerce (1998)

Mr Vusumuzi P Khanyile, Doctor of Commerce (1998)

Ms Brigalia Bam, Doctor of Laws (1999)

Mr Mongane W Serote, Doctor of Laws (1999)

Mrs Laura B G Mpahlwa, Doctor of Philosophy (Primary Health Care) (2000)

Prof Phillip Tobias, Doctor of Science (2003)

Bishop Hamilton M Dandala, Doctor of Philosophy (Humanities)(2003)


Mrs Adelaide F Tambo, Doctor of Philosophy & Literature (2004)


Prof Ngugi Wa Thiongo, Doctor of Literature & Philosophy (2004)


Mr Jonathan Shapiro, Doctor of Literature (2004)

Mrs Nokuzola Magida, Master in Education (2004)
Appendix XV: General Semi-Structured Questionnaire to UNITRA Former Vice-Chancellors

A. General Questions

- Q1. Please could you tell me about life and career before you came to UNITRA?
- Q2. What were the guiding internal policies and external policies for UNITRA?
- Q3. Could you tell me what were the events leading to you becoming a VC?
- Q4. During your tenure as a VC what challenges did you face at UNITRA?
- Q5. What was your greatest achievement at UNITRA?
  - What was your relationship to Council
  - What was your relationship with Senate
  - What was your relationship with the top non-academic staff
  - What was your relationship with Academic Staff
  - What was your relationship with the labour unions
  - What was your relationship with student leadership
- Q6. What was your greatest disappointment at UNITRA?
- Q7. What vision did you have for UNITRA and what guided this vision?
- Q8. How far were your leadership and managerial practices shaped by prevailing politics?
- Q9. How much power did the government assume over essential decisions?
- Q10. How did this impact on the governance structure at UNITRA as a higher education institution?
- Q11. What types of financial resources were made at UNITRA?
- Q12. Was UNITRA financially sustainable during your tenure?
- Q12. What do you think the functions of higher education should have been in the Transkei during your tenure at UNITRA and how far do you think UNITRA fulfilled them?

B. Specific Questions related to period of VC.
Appendix XVI: Illustrated Consent Forms for UNITRA Former Vice Chancellors

FACULTY OF EDUCATION
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES & DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Department of Psychology
Private Bag X1 WSU · Mthatha · Eastern Cape · South Africa
Telephone: (047) 502 2418 · Cell No: 084 871 2272 · Fax: (047) 502 2595.
e-mail: snkanyuza@yahoo.co.uk and snkanyuza@wsu.ac.za

(To be completed at the time of the interview)

Date

Dear Prof.

Re: REQUEST FOR AN INTERVIEW, FOR PhD RESEARCH PURPOSES ONLY

I .............................................................................................................

agree to be interviewed by Ms. S.N.Nkanyuza for the purposes of academic research in

“Leadership, Managerial Practices and Politics in a Historically Black University: A Case Study of the Vice Chancellors at the Former University of Transkei (UNITRA) from 1976-2004”.

Signature: ............................................................................................

Dated: .................................................................
22 August 2011

Dear Prof.

Re: REQUEST FOR AN INTERVIEW, FOR PhD RESEARCH PURPOSES ONLY

I write to you to request permission to be able to interview you on your role, position and experiences at the former UNITRA, for data collection for my PhD studies. My proposed topic, which has been accepted by my supervisor and the higher degrees committee of the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), Edgewood Campus, seeks to historically track and evaluate the leadership, management and politics in a historical black university.

The study will focus on the former Vice Chancellors, including the ministerial appointed Administrators, at the former University of Transkei from 1976 to 2004. It will include the important events, key actors, group dynamics and the availability of finances/funding at UNITRA. The themes and issues reflected in the thesis will relate to each Vice Chancellor. The interview with you is to seek your observations, perceptions and aims and activities during your period as VC.

My supervisor is Professor C. Mbali of UKZN (Howard College Campus) and my co-supervisors are Professor V. Chikoko at UKZN Edgewood campus, Durban and Professor P. Phoofolo based at the Mthatha Campus of WSU.

As regards ethical considerations, I can assure you that the information will be used for research study purposes and data collection analyses. I am also bound by the UKZN ethics code. As a prominent person, it may be impossible to disguise that you are the source of some of the information. If you choose to disclose sensitive information during the interview, we can discuss how you wish it to be handled.

Please do not hesitate to call me on 084 871 2272 if you wish to raise any questions or issues in advance. I will be in Gauteng from Tuesday 23 August to Saturday 27 August.

Thanking you in anticipation,
Yours sincerely,

Sylvia Nompucuko Nkanyuza
PhD candidate: University of KwaZulu-Natal, Edgewood Campus.
Appendix XVIII (a): Letter Request for Access to former University of Transkei (UNITRA) documents and Walter Sisulu University (W.S.U) documents

Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Department of Psychology
Private Bag X1
Mthatha
5117
30 March 2007

The Chairperson of Council
The Vice Chancellor & Principal
Walter Sisulu University
Mthatha Main Campus
Nelson Mandela Drive
MTHATHA
5117

Dear Professor Balintulo and Dr. Fikeni

Re: REQUEST TO ACCESS UNIVERSITY COUNCIL DOCUMENTS FOR PhD RESEARCH PURPOSES ONLY

I write to you to request that I be allowed to access the University’s Council records for data collection for my PhD studies. My proposed topic, which has been accepted by my supervisor and the higher degrees committee of the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), Edgewood Campus, seeks to evaluate the leadership styles of the HBUs with particular focus on the former Unitra (now WSU). My supervisor is Professor C. Mbal of the selfsame University based at the Howard Campus of UKZN.

As regards the ethical considerations, I can assure you that the information will be used purely for study purposes and data collection, and no names, sensitive information as well as crucial issues will be divulged without due consultation with the current University Executive Management.

I attached herewith an abridged version of my proposal which, as I mentioned, has been accepted for a PhD thesis with the UKZN Centre for Higher Education Studies (CHES), Edgewood College.

Thanking you with anticipation, I am yours faithfully,

[Signature]

Sylvia Nompucuko Nkanyuza

PhD candidate: University of KwaZulu-Natal, Edgewood Campus.
Student Number: 207527740.
Appendix XVIII (b): Letter Approval for Access to former University of Transkei (UNITRA) documents and Walter Sisulu University (W.S.U) documents

Office of the Vice Chancellor
Nelson Mandela Drive · Mthatha · 5100 · Private Bag XI · Mthatha · 5187
Eastern Cape · Republic of South Africa
Tel: (+27) 047 531 2267 · Fax: (+27) 047 502 2970 · Email: vco@wsu.ac.za

12 June 2007

Ms. S N Nkanyuza
Department of Psychology
Nelson Mandela Drive Campus
Walter Sisulu University
P/Bag X 1
Mthatha

Dear Ms. Nkayuza

REQUEST TO ACCESS UNIVERSITY COUNCIL DOCUMENTS FOR PHD RESEARCH

I write in response to your correspondence dated 30 March 2007 regarding the above matter. Please be advised that University Interim Executive Management, at its meeting on 21 May 2007, resolved to approve your request and grant you access to University Council documents for your PhD research purposes. I trust that the undertaking made in your correspondence to use the information in these Council documents responsibly will be adhered to at all times. On behalf of the Executive Management, I wish you well in your studies and looking forward to the completion of your PhD thesis.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]

Prof. MM Balintulo
Vice-Chancellor & Principal
Appendix XIX (a): University of Kwa-Zulu Natal (UKZN) Ethical Clearance

RESEARCH OFFICE (GOVAN MBeki CENTRE)
WESTVILLE CAMPUS
TELEPHONE NO.: 031 – 2603587
EMAIL: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za

23 JUNE 2009

MS. SN NKANYUZA (207527740)
CENTRE FOR HIGHER EDUCATION STUDIES

Dear Ms. Nkanyuza

ETHICAL CLEARANCE APPROVAL NUMBER: HSS/0186/09D

I wish to confirm that ethical clearance has been granted for the following project:

“Leadership, managerial practices and politics in a Historical Black University: A case study of the Vice Chancellors at the former University of Transkei (UNITRA) from 1976-2004”

PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the school/department for a period of 5 years

Yours faithfully

[Signature]

MS. PHUMELELE XIMBA
ADMINISTRATOR
HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES ETHICS COMMITTEE

cc. Supervisor (Prof. C Mbali)
cc. Dr. P Phoofolo
cc. Mr. D Buchler
Appendix XIX (b)  University of Kwa-Zulu Natal (UKZN) Ethical Clearance

28 October 2009

Ms S N Nkanyuza
Department of Psychology
Private Bag X1, WSU
MTHATHA
5117

Dear Professor Nkanyuza

PROTOCOL: “Leadership, Managerial Practices and Politics in a Historically Black University: A Case Study of the Vice Chancellors at the Former University of Transkei (UNITRA) from 1976-2004”

ETHICAL APPROVAL NUMBER: HSS/0737/2009: Faculty of Education

In response to your application dated 15 October 2009, Student Number: 207527740 the Humanities & Social Sciences Ethics Committee has considered the abovementioned application and the protocol has been given FULL APPROVAL.

PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the school/department for a period of 5 years.

I take this opportunity of wishing you everything of the best with your study.

Yours faithfully

Professor Steve Collings (Chair)
HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES ETHICS COMMITTEE

SC/sn

cc: Prof C Mbaleni
cc: Ms R Govender

Founding Campuses: [List of campuses]
Appendix XX (a): Selected Pictures of 1992 Durban Murals on Prison Wall

Mural painted by
Community Artists in
Durban, South Africa,
led by Terry-anne Stevenson

Derrick Nximalo – Nicky Savage – Kuben A – Vukil –
J Manana – Mandala Blose – Ian – Jalulani Mkhige –
Sampson M – Khulekani – Rose – Kim – Nelly –
Jayson – Avi – Michelle – Shakes – Xolan Gaso –
Jethro S – Belinda – Wilson K – Igomamdhuli –
Mervin – Gabriel – Sylvia – Joseph –
Skhumbuzo – Mthandeni – Lindam

Appendix XX (b): Selected Pictures of 1992 Durban Murals on Prison Wall
Appendix XXI (a): Address by the Prime Minister Dr. K.D. Matanzima – Fourteenth Congress of the Transkeian National Independence Party 1977. Held at Umtata 5-6 March 1977

INTRODUCTION

On October 26, 1976, the new independent state of Transkei was born. Its independence came peacefully and as a result of the wishes of the people.

Here is the background. In March, 1974, Paramount Chief Minister Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima moved in Transkei’s Legislative Assembly that the South African government be requested to grant full independence to Transkei within five years. In the 1973 election the voters had given Chief Minister Matanzima’s Transkei National Independence Party a mandate for independence. The Chief Minister’s motion was adopted by a majority vote.

On September 10, 1974, the South African Prime Minister declared that his government favoured independence for Transkei. On October 26, 1976 this dream became a reality and Transkei became Africa’s 50th self-governing territory.

Yet, while independence is real and has been achieved peacefully, the United Nations passed a resolution on October 25, 1976, calling for the nations of the world not to recognize Transkei. This resolution was passed unanimously, with only the United States abstaining. In the months since independence, only the Republic of South Africa has granted full diplomatic recognition to Transkei.

In the material which follows, the major questions regarding Transkei are carefully considered and the relevant data concerning each area of consideration is presented.

Prime Minister Matanzima has said that, “Where struggle and suffering were necessary for people to secure freedom let it be so ...... but where freedom has been gained peacefully, who is to say it is less meritorious?”. 

This material has been prepared and is presented in the belief that a careful examination of all the facts will lead men and women of good will of all nations to affirm the true independence of the Republic of Transkei. The Prime Minister’s address to the 14th Congress of the ruling Party, in his capacity as the duly elected founder-leader of the Party, shows beyond doubt the truly independent character of the Republic of Transkei.
Appendix XXI (b): Address by the Prime Minister Dr. K.D. Matanzima

SECTION A

ADDRESS BY THE PRIME MINISTER, DR. K. D. MATANZIMA

FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE TRANSKEIAN NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE PARTY 1977
HELD AT UMTATA
5 – 6 MARCH 1977

The year 1976 will go down in history as the most important, particularly when it refers to Southern Africa because of the dramatic turn of events in the political and social lives of the people of the Republic of Transkei. The history of South Africa is in the main an account of the struggle between the different racial groups involving the domination of one group by another. The colonisation of our country by the British Imperialists brought with it the oppression of the Black people by a White Colonial Government. Hence the so called native problem which occupied the major legislative programme of successive Parliaments. Since the annexation of our Territories by the British Government there has been a consistent struggle by the Black people of Transkei to regain what had been lost to them namely human rights and participation in the Government of their own country. This was manifested through debates in the local and regional councils.

The declaration of independence which had in several quarters been received with scepticism as a result of the reactionary propaganda of our official opposition and Whites opposing the Republic of South Africa Government, brought with it much jubilation and a spirit of nationalism amongst Transkeians “It was the best of times; it was the worst of times. We had everything before us; we had nothing before us.”

For, in spite of our determined stand to attain what we regard as most dear to every individual, freedom, we knew that we would face formidable difficulties in achieving and acquiring all that was historically and legally ours. We were faced with the probability of having a few friends in the international world because of our stand against Communist ideologies and adhering to our principles to attain independence peacefully and without plunging our country into a bloody revolution which appeared to the majority of nations to be the qualification for attaining freedom from Colonial domination. It was our strategy to take what we have in order to get what we want, and indeed we must get what we want, namely our land still occupied by the Republic of South Africa although historically it belongs to us. I refer to the Districts of Elliot, Maclear, farms in Cedarville (Matatiele), Mount Currie, Harding and part of Port Shepstone west of Umzimkulu River. This is the land we claim from the Republic of South Africa and in terms of Section 1 of our Constitution Act. should be added as soon as possible to our Small State. It is my hope that there will be a negotiated settlement in this issue as I shudder to contemplate the consequences of the only alternative method of settlement— an armed struggle.

The normalisation of harmonious relations between our state and the Republic of South Africa will depend on the transfer of the said land to us and no time must be lost in arriving at an amicable settlement.

At this juncture I wish to make an appeal to our white neighbours in East Griqualand i.e. Elliot, Maclear, Cedarville, Kokstad, and Harding to enter the negotiations on our side so that they can retain ownership of their properties under the Transkeian Government and enjoy all consequential rights of citizenship. They can then have a right of disposing their properties to the Transkeian Government and citizens when they so wish. Their situation makes it imperative that they should be Transkeian citizens and together with us join in repulsing any outside attack on our country. A clash between our country and the Republic of South Africa will then be averted and cordial relations stabilised once and for all.

And since the officials of the Republic of South Africa have embarked upon an abominable campaign against Transkeian citizens by endorsing them out of the Republic of South Africa cities and farms the severing of relations between the two countries will be precipitated and by means of an armed struggle for which we shall have to prepare we shall take the land aforesaid under any circumstances for the settlement of our landless population. This is not an empty threat but a warning to people who arrogated to themselves the sole ownership of South African land to the exclusion of all Black people.

We have co-operated with the Republic of South Africa to the extent of being called collaborators in our own oppression. We agreed to the separation of White and Black areas but we made it clear that we only want what historically belongs to us: land that was set aside for our occupation by the British conquerors.

The Union White Parliament acted illegally in expropriating part of our land in 1913. We have never been party to any such legislation. The 1936 Land Act passed by White Parliament was to us an act of continued robbery and aggression and is therefore ulta vires.

Independence brought us happiness because with it we attained complete freedom on the land we occupied. All discriminatory laws are to be removed from our statute books. Our people are participating in the economy of the country to which they had hitherto been excluded by discriminatory legislation intended to give monopoly of trade to the Whites. Land which was owned by Whites only in the towns is now open for occupation by Blacks. It is heartening to find that Transkeian whites are identifying themselves as equals of the Blacks. That is how it should be right through Southern Africa. If bloodshed is to be averted, justice and fairplay should be cultivated in the minds of even the most hardened Herrenvolk.

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Appendix XXI (c): Address by the Prime Minister Dr. K.D. Matanzima

In spite of economic difficulties resulting from the general inflation, Transkeians are determined to make the best out of their sovereignty. Our country can never be worse off when compared with others of the third world. Economic viability is not a pre-requisite to the political independence. It is wishful thinking to say that a country should be economically independent before attaining political sovereignty. That philosophy is nonsensical as it is devoid of all practicability. Our revenue from own sources when augmented by customs and excise duty payments from the Republic of South Africa will be able to balance our expenditure. So far we are experiencing a sound financial position. It will improve considerably when our Department of Agriculture takes positive and drastic steps to increase the productivity of the farmers.

Education is of a very high standard and Transkeian Matriculants are sufficient to fill all ranks in our Civil Service which is a sine qua non in sound and efficient administration. While at this point I humbly appeal to all our youths to cultivate a spirit of patriotism and dedication to duty in the service of their nation. Bribery and corruption should be stamped out in the public service.

Independence has brought with it limitless opportunities for enterprising and intelligent people to succeed in their chosen occupations but this can only be achieved by persons who apply their energies with dedication and honesty.

Industrial development is showing signs of unparalleled success. Both our growth points in Butterworth and Umtata will soon emulate the Republic of South Africa industrial cities and consequently give rise to housing problems. The Government is devising schemes to meet the deteriorating situation in lack of accommodation. Residential areas will be cut up into plots for sale to our citizens to erect their own houses. Locations such as one finds in the Republic of South Africa cities will be disallowed.

Trading and commercial ventures are a centre of attraction to the Transkeians. The establishment of companies is highly appreciated but mixed companies with non-Transkeian Citizens will not be permitted.

Coming now to the thorny question of passports and travel documents which gave rise to the illtreatment of Transkeians in certain labour centres by petty and rude officials of the Bantu Administration and Development Corporation. I must, without hesitation register the exception taken by my Government in the strongest possible terms.

However, as a result of talks on a high level no such arrests will be made, Transkeian subjects will not be under the care of the notorious and anti-black Bantu Administration and Development Corporation officials such as one finds in Cape Town but surrounded by the sophisticated and gentle officers of the Republican Department of Foreign Affairs.

The independence of Transkei evoked hatred and unusual indignation amongst the nations of the world whose sheepish decision not to recognised it was intended to ostracise the already enslaved people who on their own volition broke loose the bonds of oppression.

Because we did not invite the Russians and the Cubans to plunge us into a bloody confrontation with Colonial power, we were subjected to humiliation and unwarranted hatred by our Brothers in the North and the big powers of the West. We are well aware that all this unnecessary exercise was intended to please the United Kingdom whose interests in South Africa are to maintain the supremacy of the White man and to retain the cheap labour of the Blacks in the British Companies here, Great Britain is very bitter against us because we have shaken off the chains of their oppression which were inherited by their descendants - the extremist racists. The United Kingdom has consequently declared a cold war against the Transkei on the ground that its independence is a furtherance of the Republic of South Africa policy of apartheid. Yet this very country is a trading partner of South African firms and recognises the independence of South Africa their White brothers.

What double standards, what inconsistency, what discrimination on the grounds of colour!!

This is typical of what takes place in this very country.

If you want to experience indignation and hatred against Transkei go to the major English cities of East London, Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown and Cape Town. This is where the policy of apartheid was carried out to its logical conclusion by ejecting Black professional men out the towns to the Black locations. We are determined to struggle on our own without the British and American assistance but one day they will answer for their nefarious actions. We shall not apply for membership of the United Nations Organisation until we are satisfied that the world is returning to its normal senses and is free of racial discrimination such is as being practised on us.

We shall attempt to explain our position to our brothers in the North who, I am persuaded to believe are acting under a complete misapprehension through lack of correct information. Britain has never done anything for us and hence we do not care about their snub.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the general election last August gave my party an unqualified victory over the Democratic Party. I thank all those who supported the principles which I and my colleagues uphold. As a result, I had no difficulty in selecting men of integrity to my Cabinet. The election of Paramount Chief Sigxau as our First President put the Transkei on a platform of unparalleled dignity and respectability. A man of the royal family whose ancestors can be traced several generations back, he was the most suitable candidate for the post. We thank him for making his services available to his people inspite of his age. 

Thank you.
Appendix XXI (d): Questions and Answers Address by the Prime Minister Dr. K.D. Matanzima

SECTION B

QUESTION AND ANSWER

Q. How real is Transkei Independence?
A. The independence of the Republic of Transkei is as real as the independence of any other sovereign state. The Government of Transkei has total control over its own internal and external affairs.

Critics of Transkei independence argue that it is simply a part of South Africa's system of apartheid. Such a charge, however, is not borne out by the facts.

As far back as 1930 the legislative assembly of Transkei passed a series of motions requesting self-government as a precursor to full independence. Transkei is not an artificial creation of South Africa but was a colony of Great Britain prior to being dragged into the Union of South Africa by Great Britain in 1910, without consulting the people of Transkei.

Beyond this, even after inclusion in the Union of South Africa, Transkei remained a separate entity and in 1911 established its own General Council. Transkei is older than South Africa itself, having received its name in 1894 after the British completed annexing the independent and free kingdom of the Transkei area.

In 1910, the British, rather than affording Transkei the opportunity of becoming a protectorate - as it did with Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho - handed Transkei large areas to the newly established Union of South Africa. It must be stressed that Transkei was never legally integrated into the Union of South Africa. Prior to 1854, in fact the people of Transkei lived in complete independence.

Transkei is not an artificial creation, but a state with a long history of independence going back over 83 years. Its achievement of formal independence on October 26, 1976 is, therefore, far more real than that of many other African nations which surround it.

Q. Are Transkei’s people and leaders prepared for Independence?
A. Such a question was not asked of Angola, Mozambique, Kenya, Zaire, Algeria, and other African states whose independence was born in violence and bloodshed.

This question, nevertheless, is one which can be answered in the affirmative with regard to Transkei - not only on the basis that “all” people deserve independence, but on the more specific basis of the achievements, educational level and future prospects of Transkei and its leaders.

The percentage of school-going children in relationship to the population is 22 per cent in Transkei. Almost all of the other independent African states enjoy a much lower percentage: Burundi (5%), Benin (6%), Ethiopia (3.5%), Guinea (4.5%), Upper Volta (2.5%), Kenya (10%), Liberia (10.5%), Mali (3.8%), Morocco (12.6%), Mauritania (2.2%), Niger (2.1%), Nigeria (9%), Uganda (9.2%), Sierra Leone (6.5%), Somalia (1.9%), Sudan (5%), Tanzania (8%), Chad (6%), Zambie (18%).

The same story holds with regard to the number of doctors or hospital beds, the impact of child mortality, and life expectancy. Transkei has a bigger population than 34% of the member states of the United Nations, a higher gross national product than 33% of its members, and is geographically larger than 16% of its members.

The leadership of Transkei is educated and well prepared for its current role. The Honorable Paramount Chief Kaiser Dalwonga Matanzima, the Prime Minister, studied at Lovedale College and the University of Fort Hare, graduating with a B.A. degree in Roman Law and Political Science in 1939. In 1946, after serving as an articled clerk in a law firm, he passed the entrance examination of the Cape of Good Hope Law Society with Honors, and qualified as a lawyer. He has had almost 40 years of experience in government service.

George Mzimvu Matanzima, the Minister of Justice, attended Lovedale High School and received his B.Sc. degree from Fort Hare University. He subsequently qualified as a lawyer and after being admitted to the Bar practiced law in Engcobo, Transkei. He has had more than 20 years of government service.

Digby S. Koyana, 43, serves as the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Information. An advocate of Transkei's Supreme Court, he has worked for many years towards the establishment of non-racial democracy in South Africa. In 1960, and again in 1972, he was detained in solitary confinement under the South African Security Laws because of his activities on behalf of human rights.

Tepeo Tlisetso Letlaka, Minister of Finance and Auditor General, studied at Fort Hare University and taught History and English at Cala High School and subsequently practiced as an attorney. From 1969 to 1975, he studied and taught in England, when he joined Transkei's newly organized foreign service.

Mhenele Njisane, Transkei Ambassador to South Africa, after teaching sociology at the University of Natal, went to Howard University in the United States as a visiting Fulbright Professor. He subsequently taught at the University of Ghana, was tutor and graduate student at the University of Essex, and finally settling in San Francisco at the University of San Francisco and San Francisco State University. In 1975 he joined the foreign service of Transkei.
Appendix XXI (e): Address by the Prime Minister Dr. K.D. Matanzima

Also impressive is Transkei’s system of health and welfare. There are 31 hospitals in Transkei and the number of beds available in 1975 was 6,499, giving a ratio of 3 beds per 1,000 people. Special nursing services and full facilities for training nurses are offered at large hospitals.

The Transkei Department of the Interior has an active welfare section, staffed by professionally trained social welfare workers. Schools for the blind, crippled, deaf and dumb, and cerebral palsied persons, a paraplegic centre, two child welfare societies, one children’s home and other institutions complement these services.

On almost any legitimate basis of comparison, Transkei ranks high on the African continent in the quality of life offered to its citizens and by the standard of living achieved by them.

Q. Is Transkei citizenship being inflicted, against their will, upon Xhosa living and working in South Africa?

A. One of the most serious charges leveled against the legitimacy of Transkei independence is that it is simply an intrinsic element of South Africa’s system of “separate development”, an essential aspect of which is to disenfranchise blacks living and working within the Republic of South Africa.

While the government of South Africa may have envisioned such an “independent” Transkei; the government of Transkei has never agreed to this policy and has firmly rejected the idea of imposing its citizenship upon any individual who does not seek it or of denying its citizenship to anyone who legitimately seeks it.

Prior to independence, Prime Minister Matanzima declared that, “The question of citizenship has not been resolved. Prime Minister Vorster and I have agreed to disagree on that. Our parliament decided on its own standpoint, and the South African Parliament on theirs.

“But the legal point is quite clear: The Severance Act will not apply in Transkei, only the citizenship clause of our own constitution. Our own population and Transkeian migrant labourers in South Africa will be Transkeian citizens, but those people of Transkei descent who live in South Africa and have no ties with Transkei will not be affected at all, except that they will have the right to choose.”

The government of Transkei, since independence, has made it clear that no individual of Transkei origin living in South Africa will be a citizen of Transkei unless he chooses such citizenship. In his independence day address on October 26, Prime Minister Matanzima pointedly referred to a population of “two million”, thereby excluding Transkeians outside of the country.

Q. What has been the international reaction to Transkei Independence?

A. Almost immediately after the proclamation of Transkei Independence on October 26, 1976, the issue of admission was raised in the United Nations General Assembly. On October 26, 1976 Leslie O. Harriman of Nigeria introduced a resolution urging condemnation of Transkei’s “so-called independence” as collusion between South Africa and “handpicked puppets.” The resolution asked all governments to prohibit any dealings with Transkei.

The United Nations approved this resolution - 134-0 with only the United States abstaining.

There was an effort on September 21, 1976 in the U.S. Congress to pass a resolution urging the President not to recognize Transkei. This resolution failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority, and was vigorously opposed on the floor of the House of Representatives by a large number of legislators from both parties.

Rep. Clair Burgener (R-California), chairman of the House Republican Study Committee, declared that, “I had
Appendix XXI (f): Address by the Prime Minister Dr. K.D. Matanzima

the privilege of going to Transkei. I met with Kaiser Matanzima, and his counterpart, the leader of the opposition. Indeed, one visit makes no one an expert on anything, but one gains certain impressions...

"I am convinced that this nation wants independence. I am convinced, more importantly, that it is prepared for independence. In the field of politics, government, medicine and industry, the people of Transkei have been trained by South Africans to be competent to take over the task of self-government... it would be a gratuitous insult before this nation gets started, before it has any record of performance, good or bad, to suggest that we are not going to recognize it."

The world has rejected Transkei on an ideological basis, not on the basis of reality. Speaking on behalf of the nine members of the European Community, for example, Netherlands Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel told the U.N.: "Our governments do not intend to recognize Transkei... False solutions to the problems of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa, such as the establishment of homelands or bantustans presently pursued by the South African government, promote rather than diminish racial discrimination."

How racial discrimination is "promoted" by the establishment of an independent, non-racial state in which apartheid is eliminated is difficult if not impossible to understand. Beyond this, Mr. van der Stoel ignores the history of Transkei and the nationalist impulse which is the real thrust of its independence. Later in his statement, Mr. van der Stoel complains that the establishment of an independent Transkei would deprive black workers in South Africa of their South African citizenship. Again, this is not the case. The Government of Transkei has repeatedly stated that no one will be given Transkei citizenship unless he seeks it.

As for the charge of being a South African "puppet," Prime Minister Matanzima, from Independence Day on, has maintained his independence. In his October 26, 1976 Independence Day speech, for example, he touched on white sensitivities by referring to "Zimbabwe and Namibia", the African nationalist names for Rhodesia and South West Africa. He told white South Africans in the audience to "Speed up the changes your leaders know are inevitable... I hope your government will steadily improve the living conditions of blacks and, as soon as possible, treat them no differently from white aliens resident in South Africa."

Despite the fact that Transkeian independence is real, it is, at the present time, officially recognized only by the Republic of South Africa. The British Government has refused recognition of Transkei, although it recognized the Popular Movement in the Liberation of Angola as the "legitimate" government of Angola although the MPLA had only minority support and was brought to power by outside Cuban intervention.

It appears that at present many Western Nations are taking their foreign policy positions regarding Africa from the leaders of the Organization of African Unity, whose immediate past president was Uganda's notorious Idi Amin. Transkei is singled out for disapproval and reproach, although its independence has been gained without bloodshed. Perhaps nowhere else is the West's double standard of morality so clearly revealed as in its pre-

sent ostracism of Transkei.

Traditionally, there are four criteria which normally constitute grounds for recognition of statehood:

- **The existence of a permanent population.**
- **The occupation of a defined territory.**
- **Evidence of a capacity to exercise stable and effective government.**
- **Possession of sovereign independence.**

Transkei qualifies without question on all four grounds. To those who reject Transkei, Prime Minister Matanzima declares: "Recognition or no recognition, our country is going to become a sovereign state and we are certain that other countries will discover their mistake as we go on."

Q. Is Transkei economically viable as an independent state?

A. Critics of Transkei independence argue that the new nation is not economically viable but is totally dependent upon South Africa, raising serious questions about its real political sovereignty.

While it is true that Transkei will become a part of the southern Africa customs union which includes the Republic of South Africa, this customs union also includes Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland - all independent black African states with United States recognition and United Nations membership.

Transkei will have important trade ties with South Africa. But so do Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, and at least one third of the members of the Organization of African Unity, as publicly revealed at the Third World meeting in Mauritius in July, 1976.

It is also argued that since Transkei's currency has remained the South African rand its independence is compromised.

This creates a situation that Swaziland and Botswana also continued to use the South African rand immediately after their independence. Later, Swaziland adopted its own unit of currency and, on August 23, 1976, Botswana did the same. Both currencies, however, continue to be tied to the rand.

Those who discuss only Transkei's economic relationship with South Africa overlook the very active economic growth taking place within Transkei itself. In a little more than ten years, Transkei has developed several successful economic projects, including tea plantations and factories in the East Coastal region.
Appendix XXI (g): Address by the Prime Minister Dr. K.D. Matanzima

In 1965, the Xhosa Development Corporation (XDC) was established as the principal agency for promoting economic progress. By March, 1976, the XDC - now Transkei Development Corporation and Ciskei Development Corporation - had invested more than $44 million and built 34 factories in Transkei and Ciskei. But mainly in Transkei. Recently, Transkei's biggest single industrial complex - a $12.5 million blanket factory - opened at Butterworth, providing employment for about 1,600 Transkeians.

Commerce and trade has grown impressively in the past five years. There are now 3,000 stores, catering and accommodation establishments and other businesses in the region.

Compared with other Third World countries, Transkei's economic health is favourable. A 1975 survey indicated that Transkei is better off than about 85 per cent of African countries. Thus, according to United Nations criteria, Transkei does not qualify for 'backward country' status.

The per capita income of Transkei of $220 per annum is higher than that of most African states, including Burundi, Chad, Benin, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Malagasy, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Upper Volta, and Zaire.

Transkei's arable land, favoured by good soil and one of the best climates in southern Africa, is already extensively utilized. Of the 18.5 per cent of the surface area suitable for agriculture, 90 per cent is under cultivation. It is estimated that Transkei could meet half of South African's annual tea needs, as well as providing coffee, sugar cane, cotton and phormium tenax worth approximately $50 million annually. With proper modernization, Transkei could increase its maize production from 200,000 to 4.5 million tons each year. In 1976, Transkei's livestock totalled 1.3 million cattle, 2.5 million sheep, and 1.4 million goats.

The government of Transkei has embarked upon an ambitious plan to attract tourism and foreign investments to the country. In sum, Transkei's economic position is superior to that of the majority of independent African states which the international community does not hesitate to declare 'independent' and 'sovereign.'

Q. Is Transkei a part of South Africa's system of apartheid and separate development?

A. Nothing could be further from the truth. Transkei is a non-racial state. South Africa's apartheid enforced in Transkei prior to independence ended on October 26, 1976. Instantaneously, integration of all public facilities occurred and members of all races were granted the same rights and responsibilities.

The leader of Transkei, the Honorable Paramount Chief Prime Minister Kaiser Daliviwonga Matanzima, has always been a vocal critic of the apartheid system. The New York Times of October 25, 1976 pointed out that, "Chief Matanzima has consistently criticized the racial inequality imposed by South Africa's white government. He has denounced the pervasive restrictions on normal life through apartheid, the reservation of jobs for whites, the pass laws that require blacks to justify their presence in their own country by internal passports."

Concerning the idea of 'separate development,' Prime Minister Matanzima clearly differentiated his own goals from those of the South African government in a speech on April 20, 1976, prior to independence. He declared that, "Separate development is a white man's policy. Its primary goal is unashamedly the preservation of white indentity and control by white over their destiny . . . I am a disciple of the creed of nationalism. I believe in Xhosa nationalism because I was born to it. I was swaddled in it since the day of my birth. It has become my appointed task to develop it and to sponsor and foster it."

When he was recently asked whether he was establishing a non-apartheid and non-racial state, Prime Minister Matanzima replied: "A non-racial state. A man living here may apply for citizenship irrespective of his color. The normal tests for citizenship will apply."

Respected international critics of South Africa's system of apartheid and separate development recognize that the independence of Transkei is real and is, in no sense, to be confused with such policies.

The respected American organization, Freedom House, in its 1977 "Comparative Survey of Freedom" declared that, "... Chief Matanzima is not a South African puppet... We do not accept the argument that Transkei should not be accepted as independent state... We agree that the homelands policy of which Transkei is a product is not a just one in its present form, but this judgement cannot determine our assessment of the Transkei's independence..."

To equate the non-racial state of Transkei with the apartheid policy of South Africa is a serious error with no basis in fact.
Dear Prof Hodge,

I have for a long time been wanting to write and respond to your kind letter and English programmes at the University of Transkei. Field work prevented me, and I’m sorry for this silence. I’m back to my desk now and yours is the first of the pile I must tackle.

Thanks very much indeed for the syllabus and for making me feel that I’d be welcome in the Department, that I could contribute something to the ideals you have set for yourselves.

Your comments on South African universities and their obsession with the journalist approach – the worst side of the New Critica – strikes a chord in me that tells me that you and I would make a formidable team for pulling our students towards the more rational approach to literature (and art in general – or rather the arts). Your views excited me to the point that I decided at once to respond positively to any invitation to come to University of Transkei. I myself began with UNISA, so that I was apprenticed in journalist criticism. I should say that in all fairness my late professor, Edward Davis, did encourage me to relate the literary image to life, although the history of ideas, culture, were never adequately confronted. David’s ideas of ‘life’ in this context were the general ones that concern ‘literature and morality’ or ‘literature and belief’. ‘Moral’ was always an elusively defined value. My contact with African literature and with those American critics who go beyond formalism – to ontology (which embraces culture, social focus etc) corrected my squint. I’m with you all the way and find your Honours programme simply the most fascinating, the most liberal and forward-looking I have seen in this country.

When Manganyi first spoke to me about the possibility of coming to the Transkei, I wasn’t sure if I’d like to do it. But after reading your letter and seeing the programmes, I felt there’s where I want to be. Then, alas, we met on Saturday 25th and he told me the sad news that the authorities have instructed the University not to proceed any further in trying to bring me out south. Wild questions are beginning to plague me: Did I return home to be a prisoner in Lebowa (where I am)? What’s the sense of it all? But something deeper also tells me this is where it’s at – and ‘where’ takes in all of the land called South Africa.

We’ll wait and see, maybe reason will yet prevail.

Best wishes and thanks again,

Yours ever,

E. Mphahlele

1 Chabani Manganyi comments, ‘This was the one occasion in the early years of the University of Transkei known to me on which the Transkei government intervened directly to stop the appointment of an academic approved by the Senate. It was too soon after the University of the North episode for there not to have been a connection between the two non-academic decisions!’
Appendix XXIII: UNITRA’s ‘Arms Emblem’

The cultural connotation of the former University of Transkei (UNITRA)’s ‘Arms Emblem’ (on left hand), endorsed on 27 October 1978 reinforced nationalism, social commitment and unity to both UNITRA internal and external stakeholders; and the Transkeian community.

The arms emblem of most universities, especially the older universities denotes meaning and links to a person, land and/or heritage, therefore giving an institution an identity. This identity also shapes the institution’s values, ethos and culture.

Written on the official blazon read ‘progress through learning’ was the ochre, the symbolism of Transkei and traditional colour of the Xhosa-speaking people (Oettle, 1978).

The green appeared both in the flag and the arms of Transkei, with prominent black and white colours in the border and the chevron.

The chosen colours fused a common identity of the Xhosa-speaking people, who mainly consisted of twelve tribes belonging to two different ethnic groups (Matanzima, 1977, pp. 19-24). Therefore the colours of UNITRA’s arms emblem reinforced the organisation’s affiliation to nationalism and social commitment of Transkeian people.
Appendix XXIV (a): Consent Form and Questions Format of an Interview with Professor N.Jafta on the Vice-Chancellors at the former University of Transkei (UNITRA)

05 July 2013

Dear Prof. Jafta,

Re: REQUEST FOR AN INTERVIEW, FOR PhD RESEARCH PURPOSES ONLY

I hereby agree to be interviewed by Ms. S.N.Nkanyuzza for the purposes of academic research in “Leadership, Managerial Practices and Politics in a Historically Black University: A Case Study of the Vice Chancellors at the Former University of Transkei (UNITRA) from 1976-2004”.

Signature: 

Dated: 05/07/2013.
Appendix XXIV (b): Questions Format of an Interview with Professor N.Jafta on the Vice-Chancellors at the former University of Transkei (UNITRA)

Prof. Jafta (1997)

General Questions

- Q1. Please could you tell me about life and career before you came to UNITRA?
- Q2. What were the guiding internal policies and external policies for UNITRA?
- Q3. Could you tell me what were the events leading to you becoming an acting VC in 1998?
- Q4. During your tenure as a VC what challenges did you face at UNITRA?
- Q5. What was your greatest achievement at UNITRA?
  - What was your relationship to Council
  - What was your relationship with Senate
  - What was your relationship with the top non-academic staff
  - What was your relationship with Academic Staff
  - What was your relationship with the labour unions
  - What was your relationship with student leadership

- Q6. What was your greatest disappointment at UNITRA?
- Q7. What vision did you have for UNITRA and what guided this vision?
- Q8. How far were your leadership and managerial practices shaped by prevailing politics?
- Q9. How much power did the government assume over essential decisions?
- Q10. How did this impact on the governance structure at UNITRA as a higher education institution?
- Q11. What types of financial resources were made at UNITRA?
- Q12. Was UNITRA financially sustainable during your tenure?
- Q12. What do you think the functions of higher education should have been in the Transkei during your tenure at UNITRA and how far do think UNITRA fulfilled them?

Specific Questions related to period of VC.

Prof N. Jafta

Q1. Please could you tell me about yourself?
Q2. As one of the pioneers of UNITRA, how were you recruited to UNITRA?
Q3. What vision did UNITRA have and what guided this vision?
Q4. From being one of the pioneers’ of UNITRA to be a Senator, Dean of Faculty of Arts, temporary VC and then serving as a Councillor, how would you describe the challenges and successes faced at each stage?
Appendix XXIV (c): Questions Format of an Interview with Professor N.Jafta on the Vice-Chancellors at the former University of Transkei (UNITRA)

Q5. How much power did the government assume over UNITRA
Q6. What were the means of communication between the university and the Republic of South African Government?
Q7. How far were the leadership and managerial practices of UNITRA’s Vice Chancellors shaped by prevailing politics of the apartheid system
Q8. How far were the leadership and managerial practices of UNITRA’s Vice Chancellors shaped by prevailing politics of the homeland system during Paramount Chief K.D. Matizima government
Q9. After the Paramount Chief K.D. Matizima ceased being the Chancellor of UNITRA in 1986, what were the relations between UNITRA and Chief Holomisa
Q10. How would you describe the tenure of Prof. De van Merwe as a VC
Q11. How would you describe the tenure of Prof. Nkulu as a VC
Q12. How would you describe the tenure of Prof Ncyipanya as a VC
Q13. What challenges do you recall that UNITRA faced leading to the elections of 1994
Q14. How far were the leadership and managerial practices of UNITRA’s Vice Chancellor shaped by prevailing politics of the new democratic dispersion of post 1994?
Q15. How would you describe the tenure of Prof Norwana?
Q16. One of the few permanent VC recruited was Prof Moleah. How would you describe his tenure as a VC
Q17. The period as a Councillor under the chairpersonship of Fatima Meer had its challenges, which was during the period of Minister Bengu as the Minister of Education. What were the challenges faced as Councillors? What lead to the suspension of Prof Moleah as a VC? What lead to the dissolving of Council by the Minister?
Q18. What managerial structure existed in the University with regard to governance; and to what extent you think this structure contribute to the crises periods from 1994 to 2004.
Q19. From your perspective of the different leadership and managerial practices of the Vice Chancellors and how did this impact on the governance structure at UNITRA as a higher education institution
Q20. How do you think the South African political events influenced institutional governance at UNITRA and what lessons can be learned from these events.
Appendix XXV: Consent Form of an Interview with Professor E.D. Malaza on the Vice-Chancellors at the former University of Transkei (UNITRA)

(To be completed at the time of the interview)

22 August 2011

Dear Prof. Malaza,

Re: REQUEST FOR AN INTERVIEW, FOR PhD RESEARCH PURPOSES ONLY

I __________________________ agree to be interviewed by Ms. S.N. Nkanyuza for the purposes of academic research in “Leadership, Managerial Practices and Politics in a Historically Black University: A Case Study of the Vice Chancellors at the Former University of Transkei (UNITRA) from 1976-2004”.

Signature: __________________________

Dated: 24-8-2011...2011.
Appendix XXVI: Consent Form of an Interview with Professor W.L.Nkulu on the Vice-Chancellors at the former University of Transkei (UNITRA)

(To be completed at the time of the interview)

16 September 2011

Dear Prof. Nkulu

Re: REQUEST FOR AN INTERVIEW, FOR PhD RESEARCH PURPOSES ONLY

I agree to be interviewed by Ms. S.N.Nkanyuza for the purposes of academic research in “Leadership, Managerial Practices and Politics in a Historically Black University: A Case Study of the Vice Chancellors at the Former University of Transkei (UNITRA) from 1976-2004”.

Signature: ____________________________

Dated: 16 September 2011.
Appendix XXVII: Consent Form of an Interview with Professor J. Peires on the Vice-Chancellors at the former University of Transkei (UNITRA)

06 December 2012

Dear Prof. Peires,

**Re: REQUEST FOR AN INTERVIEW, FOR PhD RESEARCH PURPOSES ONLY**

I, Prof. Jeff Peires, agree to be interviewed by Ms. S.N. Nkanyuza for the purposes of academic research in “Leadership, Managerial Practices and Politics in a Historically Black University: A Case Study of the Vice Chancellors at the Former University of Transkei (UNITRA) from 1976-2004”.

Signature: .................................................................

Dated: ........................................... 2012.
Appendix XXVIII (a): Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima’s abridged curriculum vitae from UNITRA’s 7th Graduation Ceremony

UNITRA: Seventh Graduation Ceremony, 4 May 1985

Doctor of Administration
His Excellency the State President of the Republic of Transkei — Paramount Chief, Dr K. D. Matanzima.

CURRICULUM VITAE:

HIS EXCELLENCY PARAMOUNT CHIEF K D MATANZIMA,
B.A. (S.A.), LL.D. (FORT HARE), ATTORNEYS’ ADMISSION
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TRANSKEI

KAIZER DALIWONGA MATANZIMA was born on 15 June 1915 at Qamata in the district of St. Marks. After attending the Mhlobo School (so named in honour of his father) and Lovedale College, he attended the University of Fort Hare where he obtained the B.A. degree in 1939. After employment as an articled clerk with a firm of attorneys, he qualified as an attorney. In 1940 he was installed as regional Chief in Emigrant Tembuland.

His career since that date has formed an inseparable part of the history of Transkei.

He became an outspoken antagonist of the so-called Council system introduced by the Glen Grey Act of 1884, and clashed from time to time with officials administering this system because his people’s laws and traditions were ignored and disregarded.

In 1954 he became a member of the United Transkeian Territories General Council and before long became a prominent figure in the affairs of Transkei. The Bantu Authorities system was introduced in the Transkei by Proclamation no. 180 of 1956, providing for the dissolution of the General Council and its 26 district councils, and for the establishment of territorial authorities.

Chief K D Matanzima became head of the Regional Authority of Emigrant Tembuland and as such was ex officio member of the Transkeian Territorial Authority, and in 1966 was elected Chairman of the Transkeian Territorial Authority. With this he became the leader of the people in Transkei.
Appendix XXVIII (b): Paramount Chief K.D. Matanzima’s abridged curriculum vitae from UNITRA’s 7th Graduation Ceremony

CURRICULUM VITAE

He led a delegation to Pretoria to meet the Prime Minister, the late Dr H Verwoerd, in connection with self-government. The delegation was given the green light by the government and set about making Transkei the first self-governing homeland within the borders of the Republic.

Chief K D Matanzima now played a crucial part in the compilation of the constitution for Transkei.

With the approval of the draft constitution by the South African Government came the Transkei Constitution Act of 1963, marking the culmination of the development of the Transkei towards self-government.

In 1963 Chief K D Matanzima became the first Chief Minister of the Transkeian Legislative Assembly. In 1966 the State President of the Republic of South Africa ended the long controversial question of the Paramountcy of Emigrant Tembland by giving recognition to Chief K D Matanzima as the Paramount Chief of Emigrant Tembland.

Paramount Chief Matanzima was for some years a member of the Advisory Council of the University College of Fort Hare and for a time served as Chairman of that body.

He was awarded the Honorary Doctor of Laws Degree by the University of Fort Hare on April 26, 1974.

Paramount Chief K D Matanzima served as Prime Minister of the Republic of Transkei from 26 October 1976 until February 1979 when he became the President of the Republic of Transkei.

He became the Chancellor of the University of Transkei in 1977, and is still holding this office.

In view of his outstanding contribution in public affairs and the prominent role he played in the establishment of the University of Transkei and the concern he continues to show for its welfare and development, the Honorary Degree Committee, Senate and Council, are unanimous that it would be fitting indeed to honour His Excellency by conferring the degree of Doctor of Administration (honoris causa).
Appendix XXIX: Consent Form of an Interview with Professor N.Cloete on the Vice-Chancellors at the former University of Transkei (UNITRA)

25 September 2012

Dear Prof. Cloete,

Re: REQUEST FOR AN INTERVIEW, FOR PhD RESEARCH PURPOSES ONLY

I agree to be interviewed by Ms. S.N.Nkanyuza for the purposes of academic research in “Leadership, Managerial Practices and Politics in a Historically Black University: A Case Study of the Vice Chancellors at the Former University of Transkei (UNITRA) from 1976-2004”.

Signature: 

Dated: 25 September 2012.
Appendix XXX (a): Minutes of Special Meeting of Executive of Council on 11 May 1984 on student boycotts and tabled resolutions

UNIVERSITY OF TRANSKEI

MINUTES OF A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF COUNCIL HELD IN THE COMMITTEE ROOM ON FRIDAY 11 MAY 1984 AT 09h00.

PRESENT: Prof S M Miller (Chairman), Mr A T Sigcu, Prof D N Jafta, Mr S D Majokweni (Registrar: Academic).

1. OPENING

The Chairman welcomed the members.

2. The Committee noted the following course of events since Wednesday 9 May 1984:

2.1 That as a sequel to two students who were detained by the Security Police during the short vacation and a further four who were asked to call at the Security Police offices on 9 May 1984 for questioning some members of the S R C convened two meetings on 9 May 1984 at 13h00 and 17h00 despite the fact that permission to convene the meetings had been refused.

2.2 Notice of Boycott of Lectures per Annexure A was presented to the Registrar (Academic) on 10 May 1984 at 2 08h30.

2.3 Notice by the Commissioner of Police per Annexure B requiring students to vacate campus by 10h00 on 10 May 1984.

2.4 Letter No. 2/1/32 dated 10 May 1984 from the President's office as Annexure C.

2.5 Letter No. 2/1/32 dated 11 May 1984 from the President's office as Annexure D.

2.6 Notice dated 11 May 1984 from the Commissioner of Police as Annexure E.

3. The Committee resolved that the Chairman of Council, Mr A T Sigcu, should arrange to meet His Excellency the State President and request that all students be allowed to return to the University and that as far as possible the University be given a chance to attend to the problems and that the police be withdrawn from the campus and come back when requested by the University.

4. CLOSING

The meeting closed at 10h15.
Appendix XXX (b): Minutes of Special Meeting of Executive of Council on 11 May 1984 on student boycotts and tabled resolutions

ANNEXURE A

RE: BOYCOTT OF LECTURES

IN A MEETING BETWEEN PART-TIME AND FULL-TIME STUDENTS, THEY RESOLVED THAT:

(i) THEY DEMAND UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF MR PEACE KALI AND MCEBISI BOOI, OR THEY BE BROUGHT TO COURT OF LAW AND BE CHARGED LEGALLY.

(ii) STUDENTS WILL STAGE A CLASS BOYCOTT UNTIL THE TWO STUDENTS ARE RELEASED OR BROUGHT TO THE COURT AND CHARGED LEGALLY.

(iii) STUDENTS WILL STAGE A CLASS BOYCOTT BECAUSE THE FOUR STUDENTS — MR NDONDO B., MR MBALU Z., RAM T S., AND MR BULUNGU — MISS LECTURES AND CANNOT READ FOR THEIR TESTS DURING THE TIME OF QUESTIONING BY THE POLICE.

(iv) STUDENTS ARE WILLING TO GO BACK TO THE CLASSES, BUT CANNOT DO SO ON THE REASONS NOTED ABOVE.

(v) STUDENTS WOULD LIKE THE POLICE TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES FROM THE INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF THE UNIVERSITY.

(vi) STUDENTS WOULD LIKE THE ADMINISTRATION TO PROTECT THEM AGAINST THE POLICE.
Appendix XXX (c): Minutes of Special Meeting of Executive of Council on 11 May 1984 on student boycotts and tabled resolutions

I, Jacob Mantutle, Commissioner of Police, acting in terms of the provisions of section 4(2) of the Regulations framed in terms of the Public Security Act, 1977 and published under Government Notice No. 7 of 1 July, 1983, and under the direction of the Minister of Police, do hereby order that the entire student body of the University of Transkei do vacate the campus by 10h00 on Thursday 10 May 1984 and do not return thereto before 08h00 on Monday 14 May 1984 and subject to such conditions as may be determined by competent authority.

Dated at UMTATA this 10th day of May, 1984.

[Signature]

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE.

[Signature]

MINISTER OF POLICE (CHIEF COMMISSIONER G.M.M MATANI)
Appendix XXX (d): Minutes of Special Meeting of Executive of Council on 11 May 1984 on student boycotts and tabled resolutions

UNITRA LECTURERS DEPORTED

UMTATA — Five University of Transkei lecturers were detained after police moved onto the campus yesterday following further unrest.

The Dean of Arts and head of the department of political studies, Professor Gerhard Togemeyer, and a former Rhodes University graduate who is a lecturer in history, Mr. Robert Moriel, were reported to have been deported last night.

Several students are also reported to have been detained at the university said the head of the Security Police. Brigadier Leonard Kwele, declined to comment on the telephone last night after his wife answered.

Colleagues at Professor Nico Clotte’s home said last night he was being held at Wellington Prison to face deportation orders.

Staff members closely involved in the incidents at the university said the head of the sociology department, Prof. Herbert Vilakazi, and a senior lecturer in political science, Mr. Majeje, had indicated that they did not want to be deported to South Africa and had made arrangements to travel directly to John Smuts airport from where they would fly to the United States.

Both academics studied in America and Mr. Maleka’s wife is an American citizen.

The registrar of the university, Mr. S Majekweni, and chairman of the university council, Mr. A.T. Swart, both said that under university regulations they could not speak to the press.

Mr. Majekweni did, however, confirm that police had entered the university grounds during the day and “taken away several staff members.”

The principal, Prof. P. van der Merwe, said last night: “I do not know. I have no official information.”

The events which took place today are something external to the university. It was action by the police — the state, if you like. I have not been informed of intended strategies and it would be improper for me to speak without the official information.”

Earlier Prof. Van der Merwe said he had been told by the registrar that between 13 or 14 students had been detained.

“But I am not sure of the number,” he said.

Prof. Van der Merwe said he had put a notice up on campus that students who wanted to attend lectures should do so, but those who did not want to should not interfere.

“When I left the university late this afternoon, the police were still there as well as the students.”

“I do not know what has happened so far, but I will have full information by tomorrow morning,” he also confirmed that there had been no lectures yesterday because the students had been loitering on the campus.

They later went to the library building where they were addressed by Prof. Swart.

According to a Sapa report, an official mass meeting scheduled to have been held at 3 pm between the students and the university administration did not take place and the university council met in a special session.

The students then held a 30-minute mass meeting and adopted a resolution to continue their boycott of lectures until the administration agreed to meet them.

Students not attending lectures were told to leave the campus police and troopers later moved onto the campus and pursued students into the library building.

Several were said to have sustained injuries.

Meanwhile, about 100 staff members held an informal meeting and sent a no-confidence vote document to the principal calling for a commission of inquiry into the university’s handling of the issue.

“This was because the university administration have in no way supported the students, refused to listen to their grievances and frequently both police interference,” a staff member said.

Johannesburg newspaper — DDR
Appendix XXXI (a): Letter from the Minister of Education to the University of Transkei, dated 10 May 1984 and Letters to Prof B de V van der Merwe

The Registrar (Academic)  
University of Transkei  
Private Bag 35092  
UMTATA  

Dear Sir  

DEPARTMENT UNIVERSITY STAFF  

With reference to the above subject I have to state that the Honourable Minister for Interior is not being correct when he states that he is awaiting my reply or communication in this regard. As should be known generally matters relating to the incoming or outgoing of persons in this country are essentially the direct responsibility of the Department of Interior, not that of Education. This is policy.

Further I have to state that I have consulted the Honourable the Prime Minister about the possible effects of the deportation of the staff concerned. He told me explicitly that he was adamant that the deporta-

Yours faithfully,

MINISTER FOR EDUCATION
Appendix XXXI (b): Letter from the Minister of Education to the University of Transkei, dated 10 May 1984 and Letters to Prof B de V van der Merwe

The Rector
University of Transkei
P/B X5092
UMTATA.

Dear Mr van der Merwe

RE: REBELLIOUS BEHAVIOUR AND DISRUPTION OF CLASSES AT UNITRA ON 9/5/84.

As a sequel to rebellious behaviour and disruption of classes at the University of Transkei in the afternoon and evening of 9th May, 1984, I, as Chancellor of the University, in consultation with the Executive-in-Council, have decided that the students should leave the University and go home immediately and to report back at the University on Monday 14th May 1984 where a decision about them will be made.

Students whose parents are not resident in Transkei will not be re-admitted. They will be allowed to collect their belongings and leave the University Campus at once.

The parents of the affected students are free to make representations to the Cabinet Committee consisting of the Honourable the Prime Minister, the Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Honourable Minister of Education.

Yours sincerely

[Signature]

PARAMOUNT CHIEF K.D. MAIENZIMA : CHANCELLOR : UNIVERSITY OF TRANSKEI.
Appendix XXXI (c): Letter from the Minister of Education to the University of Transkei, dated 10 May 1984 and Letters to Prof B de V van der Merwe

IRIPHABLIKI YASETRANSKEI
REPUBLIC OF TRANSKEI

Private Bag X5039
Telephone No. 4191 2
Telex 728 TT

FILE: 2/1/32

The Rector
University of Transkei
P/B X5092
UMTATA.

Dear Sir

re: REBELLIOUS BEHAVIOUR AND DISRUPTION OF CLASSES AT UNITRA ON 9/5/84.

I have the honour to advise you that I have been directed by the Chancellor of the University of Transkei to communicate with you and advise you as follows:-

1. That all the students at UNITRA should be screened;

2. That on Monday 14/5/84 all students from outside Transkei should be dismissed subject to scrutiny by the Hon. Prime Minister, the Hon. Minister of Education and the Hon. Minister of Foreign Affairs;

3. The students who have been dismissed should be taken by Army and Police trucks beyond the borders of Transkei;

4. That Transkei students should sign an undertaking of loyalty to the authorities i.e. they will attend classes. They should not hold meetings of whatever nature and that they should ask for written permission before leaving the campus for any reason and the boarders should never sleep out.

Please see also the Chancellor's remarks on annexure.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]

SECRETARY TO THE STATE PRESIDENT.
Appendix XXXI (d): Letter from the Minister of Education to the University of Transkei, dated 10 May 1984 and Letters to Prof B de V van der Merwe

University of Transkei
Office of the Principal
Private Bag X5092
Umtata
Tel 3884
Tel Add UNITRA
Telex 7341T

Reference No. 2.7.2

TO ALL MEMBERS OF STAFF AND STUDENTS

1. In terms of the Laws of the Country, students have been sent home on 10 May 1984 and were allowed to return to the campus on 14 May 1984 on condition that
   1.1 They attend lectures
   1.2 No mass meetings, for whatever reason, be held.

2. Lectures are therefore to be resumed with immediate effect, and nobody should try to interfere with students who are attending or want to attend lectures.

3. Students who do not intend to attend lectures are to leave the campus and residences before 14h00 on Tuesday 15 May, 1984.

4. After the said date and time students found on campus or in residence who are not applying themselves to their studies, will be removed.

5. May I, in the interest of all concerned, call on students and staff alike to abide by the Law and to assist in having matters return to normal.

Prof B de V van der Merwe
PRINCIPAL AND VICE-CHANCELLOR

14 May 1984.
Appendix XXXII: Letter from G.G. van Beers, Transkei Chief Economic Advisor dated 23 April 1981 to Professor B de V van der Merwe

Prof. B. de V. Van der Merwe
Principal
University of Transkei
Private Bag X5092
Umtata

Dear Professor Van der Merwe,

Thank you for your letter of 9 April 1981, ref no. 5.1.1

I am aware of the situation and problem you are encountering in obtaining funds. This however, is experienced by all Departments and State Corporations which are dependent on Government Funds. I do not think that there is much one can do about it in the short run because of budget limitations.

Hopefully in the near future the economic performance of Transkei will improve sufficiently to allow for additional funding from internal revenues.

I do not think that the University of Transkei can make direct submissions to the Republic of South Africa Government for research funds as a separate item.

Sincerely yours,

Prof. G.G. van Beers
CHIEF ECONOMIC ADVISOR
Appendix XXXIII: University of Transkei Cash flow for the Period August 1988 to March 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Opening Balance</th>
<th>Gov't Grants</th>
<th>Special Grants</th>
<th>Student Fees</th>
<th>Investment</th>
<th>Other Income</th>
<th>Total Income</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Closing Balance</th>
<th>Opening Balance</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>9,105,298</td>
<td>6,896,133</td>
<td>6,214,796</td>
<td>4,572,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCT 88</td>
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<td>4,155,899</td>
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<td>6,214,796</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>9,105,298</td>
<td>6,896,133</td>
<td>6,214,796</td>
<td>4,572,249</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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Appendix XXXV: Consent Form of an Interview with Professor Daniel J. Ncayiyana on the Vice-Chancellors at the former University of Transkei (UNITRA)

30 October 2012

Dear Prof. Ncayiyana,

**Re: REQUEST FOR AN INTERVIEW, FOR PhD RESEARCH PURPOSES ONLY**

I ................Professor Dan J Ncayiyana.................................

agree to be interviewed by Ms. S.N.Nkanyuza for the purposes of academic research in

“Leadership, Managerial Practices and Politics in a Historically Black University: A Case Study of the Vice Chancellors at the Former University of Transkei (UNITRA) from 1976-2004”.

Signature: [Signature]

Dated: 1 October.2012.
Appendix XXXVI: University of Transkei Cash Flow Statement for Year Ending 31 December 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notes</th>
<th>1992</th>
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<td>Cash generated by operations</td>
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<td>Cash generated by operating activities</td>
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<td><strong>CASH APPLIED TO OPERATING ACTIVITIES</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Investment to maintain operations</td>
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<td>Proceeds on disposal of assets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Additions to investments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investment to expand operations</td>
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<td>Additions to fixed assets</td>
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<td>−13,880,657</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CASH EFFECTS OF FINANCING ACTIVITIES:</strong></td>
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<td>Increase in long–term borrowings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase in short–term borrowings</td>
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<td>7,075,141</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13,880,657</td>
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</table>
Appendix XXXVIII (a): Correspondence from Prof. A. Moleah to the Daily Dispatch and the Sport Minister

From the office of the Principal

Reference No.: 31 October 1994

THE EDITOR
Daily Dispatch
EAST LONDON

Fax No. (0431) 435155

I read with great encouragement the statement to the Senate by Mr Steve Tshwete, Minister of Sports, in the Daily Dispatch of October 29, 1994. First, I must applaud his initiatives in focusing attention on the national importance of sports to the creation of a healthy, peaceful and stable society. It will indeed be salutary, not only to sports but to society as a whole, for his initiatives of a national sports academy; sports technological services; and a National Sports Information Centre to come to fruition. A great nation is also a great sporting nation.

I would like to extend the Minister’s concern and innovative leadership to the areas of education and sports at all levels: primary, secondary and tertiary. My particular concern is with Varsity sports. South Africa has now re-entered the international community of nations, and this re-entry is going to be particularly manifested in the arena of sports competition. We will now be part of the Olympics and many other international sporting competitions. If Varsity sports is not adequately developed with good and state-of-the-arts facilities and coaching, success will forever elude us. Special funding needs to be devoted to this end.

At the University of Transkei (Unitra) we do not have a sports facility or centre - there is no building that houses sporting activity. We hardly have a soccer stadium, and, instead, use the track stadium to double as a soccer stadium, with detrimental results. Unlike other universities in South Africa, we do not have a swimming pool. Our sporting facilities are largely conspicuous by their absence. In spite of these severe deprivations, our students are ardent and devoted sports enthusiasts who make do with what little they have to be the best athletes they can be. This is obviously not enough nor right.

2/......
Appendix XXXVIII (b): Correspondence from Prof. A. Moleah to the Daily Dispatch and the Sport Minister

The cause of reconciliation cannot be served by continuation and perpetuation of the inequalities that apartheid has bequeathed us. Reconciliation cannot be served by the assured exclusion of Unitra students from the Olympics and other sporting events, both national and international. The impoverished catchment area of Unitra cannot be condemned to sporting exclusion. Sports contributes to health, pride, self-esteem and esprit de corps. Our students deserve and are entitled to their share of all these benefits of sports.

Sincerely Yours

PROF ALFRED T. MOLEAH
PRINCIPAL & VICE CHANCELLOR
Appendix XXXIX (a): Prof. A. Moleah’s message (1995)

VICE-CHANCELLOR’S MESSAGE

STRATEGIC PLANNING AND THE WAY AHEAD

The strategic planning process at the University of Transkei has been ongoing since 1992. The foundation for the UNITRA strategic planning exercise was laid at the Mngazi retreat in September of that year. Endless meetings followed, task groups reported, and a summary and compilation of those reports finally became the Strategic Plan of the University of Transkei for the period 1995–1999: Executive Summary.

The long task in this engagement has finally taken its toll. Enthusiasm has waned, fatigue has set in and expectations of quick and dramatic implementation have been disappointed. I have seen the word burn-out, but I think it is too strong to describe the situation. The frustrations and disappointments are perfectly understandable and are to be expected. Strategic planning is a process and not an event. Its difficulties are compounded by the lack of reliable data to adequately and reliably provide a picture of what is so as to fashion what ought to be.

In a situation overburdened with difficulties and problems, planning for improvement runs the risk of turning into creation of an ideal, free from all the difficulties and problems of the current situation. Instead of a plan of achievable goals you might end up with an unrealistic and unachievable wishlist. Planning for improvement and change must begin with a hard-nosed look at the current situation, ask the question why are things this way, and seriously engage in how change can be effected, including the cost in human and material terms.

Changing the HDI’s, UNITRA in particular, is not going to be easy. There is the problem of historically imposed deformities, viz. location in rural, isolated and undeveloped areas of the country, structures, faculties and curricula to serve the specific needs of the apartheid scheme, e.g. training of civil servants, and a law faculty as a higher priority than an agriculture faculty; reflection of general educational underdevelopment at pre-university schooling. The political control functions of administrative structures and operations is another entrenched difficulty to be changed e.g. the over centrality of the office of the Principal. General anomie and alienation of the people within the University – students, workers, lecturers, and administrators. A disharmonious relationship, especially of everybody towards management which is viewed negatively, if not with hostility and distrust. The long history of underdevelopment and a lack of basic requirements and infrastructure make the process of change and improvement even more difficult.

For UNITRA, a change is imperative. Our very survival calls for change. We have a new South Africa now and must become a new university to fit into and serve this new South Africa. Not all aspects of our enterprise need to be altered, some need refocussing, others need improvement. We ought to clearly differentiate between them so that “we do not fix it if it ain’t broke”, as the expression goes.

Our mission statement speaks to the very essence of our being – the generation and dispensing of knowledge to our students, communities, the nation and the world. UNITRA is first and foremost a University, i.e. an educational institution in the business of educating our students to equip them with the necessary skills and knowledge to be contributors to the development of South Africa into a stable and prosperous nation. Change for improvement should primarily focus on enhancing our capacity to deliver the educational product. To deliver quality education you must have quality deliverers, i.e. lecturers trained to the highest degree and continuing to enhance their skills and knowledge through ongoing research and publication. A good researcher is a good teacher – the two are inextricably linked.

We ought to increase our research capacity. The importance of research can-
Appendix XXXIX (b):  Prof. A.Moleah’s message (1995)

not be overstated. It greatly adds to effective teaching, it expands knowledge, it discovers new knowledge, it attracts research funds, it enhances funding based on SAPSE norms. It tremendously adds to the reputation of the University – which reputation attaches to the image and prestige of our graduates.

Our research activities and efforts will be driven by the new position of Dean of Research which will come on board in 1996.

Improvement in the delivery of education cannot take place without the necessary infrastructure being in place. Most critical is the Library.

We cannot stand still. Our curriculum must be under continuous review, evaluation and improvement. We must continuously monitor our performance to ensure quality and quality improvement.

Teaching is best monitored through peer review, as well as regular student evaluation.

Research and publication are encouraged by making them the cornerstones of promotion and tenure. Therefore, promotion and tenure need to be restructured and put on a different basis.

This is not to ignore teaching. Effective teaching must be encouraged and innovative teaching must be rewarded. Merit awards are one means. The Best Teachers Award, another.

Much more needs to be done to make this University the best it can be, and make it into a full member of the South African University system. This we must do, because if we don’t the best student, even from our area, will not come to UNITRA. The best teachers will not join us, even worse, the best teachers presently at UNITRA will leave.

Strategic planning must involve the whole University. In this message I have focused on teaching – students and teachers. Other areas of the University must be included in any comprehensive strategic plan. Teaching and educating our students is the core of our mission and reason for being. All else is ancillary.

To improve and go forward we must first correct mistakes. We must take a hard look into our present situation and unflinchingly answer the question “what needs to be changed”. Improvement starts with change. We must not anoint the past with permanence. We must be bold to go forward.

We cannot stand still, we must strategically plan the future.

PROF ALFRED T. MOLEAH
VICE-CHANCELLOR
7.3 Council Decision

7.3.1 Council welcomed both Ntesu and UASA as staff associations in which non-professorial academic staff on campus are represented.

7.3.2 Council leaves it to the staff associations to work it out between themselves and decide how they are going to be represented and report to Council.

8. VICE CHANCELLOR'S REPORT

8.1 Unrest at Unitra

8.1.1 The Vice Chancellor reported that:

8.1.1.1 Unrest at Unitra had ended. Many problems remained unresolved and answers had to be found.

8.1.1.2 A group of students had constituted themselves as “concerned students” and through action influenced other students, especially the older part-time students to return to class.

8.1.1.3 The meeting of the Council with Minister Bengu had come at an opportune time and acted as a catalyst in breaking the cycle of unrest and disruption.

8.1.1.4 The Senate ad hoc Committee had intervened positively.

8.1.1.5 Incidents of arson and vandalism had caused serious damage.

8.1.1.6 Preliminary figures of damage caused to Lecture halls and residences was about R500 000.
8.2 **Fundraising Banquet**

The Unitra Foundation had successfully staged a Scholarship Fundraising banquet, hosted by Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki. R411 500-00 was raised and the net income was R319 849-63.

8.3 **Finances**

8.3.1 The Vice Chancellor and the Registrar Finance would continue to negotiate with the Ministry of Education to induce them to increase the subsidy.

8.3.2 DBSA would also be approached to follow up a loan application.

8.4 **Restructuring**

8.4.1 The consultations with Nehawu, academic associations and non-unionised members had begun and were continuing. These were imperative for the survival of Unitra.

8.5 **St Bedes**

8.5.1 Unitra was finally out of St Bedes. The final bill for repair work was expected to come just under R300 000-00.

8.6 **Resolutions from East London Meeting**

8.6.1 After Vice Chancellor’s report the SRC raised the question of how far resolutions of East London meeting had been carried out and complained that students had not been drawn into the discussion of academic exclusions and of special cases via the Senate ad hoc Mediating Committee as agreed upon at the East London Meeting with the Minister of Education.

8.6.2 Council resolved that students should be drawn into the process in keeping with the agreements reached between Council and the Minister of Education.
8.6.3 The Registrar Academic should request the Minister’s office to provide council with the minutes of the East London meeting so that decisions of council should be based on accurate information.

9. **FORMATION OF AN INSTITUTIONAL FORUM**

9.1 Council received the resolutions of a Steering Committee meeting on the Formation of an Institutional Forum held on July, 01 1998 at BASS Studio.

9.2 Council recognised the formation of an Interim Institutional Forum to facilitate the formation of an Institutional Forum as a permanent feature of the university in accordance with the 1997 Higher Education Act.

10. **ACADEMIC MATTERS**

10.1 **Ethics Policy**

10.1.1 Council was reminded of a decision of Senate that the Ethics Committee should put together a working document to be approved by faculty boards before being tabled at Council.

10.2 **Establishment of New Faculties, Departments, Courses**

10.2.1 **Syllabi for the proposed Honours Gender Studies.**

10.2.1.1 Council approved the proposal for the syllabi.

10.3 Due to shortage of time the rest of the agenda on academic matters was referred to management to be dealt with administratively on behalf of Council.
11. REPORT OF TSHOMBE COMMISSION

11.1 The Report of the Tshombe Commission was presented by Miss Mguduso on behalf of the whole commission. Each Council member present was presented with a copy of the report. Members of management Proff Moleah, Malaza, Noruana and Luswazi were asked to recuse themselves since they had participated in the investigation.

The report was to be tabled and not discussed. Members of Council who received the report proposed that the discussion and decisions concerning the report should take place at a meeting on the 11 July 1998. Members were requested to treat the Tshombe report as confidential information.

There being no other business the meeting was closed at about 19H00.
Appendix XLI: Letter of ‘Terms of Reference’ drafted by Prof V. Dlova on behalf of ‘Ad hoc Council Committee’ dated 07 November 1996

TERMS OF REFERENCE

The Judge President of the Local Supreme Court is hereby invited in accordance with Council Resolution dated 3 October 1996 to nominate at his sole discretion a suitable candidate, with relevant legal qualifications and experience to, after due consideration of issues including written submissions and relevant University Statutes, give an arbitration ruling on the following questions:

(1) Respective roles of Council on one hand and the Principal and Vice-Chancellor on the other with regards to policy and or management of the University. Can it be said that there are areas of exclusive jurisdiction or competence for the two parties?

(2) In case of disputed jurisdiction or competence on the part of the Principal and Council, which view should prevail?

(3) In cases where the Principal is of the view that a Council directive is contrary to the interest of the University or is basically unconscionable, what options are there for the Principal? Is declining to implement a Council decision one such option? If so, if the two sides stick to their guns, what should be the ultimate resolution?

CONVENOR
AD HOC COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON
TERMS OF REFERENCE

[V. Dlova]

PROF V. DLOVA
7 November 1996

N.B. These terms of reference were drafted and agreed to in a meeting of the above Committee held at UNITRA on the 23rd day of October 1996.

Consensus on omission of No. 4 of the original draft reached on the 6th November 1996.
Appendix XLIII (a): Council recordings of internal strife (1997)

He stated that in their discussion with the Principal, the latter had indicated that he would be willing to reconsider his decision. In support of Professor Mwamwenda, Professor Dlova dealt with the issues of substance flowing from the letter of resignation. He said that although Senate did not have sufficient information on the three contentious issues, Senate had observed that the problems that gave rise to the contentious decisions arise from a noticeable vacuum in policy guidelines particularly on the matter of renewing the appointment contracts of members of top management.

After Senate representatives Professor Mjoli who was representing Deans of Faculties was given an opportunity to make his presentation.

He read out a statement prepared by Deans of Faculties which was also conciliatory in nature. Professor Meer also read out a fax message from the Chancellor which contained Chancellor’s observation on the meetings he had had with the various structures, all of which expressed a wish that the dispute be resolved urgently and in a non-confrontational manner. The Chancellor expressed hope that the Principal would find it within his power, in the interest of the University to withdraw his resignation. Ms Jordan of TRA UW indicated that her constituency expressed the same views as UDUSA.

Mr Luponwana, the new SRC President also addressed Council, giving students perceptive of the problem. After the presentations by the various structures the Principal was asked whether he was prepared to withdraw his resignation and the answer was in the affirmative. He hoped that Council would address the issues that precipitated his decision to resign. Council welcomed the Principal’s withdrawal of resignation.

Council then resolved to revisit the three resolutions that led to the Principal’s decision to resign

1. On the issue of shortlisting Council resolved that a University wide committee consisting of all structures be formed to address the issue and make recommendation to Council. Management should facilitate the discussion of the issue. The above Committee should also address the issue of the vacuum in policy guidelines.

2. On the second issue of the renewal of the contract of the Vice Principal Council also considered the legal implications of the possible reversal of its decision. After a lengthy debate the matter was put to a vote. There was a motion that, in the light of the lack of clear policy guidelines and the obvious adverse legal implications if the decision were to be reversed, Council should re-affirm its previous decision on the matter.
Appendix XLIII (b): Council recordings of internal strife (1997)

There was also a counter motion to the effect that implementation of the Council's decision be suspended pending the submission of the Vice-Chancellor's report on the matter to the next Council meeting. It was decided to vote by show of hands. The vote on the counter motion was as follows:

Those in favour  - 5
Those against   - 8
Abstention      - 1

The results of vote on the motion were as follows:

Those in favour  - 9
Those against   - 6
Abstention      - 1

Motion was carried.

3. On the issue of Professor Gumbi, Mr Titus addressed Council on the applicable rules as provided for in the current conditions of service of the University of Transkei.

Professor Moleah also addressed Council on the matter. He reported that Professor Gumbi has not yet reported for work and was still in Pretoria. Professor Gumbi also addressed Council on the matter.

She expressed the view that she was being victimised as staff on sabbatical are free to use their time as they please. She cited a number of examples to illustrate her point. Chairperson also gave her impression of the matter. After a lengthy decision Council resolved to affirm its previous decision. The resolution reached on 23 November 1995 would remain in force until varied an appeal. That the Principal was free to appeal against the decision. Proposal that Prof Gumbo's salary and benefits be paid was seconded and carried.

The Principal indicated that he would appeal. On the remaining policy issues the following proposals were made:

1. Regarding the envisaged meeting of the University structures to streamline policy guidelines the Vice-Chancellor would be expected to give an input in which he outlines his vision taking into account the Act, the University Statute and the proposed bill as well as the Transformation Document.

2. The envisaged University Committee should consider the advisability of the establishment of a conflict resolution mechanism which would include as members some Vice Chancellors of the neighbouring universities.
Appendix XLIII (c): Council recordings of internal strife (1997)

He stated that in their discussion with the Principal, the latter had indicated that he would be willing to reconsider his decision. In support of Professor Mwamwenda, Professor Dlova dealt with the issues of substance flowing from the letter of resignation. He said that although Senate did not have sufficient information on the three contentious issues, Senate had observed that the problems that gave rise to the contentious decisions arise from a noticeable vacuum in policy guidelines particularly on the matter of renewing the appointment contracts of members of top management.

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Appendix XLIV (a): Letter from Prof. A. Moleah on ‘Severance Package’ dated 13 December 2013

From the office of the Principal

Reference No.: 13 December 1998

Members of Exco Council & Council Members
c/o Ms T Mguduso

Fax No: (011) 488-7333
Tel No: (011) 488-7270

Re: Severance Package

I received, with dismay and disappointment, the letter from Ms T N Mguduso dated 15 December 1998. Let us put matters in perspective:

1. I did **not** resign as Vice-Chancellor and Principal.
2. I was **not** dismissed or fired as Vice-Chancellor and Principal.
3. I was **not** suspended as Vice-Chancellor and Principal.
4. I was **not** compelled to take paid leave until expiry of my contract.
5. I **volunteered** to resign by 31 December 1998 as Vice-Chancellor and Principal subject to a mutually agreed upon severance package being worked out.

On 12 December 1998 Prof E D Malaza will be acting Vice-Chancellor and Principal.

The meeting between the Exco of Council sub-committee and I on Saturday 5 December 1998 was constructive and was a good beginning. Subsequent correspondence and discussion carried this beginning even further along. I left two messages for Ms Mguduso and finally contacted her late Friday afternoon 11 December 1998. She informed me that Exco would like to receive my response and position in writing. I promised to do so early in the following week, which I did on 13 December 1998. All these gave me the distinct impression that we were well on the way to speedy and final resolution of this matter.

Based on this perception, my children were tested and accepted into a school in Johannesburg to start on 13 January 1999. We are at an advanced stage of buying a house in Johannesburg. A date for moving from Umtata to Johannesburg has been set. We are all geared up to leave Umtata and Umtata by end of 1998. Costs have been incurred.

To now say that since the severance package negotiations were not finalised by 11 December 1998, they are now terminated and I have to take compulsory paid leave (in Umtata, I presume) is at best disingenuous. I feel betrayed.
Appendix XLIV (b): Letter from Prof. A. Moleah on ‘Severance Package’ dated 13 December 2013

As often stated, Vice-Chancellors also have rights and are also included in the protections offered by our laws and constitution. I intend to vigorously appeal to our laws and constitution for full protection.

Until now I have resisted engaging lawyers in the rather naive hope that we could work this out simply and quickly. I still hope that this can still be done as we have come quite a distance on this path.

If we fail, I will have to hand this over to my lawyers. I have every belief that I will prevail. Please be aware that the cost of the severance package itself will drastically escalate; legal costs will have to be borne; and all good will and feelings of amity will disappear.

Even at this late stage I appeal to the Executive of Council to let your collective wisdom prevail. There is no need to attempt abuse and humiliation. Let us have a clean break.

The urgency of resolving and finalising this matter is obvious. Let us finalise by 23 December 1998, at least by this date let me get your final word.

Sincerely yours

PROF A T MOLEAH
VICE-CHANCELLOR AND PRINCIPAL
ATM/pd 17 December 1998

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New Unitra head gears up to drive RDP in rural Eastern Cape

AN INTELLECTUAL class division will be created if the imbalances of apartheid’s dual education system are not urgently addressed, warns Professor Alfred Moleah.

Bright students would avoid the so-called “bush” universities unless these universities were given special funding to improve their infrastructure and staff development.

“We are prepared to change the image of Unitra from an institution associated with handouts to one of the best universities in the country,”

But the university was cash-strapped. It was fully aware of the competition for the scarce resources by the tertiary institutions at the Eastern Cape. These include Uitenhage, Fort Hare, Rhodes, the University of Port Elizabeth, the technicians and Vista University.

“Although we do not want to hark on the legacies of apartheid and would rather lift ourselves up by our own bootstraps, we feel that we’re still living with the disparities between the traditional while universities and ourselves.

“We say we cannot talk about a new South Africa until these disparities have been addressed. Affirmative action is needed.

“I think it is only fair that when we come to reconstitution, those who have been disadvantaged in the past need special attention. Unitra qualifies as such a case.”

The university wanted to improve the qualifications of its academic staff who were largely people without school certificates. “We want them to be equipped with research skills so that Unitra doesn’t only become a teaching but a research institution as well.

Born in Johannesburg on September 14, 1937, Prof Moleah earned his university education at Leopold’s Plus X College in 1962, the beginning of more than 20 years of South Africa. After a brief spell at ANC camps in Botswana, Zambia and Tanzania, he left for the United States in December 1963.

Prof Moleah completed his BA degree at Lincoln University and his MA in political science at City College of the City University of New York.

He obtained his PhD at New York University in 1973 with a dissertation on “The Republic of South Africa” in political science at City College of the City University of New York.

The new principal and vice-chancellor of the University of Transkei, Prof Alfred T Moleah, believes special financial help should be given to the former homeland universities. In an interview with Yuyani Green he outlined his vision of Unitra’s future.

“It was a fashionable thing to skip the country either overtly or covertly to seek education opportunities or military training.”

In a voice tinged with weariness, Prof Moleah said he had been away from home for far too long.

“At a sign that I had always wanted to return to the country I named two of my kids Mosapatsa — a Tsonga name meaning you must point the way home — another Boiling, meaning you must return home.

“These two names were a constant reminder to return home after so many years in the wilderness,” he said. “I had always wanted to come back home.”

During his time in exile he was actively involved in civil rights and anti-apartheid activity. He took part in radio shows and television interviews on the evils of apartheid.

He said after the mobilization of the liberation movement in 1990, he started preparing to return to his country of birth, although he finally returned only in July this year.

“I came back for the first time in 1990 and even came to Umtata and made a stop over at Unitra not knowing that one day I’d be running the university,” he said with a smile.

Challenges

As principal of Unitra, I found that the university was terribly under-resourced, the library which is the heart and soul of any educational institution.

Unitra was not an ivory tower, but was directly affected by problems experienced in the sub-region.

“However, these problems are the manifestations of a deliberate apartheid policy of coloniaism as Transkei was largely underdeveloped.”

He said a central problem he had grappled with during his tenure of office was that about 90 percent of Unitra students came from the Transkei sub-region and could not afford to pay their tuition fees.

“The university is then obligated to subsidize them from its own funds or persuade outside donors to assist,” he said.

However, there were indications the central government was going to address the imbalances.

“A national programme of loan and bursary schemes which was somewhat done we have to address the issue.”

Social responsibility

Prof Moleah called on the Eastern Cape government to use Unitra’s rich infrastructural and human resources to drive the RDP in the sub-region.

“Unitra is well-positioned to lead in the implementation of the RDP.

“The democratic principle inherent in the RDP demands a bottom-up approach and it is for this reason that the people on the ground, such as the Unitra RDP committee, need to be consulted.

“The Bishop Government should take note that we are ready and waiting and we’ll be able to eradicate the notion in certain political circles that the RDP is only for the rural areas and not for the urban areas,” he said.

He said Unitra, despite the apparent lack of financial resources, was already leading in the delivery of aspects of the RDP with its community-based medical programme.

“We Family Health Department has done sterling work through the Unitra Community Partnership Project which has been funded through the Kelling Foundation to the tune of R3 million.

He said the project had done wonderful work in taking health care to the rural areas and were grateful that their role had been recognised by overseas donor organisations.

“Are eager to play our role and I cannot see the RDP succeeding in the sub-region if we do not play a role.”

Prof Moleah said preparations were well under way to make Unitra a resource-based institution capable of meeting the demands of the people.

He said the university planned to develop small businesses and make them viable as economic entities in the sub-region. This would be achieved by helping entrepreneurs to get funding and rudimentary skills in accounting and marketing.

“We are prepared to help them get the highest return from their products,” he said. He added that plans were under way to have a community-based radio station on the campus as an outreach.

As part of its social responsibility programmes, the university intended reaching out to high schools. “It doesn’t make sense to develop students when they enter through the gates of Unitra. We need to help them where they are,” Prof Moleah said.
Appendix XLVI (a): Service Staff in Designated Positions

Unitra Foundation are attached as Appendix k. The retained income of the Unitra Foundation as at year end (1997) amounts to R 7 169 287. These funds are not substantial enough to cover Unitra operating shortage and funds raised by the Foundation cannot be used to pay salaries of Unitra staff members.

5. THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES PER JOB CATEGORY LIKELY TO BE AFFECTED (CLAUSE 189 (3) (C))

<table>
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<th>Job Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Plumbing foreman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plumber</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carpenter foreman</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenters</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine setter</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estate manager</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handyman</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourer: carpentry</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labourer: plumbers</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi skilled Labourer: bricklaying</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourer: painter</td>
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<td>Painter</td>
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<td>Senior painter</td>
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<td>Semi skilled : carpentry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fitter</td>
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<td>Air conditioning Tech.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Chief electrician</td>
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<td>Air conditioning attendant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Key cutter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior electrician</td>
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<td>Fitter and tuner</td>
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<td>Coal trimmer</td>
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<td>Boilerman</td>
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<td>Artisan Assistant</td>
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<td>Boiler operator</td>
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<td>Labourer: electrical</td>
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<td>Greaser: boilerhouse</td>
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<td>Semi skilled electrical</td>
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<td>Drivers, messenger</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver: tractor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior operator: reprographics</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operator: reprographics</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior typesetter</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operator: reprographics</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head: printing</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant binder</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour: reprographics</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior binder</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binder/collator</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switchboard operator</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraphist superintendent</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switchboard operator / typist</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecomm Technician</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switchboard operator/typist (B/W)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Supervisor: parks</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior driver: parks</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior nursery attendant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine operator: parks</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor driver: parks</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourer: Parks</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundsman: parks</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursery attendant</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seamstress</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaner: general</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaner: residence</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor: cleaning</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendent of campus environment</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaner: BTW</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steam press attendant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydro attendant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roller iron attendant</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handironer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Handwasher</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folding attendant</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaner: student village</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dirties attendant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourer: general cleaner</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caretaker/cleaner</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nash process attendant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic servant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry supervisor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic officer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Guard BTW</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janitor</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior patrolman</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security guard</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officer</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic controller</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director security</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor security</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control officer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security/fire officer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior security guard</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fireman</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catering manager</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grill cook: catering</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaner: catering</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant catering manager</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storekeeper</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant cook</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterhand BTW</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver: catering</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashier: catering</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterhand: hostel</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterhand: catering</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor: Hostel larder chef</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk Grade 11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor: catering</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chef</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastry chef</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head chef</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total number of employees**: 578

### 6. MANAGEMENT PROPOSAL ON DEALING WITH THE SERVICE SECTOR.

Management has decided to direct available resources to the core business of the University, which is offering academic programs and research as set out in the Strategic Plan and Mission Statement of the University. At the same time management will simultaneously eliminate or reduce all other support services to the absolute required levels, in order to have an efficient and effective institution.

For this reason management has decided to close down all service departments and job categories as identified in point 5 above. Management intends
Appendix XLVII (a): Minutes of the stakeholders’ Forum held on 12 October 2000

UNIVERSITY OF TRANSKEI

MINUTES OF THE STAKEHOLDERS FORUM MEETING HELD ON THE 12 OCTOBER 2000 IN COMMITTEE ROOM “A” AT 10:30

PRESENT:

NTESU: N.P. Makiwane, W. Kwetane


Middle Management: R. Eaton, B.N. Maya and P.E. Ofori

UNUS: C. Barton and R. Graham

Core Project Team: N.L. Shitlhelani, T. Mpako-Ntusi, T. Mayekiso, T. Jubber, Dr M. Nkosi, V. Mathai and Patrick Deal

APOLOGIES: SRC

OPENING

Dr Nkosi welcomed all delegates to the meeting. He apologised for the late start and stated that students representatives will be briefed. He stated that all meetings hereon are designed to re-engineer the University.

Dr Nkosi indicated that the University is in overdraft to the tune of approximately R37m and required about R60m to operate till end of the year. He also stated that the minister had discussions with the provincial leadership and wanted their suggestions on how to handle UNITRA. They in turn, met with Dr. Nkosi and indicated that they wanted us to inform them of what we as the university are good at and what is it that we are going to do in the future. They would use this report to inform themselves and to see what they could offer. It was therefore important that we know what overall design the University is going to take.

Mr Madlongolwane from Nehawu wanted to know the context in which word “consultation” is used. He asked Dr Nkosi to clarify what he means by re-engineering. He wanted to know whether re-engineering means retrenchments.
Appendix XLVII (b): Minutes of the stakeholders’ Forum held on 12 October 2000

Mr Barton stated that they didn’t know what was on the agenda. So they would like the agenda to be submitted early to help in early preparations for meetings.

Patrick Deal stated that they want to clarify what the plenary project team does and to inform all stakeholders of the process and even suggested that they invite members of the community where appropriate.

Mr Tim Jubber presented the financial position of the institution. He stated that reserves have been spent. He also stated that there is not enough money to pay October’s salary. Statutory and other payments that are required by law have not been paid.

Nehawu also asked whether Voluntary Packages would not be affected by the non-handing over of payments. They also stated that pensions could be a problem.

Mr Madlongolwane stated that if there are retrenchments, there should be a bridging fund in order to facilitate the immediate paying over of the pensions. R2.4 million for 190 people were paid to the Government Pension Fund last year. He also stated that if we needed to retrench 600 people we would need more than 18 million provisionally placed. He also stated that we needed to seriously consider what amount we ought to have beforehand.

Mrs Shitlhelani presented the consultation model. She explained that it is important to get inputs from all stakeholders. The explained responsibilities or roles which was going to be played by each team, for example.

1) Core project team
2) Plenary project team
3) Operations management team
4) Stakeholders forum

Mr Magwentshu also stated that we must bear in mind what parallel process we have to involve ourselves e.g. setting up of Council, and appointment of the Vice Chancellor.

Mr Madlongolwane stated that the previous processes of re-engineering Unitra has failed. He also stated that a Council has to be established first.

Mr Zakuza stated that Dr Nkosi mentioned how important to have Council that fits into the greater practice. Council must be placed before Vice Chancellor. He also stated that it is a fair comment to have the Council, it is however more appropriate to address this issue in the way forward.
Appendix XLVII (c): Minutes of the stakeholders’ Forum held on 12 October 2000

Dr Nkosi responded by saying the re-engineering would be guided by what we, as the University is good at offering. The arguments on size and shape also require discussions. Our design would involve two levels:

1. Institutional Approach
2. Programmatic Approach (i.e. identifying good programmes and redesigning bad ones or losing them.)

Re-engineering also required identifying what human resource capacities we have, through a work and skills audit which would identify the right people for jobs or places. He also stated that student numbers are declining.

Patrick Deal acknowledged that there was a difference between consultations and negotiations. He said that the current financial crisis didn’t afford us much time and we therefore needed to consult with all stakeholders what the solution to our problems are. He said that the term “consultation refereed to a process of engaging with stakeholders to arrive at the architecture of Unitra i.e. when we know where we are going, we will be able to design the university accordingly.

Dr Nkosi gave a brief narration of the forthcoming visit from Fort Hare. He said that we will be learning from the experiences of Fort Hare. We would be sharing experiences and receiving guidance on the processes that they have already been through.

Members of Nehawu raised concern about the use of the term consultations. They said that use of the term should be categorical. Mr Madlongolwana continued by asking whether management is consulting with a view of retrenchment or consulting in order to share information. The issue of using the institutional forum was raised by Nehawu. Mr Magwentshu asked why the stakeholders forum was used instead of institutional forum.

Dr Nkosi responded by explaining that the Institutional forum has had 4 meetings, only one has been successful. Dr Nkosi mentioned that the institutional forum was representative but not well organised and therein lay the problem. He said that the institutional forum should be rebuilt as soon as possible but let it be done separately. This consultation is different in that we are jointly getting a view of what direction is Unitra going to. What kind of University are we going to have in terms of money, money for staff & for many people working? We can’t avoid discussing the large design. If we are not interested in the re-engineering then we can prepare a report of how we are not interested in our change. We can then send a report to the MEC’s and to the Minister’s office and leave it for them to describe.
Appendix XLVIII: New Model’ that would redesign and reform the university as a University for Rural Development, Science and Technology
1. SECTION ONE: PHASE 1 OF RESTRUCTURING

The objectives of the first phase of restructuring were to ensure that all budget overruns are corrected in this financial year, and to immediately implement the actions that are necessary to achieve this.

The processes of the first phase were based on the assumption that the University will have access to a bank overdraft facility of R100 million, which was the platform for the distribution of income.

These processes included:
1. The distribution of all fees associated with enrolments by faculty and department.
2. All costs are allocated per faculty and department:
   - Operational costs were based on historical spending per faculty.
   - Overruns were defined as all costs of service.

Faculties and departments were instructed to effect staff reductions in order to realign the expenditure to income. The exercise resulted in the reduction of the bank overdraft from R119 million to R86 million. The latter figure included the provision of R8 million for necessary strategic maintenance and R3 million for capital replacement. These areas have been neglected for the past five to eight years and were exacerbated by structural deficiencies associated with problematic construction of recent buildings, especially Atlanta residence and the Library.

1.1 DEFICITS

Intense studies of the performance and operation of the University’s faculties during this phase of the realignment process shows that three faculties have failed to meet the criteria of the process due to financial under-performance. The faculties bearing deficits are Education, Arts and Health Sciences. On the other hand, the faculties of Economic Sciences, Science and Law had surpluses.

Despite this outcome the surpluses of the faculties of Economic Sciences and Law should not be misconstrued as being positive. The nature of under staffing in these faculties can only be viewed as irresponsible and puts the learning project at serious risk. The faculty of Economic Sciences, for instance, currently possesses only 14 full time staff members, compared to 42 only a few years ago.

The Faculty of Health Sciences is also an area of concern. During discussions with the Ministry at the time of my appointment as Administrator it was suggested that the only viable faculty at UNITRA was Health Sciences, and that along with other viable units and departments, Health Sciences should form the major thrust of the University.

The budget realignment exercise has raised a number of surprises and questions about this assumption as well as the history of the medical school.
The Faculty of Health Sciences, like all other faculties, had to make budgetary adjustments and implement steps to align their expenditure to their income. The deficit of this faculty is almost R20 million. The Faculty was unable to make any contribution to balance its books and is dependent on other faculties for cross-subsidisation. While the principle of cross-subsidisation is not a new one, it would be inadvisable and unsafe to allow the future viability of this Faculty to rest on the surpluses of other faculties, particularly when these surpluses are not guaranteed.

Furthermore, when one applies the generally accepted principle of budgetary devolution there must be the incentive for units and faculties to plan deliberate savings to fund future innovations and projects, in the same way that universities as a whole are expected to generate reserves to fund future repositioning of institutions.

In depth discussions with the Dean of the Faculty of Health Sciences revealed that there were a number of historical issues that have to be presented to the Ministry. Attached is a document for further discussions with the Ministry.

A point to be taken into consideration is that the University’s fee policy, with regard to medical students, will have to be re-visited. UNITRA’s fees are not only out of sync with the cost of delivery but are also substantially below the fees charged by other medical schools. When one considers that the provincial governments fund a reasonably large percentage of students at medical schools, it is clear that this is an issue that will have to be discussed with the Eastern Cape MEC for Health.

We attach the working documents that supported the above process. These were presented to officials from the Department of Education.

1.2 THE RESULTS OF THIS PHASE OF RESTRUCTURING WERE AS FOLLOWS:

1.2.1 FINANCIAL

Based on existing patterns of income and expenditure the University would have required a bank overdraft of R119 million on 31st March 2002. We have been able to reduce this to R86 million, which included provision for strategic maintenance and critical capital replacement, totaling approximately R111 million.

We consider this to be a remarkable shift, particularly within this operational year.

Furthermore, although just an outcome limited to the budget realignment exercise, 282 posts have been made redundant and retrenchments affected. We do anticipate that the viability assessment exercise, which should be completed by the end of July 2001, will lead to a further reduction in staff as a result of the possible closure of some departments and/or faculties at the end of the year.
Although we did not encounter any labour unrest, there are a number of CCMA challenges to which we have to respond. We are confident that on the process of retrenchment we will not have any problems.

I have spent many hours with NEHAWU since I joined UNITRA and I have recorded some of the most crucial discussions. These cover meetings before, during and after the retrenchment process, with NEHAWU locally and NEHAWU’s national office.

The Minister may recall several newspaper reports suggesting that NEHAWU will take this matter to court. This action was shelved after a meeting in East London with representatives from NEHAWU’s provincial office. At this meeting we focused almost exclusively on the refinements and monitoring of the implementation of retrenchments. This will be self-evident in the record of discussion. (See Annexure 1)

1.2.2 SOCIAL PLAN

As part of the retrenchment process and in compliance with guidelines on retrenchment from the Department of Labour the University also formulated a Social Plan that is aimed at alleviating, as far as possible, the distress associated with retrenchments. The key areas of focus within the Social Plan are the re-skilling of staff, the provision of counseling services and the implementation of a call back list that will involve retrenches in the provision of basic maintenance services at an agreeable rate. (See Annexure 2)

The University is also committed to ensuring that retrenches are offered the best possible opportunities to form co-operatives that can in future tender to provide services to the institution. For this purpose, UNITRA has established a temporary office that will advise retrenched staff on the guidelines and imperatives involved in the establishment of small enterprises.

1.2.3 UNEXPECTED SETBACKS

UNITRA has, since the completion of the first phase of restructuring, encountered three unexpected setbacks of a financial nature that has compelled the institution to review the plan presented to the Department of Education. These are:

1. The University was informed that the subsidy for 2002 will only be R70million and as a consequence the maximum funding would be limited to this amount. Subsequent to a meeting with the Honourable Minister this facility was extended to R78million, which was confirmed in a letter dated 08th June 2001.

2. The University was informed that it was required to pay an amount of R17million into the Pension Fund reserve in order to make up the actuarially determined shortfall (See Annexure 3).

Without doubt we are compelled by the enacted pension fund regulations to honour any shortfall emanating from retrenchments and voluntary severance packages. However, we
Appendix XLIX (d): Second Report to the Honourable Minister of Education, Prof Kader Asmal. Page 2 to 5

...have differences as to the correctness of the amount and have requested a review. Our differences are based on past experiences and the occupational categories of those affected by the retrenchments.

Simply put, in 1999 the shortfall in respect of 198 retrenchments amounted to just over R2 million. When compared to this figure from 1999, it seems disproportional that 282 retrenchments in 2001 could result in a shortfall of R17 million. Taking into consideration the fact that a clear majority of the staff affected by the retrenchments featured at the bottom end of the occupational and earnings categories, there should not have been such a strong impact on the fund. We are awaiting the outcome of our request for a review.

3. The University was further informed that it has an outstanding amount of R22 million due to the Receiver of Revenue for the years 1996 to 2000. I have held discussions with the Umtata Revenue office and we have reached a two-step agreement:

- To audit and validate the claims from SARS. This is necessary in view of the settlement amount “negotiated” or determined under the guidance of the Department of Education in 2000. It is surprising that the issue of arrears were not raised at that earlier point in time.
- To consider a “settlement offer” to the SARS. This will follow the audit and validation process mentioned above.

These new developments are of critical concern to the University. Should the outcomes not be favourable to UNITRA then the implications will be far-reaching and could cripple the University.

SECTION TWO: PHASE 2 OF RESTRUCTURING

2.1 SYSTEMS AND POLICIES

It was mentioned in the Administrator’s First Report that a large portion of service inefficiencies were due to an absence of clear policies and guidelines which would allow for the implementation of disciplinary measures by management in instances where policy violations were clearly evident.

In June the second phase of restructuring began with workshops aimed at formulating policies that will eventually govern every sphere of operation at the institution. The need for at least 120 policies, across the board, was identified. Policies from other tertiary institutions were obtained to be used frameworks for discussion and policy formulation. The targeted deadline for the finalisation of policies for adoption is mid-August 2001.

2.2 NEW HOUSING POLICY
Appendix L: Asmal Halts Unitra enrolments for 2002

PRETORIA — Education Minister Asmal yesterday announced a drastic reduction in the number of students who will be admitted to the University of Transvaal faculty.

Asmal said the decision of the university to admitting no students for 2002, was to avoid the financial problems that beset the many institutions of higher education. The decision was made after a meeting with the minister, the university authorities and the financial experts.

The minister said that the decision would mean a major reduction in the number of students who will be admitted to the university. The decision was made after a meeting with the minister, the university authorities and the financial experts.

Asmal said the decision of the university to admitting no students for 2002, was to avoid the financial problems that beset the many institutions of higher education. The decision was made after a meeting with the minister, the university authorities and the financial experts.

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Appendix LI: Unitra Response to Freeze Intake

UNITRA still to decide on 2002 intake freeze

UMTATA — The University of Transkei has not yet taken a final decision on whether it will go ahead with the enrolment of new students next year despite a ministerial moratorium in this regard.

Unitra spokesperson Karuna Gopal said yesterday that the university administrator, Professor Nicky Morgan, would first like to discuss the moratorium announced last week with Education Minister Kader Asmal.

“We hope that meeting will take place very soon.”

Unitra academic registrar Nomfundo Luswazi was quoted as saying the senate had decided to go ahead with the recruitment of students for next year.

Eastern Cape Education MEC Stone Sizani reportedly said the province did not support Asmal’s decision. Announcing the moratorium on the intake of new students for 2002, with the exception of the health faculty, Asmal cited ongoing concerns relating to the sustainability of Unitra.

He cited the huge financial deficit the university had incurred and which showed little or no sign of being reduced. For the past seven years Unitra had received over R250 million in addition to its normal subsidy to enable it to continue operating.

There was a governance vacuum at Unitra, which had been under administration for the past two years, Asmal said.

A third issue he highlighted was the integrity and quality of the academic and educational process and, in particular, concerns that normal teaching processes had been undermined.

The university senate in a statement it vigorously disputed Asmal’s allegations and demanded that he revoke his decision on the moratorium.

It described the minister’s statement about the academic integrity of the university in particular as unsubstantiated.

“Unitra has a history of academic excellence… the minister’s decision… negates Unitra’s developmental role in this region. It also pre-empts and influences, in an unfair and prejudicial manner, the outcomes of the National Working Group…”

The Unitra branch of the National Tertiary Education Staff Union (Ntesu) echoed these sentiments.

It said the university’s programmes were accredited by the Council on Higher Education and the SA Qualifications Authority.

Ntesu blamed the governance vacuum on Asmal, saying he refused to nominate his representatives to the university council when asked to do so in 1999.

“We are not responsible for the ‘huge financial deficits’; black universities were never funded as their white counterparts in the first place.”

It disputed the amount of R250m that Asmal said Unitra had received in addition to its subsidy, saying the amount was R81m, which included retrenchment payments.

“This region, already struck by abject poverty, will suffer further economically if Unitra ceases to exist…

“We reject and condemn this moratorium; we want to be able to register every student that comes to us… We do not accept whatever sweet language the minister is trying to make us believe that he is preparing for our future.”

Gopal yesterday said the university had so far received over 2,000 applications from new students for 2002.

“That puts us in a difficult position… we cater for a large part of the Eastern Cape which is poverty stricken.”

Unitra’s fee structure was specifically designed to take into account the limited means of many of its prospective students. This sector also had a right to university education. she said.

The university had had an intense recruitment campaign in the second half of the year.

“It will be difficult to revoke those plans… the moratorium has financial implications,” Gopal said. — Sapa
Appendix LI (a): Union fights for the ‘Survival of Unitra’

Dispatch Online
Friday, June 7, 2002

Union says it will fight for survival of Unitra

GRAHAMSTOWN -- The National Tertiary Education Staff Union (Ntesu) at the University of Transkei this week reiterated its opposition to plans to close the university and vowed to fight for its survival.

"Ntesu firmly supports the university's contention that it is able to exist as an independent institution of higher learning in the region," said the union in a statement.

Its viability and sustainability assessment and the revision of its programme offerings had rendered Unitra more relevant to fulfilling the development needs of the region, by becoming a university specialising in rural development, science and technology.

"Ntesu continues to question the rationale and criteria behind the minister's decisions regarding Unitra."

The union claimed that there was "no clear logic" in incorporating the medical school into the University of Fort Hare.

"The UFH, we believe, is capable of surviving as an independent entity based on its proud political legacy. It certainly does not require the acquisition of a medical school to make it more relevant to the region or the country, for that matter."
Appendix LII (b): Union fights for the ‘Survival of Unitra’

It said Education Minister Kader Asmal should have realised the medical school was part of the broader faculty of health sciences and did not operate independently from the rest of the university.

"Instead they form an integral part of the community-based strategies that Unitra has over the years adopted in an effort to meet the needs and further the empowerment of the communities that surround the university."

Ntesu said Asmal was "ignoring the trauma" caused by his "continuous threats of closure".

"It is extremely demoralising to be continuously under threat of extinction and still be expected to function normally in a situation that is abnormal.

"We believe that the minister has failed to acknowledge Unitra's efforts to stabilise and to progress."

In Parliament yesterday UDM member Welsh Makanda said the planned closure of Unitra "brutally disempowers" the community of Transkei that used the institution as day scholars, and who would now have no access to tertiary education.

Giving notice of motion in the National Assembly, Makanda said the UDM viewed with "extreme concern the total onslaught on black African tertiary institutions" by Asmal's policies. These policies, he added, were aimed at "virtually wiping them off the educational map".

He said the Cabinet should review the decisions and retain and enhance the institutions so they are able to function more efficiently "rather than close them or reduce their scope".

Transformation, he added, "should be beneficial and not prejudicial to the disadvantaged communities who have been serviced by the threatened institutions."

Responding, Asmal accused the UDM of
Appendix LII (c): Union fights for the ‘Survival of Unitra’

promoting "tribalism and divisiveness" adding that one needed to look at the Eastern Cape as a whole and not just the Transkei.

Asmal said Unitra would become a "vibrant" institution and Umtata a centre for distance learning. -- DDR-DDC

Eastern Cape  South Africa  Foreign  Business  Stocks & Stats  Editorial  Entertainment  Features  Television & Radio  Sport  Weather  Tides  Aircraft
HEALTHY LEAN MACHINE: UNITRA’S LAST AND ONLY PLAUSIBLE RESPONSE

By Prof. S. D. Berkowitz
Professor Emeritus at the University of Vermont
Managing Director of the Institute for Study in South Africa

The future of Higher Education in South Africa hangs in the balance. The Government has made its views known several times. These views have evoked mixed responses in several forums throughout the country. According to the Department of Education, the following scenario is painted.

Port Elizabeth Technikon, the University of Port Elizabeth and Vista University at Port Elizabeth will be merged to form one institution offering both Technikon-type and University courses. Border Technikon and Eastern Cape Technikon will be merged such that their two primary sites are in East London and Umtata. The infrastructure of the University of Transkei is seen as forming the core of the academic activities of the new Technikon in Umtata. It may also be used as a learning centre for the new dedicated distance education institution. The argument is supported by further indicating that new Technikon and Distance Education centre will ensure that there is a vibrant and sustainable provision of higher education in Umtata with the focus on addressing the needs of the region, in particular, in teacher education, agriculture, rural development and tourism. The department further states that the merged Technikon, in consultation with the Ministry, will determine the continued operation of the Butterworth campus of the Eastern Cape Technikon.

The University of Fort Hare may be retained as a separate institution, incorporating the East London campus of Rhodes University and the Medical School of the University of Transkei, which will remain in Umtata. The University of Fort Hare will focus on expanding access in the East London area. This proposal, it is said, is in line with the recent decision of the Provincial Government to designate East London as an industrial development zone. Rhodes University will be retained as a separate institution.

This scenario is retrogressive, undemocratic, irresponsible and palpably biased. The National Working Group itself did not paint a good picture of the University of Fort Hare. UNITRA is singled out for total extirpation. Criticism should also be directed at UNITRA for claiming too much of the turf. The idea of UNITRA being the focus of rural development cannot fly because UNITRA does not have a Faculty of Agriculture. You cannot have rural development if you ignore agriculture. The proposal concerning Tsolo Agricultural College is not good enough because that college does not have a record of excellence, especially in recent years. Even UNITRA went as far as distancing itself from the college just a few short years ago. The time for reviving Tsolo under the UNITRA umbrella has passed. UNITRA has to wake up from its slumber and begin to re-shape its focus. UNITRA should build on its strengths, and it remains a formidable force in the
Appendix LIII (b): “A Healthy lean Machine: Unitra’s Last and Only Plausible Response” by Prof. S.D. Berkowitz

area of Health Sciences. UNITRA should focus itself around the Health and Allied Health Sciences.

Here are some musings, critiques and practical thoughts on what the future scenario could look like.

1. The management at Fort Hare has destroyed the research component of the place. Medical schools by definition, have large research components. What evidence do we have that the current management at Fort Hare can facilitate or administer research?

2. Rhodes at East London has two faculties of interest: electrical engineering and demography. Fort Hare has gotten rid of its demographers and its remote-sensing geographers (essential to sampling). Fort Hare has no Ph.D. level sociologist. Their only good theoretical statistician is about to retire. Their only Ph.D. geographer, Mini, has left Fort Hare for the NRC. This is pertinent because these guys are not long on the ground and Fort Hare is not likely to acquire replacements any time soon.

3. Fort Hare tried to develop an engineering faculty but failed because its physical science faculty, at the time, was too weak. It is even weaker now. Moreover, the Fort Hare Institute of Technology was closed because the management lost the only engineer on payroll, namely Hlatikwa, because Hlatikwa told them that engineering at Fort Hare had to be, focally, mechanical (for purposes of agriculture) and environmental (for purposes of attacking the pollution problem). Many of Hlatikwa’s students were employed by Massey Ferguson and Mercedes-Benz; which were bearing the cost of the program.

4. Electrical engineering is not for “development,” as the Ministry believes, but is part of the export industry: you are exporting trained people from the Eastern Cape. Fort Hare’s management’s first act on campus was to destroy any possibility for Fort Hare having a Computer Science department. How do you have a strong related faculty in electrical engineering and no Computer Science department? What evidence do we have that Fort Hare can administer these programs?

5. Tying Fort Hare together with the medical school is like throwing a drowning man a lead life preserver: both will sink! Fort Hare has only three social scientists holding the Ph.D. degree on staff: Verhage, who is a psychologist; Brouwer, in public administration, who is two or three years from retirement; and Sobahi, who is an anthropologist. Derek Swartz, himself, holds a D. Phil. in sociology but has never taught at the undergraduate or graduate levels.

6. A reasonable proposal would be this: focus the UNITRA counterproposal around health. Move the nursing faculty from Fort Hare, where it is a dying faculty (they lost Fourie who was their HOD and the only Ph.D.-level person in nursing), and create a faculty of Allied Health Sciences. This would include people like radio-technicians, lab technicians, physiotherapists, etc. Focus psychology around clinical and counseling. Create a MSPHA—Master of Science in Public Health Administration. Give the person organizing it the mandate to hire one or two more Ph. D.-level public health types. Focus sociology around epidemiology, demography,
Appendix LIII (c): “A Healthy lean Machine: Unitra’s Last and Only Plausible Response” by Prof S.D.Berkowitz

and the sociology of medicine—which includes both the study of the medical professions and health care systems delivery and community health systems. Hire a Ph.D.-level sociologist to head it up. This sociology department would become a key department in an MSPHA and MPH (Master of Public Health) programme, such as the one proposed here. It could be built on the existing programme at UPE, which is under-funded and under-staffed. Focus this MPH on rural health care and community health systems. Economics could be focused on health economics, especially rural health and its impact on the rural economy. This is a specialty in short supply in South Africa. The transition from a minority-oriented public health system catering for a few, to a majority-oriented one has created havoc in the hospitals of South Africa. Rural clinics, being a relatively new phenomenon in rural areas, need the support of sociologists and dedicated researchers to engender a sustainable public health care system in rural areas.

In summary the following is strongly proposed:

7. Move nursing to UNITRA. It makes great sense for it to be physically near medicine. It is also easier to teach where there is a medical school.

8. Move the MPH from UPE to UNITRA.

9. Create an MSPHA.

10. Create a demography unit. Create an epidemiology unit.

11. Develop ties to Technikons in areas like radio-techs or physiotherapy. First two years in Technikon, last two at UNITRA.

12. Lose rural development. That has to be linked to agriculture. In these terms, it makes more sense at Fort Hare—although Swartz lost its only rural development guy and its Development Studies department collapsed.

13. Strengthen UNITRA’s CS department and focus it on health care data systems. These are primitive in South Africa—one reason that health care administration is such a mess.

14. Lose education to Fort Hare. Retain postgraduate education in allied health, nursing and medicine.

15. Strengthen quantitative data analysis in sociology and economics; as well as public administration.

16. Advertise these programs and this focus widely.

17. Retain core, but small, undergraduate programs in English, the arts, world literature, etc.

18. Focus the law school on environmental law, health care law, medical malpractice, etc. UNITRA could become the leading faculty in the country in these areas.
Pro-Asmal director for Unitra

By Adrienne Carlisle

GRAHAMSTOWN — The Department of Education is sending one of its chief directors, Dr Molapo Qhobela, to the embattled University of Transkei to enforce Education Minister Kader Asmal’s moratorium on new enrolments and to “normalise” the situation there.

The Daily Dispatch learned yesterday that Qhobela will replace former Unitra interim administrator Nicky Morgan, whose term expired at the end of December.

Qhobela’s proximity to Asmal and his mandate to enforce the minister’s stay on new enrolments is likely to result in a hostile reception at Unitra, which has opted to defy the moratorium.

It has done so with the blessings of the local business and academic communities. The provincial Department of Education has also indicated it does not support the moratorium.

In an exclusive interview with the Daily Dispatch yesterday, deputy director-general of higher education Nasima Badsha revealed that Qhobela would arrive at Unitra “within days” to ensure the moratorium is heeded and to “restore normal governance and management as soon as possible”.

Qhobela will be Unitra’s third interim administrator in as many years. Badsha acknowledged that a lack of continuity of leadership had contributed to the university’s problems.

“That is why we want to normalise the situation as soon as possible. We aim to restore normal governance and management and part of his (Qhobela’s) task is to do exactly that while administering the moratorium.”

She said Asmal recognised that Umtata needed a viable higher education institution, but the university required immediate attention to achieve this. “The moratorium offers the opportunity to revitalise the institution by allowing the necessary space for restructuring which will guarantee the presence of a viable higher education institution to meet the technological and developmental needs of the region and the province.”

Badsha said that Unitra, along with all other higher education institutions in the country, would know its fate in March.

A National Working Group was appointed last year to make recommendations to the minister on, among other things, how he should reduce the number of institutions in the country and the form of restructured institutions should take.

Among its tasks, the group was to investigate the controversial possibility of regional combinations or mergers of various institutions.

Unitra could not be reached for comment yesterday. Unitra said on Friday that the student admissions office would be opened from today. There was no reply from that office and other Unitra offices yesterday.

Man claims assault, theft in police cell
Appendix LV (a): Nomination of Candidate for the Position of Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the University of Transkei, signed by stakeholders

University of Transkei
National Tertiary Education Staff Union
Private Bag X1 UNITRA Umtata 5117 Eastern Cape South Africa
Tel: 047 502 2418 / 2674 / 2252  Fax: 047 502 2595

Ms P. Nakani
Chairperson: Institutional Forum
University of Transkei
UMTATA

07 June 2002

Dear Ms Nakani

NOMINATION FOR THE POSITION OF VICE-CHANCELLOR AND PRINCIPAL, UNIVERSITY OF TRANSKEI

In compliance with the advertisement of the post of Vice-Chancellor and Principal, placed by the University of Transkei in the Sunday Times (Careers Section, 26/05/2002), we, the UNITRA branch of the National Tertiary Education Staff Union (NTESU) nominate Prof. N.J. Morgan as a candidate for the advertised post.

The decision to nominate Prof. Morgan was carried at a meeting of the Executive Committee of NTESU early in May 2002 and later re-affirmed at a special General Meeting on 30th May 2002.

We, as the NTESU-UNITRA Branch and a stakeholder in the Institutional Forum, believe that the ideal way to carry forward this motion would be for the Institutional Forum to adopt this nomination, if it is so agreeable to and reaffirmed by the other stakeholders within the Forum.

It is our sincere hope that the Institutional Forum will be able to execute this motion. Please find attached prepared documents stating the motivation for the nomination of Prof. Morgan, together with a nomination form.

As you are aware the closing date for applications and nominations is 19th June 2002. Therefore, in an effort to avoid delay in the submission of this nomination, should it be the case that the Institutional Forum is unable to carry forward the nomination of Prof
Appendix LV (b): Nomination of Candidate for the Position of Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the University of Transkei, signed by stakeholders

Morgan, we would appreciate notification to such an effect from you no later than 12th June 2002 so that NTESU can continue with its program of action.

Yours faithfully.

S.N. Nkanyuza
President

W.M. Kwetana
Secretary
Appendix LVI (a): Working Group to Advise the Minister of Education on the Establishment of Walter Sisulu University

WORKING GROUP TO ADVISE THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WALTER SISULU UNIVERSITY FOR TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE, EASTERN CAPE

As announced in Government Gazette Notice No 25787, 28 November 2003, the University of Transkei, Border Technikon and Eastern Cape Technikon are to merge into a single public higher education institution on 1 January 2005, to be known as the Walter Sisulu University for Technology and Science, Eastern Cape. The Minister, however, has decided to postpone the date of the merger to 1 July 2005, due to lack of adequate preparedness on the part of the institutions, particularly in relation to governance, management and administrative readiness for the new entity. Furthermore, the Minister has decided to establish a Working Group to advise on the academic configuration for the new institution. Its terms of reference are as follows:

1. Terms of Reference

To advise on an appropriate academic configuration, given the decision that the new institution should primarily offer technikon-type programmes. In doing so, it should take into consideration the following:

- The development of a realistic and needs-oriented academic programme profile for the new institution, which is in line with human resources, infrastructural and financial capacities.
- The need to reduce overlap and unnecessary duplication in academic programme offerings, both at the institutional and regional levels.
- The need to strengthen the career-focus component of the new institution, with the emphasis on undergraduate certificates and diploma programmes so that the vocational and technological needs of the region can be better met.
- To advise on an appropriate organisational configuration for the new institution, to support the academic functions, taking into account the need to ensure future viability and sustainability.
- Mechanisms that would need to be put in place for the professional support of improvement of both teaching and learning processes.

2. Principles

The investigation must be guided by the principles and goals for the restructuring and transformation of the higher education system, as articulated in the Education White Paper 3: A Programme for the Transformation of the Higher Education System, the National Plan for Higher Education (2001) and in the Government’s proposals for a new institutional landscape, Government Gazette Notice No 23549, 21 June 2004: Transformation and Restructuring: A New Institutional Landscape for Higher Education.
Appendix LVI (b): Working Group to Advise the Minister of Education on the Establishment of Walter Sisulu University

2. **Process**

To assist the Working Group in its task, the Department of Education will provide the necessary administrative and logistical support, including attending to all travel and accommodation arrangements. In addition, the Department will make available all relevant reports and databases, including the approved programme and qualification mix profiles of the merging institutions. The Working Group may draw on the experience and expertise of other individuals within and outside of the higher education sector as and when necessary.

The Working Group is accountable to the Minister of Education. It is required to complete its investigation and to submit its recommendations to the Minister by no later than 31 May 2005.

3. **Composition of the Working Group**

The Working Group consists of:

Dr Mamphela Ramphele – Chairperson
Professor Narend Baljnaeth
Mr Nhlanzani Dladi
Professor Patrick FitzGerald
Ms Erica Gillard
Mr Ignatius Sehoole
Appendix LVII (a): Letter to ‘Mr L.N.Capa, Chair of Council: University of Transkei’

Mr L N Capa  
Chair of Council  
University of Transkei  
P O Box 338  
KOKSTAD  
4700

By Fax: 047 531 4121

Dear Mr Capa

Establishment of the Walter Sisulu University for Technology and Science, Eastern Cape

After careful consideration, I am writing to inform you of my decision to delay the establishment of the Walter Sisulu University for Technology and Science, Eastern Cape to 1 July 2005. This decision has been necessitated by my assessment of the level of preparedness for the merger. I received an update on preparations for the merger from my Merger Unit and the Institutional Project Manager, Mr. Danie Jacobs. While I acknowledge that there has been progress in some areas, I am concerned about the administrative and technical readiness for the merger, including the absence of clear time frames to address the wide range of tasks which are crucial for the success of the merger. Furthermore, I am anxious that recent decisions of the merging entities have not been taken in the best interest of the new institution, the recent salary increases at the Border Technikon being a case in point. I am also troubled by the lack of progress towards a realistic academic vision for the Walter Sisulu University for Technology and Science, Eastern Cape, which is line with the directives of my predecessor and myself.

I wish to assure you that this decision has not been taken lightly. Rather, it is informed by my desire to ensure that the merger is a success and does indeed give rise to a new institution that is academically vibrant and able to respond effectively to the needs of the region, as well as being financially sustainable.

As part of the continued preparations for the merger I have requested, in the first instance, that an independent assessment is made to identify the range of areas and activities that must be addressed prior to the merger and the strategies, including human resource and other capacities that need to be put in place to achieve these. In this regard, I am appointing Learning Strategies, which has an established track record in supporting merging institutions, to undertake this initial assessment.

In addition, I am establishing a Working Group, to be chaired by Dr. Mamphela Ramphela, to advise me on an appropriate academic configuration for the new institution. I am enclosing the terms of reference of the Working Group for your information. Please be assured that the Working Group will make every effort to consult with all key constituencies.

I am confident that you will appreciate and support my decision.

Yours sincerely,

G.N.M. Pandor

GNM Pandor, MP
Minister of Education
Date: 17/11/2004

cc. Prof. N Morgan, Vice-Chancellor, UNITRA: 047 502 2970
Appendix LVIII (a): Letter to Professor Patrick Fitzgerald from the Minister of Education, Naledi Pandor on the establishment of the Walter Sisulu University for Technology and Science, Eastern Cape.
Appendix LVIII (b): Letter to Professor Patrick Fitzgerald from the Minister of Education, Naledi Pandor on the establishment of the Walter Sisulu University for Technology and Science, Eastern Cape.

dedication to ensuring that the merger succeeds. I wish to assure of my Ministry's continued support.

Yours sincerely

GNM Pandor, MP
Minister of Education
Date: 1-07-2005

Cc: Mr L N Capa: Former Chair of Council (UNITRA) – 047 531 4121
Reverend B B Finca: Former Chair of Council (Border Technikon)
(043) 722 7112

Ms Nostipho Skenjana: Former Chair of Council (Eastern Cape Technikon)
(047) 492 0721/(040) 608 4721

Prof. N Morgan: Interim Vice Chancellor & Principal: Walter Sisulu University
(047) 502 2970
Ex-Peninsula head leads the pack for vice-chancellor post at WSU

former Cape Peninsula University of Technology interim vice-chancellor, Dr. Maurice Balmlono, has emerged as frontrunner for the chancellor post at Walter Sisulu University (WSU), according to the source.

The Daily Dispatch understands that Balmlono impressed the university community "convincingly" during an interview, and that the university had already retained him for the position. The newspaper also quoted a source that he had already received correspondence from the WSU.

"It's highly possible that he will get the post because he has managed an institution and managed higher-learning before," the source said.

"His presentation was very convincing," said the source. "He also impressed during the interviews, was the unions favoured candidate, and has managed an institution."
Appendix LX: Media Coverage of Dr. Fikeni from the Daily Dispatch

Fikeni's PhD confirmed

June 24 2008 at 03:33pm

Dr Somadoda Fikeni, who had claimed for years that he had a doctorate in politics, would be re-instated as Walter Sisulu University chairperson of council, the institution said on Tuesday.

This after the council received confirmation that he had earned his doctoral degree, the Eastern Cape University’s spokesperson Samkelo Ngwenya said.

He said the council met on Friday and decided to re-instate Fikeni after the council received a letter from Michigan State University in the USA confirming that Somadoda had completed and received his doctoral degree in politics at the institution.

On March 8, 2008, Fikeni admitted that he had not received his PhD in political sciences from Michigan State University in 2002, as he had been claiming for six years. He however insisted that he had submitted all documentation for the completion of his degree, the Daily Dispatch reported.

Also on March 8, Fikeni said a ‘technical glitch’ was to blame for the delay to confer the degree on him.

Fikeni resigned from the university council in the middle of March 2008 due to the complaints against him. He took leave from his position as chief operating officer at the National Heritage Council the following week.

Fikeni, described as a political analyst and commentator with several awards for community work and academic performance, appeared a number of times on national and international television during the ANC conference in Polokwane last year, the Daily Dispatch reported. – Sapa

Pandor shocked by 'Dr Fake lie'

August 20 2008 at 11:02am

Read the full story on the Daily Dispatch Online

Education Minister Naledi Pandor has expressed shock about reports that Walter Sisulu University council chairperson Somadoda Fikeni lied about having a doctorate and was then reinstated to the governing body.

Speaking for the first time since the Daily Dispatch uncovered Fikeni’s six year-long lie that he held a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) from the Michigan State University in the US, Pandor said she needed to get the facts from the university before commenting.

But if true, Pandor said on Tuesday the reports would be a blot on the university's leadership.

The lie, first exposed in a Dispatch article in March, showed how the respected political commentator had been passing himself off as a doctor since 2002, even though he did not have a PhD from Michigan State as he claimed.

In the article he admitted lying about his qualifications.

The degree was conferred on Fikeni only last week, six years after he first laid claim to it.
A week after the expose, Fikeni stepped down as the council chairperson but has since been reinstated. This has, however, divided the council.

Pandor's comments come just days after the university's spokesperson Karuna Krishanlal-Gopal died from a brain haemorrhage at a Mthatha hospital at the weekend.

It emerged on Tuesday that the university management had tried to blame her for leaking the information about Fikeni to the Dispatch.

It also follows reports that Fikeni's deceit had led to the resignation of fellow council member Dr Maria Xaba-Mokoena, who had been appointed to the position by the Education Minister.

Pandor was also shocked to learn of the resignation of Xaba-Mokoena, a distinguished medical specialist and founding dean of the medical faculty of the former University of Transkei.

"I am very concerned at the loss of Dr Xaba-Mokoena as her skills and background surely added value to the university and its academic programme."

Pandor said she regarded membership of a university council as high office, which demanded standards of integrity that were exemplary.

"I will comment once I have spoken to the vice-chancellor. If the allegation of lies is true, that will be a blot on the council and its leadership. Council is the highest organ of governance and its reputation must conform to that status. I repeat, however, that I need to get all the facts related to this matter."

She would also not comment on Fikeni's reinstatement as council chairman, except to say: "Any council must have leadership and membership that is deserving of this high and honourable office. Universities face national and international scrutiny and have to have good reputations."

This week, details emerged of a PricewaterhouseCoopers-led investigation into who had leaked the information about Fikeni's "bogus" doctorate to the press. The investigation was commissioned by the council, through Fikeni.

At least four staffers close to the investigation referred to it as a "witch hunt to cover-up the 'Dr Fake' scandal".

The investigators interviewed staff members, including those in the marketing and communications department. Their telephone records were checked and computers scanned without their knowledge, they said.

Krishanlal-Gopal's hard drive was removed from her office while she was on leave.

Staff found the investigation "peculiar" as nobody had been formally informed of the procedure.

The Dispatch this week obtained council minutes from WSU, which show that Fikeni's reinstatement was met with "concern by some council members".

The minutes state that when the matter had been referred to the convocation, "Somadoda Fikeni did not have a doctorate and had not been in possession of a doctorate for six years".

Xaba-Mokoena and another councillor, known only as Mrs L Majova, disassociated themselves from the council’s decision. Xaba-Mokoena walked out of the meeting and later tendered her resignation from the council.

She then wrote to Pandor informing the minister of her resignation.

Vice-chancellor Marcus Balintulo said he could not comment on the minister's statements as he was driving.

Fikeni could not be reached for comment. - By EDDIE BOTHA – Investigations Editor
Appendix LXI: HESA’s Press Statement on the 17th September 2010

Unrest at Walter Sisulu University:
Press Release: 17 September 2010

Higher Education South Africa (HESA) notes with growing concern the violent student protests that are disrupting classes and academic life at Walter Sisulu University. In particular, HESA condemns the violence and damage to university property that has accompanied these protests. Similar to recent violent incidents at the University of the Western Cape and the University of Limpopo, there is a worrying trend emerging.

“There are two issues here which are deeply regrettable for higher education,” says Prof Dumisani Malaza, the CEO of HESA. “Firstly there is a dangerous misunderstanding of the way in which the university operates. The protest is predicated on a misperception that the Vice-Chancellor has complete control over how an institution is governed. This assumption is simply wrong and completely negates the decision-making roles of Senate, of Council and the fact that all institutions are committed to transparent and good governance.

“Prof Marcus Balintulo – as the Vice-Chancellor -- cannot simply waive rules in order to appease students, especially when there are already appropriate channels in place to deal with grievances. In fact, if he were to do so, he would be transgressing the very principle of sound governance.

“Secondly there are other broader implications here. HESA is currently involved in the study of infrastructure at our institutions and the Chair of HESA, Prof Ithon Rensburg, has been appointed by the Minister to investigate the condition of residences. For its part, HESA is investigating the backlog of existing buildings and equipment especially in the light of increasing participation for future students. Historically disadvantaged institutions like Walter Sisulu University are the most affected by the infrastructural backlog and cannot afford further losses through pointless exercises of vandalism. Burning down busses and setting fire to a dining room is, in effect, destroying their own home for the period of their studies and is the further destruction of an already compromised infrastructure”, continues Malaza.

“Worst of all,” argues Malaza, “it makes it increasingly difficult for the sector to lobby Government for additional infrastructural funding when students show a blatant disregard for what little there is currently. These violent acts not only show a disregard for their present homes but jeopardise the possibility for future students to access higher education.”

About Higher Education South Africa

Higher Education South Africa (HESA) is the leadership body that represents the 23 public universities. Led by the Vice-Chancellors of our universities, HESA acts to support and advance the higher education sector in South Africa.

Issued by: Higher Education South Africa
Date: 17 September 2010
For more information contact: admin@hesa.org.za
Appendix LXII (a): Dr. S. Fikeni states “Walter Sisulu Can Be Saved”

Dr Somadoda Fikeni

Walter Sisulu University can be saved
By Professor Somadoda Fikeni (Article published in the Mail & Guardian on 14 October, 2011).

“In many respects the report by the independent assessor on Walter Sisulu University reiterates points that we, as the council, had already raised and that the council on higher education’s institutional audit in April this year made as well (Mega-university hits the wall, Mail & Guardian, October 7).

As the council we took a resolution to establish the Walter Sisulu University Foundation with the aim of raising third-stream income, that is, income in addition to the two streams of student fees and government subsidies. By last year the foundation was fully functional, but it took us two years to achieve because complex trust laws required us to trace all former members of the foundations of the three institutions that merged in 2005 to form the university, the so-called "legacy institutions", and have them sign an agreement that a new entity would be established. The foundation is now fully operational and has embarked on an ambitious process of mobilising resources. The university chancellor has also established a scheme to complement fundraising efforts undertaken by the university. But both these moves, it would seem from the assessor’s report; have come too late for our resource-starved university.

As far back as 2007, the council imposed austerity measures and also assisted management in formulating and implementing a financial turnaround strategy. But the historical, systemic and structural challenges of a merger that combined three severely disadvantaged institutions, each with its own history of instability, could do little to change the situation. This was compounded by the poor recovery of student debt, the general culture of poor payment of fees and the reality of servicing one of the poorest regions in the country, as reflected in its demographic feature.

No elbow-room to move
Appendix LXII (b): Dr. S. Fikeni states “Walter Sisulu Can Be Saved

It became clear to us that both the restructuring and the reorganisation of the institution were capital-intensive projects and that there was no "elbow room" to move for a cash-starved institution because it was struggling to meet even its most basic services targets.

This is the common story of historically disadvantaged institutions. The severity of these problems simply differs in degree from one institution to another and they take turns to visit "institutional ICU" in the form of administrators or departmental bailouts.

Such interventions are synonymous with being a historically disadvantaged institution, which raises the question of whether this vicious circle will ever be broken. It is worth recalling that Sibusiso Bengu, the first post-apartheid education minister, proposed historical redress funding for these institutions. But he was defeated by a strong lobby against his efforts, as he later admitted.

One of the university’s legacy institutions, the former University of the Transkei, had three administrators, all of whom failed to turn the situation around. The same institution also experienced the dissolution of councils that were served by such prominent persons as Blade Nzimande, Brigalia Bam, Fatima Meer, Dumisa Ntsebeza and Zam Titus. We are now dealing with three times the problems they faced, with fewer resources and an institutional culture that has worsened.

In South Africa’s university merger history, Walter Sisulu University has a uniquely painful history. It is the only three-way merger spread over so wide an area that also tried to integrate three poorly resourced institutions, a university and two technikons. The distances between the main campuses are telling: Mthatha to the East London Potsdam campus is about 240km, from East London to Queenstown about 230km, and from Queenstown to Mthatha is about the same distance.

Region is in progressive decline

The region serviced by the university, particularly the Transkei, has been in progressive decline for many years. Homeland industries collapsed, irrigation schemes and agricultural projects such as Magwa Tea declined to a point of dysfunctionality, the former homelands administrative capital moved, the bus service discontinued, the radio station was shut down, the airport downgraded and all teacher-training colleges closed. This decline has neither been reversed in any significant manner nor has there been any major development project that would be a catalyst for development in the region.

To add to the decline, several agricultural colleges closed and the 1987 miners strike and subsequent massive retrenchments affected this region more than any other. There has also been a huge exodus
Appendix LXII (c):  Dr. S. Fikeni states “Walter Sisulu Can Be Saved

of the middle and business class to other cities in the country. Basic education is doing no better: it is on a "life-support system" now, with the Eastern Cape department under administration of the national government.

So the home of Mandela, Tambo, the Sisulus, Chris Hani, Thabo and Govan Mbeki, Alfred Nzo, Sobukwe and Biko has, ironically, experienced some of its most extreme difficulties during the democratic moment.

Simply put, the Walter Sisulu University council did everything humanly possible to save the institution and make it viable under the most difficult of circumstances, but we could not squeeze water from a stone. It is our hope and prayer that the intervention we have called for from the national higher education and training department will not be a medicine that turns out to be worse than the sickness it seeks to cure.

We will support any intervention that is meant to make the institution viable and strong, because it has great potential and a compelling vision and mission. It is at an advanced stage of establishing a faculty of agriculture and rural development, in an area that is 90% rural. The legacy institutions of the university produced a number of towering figures in our society and the merged institutions continue to excel in areas such as medicine and health sciences. This year Walter Sisulu University became the first South African university to graduate clinical associates. It is also the only university in the Eastern Cape Province with a medical school.

In the legal field the institution can boast people such as Constitutional Court judges Chris Jafta and the late Tholakele Madala, Ntsebeza, as already mentioned, acting judge Russell Mdlanga, the president of the Black Lawyers Association, Andiswa Ndoni, and many other judges. We are also proud that we produced the country's first female black chartered accountant, Nonkululeko Gobodo, as well as her colleague Sindy Nkonki-Zilwa. Also on the list are prominent business people such as Gloria Serobe and the chief executive of African Bank, Thami Sokutu. Our prominent sports personalities include Makhaya Ntini in cricket and the Ndungane twins in our rugby teams.

The council, one of the most dedicated teams with which I have ever worked, is made up of prominent people in society who have done their best under the most trying circumstances. They include the provincial president of Cosatu, top managers of international companies and the former chair and deputy chair of one of the legacy institutions councils, Dr Z Dabula, who was selected by the defence department to head the team that is looking after Madiba's health. They also include a municipal manager of Buffalo City Metro, three top legal minds and many others who came with their own expertise and experience.”
1. Preamble

This is a response of Walter Sisulu University (WSU) to the Report of the Independent Assessor into the Affairs of the WSU. The Report, compiled by Professor Dan J Ncayiyana, an Independent Assessor, appointed by the Minister of Higher Education and Training, Hon Dr B Nzimande (MP) was gazetted on 28 September 2011, (Government Notice 822 and Gazette No 34641). Whilst this response is not intended to be a defensive rebuttal of what is contained in the Assessor’s Report, it however seeks to correct some factual inaccuracies and inconsistencies with the hope of presenting a more balanced view and understanding of the state of affairs of the (WSU). The response is necessary because, unfortunately, due to the very tight schedule of the assessor, and processing time constraints in the Department of Higher Education and Training, WSU was not afforded the opportunity of rectifying the many and serious factual inaccuracies and inconsistencies that are in the independent assessor’s report before it was published in the gazette.

2. Background

On 21 December 2010 the Chairperson of WSU Council, Dr S Fikeni and the Vice-Chancellor and Principal, Prof MM Balintulo, wrote to the Minister informing him of “a deeper structural challenge that arises from the nature of our merger of disadvantaged and under-resourced institution to form Walter Sisulu University.” This correspondence further advised the Minister of the increasing difficulty of coping financially with personnel costs after harmonization of salaries and benefits which were not regarded as merger costs by the then Minister of Education. Subsequent meetings and discussions with the Minister’s officials on this matter led to an understanding that the Department will consider providing a comprehensive intervention to address the challenges faced by WSU. This understanding was captured in the correspondence of the Chairperson of Council to the Minister on 11 May wherein the Chairperson, on behalf of WSU, requested for the Minister’s intervention “with the expressed aim of comprehensively
Appendix LXIII (b): Response to the Report of the Independent Assessor into the Affairs of Walter Sisulu University: 12 October 2011

dealing with WSU challenges and injecting financial support.” It was in response to this request that the Minister met with the full Council of the WSU on 12 July 2011 to discuss the problems being encountered by the institution and consult on the best way forward to solve these issues. The joint statement released after this meeting confirmed that “many of the problems at WSU are structural and systemic, and are historical symptoms.” After consultation with the Council, the Minister had decided to appoint an Independent Assessor to assess the nature and extent of the challenges confronting the institution and to make recommendations on the way forward towards ensuring that WSU takes its rightful place as a strong and well managed rural comprehensive higher education institution.

On 4 August 2011 the Minister of Higher Education and Training wrote to the Vice-Chancellor of WSU informing him of the appointment of Professor D J Ncayiyana as an Independent Assessor for WSU. The letter from Minister Nzimande required the Assessor to advise the Minister and the Council on:

a) the source and nature of the problems facing the institution, including those relating to governance and financial management and any other matters that might arise;

b) measures required to restore good governance and financial management at the university.

The terms of reference included a detailed analysis and report on the financial management system including policies and procedures and an analysis and report on current university governance, including human resource policies and practices and information technology infrastructure. The Assessor was expected to make recommendations on restoring of effective and proper governance and financial management at the university and indicate what action, if any, ought to be taken. A period of ten days from the date of the Assessor’s appointment was allowed for the completion of the work and the submission of a report to the Minister.
Appendix LXIII (c): Response to the Report of the Independent Assessor into the Affairs of Walter Sisulu University: 12 October 2011

The Independent Assessor, Prof DJ Ncayiyana, assisted by Mr Nkosinathi Khena, an official in the Department of Higher Education and Training, arrived and commenced with his work at WSU on 15 August 2011. It is understood that the Independent Assessor had submitted his Report to the Department on 5 September and the Report was gazetted on 28 September 2011. It is in response to this Report that this submission will seek to address itself.

3. Concerns on the time-frame for the work of the Independent Assessor

The Independent Assessor and his Assistant started with their work on 15 August and concluded their business at WSU on 24 August, including one day when the Assessor had to leave the institution (the Assistant continued with the Assessor’s work for the day) to attend to one of his other commitments. In the short time at his disposal, the Independent Assessor met with a variety of stakeholders at the institution, including some Council members, Executive Management, Senior Management, representatives of Convocation, Institutional Forum, Unions’ representatives, student representatives from different campus SRCs. The Assessor also travelled to each of the four campuses and was therefore able to hear the views of a wide range of staff and students. WSU is a multi-campus institution with four campuses spread over a wide geographic area. The period allocated for the Independent Assessor’s work was totally inadequate for a full, fair and thorough analysis of the deep and complex challenges of WSU. Within that short space of time, the Assessor had also to read a whole range of documents and reports (some of which are kindly acknowledged in the Assessor’s Report) submitted to him by various stakeholders. The many serious factual errors and inaccuracies in the Report bear testimony to the short and inadequate time during which the work of the Assessor was rushed. Missing from the list of these documents is the submission from the WSU Management titled Senior Management Submission to the Independent Assessor. No reason for the omission is given although the Assessor refers to the submission in his report.
Appendix LXIII (d): Response to the Report of the Independent Assessor into the Affairs of Walter Sisulu University: 12 October 2011


(Government Notice 822, Gazette No. 34641)

The Report was gazetted on 28 September 2011 after more than three weeks of its submission to the Department. It is to be regretted that it was not possible for the Department to engage the University on the Report before it was taken to the public domain through gazetting as some of the factual errors and inaccuracies in the Report could at least have been pre-checked and corrected. This is more so as the Minister’s letter of appointment of the Independent Assessor, based on the resolutions of the Council meeting with the Minister referred to above, had promised that the Independent Assessor’s investigation will advise the Minister and Council not only of the nature of the challenges but also of the measures of addressing them. The need for this response would have been unnecessary had the opportunity and platform been provided before gazetting the Report.

As things are, Management is disappointed at the generally extremely negative tone of the report which does not reflect the efforts of Council and Management to resolve the crisis. A number of factual errors has had the effect of presenting the institution in a worse light from the perspective of the core business of teaching and learning, research and community engagement than is actually the case. The report has presented an extremely unbalanced view of the state of the state of the University. All the good and outstanding work of the University, resulting from the selfless sacrifice and dedication of many of its students, staff, management and Council over the last six years has been ignored in favour of the negative aspects of the institutional culture. This is unfortunate, but understandable, as the Assessor had confirmed that “the views of students and labour unions are detailed in subsequent paragraphs.” (p.8). Views and perspectives from management have unfortunately not enjoyed the same privilege and amount of ‘detailing’ in the report.
Appendix LXIV (a): Prof van Staden’s Terms of Reference

last 5 years; therefore the appointment of an Administrator will have to be accompanied by a substantial cash injection.

6. Appoint a team of experts to assist the Administrator in critical areas. Given the all-encompassing collapse of systems, governance and financial management at WSU, an Administrator appointed as a ‘lone ranger’ is destined to fail. It will not be possible to restore financial stability in isolation from interventions to achieve a complete overhaul and reconfiguration of such systems as HR, ICT and organisational structure. The Assessor recommends the appointment of a team of experts – a ‘cohort intervention’ – to assist the Administrator to create a coherent, efficient, cohesive and well-functioning organisational steady state at WSU by implementing rational and effective systems and procedures.

I have accepted the report and recommendations of the Independent Assessor. In this regard, I Dr BE Nzimande MP, Minister of Higher Education and Training have decided to appoint Professor Lourens Van Staden as Administrator for the Walter Sisulu University in terms of Section 41A of the Higher Education Act, with the following terms of reference:

TERMS OF REFERENCE

The general and specific terms of reference of the Administrator are:

1. To take over the authority of the Council of Walter Sisulu University for an initial period not exceeding 24 months.

2. To take over the management of the University and to steer the University back to operational and financial sustainability. This will include the strengthening of structures, systems and policies that will ensure good governance and the restoration of the culture of teaching and learning and academic integrity at the University.

3. To assess the impact of the merger and whether there has been a financial shortfall in this regard, taking into account the funds invested by the DHET during the mergers.

4. To manage the challenges regarding the harmonisation of different staff structures.

5. To develop a workable governance model for a multi-campus university taking into account the numerous challenges and inefficiencies that may have been created.

6. To introduce short-term and long-term measures to reduce the institution’s bank overdrafts.

7. To carry out a forensic audit of the institution in order to identify any corrupt practices and to institute appropriate action within the prescripts of the law, including implementing any action required by investigations, forensic audits or other audits performed prior to administration.

8. To initiate the appointment of a new Council at the Walter Sisulu University, including the establishment of necessary Council sub-committees and the drafting and submission to the Minister of Higher Education and Training, of a new statute for the University.

9. To determine with a view to increase the different revenue streams of the university, including government grants, student fees and other possible revenue sources.
Appendix LXIV (b): Prof van Staden’s Terms of Reference

10. Conduct a detailed analysis of, and report on the academic project which should include the planning processes followed, systems put into place to ensure academic quality, including the viability and sustainability of the current programme offerings, and projected student enrolments in relation to infrastructure, staffing capacity and student support that will ensure an improved throughput rate.

11. Review and improve the academic integrity and relevance of the university’s programmes and qualifications and if appropriate design a new academic structure.

12. To implement initiatives to restore governance, operations and viable systems and processes in the areas listed below. The Administrator will be guided by the assessment conducted by the DHET with specific recommendations attached as Annexure A.

(a) **Finance** - Adequacy of internal control systems, financial planning, budgeting, financial management and reporting, student financial aid;

(b) **Human Resources (HR)** - Adequacy of internal control systems, HR planning and HR management;

(c) **Governance** – Proper functioning of Council and council committees, monitoring, evaluation and reporting;

(d) **Information Technology (IT)** - IT infrastructure, operational efficiency and effectiveness;

(e) **Academic Enterprise** - Academic structures, improving academic quality; and

(f) **Students** - Proper functioning of student governance, student affairs administration.

The Administrator will report to the Minister of Higher Education and Training or his delegated officials. Besides other forms of communication and interaction with the Ministry and the Department of Higher Education and Training, the Administrator must submit quarterly written reports on the progress regarding the above issues. The Administrator may appoint technical experts where necessary to assist in the different areas.

The Administrator will commence duties on the date of publication of this notice.

BE Nzimande MP
Minister of Higher Education and Training
Date: 27/10/11
WSU turns a positive corner

University prof leads all-round transformation

PROFESSOR Lorries van Staden was appointed last year by the Department of Higher Education in man the informal strategy of the University of the Western Cape (UWC)'s Bantu education plan. The plan is being implemented in the university's rural areas.

Van Staden said that the university's "all-round educational plan" had so far been "very successful". The plan is based on the principle of "quality education". Van Staden said that the plan is being implemented in rural areas where the quality of education is being improved.

The programme is being implemented in rural areas where the quality of education is being improved. The programme is being implemented in rural areas where the quality of education is being improved. The programme is being implemented in rural areas where the quality of education is being improved.
Appendix LXVI (a): Dr. B. Nzimande's Speech at the Mthatha Health Centre in Mthatha, 25th March 2014

Our intervention in the governance of Walter Sisulu University has proven to be highly successful. Regular reports from the Professor van Staden have kept me abreast of developments here at WSU and I am very pleased with his significant achievements in a highly charged and complex environment. Let me outline some of these achievements which have been put in place since Professor van Staden took office in November 2011.

A new, ground-breaking statute for WSU was gazetted on 17 January this year. This has made it possible for us to commence with the implementation of a more appropriate divisional governance and management model for a university of this unique kind. The new Council, which is presently being constituted, will need to take over this responsibility to ensure the health and well-being of this national asset. It is envisaged that today's deliberations will contribute positively to the continuation of the institution's stability.

The new Institutional Management Committee is being constituted in accordance with the terms of reference for the extended six-month period of the Administrator. A number of appointments have already been made and positions continue to be filled to ensure a stable and accountable leadership at this level.

Student governance has stabilised with a new Student Representative Council (SRC) constitution agreed upon with a divisional governance system. Labour unions have also made progress with a single Recognition Agreement placed on the table which I believe will bring about the smooth transition towards harmonious institutional labour relations.

Walter Sisulu University is the only university in the country born out of the merger of three historically disadvantaged institutions established in apartheid times to support the despised and much hated homeland system. These institutions were the former University of Transkei, Border Technikon and Eastern Cape Technikon. This merger has contributed to the challenges facing this university. Over the past 29 months, the Department has made R858 million available to WSU to attend to the key deliverables of the turnaround strategy. I am happy to announce that significant progress has been made in this regard with visible projects including the construction of the new R40 million residences here in Mthatha, the first to be built at the 9-year old WSU. Yesterday was marked by the sod-turning event of the new facility for the Health Sciences Faculty at the Nelson Mandela Academic Hospital precinct made possible by the Department's Infrastructure and Efficiency Fund.

On the financial front, I am pleased to report that this university has a break-even budget for 2014 and admirably achieved an unqualified audit for 2013. Whilst WSU has not yet reached a state of healthy financial sustainability, clearly a great deal of effort has gone into clearing the backlogs and overdrafts as well as resolving some of the inefficiencies created by the complex WSU environment. Siyabonga Professor van Staden nako wonke umendi waser Walter Sisulu University gokubambisana.

Since the dawn of democracy in 1994, headcount enrolment in our universities has almost doubled with just fewer than one million students today in the university sector. We are expecting a further two thirds increase in university headcount enrolment to over 1.6 million by 2030. My office has given serious attention to student funding, a particular concern for the young people from this region who aspire for a university education and deserve access to post-school education. An additional R1 billion was made available from the National Skills Fund to the National Student Financial Aid Scheme to reduce the 2013 and 2014 bursary and loan shortfalls. The NSFAS budget from the Department for 2014/15 amounts to R6 billion, comprising of R3.9 billion set aside for universities and R2.1 billion for FET College bursaries and loans. This budget has grown from R578 million in 2005 to over R9...
Appendix LXVI (b): Dr. B. Nzimande’s Speech at the Mthatha Health Centre in Mthatha, 25th March 2014

billion in 2014, taking into account all bursaries and loans administered by NSFAS from other Government departments and entities. I am aware that this budget is still not enough to cover all deserving students as there are many other pressing demands on the country's fiscus. It should be noted that NSFAS allocations to WSU has totalled over R1 billion over the 4 year period from 2011 to 2014, increasing year-on-year from R216.4 million in 2011 to R251.5 million in 2012, further increasing to R272 million in 2013 and R288 million in 2014. This substantial injection of state funds into student financial aid will go a long way in providing access for academically deserving students and towards opening the doors of higher education and training to all deserving young people.

There is no doubt in my mind that WSU has the ability to produce the type of graduates our developing nation requires. WSU is a comprehensive university that offers both traditional academic programmes and technologically-focused programmes. It caters for many diverse career paths in science, engineering and technology, teacher education, law and business skills.

In health sciences it has a medical school that has produced its first cohort of Clinical Associates. In particular, I wish to compliment the ongoing SAICA/WSU project to re-accredit WSU to produce chartered accountants. The success of this project is most encouraging with student performance rated at over 90%. The R80 million invested through the National Skills Fund in this project is clearly bearing fruit. All signs point to a promising future for this young university.

The terms of reference which provide the framework for the work of the Administrator have all been met and I am encouraged by the progress made in all the eight Turnaround Projects, namely:
1. Institutional Governance;
2. Academic Enterprise;
3. Student Governance;
4. Financial Management;
5. ICT Infrastructure;
6. Human Resource Management;
7. Teaching and Learning Technology and Equipment; and

Professor van Staden will undoubtedly provide more detail on the milestones achieved in these projects in his presentation.

Whilst much has been done to stabilise WSU, a great deal of work is still required to entrench a culture of hard work and pride in this university. The WSU turnaround intervention is not a 30-month ‘quick-fix’. What is required is the sustained effort from all role players to build upon these stabilised foundations and continuously work at implementing efficiencies, improving facilities and enhancing student life.

The opportunity presented to WSU this time around is unique. This university has been overhauled, given a new framework and an opportunity to refocus itself. This
Appendix LXVI (c): Dr. B.Nzimande's Speech at the Mthatha Health Centre in Mthatha, 25th March 2014

Dr. B.Nzimande's Speech at the Mthatha Health Centre in Mthatha, 25th March 2014

A unique opportunity must be grasped by all stakeholders. WSU belongs to the nation, not to any individual or interest group and it beholds all those who hold the university dear to join hands and move together. There is a long road ahead of us.

There are therefore a lot of challenges and responsibilities resting on the shoulders of all stakeholders. We must therefore use this Summit to identify the challenges and options, and firmly reject an approach and posture which simply says: What can WSU do for me or what maximum benefit can I derive from being a worker or student at this institution? Instead ALL STAKEHOLDERS MUST TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FUTURE SURVIVAL AND DEVELOPMENT OF THIS INSTITUTION. Yes, students must demand affordable access but simultaneously commit to improve pass and throughput rates. Workers and lecturers must seek decent wages and conditions of service but this cannot be at the expense of the future viability of the institution.

At the height of the unfortunate and protracted workers’ strike, there emerged some opportunistic voices from some small town local politicians who sought to exploit the situation for narrow vote grabbing attention. It is incumbent upon all stakeholders not to allow such situations to develop as this may run the risk of de-focusing us. At no stage, during the entire duration of this period of administration has the Department or myself as the Minister abandoned our responsibility to this institution. It is important that when faced with difficult challenges, we must collectively seek to resolve them and not embark on a blame game. If we properly understand the challenges that face us, no problem is insurmountable.

We must therefore come out of this Summit with clear deliverables that commits us to what role and responsibility each stakeholder will take.

A university is an enormously valuable asset and must be seen and treasured as such. It provides an environment for nurturing the knowledge of young minds, developing researchers and academics, assisting and supporting the communities it serves. It is a valued partner for local businesses as an economic generator as it provides employment opportunities with thousands of families relying upon it and sharing its achievements in many different ways.

The continued future success of WSU depends on YOU – the leadership, staff, students, labour unions, communities and all who have an interest in the ongoing development of our people towards a better life for all.

I trust that history will judge us kindly.

Ndiyabulela.

DHET minister Dr Blade Nzimande (centre), EC Department of Education MEC Mandla Makupula (left) and Prof Van Staden in the background.

NEW COUNCIL PROGRESSING

Strides are being made in constituting a new council for WSU. Internal elections have been held and candidates elected and the ministerial appointees will be announced in due course.

It is planned that the new council should take over the reins of governance from the administrator on 1 May 2014. As of this date then, WSU will be governed by a WSU council, the interim VC and the Institutional Management Committee together with student leadership and labour leadership.

This publication is produced by The WSU Department of Marketing, Communication and Development.
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