Rebellions in the DRC: Hindrance or Catalyst to the process of Democratization

By

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Declaration

I declare that this dissertation is my own unaided work

Kabwe Didier Mutonji

Place ____________________________  Date______________________________
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ABSTRACT

The present study is an analytical investigation of the impact of rebellions on the process of democratization in the DRC. It is concentrated principally on the Ceasefire Agreement signed in 1999 in Lusaka (Zambia) between main rebel groups, central government, opposition political parties, civil society and representatives of countries involved in conflict. The stipulations of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement which provided the Inter-Congolese Dialogue widely affected the course of events in many ways. This study assesses with rigor whether rebellions in the DRC hindered or catalysed the process of democratization.

Opportunity approach is selected as the theoretical framework of this study; it gives a variety of tools to analyze the dimensions of the political environment which provides incentives for leaders to initiate actions that can affect their expectations. The tools of historical and
qualitative analysis of different texts of various Scientists and non-Scientists have been used in this study. Different aspects of rebellions and the process of democratization in the DRC have been analyzed comprising the process of democratization before the rebellions of 1996-1997 and those of 1998 which culminated in the signature of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement by all belligerents.

The result of this study stipulates that, rebellions in the DRC played a catalytic role in boosting the process of democratization by pushing the central government to agree on the Inclusive Global Accord which provided a transitional government composed of main rebel groups’ representatives; central government and opposition political parties. This adds proof to scientific findings that democratization is connected with possible diminution of rebellion, as well as co-relation between that stage of development and democracy in combating rebellion (Morrisson, 2003). Recommendations are made at the end of this study in order to tackle obstacles that could obstruct the process of democratization in the DRC.

KEY WORDS

Rebellions in the DRC, democratization process, Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, Inter Congolese Dialogue, Opportunity Theory, All Accord Global and Inclusive, Forces vive.
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
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<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliance de Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation</td>
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<td>RCD</td>
<td>RassemblementCongolais pour la Democratie</td>
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<td>MLC</td>
<td>Mouvement National pour la Liberation</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>Mission de l’Organisation de Nations Unies au Congo</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
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<td>ICD</td>
<td>Inter-Congolese Dialogue</td>
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<td>CNS</td>
<td>Conference Nationale Souveraine</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
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<td>Front Patriotique</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................. 3

ABSTRACT ................................................................................. 3

KEY WORDS ................................................................................ 4

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................... 5

I BACKGROUND AND OUTLINE ..................................................... 7

1.2 Preliminary Literature Study and Reasons for Choosing the Topic .......... 9

1.3 Research Problems and Objectives: Key Questions to be asked .......... 11

1.4 Research Questions .................................................................. 11

1.5 Principal Theories upon Which the Research Project will be constructed .... 12

1.6 Research Methodology and Methods .............................................. 15

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................ 17

2.1 Democratization process in the DRC ............................................. 17

2.2 Rebellions in the DRC .................................................................. 21

2.2.1 Overview of the History of Rebellions in the DRC ....................... 24

2.3 Regional Development and International actor’s implication in DRC’s Conflict .......... 26

2.4 Ruanda and Uganda Supports toward main Rebel groups .................. 28

CHAPTER THREE: THE IMPACT OF UN INTERVENTION AND REBELLION ........ 29

3.1 Lusaka Accords ......................................................................... 30

3.1.1 Background of the Lusaka Accord ............................................ 31

3.1.2 The Effect of Lusaka Accord on Alleviating Rebellions .................. 32

3.2 Sun City Accords ....................................................................... 33

3.2.1 The Effects of Inter-Congolesse Dialogue on the Process of Democratization .......... 34

3.3 Pretoria Accords ......................................................................... 35

CHAPTER FOUR: THE IMPACT OF REBELLIONS ON THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE DRC ........................................ 38

4.1. Direct causes which favoured the second wave of rebellion in the DRC ........ 38

4.2. The Relationship between Rebellion and Democratization in the DRC ........ 40

4.3. Rebellions in the DRC: Hindrance to the process of Democratization ........ 41

4.4 Rebellions in the DRC: Catalyst to the Process of Democratization .......... 44

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................. 48

5.1 Summary .................................................................................... 48

5.2 Recommendations ....................................................................... 50

6 REFERENCES ............................................................................. 51
1 BACKGROUND AND OUTLINE

Africa has a history of rebellions which date back to the territorial defence against Colonial regimes. In the post-independence period, rebellions have emerged as a defence against totalitarian regimes and political inequality. In the post-cold war periods, many African countries hosted rebel groups in their territories claiming that, their military interventions aim to restore democratic governance, justice and equality in societies.

This explains why many authoritarian oligarchic regimes in Africa (both civilian and military) have been obliged by the impulsion of mass discontent, popular protests, and public demonstrations to multiparty governance in the political arena (Iman, 1992:102-105). Snyder and Mahoney (1999: 103), perceived the concept of regime as an interactional structure of political institutions both formal and informal. Any change can appear on the regime when institutions are reconfigured by actors. Regime institutions play a preponderant role on the ability and conduct of incumbents who force to protect them and, it appears also that regime institutions impact the way that those who want to challenge them in seeking transformation.

The Democratic Republic of Congo is one of the countries afflicted by recurrent rebellions and armed conflicts, beginning with the bid of mutiny in army and cessation by Katanga and Kasai provinces supported by the Belgian government in 1960, immediately after independence from Belgium. As a result, the DRC went into chaos and anarchy which led to many events such as, the first UN intervention urged by the DRC government. As Stated De Witte (2001:8), on 12 July 1960 after the secession of Katanga, the Congolese authorities sent a telegram to the UN urgently requesting military aid against the presence of external aggression. The isolation of Lumumba through is assassination in 1961; the emergence of provisional national government in 1965, and the demise of Mobutu’s regime in 1997, the DRC has truly been the stage of rebellions and armed conflicts.

Rebellions have been considered by those who felt oppressed by incumbent regimes as one of the pressurizing tools that they can utilized against the central government. This study aims to delve into two periods of intense activity by rebel movements, from 1996 to 1998 and from 1998 to 2005, which mark the challenge of democratization process, by rebel movements and armed conflicts.

The democratization process in the Zaire/DRC began earlier on with the speech of President Mobutu in April 1990 and was accelerated by rebellion which started in the Eastern DRC,
and progressed in the massive and large insurrection as many allied forces and countries from the region supported the insurrection to get rid of president Mobutu’s regime. As a result, an allied force was formed namely the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL), and received support from Angola, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda and Namibia. They chose a former Zairian rebel leader Laurent Kabila, who had fought Mobutu since 1961 when Lumumba has been assassinated. He became the leader after overthrowing Mobutu, and immediately the country changed the name from Zaire to Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997.

In 1998, reproaching president Kabila as a "corrupt dictator, and incapable of conducting reforms which could lead to democracy and peace in the DRC and in the region, the coalition which overthrew Mobutu split as a result of a misunderstanding between Kabila and some regional countries who helped him to get rid of Mobutu. The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), has been formed with the aim to get rid of Kabila’s regime, with support from other rebel groups such as the Movement de Liberation of Congo (MLC) of Bemba (Mwaniki, 2009).

It was under these circumstances that the Lusaka Ceasefire Accord was signed in July - August of 1999 by all belligerents. The Accord was the net outcome not only of efforts of third-party (the then OAU and UN), it included factors on ground. In fact it was a time where both sides could not reach their objective of getting rid of their opposition. As a consequence, all parties saw the way of negotiations as the only way to draw political advantage with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which called for national dialogue and reconciliation. The key conflicting parties (rebel groups and the central government) had agreed to do their utmost to facilitate the inter-Congolese political negotiations which they expected should lead to a new political dispensation in the DRC.

In essence, the rebellions in the DRC imposed significant pressure on the central government, which served not only to open a dialogue between the parties in conflict and make a way for the “Lusaka Accord” but also the enhancement of the process towards democratization in the DRC. Beyond the known destructive aspect of the rebellions in the DRC, the conflict created an opportunity to advance the social and economic interests of the people of the DRC.
1.2 Preliminary Literature Study and Reasons for Choosing the Topic

Although the literature on rebellion is expanding, their overall effects or impacts on the democratization process have remained under-appreciated and under analysed. However, the reality remains that the rise of rebellions and conflicts, especially in Africa, has engendered scientific inquiries on the link between rebellions and democracy.

Many studies explore mainly the root causes of rebellions. Generally, such studies contend that rebellions erupt mostly where there is deep social inequality and a lack of effective democratic institutions. As indicated above, many studies examine the negative impact of rebellions on the process of democratization. These studies suggest that the promotion of democracy in Africa is congruent with dependency. The DRC benefited as well from aid from the international community especially, during the period post the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. As pointed out by Gambino (2001:5), during the year of 2001, the DRC seemed to be in danger of serious civil war as army forces from several African countries were supporting directly either rebel movements or central government. After the assassination of Kabila, the political environment changed when Joseph Kabila took the reign and showed positive signs of leading the country toward reconciliation and elections, as well as the engagement with the west, including the international financial institutions. Positive responses to the development of situations on the ground had been noticed. The diplomacy had become effective and the International Community engaged to work toward peace in the DRC with a huge mandate of intervention by MONUC, to support president Kabila’s negotiations with rebel leaders. All these factors combined helped to create a transitional government of large unity in 2003, and, consequently, successful national elections in 2006. It was in this context that substantial aid flowed from bilateral and multilateral sources.

In his study, Scarritt (1997:801) analyzed the interaction between democracy and ethno-political protest and rebellion in Africa over approximately three decades between independence and the democratization wave of the 1990s. He goes as far as to demonstrate that ethno-political protest has neither the positive consequences for democratization that worker-student protest has nor the negative consequences that violent rebellion has. He assumed that a pattern of rebellion, associated with the long-standing absence of competitive participation, may have had the opposite effect.

Some other studies focus on ethnic conflicts as major causes of rebellions. Morrison (2003:3) analyses the circumstances in which democracy can have an effect on ethnic rebellion and as
well, the circumstances in which ethnic rebellion can affect democratization. He found that “rebellions have negative effects on democracy and that the effects vary in line with the level of development a country has achieved”. Among the most developed countries, the relationship is strongest; but as the level of development declines, the effect of rebellion on democracy also declines. Ethnic rebellion has the greatest negative impact on democracy in the most complex, underdeveloped societies.

Collier and Rohner, (2008:531-540) argued that democracy constrains the technical possibilities of government repression, and this makes rebellion easier, they believe that when income is high, it creates favourable conditions for rebellions. They came up with findings suggesting that as democracy increases political violence process in rich countries, it decreases rebellion in developed countries and increases it in developing countries.

Nzongola (2006:224) focuses on the question of the nature of the armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Is it a civil war, as consistently reported by the international media, or is it a war resulting from foreign aggression, as indicated by the authorities in Kinshasa? He maintains that the reasons which led to the conflict in the Great Lakes region may shed light on the likelihood of peace and democracy in the DRC. However, it is worth considering the three key factors which led to the crisis the country is currently experiencing: The breakdown of state structures resulting from the corruption of the Mobutu regime; the genocide in Rwanda and its repercussions on the region and the expansionist outlook of Rwanda and Uganda. The complexity of the situation in the DRC and the multiplicity of actors involved, provoke debate between scholars about what went on in the DRC. Was it civil war confirmed by some, foreign aggression as Nzongola Ntalaja (2006:223) pointed out, ethnic conflict or a revolution questioned by AFDL leaders to justify their movement? Somehow all these denominations are reflecting on what happened in the DRC. This study opts for rebellion as it is recognized in the Lusaka Agreement (1999), as an opponent involved in peace agreement.

Most of the literature above, retraces generally the negative impact of rebellion on the democratization process. However, the points raised by these authors do not mention the catalytic role of rebellion on the democratization process enough, which, this research intends to look at more deeply. As Arendt (1970:236-244) wrote, “Violence is always about the destruction of the old, it is never about the construction of the new; yet, the conflicts and activities in which violence is involved are not always purely destructive. In destroying,
violence can also keep things in place; it can even set in motion change and the construction of the new”. It is in this context that the study is aligned, and in this regard, the contribution it makes to the thorough analysis of the impact of rebellion on the democratization process focusing on the catalytic role they play on democratization.

1.3 Research Problems and Objectives: Key Questions to be asked

This study seeks to excavate and analyse the negative aspects of rebellions in relation to the positive and shows how rebellions act as a catalyst to the process of democratization in the DRC.

The main objective of this study is to examine and critically evaluate the impact of rebellions in the democratization process in the DRC. Specifically, the broader will encompass the following:

- To examine the impact of rebellions on the process of democratization in the DRC;
- To evaluate critically the process of democratization since the 1999 Accord signed by all belligerents involved in the conflict;
- To find out whether rebellions constitute a hindrance or catalyst to the process of democratization in the DRC; and
- To find out how rebellions in the DRC contributed to the advancement of the democratic process.

1.4 Research Questions

This study aims to address four main questions:

1. What is the impact of rebellion on the process of democratization in the DRC?

2. What critical evaluation can be drawn from process of democratization since the Ceasefire agreement of 1999?

3. What is the extent to which rebellions can be considered to constitute a hindrance or catalyst to the democratic process in the DRC?

4. What is the Impact of United Nations Interventions on conflict in the DRC?
1.5 Principal Theories upon Which the Research Project will be constructed

This dissertation seeks to examine whether rebellions constitute a hindrance to the process of democratization or play a role of catalyst in putting pressure to the ruling movement in order for them to accelerate the democratization process. Although the democratization process started earlier in the 1990s, it had been interrupted with the demise of Mobutu’s regime, which marked also the rise of rebel movements. This study will look at both the negative and positive impact of rebellions on the process of democratization with more emphasis on the catalyst aspect of rebellion on the process of democratization in the DRC.

In order for us to understand clearly the impact of rebellion on the process of democratization, it is pertinent to analyze not only theories of democratization, but it is important to look at theories that could give explanations of the causes of rebellions. Many interesting theories have emerged to comprehend the rise of rebellions, among them we have competition theory, and according to Morrison (2003:66), Competition theory defends the fact that a group of people are coming into contact with others, especially when that contact is created by economic resources which also sort of creates competition. The results are that as competition appears, the group that prevails tries to keep their authority and power over those economic resources.

In recent academic and policy research, the conflict in the DRC has often been presented as a prominent example of how violent struggles over natural resources have shaped internal warfare (Vlassenroot and Raemaekers, 2004:386). Attention was paid in this regard to the so-called “illegal” exploitation and trade of the Congo’s natural resources. Several UN and other reports spoke of the existence of “elite networks” that were reportedly engaged in the systematic plundering of the wealth, and which potentially could make the Congo one of the most prosperous nations in the world: diamonds, gold and coltan were mined and exported from the different rebel-occupied areas in return for arms and cash to finance the country’s on going civil war (Raeymaekers, 2007:24). These natural resources created a competition between rebel groups. As a consequence, the DRC was divided into several administrations. A third of the country was under Kabila’s control, a third under the control of rebel movement called the Rally Congolese for Democracy (RCD) and almost another third under the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC).
Theories of competition suggest also that competition is high if the structures that maintain the systems are broken (Olzak 1998:187-217). As a consequence, the possibility of political competition prevailing in the conditions of it is political flux and after a time that old political environments break and new ones are constructed. Rebellion and ethnic conflict happen most of the time when those different categories of people in the country start competing in the same environment where there is opportunity and easy accessibility to political, social and economic advantages. In these conditions, the possibility of conflict occurring is especially more likely when the divisions of labour and traditional political systems are not any more culturally sustainable. (Olzak1998:187-217). This theory helps to understand the motive of competition among social categories in a society and the consequence that competition presents in a time of crisis. At the same time, this theory is limited in the sense that the battle for natural resources among ethnic groups may incite political instability which could lead to violence and ethnic conflict and makes the path of democratization difficult.

Another theory which further tries to explain the resurgence of rebellion is Elite Persuasion Theory. As Snyder (2000:288), argues that nationalism does not exist or is inconsistent until democratization starts operating and elite’s start to emphasize nationalism to protect their position. Nationalism itself suggests mechanisms that elites can use to rule and engage people. There is lack of internal cohesion among Congolese leaders; it sees the need of nationalism which puts ethnic appurtenance behind it in order to facilitate the transition of the democratization process. The main challenge that has always confronted the Congolese state is to establish a state with the capacity and authority to could peacefully manage internal conflicts, serve the general population’s basic needs more effectively, and be seen as legitimate by the population (Lund and Wolpe, 2005:23).

Calling for the protection of a group of people’s rights implies a well-defined threat coming from outside of the group as an invader and this could constitute the motivation for exclusion from any activity considered as political. It appears that this kind of nationalism developed by elites can cause violent conflict in the sense that those who feel excluded as a group could lead to the possibility of defending themselves against marginalization. Elite Persuasion Theory has some limitations, in the sense that some elitists, instead of creating cohesion and calling for cohabitation between different ethnic groups, create competition among ethnic groups which results in conflict. Since 1960, the DRC has been facing the challenge of nationalism where political parties were formed according to clan and ethnic affiliation except the Movement National Congolais (MNC) of Lumumba which had a spirit of
nationalism and had been blocked in several events to operate normally until the death of Lumumba. On the other side there is still a category of people who is still denied by the rest of the population; the Congolese people although the constitution recognizes them. It appears that this situation can only end up in rebellion and ethnic conflict.

The Theory of Dependency is a category of theories that place emphasis on international dependency as a strong cause of rebellions. For instance Boxwell and Dixon (1990: 540-559), investigated whether international dependency incites rebellious political violence directly by mobilizing anti-imperialist and xenophobic movements, and indirectly by increasing relative deprivation and repression of nonviolent protests. Using a four-equation model, they examined the effects of dependency on rebellion independent of domestic causes, and then on three primary domestic determinants; income inequality, economic growth, and regime repressiveness. Their model includes economic dependence and military dependence, the latter measured by arms supply concentration and controls for the legacy of colonialism. Findings indicate that both forms of dependency promote rebellion through their effects on the domestic class and state structures. The DRC economy has always been largely dependant on aid, donation and military intervention of foreign countries. Since the beginning of the second wave of rebellions and conflicts in 1996, the intervention of the international community has been increased in various ways and both parties involved in conflict (central government and rebel groups) depend on various allied countries which also benefit from the conflict. This theory helps us understand the impact of dependency on the structures and function of the country. However, it is difficult to evaluate objectively it’s impact on the process of democratization.

Political Opportunity Theory will be used to analyze the impact of rebellions on the process of democratization. As Tarrow (1994:85) defines political opportunity as aspects of a political environment that can arrange incentives for people to take collective action which affects their future that can bring success or failure. Basically, Political Opportunity Theory entails that an increase in the variation in rebellions and in ethnic protests depends consequently on the manner of political inclusion (Kriesi 1995: 0). All the parties who endorsed the Lusaka agreement in 1999 showed their determination to create an environment favourable for collective action and for making the process of democratization possible. It has resulted that as the country was becoming progressively tolerant politically, the incidence of violence and rebellions decreased steadily. The regimes which present a high degree of repression are supposed to have less opportunity for the occurrence of violence and
rebellions. The systems that are inclusive will re-enforce the participation of all conventional means. In this situation, the condition of democracy does not need to be linked negatively with violence and rebellions. Political Opportunity Theory entails that the greater the government is inclusive, the less violence and rebellion should occur. Thus Opportunities can include a variety of events and circumstances such as “regime shifts, periods of political instability, or changes in the composition of elites” all of which may provide “openings” for social movements to take hold and gain traction (Della Porta 2008:223). The Dialogue provided by the Lusaka Accord seen as the cornerstone of the Lusaka Agreement has been instrumental for peace and facilitated the process of democratization in the DRC.

1.6 Research Methodology and Methods

This study will opt for historical and qualitative approaches. According to Gerring (2001:37) a good research design is characterized by plenitude, comparability, independence, representativeness, variation, analytic utility, reliability, mechanism, and causal comparison.

The usefulness of the historical approach is to help us understand the historical basis of the DRC’s rebellions. It will help to test the main hypothesis with regard to their causes and effects on the process of democratization in the DRC.

The ways in which an academic discipline makes use of research methods is influenced both by its objectives and by its limitations (Burnham. et al, 2004: 5). As mentioned previously, many researches of rebellions tend to focus on their negative aspects, especially with regard to their impact on democracy and the process of democratization. It serves as a boundary for this research, which sees more the catalyst aspect of rebellions on the process of democratization.

Choosing between two different methods which promise to yield equally valid data, the researcher is likely to reject the more time-consuming or costly method (Webb E.J and all, 1169:32). With that in mind, this study will be based on qualitative and historical methodologies. As stated by Babbie and Mouton (2001:270), qualitative research aims at gaining in-depth knowledge about the context of participants in the research. Qualitative methodology is seen as an appropriate approach for this study in the sense that it seeks to understand the role played by rebel groups in enhancing or hindering the process of democracy in the DRC.
The historical methodology, as stated by Busha and Harter (1980: 90), entails the “systematic collection of data which is preceded by the objective evaluation of information related to past events so as to test hypotheses in regards to their causes and effects in order to be able to explain the present trends and have focus on the future”. Historical methodology has great value in the sense that it will help to have a good understanding of political history of the DRC by reviewing all the big events which have a direct link with this work and, from there, extract the distant causes of rebellions. The efficacy of the use of the historical approach goes beyond helping us to understand the historical basis of the DRC’s rebellions; it will help us test the main hypothesis with regard to their causes and effects in the process of democratization in the DRC, which will enable this study to identify and explain the current trends. In choosing the way to conduct research, the scientist, as any other scientist, is in the presence of a large number of possibilities of research methodologies and methods.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Democratization process in the DRC

One of the most difficult challenges in studying democratization has been reaching agreement on what “democracy” is (Coppedge.M, 2012: 11-12,). Democracy has been defined in hundreds of ways, however, almost all definitions fit into one of four overlapping models: participatory democracy, representative, liberal, and deliberative democracy. A good characteristic of democracy has to include all the aspects cited above. It is well argued and well defended that development is a concomitant aspect of democracy.

Liberal democracy which is an accommodation of liberalism and democracy is mostly and properly about the reconciliation and aggregation of predetermined interests under the auspices of a neutral set of rules (Dryzek, 2002:11). What simplifies the accommodation is the fact that Liberalism and Democracy have substantially connected to each other in the sense that Liberalism requires that the masses assume their proper role and thus embrace the rule of a directing minority (Vazquez-Arroyo, 152). Thus, modern democracy today is more related to liberal democracy.

Participatory democracy for instance, is self-government by citizens rather than representative government in the name of it citizens (Barber,1984), it implies that active citizens govern themselves directly here, not necessarily at every level and in every circumstance, but frequently enough and in particular when basic policies are being decided and when significant power is being deployed. Self government is carried out through institutions designed to facilitate ongoing civic participation in agenda-setting, deliberation, legislation, and policy implementation. Strong democracy relies on participation in an evolving problem-solving community that creates public ends.

Representative democracy called also decision making by discussion among free and equal citizens, is founded on the idea that, deliberation can at best mean discussion among a small number of speakers before an audience rather than discussion among all members of the assembly. It may mean the process of genuine deliberation where the aim is to persuade the interlocutor rather than an audience (Elster (ed), 1998:6).

Concerning deliberative democracy, scholars present extensive overlap of definitions. However, we retain for this work the definition given by Gambetta, and he defines deliberative democracy as “a conversation whereby individuals speak and listen sequentially
before making a collective decision”. Deliberative democracy is based on the idea that political decisions should turn not on the force of members but on the force of the better argument (O’Flynn).

In their efforts to explain the varied dynamic and performance of new democratic regimes resulting from the “third wave” of democratization, scholars have focused extensively on political institutions.

Despite the fact that institutional factors rule big interest by those analyzing the achievement of the process of democratization which arises in Africa since the 1990’s, they have principally played a serious role in revealing authoritarian regimes. The study of transitional democracy during the last three decades has been commanded by analyses that concentrated on dependent leadership, possibly by choice. (Snyder and Mahoney, 1999: 104). Thus, democratization empowers citizens to an option regime which is non-democratic. Therefore, democratization is characterized by a set of electoral, institutional and procedural criteria which must be extended in a broader conceptualization (Joseph, 1989:365). In the late 1980s, the wind of change was blowing throughout the world and especially on the African continent. People were demonstrating against their authoritarian leaders and demanding democracy with almost the same vehemence as they claimed independence (Mangu. 2009:431). Democratization has been activated with the so called “second liberation” in Africa which started with the era of multi-party governments that led to an election in Benin which ended up with the defeat of the president who led the country to a multiparty system. Malawi and Zambia replicated this process the same year. These elections raised expectations and held out the prospect of restoring democratization as well as improving governance all over the continent. The first liberation in Africa is referred to the Transitional period from the colonial era to period of independence that occurred in the continent. Most of transition to democracy in Africa has not been marked by the breakthrough of a founding election that brought a definitive end to dictatorial regimes and an association of political reformers to power (Barkan, 2006:11-18).

Democratization is the process of gradually introducing elections and the creation of a civil society supportive of tolerant, pluralistic politics through adherence to constitutionality enshrined rules of the game. Thus, it involves bringing about the end of an autocratic regime. Democratization would design a radical bottom-up process of change initiated and controlled
by the masses of the people; it requires a deliberate construction of democratic political institutions (Mangu, 2002:295).

The DRC did not make exception to that wind of democracy that swept Africa, Nzongola, (2002:186) pointed out that, in his speech of 24 April 1990, Mobutu announced surprisingly that he abandoned the single-party system and Prunier (2009:77) adds that, the turning point was the year 1990, when the whole system started to go awry. Mobutu had had opponents before but never any structural threat to his regime. Moreover, when his death came in 1997, it was followed by a period of armed conflict and rebellion that delayed again the democratization process somehow.

There are divergent views as to whether or not rebellions are a hindrance or catalyst to the process of democratization. Some scholars highlight the fact that the process to democratization itself creates an environment permissive to the outbreak of rebellions and armed conflicts by inducing exclusionary nationalism and polarization in the society. If democratization increases the risk of conflict, it creates a dilemma for external democracy promoters as well as for the country that are considering undertaking democratization (Sarvun and Tirone, 2011:233-246). Mobutu and his entourage decided to pretend that they were in favour of democratic reforms, while doing everything possible to obstruct the democratization process (Zongola, 2002:186).

In this regard some scholars are interested in whether the propensity for civil war of democratizing countries which receive democracy aid, is lower than that of countries that receive little or no aid. In other words, they assess whether democracy aid can provide political stability in a fragile environment. (Rueschemeyer and Stephens in Joseph, 1997:371) make the external efforts to promote political reform (democratization) as a fundamental component of their theoretical framework, they identify three “power clusters” as being the most significant in determining democratic transition: an external one; the state; and domestic classes and class coalitions. They contend that a balance of power beyond a country’s borders determines the chance of democracy. They further propose that democracy assistance programs can provide a potential constraint on the risk of domestic political violence. That is, even if a state does not have strong institutions to manage the democratization process, democracy aid can provide an exogenous source of state strength, stability, and institutional credibility to smoothen the transition.
Di Palma (1990:2) focuses on the approach of democracy whereby decisions are made by a few people in authority rather than people who are affected by decisions. He also acknowledges the impact of external factors which can favour or impede democratization. He identifies “a new force”: the direct exportation of democratic powers with global, regional or colonial clout that must be taken into account. There are scholars who recognize the interaction between democratization, rebellions and armed conflicts such as Morrison et al (2003:800-827). Their observation is based on the fact that if democratization is not placed in an adequate political system, it can be a cause of continuing conflict and consequently hinders more advanced levels of democratization. Scarrit et al (2001:801), analyzed the wave of democratisation of 1990’s in Africa and found out that there was a possibility of conflict occurring as a last resort in more autocratic countries.

Although the tenet of establishing democratic institutions started earlier on with the speech of Mobutu on 24/April/1990, and despite the fact that a National Sovereign Conference has been held to put in place democratic institutions, the democratization process was really reinforced by the signing of Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in 1999. As Rogier. (2004:26) stated the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement resulted after military power positions reached a stalemate: the armed groups had to concede their inability to overthrow President Laurent Kabila and, Kabila had also not succeeded to neutralize the armed groups. It is in this particular situation that the curiosity to know and to analyze whether either side hindered or catalyzed the process of democratization in the DRC or it came to intensify the crisis of democratization which started earlier in 1990s.

The surging effects of conflicts in the DRC, which reached a climax in 1998, culminated in a need for national dialogue between rebel groups and the central government. For instance, the Lusaka Agreement of 1999 stipulated that:

“On the coming into force of the Agreement, the Government of the DRC, the armed opposition, namely, the RCD and MLC as well as the unarmed opposition, shall enter into an open national dialogue. These inter-Congolese political negotiations involving les forces vives shall lead to a new political dispensation and national reconciliation in the DRC. The inter-Congolese political negotiations shall be under the guidance of a neutral facilitator to be agreed upon by the Congolese parties. All the Parties commit themselves to supporting this dialogue and shall ensure that the inter-Congolese political negotiations are conducted in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 5 of Annex “A”. Which treat the modalities of implementation of ceasefire agreement”
The DRC democratization process was specifically negotiated into the peace accords to establish a legitimate government and to consolidate peace through full participation of parties involved in conflict. Thus, the new constitution enacted in 2006 has changed the country’s governance system and called on many democratic reforms. This constitution sets the framework of the Congolese democratization process by transforming the relationship between institutions, people and communities on the one hand, and power and responsibility on the other (Mwaniki, 2009). By bringing together the Kabila government, the rebels, the unarmed opposition, and civil society organizations, the dialogue represented yet another attempt since the CNS2 (Conference Nationale Souveraine 2) Conference to put the democratization process back on track. Such process led at the very minimum to the restoration of the liberal democracy regime of the early 1960s, which is far better than the absence of any democracy (Zongola, 2002:264).

2.2 Rebellions in the DRC

Describing rebellion in Africa, Bujra (2002:6), stated that rebellion by armed groups outside the military establishment of a country and which aim to overthrow a government are the most common type of political conflict in most African countries. There are authors who try to distinguish between rebellion, Revolution and armed group.

Gurr and Goldstone in Helta(2008:2), give a definition of revolution based on the French Revolution as “a political struggle led by people united, can transform totally the political order which guide the lives of people, as well as the economic and social structures of the community.” Thus, Revolution can be considered a sudden destruction of a social class dominant after a political struggle of another social class considered to be oppressed. Rebel movements are those groups that intend to overthrow the regime in place and bring a revolution but are still battling to do so (Katz in Heleta 2008:2). It is sometimes difficult to make a distinction between political revolution and rebellion. According to the Oxford Dictionary of sociology (1998), the term “Revolution” could be used when revolutionary movements overthrow the regime in place and make fundamental changes in a society. Rebellion seems to be more restricted to political change, affecting only the replacement of a regime by another without affecting social and economic structures of the society. Hence, Russell (1974:56) considers rebellion as a violent struggle that menaces to overthrow a regime by violence and fighting. The DRC did not make an exception, starting from the first
rebellions up until now, it has been noticed that rebellions in their actions, aim effectively either to overthrow or destabilize central government in order to gain a chair into negotiations.

The fact that rebellion has begun to cause more problems in term of political, social and economic destabilization, it has started to receive much more sustained attention from scholars. Since the wind of democratization that invaded African countries in the 1990 which was characterized by dictatorial regimes, rebellion was utilized by certain groups to force dictatorship regimes to embark on a process of democratization. Mkandawire (2002:181-215) argued that, “to understand the actions of the rebel movements and their violence, we must understand not only the elites and the intra-elites conflict that produce their leaders, but also the wider population (2002: 182). We need to know on the one hand, the nature of the rebel movements, the thinking, composition, actions and capacities of the leaders of the insurgent movements and on the other hand, the social structures of the African countryside in which they often operate”. Rebellion in the DRC is a complex phenomenon that involves a variety of actors and causes, which are interpreted and handled differently and as a consequence, are perpetuated.

Talking about rebellions in the DRC, Many literatures are focusing on explaining they root causes and they courses, Autesserre (2010:47) stated that, one of the causes of rebellions in the Democratic Republic of Congo is the spill over of the Rwandan genocide. Many others such as, Prunier (209:24), Nzongola (2002:217), sustain this view. From April to July 1994, Hutu extremists massacred more than 800.000 Tutsi’s and moderated Hutu’s. When the Tutsi’s Rwandan Patriotic Front seized power in Kigali and ended the genocide, about 2million (mainly Hutu) Rwandan refugees flooded the eastern Congo to avoid persecution from their new Tutsi government.

The new Tutsi regime in Rwanda had to find a way to dismantle these rebel groups. Nzongola (2006:226) observes that the Rwandan genocide occurred in 1994, at a time when the Mobutu regime was collapsing and the country was ungovernable. With a dysfunctional government, stripped of its legitimacy and facing popular resistance, the DRC was powerless to stop the genocide or deal effectively with its repercussions within the country. Both the Hutu’s and the Tutsi’s were to benefit significantly from the situation in the DRC. The Hutu’s took advantage of the weakened defence force (Zaire Armed Forces or ZAF) and established bases in the DRC. That was one of the fundamental causes and the starting point of the second phase of rebellions in the DRC and we align this work mainly to this cause.
However, scholars present many other causes of rebellions in the DRC such as Collier and Hoefler (1999), who consider the act of rebellions as a “looting sector”. This was corroborated by Vlassnroot (2008:5) who stated that, economic interests are believed to be a dominant cause for the protracted nature of the Congolese conflict and the fragmentation of rebel groups. Due to the fact the Congolese wars were self-financed, this led to a mutation in the character of violence. At the same time, this is said to have provoked a systematic criminalization of warfare, as rebel movements increasingly engaged in illegal economic activities and linked up with transnational criminal networks in order to export locally generated resources. Furthermore, Vlassnroot states that the explanation advanced by economists including significantly, World Bank economists, who argued that the violence of rebel movements in Africa as a social action derived from an individual’s calculation of self-interest and personal gain.

The DRC formerly Zaire has often been portrayed as the epitome of African State collapse “a forsaken black hole characterized by calamity, chaos, confusion” (Tefon, 2004). Started earlier on after the struggle of Independence in 1960 with chaos that resulted with the assassination of the elected Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and later on with the first phase of rebellions 1961-1964, The Congolese civil wars (1996-1997; 1998-2003) have been amongst the worst humanitarian disasters of the twentieth century. Starting with the “democratization” of the Mobutu regime in the early 1990s, the consecutive confrontations between Mobutu and the AFDL (‘Alliances des Forces pour la Libération’) led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, and between Kabila and the different Congolese rebellions transformed the DRC into one of the most conflict-ridden places on the globe (Raeymaekers T, 2007:23).

Kristof (2011:43-70) in his distinction between “opportunistic” and “activist” rebellions he said that, opportunistic rebellions emerge from resource rich environments or with support from outside patrons who keep all the benefits to themselves and who commit high levels of violence against the local population. In contrast, activist rebellions emerge in resource-poor contexts, and its participants commit fewer abuses while also employing violence selectively and strategically. Weinstein (2006:12), gives us more explanation on the difference between opportunistic rebellions and activist rebellions. He says in opportunistic rebellions, the participant is in it more for short-term material interest, and less out of ideology. In activist rebellion, participants are in it out of dedication to the cause of the organization and in which short term gains are unlikely. Although this opportunistic behaviour is considered as realizing short-term material interest and maximum benefit, de Jong (2013:17), explains this is the behaviour of most of rebel groups that operate in the DRC as rebel forces are not only
concentrated on predation. Somehow, it was noticed that the political economy of resources not only produced powerful centrifugal forces that further fragmented the state, but they were also involved in the processes of negotiation and accommodation. As Christopher Clapharm(1998b) cited by Mkandawire (2009:182) commented, “Insurgencies derive basically from blocked political aspirations and in some cases also from reactive desperation”.

In this work, I assigned myself to avoid the controversy that surrounds the causes and nature of conflict and rebellion in the DRC, and look at the impact of those rebellions on the process of Democratization.

2.2.1 Overview of the History of Rebellions in the DRC

Rebellions which erupted in 1996 in the Eastern DRC is not the first phenomenon in the conquest of power in the DRC, it can be traced back earlier after independence was gained in 1960 with a conflict of power between President Joseph Kasavubu and his prime minister Patrice Lumumba who was assassinated in 1961. As noted by Nzongola (2002:121), Patrice Lumumba’s martyrdom for the cause of genuine independence, national unity and territorial integrity gave rise to the first political opposition to the neo-colonial state.

The reign of President Joseph Mobutu, the dictator who had ruled the Congo since 1965 was becoming increasingly unpopular both among neighbouring countries and in Western countries. In response, the Rwandan, Ugandan, Angolan, and Burundian governments, as well as South Sudanese rebel forces, formed an anti-Mobutu coalition, which engineered, armed, and supervised various Congolese rebel groups and local militias. In particular, with the support of this coalition, disparate anti-Mobutu forces from the Congo formed the rebel movement Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo-Zaïre (Raeymaekers T, 2007: 47). As Nzongola (2002:225) observes, “the fall of Mobutu came as a consequence of the drive by the new Rwandan authorities against Hutu extremists in the Congo. In order to deal with the threat posed by the interahamwe, ex-FAR soldiers had taken refuge across the border”.

Between September and November 1996, the rebellion progressively evolved into a full-scale national and regional conflict, now known as the first Congo War. The AFDL (Alliance de Forces Democratique pour la Liberation) toppled Mobutu to install their spokesperson, Laurent Desire Kabila. The new president did not have much time to savour his victory though as tensions soon arose between Kabila and his foreign backers over his dismissal of
his Rwandan ancestry. The governments of Rwanda, Uganda, and to a more limited extent Burundi, engineered a new rebel movement, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) in August 1998 and launched an attack on Kabila’s government, thus initiating what has become known as the second Congo War. This new rebellion was supposed to conquer the Congo in a few months, in part through support from the neighbouring countries that backed the AFDL. However, it met an unexpected opposition of forces from Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and, to a lesser extent, Chad and Sudan; each sided with Kabila for different political, security, or economic reasons.

In mid-1999, Kabila’s troops managed to halt the rebels advance. The stalled peace process, which had resumed a few days after the beginning of the 1998 war, leap into action at the time. The United States, UN, European Union (EU), and several of its member states notably France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, as well as the Organization of African Unity and several African countries in particular, South Africa, Zambia, and Libya, acted as mediators, even while in some cases supporting one of the Congolese armed groups (Raeymaekers T, 2007, 49).

These mediators took advantage of the stalemate that had emerged, and Angola, the Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe signed a cease-fire agreement in Lusaka in July 1999 (Autesserre, 2010).

Bujra (2002:6-7), added that, these rebellions are generally initiated by urban elites who are dissatisfied with the way the government had treated them and their region or ethnic group. They mobilize a section of their regional or ethnic supporters; acquire arms clandestinely and are often supported by a neighbouring country and sometimes by an outside power as well. Initial grievances of the leadership of such a rebel group would vary from being blocked from achieving political power. Under representation of their region, ethnic group in the government and administration, their region was deliberately denied access to development funds, to block their ethnic groups from the private sector, and the allocation of their land to other ethnic groups (of the ruling ethnic group), (Bujra,2007:6-7) These are reasons always advanced by rebel leaders to justify their position. As a result of Laurent Kabila’s authoritarianism, and also of a crisis within Alliance (AFDL), he was brought to power in May 1997. The DRC was again confronted with a rebellion in August 1998; the consequence was a crumbling DRC State into several administrations. A third of the country fell under Kabila’s control, a third under the control of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and
almost another third under the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC). The remaining territory was administered by small rebel groupings that split off from the RCD, the best known being the RCD-National (RCD-N) and the RCD-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML), Mangu.M (2002:457).

2.3 Regional Development and International actor's implication in DRC's Conflict

The involvement of the International Community in the DRC’s conflict dates back from 1960, when Prime Minister Lumumba, requested UN intervention to end secession of the Katanga and Kasai region that cost as well the life of it’s General Secretary Dag Hammarskjold. Nzongola (2002:258) describes that intervention as “The first major UN peacekeeping force of the postcolonial era”. The controversial nature of the first UN intervention and generally the International Community involvement in the DRC’s have been one of the subjects which raised international political debates during the period of 1960s-1970s.

Did the international community actually take action to end conflict and war in the DRC which started in 1996? Questioning Prunier yes and no, he said that it all depends how one defines action. The international community tried to offer the picture of various actions mainly via UN Resolutions, in the same way that the United States wanted to be seen as recovering a clean soul and in condemning exactions on the ground by belligerents, while France was offering up its tottering grandeur (Prunier, 2009-343). The two major powers involved in the region are the United States and France. Since both have a strategic interest in rare metals, they wanted to see their transnational corporations have access to the resources. For this reason, and for fear that such resources might fall into the wrong hands, particularly those of international terrorist groups, they cannot remain indifferent as to who holds state power in the various countries of the Great Lakes region. Another major external actor in the DRC is trans-national networks, both legitimate and criminal. As Nzongola observes, the more legitimate interests are represented by trans-national mining corporations. Mining trans-national’s from around the world have joined their South African counterparts in a new scramble for concessions and exploration rights all over Africa. Trans-national mining companies and criminal networks are not the only external forces likely to fish in troubled waters. The UN panel of experts’ report has shown that the major interest of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi in DRC is to plunder the country’s resources.
Many efforts have been made to unveil the conflict in the DRC. The U.N. has condemned multinational corporations and countries involved in the conflict and called for sanctions against countries and individuals involved in the illegal activities. Preventive measures to avoid a recurrence of the current situation have been put in place such as reparations to the victims of the illegal exploitation of natural resources; design of a framework for reconstruction; improvement of international mechanisms and regulations governing some natural resources; and security issues. (Batware.B, 2011). As stigmatized by Prunier (2009:230), what came to be known as the Lusaka Agreement, has a long story behind it and it was signed on the 31st of August, 1999. A good part of that long process was marked by differing views of the French and American’s over what was going on the Congo, be it an invasion from Rwanda, Burundi, the Uganda coalition or Rebellion from different armed groups in Congo. Resulting from an intricate cluster of internal and external factors, it also probably counts among the most complex conflicts, with up to nine military states involved on Congolese territory and even more rebel groups brought in (Roger, 2003:25). Because of a year long international (mainly African) process that placed great pressure on the belligerents, a ceasefire agreement was signed by the Heads of State of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and the Minister of Defence of Angola on 10 July 1999. This ceasefire agreement was then signed by the Ugandan-backed MLC on the 1st of August 1999 and, finally, by 50 people representing both factions of the RCD on the 31 August 1999.

The ‘Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement’ only provided for the cessation of hostilities pending a political settlement among the Congolese parties themselves. Chapter V of the agreement, which defined the parameters of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), called for the official launch of this process of negotiations, which should lead to a ‘new political dispensation and national reconciliation in the DRC’. (Rogier, 2003). Lusaka, Gaborone, Addis Ababa, Sun City, Pretoria, these are only but a few of the various steps that have marked out the ICD and, as the place names testify, have made the ICD essentially an African process.

Although controversies surround the implication of International Community on DRC’s conflict, a remarkable effort has been made by the United Nations to end conflict and war through various Resolutions taken by Security Council regarding sanction and intervention on the ground, various International institutions and actors played as well a roll to contribute to the effort of the UN to alleviate the conflict which ended up in the Ceasefire Agreement being signed in Lusaka in 1999 by all parties involved in conflict.
2.4 Ruanda and Uganda Supports toward main Rebel groups

The direct support of Ruanda, Uganda and Burundi toward main Rebel groups in the DRC has been in the centre of debate in international political discussions about what was going on in the DRC, and which engendered conflict even amongst diplomatic relations in the Great Lakes region. After denial on several occasions by Rwanda and Uganda’s of their support towards rebel groups in the DRC, the UN via the Security Council came up with many resolutions forcing Ruanda and Uganda to withdraw their troops, and recognizing the invasion of the Eastern DRC by Rwandan troops (Resolution 1756 of Security Council). In order for Rwanda and Uganda to avoid any sanctions from UN, they resolved to start backing DRC rebel groups. According to Nzongola(2002:225) to legitimize the move by a coalition of Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and some other countries from the region, to get rid of Mobutu, Museveni and Kagame proposed the idea of using Kabila and, by 1996 the AFDL was created. It is a well documented fact that the main rebel groups which were involved in country conflict were the fabrication of neighbouring countries namely Ruanda and Uganda initially to have control over the border in order to protect themselves against their own rebel movements. Furthermore, Nzongola (2002:226) highlights that; all military operations were the work of Rwandan soldiers and units of Congolese Tutsi’s trained in Uganda and Rwanda. General Kagame himself has boasted about the crucial role Rwanda played in the 1996-1997 war. In 1998, the decision by Kabila to send Rwandan troops back to Rwanda, was not welcomed by Rwandan authorities. Prunier observed (2009:183), that on the 16th of August, the rebels went public as the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democracy (RCD) and announced the names of their leaders, well known as representatives of Rwandese interests. Since the initiative to remove Kabila from power had failed from the inside, it had to come from outside. Just as Rwanda had done in 1996, by first invading the Congo and setting up the AFDL to legitimize its action, Rwanda and Uganda initiated the war that erupted in August 1998, prior to the founding of RCD, the rebel movement (Nzongola, 2002:228). The movement of liberation of Congo (MLC), the third rebel group was created by Uganda in November 1998 as a response to the lack of popular support for the RCD in the Congo (Nzongola, 2002:231).

As I argued before, the intervention of Rwandan and Ugandan troops to help rebellions in the DRC is not questionable; the reason for their intervention has been discussed above. This researcher is more interested in the role played by different rebel groups in the process of implementation of democratic institutions in the DRC.
CHAPTER THREE: THE IMPACT OF UN INTERVENTION AND REBELLION

The phenomenon of rebellion is not new in political events of the DRC. As I mentioned above early after independence in 1960, the DRC experienced rebellion following the assassination of Lumumba in 1961. As pointed out by Mangu (2002:355-356), in consequence of the dismissal and later the assassination of Prime Minister Lumumba, several loyal members of his government embarked on a rebellion against the central government. Antoine Gizenga, deputy Prime Minister in the Lumumba government and Gbenye, Minister of interior, fled to Stanleyville (currently Kisangani) to lead a rival government in 1962. Between 1963 and 1964, Lumumba supporters created a vast rebel movement called Conseil National de Liberation (CNL) with the aim of overthrowing the central government in Kinshasa. There are similarities between rebellions of 1961 and those of 1996 and 1998: Both saw the intervention of the United Nations although the first one ended up with their defeat by central government with the support of mercenaries. Another aspect is the fact that, both rebellions occurred largely in the Eastern part of the DRC. The differences are, although both saw the intervention of UN, the second wave of rebellions saw the intervention of UN with the role of mediator between belligerents rather than the first.

If the UN intervention called the “Lusaka Agreement” had as aim to end rebellions and war, the UN intervention of 1960 requested by President Kasa-Vubu and Prime Minister Lumumba was a consequence of Belgium military intervention allegedly to protect and evacuate Europeans from the Congo following the mutiny in the Force Publique which erupted early after Independence. The UN played an important role in the settlement of the Congolese crisis between the dismissal of Prime Minister Lumumba and the inauguration of the Adoula government, as well as the termination of secessions, democracy and promotion of constitutionalism. (Mangu 2002: 357).

The second wave of rebellions which started in 1996 with AFDL and the coup of Mobutu’s regime, differs from the first wave in many ways, for instance it experienced rapid expansion and was better motivated than the first one. In a short time they managed to control all of the country and seize power with a strong support from neighbouring countries. Rebellions in the DRC reached a culmination point and attracted the attention of the International Community, when in 1998 after the decision of Kabila to send Rwandan troops back to Rwanda, (Prunier2009:183), a resurgence of rebellions against the government of Kabila arose and created destabilization. Therefore, the country had many administrations managed by
different rebel groups, the most prominent being the RCD and MLC. However, the negotiated settlements that occurred from the Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement indicated that there must be circumstances in which parties were prepared to cut their losses and abandon their previous goals. In fact, the Lusaka Agreement from the researcher’s point of view, exhibited the characteristics described in a political opportunity structure. The basic premise is that, exogenous factors enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for particular sorts of claims to be advanced rather than others, for particular strategies of influence to be exercised, and for movements to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy (Meyer and Minkoff 2004: 1457-1492).

The “Lusaka Agreement” created an opportunity to all belligerents involved in conflicts to raise their concerns for the purpose of a peaceful transition. They agreed to put their differences behind for the interest of territorial integrity of the DRC and allowed the UN to monitor and implement the ceasefire. Rogier (2004: 381) pointed out that, the result of a year-long international (mainly African) process that placed great pressure on the belligerents, a ceasefire agreement was signed by the Heads of State of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and the Minister of Defence of Angola on 10th July 1999. This ceasefire agreement was then signed by the Ugandan-backed MLC on 1st August 1999 and, finally, by 50 people representing both factions of the RCD on the 31st of August. However, the ‘Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement’ provided for the cessation of hostilities pending a political settlement among the Congolese parties themselves, through Inter-Congolese Dialogue which provided an opportunity for all stakeholders in DRC politics to discuss the future of their country (Apuuli, 2002:66).

3.1 Lusaka Accords

The Congolese conflict generated a bewildering array of rapid but incoherent peace making responses by a wide variety of actors and States who, at one time, were all bent on ending the conflict as soon as possible, especially after the period that followed the rebellion launched on the 2nd of August 1998 (Malan and Boshoff, 2002:2). Many initiatives to end conflicts in the DRC before the signing of Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement have been undertaken by different personalities in the world, such as President Jacques Chirac; Colonel Muammar Khadafy and others. Many of those initiatives have failed; some of them traced the prelude to more determined initiatives such as the meeting of regional leaders held in Pretoria on 17th June 1999, under the leadership of President Thabo Mbeki. The meeting paved the way for a
DRC summit which was scheduled for 25th of June in Lusaka for the purpose of signing a ceasefire agreement called the ‘Lusaka Accord’.

The aim of this section is to provide a brief background of Lusaka Accord and it’s selective agreements in order to comprehend the role that its played in bringing all belligerents together, which is something that previous initiative’s of ending conflict in DRC failed. Therefore, the Lusaka Accord paved the way of the democratization process.

3.1.1 Background of the Lusaka Accord

As I indicated previously, many attempts to end conflict in the DRC have been initiated before by several people and international and regional organizations, but all of them could not afford to unite belligerents at the same table like the Lusaka Agreement did. As indicated by Mangu (2002: 386) a result of Kabila’s authoritarianism that brought him to power in May 1997, the DRC was confronted with a rebellion from August 1998 and the crumbling of the DRC State into several administrations. A third of the country fell under Kabila’s control, a third under the control of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and almost another third under the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC). The remaining territory was administered by small rebel groupings that split off the RCD, the best known being the RCD-National (RCD-N) and the RCD-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML).

The signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in Lusaka, Zambia, took place three times, on the 10th of July, the 30th of July and on the 31st of August 1999 respectively. The agreement was negotiated within the framework of Southern African Development Community (SADC) under the chairmanship of the former Zambian president Frederick F Chiluba. Duly authorized representatives of the DRC government, the RCD, and the MLC as well as non-violent opposition and civil society signed it. Foreign States directly involved in the DRC conflict, namely Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, were represented as observers. Zambia, SADC, the OAU and the UN witnessed the signing. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was endorsed by the UN under article 52 of the UN charter on regional arrangements dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security that are appropriate for regional action. It had a very slow pace of implementation due to President Laurent Kabila’s opposition to a number of its provisions and a dispute over its signing by the rebel groups that subsequently divided into several sub-groups.
Joseph Kabila revived the process of implementation of the Lusaka Agreement and recalled the facilitator whose office in Kinshasa had been sealed off by his father (Mangu, 2002:459).

3.1.2 The Effect of Lusaka Accord on Alleviating Rebellions

As Morrison (2003-21) stated, most of the transitions in the democratic process in Africa are the result of negotiation, compromise, and agreement under mediation. Since most transitions were negotiated, any overt conflict had to be suspended before negotiations could take place. Rebellions in the DRC reached a certain point where, it was difficult to imagine any scenario that could help to end conflict, despite the intervention as I mentioned earlier, of the International Community and neighbouring countries which instead of bringing a kind of relief, exacerbated the conflict in the sense that they aligned themselves to different parties in conflict. The Lusaka Accord is the only agreement that united all belligerents in conflict and their backers. It has provided a range of dispositions that helped the DRC to solve its conflict which turned the country in what some scholars called the “Congo War” (Prunier, 2009). From article 1, which provides the cessation of hostilities between Rebel movements, Central government, including countries that were backing these groups, to article 3, which provides the principles of the agreement, and in it’s section 19, it provides a mechanism of the implementation of transitional power and instauration of democratic institutions. The Lusaka Accord came to the rescue of a disastrous situation which the DRC was going through. As pointed out Kabemba and Kibasomba (2003:2), one of the key positive element’s of the Lusaka Peace Accord, was the recognition of the territorial integrity of the DRC. The Lusaka Accord advocated a democratic inclusive government in the DRC with civil society playing a key role and a common security regime among countries in the region by halting any assistance to, and collaborating with “negative forces”. The Lusaka Accord proposed the formation of a Joint Military Commission (JMC), to facilitate the disarmament of all armed groups and the formation of a national army. The Joint Military Commission was to receive assistance from the United Nations and the African Union. As it is stipulated “On the coming into force of the Agreement, the government of the DRC, the armed opposition namely, the RDC and MLC as well as the unarmed opposition, shall enter into an open national dialogue. These inter-Congolese political negotiations involving les forces vives shall lead to a new political dispensation and national reconciliation in the DRC. The inter-Congolese political negotiation shall be under the guidance of a neutral facilitator to be agreed upon by the Congolese parties. All the parties commit themselves to supporting this dialogue and shall
ensure that the inter-Congolese political negotiations are conducted in accordance with the provision of chapter 5 of annex A”. (Lusaka Agreement, 1999)

Meyer et al (2004:1458) stated that, in countries with strong political division like the DRC, sometimes violence halts or prevents transitional negotiations. Also, international pressure to resist violence was strong and stemmed from the rest of the world. Thus, the more homogenous the society, the less likely force was implemented.

The first explicit use of a political opportunity framework, focused on the openness of belligerents in the DRC conflict, to express their concern about what they perceived to be in the interest of the country by accepting to be part of the Lusaka Accord to redress grievances. As pointed out Meyer et al (2004:1460), the basic premise of opportunity theory is that exogenous factors enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for particular sorts of claims to be advanced rather than others, for particular strategies of influence to be exercised, and for movements to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy. Meyer et al admitted that political opportunity can affect changes in public policy through protest.

### 3.2 Sun City Accords

The Lusaka Agreement on chapter 5 called for national dialogue and reconciliation. In general, the Congolese parties expressed their firm will to put an end to the state of belligerence, the departure of the foreign troops, reconciliation between themselves and to establish a new political order in a united and sovereign Congo and their determination to work for the establishment of the rule of law (preparatory meeting for ICD, 2001). The Agreement also identified the Congolese parties who would take part in the dialogue and set out the principles to govern the dialogue process under a neutral mediator (Witman, 2006:34). The inter-Congolese Dialogue had been decided by the Congolese parties to be held initially in Addis Ababa the capital of the African Union on the 15th of October 2001, and the choice of the venue for dialogue was based on the following criteria: security guarantee for participants, availability of necessary infrastructure and acceptance or invitation by the host country (Report of UN secretary general, 2001). Some parties proposed that the dialogue should be held on Congolese soil. The ICD opened in Addis Ababa in October 2001, but could not finish its work due to problems of funds and disputes over the representation of parties (Mangu, 2002:462). The Congolese parties decided finally to accept the offer from South Africa to host the ICD there and to bear part of the funding problem. According to Rogier (2004:29), although the DRC government expressed reservations about South Africa,
which was accused of backing the RCD and their Rwandan supports, they decided to agree on South Africa as the country to host ICDI in Sun City where the name of Sun City Accord comes from.

The negotiations in Sun City, South Africa in 2002 were an attempt to address the conflict and a number of principles to enable the country to launch from a new foundation were adopted. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue was intended to be a more inclusive peace conference, including civil society representatives and addressing broader concerns beyond the Cease-fire. These included elections as a way of accession into power; reform of the security sector for peace consolidation and the effective establishment of the rule of law throughout the country; and joint management of power to ensure gender equity in institutions of the country (Civil Society Monitoring report, 2011:91).

3.2.1 The Effects of Inter-Congolese Dialogue on the Process of Democratization

The DRC has been familiar with the kind of dialogue and conference needed to unite themselves and bring peace whenever there was disaccord since independence in 1960, e.g. the conference of Tananarive in 1962 which tried to unite central government and secessionist states of Katanga and Kasai including rebel movements (Martelli, 1966:85) and the famous national sovereign conference in 1990 which opened the first wave of the democratization process. For the majority of these conferences and dialogues, the result has been always mitigated and created for most of them an impasse.

The Inter-Congolese Dialogue held initially in Addis Ababa and then in South Africa, in Sun City in 2002 was a success in many instances, despite the fact that it did not answer all the problems that the DRC was going through. However, it alleviated the situation of war and united belligerents, it mended the process of democratization which had derailed a long time ago, it broke the deadlock on the issue of power sharing during the transitional period. The Congolese parties and the facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire, requested the president of South Africa to assist in the process of reaching an agreement. President Mbeki worked together with the facilitator towards this end. After discussions with the component delegations, president Mbeki suggested two models of power sharing (Mangu, 2004:464). He submitted succinctly two plans related to the allocation of key power positions between Congolese party leaders during the transition period which raised controversies.
According to Rogier (2004:32), the first plan called “Mbeki I” suggested a presidency to be held by Mr. Joseph Kabila, a high Council of the Republic comprising the president, RCD and MLC leaders as well as the prime minister, to be appointed by the political opposition. The Civil Society was offered the presidency of the parliament and meant to act as both a legislative and a constituent assembly. A special court was to serve as the constitutional court for the transition. Besides, independent institutions such as the Human Rights Commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, National Electoral Commission, and High Authority to regulate broadcasting were also considered of crucial importance during the transition. The defence, police, security and intelligence services were meant to be neutral and apolitical and the reserve bank autonomous.

The second plan called “Mbeki II” attempted to address the criticism by putting the MLC and RCD leaders at the level of deputy presidents, each also holding an important portfolio. The first deputy president would be in charge of economy and finances while the second was to be responsible for defence, home affairs and elections. Mbeki II was amended in favour of RCD-Goma because it allegedly offended the Congolese Government and MLC. Those delegates dissatisfied with the outcome later formed an Alliance for the preservation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.

Fundamentally, although the failure to reach a consensus at the level of power sharing between leaders of parties for this first round of Inter-Congolese Dialogue, political debate remained democratic and the determination of each party to work on an all-inclusive agreement.

3.3 Pretoria Accords

The Pretoria Accords is the continuation and determinant phase of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. After the stalemate observed in Sun City by the parties to reach agreement on power sharing, the Pretoria Accords seemed to be as well an effort of three parties (personalities, organisations and countries involved in the mediation) to force parties back to the table of negotiation. One of methods used by the mediators was to convince countries that were backing the main rebel groups, to the importance of the withdrawal of their army in order for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue to move forward and also for peace within the region. As Rogier mentioned (2002:33-34), in July and September of 2002 respectively, separate agreements were conducted between the DRC and Rwanda in Pretoria as well as between the DRC and Uganda in Luanda, which prepared the way of the withdrawal of foreign forces
from the Congolese territory. The three parties did not only convince countries, who were backing main rebel groups, they went back to persuade belligerents of the necessity of continuing negotiations in order to reach agreement on power sharing.

Some observers considered the Sun City Accord as a failure in negotiations, in the sense that it could not reach agreement on power sharing between belligerents (Rogier 2004, 32-34, Mangu, 2002, 465-466). In contradiction with these authors, this research recognizes the success of Sun City Accord in many ways, although the fact that, in any negotiation it is not easy between parties to agree in all points. Thirty four resolutions have been adopted and approved by consensus within commissions, and one of the most interesting innovations, was the fact that delegates agreed to put in place a certain number of new institutions to support democracy such as higher authority for media; a national observatory for human rights; the committee on ethics and the fight against corruption; an independent electoral commission; a truth and reconciliation commission (Pretoria Accord, 2002). These commissions were very important for the rebuilding of the DRC.

As the main Congolese parties to the conflicts finally signed the Global and All-inclusive Agreement on power sharing and transition in the DRC, Pretoria Accords addressed the causes of conflicts and came up with consensus between main parties on power sharing at the governmental level during a 24 month transition period, which at the end, elections were supposed to be held. According to the Global and All-inclusive Agreement on power sharing, Kabila remained Head of state, assisted by four vice-presidents coming from different main rebel groups. Thus, Azarias Ruberwa has been chosen to represent RCD as deputy president of the DRC in charge of political commission, Jean Pierre Bemba representing MLC as deputy president in charge of economy and finance commission, Abdoulay Yerodia Ndombasi representing Kabila’s government as deputy president in charge of reconstruction and development, Arthur Z’ahidi Ngoma representing the political opposition as deputy president in charge of social and cultural commission. The accord provided that the transition government would include 36 ministers and 25 deputy ministers representing all stakeholders of the society. Furthermore, a parliament which will consist of a national assembly (with 500 members, led by an MLC representative), and a senate (with 120 members led by the “forces vives”), will play a role of law makers creating unity and cohesion in the country. Although some sort of tension could be perceived between parties on the details of some crucial questions such as citizenship and the underground support of “negative forces”, parties showed commitment to the respect of decisions of the ICD. As
emphasized by Rogier (2002:37), the Pretoria Agreement could be described as “global and all-inclusive” in so far as the distribution of political privileges had been negotiated to the smallest detail among those stakeholders considered the major players. One of the achievements of ICD which boosted the process of democratization in the DRC was the transition process to the elections which started in 2003 with the installation of a government composed by representatives of the five main armed groups under the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement. The conversion of signatories’ from armed groups to political parties was an achievement.
CHAPTER FOUR: THE IMPACT OF REBELLIONS ON THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE DRC

4.1. Direct causes which favoured the second wave of rebellion in the DRC

There are a certain number of events that took place in the DRC in 1990’s, which can be directly considered as a cause of the second wave of rebellions. Most of the literature on DRC conflict highlights the genocide of Rwanda which took place in 1994 as a direct cause of conflict. This study considers the permissive aspect which characterized Mobutu’s regime in the 1990’s after the introduction of democratization as direct cause of conflict in the course of that process. As pointed out by Bratton and De Walle (1994: 453-489), the nature of a pre-existing regime shapes the dynamics and outcomes of political transitions and they add that contemporary political changes are conditioned by mechanisms of rule embedded in the ancient regime. Authoritarian leaders in power for long periods of time establish rules about who may participate in public decisions and the amount of political regime. The long authoritarian reign of Mobutu’s regime starting from 1965 to 1997 had left the country with ethnic favouritism and a paralyzed economy which created frustration among political elitist leaders. In 1990 with the wave of democracy which did not leave the DRC behind, it forced Mobutu to embark on a process of democratization which militated for multipartism, while opposition parties found themselves thrown into an impasse orchestrated by Mobutu as he was not willing to leave power. In the conquest of a new power base, started to exploit the long existing tension among different communities. As Solomon emphasized (2003:4), in seven years preceding the Great Lakes crisis, Mobutu, the president of Zaire, had been forced by Western powers to agree to at least some semblance of democracy, the result was catastrophic. The army, more a collection of things than a fighting force, went on two disastrous looting and pillaging sprees in the early 1990’s, looting most of the modern business sector. As it is mentioned above, the genesis of the rebellion crisis in the DRC is linked to the authoritarianism of Mobutu’s regime which created frustration among political elitists and left the majority of people desperate about their future. The 1990 wave of democratization was an opportunity for the DRC to shift from an authoritarian system to democratic system; unfortunately Mobutu’s regime was capable of putting in place dispositive that would not allow a total transformation of his regime to democracy. Short-lived government succeeded one another until 1992 when the Sovereign National Conference was held. The conference was to put the country on the road towards democracy, by forming a provisional legislative body and an electoral commission as well as formulating a
transitional constitution. It is important to note that with regard to the NSC; that although this attempt at restoring the popular vote and the rule of law did not succeed in establishing democracy and social progress in the country, it did, nonetheless, leave a significant democratic legacy. This can be clearly seen in the awakening of a national conscience and the affirmation of the right to protest against the abuse of power (Zongola, 2006: 226). Mobutu used the loopholes in the transitional charter to manipulate and obstruct the new institutions; parallel government and parliament were formed, effectively blocking the country. This standstill was filled with violence and foreign intervention, until the time where the country embarked on a war of liberation with the first wave of rebellion starting in 1996 and continuing to 1997, resulting in the final disappearance of Mobutu from the Congolese political scene and the ascent of Laurent Kabila to the presidential post.

The second rebellion of 1998 resulting in the defection of AFDL also called “The African War”, started in August 1998 until 2003, when a peace agreement was accepted by major warring sides (Zagel, 2010:98-118). As mentioned by Olzak (1998:187-217), a political competition is more likely to occur under conditions of political flux, when earlier political systems are breaking down and new forms are being built. The breakdown of Mobutu’s regime opened the way to a transition which found difficulty in reaching unanimity on the principles of new regime. Bratton and Walle (1994: 453-455) pointed out that, Regime type influences both increased the likelihood that an opposition will arise and flexibility with which incumbents can respond. It also determines whether elites and the masses can arrive at new rules of political interaction through negotiations, accommodation, and election that is whether any transition will be democratic. The root causes of rebellions could be found only in the authoritarian regime of Mobutu, which did not tolerate any political parties challenging the system. The main parties involved in conflict have tried with variable success to work on the excesses of the DRC conflict. It is important to acknowledge the profound transformation of the DRC’s political system which followed was followed by multiple negotiations and agreements after the second wave of rebellion in 1998. Some progress had already been made, especially after the signing of the Lusaka Agreement. Over the last several years, the DRC has moved from political instability caused by civil war which in turn was provoked by rebellions, to relative political stability and steps being taken towards democracy. The Congo’s political transition was pursued notably through a combined strategy of political and military power-sharing which consisted of an extended negotiations between Congolese belligerents and the unarmed opposition on the one hand in the so called Inter-Congolese
Dialogue, and profound reform of political and military institutions on the other hand which paved the way for democratization (Raeymaekers, 24-27).

4.2. The Relationship between Rebellion and Democratization in the DRC

Recent scholarly work suggests that another global trend, democratization, may be partially responsible for the rise of rebellion (Vorrath et al, 2001:8). The insecurity of transition, the use of ethnic nationalism by elites, and the majority rules of democracy, poses a threat to minorities who have attempted to identify the effects of democratization on rebellion. The relationship between rebellion and democratization remains contentious in political debate as we saw previously in preliminary literature; which tends to provide a framework which explains the paradox between rebellion and democratization. Democratization provides certain incentive and opportunity for political actors to somewhat cause destabilization. It is very important to note in the DRC it was through the process of democratization that the rebellion arose and it was through the same process that rebellion was being eradicated, via the Lusaka Agreement signed in 1999. Vorrath et al (2007:8-11) in their description of democratization, mentioned that the opening of the political arena means that formerly marginalized or suppressed groups have the opportunity to mobilize and organize new actors and movements to occupy public space while old ones normally transform or disappear. The announcement of multipartism by President Mobutu in his speech on the 24th of April 1990 saw the rise of a new political leader in the DRC and new political movements. Certain events that followed, hindered the process of democratization, such as the manipulation of opposition political party leaders by Mobutu pointed out by Mangu (2004:421). Mobutu managed to confiscate or “hijack” the discourse for change that was, so far, monopolized by the members of the democratic movement namely, the political party leaders and civil society and by the incredible political turn. He suddenly regained everything that had been promised by manipulating political leaders in his favour. This behaviour by Mobutu started creating frustration and goal became saving democratization by any means by the opposition.

The process of democratization in the DRC had been accompanied all along by conflicts mediation and agreement since it has been initiated in 1990 by Mobutu, and the most recent conflicts which this research focuses on, are rebellions that occurred in 1996 and in 1998, which deeply influenced the process of democratization. The question of the impact of rebellions on the process of democratization has been at the forefront of international political debate since the signing of the Lusaka Accord in 1999. It has been widely acknowledged the
difficulties that the DRC encountered in their transition from an autocratic governed country to a democratically governed country, were due to the complexity of its situation. Rebellion had exercised a profound influence on the DRC’s political development until the establishment of transitional institutions and then to the first presidential and legislative elections in 2006. There is dichotomy between rebellion and democratization, as stated by Morrison (2004:6); many of the factors that contribute to democratization also contribute to increases in conflict in heterogeneous societies. As countries transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes, marginalized minority groups experience decreased repression as an opportunity for ethnic mobilization or true nationalism arises.

As Morrisson states (2004:7) the relationship between democratization and rebellion is most likely curvilinear, violence is possibly in the early stages of democratization, when repressed voices are allowed to be heard but competition has not been fully institutionalized. The DRC has been torn between authoritarianism on the one hand and constitutionalism and democracy on the other since the beginning of the democratization process in 1990. From Mobutu who initiated the process of democratization and tried by every means possible to block it by dividing the political opposition to prolong his reign, by Laurent Kabila who completely re-instated an authoritarian regime by banning the activities of political parties and confiscating all powers back into his hands, which created a general frustration and opened the door to the deadliest rebellion of 1998, to Joseph Kabila who activated the Lusaka Agreement. The DRC has not yet embarked on the road to democracy.

4.3. Rebellions in the DRC: Hindrance to the process of Democratization

Recent global increases in rebellion and the negative impact that violent rebellion has had on the process of democratization, calls for an examination of factors that contribute to conflict. This section focuses on an empirical assessment of the negative aspects of rebellion on the process of democratization in the DRC. At different levels, rebellions have generated alternative ways of gaining profit or loss, power and protection with the local, political and economic framework in complete tatters and the region crammed with small arms, the absence of any authority capable of regulating economic, political and social competition has further incited the militarization of economic relations and has also brought about some important change in local, organisational, economic, political and social space.

The composition and recruitment of members of rebellions have been based on the criteria of ethnicity in most of the cases in the DRC, which is the reason why the majority of authors on
DRC conflict labelled it “ethnic rebellion” and is always follow by conflict. E.g. Conflict which erupted in Butembo between Hema and Lendu resulted in thirty thousand civilians to flee (Prunier, 2009:227). Political Elite played a preponderant role in the events of 1990’s of the determination of the process of democratization in the DRC in which rebellions can be traced. As Snyder (2000) argued in his perception of Elite persuasion theory that, nationalism is weak or absent until democratization begins and elites begin to use nationalist appeals to secure their position. This was not the case for the majority of political leaders in the DRC. As noted by Prunier (2009:172), in both Kivu, were densely populated and ethnically fragmented provinces where access to the land had created major political problems and political leaders used that ethnic fragmentation to gain the trust of the local people as long as they saw in them the ability to protect them against invaders. Vlassenroot and Acker (2001:51-77) noted that, the aspect of stratification; political loyalty and regular recycling of the political elite, encouraged Mobutu in the nineties with the push for democratization, the exit-strategies based on ethnic criteria. Elite persuasion posits that democratization can lead to ethnic conflict (Morrison 2001). The Rwandan refugee crisis of 1994 and the subsequent ethnic conflicts further reinforced the view that violence was based on ethnicity and carried out by groups of mobile members who had become the dominant principle to affect structural change (Vlassenroot and Acker (2001:55). Nationalism provides a doctrine by which elites can rule in the name of the people but not necessarily by the people. It provides a way for elites to be popular without being fully democratic. The context of state disintegration in the DRC and on going insecurity orchestrated by elites in order to gain popularity in their respective communities encouraged the formation of new and militarized networks organized by local elites which are not in line with nationalism. The local members of the DRC and MLC groups were predominantly Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsi), divided largely by locality and allegiance to particular leaders; the Mai-Mai, Hema and Lendu who were indigenous Congolese groups were also involved in that on going conflict, and as a consequence, many indigenous Congolese had become increasingly suspicious and left threatened by the inflow of Kinyarwanda speakers (Banyamulenge and Banyaruanda) from Rwanda and Burundi (Gross, 2007:132). Such nationalist appeals by elites provoke violent conflict if the excluded group has the ability to resist marginalization, the case in point of Banyaruanda-speaking populations of Eastern Congo who have been almost totally blocked from political debate during the Mobutu years (Prunier, 2009:172). Rebellion in the DRC has been a hindrance to the process of democratization for it contributed to the delay of hope of the Congolese who, after the horror of Mobutu’s regime,
were hungry to see and live in a democratic era. That hope had been removed by rebellion and civil war which left many people dead, infrastructure destroyed, a country divided and an economy paralyzed. As Gross emphasizes (2007:83) by April 2003, the war in the DRC had taken more lives than any other since world war II in what was described as the deadliest documented conflict in African history; at least 3.3 million people were killed in excess of what would normally be expected during a time of war.

The kind of rebellion that eroded the Eastern DRC challenges the traditional notion that popular violence ought to promote democratization in a country haunted by an authoritarian regime. Social fragmentation in the Eastern DRC is the outcome of a long process that resulted in a different economic use of the available space and the mobility of labour within it (Vlassenroot and Acker, 2001:53). The gradual reorganization of that space from the arrival of new competitors’ through politics and market, such as Rwandan speakers after the genocide of 1994, aggravated the situation and created a sort of competition. Considering rebellions as a hindrance to the process of democratization, Competition theory as it has been applied to ethnic conflict, Olzak (1992, 1998) suggests that rather than inequality causing conflict, the increase in competition that results from declining inequality promotes conflict. The main idea of this theory is that ethnic conflicts erupt when ethnic inequality and racially ordered systems break down. Since urbanization brings diverse groups into close proximity and intense competition with each other for the first time, it causes conflict, and such conflict solidifies ethnic boundaries. This perspective is also tested in terms of political competition. If it is true that increased competition over jobs in the context of urbanization leads to conflict, it follows logically that perhaps increased competition over political resources in the context of democratization also leads to conflict. Thus, competition theory suggests that urbanization and democratization will each lead to greater rebellion. Political competition suggests furthermore that, the emerging plurality of actors generates competition over constituencies and resources. Urbanization and democratization are measured with changed scores. Rebellion has been used in the DRC by some leaders as a key reference for identity, and in which the struggle for power by all means it is a key objective for establishing rebellion. In order to grab rank of commandment into the political and economical sphere for their own interest, people engage in rebellion for ethnic power or for economic interest without any realistic vision for change. Sometimes, it is to gain territories as a tactic to sit in on negotiations no matter how destructive it is to the economy and people lives. VlassenRoot and Raemaekers (2004:395), pointed out that the political strategies of rebellions have been
overshadowed by a deeper historical division of the Eastern DRC between ethnic conflict and between strongmen over political and economic control.

Two aspects need more attention. Firstly, patterns of elite formation have changed seriously since the conflict in the DRC, due to the fact that there isn’t any political framework for organizing the social and economic interaction while leaders have surfaced making use of the existing situation of insecurity to strengthen their control over mineral resources and reinforce their grip on the population. However, as exemplified by the crisis where the Eastern DRC continued to be plagued by recurrent waves of rebellion, and chronic humanitarian crises and human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based violence. Contributing to the cycles of violence, have been the continued presence of Congolese armed groups taking advantage of power and security vacuums in the Eastern part of the country; the illegal exploitation of resources; interference by neighbouring countries and pervasive impunity; all these constituted a hindrance to the process of democratization.

4.4 Rebellions in the DRC: Catalyst to the Process of Democratization

It is not our objective to promote or make a create publicity of rebellion; its effects being disastrous in all aspects on the process of democratization which we already mentioned in the previous chapter. The aim of this chapter is to highlight the catalytic aspect that has lead to the spread of rebellions in the DRC which in some way, boosted the process of democratization that was derailing the region since its establishment in the 1990’s, and came into effect from the signing of Lusaka Agreement by all main rebel groups and central government. As the researcher stated in chapter one, in essence, rebellions in the DRC did not only want to topple the central government, but it also wanted to push the central government to open the way to the process of democratization, according to the declaration of their leaders while they were capturing territories in the DRC. Rebellions in the DRC imposed significant pressure on the central government, which also pushed the International Community not only to initiate a dialogue between parties in conflict and to progress towards the Lusaka Agreement, but also to enhance the process of democratization in the DRC. Beyond the known destructive aspect of the rebellion, it’s created an opportunity to advance democracy and the social and economic interests of the people in the DRC.

Political opportunity theory suggests that the more democratic a country is, the less rebellion there will be. Rebellion appeared in the DRC as result of many long years of authoritarian rule enforced both by Mobutu’s and Kabila’s regime characterized by terror and anarchy. As
Koko stated (1999, 35), the Lusaka Accord established the framework that would later be utilized in the inter-Congolese dialogue. According to article 19 of the Lusaka Ceasefire agreement, the armed opposition, the RCD and MLC and the unarmed opposition were to engage in open national dialogues with the objective of a negotiated settlement to end the war in the DRC, and to revive and consolidate the process of democratization. In chapter 5 of Lusaka Ceasefire agreement, annex A, it says:

5.1 On the coming into force of the ceasefire agreement in the inter-Congolese political negotiations which should be recalled to a new political dispensation in the DRC.

5.2 In order to arrive at a new political dispensation and national reconciliation arising from the inter-Congolese political negotiations, the parties agree upon the implementation of the following principles:

a) The Inter-Congolese process shall include beside the Congolese parties, namely the government of the DRC, the Congolese Rally for Democracy and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo, the political opposition as well as representatives of the Forces vives.

b) All the participants in the Inter-Congolese political negotiations shall enjoy equal status, c) all the resolutions adopted by the inter-Congolese political negotiations shall be binding on all the participants.

These negotiations were crucial in the formulation of a consensual and all-inclusive transitional dispensation, making it possible for the first multiparty elections in the DRC in forty one years. Political Opportunity Theory focuses on the political context in which rebellion occurs (Jenkins 1985; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989; Schock 1996). It assumes that grievances are inherent and that there isn’t variation in individuals’ actual position or status that influences their decision to engage in unconventional politics, but rather the availability to affect conventional means of participation. As Salomon (2003:23) observed, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue was hampered when the MLC rebels proposed a presidency that revolved every three years, that the seat of prime minister should be given to the unarmed political opposition, and that the presidency of the parliament should be allotted to the Forces vives de la nation. The DRC government immediately rejected the proposal and the MLC promptly declared that it was no longer interested in attending another meeting. If effective conventional means of influencing the government are available, individuals will choose them over the higher risk, higher cost non-conventional methods of participation. The Lusaka Accord represented a significant breakthrough in the resolution of conflict between rebellions and central government, which allowed the DRC to re-embark on the process of democratization which was derailed. Firstly, because Mobutu’s manipulation of political
party leaders, and secondly, because Laurent Kabila’s authoritarianism during the first wave of rebellion in 1996.

Political Opportunity Theory would have expected less rebellion as political rights increase and alternative means to influence politics are made available. It was noticed during the transitional period which followed the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, the increase of political rights and freedom of expression extended to all belligerents, which had a positive effect on the unity of the DRC’s territory and consolidation of peace despite some areas where there was resistance. The most rebellion occurs where political rights are the lowest, and the level of rebellion declines as political rights increase. Rebellion is thought to negatively affect democracy because it consolidates ethnic bonds, reinforces ethnic differences, and contributes to the potential for “authoritarian reflex.” I find that rebellion does have a negative effect on democracy, but can force an authoritarian regime to democratization and that the effect varies according to the organization of rebellion and their ability to pressurize the government to agree to their demands, and also when the government has a capacity to contain rebellion, it will push out the rebellion and won’t accept their demands. According to Koko (1999,36), though cases of fighting were registered after the signing of Lusaka Agreement, it worked as a psychological tool for the belligerents by “de-constructing” the notion of armed and military confrontation to ensure victory, and it created opportunity to realize other options. Democratization does not seem to increase ethnic rebellion. In fact, democratization has led to less ethnic rebellion. It may also be that democratization leads to a very short term increase in rebellion, but a long term decline and the second point is a direct consequence of the first. All three examined points are inherent in the democratization process and thus signify possible drawbacks for a peaceful transition, but these aspects of democratization take place against a specific background in a country and region (Vorrath et al, 2007:8-11). Significant progress has been achieved in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the past 10 years. Through the process of democratization, the transitional government and all institutions of support to democracy have been established, the national territory was reunited, and foreign armed forces formally withdrew in accordance with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue culminated in the signature of the Global and Inclusive Agreement on the 17th of December 2002, in Pretoria, South Africa. On the basis of this political agreement, a Constitution had been adopted and promulgated on the 4th April 2003, thus allowing the establishment of a transitional
Government comprising all the warring parties, the political opposition and civil society (Ministry of Human Rights, DRC, 2007:7).

The overall economic situation has continued to improve significantly over the past 14 years, with an average economic growth rate of 6.5 per cent per year, a major decrease in inflation, increasing government domestic revenues, effective fiscal deficit control and the cancellation of debt under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.

The western and central parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have generally stabilized, with the main challenges there relating to post-conflict reconstruction and long-term peace building. In the East, in particular Orientale Province and Kivus, efforts to address the threat of armed groups and to extend State authority have resulted in the relative stabilization of most of the Ituri district and the significant degradation of the capacities of foreign armed groups, including the Forces démocratiques de liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The Government intends to launch the stabilization and reconstruction plan for war-affected areas aimed at, inter alia, improving security, re-establishing the authority of the State and supporting the return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons and socio-economic recovery.

The recurrence of such cycles of violence continues to be an obstacle to peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and threatens the overall stability and development of the Great Lakes region. In the past, national, regional and international efforts have for the most part succeeded in addressing the immediate manifestations of crises, but not the core reasons for their eruption. In order to break such cycles and ensure that sustainable peace takes hold in the country and the wider region, a new, comprehensive approach that addresses the underlying causes of conflict is required (Report of the Secretary General on the DRC, 2013).
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The present research attempted to analyse the impact of rebellions on the process of democratization in the DRC. The research focused on the hindrance and catalytic aspects of rebellion with more emphasis on the catalytic aspect.

The research hypothesis stated thus that rebellion in the DRC played a catalytic role in posing significant pressure against central government, which served not only to open dialogue between parties in conflict and to make a way for the “Lusaka agreement”, also the enhancement of the process towards democratization in the DRC.

This present academic research hopes to contribute to the field of political science, peace and conflict studies by looking at other ways of observing rebellions beyond it disastrous aspects on the transformation of society.

Therefore, this last chapter intends to sum up the main points of the research and draw from the latter a conclusion and recommendations. The chapter is subsequently divided into two main parts. The first section consists of a summary highlighting some of the key points raised in this research. The second section is a conclusion and some recommendations from academic point of view.

5.1 Summary

Indisputably, rebellions and the process of democratization features as the most controversial and discussed subject in political science. This is one challenging intellectual research to the realization of which this research intends to make a contribution.

The discussion is far from over and can never end, with the oscillating relationship between rebellion and the democratization process. African countries have engaged seriously in the democratization process since the wave of the 1990’s and the struggle has continued against authoritarian regimes which has occurred in many forms, one being armed rebellion with the objective of forcing authoritarian regimes to engage in the democratization process.

This research is a perennial one and the struggle remains somehow a perpetual business, although in the case of the DRC, the signing of the Lusaka agreement by all belligerents was supposed to be the end of conflict. For the sake of democratization, rebellions have been launched and operating to root out incumbent authoritarian regimes. the struggle continued in several ways whether to get rid of authoritarian regimes or to push them to materialize their
promise for democratization which has been zigzagging and got long to reach common
ground on the principles of democracy.
This research on the impact of rebellions on the process of democratization is aware of the
fact that findings and conclusions could be partial and concern only the objectives outlined in
this research project.
considering the DRC as a case study, this study intended through historical stages and
experiences of the process of democratization, getting along with armed rebellion, to
establish whether rebellions constituted a blocked road to the process of democratization or
whether it helped to overcome the manoeuvres of incumbent authoritarian regimes which
took place in the DRC from the time of Mobutu and Kabila, consisting of manipulation of the
democratization process in order to remain in power.
Chapter two aimed to provide a literature review framework of rebellions: hindrance or
catalyst to the process of democratization in the DRC, and concepts related to it such as
violence, conflict, and civil war, because these terms accompanied the events all along which
occurred in the DRC. The chapter looked at the dialectic existing between them and their
auxiliary concepts. It highlighted as well, some general considerations surrounding the
democratization process and the state of the process in the DRC, since the speech of Mobutu
in 1990 which led at the very minimum to the restoration of liberal democracy. The chapter
ends with the state of rebellions in the DRC. It has noticed that rebellions in their actions,
aimed effectively to overthrow and destabilize central government accused of an
authoritarian regime, in order to gain chairs into negotiations.
Chapter three attempted to focus on contradictory debates of the UN intervention and the
uprising of rebellions in the DRC followed by a brief comparison between UN intervention in
the DRC in 1960 and UN intervention in 1999 to now.
Chapter four dealt with direct causes which favoured the second wave of rebellions in the
DRC which could be found in the number of events that took place in 1990’s such as the
permissive aspects which characterized Mobutu’s regime.
So the genesis of rebellions is linked to the authoritarianism of Mobutu’s regime. It explained
furthermore how rebellions constituted a hindrance to the process of democratization in the
DRC, the ethnic characteristic of rebellions did not facilitate the normal pursuit of the
process. The chapter goes on to explain the catalytic aspect of rebellion when its objective of
topping the central government could not be realized, and the government could not get rid
of rebellions, both sides started to value the importance of negotiations which were summed
up in the Lusaka cease fire agreement on power sharing and the installation of democratic
institutions. Since rebellion is made or constructed it can be deconstructed. the answers to the
dilemma posed by rebellion and forces of its deconstruction must lie in structural changes,
which address political social and economic inequality and democratization. . as argued
previously, it was beyond the known destructive aspect of rebellions that arose the
opportunity of advancing the process of democratization in the DRC.

5.2 Recommendations

The history of the impact of rebellions on the process of democratization in the DRC remains
to be written. The construction of democracy in the DRC needs to be fully documented and
the silence of political elite to address rebellions is still overwhelming DRC political
development.
This study did not pretend to analyse all challenges and make all recommendations for the re-
establishment and consolidation of democratization. therefore, a number of research
questions that are left unanswered or are not well addressed, would need further research and
investigation by other researchers of rebellions and the process of democratization in DRC in
particular and Africa in general.
There is a need for further involvement of the international community to help the DRC in
the process of democratization which is the best way to eradicate armed rebellions, violent
conflicts and the political elites should promote nationalism in the sense of cultivating unity
among people rather than promoting fragmentation. The intricate rebellion configuration and
militarism in DRC’s politics lies in their historical construction and continued reproduction
since independence in 1960. Rebellion has been based on cognition of different levels of
identity, clan, village, tribe, region or nationality. Pluralism in itself is not problematic except
when certain groups perceive that they are being excluded from what they consider to be their
rights, whether political, economic or linguistic such as the Banyamulenge.

moreover, as pointed out earlier, many existing studies on rebellions and their impact on the
process of democratization are more focused on negative aspects of rebellions, there is a need
of analysing what those rebellions to bring about the advancement of democracy.
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