Other than ourselves: an exploration of “self-othering” in Afrikaner identity construction in Beeld newspaper.

Yves Nicholas Vanderhaeghen

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor Philosophiae (PhD) in Media and Cultural Studies

University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Arts, College of Humanities.

December 2014

Supervisor: Dr Nicola Jones
ABSTRACT

This thesis explores Afrikaner identity construction in Beeld using the concept of “self-othering”, by which is meant first, the representation of the group as “othered” or marginalised, and second, the re-articulation of Afrikaners as “innocent”.

“Self-othering” takes place within discourses of guilt, loss, fear, belonging, transformation and reconciliation, at a time when a national identity imagined as a “Rainbow Nation” is being contested by discourses of Africanism, nativism and minority rights. These discourses are articulated in the context of the globalisation of South Africa’s economy, which has consolidated the economic fractures that characterised Apartheid.

The thesis is formulated in an interpretive paradigm, uses the post-structuralist Discourse Theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe as a theoretical framework, and draws heavily on Judith Butler’s concept of “grievable life” to analyse the ambivalences in the mediation and utterance of an identity positioned in “otherness”. A qualitative research methodology is employed to interpret the discourses that emerge in my Beeld case study.

I argue in the thesis that articulation, a concept central to the theory of Laclau and Mouffe, seeks to achieve for Afrikaners moral equivalence in a chain of meaning hegemonised by the liberation narrative, so as to restore a legitimacy of common citizenship compromised by Apartheid and subject to contemporary discourses of exclusion.

In considering how the Afrikaner self is positioned to the racial “other” in and by Beeld, I conclude that these relations are, in spite of prevailing discourses of reconciliation, “antagonistic”, while the intra-group construction of Afrikaners within the discursive space of Beeld is “agonistic”, thereby reinforcing the sense of an ethnic group identity over other identities. I also conclude that the utterance of Afrikaner innocence renders
reconciliation with the “other” of Apartheid redundant (as opposed to denied) as an element of identity because the rearticulated subject of reconciliation has been (self)absolved of guilt, leaving the historical (racial) victim “ungrieved” as the boundary of difference hardens into a frontier of antagonism.

This study makes a contribution to media studies by, first, introducing and developing the concept of “self-othering” as a mode of rhetorical displacement in representation, and second, by suggesting that it establishes a structural oscillation and an irreconcilable stress between the discursive ontological objectives embodied in “readers” and the ethical journalistic objectives which guide not just individual reports but the newspaper as a performative utterance in itself.
KEY WORDS

Afrikaner, identity, media, newspaper, Beeld, equivalence, difference, articulation, grievable, ethics, minority, settler narrative, liberation narrative, white, victim.
DECLARATION

I declare that Other than ourselves: an exploration of “self-othering” in Afrikaner identity construction in Beeld newspaper is my own work and that it has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

Full Name: Yves Nicholas Vanderhaeghen  Date:

Signed:
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thank you to Donna Hornby, my wife, for supporting me as I shed the salaried life to devote myself to this study, for listening to and offering her insights into random thoughts and observations about *Beeld*, newspapers and identity over breakfast, on our runs together and just about everywhere else. Thank you too to our children, Jono, Cate and Simon, for indulging their father trying to reinvent himself, to my mother Florence for her unfailing pride in me, and to my late father Herwig, who taught me to “look it up” even as he intoned “Oculos habent, et non videbunt”.

Thank you also to my supervisor, Dr Nicola Jones, whose gentle guidance allowed me to follow my ideas with confidence, and to the University of KwaZulu-Natal for its post-graduate financial support.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................... 1
KEY WORDS ..................................................................................................................... 3
DECLARATION ..................................................................................................................... 4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................... 5
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................................... 6
TABLES ............................................................................................................................. 9
FIGURES .......................................................................................................................... 9

1. Chapter One: Preface ........................................................................................................ 10
   1.1. Preamble .................................................................................................................. 10
   1.2. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 10
   1.3. Chapters .................................................................................................................. 29
   1.4. Key Research Questions ......................................................................................... 30
       1. What is “self-othering”? ......................................................................................... 30
       2. How is “self-othering” presented? ......................................................................... 30
       3. Why is “self-othering” an important feature of Afrikaner identity construction? 30

2. Chapter Two: Introduction ............................................................................................. 32
   2.1. Introduction: A fractal topography ......................................................................... 32
   2.2. Unfinished business ............................................................................................... 37
   2.4. Continuity ............................................................................................................... 41
   2.5. Who are we? ........................................................................................................... 47
   2.6. Afrikaners: “This is how you are” ......................................................................... 48
   2.7. Identity .................................................................................................................... 61

3. Chapter Three: Theory .................................................................................................. 64
   3.1. Theoretical framework ............................................................................................ 64
   3.2. Equivalence ............................................................................................................. 70
   3.3. Discourse ................................................................................................................ 73
   3.4. The Discourse Theory of Laclau and Mouffe ......................................................... 77
   3.5. Butler’s “Grievability” ........................................................................................... 89
   3.6. Representation ........................................................................................................ 94

4. Chapter Four: Research methodology and methods ..................................................... 101
   4.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 101
   4.2. Discourse Theory Methodology ............................................................................ 107
   4.3. Method .................................................................................................................... 116
   Content analysis ........................................................................................................... 118
   Discourse analysis ......................................................................................................... 121

5. Chapter Five: Towards understanding Beeld, newspapers and media ................. 125
   5.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 125
   5.2. Drawing the line .................................................................................................... 125
   5.3. The Fourth Estate .................................................................................................. 126
   5.4. Afrikaans media .................................................................................................... 128
   5.5. Beeld ...................................................................................................................... 135
   5.6. Eyes wide shut ....................................................................................................... 138
5.7. Bedding down ................................................................. 140
5.8. Newspaper as beacon ..................................................... 141
5.9. Heimat ................................................................. 144
5.10. Ecosystem ............................................................... 147
5.11. Ritual ................................................................. 149
5.12. Persona ............................................................... 151
5.13. The message ............................................................ 153

6. Chapter Six: Data: Beeld in the world and the world of Beeld ........................................ 157
6.1. Introduction ............................................................... 157
6.2. Number of stories ......................................................... 159
6.3. Newspaper structure and research categories ......................................................... 160
6.4. Readership ................................................................. 162
6.5. Code of ethics .............................................................. 163
6.6. “Jou koerant, Jou wêreld” (Your newspaper, Your world) ........................................ 167
6.7. The face of race ............................................................. 168

Figure 3: Race dominance of page established by effect of stories and photographs taken together ................................................................................................................................. 170
Figure 4: Percentage of stories dealing with South African, International, and African topics ................................................................................................................................. 172

6.8. Discourse of dysfunction .................................................. 172

Figure 5: Story categories, indicating the percentage of crime stories, among other categories. ................................................................................................................................. 173
6.9. What, then, is grieved? ....................................................... 175
6.10. Categories of the “grievable” ............................................. 176
6.10.1. Death ........................................................................ 177
(1) Death due to crime ........................................................................ 177
(2) Death due to traffic accidents .................................................................. 179
(3) Death due to neglect/incompetence/negligence ........................................ 181
(4) Random death ................................................................................ 182
6.10.2. Threats to survival .................................................................. 183
(a) Church ................................................................................. 185
(b) Language ............................................................................... 187
(c) Livelihood ............................................................................... 191
(d) Collapse of politics and institutions .................................................................. 202
(e) Disorder and protest .................................................................... 206
(f) Destruction of heritage .................................................................... 209
(f 1) Art ..................................................................................... 209
(f 2) Natural heritage .................................................................... 210
(f 2.1) Water ................................................................................. 210
(f 2.2) Animals ............................................................................. 211
(f 2.2.1) Rhinos ............................................................................. 214
(g) Habitat .................................................................................. 217
6.11. Celebrations ........................................................................ 218
6.12. Ambivalence .......................................................................... 222
6.13. Crime redux: “What did we ever do to them?” .................................................. 228

7. Chapter Seven: Conclusion ........................................................................ 236
7.1. Self-othering: its nature, purpose and scope .................................................. 236
7.2. Contributions, limitations and possibilities ....................................................... 243
  7.2.1. Contributions ......................................................................................... 243
  7.2.2. Limitations ......................................................................................... 244
  7.2.3. Possibilities ......................................................................................... 244
Glossary .................................................................................................................. 246
Appendices ............................................................................................................... 254
  Appendix 1 ........................................................................................................ 254
  Appendix 2 ........................................................................................................ 256
  Appendix 3 ........................................................................................................ 257
  Appendix 4 ........................................................................................................ 258
  Appendix 5 ........................................................................................................ 259
  Appendix 6 ........................................................................................................ 260
  Appendix 7 ........................................................................................................ 261
  Appendix 8 ........................................................................................................ 262
  Appendix 9 ........................................................................................................ 263
  Appendix 10 ...................................................................................................... 264
  Appendix 11 ...................................................................................................... 265
  Appendix 12 ...................................................................................................... 266
  Appendix 13 ...................................................................................................... 267
  Appendix 14 ...................................................................................................... 268
  Appendix 15 ...................................................................................................... 269
  Appendix 16 ...................................................................................................... 270
  Appendix 17 ...................................................................................................... 271
  Appendix 19 ...................................................................................................... 273
  Appendix 20 ...................................................................................................... 274
  Appendix 21 ...................................................................................................... 275
  Appendix 22 ...................................................................................................... 276
  Appendix 23 ...................................................................................................... 277
  Appendix 24 ...................................................................................................... 278
  Appendix 25 ...................................................................................................... 279
  Appendix 26 ...................................................................................................... 280
  Appendix 27 ...................................................................................................... 280
Bibliography ............................................................................................................ 281
TABLES

Table 1: Readership profile, 2012. Source: Beeld, AMPS .................................................. 162

FIGURES

Figure 1: Complexion of stories, by number, by race/ethnicity ........................................... 168
Figure 2: Race dominance of main photograph on page ......................................................... 169
Figure 3: Race dominance of page established by effect of stories and photographs taken together .................................................................................................................. 170
Figure 4: Percentage of stories dealing with South African, International, and African topics ........................................................................................................................................ 172
Figure 5: Story categories, indicating the percentage of crime stories, among other categories. ....................................................................................................................................... 173
Figure 6: Number of stories in which animals (wild and domestic) are the subject of the story. The contrast is with the number of stories in which “black” people are the categorical subject of the story. ........................................................................................................ 211
Figure 7: Stories in which victims are targeted because they are Afrikaners (farm murders), as opposed to other groups, as in the case of Xenophobic attacks. ...................... 232
1. Chapter One: Preface

1.1. Preamble

This chapter sketches the historical position of Afrikaners, and suggests why current debates of identity and ethnicity continue to be important in post-apartheid South Africa. I introduce a notion of “self-othering” that will allow me to explore the way Afrikaners negotiate their place in a society which is transitional, and I consider how these dynamics of identity formation are manifested discursively in Beeld newspaper, an Afrikaans-language, national daily newspaper with the highest circulation of all Afrikaans dailies, published in Johannesburg.

To do this I employ a narrative style of writing, drawing on my background in literature and journalism. This allows me to explore meaning through a suggestive layering of concepts and description, rather than through a taxonomic mapping of the topic. I find this approach useful given the apparent ineffability of identity, a conceptual construct that is at the same time insubstantial yet real, a tantalising will o’ the wisp that can at times, although not necessarily at will, gather the force of a Leviathon tacking into the headwinds of history.

1.2. Introduction

“Ons is nie so nie”¹ is a refrain that reverberates through what one used to be able to call Afrikanerdom. We are not that. We are other than that. That is not who we are. That is the other of us.

It represents an ambiguous assertion of identity through denial and differentiation. It simultaneously disowns an ascribed negative identity and implicitly defends one that is...

---

¹ Expressed in the title of Jeanne Goosen’s 1990 (pre-democracy) novel Ons is nie almal so nie and Herman Wasserman’s analysis of racism denialism in the Afrikaans press, “Ons is nie so nie” (Wasserman, 2010).
held to be blameless, and which is, if no longer noble, then at least deserving of acceptance.

The ambiguity is rooted in South Africa’s apartheid history, and reflects the difficulty in constructing a new identity amid the contending demands of a society in transformation while negotiating the emotional and moral debris of the past.

In public discourse the taint of apartheid attaches tenaciously to South African whites in general and Afrikaners in particular. Apartheid was the creation of white Afrikaners, and it is by no means dead. For example, in rebutting the international perceptions of South Africa as a violent society, President Jacob Zuma (Sapa, March 7, 2013) stated that “South Africans didn't just become violent. It was planted by apartheid.” Dave Steward, the executive director of the F.W. de Klerk Foundation, argues (Steward, 2013) that the ruling African National Congress “consistently characterises whites as ‘the other’” through the routine rhetorical invocation of terms such as “Apartheid colonialism”, the effect of which is to “reinforce perceptions of white moral inferiority and black entitlement”. The liberal Afrikaner historian Herman Giliomee (2000, p. 98) also notes on the part of the ANC “an insistence that from the start, European settlement here on the tip of Africa was immoral” and that there is an “assumption that whites have no right to defend their interests”.

The burden of the past therefore continues to weigh heavily on the present. For example, on news of the death of one of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s star witnesses, hitsquad leader Dirk Coetzee, City Press news editor Natasha Joseph ruminated in a tweet (Joseph, 2013): “… Coetzee’s death has me thinking about the Nuremberg Trials. Would that model have brought more closure than the TRC?” To which one reply, from Sithembile Mbete (Mbete, 2013), was “I think we’re all scarred by the fact that apartheid went unpunished. Reconciliation without justice is proving meaningless”. Veteran journalist and political commentator Harald Pakendorf (Pakendorf, March 7, 2013) admitted to ongoing “mixed feelings” at the “loss of Afrikaner innocence” that Coetzee’s revelations represented.
“What is one to do with this load of decrowned skeletons, origins, shame and ash,” asked Antjie Krog (1999, p. 128) in the wake of the traumatic revelations of the TRC.

In answer to this question, Steyn (2001; 2004) describes the various discursive ways in which Afrikaners have tried to “rehabilitate” their “disgraced whiteness” (while taking shelter in “white talk”). They range from the “reactionary” through to the “transformative”, amid an “unprecedented level of soul-searching” (Van der Westhuizen, 2007, p. 285).

Where do I place myself in this discourse of identity, guilt and belonging? Am I subject to the same “psychic glue” that the poet Stephen Watson observed holds South Africa together: “guilt on the one hand and emotional blackmail on the other” (Watson, 1997, p. 10).

My interest in the questions touched on above has two wellsprings.

**“Un-belonging”**

Personal identity has always been a source of conflict: as an English-speaker growing up in an Afrikaans environment, as the child of Francophone colonial immigrants, and as a student activist on a white university campus in the 1980s, the question of where I fitted in socially, and politically, was constantly under evaluation.

Throughout my teens and into young adulthood I held onto my “Europeanness” (defined in part by a fluency in English, French and German) to set me apart from, and above, what I saw to be the narrow-minded Calvinism of Afrikaners (in the same way that they held on to their European origins to distance themselves from their black compatriots), in whose language I was nevertheless also fluent.
It would be disingenuous to dignify a prejudice against Afrikaners as rooted only in religion (I was Catholic) or language. I took my cue from my father, in my “anti-Afrikaner” attitudes, but it would be many years before I could separate out the sometimes contradictory reasons behind what often felt like a visceral antipathy. Primarily, it was the religiously-inspired authoritarianism of nationalism that was objectionable, in that it led to the banning of films and books and of course television, all deemed hallmarks of culture and civilisation. It was not the racism of Afrikaners that was objectionable, but the fact that they were “uncultured”, “provincial” and “Nazi-sympathisers”\(^2\), a serious crime in the eyes of my parents who had lived through World War 2 and both of whose homes and towns had been occupied by Nazi soldiers. On the other hand, my parents were vehemently anti-communist, and so perforce they implicitly supported the “Rooi Gevaar”\(^3\) rhetoric of the National Party (for whom, however, they never voted, since they never adopted South African citizenship). My bewilderment was therefore great at being insulted by English children as a “Dutchman”\(^4\) on account of my Flemish surname. More bewildering was to be insulted by those I myself considered “Dutchmen” as both an “uitlander” and a “soutie”\(^5\).

And yet my heart quickens at the sound of Afrikaans. Afrikaners (individually and through the National Party’s “white immigration” policy of the time) gave succour to my family when we arrived as refugees from the Belgian Congo in 1960. My childhood friends were Afrikaans and I was embraced in their homes. And although the context is different, I find myself in sympathy with Jacob Dlamini (Dlamini, 2009) in harbouring nostalgic feelings that jar with their shattered historical setting.

---

\(^2\) The Nazi association was not at that time with reference to the Aryan race policies of the Third Reich, but to the Afrikaners (for example the Ossewa Brandwag) who objected to joining World War 2 on the side of England, and who explicitly or implicitly supported Adolf Hitler because he was the enemy of the colonial power that had subjugated Afrikaners in the Anglo-Boer wars.

\(^3\) The “Red Menace” of communism to which Afrikaner Calvinism and nationalism were implacably opposed.

\(^4\) A pejorative term for Afrikaners, who were also called “rocks” (for their perceived stupidity), and “hairy-backs” (for their perceived Neanderthal backwardness).

\(^5\) “Uitlander” is the Afrikaans word for foreigner (literally “outlander”), while “soutie” is a contraction of “soutpiel”, a derogatory term for English South Africans, meaning, literally, “salt-penis”. It described those who had one foot in England and the other in South Africa, with their penis dangling in the ocean between, and was understood to mean that the English did not belong in South Africa because they had divided loyalties between the two countries.
At the time, my relationship to black South Africans was no more than a murmur on the periphery of my conscience.

Since 1994, I have wrestled with sensitivities of being associated with Apartheid by virtue of being white, and having an Afrikaans-sounding surname hasn’t helped. When Antjie Krog dedicates her book, *Country of my Skull* (1999), “for every victim who had an Afrikaner surname on her lips”, I’m aware that the echoes of my own name extend in distressing ways beyond my own person, my own actions and control. When Thabo Mbeki pronounces “I am an African” (Mbeki, 1996), I wonder whether I’m embraced or excluded in his sentiments, whether his “I” marginalises my “I”, whether “African” is inclusive of my whiteness. As Sen (2006, p. 3) points out, “the adversity of exclusion can be made to go hand in hand with the gifts of inclusion”.

When Julius Malema (De Lange, 2011) accuses all whites of theft, I find myself abnegatingly agreeing with him, but fearful of the implications of that line of argument. My most visible features, of being white, male and middle-aged, put me firmly in the line of fire and this inevitably informs an awareness of how I’m seen, where I fit in, and what conditions are required to allow this to happen in a way that meets my own needs as well as broader social imperatives.

**The “me” in media**

Dilemmas of who’s in and who’s out have also informed my work in newspapers over 25 years, during which time I was a sub-editor, columnist, reviewer, ombudsman and editor. Various questions confronted these various roles. There were elementary ones, such as “Is this English?”, “Is this Style?” and “Is this intelligible?”, which were the crux of sub-editing. There were more complex ones, such as “Is this fair?”. At its most elementary level, if the answer was no, a story could nevertheless be balanced by including sources or viewpoints that had initially been left out. At another level, however, even if the story on its own technical merits was “fair” or “balanced”, broad social and political fairness
and balance would often prove elusive due to the fact that there was always an “understood” which excluded swathes of people (notably the very poor and unskilled, and until relatively recently “blacks”), opinion and activities. These “understoods” inevitably informed the overarching questions of “Is it news?”, “Who cares?” and “Will it sell?”, and how such news would be presented, that is, how graphically should a violent rape be reported (not very), how much blood should be seen in a photograph (not much), should dead bodies appear in photographs (rarely), are breasts\textsuperscript{6} permissible, are swearwords permissible (seldom), can we print “kaffir” (no).

My early career on \textit{The Natal Witness} in the mid-1980s coincided with the National Party government’s emergency regulations which almost terminally restricted the commercial press’s scope in covering the full story of what was happening, to which a traditionally white readership was in any case allergic.

The dynamic then, as now, was how to tell the full story in a way that did not alienate existing readers, encouraged new ones, and kept the newspaper onside with both government and other elites. Even before 1994, however, there was an urgency in trying to move beyond the colonial white focus that had been the \textit{Witness}’s hallmark and to embrace more black readers\textsuperscript{7}. A declining circulation shows the lack of success of that initiative\textsuperscript{8}.

\footnote{White breasts were taboo on the \textit{Witness}, because of the paper’s “family values”. Black breasts were permissible because it was deemed to be permissible among blacks to do so and, equally importantly, because they (black breasts) were deemed unlikely to titillate a white reader and so could not be morally “offensive” to family values.}

\footnote{There was little, if any, understanding of what might interest “black” readers, who were taken to be a homogenous mass with “collective” and “communal” interests and who could be addressed \textit{en masse}. Religion, class, leisure interests, income, aspirations, professional and educational differentiation, political allegiance and understanding, none of these categories were considered to apply. I am simplifying complex dynamics, which changed over time. For example, prior to 1994, the overriding and pressing demand of enfranchisement for blacks took for granted that “blacks” were collectively oppressed and to that extent had a common interest. After 1994, this understanding became more nuanced, but any editorial response to such an understanding was at odds with the expectations of an existing readership, the demands of advertisers, and the limit of distribution, that is where the paper was sold. No concerted efforts were made, up to the point of my own departure from the \textit{Witness} in 2011, to make the paper generally available in townships or other “black” areas.}

\footnote{The circulation of the \textit{Witness} declined steadily from a high point of 30 000 in 1994 to under 19 000 in 2012, according to Audited Bureau of Circulation figures.}
This decline was not purely caused by online media or other commercial onslaughts, although they are mainly responsible for it. Critically, as has been the case with other legacy, English-language newspapers, the *Witness* has not found an appropriate voice that makes its “meaning-making” meaningful to a racial and cultural mass of readers. In Arthur Miller’s formulation that “a good newspaper is, I suppose, a nation talking to itself”, newspapers like the *Witness* have lost both their sense of nation and their sense of self.

Since the objective was to reach out to a broad readership, we often envied the easier task of our colleagues on *Beeld* (both papers are now part of Naspers), who were able to focus on a strictly-defined audience that still essentially fitted the definition of Afrikaner (that is white, God-fearing and Afrikaans-speaking). During the course of this thesis, however, I have been struck that in one crucial way our task was easier, in that we did not consider our role as having to hold together an ethnic or linguistic group.

Loss of voice and loss of audience both combined to amplify the crisis afflicting the newspaper industry, and the ever-present professional questions were “who are we speaking to?”, “how do we speak to them?” and, ultimately, “who are we?”.

Beyond the concerns of readership and circulation, however, are also more profound political and social ones. Relevant answers to these questions are as important to newspapers and their continuing role in democratic societies as coming up with new business models. Does nicheing in the marketplace contribute to social divisions, and undermine the ethical objective to inform and empower through knowledge? In the case of *Beeld*, does its catering (even pandering) to the Afrikaner community sow the seeds of future ethnic conflict by promoting “a counter-politics of ethnic assertion *against* [original italics] the jurisdiction of the state” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2003, p. 446), or does it consolidate a sense of inclusive South-Africanism in a multi-cultural society?
Past, begone!

It is in this context that the following questions arose for me in reading *Beeld*: how is the past (and questions of moral culpability) kept in its place or recast in a way that it doesn’t compromise the present; why is there a sense that the particular diet of stories about crime and corruption has the effect not of informing, but of determining whose life, in this narrative of victimhood, is “grievable” (Butler, 2010); how do these two dynamics provide an insight into how an Afrikaner identity may be being reconstituted and usefully (or otherwise) deployed; how is the relationship between “self” and “other” being negotiated through this process, and, finally, how is this being played out in what appears to be a doomed medium of communication?

Crisis of credibility

Traditional print media, globally and in South Africa, are in a crisis of credibility (N. Davies, 2009; Monck, 2008; Simpson, 2010) and circulation (Allan, 2006; Harber, 2013a; Myburgh, 2011). Afrikaners are in a crisis of influence (R. Davies, 2009; Marais, 2011; Van der Westhuizen, 2007) and identity (Bornman, 2010; Du Preez, 2005; Engelbrecht, 2007; Steyn, 2004). To secure their survival, both are trying to find meaningful roles for themselves in radically changed political and social circumstances. How these dynamics manifest in the Afrikaans press offers insights into South Africa’s construction of a national identity (Wasserman, 2005b, 2009; Wasserman & De Beer, 2005), the position of minorities within it, and the role of the media in democratic process.

Legitimation

Since 1994 Afrikaners have had to deploy discourses of legitimation which entail at least an appearance of disowning racism (Van der Westhuizen, 2007; Wasserman, 2010), Apartheid and Afrikaner nationalism, whose spectre nevertheless continues to haunt the political landscape, as evidenced by the debate on land ownership and ethnic origins
sparked by Pieter Mulder in Parliament (De Vos, 2012), and the alarm triggered by reports of right-wing training camps (Van Gelder, 2012). Caught not only between going forward and harking back to the past, and between Africanism and South Africanism, but also between what O’Meara (1997, p. 2) refers to as the “contending Siamese twins of globalisation and ethnic nationalism”, the Afrikaner identity project is complex, intricate and often contradictory (R. Davies, 2009).

**High stakes**

The stakes are high. As Sen (2006), O’Meara (1997) and Mouffe (1994) point out in relation to post-1989 eruptions of ethno-nationalism, identity can kill. Identity is “fundamentally political” (Elliott, 2011) and identity politics are played out through contestations of power; as Castells (quoted in Rantanen, 2005, p. 138) asserts, “in modern times power is played out in media and communication”.

These contestations, at the level of representation (L. Taylor & Willis, 1999, p. 40), tend to pit identity myths of difference and otherness, “us” and “them”, against each other (Hall, 2002, p. 10). The negotiation of these tensions is crucial to the successful functioning of a plural society, and in fact to the very possibility of a democratic politics (Laclau, 2005; Mouffe, 1994). Failure increases the prospects of violence, as in Bosnia, Rwanda and South Africa’s periodic xenophobic purges.

**Who are the Afrikaners?**

Afrikaners as a group have exerted a considerable force on the course of South Africa’s history, and arguably continue to do so.

But who are these people? What is the definition of an Afrikaner? The very question is enough to arouse a strong reaction: “How incredible that you should even ask that,” is

---

9 My translation.
Pieter Mulder’s\textsuperscript{10} response to the writer Fred de Vries (De Vries, 2012, p. 9). On the other hand, according to Giliomee (2009, p. 715) by 2009 “a considerable section of well-educated white Afrikaans speakers no longer considered themselves to be Afrikaners”. The artist Mark Kannemeyer would be one of these: “I am not part of that group of people and I do not have a sense of shared destiny with them”\textsuperscript{11} (quoted in De Vries, 2012, p. 376). But there are those torn between these two poles, as represented by one respondent to Vestergaard (2001, p. 25): “I am an Afrikaner, though I hate the Afrikaners”.

Davies (2012, p. 5) doubts “whether an Afrikaner grouping exists in any formal sense”, while nevertheless acknowledging the existence of “Afrikanerness”. Even at the height of Afrikanerdom the social historian Pieter W. Grobbelaar (Grobbelaar, 1974, p. 1) was moved to ponder the “puzzle” of the Afrikaner and conclude that Afrikaners live “under the constellation of the question mark”\textsuperscript{12}.

Identity is not, of course, a constant, although the term “Afrikaner” has sufficient constancy for it to be understood to refer to the same broad group of people over three and a half centuries of settlement in South Africa. Within the term, identity is constantly being redefined. In discourse theory, periods of historical dislocation, of which the end of Apartheid has been a seismic one for Afrikaners, result in a dislocation of identity that, in turn, redirects an identity project that may have become sedimented over a period, or that is found unfit for its historical purpose.

There is inevitably an existential dimension to any identity project\textsuperscript{13}. Post-apartheid Afrikaners, according to De Klerk (2000, p. 9) are “milling around like a bunch of

\textsuperscript{10} Leader of the Freedom Front Plus Party, considered to be the last vestige of Afrikaner nationalism.
\textsuperscript{11} My translation.
\textsuperscript{12} My translation.
\textsuperscript{13} Afrikaners are not the only group having to wrestle with a post-Apartheid identity. So-called “coloureds” tend to have Afrikaans as a home language and so are important to identify within a broad definition as “Afrikaanses”. They have increasingly rejected a common political “black” identity due to Affirmative Action policies that prioritise “black Africans” as beneficiaries of employment or, for example, study bursaries and entry to tertiary education. This has led to a sense of marginalisation. Coloureds have over recent years sought to counter misunderstandings of their identity as a product of black-white miscegeny, and
cornered sheep”14. This aimlessness is also suggested by Vestergaard (2001) in the title of his study of Afrikaner identities, “Who’s got the map”, and De Vries (2012), whose book translates roughly as “Buggered Direction”. It is also poignantly captured in the lines “swervers sonder rigting … soekers wat nooit vind” in Koos du Plessis’s poem “Kinders van die wind” (Brink, 2008, p. 893). Even so, these journeys form a boundary of identity, and it cannot be ignored that one of the founding myths of Afrikaners was the Great Trek, whose 175th anniversary is being celebrated with enthusiasm nearly two decades into the democratic dispensation.

While Marx could confidently assert that “in everyday life every shopkeeper is well able to distinguish between what somebody professes to be and what he really is” (Marx, 1968), the “being” of any group cannot be reduced to an essence, and nor can appearances and signs be reduced to mere chimeras. The poststructuralist assumption integral to this thesis is that identity is a construct (Laclau, 2000a) and that it is under continual process of reevaluation, redefinition and reconstruction (Norval, 2000; Howarth, 2000; Steyn, 2001). Even Breyten Breytenbach (in his Foreward to Slabbert, 1999, p. xiii) is moved to conclude that any “‘blueprint’” of Afrikaners that may have existed has been “conclusively shattered”15. Identity is, moreover, “both a structural and subjective condition determined by historical forces and the prevailing structure of power relations” (R. Davies, 2009, p. 5), and not merely a function of Sartrean voluntarism.

14 My translation.
15 My translation.
The history of Afrikaners begins in 1652 in the Cape, but the first recorded assertion of what is understood to be an Afrikaner identity was that of Hendrik Biebouw in 1707: “…ik ben een Afrikaander” (quoted in Giliomee, 2009, p. 22). As a first-generation South African, and as what would still be called a “coloured”, it is likely that he was not so much asserting a cultural identity but a right of occupancy based on birth origin (in opposition to the status of European interlopers) (De Villiers, 2012, p. 47; Giliomee, 2009, p. 23).

By the end of the first half-century of settlement, a social identity based on being “of Africa” had consolidated into a “sense of being Afrikaners rather than being Dutch or French or German” (Giliomee, 2009, p. 51). Steyn (2001, p. 102) points out that this “[…] dissociation from European roots, has been important in Afrikaner identity since the earliest time of white settlement. This self-identification with the land also indicated a strong claim of entitlement to the land […]”

It would be impossible to claim, however, that Afrikaner identity emerged fully-fledged as a discursive construct during this period. Rather, it gathered momentum and shape through key periods in South Africa’s history. They are broadly, to use Pretorius’s categorisation (Pretorius, 2012): The Dutch era in the Cape (1652-1806), British rule in the Cape (1806-1834), The Great Trek (1830s-40s), Nation-forming (1850-1900), the Rise and Consolidation of Afrikaner nationalism (1875-1948), the Apartheid Period (1948-1994), the Post-apartheid Period (1994-2004) and the Period of Democratic Puberty (2004-2011). Spliced into this history are other formative periods: the Mfecane (1750-1835), the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and the growth of black resistance to apartheid (1950s-1980s).

Throughout, however, conflict defined the political history of Afrikaners (Giliomee & Adam, 1981, p. 7; Roux, 1972). This conflict took place within the fold, as
“broedertwis”\textsuperscript{16}, between groups (whether Dutch, English or black), and ultimately, in the 1980s era of “total onslaught”, with nations that fell under the influence of the communist USSR and those nations who had imposed economic sanctions and cultural boycotts against South Africa.

It is under the master-signifier of “Afrikaner” that these ideological battles were joined, crystallising in the ethno-nationalism that gave the National Party its electoral victory of 1948. “Volk” and racism combined (Van der Westhuizen, 2007, p. 12) to give this ethno-nationalism expression through four decades of Apartheid rule, and it is specifically against this history that post-1994 Afrikaner identity has struggled to reshape itself.

Blaser and Van der Westhuizen (2012, p. 388) argue that “while the common political project of a state-based ethno-nationalism has been abandoned by Afrikaners, ethnicity and neo-liberalism have emerged as new defence strategies for a whiteness in rehabilitative mode.” Davies (2012) and Van Der Westhuizen (2007) both argue that Afrikaners have “globalised” by riding the wave of neo-liberalism. But while Davies argues that ethnic identification is being eroded and superseded by affiliations of race and class, Blaser and Van Der Westhuizen (2012, p. 386) discern, using Stuart Hall’s phrase, a “return to the local”, “in which a defensive and exclusivist ethnicity is rediscovered as grounding in the face of the destabilisations of postmodernity and globalization”.

These dynamics are clearly complex, operating simultaneously, but not necessarily in a complementary way. Discourse and material force create further confusion and contradiction. For example, Blaser and Van Der Westhuizen (2012, p. 384) point to the

\textsuperscript{16} Generally understood to be the ideological battle between the “verligtes” and “verkramptes” to direct the political course of Afrikanerdom during apartheid. The shades of “twis” can be more nuanced than this, however, and their origins in the Anglo-Boer War carry through into the present. The spectrum of allegiance to the “volk” has ranged from “joiners” (the worst form of “verraaier”, and an accusation leveled in more recent history at the last National Party leader Marthinus van Schalkwyk and Foreign Minister Pik Botha for his rapprochement with the ANC), “hensoppers” (applied to Frederik van Zyl Slabbert when he was leader of the opposition (Blake, 2010, p. 266)), “afvalliges”, “krygers” and “bittereinders” (the most heroic of the folk heroes and a term that PRAAG (the Pro-Afrikaanse Aksie Groep/Pro-Afrikaans Action Group) and its leader Dan Roodt consider applicable to their mission to “attain freedom in a Fourth Afrikaans Republic” (PRAAG, 2013)).
fact that while the trade union Solidarity has euphemised race into “rights” under the Constitution, it is “successfully mobilising white, Afrikaans-speaking workers”.

There is agreement (Giliomee, 2009; Marais, 2011; Pretorius, 2012) that with democracy, and the disbanding of the National Party in 2005, Afrikaners have lost the political power that constituted a key element of their identity. The figures tell the story: while Afrikaners, under Apartheid, made up 60% of the voting population, they are now reduced to 6%, “a ten-fold reduction of political influence, that was for some traumatic to handle”17 (Joubert, 2012, p. 599).

However, their influence has not been scattered in the wind: 94% of white Afrikaans-speakers who voted, voted for the opposition Democratic Alliance in 2009 (Joubert, 2012, p. 600), attracted by policies informed by individual rights, clean governance and neo-liberal economics. Joubert notes the paradox that such a percentage of Afrikaners congregating under a single banner is unprecedented in their history, a phenomenon that presents interesting challenges to anyone trying to situate Afrikaners ideologically.

There may no longer be a significant, overtly Afrikaner-nationalist ethnic bloc as such. But to define Afrikaners, even shorn of a nationalist ideology, is possible if they are viewed as a Higgs boson group: that is one whose co-ordinates are known (through language, religion and common history, but also, and still, race), which is not visible except when it flares in the particle collider of identity politics, and whose presence is known from the way they agitate the world around them. As such Afrikaners have a material force that serves as a point of reference for any discourse that suggests the marginalisation or victimization of the group.

Research such as that of Bornman (2010) suggests that Afrikaners’s sense of national identity is becoming more tenuous, contributing to a sense of marginalisation. This goes against the ideological repositioning that Afrikaans media have undertaken (Wasserman, 2009) and their explicit and implicit broad embrace of the new political order.

———

17 My translation.
Afrikaners, because of their history (and because there is no consensus on who belongs to such a group, and because only the marginal right wing willingly identifies with the appellation), cannot assert their interests explicitly as those of Afrikaners.

The mechanisms of assertion take various forms. The most aggressive are those adopted by civil-rights groups such as Solidarity and AfriForum. Solidarity, for example, has mounted several challenges to the implementation of affirmative action on behalf of white, mainly Afrikaans-speaking candidates who have been passed over for jobs. AfriForum Youth in 2012 year protested at what it saw as an admissions policy at the University of Pretoria that prejudiced the chances of white students of getting in to Onderstepoort to study veterinary science. AfriForum itself took on what it considers as hate speech, the singing of the song “Shoot the Boer”\(^\text{18}\), and has also gone to court to block street renaming in Pretoria. The net effect of these actions is that the primary beneficiaries are those formerly constituted as Afrikaners, while the rights of all whites, as whites, are asserted in the process.

**The media and identity**

It is clear that identity construction does not take place in a vacuum. It is “part of political contests”(Wasserman, 2005b), and identity discourses are “deeply interwoven with the operation of power in society” (Elliott, 2011, p. xvii).

The media play a central role in these discursive practices, in the sense that they “generate, corroborate and accelerate identity formation, just as they overshadow and negate it” (Hadland, Louw, Sesanti, & Wasserman, 2008, p. 3). Afrikaans media, as former mouthpieces (to a greater or lesser extent) of the ruling National Party, have been given an ideological makeover, ditching racist, Apartheid ideology in favour of a free-market one in which the commodification of Afrikaans as a language has ensured their economic survival (Wasserman, 2009).

\(^{18}\) The South African High Court ruled in September 2011 that “Shoot the Boer” did indeed constitute hate speech and banned the ANC from singing it.
This process is riven by “contradictions and paradoxes”, and, as Wasserman (2009) points out, “this discourse of consumption and individual freedom of choice seemed to be in tension with the more overtly ideological discourse of cultural politics.” Wiida Fourie (2008), too, shows that largely unchanged typifications of “the other” in letters to Beeld, tend to undermine the reconstruction of Afrikaner identity taking place elsewhere in the paper.

What is it, then, that can be seen amid these contradictions? O’Meara (1997) questions who the “narrators” of Afrikaner nationhood are. (I use the term “nation” in Benedict Anderson’s sense of “an imagined community” (Anderson, 1991, p. 49)). That is, who is articulating the narrative that allows the group to mobilise as a nation? Is it possible to view a newspaper, as an entity, as such a narrator?

A newspaper, as all media theory makes clear (O'Shaughnessy & Stadler, 2004), does not occupy a neutral zone. Apart from anything else, the relationship between newspaper and reader is an intimate one, and communication takes place en famille, as it were, whatever space it may otherwise occupy in the public sphere. When the Daily Sun erects a cardboard cutout of a “blue-collar man” in its lobby to give visible form to its marketing-defined target reader, it indicates that it addresses each individual reader personally, and that the product it presents is done under the “authorship” of the Daily Sun. The effect of this is that “a series of cultural values is invisibly in play whenever authorship is evoked and an author function attributed to a text” (Downing, 2008, p. 64).

To make the invisible visible is the subject of discourse theory. Deacon (1999, p. 146) provides a working definition of discourse as relating “not only to the actual uses of language as a form of social interaction, in particular situations and contexts, but also on forms of representation in which different social categories, different social practices and relations are constructed from and in the interests of a particular point of view, a particular conception of social reality”.

25
These processes of meaning-making are encapsulated in Stuart Hall’s seminal “encoding/decoding” conceptualisation of the functioning of media (Hall, 1980a). Located in linguistic theory, the model points to the gaps between denotation and connotation in texts, the usefulness of which in critical social theory is that within these gaps lie the conceptual seeds of social change and the prospect of “freedom”, in this case the freedom to construct a new(er) identity.

The interplay between denotation and connotation is also for Hall, as it is for Barthes (Barthes, 1972), the domain of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses, the latter of which give insights into what Hall calls “oppositional” identities. A question that arises in relation to identity discourse in Beeld, is whether the assertion of what amounts to an Afrikaner ethnic identity is oppositional, and if so, to what? Is it a “subaltern whiteness” (Blaser & Van der Westhuizen, 2012, p. 383) speaking against its own history, against “Rainbowism” or “nativism”, and is the drop-off in identification with “South Africanism” the result of this?

Castells (1997, p. 8) refines this line of theory by positing three forms of identity: “legitimising identity”, “resistance identity” and “project identity”, the last being one in which social actors “build a new identity that redefines their position in society and, by doing so, seek the transformation of overall social structure”. Afrikaners, paradoxically as ever, would seem to fuse Hall’s “oppositional” and Castells’s “project” identities. (These concepts will be explored in greater depth in Chapter Two).

The two terms capture two components that go hand in hand when considering identity. “Opposition” refers (apart from other more dynamic aspects of resistance) to situation, or how identity is positioned in the public sphere. “Project” (apart from its connotations of direction and objective) refers to a process of construction. Each operates in relation to the other.
Othering

The process of “othering”, in turn, is integral to this interrelationship, in two ways. The first, drawing from De Saussure, rests on the insight in his *Course in General Linguistics* (1959) that concepts derive their meaning from “what the others are not”. In other words, meaning is never intrinsic or fixed, and always dependant on context (historical and semiotic), thus establishing differentiation and distinction. The second takes this innocuous recognition of “the other” and establishes a legitimation of self through an imposition on “the other” of a set of demeaning and pejorative values that Said (2003) terms “Orientalism”.

Both of these definitions posit an external “other”. The marshalling of group identity recognizes, however, that the positioning of the group entails an internal, or reflexive process of othering as well. (Othering, and the interrelationship between forms of othering and what I am calling “self-othering”, will be explained and developed in Chapter Two.)

I hope to show that victimhood, or “grievability”, forms one of the nuances of this dynamic.

Victimhood and innocence

To elaborate: implicitly or explicitly a narrative of victimhood is being created for Afrikaners, not for the first time in their history (Giliomee, 2009; O'Meara, 1983). I will argue that, through this narrative, Afrikaners negate the stigma of “oppressor”. An active, current status of “victim” serves to neutralise assaults on them as either Afrikaners, or whites, or political reactionaries (depending on the rhetoric of the day). It appeals to an impulse of humanitarian sympathy that wipes away the past and focuses on the present. An immediate need is created that trumps past crimes. In a topsy-turvy world, Malema’s “criminal” becomes Dan Roodt’s “victim”. This is a narrative that finds echoes in plaintive cries of “reverse racism”, allowing Afrikaners to embrace an identity as the
new “others”, victimised and put upon by those they themselves have and continue to “other” (partly by largely ignoring them in the pages of *Beeld*, for example).

This “self-othering”, as I hope to show, serves, at least implicitly, to empower the bargaining position of Afrikaners through weakness; a judo-move to catch the opponent off-guard, so to speak. This operates in conjunction with the “othering” of the “bad Afrikaner”, the displacement of the atavistic Afrikaner associated with and responsible for Apartheid. It is these mechanisms of cultural representation that are manifested in *Beeld* that allow its readers to embrace, or otherwise, their position as South Africans and as Afrikaners.

Discourse and representation do not take place in ethereal isolation. They operate in what the anthropologist Kate Crehan (1997, p. 172) calls “landscapes of meaning”, the “social environment within which people live” and in which hegemonic and counter-hegemonic battles are fought out. This is the terrain within which my thesis is located. Crehan extends her metaphor to point out that these “landscapes of meaning” are inextricably linked to, although not always determined by, “underlying geological formations with their associated tectonic forces”.

These “tectonic forces” refer primarily to politics and economy, which are not the subject of my thesis, but whose grinding and heaving I take to reverberate through every aspect of society. In Chapter Two I explore the contours of these forces, in a way that seeks to show the “fractal topography” within which Afrikaner identity is constructed and within which the benefits of the past and the losses (or otherwise) of the present can be understood. For example, the debate is extensive whether Afrikaners, under the ideological banner of the “volk”, rode the wave of capital (Marais, 2011; O’Meara, 1983) as it rolled inexorably along but over which they had little real control, or whether they directed the course of capitalism in an aberrant (Giliomee, 2009) or irrational (Lipton, 1986) way. The net result is nevertheless a material privilege that is given expression in

---

19 I conclude, however, in Chapter Seven, that this “othering” of the “bad Afrikaner” is relatively mild, and less forceful than might have been expected given the discourse of “transformation”.
income and education levels, work skills, leisure activities and cultural and political pre-occupations that inform the identity(ies) of post-apartheid Afrikaners.

1.3. Chapters

This chapter has set out the impetus and objectives of my thesis. I raise the question of how Afrikaner identity is established not only in relation to an external “other”, but also through a reflexive process of “self-othering” that serves to regulate the internal boundaries of the group.

In Chapter Two I elaborate and explain these concepts, and place my thesis in the context of other research, exploring historical and contemporary considerations of Afrikaans media and their role in South Africa’s social, economic and political transformation.

In Chapter Three I develop my theoretical framework, locating my thesis within Discourse Theory, with reference to discursive relations of power in the media and the ethical and hegemonic implications of particular modes of representation.

Chapter Four deals with my research methodology, establishing the rationale of content analysis and discourse analysis as research methods for the collection and analysis of data.

Chapter Five establishes the media and historical setting within which Beeld and its individual and collective reports can be read, and the suggestive semantic framework within which some meanings can be seen as more likely to have resonance than others.

Chapter Six presents a detailed analysis of the themes and discourses that emerge from a reading of Beeld.

Chapter Seven draws conclusions from this study and suggests how my findings may stimulate further research.
1.4. Key Research Questions

All the chapters address these key research questions:

1. What is “self-othering”?  
   It is necessary to establish the context and limits within which “othering” is an integral dynamic in identity construction and group relations. Within these limits it is necessary to differentiate the various dynamics of “othering”, which can roughly be summarised as the “othering” of the “external” or “other other”, the “othering” of the self in relation to the “other other”, and the “othering” of the self in relation to the self (or notional core group). Addressing this question will seek to establish whether “self-othering” contributes to a political particularism, and whether this strengthens or weakens the position of a minority on the national political stage.

2. How is “self-othering” presented?  
   Identity is constructed in communication (following Castells) and shaped in discourse (following Foucault). The process of representation sets parameters of identification in relation to which identity will form and flex its muscles. The phenomena of “othering” and “self-othering” will have latent and manifest aspects in the media, and identifying these will inform an understanding of processes of social and political signification. Furthermore, this understanding will also provide a critique of the ethical implications of how media engage in representations of “self” and “other”.

3. Why is “self-othering” an important feature of Afrikaner identity construction?  
   Identity tends to have its greatest social and political impact when it is able to consolidate unambiguously around a chosen point of reference. One way of viewing identity is through difference, a difference that marks the boundary between inside and outside.
Class, race and language are standard markers of difference. However, since no social group, Afrikaners included, is homogeneous in all respects, or devoid of ambiguities, identity battles are fought as much on the external perimeter of difference as along lines drawn in the sand within the laager. While attention tends to be focused on how groupings rub up against each other, of equal import to broader society is how a group rubs up against itself, how it resolves ambiguities in a way that consolidates the core group. How this core is carved out of the multiple contestations for the same space is important to determine, because it may contribute to whether the broad group can be accommodated within mainstream political processes. “Self-othering” is a specific phenomenon within this range of dynamics, and plays a role in whether “Afrikaner identity” is considered to be a marginal or a central issue.
2. Chapter Two: Introduction

2.1. Introduction: A fractal topography

The history of South Africa is one of a struggle in becoming. Initially, from the perspective of white settlers, it was a struggle to be free from oppressive colonial authority while being simultaneously of Europe (albeit not European) and not African (albeit of Africa). From this indeterminate ambivalence of being, grew struggles that sculpted new identities which in turn shaped the manner in which groups divided from and clashed with each other.

None of these struggles is definitive, and while the contexts in which they take place are specific, the meaning and result of these struggles is never static, never conclusive. No society is a totality, by which an enumeration of parts and trends can lead to a full understanding of it in either a current or future incarnation. It has no beginning and no end, and so the role of critical theory for Jurgen Habermas (1994, p. 93), for example, is to investigate “the conditions for recoupling a rationalized culture with an everyday communication dependent on vital traditions”. These couplings themselves are the focus of the political theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1989), who view them as a ceaseless process of “articulation”, which they define as a practice that establishes a mutually constitutive relationship between social, political and cultural elements (Laclau & Mouffe, 1989, p. 105).

Both take it as given that there is an interplay between the subjective and the objective. Habermas locates the subjective within a context he terms “lifeworld”, while the objective is referred to as the “system”. Bourdieu (1993), for his part and building on Habermas, locates the subjective within the “habitus”, while the objective is a matrix that constitutes the “field”, or what Foucault in a much narrower sense terms the “set-up” (to use Veyne’s (2010) translation of “episteme”). All these theorists follow Marx in positing that “individuals interact only in exchange” (Love, 1999, p. 49), and also Spinoza in that his principle of conatus, by which all humans seek to persist in their own being, informs
every engagement of the individual with the social. For Bourdieu (1986), the process of exchange is geared towards capital accumulation (social, political, economic, erotic and so on) that is subject to, and gives force to, shifting power relations. For Habermas (1984), the exchange is located in communication, through which the possibility of a rationalised “lifeworld” may be created in which the individual and society seek a reconciliation of values and modes of being.

For Laclau and Mouffe, the exchange takes place in discourse, through hegemonic contestations that constantly articulate and rearticulate chains of equivalence and difference that shape and bound the social. They recognise, following Gramsci (1975) that consent is not always obtained through force or coercion. But while Habermas places great store in discursive democracy as a function of rules that govern dialogical reason, which is in turn the lifeblood of his notion of the “public sphere”, Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory leans much more towards the strategic harnessing of contingent factors.

It is within a broad and fluid set of contingent factors that a distinctive identity within a way of being has been forged among Afrikaners. In Saussurian terms, it has been given meaning only through the possibility of their being different and distinguishable from “others”. As nature abhors a vacuum, so the imperative of the living is to exist. “Whatever is, is experienced in relation to its non-being,” writes Adorno (1974, p. 79), infusing an existential dimension into a structuralist formulation.

The state of non-being in relation to the British Empire informed the struggles of Afrikaners to acquire first their own language, then their independence, then their own state and finally their own nation, which became co-terminous with their own country. The armada of Afrikanerdom sailed under the flags of republicanism, nationalism, racial purity, freedom and self-determination, among others, all consolidated under the master signifier of the volk.
Equally, the legislative non-being of Africans within this history gave rise to a liberation struggle that flew the flag of a national democratic revolution, but which brought into being a post-1994 liberal-constitutional democratic dispensation, with its attendant neo-liberal economy inflected with welfarist social policies.

The notion of nation was, in both cases, the form adopted by these struggles. In the first case, it was a nation conceived in terms of an Enlightenment actualisation of society, while in the second the nation was seen as the revolutionary reclamation of a stolen birthright. The “nation” can handily be conceived as an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991), which allows for a trans-historical understanding of groups as well as a historicist one located in territory. Eagleton (2003) offers a more ideologically based definition of the “nation” as “a way of rallying different social classes - peasants, workers, students, intellectuals - against the colonial powers which stood in the way of their independence.” He argues further, however, that “the aggressive restructurings of a Western capitalism fallen upon hard times finally put paid to illusions of national-revolutionary independence”, which nevertheless continues to be a hegemonising theme in South African discourse in the form of the “National Democratic Revolution”.

The shuttering of this teleology redirected post-colonial theory from questions of nation to ethnicity, according to Eagleton (2003), which has accentuated the “cultural turn” at the expense of the political. Laclau and Fredric Jameson argue, however, that the political transects and informs the social in its every aspect, but while Laclau, especially in his later work (2005) elects to ride (cautiously) the wave of postmodernism, Jameson (Jameson, 2011, p. 10) seeks to re-engage the “interrogations of truth” amid the ineffable and bewildering maelstrom of disintegrating totalities.

While there are continuities with the past, and while the colonial is manifestly present in the post-colony, 1994 represents a watershed from which have flowed new contestations of being. Some of these contestations consist in the reformulation, or the reconstitution, or the rehabilitation, and in some cases, the demise, of identities and social formations.

---

20 By “African” here I mean indigenous black populations.
Apartheid was the defining feature of South African society and politics from 1948 to 1994. Its premises of race, difference and structural and spatial separation continue to inform every aspect of South African life. Distiller (2008, p. 274) notes the challenge facing both researcher and citizen: “South Africa, as a ‘new’ nation, is engaged in the rather contradictory task of building a national identity that depends on a past it is seeking to transcend. We have inherited ethnic identities which are overdetermined by the signifying systems of colonialism and apartheid, imbricated as these identities are in race as a primary category.” Identities are rooted, therefore, in “difference”, which Distiller (2008, p. 275) considers “the primary building block of the ‘new’ South Africa”.

The immediate question that arises from this is how the “constitutive character” of “difference” can support the project of the *simunye* “Rainbow Nation” envisioned by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Rose-spectacled identification with this Rainbowism is often seen as a prerequisite for any “new” South African identity. Against this it is argued “identification is not reducible to identity” (Butler, Laclau, & Zizek, 2000, p. 1), a critique that has relevance to the paradoxes that present themselves in considerations of Afrikaner identity.

While Apartheid fell within a broad history of colonial exploitation by Dutch settlers and the British Empire, it was the apotheosis of Afrikanerdom. And however much it enlisted to its cause the majority of whites, it was an Afrikaner enterprise.

Historical, political, social and ideological studies debate the exact nature of the Apartheid state, whether it was a rational or irrational enterprise and whether its racism was intrinsic to the march of Capital in a colonial setting (O’Meara, 1983). Was it a question of nationalism (Van Jaarsveld, 1964)? Was it a malevolent programme (ie a crime against humanity) or an ad hoc, make-it-up-as-we-go-along politics of survival, expediency and opportunism, as suggested by Giliomee (2012)?
Historians in the liberal English and the nationalist Afrikaner traditions, and whether supportive or critical of its objectives, tend to write Apartheid off as an aberration of sorts, making possible the myth that ordinary individuals never supported it, and that it was imposed on the population at large by a Broederbond cabal, and crypto-Nazis like H.F. Verwoerd and B.J. Vorster who hijacked the country away not only from blacks, but from well-meaning whites too (ie, everyone). It is vital to conceptualise what happened in a sufficiently meaningful way that the past is not written off as “inexplicable”, as being another country from which we have emigrated, as former Beeld editor Tim du Plessis once put it. It is therefore important to identify the threads of continuity, the ideological traces of the past that are still being woven into the “new” South Africa. And it is equally important to identify the discontinuities that allow us to distinguish in which ways the past is still a lived present, or a construct used to define the present.

The specific relevance of this is that discourse theory attempts to understand what is being addressed in an utterance, or within a discourse. In other words, is the true addressee the one to whom a statement is ostensibly directed, and is the ostensible subject of such a statement the one that is being presented? In a fraught moral environment these questions weigh heavily on all interpretation.

Either way, it is necessary, before venturing into the realm of abstractions, to emphasise that the institutions of Apartheid were not inert; they were given life by individuals, and those individuals collectively are recorded in history as Afrikaners, whether or not they subscribed fully or not at all to grand Apartheid or its racist premises, or whether they simply “played possum”. They policed two boundaries: the first, inner boundary, was ethnic, and so circumscribed the exclusive domain of Afrikanerdom. The second, outer boundary, was racial, and permitted whites as a broad group to share the spoils of Apartheid. This was an active process that found expression on every street, in every shop, at every workplace and in every home. It created victims. Those who created these victims were therefore perpetrators. Discourses of identity (not to mention

---

21 Durrheim (2011, p. 28) captures this as “the continuous and ongoing ‘mundane practices’ that privilege whiteness and whose cumulative weight is deeply distressing to black people.”
government policy and institutional practice) are shaped around these poles of existence, history and morality. Simply put, all discourses of “development”, “transformation”, “redress”, “redistribution”, “past”, “guilt”, “African”, “South African”, “future” - the list goes on - take Apartheid (and colonialism) and racism as their constitutive outside.

Any social analysis under these conditions implies two conditions of judgment that bear on objective understanding: first, “that human life is worth living”, and secondly that “in a given society, specific possibilities exist for the amelioration of human life and specific ways and means of realizing these possibilities” (Marcuse, 1970, p. 10). The “possibilities of amelioration” are embodied in the notion of a “New South Africa”, which is itself nevertheless under attack as a misnomer that papers over persistent faultlines.

### 2.2. Unfinished business

One of these faultlines is the question of how the “past” has been dealt with, and it has direct pertinence to the Afrikaans newspapers in that their ideological repositioning explicitly “moves on” from this past. The “huge amount of unfinished business in South Africa relating to the country’s apartheid past [and] the failure to deal with it leaves the country crippled in many ways”(Bell, 2001, p. 1). A narrow focus in the Truth And Reconciliation Commission on the most egregious individual examples of brutality meant that “no serious examination was made of the system that gave rise to some of the most horrific, racist social engineering of modern times”(Bell, 2001, p. 1), amid suggestions that “truth and justice [were] sacrificed to reconciliation”(Bell, 2001, p. 1). Van der Westhuizen (2007, p. 7) argues that in spite of, or perhaps because of this, “The TRC’s (partial) exposure of apartheid’s real effects on the lives of ordinary black people shattered a self-serving conspiracy of silence about these realities among Afrikaners. It ripped through the paternalism, the racist obfuscation and the self-delusion that enabled apartheid and the increasingly extreme violations of human rights in the 1980s and early 1990s. The revelations caused many Afrikaners to sink into denial.”
Any notions of “before” and “after”, or references to “rupture” and “dislocation”, must therefore take into account that while there was a chronological point at which power was transferred (April 27, 1994), social and economic processes are still transitional and a key discourse of this period is that of “transformation”.

Given such a discourse of “unfinished business” (energetically promoted by ousted ANC Youth League leader and now Commander in Chief of the Economic Freedom Fighters, Julius Malema, among others), together with its implication of retribution and an unsettling intimation of an unhappy end to the “miracle” which had Nelson Mandela as its saint, it stands to reason that the post-apartheid era would present severe challenges to whites in general and to Afrikaners in particular. These challenges elicit redefinitions of identity to firm up the foundations of a new way of living, sometimes predicated on or accompanied by a rejection of Apartheid.

This rejection is sometimes manifested through feelings of guilt and shame (Steyn, 2004). Steyn (2001) notes too a pervasive sense of loss, not only of power, influence and dignity, but of a very sense of place and belonging that resulted from what J.M. Coetzee called “South Africa’s entry into Africa”. This range of “negative” emotions is not only evidence of an ebbing past, but of its instrumentalisation in ways that are bewildering and counter-intuitive. The historical past, while ostensibly buried, also tends to surface “in the services of nostalgia and melancholy” (Gilroy, 2004, p. 2) as well as through narratives of loss.

It is possible to draw from this the conclusion that a reconfiguration of identity is taking place through the conscious or unconscious use of denial. However, at its simplest level, it may just be informed by the basic need for a positive social identity (Tajfel, 1982), thereby offsetting the loss of dignity, or face. It is also possible that what Arendt (1958), in reference to the similar process of rehabilitation that post-war Germans had to undergo, calls the gap between action and behaviour, is unbridgeable without some recourse to ideological guide ropes. People “produce society in order to live” (Godelier, 2011, p. 1), and Appadurai (2012, p. 187) emphasises the enormous effort that goes into
“the maintenance of routine understandings” (a pre-requisite for the “perpetuation of routine social life”) in environments that demand the reconciliation of “long-standing enmities”. Drawing on Das (2007), Appadurai (2012, p. 187), ever mindful of the Hobbesian abyss on which conflict-riven societies teeter, observes that “the production of routine social life is a complex project in which ordinary persons strive to find the right balance between attention and distraction, compromise and confrontation, visibility and recessiveness, in their bodily presence, and between greater or lesser knowledge of the circumstances of their daily lives.”

How have Afrikaners gone about this understanding of their daily lives?

Seminal studies in the immediate post-1994 period (Norval, 1996; Van Niekerk, 2000; Heaven, Woogong, Stones, Simbayi, & Le Roux, 2000; Botha, 2001; Steyn, 2001; Vestergaard, 2001) analysed how Afrikaners were adapting to or resisting the implications of change. A relative lack of academic interest then sets in until 2007, which produced a flurry of articles on, for example, the De La Rey song phenomenon22, and an intense focus on the subject of Afrikaner identity has been maintained since then.

Vestergaard (2001) warns of the threat to an understanding of a “new” Afrikaner identity by creating a “chain of equivalence” that links Afrikaners inevitably to Apartheid. Such an immutability is expressed by, for example, Verwey (2008, p. 4) who states that “Afrikaner Nationalism and the discourse of Apartheid have always formed a central part of Afrikaner identity”. In so doing he perpetuates a long tradition of conflating terms that then become interchangeable, their specific meaning congealed in an ahistorical putty that is applied to every window on the subject.

This is not just a post-apartheid phenomenon. O’Meara (1983, p. 6), for example, takes issue with Welsh (1974, p. 249) for using “the terms Afrikanerdom and Afrikaners

---

22 The pop song De La Rey, by singer Bok van Blerk, was a best-seller and continues to be popular, and for example is the first track on an Afrikaans music CD sent to subscribers of Beeld in 2012. The song was seen by Afrikaners as a revalidation of their own (as opposed to collective) history by tapping into the anti-colonial heroism of a Boer-war general. It was seen by others, notably the ANC, as a racist call to arms of sorts in the face of a “black” government.
cotermionously with Afrikaner nationalism”, which in turn is taken to mean “right-wing” and standing in contrast (in contemporary political discourse) with the “left-wing” nationalism of the African National Congress. The continuing pejorative force of the word “Afrikaner”, as evidenced by the way it is deployed by, for example, Lulu Xingwana23 and Julius Malema24, and even reflexively by the artist Mark Kannemeyer (who might otherwise have been considered an Afrikaner), quoted in De Vries (2012, p. 376) indicates that the connotations born of these historical conflations of terms are entrenched (See later in this chapter for the relevant quotes). This closure of meaning creates an explanatory dead end, in which analysis discerns ghostly outlines of the past and seeks to recreate out of them a material presence that is taken to be identical to its previous, immutable incarnation.

O’Meara (1983, p. 6) sums up the hazard of taking as a starting point “the Afrikaner” or “Afrikanerdom” as an “a priori, self-generating category”: “Embedded within the category ‘Afrikanerdom’ are the questionable premises that all (white) Afrikaans-speakers are automatically integrated into the cross-class organic unity of the volk, instinctively share the presumably innate ‘Afrikaner’ conservative traditional values, and are always available for ethnic mobilization in terms of their common ‘Afrikaner’ interests.” (The post-apartheid political terrain, which includes the demise of the New National Party and the electoral disenchantment with ethnic or rightwing parties, together with disputations and what Pechez (1983) terms “ideological disidentification” with Afrikanerness, tend to bear out O’Meara’s warning.)

This does not mean that the term “Afrikaner”, especially as it refers to an ethnic group, has no meaning. O’Meara is simply emphasizing that there are structural explanations for the emergence of “ethnic identities”, that these take different forms in different conditions, and that there is a dynamic interplay between material, economic conditions and identity.

23 Former Minister for Women, Children and People With Disabilities.
24 Former leader of the ANC Youth League before his expulsion from the party, who then formed the Economic Freedom Fighters political party, for which he is a member of parliament.
Laclau (in Butler et al., 2000, p. 57) argues that “if the name (the signifier) is so attached to the concept (signified) that no displacement in the relation between the two is possible, we cannot have any hegemonic rearticulation”. In the post-1994 domain, a persistent subordination of the signified to the signifier “Afrikaner” cannot contribute to “transformation” or “reconciliation”. The ongoing contestations over terms such as Afrikaner, Afrikaanses, Afrikaan by leading figures such as Breyten Breytenbach, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert and others (mostly Afrikaans speakers) should be seen as efforts not only to recast old identities, but as creating the conditions for “hegemonic rearticulation”.

2.3. Post-1994: Post-what?

It is taken as given that 1994 was the end of South Africa’s Apartheid past and the start of its democratic era, and most public discourse directs itself to this “fact”. It is spoken about as if it represents a categorical historical coupure, a definitive psychological rupture, a social and political dislocation (in Laclau’s sense). The analytical terrain is suffused with binaries of before/after, bad/good, oppression/freedom, racism/Rainbowism, nationalism/globalism, Africanism/South Africanism, Afrikaner/Afrikaan. While these dyads are useful as co-ordinates by which to navigate a complex reality, it is important to note them as no more than ideological nodal points that form part of an intricate matrix of existence and meaning. This matrix vibrates with valences that are animated by structural and discursive articulations which in turn create the conditions and limits of social agency.

2.4. Continuity

The discourse of the “New South Africa” is framed as a question of “then” and “now”. There has been an emphasis on the present as “transitional” (from inequality to equality), and on the process of “transformation” and “integration”. It is understood, therefore, that the binary dyads are no more than conceptual bookends to actual processes of continuity.
This applies as much to discourses of identity as to those of economics, politics, health, environment and every other aspect of society.

Emphasising the structural continuity of South Africa’s economy, Bond (2005, p. 17), for example, argues that the official entrenchment in 1996 of neo-liberal macro-economic policy through GEAR - the government’s Growth, Employment and Redistribution policy, which Hart (2013, p. 158) argues was a “unilateral” departure from the brief socialist smokescreen represented by the Reconstruction and Development policy - had as its model the “macroeconomic management during the 1989-93 late apartheid depression”. Thabo Mbeki gave expression to this continuity with his “Two Economies” thesis. He first articulated it in his 1996 “Two Nations” speech to parliament (inspired by Benjamin Disraeli’s formulation), in which one nation was “white, relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or geographic dispersal”. The other “larger nation of South Africa is black and poor, with the worst affected being women in the rural areas, the black rural population in general and the disabled.” The historical proximity of Apartheid strongly influenced this racialised understanding of the economy, but by August 2003, in his Letter from the President, he was attributing the economic schism to the “structural disjuncture that separates the ‘first world’ and ‘third world’ economies.” In justifying the government’s hitching of South Africa’s fortunes to globalization, Mbeki argued that it was necessary to encourage “the growth and development of the first economy” while throwing out a grapnel in the form of social grants to the poor until the second economy grew sufficiently to be integrated into the first economy.

The significance of Mbeki’s formulation of the structure of the economy is not so much for its analytical value (which is not central to my thesis and is best left in any case to the political economists to grapple with), but for the way in which it establishes a discursive frontier along which “antagonisms” are created through various forms of “articulation”. (The theoretical framework is that of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and will be elaborated in Chapter Three.)
This frontier is not singular or unchanging. It simultaneously creates a “difference” between white (wealthy) and black (poor) under the signifier of Apartheid exploitation, and an “equivalence” between rich blacks and poor blacks. But at the same time it creates an equivalence between white and black capital as partners in neo-liberalism, and a difference between rich blacks who support enrichment (in the guise of “development” and redressing the past) and those who oppose it (and the neoliberal policies that enable it).

The poor are therefore discursively integral to the hegemonic political project, while superfluous economically. As Hart (2007, p. 96) puts it: “What is significant about this discourse is the way it defines a segment of society that is superfluous to the ‘modern’ economy […] Those falling within this category are citizens, but second class.” This formulation draws on Mamdani’s (1996) analysis of a “bifurcation” of citizenship into first and second class, and raises important questions in media theory about which “citizen” is being served in media discourses and how democracy would be furthered or limited through any exclusion of classes of citizen, who may be constructed as such in representation.

This understanding of inequality corresponds with Jameson’s (2011) argument that globalised capital produces unemployment; that is, that there are not two economies, but one, in which poverty is not an unfortunate byproduct of capitalism but its actual product. As Baudrillard (1994, p. 78) puts it, “the human race is beginning to produce itself as waste product”, which includes not just the unemployed but “ ‘boat people’, deportees, the disappeared, ‘ghost-people’ of all kinds”25.

Marais (2011, p196), in his critique of the two economies view, argues that “Numerous backward and forward linkages operate between the ‘two economies’ …” and that the “two economies” model “is best understood as a discursive intervention that is meant to

---

25 The term “ghost-people” is apt for the poor, who haunt the pages of middle-class newspapers through their absence. Witness editor Andrew Trench, in a column, argues that the exclusive focus of the newspaper on middle-class suburban preoccupations is justified on the basis of the growth of this class, and of course because that is where the money lies that advertisers are fishing for.
endorse and disguise a development path that requires, first and foremost, that the prerogatives of capital be serviced. It marks continuity, not departure.” (p197).

This continuity is obscured by any discussion positioned by the terms “post-”, “transition” and “transformation”. However, even though there may be only “one economy”, it is criss-crossed by a multitude of complex and subtle dynamics.

Hart (2013, pp. 6-7) analyses the countervailing and contradictory dynamics of what she calls “de-nationalisation” (corporate capital’s process of reconnecting with the global economy after 1994) and “re-nationalisation” (marked by current discourses of “inclusion”, “indigenerality”, “rainbowism” and the phasing over from the first to the second stage of the National Democratic Revolution), which upset any linear or two-dimensional way of viewing either South Africa’s political transition or its economic lock-step with globalisation. Bond, Hart and Marais view the transition as an elite transition within (ie not away from) a global context in which black capital sought alliances with other capital. A narrow focus on rupture and discontinuity as a terminal “crisis” tends to obscure the fact that Afrikaners, in spite of losing political power, were able to enter the global economy in numbers (R. Davies, 2009). Bornman (2005) points out that Afrikaners make up the majority in the post-democracy wave of emigration. She places her analysis in the context of “nation building”, seeking explanations in levels of attachment to national, supra-national or sub-national (ethnic) identities. In so doing she suggests underlying motives, possibly such as racism, for emigration. However, Davies views the phenomenon more as a question of economic mobility and the capability (with their skill-set), to exploit the deterritorialised economic opportunities created by globalisation. This is not to say that those Afrikaners who chose not to join the diaspora are excluded from the global economy, which has in large measure structured the local economy; it is to emphasise that discourses about economic disadvantage (through Affirmative Action for example) and diminished opportunities, which inform the day-to-day debate of the lived reality of whites in general, are contradicted not only by wealth measures in the Census, but by the structural requirements and opportunities of the economy.
Nevertheless, bringing together the “unfinished business” of the past and economic demands of the present, Hart (2013, p. 175) notes that “A crucially important dimension of what is going on in South Africa is that escalating struggles over the material conditions of life and livelihood are simultaneously struggles over the meaning of the nation and liberation, as well as expressions of profound betrayal.”

As much as these struggles take place within what Hart, Marais and Bond demonstrate is a single, integrated economy, they are located within what Du Toit and Neves describe as a “fractal topography” (2007, p. 168) “in which both the centre and the margins are present everywhere”. Within this “messy map of unequally constituted, differentially positioned and closely related spaces” (Du Toit & Neves, 2007, p. 169), “… the social and economic agency of any individual person, and their ability to benefit from that agency is mediated and shaped, not only by the particular resources upon which they can draw (…) but also on their positionality in respect of these larger, spatially articulated formations: their relationship to the circuits and connections through which resources and burdens, shocks and windfalls are transmitted across space, and their access to what we might call social technologies of spatialised power. These constitute the ‘actant networks’, as actant theory puts it, that allows (sic) particular people to ‘act at a distance’, to make their influence felt in distant places, and that in turn transmit the effects of far-off events and processes into local contexts.”

Du Toit (2004, p. 29) emphasises that, for example, casual and seasonal workers, who would ordinarily be considered to be marginalised or excluded from the economy, are “thoroughly incorporated into the first economy”, and further, that the poor and unemployed are “adversely incorporated” into the economy if only because of their reliance on retail markets for food, which locks them into ever-present networks and circuits.

“Paying attention to such circuits, systems and connections and how they work,” argue Du Toit and Neves (2007, p. 169), “allows us (to) consider South African society as an
overlay of more or less power-laden, unevenly functioning, tangled and interpenetrated networks. This helps us to focus on the nodes everywhere in society - in the formal and informal sectors, in urban and rural spaces, in ‘traditional’ and modern’ institutions - where power and advantage congeal, and explore the factors that allocate people their positionality in these networks. In such a framework, the key issue is not whether or not people are connected; but the always complex consequences of particular forms of integration.” Together with this goes the ambiguous dance between inclusion and exclusion.

While Du Toit and Neves are primarily concerned with the underlying economic conditions and the way in which groups engage with them, they recognize that the dynamics of integration and exclusion find expression in discourse. For example, while Mbeki found it necessary to incorporate Afrikaner capital (to the extent that it could still be referred to as such) due to the imperatives of the economy, he deployed an Africanist discourse to exclude Afrikaners from the moral commonweal.

In the case of Afrikaners, the question posed in Chapter One of “who are we?” and the reply “we are not like that” are informed by a Heideggerian premise of “authenticity”, and the assumption that if a “new Afrikaner”, specifically a moral Afrikaner, could rise from the ashes of the past, then their legitimacy, and their freedom (in the full sense of unrestrained social, economic and political activity), would be secure in the new dispensation. To presuppose the possibility of such a state of being is to focus exclusively on an individualized and existential interiority. However, such a monastic approach ignores the direct impact that the (external) discursive construction of Afrikaners has on their position and how it can erode any capital (in the Bourdieuan sense of social “capitals”) they may be accumulating. Du Toit (2004, p. 7) points out, for example, that social, human, physical and natural capitals are “what they are because of the broader relationships, practices, institutional frameworks and discursive formations within which

26 Newspapers, especially those with an elite positioning such as Beeld, represent an excellent example of a “node” where “power and advantage congeal”.

46
they are caught up”, and that therefore “what may count as ‘social capital’ or ‘human capital’ in one context cannot necessarily be so counted in another”.

2.5. Who are we?

These ambiguities, and these relative valuings of social and human capital depending on the discourses within which they are located, raise questions over how, over and above a common voters’ roll, it might be possible to establish a common people’s roll.

Ivor Chipkin, for example, asks in his book Do South Africans Exist? (2007), “who are the People?” The title echoes Calpin’s “There Are No South Africans” (Calpin, 1941), and its conclusion that English and Afrikaans were preoccupied by their own “race war” (which was the view of the newspapers on both sides of the language divide) which entirely excluded any consideration of black South Africans, and that therefore there could properly speaking not be any South Africans as such.

Included in Chipkin’s question is a series of others: Where is the invisible line that divides those who belong and those who don’t, those who have a say and those who don’t, those who matter and those who don’t? Under what conditions does that line serve purely to demarcate boundaries of being, and when is it a frontier in which political (and social) antagonism finds expression? His line of reasoning is, briefly, that there has to be a “People” for there to be citizens, and there have to be citizens for there to be a democracy, and if there is no “People” there can be no true democracy.

Within the broad category of the “People”, one can ask too of Afrikaners: “Who are these people?” Following on from this question are others: do they belong, do they matter, do they fall under the ideal of “the People” or are they irredeemably just “Die Volk”, morally disgraced, beyond rehabilitation, irrelevant?
2.6. Afrikaners: “This is how you are”

Foucault argues that discursive practices seek to constrain and restrict the variety of viable speech options through exclusion, which is achieved through procedures of taboo, truth, sanity and authority, among others. He argues (in Bouchard, 1977, p. 199) that discursive practices achieve a “delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories”. This produces an “authorised truth” that becomes part of a society’s “regime of truth”, or its “common-sense knowledge”, reinforced by social relations, and ideologically housed in an “archive” which is “the set of rules which at a given period and for a given society define … the limits and forms of the sayable” (Foucault, 1991, p. 59).

A consideration of how Afrikaners are discursively constructed (and therefore how they are “known”) suggests some insights into their “positionality” within the power/knowledge conjunction, following Foucault’s observation in his essay “Prison Talk” that “it is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is not possible for knowledge not to engender power” (Foucault, 1980, p. 52).

For one thing, at the time of writing this chapter, it is the 175th anniversary of the Great Trek, one of the foundational myths on which Afrikaner identity rests. And yet one is hard-pressed to find any reference to it in the general (English) media. A Google News search throws up “Star Trek”, but no other kind of trek⁷⁷. What remains of the romantic narrative of the trekboers, as rugged, independent, anti-colonial proto-freedom fighters who ventured into a harsh, but empty, hinterland, is under attack not just through being ignored but also in the historiography. Jeff Guy, for example, in his book on Theophilus Shepstone (Guy, 2013, p. 16), characterises them as “seeking out fresh land, dispersing or capturing the African inhabitants, killing the wild and depasturing the stock”. They “were organized in groups around dominant patriarchs and their families, and were supported

---

⁷⁷ A migration or expedition. Term associated with the migration the Voortrekkers, or boer agriculturalists, from the Cape colony in the 1830s.
by the labour of bonded herders, cultivators and domestic servants. Their economy was parasitical: when the land and its resources were exhausted and their numbers had become unwieldy, new land was sought out beyond the formal frontier.”

In this characterisation there is none of the headiness with which Schalk Pienaar, future founding editor of *Beeld*, would write of the 1938 centenary celebrations that “One can say that the entire volk celebrated as one … And the volk realized that it was a volk (Mouton, 2002, p. 30)

Of this legacy, the author Dana Snyman (2014, p. 22) wrote in *Beeld* that “All over the country you can indeed still see the monuments [erected in 1938]. Some are badly damaged. Never again will Afrikaners stand together like that. We are now on a different, most likely more difficult, trek - the great trek through the empty spaces that stretch between people.”

Those empty spaces are filled with ghosts. Charles Smith (2013, p. 8), writing in *Volksblad* about the TV series *Donkerland*, asks “why the ghosts of land, forbidden love, blood, war and [concentration] camps will not stop boiling in our blood … the fever is passed on from generation to generation … but we wait in vain for an antidote to the fever: The apology that the English have owed us for 113 years.” This expectation elides the outstanding apology for 1948-94, the TRC and the unraveling of the rainbow which depended on it.

And those spaces are not getting any smaller. The gap between rich and poor is growing, and the 2012 Development Indicators Report (Chabane, 2013) says only 39% of the population believed race relations were improving compared to 72% in 2000. The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (Lefko-Everett, Nyoka, & Tiscornia, 2011, p. 29) says that only 56% of respondents had ever socialised with people of other races. And Bornman (2010, p. 237) notes in her research that “While national and African identities have apparently strengthened among Blacks since 1994, national identification seems to have diminished among Afrikaans-speaking Whites in favor of ethnic identification.”
Clearly all is not well. But is there even a “we” that Snyman refers to? Herman Giliomee, the historian, suggested at the Klein Karoo Nasionale Kunstefees (KKNK)²⁸ in 2013 that whatever it is that we’re seeing when we think we’re seeing Afrikaners is crumbling away before our eyes. Addressing an audience of about 60 people, he mused that those in the hall were in all probability “the last of the Afrikaners” (2013, p. 14). He lamented that community life is no longer central to the Afrikaner way. Now, “we live only for our family, for our 4x4 and nature walks. An enormous amount of social capital is lost when people cease to live with each other in community.” He concluded that “We are all alone on our little islands.”

So that’s it, no more Afrikaners. Why bother talking about them then?

Charles Leonard, a reviewer in the Mail & Guardian, felt the need repeatedly to justify why he should even be writing anything about them. (At the same time City Press editor Ferial Haffajee (2013, p. 25) was writing that studying whites was a waste of time, if not racist). “Readers may want to ask why one should bother with this slew of books about the Afrikaners,” writes Leonard (2013, p. 16). As a linguistic community Afrikaans speakers make up 13.5% of the population (6.9 million people). Of these only 2.7 million are white (as opposed to the 1.6 million white English speakers). But even so, according to Leonard the subject is redundant. “The Afrikaners as a nation (if such a monolith ever existed, which I doubt) is so passé, so pre-democracy, so irrelevant … Surely there are more important books dealing with the nation as a whole?”

He establishes his own position by distancing himself personally from the whole subject. Born on a farm into what was then still Afrikanerdom with all its ideological edifices in place - family, church, school, university and a stern state - he finds all of that is boring. “I lost my appetite for Afrikaner soul-searching, identity interrogation and navel-gazing back in the lecture halls and think-scrums of the Rand Afrikaans University of the mid-

---
²⁸ The Little Karoo National Arts Festival, the pre-eminent Afrikaans festival of arts and culture.
1980s. I have since identified myself as a progressive South African, not a conservative Afrikaner. My home language is English.”

Leonard thus establishes the measure of being a good South African through a) assuming a national identity b) adopting a “progressive” politics and c) speaking English. Presumably only subjects fulfilling these criteria merit scrutiny, and Afrikaners, however defined, are emphatically the irrelevant “Other”. Any membership of a South African “People” would, under these terms, require a bartering away of one’s Afrikanerness.

A spontaneously pejorative characterisation of Afrikaners is deployed by the editor of the Star, Makhudu Sefara (2013, p. 16), in a column on the subject of racism in the media: “Granted, there are white families who go out of their way to ensure that racial integration is achieved. Good people, these. But the truth is there will also be those like Afrikaans author Annelise Botes, whose dislike, hatred even, of black people is no secret. What about that racist musician Steve Hofmeyr? What about the young white boys who kill vagrants in Waterkloof for fun? Are these kids not raised in families? Do they not attend the same schools as many of us? The same churches? Their views may not be shared publicly, but they are supported.”

While a conditional acknowledgment is granted that there are good whites, by which is implied that it is “some” whites, Afrikaners as a group are taken to support not only racism but the murder of blacks.

This refrain is not uncommon. Women, Children and People with Disabilities Minister Lulu Xingwana, seeking to explain the Oscar Pistorius case in terms of domestic violence, told an Australian TV station: “Young Afrikaner men are brought up in the Calvinist religion believing that they own a woman, they own a child, they own everything and therefore they can take that life because they own it” (Davids, 2013).
Julius Malema, in his dispute with the SA Revenue Service, blamed his woes on an “Afrikaner institutionalised political and racist onslaught against me due to the views I hold about the direction of our country” (Joubert, 2013, p. 3).

These are all examples, in different media and from different sources, of a public discourse of denigration, disparagement and diminution in which Afrikaners are held by definition to be violent, racist, unscrupulous, deceiving and corrupt.

Apartheid and the legacy of National Party rule lend themselves to this, as do systemic racism and egregious examples of racist violence. But the result is a construction of a people who do not dare speak their name, and an underlying question to understanding the dynamics of “othering and self-othering”, is whether self-denial on the part of Afrikaners is a pre-requisite for their moral admission as citizens of South Africa.

Mark Kannemeyer, founder of the satirical magazine Bittercomix, in answer to a question about the future by the author Fred de Vries in Rigtingbedonnerd, says: “The future of the Afrikaner? Truly no idea. I am not part of that group of people …” (De Vries, 2012, p. 376).

Dan Roodt, from a right-wing perspective, argues that Afrikaners are a metonym for Apartheid, and that self-declaration as Afrikaners is read as synonymous with support for Apartheid and its legacy. As Roodt (2013) sees it, “A statement like ‘apartheid destroyed black wealth’ decodes as ‘Afrikaners destroyed black wealth’”, and he concludes that “Within the metonymic logic of South African ethnic discourse, eliminating apartheid is easy: you have just to eliminate Afrikaners.” On the same theme the writer Rian Malan, also in answer to De Vries’s questions about the future, responds: “The first question is: How do you calibrate the distance between ‘all whites are criminals’ and the gas chambers?”
The question “Who are The People?” leads into improbable badlands of paranoia, where the loss of state, volk, language and power is conceived not as the unavoidable, and so desirable, consequence of a broad democracy, but the conditions of genocide.

What might otherwise be seen metaphorically took on a literal dimension in the free speech versus hate speech debate in the “Shoot the Boer” legal challenge of 2011, in which the High Court ruled that the chant, which was originally an anti-Apartheid slogan, did constitute hate speech. Lest one imagines this discourse to be limited to Dan Roodt and his Twitter account, consider that: in 2013 AfriForum petitioned the UN (Roets, 2013) to treat farm murders as a priority (an ongoing theme since democracy and highlighted in the book Treurgrond29 (D. Herman, Van Zyl, & Niewoudt, 2013). In the same week in September, 2013, a column and a feature in Rapport and a column in City Press invoked the spectre of genocide. In Rapport, Claudi Mailovich (2013, p. 4), on the subject of farm murders, wrote: “Plaasmoord. Vir talle Suid-Afrikaners beteken die gelaaide word die uitmoor van ’n volk/Farm murder. For many South Africans this loaded word means the extermination of a people.” Amnesty International has been approached on the matter; at a Minority Rights conference in Holland a motion was tabled (and defeated) opposing the “genocide” of Afrikaners; at a language conference (also in Holland) it was argued that the ANC was committing cultural genocide by eliminating Afrikaans and supplanting it with English (a theme that echoes Milner’s Anglicisation campaign at the start of the last century); Kallie Kriel has addressed the Dutch parliament on Afrikaner genocide; there’s been a Stop the Boer Genocide protest march in Amsterdam (all cited in the Afrikaner-interest blog The Afrikaner Journal 2012). The Genocide Watch website (http://genocidewatch.net) reports regularly on these protests and on incidents, such as farm murders, which are cited as evidence of genocide.

Frans Cronje (2013, p. 14) writes about what he calls “Bitter wites”30, who complain about not wanting to pay tax because they get nothing in return, who “… must understand and accept that the tax that they pay - and that their children will have to pay in decades

---

29 Land of sorrow/grief. Own translation.
30 “Bitter whites”.
to come - is the price of the sins of their fathers. They must also understand that in exchange for this they will draw a great benefit by preventing a Second Revolution”31.

This formulation highlights what Chipkin argues: critically, paying tax is conceived (for whites generally but since he is addressing an Afrikaans reader, specifically Afrikaners) as a punitive compensation for a crime, not as the dues of a citizen, in exchange for which are promised not the rights of citizenship but by implication the prevention of a bloodbath (through the invocation of the feared revolution that was warded off by the negotiated settlement that paved the way for the 1994 elections).

In City Press, Percy Mabandu (September 22, 2013, p. 14) makes this link more explicit through imputation by writing that “The whites think your next logical step [in raising questions of colonial exploitation, historical justice and African identity] is to make a call for the Night of the Long Knives32.”

Anthropologist Piet Erasmus argues that “Afrikaner identity has been presented as a subjective and permeable construction that finds no meaning outside Afrikaner reality (Erasmus, 2002, p. 103).” On the contrary, as much as “Afrikaner” has evaporated as a master signifier for Afrikaner nationalist aspirations, it remains very much a “rigid designator” for everyone else.

Fred de Vries tells an illuminating anecdote (Van Niekerk, 2013) about how any potentially new story about Afrikaners is steered towards a retelling of the old story of racist right-wingers. The cover of the South African edition of Rigtingbedonnerd is of an oxwagon-wheel emerging from a stormy background being pulled in different directions at the crossroads of the new South African flag. For the Dutch edition, the publisher initially wanted to portray a right-winger with a gun. De Vries vetoed that, commenting that “the book is not about extremists, and the man they wanted to use, I don’t know him

31 Own translation.
32 “Night of the Long Knives” is a reference to pre-1994 fears among whites that a black government would venge itself on whites for the crimes of Apartheid, and subsequent fears that a similar fate would befall whites in the event of the death of former president Nelson Mandela.
and he doesn’t appear in my book. I particularly wanted to present a different picture of the Afrikaner.” The cover they eventually settled on is of a dry and rocky “plattelandse” scene complete with sagging barbed wire fences, and in the foreground a man described as “un-Afrikaans”. De Vries identifies him as the bassist for fokofpolisiekar, a symbol of his generation: tired, exhausted and yet ready to go forward.

These discourses of culpability, belligerence, guilt (or denial) and persecution find their extremes in Roodt and Malema. Roodt wishes to render the term Afrikaner speakable by stripping it of its historical context. Malema, on the other hand, wants to preserve its contagious force by fusing it to its historical context.

The naming of the Afrikaner as Afrikaner with its pejorative connotations, is to foreclose the constitution of the subject in any other way, especially when taken in conjunction with what Steyn (2001) sees as strenuous efforts to rehabilitate or reconstruct a “white” identity.

Afrikaner strategy has been variously to attempt to change its existential referent (through discourses of reconciliation, New South Africanism and so on), to change its categorial content (by stripping out nationalism, conservatism and volk identity and emphasising geographic or activity indicators) or by changing its name (as in Afrikaan or Afrikaanses, the house style brought in by Die Burger at one stage).
Nevertheless, all these terms refer back to that of “Afrikaner”, the utterance of which is to bring into being not just the spectre of oppression, but to enact it. “It is the name itself, the signifier, which supports the identity of the object”, as Zizek (1989, p. 95) puts it, even when it ceases to have any linguistic use in cases when its relationship to its stereotypical referent is tenuous. As De Vries (2012, p. 194) noted of his encounter with Eugene Terre’Blanche. “I found him more pitiful than fearsome. Here sits the man whom you know only from television where he carries on like a roaring fanatic. And then you sit and talk to him and you see those sad little eyes and you think: man, go back to your farm and your cows, you don’t have the strength anymore, you don’t have the charisma.”

Wiida Fourie, in her analysis of letters to Beeld, asks “Who is the real Afrikaner?” Look at the one and you see a New Afrikaner, look at the other and it’s the same Old Afrikaner. But where Fourie’s study is troubling is her finding that while “Afrikaans letter writers to Beeld have managed to negotiate for themselves a reasonably acceptable place in the new South Africa […] it is doubtful whether any fundamental revision of their perception of the Other has taken place (Fourie, 2008, p. 281).” She suggests, in other words, that the historical racist “gaze” of Afrikaners, as represented by Beeld letter writers, has not changed in line with the “Rainbow Nation” discourse, and therefore remains racist or at least carries a strong trace of racism.

De Vries (interviewed by Van Niekerk, 2013) offers a “don’t ask, don’t tell” way out of the predicament: “In the privacy of your home you can be as Afrikaans as you want, but in the outside world you have to be a sort of chameleon that assumes another shape depending on the environment you find yourself in.\(^\text{37}\)"

The discourse of diminution on the one hand, of the irrelevance of Afrikaners, of their “non-being”, is met with a discourse of extinction on the other. This could be seen as symptomatic of a radical inability to adjust the white imaginary to find a comfortable

---

37 Own translation.
accommodation within a plural, multi-cultural landscape, to find a Heideggerian “homely-ness” (*heimlichkeit*), as explored by Ballard (2004), for example, in his notion of “semigration”, which is an ontological retreat into a safe zone of the self through a physical encampment in homogenous housing estates or rural retreats. I suggest in Chapter Five that this ontological sense of “homely-ness”, or “at-home-ness” is important in the relation of trust and intimacy between readers and their newspaper, and so to an extent sets the semantic limits of what might be intelligible in stories. The discourse of extinction, of genocide, is hyperbolic, hysterical. To invoke the word “genocide” (*volksmoord*) in relation to farm murders specifically and Afrikaners generally, can, however, be seen as an attempt to appropriate the discourse of suffering by displacing it from its position in the dominant narrative of liberation and oppression (thereby diminishing the moral valency of Apartheid) and establishing at least an equivalence of suffering and innocence, as I conclude in Chapter Seven.

But it is also of a kind with the pattern of content in *Beeld* that I analyse in Chapter Six, which, taken together, represents a disintegrating world. The focus on crime (in some editions up to 30% of all news stories) is consistent with findings of other studies (Knol & Roberts, 2008; M. Snyman, 2007), with victims predominantly not only white but Afrikaners. The level of crime is generally seen as indexical of social dysfunction and government failure. (And because of the special role that farm murders occupy to the extent that they are understood as genocidal, Afrikaners are still considered as bearing the brunt of government dysfunction).

Corruption stories are ubiquitous, and fulfil a double role - as pure crime stories as well as stories of corrupt governance. These themes are carried through in extensive coverage of social delivery protests, where incompetence and corruption fuse to produce extreme dysfunction. While social structures are shown to be coming apart at the seams, the physical environment also falls victim to neglect, pollution and contamination (generally as a consequence of the same combination of corruption and incompetence). Snyman (2007), looking at the racial solipsism of crime coverage in *Beeld, Sowetan* and *Star*, notes, in *Beeld*, the high number of traffic accident and animal cruelty stories (absent in
the other two papers), but has no answer for what she considers this idiosyncrasy. I consider that due to the particular manner and frequency of their presentation, in the context of the other emphases I have just mentioned, that they are not discreet categories, but consistent with the overarching discourse of disintegration, chaos and brutalisation.

Epitomising this discourse (which is prevalent not just in Afrikaans media) is the rhino. (While there is an almost daily diet of rhino stories amid other animal stories of a feelgood or cruelty variety, the racial “Other” is noticeably absent in the news and opinion pages, with about one story that could be typified as “black” to every 10 that could be called “white”.) The rhino is emblematic of South Africa as one of the Big Five, iconic of a species facing extinction, prey to criminals, helpless in the face of insufficient or poor policing, corruption and superstition, and it is not too much of a stretch, in the context, to see it as a metonym for Afrikaners themselves: under threat of physical extinction (through farm murders), economic extinction (through Affirmative Action), linguistic extinction (prioritization of English and scaling down of Afrikaans), social extinction (due to collapse of infrastructure), and even the extinction of habitat due to environmental contamination and destruction.

This is the life that is “grievable”, to use a term from Judith Butler. She coins it in the context of wars waged by America and identifies “grievability” as a framing mechanism that allows opinion to be recruited to the side of war, and against the “Other”. This type of framing, through its appeal to the senses, and especially in the case of photographs, is, she argues, an “operation of power” and “an interpretive manoeuvre, a way of giving an account of whose life is a life, and whose life is effectively transformed into an instrument, a target or a number, or is effaced with only a trace remaining, or none at all” (Butler, 2010, pp. ix-x).

In the case of Afrikaners, it is not a case of legitimising war. It is, however, a case of trying to claim a position of legitimacy. If, in other words, their own circumstances/predicament/losses are not “grievable” to others, then there is an urgency to promote the “grievability” of their “own”, seeking recognition (and so legitimation)
not only through alterity (minority rights under constitution), but through establishing an equivalence of suffering. Othered by dominant social discourse as racists and rightwingers, Afrikaners flip the dynamic around: they are indeed the new “Other”, not because they occupy a position of former oppressors, but through appropriating the traditional position of minorities around the world. They offer up their dead and maimed to the world to bear witness to their grief, to assert that their loss is not a question of numerical technicalities, of a history disowned, but of life itself.

This is a delicate discursive manoeuvre, and it abounds with ambiguities.

For example, *Beeld*, in its features, columns and leading articles, has embraced neo-liberal economics, a rights-based, democratic form of government, and the need for reconciliation. Success, one might say, for the ANC’s project of hegemonisation. One sees, therefore, an opp-ed feature (Boshoff, 2013, p. 12) on a rapprochement between the residents of Orania and a neighbouring Xhosa community. It’s not a convincing account, but it is open in spirit and earnest in its intention of reconciliation. It is taken as a given that Apartheid was bad (that is, an idea that had bad consequences, rather than a crime against humanity in its very conception). And it is also taken as given that Afrikaners have their work cut out for them as they come to grips (still) with the post-1994 dispensation.

All of this takes place simultaneously with a desire to keep the group together. This occurs overtly through an appeal for the strengthening of Afrikaans as a language, for the healing of the schism in the church, and the promotion of linguistic and cultural events and organisations. However, from the typifications of *Beeld* readers, they are clearly a

---

38 *Beeld*’s editorial opinion (November 20, 2012; p. 16) holds that “Reconciliation is in the hearts of people”, and that it requires a sound economic policy to eliminate inequality. It concludes that ordinary people have the responsibility of promoting reconciliation “in the little streets and corridors of everyday life, by breaking down stereotypes and prejudices which, in their own hearts and minds continue stubbornly to exist”.

39 The feature is written by Carel Boshoff, president of the Afrikaner separatist Orania movement. In it, he argues that “all are equal before God”, and he poses the question: “What lies beyond equality?” His answer to his own question is: “Community-based development on the basis of recognition; this is the sustainable alternative to the individual self-enrichment which is the hallmark of the new elite”.

40 See Glossary.
fractious lot, and the newspaper takes upon itself the role of shepherd to guide the flock. But it also has to do the job of a sheepdog, darting back and forth to make sure that the tailenders don’t fall off the back of the bunch into their dark past. So, for example, one sees the paper lead on the death of General Magnus Malan (where other papers relegate him to inside pages), portraying him not as an Apartheid strategist for the maintenance of white supremacy, but as a brilliant military tactician, professional to his core (viz Chapter Five). Or take the case of the death of a former head of Military Intelligence (ignored by other papers), whose professional qualities are stressed while his support for the CCB\textsuperscript{41} is downplayed.

In these cases loyalty to the group trumps the overt ideological repositioning that has taken place over the years, and “grievability” is joined together with celebration (of skill, leadership, achievement) in a brew that valorises the ethnic particular over the broader (New South African) general.

To return to De Vries’s suggestion that Afrikaners should keep their true selves hidden from view, and don a more acceptable persona in public, a newspaper is a very public medium. It is also a home. In the case of \textit{Beeld} it conducts its business in Afrikaans, which also provides it with a social screen (ie of language) behind which it thrives. Seen as a home, the front page is the threshold, while the features and opinion pages are the hearth. The one is public, and the other private. Contrary to expectations, and to De Vries’s interpretation, it is in the private domain that the “new” Afrikaner identity comes into its own. It is here that the imperatives of reconciliation are strongly articulated, and where arguments against racial and ethnic exclusivism, social supremacism, religious intolerance and linguistic chauvinism are mobilised.

\textsuperscript{41} The CCB was the ironically named Civil Co-Operation Bureau, which formed part of the so-called “Third Force” which was responsible for political assassinations.
2.7. Identity

The notions of identity used here are contradictory. On the one hand there is an ‘essential’ identity, an encrusted relic of the past which continues to exist in zombiefied form unable to live, unable to die, unable to change. On the other, identity is presented as fluid, changeable, subject to will. An essentialised and a fluid identity co-exist side-by-side, objects of strategic deployment depending on circumstances, but neither considered to be definitive or representative of an essentialised totality.

Identity is an unstable object. Saussurian structuralism fixes it in relation to what it is not. Sartrean existentialism defines it in relation to the “being” of another. Heidegger seeks its essence in “authenticity”. Judith Butler (in considering gender identity) sees it as performative and incorporating both the expressiveness of the subject as agent and the interpretive “sameness” that Paul Ricoeur (Ricoeur, 1995) proposes as an imposition of “identity” by The Other. Laclau (in Laclau & Mouffe, 1998) rejects a “simple notion of identity” that would consider phenomenological self-identification as the defining measure of an identity. Laclau emphasises instead that identity can only be apprehended in dynamism - “All identity is constituted around the unresolvable tension between difference and equivalence” (Laclau, 2005, p. 5) - and that it derives meaning only through “… identifiable agency. That is to say (...) the subject is constructed through a plurality of subject position(s), that there is an essential unevenness between this position and, that there are constant practices of re-articulation”. What this means in effect, as formulated by Laclau & Mouffe (1989) and elaborated by Laclau (2005), is that in areas of political contestation, or what may sometimes be termed “identity politics”, identity is not brought into play fully formed and immutable, but is brought into being through demands (which need not relate to an exchange, but rather to questions of recognition and representation).

Fitzgerald (1992, p. 127) notes that “It is well to remember that identity often combines self-interest (the economics of identity maintenance) with strong affective ties (the
psychological, existential components of identity structure”). Nation and ethnicity serve as compass points according to which self and place are oriented, but these points cannot remain fixed: “Identity is something which lies on a continuum marked by both negative and positive poles…”(Fitzgerald, 1992, p. 127). In the case of a minority grouping, “a major function of any ethnic identification is surely the anchoring of personality in smaller, more personal units as culture change renders role expectations more impersonal or problematic. Social changes, however, rather than detracting from ethnic self-awareness, often enhance identities (Fitzgerald, 1992, p. 127)”. The negative and positive poles that Fitzgerald notes are themselves enmeshed in paradoxes. For example, Afrikaners tried in the Apartheid project to separate themselves as “Europeans” from the “natives”. Their post-apartheid project has been to be accepted as “natives” (not settlers), at the very historical moment when the flow of globalization has deterritorialised the cultural notion of “native” as primordially linked to land (Clifford, J. in Clifford & Marcus, 1988), and which adds spice to the debate about whether diasporic Afrikaners are entitled to be identified as Afrikaners (Visser, 2007). This paradox ripples through other logics of group formation, within ideologies of ‘nation’, ‘ethnicity’ or ‘wealth class’. The retreat into an ethnic identity among Afrikaners is well documented, but tends to be treated as a cultural phenomenon. It is well to bear in mind that ethnicity “has to do with material goods, whether in a positive or negative way: the Hurons [Canada] maximize their ethnicity in order to obtain resources, whereas the Aymara [Bolivia] try to destroy their own cultural and ethnic traits for the same reason. The longing for material goods does not by itself procure ethnic identity and ethnicity. Ethnicity, however, is directly concerned with group formation, and this with power relations”(Roosens, 1989, p. 158).

The thrust of much of the literature that considers the post-apartheid Afrikaner condition concerns the diffusion of the group accompanied by a defusion of its political force. Verwey (2012, p. 551) warns that “the construction of the Afrikaner community as embattled and systematically oppressed might provide powerful support for extremism”. Kriel (2012, p. 426) argues (against, for example Van der Westhuizen, 2007; Giliomme, 2009; Visser, 2004; and Vestergaard, 2001) that “Afrikaner nationalism has outlived
apartheid” and that regroupings and reconfigurations are taking place that contradict any “spent force” theory.
3. Chapter Three: Theory

3.1. Theoretical framework

This chapter locates my thesis in the Discourse Theory of Laclau and Mouffe, in particular their concept of “chains of equivalence” and “chains of difference” in the construction of political frontiers and in creating the discursive conditions of construction of “a people”. It draws too on the media theory of representation of Hall, Butler’s concepts of performativity and grievability taken in tandem with Levinas’s ethical notion of “the face”, and locating a social ontology of security not within Marxist notions of contradiction (and so oppression), but in Agamben’s theory of subjectivity produced in the subjection of “naked life” to state sovereignty.

The advocate arguing in court for president Jacob Zuma that the painting “The Spear”\[42\] should be banned (etv Live, May 24, 2012) displayed two poles with which theory wrestles as it tries to frame social and historical conditions, and the position of the individual within them. On the one hand there was an optimistic humanism at work as advocate Gcina Malindi envisaged an “ideal” future towards which South Africa was being impelled, one in which blacks would no longer have to suffer the slings and arrows of a colonial and racist past. The court, as an institution of state, was enjoined to perform

\[42\] “The Spear” is a painting by Brett Murray, in which President Jacob Zuma is depicted in a Lenin pose drawn from the Victor Ivanov poster, “Lenin Lived, Lenin is Alive”. The “Spear” refers to Zuma’s exposed penis in the painting, and alludes to the military wing of the ANC, Mkhonto weSizwe, which translates as “Spear of the Nation”. The painting caused a political controversy which led to ANC street protests, a call to boycott City Press newspaper which published a photograph of the painting (and which later succumbed to the pressure by taking it off its website), the vandalisation of the painting itself, and a vigorous public debate about the dignity and respect that can be expected to be shown towards the president. It is important to note that the 2010 painting by Ayanda Mabulu, titled “Better Poor Than a Rich Puppet” (which depicts Zuma in the nude, together with other world leaders), did not cause a public outcry or political opprobrium. This raises questions about who is allowed to comment and criticise (in this case the president and by extension the ANC), with Murray being accused of racism while Mabulu was not. In the context of this thesis, the question relates to whether Afrikaners are disqualified from the rights of citizenship because of their whiteness and their Apartheid history. This question is also pertinent to my observation above on the “poles of theory”.

64
its part in smoothing the road to a post-apartheid utopia in which all citizens could assume their full humanity\textsuperscript{43}.

On the other hand, when Malindi broke down in tears, the irruption of that very colonial history into the post-liberation present derailed the grand narrative of progress that was being articulated. This spectacle raises certain questions: has human enterprise now collapsed into postmodern randomness and ambiguity? Is the human subject eternally shackled by the past? Is human agency entrapped by entropy? Or is it more a question that situatedness within the postmodern “condition” is an “in-between” one of “transit, where space and time cross to produce complex figures of difference and identity, past and present, inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion” (Bhabha, 1994, p. 1); one in which the co-ordinates of existence and identity fix not a point, but a border from which a “beyond” (ibid.) defines the present, a realm that Agamben (1999) views as characterised by its “potentialities” and correlative ambiguities.

This thesis takes as a guiding principle the observation by Karl Marx that: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past” (1852, p. 5). The theoretical challenge, then, is how to understand the conditions that individuals and societies find themselves in, and the interplay between factors shaping and reshaping these conditions.

\textsuperscript{43} Hall, Mouffe, Laclau and Jameson are all skeptical of a humanism that takes “humanity” as a political category, in that they consider politics to be animated by difference _ even for Mouffe, who re-imagines social antagonism as “agonism”, defined as an us/them confrontation that takes place in the public sphere on the basis of _adversarial choices that can be made without resorting to a friend/enemy dichotomy. Their skepticism points to the difficulty that arises in analysing an aspect of Afrikaner repositioning: in Beeld, for example, the discourse of reconciliation makes its appeal precisely in terms of a common humanity, predicated on biological and religious equality, while the discourse of rights, in which Afrikaners lay claim to what is ostensibly being taken from them, and to which they are entitled as “South Africans” and as a minority, is predicated on judicial principles, that is on legal categories of entitlement that rest on exclusions. By the former, rights would be vested not in citizens, in the demos, in “the people”, but in all people, a conclusion that reaches its extreme in Agamben who argues that the refugee represents the sum and the point of departure of how rights should be construed and granted. By the latter, rights can only be vested in citizens, a category made possible only in relation to “a people” defined in terms of “nation” and a territorial nation state.
Given the radical indeterminacy of a signifier such as “Afrikaner”, the lack of alignment between the economic, social and political position of Afrikaners (or for that matter of the new ruling class), and the fluidity of meanings and identities in contemporary South Africa, I find it useful to work with the concept of discourse to make sense of the terrain, rather than approaching the subject through political economy, for example.

Discourse Theory has proved in the work of Howarth & Norval (1998) and Vestergaard (2001) to be a useful lens through which to look at South Africa as a dynamic society in transition, where the “politics of signification” (Hall, 1980a, p. 138) is often elusive, even baffling.

The concept of discourse is central to attempting to understand the interplay of Self and Other in Afrikaner identity formation. At its simplest level, discourse is no more than people saying things, having a conversation, but the concept of discourse also allows for a consideration not only of the “actual uses of language as a form of social interaction, in particular situations and contexts, but also on the forms of representation in which different social categories, different social practices and relations are constructed from and in the interests of a particular point of view, a particular conception of social reality” (Deacon, 1999, p. 146).

Crucially, discourses “always involve the exercise of power, as their constitution involves the exclusion of certain possibilities and a consequent structuring of the relations between social agents” (Howarth & Norval, 1998, p. 4).

In the work of Laclau and Mouffé discourse is “a relational totality of signifying sequences that together constitute a more or less coherent framework for what can be said and done” (Torfing, 1999, p. 300). Laclau (2000a, 2005) is further concerned with what he calls the underlying logics of the construction of social formations, and the political

---

44 Neither the concepts of Self or Other should be taken to be static or definable in any final sense either in themselves, through time, or especially in relation to each other. As Crick (1976, p. 165) notes, “a change in the value of the ‘self’ invariably alters the image of the ‘other’ and vice versa; and either change alters the nature of the difference which they constitute and by which they are constituted.”
identities that emerge as a result. Eschewing essentialist notions of identity, Laclau argues that identity formation takes place through social antagonisms (2005, 2006) and through an opposition to an Other. The space of differentiation between Self and Other can be conceived not so much as a defined boundary but as a “frontier”, and Norval (2000) notes that “frontier formation is the *sine qua non* of identity formation”.

The location of a frontier (fluid as it may be) is important to how one understands the relationship between Self and Other. In the formulation of Said (2003) and Kristeva (1991), the Other is conceived as an object external to the self or the group in relation to which the self is defined. For Said, the construction of the Other implies derogatory categorisations of inferiority - an Otherness, in short, “recognized as a byproduct of colonialism, exoticism and Eurocentrism” (Corbey & Leerssen, 1991, p. ix). For Kristeva, such a construction is more nuanced, but nevertheless seen in terms of a foreign “intrusion” into a set of norms of being and conduct, which then place a burden of responsibility on how the self should engage with the “foreign other”, a challenge to which Levinas develops his ethical concepts as based on an interaction with “the face”. However, neither is concerned with alterity at an intra-cultural level, favouring instead inter-cultural concerns. In either case, however, frontier formation is a function of power: “the constitution of a social identity is an act of power and [...] identity as such is power” (Laclau, quoted in Torfing (1999, p. 214)).

To observe a single example of how the sometimes contorted and paradoxical tracing of frontiers may operate, consider the way in which *Beeld* reported the death of General Magnus Malan. The ideological repositioning (for commercial, cultural or political reasons) of Naspers45 publications such as *Beeld* and *Die Burger* (Wasserman & Botma, 2019). Naspers, through its subsidiary Media24, is one of the largest media owners in South Africa, with international interests in Brazil, Russia and China, among others. Naspers had revenues exceeding R62 billion in 2014. Media24 has a monopoly on daily and Sunday Afrikaans newspapers. They are *Beeld*, *Die Burger*, *Volksblad* and *Rappor* and *Sondag*. It also owns English papers, the *Daily Sun*, which is the largest circulation daily newspaper in South Africa, *City Press* (Sunday) and *The Witness*. It also owns News24, the largest online news platform in South Africa, which draws its content from the group’s newspapers. The other main newspaper publishing groups are Independent News and Media (*Star*, *Cape Times*, *Cape Argus*, *The Mercury*, *Pretoria News*, *Diamond Fields Advertiser*, *Tribune*), Avusa (*Sunday Times*, the largest circulation Sunday newspaper, and *Business Day*, a business and politics focused daily), and Caxton, which owns the daily *Citizen* and dominates the community newspaper market. Naspers also has interests in...

---

45 Naspers, through its subsidiary Media24, is one of the largest media owners in South Africa, with international interests in Brazil, Russia and China, among others. Naspers had revenues exceeding R62 billion in 2014. Media24 has a monopoly on daily and Sunday Afrikaans newspapers. They are *Beeld*, *Die Burger*, *Volksblad* and *Rappor* and *Sondag*. It also owns English papers, the *Daily Sun*, which is the largest circulation daily newspaper in South Africa, *City Press* (Sunday) and *The Witness*. It also owns News24, the largest online news platform in South Africa, which draws its content from the group’s newspapers. The other main newspaper publishing groups are Independent News and Media (*Star*, *Cape Times*, *Cape Argus*, *The Mercury*, *Pretoria News*, *Diamond Fields Advertiser*, *Tribune*), Avusa (*Sunday Times*, the largest circulation Sunday newspaper, and *Business Day*, a business and politics focused daily), and Caxton, which owns the daily *Citizen* and dominates the community newspaper market. Naspers also has interests in...
2008), has entailed an apparent acceptance of the “New South Africa”, majority rule and equality before the law, among others. Implicit (and often explicit) in this is the rejection of Apartheid and those Afrikaners in relation to whose conduct the “new” Afrikaner asserts that he or she “is nie so nie”46, to borrow a phrase from Wasserman (2010).

Durrheim (2011, p. 95), commenting on the discourse of the racist Afrikaner and the fashioning of a “new” Afrikaner, also notes that “A new version of Afrikaansness […] is defined by what it is not [emphasis in the original] as much as by what it is”. The frontier of identity is therefore quite clearly demarcated with the denigrated “bad” Afrikaner on the one side together with Apartheid and all that entails, and the “new” Afrikaner on the other side, albeit with some reservations around Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and affirmative action (Fourie, 2008; Steyn, 2004). The representation of Malan’s death in Beeld confounds this. First, alone among all South African newspapers, Beeld chose to lead on the event (July 19, 2011). Second, while other papers demoted reports to inside pages and portrayed Malan in morally reproachable terms as the architect of the military’s “total strategy” against the “total onslaught” of the liberation movements, Beeld characterised Malan as a shrewd military strategist while downplaying his role as a key figure in an oppressive regime that sent soldiers into the townships and into neighbouring countries.

The ambiguities of who is defined as an outcast in relation to a blameless in-group that is being promoted as “South African” and “Afrikaans speaking” as opposed to Afrikaner subscription television, through its wholly-owned subsidiary Multichoice, which has three dedicated Afrikaans channels. The television news sector is dominated by the national broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (which broadcasts in the 11 national languages, but mainly in English, Afrikaans, isiZulu and isiXhosa), the free-to-air ENCA, and ANN7, the most recent entrant into the television broadcasting market and which is owned by Infinity Media Networks but which is dubbed the “Gupta Channel” after its owners, the Gupta family of India, who are close business and political allies of President Jacob Zuma. They also own The New Age newspaper, a national daily.

46 “Ons is nie so nie” translates as “We are not like that”. The use of the collective “ons/we” varies. It may be qualified, as in the “Ons is nie almal so nie” (“We are not all like that”) of Goosen’s (1990) book title (shared 24 years later by Max du Preez’s criticism [Du Preez, 2014], on his Facebook page, of the singer Steve Hofmeyr’s celebration of “Die Stem” - the national anthem under Nationalist rule, which translates as “The Voice”, and equally “The Vote” - in which he protests, with the same qualification used by Goosen, that “Goddank ons is nie almal so nie/Thank God we are not all like that”). It can be suggestively unqualified, as in “Ons is nie so nie” (Wasserman, 2010, translated as “We’re not like that”), or ambiguous, as in “Dalk is ons almal so/Perhaps we are all like that”, the title of the 2001 compilation of Goosen’s work. The first English translation of Goosen’s novel (1992) was translated as Not all of us. All the nuances evoke the post-World War Two denial of support for Hitler and Nazism by “ordinary” German citizens.
and politically recalcitrant (and in need of rehabilitation), point to the difficulties in locating the frontier between Afrikaners and Others (as an inter-group dynamic), and Afrikaner Others (as an intra-group dynamic). Hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses can be seen to be simultaneously deployed, the balance of which would tend to locate identity, through representation, in different ways.

Hall (1980a), in trying to understand communication and what happens in the “encoding” and “decoding” processes\(^47\) that contribute to social identities, posits that a viewer or reader can position him or herself within a discourse in a way that is “dominant-hegemonic”, “negotiated” or “oppositional”. Castells (1997) theorises identity positions which closely resemble Hall’s, but which he describes as “legitimising”, “resistance” or “project” identities. A “legitimising identity” hews closely to Hall’s “dominant-hegemonic” framework as one that by and large accepts the dominant structures of authority and/or domination. A “resistance” or “oppositional” identity would apply to those social groupings that are marginalized or “devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination” (Castells, 1997, p. 8), whose stance is defensive and whose identity is expressed as an “exclusion of the excluders by the excluded” (ibid: p. 9).

Implicitly and explicitly, in the public discourse, Afrikaners tend to be seen as conforming to this second level of identity, which stirs disquiet because of the potential inherent in it for social and political disruption. Hall’s “negotiated” position and Castells’s “project identity” diverge slightly, in that in Hall’s view, a “negotiated” position “contains a mixture of adaptive and oppositional elements” (Hall, 1980a, p. 137). For Castells, a “project identity” is one according to which social actors “build a new identity that redefines their position in society and, by so doing, seek the transformation of overall social structure” (Castells, 1997, p. 8).

---

\(^47\) Hall’s encoding/decoding theory can be viewed as located within the transmission model of media theory, but in the historical context of the Birmingham School’s work on culture it represents the categorical shift to a more post-structuralist approach to media and culture. Castells’s concept of a “network society” fits neatly with the Discourse Theory and Field Theory understanding of the constitutive role of flows and articulations.
Wherever groupings may be located within these frameworks, they would be investing what Bourdieu (1993) calls “symbolic capital” into the construction of their identity, which raises the question of whether, and in whose terms, the Malan report represents an example of gaining or squandering “symbolic capital” and how this speaks to the shaping of Afrikaner identity, where the frontiers of such an identity might lie and what contingent factors might have a bearing on how these frontiers are articulated in discourse in Beeld. This embodies dynamics of beyondness and in-betweenness (Bhabha, 1994), an emplacement within a versatile “laager” (De Klerk, 1975), and the as-ifness of equivalence (Jameson, 1998), all brought together through processes of articulation.

3.2. Equivalence

Barrett (1991) raises an intriguing question of interpretation about the idea of “equivalence”, which is a central concept in the Discourse Theory of Laclau and Mouffe, integral to the processes of hegemony, identity and the creation of frontiers through “chains of equivalence” and “chains of difference”.

In considering the bringing into being of a democratic “imaginary” by the French Revolution, Laclau and Mouffe write that: “This break with the ancien regime, symbolized by the Declaration of Rights of Man, would provide the discursive conditions which made it possible to propose the different forms of inequality as illegitimate and anti-natural, and thus make them equivalent as forms of oppression” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1989, p. 155). The democratic revolution brings about a “logic of equivalence”, that is, “a logic of comparison of subjects that are, essentially, construed as equals, through its new discourse of ‘rights’, ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’” (Barrett, 1991, p. 71). However, there is, writes Barrett, a “confusing ambiguity as to whether ‘equivalence’ is being construed as similar to ‘equality’, which is at times implied, or whether Laclau and Mouffe’s logic

Howarth (2000, p. 180) provides an excellent analysis of how the UDF managed in the 1980s to establish political equivalences between disparate groupings that shifted the anti-apartheid hegemony from what objectively appeared to be the stronger black consciousness position to a non-racialism that allowed the ANC to gain dominance.
of equivalence is more appropriately captured with reference to the chemical use of equivalence to denote the proportional weights of substances equal in their chemical value. This would emphasise a notion of equal value, but introducing the tension between equality and - precisely - difference is difficult to square with the one man one vote’ (sic) logic of democratic equality” (Barrett, 1991, pp. 71-72). Given Laclau and Mouffe’s anti-essentialism, and their interest in new social movements in radical democratic change, “equality”, and even “equal value”, suggest fixed entities (that is, constructed identities as final products, or “positivities”) placed on a scale, whereas the primary concern is with movement, engagement, interaction in conditions of contingency and (in the case of countries such as South Africa, the Baltic States, post-Revolutionary France) dislocation. The emphasis in equivalence when considered as a chemical phenomenon is on the valency of atomic particles, the combining power of attraction or repulsion that allows atoms to bond. Valent bodies will seek, under various conditions, to create bonds and establish a state of balance. Many particles exhibit more than one valence, and their polyvalence creates the potential for multiple bonds, including with monovalent bodies.

Drawing parallels with chemistry has its limitations, but the metaphor is fruitful. Most importantly, it emphasises the dynamism of “combining powers”, as compared with the separation of objects by number, function and value so as to be able to see them as the same, as corresponding, as being able to stand in each other’s stead. The tension between equality and difference to which Barrett draws attention is precisely the condition of articulation without which the possibility of hegemony could not exist. The challenge for any hegemonising bloc is how to universalize its horizons when faced with interests that are not the same, that are not shared, and that nevertheless have to be ideologically incorporated in such a way that make them appear so, usually through an appeal to a unifying empty signifier. In the example explored by Howarth (2000), a relationship of equivalence is articulated between black and white, worker and owner, in a manner that extends the frontier of antagonism between “oppressor” and “oppressed”. It is not simply a question of asserting an equality among people, although such a discourse was present in pre-1994 South Africa. It is, rather, a question of an equivalence in relation to an
outside, to an empty signifier (such as “democracy” or, post-democracy, “the New South Africa”), which is the master link in the resultant chain of equivalence.

Equivalence also relates crucially to the question of value exchange, and is located theoretically at the juncture between ideology and hegemony. It is the “as-if” dynamic through which hegemony gains validity and currency, and is counterpoised to Althusser’s (1997) categorically interpellative “you are” or “it is”. Laclau (2005, p. 72) argues by contrast that hegemony is “essentially catechristical”, and that equivalential relations depend on a “rhetorical displacement” of terms and demands. For example, the discourse of dysfunction that prevails in Beeld through extensive coverage of “service delivery protests”, corruption and crime seeks simultaneously a) to create and maintain distinctions - an “us” and a “them” that is inevitably racialised, a key requirement for the affect of distinction to take hold - and b) paradoxically, to position particular demands emanating from class conditions of affluence, influence, privilege and prejudice, as if they formed part of a universal set of demands - that is, so that the articulation of demands (filling potholes in suburban streets) be considered equivalential with demands for basic services. This ontology of disadvantage (which is embodied in the discourse of dysfunction) obliterates structural distinctions and establishes the ontic rationale for displacing the ruling ANC and replacing it with an even more capital-friendly, but also “white-friendly” party49. Equivalence in this process is not simply an ideological “as-ifness”, but also represents what I call the “structural oscillation” between elements in discourse.

The concept of equivalence hinges on four basic concepts in Laclau and Mouffe: discourse, hegemony, articulation and social antagonism50.

---

49 At the time of writing, leading up to the 2014 elections, there were indications of a muting of both these factors in the DA, and the impact of the EFF on policy (regardless of its actual representation) remains to be seen.

50 Mouffe has moved from a focus on antagonism to agonism, seeking to identify the conditions of social interaction in which boundaries and frontiers signify not “enemies” but “opponents”, with a view to enlarging the democratic imaginary under conditions of separatist particularism.
3.3. Discourse

The concept of “discourse” is both highly technical and specific, as well as so broad as to mean just about anything. Mills (1997, p. 1) notes its “vague and sometimes obfuscatory” usage in theory. It denotes speech in general, as well as the way in which things are said or written, and so encompassing text within its meaning. It can be an articulation of social ways of being, or to put it differently a “set of social practices which ‘make meaning’ ” (Jaworski & Coupland, 1999, p. 7). Its analysis is a question of seeing “text in context”, the situatedness of meaning (Gee, 2007, p. 68), of “understanding and interpreting socially produced meanings” (Howarth, 2000, p. 128). By this is meant not just a reading of the ideology of expressed saids and unsaids, but that there should be a recognition that discourse is “a differential ensemble of signifying sequences in which meaning is constantly renegotiated” (Torfing, 1999, p. 85). This rippling out of definitions within a structured social domain is captured by Foucault (1972, p. 80) when he views discourse “sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualisable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements”.

While Foucault argues that discourse is located within and shaped by structure, others stress its transitive and interactive nature. Benveniste (1971, p. 208) stresses the communicative, rhetorical nature of discourse when he insists that it “must be understood in its widest sense: every utterance assuming a speaker and a hearer51, and in the speaker, the intention of influencing the other in some way”. In this he is followed by Pecheux (1983) who emphasises the dialogic nature of discourse, but where Benveniste speaks of a “speaker” and a “hearer”, Pecheux draws on Foucault’s theorizing of a “subject position” (supplanting the “author”) to determine the institutional location of a discourse and its oppositional orientation to other discourses (for example, for the purposes of this thesis, Afrikaans opposed to English, civil society opposed to government, neo-liberalism opposed to the collectivism of the “mob”, but the collectivism of the Afrikaner group

51 In this Benveniste echoes Bakthin (1986) who holds that since language is dialogical an addressee is always presupposed.
opposed to the neoliberalism of government or the neoliberalism of enterprise capital opposed to the social-democratic “compromises” of government and the ruling party). In other words, in the case of a newspaper for example, while the reader may be the notional hearer of the message, the putative partner in dialogue may be entirely peripatetic and the oppositional stance may be oriented not against, say, the ANC (by criticising policy issues, for example), but towards commercial competitors in the market for readers (through nicheing, on racial or class or ethnic lines, and through offering “exclusives”, redundant though such a concept may be in a “network society” characterized by the instantaneity of news). A debate on freedom of expression, for example, may, while recruiting the reader, be focused largely on government and media-policy makers. Or, when Afrikaans media wrestle with the terminology of Afrikaner versus Afrikaanse, this “relexification” (Tomaselli, 2011b, p. 176) is a bifurcate one, simultaneously referring to internal “identity” questions among Afrikaners, and seeking a discursive repositioning in relation to both Apartheid history and to an inclusive nation. Internal tensions arising from this represent what Torfing (1999, p. 212) describes as “the asymmetrical effects of mass media on the social and political forces constituted in and through the expansion of chains of equivalence” as “forms of power and resistance engendered by mass media are the outcome of what takes place both inside and outside the mass media message”.

The tension created by these factors manifests as what I shall call in my conclusion “structural oscillation” between elements of discourse, in which logics of equivalence and difference subvert each other as each seeks dominance through extended articulations of its chain. Torfing (1999, p. 95) refers to “a determinate oscillation between pragmatically determined possibilities”, but within this dynamic, at the level of representation, it is the non-representation of the other, as much as its Orientalisation (Said’s term), that serves to load the deck of power towards a logic of difference.

While this definition would incorporate a general view of discourse as “the way we talk about things”, it is not simply synonymous with language, in that Laclau and Mouffe “reject any ontological distinction between linguistic and material practices, or, to
formulate the point another way, any ontological distinction between meaning/signification and action” (Dahlberg in Dahlberg & Phelan, 2011, p. 4).

By Torfing’s interpretation of Derrida, this concept of discourse and its relation to the material is summed up as follows: “‘text’ implies all the structures called ‘real’, ‘economic’, ‘historical’, socio-institutional, in short: all possible referents. Another way of recalling once again that there is ‘nothing outside the text’ [...] ‘one cannot refer to this ‘real’ except in interpretive experience’ ” (Torfing, 1999, p. 94).

Where Althusser considered ideology to be materially embodied, which enabled Foucault to look to the materiality of historical institutions to map the disciplining structure of ideology, Laclau and Mouffe look to discourse for the semantic structuring of the social. This structuring of the social, and with it the construction of identities in what Gramsci refers to as “the war of position”, entails the hegemonic interplay of relations of difference and relations of equivalence amid the stabilising effect of “nodal points”. Laclau, drawing on Saussure, argues that “difference exists only in the diachronic succession of the syntagmatic pole, equivalence exists at the paradigmatic pole” (1988, p. 256). Equivalence seeks not sameness but an ideological basis of value exchange, and so a logic of equivalence is one in which the differential character of identity is undermined, with the result that meaning itself is eroded as paradigm swallows up syntagm. Laclau and Mouffe use as an example Jacobin discourse which managed to reduce identities to either equivalential chains of “the people” or the ‘ancien regime’. In South Africa the ruling party seeks a discursive equivalence in which poor=black=the people=ANC, but in such a way that it also incorporates the wealthy beneficiaries of the new dispensation. The wealthy beneficiaries of Apartheid are excluded through a logic of difference.

Difference and equivalence do not relate to essential identities, or the idea of an identity in toto. Laclau and Mouffe stress that the articulation between equivalential identities is between aspects that can be seen as the same, while they differ in others. These articulations can change, and so the relations of difference and equivalence are what Laclau and Mouffe call “undecidable”. Signifying chains can link up differentially or
equivalentially, and, confusingly, simultaneously. The fixing of meaning within
signifying chains takes place at “nodal points” (Lacan’s *points de capiton* or quilting
points). A coherent patchwork of meaning is stitched to these points, which in turn draw
on metaphor and metonymy, both of which operate at the symbolic level of condensation
or displacement, in which condensation “involves the fusion of a variety of significations
and meanings into a single unity” and displacement “involves the transferal of the
signification or meaning of one particular moment to another moment” (Torfing, 1999, p.
98).

The metaphoric force of “Rainbow Nation” illustrates the process of condensation of
identity elements into a unity. A study by Matthews (2011) illustrates the opposite for the
use of the word “African”. Matthews describes how attempts by some of her white
students to be considered “African” (which they self-identify as) is resisted by some of
her black students for whom the word can only meaningfully be applied to blacks. The
white students in this case seek a discursive condensation in which their signification as
“South African” is fused into, even superseded by, “African”. Black students, on the
other hand, seek metonymically to transfer the meaning of “whiteness” back into its
difference, stitching it into the patchwork of meanings given unity by the term
“Apartheid”. The possibility of an expanded chain of equivalence is severely limited in
this discourse by the inability to establish the logic by which “white” can be incorporated
symbolically into the same paradigm as black or “African”. Laclau and Mouffe
incorporate Foucault’s conceptualization of power in their theorizing, that is that although
“discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more
than silences are”, discourse “transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also
undermines it and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it”
(Foucault, 1978, pp. 100-101). The play of power through discourse establishes the basis
of inclusion and exclusion.

In Matthews’s study, the possibility of inclusion lies in a chain of equivalence that can
articulate, for example, “young”, “student”, “pro-democracy”, “aspirational” and “South
African”. The possibility of exclusion is established by articulating any term to the
signifier “African”, or “white”. Establishing which way the deck of power is loaded is important to reading any discourse, in that the task is not simply to identify ideologies, or a clash of ideologies, but also whether the hegemonic tide is ebbing or flowing. For example, an alarmist front page splash on “right-wing bombers” at Mangaung or “right-wing training camps” demands an interpretation that rules out these examples as isolated splutters of a dying ideology, in favour of a more panicked one that sees in these examples an anti-democratic, counter-hegemonic flow that gives reason to alarm.

3.4. The Discourse Theory of Laclau and Mouffe

Laclau (2000b, p. xi) summarises the focus of his and Mouffe’s post-structuralist Discourse Theory as “the discursive construction of politico-ideological frontiers and the dichotomisation of social spaces”. To this end they draw on the phenomenology of Heidegger, Wittgenstein’s “language games”, Foucault’s “Power/Knowledge” nexus, in the process deconstructing Marxist determinism to allow for Gramsci’s notion of hegemony to frame social and political analysis. Their theorizing offers a conscious critique of “sociologistic categories, which address the group, its constitutive roles and its functional determinations” in favour of a view that speaks of “logics of equivalence and difference, of empty and floating signifiers, and of myths and imaginaries” in a shift in attention from “‘ontically’ given objects of investigation to their ‘ontological’ conditions of possibility” (ibid.).

Laclau (2005, p. 68) defines “discourse” as “any complex of elements in which relations play the constitutive role”. This is in keeping with the definition put forward by Laclau and Mouffe (1989, p. 105) in which the practice of articulation establishes discourse: “We will call articulation any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we will call discourse. The differential positions,

52 Laclau and Mouffe’s emphasis on articulation draws heavily on Foucault, for whom a discursive formation “presents the principle of articulation between a series of discursive events and other series of events, transformations, mutations, and processes” (Foucault, 1972, p. 74).
insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse, we will call *moments*. By contrast, we will call *element* any difference that is not discursively articulated.”

Laclau and Mouffe deploy a range of theoretical concepts in developing their Discourse Theory: hegemony, discourse, articulation, elements, nodal points, signifiers (empty, floating, master), myths, imaginaries, antagonism (Mouffe (2009) ends up developing this concept into one of “agonism”), and logics of equivalence and difference.

“Hegemony”, asserts Lacla (2000c, p. 44), “defines the very terrain in which a political relation is actually constituted”. Dislocation and social antagonism are key features of the terrain in which hegemony takes place (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 14), and, since “conflict and struggle pervade the social” (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 47) “no discourse can be fully established, it is always in conflict with other discourses that define reality differently and set other guidelines for social action” (ibid.). Hegemonic contestations bring into play social identities and particular sectorial interests, and hegemonic “victory” obtains, according to Laclau (2000c, p. 50), when the universal aims of a community are expanded through the successful articulation between particularity and universality. Identities in Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory (as too in all social constructivist approaches) are not fully constituted as singular positivities jousting on a circumscribed and pre-ordained battlefield. “We gain very little,” cautions Laclau (2000c, p. 53), “once identities are conceived as complexly articulated collective wills, by referring to them through simple designations such as classes53, ethnic groups and so on, which are at best names for transient points of stability. The really important task is to understand the logics of their constitution and dissolution.” He notes therefore (in Laclau, 2005, p. 70) that “all identity is constructed54 within this tension between the differential

53 Laclau’s formulation here demonstrates his definitive departure from Marxist economism to a post-structuralist view heavily inflected by Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony and contestations of consent. He notes (Laclau, 2011, p. 141) that “Gramsci’s great originality did not lie so much in his insistence in the importance of superstructures in the determination of historical processes […] but in his effort to overcome at the same time economism and class reductionism.”

54 Identity (of gender, for example) rests on what Butler (2010, p. 168) calls the “normative production of the subject”, which is an “iterable process”, that is, “the norm is repeated, and in this sense is constantly ‘breaking’ with the contexts delimited as the ‘conditions of production’ ” (ibid.). She suggests, in relation to this non-deterministic understanding of norms, that this “may also be the reason why performativity is finally a more useful term than ‘construction’ ” (ibid.). An implication of this suggestion for my thesis is
and the equivalential logics”, and that “equivalence is precisely what subverts difference”. Nevertheless, while Jorgensen and Phillips (2002, p. 47) note that “although a subject has different identities, these do not have to relate antagonistically to one another,” but a social antagonism does come into being “when different identities mutually exclude each other”. This process of exclusion operates not only at the level of particularities being excluded from a universal, a totality, but through challenging what Butler calls the “frame of intelligibility” (Butler, 2000, p. 138), or discursive framework. However, according to Laclau and Mouffe no society is a self-enclosed totality (leading them to assert, ironically echoing Margaret Thatcher, that there is no such thing as society), and no single discourse can fully hegemonise a field of discursivity. Under such conditions, “The major aim of hegemonic projects is to construct and stabilise the nodal points that form the basis of concrete social orders by articulating as many elements - floating signifiers - as possible” (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 15).

that questions of Afrikaner identity construction (and the questions of “how?” and “by whom?”) should perhaps be conceived rather as “how the Afrikaner is performatively effected”.

Two points should be noted regarding the word “field”. It is not the “field” of Bourdieu, for whom it is a champ (Bourdieu, 1993), conceived as a bounded agricultural field within which, for example, social capital is accumulated and from which engagement with other fields, such as the economic or political, is mobilised. Bourdieu’s concept is essentially cartographic, and therefore, while in no sense inert, it is two-dimensional. For Laclau and Mouffe (1989, p. 111), on the other hand, the “field of discursivity” is best conceived as a three-dimensional force-field within which a discourse is located but which also contains all the possibilities excluded by that discourse. These excluded possibilities may be a “surplus of meaning” created through the process of articulation, or alternatively they may be the as-yet unarticulated “elements” of discourse, that is signs whose meaning has not been fixed and which exist therefore in a polysemous state of potential meanings. Capturing, or fixing, these elements, would be, in Discourse Theory, a moment of closure, or a stable state in which meaning has come to rest. The moment is always transient, however, since “The transition from the ‘elements’ to the ‘moments’ is never entirely fulfilled” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1989, p. 110). This is because the unity of meaning is always subject (due to the relational nature of signification) to the fixing of other signs and to underlying processes of dislocation.

Nodal points are also referred to as empty signifiers, the construction of which is a form of representation that enables the construction of equivalent relations within hegemonic operations. Laclau (2005, p. 104) describes the signifier as “empty” in that it engages a universalizing logic while simultaneously retaining the inscription of its particular signifying content. For Afrikaners, for example, the signifier “South African” has of necessity to incarnate a transcending logic beyond the particularity of the historical Afrikaner, without effacing the trace of the signifying content of “Afrikaner”.

A “floating signifier” is a contested sign, one that different discourses seek to invest with meaning in a way that “fixes” it as a “nodal point”.

This process described by Howarth and Stavrakakis is a closely theorised elaboration of the way in which Barrett (1991, p. 54) interprets Gramsci’s concept of hegemony: “Hegemony is best understood as the organisation of consent - the processes through which subordinated forms of consciousness are without recourse to violence or coercion.” However, Laclau and Mouffe, together and separately, do not hold to the view of a subordinate consent as being the product of a dominant ideology. Their view of discourse stresses unpredictability and contingency in discursive articulations, in which the play of ideology may not necessarily follow the logic of determination suggested by Barrett.
Laclau and Mouffe (1989, p. 112) argue that a nodal point is a privileged sign in relation to which other signs gain their meaning. Jorgensen & Phillips (2002, p. 26) give the example that “A nodal point in political discourses is ‘democracy’ and in national discourses a nodal point is ‘the people’. ” The articulation between these discourses engages the hegemonic process by which “this people” becomes “The People”, or how a chosen people (chosen through recourse to “civilization” or Christianity, or alternatively to indigenerality in the case of African nationalism) become democratic citizens, a process explored by Chipkin (2007) who concludes that the African nationalist construction of the “People” (as reflected in official discourse and in policy) makes a democratic form of society impossible.

Hart (2013, p. 23) argues that the “linchpin” of the ruling bloc’s hegemonic power is its “capacity to tap into deep veins of popular understandings of the ‘national question’”, and that “simultaneous processes of de-nationalisation and re-nationalisation are crucial to understanding the ANC’s hegemonic project, and the contradictory ways it plays out in practice”. By extension, these contradictions are reflected in an equally contradictory manner in processes of hegemonic accommodation or in counter-hegemonic contestations. Noting that the “South African nation” “had to be conjured into existence from the rubble of a deeply divided past”, which she defines as the thrust of “re-nationalisation”, Hart (2013, p. 6) argues that at precisely this moment of foundation, “powerful South African conglomerates were straining at the leash to break away from confines of any sort of national economy and reconnect with the increasingly financialised global economy”, which she sees as the process of “de-nationalisation”.

The dialectical relations of these two processes shape and define the parameters of not only the ANC’s hegemonic project, but of others. For example, Hart argues (2013, p. 9) that “many popular struggles over the material conditions of life and livelihood that erupt in local arenas are simultaneously struggles over the meanings of the nation and liberation, now rooted in a profound sense of betrayal - struggles that can and do move in dramatically different directions”. The high road to hegemony, therefore, is constructed not from the gold bricks of historical moral authority, but from a painstaking and
ceaseless process of delinking and re-articulating issues. To use Laclau’s terminology, derived from Lacan, while the ANC seeks to stitch floating signifiers such as “pro-poor”, “development”, through the quilting point of “ANC”, “African”, “liberation” and “nation”, there are countervailing efforts to stitch “elite”, “bourgeois”, “betrayal”, “neo-liberal” through the same quilting points.

Inevitably the stitching process is patchy. It shifts and is contradictory, an endless Sisyphian task of attempting to suture the Real. This is partly due to the logic of semantic signification that Derrida identified as the “slippage of the signifier”, or the “deference” of meaning that results from every moment of utterance or representation. Laclau and Hall both understand that it is in the attempt to arrest the slippage, to “fix” meaning, that ideology exists. For Laclau (2005, p. 13) the “differentiation between ideas in people’s heads and actions in which they participate […] is untenable”, and also irrelevant because “what matters is the determination of the discursive sequences constituting social institutionalized life”.

Ideology in Discourse Theory (and in Hall) is no longer a determinate (economic) truth that is hidden by or from “false consciousness”, or the willful or unconscious misrecognition (or misrepresentation) of an “underlying” truth or transcendental foundation. If ideology can no longer be grasped as “the epistemological distortion of a consciousness that would otherwise be true”, argues Dahlberg (in "Introduction" 2011, p. 27), then “mainstream media can no longer be simply positioned as a space of falsity”.

What is loosely understood as falsity Laclau accepts as the effect of distortion which is a necessary feature of the “unresolvable tension between equivalence and difference” (Undated article: "Philosophical roots of Discourse Theory"). He goes on to refine his definition of hegemony59, by arguing that a “relation, by which a certain particularity assumes the representation of a totality entirely incommensurable with it, is what in Discourse Theory is called a hegemonic relation” (ibid.).

---

59 Derived from Gramsci’s notion that submission to dominance hinges on consent as opposed to force.
Ideology, then in Discourse Theory, “is present when a particular discursive system, such as neo-liberalism, is seen as “all there is” ’ (Dahlberg, "Introduction" Dahlberg & Phelan, 2011, p. 27). This is not an end-point, a stable state. It is, rather, a question of continual re-articulation and re-invention. Hall, in a critique of Althusser’s “Ideological State Apparatuses”, notes that “Meaning is relational within an ideological system of presences and absences” and that ideology is “precisely, this work of fixing meaning through establishing, by selection and combination, a chain of equivalences” (Hall, 1996, p. 13).

Summarising the teleological break of post-structuralism, Hall concludes that “there is no law which guarantees that the ideology of a group is already and unequivocally given in or corresponds to the position which that group holds in the economic relations of capitalist production” (1996, p. 14). In his own work Hall demonstrates, for example, how the working class “bought into” Margaret Thatcher’s monetarist economic policies (against their own interests), but also how challenges to the negative construction of “blacks” through disrupting the chains of connotations becomes a social practice in which “social reproduction itself becomes a contested process” (Hall, 1996, p. 33). Hall’s critique of class reductionism points to the limitations of essentialising the social, and how contingent power relations must lead, according to Laclau, to the “non-recognition of the precarious character of any positivity, of the impossibility of any ultimate suture” (Laclau, 1990, p. 92).

“We will call articulation any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1989, p. 105).60

The concept of “articulation” incorporates both the idea of “speech” and of “coupling”. Its theoretical roots lie in Saussure’s notion of the arbitrariness of the sign and how therefore any perception or representation of “reality” derives from its articulation in language. In the post-structuralism of Laclau, Mouffe and Hall, for example, it offers an

---

60 Identity is not modified, then, by the mere contiguity of elements. It requires an engagement through practice. This implies that articulation belongs not only in the conceptual realm of epistemology, but of ontology too. Each implies the other.
escape from the bear-trap of Marxist “reductionism”, that is the theory that social phenomena can always be traced back to class and the economy “in the final instance”. It allows, instead, for modes of existence to be considered as complex combinations of ethnicity, language, economics, sexuality and race, among others. This allows Hall (1980b, p. 341) to separate race and class conceptually and then consider how they were articulated in Thatcherite Britain, observing in conclusion that race is “the modality in which class is ‘lived’, the medium through which class relations are experienced, the form in which it is appropriated and ‘fought through’.”

Hall (1996, p. 33) explains his understanding of articulation as follows: “By the term ‘articulation’, I mean a connection or link which is not necessarily given in all cases, as a law or a fact of life, but which requires particular conditions of existence to appear at all, which has to be positively sustained by specific processes, which is not ‘eternal’ but has constantly to be renewed, which can under some circumstances disappear or be overthrown, leading to the old linkages being dissolved and new connections - rearticulations - being forged. It is also important that an articulation between different practices does not mean that they become identical or that the one is dissolved into the other. Each retains its distinct determinations and conditions of existence. However, once an articulation is made, the two processes can function together, not as an immediate identity […] but as ‘distinctions within a unity’.”

This unity, this totality of meaning, is expressed in discourse, whose hegemonic force then depends on the elements that have been aligned in articulation. For example, in their analysis of Peronism and paralysis in the Argentine political system, Barros and Castagnalo (2000, p. 27) argue that the vitality of the Peronist movement was “not ultimately linked either to the satisfaction of the material demands of the popular sectors or to the predominance of a supposedly intrinsic political logic of trade unionism” and resulted from “the impossibility of constituting a stable overall hegemonic articulation”. Translated into the South African context, the particular articulation of elements in a

---

61 Shared by Hart (2013, p. 17), who uses its “dual sense of ‘joining together’ and ‘giving expression to’” in her theorising of “de-nationalisation” and “re-nationalisation” as the hegemonising tensions in South Africa.
discourse provides the clue to its social potency. For example, within Afrikaner discourse economic dominance is articulated to political incapacity (in a way that forefronts the latter), while for the EFF it’s a question of a populist articulation of the elements of “blackness”, economic subordination and political incapacity through establishing a chain of equivalence between the ANC and “white interests”, the very reverse of the Afrikaner articulation.

“Elements”, in the definition of articulation by Laclau and Mouffe above, are signs whose meaning has not been fixed. The point of fixity is a moment of ideological and discursive closure, but Laclau and Mouffe emphasise that within the moment of exclusion brought about by such a closure lies the Derridean logic of slippage, in that “the transition from the ‘elements’ to the ‘moments’ is never entirely fulfilled” (1989, p. 110) as new meanings are acquired in the process. The system of meaning is not simply an amoebic agglomeration of categories. This would mean that identity is the sum of its descriptive elements, against which Zizek (1989, p. 95) argues that identity results from the “retroactive effect of naming itself: it is the name itself, the signifier, which supports the identity of the object”, but is structured through nodal points which as privileged signifiers bind a “chain of signification” (in Hall’s terminology) or “framework of intelligibility” (in Butler’s terminology).

The media, according to Hall (1982, p. 83) are not only a mechanism of hegemony, they do not only structure hegemony, but they have the force of an “agent”. This is important in the move away from seeing media as carriers of messages or mediators of events towards an understanding of their constitutive role and characteristics. In this, they are a technology of articulation, and “it is precisely through a process of articulation/communication that the identities of all entities involved are established” (Marchart, 2011, p. 79).

“Insofar as there is antagonism, I cannot be a full presence for myself. But nor is the force that antagonizes me such a presence: its objective being is a symbol of my non-
being and, in this way, it is overflowed by a plurality of meanings which prevent it being fixed as full positivity” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1989, p. 125).

Antagonism establishes, first, the dichotomy of “us” and “them”, demarcating in the process the social and political boundary beyond which “there be dragons”, and naturalizing, even in its contradictions, the ideological terrain inhabited by “us”. This boundary-drawing, “acts as a discursive attempt to name and expel the antagonistic Other(s) blocking the possibility of a full identity, so as to establish the mythical coherence of the positively asserted identity” ("Introduction", Dahlberg & Phelan, 2011, p. 27).

Chipkin (2007, p. 198) illustrates how the cohering logic of the ANC’s notion of a national democratic revolution “divided the political space into two opposing camps. Black and white referred to antagonistic identities, and in this sense they demarcated a frontier.” He argues that “blackness becomes the essence of the social”, and the logic of the social is grounded in the nation as historical community, which is why the “name” of “the people” - which within the national discourse of freedom and justice has always to be articulated to the name “black” - is central to establishing the democratic limit as co-incidental with a popular identity.

This moment, this “nodal point” of blackness, is never stitched up once and for all. The givenness of the black/white couplet depends for its currency on a third element, a contingent one located within a discourse of “non-racialism” or “reconciliation”, for example. But at the same time it is undermined by the same or other elements. Any social relation is held in tension, as Laclau argues throughout, by its own conditions of necessity and impossibility. A totality (the temporary fixing of a unity established in equivalence), is impossible “because the tension between equivalence and difference is insurmountable;

---

62 In the process reinscribing social boundaries drawn under colonialism and apartheid, but simultaneously reinvesting them with a “positive” positivity, in which denigrated identities assume an ontological authenticity. Citing Althusser, Chipkin (2007, p. 211) asserts that “what counts is the way that power is subjectivised - internalized as something one believes in for oneself”, and “the citizen was an effect of democratic interpolation: the national subject is interpolated according to the measure of authenticity”.

85
necessary because without some kind of closure, however precarious it may be, there would be no signification and no identity” (Laclau, 2005, p. 70).

Chipkin relates this to the concept of “blackness” in the “black republic” that is the logical telos of the national democratic revolution. This “native republic”, coterminous with “free South Africa”, “is fixed in relation to a whiteness that is no longer in the discursive field - it has been cut out63 […] Not only must the state constantly ward off any and every (real) resurgence of whiteness (racialism and capitalism) within the demos, but, paradoxically, it must preserve the very whiteness it is driven to negate. Why? The native republic qua negative relational term itself dissolves when the term ‘white’ is negated. More importantly, the demos dissolves if the identity of the term ‘black’ changes. Yet this is exactly what must be possible in a democracy” (Chipkin, 2007, p. 198).

Chipkin’s analysis aims to establish the theoretical conditions for a citizenship within a radical plural democracy. But the nodal point of “blackness” that he posits stitches the ideological terrain in a way that not only limits democracy by limiting the demos, but veils structural reconfigurations of the political terrain that are fundamentally anti-democratic. For example, recourse to the name “black” allows, in ways that do not but may yet line up: a nationalistic discourse to be articulated as democratic; the mobilization of fascism under EFF leader Julius Malema (Duncan, 2011) under the same signifier within a chain of difference that fixes and excludes the white-colonial-oppressor identity; and the re-tribalisation of territory (and re-emergent nationalism) and government through strengthening “Bantustan” institutions (Phillips, Lissoni, & Chipkin, 2014) as well as the extension of land claims allowing Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini to lay claim to territory in the name of “the Zulu nation”, all articulated to a historical notion of

---

63 “Cutting out” is the process by which the enemy and all its negative connotations are excised from the “imagined” demos and located across the resultant frontier, thus creating and preserving the “constitutive outside” against which positive identities are unified.
“blackness” that incorporates dispossession, injustice, freedom under the ostensible empty signifier of “democracy”64.

Discourse, as has been pointed out, is never neutral, and serves always to load the decks of power, and the frontier cannot simply be constituted as a set of inanimate co-ordinates. At what point does a dyad become a dialectic, a couplet a dichotomy? Meaning is constructed in a medium of meaning, but for meaning to end there would require a very narrow adherence to elementary Saussurianism. Signification (in Laclau and Mouffe, Hall, Barthes, Benveniste, Butler and Agamben) requires for its effect an apperception of the unity of a totality while simultaneously recognising its impossibility, both ontologically and in representation. The motive force that animates the autonomous subject comes out of this dislocation. The question Laclau asks is how the named object, having achieved its identity as a “concrete social agent” (ie a singularity which contains the unity of the universal) acquires its force, which ultimately makes itself manifest through a collective will. In an important extension of his understanding of the articulation of equivalences (and an implicit acknowledgment of the structuralist limitations of a narrow view of the concept), Laclau incorporates the psycho-analytical concept of “affect” into his thesis.

He notes (Laclau, 2005, p. 110) that “the emergence of the ‘people’ requires the passage - via equivalences - from isolated, heterogeneous demands to a ‘global’ demand which involves the formation of political frontiers and the discursive construction of power as an antagonistic force”, but “since, however, this passage does not follow from a mere analysis of the heterogeneous demands themselves - there is no logical, dialectical or semiotic transition from one level to the other - something qualitatively new has to intervene”65. This something, what Laclau calls a “radical investment”, takes the form of

64 Blaser and Van der Westhuizen (2012) and Boersema (2012) consider Afrikaner identity as having entered a “post-nationalist” phase, regrouping around “rights”, but the ethnic reterritorialisation of nationalist identities likely to be set in train by the “Zulu” land claim may rekindle this suppressed/discarded element of identity which in the post-1994 period has tended to fall into Hart’s typology of “de-nationalisation”.

65 Wodak et al (2009) provide an example of this in respondents to “neutral”, fact-based radio reports on Palestinian-Israeli conflict who nevertheless continue to adhere to a prior understanding of victim-perpetrator.
“affect”⁶⁶. This is not an ex machina dimension, but flows from the ontological centrality that psycho-analysis gives to the concept of cathexis, or the emotional or mental investment in an object (material or ideal). “If an entity becomes the object of an investment - as in being in love, or in hatred - the investment belongs necessarily to the order of affect” (Laclau, 2005, p. 110).

Drawing on Saussure’s associative pole of meaning in language, Laclau notes that “affect is required if signification is going to be possible”, and therefore “the complexes which we call ‘discursive or hegemonic formations’, which articulate differential and equivalential logics would be unintelligible without the affective component” (ibid., p. 111). Laclau appears to be trying simultaneously to hold the “irrational” and the “rational” within the same framework of intelligibility, a post-structuralist tactic that explains itself from within the Saussurean notion of paradigmatic substitutions. But he also relies heavily on Lacan and Copjec to locate the impetus of Freudian drive within signification to assert that “any social whole results from an indissociable articulation between signifying and affective dimensions” (ibid.). The Freudian drive, here, is galvanised by the state created by the “split between das Ding (the Thing), and what is representable” (Laclau, 2005, p. 112). Dislocation creates an aspiration for fullness, a wound “sutured” in ideology, according to Laclau and Mouffe (1989) and Zizek (1989). But extending his notion of rhetorical displacement, in which rhetoric is “the anatomy of the ideological world” (Laclau, 2005, p. 13), Laclau draws on Copjec to reiterate that “the partial object becomes itself a totality” (ibid., p. 113), the partial object “is not part of a whole, but a part which is the whole.” Copjec (2003, quoted in Laclau, ibid., pp. 113-114), refers to Deleuze, for whom the part, “the close-up is not a closer look at a part of the scene, that is, it does not disclose an object that can be listed as an element of that scene, a detail plucked from the whole and then blown up in order to focus our attention.

⁶⁶ Chipkin (2007, p. 209), in arguing for a demos constituted not in antagonism but, following Mouffe (2009), in “agonism”, suggests that for the democratic ideal of freedom and equality to acquire its fullness requires the affective investment of fraternity: “those that are free and equal are also those bonded in fraternity […] - i.e. by love and friendship. Without this investment, ‘the people’ themselves do not exist”. This state cannot obtain, he argues, for as long as “the name ‘black’ has the force of a glue because it becomes a ‘source of enjoyment’.” The same would apply, in my argument, to the name “Afrikaner” and any jouissance that attaches to it.
The close-up discloses, rather, the whole of the scene itself, or, as Deleuze says, its entire “expressed”… Which brings Laclau to his key assertion that “the need to constitute a ‘people’ (a plebs claiming to be a populus) arises only when that fullness [an institutional order that satisfies all demands] is not achieved, and partial objects within society (aims, figures, symbols) are so cathected that they become the name of its absence” (Laclau, 2005, pp. 116-117).

3.5. Butler’s “Grievability”

What happens at the limit, when the partial becomes the general and the singular supplants the universal? The limit bounds an inside and an outside, insiders, or citizens, and outsiders, or mere denizens, the included and the excluded. It is the frontier created by articulations of antagonism, beyond which the Other is irrecoverable. And within a “fractal topography” in which the precarious condition of the excluded (but which Du Toit (2004), in the case of the economic poor, shows may be discursively excluded from the economy while in fact being “adversely incorporated” into it) is represented as a side-effect rather than as a condition of a neo-liberal economy, the irrecoverability of the Other is sustained through the investment and withdrawal of affect, as Butler (2010) shows in her exploration of what she calls “grievability” in the recruitment of support for war.

Up to a point Butler reiterates the propaganda model thesis of Herman and Chomsky (1988) in which the process of manufacturing an elite consensus establishes “worthy” and “unworthy victims”. In Butler’s formulation, which has as its primary focus the legitimation of the waging of war, there is still an instrumentalism in how assent is cultivated, but she goes further in thinking about the “interpretive maneuver” that is required in “giving an account of whose life is a life, and whose life is effectively transformed into an instrument, a target, or a number, or is effaced with only a trace remaining or none at all” (Butler, 2010, pp. ix-x). She postulates that this framing takes place within an ontology of “generalized precariousness”, and that “precariousness as a generalized condition relies on a conception of the body as fundamentally dependent on,
and conditioned by, a sustained and sustainable world” (ibid., p. 34). The conditions of vulnerability extend therefore beyond the arena of war, and the ethical responsiveness to such conditions - which “may include a wide range of affects: pleasure, rage, suffering, hope …” (ibid., p. 34) - “must focus not just on the value of this or that life, or on the question of survivability in the abstract, but on the sustaining conditions of social life - especially when they fail” (ibid., p. 35). Responsiveness depends on norms of recognition, and the frontier of antagonism creates not just a demarcation of a visible and recognisable “beyond”, but the limit of what is recognisable 67.

Butler follows Levinas in her understanding that responsibility is based on an intersubjective recognition of the “face” of the other, and its implicit summoning of the “fraternal” 68 self. “If there is no ‘you’, or the ‘you’ cannot be heard or seen, then there is no ethical position” (Butler, 2010, p. 181) 69. However, Butler’s formulation is not a mere assertion of Christian “brotherly love” or of “ubuntu”, although the reciprocity of humanity is integral to her argument. But because Levinas appreciates that “no event is as affectively disruptive for a consciousness holding sway in its world than the encounter with another person” (Bergo, 2014), Butler argues with him that within an ontology of precariousness “the face is at once a temptation to kill and an interdiction against killing” 70 (Butler, 2010, p. 172).

67 Whether as an “ons/us” or a “soos ons/like us”. This entails an understanding of which “we” one might belong to, which incorporates the multiplicity, interchangeability and functionalities of identities, but Butler wrestles with the ethical ambivalences inherent in the affective thrilling to likeness: “If I identify a community of belonging on the basis of nation, territory, language, or culture, and if I then base my sense of responsibility on that community, I implicitly hold to the view that I am responsible only for those who are recognizably like me in some way. But what are the implicit frames of recognizability in play when I “recognize” someone as “like” me? What implicit political order produces and regulates “likeness” in such instances?” (Butler, 2010, p. 36).

68 Chipkin (2007) and Mouffe (2009) extend their thinking of “democracy” to the neglected third element of the French Revolutionary credo of “liberté, égalité, fraternité”, in that it stresses the reciprocal “with”, over and above the declaratory “from” and “to” qualities of the former. Critchley (1999, p. 283) also argues that in the question of fraternity lies the “reciprocal relation of supplementarity” required to “solder” the logics of deconstruction and hegemony, that is the ethical injunction that informs any radical politics.

69 The implications of this ethical logic are profound for any media that position themselves in relation to a “target market” that explicitly and implicitly excludes not only other niches, but “Others”. The consequence of this, intended or otherwise, is, as I am arguing, that the discourse of reconciliation present in Beeld does not have the necessary form of a dialogue, and without the presence of the reconciled or unreconciled “Other”, reconciliation as understood by the TRC and in “common sense” is unrealised.

70 Levinas’s notion of the “Other” as an absolutely unknowable form of difference posits that left outside, or beyond the norm (as an “alien”, in effect, whether one who is exoticised, denigrated or subordinated in
Recognising that full interpersonal exposure to others is impossible, but that it takes place through processes of mediation in a mediatised social and technological environment, Butler notes that “the claim upon me takes place, when it takes place, through the senses, which are crafted in part through various forms of media: the social organization of sound and voice, of image and text, of tactility and smell. If the claim upon me is to reach me, it must be mediated in some way, which means that our very capacity to respond with non-violence (to act against a certain violent act, or to defer to the “non-act” in the face of violent provocation) depends on the frames by which the world is given and by which the domain of appearance is circumscribed. The claim to non-violence does not merely interpellate me as an individual person who must decide one way or another. If the claim is registered, it reveals me less as an ‘ego’ than as a being bound up with others in inextricable and irreversible ways, existing in a generalized condition of precariousness and interdependency, affectively driven and crafted by those whose effects on me I never chose” (Butler, 2010, p. 180). “For this purpose,” Butler argues, (ibid., p. 181) “we do not need to know in advance what “a life” will be, but only to find and support those modes of representation and appearance that allow the claim of life to be made and heard (in this way, media and survival are linked)”.

Butler’s concerns about the limits of “grievability” have as their touchpoint the wars in Iraq and between Israel and Palestine, among others – in other words, wars between nations. The starkness of her examples locates, but does not limit, her condition of “precariousness” in conditions of strife and homicidal aggression. Levinas, while recognizing the state as the progenitor of war, understands war more broadly to encompass the economic as well (Levinas, 1987), and so he locates what Benjamin called a “state of exception” not outside or beyond the norm, but very much as incorporated within the norm.
Agamben (1998) takes this further in theorising what he calls “bare life” and “states of exception”, concluding not only that “where there is bare life, there will have to be a People”, but that “where there is a People, there will be bare life” (p. 179). His understanding of “people” is that the term “names both the constitutive political subject and the class that is de facto, if not de jure, excluded from politics” (p. 176) - those reduced to “bare life” being the “people”, and those having political existence, the “People”. The extreme case that he uses is that of the Nazis and concentration camps, in which the “state of exception” that enabled the extermination of Jews was not an exceptional case created outside the civic and juridical framework but rather a condition of sovereignty (of the state) to expel the excluded. *Homo sacer* is constructed in such a way that he/she occupies a “zone of indistinction” (a space created in law where the law does not apply) in which to kill him/her does not amount to homicide. The analogy of the death camps extends to any preserve of “the wretched, the oppressed, and the defeated” (p. 177). Social life for Agamben is structured by “biopolitical fracture” (as opposed to Marxist class contradiction), and so the limit case for him is not the poor or the working class, but the example of the “musulmann” that he draws from the concentration camps (a paradigm he then extends to argue that the “camp” is the “fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West” in that “naked life” lies at the centre of both totalitarian regimes and “democratico-capitalist projects”). This is a person who “was not only, like his companions, excluded from the political and social context to which he once belonged;”

---

This vitalist turn informs Butler and Agamben as they explore what Fredric Jameson calls the “antinomies of postmodernity” in ways that deconstruct social models of domination/oppression which are limited in their explanations of how contradictory social movements emerge, or rather how their manifestations contradict their conditions of emergence, as Hall (1980b) shows in his exploration of the race-class nexus in Britain. Laclau and Mouffe, separately and together, in their departure from the same model, steer away from such vitalism except to the extent that they incorporate “affect” in their post-structural theorizing. Jameson, too, tilts in the same direction, albeit from a more solidly materialist perspective, when he revisits *Capital* (Jameson, 2011, p. 151) to rethink “lost populations of the world in terms of exploitation rather than domination”, a “recoding of these multiple situations of misery and enforced idleness, of populations helplessly in prey to the incursions of warlords and charitable agencies alike, of naked life in all the metaphysical senses in which the sheer biological temporality of existences without activity and without production can be interpreted”. Jameson’s Marxian view of globalisation leads him to view the condition of unemployment not only as that of “naked life”, but to theorise unemployment as the productive object of capital. Agamben, although his analysis of state power and naked life is not economistic, reaches a similar conclusion, extending his understanding of the biopolitics of concentration camps by analogy to globalization: “today’s democratico-capitalist project of eliminating the poor classes through development not only reproduces within itself the people that is excluded but also transforms the entire population of the Third World into bare life” (Agamben, 1998, p. 180).
he was not only, as Jewish life that does not deserve to live, destined to a future more or less close to death. He no longer belongs to the world of men in any way; he does not even belong to the threatened and precarious world of the camp inhabitants who have forgotten him from the beginning. Mute and absolutely alone, he has passed into another world without memory and without grief” (p. 185). He has passed beyond the biopolitical possibility of grief, and therefore into a state of “ungrievability”, to himself and others.

Agamben and Butler are not drawing attention to a particular tragic pathos here or there, but to a dislocation, the “fundamental biopolitical fracture of the West” (Agamben, 1998, p. 180) from which Agamben (p. 181) develops three key theses:

“1. The original political relation is the ban (state of exception as zone of indistinction between inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion).
2. The fundamental activity of sovereign power is the production of bare life as originary political element and as threshold of articulation between nature and culture …
3. Today it is not the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West.”

The implications that Agamben draws from these theses are far-reaching: the first “calls into question every theory of the contractual origin of state power and, along with it, every attempt to ground political communities in something like ‘belonging’, whether it be founded on popular, national, religious, or any other identity”72; the second “implies that Western politics [by which is understood representative democratic systems of government] is a biopolitics from the very beginning, and that every attempt to found political liberties in the rights of the citizen is, therefore, in vain”73. And, finally, that

72 Mouffe (2009), in developing her theory of agonistic pluralism, argues that liberal democracy cannot dispense with the concept of the demos (which incorporates the notions of belonging, patriotism and identification), which continues to be territorially localised (contra Deleuze), and whose particularities are the sine qua non of the democratic process.
73 This conclusion unsettles, for example, Chipkin (2007), for whom a broader conceptualisation of the demos is premised on a notion of full citizenship and by extension full freedom (in politics), and Mamdani (1996), for whom full citizenship and freedom are likewise premised on a bringing together of the two poles of “bifurcate citizenship”. Mouffe (2009), in noting what she calls the “democratic paradox”, considers the logic of democracy to be one of exclusion (hence the importance of who is a citizen,
public space (and cities) cannot be understood “without any clear awareness that at their very center lies the same bare life (even if it has been transformed and rendered apparently more human) that defined the biopolitics of the great totalitarian states of the twentieth century”\textsuperscript{74}. Agency emerges then, ultimately, as a process of subjectivation within this biopolitical terrain, through, as Laclau and Mouffe argue throughout, hegemony as a construction of the political through articulation.

The usefulness of Agamben’s emphasis on “bare life” is that he makes of “humanity” a political element, in that through this conceptualization of the sovereign power of the state (any state, in any of its guises) bearing down on the biological subject provides an analytical tool with which to examine conditions of anxiety that emanate not solely from specific conditions of oppression but from what Giddens (1991) views as conditions of “ontological security”.

### 3.6. Representation

Articulation, whether in the form of symbolic representation or demands directed vertically towards the state or horizontally through and to social groups and movements, is a question of mediation, that is representation. For Hall (1996, p. 24), “it is in and through the systems of representation of culture that we ‘experience’ the world: experience is the product of our codes of intelligibility, our schemas of interpretation.” In the case of a niched (as consumers), or ethnicised (as Afrikaners) medium, representation creates not only a version of a world, a validation of that world, but to the extent that that representation is representative of a lived domain of experience, the subject (reader, consumer) becomes implicated in the process of being represented in the political domain.

\textsuperscript{74} Agamben pits the biological individual against the state as a condition of possibility for social change, rather than class or economic action.
For Laclau (2005, p. 161), “the construction of a ‘people’ would be impossible without the operation of mechanisms of representation”\textsuperscript{75}. For Jameson (2011, p. 6), representation is an “essential operation in cognitive mapping and in ideological construction”, but as a concept it “eats away at all the established disciplines like a virus, particularly destabilizing the dimension of language, reference and expression (which used to be the domain of literary study), as well as of thought (which used to be that of philosophy). Nor is economics exempt, which posits invisible entities like finance capital on the one hand, and points to untheorizable singularities like derivatives on the other” (\textit{ibid.}, p. 4). As a corollary of this, the concept of the state and “the former thing called power” have evaporated, and he sums up the difficulty the “free play of categories in the void” has created in, for example, the understanding of social class, which can no longer be defined; “it can only be approached in a kind of parallax [an idea that approaches Derrida’s of ‘\textit{diff\’erance}’], which locates it in the absent centre of incompatible approaches” (\textit{ibid.}, p. 7)\textsuperscript{76}.

Representation is always therefore what it is, what is guessed at, and more. Representation is not ontologically separate from Althusser’s “real conditions of existence” because, as Hall (1996, p. 25) points out, we are stitched both in and into discourses and social relations, neither of which in turn can be extricated from the other. One of the consequences of this is that the representation of the “Other” is not limited to an actual representation of an “Other” in its difference, but is represented in the representation of the self even when the “Other” is not represented as a denoted object\textsuperscript{77}.

\textsuperscript{75} ‘People’ being always understood as a “community of citizens”, in Mouffe’s words, and not as “humanity” or “the population”.
\textsuperscript{76} Hall (1996, p. 13), drawing on what he calls Althusser’s “break with a monistic conception of social contradictions”, and concurring with Derrida’s notion of difference as the perpetual product of the “slippage of the signifier”, agrees with Laclau here that chains of equivalence articulate both difference and unity, which makes it possible, for example, to think how a sense of class belonging may not be congruent with class position, or, likewise, how an ethnic identity may be in tension with a class identity. Hall comes to this conclusion in a partial critique of the common understanding of discourse theory that “nothing really connects with anything else” (\textit{ibid.}, p. 14), noting that while effects and origins may have no necessary correspondence, they can be understood in terms of processes of linkage, where those linkages both derive from and are the product of “imaginary relations” (\textit{not false relations}).
\textsuperscript{77} For example, Hall (1996, p. 31) identifies connotative chains established by the term “black”: “black-lazy, spiteful, artful”, and “blackness”: “Hell, the Devil, sin and damnation”. Any chain of connotation
Connotations flow even in the absence of an explicit denoted due to what Hall (ibid.) terms “deep structure”, that is, “the notions of nation, the great slabs and slices of imperialist history, the assumptions about global domination and supremacy, the necessary Other of other peoples’ subordination”, and of “society as a field of social difference organized around the categories of race, colour and ethnicity”\(^78\).

In this charged context, representation “engages feelings, attitudes and emotions and it mobilizes fears and anxieties” (Hall, 2002, p. 226), not according to a script (even when recourse is made to myth), but always in reference to what Hall (1996, p. 31) calls “the moment of historical formation” and even when ideological traces have disaggregated yet continue to “trail through history, usable in a variety of new historical contexts, reinforcing and underpinning more apparently ‘modern’ ideas”.

Hall incorporates the psychoanalytic theory of Freud and Lacan to theorise agency in terms of unconscious mechanisms, but argues that “subjects are not positioned in relation to the field of ideologies \textit{exclusively by} the resolution of unconscious processes in infancy”, since “ideologies of identity” are located in struggle; in other words, they are not static blocks thrust together by immutable, determined forces. For Hall (1996, p. 36), “a particular ideological chain becomes a site of struggle, not only when people try to displace, rupture or contest it, by supplanting it with some wholly new alternative set of terms, but also when they interrupt the ideological field and try to transform its meaning by changing or rearticulating its associations, for example from negative to positive”. In considering the contestations over the term “black” - “which connotes the most despised, the dispossessed, the unenlightened, the uncivilized, the uncultivated, the scheming, the incompetent” - Hall concludes that where the struggle is successful “it stops the society reproducing itself functionally, in \textit{that} old way. Social reproduction itself becomes a contested process” (\textit{ibid.}, p. 33).

\(^78\) Hall’s analysis referred to Jamaican society, but has obvious application to the South African context, and it provides a necessary framework within which to judge how dominant discourses come to be and how they can be recognised as such.
From this analysis it is necessary, in the South African context, for the connotative chains of both “black” and “white” to undermine each other so that the processes of social reproduction are disarticulated from racialised chains. A paradox arises in that, for example in discourses of BEE\(^{79}\) and restitution, the disarticulation can only be effected under racial signifiers, thereby reinforcing them. But what Hall implies is that through the possibility of engagement, the social terrain is already altered, and with it the identities of social players.

Laclau argues the same point, invoking Marx to argue that social identities are not assertions of an *a priori* being, but constructed through the reciprocal processes of social demands (ie specific rights), and these demands are always mediated through representation. Identity does not “pass through” the mediation process; it is constituted in it, through what Hall (1973) calls a “double-articulation” that “binds the inner discourse of the newspaper to the ideological universe of society”. “Double-articulation” describes for Hall the ideological process of meaning making in media, and also the process by which a condensed social position, or social identity, is established. In considering how race, class and gender are articulated differentially, given particular modes and histories, Hall (1996, pp. 30-31) argues that in being subject to “double-articulation”, social identities “are by definition overdetermined. To look at the overlap or ‘unity’ (fusion) between them, that is to say, the ways in which they connote or summon up one another in articulating differences in the social field, does not obviate the particular effects which each structure has. We can think of political situations in which alliances could be drawn up in very different ways, depending on which of the different articulations in play became at that time dominant ones.”

The ethical challenge in journalism is to what extent stories, which are always articulating surfaces in themselves (in that the fact of and manner of representation determines the manner of ideological stitching that occurs in any reading of a text), present the possibility of articulation that would substantiate any intention to represent

\(^{79}\) See Glossary.
facts fairly, accurately and without favour (the cardinal principles of any code of ethics), in ways that are not locked in what Althusser calls a mere “accumulation of circumstances”, but in which cognates of social identity are opened up.

Mouffe, in pursuit of a model of democratic pluralism (Mouffe, 2009), argues that the role of journalism should be that of a “gate-opener”\(^{80}\). This is crucial because, for Mouffe, “us” and “them” come together, always as adversaries, but in a relation of “agonism” where “there is nevertheless also a symbolic space\(^{81}\) which is common, while in an antagonistic relation there is no symbolic space in common” (Mouffe, 2001, p. 103). This symbolic space, within which a symbolic order is made manifest in discourse, is structured by equivalential chains represented by and in an empty signifier (Laclau, 2005, p. 162). Mouffe is not arguing for a fully hegemonised public sphere (she holds to a view of “public spheres”), which in terms of the inherent tensions of equivalence and difference would be impossible, which would eliminate difference and all possibility of politics. But it must follow that the chain of equivalence should be sufficiently extensive for the symbolic order to make sense\(^{82}\).

To take an example of how symbolic spaces are separated and possibly held together, the *Sowetan* newspaper under its editor Aggrey Klaaste was explicitly Black Consciousness in orientation, while simultaneously promoting “nation building”. At the same time *Beeld* subscribed to a kinder, gentler (to borrow a phrase from American president George Bush) form of Afrikaner nationalism and national reconciliation. Neither could find a belonging in the symbolic space of the other, unless conceived (in common) under the empty signifier of “democracy”, specifically the liberal democracy established under the

\(^{80}\) A term coined by Manca (1989, p. 172)

\(^{81}\) Symbolic space is not here seen as an abstract construct only, but also space structured by social processes, and the media are central to this notion, especially insofar as media are deemed integral to democratic processes. Bruck and Raboy (1989, p. 3) note that dynamics of domination and exclusion, viewed from the mid-nineteenth century onwards as the product of politics and economic factors, now need to be viewed in terms of social and cultural concepts of democracy, because “information economies and information societies are characterized by the fact that the lion’s share of productive social activity revolves around the production, distribution, and management of symbolic matter”.

\(^{82}\) Butler (2010, p. 114) also argues for a maintenance of tension in the symbolic order, which “has to be protected, underwriting contract relations just as it must be immunized against a full saturation by those relations”.

98
constitution. As Mouffe puts it, the symbolic space, to forestall a friend/enemy antagonism, must, for an agonistic dynamic to prevail, proceed from an “allegiance to the ethico-political principle of liberal democracy - liberty and equality for all - even though we are going to have different interpretations of those principles, between a radical democratic interpretation, for instance, or a social democratic interpretation, or whatever. If there is a vibrant, political public sphere where this kind of confrontation can take place, it is less likely that there will be confrontations about non-negotiable issues or essentialist identities” (Mouffe, 2001, p. 102).

These symbolic spaces are not neutral zones of Habermasian reason (which Laclau and Mouffe, especially, would view as a homogenised state that could only exist under total hegemonisation\(^\text{83}\)), but precisely, if they are to serve any political function, affective areas in which “passions” are present. Again, in Mouffe’s (2001, p. 120) view, this is because “collective identifications have to do with desires, with fantasies, with everything that is precisely not interests or the rational. Instead of thinking about politics as a place where we should all get together and try to find the rational solution - this is not what politics is about at all - politics needs to speak to people about their passions in order to mobilise them toward democratic designs.”

In considering the media space as symbolic space, as the discursive locus of symbolic order, Mouffe turns on its head Heidegger’s distinction (which informs the Frankfurt School’s distinction between low culture and high culture and their influence on the public sphere) between “Rede” and “Gerede”, translated by Steiner (1978, p. 91) as “speech” and “talk” respectively, with the former the domain of “Dasein” and “authenticity” and the latter of rootless alienation and inauthenticity. In what Steiner calls “a devastating anatomy of journalism and the idiom of the media” (ibid.), Heidegger considers Gerede - understood as idle chatter and “scribbling” born of “mere curiosity” that makes public what should be private, a distinction that has become tenuous at best - as the register of journalism, which does no more than “pass the word along” in “an echo-

---

\(^83\) Laclau (2005, pp. 162-163) stresses that the construction of an equivalential chain depends on the “homogenizing moment of the empty signifier”, and is constantly in tension with the heterogeneity of chains of difference.
chamber of incessant, vacant loquacity, of pseudo-communication that knows nothing of its cognates which are, or ought to be, ‘communion’ and ‘community’ (ibid.).” In an augury of tabloidisation and the postmodern condition, Heidegger deemed that “Idle talk discloses to Dasein a being towards the world, towards others, and towards itself - a being in which these are understood, but in a mode of groundless floating. Curiosity discloses everything and anything, yet in such a way that being-in is everywhere and nowhere. Ambiguity hides nothing from Dasein’s understanding, but only in order that being-in-the-world should be suppressed in this uprooted ‘everywhere and nowhere’ (quoted in Steiner, 1978, p. 91)

Media, as understood in the post-structuralism of Laclau and Mouffe, Butler and Hall, are performative\(^8\) (as opposed to reflective or purely mediative), constitutive elements (even agents, following Hall) in the public spheres (Mouffe’s plural) as spaces which mark “the legitimacy of the debate about what is legitimate and what is illegitimate”, a debate which in itself “should not be understood in a rationalistic way but in terms of the mobilization of passions and collective forms of identification” (Mouffe, 2001).

The strong emphasis on the affective elements of media and communication in relation to the construction of identity leads me, in the next chapter, which seeks to locate Beeld more closely in its historical context, to identify affective categories which inform the presentation and analysis of data in Chapter Six.

\(^8\) The concept is derived from Austin (1962), that certain utterances (such as “I do” in marriage vows), enact in the utterance that which is being said. Butler argues that performativity is the enactment of identity through discourse. It is the “reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names” (Butler, 1993, p. 2), effects that are materialized, following Foucault, according to “regulatory norms” granted force over time. Butler (1997) acknowledges the difficulty this creates for liberal notions of “free speech”, when hate speech, for example, viewed as speech removed from action, and yet whose effect is one of an act of hate, is protected (in the U.S. and elsewhere, but only to an extent in South Africa) by freedom of expression laws, rather than considered as falling under laws of assault. Acts, Butler stresses, are not discreet, circumscribed moments in linear time, but rather “an act is itself a repetition, a sedimentation, and congealment of the past which is precisely foreclosed in its act-like status” (Butler, 1993, p. 24).
4. Chapter Four: Research methodology and methods

4.1. Introduction

A basic premise of Discourse Theory is, as Dahlgren (2011, p. 229) notes, that “much of the reality about the social (and psychic) world is occluded”. The choice of the verb “occlude” is important for its apparently benign neutrality. It establishes a straightforward relationship between vision and object. It recognizes that objects may not be seen simply because they are not in view, and invites the epistemological possibility that a shift in position will make them visible. It further suggests a cautionary skepticism or “suspicion” (in Ricoeur’s sense) about inferring a specific ideological malevolence or intentionality from a lack of visibility or representation brought about by what may be neglect, inattention, unavailability, convenience, expediency or incompetence, among others, which is not to deny, however, the “mystifying” role of ideology in relation to “reality”.

However, Discourse Theory also holds that the empirical surface, even when in view, cannot deliver “truth”, even when the horizon of position, or “situatedness”, is taken into consideration. Discourse Theory asks how it has come about that a specific object is visible in the first place (and not others), how the play of power allows for a particular representation or appearance to be possible or necessary, and following on from this, what are the conditions that make the unsaid, unsayable. It also seeks to make visible what is behind the surface, of a text or discourse for example, and what is behind or beyond the text or discourse in toto, that is, the contingent context of its manifestation and that of the hearer/speaker/observer/interpreter/analyst.

This is not to seek a “hidden truth”, for to do so would be to accept a foundational essence to social phenomena, but to discern, as Dahlgren (ibid.) puts it, the “systematic mechanisms of concealment at work, not only in regard to power, but also concerning

85 The question of occlusion will be important in my later consideration of the absence of, for want of a better term, “black life” in the pages of Beeld.
conflict, desire, and social relations”, or taken together, what Habermas calls “interest”, or Gadamer historically conditioned reason.

The Discourse Theory of Laclau and Mouffe has charted a theoretical course away from ideology (reference to terms such as “appearance” and “concealment” notwithstanding), especially as understood by Althusser, in favour of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, by which it is understood that notions of “false consciousness”, “underlying truth” or “mysticism” are not tenable in an anti-essentialist approach and make way for a theorizing of how discourse(s) expands meaning in a way that consensus/consent is fixed sufficiently effectively and congruently for a socially forceful concatenation to be produced. It concerns itself, then, not so much with stripping away facades, as with elucidating contingencies and dispositions of antagonism within a social ontology.

Laclau and Mouffe do not ditch the idea of ideology as such, but they retain it in inverted form. Laclau (1983, p. 24) proposes that “the ideological would not consist of the misrecognition of a positive essence, but exactly the opposite: it would consist of the non-recognition of the precarious character of any positivity, of the impossibility of any ultimate suture”. What Laclau is suggesting here is that ideology is not a window into the totality of society (he prefers to refer to “the social”), since “the incomplete character of every totality necessarily leads us to abandon, as a terrain of analysis, the premise of ‘society’ as a sutured and self-defined totality. ‘Society’ is not a valid object of discourse. There is no single underlying principle fixing - and hence constituting - the whole field of differences” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1989, p. 31). This decisive breach with modernism inevitably leads to the postmodernist emphasis on the play of surfaces and relational dynamics embodied in their theoretical concepts of articulation, discourse itself,

---

86 Barrett’s (1991, p. 167) term which attempts to salvage something of the concept of ideology, which she defines in a way that, but for her use of “mysticism”, echoes Dahlgren and suggests the basic functioning of hegemony: “The retrievable core of meaning of the term ideology is precisely this: discursive and significatory mechanisms that may occlude, legitimate, naturalise or universalize in a variety of ways but can all be said to mystify … It refers to a function or mechanism but is not tied to any particular content, nor to any particular agent or interest. On this definition, ideology is not tied to any one presumed cause, or logic, or misrepresentation; it refers to a process of mystification, or misrepresentation, whatever its dynamic”.

102
equivalences, nodal points and so on, understood under the organising principle of hegemony.\footnote{See Chapter Three for the explanation of these theoretical terms.}

Hegemony rests on the harnessing of consent, and in media studies departs from the notion of His Master’s Voice being disseminated to and percolating through the body politic by means of ideological infusions, in favour of a notion of a “master signifier”. Hall’s concept of encoding/decoding highlights this departure in theory, recognizing both the polysemous element of communication and a recognition that communication spans a process that involves author, text and reader (thus ditching notions of “true to source” contained in traditional communication models that evaluate the efficiency of message transmission between a sender and receiver) and whose concern, while it pays attention to the literal (the denoted), recognizes dynamism and fluidity as being brought about by what is “conveyed” or “understood” in the latent aspects of content.

Discourse theory in general is largely interpretive in nature, especially when it is applied to the media, where the chain of meaning from event to production to reception can never be visible in its entirety, whether it is a case of a single event, its thematic treatment across one or many titles/platforms, or of how it is bundled together with other stories in a single product. Making sense through interpretation leans away from a positivist approach, and the central concern, as Deacon et al (1999, p. 6) notes, “is not with establishing relations of cause and effect but with exploring the ways that people make sense of their social worlds and how they express these understandings through language, sound, imagery, personal style and social rituals”. As Barthes (1972) held, all things are also significations, and Hall (1996, p. 23), following Althusser, holds that “there is no social practice outside of discourse”. This is a crucial observation on ideology - which Hall (1996, p. 22), again following Althusser, defines as “systems of representation - composed of concepts, ideas, myths or images - in which men and women […] live their imaginary relations to the real conditions of existence” - in that it locates for Laclau and Mouffe the position and nature of discourse and also, by extension, the rationale for an
interpretivist approach which sees meaning as much a manifestation of the material as a function of gaps and absences. They argue (Laclau & Mouffe, 1989, p. 108) that:

“The fact that every object is constituted as an object in discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’, depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence.”

This understanding of “reality” demonstrates what Deacon et al (1999, p. 7) regards as the key difference between a positivist and an interpretive approach to research. “For positivists,” he argues, “social ‘reality’ is ‘out there’. It consists of a network of forces and cause-effect relations that exist independently of anything either researchers or the people they study might do or say. The job of research is to identify these forces, demonstrate how they work, and develop robust predictions that can be used as the basis for rational interventions. Interpretive researchers totally reject this view, arguing that far from existing apart from social action, the organizing structures of social and cultural life are continually reproduced and modified through the myriad activities of daily life.” In this sense, then, “cultural texts - newspaper stories, television programmes, films, advertising images and material objects - are seen as frozen moments in a continuous stream of social interactions, which embody the values and meanings in play within public culture in a particularly clear and compact way” (Deacon et al, 199, p. 8). In short, facts (and their statistical “meaning”) do not speak for themselves, and require what Ricoeur identifies as “explanation” and “understanding”. For example, that Beeld portrays a world populated by “Afrikaners”, or that it is critical of government, would not

---

88 Deacon’s understanding of interpretation draws on the hermeneutics of Ricoeur (1976, p. 90), who defines the discipline as “the theory of the fixation of life expressions by writing”, and further, that “The access to writing implies [an] overcoming of the historical process, the transfer of discourse to a sphere of ideality that allows an indefinite widening of the sphere of communication”.

104
in itself necessarily constitute a “finding”, but it provides, for an interpretive researcher, “a springboard for further investigation and analysis” (Deacon et al, 1999, p. 9).

It is necessary to borrow a guiding principle from hermeneutics to steer the interpretation of what I observe in Beeld. Hermeneutics seeks not to decipher hidden meaning, but to understand the abundance of meaning represented by an action or a sign (being one and the same thing), and to explore empathetically “the conditions and criteria that operate to try to ensure responsible, valid, fruitful, or appropriate interpretation” (Thiselton, 2009, p. 4). For Gadamer (1989, p. 358), hermeneutics is keeping oneself “open to the other” (which introduces the possibility/necessity for dialogue with the other). Ricoeur (1970, p. 5) extends this notion and provides a necessary qualification by positing his “hermeneutics of suspicion”: “Hermeneutics seem to me to be animated by this double motivation: willingness to suspect, willingness to listen …”

Ricoeur’s formulations, in considering the gaps of “untranslatability” between events as referents, texts and addressees, are echoed by Agamben (2002, p. 12) who, in arguing that the central event of the Nazi extermination camps - that is death, and the state of unhumanness that preceded it - could not, cannot, deliver testimony from within the event itself, and that “the aporia of Auschwitz is, indeed, the very aporia of historical knowledge: a non-coincidence between facts and truth, between verification and comprehension.” Agamben here touches on a key difficulty, an insurmountable obstacle, in journalism in its very enterprise of “bearing witness” to events. At issue is not, he argues (2002, p. 12), “the difficulty we face whenever we try to communicate our most intimate experiences to others. The discrepancy in question concerns the very structure of testimony. On the one hand, what happened in the camps appears to the survivors as the only true thing and, as such, absolutely unforgettable; on the other hand, this truth is to the same degree unimaginable, that is, irreducible to the real elements that constitute it. Facts so real that, by comparison, nothing is truer; a reality that necessarily exceeds its factual elements.”
Of this relationship between sense and referent, Ricouer (2006, p. 31) muses that “throughout the world sentences flutter between men like elusive butterflies”, noting that, ultimately, “it is texts, not sentences, not words, that our texts try to translate. And texts in turn are part of cultural groups through which different visions of the world are expressed, visions which moreover can confront each other within the same elementary system of phonological, lexical, syntactic division, to the extent of making what one calls the national or the community culture a network of visions of the world in secret or open competition” (or the contestations that Gramsci identifies as hegemonising processes). It is in the divisions, the lacunae, the spaces between positions, the questions elicited by particular positions, that interpretation offers a way forward. As Agamben (2002, p. 13) puts it, it is necessary to listen to the lacunae, since testimony from the death camps “contained at its core an essential lacuna; in other words, the survivors bore witness to something that it is impossible to bear witness to”.

These strands of thinking, which draw attention to absences from which sense nevertheless needs to be drawn, and within which moral and ethical semantics reside, are important to my research methodology for several reasons.

First, suspicion comes easy in a study of this kind. Given that Afrikaners were the architects of Apartheid, attempting to read how they reposition themselves, how they seek to (re)legitimise their social and political roles (whether through utilitarian necessity or moral reinvention) is already saturated by an awareness of a lived history and the moral opprobrium that goes with it. The suspicion of which Ricoeur speaks is an intellectual one, but in striving for it I find myself suspicious of myself, doubting whether intellectual suspicion feeds off moral suspicion. How can a “non-allergic relation”, in the words of Levinas (1991, p. 47), be established with an other so thoroughly “Othered” both by history and still in current discourses of transformation, rights and race? To what extent is Ricoeur’s suspicion not simply a matter of distrust, where a striving for an Aristotelean good life with its concerns for security, prosperity, liberty and equality is interpreted as an act of deception best understood as a manoeuvre of “whiteness”
protecting its privilege, the conclusion that Steyn (2004) comes to in her discourse analysis of readers’ letters to Rapport?

Second, it is tempting to be lulled by the empirical exercise of counting stories and seeking correspondences into a two-dimensional process of understanding. But as Thiselton (2009, p. 232) notes, “empirical, everyday meaning is conjoined, even if in tension, with a moral or spiritual realm”. That is, the process of interpretation is not simply one of peeling away layers of meaning (the premise of which in, for example, ideology critique, is that at the end of the process a demystified kernel of truth/meaning will be made visible), but of recognizing the interpenetration of dimensions, or domains, of meaning. Any conclusions will therefore have to be suggestive.

4.2. Discourse Theory Methodology

The Discourse Theory of Laclau and Mouffe has presented researchers with the difficulty that it offers no specific methodology. However, systematic engagement with the concepts formulated by Discourse Theory (drawing as it does on the deconstruction theory of Derrida, Foucault’s Power/Knowledge nexus and Lacan’s psychoanalysis), has led Jorgensen & Phillips (2002) to extrapolate from Laclau and Mouffe’s theories basic procedures for discourse analysis, appropriated and developed in turn by Steyn (Steyn, 2001) to analyse media texts in South Africa.

First, however, it should be noted that the injunction of Hall (2002), Fairclough (2003), Van Dijk (1998) and Torfing (1999) that media studies should include micro-, meso- and macro- levels of analysis, is followed not in a systematic step-by-step manner, but is implicit throughout in the presentation of the political, social and economic factors at play in South Africa, and in the location of Beeld within South Africa’s media landscape.
An essential element of my research methodology is what Stuart Hall (Introduction, A. C. H. Smith, 1975, p. 1) calls “a long preliminary soak”. This has a general and a specific component.

My involvement in South African media spans the last decade of Apartheid and the first two decades of democracy. In various roles while working on The Witness, formerly The Natal Witness - as chief sub-editor, news editor, deputy/acting editor - and as editor of the Weekend Witness, my routine started with a systematic comparison of the news coverage of a range of national and regional papers, namely The Witness, The Mercury (formerly The Natal Mercury), the Daily News, Business Day, The Star, Sowetan, Daily Sun, Citizen, Beeld, and latterly the online-only Daily Maverick, as well as a selection of weekly and weekend papers, namely the Mail & Guardian (formerly the Weekly Mail), Independent on Saturday, Sunday Tribune, Sunday Times, City Press and Rapport. Two Zulu-language papers, Ilanga and Isolezwe, were monitored with the assistance of isiZulu-speaking colleagues, but this was necessarily a more cursory scan of highlights than the other newspapers due to my inability to understand Zulu. With the advent of online media, international media such as The Guardian, The New York Times and Le Monde were also monitored. Radio channels - SAfm, East Coast Radio, Radio Sonder Grense, Lotus), as well as television news channels - SABC, ENCA (previously e-News), latterly ANN-7, BBC, Sky, Channel 5 (French) - and investigations channels - Carte Blanche, Third Degree - were also monitored, as were forms of social media - Facebook and Twitter.

The purpose of monitoring so many media was manifold. First, the overriding professional objective was to measure The Witness’s news coverage (both regional and national) against its competitors (specifically The Mercury and the Daily News), and to check whether any important stories had been missed, in which case follow-ups would be diarised. Second, ideas for the local diary (profiles, features, interviews, news) would be
gleaned from other media, in particular if a local\textsuperscript{89} angle could be established. Third, the general mood of the media would be gauged, partly as a reading of national sentiment (which was pertinent to our readers), and partly to finetune how to situate the paper in its news coverage but also in its commentary and opinion (including editorial leaders).

An aspect of monitoring South African newspapers was to evaluate how they were repositioning themselves ideologically and in terms of extending their definitions of newsworthiness to include a broader racial demographic (especially the established “white” mainstream newspapers). For example, \textit{Sowetan} and \textit{City Press} shifted abruptly from a Black Consciousness ideology to a more class-based (ie middle-class) approach to news, which nevertheless continues to doff its hat to a residual “black pride” sentiment. The \textit{Daily News}, under editor Kaizer Nyatsumba, aggressively turned away from a white suburban emphasis to focus on black township news and to an extent “Indian” areas. At the same time, all newsrooms were wrestling, at a personal and organizational, not to mention political, level, with the implications of transformation not only in news coverage but in staff composition. On \textit{Beeld} and the other Afrikaans newspapers the upheavals had their own particular flavour (of which more elsewhere), but on all the English papers battle lines emerged between white and black staff, in which questions of professionalism, language, political allegiance, journalistic independence, among others, were engaged with daily, and often in a bruising manner.

From contact with other journalists throughout the country it was always clear that \textit{The Witness} was a microcosm of the broad media world (in all its aspects, from race to news to technology to commercial viability). The internal tensions stemmed from contradictory imperatives: on the one hand, coverage needed to be extended to include people and areas previously considered beyond the pale. This was both an ideological/ethical and a commercial imperative. However, extending the geographical boundaries (ie black, Indian and coloured suburbs/townships) as well as the racial boundaries (again, black, Indian and coloured) had to be managed in a way that did not alienate the traditional

\textsuperscript{89} Local would be considered as news emanating from the province of KwaZulu-Natal, or from the midlands region of the province, in which the city of Pietermaritzburg is located and which is where \textit{The Witness} is based.
white readers, who formed the majority of subscribers and indeed advertisers (although not the majority of readers as recorded by AMPS, the All Media Product Survey). Many of these readers took strong exception (to the extent of canceling subscriptions) to the incorporation of “black” news in “their” paper, resulting in the case of the Daily News, for example, in a sharp drop in circulation. The balance of news was therefore critical, and required constant monitoring and cautious manipulation to approach a news mix that would have a broader appeal than the racially (and ideologically) circumscribed pre-1994 coverage. There were also some radical shifts, as in for example acknowledging the ANC, warming towards social welfare (while maintaining a broadly laissez-faire neoliberal stance on the economy), embracing previously taboo cultural practices such as “lobolo”90 and ancestral theology91. Logistical implications of this expanded sense of community92 included covering township schools (not predominantly private schools), soccer leagues93 (as opposed to only rugby leagues), and gospel choirs94 (as opposed to operas and symphony orchestras)95.

---

90 “Lobolo” is the isiZulu word for bridal wealth, and presented a double-whammy, in that it was rejected from a “white” cultural perspective, as well as from a liberal feminist perspective, and so policy decisions were caught between what appeared to be mutually exclusive ideological imperatives. Feminism represented “progressiveness”; and so was consistent with the liberal path English mainstream newspapers considered themselves to be on, while the cultural implication of racial transformation dictated a reclamation of practices that had been delegitimised and stigmatized by Apartheid’s racial supremacism. The perverse consequence of this was that adopting a feminist line was construed as being racist because it was seen to perpetuate a diminishing of “black” culture.

91 This refers to “ancestor worship”, in which ancestors are considered to be intermediaries between the living and the spiritual worlds, and for whom rites are performed. Ancestor worship is rejected by African Christians, but the two beliefs may also be held side-by-side.

92 “Community” here refers to “reading community”, and while the ultimate objective was that one should be synonymous with the other, in reality this could not come about because categories of class, race, education and geography all had to be subsumed under the catch-all marketing cliché of “aspirational readers”, defined by their desire for the trappings of affluence, which served the purpose of delivering consumers to advertisers, rather than newspapers to readers.

93 Soccer has historically, in South Africa, had a mainly black following, while rugby was seen as a “white sport”, and particularly the domain of Afrikaners, for whom the rugby prowess of the national team, the Springboks, was a matter of national and volk pride. These allegiances, while weakening, persist in the democratic era.

94 Gospel music is popular in coloured and black communities, but does not feature in the arts and culture pages of Beeld or any of the “white” papers I mention above.

95 In spite of its ideological repositioning, Beeld exhibits few signs of an expanded sense of community, suggesting that what has happened is a repositioning within Beeld’s own historical tradition, rather than what is commonly understood as a repositioning into another tradition, as represented by Die Burger’s abortive attempt to become “coloured”-friendly.
The specific aspect of my “long preliminary soak” relates to the subject of this research, *Beeld*. This has, in turn, several elements: a critical and comparative evaluation of its news coverage over a long period; an indirect involvement in its news decision-making processes; and finally, as an object of academic study.

1) The evaluation of *Beeld*’s news coverage was directed by the considerations mentioned above, but boiled down to how much of it could be used by the *Witness*. The answer was not much except for matters of national politics. The Afrikaner-centrism of coverage of crime, arts, sport, social and lifestyle issues made it difficult to transplant reports into an Anglo-centric paper. Only occasionally would subjects overflow the bounds of cultural parochialism (notably coverage of Charlize Theron and *Die Antwoord*). The difficulty was reciprocal, and general *Witness* stories appealed to *Beeld* news editors only when the subject was Afrikaans-related, as in the case of farm attacks, for example. Where *Beeld* covers the erosion of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction at schools and universities, and as a language of government and the courts, the *Witness*’s take on the same broad rights issue would be on the neglect of isiZulu, which draws attention not just to preoccupations but to interpretations of transformation. Extensive coverage of challenges to affirmative action by white Afrikaners passed over for promotion in government services had little resonance (in spite of white readers’ interest in and general opposition to the implementation of Affirmative Action) in a paper where readers, both white and black, had borne the brunt of Afrikaner affirmative action. It goes without saying that regional partisanship influences the calibration of all news, and it was therefore to be expected that the *Witness* covered the Sharks while *Beeld* covered the

96 Theoretically political copy is defining of a paper’s ideological positioning, and it would have been expected that the *Witness* and *Beeld* worldviews would be incompatible in this area. The line of continuity in the *Witness* is its liberal, non-racial, free-enterprise stance in matters of politics, economy and race. Its natural leaning has historically been towards the Democratic Alliance (DA) and its predecessors. *Beeld*, on the other hand, has supported group interests, ethnic rights, nationalism, and state subsidization of key sectors such as agriculture (moderated post-1994 by a neo-liberalism). It supported the National Party, and after its demise, the DA. Both papers are united in their opposition to the ANC, to black nationalism, socialism and trade unionism. Sharing critical news stories, columns and features (in translation) about President Thabo Mbeki (especially his Aids denialism) and President Jacob Zuma (allegations of corruption, his sexual habits, his homophobia, his polygamy) could take place seamlessly. The specific self-interest of the two papers and their readers was, and remains, vastly different, and so this seamless sharing of political copy demonstrates how “equivalences” can be established and articulated within a chain even where no ideological commonality or congruence exists.

97 A retro rock band that draws on street culture.
Blue Bulls, although Beeld’s non-coverage of professional soccer is a more culturally and politically loaded policy, as explained above.

2) News diaries were shared between all the daily Media24 newspapers (excluding the Daily Sun, whose working class readership and whose specific tabloid style held little in common with the others), and news conferences were held telephonically three times a day, in which I represented the Witness due to my Afrikaans language skills. The divergence of interest mentioned above was evident in the diaries, and in the lack of enthusiasm for what were objectively excellent journalistic offerings but which lacked, on the one hand a sufficient “Afrikaans-factor”, and on the other, a sufficient “cross-over factor”, which included racial and cultural criteria. While the Witness front page the following day tended to reflect priorities established on the daily diary, Beeld’s often did not. Sometimes this would be due to late-breaking stories. But in the postmortem discussions among the news editors it was apparent that there were tensions between decision-making layers of the organisation, with news editors tending to have a broader view and complaining of the narrower, conservative judgments of senior editors who would, for example, “jump” on stories about the singer Steve Hofmeyr, who is active in promoting Afrikaner rights, that the younger news editors had dismissed. The tension was not so much between “progressive” and “conservative”, as between “old-school” and “new-school”98. Editors also tend to have the specific, niched interests of the publication in mind when making key decisions, while lower-ranking staff tend to have a more loosely defined general interest in the news potential of events.

3) Points 1 and 2 above raise the question: “Why Beeld?”

Every newspaper is a discourse in that it “is a structure of meanings in linguistic and visual form”, notes Stuart Hall ("Introduction", A. C. H. Smith, 1975, p. 18). If discourse is considered as articulations of social ways of being, or to put it differently as a “set of

98 “Old school” means shared traditional cultural values, such as church-going, folk music, for example. “New school” means more cosmopolitan values that largely reject tradition and authority. Since the average age of Beeld’s readers is 44 it makes sense that editorial policy would lean towards “old school” to hold on to its established readership/market.
social practices which ‘make meaning’” (Jaworski & Coupland, 1999, p. 7), then the question that constantly nagged me in reading Beeld was, “Why is this content like this?” Why was its world so tightly circumscribed? Why in such a fraught political and racial environment, given the Afrikaner legacy of Apartheid, would a newspaper adopt and implicitly promote an ethnically marginalized position? Or was I misreading its content? What was I missing? As these questions continued to bother me, and as I looked more closely at specific story selections, it struck me that there was a high level of ambivalence, of push-me-pull-me, being expressed. It is this that set Beeld apart from daily English-language papers: its engagement not just with the ontic elements of change and transformation, but with a delicate and fragile way of being in South Africa. It struck me too that its mechanisms of meaning-making were more nuanced, more complex than those of the English-language media (by which I include papers aimed at white readers (such as the Star, a national paper but which circulates mainly in Johannesburg) and black readers (such as Sowetan, also a national paper, and which circulates mainly in Johannesburg). Ultimately, a recognition of Beeld as an utterance of identity foregrounds not just the question of Afrikaner identity, but of “who is a South African” and “what is the South African nation”; questions that drag the debate out of a minority cul-de-sac onto the highway from the depths of Apartheid society and the colonial order that shaped it.

It seemed appropriate then to choose Beeld as a “text”\textsuperscript{99} representing not only “language in use” (Jaworski & Coupland, 1999, p. 7), but a discourse whose analysis would lead to “understanding and interpreting socially produced meanings” (Howarth, 2000, p. 128) that would be pertinent not just to Afrikaners as such, but to groupings finding themselves at the margins in ways that differed from the standard narratives of colonialism and post-colonialism. This point needs to be emphasised. Gilroy, Spivak, Hall, Laclau, Jameson - all assume in their theory a trajectory of oppression which locates their social subjectivity in, essentially, racial and colonial oppression, and so they assume

\textsuperscript{99} “Text” understood not just as words on a page, but, following Hall’s understanding of a newspaper, as a “structure of meanings”, as “literary and visual constructs, employing symbolic means, shaped by rules, conventions and traditions intrinsic to the use of language in its widest sense” (in his "Introduction" to A. C. H. Smith, 1975, p. 16)
a “class of oppressed”. Afrikaners do not fall in this category for a host of reasons but most pertinently because of their economic position (which is not to say that this will last), for which refer to Chapter Two.

It is still sometimes glibly assumed that Afrikaans newspapers, in unison with the South African Broadcasting Corporation, served during Apartheid as no more than mouthpieces of the National Party. However, even in the 1980s, critical observers of the media noted that this was not the case, although the terms of analysis were locked into a functionalist framework seeking to lay bare the processes of active ideological propaganda, and equating this to a party political position.

Hachten and Giffard (1984, pp 178-179) argue that even though the Afrikaans press “was a creation of Afrikaner political aspirations, established by the National Party to spread its message and strengthen its power base”, with time papers “became an important internal opposition” within the party.

Tomaselli (1987, p 87), too, argues that “the Afrikaans press is not a monolithic undifferentiated publicity arm of the National Party”. The launch of Beeld in 1974 was motivated (apart from commercial reasons) precisely by the need for verligte Afrikaners to be given a voice (Hachten & Giffard, 1984), and the paper adapted quickly to the changing political terrain and the eventual birth of democracy (Wasserman, 2009). As such it engaged energetically, and continues to do so, with the position and role of Afrikaners in the dispensation of the day. Over the course of the period of scrutiny (November 2012-January 2013) it has, variously, wrestled with the legacy of the “Border War”\(^\text{100}\), a new volume of Anglo-Boer War\(^\text{101}\) tales and whether they portrayed Afrikaners as recidivists, and asked the question: “Hoe lyk die nuwe, jong Afrikaner?/How does the new, young Afrikaner look?” (Beeld, July 7, 2012).

\(^{100}\) The “Border War” refers to the border between Angola and the then South West Africa, now Namibia, which the Nationalist government considered to be the frontline of battle between communism and “white rule”. Young, male military conscripts were deployed to the border for national service during the 1970s and 1980s, until Namibian independence in 1990. It served as a rite of passage for generations of white men.

\(^{101}\) The 1899-1901 war between the British Empire and the “Boers”, who fought for independence but lost.
Beeld is, furthermore, the biggest-circulation Afrikaans-language national daily newspaper. One implication of this is that it addresses itself to a broad cross-section of Afrikaans-speakers and so has an interest in seeking to cover stories that have an appeal to a “generic Afrikaner”.

The other main Afrikaans daily is Die Burger, but it is confined largely to the Western and Eastern Cape, and so its geographical focus is constrained and its engagement with questions of identity is strongly influenced by the putative rapprochement between white and coloured Afrikaans-speakers. Beeld, for all its relatively more liberal tradition, is, I would suggest, still very much a paper whose pages are populated by Afrikaners who are white, and any overarching ideological shifts undertaken by the paper have not translated into a rainbow-coloured picture. Die Burger perforce (in the interests of readership) has had to engage with an embracing notion of identity that can accommodate coloured “kin”. For such a reconstruction of identity to be feasible it is necessary to reach beyond the traditional confines of the laager, and so dialogue with “others” is more pronounced.

Beeld, paradoxically for a more “enlightened” paper, is not compelled to embrace coloureds as Afrikaners of a different hue (except at an abstract, political level), and the reshaping of Afrikaner identity takes place largely “within the family”. And so what constitutes “ons”, “eie” and “Other” retains the flavour of an intra-group dialogue, where differentiation within the group is what gives shape to the “new Afrikaner”.

The pattern and emphasis of stories in a newspaper on any given day is the product of hazard and intent. Between the precepts of a daily diary, currents of ideology and the intrusion of unforeseen events (the very stuff of news) lies an infinite number of permutations of how the world of the day might be presented. Nevertheless, a narrative emerges that is tailored to the needs of a particular market segment (reader) and over time a coherent and recognizable space is carved out of the public sphere which enables the observer or researcher to determine trends and draw conclusions.
Wasserman (2009, p. 16), in noting the complex discourses through which Afrikaans media have simultaneously attempted to distance themselves from their past while retaining the loyalty of readers, concludes that “Taken together, these discourses serve to entrench Afrikaans audiences’ material interests and their historically determined structural privilege, while opening up the possibility of new markets on the back of a newfound political acceptability.” And Foucault, quoted in Veyne (2010, p. 19), observes that a “statement”, or “discourse”, “is not presented to the perception as the manifest bearer of its limits and characteristics”. To tease out these characteristics, decode them and consider their possible meaning, I deploy two separate research methods.

4.3. Method

The daily newspaper Beeld was selected as a case study, and the period leading up to, during, and after the ANC’s policy conference in Mangaung in December, 2012, was selected as the period of research.

The selection of Beeld as a case study was based on the fact that it is the only national, daily Afrikaans newspaper, and it is also the largest-selling Afrikaans daily newspaper. Its broad target among Afrikaners was therefore deemed to hold the most promise for a study of the construction of an Afrikaner identity in a mainstream Afrikaans newspaper.

The choice of period was based on the premise that, as shown at the ANC’s 2007 policy conference in Polokwane, policy conferences throw into high relief not only the political issues raised in such forums, but stir up anxieties and hopes relating to a range of concerns, ranging from the social through to group identity and security. The question underlying the research was not how Beeld covered the conference, or how such coverage reflected a party political bias in the reporting, or indeed how the reporting compared to the saturation coverage of equivalent National Party conferences prior to 1994. The conference itself serves as an element in what Gee (2007, p. 3) calls the “cushion” within which points and themes emerge, as well as a catalyst for such points and themes to be made manifest.
Two research methods are used in this thesis to organise and understand data in a way that suggests a plausible narrative of aspects of Afrikaner identity construction: content analysis and discourse analysis. These two methods are developed into procedures suitable for Discourse Theory by Phillips & Jorgensen (2002) and Steyn (2001).

These procedures, or steps, have a sequential flow, but are unavoidably iterative in their practical execution. They are:

a) A careful engagement with the manifest content of *Beeld* over the designated three-month period, reading it as text and utterance and rereading the multitudinous textual units that comprise the total product, including advertising which adds a dimension of intertextuality that tends to be neglected in content and discourse analysis of news texts alike.

b) This was followed by a first level of analysis to identify categories, themes and the key logics of Laclau at play through the genres, summarised by Andersen (2003, pp. 59-61) as the logics of signification, representation, power, equivalence, difference, and universalisation (or, in this case, particularisation).

c) A second level of analysis aimed to identify, in relation to broad social contestations (ie the context of discourse), the imagining of “Afrikaners” as a group, their agonistic/antagonistic positioning, how this positioning is legitimised in relation to constituting citizens as people, and the hegemonic flows and counter-flows that fix this positioning.

d) The final level of analysis attempts to demonstrate the strategic manner in which discourse serves to negotiate the dynamics of antagonism that emerge as the contours of the social are shaped by chains of equivalence and difference, the articulation,

---

102 This entails in large measure following Van Dijk (1998) in looking for positive and negative representations (in opinion or otherwise, such as framing) of “Us” and “Them”, as well as any emphases that may polarise group opinions, a dynamic that cannot simply be reduced to hate speech or overt racism.
disarticulation and re-articulation of which is a restless, unceasing process that requires a flexibility of self-othering to maintain a versatile sense of and deployment of identity under conditions of dislocation.

The first step above amounts to the content analysis part of this research, while the others are the deployment of discourse analysis to suggest and interpret the contours of meaning that emerge.

**Content analysis**

A content analysis of news, feature and opinion pieces in *Beeld* is a quantitative method undertaken “to quantify salient and manifest features of a large number of texts” (Deacon et al, 199, p. 116). *Beeld* is taken to be a text, in that it communicates through the collective import of all its articles, and these articles comprise texts in themselves.

The thrust of content analysis is descriptive, and aims to provide a map, or objective framework, within which a closer analysis of meaning can take place. This content analysis approaches “quantification” not as an end in itself, but rather as the handmaiden of the interpretive component of this thesis.

Sayer (1992, p. 221) draws a distinction between “extensive”, or what is otherwise termed quantitative, and “intensive”, or qualitative research designs. “Extensive” research “is concerned with discovering some of the common properties and general patterns of a population as a whole” and therefore seeks, with the aid of standard surveys and statistical patterns, to determine what is “representative”. A newspaper case study sets a clear limit to the extensiveness of the research, but it is nevertheless necessary to describe what “population” of topics it does cover and how they are covered as the basis for suggesting an interpretation of the import and reasons for such coverage. In other words, once a picture has emerged of what is being stated, the question of what is being said can be addressed.
Berelson (1952, p. 147) held that the purpose of content analysis was to impose scientific rigour in the “objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” (quoted in Deacon et al, 1999, p. 115), and from this description is generated what Deacon et al (1999, p. 117) calls a “big picture” in “delineating trends, patterns and absences over large aggregates of texts”.

A first level of description (See Chapter Six for a detailed presentation) is the structural segmentation of the newspaper by genre: news, sport, features, opinion, arts, letters and special interest pages and supplements. This establishes Beeld as a standard broadsheet newspaper aimed at a general (Afrikaans-speaking) readership interested in current affairs and with lifestyle and leisure interests enabled by relative affluence.

The broad outlines having been established, the research focuses on all articles appearing on the pages up to and including the Leader and Opp-ed pages, because these are the pages that can be defined as “general” and on which information of broad appeal is most likely to appear most frequently.

The total number of articles appearing on these pages was counted to provide a benchmark against which proportions and categories of stories could be calculated.

To gauge how “inclusive” or “exclusive”, not to mention comprehensive, the news coverage might be, and how (given that this thesis is about identity) the scope of the news might suggest how a “self” or “other” might be framed and located in a global context, I counted the number of stories that were South African, African and international in subject. This was premised on the possibility of Eurocentric, African, or South African identities emerging, and deemed necessary to any analysis of an ethnic identity seeking to locate itself in discourses of nativism, Africanism and South Africanism and inclusive or exclusive citizenship.

Having traced this geographical element, I counted and analysed articles by topic: crime, politics, labour, religion, celebrity, social, justice (court), affirmative action, agriculture,
land, economy, municipal, sport (on news, not sport pages). The prominence of stories (that is whether they are a lead, second lead or whether they appear on page 1 or a deep inside page and whether they form part of a package or are accompanied by a photograph) was also recorded. These considerations relate to what Deacon et al (1999, pp. 174-175) refers to as the “formal staging of a news text” in which a story is assessed according to its “position” (on the page, in the paper, in relation to other stories), its “composition” (how it is laid out in “typographical arrangement and style”) and the “intertextual relations” established between stories and photographs or cartoons across and within pages.

Given that an Afrikaner identity would likely have reference to race markers, I counted the number of stories in which the subject of the story was “white” or “black” (for reasons I elaborate in Chapter Six). Allied to this, I counted the number of photographs by race of subject, as well as complete pages by the overall “race face” they presented in the combined effect of the main stories and photographs. Of the stories with “white” subjects, I counted how many of these subjects could be considered “Afrikaner”, and given the emerging theme of victimhood, I counted not only how many victims were “Afrikaners” (most were), but how many had been victimised as Afrikaners, and, by contrast, how many other victims had been victimised because they were black or foreign (Xenophobic attacks).

Linked to the above, I counted how many stories expressed “Afrikaner pride”, “South African pride” or pride in any other national, ethnic or racial sense.

One category of story that I did not set out to count and might have discounted, but which emerged compellingly from the data, is that of animals. They are not relegated to a pets or hobbies page but are presented prominently on all news pages, and the relevance of this is explained fully in Chapter Six, especially in relation to the preponderance of rhino stories and how rhino endangerment might be regarded as a proxy for Afrikaner identity.
One final category must be mentioned here, and that is a category I called “Yeats” stories, an allusion to the poet’s line that “the centre cannot hold”. These are stories whose connotative sense overwhelms their denotative sense to such an extent that they cannot be confined to their most obvious category. For example, some (not all) stories about corruption (tender fraud for example) present the act of corruption not as a crime, but as a function of the political. The characteristic of this category of stories is that they forefront a causality of malfunction, system collapse, lack of maintenance and breakdown that ultimately feeds into what I later call a “discourse of dysfunction”.

The data collected as part of the content analysis was captured in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, from which the figures in Chapter Six were generated.

**Discourse analysis**

The advantage of content analysis, according to Deacon, is that it is methodical and therefore allows a reliable pattern of representation to emerge, but he also cautions, in advocating a combination of research methods, that quantitative analysis should not simply “equate significance solely with frequency” (Deacon et al, 199, p. 132).

The patterns of categories and themes are organised by, or generate, discourse schema, through which run what Deacon et al (1999, p. 176) calls the “interpretive thread that makes all the rest relevant and fixes their value”.

The second research method that I deploy is therefore discourse analysis. Discourse can be understood in many different ways, as I explain in Chapter Four. It can be taken to mean conversation, or the things that are said, or how these things are said, or what is meant by the things that are said (or written). In a media study such as this, inevitably a close study of texts (individual stories) is necessary to establish the presentational, corroborative, framing and sourcing procedures that together make up the “thematic structure” of a text (Deacon et al, 199, p. 176), which in turn enables the formulation of discourses.
The Discourse Theory of Laclau and Mouffe adds yet another dimension to what is understood by discourse (Chapter Four), but for the purposes of this section Deacon et al (1999, p. 146) provide a useful definition of discourse as not only language in use or “text in context”, but as “forms of representation in which different social categories, different social practices and relations are constructed from and in the interests of a particular point of view, a particular conception of social reality”.

Gee (2007, p. 22) draws a distinction between what he calls “small d” discourse, which concerns the purely linguistic, and “big D” Discourse, in which the meaning of an utterance is established through the enactment of a “who” and a “what”. Gee defines “who” as “a socially situated identity, the ‘kind of person’ one is seeking to be and enact in the here-and-now”. “What” is defined as “a socially situated activity that the utterance helps to constitute”.

The analysis of discourse engages the qualitative research method that Sayer refers to as “intensive”, characterised by a focus on “depth” and “relations” on the understanding that “human action [is] particularly context-dependent or ‘polyvalent’” (Sayer, 1992, p. 213). “Intensive” research is concerned not with collecting data across groups or categories with a view to generalising, but more with “structural and causal analysis” of “groups whose members may be either similar or different but which actually relate to each other structurally or causally” (ibid., p. 221). However, Sayer argues that “although at the level of concrete events the results may be unique, in so far as intensive methods identify structures into which individuals are locked and their mechanisms, the abstract knowledge of these may be more generally applicable” (ibid., p. 226).

To meet the above objectives discourse analysis entails two related strands of analysis. The text, as text, is a cocktail of connotative elements and devices, whose polysemous nature needs to be subjected to close analysis for an interpretive logic to be extracted from it. Elucidation of meaning, while it is a fundamental objective of this investigation, is not conceived as the “exclusive property of linguistic forms in themselves” (Deacon et
al, 1999, p. 155). Rather, it extends further to take into consideration “the way in which political forces and social actors construct meanings within incomplete and undecidable social structures” (Howarth, 2000, p. 129). While significations operate within a “matrix of relations of social power, authority and control” (Deacon et al, 1999, p. 155), their intensity (or degree of ideological common-sense) ebbs and flows depending on any given set of contingent factors.

Discourses are therefore not fixed, or constant, and may hybridise, spawn new discourses or fade entirely. Nevertheless, the broad typology used by Alden and Anseeuw (2009, p. 29) applies to this research (as I argue in Chapter Six). They argue that the white settler narrative in post- and neo-colonial African states is informed by three discourses: of loss, fear and privilege.

I use this typology to identify what I call a “discourse of dysfunction”, which both derives from and informs Alden and Anseeuw’s three “dominant” discourses. I seek in my data analysis (Chapter Six) to explain how a discourse of “ons/we” is established in chains of equivalence and difference (See Chapter Four for the theoretical basis of these concepts), and how this discourse is framed by what Butler (2010) calls the “grievable”. To do this I identify categories of the “grievable” as they are manifest in the various categories of news, and argue that these categories represent the effect of the dysfunction of the hegemonic order, and the symbolic representation of the group self as both “other” and “othered”.

Discourse analysis provides the method by which an explanation might be ventured as to how and why Afrikaners engage with the hegemonic discourses outlined in Chapters One and Two, and how such an engagement serves to construct the identity under scrutiny.

It is important to stress in conclusion that the data gleaned through content analysis and discourse analysis is read against the discursive framework presented in Chapter One, the social, economic and political framework presented in Chapter Two, as well as the understanding of media, and newspapers in particular, presented in Chapters Four and,
especially, Five. While an “intensive” approach may concentrate on the internal logic of an object of study, this logic flows from and is embedded in other logics and can therefore not be isolated.
5. Chapter Five: Towards understanding *Beeld*, newspapers and media

### 5.1. Introduction

This section seeks to locate the newspaper as a medium and an object, and ultimately within discourse. To do this, I draw on antinomies of the literal and the figural, a theoretical space that is informed by hermeneutics and rhetoric, but which the study of discourse embraces fully to the extent that it seeks to explicate social meaning within technological modes of communication. I emphasise the affective elements of a newspaper not with a view to understanding reader-reception, but because I view them as elements within the symbolic construct that a newspaper represents, standing as it does at the very heart of the relationship between editors and readers and “without which no transaction would be possible” (Hall, "Introduction", in A. C. H. Smith, 1975, p. 23). Such a transaction is always subject to what semiotics would consider an organising principle of mediation, and which discourse would locate in the ideological structuring of floating and empty signifiers, which Laclau takes to be central to the processes of articulation and disarticulation that shape social action and identity.

### 5.2. Drawing the line

Identities tend to be negotiated within what Warren (1999, p. 168) terms “appropriate institutional spaces”, structured and mediated by dynamics of class, race, gender and other social qualities and attributes. Media, of whatever form and in whatever political environment, constitute such a space, saturating social life to the extent that they have become “the major public forum for negotiating matters of ideology” (Connell, 1978). Following Laclau and Mouffe’s thesis (1989) on the discursive construction of reality and the social, it is a space of hegemonic contestation, a “*site* [original emphasis] where battles over identity, distribution and societal control are fought out” (Torfing, 1999, p. 210). Furthermore, Mouffe argues that democracy, in whose service media (conceived in terms of Fourth Estate and the public sphere) operate, “always entails relations of inclusion-exclusion” (Mouffe, 1999, p. 43), which “creates an unstable frontier that makes
possible a negotiation over what and who constitutes ‘the people’” (Martin, 2013, p. 9). The question of who constitutes “the people” is an important one for media, since they legitimize their activities on the basis that they “speak for”, or “in the name of” their readers-as-citizens, who are stand-ins for the “public at large”, or, in short, “the people”.

The political, social and cultural importance of media, whose function can be understood to be the institutional production of news and opinion, is taken for granted both analytically and in common sense. Habermas (1989) and Fraser (1990) consider the role of the Press to have been instrumental in creating the “public sphere”, Sen and Dereze (1999) consider a free Press to be essential to the functioning of an open democracy, and Anderson (1991) considers newspapers as the primary technology that articulated the idea of “imagined communities” which found their political shape in the nation.

This “space” is not unbounded. It is limited (and enabled) by several factors: legislation, technology, economics, credibility, political climate, history, language. Mouffe prefers the idea of “public spheres” to that of a unitary, single sphere, which unsettles the notion of “mass media” and raises the important question of how multiple spheres (including their online dimensions) might articulate in a coherent way in a plural democratic environment, and especially one in which, for example, Afrikaner minority rights are energetically promoted on the national stage. Although even Mouffe’s notion of a disaggregated public sphere is destabilized by what Eagleton was already noting in (1984, p64), that with “transgression of traditional boundaries between private and public, the space of the classical public sphere rapidly dwindles”.

5.3. The Fourth Estate

The mainstream media in South Africa tend to style themselves as belonging to the “Fourth Estate” (viz former South African editor Joel Mervis’s [1989] newspaper history by this title), operating according to libertarian ethical imperatives of “truthfulness”, “objectivity” and “independence” while performing a role as “watchdog” over
government. Underlying this understanding is a functionalist assumption that the media are the “unacknowledged legislators” of the world (to borrow a phrase from the poet Percy Bysshe Shelley), that they are a central part of a complex political whole which, if they perform their function “properly”, will contribute to the smooth functioning of democracy. Bertrand (1997, p. 1) grandiosely summarizes the view that the media, rather than being either an epiphenomenon (in the Marxian view) of society, or a mere “nodal point” that forms part of the discursive field (in the poststructuralist view), are indeed the very driver of our way of life: “The fate of mankind is predicated on [good media]. Only democracy can insure the survival of human civilization and there can be no democracy without well-informed citizens and there cannot be such citizens without quality media.”

What is taken as an article of faith among journalists, however, unravels in media studies, where post-structuralism has deconstructed the entity that Durkheim (1982) called “society” into an indeterminate flux of a network society (Castells, 2000) whose fleeting fixities are stitched together around semiotic “signifiers” suspended under either a determinant master signifier or Laclau’s volatile and radically indeterminable “empty signifiers”.

Couldry (2004, p. 115), losing faith with the standard paradigms of media theory in a context in which “the discreteness of audience practices can no longer be assumed”, nevertheless maintains that the media have a role “in ordering other practices in the social world”. In developing a new paradigm which views media as “practice” (rather than “as texts or structures of production”), he usefully identifies the historical currents which have flowed into the current critical frameworks for the study of media. They are: the mass communications research of Merton (1946), Lazarsfeld (1940) and Katz & Lazarsfeld (1955), with its concerns about the effect media have on mass audiences, and especially the correlations between state control, commercial ownership and propaganda; the critical theory of Adorno & Horkheimer (2002) and Benjamin (2008), deployed as a critique of capitalism, “commodification” and “popular culture”; semiotic analysis, drawing on structuralism and post-structuralism in situating meaning in the polysemous text; the cultural turn of the critical studies of Hall (1980c; 1996) and Morley (1992) that
turned the focus back to audiences and the role of interpretation; and fifth, “anthropological narratives of media practice”.

The research field becomes ever more complex, mapping out a media system that ensnares the user in cognitive puppetry that denies individual agency, or alternatively grants Protean powers of agency to individuals who surf the network society’s waves of virtuality.

This study does not attempt to locate newspapers in the network society as such, and nor does it attempt to consider newspapers in relation to new media and online communities, where notions of public and readers are more diffuse, even fugitive. *Beeld* is therefore viewed as a traditional print medium, a limited public sphere among others. I do not assume that *Beeld* readers read no other media, or that they do not source information from the internet. They would therefore, as well as inhabiting their own ethnoscape, be denizens of McLuhan’s (1962) “global village” linked together in Castells’s (*ibid.*) “network society”.

**5.4. Afrikaans media**

The founders of the Afrikaans media in South Africa had no doubt that a newspaper in their (as yet unofficial) “bastard language” granted legitimacy, propagated their specific interests, and in so doing created a platform on which the “Afrikaner” would exercise individual agency (or, more correctly in the parlance of the period, fulfil his or her “destiny”). It is only in the post-apartheid period that Afrikaans newspapers thrilled to their “newfound libertarianism” (Tomaselli, 2011a, p. 172).

De Kock (1982, p. 86) identifies the founding of *De Zuid-Afrikaan/The South African* in 1830 as “the first paper to speak for Afrikaner interests” (even though it published in Dutch), before the start of the Great Trek, before the launch of the “Taalbeweging/Language Movement” in 1875 - the earliest date at which Giliomee &
Adam (1981) and Giliomee (2009) place the start of Afrikaner nationalism, before the launch in 1876 of *Die Afrikaanse Patriot/The Afrikaans Patriot* as the “kitchen Dutch” mouthpiece of the *Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners/Association of True Afrikaners*, before Eugene Marais managed to infiltrate Afrikaans into the papers he edited at the turn of the 20th Century (Rousseau, 1982), and almost a century before Afrikaans became an official language in 1925. Given the Apartheid to come and contemporary contestations of origin and belonging, it is interesting that *De Zuid-Afrikaan* proclaimed that “Each African has equal place with me” and “… all who inhabit this land, and derive nourishment from her bosom, are Africans!” (quoted in De Kock, 1982, p. 9). “The paper meant whites, of course,” De Kock notes wryly.

The key year in the history of Afrikaner media was, however, 1915, with the birth of three Afrikaner newspapers. First was *Het Volksblad/The People’s Paper* (which went daily in 1925, after its takeover by Nasionale Pers in 1917 and still exists as *Volksblad*, the oldest Afrikaans paper in the country). Second came *De Burger/The Citizen*, first product of Nasionale Pers (now Naspers), which itself “was born out of a powerful welling up of Afrikaner nationalism that flowed largely out of two setbacks: the Afrikaner’s bitter Peace of Vereeniging103 and the ramifications of the failed Rebellion104, which further humiliated Afrikaners” (Muller, 1990, p. 754). Third came *Die Vaderland/The Homeland*, the mainstay of what would become Perskor, which much later would represent “verkrampte”105 northern Afrikaner nationalists against the Naspers stable which represented the “verligte”106 nationalists of the Cape. Equally pertinently, Naspers (now a global communications and media technology company) came to represent first Afrikaner capital, then, from the 1970s “White”107 capital, and now global capital.

---

103 The treaty signed between the victorious British and the defeated Boers in May 1902 which brought an end to the second Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902.
104 The failed 1914 Boer Revolt, an organised rebellion against the British rule of the Union of South Africa. Its leaders sought independent rule under the so-called *Vierkleur/Four-colour*, the flag of the former South African Republic.
105 See Glossary.
106 See Glossary.
107 See Glossary for the use and meaning of terms of racial classification – “White”, Black”, Coloured”, “Indian”.

129
These three papers were launched in exactly the period identified by O'Meara (1983) and Marais (2011) as that during which the rudiments of the nationalist class alliance were being formed which would ultimately bring the National Party to power in 1948. This alliance “included agricultural capitalists, white workers (especially newly proletarianised Afrikaners), layers of the growing Afrikaner middle classes and fledgling manufacturing capital” (Marais, 2011, p. 15). The newspapers were therefore instruments of capital accumulation, located in an “extensive network of cross-cutting organizations” (O'Meara, 1983, p. 149) in a way that made them quilting-points (Lacan’s *points de capiton*) of the “ideology through which Afrikaner capital developed” (*ibid*). *Die Burger*, for example, adopted a line that strongly opposed the unification of the South African Party and the National Party, following D.F. Malan’s Afrikaner exclusivism and opposing a South Africanism that would have brought English and Afrikaans into the same fold (while leaving blacks out altogether). In 1937 *Die Oosterlig/The Eastern Light* was launched in the Eastern Cape as mouthpiece for Malan’s “*Gesuiwerde*/Purified” NP. In 1936 Nasionale Pers set up the *Voortrekkerpers/ Voortrekker Press*, which launched *Die Transvaler/The Transvaaler* with future Prime Minister H.F. Verwoerd as editor, to promote “*gesuiwerde*” policies without being seen as part of the ‘southern clique’ of the NP (Muller, 1990, p. 755). “*Gesuiwerde*” politics of ethnic primacy would with time become “*verkrampa*” in the face of the NP’s attempts to reform Apartheid and accommodate not the English, but blacks, coloureds and Indians in various ways.

*Beeld*, from its launch in 1974, supported reformist NP policies against the “*verkramptes*” within the party as well as the right-wing *Herstigte Nasionale Party/Reformed National Party* (HNP) and later the *Konservatiewe Party/Conservative Party* (CP).

The titles of some South African newspapers give an insight into their relative interests and ambitions. Thomas Pringle’s *South African Journal* offers itself as a mere record of

---

108 D.F. Malan became prime minister of South Africa in 1948 following the electoral victory of the National Party of Smuts’s United Party.
events, its only distinction being to assert a South African identity. The same applies to *De Zuid-Afrikaan*. Contemporary newspaper titles reflect a similar air of neutrality: The daily *Times*, *Sunday Times*, *Cape Times* and *Daily News*, promising no more than chronicles of the day; the *Star*, a light in the darkness by which to chart position; the *Daily Sun*, more ambitiously promising light (as does the isiZulu paper *Ilanga*); the *Witness* and *Argus*, undertaking to be an objective observer (as does *Isolezwe*, the other main isiZulu paper). The *Mercury* and *Sunday Tribune* invoke more assertive roles for themselves: the former, a divine role as messenger-god among gods, the latter, a classical role of elected protector of Roman plebeians. All these titles, bar one, position the paper beyond, or above, or outside the world it represents. Only *De Zuid-Afrikaan* positions itself within a geography, an embracing identity, that suggests a one-ness with its subject and its reader.

The titles of Afrikaans papers also tell an interesting tale, and reflect a process of engagement and becoming. *Die Afrikaanse Patriot* asserts an overt and integral role in national politics and the affairs of a language group. By the time *Het Volksblad* starts publishing nearly 40 years later, and countering the incorporation of victorious English and vanquished Boer in 1910 under the flag of Union, the Afrikaner volk has come into political being and its interests are to be served directly by its own newspaper. *De Burger*, while still exclusively serving the interests of the Afrikaner volk, locates the group as citizens, that is a group with rights (crucially) and duties (primarily towards themselves, but also to the state). H.F. Verwoerd’s *Die Transvaler*, and *Die Vaderland*, both now defunct, offered a similar vision, but evoking geographical and spiritual belonging, and simultaneously asserting a political centre of gravity against the Cape wing of the National Party and its supportive publications, the so-called *Keuromstraat-klied*. By the time the Sunday paper *Die Beeld* is launched in 1965 (and relaunched as *Rapport* in 1970), and the daily *Beeld* in 1974, the Afrikaner project was complete.

---

109 A reference to the headquarters of the National Party and *Die Burger* in *Keuromstraat* / Turnaround Street in Cape Town. The term was coined by J.B.M. Hertzog, Boer general and first prime minister of the Union of South Africa, whose National Party merged with the South African Party of Jan Smuts to form the United Party. It referred to the supporters of D.F. Malan who scuppered the United Party’s ideals of unity between Afrikaners and English speaking South Africans. This was one of the main causes of Malan’s breakaway from the old National Party to form his own *Herenigde Nasionale Party* / Reunited National Party, which went on, as the National Party again, to rule Apartheid South Africa.
“Afrikanerdom” had consolidated its position as a master-signifier, and Afrikaner newspapers could assume the ostensibly more detached “persona” of their English counterparts, casting a cold eye on the affairs of the day.

Tomaselli & Tomaselli (1987, p. 87) note that “all the major Afrikaans newspapers were founded with the aim of propagating the views of the various precursors and branches of the National Party”, and Muller (1990, p. viii) extends their scope by arguing that “initially it was mainly a question of preserving Afrikaner identity within a powerful British Empire with its world language; later it was about the survival of the foundations of the white order, or a Western, democratic way of life in South Africa”.

Assessments of the historical role of the Afrikaner press tend to be made in relation to moral questions, concluding that its ethnic focus on Afrikaners, its support for the National Party, and its endorsement of Apartheid were immoral, criminal and racist. These sweeping judgments tend to endorse the myth of a monolithic Afrikanerdom, obscure local dynamics and internal tensions and support an instrumentalist view of the media. However, they also tend to shield the media in the post-1994 era from some critical discourses. They do this by measuring current “morality” against the same pre-1994 signifiers, concluding that since Afrikaans (specifically) newspapers no longer support Apartheid or the National Party and promote reconciliation (as opposed to separatism or supremacism), they have “transformed”, that they are serving their social and political purpose in a moral, civic, “responsible” and professional way. What this narrative, which is not new, obscures - through its emphasis on race/human rights - is the economic line of continuity stressed by many analysts. This would imply, for example, viewing the across-the-board support of newspapers for the liberalization of labour laws as part of an unbroken ideological line which asserts the needs of capital over those of labour. By the same argument, when Die Beeld, under the editorship of Schalk Pienaar, took a “verligte” line in the late 1960s, its concerns were about the poor treatment of blacks and the deleterious effect this had on race relations. Apartheid itself was viewed as logical and necessary, and its role in producing cheap labour for capital was either
ignored or simply occluded by the attention paid to promoting the cultural needs of the volk.

But even the degree of “verligtheid” of Pienaar and his fellow editor at Die Burger, Piet Cillie, is brought into question when viewed in the broad context of the time (as opposed to within “Boerepolitiek/Boer politics”) by Du Preez (2002), who says they were merely less “bekrompe/hidebound” than others.

Nevertheless, when Du Preez (2002) is able to write in Beeld that “newspapers of today such as Die Burger, Beeld and Rapport are progressive, innovative and entirely in keeping with our new community”, he takes an extremely narrow view not only of the elements of hegemonic continuity, but ignores what Tomaselli (2011a, p. 175) identifies as “the exclusion of the public from the public sphere”, which he argues is “a consequence of capitalist rationalization - as it is of politicians who are intolerant of debate, dissent, and criticism from both within their ranks and without”. Tomaselli notes that the media industry is “exemplary” of the “interpenetration of White and Black capitals” and that this is merely the latest, globalising, phase in the repositioning of capital. The alignment of English and Afrikaner capital had already taken place in the decades before (Giliomee, 2009; Marais, 2011; O'Meara, 1983; Van der Westhuizen, 2007).

Tomaselli notes that the media space in South Africa has from before 1994 been subject to material, economic (re)structuring and political and policy pressures. For example, the Argus group, owned by the Anglo-American Corporation, started restructuring by unbundling to enable it to demonstrate a commitment to Black Economic Empowerment. This strategic repositioning within the socioeconomic order allowed for “the continuing appropriation of profit and the creation of new products” in a way that supported “the continuance of a class-based social formation” (Tomaselli, 2011a, p. 172). He further argues that this was done “in the clear assumption that capital-speak would soon co-opt and re-lexify the discourses of even socialist-leaning investors” (ibid.). Re-lexification to these ends leads to, for example, the hegemonic articulation of “growth”, “development”,

133
“business”, “entrepreneurship” and “jobs” in a chain of equivalence that links the needs of capital to those of society in general. Also articulated to this chain are “non-racialism” and “human rights”, assuming a moral high ground in relation to which a hegemonic chain of difference is created out of discourses that focus on the structural legacy of Apartheid and its privileging of whites, and any debate about the racialised distribution of wealth, skills and power.

This is evident in the Afrikaans media, whose reformism in the service of capital (at the time Afrikaner capital) started with the launch of Beeld in 1974 to extend the influence of Cape Afrikaner capital, and then in the early 1980s through the takeover by Naspers of Perskor, which served conservative northern Afrikaner interests. In the early 1990s, following the same path as the English papers, Naspers diversified, sold shares to black-owned companies, bought new companies that reflected BEE partnerships and merged with yet others. Restructuring of ownership and staff transformation continue to exert enormous changes on the media landscape (Moodie, 2014), together with a tidal shift from “watchdog” journalism to “sunshine” journalism (Harber, 2013b).

The early period of transition was accompanied by “some extraordinary shifts in political allegiance” Tomaselli (2011a, p. 173). However, while Die Burger, the “soul of the volk” and the “personification of the Afrikaner” (Van Wyk, 1983, p. 5), switched its editorial support from the National Party to the then Democratic Party (now the Democratic Alliance) in the 1994 elections, its slip continued to show in its hostile attacks on Archbishop Desmond Tutu and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. According to Van Der Westhuizen (2007, p. 9), under editor Ebbe Dommisse it “used ‘Biegbank’ (Confession Bench or Rack) in headlines, news reports and editorial comment from 24 January 1996 onwards, and the phrase ‘Wraak-en Vergeldingskommissie’ (Revenge and Retribution Commission) in editorial comment on 8 December 1997”. This tension between strategic ideological “repositioning” and relaxification is equally evident in Beeld, as will be demonstrated in Chapter Six. Tomaselli (2011a, p. 177) argues that

---

110 The Afrikaners of the Cape have historically been regarded as more liberal than those of the northern provinces of Transvaal, Northern Transvaal and the Orange Free State (now Gauteng, Free State and Limpopo), who have been more culturally and politically conservative farmers.
“material changes cannot occur unless a shift in ideology precedes the kinds of changes required” and the “discourse of empowerment is coincident with the discourse of class and embourgeoisification”. While both the English and Afrikaans press have followed this logic, their framing of middle-class interests as universal ones nevertheless contains inflections and residues of their history which place the emphasis of “ideological repositioning” on its strategic aspect, rather than its “substance”. Van der Westhuizen (2007, p. 324) remarks, for example, on the “repositioning” on race which embraced coloureds in the terms Afrikaanses or Afrikaans-speakers: “While to some extent the inclusion of coloureds in Afrikaner ranks was the result of duress imposed by laws such as those on affirmative action, it also seems to have been part of a calculated attempt to boost both Afrikaner demographics and political clout.”

5.5. Beeld

*Beeld* was an ideological initiative, a “verligte” product to counter the voice of conservative Afrikanerdom in the industrial heartland of Johannesburg. It was also a commercial initiative from the outset, because Johannesburg was where the country’s wealth lay and *Beeld*, according to an internal memo from 1975, was aimed “at those households that can afford a newspaper, even in hard times” (Vosloo, 1992, p. 314). This was a far cry from the subsidisation of *Die Burger* in its early years.

Founding editor of *Beeld*, Schalk Pienaar (quoted in Vosloo, 1992, p. 314) wrote that “If the Afrikaner is true to his own best self, he stands in the service of the interests of all in our country, not just his own” and to this end *Beeld* “directs itself to the English speakers and the coloureds and the blacks of our country with a positive and inclusive national message.” Ten years later, in 1984, he wrote that “involvement in the community is the duty and privilege of every serious newspaper. Through a range of community involvements, including charities, *Beeld* established itself ever more firmly in the
community that it serves” (ibid.). Then, as now the pattern of accumulation of social capital (in the Bourdieuan sense) remains the same, driven by the commodification of both language and culture. It is also apparent that the exclusion of the “pauperized public” by the “rationalization of the public sphere” (Tomaselli, 2011a, p. 176) is not just a feature of post-apartheid capital consolidation, but was already manifest in Beeld from its inception.

How can this be, if editors like Pienaar “changed the DNA of Afrikaners”, as former editor Tim du Plessis (2002) said of him in his review of his biography? This assessment, which forms part of what Du Preez (2002) calls a “rebuilding of Afrikaner heroes”, is based on Pienaar’s criticism of the excesses of petty Apartheid and the conservative wing of the NP (and conservative Afrikaners elsewhere), of the moral hypocrisy of Afrikaners, of authoritarian leadership, and for his promotion of better relations across the colour bar. On principle, he chose to be a “loyal critic” and to “change Afrikanerdom from within”, with the result that he considered Beyers Naude’s political stance as a betrayal of Afrikaners, liberalism as beyond the pale for arguing that Apartheid could not be morally justified, and Nusas (National Union of Students of South Africa), the liberal-to-left-wing student organisation, as “sick and disloyal” (Mouton, 2002, p. 112). At most, as his generally favourable biographer argues (Mouton, 2002), he “pricked the conscience of Afrikaners”. Mouton’s key claim, which seems to have developed into a consensus, is that Pienaar (and therefore Beeld) helped “prepare” Afrikaners for change. Giliomee (2012) points out the limitations of any such preparations and the resulting resistance to the implications of change, in suggesting that Afrikaners, to the extent that they supported NP reforms, did not bargain for their loss of power as whites and as Afrikaners in the post-1994 dispensation, and “The heady fluidity of thought and expression after the first democratic election had by the early 2000s been worn down by resentment and self-pity among many Afrikaners” (Van der Westhuizen, 2007, p. 6). Nevertheless, Beeld did

---

111 This historical community-mindedness has undergone a profound shift as a result of the quest for profits. After Naspers’s Media24 took over The Witness newspaper, for example, it withdrew from numerous community support and sponsorship deals, and the explanation offered by a senior Media24 executive was “Fuck the community”. The building of social capital (that Botma (2011) describes at Die Burger) through community “projects”, becomes tenuous under the conditions of acute pressure on profits and circulation as experienced by all newspapers.

112 Liberal Afrikaner theologian and anti-Apartheid activist.
support reform, the necessity of negotiating with the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela.

The “heady fluidity” that this “liberalisation” of editorial stance led to, had, however, by the next decade, stagnated, or reverted to type. “The popular Afrikaans media, so essential to maintaining the Apartheid status quo and later in promoting Botha\textsuperscript{113} and De Klerk’s\textsuperscript{114} reforms, were emitting worrying signals of a return to a stifling conformism, accompanied by the promotion of a mind-numbing consumerism,” writes Van der Westhuizen (2007, p. 6). By way of illustration, she draws on her personal experience as a political reporter at Beeld, providing an insight into both process and policy. She writes:

“The issue of class among white and black had to be avoided, lest old or new anti-capitalist demons\textsuperscript{115} be awakened. In 2003, as part of my regular series of political columns in Beeld, I explored the reasons why the Afrikaner vote had moved from the NP to the DA\textsuperscript{116}. After all, the NP had contributed to the delivery of an elite compromise that assured its supporters of continuing privilege after 1994, so why did these beneficiaries abscond? And why to the DA? Strictly speaking, if interests were measured according only to affluence, Afrikaners should have been voting for the ANC, as their standard of living had on average improved markedly since the dawn of democracy.

The column was scrapped at the last minute by the power(s) that be, an unprecedented move in my then seven years as a political journalist. The ‘reason’ was that ‘our readers’ would be alienated by an analysis of the class and race factors underlying Afrikaners’ abandonment of the NP. Again I was confronted by a power broker’s insistence on controlling the information – the ‘known’ and

\textsuperscript{113} P.W. Botha, prime minister of South Africa from 1978-84 and executive president from 1984-89.

\textsuperscript{114} F.W. de Klerk, the last president of Apartheid South Africa from 1989-94, and deputy president from 1994-96 under President Nelson Mandela, with whom he shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993.

\textsuperscript{115} This is a reference to the anti-capitalist tradition in Afrikaner nationalism, especially prior to the 1950s, and which the Afrikaans media caricatured through the anti-semitic figure of “Hoggenheimer”, representing English/Jewish mining capital. Hoggenheimer is the name of a cartoon character created in 1915 by the cartoonist for Die Burger, D.C. Boonzaaier. He was South Africa’s first full-time cartoonist, and drew political cartoons for Die Burger from its foundation in 1915 to 1940.

\textsuperscript{116} In the 2009 elections, 94% of the Afrikaans vote went to the DA (Joubert, 2012).
the ‘unknown’ – that reached Afrikaners. In this way, Afrikaner leaders in different spheres affirmed the lack of critical self-reflection among Afrikaners throughout the decades.”

By 2012-13, the period of my research, there is no evidence of a fundamental change to Van der Westhuizen’s analysis. For example, there are features and news stories on “white squatters” (there is no parallel coverage of “black squatters”), and poverty is expressed not in terms of social differentiation brought on by capitalism, but as a racialised consequence of government policy. One could argue that the editorial constraints break down into three key components. First, viewing both black and white poor together in class terms weakens the ethnic focus which underpins the paper’s market positioning as well as its neo-liberal economic positioning. Second, it would undermine the victim narrative in which the Afrikaner is subjected to “black” economic prejudice represented by Affirmative Action (AA)\textsuperscript{117} and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE)\textsuperscript{118}. Third, it would destabilize an Afrikaner identity premised on language and race by positing, implicitly, a variant possibility of identification.

5.6. Eyes wide shut

\textit{Beeld}’s ethical guidelines to reporters state that “the primary purpose of gathering and distributing news and opinion is to serve society by informing citizens and enabling them to make informed judgments on the issues of the time.” Further, all Media24 newspapers are committed to “encouraging racial harmony and striving for the wellbeing and development of all sectors of the population in their reporting”\textsuperscript{119}. Ads24 boasts that

\textsuperscript{117} See Glossary.
\textsuperscript{118} See Glossary.
\textsuperscript{119} All Media24 newspapers follow the same code of ethics, which uses as its basis the national Press Code of conduct. Illustrative examples from specific titles (\textit{Beeld, Die Burger} etc) are cited as broadly representative of each other at the level of principle and philosophy. Localised editorial initiatives, deviations or interpretations of ethical objectives will be clear from the context. So, for example, \textit{Die Burger}’s strategy to increase circulation by recruiting coloured voters through an appeal to language, is different (because of the demographics of the region) from any practical application by \textit{Beeld} to meet the same objective. All the newspapers share copy, are designed to the same format and (except for \textit{The Witness}) assume a white, Afrikaans-speaking reader, in spite of non-racial editorial policy.
*Beeld* is a “progressive thought leader” that rates third place in its survey of the most “authoritative” newspapers. Ads24 also emphasises (quoting Chris Botha in Wright, 2013, p. 26) the affective role of vernacular media, which “speaks to a person’s core, their culture, the deepest part of their being. It elicits emotions and feelings that no other media can”. Placed alongside the further ethical injunction to reporters on the Afrikaans-language papers to be “committed to the promotion of Afrikaans among all speakers, regardless of race and ethnicity”, the assumption of cultural homogeneity and the almost exclusive focus on white Afrikaners (by *Beeld*) as a market-driven target audience, the emphases contained in news selection for the common interest are immediately apparent.

The commercial identification of a “target market” is to contradict fundamentally the objective to “serve society by informing citizens” because it delimits an audience in a manner too narrow to correspond with a broad notion of a “citizen”. *Beeld’s* readership, according to AMPS, has an average age of 44, is 92% white, and 86% of them fall into the LSM categories 7-10. Once narrowed like this, the putative audience needs to be extended rhetorically to a “universal reader” for any philosophical objectives to be imagined.

The limits of a paper’s news scope and reader appeal are explored by Van Wyk (1983), in the context of *Die Burger’s* role in Afrikaner politics in the 1930s, amid the echoes of the issues that could be detected in the last decade of Apartheid. The question of the addressee, as Gee (2007) notes, is of fundamental importance to any discourse analysis.

Van Wyk writes: “That it is essential that the function of a newspaper is to offer a national or comprehensive picture of the community, is not a given” (Van Wyk, 1983, p. 10), and that “*Die Burger* and the Afrikaner walk hand in hand to the extent that it is self-evident that the paper would have a sectarian interest”; and that “no newspaper that serves a community can be a friend to all (*allemansvriend*)”. He notes that English and Afrikaans media were strongly sectarian, and that “the image of Englishman and

---

120 All Media Products Survey, which provides statistics on newspaper (and magazine) readership.
121 Living Standards Measure, a marketing research tool used by the South African Audience Research Foundation, which divides the population up into 10 groups on the basis of their lifestyles, with 1 being the poorest LSM and 10 the richest, with the most disposable income and assets.
122 My translation.
Afrikaner in each other’s papers displayed bursts of misapprehension, prejudice and even distortion, which is ironic when taking into account that they were in a pitched battle for the soul of the country and its people”. Van Wyk (p. 196) concludes that “just as the focus of a paper can be too broad, so too can it be too narrow” and that “the circumstances of the day demand that the focus must encompass the whole of South Africa. This is what Prof. Piet Cillie, chairman of Nasionale Pers, put forward as the objective of the press on 24 February 1983”.

5.7. Bedding down

The message of a newspaper precedes it: toilet paper, timewaster, status symbol, revealer of truth, entertainment. It is harnessed to routines, predilections, predispositions, availability, affordability and literacy in ways which overflow, contradict and defy straightforward understandings of media, representation and meaning. Hall (1980a), in deconstructing the process of transmission and reception while moving on from the dominant ideology thesis, analyses the multiplicity of ways in which a “meaning” is extracted or constructed in, through, and from a “message”. He has to presume a degree of open-endedness, even when noting the “preferred” encoding of a message, if only because the social discourse about the media is that they make the truth open to viewing, and because of a sleight of hand that the “truth” is an essence that can be revealed, rather than that it is a rhetorical production. Openness, or closedness, is an important unit of measurement by which ideology is gauged, and by which a medium is assessed to be on the propagandistic end of the scale (ie in closed or totalitarian societies), or on the democratic end of the scale with its expectations of free speech and the free flow of information.

In Chapters Two and Three I described a context of a fractal social and economic topography within which any medium of communication is located, from which it takes its shades, and to which any of its messages speak, implicitly or explicitly. While there
may no direct correlation between the economic base and cultural representations, Couldry (2000, p. 141) declares that “contemporary cultures are not democratic” in that “the speech of many is curtailed, the practice of listening to others is limited, the resources of cultural production are emphatically not shared, and all this derives in part from the material bases of contemporary culture, its industrial form”. The section below now considers questions of medium and message: what are the media (newspapers specifically), what are they for, and what is done with them if one recognises, with Couldry (2004, p. 118) that “there is a crucial uncertainty about how media texts (or any texts produced in an economy) causally mediate between the world they represent and the world where they are consumed”? But to start with, any newspaper is a determinate object, the mere fact of which, through its presence and appearance, also renders it a discursive object.

5.8. Newspaper as beacon

The traditional model of communication within sociology takes as a given that there is a sender of a message, that this message is encoded and transmitted (or transmuted) through a channel, and that a receiver will pick up and decode the message upon which he or she will duly act, or not (McQuail, 2010). This broadcast, or pipeline, model of communication is made more complex through the positing of an infinite number of feedback loops that are supposed to make of any medium a model of interactivity (and therefore contributor to a Habermasian objective of ideal communication), compressing time and space (in the case of online media, but since they now form an obligatory component of all newspapers, this understanding can now be extended to the print product) into communicative instantaneity, an idea that undergirds Castells’s (1997, 2011) theory of a “network society” as an immanent matrix of meaning which has supplanted Foucault’s already extensive “episteme”.

But what is a newspaper? It may be ink on paper, a feature that fixes it in culture and history and extends and defines the boundary of Anderson’s (1991) “imagined community”, the shape of a nation. It is located in popular culture, which, according to
Hall (1992, p. 22) “is not at all, as we sometimes think of it, the arena where we find who we really are, the truth of our experience. It is an area that is profoundly mythic … It is there that we discover and play with the identifications of ourselves, where we are imagined, where we are represented. Not only to the audiences out there who do not get the message, but to ourselves for the first time.”

A newspaper is also a binary code generated image on a screen, where it can do its business without ink or paper. It can be free or paid for, a single page or a thousand, daily, weekly, and in whatever permutation it can be updated by the minute. And no matter what technology it is based on, its effect is to make the world bigger (to the extent that it allows one to see more and further) and smaller (by making of the world “out there” a village, as was understood by Alexander Graham Bell, by Innis [1952], McLuhan [1962], Habermas [1984] and Castells [2000] and is possibly embodied in the very notion of communication). The bringing of the world down to scale makes it manageable, but it is also made manageable by making it conform to “our world” (sometimes through contextual, cultural or ideological translation), which is why ultimately all communication in the mass media is self-referential. As Taylor (2010, p. 78) puts it, we engage with the media “not to escape from but rather in order to escape to a social reality that protects (mediates) us more effectively from the truly traumatic issues and concerns that belie our ‘normal’ lives.” Readers complain regularly of the amount of “bad” or negative news in newspapers not because they wish to be ignorant, but precisely because it is something they already “know”, which therefore does not belong in the virtual world to which they escape, a world that is coextensive with their “heimat”123, which is therefore expected to be “heimlich”124. Van Wyk (1983, p. 12) describes Die Burger as an “anchor of safety” for Afrikaners, as their “home”. The newspaper reader’s cognitive map is drawn in some measure by the co-ordinates which locate the newspaper

---

123 The philosophers Martin Heidegger and Friedrich Hegel used the notion of heimat, meaning literally home or homeland, and heimlich to convey the ontological sense of being at home, an at-homeness or homeliness. See below for an understanding of the notion in the context of Beeld.

124 The dissolving of the boundary between private and public activities makes this observation of the extension of the private important. Work habits (in the formal workplace), for example, now include a period before the start of work proper of updating Facebook, personal email, scanning news updates, all of which is repeated through the day either on workstations or by means of smartphones. The spikes in online news “consumption” coincide markedly with standard office hours.
itself. Ideological effect, according to Zizek (1989), is conveyed via form. It would be difficult to find a medium now which is the “Alles!”, the “Everything!” to its readers that Van Wyk (1983, p. 6) argues Die Burger was for Afrikaners in the Cape, but it expresses something of the role of a newspaper as signifier, as a nodal point which, whatever its ideological stitching role, is also a point of reference, a point of triangulation by which a reader/consumer can position him or her self in relation to an overarching empty signifier (be it democracy, freedom, civilization and so forth).

This territorial “beacon” achieves a measure of ideological emplacement simply by its presence. For example, Beeld, as a print product, takes its place on a shelf in a store, among a range of other publications. It signals, even asserts, that it is a space claimed by and for Afrikaans. In the language of Foucault, it constitutes a “statement”, which is defined as the “modality of existence proper to [a] group of signs” (Foucault, 1972, p. 107) and it (a statement) “belongs to a discursive formation as a sentence belongs to a text” (Foucault, 1972, p. 116). Mills (1997, p. 61), in an observation that is central to my understanding of the functioning of news media, notes that “statements do seem to bear a striking similarity to the speech acts described by John Searle (1979) and John Austin (1962)” in that “those utterances and texts which make some form of truth claim (and how many do not?) and which are ratified as knowledge can be classified as statements. In a sense, statements could be considered as ‘serious’ speech acts.” Extending Foucault’s argument that statements are the building blocks of discourse, Mills (2003, p. 64) considers discourses or discursive formations to be “groups of statements which are grouped together because of some institutional pressure or association, because of a similarity of origin, or because they have a similar function. They lead to the reproduction of other statements which are compatible with their underlying presuppositions”.

---

125 The bulk of Beeld’s circulation is made up of single copy sales, that is copies sold through stores or by street vendors, with the rest made up of subscribers and trade deals.
126 Or what Barrett (1991, p. 127) calls the “molecular unit”.
The force of a public linguistic utterance (in the form of, in this case, an Afrikaans publication, to the extent that it represents a discursive unity in the same way that a book or a genre or a discipline - medical, political and so on - might) derives from the fact that language cannot be neutral, even less so in a multi-cultural, multilingual society.

Wasserman (2009) argues that as part of the ideological repositioning of Afrikaners and the Afrikaans media, the Afrikaans language has been “commodified”, a means by which Afrikaans media audiences can continue “to obtain cultural and symbolic capital” (Wasserman, 2009, p. 63). The newspaper itself contributes to this store of capital. Informational needs (about finance, politics, for example), could equally be met by an English language newspaper²¹⁷, which would however in no way add to Afrikaner symbolic capital. The Rapport slogan reads “Ons praat jou taal/We speak your language”, while that of Beeld reads “Jou wêreld, Jou koerant/Your World, Your Newspaper”, both examples of how interpellation takes place through a direct appeal to language. Meaning resides in this language. It is this language which confers identity. All news is shaped in this language. A master link in the chain of difference is forged in this process, highlighting the tension and ambiguity that Wasserman identifies when he notes that the commodification of the language is not a straightforward switch to consumerism, but that it goes with “an attempt to position Afrikaans within a new identity politics” (Wasserman, 2009, p. 62).

5.9. Heimat

South African newspaper sales have traditionally not been driven by news value. This is in spite of the myth being sustained by a journalism culture of “scoops” and “exposés”, both of which are premised on an “intrinsic” quality of the content and “importance” of stories. Calpin (1941) draws attention to this historical commercial reality in his evaluation of both English and Afrikaans newspapers in the pre-World War Two years. It

²¹⁷ Foucault (1972, p. 27) notes the importance of context in determining the differentiating effect of the enunciating function when he writes: “The question posed by language analysis of some discursive fact or other is always: according to what rules has a particular statement been made, and consequently according to what rules could other similar statements be made? The description of the events of discourse poses a quite different question: how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another?”
is borne out by the ongoing emphasis placed on subscriber bases, and by the lack of
correlation between day-to-day sales and the quality of lead stories\textsuperscript{128}. Marketing
departments are aware that newspaper purchases are largely related to habit (which is
nurtured through special offers, sponsorship of prominent events to promote “brand
awareness”, and subscription drives), impulse, and advertising\textsuperscript{129}. Content analyses that
focus exclusively on ideology within genres (letters, news stories, features, columns) tend
not to consider the necessary congruence across genres and between editorial and
advertising. Any variance, or diversity, is made intelligible to a reader only in the context
of the entire ecosystem of a newspaper. It is this ecosystem that constitutes the \textit{heimat},
the “home” to which Van Wyk refers. Whether this home is “virtual”, a “simulacrum”,
“representative” or “verisimilar” to an external “reality” is immaterial, as is any measure
of “reasonableness”. What is important is that it is recognisably home - an antidote, a
refuge from the “unhomely” state that Bhabha (1994, p. 9) considers “a paradigmatic
colonial and post-colonial condition” but which equally characterizes any post-ruptural
period or one of extreme flux - and that the furnishings are emotionally, intellectually and
culturally “useful”, allowing the reader to relax \textit{into} the newspaper\textsuperscript{130}. This is a reference
to a psychological or cultural space, not to the manner of reading\textsuperscript{131}.

\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Beeld}’s newspaper circulation remained relatively static during the frenzied coverage of the Oscar
Pistorius case in 2013 in which the Olympian athlete shot and killed his girlfriend Reeva Steenkamp, in
spite of the fact that \textit{Beeld} set the pace in “scoops” (several of which were baseless) for other papers, and
even as the story caused a spike in online readership on News24.com. The \textit{Witness}, which took its Pistorius
copy from \textit{Beeld} and translated it, also reflected no circulation increase during this period, and in fact
continued its downward trend. It could be argued that \textit{Witness} readers had no cultural kinship with the
story, which \textit{Beeld} framed in a way that emphasized Afrikaans celebrity culture. In \textit{Beeld}’s case, it can’t be
argued that the story had no appeal in itself, but this appeal was not sufficient to elicit the purchase of the
entire newspaper package. It may also simply be that Pistorius did not have the star appeal that newspapers
presumed or imagined he had, in which case what happened was a pack mentality consensus on “news
value” that was manufactured from non-existent “fame”.

\textsuperscript{129} The \textit{Witness} provides an example of how newspapers are read as much for adverts as for news (among
poor and wealthy consumers). One of the key reasons why its attempt to establish itself in Durban through
the \textit{Weekend Witness} in the 2000s failed, was that while editorial focused on Durban news in the Durban
edition, it could not be complemented by classified advertising or Durban-specific advertising, meaning in
effect that it was not able to provide an essential ingredient of the newspaper “package” to “readers”.

\textsuperscript{130} Designers, recognizing that this more traditional understanding of the relationship between reader and
paper requires, in part, an unhurried time-out or a more leisurely lifestyle which is no longer the norm, are
redesigning formats and replacing longer stories with infographics precisely to update the furniture and the
architecture to meet the changing needs of a “home”, and not necessarily to improve the representation of a
“worldview” through better journalism.

\textsuperscript{131} Settling into a newspaper does not mean that a reader will read every story top to bottom. Most will tend
to browse through the paper by reading only headlines, introductions and news briefs. Older readers, on the
It is this space that newspapers set out to capture, or colonise. For example, when the tabloid *Daily Sun* was launched in 2003, it guessed that there was, to use the marketing terminology, an “uncaptured market”, that there were blue-collar workers in the LSM 1-5 market segment who had no reading home. The founder of the paper, Deon du Plessis, had pitched the paper at Independent Newspapers to publish, but their research suggested that there was no market to tap. Media24 research showed differently, and the brash *Daily Sun* launched with unexpected success, circulation topping 500 000 before its decline to a current level of around 300 000. That market “space” has now shrunk, in spite of its readership demographic now extending to LSM 7 and even beyond. This may be because readers have “outgrown” the paper, that their class trappings are not reflected in it, or that it has simply ceased to “speak to” them, all of which is exacerbated by online competition. It may be because of a migration online and the corresponding erosion of a “home base” newspaper. It may be that the ideological space for a “worker’s” newspaper has shrunk, as did the Black Consciousness space occupied by the *Sowetan* and *City Press*, for example. The same questions arise in relation to *Beeld* and the “*habitus*” of its readers. When reference is made to the “ideological repositioning” of Afrikaans media, there is an assumption that all the other elements of the “*habitus*” continue to make sense, and it is possible that the circulation drop in *Beeld* is a slowburn realization of an *unheimlichkeit* leaving readers stranded with no mainstream home (if they are overtly right-wing racists), or to migrate perhaps to English media (not reflected in circulation graphs) or to an online harbour. In the case of *Die Burger* it may be that neither prospective new, coloured Afrikaans speakers, nor traditional white Afrikaans-speaking readers, are convinced of the *heimlichkeit* of the repositioned paper, and so are both staying away and leaving. In both cases it should be clear that a “repositioning” is not

---

132 Adriaan Basson (2014), the editor of *Beeld*, in bemoaning the racism of some of the paper’s readers who refuse to deal with reporters who are not white, draws attention to the phenomenon of readers continuing to see the paper as “theirs” in spite of its staff transformation and stated non-racial stance on society. The *Witness* has traditionally reflected a similar phenomenon, in that two-thirds of its readership has traditionally been African (black, Indian and coloured), even when the paper focused exclusively on “white” society, and these readers nevertheless felt bonded to the paper as “their” paper in which they felt “at home”, or at least sufficiently at home in the absence of any viable alternatives.
simply a case of switching allegiance from the National Party to the Democratic Alliance, and even in this example it is impossible to tell from voting patterns when a vote is for the DA or against the ANC (in its policies or in its perceived representation of “black” interests). While the two papers have a difference in emphasis (and obviously geographic news focus, with Die Burger concentrating on the Western Cape and Beeld on Gauteng province), there is a degree of homogenisation of copy as all the papers in the group (including The Witness) share stories across all genres, if judged appropriate or in the case of copy shortage\(^\text{133}\). An error of judgment (for example, misreading a Witness reader’s affinity for the Pistorius story) is immediately jarring, as would Beeld backing the Stormers\(^\text{134}\) against the Bulls in a Super Rugby derby.

**5.10. Ecosystem**

Linked to the idea of the *heimlichkeit* of a newspaper, is that of an ecosystem of news and opinion. Once the market/readership has been captured, a symbiotic relationship develops between the paper and its readers. This means that once the terrain has been established, there is a requirement to navigate the same broad contours that have become familiar and understandable, even comforting. Once a paper has established that it covers national and international politics and finance, it will not cover neighbourhood affairs. Equally, once a paper has signalled that its focus is on urban/suburban matters, it will not start running stories predominantly about rural and village pre-occupations\(^\text{135}\). In the case of Beeld, when it strays from covering the big city to reporting on farm murders or droughts, it is being guided not by a broad national interest but by ethnic considerations and the understanding that its “constituency” is white Afrikaners, and not “urban readers”.

Within this conceptual ecosystem, some news will take hold and other not. Some articulations are intelligible, others not. For example, when Die Beeld published details in 1969 of (white, Afrikaans) conscripts who had died in training (Mouton, 2002, p. 105), it

\(^{133}\) The current layout of the Afrikaans papers, designed by Peter Ong, is specifically aimed at seamlessly exchanging copy, including leader articles.

\(^{134}\) See Glossary.

\(^{135}\) As an example: “How”, asked a former editor of the Witness, “can our readers be expected to be interested in some old gogo (isiZulu word for old woman or grandmother) standing in front of her burnt-out hut in the sticks?”, an observation that points to geographic, class and race determinants in news selection.
was embedded within an ecosystem that nurtured Afrikaner interests and so was an articulation within a “verligte” chain of equivalence that did not oppose national service in the cause of a white state against black citizens, but only the authoritarianism of the security establishment and the way in which this prejudiced white (and in the context, Afrikaner) men and their families. This chain of equivalence would later (for example in Beeld’s reformist support of the 1983 tricameral parliament\textsuperscript{136} and the recognition of the permanence - not “rights” - of urban blacks) seek to extend its articulations with, respectively, “Indians” and “Coloureds” (excluding all blacks from representation), and blacks (as middle-class allies, not as a disenfranchised class). These articulations (and re-articulations) take place within a context of intelligible possibility and limits that are rooted in a newspaper’s ecosystem, which, in turn, constitutes its hegemonic discourse.

Hall (1980c, p. 159), in a consideration of Screen Theory’s “productivity of the text”\textsuperscript{137}, notes that “this ‘productivity’ is defined exclusively in terms of the capacity of the text\textsuperscript{138} to set the viewer ‘in place’ in a position of unproblematic identification/knowledge”. While this analysis is an attempt to use Lacan to introduce “the subject” into Levi-Strauss’s structuralism, its relevance to the notion of an ecosystem lies in the way in which it heralds the affective element in the understanding of media consumption. How hospitable the ecosystem is to new or different ideas and perspectives depends also on the extent to which an “affective equivalence” can be achieved between the putative reader and the framed subject. Butler (2004, pp. 131-132) considers this dynamic in the context of “recognition”, which she understands in the following way: “It is not the simple presentation of a subject for another that facilitates the recognition of that self-presenting subject by the Other. It is, rather, a process that is engaged when subject and Other

\textsuperscript{136} A reform initiative of the Nationalist government in 1984 to co-opt “Coloureds” and “Indians” by granting them limited representation in their own separate chambers of parliament, namely the House of Representatives for “Coloureds” and the House of Delegates for “Indians”. Blacks continued to be excluded from representation.

\textsuperscript{137} Which is taken to mean that texts do not “express” a meaning which is in reality located outside the text, or “reflect reality”, but they “produce a representation of ‘the real’ which the viewer is positioned to take as a mirror reflection of the real world”. Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory accepts this idea of the “productivity of the text” but takes it further using the Gramscian conception of hegemony to argue that meaning is produced in and through articulation, and not just through reflection or representation.

\textsuperscript{138} “Text”, in the context of this thesis, refers both to the newspaper in its entirety, and to individual articles.
understand themselves to be reflected in one another, but where this reflection does not result in a collapse of the one into the Other (through an incorporative identification, for instance) or a projection that annihilates the alterity of the Other.” The potential of the reading subject to thrive within the ecosystem\(^{139}\) (whether viewed as either representation or production), depends then on the extent to which different subjectivities can come together as one “in recognition”. The process of producing the text seeks to achieve this by conceiving the literal subject (who is represented in an article) as a stand-in for a “universal subject” whose reality incorporates that of the reading subject. Degrees of separation between these “subjects” will tend to be reflected in the degree of solipsism within a given text, which in turn is a function of the extent to which Hall’s “intended reading” leans towards the literal (that is, the “universal subject” is occluded through the exclusivity of the particular). Butler (2004, p. 3) is alert to the possibility that “if my options are loathsome, if I have no desire to be recognized within a certain set of norms, then it follows that my sense of survival depends on my escaping the clutch of those norms by which recognition is conferred. It may well be that my sense of social belonging is impaired by the distance I take, but surely that estrangement is preferable to gaining a sense of intelligibility by virtue of norms that will only do me in from another direction.”

This aversive dynamic is brought about by a recognition of the hostility of the ecosystem. So, for example, even if a Beeld report on, say, service delivery protests, were fully representative of the “reality” of an event (and identical except for language to one in the Sowetan), the mere fact that it is located in an Afrikaans paper may itself be seen in terms of the pejorative discourses of the “Afrikaner”, and so evocative of the historical discourse of Apartheid, prompting an aversive non-recognition of the event as “true”. The marketing drive to corral readers into niches activates aversion among non-designated social groupings and identities, even where ideological differences may be mild.

5.11. Ritual

\(^{139}\) The reader is considered as part of the ecosystem of the text, in much the same way that Reception Theory argues that meaning exists not solely in the text, but in the engagement with the text.
The incorporation of a medium as artifact into the fabric or flow of the day, enacts a signifying lifestyle ritual that Anderson (1991, pp. 35-36) considers central to how an “imagined” community is shaped:

“We know that particular morning and evening editions will overwhelmingly be consumed between this hour and that, only on this day, not that … The significance of this mass ceremony - Hegel observed that newspapers serve modern man as a substitute for morning prayers - is paradoxical. It is performed in silent privacy, in the lair of the skull. Yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion. Furthermore, this ceremony is incessantly repeated at daily or half-daily intervals throughout the calendar. What more vivid figure for the secular, historically clocked, imagined community can be envisioned? At the same time, the newspaper reader, observing exact replicas of his own paper being consumed by his subway, barbershop, or residential neighbours, is continually reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted in daily life.”

Online media have changed habits in important ways, but Anderson’s observation about ritual still holds. Reading may in principle take place continuously and across many platforms, but a pattern exists in which readers go online at work - meshing private and professional (public?) environments - to catch up on news. The signifying function of media usage, captured by the assertion “I take the Times” (or Telegraph, or Sun), also remains. So the very “taking” of Beeld from a shelf, a vendor, a website, carries significations that may assert language, tradition, religion, education and time availability (as examples), and “reassure” the reader of which world (primarily, but among others too) he or she occupies. Each purchase reproduces this world, granting back as much value as is obtained. Diminishing circulations could suggest the withering of a particular ritual, but are as likely to reflect a migration of ritual online and a re-mapping of the imagined community (in the case of Afrikaners to incorporate the diaspora now resident
in Australia, England and Canada, among other places), which would not have been necessary before.

5.12. Persona

Hall ("Introduction", in A. C. H. Smith, 1975, pp. 20-21) suggests that a newspaper has a distinct persona which is developed through the deployment of specific rhetorics, and which allows it to “maintain through time something like a collective identity”. This emphasises the element of continuity in newspapers, which are sensitive to alienating readers (revenue), and so changes, in layout as in content, are managed carefully and slowly. Even when the content changes, it does not necessarily alter the fundamental discourse of a newspaper, and if it does, there is a considerable lag between the change in content and any redefinition or consolidation of ideological position, if any.

Peter Ong, who has redesigned all the Afrikaans Media24 newspapers over the past five years, warns how any fundamental redesign can cause an identity crisis among readers who “may not recognize their old and trusted friend” (Ong, 1987, p. 6). Charles Apple (Apple, 2011), a Media24 consultant commenting on their most recent redesign, notes the continuity in look from 1974 to the present, especially in the masthead (which has changed from Clarendon to Popular), whose subtle changes in fount are almost imperceptible to the lay person. Arlene Prinsloo, design director of the newspaper group, writes in Beeld of the redesign, that “The mirror just has a new frame and is shiny and polished!” (Prinsloo, 2011), emphasizing the philosophy that Apple reflects on.

Presentation, of which typography is just one element, is underpinned by the philosophy of the paper (Ong, 1987, p. 7). An internal memo from 1975 (quoted in Beukes, 1992, p. 314) sums up the options: “Does Beeld want to be basically a serious but lively paper? Does it want to be a daily Sunday paper? Does it want to be a boulevard-paper like the Daily Mirror? Beeld is neither fish nor fowl […] The newspapers in our group that have

140 Hall ("Introduction", in A. C. H. Smith, 1975, p. 19) notes the “sedimentation” of the “codes of signification” over a long period which creates routines of meaning between reader and newspaper, a relationship of familiarity that is sensitive to disruption.
141 Own translation.
achieved success, did it because they are authoritative and credible.” However, the philosophy of *Beeld* was eventually set down by founding editor Schalk Pienaar, who brought with him from *Die Beeld* the circulation imperative that to grow, *Die Beeld* could not just be a serious newspaper. “Much attention was therefore devoted to crime, especially crimes of passion and family murders” (quoted in Mouton, 2002, p. 57). From its inception, *Beeld* adopted what was then, as now, a tabloid philosophy. Mouton notes that from the beginning *Beeld* signalled “that the tradition of the former Sunday newspaper [*Die Beeld*] would be continued” (2002, p. 139), which finds articulation in aggressive, bold design, nestling in a broadsheet sleight-of-hand. In large measure, the distinction between serious broadsheet, Sunday muckraking and tabloid sensationalism is spurious. A focus on crime, personal scandals and political pecadilloes has become commonplace across styles of publication. And convergence of style and content at Media24’s Afrikaans newspapers is represented by two key factors: First, design, under the guidance of Peter Ong, has been standardised across publications. Apple (2011) notes of the latest change that “one of the objectives of this redesign was to standardize the three daily editorial pages so they could more easily swap cartoons, letters and columns”. This leads to the second factor, that news stories and features are shared through common diaries, which has also been consolidated by the centralization of the production of the three newspapers, *Beeld, Die Burger, Volksblad*, and subsequent to the redesign, *Rapport* too. The homogenisation of the news diet, which saves money and is facilitated (in fact dictated) by the structure of daily production, takes place under an overarching philosophy of news, which makes the editorial boundaries between individual publications very fluid. This makes it possible, for example, to view the relation between *Beeld* and *Rapport* as continuous, the one appealing to the reader during his or her working week, the other to the same reader as they slip into weekend activities.

---

142 The view of newspapers as authoritative in any sense, and as reflected by dropping circulations, has declined dramatically since, and traditional print media are in a crisis of credibility brought on for many reasons, including inaccurate reporting, limited focus and ideological bias and manipulation of perceptions to serve vested interests (N. Davies, 2009; Monck, 2008; Simpson, 2010). Not to be excluded from these empirical evaluations of the erosion of credibility, is the postmodern mood and the relentless tendency of global capitalism to “frack” culture and consciousness in order to commodify all reserves of value, to which Jameson (1998) draws attention.
Given South Africa’s fraught history of racism, much media analysis has focused on questions of political “bias” and racist reporting, commentary and employment practices. This tends to obscure, when one considers Beeld as a relatively “verligte” publication on the basis of its liberal take on National Party policy, the fact that the gothic arches that permit enlightenment to flow into the nave of social understanding are constructed not from what people should know, but what they want to know. As former editor of Rapport Tobie Boshoff, put it, there is a “difference between what you want to know, and what you ‘should know’,” and so between papers published to be sold and those published to be read (quoted in "Voorwoord", Jansen, 2010). The formula for success is encapsulated by Jansen\textsuperscript{143} as: “All reason and logic tossed aside. Hysteria that shakes the crowd this way and that – now the cheering, and then again irrational anxiety. Blood. Death. Maiming. Lawless pillaging and devastation” ("Voorwoord", Jansen, 2010). My study of Beeld suggests that the same formula, slightly diluted, informs Beeld’s coverage\textsuperscript{144}, and shows no divergence from its founding commercial philosophy.

Any and all of the above serve to show the complexity, the three-dimensionality, of Beeld as a newspaper, emphasising the argument by, for example Agamben (1998), Derrida (1978) and Benveniste (1971) that communication communicates not content but communication, and also that ideological sedimentation consists of factors over and above the choice and construction of individual articles.

5.13. The message

Newspapers place importance on being accurate in reporting “the truth”, through fact-checking by sub-editors, news editors and proofreaders, and by reporters themselves, and by attempting to neutralise “bias” through the selection and cross-referencing of sources.

\textsuperscript{143} Own translation.
\textsuperscript{144} As do Knol and Roberts (2008), who, in noting that “extreme news sells”, point to a sensational approach to crime coverage in Beeld that falls short of ethical imperatives of telling the truth, providing context, and minimizing harm.
The production process is seen in terms of technical, professional and ethical procedures that polish the story to the extent that the “event” or “issue” will shine through as “purely” as possible and the distance between reader and action (or statement) will be as small (or as unmediated) as possible. In effect, the objective is to place the reader “on the scene”, obliterating time and space through semantic trans-substantiation. The “message”, in this linear model of communication (McQuail 2010), is simply taken to be the event neutrally reconstituted in language and transmitted to an imagined reader. This “shaping” of the message for specific consumption is generally not deemed by journalists to have ideological implications, or to “influence” the truth, or detract from or contaminate the message in the exchange process, as long as the verification and substantiation procedure is followed. It is this technical approach to news that made it possible for Naspers chairperson Ton Vosloo to tell the TRC media hearings that the Afrikaans media had nothing to apologise for, implying that reporting was, in the context and given the readership, “accurate”.

In Discourse Theory, “the essence of communication is not the exchange of messages” (Torfing, 1999, p. 218), and “accuracy” cannot therefore be taken as any measure of the validity of the message. The message lies elsewhere. The discourse-theoretical perspective places into question both the “telos and the influence of mass media” (ibid.), which is easier to grasp in a universe of search engine optimization and the algorithmic determinations of interest, than in the context of the physicality of a specific newspaper (and even its online incarnation). This assertion has to be understood as a radical contestation of determinism and the dominant ideology thesis, favouring a constructivist view in which the reader collaborates in the construction of the social in or through communication. It is counter-intuitive, and in the context of ongoing

---

145 Media corporations argued in court in February 2014 that live screening of the Oscar Pistorius trial (creating a precedent in South Africa) would serve to show viewers “the truth”, unintentionally casting the entire news production process of writing, researching and editing as an obstacle to the truth.  
146 For the Daily Sun it would be the “man in the blue overall”, for The Telegraph the “man in a pin-stripe suit”, and on The Witness, the “man on the Oribi bus”, an anachronism that refers to a formerly white, working class suburb in a time when there was still a municipal bus service.  
147 While it is taken as a given that humans construct their realities (and that any attempt to validate this “reality” is itself part of that construction), this process of construction is severely constrained, argues Hacking (2000), by structural and contingent factors.
acceptance that whites were “brainwashed” under Apartheid, and continue to be influenced by unrehabilitated, racist media with a “white” agenda, it relies heavily on discourse and deconstruction to make sense.

Consider the case of Rapport, for example, in 1974. Then, a year after it was founded, circulation topped 500 000, the first newspaper in South Africa to do so. That meant that the paper was sold to one in four Afrikaners (who at the time numbered about two million), and read by even more\textsuperscript{148}. The media space coincided to a considerable extent with the social and ideological space occupied by Afrikaners, and it would be difficult to argue that the media (in this case Rapport, but equally Beeld, whose reader is the Rapport reader in work clothes) were somehow located outside the social, into which it beamed the “message” of the National Party (which perforce would also have to be located outside the social to perform this indoctrination).

The nature of the “message” is destabilised in several ways.

Following Saussure’s and Derrida’s notion that meaning derives from difference (that is, not from any essence of a fact conveyed through a technological medium such as speech or text), Hall argues in “Encoding/Decoding” that communication is systematically distorted through the processes of production and transmission, and through the supercession of the denoted by its connotation which removes the literal referent from the semantic ambit. In its place is Baudrillard’s system of abstraction, the simulacrum, which is not a counterfeit of the real but the production, the tangible intangible, of the cultural and imaginary milieu. To the extent that the denoted is an “event”\textsuperscript{149}, Baudrillard notes that it is obliterated as the basis of meaning through the technological “obsession with ‘real time’, with the instantaneity of news”, which he argues has the effect of “canceling the flow of time, canceling delay, suppressing the sense that the event is happening

\textsuperscript{148} AMPS figures are not available for 1974, but those for 1975 reflect readership of Rapport as 1 990 000. Readership surveys are problematic, and AMPS figures are treated with caution by newspapers, and this figure is improbably high. Nevertheless, given the nuclear structure of Afrikaner families actual readership is likely to be very high, and it is not implausible that possibly half of the Afrikaner population read Rapport on Sundays, generating and amplifying the churn of topicality within an Afrikaner way of living.

\textsuperscript{149} The event constitutes the “what” which forms the basis of all “news” in reporting.
elsewhere, anticipating its end by freeing ourselves from linear time, laying hold of things almost before they have taken place. In this sense, ‘real time’ is something even more artificial than a recording, and is, at the same time, its denial - if we want immediate enjoyment of the event, if we want to experience it at the instant of its occurrence, as if we were there, this is because we no longer have any confidence in the meaning or purpose of the event” (Baudrillard, 1994, p. 9). While “real time” is the domain of broadcasting and online news, print media simulate, or more accurately anticipate, real time by creating the event in advance through “previews” which are accompanied by pre-event analysis, making the event redundant, or in Baudrillard’s terms “spurious”, in the routine course of actual events. The “preview”, notes Fredric Jameson in his essay “Culture and Finance Capital” (Jameson, 1998, p. 155) is “really all you need”. While his observations relate to cinema, it is possible to stretch them to news media (whether print or online), in that the news preview supplants the event itself, it brings the future into the present (as opposed to the past into the present as was formerly considered to be the case), and the preview story is itself made redundant by the headlines and blurbs that preview it, reducing the “laborious threads and connections of the former plot” to a fragment, a “former story [that] has become little more than a pretext on which to suspend a perpetual present of thrills and explosions”.
6. Chapter Six: Data: Beeld in the world and the world of Beeld

6.1. Introduction

The world represented in Beeld, and which the data show, as I argue in this chapter, is one of dysfunction and distress within which the “grievable” is framed, although the “celebratable” is not neglected and it forms a valuable counterpoint which renders the “grievable” as intelligible. My analysis shows not an overt expression of an Afrikaner ideology or identity, but an ontology located in distress and a consequent identity produced in chains of articulation that tend to reinforce and close the ethnic laager, as I suggest in my conclusion in Chapter Seven.

Every edition of Beeld from and including November 1, 2012, to January 31, 2013 (total 77 editions, including the Saturday edition, which has since switched to a tabloid\textsuperscript{150} format while the daily retains its broadsheet format) was read from cover to cover (including block adverts and Classifieds), but this study focuses on what could be considered the “front-of-house” news and opinion sections, which included 3 328 stories on pages up to and including the Leader (See Appendix 3) and Opp-ed pages\textsuperscript{151}, which incorporate news, news features, personality features, some art and culture reviews and stories, background features, opinion columns and leading articles (in that they provide the intellectual and ideological “keel” of the newspaper).

Stories were identified and counted in terms of news categories, from which themes and discourse categories were established. Appendix 1 provides a list of Page 1 lead headlines to demonstrate Beeld’s main news priorities over the period. As illustrated in the figures below, news categories comprised International, South African and African stories. South African stories were then categorized as Political (national, provincial, municipal), Crime (by violent assault and murder), Labour, Religion, Social (which includes Leisure, Celebrity and Human Interest) Education, Health, Agriculture, Land, Military. Given the

\textsuperscript{150} See Glossary for the distinction between “tabloid” and “broadsheet” newspapers.

\textsuperscript{151} See Glossary.
subject of this thesis, stories were also categorized by race - that is, how many stories had as their subject “Afrikaners”, “blacks”, “whites”, “coloureds” or “Indians” – and of these, how many presented their subjects as victims, and of these, how many were victimized because they were “Afrikaners” or “blacks” and so on. In addition to counting stories by race, all pages were assessed as a whole and counted according to whether they presented a “face” that could be considered “white” or “black” and so on. The number of stories about animals (domestic and wild) was also counted when it became apparent that they represented a theme that was relevant within the framework of “grievability”. Finally, stories were also counted under the category of Disorder, which were stories which may be political or workplace related, but which manifest as stories about riots, strikes, protests or generalised disruption.

From all these categories were generated discursive categories of “Grievable” which are then interpreted in terms of a prevailing discourse of dysfunction, which is informed primarily by the categories of crime and disorder, but also in certain instances (such as the debate about the Afrikaner Church schism) by other categories.

The “Grievable” was then categorized according to whether subjects were under threat to their biological existence through death (as the result of crime, traffic accidents, official neglect/incompetence/negligence, or for random reasons such as drowning accidents), or threatened in their social existence, through assaults on the institutional role of language and church, livelihoods and security of economic reproduction, the political system and institutions, as well as through the destruction of heritage and habitat.

The decision to limit the focus of the study to the news and opinion sections is based on the fact that these pages are a daily constant, regardless of the fluctuations of pagination, and so establish a day-to-day pattern. Special categories such as Motoring or Youth or Health tend to appear weekly, and so do not inform the baseline texture of the news world. Sport as a section is excluded\(^1\), as is business and the “softer” lifestyle type

\(^{1}\) Sport is not excluded because it is deemed unimportant. On the contrary, sport plays a big role in everyday life, and in national identity, where soccer is considered as part of the identity of black South
features which are generally located after the Leader-Opp-ed spread, which structurally defines them as an after-thought (they are also the pages that get excluded when pagination drops, making way for more pressing topical and news pages, which contain the content deemed to provide the purchasing “hook” for readers). Also excluded were the letters, which are a category in themselves. They are a rich and fruitful source, as Steyn (2001) has shown in her study of resistant discourses of whiteness in letters to Rapport, but while they naturally form part of Beeld’s scope of represented opinion, they occupy a distinct and to an extent separate, less journalistically mediated, discursive space from the articles generated by the newspaper’s own resources.

6.2. Number of stories

The average number of stories per edition in the sections under scrutiny is 43,2153. The lowest number of stories on a given day is 24 (December 22), a 16-page edition, the Friday before Christmas, when papers are traditionally thin. The highest number of stories is 105 (January 3), a 24-page edition with low-advertising content devoted to the national matric results and containing a high number of human-interest cameos of matriculants, together with photos. The lowest pagination154 is 16 (on four dates), and the highest 40 (twice).

---

Africans, and rugby as the sport of Afrikaners in particular and of white South Africans generally. Rugby dominates the sport coverage of Beeld, which pays little attention to soccer. Reports on soccer seldom (and during my period of scrutiny, never) make it on to the news pages, and soccer stars and personalities, and the politics and economics of soccer, are ignored. Rugby, and to a lesser extent cricket, do feature on the news pages of Beeld, and I would consider rugby to fall under the category of “celebratable” among Afrikaners. I recognize it, therefore, as an element of Afrikaner identity, and indeed as fundamental to the Afrikaner psyche. Of importance to this thesis is that rugby continues to receive extensive coverage, and that soccer is ignored. My data show that the “black” news world (of which soccer forms part) is neglected in preference to a “white” news world, in which rugby and cricket feature prominently.

153 A survey, commissioned by Media24 (Vanderhaeghen, 2013), of papers that circulate in Pietermaritzburg and Durban shows, by comparison, an average number of stories in these sections of 47 for The Mercury, 46 for the Daily News, and 37 for The Witness.

154 “Pagination” is the term for the total number of pages of an edition. Pagination is determined by the number of adverts. The profitability of an edition is determined by this advertising volume. Few adverts generally means a thin edition, but, paradoxically, a very high advertising volume (or “loading”) does not always translate into more editorial space, because if, for example a high number of these adverts are full-page adverts, the pagination will increase but editorial space may remain static, and the number of stories low. A further dynamic is that advertisers want their adverts to appear on “prime” pages (that is, right-hand pages, from Page 1 to Page 5 or 7), which reduces the amount of prime news space. This often leads to editorial space appearing far back in the paper, but which is filled with “soft” (that is, generic or space-
6.3. Newspaper structure and research categories

*Beeld* conforms to a standard newspaper structure in the way information is selected into categories that are presented in discrete sections: news (international and local), sports, arts, lifestyle, health, opinion and various secondary categories such as Youth or Motoring. Any category can either dominate a page (however designated), or it could form a sub-category of another, so for example a personality feature of an athlete may be placed on a news page, depending on the occasion, the person, or the vagaries of news flow.

While the categories taken together are understood to represent a panorama of the human tragedy, they are also considered by editors and readers alike to have lesser importance the further they appear from the front (or for the sports enthusiast, from the back) page. An article appearing on Page 1 is therefore more important than one in the same position on Page 3, which is the second most important new page, by virtue of it being a right-hand page and therefore one on which the eye falls more easily than the left-hand Page 2, which in sequential logic should be the more important (See Appendix 2 for the key features of a page). A page lead\(^{155}\) carries more weight than a secondary story, although a “nib”\(^{156}\) (news in brief) is more likely to be read. Above the fold\(^{157}\) is more visible therefore more prominent and more important than below the fold. Picture packages tend to boost importance, even if not displayed as a lead item. Reader predilections can and do throw any of these structural rankings out of kilter. They may also bear no relation to the selections of other papers, which operate in different news niches, although levels of

---

\(^{155}\) See Glossary.

\(^{156}\) “Nib” is an acronym for News In Brief, and refers to short stories of one, two or three paragraphs, and which are used either as space “fillers” in page design, or in columns of nibs. Even though they are not dominant, they tend to be well read because the story can be conveyed quickly and is easy to read.

\(^{157}\) See Glossary.
conformity in covering the “big” stories are high, with divergence taking place at lower levels of news “value”.

However, the matrix of meaning stretches across a newspaper in its entirety (including adverts) - which in turn forms part of the weave of De Certeau’s (1984) “practise of everyday life” - and so “hard news” as a proportion of all the information contained between the front page and the back is a fraction (which is not to say that other articles are not “topical”). Hard news pages and their complement of “bad” (negative) news establish for readers the discursive reality of the “outside world”, while the secondary categories tend to provide more intimate, inward discourses of daily life.

The ideological foundations of a newspaper are to be found not only in its editorials and dominant stories, but also, and possibly more so, in the ensemble of news in its entirety (through which narrative themes run), as well as in the “secondary” stories which serve to articulate (ie couple) meanings conveyed in the “dominant” stories. While news tends to emphasise by exceptionalising, the “secondary” stories (even if only deemed so by their lesser placements), tend to contribute to what Taylor (1989, p. 23) calls the “sense of the importance of the everyday in human life”.

Due to the affective resonance of news stories, which create a bond between reader and newspaper, it is the recognisability of this “everydayness” that carves out what Appadurai (1991) calls an “ethnoscape” from the broader socioscape, whose correspondences may

---

158 News values (see also “News” under Glossary) are the criteria according to which an event is classified as news, or newsworthy. Galtung and Ruge (1965) list key factors that contribute to assessing news value: timespan, intensity, clarity, cultural relevance or proximity, consonance with norms, unexpectedness, continuity, sociocultural values, conflict, graphic or visual appeal (photographs) and emotion. These factors interact with each other, and it is seldom that a lead story does not contain a number of these factors.

159 Adverts are important not only because they generate a newspaper’s profits, but because they “speak” to a reader as much as news and opinion columns do. In this they address the lifestyle of the reader. Adverts generally fall into two broad categories: Retail adverts and brand adverts. Retail adverts are, for example, supermarket adverts listing products. The supermarkets which advertise will be those where the specific readership is likely to shop, and so Beeld advertisers tend to be “upmarket”, and not those who sell in bulk. Brand advertising is advertising that sells, for example, the status image of “Mercedes”, and not necessarily a particular car available at a particular dealer. Adverts tend to be congruent with the domestic and professional reality and aspirations of readers. I have not analysed the adverts in Beeld in detail, noting only that they tend to conform to the “upmarket” target identified in the marketing profile of the paper as cited in this chapter.

160 See Glossary.
be greater or smaller depending on the level of hegemony and the flow of power through social institutions and groups.

6.4. Readership

The selection, presentation and slant of news is framed by a journalistic code of ethics\textsuperscript{161} on the one hand, and geared, through news values, towards a specific readership (which in practice is as much a designated community of consumers as an imagined one of citizens), on the other.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profile</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>15-24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25-34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35-49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>White</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income p/m</td>
<td>0-R4,999</td>
<td></td>
<td>R21,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R5-7,999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R8-10,999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R11-19,999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R20,000+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Looking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Student</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Retired</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>No Matric</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Matric</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reader distribution</td>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>426 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M’langa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>74 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KZN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circulation</td>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>73 595</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M’langa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>74 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KZN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This designated readership is, in brief, Afrikaans-speaking, high-earning, well-educated, the majority are over 35 years old and living in the economic hub of Gauteng (although

\textsuperscript{161} This assertion is based on the objectives established in codes of ethics used by newspapers and other media. The extent to which these codes are applied, and therefore the extent to which this assertion is valid, is often a matter of debate. In my analysis of data from \textit{Beeld}, I question, for example, whether not representing the lifeworld of the majority of South Africans (be they categorized as “poor” or “black” or both) in any detail if at all, meets any ethical objectives of accurate or fair representations of the country or its demos. From my experience, codes of ethics tend to be honoured in the breach, and the adage “don’t let the truth get in the way of a good news story” is a more common ethical guideline.
circulation extends through six provinces), most of whom are “unreachable” through any other newspaper. In addition, at 57%, Beeld has a higher percentage of reader loyalty (readers who read 4-5 copies out of 5) than, for example, The Star (45%), Business Day (44%), The Times (50%) or Citizen (52%), which may be an indicator of a sense of group or community identity.

6.5. Code of ethics

Beeld operates to journalistic guidelines codified by the International Federation of Journalists (and as listed by Krüger, 2004, pp. 12-13) under the broad ethical headings of Truth-telling (which includes accuracy and fairness), Independence (not being swayed by political, personal or commercial motives or pressure), Minimising harm (not stigmatising or ridiculing people or offending taste or invading privacy). (To this list Krüger adds Accountability, by which readers are entitled to explanations and corrections of fact, and which is a matter of self-regulation rather than state regulation). These principles are also expressed in the Press Code of Conduct (Print Media Industry), which is formulated in terms of Section 16 of the SA Constitution governing freedom of the media. The Afrikaans newspapers (which share many of their stories and columns), share the same code of ethics, drawn up by Die Burger (Burger, no date), which establishes the core values of the group, although each newspaper interprets the code in accordance with its understanding of its own readers (as readers and as target market). For the purposes of staff training, Beeld has summarised the Burger code (BeeldPP, 2012b). The emphasis of the code is in large measure on the professional technical aspects of journalism, stressing accuracy as a question of “true to source”, where it is understood that “source” should never be a single source\footnote{The international news agency Reuters requires, for example, five separate sources. On The Witness, from my experience, and on Beeld, from the news editors with whom I had daily contact and who I would question on sourcing, three separate sources were required. There were exceptions, especially in the case of investigative stories whose sources were whistleblowers.} and that verification is therefore established through a cross-referencing of sources and “stakeholders”. This emphasis bears on what Mouffe (interviewed by Carpentier & Cammaerts, 2006) calls “la verité de faits [factual truth]” as...
opposed to “la verité de raison [truth of reason]”. When Naspers chairman Ton Vosloo submitted the official history of the Naspers group, *Oor Grense Heen*[^163] (Beukes, 1992) to the TRC (TRC, 1998) in lieu of a representation by the Afrikaans newspapers acknowledging moral responsibility, culpability and complicity in supporting and enabling Apartheid, it is this distinction that Mouffe draws that was at issue. Factual truth, for Vosloo, meant “true to source” in that the stories printed were accurate to the extent that they followed technical procedures established within an ideological context that promoted white Afrikaner interests, a legal context that proscribed sources (such as the ANC), and a “citizenscape” that excluded black subjects. Individual Afrikaans journalists who made their own collective submission to the TRC were acknowledging the “truth of reason”, the “moral truth”, of the manner in which they had reported.

The Media24 corporate values are summarised (in *BeeldPP*, 2012a) as encompassing personal and journalistic values. Personal values include “freedom, rights, restraint, integrity, truthfulness, respect, loyalty, service”, while journalistic values include “truthful[ness] and conscientious[ness], integrity and objectivity, treat[ing] all with dignity, integrity and respect, comply[ing] with laws, regulations and the group’s [ie Media24] rules.”

The code of ethics adheres broadly to an embracing notion of fairness (taken as a matter of balance, rather than objectivity), and asserts the role of journalism as upholding “the public’s fundamental right to be informed and freely to receive and to disseminate opinions”, and that “The primary purpose of gathering and distributing news and opinion is to serve society by informing citizens”[^164] and enabling them to make informed judgments on the issues of the time” (*BeeldPP*, 2012b).


[^164] The *Star*, by contrast, draws no distinction in its code of ethics between “public” and “citizens” (*Star*, 1999). The distinction is important because of the contestations around claims to citizenship and who is entitled to the rights it confers. However, the distinction is also important if one considers, for example, the regular Xenophobic attacks across South Africa. Many of the victims are not citizens of South Africa. A newspaper that conceives its ethical obligations in relation to “the public” would consider such non-citizens as members, whose conditions are important considerations in the broad wellbeing of society. A newspaper that considers its ethical duty in relation to “informing citizens”, therefore excludes these non-citizens from consideration, and implicitly draws a distinction between a public that matters and one that doesn’t.
Apart from legal qualifications on the freedom of expression (as in the case of hate speech, for example, which the code prohibits), the code of ethics establishes its own qualifications (both “positive” and “negative”), and “encourages racial harmony and strives to promote the wellbeing and development of all sectors of the population through its reporting”, while at the same time being “committed to the promotion of Afrikaans among all speakers, regardless of race and ethnic group”. It also “supports a business environment in which an independent media industry can compete and flourish”.

An explicit mechanism of not so much promoting racial harmony as avoiding disharmony is the injunction not to resort to stereotypes (of “gender, race, ethnic allegiance, religion, country of origin, living area, sexual preference, physical and mental disability [or otherwise], political views, and other types”), specifically through the use of “offensive terms”. Articles should therefore not cause offence through the use of offensive, obscene or profane words, a policy aimed at finding appeal “with as wide a readership as possible”.

These sensitivities and proscriptions are all stipulated in relation to actually represented subjects. They do not refer to subjects who are unrepresented through silence and exclusion. The injunction to “fairness” might be understood to address this insofar as it seeks to avoid active or actual prejudice. While no newspaper could claim or aim to cover a comprehensive spectrum of news, and as much as any newspaper may claim to want to address “as wide a readership as possible”, the Media24 code of ethics (not uniquely) presents itself as if the readership terrain has not been commercially delimited, and in practice narrowly culturally delimited too through the selection of what is newsworthy (a factor of perhaps less moral, social and political import in a homogeneous society such as Iceland than in a racially fraught one such as South Africa).

For example, Beeld promotional material (BeeldPP, 2012a), drawing on AMPS statistics, identifies readers that advertisers want to reach (in a mutually reinforcing dynamic in

---

165 See Glossary.
which the needs of the one meet the needs of the other) as 74% in LSM 8-10 (where the population norm is below LSM 7), 48% of whom earn more than R20 000/month (where it states the population average as being R9 341). The notionally “average” reader (the generic “citizen” that the newspaper addresses) is therefore one who has a car, travels, eats in restaurants, shops for pleasure, buys accessories, has an insurance policy, among other consumer habits, each of which categories shapes both individual story selection and the structural sectioning of the newspaper (for example “Motoring”, “Art and Leisure”, “DIY”). This commodification of news takes place in conjunction with what Wasserman (2008) identifies as the “commodification of Afrikaans”. Beeld’s promotional material, under the newspaper’s slogan “Jou wêreld, Jou koerant” (“Your world, Your newspaper”), highlights the seamless interchangeability of commodifications under a heading “High number of exclusive readers” by claiming that “Many people that you may want to be reaching can only be accessed via Afrikaans media”, “27% of South African adults prefer their media communication in Afrikaans”, “189 000 people can only be reached via Beeld and no other newspaper”, “330 000 people can only be reached via Beeld and no other daily newspaper” and “248 000 people in LSM 8-10 can only be reached via Beeld and no other daily newspaper”. Minette Ferreira, Beeld’s general manager, asserts the newspaper’s “influence as a news brand … that not only guides the news agenda in terms of its target market, but also in the broader media environment … The information presented by Beeld is trustworthy and the newspaper plays an important part in verifying, organizing and interpreting the plethora of information it distributes” (Ads24, 2013).

This, then, is the face, not of the Levinasian Other166, but of the Afrikaner self, serving not to minimise harm or invoke benevolence, but precisely to prevent the intrusion of the Other into an interiority that seeks not to soften or eliminate boundaries, but to firm them up in order to prevent a collapse of identity into what Kristeva (1982) calls a state of

---

166 I share Wyschogrod’s (2000, p. xi) observation that she “consider[s] the face of a Levinasian text akin to a human face”, and so my reading of Beeld is heavily influenced by this premise, which is an important buttressing of Butler’s theorising of “grievability” (Butler, 2010).
abjection\textsuperscript{167}. The tension between hermeticism and narcissism on the one hand, and open and/or inclusive reporting (as understood by Mouffe and Manca) and representation on the other, underlies the orientation of the newspaper as a whole, and within that, every story’s selection, its presentation, its form and its relationship with other stories.

\textbf{6.6. “Jou koerant, Jou wêreld” (Your newspaper, Your world)}

How is one to understand the interrelationship between the possessive “jou” of Beeld’s slogan, the abstract “citizen” and “public” of the code of ethics, and the code’s concrete determination of population (not readership) in terms of race and language? The bounds established by these categories establish the terrain on which self and other face off, and suggest the limits of pluralism in the practice of news.

The quantitative reading of Beeld establishes a genre division between news (facts) and opinion, and a news differentiation by beat (eg health, politics, crime) underpinned by structural differentiation under specific page headings and position. This suggests a comprehensive approach to “the world”, as having both an objective and a subjective dimension, both subject to a process of prioritisation that establishes orders of importance. The statistical breakdown of stories (by beat) suggests the interpellative orientation of the paper. For example, and consistent with other research into Beeld, the single biggest category of news is crime (20% of all stories), suggesting that the reader is being hailed as a possible victim. “Labour” stories make up only 3% of all stories, suggesting that the reader is not being hailed as a worker (which would be in line with the market positioning in terms of LSMs). “Social” stories (at 16%) make up the second

\textsuperscript{167} The “abject” is the unacceptable in the identity of the self which can never fully be purged, and which therefore represents a constant threat to that identity. Most obviously, an identity characterised as “criminal” or “treacherous” (both of which characterizations feature in the public discourse of Afrikaners) would be threatened by abjection. Abjection is brought about, argues Kristeva (1982, p. 4), by that which “disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite”. The greatest hazard of a state of abjection is therefore that it compromises the construction of a “clean” identity which tries to set itself apart from, or purge, its monstrous aspect.
biggest category of all stories, followed by “politics”\textsuperscript{168} (at 12%), suggesting a level of interpellation of the reader as a private individual rather than as a citizen.

6.7. The face of race

However, given the importance of race as a marker in South Africa, the otherwise neutral professional segmentation of news manifests in a way that immerses all stories in a medium that is overridingly “white”, and particularly “Afrikaner”.

In what I call the race loading of Beeld, bearing in mind the market targeting of Afrikaner readers on the one hand and on the other an ethical concern with “all sectors of the population [understood as defined by race rather than class]”, the “whiteness” of the paper is demonstrated by three graphs:

**Figure 1: Complexion of stories, by number, by race/ethnicity**

![Complexion of stories by race/ethnicity](image)

Of all stories, ones in which the complexion or race “face” of the story is white (ie where the subject is overtly white) number 25%, while those which present a black “face” number 4%.

\textsuperscript{168} I share the distinction drawn by Chipkin, who follows Mouffe, that all social activity must be seen as “political”, while “politics” refers to the ontic, that is, the institutional processes of government and democracy.
Of the main photographs on page 1, 69% have a white subject, 9% have a “black” subject (that is “not white”), while in 22% of cases the picture is not obviously “raced”, if the subject is for example a road accident or a natural disaster. However, in some instances an otherwise “neutral” photograph can be “raced” when illustrating a story that invites a “raced” reading, for example the November 15, 2012 coverage of the De Doorns wage strike as a “Crisis for agriculture” in which wine farmers (all white) are presented as beleaguered (reinforced by the main photograph of a burning shed) and the protests are delegitimised through their impact on profitability and the national economy. In this edition, no story presents the strike from a farmworker point of view, and in the context the photograph of a burning farm shed represents the violence done to white farmers and not as an expression of frustration over working conditions.
The overall “face” of Page 1, in which the total package, being a combination of stories and photographs, presents as “white” in 69% of cases (noting the importance of the main photograph in creating this impression), and as “black” in 8% of cases, for example on January 31, when the lead story and main photograph are of a philanthropic donation by Patrice Motsepe\(^{169}\). Of interest in Figure 3 is that the strong “racing” of the main news pages becomes more neutral in the deeper pages, although quite often this is because the

---

\(^{169}\) Patrice Motsepe is a black South African billionaire with interests in international mining. He is also the owner of a soccer team in the country’s professional league. As reported, he donated, through his charity foundation, half of his fortune to charities. The story is an anomaly. Through stories critical of Affirmative Action and so-called “tenderpreneurs” who profit through doing preferential business with the government, the wealth of blacks is implicitly characterised as ill-gotten, and at the expense of whites. In this context, the Motsepe story represents a “good black” story, whose example, while lauded (through being highlighted) serves as a contrast to the perceived norm. His gesture is compared to similar donations by Bill Gates and Warren Buffet. Politicians and traditional chiefs, who are paid from the public purse, are portrayed as “fatcats” and scroungers. For example, the Page 1 lead on January 27, 2013, is headlined “Konings rol lekker in geld/Kings roll merrily in money”, subheaded “Kry R1m per jaar en ander voordele/Receive R1 million a year plus other benefits”, and portrays 10 traditional (black) kings as leeching off the public (See Appendix 6). International royalty, however, is reported on uncritically and in exuberant terms as celebrities. For example, on January 29, the Page 3 lead is on the abdication of Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands, who is praised as an exemplary ruler who set a good example. This is followed on January 31 (Page 17) with a sympathetic feature on Prince Willem-Alexander as a “reluctant monarch”. Afrikaners also have a longstanding love affair with British royalty, as demonstrated by special editions and extensive coverage given to the death of Princess Diana in 1997. Beeld continues this favourable royal-watching tradition in its reporting on Prince William and his wife, Princess Catherine, Duchess of Cambridge, whose pregnancy gets front page coverage (with photograph) on December 5, as well as a Page 2 report on the same date.
pages contain no more than one or two columns of editorial copy, and often without a photograph to make a visual emphasis one way or the other.

To summarise, the delineation of “your world” within “the world” is determined by story subjects, which are aligned to market targets that conform to a linguised and racialised reading “public”, which is located in an urban/suburban living space\textsuperscript{170} - which corresponds to Ballard’s (2004) space of “semigration” - whose global national point of reference is strictly South African (88% of stories are on South African subjects, while 11% treat international subjects, and only 1% have a focus on Africa, and all of the “Africa” stories have reference to South Africa or South Africans. See Figure 4 below). From a Saussurian point of view, the meaning of “your world” is constructed without reference to a largely un-represented greater world (as global trends, racial plurality, class diversity), and so the dialogic aspect of \textit{Beeld} as a medium of communication is severely circumscribed. To the extent that there is an “I” and a “thou”, the “thou” is at best an understood “thou” if the addressee of the discourses present in \textit{Beeld} is “other” in the rigid sense of being outside, or beyond the defined norm. However, while no medium is likely to address itself directly to an “other” audience except occasionally or in passing, any public medium always has an understood “other” who is being addressed, as recognized by a code of ethics that proscribes offensive stereotyping and, for example, laws that prohibit racist and religious prejudice.

\textsuperscript{170} The suburban space is nevertheless infiltrated by a rural mythos, which informs the anxieties about farm murders and the degradation of South Africa’s natural heritage.
Therefore, even though it is a mass, public medium, Beeld does not address itself to “the public”. At most it addresses itself to “this public”, which reduces, to an extent, the addressee-addressor dialogue of discourse theory to a soliloquy.

6.8. Discourse of dysfunction

I suggest in Chapter Four that a “discourse of dysfunction” prevails in Beeld. The tone is set on Page 1, where, of the 77 editions, only three lead stories are what may be termed unambiguously “positive”. The first (November 27, Headline: “Faf so, Aussies/Take that, Aussies”\textsuperscript{171, 172}) celebrates the South African cricket team’s performance against Australia. The second and third (December 29 and January 3) celebrate matric achievements in the private and state school exams respectively. However, these “positives” cannot be read in isolation, as, firstly, all national sport stories are set against debates about quotas and racial representivity and so it is symbolically important that a national triumph is personified by an “Afrikaner”, and secondly, academic achievement

\textsuperscript{171} Lost in translation: The Afrikaans headline puns on the player’s name, Faf du Plessis, with “Faf” a near-homophone of “vat”, or take.

\textsuperscript{172} All translations of Beeld headlines and text are my own. Where a nuance of the original cannot be translated easily (as in the “Faf so, Aussies” headline cited above), I include the original alongside the translation.
has to be read against education policy failures, declining literacy, violence in schools and the decline in the number of Afrikaans schools and Afrikaans as a medium of instruction, as well as fraud\textsuperscript{173}. Those who succeed in spite of what is presented as a systemic failure are, in \textit{Beeld}, overwhelmingly white: the December 29 edition reporting the private (Independent Education Board) results reflects in 26 photographs of achievers, one Indian pupil and no black or coloured ones. The January 3 edition reporting the state results devotes nine pages to matric achievers, most of whom are from Afrikaans schools, and most of whom are white (and of these only three have English names\textsuperscript{174}): of the dozens of photo-story cameos, only two are of other races, a black girl (Page 6), and an Indian girl (Page 8).

\textbf{Figure 5: Story categories, indicating the percentage of crime stories, among other categories.}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure5.png}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure5.png}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{173} These “negative” factors are highlighted in both editions, in both news stories and columns: Jonathan Jansen, on December 29, deals specifically with the “intellectual dishonesty” in setting maths literacy standards, while Danny Titus (January 3) deals more broadly with the importance of meritocracies, a point reinforced in the same edition by Annemarie van der Walt who argues the importance of being “a participant, not a bystander” in the pursuit of success.

\textsuperscript{174} I make a general assumption, in the examination of \textit{Beeld}, that an Afrikaans surname indicates an “Afrikaner”, that is white and Afrikaans mother-tongue speaker, and that an English name indicates an English speaker, although this does not necessarily always apply. Oscar Pistorius, for example, is thoroughly “English”, in spite of his name, and in spite of being incorrectly characterized as a “Calvinist Afrikaner” in the media, by Lulu Xingwana (\textit{viz} Chapter Two) and the ANC Women’s League. While not an “Afrikaner” in any sense, he was nevertheless claimed by \textit{Beeld}, before he shot Reeva Steenkamp, as “one of us”, that is one of the constellation of Afrikaner folk heroes that included rugby stars such as Bulls rugby player Francois Hougaard and the singer Steve Hofmeyr.
In general, a “positive” register manifests in stories classified as “social” (including arts, sport, culture and celebrity stories on news pages), which make up 16% of all stories, in contrast to the 33% of stories that fall under the “dysfunction” category (which includes crime, which makes up 20% of all stories, and stories of social disorder such as violent protests and strikes). The relevance for this thesis of “positive” or “negative” loadings is not so much whether the representation is fair, or comprehensive, or sympathetic or antipathetic in itself, but how as elements of a référentiel they present the discursive surfaces that allow for ideological articulation. Simply put (and this is not necessarily a question of racism although it lends itself to such an interpretation), on to what could discourses of merit and achievement latch if the only visible (deserving) subjects are white and Afrikaans? How is a chain of equivalence (linking “the people”, “citizens”, “Afrikaners”) forged through discourses of reconciliation, language rights, civic responsibility, non-racialism and transformation, when the only links available for articulation are “marked” white, and where the order-disorder binary falls broadly under a white-black one? How are these concepts or principles embodied? Put differently, with whom is reconciliation to be achieved if only the self of the group is available, reducing the enterprise to one of self-help rather than nation-building? And, taking the question further, is this a necessary aspect of the process of rehabilitation, of the attempt to reclaim an identity that is not subject to Kristeva’s (1982) condition of “abjection”? Furthermore, is rehabilitation pursued, not through reconciliation, as suggested in the rhetoric of the opinion pages, but through a self-granted absolution, which Alden and Anseeuw (2009) argue is a feature of the discourse of privilege in Settler narratives. However, while the assertion of the rights of privilege is a feature of Beeld, it is not the only route to

---

175 Alden and Anseeuw argue that Settler, Liberation and Neo-Colonial narratives contend for discursive hegemony in independent Africa. They propose (p. 29) a typology of “Three discourses [which] inform the white settler narrative”: 1) “A discourse of loss: stabbed in the back by local politicians and international community (especially the West) that did not understand their importance. In this way the victimizers was (sic) transformed into victims; 2) “A discourse of fear: the new majority black government was seen as heir to the white settlers’ founding myth of liberation - the Belgian Congo and the Mau Mau - violence, disorder, economic collapse, arbitrary rule. Where this did not occur (as in most cases), each measure undertaken by a black government was nonetheless interpreted as a sign of the impending slide into chaos; 3) “A discourse of privilege: white settlers have earned their right to state protection and privilege through capacity to produce economic goods for society and elite, in this case the source of their privilege was no longer racial as such but economic criteria. Having embraced minority protection through invocation of a universalistic human rights discourse, white communities felt themselves to be absolved from history especially with regard to the sources of privilege (dispossession of land) but still situated themselves as an outpost of civilization and rationality.”
absolution, an objective more strenuously driven by an encompassing presentation of the “grievable”.

6.9. What, then, is grieved?

Grief implies loss, actual and perceived, and a discourse of loss is characteristic not only of the post-apartheid Afrikaner condition (Steyn, 2004), but also more broadly of post-liberation Settler narratives that seek both to re-interpret the Liberation narrative itself and simultaneously to provide a countervailing one (Alden & Anseeuw, 2009).

Newspapers present information through events in the form of news\textsuperscript{176}. Forefronted in news stories\textsuperscript{177} are individuals, embodied validations of “whose life is a life” (Butler, 2010, p. ix). The discourse of loss may draw on historical narratives to weave an imaginary that makes sense of altered or dislocated states, but the awareness of fragility that it expresses relates to the biological vulnerability of the self to physical harm, and the harm to which “naked self” is exposed in relation to the sovereignty of the state, which enables conditions that create, mitigate or obviate fear or hope.

In Beeld, the life of the Afrikaner subject is presented as vulnerable at every level, that is, “othered” in every aspect of public life (beyond the influence of the group where loss of power is felt most acutely). This vulnerability finds expression in a number of ways, which collectively establish a chain of difference (in that the theme of vulnerability is self-reflexive) which binds the meaning of Afrikaner co-existence in a way that tends to preclude an articulation of a broader chain of equivalence (a requirement of which would be a sense of non-exclusivism).

\textsuperscript{176} Opinion and Features tend to follow from news, engaging in issues in a way that presumes some familiarity on the part of the reader with the context of the debates sparked by news events.

\textsuperscript{177} And also in Background and Features stories, due to the prevalent use of the Wall Street Journal style, promoted by, for example, the Institute for the Advancement of Journalism in South Africa and the Poynter Institute in Florida.
6.10. Categories of the “grievable”

These are\textsuperscript{178}, thematically within a discourse of disorder in which affective resonance is established through the discourses of fear and loss\textsuperscript{179}, under the headings of Death and Threats to Survival:

Death

1) Death due to crime
2) Death due to accidents
3) Death due to neglect/incompetence/negligence
4) Random death

Threats to Survival:

a) Church
b) Language
c) Livelihood
d) Collapse of politics and institutions
e) Disorder and protest
f) Destruction of heritage
f 1) Art
f 2) Natural heritage

\footnote{\textsuperscript{178} I do not seek to establish orders of discourse under these headings for two main reasons: a) I have suggested from the outset that the “frame of intelligibility” is established under an identifiable master signifier of “Afrikaner” which, under different conditions of articulation may be amplified or muted in a way that renders the signifier ambiguous; and b) all these headings point to elements that are always fluid and even at moments of fixity (when a theme is quilted through a nodal point) they always tend towards a rearticulation depending on how the chain of difference/equivalence is being shaped and adapted.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{179} These discourses of loss, fear and (precarious) privilege are, as Alden and Anseeuw argue, typical features of Settler narratives. They operate in tandem, and their implicit putative addressee may be considered to be the “Others”, that is those responsible for the state of affairs afflicting Afrikaners in particular: the government, the ruling party, fellow (non-Afrikaans-speaking) citizens, fellow (black) citizens. The explicit addressee is the Afrikaner (as outlined in this Chapter above).}
f2.1) Water
f 2.2) Animals
f 2.21) Rhinos
g) Habitat

6.10.1. Death

(1) Death due to crime

Most of these stories deal with the murder of blameless victims at the hands of an external (usually unknown) aggressor. For example, “Pa voor seuntjie geskiet/Father shot in front of son” (November 19, Appendix 12), “Martel aanval/Torture attack” (December 1, see Appendix 16), “Lyk in trein gekry/Body found in train” (December 27), “Oues in vrieskas gedruk/Elders stuffed in freezer” (January 10), “Onder boewebeleg/Under thug-rule” (January 28, see Appendix 23).

Farm murders represent a distinct sub-category of external-aggressor stories, and are characterised by extreme brutality: “Plaasmoorde. ‘Dis veel wreder as ander’/Farm murders: ‘More cruel than others’” (November 28, Appendix 15), “Hy val oor ma se lyk/He falls over mother’s body” (December 8).

Overshadowing both these categories, however, are murders committed by “the enemy within”. The prime example of this is the case of the “Modimolle Monster”, which led the paper on three days in a row (the most on any single subject in the three months under examination), as well as receiving extensive coverage on inside pages: “My kind is vrek geskiet/My child was shot stone dead” (November 20), “Dag van gruwels/Day of horrors” (November 21, Appendix 13), “Woede oor ander man/Fury over other man” (November 22). The “Monster” is a white man standing trial for the orchestrated murder of his stepson and rape and torture of his wife. Other examples in this category are a

---

180 All the murder examples cited are Page 1 leads.
181 Modimolle is the name of a town in Limpopo province.
husband who allegedly\textsuperscript{182} organised the murder of his wife ("Chanelle: Haar man genoem/Chanelle: Her husband named", November 30), and an adopted son who murdered a clergyman and his wife: "Pastorie: Hulle ken mekaar/Parsonage: They knew each other" (November 13), "Vergewe my: Pastorie: seun se brief uit tronksel/Forgive me: Parsonage: son’s letter from cell" (November 17).

A variation on the theme of stories dealing with the “enemy within”, is stories of domestic workers turned killer, for example “Keelaf: Onnie se man vas/Slit throat: Teacher’s husband held” (December 20), in which a husband hired his gardener to kill his wife\textsuperscript{183}.

Two of the crime/murder leads (apart from the farm murders, which tap into the “Afrikaner genocide” theme which, although explicitly rejected in the newspaper’s leaders is an implied logic behind these farm murders\textsuperscript{184}) place the responsibility for the murders, through commentary by victim-family and -friends, on the ANC government, albeit in a paradoxical manner to each other.

The first, “Martel-aanval/Torture attack” (December 1), combines the elements of the Afrikaner as the (helpless) victim of extreme brutality directly and indirectly at the hands of the ANC. The story deals with the torture of a 94-year-old woman who is burned with a hot pan, whose great-grandchild is burned with an iron, and whose son is killed. The pull-quote from his brother, “My broer is ’n skiettrofee van die ANC en misdadigers/ My brother is a hunting trophy for the ANC and criminals”, establishes the ANC as a criminally minded hunter (of Afrikaners) in league with common criminals. (See Appendix 24).

\textsuperscript{182} Trial still not concluded at the time of writing.
\textsuperscript{183} White South Africans, being historically relatively affluent, have employed domestic labour, in the home and as gardeners. A large measure of trust is therefore placed in domestic workers, who have access to the home when their employers are at work, and so a breach of this trust is regarded as a personal betrayal which reinforces a sense of vulnerability that also finds expression in discourses of fear and loss.
\textsuperscript{184} Explicitly articulated in the November 28 lead: “Plaasmoorde: Dis veel wreder as ander.”
The second, “Vermoor 7 - nou sy vrou/Murdered 7 - now his wife” (January 7), presents the case against the ANC implicitly. Its subject is a white right-winger who killed seven people in KwaMashu in then-Natal in 1990 during the Apartheid-state sponsored civil war in the province, who was granted political amnesty in 1997 following his testimony to the TRC, who had now murdered his wife. While on one level this is an “enemy within” story, the origins of the crime lie in what is implied to have been an ill-conceived amnesty, the flawed product of a political process on which Afrikaners have founded much of their discourse of reconciliation.

(2) Death due to traffic accidents

The dominant feature of this category of blameless deaths is that they are not “accidental” but arise out of, or have an element of, criminality.

The clearest example of this is the lead on November 5, “Roofkar eis Bull/Stolen car claims Bull” (Appendix 27), in which a young Blue Bulls rugby player is killed in a collision with a speeding getaway car. The Blue Bulls are, historically, among the pre-eminent symbols of Afrikaner pride and sporting prowess. The fatal collision presents, therefore, not simply as the poignant tale of premature death, but as a collision between reckless criminality (the subjects of which are black), and youthful talent, promise and success (the subject of which is white/Afrikaner).

The lead on November 29, “Thomas: Man help nie eens/Thomas: Man doesn’t even assist”, draws a political element into the mix. The story deals with the reckless driving trial of the driver for a member of the provincial parliament who ran over a matric pupil on his way to his exams on his motorbike. The sting of the headline (‘man help nie

\[185\] The term “Afrikaner” necessarily implies a white subject. However, while the context suggests that the subject should be read as an Afrikaner, I would suggest that a primary reading of the subject as “white” is as likely, especially to the extent that the newspaper would be seeking to appeal to white Afrikaans speakers, some of whom do not self-identify as “Afrikaners”. The story would appeal, therefore, in simultaneous registers of race and ethnicity. However, since the interpellation is at a connotative level (that is, the subject/victim is not described as “white” or “Afrikaner” or even “Afrikaans-speaking”), the primary register, whether the story is seen as “about” a white victim or an Afrikaner victim, depends to a large extent on the reader’s reading.
eens/even’) relates to evidence that the driver ignored the badly injured schoolboy while checking for damage to the car instead. Again, youth, innocence, promise and endeavour in the form of a white/Afrikaner are cut down by recklessness and callousness in the form of a black perpetrator. Further, due to the “political” dimension of the story and discourses of corruption and “anti-white” Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies, this perpetrator is likely to be seen as an “undeserving” beneficiary of a corrupt political order.

Three days later, on December 3 (“Dronk ryer eis bruid/Drunk driver claims bride”), the theme is pursued (with a follow-up on December 11: “In bed by haar graf/In bed at her grave”), but with an important variation. The victim is, yet again, young, white/Afrikaner and innocent. The perpetrator (the headline offers no other interpretation of his actions, which are not muted by a designation of him as an accused, for example) is drunk, reckless, black and a colonel in the army. The army was, under Apartheid, the bastion of Afrikaner power and an international symbol of its might (and cruelty), and so the story is not only “about” negligence and a fatal road accident, but about dereliction of duty and the corruption (in the sense of dishonour and debasement) of a once formidable institution.

The new year opens with an archetypal road carnage story in which minibus taxis fill the role of the villain. “Taxi ry held dood/Taxi kills hero” (January 4), and “Burry: man vervolg/Burry: man arrested” (January 5), deal with the death of South African mountain-biking champion and Olympic competitor Burry Stander, killed on the South Coast while on a training ride by a taxi swerving in front of him\(^{186}\). The victim is white, with an Afrikaans surname (albeit English-speaking), a model achiever and identified as a “South African” hero even though mountain biking is the preserve of a minority, white, affluent elite. The driver of the taxi is black, and from the outset held responsible for the

---

\(^{186}\) The taxi element recurs on January 14 (“Botsing eis haar ma en pa/Taxi claims her mom and dad”), in the lead story dealing with a couple who died in a head-on collision as a result of trying to avoid hitting a taxi.
accident. The taxi element forms part of a broader discourse on road safety in which “Irresponsible and reckless drivers, in particular taxi drivers, are typecast as ‘unworthy’ citizens and habitual perpetrators of the ‘carnage’ on the roads” (MacRitchie & Seedat, 2008, p. 337). While the drivers may be the individual perpetrators, ultimate responsibility for road deaths and “chaos” is attributed to poor law enforcement, a breakdown in governance that also establishes road accidents as an element in the broader discourse of dysfunction.

(3) Death due to neglect/incompetence/negligence

Negligence is an aspect of the two previous categories of violent death, in that they address institutional breakdown and the direct effect of poor governance on individual lives. Neglect and incompetence may be a feature of this negligence, but the lead stories cited present no evidence for such a conclusion.

This attribution is made explicit, however, in the December 6 and 7 leads: “Dakota vermis in berge/Dakota missing in mountains” and “’n Graf in die berge/A grave in the mountains” (Appendix 14). The story deals with the crash in the Drakensberg of a plane carrying medical personnel headed for the home of the ailing Nelson Mandela. The first installment is a standard missing aircraft story in which weather or pilot error may explain what had happened. The follow-up, however, in which the crash details are reported, raises concerns about why a World War Two vintage aircraft would be used in the service of Mandela’s health, but also reports that the cause of the crash may have been due to the poor maintenance of the aircraft, which in turn is attributed to both poor skills and insufficient resources.

187 All accounts portray Stander as blameless and the driver as culpable, even though the case has yet (at the time of writing) to be concluded. 188 A further aspect of taxi-related accidents such as the Burry Stander one, is that they represent a public-private clash. Taxis, even though they are privately-owned, are the dominant form of public transport. Stander, and the bridal couple, are engaged in their own private lives, and so “the public” is perceived as a threat to the life and livelihood, as I argue below, of the private individual.
Multiple discourses are at work here. Degradation of services in general, due to political inaction or inadequate or ill-conceived policy, is a theme that runs through stories of service delivery protests and institutional failure. The degradation of the military (a link created by the Dakota being associated with its wartime legacy) forms a particular focus of such stories, and Beeld, which is the only paper in the country to have a dedicated military correspondent, gives the subject much play in reports of, for example, idle submarines and pilot shortages, the former in the context of the controversial arms deal\textsuperscript{189} and the latter usually in the context of Affirmative Action\textsuperscript{190} forcing qualified, white pilots out of service.

The Mandela angle to the Dakota crash story emphasises the egregiousness of the neglect in maintenance. Mandela is a powerful symbol of reconciliation for a constituency that held him up as a “terrorist” in the Apartheid era. This introduces a nuance to the theme of death not present in the other examples cited, in that, while they present accidents in which “they” have a violent impact on “us”, the Dakota story (in which all on board died) demonstrates that not only do “we”\textsuperscript{191} suffer but “they” are negligent/neglectful in not taking sufficient care of “their” (who also serves as an adopted “our”) elder statesman.

(4) Random death

In all the above examples, the victims are subject to violence that is caused by a identifiable agent. This category represents deaths that could be deemed purely

\textsuperscript{189} An arms deal brokered initially under the Mandela government and concluded under Mbeki, which at the time of writing was the subject of the Seriti Commission of Inquiry, saw the purchase of military jets, ships and submarines at what was criticized as inflated rates and through the use of bribes which were allegedly pocketed by government ministers and ANC loyalists. The arms were purchased from Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Reference to “the arms deal” has also become shorthand for a “corrupt government”.

\textsuperscript{190} See Glossary.

\textsuperscript{191} There is a multiple “harmed” community in this case. There is a collective “we” in that the victims are not all white and race is not a discernable feature of the accident report. Secondly, given that the historic equation was one of military=white, the harmed “we” can be viewed as the displaced “white” skills that were dispensed with in the new order and who, by implication, would not have allowed the accident to happen had they still been employed. Thirdly, the greatest potential casualty of the crash would have been Mandela himself, deprived of medical support destined for him. Such a potential consequence of what would otherwise be a mechanical maintenance issue tapped into the “When Mandela Dies” fears of the time and the underlying anxieties of social chaos and a definitive end to the reconciliation project that Mandela embodied.
accidental, and in all cases the victims are relaxing on holiday: “Waterval eis gesin van drie/Waterfall claims family of three” (December 31), “Pta-ma sterf in see ongeluk/Pretoria mother dies in sea accident” (January 8), and “Njala dood vrou/Njala kills woman” (January 19), which is similar to the January 15 lead (“Staan net ’n bietjie nader/Stand a bit closer”) except that the victim survives her goring by a rhino. These stories do not appear to have anything in common with the others. However, in all four of these stories the victims are white/Afrikaner and blameless. In the Njala case the victim ran an animal shelter and was killed by one of her wards. In the rhino case negligence is suggested on the part of the tour guide for posing the victim outside the viewing truck near a herd of rhino, but the story is otherwise presented as quirky and silly. In the sea and waterfall stories cited above, no suggestion of carelessness is imputed to the victims. All four stories also share, with the three other categories of death stories, the representation of subjects as victims who are helpless, and for whom control of their circumstances is impossible (the Njala attack is described as a “freak” accident).

While these “random accidents” do not lend themselves to a Shakespearean reading, a sense of cosmic disorder would not be improbable in a reader who is faced almost daily by tales of grief.

6.10.2. Threats to survival

Beyond the representations of the definitive threat to the biological subject, that is death, there are multiple elements of chaos and destruction that play into the overarching discourse of dysfunction. Some of these are given high priority through their placement as Page 1 leads, but others, such as features and columns on language and church, are given extensive coverage in the form of ongoing debates that are run at length over long periods, and so in total may be deemed to have as much as, if not greater, weight and resonance than the more dramatic lead stories.

An Njala is a large buck.

The plight of rhinos through poaching is given extensive coverage in Beeld (as elsewhere), as I demonstrate later in this Chapter, and as an animal that is vulnerable and whose cause has been embraced editorially, this particular story has echoes of the “enemy within” theme.
The headings under which I consider these stories are: a) Assaults on and erosion of the institutional role of church and language; b) Assaults on livelihoods and the security of economic reproduction; c) Collapse of governance as embodied by “chaos” in the ANC; d) Destruction and protest; e) Destruction of heritage; f) Erosion of suburban social norms.

Language and church are two pillars on which traditional Afrikaner identity rests. Both are presented as being under siege: language faces external threats from the state (with survival depending on group mobilisation), while the church faces an internal threat from conservatives who “are camouflaging right-wing ideology” as theological debate (November 2, p. 10). Editorial opinion (December 15, 2012) takes a conciliatory line that emphasises the need for unity, for the sake of the Church and Afrikaners, while noting that the Church has a duty to stand for social justice.

Rearticulations are evident in both cases: in the instant of disarticulation, language is rendered an element that needs to be articulated to “other races” for a new chain of equivalence to be established, in the process shifting “Afrikaner” as a signifier whose articulation with “Afrikaans” is unique and exclusive. For example, the report and features on the death of Jakes Gerwel (November 29, pp. 2, 18, 29) emphasise his Afrikaans-ness and his contribution to the language and to non-racialism. The chain of equivalence is further extended through an articulation to international elements, notably Dutch and Flemish, in seeking a linguistic identity that is not limited to, or bound by, “nation”.

News and features on December 4 (pp. 9 and 11, respectively) deal with representations by Solidarity to the Flemish parliament on the “precarious” state of Afrikaans (contrary to several features in Beeld on how “vibrant” the language is, for example the November 20, full-page feature on Page 11 on the proliferation of Afrikaans-interest organisations), brought about by government policy, unofficial neglect, globalisation, “unintended

---

194 See Glossary.
consequences” and poor mobilisation by “Afrikaans-speakers”.

The case is made for solidarity, based on historical ties, to “save” Afrikaans, a discourse that articulates more readily in a chain of difference than one of equivalence, for two main reasons: firstly, given that the representation is made to a parliament with strong secessionist leanings to break away from the French-speaking south (Wallonia), linguistic chauvinism is more of an affective dynamic than one of plurality, and it bears the trace of the linguistic dominance that the Apartheid state established in public affairs. The case for Afrikaans was made not only to the Flemish parliament, but also to the Dutch Language Union (by Solidarity), the Forum for Minority Rights in Geneva (by AfriForum\(^{195}\)), and an International Conference on Minority Rights in The Hague (hosted by AfriForum), all between November 27 and December 5. Secondly, an appeal for linguistic solidarity is made in conjunction with appeals for recognition that Afrikaners as a group are under threat and that farm murders should be seen as a genocide. The discursive flow here animates valencies that tend to reinforce traditional ethnic articulations between the elements of language and Afrikaner, rather than enabling rearticulations that allow for equivalent resignifications of Afrikaner and Afrikaans on the basis of plurality and transformation (which is Beeld’s editorial line). The rhetorical thrust of this discourse, which renders rearticulation more ambiguous, is reinforced by the extent to which Solidarity, AfriForum, together with AgriSA\(^{196}\) and Freedom Front Plus, are quoted in relation to matters from education to labour to farm murders to minimum wages to rhino conservation.

**(a) Church**

As with language, the Afrikaner Church has been rearticulated with “new”, or “transformed”, or “non-racial”, in a way that extends the fold beyond the “traditional” Afrikaner to embrace not only other races, but also a diversity of lifestyles (for example “Geloofsbeeld van ’n gay Christen/Portrait of faith of a gay Christian”, November 22, p. 15, which is spliced into the ongoing theological series on the Church).

\(^{195}\) See Glossary.

\(^{196}\) See Glossary.
The Church debate\textsuperscript{197} (which is given play on November 2 and 28, December 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21 and 27, and January 2, 3, 4 and 8), represents the highest number of features devoted to a single topic to appear on the Leader and Opp-ed pages (Appendix 20), outnumbering all features dealing with national politics or, pertinently in light of the fact that the Mangaung congress takes place in the period under examination, ANC politics\textsuperscript{198}. The coverage is distinctive in that it is carefully “managed” to include a range of very nuanced and opposing views, and the series is concluded by a feature, by Wilhelm Jordaan, that acknowledges the differing positions and recommends an approach that wards off a schism or the “banishment” of groups or individuals. The series also accommodates both expert and lay opinion and grants them equal importance by promoting readers’ contributions to feature and column status rather than relegating them to the “mere opinion” of the Letters section. The group “self” is understood as embracing the full range of opinion, while at the same time opinions that are extreme (that is right wing) or intemperate are “othered” in Jordaan’s (2013, p. 15) final analysis and in the editorial opinion.

However, in the “othering” of the “right-wing” lies a great deal of ambivalence which suggests that the intra-“frontier” of exclusion is pervious at best. Contained within a single discourse, in this case of the Church, it is possible to assume that an absolute frontier has been established to enable a categorical expulsion of the other - being “racist”, “Apartheid apologist”, “un-Christian” - to enable a consolidation of a “new”, non-racial, Christian. However, when taken together with other discourses such a reading

\textsuperscript{197} The Church debate focuses on the 2010 decision by the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (the spiritual home of the National Party) to brand Apartheid as morally wrong and as having had no theological basis. While “1994” represents a shorthand way of locating the point of dislocation in South African politics (even though there was no corresponding shift in economics, as I argue in Chapter 2), and which is the ground-zero on which “transformed” identities are founded, the 2010 NGK decision could represent a surer rupture in the trajectory of traditional Afrikaner identity.

\textsuperscript{198} The coverage of the ANC’s Mangaung congress is cursory when compared to the saturation coverage of pre-1994 National Party policy gatherings in Beeld and the other Afrikaans newspapers. A possible interpretation is that coverage of the NP fell into the category of “ours”, that is, it was the ruling party but it was also “our” party and so there were both ontic and ontological elements in the “newsworthiness” of the NP conferences. Coverage of the ANC’s congress, most of which is critical in tenor (for example the November 15 lead on the eve of the congress: “ANC in chaos”), has no “our” element (given that Afrikaners have found a new home in the DA).
is less clear-cut. For example, Dana Snyman (2012, p. 10) argues in his column “As Verwoerd hom soos Zuma gedra het/If Verwoerd had behaved like Zuma” that, however bad Verwoerd may have been, he had more integrity and was more morally upright than Zuma. The singer Steve Hofmeyr, considered a right-wing apologist for Apartheid, is routinely celebrated on both news and arts pages of Beeld. I shall argue later in this chapter that attempts to rehabilitate the Afrikaner in public discourse negotiate this boundary of exclusion with great circumspection in ways that are contradictory at worst and ambiguous at best, ever mindful that an internal boundary should not harden into a frontier of antagonism against the group itself or elements of it199, even those who have broken away to establish the conservative “steedsHervormers/stillReformers” (November 12, p. 5 lead).

The defining characteristic of the Church debate is that it is a strictly internal debate, its only “outward” feature being that it articulates with the hegemonic discourse of “non-racialism”. There is no engagement with or from other churches or denominations or groups. It echoes the discourse of reconciliation that runs through the paper, but at issue is the reconciliation within the group, and not between heterogeneous groups. The threat is internal, and derives from Afrikaner history, and not from the contemporary political dispensation. The emphasis is on “healing” and “inclusivity”; “order” and “wholeness” go together.

(b) Language

The position of the language, by contrast, is subject to a variety of external threats, with the only internal threats relating to the corruption of the traditional “purity” of the language (November 7, p. 13 cartoon) and a lack of mobilisation by Afrikaners on behalf of Afrikaans (“As die Afrikaanse gemeenskap did nie self doen nie, sal niemand dit namens ons doen nie/If the Afrikaans community won’t do it for itself, no-one will do it on our behalf”, December 5, p 13).

199 For example, the leader page headline on November 28, “Kerkspanning tussen tradisie en vernuwing/Church tension between tradition and renewal”, places the tension in the context of tradition and progress, rather than groups pitted against each other, while the December 11 Opp-ed feature (p. 17), enlists a psychologist, a teacher and a preacher on how old and new, young and old can be reconciled.
These external threats stem from official policy and are aimed at universities (November 15, p. 13; November 23, p. 6 and January 7, p. 4), and schools (November 8, p. 4; December 5, pp. 13, 12; January 10, p. 1; January 19, p. 5 and January 23, p. 4). In both spheres of education Afrikaans has lost its dominance due to the promotion of other languages as mediums of instruction. The extent of the loss is emphasized in an Opp-ed feature (November 15, p. 13) on the fate of Afrikaans at the University of Pretoria, which notes that 2003 was the last year in which it was the majority spoken language at the university. The pressure from government is presented as unrelenting, with a proposal by Higher Education Minister Blade Nzimande to base state subsidies to universities on language (November 2, p. 6). At school level, the “assault” by the state is presented as being waged against school governing bodies and their authority in setting language and admissions criteria (November 23, p. 6; December 5, p. 13 and January 7, p. 4). In a leader page opinion column on the fate of the language (December 12, p. 19), Henry Jeffreys, a former editor of Die Burger, concludes that “Voorlopig moet Afrikaans nie op overheidsteun reken nie. As die taal wil oorleef, sal sy sprekers hom self moed red/For the time being Afrikaans should not rely on official support. If the language wants to survive, its speakers will have to rescue it themselves”.

There is, however, a countervailing narrative to those of siege and abandonment, which emphasises the vitality, resilience and growth of the language. This is not a question of

---

200 This “assault”, while in the context specifically aimed at Afrikaans as a language and at Afrikaans schools, is also characterised as being an assault on education as such. The leading article of December 5 (p. 12), for example, “Vrot skole is onreg teen SA se jeug/Rotten schools are an injustice against SA’s youth”, criticises the government for allowing some schools to fail while at the same time attacking “good” schools by undermining their authority.

201 Jeffreys’s formulation clearly establishes the frontier of antagonism as being between the “us” of Afrikaans-speakers, and the “them” of the “authorities”, which would be the state and the governing party. This frontier remains constant across discourses in Beeld; the “authorities”, seen as the agent of “othering” of the group whose interests are harmed or antagonised, are in turn “othered” in their lack of will or capacity in provision of services, combating crime, ensuring animal welfare and, as indicated in this case, promoting education, language and culture. In some discourses, an internal boundary may be re-articulated to form a frontier. For example, where race is a boundary between white and, mainly, coloured speakers of Afrikaans, the discourse of language articulates a commonwealth of speakers in a chain of equivalence whose interests coincide. However, the rights discourse of affirmative action forces a re-articulation of the race boundary into a frontier, since the relative interests (access to civil service jobs or government tenders) do not coincide. It is in the affective force of an abstraction such as “the People” that a valency will tend towards equivalence rather than difference.
contradictions, but is more usefully seen, as I argue in my conclusion, as a complex and simultaneous articulation of chains of difference and equivalence, each articulation presuming aspects of identity of the putative addressee, and binding the group within shifting boundaries and frontiers.

This narrative may be termed a “Do-It-Yourself” (DIY) narrative, which accepts a marginalised ontology of “We’re on our own”, which is articulated not in a discourse of victimisation, as one might expect in that it would be congruent with the discursive articulations that are established in relation to farm murders, but rather in a discourse of self-sufficiency: “We can do it”.

This DIY narrative is by turns celebratory, combative, accommodating or evangelical. Celebration (of the language) is a salient theme in features on writers, for example Fanie de Villiers, alias “Kleinboer/Peasant or small farmer” (November 17, p. 9, December 5, p. 15) who is described by fellow writer and singer Koos Kombuis as not only a “ware boer/true boer” but as “dubbel en dwars geanker in sy Afrikaanse verlede/anchored through-and-through in his Afrikaans past”, Breyten Breytenbach (January 30, 2013, p. 15), Eugene Marais (November 26, p. 9), Deon Opperman (November 19, p. 11) and Herman Charles Bosman (November 26, p. 9, November 28, p. 23)202, who, although he wrote in English, is claimed in the features as “Afrikaans” in the context of a new Afrikaans translation of his work.

The celebratory element is also evident in news stories: an Afrikaans-pride march to the Voortrekker Monument (November 2, p. 3, and p. 1 teaser), an Afrikaans-speaking U.S. senator (November 8, p. 3), Afrikaans schools topping the matric results list (January 14, p. 2), the Stellenbosch “Woordfees/Word festival” drawing 200 writers (January 21, p. 8). It is further evident in ongoing columns and features on the state of the language and cultural organizations: for example, on November 7, Danny Titus, on leader page (p. 12) considers the growth of the language among black speakers, while on the Opp-ed page (p.

---

202 All these features are given pride of place on the Opp-ed page, which often showcases Afrikaans literature.
13), Tim du Plessis, a former *Beeld* editor, celebrates its “vitality”. On November 20, Opp-ed (p. 11) is devoted to a feature, written by two leaders of the FAK (*Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge*203), about the proliferation of Afrikaans organisations, and which argues that Afrikaans pride is a means to an end, through which Afrikaners should establish a “true community of communities”. The imagined community here is a linguistic one, and the article does not propose a way of establishing a community of communities within a plurality of languages and cultures.

The combative element is evident in a main leader page column, “Afrikaans sal ’n faait posit/Afrikaans will put up a fight” (November 17, p. 8), and implicit in, for example, an Opp-ed feature on the state of the language, “Toekoms lê by spekers van die taal/Future lies with the speakers of the language” (December 19, p. 15). Both these articles establish an imperative of survival. The former emphasises survival over “purity” through rendering the English word “fight” into Afrikaans, which further suggest that the fight is not likely to follow Queensberry rules. The latter, while stating in a sub-head that “Afrikaans is g’n in ’n krisis nie/Afrikaans is in no way in a crisis”, argues that its “beste opsie vir oorlewing /best chance of survival” lies in linguistic pluralism.

The element of accommodation is evident in the FAK feature of November 20, and in the news (November 29, p. 2) and features (November 29, p. 19 and November 30, p. 14) on the death of Jakes Gerwel which emphasise his contribution to non-racialism (as well as his Afrikaans-ness).

Finally, the element of linguistic evangelism is evident in, again the FAK’s promotion of a “community of communities” (November 20, p. 11), and the Herman Charles Bosman feature (November 28, p. 23) which asserts in its headline that “Afrikaans is die taal van Afrika/Afrikaans is the language of Africa”, and an Opp-ed feature (January 9, p. 15), headlined “Tale as bates bestuur/Languages managed as assets”, in which the chairperson of the “Afrikaanse Taalraad/Afrikaans Language Board”204, Michael le

---

203 See Glossary.
204 See Glossary.
Cordeur, argues that languages should be promoted as an economic and cultural asset and as a means to “reach across cultures and strengthen nation-building”.

(c) Livelihood

Affirmative Action is presented as a manifest threat to the employment prospects of whites, particularly in the civil service and parastatals which were once the strongholds of white job reservation. Court challenges against the practice are often launched by Solidarity, a formerly white union which, although it does take on some issues that have a broad resonance, such as the e-tolling system in Gauteng province, is mostly associated with furthering white rights in general and Afrikaner rights in particular. An exemplary case, which Beeld has followed assiduously from the outset, and which was in 2014 defeated in the Constitutional Court, is that of SA Police Service Captain Renate Barnard, who was passed over for promotion due to the police force’s racial equity policies and procedures. It is given prominent exposure on November 3, when it is flagged by a Page 1 plug and the story dominates Page 4, and on December 14, when it leads Page 20. In the former, she is cast as a campaigner for white rights against Affirmative Action, and as paying a high personal cost for her principles, while the latter headlines Solidarity as criticising the discrimination against her as “blatantly racist”. The theme of job exclusion is picked up on January 30 with a Page 13 lead on Higher Education Minister Blade Nzimande - who has previously (November 2, p. 6) been highlighted as threatening “Afrikaans” universities - as criticising the professions for “keeping blacks out”.

This theme of limiting employment extends to other areas in which revenue to whites or Afrikaners in particular (or among others) is threatened. For example, the Page 7 lead of November 19 deals with amendments to the Broad Economic Empowerment legislation which would curtail donations to “white” charities, while the Page 2 leads on November 2 and December 21 deal with the “pittance” paid to Transnet pensioners. While the “victims” are from all race groups, those presented in the stories are Afrikaners, who would have been beneficiaries of the National Party government’s preferential

205 See Glossary.
employment policies. The headline on the December 21 story, “VF+ pak Transnet/FF+ tackles Transnet”, further establishes clearly that it is a “white”, Afrikaner opposition party that is championing the cause against not only the parastatal but the ANC too, which is accused by one pensioner (November 2) as preferring that the beneficiaries “would just die” as they are a liability to the state. The “maladministration” of R90 billion in the Transnet pension fund is the subject of an ongoing legal challenge. The prejudicial dispensation portrayed by the Transnet story is underscored on December 21 by a second lead about the “unfair dismissal” of an official with 30 years’ service by Armscor206 (another parastatal), for being “too strict”, a case taken up by Solidarity207.

Coverage of the farmworkers’ strike in the Western Cape winelands draws together a range of threats, from physical danger, damage to property, loss of earnings, wage policy impact on profits, and state assault on free enterprise208, all of which are seen to undermine the economic survival of, primarily, the farmers, but also of the farmworkers themselves, and ultimately of the country.

These relations of consequence and interdependence are made explicit in copy, but they extend beyond the ontic to the phenomenal. The location of the strike has particular resonance. De Doorns, where the strike started and spread from, is located in the winelands region of the Western Cape which is broadly known as the “Boland”. It is associated with early Dutch and Huguenot settlement, which is seminal to the Afrikaner myth of origin. Its cultural significance is captured by the folksong, “My hart verlang na die Boland”, whose lyrics tell of home and longing and whose imagery (“My hart verlang

See Glossary.
207 Between the two issues, the quoted authority bodies are Afriforum, Solidarity and Freedom Front Plus, all three associated with championing Afrikaner rights.
208 This theme also finds expression in coverage of mine conflict, for example “Staat dreig Anglo/State threatens Anglo” (January 16, P. 1 lead), and is subjected to similar criticism on the leader page, where former editor Tim du Plessis (January 18, p. 14), in an analysis of the likely effect of Cyril Ramaphosa’s appointment as Deputy President (“Dit kan Cyril nie vir SA lever nie/This Cyril can not do for SA”), compares it to Apartheid prime minister B.J. Vorster using his foreign minister, Pik Botha to “repaint ugly apartheid’s house”, and concludes that “he (Ramaphosa) can’t make disappear that the ANC doesn’t know how a modern economy works”. The thrust of this argument is present, too, on the facing Opp-ed page lead about the farm strikes, “Wanhoop ontplaf/Despair explodes”, by the head of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (the Afrikaans Chamber of Commerce), Christo van der Rheede, who argues that “rather than try to destroy successful farmers” (i.e. by raising the minimum wage), the state should use a multi-pronged strategy through health, education and broad economic policy to address the workers’ plight.
na die Boland/Waar die blou blou berge troon/Waar reuse kranse en klowe/Hulle trots en skoonheid toon 209) reflects that of the opening verse of “Die Stem” (“Uit die blou van onse hemel, uit die diepte van ons see/Oor ons ewige gebergtes, waar die Kranse antwoord gee”210), which is the remnant that has been incorporated in the new national anthem.

The Boland was also the base of the agrarian capital that funded the early Cape National Party and Die Burger, it was the home of D.F. Malan, the first NP prime minister, and the post-1994 “Taaldebat/Language Debate211” has been most fiercely fought there, at Stellenbosch University212, where H.F. Verwoerd was a lecturer.

The strike213 had started in August with small groups of farmworkers walking off the job, but it received no mention. From November 1 to 13, it still received no mention in Beeld, even though during this period the strike had intensified -8 000 workers were on strike in De Doorns and the Hex River Valley; the N1 highway to Johannesburg had been blocked, the labour dispute resolution body - the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration - had been called in to negotiate; the Premier of the Western Cape, Helen Zille, had had to be escorted to safety after being stoned at De Doorns; some farmers had left their farms; protesters had been arrested; and the minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Tina Joemat-Pettersson had convened meetings on the matter.

The consideration here is not so much why the issue was being ignored, or how other news was being prioritised (although the question might well be asked why rhino poaching continued to receive steady coverage). It is, rather, to illustrate how this tabula

209 “My heart yearns for the Boland/Where the blue blue mountains tower/Where giant crags and gorges/Their pride and beauty show”.

210 The national anthem of Apartheid South Africa, “Die Stem” translates as The Voice and The Vote. Its opening verse translates as “From the blue of our heaven, from the deep of the sea/Over our eternal mountain ranges, where the crags give answer (echo)”.

211 The Taaldebat is a vigorous debate among Afrikaners about the role of Afrikaans and especially whether it should be the sole or main medium of instruction at universities such as Stellenbosch and Pretoria which were formerly citadels of Afrikanerdom where Afrikaans was the sole medium.

212 The November 17 (p. 7) story, “Stellenbosch nou in oproeriges se visier/Stellenbosch nou in the sights of the protesters”, dramatises the onslaught on the historical heartland of Afrikanerdom.

213 The strikers were calling for an increase in daily wages from ZAR69 to between ZAR150 and ZAR250. In February 2013 government set the new minimum wage for farmworkers at R105 per day.
rasa presents no immediately available possibilities for variable articulations once the issue does finally receive attention, when the labour protest erupts in mass action on November 13 that stretches beyond the De Doorns area throughout the Western Cape. *Beeld* reports this on November 14, as a Page 4 lead\(^{214}\), under the headline “Lof vir stakers: Minister salueer hul ‘brawe sege’/Praise for strikers: Minister salutes their ‘brave victory’”, accompanied by a photograph of toyi-toyiing strikers brandishing sticks at farmers in the foreground\(^{215}\), and a map with flame graphics marking all the towns where protests had taken place, including those such as Malmesbury, Lourensford, Wellington and Worcester where no violence had been reported at all.

The strike package includes two sidebars\(^{216}\), one in the gutter\(^{217}\) at the top of the page, headlined “Boere lei DA in W-Kaap; leier soos bobbejaan/Farmers head (lead) the DA in W-Cape: leader like a baboon”, and one below this headlined “Verhoog dié lone, vra Zille/Raise these wages, requests Zille”.

The subject of an ongoing strike and workers’ demands for higher wages (on the basis that first, the legislated minimum wage is not a livable wage, and so should be recalibrated, and second, farmers should be paying more regardless since wages are both too low and they are wealthy and can afford it), makes its first appearance in *Beeld* with government (Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Joemat-Pettersson) congratulating and supporting strikers - who are presented as violent and destructive - against farmers. The intro describes the strike as spreading; the second paragraph lists incidents of damage to farms, sheds and vineyards; and the third announces the

\(^{214}\) The Page 1 lead on this day, November 14, is of stolen art works being found, which is an example of the narrative of loss being articulated through assaults on heritage, as I explain later in this chapter.

\(^{215}\) The photograph is shot from a low angle, which captures the bare calves of two farmers who are wearing shorts and ankle-boots, against a solid mass of protesters in the background. The frame does not show if there were other farmers present, and the caption offers no information on the standoff that has been photographed beyond to say that the demand of these particular strikers in Lourensford is for R250 per day and that they had blocked entry to the area’s wine farms. The impression is of a minority (white farmers, apparently unarmed), facing a group who in the context of the rest of the package are represented as a threatening, possibly violent, mob. I do not know if the photograph appears as originally framed by the photographer, or whether it has been cropped to accentuate the impression that has been created.

\(^{216}\) See Glossary.

\(^{217}\) See Glossary.
consolidation of a coalition of Cosatu\textsuperscript{218}, farmworkers’ unions and community organisations who declare in a press statement quoted in the story, that “It is time we stood together and showed farmers how much power and strength we have. We have the ability to bring the whole fruit and wine industry to a halt.” In paragraph 9 (out of 14) Joemat-Pettersson congratulates strikers for their “brave victory” (two sentences later she cautions against burning down farms). The next paragraph quotes a “heartbroken” farmer, by name, whose shed, office, cars and forklift had been set alight. No farmworkers are interviewed. The specific reason for the strike is mentioned only in passing by Joemat-Pettersson who hints at a new wage deal of R150 per day.

The issue is therefore presented as a broad range of forces, including government, organised labour and community\textsuperscript{219} organisations, lined up against farmers who are being victimised. The story is not framed as an overt conflict between labour and capital, nor does it suggest that the underlying conflict is not in fact between labour and capital but between retail capital and productive capital in which the squeeze on profit margins places pressure on wages.

The main sidebar reinforces the theme of farmers as besieged, quoting the leader of the ANC in the Western Cape, Marius Fransman, and another ANC MP, as accusing the DA of colluding with delinquent farmers (who are accused of “shamefully” paying less than the minimum wage) to protect their interests, and that moreover the DA leadership in the area is made up of farmers (“boere”, a term that carries the weight of “Afrikaner” and “oppressor” in its meaning). The attack is therefore extended beyond farmers to the governing party in the province, the DA, as is portrayed by the national governing party, the ANC, as protecting “white” interests against those of “the People”. Again, the specific demands of the strikers are not explained, and no farmworkers, or community organisations or farmworkers’ unions are quoted on the subject, which in this sidebar is

\textsuperscript{218} See Glossary.

\textsuperscript{219} “Community”, in both pre-1994 and post-1994 usage, is a euphemism for “black”, as in black townships, black suburbs, black residents, as opposed to residents of “white” suburbs, who are less likely to be described as “community” than as suburbanites, or ratepayers, or residents. Current usage also carries the “Struggle” trace of community as the “ politicised oppressed”. 195
treated exclusively as a slanging match between political parties - the DA and the ANC, with a supporting quote from the Congress of the People (Cope)\textsuperscript{220}.

The second sidebar reinforces the party-political conflict, leading on Helen Zille requesting that President Jacob Zuma “order” the labour minister to start negotiations to increase the minimum wage, implicitly attributing the cause of the strike to government. This theme is reinforced by the two other bodies quoted in the story: AgriSA (formerly the SA Landbou Unie), whose president, Johannes Möller, argues that AgriSA has no authority to negotiate the setting of minimum wages, which is the jurisdiction of government, and TLU\textsuperscript{221} (formerly the Transvaalse Landbou-unie, but still known by the same initials), whose president, Louis Meintjes, laments that farmers are being held responsible for the “socio-social (sic: ‘sosio-sosiale’) problems of the country”. Zille’s overture in the headline is not supported by the authorities marshaled in the story who do not represent the interests of the farmworkers, whose interests Zille appears to be taking up. On the contrary, however, she argues not for a livable wage as such, or as a means to alleviate the conditions over which the farmworkers are protesting, but as a necessary means to prevent the “consequences of the current crisis” to the economies of the region, the province and the country.

In a three-quarter page spread (on a page without adverts) on a strike that has received no previous coverage and which has escalated into violence, there is no summary of grievances, no direct presentation or explanation of demands, and no presentation of or quote by a farmworker as a person or as a worker\textsuperscript{222}. The basis of the strike (whether viewed as an economic demand expressed in rands, or a social demand, if also expressed in rands\textsuperscript{223}) is subordinated throughout by the discourses of politics, and violence,

\textsuperscript{220} See Glossary.
\textsuperscript{221} See Glossary.
\textsuperscript{222} In the case of a dramatic, unheralded or unexpected event, it could be argued that there was too little time or too few reporters to develop a comprehensive package. That does not apply here. The strike had been going on for nearly three months (albeit fitfully), and had already escalated into violence and spread to numerous areas by the first week of November.
\textsuperscript{223} See Glossary.
locating it ultimately in a power play between the ANC national government ("their government") and the DA provincial government ("our government").

After giving the strike secondary treatment on November 14, the next day the entire front page and three-quarters of Page 4 are devoted to it. The lead headline "Krisis in Landbou/Crisis in agriculture" is dropped in over a photograph of a burning packing shed in Wolseley, which dominates the page.

Two sidebars appear above the Front Page fold on November 15. The bottom one reinforces the dominant theme established in the previous day’s reporting: “‘Dit is alles politiek’”/“It is all politics”. The quote is by Pieter Mulder, in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Agriculture (he is also the leader of the Freedom Front Plus Party). He attributes the “Marikana” climate in the Western Cape to the power struggle between the ANC and the DA for control of the Western Cape, underpinned by a fragmenting Cosatu trying to shore up its support. The substantive issue of wages is not mentioned, and (in only the fourth paragraph) it is instead portrayed by him as a question of “the relationship between farmers and farmworkers”.

The theme of victimisation which was also established in the November 14 coverage, dramatically reinforced by the lead photo-headline package, is extended in the main sidebar: “Daar is nie geld nie/There is no money” (above a photo of armed police in riot position). It refers not to the farmworkers, but to farmers, who according to the Agri SA

---

224 ANC Western Cape leader Marius Fransman is quoted in the sidebar referred to above as being aggrieved that it is to “my own government” that he has to appeal to help the farmworkers, in a story in which farmers are explicitly portrayed as having “their” government in the DA, reinforced in the second sidebar in which the DA, TLU and AgriSA all argue that it is up to government to help farmworkers, through legislation, which removes all responsibility for wage levels from farmers. Read against this, the lead headline on the page lends itself most to being interpreted as meaning the government is ganging up with “them” against “us”, where a metonymic relation is established between farmer and reader. The lead on the “Sake24/Business24” business section (p. 19), (which falls outside the ambit of my research data but which I am compelled to refer to in this case) extends this rhetorical displacement. Under the headline “SA kan wrange vrugte verwag/SA can expect bitter fruit (a bitter harvest)”, the article warns of the economic harm of the strike to the country and the disadvantage that local fruit farmers will now suffer in relation to international farmers. In this metonym, the farmers are the economy, and the economy is the country (SA). Government, the ANC, organised labour, workers, community organisations would, through this metonymic logic, be located rhetorically as being other than the country, and therefore as undermining “SA”.

225 See Glossary.
president, pay ZAR13 billion in wages annually out of bankloans. He estimates that an extra ZAR10 per month would add up to an addition of ZAR1,5 billion to farmers’ costs, which is “unmanageable”.

While the photo of a burning shed dominates Page 1 (November 15), the main report on the strike, headlined “Minimum loon word wel hoër/Minimum wage will indeed be higher”, appears below the fold. A secondary photo is of burning packing crates, and the day’s damage is listed in bullet-points next to it. The strike is now described as a “runaway fire” that has claimed two victims: a young farmworker who is killed as police shoot at a group of strikers, and an elderly farmer, who is assaulted by strikers but survives. The farmworker is named, and is allocated one sentence. The farmer, too, is named, and in four paragraphs his attack is first described, and then elaborated on by the Western Cape commercial agriculture union. However, the angle of the story (to which the first three paragraphs of the 22 paragraph story are devoted), is that a deal brokered by Cosatu with employers to suspend the strike pending wage negotiations has been announced by the Acting Minister of Labour, Angie Motshekga. The rest of the story reports on the casualties and damage (12 paragraphs), Helen Zille warning the province “stands on the brink of total anarchy” and calling for military intervention, which is rebuffed by government, and Agri SA saying that farmers had not budgeted for any proposed wage increases.

The inside spread (November 15, p. 4) leads, “Loonsubsidie vir plaaswerk gevra/Wage subsidy for farmwork requested”, quoting the Agri SA president explaining why a minimum wage increase would be unaffordable and that therefore the only solution to the “problem” is for government to subsidise it. No other sources are quoted, no cost breakdown is provided except for a concluding comment that low profit margins are largely due to labour costs, and no wage figures are mentioned. The photograph above the lead (which heads the page) is of a photographer for Die Burger whose nose is bleeding from being struck by a stone thrown by protesters, and a sidebar reports on the strike’s disruption of schooling. Two secondary stories, “ANC steun die stakendes op

226 See Glossary.
ANC supports the strikers on farms”, and below it “Swak politieke bestuur skaad SA ekonomie/Poor political leadership harms SA economy”, reinforce themes established the previous day, that is ruling party backing for strikers against farmers, and politics “sacrificing” the economic viability of agriculture (and mining) by rendering them marginal through the adoption of onerous minimum wage determinations.

By the next day, November 16, the issue has moved off the front page, but dominates pages 6 and 7 as well as leader page, in the form of the editorial opinion and a main column by then-chief political reporter Jan-Jan Joubert. Page 6 leads on Helen Zille attacking an anonymous phone text message and a statement by Cosatu’s Western Cape leader, that farms would be turned into another “Marikana”, and introduces, for the first time, an attempt to humanise the conflict in two equal-sized panels alongside the lead package.

One (at the top of the column), headlined “Week se loon ná ’n dag op/Week’s wages gone in a day”, is an interview with a female farmworker, who remains anonymous out of fear of dismissal. Wages, she says, go towards food, electricity, crèche fees, doctor’s fees and domestic help, with none left for luxuries. Employment is described as precarious, subject to the whim of the farmer, whom workers call “baas/boss”. It is not clear if she is a striker or supports the strike, and the tenor of the article casts her more as a consumer (with its positive affective loading) than as a “worker” (which is negatively loaded). She earns ZAR69 per day.

The second panel is an interview with a farmer, headlined “Ons slaap met een oog oop/We sleep with one eye open”, in which fears about security and the employment of extra guards is emphasised. He expresses “sympathy” with workers “who want to work”. He describes the damage caused to his farm by the strike, and while not averse to a wage increase to ZAR80 per day, he concludes that this would lead to restructuring and the dismissal of “weaker workers”.

---

227 See Glossary.
Both stories emphasise the fearfulness of the two subjects, one fearing the strikers, the other the farmers.

The full-page spread, under a page label “Landbou-krisis/Farming (agriculture) crisis”, is rounded off by a sidebar to the lead in which the TLU urges farmers no longer to house workers on their farms, and an anchor in which Solidarity accuses Joemat-Pettersson of encouraging violence and breeding “a climate of violent anarchy”.

The lead on the opposite page, “Loonverhoging lang proses/Raising wages a long process”, casts doubt on government promises to raise the minimum wage by year-end, offering an interpretation of the lengthy procedures required by law. The story also presents some details of what the law stipulates in relation to permissible deductions from wages.

The leader page (p. 14) presents the first opinion and analysis of the strike. The leading article, “ANC kraai oor onrus in Wes-Kaap/ANC crows over unrest in Western Cape”, directs its criticism at President Jacob Zuma and the ANC for taking pleasure in the upheavals of the strike, and berates Zuma for his lack of statesmanship, his absence at times of conflict (including Marikana), and his lack of leadership in not defusing the tension. The view is illustrated by the cartoon on the leader page, in which Zuma pats an elephant (which is dubbed “Western Cape labour unrest”, and is a pun on the name of the Labour Minister, Mildred Oliphant) for overturning a car out of which Zille crawls.

Joubert’s leader page column, “Die versluierde landboustryd/The murky battle of agriculture”, pulls together the threads of argument articulated by the Freedom Front Plus, Solidarity, Agri SA, TLU and the DA, concluding that “Om ons land skade aan te doen is maklik en dis wat Fransman en die vakbonde gedoen het/To harm the country is

---

228 The term “unrest” has a long history in South Africa. It is not a neutral term for turmoil, but was under Apartheid the official euphemism for political action, whether in the form of protests or acts of aggression or defence. Where other terms from the period, such as “terrorist”, have largely disappeared from the political lexicon, “unrest” has continued to be used by journalists as if the rules of style have not been modified.
easy, and that is what Fransman and the unions have done". The conflict is characterised as being between labour and agriculture, with the qualifier that the seasonal workers, who are at issue, are only a small fraction of farm labour, but who nevertheless represent the potential to ignite “unrest” among the “shantytown poor”. The solution to contain this “unrest” is for these workers to be unionised, for farmers not to be “emotional” and to get “more involved” in combating poverty in their immediate surrounds, and for politicians to exercise “true leadership”. Although there is an acknowledgment that South Africa “is one of the most unequal societies in the world”, this structural issue is sidestepped in attributing the “unrest” to the grievances of a specific “small minority”, which are stoked by the ANC, labour and government. The substantive problem is identified not as inequality (except in passing), but as the “unrest”, and the “solution” is framed as defusing this “unrest” through political good leadership, and a beneficent voluntarism on the part of farmers. Goodwill, then, is presented as the mechanism by which the structural contradiction between workers and farmers is addressed to promote social harmony, and the propensity to goodwill is seen as manifestly absent within the leadership of the provincial ANC and Cosatu.

The themes and framework established in 20 articles over three days are maintained in coverage of the strike throughout November, December and January, coverage which is interspersed with articles on farm murders, as mentioned above. The final article on the subject during the period under analysis is the lead on January 30, “Boere het nie R105/Farmers do not have R105” (Appendix 10), which quotes only the position of commercial agriculture on the impending revised minimum wage, in a reprisal of the November 15 front page headline quote from Agri SA (“Daar is nie geld nie/There is no money”).

---

229 The refrain of poor leadership is again presented, this time in relation to Labour Minister Mildred Olifant, in Joubert’s leader page column of January 11 (p. 10).
230 The theme of beleaguered farmers is articulated in different discourses apart from those of politics, labour and violence, notably that of farm murders. Joubert’s column is an attempt to articulate it in a discourse of “nation-building”, the fragility of which is apparent in a story of farmers leaving to farm elsewhere in Africa (November 20, p. 2), which inevitably invokes the myth of the Great Trek and its rejection of the unfair/illegitimate strictures of the British colonial government.
(d) Collapse of politics and institutions

The undermining of livelihoods is attributed, as described in the section above, to inadequate policy frameworks and inappropriate political conduct. This section seeks not to evaluate policy or politics and their “correctness” or otherwise, but to consider the manner in which “disorder” is represented through coverage of the ANC, as the governing party, and the institutions of state\(^{231}\).

The ANC is consistently portrayed as unable to govern (for example in its inability to fight crime or implement appropriate economic frameworks), malicious towards whites (for example in contesting the court challenges to Affirmative Action, and defending the song “Shoot the boer”, and in its changes to the institutional role of Afrikaans), corrupt (for example in the arms deal), and subverting due process (for example in “rigging” the Seriti Commission of Inquiry into the arms deal\(^{232}\)). Its inability to govern the country represents, then, a general threat to its inhabitants (at least according to the worldview presented in Beeld, which tends not to cover the constituency that benefits from social grants, protection from eviction and so on).

Furthermore, the ANC is portrayed as unable to govern itself.

Two Front Page leads illustrate this. “ANC stry, DA gaps toppos/ANC quarrels, DA nicks (snatches) top post” (November 23, p. 1) reports how in-fighting in the ANC in the Tlokwe municipality, in which one faction had tabled a motion of no-confidence in the mayor which allowed the DA candidate to be voted in. The story is largely technical in describing how the ANC was outmanoeuvred in the voting process, noting that it would regain the leadership within three months. The ANC admits to being “shamed”, while the DA emphasises conciliation: “Ons wil versoenend wees/We want to be conciliatory”.

However, the report offers no information on the source of the dispute within the ANC,

\(^{231}\) These representations of disorder are articulated most clearly within a Settler narrative which “…remains important due to its role in structuring the inherited institutions and practices of the transition.” (Alden & Anseeuw, 2009, p. 29).

\(^{232}\) See Glossary.
whether it related to municipal affairs, and nor is the DA’s position on any substantive municipal affairs reflected. Only in the 16th paragraph (out of 18) is it suggested (by the deposed mayor himself) that the no-confidence motion was “about questions such as an overseas trip, a jazz festival and an airport built near the city” - in other words, corruption. The dysfunctionality of the ANC is presented as total, as opposed to, for example framing the issue as ANC members taking action against corruption. The use of “gaps/nick (snatch)” in the headline is gleeful in tone, suggesting a supportive representation of a victorious David (DA) against the ANC’s Goliath.

The next Front Page lead about the ANC is on December 15, on the eve of the party’s important Mangaung policy congress, and the first time the conference makes it to the front page. It is headlined “ANC in chaos” (Appendix 7), and reports on a court ruling that the Free State ANC Congress was illegal, and therefore its policies (including the selection of delegates to Mangaung) invalid. The impact of this on the Mangaung congress, in particular the balance of votes for Zuma to retain his presidency, is speculated on by political commentators. The gravity of the “chaos” is declared in the concluding paragraphs of the story, where “ANC politics” is shown to be “deadly”: “The potentially deadly nature of ANC politics in Northwest was again highlighted yesterday when a regional secretary of the party, Oubuti Chika, was shot dead in front of his house in Klerksdorp, two weeks after a failed assassination attempt in Mahikeng on the sacked ANC provincial secretary, Kabelo Mataboge.” The “motive” for the murder (for which no arrests have been made and no suspects named) is provided by “Friends, family and colleagues, who “believe (Chika’s) death was a political assassination connected to the extreme faction-fighting233 within the ANC in the Northwest”.

The following three editions – whose front page lead headlines are “Cyril wys sy kaarte/Cyril shows his cards” (December 17, see Appendix 11), “Zuma-ses in

---

233 “Faction-fighting”, like “unrest”, has its own particular history in the lexicon of political euphemisms. During the colonial period, it was used to refer to fights between and within tribes, in either case not necessarily threatening to the settlers. In the latter period of the liberation struggle, prior to 1994, “faction-fighting” was used in much the same way, meaning what officials tended to refer to as “black-on-black” violence (in the civil war in KwaZulu-Natal, for example, where state support was channelled through Inkatha in hostilities with ANC-aligned groupings), that was not directed at the regime, or at whites.
*pylvak/Zuma-six in the lead*” (December 18), and “*Cyril versterk rand*/Cyril strengthens rand” (December 19) - focus on Cyril Ramaphosa’s candidacy for deputy president of SA, and the likely victory of Zuma and his supporters in the party leadership election.

The coverage of Mangaung is concluded on December 21, lead headlined “*Dag van die lang messe*/Day of the long knives”, which, drawing heavily on war imagery (as in the opening sentence of the intro, “*Dit was a slagting*/It was slaughter”) reports on Zuma’s purge of his critics from the National Executive Committee of the ANC.

This metaphorical slaughter, in which procedures of election and appointment are represented as violent and lethal (and in which the president is the one holding the knife), contrasts with the reporting on the arrest of right-wing “Boerevolk” members over a plot to bomb the ANC congress. The first report, a single-column sidebar alongside the December 17 lead, “*Cyril wys sy kaarte*”, is headlined “*Plofplan vir ANC se tent: 7 in arres*/Plot to blow up ANC tent: 7 in custody”. The balance of newsworthiness is between a candidate for the deputy-presidency accepting his nomination, on the one hand, and on the other a bomb plot against the ANC leadership. The bomb plot headline makes no reference to the politics of the bombers, who are identified as “*regses/rightwingers*” in the intro, and the target of the bombing is presented as an inanimate “tent”, rather than its occupants. If this naming is metonymic, it serves not to emphasise but to soften the import of the plot. The follow-up story the next day occupies the same top-right position of the page, but now across two columns, next to the lead “*Cyril versterk rand*”. It is headlined “*Regses wou ANC-Hoës in slag uitwis*/Rightwingers wanted to wipe out ANC leadership in attack”. Only in the second paragraph is it stated that part of the plot was to shoot “Zuma, ministers and other ANC leaders at close range”.

I suggest that a number of things are happening here. The first is that, in a frame of grievability, the threatened assassination of this president (ie Zuma), is a threat deemed of lesser import to the health of the country than the Ramaphosa nomination, whose “positive” loading lies in its mitigation of Zuma’s leadership and its deleterious effects. Secondly, because of the historical synonymousness of “boer” and “Afrikaner”, giving the story a secondary positioning minimises the weight given to the threat and thereby serves to defuse the antagonism contained in the right/white/Afrikaner thread of
association. A third element, which incorporates the first two, is that a chain of
equivalence is being articulated between Ramaphosa (as opposed to Zuma) as a herald of
economic health (with the rand as metonymic for “the country”), and a consensus of
reasonableness in which the newspaper places itself and its reasonable readers.

Policy matters are relegated to inside pages, except in one case (“Cyril versterk rand”), in
which Ramaphosa is viewed as “good for business” (and, in this, an antidote to Zuma),
and the lead story speculates that the ANC is to abandon its proposals to nationalise
industry, which is reflected in a sub-heading. However, Ramaphosa, even though he is
represented in a “positive” light, serves not to illustrate a revitalisation of the ANC, but
more as window-dressing which accentuates that which it covers, as Tim du Plessis
concludes in his leader page analysis of Ramaphosa (January 8, p. 14). The faint ray of
new hope that Ramaphosa might otherwise represent in the affairs and policies of the
ANC is offset by the consistent representation of it as an organisation that is violent,
corrupt, undemocratic and anti-democratic\(^{234}\), an ethos that percolates through the
broader political system\(^{235}\). (See Appendix 5 in which the ANC delegates are
characterised as fatcats).

\(^{234}\) The “potentially deadly nature of ANC politics” is described above as manifested in the murder of rivals
in local government, and figuratively by “purges” of Zuma rivals, both suggestive of an undemocratic ethos
within the organisation. It is also represented as anti-democratic or politically intolerant as in, for example,
the report (November 3, p. 2 lead) on ANC members preventing a DA tour of Zuma’s Nkandla estate, the
subject of an investigation into corruption in state spending.

\(^{235}\) Two examples serve to illustrate the causative link between the ANC’s corruption/ineptitude and the
subversion of public process and institutions. One is the arms deal, in which ANC leaders, including Zuma,
stand accused of personal enrichment through bribery, and the allegations that the Seriti Commission of
Inquiry, set up to probe the allegations, is being subverted through ANC interference to produce a finding
that there was no wrong-doing: “Wapens: Klad op panel/Weapons: Stain on panel” (January 17, p. 1 lead.
See Appendix 8), “Getuies kry koue voete/Witnesses get cold feet” (January 18, p. 1 lead. See Appendix 9),
and “Wapens: getuies in duister/Weapons: Witnesses in the dark” (January 19, p. 5 lead). A second is the
Marikana massacre, where the killings are presented as the result not only of police incompetence and
callousness (“Njalaas ry glo oor myners/Njalas allegedly rode over miners” (November 16, p. 5 lead),
“Polisie skiet nou, vra later/Police shoot now, ask later” (November 20, p. 7 lead)), but also of political
pressure from the ANC and business, and where the judicial Commission of Inquiry into the massacre is
being undermined by the police: “Polisie peuter/Police tampering” (November 6, p. 1 lead). Political
pressure is most strongly suggested by allegations by the lawyers for the relatives of the miners of
Ramaphosa’s role in the matter.
(e) Disorder and protest

Not only, then, does the centre not hold (in the form of the ANC as the ruling party), but its unraveling is presented as bringing disorder to every facet of social life. The state, here, is conjoined not with “the People”, but with the ANC’s self-interest, both placed in opposition to those of “the People”, however defined. This opposition is visible in the form of public protests, some of which are “peaceful”, as in the case of so-called “e-tolling”, while others are violent and destructive. Service delivery protests fall into the latter category, exacerbating the level of disorder caused by the state.

One such example that is given extensive coverage is street protests in Sasolburg. “Oproer chaos in Sasol strate/Riot chaos in Sasol” (January 21, p. 1 lead) establishes the protests as “riotous”, widespread and violent, in which residents, property and the police are being targeted. Since there has been no prelude to these protests, their origin is not immediately apparent, and it is not until the sixth paragraph of the lead that the reader learns they are in response to a government proposal to amalgamate two municipalities, but the basis of the objection is not reported. The protests warrant two more Front Page leads: “Sasol wil vrede nie vertrou/Sasol dares not trust peace” (January 23), and “Polisie smoor oproer/Police quell riot” (January 24). Residents are reported to be mistrustful of both government and police, whose actions in Zamdela township of Sasolburg are likened to “Marikana”, which, as in the case of De Doorns, has come to stand as the symbol of the iron-fisted abuse of power. The page 4 headlines on January 22, “Honderde plunder drankwinkel/Hundreds loot bottle store” and “Polisielede aangeval: twee beseer/Police members attacked: two injured”, present the protest as generalised, random and criminal, while the Page 9 lead on the same day (January 22) underlines the extent of protests (“one every two days”) under successive ANC governments: “Betogings eis 181 sedert ’99/Protests claim 181 since ’99”.

These protests are identified as related mainly to “service delivery”, a catch-all category that covers anything from specifically political protests, to the slow pace of the extension
of services such as sewerage, water and electricity, to the poor maintenance of service infrastructure, to charges related to these services.

To the extent that these service-delivery protests are identified as violent and destructive, they are articulated in a chain of difference. The demands behind the protests receive relatively little space or explanation, either in terms of the cost of living or the history of farm labour (or service delivery in a specific area) and the nature of political mobilisation among non-unionised labour or the unemployed. As in the case of De Doorns, an articulation is established between the protesters, poor governance, and government. In De Doorns the articulation occurs through the endorsement of what is a violent strike by ministers and regional ANC politicians, while a chain of equivalence is established between farmers, Afrikaans agricultural unions, the national economy and the dictates of the global economy, all of which are presented as being placed at risk by the strikers. In the case of service-delivery protests, no clear chain of equivalence emerges, but an identical chain of difference is established. Zuma (January 24, p. 2) is reported as telling delegates at an economic summit in Davos, Switzerland, that strikes and protests are “a normal part of democracy”, juxtaposed with a picture package on the same page of looting and secondary stories on rioting, a councillor and his family forced to flee, and police being prohibited from opening fire against petrol-bombers. The leading article (p. 16) criticises Zuma, again, for a lack of leadership which “forces” police to deal with “politically inspired protests”.

By contrast, the protests related to the e-tolling of traffic in Gauteng establishes an extensive chain of equivalence by articulating the interests of the “common person”, commuters, protesters, business, civic action groups (specifically Outa) and Cosatu, as well as Solidarity. The chain of difference is established through an articulation between the ANC, national government, local government, “tenderpreneurs” and their international consortium partners in the e-tolling venture, and Sanral (South African National Roads Agency Limited), the parastatal that manages the country’s roads network.
E-tolling, the electronic tolling of motorists in Gauteng province, is presented as not only a question of the public being fleeced, but as embedded in what arms-deal activist Terry Crawford-Browne, in an op-ed article (January 24, p. 16), calls a “network of corruption”, including oil and arms deals, drivers’ licence contracts, Cell C, diamond and drug smuggling, money laundering and tollroads, with the ANC receiving a cut of all contracts. The chain of difference is articulated under this signifier of “corruption”.

Articulations in the chain of equivalence are established under the signifier of the “hard-pressed consumer”, which in turn signifies “the public”. An important extension of the chain of equivalence is achieved through the articulation of the element of “Cosatu”, an element that is usually countervalent to the equivalences established by Afrikaner discourses. For this to happen necessitates a disarticulation from the chain of difference to which Cosatu is articulated in the De Doorns discourse of dysfunction, for example, in which it is bound to the demonisation of the farm strikers (who are not represented as “hard-pressed consumers” but as “rioters”, in the same manner as the Sasolburg protesters are). The equivalence is established through an articulation with “civil society”, rendering the indexical signification of Cosatu as a “worker/labour” federation mute, and its alliance with the ANC moot. The trace of these associations is nevertheless carried through in the re-articulation, together with the implication that the protests against e-tolling are not limited to the affluent, or to whites. The equivalence extends the moral legitimacy of the protests, and all those it encompasses, against the “corrupt” political establishment.

Besides the “Cosatu” articulation, another important one is that of “David and Goliath”. In their role as a minority, Afrikaners, in their assertion of their rights (for example in AA cases, or in the “Shoot the boer” case), are portrayed, in Beeld, as the David to the State’s Goliath. And so it is in the e-tolls matter. While equivalences establish the range and depth of opposition, the stress is placed on the “Everyman”, the “little guy”, the David. The interview with the spokesperson of the anti-e-tolling organisation Outa (January 26, p. 9), highlights this symbolism in its headline, “David se slingervel woer/David’s sling

---

236 Cosatu is never cited in any of the stories in which white subjects launch rights challenges against Affirmative Action (for example policewoman Renate Barnard), where it is Solidarity that is held as a marker of authority.
whirrs”, evoking a justifiable, honourable combativeness that extends the sentiment of the December 14 lead headline, “Tol-stryd nou terug strate toe/Toll fight back to the streets”, in which street protests are urged by Cosatu general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi after a court dismissal of a challenge to the implementation of the tolls. In the extended chain of equivalence, affluent/white/minority is coupled with the general consumer and the general commuter in legitimate protest, as opposed to the violent protests of Sasolburg and De Doorns which are de-legitimised because of the harm they cause to “the economy”, if not to farmers and business.²³⁷

(f) Destruction of heritage

(f 1) Art

The themes of dysfunction, disorder and decay that are presented as destructive to the biological, ethnic, economic, social and political subject, are also presented as damaging the natural and cultural heritage, among others.²³⁸

The Front Page leads of November 12 (“Duur kuns geroof/Valuable art stolen”) and November 14 (“Kuns by kerk gevind/Art found at church”) report on the literal plunder of art heritage. The artists are largely from the colonial and Afrikaner tradition (Pierneef, Hugo Naude, Maggie Laubser, Irma Stern), with Gerard Sekoto the only black artist whose work was stolen. Crime and neglect come together in this story in the report (November 13, p. 4) that CCTV cameras at the museum from which the paintings had been stolen were out of order.

²³⁷ An articulation between Cosatu as “civil society” and general business is easier than between Cosatu as a labour federation representing the rights of “black” workers, and “boere” as representing agricultural business.

²³⁸ It is possible, for example, to view the built environment as part of the national heritage, but claimable as “white” or “Afrikaner” heritage where the buildings and infrastructure predate 1994. However, it falls more clearly under the category of municipal neglect of infrastructure. A report on potholes (December 1, p. 6), in which farmers (“boere”) volunteer (another manifestation of the “DIY discourse”) to repair potholes on a public road, brings together the themes of (past) heritage and (current) neglect, in that the road was built and maintained under Nationalist rule (Afrikaner political heritage) and is being allowed to collapse under the current dispensation. Potholes are a standard trope of official dysfunction in my local newspaper (The Witness) too, which, like Beeld, serves a largely suburban readership.
This theme, of the theft of heritage, also finds expression in the erosion of Afrikaans, as described earlier in this chapter.

(f 2) Natural heritage

The destruction of natural heritage is a theme that finds expression in the (mis)management of resources such as water, but most emotively in the destruction of wildlife, and of the rhino in particular.

(f 2.1) Water

Water is a resource whose relevance is most immediate to farmers, and so in some of the reporting it is articulated to a discourse of discrimination/victimization. For example, on November 21, page 6, farmers are presented as doubly beleaguered: the lead reports government plans to redirect water from irrigation for commercial (white, productive) farmers to “more strategic users”, or black, “emerging” (and as yet unproductive) farmers. The frame of discrimination is strengthened by the second lead, in which the Northern Cape government is criticized for not assisting farmers affected by “devastating” bush fires. The chains of equivalence and difference are articulated here in much the same way as in the De Doorns case.

However, water also represents a broader environmental and health issue, and is presented as a resource abused by both government and industry. It is “wasted”: a November 6 (p. 4) spread reports that 37% of the country’s water is “lost”, and that government admits that water-use legislation is “impossible to implement”. It is polluted by industry: The mining company ExxaroResources is reported as fighting a court case over poisoning water (November 28, p. 18), and on December 6 (p. 16) it is reported that a mine’s production is halted over community health fears, while 39 mines are operating without licences.
It is mismanaged by local authorities: In Ermelo, taps dry up because unmaintained pumps have broken down (December 12, p. 4), while, on the same page the Lichtenberg River is “immeasurably” polluted by sewage overflow. In Potchefstroom (December 19, p. 9) municipal water is contaminated by uranium; in Tshwane (January 31, p. 2) manganese is found in the water; in Rustenberg water has to be boiled (January 31, p. 2); while some areas (North West, Makhado) have no water at all (January 18, p. 8; and January 25, p. 8 respectively). In all cases (including those involving mines) responsibility is attributed either to national government and inappropriate policy and/or inadequate enforcement, or local government for poor monitoring and maintenance.

(f 2.2) Animals

![Bar Chart](image)

Figure 6: Number of stories in which animals (wild and domestic) are the subject of the story. The contrast is with the number of stories in which “black” people are the categorical subject of the story.

Animals, both as domestic pets and as wildlife, receive prominent coverage, as the subject of 199 stories (including 32 devoted to rhino poaching) over the period under study, during which there were only six editions in which there were no “animal stories”. By contrast, there were only 110 stories in which a black person was the subject of a story as a person (i.e. “human interest” stories as opposed to stories in which office
bearers, who are black, feature in the news), and in 19 editions there are no stories that fit this category.

Pets largely occupy a private, sentimental position, and stories about them generally appear in *Beeld* on Page 3 (a page generally devoted to the “private” realm), in what I call the “dog spot” in my data collection (Appendix 21). Wildlife command a sentimental spot too, but as part of the natural heritage of the country they also occupy a more public role which, I argue, is symbolic, and they serve, notably in the case of rhinos, as a proxy for whites in general, and for Afrikaners in particular, as an endangered species. Both are, at the same time, celebratable (it’s a stretch to say “lovable”) and therefore “grievable”.

*Beeld* readers are dog people, if the types of pet stories are anything to go by, and coverage tends to be anthropomorphic, as, for example, in the intro to the November 21, page 3 lead: “Jasper (10) - a once-lame sausage dog …”. The story is personalised in the same manner as “human interest” stories are: noting Jasper’s age emphasises the frailty of old age, the adjectival “once-lame” connotes triumph (he has regained mobility through being in a wheelchair), and the package is rounded off with two accompanying photographs. Where the *Sun* of London has its “Page 3 Girls” to bait its male readers, Page 3 in *Beeld* serves a more inward purpose, in that, through its “softer”, feelgood selection of stories, it represents, to borrow an image from Fred de Vries (2012), the hearth of the Afrikaner world (together with the more argumentative Leader and Opp-ed pages, which nevertheless strike a “fireside chat” tone). The story of Jasper the dog does not have to jostle with tales of misery and woe, but nestles instead in a more innocent world of hope, as suggested, perhaps, by being placed alongside a photograph of birds.

On November 29, this time on Page 6 (Page 3 is headed by a human hero, a champion boxer, who, being white, is a rare achiever in a field dominated by black athletes), there is a story about another dog, who needs a more comfortable wheelchair. On December 11, dogs are back on Page 3, with one story about Gauteng bylaws changing to allow dogs to bark (contrasted with the noise pollution story mentioned in the next section), and another of a car-driving dog in New Zealand. On December 20, the Page 3 lead deals with the
therapeutic value of dogs to those traumatised by the Newtown school shooting in America. The psychological theme is picked up on Page 8 (which is devoted entirely to animal stories: a rhino calf in distress following her mother’s poaching death; volunteers at a cat shelter; new zoo additions) with a story on dogs barking because they’re bored. On December 31, a Page 4 story at the top of the page deals with a dog, which “stood watch” over its dead mate along a highway, which has found “a new home”. The January 2 Front Page lead, on a disruptive New Year’s party, quotes a woman who “had to give her dog five sedatives” because of the noise. The story cross-refers to Page 3 (dominated by New Year’s babies), where a woman worries if her dog is “orrait”239 because of the fireworks, and Page 6, where a dog has impaled itself trying to escape the noise of fireworks.

Dogs are also an indicator of cruelty in crime stories. On November 27 (p. 5 lead), a family mourns the disappearance of their “beloved dog” after a break-in. On November 29 (p. 12 lead), robbers kill a man and his wife, drown their son in a boiling bath, and disembowel their dog. On January 4 (p. 2 lead), robbers shoot dead a man and his dog. On January 25 (p. 1 anchor), a sausage dog whose legs were broken by striking De Doorns farmworkers has to be put down, while the January 27 Page 1 anchor story deals with a dog “cut nearly in half” by a snare.

It is not surprising, then, that President Zuma should find himself in the dog box (See Appendix 4) over his comments that owning dogs is un-African and that it shows a “lack of humanity” to love dogs more than people” ("Pet dogs not for blacks _ Zuma", The Mercury, December 27, 2012). While Beeld does not carry the original report, it is quick to respond, with multiple stories on the issue on December 29. Page 3 leads with a story on young African women responding to Zuma’s criticism that weaves are “un-African (in the same speech as his comments on dog-ownership), and saying that they are African “no matter what hairstyles” they choose, a theme picked up in a leader page (p. 9) column, in which the same is argued for Afrikaners, that they are African regardless of their cultural or lifestyle choices.

239 “Orrait” is the Afrikaans slang corruption of the English expression, “All Right”, or “Okay”.

213
Zuma, in his utterances, establishes a frontier of antagonism by articulating a chain of difference under the cultural/racial signifier “African”, of which he himself (through his polygamy, Nkandla architecture, ceremonial dress of leopard skin) is an index. Whites (and Afrikaners, as manifest dog-lovers, are archetypal whites in this case), are marginalised as not only “un-African”, but implicitly in the criticism of those who have a “lack in humanity”, as “anti-African”.

A rearticulation of Afrikaners and dog-lovers in a chain of equivalence, is established in the republication, on Page 3 alongside the lead on weaves, of a 1961 photograph (and story) of Nelson Mandela and his dog. Mandela is a symbol not only of reconciliation, but of humanitarianism, and this moral valency allows for a re-articulation of the differential couplings already established in the De Doorns, e-tolling and ANC reports cited above.

(f 2.2.1) Rhinos

Like shooting the “boer”, the shooting of rhinos by poachers is given extensive coverage, with 32 stories (news, features and columns) on the topic over the 77 editions. See Appendix 24, 25, 26).

While dogs, as pets, occupy the private realm, rhinos, even when there are sentimental inflections, occupy the public realm, and they are a symbolic extreme case, in the risk of extinction, of the consequences of crime, the failure of law enforcement, and unsecured (national) boundaries.

The Front Page lead of November 10 (“Bly weg uit SA!/Stay out of SA!”), deals with the conviction of the head of a rhino poaching syndicate, who is being deported back to

---

240 See Glossary.
241 Beeld is not alone in deeming rhino poaching to be important. The National Press Club voted the rhino as 2012 “Newsmaker of the Year” (although not without controversy: January 21, p. 3), and the severity of the issue is established by statistics: “Byna 2 renosters per dag in 2012 gestroop/Nearly 2 rhinos a day poached in 2012” (January 11, p. 1 anchor).
Vietnam, where much of the rhino horn gets exported to. The theme of the plunder of resources is heightened through the perpetrator being foreign\textsuperscript{242}, that is, a stranger to “our” norms, and even though the judicial system has asserted the legal line, the police have not managed to protect the national borders. Police credibility is already presented as under serious question, with the Front Page lead of four days before (November 6) reporting evidence tampering in the Marikana Inquiry, and a cross-reference to the Page 2 lead on the same day (November 10) emphasising the rhino-poaching “epidemic” in the Kruger National Park being caused by the ease with which poachers can cross the border with Mozambique. Three days later (November 13), the Opp-ed feature headline calls for a “Radikale reddingsplan vir rhinos/Radical rescue plan for rhinos”, while on the facing leader page a column calls for ways to keep Afrikaans “alive and relevant”. The rhino feature also emphasises that survival depends on “social relevance”, and that “addressing poverty” is more likely to succeed than simply “raising awareness”. Three days later, the “pillage” of rhinos in the Kruger National Park leads Page 3. On Page 6 of the same edition former President Thabo Mbeki picks up the theme of plundering resources of a different nature, by arguing that granting fracking rights in the Karoo would be “selling the crown jewels” to foreign interests\textsuperscript{243}.

On November 17, there is a full-page spread (p. 6) on the “War on poaching” (a consistent theme in poaching reports, for example in the December 8, p. 2 story on the arrest of poachers in which an appeal is made to use military drones to track down poachers, while on November 20, in the second lead on Page 1 on the poaching death of

\textsuperscript{242} In a December 28, Page 3 spread on poaching, (two separate stories, on the imminent extinction of abalone and crayfish through poaching), the threat is also designated as foreign, in this case Chinese.

\textsuperscript{243} The “grievability index” in this edition (of November 17) can be seen as informing the lead selections on the prime news pages (1-5). The Front Page lead (“Vergewe my: Pastorie: seun se brief uit tronksel/Forgive me: Pastory: son’s letter from prison cell”) is a follow-up story (ie one that has already lost some of its “news” impetus), conciliatory in tone, the murderer abject and remorseful. The Page 2 lead (which is plugged on Page 1) reports on government as “intransigent” in “disregarding” popular (a broad constituency into which \textit{Beeld} readers and their interest have been articulated) protests against e-tolling. Page 3 leads on rhino poaching, Page 4 on the murder of a cyclist (white) who was stabbed “25 times”, while Page 5 leads on the national Springbok rugby team’s chances against Scotland in an end-of-year rugby tour. In this sequence, it is a secondary story on Page 4 that appears out of place. The report is on six boys, aged 12 to 14, who are charged with the murder of three orphans in Limpopo province. All are black. A photograph of them does occupy the lead photograph position, but being not only on a left-hand page, but, secondary to the murder of a single cyclist, the story ranks lower than rhinos, rugby, toll fees and the sentiments of a parricidal son, it cannot be deemed to have a high affective element, and Butler’s question of “whose life” matters in the framing of death appears pertinent here.
eight rhinos, conservationists and farmers call for the army to fight poaching, elevating it to a matter of national interest\textsuperscript{244}, positioning the issue away from a broad social issue in which the poachers “breed in poverty”, towards crime regarded in military terms. Poachers are “othered” in their criminality (compared to the Pastorie killer, for example, who is held sympathetically in the fold as worthy of understanding and compassion), which surpasses conventional criminality when the Greek singer Demis Roussos, in a headline (December 6, p. 3), calls rhino poaching “terrorism”. If the reference is to terror inflicted on rhinos, this would be another case of anthropomorphism. If not, the “terrorism” is directed not at rhinos, but at a way of life, in which the rhino plays a pre-eminent role (apart from dogs) as heritage.

On December 7 (p. 13), the equivalence between the plight of the rhino and the plight of Afrikaners is established unambiguously. The lead, “\textit{Regses en minister sonder sukses byeen/Rightwingers and minister meet without success}”, deals with representations by Agri SA and TLU (the authoritative sources in the farmworkers’ strike stories, where neither is designated as “right-wing”) to government to improve security. A companion piece reports on an increase in “farm attacks”, while another secondary story reports on a resolution by the Unrepresented Nations’ and Peoples’ Organisation\textsuperscript{245} to ask the UN to send a fact-finding mission to investigate the plight of minorities in SA, specifically whites and Afrikaners who, in representations to other international bodies, are presented as victims of genocide. Included in the appeal by Agri SA (which in a separate story on Page 3 calls for December 16 to be a “day of prayer against violence) and TLU for increased security for farmers, is an appeal for a “special unit” to combat rhino poaching. These organisations have historically called for special units to combat farm attacks.

\textsuperscript{244} The elevation of rhino poaching to a matter of national interest is reinforced by the intercession of President Zuma, who as part of his New Year’s message (January 2, p. 2), as he did at Mangaung, makes a plea for “rhino safety”.

\textsuperscript{245} See Glossary.
(g) Habitat

The siege on a way of life takes the form of crime (murder), pillage (of property and heritage), poor governance (administrative incompetence and political chaos), discrimination, poor economic policy, civil disorder and the collapse of infrastructure. Homicide and health hazards (water pollution, for example) penetrate all defences, even those of kinship (for example in the cases of the “Modimolle Monster” and the “Pastorie” parricide).

These are all extreme examples. The safety perimeter is, however, breached in more subtle ways too, and suburban (or habitat) order is destabilised by social disruption. The lead story that ushers in the new year (January 2, p. 1, there being no January 1 edition) is headlined “Nwakejaar uit die hel/New Year’s from hell” (Appendix 19). There are follow-up stories in the following two editions. The source of outrage is an “illegal”, “chaotic” New Year’s party at a house in Northcliff, an affluent neighbourhood in Johannesburg, attended by “5 000” partygoers. The story is starkly “raced”. All the complainants quoted are white, and the homeowner is referred to only as “ene Bongani/one Bongani”. Pets are again an index of abuse, although in this case the “torture” is committed by noise, and one woman complains that she had to give her dogs “five sedatives for the noise”. The extent of the “hel” through which residents were put is described by one neighbour:

“Behalwe vir die geraas was daar trokke, taxis, klein karretjies, groot karretjies, kinders wat nog nie 18 was nie, en drank – sakke en sakke vol drank/On top of the noise there were trucks, taxis, small cars, big cars, children who were not yet 18, and drink - bags and bags full of drink (alcohol)”. To cap it all, “Sy het iemand ‘n kruiwa vol drank gesien stoot/She saw someone pushing a wheelbarrow full of drink.’” (A report on the previous publishing day, December 31 (p. 2), deals with the same problem of noise, drinking and disruption, this time by “squatters” who are celebrating next to an established suburb,

---

246 The siege mentality is captured explicitly by the January 28, Front Page lead. Under the headline “Onder boewebeleg/Under thug-rule”, and a sub-head “Bendes moor sewe inwoners in vyf maande/Gangs murder seven residents in five months”, the report chronicles a “crime wave” in the affluent area of Muldersdrift (there are six separate reports on the subject in Beeld from November to January).
whose behaviour draws opprobrium in a way that is expressed in almost identical imagery: “… ons het al gesien hoe ’n lorrie kiste en kiste bier daar gaan aflewer!… we’ve even seen a lorry going there to deliver crates and crates of beer"). The violation of suburban sanctuary comes equally from the poor (“squatters”) and the wealthy (the house is a “luxury house” whose owners can afford to “hire a Jacuzzi for R5000” as well as a bouncer), who have in common race and conduct.

On January 3 the party is again referred to as “illegal”, and the owner of the house is named (and implicitly identified as “criminal”), while on January 4 (p. 3 lead and picture package), police state that permits had been granted, and the owner apologises for the party “getting out of hand”. The cumulative, and residual import of the story is nevertheless that chaos has overrun suburbia, the last redoubt of a “normal”, safe way of life.

6.11. Celebrations

The discourse of dysfunction into which all the themes above are inserted derives affective force from historical notions of order, which inform the discourse of loss in Settler narratives. A Liberation narrative on the other hand achieves affective force from notions of a prospective order in the making, discarding as oppressive disorder the historical order of Settler narratives. A news story about potholes, within a Settler narrative, does not establish just that a road is not sound, but that it once was sound and will no longer be sound.

247 The headline “Dis nou anders/Things are different now” (December 28, p. 10, news feature) sums up this sense of loss of position, power and dignity, in a feature on a “poor white” settlement in Vrededorp in Johannesburg. These “poors”, to borrow a word from Ashwin Desai (2002), are not “othered”. On the contrary, they are re-dignified first through the human interest genre of the feature, and second in that their circumstances are presented as the consequence of policies which exclude them from the economy. While there are no “human interest” features or news stories dealing with the lives of poor people of any other race groups, poor whites are represented regularly, and always “positively” (that is not as criminals or spongers): December 13, p. 1 lead and Opp-ed feature; December 14, p. 4 news story, p. 22 leader, p. 23 Opp-ed feature; December 22, p. 5; December 31, p. 2; January 10, leader page column.
The Settler narrative incorporates not only discourses of fear and loss, but of privilege. The discourse of privilege, in turn, is not merely defensive, but celebratory. In the De Doorns case, for example, the chain of equivalence which establishes the metonymic relation between farmers and the economy (and therefore the “national interest”) cordons off not only the benefits of the few (wealth), but the prerogative of the many (a sound economy). A productive contribution to the economy is then worthy of being celebrated, or “celebratable”.

In the De Doorns example, the “celebratable” is implied. Elsewhere, it is explicit, as in, for example the “Dog spot” page where the “heroic” and the “lovable” is routinely found, but also in the coverage of the matric results. The “celebratable” informs the “grievable”, establishing in positive terms the value of loss that is “grievable”. The celebration of achievement celebrates, too, the virtues of “discipline”, “hard work”, “talent”, “responsibility”, and perseverance against the odds (of a dysfunctional education system), the absence of which qualities is held to account for all aspects of social dysfunction (maladministration, poor service delivery, disrepair of infrastructure, traffic hazards, corruption, Affirmative Action). The virtues that underpin achievement, are seen to uphold order.

The matric results are given extensive coverage, which is highly “raced”.

Wealthy parents, who have historically been white, have enrolled their children in private schools, which are independently funded and follow a different curriculum from state schools. The matric results and pass rates of these private schools have always been higher than those of state schools, which are associated with poor teaching, poor resources and ill-discipline. Most black children go to state schools.

248 In this dichotomy, order is celebrated and disorder is mourned. However, some disorder is celebrated. For example, the Lead headline “ANC in chaos/ANC in chaos” (December 15, p. 1) must be read as celebratory (even schadenfreudig) in tone in the context of a general attribution of responsibility to the ANC for policies that are detrimental to whites and governance that is detrimental to all constituencies. This would be a celebration of disorder to the extent that it holds the promise of (another) order.
The private school results were announced on Page 1 on December 29, under the headline “Ritse en rites A’s vir IEB/Heaps and ritual A’s for IEB”. The IEB pass rate (98% in 2012), has always exceeded the pass rate in government schools (73.9% in 2012), a constant reinforcer of the success/failure dichotomy in which private schools are a preserve of excellence (a point made explicit in the Page 4 lead, “Onderwys is glad nie by Mangaung verbeter/Education was not improved at all at Mangaung”).

In this “IEB Special Edition”, all the reports are of white matriculants. Of the 26 accompanying photographs (on all the news pages), all bar one (which is of an “Indian” pupil) are of white pupils. In the four advertisements for private schools published alongside the news reports, of the 42 faces portrayed only four are not white: one is Chinese, one “Indian”, and two “coloured” - none “black”.

The government school matric results appear on January 3, under the lead headline “Dit reën A’s vir gr. 12’s/It rains A’s for grade 12’s” (Appendix 17). The entire front page is devoted to the issue. The main photograph is of an Afrikaner boy, the secondary photograph of an English (white) girl. Both have 10 A’s. Neither is the top pupil in the country, who is announced the following day as a black girl who features as the main photograph.

On January 3, altogether eight pages are taken up with matric achievers:

- On Page 3, there are eight stories of individual achievers, all are white, six Afrikaans. (Appendix 18).
- On Page 5, four achiever stories, six photographs, all white, Afrikaans.
- On Page 6, six stories, four photographs of white, Afrikaans pupils, one of a black girl.
- On Page 8, 10 stories, 10 photographs (nine whites, one “Indian”, eight Afrikaans, two English).
- On Page 11, 13 stories, 13 photographs (all 13 white, Afrikaans).

IEB stands for the Independent Education Board, the governing body of private schools which sets the curriculum and marks exams.
The main column on leader page (p. 14), by Danny Titus (who is “coloured”), promotes “meritocracy”.

On January 4, the pattern is largely repeated, with achiever stories and some analyses spread over 10 pages (including Page 1). Page 4 leads with experts expressing skepticism over the improved pass rate. The main photograph is of matrics cracking a bottle of champagne (all four white). A sidebar and photograph features the top Mpumalanga pupil (black). On Page 6, there are 14 achiever stories plus photographs (12 white, Afrikaans; one “Indian” girl and one white, English girl). On Page 8, there are 13 stories plus photographs (11 white, Afrikaans, one “Indian” boy, one black girl). On Page 9, there are 13 stories plus photographs (11 white, Afrikaans, one black girl, one English, white girl). On Page 11 there is one achiever story, which leads the page, of a school gardener (who is black) who has obtained his matric, who is portrayed in the main photograph next to the school principal (who is white, Afrikaans) who mentored him. In secondary stories, the SA Institute of Race Relations says the results are “nothing to celebrate”, the DA expresses caution, while the ANC welcomes the results. The leader (p. 14) praises the results but criticizes the large number of “failing schools”.

This edition contains no animal stories, but some matriculants pose with their dogs, and one with a sheep.

The flush of celebrations passes and the January 5 edition resumes with a litany of threats: Page 1 leads with a follow-up on the death of the champion cyclist Burry Stander (the lead on January 4) which is amplified by a full page spread on page 4 (and a January 6, Page 2 follow-up lead on “Padsterfies: 1 300/Road deaths: 1 300”), Page 2 leads on “chaos” as “many” matriculants haven’t received their results, Page 3 leads, anthropomorphically, with “Kiets, Wagter se vrot feestyd/Kiets and Wagter’s rotten festive season” about “chaos” at the SPCA due to animals distressed by New Year’s fireworks, Page 5 leads on a double assault on Afrikaans as the Higher Education Transformation Network opposes a Solidarity-led initiative to register an Afrikaners-only school, and opposition to Solidarity office-bearers Willie Spies and Kallie Kriel
being appointed to the board of Pretoria University), Page 5 leads with a farm attack, “8 vrees-ure in kluis/8 hours of terror in safe” in which a farmer is shot in the stomach and locked in his safe together with his wife, and Page 9 leads with the eviction of 170 animals from a shelter.

The discourse of privilege grants agency and value in a narrative whose subjects are innocent and virtuous, and white and Afrikaans. In the discourses of fear, loss and dysfunction, it is this which is “grievable”. The “grievable” is unambiguously “we”.

6.12. Ambivalence

A chain establishes not a consolidated, undifferentiated ideological territory, but a boundary of meaning that designates the limit of the intelligible, which is established in discourse in terms of signifiers. The signifying process never remains static, and articulations of meaning (establishing difference and equivalence) are held in a constant condition of ambivalence. Without the ambivalent nature of articulations, re-articulations which lead to a broadening (or constriction) of boundaries would be constrained.

The “we”, then, that is “grievable” is identifiable but not constant. An “external” boundary serves, in this case, to give shape to an identity “faced” by ethnicity. This “face” renders, in terms of itself, the identity of the “other”, even when the other is not visible. In other words, the “other” as “external” (that is, merely “beyond” or “enemy”) can be rendered both through representation or absence (non-representation). To be brought within the boundary of meaning, the “other” needs to be rendered as equivalential, “as if”, in Fredric Jameson’s (2011) terms, it or they were articulated within the same chain of meaning. Due to the ambivalence of chains, the reverse applies, by which elements of the self (and group self) are rearticulated in chains of difference, so as to enable or strengthen chains of equivalence.

For example, dominant discourses of transformation and reconciliation necessitate that articulations of equivalence be established under these signifiers. When the dominant
discourse about Afrikaners positions them as “other”250 (the racist, historical “enemy”), this proves difficult in a group that seeks simultaneously to assert a self which in defining itself as a “minority”, “others” itself from the external “other”, but needs also to “other” elements of itself from itself to create the possibility of articulations under the signifiers “transformed”, “South African” or “reconciliation”.

This intra-“othering”, which seeks to establish chains of difference, is manifest but relatively muted in that “bad” Afrikaners continue to be held as insiders, even in cases where a moral “othering” occurs.

Stories about subjects associated with Apartheid present a way of gauging how these valencies operate. The moment of “dislocation” brought about by the “New South Africa” dichotomises discourses of “old, bad” and “new, good”, establishing valencies in which these discourses tend to articulate “white” and “Afrikaner” to the former under the signifier “settler” or “oppressor”, and “black” or “African” to the latter under the signifier “liberator” (for which the “ANC” is metonymous) or “democrat”. Celebrating, commemorating or memorialising the former would tend to destabilise the possibilities of articulation to the latter. Under these conditions, is the past “grievable” in a way that is conducive to a coherence of cultural identity?

Although the example falls outside of my specific period of study, Beeld’s lead (July 19, 2011) (cross-referring to a full-page spread on Page 6), under the headline “Magnus ‘n ware generaal’/Magnus ‘a true general’ ” on the death of Nationalist Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, is worth citing because of the way in which he is not “othered”.

The use of his first name in the headline establishes an intimate familiarity, while the adjectival phrase “a true general” establishes him as “authentic”, which taken together connote an iconic status. The intro confirms his standing as “An officer and a gentleman”, in the eyes of his “makkers”, an informal term which has the meaning of

---

250 As I demonstrate in Chapter 1.
both “buddy” and “comrade”. These “makkers” are presented lower down as Malan’s successor as head of the military, General Jannie Geldenhuys, and Colonel Jan Breytenbach, the founder of 32 Battalion, best known for its role in fighting South Africa’s colonial wars in Angola and then-South West Africa. There are three qualifications to Malan’s character. In the first line, he is referred to as “bekonkeld/ill-tempered”. In the penultimate paragraph the ANC refers to the “passing of an era in South Africa’s transition from the tyranny of Apartheid to a constitutional democracy”, and Breytenbach refers to a “difference of political opinion”. I would suggest that Malan is fully “owned” as an icon, as opposed to being “othered” as a relic of Apartheid. This is done in three key ways. First, there is a muting of criticism. Second, there is no point of articulation between Malan and Apartheid, and Apartheid itself is not “othered” in text except in a quote by the ANC in the second-to-last paragraph. Third, no other points of articulation are presented, except for the ANC’s statement, which, given the prevailing representation of the ANC, offers no viable valency to allow an articulation that validates its view to couple with any force in a way that places Malan outside equivalences of meaning.

The report on the death of former head of Military Intelligence, Lieutenant-Colonel Rudolf “Witkop” Badenhorst (November 13, p. 7 lead) presents ambivalences which are

---

251 Treatment of 32 Battalion is circumspectly revisionist. In the period of study it is the subject of three articles. On December 15 (on which the lead story is “ANC in chaos”), a full-page Opp-ed feature (p. 15) on a former 32 Battalion commander (headlined “Vang ‘n Boer: Die stryd tussen Boer en Ovambo/To catch a Boer: The battle between Boer and Ovambo”) has him acknowledge that “war is bad”, and that he is the “conscience of war”, but the harm of war is shown as having made him a “victim” of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. On December 31 (p. 8), veterans of 32 Battalion (who are black, and many Portuguese-speaking former Angolans) are reported to have been “abandoned” by government and “dumped” in Pomfret where their houses are falling down and they face starvation. They are “rescued” by local farmers who feed them and mobilize to upgrade the town and prevent government from relocating the veterans to Mahikeng where they would be discriminated against as “foreigners”. On November 3, the weekly BY supplement to Beeld on culture leads on an historical appraisal of 32 Battalion. None of the stories devalues the unit or the military, which is presented throughout as a thoroughly professional institution which served “South Africa” with distinction, and without reference to its role either in the townships or in neighbouring states. Whatever ideological gloss is placed on this revisionism, it should not be seen as co-incidental that the average age of Beeld readers is 44 (38% over 50), and therefore many of those male readers would have been in the military (as conscripts or Permanent Force), and most of those readers would have had their lives influenced in some way by military service. I would suggest that the “value” of the military in Afrikaner culture is maintained through articulations, in the examples cited, of “professional”, “principled”, “victim” (white) and “victim” (black) and “neglect” (or abuse) by government (which is a key discourse in the extended chain of equivalence into which Afrikaners are articulated, which “excludes” government from the values of “order” and probity).
more emphasized than in the case of Malan, but which nevertheless allow Badenhorst to be “owned”. Both are “enacted” in discourses of “righteousness”. Malan is a “true general”, Badenhorst, in the intro, as a “combative soldier” under the headline “‘Vrede in hart’/‘Peace in heart’”, connoting a clear conscience 252. In Beeld, Badenhorst is “grievable” as a frail man (the sub-head gives his cause of death as “Former head of MI’s organs give in), Malan as a general. Badenhorst is referred to familiarly by his nickname “Witkop” (Greyhead) without quotation marks and without mention of his given name, Rudolf. His military career, including as a Border-war Commander in Oshakati “from where cross-border raids were carried out” and head of the army, is presented as honourable, while his term as head of Military Intelligence was a “failure” for having “hidden” the CCB (Civil Co-operation Bureau), a covert unit of political assassins. The implication is that he erred in judgment (probably out of loyalty, since earlier in the story he is praised by a former colleague as having been able to “spur his troops to unknown heights”) which, in the words of the reporter, led to him being in the news “for all the wrong reasons” towards the end of his life. He is not “disowned”. He is not made “other”. His activities in the military are presented as principled, and as head of MI he is not fully articulated to the CCB in that it is not its activities that he is reported to have “covered up”, but the agents whose employment he “hid”, a technical or administrative “offence”. In all, he is granted the virtue of authority and noble action, the virtue of principle and the grace of frail humanity. The chain of difference, to the extent that it is articulated, albeit weakly, is established between “oudmakkers/old comrades/buddies”, not “voormalige/former” comrades/buddies, which turns the chain back on itself to hold the equivalential bond. He, and they, are held firm in a value chain that permits no disarticulation, that merits sympathy and compassion, and which, moreover, is sufficiently personal for the funeral details to be listed at the end of the story. “Apartheid” as a signifier is no more than a spectre, and if a disarticulation from it is taking place, it is no more than implied. It is such a powerful signifier, and is so emphatically “othered” in discourse, that if an explicit articulation “Badenhorst-Apartheid” were to take place, it

252 The report on Badenhorst’s death in Die Burger (November 13, p. 8) contains a quote not present in Beeld which establishes the coupling between “integrity” and “conscience” explicitly: it is from his son, who says “My pa was ‘n soldaat in murg en been. ‘n Ding was reg of weg”/My father was a soldier to the bone. Things were right or wrong”.

225
would force a disarticulation from the value chain of “righteousness”, forcing ambivalence to harden into antagonism between “new(transformed)” and “old/untransformed”. All the sources in the story (colleagues, friends, daughter-in-law) are “insiders”. The chain of value is a closed circle. *Beeld*, in identifying and presenting this subject as “grievable”, forms part of the same chain, in that no alternative points of articulation are presented on which to couple values which would invite or force a re-articulated frontier whose affective force does not derive from the coupling of “authoritarian-militaristic-Apartheid”253.

As a final example of this type of story which renders the past “grievable”, is the report on the death of Louis Pienaar, the last Administrator of SWA/Namibia (November 6, p. 2 news; November 7, Opp-ed “Tribute”). He is described as “one of the most charming NP ministers”, “well-read”, “reasonable” and “verlig/enlightened”. Neither Malan nor Badenhorst is positioned politically in terms of the “verlig/verkramp” divide, a silence that “loads” a neutral reading, or alternatively maintains a *status quo* by enabling a multivalency that allows for an “acceptable” reading from any position on the political spectrum. The Opp-ed tribute evaluates his “constructive” contribution to the transition to independence of Namibia, and lauds his intellect and diplomacy. The characterisation of Pienaar as “verlig” suggests not only that he is “owned”, but embraced, a fine distinction that points to where the intra-group boundary lies in the representations of Malan, Badenhorst and Pienaar254.

In none of these three examples is it a case of a death “noted”. The familiar tone, the emphasis on stature, the “personalisation” of the historical, all validate these lives as “grievable” in the values that are celebrated. How does “transformation” or

---

253 It is possible to view these articulations as a sleight-of-hand, that is, that the story is angled and written in a way to “appeal” to a conservative, Afrikaner readership, and that the story is not ideologically “loaded” editorially, but this would not detract from the performative element of the story from the headline through to the funeral details.

254 This distinction is not constant. For example, the singer Steve Hofmeyr, who is considered to be “far right”, is not only “owned” but celebrated, in Page 1 plugs, Page 3 news stories and on arts pages (where one would expect him to appear), as an “Afrikaner” and as an achiever. It should be noted that, subsequent to my period of study, Beeld’s reports on Hofmeyr have been fewer and more critical of his overt racism and defence of Apartheid on Facebook and Twitter.
“reconciliation” articulate here? The familiar “Magnus” and “Witkop” establish a familial limit of belonging, an exclusionary “face” or quilting point through which no other meanings can be quilted. For example, in the famous Private Eye of September 16, 1966, the satirical headline announcing the assassination of H.F. Verwoerd, “Verwoerd: A Nation Mourns”, against a backdrop of leaping Zulu warriors, does not permit any quilting of meaning in which the values represented by Verwoerd can be celebrated or mourned.

The Badenhorst, Malan, and for that matter the celebratory stories on Steve Hofmeyr, establish a familial “own” which does not admit the “expanded” definition of a community of Afrikaans-speakers contained in the Media24 codes of ethics. The putative reader who is being addressed here (viz Gee, 2007) is not the reader in Khayelitsha or Diepsloot or whose narratives are of resistance to the command of those deemed “grievable” by Beeld. It is a reader who recognises value in authority, the military, the social order they maintained in the past (current discourses present the military as underfunded, underskilled, overstretched and ineffectual), and for whom, when AfriForum calls for the army to combat rhino poaching, or farm murders, the signifier of “order” is the (pre-1994) South African Defence Force (SADF), not the (post-1994) South African National Defence Force (SANDF).

The concept of “ambivalence” which introduced this section – and which is a central dynamic in the maintenance of chains of equivalence and difference (Laclau & Mouffe, 1989; Laclau, 2005) - refers not to affective “mixed feelings”. It refers to the potential, or pull, or valency by which signifiers can be articulated in different chains of meaning. The tendency within a liberation narrative, for example, would be to render the sign “Magnus Malan” a signifier articulated in a chain of difference in which Apartheid (as a master signifier), and all it entails, is “othered”. In a settler narrative, on the other hand, the tendency would be to disarticulate “Magnus Malan” from the master signifier “Apartheid”, and rearticulate it in a chain established under the master signifier “Democracy”.

227
While the “valency” (viz Barrett, 1991) of the Malan story strains towards “Apartheid” (largely successfully), ambivalence is suggested to the extent that he is referred to by former President F.W. de Klerk and former Foreign Minister “Pik” Botha (in the second-last sentence of the lead) as “having realised that there could be no military solution to the political challenges of the country or the region”. However, the positioning and the euphemistic use of “challenges” suggests a weak pull of “Democratic”, and a primacy of “peace” (in the war/peace dichotomy) over, for example, “justice” or “equality”, neither of which is either stated or implied.

Finally, the framing of Apartheid generals as “grievable” is articulated within a discourse of privilege, understood as “immunity” rather than “benefit”. Most obviously, immunity from culpability, and with that, the plausibility of guilt, but also (within the discourse of Truth and Reconciliation), an immunity from the need for reconciliation.

6.13. Crime redux: “What did we ever do to them?”

The discourses of loss, fear, dysfunction and privilege are not discrete, nor are they comprehensive elements in the discourse of the Afrikaner. I have avoided a typology of Foucault’s “orders of discourse” from an understanding of Laclau’s Discourse Theory in which the indeterminate ambivalences of chains of difference and equivalence are held in a constant state of structural “potential” (in Agamben’s [1999] sense). This means that even though the discourses will tend towards an assertion of hegemony, discursive flows can switch this way or that, depending on specific articulations.

For example, the lead story in the first edition of my period of study (November 1), headlined “‘Skiet Die Boer’ se einde/’The end of ‘Shoot The Boer’ ”, dealing with a court ruling that this “Struggle song” constitutes “hate speech”, binds a number of discourses together. It establishes an equivalence between “human rights” and “minority rights” and Afrikaners. It establishes the hegemonic discourse about Afrikaners as being “othered”, articulating in difference the “other” of “ANC”, “Julius Malema”, “new dispensation”, “black government”. The headline registers both relief and triumph. As
triumphal, the discursive flow is outward, “writing back” against the hegemony of “black hate”. As relieved, the discursive flow is inward, reflexive. The registers are in equipoise. By contrast, in the headline “Staat dreig Anglo/State threatens Anglo” (January 16), the flow is entirely outward in its “othering” of the state as malevolent, while in “Dit reën A’s vir graad 12’s/It’s raining A’s for grade 12’s” (January 3) the flow is inward, self-congratulatory (although there is an implied “against” when considering “who” is being celebrated as successful).

A basic editorial conceit in journalism is that the subjects of stories are stand-ins for a “general reader”, and that in the representation of the individual, the interests (material, social, intellectual) of all are represented, based on an assumption of shared or common interests. It is this that Arthur Miller would have had in mind in describing a newspaper as a “nation talking to itself”. When the notion of nation frays, however, or under conditions of bifurcate citizenship (whether the division is ethnic, racial or economic), the emphasis of the phrase moves from a redundant or narrowly redefined nation to the solipsistic aspect of the relationship between a newspaper and its “niched” readers. The “who” constructed in newspaper representations is as a result tightly bounded, and I have demonstrated that in Beeld this boundary is inescapably ethnic. This ethnic identity is no longer articulated to “volk”, and a political discourse of Afrikaner nationalism is not evident except in the marginal politics of, for example, the “Vry Afrikaner Beweging” (Free Afrikaner Movement) and the post-nationalist “Front Nasionaal” (National Front), with its echoes of the Apartheid-era South African National Front and the anti-immigration French right-wing Front National.

The articulation of an ethnic “minority” to notions of “the People” is precarious at best and unsuccessful at worst, and a discourse of the “citizen” provides better purchase. The “citizen”, however, is not only the citizen who can claim rights, but also the “model

---

255 The concept proposed in Ashcroft, Griffith & Tiffin (2002) that post-colonial literature reasserts the power of the marginalised by “writing back” at the Eurocentric, normative “centre”.
256 Kriel (2010; 2012) and Blaser & Van der Westhuizen (2012) argue that even though Afrikaner Nationalism may no longer be a mainstream mobilising discourse, it has not disappeared but has been rearticulated in discourses of “culture” and “neo-liberalism”.
257 See Glossary.
258 See Glossary.
citizen” (and so the “authentic citizen”), as Chipkin (2007) observes, who performs the duties required of them. The high-achieving matriculants are exemplary in this regard, as having demonstrated their potential to embark on careers and so be economically productive. The farmers who fill in potholes are models of civic-mindedness. The wine-farmers in the Western Cape are pillars of the economy. The police captain contesting being overlooked for promotion due to Affirmative Action argues not only her rights but the value to society of her professional skills and dedication to duty.

I have suggested, under the section “Survival Threats” above, that crime constitutes one of a range of threats in discourses of fear and loss (viz Alden & Anseeuw, 2009), and crime reports have an acute “affective force” (Couldry, 2004) in that it is the survival of the biological subject that is threatened. And, as Agamben (1998, 2002) argues, political action is based on the survival of the biological being, rather than, as Marx argued, on class. The discourse of crime articulates most readily to discourses of governance (and dysfunction) and to the discourse of race, as Knol & Roberts (2008) show in their survey of how reports of crime in Beeld (and The Star) are overwhelmingly about white victims, while in the Sowetan they are almost exclusively black. The historical Black Consciousness and “Nation-Building” editorial stance of the Sowetan would tend to locate the discourse of crime in a Liberation narrative, in which the extent of crime is seen as being rooted in Apartheid, even when a sense of “betrayal” by the ANC government is evoked. In Beeld, however, the discourse of crime fits in with the Settler narrative in which crime is not attributable to the legacy of Apartheid, but to the destruction/implosion/erosion of policing under the current government (which adds the ideological sting to the Renate Barnard campaign).

Not all crime stories are alike, however. News values accept/dictate, for example, that proximity of events and “likeness” of subject influence the newsworthiness of an issue or occurrence. Newspapers also favour the superlative and extraordinary. To the extent that crime is an everyday occurrence, although less among suburban whites than township blacks, it is not “news” and gets disproportionate coverage. In part this can be explained
by an understanding of the “watchdog” media as ethically constrained to stir “moral panic” that galvanises official action, usually through more policing.

Official discourses about alleviating the lot of the “poorest of the poor” construct, at a rhetorical level, priorities of entitlement in which “poor” and “black” are articulated as “deserving”, and “wealthy” and “white/Afrikaner” as not, the result of, as argued by Afrikaner activist Dan Roodt, “Apartheid” serving as “metonym for Afrikaners” (April 16, 2013). The narrative of crime in Beeld “speaks to” this exclusion by giving prominence to crime stories in which Afrikaners (almost exclusively) are the victims.

The presentation of these crimes is informed by an understanding that crime is pervasive and therefore viewed as a serious social issue, and also by an understanding that Afrikaners/whites are targeted not because they are relatively wealthy and tend to have assets that tempt criminals, but because of “who” they are as whites/Afrikaners. The explanatory logic of this understanding renders the victims of crimes as not only victims, but as victimised.

The “Shoot the Boer” saga, a report on which (November 1) sets the scene for my research period, illustrates the point. The report deals with an agreement, following an Equality Court ruling that the song constitutes “hate speech”259, between the ANC, AfriForum and the TLU, that ANC members would be “requested” not to sing it at gatherings. By treating “Shoot the Boer” more as an utterance than an expression, the report appears to endorse the view that Afrikaners are specifically targeted in public discourse (by the ANC and its supporters) and in direct consequence suffer actual harm, again linking political ideology with homicidal criminality. While this story is

---

259 Beeld presents the ruling, in news reports and opinion, without qualification, accepting implicitly that speech, specifically “hate speech”, constitutes an act, and in so doing prioritises the ontological interests of the constituency it “represents” over its institutional commitment to freedom of speech, which would allow it to take a broader view of other interests. The story quotes a legal expert from the University of Pretoria as saying that the undertaking demonstrates a commitment to “dialogue and the promotion of an understanding of each other’s cultural heritage and aspirations”, while making no reference to either the origins of the song or the history to which it speaks. The story takes as given that protection of minority rights contributes to “nation building”, a discursive flow that equates the “source” of the national interest with the interest of the Afrikaner minority.
celebratory in reporting on the undertaking between Afrikaner-interest groups and the ANC, ongoing reporting on crime and farm murders suggests that it has had no impact, and that therefore Afrikaners continue to be targeted.

Farm murders are the most powerful symbol of the theme of targeted victimisation, as suggested by numerous reports on murders designated as “farm murders”, as opposed to, for example, plain murder or “murder on a farm”\textsuperscript{260}.

![Grievable](image)

**Figure 7:** Stories in which victims are targeted because they are Afrikaners (farm murders), as opposed to other groups, as in the case of Xenophobic attacks.

The November 28 lead, “Plaasmoorde: ‘Dis veel wreder as ander’/Farm murders: They are much worse than others”, reports on research findings by Solidarity that “Farm murders are accompanied by more violence and torture than the public\textsuperscript{261} is ever informed about” (in the intro), and that “Even though farmers of different race groups are victims, white farmers have a greater chance of being victims” (second last line). Examples of torture are presented by the authors as “Victims are also tortured by being dragged behind vehicles or mutilated with boiling water”. A criminologist emphasises

\textsuperscript{260} “Farm” tends to be fairly loosely used in reports and can refer equally to large farms, small farms, or large peri-urban properties, where there may be no animals or crops. The symbolic valency appears to be more a matter of an historic association between farmers and the land (as captured by the term “Boer”), and the personal or family control of the land, rather than evoking agriculture as a business. The De Doorns reports are ambivalent in this regard, establishing the protests in a personal relation to farmers (who are characterised by strikers as cruel or exploitive) and the farmers in relation to the agricultural economy.

\textsuperscript{261} Beeld reports regularly on violence and torture in farm murders, and so the “public” to which the authors of the report refer must be seen as distinct from the “public” of which Beeld readers form a part.
that the torture is “unnecessary”, “extraordinary” and “extreme” especially since it is performed after money, guns or other property has been taken. He also attributes the reason (apart from standard social triggers such as alcohol and poor economic prospects) for the “sadism” as a “culture of violence and violence towards a specific group such as hatred towards the white farming community”.

The report establishes these murders as politically inspired genocide, through quoting a Solidarity spokesperson as saying that politicians responsible for not taking strong action “will one day most likely face charges of crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing”\(^\text{262}\). Neither the ANC nor government ministers nor any other politicians are quoted; the table listing the number of farm murders per year shows numbers declining (from 140 murders in 2001-02 to 86 in 2006-07, the last year for which official figures are available); the number of farm attacks is not related to overall figures for murder and no statistical analysis is conducted.

It is always possible that omissions in reports are the result of sloppiness, “juniorised” newsrooms or deadline pressures. Whether they are or not, the resultant story is ideologically “loaded” in its deviation from ethical requirements of “fairness” (BeeldPP, 2012; Burger, No date), unless the injunction to be fair is understood as “fair to”, for example, fair to Afrikaners who are mis- or under-represented in public discourse. This would appear to be contrary to a professional requirement to represent contrary views, and to represent them fairly. Laclau & Mouffe’s (1998) argument, contra Habermas (1989), that there are many “publics” has relevance: the manner of “loading” identifies this public as the public (viz also Chipkin, 2007) whose interests determine the “national interest”, a refrain that is articulated in this farm murder report by the head of the Institute for Strategic Studies, who is quoted as saying “The situation must be a national crisis”.

Interestingly, there is no equivalential articulation in this story between farmers and “the

\(^{262}\) Beeld is ambivalent towards the terms “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing”. It mainstreams the genocide discourse by drawing on Solidarity as an authoritative source, bolstering it with corroborating analysis from criminologists and researchers. In this regard, it represents the “ontology” of its readers. On the other hand, it “others” the “Rooi Oktober/Red October” (See Glossary) campaign against Afrikaner genocide as marginal, unrepresentative and “right-wing”, largely due to its association with right-wing campaigner Steve Hofmeyr. Beeld also endorses, in its editorial opinion, the call by Afrikaner-interest groups to “prioritise” farm murders, reinforcing the genocide discourse.
“economy”, possibly because the signification of “crimes against humanity” is seen as so forceful as not to require bolstering couplings.

The Page 1 lead of three editions after the Solidarity research report (December 1), headlined “Martel-Aanval/Torture-Attack”, corroborates the findings (which are cited in the story) through example 263, 264. It emphasises, in the main headline and the sub-head (“94-jarige met pan gebrand; seun sterf/94-year old burnt with (frying) pan; son dies”) the apparently sadistic assault over the murder, which in the intro, too, is listed as secondary to the torture: “A helpless 94-year-old woman was burnt with a frying pan by four robbers on a farm; her 74-year-old son was killed by three shots from behind; her 64-year-old son was wounded in the stomach; and her great-grandson was stabbed in the head with a knife”. The great-grandson was also burnt on the thigh with a clothes-iron. The nature of the attack is depicted as sadistic and gratuitous, its victims helpless (in that they are all old and elderly apart from one teenager) and “undeserving”: “What did grandma and Hekkie do to them?” asks a son. The son interprets the attack in explicitly political terms: “My brother was a hunting trophy for the ANC and criminals”.

The hunting image is evocative in contradictory ways. First, it articulates the perception of hegemonic power that relegates Afrikaners to the status of animals, who lack control over their own destiny and whose purpose is to be hunted at the pleasure of the new

263 Other examples presented as Page 1 leads are: “Hy val oor ma se lyk/He fell over mother’s body” (December 8), a farm murder of a 60-year-old woman who her son says “was killed for nothing”; “Oues in vrieskas gedruk/Elderly (couple) stuffed into freezer” (January 10), a suburban murder in which a couple, described by their daughter as “My ma was piepklein en my pa ’n verswakte mens/My mother was small as a bird and my father a feeble person”, suffocates to death after being locked in a freezer by robbers; and “Onder Boewebeleg/Under Thug-Rule” (January 28), about a criminal “siege” of smallholdings in Muldersdrift where seven residents have been murdered in five months. Other examples occur on inside pages, such as the report cited in the section above on dogs in which a woman is murdered, her husband assaulted, their son drowned in a boiling bath and their dog disemboweled.

264 Personal observation: I consider these examples, cited above, of crimes against the elderly and of a crime wave sweeping through a community as, in themselves, horrific, and worthy of attention by any standard of newsworthiness. I found no reference to them however in the English-language newspapers I read (Star, Sowetan, Pretoria News) to see if they had reported on them, but that would be the subject of another thesis. I feel constrained to make this observation due to an unease that I may be seen to be diminishing or dismissing these crimes as I analyze them as part of the discourse of Afrikaners. Regardless of how I am understanding the representation of these crimes, I do consider them as traumatic events, for those involved and the broader community in whom they strike fear. I therefore consider these reports to be important and necessary, even as I express criticism of how they appear to reinforce ethnic exclusions, as I conclude in Chapter Seven.
rulers. It also reinforces the proxy relations between doomed animals and Afrikaners, as suggested in the section on rhinos above.

A second level of evocation (and not connotation in the articulation itself) is suggested by the image of humans as hunting prey: first, the hunting of the San in the Cape during the early colonial period (Adhikari, 2011); second, the killing of indigenous populations by the Voortrekkers, for whom “the distinction between hunting and raiding parties was often blurred […] Killing and looting were their business, land and labour their spoils” ("The Voortrekkers," SA History Online)265; and third, the Border War trophies of “Terrorists’ Ears” brought home by SADF conscripts after service on the SWA-Angola border in the 1970s and 1980s266.

The state of “innocence” which the statement “What did grandma and Hekkie do to them?” implies, is articulated in a discourse of privilege which silences the history of oppression and extermination of indigenous populations. Isolated from historical context, the statement can be read as a “speaking against” by a victim to perpetrators who have no justification for their actions. Read in context, however, it paradoxically opens up an interpretation of farm murders as acts of vengeance for past wrongs, an interpretation that would affirm those grievances as valid but in the process undermining any moral claim to “innocence”.

265 Jeff Guy (2013) makes a similar observation about the Voortrekkers.
266 Personal recollection of the dried and formaldehyde-preserved ears of guerrillas shown off by conscript friends on their return home from duty.
7. Chapter Seven: Conclusion

7.1. Self-othering: its nature, purpose and scope

Wimpie de Klerk (1975, p. 325) notes, in a description of the Thirstlanders, that the laager was, initially, “a movable object, a practical measure for the purposes of human habitation in a still wild and dangerous territory and for human self-defence”. In this sense it could be dismantled as the trekkers moved on. For the Thirstlanders, however (and later under Afrikaner Nationalism), “The laager was internalized and became the Trek itself. Now it was a permanent preoccupation with the eie. It was a spurious eie, however, which only pretended to exist; which, because it had lost the contact with reality, was no longer the eie. The laager of the Thirstlanders was an institution of final sanctity.” And also, as De Klerk notes, “a fatal isolation”.

I have held this image in mind throughout this thesis, in trying to understand the sense of eie, and the balance between openness and insularity. I have not sought to establish whether Afrikaners are “transformed”, or whether they constitute as a group an active or latent right-wing “threat to democracy”, which tends to inform the discourse about Afrikaners. I have taken it as a given that 1994 represents a political and ideological “dislocation”, and a moment of psychological “rupture” which defines a “before” and “after”, while recognising that the traces of “before” continue to shape any construction of the Afrikaner self as “democratic”, “South African” or a “minority”.

I locate Afrikaners within discourses of and about the Afrikaner, exploring how the articulation of signifiers establishes chains of equivalence and difference which suggest how “open” Afrikaners as a minority might be open to non-exclusionary identities. I do this by considering how Afrikaners position themselves, in the public discourse represented in the news medium of Beeld, in relation to the ethnic “self” and the “other”, understood primarily as the “racial other” (given the dominance of race discourse in

---

267 The Thirstlanders were a group of fundamentalist Afrikaners who set out in the 1870s on a trek from the then Transvaal across the Kalahari desert, seeking a self-sufficient Calvinist Utopia free from British and Boer rule.
South Africa), and conclude that these relations are, in spite of prevailing discourses of reconciliation, “antagonistic”, while the construction of Afrikaners within the discursive space of Beeld is “agonistic”, thereby reinforcing the sense of group over other identities.

This conclusion is drawn from a critical engagement with three key research questions:

1. What is “self-othering”?
2. How is “self-othering” presented?
3. Why is “self-othering” an important feature of Afrikaner identity construction?

1. What is “self-othering”?

Afrikaners are, as is argued in Chapter One, “othered” in public discourse as the agents of Apartheid, whose moral standing is compromised both historically and as current beneficiaries of past exploitation, and whose claim to full citizenship remains fraught due to contested understandings of “the People”. Responses to this “othering” have included a disowning of the identity of Afrikaner-as-“othered” through disarticulating the binary of Afrikaner/oppressor, re-articulating Afrikaner-as-model-citizen to the signifier “true South African” and to a broad, racially diverse linguistic group, and simultaneously re-articulating “oppressor” to the ANC government.

Discourse Theory explains how re-articulations are achieved through “quilting” new chains of meaning, and seeks to hegemonise new meanings in discourse. Hegemonic discourses of oppression, victimisation, poverty, nativism and citizenship, among others, create chains of equivalence that exclude Afrikaners in difference.

A rights discourse enables Afrikaners, through the signifier “minority”, to articulate this “difference” to constitutional rights and so articulate an equivalence between majority rights and minority (white) rights. Such a re-articulation is complicated by the connotations of “Afrikaner” whose valency as a signifier of the self is weakened (except
at the extreme ideological margins). Representations of the Afrikaner in the public sphere(s) (*Beeld*) are utterances/enactments of the self, representations of the “face” of the self that need to be recognisable both to the self and to the other. Identities articulated to notions of Afrikaner Nationalism or a ruling minority would not be recognisable. An identity articulated to discourses of loss (of power), fear (of the majority, “blacks”, poverty) and privilege (immunity from guilt and redress), on the other hand, is recognisable. Loss of power is not articulated as “weakness”, but as “rendered weak”, and the representation of this identity is the self not as “other” (something monstrous, inhuman or dehumanised), but as “othered”. That is, a self excluded from power. Such an exclusion, based as it is on historical culpability for the policies and crimes of Apartheid, can lay no moral or special claim to benefits (of citizenship or positive discrimination). A self represented as innocent, however, is “grievable”, its case righteous, disarticulating the Afrikaner from the monstrous, relieving the state of abjection, and rearticulating the discourse of “oppressor” to oppressed “victim”.

This articulation addresses the hegemonic public discourse by presenting a new signifier whose affective valency serves to weaken the historically-bound chains, creating meaning through representations of “vulnerable humanity”. The articulation is also addressed to the group iself, permitting a reconstruction of innocence which allows a softening of intra-group boundaries which, if hardened in anatagonism to elements of the self, would otherwise lead to a disintegration of the sense of group. It allows, for example, figures such as General Magnus Malan to be “owned”, for right-wing activists such as the singer Steve Hofmeyr to be celebrated in their Afrikaner-ness, and for conservative “dissidents” in the debate about schisms in the Church to be held in the fold and not excluded as heretics.

I had expected two things to emerge from my analysis of *Beeld*. First, that there would be a strong “othering” of right-wing or conservative Afrikaners (the “bad” Afrikaner) in order to establish an unambiguously “transformed” core group self, a “worthy” partner in the task of reconciliation. The revisionist presentation of icons of Afrikanerdom, such as General Magnus Malan, 32 Battalion and Military Intelligence, suggests otherwise.
Second, I expected that there would be a revised representation of the historical “racial” other, and a significant incorporation of a lifeworld (in mediation) which presents an articulating surface onto which the discourse of reconciliation can attach. In other words, that a “purification” of the self would be accompanied by a “rehabilitation” of the “other” by uttering its presence.

Instead, the intra-group boundaries never harden into a frontier, the most visible evidence of which would have been the silencing and effacing of those excluded by the discourses of the “New South Africa” and the “New Afrikaner”. The inner boundaries create conditions of “agonism” by establishing equivalences under signifiers of religion, economic interest and resourcefulness in adversity, among others. That agonism is made possible because of the abundant range of representations of individuals as agents in diverse circumstances but all of whom are recognisably (even if only by their names) Afrikaans at least.

The vigorous representation of the group self is matched by an almost complete absence of any representation of the constitutive racial “other”, and therefore no matching equivalent onto which to articulate non-reflexive notions of the self. In other words, representations which allow for not only a broader notion of the self, but of the self within diverse interests, which in turn are not conceived as threats to self interest. For example, given the extensive debate among Afrikaners and in the literature, as I show in Chapters One and Two, about a community of language which would enable a point of equivalence between (mainly) coloured Afrikaans speakers and white Afrikaans speakers, I expected to find representations of the coloured lifeworld which would enact this broader community. The agonistic potential of language, which is implied in the codes of ethics (viz Chapter Five) and in the discourse of Afrikaans, is recognised, and has been since before 1994, as the surest way to “open” the laager.

I would suggest that the “invisibility” of the other closes the laager. The coloured or black lifeworld is neither celebrated nor grieved, a precondition for which would be that the celebratable and the grievable be intelligible.
It is to be expected, given the sensitivities about historical pejoratives such as “kaffir” and “terrorist”, that a newspaper would not use them as a lexical means of “othering”. However, not to use them does not remove their trace, and so the historical “other” persists in absence. It also persists in euphemism, through the discourse of dysfunction which articulates government in an explanatory chain of incompetence and corruption, among others.

2. “Self-othering” is not the simple act of presenting the self as different. It is manifest in Afrikaner discourse because the political lexicography of pre- and post-Apartheid South Africa fixes the meaning of “victim”, “exploited”, “discrimination” and “oppressed” in a liberation narrative, to the exclusion of, at least, the Afrikaner minority. These terms, even when they have unambiguous meaning within the ontology of Afrikaner-ness, do not have the discursive ambivalence necessary to enable them to articulate both/alternately in liberation and in settler narratives. “Self-othering” emerges through the presentation of a lifeworld in which extreme brutality is directed at and inflicted on the group, whose vulnerability is both ontological and ontic.

I suggest in Chapter Five a range of discourses articulated in the representation of a “grievable” lifeworld. Crime, inevitably given its extent and its compelling attraction in news selections, forms a large part of this. However, the discourse is not of “casualties” of crime, which might locate crime as a social factor with structural causes, but of “victims” and “victimisation”, which stresses the agency of the attacker (most of the crime stories deal with violent assault or murder) and conflictual social relations. The presentation of crimes as gratuitous and vengefully violent (as if there is no possible cause) is the “proof” of this. These are not ordinary crimes, but “race” crimes against Afrikaners, best illustrated by the reports on farm murders, which articulate crime strongly to the myths of Afrikaners, land and hostile natives.
Crime is not the only survival threat, and I also show in Chapter Five the many themes articulated in the discourse of dysfunction which represent a threatened existence, ranging from death of the biological self, the linguistic self, the economic self and its very habitat and natural heritage.

How does this amount to, or support the concept of “self-othering”? Before answering this question, it is necessary to reiterate that the addressee of discourse (in the sense of “talk”) is never solely the one being addressed directly. A report “aimed” at a reader may equally be aimed (even if only overheard) at “the government”, or “the Church”. The “other” is an ever-present listener (hence the self-censorship of the word “kaffir”, among other pejoratives), and a subaltern “writing back” against hegemonic discourse forms part of the communication. The inward address of a crime report for example, is “look at what they are doing to us”. The outward address is “see what you have done”. This would not apply in the “Modimolle Monster” reports, although the presentation of the “innocent victim” may well have the “other” as a putative audience to the spectacle of “who” is being murdered.

The presentation of the self as victim “others” from it the oppressor “other” of public discourse, bounding the “we” in a way that excludes the “that” of the statement “Ons is nie almal so nie/We are not all like that” referred to in Chapter One. The discursive demand in the articulation of the self as victim is not to be treated as a victim, but to be recognised as such, together with the political implications this would entail. This creates a rhetorical displacement in which the referent of “oppressor” or “monster” comes to be understood as the one who has created the Afrikaner victim, who further subjects the victim to victimisation by ignoring its plea of “What have we done?”, itself an echo of the anti-Apartheid protest song “Senzeni Na?/What have we done?” The discursive articulation of “victim” in this context also “creates” a “racist state”, which in the various discourses of dysfunction, fear and loss is the agent of the “othering” of the Afrikaner. The representation of the Afrikaner as victim is addressed to this “otherer” in admonition, and also inwardly to the group who recognise in it their condition of being.
3. Why is self-othering an important feature of Afrikaner identity construction?
Identity tends to have its greatest social and political force when it is able to consolidate unambiguously around a chosen point of reference - that is, a master signifier under which meaning is made sense of, or a quilted point of fixity in discourse which makes it possible to articulate meanings in chains.

A usual way of viewing identity is through difference, a difference that marks the boundary between included and excluded. Class, race and language are common markers of difference. However, since no social group, Afrikaners included, is homogeneous in all respects, or devoid of ambiguities, identity battles are fought as much on the external perimeter of difference as along lines drawn in the sand within the laager.

While attention tends to be focused on how groupings rub up against each other, of equal import to broader society is how a group rubs up against itself - how it resolves ambiguities in a way that consolidates the core group, how it rescues itself from abjection. How this core is constructed out of the multiple contestations for the same space is important, because it may contribute to whether the broad group can be accommodated within mainstream political processes; whether it can articulate itself within a national identity, or whether it constructs itself as marginal, which lays down the basis for social and political engagement. This engagement is weakened by a public discourse which excludes Afrikaners as monstrous “others”, fixed inextricably in a discourse of oppression. Discourses of redress, truth and reconciliation appear to have done little to rehabilitate the legitimacy of the Afrikaner as citizen.

I suggest that “self-othering” is a discursive reclamation of “grievability” from what public discourse makes ungrievable, by enacting an innocence that disarticulates Afrikaner/guilt, and rearticulates an Afrikaner identity in discourses of victimhood, which includes murder, discrimination and political and social exclusion. This establishes a clean slate not through an explicit denial of history or culpability, but through a rhetorical displacement in which Afrikaner ceases to be the “metonym of Apartheid”, but the synonym of victim. The innocent victim is the other of the monster.
I suggest that one of the effects of othering the monstrous self, apart from negating a state of abjection, is to remove the basis of reconciliation because the rearticulated subject of reconciliation has been (self)absolved of guilt. Reconciliation is made redundant, rather than the need for it denied.

This has a further effect of weakening what might otherwise be a frontier between good Afrikaner/bad Afrikaner and the antagonism that would result, engendering rather an agonism in which a common grievability is achieved. The notional objective of reconciliation, that is an agonism between the historically oppressed and the historical oppressor, is compromised in this process. The historical victim remains “ungrieved”, and the boundary of difference hardens into a frontier of antagonism.

This is not necessarily the result or overt intention or an “Afrikaner ideology”. It is, rather, an effect of the discursive demand to be seen as a victim, whose ontological condition is “grievable”.

### 7.2. Contributions, limitations and possibilities

#### 7.2.1. Contributions

My research focus has been to explore how elements of the Afrikaner lifeworld and identity are articulated in *Beeld*. I have suggested that these articulations can be termed “self-othering”, a conceptual and lexical contribution to Discourse Theory. It is a term that represents the ambivalence that theory posits by implicitly, and simultaneously, deconstructing the concepts of denial and reconciliation in the context of discourses of guilt (by which citizenship and “humanity” is denied) and innocence (by which they are claimed).

I conceive the term “self-othering” as an interpretive tool by which to understand and explain the particularly graphic and regular reports in *Beeld* of crimes, in which
Afrikaners were the victims, and the news fabric within which these crimes were represented. This in turn led me to identifying a discourse of dysfunction, which incorporates discourses of fear and loss, but which better captures the civic (ontic) gaze of the newspaper than the more ontological expressiveness of the terms “fear” and “loss”.

7.2.2. Limitations
This study is neither comparative nor longitudinal, since a small period of study was more practical in attempting to understand the concept of “self-othering”, and how it is articulated. I have also tended to focus on the identity construction of the Afrikaner, rather than, except briefly, on how the racial “other” is constructed. It is evident from the data that Afrikaner identity is constructed in “whiteness”, but that has not been my theoretical lens, favouring as I have a Discourse Theory approach to media analysis. I have also been more mindful in my analysis of the underlying question (which is of importance to journalists) of how the ethical imperatives identified in Chapter Five are met (or otherwise) by how the newspaper “speaks” identity, and how this articulates Afrikaners in hegemonic or counter-hegemonic discourse.

These limitations offer opportunities to use “self-othering” as a conceptual lens through which to study shifts in Afrikaner identity construction over time and in other Afrikaans media, which would contribute to a fuller ideological map of post-Apartheid Afrikanerness.

7.2.3. Possibilities
Given the ethnic identity that emerges from this study, a potentially rich research opportunity is presented by extending the analysis of a comparison of the articulations of Afrikaner identity in Beeld to the articulation of Zulu identity, for example, in Ilanga or Isolezwe, of other ethnic identities in other vernacular publications, or of the contestations of ethnic identities in mainstream media, and whether they are equally articulated in the discourse of dysfunction.
The questions of media ethics also present an avenue of research, in exploring whether the “heimatlichkeit” of a news medium which is deemed a necessary “hook” by which to make the reader feel invited, is inimical to its “civic” role or to notions of “public” and “people” through an exclusive focus on “this public”, which may or may not be ethnically defined: whether it contributes, in short, to an opening or a closing of the laager. I suggest that the play of open-closed, equivalence-difference, agonism-antagonism is not addressed by standard in-house newspaper codes of ethics. They are both moot and redundant, insofar as they attempt to create a rational framework of “objective” representation which aims to articulate universal signifiers in chains of meaning in which “citizens” and “The People” are constructed, while news selection emphasises, as I hope to have shown, the “affective” elements (of pleasure, rage, suffering and hope) of representation through which are expressed the state of ontological insecurity of this people.
Glossary

Affirmative Action: Employment practices which favour the employment of black Africans to redress the white employment preferences of the past.

Afrikaans: Language spoken by Afrikaners. Derived from Dutch, it was recognised as an official language in 1925, and together with English, was the official language of South Africa from 1948-1994, and is now one among 11 official languages.

Afrikaanse: Term used to refer to someone whose identity is based on being an Afrikaans-speaker, but not necessarily on nationalism or any other cultural associations of Afrikaners. Distinguished from “Afrikaner”.

Afrikaans-sprekende: Literally “Afrikaans-speaker”, used merely descriptively and without any claim to identity on the basis of language.

Afrikaanse Taalraad: Afrikaans Language Board, which promotes and protects the Afrikaans language.

Afrikaner: Originally taken to mean colonials who identified themselves as “of Africa”, as opposed to identifying themselves as “European”. Later, with the rise of Afrikaner nationalism, throughout the Apartheid era and to an extent today, Afrikaner came to be understood as white, Calvinist, Afrikaans-speaking nationalists, and taken to be synonymous with “racist”, especially after the 1976 Soweto riots whose flashpoint was Afrikaans as medium of teaching in black schools. Nationalism has faded as a marker of Afrikaner identity, which nevertheless continues to cluster together the markers of “white”, “Afrikaans-speaking” and Christian (not necessarily Calvinist).

Afrikanerdom: The domain, or realm, of Afrikaners. Originally understood to encompass the social, political, religious, cultural and economic aspects of a homogeneous Afrikaner lifeworld as hegemonic. It was inextricable therefore from Afrikaner power or Afrikaner rule. With the collapse of Afrikaner nationalism and its dominant influence in national politics and group identity, Afrikanerdom is now taken to mean threatened position of the Afrikaner minority, although its usage is rare except in right-wing discourse.

Afrikanerskap: Literally Afrikanerness. Afrikaner character or essence. The condition of being an Afrikaner.
African National Congress (ANC): South Africa’s ruling party, formerly a liberation movement.

AfriForum: Afrikaner rights organisation.

AgriSA: Agricultural union for commercial (white) farmers.

Angle: Newspaper term for the way in which a story is approached, in other words what it emphasises from the outset.

Apartheid: Literally separateness. Official National Party policy of racial segregation and separate development for blacks and whites.

Armscor: Parastatal armaments company, which under Apartheid developed and manufactured military arms and vehicles for use by the defence force.

AWB (Afrikanerweerstandsbeweging): Literally Afrikaner Resistance Movement. Right-wing organisation founded by Eugene Terre’Blanche, which has faded into marginal irrelevance politically.

Baaas: Afrikaans word for “boss”. Its use by blacks is seen as indicating subservience, and is considered demeaning to the speaker.

Black: Under Apartheid the population was segregated according to racial classifications of “Black”, “White”, “Indian” and “Coloured”. Capital B “Black” referred to black Africans, while “blacks” generally referred to all so-called “non-whites”. During the Liberation Struggle leading up to the democratic elections of 1994, “Black” was taken to mean all racially oppressed groups. Now, “Black”, largely due to the racially preferential prescripts of Black Economic Empowerment legislation, is again used to describe black Africans. It is therefore a political and legal term, which denotes “black people” and also connotes “autochthonous/indigenous/native people” who assume a historically legitimised claim to a geographical and national identity.

Black Economic Empowerment (BEE): Labour legislation aimed at accelerating the access of black South Africans to the economy, both as owners of capital and as workers.

Blue Bulls: Rugby team playing in the domestic Currie Cup and international Super Rugby series. Formerly Northern Transvaal, based in Pretoria, the administrative capital of South Africa and therefore under National Party rule, the headquarters of the civil service, staffed by Afrikaners benefiting from official affirmative action policies for whites. The team has historically been associated with conservative Afrikaners, and its
fierce rivalry with Cape Town-based Western Province (now the Stormers) rugby club was based on the ideological division between the more liberal Cape nationalists and the conservative Transvaal nationalists. Pretoria now falls under Gauteng province.

**Boer**: Afrikaans word, now part of the South African English lexicon, meaning, literally, “farmer”. It has historically been used as synonymous with “Afrikaner”, and during the liberation struggle was used as a pejorative to refer to those who upheld “the system” of Apartheid. It continues to have pejorative connotations, for example in the song “Shoot the Boer”.

**Broadsheet**: Large-format newspaper, historically considered to be “high-brow”, dealing with the issues of the day in a sober (if not necessarily impartial) way. Some traditionally broadsheet-format newspapers, such as the *Times of London*, are now published in tabloid format, but maintain a broadsheet style.

**Coloured**: Under Apartheid the population was segregated according to racial classifications of “Black”, “White”, “Indian” and “Coloured”. “Coloureds” were, and largely still are, considered to be “mixed-race”, born of miscegenation between blacks and whites. The term also refers to people of Malay slave origin who since colonial times assimilated into both black and white groups. The term is now also used to refer to those with indigenous “first people” ancestry, a political identity pitted against the autochtonous claims of black people.

**Congress of the People (Cope)**: Political party formed in 2008 by disgruntled ANC members.

**Cosatu (Congress of South African Trade Unions)**: South Africa’s largest trade union federation.

**Democratic Alliance DA**: Official Opposition party in Parliament

**Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)**: Socialist, Africanist party founded by Julius Malema, former leader of the ANC Youth League.

**Editorial**: Term to describe the editor’s opinion article, or Leader, on the leader page. It also refers to stories, or the space in which stories appear, as opposed to advertising space.

**Eie**: Literally “own” or “self”.

---

248
**Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (FAK):** Federation of Afrikaans cultural organizations concerned with the protection and promotion of the Afrikaans language and Afrikaner culture.

**Freedom Front Plus:** Political party representing the interests of white Afrikaners.

**Front Nasionaal:** National Front, a right-wing Afrikaner nationalist party formed in 2013, but which has no parliamentary representation.

**Great Trek:** The mass migration of Voortrekkers (pioneers) from the Cape colony in the 1830s to escape colonial rule by England.

**Gutter:** Newspaper term for the margin between facing pages.

**Human Interest Stories:** Articles that focus on the personality and private life of people, often to illustrate the effect of a big event on individuals.

**Indian:** Under Apartheid the population was segregated according to racial classifications of “Black”, “White”, “Indian” and “Coloured”. Indians are people of Indian origin, many of whose ancestors came to South Africa as indentured labourers in the late 1800s.

**Jou:** Literally “your”, as opposed to “our”. The “jou” of Beeld’s slogan – “Jou koerant, jou wêreld/Your newspaper, Your world” – must be understood as being included in a “we”, in other words not as a separate, unrelated, descriptive “you”.

**Laager:** A defensive encampment, historically of oxwagons, to protect Voortrekkers from attack by African tribes. It also refers to a defensive cultural or political mentality.

**Media24:** Subsidiary of Naspers, which was established to further Afrikaner nationalism and which has grown into a multinational company with interests in China and Brazil, among others.

**Lead:** The main story on a page. “The Lead” is the lead story on the front page, and so represents what the newspaper considers the most important story of the day for its readers.

**Leader:** Newspaper term for the editorial opinion of the editor which appears on the leader page.

**Leader Page:** The page on which the editorial column, or leader, appears, which provides the newspaper’s analysis of events and issues. The page also features opinion columns, the political cartoon, and often letters.
Marikana: Town in Limpopo province, where, on August 16, 2012, police shot and killed 34 striking mineworkers. This is referred to as the “Marikana Massacre”, which was considered to be the result of political pressure on the police to get labour into line, and a combination of incompetence and trigger-happiness on the part of poorly trained police officers.

Naspers: Multinational media corporation, founded to further Afrikaner nationalism, and which owns Media24, which is the publisher of all the Afrikaans-language daily newspaper in South Africa - Beeld, Volksblad, Die Burger – and the Sunday Rapport, among others and among other interests.


News: News refers to events and issues deemed newsworthy. Newsworthiness is based on news values which prioritise events and issues according to their topicality, immediacy (although less so in the age of online news), importance (on a scale from local to global), and a range of other factors such as celebrity, geography, strangeness or deviation from the “normal”. “Hard news” refers to a compelling event that is fresh, immediate and evidently topical. “Soft news”, by contrast, is news which is not necessarily compelling, such as animal or human oddities, or even celebrity news. The editor is always mindful, in establishing the news priorities of the day, of the interests of the newspaper’s readers, for whom swathes of “news” are not of interest and so to publish such news would not add, and in fact would detract from, the appeal of the newspaper, from an informational and commercial point of view. While there is a general consistency of news selection over time, it is important to note that what might make the news today may be dismissed tomorrow. This depends on what the news flow of the day is. A good news day is one in which, for example, important or exciting events are happening in parliament, a celebrity scandal is exposed, a gory crime takes place, a high-profile criminal is brought to trial and a contentious public debate is taking place. A slow news day is what happens during what is called the “silly season”, for example. This is the period leading up to the end of the year when parliament and courts are in recess, schools are on holiday and so the routine institutional processes do not generate any news. As a result ordinary stories that would otherwise not feature prominently get “pumped up” artificially by normal standards.
Njala: A type of large buck, and also a type of armoured vehicle used by the police and army.

Nkandla: Village in KwaZulu-Natal province which has given its name to President Jacob Zuma’s traditional (private) homestead, which has been the subject of an official inquiry by the Public Protector into unauthorized state spending on upgrading the buildings. The total cost of the upgrades is estimated at ZAR240 million, for some of which the Public Protector has found Zuma personally liable.

Orania: A town in the Northern Cape province established as a whites-only, separatist haven for Afrikaners. It was founded by Carel Boshoff, a right-wing academic, and leader of the Afrikaner Freedom Foundation.

Ons: Literally “we” or “us”, but understood as a discursive entity that embodies an Afrikaner “eie”.

Opp-Ed: The page facing the editorial or leader page, hence Opposite-Editorial. It is generally a forum for background features, analysis, opinion and often letters.

Outa: The Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance, a civil action group opposed to the so-called e-tolling system of levying tolls on motorists.

Pistorius, Oscar: South African paralympian athlete who was convicted of shooting dead his girlfriend Reeva Steenkamp.

Private schools: Schools that are funded exclusively or largely through school fees paid by parents and in some cases supplemented by bequests from alumni. These schools set their own curricula and exams through the Independent Examination Board.


Rooi Oktober: The Red October movement, whose supporters maintain that whites, and Afrikaners in particular, are the victims of ethnic cleansing, and farm murders are considered by them as the evidence of this. The name alludes to white Apartheid-era fears of the “Red Onslaught” of Communism and the “Swart Gevaar/Black Danger” of blacks. Each was synonymous with the other, as Communism was considered by Afrikaners to be the political ideology of blacks in general, but also, anyone opposing Apartheid was deemed to be a Communist.
Sidebar: A newspaper term for a secondary story, placed alongside a main story, reporting on an aspect of, or adding to, the main story.

South African Party: Political party from the start of the Union of South Africa (1910) until it merged in 1934 with the National Party to form the United South African National Party (United Party).

Sharks: Durban-based rugby team playing in the domestic Currie Cup and international Super Rugby series. Formerly known as “Natal”, the team was and still is seen as “English”, as opposed to “Afrikaans”. The province of Natal now forms part of KwaZulu-Natal.

Solidarity: Formerly a white trade union, now an umbrella organisation for the rights of whites and Afrikaners.

State schools: Schools that are funded by the state. Poorer schools have no additional sources of funding and do not charge fees. Others, such as the former “Model C” schools, do charge fees which go towards employing extra teachers and improving facilities.

Stormers: Western Cape based rugby team playing in the Super Rugby series.

Tabloid: Small-format newspaper, such as the Sun of London, whose style tends to be loud and sensational, and whose subject tends to be scandal and titillation, especially among celebrities. Generally the term “tabloid” is used pejoratively, and is taken to mean “low-brow” or “popular”. However, a newspaper such as the Mail & Guardian in South Africa, is tabloid in format but, as an investigative newspaper, it would be considered as a serious publication in the broadsheet tradition.

Township: Residential areas designated for blacks under Apartheid. Current urban geography still reflects the Apartheid segregation of races, although there are no legal barriers to where people may live.

Transnet: Parastatal company in charge of railways, which, under Apartheid, gave preferential, or “sheltered” employment to whites.

Transvaal: Former province of South Africa, renamed as Gauteng.

Transvaalse Landbou-unie(TLU): Afrikaner agricultural organization, the Transvaal Labour Union, which has retained its initials in spite of the change of name of the Transvaal province to Gauteng under the new dispensation.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC): Commission established to hear Apartheid crime and grant amnesty in cases where perpetrators were deemed to have met a standard of full disclosure.

Unrepresented Nations’ and Peoples’ Organisation: An international organization promoting the rights of minorities, marginalized and unrepresented people and nations. It consists, among others, of indigenous people and inhabitants of occupied territories.


Verligtes: Literally enlightened ones. Liberal-minded supporters of the National Party who favoured some easing of Apartheid race laws.

Volk: Literally “people”. Term used for the Afrikaner group, and understood to mean “God’s chosen people”.

Volkseie: Literally “people’s own”. Group identity based on markers of Calvinism, Afrikaans language and whiteness.

Voortrekkers: Afrikaner pioneers who migrated from the Cape colony in the 1830s to escape colonial rule by England.

Vry Afrikaner Beweging: The Free Afrikaner Movement, a network of Afrikaner-interest organizations seeking an independent homeland for white Afrikaners in South Africa.

White: Under Apartheid the population was segregated according to racial classifications of “Black”, “White”, “Indian” and “Coloured”. Whites were considered to be people of European descent, and were often called “European”. The denotative meaning of the term remains much the same, but it connotes “oppressor”, “Apartheid” and “colonialist”, all of which tend in public discourse to delegitimise political claims to an indigenous identity.
### Appendices

#### Appendix 1

**Table of Headlines**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Headline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1</td>
<td>‘Skiet Die Boer’ se Einde/ End of ‘Shoot the Boer’ (song)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2</td>
<td>R54m nie na welsyn/ R54 not going to welfare (department)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 3</td>
<td>Vergeet van jou kaartjie/ ‘Forget about your ticket’ (Airline bankrupt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 5</td>
<td>Roofkar eis Bull/ Stolen car claims Bull (rugby player)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 6</td>
<td>Polisie peuter/ Police tamper (with Marikana evidence tampering)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 7</td>
<td>Skande tref SA fietsry/ Scandal hits SA cycling (doping)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 8</td>
<td>SA man sterf in Outback/ SA man dies in Outback</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 9</td>
<td>Hy kan weer se ‘Mama’/ He can say ‘Mommy’ again</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 10</td>
<td>‘Bly weg uit SA’!/ Stay out of SA (Rhino poaching kingpin sentenced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 12</td>
<td>Duur kuns geroof!/ Valuable art stolen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 13</td>
<td>Pastorie: Hulle ken mekaar/ Pastor and his killer knew each other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 14</td>
<td>Kuns by kerk gevind/ (Stolen) Art found at church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 15</td>
<td>Krisis vir landbou/ Crisis for agriculture (De Doorns protests)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 16</td>
<td>Eis jou boetes terug/ Demand your money back (traffic fines illegally issued)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 17</td>
<td>‘Vergewe my’/ ‘Forgive me’ (Pastor killer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 19</td>
<td>Pa voor seuntjie geskiet/Dad shot in front of son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 20</td>
<td>‘My kind is vrek geskiet’/ ‘My child shot stone dead’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 21</td>
<td>Dag van gruwels/Day of horrors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 22</td>
<td>Woede oor ander man/ Fury over other man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 23</td>
<td>ANC stry, DA gaps toppos/ ANC feuds, DA nicks top post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 24</td>
<td>Bokke het se gevoel/ Springboks need a victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 26</td>
<td>Bendes hard geslaan/ Gangs hit hard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 27</td>
<td>Faf so, Aussies/ Take that, Aussies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 28</td>
<td>Plaasmoorde. ‘Dis veel weder as ander’/ Farm murders crueler than others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 29</td>
<td>Thomas: Man help nie eens/ Thomas/ Man didn’t even assist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 30</td>
<td>Chanelle: Haar man genoem/ Chanelle: Her husband named</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1</td>
<td>Martel-aanval/ Torture attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 3</td>
<td>Dronk ryer eis bruid/ Drunk driver claims bride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 4</td>
<td>SA se tariwe te duur/ SA tariffs too high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 5</td>
<td>AWB-7 vas by oproer/ AWB-7 held at (farm) protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 6</td>
<td>Dakota vermis in berge/ Dakota missing in mountains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 7</td>
<td>‘n Graf in die berge/ A grave in the mountains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 8</td>
<td>Hy val oor ma se lyk/ He fell over mother’s body (Farm murder)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 10</td>
<td>Die land bid vir Madiba/ Nation prays for Madiba (Mandela)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 11</td>
<td>In bed by haar graf/ In bed at her grave (Husband mourns new bride)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 12</td>
<td>Pad is weg: 14 sterf/ Road washed away: 14 dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 13</td>
<td>Oorde buit oues uit/ Homes rip off the old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 14</td>
<td>Toll-stryd nou terug strate toe/ Toll-fight back to the streets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 15</td>
<td>ANC in chaos/ ANC in chaos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 17</td>
<td>Cyril wys sy kaarte/ Cyril (Ramaphosa) shows his cards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 18</td>
<td>Zuma-ses in pylvlak/ Zuma-six in the lead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 19</td>
<td>Cyril versterk rand/ Cyril strengthens rand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 20</td>
<td>Keelafl/ Neck slashed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 21</td>
<td>Dag van die lang messel/ Day of the long knives (ANC critics purged)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 22</td>
<td>Angs-nag in myn/ Night of anguish in mine (Hostage drama)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 24</td>
<td>Kind (7) se nag in berg/ Child’s (7) night in mountains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 27</td>
<td>Lyk in trein gekry/ Body found in train</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 28</td>
<td>Taalplan is 18 j. laat/ Language plan is 18 years late</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 29</td>
<td>Ritse en rites A’s vir IEB/ Strings of A’s for IEB (private school matrics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 31</td>
<td>Waterval els gesin van driel Waterfall claims family of three</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN 2</td>
<td>Nuwejaar uit die hell New Year from hell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 3</td>
<td>Dit reen A’s vir gr. 12’s/ It’s raining A’s for matrics (govt school results)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 4</td>
<td>Taxi ry held dood/ Taxi kills (cycling) hero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 5</td>
<td>Burry: man vervolg/ Burry (cyclist): Man held</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 7</td>
<td>Vermoor 7 - nou sy vrou/ Murdered 7 – now his wife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 8</td>
<td>Pta-man sterf in see ongeluk/ Pretoria man dies in sea accident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 9</td>
<td>Tiener in winkel gewond/ Teenager wounded in shop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 10</td>
<td>Oues in vrieskas gedruk/ Old couple stuffed into fridge (by robbers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 11</td>
<td>Staat met hof gedreig/ State threatened with court action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 12</td>
<td>In malaria se kloue/ In malaria’s claws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 14</td>
<td>Botsing eis haar ma en pal/ Crash claims her mom and dad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 15</td>
<td>Staan net ‘n bietjie nader/ Stand a bit closer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 16</td>
<td>Staat dreig Anglo/ State threatens Anglo (mining company)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 17</td>
<td>Wapens: Klad op panel/ Weapons (probe): Stain on panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 18</td>
<td>Getuies kry koue voete/ (Probe) Witnesses get cold feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 19</td>
<td>Njala dood vrou/ Njala (buck) kills woman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 21</td>
<td>Oproer-chaos in Sasol strate/ Protest-chaos in Sasol streets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 22</td>
<td>Die wye, wye water/ The wide, wide waters (floods)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 23</td>
<td>Sasol wil vrede nie ver trou/ Sasol suspicious of peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 24</td>
<td>Polisie smoor oproer/ Police quell protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 25</td>
<td>Voor gesin gegrypl/ Grabbed in front of family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 26</td>
<td>Hof keer SA heli’s vir Zim/ Court blocks Zimbabwe helicopter deal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 27</td>
<td>Konings rol lekker in geld/ (SA) Kings rolling in (taxpayers’) money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 28</td>
<td>Onder boewebeleg/ Under thug-rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 30</td>
<td>Boere het nie R105/ Farmers don’t have R105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 31</td>
<td>Fortuin-skenker/ Fortune donator (Philanthropic donation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Illustration of the essential components of a page, showing the position of the masthead, title, lead story and headline, photographs, teasers, pull quote, secondary story, anchor position and the fold.
Appendix 3

An example of a leader page. The leader, or editorial opinion of the paper, is placed vertically, top left. The political cartoon, opinion columns and letters also appear on this page.
Appendix 4

The *Beeld* cartoon on December 29, 2012 (p. 8), lampoons President Jacob Zuma’s comments that owning dogs is “un-African”, by showing dogs looking through a fence to Zuma’s homestead at Nkandla, in KwaZulu-Natal province, which is the subject of accusations of unauthorized spending by the state on what is Zuma’s private residence. The sign on the fence reads “No Dogs”, and the face is a caricature of Zuma. By combining the two issues, the cartoonists presents a landscape in which a corrupt, African scene is separated from the one which *Beeld*’s readers inhabit, in which dogs are valued as pets and as guard dogs. In their capacity as guard dogs, they would be considered to be defending the readers’ world against incursions from the African world.
Appendix 5

The Beeld cartoon on December 20, 2012 (p. 16) depicts the ANC government as fatcats in a commentary on the luxury vehicles driven by delegates to the ANC’s policy congress in Mangaung in December 2012. The note at the bottom left of the cartoon reads “Mangaung: ANC shows off with luxury cars”. The number plate on the small car, whose occupants are recognisably white, reads “Taxpayer”, and the bumper sticker reads sarcastically “My other car is a BMW”. The speech bubble of the passenger, a boy, reads “Daddy, why do we drive such an old, small car?” to which the driver responds “Because daddy is still paying off that one”, referring to the big car on his right. The number plate of the big car, a BMW, reads “ANC-Government”, and its driver is recognizably a black African woman (from the hairstyle). The imputation is that the ANC is sponging off the taxpayer, who is footing the bill for the lavish lifestyle of the party faithful.
The *Beeld* cartoon on January 31, 2012 (p. 16) shows President Jacob Zuma and the Zulu King Zwelethini comparing accounts of how much they have benefited from state coffers, with Zuma boasting that “Mine is longer than yours”. Zuma’s extensive list itemises the additions, at state cost, to his private homestead at Nkandla. They include fencing, helicopter pad, cattle gate, swimming pool, underground bunker, bullet-proof windows, tuck-shop and a guard-house. Zuma’s bill does not reflect a total, suggesting either that there has not been a full accounting, or that he continues to benefit from the state. The total bill for the upgrade of his Nkanda residence has been put at more than ZAR240 million. The King’s much shorter list, which amounts to ZAR 80 million, includes household costs, maintenance cost of his palace, a palace for one of his wives, maintenance of children and the upkeep of farms. Zwelethini is the most prominent of the kings in South Africa who lead their tribes, all of whom are characterised as scoungers, in contrast to the celebrity treatment given to European royalty.
Appendix 7

Front Page of December 15, 2012, on the ANC’s policy congress in Mangaung.
Appendix 8

Front Page of January 17, 2013, on a cloud over the Seriti Commission of inquiry into the arms deal.
Appendix 9

Front Page of January 18, 2013: An example of a page that presents a “white face”, in this case through a main photograph in which all the pupils (all twins, on their first day at school) are white, and the teasers are all illustrated with white subjects.
Appendix 10

Front Page of January 30, 2013, leading on farmers complaining that they cannot afford to pay their workers a minimum wage of ZAR105 per day, in the wake of protests by farmworkers in the Western Cape.
Appendix 11

Front Page of December 17, 2012, on the ANC leadership challenge.
Appendix 12

Front Page of November 19, 2012, with a teaser on the war on rhino poachers (top left), the lead on a father shot in front of his son, and a secondary story (right) on “loyal” workers to the rescue in a bush fire.
Appendix 13

Front Page of November 21, 2012, leading on evidence in the case of the “Modiomolle Monster”, who is pictured in the dock.
Appendix 14

Front Page of December 7, leading on the crash of a Dakota in the mountains killing crew and medical staff on their way to former president Nelson Mandela’s home in the Eastern Cape province.
Appendix 15

Front Page of November 28, 2012, leading on farm murders being “crueler than others”.

269
Appendix 16

Front Page of December 1, 2012, on a “Torture-attack” and murder.
Appendix 17

Front Page of January 3, 2013, announcing the state matric results, and celebrating achievers.
Appendix 18

Page 3 of January 3, 2013, devoted to pupils who scored well in their matric results. All featured on this page are white.
Appendix 19

Front Page of January 2, 2013, on an affluent neighbourhood’s “New Year out of hell”.
Appendix 20

Full page Opp-ed feature on December 1, 2012, on the Church debate.
Appendix 21

An example of the “Dog Spot” Page 3, on November 21, 2012, featuring a dog receiving a wheelchair, and a pretty wildlife photograph of birds frolicking.
Appendix 22

Front page of November 15, 2012, on the eruption of farm protests in De Doorns in the Western Cape.
Front Page of January 28, 2013, which leads on a wealthy suburb “Under Thug-rule”.

Appendix 23
Appendix 24

The Page 1 teaser of November 17, 2012, of a rhino with a US$85 000 price on its head, referring to a story on Page 3 about the price trophy hunters pay for rhino. I suggest that this is illustrative of the metonymy between Afrikaners, who are “hunting trophies” for the ruling party (November 1, p. 1, lead) and rhino, their endangered proxies.
Opp-ed page of November 13, 2012, on a “Radical rescue plan” for rhinos.
Appendix 26

Page 6 spread on November 19, on the “War against poachers”.

Appendix 27

Front Page of November 5, 2012, leading on “Stolen car claims Bull”, with a secondary story (top left) on “11 Rhinos poached in 6 weeks”.

280
Bibliography


Beeld. (2012, December 1).


Beeld. (2012, December 5).

Beeld. (2012, December 8).
Beeld. (2012, November 1).
Beeld. (2012, November 2).
Beeld. (2012, November 3).
Beeld. (2012, November 5).
Beeld. (2012, November 6).
Beeld. (2012, November 7).
Beeld. (2012, November 8).
Beeld. (2012, November 9).
Beeld. (2012, November 26).
Beeld. (2013, January 2).
Beeld. (2013, January 3).
Beeld. (2013, January 5).
Beeld. (2013, January 8).
Beeld. (2013, January 9).
Beeld. (2013, January 10).
Beeld. (2013, January 15).
Beeld. (2013, January 22).
Beeld. (2013, January 26).
Beeld. (2013, January 30).

285


Etiese Kode en Riglyne vir Verslaggewers, Fotograwe en Grafiese Kunstenaars van Die Burger (No date).


GenocideWatch. Arlington, VA: International Alliance to End Genocide.


Harber, A. (2013a). Remember when newspapers boasted of their sales figures? So why were they so quiet last week? Retrieved from http://www.theharbinger.co.za/wordpress/2013/03/13/remember-when-newspapers-boasted-of-their-sales-figures-so-why-were-they-so-quiet-last-week/


and political analysis: Identities, hegemonies and social change (pp. 1-23). Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

Press Code: Media Codes of Conduct.


https://twitter.com/TashJoeZA


Leonard, C. (2013, April 12). Oh broeder, where is the volk now?, *Mail & Guardian*.


The Differend: Phrases in Dispute (1988).


Media24 Code Of Ethics And Business Conduct.


The Star’s codes of ethics and conduct (1999).


