

POLICE CORRUPTION: A THREAT TO SOUTH AFRICA'S DEMOCRACY

Abstract

In South Africa today, there is no single agreed definition of corruption. However, as researchers we do know that some definitions of corruption are available, enabling us to put police corruption into context. It is disappointing enough to find out that police officers who have been entrusted by the laws of the Republic of South Africa to protect and serve us are the same people who are now being investigated for corruption. The image of the South African police has been severely damaged due to the reporting of rampant and reckless corruption amongst its rank and file. The researcher argues that if nothing is done to address the level of police institutionalised corruption our democracy may suffer as a consequence.

First, this article is very important to all South African citizens as Policing affects their everyday life. With crime like rape, murder, house breaking, assault, drugs on the increase. South Africans are very much concerned about their safety and security.

Second, it is designed to give a voice to citizens of South Africa ensuring that the responsibility of policing is left in hands of trustworthy and accountable officials.

Third, to identify different types of corruption and to find some solutions to it.

Fourth, the research is designed to provide a basis for other researchers into police corruption to develop and build upon it.

The researcher relies on extensive literature review, media reports, and police practical experiences and the researcher's role and involvement being a member of the Civilian Oversight Committee dealing with issues around police accountability in South Africa.

Keywords

Corruption, Accountability, Policing, Democracy

Introduction

Police corruption is not a new phenomenon in South Africa. It is misleading for us to think that police corruption was not pronounced during apartheid era in South Africa. There is evidence to suggest that corruption was very much present. The role of the “kitskonstabels” translated as “ instant constable” who were known to have been poorly trained in six weeks, took bribes from members of the public and served as agents of oppressive apartheid regime (Leggett 2005, Cawthra 1993, Brogden 1996) Basically, police corruption in South Africa is well documented.

In South Africa today, politicians have taken advantage of our police service, partly because they recommend and appoint national police commissioners to the top positions in the police. Police officers are inevitably put in a competitive and compromised position seeking favours from politicians. The inseparable relationship between the police and politicians is a worrying development in South Africa for two reasons. First, previous researchers have argued that, when there is a fusion between police and politicians, the police become less accountable to the citizens (Brogden 1986; Reiner 2000, 2010).

Second, the collaboration between police and politicians negates the whole theory of the separation of powers propounded by Montesquieu (1977) in his ground breaking essay entitled ‘*Spirit of the Laws*’. He argued that, within a democratic dispensation in any nation, the three arms of government - namely the legislature, executive and judiciary - should work independently of one another to avoid usurpation and abuse of powers by any one arm of government. In looking at one of the constitutional duties of the President of the Republic of South Africa, is to appoint and fire the National Police Commissioner of the South African

Police Service under section 216 (4) (a) South African Police Service Act 1995. A good case in point was the political appointment of General Bheki Cele as the National Police Commissioner by President Jacob Zuma. On June 12 2012, General Bheki Cele was sacked by the President for alleged offences of fraud and corruption. General Cele was found guilty for maladministration and found 'unfit for the office of National Police Commissioner by Justice Jake Moloi's independent investigation Inquiry in May 2011.

Sayed and Bruce (1998) define corruption as 'any illegal conduct or misconduct involving the use of occupational power for personal, group or organisational gain.' The gain referred to here may be special favours or monetary gains. The recipient of such gains must have some informed knowledge of what the gain is intended for. Basically, it is difficult to identify people who have received a gift or reward from persons known or unknown without knowing what the gift was intended for. According to Sayed and Bruce (1998), corruption can be understood from the following three perspectives: (i) Why it was committed; (ii) how was it committed; (iii) the kind of improper conduct committed.

The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act No.12 of 2004 defines corruption as follows:

'Any person who directly or indirectly accepts or offers to accept any gratification from any other person, whether for the benefit of himself or herself or for the benefit of another person: or gives or agrees or offers to give to another person any gratification for the benefit of another person in order in order to act personally or by influencing another person so to act to in a way that amounts to illegal , dishonest , unauthorised , incomplete or biased or misuse or selling of information or material acquired in the course or exercise , carrying out or performance of any powers , duties or functions arising out of a constitutional , statute or contractual or other legal obligation that amounts to the abuse of a position of authority, a

breach of trust , or the violation of a legal duty or set of rules designed to achieve an unjustified result, or that amounts to any other unauthorised or improper inducement to do or not to do anything is guilty of the offence of corruption’

Looking at police corruption during the apartheid regime, Newman (2002) argues that ‘De Kock presented a litany of evidence...a vast majority of the 121 charges were not brought about by the senior officers to whom he reported, but by independent state prosecutors following the revelations of the Goldstone Commission into public violence...Police members were involved in the smuggling and dealing of drugs, diamonds, illegal weapons from which they profited handsomely... there are indications that bribery, protection rackets and theft were also among “ordinary police members”. These forms of corruption, closely linked to the policing of illicit markets such as gambling, prostitution and the illegal sale of alcohol, were promoted throughout the apartheid police force’. This point was also emphasised by Lodge (1998).

According to Newman (2004:232), ‘corruption is when a policeman works for himself rather than his country.’ The researcher interprets the line of argument taken by Newman as a euphemistic remark because, under the South African Police Services Act 1995, the Corruption Act 94 of 1992 and the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act No.12 of 2004, there are no provisions in any of these Acts stipulating that the police should work for themselves.

The state criminalises the unlawful receipt of benefits and the performance of any corrupt act. More importantly there is no section that encourages a police officer to work for himself rather than his country, as the researcher understand it. The police officer is a state official entrusted with the duty to protect and serve all South African citizens.

According to Newman (2002), talk of corruption has become taboo in South Africa. He argues that

‘Talk of it can make police officers, particularly at senior levels, visibly uncomfortable. This is because it draws attention to the murkier areas of policing which are often out of the sight of the public. It brings to the fore a critical tension between the occupational requirements of police members to combat criminals and the organisational needs of the police agency to be accepted in the eyes of the public. Simply put, police corruption lurks in the arena where a police member’s discretion starts and organisational control ends’.

The researcher found some of the points raised above by Newman (2002) persuasive as he invites us into the murkier world of policing. The researcher argue that it is the secrecy associated with policing that has enabled institutional police corruption to thrive for decades in South Africa. One can also understand why the Republic of South Africa government legislations have met with resistance and, to a greater degree, a failure to consign police corruption to history.

Police officers, by virtue of having dealings with criminals, are more likely to be susceptible to corruption. A police officer dealing with drug dealers may be tempted to become involved in crime if he/she believes that such involvement will go undetected. (Manning and Redlinger (1977) and Punch (2009). The fall of National Police Comissioner Jackie Selebi is linked to the unlawful dealings with drug lord Glen Agliotti. More recently, the current National Police Commissioner General Riah Phiyega is currently being investigated by the Independent Police Investigative Directorate for alleged criminal offence of defeating the ends of justice. It was reported that General Phiyega tipped off Western Cape Commissioner of police Lieutenant –General Arno Lamoer that he was under investigation by the division of crime intelligence unit as having possible dealings with a drug lord. (The Sunday Independent November 03 2013: 6). The researcher argues that the fact that

the National Commissioner is alleged to have acted in this unlawful manner shows that corruption remains institutionalised within the SAPS.

Newman (2002) argues that ‘collusion between police members and drug syndicates has been recorded in South Africa. In some cases police officials are asked by syndicates or drug dealers to use their policing powers to undermine competition from other syndicates’

Sekhonyane (2003) argues that the extent of police corruption in South Africa is no longer a debatable issue. But too many corrupt officers are operating in an unchecked manner. The cases of national police commissioners Jackie Selebi and Bheki Cele come to mind. South African citizens were shown the extent of police corruption at the very top of the SAPS. The hypothesis proposed by the ‘few bad apples’ theory came under close scrutiny. The unanswered question in most of our minds was: Who was going to be next person accused of police corruption?

This article is divided into four parts. In the first part the researcher look at some definitions of corruption, police culture and institutionalised corruption.

In the second part, the researcher look at types of police corruption. In the third part, the researcher evaluate the impact of police corruption in the new democratic South Africa. In doing so, the researcher rely on the research guidance provided by Klockars et al. (2000). They argue that ‘Corruption is extremely difficult to study in a direct, quantitative and empirical manner. Because most incidents of corruption are never reported or recorded, official data on corruption are best regarded as measures of a police agency’s anti-corruption activity, not actual level of corruption’

In the fourth part of this article the researcher seek to find a long-term solution to police corruption in South Africa. The researcher is of the opinion that proper police accountability

is one of the solutions to corruption. Were police officers to be made truly accountable, the researcher is of the opinion that corruption would be reduced to a barest minimum. Police corruption is not peculiar to South Africa; it is a global phenomenon. It can happen in any country where citizens are judged and measured by the amount of material possessions they enjoy in society.

Causes of police corruption

1. Societal Strain

South Africa is a capitalist country and in most capitalist countries of the world we are judged by our social status in society. Our status in society may be defined by the amount of our material possessions. The individuals who do not have economic power in their communities are sometimes pressurised to do all they can to be counted and respected as successful members of their communities. Some citizens may resort to unlawful acts to become successful due to societal strain (Agnew 1992). The researcher argue that police officers are human beings who do not exist separately from the aspirations and expectations of the communities to which they belong. It is important that we recognise the fact that police officers are by and large a microcosm of the wider society they serve and protect. The researcher argument is that societal strain as a result of living in a competitive capitalist society may be responsible for police corruption. The ‘get rich quick’ syndrome becomes the order of the day over and above the constitutional duty of the police. The urge to satisfy some of our needs may drive errant police officers into committing unlawful acts like corruption, bribery, or get paid for docket disappearance.

2. The use of police discretionary powers

Geoffrey Marshall (1965) referred to the case of Fisher v Oldham Corporation [1930] in explaining the concept of police accountability. He argued that ‘the theory of constabulary independence has had a considerable impact on legislative

accountability for police work. Local accountability has been hindered and its operations rendered uncertain both by the legal status of the constables and by the existence of the Home Secretary's statutory powers...For the doctrine that chief constables were not subject to control in law enforcement matters rested squarely upon the proposition that they were constables at Common Law, and the notion that constables at Common Law exercised independence rested in turn upon the doctrine that they were not in a master-and-servant relationship with anyone for the purpose of civil liability' (Marshall 1965).

One can deduce from the above arguments by Marshall (1965) that the precise constitutional status of police constable remains ambiguous and not clearly defined enough for British citizens. The intriguing source of controversy stemming from the above argument is that if it is indeed assumed that the police are not in any master-and-servant relationship how can British citizens continue to respect the notion that the police are there to serve and protect the public? In reality, from the argument above provided to us by Marshall (1965), it can be argued they don't appear to serve and protect us, looking at the situation from a legal perspective.

Miller (2003) argues that 'South African police are three times more likely to commit a crime than the average South African civilian.' This line of argument is gleaned from the fact that police officers because of the nature of their jobs and high levels of temptation in areas such as the investigation of organised crime and high-profile criminals who have interest in compromising and corrupting police and the fact police officials have very high levels of discretionary authority which they can exercise in circumstances where close supervision is not possible (Punch 2009).

In South Africa, police officers make choices about which suspects to arrest or when to arrest them. The decision to arrest may sometimes be influenced by police officers' use of discretionary powers. In some instances where money has been exchanged for protection by

criminal gangs, errant police officers end up protecting criminals instead of protecting law-abiding citizens.

3. Lack of ethical standards

Ethical standards are rules set by organisations to ensure that their members fulfil their constitutional obligation to serve and protect. Ethical standards do not condone bribery and corruption. It is the failure of police officers to follow prescribed ethical standards that may lead to corruption in the first place. Rigorous enforcement of ethical standards is needed in the police service to consign corruption to history. Any police service where the observance of ethical standard is promoted will deliver effective more than the police service that is plagued with corrupt officials.

4. Political influence

The South African police service has become more politicised than ever. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between politicians and the police in South Africa. One is able to reach these conclusions from the cases of disgraced SAPS National Commissioner Jackie Selebi who was jailed for 15 years for corruption. The current sack, reinstatement and re sack of crime intelligence boss General Richard Mduli. The then appointed Acting police national Commissioner Lieutenant Nhlanhla Mkwanazi was reported to have said before the Members of Parliament that he had been instructed by “ Powers beyond us to release some case dockets to the Inspector –general for intelligence” suggesting once gain illegal political interference to derail General Richard Mduli investigation over alleged murder, fraudulent use of the crime intelligence slush funds diverted to his personal use (Mail and Guardian November 1 to 7 2013:2; The Sunday Independent November 03 2013 :6).

5. Greed

Human greed may be responsible for police corruption in South Africa. It was widely reported that Jackie Selebi earned over R1.3 Million. One cannot understand why he was still taking bribes. Greed is a possible factor responsible for police corruption.

6. Citizens' willingness to offer bribes to the police

A number of incidents have been brought to our attention in South Africa in which some citizens have encouraged police officers to work from a compromised position (Newman and Faull 2011). The researcher argue that the unlawful act and willingness of members of the public to offer bribes to the police in South Africa has helped to create and sustain police corruption. If there is no supply for corruption the demand will not be so prevalent in South Africa.

7. A failure of the police recruitment and selection processes

It can be argued that, prior to the World Cup in 2010, the South African Police Service embarked upon a large-scale recruitment process. The haste to recruit more officers in preparation for the World Cup led to a drop in standards among police officers in South Africa. The researcher confirm that we still do have a number of police officers who know the grounds for stopping motorists, or the legal aspects related to such stops. The researcher concurs with some of the argument found in the recent Green Paper on policing published in June 2013 highlighting some of the shortcomings associated with the South African Police Service. For some of the reasons given , the researcher suggest that that the police need to look the recruitment processes, detective and forensic investigations again to ensure that quality officers are appointed solely on merit to the South Africa Police Service. Their overall performance is up to international standards (Green Paper on Policing June 2013).

8. Police culture and solidarity.

Reiner (1992) defines police culture as ‘the values, norms, perspectives and craft rules which inform police conduct’. Meanwhile, Chan (1997) defines police culture as ‘informal occupational norms and values operating under the apparently rigid hierarchical structure of police organizations’.

What we can deduce from the above definitions is that ‘the police hold a distinctive set of norms, beliefs, and values which determines their behaviour, both amongst themselves and operationally out on the streets’(Loftus 2009).

Police culture is sustained because of the exigencies of the job in coping with things such as pressures, tensions and working under stressful conditions. It is through these informal arrangements that the police subculture endures (Reiner 1992; Waddington 2000; Chan 1997; Bayley 1996).

Solidarity

Unarguably, a police constable needs the full support of his/her colleagues whilst on duty. Police officers have a reputation for backing one another, especially when faced with violent confrontational situations. Without the solidarity and support of his/her colleagues, a police officer may find it difficult to function properly (see Holdaway 1983; Punch 2009; Loftus 2009).

Both police culture and solidarity provides a fertile ground for corruption to thrive unreported. In an environment where the where the code of silence is sustained by reward and acceptance into police dominant culture, no police officer would like to become whistle blower for fear of reprisal or isolation. Policing is not done in isolation, the risky nature of the job encourages police officers to rely on each other during patrols. Sometimes police officers are dishonest enough to protect their colleagues if the need arises or when faced by external threats (see , Holdaway 1983, Reiner 2010).

9. Low pay

Low pay does not boost the morale of police officers. The police service is a very risky job. Many police officers put their lives on the line to protect and serve us. Many feel that the rewards are not commensurate with the nature of job they do. Based on this analysis, low pay should be seen as motivating factor for police officers worldwide to become more susceptible to corruption. One can argue that if police officers are well paid, there will be no need for them to expect or ask for bribes from citizens. It can be argued that not all police officers are corrupt. Police officers in South Africa simply cannot manage on a salary of less than around R200,000 per annum for the type of job they do and the constitutional role they play in society. The researcher have heard a number of people express the view that police officers are already paid enough. If they are paid enough, why are they still prone and susceptible to corruption?

Better pay will enhance professionalism , integrity and less corruption. This may eventually boost the morale for serving police officers. Police salaries should be linked to performance. A reward for good performance in fighting crime successfully is imperative. If we are to attract good-calibre police officers to meet the crime challenges of the 21st century a revised salary structure is needed. If one looks at the disparity in pay between the Commissioner and the ordinary police constable in South Africa one will observe a very wide gap. Many would argue that the Commissioners of Police have more responsibilities and decisions to make. The researcher argue that an unhappy workforce will never deliver efficiently and effectively when it comes to policing our communities.

Reckless corruption in South Africa today: Jackie Selebi v S

Jackie Selebi was appointed in 2000 as the first SAPS police chief. This was a political appointment by the ANC-led government. In 2010 Selebi was tried and convicted of corruption; he was found guilty and jailed for 15 years for violation of section 4(1) a (1)bb of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 2004. It was alleged that J Selebi had received cash payments totalling about 1.2 Million Rands from convicted drug trafficker Glen Agliotti in exchange for turning a blind eye to his drug smuggling business in South Africa and for passing on confidential information to Glen Agliotti. During the court trial, Selebi persistently denied the charges and maintained his innocence despite the overwhelming evidence against him. Selebi was sentenced to 15 years in jail. However, Selebi has recently been released by the South African medical parole board on the grounds of ill-health. This decision has not gone down well with many South Africans for two reasons. Some have argued that Selebi was released due to his political connections and that there are so many other South Africans who have not been granted early release from prison on medical grounds. They have asked why Selebi did not serve his full sentence. Some would also doubt the wisdom of spending millions of Rands on prosecuting high-profile criminals who we know will simply not serve their full jail terms. It is a waste of time, energy and resources. One can argue that this is a mockery of our criminal justice system in South Africa where there now appears to be one rule for the powerful and connected and another rule for the poor and marginalised. The issue here is that our criminal justice system is being accused of bias and nepotism. More importantly, our criminal justice system, which is supposed to defend the rule of law, now appears to be rubber-stamping corruption and unlawful acts. This is a sad and worrying situation for our new democracy in South Africa.

National Commissioner Beheki Cele

In 2010, General Bheki Cele was summoned before parliament to explain why about 3.2 billion Rands were allocated to the police for construction and renovation of police buildings in South Africa. Bheki Cele was accused of signing unfair contracts for his colleagues and receiving kickbacks from some of the contractors. Bheki Cele was allegedly accused of signing a contract worth over 500 million Rands with Mr Roux Shanbangu. This deal was not a straightforward one and it eventually led to the suspension from office and sacking of Bheki Cele. Although, no court in South Africa has found Bheki Cele guilty, it generated bad publicity for the South Africa Police Service. Again, South Africa watched the media as the inquiry set up by the government and headed by Justice Jake Moloai found Bheki Cele guilty of grand-scale corruption. The delay by President Jacob Zuma came under close debate and scrutiny. Why did it take so long to get rid of Bheki Cele? The researcher argue that, during this delay, the morale of members of the South African Police Service was at an all-time low. It was becoming an embarrassment to work for an organisation that is seen by many South Africans as institutionally corrupt. Although Bheki Cele was eventually sacked, immeasurable damage has been caused to the SAPS by the South African government's indecision and failure to act swiftly to minimise the damage.

Independent Police Investigative Directorate Annual report 2012/2013

According to this report covering the period 1 April 2012 to 31 march 2013, it was reported that: ‘ the fight against corruption remains a challenge, this calls for the review of current controls in order to improve the control environment within SAPS and MPS to eliminate opportunity for corruption’ (IPID 2013:30)

The researcher rely on this report in presenting a breakdown of police corruption province by province as follows:

Province	Incidents(s)	Percentages
Eastern Cape	8	7%
Free State	14	12%
Gauteng	9	7%
KwaZulu-Natal	56	47%
Limpopo	12	10%
Mpumalanga	2	2%
North West	4	3%
Northern Cape	4	3%
Western Cape	11	9%
Total	120	100%

*Source: Table 12 (a) IPID , 2013.

‘In analysis of cases received , the majority of the cases were related to extortion or soliciting for a bribe, followed by sale , theft of exhibits and sale , theft and /or destruction of police dockets. Table 12 (b)depicts the total number and the percentage of cases received related to corruption per description. One can clearly see that Kwazulu Natal police are the most corrupt province going by the report 47 incidents. This followed by Free State with 14 reported incidents of police corruption. It does not suggest that these figures are accurate and

reliable but it provides us with an evaluation or extent of police corruption. Not all police corruption are reported and detected.

Description	Incident(s)	Percentages
Corruption-Aiding escape from custody	6	5%
Corruption-Extortion	90	75%
Corruption-Issuing of fraudulent documents	3	3%
Corruption-Sale, theft and /or destruction of police dockets	10	8%
Corruption-Sale, theft of exhibits	11	9%
Total	120	100%

*Source Table 12 (b) IPID 2013.

South African citizens are becoming frustrated and less tolerant of corruption. Failure to do something about it, especially when public officials are accused of corruption, will exacerbate the anxiety caused by it. It is ironic that the people we have entrusted to serve and protect us, and to bring criminals who violate our rights to justice, are now the very people being brought to justice. The researcher calls this trend an ironic tragedy or a negative role and responsibilities reversal. Next, the researcher look at the concept of democratic policing.

Democratic policing

The South African Police was established on 1 April 1913 in terms of Act 13 of 1912, is a national police force responsible through its Commissioner, to the Minister of Law and Order. The South African Police is charged with the following responsibilities (Compare Act 7 of 1958, The Police Act):

- The preservation of internal security;
- The maintenance of law and order;
- The investigation of any crime or alleged crime, and
- The prevention of crime.

The South African Police service is governed by the South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act No 68 of 1995). This Act has recently been amended under the South African Police Service Amended Act 2008 (Act No 57 of 2008). The new Act is designed to bring about some of the following changes:

- Enhance the capacity of the South African Police Service to prevent, combat and investigate national priority crimes and other crimes, by establishing a separate Division in the South African Police Service, the Directorate for priority crime investigations.
- Ensure a multi-disciplinary and integrated approach in the prevention and investigation of all crimes.

The Principles of Batho Pele

Batho Pele is a Sesotho phrase meaning 'putting people first' Sesotho is one of the eleven official languages spoken in South Africa. Batho Pele was introduced into the sphere of public service delivery due to the South Africa government White Paper on the

Transformation of public service 1995. It was designed to improve the quality of public service delivery, monitor and respond to community needs.

It has the following objectives:

- Consultation: People must be consulted about the level and quality of public service they receive and whenever possible be given choice.
- Service Standards: People should be told what level and quality of public services they will receive, so that they what to expect.
- Access: All citizens have equal access to the services to which they are entitled.
- Courtesy: All people should be treated with courtesy and consideration.
- Information: People should be treated with Courtesy and consideration.
- Information: People should be given full, accurate information about the services they receive.
- Openness and transparency: People should be told how government departments are run, how much they cost and who is in charge.
- Redress: If a promised standard of services is not delivered, people should be offered apology, an explanation and a speedy remedy when complaints are made, people should receive a sympathetic and positive response.
- Value for money: Public services must be provided economically and efficiently.

One can clearly see the desired goals of Batho Pele Principles in relation to public service delivery. Ideally, it is a very good practice because it was designed to promote good community spirit amongst citizens.

Loveday (1995) argues that “true accountability cannot be said to exist without a fully democratic and locally-oriented structure for police accountability” (see Loveday 1995, 1999).

Democracy in this context as the researcher understand it means giving people the opportunity to make choices about their policing needs and safety. It also means reinstating the ethos of community policing where all sections of society are allowed to participate in day-to-day matters of safety. Community policing is about crime prevention, stopping crimes before they occur in our communities. It means that local people are invited to participate in their respective communities and are given a voice to decide how they should be policed. It places the responsibility on citizens to make choices about what sort of policing they want, and to question the police about issues of safety and security that may affect them and their communities.

In South Africa today, the researcher argue that we do not have democratic policing as described above. Although we have police community forums, members of our communities do not feel that police listen enough to them, neither do they have trust or confidence in the police especially in view of the extent of police corruption reported in the South Africa media.

The researcher stumbled across a recent document published by the South Africa Police Service entitled ‘Annual Report 2010/2011’. Surprisingly, corruption did not appear on the current list of crime challenges facing the South African Police Service. The researcher take this either as an oversight or a deliberate attempt by the South African Police Service management team to avoid addressing endemic corruption within its rank and file. Police corruption in South Africa will not go away without all citizens first joining in the long-standing struggle to consign corruption to history. From the researcher’s observation, it has become more or less a competition between the police and politicians in South Africa as to who will be more corrupt. Democracy is endangered by the collaboration between the police and the politicians in turning a blind to corruption in our society. Corruption permeates our institutions in South Africa and this in turn impacts service delivery.

South Africa is witnessing a rise in ‘tenderpreneurs’ - a process of applying for tenders to provide basic services for the citizens of South Africa - has become more of a lucrative venture characterised by grand scale corruption, as some municipalities are enmeshed in corruption scandals as a result of it. Police corruption and civic corruption in South Africa are inseparable because they serve one purpose collectively to impoverish the marginalised citizens of South Africa.

Newman (2002) argues that ‘managers themselves may be beneficiaries of corruption. They may also believe the personal costs they face in tackling it are too high. For a police agency to effectively act against corruption, managers must have the willpower, authority and organisational support to do so...when a police agency is serious about tackling corruption, its managers must actively share this commitment’.

Possible solutions to police corruption in South Africa

1. A review of the current SAPS selection and recruitment Policy. This policy states that for any person to be appointed as a police official into the South Africa Police Service, certain criteria have to be met under the South African Police Service Act , 1995 (Act No 68 of 1995). They are as follows:
 - fill out official application form and affirm under oath or by of a solemn declaration that the information he/she supplied on the application is true and correct.
 - have permanent residence in the Republic of South Africa (RSA) of which he/she must give documentary proof.
 - be at least 18 years and younger than 30 years (documentary proof needed).
 - undergo a physical and medical examination as determined by the SAPS and must be found to be physically and mentally fit to be appointed in the post for which he/she applies.
 - have a senior certificate (Grade 12) or an equivalent qualification, of which he/she must have a documentary proof.

- be fluent in at least English and one other official language.
- have a valid driver's licence for at least a light motor vehicle.
- be prepared to serve anywhere in South Africa.

(see, SAPS website)

This current process of recruitment needs to be reviewed as a matter of urgency. The World Cup has come and gone when there was a mass recruitment of police officers. It is high time that SAPS started to work on recruiting high-calibre officers of integrity who are willing to serve the citizens of South Africa diligently and to uphold the law taking into recognition human rights and democratic values.

2. It is vital to increase the detection of and punishment of corrupt acts in order to deter all officers in each department from engaging in corrupt acts (Sherman 1983:146). In this regard, law enforcement agencies to fight corruption have been set up. For example, the Special Investigative Unit (SIU); Asset Forfeiture Unit (ASU); the Independent Investigative Directorate (IPID).
3. Early warning systems need to be put in place internally and externally to carefully monitor suspected police officers who might be vulnerable to corruption. This will complement the role of the SIU. The SIU was set up to investigate fraud, corruption and maladministration and to institute civil litigation to recover losses suffered by the state, or prevent further losses. The SIU was set up under Act No 74 of 1996 and Act No11 of 2012 SIU amendment Act. (see, SIU website)
4. Police accountability is needed now in South Africa. When setting the parameters for the police disciplinary process, care should be taken to ensure it is efficient, reliable and transparent.

5. The Independent Investigation Directorate (IPID) needs to be given more constitutional powers to be able to investigate the police in South Africa. The Functions of the IPID is set out under Act 1 of 2011 as :

- provide independent and impartial investigations of identified criminal offences allegedly committed by members of the SAPS and Municipal Police Services
- investigate corruption matters within the police.
- to make disciplinary recommendations in respect of members of the SAPS and MPS resulting from investigations conducted by the directorate.
- investigation of any deaths in police custody.
- investigation of incidents involving police officers discharge of firearm.
- rape by a police officer , whether the police officer is on duty or off duty.
- any complaint of torture or assault
- to ensure accountability and transparency by the SAPS and MPS in accordance with the Republic of South Africa constitution.
- the entry and search of premises (execution of warrants)
- the seizure and disposal of articles

6. Professionalisation of SAPs: Officers should see the police service as a long-term career in which they are equipped with both academic skills and the practical knowledge needed to do their jobs effectively. This would give them something to rely on whilst in service and even after their retirement. The SAPS is currently promoting professionalism of police officers. It is important that they sustain their efforts like the Police in the United Kingdom who has already commenced the professionalisation of the police service (see Neyroud Report 2010).

7. Whistle-blowers who have the moral courage to break the unofficial code of silence and turn their colleagues in should be protected and rewarded.
8. Property should be confiscated if it is traced to corruption. This will complement the role of the Asset Forfeiture Unit (ACU). ACU was established in May 1999 in the office of the National Director of Public Prosecutor under the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 1998 (Act No 12 of 1998) POCA. ACU was set with the following objectives:
 - To develop investigative mechanism to seize criminal assets particularly proceeds from organised crime.
 - There should be a constitutional body set up to hire and fire the National Police Commissioners and all provincial commissioners. A transparent short listing and interviewing process should be put in place.

Conclusion

South African citizens are running out of patience with the grand-scale corruption among police officers. We have become used to reports of corruption in South Africa. Police officers, by virtue of their role in society, are not supposed to be corrupt. We rely on them to serve and protect us diligently. There is nothing as disappointing as seeing police officers being sent to jail. This erodes public confidence in the police. Corruption has become a pervasive trend in South Africa. Sometimes, it is difficult to tell whether the politicians are more corrupt than the police. Whichever way we look at it, corrupt police officers lose their legitimacy to protect and serve us all. Corruption in the South Africa Police service is no longer a conceal phenomenon but an open one. The South Africa police Service is faced with one choice to win the hearts and minds of South African citizens or stands the risk of losing

the legitimacy to protect and serve the people of South Africa. The last our new democracy wants is lack of police accountability. If we are unable to work very hard collectively to consign corruption to history and do nothing about this problem, it may be at the expense of our new democracy in South Africa.

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