Evaluating the African Union’s Military Interventionist Role towards Conflict Management in Africa

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ABSTRACT

The prevalence of intra-state conflicts and state failures in Africa since the end of the Cold War has made Africa the epicentre of threats to human, national and international security. The inability of African states to combat the insecurities in their respective countries reinforces the discourse on the role of the African Union (AU) in enhancing peace and security across the continent. Since its establishment in 2002, the AU has responded to some security challenges in Africa. In situations of armed conflicts, especially where diplomatic and mediatory efforts fail, the AU has adopted military interventionist mechanisms to protect civilians and to restore peace and security in accord with Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act. Drawing from the cases of Somalia, Sudan and Libya, this research evaluates the capacity of the AU to operationalize the idea of ‘African Solutions to African Problems’ and enforce peace and security especially through its military interventionist mechanisms. Limitations in terms of resources, expertise and funds as well as the poor commitment of member states constitute setbacks to the AU’s effort at conflict management. For the AU to perform effectively in conflict situations, it is imperative for the regional body to develop the required supranational capacity to compel obedience from member states as well as warring parties.
DECLARATION

I, Ndubuisi Christian Ani, 212510102 declare that:

1. The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original research.
2. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.
3. This thesis does not contain other persons’ data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons.
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   A) Their words have been re-written but the general information attributed to them has been referenced
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5. This thesis does not contain text, graphics or tables copied and pasted from the Internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and the source being detailed in the thesis and in the References sections.

Author: Ndubuisi Christian Ani Date: 21st of February, 2013

Supervisor: Mr. Adeoye O. Akinola Date: 21st of February, 2013
DEDICATION

In memory of all the victims of conflict in the African continent as well as all individuals that work tirelessly to restore peace and security in Africa.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Background of Research

The increased rate of intrastate conflicts and state failures in Africa since the end of the Cold War has made Africa the epicentre of threats to human, national and international security (Osaghae 2007; Reilly 2008). State failure and intrastate conflicts have made the continent susceptible to problems such as local and international terrorism, organized criminal activities, arms and drug trafficking, refugee flows and the spread of diseases (Cusimano 2000: 4). Terrorists and criminal syndicates carry out their clandestine and deleterious activities from (and in) the continent with global outreach. Intra-state conflicts in Africa are also notorious for metastasizing into regional conflicts.¹

Thus, aside from the loss of lives and properties in many states-in-crisis, political instabilities and armed insurrections have continued to impede peace, security and sustainable development in the African continent. The persistence of conflict in Africa defies the power of African states to provide security and hampers Africa’s goals and development. Internationally, the rampant conflict in Africa taints the continent’s image, and attenuates its right to self-determination and meaningful contribution to global debates (Hoeffler 2008; Ayittey 1994; Somerville 1990).

The inability of states to combat the spate of violence and insecurities in their respective countries re-ignites the discourse on the role of the continent’s regional organization in enhancing peace and security across the continent. This raises interests around the efficiency of the African regional organization in tackling the security challenges in Africa via its conflict management role. The efficacy of the regional organization would create a safe and stable environment for Africa, as a geopolitical region, to materialize its political, economic and social aspirations.

In their pan-African mindedness, African leaders, since independence, have always tried to adopt a multilateral approach to addressing the continent’s multifarious challenges (Parker and Rukare 2002: 365; Murithi 2009: 93; Poku et al 2007: 115). However, the Organization

¹ The conflict in DRC dragged in neighbouring states such as Rwanda and Uganda. The Somali conflict as well dragged in Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea into the crisis.
of African Unity (OAU), which was established in 1963 to address the continent’s problems, failed to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War realities of African states. The OAU’s strict allegiance to its policy of non-intervention prevented it from intervening in the internal affairs of member states to protect citizens from gross human rights violations and insecurities (Tieku 2007: 29; Kioko 2003: 814). Laporte and Mackie (2010: 15) note that ‘the OAU was little more than a secretariat whose main task was to support regular meetings of Heads of States’. Given its strong dedication to the non-interventionist principle, the OAU was hamstrung in the face of internal conflicts, gross human right abuses, repressive regimes and crimes against humanity that have wracked the continent’s socio-economic and political aspirations (Apuuli 2012: 136).

In a bid to redress OAU’s inefficiencies and limitations, the African Union was established in July 2002 as a replacement to appropriately shoulder Africa’s socio-economic and political challenges. This comes in line with the notion of providing African solutions to African problems. The idea of African solutions to African problems derives from the need for Africans to attend to African problems alone. This would enable African states to lessen the risk of being abandoned by the international community in their times of need and to reduce the risk of ulterior external interventions in the continent (Parker and Rukare 2002: 365; Murithi 2009: 93). By pulling resources together, African states are expected to closely attend to the sundry challenges in the continent. Through the African Union, Africans are expected to confront the scourge of conflicts that has been the bane of political, economic and social development in the continent (Williams 2011: 3).

In line with the contemporary challenges of Africa, the African Union stretched its notion of security beyond the state-centric concept to human security (Hanson 2009: 1; Poku et al 2007: 1158). The Human security paradigm entails the provision and protection of the rights of individuals, groups and societies as against the state-centric model that focuses on the survival of state regimes (Kaldor 2007: 182). The human security paradigm in essence attaches more precedence to human rights than the existence of regimes, especially ones that

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2 Tieku (2007: 28) notes that the pan-Africanists idea of AU is grounded on the concern for the challenges of ordinary Africans and the new security threats facing the continent.

3 The history of colonialism in Africa and the Cold War meddling of foreign powers in Africa coupled with the ulterior interests of foreign powers in Africa have made non-African interventions in the continent suspicious. The continent’s regional organization is constantly being relied on to adequately respond to African problems to prevent the dangers of external intervention and to ensure that African-oriented solutions that speak to the lived reality of Africans are used.
are inimical to ordinary people. The AU integrated human security ideas in its binding agreements, declarations, decisions, memoranda of understanding, policy, mission and vision statements, conventions and communiqués (Tieku 2007: 26; Sesay 2008: 6). In accord to its human rights security paradigm, the AU reserves the right to exploit military interventionist mechanisms in cases were diplomacy and non-military alternatives have gone unheeded.


Africans cannot… watch the tragedies developing in the continent and say it is the UN’s responsibility or somebody else’s responsibility. We have moved from the concept of non-interference to non-indifference. We cannot as Africans remain indifferent to the tragedy of our people (quoted in Powell 2005: 1).

In the case of Sudan for instance, the African Union has been taking a leading role in the resolution of the violence that erupted in the Darfur region of Sudan in February 2003. The armed conflict began when two rebel groups; the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement began an armed insurrection against the government. In turn, the Sudanese government in alliance with the pro-government militia known as the Janjaweed launched a high handed crackdown on the rebels and their affiliated tribes (Murithi 2009: 99). The armed insurrection led to grave atrocities against civilians, destruction of property, the loss of over thousands of lives, large number of internally displaced persons and refugee flows into neighbouring countries. When the AU’s facilitated ceasefire and peace agreement were violated by the warring factions, the regional body established a military mission in Sudan (AMIS) in December 2004 to protect the civilian population and restore stability in Sudan (Farmer 2012: 99).

The African Union draws its right to intervene militarily in its member states from Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act of 2001 which mandates AU to respond to war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order (African Union 2013; Kioko 2003: 807; Tieku 2007: 29). Moreover, chapter VIII of the UN Charter
enjoins regional organizations to take the first necessary step to resolve regional conflicts with the authorization of the UN Security Council (Peck 2001: 562; Williams 2011: 17). Hence, apart from the right bestowed on AU by its members to intervene, the international community also recognizes the pivotal role of regional organizations in addressing the conflicts within their region.

The commitment of the African Union to containing conflicts in Africa raises both positive and negative criticisms. It becomes pertinent to probe how effective the AU has been in fostering peace and security in Africa. There are literatures which assess African Union’s interventionist role in the continent (Williams 2011; Møller 2009; Ado, 2011; Apuuli 2012; Murithi 2009; Poku et al 2007; Kioko 2003; Tieku 2007; Sesay 2008, Kerekou 2007; Shinn 2012; Scanlon et al 2007, etc.). Such studies conflate African Union’s conflict resolution, transformation and management efforts with features such as mediation, negotiation, peace-making, peacekeeping and peace-building.

This research however, focuses on assessing the African Union’s military approach towards conflict management. Conflict management entails the international community’s measures to alleviate the dangers of conflict and lessen actual or potential suffering (Wallensteen 2011: 5). This involves attempts to minimize suffering, prevent conflict from escalating and creating conditions for non-violent settlement of conflict. Unlike the ambitious nature of conflict resolution that extends to the transformation of social, political, economic and cultural institutions and practices that sustain conflict, conflict management has a narrow scope (Butler 2009: 15). Rather than aspiring to tackle underlying causes of conflict, conflict management has a clear, feasible and widely applicable aim of managing the deleterious effects of conflict without meddling with the internal structure and particularities of the host state. Conflict management aims not only to lessen the dangers of conflict for the community or nation directly involved in the conflict but also for communities that are not directly involved such as neighbouring states and the international community at large. It focuses on containing conflicts, protecting civilian populations, and creating a nonviolent environment for a political solution to take place (Wallensteen 2011: 3, 8).

Based on the foregoing, this research restricts its analysis to the military peace operations of the African Union that are geared towards containing armed conflicts, protecting civilian populations and facilitating peace processes. Situated within the theoretical framework of liberal institutionalism, the research investigates the efficiency of the African Union’s
military interventionist role in achieving the aforementioned goals. The cases of AU’s intervention in the Darfur’s region of Sudan, and Somalia as well as its response to the Libyan revolution are used to examine the efficiency of the African Union’s response to conflict cases in Africa. Using the principles of Human Security and Responsibility to Protect, the study sets the criteria for an effective African Union in terms of enforcing its agenda of peace and security in the African continent. Most significantly, the dissertation assesses how the African Union has been able to operationalize the idea of ‘African Solutions to African Problems’ through its conflict management efforts. The assessment goes a long way in estimating the regional body’s legitimacy and responsibility for African peace and security in a globalized world. It also identifies the strengths of AU that are sustainable and how best to constrain its failures.

1.2 Research objectives

The primary objectives of the research are to:

1. Examine the significance of the African Union as an institution committed to regional peace and security.
2. Assess the achievements and failures of the African Union in terms of promoting, enhancing and enforcing peace and security via military intervention in Africa.
3. Explore the challenges and prospects of an effective African Union’s military interventionist role.

The research shall grapple with the following key questions:

1. What are the motivations for an effective African Union with regard to conflict management in Africa?
2. What are the African Union’s military mechanisms and measures for enforcing peace and security in Africa?
3. What are the achievements and challenges of the African Union’s conflict management efforts via military intervention in Africa?
4. How can the African Union develop its capabilities for military approach to conflict management?

A Pan-Africanist idea insisting that African issues should be addressed by Africans alone to guard against neocolonialism and other ulterior external interventions in the continent (Parker and Rukare 2002: 365; Murithi 2009: 93; Williams 2011: 3; Farmer 2012: 95).
Broader Research objectives and issues to be investigated:

1. The study shall examine the concept of *African solutions to African problems* and how the African Union tries to operationalize the idea.
2. The study will explore the effectiveness of multilateral approach to combating armed conflicts within a state.

Broader questions to be asked:

1. Does the African Union have the required institutional support, resources and political will to achieve the idea of *African Solutions to African Problems*?
2. What is the significance and importance of African Union’s efficiency in terms of peace and security?

1.3 Scope and Limitation of the Study

The research restricts its unit of analysis to the African Union’s military operations in Somalia and Sudan as well as the contentious negligence to intervene during the Libyan Revolution. By using the terms military operation or approach, the study does not refer to military intervention\(^5\) as used in the classical sense. This study uses the terms military operation and approach to refer to any intervention that require the deployment of soldiers such as peacekeeping\(^6\) and peace-enforcement\(^7\) missions including military intervention.

The three case studies – Somalia, Sudan and Libya – that were employed for this study were strategically chosen to enable a genuine evaluation of the African Union’s interventionist role in Africa. Basically, the African Union has sent peacekeeping forces to Burundi, Comoro Islands, Somalia, Sudan and recently, the Central African Republic. For Burundi, the African

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\(^5\) Military intervention involves the use of military force without the consent of the host state to provide humanitarian aid to civilians, protect civilian population, prevent genocide and crimes against humanity and/or to coerce belligerents to engage in peaceful negotiations (Viotti and Kauppi 2001).

\(^6\) Peacekeeping involves the expeditionary use of police and/or military personnel to prevent armed conflicts as well as to enforce, observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements (Williams 2010:2).

\(^7\) Peace enforcement entails a third-party military intervention in a violent conflict scenario in order to bring an end to the conflict with or without the consent of the belligerents (Butler 2011: 160)
Union intervention lasted for a year from 2003 to 2004 when the mission was replaced by a stronger UN peace mission. An evaluation of the African Union’s interventionist role in Africa based on the Burundi’s one year experience would yield a limited understanding of the AU's interventionist role. The African Union’s interventions in the Comoro Islands in 2004, 2006 and 2007 to 2008 were basically for election observation, monitoring and support. Moreover, South Africa was the only main troop contributing country for the missions in the islands. The AU mission’s in the Comoro Islands would also provide lesser understanding of the African Union’s efforts at conflict management. Furthermore, the build up for the AU’s peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic which began in 2013 also provides less information of the African Union’s interventionist role.

However, the African Union’s interventions in Somalia and Sudan stand out and are specifically important for analysis given the persistent nature of the conflicts and the African Union’s efforts to tackle it in a proactive and confrontational manner. In Sudan and Somalia, the African Union sent a peacekeeping mission to the countries to facilitate peace processes, contain the unrest and protect civilians. The interventions have also demanded immense financial and resource commitment of the African Union. In Sudan, the African Union has been involved in seeking a peace process in Darfur since violence erupted in the region in 2003. Even after its sole mission – the AU’s Mission in Sudan (AMIS) – elapsed in 2007, the African Union continues to take the lead in resolving the conflict in Darfur under the hybrid UN/AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In the case of Somalia, the African Union established a peacekeeping mission in the country in 2007 when the international community seemed to have given up hope on peace and state building in Somalia. Up to the present time, the African Union’s continues to spearhead the peace and state building in Somalia with immense progress in recent times. The case of African Union’s interventions in Somalia and Sudan presents useful data for a better understanding and evaluation of the African Union’s military approach and role towards conflict management in Africa.

Although the African Union did not intervene militarily in Libya, the study uses the case of Libya, on the other hand, to inquire into the options present to the African Union in the face of the crises that resulted in NATO’s intervention in the country. The study assesses the quality of the regional organization’s response to the Libyan crisis under the prism of conflict management. The use of Libya as a case study enables the research to consider arguments that favour the military approach to containing the conflict. The case of Libya raises complex debates about the African Union’s responsibility and genuine commitment to African peace
and security. The Libyan case is also useful in considering AU’s legitimacy and credibility in tackling regional issues in a globalized world. Generally, the three case studies – AU’s responses to the conflicts in Sudan, Somalia and Libya – enable a reasonable estimation of the African Union’s conflict management roles and capabilities with focus on the African Union’s military approach.

The research faces some limitations in that it does not delve deeply into the diplomatic, preventive and mediatory aspects of the African Union’s interventions. Nevertheless, the focusing on the African Union’s military dimension to conflict management is to ensure the feasibility of the research and the concentration of the study on the most contentious aspect of third party intervention, which has to do with third-party deployment of military forces to conflict states. Furthermore, given that the research looks at three case studies of conflict cases where the African Union has responded to, the research shall not dwell so much on the historical details of the countries in question. The study shall present an overview of the situation that precipitated the response of the African Union in the conflict zones while concentration would be placed on examining the efficiency of the African Union’s interventions.

1.4 Significance of the study

The study contributes to the extant literature on conflict management and the role of the African Union in promoting peace and security. The research is timely with the increasing expectation for the African Union to address the continent’s ills especially the spates of conflict in the continent. Armed conflicts in the continent hamper initiatives and efforts at solving the socio-economic and political challenges facing Africa such as poverty, hunger, underdevelopment and lack of basic social services. The study stimulates renewed debates on the role of the African Union in addressing African issues and provides specialists, scholars, and policy makers with data on how to improve AU’s capacity to address the scourge of conflicts that has been the bane of stability and development in the continent.

1.5 Research methodology and methods:

The research elicits data from secondary sources. Due to the limited timeframe for the study, the absence of fiscal support to conduct interviews with prominent staffs at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as well as the precarious nature of the states used as case studies, the researcher could not obtain primary data from the conflict fields. Although
there is a paucity of exclusive literatures that evaluate the African Union’s military conflict management efforts, the researcher is aware of the availability of several materials that contain some information that are useful for the completion of this study. Hence, the researcher extracts relevant information from materials that deals with issues on the African Union’s military roles.

The research makes critical use of secondary data from textbooks, journals, reports, newspapers and news commentaries. The researcher looks into the disparate materials discussing the conflict situations in Sudan, Somalia and Libya, as well as the African Union’s response to the crisis cases. As noted by Neuman (2011), secondary evidence may be problematic in terms of its accuracy in historical accounts. Secondary sources may also reflect the bias of the authors. Cognizant of such limitations, the researcher ensures that the data extracted from the secondary sources are verified across various scholarly sources and primary reports of the African Union to avert the problems of inaccuracy and distortion in historical accounts and to minimize the risk of reflecting the prejudice of the authors. This goes a long way to ensure the genuineness and validity of the research as it endeavours to present various views on the efficiency of the African Union’s interventions. The research information is corroborated with the primary data of the African Union such as the reports of the African Union Peace and Security Council and the information on the AU website.

In line with the theoretical framework, objective of this research and method of data collection, qualitative methodology is employed to explicate and analyse the data relevant to African Union’s military approach to conflict management. Qualitative research methodology entails understanding some aspect of social life using words as currency for analysis (Patton and Cochran 2002: 2). Hence, the research contends with the what, how and why questions related to the assessment of the African Union’s conflict management efforts via military intervention. The data extracted from the secondary sources underwent an interpretative form of data analysis. This entails drawing meaning out of social phenomena (Cassidy 2013). Interpretive data analysis enables the researcher to assess and make judgements on the factual responses of the African Union in conflict situations.

It is observed that based on the interpretive approach, different analysts could have different understanding of reality (Hammersley 1992). This may engender subjective and biased analysis of data as people’s interpretations are often affected by their different assumptions, world views as well as cultural, educational and geographical backgrounds. In line with
Cassidy (2013: 27), the cognizance of the forgoing limitation of interpretation ensures that one is not intoxicated with the conviction that one’s understanding and judgements are the best and are irrefutable. Through inter-subjectivity\(^8\), the researcher takes into account various assessments of the African Union’s efficiency so as to arrive at a more non-subjective conclusion for this research. Nevertheless, the study presents a unique interpretation of the efforts and capabilities of the African Union at conflict management.

The findings and analysis shall be presented in an informational and discursive manner. The data garnered from the secondary sources shall be presented in an expository way with facts on how the African Union responds and operates in cases of conflict. At the same time, while putting forward the factual evidence of AU’s responses to conflict, the research shall be discursive to evaluate the achievements, challenges and prospects of the AU’s role in conflict situations.

The study presents a case by case evaluation of some of the African Union’s conflict management interventions. Despite the criticism that a case study mostly employs inappropriate methods to make causal inferences, a case study has been identified as effective in conducting an intensive examination of a single case of a particular phenomenon (Perecman and Curran 2006: 21-23). Relevant to this research, the case study approach enables the researcher to present a thorough understanding of a conflict situation and the particular response of the African Union so as to preclude the fallacy of generalization (Neuman 2011). This also ensures that the research is focused and credible. The research avoids the risk of making a general conclusion from only one case study by looking at three case studies of the AU’s interventions. The three case studies being considered for this research help to identify recurring factors, issues and variances that epitomize the African Union’s interventionist role and capacity.

1.6 Structure of Study

To this end, the research is divided into six chapters. Chapter one gives a general introduction to the research paper by elucidating the background of the research, scope and limitation of the study, significance of the study, objective of the study, the research methodology and the structure of the study. The second chapter provides a review of the literature on the African Union’s interventionist role and capacity.

\(^8\) Inter-subjectivity is a principle that claims that different people can agree on empirical evidence (Neuman, 2011).
Union’s conflict management capabilities and considers the theoretical framework upon which the research objective is analysed. The chapter also goes further to clarify useful concepts pertinent to the research and sets the criteria for an effective and ineffective conflict management intervention. The third chapter assesses the legitimacy and responsibility of the African Union in providing African solutions to African problem in a global and interdependent world. This chapter also considers the institutional bodies and mechanisms of the African Union that are useful for effectively tackling the conflicts in Africa. Chapter four engages in a case by case examination of the African Union’s responses to conflict scenarios in Sudan, Somalia and Libya. Chapter five explores the prospects, research findings and challenges of the African Union’s conflict management endeavours. Chapter six culminates the research with the summary, recommendations and conclusion of the research work.
CHAPTER 2

Literature Review, Theories and Concepts

2.1 Introduction

This chapter sets the context, and examines the theoretical framework and terminologies upon which the research is conducted. The first section titled ‘Literature Review’ began by exploring the security issues in Africa. The section culminated with an assessment of the African Union’s interventionist roles in Africa as contained in extant literature. The second section titled ‘Theoretical Framework’ frames the African Union’s interventionist role under the tenets of liberal institutionalism. The third section elucidates crucial concepts – conflict management, human security and the responsibility to protect doctrine – that are pertinent to the research. These concepts aided in setting the criteria for evaluating the African Union’s military interventionist role in Africa at the end of the chapter.

2.2 Literature Review

Based on related history of colonialism, shared experiences, culture and challenges, African leaders have always found it imperative to forge greater cooperation and solidarity between African states to confront the socio-economic and political challenges facing their continent. In line with pan-African ideals\(^9\), integration, solidarity and unity among African states are considered as the necessary means for improving the living conditions of Africans, protecting (weak) African states from external meddling and asserting African ideologies in the global arena (Parker and Rukare 2002). Unfortunately, violent conflicts in the continent continue to be the main hurdle of African socio-economic and political development and aspirations. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) that was established in 1963 to drive the integration agenda of African states was crippled by the persistent violent conflicts, insurgencies and political instabilities in its member states.

Since independence, Africa has become reputed for being a continent at war with itself as exhibited in the long litany of conflicts in the continent. Anyanwu and Njoku (2010: 21)

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\(^9\) Pan-Africanism has to do with the desire for a greater solidarity, unity and cooperation between African states to address domestic and global challenges (Parker and Rukare 2002: 365; Murithi 2009: 93; Williams 2011: 3).
observe that out of the 141 wars fought worldwide between 1960 and 2000, 56 wars were fought in Africa\textsuperscript{10}. Many African states have experienced, are experiencing or are prone to experience violent conflict due to state failure, artificial colonial boundaries\textsuperscript{11}, secessionist and irredentist struggles, inequalities, poverty, scarce resources, religious and ethnic differences, bad governance, elite corruption, post-election violence and political repression (Dersso 2011: 115; Somerville 1999).

Significantly, the end of the Cold War introduced a new dynamism to the security challenge in Africa as evident in the predominance of civil wars, state failures, terrorism and heightened insecurities in the continent. The demise of the Cold War era in the late 1980s led to the loss of external protection and legitimacy by illegitimate regimes in Africa. Illegitimate and dictatorial African states had enjoyed external support and protection from the competing Cold War super powers who were seeking to promote their ideologies in the continent. African socio-economic, political and legal systems were determined and sometimes imposed on African governments by foreign powers under the threat of terminating support to the intransigent government\textsuperscript{12}. Via state terror, some regimes in Africa maintained relative security in their states under the auspices of the military arsenals and financial backings from foreign powers (Reilly 2008: 18).

With the abolition of the Cold War, latent opposition groups in various states were emboldened to challenge their unpopular state regimes that have lost external support even by the use of force. Besides, opposition groups, as well as unpopular governments, accessed weapons effortlessly to further their cause given that trans-national non-state actors have an

\textsuperscript{10} The 2011 Armed Conflicts Report Summary notes that out of the 26 conflict worldwide in 2011, Africa and Asia host three-quarters of the world’s conflicts.

\textsuperscript{11} The colonial legacy of arbitrary constructed boundaries and the lack of national cohesion that resulted from such boundaries have engendered many African states to conflict. The arbitrary boundaries of the Berlin Act of 26th February 1885 resulted in the indiscriminate conglomeration of different ethnic, linguistic and religious groups under one polity. Previously hostile and unrelated communities were housed together and expected to interact with each other without respect to their cultural, ethnic and religious differences. To aggravate the challenge of unification, the colonial administration subjected them to unsuitable forms of governance. The colonialists adopted a tactics of ‘divide and rule’ by creating political and economic policies that favored one group at the expense of others. Consequently, the tactics of ‘divide and rule’ prevented national integration and fostered tribalism and ethnic hatred (Somerville 1999: 3). Generally, colonial misrule in Africa has been indicted for the experiences of state failure, ethnic conflict, secessionism, irredentism and border conflicts in the continent.

\textsuperscript{12} For Keith Somerville (1990:1), peace and war in Africa, is determined by foreign powers. The African nationalists and elites who fought for self-rule turned out to be handmaids and agents of colonial and foreign powers. When things go wrong, they quickly request the assistance of foreign powers.
increasing hold on the proliferation of weapons at the end of Cold War (Ahmed 2010: 199; Reilly 2008: 18). Conflict in Africa became predominantly intra-state in nature. While armed conflict engulfed much of sub-Saharan Africa, northern African states remained relatively peaceful until recently. In the wake of the Arab Spring in 2010, northern African states that had enjoyed relative peace in the last two decades joined sub-Saharan African states in the experience of armed conflicts. Hence, conflict tends to be pervasive in Africa.

Conflicts in Africa have resulted in serious human rights violations, large-scale displacement of people and refugee flows. In accord with the 2006 UNHCR report, Africa, being a home to about 12 per cent of the population of the world, has about 31 per cent of the world’s refugee population (cited in Hoeffler 2008). The continent also has over 42 per cent of the global IDPs\(^\text{13}\) in accord with the UNHCR report (cited in Hoeffler 2008). This shows that Africa has more refugee and IDP concern than the rest of the world. Besides, more people die of war-related violence in Africa than the rest of the world. As noted by Hoeffler (2008), between 1960 and 2002, about 1.55 million people were killed in civil war related-deaths in Africa out of the 3.86 million people killed globally in civil war related battles. Thus, war-related deaths in Africa account for 40 per cent of global war related deaths. Conflicts in Africa tend to be persistent in nature and have proven to be deadlier and more atrocious than those in other regions.

Non-combatants, especially women, children, the disabled, the poor and the elderly, are more prone to the vicious effects of armed conflicts (The United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa 2005:8). The conflicts in the continent continue to engender problems such as hunger and malnutrition, lack of food production, famine, spread of diseases, disruption of trade, slow economic growth, poverty, unsafe water, lack of basic medical care, inadequate clothing and housing, unwanted pregnancies, early mortality and a host of other human rights abuses (The United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa 2005: 8; Hoeffler 2008). Conflict in Africa has slowed down the development of most African states and has increased poverty rates. This entangles the continent in a vicious circle of conflicts precipitated by poverty and underdevelopment which in turn spawn further poverty and underdevelopment (Hoeffler 2008).

Apart from making citizens vulnerable to human right abuses, the internal conflicts of particular states have also metastasized into regional problems. For instance, the conflict in

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\(^{13}\) Internally displaced persons.
Somalia dragged neighbouring countries like Ethiopia, Kenya and Eritrea into the Somali crisis. With many stakeholders, the Somali crises turned into a complex and prolonged regional security conundrum. To further stress the metastasizing of intra-state conflicts into regional problems, the internal crisis of Somalia has also led to the problems of refugee flows, spread of diseases, trafficking, piracy, etc. Furthermore, the political instability and conflict in Libya and Egypt has also overflowed and affected the political situation of Niger, Mauritania, Chad, Sudan and Mali (Rupiya 2012: 178).

Armed groups in post-conflict African states further sell out their weapons to rebel groups in other countries at affordable prices. Such practice leads to arms proliferation thereby making weapons accessible for rebel groups in other countries to further their interests via the use of force. This entraps Africa in a circle of conflict. With regards to Mali for instance, Malian Touareg and Salafist rebel groups accessed sophisticated weapons used during the 2011 Libyan armed conflict to enforce their secessionist agenda (Rupiya 2012: 178). Hence, the internal insecurities of African states continue to jeopardize human and national security as well as international security. Conflicts in Africa have also encouraged terrorism and organized crime by providing a safe haven for criminals and terrorists to carry out illicit activities with far reaching impacts across the globe. The correlation between conflict/failed states and terrorism/international criminal networks has led to strong interventionist policies of foreign powers in Africa. Recently, the US government have carried out successful unauthorised raids in Libya and Somalia to arrest the leaders of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab respectively. Apart from such unsanctioned raids in Africa, conflicts and state failure in Africa continues to expose the continent to several unwanted external interventions.

Basically, the conflicts and insecurities in Africa have attracted greater international community involvement and intervention in the continent. This has largely been done under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council. However, as noted by Ekeus (2001: 519), the huge responsibilities of the UNSC across the globe as well as the UNSC’s abuse of veto power precludes the organization from effectively dealing with the security threats in the continent. The UN failures to respond properly to the continent’s predicaments (e.g. the Somali crises, the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil war in the late 1990s and the numerous social and economic challenges in the continent) add to the

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14 Somali pirates cost shippers about hundreds of millions of dollars. In 2011 alone, shippers paid $160 million in ransoms and other international response to Somali piracy cost several billions of dollars (Crisis Group Africa Briefing 2012).
necessity for a strong regional organization to contend closely with African problems (Williams 2011: 4).

Cognizant that the OAU and the United Nations\textsuperscript{15} could not adequately address the security challenges that Africans are faced with; African leaders thereby resorted to the formation of a strong institution that could confront the multifaceted continental and global challenges facing the continent (African Union 2013). In July 2002, the African Union was established as a panacea to its defunct predecessor OAU. Most importantly, the African Union is expected to materialize the political ideal of African solutions to African problems (Apuuli 2012: 135). In view of the nexus between peace, security and development, the African Union is mandated to confront the scourge of complex conflicts that has been the bane of development in Africa.

Having replaced the defunct OAU, the African Union committed itself to resolving African problems. As observed by Moise Kerekou (2007: 3), the African Union made a huge paradigm shift from its predecessor’s (OAU’s) insistence on \emph{non-interference} in the affairs of member states to \emph{non-indifference} to the internal affairs of member states. Under Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of 2001, AU endorses the right for humanitarian intervention as entrenched in the \emph{responsibility to protect}\textsuperscript{16} principle (Tieku 2007: 29; Kioko 2003: 807). That is, in cases of humanitarian crisis, the African Union has the right and responsibility to intervene with or without the permission of the host state.

Anthony Bizos (2011: 2) and Tim Murithi (2009: 93) argue that the African Union is arguably the only regional organization with institutionalized ideas of the \emph{responsibility to protect} ingrained in its system. That was before the doctrine was popularized at the 2005 UN World Summit. The first Chair of the AU Commission Alpha Oumar Konare, maintains that African states cannot afford to be passive while atrocities are committed in neighbouring countries (cited in Murithi 2009: 95). While trying to reform and develop its institutions, the African Union has plunged itself deeply into addressing the continent’s travails (Hanson 2009: 1).

\textsuperscript{15} The following chapter shall delineate the transition from OAU to AU.

\textsuperscript{16} The doctrine of the responsibility to protect mandats the international community to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes and mass atrocities against civilians. See ICISS (2001).
Unlike the OAU, the African Union had been more active in condemning human right abuses and bad governance of its member states (Parker and Rukare 2002: 365). Informed by the 1997 Harare Declaration that banned unconstitutional changes of government, the Union has actively condemned every overthrow of a democratically elected government by its military, mercenaries, or armed rebels and all unconstitutional changes of government in line with article 4(p) of the AU Constitutive Act (Williams 2011: 4). Since its establishment in 2002, the AU has condemned every successful coup on the continent for instance; the Central African Republic (2003), Guinea-Bissau (2003), São Tomé and Príncipe (2003), Togo (2005), Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Guinea (2008), Madagascar (2009), Niger (2010), Ivory Coast (2010), Mali (2012), and Egypt (2013) (Williams 2011: 4; Shinn 2012: 3).

Funmi Olonisakin (2007: 1) assesses the nature of conflict management in Africa and notes that African regional and sub-regional organizations are continually making considerable efforts in conflict management. The African Union has taken a more proactive stance in preventing, managing and resolving African conflicts (Sesay and Omotosho 2011: 3). Addo (2011: 90) argues that via its peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building efforts, the African Union has managed to make significant strides to contend with the conflicts in Africa. In conflict zones where diplomatic and mediatory interventions failed, the African Union has adopted military intervention to protect civilians as well as quell conflicts.

The AU’s first adoption of military interventionist mechanism began with its peace operation in Burundi in April 2003 (Scanlon et al 2007). The conflict scenario that led to the AU’s peacekeeping intervention in Burundi is traceable to the ethno-political violence that ensued after the assassination of President Francois Melchoir Ndadaye in 1993. President Ndadaye, a Hutu Front pour la Democratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), was allegedly assassinated by Tutsi-dominated forces. The violence that ensued led to the loss of over 300,000 lives and the displacement of many civilians. In 2000, the government, seventeen political parties and the national assembly signed the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation for Burundi.

However, the Arusha agreement as well as a host of other peace agreements between the government and the armed parties failed to establish a comprehensive cease fire agreement to stop the fighting (De Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and Okumu, 2010: 68). In the absence of the political will of UNSC to establish a stabilizing peace mission in Burundi, the newly formed African Union took on the responsibility to intervene in Burundi from 2003 to 2004. With
force strength of 3,335 troops, mainly from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique, AU’s Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was mandated to ensure the implementation of the ceasefire agreements, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the armed factions and to stabilize Burundi in anticipation of a stronger UN peace operation (Murithi 2008). This marked AU’s first peace operation in Africa.

Since then, the Africa Union has also sent peacekeeping missions to Sudan (AMIS) from 2004 to 2007 and in 2008; Comoros in 2004, 2006, 2007 and 2008; and Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007 (Møller 2009: 14). The African Union has also supported other peace operations sponsored by the UN, NATO and powerful states such as in the case of the DRC and Mali. The AU has ongoing post-conflict reconstruction activities in Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Comoros, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan, among others (Addo 2011: 91). Møller (2009: 16) observes that even when the outside world seemed indifferent to African problems, the AU and the sub-regional organizations have managed to considerably carry out peace building and peacekeeping operations. This depicts the regional organization’s commitment to the continent’s peace and security (Murithi 2009: 106).

Williams (2011: 14) notes that in stark contrast to the OAU, the African Union has carried out a significant number of peace operations with relative success.

The AU mission in Burundi (AMIB) contributed to the stabilization of the country, prevented the escalation of violent conflict and laid a foundation for reconciliation and reconstruction in Burundi (Scanlon et al 2007: 20-21; Murithi 2008). AMIB also created the conditions for the deployment of a UN peace operation in 2003 and subsequent elections in June 2005. The AU’s mission in Burundi reflects the continent’s will for self-reliance and responsibility for peace operations in the continent (National Model United Nations 2008: 20). The African Union has also been taking the lead in restoring peace and stability in Sudan since violence erupted in Darfur in 2003. The African Union was the first to intervene in Darfur before the UN and EU although this is a move expected of the regional organization in line with its commitment to providing African solutions to African problems. Between 2004 and 2007, the AU deployed about 7,000 African Union force in Darfur and backed a stronger UN peacekeeping force in the region in 2008 (Scanlon et al 2007: 21).

AU intervention in Burundi (AMIB), its missions in the Comoro Islands and sometimes, its mission in Sudan (AMIS) are adjudged as successes despite their shortcomings (National Model United Nations, 2008: 7; Shinn, 2012:2; Scanlon et al 2007: 21). Shinn (2012: 2)
observes that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has also gradually attained considerable achievements in recent years leading to the establishment of a new Somali federal government since the collapse of President Siad Barre’s regime in 1991.

However, the AU has been indicted severally for being incapable of meeting its expectations in terms of ensuring peace and security in the continent (Williams 2011: 1; Kerekou 2007). Williams (2011:5) observes that despite the paradigm shift from non-intervention to non-indifference to the internal affairs of member states, the African Union, since its inception, never invoked Article 4(h) to justify military intervention against a member state. The Union was expected to act proactively in states like Cote d’Ivoire and Libya where mass atrocities were committed against civilians. Yet, it failed to intervene or react decisively when it was supposed to, thereby leaving the United Nations, NATO and other western powers to intervene directly in these countries. In accord with Williams (2011: 5), such failure is resultant from the AU’s lack of political will and inability to extricate itself from the non-interventionist norm of its predecessor, OAU.

Apuuli (2012: 136) contends that ‘the crises in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya exposed the hollowness of the AU being an African solution to African problems’. Apuuli (2012: 136) argues that the marginalization of the AU by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during the Libyan revolution as well as the France-led UN intervention during the Cote d’Ivoire post-election crisis was self-inflicted. This was due to the failure of AU to take a strong united stance at the outset of the conflicts. The direct intervention of the United Nations and France in Cote d’Ivoire’s crisis as well as the NATO and UN intervention in Libya is consequent from AU’s passivity at the dawn of the crises. Its passivity and half-hearted reactions led to its being sidelined and ‘relegated to a mere bystander to a game being played within its own backyard’ (Apuuli 2012: 136). Apuuli (2012: 135) notes that AU’s half-hearted measures and internal divisions on how to react to crisis situations have rendered the African Union incapable of attaining the expectations entrenched in the notion of African solutions to African problems.

The African Union has proven its metier in terms of mediation and diplomacy. In the wake of conflict situations, the African Union has expectedly adopted a mediatory and diplomatic stance to address the causes of conflict via political negotiations. Via its Panel of the Wise, the AU has tried immensely to facilitate peace processes in conflict states such as in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Zimbabwe and Sudan (Williams 2011: 48). The effort of Thabo
Mbeki, former president of South Africa aided in the negotiated secession of South Sudan from Sudan. However, Apuuli (2012: 151) notes that the Libyan crisis demonstrated the failure of AU’s diplomacy. The lack of power particularly economic and military power, impedes the African Union from ensuring that its diplomatic efforts are considered seriously. Rupiya (2012: 165) argues that the African Union’s mediatory efforts and sanctions on member states are negligible and incapable of achieving desired effects. Given the AU’s lack of economic and military power, its diplomatic efforts and sanctions only take on a symbolic posture of dissatisfaction with the recalcitrant state and are ineffective in achieving desired effects.

Møller (2009: 16) maintains that there is a huge gap between the ambitions and accomplishments of the African Union. For Williams (2011: 1), the African Union is bent on making grandiose or rather ambitious projects that go beyond the bounds of its finance, political will and capacities. Kerekou (2007: 10) insists that the inability of the African Union to meet expectations is consequent upon its institutional weaknesses and inexperience. To buttress this claim, the 2011 Institute for Security Studies (ISS) monograph asserts that the capacity of the AU to undertake any conflict management initiative depends on the capacity of its various member states to provide necessary resources and influence (Sharamao and Ayangafac, 2011: 5). However, most African states are at the risk of state failure, civil wars, rebellion and instabilities. Hence, the AU – composed of such states – is hamstrung in its ability to meet up to expectations (Sharamao and Ayangafac 2011: 4).

The weaknesses of AU are evident in the fact that the AU Standby Force (ASF) has not yet been operationalized since it was created in 2003. This shows AU’s inability to realize its ambitions as stipulated in its Constitutive Act and protocols. AU forces still rely on western powers for military support, training and assistance. The Union’s military operations and initiatives are greatly stymied by unpredictable and poor funding, the dearth of resources, inadequate logistic support, lack of transparency in the management of resources, and the delay and inadequate deployment of expected personnel and resources.

Laden with these challenges, the AU is incapable of sustaining effective long-term peacekeeping operations. AMIS, for instance, was criticized for being understaffed, undertrained and under-resourced to cover the huge land mass of Darfur and to handle the

17 As noted by Williams (2011: 18) ‘Sanctions serve many purposes: they can signal dissatisfaction, stigmatize the target, act as a substitute for armed conflict, and potentially change political behavior’.
complexity of the conflict in Sudan (Hanson 2009: 1; Scanlon et al 2007: 21). AMIS failed to stop the killings and displacement of civilians and it lost about sixty troops (Møller 2009: 15; Williams 2006). This prompted the call for a stronger UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. At the end of 2007, AMIS was subsumed into the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.

On a mild position, Scanlon et al (2007: 7) note that while the African Union bears the responsibility for peace and security in the continent, the complexity of the conflicts in the continent thwarts its ability to contend with them. In accord with Williams (2011: 1), AU’s inefficiencies stem from its emergence at a time when conflict had engulfed much of the continent. As the organization makes grandiose declarations of intent, new and complicated conflicts as well as the lack of resources to handle the conflicts continue to cripple the organization. Møller (2009: 16) argues that ‘it would be surprising if the world’s poorest continent were able to solve the world’s most frequent and widespread as well as most deadly conflicts’. For Møller, the conflicts in Africa cannot be addressed solely by the African Union. They require a coordinated partnership between the African Union, the United Nations as well as other international organizations.

In his assessment of the efficiency of the AU in terms of the responsibility to protect, Murithi (2009: 106) argues that it is premature to pass judgments on the AU’s efficiency because it is still an embryonic organization. The AU as an effective supranational organization is yet to gain expertise and adequate resources to face the complex challenges in the continent. The nascent life of the AU and its limited experience with conflict resolution in Africa are constraint on the regional organization’s efficiency at conflict management (National Model United Nations, 2008: 7). For Sesay (2008: 7) the principles, objectives and institutions of the African Union are dreams we hope will come true. It is commendable that the African Union did not wait to strengthen all its forces and mechanisms before confronting the continent’s challenges. From its successes and failures, the African Union has gained (and continues to gain) considerable beneficial experiences (Møller 2009: 15). Maasdorp (2010: 11) maintains that with time, the African Union would mature to adequately contend with the series of challenges impeding peace, security and development in Africa.

The foregoing review has explored some extant literature on the achievements, failures and challenges of the African Union in terms of ensuring the peace and security in the continent. These literatures conflate African Union’s conflict resolution, transformation and
management efforts with features such as mediation, negotiation, peace-making, peacekeeping and peace-building. There remains a paucity of research materials that exclusively study the military efforts of the African Union without dwelling much on the Union’s mediatory and diplomatic measures.

Against this backdrop, this research fills this gap by focusing on the military mechanism recurrently applied by the African Union. Moreover, for the African Union to effect changes in conflict situations and to pride itself as being committed to peace and security, the Union ought to possess a strong military power to coerce as well as coax warring parties to take its diplomatic, mediatory and military interventions seriously. Under the framework of conflict management, the research explores the African Union’s measures to contain conflicts, protect civilian populations, and creating a non-violent environment for conflict resolution to take place.

The research restricts its analysis to the military peace operations – military intervention, peacekeeping and peace enforcement – of the African Union and assesses the efficiency of the Union in containing armed conflicts, protecting civilian populations and facilitating peace processes. Using the principles of human security and responsibility to protect as enunciated in the third section, the research investigates and assesses the Union’s reaction to three noteworthy cases of armed conflict situations in the continent – Somalia, Sudan (Darfur) and Libya. By investigating the Union’s interventions, the study shall inquire deeply into the capacity of the African Union to enforce peace and security in the continent.

The following key questions shall drive this research:

1. What are the African Union’s mechanisms and measures for promoting, enhancing and enforcing peace and security in Africa?
2. What are the achievements, failures and challenges of the African Union’s military interventionist role in Africa?
3. Does the African Union have the required institutional support, resources and political will to achieve the idea of African Solutions to African Problems?
4. How can the African Union develop its capabilities for conflict management?
2.3 Theoretical Framework: Liberal Institutionalism

Central to this research is the evaluation of the military conflict management measures and interventions of Africa’s continental regional organization, the African Union. To this end, the tenets of liberal institutionalism are instrumental in scrutinizing the significance, capabilities, achievements, failures and challenges of the African Union’s effort to promote and enforce security within the African regional. In the face of the predominance of internal insecurities in African states and the concern for human, national, regional and international security, institutionalized cooperation between African states is deemed quintessential to attain peace, security and stability in the continent (Murithi 2009: 93). The claims of institutionalism shed greater light to the pan-Africanist longing for integration between African states in a bid to surmount the challenges facing the continent.

An adequate conception and appreciation of the claims of liberal institutionalism, founded on the principles of idealism, is hazy without the comprehension of the basic tenets of its rival theory, realism. Realism has endured as a traditional tenet in political thought. Precursors of realism such as Thucydides, Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes among many others emphasize the anarchic, self-reliant and militaristic nature of the international order (Baldwin 1993: 11). The works of E. H Carr (1946: II) and Hans J Morgenthau (1948) shaped a coherent conception of the claims of realism.

In accord with realists, the international system is composed of independent and atomic sovereign states selfishly seeking their narrow interests (Baldwin 1993: 11). This entails that the international system is defined by insecurities, uncertainties and tensions between states seeking to maximize their parochial interests. Devoid of any central authority to control state behaviour, the international system is deemed by realists to be inexorably anarchical and characterized by competition between states. Given their grim image of world politics (realpolitik), realists insist that cooperation between states is difficult to attain and sustain (Baylis 2005: 304).

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, liberal institutionalism emerged to mount a strong challenge to realist claims. Proponents of institutionalism such as Robert O. Keohane, 18 The tenets of institutionalism could be traced to the claims of ancient Stoics who saw themselves as citizens of the world and early Christian philosophers who maintain that all humans are children of God, and in unity and love, people create a strong world society with different people sharing and learning from their different limited capabilities (Baldwin 1993: 11).
Arthur Stein, Charles Lipson, Robert Axelrod, and Joseph Nye hold that institutions\(^{19}\) are imperative for the attainment of cooperation, security, stability and development in the international system (Keohane and Martin 1995; Udombana 2005; Abbott and Snidal 2001). Contrary to the realist emphasis on anarchy, military alliance, balance of power mechanism, competition between states, institutionalists dilute the realist notion of anarchy by emphasizing the interdependent nature of the international system (Baldwin 1993: 12).

Advocates of institutionalism observe that states have mutual interests and challenges. Significantly, states have come to realize that the challenges of security, human rights violations, refugee flows, disease control, trafficking, weapon proliferation, climate change, *inter alia*, go beyond unilateral state efforts irrespective of how powerful a state is (Powell 2003: 1). Particularly, security threats such as intra-state conflicts demand the cooperation of the international community to manage the conflict, protect civilians and restore peace and security. It is not certain that conflicting parties would cease hostilities without a third-party intervention. If left unchecked, intrastate conflicts could metastasize into regional conflicts and provide grounds for refugee flows, spread of diseases, international criminal activities, terrorism, nuclear and drug trafficking, (Cusimano 2000: 4). These challenges nudge states towards interstate cooperation (Baldwin 1993: 12).

Robert Keohane (1984), a staunch advocate of institutionalism, contends that the rationality and self-interests of states in the anarchic international system are sources of cooperation. To tackle significant common interests, states – acting out of rationality – cooperate with other states to satisfy their narrow interests (Keohane and Martin 1995: 39). Multilateralism and institutionalism are highlighted as ways of tackling issues of common interests. Multilateralism and institutionalism both emphasize the need for cooperation between many states to contend with common challenges.

However, while multilateralism places emphasis on governing and organizing principles and rules to guide cooperation regarding a particular common interest (Powell 2003: 5), institutionalism emphasize a regularized and perpetual cooperation between states in an institutional environment (Slaughter 2011). Institutionalists observe that *ad hoc* multilateral co-operations between states that are not regular and institutionalized are not reliable as one

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\(^{19}\) It is worth noting that the term ‘institution’ is a vague concept because it could be used to refer to organizations, structures, systems and practices. This study however limits the concept of institution to formal organizations of state and non-state actors with ‘related complexes of rules and norms, identifiable in space and time’ (Keohane 1988: 383).
party may cheat or renege on the agreement (Keohane 1988: 393). Multilateralism merely espouses the cooperation of many states through some organizing principles without specifying how the cooperation should be achieved. However, institutions—described narrowly as international organizations with customs and rules—provide an epicentre where states meet and engage in coordinated cooperation regularly to confront diverse challenges (Keohane 1988: 383; Slaughter 2011).

Annie-Marie Slaughter (2011) notes that institutions create extended time-frame of interaction between states. Thus, knowing that they have to cooperate with each other for a longer period of time repeatedly and on varied interests, states abide by the rule of an institution and reap the benefits of cooperation over an extended period. Thus, via institutions, cooperation is more trusted, reliable and efficient and the fear of unequal gains from cooperation is alleviated (Keohane 1988: 380; Keohane and Martin 1995: 42).

In institutional settings, individual states hardly renege or cheat on agreements because they are involved in a habitual chain of cooperation. As an institution that goes beyond mere multilateral cooperation, the African Union seeks to confront Africa’s social, economic and political challenges. In this institutional environment, every member state considers its peace, security and development as contingent on the peace, security and development of fellow member states. Hence, in cases of internal crisis in one member state, other members do not remain indifferent. Rather, under the norms and customs of the institution, fellow member states seek to address the problems of their affected fellow member.

For realists such as Kenneth Waltz, Stanley Hoffman and John Mearsheimer, despite the growth in interstate cooperation, states remain fearful that some states will renege on any agreements reached and attempt to gain greater advantages over them (Baylis 2005: 304). Even when cooperation occurs via supposed institutions, states tend to gain more by exploiting others (Baylis 2005: 304). In such situations, powerful states tend to gain more benefits at the expense of others. For them, international institutions are mere instruments used by dominant states to advance their power, interests, and welfare. For instance, after the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, U.S., Russia and other nuclear powers continue to maintain their nuclear weapons. The same nuclear powers mount campaigns to prevent other states from developing nuclear weapons while they hold on to their weapons. For realists, every state is eventually left with the responsibility to provide for their survival and security because no state can be trusted.
Keohane and Martin (1995: 42) however argue that the uncertainties in the international system are overcome by institutions as they allay the fears of member states by disclosing the military capabilities of member states. States then have the capability to predict and foresee the responses of other states. As such, competitions and tension between states due to the security dilemma are mitigated and state relationships are driven by the positive awareness of each state’s capacities (Udombana 2005: 2). Here, states engage in mutual and reciprocal relationship.

In accord with Mearsheimer (1994), an unwavering advocate of realism, the capabilities and ambition of states to satisfy their narrow interests are not influenced by institutions. In his *The False Promise of International Institutions*, Mearsheimer (1994) argues that the self-interests and power capacities of individual states making up institutions is responsible for the achievements of an institution not the institutions as such. For instance, the success of NATO in preventing World War III and its role in the demise of the Cold War is seen by Mearsheimer as the success of the individual powerful states that make up the institution. In tandem with Mearsheimer, institutions have marginal power in the international system (Slaughter 2011).

Contrary to neorealist claim that institutions have marginal power, as success is only attained through the power capacities of individual states that make up an institution, liberal institutionalists insist that institutions *per se* make significant difference in the international system (Keohane and Martin 1995: 42). Institutions harness and shape the behaviour of member states whether powerful or weak. Via international standards\(^{20}\) and governance\(^{21}\), international institutions define, regulate, coordinate and constrain the individual behaviour of different states (Abbott and Snidal 2001: 346; Udombana 2005: 1). Institutions provide forums for leaders of member states to share ideas, discuss common problems and offer ideas on how issues can be addressed theoretically and practically. Institutional mechanisms are also created from such forums to address issues raised and the decisions and standards agreed upon are enshrined in declarations, conventions, or treaties (Peck 2001). Institutions provide incentive, mechanisms and structures to encourage and ensure the compliance of member states to institutional standards and norms (Peck 2001).

\(^{20}\) Standards are central mechanisms used by international governance to coordinate and constrain individual behavior of different states (Abbott and Snidal 2001: 346).

\(^{21}\) International governance is the formal and informal bundles of rules, roles and relationships that define and regulate the social practices of state and non-state actors in international affairs (Abbott and Snidal 2001: 346).
Significantly, institutions also coordinate the power capacities of member states and make meaningful impacts in international order. In response to intra-state conflict for instance, institutions put pressure on conflict states to resolve their issues peacefully and they place sanctions on defaulting states. Unlike the collective security paradigm in international relations that is concerned mostly with the peace and security of states and that sees aggression against one member state as an aggression to all (Butler 2009: 15), institutional approach sees any form of aggression against or within one member state as a threat to national and international peace and security – a threat that demands the response of the institution.

In this regard, institutions are concerned not only about protecting its member states from external aggression as espoused by the principle and practices of collective security; it is also concerned with ensuring peace and security within member states. Besides, by virtue of belonging to an institutional setting, states bind themselves to standards and norms that involve institutional demands and sanctions in cases of a breach in agreement. When institutional diplomatic measures fail, institutions sometimes intervene with or without the permission of the host state. Put together, the power capacities of member states forces recalcitrant states to comply with institutional mandates. Thus, institutions per se attain successes (Keohane and Martin 1995: 42).

The United Nations as a widely recognized global institution has made considerable efforts in contending with global social, economic and political challenges. The number of member states of the United Nations has grown from 51 when it was established in 1945 to 193 member states today. In a bid to contend with contemporary security threats, the UN as well as other international organizations like NATO has retrofitted to tackle new tasks beyond their initial objectives and mandates (Cusimano 2000: 302). In terms of peace and security, the United Nations has tried considerably to prevent and manage the scourge of conflicts across the globe. Without international institutions such as the UN, it is unimaginable conceiving a non-chaotic post-1945 international order. Keohane (1988: 393) notes aptly that without international cooperation the future of humankind is dim and gloomy.

22 The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet and the end of the Warsaw Pact did not see to the end of NATO as predicted by John Mearsheimer in 1990 (cited in Keohane and Martin 1995: 40). Rather, NATO and other international institutions like the UN mutated and become much influential in the international system.
The tenets of liberal institutionalism are particularly useful for the understanding of the African Union as an interstate initiative for tackling common challenges in Africa. As an interstate institution, the African Union aims at tackling common challenges faced by African states. Given that conflict is a major challenge to African states, the African Union is expected to confront the security challenges of African states. Here, each state recognizes the fact that their security is greatly tied to the security conditions of other states within the African continent. The common challenge involved in intrastate conflicts is evident in the fact that Internal conflicts in Africa raise concerns around refugee flows, arms proliferation and the growth of organized international criminal enterprises and terrorist organizations. Moreover, the crisis in the DRC for instance has spread its malevolent tentacles across Central Africa. The Somali conflict as well affects the security situation of Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea. These highlight some instances were internal conflicts in Africa has metastasized into regional conundrum. In accord with the rewards of liberal institutionalism, African states could gain greater security benefits by seeking to confront the challenges of conflict in the continent through the regional body, the African Union.

The challenge with the tenets of liberal institutionalism lies in the fact that some influential states in the continent may pursue their national interest under the banner of the African Union. The interventionist role of South Africa in the Central African Republic at the immerge of the 2013 conflict in the country tended to highlight South Africa’s quest to confront the a security challenge that challenged its investment initiative in the country. Nevertheless, the institutional background of the African Union serves to ensure that member states do not take advantage of other states. The African Union as an institution could continually grow at coordinating the power capabilities of member states to tackle Africa’s problems particularly the conflict challenges in the continent. As an institution, the African Union has established measures to promote, enhance and enforce policies geared towards making the continent violent-free. With the support of its member states, the Union has been able to intervene diplomatically and militarily in the internal affairs of member states to restore national and international peace and security (Bizos 2011: 2).

In line with liberal institutionalism, the study further investigates how the African Union, as a regional institution, influences and intervenes in the internal and interstate affairs of member states in an attempt to manage the conflicts in the continent through its military approach.
2.4 Conceptualizations

This section aims at elucidating important concepts pertinent to militaristic intervention on which the research is conceived and analysed. The section goes further to set the criteria for evaluating African Union military interventionist role in Africa.

2.4.1 Conflict Management

As noted by David Weeks, ‘conflict is an inevitable outcome of human diversity and a world without conflict is not desirable because it would mean a world without diversity’ (quoted in Agada 2008: 23). Though conflicts are inevitable, violent conflicts that threaten national and international peace and security raise international concerns. This concern is noticeable in the international community’s direct intervention in the internal affairs of states in crisis since the end of the Cold War era. Interventions entails third party effort to address conflict challenges in a conflict state. Such interventions are geared towards protecting civilians, creating conditions for non-violent solution to conflicts and establishing peace, stability and order in conflict and post-conflict regions (Whyte 2009: 5). International interventions in conflict regions are predominantly assessed under the concepts of conflict resolution and conflict management.

Conflict resolution deals with how third parties strive to facilitate negotiations, agreements and the resolution of conflicts between warring parties (Wallensteen 2011: 3). Conflict resolution does not only help to resolve conflicts and ensure the ending of armed struggle, it also entails agreement between warring parties to respect and cooperate with each other and deal with their differences through non-violent means (Wallensteen 2011: 10). Thus, conflict resolution encompasses broad attempts at peacemaking and peacebuilding.

Peacemaking has to do with the international community’s diplomatic effort to create conditions for conflicting parties to end violence through negotiated settlements (Abdi 2012: 61). It involves mediatory efforts to contain a violent conflict through the brokering of a ceasefire agreement and the facilitating of negotiations between belligerents so as to avoid or end conflict (Dawson 2004: 2, Murithi 2008). Peace-building entails reconstructing a society to ensure binding peace agreements and to develop a society that is less likely to resort to conflict in the future (Henrard 2002: 18). Peace-building measures entails altering structural – social, economic and political – contradictions, improving relations between the conflict parties and changing individual attitudes and behaviour so as to ensure lasting peace (Abdi
Generally, conflict resolution attempts to resolve the root causes of conflict and develop conditions to prevent the resurgence of conflict (Fearnely and Chiwandamira 2006: 10).

On the other hand, conflict management, which serves as the framework for this research, entails third party measures to alleviate the dangers of conflict, lessening actual or potential suffering as well as containing, controlling and ending on-going conflict (Wallensteen 2011: 5; Viotti and Kauppi 2001: 196; Butler 2009: 1). This involves attempts to minimize suffering, prevent conflict from escalating and creating conditions for non-violent settlements of conflict. Unlike the ambitious nature of conflict resolution that extends to the transformation of social, political, economic and cultural institutions and practices that sustain conflict, conflict management has a narrow scope (Butler, 2009: 15). Rather than aspiring to tackle underlying causes of conflict, conflict management has a clear, feasible and widely applicable aim of managing the deleterious effects of conflict.

Conflict management enjoys greater justification given its aim of not only lessening the dangers of conflict for the community or nation directly involved in the conflict. Rather, it also aspires to lessen the dangers of conflict for communities that are not directly involved such as neighbouring states and the international community at large. Its narrow scope of protecting civilians and containing conflicts makes conflict management pragmatic and widely accepted in international relations unlike conflict resolution which seems to interfere in the deep issues and structures of sovereign states to end conflict and restore peace and security (Butler 2009). Apart from being a one track form of international intervention, conflict management is also instrumental in creating non-violent and stable environment for conflict resolution to take place. Thus, there are conceptual thin lines between conflict management and conflict resolution as both can (often) take place at the same time. As conflict management measures create stable and violent-free or less violent environment, conflict resolution measures takes place (Viotti and Kauppi 2001).

In terms of conflict management, third parties could seek to contain conflicts via the use and/or the threat of the use of force; the use of legal, normative and extra-legal institutions to enable belligerents settle their differences legally; and the use of other diplomatic measures to enable aggressors to broker agreements (Butler 2009: 14). As noted by Butler (2009: 22), conflict management involves mediation, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Mediatory efforts of conflict management are manifest in the attempts to attain ceasefire agreements and
peace agreements between warring parties to facilitate peacemaking (Wallensteen 2011: 8). The ceasefire and peace agreements often bind warring parties to the cessation of all violent action against each other to facilitate negotiation and diplomatic resolutions of conflict (Wallensteen 2011: 9).

In cases where ceasefire agreements are reached, the international community may establish peacekeeping missions to ensure adherence to the terms of the agreement, alleviate tension, stabilize hotspots and protect civilian populations. In this regard, peacekeeping involves the expeditionary use of police and/or military personnel to prevent armed conflicts as well as to enforce, observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements as delineated in Chapter VI of the UN Charter (Williams 2010: 2). Butler (2011: 70,162) observes that peacekeeping operations unlike military intervention are not meant to forcefully end or alter a conflict, restore order or arrest war criminals by force (Butler, 2011: 70). Significantly, peacekeepers are deployed to conflict zones after the cessation of widespread armed violence so as to maintain or encourage a non-violent environment, to monitor ceasefire agreements and to enable peace processes to take place (Butler 2011: 70; Abdi 2012: 61).

Peacekeeping missions are contingent on the permission from the governments (and warring parties) of directly concerned states. This shows that peacekeeping upholds the principle of state sovereignty and respects the principle of non-intervention. Central to peacekeeping effort is impartiality as peacekeepers are expected to be impartial to the warring parties (Dawson 2004: 1). Peacekeepers are supposed to possess deterrent capacities to prevent and forestall warring parties from engaging in violent actions. Peacekeeping helps to contain and stabilize conflict situation until negotiations produce lasting peace. It helps in facilitating a transition from conflict to peace (Dawson 2004: 1). Thus, peacekeeping could run concurrently with peacemaking and peace-building efforts.

Peace enforcement is another least highlighted form of conflict management. Peace enforcement as defined by Butler (2011: 160) entails a third-party intervention in a violent conflict scenario in order to bring an end to the conflict as mandated in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This involves the use of military coercion to ‘create or impose, by force, a cessation in hostilities so as to provide the conditions amenable to the negotiation of a ceasefire or peace agreement (or to help maintain that cessation)’ (Butler 2011: 160). The mandate
for peace enforcement can occur when the international community has determined that peace or its conditions is only attainable by a third party intervention.

Peace enforcers reserve the mandate to defend non-combatants who are under attack or threat of attack or to militarily engage with armed combatants who are impervious to the calls for peace (Butler 2011: 162). This mission unlike peacekeeping requires only an imperfect consent as it can be carried out with the permission of the parties involved as well as when the parties involved express no desire for peace (Butler 2011: 163). Thus, the enemy for peace enforcers is the persistent aggression, not the warring parties. The mission is also required to be centred on the principles of impartiality and neutrality as the mission is not aimed at helping or targeting any party to the conflict. The failed US led UN intervention in Somalia between 1992 and 1995 is sometimes considered as an example of peace enforcement mission because the intervention was taken without the consent of a Somali government given the lack of a Somalia central government to seek consent from and the perpetual nature of the conflict.

While the foregoing peace operations – peacemaking, peacebuilding, peacekeeping and peace enforcement – require some form of consent from host states, the international community may intervene militarily in conflict situations without any consent of the host state (Dawson, 2004: 1). This intervention dubbed ‘military intervention’ is also referred to as humanitarian intervention. It involves the use of military force to provide humanitarian aid to civilians, protect civilian population, prevent genocide and crimes against humanity and/or to coerce belligerents to engage in peaceful negotiations (Viotti and Kauppi 2001). Military interventions are expected to come as a last resort to conflict scenarios (Powell, 2005: 8)23. Unlike peace enforcement, military intervention is carried out without a prior attempt to seek the consent of the host government/or belligerents. Military interventions aim primarily to protect civilian population from egregious human right abuses and to provide humanitarian aid to the civilian population without necessarily imposing peace or its conditions on the host state as in the case of peace enforcement (Powell, 2005: 8).

Generally, third party interventions – especially military/humanitarian interventions – in the internal affairs of member states continue to raise concerns in international relations. When

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23 While some analysts deem humanitarian intervention to refer solely to armed interventions by third parties, others consider humanitarian intervention to include both military and non-military interventions. This dissertation however uses humanitarian intervention to refer to interventions that are military in nature.
humanitarian interventions occur as in the case of Somalia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, Ivory Coast and Libya, questions arise around its legitimacy and commensurability with the principle of sovereignty (ICISS, 2001; Kaldor, 2007). Yet, when it is neglected as witnessed in Rwanda in 1994 and currently in Syria, the international community’s commitment to human rights and global peace and security is questioned.

The controversy around humanitarian interventions has to do mainly with its contradiction with the principle of sovereignty, and the fear of abuse of weaker states by powerful states under the guise of protecting civilians (G Gottwald, 2012: 10; Bellamy, 2008: 616). Humanitarian intervention contravenes the right to sovereignty established in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia and the principle of non-intervention as endorsed in Article 2.4 of the United Nations Charter (Kioko, 2003: 809). The principle of sovereignty entails that states have the right to self-determination and self-rule without external interference. Thus, under what circumstances should other states or non-state actors violate the dominant principle of sovereignty?

2.4.2 Rhetoric on Security: From State to International Security

Prior to the end of Cold War era, national security dominated the idea of security in world politics (Baylis 2005: 300). Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the international political system has been dominated by the sovereign form of political arrangements. By virtue of being an internationally recognized state, a state possesses the right to sovereignty, an ‘exclusive and final jurisdiction over territory, as well as resources and populations that lie within the territory’ (Cusimano 2000: 2). Emerging from western political thought, the principle of sovereignty gradually spread all over the world as the right form of political organization. Sovereign states had the right to be internally organized into different forms of government; autocracy, theocracy, monarchy, dictatorship, democracy, etc. Sovereign states were entitled to relate with its citizens as it pleases and contend with its internal affairs without interference from external forces (Cusimano 2000: 2). With the dominance of realism in global politics, the state is conceived as the major actor in the international system.

Under the paradigm of an anarchical international system, states bear the onus of providing for their security and survival (Butler 2009: 27). State governments pride themselves as the providers of security to their citizens as well as the bearer of the onus to ensure citizen’s
security from external forces. The international community saw its role as mainly preserving the sovereignty of states and protecting states against attacks from external forces. The United Nations emerged in 1945 with the commitment to maintain international peace and security via the protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of its member states as endorsed in Article 2.4 of the UN Charter (ICISS 2001: 13).

National security (sometimes regime security) was considered primary to any other form of security prior to the demise of the Cold War era. As noted by Cilliers (2004: 8) the dominant theories of international legal practice prior to end of the Cold War era recognize that both individual and international security is dependent on national security. However, in contemporary discourses in international relations, the idea of security has shifted from national security to human security – individual, societal, ethnic and group security (Kaldor 2007; Cilliers 2004; Gottwald 2012: 8). The foregoing paradigm shift in the concept of security was precipitated by the post-Cold War turn-out of events across the globe.

After the end of the Cold War, the United States and European powers enjoyed unrivalled influence in global politics. Western values of democracy and market economics were sold to both willing and unwilling states (Destradi 2010). This precipitated the globalization of the international system, the expansion of market and networking forces, and the universalization of democratic tenets which placed more value on individual and civil rights than the state more than before (Ekeus 2001: 519). Added to this is the fact that after the Cold War, regionalism gathered momentum and hence the power of domestic governments to do as they please was pitted against mounting opposition (Lehmann and Steinhilber 2006: 2). Informed by globalization and democratic principles, individuals and civil groups became more assertive of their interests in their respective states even if it means using force to achieve their aim.

Cusimano (2000: 4) is informative in noting that since the demise of the Cold War era, the world recorded more intra-state conflicts, decline of inter-state conflicts and decline in state power. With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, illegitimate regimes lost external protection and legitimacy and were left in the cold. Latent opposition groups quickly felt emboldened to fight for their cause relentlessly even with the use of force. Besides, given that trans-national non-state actors have an increasing hold on Cold War-proliferated weapons, opposition groups as well as unpopular governments accessed weapons effortlessly to further their cause (Reilly 2008:18). As observed by Butler (2009: 51), 30 out of 33 main armed
conflicts between 1991 and 2009 are intra-state conflicts. In the post-Cold War World, intra-state conflict predominate international agenda and threaten the collapse of states.

Significantly, technological advancements as well as the development of the media industry led to a generous coverage of the gruesome nature of intra-state conflicts. Increasingly, the domestic issues of states whether political, economic or social is made available to people across the globe (Gottwald 2012: 6). The awful images of conflict and the sufferings of people within a particular sovereign state provoke the sympathy of citizens in other sovereign states. Due to the media coverage of events in conflict states, the horrific sight of violence and bloodletting in states undergoing civil war and armed conflict seem as though it is happening to citizens of other sovereign states and it reinforces the idea of our common humanity. Particularly, the horrendous images of the ethnic cleansing of the Bosnians by the Serbs and the 1994 Rwandan genocide challenged the international community’s exclusive conception of security from the perspective of the state.

Apart from the universality of the right of all people to live in a peaceful environment as against the associated anguish resulting from conflict, the international community is cognizant of the threats posed by intra-state conflicts to world peace and security. Intra-state conflicts have turned many states into failed and crisis states. Such states have provided grounds for international criminal activities, terrorism, piracy, nuclear and drug trafficking, refugee flows, the spread of diseases, etc. (Cusimano 2000: 4). Intrastate conflicts on the other hand are notorious for metastasizing into regional conflicts thereby disrupting free trade and international peace and security. Cusimano (2000: 12) notes that ‘when sovereign states collapse, the international system feels the shock waves’. Thus, there seems to be a strong correlation between human security and global peace and security.

The 2004 UN Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change maintains that any threat to a state and to human life en masse constitutes a threat to international security. This new security paradigm of the post-Cold War world entails that the well-being of citizens within states takes more precedence than national security. Human security turned into everyone’s business and has become the pillar of national and international security (Cusimano 2012: 11). The traditional conception of national security became dislodged to

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24 Since 1990, only four wars were dubbed interstate war i.e. the India and Pakistan war (1997 to 2003), Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998 to 2000), the Persian Gulf War (1990 to 1991) and the Iraq and US/allies war.

The notion of human security was first propagated in the 1994 Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Kaldor 2007: 182). The UNDP Report identifies seven elements of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security (Kaldor 2007: 182). The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report shifted the discourse on security from its state centric-militaristic terms by defining human security as the the freedom from fear and from want. Drawing on the 1994 UNDP’s notion of human security, subsequent debate about human security was either based on minimalist or on maximalist perspectives. On a minimalist sense, human security is narrowly approached as ‘freedom from fear’. This human security concept has to do with the safety of each individual from direct physical threat and the satisfaction of basic needs. On a maximalist a base, human security is broadly viewed as ‘freedom from fear and freedom from want’ comprising the seven security dimensions observed by the UNDP (Gottwald 2012: 8).

Critics of the maximalist/broad notion of human security identify the difficulty involved in ascertaining where to draw the line between what should be on the list of human security and what should not especially (Gottwald 2012: 8). It is also a dilemma ascertaining if a single state necessarily bears the onus of satisfying all the security dimensions as listed by the UNDP (Gottwald 2012: 9). In our interdependent world, a state’s effort alone can hardly assure economic security, food security, environmental security, health security, among others. Even political stability and security cannot be realized by one state alone. The political, economic and social conditions of external actors have sway in the internal security conditions of states. The insecurities caused by armed conflicts in a particular state, for example, threaten human lives and could pose enormous threats to international peace and security in the form of refugee flows, spread of diseases, terrorism and the extension of internal conflict into regional crises. Thus, there is no state that could claim to be unaffected
by external factors. This implies that no state could provide full security to its citizen on its own.

In tandem with Buzan (1991), the broadening of the concept of security as espoused by UNDP leads to a greater platform for external involvement in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Based on realist framework, Buzan in his work *People, States and Fear*, insists that the state bears the primary and ultimate prerogative to satisfy the conditions of human security (Buzan 1991). For Buzan, in the anarchic international system, citizens are more secured within the state and the political goods and services it offers. In cases of state weakness, failure or crisis, Buzan insists that states ought to be empowered to grow strong to protect and provide security rather than being dislodged as the primary referent of security (Naidoo 2001: 3).

Nevertheless, in our contemporary world where no single state can ensure security of its territory, multilateral state organizations are increasingly being relied on to coordinate and enforce security initiatives especially when states fail to provide security. In fact, based on a postmodernist framework, states should be dislodged as the primary referent in the discourse of human security (Naidoo 2001). Based on the postmodernist framework, it is somewhat problematic to rely on the state to provide security to its citizens as states can be the precipitants of human insecurities. The Postmodern approach begins with the premise emphasizing the decline in state power and the increasing inability of the state to perform traditional state function in the face of globalization (Naidoo 2001: 6). With state sovereignty under severe challenges due to the increasing interdependent nature of the international system, other systems should be relied on for the provision of security. For postmodernists, non-state actors ‘such as individuals, ethnic and cultural groups, regional economic blocs, multinational corporations (MNCs) and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and just about all humankind’ are expected to play primary roles in enhancing human security (Naidoo 2001: 3).

2.4.3 The Doctrine of ‘Responsibility to Protect’

As intra-state conflicts soared in the post-Cold War world, the international community continued to look for justifications for humanitarian interventions to promote human security as well as world peace and security. In any consideration of humanitarian intervention,
several questions arise around its legitimacy, compatibility with the principle of sovereignty, its successes and consequences as well as the justness of the operation (ICISS 2001; Kioko 2003: 809; Kaldor 2007). Yet, the failure of the international community to intervene to avert the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the massacre of thousands of people seeking shelter in UN-supposed ‘safe areas’ in Srebrenica in 1995 raised questions around the extent of the international community’s respect and concern for human security. Generally, when humanitarian intervention occurs as in Somalia, Bosnia, etc. and when it is neglected as in the case of Rwanda, it is always a controversial issue in the international realm. In a world organized around the principle of sovereignty, it remains contentious to respond to intra-state conflicts. Under what circumstances should third parties violate the dominant principle of sovereignty to respond to intra-state conflicts? From whence does the right to humanitarian intervention lie?

As discussed in the previous section, the nexus between human security and global peace and security entails that states cannot afford to sit and watch while other states are destroyed by internal conflicts. The international community continues to express growing intolerance to severe human insecurities within conflict states. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 Agenda for Peace report argues that the time for sacrosanct sovereignty has passed (Dembinski and Reinold 2011: 3). Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General, in his 20th September 1999 Report to the United Nations General Assembly, argues that despite the limitations and imperfections of humanitarian intervention, ‘it is testimony to a humanity that cares more, not less, for the suffering in its midst, and a humanity that will do more, and not less, to end it’ (cited in Kaldor 2007: 16). Nevertheless the conditions for humanitarian intervention and the authority to authorize the intervention remain vague and contentious (Evans 2006: 703).

In his landmark article in 1999 to the United Nations General Assembly, Kofi Annan argues in line with Francis Deng’s claim\textsuperscript{25}, that the principle of sovereignty contained in the UN Charter be interpreted as a responsibility to adequately carry out both domestic and external duties (cited in Gottwald 2012: 9). In his Millennium Report to the General Assembly in the subsequent year (2000), Annan made compelling pleas for the international community to set

\textsuperscript{25} In an attempt to address the predominance of internal conflicts and the growing number of internally displaced person IDPs, Francis Deng along with other scholars In 1996, had argued innovatively for the idea of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ (Scanlon et al 2007: 14; Bellamy 2008: 20).
up a commission to bridge the gap between sovereignty and humanitarian intervention given the lack of legal document and cohesive doctrine that justify and authorize humanitarian intervention.

In 2001, the Canadian-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)\textsuperscript{26} was set up to investigate the chasm between sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. After its inquiry, the ICISS 2001 report stresses that state sovereignty entails responsibility. In line with the traditional view of security, the state possesses the primary responsibility to protect its people. States are expected to use soft power instead of military power or state terror to foster cooperation and development in their respective states. However, in situations where a state is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens, the international community, the broader community of states, assumes the responsibility to protect citizens in the state. This international norm known as the Responsibility to Protect entails that the international community come to the aid of populations ‘suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it’ (ICISS 2001).

The ICISS pioneering report espouses three core responsibilities embedded in the notion of the responsibility to protect: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild (ICISS 2001). The responsibility to prevent demands addressing the direct and root precipitant of conflicts that expose civilian populations to human insecurity. The responsibility to react has to do with responding to human insecurities by using measures that range from sanctions, international prosecution to military intervention (ICISS 2001). Lastly, the responsibility to rebuild charges the international community to provide recovery, reconstructive and reconciliatory assistance to a post-conflict state that has undergone military intervention (ICISS 2001).

In the necessity of exercising the responsibility to react via military intervention, the 2001 ICISS recommends that the intervention must fulfil six criteria with pedigree on the ‘Just War Principles’: just cause, right intention, last resort, proper authority, proportional intervention, and reasonable prospect of success. In terms of just cause, the ICISS insists that there must be grave and severe harm occurring to human beings such as large scale loss of life and large

\textsuperscript{26} ‘Co-Chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, the ICISS comprised 12 Commissioners from both the North and South and was charged with the task of confronting key questions surrounding intervention for human protection purposes’ (Powell 2005: 7).
scale ethnic cleansing to warrant military intervention. The commission envisages the *right intention* for humanitarian intervention to be aimed at averting human suffering\(^\text{27}\). Military intervention should come only as a *last resort* when non-coercive measures have failed. In terms of *proportional intervention*, the ICISS proposes that the intensity, duration and scale of the military intervention should be in proportion with the primary mandate of human protection. Before any military intervention, the international community should also ascertain if there are reasonable *prospects of success*. Finally, all military intervention ought to be rightly authorized by the United Nations Security Council (ICISS 2001).

In the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, UN member states agreed on three main components of the responsibility to protect as submitted by the ICISS (Gottwald 2012: 10). Firstly, every state formally recognizes the responsibility of sovereigns to protect their own citizens. Secondly, UN member states pledge to develop institutional capacities and mechanisms to prevent mass atrocities and genocide and to help states meet the challenge of providing security to its citizens (Gottwald 2012: 10). Thirdly, when deemed necessary, the UN Security Council bears the authority to intervene or authorize intervention when a particular state in question fails or is unwilling to protect civilians in line with Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter (Bizos, 2011:6)\(^\text{28}\). After the 2005 UN World Summit, the doctrine of the *responsibility to protect* gained widespread international recognition and acceptance.

Critics accuse the 2001 ICISS commission for infiltrating the concept of human security into the principle of sovereignty to justify external meddling in internal affairs of states. In situations of intrastate conflict, some experts like Micheal Walzer have argued that the right to self-determination enshrined in the principle of sovereignty demands that states should sort out their internal crises without external interference (cited in Calhoun 2001: 5). Article 2.1 of the UN Charter recognizes the sovereignty of states under the international law as the most important aspect of the international system. Sovereignty tends to be sometimes the only line

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\(^{27}\) Kofi Annan contends that intervention must be cosmopolitan in nature (cited in Calhoun 2001: 5). For him, what matters is the ‘overall good of humanity; every life is equal to every other life’.

\(^{28}\) However, during the 2005 World Summit, members states failed to adopt the six criteria for exercising the *responsibility to react*. Rather, the summit recommended an ongoing review and consideration of the criteria. Bellamy (2008: 626) notes that ‘Whereas several African states endorsed the view that criteria were essential to making the Security Council’s decisions more transparent, accountable (to the wider membership) and hence legitimate, the United States, China and Russia opposed them—though for very different reasons: the United States because it believed that criteria would limit its freedom of action, the others because they feared that criteria might be used to circumvent the Council’.
of defense for most states in an anarchical international system marked by differences and inequalities in power and resources (ICISS 2001).

Besides, it is difficult for outsiders to adequately understand the dynamics of internal conflicts. External intervention may turn out to become one-sided and un-strategic given the limitedness of external diagnosis of the deep-seated internal issues involved. The 2011 NATO intervention in Libya is sometimes seen as a one-sided intervention against Gadhafi’s regime. This goes against the principle of impartiality which military interventions ought to champion. External interventions may also lead to the escalation of internal conflicts and a prolonged conflict resolution measures aimed at resolving the crises (Crocker, 2001: 231). The US led UN intervention in Somalia is an example were some analysts adjudged external intervention to fuel and intensify conflict.

In *The Curse of Inclusive Intervention*, Edward Luttwak (2001) argues that wars should be allowed to follow their natural course which is an end. For Luttwak (2001), intervening in war situations only ends up prolonging the war. When wars are stopped via ceasefire agreements or international peace operations, warring parties regroup, retrain and rearm themselves for a reinvigorated conflict. In support of his claims, Luttwak (2001) adduces the example of the Arab-Israel War of 1948 – 1949 where (as he claimed) the intervention of the UN Security Council gave the belligerents the opportunity to rearm and continue the arms struggle which could have ended in few weeks. In line with Luttwak (2001), wars should be allowed to ripen and warring parties should be allowed to attain victory, reach a mutual exhaustion or lack the necessary arms to further their armed struggles.

However, experiences like the 1994 Rwandan genocide have shown that international involvement in conflict situations when necessary is crucial. There is no guarantee that internal conflicts will ebb away if left alone. At times, internal conflicts metastasize to become regional conflicts like the case of Somalia, Liberia, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Rwanda and Congo. The foregoing conflict states dragged other neighbouring states into the conflicts as well. For instance, the conflict in Somalia dragged other countries like Ethiopia, Kenya and Eritrea into the conflict. The nature of conflict turned into a complex and prolonged regional security conundrum. The internal crisis of Somalia also led to the problems of refugee flows, spread of diseases, trafficking, piracy, etc. Furthermore, the Syrian conflict has also overflowed into neighboring states such as Turkey and Lebanon. The ICISS argues that the principle of non-intervention entails that states should solve their own internal problems
to avoid the conflict spilling over to neighbouring countries as well as becoming an issue of international peace and security (ICISS 2001: 31). Hence, issues that pose actual and potential threat to international peace and security demand international responses²⁹ (ICISS 2001: 13).

In justification of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, the ICISS observes that Article 24 of the UN Charter charges the Security Council with the responsibility to maintain international peace and security. Thus, the UN has the mandate to intervene in the internal affairs of member states for the sake of world peace and security. By virtue of being a member of the UN, sovereign states bind themselves voluntarily to the responsibilities demanded by the UN Charter. The human rights law as endorsed in UN Charter, Conventions, Treaties and Declarations demands adherence from member states. Hence, the doctrine of the responsibility to protect is not merely a fabrication to provide leeway for powerful states to dominate and undermine the sovereignty of weaker states as espoused by critics of humanitarian intervention (Gottwald 2012: 10; Bellamy 2008: 616).

To add to the credibility of external intervention, sources from Non-Governmental organizations like the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), High Commissioners for Human Rights and for Refugees, human rights groups, etc. provide useful information about the nature of conflicts. These humanitarian aid institutions sometimes call for urgent intervention in affected states to protect civilians from gross human atrocities (Anderson 2001). Their view and recommendation for military intervention somehow justifies political decisions for intervention and shows that it is not (always) an ulterior political action to invade another state³⁰.

In its report entitled The Responsibility to Protect, the ICISS deliberately avoided the use of the terms ‘humanitarian intervention’ or ‘military intervention’ thereby shifting the attention from the right to intervene to the responsibility to protect citizens (Kioko 2003: 809; Bellamy

²⁹ Some observers are keen to note that in a globalized world bedevilled by threats to international security, the current notion of the ‘responsibility to protect’ is narrow as it only makes reference to worst case scenarios (Scanlon et al 2007: 7). Must the international community wait for worst cases to intervene in order to promote human and international security? However, proponents of the responsibility to protect argue that adding broader mandates that encompass the concern for human security would only end up making the concept vague and difficult for consensual response when need arises (Scanlon et al 2007:18). However, with the scope of the responsibility to protect, the international community has a clear principle and guide for action.

³⁰ NGOs are sometimes criticised for picking sides with a political group and calling for international intervention so as to uphold the views of their donors.
Alex Bellamy (2008: 618) contends that the responsibility to protect is well placed to reduce the appeal for policy-makers to dwell exclusively on military responses by providing them with other non-coercive forms of interventions. Moreover, in the necessity of intervention, the protection of human lives is the actual and vivid mandate of interveners and nothing more.

Additionally, Bellamy (2008: 630) argues that the broad measures of the responsibility to protect prevent ‘moral hazards’ that may result from opportunists purposefully inciting intra-state conflicts and seeking external intervention for their narrow interests. Opportunists only seek to replace prevalent leaderships for selfish reasons without any meaningful alternative to the kind of rule that they seek to topple. For instance, it is difficult to see any meaningful alternative proffered by the M23 rebel group if they should replace the incumbent government of the DRC. According to Bellamy (2008: 632), the responsibility to protect actually allows the use of force by a state against supposed rebels unless the force amounts to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Most significantly, responsibility to protect doctrine places the individual at the centre of security analysis.

Criteria for Evaluation

Based on the theoretical framework and concepts considered in this chapter, the evaluation of the African Union’s interventionist role shall be based on the following:

**Civilian protection:** This criterion of evaluation requires that an effective African Union in terms of the military approach to conflict management would be based on the regional body’s capacity to provide protection to civilians. This criterion has its

31 The excessive reliance on military force for the humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992 as well as its poor planning, coordination and execution gives little support for humanitarian intervention. The intervention ended up fuelling the Somali conflict as evident in the increased armed conflict between the UNOSOM forces and the various warring factions in Somalia. The poor reception of the external forces and the killings and desecration of US and UN forces tended to show that aversion of the predominantly Islamic Somali society towards foreign influences. In terms of the proportional force used, the alleged excessive interventions in states like Kosovo and Libya tend to undermine humanitarian intervention.

32 Alan Kuperman used the term ‘moral hazard’ to refer to the phenomenon whereby the provision of protection against risk encourages or enables risk-taking behaviour. For example, Kuperman argues that talk of military intervention in Kosovo in 1998 emboldened the Kosovo Liberation Army, encouraging it to use violence to provoke Serbian reprisals and take an uncompromising political position to secure NATO intervention. The reality is often more tragic: in most circumstances, having inadvertently encouraged violent rebellion by promises of intervention, international society does not deliver on its promise, leaving civilian populations more vulnerable to attack’ (cited in Bellamy 2008: 630).
pedigree on the objective of conflict management which is centered around lessening the dangers of conflict for civilians. Moreover, the human security principle accords greater security to individuals and charges the international community to protect civilians against gross human violations through the responsibility to protect doctrine. This criterion serves as one of the main standards for estimating the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the African Union in terms of conflict management.

**Capacity:** This criterion entails the assessment of the African Union’s capacity – in terms of will, commitment and resources – to engage in conflict management. This criterion goes in line with the responsibility to protect doctrine which mandates third party interveners to have the required will, commitment and resources to attain success. To evaluate an effective intervention, the African Union ought to demonstrate a considerable willingness and commitment to wrestle with the conflict of its member state. The regional body ought to provide required troops and commit resources for its missions.

**Planning and execution:** This criterion entails that the African Union’s interventions ought to be timely with clear and well-planned mandate and precision in terms of implementation. The regional body ought to show that its intervention on the ground was well planned with clear objectives. This criterion also requires the African Union to display considerable responsibility, control and ownership of its missions in conflict states. This is to explore whether the regional body has been able to adequately operationalize the political ideal of African solutions to African problems. Finally, this criterion helps to estimate the current achievement of the African Union in mission areas.

**Conclusion**

In the first section of this chapter, relevant concepts useful for the understanding of the context of the study on the African Union were considered. This section examined the concept of conflict management and its features – peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and military intervention – which are geared towards containing conflicts and protecting civilian populations and establishing non-violent environment for political solutions to take place. It
goes further to look into the principles of human security and the responsibility to protect doctrine which places more value on individual rights and the responsibility of the international community to protect civilians when states are unwilling or unable to.

The second section of this chapter reviews the relevant literature that examines the efforts of the African Union at promoting and enforcing peace and security in Africa. From the review, this study outlines its pertinence by looking into the African Union’s military approach to conflict management as against most reviews that conflate AU’s conflict resolution and conflict management interventions. The third section on the other hand explores the theoretical framework (liberal institutionalism) upon which the research is conceived. The tenets of liberal institutionalism provide a suitable platform for the assessment of the African Union as an institution with a mandate to promote and enforce peace and security. The subsequent chapter shall expound the grounds favourable for the establishment of the African Union and how the regional body intends to confront African problems particularly the conflict challenges in the continent.
CHAPTER 3

African Union’s Responsibility to Protect

3.1 Introduction

This chapter establishes the political and institutional legitimacy and responsibility of the African Union to respond to the conflicts in Africa. Section one explores the basis for institutional cooperation between African states to respond to the continent’s security problems. The second section examines the rationale behind the emergence of the African Union to replace its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity. The chapter goes further in the third section to consider the African Union’s institutional bodies that are responsible for contending with issues of peace and security in Africa.

3.2 Motivations for pan-African Regional Security

In light of the continent’s insecurities, the international community has intervened severally in the African continent. As the primary agent coordinating international peace and security agenda as endorsed in Chapters IV and V of the UN Charter, the United Nations via the Security Council has made efforts to contain security threats in Africa. In cases of armed conflict, Chapter VII of the UN Charter mandates the UN Security Council to take enforcement measures to restore international peace and security (Agada 2008: 2). Pan (2005: 1) notes that there have been over fifty-four UN Peacekeeping missions in Africa since 1948. As noted by the Human Security Brief 2007 the peace operations in Africa have led to the 60% reduction of the number and magnitude of conflicts in Africa since the mid-1990s (Williams 2010: 1).

However, the huge responsibilities of the UN Security Council across the globe constitute a huge challenge to the organization’s efficiency (Ekeus 2001: 519; Franke 2006: 1). It has become increasingly clear to the UN that it cannot effectively tackle the conflicts and security threats across the globe all by itself. Rof Ekeus (2001: 519) notes that the UN is faced with the challenges of lack of political will, abuse of veto power, legitimacy, financial constraints.

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33 50,000 of the 65,000 UN peacekeepers deployed worldwide in 2005 were deployed to Africa (Pan 2005: 1). Williams (2010: 1) notes that the United Nations has spent over $32 billion on its 12 peacekeeping operation in Africa since 2000. From 2000 to 2010, there have been over 40 United Nations-sponsored peace operations in 14 African states (Williams 2010: 1).
as well as the preponderance of intractable conflicts across the globe. These preclude the organization from effectively dealing with the security threats in Africa. Bergholm (2010: 6) notes that UN peace operations in Africa reduced drastically from a 51% uniformed personnel of about 40,000 forces present in Africa out of 78,400 personnel deployed in 1993 to a 16% presence in Africa out of the worldwide 10,000 deployed uniformed UN peacekeepers in 1999. This drastic reduction did not correspond to a reduction of conflict levels in Africa as major wars were fought in Africa between 1993 and 1999 in countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan. Besides this reality, about 16 conflicts were going on in Africa in 1999 (Bergholm 2010: 6). UN expenditures for peace operations also reduced in Africa from around $3 billion in 1993 to 1.3 billion in 1999 (Bergholm 2010: 6).

These reductions expose the UN’s dwindling capacity to handle the problems of a continent infected by complex conflicts and challenges. One of the most recounted failures of the UN in Africa is its failure to stop the massive killings of people during the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Beside the passivity of the UN during the Rwandan genocide, the failure of the UN to respond appropriately to the state collapse and crisis in Somalia, the armed conflicts in DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone in the late 1990s as well as other socio-political and economic challenges in the continent adds to the imperative for a strong regional organization to contend closely with African problems (Williams 2011: 4). Moreover, most African states were undergoing the hardship of insurgencies, political instabilities, poverty, underdevelopment and state failure without any coordinated international effort to confront such challenges.

Cognizant of its limitations, the United Nations recognizes the pivotal role of regional organizations to the peace and security of their regions (Peck 2001: 562). The UN Charter expresses great need for partnership with regional organizations to attain international peace and security (Ekeus 2001: 522). Chapter VIII of the UN Charter enjoins regional organizations to take first necessary steps to resolve regional conflicts. To coordinate peace initiatives, regional organizations are expected to keep the UN Security Council informed in their decisions for peace and security and their interventions should be authorized by the

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34 The UN/US failed intervention in Somali crisis between 1992 and 1995 had tended to discourage foreign powers from intervening in African conflicts until the twenty-first century. The crises in Somalia – if not the whole conflicts in Africa – was deemed hopeless situations in western eyes in the 1990s. UN and foreign interest in African conflicts was only re-ignited with the war against terror inspired by the 9/11 terrorist attack in US.
Council in line with Chapter VIII, Articles 52, 53 and 54 (Williams 2011: 17; Peck 2001: 562).

Peck (2001: 562) argues that the advantage of regional organizations is that they are more conversant with issues within their regions than the United Nations. Regional members who are neighbours to a state in conflict are also affected by the conflict. Hence, they are urged to find solutions to solve the problems of their neighbouring states (Bizos, 2011: 9; Franke, 2006: 6). Neighbouring states are able to influence the resolution of conflict in a state in conflict due to the importance of maintaining a good relationship with neighbours.\(^{35}\)

Moreover, given the history of colonialism as well as the suspicious external meddling in the African continent by Western powers, interventions from non-African forces have come under severe criticism from political leaders, academics and most significantly, the people or regimes for whom the intervention and efforts are meant for. Even after independence, African states continue to witness several external interferences due to the weak and vulnerable nature of African states. For some scholars, post-colonial African states are artificial, weak or even failed states \textit{ab initio} (Osaghae 2007: 696; Brown 2001).

Taking advantage of the weakness of African states, foreign powers during the Cold War era meddled in African affairs by trying to promote their political ideologies on the African continent and to exploit its resources. The demise of Cold War era did not translate into the freedom of African states to determine their goals. The intra-state conflicts that predominates the security concerns in post-Cold War Africa provided grounds for an even greater meddling of foreign powers in Africa. Even if it is well intended, external intervention in Africa conjures up images of colonialism, imperialism and the blatant display of superiority by Western powers in particular (Somerville 1990: 1). Foreign interventions tarnish the dignity and pride of Africa as it portrays Africans as being savage and incapable of articulating and solving their own issues and must await external powers to come to their rescue (Ayittey 1994; Somerville 1990: 1).

\(^{35}\) Nevertheless, the familiarity of neighboring states to the conflict in nearby states could have a huge implication to the principle of impartiality as they may tend to favour one conflict party than the other. Neighboring states could also use the conflicts in nearby states for their own narrow interests as in the case of the DRC were Rwanda and Uganda were accused of aiding in the perpetuation of the conflict so as to illegally tap the country’s mineral resources diamonds. Regional organizations also lack the necessary resources and capacity to facilitate peace operations in relation to the UN (Franke 2006: 1).
Worryingly, the parochial interests of foreign powers with regard to African mineral wealth make the continent vulnerable to external meddling from foreign powers. For its high-technology industries, France, for instance, is dependent on a number of raw materials and energy resources in the African continent (Renou 1999). Its need to access African cheap materials on a permanent basis has informed its friendly and interventionist policies mainly in its erstwhile colonies in West Africa. In reference to French policies in Africa from independence till the late 1990s, Xavier Renou (1999) notes that under different forms of agreements, there are about 38 African countries engaged in cooperation with France. On its own part, France supplies the regimes with weapons, logistic supports, training of soldiers and officers and the protection of the regimes from aggressions. On the other hand, France gains the favour of African leaders who are willing to ensure that France has the monopoly to the raw materials in their countries\(^{36}\).

The interest of the U.S. and other Europeans in Africa is continually growing as more resources are discovered in Africa. Williams (2011: 1) is instructive in noting that Africa ‘offers profitable business opportunities, especially in the energy, telecommunication, and minerals sectors’. In the face of the growing Chinese and Indian influence in the African continent, USA and European powers with strategic interests in Africa are engaging in a new scramble for African resources. As such, it is possible for the continent to experience more external meddling under the guise of responsibility to protect and human security justifications. For Ayittey (1994), the complexities of local particularities cannot be solved by impulsive and ulterior foreign solution and strategies. Because of the suspicious nature of external intervention, any long-term solution to the recurring conflicts in Africa ought to come from Africans.

The foregoing challenges which range from the UN’s inability to contend with Africa’s security issues to the questionable nature of external interventions makes it imperative for African states to engage in a stronger cooperation and integration to confront the common challenges that they face (Murithi 2009: 93; Williams 2011: 3; Farmer 2012: 95). This is in line with the African political ideal of providing African solutions to African problems. While arguing for the notion of continental jurisdiction, Ali Mazrui in his 1967 work entitled

\[^{36}\text{Renou (1999) observes that in 1998, 50\% of French Official Development Aid of about 18 billion Francs was dedicated to Sub-Saharan Africa with a bigger share to francophone African states. Using such means, France ensures the monopoly of African raw materials for France’s transnational companies.}\]
Towards a Pax Africana had insisted on *African solutions to African problems* at a time when newly independent states sought to rid themselves from external meddling (cited in Scanlon et al 2007: 13). Based on the notion of racial sovereignty, Mazrui deemed foreign interventions to be illegitimate. He argues that only inter-African interventions are legitimate in the African continent. Building on Mazrui’s arguments, the concept of *African solutions to African problems* turned into a slogan used often by African scholars, policymakers and politicians seeking a solution to Africa’s myriad problems (Scanlon et al 2007).

The notion of African solutions to African problems hinges on the desire of African states to be masters of their own destiny. This will firstly help Africans to drive their desire for self-determination without external interference which re-lives the experience of colonialism in Africa (Scanlon et al 2007:13). Here, the analysis, understanding and solution to African problems would no longer be based on the view of external powers, views that are imposed on Africans and their conditions (Dersso 2012: 22). By decolonizing the understanding and solutions to African problems, Africans would then be able to define their challenges, lead and drive the effort to remedy the maladies plaguing the continent. It is hoped that African problems can truly be solved only when the attempts at ensuring that the solutions to African problems are African-oriented and of African provenance.

Secondly, providing African solutions to African problems empowers Africans to take responsibility and readily confront the political, economic and social challenges in the continent without suspicious external assistance. By drawing resources together, African states with their weaknesses are expected to be able to respond to the challenges of their respective states (Parker and Rukare, 2002: 365). Nevertheless, the idea of African solutions to African problems does not isolate the involvement of the international community. Rather, the idea of African solutions to African problems espouses minimal external involvement in African affairs. It accords Africans the central role in addressing African issues.

Against this backdrop, the continent’s regional organization seems to be better suited to tackle African problems legitimately and credibly. Apuuli (2012: 135) argues that ‘the formation of the African Union (AU) was precisely aimed at finding African solutions for African problems’ wherever possible. The regional institution mirrors the prevalent idea of Pan-Africanism – a desire for a greater solidarity, unity and cooperation between African

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37 The external involvement in African affairs notes the fact that African problems are at times precipitated by external factors.
states to address domestic and global challenges (Parker and Rukare, 2002: 365; Murithi, 2009:93; Williams, 2011: 3). This is reflected in AU’s vision of ‘an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in global arena’ (African Union, 2013).

3.3 Evolution of the African Union

The nature, shape and function of African regional organization have been subjects of controversy among African leaders since independence. African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt argued that the boundaries that differentiate African states as drawn by colonial powers in 1885 during the scramble for Africa are quasi and arbitrary (Murithi, 2008). Thus, they argue beyond a mere cooperation of African states to a political unification of African states. However, other African nationalist leaders express misgivings about a political unification of African states which would entail having a political head of Africa. For such leaders, it is better to retain national independence based on the state system created by the colonial powers. After the failed debate on a political unity of African states (United States of Africa) espoused passionately by former President Kwame Nkurumah of Ghana, the first continental regional organization was established on the 25th of May 1963 and was called the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

The OAU was expected to drive the then contemporary pan-African agenda of the continent which was centred on limiting external involvement in the continent’s affairs and upholding the sovereign and territorial integrity of the newly independent states in Africa. Article II of the OAU’s 1963 Charter which served as a crucial Article in the Charter has the defence of sovereignty, territorial integrity and eradication of all forms of colonialism in Africa as the core objectives of the regional organization. The OAU cherished and upheld the principles of non-intervention and anti-imperialism.

Unfavourably, the OAU’s insistence on the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of member states was exposed by its inability to contend with the security threats in the continent. The non-interference principle enshrined in the OAU Charter made it incapable for the organisation to influence the politics of member states and intervene in the internal crisis of member states to prevent gross human right violations (Apuuli, 2012: 136; Tieku, 2007: 71).
Although the OAU was not primarily formed to combat security problems in Africa, it failed to adapt to the post-Cold War insecurities of African states.

Møller (2009: 6) notes that the non-interventionist norms of OAU led it to be a guardian of incumbent state regimes at the expense of the rights of civilians. Moreover, most members of OAU came to power via unconstitutional and illegal means and they were notorious for human rights abuses. The principle of non-intervention served as a conducive principle for them to prevent the interference of other states in their internal affairs and to ensure their regime survival and absolute control over their territory. OAU’s intervention in member states was only carried out under the custom of a complete consensus by the host state and in solidarity with the government (Tieku 2007: 29).

The intervention of OAU member states in troubled African states was also based on solidarity to state regimes. Thus, OAU as well as individual African states were unable to contend aptly with conflicts, secessionist struggles and human right abuses in the continent. OAU was notorious for ignoring the oppression and sufferings of civilians in repressive states and conflict states. The political, social and economic security of citizens seemed to be trifling issues for the OAU. The atrocities committed by illegitimate and repressive regimes against civilians were left un-criticized, unpunished and unsanctioned by OAU.

In such situations, dictators and illegitimate regimes thrived (Kioko 2003: 814). The military dictatorships of Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Mohammed Siad Barre of Somalia, Emperor Bokassa 1 of Central Africa, Samuel Doe of Liberia, Idi Amin Dada of Uganda, and Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria among many others were left unchecked by OAU. Kioko (2003: 813) recounts President Museveni of Uganda’s maiden speech to the Ordinary Session of Heads of State and Government of the OAU in 1986. Museveni charged the OAU and its non-interference principle for overlooking the massive massacre of Ugandans by Idi Amin. In his words, Museveni states:

> Over a period of 20 years three quarters of a million Ugandans perished at the hands of governments that should have protected their lives (...) I must state that Ugandans (...) felt a deep sense of betrayal that most of Africa kept silent (...) the reason for not condemning such massive crimes had supposedly been a desire not to interfere in the internal affairs of a Member State, in accordance with the Charters of the OAU and the United Nations. We do not accept this reasoning because in the same organs there are

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38 This earned the OAU Assembly a derogatory name “Heads of State Club” were African leaders meet for fun (Kioko, 2003: 814).
explicit laws that enunciate the sanctity and inviolability of human life (quoted in Kioko 2003: 813).

Poku et al (2007: 158) note that the 30 years existence of OAU was characterized by nonchalance to the domestic affairs of member states thereby entertaining the excesses of dictatorial regimes. In accord with Møller (2009: 6), OAU is adjudged to have failed at most levels of its objectives politically, economically, militarily and socially. Although OAU arguably championed the decolonization and anti-apartheid struggles against the colonialists, it lost relevance and effectiveness in a post-Cold War world where intra-state conflicts and state failures became rife. In the light of OAU’s constraints in the post-Cold War world, most African states faced the jeopardy of failure, civil wars, rebellion and instabilities.

Osaghae (2007: 691) is instructive in noting that ‘while the image of fragility is historically associated with the Third World in general, the focus here is mainly on Africa’. In the failed state index, many African states unfortunately tend towards the pinnacle of state failure and collapse. State failure and intra-state conflicts bedevilled the bounds of OAU’s objectives, principles, institutional mechanisms, political will, financial strength and capabilities (Sesay 2008:11). The Somali state collapse, the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the armed conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC as well as the on-going fighting in Angola and Sudan in the 1990s exposed the impotence of OAU and highlighted the need for Africans to rise up to the challenges in the continent.

The constraints and inefficiencies of the OAU Charter and objectives in the 1990s meant that a more efficient regional organization was long overdue (Apuuli 2012: 136). Moreover, OAU’s objective of eradicating every form of colonialism in Africa was arguably attained with the collapse of apartheid in South Africa and the attainment of independence from colonial powers by all African states. The focus for African leaders redirected to ridding the continent of the protracted underdevelopment and conflicts that has wracked African states (Laporte and Mackie 2010: 49).

Contrary to OAU’s non-interference principle, African leaders, since the end of the Cold War era, became more conscious that no state can unilaterally address the issues of conflict, the massacre of civilians, refugee flows, conscription of child soldiers, illicit small arms trade, drug trafficking, and underdevelopment that constitute common threats in the continent (Murithi 2009: 95). Poku et al (2007: 1155) observe that African leaders have become increasingly aware of the need for a proactive and cooperative approach towards confronting
the multiple challenges in the continent. In the late 1990s, it became imperative for African leaders to establish a strong regional organization with relevant principles and objectives to play an active role in the continent as well as in the global arena (Kioko 2003: 810; Sesay 2008: 10; National Model United Nations 2008: 5).

During the Sirte Summit on the 9th of September 1999, Muammar Gaddafi proposed the establishment of the United States of Africa (USA model) or alternatively, the Union of African States (Soviet Union model)39 (Kioko 2003: 811). These entailed a political unification of Africa under a federation or confederation system. Having discussed the proposal, African leaders jettisoned the federation or confederation proposal given the misgivings and divided opinions about the political unification of African states. During the same Summit, nevertheless, they agreed on the formation of a stronger and vibrant regional organization to accelerate ‘the process of integration in the continent and to enable it play its rightful role in the global economy while addressing multifaceted social, economic and political problems compounded’ (African Union 2013).

As a way of making a major policy and structural shift from OAU’s limitations and inefficiencies, African leaders deemed it wise to create a new pan-African organization called ‘African Union’ as a panacea to its predecessor, the OAU (Kerekou 2007:3). At Lome Togo in 2000, the Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted and signed, and was put into force in 2001 (African Union, 2013). In July 2002, the African Union was formally inaugurated in Durban, South Africa. In concord with the idea of providing African solutions to African problems, the African Union is expected to confront the scourge of conflicts that had been the bane of political, economic and social development in the continent.

The move by African leaders to change the name of OAU to AU or rather the move to create a new pan-African organization under a new name (African Union) raises concerns among some analysts. For Sesay and Omotosho (2011: 10), the organizational change of name brings up crucial questions around the significance of a name change on the new organization which has the same members, same resources and political will as its predecessor. The African Union is still made of the same African leaders that comprise the OAU. They still have the challenges of funding, poor political and security record of member states and low

39 Kwame Nkrumah was a powerful proponent of a politically and economically united Africa as evident in his book ‘Africa Must Unite’. Since his unsuccessful argument for the unification of African states prior to the formation of the OAU in 1963, the idea of a united Africa lingers on in pan-African political debates.
political will of member states. Would it have been beneficial for African leaders to restructure the OAU to contend with contemporary challenges by reviewing its policies and institutional mechanisms? What is clear is that the adoption of the new name or rather the establishment of a new organization under the name African Union tends to have had positive effect on the incumbent continent’s regional organization. As noted by Dersso (2011: 116), the transformation from OAU to AU could be considered as a regime change in Africa’s regional organization, a normative and institutional change.

Going with the tide of times, the African Union extends the notion of security beyond the state-centric concept to human security (Hanson 2009: 1; Poku et al 2007: 1158). The constitutional, institutional and policy objectives of the African Union adopted a more holistic human security perspective that commits member states to promote and respect the sanctity of human life as endorsed in Article 4(o) of the 2001 Constitutive Act. Article 3(g) further commits member states ‘to promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance’. In Article 3(h), the African Union enjoins member states to ‘promote and protect human and people’s rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments’ (AU Constitutive Act, 2001). In cases of infringements to human security, the AU is mandated to mete out political and economic sanctions against the recalcitrant state as etched in Article 23(2).

Bizos (2011: 2) argues that the African Union is arguably the only regional organization with institutionalized ideas of the responsibility to protect ingrained in its system. African Union had already incorporated the idea of the responsibility to protect in its 2001 Constitutive Act prior to the popularization of the doctrine by the 2005 UN General Assembly. Moving away from the old OAU norm of ‘non-interference’, the AU was grounded in a new norm of ‘non-indifference’ to the internal problems of member states (Kioko 2003: 819). Despite recognizing and endorsing the inalienable right of states to sovereignty and non-interference from external forces as ratified in Article 3(b) of the Constitutive Act, the African Union stresses its right and responsibility to interfere in the internal affairs of member states in cases of gross human rights violations as well as those that threaten international peace and security. The first Chair of the AU Commission Alpha Oumar Konare, maintains that African states cannot afford to be passive while atrocities are committed in neighbouring countries (cited in Murithi 2009:95).
In tandem with the responsibility to protect, Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of 2001 mandates the AU to respond to war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order. The last clause of Article 4(h) ‘as well as a serious threat to legitimate order’ gives the AU the power to intervene pre-emptively at any stage of a conflict to quell an emerging conflict before it deteriorates. When deemed necessary, the African Union Assembly wields the power to authorize military intervention with or without the consent of the host states and even prior to the UN Security Council’s authorization as endorsed in Article 4(h). This contradicts Article 53 of the UN Charter which insists that all humanitarian military interventions must be authorized by the UN Security Council.

Recent peace operations in Africa by regional and sub-regional organizations since the late 1990s are often carried out prior to seeking authorization from the UN Security Council. This tends to challenge the role of the UNSC in overseeing matters of international peace and security. Though Chapter VIII of the UN Charter emphasizes the paramount role of regional organizations in addressing regional conflicts, regional interventions in conflicts are expected to be authorized by the UNSC. In an interdependent world with the United Nations serving as a legitimate global organization, the African Union is expected to cooperate with the UN. Moreover, the AU is quite dependent on the funding and assistance of the UN and other international bodies to enable it to carry out its peace operations.

It is based on the foregoing, that members of the African Union, during the February 2005 Ezulwini Consensus on UN reform, recognized that the African Union and African sub-regional organizations should intervene with the approval of UN Security Council (cited in Scanlon et al 2007: 7). Nevertheless, there seems to be some form of understanding between the AU and the UNSC based on the fact that the UNSC has provided official authorization of AU missions after the regional body’s mission had begun (De Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and).
Okumu 2010). The AU interventionist role in Africa is expected to ensure that African problems are resolved by Africans using African solutions. This would also go a long way to prevent the ulterior and ill-suited solutions of foreign bodies. However, the question remains, does the African Union have what it takes to actualise the notion of African solutions to African problems?

3.4 The African Union’s Conflict Management Institutions and Mechanisms

Under the coordination of the African Union, the Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is Africa’s structure for promoting and enforcing peace and security. Williams (2011: 6) notes that ‘the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) denote a complex set of interrelated institutions and mechanisms that function at the continental, regional, and national level’. At the national level, member states are expected to ensure the security and stability of their respective states as well as respect the norms enshrined in the AU Constitutive Act. Member states are also envisioned to possess the relevant resources and power needed for conflict management in the continent. At the regional level, the regional economic communities (RECs) – the Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) – are expected to drive the peace and security agenda of their regions (Williams 2011: 6; Mathiasen 2006: 2; Murithi 2009: 92). Nevertheless, the RECs are expected to be accountable to the African Union in matters of peace and security.

At the continental level, the African Union serves as the overseer and enforcer of peace and security in the continent. As members of the African Union, African states as well as the sub-regional economic communities (for instance ECOWAS and SADC) they belong to are subordinate to the African Union (Williams 2011: 6). Via its peace and security mechanisms, the African Union coordinates and harmonizes the peace and security agenda of member

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43 Each of the five African regions – North Africa, West Africa, East Africa, Central Africa and Southern Africa – have regional organizations committed to economic development. However, Regional economic communities have realized that economic development and growth is contingent on peace, security and stability of member states (Mathiasen 2006: 2; Peck 2001: 563). Given the predominance of conflict in the continent which has been the bane of development in the continent, the organizations adopted the mandate of promoting peace and security as one of their major objectives.
states and RECs which is made effective mainly by the AU Assembly, and the Peace and Security Council.

The African Union Assembly, composed of Heads of States and Governments, is the supreme organ of the African Union. It is expected to convene at least twice a year and its decisions should ideally be based on consensus or by a two-thirds majority of member states eligible to vote (Kioko 2003: 816; Udombana 2005: 10). In terms of conflict management, the Assembly is charged with deciding whether or not to intervene militarily in a member state in response to grave circumstances namely: war, crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity pursuant to Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act. The Assembly also has the power to determine the sanctions to be imposed on recalcitrant member states.

At the heart of African peace and security architecture is the AU Peace and Security Council. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) was entered into force on the 26th of December 2003 and was officially launched in May 2004 to tackle the issues of peace and security in the continent (African Union, 2013; Scanlon et al, 2007: 20). The Peace and Security Council is made up of a fifteen-member elected forum without permanent members or veto rights like the UN Security Council (Mathiasen 2006: 5-6). The PSC is based on the principle of equitable regional representation and rotation in such a way that the members are representative of the north, south, central, east and western regions of the continent (Williams 2011: 7; Sesay 2008: 25). The regions are expected to present candidates that are in good standing and willing to shoulder the required tasks for membership. Ten members of the PSC are elected for a two years term and the other five members are elected for a three years term. This is a built-in mechanism to ensure that the workings of the PSC do not discontinue and start anew with the election of new members into office. The decision of the PSC is supposed to be based on general consensus. However, in the absence of a consensus, the decision is based on majority vote or two third majority vote (Maasdorp 2010: 5).

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44 AU is made up of the following key institutions: African Heads of State and Government (Assembly); the Executive Council; the Permanent Representative Committee; the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the AU Commission, the Peace and Security Council; the Pan-African Court of Justice; the Economic, Social and Cultural Councils (ECOSOC), the African Central Bank, the Investment Bank, and the Monetary Fund (Tieku 2007: 29).

45 However, it is often difficult to find members with good records in their internal state affairs. The inclusion of regimes with records of human rights abuses and bad governance somehow attenuates the legitimacy of the PSC in terms of enforcing peace and security programs (Williams 2011:8).
Poku *et al* (2007: 1164) argue that the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) marked AU’s commitment to peace and security. The PSC takes care of the day-to-day conflict management in the continent and it coordinates the peace and security agenda of the APSA. The Council is mandated to enforce peace-making, peacekeeping and peace-building operations across the continent (Murithi 2009: 92; Poku *et al* 2007: 1164; Williams 2011: 7).

Unlike the UN Security Council, the Peace and Security Council recommends the adoption of Article 4(h) to the AU Assembly in situations that require military intervention in the internal affairs of member states (Kioko, 2003: 816).

Nevertheless, PSC holds the responsibility to enforce and monitor the interventions in member states in response to war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as well as the threats to legitimate order. For effectiveness, the PSC is expected to cooperate with the UN Security Council and the continent’s sub-regional organizations in matters of peace and security (Murithi 2009: 92, Møller 2009: 13). The PSC is complemented by its subsidiary bodies namely: the African Standby Force, the Military Staff Committee, the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the AU Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development, and the Peace Fund (Murithi 2009: 92; Scanlon *et al* 2007: 20).

The African Standby Force (ASF) was created in May 2003 in accord with Article 13 of the PSC Protocol to serve as the operational arm of the AU poised to be deployed to crisis regions across the continent (AU PSC 2010; Tieku 2007: 29; Williams 2011: 10; Møller 2009: 13). The ASF is envisioned to respond rapidly – within 30 days – to crisis situations once a decision has been made by AU. In line with Article 13(1) of the PSC Protocol, member states are expected to institutionalize the ASF by making pledges of military, police and civilian personnel (Dersso 2011: 124). When the personnel are identified by member states, the names are submitted to their Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) which are responsible for coordinating the forces within their region. Afterwards, the RECs/RMs forwards the full data of their regional force to the AU. In their home countries, the identified personnel remain on standby poised to be deployed to mission when a decision is reached (Dersso 2011:124).

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46 The UNSC on the other hand could establish a military intervention without a decision by the UN Assembly.

47 The PSC is expected to cooperate with the UNSC and to make recourse to the United Nations for necessary financial, logistical and military support.
The African Standby Force comprises five brigades from each of Africa’s sub-regions: The Southern, Eastern, Central, West and Northern regions (AU PSC 2010; Murithi 2009: 93). Maasdorp (2010: 6) notes that the force generating regions are:

Northern African Regional Capability (NARC) with the Regional Headquarters located in Tripoli, Libya. • East African Standby Forces (EASBRIG) with the Brigade Headquarters located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and the planning element in Nairobi, Kenya. • Central African Standby Forces (ECCAS) with the Regional Headquarters located in Libreville, Gabon. • West African Standby Forces (ECOWAS) with their Regional Headquarters located in Abuja, Nigeria. • Southern African Standby Forces (SADC) with their Regional Headquarters located in Gaberone, Botswana.

The five brigades are expected to be composed of 3000 to 4000 troops, 300 to 500 trained military observers, 240 individual police officers and about 500 light vehicles (National Model United Nations, 2008:17). The total of the five brigades of 5000 personnel each amount to 25,000 personnel. The personnel go through training under the auspices of the REC. RECs also provide the operational headquarters for ASF missions (Dersso, 2011: 136). The ASF is expected to have a few centralized forces situated at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia with about 50 military observers, 240 civilian police and some civilian specialists (Mathiasen 2006: 9).

The ASF is designed to take up monitoring and observing missions; aid in containing conflict from overflowing into neighbouring states and protecting civilians; engage in peacekeeping and peace-building operations; engage in military intervention in the affairs of member states as well as engage in post-conflict reconstruction (AU PSC 2010; Bozis 2011: 11). The PSC is expected to control, coordinate and direct ASF missions. It is no doubt that the ASF will serve as a crucial element of African Union’s conflict management capabilities. However, although the ASF was anticipated to reach full operational capacity by June, 2010, it remains a figment of imagination in the APSA to date. African leaders continue to have difficulties operationalizing the ASF.

The Military Staff Committee is another subsidiary body of the PSC that is supposed to serve as an advisory body to the PSC on military matters (Williams 2011: 13). The Military Staff Committee consists of senior military officers from the PSC member states and they are expected to meet regularly to discuss peace and security issues (Maasdorp 2010: 4). However, as noted by Williams (2011: 13), the committee rarely met and it had so far been ineffectual.
The Continent’s Early-Warning System (CEWS) which was established under Article 12 of the PSC protocol has its central observation and monitoring centre known as the ‘situation room’ in Addis Ababa (AU PSC 2010; Williams 2011: 9). The Continental Early Warning System collates and receives data from the various Regional Early Warning Systems (REWS) and other independent means (Maasdorp 2010: 3). With the assistance of external donors and the UN’s situation centre in New York, the African Union CEWS situation room collects and analyses data and feeds the PSC with indicators of risks, threats and vulnerabilities (Williams 2011: 9). The CEWS helps the AU to make an informed decision about the deployment of AU forces. The CEWS remains yet to reach its full potential to support conflict prevention and management in Africa (AU PSC 2010).

One of the vital and functioning parts of the African Union peace and security initiative is the African Union Panel of the Wise. The Panel of the Wise was officially inaugurated in December 2007 under Article 11 of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Williams 2011:12). The Panel of the Wise is composed of five members – appointed by the AU Assembly – with outstanding profiles of past contributions to peace, security, and development. The panel is representative of the five regions in Africa. Based on their reputation, members of the Panel of the Wise are expected to use their expert knowledge and moral influence to resolve conflicts peacefully via diplomacy and mediation as well as provide advice to the PSC (Møller 2009: 13; Williams, 2011: 12).

In conflict situations, the Chairperson of the AU Commission has the power to deploy the Panel of the Wise or appoint a member of the Panel as a Special Envoy to get conflicting parties to negotiate an end conflict. The Panel has been very instrumental in contending with issues of electoral-related violence, justice, impunity, reconciliation and the situation of women and children in armed conflict. Notably, Thabo Mbeki, a member of the Panel, was instrumental in negotiating the peace agreements in Sudan including the agreement that facilitated the secession of South Sudan from Sudan in a bid to end the protracted conflict between north and south Sudan.

To drive the Union’s responsibility to rebuild, the Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) framework was developed at the 7th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council in Libya in July 2005 (Addo 2011: 91). The PRCD is expected to contend with post-conflict reconstruction in post-conflict states. The PCRD is envisioned to establish conflict
management mechanisms and reliable institutions based on democratic principles as well as strengthening institutions capable of addressing conflicts to avoid the resurgence of conflict.

Another indispensable organ driving the peace and security agenda of the African Union is the AU Commission. The Commission is the executive/administrative arm of the African Union and is composed of the Chairperson, the Deputy Chairperson, eight Commissioners and Staff members (African Union, 2013). The Commission is responsible for the daily management of the African Union. It coordinates and implements high-level decisions of the African Union. In terms of peace and Security, the AU Commission facilitates, coordinates, and monitors AU’s progress towards its overall vision of peace and security (William, 2011: 8). In line with its mandate for conflict prevention, the AU Commission is also responsible for popularizing the doctrine of human security to AU member states (Tieku, 2007: 26).

To emphasize its commitment to the continent’s peace and security, the AU Commission allocated $144 million out of it is overall expenditure of $784 million for the Union’s peace and security issues in the continent for 2009-2012 (William 2011: 8-9). Moreover, to ensure that enough resources are available to drive AU’s peace and security efforts, the AU Peace Fund, under the Peace Support Commission, makes funds available for peace and security operations according to Article 21 of the PSC Protocol. The Peace Fund is expected to acquire funds via the ordinary budget funds, voluntary contributions from member states, and other sources like external donations (Mathiasen 2006: 6).

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has considered the arguments conducive for the establishment of the African Union in 2002. The first section examined the limitations of the United Nations and non-African interventions in Africa which makes it imperative for a strong regional body to contend with African problems. The second sections looked into the shortcomings of the OAU in the post-Cold War reality of Africa, a shortcoming which led to the formation of the African Union. The third section inquired into the institutional bodies and mechanisms introduced by the African Union to tackle conflict challenges in Africa. As noted by Hanson (2009), while striving to reform and develop its institutions, the African Union has invested an estimable amount of resources in addressing the continent’s ills. The following chapter shall explore and assess African Union’s conflict management responses particularly in Sudan, Somalia and Libya.
CHAPTER 4

African Union’s Military Interventionist Role

4.1 Introduction

This chapter assesses the African Union’s interventions in Sudan, Somalia and Libya. This chapter is of great importance for this research because, apart from making general analyses of how the AU has performed, it undertakes the task of considering and assessing the efficacy of the AU’s in specific case studies. The first case study evaluates the AU’s performance in Sudan’s Darfur region after a civil war erupted in 2003. The second part of the essay addresses the AU’s intervention in Somali. The third section estimates the African Union’s response to the Libyan revolution of 2011. By looking at these three case studies, this research aspires to give a balanced review of the AU and its curative potential for Africa’s conflicts.

4.2 The Case of Sudan

In February 2003, violent conflict erupted in the Darfur region of Sudan between the Sudanese government in alliance with a pro-government militia known as the Janjaweed, and two rebel groups: the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (Murithi 2009: 99). The conflict led to grave atrocities committed against civilians, a large number of internally displaced persons and refugee flow into neighbouring countries thereby causing a huge worry for the international community. Prior to the 2003 violent eruption of conflict in Darfur, Sudan has been a home to humanitarian crisis for decades even before independence.

Prior to the secession of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011, Sudan was basically divided based on religious lines, ethnicity, economic activity (sedentary or nomadic) and tribal loyalties (Dunne 2009: 1). Along religious lines, Sudan is composed of about 70% Muslims, 25% Animists and 5% Christians. Based on ethnicity the country is divided between the Arabs who predominated the northern region and are mainly Muslims, and Africans who predominated the South and are mainly Animists and Christians. Though Sudan witnessed

48 Janjaweed is the popular name for the Popular Defence Force (PDF)
various forms of internal insecurities and violence across the country, conflict in Sudan is predominantly between the Arab/Muslim-North and the Animist/Christian-South (Brosché 2008: 1).

Sudanese violent conflict dates back to 1955 at Tort when Southern Sudanese soldiers mutinied from the military in fear of the domination of the southerners by northerners after independence (Luqman and Omede 2012: 61). As part of colonial legacy, south Sudanese were deliberately marginalized and neglected in the political and socio-economic development of the country. Unlike their Northern counterpart, Southern Sudan and the Darfur inhabitants lacked infrastructural development and education schemes. The discontent of southerners marked by the 1955 mutiny of south Sudanese soldiers led to a widespread violence against the northerners residing in the southern region.

By 1956, the violence was curtailed to pave way for the united Sudanese independence in the same year (Dunne 2009). Nevertheless, successive Sudanese regimes in Khartoum who were predominantly from the Islamic north failed to heed the developmental needs of the southerners (Osaore Aideyan 2010: 42; Luqman and Omede 2012). Sudanese military regimes dominated national politics with their Islamic ideologies and oppressed southerners (Dunne 2009: 3). This neglect engendered civil war between the government and the liberation movements from the south.

The first phase of the civil war began in 1962 and was spearheaded by the southern based rebel group Anya Nya who fought for the independence of southern Sudan. The war was resolved via negotiation and the signing of the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement. The agreement conceded a single regional government to the South to control regional trade, education and language (Osaore Aideyan, 2010: 42). In the early 1980s, President Nimeiri’s dictatorial tendencies and quest to secure power led him to abandon the peace agreement of 1972.

In 1983, a second civil war broke out in the country following Nimeiri’s imposition of Sharia law across the country, declaration of Arabic as the official Sudanese language, introduction of northern troops into the south and the policy for the redefinition of the borders between the north and south due to the discovery of oil in Bentiu (as southern region) by Chevron (Osaore Aideyan, 2010: 42). The civil war was initiated by the southern based Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The civil war which began in 1983 ended in 2005 with the
The signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)\textsuperscript{49} on the 9\textsuperscript{th} of January 2005 (Brosché 2008: 1). Prior to the eruption of the 2003 armed insurgency in Darfur, much of the civil war took place in the southern part of Sudan and the fighting was relatively limited.

4.2.2 The War in Darfur

Situated in western Sudan, Darfur has 6 million people of different ethnic groupings (Dunne 2009: 2). Like the southern region, Darfur’s non-Arab population was neglected and marginalized by successive Sudanese governments (Dunne 2009: 3). Generally, Darfur had poor infrastructure, health and education systems, and lacked basic social amenities. Khartoum and the regions close to the capital city enjoyed better standards of living at the expense and dismay of peripheral regions. Worse still, non-Arab people of Darfur felt less than citizens than their Arab counterparts. The Arab government had reportedly led several attacks on non-Arab villages in Darfur to oppress and repress the non-Arab population. The feeling of being discriminated, marginalized and oppressed by the Arab regime in Khartoum coupled with political, economic and human injustices led to the 2003 armed insurrection in Darfur (Luqman and Omede 2012: 62).

Though there had been low-scale communal fighting in Darfur before 2003, large-scale conflict and bloodletting began in 2003 when the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) initiated an offensive on the historic capital of Darfur, El-Fashir (Luqman and Omede 2012: 62). The SLM soldiers attacked government targets, destroyed aircrafts at El-Fashir airport and looted the armoury. The war against the government was later joined by an Islamic sect called the Justice and Equity Movement (JEM) – made up of non-Arab Muslims from Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit ethnic groups – which was averse to the Arab government’s excesses and injustices against non-Arabs. Despite their differences, the SLM/A and JEM had on occasions launched joint offensives against the government. The government in turn embarked on a high handed reprisal of the opposition groups as well as the non-Arab ethnic groups which the rebel movements sprang from. The government carried out aerial bombardments and attacks on the rival movements as well as civilians.

Moreover, the Sudanese regimes in Khartoum are notorious for recruiting tribal militias to oppress and terrorize rival groups as well as civilian populations. When it was not directly

\textsuperscript{49} CPA created a somewhat fragile peace between the north and south after two decades (Dunne 2009: 23).
committing atrocities, the government provided assistance to Arab militias that are keen to defend Arab supremacist ideology (Kangwanja and Mutahi 2007). Given that the government had sent much of its military forces to south Sudan were the second civil war was coming to an end and to the east were rebels were threatening a newly constructed oil pipeline, the government was unable to squash the rebellion in Darfur.

In a bid to stop the opposition movements, the government provided support to the pro-government Janjaweed militia that is notorious for attacking non-Arab civilians (Kangwanja and Mutahi 2007). The government provided Janjaweed with financial support, arms, equipment and support (Dunne 2009: 13). The state-sponsored Janjaweed militia quickly gained more grounds than the rebel groups. The state military and Janjaweed militia attacked non-Arab villages accused of harbouring rebels (Kangwanja and Mutahi 2007; Dunne 2009: 5). Significant number of non-Arabs villages of was terrorized and many were displaced by the pro-government Janjaweed militia (Dunne 2009: 12). This was reportedly considered as a move to depopulate non-Arabs and replace the people populating non-Arab villages with Arabs (Dunne 2009). The attacks by the Arab Janjaweed militia on non-Arabs were likened to the events of the Rwandan Genocide. The armed insurrection led to the destruction of lives and properties, looting, rape and forced displacement. Thousands of lives were lost while others raped, maimed and assaulted. More than 2 million people were displaced as refugees or as internally displaced persons.

Being directly affected by the upsurge of Darfur refugees pursued into their territory by the Janjaweed militiamen, Chad took the initiative to initiate a peace process to seek a political solution to the conflict. The peace process known as the 2003 ‘Abeche Mediation’ was facilitated by the Chadian President Idress Derby (Murithi 2009: 99). The mediation led to the signing of the Abeche Ceasefire Agreement on the 3rd of September 2003, an agreement that failed to prevent the signatories from continuing their hostilities.

4.2.3 The AU’s intervention in Sudan

When the Chadian-mediated ceasefire agreement failed, the African Union took on the arduous responsibility and leadership in tackling the complex conflict of Darfur in tandem with its commitment to providing African solutions to African problems. The African Union conducted series of mediated talks between the government and the rebel groups that led to the signing of a ceasefire agreement known as the N’djamena Agreement on humanitarian
Ceasefire in April 2004 (Hanson 2009: 1; Farmer 2012: 99). The agreement was followed up with series of peace talks between the parties so as to strengthen the ceasefire agreement and facilitate a resolution to the conflict (Luqman and Omede 2012: 64).

To enforce N’Djamena Agreement on humanitarian Ceasefire, the African Union established the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS) with the consent of the government of Sudan. AMIS began with the establishment of a ceasefire verification commission and deployment of 60 AU Military Observers (MILOBS) in June 4 2004. A 300-strong Armed Protection Force was later sent to provide security to the MILOBS and AU members who were overseeing the implementation of the ceasefire agreement in the region. Notwithstanding, the belligerents continued to carry out violent acts with huge tolls on the civilian population.

Due to the violation of the ceasefire agreement and the continued violence, the Armed Protection Force was impotent in stabilizing the country. On 20 October 2004, the AMIS was expanded to 3,320 soldiers and police (Aboagye 2007: 4; Farmer 2012: 99). The force reached its full strength only in April 2005 six months after the decision was reached. On the 28th of April 2005, AMIS was approved to be extended to 7,731 personnel to be deployed by the end of September

AMIS was mandated to protect civilians as a priority, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, monitor the ceasefire agreement, and restore peace and stability in Sudan under the traditional peacekeeping principles of impartiality and neutrality (Farmer 2012: 99). As AMIS forces sought to defuse the armed insurrections in Darfur, the ceasefire agreement was followed by further negotiations geared towards addressing the issues of power sharing and political representations, wealth sharing, reparation for the victims of conflict, reconstruction of Darfur, inter alia (Luqman and Omede 2012:64). Despite the ceasefire agreements and the intermittent peace talks, fighting continued in Darfur (Dunne 2009: 12).

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50 By October 2005, AMIS force strength was 6773 – with ‘4 847 soldiers in the protection force, 700 military observers, 1 188 civilian police and 38 international staff of various kinds’ – below the required number but quite commendable (Kagwanja and Mutahi 2007: 8)
51 The civilians here are deemed people “whom it encounters under imminent threats and in the immediate vicinity, within resource and capability” (Luqman and Omede 2012).
At the onset, AMIS tended to be effective in reducing the violent attacks on the civilian population. Scanlon et al (2007: 21) notes that AU’s Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has been adjudged as a major step depicting the regional organization’s commitment to the responsibility to protect. As observed by Franke (2006: 10), with limited capabilities, AMIS has remarkably helped ‘in the alleviation of widespread suffering and containing a conflict in which no one else was prepared to intervene’. However, the situation later became worsened as the conflict parties found AMIS forces less effective to make them comply with the terms of the ceasefire agreement and to deter them from violence (Luqman and Omede 2012).

The incomprehensiveness of the ceasefire agreement also created grounds for a weak and incoherent mandate with which AMIS operated under (Murithi 2009: 99). AMIS was unable to intervene in the fighting or disarm warring factions so as to vigorously protect civilians. AMIS became hamstrung in the face of the violent attacks and gross atrocities on civilians (Kagwanja and Mutahi 2007: 7). AMIS resorted to dealing with soft security operations like monitoring, liaison, protection of high dignitaries and verification (Dunne 2009: 17).

Besides, AMIS lacked the capacity, resources and operational will to enforce the protection of civilians and achieve its mandate (Aboagye 2007: 4). The mission lacked personnel, expertise, logistics and resources to protect citizens as well as restore order in a region as large as the size of Darfur. In comparison to the warring parties, AMIS was under-armed, outnumbered and outgunned (Luqman and Omede 2012:64). On the 5th of May, 2006, the government of Sudan and the Minni Minnawi led SLM/A signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) after years of intense negotiation. But because the DPA was not signed by the JEM, the Abdul Wahid al Nur-led SLM/A and other small factions, conflict continued in Darfur. The DPA failed to ensure the disarmament of the Arab militias; facilitate a wealth and power sharing deal; it also failed to receive the support of other Darfur rebels that were not signatories to the agreement (Dunne 2009: 25).

The government remained adamant to the call to disarm the pro-government Arab militias as the DPA stipulated. To compound the crisis, Darfur experienced fierce rivalry and infighting within the SLM/A and the JEM forces as well as other faction groups. For instance, the infightings between the Minni Minnawi led SLM/A and the Abdul Wahid Nur led SLM/A forces in 2006 made peace efforts difficult. Darfur Arabs as well began a rebel movement known as the Popular Forces Troops against the government in late 2006 thereby defying the simple explication of Darfur conflict as between Arabs and non-Arabs. Arab tribes such as
the Terjem and Mahria also fought against each other. Meanwhile, the increased illegality and criminality across the country compounded the challenges of the already overstretched AMIS (Dunne 2009: 19).

There was mixed feelings towards the activities of AMIS. Civilians and rebels somehow nurse the feeling that AMIS was biased towards the Sudanese government (Luqman and Omede 2012: 64). This was further supported by the failure of the AU to enforce the arrest of President al-Bashir on charges of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as mandated by the ICC. The failure of the AU to implement the arrest of President Bashir challenges the Union’s political will and commitment to confront the ills of its members. Moreover, the AU PSC had allowed the government of Sudan to play a leadership role in drafting the mandate of AMIS and setting the bounds of its deployment (Jibril 2010: 12). The government of Sudan was given veto powers in situations that call for the amendment of the mandate of AMIS. By allowing the government of Sudan to have a huge influence in mandating and the deployment of AU forces, the AU PSC tended to be biased in favour of the government.

Moreover, the Sudanese government had on several occasions interfered with the operations of AMIS thereby undermining the power of the African Union. For instance, the government in 2005 delayed the delivery of 105 Armoured Personnel Carriers of AMIS for three months. The carriers were only allowed into the country after an attack on AMIS that led to the killing of four AMIS troops allegedly by the pro-government Janjaweed militia (Dunne 2009: 19). With Kalashnikov rifles and rocket propelled grenades and doshkas, the Janjaweed armed militias, in the same period, destroyed farms and households in Darfur while attacking non-Arab villages (Dunne 2009: 21). In the same year, the government also refused to allow six AMIS helicopters to enter Sudan for five months demanding that the helicopters should not be used for offensive purposes (Dunne 2009: 19). The government also imposed curfews on AMIS which was supposed to be overseeing and enforcing peace processes in Darfur (Dunne, 2009:19). As observed by Bergholm (2010: 25), the Sudanese government imposed a curfew on AMIS and denied them freedom of movement between 8pm and 8am daily. Thus, the mission operated under the dictates of Khartoum. AMIS police were also prevented from entering rebel regions as well as visiting people in detention facilities.

In fact, aside from being unable to adequately protect civilians, the troops and personnel of AMIS became targets of belligerents (Luqman and Omede 2012: 61). In 2005, September 19,
an AMIS patrol team deployed to investigate the attacks on the Harafa area (were 10 civilians were killed and 7,000 people were displaced) were attacked by Janjaweed militias (Kagwanja and Mutahi 2007: 8). In the same year, two AMIS soldiers from Rwanda were shot. In an attack on AMIS forces near the Kourabishi in South Darfur on 8 October 2005, five AMIS soldiers from Nigeria and two AMIS civilian personnel were killed and three peacekeepers were wounded. Rebel SLM/A fighters were blamed for the attack. The following day on 9 October, a fragment group of JEM in West Darfur abducted ‘an entire 18-strong AMIS patrol team, including the American Monitor team advisor, and a rescue team of 20’ (Kagwanja and Mutahi 2007: 8). The patrol team was later released in the same month.

Brosché (2008: 71) claims that the bloodiest attack on AMIS was the 29 September 2007 surprise attack on AMIS base allegedly by SLM/A rebels in the Haskanita area of Northern Darfur State. The attack led to the killing of 10 soldiers and wounding of seven soldiers (Jibril 2010: 11). Generally, AMIS lost over 59 troops to the fighters in Sudan (Brosché, 2008). Meanwhile, the need to secure weapons also encouraged militias and rebel groups to attack AMIS facilities in order to commandeer weapons, armoured vehicles and heavy machine guns (Kagwanja and Mutahi 2007: 9).

The inability to protect its personnel and facilities undermined AMIS’s credibility in the eyes of the population seeking its protection. Belligerents were largely undeterred from violence and attacks on the civilian population. Inadequate training and lack of expertise and experience led to a lacklustre performance of AMIS. AMIS forces continually grew demoralized and inefficient in the face of humanitarian abuses in the country. Cases of rape and abduction of civilians were rampant in southern Sudan and Darfur. As AMIS struggled to secure their personnel, IDPs and humanitarian agencies came under increasing attack from the belligerents (Dunne 2009: 20). This prevented the safe and expedient delivery of humanitarian aid. The praises which the African Union received for its initial efforts gave way to negative criticisms of its inefficiency. The increased insecurity in Darfur in 2006 revealed the incapability of AMIS to deal with the crisis in Darfur.

Muriithi (2009: 100) argues that the Darfur situation was a huge test for an institution (AU) that is under-resourced and ill-equipped to effectively manage conflicts. Even with logistic assistance by NATO in 2005, the AU remained unable to maintain a significant and effective

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52 The attacks on AMIS could have easily being repelled or deterred if the forces had helicopters to reinforce convoys under attack.
presence in Sudan (Farmer, 2012: 99). For Murithi (2009: 100), AMIS only ended up enhancing and prolonging the carnage and destructive conflict between the warring parties. Luqman and Omede (2012: 64) note that AMIS was inefficient due to the limited fund available for it to carry out its mission in Darfur. AU needed about $40 million to sustain its Darfur mission on a monthly basis (Kangwanja and Mutahi 2007: 9). Most of the funds used to run the mission came mainly from foreign donors such as the United States, European Union, G8, Canada, NATO, Arab League and other bilateral donors. AU has also been accused of not making proper use of the donor funds (Aboagye 2007: 4). The inefficiency of AMIS precipitated the call for a United Nations intervention.\footnote{Luqman and Omede (2012:61) argue that AU’s efforts in Sudan are commendable as the institution manage to stabilize Darfur to some extent with a late international assistance.}

Given the increased limitations and in capabilities of AMIS, the UNSC passed resolution 1706 in August 31, 2006 to deploy a UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to take over from AMIS after the lapse of its mandate (Murithi 2009: 100). However, the Sudanese president declined any form of non-African intervention in the country (Lopez, 2004: 7). Khartoum threatened war against UN forces if the UN deployed its forces without Sudan’s consent (Kangwanja and Mutahi 2007: 10). Due to the intransigence of the Sudanese government, the UN adopted UNSC resolution 1769 and established a Joint AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) on the 31 July 2007 (United Nations 2013). Several analysts have noted that the UNAMID paradigm is an emerging model of burden sharing and pulling of resources together by international and regional bodies to tackle security challenges in Africa (Luqman and Omede 2012: 65; Franke 2006: 1).

UNAMID was mandated to protect civilians, ensure the security of its personnel and humanitarian workers, monitor the implementation of peace agreements, monitor Sudan’s borders with Central African Republic and Chad and facilitate the restoration of law and order in Darfur (United Nations 2013). The peacekeeping forces were deployed in 2008. While subsuming AMIS personnel, UNAMID forces by 2013 consist of 14,481 troops, 347 military observers, 4,720 police (including formed units) bringing UNAMID forces to the total of 19, 548 uniformed personnel (United Nations 2013). Alongside uniformed forces are 1,064 international civilian personnel, 2,910 local civilian staff and 424 United Nations Volunteers (United Nations 2013). Unlike AMIS, UNAMID is well funded, proactive, and more effective in protecting civilians and ensuring a safe environment for the provision of...
humanitarian assistance\textsuperscript{54}. UNAMID has also been able to protect its bases, equipment and personnel unlike AMIS (Luqman and Omede 2012: 60).

However, UNAMID faces similar challenges faced by AMIS. As noted by Murithi (2009:101), considering its force strength, resources and logistic capabilities, UNAMID has performed less than expected (Luqman and Omede 2012: 67). Cases of insecurities, abduction, and targeted attacks on peacekeepers and aid workers continued largely unabated. Civilian populations and IDPs remained victims of gross human right abuses. In 2008, about 317,000 people were rendered internally displaced by militia attacks, tribal fighting and military operations (Jibril 2010: 5). To compound the challenges of UNAMID, the SLM and JEM forces are continually fragmenting. Thus, it becomes difficult to maintain peace agreements as different rebel factions keep breaching them.

UNAMID also fell victim of attacks from Sudan belligerents. On the 7 of January 2008, a UNAMID supply convoy was attacked by government troops in West Darfur which lead to the severe wounding of one of the drivers (Brosché 2008: 72). In July 8, 2008, UNAMID convoy was ambushed by about 200 attackers at the southeast of El-Fasher in Northern Darfur leading to the death of 7 UNAMID personnel and 19 casualties (Diop et al, 2012: 2; Jibril 2010: 8). Significantly, UNAMID forces fell victim of attacks in regions under the control of government forces and Janjaweed militias.

The AU/UN forces were continually accused of being partial in favour of the government. On the 25\textsuperscript{th} of August 2008, more than 30 IDPs in Kalma camp near Nyala in Southern Darfur State were killed and over a hundred people were wounded by an attack by the government forces. The government military source held that the attack was tolerated by UNAMID to aid in the clean-up of the camp from alleged elements that were inciting unrest Darfur (Jibril 2010: 7). UNAMID is also accused of being controlled by the government of Sudan. As noted by Jibril (2010: 16), the government of Sudan has on several occasions prevented UNAMID from investigating some areas in Darfur especially when the investigation has to do with the government or Janjaweed’s attacks.

The government also hinders relief materials from being delivered to the needy people in Darfur by restricting aid workers or expelling relief agencies from the country without the

\textsuperscript{54} Commendably, the AU, EU and UN collaboration in Sudan has largely been complementary and subsidiary (Lopez 2012: 7).
intervention of UNAMID (Jibril 2010: 5). 13 international relief agencies were expelled from northern Sudan and 3 national human rights and relief agencies were closed down in March 2009 (Jibril 2010: 18). These relief agencies were mainly working in Darfur and were responsible for providing food, water, sanitation and health services to more than 1.5 million people in Darfur (Jibril 2010: 18). To compound the suffering of Darfur’s IDPs and the needy population in Sudan, a staggering number of 26 relief organizations were expelled from the country in 2010. When not denied, the travel permits for aid workers were delayed indefinitely. Hence, aid agencies that were tolerated in Darfur lacked adequate personnel to deliver necessary services and assistance to the needy people. Moreover, aid agencies were denied access to some needy regions of Darfur that are under the control of rebel forces.

Yet, UNAMID rarely challenges the government’s actions that prevent or restrict the operation of humanitarian relief agencies in the country. In fact, UNAMID’s operations were also restricted by the government in terms of delivering humanitarian assistance to the needy. Particularly, UNAMID was prevented from delivering humanitarian assistance to the people in the region of Jebal Marra where more than 100,000 IDPs were in desperate need of humanitarian assistance (Jibril 2010: 19). With the inability of UNAMID to provide necessary security in Darfur, civilian population who do not fall victims of direct attacks from the government and its proxy as well as rebel groups became victims from the lack of food, clean water, medicine, sanitation and shelter which was engendered by the conflict.

Generally, the African Union has exhibited huge commitment at tackling the conflict in Sudan. However, the seeming favouring of the government of Sudan by the African Union tends to undermine AU’s credibility and operation in Sudan. Moreover, the inadequate training and poor resources of AU forces made the regional body deficient in its response to the crisis in Darfur. Even under the joint AU/UN mission, the Darfur region continues to pose a huge concern for the international community. The failures of UN mandated UNAMID forces in Darfur tend to provide reasonable grounds for a better understanding of the challenges faced by AMIS. AMIS performed arguably well for a force of its size and potential. This is supported by the fact that a well-supported UNAMID did not make any major headway in Darfur. However, it could be argued that despite the UN involvement in the peacekeeping operation in Sudan, AU continues to play the leading military and diplomatic role in Sudan (Farmer 2012: 99). UNAMID forces are mainly from African states and the leaders of the mission are military officers from African states (Jibril 2010: 16).
4.3 The Case of Somalia

Until recently in 2011, Somalia was without a central government since state collapse in 1991. Bandits, warlords, terrorists and armed thugs roam the country, plundering, pillaging and seeking control of the capital city, Mogadishu. Although there presently exists a central government in Somalia, the country remains a humanitarian crisis zone. Several reasons have been adduced to explicate Somali state collapse and instabilities. Makhubela (2010: 40) highlights that although ‘the sources of Somali conflict dates back to the imperial partitioning of the country in 1897, the modern day Somali conflict is driven by a plethora of issues and it remains mostly intra-Somalis in character’. Inasmuch as the global system as well as historical factors such as colonialism and external meddling could be adduced to explicate Somali state collapse, domestic actors play pivotal role in the ills of Somalia. From independence in 1960 until state collapse in 1991, Somalia was governed by corrupt, incompetent and oppressive governments. Notably, President Major General Siad Barre who came into power via a coup in 1969, was directly culpable for plunging the state into collapse due to bad governance, political repression and elite manipulations (Ismail 2010: 86).

Barre’s regime sponsored terror, the military and elite security forces to oppress rival clan members and opposition movements (Ismail 2010:97). During Barre’s rule, several Somalis fled their homes seeking refuge in neighboring countries. Moreover, Barre ran the state using his Darod sub-clans specifically the Marehan sub-clan of his paternal relations; the Ogaden clan of his maternal kin; and the Dulbahante clan of his principal son-in-law Ahmed Suleiman Abdulle (Emathe 2006:12). Non-Darod clans that were not in alliance with Barre were marginalized, oppressed and repressed. This bred deep-seated clan animosity and distrust for the Darod clans. In the 1980s, opposition groups such as the Isaaq Somali National Movement (SNM), Hawiye dominated United Somali Congress (USC) and the Ogadeni-led Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) emerged aggressively in opposition against Barre’s regime. In December 1990, fierce civil war broke out in Mogadishu which led to the collapse of Somalia states. The collapse of Somalia was marked by Muhammad Siad Barre and his son-in-law General Siad Hersi Morgan’s escape from Mogadishu to the South-west of the country in the Gedo region, Siad Barre’s home area on the 26th of January 1991 (Department of State 2011).

Since the collapse of the central government in 1991, Somalia was left in ruins and anarchy. The fall of Barre’s regime created a political vacuum and cataclysmic civil war between
clans, warlords, religious opportunists, nomads and pastoralists. There was no formidable political entity that could unify Somalia or claim control of the capital city. In the state of anarchy and lawlessness, several armed bandits, warlords and armed thugs plundered, pillaged and battled for the control of some interest areas in Somalia (Ayittey 1994). Somalis resorted to the traditional clan and lineage solidarity divisions to safeguard their lives and properties. Pham (2011: 160) notes that post-Siad Barre’s Somalia turned into ‘a land of clan (and clan segment) republics where the would-be traveler needed to secure the protection of each group whose territory he sought to traverse’.

Menkhaus (2006: 75) notes that the extended period of Somali state collapse led to the complication of the interest of several Somali actors. Leaders of different clans and factions including defeated Siad Barre’s generals turned into warlords vying for the control of major Somali cities (Makhubela 2010: 48). To protect their economic interests in the anarchic society, businessmen formed militia gangs. Instead of funding warlords to protect them, businessmen hired and recruited militias and became warlords themselves (Menkhaus 2003: 411). By 1996, warlords proliferated in Somalia. As various leaders and rebels make profits from war situation, they derive more incentives to perpetuate violence to ensure the instability of the state. Because of the lack of central leadership, the drought of 1992 was more devastating as there was no proper way of dispensing aid to acutely affected peoples. The drought and famine that ensued amidst the heavy fighting introduced a new dimension to the conflict that further compounded the Somali crisis.

Given the devastating civil war and the escalating food crisis in country, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 794 of 1992 which instituted the deployment of 30,000 U.S. troops to Somalia under the name UNOSOM (United Nations operations in Somalia) (Makhubela 2010: 62). A study by Life and Peace Institute (1995:4) observes that the 1992 UN intervention in Somalia took the forms of peacemaking\(^\text{55}\), peacekeeping\(^\text{56}\) and peace-enforcement\(^\text{57}\) activities. The mission vacillated from protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, maintaining a secure environment, capturing a leader of the factions and

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\(^{55}\) Peacemaking has to do with the international community’s diplomatic effort to create conditions for conflict parties to end violence through negotiated settlements (Abdi 2012: 61).

\(^{56}\) Peacekeeping involves the expeditionary use of police and/or military personnel to prevent armed conflicts as well as to enforce, observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements (Williams 2010:2).

\(^{57}\) Peace enforcement entails a third-party military intervention in a violent conflict scenario in order to bring an end to the conflict with or without the consent of the belligerents (Butler 2011: 160)
encouraging negotiations with the leaders of the factions. With such vague mandates, UN forces became party to the conflict as they tried to rein in the excesses of the different factions (Ahmed, 1995: 249).

Ayittey (1994) stresses that Somalis resent the fact that the solution to their problems would come from outside forces whose agendas were suspicious. In 1993, 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed and some of their bodies desecrated while others were paraded on the streets of Mogadishu. Following this carnage, U.S.-led forces abandoned the mission and withdrew from Somalia in 1993. Other UN forces (mainly Pakistani soldiers), nonetheless, remained in Somalia until 1995 when they withdrew from the state in realization of the futility of their military effort in the state. Moreover the UN has organized over ten highly publicized and costly reconciliation conferences to address the Somali crises since 1993. However, the reconciliation efforts failed to yield peace and order in Somalia (Menkhaus 2006: 94).

To compound the Somali crises, radical Islamic movements emerged in the mid-1990s with political aspirations. The collapsed and anarchic nature of Somalia created a vacuum for Islamic fundamentalism to fester (Tadesse 2001). At a time when clan struggles tended to destabilize the country and plunge it further into anarchy, some Islamists reckoned that political Islam is the remedial movement for a country sharing the same Islamic faith. Islamic fundamentalists exploited the opportunity to form radical Islamic movements alien to the traditional moderate Islam peculiar to Somalia (Taarnby and Hallundbaeki 2010; Abdullahi 2008). Prominent was the Islamic Court Union (ICU) that emerged in the mid-1990s with political intentions. By 2006, the ICU became a force to reckon with and in June 2006, it ICU defeated a US-backed coalition of warlords and business leaders (a coalition known as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism) and took control of much of Mogadishu (Makhubela 2010: 62). However, on the eve of Christmas 2006, heavily armed and well-trained U.S. backed Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia, defeated and routed the ICU forces.

After the demise of the ICU, Harakat al-shabaab al-Mujahideen (Movement of Warrior Youth known as Al-shabaab) a militant group of the ICU grew and became one of the fiercest militant Islamist movements domestically and internationally (Pham 2011: 170). The movement encompassed both local and international interests. Al-Shabaab’s initial campaign against the Ethiopian backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) gained ostensible support among Somalia. However, like the ICU, its extreme Islamic stance diminished the
initial support it enjoyed. In a bid to purge all western influence in Somalia, Al-Shabaab imposed stringent Sharia law on Somalis without regard to traditional values and system of Somalis. Al-Shabaab battled with the TFG to control the Capital City and different parts of Somalia.

The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed in October 2004 after the Nairobi peace accords and raging external pressure (Menkhaus 2008). However, the TFG was defiled by internal divisions, defections, unpopularity among the populace and lack of power. The TFG was weak and incapable of uniting the state or effecting any change in the security situation of Somalia.

4.3.1 The AU’s Mission in Somalia

Faced with UN reluctance to solve the Somali conflict, the African Union established a peacekeeping mission known as African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007. AMISOM replaced Ethiopian forces that were enjoined to withdraw from the country given the intolerance of Ethiopian forces in Somalia (Cilliers et al 2010: 2). The mission came after over 10 years of continued unrest in Somalia since the termination of UNOSOM in 1995. In tandem with its mandate of contending with African problems, the African Union took on the burden of contending with Somalia’s crises with an approval from the UNSC on the 20th of February 2007 in line with UNSC Resolution 1744.

AMISOM began with a limited mandate to protect the TFG officials in Baidoa from rebel forces (Agada 2008: 51). Later on, AMISOM was mandated to protect the TFG and important infrastructures in Mogadishu such as the port and airport, to provide support for humanitarian assistance as well as stabilize the security situation in Somalia (Cilliers et al 2010). With limited resources and personnel as well as the complex and unpredictable nature of Somali crises, AMISOM was limited in its ability to attain its envisaged mandate (Cilliers et al 2010: 3). Until recently, the mission was mainly efficient in providing security for TFG officials. AMISOM was also ill-equipped and lacked the financial resources and manpower.

58 The UN and US intervention in Somalia that ended in a debacle in the mid-1990s discourages the international community’s political will to intervene again in Somalia’s crises. The crises in Somalia – if not the whole conflicts in Africa – was deemed hopeless situations in western eyes in the 1990s. This somewhat explains the failure of the western powers to intervene in Rwanda in 1994, and Seirra Leone and Liberia in the late 1990s. It was only after the 9/11 terrorist attack in U.S that the international community grew concerned about the plight of failed and crises states given their link with international terrorist organizations.
to mitigate the humanitarian insecurities in the country. AMISOM could not protect the civilian population and quell the unrest (Agada 2008: 51). Besides its inefficiency, AMISOM forces came under direct attack from better-armed rebel forces. For instance, soon after its deployment, four Ugandan peacekeepers were attacked in May 2007. In October 2008, Burundian forces were attacked soon after their arrival. Between 2009 and 2012, AU forces lost over 500 troops in Somalia (Crisis Group Africa Briefing 2012).

Al-Shabaab battled relentlessly with the AMISOM-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in a bid to control significant parts of the country. Al-Shabaab soon engaged in international terrorist activities to register their displeasure with regional intervention. In July 2010, Al-Shabaab carried out a suicide bomb attack in Ugandan capital Kampala – an attack that killed 79 people. The terrorist group claimed the attack was a retribution for Ugandan and Burundian involvement in Somalia given that AMISOM is made up of military forces mainly from the foregoing countries (Cilliers et al 2010: 2). This raised AU’s attention to the need to wrestle properly with the Somali conflict that has become a security problem for the horn of Africa.

During the AU Summit in Kampala in July 2010, few days after the suicide bomb attack in the Capital City, AU Commission chairperson Jean Ping called for the reinforcement of AMISOM, which continued to operate with 6300 troops – mainly from Burundi and Uganda – instead of the targeted 8000 troops that was mandated since 2007. It was agreed that the mission should be reinforced with about 2000 troops, a move that would increase the size of the force from 6300 to more than 8000 troops. The complex, unstable and violent nature of the Somali crisis deterred African states and UN members from making effective military commitments to Somalia (Cilliers et al 2010: 2). While UN members only provided financial assistance to AMISOM, African states lacked the will to make commitments to reinforce AMISOM. Since the 2010 call for the reinforcement of AMISOM, the mission remained with a force strength of less than the 8000 required troops until 2011 when AMISOM began to make considerable progress.

Until 2011, AU’s efforts in Somalia were analysed with pessimism. But in 2011, Al-Shabaab was weakened politically and financially by the devastating famine that plagued the country and AMISOM took advantage of this to launch an offensive to bring Mogadishu and much of Somalia under the control of the TFG (Pham, 2011: 184). On 6 August, 2011, Al-Shabaab abandoned Mogadishu under immense pressure from AMISOM. Between September and
October 2012, AMISOM captured Merka, a port at the south of Mogadishu, and key areas in Kismayo that used to be a stronghold of Al-Shabaab. Since then, the security situation in Mogadishu has improved and Somalia has recorded a decrease in violence and even pirate activities (Back 2012: 1).

The recent successes of AMISOM have engendered hope for the stabilization of Somalia since state collapse in 1991 (Back 2012: 1). AMISOM oversaw the September 2012 elections that led to the election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President by the 275-member parliament (Back 2012: 1). This election marked a significant transition in Somalia as power was transferred from the TFG to the Federal Government of Somalia. The transition was made possible by the huge commitment and effort of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The AU’s effort in considerably stabilizing Somalia raises the regional organization’s status and role in the continent as mediator and peacekeeper.

The UNSC in February 2012 approved the boosting of AMISOM forces due to its recent progresses. Presently, AMISOM has about 17,000 troops. Though AMISOM has made crucial achievements, consolidating recovered areas remains a challenge. The lack of air assets and understrength force constrained AMISOM from expanding its area of operations (AU PSC, 2013). To recover the territories still under Al Shabaab’s control and adequately consolidate recovered areas, AMISOM requires a well-equipped force to subjugate the strategic resources of Al-Shabaab (AU PSC 2013). Nevertheless, it is necessary to keep the pressure on Al-Shabaab so as to forestall conflict relapse and heightened insecurity in the country. AMISOM has the responsibility of contributing to the development and training of Somalia’s Security forces. These would go a long way in enabling the Federal Government of Somalia to weaken and neutralize Al-Shabaab in a bid to bring much of Somalia under government control.

To this end, it will be beneficial for the international community to enhance the capacity of AMISOM forces to take up a more important role in shaping the future of Somalia. It remains contentious whether it would be most helpful for AMISOM to be reinforced, or to establish an exclusive UN mission or a joint AU-UN mission in Somalia parallel to that of Sudan. Given the aversion of external influence in Somalia, an exclusive UN mission may drag Somalia backward in terms of its present security situation even though AMISOM was

59 Experience has shown that the more international parties get involved in the conflict, the more terrorism is fueled (Cilliers et al 2010: 6). In contrast to Agada (2008) call for an international
primarily mandated to hand over to a stronger UN mission when its mandate expires. Even if a hybrid mission of AU and UN (UNASOM) – replicating the scenario in Sudan – is to be recommended in Somalia, caution needs to be taken to ensure that the mission is largely under the control of Africans to allay Somali fears of foreign/western influence. In line with Vines’ (2013: 100) submission, this entails an active African leadership and ownership of the peace processes in Somalia (Vines 2013: 100).

4.4 The Case of Libya

During the wave of democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, Arab states in North Africa that operated under autocratic regimes remained unaffected. When Aziz Bouziz, a destitute student in Tunisia set himself on fire in demonstration against Tunisian leadership, Tunisia embarked on a radical move towards democracy – a radical move that spread across Northern Africa and other Arab states in the Middle East (Rupiya 2012: 173). Thus, North Africa joined the rest of Africa in a bid to transform from one-party state system to full democracies (Rupiya 2012: 180). Between January and February 2011, Tunisians and Egyptians deposed Presidents Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak’s regime respectively.

Inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian revolts, some masses of the Libyan population began an uprising against the 42 year-old regime of Colonial Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi who had seized power in 1969. The revolution began on the 15th of February 2011. Gaddafi’s 42 year of repressive, arbitrary and autocratic governance was challenged to a level more militant than ever before (Apuuli 2012: 139). Using social networks such as Facebook and Twitter to mobilize the larger population, opposition groups summoned people to stage protests against the government. A revolution which started in a nonviolent and peaceful manner turned into an armed rebellion and civil war when Gaddafi embarked on a high handed military suppression of protesters. Gaddafi’s forces carried out several attacks on protesters which compelled opposition groups to adopt the use of force to drive their revolutionary agenda.

intervention in Somalia that is championed by the US and UNSC, it will be will be beneficial to ensure an active AU engagement with the Somali crisis albeit with external assistance.
By not providing security for its population and proving to be a dictatorship, Gaddafi’s regime failed in its primary responsibility to protect its citizens. On the 23rd of February 2011, a week into the violence, the AU’s Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) condemned the indiscriminate attack on peaceful protesters and civilians, and urged the Libyan government to uphold the primary responsibility to protect its citizens (Dembinski and Reinold 2011: 10). AU PSC spelt out its intent to send a fact-finding mission to Libya60 (Apuuli 2012: 139). However, the AU was indecisive; it failed to send a fact-finding mission timely and took no major action to stop the gross abuses against civilians. The UNSC sprang into action on 26 February 2011 by adopting Resolution 1970 that called for an arms embargo and targeted sanctions on Gaddafi and his aides. The sanctions were implemented by the US, EU, Arab League and other international organizations. However, the sanctions and embargoes failed to stop the Gaddafi’s onslaught on his people. The resolution also demanded the ICC to look into the Libyan situation. The ICC gave a warrant for the arrest of Gaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and the Intelligence Chief for the wilful killing of civilians and crimes against humanity (Rupiya 2012: 174).

Meanwhile, AU opposed any use of force against Gaddafi’s regime and the ICC’s arrest warrant for Gaddafi (Gottwald 2012: 22). Instead, AU insisted that Libyans should be allowed to choose their leader without external assistance. On 10 March, the AU PSC established an Ad Hoc High Level Committee – consisting of five heads of state – charged to seek diplomatic solutions to the Libyan conflict61. In a meeting at the Mauritanian Capital Nouakchott, the Ad-Hoc High Level Committee reiterated the AU’s stance that Libya’s unity and territorial integrity must be respected (Winston 2011). Through the Ad-Hoc High Level Committee, the African Union submitted a Proposal for a Framework of Agreement on a Political Solution to the Crisis in Libya. The proposal called for ‘an immediate and complete cessation of hostilities, to be followed by the formation of an inclusive transitional government, the establishment of a constitutional framework and the organization of elections’ (Dembinski and Reinold 2011:11).

60 As part of its mandate for the continents collective security and early-warning arrangements, the Council is expected to send fact-finding missions to trouble spots to assess potential crisis zones to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict situations in Africa (Williams 2011: 7; Murithi 2009: 92).
61 With the enforcement of Resolution 1973 by NATO forces, the effort of High Level Committee was frustrated as they had to seek permission from NATO forces to go into the country (Dembinski and Reinold 2011: 11).
In line with AU’s idea of an inclusive transition government, Gaddafi was expected to be part of the transitional process in Libya against the demand of the protesters and rebel groups. Gaddafi in turn, was not willing to compromise by giving up power as president. The National Transitional Council (NTC), representing the rebel movement on the other hand did not find AU’s proposal practical and viable due to the NTC’s insistence for a settlement without Gaddafi in power or involvement in the transition process. Besides, the NTC found AU as an unreliable third party actor due to AU’s apparent favouring of Gaddafi and the Union’s opposition to any use of force against Gaddafi’s regime (Apuuli 2012: 149).

Nevertheless, the AU failed to take swift and crucial action to resolve or spearhead the resolution of the conflict thereby creating room for the UNSC to take a leading role. Given the timidity and reluctance of the AU PSC to act on time and the increasing threat by Gaddafi’s forces to crush the rebellion, members of UN Security Council voted for the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya and the protection of civilians under the light of the UNSC resolution 1973 that was adopted on the 17th of March 201162. Among the 15 members of the UN Security council, ten members voted for the adoption of the UN resolution while 5 members – China, Russia, Germany, Brazil and India - abstained. Three African members of the Security Council, South Africa, Gabon and Nigeria, voted for the adoption of the resolution thereby exposing the lack of unity within the African Union (Winston 2011).

The UNSC resolution 1973 set an invitation for a coalition of the willing to enforce the will of the UN as captured in the UNSC Resolution 1973. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) offered to carry out the mandate of the resolution. The Libyan case became the first instance where the doctrine of responsibility to protect was put into practice after its acceptance during the 2005 UN World Summit. Spearheaded by France and Britain, NATO forces embarked on a bombing campaign focused at first on incapacitating Libyan air defence and destroying heavy weapons of Gaddafi’s forces in embattled zones within hours of the adoption of UN resolution 1973 (Dembinski and Reinold 2011: 7).

As soon as NATO began enforcing the no-fly zone in Libya, a chorus of criticism greeted the air strikes carried out by NATO forces that were acting under the approval of the UN (Winston 2011). Notably, Russia, Turkey, AU, and the Arab League which supported the no-

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62 Outraged by the turn out of events in Libya, the Arab League set the motion for the adoption of the UNSC resolutions 1973 on Libya (Rupiya 2012: 173).
fly zone before criticized NATO’s military assault on Libya and indicted it for going beyond the scope of the UNSC resolution 1973. The Western forces were accused of enthusiastically embarking on the campaign of regime change to secure Libya’s vast oil supply (Dembinski and Reinold 2011: 13). Amid the barrage of criticism NATO did not relent. After successfully stopping the advance of Libyan forces on the rebel stronghold of Benghazi, NATO changed its campaign to one of regime change. This was an improvement from the prior campaign which did not openly call for comprehensive removal of the powers that be. Gaddafi’s track record of being eccentric and obstinate as well as his alleged historic ties with terrorism induced western forces to seek a Libyan state without Gaddafi in power.63 Moreover, Gaddafi’s call for the random killing of all rebels and opposition groups raised significant international doubt about the possibility of a peaceful or negotiated settlement that involved Gaddafi and somewhat legitimized the actions of NATO.

To spearhead the revolution, the NTC was officially considered as the legitimate governing authority in Libya in July 2011 by the Libya Contract Group under the leadership of former Justice Minister Mustafa Mohamed Abud Al Jeleil. The NTC received widespread recognition by Libyans and rebel forces thereby providing grounds for western states to push for the deposition of Gaddafi’s unpopular regime. Alain Juppe, the foreign minister of France, points out that it is obvious that the aim of NATO’s mission in Libya ‘is to allow the Libyan people to choose its own government’ (Godoy 2011). This made it clear that the real motive of NATO was to overthrow Gaddafi. NATO attacked vital military installations of Libya and Gaddafi’s former compound in Tripoli that housed major military equipment thereby providing grounds for the advancement of rebel forces. Dembinski and Reinold, (2011: 4) argue that the broad idea of the UNSC resolution 1973 created room for the military intervention in Libya that led to a bid to topple Gaddafi’s regime. This runs athwart to the responsibility to protect doctrine is primarily for the protection of civilians and not for regime change.

As NATO’s bombardments grew in momentum, AU’s voice grew insignificant. AU became a spectator in the events going on in Libya to the extent that it had to seek permission from the UN and NATO to enter Libya. This attests to the fact that the AU became more

63 The American ambassador to Libya Gene A Cretz describes Muammar Gaddafi as “mercurial and eccentric” (Muaddi, 2011). In a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly 2009, Qaddafi made an erratic speech where he wondered whether swine flu was a manufactured weapon, demanded that Security Council be renamed “terror council” and called for the investigations into the assassinations of John F Kennedy and Martin Luther King (Muaddi 2011).
insignificant in Libya’s revolution\textsuperscript{64}. Worst of all, the UNSC regulated the entry of the AU Ad Hoc Committee into Libya to meet the rebel leaders and Gaddafi (Apuuli, 2012: 149). For instance, due to NATO’s intensive offensive against Libyan air defences, AU Ad Hoc Committee meeting with Gaddafi and other stakeholders in Libya which was planned for 19 March 2011 was delayed till the 11\textsuperscript{th} of April (Tungwara 2011: 3). NATO’s intervention in Libya was criticized by AU for not giving Africa the opportunity to deal with its issues before the consideration of a non-African coercive means of resolving the conflict. However, Apuuli (2012: 147) argues that if the AU had sent the fact finding mission\textsuperscript{65} urgently to Libya, the UNSC would not have ignored or marginalized the Union’s role and effort.

The AU was too divided to make any decisive resolution about the Libyan crisis. Moreover, at the outset of the conflict, some African leaders downplayed the carnage (Dembinski and Reinold 2011: 11). This was because President Muammar Gaddafi had been a leading actor in the AU and he had a huge influence in AU’s reforms and operations (Hanson, 2009:1). Besides, as noted by Williams (2012: 12), Libya had allegedly paid the dues of poorer African states\textsuperscript{66}. Gaddafi also supported many controversial leaders in Africa such as Zimbabwe’s Mugabe who called the Libyan uprising a mere ‘domestic hiccup’ and Uganda’s President Museveni who referred to Gaddafi as a ‘true nationalist’. (Dembinski and Reinold 2011: 12). Gaddafi’s financial and ideological bearing on AU and its predecessor, OAU, over a long period of time made AU hamstrung in making a speedy response to the Libyan conflict. Hence, AU, like its predecessor OAU, tended to favour regime security and consolidation at the expense of human security.

Despite the belief within the camp of African leaders that Gaddafi had been too brutal due to the massive destruction of lives and properties by the government forces and the associated bloodshed, they still could not spearhead the immediate resolution of the crisis. Instead of reacting decisively to the Libyan conflict, AU ended up condemning NATO’s intervention for taking sides with the insurgent group. However, Handy contends that AU’s criticism of NATO’s airstrikes were confusing as there was no firm position on the issue because

\textsuperscript{64} Besides, the resolution 1973 ‘recognized the primacy of the Arab League over the AU in the crisis’ (Apuuli 2012: 149).
\textsuperscript{65} As part of its Early Warning System, the African Union is supposed to send a fact finding mission composed of military operatives to assess risk levels in conflict regions to enable them make informed decisions on how to intervene.
\textsuperscript{66} As noted by (Tungwara 2011: 4), ‘North African member states contribute 53\% of the AU’s annual budget’. 
different African states seemed to have different opinions for and against NATO’s intervention (quoted in Winston 2011). South Africa, for instance, voted for a no-fly zone in Libya in contrast to AU’s insistence on non-intervention in Libya. When NATO’s intervention began, South Africa turned out to be one of the ardent critics of NATO’s intervention. Moreover, contrary to the will of AU, 17 African countries including Nigeria and Ethiopia recognized the National Transitional Council during the revolution (Rupiya 2012: 174). This further mired the Union’s unity and commitment to addressing issues in the continent.

After a decisive offensive by the NATO-backed Libyan rebel forces in Tripoli, Gaddafi’s regime was defeated. With the capture and eventual death of Gaddafi in October 2011, the Libyan conflict came to an end (Apuuli 2012: 140). The expectation was that AU would seriously be involved in Libya’s post-conflict peacebuilding. But, the reverse was the case. The AU still failed to provide cohesive policies to guide the transition efforts of the National Transition Council and recognize the NTC as the legitimate Libyan government. This was case until the AU capitulated in light of widespread international acceptance of the NTC as the de jure government. The turnout of events during the Arab spring in North Africa, especially in Libya, somewhat undermined AU’s relevance and significance as an institution committed to African peace and security.

Taking the cue from the turnout of events in Libya, AU has been challenged to swiftly take proactive stance in the continent to guard against hidden and undeclared agendas such as that which NATO was accused of harbouring. Moreover, it is hard to imagine that AU’s interventionist strategy would have been successful, given Gaddafi’s obstinacy and the hard resistance of the Libyan rebels. Perhaps, if the African Union had been more proactive in taking the responsibility of finding a truce with a possible option of military intervention, the Union would have facilitated Libya’s transition to democracy as it deems best.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has interrogated the responses of the African Union to the internal crisis of its member states. The first section examined how the African Union through AMIS tried to wrestle with the conflict in Darfur with its limited resources, as well as its few undertrained staff. Initially, the AU was also praised for its proactive measures to resolve the conflict. Due
to the limitations in arms and resources as well the AU’s apparent favouring of the Sudanese government, AMIS failed to have deterrence effect on the belligerents. Fighting and violence against the civilian population continued. After the mandate of AMIS expired in 2007, the African Union continued to take leading role in resolving the conflict in Darfur under the joint AU/UN mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The Darfur crisis continues to pose an immense challenge for the African Union.

The second section looked at the African Union’s intervention in Somalia, a peacekeeping intervention that moved from poor achievements in the first three years of its establishment to a significant progress in recent times. Since AMISOM led a successful campaign against Al-Shabaab in 2011, it has continued to make immense progress in Somalia by gradually restoring stability and facilitating in the establishment of a new Somali government in 2012. In the third section, the African Union’s response to the 2011 Libyan crisis was estimated. It was observed that if the African Union had being more decisive, it would have spearheaded the Libyan revolution.

In a highly competitive international security environment, the African Union ought to be more proactive in making itself relevant in a region under its direct jurisdiction. This would go a long way in ensuring that the needs, demands and fears of its member states are met in line with the notion of African solutions to African problems. The next chapter shall engage in an analysis of the prospects and challenges of AU’s interventionist role especially in the light of the case studies examined.
CHAPTER 5

**Prospects and Challenges of the AU Interventionist Role**

5.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the prospects and challenges of the African Union’s efforts at conflict management. Section one of the chapter considers the crucial aspects of commitment and political will of the African Union in contending with the problems of conflict in Africa. The second section examines the financial, expert and resource capability of the African Union to carry out peace operations. Section three explores the status of AU member states which are detrimental to the regional body’s efficiency.

5.2 The Question of Commitment and Political Will

It is true that the African Union was not formed out of a vacuum; it inherited the members, infrastructures, institutions, resources and external donors of the Organization of African Unity. Nevertheless, the changes made to establish the African Union were epic and demanded huge financial and resource commitment as well as political will. Members of the African Union have demonstrated huge commitments to confronting the scourge of conflicts in Africa through AU’s complex peace and security institutional mechanisms. While still trying to develop its institutional mechanisms, the African Union soon after its establishment quickly embarked on the task of wrestling with the conflicts in Africa. Unlike the OAU, the African Union has taken a more proactive stance in preventing, managing and resolving African conflicts (Sesay and Omotosho 2011: 3).

In situations that threaten peace and security such as border disputes, secessionist struggles, electoral violence, unconstitutional changes of government\(^\textit{67}\), insurgency and civil war, the African Union seeks peaceful resolutions to conflict. The reaction of the African Union to conflict situations reflects in its condemnation of actions that threaten peace and security, its calls for peaceful settlement of conflicts and its proactive stance on establishing a host of diplomatic and mediatory interventions that sometimes extend to peace keeping operations. Commendably, AU’s response to conflict cases favours negotiated settlements to conflicts.

\(^{67}\) The African Union has condemned all unconstitutional changes in government in its commitment to democracy and peaceful transition of power in respective member states (Williams 2011: 4; Shinn, 2012: 3)
The Union makes remarkable efforts at including all stakeholders including rebel or perceived terrorist groups in the negotiation efforts (De Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and Okumu, 2010: 30).

To enforce negotiated agreements, the African Union has established peacekeeping missions in conflict states when necessary. For instance, the African Union established a peacekeeping mission in Sudan in 2004 after it had engaged in diplomatic and mediatory efforts to quell the unrest in Darfur. The African Union’s peacekeeping operations often aim to protect civilian populations, stabilize conflict zones and create a conducive environment for a strong UN intervention. AU’s peacekeeping interventions have been witnessed in Burundi, Sudan, Comoro Islands and Somalia. Members of the African Union showed their commitment by contributing troops and resources to the foregoing mission areas.

The first AU peacekeeping mission AMIB (AU Mission in Burundi) is commended for its successful endeavour in deterring the use of violence, stabilizing the country and creating the conditions for the deployment of a UN operation in 2003 and subsequent elections in June 2005 (National Model United Nations, 2008: 20). To quell the crisis in Darfur, AU deployed over 7,000 African Union forces between 2004 and 2007 and backed a stronger UN peacekeeping force in the region from 2008 to the present (Scanlon et al 2007:21). The AU Mission in Somalia also came at a time when the UN was reluctant to intervene in the conflict-ridden and collapsed state of Somalia.

AU intervention in Burundi, its missions in the Comoro Islands and its mission in Sudan (AMIS) are adjudged as successes despite their deficiencies (National Model United Nations 2008: 7; Shinn, 2012:2; Scanlon et al 2007: 21). The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has gradually attained considerable achievements in recent years as well leading to the establishment of a new Somali federal government since the collapse of President Siad Barre’s regime in 1991 (Shinn 2012: 2). With such efforts, AU’s interventionist role in the continent promises a peaceful Africa where issues are tackled by Africans in solidarity.

However, the African Union is faced with many challenges that undermine its peace and security agenda. The African Union is faced with the problem of summoning the sufficient political will and commitment to adequately enforce conflict management operations. African states tend to be less committed to African Union’s peace operations in Africa in terms of contributing forces as well as resources. In terms of the supply of armed forces, during the
July 2010 AU Summit in Kampala, member states agreed to reinforce AMISOM by increasing its troops from the 6300 troops (mainly comprising of Burundian and Ugandan soldiers) to the 8000 targeted size that was mandated in 2007 (Cilliers et al 2010: 2). However, member states failed to commit their soldiers and fulfill their pledges of troops for the mission. Since 2007, AMISOM remained with a force strength that is less than the 8000 required troops until the recent achievements of AMISOM forces which reignited the discourse on the reinforcement of AMISOM.

Likewise, the African Union’s mission in Sudan (AMIS) faced a similar challenge as its 3,320 force strength that was mandated in October 2004 only reached its full strength in April 2005, six months after the decision was reached. When AMIS troop reached its reinforced force strength of about 7,000 troops in 2006, extra five thousand troops were needed in the region due to Darfur’s huge land mass. It became difficult for AMIS to respond to the challenge of reining in on the violence in Darfur. The African Union lacked the political will to mandate a further reinforcement of the force strength until the mission was transformed into a hybrid AU and UN mission UNAMID in 2008 (Evans 2006: 720).

Moreover, few member states within the African Union have shown great commitment while others keep displaying poor commitments in relation to sending armed troops to support the AU cause. Table 1.0 below illustrates this point by displaying AU peace operations and the force generating countries.
Table 1.0 African Union peace operations 2002 to 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Mission and Acronym</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Main Contributors</th>
<th>others</th>
<th>Main Task(s)</th>
<th>Approximate Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special Task Force Burundi</td>
<td>2006 – 2009</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>VIP Protection</td>
<td>c.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>AU Military Observer Mission in the Comoros MIOC</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC)</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>Election Monitor</td>
<td>1,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES)</td>
<td>2007 – 2008</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>Election Support</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democracy in Comoros</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Tanzania, Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>1,350(+450 Comoros)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)</td>
<td>2008 – date</td>
<td>Nigeria, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Ghana, Senegal, Egypt, South Africa, Gambia, Kenya</td>
<td>Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan and others</td>
<td>Peace-building/Civilian Protection</td>
<td>c. 23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>2007 – date</td>
<td>Uganda, Burundi</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Regime Support</td>
<td>c. 9,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from (Møller, 2009:14; Williams, 2011:15)
Evident from the table above, the support for regional peace operations in Africa are hugely uneven. Contributors such as South Africa, Uganda, Rwanda, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and Ethiopia seem to be the main pillars of AU peace operations. With such a small number of contributors out of fifty four member states, African Union peace operations suffer from lack of adequate support from member states (Williams 2011: 15).

As diagnosed by Coleman (2011: 517), regional peace operations in Africa suffer from poor commitment due to the preference for UN/global peace operations. African states participate more in UN peace operations than in the continent’s regional peacekeeping operations. Between 2001 and 2009 African states have deployed more troops to UN missions in the continent than regional peace operations (Coleman 2011: 538). The range of troop supply from African states between 2001 and 2009 has been about 5,200 troops and military observers for regional peace operations and 14,200 troops and military observers for UN missions worldwide. Within Africa, sub-Saharan African states’ troop contribution for UN missions ‘rose from 8,441 military personnel in July 2001 to 20,677 in July 2009’ (Coleman 2011: 537). Noticeably, after UN missions replace regional missions such as the case of UNAMID, UNMIL and UNOCI, African states commit more forces to the UN mission than they do for regional missions. For instance, in the case of AMIS transition to UNAMID, African states provided more troops that amount to about 71% UNAMID force strength by May 2011 (Luqman and Omede 2012: 60).

Such uneven troop commitments are explicable from the fact that the demands and financial commitment required for peace operations preclude African states from dedicating their forces to regional peace operations because they, as member states, bear the responsibility to provide for their soldiers. But for UN peace operations, African states deploy more troops for the operation because the financial needs of the troops are catered for by the UN peacekeeping budget (Coleman 2011: 539). Moreover, the training, experience, advanced logistics, better treatment and the prestige of contributing to a global peace mission entice African states to deploy more troops for UN peacekeeping operations.

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68 The experience of the UN in conflict resolution is broader and reliable than that of regional organizations. The UN has intervened in different conflicts across the globe. Hence, it possesses a wide range of knowledge and ideas on how to approach conflict situations. The decisions and actions of the UN are backed by the great powers who give weight to its decision and actions than that of regional organizations. UN provides comprehensive dispute settlement system under the backing of international law, International Court of Justice and the Security Council, etc.
A phenomenon that further raises concern for AU’s commitment to devise African solutions to African problems is that regional peace operations are conceived as interim - and not alternative - operations to be taken over by a stronger UN mission. African states prefer short-term peacekeeping missions while shying away from long-term missions. AU missions are designed as stabilization operations to be replaced by a UN peace operation from about 90 to 120 days (De Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and Okumu 2010: 41). The regional body’s missions to Burundi, Sudan, Somalia, except that of the Comoros Islands were all designed as interim missions to be replaced by a well-equipped, financed and stronger UN mission (Shinn 2012:2). As such, African regional organizations as well as the African Union tend to conceive themselves as only being important when the UN Security Council is passive to the conflicts within their regions.

Realistically, the arrangement to replace AU (stabilization) missions with a stronger UN operation is inevitable given the minimal financial and resource capacity of AU to engage in long term peace operations (De Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and Okumu 2010: 15). However, regional peacekeeping does not necessarily derive its legitimacy from the UN and it may not be funded by it (Coleman 2011: 519). If the African Union is to go in line with its mandate of providing peace and security in Africa, it should be willing to take up the responsibilities involved in both short term and long term peace operations in the continent.

Coleman (2011: 519) argues that due to the preference for UN peace operations by African states, the African Union as well as African sub-regional organizations do not control the mandating process for UN peace operations as well as the interventions of foreign powers in the African continent. The case of Libya where the UN-mandated NATO forces decided to intervene militarily without the consent of the African Union shows that the African regional body could easily be sidelined from decision making in international affairs. It remains mind boggling trying to comprehend why the international community intervened in Libya after some few months of violence while they are not determined to intervene in Syria that has been in conflict for over two years. Do the United Nations and other foreign powers undermine African states and the continent’s regional organization by easily intervening in the continent when they deem fit?

Nevertheless, as argued by Apuuli (2012), if the AU had stepped up adequately to the challenges of the continent, the foregoing question could have been phrased differently. It would have only been a question of the necessity of a NATO intervention in Libya. The AU
continues to be stymied by poor political will, half-hearted measures and failure to reach crucial decisions. This dithering runs athwart to the mandate of the regional body to solving African conflicts (Apuuli 2012:135). Adding to the issue of poor political will and half-hearted measures is the failure of the African Union to institutionalize the African Standby Force (ASF) since it was established in 2003. The ASF is expected to serve as the operational arm of the AU to enable the African Union to respond timely and perhaps efficiently to humanitarian crises across the continent. Though the ASF was expected to reach its full operational force by 2010, AU has been unable to make any decisive move to institutionalizing the ASF.\textsuperscript{69}

Inauspicious to the African Union’s conflict management capabilities, there tends to be a lack of harmony between the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Union (Vines 2013:104). The RECs are expected to play significant roles in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) by addressing the conflicts in their regions under the leadership of the African Union (De Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and Okumu 2010: 16). The African Union is privileged by the invaluable lessons learnt from the experiences of peace operations led by the RECs. Notably, ECOWAS and SADC have been prominent in engaging in peace operations in Africa particularly in West Africa and Southern Africa respectively. The peacekeeping operations led by these two RECs in particular and the experiences garnered from such operations set the stage for African Union’s endeavours in peacekeeping operations. Although, RECs are expected to be proactive in addressing the conflicts within their regions, their peace and security agendas are expected to be coordinated by the African Union.

Yet, the RECs tend be less committed to AU’s leadership (Vines 2013:101). A good case of RECs discordant with the AU has to do with the establishment of the ASF. The RECs have a significant role to play in the institutionalization of the ASF by providing troops that would make up the ASF as well as making financial and resource commitment to operationalize the ASF. But, the RECs have failed to provide the resources needed or to show commitment to developing the ASF by recruiting troops from the different regions. As noted by Vines (2013: 104), there will be no African Standby Force, Continental Early Warning System and the Panel of the Wise without the cooperation of the RECs.

\textsuperscript{69}Sesay and Omotosho (2011: 19) observe that even the United Nations has not being able to successfully operationalize a Standby Force.
5.3 The AU’s Resource Capabilities

The African Union is crippled by its lack of finance, expert personnel and relevant resources to match the challenges facing the continent. Finance is a major prerequisite for an effective African Union because it determines the number of troops to be deployed for a mission, the kind of equipment used by the troops and the duration of the mission. Kioko (2003: 822) notes that the ‘average cost of sustaining peacekeepers is estimated at US$130 per day, excluding ordnance, equipment and transportation’. Such a huge financial commitment required for peace operations is evident from the Nigerian-led ECOWAS peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It is alleged that Nigeria spent over US$1 million a day during the peacekeeping operations in each of the two countries (Liberia and Sierra Leone) to quell and resolve the conflicts. The African Union Mission in Burundi had an operational budget of $110 million per year for 3335 personnel. The cost of sustaining AMISOM on the other hand was estimated at $600 to $800 million annually. Thus, there are huge financial burdens involved in carrying out peace operations effectively (National Model United Nations 2008: 17).

Most of the AU’s funding is dependent on uncertain external support as the cases of Somalia and Sudan where the generosity and support of external bodies such as the UN, EU, G8 as well as states such as the US, China and Canada was dominant. As noted by Vines (2013: 107), African states have only provided for 2% of the AU Peace Fund while international donors provided the bulk of the funds. The UN, EU, G8, US and China have been very supportive of the African Union and have prioritized the Union as an important actor committed to the resolution of conflicts in Africa (Mathiasen 2006: 7). These international bodies continue to pledge their commitment to developing AU’s capacity for instituting regional peace and security initiatives (Coleman 2011: 518). Møller (2009: 16) observes that

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70 The EU and U.S. contributed about 80 per cent of the cost of AMIS. They still contribute about 80 per cent of the ongoing AU mission in Somalia AMISOM (De Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and Okumu 2010: 37).

71 The EU has been very instrumental in providing financial support and assistance to the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (Lopez 2004: 7). Beside other financial support, China single-handedly built a multi-million dollars new secretariat for the AU. The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon notes that ‘the UN is committed to helping build up the capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations to undertake conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacekeeping tasks in their respective regions’ (Coleman 2011: 518). Several regional peacekeeping capacity-building programmes have been launched by western actors to develop regional institutional capacities to plan, deploy, manage and sustain peace operations (Coleman 2011: 518).
‘it would be surprising if the world’s poorest continent were able to solve the world’s most frequent and widespread as well as most deadly conflicts’.

However, external support is uncertain and based on charity to the African Union. The uncertainty of external support entails that the AU is restricted in making tangible and binding decisions unless its decisions are accepted and funded by external donors. Hence, without external donation, the African Union seems to be hamstrung in making any useful impact in Africa. In such a situation, external donors have the power to influence AU’s decisions to suit their interests.

In addition to financial dependency, the AU is further beset by the lack of adequate expertise. Sharamao and Ayangafac (2011: 5) note that despite the progress and the experience gained by African troops during peace operations, they still require training and technical support from external bodies. AMIS, for instance, would have faced huge difficulties in Sudan without the help of NATO’s support and assistance. For AU’s mission in Sudan, NATO provided training for AU forces and provided logistic assistance for AMIS in 2005. Without external support and assistance, the AU’s present military capabilities and strategic expertise are limited in terms of conflict prevention, peace building, peacekeeping and civilian protection.

Nevertheless, the over reliance on external financial, military and expert assistance runs contrary to AU’s rhetoric and commitment to finding African solutions to African problems (Williams 2011: 15). How can the Union be committed to solving African problems using African solutions when they are dependent on external powers for peace and security initiatives and operations? The idea of African solutions to African problems tends to be a mere catch phrase or a future goal that does not reflect the implementation endeavours of Africans. Sesay and Omotosho (2011: 1) argue that to actualize the notion of African solutions to African problems, the African Union needs to ensure sustainable local funding and ownership as well as ensure that conflict management efforts are feasible, affordable and sustainable.

Another major limitation of the African Union is its limited material resources (Mathiasen 2006: 7). The paucity of resources to engage in military missions undermines African Union’s efficiency in terms of the responsibility to protect. In reference to AU’s mission in Darfur, Scanlon et al (2007: 8) note that the difficulties faced by AU’s missions are indicative
of the regional organization’s lack of military capacity. The AU does not have the necessary sea and airlift capacity, training facilities, management structures, weapons, information technology and mobile carriers to engage in an effective peace operation (Williams 2011:15). As observed by Evans (2006: 720), the African Union’s Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2006 was manned by only ‘seven thousand inadequately mandated, insufficiently mobile, and otherwise militarily incapable personnel on the ground’.

Most significant is the AU’s lack of airlift capacity such as armoured helicopters, jet-powered aircraft, turboprop aircraft, drones, etc. Airlift resources would have been useful in transporting troops and equipment in a timely manner to operation areas. For instance, AMIS forces had to undertake dangerous journeys into Darfur stalked by the risk of ambushes by warring parties. It also took UNAMID almost 2 years to reach 68% of its mandated force strength due to the lack of airlift resources to transport troops from their respective countries to the conflict zone (Diop et al 2012: 1).

With airlift capacity, AU forces would also be able to bypass regions that warring parties deny them from passing. This will also prevent AU forces from being vulnerable to landmines, ambushes and attacks from irregular forces (Diop et al 2012). Moreover, AMIS could have avoided the numerous attacks on its personnel if it had been supported by airlift resources as these could have been used to reinforce troops under ambush or attack (Diop et al 2012: 2). AU forces could also use the airlift capacity to strategically target the resources of defaulting parties. UNAMID forces as well have blamed their inability to defend civilian populations on the lack of helicopters to transport troops and target defaulting forces (Diop et al 2012: 2). With airlift resources, civilian casualties would be reduced and AU could function more effectively without delays\(^2\). If the African Union does not wield necessary capacity to intervene in conflict situations, how could they be taken seriously by warring parties?

Williams (2011: 5) further observes that despite the paradigm shift from non-intervention to the non-indifference to the internal conflicts of member states, the AU is yet to invoke Article 4(h)\(^3\) and launch military intervention against a member state despite the presence of

\(^2\) Airlift resources would go a long way to enable the regional organization to contend to issues of illicit trade that take place in the seas and by air and prevent criminal and terrorist networks from easily occupying ‘ungoverned’ areas in Africa.

\(^3\) Article 4(h) mandates AU to respond to war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity as well as threats to legitimate order (Kioko 2003: 807).
plausible circumstances to do so. The AU PSC has rather shown strong preference for interventions carried out with consent of the state as evident in its missions in Burundi, Comoros Islands and Sudan, as well as in Somalia where the consent was from a transitional government because Somalia had no central government. The AU had been expected to act proactively – with considerations of all forms of intervention – in states like Cote d’Ivoire and Libya where mass atrocities took place. Regrettably, the AU failed to do so leaving the United Nations and other western powers to intervene directly in the two countries.

According to Williams (2011:5), the strength and influence of states of certain states and their rulers militates against AU’s ability to invoke Article 4(h). This could have been the case in Libya. Evans (2006: 711) notes that the criteria of the responsibility to protect, holding that military intervention should have reasonable prospects of success, automatically rules out intervention against states where chances of success are remote, even when the intervention is justified. This may be adduced to explain why the African Union failed to consider military action in Libya due to limited resources beside the fact that Gaddafi had been a major actor in the African continent. As noted by Franke (2006: 4), the willingness to intervene in a conflict situation is parallel to the capacity to do so. Given the AU’s limited resources, the consideration of military intervention in Libya would seem futile because the prospect of success – a crucial criterion – was slim. AU is still battling to rise above member states and gain a bold stature to confront its member states. The African Union ought to develop a supranational capacity to intervene anywhere in the continent.

5.4 Status of the AU Member States

The African Union’s ability to develop the relevant power to make effective influence in the continent is contingent on the status of its member states. Inauspiciously, most of the African Union’s member states are weak and crisis states. Howard (2010) observes that ‘Africa is undoubtedly plagued by systematic state failure in that the region lacks strong governance,

74 This raises concerns about the Union’s commitment to move beyond regime security to the security of Civilians.
75 However, it is important to underscore the primacy of seeking political and diplomatic solutions to conflict. The doctrine of the responsibility to protect is not a justification for AU’s military adventurism. Nevertheless, states that engender their civilian population to untold suffering and gross atrocities ought to be confronted when their actions defy diplomatic and mediatory efforts.
76 More so, the Union would hardly consider military intervention for regional hegemonies such as Nigeria and South Africa even if it is warranted.
comprehensive economic development, and fails to provide security to its citizens and order in its territories’. By being composed of weak and crisis states, African Union inevitably reflect some form of weaknesses in its institutional bodies and operations. It is in view of the limitation of the states in Africa that Sesay (2008) contends aptly that ‘how can weak states generate the resources necessary to create domestic cohesion on matters of political power and economic distribution; and at the same time pursue regional or continental goals?’ Most states in Africa have been unable to contend with their internal issues let alone to tackle the problems of other states.

The state failure, insecurities and human right abuses that have marred most African states have a bearing on the African Union’s agenda for peace and security. Countries torn apart by civil war such as Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Central African Republic, and the DRC cannot effectively contribute to matters that have to do with upholding human security, order and peace in another state. In addition, regimes notorious for human rights abuses in Africa would also be reluctant in promoting human security and would show poor political will in AU’s preventive and reactive initiatives towards conflict management (Tieku 2007: 33).

To its discredit, the African Union as an institution has also failed to develop supranational capacity to properly challenge African states guilty of human right abuses. After it was formed in 2001, the African Union has not been able to effectively reprimand African leaders that are responsible for human rights abuses or that came to power via unconstitutional means in the past. The African Union did not challenge the political systems of its member states. For instance, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, having usurped power in 1969 through a coup, clung to power for 42 years until he was removed during the Libyan revolution in 2011. Gaddafi’s regime was characterized by state terror and human right abuses and he had been a military dictator since 1969. Further tarnishing the AU’s image, Gaddafi held the chairmanship of the PSC – which is responsible for promoting human rights, peace and security – in 2009 and he had held important positions in AU as well as its predecessor, OAU. During the Libyan revolution in 2011, the AU was caught in an unwarranted dilemma: it was confronted by the invidious position of either supporting the influential Gaddafi or his detractors who, without doubt, enjoyed the support of non-African forces

Beside the Libyan example, the case of Sudan posed a huge test for AU’s ability to display a supranational capacity to challenge its member states. With the leverage of being a member of the PSC between 2004 and 2006 the Sudanese government was able to influence and
determine the PSC mandate under which AMIS was founded. The AU PSC also gave the government the veto power in situations that call for the amendment of the mandate of AMIS. Coupled with the fact that the government was responsible for high handed attacks on its people, civilians and rebels nurtured the impression that AMIS was biased towards the Sudanese government. The impression was further encouraged by the failure of the AU to enforce the arrest of President al-Bashir on charges of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as mandated by the ICC.

Moreover, the Sudanese government had on several occasions interfered with the operations of AMIS thereby undermining the power of the African Union. The government delayed the delivery of AMIS resources into the Darfur region. It also imposed curfews on AMIS which was supposed to be overseeing and enforcing peace processes in Darfur. Thus, the mission tended to operate under the dictates of Khartoum. This challenges the African Union’s capacity to intervene in its member states.

On the list of regimes with bad records is that of President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal who clung to power for twelve years abdicating power only in the face of mounted domestic and international pressure. President Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast clung to power until he was ousted through military force in 2010. President Mugabe of Zimbabwe who is currently a member of the PSC continues to cling to power since he became president in 1987. His regime has committed several human rights violations including the use of state terror to maintain power. The incumbent Kenyan President and his deputy were recently arraigned by the ICC for crimes against humanity while the government is also a member of the AU PSC.

From the examples cited, it is clear that the African Union tolerates the membership of governments with such dictatorial and repressive tendencies in its Peace and Security Council. How can the PSC be relied on to address African conflicts if members and potential members of the PSC are lacking in having a clear record of good governance, rule of law and security in their respective states? In fact, even if it wishes to confront its member states, there is virtually no member state with a good moral standing and relevant influence and power capacity to advance such an agenda. This makes it difficult to comprehend how the AU PSC, composed as it is of questionable governments can carry out the mandate of promoting and enforcing human security and enforcing peace and security?
Discouragingly, more powerful states – that are expected to play significant role – such as Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia and Libya\textsuperscript{77} are also bedevilled by internal weaknesses (Møller 2009: 3). Particularly, South Africa and Nigeria have proven to be probable hegemonies in Africa that can bolster the ability of AU to meet its objectives. With its economic and military capacity and stable democracy relative to other African states, South Africa tends to be a strong power in Africa and plays leadership roles in the African Union. South Africa has been involved actively in AU and UN peacekeeping deployments in Comoros, Sudan, Burundi and DRC.

However, South Africa is also challenged by its internal challenges at post-conflict reconstruction given the huge margins between the rich and the poor. Besides, most African countries are suspicious of South Africa’s role in Africa as indicated during the 2005 Cote d’Ivoire crises. South Africa was construed as being partisan, and driven by its quest to expand its economy and create business opportunities for South African firms like Randgold (Scanlon \textit{et al} 2007: 29). Mahmood Mamdani, a Ugandan academic, has also accused South Africa of having 'an inflated sense of authority and influence in foreign relations' (quoted in Scanlon \textit{et al} 2007: 29). Suspicions around South Africa’s operations in the continent challenge the role which it could play in strengthening the AU.

Nigeria, on the other hand, has proven to be a de facto regional hegemony in West Africa\textsuperscript{78}. With its economic and military power, Nigeria has played integral roles in ECOWAS, OAU and AU. It has been involved in more than 40 UN peacekeeping operations across the world and over 150,000 Nigerian soldiers have served on various peacekeeping missions (Scanlon \textit{et al} 2007: 29). Moreover, the two Nigerian-led peacekeeping interventions in the 1990s were instrumental in resolving the conflicts in Liberia (1998) and Sierra Leone (1997). These make Nigerian forces an asset to the African Union in terms of peace and security. However, Nigeria has been accused of paternalism and arrogance in its foreign relations due to its willingness to intervene and play leadership roles in the continent (Scanlon \textit{et al} 2007:29). Besides, the country faces internal challenges in terms of mal-governance and internal conflicts. There remains a need for the country to solve its internal problems so as to gain legitimacy with regards to its leadership endeavours in the continent.

\textsuperscript{77} These countries are considered to be sub-regional hegemonies in Africa.

\textsuperscript{78} Nigeria’s economy is 75% of West Africa’s economic strength. Its population also account for 50% of West African population.
Yet, African missions rely immensely on the commitment of the abovementioned ‘lead nations’, South Africa and Nigeria (Møller, 2009: 15; Kangwanja, 2006). For the African Union as well as any intervener to effect change in conflict situations, there ought to be a strong backing of the intervener’s resolution (Crocker 2001: 242). South Africa and Nigeria should be committed to support the development and efficiency of the African Union’s peace and security agenda. The African Union could gain much more from the active backing of its missions by Nigeria and South Africa (Scanlon et al, 2007: 29). Sesay (2008: 26) notes that with proper leadership, political will and motivation, South Africa and Nigeria could change the current and rather humiliating perception of Sub-Saharan Africa as a continent devoid of credible regional leaders(s) or ‘change makers’, although much would depend on whether or not they are ready to play the role of ‘defenders and ‘enforcers’ and make the necessary human and financial sacrifices.

Given the weaknesses of other African states, successful African countries are expected to take the lead in the African Union so as to ensure that there is enough muscle to back AU’s decisions. To allay the fear of the domination of weaker states by powerful ones, the African Union, as an institution, could serve to check the power of powerful states and sub-regional hegemons and prevent them from dominating smaller African states (Franke, 2006: 8).

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the prospects and challenges of the African Union’s peace and security agenda in Africa. The first section examines AU’s commitment and political will at conflict management. Despite its efforts, the poor commitment in terms of inadequate troop contribution from member states and the failure to operationalize the ASF undermines AU’s effort at conflict management. The second section acknowledges the limited resource capabilities for the African Union’s peace and security agenda. This has led the regional body to be greatly dependent on external bodies, a phenomenon that controverts the African Union’s quest to provide African solutions to African problems. The succeeding chapter culminates the discussion with a summary of the research and a recommendation on the development of AU’s capacity for conflict management.
CHAPTER 6

Summary and Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

This chapter summarizes the research findings and proffers some recommendations for the improvement of the African Union’s capabilities for conflict management. The last section offers a general conclusion on the research.

6.2 Summary

Since the end of colonialism, violent conflicts characterize most African states. Intra-state conflicts which became more rampant in Africa since the demise of the Cold War prompted the collapse of some states in Africa and exposed civilian populations to wanton deaths, loss of properties and gross human right abuses. Apart from the horrendous impact of intra-state conflicts to civilian populations, the internal crises of individual states in Africa also threaten regional and international peace and security. Intra-state conflicts have engendered international problems like refugee flows, spread of diseases, arms proliferation, organized criminal activities, and international terrorism and trafficking. Conflicts in Africa have further stymied the socio-economic and political development of the continent and have tarnished its image in the globe.

Due to the inability of African states to contain the insecurities in their respective countries, the United Nations and foreign powers such as the US, EU, France, China and Russia have often interfered in the internal affairs of African states to restore peace and security. Nevertheless, the United Nations’ commitment across the globe and the strategic interests of foreign powers preclude them from successfully restoring peace to the crisis situations in states involved. Moreover, Africa’s regional organization, the Organization of African Unity which was established in 1963 could not address the post-Cold War insecurities of its member states because of its out-dated objectives and strict adherence to the principle of non-intervention.

It is against this backdrop that African leaders found it crucial to establish a stronger and a more efficient regional organization, the African Union in 2002. In line with the political ideal of African solutions to African problems, the African Union, as a pan-African
institution, is expected to diligently respond to the multifarious challenges of Africa. This goes in line with the theoretical framework of liberal institutionalism used for the understanding of the significance of the African Union’s role in Africa. Liberal institutionalism emphasizes the importance of cooperation especially in an institutional environment so as to confront common challenges. The institutionalization of the cooperation between states encourages the commitment of member states to multilateral projects and promotes a perpetual and close attention to common challenges.

Faced with the challenge intra-state conflicts and the resultant consequences, African leaders through the continent’s regional institution (African Union) have formed several institutional bodies and mechanisms to promote, enhance and enforce peace and security. The African Union seeks to address Africa’s conflicts in tandem with the principle of human security which accords greater concern for the security of individuals. Based on the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect, the African Union aspires to protect civilian populations and contain the deleterious effects of conflicts.

Since its establishment, the African Union has adopted a host of diplomatic and mediatory interventionist mechanisms to respond to the conflicts in the continent. Interestingly, when its diplomatic and mediatory interventions fail, the African Union adopts military interventionist mechanisms to contain conflicts and to protect civilian populations in its member states in pursuant of Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act. The regional body has employed military alternatives and sent peacekeeping missions to Burundi, Comoros Islands, Sudan, and Somalia. The African Union’s interventions depict its commitment to respond to the myriad conflicts that have been the bane of development in the continent.

Still yet, the regional organization’s efficiency remains a subject of concern for Africans who have vested so much anticipation on its ability to address Africa’s security problems. The African Union’s capacity for conflict management and the quality of its interventions remains a subject of concern. The AU is envisioned to be effective enough to create a safe and stable environment for Africa to realize its political, economic and social aspirations. In line with the ideal of African solutions to African problems, the African Union’s efficiency at addressing African conflict issues would curtail the wanton suspicious external interventions in the continent and enable Africa to drive its goals and development.
Situated within the context of conflict management particularly, the research assesses the efficiency of the African Union in enforcing peace and security in Africa. Conflict management involves efforts at defending civilians and lessening the deleterious effects of conflict. The study places interest on the African Union’s effort at achieving the aforementioned goals specifically through its military approach. The cases of the African Union’s interventions in Sudan and Somalia and its response to the Libyan revolution are particularly instrumental in examining the regional body’s role, efficiency and capability to enforce peace and security in Africa.

In the case of Sudan, the African Union in 2004 established a peacekeeping mission in the Darfur region of Sudan when violence erupted in Darfur in 2003 between the Government of Sudan in alliance with its proxy the Janjaweed militia and two rebel groups; the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (Murithi, 2009: 99). The armed insurrection led to the loss of thousands of lives and grave atrocities against civilians in Darfur. Given atrocious nature of conflict coupled with the regional and international concern over the crisis, the African Union stood up to the challenge by taking up a mediatory role that eventually led to a peacekeeping mission in the Darfur region of Sudan (AMIS) in 2004. The peacekeeping mission which lasted between 2004 and 2007 was charged with the mandate of protecting civilians as a priority, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, monitoring the ceasefire agreement, and restoring peace and stability in Sudan.

Initially, AMIS was hailed for its efforts that led to the reduction of violence in Darfur. The AU was also praised for its proactive measures to resolve the conflict (Franke, 2006: 10; NMUN, 2008: 7; Scanlon et al 2007: 21). Situations later deteriorated when the warring factions failed to recognize the deterrence power of AMIS due to AMIS’s limitations in terms of arms and resources. The lack of a binding agreement in Darfur further complicated the efforts of AMIS. Fighting and violence against the civilian population continued unabated. Aside from being unable to adequately protect civilians, AMIS troops and personnel fell under grievous attacks from belligerents.

The failures and limitations of AMIS led to the establishment of a stronger joint AU/UN hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID) which began since 2008 to the present. The African Union continues to play a major role in the resolution of the conflict in Darfur. UNAMID relatively stabilized the Darfur region. Yet, despite its force strength, UNAMID also face
similar challenges faced by AMIS such as continued unrest, indiscriminate attacks on civilians as well as UNAMID and humanitarian aid personnel.

The AU Mission in Somalia on the other hand came at a time when the international community was reluctant to intervene in the conflict-ridden and collapsed state of Somalia. The US-led UN intervention in Somalia that ended in a debacle in the mid-1990s discouraged the international community’s political will to intervene again in Somalia’s crises. The insecurities of the anarchic state dragged neighbouring countries into the conflict and engendered the emergence and growth of fundamental Islamic militant movements with domestic and international terrorist intents. In line with its mandate of providing African solution to African problems, the African Union stood up to the Somali crisis by establishing a peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) in the country in 2007.

In the first three years of the mission, AMISOM was assessed negatively as it failed to protect the civilian population and contain the unrest. AMISOM virtually restricted its peacekeeping mission to the protection of the Transitional Federal Government’s officials (Shinn 2012). However, in 2011, AMISOM began a successful campaign against the Al-Shabaab militia in the Mogadishu region. Under immense pressure from AMISOM, Al-Shabaab forces abandoned the Mogadishu region. Gradually, AMISOM restored relative security in the Mogadishu region and facilitated the establishment of a new Somali government since the 1991 state collapse (Shinn 2012: 2).

The 2011 revolution in Libya however, challenged the capacity of the African Union to meet up to the problem of conflict in Africa. The 2011 peaceful protest against Gaddafi’s 42 years dictatorial regime quickly turned into an armed rebellion due to the regime’s intransigencies and indiscriminate crack down on peaceful protesters. AU’s half-hearted measures and rather shaky proposal for a political solution in Libya was neither embraced by Gaddafi’s regime nor the rebel movement which was organized under the name National Transitional Council.

The atrocities committed indiscriminately against the civilian populations led the UNSC to adopt resolution 1973 which established a no-fly zone in Libya. This paved way for NATO’s intervention in Libya, an intervention that turned into a campaign of regime change. The African Union became a spectator and mere reactors to NATO’s intervention that eventually led to the overthrow of Gaddafi’s regime in October 2011. After the overthrow of Gaddafi, the African Union still remained incapable of guiding the future of post-Gaddafi’s Libya.
AU’s impotence in the crisis raises crucial questions around its credibility, legitimacy and capability to enforce its agenda of peace and security in the continent.

Extrapolating from AU’s interventions in Sudan, Somalia and its response to the Libyan revolution, the African Union has shown a huge commitment relative to OAU in terms of actually making efforts to address the conflicts in the continent. While at its nascent stage, the regional body has made strides to respond to conflict scenarios in Africa without waiting to fully develop its institutional bodies and mechanisms. With limited finance and resources, the African Union has intervened militarily in conflicts that require enormous financial and resource commitments. The African Union has also been instrumental in responding to conflicts in Africa that were ignored by the UN. For instance, civil war has raged on in Sudan since 1983 without the UN’s intervention. The UN also failed to take a proactive stance in the face of the 2003 outbreak of violence in the Darfur region leaving the newly formed AU to rise up to the challenge by sending a peacekeeping mission into the region.

In addition, since the debacle of the US-led UN intervention in Somalia between 1992 and 1995, the international community had abandoned Somalia in its state of anarchy for twelve years until the African Union embarked on a peacekeeping intervention in the country from 2007 to date. These interventions depict the regional body’s commitment to the ideal of providing African solutions to African problems and betoken the possibility of a continent that forges solidarity between African states in a bid to solve the conflicts in the continent. AU’s interventionist role also promises a continent that would experience lesser and controllable conflict as well as fewer ulterior external interventions.

Despite the promises of the African Union’s interventionist roles, the organization is wanting in terms of its capability to earnestly drive its agenda of peace and security. The African Union is faced with the challenges of:

1) Summoning the political will to engage decisively with the conflicts in the continent.  
2) Poor planning and ambiguous mandates for its missions.  
3) Lack of adequate force-strength and troop contribution for its peace operations.  
4) Poor resources to carry out peace operations.  
5) Poor credibility due to the poor moral standing of its member states.  
6) Dependency on external assistance and support.
The subsequent section shall consider these limitations and proffer some recommendations on how to develop the AU’s conflict management capabilities.

6.3 Recommendations

This section looks into some of the challenges faced by the African Union’s military efforts and proffers some recommendations for the development of the AU military interventionist role in Africa.

6.3.1 Conflict Prevention and well-planned Intervention

In line with the injunctions of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, the African Union ought to underscore the importance of conflict prevention in Africa. As noted by Williams (2011:7), the AU PSC has been preoccupied with contending with armed conflicts in the continent than devising conflict prevention strategies which form a vital part of its mandates. The African Union’s initiative of early warning action through the Continents Early Warning System (CEWS) is supposed to be an integral effort of the regional organization in preventing conflicts and promoting peace and security. The CEWS in Africa still has a long way to go in terms of developing appropriate information technology, infrastructure and well-trained analysts to arrest risks and early crises before they deteriorate.

Moreover, the AU should also be proactive enough to send fact finding missions to regions experiencing mounting tensions in order to assess the situation and make informed decisions about what to do. It is argued that if the African Union had sent a fact finding mission to Libya at the dawn of the Libyan crisis, the regional body could have responded properly to the crisis and spearheaded the change that took place in Libya. The AU should also be bold enough to send early deployments of peacekeepers to conflict regions that could experience even greater carnage without some form of intervention to encourage nonviolent negotiations and deter the use of aggression.

Furthermore, the African Union has been accused of poor planning and making ambiguous mandates for its missions. For instance, the African Union has been criticized for establishing

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79 The PSC has also been unable to pay attention to other forms of security threats such as environmental degradation, organized crime, terrorism, famine and diseases.

80 As part of its Early Warning System, the African Union is supposed to send a fact finding mission composed of military operatives to assess risk levels in conflict regions to enable them make informed decisions on how to intervene.
a peacekeeping mission in Somalia where there was no peace to keep and no peace agreement to enforce (Murithi, 2009: 101). Contrary to the conditions stipulated by the Lakhdar Brahimi Panel of 2000, AU embarked on a mission of peacekeeping in Somalia without a peace to keep or the resources and means to carry out the task (Cilliers et al, 2010: 4-5). The mission mainly concentrated on the protection of TFG officials until recently when it began a mission of driving out Al-Shabaab militants. It remains unclear if the mandate is the protection of officials or a peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission. This highlights the Union’s limitations in terms of articulating a proper military strategy to combat such security challenge.

AMIS on the other hand tended to have accorded the power to control its mission to the government of Sudan. The government of Sudan at times imposed curfews and restricted the operations of AMIS. Worst still, AMIS was accused of being partial in favour of the government. Such limitations in AU operations demands a carefully planned mandate and modus operandi so as to ensure that AU have full control of its mission in host states, to ensure that the regional body remains impartial to warring parties and is able to meet up to its objectives.

As noted by Butler (2009:13):

> attempts at managing, containing and limiting the use of armed violence by third parties can have positive, even transformative outcomes, in the form of order, stability and even peace. At the same time, ill-conceived, inappropriate, poorly timed, or half-hearted efforts at conflict management can worsen a conflict, generating even more danger, destruction, and death for even more people.

Given the complex nature of third party intervention which may either facilitate peace processes or worsen conflict situations, the African Union ought to make careful planning before engaging in intervention. It should also ensure that its resources match its operations. The AU PSC should also make clear objectives and realistic timeframes for its missions to ensure efficiency. Most importantly, drawing from the lessons of its previous peace operations, the regional body could improve its future missions in the continent. The

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81 Extrapolating from several years of UN peacekeeping experience, the Lakhdar Brahimi Panel of 2000 holds that peacekeeper ought not to be deployed in post-conflict environments without peace to keep. If the mission is expected to create peace and keep the peace, the mission ought to be a robust mandate with political, financial and material support to protect the mission and attain the success required (Cilliers et al, 2010: 4).
challenges of fulfilling the mandates of the foregoing missions could help to enable AU’s future missions to be better in terms of planning, deployment, expertise and duration.

This entails denoting the pivotal role of the AU Military Staff Committee (MSC) in matters relating to the planning and implementation of AU military operations. As noted by Williams (2011: 13), the MSC, which is supposed to play a paramount role in advising the AU PSC on military matters, rarely has meetings and it has so far been ineffectual. This notwithstanding, the MSC is rightfully suited for the planning and coordination of military operations and the provision of the required expertise in operation fields. Hence, the MSC should be reinforced and empowered to occupy its rightful place in the African Peace and Security Architecture.

6.3.2 Force Mobilization

For the African Union to perform effectively in conflict situations, the regional body ought to possess a strong military power to coerce as well as coax stakeholders to take its interventions seriously. But in terms of mobilizing troops, the AU member states have shown less commitment and political will to mobilize and commit their soldiers for AU peace operations. Only few African states demonstrate considerable willingness to commit their troops for the regional body’s peace operations. Hence, AU peace operations suffer the lack of necessary force strength to deter warring parties from violence and to achieve its mandate effectively.

The African Union’s Mission in Sudan (AMIS) for example, faced the challenge of troop mobilization as its 3,320 force strength that was mandated in October 2004 only reached its full strength in April 2005, six months after the decision was reached. When AMIS troop reached its reinforced force strength of about 7,000 troops in 2006, extra five thousand troops were needed in the region due to Darfur’s huge land mass. It became difficult for AMIS to respond to the challenge of reining in on the violence in Darfur. The African Union lacked the political will to mandate a further reinforcement of the force strength of AMIS until the mission was transformed into a hybrid AU and UN mission (UNAMID) in 2008.

Likewise, AMISOM was mandate to reach a force strength of 8000 at its inception in 2007. But the mission operated with only 6300 troops in the volatile and collapsed state of Somalia. During the July 2010 AU Summit in Kampala, member states agreed to reinforce AMISOM.
by increasing its troops from the then 6300 troops to the 8000 targeted size. Still yet, member states failed to commit their soldiers and fulfil their pledges of troops for the mission until the recent achievements of AMISOM forces which led to the reinforcement of the mission.

Nevertheless, generating adequate numbers of troops to match conflict situations is quintessential in any peace operation that hopes to succeed. Peace operations ought to have the necessary force strength at the initial and on-going stages of intervention to deter warring factions from violence and to provide a stable environment for negotiations and agreements to happen. Hence, the African Union ought to ensure that adequate forces are generated to effectively carry out its military operations. AU member states should show more commitment and political will by supporting and committing troops for AU missions.

As enunciated in the earlier discussion on conflict management, the internal insecurities of particular states in Africa are threats to regional and international peace and security. The conflict in the DRC for instance has spread its tentacles to neighbouring states in Africa especially Rwanda, Uganda and the Central African Republic. The Somali conflict as well affects the security situation of Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea. This entails that no African state could extricate itself from the insidious impact of internal armed conflict in the states within the African region. In accord with the rewards of liberal institutionalism, African states could gain greater security benefits by seeking to confront the challenge of conflict in the continent through Africa’s regional organization – the African Union. This demands an immense effort at troop commitment by the AU member states in support of regional peace operations.

Most importantly, the African Union could make useful impact in conflict scenarios by displaying the power capabilities of its multinational bodies. This requires that any intervention by the African Union should have the necessary backing and authority to avoid being undermined by conflicting parties (Crocker 2001:242; Williams 2011: 21). To ensure that AU missions achieve the required results, the commitment and support of AU peace operations by successful and powerful nations in Africa like Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, Egypt, Libya, etc. could help the regional body to display the necessary force in conflict regions. Nevertheless, troops for AU missions should be generated from as many African states as possible. AU peace operations could gain much legitimacy in the eyes of the conflict-states if the troops involved come from different parts of the continent. This would
highlight the multinational element of the African Union and show a huge commitment of the African Union to attend to the problems of its affiliates.

In cases where one or few states dominate peace operations via troop contribution, the credibility of such intervention is called into question (De Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and Okumu, 2010: 18). This is because the main troop contributing countries could be harbouring ulterior motives or could be accused of such. For instance, the fact that South Africa was the ‘lead nation’ and major troop contributing country for the AU mission in Burundi as well as the only troop contributing country for the AU missions in the Comoros Islands portrays South Africa as having a secret agenda in these states. It also contradicts the fact that the African Union is a continental and supranational organization aimed at contending with the security issues of its member states, rather than a single state’s hegemonic effort to address the security challenges of the continent. With such issue, the multinational nature of AU as an institution is undermined and its operations tend to be less credible. Hence, more AU member states should be willing to send their troops for AU peace operations.

6.3.3 Provision of Logistics

Apart from the problem of limited weaponry and facilities, AU peace operations have suffered from poor logistics. Significantly, the regional body’s lack of airlift capacity to transport troops and supplies to buffer zones has slowed down AU’s operations and has made AU troops vulnerable to ambushes. Due to the lack of airlift capacity, UNAMID took 2 years to reach 68 per cent of its force strength. AMISOM has also been hampered in terms of gaining and consolidating grounds gained from Al-Shabaab militants.

The lack of airlift capacity also made AU forces vulnerable to ambushes from hostile warring parties. AMIS and UNAMID are known to have been ambushed severally by Darfur’s warring factions and the AU lacked the airlift capacity to avert or halt such attacks. Beside securing itself, for AU forces to effectively achieve the mandate of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect which entails protecting civilians, the African Union ought to have the means to reach and protect civilians under attack in a timely manner. Hence, The African Union ought to invest in airlift capacity such as armoured helicopters, jet-powered aircraft, turboprop aircraft, drones, etc. to engage in its missions. This will ensure that AU’s deployments to conflict regions are timely; that AU troops are prevented from ambushes that
may occur via road transportation; and that civilians as well as AU troops under attack are reinforced.

6.3.4 Operationalizing the African Standby Force

To attain AU’s ideal of providing African solutions to African problems, AU member states as well as the RECs ought to trust and commit themselves to AU’s leadership and its peace and security initiatives. So far there tends to be little coordination between the AU and RECs. At times the quest to gain funds from external donors has led the RECs to seek incompatible peace and security initiatives that go athwart to the AU’s initiatives and agenda (Franke 2006:13). The lack of coordination and poor commitment to the AU’s agenda of peace and security reflects in the failure of the RECs to aid in the operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF).

As noted earlier, the ASF was created to serve as the operational arm of the AU. The ASF is supposed to be composed of five brigades from each of Africa’s sub-regions. The five brigades are expected to be composed of 5000 personnel each bringing the total force strength of ASF to 25,000 personnel. Though the ASF is expected to reach its full operational force by 2010, the ASF remains a fantasy in Africa’s Peace and Security Architecture. Nevertheless, the establishment of ASF would enable the regional body to respond to conflicts on time. It would enable the African Union to solve the issue of deploying inadequately trained troops to conflict regions. The ASF would be better placed to have undergone extensive training in peace operations before engaging in a mission unlike the current case where soldiers are hurriedly recruited for missions without adequate training.

An issue with the formation of the ASF has to do with the imbalances amongst RECs. The Southern and Western parts of Africa have stronger RECs compared to the North, East and Central Africa whose RECs are weak and lacking in adequate structures to enable the formation of the ASF regional brigade. This imbalance makes it difficult to operationalize the ASF in a balanced manner. To surmount these challenges, the African Union ought to coordinate the formation of the ASF under the aegis of RECs.

Furthermore, the current design of ASF is problematic because the 25,000 maximum force strength expected of the ASF can only manage to engage in two missions concurrently.
(Dersso 2011: 126). Yet, conflicts in Africa are often beyond two conflicts on a yearly basis and the ASF with the envisioned force strength can hardly tackle multiple conflicts. Besides, half of the 25,000 force strength of ASF can hardly handle the huge land mass of the individual states in Africa. Thus, beside the imperative of institutionalizing the ASF, the force strength of the ASF needs to be reviewed to provide room for the increase of its force strength. The establishment of the AU Standby Force will require coordination, funding, political will and commitment of African leaders. In this regard, there remains a need for creating a synergy between RECs and the AU so as to ensure that the African Peace and Security Architecture is harmonious and efficient. Such synergy should enable the AU to champion the security agenda of the continent in a coordinated and efficient manner.

6.3.5 Improving the Status of Member States

Inauspicious for the African Union, most of its member states have poor records of good governance and human security. For instance, President Gaddafi of Libya was a prominent member of AU PSC which is charged with the continent’s peace and security, while he was responsible for human right abuses and dictatorial rule in his state. With the leverage of being a member of the PSC between 2004 and 2006, the Sudanese government was able to influence and determine the PSC mandate under which AMIS was founded while the government engaged in high handed attacks on its people. The seeming favouring of incumbent state regimes by the AU also challenges the regional body’s transition from OAU’s state-centric conception of security to human security, a security paradigm that places more concern on the wellbeing of individuals rather than the government. The AU ought to try harder at approaching conflict cases with impartiality and with the motive of maximizing the interests of citizens rather than the narrow interests of the ruling elites.

Apart from the cases of Sudan and Libya, many African states have poor records of governance and these states are either members or potential members of the AU PSC. The membership and active role of dictatorships, autocratic and repressive regimes in AU’s PSC – which is supposed to champion democracy, justice, equality, peace and security – affects the credibility of AU PSC’s mission in conflict states. The efforts of AU through the PSC could be continually undermined if the members and potential members of the PSC are lacking in having a clear record of good governance, rule of law and security in their respective states.
Therefore, it is necessary for the AU to develop a mechanism to ensure that its members as well as the members of its subsidiary body the PSC have a record of good governance and human security.

Besides, AU’s overall legitimacy to contend with the security threats in the continent is contingent on the nature of domestic governance of its member states. If AU member states have good records of governance and rule of law, the African Union would be investing itself in addressing other pertinent issues in Africa which has been clouded by security concerns. This is because citizens of member states would have fewer reasons to challenge the government of their respective states if the government is adept at providing basic services and if everyone is equal before the law. Sharamao and Ayangafac (2011: 4) observes that ‘Africa’s security challenges are the unfortunate result of the governance choices some states have adopted’.

Some African leaders pay lip-service to democratic principles while practicing tyrannical and dictatorial governance. African leaders who had earlier denounced colonial oppression and exploitation turned into oppressors and exploiters of their own people (Ayittey, 1994). They ran the state as their own personal fiefdoms. As observed by Brown (2001), violent oppositions are likely to erupt if a state adopts oppressive or violent measures against its people. The attempt to ruthlessly suppress opposition in troubled African countries has done nothing more that reinforce the resolve of the opposition to topple what they consider odious regimes. Because of the violent ways in which opposition has been suppressed, many of those who want to replace oppressive regimes had to use combative strategies. In Somalia, the quest for the survival of his regime led Barre to engage in violent and indiscriminate repression of opposition groups and unfavourable clans (Reilly 2008: 26). This led to widespread resentment against Barre’s regime, a resentment that led to fierce opposition and the eventual demise of the central government and protracted state collapse.

To resolve the governance conundrum in Africa, the African Union ought to promote the genuine adoption of the principles of good governance and democracy in Africa. Immanuel Kant contends rightly that tyrannical and dictatorial regimes that are deficient in democracy create avenues for social discontent and conflict (cited in Anyanwu, and Njoku 2010: 24). Based on the notion of democratic-peace, Kant insists that, unlike dictatorships, democracies are peace loving. Democratic states are inclined to peaceful resolution of conflict. The bureaucracies of democratic institutions and the numerous checks and balances in the system
preclude democratic leaders from pursuing selfish interests and using indiscriminate force on people. Hence, adhering to the principles of democracy and good governance is of upmost importance for peace and security in Africa.

For AU to promote peace, it needs to develop mechanisms to ensure that member states adhere to the principles of democracy and good governance. Irrespective of an African leader’s contribution to AU and individual African states, African states and AU should not hesitate to condemn a leadership that errs or turns violent on its people. AU should develop the supranational capacity to ensure that member states comply with decisions, treaties and declarations that promote the norms and values of democracy, good governance and human security in the continent. This requires commitment and a zero tolerance to oppressive regimes irrespective of their status or history in the organization. Given the virtual absence of a moral and powerful state to push the agenda of ‘good governance’ in AU, the AU Commission composed of credible staffs could play an immense role in promoting the agenda of good governance and insisting on the adherence of democratic and human security norms.

6.3.6 External Assistance and Self-Reliance

Presently, the African Union on its own lacks the finance to carry out its peace and security missions. Peace operations require huge financial commitment that undermines the meager contributions made by AU members. Despite the increasing call for AU to take the bulk of the financial and resource responsibility of its operations, the regional body’s missions continue to be heavily dependent on external financial support. External organizations such as the UN, EU, G8 and states such as China, France, US and Canada continue to invest enormously in AU peace missions. Besides financial support, the AU also depends on non-African logistic and expert assistance to a great extent. These challenge the AU’s ownership of peace operations, its capacity to initiate peace operations independently and its commitment to providing African solutions to African problems.

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Ayittey (1994) argues that Ethiopia, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Zaire, Angola and other African countries could not have faced strife if they were democratic. The lack of democratic transition of power have led to civil wars in states like Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Togo, Sudan and Libya.
The involvement of the international community in helping to resolve the conflicts in Africa is necessary given that African conflicts are precipitated not only by internal factors but by external factors as well. Apart from the problem of border disputes, secessionist and irredentist struggles caused by the colonial legacy, conflicts in Africa are also engendered by the problem of arms proliferation and external meddling in Africa. Moreover, instabilities within the continent have deleterious effect on international peace and security. These entail that non-African states cannot use the notion of African solutions to African problems as an escape point to the challenge of preventing, managing, and resolving African conflicts.

Møller (2009:16) observes that with the level of economic development in Africa, it would be unrealistic to expect Africans to provide the necessary financial commitment required for dealing with the deadly conflicts in the continent. Thus, the involvement of the non-African states in partnership with African regional organizations is quintessential for solving the complex conflicts in Africa. This entails a burden-sharing mechanism between the AU and other international bodies. Particularly, the hybrid mission of AU and UN troops in Sudan’s troubled Darfur region is a welcome development in burden-sharing approach to attend to the continent’s conflicts.

However, the fact that most of the resources, logistics, funds and expertise required for solving African problems are derived from, and dependent on, external bodies raises a huge concern about the ownership of AU missions that are geared towards providing an African solution to African problems. To materialize the values embedded in the notion of African solutions to African problems (which hinge on self-reliance) as spearheaded by the African Union, African states ought to take considerable responsibility of the challenges involved in solving African problems. This requires making financial, resource, expertise and logistic commitments to tackling African conflicts beside the diplomatic and mediatory commitments.

Most of the time, the failure to secure funds and resources from African states is not merely because African states are poor. Rather, it could be considered from the fact that some African leaders have mismanaged their countries’ economies. Given their unwillingness to develop their respective countries, some member states also lack the commitment to invest in a multilateral African project. Having aided in the establishment of AU, African states ought to show commitment to, and confidence in AU’s leadership and efforts to resolve African conflicts. Pertinent to the tenets of liberal institutionalism, harnessing the power capabilities
of cooperating member states is the root of the success of institutions in solving common challenges. Hence, without the commitment of member states to AU’s initiatives, the African Union lacks the ability and legitimacy to operationalize the pan-African call for African solutions to African problems. If African states via the African Union are to look towards an African based solution to African conflicts, the AU needs to be self-sufficient and only minimally reliant on external assistance for much of its operations (Vines 2013: 109; Dembinski and Reinold 2011: 1). This would help the regional body to be proactive when it needs to be without waiting for external approval. It could also ensure that the continent avoids wanton ulterior interventions and influences that undermine the sovereignty and right to self-determination of African states. When AU takes much of the leadership and responsibility in tackling African problems, external bodies should play the role of providing support and assistance when required to enable the AU to meet the challenges in the continent.

In line with Mathiasen (2006: 4) ‘establishing a new pan African cooperation to handle peace and security in a troubled continent is a very complex and demanding endeavour’. The regional institutions in Europe, Asia, and Latin America took so many years to establish themselves. Likewise, the African Union needs time to become a matured institution. Moreover, the peace and security efforts of the United Nations, NATO, EU and other foreign powers in Africa and across the globe have also been fraught with challenges and they have been unsuccessful in many peace operations. Thus, the African Union should not be scapegoated as an incompetent organization in view of its current challenges.

Besides, the AU is faced with greater challenges than other organizations due to the severe problems of poverty, underdevelopment and armed conflict which it faces. Particularly, the plethora of conflicts in the continent and their complex nature pose a huge challenge to the nascent African Union. Given the right support, moral political certitudes and authority, the AU can continually make huge progresses in its efforts at conflict management. It is envisioned that with time, the African Union will gain the required capabilities to promote, enhance and enforce its agenda of peace and security in Africa.
6.4 Conclusion

Thus far, the thesis has examined the efficiency of the African Union in enforcing peace and security in Africa. The research situates the discourse on the framework of conflict management which entails containing conflicts and protecting civilian populations. Drawing on the principles of human security and the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, the research sets the criteria for an effective African Union in terms of conflict management. The study explored some extant literatures on AU’s conflict management record and capabilities. These literatures conflated AU’s diplomatic, mediatory and military interventions and capabilities. This research however restricts its focus of analysis on the African Union’s military approach towards conflict management.

For the purpose of this study, liberal intuitionalism was used as the theoretical framework. Liberal institutionalism considers how states, in an institutional environment, could tackle common challenges. The tenets of liberal institutionalism was instrumental in setting the relevance, significance and overarching framework for the consideration of the African Union as a regional body committed to African peace and security. Via a case by case evaluation, the research evaluates the AU’s responses to conflict scenarios in Sudan, Somalia and Libya. It is observed that the African union has attempted to respond to some conflicts in Africa. However, the quality of such responses is wanting. The regional body’s limited resources, lack of expertise, inadequate funds, as well as poor commitment, inadequate political will and internal problems of member states continue to undermine the efficiency of the regional organization.

The assessment culminated with the findings of the research and some recommendations on how to improve AU’s capabilities to meet up with the security challenges in the continent. The African Union is envisioned to develop a supranational authority and power to respond to the challenge of conflict in Africa. In sum, the African Union is envisioned to improve its conflict management capabilities in the following ways: conflict prevention and early response; commitment in troop mobilization; operationalization of the ASF; improvement of the status of member states; and growth in securing local funding, resources and self-reliance. It is expected that the improvement of the African Union’s capability to respond to African conflicts will help reduce the insecurities that have stymied the socio-economic and political development of Africa.
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