Competing Priorities, Conflicting Outcomes:
International Peace Interventions and Conflict Transformation in Somalia

By
Patrick Karanja Mbugua

Student No: 209526647

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Commerce in Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies (CRPS)

School of Economics and Finance
Faculty of Management Studies

University of KwaZulu Natal
Westville, Durban

Supervisor
Professor Geoff Harris

JUNE 2011
DECLARATION

I………Patrick Karanja Mbugua……..declare that

(i) The research reported in this dissertation/thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original research.
(ii) This dissertation has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university
(iii) This dissertation/thesis does not contain other persons’ data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons
(iv) This dissertation/thesis does not contain other persons’ writing, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written sources have been quoted, then:
   a) Their words have been re-written but general information attributed to them has been referenced;
   b) Where their exact words have been used, their writing has been placed inside quotation marks; and
(v) This dissertation/thesis does not contain text, graphics or tables copied and pasted from the internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and the source being detailed in the dissertation/thesis and in the References sections.

Signature: ____________________________
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................... iii  
Map of Somalia ................................................................................................................ vi  
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... vii  
Abstract ............................................................................................................................. viii  
ACRONYMS ...................................................................................................................... ix  
List of figures, tables and maps ........................................................................................ xii  

**Chapter 1: Introduction** ............................................................................................... 1  
1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1  
1.2 Research problem ........................................................................................................... 2  
1.3 Objectives and relevance of the study ............................................................................ 4  
  1.3.1 Objectives ................................................................................................................ 4  
  1.3.2 Relevance of the study ............................................................................................. 5  
1.4 Research methodology ................................................................................................... 6  
1.5 Limitations ...................................................................................................................... 7  
1.6 Dissertation structure ...................................................................................................... 8  

**Chapter 2: Literature review and theoretical foundations** .......................................... 9  
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 9  
2.2 Literature review .......................................................................................................... 10  
  2.2.1 Peace processes ..................................................................................................... 10  
  2.2.2 Causes of conflict and state collapse ............................................................... 13  
  2.2.3 Conflict intractability .......................................................................................... 15  
  2.2.4 International humanitarian interventions ........................................................... 16  
  2.2.5 Political Islam, terrorism and piracy ................................................................. 18  
2.3 Theoretical foundations ................................................................................................ 20  
  2.3.1 Conflict and violence ......................................................................................... 20  
  2.3.2 Interest-based (or principled) negotiation theory ............................................... 22  
  2.3.3 Conflict transformation theory .......................................................................... 23  
2.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 27  

**Chapter 3: Somalia: mapping the conflict** ................................................................. 28  
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 28  
3.2 Conflict context ............................................................................................................ 28  
  3.2.1 Geography ........................................................................................................... 28  
  3.2.2 Ethno-cultural structure ...................................................................................... 30
7.2.1 Competing interests, conflicting outcomes ......................................................... 102
7.2.2 Lessons learned ............................................................................................... 103
7.3 A peace studies understanding of the conflict and peace processes ..................... 105
  7.3.1 The primordial narrative .................................................................................... 105
  7.3.2 The instrumental narrative .............................................................................. 106
  7.3.3 The identity construction narrative ................................................................. 107
7.4 Recommendations ............................................................................................... 108
7.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 110
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 111
Map of Somalia
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Professor Geoff Harris for his support, encouragement and guidance. This dissertation is richer because of his valuable insights. Thanks to my friends and colleagues at ACCORD and AMISOM whom we engaged on Somali and Africa’s conflict issues. Some stand out for special mention. Dr. Tor Sellström of Nordic African Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, who was at one time my supervisor and boss at ACCORD and always a mentor and friend. He encouraged me to study for a degree in peace studies and I am hugely indebted to him. Koko Sadiki and I have spent uncountable hours discussing conflicts and political developments in Africa. Kwezi Mngqibisa always sought my opinion on Somalia and other conflict situations in Africa. These comrades’ perspectives have shaped this dissertation and I will always be grateful. I would also like to thank Vasu Gounden, ACCORD’s Founder and Executive Director, for giving me an opportunity to participate in conflict resolution trainings and to engage on issues in peace processes. Some of the ideas in this dissertation were formed and refined during those engagements. To my beloved wife and best friend Ann Mary Gathigia, who read and commented on all the chapters’ drafts, and to our son Andrés Mbugua, this dissertation would not have been completed without you, thank you. Lastly, special thanks to Dr. Halima Abdilahi for proof reading this dissertation.
Abstract

Most studies on the role of international actors in peace processes tend to focus on mediation and applications of incentives and sanctions. This study deviates from these general trends and focuses on how the interests and fears of the international actors affect the progress and outcomes of a peace process and subsequently conflict transformation. Using post-2001 peace processes in Somalia as the study case, the dissertation notes that international actors’ interventions, particularly in collapsed states, are inspired by concerns over the trans-border implications of the conflict, moral imperative or third party intervention interests. Thus, mapping the interests of the main international actors who were involved in these peace processes and analysing their impact on these peace processes’ outcomes are the core objectives of this study. The central thesis is that assessing the impact of these interests on the progress and outcomes of the peace processes entails evaluating their effects on the transformation of the Somali actors, their relationships, their socio-political and economic institutions and the narratives and discourses that premise their interactions and social identities. The key finding of the research is that all international actors pledged their commitment to conflict resolution, peace and reconstruction in Somalia, but their competing interests and contending priorities undermined actor transformation, frustrated relationship transformation, hampered re-building of institutions and stymied transformation of conflict narratives. As a result, conflict and violence escalated. The dissertation concludes with a brief peace studies understanding of the conflict in Somalia, lessons learned from international interventions in post-2001 peace processes and some policy recommendations. Among the recommendations are harmonisation of regional interests, phased approach to resolution of the conflict, reframing of narratives and de-linking of Somali conflict issues from global discourses on terrorism.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIAI</td>
<td>Al-Itihaad al-Islamiyya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission for Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARPCT</td>
<td>Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARS</td>
<td>Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARS-A</td>
<td>Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia – Asmara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARS-D</td>
<td>Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia - Djibouti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAM</td>
<td>Al-Shaabab al-Mujahideen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASWJ</td>
<td>Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUPSC</td>
<td>African Union Peace and Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAI</td>
<td>Hizbul al-Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGADD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGASOM</td>
<td>IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAS</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LC</td>
<td>Leaders’ Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCPMR</td>
<td>Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>National Reconciliation Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Salvation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSP</td>
<td>National Security and Stabilisation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organisation of the Islamic Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLF</td>
<td>Oromo Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONLF</td>
<td>Ogadeen National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCIC</td>
<td>Supreme Council of Islamic Courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDM</td>
<td>Somali Democratic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIC</td>
<td>Sharia Implementation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>Somali National Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNF</td>
<td>Somali National Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNM</td>
<td>Somali National Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNPC</td>
<td>Somali National Peace Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNPRC</td>
<td>Somali National Peace and Reconciliation Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRC</td>
<td>Supreme Revolutionary Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRRC</td>
<td>Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSNG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the UN Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSDF</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSM</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>Technical Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFA</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFC</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Charter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFI</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNA</td>
<td>Transitional National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNC</td>
<td>Transitional National Charter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNG</td>
<td>Transitional National Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>UN Operation in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPOS</td>
<td>United Nations Political Office for Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United Somali Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USP</td>
<td>United Somali Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWSLF</td>
<td>United Western Somali Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPD</td>
<td>World Population Datasheet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES, TABLES AND MAPS

FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Galtung’s conflict triangle ................................................................. 21
Figure 2.2: Galtung’s violence triangle ................................................................. 21
Figure 2.3: Linking conflict and violence triangles ............................................. 22
Figure 2.4: Linking conflict, conflict transformation theory and peace processes in
Somalia .................................................................................................................. 26
Figure 3.1: Linking conflict causes ..................................................................... 35

TABLES

Table 3.1: Summary of the main actors, 1982-1990 .......................................... 36
Table 3.2: Mapping actors’ attitudes, behaviour and contradictions, 1982-1990 .... 37
Table 3.3: Mapping actors’ attitudes, behaviour and contradictions, 1991-1995 .... 40
Table 3.4: Mapping actors’ attitudes, behaviour and contradictions, 2007-Present... 44
Table 5.1: Summary of international actors’ interests in post-2001 peace processes .... 71

MAPS

Map 3.1: Somalia in the Horn of Africa ................................................................. 29
Map 3.2: 1960 Somalia and post-1969 Somalia .................................................. 32
Map 5.1: Positioning and density of piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden ............. 67
Map 6.1: Areas of control as of January 2011 ...................................................... 99
Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Introduction

What can be done to restore trust, hope and resolve the conflict in your country? I first posed this question to my friends from Somalia - Hadi Abdi Yusuf, Abdulrahman Roble and Hussein Jabiri - in March 2003. I later asked the same question to many Somali delegates who were attending the Somali National Peace and Reconciliation Conference (SNPRC) at Mbagathi in Nairobi in 2003 and 2004. I have since then posed the same question to Somali leaders and academics that I have met in international forums on Somalia. Interestingly, the connecting thread in all responses has been criticism of the role of international actors. The criticism is inevitable given that international actors have played a central role in Somalia in the last two decades. The important point is the difference in viewpoints in exactly how the international interventions have affected the peace processes.\(^1\) One view argues that the international actors have failed to provide the necessary support, particularly financial resources, to the „well-meaning” internal actors.\(^2\) Another view blames the international interveners for „spoiling” internal peace initiatives and for not allowing Somalis the opportunity to resolve their own conflict. In between these two are myriad of views, some preferring more engagements by international actors and others opting for less engagement.

This dissertation pursues that theme of interventions by international actors in peace processes in Somalia. The study will focus on the post-2001 peace processes and will be premised on conflict transformation theoretical perspectives. Other theoretical frameworks will be incorporated to elaborate the arguments when their role has relevance to the discussion. Four important issues will anchor the research. Firstly, international actors

\(^1\)There is no universally agreed definition of a peace process. A detailed unpacking of the terminology will be done in Chapter 4.

\(^2\) This argument was forcefully articulated by the First Deputy Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Prof. Abdulrahman Adam Ibrahim „Ibbi”, during the Conference on the African Union Support to the Implementation of the Djibouti Peace Process for Somalia, which took place in Bujumbura, Burundi, on 15-18 November 2010. In my discussions with him at the margins of the conference, Prof. Ibbi argued that his view represents the official position of the TFG. However, who the well-meaning internal actors are is contested. To Prof. Ibbi, well-meaning actors refer to the TFG. Others disagree and refer to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), while gender activists refer to the women constituency.
have interests and goals that drive their interventions. The research aim’s to explore how these interests affect the progress and the outcomes of peace interventions. Secondly, the nature and scope of international peace interventions in Somalia has changed greatly over the last two decades, but the outcomes have not changed. Thirdly, the conflict in Somalia is intractable. This means the conflict “has created patterns that have become part of the social system” (Botes, 2003: 10). Thus, its resolution requires not just a peace agreement, but the transformation of the actors, the structures and the narratives that reproduce violence. Fourthly, how internal actors view the role of external parties has affected the way they (internal actors) relate with each other, and how they link Somalia conflict issues to the global discourses. For instance, some Somali parties view external interveners such as Ethiopia, the AU, UN and the US positively, while their opponents view these actors negatively. Accordingly, those who have a positive view seek to de-legitimise their opponents by associating them with international terrorism thus linking Somalia’s internal conflicts with the global discourses on terrorism (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; Hehir, 2007; Ibrahim, 2010; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007, 200b). The study will therefore seek to understand the impact of these relationships on the peace processes and, ultimately, on conflict transformation.

1.2 Research problem

Interventions by international actors in peace processes that seek to resolve protracted intra-state conflicts such as Somalia are premised on three ideas. Firstly, protracted conflicts that lead to state collapse destroy internal political, economic, social and cultural institutions. International actors are therefore bound by moral imperative to intervene as the collapsed states will not emerge from such conflicts on their own (Covey et al, 2005; Hehir, 2008; Weinstein, 2005). Secondly, the trans-border consequences of these conflicts pose a threat to the regional and international security (Covey et al, 2005; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; Hehir, 2008; Menkhaus, 2009a; Weinstein, 2005). It is therefore in the interest of the international actors to intervene in such conflicts. Thirdly, international actors, as third parties, can facilitate resolution of these conflicts (Covey et al, 2005; Darby and Ginty, 2003; Hampson, 2005; Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Regan, 1996).
What role do the international actors play in such peace processes? Most studies on this topic tend to focus on mediation and applications of instruments such as incentives, sanctions and pressures. As a third party intervention into a conflict, mediation is aimed at assisting the conflicting parties find their own mutually acceptable settlements (Hampson, 2005; Kriesberg, 2007; Ramsbotham et al, 2005). Incentives are those measures that seek to create favourable conditions for negotiations, encourage progress in peace processes, support implementation of peace agreements, and generate wide support for peace (Wallensteen, 2007). Sanctions are those measures that threaten and pressure one or all of the parties in the conflict to change their positions or behaviour through raising the costs of intransigence (Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Wallensteen, 2007). Whilst mediators are presumed neutral or impartial, both incentives and sanctions target local actors who are directly responsible for driving the conflict and have the greatest interests in the outcomes of the peace processes (Arnson, 1999; Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Wallensteen, 2007).

However, the international actors are hardly neutral when they intervene in peace processes. On the contrary, they have interests in how the peace processes are conducted and in the overall outcomes. These interests include support of one or the other local actors, access to resources and economies, political prestige and security considerations (Gambari, 1995; Menkhaus, 2010b, 2002). The key indicators of these interests are the priorities the international actors articulate or support in the course of peace processes and their post-peace agreement engagements and policies. Yet, how the interests and priorities pursued by the international actors affect the outcomes of the peace processes has received little academic attention. Using the case of international interventions in post-2001 peace processes in Somalia, this study seeks to contribute towards bridging this gap. In particular, the study aim’s to map the interests, fears and priorities of the main international actors that were involved in these processes. It then explores how these priorities affected the internal actors, components and outcomes of the peace processes and, subsequently, conflict transformation in Somalia. The study then sums up the learned lessons and concludes with some policy recommendations for the international actors, which include the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and regional institutions.
1.3 Objectives and relevance of the study

Since January 1991, when the state of Somalia collapsed, the country has been without a functioning central government, a formal economy, or an effective peace agreement. The central-southern regions of the country are still in partial anarchy, the north-east districts became a semi-autonomous region known as Puntland in 1998, while the north-west region seceded in August 1991 to form the unrecognised Republic of Somaliland. More than fifteen internationally supported peace processes have been held since 1991. None has succeeded. Instead, all have been followed by escalation of violence. Thus, the objectives of this research will be:-

1.3.1 Objectives

Overall objective

The overall objective of this study will be to explore why all of the post-2001 international peace interventions in Somalia have led to escalation of violence instead of resolving the conflict.

Specific objectives

The specific objectives of the study are: -

1) To map the interests, fears and priorities of the international peace interveners in post-2001 Somalia;
2) To explore how the interests, fears and priorities of the international peace interveners affected or influenced the outcomes of the post-2001 peace processes; and
3) To identify lessons from post-2001 international peace interventions in Somalia.
1.3.2 Relevance of the study

Several reasons justify this study. Firstly, there is robust literature on the essential components of peace processes and the conditions under which they succeed or fail (Covey et al, 2005; Darby, 2001; Darby and Ginty, 2003; Hampson, 2005; Zartman, 1995). These conditions include interventions by third parties, the terms of peace agreement and the regional and global context. However, how exactly the interests and fears of international interveners affect the outcomes of the peace processes has received little academic attention. Moreover, peace and conflict scholars argue that intra-state conflicts start when the political system fails to address particular grievances (Arnson, 1999; Darby, 2001; Wallensteen, 2007). Therefore, a key aim of a peace process is to establish mechanisms that shift the conflict from violence to the political arena (Arnson, 1999; Covey et al, 2005; Darby and Ginty, 2003). Central to that shift is the transformation of actors and the structure of interaction. This study is therefore relevant as it aims to contribute towards an understanding of how the interests of international actors have affected the transformation of the internal actors and the social structures in Somalia.

Secondly, all the peace processes that have been initiated by international actors in Somalia have been followed by escalation of violence. While academic studies on how the internal actors use violence to derail peace processes exist (Darby, 2001; Stedman, 2003, 1997; Zahar, 2003), there is very little academic research on the linkage between the interests and priorities of international peace interveners and violence escalation. This study is relevant for it seeks to bridge that gap by exploring the co-relation between the priorities pursued by international actors, peace processes and the outcomes. Additionally, the study seeks to understand how that co-relation can create hindrances or potential opportunities for transformation of the protracted conflict in Somalia.

Thirdly, international actors have spent huge amount of resources, in terms of money, time and diplomacy for the purpose of resolving the conflict in Somalia. As Kaplan (2010: 81) avers, the international community has since 1991 „launched at least fourteen peace initiatives in Somalia and spent more than US$8 billion on efforts to create a strong state.’ These huge resources have failed to transform the conflict. The study will therefore contribute towards a better understanding of how the AU, the UN and other international
actors can best implement peacemaking initiatives not just in Somalia, but also in other countries where states have collapsed. Hence, it will conclude with some policy options for international actors that are implementing conflict resolution interventions in Somalia.

Lastly, the conflict in Somalia presents a regional, continental and global challenge. An internationalised intra-state conflict, Somalia is currently one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises (Hesse, 2010; Menkhaus, 2010a). In 2010 alone, more than 200,000 people were displaced within Somalia while another 70,000 fled to neighbouring countries adding to the estimated 2.2 million who remained displaced at the end of 2009 (UNHCR, 2011). Somalia also has an estimated diaspora of one million people, the world’s biggest (Healy and Sheikh, 2009). In addition, international actors have been concerned that stateless Somalia has become a haven for international terrorists (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; Hehir, 2008; Menkhaus, 2007, 2002a, 2002b; Samatar, 2010; Verhoeven, 2009). That has been worsened by the problem of piracy along the coast of Somalia (Kaplan, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009b; Pham, 2010). This study is therefore significant as it will add to the existing scholarship on conceptual and theoretical understanding of the international dimension of the conflict in Somalia.

1.4 Research methodology

This study will be exploratory in nature. Its research methodology will therefore be a systematic analysis of key texts and policy documents. The primary sources that will be analysed are the official policy documents and resolutions of the important international actors. These include UN Security Council (UNSC), the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), the African Union Commission (AUC), the Inter-government Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of the Arab States (LAS), European Union (EU) and the Horn of Africa countries. Other documents to be reviewed include letters and media statements of the relevant international actors. Peace agreements, Transitional Federal Charter (TFC), official documents of the TFG and media statements of other armed groups will also be analysed.

The secondary sources of data that will be reviewed are news reports, media statements, peace processes’ evaluation reports, scholarly and academic analyses as well as books,
articles and papers by Somali studies’ experts. The review of secondary data will not only assist in mapping the interests and priorities of the international actors, but it will also provide a sound understanding of the issues and discourses on the subject of research. Additionally, it will deepen the understanding of the links between theoretical thinking on conflict transformation and practical issues in Somalia. In sum, the strength of qualitative textual analysis lies in its ability to allow for the presentation of a wide range of views on the issues of research and making of logical deductions.

These deductions will be supplemented by my own engagements with discourses on Somalia, and interactions with some Somali faction leaders. They will also be supplemented by my engagements with the officials of the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM), and discussions with the staff of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS). For ease of data analysis, the literature will be grouped into five categories: (a) peace processes, (b) causes of conflicts, state collapse and conflict sustenance, (c) conflict intractability, (d) humanitarian interventions, and (e) Islamism, terrorism and piracy. The research approach will be to analyse empirical findings using the postulates of the interest based negotiation and conflict transformation theories.

1.5 Limitations

There are some limitations related to this research. Though every effort will be made to read as widely as possible, it is worth noting that academic works on the conflict in Somalia are dominated by non-Somali scholars from Western Europe and North America such as I. M. Lewis and Ken Menkhaus. The scholarship in most of their works is of high quality; nonetheless, no social scientist is absolutely neutral. These academic works therefore have elements of their authors’ Western bias. Additionally, their conceptual approach to the resolution of the conflict in Somalia is informed by the international actor’s efforts to re-create the Somali state and the global discourses on terrorism. Thus, they tend to overemphasise the role of internal actors and to downplay the effect of international actors on peace processes. Indeed, some Somali scholars such as Abdullahi Osman, Ali Jimale, Ismail Samatar and Said Samatar have written extensively on the conflict, but their work focuses on the causes of the conflict and state collapse. Some of them, as Ali (1995) has argued, have adopted the perspectives and approaches of the
international actors towards Somalia. This has left a gap in the analyses of peace processes and the role of international actors. To a large extent, therefore, this study will be entering an under-researched area. Lastly, conducting field work in Somalia is very difficult due to violent lawlessness. Even international actors such as AMISOM, UNPOS, UN agencies and all the international humanitarian organisations that work in Somalia have their offices in Nairobi, Kenya.

1.6 Dissertation structure

The dissertation is structured into seven chapters. Chapter one introduces the study, the research problem, the objectives of the research and explains the research methodology. Chapter two will review the literature and then explores the various theoretical frameworks that have been employed in the analysis. The literature is categorised into five subsets, while the frameworks that are reviewed are the interest based negotiation and conflict transformation theories. Chapter three and four will provide the context of the conflict and the main international peace processes respectively.

Chapter five and six captures the central thesis of the study. Chapter five will map the interests, fears, and priorities of international actors and analyse their competitions in the post-2001 peace processes. Chapter six will then analyse in details how these interests and fears have affected the outcomes of peace processes. Important highlights in the analysis in chapters five and six include the argument that state-building and conflict resolution as desired outcomes of the peace processes have been complementary, but the competing interests and priorities of the international actors have undermined transformation of the Somali actors. As a result, the processes have produced conflicting outcomes which have in turn led to escalation of violence. This argument leads to identification of the learned lessons in chapter seven, which also concludes with some policy recommendations.
Chapter 2

Literature Review and Theoretical Foundations

2.1 Introduction

The protracted conflict in Somalia has been a subject of popular and academic discourses. While the popular discourses have narrated the conflict in stereotypical terms of anarchy, most academic discourses have been premised on anthropological, historical, political science and international relations perspectives. Therefore, there are very few analyses of the conflict that have utilised theories of peace studies. In addition, academic writings on the causes and consequences of the state collapse are abundant. Considerable academic attention has also been devoted to themes such as Islamism and terrorism. However, literature on international interventions in Somalia’s peace processes is limited. Yet, Somalia has witnessed more than fifteen internationally supported peace processes since 1991.

This implies that the dynamics of the peace processes, including the impact of international interests, have not been adequately covered. The first aim of this chapter therefore is to review the existing literature in order to survey the accumulated scholarship on peace processes in Somalia. The review will also survey how scholars of Somali studies have framed their arguments and conceptualised peace interventions. For ease of analysis, the literature will be divided into five sets: peace processes, causes of conflict and state collapse, conflict intractability, humanitarian interventions and Islamism, terrorism and piracy. This chapter also aims to present the peace studies theoretical approaches that will be employed in this dissertation.

All the major Somali peace processes, including the 2002-2004 Somalia National Peace and Reconciliation Conference (SNPRC) and the 2008 Djibouti IV process, were initiated by international actors. International actors initiate peace processes in order to end violence and to create institutions that would discourage internal parties from resorting to arms (Darby and Ginty, 2003). These two goals of international peace interventions are founded on the understanding that violent conflicts occurs within a structure of interaction that can be transformed (Covey et al, 2005; Darby and Ginty, 2003). This makes the
interest-based and conflict transformation theories very relevant to this study. The interest-based theory is concerned with interests underpinning incompatibilities, while the conflict transformation theory is concerned with the change of actors, their structure of interaction and their cultural context (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Ross, 2000). Thus, the chapter will highlight the key postulates of both theories.

2.2 Literature Review

There exists a good amount of academic studies on different themes around the protracted conflict in Somalia. However, there are very few texts that are devoted to international interventions in the country’s peace processes. Previous research on this topic is thus found in five different sets of literature.

2.2.1 Peace processes

The first set is concerned with the dynamics of the peace processes. Four main arguments are found in this literature. The first argument emphasises components of a peacemaking process such as representation, legitimacy, inclusion and exclusion. In an analysis of the 2008 Djibouti IV peace process, Kasaija (2010) argues that the process failed because it excluded important actors who resorted to violence. The author also argues that previous processes including the 2000 Djibouti III process and the Nairobi process failed because of limited inclusivity. Other authors such as Hansen (2003), Healy (2011), and Menkhaus (2010b, 2002b) have emphasised exclusion as a cause of failure of the peace processes. Woodward (2004) has, however, offered a contrary argument stating that the peace process in Kenya failed due to open ended inclusion. Noting that 1000 delegates arrived in Eldoret for the talks instead of the 300 expected by the Technical Committee on behalf of IGAD, he adds that the delegates arrived and went continually. He has also averred that the issue of the numbers raised questions about representation and motives for participation, something that led many analysts to observe that the numbers were about expectations of potential spoils. Schlee (2010) has also articulated the same viewpoint about the issue of numbers and representation in the process in Kenya. Nonetheless, these two opposed viewpoints concur in their emphasis on the role of internal actors.
The centrality of internal actors is also emphasised in the second argument which is premised on the spoiler discourses. Such discourses refer to spoilers as “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (Stedman, 1997: 5). Spoilers are thus groups, factions or individuals who use violence to undermine peace processes or implementation of peace agreements. Menkhaus (2006) has argued that an array of spoilers exists in Somalia. These spoilers not only undermined peace processes to perpetuate an armed conflict, but also hampered efforts to revive an effective central government and derailed efforts to improve law and order. The spoilers fall into two categories. Category one comprises of situational spoilers. These are clans or factions who feel unrepresented in institutions emerging from peace processes. Category two comprises of perpetual spoilers who dread the return of state institutions and the rule of law. These include warlords who benefit from the war economy, some business people engaged in illicit trade, and clans that have occupied other people’s valuable rural lands and urban properties. Other authors such as Kasaija (2010) and Ibrahim (2010) have included Islamists in the list of spoilers. The Islamists are presumed to be motivated by religious extremism (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Bryden, 2003; Hansen, 2003; Ibrahim, 2010).

The third argument stresses the absence of the necessary conditions for conflict resolution, inappropriate timing of peace interventions and missed opportunities by international actors (Menkhaus, 2009a, 2007, 2006, 2003a; Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 2000; Woodward, 2004). Conditions necessary for conflict resolution include parties’ willingness to negotiate, ripe moments, mutually enticing opportunities, mutually hurting stalemates, appropriate turning points and external context (Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Ross, 2000; Zartman, 2003). In Somalia three factors, the external context, parties’ willingness to resolve the conflict and timing of interventions, have been critical. Menkhaus (2009a, 2007, 2006, 2003a) observes that the external context has not been favourable to the resolution of the conflict, while Somali leaders have undermined peacemaking processes in their quest for power. He also notes that a collective fear of the return of a centralised

---

3 Kimberley Marten (2006: 48) has offered four characteristics of warlords: First, trained, armed men take advantage of the disintegration of central authority to seize control over relatively small slices of territory. Second, their actions are based on self-interest, not ideology. Third, their authority is based on charisma and patronage ties to their followers. Four, this personalistic rule leads to the fragmentation of political and economic arrangements across the country, disrupting the free flow of trade and making commerce and investment unpredictable.
state pervades in the country and international interveners have missed the right opportunities. Menkhaus and Ortmayer (2000: 212) adds that one explanation for failure is that „the Somali conflict has simply not been ripe for resolution; that is, the protagonists to the dispute have not reached a “hurting stalemate” and are thus not amenable to outside mediation.’ Woodward (2004: 473-474) also raises the point of timing and ripeness in a comparative analysis between Sudan and Somalia where he argues that „Sudan looked more ripe for resolution [while] Somalia looked more difficult’. The central point of this argument touches the heart of this study because external context includes the priorities and interests of international actors.

The point also links us to the fourth argument, which focuses on the behaviour of external actors. Schlee (2010) has stressed that each IGAD frontline state and other international players had their preferences among the Somali factions participating in the Nairobi process. Thus, each wanted to increase the representation of their preferred faction at the expense of the others. Ibrahim (2010: 284) also advances the same argument noting that the 1996-97 Sodere (in Ethiopia) conference „strengthened Ethiopia’s role in Somali affairs, while Egypt organised a rival peace process in Cairo in an effort to undermine the Sodere process.’ And while Osman (2005) has discussed in details the effects of competition between Ethiopia and Egypt, other authors such as Bamfo (2010), Cliffe (1999), Gresse-Kettler (2004), Menkhaus (2010b, 2009) and Raffaelli (2007) have briefly mentioned external actors’ support to rival factions. Additionally, Menkhaus and Ortmayer (2000) and Samatar (2010) have critiqued international actors such as the UN and US for legitimising the warlords.

Arguments three and four raise important questions: how can external interveners create the necessary conditions for conflict resolution? Can the behaviour of the external actors be classified as spoiling? What can be done about external situational and perpetual spoilers? Understanding how the interests and fears of the international actors have affected peace processes partly responds to these questions.
2.2.2 Causes of conflict and state collapse

The second genre of literature, which deals with the causes of the conflict and state collapse, is the most robust and abundant. The robustness is represented by heated debates between three competing interpretations. The first one, the primordial interpretation, is the most pervasive in popular and academic discourses. The interpretation portrays the Somali society as ethnically homogenous but one that is divided into kinship units based on segmentary lineage system (Hesse, 2010; Kusov, 1995; Lewis, 2008, 2004, 1998, 1972; Samater, 1992). Samatar (1992) attributes the prevalence of primordial thinking to Anthropologist I.M. Lewis’s dominance of Somali studies. Lewis 1950s seminal work on Somalia concluded that „the Somalis have a highly equalitarian society with pastoralism as a base [and] the fundamental organising principle of their way of life is segmentary clanism” (Samatar, 1992: 627). Lewis has re-emphasised the primacy of the clan system in Somali society and its role in competition for resources, political power and personal security in subsequent works. Thus, according to the primordial view, the conflict arose and the state collapsed because the clan system is inherently against modern state-building (Hesse, 2010; Lewis, 2008, 2004, 1998, 1993). As Prunier (1997, cited in Hesse, 2010: 250) writes, the „very idea of the state is totally alien to Somali culture and was unknown before the colonial period….’ In short, the primordialists view the conflict as rooted in traditional clan rivalries. In primordial thinking, therefore, participation in peace processes and subsequent state institutions has to reflect clan representation. The primordialists most important contribution to all peace processes is the 4.5 formula. One weakness with the primordial thinking is that it downplays the role of external actors in the peace processes. It therefore does not address how their interests and fears have affected these processes.

---

4 The terms primordial, instrumental and construction comes from Peter J Schraeder’s (2006: 108-110) analysis of the pan-Somali nationalism of the 1960s and 1970s. Other analysts have used different approaches. Abdi Ismail Samatar (1992: 626-631) has employed „two theses’, that is, the traditionalist and the transformationist. Abdullah A. Mohamoud (2006:20) has employed Samatar’s approaches, but he calls them „two rival academic traditions’. Abdulahi A. Osman (2007:97) has used two schools, heterogeneous and homogenous. I have elaborated these approaches and my usage of the three terms in chapter 7 where I develop a peace studies understanding of the conflicts in Somalia.

5 The 4.5 formula was first proposed at the Sodere peace conference of 1996. It was later adopted at the 2000 Djibouti peace conference and the 2002- 2004 Somali National Peace and Reconciliation Conference (SNPRC) that took place in Nairobi. 4.5 means representation in parliament is evenly divided amongst four main clans, the Darood, Hawiye, Dir and Digle-Mirifle, while the minority constituencies get 50% of the share allocated to each of these four. Details of this formula are explained in Chapter 4.
The second interpretation, the instrumentalism, critiques the primordial thinking and attributes the causes of the conflicts to bad governance and leaders who mobilised clan identities (Menkhaus, 2002b; Osman, 2007; Samatar, 1992). Asserting that the ‘culprit is not kinship,’ Samatar (1992: 638-639) has critiqued the clan analysis as pandering to ‘elite opportunism and Eurocentric racism’. He has also faulted the elite for collectively instrumentalising clanship in their political competition over the control of the state which was the most lucrative source of wealth accumulation. Samatar (1992) further argues that the instrumentalisation of the clan heritage acquired deadly dimensions during the reign of President Siyaad Barre, particularly after the defeat of Somalia in the 1977 Ogaadeen war. Osman (2007: 104) takes this argument further pointing out that General Barre’s first cabinet of 1969 ‘consisted of 14 ministers of which 7 (or 50%) were held by members of Barre’s Darood clan up from 32% in the government of the late Abdulrashid Shammarke’s (1967-1969).’ The instrumental thinking therefore faults the international actors for legitimising the faction leaders (including warlords) in the peace processes. In other words, the instrumentalist question the linkage between some internal actors and the interests and fears of external actors.

The third interpretation also critiques the primordialists. Articulated by scholars such as Catherine Besteman (1999a, 1999b, 1996a, 1996b, 1995), Lee Cassanelli (1996, cited in Schlee, 2008) and Christian Webersik (2004), the construction interpretation argues that the war that led to state collapse was rooted in social stratification, inequality and political, economic and social exclusion. In a critique of the popular media’s depiction of the post-1991 violence, Besteman (1996a:123 -124) argues that ‘the cleavages in Somali society not only derive from clan but, more critically, draw upon shifting cultural constructions of difference such as race, language and status, and economic divisions such as occupation and class.’ Consequently, the patterns of post-1991 violence, most of which occurred in the Jubba Valley, were determined by the cultural construction of identity. Furthering the same argument, Webersik (2004: 516) writes that the collapse of the state ‘can be explained by the unjust distribution of new sources of wealth in post-colonial Somalia rather than by existing internal divisions based on the ideology of kinship.’ Other authors such as Osman (2007) have argued along the same lines. Thus, the constructionists implicitly critique the peace processes for entrenching primordial notions, and for failing to address issues of identity formation and transformation of social structures. This
argument about transformation of social institutions raises two questions that resonate with the core objective of this dissertation. Have peace processes transformed social structures? What has been the role of international interveners in that transformation?

In sum, the literature on the causes of conflict and state collapse assists us identify gaps in research. It also confirms that the international actors’ interpretations of the conflicts in Somalia have informed their interventions. However, the literature does not comprehensively address how the interests and fears of international interveners have affected peace processes.

2.2.3 Conflict intractability

Some authors have implicitly addressed the question of intractability of the conflict in Somalia in their writings. An intractable conflict (also referred to as protracted or deep-rooted) is „one that is unusually difficult but not impossible to manage or resolve’ (Crocker et al, 2004: 3). A conflict becomes intractable when political, social and economic exclusion and marginalisation converges with group identities (Crocker et al, 2004; Webersik, 2004). Indicators of intractability include long duration of conflict, deep sense of grievances, bitter feelings of enmity, cycles of destructive violence, and many failed peacemaking interventions (Crocker et al, 2004).

The literature on conflict intractability advances four arguments (Besteman, 1996a, 1996b; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; Hesse, 2010; Menkhaus, 2010b, 2003a). First, many Somalis use the clan discourse to explain their conflict because the state under President Mohamed Siyaad Barre dispensed patronage and punishments in clan terms. As Besteman (1996a:126) writes, Barre’s „distribution of rewards and punishments increasingly came to be perceived in clan terms, encouraging a public awareness of and commentary on the clan basis of his rule.’ Second, the shock of state collapse led many Somalis to seek refuge in „social networks with great emotional bonds – ties of kinship’ (Besteman, 1996a: 128). Third, the sentiment of the clan has been used in post-1991 Somalia to rally support. A lot of violence has thus been between groups organised around clan lines. As Menkhaus (2003a:412) writes, an important feature of the „armed conflict since 1992 has been the continuing devolution of warfare to lower and lower levels of clan lineages.’ Fourth, the
clan idiom „obscures the fact that rural Southerners had been excluded from national politics and policies on the basis of notions of race, ancestry (pure and impure), and status – aspects of identity that are inadequately captured in the rubric of clan alone’ (Besteman, 1996a: 128).

The intractability dimension is vital to this study because one pillar of conflict transformation is changing of the narratives that reproduce violence. These narratives in Somalia, as Besteman (1996a: 124) has observed, include those of „class, occupation, race, status and language.’ Hence, the literature helps us understand how the interests of international actors have or have not influenced discourse transformation in Somalia.

2.2.4 International humanitarian interventions

The fourth set of literature, which focuses on humanitarian interventions, falls into two categories. The first category focuses on the humanitarian interventions of the early 1990s. These interventions include the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) I and II. The collapse of the state in January 1991 was followed by unparalleled violence, massive displacements and widespread famine. The international actors then sought to mediate a ceasefire and distribute humanitarian relief. Thus, some authors dwell on the ceasefire mediation efforts (Cliffe, 1999; Menkhaus, 2002a; Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 2000). Menkhaus and Ortmayer (2000) have for instance observed that the early 1990s international efforts to mediate peace failed because the international actors attempted to marginalise some factional leaders and the UN failed to maintain neutrality in the conflict. Cliffe (1999: 109) concurs with this argument pointing out that the international actors „did not deal even-handedly with all the warlords, choosing at one stage to target Aideed’s faction; but they thereby further marginalised elders, women groups, intellectuals and others who wanted to promote peace, and could have emerged as an alternative leadership.’

Other authors have focused on the successes and failures of international humanitarian relief particularly UNOSOM I and II (Ahmed and Green, 1999; Diehl, 1996; Menkhaus, 2010a; Sahnoun, 1994). According to Diehl (1996: 154), UNOSOM was a peacekeeping operation that was „specifically designed for the relief and protection of an indigenous
population threatened by civil anarchy, inadequate food supplies and the lack of medical care.’ Among the key lessons drawn from the UNOSOM experience were that traditional peacekeeping forces do not do peace enforcement jobs, and peacekeeping ‘does not always translate into conflict resolution’ (Diehl, 1996: 165). Ahmed and Green (1999) and Sahnoun (1994) articulated the same point adding that despite UNOSOM’s successes in relief distribution, the mission failed the conflict resolution test when it entered into a war with one of the factions leading to deaths of innocent civilians.

Clearly, both groups of authors provide a useful background data on international interventions. However, they lack a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between interests of the international interveners and the peace processes.

The second category of literature deals with post-2001 interventions. After UNOSOM II withdrew in 1995, international actors showed little interest in Somalia. Humanitarian efforts were therefore led by local Islamic groups. However, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 revived international interest in the country as collapsed states were identified as causal variables in the global terrorism (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; Hehir, 2008; Ibrahim, 2010; Marchal, 2007; Menkhaus, 2003b, 2002b). Post-2001 literature on humanitarian interventions therefore explores the tensions between humanitarian relief and military interventions by international actors leading the war on terror. As Menkhaus (2010a: 320) avers, ‘throughout Somalia’s 20-year crisis, the relationship between ongoing, routinized emergency relief operations and episodic but intense stabilisation interventions has been contentious.’ Menkhaus (2010a, 2009) adds that the tensions have worsened since 2007 due to many factors among them unilateral Ethiopian and multilateral AU military interventions, a ferocious insurgency and counter-insurgency campaigns, presence of al-Qaeda militants, US counter-terrorism activities, and the emergence of piracy. As a consequence, Somalia has become the most dangerous place in the world for humanitarian relief agency personnel. Though it focuses on humanitarian interventions this literature highlights a key concern of this dissertation: the clash between the interests and fears of international actors and the goals of peacemaking processes.
2.2.5 Islamism, terrorism and piracy

The fifth set of literature is divided between those who have written on Islamism and terrorism, and those who have analysed piracy. Most analyses on terrorism are premised on the notion that stateless Somalia is a likely base of Islamic extremists and/or terrorists. However, there are variations in perspectives and emphasis. Some authors take it as given that Somalia is a base of international terrorists and that Somali Islamists are part of the international terror networks. Pham (2010: 325) has for instance asserted that Somalia poses a threat to international peace and security because „the al-Qaeda linked militant Islamists of the Harakat al-Shaabab al-Mujahideen’ have transnational ambitions of setting a „fundamentalist state in the Horn of Africa”. Murphy (2010: 90) also makes similar assertions stating that the rise of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC) to power „stirred fear of regional instability and the possible expansion of terrorist safe havens, which forced the United States, however reluctantly, to back Ethiopia in its own intervention….’ To Kaplan (2010: 81), lawlessness, an Islamist insurgency that is linked to al-Qaeda, burgeoning anti-Western sentiments and piracy are indicators that Somalia has become a haven for terrorists. Bryden (2010) concurs adding that terrorism exists in Somalia but it has shallow roots and its focus is local rather than international. Ibrahim (2010) similarly asserts the presence of international terrorists in Somalia but roots for a cautious approach to the problem.

Other authors have focused on the conditions that led to the emergence of Islamic groups. In particular, Menkhaus (2009b, 2007, 2002a, 2002b) has dealt with this question extensively tracing the emergence of al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) and other Islamic charities in the 1990s and the rise of Sharia courts. He has also analysed the merger of the local Sharia courts to the umbrella body SCIC, the rise of the SCIC to power in 2006, and its military defeat by Ethiopia in January 2007. Menkhaus (2007) concludes that the SCIC fell because the extremist wing of the Islamists won control of the movement. Submitting a similar argument, Barnes and Hassan (2007) observe that the SCIC was a popular response to state collapse and its main goals were to provide judicial services, restore law and order and provide security. However, the extremist wing won control as the movement captured territory and made efforts to recreate the Somali state. The rise of extremists
alarmed Ethiopia; it therefore intervened militarily in December 2006 and ousted the SCIC from power.

The third group of scholars has vigorously critiqued claims that link Somalia with Islamic extremism and international terrorism. Machal (2007) has argued that Islamism and extremism are not the same. On the contrary, „religion is, in the great majority of cases, a secondary factor behind political grievances and nationalism: the religious discourse used by these actors is more instrumental than causative” (Machal, 2007: 1101). He has also argued that one cannot link local Somali extremism with international Jihadism without hard evidence. Making similar arguments, Elliot and Holzer (2009: 226) state that „transnational terrorism may be a concern for policymakers in Washington but it has never been a significant entity in Somalia.’ They add that Somalia’s social environment, particularly the clan lineage, hampers growth of international terrorism in the country.

They conclude their argument with two points. One, the assertions that link Somali Islamists with international terrorism are no more than a fallacy, which is informed more by external interests and perceptions. In Machal’s (2007: 1106) words, „the identification of the Islamic Courts with Islamic extremism and terrorists gave legitimacy to the US–Ethiopian intervention in Somalia.’ Two, the linkage is a reflection of the instrumentalisation of the war on terror by both internal and external actors. Hehir (2008) does not specifically focus on Somalia, but his broad critique of the linkage between collapsed (or failed) states and international terrorism ends with the same observations.

Focusing on Islamism and terrorism in Somalia, the three groups of authors have raised important questions around international actors’ perceptions and their influence on interventions in peace processes. This study will further explore these questions.

On the issue of piracy, some authors have emphasised the criminal and security dimensions (Menkhaus, 2009b; Murphy, 2010; Pham, 2010; Samatar, 2010). Others have been more concerned with the causes (Khalid, 2010; Kisiangani, 2010). Two important causes have been mentioned. The first one is the offshore disorder and statelessness. As Khalid (2010: 13) avers, „it is not just a question of lack of enforcement at sea but of disorder on land and the growth of land-based networks and infrastructures in Somalia and certain socioeconomic factors which create a conducive environment for piracy to foment and thrive.’ The second cause is Somali’s reaction to illegal fishing and dumping of toxic
waste in Somali waters by international actors. As Kisiangani writes (2010: 362), former
“fishermen, in an attempt to protect the country’s waters and resources from flotillas of
external gunboats, or at least wage a campaign to “tax” them, started patrolling the Somali
waters and engaging in sporadic attacks on foreign vessels.” In brief, this genre mainly
focuses on piracy, but it mentions a central concern of this dissertation: the external
perception of the conflict in Somalia and their influence on peace interventions.

2.3 Theoretical foundations

This study will primarily employ two theories: the interest-based (or principled)
negotiation theory and the theory of conflict transformation. The conceptual foundation of
the two theories is Galtung’s model of conflict and violence.

2.3.1 Conflict and violence

Conflict and violence are closely related, but they are not synonymous. A conflict is
conceptualised as incompatibility of interests and needs between two or more parties
(Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Wallensteen, 2007). The incompatibility may be over material
and non-material things. These include geographical territory; money or food; political
power; cultural, political or religious identities; social status, dignity and values. A conflict
occurs in a particular context and involves attitudes, behaviour and contradictions
(Galtung, 1996; Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Wallensteen, 2007). Contradictions are the
perceived or actual incompatibilities while attitudes refer to parties’ perception of each
other. As Ramsbotham et al (2005: 10) writes, “attitude includes emotive (feelings),
cognitive (belief), and conative (will elements). That is, a conflict arises when negative
attitudes and behaviour encounter contradiction. A conflict is thus a “dynamic process in
which structure, attitudes and behaviour are constantly changing and influencing one
another” (Ramsbotham et al, 2005:10). In short, this Galtung model conceptualises conflict
as a triangle with attitude (A), behaviour (B) and contradiction (C) as its vertices.
Violence on the other hand refers to injuring of others in the pursuit of one’s interest. The Galtung model has identified three types of violence: direct, structural and cultural violence (Galtung, 1996; Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Wallensteen, 2007). Direct violence refers to physical or psychological injury to an actor. It is a specific event with an identifiable perpetrator and victim. Structural violence, in contrast, is related to the existence of structures, institutions or policies that prevent people from satisfying their basic needs. Structural violence is not visible in specific events; its effects are apparent at the societal level. Cultural violence refers to the social, cultural and political rationales that are used to justify direct or structural violence. Similarly, it is not visible.

The causal relationship between conflict and violence means their elements are related. While direct violence co-relates with behaviour, structural violence co-relates with contradiction and cultural violence co-relates with attitudes.
The Galtung’s model forms the conceptual foundation of the two theories utilised by this study. Hence, exploring effect of international actors means assessing the extent to which international actors have affected direct, structural and cultural violence.

### 2.3.2 Interest-based (or principled) negotiation theory

Negotiation is a central component of peace processes. Every activity in a peace process from ceasefire agreements, to venue and time determination, to agreements on participation and substantive issues involves negotiations. Similarly, implementation of peace agreements and post-agreement policy options involve negotiations. Most literature on negotiations in peace processes focuses on two theoretical approaches. The first approach is positional (or distributive) bargaining, which premises negotiations on the notion of bargaining a range of actors’ positions (Fisher and Ury, 1983, cited in Ross, 2000). Positional bargaining prioritises immediate substantive gains as the aim is to win as much as possible in a competitive bargaining process. It is characterised by confrontation, hostile tactics, rigidly-held positions, and ends in win-lose outcomes and damaged relationships (Fisher and Ury, 1983, cited in Ross, 2000). Thus, the second approach, interest-based (or integrative) bargaining, seeks to improve on positional
bargaining. Interest-based bargaining premises negotiations on the parties underlying interests. The theory has four core postulates: „focus on interests, not positions; separate the people from the problem; generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do; and insist that the result be based on some objective standard’ (Fisher and Ury, 1983, cited in Ross, 2000: 1011). At the heart of the theory, as Ross (2000:1011) explains, is the understanding that „once each side can articulate its core interests and understands those of the other parties, a creative solution to bridging differences can be generated.’

This thinking, particularly the notion of focusing on the interests that underpin seemingly incompatible positions forms the foundation of the first objective of this study. As a conflict is conceptualised as incompatibility of interests, then transforming it, according to the theory, means addressing those interests. The notion of interests in the theory implies the interests of the primary actors. However, this study extends it to include secondary and tertiary actors. In Somalia, the external actors, who have been initiating the peace processes, are secondary and tertiary actors. They therefore have interests and fears that drive their interventions. While the interests and fears of the internal actors are overtly articulated as they are the principal protagonists, the interests of the international actors are not explicit. This problem is complicated by the intractability of the conflict. The interest-based theory addresses the intractability problem through its goal of „getting the parties to recognise how their relationship is entangled with substantive issues so that the two can be separated’ (Ross, 2000: 1012). In sum, the profound insight from the interest-based theory is that understanding the interests that drive international actors’ intervention in Somalia is the key to understanding their impact on peace processes. The insight links logically with the greed-grievance theories which scholars have used to analyse the phenomenon of warlordism that has been rampant in post-1991 Somalia.

2.3.3 Conflict transformation theory

Ross (2000:1020) has referred to conflict transformation as „an alternative approach’ that is premised on the idea that „building sustainable peace requires far more than elite agreements.’ According to Lederach (1997), a conflict has long-term relational, structural, contextual and cultural dimensions. That means a conflict is caused by and changes the actors, their relationships, social institutions and the narratives that underpin their
interactions and identities. In the words of Botes (2003: 1), a conflict ‘moves through certain predictable phases, transforming relationships and social organisation.’ This fundamental dictum of conflict resolution makes the conflict transformation theory very useful to this study because it is primarily concerned with the changes of the actors, their relations, the structures in which they interact and their cultural context. As Dukes (1999: 48, cited in Botes, 2003: 10) writes, conflict transformation entails ‘transformation of the individuals, transformation of the relationships, and transformation of the social systems, large and small.’ Thus, the pillars of the conflict transformation theory are four postulates.

**Actor transformation**

The first postulate concerns the transformation of the actors. Parties to a conflict have certain perceptions towards their adversaries, the conflict and the structures in which they interact. As Lederach (1997: 63) puts it, a ‘conflict is born in the world of human meaning and perception.’ This means transforming a conflict requires changing the perceptions of the actors towards their adversaries and their view of the conflict. Botes (2003) calls this transformation of the emotional, perceptual and spiritual dimensions of a conflict. Actor transformation, according to Ramsbotham et al (2005:163), requires redefinition of directions, modification or abandonment of cherished goals, and ‘adoption of radically different perspectives’, that is, ‘new goals, values and beliefs’. This postulate has immediate relevance to the Somali conflict and peace processes. International actors have cherished goals and interests that have premised their interventions; thus, assessing the impact of their interests on the peace processes entails evaluating how they have transformed internal actors’ attitudes and negative perceptions (Covey et al, 2005).

**Relationship transformation**

The second postulate concerns the transformation of the relationships between the actors. Lederach (1997: 63) argues that a conflict is caused and ‘constantly changed by ongoing human interaction… and the social environment in which it is born.’ Ramsbotham et al (2005: 163) refers to this as ‘the structure of relationship within which the parties operate.’ According to this postulate, relationship transformation requires changing the norms that define the relationship, redefining roles in the relationship, altering how the parties
communicate, redefining patterns of interaction, and correcting power imbalances between the parties (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Ross, 2000). This postulate is equally relevant to this study. If a peace process aims to end violence and rebuild institutions, as Covey et al (2005) argue, then exploring the effect of international interveners on Somalia’s peace processes means assessing how these actors have transformed relationships between the internal actors.

Structure transformation

The third postulate focuses on the transformation of the structure within which a conflict occurs. As Vayrynen (1991: 163, cited in Botes, 2003) avers, „structural transformation alludes to changes that may transpire in the system or structure within which the conflict occurs, which is more than just the limited changes among actors, issues and roles.’ According to this postulate, transforming the structure means changing the political, economic and socio-cultural institutions as the conflict arose because these institutions could not address the causative grievances (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Ross, 2000). Some of these structural issues are, as (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 163) have noted, embedded in the regional and international context. Thus, the relevance of this postulate to the conflict and peace processes in Somalia cannot be belaboured. As Arnson (1999) argues, structural issues comprise the core of the substantive agenda of peace processes. In essence, then, assessing the role that international actors have played in Somalia’s peace processes entails evaluating how their interests have hampered or contributed towards transformation of the structural issues.

Cultural context transformation

The fourth postulate addresses the cultural dimension, which refers to the way societies understand and respond to conflicts, and the narratives and discourses that underpin social interactions and identities’ formation (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1997; Ross, 2000). As Ross (2000: 1020) writes, conflicts „should be understood as social and cultural constructions whose meanings can be transformed as people change their knowledge, perceptions and models of what is at stake.’ In other words, transforming the cultural dimension requires changing the way parties to the conflict understand and frame the conflict, and altering the
discourses that forms the basis of their identities. Clearly, this is an important dimension in conflict transformation in Somalia.

In sum, the conflict transformation theory is very useful to this study because ending direct violence in Somalia, as the international interveners have been seeking to do, require transforming the attitudes of the internal actors, their view of the conflict and their relationships. Moreover, re-building state and social institutions in Somalia, as international actors have been attempting to do, require transformation of the structural and cultural violence. That means assessing the effect of the international interveners in Somalia’s post-2001 peace processes requires analysing the extent to which they have transformed the internal actors, their relationships, their social structures and the discourses that reproduce violence. The figure below summarises that thinking.

![Figure 2.4: Linking conflict, conflict transformation theory and peace processes in Somalia](image)

*Figure 2.4: Linking conflict, conflict transformation theory and peace processes in Somalia*
2.4 Conclusion

The protracted conflict in Somalia has been a subject of popular and academic commentaries, but few of these discourses are premised on peace studies’ theories. Instead, most are anchored on historical, anthropological and political science perspectives. Moreover, there are very few texts that specifically focus on international interventions in Somalia’s peace processes. This subject has instead been covered in the generic literature on the broad themes around the conflict such as causes and consequences of state collapse and Islamism and terrorism. This dissertation partly seeks to address that gap. Therefore, the first aim of this chapter was to review that generic literature with a view to explore the accumulated scholarship on peace processes, and to survey how scholars of Somali studies have framed their arguments and conceptualised international peace interventions. The second aim of the chapter was to introduce the peace studies theoretical approaches that will be employed in this study of the effect of international actors on peace processes in Somalia.
Chapter 3
Somalia: Mapping the Conflict

3.1. Introduction

The protracted conflict in Somalia is not just a humanitarian disaster, but it has also raised concerns that the country may have become a sanctuary of international terrorists. Those concerns have been aggravated by the emergent problem of piracy along the coast of Somalia. Menkhaus (2003a) has rightly observed that the nature and severity of the warfare in Somalia has changed much since 1991 when the state collapsed. From brutal massacres in the early 1990s, to localised clashes in the late 1990s, to internationalised insurgency in the late 2000s, the conflict can currently be characterised as having three main features. It is intractable. It has been affected by the duration effect, that is, the longer the conflict has persisted the higher the number of actors it has drawn in. It also comprises a complex web of inter-related but different conflicts: the unresolved civil war that led to state collapse, political Islam versus liberal Islam and external actors, and second-tier conflicts that flourish due to lack of a state. This chapter aims to map the conflict with a view to contextualise the discourses and issues discussed in the previous chapters and the international peace interventions within Somalia’s conflict dynamics.

3.2. Conflict Context

3.2.1 Geography

Location

Somalia is located on the Horn of Africa and shares borders with Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, and is adjacent to Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula. It also borders the Indian

---

6 This dissertation employs the term state collapse while most literature refers to Somalia as a failed state. Menkhaus (2003a), for instance, has referred to Somalia as a failure among failed states. However, state failure and state collapse are conceptually distinct. William Zartman (1995) and Robert Rotberg (2003) have argued that a failed state is one where all core functions have ceased to be performed (on a continuous base and over the entire territory), but where some institutional structures still exist. They see this as a functional failure without institutional failure. They further argue that a collapsed state involves both a functional failure and an institutional failure, that is, the political superstructure has ceased to exist on a continuous base and as part of an integrative framework. Thus, a collapsed state is a more acute version of state failure.
Ocean and the Red Sea. Somalia has a land area of 637,660 km$^2$, and its coastline extends 3,300 kilometres. Somalia’s location has always attracted international forces that seek to control the intersection of the two strategic waterways, the Gulf of Aden, which connects East and West and facilitates the transportation of much of the world’s crude oil (Khalid, 2010; Osman, 2007). Thus, Somalia’s strategic location has been an important factor in its conflicts.

![Map 3.1: Somalia in the Horn of Africa (source: World Atlas)](image)

Landscape and climate

The northern part of Somalia is hilly and the altitude ranges between 900 and 2,100 meters (3,000 ft.-7,000 ft.) above sea level. The central and southern areas are flat, with an average altitude of less than 180 meters (600 ft.). Two rivers, the Jubba and Shabelle, rise in Ethiopia and flow across Somalia toward the Indian Ocean; the Shabelle does not reach the ocean. Major climatic factors include a year-round hot climate, seasonal monsoon winds, and irregular rainfall with recurring droughts. May to October and December to February are cool months due to the southwest and northeast monsoons respectively. The
other months are hot and humid. The central and northern regions are semi-arid and their inhabitants practice nomadic pastoralism rearing mostly camels, cattle and goats (Aidid and Ruhela, 1994; Lewis, 2008; Mukhtar, 1996). The area between the two rivers is the most agriculturally productive part of the country and the inhabitants practice agro-pastoralism and sedentary farming (Besteman, 1999a, 1995; Kusow, 1995; Lewis, 2008; Mukhtar, 1996). The inter-riverine area has experienced the worst violence and population displacement since 1988, when warfare escalated.

3.2.2 Ethno-cultural structure

No reliable statistical data has been collected in Somalia for more than three decades. The country actually dropped out of the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) reporting in the late 1990s. Nonetheless, the 2010 World Population Datasheet (WPD) estimates the population of Somalia to be 9.4 million. More than one million Somalis are in the diaspora (Healy and Sheikh, 2009), while more than 2.2 million are internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees (UNHCR, 2011). Majority of Somalis are Muslims.

Studies on Somalia’s ethno-cultural structure falls into two categories: homogeneous and heterogeneous (Osman, 2007). The homogeneous narrative traces Somalis’ origin to the shores of the Red Sea and portrays them as people who share the same language, culture, religion, common ancestry and engage in camel and cattle nomadism. Premised on segmentary lineage approach, it divides Somalis into six patrilineal clans: Darood, Dir, Hawiye, Isaaq, Digil and Rahanweyn (also called Mirifle) (Hesse, 2010; Kusow, 1995; Lewis, 2008, 2004, 1993, 1972; Osman, 2007; Samatar, 1992). This homogeneous view of the Somali society has been the most pervasive in the media and in scholarly writings. Some attribute its prevalence to I.M. Lewis’s dominance of Somali studies (Samatar, 1992; Kusow, 1995). Others attribute its pervasiveness to its appropriation as the official discourse by post-colonial governments (Osman, 2007).

The heterogeneous view questions the Red Sea origin hypothesis and homogeneity of the Somali society. It asserts that the linguistic and socio-cultural structures of southern Somalis indicate that southern Somalia was „the earlier location of the Somali-speaking people” (Kusow, 1995: 102). The view adds that the structural differences between the
northern and southern Somali languages, including mutual unintelligibility, questions the common ancestry myth. It also stresses that Somalia is ethno-culturally, occupationally and socially diverse (Besteman, 1999, 1996a, 1996b, 1995; Eno et al, 2010; Kusow, 1995; Mukhtar, 1996; Osman, 2007). Indeed, northern-central Somalis practice camel-cattle nomadism and speak Af-mahaay, while southerners from the inter-riverine region practice agro-pastoralism and speak Af-maay-maay. The two languages are as different as Spanish and Portuguese (Lewis, 2008, 2004; Mukhtar, 1996; Osman, 2007). Further, the Jubba and Shabelle valleys are pre-dominantly occupied by the culturally distinct Jareer group (also called waGosha or Somali Bantus), who are settled farmers, whilst other distinct groups such as Jiddu, Dabarre, Bajuni, Baraawe, Hadamo and Banadiri also inhabit the Southern region (Besteman, 1999, 1996a; Eno et al, 2010; Kusow, 1995; Mukhtar, 1996; Webersik, 2004). This empirical evidence negates the homogeneous view. Additionally, the clan discourse ignores important horizontal identities such as social class, race and location of origin.

### 3.2.3 Historical development

**Somalia before 1960**

Pre-colonial Somali society had no formal, centralised political organisation. It maintained social order and justice through moral, material and social sanctions that were executed through a code of conduct known as xeer and the Islamic law (Hesse, 2010; Lewis, 2008; Mahmoud, 2006; Samatar, 1992). In the 1880s, imperial powers divided the area inhabited by Somalis into five regions: British, French, and Italian Somaliland, Ethiopian Ogadeen and the Northern Frontier District in British East Africa (modern Kenya). The colonial rule spawned violent resistance and Somali nationalism that attained its zenith in the 1950s. Somalia attained independence on 01 July 1960 as a Union of the Italian and the British Somaliland. The country’s flag had a five pointed star indicating a desire to bring to the Union the other three territories. However, the Ogadeen region and the Northern Frontier District remained part of Ethiopia and Kenya respectively, while the French Somaliland attained independence as Djibouti in 1977.
Map 3.2: 1960 Somalia and post-1969 Somalia

Elite factional conflicts, 1960-1969

Independent Somalia pursued two objectives: pan-Somali nationalism and domestic nation-building. Pan-Somali nationalism “sought to incorporate the Somali-inhabited portions of neighbouring countries into a larger pan-Somali nation-state” (Schraeder, 2006: 107). Thus, it negated the Organisation of African Unity’s (OAU) fundamental principle of respecting the inherited borders and led to the Somali-Ethiopian war of 1964 and Somalia’s support for shifia insurgents in Kenya. The nation-building objective also had its challenges (Aidid and Ruhela, 1994; Lewis, 2008, 1972; Schraeder, 2006). The country did not hold the unity referendum stipulated in the 1960 Act of Union. This fuelled secessionist sentiments in Somaliland, which led to the rejection of the new constitution in June 1961 referendum and a mutiny by army officers in Hargeisa. Also, the competing

7 In October 1962, the leaders of the ethnic Somalis in the Northern Frontier District (NFD) demanded the integration of the region into Somalia. Both Britain and the Kenyan government rejected the demand. Two weeks after Kenya attained independence in December 1963, Somali pressures forced the new state to declare a state of emergency in the NFD. Shifia is a Somali word for the insurgents who were fighting the Kenyan government with a view to secede from Kenya and join Somalia. Somalia renounced the NFD claim in 1968.
elites undermined the political system as they organised politics around clan identities in a context where 90% of the population lacked formal education. Additionally, integrating former British and Italian designed institutions proved a herculean task. Unable to cope, the elite adopted patrimonialism that generated power struggles along clan lines. Subsequent efforts to undermine democracy through electoral fraud generated a crisis of the state. The elite conflicts culminated in the assassination of President Abdul Rashid Shermake on the 18 October 1969 and a military coup three days later.

The rise of fascism, 1969-1978

The coup leader, General Mohamed Siyaad Barre, suspended the constitution, banned political activities, dissolved parliament, replaced the civilian cabinet with a Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) and arrested members of the previous government (Lewis, 1972; Osman, 2007). He also declared scientific socialism the official ideology, Islam the official religion, and outlawed „public and private acknowledgement of the existence of clans’ (Besteman, 1996b: 587). In addition, Barre enacted populist policies such as a mass literacy campaign and writing of the standard Somali using Roman orthography, which became the official language (Besteman, 1996b; Lewis, 1972; Schraeder, 2006). General Barre also orchestrated „ritualised celebrations of pan-Somali cultural heroes’ (Besteman, 1996b: 588).

Unfortunately, Barre’s rule generated a crisis of legitimacy. As Besteman (1996b: 587) avers, questions about the government’s orientation were „bolstered by Siyaad’s overt manipulation of the clan relations through distribution of favours and jobs.’ That is, Barre’s „regime constituted an even more polarised clan-based structure than the previous regimes’ (Osman, 2007: 104). The peak of Barre’s pan-Somali nationalism, the 1977-78 irredentist war to recapture the Ogadeen, proved to be an unmitigated disaster. Ethiopia, with support from the Soviet Union and Cuba, defeated Somalia. Thus, „Siyaad’s greatest

---

8 There was no written Somali language before 1972. Previous governments had debated whether to use Roman, Arabic or Ismaantiya scripts (Lewis, 1972: 407). The „standard’ Somali language that was adopted in 1972 is the af-Mahaay of the northern Somalis. Catherine Besteman (1996b: 588) notes that the adoption of the Af Mahaay as the standard and, therefore the official language, and exclusion of af-Maay Maay, which is also widely spoken, „left a bitter legacy among Maay Maay speakers.’ The exclusion formed the basis of their resistance to the regime as „they were marginalized in the nation-building effort when their language was excluded from the literacy program’ (Besteman, 1996b: 588).
nationalist effort [became] his greatest debacle’ (Besteman, 1996b: 589). Instead of unifying Somalis, the Ogadeen war marked the beginning of the end of Barre’s rule and the unrravelling of Somalia.

3.3. The first civil war, 1982-1990

The first civil war started shortly after the Ogadeen war. Its causes were: Somalia’s defeat in the Ogadeen war, elite conflicts over state resources and unbridled militarism. Somalia’s defeat led to blame and recriminations in the military that triggered an attempted coup in April 1978 (Aidid and Ruhela, 1994; Besteman, 1996a). Some coup leaders were arrested and executed in Mogadishu in October 1978, while others fled to Ethiopia where they started an armed opposition, the Somali Salvation Front (SSF) (Lewis, 2008). The defeat also led to an economic recession from which the country never recovered. Additionally, the defeat led to an influx of Ogadeen Somali refugees ‘who were settled among northern farmers and pastoralists of the Isaaq clan’ (Besteman, 1996b: 589).

The settlement coupled with Barre’s efforts to control livestock and khat (a popular stimulant) businesses in Hargeisa triggered an armed resistance in the north-west region spearheaded by the Somali National Movement (SNM). The government’s response to the rebellion was a harsh military campaign that included bombing and starving of northern towns, villages and rural encampments, disruption of economic activities, destruction of water catchments and burning down of villages (Besteman, 1996a; Lewis, 2008; Menkhaus, 2003a). The war between the SNM and Barre’s government cost 60,000 lives, 400,000 IDPs and refugees (Menkhaus, 2003a).

Meanwhile, the elite competition intensified because the state had become the primary source of wealth accumulation (Besteman, 1996b; Hesse, 2010; Samatar, 1992). Besteman (1996a: 126) writes that because ‘the state became a primary source of wealth and resources, competition among the new urban elite who gained prominence in the 1980s often played out along bloodlines.’ Worsening elite competition was Barre’s unbridled militarism. In the 1970s, Somalia received massive military aid from the Soviet Union to counter the US presence in Ethiopia (Besteman, 1996a; Menkhaus, 2003a; Osman, 2007; Webersik, 2004). But the superpowers switched sides after the Ogadeen war. Between 1980 and 1988, the US gave Somalia military aid worth $163.5 million which it used to
amass a huge army; the country had an average of 12 soldiers per 1,000 people, compared to the regional average of less than 4 per 1,000 people (Osman, 2007).

Thus, as the centre weakened, the convergence of militarism, economic decline and escalating insurgency made weapons the spoil of the war, which civilians turned to for survival (Lewis, 2008; Osman, 2007). In late 1980s, the rebellion spread to the rest of the country where two more armed movements, the United Somali Congress (USC) and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), emerged in the central and south-west regions respectively. A full-scale uprising of USC supporters in Mogadishu defeated Barre’s government in January 1991. His fall led to state collapse as the armed movements „were sectarian themselves and had no reconstruction programme“ (Kasaija, 2010: 262).

![Figure 3.1: Linking conflict causes](image)

A summary of the main actors, their relationship and behaviour between 1982 and 1990 are provided in tables 3.1 and 3.2
Table 3.1: Summary of the main actors, 1982-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Formation</th>
<th>Interests</th>
<th>Area of operation</th>
<th>Relationships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government of President Barre</td>
<td>Came to power through a coup in 1969</td>
<td>-Maintain power and state control</td>
<td>Whole country</td>
<td>Fought with all armed movements that existed before January 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali National Movement (SNM)</td>
<td>Formed in 1981</td>
<td>-No settlement of Ogadeen refugees in Isaaq lands</td>
<td>North-west</td>
<td>-Fought With government of President Barre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Removal of military from north-west</td>
<td></td>
<td>-Encouraged other clans to form their movements, but did not want them to join it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-No state control of livestock and khat trade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Inclusion in all national institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic</td>
<td>Formed as SSF in Ethiopia in 1978. It changed its name to SSDF in 1981</td>
<td>-Control of the state power</td>
<td>North-east region</td>
<td>-Fought with government of President Barre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front (SSDF)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-Political inclusion of the Mejertin clans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Somali Congress</td>
<td>Formed in Rome in 1989</td>
<td>-Control of the state power</td>
<td>-Central rangelands, Mogadishu and</td>
<td>-Fought with the government forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Inclusion of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor</td>
<td>Attitude</td>
<td>Behaviour</td>
<td>Contradiction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Siyaad Barre</td>
<td>-Viewed itself as the legitimate authority</td>
<td>-Excessive spending on military</td>
<td>-Clan-based exclusion in national institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Viewed opposition groups as enemies</td>
<td>-Deployed military in north-west</td>
<td>-Nationalisation of all productive assets including land, industries and livestock &amp; khat trade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Viewed Gen. Barre as the „father of the nation”⁹</td>
<td>-Armed Ogaden refugees</td>
<td>-Used state institutions as the tool of wealth accumulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Viewed state as an instrument of capital accumulation</td>
<td>-Military attacks on civilians</td>
<td>-Exclusion and discrimination of minorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Viewed minorities in the south as racially and socially inferior</td>
<td>-Bombing of northern towns</td>
<td>-Underdevelopment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formed in 1989</td>
<td>-Inclusion of the Ogaden clans from the South in state institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower Juba areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Fought with government forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Fought with the USC forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁹ Besteman (1996b: 588) argues that as a self-proclaimed „father of the nation”, Gen. Barre „constructed a highly elaborate mandatory personality cult around himself.” He also sought to appropriate the mantle of Sayyid Mohammed Abdulle Hassan (the „mad Mullah”), the sheikh who led the 1900-1920 Dervish resistance against the British rule. In Besteman’s (1996b:588) words, Siyaad symbolically sought to „identify himself as the successor to the Mullah.”

Table 3.2: Mapping actors’ attitudes, behaviour and contradictions, 1982-1990

37
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Somali National Movement (SNM)    | - Viewed the Government as an enemy  
- Viewed north-west people as a threatened minority  
- Viewed itself as the defender of north-west interests  
- Did not trust other movements |
|                                   | - Attacked government institutions  
- Recruited north-west population  
- Fought against the government in Mogadishu |
|                                   | As above                                                                  |
| Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) | - Viewed the government as an enemy  
- Viewed itself as a liberation movement  
- Did not trust other movements |
|                                   | - Attacked government institutions in north-east  
- Controlled Bosaso |
|                                   | As above                                                                  |
| United Somali Congress (USC)      | - Viewed itself as a national liberation movement  
- Viewed Gen. Barre as the enemy  
- Did not trust other movements |
|                                   | - Attached government forces in the central rangelands and in Mogadishu  
- Full scale uprising of its supporters in Mogadishu defeated |
|                                   | As above                                                                  |
3.4. The Second civil war, 1991 - present

Phase I War for all against all, 1991 - 1996

The immediate post-Barre era involved many conflict issues. While the armed movements disagreed on power sharing and the structure of the state, the SNM declared secession of the north-west region to form the Republic of Somaliland (Lewis, 2008, 2004; Menkhaus, 2010b). In the south, new militia groups emerged among them Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) and former Barre’s forces, who re-grouped as Somali National Front (SNF). Meanwhile, the main movements’ fragmented into smaller factions (Lewis, 2004, 1993; Menkhaus, 2003a). The USC, for example, split into the USC/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) led by General Mohamed Farah Aidid, and the USC/Somali Salvation Alliance (USC/SSA) under Ali Mahdi Mohamed. Additionally, all militia factions desired to control the productive land resources in the south, infrastructure such as roads and ports, and valuable urban real estate (Besteman, 1996b; Eno et al, 2010; Menkhaus, 2003a; Mukhtar, 1996; Samatar, 1992). The convergence of these issues led to a vicious war that ravaged southern Somalia.10

| Somali Patriotic Movements (SPM) | -Viewed itself as the defender of Ogaden interests  
-Viewed the government as an enemy  
-Did not trust other movements | -Attached government forces in the South  
-Fought against the USC forces | As above |

---

10 According to May 1992 Human Rights Watch (HRW) Report, *No Mercy in Mogadishu*, the battle for the control of Mogadishu between the two USC factions was so ruthless that it greatly exceeded the destruction inflicted on the country during the first civil war.
The main victims of the violence were the agricultural communities and coastal minority groups. These communities played no role in Barre’s government or in the rebellion against it, but they had been stigmatised as racially and socially inferior and their lands became the major battle grounds (Besteman, 1999a, 1996a, 1996b; Eno et al, 2010; Menkhaus, 2003a; Mukhtar, 1996). The violence displaced 1.7 million people, over one-third of the entire population in the Southern Somalia (Ahmed and Green, 1999; Besteman, 1996b). By August 1992, more than 250 000 people had died due to war and famine, while 4.5 million suffered from acute malnutrition (Ahmed and Green, 1999; Menkhaus, 2010a). Much worse, the international relief that aimed to assist them became an additional source of income for the militia groups. Besides robbery, blackmail, and roadblocks that ‘taxed’ the international relief organisations, the militia groups provided interpreters and security services. Moreover, those who controlled the ports and airports resold the relief for profit, or they prevented it from being delivered upcountry to stop their rivals from accessing it (Menkhaus, 1991 cited in Besteman, 1996a; Mukhtar, 1996).

The dire humanitarian situation attracted the interventions of the OAU and the UN. In March 1992, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed resolution 751 that imposed a ceasefire and stipulated deployment of the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) to monitor the ceasefire (Diel, 1996; Menkhaus, 2003a; Sahnoun, 1994). Persistent violation of the ceasefire forced the UNSC to expand UNOSOM I’s mandate in August 1992 to protection of humanitarian convoys and the UN personnel. Fighting continued, however, forcing the UNSC to authorise a US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF), which comprised of 28 000 US troops. UNITAF’s mandate of protecting and safeguarding relief efforts lasted until May 1993 when the UNSC replaced it with UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II failed to end hostilities and it was withdrawn in March 1995. A summary of the main actors’ attitudes and behaviours is provided in table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Mapping actors’ attitudes, behaviour and contradictions, 1991-1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Behaviour</th>
<th>Contradiction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USC/SNA</td>
<td>-Viewed itself as the liberator of Somalia</td>
<td>-Fought vicious battles with other</td>
<td>-The state had collapsed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Barre’s rule</td>
<td>Viewed other movements as enemies</td>
<td>Viewed international actors as roadblocks to its military victory</td>
<td>Prevented relief food from reaching hinterlands in order to starve SNF groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC/SSA</td>
<td>Viewed itself as more politically competent</td>
<td>Viewed USC/SNA as its main enemy</td>
<td>Fought vicious battles with USC/SNA for the control of Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNF</td>
<td>Nursed bitterness over General Barre’s defeat</td>
<td>Viewed other movements as enemies</td>
<td>Fought brutal battles with all other groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>Viewed itself as the defender of the Ogadeen clan</td>
<td>Viewed other groups with</td>
<td>Fought vicious battles with other groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDM (later renamed Rahanweyn Resistance Army – RRA)</td>
<td>Viewed itself as the defender of the Rahanweyn clans</td>
<td>Fought vicious battles with other groups particularly USC/SNA, SNF and SDF</td>
<td>As above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suspicion</td>
<td>properties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Phase II: The reign of the warlords, 1996-2000**

Armed conflicts prevailed in 1995 after UNOSM II’s withdrawal, but the nature, duration and intensity of the warfare changed significantly (Menkhaus, 2010b, 2003a). The most important developments were substantial decreases in banditry and looting and decentralisation of warfare to lower clan lineages (Lewis, 2008; Menkhaus, 2010b, 2003a, 2006). For the next four years, central-southern Somalia was curved into several fiefdoms controlled by a several faction leaders (or warlords), who drew their power from sub-clan support and control of light and heavy weapons and important economic infrastructures including ports and airports.

**Phase III: The rise of the Islamists, 2000 – 2006**

Some Islamic relief organisations such as Al-Itihaad al-Islaami (AIAI) expanded their activities while the Sharia courts also emerged after 1995 (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; Menkhaus, 2003a, 2002a). In 1999, the Mogadishu business class switched its financial support from warlords to the Sharia courts in order to improve security (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; Menkhaus, 2007, 2006). To unify and enhance their effectiveness, the localised courts established the Sharia Implementation Council (SIC) in 2000. The business class also supported the 2000

---

11Among the militia groups that emerged at this time are Somali Salvation National Movement (SSNM), United Somali Front (USF), Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA), Somali Africans Muke Organisation (SAMO), Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU), Somali National Union (SNU), United Somali Party (USP), Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM) and Allied Somali Forces (ASF). Some of the warlords who emerged at this time were former General Aidid supporters such as Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Osman Hassan Ali Atto and Hussein Haji Bod, as well as former Ali Mahdi Mohamed supporters such as Muse Sudi Yalahow and Omar Mohammed Mahmood (alias Mahmood Muhammad Finish). Gen. Aidid and Ali Mahdi died in 1996 and1999 respectively.
Somali National Peace Conference (SNPC) that had been initiated by the government of Djibouti. The peace process produced a Transitional National Government (TNG), which failed to exercise authority due to internal weaknesses and external factors (see chapter 4).

IGAD responded by initiating another peace process that took place in Kenya from 2002 to 2004. It produced a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which also failed to exercise authority due to internal weaknesses and external factors (see chapter 4). TFG’s weakness revived the fortunes of the Sharia Courts that were by then ‘facing declining legitimacy and local support’ (Menkhaus, 2007: 364). In 2004, the Courts established the SCIC, which was the strongest political and militia force in Mogadishu by mid-June 2005 (Menkhaus, 2007). By June 2006, the SCIC had defeated the US supported Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) and it established a unified administration in Mogadishu, the first one in 16 years (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; Menkhaus, 2007). SCIC’s success alarmed international actors particularly Ethiopia. With support from the US, Ethiopia intervened militarily in December 2006, defeated the SCIC and installed the TFG in Mogadishu in January 2007.

**Phase IV: 2007 – Present**

Ethiopia’s intervention attracted a fierce insurgency led by Al Shabaab. Meanwhile, former SCIC supporters regrouped in Eritrea where they formed the Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) (ICG, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007). In May 2008, the UN initiated a peace process that took place in Djibouti, but only the moderate Islamists signed the agreement (Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a). The Al-Shabaab and Hizbul al-Islam opted to continue with the war. The moderate Islamist leader, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, became the President of the unity government on 31 January 2009. Meanwhile, Ethiopia pulled out of Somalia in December 2008 and was replaced by AMISOM peacekeepers. Table 3.4 summarises the actors’ attitudes and behaviours.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Behaviour</th>
<th>Contradiction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCIC</td>
<td>- Viewed itself as having domestic legitimacy</td>
<td>- Defeated the ARPCT in all battles</td>
<td>- Lack of a state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Viewed the TFG and its allies as Ethiopian lackeys</td>
<td>- Established a central authority</td>
<td>- Hegemonic control of lands and urban properties grabbed from some communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Viewed Ethiopia as the main enemy</td>
<td>- Implemented Sharia law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Preferred a centralised government</td>
<td>- Fought with TFG forces and threatened Ethiopia with Jihad</td>
<td>- Clan-Islamism dialectics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Internal contestations were resolved through violence</td>
<td>- Dilemma of Islamism vs. Somali traditional norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional Federal</td>
<td>- View itself as the legitimate authority</td>
<td>- Has fought battles with Al-shaabab and Hizbul al-Islam</td>
<td>In addition to the above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>- Views its opponents as terrorists</td>
<td>- It depends on foreign support</td>
<td>- It is defended by AMISOM peacekeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Prefers a devolved government</td>
<td>- Hampered by internal conflicts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shaab al-Mujahideen (ASAM)</td>
<td>- Views itself as an Islamic liberation movement</td>
<td>- Has fought deadly battles with TFG forces</td>
<td>As above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Views the TFG, Puntland and Somaliland as lackeys of Ethiopian hegemony</td>
<td>- Has employed bombing and other terror tactics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Has implemented Sharia laws in the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.5. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to map the conflict in Somalia in order to provide a background to the discourses and issues, and to situate international peace interventions within Somalia’s conflict dynamics. The mapping has shown that the conflict in Somalia is more complex than is generally portrayed as it is rooted in frustrated national ambitions, weak state structures, inability to build a national identity and political, economic and social exclusion. The mapping has also shown that Islamism in Somalia emerged as a response to state collapse and has been primarily a vehicle for channelling of humanitarian assistance and articulating social and political grievances rather than a motive for conflict.
Chapter 4
The Peace Processes

4.1 Introduction

There is no universally agreed definition of the term peace process because ‘“the extensive set of variables involved greatly complicates the task of definition’ (Darby and Ginty, 2003: 2). Nonetheless, peace and conflict scholars have clearly conceptualised peace processes. Pearman (2008:79) has referred to a peace process ‘as a sustained effort to negotiate a lasting solution to a protracted conflict between states and/or non-state groups.’ Similarly, Arnson (1999:1) has conceptualised a peace process as ‘an effort to end armed confrontation by reaching agreements that touch on at least some of the principal political, economic, social and ethnic imbalances that led to conflict in the first place.’ That is, a peace process entails negotiations over the underlying causes of the conflict and signing peace agreements that address these causes. Other scholars have provided five criteria that a peace process must include: actors’ willingness to negotiate in good faith, commitment by the primary actors to the process, inclusiveness, no violence in pursuance of objectives, and desire to address substantive conflict issues (Darby, 2001; Darby and Ginty, 2003). Advancing a similar argument, Covey et al (2003: 14) write that a peace process must dislodge ‘violent-prone power structures’ through reducing motivations and means for pursuing violent conflict.

Inherent in these conceptualisations are four ideas. First, a peace process involves series of activities from pre-negotiation to peace agreement implementation. Second, a peace process is deemed successful if it ends violence. This means that a peace process has to address transformation of the actors’ perceptions, their relationships and the structures that breed violence. Third, a successful peace process has to lay the foundation for building post-agreement institutions that would henceforth resolve conflicts peacefully. Fourth, a peace process has to reduce the motives and change the narratives that propel protagonists to use violence. One can therefore argue that Somalia’s peace processes have not been successful. Thus, the first aim of this chapter is to highlight the main peace processes and explore why they have failed to end violence or to build sustainable institutions. The second aim is to interrogate the contribution of the international actors to those outcomes.
4.2 Pre-2001 peace processes

4.2.1 From Djibouti I to UNOSOM II

Djibouti I and II peace conferences

Djibouti I and II peace conferences were hosted by President Hassan Guled Aptidon in June and July 1991. The 5-11 June conference was attended by representatives of SSDF, SPM, SDM and USC. The SNM did not attend. The main aims of the conference were to discuss the escalating violence, appoint an interim government and explore methods of removing President Barre from Somalia as he had retreated to his native Gedo region (Aidid and Ruhela, 1994; Kasaija, 2010). Participants signed a ceasefire agreement and resolved to hold another meeting in July. The 15-21 July conference was supported by Italy, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and attended by all armed factions except the SNM (Aidid and Ruhela, 1994; Kasaija, 2010). It also attracted observers from the OAU, the LAS, the OIC, all neighbouring states and countries such as Libya and the US (Kasaija, 2010). Its main resolutions included expulsion of General Barre by military force, implementation of the June ceasefire agreement, respect for Somalia’s territorial integrity, and formation of an all-inclusive government (Aidid and Ruhela, 1994; Kasaija, 2010). The conference also appointed Ali Mahdi as interim president for two years, promulgated the 1960 constitution for not more than two years and proposed a 123-member parliament (Aidid and Ruhela, 1994). However, all resolutions could not be implemented because facilitators lacked leverage over the warring factions, parties disagreed over power sharing, intra-USC wars, proliferation of militia factions, and external actors, principally Italy, were not seen as impartial (Ghebremeskel, 2002; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 2000). The UN did not participate in both conferences\textsuperscript{12} (Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 2000; Sahnoun, 1994).

From UNOSOM I to UNITAF

Somalia descended into anarchy after the failure of the Djibouti II peace process, which prompted the UNSC to adopt resolution 733 on 23 January 1992 that imposed an arms

\textsuperscript{12} The escalation of the civil war in Somalia, the fall of General Mohamed Siyaad Barre and the collapse of the Somali state coincided with the first Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the war in the Balkans. Thus, the UN and the Western powers were focused on those wars.
embargo. The UN Secretary General (UNSG) then invited the OAU, LAS, OIC and faction leaders General Aidid and Ali Mahdi for consultation in New York on 12-14 February 1992 where they agreed to a ceasefire (UNOSOM, 1995). The UN then sent a high level delegation of the UN, OAU, LAS and the OIC to Mogadishu where Aidid and Mahdi signed a ceasefire agreement on 3 March (UNOSOM, 1995). The UNSC followed the ceasefire with resolution 746 of 17 March that authorised UN personnel to monitor the ceasefire and supervise provision of humanitarian relief (UNOSOM, 1995; Diel, 1996; Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 2000). The UNSC then adopted resolution 751 on 24 April that established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) comprising of 50 military observers and 500 troops. In response to persistent violations of the ceasefire, the UNSC passed resolutions 767 of 27 July and 775 of 28 August that increased UNOSOM troops to 4,219 (UNOSOM, 1995). However, violence persisted and militia factions attacked UNOSOM forces.

The UNSC responded to these attacks through resolution 794 of 3 December that established the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). The US assumed the command of the UNITAF – codenamed Operation Restore Hope - that comprised of 28,000 US troops and 17,000 troops from other UN members (Sahnoun, 1994; UNOSOM, 1995). By January 1993, UNITAF had deployed 37,000 troops in southern-central region, an area covering 40% of the country's territory. Meanwhile, the UNSG convened a preparatory meeting for the envisaged national reconciliation conference in Addis Ababa on 4-15 January 1993 (UNOSOM, 1995). Fourteen factions attended the preparatory meeting which concluded with signing of three agreements: the General Agreement of 8 January 1993, the Agreement on Implementing the Ceasefire and on Modalities of Disarmament, and the Agreement on the Establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee for the Conference on National Reconciliation (UNOSOM, 1995).

Addis Ababa Conference March 1993

The UN convened a Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia in Addis Ababa on 11-13 March 1993 and followed it with a Conference on National Reconciliation on 15 March 1993. Fifteen armed factions, civil society and women’s groups attended the reconciliation conference (Kasaija, 2010; UNOSOM, 1995). Meanwhile, the country still
had no state or functioning government. That prompted the UNSC to pass resolution 814 on 26 March 1993 that changed UNITAF to UNOSOM II, a Chapter VII peacekeeping mission, whose mandate included protecting civilians, disarming warring factions and promoting reconciliation (UNOSOM, 1995). On 27 March, all the fifteen faction leaders attending the Addis Ababa reconciliation conference signed a peace agreement whose key stipulations covered disarmament, rehabilitation and reconstruction, restoration of property, settlement of disputes and transitional mechanisms (Kasaija, 2010; UNOSOM, 1995). The latter included a Transitional National Council (TNC) made up of three representatives from each region (including one woman), five additional seats for Mogadishu, and one representative from each of the fifteen factions. UNOSOM II commenced its operations in May 1993, but fighting continued and the Addis Ababa agreement collapsed. Indeed, UNOSOM II’s attempts to implement the disarmament provisions in the Addis Ababa agreement triggered battles between its troops and USC-Aidid militias that killed 25 and wounded 54 Pakistan peacekeepers (Sahoun, 1994; UNOSOM, 1995).

The UNSC responded through resolution 837 of 6 June that mandated UNOSOM II to initiate military operations. One such operation in South Mogadishu in October 1993 led to battles with Aidid’s militia that downed two US helicopters, killed 18 US soldiers and wounded 75. Somali casualty figures are unknown. The „black hawk down“ debacle led to a decisive US policy shift. Meanwhile, subsequent UNSC resolutions, 886 of 18 November 1993 and 923 of 31 May 1994 renewed UNOSOM II’s mandate to May 1994 and October 1994 respectively. But it was clear that UNOSOM II’s goal of assisting the national reconciliation process had failed. On 4 November 1994, the UNSC passed resolution 954 that authorised UNOSOM II to withdraw by 31 March 1995. Thereafter, the major international actors showed little interest in Somalia until 11 September 2001.

4.2.2 Post-UNOSOM peace processes

The Sodere peace conference

The Sodere conference of December 1996 was the first post-UNOSOM II peace process. Several factors informed Ethiopia’s intervention: national interest, the UN’s preference for
a regional approach after UNOSOM II’s disaster, and the fact that Ethiopia had been elected the chair of IGAD and the newly created OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) (Ghebremeskel, 2002; Hansen, 2003; Abraham, 2002, cited in Hansen, 2003). The conference attracted 26 factions which signed a Joint Declaration on 3 January 1997. Some key protagonists, including Somaliland’s leadership, did not participate. Key resolutions of the declaration were establishment of a National Salvation Council (NSC) with a mandate to organise a transitional government and convening of a National Reconciliation Conference (NRC) in Bosaso, Somalia, to approve a Transitional National Charter (TNC) in November 1997. Mistrust and power-sharing contests, operating in Addis Ababa, and competition between Ethiopia and Egypt hampered implementation. Indeed, another peace conference was held in Cairo, Egypt, instead of the Bosaso NRC.

The Cairo peace conference

The Cairo conference opened on 12 November 1997. It was attended by representatives of the NSC as formed in Sodere and their opponents who had boycotted the Sodere process. On 22 December 1997, the conference proclaimed the Cairo Declaration which stipulated regional self-administration and committed the parties to organise an NRC in Baidoa in February 1998 that would elect a presidential council, a prime minister and adopt a transitional charter. While some delegates signed the Cairo Declaration, others objected to the allocations of representations to the proposed NRC. Those objecting travelled to Addis Ababa, where they convened a meeting of the NSC that proposed changes to the Cairo Declaration and accused Egypt of "hijacking" the Sodere process and sabotaging the Bosaso NRC (Hansen, 2003; Healy, 2011). Moreover, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti faulted Egypt for disregarding their previous efforts and achievements and their security interests as Somalia’s neighbours (Hansen, 2003).

4.2.3 The Djibouti III peace process

The Government of Djibouti convened the 2000 Somali National Peace Conference (SNPC) in the town of Arta. Other international actors, including the OAU, the UN, the AL, the UN, and the EU, supported the Djibouti initiative, but Ethiopia did not (Kasaija,
The conference, which started as a series of meetings from 20 April to 5 May, reduced representation of the armed factions and emphasised the role of civil society (Hansen, 2003; Kasaija, 2010). Thus, most Mogadishu-based warlords, the Puntland and the Somaliland administrations did not attend. The conference elected a 245-member Transitional National Assembly (TNA) using the 4.5 formula (Eno et al, 2010; Menkhaus, 2003a; Schlee, 2010). The TNA enacted the Transitional National Charter (TNC) and elected the Transitional National Government (TNG) president. In turn, the president appointed a prime minister. Though the TNG received support from the Gulf countries, it could hardly assert itself for several reasons (Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2003a, 2007; Schlee, 2010). First, it was undermined by warlords and other factions that feared return of the state. Second, it was fought by groups that objected to its vision of a centralised state. Third, it lacked policy implementation instruments and peace enforcement capabilities. In addition, Ethiopia mistrusted its composition and instead supported the Somalia Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC), a loose coalition of all the factions that were opposed to the TNG. Consequently, the Arta process failed despite its early promise.

4.3 Post-2001 peace processes

4.3.1 The Nairobi process

The failure of the TNG prompted IGAD to initiate the Somali National Peace and Reconciliation Conference (SNPRC) in 2002 in Kenya. Other international actors including the AU, UN, LAS, EU, Italy and the Gulf states explicitly supported the initiative. The conference opened on 15 October 2002 in Eldoret town, 300 kilometres north-west of Nairobi, and moved to Nairobi on 15 February 2003. It attracted all the major actors, including the TNG and the SRRC. Somaliland was invited, but declined to attend with the assertion that it was an independent state. The process was structured by the Technical Committee (TC) of the IGAD frontline states - Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya - into three phases: ceasefire declaration, resolution of substantive issues and power-sharing (Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010). Phase I of the conference concluded with a Declaration on the Cessation of Hostilities on 27 October 2002. Though
all faction leaders signed the ceasefire agreement, they thereafter regularly violated it (ICG, 2003; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010).

Phase II of the conference was led by the TC and a Leaders’ Committee (LC) comprising of the faction leaders while negotiations occurred within six thematic committees\(^\text{13}\) (Schlee, 2010). This phase produced a draft of the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) which was signed on 15 September 2003 and revised on 29 January 2004 in the Safari Park Declaration (ICG, 2004a). The TFC formed the basis of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) namely a 275-member Transitional Federal Assembly (TFA) and a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004). Selection to the TFA was based on the 4.5 formula; that is, Darood, Hawiye, Dir and Dir-Rahanweyn clan-families would each have 60 MPs, while the minorities would contribute 35 (Eno et al. 2010; Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004). In October 2004, the TFA elected TFG president, who then appointed the prime minister. Some have argued that Ethiopia influenced the election of Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf as the TFG president (Bamfo, 2010; Healy, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007; Woodward, 2004).

Soon thereafter, the TFG split into two broad wings over the interpretation of the Charter, deployment of international peacekeepers and location of the government. One wing, which was led by TFA Speaker Sheikh Hassan Aden, opposed deployment of international peacekeepers and preferred Mogadishu as the capital. The other wing, which was led by TFG President, Yusuf Abdullahi, preferred deployment and opted for Baidoa as the provisional capital until insecurity in Mogadishu was resolved. Ultimately, the dispute degenerated into a fractious war and the Nairobi process failed as the TFG could hardly exert its influence in Somalia after it relocated in June 2006. Nonetheless, the „TFG limped on until [the UN initiated] a new round of negotiations’ in May 2008 in Djibouti (Kasaija, 2010: 9).

Several factors caused the failure of the Nairobi process (Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010). This process did not address the substantive conflict issues; the Mogadishu group rejected the TFG’s federal vision; the process did not resolve mutual hostility

\(^{13}\) These committees were: federalism and provisional charter; DDR; land and property rights; economic recovery, institution building and resource mobilisation; conflict resolution and reconciliation; and regional and international relations’ (Schlee, 2010: 127).
between the former TNG and SRRC factions; the process did not address the pervasive complexity of fear that had been produced by the prolonged violence; the 4.5 formula had pitfalls; there were many spoilers who feared the return of a state authority; and finally the international actors supported the TFG without reservations even though it was a party to the post-Nairobi conflict.

4.3.2 Sanaa reconciliation meeting

Some MPs from the Speaker’s wing boycotted TFA sessions in Nairobi in early 2005 and relocated to Mogadishu due to the conflict over the location of the capital and deployment of international peacekeepers (Menkhaus, 2007). Thus, the TFA did not meet again for the next year. Concerned about the conflict, the President of Yemen invited the protagonists to Sanaa for a reconciliation meeting in January 2006. At the end of the meeting on 5 January 2006, President Yusuf and Sheikh Aden signed a reconciliation agreement that broke the deadlock within the TFIs. All international actors including the AU, the UN and the LAS welcomed the agreement. More importantly, the agreement allowed for convening of the first session of the TFA in Baidoa on 26 February 2006 (ICG, 2006b). Three months thereafter, on 14 June, the TFA adopted the National Security and Stabilisation Plan (NSSP) (ICG, 2006b; Menkhaus, 2007). In June, however, the SCIC emerged as the strongest military and political force in Mogadishu after defeating the US supported ARPTC.14

4.3.3 Khartoum peace meeting

SCIC’s rise created the necessary conditions for dialogue. Whilst the defeated groups, which previously spoiled, recognised the need for resolution, hence, there were now two major groups, one with international support and no domestic legitimacy and the other one with domestic legitimacy and no international recognition. As Menkhaus (2007: 369)

14 The US had been concerned that failed states, particularly lawless Somalia, could become a sanctuary of international terrorists. The 7 August 1998 terrorists bombing of the US embassies in East Africa, and the 2002 bombing of a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, escalated those fears. Menkhaus (2007: 368) has argued that lack of a central government in Somalia led the US ‘to forge partnerships with non-state actors on counter-terrorism monitoring and rendition.’ These non-state actors included warlords. The formation of the ARPTC by these warlords attracted the fury of the Islamists. They therefore engaged the ARPTC in a series of battles from January 2006 that culminated in the Islamists victory in June 2006. SCIC’s rise reduced the TFG to a minor actor and worried Somaliland and Puntland administrations.
notes, the win of the SCIC over the ARPCT increased the ‘national power of the Islamists.’ Indeed, the SCIC had a clear leadership structure, well-articulated political positions and a cross-cutting constituency (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Menkhaus, 2007). It therefore attracted a ‘broad and sometimes passionate support of Somalis’ within Somalia and in the diaspora (Menkhaus, 2007: 370). Additionally, the SCIC unified Mogadishu for the first time in 16 years (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Menkhaus, 2007). Certainly, writes Menkhaus (2007: 370), ‘most of the international community’ started pressuring the TFG ‘to engage in dialogue with the CIC in order to form a government of national unity.’ It is on this basis that the TFG and the SCIC attended a peace meeting in Khartoum, Sudan, on 22 June 2006. The Khartoum meeting led to mutual recognition. However, the SCIC’s Islamist and pan-Somali orientation worried the Ethiopians (Bamfo, 2010; Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007).

As the war of words escalated between the SCIC and Ethiopia in July, Ethiopian troops entered Somalia, supposedly to support the TFG (Bamfo, 2010; Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Menkhaus, 2007). Consequently, the Khartoum power sharing deal collapsed as the SCIC refused to engage with the TFG as long as Ethiopian troops were in Somalia. In December 2006, a full scale military confrontation ensued after the Islamists gave Ethiopia a seven day ultimatum to leave Somalia (Bamfo, 2010; Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; Menkhaus, 2007). In January 2007, the Ethiopian military drove out the SCIC out of Somalia and installed the TFG in Mogadishu. This ouster triggered an insurgency. On 19 January 2007, the AU Peace and Security Commission (AUPSC) authorised the deployment of AMISOM for six months to support the TFIs (AMISOM, 2010). On 27 February 2007 the UNSC approved the AUPSC authorisation (AMISOM, 2010).

4.3.4 Djibouti IV peace process

The TFG organised a National Reconciliation Congress (NRC) in Mogadishu in July 2007, whose key resolutions included an end to inter-clan violence, ceasefire and voluntary DDR, and the return of looted property (UNPOS, 2010). The NRC also urged the TFG to conduct census, draft a federal constitution, re-build state institutions and prepare the country for a free and fair elections before its mandate expired in 2009.
However, the TFG was too weak and lacked internal legitimacy to implement these resolutions. Meanwhile, the SCIC leaders regrouped in Eritrea and Yemen where they formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) in September 2007 (Kasaija, 2010: 269). The ARS’s primary objective was to fight the Ethiopians and the TFG. It was a broad alliance of some MPs, diaspora and clan groups that supported the SCIC and the Islamic movements - the traditional Sufists and the Salafists (ICG, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007).

Thus, the alliance members did not have a common approach towards the TFG or share a common interpretation of Islam and the relationship between Islam and the Somali statehood (Elliot and Holzer, 2009; ICG, 2008; Menkhaus, 2007). While the Salafists viewed the TFG as a lackey of Ethiopians and preferred military approaches, the Sufists opted for negotiations with the TFG if Ethiopians withdrew. It is these divergent viewpoints that informed the two groups approach to the 2008 UN-sponsored Djibouti IV peace process. The Sufi wing of the ARS attended the peace negotiations, while the Salafists rejected negotiations and formed an armed movement Hizbul al-Islam (HAI) which supported the Al-Shabaab led armed resistance.

The Djibouti IV process comprised of four phases (Kasaija, 2010). Phase I started on 9 May 2008 and entailed parties submitting their positions and substantive issues for negotiation. It culminated with a ceasefire agreement. Phase II started on 1 June and involved negotiations over procedural issues, withdraw of Ethiopia and deployment of international peacekeepers. Phase III took place on 25 and 26 October and ended with the parties signing a Joint Declaration on the Modalities for the Implementation of the Cessation of Armed Confrontation. This accord provided for implementation of the May ceasefire agreement and deployment of 10 000 ARS/TFG security forces in Mogadishu. Phase IV started on 22 November and ended on 25 November when the parties signed an agreement that expanded the TFA by 275 seats. The ARS was allocated 200 of these seats while 75 went to the civil society including women. These agreements were regarded as addendums to the 2004 TFC (Kasaija, 2010). According to Kasaija (2010: 261), the Djibouti process came to a climax at the end of January 2009 when the ARS leader, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, was elected the president of the new unity government.”
Al-Shaabab and Hizbul al-Islam have since then escalated violence and the TFG is currently ‘on life support’ (ICG, 2011).

4.4 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to highlight the main peace processes for Somalia, to explore why they have failed and to interrogate the role of international actors. The chapter has shown that the processes have failed to end violence or build sustainable post-agreement institutions for four main reasons. Firstly, the peace processes did not build the confidence of the internal actors in the emergent institutions particularly the post-agreement state. As a result, there is pervasive fear of the emergent state. The roots of this fear lies in the character of the state under General Siyaad Barre. Barre’s brutal repression created „in the minds of Somalis the perception of the state not as an instrument of governance but as a tool for domination and expropriation by one group over others’ (Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 2000: 215). That is, Barre used the state to extract wealth and resources from the population, and as an instrument of clan and ethnic exclusion. Additionally, massive violence was perpetrated against the population in the name of the state and by the state. That problem was worsened by post-Barre’s cycles of violence.

Secondly, the peace processes have hardly addressed the question of the looted properties and the occupied productive lands in the inter-riverine areas. Indeed, this question is the heart of the differences between centrists and federalists. Thirdly, those controlling the conflict constituencies and the war economy feared accountability for war crimes and human rights abuses, and reparations for the war victims (Hansen, 2003: 65; Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 2000: 216). They therefore preferred to undermine the peace processes. Fourthly, and this is the main research question of this dissertation, all the peace processes have been initiated, supported and financed by external actors and held in foreign cities or towns. Thus, the international actors who initiated or opposed these peace interventions played key roles in their outcomes.
Chapter 5
Exploring the interests and fears of the international actors

5.1 Introduction

Menkhaus (2004, cited in Kasaija, 2010) has observed that peacemaking efforts in Somalia have an identifiable pattern. An external actor initiates a peace process in a town outside Somalia. Most Somali actors participate in the process, but their main concerns are representation in the negotiations and post-agreement power sharing. The negotiations end with a peace agreement that is never implemented and the initiative adds onto the many failed peace processes as Somali actors return to their residences in third countries leaving the host country with a large bill. Why then do international actors initiate peace processes?

Firstly, the trans-border consequences of the prolonged conflict threaten regional and international peace and security. These consequences include influx of refugees and other forms of migration, proliferation of arms, increase in regional banditry, trans-national crimes and human trafficking (Healy, 2011; ICG, 2007, 2006b, 2004b, 2002a; Menkhaus, 2003a; Raffaelli, 2007; Schlee, 2010). Others are concerns that Somalia has become a haven of Islamic extremists and international terrorists and worries over piracy off the coast of Somalia (Bamfo, 2010; Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Bryden, 2003; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; Kisiangani, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a, 2003a, 2002a, 2002b). Secondly, the prolonged conflict has devastatingly destroyed the internal political, economic and socio-cultural institutions such that Somalia cannot recover on its own (Besteman, 1996a; Covey et al, 2005; Menkhaus, 2003a; Raffaelli, 2007; Weinstein, 2005). The international actors are therefore bound by moral imperative to intervene as Somalis share a common humanity with the other human societies. The international expression of this moral commitment is the doctrine of the responsibility to protect. Thirdly, the international actors have third party roles in resolution of the conflict (Covey et al, 2005; Darby and Mac Ginty, 2003; Ross, 2000). These roles include facilitation of peace processes and mediation, guaranteeing peace agreements and managing escalation of violence through militarised interventions as envisioned and practised under chapter VII of the UN charter.
Due to state collapse, third parties have an extra burden of providing a vision of the post-conflict state.

Thus, all the international actors, who have been involved in Somalia’s post-2001 peace processes, have their interests and fears. As President Guelleh of Djibouti (AFP, 2006) observed, „there are external and internal factors that come into play, to impose their ulterior interests and each time we failed.’ Exploring these interests holds the key to understanding the effect of international actors on the outcomes of post-2001 peace processes. Thus, section 5.2 will highlight the interests of the main international players who featured in the post-2001 peace processes, while section 5.3 will analyse how these interests competed in the peace processes.

5.2 Exploring the interests, fears and priorities

5.2.1 Global, continental and regional institutions

United Nations (UN)

The UN first intervened in Somalia in 1992 in response to the devastating violence, dire humanitarian crisis and failed state „threats to international stability’ (Diel, 1996: 154). As the main custodian of international peace and security, the UNSC passed resolution S/RES/733 of 1992 which imposed an arms embargo on Somalia. The UN’s direct intervention suffered a blow when UNOSOM I and II fought Somali militias. It therefore changed tact and supported regional approaches (Ghebremeskel, 2002). Though the UN established UNPOS in 1995, it did not show much interest in Somalia again until 11 September 2001. In 2002, the UNSC passed two resolutions, S/RES/1407 of 3 May and S/RES/1425 of 22 July, which reaffirmed the arms embargo and supported the peace process in Kenya. Interestingly, none of the two resolutions identified Somalia as a threat to international peace and security. The first resolution that explicitly mentions Somalia’s threat to international peace and security is S/RES/1474 of 8 April 2003. All subsequent UNSC resolutions, including the latest, S/RES/1976 of 11 April 2011, have consistently mentioned the threat. Similarly, all post-2002 UNSC President’s statements and the UNSG’s reports on Somalia have underlined Somalia’s threats to international security.
We therefore infer that the UN’s interests in Somalia’s post-2001 peace processes range from moral imperative to concerns over the trans-border implications of the Somali conflict. However, the UN’s resolutions and statements led to conflicting interpretations of its priorities. Their emphasis on Somalia’s territorial integrity, stabilisation and reconciliation was interpreted by some actors as support for building of a strong centralised state. The UN also endorsed the building block approach and supported the TFIs that emerged from the Nairobi process (ICG, 2008, 2004b; Hansen, 2003; Menkhaus, 2007). This led to the perception that the UN had „forfeited its neutrality in the conflict” (Menkhaus, 2007: 364).

The African Union (AU)

The OAU’s role in pre-2001 peace processes was peripheral though it created the MCPMR to lead its peace interventions in 1995. The AU, which replaced the OAU in 2002, has been more involved. Indeed, the AUPSC 6th session of 29 April 2004 endorsed the Nairobi process, while the session on 7 February 2005 authorised the deployment of an IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) (AUPSC, 2004a; ICG, 2004a; Kasaija, 2010). The mission was not deployed.

In June 2006, the AUPSC appealed to the UNSC to authorise the deployment of an international peacekeeping mission (AUPSC, 2006a; Kasaija, 2010). The UNSC formally approved the request in December 2006. However, Ethiopia’s military intervention delayed deployment. At its 69th meeting on 19 January 2007, the AUPSC authorised the deployment of AMISOM to replace Ethiopians. The UNSC supported the authorisation on 20 February 2007 and stipulated AMISOM’s mandate as inter alia protection of the TFG, peacekeeping and peacemaking. The AUPSC also supported the Djibouti IV process and has since then supported AMISOM’s international forums on implementation of the Djibouti peace agreement (ICG, 2011). However, AMISOM lacks capability to enforce
peace as it „has no presence beyond some parts of Mogadishu“ (Kasaija, 2010: 278). Indeed, key Somali actors such as Al-Shabaab view AMISOM as a party to the conflict.

We thus infer that the AU’s interests have led to divergent priorities. The moral imperative interests have led to emphasis on Somalia’s territorial integrity, but some have faulted this as support for a centralised state (ICG, 2009b, 2009a, 2006a). The AU’s concerns over the trans-border consequences of the conflict have led it to prioritise stabilisation and rebuilding of the state, but this has been hampered by lack of a common understanding of the post-conflict state. The AU’s third party intervention interests have emphasised conflict resolution aspects such as dialogue and reconciliation, but this been undermined by statelessness and an array of spoilers.

*Inter-government Authority on Development IGAD*

IGAD did not play any significant role in pre-2001 peace processes. Until 2002, writes Healy (2011: 113), ‘IGAD played no institutional role in Somali reconciliation beyond endorsing Ethiopian and Djiboutian initiatives.’ The organisation’s involvement in post-2001 peace processes was inspired by concerns over cross-border implications of the conflict. Nonetheless, facets of moral imperative and third party intervention were evident. IGAD’s effectiveness in the peace processes was, however, hampered by the competing interests of its members.

In the Djibouti III process, Ethiopia and Djibouti took divergent positions and thereafter supported different factions; Djibouti supported the TNG while Ethiopia supported the SRRC (ICG, 2004a, 2003a, 2002a; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007). IGAD responded by requesting Sudan to host another peace process to reconcile the TNG and the SRRC.

---

15 IGAD has estimated that 20 000 troops are needed, but the current deployment stands at 9 600, that is, 5 200 Ugandans and 4 400 Burundians.


17 IGAD was founded in 1986 as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) to address challenges of drought and famine in the Horn of Africa. Founding members were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Eritrea joined in 1993. The IGADD changed its name to IGAD in 1996 and reviewed its mandate to emphasise conflict resolution.

60
Subsequently, IGAD appointed a technical committee comprising of Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia to lead the reconciliation process, which took place in Kenya from 2002 to 2004 (ICG, 2004b, 2003a, 2002b; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004). The process was financed by ‘European development funds’ (Healy, 2011: 113). But the competing interests of IGAD members hampered the organisation’s stewardship of the Nairobi process (ICG, 2004b, 2003a, 2002b). Indeed, the final outcome, the TFIs split into two factions: President Yusuf’s TFG and the Mogadishu group. Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda supported the TFG, while Djibouti and Eritrea sympathised with the Mogadishu group. Thereafter, in January 2005, IGAD decided to establish IGASOM to support the TFG. The mission was never deployed. Subsequently, IGAD endorsed the Sana’a, Khartoum and Djibouti IV peace processes.

*The League of Arab States (LAS)*

Somalis are Muslims, but they are not Arabs. Somalia joined the LAS in 1974 and the LAS members are Somalia’s major trading partners. However, the LAS as an institution did not initiate any of the pre-2001 peace process. In 2000, the LAS sponsored the Djibouti III process, which produced the TNIs – TNG and TNA - whose central goal was rebuilding of a centralised state (ICG, 2002a, 2002b; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010). The LAS involvement encouraged individual Arab countries to support the TNG bilaterally (Schlee, 2010). The TNG failed to function. Thereafter, writes ICG (2006b), the LAS’s role in the Nairobi process was mostly peripheral, but the League supported and financed the Sana’a and Khartoum processes. According to ICG (2002a: 9), the League remained consistent and „maintained a unified position on Somalia despite natural differences between its members.’ That is, the LAS stood for Somalia’s territorial integrity and the formation „of a strong central government capable of holding its own vis-à-vis Ethiopia’ (ICG, 2002: 9). Thus, the LAS involvement in Somalia’s post-2001 peace processes was motivated by its concerns over the trans-border implications of the conflict, its members’ business interests and desire to control Ethiopia’s influence in Somalia. It therefore prioritised rebuilding of one Somalia under a strong central government.
ICG (2008: 27) observes that „European states have been mostly content to let the AU and the UN’ lead in Somalia’s peace processes. According to Schlee (2010), the European countries opted to channel their contributions through the EU. The EU, as Raffaelli (2007: 125) notes, considered Somalia „a key security factor in the Horn of Africa’ and a part of the „regional systems of insecurities [that] feed on one another’ thus affecting the whole region negatively. Thus, the EU’s prime interests revolve around the trans-border implications of the conflict as Europe has become a „home to a growing Somali diaspora’ (ICG, 2008: 27). As Raffaelli (2007: 127) puts it, the EU’s „primary concern [is] the risks of immigration and the obvious links to the Middle East region.’ The EU’s other main motivation has been moral imperative. „Somalia’s problems will not be solved by Somalis alone,’ writes Raffaelli (2007: 128), „both for the unique set of problems of a country devoid of any institutions for over 16 years and for the meddling of (mainly foreign) actors within the regional context.’

These concerns led the EU to finance the Nairobi process for two years (Raffaelli, 2007; Schlee, 2010). Thereafter, the EU continued providing budgetary support to the TFG, but as ICG (2008: 27) has observed, its „interactions with Somali actors … remained “decidedly” minimalist.’ The EU played no role in the Sana’a and Khartoum processes, but it provided the UN-led Djibouti IV process with „€254 million for political reconciliation’ (ICG, 2008: 27). The EU has prioritised stabilisation, dialogue and reconciliation so as to prevent Somalia from „drifting into a state of war which would enflame the entire region’ (Raffaelli, 2007: 127).

5.2.2 Regional states

Djibouti

Djibouti is a very small country – only 23 000 km² and 750 000 people of which sixty per cent are ethnic Somalis. It shares with Somalia a fifty eight (58) kilometre border and Islamic religion. The country has been intensely involved in Somalia’s peace processes; it hosted the first two peace conferences in June and July 1991 and the 2000 Djibouti III
process (ICG, 2003a, 2002a, 2002b; Kasaija, 2010; Lewis, 2008). Djibouti was also actively involved in the Nairobi process and supported the Sana’a and Khartoum processes. Besides opposing deployment of international peacekeepers (IRIN, 2006), Djibouti hosted the 2008 UN-led peace process, which resulted from „a genuine consensus that the only way forward was a peace process involving the Islamists and eventually leading to a power-sharing accord’ (ICG, 2008: 23).

Djibouti does not have the necessary economic, military or human resources to engage in hard power tactics. It has also received only 14 216 (2%) out of the 658 773 recorded Somali refugees as at December 2010 (UNHCR, 2011). Therefore, its involvement in Somalia’s peace processes seems to be motivated by „familiarity with the problems at hand and the cultural, social, and historical affinity’ (Ghebremeskel, 2002: 21). Indeed, „ethnic and historical ties … place Djibouti under a special obligation to show leadership in Somali affairs’ (ICG, 2002a: 10). This means Djibouti’s geographical, historical and cultural proximity to Somalia have imposed on it moral imperative and third party intervention responsibilities. Djibouti has prioritised rebuilding of a strong central state, dialogue and reconciliation (ICG, 2008, 2004b, 2002b; IRIN, 2006).

Ethiopia

Geography and history have inextricably tied Ethiopia to Somalia. The two countries share a 1,600 kilometres border, have in the past fought two wars and engaged in mutual destabilisation through supporting each other’s armed opponents (Bamfo, 2010; Cliffe, 1999; ICG, 2009b, 2007; Menkhaus, 2007). Yet, Ethiopia hosted the UN-led 1993 Addis Ababa and the 1996 Sodere processes. Ethiopia opposed the outcome of Djibouti III process and was a major player in the Nairobi process. Indeed, a key highlight of the Nairobi process was competition between Ethiopia, Djibouti and Egypt. As Schlee (2010: 123) notes, „the Ethiopians abstained from diplomatic restraint and played rather open power politics.’ Some have argued that Ethiopia influenced the election of the TFG President (ICG, 2004b; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010). Indeed, Ethiopia was on the receiving end during Djibouti IV process.
In addition, the Ethiopian military entered Somalia in August 1996 and January 1997, targeting Al-Itihaad Al-Islaami, an Islamist organisation which Ethiopia held responsible for bomb attacks in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa\textsuperscript{18} (ICG, 2010, 2006b, 2005b, 2002a; Menkhaus, 2002a, 2002b; Schlee, 2010). It intervened again in 2006 after the ascendant Islamists expressed anti-Ethiopian sentiments and invoked pan-Somali nationalism complete with its irredentist claims over the Ogadeen (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; ICG, 2007a; Menkhaus, 2007; Radio Somaliland, 2006).

We therefore surmise that Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia’s peace processes has been motivated by its security and strategic concerns. These include cross-border consequences, worries over Somalia’s irredentism and support to armed insurgencies in the Ogadeen, Islamic extremism and terrorism (ICG, 2008, 2007, 2006b, 2005a; Menkhaus, 2007, 2002a, 2002b). Ethiopia has also been concerned about Eritrea as the two countries have engaged in a proxy conflict in Somalia after their 1998-2000 war (Bamfo, 2010; ICG, 2008, 2007, 2005a, 2004a). As Bryden (2003) sums it, Ethiopia prefers a friendly, cooperative government for Somalia that would address its security needs, abandon irredentist claims, deny insurgents such as OLF, ONLF and UWSLF operational areas, and provide it with a secure access to the sea. These interests have led Ethiopia to prioritise a building block approach to state-building and localised approach to reconciliation in Somalia (Hansen, 2003; ICG, 2009a; Menkhaus, 2007, 2003a). “The building block approach,” writes Hansen (2003: 60), “promotes a decentralised state consisting of regions that have extensive powers. Puntland and Somaliland are cited as examples that have benefitted from such a strategy.”

\textit{Kenya}

Kenya shares a 682 kilometres border with Somalia and has a small Somali population. The country has received the highest number of Somali refugees; 353 208 (53.6\%) out of the recorded 658 773 as at December 2010 (UNHCR, 2011). The influx of refugees has been worsened by cross-border flow of arms, incursions by armed groups, increase in banditry in north-eastern Kenya and transnational crime (ICG, 2002a; Menkhaus, 2003b;

\textsuperscript{18} Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, addressed a press conference on this question in Addis Ababa on 27 June 2006 where he emphasised Al Itihaad’s role in the bombings. For details see:\url{http://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/Archive/}. Accessed 03 May 2011.
Schlee, 2010). Additionally, Kenya experienced international terrorist attacks in Nairobi and Mombasa in August 1998 and November 2002 respectively. Somalia was suspected to have been ‘a conduit for personnel and materials’ that was involved in these bombings (Menkhaus, 2002a: 118). Indeed, in 2007 and 2008, the US launched air strikes on villages in southern Somalia, near the Kenyan border, targeting several individuals whom it wanted in connection with the bombings (ICG, 2010, 2008). In addition, all the international agencies that work in Somalia including UNPOS and AMISOM have their offices in Nairobi. Kenya has also been prosecuting arrested Somali pirates.

Kenya’s role in the pre-2001 peace processes was mainly supportive. In 2001, IGAD requested Sudan to host Somali reconciliation conference, but the TNG objected to Sudan leading the process (Woodward, 2004). IGAD then appointed a technical committee comprising of Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia to lead the process. Kenya chaired the committee and hosted the peace process, first in Eldoret and then in Nairobi (ICG, 2002b, 2004b; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010). The progress of the conference was characterised by disputes among IGAD members (ICG, 2004a, 2002b). Kenya often sided with Ethiopia. As ICG (2004a: 4) notes, ‘Kenya's tendency to align with the Ethiopian position encouraged perceptions of Ethiopian dominance of the process and attracted increasingly vocal criticism from Somalis and international observers alike.’

In 2003, however, Kenya’s ‘desire to restore an aura of neutrality to the process’ saw it shift its sympathies towards the TNG (ICG, 2004b: 12). This wavering was due to Kenya’s internal politics than its policy shift towards Somalia. Despite portraying itself as ‘an honest and non-partisan peace mediator’ and a good neighbour (KPPS, 2004), Kenya thereafter consistently supported the TFG and its federal vision as well as deployment of international peacekeepers (ICG, 2011, 2004b). We can therefore argue that Kenya’s main interest in Somalia’s peace processes is its strategic and security concerns. Thus, the country has prioritised stabilisation, border security and rebuilding of a state that would address its security needs.
**Eritrea**

Eritrea does not share border or a population group with Somalia. The number of Somali refugees in the country, 4,469 (0.7%) as at December 2010, is extremely small. Eritrea is a member of IGAD, but it suspended its participation in 2007 (Reuters, 2007). Eritrea has also not initiated or hosted any peace process for Somalia; it has nonetheless been engaging Ethiopia in a proxy war (Bamfo, 2010; ICG, 2007, 2006b, 2004a). While Ethiopia supported the TFG and rejected the SCIC in 2006, Eritrea supported the Islamists (ICG, 2007a, 2006b; Reuters, 2010). When the TFG organised a national reconciliation conference (NRC) in September 2007 that attracted the support of the AU and the UN, Eritrea hosted a parallel conference in Asmara that ended with the formation of the ARS (AFP, 2007; ICG, 2008, 2007a). Thus, Eritrea’s involvement in Somalia has been motivated by its hostile relations with Ethiopia. In December 2009, the UNSC imposed sanctions on Eritrea due to its activities in Somalia.

**Yemen**

Yemen is adjacent to Somalia across the Gulf of Aden. The two countries share membership of the LAS and the OIC and Yemen is Somalia’s biggest trading partner. Yemen also has a huge number of Somali refugees, 180,341 (27.5%) as at December 2010, and serves as a bridge to migrants heading to the Gulf States (IASC, 2008; ICG, 2008; UNHCR, 2011). According to Menkhaus (2003b), Yemen is among those weak and corrupt states that are suspected to harbour international terrorist networks. Indeed, the US aircraft carrier USS Cole was attacked in Yemen on 12 October 2000 (BBC, 2000). Additionally, a Yemen national, Suleiman Abdalla, who was suspected of being involved in the 1998 bombing of the US embassies in East Africa, was arrested in March 2003 in Mogadishu, where he was running a hotel business (Bryden, 2003; ICG, 2005a; Menkhaus, 2003b). Meanwhile, Somali pirates have been more active on the Yemen side of the Gulf of Aden as shown by Map 5.1 below.

Thus, Yemen has direct interests in Somalia’s peace processes. While it endorsed the LAS interventions in pre-2001 processes, it engaged directly with the Somali actors after 2001. In January 2006, Yemen hosted the Sana’a process that reconciled the TFA speaker and
the TFG president. Later in December 2006, Yemen made efforts to facilitate dialogue between the TFG and the Islamists (ICG, 2008). After Djibouti IV process split the ARS, Yemen pursued reconciliation between ARS-Djibouti and ARS-Asmara factions (ICG, 2008). Yemen’s involvement in these peace processes was motivated by moral imperative and its concerns over the conflict’s trans-border consequences. Yemen supported rebuilding of a strong centralised state.

Uganda

Uganda and Somalia do not share border but they share IGAD and AU membership. The number of Somali refugees in Uganda as at December 2010 is only 18 263 (2.7%). The country did not play any role in the pre-2001 peace processes, but it actively participated in the Nairobi process, strongly supported the emergent TFG and was the first country to send troops when the AU and the UN established AMISOM in 2007. According to Kasaija
Uganda advanced three reasons for contributing troops\(^{19}\): „being a member of IGAD, AU and the UN. Thus it was responding to a call of these bodies to help stabilise the situation in Somalia; the remuneration and associated benefits of Uganda’s soldiers were guaranteed with regard to allowances, feeding, medi-care and compensation in case of injury or death; and its participation in AMISOM was to be budget neutral as all the costs were covered by the AU.” Thus, Uganda’s involvement was motivated by moral imperative. The country has since then been on the firing line of Al Shabaab. Indeed, more than forty Ugandan soldiers have died in Somalia, while Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for bomb explosions that rocked Kampala in June 2009 (Matsiko, 2010). This means concerns over trans-border implications of the conflict have inspired its stay in Somalia. Thus, Uganda prioritised stability, reconciliation and defeat of extremism.

**Sudan**

Sudan shares with Somalia membership of the AU, LAS, OIS and IGAD. In the 1990s, Sudan’s Islamists inspired political Islam across the Horn of Africa including Somalia (Menkhaus, 2002a, 2002b; Woodward, 2004). However, Sudan’s role in Somalia peace processes was peripheral due to its civil wars. Sudan’s first direct involvement was the 2006 Khartoum peace process which it facilitated on behalf of the LAS (ICG, 2006b). However, the Khartoum process unravelled as radical Islamists won the movement’s internal power contestations prompting Ethiopia to intervene militarily (AFP, 2006; ICG, 2007a, 2006b; Menkhaus, 2007). Sudan had no role in the subsequent Djibouti IV process. Thus, the country’s involvement in Somalia’s peace processes appears to have been motivated by moral imperative, particularly the Islamic connection, and third party intervention. As ICG (2006b: 21) notes, „Khartoum’s Islamist credentials and its warming relations with Ethiopia recommended it as a mediator. Its support to AIAI in the early 1990s also implied an unparalleled degree of access to the militants within the Courts.” Sudan supported rebuilding of a centralised, albeit Islamic, state in Somalia.

\(^{19}\) I discussed this subject with AMISOM’s force commander, General Nathan Mugisha, and AMISOM’s spokesperson, Major-General Barigye Ba-Hoku, on the side-lines of an AMISOM confidence building workshop for troops and potential troops contributing countries (TCCs) in Kampala, Uganda, on 2-3 December 2009. The two officers emphasised that Uganda was in Somalia due to its Pan-African commitment.
5.2.3 Others

Italy

Italy has economic interests in Somalia, particularly in banana farming (Gross-Kettler, 2004). The country supported all pre-2001 peace processes, but some factions accused it of partiality (ICG, 2004a; Schlee, 2010). Italy opted to pursue its interests through the EU in post-2001 peace processes (ICG, 2008; Raffaelli, 2007; Schlee, 2010). In the Nairobi process, Italy participated in the Somalia International Contact Group\(^{20}\) and co-chaired with Norway the IGAD Partners Forum, a group of development partners that were financially supporting IGAD (Raffaelli, 2007; Schlee, 2010). Italy also supported the EU and the UN’s positions in the Khartoum and Djibouti IV processes. Italy fears the trans-border consequences of the conflict; thus, it prioritised stabilisation, dialogue and reconciliation.

United States of America

The US did not intervene in 1991 as it was engaged in the first Gulf War, but it led UNITAF and was heavily involved in UNOSOM I and II. However, the ‘black hawk down’ experience dispirited the Americans and they ignored Somalia until 11 September 2001. Thus, the US post-2001 engagements in Somalia’s peace processes have been informed by its war on terrorism (Bryden, 2003; ICG, 2008, 2007, 2005a; Menkhaus, 2002a, 2002b, 2003b). According to ICG (2007: 7), the US “provided tepid support for the IGAD peace process, which led to the formation of the TFG, but its policies have been dominated by military rather than political considerations.” While the Americans welcomed the Sana’a process, they also worked with the TFG opponents on counter-terrorism monitoring and rendition (ICG, 2007, 2005a; Menkhaus, 2007). This counter-terrorism work led to war between the warlords, who had formed the ARPCT, and the SCIC that ended with a decisive victory by the Islamists (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot

---

\(^{20}\) The International Contact Group was established by the UNSC in June 2006 to ‘to support the peace and reconciliation efforts in Somalia’. It comprises of EU, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Tanzania, the UK and the US. For details please see (http://www.norway-un.org/News/Archive_2006/20060615_somalia/, Accessed 05 May 2011).
and Holzer, 2009; ICG, 2007; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007). The „rapid defeat of the Alliance,” writes Menkhaus (2007: 369), „[was] an embarrassing setback for the US.’

As a result, the US wavered on the Khartoum peace processes. It initially encouraged Ethiopia to support power sharing between the TFG and the Islamists, but it later supported Ethiopia’s military intervention in December 2006 (ICG, 2007; Menkhaus, 2007). As ICG (2007: 7) avers, it went further and „participated in military attacks against the fleeing members of the Shabaab and suspected al-Qaeda figures.’ Subsequently, the US declared Al Shabaab a terrorist organisation and then conducted airstrikes in Dhoebly and Dhusamared in southern Somalia in March and May 2008 which targeted prominent Al-Shabaab leaders (ICG, 2008). The 1 May 2008 strike killed Aden Hashi „Ayro’, an Al-Shabaab commander who was on the US list of terrorists (ICG, 2008). Though the US supports AMISOM, it favours a stronger UN-led stabilisation force.

Egypt

Egypt share with Somalia membership of the AU, LAS and the OIC. Egypt provided Somalia with diplomatic and military support during its two wars with Ethiopia and lobbied for it to join the LAS (Osman, 2005). In 1991, Egypt directly supported Djibouti I and II peace processes, but it did not support the 1993 Addis Ababa process; instead, it supported the factions that boycotted the process (ICG, 2004a; Osman, 2005). In 1997, Egypt organised a parallel conference in Cairo instead of supporting the Ethiopian-led Sodere process (Healy, 2011; Ibrahim, 2010; ICG, 2004a, 2002a; Osman, 2007). This prompted the 6th IGAD Heads of State summit of 1998 to deplore proliferation of peace processes (Healy, 2011).

Egypt led the LAS in supporting the subsequent Djibouti III process and its outcome - the TNG -, but it opposed Ethiopia’s positions in the next Nairobi peace process (ICG, 2002b, 2004a, 2004b; Schlee, 2010). Thereafter, Egypt endorsed the Sana’a, Khartoum and Djibouti IV processes. We therefore deduce that Egypt’s interest in Somalia’s peace processes revolved around its competition with Ethiopia. This competition has its roots in the control of the Nile waters (ICG, 2009a; Osman, 2005). Ethiopia generates eighty six
per cent (86%) of the Nile water; but it cannot use it due to colonial Anglo-Egyptian treaties (Osman, 2005). This means Egypt has been using Somalia to distract Ethiopia.

Others

Other international actors who have been involved in Somalia include Libya and the Gulf States. Libya shares with Somalia membership of the AU, LAS and OIC. In 2006, Libya supported the Khartoum process and attempted to reconcile the TFG and the Islamists (ICG, 2006b). However, the TFG accused „Egypt, Libya and Iran … of supporting “terrorists” in Somalia’ (ICG, 2006b: 20). Libya’s efforts seem to have been motivated by moral imperative and Gaddafi’s pan-African agenda. Similarly, the Gulf States share membership of the LAS and the OIC with Somalia. These States particularly „Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) also have historical commercial ties with Somalia’ (ICG, 2002a: 9). Somalia’s main exports to the Gulf States include livestock products and charcoal while business people in the Gulf States have been exporting many goods into Somalia including weapons and printed currency (Gross-Kettler, 2004). „About 80 per cent of charcoal produced in Somalia is shipped to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates,’ writes Gross-Kettler (2004: 17). While the Gulf States host a substantial Somalia diaspora, Islamic charities, particularly from Saudi Arabia, were active in Somalia in the 1990s (Healy, 2011; ICG, 2010, 2008, 2006b, 2005, 2002a; Menkhaus, 2002a, 2002b). In all the peace processes, the Gulf States supported the position of the LAS and prioritised one strong centralised Somalia.

Table 5.1: Summary of international actors’ interests in post-2001 peace processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Form of intervention</th>
<th>Interests</th>
<th>Fears</th>
<th>Priorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations (UN)</td>
<td>a) Diplomatic and moral support to all peace processes</td>
<td>a) No threats to international Peace and security b) Moral</td>
<td>a) Trans-border implications b) International terrorism and piracy</td>
<td>a) Stabilisation b) Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>Impact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union (AU)</td>
<td>a) Diplomatic and moral support to all peace process</td>
<td>a) No threats to continental peace and security</td>
<td>a) Trans-border implications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Deploying AMISOM</td>
<td>b) Regional peace and security</td>
<td>b) Implications of Somalia’s break-up</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c) International terrorism and piracy</td>
<td>c) International terrorism and piracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a) Stabilisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b) Dialogue and reconciliation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Leading the Djibouti VI process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>a) Leading the Nairobi peace process</td>
<td>a) Regional peace and security</td>
<td>a) Trans-border implications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Diplomatic support to post-2004 peace processes</td>
<td>b) Good neighbourliness</td>
<td>b) International terrorism and piracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c) Resolution of the conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a) Stabilisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b) Building block approach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of the Arab States (LAS)</td>
<td>a) Sponsoring the Djibouti III process</td>
<td>a) No threats to regional peace and security</td>
<td>a) Trans-border consequences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Diplomatic and moral support to Sana’a and Khartoum processes</td>
<td>b) Members economic interests</td>
<td>b) Terrorism and piracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c) Containing Ethiopia’s influence in Somalia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a) Rebuilding of a strong centralised state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b) Dialogue and reconciliation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Threats</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>a) Diplomatic and financial support to the Nairobi and Djibouti IV processes</td>
<td>a) No threats to international peace and security</td>
<td>a) Stabilisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b) Dialogue and reconciliation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>a) Participating in the Nairobi process</td>
<td>a) Good neighbourliness</td>
<td>a) Rebuilding of a strong centralised state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Facilitating Djibouti IV process</td>
<td>b) Moral imperative interests</td>
<td>b) Dialogue and reconciliation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c) Diplomatic and moral support to Sana’a and Khartoum processes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>a) Diplomatic and moral support to the Nairobi process</td>
<td>a) Security and strategic interests</td>
<td>a) Building block approach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Installing the TFG in Mogadishu</td>
<td>b) Good neighbourliness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c) Eritrean factor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>a) Facilitating the Nairobi process</td>
<td>a) Security interests</td>
<td>a) Building block approach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Diplomatic and moral</td>
<td>b) Good neighbourliness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Reasons</td>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>a) Diplomatic and Moral support to Khartoum and Djibouti IV peace processes b) Facilitating the Sana’a process</td>
<td>a) Security interests b) Economic interests</td>
<td>a) Trans-border implications b) International terrorism and piracy</td>
<td>a) Rebuilding of a strong centralised state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Hosting the ARS conference</td>
<td>To distract Ethiopia</td>
<td>Ethiopia’s influence in the region</td>
<td>Not clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Diplomatic and moral support to the Nairobi and Djibouti IV processes</td>
<td>a) Economic interests b) Moral imperative interests</td>
<td>a) Trans-border implications b) International terrorism and piracy</td>
<td>a) Stabilisation b) Dialogue and reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>a) Diplomatic and moral support to the Nairobi and Djibouti IV processes</td>
<td>a) Security and strategic interests b) Flow of oil in the Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>a) International terrorism b) Piracy</td>
<td>a) Elimination of alleged terrorists b) Stabilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Diplomatic and moral support to Sana’a, Khartoum and</td>
<td>To contain Ethiopia’s influence in the region</td>
<td>Ethiopia’s influence in the region</td>
<td>Rebuilding of a strong centralised state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Contributions</td>
<td>Moral Implications</td>
<td>Building Block Approach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Uganda       | a) Contributing troops to AMISOM  
b) Diplomatic and moral support to Nairobi Djibouti IV | Moral imperative interests  
a) Trans-border implications  
b) International terrorism | a) Building block approach to state-building |
| Sudan        | a) Facilitating Khartoum peace process                                     | Implications of Somalia’s break-up            | Building of a centralised Islamic state        |
| Gulf states  | a) Diplomatic support to Sana’a, Khartoum and Djibouti IV                    | a) Economic interests  
b) Religious and moral imperatives | a) Trans-border implications  
b) International terrorism and piracy | Rebuilding of a strong centralised state |

### 5.3 Analysis: international actors competition in peace processes

The competition between the international actors took the form of parallel peace processes in the 1990s (Healy, 2011; Ibrahim, 2010; ICG, 2004a, 2002a). When „the Sodere process threatened to produce a new Somali government,” writes ICG (2002a: 8), „Egypt invited the key participants to a parallel conference in Cairo and effectively aborted the initiative.” In post-2001 peace processes, however, the competing interests were masked as contestations between three broad ideas on the outcomes of the peace processes and a future Somali nation-state.
The modernist ideas of the nation-state viewed the end goal of the peace processes as rebuilding of the Somali state as it existed prior to January 1991. Modernists, as Hansen (2003: 62) notes, ‘tried to find a solution for the whole of Somalia.’ Indeed, key proponents of modernist ideas such as Djibouti, Egypt and the Gulf States affirmed ‘Somali territorial integrity and the development of a strong central government capable of holding its own vis-à-vis Ethiopia’ (ICG, 2002a: 9). In contrast, post-modern perspectives argued that the old Somali nation-state was defunct. Thus, they viewed the final outcome as a new Somalia which reflected the post-1991 realities, which included the emergence of Somaliland and Puntland. As ICG (2004a: 10) avers, ‘Ethiopia managed to persuade IGAD and its international partners to endorse – over Egyptian objections - a new approach to political reconstruction… the building block approach.’ The third broad idea was articulated by the Islamists and sought to blend the Islamic worldview with modernist ideas of the nation-state (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; ICG, 2010, 2005; Menkhaus, 2002a, 2002b). However, the Islamists split ‘on two crucial issues, pan-Somali nationalism and the political utility of clans’ (ICG, 2010: 4).

The rivalry between proponents of modernist and post-modernist perspectives was intense in the Nairobi process while the Islamist viewpoints appeared in the Khartoum and Djibouti IV processes. The Nairobi process primarily aimed to reconcile the SRRC and the TNG coalitions, but the ‘IGAD's member states found it impossible to forge a common approach sometimes for reasons that [had] nothing to do with Somalia’ (ICG, 2004a: 10). Their rivalry appeared in all aspects from process management, delegates’ selection, negotiation of substantive conflict issues to support for the final outcome.

The Technical Committee (TC) of the IGAD frontline states was responsible for managing the process. But phase two was characterised by ‘unconstrained regional rivalries’ with Ethiopia, Djibouti and Egypt ‘working at cross-purposes, backing their respective proxies rather than seeking a way forward’ (ICG, 2002b: 6). Though Egypt was not a member of the committee, as it is not an IGAD member, it aggressively pursued its interests behind the scenes. As ICG (2002b: 6) avers, ‘both Ethiopia and Egypt intimated that they [were] prepared for renewed fighting if the talks [failed].’ Additionally, Djibouti often accused Kenya of mismanaging the process, while the ‘Kenyan and Ugandan governments engaged in a fairly public tussle over its leadership and venue’ (ICG, 2004a: 5).
Further, the „diametrically opposed interests” of international actors led them „to back rival factions, thus intensifying clan and political polarisation, undermining opportunities for dialogue and ultimately adding another layer to the Somalia conflict' (ICG, 2009a: 4). Ethiopia supported the SRRC coalition because it viewed the TNG as „as a stalking horse for Arab and Islamic domination of the Horn of Africa [and] a front for al-Qaeda’ (ICG, 2002a: 7). Both Kenya and Uganda sided with Ethiopia. In contrast, „Djibouti, Eritrea and Egypt were staunch TNG supporters’ (ICG, 2004a: 11). The Gulf States and the LAS also supported the TNG. As ICG (2002a: 9) avers, all LAS members had „a unified position on Somalia’.

In addition, ICG (2002b: 5) has observed that the „stalemate over participation reflected the perception’ that whoever had more delegates „would predetermine the final power-sharing arrangements.’ The initial plan was to have equal representation between the TNG and the SRRC coalitions. However, „Ethiopia's dominance of the Technical Committee and close involvement in conference mechanics such as organisation of the daily agenda and screening of delegates produced an increasingly noticeable bias in favour of the SRRC’ (ICG, 2004a: 4). As a result, notes Schlee (2010: 115), „groups which had originally been comprised within the fold of the SRRC [got] separate allocations of seats so that, as a part of the whole, the weight of the TNG was diminished.’ This led Diplomats from Djibouti, „the TNG's principal patron … to defend their client's interests in the Technical Committee triggering heated disputes with the Ethiopians’ (ICG, 2004a: 4).

Related to this were „disputes over distribution of seats’ (ICG, 2002b: 4). As more than 1000 delegates had arrived, instead of the expected 300, international actors wrangled over the formula that could be used to reduce them to a manageable number (ICG, 2002b; Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004). The rivalry „between Ethiopia and Djibouti over allocations for their respective Somali clients led to roughly a dozen revisions of the list during the first week of November [2002] alone,’ writes ICG (2002b: 4). The issue among Somali delegates was whether representation would be by faction or by clan. Both modernists and post-modernists preferred factional representation, but the crux of their dispute was the size of the faction representation. As ICG (2002b: 5) notes, „Djibouti and
Ethiopia sought to maximise their influence by ensuring that their proxies were disproportionately represented. The conference finally settled for the 4.5 formula.

Menkhaus (2007: 363) has argued that the Somali delegates did not „seriously engage on key conflict issues’ in the thematic committees. Nonetheless, the international actors competed over resolution of these issues especially the structure of a future state. Ethiopia promoted the building block approach because it „advocated support for de facto authorities, thus favouring Ethiopia's allies in Somaliland, Puntland, the Hiiraan region and the Bay region’ (ICG, 2002a: 11). Ethiopia also viewed a federal state as the best guard against the growth of Islamists. Kenya echoed the same position due to „fear that a reunited and prosperous nation might resurrect Somalia's territorial claims’ (ICG, 2004a: 11). According to Hansen (2003), IGAD had started promoting the building block approach in 1997 and the UN had accepted it.

In contrast, Djibouti, Eritrea, Egypt and the Gulf states supported the centralised approach to state-building. Djibouti was opposed to Somaliland’s secession, while Eritrea was driven „almost entirely by desire to frustrate Ethiopian ambitions’ (ICG, 2006b: 20). On its part, Egypt argued for a „strong, unified Somali state’ which would be „an essential counterweight to Ethiopian influence in the Horn’ (ICG, 2002a: 9). Egypt also saw a strong central state as the best guard against „Islamist political influence in Somalia’ (ICG, 2002a: 10). The LAS supported a centralised state because Egypt provided its leadership on Somalia affairs (ICG, 2003a). Meanwhile, the EU financed the process, but its „diplomatic engagement…remained low-key’ preferring to let the AU take the lead (ICG, 2004a: 12). Interestingly, the UK supported the peace process, but its parliamentarians showed in 2004 „a surprising level of bipartisan interest in support and recognition of the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland’ (ICG, 2004a: 12). On its part, the US contributed $350,000 to the Nairobi process, but it was reluctant „to re-engage in Somalia’ and prioritised its war on terror (ICG, 2004a: 13).

Another point of dispute was the question of Somaliland and Puntland. While Puntland participated in the Nairobi process, Somaliland declined the invitation arguing that „it represents an independent state, not a party to the Somali conflict’ (ICG, 2003a: 13). Post-modernists touted both entities as „building block(s) of a future federal Somali republic”,

78
but the modernists rejected these entities (ICG, 2004a: 1). As ICG (2002b: 10) notes, Djibouti had „used the Arta process and the establishment of the Transitional National Government as checks on the emergence of Somaliland.’ Meanwhile, Egypt „campaigned energetically against Somaliland independence and viewed creation of “mini-states” as a strategy by Addis Ababa and its allies to establish weak client entities incapable of challenging its strategic ambitions’ (ICG, 2009a: 4).

The outcome of the Nairobi process climaxed the competition between international actors. Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda fully embraced the TFG. For Ethiopia, writes ICG (2004a: 11), the outcome was „a political coup de grace’ as it formally established „a new more friendly transitional authority’. Similarly, the AU and the UN and its lead aid agencies such as the UNDP fully supported the TFG arguing that they were supporting the „recognised transitional government” (Menkhaus, 2007: 364). In contrast, „Djibouti and Egypt – supporters of the previous transitional government – [were] less enthusiastic’ (ICG, 2004b: 2). The LAS and the Gulf States also received the TFG coldly. Meanwhile, the EU was split with Italy embracing the TFG and the UK urging caution (ICG, 2004a; Menkhaus, 2007). On its part, the US adopted „a "slow, measured approach" that [was] interpreted as a distinct lack of enthusiasm for the new leadership’ (ICG, 2004b: 2).

A key consequence of the competition was reinforcing of Somali actors’ perception of the Nairobi process as „a forum for political struggle rather than reconciliation and compromise’ (ICG, 2004a: 7). Hence, they viewed the outcome as a victory for the SRRC over the TNG. This led to split of the TFG into two wings. Thus, the Sana’a initiative was an effort to reconcile these two groups. It was short-lived and without competition. However, the next Khartoum peace meeting did witness clashing of interests with the key issue being the role of the Islamists in the transitional institutions and post-transition state. Djibouti, Egypt and the Gulf States rooted for accommodation of the moderate Islamists, but Ethiopia objected (ICG, 2010a, 2008, 2006b). Menkhaus (2007: 370) argues that the question would have been resolved in Islamists favour had the moderates contained „the hardliners and jihadists’ and assuaged „the external spoiler’- Ethiopia - and the United States.
In the subsequent Djibouti IV process, all international actors agreed that the moderate Islamists had a role in the transitional institutions and post-transition state-building (ICG, 2011, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a). Nonetheless, the competition between Ethiopia and the Gulf States surfaced as the former felt the UN officials were letting the latter, particularly Saudi Arabia, play ‘a dominant role in the negotiations’ (ICG, 2008: 24). Additionally, ‘inter-Arab/Muslim tensions’ surfaced with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Egypt being the main competitors (ICG, 2008: 28). According to ICG (2008: 28), Egypt was ‘Ethiopia’s perennial rival in Somalia’, while Qatar and Saudi Arabia sought to ‘present themselves as regional peacemakers.’ As a result, the outcome of the Djibouti IV process, an Islamist led unity government, was inherently contradictory for it placed modernists at the helm of transitional federal institutions.

5.4 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to explore the interests of the international actors that have initiated, hosted or supported Somalia’s post-2001 peace processes. We started by observing that three main arguments underpin international interventions. These are concerns over trans-border consequences of the conflict, moral imperative and third party interventions. We then interrogated official policy documents, policy research reports, news items and academic texts with a view to identify the main interests and analyse how these interests interacted in the four post-2001 peace processes. The analysis has shown that each actor pursued its own interests, but their desired final outcome groups them into three main camps: those who desired a federal Somalia with strong regional governments, those who preferred a strong centralised secular state and those who opted for a centralised Islamic state. This means that though all international actors pledged commitment to peace and recovery in Somalia, their competition led to outcomes that negated the goals of the peace processes.
Chapter 6

Effect of competition on peace processes and conflict transformation

6.1 Introduction

Chapter five has shown that international actors have played central roles in Somalia’s peace processes, but their interventions have been characterised by conflicting approaches, competing interests and divergent priorities. Broadly speaking, Somalia’s peace processes, as chapter four has argued, have aimed at achieving two broad objectives: ending direct violence and re-building functional state and civil society institutions. Thus, while ending direct violence has been an important objective, the essence of these peace processes has been to address the substantive conflict issues. This includes providing a sound foundation for rebuilding of the state and non-state institutions and conflict transformation (Covey et al., 2005; Darby and Ginty, 2003).

According to conflict transformation theory, a peace process strives to accomplish these broad objectives through transforming the actors in the conflict, their relationships, their socio-political and economic structures and the narratives and discourses that premise their relationships and identities (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham et al., 2005; Ross, 2000). Therefore, assessing the impact of the competing international interests on Somalia’s post-2001 peace processes and conflict transformation entails evaluating how they impacted on the transformation of the Somali actors, their relationships, their envisaged structures and the narratives and discourses that have driven the conflict. This chapter aims to accomplish this evaluation.

6.2 Transformation of Somali actors

The interest-based negotiation theory presupposes that when conflicting actors engage in a peace process, they do not just articulate their own interests, but also try to understand their opponents’ interests (Fisher and Ury, 1983, cited in Ross, 2000; Ramsbotham, 2005). The understanding of opponents’ interests leads to recognition of the legitimacy and interdependence of all interests. It also leads to changes in actors’ perceptions towards each other and towards the conflict and to search for a solution that satisfies all actors’ interests.
The conflict transformation theory refers to this change of perceptions and view towards the conflict as actor transformation. Actor transformation is very important in a peace process because it creates a sense of legitimacy and ownership of the process and its outcomes (Arnson, 1999; Darby and Ginty, 2003; Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Ross, 2000). Indicators of actor transformation at the end of a peace process include their acceptance that the process has addressed their core issues, resolved the conflict and reached a closure (Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Ross, 2000). In view of this, we argue that one of the key roles of the international actors who were involved in Somalia’s post-2001 peace processes was to assist in the actor transformation process.

The 2002-2004 peace process in Kenya primarily aimed to reconcile the TNG and the SRRC coalitions. The two groups differed on broad range of issues (ICG, 2008, 2002b; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007, 2003a; Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004). The TNG group was based in Mogadishu, envisioned a strong central government, included Islamists in its alliance, was opposed to Ethiopia and received support from Djibouti, Egypt, the LAS and the Gulf countries. In contrast, the SRRC was based outside Mogadishu, envisioned a federal state with strong regional governments, was opposed to Islamists and the Gulf States and received support from Ethiopia. Thus, the Nairobi peace process witnessed a clash of competing international interests, with Ethiopia and the LAS members being the main protagonists (ICG, 2002a, 2002b; Schlee, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a; 2007; Woodward, 2004). Though other international actors were involved, their motivations for engagements varied. IGAD members such as Kenya sided with Ethiopia while Eritrea sided with the LAS members. Meanwhile, the UN and the EU opted to follow the AU lead, but the US anchored its position on its war on terror (ICG, 2008, 2004b, 2002a; Menkhaus, 2009a, 2007; Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004).

These competing interests encouraged the Somali parties to adopt a competitive negotiation style whose hallmarks were an inability to recognise each other’s interests, threats, confrontations and endless argumentations (ICG, 2002a, 200b; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004). As a result, notes Menkhaus (2007: 360), ‘the assembled Somali delegates made little progress – and demonstrated little interest – in addressing conflict issues and routinely violated the ceasefire they had signed.’ The competition also hampered efforts to build confidence among the Somali
actors and they took advantage of the rivalry to undermine the international actors’ capacity to exercise leverage (ICG, 2009a, 2004a, 2003a; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010). To the Somali actors, writes ICG (2009a: 4), „the rivalry was a godsend. They were adept at playing off one state against the other.’ Consequently, they failed to commit to conflict resolution and reconciliation. „Foreign actors,’ avers Menkhaus (2007: 364), were „partly to blame for the disastrous outcome of the Kenya peace process.’ We therefore infer that the competing international interests and priorities impeded, instead of assisting, the transformation of the Somali actors. The consequences were tragic: split of the emergent TFG along the SRRC-TNG lines and violence escalation.

The subsequent Sana’a reconciliation meeting was aimed at addressing the TFG split. Ross (2000) has argued that intervening in a conflict like post-Nairobi Somalia, which was characterised by bitterness and cycles of violence necessarily requires a two-step approach. The first step entails creating the necessary preconditions for negotiations, which seeks to convince groups that their opponents are worth talking to and that it is possible to arrive at a settlement that meets each other’s core interests. The second step is the formal negotiation process.

The essence of the Sana’a process was to explore the necessary preconditions in which the two coalitions could go back to formal negotiations. The facilitators identified a working relationship on non-disputed legislative matters as an important precondition. The central idea was that developing cooperation on legislative matters in the TFA „would produce changes which would spill over and produce a shift in the larger conflict’ (Ross, 2000: 1003). Thus, notes ICG (2006b:7), the meeting’s „central promise to convene parliament in 30 days’ in Baidoa „was acceptable to both sides’ because it gave the TFG president a foothold inside Somalia while Baidoa did not threaten the Mogadishu group. Though the cooperation idea was impeccable, actor transformation did not occur as envisaged. As ICG (2006b: 8) avers, many members „on both sides of the divided TFG’ did not embrace the Sana’a accord. Moreover, the Sana’a meeting was initiated by Yemen and financed by the LAS, both supporters of the Mogadishu group. As it turned out, the terms of the Sana’a accord were at odds with the military reality on the ground as they excluded the Islamists, the strongest force in Mogadishu at that time (Elliot and Holzer, 2009; ICG, 2006b; Menkhaus, 2007).
The rise of the Islamists in June 2006 saw most international actors exert pressure on the TFG to initiate dialogue because it „was in a severely weakened position, and was no match for the ascendant SCIC” (Menkhaus, 2007: 369). The Khartoum peace process was therefore an effort to reconcile the emergent SCIC and the TFG with a view to share power. „The first round of talks,’ observes ICG (2006b), „achieved little: the parties agreed only to refrain from hostilities, to recognise one another and to meet again on 15 July.’ The envisaged rapprochement did not occur partly due to the competing interests of international actors. Though the Islamists enjoyed the support of Djibouti, Eritrea, Egypt, Yemen, the LAS, and the Gulf States, their rise rattled other countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and the US (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; Ibrahim, 2010; ICG, 2006b; Menkhaus, 2009a, 2007). Indeed, Ethiopia was resistant to the proposed power-sharing, while the SCIC scorned the TFG as „an illegitimate puppet of Ethiopia’ (Menkhaus, 2007: 376).

Thereafter, attitudes hardened and mutual hostility escalated despite interventions by other international actors such as Libya. The Khartoum peace process finally collapsed in July when Ethiopia deployed „several hundred’ troops in Baidoa supposedly to protect the TFG from the Islamists (ICG, 2006b: 21). Meanwhile, Eritrea upped the ante by denouncing the Ethiopian „invasion’ and arming the Islamists (ICG, 2006b: 20). Ultimately, the competing international interests hampered the transformation of the Somali actors during the Khartoum peace process. Subsequently, escalating mutual hostility led to war which ended with Ethiopia’s installation of the TFG in Mogadishu in January 2007.

SCIC’s defeat split the Islamists into two factions. The radicals - mostly the Al-Shabaab - launched a guerrilla campaign against the Ethiopians. The moderates regrouped in Asmara, Eritrea, where they formed the Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) in September 2007. The ARS was a broad coalition of Islamists, disaffected MPs and Somali nationalists and its main aim was to „fight Ethiopian and TFG forces’ (ICG, 2008: 10). In early 2008, the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) proposed peace negotiations between the ARS and the TFG, a proposal that was accepted by all key international actors (ICG, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a). Several factors drove the international community to advocate dialogue between the TFG and the Islamists: TFG’s inability to
function, escalating insurgency with insurgents controlling most of the territory, humanitarian disaster and Ethiopia’s military woes (ICG, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a). „For the first time,’ notes ICG (2008: 23), „there was a genuine consensus that the only way forward was a peace process involving the Islamists and eventually leading to a power-sharing accord.’

The key objectives of the proposed peace process were to end the insurgency, reconcile the TFG with the ARS and install a power sharing government (ICG, 2011, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a). However, the negotiation proposal split the ARS into two factions. Those who supported negotiations moved over to Djibouti (ARS-D), while those who preferred military campaign remained in Asmara (ARS-A) (Kasaija, 2008). Thus, Eritrea and Djibouti pursued divergent approaches and interests even before the negotiations started. The first round of the Djibouti IV process started in May 2008 and involved the TFG and the ARS-D. The subsequent rounds split the TFG between the president and the prime minister; the TFG president was suspicious of the process while the prime minister embraced it. „Relations between [President] Yusuf and [Prime Minister] Adde became strained to the point that the Ethiopian government called the two together, with [TFA Speaker] Madobe, in Addis Ababa,’ writes Kasaija (2010: 272).

The process also caused friction between the TFG president and his erstwhile supporters such as Ethiopia, IGAD and Kenya (ICG, 2011, 2008; Kasaija, 2010). As a result, IGAD transferred its support to the prime minister, while the TFG president turned to Libya (ICG, 2008). Meanwhile, Egypt, the LAS and the Gulf States embraced Djibouti IV, which they viewed as an opportunity to get even with Ethiopia and IGAD. On its part, the US saw the Djibouti IV process as an opportunity to separate the moderates from radical Islamists. Indeed, Djibouti IV climaxed with the election of a moderate Islamist leader Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as president of the new unity government in January 2009 (ICG, 2011; Kasaija, 2010’ Menkhaus, 2009a). Kasaija (2010: 261) notes that the Djibouti IV process „resulted in “winners” and “losers”, among the former being Sheikh Sharif and Sheikh Madobe, while the latter included President Abdullahi Yusuf and Prime Minister Nur Hussein “Adde”.’

85
We therefore infer that competing international interests in the Djibouti IV process affected actor transformation in several ways. Firstly, they hampered transformation of the Somali actors’ perceptions and views towards the conflict. As a result, the moderate Islamists viewed the outcome as their victory over the old TFG. Secondly, the competition undermined the Somali actors’ ownership of the process and its outcomes. This is why the Islamists have continued to view the federal vision as ‘a secularist agenda’ which was imposed on them at the Djibouti talks’ (ICG, 2011: 6). In other words, the Islamists did not recognise the legitimacy of their opponents’ interests. Thirdly, the persistence of violence is testimony that most Somali actors feel that the Djibouti IV process did not resolve the conflict. In sum, the Djibouti IV process marked a dramatic shift in international perceptions towards Somalia, but it did not transform the Somali actors.

6.3 Transformation of relationships

The interest-based negotiation theory presupposes that understanding each other’s interests improves communication between the warring parties. In turn, the improved communication creates spaces for informal and formal constructive dialogues (Ross, 2000). The improved communication also transforms the actors and leads to building of confidence and trust. This means improved communication between the warring parties during a peace process leads to transformation of their relationships, which is one of the core dimensions of conflict transformation. According to conflict transformation theory, third parties play an important role in this relationship transformation as they support the primary actors in their quest to repair their relationships, which have been damaged by years of hostility and violence (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1997; Ross, 2000; Ramsbotham et al, 2005). In view of this, we argue that the competing international interests in Somalia’s post-2001 peace processes affected relationship transformation.

The 2002 -2004 peace process in Kenya primarily aimed at repairing relations between the TNG and the SRRC coalitions. This reconciliation effort implicitly extended to the other smaller factions, individuals and warlords who oscillated between the two main groups. The relationship between the two main coalitions was hostile. The TNG faction enjoyed close diplomatic and financial relations with the Gulf States. As Menkhaus (2003a: 420) writes, the TNG not only received fifty million US dollars from the Gulf States, but also
went as far as calling for an „Arab Marshall Plan’’ for Somalia. In contrast, Ethiopia viewed the TNG as „an unacceptable threat’’ and provided military and diplomatic support to the SRRC factions that „succeeded in blocking TNG efforts from extending its presence beyond parts of Mogadishu’’ (Menkhaus, 2003a: 420). Thus, the two coalitions approached the peace process in Kenya in October 2002 from diametrically opposed perspectives.

Indeed, the divisions and rivalries among the international actors played a role in the disagreements over representation among the Somali actors, which arose mainly due to the conflicting formulas that were used to select delegates (ICG, 2002b; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004). „The most damaging consequence,’ writes ICG (2002b: 6), „[was] regional rivalries’’ involving Ethiopia, Djibouti and Egypt, which were not just „backing their respective proxies rather than seeking a way forward,’ but also had „intimated that they [were] prepared for renewed fighting if the talks failed.’’ The effect of these rivalries was to worsen the relations between the Somali actors. As ICG (2002b: 4) notes, Ethiopia’s „dominance’’ of the early phases of the conference triggered the „formation of a new, anti-Ethiopian coalition - the Group of Eight (G8)’, which threatened to pull out of the talks and to conduct a military action against the SRRC. The final outcome, the adoption of the TFC and election of the TFG president, did not heal the divisions among Somali actors. Instead, it worsened their relations as it was perceived as a win for the Ethiopian supported SRRC coalition and a humiliating loss for the TNG coalition (ICG, 2004b; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010).

As Menkhaus (2007: 361) observes, those „closely identified with the old TNG were conspicuously marginalised in the new government. What was intended to be a government of national unity was, yet again, a government based on one of the country’s two main coalitions at the expense of its rival.’’ Indeed, the TFG president „believed he could impose a victor’s peace on his adversaries, by relying on Ethiopian “peacekeepers” to outgun them’’ (Menkhaus, 2007: 363). The marginalised group responded by forming the Mogadishu coalition which opposed the TFG president and his proposal for deployment of international peacekeepers. „Yusuf's rivals within the TFG,’ writes ICG (2005a: 3), „including several key ministers, perceived the peacekeeping proposal as a ruse the interim president and his Ethiopian allies would use to crush them -- a sentiment widely shared within the Hawiye clan.’’ Subsequently, adds Schlee (2010), each group
feared entering each other’s territory in Somalia. In a nutshell, the international actors involved in the Nairobi process exacerbated the hostilities between the Somali actors instead of repairing their relations. As a consequence, the TFG split and violence escalated in the aftermath of the Nairobi process.

The subsequent Sana’a peace conference aimed to establish a working relationship between the two coalitions that emerged from the Nairobi process without necessarily transforming their view of the conflict. According to ICG (2006b: 7), the Sana’a accord initially attracted little excitement, but over time it acquired ‘a life of its own.’ Both groups accepted the proposal to reconvene parliament in Baidoa in thirty days for two reasons (ICG, 2006b). Reconvening was being financially supported by the UNDP and Baidoa was at that time relatively free of either group’s influence. To a large extent, therefore, the Sana’a peace accord achieved its objective of forging a working relationship as parliament held sessions for the next four months. In June 2006, however, most members of the former TNG coalitions opted to side with the ascendant Islamists rather than the TFG (ICG, 2006b; Menkhaus, 2009a, 2007).

Thus, the Khartoum peace process was more ambitious as its aim was not just to reconcile the TFG and the Islamists but also to generate a power sharing arrangement. Initially, the parties agreed to refrain from hostilities, to recognise each other and to meet again on 15 July 2006 (ICG, 2006; Kaplan, 2010; Kasaija, 2010). Thereafter, hostilities increased while both the TFG and the Islamists split over participation in the process. Whilst the TFG president resisted the second round negotiations, the TFA speaker embraced the Khartoum process (ICG (2006:21). On its part, the SCIC split between the moderates and the radicals; the moderates embraced the negotiations while the radicals rejected them (ICG (2006b: 21). Efforts by Libya to heal these rifts came to nought. Thereafter, the radicals took control of the SCIC and pushed it „into increasingly radicalised positions, culminating in a disastrous confrontation with Ethiopia’ (Menkhaus, 2007: 370). The Khartoum process collapsed when Ethiopia sent its troops to Baidoa.

We therefore deduce that the competing interests of the international actors, particularly Ethiopia and US on one side and the LAS, Djibouti, Gulf States and Eritrea on the other
led to intensification of hostilities and ultimately to war. In short, they led to the collapse of Khartoum process by worsening the relationships between the Somali actors.

The next effort was the Djibouti IV peace process that aimed to repair relations between the TFG and the ARS so that they could share power and implement the transition tasks (Elliot and Holzer, 2009; ICG, 2011, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a). The first round of the negotiations, which took place in May 2008, was characterised by bitterness and mutual hostility such that delegates refused to „meet face to face‟ (ICG, 2008: 23). But the delegates calmed in the second round in June and even signed an eleven-point agreement, which stipulated ceasefire in thirty (30) days and deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force within 120 days (ICG, 2008; Kasaija, 2010). Nothing changed as the ARS-D „had no capacity to deliver‟ and multinational peacekeepers could not be deployed within 120 days’ (ICG, 2008: 23).

Interestingly, the Djibouti IV process soured relations in the TFG especially between the president and the prime minister. The prime minister enthusiastically participated in the negotiations while the president viewed the process with suspicion (ICG, 2008; Kasaija, 2010). The president even attempted to remove the prime minister and toyed with the idea of relocating „the peace talks away from Djibouti‟ (ICG, 2008: 24). The process also affected the relations between the TFG president and IGAD members Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. The IGAD first imposed targeted sanctions on the TFG president and later, in December 2008, forced him to resign (ICG, 2011; Kasaja, 2010). Other relations that were affected during the Djibouti process were those of Ethiopia and the Gulf States. The crux of the problem, as ICG (2008: 24) notes, was the perception by Ethiopia that the SRSG, Ould-Abdallah, was allowing the Arabs, especially Saudi Arabia, dominate the process.

We therefore infer that the competing international interests affected relationships differently during Djibouti IV process. Firstly, the relations between the moderate Islamists and the TFG, the UN, IGAD and the AU improved such that the Islamists won control of the unity government in January 2009. Secondly, the relations within the TFG and between the TFG president and his international benefactors worsened. Thirdly, the process exacerbated the hostility between the moderate and radical Islamists. Indeed, the subsequent waves of violence including bombings of schools and hospitals have been
targeting the moderate Islamists and their AMISOM protectors. Fourthly, the Djibouti IV process worsened the relations between the international actors, especially between Ethiopia and the Gulf States.

6.4 Transformation of structures

Conflict transformation theory postulates that all the conditions that initially spawns a conflict and those that sustains it thereafter have to be transformed in order for durable peace to be attained (Botes, 2003; Covey et al, 2005; Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham et al, 2005; Ross, 2000). That means transforming a conflict entails re-building social, political and economic institutions for the conflict arose in the first place because these institutions could not address the causative grievances. Indeed, these structural issues comprise the core of the substantive agenda in peace processes (Arnson, 1999; Covey et al, 2003; Darby and Ginty, 2003). State institutions in Somalia collapsed in 1991 and their re-building since then has had mixed fortunes. Somaliland opted to secede and has built its own institutions while Puntland declared semi-autonomy and has been struggling to build state institutions. State re-building in the central-south region has failed. Thus, the post-2001 peace processes have primarily targeted the central-south region though all international actors including the UN have recognised Somalia’s territorial integrity.

The peace process in Kenya was structured into three phases: declaration of ceasefire, resolution of substantive conflict issues and power sharing. Negotiations on the substantive issues took place in six thematic committees: federalism and provisional charter; DDR; land and property rights; economic recovery, institution building and resource mobilisation; conflict resolution and reconciliation; and regional and international relations (ICG, 2002b; Schlee, 2010). However, writes Menkhaus (2007: 360), the Somali delegates were preoccupied with power sharing and „demonstrated little interest in addressing conflict issues.” The process was also marked by divisions among the regional actors and lack of engagement by the other international actors (ICG, 2004a, 2004b; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004). Since „IGAD’s member states found it impossible to forge a common approach,” notes ICG (2004a: 10), the peace process became a hostage of „the interests of regional powers”. Nonetheless, the process ended in October 2004 with the adoption of the TFC and the establishment of the TFIs
whose mandate included preparing a federal constitution, re-building economic management institutions (e.g. central bank), and building state institutions at the regional and district levels. Other highlights were power sharing during the transition phase and a federal structure for the post-conflict state. The Charter gave little guidance on reconciliation and the occupied lands and contested properties. It also did not mention transitional justice and Somaliland’s self-determination.

The outcome of the peace process, observes ICG (2004b: 18), “[was] the product of regional détente as of a peace deal between Somalis.’ However, the regional détente collapsed as soon as the Charter was signed. Indeed, the TFG fragmented into two coalitions. One coalition was led by the TFG president and enjoyed the enthusiastic support of Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Italy and the AU; the other one was led by the TFA speaker and enjoyed the support of Djibouti, Eritrea, Egypt, Yemen and the Gulf States (ICG, 2004b; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010; Bamfo, 2010). For the latter coalition, the adoption of a federal structure was ‘an indication that the peace process had shifted in favour of Ethiopia and its Somali allies’ (ICG, 2004b: 4). Further, Italy embraced the TFG, the UN was cautious, whilst the UK and the US were ‘more diffident’ (ICG, 2004b: 18). Actually, the US thereafter opted to work with non-state actors including warlords on counter-terrorism monitoring and rendition (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; ICG, 2007, 2005a; Kaplan, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007). Ultimately, the TFG failed to function let alone build state institutions.

The competing international interests had other effects. They undermined the Somali ownership of the process and its outcomes, and implicitly encouraged those who felt excluded to spoil post-agreement state-building and peacebuilding (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; ICG, 2007, 2006b, 2004b; Kaplan, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a, 2007; Schlee, 2010). As ICG (2004a: 15) puts it, the Nairobi process was ‘devoid of genuine Somali ownership, lacked substantive depth and failed to build either trust or a spirit of conciliation.’ The competing interests also intensified mutual hostility between the internal actors leading to violence escalation, and prolonged statelessness which spawned other international challenges especially piracy (Khalid, 2010; Kisiangani, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009b; Murphy, 2010; Pham, 2010).
The subsequent Sana’a peace processes was concerned with the relationships between the TFG president and the TFA speaker-led coalitions, while the Khartoum process sought to reconcile the TFG and the Islamists. Therefore, the two processes primary focus was building confidence and not resolution of the substantive conflict issues. The Khartoum process actually did touch power sharing, but it collapsed before it could address the issue. Our inference is that the two processes could have impacted on resolution of substantive conflicts issues and institutions building if they had achieved their objectives. Unfortunately, mounting mutual hostility led to war between the Islamists and Ethiopia and ushered in a period of insurgency.

Indeed, it was the combined effects of Ethiopia’s occupation, escalating insurgency, humanitarian disaster and TFG’s inability to establish functional institutions that shifted the international actors’ thinking in 2008 (ICG, 2011, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a). Thus, the four round Djibouti IV peace process was essentially aimed at addressing Ethiopian pull-out, cessation of all armed confrontations and deployment of international peacekeepers, power sharing and resuscitation of the paralysed transitional institutions. However, the process implicitly aimed to address re-building of post-transition institutions at the national, regional and district levels. Indeed, participating parties raised profound issues such as justice and reconciliation, reparations, accountability for war crimes, reconstruction and development, which requires structural transformation (ICG, 2008; Kaplan, 2010; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2010). That is why the three peace accords that were signed during the Djibouti IV process were addendums to the 2004 TFC (ICG, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a).

As in all previous peace processes, competing interests of the international actors affected the negotiations. The main competitors were Ethiopia and the Gulf States. According to ICG (2008), Ethiopia had cold relations with the negotiations facilitator - the UN’s SRSG. Ethiopia’s main concerns were its military withdrawal and the structure of the transition and post-transition institutions. Meanwhile, Egypt and the Gulf States saw Djibouti IV negotiations as an opportunity to recover what they lost in Nairobi and influence the structure of the transition and post-transition institutions. Indeed, notes ICG (2008: 28), Saudi Arabia had “set aside $1 billion for [Somalia’s] reconstruction.” Meanwhile, the EU financially supported Djibouti IV and lobbied for replacement of President Yusuf with
Islamist leader Sheikh Sharif (ICG, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a). Sharif, like all Islamists, was hostile to the federal structure envisioned in the Charter (ICG, 2011). On its part, the US supported the peace process and at the same time pursued its war on terror. Had the negotiations failed, writes ICG (2008: 27), the US planned to „pursue a “containment” policy to stop extremism from spreading beyond Somalia while dropping food relief into the country from a plane.’

We thus infer that these competing interests and priorities did contribute to the post-2009 paralysis of the transitional institutions. For an Islamist-led TFG has not identified with the federal vision let alone build federal institutions stipulated in the charter (ICG, 2011). Similarly, it has no capacity to pursue substantive conflict issues such as exclusion or implement reparations for its Islamist vision is exclusionary (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; ICG, 2011, 2010, 2008; 2006b; 2005; Menkhaus, 2009a, 2007).

6.5 Transformation of narratives and discourses

Parties to a conflict usually have different narratives that explain their attitudes, behaviours and contradictions. These narratives also underpin their relationships, the strategies they adopt during peace processes and their preferred post-conflict policies and institutions. Therefore, a fundamental component of conflict transformation is reframing of narratives. As Ross (2000: 1020) avers, conflicts are „social and cultural constructions’ whose meanings are transformed when people „change their knowledge [and] perceptions”. Thus, reframing of narratives, as Ramsbotham et al (2005: 288) notes, assists the conflicting parties „overcome prejudice and misunderstanding and to build trust’. The essence of narrative reframing is to transform the actors, their relationships and ultimately foster reconciliation at the top leadership, middle-range and grassroots levels (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham et al, 2005). Thus, a key indicator of the success of a peace process is the extent to which it contributes towards reframing of narratives (Covey et al, 2005; Darby and Ginty, 2003; Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham et al, 2005).

The Nairobi peace process involved two major parties, the TNG and the SRRC, and many fringe actors. Two broad categories of narratives predominated in the peace process: pre-2001 and post-2001 narratives. The pre-2001 narratives focused on the causes of the
conflict and state collapse, persistence of warfare and anarchy, and conflict intractability. The narratives on the causes of the conflict emphasised political, economic and cultural exclusion. These narratives spawned contrasting primordial, patrimonial and identity construction discourses, which sought to explain the massive violence that ravaged Somalia (Besteman, 1999b, 1996a, 1996b; Hansen, 2003; Lewis, 2008, 2004; Samatar and Samatar, 2005). Indeed, the convergence between exclusion, patrimonialism and ethno-cultural identity largely accounts for the intractability of the conflict. As Menkhaus (2003a) notes, these narratives depicted the conflict as zero-sum with winners and losers. That explains why themes such as centralism vis-à-vis federalism, traditional structures vis-à-vis modern civil society, proportional representation, group and minority rights dominated negotiations in the earlier peace processes (Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2003a; Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004). Additionally, it is discourses on exclusion and clan domination that premised secessionist tendencies whose main expressions were Somaliland’s independence and Puntland’s semi-autonomy.

The narratives on the warfare persistence emphasised warlordism and war economy (Gross-Kettler, 2004; Hansen, 2003; Marchal, 2007; Menkhaus, 2009a, 2006b, 2003; Schlee, 2010). These narratives gained currency after UNOSOM II’s withdrawal when warfare became decentralised to lower clan lineages (Menkhaus, 2003a). Besides raising discourses around peace and security, warlordism spawned themes such as individual vis-à-vis clan accountability (Hansen, 2003; Menkhaus, 2003a). Hansen (2003: 67) appropriately argues that warlords derived their power partly from controlling resources and instruments of violence and partly „from patrimonial relations with the traditional clan structure“. The ascendance of Islamist discourses in the late 1990s was a reaction to warlordism (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Bryden, 2003; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; ICG, 2005; Menkhaus, 2002a, 2002b). Indeed, the 2000 Djibouti III process had three high points (Hansen, 2003; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2003a; Samatar and Samatar, 2005). It sought to shift power from the warlords to professional politicians, civil society and traditional structures. It returned the old discourses, particularly centralism vis-à-vis federalism, to the centre stage of peace negotiations. And it ushered in Islamism vis-à-vis secularism narratives into the peace processes. Therefore, centralism vis-à-vis federalism, Islamism vis-à-vis secularism and Somalia’s Islamists linkage with international terrorism were the core narratives that dominated the post-2001 peace processes.
The main actors in the 2002-2004 peace process in Kenya were the TNG and SRRC, the official and unofficial outcomes of Djibouti III. The TNG’s main narrative stressed centralism and accommodation of Islamism. The SRRC’s primary narrative emphasised secular federalism. Some groups such as the RRA prioritised minority land rights within secular federalism (Eno et al, 2010; Hansen, 2003; ICG, 2002a). Most warlords oscillated opportunistically between the main narratives (Hansen, 2003; Marchal, 2007; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010). Thus, by seeking to reconcile the two main factions, the Nairobi peace processes implicitly aimed to draw a common narrative from very divergent narratives. Moreover, participants initially argued over representation in the process; some opted for representation by larger coalitions while others rooted for clan delegates (ICG, 2002b; Kasaija, 2010; Schlee, 2010). At the heart of their disagreements were two contrasting discourses. The transformative discourse, which argued for a coalition representation, advanced the view that the peace process needed to expand the boundaries of the political community beyond the clan identity. The primordial discourse sought to confine the political community within the boundaries of the clan. The conference finally settled for the 4.5 formula, meaning that it gave primacy to the primordial discourse (ICG, 2002b; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007; Schlee, 2010; Woodward, 2004).

We therefore infer that one of the core tasks of the international actors who initiated the peace process was to reframe the narratives and discourses with a view to transform the Somali actors and their relationships. But their competing interests and priorities hampered this aim. Instead, those actors such Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, IGAD, AU and the EU, particularly Italy, who ardently supported the emergent TFG, reinforced its main narrative which portrayed the federal charter as a tool for national reconciliation. In contrast, actors such as Djibouti, Yemen, Egypt, the LAS and the Gulf States, who sided with the Mogadishu group, reinforced that coalition’s main narrative which portrayed the final outcome as a humiliating defeat for the centrists. The Nairobi peace process therefore failed to reframe the narratives and to produce a unifying one. The results of this failure were the subsequent win-defeat bitterness, hostility and violence escalation.

The subsequent Sana’a reconciliation meeting (as noted in section 6.4) was aimed at forging a working relationship between the TFG president and the TFA speaker. Its central
focus was cooperation on non-disputed legislative matters; it was in essence a confidence building narrative. To an extent, Yemen made efforts to reframe the narratives when it focused the Somali actors on unifying legislative matters. This reframing enabled the TFA hold sessions for four months, but the narrative collapsed when the Islamists took over in June 2006.

Similarly, the Khartoum process aimed to reconcile the TFG and the ascendant Islamists, but this process had to grapple with exclusivist Islamist narratives ((ICG, 2006b; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a). That is, while the federal charter remained the core tool of the TFG, the SCIC’s main narratives were Islamism, centrist and pan-Somali nationalism (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Bryden, 2003; Elliot and Holzer, 2009; Ibrahim, 2010; ICG, 2005; Menkhaus, 2007). The core Islamist narrative depicted Islamism as a „refreshing alternative to the country's warlords and clannish political elites’ (Bryden, 2003: 14). But contrasting discourses existed within Islamism, especially over the questions of pan-Somali nationalism and the political relevance of the clan (Elliot and Holzer, 2009; ICG, 2010, 2005b). Nonetheless, Islamism and pan-Somali nationalism worried many international actors, particularly Ethiopia, Kenya and the US (Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Ibrahim, 2010; ICG, 2008, 2006b; Kaplan, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a, 2007). As Menkhaus (2007: 376) avers, „international diplomatic circles [hoped] that the moderate wing of the Islamists could be brought into dialogue with the TFG with the aim of negotiating a more inclusive TFG cabinet.’ That is, the international actors gave prominence to the moderate discourse of Islamism. The premising idea was to focus on unifying issues in a power sharing arrangement between the TFG and moderate Islamists in order to build confidence. No confidence was built.

Instead, writes ICG (2006b: 20), some argued that „Khartoum [was] fronting for Egypt, which has historically competed with Ethiopia for influence over the Somali peninsula.’ In July 2006, TFG Prime Minister Geedi lashed out at Egypt, Libya and Iran, accusing them of supporting “terrorists” in Somalia.’ That is, exploiting Egypt-Ethiopia rivalry, the TFG espoused a narrative that aimed at delegitimising the Islamists by linking them with international terrorism. In return, the SCIC radicals sought to delegitimise the TFG by portraying its links with Ethiopia as betrayal of Somali nationalism (Bamfo, 2010; ICG, 2007, 2006b; Menkhaus, 2007). Moreover, Ethiopia objected to negotiations with the
Islamists, whom they argued had „been infiltrated by al-Itihaad, and a potential entry point to the region for al-Qaeda” (ICG, 2006b: 19). Meanwhile, the US initially supported engagements with the moderates, but the SCIC stonewalled the Americans „on the issue of safe haven for al-Qaeda” undercutting their „efforts to promote dialogue and restrain Ethiopia” (Menkhaus, 2007: 378). Later in the year, the US referred to SCIC’s top leadership as „extremists’ and their movement as „controlled’ by al-Qaeda (ICG, 2007: 4).

The Khartoum process ultimately failed to reframe any narrative including the dominant terrorism narrative, which underpinned the subsequent war between the TFG and Ethiopia on one side and the SCIC on the other.

The terrorism narrative was actually not far from the surface during the next UN-led Djibouti IV peace process, but the international opinion had considerably shifted in 2008. At least, all international actors supported dialogue with the Islamists (ICG, 2011, 2008). The TFG’s main narrative during the process emphasised its international recognition, need for multinational force to protect the transitional institutions, acceptance of the federal charter as the core tool of national reconciliation and renunciation of violence by their opponents (ICG, 2008; Kasaija, 2010). The Islamists’ main narrative stressed their domestic legitimacy, respect for Somali nationalism and statehood, Ethiopia’s pull-out, reparations and accountability for war crimes, re-negotiation of the transitional charter and deployment of a predominantly Muslim multinational force (ICG, 2011, 2008; Kasaija, 2010). Anchoring these broad narratives were contrasting discourses. The TFG’s central discourse offered a secular, federal structure as the best option for re-building Somalia, guaranteeing minority land and property rights and addressing the complexity of fear, which had been induced by „centralised and predatory exercise of power of the past’ (Woodward, 2004: 476). The core Islamist discourse offered the Islamic identity as the alternative to clan identity, argued all rights could be guaranteed in a centralised pan-Somali Islamic state and dismissed a federal structure as an external strategy to prevent the emergence of a strong Somali state (ICG, 2011).

On their part, most international actors acknowledged that the TFG as then constituted was an „inadequate instrument for national reconciliation and political reconstruction’ and needed to be reformed (ICG, 2007: 11). They therefore supported power sharing between the Islamists and the TFG. Though their competing interests surfaced in the Djibouti IV
peace process, most international actors articulated the cooperation narrative for different reasons (ICG, 2008; Kasaija, 2010; Menkhaus, 2009a). Ethiopia was frustrated by its military losses, failure of the TFG to establish functional institutions, failure of other African states to contribute troops to AMISOM and US’s lack of leverage over AU. The US felt that the moderate Islamists could be accommodated, but it prepared a plan B.

The EU was concerned about the Somali diaspora in the European countries and argued that involving the moderate Islamists would eventually change the perceptions of the radicals. The Gulf States had their internal competition, but most of them hoped they could use the process to influence re-structuring of the transition institutions and persuade radicals to pursue peace negotiations. Meanwhile, Eritrea continued supporting the al-Shabaab radicals forcing the UNSC to impose sanctions through resolution S/RES/1907 of 23 December 2009. In short, there were efforts to reframe narratives during the Djibouti IV peace process. But they were not successful as an Islamist-led TFG has been “unable to expand its authority beyond Villa Somalia in Mogadishu, seat of the presidency” (Kasaija, 2010: 278). In contrast, the al-Shabaab radicals have escalated the insurgency and control large swathes of the country as map 6.1 below clearly shows.
6.6 Conclusion

International actors played central roles in Somalia’s post-2001 peace processes, whose core aims were to end direct violence, address structural and cultural violence, and lay the foundation for long-term peacebuilding. Achieving these objectives required conflict transformation, which, as the theory postulates, entails transforming the actors, their
relationships, their socio-political and economic institutions, and the narratives and discourses that premise their interactions and identities. Therefore, assessing the impact of international actors on Somalia’s post-2001 peace processes entails evaluating the extent to which their interests and priorities contributed to conflict transformation. The aim of this chapter was to evaluate how the interests and priorities of international actors, who were involved in Somalia’s post-2001 peace processes, impacted on their outcomes and conflict transformation.

The chapter has shown that competing interests and priorities of the international actors undermined Somali actors’ transformation, frustrated their relationships’ transformation and impeded building of transitional and permanent state and non-state institutions. The chapter has also shown that competing interests and priorities of the international actors stymied transformation of the discourses and narratives that reproduce violence. Indeed, these interests and priorities reinforced the discursive privileges accorded to the narratives and discourses. The results were a hardening of the attitudes and views that did not regard the peace processes as viable alternatives to armed confrontations. Thus, the international actors in fact played a central role in perpetuating and exacerbating the conflict in Somalia.
Chapter 7
Conclusion, lessons learned and recommendations

7.1 Introduction

International actors have played a dual role in post-2001 Somalia; they have initiated peace processes and at the same time exacerbated the conflict. Their motivations for involvement in Somalia’s peace processes varied. While some were motivated by concerns over the trans-border implications of the state collapse and violent lawlessness, others were moved by moral and humanitarian imperatives, and others were motivated by third-party intervention interests. Moreover, warfare persisted regardless of the international actors’ motivations. According to Menkhaus (2003a), misinformed external diplomacy, incompetent mediation and external conspiracy were key contributors to the failure of the peace processes and persistence of warfare. This study has, however, argued that rather than being misinformed, incompetent and conspiratorial, the external diplomacy in post-2001 peace processes was hampered by competing interests, the mediation efforts were undermined by contending priorities and actions by their fears.

Therefore, the first objective of this study was to map the interests, fears and priorities of the international actors. Premised on the interest-based negotiation theory, the mapping formed the basis of the second objective, which was to explore how these interests, fears and priorities of international actors affected the outcomes of the post-2001 peace processes. The analysis of the impact on the peace processes was based on the conflict transformation theory, chosen because Somalia’s collapsed state status requires conflict transformation as it is characterised by „uncompromising political aims, capacity for militant extremism, lawless rule and a criminalised political economy” (Covey et al, 2005: 15). The third objective of this study was to link the mapped interests, fears and priorities and their impact analysis with the broader peacemaking praxis through identifying the learned lessons. An additional aspect of this objective was the need to develop a peace studies understanding of the conflict in Somalia. This chapter will summarise the main findings, which have been discussed extensively in chapters five and six, and highlight the learned lessons. It will then present a brief peace studies understanding of the conflict in Somalia and end with some policy recommendations.
7.2 Summary of the main findings

7.2.1 Competing interests, conflicting outcomes

Most studies on international interventions in peace processes tend to focus on negotiation, mediation, peace agreements and applications of diplomatic instruments such as incentives, sanctions and pressures. This study deviated from these general trends and focused on how the interests and fears of the international actors, which have been involved in Somalia’s post-2001 peace processes, affected the outcomes. The study started by explaining that assessing the impact of international actors in peace processes entails exploring how their interests affected the transformation of the Somali actors, their relationships, the structures in which they interact and the narratives and discourses that underpin their interactions. The study then identified the categories of international actors that intervened in Somalia’s post-2001 peace processes, analysed how they competed in the peace processes and inferred that each actor pursued priorities which were primarily aimed at satisfying its interests and assuaging its fears. Indeed, notes Regan (1996), third-parties intervene not just to end direct violence but also to secure their own interests.

All the international actors that were involved in the Nairobi peace process, the Sana’a reconciliation meeting, the Khartoum peace meeting and the Djibouti IV peace process pledged their commitment to conflict resolution, peace and reconstruction in Somalia. However, their competing interests and contending priorities led to a diametrically opposed outcome: non-transformation of the actors and the conflict and violence escalation. Scholarly studies on peace interventions show that third-parties intervene not to prolong a conflict, but to end it ‘on terms favourable to the intervener’ (Regan, 1996: 341). This means the competing interests and contending priorities of the international actors who were involved in the various peace processes had strong undercurrents which affected their outcomes in many ways. These include impeding Somali ownership of the processes and hampering the transformation of the actors, their relationships, structures, narratives and discourses.
7.2.2 Lessons learned

The international actors’ interventions in Somalia’s post-2001 peace processes raise many valuable lessons around five broad themes. The first theme concerns issues in peace negotiations such as inclusion and exclusion, representation, legitimacy, timing, power asymmetries and third-party biases. Three of the four post-2001 peace processes were vexed by questions over representation and legitimacy of the participating Somali actors (see chapter six). Emerging lessons here are the importance of managing tensions between inclusive and exclusive approaches in a peace process and the pitfalls of competing international actors dictating the internal parties that would be included or excluded in peace negotiations. Other lessons concern the legitimacy of the negotiators and the dangers of third-party bias in a peace process.

The second theme centres on the balance between conflict resolution and state-building. Power sharing, which was a central aim of all the four post-2001 peace processes, was premised on the notion that a unity government would spearhead both state-building and conflict resolution. Some analysts have criticised the international actors for emphasising state-building and down playing conflict resolution. Where the state has collapsed, however, rebuilding the legitimacy, authority and effectiveness of the state institutions is a fundamental requirement of conflict resolution. The challenge is how to strike a balance between the two.

The third theme is about resolution of an intractable conflict that is characterised by destructiveness, mutual mistrust and deep individual and community pain and bitterness. Ross (2000) argues that resolving such a conflict requires a two-step approach: developing the necessary pre-conditions for negotiations and the formal negotiations. According to Menkhaus (2007: 360), the Nairobi process improved ‘over past peace processes in Somalia’ because it shifted the parties from ‘crude cake-cutting exercises’ to reconciliation, but the Somali delegates failed to engage ‘on key conflict issues’. We have explained that the delegates failed to address the conflict issues because the international actors, who initiated the process, glossed over conflict intractability and thus failed to consider the necessary preconditions for successful negotiations.
The fourth theme concerns approaches to post-agreement state-building. The Nairobi process adopted the building block approach, which is still the basis of the current unity government. "The building block approach," writes Hansen (2003: 60), "promotes a decentralized state consisting of regions that have extensive powers…. This approach suggested that Somalia should be federalized and that peace must be created locally before it can be achieved centrally.' The opponents of the building block approach, who were mostly the TNG coalition, clamoured for a centralised state. According to Menkhaus (2007: 363), this group was vehemently opposed "to federal and confederal models for Somalia’ because it operated ‘on the unspoken assumption’ that its control of the capital city, Mogadishu, gave ‘it the right to rule over the entire country.’ International actors such as Djibouti, Yemen, Egypt and the LAS also supported a centralised state.

Two lessons emerge here. Firstly, the competing interests of the international actors prevented the Somali delegates from engaging seriously on the merits and demerits of the various state-building models. "The debate over various approaches (federalism, regionalism and building blocks),’ ICG (2009a: 4) sums it, ‘occurred against [the] backdrop of regional competition, warlordism and political opportunism, with little intellectually rigorous argumentation to convince the public.’ Secondly, the international actors implicitly encouraged a zero-sum view of the conflict instead of encouraging Somali actors to understand and accept the legitimacy and inter-dependence of all interests. Menkhaus (2007: 363) believes that the international actors fuelled ‘the impulse to try to marginalise rather than integrate the opposition in a transitional government’ and the desire to ‘impose a victors’ peace’.

The linkage between Somalia’s conflict discourses and global discourses on terrorism is the fifth theme. Many international actors have linked stateless Somalia with international terrorism despite evidence that, unlike Afghanistan, Somalia is ‘decidedly less welcoming for non-Somalis with ulterior political agendas, as external Islamic movements have learned’ (Menkhaus, 2002a: 120). Linking Somalia’s conflict with international terrorism discourses affected negatively the international actors’ ability to steer the post-2001 peace processes.
7.3 A peace studies understanding of the conflict and peace processes

Academic studies of the causes and the persistence of the warfare in Somalia have advanced various interpretations, narratives and discourses. Most studies that have focused on the causes of the conflict and state collapse have employed the realist theoretical frameworks while others have employed the anthropological structural-functional and identity construction approaches (Besteman, 1996a, 1996b; Lewis, 2008). The studies that have dwelt on warfare persistence, war economy and warlordism have been premised on greed-grievances theories. There have also been studies on Islamism, terrorism and lately piracy. Most of these studies have combined realist approaches with new wars frameworks. In general, therefore, peace studies theoretical perspectives have been peripheral in Somali studies. We advance in this section a peace studies theoretical understanding which links all the perspectives that anchor the various interpretations, narratives and discourses.

7.3.1 The primordial narrative

Chapter two explained three broad narratives which have dominated debates about the causes of the conflict and state collapse in Somalia. These three narratives arise from different theories of conflict. The primordial narrative portrays Somalia ,as an ethnically homogeneous society broken down into kinship units based on segmentary opposition’ (Besteman, 1996b: 579). According to this narrative, traditional enmity between these kinship units (clans) are the main cause of the conflict and state collapse in Somalia. That means the primordial narrative is essentially premised on the biological theories of war, which attribute conflicts to the human nature. That human nature in Somalia is presumed to be clan relations. Additionally, when we situate the primordial narrative within conflict transformation discourse, we note that the narrative emphasises actors and downplays the role of the structures. The „emphasis on unchanging clan identities in explaining Somali society,” argues Besteman (1996a: 123), „reflects the persistence of discredited assumptions characteristic of structural-functional anthropology – assumptions that privilege static roles over social agents.’
Therefore, the primordial narrative has major weaknesses in that it ignores the dynamism and creativity of the human society. Indeed, the narrative downplays the role of structural violence in Somalia, which was the main cause of the conflict and state collapse, and freezes the cultural violence in ancient history. Yet, as UNESCO’s 1986 Seville Statement declared, „biology does not condemn humanity to war“; on the contrary, „humanity can be freed from the bondage of biological pessimism and empowered with confidence to undertake transformation tasks needed now and always.” These transformation tasks in post-2001 Somalia entails transforming the perceptions of the internal actors, their view of the conflict, the structures and the narratives that reproduce violence.

7.3.2 The instrumental narrative

The instrumental narrative, on the other hand, attributes the prolonged conflict to leadership and governance failures. According to Samatar (1992), the elite instrumentalised clan identities as they competed for control of the state and its resources. This argument resonates with the theories of war, which emphasise the social, political and economic roots of conflicts. As Mead (1940: 402) puts it, „warfare is the inevitable concomitant of the development of the state, the struggle for land and natural resources of class societies springing not from the nature of man, but from the nature of history.” The argument here is that Somalia’s conflict has its roots in the organisation of the post-1960 state and the country’s structural violence. Indeed, writes Besteman (1996b: 580), „the dissolution of the Somali nation-state is rooted in the political economy of class and regional dynamics, played out in an idiom of kinship.” Further, when situated within the conflict transformation perspective, the instrumental narrative emphasises the structure of interaction. As Besteman (1996b: 591) writes, „Somalis have killed each other not because they are unrelated but because they are struggling for power and control over resources in a highly militarized atmosphere of suspicion, mistrust, domination and terror.”

This struggle for power and resources amidst bitter hostilities links discourses on conflict causes with those on conflict persistence particularly discourses on war economy and warlordism. These include the greed-grievance discourse which basically contrasts personal greed with political grievances as underwriters of warlordism. As Gross-Kettler (2004: 5) puts it, warlords „control their own militias and operate on a strictly economic
basis, whereby the use of violence is simply a form of conducting business.’ Hansen (2003: 66) while acknowledging ‘warlordism as an economic system’ argues that it was not all about individual greed in Somalia as some of the business proceeds were redistributed to traditional leaders ‘through the patrimonial channels in the clan system’. In short, warlords, like the elite of Barre era, instrumentalised the clan identities. That means the instrumental narrative has roots in of the theories of conflict that underlines changes in the socio-economic and political structures as an important component of peace processes.

7.3.3 The identity construction narrative

The third main narrative, the identity construction, emphasises ‘shifting cultural constructions of difference such as race, language, and status, and on economic divisions such as occupation and class’ (Besteman, 1996a: 123). Emphasising the dynamism of human society, the narrative identifies other social identities such as social class, occupation and religious identity which transcend clan identities. The narrative, therefore, resonates with peace studies discourses that derive their explanatory power from theoretical frameworks such as relative deprivation and social identity theories. That is, from a peace studies perspective, we would argue that many groups in Somalia, particularly the inhabitants of the inter-riverine region, were relatively deprived of economic and political power on the basis of their social identity (Besteman, 1996a, 1996b; Eno et al, 2010; Webersik, 2004). Indeed, the minorities of the inter-riverine region were not just the main victims of the violence and famine in the early 1990s, but also they have been deprived of their livelihood means by war persistence because their lands have been occupied by other groups. It is this relative deprivation that partly accounts for the pervasive fear of the return of a centralised state.

When viewed within the conflict transformation perspectives, the construction narrative stresses not just the structures but also the relationships, the context in which these relationships are formed as well as the discourses that underpin identities’ formation. As Besteman (1996a: 125) affirms, a constructed ‘superior-inferior’ narrative determined relationships and participation in the state. Those groups that were profiled to be of ‘lower status in the national arena’ due to combined factors of ‘language, racial construction, and occupation’ were then marginalised ‘from national governments since the 1970s’
(Besteman, 1996a: 125). Concurring with this view, Webersik (2004: 517) argues that the boundary between ethnic and non-ethnic Somalis „was based on racial stereotypes”; that is, „major lineage groups used imagined differences to maintain their power in the southern agricultural regions. In turn, groups who felt excluded from economic and political life took up arms to be heard.” Thus, the construction narrative, which critiques the discourses that legitimised exclusion and violence against some communities, resonates with the relative deprivation, social identity and conflict transformation theoretical perspectives. Accordingly, the narrative rightly posits that peace processes in Somalia ought to have transformed narratives and discourses that have consistently reproduced violence.

7.4 Recommendations

The learned lessons points to several policy recommendations. Firstly, actors such as the UN and the AU have better chances of success in mediating the conflict as they can synchronise the interests of their members. We therefore recommend that the AU supported by the UN should explore mechanisms of harmonising the interests of Somalia’s neighbours, and subsequently lead in the peace processes. For example, the AU should help Ethiopia and Djibouti see their role in Somalia as complementary rather than competitive. Similarly, the UN and the AU should assist Egypt see that in the long term, it needs Ethiopia’s cooperation on the question of Nile Waters. Such synchronisation will lead to cooperation rather than competition in Somalia’s peace processes.

Secondly, all the approaches to post-2001 peace processes ignored the intractability of the Somali conflict. An intractable conflict requires a phased approach with the first phase focusing on harnessing of the necessary preconditions and building of confidence. The international interveners should therefore adopt a phased approach with the first phase focusing on unifying matters. The international actors should only initiate a formal negotiation process once they have built enough confidence among the Somali parties.

Thirdly, Somalis have to address their foreign dependence syndrome. All the post-2001 peace processes were initiated and financed by international actors. Similarly, the transitional governments emerging from these processes were financed by international actors and defended by foreign troops. The Nairobi process and the TFG were financed by
the EU. The Sana’a process was financed by the LAS and the TFA sessions in Baidoa by the UNDP. The Khartoum process was financed by the LAS, while the Djibouti IV process was initiated by the UN and financed by the EU. The post-2004 TFG and the current unity government in Mogadishu have been dependent on AMISOM troops. Indeed, a major weakness of the transitional governments has been their inability to establish functional revenue collection institutions. This failure has made them pawns of international actors. Our recommendation then is that Somali transitional institutions must establish functioning revenue collection institutions in the areas they control.

Fourthly, the conflict in Somalia has to be de-linked from international terrorism discourses. Analysts have consistently warned that though the case of the linkage is plausible, stateless Somalia is not an attractive location for international terrorists, including Al-Qaeda, as terrorists thrive in countries with weak dysfunctional states. In that sense, analysts have argued, Yemen is more attractive to Al-Qaeda than Somalia. We thus recommend adoption of peacemaking approaches that de-links the conflict from discourses on terrorism. Indeed, the “enhanced security for both the West and the people of the Horn of Africa” requires addressing the “overwhelming crisis of political and economic underdevelopment” (Menkhaus, 2002a: 122).

Fifthly, Somali actors’ have to appreciate the importance of conflict reframing. One weakness with all Somali factions is that they approach peace processes with rigid, uncompromising positions. Their positional negotiation style leads to bitter arguments, mutual hostilities and violence escalation. Reframing the conflict in terms of interests will refocus them to examine how all actors’ interests could be satisfied. In turn, this will lead to transformation of all actors. Conflict reframing will also address other challenges such as inclusion-exclusion, third-party biases and the pervasive fear of the return of the state. The international actors should promote conflict reframing efforts.

Sixthly, support for different state structures arise from different interests. By prioritising their own interests, the international actors hampered debates by Somali actors on the post-agreement system that would best satisfy the interests of all Somali groups. We therefore recommend that all international actors must let Somalis engage freely on the best state system that will satisfy the interests of all Somali groups. This includes candidly
addressing the question of Somaliland. These discussions must however be tempered by considerations of the regional dynamics. This means as Somalis choose their system they must recognise the interests of their neighbours. For example, rather than view Ethiopia as an enemy, Somalis could consider opening a trade corridor that links landlocked Ethiopia with ports in Somalia. Somalis would then benefit from Ethiopia’s diversity, relatively advanced infrastructure and huge market, while Ethiopia would access the sea. Such mutually beneficial relations would also address the Ogaden problem. Indeed, Somalis can learn from Kenya-Ethiopia relations which have seen the two build a modern highway that links Nairobi with Addis Ababa.

7.5 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to summarise the main findings of the study, present lessons learned, locate Somalia’s peace and conflict discourses within the broader peace studies theoretical approaches, and provide some policy recommendations. The chapter has summed up the key impacts of the competing international interests in Somalia’s post-2001 peace processes as undermining actor transformation, frustrating relationship transformation, hampering re-building of institutions and impeding transformation of conflict narratives and discourses. The key lessons that have emerged from these processes and impacts were classified into five themes: dynamics of peace negotiations, balance between conflict resolution and state-building, conflict intractability, approaches to post-agreement state-building and links between Somali conflict and global discourses on terrorism. The chapter then advanced a peace studies perspective that linked the various interpretations, narratives and discourses which have been anchored on other theoretical approaches such as realism and structural-functionalism. Nonetheless, the study did not address issues of piracy because they did not feature in the post-2001 peace processes. The overall conclusion is that the prolonged Somali conflict is very complex, but it is not impossible to transform. The chapter has therefore ended with some policy recommendations which will hopefully contribute towards the conflict’s transformation.
REFERENCES

Books and book chapters


Covey, J., Dziedzic, M and Hawley, M., 2005, The quest for viable peace: international interventions and strategies for conflict transformation, United States Institute for Peace (USIP) press


Journals


__________, 1996a, Representing violence and „othering” Somalia, in Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 120 -133.


Healy, S., 2011, Seeking peace and security in the Horn of Africa: the contribution of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in International Affairs, Vol. 87, No.1, pp. 105-120.


__________, 2009a, Somalia: they created a desert and called it peace (building), in Review of African Political Economy No. 120, pp. 223-233.


**Published Reports**


News and internet sources


__________, 2006a, Communiqué of the 55th Peace and Security Council meeting, PSC/PR/Comm (LV), 17 June, http://www.africa-


118


**Unpublished works**
