MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND PEACE-BUILDING IN SOUTH SUDAN

By

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Supervisor:

Professor Nwabufo Okeke-Uzodike

May 2013
Declaration

I declare that this dissertation – “Managing the Challenges of Conflict Transformation and Peace-building in South Sudan” is a product of my own independent research work and has not been previously submitted for publication or any other degree programme or examination at any University. I further maintain that information derived, cited and referenced from the works of others have been given the appropriate acknowledgement.

Lukong Stella Shulika ______________________ Date: 22 May 2013
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**Dedication**

In memory of all who lost their lives in the long struggle for South Sudan’s independence.

Also in loving memory of my treasured sister Nyuykighan Lukong Honorine (1983 – 2011), who stood by me at all times, sharing with me all my joys and challenges, encouraging me to work hard, to be optimistic in pursuing my dreams and face life with the spirit and energy of possibilities and not impossibilities. You saw my capabilities and believed I could attain greater heights by putting them to use. I only wish you were here to see this day, but I know you are happier where you are and watching over us all. I thank God for your life Hono and for our beloved family.
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# List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGOA</td>
<td>Africa Growth and Opportunity Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUHIP</td>
<td>African Union High Level Implementation Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUPSC</td>
<td>African Union Peace and Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CfPS</td>
<td>Collaborative for Peace in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil society organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTPB</td>
<td>Conflict Transformation and Peace-Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoP</td>
<td>Declaration of Principles</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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IPCS  Institute for the Promotion of Civil Society
IPF  IGAD Partners Forum
JAM  Joint Assessment Mission
JDT  Joint Donor Team
NCP  National Congress Party
NP  Nonviolent Peaceforce
NSCC  New Sudan Council of Churches
NUF  National United Front
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
RoS  Republic of Sudan
RoSS  Republic of South Sudan
SONAD  Sudanese Organization for Nonviolence and Development
SPLA  Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SPLM  Sudan People Liberation Movement
SPLM/A  Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army
SSDM/A  South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army
SSI  South Sudan Initiative
SSI  South Sudan Institute
SSIM/A  Southern Sudan Independence Movement/Army
SSLA  Southern Sudan Liberation Army
SSLM  Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
SSP  South Sudanese Pound
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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Executive Summary

Since its independence on July 9, 2011, the Republic of South Sudan, with the assistance of various internal and external stakeholders, has been working towards viable and constructive political and socio-economic change in the new state. These processes of change are aimed at the effective development of South Sudan as a sovereign, peaceful and stable nation-state that is capable of serving the short- and long-term needs and expectations of its citizens and the environment at large. However, the successful realisation of this transformation is facing serious challenges. These challenges are partly attributable to the unresolved issues and consequences of South Sudan’s protracted years of civil war with Sudan, and the difficulties that often confront post-conflict societies, especially a post-independence state like South Sudan, which came into existence after two prolonged civil wars. Given the complexity of South Sudan’s post-independence environment, this study aims to gain a clearer understanding of South Sudan’s complex transformational and peace-building challenges as an independent state; and to propose recommendations on how they can be managed. This will be achieved through the use of historical and qualitative research methods, which locate the study within a framework that provides the basis for the analyses of the data collected on South Sudan and on the subjects of conflict transformation and peace-building.

As South Sudan celebrated its one-year anniversary on July 9, 2012, it was recalled that the country’s official independence was regarded as a historic event for the African continent at large. While there were high expectations among the South Sudanese population and the international community that this signalled an end to Africa’s longest conflict, it was soon clouded by a myriad of political, economic, socio-cultural, peace, security and development challenges. These include building an entirely new state out of the ruins of war, confronting the unresolved resource and border demarcation conflicts with Sudan, and tackling South Sudan’s own internal ethnic confrontations, among many other human resources and capacity challenges. Given South Sudan’s challenging post-conflict and post-independence environment, this study contends that contrary to the notion that the resolution and transformation of the Sudan-South Sudan conflict and the birth of the new Republic of
South Sudan ended the conflict between the two entities, the secession did not create a cohesive and robust new state that is free from serious internal and external challenges.

The Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and external and internal stakeholders, including the African Union (AU); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the United Nations (UN); civil society organisations (CSOs) and various individual countries (among many other initiatives) have been and are actively engaged in joint efforts to address and manage the challenges that confront South Sudan as an independent state. However, such endeavours have mainly concentrated on state-building issues, resources and border demarcation conflicts, and have focused less on the problems of nation-building. As such, internal complexities such as social and national identity, the decentralisation of power/broader representation in government and state affairs and growing ethnic conflicts have continued to receive less attention. Bearing this in mind, this study argues that unless these internal matters are given serious consideration, sustainable peace and development in South Sudan will remain elusive. While negotiations to resolve the cross-border South Sudan-Sudan conflicts continue, a solution that is acceptable to all parties is only possible if all the conflicting parties are invited to the negotiation table to engage in peaceful dialogue and find the means to reconcile their differences and build trustworthy and mutually beneficial relationships. The study also identifies a need for the promotion and coordination of a constructive relationship between the South Sudanese state and civil society. It further recognises the importance of building inclusive political processes to facilitate a state-society cooperative environment, and the development of state capacity to perform its duties in a manner that satisfies the expectations of the population that they will enjoy the fruits of their long-drawn out struggle for independence.

In terms of how these processes can be achieved, the study recommends an indigenous intervention mechanism that encourages the active engagement of the entire post-conflict society in its own peace-building and development initiatives. This mechanism is encapsulated in John Paul Lederach’s *Pyramid Model* of conflict transformation, which emphasises the importance of coordinating peace-building activities between and among the various leadership levels – the top, middle and grassroots leaders of the post-conflict
society. This model also advocates that the local community be encouraged to develop and drive its own peace-building and development activities, which is a major step forward in reconciling differences, building a sense of belonging, trust, mutual respect and ultimately societal cohesion. These are very important considerations for any society or state with the long-term goal of sustainable peace and development. The research study thus recommends this model for managing South Sudan's challenges. It urges all stakeholders to promote the involvement of the local community in peace-building and development activities and to facilitate peaceful dialogue and reconciliation within South Sudan and with Sudan in order to achieve viable peace and development in the longer term.

**Key Words:** South Sudan; conflict; post-conflict and post-independence challenges; conflict transformation; peace-building; state-building; nation-building; Pyramid Model.
Chapter One

1. Introduction: Orientation of the Research Theme

1.1. An Overview and Background of the Study

South Sudan is a post-conflict society and a sovereign state. Its historic transition from a region of the Republic of Sudan (RoS) into an independent state came after decades of being ravaged by two prolonged and devastating civil wars with the Northern part of Sudan. These wars were a threat to peace and security in both the Northern and Southern Sudan territories and the republic as a whole, causing widespread environmental and infrastructural destruction, regional instabilities, increasing numbers of displaced persons and refugees, and an enormous loss of human lives. Having transformed from a conflict-engulfed Southern region into a self-governing country – the Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) – its post-conflict and post-independence transformation is threatened by the possibility of renewed violent conflict with Sudan and internal violent strife. These endpoints at which the newly independent RoSS finds itself can be attributable to a number of grave challenges, which include not only dealing with the consequences and unresolved problems of its long-drawn out conflict with Sudan, but also the difficulty of building from scratch a brand new state and a nation that is politically and socio-economically self-sufficient to meet the needs and demands of its population.

As South Sudan struggles to address its difficulties in order to build a sustainable peaceful and stable society, it is imperative to note that there are still a number of issues militating against its peace efforts and processes. The literature on peace and conflict analysis notes that in many post-conflict situations, conflict transformation and peace-building (CTPB) are subject to a multitude of challenges, which expose the post-conflict society to the vulnerabilities of war and peace-building complexities for some time. The propensity of such challenges to impede constructive change, development, and peace processes in war-prone and post-conflict societies has prompted international, regional and local
communities and organisations to launch initiatives to manage and overcome such obstacles. Many such initiatives aim to address fragility and consolidate stability in a particular conflict country or region. However, the literature stresses that challenges to peace and development are not restricted to the conflict-affected community alone, but also may indirectly affect the intervening bodies and actors (Ball, 2002: 38).

Developing and engaging mechanisms to manage conflict challenges, especially in the aftermath of conflict, entail multifarious political, economic and socio-cultural processes aimed at continuous efforts to: address the conflict relations in a non-violent manner; moderate violence and mitigate the chances of relapse into conflict or its escalation; build harmonious, tolerant relationships; and build and support existing capacity for the enhancement of sustainable peace and development in the longer-term (Schirch, 2008: 9). These processes are necessary to promote peace and stability and involve multi-dimensional and multi-sectoral undertakings of infrastructural (re)construction, (re)building institutions and endeavours to reconcile differences that will establish collaboration between communities and groups (Lederach, 2003). At the heart of conflict transformation and peace-building, therefore, is the need not only to understand the root causes of the conflict and engage in constructive change processes, but also (and most importantly), to build healthy relationships between the warring factions, as well as between the state and the society. This, in turn, can help define and foster coordinated efforts capable of enabling change in the structures of violence and achieving sustainable peace and development in the longer term (Lederach, 2003; Schirch, 2008: 8).

Since the development of conflict transformation and peace-building strategies in the early 1990s, conflicted societies worldwide, and especially those on the African continent, have experimented with the implementation of these (reconstruction, institutional and capacity development and reconciliation) processes. In Africa, such initiatives have been successful in post-conflict societies like South Africa, Lesotho, Mozambique and Sierra Leone, while in other countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, and the Sudans, among others, the efficacy of these approaches continues to be challenged.
Reychler (2001: 12) asserts that the implementation of conflict transformation and peace-building mechanisms is challenged in some cases because, in the process of transformation, some conflicts are transformed in a constructive and reciprocally satisfactory manner, while others end up frustrating one or all of the parties involved in the conflict. Debiel (2002: 8) maintains that it is normal for societies which have experienced war and are in a recovery phase to be challenged by the history of the conflict and its consequences, as well as other peace-building difficulties. The massive influence of insurgents, the difficult reintegration of ex-combatants, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) back into mainstream society, and the challenge of what constitutes social identity are common problems faced by countries emerging from violent conflicts (Debiel, 2002: 8). Similarly, there are challenges in “strengthening political institutions, promoting economic and social revitalisation, providing a safe and secure environment for poverty-reducing development and promoting a reasonable, equitable and fruitful political development and security of individuals, social groups and the society at large” (Ball, 2002: 35 & 36).

While these post-conflict challenges may seem generic, they are not homogeneous and vary from one post-conflict society to another. However, their (un)intended influence on peace-building and development projects undermines the prospects for durable peace, as has been the case with post-conflict and post-independence South Sudan.

After almost four decades of conflict with the Sudanese government, the Southern Sudan region has not only entered a post-conflict phase, but also has emerged as an independent state. Since the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which officially ended the Sudan-South Sudan conflict followed by the proclamation of independence on July 9, 2011, South Sudan has been going through a process of transformation – attempting to build a new state and a nation out of the ruins and remnants of war, and the internal and external relationships that were destroyed as a result of years of violent conflicts. Peace-building efforts have included agreements, policy provisions, humanitarian and developmental assistance, and institutional and security arrangements largely overseen by international and regional actors/organisations, the South Sudanese government and a small number of civil society organisations (CSOs) (Government of the Republic of South
Sudan, 2011(a)). While these processes have prevented the outbreak of renewed or fresh violent conflicts between the Sudan and South Sudan, and within the South Sudanese communities, peace remains very fragile. This is because resilient challenges such as resources and border land demarcations disputes, political and socio-economic governance disparities, and most notably, South-South violent clashes between ethnic groups have continued to pose a serious threat to development and the attainment of a stable peace.

Given this complex scenario in South Sudan, the following questions arise: Why do the processes of conflict transformation and peace-building in South Sudan continue to be challenged? Why does peace still remain an unattainable dream in South Sudan and what can be done to enhance these processes? These questions are at the centre of this research. In order to gain some perspective on these issues, this study sets out to assess South Sudan’s post-independence environment and investigates the factors constraining its smooth and successful transition to a peaceful sovereign state. In this light, the study examines the implementation of conflict transformation and peace-building processes and the challenges these processes face. Likewise, it evaluates the peace-building efforts of international stakeholders as well as the role of the government and CSOs in enhancing peace and development in South Sudan. This is vital in order to determine the reasons why the attainment of peace has remained elusive and why development has remained slow, despite various initiatives and the progress made in building a peaceful and secure South Sudanese state.

Adopting a forward-looking perspective on South Sudan’s challenges, the study proffers recommendations by drawing on lessons that offer an understanding that building trust and healthy relationships is central to conflict transformation and sustainable peace-building. Thus, the study suggests that as peace and development remain an ongoing process in South Sudan, the mechanisms employed must be coordinated and aimed at creating a solid vision for long-term peace and security. This would be made possible by creating communal trust and engaging in projects that are mutually beneficial to the various communities and that strengthen state-society relations.
1.2. Delineating the Research Problem and Argument

This research examines the complexity of South Sudan’s problems, which are not limited to the fundamentals and agendas of (re)building a post-conflict society, but also involve building a completely new state ‘out of nothing’. As a new and developing state, South Sudan has to contend with a plethora of rising tensions and transformation challenges, which in this context also imply challenges to state-building\(^1\) and nation-building\(^2\). Given that it has just emerged from conflict with Sudan, South Sudan presents an intricate and fragile situation, which will manifest itself in at least one of two possible directions: (1) growing into one of Africa’s stable and accountable governments; or (2) relapsing into civil tension orchestrated by an internally divided and impatient population demanding expedient and sustainable improvements in life within independent South Sudan.

The RoSS is located in eastern Africa and borders six countries: Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, the DRC and Central African Republic (CAR). The country comprises a culturally diverse population, which according to the 2008 population census is made up of approximately 8.2 million people (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011(b)). South Sudan is endowed with abundant natural resources, including petroleum, iron ore, gold, silver, copper, aluminium, coal, uranium, chromium ore, zinc, mica, diamonds, quartz, tungsten, teak, water and land (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011(b)).

South Sudan’s geographic borders, heterogeneity, and natural resources speak to the country’s wealth. However, they also provide the context and platform for South Sudan’s

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\(^1\)“State-building is an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state society relations. Positive state-building processes involve reciprocal relations between a state that delivers services for its people and social and political groups who constructively engage with their state. State-building therefore involves multiple national stakeholders that continually negotiate and transform the political process” (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011(a): 10).

\(^2\)Nation-building is the process of building a sense of a common national identity, whether defined in an ethnic, cultural or political sense. It can be an important part of the process of state-building and both can mutually reinforce each other (State Building in Situations of Fragility…. 2008).
past and present conflict dynamics not only with the Republic of Sudan (RoS) but also within itself. The facts that South Sudan shares boundaries with several war-torn and war-prone countries tends to impact negatively not only on its peace and stability but also on its development agenda.

South Sudan’s conflict with Sudan spanned the periods 1955-1972 and 1983-2005. The proliferation of these conflicts in one of Africa’s most conflicted-regions (Martell, 2011) presented major challenges to international and regional efforts aimed at resolving conflict and achieving transformation. Symptomatic of the challenges were the stalemates experienced in the implementation of the first attempt at conflict resolution – the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement – as well as subsequent attempts. All efforts aimed at addressing the conflict and achieving reconciliation proved elusive until the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The fact that 99 percent of South Sudanese voted for independence sent a message of a united people with a common purpose and signalled an end to the decades-long conflict. South Sudan achieved sovereignty but this was accompanied by challenges which emerged immediately following independence. These challenges were not limited to politically, economically and socially weak institutions. They also included extremely poor infrastructure; unresolved disputed resource and border territories; a population extremely lacking in formal education, technical capacity and skilled human resources; and, most disturbingly, an ethnically divided populace (Mbaku and Smith, 2012: 1).

The literature on peace-building has focused on issues such as the continuing effects of the consequences of war, governments’ inadequate or complete lack of legitimacy, the over-centralisation of state systems, and the inability of state authorities to guarantee national peace, development and security. Futamura, Newman and Tadjbakhsh (2010: 2), for example, argue that the first challenge to building long-term peace in post-conflict societies lies in the reasons for international intervention in the first place. This is due to the threats that conflict societies pose to international security and stability. Because they have international security at heart, such interventions tend to be driven by the belief that the major problem with conflict prone and post-conflict states is the absence of effective state
institutions. As a result, they concentrate their efforts on promoting strong states and containing conflict for the sake of international security (Futamura et al., 2012: 2 & 3).

The importance of supporting post-conflict societies to build accountable governments and lay the foundation for effective state institutions cannot be overemphasised. The problem, however, is that such a state-focused approach often overlooks the importance of the ethnic dimension to peace-building. As a logical consequence, the needs and grievances of the ethnic local populations directly affected by the past conflict and who may suffer if new conflicts begin are often ignored. Worst still, their views, suggestions and initiatives aimed at finding solutions to the real problems are either marginally considered or disregarded altogether, leading to their alienation.

In South Sudan, international stakeholders like the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) are investing significant financial resources through multiple humanitarian assistance programmes and rehabilitation and (re)construction projects, as well as economic stabilisation, human rights monitoring, education and empowerment for political participation initiatives. There have also been numerous negotiations to resolve the problems in contested resource-rich areas. Notwithstanding these efforts, there are increasing media reports of non-stop militarisation around the oil-rich areas of Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Unity States and battles for control of the oil-producing Heglig (Soliman, 2012).

In Pflanz’s (2012) view, these challenges may eventually ignite a fresh and sustained conflict. The focus on building state institutions and resolving resource conflicts seems to have taken precedence not only over the government’s agendas but those of intervening and donor organisations/bodies. As a result, those challenges have weighed down the ability of those actors to give equal attention to crucial factors like addressing the ethnic divides within the South Sudanese or enlisting the conflict resolution and mediation tools that ethnic institutions possess.
The fact that South Sudan continues to experience power imbalances, and that a number of factors are hindering its peace and development endeavours does not imply that the presence of external support is not critical and appropriate in creating and ensuring peace. However, Ball (2002: 35) argues that such support should complement, rather than substitute for local efforts for sustainable peace. In similar vein, Mercy Corps (a global aid agency) argues that external investments to achieve peace in post-conflict societies have limited potential to bring about peace in the absence of concurrent efforts aimed at promoting inter-ethnic understanding and cooperation (International Alert, 2006: 401). The organisation further argues that attaining sustainable peace is possible if development programmes are implemented to restore relationships between conflicting communities by bringing them together to discuss issues of common concern (International Alert, 2006: 401). Similarly, De Maio (2009: 47) contends that although external efforts have been proven to be necessary in conflict-ridden societies, they are not sufficient to safeguard peaceful relationships or resolve the strategic problems challenging development; local peace-builders are indispensable to this process.

Given the above, this study presents two major arguments:

**First:** That contrary to the notion that the resolution of Sudan-South Sudan conflict and the birth of the new Republic of South Sudan ended the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, the secession has not created a cohesive and robust new state that is free of serious internal and external challenges. Anchored on this premise, the study contends that confrontations arising out of internal power disparities are the result of power struggles emanating from complex political, economic and social imbalances within South Sudan. These issues engender violent conflicts and obfuscate efforts to create a cooperative, cohesive, and secure environment for sustainable peace and development.

**Second:** That beyond building a new state and effective state institutions in South Sudan, the breakdown of long-established political, economic and socio-cultural relations that were the root of the protracted years of two civil wars still needs to be constructively and reciprocally addressed. Therefore, irrespective of the resources invested in addressing
current challenges and opportunities in South Sudan and Sudan, sustainable peace will remain elusive unless the relationship issues between the two states and within the South Sudan ethnic communities are reconciled through a national (or broad-based) consultative and cooperative peace-building process. The development of healthy relationships within/between ethnic groups and communities is crucial for cooperative and long-term interactive engagement, which is necessary for the advancement of lasting peace and development.

Proponents of the conflict transformation theory, including John Paul Lederach, Johan Galtung, and Kumar Rupesinghe as variously cited by Miall (2004) emphasise the importance of the constructive transformation of broken relationships within and beyond the conflict and post-conflict society as a central component of the process of peace-building. Amidst the many obstacles to peace in South Sudan, this research draws particular attention to the challenge of ethnic divisions. Lederach, for example, argues that poor relationships between groups are all too often a trigger for conflict, and remain a critical hindrance to peace-building efforts after the violence has abated (Miall, 2004: 8). Lederach further proposes a model for building relationships and trust in divided societies.

The *Pyramid Model* promotes the coordination of efforts and activities at all levels of society. This approach stresses multinational facilitation and encouragement directed at the three most important leadership clusters of a society – the top, the middle, and the grassroots. The model thus aims to bring about social and political change through building trust, mutual relationships and structural conditions that are not only supportive of peace and social justice, but are also crucial in creating settings that enable constructive and decisive integration in the society and foster the active participation of civil society and local community groups in activities aimed at building a viable peace (Lederach, 2003). This, Lederach states, is achievable when peace is built from below by empowering the communities that have been destroyed by war, taking into consideration and linking into the peace-building process the cultures and traditions of the conflict communities, and simultaneously engaging grassroots and civil society actors in decision-making activities.
1.3. Research Questions

On the basis of the foregoing problems and arguments, this study is defined by three main research questions:

Q1. What are the major challenges impinging on South Sudan’s transformational change and peace-building capacity?

Q2. How can the challenges be managed and would the promotion of peaceful dialogue between the Southern ethnic groups as well as with Sudan enhance and empower South Sudan’s quest for long-term peace and development?

Q3. What/how can external and internal stakeholders heighten their support for local efforts and facilitate the processes of reconciliation within South Sudan and between the two Sudans as a step towards confidence building, mutual relationships, sustainable peace, development, and societal/national cohesion?

1.4. Research Hypotheses

Given these aforementioned problems and questions, two central assumptions are made:

H1. That achieving the required state of change (successful transformation from resistance to independence) and peace in South Sudan will continue to be elusive if attempts at managing its challenges remain focused on the problems of weak state institutions and resource-rich/border land confrontations (among others), to the exclusion of the problem of fragmented ethnic groups, which continues to create a lack of trust and cooperation in the society.

H2. That South Sudan’s post-independence challenges can only be addressed if stakeholders dedicate considerable efforts to dealing with ethnic divisions and engage ethnic communities in: (1) peaceful dialogue aimed at addressing their
ethnic differences; and (2) reconciliation projects aimed at national/societal healing and confidence building between the various communities as key to managing not only the fragile peace but also advancing development in South Sudan.

The first hypothesis creates a point of departure that provides the necessary information to investigate the relationship between ethnic divisions and their impact on peace-building in post-independence South Sudan. The second hypothesis validates the importance of building healthy, interactive and reciprocated relationships as a necessary dimension of peace-building processes and as a pathway to overcoming the challenges in post-conflict and post-independence South Sudan. By extension, this implies the need to use the same approach in dealing with the relationship concerns between South Sudan and Sudan. Notter (1995: 3 & 8) states that building trust and transforming conflicts centres on relationship issues, especially considering that there is a strong connection between trust and cooperation. This leads to the conclusion that transforming conflict relations and building trust is central to the analysis of any conflict and fundamental to the peace-building process, especially between the conflicting parties.

1.5. Research Objectives

The three main objectives of this study are to:

1. Identify and examine the major challenges hindering South Sudan’s development and peace-building efforts.

2. Assess the magnitude of the challenges confronting South Sudan, especially the ongoing latent and potential inter-ethnic conflicts on peace-building and development efforts.

3. Offer recommendations as to how South Sudan’s challenges can be managed and the role of external and local actors in addressing the impact of ethnic divisions on
peace efforts through peaceful dialogue, project involvement and building trust, for the enhancement of social cohesion as well as coordinated efforts for sustainable peace and development.

1.6. Justification for the Study

The history of the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan is a rich area of study. Until 2005, attempts to address these conflicts were hampered by insurmountable structural, socio-economic and political impediments. While the conflict has supposedly ended, post-conflict development and peace-building efforts face a multitude of challenges that undermine state-building and nation-building. Given this situation, this study is motivated by the need to investigate what conflict transformation and peace-building strategies are being employed in South Sudan; what factors are constraining their effective implementation; and most importantly, how the situation can be addressed and managed.

The researcher hopes that this study will constitute a significant addition to the existing or related literature on conflict transformation and peace-building in South Sudan. The study recommends the adoption of a transformation strategy that calls for the active involvement, participation and contribution of the different communities and local groups in decision-making processes and peace-building activities. The researcher believes that this strategy is the pathway to building social relations and trust among the divided South Sudanese people and communities. The researcher also anticipates that the research outcomes will provide policy makers with a perspective to deliberate on and formulate solutions that are specific to South Sudan’s problems and/or amend the policies and steps already undertaken to address the challenges. Policy makers need to take into account the ethnic context of conflicts and design interventions that explicitly address ethnic problems and relationships destroyed as a result of war. Addressing ethnic differences is seldom a priority in conflict and post-conflict societies; rather, the emphasis is on (re)building state institutions and addressing resource conflicts. Finally, it is hoped that this study will generate scholarly interest in the interconnection between political science, international
relations and conflict transformation and peace studies, as well as contribute to making a difference in real conflicts and similar post-conflict situations.

1.7. Theoretical Framework

"It is a precept of academic engagement with conflict/peace studies that a good understanding of the causes of a conflict is a prerequisite for its resolution" (Klein, 2002:161).

According to Gibson (1986: 143), theory and research are closely intertwined parts of a coherent body of knowledge and a paradigm that can assist in selecting and construing facts. This research study is designed and contextualised within the framework of conflict transformation theory. This theory underscores the importance of “addressing the structural roots of conflict by changing existing patterns of behaviour and creating a culture of nonviolent approaches that proposes an integrated approach to peace-building aimed at bringing about long-term changes in personal, relational, structural, and cultural dimensions” (United States Institute of Peace, 2011: 15-16). The concept of conflict transformation emerged in the 1990s as the world witnessed many civil wars that originated from old grievances. For Ramsbotham et al. (2009: 22), these conflict emergencies revealed the need for the transformation and (re)construction and/or a (re)conceptualisation of existing models of conflict intervention measures. After assessing their impact, a number of analysts arrived at the conclusion that existing conflict resolution mechanisms were ineffective in confronting this model of conflict development (Ramsbotham et al., 2009: 5). Consequently, the introduction of a contemporary approach to conflict transformation in the field of peace studies adopted a more comprehensive structural and systematic approach (Ramsbotham et al., 2009: 23).

Alluding to Väyrynen (1991), Botes (2001: 7) explains that the ‘micro’ perspective of conflict transformation entails transformational changes in the conflict behaviour of
disputing parties, while the ‘macro’ perspective carries the expectation that the socio-political system within which the conflict is rooted undergoes complete transformation. For Lederach (2003: 14), conflict transformation means to “envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships”. This is an umbrella concept of intervention, which accentuates the need for constructive development and stresses the necessity of building peaceful relations that resonate with the overall goal of peace-building.

Boutros-Ghali, former UN Secretary General and one of the pioneer scholars in the study of peace-building, provided the first official definition of peace-building in the Agenda for Peace. He defined peace-building as, “an action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 11). Isike and Okeke-Uzodike (2010: 683) alluded to Lederach’s (2005) conception of peace-building as the capacity to conceive of and engender meaningful responses that are capable of resolving the incidence of violence and its recurrence in society. Such evolutionary and emancipatory concepts of conflict transformation and peace-building have occupied an important place in the debates on conflict and peace, and have added insight and depth to the conceptual framework of conflict intervention mechanisms.

These theories have been expanded by transformation models such as the Ripe Moment approach of William Zartman; the Positive Peace and Negative Peace Paradigm of Johan Galtung; and the Eleven Points Model of Kumar Rupisinghe. These are discussed below, but are not considered suitable for managing the challenges that confront South Sudan. Given that the sustainability of peace in the aftermath of conflict is a very important aspect of conflict transformation, this section also examines John Paul Lederach’s Pyramid Model, and suggests that it is a more viable approach in view of South Sudan’s complexities.
William Zartman’s Ripe Moment Approach: Zartman, as cited in Logan & Croft (2004: 2) maintains that there is a specific convenient and ripe moment where the conflicting parties reach a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’, which renders them willing and ready to negotiate an end to the conflict. Amer (2007) observes that this approach seems to have been successful in Cambodia and Northern Ireland. However, two factors – the intractability of the Sudan–South Sudan conflict and the enormous challenges facing South Sudan prompt the following questions: When was the Sudan–South Sudan conflict right for mediation and when did the conflicting parties realise they were not achieving their goals and became unhappy with the conflict situation? Was it 17 years or 39 years into the conflict? When will South Sudan’s internal latent conflict and confrontations with the RoS be ripe for settlement? Will this be 15 months, two years or 10 years or more into the conflict? Who should intervene and what happens after the intervention?

According to Doyle (2011: 4 & 7), a ‘moment’ of ripeness does not have the predictive capacity to signal which moment is right or not. Thus, Doyle (2011: 3) argues that “the conceptual category of ‘ripeness’ is indistinguishable from later success in a peace negotiation; and that even if it is separated conceptually there is no means of rigorously analysing whether perceptions of ripeness exist until after the fact.” However, De Maio (2009: 155) argues that the Sudanese conflict reached a point where the conflicting parties were not achieving their goals and were exhausted from war. As a result, they welcomed peace (the signing of the 2005 CPA) as a means of re-establishing a stable and secure Sudan. While this may be true, only those close to the conflict can reasonably identify if/when they reach a mutually hurting stalemate. It has been noted that the peace-building process in the aftermath of war is very challenging, especially when episodes of renewed conflicts are increasing. Zartman, as referenced in Doyle & Sambanis (2000: 780-781) argues that achieving peace under these circumstances requires that central power be re-concentrated; state legitimacy be increased through participation (elections, power sharing); economic resources be dedicated to support peace; and external and international assistance be present during the transitional period. While these suggestions are undoubtedly supportive of the need to build peace, Zartman does not expand on how
the processes should be carried on and what role the internal or local community should play during the transitional period and thereafter.

**Johan Galtung’s Positive Peace and Negative Peace Paradigm:** Galtung is recognised as the pioneer of peace studies. Galtung, as cited in Grewal (2003: 4) posits that peace research should address the narrow vision of ending or reducing violence at a direct or structural level and also seek to understand the conditions for preventing violence. He refers to *negative peace* as the absence of personal violence, characterised by a lack of destructive social and political tendencies and the absence of war. On the other hand, *positive peace* is the absence of structural violence, characterised by the presence of positive social and political trends such as justice, human rights, equality and well-being (Atack, 2009: 41 & 44). This implies that in the absence of “positive peace,” “negative peace” is challenged because war, armed conflict and political violence may be imminent. However, this depends on what is done to transform or alter the possibility of such an occurrence. As such, Galtung projects positive peace as a higher ideal than negative peace.

Kenneth Boulding, as mentioned in Atack (2009: 41) critiques the theory of negative peace as abstruse, since peace does not merely imply the absence of war. Further alluding to Ian Harris, Atack (2009: 41 & 45) states that the presence of positive elements does not remove the causes of conflict. Furley and May (2006: 5) are of the opinion that negative peace, which proposes the absence of war, is overwhelmingly impracticable. This is illustrated by the fact that within a decade or so of the cessation of many African wars, conflict re-emerged (as was the case at the end of the Sudan-South Sudan first civil war). Furley and May (2006: 5) add that the construction of positive peace, which addresses the complex goals and misgivings of the conflicting parties goes far beyond dealing with prevailing political and economic differences. Rather, the challenge lies in addressing key elements like social reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation, which Galtung (1998) observes are important for the attainment of a long-lasting and sustainable peace process (Jeong, 2005: 1)
The negative and positive peace theory is a good example of the different interpretations of peace and why it is important to adopt a broad focus in peace processes. While the concept of peace-building is said to have been introduced by Johan Galtung in 1975, his ‘tactical’ explanation of the concept in the form of the negative and positive peace perspective is extremely complex. Paffenholz, Abu-Nimer and McCandles (2005: 3) maintain that working towards positive peace involves processes that correspond with the notions of peace-building and conflict transformation. That is to say, they involve activities aimed at impacting on the social and structural composition and relations of the post-conflict society through the involvement of various actors at different levels of the peace process.

**Kumar Rupisinghe’s Eleven Points Model:** This model presents a comprehensive perspective of the conflict transformation theory. Rupisinghe’s model consists of 11 stages, covering pre-negotiation, root cause analysis and the ownership and actors involved in the peace process. This approach focuses on internal conflicts. It is multi-sectoral and promotes a national culture of peace from grassroots to national level (Gounden & Solomon, 1999: 4). It emphasises the importance of an inclusive approach to ensure that the actors involved in the transformation to peace reflect all the constituencies/groups in the conflict society. These groups have an interest in the peace. They are in fact the owners of the peace process, considering that the aim of negotiating transformation is to attain peace and build a sustainably peaceful and secure society (Gounden & Solomon, 1999: 7 & 8). The rationale for this approach is also to prevent the escalation of conflict. Rupisinghe, as cited in Warfield and Jennings (2012: 21) maintains that the main objective of conflict prevention efforts should be the empowerment of local communities. This is because peace-building from below has the potential to strengthen local communities’ resources and capacity to work towards enhancing constructive and positive outcomes of various peace projects (Warfield & Jennings, 2012: 21).

Although Rupisinghe’s model has certainly been useful in addressing conflict and post-conflict situations in both South Africa and Mozambique, for example, his approach is limited by its lack of cultural perspective. South Sudan is a heterogeneous country and one
of its major challenges is the exclusion facing some communities and ethnic groups. As such, development efforts and the quest for sustainable peace will need to focus attention simultaneously on the advancement and reconciliation of state development and building a cohesive civilian culture and civil society.

While the above approaches make valuable contributions to the theories of conflict transformation and peace, this study adopted John Paul Lederach’s Pyramid Model of conflict transformation. This model is used as a framework to link the theoretical aspects of the study with the research topic and questions on how to manage the challenges confronting South Sudan. Axt, Milososki and Schwarz (2006: 17) argue that the framework of conflict transformation has been predominantly fashioned by Lederach’s work since 1995; his Pyramid Model has been a focal point of efforts to comprehensively manage conflict situations.

**John Paul Lederach’s Pyramid Model:** The pyramid model, as proposed by Lederach, seeks to rebuild destroyed relationships, focusing on reconciliation and the fortification of a society’s long-term peace-building potential (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006: 22). For Lederach, the relationship aspect is central to peace-building because conflicts are rooted in the breakdown of relationships and the potential of transforming conflicts lies in reconciling these relationships (Isike & Okeke-Uzodike, 2010: 687).

Lederach conceptualises peace-building as the long-term transformation of a war system into a peace system. This requires constructive changes in the personal, structural, relational and cultural aspects of conflict over the short, medium and long terms (Miall, 2004: 6). Thus, Lederach provides a substantive and analytical framework that addresses the need for a comprehensive and strategic approach to the transformation of deep-rooted conflicts, as well as an integrated framework for building peace and sustained reconciliation. He visualises peace-building as a structural process that allows the transformation of conflict to take place at three key levels of leadership, namely: top-level leadership (top-down approach); middle-level leadership (middle-out approach); and
grassroots-level leadership (bottom-up approach) (Pillay, 2006: 55-56). This process aims to describe how peace should be built within the conflict-affected population, that is – “how the house of peace should be built” in war-torn societies (Lederach, 1997: 37). This framework is illustrated in the Diagram below.

*Diagram 1: Peace-building Levels in Conflict Societies: Actors and Approaches to Peace-building — (Lederach, 1997: 39)*

As demonstrated above, the top level consists of key political and military leaders in the conflict and can be accessed by mediation at the level of states, which is advantageous for peace negotiations (Mischnick, 2007: 64; Document of the World Bank, 2006: 6). The
The middle level is made up of people who are highly respected in society and who may be in formal leadership positions in sectors such as education, business or health or may be members of ethnic or religious groups within a community. The middle level leaders can be engaged through activities such as problem-solving workshops or peace commissions with the assistance of renowned local individuals in society. The grassroots level represents the majority of the population or the masses, and includes leaders who operate on a day-to-day basis, like leaders of a local NGO or a refugee camp; they can be reached through a wide range of peace-building approaches such as local peace commissions, community dialogue projects, or trauma healing (Document of the World Bank, 2006: 6; Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006: 22).

This model addresses and coordinates change at all three levels of society. It recognises the potential, importance, legitimacy, uniqueness, and interdependency of the needs and resources of civil society in their own peace-building processes, and promotes coordination across all levels and activities. As stated by Miall (2004: 6), the model also broadens the view of the conflict and the conflict parties and indicates the scope for drawing peace-building resources from the wider society. It hinges on the fact that building mutual relationships is a pivotal part of the peace-building process. It credits the role of indigenous actors from within the conflict society and empowers and supports local efforts by engaging groups in different peace-building activities. Thus, this model of peace-building as proposed by Lederach seeks to bring civilians together through building trust; it requires and promotes intergroup communication, interaction and cooperation.

The pyramid model proposes an integrated and analytical framework of the processes and goals of conflict transformation and peace-building, in both theory and practice. The model is posited as a policy alternative and recommended framework for the management of South Sudan’s challenges. This is due to the fact that it will enable the maximisation of efforts to address South Sudan’s development concerns and in the event of its implementation, contribute to sustainable peace.
1.8. Research Methodology and Design

This study employed both historical and qualitative research techniques to unpack the challenges destabilising South Sudan’s constructive transition from war to peace and nation-building endeavours. According to Elena et al. (2011: 1), the historical research approach involves finding, using, and correlating information within primary and secondary sources, in order to communicate an understanding of past events. This research method enabled useful insight into phenomena through a careful assessment of narrative data collected on: the Sudan and South Sudan conflicts; attempts at intervention and the resulting outcomes; and the post-conflict challenges, peace-building and the associated development strategies. Thus, the use of the historical research method linked with the case study, which assisted in the design of specific research questions and the underlining research hypotheses that were derived from the historical review and analysis of information. Likewise, the rationale for the study’s use of the qualitative research method was to logically arrive at, and engender qualitative justifications of the “what and how” questions the study sought to answer. As stated by King, Keohane and Verba (1994) the qualitative method allows a researcher to unearth an immense amount of information.

The existing or secondary sources the study used included the following: a wide range of books and academic sources; government documents and reports; policy documents and published papers; newspaper and magazine articles and media reports; journal articles; published and unpublished theses; and information available on the Internet. To determine the validity of the data collected from the above documents, the study applied four of Scott's (1990: 6) benchmarks for assessing the quality of the data sources. These included:

1. Authenticity: whether the evidence gathered for the study is genuine and of unquestionable origin or sources;

2. Credibility: whether the evidence obtained is typical of its kind or not;
3. Representativeness: to establish the extent to which the evidence gathered is free of error and distortion, and whether the documents consulted are representative of the totality of the relevant documents; and


Primary sources included official Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), UN and AU documents; the memoranda of ceasefire and peace agreements (1972 and 2005 peace accords, among others); and relevant documents on the Pyramid Model of conflict transformation as developed and articulated by Lederach and other peace and conflict scholars. In light of South Sudan’s long-term development and peace-building challenges, the study used the Pyramid Model to address these complex issues. The use of this model provided new and unanticipated findings that offer prospects for establishing sustainable development and peace in South Sudan.

Content analysis was used to analyse and adapt the information sourced from both secondary and primary documents. According to Elo and Kyngas (2008: 108) content analysis can be used for either qualitative or quantitative data. Hsieh and Shannon (2005: 1277) add that it constitutes a very important part of the qualitative research approach and is used to construe meaning from the context of the data text. The content analysis approach was distinctly used owing to the fact that it involved the analysis and appraisal of existing literature on the Sudan–South Sudan conflict history, and the transformational and peace-building challenges that confront South Sudan. Basically, this approach facilitated understanding of, and vividly explicated pertinent primary and secondary information specific to the subject matter of the study.

In the main, the use of these research methods expedited the researcher’s ability to illustrate different viewpoints on South Sudan. It also allowed for an assessment of South Sudan’s ability to commit to state and nation-building.
1.9. Limitations of the Study

This study was confronted with a number of challenges. With South Sudan just having gained independence, there is a paucity of comprehensive scholarly literature on the research focus of this study. Geographical distance and time constraints did not allow for field research for primary data (interviews, questionnaires and/or surveys) collection purposes. Therefore, only the available documented primary and secondary data were used. Although useful, the use of existing or secondary sources could limit the relevance and accuracy of the information sourced. Since South Sudan is a young state, its history is also new, which provides opportunities for scholarly research and publications. The researcher consulted the relevant published material, which provided the background to the study’s research questions. Studies published after the completion of this study are therefore not germane to the analysis and conclusions reached by the researcher.

1.10. Outline of the Study

Chapter One: Introduction: An Orientation of the Research Theme. This chapter presents the background to the study and the research problem. It also outlines the research objectives and theoretical framework, the research methodology and design and the outline of the study.

Chapter Two: A Historical Review of the Sudan-South Sudan Conflicts and Peace Processes: This chapter provides a brief literature review and examines discourses on the root causes and nature of African conflicts. It explores the historical background to the North-South Sudan conflicts, their impact and the attempts at resolution. In terms of peace intervention measures, the chapter examines the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, which ended the first civil war, and the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which put an end to the second civil war and opened up opportunities for political change.

Chapter Three: South Sudan’s Post-conflict and Post-Independence Challenges: Exploring the Transformational and Peace-building Complexities. This chapter examines South Sudan’s
post-conflict/post-CPA challenges as well as the post-independence environment and its challenges. Since this is one of the main chapters of this study, the ‘post-post’ phases are examined, with particular focus on the post-independence period. Challenges to South Sudan's successful transformation and capacity to establish durable peace and development are addressed in this chapter. The chapter further evaluates the contributions of external and internal stakeholders in the enhancement of peace and development initiatives and the reasons why peace and development remain slow despite the supportive efforts of the various actors.

Chapter Four: Framework for Managing South Sudan’s Challenges: An Application of Lederach’s Pyramid Model: This chapter focuses on how South Sudan’s challenges can be managed. It provides policy recommendations inspired by John Paul Lederach’s Pyramid Model, which emphasises the importance of coordinating peace-building activities across all levels of society in order to build a relationship of trust, respect, cooperation and cohesion. Specific policy recommendations that aim to address the major challenges identified and discussed are proposed.

Chapter Five: Summary, Findings and Conclusion: Reflecting on the research questions, hypotheses and objectives, this chapter again underscores the importance of healing broken relationships and building trust as the way forward in achieving viable peace and development, national and societal cooperation and harmony in South Sudan. It summarise the key research findings and provides a general conclusion to the research study.

1.11. Conclusion

Challenges to transforming the Sudan–South Sudan post-independence conflict and enhancing the development of a peaceful and stable South Sudan constitute major drawbacks to South Sudan's efforts to move forward. The significant change in the Sudan–South Sudan conflict dynamics, subsequent to South Sudan's secession and attainment of independence from Sudan, and the quest of South Sudan to establish a peaceful nation-
state continue to encounter a multitude of political and socio-economic obstacles. In an attempt to examine the transformational and peace-building challenges, this chapter has provided a general background to the research, laid a framework for the study’s relevance, spelled out the driving research questions and the theoretical approaches adopted to address and recommend mechanisms for managing South Sudan’s post-conflict and post-independence problems. Likewise, the framework is formulated to investigate the relevance of the research hypotheses and the lacunae which the study contends to fill in the growing literature of conflict transformation and peace-building in South Sudan. Against this backdrop, the next chapter engages in extensive literature review and discourses, unpacking the historical evolution of the Sudan–South Sudan’s conflict and peace processes, as a prelude to provide a clearer insight and comprehension of South Sudan’s complexities as a sovereign entity.
Chapter Two

2. A Historical Review of the Sudan-South Sudan Conflicts and Peace Processes

2.1. Introduction

This chapter analyses the fundamentals of the Sudan–South Sudan first civil war (1955-1972) and second civil war (1983-2005) and offers a comprehensive delineation of their complex and widespread development and consequences. This historical background is important because it will provide a perspective of South Sudan’s conflict trajectory. An analysis and understanding of the multi-faceted challenges confronting South Sudan as a post-conflict and a sovereign state (see chapter three), would be incomplete without an examination of their origins and context. Considering the prolonged nature of the Sudan-South Sudan conflict, the ‘conflict’ is briefly discussed and the Sudan-South Sudan conflict is contextualised within the framework of protracted conflict.

Generally, conflict is a unique occurrence that is defined by distinct characteristics. It constitutes a natural part of human existence and has historically defined the landscape of most countries across the globe. According to Bartos and Wehr (2002: 6) conflict and change are as inherent in the social world as order and permanence. This underscores that there is a congruent relationship between conflict and change. For Ramsbotham et al. (2009: 28) conflict denotes the quest for irreconcilable goals and objectives by different groups exercised through the use of force. Isike and Okeke-Uzodike (2010: 682) conceptualise conflict simply as the breakdown of relationships, while for Miller (2005: 22), “conflict may be either manifest, recognisable through actions or behaviours, or latent, in which case it remains dormant for some time, as incompatibilities are unarticulated or are built into systems or such institutional arrangements as governments, corporations, or even civil society.” Reychler (2001: 5) also asserts that conflicts occur as a result of different groups pursuing incompatible goals and its outbreak into violence is preconditioned by four factors: (1) the interdependent parties, who (2) experience the
interdependence as negative, and (3) have the opportunity to use violence, and (4) consider the use of violence the most cost-effective policy option. This therefore, implies that conflicts only become a hindrance when they resort to the use of violence.

According to Bujra (2002: 16), citing Adebayo Adedeji (1999), conflicts are generally triggered by a multitude of factors that have deep political, economic, social and cultural causes. Bannon and Collier (2003: 7) argue that states with natural and economic resources have the propensity to resort to conflict and contestation over such resources. Over and above the fact that resources engender and sustain conflicts, they also have the potential to destabilise governance and lead to famines, the spread of disease, population displacement, and serious environmental damage. Clover (2004: 7-8) contends that conflicts are caused by the pursuit of national and indigenous self-rule, ethnic tensions and political disputes. These are driven by socio-economic and political grievances, poverty, poor governance and disparities in economic and social development. Oyeniyi (2012: 3-4) posits that historical legacies of inter-state boundaries inherited from colonialism on the one hand and the multi-ethnic character of most African states on the other, are conflict enabling factors said to define the nature of conflicts in Africa.

Dudouet (2006: 3-4) states that conflicts characterised by ideological, political, resources and ethnic identity issues have a greater propensity to be protracted and last for many decades. According to Azar (1990), conflicts that are marked by the above enabling factors tend to be protracted and remain defined by the issues and dynamics of the conflict relations (Nilsson & Kreutz 2010: 3). These include conflicts over resource-rich or geo-strategic territories that are prolonged as a result of the conflict parties’ disinclination to retract; and dynamics such as the control and domination of state institutions by a certain ethnic or regional community or group to the exclusion of the others (Nilsson & Kreutz, 2010: 3). Protracted conflicts are characterised by various types of inequalities – economic, social, political and cultural (Stewart, 2011: 2). The historical causes of the Sudan-South Sudan conflicts, as will be demonstrated, were a blend of these issues and dynamics, some of which are still evident in the aftermath of the conflict.
In line with the above context, this chapter aims to answer important questions such as: what factors prompted the conflicts’ persistence? And, what was the magnitude of the conflict and its impact on the emerging nation of South Sudan? As noted by Michailof, Kostner, and Devictor (2002: 2), understanding the causes, characteristics and impact of conflicts in Africa is a fundamental prerequisite to being able to resolve them. Taking cognisance of this fact, further questions include, but are not limited to: what conflict resolution attempts were made over the decades and how did these influence or alter the nature of the conflict? How did the conflict evolve? What were the political, economic and social conditions associated with the agreement(s)? Given these questions, the chapter further evaluates the methods and nature of the peace processes in Sudan, alongside overall regional and international efforts and reactions to the successive conflicts. This includes an examination of the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, which ended the first civil war but fell short of instituting mechanisms for its implementation, and the 2005 CPA as the significant qualitatively superior peace development that ended the second civil war and created a window of opportunity for South Sudan to transition to a historical era free of violent conflict.

2.2. Deconstructing the Sudan-South Sudan Conflicts

The Republic of Sudan has endured civil wars and armed conflicts for several decades. In the wake of its independence from Anglo-Egyptian rule in 1956, Sudan was already embroiled in a conflict that later became known as the first Sudanese civil war. According to Johnson (2003: 21), this was the first of its kind in post-colonial Africa. While a settlement was reached in 1972, the 11-year period of peace was broken by the outbreak of a second civil war in 1983, which lasted until 2005. The Sudanese civil wars caused tremendous suffering, destruction, loss of human lives and displacement of people. At this present time, South Sudan’s complex conflict dynamics can be explained by the social composition of the two regions of the former Sudan, the power relations, and the limitations on the part of the Sudanese government to fully understand the resolve of the South Sudanese to reclaim their rights.
Below is a map of the Republic of Sudan at independence in 1956. The Map is illustrative of the different regions – North and South, and its border countries.

*Map 1: Map of Sudan at Independence on January 1, 1956.*

![Map of Sudan at Independence on January 1, 1956.](http://www.state.gov/cms_images/sudan_map.jpg)

Source: US Department of State, 2005: [http://www.state.gov/cms_images/sudan_map.jpg](http://www.state.gov/cms_images/sudan_map.jpg). Along the lines, as visibly indicated on the map, lies the colonial border delimiting the Southern Sudan region from the broader Sudan at the time of independence from the British. This 1956 boundary demarcation remained among the driving factors behind the Sudan-South Sudan decades-long history of violent conflict.
2.2.1. The causes and implications of the first civil war: 1955-1972

The origins of the first Sudanese civil war can be traced as far back as the period prior to British colonization that later extended to the legacy of expatriate Anglo-Egyptian domination. During the pre- and post-independence Sudan revolution, these two regions were broadly described as the Arab-Muslim North and the African-Christian/Animist South, or simply put, the North Sudan-South Sudan conflict (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 27). According to Kulusika (1998: 36), the roots of Sudan’s problems can be traced to the sale and enslavement of indigenous black Africans by the Arabs long before the Sudanese state was demarcated into Northern and Southern groups by the Turkish-Egyptian colonialists from 1821-1885. This delineation was subsequently reinforced by the Anglo-Egyptian regime; from 1898 to 1956, where the British administered two distinct policies in a single colonial entity (Kulusika, 1998: 36).

Jacon et al. (2012: 498) note that the administration of Sudan as two distinct policy entities created a huge divergence between the Northern and Southern territories. Firstly, in terms of religion, the British encouraged the Southern Sudanese to embrace Christianity and dissuaded them from taking up or practicing the Islamic culture. Secondly, the British invested little in the educational needs of the Southerners, which limited their capacity to engage in political affairs. This was not the case in the North, where the elites were given education and enabled to defend the independence of the country (Jacon et al., 2012: 498). Moreover, during the Turkish-Egyptian era as well as Anglo-Egyptian rule, the Northern part of Sudan benefited tremendously from large scale economic investments, such as the introduction of modern irrigation systems for cotton plantations and the economic ecosystem that developed around the booming cotton industry, trade, transportation and employment; while in the Southern part, the indigenous economy was left largely untouched (Johnson, 2003: 17; Jacon, et al., 2012: 497).
Kulusika (1998: 36 – 37) notes that the fact that Sudan was presented *de facto* as two distinct entities was made manifest in the Southern Policy³ of British rule in the 1930s. This policy was replaced by ‘Sudanisation’⁴ in 1946, which aimed at integrating the Anglo-Egyptian administered Northern territory and the British governed Southern region under one government (Sawant, 1998: 350; Gadir, Elbadawi & El-Batahani, 2005: 7). Gadir *et al.* (2005: 5-6) further stress that this policy was not the first of its kind, since a number of memoranda dating back to 1918 and 1921 had suggested the linkage and integration of Southern Sudan with Central African administrative systems of rule rather than with Northern Sudan.

According to Ryan (2012: 9), the endorsement of the policy of ‘Sudanisation’ in the 1947 Juba Conference was backed by a number of promises from the Northern region to the Southern region, mainly to gain the support of Southern Sudanese for the idea of a united Sudan at the dawn of independence. Scholars like Malwal (1987), as mentioned in Gadir *et al.* (2005: 8) also maintain that the unity settlement was based on certain provisions, which included: the demand by Southerners for the respect, preservation, and promotion of Southern cultures (languages, traditions and heritage); reconciliation of the poor relations between the two regions and a commitment to the equality of citizens in the future Sudan; racial equality; accelerated educational and economic development in the South; and the

³The Southern Policy aimed at extricating the South from the North and incorporating and developing it along the culture of Africanism and Christianity rather than Arabisation and Islamisation. This declaration to rule the South differently from the North therefore suggested the development of a southern Sudan state alongside countries in British East Africa, rather than the Middle East (Johnson, 2003: 11).

⁴The new version of the Southern Policy read thus: “[W]e should now work on the assumption that the Sudan, as at present constituted, with possibly minor boundary adjustment, will remain one: and we should therefore restate our Southern Policy and do so publicly, as follows: ‘the policy of the Sudan government regarding the Southern Sudan is to act upon the fact that the peoples of the Southern Sudan are distinctively African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combine (so far as can be foreseen at the present time) to render them inextricably bound for future development to the middle-eastern and arabicised Northern Sudan: and therefore to ensure that they shall, by educational and economic development, be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future as socially and economically the equals of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future’” (Gadir *et al.*, 2005: 7-8), quoting Beshir, (1968), *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict*; Khartoum University Press, Khartoum).
involvement of Southerners in the administration of the country at the national level coupled with self-rule in Southern Sudan. Despite these conditions, the Southerners still had reservations, especially regarding their vision of assuming political control within the South Sudan territory after independence. The exclusion of Southern representatives from the 1953 elections on the future of Sudan and the influx of Northerners to replace positions vacated by departing British administrators, educators, senior officers, military and business positions in the South, confirmed the worst fears of the Southern Sudanese (Johnson, 2003: 27). Johnson adds that the reason for such anxiety among Southern Sudanese was attributable, first to the fact that the Southern Sudanese had little or no representation in the national parliament, and second, that Northern Sudanese were appointed not only to key, but all the senior positions in the South.

This evidence of Northern domination and the marginalisation of Southerners long before independence prompted Southern Sudanese to engage in political action, *inter alia* violent demonstrations, leading to the 1955 Torit Massacre, which set the stage for the first Sudan civil war (Paglia, 2007: 4). It also prompted the South to form political groups, such as the Southern Liberal Party (SLP) to demand federalism after independence and to fight for the recognition of the Southern Sudanese identity within its political zone (LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 13). At independence on January 1, 1956, there was still no agreement between the North and the South, especially on the issue of federalism and Southern involvement in the political and economic affairs of independent Sudan. These problems as well as the open conflict between the Arab North and the African South resulted in the formation of rebel groups like the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) – a unit of Anya Nya Guerrillas and its political wing – and the Southern Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) in 1963; these groups orchestrated attacks in several provinces like Wau and Juba; the coup d’état against General Ibrahim Abbud’s government in 1965; and the 1969 coup that brought General Jaaffer Nimeiri to power. All these actions caused the further escalation of war (Sawant, 1998: 353-354; Plagia, 2007: 4).

Given the above, scholars like Yokwe (1997: 82) have attributed the causes of the civil war to the struggles for power and the quest for autonomy by the Christian and animist south
from the Khartoum government. This first civil war created a period of turmoil that lasted until 1972. It can be concluded that the problem of a prosperous Arab North and a neglected Christian South fundamentally divided by a number of historical, religious, political, economic and socio-cultural issues and events was at the heart of the violent conflict. The interest of the North not only in retaining political, economic and social control of the country, but to completely exclude and deprive the South, pushed the Southern Sudanese to swiftly resort to the politics of war. The signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 ended the conflict and ushered in 11 years of peace. However, the lack of substance and shallowness of the agreement, the non-compliance of the Khartoum government in upholding even the most basic tenets of its terms and provisions and the daunting challenges of implementation were all causes of the re-emergence of violent conflict in 1983.

2.2.2. The causes and implications of the second civil war: 1983-2005

The violent outbreak of conflict in Sudan in 1983 marked the second phase of the Sudanese civil war. A number of unresolved differences, events and the policies adopted by President Nimeiri’s government led to the collapse of the 1972 agreement and are said to have triggered the conflict (Ryan, 2012: 11). The first such event was the removal of Islamic provisions from the 1973 Constitution by President Nimeiri’s administration in order to comply with one of the provisions of the Addis Ababa Agreement with the South (Sawant, 1998: 355). This caused widespread rebellion among the Northern Arabs. Likewise, the provision which called for the South to be afforded the political right to self-govern their region was contested and viewed by some Northern elites as constituting a threat to Sudan’s future and their existing political privileges (Ryan, 2012: 10).

The majority of the Anya Nya rebels expressed dissatisfaction with the peace process and did not share the idea of a united Sudan. This eventually resulted in the breakup of the movement, leading to formation of Anya Nya II whose main objective was Southern autonomy rather than unity (Johnson, 2003: 60). Furthermore, the problems over certain borders like Abyei, the Chali area of the Blue Nile and the Kafia Kingi and Hofrat al-Nahas...
areas, also proved triggers for conflict. Johnson (2003: 44) notes that some of these areas, like Abyei and Chali area of the Blue Nile were part of the South until 1953, but were undefined when Sudan gained independence in 1956. While the 1972 peace agreement provided for their transfer back to the Southern region, there was great reluctance on the part of the government to implement this provision because of its interest in the water and mineral resources in the areas (Johnson, 2003: 44).

The discovery of oil in the south of Sudan in 1976 also exacerbated tensions in the region, especially since the Southern government were not consulted or included in the decision-making processes and negotiations that led to the drilling and extraction of the oil by international companies like Chevron and Total (Ryan, 2012: 10). Ryan adds that the scarcity of water in the Northern region and the proposal to build the Jonglei Canal to direct water resources to the North was an added source of tension between the North and the South. According to Johnson (2003: 45), South Sudan's main asset was oil, mostly located in the Upper Nile and Jonglei provinces; and the numerous tributaries of the Nile River and heavier rainfall in Southern Sudan also gives the region better access to water compared with the then North Sudan that relied on perennial and seasonal rivers, originating in neighbouring countries (OCHA, 2006). This abundance of resources in the South was the cause of the major divide between it and the North. The North's determination to control these resources and the South's keenness to retain control provoked the hostilities and remained at the heart of the North-South Sudan conflict's intractability.

Furthermore, new developments in the 1980s such as the government's decision to proceed with the Jonglei Canal project despite opposition from the South, led to a series of attacks by the Anya Nya against Sudan troops (Sawant, 1998: 356). Hoile (2002: 33) also notes that the arrest of 21 Southern politicians accused of illegally forming the Council for Unity of Southern Sudan (CUSS) party in 1982 provided further grounds for tension in Southern Sudan. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), mostly composed of members of the Dinka ethnic group, was formed in 1982. Its objective was to overthrow Arab rule and create a united Sudan, as opposed to the ideology of the Anya Nya
(predominantly from the Nuer population) who advocated for an independent Southern Sudan (LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 16-17). These conflicting visions for Southern Sudan’s future also provoked divisions in the South, especially between the Dinka and Nuer populations, which led to individuals advocating for the prevention of the South’s domination by the Dinka.

According to LeRiche and Arnold (2012: 58), the government of Sudan’s repeal of the Addis Ababa Agreement; the re-division of Southern Sudan into three separate regions: Equatoria, Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile; and the implementation of Islamic Sharia law in all regions of the country, including Southern Sudan in 1983, are the three major policies that incited and marked the beginning of the second Sudanese civil war. This war, spearheaded and led by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and its military wing, the SPLA (SPLM/A) under the leadership of Dr John Garang came to an end only in 2005 with the signing of the CPA.

From 1983 to 2005, many other factors and incidents contributed to the escalation and protracted nature of this conflict. External support for the government and rebel groups in the South – from the United States of America (USA), Libya, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Central Africa Republic and the DRC and the spread of the conflict to other regions of Sudan promoted the conflict (Johnson, 2003: 67). The deteriorating political and economic situation in the country that led to Nimeiri’s overthrow in 1985; the 1989 coup that brought Omar Bashir to power as the president of Sudan, and the Sudan government’s re-launch of the war led by the army, which ended ongoing reconciliation efforts between the SPLM/A and several Northern opposition parties, also exacerbated the conflict (Sawant, 1998: 357; LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 77). The lack of unity within the SPLM/A also precipitated violence in Southern Sudan. The coup against the SPLM/A leadership of John Garang in 1991 split the movement into factions, the SPLA-Nasir in 1991 and the SPLA-United (later renamed the Southern Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A)) in 1993. This also led to widespread unrest between the fragmented groups as well as attacks on villages and communities within the Southern regions (Johnson, 2003: 98; LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 85). It further generated the ‘conflict of ethnic politics’ that led to the
The intensification of inter-ethnic conflict between the Dinka and Nuer, described as one of the worst and bloodiest conflicts in the history of Southern Sudan (New Sudan Council of Churches, 1999). While both communities had been fighting for years over issues related to grazing land and cattle raiding, the new inter-tribal and inter-factional disputes increasingly targeted women and children (New Sudan Council of Churches, 1999).

Furthermore, Southern Sudan’s discontent spiraled into political dissonance over access to power, lack of respect as an ethnic group/s, being deprived of opportunities and the distribution of resources, and encapsulated a complex conflict over ethnic, religious and cultural identity and extensive rivalry over water, land and oil resources (Goldsmith, Abura & Switzer, 2002: 190). Although Southern Sudan is said to have been at the heart of the civil wars because of the momentum it gathered for its strong opposition as early as 1955 (the Torit Mutiny), other conflicts linked to ethnic identity had simmered and continue to do so today in the peripheral regions of the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, Abyei, Eastern Sudan, and Darfur, contributing to the instability and humanitarian crisis in Sudan (Kameir, 2011: 4).

While a settlement was reached in 2005, the war already had devastating consequences. According to Peters (1996: 9) the conflicts caused the South to remain perhaps the most underdeveloped area not only in Sudan, but in the whole of Africa. It also resulted in gross violations of human rights; led to the genocide of defenceless civilians in towns, villages and refugee camps (mostly in South Sudan); and the abduction and torture of women and children as well as Southern politicians (Yokwe, 1997: 97-98). Mears and Watt (2011: 1-2) note that the conflict resulted in the displacement of more than four million people and approximately two million deaths; about 50,000 children were orphaned and another 17,000 were recruited into armed groups. Other consequences included poverty, famine, starvation and food insecurity; and the disruption of basic social services (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011(a): 5 & 8). It also led to the destruction of the little infrastructure that existed in the South, such as hospitals, schools and roads; and weakened the existing socio-economic systems, as well as state administration and institutions (Peters, 1996: 9; Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011(a): 5 & 8).
Whereas the foregoing historical analysis points to economic and political inequities, as well as the perpetual violation of the basic rights of the South Sudanese by the North in the former Sudan as drivers of the conflict, the root causes that confined these inequities to the Southern region, remain apparent. The Horizontal Inequalities Model however, offers an alternative explanation of the causes underlying such inequalities. Østby (2003: 24) contends that "incompatible interests may be the apparent cause of conflict among groups in many cases, but conflict, arguably, will not occur in the absence of some inter-group identity competition." Even though this does not imply that conflict is an evitable outcome of inter-group differences, Tajfel and Turner (1986), as cited in Østby (2003: 24) postulate that inter-group conflicts are prompted and enhanced even where the groups have compatible interests, and that this is common where one group’s “action for positive distinctiveness is frustrated, impeded or in any way actively prevented by an out-group.”

This model brings to the surface the fact that the ethnic distinctness between Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan regions defined the conflict; these ethnic variations continue to influence Sudan (with the crises in Darfur and Kordofan) and have cascaded into the political landscape of independent South Sudan. The application of the Horizontal Inequalities Model to the conflict clarifies that internally, neither the Northern Sudan nor the Southern Sudan regions were ethnically homogenous but that the Northern Sudan region – save for marginal dissenters – was united in supporting the Khartoum government’s policies that the Southern Sudanese opposed. Likewise, the Southern Sudanese were, despite their broad ethnic diversity, equally exposed to the Khartoum government’s unfavourable policies as well as united in opposing them. Given this, one can contend that the same identity-related unresolved causes of the first civil war reignited the second civil war, with the only difference being that the dashed expectations created by the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement also added to the resolve of the South Sudanese never to settle for quasi- and half-baked solutions – as demonstrated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005.
Furthermore, although competition for resources added another dimension to the conflict, it sprang (and continues to do so) from the inequalities along ethnic lines that contributed to the prolonged conflict in the first place. These inequalities have in the post-conflict setting continued to cause internal conflicts within South Sudan as well as with Sudan. On this note it can be argued that the inequalities between ethnic groups that stood at the heart of the first Sudanese civil war also expressed and manifested themselves in economic/resource inequalities, which further perpetuated a sense of domination by the advantaged Northern Sudan entities, and a sense of marginalisation by the disadvantaged Southern Sudanese. This situation likewise created a cycle where the Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan entities, as well as communities within South Sudan were/are set apart by their differences. The identities of the Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan districts as distinct entities either benefitting from or disadvantaged by unbalanced power relations reveal the causes of the first and second civil wars in the former Sudan, even if the issue that sparked the wars appear to vary. The fact that Sudan has grappled with ethnic-based problems (manifest in political, economic and social differences) in a greater part of its post-independence history, including the period following the independence of South Sudan in July 2011 – suggests that identity-based (ethnic) inequalities lie at the root of the Sudan–South Sudan conflict, and are latent in the challenges of inter- and intra-ethnic harmony in the Republic of South Sudan.

**Summary Causes of the Sudan–South Sudan Conflict — Identity (Ethnic)-Based Inequalities further manifested in Political, Economic and Social Inequalities**

- Identity-based political inequalities in the control of political power by Khartoum government (dominantly North Sudanese) to the exclusion of the South, equating the unequal distribution of political power between the North and the South — thus, concerns of poor governance and corruption, and competition for political opportunities/power and participation in political affairs by the South.

- Identity-based economic inequalities in the South’s unequal access to employment opportunities, thus the issue of poverty, and unequal distribution of resources, especially following the discovery of oil in the south of Sudan in 1976; the numerous tributaries of the Nile River and heavier rainfall in Southern Sudan, providing the South with better access to water compared to the then North Sudan — thus the North’s determination to control these resources and the South’s keenness to retain control

- Identity-based social inequalities in the South — as observed in the unequal access to health, educational and other infrastructural facilities as compared to the North, and the nation-wide imposition of Islam and the Sharia Law
2.3. Peace Processes and Negotiations to end the Sudan-South Sudan Conflicts

This section examines the nature of peace processes and negotiations to address the Sudan-South Sudan conflicts. According to Peters (1996: 4) a large part of Sudan’s conflict history, particularly the period following the outbreak of the first civil war, remained overlooked by the outside world. Attempts to find a solution to Sudan’s first civil war were mainly directed by the government and rebel groups. The Addis Ababa Agreement of February 27, 1972 proved to be a complicated undertaking, which ended the violent conflict but encountered serious implementation challenges. However, the agreement was considered unique in being the first of its kind in post-colonial Africa (Johnson: 2003: 39).

Unlike the first civil war, the second civil war was characterised by the continuing commitment of international negotiators, spearheaded by IGAD.5 While peace efforts initially incited more violence, the mediating parties remained instrumental in assisting Sudan-South Sudan in reaching a political and negotiated solution to the crisis. This eventually resulted in the 2005 CPA, which has been credited as a significant marker that transformed the conflict, mapped the end of 22 years of instability, spurred the secession of the South from the North, and set the stage for the creation of newly autonomous Republic of South Sudan.

2.3.1. The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement

President Nimeiri’s public declaration of the government’s willingness to work for social justice for all Sudanese, including Southerners and, the drafting of a policy statement to this

5IGAD is a sub-regional organisation with members from seven states in East Africa and the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Eritrea). IGAD was formerly the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), established as an economic community in 1986 to deal with environmental problems such drought and desertification. However, it later assumed the additional role of addressing and managing other political and socio-economic issues and resolving conflicts in the region http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93&Itemid=124&limitstart=3.
effect just after he assumed power in 1969, created the basis for the Addis Ababa Agreement (Shinn, 2005: 240). The policy, which comprised three major elements, in theory attempted to address the consequences of the horizontal inequalities to which the Southern Sudanese were subjected:

1. The new revolutionary government acknowledged the extent and degree of the Southern grievances, as resulting from the legacy of uneven development between the Northern and the Southern regions of Sudan and was determined to find a lasting solution to the problem.

2. The government also recognised the existing cultural and historical differences between the North and South and as a result afforded Southerners the right to regional autonomy and to develop their respective cultures and traditions within a united Sudan.

3. The amnesty law would be extended to develop the South, appoint a Minister of Southern Affairs and call on all Southerners to build a united and democratic Sudan, as a mechanism to achieve the first two goals (Shinn, 2005: 240).

Negotiations over the proposals for regional autonomy and dialogue to end the violence between the government and the SSLM/SSLA were mediated by the late Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia (LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 27). These discussions culminated in the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement between the second military regime of General Nimeiri’s Khartoum government and the SSLM/SSLA and ended 17 years of conflict. Some of the key points of the signed agreement included:

1. A Regional Assembly would be elected as a legislature based in Juba and a High Executive Council (HEC) as a Southern Regional Government (SRG) exercising executive powers in addition to an independent civil service commission. This meant that Southern Sudan would be represented as a single and distinct entity through an autonomous SRG (Gadir Ali, 2003: 3);
2. The Regional Assembly could also vote to request the President of the nation to exempt the Southern region from any national legislation it considered detrimental to regional interests (Johnson, 2003: 40);

3. The Southern areas outside the formally defined South, particularly Abyei, would have referenda regarding inclusion in the South;

4. The Anya Nya insurgents would be integrated into the national army and comprise half of a ‘Southern Command’ that would be subordinated and answerable to command in Khartoum; and

5. The SRG could raise revenue and local tariffs, but not engage in economic planning, as the President of the country retained the final authority over economic matters (LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 27).

Many Southerners regarded this agreement as violating the original goal of Southern independence. Irrespective of these concerns, the agreement was ratified in March 1972 and later enshrined in the new national constitution of the Southern Sudan Regional Self-Government Act in May 1973 (Johnson, 2003: 41). Gadir Ali (2003: 3) maintains that under this agreement the South was privileged to have self-sufficient democratic governance in contrast to the rest of the country. For LeRiche and Arnold (2012: 28), the agreement simply addressed a few key Southern concerns and did not bring to the South the necessary development they had been deprived of by the British and Northern politicians or the reconstruction of whatever meager infrastructure they had, which had been destroyed during the conflict (Ryan, 2012: 11).

The re-emergence of conflict in 1983 pointed to the consequences of not abiding to, or successfully implementing the peace agreement. As noted earlier, the failure of this conflict resolution attempt was directly linked to a series of events that instigated a relapse into conflict. It can also be contended that the failure of the agreement and the eventual
outbreak of the second civil war was a result of its shallowness, as illustrated in the above provisions. Thus, despite the fact that it was symbolic, the Addis Ababa Agreement was not sufficiently complete to address the distinct needs of the Southern Sudanese for fair and equal treatment and the desire of the Khartoum government to perpetuate its dominance at the expense of the Southern region. This lack of commitment on the part of both parties led to the collapse of the agreement. The failure to address the issues of underdevelopment that had plagued the South since colonialism created a ripe socio-economic and political situation to spark another conflict.

According to David Malone, the reasons for the failure and the challenges in implementing peace agreements can be attributed to three factors: insufficient time for peace accords to translate into meaningful actions; hasty steps taken to implement the agreement without studying or understanding the vulnerability of the conflict environment and/or putting in place constructive and strategic plans to manage imminent challenges (Stedman, 2001: 1). In the cases of Angola and Rwanda for example, such failure to implement peace agreements resulted in the most catastrophic violence ever witnessed by both countries (Cousens, 2002: 2); this was also the case with Sudan.

From a theoretical perspective, John Paul Lederach attributes such failures to the limitations of the conflict resolution mechanism. In his view, the conflict resolution approach merely aims to source immediate solutions to end conflicts rather than engaging in long-term processes to understand the root causes of the conflict and pursue constructive change (Ramsotham et al., 2009: 8 & 332). This conforms with Ryan’s (2012: 11) assertion that although the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement may have yielded the desired outcome of ending the immediate violence, it failed to address the root causes of the conflict.

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6 David M. Malone is a Canadian author and career diplomat. He is the former President of the International Peace Institute (IPI), an expert in International Affairs and has authored several books on International Security and Development and the UN and its Peacekeeping efforts.
It is also important to note that between the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the 2005 CPA several attempts aimed at addressing and achieving reconciliation were initiated in Sudan. The document ‘the chronology of the Sudanese peace processes’ specifies that about 18 different ventures aimed at reconciling the various Sudan conflicts were signed between 1989 and 2001 (Hoile, 2002). Collins (2007) further elucidates that in 2002 and 2003, 16 different efforts at resolving the Sudan conflicts were reached; with 15 in 2004.

2.3.2. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The rapid rise to prominence of the second Sudanese civil war on the agendas of governments and regional and international organisations provided the platform for the international community to undertake a series of diplomatic initiatives to broker peace in Sudan. According to Johnson (2003: 101), serious talks to broker peace between the Northern and Southern Sudan regions began in 1992 with the Abuja Agreement. While no conclusions were reached on this agreement, it stirred an interest in further external involvement and established the need for intervening actors to intensify and engage in constructive settlement strategies under the patronage of IGAD. IGAD’s involvement in creating a diplomatic climate of change in the Sudanese conflict began in 1993, marking the beginning of efforts for more pre-emptive African regional institutions and actors with both the political will and capacity to manage African conflicts (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006: 101). From the beginning of the 21st century, these efforts, with the support of Western powers, resulted in a series of peace negotiations that culminated in the signing of the CPA.

Initially faced with a number of challenges, IGAD-led negotiations in 1994 resulted in the drafting of the Declaration of Principles (DoP), which recommended the right of Southern autonomy, while upholding the fact that the unity of Sudan remained a priority; and also

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7 IGAD-led initiatives were made possible through the Organisation of African Unity’s (OAU’s) efforts to develop mechanisms for the mediation of internal conflicts in Africa (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006: 94). While the OAU/African Union (AU) did not feature much in the peace discussions to end the North-South Sudan second civil war, it remained a political will behind IGAD and fully supported its initiative. Thus, it can be said that the importance of IGAD’s role in addressing the protracted conflict by extension represented the objectives and conflict resolution and peace and security framework of the AU for Africa.
pronounced the need for the establishment of a secular and democratic society throughout the country (LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 107). This declaration was supported by the SPLM/A, but spurned by the Government of Sudan (GoS) who nonetheless sanctioned it as a backdrop for dialogue to broker peace with the South in 1997 (Shinn, 2005: 239; Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006: 105 & 106). Thus, the DoP became the basis for IGAD’s future negotiations with the conflicting Sudanese parties. Despite the more positive attitude of the GoS, the implementation and development of the DoP faced serious challenges, especially in light of the ruling National Congress Party’s (NCP) constant attempts to renegotiate its terms; the rising tensions between the warring factions and the ethnic divisions within the Southern parties and communities, as well as between Egypt-Libya and IGAD; and the problems of famine, warfare and drought in the South that surpassed the intervention (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006: 111; LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 107).

At the turn of the 21st century, IGAD’s efforts received strong support from President Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi of Kenya and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF)8. Furthermore, the USA focused its support and efforts on securing a cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains that began in 2001. With such backing, IGAD's position was greatly strengthened and in July 2002, there was a breakthrough in its peace efforts when the GoS and SPLM/A signed the Machakos Protocol under the guardianship and encouragement of President Moi and General Lazarus Sumbeiywo of Kenya (LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 108). This agreement was welcomed as a major step towards peace and commended for two major achievements: (1) securing the SPLM/A’s consent that Islamic Sharia law would remain the source of governance and legislation in the North, whereas the South would be governed by a secular administration; and (2) bringing the GoS to agree to an internationally observed referendum that would take place after a transition period of six-and-a-half years for the

8The IPF started as a new grouping of the friends of IGAD in 1994 and developed a strong partnership and was later renamed the IGAD Partners Forum in 1997 with three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, ambassadorial and technical level. The IPF is made up of Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, United States of America, European Commission, the International Organization for Migration, United Nations Development Programme, and the World Bank. They work to enhance and to facilitate development processes in the IGAD region and provide a wide array of organisational, diplomatic and economic support for IGAD initiatives. Available at: http://igad.int/ -- About Us (pg 6 of 7).
South to decide whether to separate from Sudan or maintain its unity with Sudan (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006: 121-122).

The provisions of the Machakos Protocol provided the framework for subsequent comprehensive peace initiatives under the auspices of IGAD. These initiatives were supported by the active involvement and facilitation roles of the international community, represented by the USA, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Italy, and provisions were finalised that would cover the pre-interim, interim and post-interim period.

Between 2003 and 2004 various negotiations took place in Naivasha, Kenya; the outcome was the signing of six additional protocols and agreements (Shinn, 2005: 139). Among these was the Agreement on Security Arrangement signed on September 25, 2003, which among other things stipulated that irrespective of whether the Southern Sudan seceded or not from Sudan, the Sudan and the South would maintain independent armies during the interim period; and that they would negotiate a ceasefire agreement mediated by IGAD and other international mediators (The Comprehensive Peace Agreement...2005: 87).

On January 7, 2004, the Agreement on Wealth Sharing was also endorsed, containing the guiding principles governing the equitable sharing of common wealth, mainly the division of oil and non-oil revenues, the management of the oil sector, the monetary authority and the reconstruction of the South and other war-affected areas. The agreement provided that 2 percent of the oil revenue would be allocated to the oil producing statesregions in proportion to the output produced in such statesregions and the net oil revenue generated from South Sudan would be equally shared between the GoS and the Government of South Sudan (The Comprehensive Peace Agreement...2005: 54).

This was followed by the Protocol of Power Sharing of May 26, 2004 which defined the structure of the government of Sudan and provided that should the South vote for unity during the referendum, it would have its own regional government semi-autonomous from the broader Sudan (Jobbins, 2008: 6). Under this interim arrangement, the South would have an independent government at the regional level, while at the national level, an
interim Government of National Unity (GoNU), under the authority of the president, vice-presidents and parliament would take charge of the matters of Sudan as a whole (LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 109). Elections were to be held at all levels of government within four years of the interim period. These provisions were very important as they underpinned the structure of the Sudanese governments in the long-term.

The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei and the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States were also signed on May 26, 2004. The Abyei agreement accorded Abyei special administrative status under the institution of the Presidency. It also approved the formation of an Abyei Referendum Commission that would oversee the referendum where Abyei would decide whether to remain part of the broader Sudan or South Sudan (The Comprehensive Peace Agreement…2005: 65-69). The GoS and the SPLM/A further engaged in a democratic and consultative process aimed at resolving the conflicts in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States. This protocol allowed for these states to determine whether the comprehensive agreement satisfied the aspirations of the public as the final determining factor in ending the political conflict in that state (The Comprehensive Peace Agreement…2005: 73-83).

The CPA signed between the GoS and the South rebel political movement SPLM/A on January 9, 2005, therefore comprised six protocols. Contingent on this agreement, a plebiscite was held in January 2011 where South Sudan overwhelmingly voted to secede from the RoS and was proclaimed an independent state on July 9, 2011. The CPA also provided for general national elections to be held during the interim period in accordance with the laws of the Interim National Constitution, which was adopted by the National Assembly in July 2005 (Almquist, 2010: 1).

2.3.3. The CPA–Summary and Analysis

The signing of the CPA paved the way for Sudan and South Sudan to move from a conflict to a post-conflict atmosphere. The negotiations and collection of agreements that led to the CPA indicate a shift beyond traditional round table negotiations as was the case with the
Addis Ababa Agreement to a more robust transformation mechanism of peace discussions at different levels based on internal consensus. The agreement thus represents considerable progress that gradually made a difference in the Sudan–South Sudan conflict situation by creating change in the conflict dynamics and the political situation. The international community was commended for its success in supplying different mediators to facilitate this peace process. As highlighted by Iyob and Khadiagala (2006: 125), President Al-Bashir pronounced that the agreement signalled an end to years of war and shaped a new covenant that obliged the Sudanese to share their wealth and safeguard their country.

Even though the CPA created a transformative phase in the Sudan conflict, Sudan and South Sudan as post-conflict societies have remained fragile, and solid political, economic and social advancement in both states remains elusive. This presents a complexity of political and socio-economic challenges, especially in South Sudan, which faces serious threats to its security as well as to its effective and peaceful development processes. These impediments will be expounded on in chapter three. In part, they can be attributed to the loopholes in the CPA identified in the scholarly literature. It is clear from the above discussion that the CPA mainly engaged two factions – the government’s NCP and SPLM/A.

Considering the ethnic conflict embedded within the Sudanese and Southern communities amidst the broader Sudan-South conflict and the impact of the overall conflict on the masses, the following question arises: Where were/are the opinions of civil society organisations and the voices of other political and rebel parties⁹ which were identified in the CPA as the defining charter of the future of both states? The details of the agreement failed to expansively address the humanitarian and political crisis in Darfur, which remains of great concern and a factor working against peace in Sudan. The CPA was also inconclusive on the issues of the geographical borders of the Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan and Abyei, which still constitute bones of contention and fuel the Sudans’ post-CPA conflict

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⁹ For example, the Umma Party, the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF), National Democratic Alliance, United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF), Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the National Islamic Front (NIF), were all party to the Sudan conflicts.
situations. Aside from the undefined borders, the CPA also seems to have excluded these areas from taking part in the referendum that would define South Sudan's future at end of the interim period.

2.4. Conclusion

Every historical era is defined by a common theme of major challenges. In Sudan, ethnic, economic, political and socio-cultural competition and inequalities between its Northern and Southern regions resulted in prolonged, decades-long civil wars. This chapter has analysed and reviewed these two civil wars and has concluded that the major dynamic that prolonged the conflicts was ethnic inequities, which spread to incorporate other forms of inequality. A historical examination of the Sudan-South Sudan was undertaken to provide an understanding of the conflicts' evolution patterns and the domino effect on the Sudanese population, as well as on the socio-economic and political environment and beyond. It was shown that the protracted conflicts between the Northern and Southern parts of Sudan did not materialise in a void. They originated in particular circumstances, prompted by certain historical, political, economic, social and cultural issues and dynamics. Generally, these included the exclusion of South Sudan from political power and development, the underdevelopment of the South, the problem of the overall exclusion of Southern Sudanese along ethnic lines, the ‘Islamisation’ and imposition of Sharia law over the whole country and the problems that generated from the discovery of mineral resources.

During both civil wars numerous conflict resolution and ultimately conflict transformation initiatives were launched. While the Addis Ababa Agreement failed to resolve the conflict situation, the CPA was applauded for moving the conflict to a sustainable resolution; and IGAD's role in this process proved instrumental. The achievement of the peace deal marked the official end of decades of protracted violent conflict between Northern and Southern Sudan regions and was a crucial moment in the country's history. For South Sudan, this agreement allowed it to break free from years of marginalisation and oppression by the Khartoum government and from the destructive scourge of civil wars. The six-year interim
period affixed to the CPA provided the basis on which South Sudan was to decide on its future through a referendum.

At the time, the biggest concerns were whether the parties would abide by the CPA’s provisions; what it would mean for both the North and South regions of Sudan, bearing in mind that the conflict had proliferated into Africa’s most protracted one; and whether the post-CPA period would witness a repetition of the outcome of the 1972 agreement or spark a major backlash in the country. As it turned out, Al-Bashir’s assertion that the CPA had created a path by which Sudan and its Southern regions would share their wealth while safeguarding the integrity of the country and the region was far from the reality of the transition period. The failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the CPA to involve or invite to the negotiating table other smaller insurgent groups active in the conflict; and to take into consideration the perspectives of the wider community at the base – who are the most affected by the consequences of the conflict, remain amongst the many challenges to the peace agreements. This creates a blurriness in the literature of conflict transformation and peace mechanisms on South Sudan (and Sudan) – a gap which this study intends to fill, contending that an all-inclusive approach of all the tiers in the conflict society is an imperative, if effective conflict transformation and peace-building are the long-term goals.

The post-CPA political, economic and socio-cultural landscape (as will be established in the subsequent chapter) remained shaped by a multitude of complexities, especially land, border and resource issues, and most importantly ethnic-based clashes which have extended to, and continue to express themselves and impact negatively on South Sudan’s post-independence environment. It is against this backdrop that chapter three identifies and examines South Sudan’s post-conflict, post-independence challenges and their repercussions on peace-building and development efforts. Taking into account that the CPA also provided the platform for international actors to support Sudan’s transition to peace, the following chapter will further evaluate the role and engagement of stakeholders in aiding South Sudan in its process of transformation and development as a newly independent state.
Chapter Three

3. South Sudan’s Post-Conflict and Post-Independence Environment: Exploring the Transformational and Peace-Building Complexities

3.1. Introduction

The quest by the Southern region for peace and the transformation of their homeland into a modern nation-state, where citizens enjoy peace and security and are treated as equals, irrespective of their differences, has spanned decades, starting with the Torit mutiny in 1955, and ending with the country’s independence in July 2011. South Sudan used various avenues to achieve its aspirations, as manifested in their willingness to sign the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, an experiment that turned out to be a disappointment for the Southern region. In July 2011, South Sudan, while aware of the challenges facing a country emerging from a history mired in conflict, opted for independence in order to realise their desire for peace and transition into a society whose citizens live in peace and dignity. This chapter centres on an analysis of the challenges evident in the post-conflict transition period (January 2005 to 8 July 2011) that extended into post-independent South Sudan (9 July 2011 to the present–December 2012), as well as the impact of Sudan’s legacy of internal conflict and the spill over effects on South Sudan, as a prelude to charting future strategies for the independent South Sudan to achieve its goals.

The months and years that followed the signing of the CPA were marked by significant transformation and peace-building complexities. These reflected the unresolved causes of the Sudan-South Sudan conflict and the problems left unaddressed by the CPA. According to Wassara (2007: 5-7), South Sudan’s internal challenges were/are compounded by Sudan. The challenges that confronted post-CPA South Sudan included the Darfur crisis. Additional factors include inter-communal tensions in South Sudan over land
ownership; social, political and economic inequalities; weak representative governments at the local level; and inequitable access to natural resources, especially between pastoralists and settled agriculturalists (Wassara, 2007: 5-7). Taken together, these factors presented a complex challenge to the implementation of the 2005 peace agreement with the possibility of widespread renewed violence.

Another challenge was the death of John Garang\textsuperscript{10} in 2005, which weakened the position of SPLM and provoked the recurrence of inter-communal violence in Khartoum and parts of South Sudan (Young, 2005: 536). Other post-CPA transitional challenges included ideological disharmonies between the former foes, conflicts between the different fragmented rebel groups, especially within communities in South Sudan; the citizenship crisis; and undefined and unresolved border issues, which sparked occasional confrontations between the South Sudan-Sudan governments as they struggled to gain access to and control of the regions, especially oil-rich Abyei (Insight on Conflict, 2011). It is also worth noting that apart from these problems emanating from unresolved grievances, some of the immediate post-CPA challenges lay on Sudan and South Sudan's non-adherence to certain provisions (like the oil and wealth sharing deal and the status of Abyei) of the peace treaty, as well as to the conventional impediments that accompany the implementation of peace agreements.

Despite these challenges, the greater vision of the South Sudanese population, both at home and in the diaspora during this interim and transitional period of the CPA, remained focused on building a united force to realise the common goal of “Independence for South Sudan.” This unity was evident in the January 9, 2011 referendum where 99 percent of Southern Sudanese voted for secession and independence. On July 9, 2011, South Sudan became Africa’s 54\textsuperscript{th} independent state and the world’s newest and 195\textsuperscript{th} sovereign nation-

\textsuperscript{10} John Garang was the leader of SPLM/A and a key player in negotiating and signing the CPA. His death raised a lot of questions, including what the results of the referendum would have been under his leadership as the [first Vice President of Sudan, President of Southern Sudan, and Leader and Chairman of the SPLM/A (Young, 2005: 535)], especially considering his original position of unity. It is hard to predict what would have happened if Garang was still alive. There may well have been a different outcome, given his personality, political prominence, influence and network of alliances.
state. As it celebrated its first anniversary as a new Republic in July 2012, many recognised that South Sudan’s official independence was a historic event for the African continent at large (El-Nour, 2011: 1). According to Herr (2011:1) independence created high expectations among the South Sudanese and the international community that one of Africa’s longest conflicts had finally come to an end. However, the persistence of the challenges confronting the new state are indicative of the fact that the moment of opportunity which independence represented, has since been clouded by a myriad of complex developments, such as, the disputes with Sudan and internal ethnic divisions as well as state- and nation-building challenges.

Independent South Sudan is confronted with the challenging task of building a new state out of nothing, which includes laying sound foundations for a broad-based accountable political, economic and social infrastructure and the institutions commensurate with a modern state. Kamier (2011: 12) and Jok (2011: 2) highlight the fact that South Sudan inherited weak state institutions, a corrupt civil service, non-existent or poor economic markets and physical infrastructure, an unstable political climate, financial crisis, violent ethnic divisions, a limited capacity for governance, an uncertain regional and international environment, and a decades’ long legacy of insecurity left by the civil war (Lacher, 2012: 5). Moreover, in 2011, Southern Sudan’s Human Development Index remained among the lowest in the world, with the majority of its population living on less than one US dollar a day (Mears & Watt: 2011: 2). The wars stymied the development of South Sudan’s human capital, which deeply damaged the possibility of a transparent public service and economic and social service institutions. Other challenges originating from this background and currently engulfing South Sudan are the acute shortage of qualified employees, inequalities in income distribution, and limited access to health, education, and employment opportunities (Ali, 2011: 4).

The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Ad Hoc Advisory Group Report (2011: 7) has described South Sudan as representing the “single biggest state-building challenge of this generation”. While this reflects the magnitude of South Sudan’s predicament, it should be borne in mind that societies recovering from war are more often
than not characterised by similar challenges. The fragile situation in South Sudan is not uncommon, especially for a newly formed nation emerging and recovering from conflict.

There have been numerous efforts to ensure the (re)construction and development of South Sudan as a new state and to establish long-term peace by addressing current problems. Both external and internal stakeholders have laid foundations to activate distressed local economies and expand social services (such as schools and health services), engaged in peacekeeping (to support the young state institutions), and supported the government in building a viable state infrastructure. These projects aim to create accountable and stable political institutions, equitable economic development, human security, reinforcement of the rule of law and access to justice. Some stakeholders have established relationships with the South Sudan and the Sudan governments and have also been engaged in peace negotiations, humanitarian assistance, networking and raising public awareness among the various communities. Despite this multitude of endeavours, the international presence and the progress made in creating a peaceful and stable society, South Sudan's transformation to peace and development remains challenged, prompting the pursuit of sustainable peace as a top national priority.

It is pertinent to state that while the CPA – as was intended, made a difference in the Sudan-South Sudan conflict by creating the opportunity for political change, particularly for South Sudan, the challenges of the full and successful implementation of this agreement continue to manifest in post-independence South Sudan. This brings us to the first research question this chapter addresses: “What are the major challenges impinging on South Sudan’s transformation and peace-building capacity?” Addressing this question, the chapter examines South Sudan’s transformation difficulties – state-building and nation-building challenges. And it is argued that South Sudan’s transformation depends primarily on maintaining internal unity, peaceully resolving the outstanding CPA issues with Sudan.

11 IGAD, the UN, AU, and European Union (EU); Save the Children Project; Collaborative for Peace in Sudan (CFPS), Sudan Inter-Religious Council (SIRC), Sudanese Studies Centre (SSC), Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund (SCHF), the World Health Organisation (WHO); China, USA, Canada, Ethiopia, and Kenya are engaged in various projects and peace initiatives in the country (these are just a few of the many stakeholders/actors present in South Sudan).
creating a solid, diversified economic foundation, and nurturing partnerships with neighbours, friends and strategic allies.

The map below portrays a picture of the Republic of South Sudan as of independence with its provinces and surrounding borders.

**Map 2: Map of the Republic of South Sudan as of July 9, 2011**

Source: Food Security Cluster, 2011. [http://foodsecuritycluster.net/countries/south-sudan-republic](http://foodsecuritycluster.net/countries/south-sudan-republic). As indicated on the map, South Sudan is comprised of three provinces, which are subdivided into ten states. **The Bahr el Ghazal Province** consists of four states: Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, and Lakes. **The Greater Upper Nile Province** comprises of three states: Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei. **The Equatoria Province** is also partitioned into three states: Western Equatoria, Central Equatorial (which contains Juba, the national capital) and Eastern Equatoria.
3.2. Post-Independence South Sudan: Conflict Transformation and Peace-building Objectives and Challenges

Conflict transformation aims to change conflict attitudes, perceptions and relationships, be they political, economic or socio-cultural. Its short-term focus is ending violence and dealing with social justice and identity, livelihoods and political power-sharing to achieve long-term institutional and structural transformation (Austin et al., 2012: 25). Conflict transformation’s objectives go beyond changing the conflict situation, and encompass state-building, nation-building and peace-building processes.

As indicated in the first chapter, state-building consists of a collaborative process that supports the building of effective legitimate, accountable and responsive state institutions. It involves developing capacity and the legitimacy of the state by promoting a constructive relationship between the state and society, building inclusive political processes to facilitate a continuous exchange between state and society, and developing state capacity to perform its duties in such a way that it meets the expectations of the population (OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010: 2 & 22). However, the process of state-building must be complemented by the nation-building process, where an equitable, democratic and egalitarian society is built and the will of the masses is represented in the conduct of the affairs of the state.

According to Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda, the process of nation-building is a very challenging political development that includes four major components: “(1) The conscious cultivation of national identity as the foundation of social cohesion, the sense of belonging, based on shared values, tradition, history and aspiration. (2) The establishment of institutions and laws of governance which formalise the relationship between the leaders and the citizens, and their expectations of service delivery. (3) The participation of citizens in the governance process by choosing a system that best serves the people, selecting their leader and playing an active role in decision making; and (4) Establishing the climate and mechanisms for economic development for the whole nation” (Kagame, 2010: 2).
On the other hand, Dudouet (2006: 10-11) posits that *peace-building* is a process of change as well as an instrument of intervention in post-war societies, which aims to structurally transform the root causes of conflict in all areas – political, economic, and social. Lederach maintains that peace-building also entails building structures and processes that (re)define violent relationships into constructive and cooperative patterns and transforming the society during the implementation of peace processes (Dudouet, 2006: 11). According to Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009: 8) the process of *peace-building* comprises a wide range of measures, which include: strengthening national capacities to avert conflict, engaging security and development actions, humanitarian assistance, (re)building institutions of governance and the rule of law, and laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development (OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010: 21).

These state-building, nation-building and peace-building processes are crucial components for addressing any immediate post-conflict complexities and enhancing efforts for peace and development in fragile state situations. They are the key foundation for societal sustainability and stability. It is in the above context that the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, (2011(a): 41) defined its primary national development priorities as effective nation-building, state-building and peace-building. These priorities are adapted from the Sudan Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) framework, which spelled out South Sudan’s core transformation and peace-building goals (JAM Sudan, 2005: 40; OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010: 11-20; Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011(a)) These goals are:

1. Reviving the economy to emerge from its distressed state and promoting economic growth as central to sharing peace dividends and to strengthening the emerging state institutions through developing physical and institutional infrastructure for better governance, prioritising agriculture, effectively managing the country’s natural resources, and encouraging private sector development.
2. Rebuilding internal South Sudanese peace and harmony, including through access to basic services, opportunities, wealth, and the wider political space; strengthening and enhancing cordial relationships with neighbouring countries; narrowing the gap between the citizens and state institutions; improving local security by reforming and making security institutions accessible; resolving disputes through negotiations with dissenters who resorted to force; and strengthening the capacity of local government and traditional institutions.

3. Investing in the development of human capital (health, education, training) including the successful return, resettlement and reintegration of refugees and the internally displaced.

4. Embarking on a political process for broader inclusiveness and to end the conflict with a view to creating the basis for sustainable, sound governance and political stability, and constructive state-society relations as a critical facet of peace-building and state-building priorities (JAM Sudan, 2005: 40; OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010: 11-20; Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011(a)).

The South Sudan Development Plan for 2011–2013 restates these priorities in its long-term goals up to 2040, which are based on the vision of “a nation that is educated and informed; prosperous, productive and innovative, compassionate and tolerant; free, just and peaceful; democratic and accountable; safe, secure and healthy; and united and proud.” In the short- and mid-term, the objectives are to ensure that South Sudan should be “fully established as a peaceful, stable, viable and secure and united nation, building strong foundations for effective governance, economic prosperity and enhanced quality of life for all citizens” by 2014 (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011(a): 41).

However, a host of inherited and post-independence challenges and difficulties hinder South Sudan in achieving these noble objectives. Chimanikire (2011) notes that these include: the urgency of meeting the needs of its impatient population; healing the wounds
of post-conflict border struggles which persist over resources in Abyei and South Kordofan; avoiding massive reliance on Direct Foreign Investment (DFI) for building state institutions and infrastructure; managing resources and the South’s unavoidable relationship with the Republic of Sudan; developing strategies to prevent and contain cross-border and internal South-South conflicts; and managing active internal security threats from armed groups (El-Nour, 2011). Similarly, Van der Zwan (2011: 9) asserts that besides the problem of citizenship; sharing oil revenue; border demarcation; and sharing the debt burden that confronts South Sudan, the country is also embroiled in one of the most difficult tasks of state-building and rehabilitation since the end of the Cold War.

Conflict prevention and improved security are major preoccupations for a newly emerging country with a recent history of conflict. South Sudan experienced two conflicts (chapter two): the first had its origins in the marginalisation, discrimination and underdevelopment of Southern Sudan, whereas the latter was sparked by poor economic development and governance, and the Sudan government’s policies that violated the 1972 Addis Ababa accord, which provided for the unique identity of South Sudan to be respected. Thus, the government of South Sudan has prioritised four major challenges: human and social development; economic development; governance; and conflict prevention and security (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011(a): 44). While these challenges are diverse yet interrelated, each plays its part in complicating the political, socio-economic and security transformation and development of South Sudan into a stable and peaceful sovereign state.

**Politically,** the absence of efficient and transparent public administration; financial management, the decentralisation of political leadership and improved representation and empowerment have been among the major concerns. Such challenges have been cited as the reasons for widespread perceptions that government and state portfolios are predominantly concerned with the SPLM members and its military wing, the SPLA, who hail mostly from the Dinka ethnicity (Haile, 2012). According to the report of a focus group interview conducted by National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, this
centralisation and monopoly of power speaks to the problem of power imbalances and domination (Cook, 2011: 7). Many have also identified these factors as the cause of corruption, discrimination, tribalism and tribal conflict, unfair government employment practices, and the marginalisation and exclusion of other ethnic groups from state politics and the denial of their right to share the gains of the long war for independence (Cook, 2011: 7 & 9). As such, the challenge is for the SPLM/A to substantially reform itself and accommodate other political parties and the broader society.

The culture of accountability and transparency remains very weak. LeRiche and Arnold (2012: 142) argue that another challenge to political development is the fact that administrative decisions are mainly taken in the upper echelons of government, that is, decision-making is concentrated in the president's office to the exclusion of other key ministerial offices. This sets a bad precedent for the entire state apparatus (national, state, and county levels), and deprives governments at all levels from benefitting from the rich contributions that wider citizen participation can offer government policy-making. It can also alienate key stakeholders, including public servants, who may feel marginalised. The most serious challenge, however, is the state's alienation from its constituents, which may jeopardise the political future of the ruling party – SPLM, and trigger new sources of instability.

The impact of South Sudan's strategic relationship with Sudan likewise presents a political challenge to peace and development efforts, and by extension, also constitutes a security and economic problem. This relationship is mainly defined by the issues of contested border territories and oil and natural resources, which stoked the conflict between South Sudan and Sudan for decades. South Sudan is experiencing a low but a rising concentration of cross-border conflicts and violence (LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 158). Since independence, aerial bombings combined with cross border attacks have been rampant in the disputed areas of the Blue Nile and Abyei, among others. Recent developments indicate that there are approximately nine insurgent groups operating, mainly along the Sudan-South Sudan oil fields borders (LeRciche & Arnold, 2012: 157).
According to Human Rights Watch (2012: 2), 2011 witnessed a steady increase in conflict between the South Sudan ruling party, SPLM and Sudan's ruling party NCP, over oil revenue sharing, border management and the status of the contested area of Abyei. The statistics relating to these conflicts speak for themselves: (1) almost 110,000 people were displaced to Warrap state in South Sudan following the violent occupation of Abyei by Sudan just before independence; (2) the outbreak of conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and other fractions of SPLA in Southern Kordofan resulted in the displacement of more than 20,000 people to South Sudan's Unity state; and (3) in September 2011, an estimated 4,000 people were displaced to the Upper Nile state in South Sudan as a result of the outbreak of violent hostilities between Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLM-North\textsuperscript{12} in Southern Kordofan (Human Rights Watch, 2012: 2). In 2012, there were a series of bombings in the capital of the oil-producing Unity border state by the SAF, and conflict erupted between Sudan and South Sudan over control of Heglig in the Abyei region and the oil facility within it (Sudan Tribune, 2012(a)). These border area conflicts have a significant bearing on South Sudan's political environment in that they are diverting attention and scarce resources from internal development efforts.

These disputed areas between Sudan and South Sudan, as indicated in the map below include: Abyei region, which is located along the borders of South Sudan and Sudan; the oil rich Heglig town, which since independence in 1956 to 2003 was administered as part of Unity State in the Southern Sudan, but is positioned in the Northern Sudan side of the map since 1956; the Kafia Kingi region, which is the largest of the regions disputed between Sudan and South Sudan, but an area belonging to the North's South Darfur since 1960; and the Jau area, located on the border of Unity State and South Kordofan (Political Geography Now, 2012). Other areas under dispute also include: the Bahr el Arab (Kiir) River, which is translated as the ‘River of the Arabs’ by the north, and the Kiir River by the South; the Kaka town located within the Upper Nile state, but had since 1956 been occupied by northern farmers; the Megenis Mountains – divided between Sudan's White Nile, South Kordofan states and South Sudan's Upper Nile state; and the Jodha area, located between Renk

\textsuperscript{12} SPLM-N is a northern link of the SPLM/A on South Sudan, active in the states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan.
County in the South’s Upper Nile state and Jebeleyn County in the North’s White Nile state (Political Geography Now, 2012).

Map 3: Border map of Sudan and South Sudan Showing disputed and conflict areas in 2012

Source: Political Geography Now, 2012. [http://www.polgeonow.com/2012/05/feature-sudan-south-sudan-border_26.html](http://www.polgeonow.com/2012/05/feature-sudan-south-sudan-border_26.html). The map shows the disputed areas and the eruption of clashes from the beginning of 2012, between South Sudan and Sudan. It also speaks to the level of security threats facing both states, particularly the new state of South Sudan as it struggles to build a sustainably peaceful and stable society.

**Socio-economically**, widespread poverty and food insecurity; a high illiteracy rate and unemployment; poor access to health; the government’s high dependence on oil revenues and the country’s limited capacity to effectively manage large inflows of aid and private investment; underdevelopment of the financial sector and weak or non-existent monetary
policies; and limited domestic production, resulting in dependence on imports, characterise the collective challenges of social and economic development in South Sudan. According to Dagne (2011: 14), South Sudan’s economy greatly depends on oil revenue, which accounts for an estimated 98 percent of its public revenue and contributes significantly to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) (Kimenyi, 2012: 8). USAID (2012) estimated in 2012 that 890,000 people in South Sudan are extremely food insecure and 2.4 million are moderately food insecure; while approximately 80 percent of the South Sudanese population live in rural areas and are largely dependent on livestock and subsistence farming; this important sector receives less than two percent of the national budget (Mears and Watt, 2011: 4), indicating the rural-urban divide and imbalances. South Sudan's development indicators reveal that (Dagne, 2011: 15; The UN in South Sudan, 2011: 3):

- The total population of South Sudan is 8.2 million.

- An estimated 72% of the population is below the age of 30.

- An estimated 27% of the adult population is literate and 92% of women cannot read or write.

- More than 51% of the population live below the poverty line; with more than 90% estimated to be income poor; only 1% of households have a bank account.

- 85% of the population lacks access to basic health centres.

- An estimated 83% of the population live in rural areas.

- Less than 10% of children complete primary school.

- An estimated 78% of households depend on crop farming or animal husbandry and 35% of the population remains food insecure, requiring food assistance.
Infant mortality is 102 per 1,000 live births. The mortality rate of children below five years is 135/1000 (Dagne, 2011: 15; The UN in South Sudan, 2011: 3).

The marked variations in the quality of social and economic life is best reflected in the situation of the rural/urban divide, where 51 percent are poor, of which 55 percent of the poor are rural and 24 percent are urban (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011(a): XIII). The challenges facing rural areas can be partly attributed to the fact that the government inherited a weak infrastructure, which affected its ability to manage the resources it has in the most optimal manner. The influx of thousands of returnees, especially from Sudan, adds to the demand for basic social and economic services (Mears & Watt, 2011: 2). Furthermore, Mears and Watt note that literacy and education are major challenges, given that only 40% of men and 16% of women are literate; while literacy in practical reading and writing skills is likely to be much lower. While there is a high unemployment rate, there are not enough qualified personnel to fill the few available employment opportunities. The UN Security Sector Reform Unit (2012: 42) also notes that out of the more than 150,000 South Sudan armed forces, 75 percent are illiterate. This hampers efforts aimed at transforming the security sector into an efficient operational and accountable system. Literacy is an empowerment tool in every society that seeks peace, security and development, and political, economic and social prosperity.

South Sudan’s abundant natural resources and the country’s high dependence on oil further complicate the complex economic and political situation in the country. Should South Sudan fail to apply the lessons learned from the undesirable experiences of resource-rich post-conflict nations like the DRC, the country will encounter internal and external threats. On the domestic level, South Sudan might experience what has come to be known as the ‘resource curse’ if it: (1) adopts frugal policies to control expenditure and embark on aggressive savings to invest in national development; (2) makes inefficient investments that lead to inefficient redistribution and its attendant challenges; (3) if the economic strength of the country (agriculture, agribusiness, agro-industry) is not embraced as the central focus of economic development; and (4) if the inherited and weak state institutions are not strengthened to develop and consolidate checks and balances and result in a
situation where public resources are redistributed to existing and potential political constituencies (Collier and Goderis, 2007: 21 & 26). These internal threats are accompanied by external challenges not only because of the conflict over resources, but more so because, although South Sudan controls oil production, the oil refineries, pipelines and transportation are still on Sudanese territory; and part of the transportation is managed by the Sudan.

In January 2012, South Sudan discontinued use of Sudan’s pipelines and port facilities in protest against high transit fees imposed by the Sudan, and shut down all its oil production (Kimenyi, 2012: 8). As Kimenyi notes, this led to a loss of revenue that forced the government of South Sudan to adopt a 3.45 billion South Sudanese Pound (SSP) austerity budget. This will cause a substantial reduction in government expenditure; most disturbingly, it will lead to cuts in critical areas such as agriculture, local government development, education and health (Kimenyi, 2012: 8). According to USAID (2012), the trade blockade with Sudan, combined with other factors, such as the very low 2011 harvests, inter-tribal conflicts, and a growing population of refugees, IDPs and returnees, are significant contributors to increasing food insecurity. Another challenge created by the shut-down of oil production is that it has the potential to further expose South Sudan to unpredictable economic and by extension, social risks; security is likely to deteriorate with the two countries continuing their proxy war against each other.

**Security** remains important to development, and addressing and resolving internal conflicts and disagreements and stabilising peace are central to achieving the desired security objectives. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that South Sudan faces major political and socio-economic challenges, which continue to be exacerbated by inter-communal animosity, insurgency by rebel groups and localised conflicts over land and natural resources, further aggravated by the mass arrival of South Sudanese refugees from Sudan and other parts of Africa (UNHCR, 2012). South Sudan has more than 60 ethnic groups scattered throughout the geographic regions of the

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13 It should be noted that both the political and socio-economic problems are also part of what constitutes security challenges.
country. Internal ethnic divisions and conflicts among these groups remain an enormous challenge to sustainable peace and stability. The patterns of ethnic diversity and conflict within the South Sudan communities started developing during the years of the civil wars and have grown to embrace social, political, and economic grievances. This has led to entrenched insecurity, which is manifested in ongoing ethnic conflicts within and between the various South Sudanese communities over resources, power-sharing, land and violent cattle raids.

The resource and power sharing conflict is mostly fought between the Dinka and the Nuer ethnic groups, who contest Dinka domination of public and political office. Haile (2012) highlights that the exclusion of the majority has fuelled the formation of rebel groups – the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA), South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A) and the National United Front (NUF), among others. These groups have been behind the numerous attacks in regions such as Unity state, which produces a third of South Sudan's total oil production (Haile, 2012). As further indicated by Haile, these rebel groups are also working to overthrow President Salva Kiir's government, as evident in this statement released on November 17, 2011 – “It is our position that once Salva Kiir is removed, our government will give each household across the ten states of South Sudan a share of oil money. We will ensure that the oil money is accessible to each and every citizen of South Sudan. Under Salva Kiir regime, the oil money is controlled by Awan clan where he originated from. As soon as the current regime is toppled, each Southern Sudanese will get monthly payment from the government as the way to redistribute oil money” (SouthSudan.Net, 2011).

Furthermore, ethnic conflicts revolving around the issues of cattle raids and land between the Murle and Nuer ethnic groups are also a major cause of instability in the Jonglei State and in South Sudan as a whole. The outbreak of conflict in August and September 2011 resulted in deaths of 600 Nuer inhabitants, the kidnapping of children and the raid and slaughter of tens of thousands of cattle (Agbor & Taiwo, 2012: 14). The Nuer-Murle ethnic conflict has continued to spread and intensify, causing increased displacement and the deaths of thousands of people. These ethnic tensions have led to the increased use and possession of small firearms, especially by the youth who feel they are not afforded
equitable opportunities to access the normal services provided by the government, such as security and the rule of law; they feel a communal obligation to protect their ethnic identity and property (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011(a): 6). As a result, youths in South Sudan have tended to direct their loyalty towards protecting their ethnicity than their identity as one nation.

This situation represents a high risk with potential for outbreak of widespread violent conflict. The majority of the country's population are youth (51 percent) under the age of eighteen, with 72 percent under the age of 30 (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011(a): 13). Moreover, this generation of youth grew up experiencing the cruelty and violent conflicts and have not known peace. If this social force is not dealt with correctly, this will have serious security implications for the future development of the state.

Internal conflicts and their repercussions have exacerbated the already difficult humanitarian situation in South Sudan. There is common consensus that conflicts over identity and resources have been the backdrop for protracted violent conflict in Africa; examples include Burundi, the DRC, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Sudan. Similarly, the case of South Sudan (though not yet extensive) is also posing serious challenges to the efforts and ideals of sustainable peace, development and stability in the country at large.

3.3. Addressing Post-Independence Challenges and Building on the Nation’s Development Objectives

South Sudan’s growing challenges (as outlined above) have raised the question as to whether it will be able to forget the spoils of war and develop into an all-inclusive sovereign state out of the shadows of the RoS; and whether it will be able to sustainably achieve peace and stability by overcoming ongoing and future challenges (Haile, 2012). While these questions remain to be answered, these challenges to South Sudan’s effective development require remedial, short-and medium-term and long-term measures for the realisation of the country’s transformation and peace-building priorities. Kameir (2011:
12) suggests that in managing South Sudan’s challenges three important areas, internal security, including the identification of salient as well as latent causes for instability; guaranteeing peace dividends to the people of South Sudan; and good governance and integrity in public life, which is the key to political stability and healthy economic growth, need urgent attention.

According to Coutts and Ong (2001), managing post-conflict challenges generally requires the broader coordination of security at the strategic, tactical and operational levels. This involves a number of factors: engaging local stakeholders (as the sustainability of any solution depends on its acceptance by the local community); strengthening indigenous police forces; and harmonising civil and military operations (Coutts and Ong, 2001). For Finell (2002), such management efforts should include: policing; strengthening the rule of law; strengthening civilian administration; and civilian protection as the priority target areas for crisis management. John Paul Lederach (1997) and Timothy Donais (2012) also underscore the importance of empowering local ownership of post-conflict peace-building processes as a vital strategy for managing post-conflict complexities, and supporting the transformation of the relationship between the conflicting or former conflict parties from one of confrontation, to one of conciliation and development.

The Government of South Sudan has been engaged in discourses and broad-based policy decisions to address its numerous complexities by way of building on its outlined peace and development goals. With support from the international community, the government has taken steps to institutionalise good and democratic governance; promote peace-building activities and respect for human rights; execute major state duties such as security and justice, service delivery and mobilizing revenue; generate employment opportunities; and facilitate infrastructural and economic development (Kameir, 2011: 8). The government has also been working to realise key state-building processes, which comprise: a political reconciliation process that aims to build a national identity; security reforms to deal with the monopoly of force; engaging in clear and strategic communication on matters surrounding the transitional constitution; and engendering a major
development plan through collaborative ministerial efforts (LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 143). In April 2012, for instance, the Presidential Committee for Peace, Reconciliation and Tolerance in Jonglei held a workshop for dialogue and in May, the Presidential Committee and traditional chiefs in Jonglei state signed a peace deal in a ceremony witnessed by President Kiir. This peace agreement recommended the implementation of development projects, such as road construction and the opening of police stations within the communities (International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), 2012: 13).

To achieve the country’s stated transformation and peace-building goals, the GoSS, with the assistance of the UN framed the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) for 2011-2013, which identified four priority areas. These are: Human and social development, the aim being the expansion and strengthening of government provision of basic services and the establishment of social safeguards for the poorest and most vulnerable; Economic development, which will focus on large-scale infrastructure development, especially the expansion of the road network and the provision of energy, and the establishment of community-based infrastructure and development projects; Governance, to focus on projects that support capacity-building and core governance functions; and Conflict prevention and security relating to the transformation of the security sector and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes as well as the establishment of a legal framework for all levels of government (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011(a): 140-141).

As a young nation, South Sudan’s democratic future depends on its ability to promote a political culture where government is held accountable by the legislature, and the independence of the judiciary is upheld. It is for this reason that the 2011-2013 SSDP devotes significant attention to governance. Similarly, economic development creates a concrete foundation for citizens to live a quality, dignified life and paves the way for a sustainable democratic system. The SSDP thus also assigns high priority to economic development. The plan also focuses on social services (education, health, social support) as a sector through which the state communicates with its citizens. Conflict is detrimental to South Sudan’s state- and nation-building endeavours, and as such conflict prevention and
resolution are important components of the plan. Table 1 below presents the government’s plan for the priority areas and targeted outcomes by the end of 2013.

**Table 1: Priority Programme Outcome Objectives and 2013 Targets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome Objective</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>2013 Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved whole-of-government approach to addressing national presidential priorities by GoSS and state institutions.</td>
<td>Number of GoSS institutions that can correctly articulate key national priorities</td>
<td>Increase by 50% from baseline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of GoSS institutions that implement key national priorities</td>
<td>Increase by 40% from baseline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced coordination, application and development of knowledge and skills of public servants.</td>
<td>Proportion of GoSS institutions that conduct training and that report on the effectiveness of training to the Ministry of Human Resources Development (MoHRD). <strong>Baseline:</strong> 20%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase the capacity of SSLA to effectively and efficiently carry its oversight function through review of the laws passed and increase the numbers of laws passed annually.</td>
<td>Number of bills submitted to SSLA, debated, and enacted into law. <strong>Baseline:</strong> 12 laws passed in 2010</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collect, analyse and disseminate all official geospatial, economic, social, demographic, census, environmental and food security statistics, ensuring that the Government and DPs have access to up-to-date and accurate information with which to plan the efficient and equitable allocation of public resources.</td>
<td>SSCCSE’s score on the Statistical Capacity Building Indicator (SCBI). <strong>Baseline:</strong> No score on SCBI</td>
<td>Improve five percentage points on 2011 baseline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved stability of government revenue and management of the macro-economy</td>
<td>Amount of non-oil revenues collected. <strong>Baseline:</strong> SDG 118 million, 2009.</td>
<td>SDG500 million.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monthly revenue forecasts established <strong>Baseline:</strong> no forecasts produced.</td>
<td>Long-term annual revenue forecasts produced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Development</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>To increase crop production and land/ vegetation cover.</td>
<td>Sustained increase in cereal crop production, and overall production increase of other major food crops. <strong>Baseline</strong> 2010: estimated traditional sector cereal production was 0.695 million Mt - last five years average was 0.744 million Mt)</td>
<td>Cereal production consistently above 1.0 million Mt per year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved interstate, trunk and feeder roads routinely maintained on sustainable basis and roads safety to enhance economic growth.</td>
<td>Length of asphalted trunk road network under construction/completed. <strong>Baseline:</strong> 0km</td>
<td>752km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>Length of constructed engineered roads <strong>Baseline:</strong> 363km of interstate and feeder roads constructed to engineered roads standard in 2010</td>
<td>2000km</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of roads under maintenance with safety provision. <strong>Baseline:</strong> 1750km of roads is under maintenance and safety provision</td>
<td>4500km</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To promote and improve the exploration, development, production and utilisation of South Sudan’s mineral, oil and other energy resources.</td>
<td>Award new licenses and attract new mineral and oil exploration companies. <strong>Baseline:</strong> 17 licensed minerals companies 2010.</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase oil recovery and a number of oil infrastructures in South Sudan. <strong>Baseline</strong> 2010: 0.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To increase production of livestock and fish commodities.</td>
<td>Gradual and sustained increase of production and market supply of meat and milk. (<strong>Baseline:</strong> MARF Strategic Plan 2006-10 and 2010 MDTF project assessment report).</td>
<td>157 Mt of meat. 5,250 litres of milk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustained increase of production and market supply of fish (baseline 2010: estimated by GTZ/FAO survey report fresh fish production/catch was 40,000 Mt)</td>
<td>100,000Mt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable management of water resources to enhance access to safe water and improved sanitation services; and other uses.</td>
<td>Percentage of rural communities with access to safe water. <strong>Baseline:</strong> 34% in 2010</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Social and Human Development**

| Reduce maternal, infant and child mortality. | Percent of population with access to healthcare. **Baseline:** 13%. | 40% |
| Provide qualified teachers, academic staff and a relevant curriculum for general education. | Teacher: pupil ratio. **Baseline:** Qualified primary 1:111 (26,658 teachers) | Qualified primary 1:50 (50,060 teachers) |
| By 2013 South Sudan is on track to achieve universal access and completion of free primary education and has expanded equitable access to post-primary education. | Gross Enrolment Rate **Baseline:** Total: 78%; Boys: 88%; Girls: 61%. | 92% |
| | Net Enrolment Rate (NET). **Baseline:** Total: 46%; Boys: 53%; Girls: 39%. | 65% |
Gradually provide families with unconditional child benefit cash transfers nation-wide | Percent of households receiving cash transfer through child benefit. | 20% |

**Conflict Prevention and Security**

5. Establishment of effective and affordable DDR programme to support transformation strategies for all organised forces (SPLA, SSPS, prisons, fire brigade and wildlife forces) and to provide ex-combatants and host communities with a sustainable future, including the reintegration of women and children.

Number of organised force personnel disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated (Baseline: 11,130 special needs group from SPLA disarmed and demobilised as at 25 February 2011, of which 10,760 were counselled and 8,523 were at various stages of reintegration. Service delivery timelines for DDR have varied widely, and have not provided ex-combatants with a predictable process).

DDR completed for 30,000 ex-combatants.

1. Improved, coordinated security-related policy- and decision-making at national, state and county level, based on appropriate information-gathering and analysis.

Appropriate National Security Architecture established. (Baseline: No national security committee secretariat. No national security advisor, although there is currently a security advisor to the President. Suitable staff from across government recruited and trained.

1. South Sudan has essential legal framework befitting an independent country.

Number of MoLACD draft legal documents submitted to the Council of Ministers (CoM). (37 laws in force, transitional constitution drafting underway).

60

2. Access to justice and respect for human rights across South Sudan enhanced.

Number of functional legal affairs offices at the county level. (32 county legal affairs offices established).

75

Communities secure and threat posed by small arms reduced.

Implement community security approach in all ten states (conflict-sensitive development projects implemented in 25% of counties)

50% of counties across all ten states

**Source:** Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011. *South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013: Realising freedom, equality, justice, peace and prosperity for all* (pp. 44 – 46).

**The African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP)** mandated by the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) has been facilitating negotiations between South Sudan and Sudan to address border and resource disputes. The negotiations have so far been chaired by former South African President Thabo Mbeki and former member of the International Court of Justice, Judge Abdul Koroma. These negotiations have been guided by the principle of promoting a relationship where both countries will remain politically, socially, economically and culturally interlinked, stable, democratic, fair and
prosperous (Kameir, 2011: 9). In November 2011, the AUHIP defined an administrative common borderline roadmap for both countries, in terms of which all disputed areas lay north of the north-south border. In April 2012, negotiations and security dialogue concerning resources and border disputes between South Sudan and Sudan in Addis Ababa became the main forum for the international community to instigate a ceasefire (Hsiao, 2012: 3). While the roadmap negotiations of 2011 remained disputed, from May to August 2012, the AUHIP succeeded in bringing the two governments together in negotiations focusing on the implementation of the provisions of the previous negotiations and statements of the roadmap, and on August 3, 2012, the parties reached an innovative agreement on the terms of payment under which South Sudan would resume the export of oil through Port Sudan (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2012: 1). These negotiations, supported by Ethiopia, in its capacity as Chair of IGAD, resulted in the signing of a series of agreements by the presidents of South Sudan and Sudan on September 27, 2012. The agreements covered security arrangements, oil and transitional financial arrangements, the status of nationals of one country resident in the other, post-service benefits, trade, banking, border issues and other economic concerns, as well as an overall Cooperation Agreement (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2012: 1).

In the main, the AU has endeavored to integrate the substantive contributions of South Sudan and Sudan in its mediation efforts to resolve the outstanding CPA issues of resources and border delineations. It is worth mentioning that a local delegation from Sudan was in Addis Ababa before the signing of the September 27, 2012 agreements. Solutions arrived at with the broadest participation of the grassroots often create a sense of ownership and sustain the process and solutions. Importantly, the September 27 agreement, irrespective of the stalemate on the contested Abyei region, provided for the implementation process to start within a month of the signing, and for oil production to resume at the end of 2012 (Sudan Tribune, 2012(b)). However, the major challenge regarding this new development is whether it will be successfully implemented, considering the limitations of previous such agreements.
In furthering regional efforts for peace and development in South Sudan, IGAD also complements other interventions supported by United States, South Africa (Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy), and the Government of Kenya Technical Cooperation, among others (IGAD, 2011: 5). It further supports several public sector reform initiatives, such as the Capacity Building Institutional and Human Resource Development Project implemented by the World Bank and funded by the South Sudanese Government and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, and initiatives of the Capacity Building Trust Fund (IGAD, 2011: 5). In terms of capacity building, IGAD has deployed workers and plans to deploy about 200 more experienced civil servants from three of its member states (Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda) to assume duties in respective ministries in South Sudan with the aim of providing direct on-the-job training to South Sudanese civil servants (Kameir, 2011: 29).

The United Nations has also been an influential player in enhancing peace and security in South Sudan. On July 8, 2011, UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1996 (2011) established the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and deployed a large peacekeeping operation team with 7,000 military personnel, 900 civilian police recruits and a significant civilian component (Sabra, 2011: 4). The UNSC (2011: 3) mandated the UNMISS to enhance peace and security, assist in the establishment of peace and stability as a necessary condition for development in the Republic of South Sudan and as a step towards reinforcing the capacity of the GoSS to govern effectively and democratically, and establish good relations with its neighbours. The mandate also tasked the UNMISS to: (1) support peace consolidation and promote viable state-building and economic development; (2) support the government in taking up its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation, resolution and the protection of civilians; and (3) further encourage the government to work in cooperation with the UN Country Team and other international stakeholders in the development of its capacity to provide security, establish the rule of law, and strengthen the security and justice sectors in accordance with the principles of national ownership (UNSC, 2011: 3-4).
Thus far, the main priority areas in the UNMISS broad peace-building plan have been to transform South Sudan’s security policies and institutions; convert the SPLA into a national army and extend the state’s presence and legitimacy throughout the territory (Sabra, 2011: 4). Given this, UNMISS has been working in close collaboration with the GoSS and local communities to develop a National Security Strategy. They have been involved in the evaluation of the capabilities and gaps of the security sector; reinforcing security committees in the ten South Sudan states and their link to the central level; and fostering the capacity of state and non-state actors to manage the activities of security institutions and sustain the control of small arms and light weapons (UN Security Sector Reform Unit, 2012: 42). With these efforts in place, the UNMISS has been able to build solid relationships with the GoSS at the strategic political level, and has assisted the government in providing 45,800 rules of engagements cards for the South Sudan Armed Forces (UN Security Sector Reform Unit, 2012: 42).

Furthermore, UN Agencies\textsuperscript{14} have also been working towards meeting and achieving eight Millennium Development Goals\textsuperscript{15} for 2015 in South Sudan. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) efforts in particular have focused on training professionals in the public service, strengthening the management of public resources, and improving the rule of law and the security of communities as the groundwork of a functioning state (UNDP in South Sudan, 2011). Since independence, the UN has deployed more than 100 UN volunteer experts and 200 civil servants to various sectors of South Sudan’s government and public offices to support essential functions in planning and budgeting, public finance management and other sectors necessary for establishing and

\textsuperscript{14}United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA); United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF); Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO); International Labour Organization (ILO); United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM); and United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in collaboration with International Organization for Migration (IOM) and World Health Organisation (WHO) (UNDP in South Sudan, 2011).

\textsuperscript{15}Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability and develop a global partnership for development (UNDP in South Sudan, 2011).
running a state, as well as providing direct and on-the-job monitoring of civil service workers (UNDP in South Sudan, 2011; Grande, 2012).

**Kenya** is an instrumental and strategic player in South Sudan’s peace-building efforts. Responding to the problem of skills shortages, especially in the civil service in South Sudan, Kenya deployed 50 civil servants to work in strategic functions within South Sudan’s national ministries, commissions and state-level local government, and in frontline service delivery in areas experiencing chronic shortages, such as health (IGAD, 2011: 5). Kenya is also an important trading partner of South Sudan, as South Sudan imports and exports its goods through the port of Mombasa in Kenya. Kenya and South Sudan are also partners in a major regional infrastructural investment – the Lamu Port and Lamu-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (Howes, 2012). This project involves building airports, railways and roads, and most importantly, the January 2012 agreement between Kenya and South Sudan to construct a new oil pipeline from South Sudan’s oil fields to Lamu, Kenya (Howes, 2012).

**Local Institutions and NGOs’ Efforts**: The South Sudan Institute (SSI), together with CARE South Sudan have also been working to resolve tribal-based conflicts in the Jonglei State, which is made up of five tribes – Dinka, Nuer, Murle, Anyuak, and Jie (South Sudan Institute, 2012: 6). The SSI and CARE, through the Jonglei Peace of Neighbours project, have been engaged in efforts to develop skills and encourage the peaceful resolution of ethnic conflicts. The primary objective of this project, which was carried out by citizens of Jonglei State called the Ambassador Group (AG), is for the tribes to live peacefully and respectfully with one another (South Sudan Institute, 2012: 6).

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16SSI was established in 2008 as an NGO to response to the need for peace, food security, and education in Jonglei State. Its main mission included the provision of services in the areas of education, agriculture, and peace-building. For the implementation of the peace-building element, SSI, with financial support from CARE South Sudan, recruited 22 citizens of Jonglei State living in North America to form the Ambassador Group (South Sudan Institute, 2012: 6).
Local NGOs like the Collaborative for Peace in Sudan (CfPS)\(^{17}\) have been working to bring together organisations from Sudan and South Sudan to coordinate their efforts to assist border ethnic groups and communities to overcome their differences and settle their disputes peacefully (Peace Direct, 2012). While little has been reported on the efforts of faith-based organisations, local NGOs and civil society in the transformation processes in South Sudan, the Joint Donor Team (JDT)\(^{18}\) has supported the inclusion of local civil society organisations in peace-building processes in partnership with state actors (Joint Donor Team, 2012: 1).

Other NGOs and UN agencies have been providing about 80 percent of basic services in South Sudan. The African Development Bank for example undertook an "Infrastructure Needs Assessment Study" to address the critical infrastructure sectors of transport, energy and water and sanitation (Kameir, 2011: 26 &27). ‘Save the Children’ which is one of the largest international NGOs in South Sudan has launched several development programmes in nine of the country’s ten states, including all its border states. These include nutrition, community and facility-based healthcare, water and sanitation, livelihoods and food security, education, child protection, children’s rights, and emergency response programmes (Mears & Watts, 2011: 2). Likewise, key international players like the JDT as well as the USA, China and the EU Joint Programming Initiative for South Sudan\(^{19}\) (among others) have also been providing massive security, technical and humanitarian support to foster long-term peace and development in South Sudan.

\(^{17}\)CfPS is a unique movement of local peace-building organisations from Sudan and South Sudan working together to build sustainable peace especially at local community and tribal levels.

\(^{18}\)Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Canada work in collaboration with civil society partners, the United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union, USAID and NGOs to support sustainable peace, poverty reduction and the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (Joint Donor Team, 2012).

\(^{19}\)The European Union (EU) Joint Programming initiative for South Sudan is headed by the Netherlands and works in cooperation with other international partners. They are developing the water sector, enhancing rural development and food security, with a particular contribution from the Netherlands in the peacekeeping mission under the UNMISS, policing, promoting the rule of law, civil affairs and human rights for the development and security (Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in South Sudan, 2012: 2).
3.4. Progress in the Implementation of Development Objectives

Since independence in 2011, South Sudan has experienced a range of challenges, opportunities and accomplishments. Despite the challenges of building a new country out of the ruins of war, South Sudan and its external allies have made significant strides in initiating development projects to overcome the problems that confront the country’s post-conflict (re)construction plans. As a result of these collective efforts, notable achievements have been recorded in the following areas (UN in South Sudan, 2011: 4; Grande, 2012):

- 32 ministries and 17 independent commissions and chambers have been established.

- A fully functioning legislative assembly has also been established and has passed more than 30 pieces of essential legislation.

- A national parliament, governor’s offices and assemblies have been established in each of South Sudan’s ten states. The Republic of South Sudan’s Transnational Constitution represents the foundation of governance.

- Key rule of law institutions have been established including a police service, a prison service, and a judiciary.

- More than 6,000 kilometres of earth road have been reconstructed linking major cities and towns and the Juba International airport has been upgraded.

- The number of children enrolling at and attending primary school has multiplied, the number of school buildings has increased by 20 percent and new primary and secondary schools are under construction.

- In the area of health, more than three million children have been vaccinated against polio and more than 600,000 have been vaccinated against measles.
In parallel with South Sudan’s quest for political solutions to internal problems and the diplomatic settlement of the disputes with the Sudan over the outstanding CPA issues, the GoSS has also sought ways and means to accelerate the implementation of its plans to create viable alternatives to the Sudan oil transport infrastructure. As indicated earlier, an agreement to transport oil exports through Kenya was signed in January 2012 between the GoSS and the Government of Kenya (Globalpost, 2012). This has the potential to serve South Sudan’s short-term needs and long-term interests. The short-term needs take the form of South Sudan’s ability to resume the generation of sustained oil revenues that will strengthen its position in handling the challenges it encounters. In the long-term South Sudan will develop critical infrastructure, as Kenya is, and will remain, the gateway for South Sudan’s exports and imports. Adding to these achievements, the recent Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)\(^{20}\) that was passed by the USA government also speaks to South Sudan’s achievement. This Act gave South Sudan the advantage of duty-free access to USA market (Kuacjok Herald News, 2012), thus placing South Sudan in a position where it stands to benefit economically and enhance economic development.

The above-mentioned achievements and continuing developments in post-independence South Sudan are evidence of remarkable progress for such a young state. However, the fragile state of peace remains a major concern. Insecurity resulting from the cross-border resource conflicts and internal ethnic conflicts; the wide-ranging complaints arising from deficiencies in representation and inclusion in the politics of the state; and the economic hardships caused by South Sudan’s reliance on the oil pipelines that transport its crude oil through the Sudan, have continued to impact negatively on the attainment of durable peace and stability in South Sudan. These drawbacks lay the platform on which to further explore and validate the argument that, aside the problems of cross-border resource conflicts, internal ethnic divisions also have damning effects on development and peace-building efforts in post-independence South Sudan.

\(^{20}\) The AGOA is a legislation approved by the USA government in May 2000, and aims to provide real and considerable supports for African countries (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa) to continue their attempts and endeavours to open their economies and build free markets (Kuacjok Herald News).
3.5. Key and Persistent Challenges to Development Objectives

Resource conflicts generally have substantial negative impacts on the development, peace and stability of a state and the potential to prolong conflict, as has been the case with the DRC and Nigeria, and as was the case with the Sudan's second civil war, Sierra Leone, Angola and Chad. There is overwhelming evidence, especially in Africa, that countries rich in natural and mineral resources are the most vulnerable to resource conflicts or conflicts attributable to the resource cause/curse. According to Collier (2009: 2), countries that are relatively poor, with a shrinking economy and that are heavily dependent on natural resources for development and sustainability, are prone to, and face the risk of experiencing a civil war. Natural resource wealth (oil), which is one of South Sudan's greatest financial endowments, has proven to be an ongoing source of conflict and rivalry between South Sudan and Sudan, as well as internally within South Sudan. The struggle over the ownership and maintenance of control over resources and land in the Abyei region and the Blue Nile, and for a share of resource profits and benefits has continued to undermine the ability of the South Sudanese government to focus on effective economic (re)construction and development and peace and stability.

The DRC presents a good case where natural resources fuelled and continue to fuel conflicts for decades, especially in the Eastern Congo. While the war in the DRC was formally terminated in 2003, there have been continuous reports by the UN and news agencies that post-conflict DRC has remained fragile and conflict prone. This is attributed to the widespread illegal exploitation of natural resources, particularly by rebel groups in the North and South Kivu provinces, and also to poor political and economic governance, on the one hand, and the inability of international organisations to usher in change to improve the management of the natural resources (Burnley, 2011: 7; International Crisis Group, 2012).

Resource conflicts have included using the proceeds of mineral resources exploitation to finance various armed groups and military units in the DRC, as they fight for control over
mining areas in the eastern provinces; while the government has been unable to use its resources to generate income and improve the quality of life of its citizens (Burnley, 2011: 7-8). Given that one of the causes that ignited the DRC civil war was linked to the issue of resources, and considering that in the aftermath of the war, the country remains plagued by resource conflicts, it can be argued that the resources in the DRC are not only an instigator and perpetuator of conflict, but also a source of damage to economic development, peace-building and reconstruction efforts in post-conflict DRC. Taking cognisance of the impact natural resources exert on development and conflict in the DRC, this study contends that the resource factor, primarily externally with the Sudan, and its potential to cause deep internal tensions within South Sudan constitutes one of the major threats to development and the attainment of sustainable peace in post-conflict South Sudan.

Resource-driven tensions have continued to exacerbate episodes of cross-border conflicts between South Sudan and Sudan, resulting in the increase in the oil transit fee by Sudan and the eventual shut down of oil production by South Sudan. The question of resource-driven disputes and their potential for conflict extends to land ownership and the land tenure system in South Sudan. The major disputes over resources and access to grazing land by livestock owners in South Sudan have, in certain cases, been the cause of internal tensions. But as the economy improves with larger farming and agricultural projects and attendant urbanization, the land tenure system will constitute another key source of potential conflict with South Sudan. Such resource conflicts may continue to obfuscate the peace process in South Sudan, thus exposing the country to a resource curse.

Conflict over natural resources can be triggered by several factors. Humphreys (2005: 511), identifies these as: the possible engagement of domestic groups in ‘quasi-criminal’ activity to benefit from resources independent from the state; and the use of the resources by third parties, states and internal and external organisations as an incentive to engage in and/or promote civil conflicts. Moreover, it may lead to the problem of resource grievances – resulting from the method of extraction that may cause environmental damage and loss of land rights, unfair distribution among the various local groups, and the over-dependence
of state economies on natural resource exportation revenues and less on other commodities like manufacturing and agriculture for their export earnings (Humphreys, 2005: 512-513). While resource dependence may also create weak state structures and weak state-society relationships, the GoSS’s concentration on resolving the resource and border conflict with Sudan has so far overshadowed its capacity to attend to and resolve resources and land problems internal to South Sudan; these are manifest in inter-ethnic conflicts.

*Internal ethnic conflicts* in South Sudan remain a grave danger to the peace and stability of the state. Ethnic conflicts, especially in Africa, have predominantly revolved around ethnic identity with severe consequences for individuals or groups’ political inclinations, prospects for economic development and security. Ethnicity or ethnic diversity has featured prominently in conflict literature and discourses, as provoking violent and prolonged social conflicts along ethnic lines and having devastating human and material consequences, as was the case in Rwanda, Kenya, Burundi, the DRC and Sudan. Ethnicity is a social phenomenon. According to Carment and James (2000: 176), ethnic divisions and mobilisation along new politically based identities is a feature of transitional societies, where human/civil populations are able to respond to changes in political power.

Before South Sudan’s independence, Sudan was an ethnically diverse and mixed country. This diversity is considered to have been one of the root causes of the Sudan-South Sudan conflict, as well as the internal divisions in pre-and post-independent South Sudan. While ethnic conflict and disparities fragmented the social, economic and political relations between Sudan and South Sudan, they have remained a cause of disunity in the sovereign state of South Sudan, causing massive displacement of the local population; suspicion, mistrust and fear between the various ethnic groups. A major concern is the fact that in the face of difficulties emanating from ethnic cleavages, leaders are likely to mobilise their members against threats from the other ethnic groups (Carment & James, 2000: 175), as is the case with the Dinka and the Nuer ethnicities or Nuer and Murle. Carment and James (2000: 175) note that when states are faced with the relatively important and daunting
responsibilities of political and economic liberalisation (as is the case with South Sudan),
etnic resentment can be nurtured and ethnic animosity is further influenced by
institutional, political and international decision-making and relations.

Ethnic conflict in South Sudan remains one of the major challenges impacting on peace-
building and prosperity. High levels of poverty; the relatively high dependence on oil
resources for sustainability; and the lack of political and economic representation of the
majority of the local ethnic groups in state affairs, play crucial roles in fuelling ethnic
tensions and occasional confrontations in South Sudan; this could evolve into widespread,
that ethnic conflicts have the propensity to create severe societal disintegration that may
affect investment and the country's economic prosperity and welfare, increase public and
political corruption, cause political instability, and in worst case scenarios, transform into a
civil war. In Kenya, for example, the wave of inter-ethnic conflicts that plagued the country
in 1991 had devastating consequences for civil society and the political and socio-economic
development of the country as a whole. Aside from the colonial legacy, among other factors,
Nyukuri (1997: 8-12) attributed the outbreak of the ethnic conflicts that ravaged Kenya to
the scramble for scarce national resources and land, which for a long time remained a
thorny economic and political issue in Kenya, and to efforts on the part of influential
government leadership to re-establish a federal system of government based on ethnicity.
While Kenya’s ethnic crisis did not translate into civil war, its consequences included the
indiscriminate loss of human lives; enormous destruction of human and economic
resources; food insecurity and the disruption of agricultural activities; the permanent
alteration of land ownership arrangements; an increase in ethnic enmity and bigotry, and
the embracing of ethnic politics (Nyukuri, 1997: 15-28). According to Carment, James and
Taydas (2006: 1), such politicisation of ethnicity poses a major threat to the stability of a
democratic state.

This perspective of the causes and consequences of the ethnic clashes in Kenya, consistent
with other cases in Africa like the DRC, Sudan, Burundi and Rwanda (except for the fact that
in these cases, the ethnic conflicts translated into civil wars), provides ground for concern
about the direction the internal ethnic conflict might take in South Sudan. South Sudan’s prolonged history of conflict with Sudan is sufficient evidence of the devastation, the tragic effects and the long-term impacts civil wars can have on the development of a state. While this point cannot be overemphasised, it is important to state that the overlap of the resource, ethnic and political representation challenges to peace-building efforts speak to the obvious, which is that these concerns are of prime importance to South Sudan.

This raises a number of questions: what are the GoSS and stakeholders doing or failing to do so that the desired level of peace remains a major challenge? What mechanisms can be put in place to manage the complex situations that are the backdrops to insecurity, and to enhance efforts that will lead to the creation of sustainable peace and development? To answer these questions, the next chapter argues for the need for peace-building efforts and activities to be coordinated internally throughout the various South Sudanese constituencies. This is because; the weak institutional legacy South Sudan inherited has constrained coordination among stakeholders in South Sudan, despite the efforts by all involved parties to collaborate effectively. The sheer numbers of stakeholders in South Sudan, the complexity of sectors the stakeholders are involved in, the limited physical infrastructure, and the limited human resources at the disposal of South Sudan have rendered coordination a challenging task. Notwithstanding these constraints, evidences from the GoSS and international involvement in South Sudan peace processes, as indicated above, portrays that effective coordination characterises the state-building activities, resource management, and conflict mediation with the Sudan. However, coordination challenges are encountered in the management and resolution of violent conflicts in promoting harmony among and between ethnic groups, especially in managing the domestic political space, in the coordination of development interventions, and in public accountability. On this basis, the chapter further discusses the need for internal and external stakeholders to facilitate the coordination processes, as well as encourage the communities-in-conflict and other groups to engage in peaceful dialogue with third party support.
3.6. Conclusion

This historical and contextual analysis of South Sudan’s post-CPA and post-independence challenges has demonstrated that a blend of internal and external factors contribute to fragility in post-conflict societies: a situation most often caused by the precarious balance that exists between the threat of conflict resumption (domestic and foreign) and the potential to build, maintain, and consolidate peace. South Sudan’s transition from a resistance movement to an independent state presented a forward-looking perspective for the South Sudanese under the new status of a sovereign country, ready to govern itself outside the shadow of Sudan’s authority. However, many challenges block South Sudan’s path to sustainable peace and development.

The magnitude and complexity of South Sudan’s underdevelopment and the difficulties encountered by the South Sudanese government, albeit with generous support from the international community, in building an entirely new state after decades of devastating wars cannot be overemphasised. It should be noted that the sincere efforts jointly exerted by the stakeholders – the GoSS, the AU and IGAD, the UN, bilateral donors, international and national NGOs, (and others) – to manage and surmount South Sudan’s numerous challenges in state-building; in handling the difficulties originating in South Sudan’s rich ethnic diversity and the ongoing conflict with the Sudan over the unresolved CPA issues (including the burning issue of the dispute with the Sudan over the oil transit fees); have yielded encouraging progress in laying the foundation for building the institutions and infrastructure of an emerging state. Judging by the GoSS’s ability to maintain the current status quo, despite the incessant latent conflict with the Sudan and internal turbulence, it is not an oversimplification to state that South Sudan’s current challenges pale in the face of the promising opportunities, if the country respects the priorities dictated by South Sudan’s realities.

Post-independence South Sudan has many competing priorities and the way in which the GoSS, with the support of and in partnership with the international community, addresses these priorities will impact the country for generations to come. The review of South
Sudan’s challenges and efforts has shown that state-building projects and rivalries over resources and borders have taken primacy on the agendas of both internal and external stakeholders, and have overshadowed other equally pressing priorities. This has raised questions among South Sudanese intellectuals and influential personalities, observers, allies, and friends of South Sudan as to whether sufficient resources, efforts, and attention are being dedicated to the equally important domestic issues of social and national identity, and access to opportunities on the part of various communities and ethnic groups within the heterogeneous South Sudanese population. This dimension of the conflict equation is strategically crucial as its mishandling or neglect would constitute an even greater threat to prospects for sustainable national unity, stability, development, peace, and the security of the emerging South Sudan. This gap in addressing the challenges at the forefront of South Sudan’s current crisis sheds light on the enormity of the task the GoSS has shouldered in its drive to develop a new nation-state. It underscores the fact that the GoSS, which emerged from decades of devastating conflict and inherited next to nothing in terms of functioning state institutions, is and will continue to be overwhelmed by this daunting task without the active and enduring support of the international community.

The stakes in South Sudan and Sudan’s relationships could not be higher: deteriorating relationships will harm both countries, whereas good neighbourly cooperation will benefit them. Both countries could gain from developing common, constructive, mutually beneficial relationships while drawing on each other’s strengths, and responsibly managing the outstanding issues from the CPA of 2005 – oil transit fees, Abyei, citizenship of nationals, among other issues.

Where the South Sudanese government focuses its attention is critical, despite the legacy of poor governance and weak state infrastructure. The pursuit of domestic policies that recognise and appreciate South Sudan’s diversity will strengthen the South Sudanese state. From a position of citizen-sanctioned strength, the GoSS will be able to dissuade internal dissonance, meet the growing expectations of its people for political inclusion and fair representation, and develop social services across the country – desires the South Sudanese yearned for and that were held at bay for far too long. However, the attainment
of these goals will very much depend on the government and stakeholders’ abilities to encourage dialogue, confidence building, mutual relationships and national and societal cohesion among the conflicting parties and groups. South Sudan has welcomed allies and partners in its journey of state-building. The UN and its specialised agencies, the AU, IGAD, bilateral donors, NGOs (national and international) and CSOs have through active collaboration, gradually enhanced coordination, enabled synergies of benefits and optimised the impact of their interventions in development, peace-keeping, security and the administrative sectors.

The main purpose of the next chapter is to provide recommendations to address and manage South Sudan’s challenges by employing the theoretical framework of John Paul Lederach’s Pyramid Model. This model sets out mechanisms to coordinate peace-building activities across various levels and communities of the conflict/post-conflict society as a prime step for trust building and cooperation.
4. Framework for Managing South Sudan’s Challenges: Application of John Paul Lederach’s Pyramid Model

4.1. Introduction

Having examined the complex challenges impinging on South Sudan’s transformation and peace-building capacities, this chapter focuses on providing recommendations to address such challenges. This is done by examining the processes and goals of conflict transformation and peace-building (CTPB); and how Lederach’s Pyramid Model (the recommended model for managing South Sudan’s challenges) fits into the broad framework to achieve South Sudan’s peace-building expectations.

As argued in the previous chapter, (re)constructing and developing post-conflict and post-independence South Sudan is work in progress that is exposed to a number of serious challenges. These challenges persist, despite the invaluable efforts and contributions of the government and stakeholders in various transformation and peace-building processes. Increasing attention has been given to building state institutions and infrastructure and to resolving the unresolved resource and border land problems. The persistent disputes with Sudan over territorial demarcation, transit fees, trade, and citizenship have been a source of economic antagonism; the growing internal ethnic divisions and conflicts in South Sudan and the problem of poor/weak political governance – the concentration of political power in the hands of a few and deficiencies in the broader political representation of all South Sudanese – have remained among the most pressing obstacles hindering progress towards sustainable peace. Deliberating on why these challenges remain a problem in South Sudan, this section presents three main reasons: the lack of a consistent and all-inclusive approach for broad-based involvement of the society in its own peace-building and development programmes; shortcomings in initiating, reconciling and building peaceful and mutually beneficial relationships, which are of central value to the theory and practice of conflict
transformation; and the inadequacy or lack of coordination, cooperation and cohesion among the existing societal and local community efforts.

Persistent challenges to peace can be attributed to many different causes. According to Maphosa (2010: 711) one such cause includes the fact that not all peace-building activities may be positive or yield the expected constructive outcome. Jackson (2006: 25) notes that ineffectual management of the prevalent nature of African conflicts that most often centres on settling political differences among warring factions does not guarantee a long-term solution capable of ending protracted conflict or ensuring the sustainability of peace. Furthermore, attaining and building viable peace remains subject to a multitude of complexities because the international community’s diplomatic initiatives to transform conflicts and build peace often inadvertently disregard and marginalise some activities as peripheral and of little importance to what they consider key activities in the process of conflict transformation (Jackson, 2006: 26). Jackson further outlines that these activities include the (re)building of national identity and the deconstruction of violent identity, which in the case of South Sudan is also a major challenge to peace.

Identifying the context in which constructive transformation can be realised, as described in chapter one, this study adopted John Paul Lederach’s theoretical framework of conflict transformation. Lederach’s theory, known as the Pyramid Model, provides a contextual understanding of the activities and approaches which support the participation and involvement of the population from “top to bottom and from bottom to top” in building peace within post-conflict societies. The application of this theory, as the most suitable framework for managing South Sudan’s challenges, provides a practical method of underpinning peace-building activities that are based on insight into and the resources available to the conflict-afflicted society at large. This model proposes a set of peace-building activities through which leadership at all levels – top, middle, and grassroots – would coordinate their various efforts towards a reconciliatory, common process that will enable the building of relationships and trust, cooperation and societal cohesion. As such, the model will address South Sudan’s challenges in order of the centrality of the elements of conflict transformation and peace-building processes in the aftermath of violent strife.
According to Maiese (2003(b)) these processes should consist of three fundamental dimensions: addressing the underlying causes of conflict, repairing damaged relationships, and dealing with psychological trauma at the individual level. Furthermore, Mitchell (2012: 3) proposes that the processes should focus on: (1) activities that will develop and strengthen non-violent relationships at the local level between conflicting and distrustful constituencies, and (2) activities that will impel the conflict leaders and militia groups at the national level to engage in efforts to minimise and lessen the effects of violence and undertake confidence-building actions in organising meaningful negotiations to resolve the conflict.

4.2. **Conflict Transformation and Peace-Building Processes**

Conflict transformation is based on the constructive and long-term development of peace and security in divided societies through the development of norms and knowledge; the development and support of institutions for peaceful conflict management; and the elimination of structural risk factors (Akerlund, 2005: 11). Long-term development relates to the process of building peace, which, according to CARE International (2010: 7) recognises and supports the central role that local actors and processes play in ending violence and constructively addressing both the immediate effects and structural causes of violent conflict. Failure to address the causes of conflict contributes to structural risk factors. These include issues that threaten the core interests of the conflict parties and the capacity of the local community to manage conflict without violence. Akerlund (2005: 11) adds that if these factors are not adequately explored, they in turn cause conflict challenges. This is manifest in recurrent episodes of conflicts, as is the case with South Sudan's cross-border and internal conflicts.

Reychler (2001: 12) states that the defining objective of peace-building is to transform conflict in a manner that is constructively sustainable. For Schirch (2008: 8), peace-building is a process of building relationships and institutions that support the peaceful transformation of conflict. Constructive conflict transformation therefore, involves three
inter-related elements (DFID – Department for International Development (2010: 14), as follows:

1. Addressing the causes and effects of conflict. The causes often include social, political or economic exclusion, which are based on ethnicity, religion or unequal power relations between the centre and periphery. This further requires confronting and responding to drivers or triggers of conflict, such as youth unemployment, economic shocks or access to light weapons. It also entails addressing the devastating effects and consequences of violent conflict, to enable communities to recover and reconcile.

2. Building mechanisms to resolve conflict peacefully involves strengthening local, national and regional capacity to prevent and resolve conflict in non-violent ways. This is crucial during all phases of conflict and peace-building (DFID – Department for International Development (2010: 15).

3. Supporting inclusive peace processes and agreements provides a focus for peace-building efforts, and often relies heavily on international support to succeed. This process aims to achieve a peace agreement that is sustainable and lays a strong foundation for a new political settlement (DFID – Department for International Development (2010: 15).

Generally, peace-building encompasses a wide range of processes and engages different actors in the exercise of multiple peace-building activities. According to Truger (2001: 35), the goals of peace-building need to correlate with the needs of the conflict-affected population and be compatible with civil society. It also needs to be non-violent and distinct from enforcement actions, flexible and practical, and capable of responding to violent escalations. For these goals to be achieved, Truger (2001: 35-36) envisages a series of peace-building activities as being of great importance to the process of constructive conflict change. These include: mediation and confidence building among conflict parties; humanitarian assistance (including food aid, water, sanitation and health care);
reintegration, disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants; rehabilitation and (re)construction; stabilisation of economic structures and empowerment for political participation. These activities or categories covered by the peace-building umbrella should be realised through organised international and local actions in the conflict or post-conflict environment (Truger, 2001: 36).

As a nation born out of prolonged violent conflict, South Sudan is well-positioned to fully comprehend the benefits that derive from adopting mediation as a central strategy to resolve domestic and external conflicts. This explains South Sudan’s pursuit of a mediated resolution of the issues outstanding from the CPA with the Sudan, which has been promoted in a series of AU initiatives. This is a relevant starting point for addressing the antagonism. Mediation remains the approach of choice, as it is capable of narrowing the gaps and differences between and among the diverse and rich ethnic groups of South Sudan. In the domestic sphere, South Sudan’s embrace of mediation would need to manifest itself in tangible development interventions such as schools, clinics, medical supplies (in which there have been progressive developments, as indicated in chapter three), personal safety and security provided by the South Sudan government; and by delivering effective, fair, and equitable urgent humanitarian assistance to communities affected by natural and manmade crisis.

As a natural outcome of South Sudan's armed struggle for independence, the new country inherited a large contingent of former combatants; many of whom were absorbed into the South Sudan military. The phenomenon of former rebels is an important factor in the peaceful transformation of countries emerging from armed conflicts. Well-organised demobilisation and rehabilitation programmes and the successful reintegration of former combatants and soldiers into society would constitute a necessary security stabilisation step. The manner in which South Sudan handles this element in the conflict management equation will have strategic implications for stability in South Sudan.

Diagram 2 below projects the different peace-building activities proposed by Schirch (2008: 9), who asserts that how tactical a peace-building process is, very much depends on
the ability of peace-builders and actors/stakeholders to complement one another; coordinate and manage resources, peace activities and strategies in a manner that will accomplish multiple goals and address multiple issues in the long-term (Maphosa, 2010: 711).

*Diagram 2: Categories of Peace-building* — (Schirch, 2008: 9)

The above presentation of the goals and processes of peace-building sets out a progressive pattern of building peace that moves from ceasefire to the constructive transformation of conflict relations. The cycle of peace-building represents a set of activities that relies on different strategies and techniques, but are overlapping and the success of each is dependent on the others; however, collectively, they support peace as a central goal. These processes also consist of an integrated framework of short-term and long-term activities...
that are slated to be achieved over different time frames. Are these processes a possible solution to manage South Sudan’s challenges? The peace-building pyramid examines and classifies these processes in three distinct categories of: high level negotiations; problem-solving workshops; and social healing/building relationships (Lederach, 1997: 39). These approaches are spread out across three major types of leadership within the conflict country. In Lederach’s view, the essence of these processes is how they are coordinated and managed across the society, implying that the harmonisation of peace-building activities as well as efficient leadership provides the backdrop for effective conflict transformation and reconciliation of differences and relationships. This is an important step in building trust and cooperation to maintain a positive peace culture and consolidate state-society relations in post-conflict societies like South Sudan.

4.3. **Application of the Pyramid Model and its Implications for South Sudan**

Managing the challenges that hamper South Sudan’s ability to achieve sustainable peace is critically important for breaking the ongoing cycle of violence internally and between South Sudan and Sudan. Building viable internal and external relations will require sincere dialogue, and an inclusive and interactive problem-solving process that will enhance the prospects of empowerment and confidence building. This is necessary if South Sudan’s is to attain its long-term objectives of a sustainable political and socio-economic environment, which also depends on how its peace-building activities are coordinated at the various levels of leadership.

4.3.1. **Top Level Leadership**

Lederach (1997: 38) asserts that ‘level-1’ leaders are key political and military leaders who are the highest representatives of the government and opposition movements in internal conflicts. Lederach further indicates that, these leaders are at the top of the pyramid. Though few, they are the key actors within the wider setting of the peace-building
framework. According to Notter and Diamond (1996: 5), they engage in political peace-building processes that are concerned with high level political negotiations. They provide a comprehensive framework for understanding the relationships between the conflict parties and their resources. The aim of this process is to establish a comprehensive structure that can address the political needs and manage the limitations of a peace system. Activities include negotiations, fact-finding missions and technical working groups (Notter & Diamond, 1996: 5).

Diagram 3: Top Level Leadership in South Sudan

At this level, the peace-building roles of the external/international community are a very important asset in assisting the conflict and/or post-conflict society in the transitioning process to sustainable peace and development. As illustrated in chapter three, the AU, IGAD, UN, EU, Kenya, and the USA (among others) constitute this group of international actors and have been actively engaged in various peace-building endeavours – supporting
South Sudan and Sudan to arrive at a peaceful resolution of their differences and providing the resources for capacity building. The IGAD-led negotiations with the support of the USA and the IGAD Partners Friends are a case in point. The UN efforts in South Sudan continue to be realised through the work of its different departments and partner organisations; for example, UNMISS’ support for the implementation of the CPA since 2005 and its engagement in efforts to establish and enhance peace, security and the conditions for the effective development of South Sudan since independence in 2011. The AU has also been involved in high-level negotiations to resolve resource and land conflicts especially over the status of the Abyei district between the Sudans. These negotiations, mediated by IGAD/the AU with the support of the UN and other bodies, continue between the governments of South Sudan and Sudan, with influential roles reserved for leaders of the ruling political parties in the Sudan (the NCP) and South Sudan (SPLM). The most recent agreement resulting from such negotiations was the September 27, 2012 security arrangements and agreement on the status of Abyei and other disputed border areas, like the Mile 14 – a disputed area of grazing land located between Northern Bahr El-Ghazal State in South Sudan and East Darfur State in Sudan (Safi, 2012).

The objective of the several negotiations over Abyei region has been to achieve a settlement between the two governments. In spite of the ongoing efforts, the final status of the disputed regions remains unresolved and a sensitive matter obstructing peace in South Sudan. Moreover, the land and resources issues that are internal to South Sudan and are crucial points of tension, instability, and conflict have been continuously overshadowed and are not accorded the same attention as the cross-border issues by this level of leadership. The continuous stalemate in resolving the external resources and land issues indicates the strained relations, at the highest leadership levels, between South Sudan and Sudan. This will not be settled through the imposition of agreement(s) that are not fully and broadly supported by the highest echelons in both countries, but rather through a process of sourcing strategies on how to address the damaged relationships, which requires constructive dialogue to reduce the mistrust between the leaders in both countries.
**Policy Implications for South Sudan:** This level of leadership as presented in the pyramid model (Lederach, 1997: 45) comprises the top-level leaders – the governments of South Sudan and Sudan, and the representative leaders of the NCP, the SPLM and SPLA – who have the strategic responsibility to chart the road to peace. This depends on the effectiveness of their leadership and whether the two leadership groups can find common grounds to agree on a more comprehensive framework. An opportunity exists for both countries to address their long-simmering conflicts and manage their differences, if they engage in genuine dialogue as the first significant step to sustainable settlement. Such dialogue needs to involve other groups (not necessarily supporters of either government) that are engaged in the resource and land conflicts, such as the SPLM-N, SSDM, SSDF and the NUF; as well as the leaders of the conflicted border regions. This implies that the mediators would have to invite these groups and leaders to the negotiations. Embracing such a comprehensive approach at this level would set the platform for possible participation by multiple leaders and create an environment that would enhance the interdependence of the rest of society and activities towards establishing viable peace in the long term.

**4.3.2. Middle Level Leadership**

At this level of peace-building, leaders, including NGOs, highly-respected individuals, religious groups, academic institutions and humanitarian organisations (whose positions are neither defined, connected or controlled by government structures or the major opposition movement) engage in what are called ‘structural peace-building activities’ (Lederach, 1997: 41). Structural peace-building activities include: problem-solving workshops; conflict resolution training; and peace commissions; they aim to support the political processes in level-1. This facilitates conflict transformation. This process comprises of economic development programmes, strengthening democracy and governance, and supporting the creation of indigenous NGOs to enhance their support for local peace-building projects and the implementation of a peace culture (Notter & Diamond, 1996: 5).
According to Dudouet (2006: 36) the middle range leaders are considered key agents of change in conflict situations since they have the ability to influence decision-making; encourage and sustain local groups and community development activities; build peace constituencies; organise training conferences, workshops and informal meetings between political opponents and warring groups – to facilitate, empower and strengthen their peace-building capacities; and assist in reconciliation processes (Miall, 2004: 14). Potential ‘level-2’ leaders in South Sudan would include, but are not limited to, South Sudanese religious leaders, tribal chiefs, influential personalities, and even moderates from the Sudan who can bridge the gaps between the disputants on both sides of the border.

Recognizing the importance of middle level leaders many organizations have initiated interventions on this entry point. Since 2010 (prior to South Sudan’s independence in
2011), the Institute for the Promotion of Civil Society (IPCS) and the Sudanese Organization for Nonviolence and Development (SONAD) have been working in collaboration with Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) – an INGO to provide practical skills in preventing violence in several states in South Sudan (Nonviolent Peaceforce – South Sudan Project. 2011). To this effect, the NP in partnership with IPCS and SONAD put in place Sudanese-led violence prevention teams to assist in traditional dispute settlement and peace-building activities in regions that stand at high risk of serious violent confrontations. Furthermore, the NP, IPCS and SONAD continue to work with local groups to foster dialogue and train civil society leaders, traditional and community leaders, elected officials, civil servants, and the military workforces on how to empower and build confidence in their communities, and how to engage nonviolent mechanisms to reduce and/or prevent violence (Nonviolent Peaceforce – South Sudan Project. 2011). In this scenario, the NP and its South Sudan partners continue to relate with both the top and grassroots levels of the society in an effort to support and promote nation-wide peace.

The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) has also been involved in several projects – aimed to promote peace, reconciliation, and peacebuilding initiatives at the national, provincial, and grassroots levels in post-independent South Sudan. For instance, in April 2012, ACCORD hosted a three days Dialogue Forum in Malakal, Upper Nile State of South Sudan (ACCORD, 2012(a)). This forum – one of ACCORD’s many programmes under its Conflict Transformation Initiative brought together a wide range of participants from South Sudan including representatives from the government, civil society, youth organisations, women groups, traditional leaders, UNMISS personnel, and the academia to engage in peace-building discourses and skills training (ACCORD, 2012(a)). The forum, which convened to exchange ideas on addressing insecurity and promote peace-building initiatives in South Sudan, was concluded with recommendations on how to advance and support the Peace Commission of South Sudan. In addition, ACCORD, through the South Sudan Initiative (SSI) has continued to work with South Sudan’s Peace Commission to meet the country’s 2011 to 2013 strategic objectives and policy frameworks, and to provide training on conflict management, mediation, and negotiation to key actors in South Sudan (ACCORD, 2012(b)).
Among the faith-based organisations, the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) has significant potential to play a role in reconciliation, conflict transformation, and peace-building by virtue of their intimate knowledge and respect of the communities' traditions, and community links and outreach - transcending denominational boundaries. Through its humanitarian work over the years, the NSCC has promoted calls for peace during the outbreak of violent conflict (Berghof Foundation for Peace Support, 2006: 7). In its People to People Peace Process initiative, the NSCC employed traditional methods of conflict resolution and reconciliation at grassroots community levels and engaged the Nuer and Dinka traditional leaders in a conference, which led to the resolution of the conflict between the two ethnic groups (Ouko, 2004: 1). By means of dialogue and presentation forums, the NSCC also influenced the parties to the CPA peace negotiations to consider the inclusion of human rights in the CPA (Berghof Foundation for Peace Support, 2006: 72). Though not much has been detailed on middle level peace-building in post-independent South Sudan, the NSCC’s past experience in employing traditional mechanisms to resolve inter-ethnic conflicts attests to a potential that would, combined with other initiatives, contribute to conflict transformation and peace-building in South Sudan.

**Policy Implications for South Sudan:** Activities such as problem-solving workshops, otherwise known as interactive problem-solving or third party consultation, involve third party negotiations, and also bring together representatives of the various conflicting groups in an unofficial setting to participate in efforts aimed at transforming the conflict relations by seeking solutions to shared problems (Lederach, 1997: 46-47). According to Kelman (1990), problem-solving workshops offer a joint-problem solving approach and can also enable the conflict parties to work towards peaceful conflict resolution, as well as cooperate and find ways to assist one another to arrive at mutually accepted solutions. Reflecting on the case of South Sudan, the benefits of this approach also provide an interactive, flexible and neutral platform for conflicting parties and participants to analyse, discuss, and try to understand their difficulties from one another’s perspective (Maiese, 2003(a)). It is also provides a setting for participants to nurture new ideas on how to
operate better in their conflict-torn societies and even provide support, facilitating the negotiating process (Maiese, 2003(a)).

Engaging the conflict resolution training approach, as prescribed by the pyramid model, will also be useful in South Sudan in that, through such training or education, awareness will be raised about the ongoing conflicts and participants will also acquire skills to deal with the conflict. As stated by Lederach (1997: 48), this process can also be employed at all other levels of society and leadership. According to Kumar (1999: 4), the positive implication of this approach is that it gives individuals and groups the methods and skills to limit or avoid intra-group conflicts; and also enables the various groups to learn and develop their peace-building capacities. Additional middle level activities include building peace commissions. Peace commissions are usually made up of prominent individuals representing the different conflict factions. These commissions are often concerned with the creation and organisation of different peace and reconciliation activities, and the establishment of committees at the local, national and regional levels of society to engage these activities (Lederach, 1997: 50-51).

Overall, the middle range involves extensive and worthwhile processes, which if employed to their full in South Sudan, have the potential to promote the attainment of sustainable peace in the long run. As Lederach noted, this model was successful in other situations in Africa, like in South Africa and Mozambique. The major policy implications of this model in South Sudan are that, it would provide different forums and opportunities for conflict parties to convene, negotiate and intensify organised efforts to address their differences. Individuals and groups’ participation in the interactive dialogue meetings and workshops would also assist the conflict parties to decide how to proceed with the resolution and building of broken relationships as a step towards sustaining peace, and would offer the third parties or intervening bodies a better understanding of the context and background to the problems.
4.3.3. Grassroots Leadership

This level of leadership represents civil society or the masses and entire communities, cutting across divisions and affiliations. These communities are often the most affected by conflicts, violent or otherwise. Grassroots leaders include local community leaders, local NGO leaders or developers, professional leaders, key service providers, business people, returned refugees’ leaders, refugee camp leaders, and ordinary citizens (Lederach, 1997: 39). These leaders engage in what is known as social peace-building. According to Notter and Diamond (1996: 6), they are concerned with understanding the beliefs and values of the local people and groups as well as healing and building relationships. The rationale is to create a society that is committed to engendering a new “peace culture” within the social organisation of communal and inter-communal life. This peace-building process mainly involves training or dialogue programmes, such as local peace commissions, community dialogue projects or trauma healing at the grassroots level of the society (Lederach, 1997: 39).

Diagram 5: Grassroots Leadership in South Sudan

- Grassroots Leadership
  - local community leaders - tribal, ethnic, religious, women or youth leaders, local NGO leaders or developers, professional leaders, key service providers, business people, returned refugees’ leaders, refugee camp leaders, and ordinary citizens

- Leadership Functions
  - Engaged in social peace-building — live and work directly with the population and are in a better position to understand what is happening at the base. They are involve in advocacy training, human rights/peace education, inter-community-ethnic and -religious dialogue programmes and activities — local peace commissions and reconciliation, community dialogue projects or trauma healing, rehabilitation and public awareness
In South Sudan, the grassroots leadership would consist of the traditional leaders of the various ethnic communities, leaders of local youth groups and leaders of women’s and church groups. Peace-building at the grassroots level in South Sudan is very important. This is because South Sudan’s major challenge to domestic peace emanates from ethnic divisions and conflicts, poverty and the marginalisation or less than optimal representation of the grassroots or local communities at the national level. According to Mckeon (2003: 2-3), grassroots peace-building provides a practical approach to internal conflict. This is because, the processes develop from and draw on the distinct social and cultural resources and traditions of the local environment in which the conflict is manifest and the local communities seek to create a society less vulnerable to violence. As such, social inclusion and social reconciliation are central to grassroots peace-building, which aims to rebuild healthy relationships as a prerequisite for peaceful interaction between the inter-dependent community groups (Mckeon, 2003: 3). Realising these goals requires the creation of platforms, such as inter-community meetings and gatherings, and community development programmes, where leaders and community members can engage in mutual dialogue and cooperative action.

It is noteworthy to mention the paucity of reports or records on grassroots peace-building in post-independent South Sudan, considering that the grassroots organisations and movements are still embryonic. However, as stated earlier in this chapter, ACCORD and the NP have created a platform wherein through training programmes, dialogue sessions and conferences, these two organisations are reinforcing existing initiatives and opening new avenues to disseminate peace-building skills, mitigate violence and promote local peace initiatives. These interventions encourage “a need for increased local ownership to make peace-building activities sustainable; attention on the issue of ethnicity, particularly in relation to power dynamics in South Sudan; and the need to strengthen civil society” (ACCORD, 2011). Likewise, the NP and its South Sudan partners stress that: solutions to conflict must emanate from within the conflict communities; and if sustainable peace is to be achieved, then local solutions must be found to local problems; – thus the belief that engaging the grassroots level in peace-building efforts is without doubt an efficient
approach of solving conflict and building peace (Nonviolent Peaceforce – South Sudan Project, 2011).

**Policy Implications for South Sudan:** Bottom-up peace-building helps to strengthen local communities. Reflecting on South Sudan, this model would bring local leaders together in joint efforts to promote a localised infrastructure and engage in strategies that would enhance communities’ constructive response to violence, providing relief, promoting human rights, improving security, and imparting and instituting comprehensive conflict change initiatives across various ethnic groups (Insight on Africa, 2011). According to Kumar (1999: 2), engaging the grassroots in peace-building activities would also help to facilitate and improve communication and the development of local skills to prevent or resolve conflict and reduce deep-rooted resentment and misunderstandings among divided ethnic groups. For Mckeon (2003:3), it would promote and create confidence within local community groups; this is very important to the effectiveness and viability of community-based approaches. As illustrated by Lederach (1997: 52-54), the employment of this bottom-up model has been successful in the cases of Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Africa and Liberia.

The critical factor in the conflict architecture in South Sudan however, has been the latent internal inter- and intra-ethnic conflict, which takes precedence over all other considerations. The future of South Sudan hinges on resolving this key challenge. Lederach’s model, with adaptations to the local conditions of South Sudan, provides the conflict management tools to address this challenge. As ethnic diversity can serve the dual purposes of strengthening national unity and discord, South Sudan should guard against slipping into a situation where ethnic loyalties take primacy over national affiliation and where leaders may adopt policies that perpetuate ethnic divisions to the detriment of national South Sudan unity.

The pyramid model and the situation on the ground in South Sudan imply that the realisation of the transformation and peace-building priorities outlined in the SSDP for
2011-2013 will need to be accompanied by measures to promote a genuine sense of national cohesion. This is especially important because in the multi-ethnic South Sudan, the inequalities causing internal conflicts are increasingly gaining ground; if policies are not adopted and implemented to address these economic, social, and political inequalities, the fast evolving divisions that continue to manifest in the form of internal ethnic conflicts pose a threat and may, in the future constitute a high risk of the outbreak of violent conflicts. Given this, recognising ethnic diversity should not be restricted to empty promises and an exchange of pleasantries in conflict mediation forums. It would have to be supported by concrete and visible economic policies, programmes and projects that will convey the resolve and sincerity of South Sudan to address the concerns of all South Sudanese. This implies that South Sudan would have to promote agriculture, the single largest economic sector that sustains more than 80 percent of South Sudanese households (Tizikara & Lugor, 2012: 3). This in turn will lead to economic development that will serve as a solid foundation for stronger national cohesion and improvements in social services, which naturally flow from political stability and economic prosperity. South Sudan is on the right path in allowing market forces to drive economic development, but given the prevailing economic disparities, policies that encourage equity and opportunity should be adopted by the government.

South Sudan is at a crossroads, a situation it created by deciding to face the inevitable earlier rather than later, the pain ensuing from shutting down oil production and the consequence of losing more than 90 percent of the hard currency earnings of the country. Thus, South Sudan may need temporary financial support of a magnitude that will enable the country to undertake multiple initiatives to address internal and external challenges. The international community, with adequate safeguards in place, can play an important role in supporting South Sudan in this transition until such time as either the disputes with Sudan are resolved or alternative solutions are implemented. South Sudan’s adoption of these policies is projected to generate internal harmony among all South Sudanese regardless of their ethnic differences, and the agricultural economy will be strengthened, internal and external trade will flourish, internal security will be enhanced and South Sudan’s external relationships will be consolidated. Sudan may also realise the benefits that
can be gained from cooperating with South Sudan, thereby accelerating the resolution of the dispute between the two countries.

Furthermore, the more meaningful inclusion of civil society and CSOs, particularly locally-based organisations will contribute to better and more sustainable implementation of peace-building processes, because there will be trust and societal cooperation/cohesion. The processes presented in the pyramid model represent a framework for the state and civil society to work together. Thus, the contention that through coordinated efforts and engagement in the different peace-building activities, both the state and society will be able to exchange views on leadership-level experiences, build awareness and consensus around important principles and good practice related to the peace-building and development goals of the state and agree on representative objectives for action. While the government remains the lead actor, civil society and local organisations also have key roles to play in the realisation of stable peace and development in South Sudan.

Overall, Lederach’s pyramid model underscores the fact that constructive transformation of conflicts requires the comprehensive engagement of coordinated actions and sustained reconciliation peace-building processes. However, reconciling warring parties or former conflicting groups is a necessary, yet lengthy and long-term process (Furley & May, 2006: 7). Furley and May (2006: 7) illustrate that this process involves the complex tasks of “erasing traumatic memories, employing traditional healing methods and amnesties to new institutional structures, such as truth and reconciliation commissions and promoting and defending human rights.” They suggest that these activities should be coordinated at government and civil society levels. Lederach emphasises the role of local actors in the conflict society, rather than external actors. Thus, the pyramid model limits the role of external actors to supporting and empowering the efforts of internal actors (Maphosa, 2010: 714). This aims to instil a sense of ownership and being a part of a comprehensive peace-building development in local actors, which will inspire them to commit to pooling their resources and put aside their differences to work for the greater good and mobilisation of peace in the society.
For conflict transformation and peace building measures to be effective and responsive to the political and socio-economic challenges to peace and development in South Sudan, it is imperative for the government and stakeholders to encourage the active participation of civil society in both local and national peace-building efforts. Layson (2003) in Mitchell (2012: 3) states that “while national-level peace agreements may create a conducive space, they are not a guarantee that there will be instant peace in the communities. Thus, a lot of work will still need to be done at the grassroots level.” There is a need to create a sense of belonging and giving at all levels of society, especially the grassroots who are the most disadvantaged and affected by the conflict. Adopting this mechanism is particularly necessary in South Sudan, where internal clashes are increasing due to lack of/inadequate representation of majority ethnic groups in state affairs, among others.

Drawing on the lessons drawn from the pyramid model, this study recommends the adoption, engagement and coordination of peace-building activities in South Sudan across the macro and micro levels of society. It also suggests activities and processes that will facilitate reconciliation within and across society as key mechanisms to build trust, cooperation and cohesion. This is vital because, as Jeong observes (2005: 39), rising above social divisions and reducing animosities between conflict groups as well as between the state and society is crucial for the successful implementation and realisation of peace-building projects. It is evident that external stakeholders are investing much positive energy and resources in peace-building processes in South Sudan. An integrated and holistic, as opposed to fragmented, approach to development and conflict transformation efforts, by stakeholders will achieve the desired results. Healing and confidence building among the various communities of South Sudan is considered an important entry point to conflict transformation, peace building, and long-term development. The stakeholders, especially the regional and international partners of South Sudan, are positioned to make enduring and constructive contributions to reconciliation and peace-building in the country through consistent and deliberative support to grassroots-led development initiatives and the community-owned conflict management and resolution projects. This blend of development and conflict transformation efforts have the potential to create sustainable linkages that are felt by and visible to the South Sudanese public – a promising
situation bound to reinforce and restore confidence in the prospects for transforming conflict, building peace, and mitigating the threats of fragility.

Additionally, more progress is likely to be achieved if external and internal stakeholders heighten their efforts and direct more resources and focus on projects that will build the capacities of the government, civil society and local NGOs to interdependently manage and be involved in decision-making processes for peace, to overcome the challenges to peace and development. The achievement of these objectives will herald an era where South Sudan lives in peace with its neighbours as a politically inclusive nation-state, a country founded on solid internal unity, and an economically viable sovereign country.

**Diagram 6: Summary Logic Model for the Application of the Pyramid Model**
Note: The pyramid model and the suggested approaches aim to provide possible policy ideas for South Sudan. It should be noted that the expectation that the recommended framework will bring about peace and security in South Sudan is methodologically subjective, and may not uniformly apply across post-conflict situations. Thus, the Lederach Model’s application to South Sudan does not imply universal applicability without adaptations; rather the model would need to be adjusted to accommodate the variations of each conflict and post-conflict situation. Cases of conflict transformation differ in variation and complexity, and each individual case requires a transformation strategy that fits the uniqueness of the situation at hand. By the same token, the implementation of peace-building strategies, which comprise a series of interrelated activities, varies from one post-conflict society to another.

4.4. Policy Recommendations

Having provided a general policy perspective on how to build sustainable peace, this section focuses on suggesting policies for South Sudan, relating to the major political, socio-economic and security challenges identified in the previous chapter. Note is taken that the agenda of building South Sudan is crowded with many important tasks. However, the factors that will transform South Sudan primarily lie in consolidating national unity (through opening up the political space for the opposition and underrepresented ethnic groups), while simultaneously embarking on serious economic development programmes, which capitalise on the natural strengths of the South Sudanese people and the natural resources of the country.

- Embrace South Sudan's Traditional Institutions to Accelerate Modernisation:
  There is need to establish solid political, economic, and social infrastructure in an integrated traditional framework of conflict resolution mechanisms and participatory and inclusive approaches to building state institutions. The government and stakeholders need to support the establishment of community-based conflict aversion and mitigation mechanisms, inclusive of local leaders,
women, youth and civilians to develop skills to address conflict without violence. Programmes should be established that create a viable political framework that seeks to end ethnic conflicts and pave the way for economic development – primarily agriculture as the main activity of the overwhelming majority of South Sudanese; and embrace forward-looking policies for good governance.

- **Embrace South Sudan’s Diversity to Solidify National Unity:** South Sudan should enlist the influence and power of all ethnic leaders to mobilise their supporters to collaborate in sustained inter-ethnic cooperation. South Sudan’s ethnic diversity is an asset that should be capitalised upon to help the country conquer its current challenges. The dividends of independent South Sudan should trickle down to the entire population; this will, in turn, cultivate confidence in the emerging state’s national character and perpetuate collaboration among the populace. The sense of belonging to a nation that cares for its citizens will not be limited to ethnic leaders but permeate the entire society. It would also create a sense of obligation and reciprocation of the ruling parties to cooperate with the leaders, as well as a self-perpetuating cycle of mutual trust that strengthens internal cohesion. With the expanded institutionalisation of this policy in theory and practice (which is hoped to be the case for a prosperous South Sudan), a robust sense of affiliation to the country that transcends ethnic divisions and loyalties will prevail in South Sudan.

- **Develop Agriculture to Banish Food Insecurity, Eliminate Poverty, and Embark on Sustainable Development:** Poverty is not known to be peace friendly, making the economic challenges South Sudan faces of paramount importance. Considering that the overwhelming majority of South Sudanese subsist on farming, it is imperative that the government of South Sudan and its partners in nation-building adopt policies and dedicate substantial resources and more attention to developing the agricultural base of South Sudanese households through a nationwide long-term strategy aimed at achieving food security within the shortest period of time. In this regard, NGOs, who are playing a very constructive role in independent South Sudan, should increasingly shift their focus to promoting agriculture. Food security is a
vital foundation upon which all else is built and from sustained food security will emanate the outcomes that citizens and stakeholders of South Sudan desire. Food security needs to and can be accomplished within a maximum of two harvests.

Fighting poverty and stabilising security through agriculture has immediate and long-term gains and will make South Sudan food secure even after its oil reserves run out. The most realistic strategy to reintegrate former combatants is to engage them in modernising agriculture in South Sudan, a massive sector with a promising potential. As South Sudan is primarily an agricultural society, economic development policies should assign the highest priority to improved farming practices, achieving food security and setting the country on the path to prosperity. In this respect, national development strategies should be adopted to modernise agriculture through the regulation of land tenure, the protection of traditional farming, while modernising it (through agriculture extension programmes) and developing infrastructure to unleash the power of trade and market forces.

- **Expand the Reach of Social Services:** Improving basic social services is one of the effective entry points for the government to foster a stronger sense of a new national identity. Existing social services should be equitably distributed to expand their reach to remote communities. Development that extends to the periphery, rather than concentrating on Juba only, could prove a rallying point for national unity.

- **Peaceful and Principled Resolution of the Disputes with the Sudan:** The dispute with Sudan over the outstanding issues in the CPA agreement are important mainly because South Sudan’s oil revenues were lost when oil production was halted; it is important to resume production in order to sustain the fledgling economy. The difficulty is that South Sudan has no control whatsoever, of how fast or slow the resolution of the dispute will be, and therefore, the country should not bank on the quick return of the South Sudan-Sudan relationship to normalcy. However, resolving the dispute with Sudan is in the interests of South Sudan and the
Sudan, and as such South Sudan should miss no opportunity to peacefully settle the outstanding issues based on the framework agreements the two countries, with the active support and mediation of AU/IGAD, have developed. As the disputes drag on the uncertainties are equally detrimental to both the Sudan and South Sudan, and the latter should exert efforts to end the dispute at the earliest opportunity so that the country can refocus its energy on strategic domestic priorities.

4.5. Conclusion

The thrust of this chapter is premised on the assumption that the tools and mechanisms for addressing South Sudan’s post-independence challenges are embedded in the traditional and modern political and social structures of South Sudan. The country holds opportunities for the diverse social strata (women, youth, leaders and ordinary citizens) to contribute to conflict transformation and peace-building. The prime challenge has been seeking avenues to create conditions conducive to the effective and sustained participation of all stakeholders, including the critical top, middle and grassroots leaders in South Sudan’s peace-building processes. Departing from this premise, the chapter explored the presupposition that the key to managing, not only the fragile state of peace, but also advancing development in South Sudan are peaceful negotiation and dialogues, aimed at addressing South Sudan’s political and socio-economic challenges and disputes with Sudan; and the launch of reconciliation projects aimed at national/societal healing and confidence building, especially at the grassroots or local community levels. The chapter attempted to apply Lederach’s Pyramid Model, tailored to the specifics of South Sudan as a workable framework to tackle the challenges in the newly independent country with its rich and diverse ethnic composition. The model’s relevance to South Sudan is evident from its focus on and the high priority it assigns to the need and importance to embrace and coordinate an all-inclusive vertical and horizontal peace-building process of in-conflict and post-conflict societies. The model also encourages broader grassroots participation as a conduit to creating a strong sense of ownership of the peace processes, a prerequisite to durable conflict transformation and post-conflict peace.
Cognisant of the current realities in South Sudan, wherein the implementation of the Pyramid Model is envisaged, the chapter further provided general recommendations on policy priorities to address the acute and urgent challenges in the specific areas of South Sudan's diversity, political representation, food insecurity and poverty, and the South Sudan-Sudan dispute. Against this background and building on prior chapters, the next chapter offers a summary and a conclusion to this study.
Chapter Five

5. Summary and Conclusion

This study engaged in an analysis of the challenges impinging on effective conflict transformation and peace-building processes in South Sudan. It also sourced information and mechanisms on how these challenges can be managed and how sustainable peace can be built through short- and long-term processes. Since attaining independence in 2011, the subject of South Sudan as a new state and the complex peace and development challenges it is facing, has become a very topical issue and an area of concern for government, regional and international organisations, academics and individuals and researchers on Africa.

As a point of departure, the research study’s main arguments, objectives, questions and hypotheses were outlined, as well as the growing literature on conflict transformation and peace-building. To gain an understanding of South Sudan’s journey to the post-conflict and post-independence phases, as well as the complexities of its predisposing environment, the study undertook a historical examination of its conflict history with Sudan. The two consecutive and devastating South Sudan-Sudan civil wars were the result of a multiplicity of causes. While the first civil war was ethnically-oriented and centred on issues of underdevelopment and the socio-political and economic marginalisation of the South, the discovery of resources, especially oil, and the desire to control and own it, greatly contributed to and exacerbated the second civil war. As such, the second civil war which began in 1983 took the form of a protracted violent conflict and provided the basis for a clearer understanding of the social, political and economic dimensions of the conflict. The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement which ended the first civil war was shaped by the need to resolve the conflict and build peace. However, efforts to resolve the second civil war were influenced and complicated by the resource factor. Despite the enormous historical contributions of the 2005 CPA that was signed between the GoS and the SPLM/A to officially end this war, post-independent South Sudan demonstrated the implementation challenges that even a well-crafted peace agreement encounters.
South Sudan transitioned from a post-conflict territory of Sudan into a sovereign state that encounters its own internal and external challenges. South Sudan is at a crossroads, as its strained relationship with the Sudan as well as domestic challenges, distract it from concentrating on rebuilding its dilapidated infrastructure. Extensive efforts are underway by the government of South Sudan and its partners to transform the country into a sovereign, peaceful nation-state. In the drive for nation-building, the pursuit of peace in South Sudan has remained a central concern, encountering endless obstacles, as is the case in situations when nations emerge out of conflict. South Sudan faces many complex obstacles, but the most challenging are the continuous cross-border resource and land conflicts with Sudan, on the one hand, and the growing internal confrontations among some South Sudanese ethnic groups, on the other. The challenges South Sudan has encountered are the teething pains of a new country, except that South Sudan inherited a state infrastructure that was malfunctioning at best or non-existent at worst. Such a legacy complicated and continues to impact the ability of the government to discharge its responsibilities in the vital security, economic, social, national unity, and political spheres of state- and nation-building.

Despite these challenges, South Sudan’s independence has opened opportunities for the South Sudanese to thrive and prosper. Efforts to peacefully settle the conflict with the Sudan are bearing fruit: the September 27, 2012 peace agreement brokered by the AU is one such gain. Joint efforts and the commitment of substantial resources by the GoSS and external and internal stakeholders, (like the AU, IGAD, UN, and CSOs) continue to contribute to peace and development initiatives. These initiatives have had encouraging results in terms of building infrastructure, laying the foundation for state institutions, and most importantly, maintaining internal stability and defending the sovereignty of independent South Sudan.

This study recommended the application of John Paul Lederach’s pyramid model of conflict transformation in South Sudan. This model is based on a comprehensive framework of constructive conflict transformation, which runs through the three major categories of top,
middle and grassroots levels of leadership, where these actors engage in a variety of interdependent activities. This approach to peace-building takes into account the interests of all stakeholders and underscores the importance of the local society in driving and owning its peace-building process. Building on this premise, a broad outline was provided for the effective implementation of peace initiatives in a post-conflict and complex environment like South Sudan, where peace should be treated as a strategic asset, the attainment of which requires the coordination of all efforts and home-grown initiatives and tools. For this model to succeed, leaders at all levels would not only engage the different activities provided for in the pyramid model, but would also need to ensure broader societal inclusion and participation in the peace-building processes.

The study underscored the immense potential of South Sudan’s diverse and rich ethnic composition and therefore underscored the need to accommodate this diversity. South Sudan’s ethnic diversity was a formidable force that united the entire nation to vote for complete independence in January 2011. The South Sudanese hoped that an independent South Sudan would open hitherto closed doors to realise their dreams of a dignified, secure, prosperous, proud, and free society that they were denied under the rule of successive Sudanese governments. The same force that bonded South Sudanese to seek and achieve independence will enable them to overcome ethnic differences in a peaceful and negotiated manner, forge strong unity, join hands in nation-building, and lead to a cohesive new country. It is incumbent on the GoSS to recognise the country’s diverse nature.

The protracted dispute with the Sudan over the outstanding issues from the CPA represents the single most important national and foreign policy challenge for South Sudan. South Sudan’s resolve to reach a peaceful, negotiated settlement despite its slow, tortuous, painful, and frustrating progress is a viable policy option that will pay security dividends not only to South Sudan but to the Sudan as well.

South Sudan, a new nation emerging from decades of violent conflict and confronted with a series of challenges, has demonstrated diplomatic savvy and maturity in its relationships not only with neighbours, friends and allies but also with its enemies. This diplomatic path
will secure the political support of neighbouring countries and lead to prosperity through economic cooperation and trade with neighbours, secure borders, cordial and cooperative ties with the IGAD, AU, the UN, EU, and alliances with major global powers. The recent Africa Growth and Opportunity Act passed by the US government to give South Sudan access to the US market is testimony that diplomatic savvy is benefitting South Sudan.

The conflict transformation and peace-building challenges in South Sudan are similar to comparable post-conflict societies, except that, unlike other countries, South Sudan encountered immediate economic and security threats from Sudan, its former ruler, as well as domestic risks emanating from the dispute with the Sudan and internal dissent caused by governance challenges that the GoSS needs to address. However, the study found that the role of ethnic groups in a country with a large numbers of ethnic communities evolves with the political and economic dynamics of post-conflict society and that the pressing issues of each phase of the conflict defines their ever-changing roles. The study also established that ethnic diversity has the potential to serve multiple purposes – the South Sudanese, despite their rich ethnic diversity, overwhelmingly voted for independence but disagreements surfaced over governance and access to power, wealth, and opportunities after independence. The study further discerned that a young country like South Sudan, with limited resources and little experience in the craft of inter-state relationships can command hefty diplomatic clout, when compared with countries that achieved independence decades earlier.

The long term consolidation of peace in South Sudan is closely linked to the security situation in the country. At the centre of durable security, a national priority; is domestic peace among South Sudanese. Achieving domestic peace requires the intensification of efforts to consolidate existing peace gains and break new internal peace grounds. Ethnic, national, and civil society organisations have a crucial role to play in such initiatives, while the state plays the central role in coordinating the diverse initiatives into a national platform. Dispute resolution mechanisms to build mutual relations and strengthen trade relations between South Sudan and Sudan must also be encouraged. Given that achieving sustainable peace in any post-conflict society, and specifically in South Sudan, also aims to
build durable state-society relations, the state must devise ways and means of interacting with civil society in order to consult on issues of national importance that require citizen support for the responsible exercise of public authority; define the political and socio-economic rights and obligations of the state and society; negotiate how public resources should be allocated; and set up systems for broader representation and enhanced accountability.

This study concludes with the assertion that attaining sustainable peace in South Sudan, as in other nations emerging from conflict, is a long-term project; peace-building in South Sudan is an ongoing process. Despite the challenges, there has been some progress, but more resources and efforts need to be harnessed to attain viable peace. Post-independent South Sudan’s experience and the country-specific internal and external conflict variations provide evidence that even though conflict transformation and peace-building models are valid and relevant, further research is necessary to devise situation-specific micro-models that address the unique characteristics that define distinct conflicts. One way of achieving this goal would be to conduct in-depth research on ongoing violent or escalating conflicts in preparation for conflict transformation and peace-building in the post-conflict stage. The South Sudan experience is rich with new phenomena and post-conflict-post-independence challenges; it presents untapped opportunities for further research to apply to current conflict transformation and peace-building models and devise new ones.
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