1. [A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PLATO'S THEORY OF JUSTICE IN THE LIGHT OF HIS THUMOEIDES CONCEPT, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE REPUBLIC]

resp by

Graeme James Francis Simpson 700

submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of D.Phil., Department of Philosophy, in the Faculty of Arts in the University of Durban-Westville.

Promoter: Professor G.A. Rauche, D.Phil. (SA), D.Litt. (UCT).

Joint Promoter: Dr. R. Singh, B.A.(Hons.)(SA)., M.A., D.Phil.(UDW).

[S.l. : s.n.], [1985?]

C O N T E N T S

/b.20

/PREFACE

PREFACE

Stumbling on something one believes new and perhaps significant; and trying to formulate a thesis in which its significance is brought out: these two may involve two such different sets of circumstances that many people are probably unfortunate enough to end up either writing nothing about what they stumble upon, however significant, or being reduced to having to write about something they think the reverse.

The opportunity to try to formulate on paper a theory I stumbled on and thought significant I owe in greatest part to Professor G. A. Rauche, who with unlimited patience persisted in indicating the immense defects of my 'thesis' as it stood, and attempted, under adverse conditions, to supply the means of moulding it into something more coherent. Without this support, the available material would probably never have been put together - or at any rate not by me. I also owe considerable thanks to Dr. R. Singh, my co-promoter, who has shared to a substantial extent Professor Rauche's burden.

In previous years I have been helped by Professor J. R. Howes and Dr. P. A. L. Greenhalgh of U. C. T., and Dr. G. E. R. Lloyd of King's College, Cambridge. To them I should like to express my sincerest appreciation and gratitude. Their ready help during the time I was at the earliest stages of thinking out my problem was radically important to me.

My unreserved thanks, too, are due to my wife for her forbearance in general and specially for typing the first draft, and to Mrs. R. L. Newell, who did the present one. As I have largely recorrected and reset it, the shortcomings in the layout as well as the text are now both solely due to me.

ARGUMENT

a. If, in the context of Plato's Theory of Justice, the radically important Greek term θυμοειδής had been inadequately evaluated, its meaning would as a result have been insufficiently comprehensively rendered, in English and other translations of the Republic in particular, and the Platonic dialogues in general - with serious consequences. It is contended in this thesis that this has been the case.

b. The second and principal contention of the thesis is that owing to this inadequate evaluation and the resultant unsatisfactory renderings, Plato's Theory of Justice itself has been inadequately evaluated. The outcome of this has been serious because, through it, the whole basis of man's motivation for activity at all (and it must be stressed that without activity there can of course be neither justice nor injustice) has inevitably been glossed over as though it were of no account.

c. The term θυμοειδής, it is correspondingly argued, is used by Plato to denote, as the second of three sectors constituting the soul (the other two being the logistic and the appetitive), a morally neutral energy-potential. The meaning virtually uniformly assigned to it by English translators (others closely correspond, and are accordingly not quoted) is "spirited" (in substantive form "spirit", "spiritedness", etc.). Yet this term has, in the moral sphere, exclusively "favourable" connotations. If, as the thesis further and crucially proposes to demonstrate, the θυμοειδής element is overall the major source of "drive" for all man's activity, it cannot be a purely favour-

able force. If it were, there could be no injustice. It must, overall, be a broader entity. And if - as, it is hoped, may further be shown - it has at different points different nuances, varying between the morally highly favourable through neutral to highly unfavourable, these must be given their full individual force at each such point.

d. When this is done, and we observe that, on all the Platonic "levels", Justice is a Harmony, it is found that this Harmony is produced by due logistic control not of some anomalous "force", amounting to some mysterious "whim" of man to act in one way or another, but of a clear-cut, irrepressible energy-source conferred upon him by the Deity. As one important result of this, the nature of the supremely important entity ἔρως is explained. It is that combination of λογιστικόν and θυμοειδές (the λογιστικόν being fused with, and "fired" by, the θυμοειδές) by whose agency man strives towards the ultimate Good. Ultimate Justice then becomes the harmonious functioning of ἔρως, working together with the subordinate aid of the appetitive (ἐπιθυμητικόν) sector, through which ultimate Good is attained. If basically neutral dynamism of the θυμοειδές firing the λογιστικόν is posited to account for the varying success of ἔρως, Plato's Theory of Justice becomes far more rationally consistent than it has yet been shown to be.

INTRODUCTION

a) The central postulate of the thesis is that Plato's Theory of Justice is fuller than the traditional accounts allow it to be. The crucial omission of the latter is a comprehensive description of the θυμοειδές ('thumoeidic') sector of the soul. Traditionally, as the 'middle' of the soul's three sectors, it is the 'Will to Contend'. But on Plato's express indication it is also the source of absolute drive to action. Traditionally, logistic, thumoeidic, and appetitive sectors thrust the individual into, respectively, logistic, thumoeidic, or appetitive behaviour. Each also does so at apparently unspecified intervals, and for unspecified reasons. But Plato implicitly suggests first that the θυμοειδές does so constantly and irresistibly, and second that it affects both other sectors. Traditionally, the thrust seems an incidental affair. In fact, it appears as though, if the individual chose to do nothing at all permanently, he could. But on Plato's clear suggestion, this is impossible. Man, on his thesis, is inevitably involved in dynamic existence.

b) This being so, the effect on Plato's Theory of Justice is drastic. For Plato has shown that only justice is profitable. And he states that only ordinary intellect is required to understand this. Every man will therefore wish to act justly. However, he will only achieve that justice if he knows how to channel his drive. And, for this to happen, superior intellect

becomes vital. For in certain situations it can take a great deal more than normal intelligence to determine what exactly is just. And few people possess this degree of intelligence. On the other hand, given the additional knowledge outlined in '(a)', the circumstances are seriously qualified. For by virtue of the awareness that he must inevitably act, man can plan ahead. If he has prior knowledge that an irresistible force constantly accumulating within him has to be catered for, he can prearrange its expenditure. He can avoid mistakes. Instead of being forced impromptu into indiscriminate conduct, he can devise ethically acceptable behaviour patterns. These patterns may well be trivial. But this will be very different from unjust.

c) That the thumoeidic element should have this character becomes readily acceptable on consideration of Plato's concept of ἔρως. For it was said above that traditionally the logistic, thumoeidic and appetitive ('epithumetic') sectors thrust the individual into action 'for no specific reason'. It could well have been asked whether any specific reason existed for the absolute thrust of θυμοειδές. The reason, in Plato's terms, would arguably be this. The Demiourgos (deity) could have created nothing but perfect Ideas. Instead, he chose to create imperfect objects as well. Yet perfection, Plato conceived with Pythagoras, must be the desired ultimate aim. He (Plato) therefore concluded that the deity had an aim in harmony with this. The deity (we may fairly term the Demiourgos Plato's 'God'), in his view, regarded the true and proper function of

all beings as ἔρως, the struggle towards perfection. τὸ θυμοειδές, with so much in common with ἔρως, embodies one of its features. It is a divinely created source of ethically neutral energy. As such, it fuels the ethically positive process of ἔρως.

d) The findings summarised in paragraph 'a)' are in strong contrast with scholars' interpretations so far. To begin with, the term 'θυμοειδές' is almost universally, in English translations, rendered 'spirited'. This word has no trace of morally 'unfavourable' purport. Nor are English translations by any means the sole ones involved. Leading German, French and Italian versions are found to give the word exactly the same tone. But if the term 'θυμοειδές' denotes something that can lead to unjust as well as to either neutral or just activity, this rendering is not adequate. The word cannot consistently be translated into terms which have none but 'favourable' connotations. The terms by which it is rendered must, on due occasion, have certain baser aspects incorporated into them. Yet these (with some notable exceptions referred to later) are never introduced. The θυμοειδές' explicit capacity for fuelling evil is minimised. Quite apart from what it means in the Republic, however, it appears that the general contemporary Greek sense of the word θυμοειδές was by no means purely favourable. Indeed, it had a strong vein of 'anger', or 'passion'. Evidence will be provided that that vein was far stronger than 'spirited' can even begin to convey.

e) The conclusion from these considerations is readily arrived at. Plato has said a great deal more about Justice (the ultimate 'balance') than has so far been suspected. In postulating a perpetual thrust intrinsic in the "Will to Contend", he has provided for a Theory of Aggression. A new Theory of Justice, on revolutionarily modern lines, follows. He has shown that θυμοειδές inexorably accumulates, and that random action occurs unless the individual knows enough to channel his thumoeidic force justly. If these things are so, and the extreme form of injustice is lethal aggression, thumoeidic misdirection includes war. The inevitable corollary of the finding is as follows. If channelling of the θυμοειδές is knowledgeably and systematically carried out, neither injustice nor war will occur at all.

f) The chief fields for exploration in an attempt to obtain proof that Plato made this postulate are threefold. First, the internal evidence for the significance of θυμοειδές in his texts. Second, the dialectical relationship of the respective parts of the soul with each other. Finally, the relationships between the various typologies of soul-sector, man, social unit, and transcendental form. The relationships with the soul, and with one another in turn, in regard to Justice and the Cosmos follow in order. The separate parts of the soul can of course only properly be seen in the overall context of the Platonic dialectical whole. And this will entail that any concepts occurring outside the immediate material of the dialogues can only be given secondary

importance. Lexicographical and other relatively "external" evidence may be highly illuminating, but however much this may be so, it must be subsidiary to the textual.

g) The overall plan of the thesis is, accordingly, as follows. A historical background chapter is inserted at the outset. The purpose this fulfils is to place the study as a whole in its concrete perspective. Still, in its capacity as a mere introduction to the central topic, this chapter lays no claim to represent original research. And second, even the philological and quasi-philological material of the second chapter is illustrative rather than demonstrative. It is the ensuing comparisons in that chapter of the various senses of the word that are most important. Following them, and comparable in importance, is the analysis in chapters three and four of their bearing on the dialectical structure created out of them. These have a special role in linking up the various typologies of soul sectors, human genera, etc. For the remarks made about the thumoeidic faculty and its importance in the particular context of the thesis have one special qualification. They cannot be seen in any light other than that of Plato's actual dialectic <u>as a whole</u>.

h) Reviewing the topic from a more present-day standpoint, several considerations present themselves.

i) The chief problem presented by war, namely its apparent habit of <u>periodic</u> recurrence, has led to much

modern literature on Aggression. One table given by a modern historian (Toynbee, A.J., A Study of History, vol. IX) shows cycles of war and peace over randomly chosen periods among randomly chosen peoples. This table has possibly been one of the earliest pointers in the later 20th Century to the thesis that the generating of war is more an affair of physiology than 'moral' decision. Ardrey, Lorenz, Morris are other exponents of man's behavioural syndromes in this direction.

ii) In the light of this modern material, one is abruptly brought face to face in Plato with the term θυμοειδές - the "angry", "passionate". As if this concept were now not electrifying enough, it appears in an obviously special context as the 'drive' sector of the mind. The suspicion that one has met with a Platonic Theory of Aggression becomes virtually a certainty.

iii) Granted this, however, it might be asked in what the alleged philosophical, as opposed to merely scientific, interest of the thumoeidic* lies? What, it could well be inquired, has war to do with Philosophy? The answer to this seems unequivocal. In as far as Philosophy has to do with man's ethical behaviour, it must concern itself with any serious deviations apparent in that. In regard specifically to war, Plato reveals that it is a product of the thumoeidic. The position the thumoeidic must assume in the scheme of his ethics therefore becomes unique.

* (Used synonymously with θυμοειδής)

iv) The philosophical interest of the thumoeidic then lies chiefly in the moral implications which a duly modified rendering of the word must carry. If men cannot help being thrust into action by it, there will now be a doubt as to how "guilty" they are if unaware that they are being so thrust. The logical connexion between the θυμοειδές and the other two parts of the tripartite soul will in any event be altered drastically. So will the ethical consequences implied by that changed version. That it has hitherto been inadequately translated now becomes an obvious and leading consideration.

v) Moreover, its interest is not limited to this aspect of inquiry. The whole structure of Plato's philosophy, amongst others his Principle of Identity and Concept of Forms, is involved. For we have seen that the thumoeidic, as the fundamental driving force to which men, society and the universe owe their dynamism, is at the basis of ἔρως. And ἔρως in turn is not only at the basis of the very existence of these entities, but also the process by which man strives towards the supremely important goal - the Good. The thumoeidic is the 'springboard' of that process. It thereby becomes the concept showing the closest affinity with ἔρως - the latter being perhaps the most formidable of all terms encountered in Plato's philosophy.

vi) As was seen above, the mind consists, on Plato's

tripartite principle, of three sectors: intellectual, hot-tempered*, and appetitive. These are termed variously λογιστικόν, θυμοειδές, ἐπιθυμητικόν ; or again φιλομαθές, φιλόνικον, φιλοκερδές, etc. ἔρως is not explicitly included among them. We can accordingly take it to be either made up of a combination of fractions of them, or alternately a divine infusion <u>into</u> them. But if the Divinity meant man to struggle towards the Good, it is not likely that he would have implanted in him inadequate means of doing so. It is, after all, solely by means of the faculties given him by the Demiourgos that man glimpses the Good at all, let alone struggles towards it. We might rather guess that ἔρως (though earlier as a philosophical concept than any of them) is in practice a simple or fractionated <u>compound</u> of two or more of the soul's sectors. If so, we must include in those sectors the aspiration towards ultimate Good. This is acceptable enough, since Plato makes the search for Good a matter of <u>knowledge</u>, which is covered by the logistic sector. ἔρως , then, could be taken simply as a compound of at any rate predominantly thumoeidic and logistic. On the other hand, if that seems too facile, we may think of it as some such combination <u>touched with the divine inspiration</u>. It seems less likely that it should be identical with any one sector. Still, if finally we took it to be such, the <u>thumoeidic</u> touched by that inspiration would cover most conceivable requirements.

* This rendering is used anticipatorily.

vii) Nevertheless, whichever way it is seen, ἔρως is positive for good. And here lies the essential difference between it and the thumoeidic. For the thumoeidic, although perhaps overall, by the Platonic synthesis, more inclined towards good than evil, can promote evil as well as good, and ἔρως is never associated with evil. The thumoeidic appears in its more obvious Platonic context specifically as the primarily good-orientated energy-source. The logistic may still sway it in whatever direction it sees fit. But more commonly it chooses a good rather than a bad direction. (It is in a less obvious context that we see it as the neutral energy-source, which will operate whether so swayed or not.)

If, we found, the logistic is defective, it will not have the wisdom to recognise the Good. It will not know how to get it, or even that it is worth getting. A critical issue arises at this point. Since this thumoeidic power incessantly accumulates, and by its accumulation forces its own expenditure, effective and just means of channelling it must be found. Yet these can only be found by the sufficiently intelligent being. But, more than that, this channelling must, of course, also be for application not only to the intelligent, but to the insufficiently intelligent, man. The latter must, indeed, be coerced into correct activity, if other persuasion fails. There must, in short, be state organisation by the intelligent of activities leading to sufficient, just expenditure of thumoeidic resources.

viii) The connexion of these findings with ἔρως and the overall Platonic view is of course critically important. Taking ἔρως provisionally as a blend of thumoeidic with logistic, we can say that the logistic provides both the intelligence necessary to realise that the Good is pre-eminently worth seeking, and the know-how to find ways of attaining it. The thumoeidic provides the drive to prize it vigorously and carry on the search for it. A new light is hereby shed on ἔρως. The thumoeidic is not merely a 'spirited' element, to be employed wholly voluntarily by its possessor. It cannot be 'switched on', so to speak, or 'switched off' at will. In just the same way, ἔρως is irrepressibly dynamic. It must be "catered for". This last characteristic is noted by both early philosopher-scientists, and by Plato, as one of the greatest, if not the greatest, mysteries of nature. Undoubtedly it will have been inferred by them from the persistent, constantly upsurging energy of the natural animal. But observation of cosmic forces such as tides, volcanoes, etc. will have caused them to read it further into the cosmos. Later they introduced it into the social unit, ultimately the transcendent world of abstracts. Some probably read it back from the natural phenomena into man. But, whatever the case, the erotic element takes over from that earliest energy concept a feature of perpetuity, of never-ending recurrence of thrusting force and dynamism towards the high ultimate goal.

ix) Referring back from the force of ἔρως to its simpler version in the thumoeidic element, we rehearse once more the main conclusions of the present thesis. These are that, since τὸ θυμοειδές accumulates incessantly, action is inevitable and permanent inaction inconceivable, and that, if the unbridled, ultimately explosive force of τὸ θυμοειδές is not to materialise in brutish and lethal war, higher intellects must be applied to channelling that action. The eternally self-regenerating thumoeidic 'hot-temper' must be harnessed, in ἔρως , to attain ἀρετή - the supreme power to attain, in turn, the ultimate Good. Justice is of course incorporated in that Good. The dialectical consistency of these relationships underlies this thesis.

CHAPTER ONE

A BRIEF PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THE INFLUENCE OF MYTHOLOGICAL AND FOLKLORISTIC SOURCES ON PLATO'S CONCEPT OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL, AND THE CONCEPT θυμοειδές IN PARTICULAR

a.1 SOURCES

Plato's concept of the soul was necessarily moulded in the circumstances in which life was lived in 5th - 4th Century Greece. This meant that it was moulded under the potential influence of the mythology and folklore current at the time. By this stage of Greek culture, one might have suspected that ancient prehistoric and traditional beliefs were on their way out.

This was by no means the case. On the contrary, they were rife. A short list of their objects would include powers such as Dionysos controlling the crops (and so, indirectly, Life), Hades controlling Death, theories of Reincarnation (or Metempsychosis, (Palingenesis)such as the Pythagorean, Orphic[1], etc., and finally worship of the gods in general. Cults and superstitions of this pattern were universally popular. Amongst other things, they rationalised Life and Death as a detailed cycle, and primordial forces such as these still meant a great deal to the Greeks. For even the sophisticated

townspeople were scientifically uninformed. Storms, disease, crop failure were no less unaccountable to them than to the peasants of the countryside. They made no sense except as divine inflictions. We cannot be surprised, then, if, as Plato himself bears witness[2], the rule of mythology and folklore was exceedingly powerful. Admittedly the younger generation were beginning to regard much myth as old wives' tales[3]. Among the common people[4], however, belief in and reverence for it had an undiminished strength. This was mirrored in several solidly real phenomena. A few samples of these would be the current popularity of drama, tragic and comic; a religious conformism harsh enough to lead to the execution of Socrates on religious grounds alone; and finally the universal terror and indignation resulting from the notorious Mutilation of the Hermai (Athenian household gods). The violence of reaction to this last[5] among the Athenians, proletariat and nobles alike, was so phenomenal as to strain belief. One may perhaps best just quote Thucydides' report. Once blame for the mutilation had been fixed on Alcibiades, the whole monumental failure of the Sicilian expedition of 415 B.C. was, Thucydides tells us, put down to this sacrilege.

a.2 THEIR INFLUENCE ON PLATO.

To what extent Plato consciously allowed himself to be influenced by myth is a harder question. Still, it can to some extent be learned from his own writings. His knowledge of myth

was certainly very wide. Socrates condemns much tradition and folklore out of hand as fantastic and degenerate[6]. But not only do the many traces of myth found in the dialogues form evidence that Plato (and probably Socrates) treated certain of the more familiar legends very seriously. Plato himself actually refers to them as accounts handed down by our forefathers "who are now wrongly disbelieved* by many"[7]. Other possible sources from which he might have drawn for his material concerning the soul included the Presocratic philosophers. Prior to all these were, however, a considerable fund of established religious and chthonic institutions. To those listed above, we could here add the Eleusinian Mysteries (strongly if diffusely connected with Dionysiac ritual), and the rites of Demeter and Persephone. These stand at the head of many cults of other deities intimately affecting human physical survival. Last but not least, and providing the bulk of available enlightment on all the aforementioned, come the Homeric and Hesiodic Epics.

a.3 A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE DIONYSOS CULT, REINCARNATION, THE ELEUSINIAN MYSTERIES, AND ORPHISM.

First and foremost, the above-mentioned elements provided material for a theory of the Underworld. It was not a very precise theory. As far as concepts of 'spirit' and 'mind' went,

*(my underlining)

it seemed to be summed up in the general belief that the dead had their being merely as a kind of 'strengthless'[8] semi-solid[9]. (Importantly, they were not totally insubstantial spirits.) These smoke-like versions of men's previous selves then apparently roamed throughout eternity the asphodel-strewn marches of Hades. It was a perhaps fanciful belief. Nevertheless it was a plausible one, and from it we can trace later, and in particular Platonic, theory through a natural progression. The shades of the dead were substantial enough to be visible to a person such as Odysseus who happened to gain access to the Underworld. Yet they were not substantial in a normal sense[10]. That was convincing. The body of a person was irrefutably, visibly, earth-bound after death. Only abstract "life" had left it. Yet even life (taken as virtually synonymous with breath) was not totally abstract. Air blown from the lungs carried a palpable force, and on cold mornings was physically visible as smoke. The concept of smoky, wraith-like shapes (forms?) of the dead, which these 'shades' were, also carried a logically sound ring. More than that, it functioned as a stepping stone to the concept of the all-but-insubstantial, because maximally attenuated, soul. And from here it extended to mind and reason, which by the Pythagorean doctrine would only be separated from the soul as universal ingredients, the soul 'itself' being individual to its possessor[11]. Ultimately, as has been apprehended, it would reach the stage of maximal attenuation. This would be the guise proper to the Ideas themselves.

It would accord with this that the soul was taken by Plato as of more or less equal insubstantiality with mind and reason, since its affinity with the Ideas makes it virtually indistinguishable in kind from them. The point should be made here, however, that this near-abstraction of the Ideas ('unseen', ἀόρατον[12], and 'unperceived', ἀναίσθητον[13]) is still only a "near-abstraction". The ruling Greek concept of the cosmos was one involving continuous matter (ὕλη). The postulate of a so-to-speak cosmic essence, together with Parmenidean-type arguments that 'nothing cannot exist', will have ruled out a concept of total abstraction.

a.4 THE DOCTRINE OF REINCARNATION.

Plato's conception of the soul is in great part traceable to Pythagoreanism. The fact that speech was the vehicle of thought will early on have led to the conclusion touched on above that the breath in which speech was contained was also insubstantial - in as far at any rate as it was capable of being invisible. By virtue of this property it was then accepted as being also indestructible and eternal[14]. A situation will then have presented itself in which two things had to be assumed. First, the human body when alive must possess a minimally material soul. Second, if the body died, the soul, unable to die with it, must remain an unfixed wanderer through the universe.

The idea that the soul roamed at large was one possibility. That it could fuse with a 'universal' soul was another. But, whichever of these doctrines was believed, there was a further difficulty. For if each new creature born obtained a new soul, this would entail an infinite increase in the number of souls. Without a simultaneous increase in the size of the so-to-speak 'psychic' cosmos, which does not seem to have been envisaged, it was straining common reason to suppose that new souls could continue to be manufactured indefinitely. And, besides this difficulty, there was another. It lay in the implication, mentioned above, that the souls of deceased persons continued to exist in an 'unattached' state. That is, that they could be supposed to drift eternally through the cosmos without any apparent function.

The answer to both these problems was simple. It was to conclude that every soul, on the death of the physical being that housed it, eventually entered a new-born physical being. It might wander for an unspecified time before doing so, but in the end it found a suitable recipient. No new being ever possessed, so to speak, a 'new' soul. The primordial one which entered it, however, remaining with it until its physical death, then continued on its way through multiple existences until it reached moral perfection. Presumably it then, at some later unspecified stage, began its journey over again, but this was a pedantic rounding-off of the theory which received correspondingly little attention.

a.5 ORPHISM.

The perfect soul was nevertheless scheduled to find its eventual haven. Orphic doctrine, handling this problem, and fundamental to Plato's theory of the after-life, was mainly exemplified in the Eleusinian Mysteries. These perhaps went no further than to maintain the soul's mere survival, together with its arrival at this divine destination. Still, more important than details of this last was the possible, indeed probable, adjunct of happiness for those who had lived virtuously.

Orphism made use of the Dionysos cult, but was also regarded as the forerunner of Pythagoreanism. It was, moreover, to a large extent recorded. The early Orphic poems are unfortunately lost, so that late sources alone can be consulted, but among these Plato himself lists six[15] generations of Orphic cosmogony. He speaks further of the 'Titanic' (i.e. sinful) nature of man. (The Titans, themselves[16] incinerated by Zeus' bolt for their sin in killing and devouring Dionysos, were taken to have supplied, by means of their ashes, the substance originating man.) However, the doctrine of re-entry of souls set free by death into new bodies beginning a new life was not dependent on this. It was a natural rationalisation, even without the clear evidence of material reality. New bodies were of course in any case not strictly 'new', but built up from the dust of the earth formed by previously live matter. The theory covering this was no

doubt earlier than Pythagoras, but he emended and expanded it.

The ancient and modern debt to Pythagoras is indeed overwhelming. In as far as his influence relates to Plato and the present inquiry, he is, according to Burkert[17], 'the hierophant of Great Mother mysteries with an Anatolian stamp, and has a new doctrine, probably influenced by Indo-Iranian sources, of immortality and of the triumph over death through successive rebirths'. The Iranians themselves had not produced a very elaborate theory of reincarnation. Pythagoras, in fact, remains the only likely immediate source of the doctrine, his own probable source being the Indians. Refinements on it, such as questions of the transmigration, or even presence, of souls in animals[18] or plants, and of inter-transmigration between these and humans, are harder to trace. Plato's use of animals at all as representatives of parts of the soul is a question of considerable interest[19]. An immediately important feature, however, of the Pythagorean legacy used by Plato is the mysticism surrounding number. Especially relevant is the number three[20]. And in particular relation to it, we have the division of the soul, the so-called "tripartite" division, into three sectors. This question receives a brief treatment under the next heading.

a.6 SOME FURTHER ASPECTS OF PYTHAGOREANISM, AND PLATO'S CONTACT WITH IT.

According to Alexander of Aphrodisias[21], commenting on

Aristotle's book on the Pythagoreans, the Pythagoreans took the number one to be νοῦς (mind), two to be δόξα (opinion), and three "the whole". These echoed the trio beginning, middle and end. Every whole would, therefore, initially tend to be conceived of as composed of three rather than any other number of parts. It cannot be questioned that Plato attributed an inherent significance to numbers. A single passage in the Republic alone[22] puts this beyond doubt. But in his division of the soul there seems more than the simple desire to make the number three 'fit'. There is more, that is, than a simple insistence on a "half-way mark" (here θυμοειδές) between two obviously distinct parts of the soul, reason and appetite. The fact that in the subdivision of citizen types into three: intellectuals, soldiers, and workers, he finds it necessary to add a 'superintellectual'[23] group, proves the integrity of his approach. He was not inclined to pursue mysticism at the expense of science. The opposite was, indeed, more consistent with his policy. He took number as a higher entity, but with which facts might conform, not on which they should be modelled.

a.7 In the case of the tripartite division of the soul, there was already extant a Pythagorean thesis which distinguished three types of person: buyers-and-sellers, competitors, and thinkers[24]. These of course exactly correspond with the Platonic classification. The divine origin of the soul was even more widely affirmed. Pindar had asserted

it[25]. Anaximenes had designated the soul as air, and air as God. Of the Pythagoreans specifically, Timaeus maintains that the only eternal, genuinely existing things are νόησις, thought, and λόγος, reason, which the Demiourgos then infused into the ψυχή, thus making that eternal[26], and combining it with the body, which was not. The Pythagoreans had in addition, by the 6th Cent. B.C., developed an ethical theory of rebirth[27]. This probably emanated from the Eleusinian Mysteries 28. And these, concordantly with Orphism, definitely promised the possibility of a happier lot in the after-life.

It is the Pythagorean variant of Orphism that is encountered in Plato, as it is in Pindar, Empedocles, and Herodotus[29]. The basic principle of this variant was that a soul, consisting of attenuated substance, entered the physically more 'solid' substance of an animal or human, and there formed the thinking agency which guided that body through physical life. This provides one reason why Pythagoras demands abstinence from living things[30] (and even avoidance of association with butchers and hunters). During this life, the spirit's constant aim was to transcend the merely physical traits of matter with which it had become associated. Appetite, greed, anger, and lust had to be subjugated. This was done with a view to attaining an ultimate state of perfection in which λόγος rules. But this process of striving towards perfection was very difficult. Ordinarily it was not to be achieved in less than a great many lifetimes. This was why the soul, having left one body, would be compelled to enter

another[31], and again yet another. And it continued to do so until it had totally risen above the domination of gross matter.

a.8 Plato's life-long friendship with the Pythagorean Archytas of Tarentum is well worth observing for another reason. Archytas was both mathematician and theoretician of music. In this context, the view of music taken by the scientists may be seen in a far clearer light. It is so much more evidently the experience in which the Dionysiac (vigorous without rationality, and so virtually thumoeidic), and the Apollinian (rational, or logistic), become fused. It was discovered moreover by the Pythagoreans that music constituted an excellent means of purging the soul. In this we detect a forerunner not only of Aristotelean κάθαρσις, but of Plato's stress upon consistent types of music as an absolute necessity for maintaining a consistent Republic. Archytas' friendship with Plato and his influence with Dionysios of Syracuse was extremely strong; strong enough indeed to prompt and enable him to procure Plato's release from prison in Syracuse[32]. And there is no doubt that Pythagorean doctrine in general enjoyed wide currency and respect at the time.

Plato's own actual references to Pythagoras himself number, in fact, one only[33]. But he speaks respectfully of the Pythagoreans at all times[34], talks seriously with them when he happens to meet them[35], and occasionally seems to reflect their doctrines quite explicitly in his own dialectic. We have, for

instance, Aristotle, followed by several others, e.g. Cicero, Apuleius, maintaining that at this or that point 'Πλάτων πυθαγορίζει' (Plato is 'pythagorizing')[36]. At the same time, Aristotle himself has left substantial material distinguishing Pythagorean and Platonic doctrines. Overall it seems clear that Plato's reliance on them, although immense, was by no means unqualified.

His closest contact with them began during his visit to Magna Graecia and Sicily in 387B.C., when he was already forty[37]. Even at this time the reigning interest in the Academy was still Mathematics and Astronomy ('Philosophy' as we understand the term coming later). This will have caused him to be preoccupied with current Pythagorean speculations concerning Number and Geometry. Yet these themselves could have led him to take greater notice of Pythagorean metaphysical doctrines when he himself began to move in a philosophical direction.

a.9 To return to the specific Pythagorean doctrine in question, that of Reincarnation. The concept of an 'insubstantial' νοῦς and λόγος being made to unite, in the soul, with the substantial body led naturally to the concept of certain <u>less attenuated</u> parts of the soul uniting with that body. Throughout Plato's treatment of the soul, we are made aware that the <u>epithumetic</u> (appetitive) is the least attenuated of the three sectors. In natural consequence it is the part which has become most inextricably entwined with the body, and

finds it hardest to break away from it. Here at any rate, in both Orphism and Pythagoreanism, was a constructive departure. Here at last a contrast to the dull, colourless fate ascribed by Homer to good and bad alike. How indeed could such an unconvincing account be accepted? The suggested existence in Hades of criminals such as Tantalus and Sisyphus suffering interminable pains made it thoroughly implausible that positively good people should be left totally without pleasures. Orphism, as developed in Pythagoreanism, had destroyed this anomaly. Positive happiness in the after-life awaited those who had achieved perfection in the present one.

a.10 BACKGROUND INFLUENCES OF OTHER PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS.

In regard to the "semi-abstract, semi-solid" "shades" of Hades mentioned earlier, the fact that the Greek philosopher-scientists held to a predominantly 'hylozoic' principle brought them up against certain problems. To maintain, that is, the assumption that what was at times invisible, or at times apparently totally imperceptible (nothing had yet been found to be invariably either of these), was still "substantial" was not too hard. As has been said, no entity invariably such had been identified except theoretically. But here came the difficulty. To insist that theoretical entities were also substantial necessitated certain awkward generalisations. First, substance must be everywhere. Second, some individual

substances must be made out to be "thinner"[38], some "denser", than others. But if ὕλη was continuous[39] and omnipresent, it was a bit hard to describe the apparently totally insubstantial (if it existed) in such terms. This hurdle was ignored. Doubtless, also, as the ultimate, divinely originated essence, ὕλη had a unique claim. It was a thing which we would be presumptuous to expect to be able to understand. Undeniably, as long as mental products were associated with breath, then air, Anaximenes' choice as the universal and divine essence, had the fairest prospects as a candidate for the 'universal substance'. Its visible and invisible versions would, to an early way of thinking, have seemed proof that the same 'thing' could be both 'something' and 'nothing' (the question of its 'solid' attributes, if any, was another problem). And if Anaxagoras could postulate, as he did, that all was mind, we may also be sure that he was by no means suggesting that mind was 'insubstantial'. It was merely one of the 'thinnest' "substances". The concept of a thing existing without possessing substance could therefore have posed a problem, had that concept existed. It did not. 'Nothing', as Parmenides had pointed out, could not 'exist'. ὕλη therefore, varying in density from solid, 'material' substance to the maximally attenuated, accounted no less for evanescent 'idea' than for gross matter. The concept of a soul, one of the "thinnest" substances, being able to wander the earth unhindered was, as a result, not a difficult one. It rested simply and primarily on the observation of the behaviour of the air. And since air seemed, in the shape of the breath, to constitute the life

principle, we see here the completion of a logical sequence. Air was invisible; the invisible formed breath; breath was the "real" constituent of life; life was invisible; the invisible was therefore the most essentially real. Yet, in spite of all this, we might reconfirm our previous observation that, even if Plato did conceive of the most abstract entities as 'unseen' (ἀόρατα), and 'unperceived' (ἀναίσθητα)[40], he would not have divorced them from ὕλη. Attenuated though they might be, they were still, to him, continuous with the cosmic essence.

The alliance of the insubstantial with the substantial was therefore a blending of substances. These differed not in essence, but in degree of attenuation[41]. The thumoeidic element is one good example of the less attenuated. It is, as it were, partly 'spiritual', partly material. (We may take, here, as now meaningful the terminology '"spiritual" and "material" "substance"'.) The latent possibility existed that it could slough off its material fraction and become purely λόγος. For Plato envisages, in the attainment of ultimate perfection, the discarding of everything but the logistic (i.e. most 'insubstantial' and so most 'real'). But there remains, in the θυμός, the highly central concept of 'drive' or 'energy'. And since we can readily conceive of a drive to perfection being discarded once perfection is reached, the non-perfection of that drive is also easy to envisage. There is the interesting consideration, moreover, of θυμός as possible origin of Schopenhauer's absolutising of the will. This adds further to what is already considerable matter for discussion regarding its relationship to ἔρως.

a.11 A problem now arises as to whether Plato's concept of the independent soul includes all three of its sectors: logistic, thumoeidic, and epithumetic. This, in turn, presupposes the problem of what function the thumoeidic and epithumetic sectors of a soul could conceivably perform if the soul were independent of the body. Put in another way, the question might be: What function could the logistic sector possibly have if there were no thumoeidic and epithumetic sectors present? For the most obvious of the logistic's functions is to oversee those of the latter two. Indeed their absence might seem to leave it, as it were, in a vacuum.

But Plato clearly saw no objection to having, as an ultimate state of perfection, a situation in which absolute mind "intellectualised" 'in abstraction'. The purpose to which this intellectualising was directed was contemplation of the Good. It did not, then, seem specially in need of any sort of 'drive', particularly of the sort the difficulties of earthly life made necessary. He clearly regards perfection as a progressive process. It is an activity in which something eternally still-to-be-ascertained (namely the Form of the Good) is the object of perpetual thought. But the thought process at this stage seems able to get along with the help of its own energy (unless perhaps with the contributory help of Ἔρως). As regards the ultimate termini of thought, he gives no more enlightenment than moderns do on the query as to how a Demiourgos should originally have come into being. As long, however, as we can accept that his system includes a

constant aspiration to discover more about this, then that system presents consistency.

In his denial, in the Seventh Letter[42], of an ability to describe the ultimate Good, he was therefore no doubt stressing the purely theoretical nature of the conclusions he had so far drawn. The realisation of man's limits as well as of his own philosophy is one of the marks of Plato's greatness. The aporieutic character of his Parmenides confirms this in full. He presented aspects of the Good, namely Truth (rational insight), Harmony (beauty), Justice, etc. If he did not claim to know what the Good itself was, he certainly could have claimed to have carried his argument as close to its logical termination as anyone could. Its lack of finality was no fault of his. It was the inherent consequence of the human condition. The mysteriousness of the Absolute Good was no doubt due to the fact that it must imply 'good for every single individual'.

It scarcely seems possible that Plato did not feel, when he shrank from describing this, that this knowledge was a divine province, overwhelmingly difficult for a human to attain to. On both scores, of divine origin and practical inaccessibility, it deserved respect. He clearly had the logical right to suspend his investigation of the Good itself in favour of its more accessible aspects. His choice therefore of the human soul and of human Justice as principal objects of study resulted, in the Republic as elsewhere, simply in as close as

possible an analysis of the spiritual process as he could manage. The importance he attaches to an examination of the soul accords naturally with Socrates' well-known reminder to various colleagues in the Dialogues that their overriding aim must be to find out '<u>how one ought to live</u>'[43]. And "knowing how one ought to live" presupposes knowledge of the <u>Truth</u> (as seen by Plato). The guiding instrument of life must be the mind, which is contained in the soul. Accordingly, the make-up and various qualities and characteristics of the soul are the least that have to be analysed for the science of life to be grasped.

a.12 To get to closer grips with the θυμοειδές concept now, we may observe that, in his approach to the study of the soul of the Guardian in the <u>Republic</u>, Plato postulated two leading qualities of the good watch-dog. First it must be ἀνδρεῖος (brave), second φιλόσοφος (eager to learn)[44]. These qualities were mental. But just before this he had required that it be keen, swift, and strong, and he had called these its bodily[45] qualities. In his summing up[46], he requires it to be philosophic, thumoeidic (which here is apparently an umbrella term including ἀνδρεῖος), swift, and strong.

These seem at first to be an arbitrary mixture of terms. Two psychic sectors are combined with two bodily attributes. Further mention of a sector of the ψυχή comes only in σωφροσύνη[47], that part regulating the bodily appetites. The dialogue here is either deliberately flexible, to give dramatic

conviction, or further illustrates Plato's resistance to numerical pigeon-holing. Suspiciously over-neat duo's, trio's, or other mystical collections are not in Plato's métier. They can only be assembled as such after all available evidence has been collected. If they then still happen to show a certain pattern and neatness, this is welcome to him. But the numerical criterion, we may restress, has no ultimate sacrosanct status in his view.

a.13 <u>ἀνδρεία(COURAGE)</u>.

The linkage of the thumoeidic quality with ἀνδρεία, since without θυμός one cannot be ἀνδρεῖος[48], is a critical step. It carries one, finally, into that particular morally positive field which perhaps provides most justification for the deeper study of θυμός. The aim to live in accordance with the moral virtues necessitates that the soul be able to generate these virtues in itself. Therefore, since particular virtues seem to be confined to particular parts of the soul, those parts of the soul which originate the particular virtues must be scrutinised. Regarding this, the <u>Republic</u> contains a scientific groundwork to its own moral discourse. (It will also, incidentally, be found to do so for the other dialogues in which entities such as Justice, ἀρετή (excellence), Pleasure, the Good, etc., come up for analysis.) The reason for wishing to live in accordance with the virtues is, to Plato, obvious. His arguments have shown that they represent

the only path by which the Good may be reached[49]. If the sum total of the virtues is contained in ἀρετή, any examination eventually made of the various uses of θυμοειδές in the Republic must explore in particular its links with ἀρετή.

a.14 THE DIONYSIAC ENERGY SOURCE.

To return temporarily to the springs of θυμός, we have found that it is certain, from considerable material available in several dialogues[50], that Plato recognised the existence in man of a primitive Dionysiac energy. This energy was 'irrational', in the sense that it welled up irrespective of reason. It was even unconcerned, that is, with whether reason regulated its operation or not. Moreover, it forced its own outlet by its sheer biologically accumulating presence. The course of pursuit of the Good, which involved a process of perpetual striving (all summed up in ἔρως) was the occupation by which Plato judged existence's requirements most effectively fulfilled. This course involved struggle, first, towards knowledge of the Good, second, towards its achievement. A struggle required energy. The Dionysiac energy was accordingly postulated as the motive force to be harnessed by the λόγος to pursue this end. Even if one cannot expect to find out the ultimate Truth, or Good, one cannot do better than channel one's energy towards that end. Failure to find it was better than failure to strive, and strive in a direction as closely approximating to it as possible.

It would seem, however, in this analysis, almost as though ἔρως were an 'ingredient', or 'aspect', of θυμός. The 'anger' coefficient is left out, the factor of positive energy stands on its own. Indeed, ἔρως might be regarded as a concept covering 'correctly channelled θυμος'[51]. Whatever the case, it represents a striving towards the Truth (rationality), Balance (justice), and Harmony (beauty) of the cosmos. In so striving, the irrational and the rational (or as Schelling and Nietzsche termed them, the Dionysiac and the Apollinian) are reconciled, and through it the Principle of Identity is fulfilled. This is to say that nature, soul, and society (state) conform. This act of striving for rational insight into the cosmos (i.e. for Truth and Goodness) is therefore of the utmost significance for the concept of θυμοειδές. It explains its apparent contradictions. (It is only if the unity of Plato's philosophy is kept in mind that these apparent contradictions can be explained, and endless detail avoided.) If, as we see, Plato seeks Truth and Knowledge in order to live by them, thus leading an 'authentic' life, then reason is not an end in itself but a means towards that end. A life free from the conflicts of the imperfect world is, after all, by definition unattainable in the world. But if Plato has discovered that reason does not exhaust truth, this does not mean that he abandons the search for truth. On the contrary, the search for truth and goodness is the perpetual preoccupation of his philosophy. And it is ἔρως which sets us in pursuit of them.

a.15 The treatment of ἔρως in the Phaedrus, while it would be in agreement with the θυμοειδής doctrine as so far discussed, may well not have the exact connexion with it that it at first seems to. At first, it seems possible that in this dialogue Plato is dealing with love as a form of emotion ('μανία') rather than a drive. Certainly he objects to his earlier definition of it as an ἐπιθυμία[52]. But he seems to be attempting to say that, though it is a desire, an ἐπιθυμία, it is simply not the crude one most people take it to be[53]. The 'best' soul[54] is a lover of the fine ('beautiful, or fine, things', τῶν καλῶν)[55]. When it sees beauty, it looks upwards[56] to the truth of which that beauty reminds it, and wishes to fly up to it. The possessor of this kind of soul clearly <u>wishes</u> to reach the Truth. To that extent he might be presumed to desire it. Yet the struggle he engages in is not, strictly, one of <u>desire</u> - an aim at possessing. Rather it is an <u>aspiration</u> to be in proximity to the thing loved. We are compelled on this ground to put ἔρως into a category distinct from desire. The question is whether it is distinct from it in the same way as the thumoeidic element is. We had assumed that with ἔρως an emotion alone was in question. But clearly, if it incorporates an urge (to fly upwards), it must at least incorporate a form of drive as well.

a.16 <u>EARLY SENSES OF θυμός : HOMER AND HESIOD.</u>

In its earliest literary uses, the term θυμός seems to be

allotted the overall, approximate meaning "breath of energetic life", i.e. the breath not in the guise of the cool, rational ψυχή (derived from ψύχω = to breathe, make cool), but as loaded with the warm vapour of the blood. (The rationalisation of this was that the blood is most heavily concentrated in the heart, and thus between the lungs, which hold the breath.) In Homer it consistently means this. Since, however, the θυμός 'energy-loaded breath', so to speak, technically implies the ψυχή, it can also mean the stuff of cool consciousness, the 'mind'[57]. It is worth emphasising, indeed, that it is sometimes used quite interchangeably with ψυχή in Homer. e.g. Sarpedon's ψυχή (seeming here more to equal 'consciousness') leaves him when he is stricken[58]. Then, even after having been said, in connexion with the same incident, to have 'breathed forth his θυμός', he still revives. Still, as a term in early myth and folklore, θυμός is seldom found. It is only in such a writer as Plato that we find it assuming an important place, and one indeed comparable with that of ἔρως. Here, however, the place is at times so importantly unlike that of ἔρως that a close preliminary study of ἔρως itself becomes essential.

a.17 Here we are on firmer ground. The background to ἔρως is, by contrast with that of θυμός, deep and extensive. The greatest mystery to the early philosopher-scientists was the one surrounding the primordial source of energy. The dynamic processes of the cosmos had been set in motion. By what? Independently of the scientists, Hesiod[59] names ἔρως as having

come into being, fourth in order after Chaos, Gaia, and Tartaros, to initiate the cosmos. Still, it does not, to him, assume the status of a critically important force so much as a catalyst by means of which forces, initiatory and otherwise, act. The concept of ἔρως as a vital driving power behind the cosmos falls to Empedocles, as to a small number of other philosophers[60].

As rain, the 'semen' fertilising the soil, ἔρως does not appear either in Homer or Hesiod, but we do find it in Aeschylus[61]. It is certainly, to the philosopher-scientists concerned, an agency generating and promoting the continuance of the cosmos. However, it is nowhere treated by them as a fundamental force in the mental or spiritual life of man.

The result of this finding seems to be significant for the status of θυμός. In relation to ἔρως, θυμός has a varying intellectual ingredient conjoined with the energetic ingredient which at any rate the primitive ἔρως does not seem to possess. The Platonic ('true') ἔρως is indeed a far fuller entity. It is highly selective, and in this implies a strong mental factor. Meantime, however, the primeval force of ἔρως was, we may safely say, altogether without that factor. Its root folkloristic significance, as we may take it from Hesiod's and Empedocles' record, was a flowing, the flow, presumably, of the semen generating new life. To this the flowing of rain onto the earth was a clear parallel. From the generative power evinced by this flow the assumption will have arisen (since we

can regard the witness of Hesiod and Empedocles as fairly symptomatic of folkloristic belief) that the cosmos was itself generated through a form of ἔρως. The force of this entity either acted on its own, or existed in some divinity, the further origin of whom was not inquired into. Again, the distinction between φιλότης and ἔρως[62] in Hesiod seems to be that between the inner force of loving and the act of love. Yet even this distinction should probably not be strained. Hesiod for instance[63] speaks of Ἔρως as 'fairest among the gods, looser of limbs'. But then he tells of the conception by Night of Aither and Day after mingling in 'φιλότης' with Erebus. It seems certain that ἔρως must to him have conveyed the sense of the act of love in being the actual 'flow' of the seed, the process at all events during which the limbs were loosed. From this core of meaning, a transference to a 'feeling' of ἔρως would be natural, φιλότης having the same approximate sense. It could be this that formed the source of the process of ἔρως which we see in Plato.

But though ἔρως may generate life, the most superficial glance shows that it is not the critical symptom of life. Life in man stops, to the primitive eye, with the breathing. The breath represented the real 'stuff' of life. Later, more sophisticatedly, it became the stuff of consciousness. On the other hand, life stopped in plants when they dried up. But this was no hindrance, since breath was not only vapour, but warm and moist, as plants were moist, and it made good sense that moisture should be included. So another ingredient of θυμός

seems to be accounted for. With moisture the common factor in both cases, no doubt this had its part in the distinction of θυμός from ψυχή. The ψυχή was the colder and drier form of air which was the substance of cool reason.

a.18 But to stress solely its moist character is to take away from θυμός the primal significance it has of 'breath' simplex[64]. This is an important error to avoid, for from aspects of the breath spring 'mind', 'anger', 'fatigue' - all the major symptoms of changing mood and vigour in the highest faculties of man. In this regard, our early testimony concerning θυμός is strangely limited. It comes, significantly enough, solely from epic and lyric poetry. There is no earlier record. It is found in Pindar, Bacchylides, etc., as well as Homer, but folklore outside Homer and the Lyric poets does not show any concern with it. It is clearly a relatively late object of interest.

This could logically be expected. The power of the original creating force, or of the enormous but virtually 'blind' natural forces of the created cosmos, was not[65] of such a kind as to be associated by the common man with intellect. Much less was it thought that it could be steered or countered by humans exercising their own intellect. The original creating power did not create the world by means of intellect. It created it by means of its sheer power. Similarly, it could not have been conceived of that the acts of the gods could be

evaded by humans exercising mere intellect. Indeed, even to have attempted to evade them thus would have constituted an insult, risking serious punishment. Odysseus is the wisest of Homer's Greeks, yet there is no question of his escaping Poseidon's wrath by his own cleverness. The intervention of Athena might help him, but that is all he hopes for. Similarly, it would not have occurred to him, or to early man in general, to trouble to isolate intellect as a particular attribute of the gods. They had an all-embracing power which totally overshadowed - it simply implied - intellect. Odysseus can therefore only use his utmost resources against the elements when in trouble, trying to survive as well as he can, and constantly praying for divine help or forbearance. On the other hand, his intellect is still in general, and correctly, represented as being of great importance to him. It can properly help him evade some of the worse aspects of his divinely inflicted hardships. And crucially enough, of course, it keeps him supreme amongst humans.

a.19 It can easily be appreciated why only the more gross natural forces should have received attention from the philosopher-scientists. Forces such as hunger and thirst, physical fear,sexual love, etc., were predominant in man's primitive state. The gross powers controlling these were therefore to him the only ones that could possibly be worth considering. One could almost never, by ingenuity, avoid their effects. Drought, flood, 'attacks' by the elements in general,

or by animals, the demands of sexual libido, which could drive one to frenzy - these had to be accepted. It was certainly possible to take some precautions against them. But no precautions at all could be effective if their onset was at all strong. If the deity concerned intended your destruction, you had no escape. On the other hand, on a more sophisticated level, when these primal necessities had been dealt with, man still had his surplus energies. He could devote them to more complex activities.

However, an unfortunate phenomenon now presented itself. Of these activities, gratuitous competition, that is war with his fellows, for some reason became a leading medium. At this point, at all events, the more sophisticated forces in him, such as will-power and intellect, began to claim his attention. For this reason, we expect to find multiple references to man and his possession of θυμός, ψυχή, μένος, etc. in the Homeric Epic. And we do. It is, after all, later than the primitive era, although several stages earlier than the Presocratic in sophistication. Correspondingly, there are fewer references to the cosmos outside man, and its forces of ἔρως, drought, flood, famine. These he can now handle more efficiently. In accordance with this, it is also the mainly more 'human-orientated' divinities such as Athena, Hephaestus, Aphrodite and Ares that get the more interesting parts in epic and lyric. Less so do the vast, cosmic wielders of power such as Dionysos, Demeter, Zeus. The interest has shifted. It is the newer dangers which confront man, now that his growing technical

ability has removed the old ones, that claim attention - war in particular. As yet, the activity of the philosopher-scientist, of detailed reflection on the cosmic forces, has no place. Still, it will not be long taking that place.

Not entirely unexpectedly, then, we find much stress on war and comparably sophisticated human action, and little stress on ἔρως or any other cosmic force in Homer. It does occur in Hesiod, and in Presocratics φιλία or φιλότης may be taken to correspond with it[66]. But otherwise its primitiveness takes it beyond the age of records. Empedocles indeed, the inquirer par excellence back into first causes, writes well into the 5th Century of Love and Strife as the originating principles of the cosmos. That Plato's ἔρως, combining these two, owes its origin at least in part to Empedocles can scarcely be doubted. On the other hand, such specifically mythical and folkloristic influence as Plato was subject to will not have come from Empedocles, or any one like him. Plato's basic impressions concerning the ψυχή and θυμός will, we find, be principally from epic and lyric.

a.20 DIONYSOS WORSHIP, ORPHISM AND THE SOUL.

Concerning, once again, Plato's interpretation of the nature of the soul, as it springs from these, and other, earlier, force-concepts, we have seen that we must reckon here specially with various vitally important forerunners to

Pythagoreanism. Dionysos worship, the Eleusinian Mysteries, and Orphism have been mentioned. These phenomena are primitive enough to rank with folklore.

If, on the one hand, human intellect as such was, for self-preservatory purposes, of secondary interest to early man[67], the problem of death was decidedly of primary. Accordingly, folklore concerning death was voluminous. Doctrines of its nature were even more so. Hades the god of the Underworld was the most acutely feared divinity, and efforts to pacify him most consistently made. They were also automatically made, since of course whenever any sacrifice was offered to any deity whatever, it automatically, by incorporating a death, implied one to him. The maximum penalty exacted by any cosmic power was death. Accordingly, the form of placation of Hades was most commonly in the shape of a 'scapegoat'. This creature, human or otherwise, was made to die in place of oneself, in the hope that the god might accept such a substitute[68].

The commonest causes of death in primitive times would have been starvation and disease. The first would have resulted from crop or herd failures. These could in turn be caused by weather or other inexplicable divine causes. The second, disease in general (which could, of course, as plant disease, also cause crop failure), was also a divine imposition. As the deities concerned with crops were Dionysos, Demeter, and Zeus, these three assume colossal importance primitively. The story is found in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter that Hades (Pluto)

carried off Kore (Persephone), who is here made out to be the daughter of Demeter. He then took her down to his subterranean kingdom, and this removal symbolised the disappearance of the green shoots in winter. Demeter, after searching in vain for many years, eventually wandered to Eleusis. Here she revealed herself to the Eleusinians, who built her a temple. It is evident that the Eleusinian Mysteries were concerned with the death and rebirth of the corn, and were also pre-Hellenic, and thus considerably older than Demeter; but now, naturally, they took on an association with her. The death and rebirth of the corn had without a doubt given original rise to the thoughts of human rebirth after death. In turn, the probability is that these simply merged spontaneously into Orphism. Thus the main features of the phenomena of death and rebirth of the corn were transferred to human beings.

a.21 DIONYSOS THE GOD.

Demeter was almost exclusively a corn-goddess. Still, she sufficed for all crops, and for fertility in general. Then abruptly the Thracian-Phrygian import[69] Dionysos takes over wine and much of general fertility. He had come in possibly as early as c. 900 B.C. (his other name, Bakchos or Iakchos, a Lydian word, further confirms his eastern origin), and his cult was more that of an emotionalism than a religion. The emotion was no doubt further stimulated by wine. Basically it was

characterised by the devotees roaming at large in a state of intoxicated frenzy[70]. Women were especially concerned in these activities, which were known as the ὄργια. They scoured the countryside until they found some live animal (sometimes, as in the case of Pentheus, human) which they then rent apart and ate (omophagy). In eating it they believed themselves to be absorbing the vitality of the animal victim (usually, also, a young one, to accentuate this vitality). In this way their vigour and life were, as they saw it, increased. Ancient writers say further that, according to the specifically Phrygian tradition, Dionysos was bound[71] during winter and awake during summer. This links his character quite closely with that of Kore. He was also known as a child-god[72], and is essentially a divinity not only of vegetation but of any young, growing thing.

Another influential factor promoting his cult may have stemmed from Asia Minor, where he was a general god of fertility. (The phallus carried in the Dionysiac processions is proper to him, though he himself is not represented as phallic.)[73] He was also, there, a god of the fruit of the trees, in particular the vine. Oddly, though, this influence did not apply to any other crops. His connexion with the Underworld no doubt came from the Phrygian myth, or from it via Orphism, in which he had a great place. He was thus introduced into Mysteries other than the extremely ancient ὄργια with which he had once been exclusively concerned. That the traditions associated with him in this connexion treated of a happy after-life, moreover, is shown by the decoration of later

Greek sarcophagi with Dionysiac myths. From these and the various Orphic doctrines we find that an already well-marked belief in an after-life was taking detailed shape. There remained only its full logical development by some gifted philosophic mind. This mind was that of Pythagoras.

a.22 PYTHAGORAS.

A final reversion here to Pythagoras may seem otiose. It can be justified on two counts: both as a probably worthwhile recapitulation, and as a re-emphasis of the critical nature of his influence on Plato. Pythagoras' reputation has, to give it no more than its due, been so universally great as to have engrossed the Reincarnation doctrine - amongst a lot else - almost exclusively to him. That his forerunners had already evolved its basic structure is, however, clear from what has already been said. The main difference between the doctrine as developed by them and by Pythagoras[74] is in its completeness and definition. Pythagoras turned what was a web of myth into a formal, logical theory.

A study of the most ancient testimony, uninfluenced by Plato, shows Pythagoras as we saw him earlier. He is "the hierophant of Great Mother mysteries with an Anatolian stamp" who "has a new doctrine, probably influenced by Indo-Iranian sources, of immortality* and of the triumph over death through successive rebirths"[75]. The doctrine of reincarnation is found

* (again my underlining)

in early Iranian records (the Avesta). Herodotus[76] ascribes it to the Egyptians[77]. Orphic doctrine, written down immediately, as we have observed (unlike Pythagorean), no doubt supplied a particularly fertile source. This fact that it was put down in written form straight away was incredibly valuable. The emphasis the Orphics put on permanent records appears from the evidence of vase paintings of Orpheus, each invariably showing a scribe standing writing near Orpheus' head. Actual Orphic writings are in consequence available to, and alluded to by, Euripides[78] and Aristotle[79], (as also in fact Plato[80] himself). One more source for Plato's thinking on soul and idea thus stands revealed.

Testimony concerning Pythagorean theory in its earliest form is rare. Regarding the so-called 'Pythagoreans' as a possible source, it is interesting to note some remarks of Porphyry's[81]. He states that the fruitful part of Pythagorean doctrine was taken over by Plato, Aristotle, and their pupils. The 'dross', he claims, was left to the 'Pythagoreans'. Their name had now clearly, in his estimate, become considerably cheapened. Indeed, his comment is just one of many symptoms of the vanishing reputation of 'Pythagorean' productions of later years. At all events, there is no record left by 'Pythagoreans', early or late, which throws any light on the sources used by their alleged founder.

In contrast with this, the vast reputation of their master has even caused it to be suggested, as a variant[82], that Orphism was the borrower from him. However, this is not the common view[83]. It also has relatively little importance for

the present argument. Orphism, as does Pythagoras, at all events comes chronologically between the Eastern tradition and Plato. So whether Pythagoras drew from it, or vice versa, the form in which Plato inherited the doctrine is clear. We can regard either source indifferently as valid.

a.23 DRAMA.

The vital counterpart to the Dionysiac-Orphic factor - the Apollinian - now comes naturally to the fore. There is much more than coincidence in the fact that it should have materialised most prolifically in the drama, itself an offshoot of Dionysiac worship. The two naturally complement each other. That they can perfectly convincingly - as above - be argued to involve a parallel with the θυμοειδές - λογιστικόν combination, and probably together represent ἔρως, rapidly shows us the order of importance of their rôle.

In the Platonic connexion, the dramatist that most immediately comes to mind is Euripides. Socrates' great admiration for Euripides presents several points of considerable interest. Euripides' apparent departure from an attitude of unconditional reverence for the gods may be hard to square with the seriousness with which Socrates, whom we may also take here as Plato's representative, viewed them. But if Euripides 'paid lip-service to religion'[84], we certainly find Socrates in part deserting the gods for a single God. ὁ θεός (he refers to this Being countless times) is clearly, to him, the single

Supreme Being. The distinction he demands is between reverence for traditional 'divinities' and reverence for the Divine overall. Euripides shows a high veneration for the natural forces which he made an embodiment of the gods. If this is seen as a diminution of their majesty, we need to ask a serious question. Why does he nevertheless make the consequences of not observing their claims so comprehensively catastrophic? It has been said that Nemesis to Euripides is merely random. It is supposed, to him, to be purely a source of human sadness[85]. But there is nothing random about the judgment meted out to Hippolytos, Phaedra, Pentheus, Medea. His gods may bedehumanised, against Greek tradition, but the powers they represent, physical and intellectual, are by no means diminished. Nor is their impersonalisation allowed to make them less convincing as entities. Socrates disapproved wholly of the ascription of human weakness to the gods[86]. He was likely to have found Euripides' dissociation of them from all human characteristics, good or bad, more to his taste than anything the other dramatists produced. The preference he showed for his plays naturally accords.

The leading concept (for Socrates' purposes) given rise to by Euripides was, then, that the 'gods' were no other than the great natural forces of the universe. If, as he did, Euripides conceded to these forces an overall guiding mind, a significant if obvious point follows. The existence of such a mind, in the abstract, was included in his system. It was separate from force itself. This mind, not necessarily resident in any type of human 'superbeing', might therefore exist on its own.

Such a doctrine was in keeping with, and no doubt sprang from, the Pythagorean doctrine of a non-solid, independent World-Soul. This doctrine was blended no doubt with others concerning matter promulgated by the Presocratic physicists. It will, too, have been close to Anaxagoras' theory (the All = νοῦς). Similarly, to Heracleitus' 'the All' = λόγος plus fire, to Anaximenes' air, to Anaximander's ἄπειρον (unlimited). These philosophers, while giving yet more stress to the ultimately attenuated, and so most close to 'insubstantial', nature that substance could assume, still only postulated the existence of the highly attenuated. The totally insubstantial was not reckoned a reality. That any of them actually believed in the possibility of "something" altogether without substance at all is conceivable[87]. They may have had private theoretical convictions along these lines. But apart from any other dissuading influences, the belief that Nature abhors a vacuum will already have been supported by acquaintance with the syringe. This had indeed been developed considerably before their time. And its evidence was incontrovertible. With the apparatus currently available a vacuum just could not be achieved. It would have been easy to conclude that it was inherently impossible.

We cannot, again, imagine how they would have conceived of, for instance, air in a material context. After all, it had all the nature of an invisible, 'insubstantial' entity. But since - apart from its 'smoky' potential - it could be contained in bladders, it was obviously like solid matter. It was not free to wander unchecked[88]. And if Plato's

Ideas were the most abstract entities imaginable, their recognised vehicle was still the air of speech, even if they could remain unspoken. There was no other account that could have been given of their nature. In short, they gave every sign of being strictly ὕλη . The true belief in the back of Plato's mind concerning this cannot be known. Whatever it was, Apollo, presented in the works of such men as Euripides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and their fellows, could scarcely have been given greater weight for him than by such other minds.

a.24 POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OF THE EPICS.

The probably powerful influence on Plato of epic poetry can now be considered, and indeed it stands almost in its own category. It is only in principle parallel to those that have just been discussed. From Socrates' remarks alone[89] we can infer that 'Homer' was not just standard reading. He was almost the exclusive object of literary study. In fact, he was regarded as absolutely authoritative on almost every topic he even alluded to. Plato's intimate knowledge of the Homeric poems is shown by his ability to quote extensively from them. But to this fact can further be added the assumption that this ability was acquired early on. It was almost a 'reflex'. He was grounded in Homer and Hesiod in the way a modern child is grounded in reading and writing as such. All the events and language of epic were absolutely embedded in his memory from earliest youth.

This is no additional argument in favour of his having been influenced by them. It is no more so than the fact that he makes actual use of the words Homer uses, for many of these were clearly in common use during his own time. But it certainly is curious that he uses no major psychosomatic term (e.g. ἀρετή, νοῦς, φρένες, ἔρως, ἐπιθυμία, θυμός, ψυχή) that is not commonly used in Homer. His personal development of that use, however (even if it greatly corresponds with the current usage of his day), is of principal interest. In an attempt to detect that development, the sense in which Homer himself uses the words is first worth establishing.

a.25 In the Homeric epic, we find the forces of mind and soul intimately bound up with those of life itself. The reason for this could be fairly guessed at. It would almost certainly be that their disappearance from the body coincides with the disappearance of life[90]. ἀρετή has a correspondingly elemental nature. It is regarded both in Plato and Homer as the highest qualification any man can have. In Homer, however, it is more or less exclusively the ability-plus-will to fight[91]. This is what we might expect it to be in the story of peoples permanently fighting for existence, or at any rate in a tale where deeds of war and emergency are treated as the subject of greatest interest. By contrast, in Plato, it has the broadened sense which we should expect it to have for a community which needs talents more variegated than are involved in plain fighting. It still retains in considerable part that

former sense. But it has acquired additional overtones of 'excellence' in other spheres. Put in another way, the field of application of the term "excellent" has been enlarged. It now includes people who by coincidence have simply never had to use their excellence specifically for fighting. The preservation of the social unit still remains the paramount criterion for ἀρετή. The actions necessary to ensure it will always be primarily important. But other aspects of excellence have multiplied. In this context, honesty, moral fibre, an all-embracing competence in peace-time activities - these become in themselves criteria of the possession of ἀρετή.

In Homer it seems possible that ἀρετή may sometimes also be given a wider application. Admittedly it is only on rare occasions that this becomes necessary[92]. But we might therefore have less cause to regard as strange Plato's apparently tremendous extension of its sphere to mean the human ψυχή's closeness to Absolute Good. Still, whether we do regard this as strange or not, we do not even have real title to say that the extension <u>is</u> so very great. Much less can we say that the men of the Homeric age had not the ability to appreciate more than just military prowess. We can only emphasise that, during the age of the heroes, talents for defence and offence were at a premium.

The heroes provided the governmental basis upon which the aristocratic πόλις was founded, and their war-effectiveness was the sole key to its survival. Had this not been so, and

leisure been greater, the concept of human excellence would have been broader. As it is, Plato's ἀρετή quite categorically includes the 'excellence' required of the essentially military Guardian. This man, even if he must be more than a mere soldier, still has to be a soldier before all else[93]. In Plato's city-state, the ultimate standards of Justice, Culture, Education (μουσική), and self-control, etc., are further refinements required of him. But when war and emergency are virtually never-ending, as is the case in intermediate cultures such as those dealt with in Homer's epic, these items have no real place. The point to be made here is that, were such leisure as the inhabitants of Plato's Republic enjoy to have become available to the Homeric hero, a man like Agamemnon would have aimed at them. Even for Homer's purposes they would be the logical objective of any noble soul. Indeed, we may assume them as tacitly included in ἀρετή. In their developed shape they require a physical leisure which kings like Agamemnon ordinarily just do not have, yet, notwithstanding, δίκη (justice) is praised in Homer as a thing "beloved of the gods"[94]. The Good (ἀγαθόν), in the guise, Homerically, of a good man, is not only good as regards war (ἀγαθός = courageous); he is good in respect of other skills[95]. Once war has been successfully waged, he will be, germinally, good in the supreme activities of the φρένες. Then finally, in a society in which leisure is available for the highest development of 'phrenic' activity - a stage of social sophistication such as Plato experienced in his own lifetime - the impact of everyday needs diminishes almost to vanishing

point. The only source of exertion now remaining for the mind is abstract objects. These objects can then ultimately be convincingly divorced altogether from material existence. ἀρετή can be reserved solely for totally (or potentially totally) "non-material" ideas.

a.26 Similarly to δίκη, ἔρως, in Hesiod the primordial, physical passion drawing entities together, advances, as we have seen, considerably beyond that guise in Plato. Hesiod, in the passage we have quoted, writes of Ἔρως as "fairest among immortal gods, looser of limbs". But more importantly, for present purposes, he also states that he "subdues in their breasts the mind and thoughtful counsel of all gods and all men"[96]. This ἔρως, for him, is, then, an agent so physical that it actually brings mental activity into utter subjection. In strong contrast, Plato's ἔρως retains its nature as a powerful driving force, but so far from causing the activity of the mind to diminish, it stimulates it. It also incorporates an attraction of minds to one another for the very purpose of mental interchange and research. Occasionally we have found that Socrates even calls it a 'madness' (μανία). But this is a mad urge to attain higher things[97], to apprehend the Absolute[98]. It is a pulsing, thinking urge, the uplifted love springing from Zeus. The relatively debased physical type of love which springs from Ares is in the strongest possible contrast to it. Plato indeed regularly stresses that it is only too frequently confused with the latter. So much so does

this in fact happen that the Arean is wrongly regarded by most people as the only type of love. Once again, we see that Plato has retained ἔρως in the primordial sense of a powerful drive, but at the same time done something more. He has fed into it a quite new concept. This is the drive towards a sophisticated and mentally abstract '<u>looking upward</u>'[99]. The "looking upward" implies a type of procreation, namely that of a new self out of one's old material self. It brings into existence a new being less weighed down by matter[100]. And this procreation is achieved by close approximation to, and dialogue with, beings who are endowed with gifts of soul superior to one's own. ἔρως is primarily, that is, the love which attracts us to such people, and second, which spurs us to make ourselves finer by such association. Any other aim in it than these is despicable. No doubt Plato does not envisage our dragging such persons down spiritually by our presence. The relation of these 'finer' people to us is simply on the analogy of the relation of the gods to humans. They are presences who, as it were, give out an aura of light. There may be others there for the light to fall on, or there may not. It makes no difference. The genuine 'lover' can only make his utmost efforts to find them, and strive permanently to fly higher. His aim is not, by mere instinct, for bodily pleasure. It is, by reason, for self-betterment on the highest plane.

a.27 INFLUENCE OF OTHER EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHERS.

Besides and simultaneous with these influences, that of certain other Presocratic philosopher-scientists has deserved mention. In particular we have noted Xenophanes, Parmenides, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heracleitus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras. But together with the 'cosmic' scientists and sciences, we cannot underestimate the specialised "medical" sciences of anatomy and physiology. Speculative and 'unscientific' as these then were by modern standards, their findings were of much significance for the development of Plato's theory of the soul. And apart from them, perhaps even more significant for that theory, were the flourishing fields of astronomy and music, let alone mathematics.

The latter, with its dependence on number, had a special appeal for him. Its clear suggestion, especially in geometry, of the abstraction which number necessitates was very much in accord with it. It seems very probable that he fixed originally on the figures or "forms" of geometry for his Theory of Ideas. These figures, because they required mental "picturing", would have lent themselves particularly readily to his argument. For his claim was that they "existed" (in the mind or elsewhere) whether or not individual rectangles, triangles, or other figures[101] were actually drawn. From this step to the thesis that they "existed" whether or not they were even thought of was philosophically a short distance. Numbers themselves were equally classed as abstract. The

universalisation of ideas to all entities would have followed. (The belief that certain numbers had magical properties, a belief shared by several other philosophers before him[102], may mean relatively little to modern thought. Still, it is some indication of the reverence in which they and he held the mathematical discipline generally.)

Mathematics itself is normally assumed to have come to the Greeks from the East. Many Greeks are credited with visits to Egypt[103]. Here geometry and medicine had already been firmly established for over a thousand years. Because of the scant nature of early records, it is not known whether anything approaching the philosophical analysis of these disciplines achieved by the Greeks had been achieved in the East. The credit for that at least has therefore to be given to the Greeks. And of them, it must be given to one in particular. This man is Plato.

Pythagoras before Plato had gone so far as to state that all was number[104]. This was a step forward on a par with the dicta of Xenophanes, Anaximander, and their peers. It was an insight of peculiar depth, and one founded on acute observation. The possibility that the apparent variety displayed by different substances might be merely superficial was, at such a stage of development, a vision accessible only to men capable of strict experimentation and deeply analytical reflection. The 'sameness' of ice, water, and steam, for instance, would not have suggested anything of other than practical interest to a

primitive mind. But tothe intensely inquiring minds of the Ionian philosophers it could only suggest a need for the closest philosophical analysis. This analysis resulted in some cases in rather extreme verdicts. E.g., postulates were made that all substance (Ὕλη) was water (Thales), that all flowed (Heracleitus), that all consisted of air (Anaximenes), or the infinite (Anaximander), or mind (Anaxagoras), etc. Alternately, it resulted in less extreme findings, as in the case of Thales, or Empedocles, such as that Ὕλη was reducible to several elements (e.g. earth, air, fire, water). These basic substances were, then, the only 'reality'.

It took Plato, however, to conjoin Parmenidean 'Being' with these fundamental findings. His conclusion was that the only "real" entities were indeed varying substances. These substances were, however, characterised by one indispensable qualification. They were so rarefied as to be only in the most attenuated sense substances at all. For practical purposes, as has been hinted, if Greek thought had not generically been along 'hylozoic' lines, we might have believed that his Forms were wholly independent of substance. We have little prospect of really knowing Plato's innermost thoughts on this. As it is, we have at all events to follow the Greek concept of substance rather than our own, and take them as what that would have made them out to be. This was, in short, a more or less infinitely refined version of the basic, divine element - the fundamental stuff of which the cosmos is made up. Correspondingly, the more 'solid' a thing was, the grosser a manifest-

ation of substance it would be, the less 'real', and, in proportion, the more worthy to be avoided.

The Pythagorean recommendations for life seem to be allied with this sentiment. They consist variously of purges and purifications of the body and soul, abstinence from living things (most of all from the heart of any living thing), from beans, from helping to unload rather than load, etc.[105]. Purifications and taboos of this kind would (if at times not very obviously) cause the body to tend more fully towards the 'spiritual' state. They would encourage independence from gross matter. And this, after all, was the ultimate aim of reincarnation. Such a doctrine immediately linked up with the Platonic moral doctrine of bodily restraint and abstinence. Together these must culminate in total independence of the soul from the body. The result would be fitness of the soul, now virtually unaccompanied by matter, to enter the divine world of the Forms.

a.28 THE ELEATICS.

The influence of the Eleatic School can be seen in the uniformity attributed by Plato to the highly attenuated ὕλη of the Forms. Though the Forms are distinguished among themselves, they are nevertheless of the same nature. They are composed of the same essence, namely the spiritual ὕλη. This is maximally attenuated essence, unencumbered by any of its more compressed

versions (i.e. specimens of grosser matter).

Xenophanes' logical position as founder of the Eleatic School has, even though Parmenides was his pupil, been doubted. The grounds for this are that his doctrine of 'Oneness' is more like a monotheism based on a critical re-examination of traditional theology than a closely reasoned analysis such as Parmenides provided. Both philosophers, nevertheless, stressed the unity of the All. The actual physical nature of that unity did not so particularly concern them. (It did the Milesians Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes.) But in that one critical respect - that it was one entity - they were adamant. Parmenides especially, in laying stress on Being as the sole ultimate component of the cosmos, has a compelling claim to be originator of the concept of genuinely total 'abstraction' if anyone has. (Indeed, it is he who gives us reason to wonder what Plato's innermost views about ὕλη were.) As forerunner of Plato in his concern with that which truly is (i.e. τὸ ὄν = 'the "being", or "existing", thing')[106], he is not a long step from Plato's doctrine that only certain entities truly 'exist' or 'are' (namely the Ideas)[107].

The Parmenidean formula is relatively somewhat rigid and limited. "What is", the Master puts it, "is therefore a finite, spherical, motionless, continuous plenum, and there is nothing beyond it"[108]. Plato, less concerned with degrees of extension or shape than with eternity and changelessness, relatively ignores these more physical aspects. Instead, he

retains the central thesis of eternity and immutability. His version simply corresponds with Parmenides' in respect of the concept of 'plenum' or 'fulness'. And he presents it to us as the maximally attenuated ὕλη of the Forms.

a.29 Heracleitus, though he very probably wrote earlier than Parmenides, seems to represent a point half-way between the Eleatics and Anaxagoras. He rejects all his predecessors' doctrines en masse, and emphatically those of Pythagoras[109], (together with the Orphic system). It was useless, he claimed, to possess vast learning if one could not understand the λόγος[110]. His concentration on the concept of λόγος, beyond his theory of Fire as primary substance and the doctrine of the Flux, links him most irrevocably with Plato. He further holds, this time in common with his contemporaries in the religious field, that the most real thing of all is soul. Most importantly, he takes it as characterised by γνώμη (wisdom, τὸ σοφόν). The wisdom which guides the soul is Fire, and the Fiery (to Plato, no doubt, the "top-rate" thumoeidic-plus-logistic) soul, the wisest, is the one to be sought. Fire implies dryness to Heracleitus. Moisture, e.g. as wine, in his opinion destroys the soul's unique logical capacity. This squares quite well with the logical precedence given by Plato to the cold, dry ψυχή - the steamy breath of θυμός being largely without logic. Where Plato and the Eleatics essentially differ from Heracleitus is in their total rejection of his doctrine of the eternal Flux, or changeability of the cosmos. Their own teaching in this regard is, of course, almost the exact reverse.

a.30 Empedocles and Anaxagoras[111], coming after both Heracleitus and Parmenides, both seem to feel a necessity to seek a way out of the Parmenidean net. This spider's web of reasoning which made the world static as well as devoid of variety, set up, to their way of thinking, an impossible situation. All change, according to Parmenides, is an illusion of the senses. To Empedocles and Anaxagoras, by contrast, "the real" is still eternal and unchanging, but the strong claims made by the external world for acceptable explanation have to be met. The evidence of the senses, they believe, cannot just be jettisoned.

To re-introduce motion's claim to reality, Empedocles postulated a twofold cause of movement: Love and Strife. Anaxagoras postulated a single cause: Mind. Second, to allow for the variety of the world's contents, both postulated that there were, in fact, different kinds of ὕλη. The qualification they made was that, although those differing types of ὕλη had never become ὕλη, nor would ever cease to be it, the various things in the world became what they were (or were altered into something else) by processes of mixture and separation (Love and Strife). According to Empedocles, as, in part, to one or two others before him, ὕλη was of four types: earth, air, fire, and water. These, mixed in varying proportions, formed all things.

Anaxagoras, on the other hand, stated that, while the cosmos consisted of 'things', these 'things' were infinite both

in number and minuteness. It was by combining themselves into 'seeds' which contained all the things, but in different proportions, that distinct substances were obtained. νοῦς (mind), the original motivating force, was by Anaxagoras' doctrine "the thinnest of all things". To Empedocles, too, Love and Strife were 'things'. But he does not attribute to them anything like the specialised sense Anaxagoras does. Being principally interested in Medicine, he appears to have been totally uninterested in what seems to be this brilliantly original, close to 'atomic', theory. That his concern with Love and Strife will have been further stimulated by Hesiod's allusions to ἔρως is most likely. It may indeed actually have originated from them.

a.31 SOCRATES' MAIEUTIC METHOD.

The crystallisation of more than one of the earlier philosophical and religious tenets outlined above was now to take place. It may be seen in what to Socrates was the equivalent of writing: his 'maieutic'[112] or 'midwife' technique of conversation. The theory of the eternity of ὕλη, whether as gross substance or attenuated soul, coupled with that of the transmigration of souls, had supplied Socrates with the basic rationale for his purpose. This embodied the scheme of seeking all knowledge in living persons, however ill-educated. For if the person's soul, in addition to its perfection in the original world of the Forms, had traversed numerous previous lives, vast, indeed total, knowledge* was

*That obtained in the lower material world (but see Meno 81 c 5) being taken as non-genuine.

already present in it. One had only therefore to extract it. And the most effective method of doing this, he found, was the maieutic technique through the medium of the disciplined conversational process called Dialectic. His preferred method in this medium was not simple discussion, but question and answer.

To enlarge on this. We have already seen something of the probable sources of the "Platonic" (taken here as for practical purposes = "Socratic") Theory of Ideas. The Anaxagorean doctrine that mind was the 'thinnest' of things, as also that it was the prime mover, would have suggested strongly the prime importance of the logistic faculty. That the only objects conceivably worth investigating must be mental concepts followed automatically. The combination of all these points with the Pythagorean doctrine of the eternity of the soul ensued. The latter will, finally, have suggested that only the objects of the mind's activity, i.e. ideas, were ultimately real. This decisively set the course for Socrates.

That he should have chosen to be primarily concerned with the Form of the Good as the chief 'Idea' can be no coincidence. It will no doubt have arisen from the Orphic-Pythagorean demand for ultimate moral perfection. It may well also have been partly historical. The current Athenian wars with Sparta had produced the democratic experience. Amongst other things, this had shown, especially in the Sicilian disaster, that expert but morally bad orators could lead popular assemblies

into voting for catastrophic ventures. More than this, the presence of numerous "Sophists" was disquieting. That they could be openly claiming to teach a deceitful oratory (under the guise of 'universal education') seemed to Socrates' blameless integrity a serious situation.

To his naturally contentious spirit, that situation will also have seemed unquestionably well worth confronting. Certainly the religious motive will have been strong in him. His highest goal was to attain goodness, therefore evil had to be opposed. But much more than that, the nature of goodness, and the means of obtaining it, had to be found. People who made falsehood a profession must be shown up.

A divine agent, or δαιμόνιον, aided him, he believed, to avoid wrong courses. On the positive side, it was left to him to exert his own energies. The concept of the Just was in his view essentially tied to that of the good, so it was natural enough, in the Republic, for him to investigate Justice specifically. He enlarged the scale of the investigation to make it easier to follow. In consequence we have what was to have been a study of the just man converted into a study of the just state. That established, the soul, which is the producer of justice, remained to be analysed in its light. It is here that questions concerning the parts of the soul arose.

a.32 PLATO'S CONCEPT OF THE SOUL AS AN ASPECT OF COSMIC STRIVING FOR TRUTH AND GOODNESS.

The purpose for which the cosmos had come into being held no less interest for Plato than for any other philosopher. Plato, however, takes man instead of the cosmos as his basis of inquiry. Owing to this choice, he is faced with the problem in turn of finding a plausible purpose for man's existence. Granted the existence of the Demiourgos, this Maker of the Cosmos might, as we noted, have chosen to make only perfect Form. Why should He instead have seen fit to make perfect souls, yet at the same time allow them to become imperfect, and occupy even more imperfect bodies? The only answer that suggested itself to Socrates was that the struggle for perfection must have seemed to the Demiourgos intrinsically worthwhile. The point of introducing imperfection would then have been in order to initiate that process of dynamic effort. Certainly this appears to have been Plato's viewpoint. He classifies that dynamic aspect of perpetual striving towards perfection as the sole worthy occupation of man. Further, Empedocles' theory of the perpetuity of Love and Strife, Heracleitus' theory of perpetual Flux, etc., would have provided a background to his inclination to see the cosmos as irrepressibly dynamic. But it still remained for him to select, as the purpose of this dynamism, the search for the Form of the Good. For it was knowledge of this alone that allowed of, but not only that - implied - perfect conduct.

That the Perfect Good was what the Demiourgos meant man to aim for, and that one's duty was to try to bring about what the Demiourgos had intended, were things neither Plato nor Socrates questioned.

Socrates' effort portrays the opening stage of the dynamic process. This, the attempt to discover the Good, is to be followed by the struggle to achieve it. But from what source did one draw the vigour to pursue this search? In certain dialogues we may justifiably take Socrates to be regarding this energy as ἔρως. In others, in particular the Republic, we may take it to be θυμός. Here, in the context of the soul as the tripartite whole which Plato makes it, θυμός, or the thumoeidic element, comes to the fore. Indeed, ἔρως scarcely receives a mention. One could argue from this that Plato did not intend an exact distinction between the two. That they even occasionally seem interchangeable. Exact distinctions, we find, were not something it was Plato's habit to insist on unless they had special practical use. He might have felt here that some fusion did not particularly matter. A possible answer to the problem may be to see ἔρως as the trigger of the thumoeidic element. The latter would then represent the actual energy, and this would be drawn in turn from the fuel supplied by the ἐπιθυμητικόν. Such an account may, however, seem too facile. The probability, in fact, is that only one point need here be made crucial. ἔρως invariably implies θυμός, but θυμός never implies ἔρως. In fine, the thumoeidic element

exerts the energy which, in partnership with the logistic sector, produces the rational striving of ἔρως. And to Plato, we may repeat, that process is the very ratio existendi of man.

NOTES

(N.B. All bare number-references are to the Republic.)

1. BURKERT, W. : Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, e.g. p.125.

   SNELL, B. : The Discovery of the Mind, p. 11 and passim.

2. PLATO : Phaedrus, 229 c d; Politicus, 271 a seq.

3. PLATO : Lysis, 205 c: 'χρονικώτερα'; Phaedrus, 229 b seq.

4. PLATO : Euthyphro, 5 e - 6 a; Phaedrus, 229 c only the σοφοί disbelieve; Republic, 377 c nurses tell their charges the standard myths, and once learnt young they are hard to erase (378 d).

5. Thought to have been done by Alcibiades, the well-known protégé of Socrates.

6. Ironically, some of the best evidence of the wideness of his knowledge comes in the passages where he is decrying it, e.g., again, Phaedrus, 229 c - 230 a, and the anti-Homeric passages in Republic, 377 d seq. In general, cf. Phaedo, 108 a (KERENYI, C. in Dionysos, vol. II, ch.3, arguing for Cretan associations of the Dionysos myth, refers to Plato's allusion here to the labyrinthine qualities of the path to Hades; a further ref. to a labyrinth occurs in Euthydemus, 291 b); Protagoras, 320 c 8 ff.

7. PLATO : Politicus, 271 b; Laws, 927 a; cf. also FRIEDLANDER, Plato, p. 173.

8. HOMER : Od., 10.521 : ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα.

9. Possibly on the analogy of solid matter being thus transformed by fire.

10. εἴδωλον, Iliad, 23.104; σκιαί Od., 10.495.

11. This information we have through Plato himself: Rep. 611 a, Timaeus, 41 d.

12. PLATO : Rep. 529 b; Timaeus, 52 a.

13. PLATO : Timaeus, 52 a.

14. cf. Iranian (pre-Pythagorean) split of mind-body, mind being 'left' when the body dies: Avesta, passim. Also HESIOD fr. 204, line 139 'only the ψυχή remains'.

15. GUTHRIE, W.K.C. : Orphism and Greek Religion, p. 25 ff.

16. All was consumed but his heart, which Athena saved and brought to Zeus, who ate it and begot a second Dionysos by Semele.

17. Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, p. 165.

18. HOMER : Od., 14.426, suggests that animals have souls.

19. cf. SNELL, B., The Discovery of the Mind, p. 202 ff.

20. BURKERT, W. : op. cit., p. 467.

21. ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS, In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria 74.12. cf. BURKERT, p.467.

22. PLATO : Rep., 616 c - 617 b.

23. ibid. 414 b.

24. DIOGENES LAERTIUS, VIII, 8; cf. KIRK & RAVEN, Presocratic Philosophers, p. 228, also BURNET, Greek Philosophy, p. 33.

25. PINDAR : Olympic Ode 2.56 ff.; fr. 131 & 133, BERGK.

26. PLATO : Timaeus, 27 d - 28 a, 30 b.

27. HOMER, except for Od. 4.561 seq., has no trace of it.

28. Probably a pre-Greek agrarian cult, cf. NILSSON, M.P., Geschichte der Griechischen Religion, i^2, p. 677 seq.

29. cf. BURKERT, p. 133.

30. (cf. KIRK & RAVEN, pp. 225-6) PORPHYRY, Vita, 7 (DIELS-KRANZ 14,9).

31. HERODOTUS : II.123; PORPHYRY, Vita Pyth. 19 (cf. KIRK & RAVEN, p. 222 ff.)

32. PLATO : Letter VII, 350 a.

33. PLATO : Rep. 600 b.

34. ibid. 530 d, 600 b; Phaedo, 61 d.

35. e.g. Timaeus, Archytas

36. e.g. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, 987 a 29 seq.; CICERO, de Re Publica, I.16; APULEIUS, Florida, 15.60.

37. PLATO : Letter VII, 324 a.

38. λεπτότερα , cf. e.g. THALES as in HERACLITUS HOMERICUS, Quaest. Hom., 22; ARISTOTLE, de Gen. et Corr., B 5, 332 a 19.

39. cf. KIRK & RAVEN, pp. 105 and 144 re Anaximander, Anaximenes resp

40. e.g. Rep. 529 b, Timaeus, 51 a both call the Form ἀόρατον, and contrast it with αἰσθητόν.

41. The union of two types of ὕλη, however attenuated the one is as opposed to the other, is at least a logically convincing union when both are 'substantial' and there is no question of total insubstantiality.

42. PLATO : Letter VII, 341 c.

43. PLATO : e.g. Rep., 344 e.

44. ibid. 375 a, e.

45. ibid. 375 b.

46. ibid. 376 c.

47. ibid. 389 d.

48. ibid. 375 a.

49. ibid. 438 a, 505 d; Meno, 77 d.

50. e.g. Republic, Phaedrus, Symposium.

51. ONIANS, R. B. : The Origins of European Thought, pp. 28, 44 et θυμός is the 'vital principle that thinks and feels and prompts action'.

52. PLATO : Rep. 235 - 242 (esp. 237 d).

53. Eryximachus in Symposium, 186 b seq. in his stress on the existence of 'good' and 'bad' ἔρως recalls Heracleitus' concept of opposites: hot and cold, moist and dry.

54. PLATO : Rep., 248 a.

55. ibid. 249 e.

56. ibid. 249 d.

57. e.g. Iliad, 4.522 seq., 13.653 seq., 20.403 seq., etc. cf. ONIANS, op. cit. p.44.

58. Iliad, 5.696 seq.

59. Theogony, 120.

60. e.g. Fr. 17, 1-13; SIMPLICIUS, Phys. 158,1. Substituted by 'mind' in Anaxagoras, and otherwise disguised elsewhere.

61. Fr. 44, 1 - 5 (from the Danaids). 'Holy sky passionately longs (ἐρᾷ) to penetrate the earth, and Desire (ἔρως) takes hold of the the earth'.

62. cf. EMPEDOCLES, Fr. 17, 21 - 26.

63. Theog., 116.

64. Moreover too much moisture (which is taken as a liquid: e.g. a scholiast on Iliad, 14.253 says ὑγρός ὁ ὕπνος) and intoxication, robs the φρένες of their efficiency.

65. (until Anaxagoras, c. 500 - 428 B.C.)

66. e.g. EMPEDOCLES, Fr. 17, line 20, SIMPLICIUS, Phys. 158,13; esp. ibid. 25,21 (DIELS - KRANZ, 31 A 28) : ποιεῖ ... τὰς δὲ κυρίος ἀρχάς, ὑφ' ὧν κινεῖται ταῦτα, Φιλίαν καὶ Νεῖκος

67. (the offering of sacrifice and prayer to the gods being regarded as the chief means of warding off evil: cf. Homeric Poems, passim; HERODOTUS, THUCYDIDES, etc.)

68. cf. esp. Alcestis. Regarding Demeter, cf. ROSE, NILSSON, etc.

69. The Phrygians were originally from Thrace.

70. cf. fate of Pentheus in EURIPIDES' Bacchae.

71. CALDER, W. M. : Classical Review, 1927, pp. 160 seq.

72. NILSSON, M. P. : Geschichte der Griechischen Religion, p. 593.

73. KERENYI, C. : Dionysos, vol. II, ch. 6, p. 285 seq.

74. Of all the theories ascribed to him, this one is the most firmly maintained by the ancients as his. cf. BURKERT, p. 120 re XENOPHANES fragment concerning the dog (DIELS - KRANZ, 21 B 7 = D.L. 8.36) in which the philosopher claimed the soul of a deceased friend had lodged.

75. ac. BURKERT, p. 165.

76. (who connects Pythagoreanism and Orphism), 2.81, 123.

77. A certain Antiphon states that Pythagoras learned Egyptian (DIOGENES LAERTIUS, 83).

78. Alcestis, 967, Hippolytus, 954.

79. de Anima, 410 b 28.

80. Rep., 364 e.

81. Vita Pythagoreae, 53; cf. also Avesta, passim.

82. LOBECK, C. A. L.: Aglaophamus, p. 800 seq.

83. The reverse view is held by ROHDE, ZELLER, RATHMANN, and NILSSON amongst others.

84. BOWRA, C. M. : Early Greek Literature, p. 52.

85. cf. also ibid., p. 52.

86. e.g. Rep. 378 b, 382 a.

87. DEMOCRITUS is the first to postulate a hypothetical 'void' (τὸ κενόν).

88. e.g. Empedocles and Anaxagoras both explicitly recognise air's substantiality.

/89. Rep.,

89. Rep., 376 - 7, 598 - 600.

90. Iliad., 4.522 seq., 16.468 seq., Odyssey, 11.218 seq.

91. cf. esp. Iliad, passim.

92. e.g. it seems to be attributed to Penelope in Od., 2.206.

93. Rep., 374 d.

94. Iliad, 16.388, Od., 14.84.

95. e.g. as a doctor, Iliad, 2.732, or a servant, 16.65.

96. Theog., 120 seq. (KIRK & RAVEN, p. 24).

97. Rep., 249 d.

98. αὐτὸ τὸ κάλλος : 250 e.

99. Phaedrus, 249 d.

100. e.g. Phaedrus, 252 e.

101. Rep., 510 d,e; Timaeus, 50 b.

102. e.g. Pythagoras, Philolaus, Eurytus, etc.

103. e.g. PLUTARCH, of Homer and Thales visiting Egypt, de Is. et Osir., 34, 364 D (K. & R., p. 77); HERODOTUS of Solon going to Sardis, 1.29.

104. At all events, the 'Pythagoreans' had, cf. ARISTOTLE, Metaphys., A 5, 985 b 23.

105. IAMBLICHUS : Protr. 21 (D. - K., 58 c 6).

106. e.g. Timaeus, 49 - 51; Rep., 476 e.

107. cf., for the ever-present nature of ὕλη, even in Forms, ANAXAGORAS, fr. 12 on νοῦς being the 'thinnest of all things'.

108. BURNET, J. : Greek Philosophy, p. 54.

109. ibid., p. 46

110. fr. 1, SEXTUS, adv. math. vii, 132: 'Of the λόγος which is as I describe it men always prove to be uncomprehending... although all things happen according to this λόγος'.

111. For detail in both philosophers: DIELS, BURNET, KIRK & RAVEN, etc.

112. Politicus, 268 b, Theaetetus, 151 c, etc.

CHAPTER TWO

INVESTIGATION OF PLATO'S USE OF THE TERM θυμοειδές IN THE REPUBLIC.

b.1 SYNOPSIS OF ETYMOLOGICALLY PROBABLE DERIVATIONS, AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MEANING, OF THE WORD.

The next stage in an attempt to trace the part of θυμός and τὸ θυμοειδές in Plato's philosophical schema would probably best be an inquiry into his actual use of the words. Also, there will be a need to probe their uses in contemporary literature. Where we can be certain that that literature was not only available but almost certainly familiar to Plato, this will be of even greater help.

In this preliminary section of the thesis, brevity is again a prime consideration. The present chapter therefore contains a short (it is hoped not culpably so) investigation into the philological background of both θυμός and θυμοειδές. Then, again, the Republic is chosen as the particular dialogue[1] for more detailed examination. In the case of each of the two words, every instance occurring in this work is, for completeness' sake, cited and discussed here. A special attempt above all is made to highlight Plato's own variants on the meaning he otherwise normally assigns the terms. To begin the inquiry, we look at the lexicographical background of the root word θυμός.

II

First, to recapitulate briefly. One central point aimed at in this thesis, as was said in the Introduction, is to show that the translations 'spirit' for θυμός and 'spirited' for θυμοειδές are, in terms of what is required of the words by Plato vis-à-vis Justice, inadequate. The term 'inadequate' is preferred here to 'incorrect' because, to mention just one consideration, the version 'spirited' for θυμοειδές is at times an absolutely correct rendering. The word θυμοειδές may convey that sense in great part, and indeed in toto. In at least equally numerous instances it does not, however, have it at all. And in as far as the rendering 'spirited' is invariably given for it, this must therefore be amplified. Certainly one regularly occurring central and essential ingredient, namely 'passion', 'rage', 'anger', etc. has to receive due inclusion.

A worthwhile preliminary step may be to try to establish lexicographically the position that 'spirited' occupies in the semantic framework. Philosophy is of course unconcerned with dictionary definitions, but if 'common usage' is disputed, these may need to be checked.

Ending up with a relatively unspecialised dictionary, illustration of the point in question is perhaps best achieved by starting with detailed articles in a comprehensive lexicon. The Oxford English Dictionary* gives a large number of meanings. These can be variously summed up as indicating 'courage, self-assertion, vivacity, energy, dash', etc. In one case, and in one case only, is there mention of an 'anger' element. Under Sect. III, sense 12, it defines 'spirit' as 'the

* (see Bibliography)

emotional part of man as the seat of hostile or angry feeling'. Whether or not this is a rare sense need not at present be argued. Certainly it is not familiar. Under 'spirited', however, we find no trace whatever either of anger or hostility. The Shorter O.E.D.+ corresponds, with abbreviated comment.

When we reach the Concise O.E.D.+, we find, whether under the relevant subsections or in any other, not the faintest indication of any ingredient of anger or hostility in either word. We find only, for 'spirited', 'full of spirit, animated, lively, brisk, courageous', and corresponding terms for 'spirit'.

This is a remarkable fact. If a standard, moderately detailed dictionary can totally exclude the ingredients 'anger' or 'hostility' in either 'spirit' or 'spirited', then these ingredients are, in normal use, simply not there. And if Philosophy is concerned with any manner or kind of use of words at all, it is normal use.

It is to this point that the present thesis draws particular attention. For, certain though it is that this exclusion has occurred in normal modern use, it is no less certain, from the single mention of it in the fullest dictionary, that that sense was originally (if exceptionally) there. The significance of this can be dealt with in due course.

+ (See Bibliography)

II

We can now usefully subject the words θυμοειδές and θυμός to the same treatment. The contrast to "spirit" and "spirited" is most remarkable. Liddell & Scott's Greek-English Lexicon+ gives under θυμός as Sense II, subsect. 4: 'the seat of anger'*. θυμοειδές, under Sense II, is 'passionate', 'hot-tempered'. Second, the Greek-German Lexicon of Dr. H. Menge+ includes under θυμός' equivalents 'Zorn', under θυμοειδές', 'zornig'. Apelt+, in his note 46 on Book II of the Republic, speaks of 'der.....Begriff des θυμός und θυμοειδές hervor, der 'Zorn', der 'Eifer', 'die heftige Gemütsaufwallung, die zu rascher Tat hinreisst'; Astius+ has for θυμοειδές 'animosus, iracundus', Frisk+ 'leidenschaftlich', 'heftig', Leopold+ 'thymo similis' where for θυμός he has 'animus, vis vitalis, spiritus animalis, animi praesentia, impetus animi, cupiditas, ira, iracundia'; Chantraine+, referring to θυμοειδές as 'siège des passions nobles', adds 'On note que toute la dérivation se rapporte à la notion de colère', humeur, etc.' Finally we have Hofmann+ giving for θυμός 'Gemütswallung, Leidenschaft, Mut'.

Of translators other than those (for convenience's sake here, English) chosen for detailed examination, Bastien+ translates θυμοειδές 'porté à la colère', Bosanquet+ 'of the nature of anger', and Apelt+ 'beherzt', where he has for θυμός 'Beherztheit (der Zornesmut)'.

These scholars all read 'passion', and regularly 'anger',

+ see Bibliography

* Underlining here, as in all quotations, is (unless otherwise specified) my own.

into θυμός. Their separate renderings of θυμός are therefore not reproduced here. The anger-hostility element, in short, could not be more clearly present. In contrast, however, let us say one thing before we go any further. If this element has now disappeared, as it clearly has, from the normal usage of the English terms 'spirit' and 'spirited', an explanation would appear to be called for. And there is a persuasive hypothesis forthcoming to account for it.

The date of the first appearance of 'spirit' in the sense 'seat of anger and hostility' is just prior to A.D. 1500. This is the period of Late Middle English, and the appearance of the word in this sense is clearly the result of Renaissance scholarship reviving classical knowledge. The natural translation of θυμός by these early scholars was into the Latin 'spiritus'. This conveyed the sense 'breath' more <u>exclusively</u> than θυμός did. But the all-important consequence is that it will have caused <u>Greek</u> sub-meanings of <u>θυμός</u> to be transferred into the <u>English</u> renderings of '<u>spiritus</u>'. 'Spirit' would now therefore contain, in one of its root senses, an 'anger-hostility' ingredient. However, in the era immediately following 1500, we have the tremendous scientific advances, in this case especially biological, made by Vesalius (born 1514), Gesner (1516), Fabricius (1537), Harvey (1578), and others. Their discoveries quite nullified, amongst other things, a great number of early anatomical assumptions. The doctrines which had made the breath the seat of so many mental, emotional, and generally vital elements, which had made the

brain the centre of reproduction, etc. - these were whittled away. The term 'spirit', in its turn, began steadily to lose most of its earlier emotional characteristics. Accordingly we find, after Shakespeare's time, certainly increasingly rare and ill-defined examples of the word 'spirit' in the sense of 'seat of anger or hostility'.

This is, however, as may be. We are still faced with Sense 12 of the O.E.D. article under 'Spirit', 'the emotional part of man as the seat of hostile or angry feeling'. The Concise O.E.D.+, Webster+, Tedeschi and Fantonetti++, and numerous German and French dictionaries consulted have no such elements in their renderings of the word. Nor does any other dictionary of any other language to which the present writer has had access. This, then, is clearly, at the least, a rare sense of the word.

But we must now put strictures on our inquiry. The last point, though of great interest and importance, is not even essential to the present thesis. For the rendering in question is not of θυμός, whether as 'spirit' or anything else, but of θυμοειδές as 'spirited'. And the salient fact is that, under 'spirited', neither the O.E.D. nor any other English or other dictionary consulted makes any reference whatsoever to anger or hostility. The sole counterparts given are words such as 'vivacious', 'energetic', 'self-assertive', etc.

+see Bibliography

++'spirit' = 'forza, vigore, coraggio, slancio, foga; morale....vivacita'.

II

We therefore have, in the O.E.D., a single (and this is clearly a rare, though the point, again, will not be argued) "adverse" sense given of 'spirit'. In this, the factors of anger and hostility are incorporated. But second, of sole ultimate importance, we have in the same dictionary, under the term 'spirited', not the faintest trace of any sense including anger or hostility at all.

It is not just the occasional, but the virtually invariable, use of the word 'spirited' to render θυμοειδές that is being contested in this thesis. It may first, then, be observed that if no lexicon whatever associates 'spirited' with 'angry' or 'passionate', but in vital contrast every lexicon associates θυμοειδές with these two elements, then the lexicographical grounds for invariable use of the word 'spirited' as a counterpart to the Greek θυμοειδές are non-existent.

It must be stressed again that lexicographical findings can only be secondary in value to the internal Platonic evidence concerning the use of the word. The citations given above supply a preliminary background against which the varying semantic values normally attached to the words θυμός and θυμοειδές appear more clearly. It may be stated further at this point that the various Greek texts of the Republic (ed. Hermann+ for Teubner, Chambry+ for Budé, Burnet+ for Oxford, and Shorey+ for Loeb) show no significant differences from the English ones in the passages in which θυμός and θυμοειδές appear. Where translators nevertheless retain a virtually identical translation for it at all points, the effect on a

+Bibliography

Greekless reader's interpretation of it can be imagined as utterly disastrous. Its ultimate function vis-à-vis philosophical issues can, for him, only be totally chaotic.

The purpose of quoting, later in this chapter, the English translations as English translations is primarily illustrative rather than demonstrative. The passages would have had to be quoted whatever language was used. The main purpose, however, is to show the differing shades of meaning contained in the term θυμοειδές. In as far as any translation purports to be philosophically useful to students of Philosophy who are unfamiliar with Greek, it must achieve maximum accuracy in each instance of the word's appearance.

Signs of an awareness of inadequacy in the rendering of the word appear in comments made by several editors. One example is Cornford's note (no. 1.5, p.62 of his tr. of the Republic) attempting to circumscribe the sense of θυμοειδές. He tries to produce an all-embracing word description. But not only does his translation not allow for the various important facets he correctly attributes to it. He also allows himself in the note to recoil disproportionately from the essentially crude 'rage', 'anger', 'passion', 'fury' element so obviously germinal to θυμοειδές. No doubt this is because of the prevalent idealisation of the vigorous, morally clean Platonic Guardian. Cornford must feel that he cannot permit himself any stronger word than 'indignation' to convey its extreme emotional pole.

II

But even if 'spirited' manages to cover this feeble extreme, it only just manages to. Superficially it sounds felicitous, especially from the idealists' point of view. It occurs in all the early translations. Accordingly, since the concept seems philosophically otiose anyway, later translators are prompted to follow suit. Certainly it has served philosophical interests perfectly well so far, but only because there have been no philosophical interests to serve. To cater for a new specific interest in the word, it must be heavily supplemented. To satisfy a newly concentrated examination of the part the θυμοειδές element plays in Plato's philosophy, a much fuller analysis is needed of its rôle in the dialogue.

The contention that Cornford, Jowett, and the other English translators have given 'inadequate' renderings of the word does not, of course, involve the slightest reflection on their stature as scholars. The thumoeidic element has simply never formed a focal point of philosophical interest. The reason the translation 'spirited' has been so long retained by them is therefore a straightforward one. The nuances, if any, in its meaning did not appear to matter. No reason was seen why they should. It is only modern research that has even suggested the existence of an inherent 'aggression-urge' in man. And, in consequence, it is only now that the suspicion has arisen that Plato was well ahead, indeed almost incredibly far ahead, of his time - and deserves to be recognised as such.

The palpable certainty that the corresponding Greek term

II

θυμοειδής has to do with the concept of human aggression prompts close inquiry. Owing, however, to the recent nature of the 'aggression-urge' theory, leading scholars have on no occasion devoted themselves to a close study of the term in that context - or indeed in any, except as a minor constituent of the tripartite soul. Moreover, as we have seen, 'spirit' had held, in earlier times, a possible anger element. But even if the 'spirite sense of the word was rare, it was convenient. English possessed no other term which adequately balanced 'anger' with emotionally neutral 'vivacity', 'vigour', 'energy', etc. Researchers could therefore scarcely have been expected to devote special attention to what they considered of secondary, or even negligible, importance. Even now its interest has difficulty in coming to the fore. It suffers eclipse by the problems of the more widely familiar sectors and subsectors of the mind: Intellect, Desire, Imagination, etc. Second, it has less philosophical familiarity than concepts such as those of the Ideas, Justice, the Good, or, in short, any of the other more prominent facets of Platonic philosophy. This has until the present day reached a point at which the production of an English version meeting all requirements of its interpretation has seemed quite unnecessary. Accordingly the traditional rendering has stuck. An approximate translation has sufficed.

German and French scholars were more fortunate, and perhaps more perspicacious. Certainly through a favourable coincidence of language (e.g. 'Zorn', if not 'colère', is a wider term than 'anger'), they were able to give it a rendering closer to the

sense it held in the Greek. The examples given above illustrate this. It seems disappointing that they still did not attribute any explicit importance to this feature of the word. However, the reason for their not having done so is perfectly solid, and of course, from another aspect, exactly the same as the reason for the English translators' making do with 'spirited'. The latter no doubt knew that their translation ought regularly to contain an 'anger' ingredient, but there was no English word available for that. So, seeing that the concept was to them not crucially important anyway, they left it as it stood. Yet the importance to Plato of τὸ θυμοειδές can without doubt be assumed great. It can indeed just faintly be gauged by the fact that wherever it is mentioned in the earlier books of the Republic it is expanded on. Only later do unamplified references occur.

As things now stand, there is still no suitable single word to cover it. But even a periphrasis would, of course, in terms of philosophical requirements, be preferable to a single but inaccurate term. A good preliminary step at this point may therefore be to make a slightly deeper inquiry into etymological and other aspects of the word. This would supplement, and indeed give a better basis all round to, the lexicographical data so far cited.

b.2 FURTHER ETYMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON θυμοειδές.

To begin with, a possible primitive meaning of θυμός is

II

suggested by the probability of the word θύω A[2*] ('to sacrifice by fire') being cognate with θύω B('to rage' or 'seethe'). In this case, assuming θυμός must be descended from one or other, it is related to 'fumus' (cf. Liddell & Scott under θύω A), and so has association with terms denoting fire and smoke as well as 'seething' and 'rushing'[3]. The obvious turbulence generated by heat, especially in boiling liquids, can be set alongside the 'boiling' of rough if cold sea-water, rivers, etc. It certainly strongly suggests that the 'sacrifice' θύω and the 'seethe' θύω are connected. In any case, these particular features of theirs are evinced in anger and strong emotion, and even if this point were not available to give further weight to a linkage of themselves with each other, θυμός is certainly linked with one, if not both, of them. (The naming of the thymus gland is on the other hand clearly secondary - almost certainly because its position over the heart makes it a strong candidate for the source of θυμός) Hippocrates in Galen[4] merely defines θυμός as the desire to cough, which does not give much help - unless to show how unimportant the term has become by his time. The primordial, more concrete meaning of θυμός, namely 'breath', could, then, as we have speculated earlier, have been the thickened, quicker breath. This, seen as smoke on cold days, or as steamy blasts from the nostrils of ploughing oxen, etc., would strongly resemble an efflux of inner fire. On the principle by which the seat of the mental powers was the φρένες[5] (lungs), it would naturally have been deemed a denser, warmer, accelerated form of the ψυχή[6].

* (i.e. Note no. 2)

II

b.3 Whatever the case, the predominant meaning of θυμός in Homeric, i.e. earlier, Greek is, as we have seen, 'breath' (hence 'life'). It also has important overtones of 'life-warmth' or vigour, since the sense often alters to plain 'anger'[7], or at a less intense level 'spirit'[8], in that word's more contentious sense.
Indeed, Homer never on any occasion uses ὀργή for 'anger', employing θυμός exclusively for this. In Plato, the meaning 'breath' is totally displaced in favour of the emotionally-orientated senses. 'Emotional' energy in some or other form is indicated, in particular direct 'anger', more neutrally 'temper', 'drive', or at the other pole 'spiritedness' etc. The invariable ingredient is dynamic warmth[9], as in 'hot'[10] rather than more restrained temper, heated or indignant emotion, vibrant spiritedness, etc.

The element of neutral 'drive' is, indeed, almost disproportionately often coloured by the 'anger' constituent. Still, this has not detracted from the use of the word θυμός, both in earlier and Platonic Greek, to denote not only the vehicle of intellectually significant speech, but even much that we might have expected words like ψυχή and ἐπιθυμία (desire) to cover exclusively. Presocratic (but post-Homeric) use shows something of an assortment of meanings: 'mind, desire, will, spirit (=soul), life'. Most notably, however, the ingredient of 'will' or 'urge' is present[11] in part or the whole. Most of the 'desire', 'will' meaning is taken over in Plato by ἐπιθυμία.

Some confusion can crop up here. As we see later, the

II

prime Platonic sense of θυμός remains 'passion'[12] or 'emotion', whether generally or specifically (as, e.g. in 'spiritedness', or again 'anger'[13]). The sense 'emotional drive' or 'spirit'[14] (='spiritedness')* coupled with an aggressive tinge seems to come uppermost in the term θυμοειδής, as far as the suffix -ειδές means 'having the form or look of', and the θυμοειδής man is said to be 'contentious' and 'honour-seeking'[15]. But even if the urge to win contests or gain honour cannot be linked simplex[16] with direct 'anger', which is only a particularly intense manifestation of emotional drive, it can be seen as a by-product of the incipient stages of anger. The translation 'irascible', 'prone to anger' has at so many points the strongest possible claim to consideration that, even if the above were not fully admitted, we should have to make allowances for it. And it can certainly only be discounted at the expense of a full presentation of what Plato is trying to convey. But there is no reason why such a liaison should not be admitted.

b.4 Variably, then, the term θυμός in the Republic is made by Plato at varying times to correspond with our concepts of 'passion', 'spirit', 'anger', 'drive', etc.[17] Its derivative θυμοειδής is paired accordingly with 'passionate', 'spirited', 'irascible', 'energetic'. The θυμός can be 'moved', leading a person towards emotion[18], etc., and is also (indifferentiably from θυμοειδής) that thing by whose agency a person θυμοῦται[19], 'becomes or is irascible'.** The fact that Plato chooses to use the -ειδής ending with θυμός might suggest that he is not happy

* (not 'soul')

** As the exclusive sense of this verb is that given, we have here

to think of θυμοειδής as being always precisely of, or to do with, θυμός in its apparently most common sense of 'ire'[20]. It might be thought that he would have chosen a more direct-sounding adjective, if one had been available. However, there is no other more direct-sounding adjective in common use. 'θυμικός', the nearest, has virtually fallen into disuse. So that in this connexion it can only be said of his choice of the word θυμοειδής that its latitude does seem to be made to extend beyond the merely 'angry'. Plato indubitably wishes on many occasions to convey by it the quality describable as 'having the "look" of ire', 'akin to irascible emotion'. θυμοειδής is that quality which fosters sheer belligerence, as we later see[21]. It also fosters other dynamic emotional propensities, indeed almost impartially. But this is not sufficient ground for uniformly giving the totally favourable sense 'spirited'. The possibility of this creating a false impression must therefore constantly be borne in mind. The 'contentious' element is usually directly present, seldom if ever far away. Its more or less total elimination by the unvarying use of renderings such as 'spirited' is, it can immediately be seen, absolutely misleading.

b.5 MORE GENERAL SPECULATIONS ON THE WORDS.

In regard to θυμός' possible connotation of visibility (smokiness), in contrast with ψυχή's ethereality and clarity, it is also justifiably tempting to see an intended connexion with Plato's Ideal Theory. Invisibility being the characteristic of the eternal and real[22], θυμός must thereby stand inferior to ψυχή.

II

b.6 Such considerations may perhaps be too remote to contribute to Plato's 'higher'[23] classification of θυμός. i.e. θυμός is ordinarily placed closer to the logistic than to the epithumetic ('desiring') part of the tripartite soul, and no doubt he is concerned with other criteria for its moral classification. For instance, he constantly lists the mental, emotional, and appetitive segments of a man's soul in that order of precedence, that is, mental, emotional, appetitive as if in "descending" order - but perhaps this is a moral and pragmatic, not an academic, conviction. Socrates finds, for instance, that he is not satisfied[24] with Glaucon's alliance of θυμοειδές, the energetic, with ἐπιθυμητικόν, the desirous[25]. His reason, however, is the moral one that θυμοειδές never becomes an ally of ἐπιθυμητικόν if λόγος chooses otherwise[26], not that the two have differing measures of reality[27]. In Book IV he weakens the link on the moral basis between θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν. But in whatever way his treatment of it in this book is to be reconciled with that in earlier books, the early treatments deserve close attention.

b.7 To begin with, a principal context in which the term θυμοειδές seems to demand discussion in Plato's use is that he chooses to employ it as an independent quantity at all. He could, one might imagine, very naturally have lumped it together with ἐπιθυμητικόν as a common passion, felt as a desire-to-evince-emotion, a desire which must be indulged and sated by venting itself in some sort of variant of emotion ranging, e.g., from urgent drive to open fury. Nevertheless, he chooses

to represent it as, in most cases, a greatly neutral, absolute force. And this seems very important. It is like the force of a passion towards some object, but, instead of being morally or otherwise limited to that object, it remains unlimited. The object towards which it urges a person can be good, bad, or indifferent. In Book IX, for instance, the lion of 'spiritedness'[28] can ally itself with either the many-headed beast of the ἐπιθυμίαι, or with the man of the λογιστικόν[29]. The lion and the beast are no less able to pull in the same (but negative) direction than the lion and the logistic man. Plato admittedly puts the stress on the possibility of the former two tearing each other apart, and a general reign of chaos being set up in the person's ψυχή if the 'man' (i.e. logistic) does not apply intellectual restraint. The latter two, that is, appear here as the more normal collaborators. But the essentially independent nature of the thumoeidic urge is kept well to the fore. Indeed Plato's treatment of it in Book IV is extremely revealing, because he assigns it the status no longer of a mere inciter to either of good or evil, but of a quantity good or evil in itself. On the balance, if it can be said to fall absolutely into either category of good or bad, we might fairly say that overall it falls into that of good[30]. As a purely statistical observation, this is of qualified value, but it deserves the closest attention.

In Book IX, as has been mentioned, we see θυμοειδές, in the shape of the lion of vigour, capable of supporting indiscriminately the vicious elements of the beast, or

alternately the good elements of the man. Earlier (440 e, 442 b, c), it had been elevated to an ally preferentially of the man, the λογιστικόν. It is capable of being corrupted by bad upbringing, but is not otherwise naturally a supporter of the baser 'desire' compartment. Socrates even suggests[31] that it might be taken together with λογιστικόν as an integral part of the same form or εἶδος, but then corrects himself. His final - as most frequent - view of it is as the separate, if closely associated, helper of that element[32].

b.8 DETAILED EXAMINATION OF ITS USES IN THE TEXT OF THE REPUBLIC, WITH COMPARISON OF THE TRANSLATIONS OF IT GIVEN BY CERTAIN PROMINENT TRANSLATORS, AND AN ATTEMPT AT EVALUATION OF THE LIGHT THROWN ON ITS MEANINGS BY THESE TRANSLATIONS, COUPLED WITH ANALYSIS OF THE TEXT.

To sum up the argument posed. Various renderings by different translators show a tendency to move too markedly away from the clearly limited term 'irascibility' in their versions of θυμός and its associates. The question that must be put is a) whether in doing so they are always expressing Plato's intended meaning, and b) whether it is possible to decide exactly what that meaning overall is. It seems fair to suppose that one of the safest approaches to discovering what Plato meant by θυμοειδής would be first of all to analyse his earliest uses of it in the dialogue. Here he will not yet have subordinated it to the system of morals delineated in its more developed form in the later passages. We can profit on this

score from the fact that, to be comprehensible to his hearers, he still has to restrict himself to using it in an everyday sense. Then the later uses can be taken in their due order.

At this stage, too, it should, above all, be stressed that speculation on the widest reasonable scale is undertaken as to what Plato might precisely mean at each point. Fairness to translators would not allow of anything less. If the result appears at first somewhat diffuse, the material crystallised out in the final chapters should, it is hoped, provide compensation. Much may be sacrificed in the cause of completeness, but it is believed that the end result should prove justificatory.

> (375 a 11)*: Socrates: 'But will a horse or dog or any other animal that is not θυμοειδής wish to be brave (ἀνδρεῖος)? Or have you not realised how irresistible and indomitable a thing θυμός is, in the presence of which every soul is fearless and invincible in the face of anything?'

Where Plato uses the adjective θυμοειδής, the translators whose versions are being examined[33] use the following phrases: 'has spirit' (Lee, Jowett), 'of a spirited disposition' (Cornford), 'is spirited' (Lindsay, Davies & Vaughan, Spens). Where Plato

* (The translation of the excerpts is in each case my own; the text used that of Burnet in O.C.T., 1900.)

II

uses θυμός, the translators have: 'high spirits' (Lee), 'a high spirit' (Cornford), 'spirit' (Jowett, Lindsay, D. & V., Spens). As one sees, 'spirit' comes in throughout. Not even Spens, the most independent (no doubt partly because earliest) of all, fails to choose this version.

b.9 This first incidence of the use of the word θυμοειδής is of further value in that it has θυμοειδής and θυμός closely juxtaposed to each other. So we can probably justifiably assume that Plato was consciously giving the same significance to θυμός <u>on its own</u> as it had in the compound θυμοειδής. A second related feature of interest is that ψυχή, close in primitive meaning to θυμός, is also in the same paragraph, and is treated as having a <u>pointed contrast</u> with θυμός.

This narrows down possible candidates for the meaning of θυμός at this point. The common Homeric sense 'breath', 'life', cannot apply. Or it cannot unless it is a once-and-never-again usage[34], which would be hard to credit. A more restricted, specialised sense is obviously in question. In the particular context it is rather difficult to extract an immediate meaning of θυμοειδής. Still, two leading points made by Socrates give a little help:

i) No horse or dog which was not θυμοειδής would tend to be brave.

ii) θυμός is invincible, indomitable.

In other words, to be brave you have to be θυμοειδής. The

possession of θυμός is implied in bravery.

A further clue may be sought among previous adjectives attributed to the satisfactory guard dog[35]. He must be three things: ὀξύν.....πρὸς αἴσθησιν, ἐλαφρὸν πρὸς...διωκάθειν, ἰσχυρὸν....διαμάχεσθαι, i.e. sharp at noticing intruders, nimble at pursuing them, and strong in order to fight them. Now come two extra things he must be: θυμοειδής and ἀνδρεῖος. These are added characteristics, set apart from the others. The previous three were traits of body, or at most of the physical senses, not of character. 'Spirited' and 'brave' are clearly features of character, not at all concerned with body.

To take ἀνδρεῖος first: it is thought of here in rather a materialistic sense - that of "possessing a sheer tendency to resist". Apart from this, it implies a great deal of what might be thought to be covered by the term 'spiritedness'. In all, it suggests a resolution of demeanour, an active readiness to take defensive or aggressive action. And this is so close to anything which the English word 'spirited' conveys as to cover it almost entirely. The important question arises: would Plato have bothered here to set θυμοειδής alongside 'brave' when, translated as 'spirited', it already so fully carries the meaning of 'brave'? The sentence would simply lose all its impact. He mentions them apart. He must imply that they belong apart. He would hardly have used a word synonymous with, or implying, the other. In any case, even if he had, the order of terms in the sentence, given the translation 'spirited'

for θυμοειδής, would be in reverse if the terms were so placed.

Finalising: the question asked, if translated 'Would any horse that is not spirited tend to be brave?', implies that all that is brave must be spirited. But this is not the case. Brave people or animals are not necessarily spirited. They do not necessarily display the more overtly active and ebullient type of courage which the term 'spirit' denotes. On the other hand, creatures which show spirit are invariably brave. Spiritedness is, as it were, a kind of overflow of the inner resource of courage. θυμοειδής is here far more likely, then, to present a meaning distinct from that of ἀνδρεῖος. It is far less likely to present one at all closely similar to it, least of all one which actually includes it. If it did, then, to make sense, the sentence would have to read the other way round: 'Would any horse that was not brave tend to be spirited?'

b.10 Both from the context and other evidence as to the nature of θυμός, it seems clear, then, that Plato cannot have intended so close a match. We must seek a meaning - here at least - of θυμοειδής elsewhere than in 'spirited', somewhere further along the emotional scale towards the pole with which it unmistakeably shows itself to have most affinity. This shift is supported only a few sentences later by the definitive remark that the opposite of θυμοειδής is πρᾶος, 'mild' or 'gentle'. 'Spirited' could never be a strong enough term to stand as the diametric opposite of 'mild' or 'gentle'. The conventional antithesis of 'spirited' is properly 'spiritless'[36], literally 'ἄθυμος'. The antithesis of 'mild'

II

is something expressly of the nature of 'irascible'. If θυμοειδής is the antithesis of 'mild', then 'irascible' is certainly the closest approximation to it so far.

Later passages explicitly give χόλος (bile), ὀργή (rage), δυσκολία (bad-temper) as part and parcel of intensifying θυμοειδής[37]. On the one hand, then, we have proximity of the term ἀνδρεῖος (brave), but in a somewhat unexalted connexion - the bravery of encroachment and acquisitiveness. This is the first point to force upon us consideration of a meaning less sublime, here, than 'spirited', and nearer to 'anger', for θυμοειδές. On the other, we have the defining term πρᾶος, pressing that meaning even closer to 'irascible'. On a third front, however, we face a dilemma. This is the problem of the limited nature of terms connoting anger at all[38] as adequate universal renderings of a term so nearly - and so often - conveying a sense of 'nobility' as θυμοειδής.

b.11 A possible answer to this problem - apart, of course, from the evidence of Plato's own varying usage of the word - might be the following. In English we cannot see much connexion between 'spiritedness' and 'anger'. We regard spiritedness as what, after all, it has come, in English, to mean - a higher than merely emotional phenomenon. The Greek tradition, however, quite clearly retained a very close kinship of type between 'anger' and what so many translators choose to

render as 'spiritedness'. One large part of our problem stems from the shift (discussed above) since Plato's time of the seat of the intellect from the life-breath of speech, and its situation in the lungs, to the head. Confusion now occurs, because the word 'spirit', meaning strictly 'breath' in early parlance, has nevertheless still been retained for θυμός, but with exclusively mental overtones. Now, however, that the scientific reality has become common ground, we have 'spirit' treated in everyday language as solely mental, solely stemming from the 'higher' centre in the head. Its other sense has wholly disappeared. No doubt in the future further separable mental ingredients of this loose term 'spirit' will emerge, simply because the word has not yet been sorted out clearly or long enough to fall altogether (as it may in any case not necessarily ever do) out of the English language. But as a crucial result of all this we retain part of the original complex denoted by θυμός in our word 'spirit' meaning 'spiritedness'.

In the same way, θυμοειδής might itself have kept part of the fabric of meaning covered by θυμός. It could equally have assimilated some other features. There seems no ground for not accepting that as a reasonable explanation of why the Greeks should have developed θυμοειδής into a word at times conveying a strong streak of nobility, at times crude anger.

b.12 It is, of course, this process of, so to speak, "splitting off" of terms which have become better understood individually, that has produced two meanings of the English

word 'spirit' ('spiritedness' and 'soul'). In contrast with this, the Greek term θυμός comprehends a whole spectrum of '<u>life-force</u>' manifestations. This list covers breath, anger, and all the more heated, or 'seething', forms of emotion, yet also very often with a strong mental tinge. θυμός is the substance of a thing we might almost call 'temper', ranging from mildness to anger, and implying a capacity for thought. Cornford[39], as mentioned, makes a bulky package of this word's analysis. He says of θυμοειδής: 'The fierceness is characteristic of the "spirited element" in the soul. This term covers a group of impulses manifested in anger and pugnacity, in generous indignation allied to a sense of honour (439 e), and in competitive ambition (581 a).' Our problem, however, has been to decide what the <u>common</u> factor is. What <u>single</u> quality (<u>if any</u>) enables θυμοειδής to convey all these meanings? For where a particular word in one language has, on translation into another, to have its meaning changed at different loci, this is highly inconvenient. It is a consequence of the 'splitting' spoken about above, and of course it is justifiable if no adequate single word can be found; but one of the principal objects of any translator is to avoid it.

In the case of θυμός, clearly a very basic quantity is involved. This yields (depending on the amount of it present) various degrees of vitality, 'life-force', 'spirit', etc., ranging from relative lifelessness to frenzied activity, blind rage, and other emotional mutants. Any translation of it must reflect that particular section on the 'forceful-vitality' scale which it happens to denote at that particular locus. But

at the same time, we can repeat, if one term can be found conveying the common factor in all the translated term's meanings, and is close enough to the specialised meanings to make adequate sense, some sacrifice of accuracy (if unavoidable) is worth making in the interests of uniformity.

b.13 Second, Socrates has said that θυμός is invincible, indomitable. As a rendering of θυμός, 'temper' would have greater claim here even than 'spiritedness' - which is at this point apposite - to general validity. Unfortunately, 'temper' alone does not mean a neutral degree of 'high-' or 'short-temper', but something rather different. But if we ask ourselves what fraction of man's mental-emotional force spectrum is most notoriously careless of danger, what part most easily keeps the individual dynamic regardless of threats and opposition, it is surely the emotional force of anger (by which of course is meant sincere anger rather than, for instance, the anger of the ἀκράχολος, 'snappish', and ὀργίλος, 'testy'[40].) And this applies steadily more so to its more extreme gradations.

The more intellectual quantity 'spirit' does not, then, apply in this context. Rage is notoriously blind to menace. A man of 'spirit', on the other hand, is cool enough to measure danger, as well as being readier by nature to face it than a spiritless. And this might raise the question of whether Plato intends here a slower, more solid determination to resist

attack. This point could be contested. Perhaps the arguments for and against should not be pressed too hard. However, the dog's sharpness, swiftness, and strength all suggest rapid, forcible aggressiveness. And it would seem conclusive, both from this and from the other loci, that Plato leans early on, as well as later, towards an 'irascible', as incorporated in the adjective θυμοειδής, at least as much as to any other component, in his use of the term θυμός.

b.14 Unfortunately, as we have premised, 'temper' absolute in English is importantly unlike θυμός in one respect. It does not quite mean, as does θυμός, that substance which, depending upon its intensity, produces good or bad temper. And there seems to be no single English word which does. This could be because the concept of 'humours' and other physical substances producing different emotions has fallen away, or by simple accident of language-development. Where parts of a whole are defined and become separately important, the whole may of course lose its identity. And this is especially so if it is an artificial whole. This is what seems to have happened to the 'humours' producing 'vital force', 'rage', etc. However, 'temper' comes very near to rendering θυμός. It is to be questioned whether 'spirit' is as accurate, or even as harmonious, a translation of it - especially as, at all events, 'short-' or 'hot-temper'. If it is accepted that θυμός, while embracing at least the whole "anger"-scale (and much more), commonly refers to its more intense pole, it is apt that

a translation should indicate this. But more than that, as we have already seen, the word 'spirit' is not only ambiguous in English. Even if understood without ambiguity as 'spiritedness' rather than 'soul', it still carries strong overtones of intellect[41]. This element is too much 'higher' than the emotional to be left unqualifiedly present. It therefore becomes important that any single word that is proposed to replace it should both be freer of that higher element, and at any rate on statistical grounds a good deal further up the emotion-intensity scale.

b.15 Several further instances of θυμοειδής follow in fairly close succession:

375 b 4: Soc.: It is clear now what sort of individuals the Guardians have to be physically.

Glauc.: Yes.

Soc.: And spiritually, that they must be θυμοειδεῖς[42]

Glauc.: That, too.

Soc.: Then how, Glaucon, will it be possible for them not to be rough (ἄγριοι) towards one another?

Translators' phrases (covering ψυχή as well as θυμοειδής, with their renderings of ἄγριοι bracketed) are: 'he must be of a spirited temper' ('behaving pugnaciously') (Cornford), 'and also what qualities of the mind, namely that he must be spirited' ('behaving fiercely') (D. & V.), 'his soul is to be full of spirit' ('savage') (Jowett), 'in character they must be high-spirited' ('aggressive') (Lee), 'as to their mental

qualities, we know they must be spirited' ('behaving savagely') (Lindsay), 'and with reference to his soul, that he should be spirited' ('savage') (Spens).

If people are θυμοειδεῖς it evidently follows to the Greek ear that they could tend to be ἄγριοι: 'boorish', 'rough', 'violent'. These are established senses of ἄγριος. And they carry heavy significance. Foremost, they pinpoint attention on that constituent of θυμοειδής which will allow of them at all. At the very least, it cannot be less than contentiousness. Its stronger suggestion is of something even less pleasant. To the question 'What characteristic most ordinarily makes people boorish, rough, and violent?' the answer that springs immediately to the mind is certainly not 'spirit'. Much less is it 'spiritedness'. At best it is 'hot-', or rather 'bad-', 'temper'. In abnormal contexts (e.g. a person's feeling a serious temporary grievance, suffering from a chronic illness, etc.), this obviousness of the presence of bad-temper in his <u>make-up</u> would disappear. But the present sense indicates that the word is being used in the normal context. Plato is here talking about a person's continuous natural disposition. That θυμοειδής at this point carries a strong 'bad-temper' constituent therefore becomes a mandatory conclusion.

b.16 These considerations can now be weighed against the translators' interpretations. (Of the six sets of renderings, Lee's seems internally the most consistent. It is followed

closely by Cornford's.) A spirited person can more or less aptly be thought of as mildly aggressive. He can also, if slightly less so, be thought of as being capable of behaving pugnaciously. But the terms 'savage' and 'fierce' are out of the running. They are quite unconvincing. Savagery and fierceness do not go with spiritedness at all. They are far too crude. On the other hand, the fact that the other four translators (D. & V., Jowett, Lindsay, and Spens) can go so far for ἀγριότης as 'fierce' and 'savage' puts into really conspicuous relief the unsuitability of the versions all of them give for θυμοειδής. For a spirited person is primarily thought of as defensively, not offensively courageous. He just does not have ignoble (e.g. greedy) characteristics. He endeavours to maintain what is right. Certainly, he might initiate contest, but only for very good reasons. He would never be gratuitously aggressive. But even less than that would he be likely to be guilty of acts of unprovoked fierceness and savagery. The word 'spirited' for θυμοειδής against this testimony goes into the realm of the fanciful.

By contrast, 'aggressiveness', 'pugnacity', 'fierceness' and 'savagery' can all very properly be predicated of 'hot-temper'. If θυμοειδής were here translated as that instead of as the various mutations given of the word 'spirit', the passages would all become harmonious.

b.17 375 c 6 is less uncompromisingly, but still

distinctly, favourable to this way of turning the word:

'"Then what will we do?" I asked. "Where will we find a disposition that is at once mild (πρᾶος) and fiery (μεγαλόθυμος)? Since I would say a mild nature is the opposite of a θυμοειδής."'

Translators have (again my underlining for the respective renderings of θυμοειδής): 'gentleness and a high temper are contraries' (Cornford), 'a gentle nature is the opposite of a spirited one' (D. & V.), 'how shall we find a gentle nature which has a great spirit, for the one is the contradiction of the other?' (Jowett), 'gentleness and high spirits are natural opposites' (Lee), 'a gentle nature is surely the antithesis of a spirited' (Lindsay), 'the meek disposition is somehow opposite to the spirited' (Spens).

θυμοειδής and μεγαλόθυμος are apparently treated here by Socrates as synonyms. The merit of the passage as a source of information about the meaning of θυμοειδής is mostly affected by the doubt attaching to the meaning we should give μεγαλόθυμος. ('Having a large θυμός' suggests, in the Greek, possession of large stores of θυμός in the sense more of general 'drive', 'heart', than specifically of 'ire', or similar qualities.) But the word occurs so often in the latter sense that we might submit that, in view of the second half of the passage, this is probably the likely sense.

b.18 In this second half, we have πρᾶος set over against θυμοειδής as its direct antithesis. As is shown in the case of ἥμερος[43], which is for practical purposes synonymous with

II

πρᾶος, 'mild' is less properly an antithesis of 'spirited' than of 'hot-tempered'. 'Mild' and 'hot-tempered' are both descriptive of passionate (and thus 'suffering', 'passive', emotional) dispositions. In contrast, 'spirited' and, e.g., 'apathetic' would correspond better as antitheses. Both are descriptive, at opposite poles, of the more intellectually positive disposition to take constructive steps in a particular direction. A spirited person could never be constitutionally apathetic. On the other hand, a hot-tempered person conceivably could. Having effectively less intellect, on average, he has also less of the mentally generated enterprise that goes with it. Again, a spirited person is not the sort who could be naturally 'crude' or 'rough' (ἄγριος). On the contrary, it is specifically stated[44] that the θυμοειδής person could. Accordingly, Cornford's 'high temper' version is the only one that comes near the meaning expressed. The other versions, uniformly retaining 'spirit' variants, miss it.

b.19 Plato has supplied a second possible opposite of θυμοειδής in ἄθυμος[45]. This has more the look of 'apathetic' than πρᾶος or ἥμερος but still strictly means no more than 'lacking in θυμός'. As such, it is an acceptable candidate for interpretation as 'mild', that is, an opposite of 'hot-tempered'. But there is little peripheral material present in the passage in which it occurs (not quoted here), and none to indicate whether or not θυμός[46] leans to one or other pole of the 'temper' spectrum. It cannot, in every event, alter our

general conclusion that so far θυμοειδής shows quite remarkably unequivocal loading with an ingredient of contentiousness, if not direct anger. Of the other pieces of evidence mentioned, those that do not positively support this finding do not at least run counter to it.

b.20 Further evidence for a sense of θυμοειδής incorporating more heat of temper in it than the term 'spirited' connotes occurs just before the first mention of the word in Book II. Here Socrates is discussing the way a luxury-seeking state proceeds from superfluous complexity to war. A state of discontentment with simple but adequate means for life had led to acquisitiveness. In turn, this led to a desire to take over other people's territory. The third and final step was physical clash. The θυμοειδές quality comes up for discussion in connexion with the conclusion that, granted war, there will be a need for soldiers. The preliminary passage is given first:

<u>373 e 2</u>: '"So after this we will be making war, won't we, Glaucon?"

"Yes."

"And let us not yet say anything," I said, "about whether war does good or evil, but just this much: that we have found the cause of war, from which bodies politic derive their chief private and public ills."

"Agreed."

"So, my friend, we need a still larger city, and

II

> larger not just by a small margin but by an entire army, which will march out in the interests of the general whole and fight for the sake of what we've just been mentioning against those who oppose it."

This introduction has some special features. Plato speaks of the need for soldiers for his planned Republic without further preamble, and we can of course by no means assume that he means their function to be purely defensive[47]. In terms of his overall dialectical purpose, his pursuit of the ideal state, we no doubt do not have to be explicitly shown that he does. But at any rate we have already been told that the city is a luxury-seeking one, which starts the fight for gain. This city is by implication one disapproved of by Socrates, and the fact that the Republic he is now discussing is not ideal is one that must not be forgotten. It takes the offensive: makes aggressive war. It is a city out for gain, as he admitted from just after the start of the discussion (when forced unwillingly into this position by his young colleagues). We therefore logically enough read, through large sections of the dialogue[48], of fighters - the Guardians - who are the "best possible" men engaging in the "highest possible" pursuits. But this needs a drastic qualification. We must read into it the rider 'best in terms of the luxury-seeking, sophisticated state'.

In passing, even if we do have to accept this qualification, we do not have to answer any further questions of just how 'contentious' or 'aggressive' we are to take ἀνδρεῖος to be.

II

It would be difficult to split 'bravery' (or, literally, 'manliness') into two types: one shown by the 'innocent' defender, the other by the 'aggressive' attacker. In the sentence in which we meet the word θυμοειδής for the first time in the dialogue, 'The horse or dog which is not θυμοειδής will not wish to be brave', the intention is clearly to point out one leading consideration: the positive wish to engage in manly behaviour, standardly accepted as military contest - or more simply fighting. And this will only be found in the 'irascible', 'aggressive' individual. Others will be content to be manly when provoked. The word 'manly', a fair equivalent to ἀνδρεῖος, has solely good connotations, and never loses them.

Plato's words here, as we observed, therefore include under fighting the sort of fighting done by a self-indulgent city. In other words, it unequivocally allows for aggressive war, as well as that done by the city which is attacked by the aggressor. The individual capable of bravery is as much the avaricious one who attacks unprovoked for purposes of theft as the one who innocently tries to ward off such an attack[49]. But ἀνδρεία is a morally favourable term,not to be lightly associated with unprovoked attack. In fact, Plato seems actually to avoid the word 'wants' altogether in this passage[50], as though aware that an issue of ἐπιθυμία (desire) and blatant injustice arises. The favourable term "guard" comes belatedly[51]. There can, however, be no doubt of his referring to active commandeering of other people's goods. He here, in short, precisely means by θυμοειδές a preliminary to

acquisitive, contentious aggression. And in that connexion it is quite implausible to speak of a 'spirited' individual; for rather we contemplate one who, without cause except his own aggression-urge, develops truculent anger against others. There is far less sublimity of mind attaching to gratuitous lethal attack than we can expect of high spirit. Some cruder property, essentially one of the lower emotions, suggests itself. The intellectual uncontrol of passion is obviously reprehensible to Plato. It cannot be predicated of something as elevated as 'spirit'.

The contrast of θυμοειδής with φιλόσοφος, 'intellectual'[52], is discussed very shortly afterwards. Plato seems to be making it additionally clear that there is a characteristic of unreflectiveness about τὸ θυμοειδές which puts it below (though often as the helper of)[53] the higher faculties:

375 e 1: '"You know that it is the natural habit of thoroughbred dogs to be as gentle as can be with people familiar to them, but the opposite to strangers."

"I do."

"So then this is a possible situation, and we are not seeking something contrary to nature in the Guardians."

"No."

"Do you not also think that the individual who is to belong to the Guardian class ought to be intellectual (φιλόσοφος) as well as θυμοειδής?"

Translators, for θυμοειδής : 'spirited temper' (Cornford),

II

'high-spirited' (D. & V.), 'spirited nature' (Jowett), 'high spirits' (Lee), 'spirited element' (Lindsay), 'spirited' (Spens).

If there were any doubt as to the type of meaning being attached by Plato to θυμοειδής at this point, it is dispelled by its use in connexion with the behaviour of dogs. A dog's bark, almost its sole vocal signal, can no doubt be friendly. So, possibly, also can a lion's roar. But expert knowledge is required to pronounce on this, and only those thoroughly well-acquainted with the dog or lion will risk assuming that it is friendly when it gives tongue. A stranger, when he is barked at, assumes the reverse - for practical purposes. The price to be paid in these cases for misinterpreting anger as friendliness is too high. By common utilitarian inference, then, a dog is taken to be angry if it is not silent.

Another and perhaps clearer way of expressing this might be to say that the transition from calmness to rage in a dog is in any case so facile that intermediate stages cannot for practical purposes be taken into account. Fine distinctions are simply not worth making. That Plato is putting the interpretation "aggressive" on the term as applied to the guard dog seems therefore by far the most likely of the various alternatives. He is most unlikely to be referring to any subtle kind of courage or drive. The primitive anger portrayed in the familiar picture of the dog barking is in question. As a result, the terms 'spirited temper', 'high spirits', etc. used by translators are too elevated to fill its place.

II

b.21 <u>376 c 4</u>: 'So the man who is to be a fine and good guardian of the city will by our scheme be naturally intellectual, θυμοειδής, swift, and strong.'

<u>Translators</u>: 'spirited' (Cornford), 'high-spirited' (D. & V.), 'spirit' (Jowett), 'high spirits' (Lee), 'spirited' (Lindsay, Spens). Here the standard translation given to θυμοειδής is not suprisingly retained. But the simple absence of factors tending to compel the choice of another is not a strong justification for retaining it. Whatever overall English equivalent is preferred for it - and "hot-tempered" seems a good candidate - 'spirited', 'of a spirited disposition', etc. do not provide adequate equivalents. They give the concept a bias in the direction of the 'higher', more intellectual faculties which Plato obviously does not mean it to have here. However, further passages supply fuller evidence for this:

b.22 (At the next point after 376 c at which it occurs, θυμοειδής has at first a not specially definable 'lower' ingredient.)

<u>410 b</u>: 'He (the Guardian-to-be) will engage in gymnastic and endurance tests with his mind centred on the θυμοειδές in his nature, and will go in for the exertions in question in order to rouse that element rather than to increase his strength.'

Translators: 'energy and initiative' (Lee), 'spirited element in their nature' (Cornford), 'spirited element of his nature' (Jowett, D. & V.), 'spirited part of his soul' (Lindsay), 'sprightliness of his temper' (Spens).

II

Here there is an immediate hint, by implication or otherwise, of the kind of natural property that is involved. Unfortunately, however, the hint is somewhat vague. 'Spiritedness' could be meant; 'irascibility'; several things. A translation has to rely on reference to its earlier meanings. The passage is however interesting in that it can, at a stretch, be interpreted as meaning that the young Guardian deliberately labours beyond his strength. This involves a viewpoint common to militaristic societies. Exertion of oneself beyond the limits of moderate tolerance, even to breaking point, is worthy and to be encouraged. The habit is regarded as laudable for various reasons, some less obvious than others, by war-like people. And it is probable not only that Plato was aware of this viewpoint and himself held it, but that he is making a specific allusion to it here. His founding of the Republic largely on Spartan practice would exactly accord with this.

b.23 Then, however, a few sentences later[54], he specifies the extremes which will result if the θυμοειδές property is developed exclusively, to the disregard of the tempering influence of music. These extremes are ἀγριότης, 'roughness', and σκληρότης, 'hardness'. Here an "ire" ingredient emerges quite definitively.

410 c 8: '"You know, don't you, " I said, "the sort of character one finds in people who go in for gymnastic all their lives without touching music - and vice versa?

II

"What are you referring to?"

"Roughness and callousness, and softness and mildness - "

"I see," he answered. "The ones who participate exclusively in gymnastic become rougher than they should be, those who do so in music softer than really befits them."

"And yet, the θυμοειδές would produce the rough part of our make-up; in other words, properly nurtured it would be courage; whereas, carried further than it ought to be, it turns harsh and intractable - or so it seems to me."'

Translators' phrases are : 'surely that ferocity is the outcome of the spirited element in our nature' (Cornford) (the rendering in each case of θυμοειδές is underlined), 'rudeness is the natural product of the spirited element' (D. & V.), 'this ferocity only comes from spirit' (Jowett), 'it is the energy and initiative in their nature that may make them uncivilised' (Lee), 'it is the spirited element in their nature that produces the fierceness' (Lindsay), 'this rusticity, at least, may generate a sprightliness of temper' (Spens). In this particular passage, all the translators except Lee and Spens render τὸ θυμοειδές as 'spirit' or 'the spirited element', and the expressions used by the latter two scholars are close paraphrases of these. A point of some interest is that Plato, in the expression used here, seems most probably to be using θυμοειδές as subject and ἄγριον as object. i.e. he is saying, 'The θυμοειδές part would produce the roughness', not,

II

as the translators (except Spens) take him, the other way round. But even if he were, by contrast, saying (using ἄγριον and θυμοειδές as interchangeably generated and generator, as well as virtual synonyms) that 'roughness' would engender the θυμοειδές in our nature, and that, properly nurtured, this roughness would be courage, it would make little difference. We simply have an even closer tie here between the central characteristic features of θυμοειδές and the ill-temper of ἄγριον.

Of the translators, Spens, as we see, is the only one to turn the sentence in this way. A stock version of θυμοειδής seems now to be ingrained in the other translators' minds. At this stage they seem to have accepted it exclusively as that formally classified part of the soul which generates the general characteristics of 'drive'. As a result, the unexpected construction of this sentence slips by unnoticed. Even Adam assumes without comment that the sequence is θυμοειδές as subject, ἄγριον as object[55]. Yet the importance of the other sequence needs little highlighting. Plato, if he is using the reverse construction, must see - at this point at any rate - little generic difference between ἄγριον and θυμοειδές. But even if he is using the original construction mooted, he cannot be seeing much more. Otherwise the arguments led above on the source from which ἀγριότης may be derived could not hold.

b.24 As regards the translations of the individual word ἄγριον. All of these ('ferocity'. 'fierceness', 'rudeness', etc.)

represent versions equivalent to 'roughness'[56]. ἀγριότης, when taken in the present context together with later ones[57] (as also together with σκληρότης, χαλεπότης, φθόνος, βία, etc.[58]), suggests a distinct vein of malice. This is expressed especially in malicious negligence of others' interests, if not active injustice itself. 'Spiritedness', in contrast, suggesting in its essence the energetic, perceptive, morally 'good' individual, has no trace of malice. The positive extreme of spiritedness is rather of the order of rashness. Yet this too is a rashness in the cause of basically good ends. If anything, it involves self-sacrifice, as against the selfishness of negligence. On the other hand, if there were not most often a definite element of noxiousness, even malice, in θυμός (and so θυμοειδής) at their ordinary level, θυμοειδές could scarcely metamorphose into ἀγριότης - much less into βία[59]. The natural extreme of spirit is, as has been observed, foolhardiness or recklessness. But these are the faults of energetic, honourable enthusiasm, not of vulgar aggressiveness. In proposing 'spiritedness' as a primary source of ἀγριότης, the translators again seem content with far too favourable an approximation.

b.25 'Stirring up', 'rousing' (ἐγείρων)[60] is as applicable to spirit as to anger. However, from the above considerations the conclusion would appear to be that the baser element was there at the ordinary level. θυμοειδής still does not here mean 'spirited' so much as 'hot-tempered', 'prone to

irritation'. The most important feature of irritability is its aura of menace. The chief interest to others inherent in reporting of a person that he is irate is normally that he is in a state which is potentially dangerous to others. His irritation is a possible forerunner of incompletely controlled, aggressive action. 'Roughness' is a quality of essentially clumsy, and so potentially noxious, individuals. It also often goes with active ill-disposition, and is capable of spilling over into serious general harmfulness. In contrast, an oversupply of 'spirit' is never even remotely conceived of in this way. It is never even vaguely considered as such. We regard it as incapable of having adverse consequences for anyone but declared enemies. That the crude, lowly quality ἀγριότης could be produced by the development - excluding as irrelevant the more grotesque maldevelopments - of 'spirit' is impossible to conceive. Of hot-temper, certainly. Conversely, ἡμερότης[61] (gentleness) is not really a convincing opposite of 'spirit' at the negative pole either. Apathy, laziness, cowardice, as we have seen[62], fit this category much better. It may be that they are deficiencies of the 'higher', more 'deliberate' voluntary virtues. Softness, mildness, effeteness may be features of the lower, emotional and more involuntary level of the human psyche. But hot-temper is, in that eventuality, their natural counterpart.

b.26 A test for this distinction is elusive. Still, it could be the case that effeteness, softness, hot-temper, etc.

II

are attributes which people are not usually very heavily blamed for showing. And this is perhaps because they are of secondary importance to others. Praise and blame are reserved more for the cardinally important 'higher' mental manifestations. The importance of these latter lies of course in the fact that they initiate intellectually deliberate, sophisticated and so maximally serious acts influencing other people's lives. On the other hand, of the attributes we are presented with in this passage (juxtaposed in contrasting pairs[63]), ἀγριότης and σκληρότης, and μαλακία and ἡμερότης, only ἀγριότης and ἡμερότης have been discu ed. These represent, respectively, the opposite extremes to which t θυμοειδές can be developed. But then, so do the two we have not discussed, σκληρότης and μαλακία. And these are significantly less loaded with the 'harmful' coefficient inherent in any word associated with anger. ἀγριότης connotes positive harmfulness, ἡμερότης the negation of it. σκληρότης and μαλακία, on the other hand, are more or less neutral regarding harmfulness. These last two, especially μαλακία, as 'alternate' extremes of θυμοειδές, seem to bring us closer to the meaning 'spirited' for θυμοειδής than we have ever yet been. Plato does ascribe μαλακία to a surplus of μουσική. Nevertheless this would not discount a possibility that he is here endeavouring to give the lower, emotional sense of θυμοειδής a lift upwards. It needs now, for present purposes, to approach closer to the intellectual plane. Such a move will be a natural preparation for his treatment of it later[64] as the ally of the rational (λογιστικόν). The choice, too, of the term ἀνδρεῖος is significant. It provides a 'good' alternate form of

what θυμοειδής can be developed into at the positive pole (the 'bad' alternate being ἄγριος). As such, it then supplies another intellectual component in addition to the primarily emotional 'irascible' component.

b.27 In the Protagoras[65], Socrates actually equates bravery with wisdom. The irascibility that can be developed to bravery is here no longer just a proneness to anger. It has gone beyond simple passion. An advance has been allowed to a quantity in which the mind as well as the emotions not only plays a part, but overshadows the emotions altogether. This sort of entity, intellectually focussed 'drive' or 'emotion', might well do duty as 'spirit', Plato's inclusion of the term ἀνδρεία as a development of θυμοειδές would also seem to be evidence that what he wants to convey by θυμοειδές, at that point, is not just a passively emotional, but more a conscious force[66]. Nevertheless, when we see θυμοειδές linked elsewhere with φιλόνικον[67] and φιλότιμον (both called a 'reproach'[68]), and most of all with δυσκολία[69], we are made aware that it can be a defectively conscious force. ἀνδρεία is then at least as much of an improvement on it as ἀγριότης is a corruption of it.

b.28 Gosling comments[70]: 'It is not at all obvious what Plato is trying to isolate with the term "thymos"'. Further, 'either Plato is very confused or else he is using the word "thymos" technically to isolate a phenomenon for which there is no term readily available'. It may be justifiable to say this.

It sometimes seems difficult to tell whether we or Plato are confused, although Plato is probably the less likely, and proof that he is confused almost invariably turns out to be impossible. But what seems to be happening here is that Plato is not so much 'trying to isolate' a single natural phenomenon. What he seems to be doing is making use of θυμός as it is normally employed, but packing it from time to time with more matter than it normally holds. The purpose behind this would seem to be to combine several simple phenomena into one which he believes deserves to have a single compound existence.

b.29 Earlier treatment of the term θυμοειδής foreshadows these more 'loaded' instances, in the important passages[71] of Book IV. Even here, however, the loading is at first not uniformly applied. This is indeed to be expected on first citation in a passage. The listeners' minds must be prepared gradually for the 'packed' uses by preliminary normal uses. The complex versions can then safely be allowed to appear later on.

b.30 SECOND MAIN DIVISION OF USES - PARAS. 411 - 586.

The next passage containing an instance of θυμοειδής is the last prior to Book IV, and in a way introductory to it. Closely following it in the next book, however, are sufficient further passages to make the full sequence worth taking as a whole. In all, the passage contains eight instances of

variants incorporating the stem θυμ–.

411 a : Soc.: '"Isn't it the case that when someone conjoins with music the practice of letting these melodies we have just referred to as sweet, soft, and melancholy wail him into subjection, pouring into his soul via his ears as through a funnel, and lives out his entire life warbling and revelling in song, he first of all, if he had any θυμοειδές (1)[72] in him in the first place, softens it as one does iron and makes something useful of what was useless and hard. But when he carries this too far, no longer merely relaxing but beguiling it, he subsequently melts and pours it out of himself utterly, till he has completely melted his θυμός(2) away, and as it were cut the nerves of his soul and turned himself into a 'spineless spearman'."

"He does exactly that," he answered.

"And if," I said, "this happens to a person who is naturally ἄθυμος(3) at the outset, his account is quickly enough settled. If, on the other hand, it happens to someone who is θυμοειδής(4), it makes the θυμός(5) weak and easily swayed, quickly incensed by small matters, and quickly snuffed out. These people become irritable and bad-tempered instead of θυμοειδεῖς(6), full of snappish ill-humour."

"Very much so."

"But what if a person works hard at gymnastic and takes great delight in it, but never touches music or philosophy? Does he not, at first, owing to his bodily well-being, become filled with self-confidence and θυμός(7) and grow to be braver than normal?"

"He does."

"What of the case when he does nothing else - has absolutely no truck with any of the Muses at all? Surely if there was any love of learning in his soul it must, as far as it gets no taste of learning or inquiry, become - as it partakes neither of reason nor of the rest of the arts - weak, lame and blind through being neither roused nor nourished, its perceptions left unpurified?"

"Quite so," he said.

"I'm sure a man like that becomes a hater of reason and devoid of culture. He no longer persuades by means of words but by brute force, which he inflicts on everyone he meets, like an animal, and in his ignorance and oafishness his life has neither harmony nor grace about it."

"This is how things turn out," he replied.

"For these two entities, the philosophic and θυμοειδές(8) faculties respectively," I said, "it would seem then that some god has given man two skills, music and gymnastic; not for the mind and body as such, except incidentally, but for

those two faculties, so that they can harmonise with one another, exerting themselves or relaxing to the correct degrees."'

b.31 Of the translators, D. & V., Jowett and Lindsay use solely variants of 'spirit' for the 'θυμ–'-containing compounds. As greater expansion on θυμοειδής and its correlates can therefore only be obtained by reference to the versions of the other three scholars, only theirs are considered. Each version they provide is given after the numbered instance of the 'θυμ–'-compound:

(1) 'energy and initiative of mind' (Lee), (5) 'mind' (Spens), (6) 'energy' (Lee), (7) 'energy' (Cornford, Lee), (8) 'energy and initiative' (Lee).

(1) Lee's full sentence is: 'The effect at first on his <u>energy and initiative of mind</u>, if he has any, is to soften it as iron is softened in a furnace': The expression 'energy and initiative of mind' could be one of two things: First, an adjusted translation of what the translator believes to be an altered sense of the word θυμοειδής. Second, it could be a bid at a more familiar exegesis of the word 'spirit'. At the outset, it seems as though it might be the first. The ever-present germ of 'soul' in 'spirit' is displaced in favour of 'mind', its more ethereal connotations being excluded. That it is the second of the two, however, is shown not only by its excessively close approximation in meaning to 'spirit' as the word has been expanded above[73]. (This is so close as to make

the variation on the normal sense of 'spirit' for practical purposes imperceptible.) It is also shown by the equal incongruity of seeing 'energy and initiative of mind', and 'spirit', as 'hard' and 'unworkable' things that need 'softening'. Energy and initiative would need guidance, if anything; not softening. One could not conceive of them as obdurate, perversely unbending tendencies. Rather, by contrast, the hard intractability that needs softening is looked for in 'hard' people. And these people are, if not patently cross-grained and irritable, then certainly the sort who are so to speak "angry deep down". Their 'hardness', indeed, takes its very definition from their unrelenting intractability, and the intractability in turn is further braced by a force of emotion of which the hallmarks are those predicated of anger. 'Hardness' suggests a chronic, habitual lack of readiness to confer benefits, coupled with, importantly, an inflexible urge to inflict privation. This is the disposition most typically denoted by it. And its core, the means through which inflexibility is conferred on it, is irascibility, here of the most unreasoning sort.

b.32 This argument applies at first sight more obviously to 'energy and initiative of mind' than to 'spirit' and its cognates. Even so, it must still be admitted, on closer analysis, to apply virtually equally to 'spirit'. All that has to be taken into account is the selection of intellectual overtones[74] proper to spirit. The dual character of the

English term 'spirit' as an intelligent as well as energetic element is strongly etched into it - strongly enough to pass unquestioned. As a natural colleague now of λογιστικόν, we can see that θυμοειδές is meant-by Plato at least-to be specially adapted to assisting the rational and intellectual. But even now it is only a naturally part-intelligent energy source. It does not come up to the intellectual standard of 'spirit' = 'spiritedness'. That 'spiritedness' should be contemplated as capable of being, at any time or in any circumstances whatever, 'useless and hard', as above (ἀχρήστου καὶ σκληροῦ), puts an impossible strain on its normal sense. 'Hot-temperedness', on the other hand, has once again the right element here of "unfavourability" - in this case in particular of obstinacy. It is an indurated, stubborn, though not utterly mindless, type of tenacity. And this would call for 'melting down', 'rendering useful'.

b.33 (2) The melting away of θυμός involves 'cutting the nerves of the soul' and turning the subject of this process into a 'spineless spearman' (μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν). This suggests a less complicated meaning for θυμός, with 'nerve' or 'courage' as its major feature. 'Spirit' would pass well enough here. It also would for (7), where Cornford and Lee's 'energy' seems actually not even as adequate as 'spirit' to cover the general sense 'resistant mental and emotional backbone' that θυμός includes. It has an inbuilt 'bolster' - in a potentially perfectly good sense - as it were, of obstinacy and intransigence. It incorporates resistance by natural inclination to

outer influences, which a purely dynamic quantity such as 'energy' cannot convey. 'Hot-temper', by contrast, has both - for good or bad purposes.

b.34 ἄθυμος (3) is similarly unspecific, and adequately covered by 'spiritless'. On the other hand, θυμοειδής(4), θυμός (5), and θυμοειδής(6) point more uncompromisingly to an anger principle. If music is infused excessively into a θυμοειδής(4) man, it makes his θυμός(5) weak and easily swayed. It is quickly incensed by small matters and quickly snuffed out (ταχὺ ἐρεθιζόμενον τε καὶ κατασβεννύμενον). Such men become 'touchy and irritable'(ἀκράχολοι οὖν καὶ ὀργίλοι).

We are shown par excellence, by the words ἀκράχολοι and ὀργίλοι, that θυμός here bears the meaning 'irascibility'. The particular sort of 'ire' denoted may be snappishly petty, but this highlights it even more for what it is not - i.e. a lofty emotion. Its noun-adjective relation to θυμοειδής(4) combines with the placing of the two words closely adjacent to each other to lay added emphasis on the existence of their common stem. Their juxtaposition, suggesting that θυμοειδής is being expressly used as the adjective serving as precise counterpart to θυμός(5), obviously here = "(hot-) temper", has an intentional flavour. Lee translates: 'But if he is a man of spirit, the effect is, by weakening his spirit, to make him unstable, a man who flies into a rage at a trifle and calms down as quickly. His energy has degenerated into peevishness and ill-temper....'. But there is an important admission we

must make about the cardinal distinguishing mark of someone who degenerates into a pettily sharp-tempered individual, or about a faculty of the mind which degenerates into peevishness. And this is that it is hard to find an accurate single term for it. A second admission is that, of the single terms that can be found to correspond most acceptably with it, 'spirit' is close enough to escape being misleading. Yet even so a weakening of the spirit would not naturally suggest, as its natural outcome, ill-temper or peevishness. Nor, correspondingly, would peevishness naturally be predicated of degenerate 'energy'. What it would be predicated of is the degeneration of something resembling a healthy 'capacity for indignation'.

b.35 Spens' 'mind' for θυμός is again a much vaguer version. Perhaps, through that very vagueness, it could actually be more satisfactory than the more specific ones 'spirit' and 'energy'. But overall 'mind' is really not adequate. We can imagine the dynamic drive of 'spirit' made, in a sense, febrile and brittle by weakening. But weakening of spirit, unless it were a narrowly specified type of weakening, indeed an explicit alteration more than a weakening at all, would not so naturally lead to sharp-temperedness as to apathy, sheer lack of positive drive. What would most naturally, when weakened, lead to snappishness and petty-temperedness would be the capacity for stronger, deeper, more 'solid' indignation. At all events, weakening is necessarily weakening of something stronger than the product of the weakening (ἀσθενῆ ποιήσας

τὸν θυμόν). And, importantly, it would, except in very unusual circumstances, be weakening of a stronger form of that product, not of something generically different from it. That the products of the weakening here are attenuations of anger is therefore made especially obvious. From the vocabulary used, we see that the above conditions are fulfilled. The products of the weakening are derivatives of χόλος and ὀργή, both of which words signify 'anger' simplex and never anything else, in the relevant Platonic usages.

b.36 At (7), Cornford and Lee both give 'energy' for θυμός. They also each employ a different verb (underlined) from Plato's 'γίγνεται' (becomes): Cornford: 'The sense of physical fitness fills a man with confidence and energy and makes him twice the man he was;' Lee: 'the physical health that results from such a course fills him with confidence and energy (φρονήματός τε καὶ θυμοῦ) and increases his courage'. But we must observe that the outcome of the physical health is that the man becomes braver (ἀνδρειότερος). It is not that 'it makes him' braver.

There is substantial point in disputing these versions. The argument should be taken step by step. In the first place, it is to be asked whether increased health will necessarily on its own make a man braver. This query might reasonably, at a superficial level, be answered in the affirmative. But, second, the Greek (εὖ ἴσχων τὸ σῶμα φρονήματός καὶ θυμοῦ ἐμπίμπλαται καὶ ἀνδρειότερος γίγνεται) simply does not mean that. It does not

carry the significance 'the sense of physical fitness....makes him twice the man he was' (Cornford), or that 'physical health....increases his courage' (Lee). For these phrasings suggest that it is the physical health that increases his courage. They discount the intermediate stages. More importantly, they suggest that it might even do so independently of these intermediaries - the φρόνημα and θυμός it instils. The Greek construction is in substantial contrast with these renderings. It indicates clearly that the increase in courage is to be seen as a result of the φρόνημα and θυμός which the health generates, not of the health itself.

b.37 The aim in establishing this now emerges. In regard to the initial question, whether it is his physical health that increases a man's courage, we conceded that it seems plausible, at first sight, that good health or energy would alone make one more courageous. But Plato is not saying that. The sense of the strictly translated Greek may well be that it is the remote cause. But that is something else. It is thanks to the φρόνημα and θυμός with which the good health fills one that the man becomes braver. For instance, food may provide one with the energy to think, but we would certainly not say that one becomes more intelligent thanks to food. Further, in regard to the above translations of θυμός in particular, it seems far more plausible[75] that courage should be increased by something with strong emotional content than by mere energy. And this, after all, is what Plato is saying. He has not, at this point, talked about energy. He has talked about θυμός. Energy,even

in company with confidence, is here patently a mere part, an ingredient, of θυμός. But because it shows some predominance in the present context, it has been allowed to supplant the whole.

Three points need to be made about energy simplex. First, it contains no trace of the emotional content proper to θυμός. Second, it is an accurate translation of φιλοπονία, a word used by Plato[76] in the totally neutral sense characteristic of energy. Third, its link with ἀνδρεία, courage, is so unspecific that for Plato's purposes it could have made no point in the sentence. From a superficial semantic aspect it is acceptable. But if the full implications of Plato's summation of φρόνημα and θυμός to courage are to be captured by the translation, it must be more comprehensive. The "irascibility" fraction is broadly hinted at by the accompanying term (φρόνημα, as it is later by ὑψηλόφρων)[77]. There is a strong flavour of aggressive pride present in these derivatives of φρήν-, which would have provided some hint of what Plato was saying. But none of this is brought in by Cornford or Lee, although some who give 'spirit' for θυμός do allow for it (e.g. Jowett: 'pride', Spens: 'courage').

b.38 (8), the last instance of θυμοειδής in the passage, where γυμναστική is said to promote τὸ θυμοειδές while μουσική promotes τὸ φιλόσοφον, has a vaguer, more general sense. Here we are less fully supplied with circumstantial evidence for its intended meaning. Lee's 'energy and initiative' is therefore

at first sight acceptable. However, the very presence of the word φιλόσοφος, which implies in itself something like 'energetic, and possessing initiative, in the region of thought', makes such a rendering inadequate as well. Plato expressly says that the two disciplines, music and gymnastic, do not relate respectively to mind and body 'except incidentally' (εἰ μὴ εἰ πάρεργον). They relate to the φιλόσοφον and θυμοειδές elements[78]. This entails that τὸ θυμοειδές carries a further distinct constituent over and above energy and initiative. We are therefore obliged to translate it as something more than - at the same time no doubt including - energy and initiative. Once again, therefore, the translations are found to be attempts to render the whole by that part (or parts) of it that seem to have the most felicitous ring at the particular point in question. But such translations of course only satisfy as ostensibly logical and readable equivalents. The full spectrum of technical appendages of meaning belonging to the word they purport to translate is drastically reduced. If this is so much the case as to make the word even more unintelligible than translation makes any foreign word at the best of times, then Plato's aim has been utterly defeated. As far as the philosophical understanding of the various Platonic doctrines hinging on θυμοειδές goes, a better - though still not ideal - policy would be to use a more generally accurate term, e.g. 'hot-tempered', for θυμοειδές. It might sound less felicitous. Appearances might in some degree be sacrificed for the sake of reality. But the overall gain in truth would more than compensate these disadvantages.

b.39 This passage came at what was still a moderately early stage in the dialogue. It was still too soon, that is, for the 'packed' use (incorporating the 'higher' features) of θυμοειδές to come into full play. Hence, at the first mention of the word to summarise the characters of the natives of Thrace and Scythia (= Russia ±), barbarians traditionally known and feared for their vicious temper, we find it still at an emotional, low level. Certainly it is still without the principle of 'consciousness' or 'intellect'. These could only be predicated of 'spirit' (= 'spiritedness') proper.

435 e: 'For it would be laughable if one thought that the θυμοειδές element in the cities did not spring from the individual citizens who are subject to that reproach, as for instance the folk in Thrace and Scythia and the northern regions generally; or that of hunger for learning, with which one might reproach our part of the world; or again fondness for money, not least prevalent amongst the Phoenicians and the people in Egypt.'

To match θυμοειδές translators have: 'high-spirited character' (Cornford), 'the spirited element' (D. & V.), 'passion or spirit' (Jowett), 'spirited character' (Lindsay), 'irascible disposition' (Spens). So far removed here is τὸ θυμοειδές in sense from anything obviously <u>commendable</u> like 'courage', 'spirit', that having it is said to be a subject of <u>reproach</u> (αἰτία). This could never be said of 'spiritedness'. And even if the word αἰτιάομαι, to reproach, is used in the same sentence in connexion with τὸ φιλομαθές (the intellectual

curiosity of the Athenians), its initially weaker force as the verb is further weakened by its use in the optative. The whole clause, in short, amounts virtually to a mild joke about Athenian 'bookishness'. The chief function of this sentence, incorporating θυμοειδής, φιλομαθές, and φιλοχρήματος together, is to introduce simultaneously the three 'forms' present in the soul. But it also casts a certain amount of light on the nature of each. And the predominant impression we receive concerning the θυμοειδής quality is, as we have observed earlier, that it is one which people may be reproached for possessing in excess. That people should be reproached for being even excessively 'spirited' is hardly even partially plausible. That they should for being excessively hot-tempered is very much so.

b.40 A few lines further down[79] the corresponding verbs μανθάνω, θυμοῦμαι, and ἐπιθυμῶ are conjoined, and we may take this as conclusive concerning the 'anger' connexion of τὸ θυμοειδές. The verb θυμοῦσθαι means in Greek simply and solely 'to be angry' - nothing else - and Plato is stating here categorically that this is what we do by means of the θυμοειδές sector. For comprehensiveness' sake, the remaining uses must be examined. But the case for 'anger' may be assumed complete.

In the present passage, we may suppose that, as later[80], θυμός in this guise is limited in meaning, and inconvenient for him to use. From what has gone before we have to assume that in this passage, at first sight at any rate, it conveys the meaning 'anger'. The reason he separates it from learning and desiring would be, to the hearer, that it is still essentially different from them. (This is so whether or not it completely fills a void that the other two leave open.) And that much it certainly is. Anger is very different both from intellect on the good, and desire on the bad, side. But it is still a quality which, in the

guise we may admissibly believe Plato wishes it to have here, implies certain defects in the person possessing it. Its linkage with ὀργή[81], moreover, confirms its practical identity, at that point, with the passion of ire. This appears to greater advantage in 440 e:

'"We seem to be holding a view of τὸ θυμοειδές(1) opposite to the one we held just now. Then we thought it was a kind of desire; now we say it's far from being that, but much rather, in internal spiritual strife, throws its weight in with the rational element."

"Certainly."

"Does it do so as something different from, or as a form of, the rational element, with the result that there are not three but two elements in the soul, the rational and the appetitive? Or, as in the case of the Republic, when we found three types holding it together - the wealth-amassing, the military, and the councillors - so, in the soul, does this third element, the θυμοειδές(2), exist as a helper of the rational part, if it is not destroyed by bad upbringing?"'

Translators: 'spirited element', 'spirited element' (Cornford), 'spirited principle', 'spirited principle' (D. & V.), 'passion or spirit', 'passion or spirit' (Jowett), 'this third element' (refers back to 'indignation'(1)), 'spirit' (Lee), 'spirited element', 'element of spiritedness' (Lindsay), 'irascible', 'irascible' (Spens). Lee has given 'spirit' for the second instance of θυμοειδές, after translating the first instance 'this third element'. This 'third element' quite certainly refers to the 'indignation' by which he has already

three times rendered θυμός[82] just previously. The 'third element', in other words, is no more nor less, in his version, than 'indignation', although the immediate demands of felicity prompt him to use that ambiguous expression in its place.

b.41 Apart from Lee, Jowett has also made a concession to the 'anger' factor by his 'passion and spirit'. Spens alone, of the six, gives it full value with 'irascible'. And the indications for such a translation are very strong. First, we have already had reference to an εἶδος 'θυμοῦ καὶ ᾧ θυμοῦμεθα'[83]. This places θυμός in close conjunction with a correlate θυμοῦσθαι, which invariably carries the sense 'to be angry'. As Lee correctly infers, θυμός here contains a strong component of ire. Yet for some reason he does not contrive to bring this out in his rendering of θυμοειδές.

Then comes the example of Leontios' θυμός, rousing him to anger with himself for wishing to look at corpses[84]. The linkage of earlier θυμοῦ καὶ ᾧ θυμοῦμεθα with later ὀργήν (440 a 5) leaves little room for anything other than "rage" here.

Third is the sentence 'This account shows that the ὀργή sometimes struggles with the desires, as one distinct entity with another[85]'. By placing θυμός in the same camp with ὀργή, which is definitive for 'anger', Plato sets a further seal on the importance of the status of 'anger' in the constitution of the word θυμός. Finally, he now defines the third part of the

spirit[86], already named θυμοειδής[87], as the 'εἶδος τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ ᾧ θυμοῦμεθα'. By means of this expression, 'the form of the θυμός, and that thing by which we are angry', he provides a critical link between τὸ θυμοειδές and irascibility.

b.42 It remains now for him to recharge τὸ θυμοειδές with extra intellectual weight. This will transform it from mere emotion back into the more intellectually aware emotional force that he requires. (The relation 'intellect : emotion' is taken to stand, somewhat inexactly but conveniently, for 'λόγος : θυμός'.)

To do this, he first allows Glaucon to suggest that it may belong to the lower compartment - desire. He then proceeds to extricate it from that lowly station by, as we have seen, the tale of Leontios[88], who uses it to condemn his sensation-grubbing desire element. To need extrication at all it must have seemed to be allied with the avowedly inferior desire-fraction. It must suggest, on the surface at least, a suitably humble meaning. Plato achieves its re-elevation by showing first[89] that it never allies itself with the desires if reason chooses otherwise; later[90], that as a lion (as opposed to a monkey) its aid can be drawn on by the intellect. So, while it cannot be found to be unified with the rational sector of the soul, it can certainly not be left linked with the desire sector. In the meantime, we must concede to Jowett and Spens, particularly Spens, the closest approach to a fair version of τὸ

θυμοειδές. Again, none of the other translators gives due weight to the 'unfavourable' constituent.

b.43 The attribution of a face-value 'high-temper' to θυμός need not lay one open to an accusation of inconsistency after the earlier postulate that θυμός is a blanket term covering the entire mild-angry spectrum. From an inspection of Plato's use of the word thus far, it seems clear that it refers to an entity more or less of the nature of a primitive 'humour', constituting, in various concentrations, the cross-section of terms denoting the various degrees of anger-like emotion. But this does not exclude it from very commonly and familiarly holding the more limited sense of 'anger' simplex, which "spiritedness" emphatically does not. (For instance, we might observe that the word 'emotion' in English by itself normally conveys the sense more of a tenderness of feeling than any other specific type of emotion. Least of all does it convey an actively aggressive feeling such as 'anger'. Yet anger is, of course, at least as much 'an emotion' as pity, sorrow, gladness, or any other 'feeling' in principle allied to them. τὸ θυμοειδές' normal absolute sense, on the other hand, lies significantly towards the morally negative end of the scale.)

b.44 Now, crucially, having amplified and elevated the content of τὸ θυμοειδές in order to give it its proper place in the soul's triad, Plato in the remainder of this passage of Book IV defines the part it has to play in relation to the

'higher' εἶδος. In its new shape it can properly act as supporter of, while being subject to, the rational element. It also acts in conjunction with it as overseer of the element of desire.

441 e: 'Accordingly, is it not fitting for the rational part to rule, being wise as it is, and holding a supervisory relation to the whole soul, and correspondingly fitting for the θυμοειδές to be subordinate and an ally to it?'

By this stage it is easier to agree with translators in their renderings (which are here uniform) of τὸ θυμοειδές as 'spirit', 'the spirited element', etc. There has always been room in it in a distinct degree for the elevated element, and at this point there is more room than usual. The morally more neutral translation 'emotionally energetic' nevertheless remains preferable as the more accurate one, and should be maintained. In the same vein, at 442 c 1 we have:

'I think we call a person brave in that quarter when his θυμοειδές part adheres amid pain or pleasure to reason's rather than its own estimate of what is evil.'

Translators: 'spirited part of his nature' (Cornford), 'spirited element of his nature' (D. & V.), 'spirit' (Jowett, Lee), 'spirited element' (Lindsay), 'irascible part' (Spens). Here Spens alone permits the anger element to remain foremost, which for accuracy's sake is probably where it should remain. θυμοειδές' secondary role in this specific instance, however, makes its full weight of meaning hard to assess.

b.45 The English terms 'high-spiritedness', 'morale', 'courage' are substantives so closely alike that the importance of the fact that Plato contrasts their Greek equivalents must not be underestimated. They have forced themselves on our notice throughout all six translations of these first four books, beyond and superimposed on anything we might ourselves at first have taken θυμοειδές to mean. Plato's contrasting them is evidence enough on its own that he takes them to be importantly different. To translate them, therefore, by means of terms so heavily weighted with moral, military, and other 'positive' idealism in the modern tradition as the English versions mentioned must inevitably prejudge a key issue. It certainly altogether sacrifices what any hearer of Socrates would have been able to pick up when he heard the Greek words. For a person to be called 'spirited', a 'man of spirit', etc., is an unquestioned mark of commendation in English. The terms ὀργή, ἀγριότης, βία, ἀκράχολος and others by contrast connote ire and violence. If they are cited by Plato as developments - corruptive developments though they may be - of θυμοειδές, they must force our thinking along a quite distinct track. The conclusion they suggest is a very different one, yet it is one at many points clearly intended by Plato. Indeed, they ultimately compel us to recognise the presence commonly, in τὸ θυμοειδές, of a ground-component of nothing less than the emotionally crude and inflammable. The existence of this ground-component has, moreover, a crucial significance. It signals, in its capacity for 'reinforcing' the πλεονεξία (greed) characteristic, and φιλοκερδές (the avaricious) generally, that

τὸ θυμοειδές is the possible major or exclusive origin of universal Injustice (ἀδικία).

b.46 The division used so far has been as much a natural as an artificial one. An earlier series of uses of the word θυμοειδής (up to and including those in Book IV) has been examined as a whole, prior to those in subsequent books. The principal purpose of inspecting the earliest uses in Books II and III was to try to pin the term θυμοειδής down in its most 'unspecialised' form. This would help one to see how great a degree of, for instance, irritability (as also of desire, intellect, etc.) was normally incorporated into it at that level, and to check from these findings whether, and if so how far, its meaning became specialised in Book IV. (The specialisation continues later when the quality it represents is formally classed as one of the triad composing the soul.) The material in these earlier books forms quite substantial evidence on its own for the overall common meaning of the word. Nonetheless, the further instances of its use provide grounds for adjustment (as also for confirmation) of the previous findings, and in addition help answer certain central questions about it. For instance, its connexion with ἐπιθυμία, and the degree to which it can be developed to contribute to good or bad, are urgent points for analysis. These are only fully clarified later on in the dialogue.

b.47 One of the principal aims of this extended investigation has been to show that considerable evidence for a morally negative constituent in θυμοειδής occurs further on into the Republic as well as at the outset. The only translator, as we have found, who consistently introduces this element into the text (at the expense, sometimes, admittedly, of a broad enough rendering of θυμοειδής at some points) is Spens[91]. The other scholars no doubt feel that, while there is such an element present, there is also a strong one of disinterested drive, and more so - a predominantly favourable form of drive. They regard this as strong enough, clearly, to make it necessary to render it explicitly and uniformly at the expense of the other element in a translation. For the English language (as opposed to, e.g., German, where, we found, Zorn comes very close to doing so) just does not provide a word blending both anger (in an almost neutral form) and drive. In consequence, they usually take the 'high road'. They translate as 'spirited' what ought to be something of lesser calibre, and automatically its metamorphosis to (or generation of) 'roughness' (ἀγριότης)[92], 'rancour' (φθόνος)[93], and ultimately 'violence' (βία)[94] loses conviction. But it should not lose it. There should be no such impoverishment of the word. It should not be shorn in a translation of what it had in the original. The possibility of a connexion being at all readily seen between θυμοειδές and Injustice must not be virtually eliminated, as it is. So this consequence is serious if there is reason to suppose that Plato meant there to be such a connexion.

It goes without saying that Plato takes the most important link between the soul and Injustice to be the ἐπιθυμίαι. (These, as the 'desires', are the generators of πλεονεξία.) But the θυμοειδές element patently has a most powerful link in its own right with Injustice. If its role as a lion is chiefly to aid justice, and only aid the many-headed beast[95] of ἐπιθυμία when perverted into doing so, not even this is critically important. The θυμοειδές' exclusive power is to produce random action (= injustice and justice indiscriminately and by coincidence). This, therefore, is the quantity that needs to be taken into fullest account. And we see the separate stages of its development in the later books.

b.48 Summed up, the present purpose is first to note the various versions translators give of θυμοειδής at the remaining, and essentially later, loci in the Republic. Second, it is to discuss their various merits, as before, but in particular to ascertain whether the earlier indications of a negative or 'anger' overtone in it are further substantiated. (A similar review is at the same time made of the so-called 'higher' constituent in 'spiritedness'.) The final aim will then be to settle on the most accurate general meaning - if any - attributable to the word, in terms of these findings. By then, it is hoped, there should be adequate ground for such a determination, given the help also of an inquiry into its connexion, first with ἐπιθυμία, and, second and most importantly, with ἀδικία.

b.49 Two instances only of θυμοειδής are found in Book V. Neither, unfortunately, seems to provide any additional pointers to its meaning.

456 a 4: 'And one woman will be a lover of learning, another a hater of it? One will be θυμοειδής, another ἄθυμος?'

Translators: 'high-spirited', 'spiritless' (Cornford, Lee), 'spirited', 'spiritless' (D. & V., Lindsay), 'has spirit', 'is without spirit' (Jowett), 'of high spirits', 'of low' (Spens). The context is, as is said, an unrevealing one for purposes of determining the sense of θυμοειδής. This forces translators to depend on other uses of the word, and the 'spirit'-orientated versions can therefore hold their own more or less unchallenged. Second,

467 e 4: 'We must get them onto horseback as young as possible, and, after teaching them to ride, bring them along to watch combat on their horses, not θυμοειδεῖς and war-like ones, but as swift and easy to handle as can be obtained.'

Translators: 'spirited' (Cornford, D. & V., Jowett, Lee, Lindsay), 'high-mettled' (Spens). In view of the general, open context in which θυμοειδής is used, 'spirited' here once again provides a satisfactory enough translation. A version incorporating a certain 'fierceness', as, e.g., 'hot-tempered', would nevertheless not be less satisfactory. An aggressive (let alone an actively angry) horse would certainly not be less ready to attack than a 'spirited'.

b.50 Earlier passages in Book IV are more fully committed.

547 e 3: 'So, fearing to put wise men into positions of authority, since it no longer has this sort of men in their unadulterated, energetic form, but mixed, will it not incline towards the θυμοειδεῖς and more straightforward, the ones better adapted for war than for peace, and hold in honour the tricks and devices associated with that? Then, by constantly making war, will it not acquire many of the characteristics of those people for its own?'

Translators: 'with plenty of spirit' (Cornford), 'men of spirit'(D. & V.), 'passionate' (Jowett), 'hearty' (Lee), 'spirited' (Lindsay), 'forward' (Spens). θυμοειδής is here earmarked as a characteristic of the cruder (but not crudest) type of person. It is inferior to the intellectual, but superior to the appetitive. Hence it displays its ingredient of wrath more decisively, and Jowett's 'passionate' and Spens' 'forward' seem suitably designed to capture this.

b.51

550 b 3: 'Then the young man, hearing and seeing these things, and hearing his father's words and seeing his way of life alongside that of others, tugged at by both - his father stimulating and augmenting reason in his mind, the others desire and τὸ θυμοειδές (1) - since he is not naturally

a bad man, but keeps company of an evil type with the others, is pulled by the two contrasts into a middle course, surrenders the governance of himself to that middle course, the ambitious and θυμοειδές(2) and becomes an arrogant (ὑψηλόφρων) and ambitious man.'

Translators: 'ambition', 'high-spirited' (Cornford), 'spirited element', '<u>hot-tempered</u>' (D. & V. give '<u>hot-tempered</u> and contentious' for 'φιλονίκῳ καὶ θυμοειδεῖ' - order uncertain - but as they elsewhere take φιλόνικος as '<u>strife-loving</u>' (581 c 4), 'honour-loving' (586 d 5), etc., 'hot-tempered' may here be taken to be their version of <u>θυμοειδής</u>), 'passionate', 'passion' (Jowett), 'ambition', 'competitive spirit' (Lee, for φιλονίκῳ καὶ θυμοειδεῖ), 'spirited element', 'spirit' (Lindsay), 'irascible', 'irascible' (Spens). Davies and Vaughan, Jowett, and Spens all, as we see, finally show a <u>marked</u> inclination here towards the anger-orientated version (though oddly enough, the reason for their preference at this point seems actually not very clear).

b.52 The last passage before 572 a has probably the most striking example of anger-incorporation. Here we find much firmer commitment:

<u>553 c 1</u>: '"Seeing this, my friend, and enduring it all and losing all his possessions, he immediately - in fear, I think - hurls ambition and τὸ θυμοειδές headlong from their throne in his soul, and,

humbled by poverty, turns to money-making, gathering it by grubbing, saving, and husbanding little by little. Don't you think that this sort of man then seats the appetitive, money-loving sector on that throne, and makes a great king out of it, decking it out with tiaras and bracelets and ceremonial daggers?"

"Yes."

"And, setting the reasoning and θυμοειδής parts on the ground round about it, and enslaving them to it, he refuses to allow the one to reason or speculate on anything except by what means he can make more money out of less, while he forces the other to admire and honour nothing but gaining money, or whatever leads to that."'

(The phrase 'φιλοτιμίαν (ambition) τε καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές' complicates the business of rendering the first instance of τὸ θυμοειδές. Where translators' versions are paraphrases of the text, the part of each rendering taken to cover φιλοτιμίαν is bracketed.) Translators: 'spirit (of eager ambition)', 'ambition' (Cornford), 'high-spirited element', 'high-spirited element' (D. & V.), 'passion', 'spirit' (Jowett), 'courage' ('and ambition', but the order in which these are meant is not clear), 'ambition' (Lee), 'spirited element', 'spirited element' (Lindsay), '(ambitious and) forward', 'ambitious' (Spens). Variants here from the 'spirit' theme are Jowett's 'passion', Lee's 'courage' (also Spens' 'forward'). 'Passion' is a familiar enough alternative to 'spirit', but provides a

most striking contrast here with 'courage', which may readily be conceived of as cool. That two such considerable scholars as Jowett and Lee should produce two such strongly dissonant solutions to the problem of translating θυμοειδές as "passion" and "courage" suggests an important consideration. Each must be concentrating on what he takes to be a distinctly characteristic ingredient of it. The likelihood nevertheless remains that their translations at least have some important factor in common. And this factor (assuming it is there) is evidently important enough for highly contrasting overtones to seem admissible without prejudice to a proper rendering. The core of meaning in question could very plausibly be 'drive', 'spirit'. But whereas Jowett has given it an 'anger-', or at any rate emotional, component, Lee has perhaps somewhat arbitrarily introduced the danger-defining feature 'courage'. In this he may be straying from Plato's meaning to an even greater extent than he would if he had not from the very beginning used 'spirit' as a standard source-word for absolutely every translation of θυμός and τὸ θυμοειδές.

b.53 It was reassuring earlier to be able to establish that Plato does on numerous occasions use the words θυμός and θυμοῦμαι with meanings strongly stressing anger. This was of assistance because, as we saw, he at several points[96] juxtaposes these with θυμοειδής as related terms, or as constituent and compound. The net result of the two of these taken together is that we are given to understand that he

regards the constituent as carrying the same semantic value when incorporated in the compound as on its own. Our later submissions of an anger-element in θυμοειδές are now further confirmed by this.

b.54 The most arresting example of anger incorporation occurs early in Book IX.

572 a: ...'when, as I think, a person preserves a healthful and temperate attitude, and rouses his reasoning faculty before going to sleep... similarly, having calmed the θυμοειδές (1), takes his rest without falling into rages (ὀργάς) with people owing to the arousal of his θυμός(2)....'

Translators: 'passions', 'anger' (Cornford), 'spirited element', 'spirit' (D. & V., Lindsay), 'passionate element', 'quarrel' (1), (Jowett: the word 'θυμός' seems actually to be omitted in his paraphrase), 'spirited part', 'temper' (Lee), 'irascible part', 'passion' (Spens).

The expressions

'go to sleep after having calmed the θυμοειδές element', 'without falling εἰς οργάς with people owing to one's θυμός being roused',

show that the θυμοειδές element, unlike spirit, has at times to be calmed, and can be responsible for the individual's reaching a state of fury. Here it not only explicitly contains the 'anger' element, but connotes virtually nothing else.

Nonetheless, we still need at this point to suspect a blanket nature of the Greek emotional term ὀργή. Reference to 'desire' (ἐπιθυμητικόν, 571 e 1) a few lines above (rape, murder and greed are the three heads) covers lust; and the wider senses of ὀργή, 'disposition', 'mood', 'temperament', etc., are inapplicable. Still it would not seem reasonable to suppose that they are displaced altogether by that of anger. (Significantly, ὀργή, like θυμός, also denotes an emotion-range. A mood of anger is, however, its commonest meaning, and here, in the phrase εἰς ὀργὰς ἐλθών, probably its dominant one. The term θυμοειδές in this passage may, then, more or less unequivocally be attributed the meaning 'anger element'.)

b.55 Taking this into account, the English version closest to the significance of the Greek seems again to be that of Spens. Cornford and Jowett leave a vaguer impression, with introduction of the notion of passion. Otherwise they seem nearer the mark than elsewhere, as well as providing mutually consistent renderings of both words. On the other hand, Lee, while deciding on 'temper' for θυμός, remains content with the 'spirit' asociation in his version of τὸ θυμοειδές ('spirited part'), and is accordingly partly inconsistent. In turn, Davies and Vaughan and Lindsay, conceding still less with their renderings 'spirited element' and 'spirit', may be thought liable to a direct charge of one-sidedness.

b.56 581 a 9 fortifies earlier evidence, if it adds little to it:

> '"Well, don't we say that τὸ θυμοειδές aims constantly, and in its totality, at dominating, defeating, and gaining repute?"
>
> "Yes."
>
> "So, if we called it contentious and ambitious, we wouldn't be far out?"
>
> "Quite the reverse."'

Translators: 'spirited element' (Cornford, Lindsay), 'spirited part' (D. & V.), 'passionate element' (Jowett), 'element of spirit' (Lee), 'irascible' (Spens). This passage, like some previous ones, is again somewhat thin in material for a definition. Dominating, defeating, and gaining repute are aims proper to 'drive' in a fairly wide sense, and do not shed much light on what special type of drive is envisaged. The character of τὸ θυμοειδές as 'drive' is amplified still further by the word ὥρμῆσθαι. There is no clear link between aiming energetically at dominating, etc., on the one hand, and a specific emotional state on the other, whereas on the contrary, as has been seen[97], the word θυμός is radical for emotion. But the essence of θυμός is that the drive it produces is emotional, ranging morally from the 'goodness' of spiritedness through neutrality to the 'evil' of rage.

b.57 A more significant piece of evidence materialises shortly after this. In the ensuing commentary on it we quote the most important collection of phrases, for the purpose of

this thesis, in the whole of the Republic.

586 c 7: 'Must not a similar situation obtain in regard to the θυμοειδές element, when someone indulges it to the full in envy (φθόνος) because of vanity, in violence (βία) in the cause of aggressive ambition (φιλονικία), or in θυμός through ill-disposition (δυσκολία), pursuing a surfeit of honour, triumph, and θυμός without reason or intelligence?'

Translators: (for θυμοειδής, θυμός, θυμός respectively) 'spirited element', 'outbursts of passion', - , (Cornford), 'spirited element', 'anger', 'anger' (D. & V.), 'spirited or passionate element', 'angry', 'satisfaction of his anger' (Jowett), 'element of spirit', 'ambition', 'ambition', (Lee), 'spirited element', - , 'anger' (Lindsay), 'irascible part of the soul', 'anger', 'anger' (Spens). Numerous examples[98] are, as we have seen, available in the dialogue of the root terms θυμός and θυμοῦμαι being used with the respective, explicit meanings 'anger' and 'being angry'. E.g. a person acts θυμῷ owing to ill-temper (δυσκολία)[99]. Or we find θυμός, numbered with lust, desire, pleasure, and pain, clearly meant as a passion[100], and only translatable in the context as that of 'temper', or more accurately 'bad-temper'. Now, again, at 465 a, we have: εἰ πού τίς τῳ θυμοῖτο, ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ (i.e. τοιούτῳ = ἀμύνεσθαι, with ἀνάγκην τιθέντες as rider) πληρῶν τὸν θυμὸν ἧττον ἐπι μείζους ἂν ἴοι στάσεις, "If someone is angry with someone else, then, satisfying his θυμός by opposing him, he will the less proceed to worse conflicts."

These words are crucial for this thesis. It is plainly - and only - some aggressive feature of the aggrieved party, his

resentment or ire, that will be appeased by his "taking up arms" physically against the offender. No aspect of 'spiritedness' can answer here. But now, on top of all this, we have constantly had indications that θυμός wells up irrepressibly in a man; that in this context it causes the aggression-urge which is at the basis of all injustice. Here is Plato's prescription for dealing with it. Now, by obviously controlled contest (ἀμύνεσθαι), men will πληρεῖν ('satisfy' - i.e., in the context, 'tap') their θυμός. Aggression-urge will lapse, and injustice be terminated.

This germinal finding receives fuller treatment in later, concluding chapters. To return temporarily to the current point concerning θυμοειδής' fuller meaning : θυμωθείς is, at 536 c, clearly enough 'angry' even without being coupled with ἀγανακτήσας. These meanings are not really questioned by anybody. What is questioned is again the most general meaning of the word θυμοειδής, often placed alongside them, and of which they presumably contain in common the principal constituent.

b.58 In the above passage (586 c), the θυμοειδές element of the soul is associated by Plato particularly with φιλονικία and φιλοτιμία[101]. In turn, these two are coupled with δυσκολία. The θυμοειδές element, the archetype of these propensities, gives rise, through them, to, respectively, φθόνος, βία, and θυμός. φθόνος, 'envy' or 'rancour', carries a large weight of ill-feeling, if not very concentrated. βία in Attic law is

direct physical assault. Usually in the form of rape, it includes all other types of violence, and involves at best arrogant but less intense violence inflicted on an unwilling victim, at worst serious and illegal on an unwilling. It is, in short, an act performed in consequence of uncontrolled passion. This can be of anger, lust, or greed.

Here, obviously, is a strong emotion-component. There is nothing 'high' about it. That is clear enough. Still, to supplement any 'higher' 'spirited' element that might be thought to be present, we have an unexceptionable guarantee for a specifically 'ire'-orientated meaning of θυμός in δυσκολία. δυσκολία is standard Greek for peevishness or ill-humour, and it is more naturally the generator of ire than of any other emotion. We have abundant reason to envisage its meaning here as the indulgence of untrammelled spleen. All three of these dispositions, envy, violence, and anger are now directly laid at the door of θυμοειδής. And with them are their originators, ambition or vanity, contentiousness, and ill-humour.

b.59 This is no high destiny for θυμοειδής. All the above characteristics are totally ungenerous, quite remote from 'spiritedness'. Admittedly, they arise from the individual's indulging the θυμοειδές faculty 'without reason or intelligence' (ἄνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ, 586 d 1), and in this respect they are rather parallel to the ἀγριότης and σκληρότης resulting

from participating too much in gymnastic at the expense of music. Still, they are the accepted fruits of τὸ θυμοειδές in its own right. They can emanate from it when it is unqualified by outside influences, and as such they do not by any means present a favourable impression - which 'spirit' invariably does.

b.60 Lee's rendering 'ambition', by extensively altering that impression, is misleading. 'Ambition' in modern usage is overall a noble, not a mean, thing. The 'anger' and 'angry' of Davies and Vaughan, Jowett, Lindsay, and Spens are clearly closer to the true denotation. Though even 'anger' is more respectable than the peevishness that δυσκολία demands. Cornford, with 'outbursts of passion', gives the nearest to an exact rendering of the sense the Greek indicates.

To suggest that 'spiritedness', even an unregulated 'spiritedness' permitted to run amok, could produce such base mental or emotional phenomena as envy, violence, and bad temper is to humble it beyond anything that its traditional meaning could imply. To come so low, it must, as has been contended, have at least the germ of baseness. But 'spiritedness', to reiterate something already frequently stressed, just does not have that germ. A translation of τὸ θυμοειδές incorporating at least 'irritability' is essential. And while Lee's rendering 'ambition' therefore seems a radically unwarranted departure, the others, with the exception of Cornford's, though less wide of the mark, still do not give enough weight to the element of irascibility.

b.61 At another point[102], we have seen θυμοειδής presented as the opposite of 'manageable' (εὐηνιότατον). One can read a good element into unmanageability and headstrongness in a horse. It may be hard to hold because of its eagerness to be in the thick of the fighting. But it seems doubtful here that this will do to pull the quality off the border-line of the irresponsibly 'hot-headed'. In contrast to 'spiritedness', 'hot-headedness' is necessarily somewhat directionless. Instead of possessing the implicit element of intellect[103] guiding the spirited individual, the hot-headed individual suffers from diminished responsibility and mental power. He is not totally <u>without</u> mental power, but as his θυμοειδές is unsupplemented by sufficient logistic, he is intellectually inadequate, and veers in whatever random direction his passion happens to turn him. Correspondingly, at 547 e, the θυμοειδής individual, better at making war than keeping peace, is constantly associated with the deceits and tricks of war. The urge for heated action <u>as such</u> is predominant in him. The wisdom or unwisdom, justice or injustice of that action takes second (or no) place. These uses further reveal the claim of a 'lower' component, 'irascibility', 'ire', etc. to a far more pre-eminent status in the make-up of the word θυμοειδής than it has so far been accorded.

b.62 <u>THIRD MAIN DIVISION OF USES: - 588-590</u>.

We now approach the celebrated interlude (588-590) of the many-headed beast, the lion, and the man in Book IX. This section contains perhaps the most interesting material of all

regarding the breadth of meaning of θυμοειδής. In the parable of these three beings, standing for 'desire', 'hot-temper'[104], and 'reason'[105] respectively, there again seems to be - as is only characteristic of his open-mindedness - some conflation of terms by Plato. Still, the lion may be assumed to be meant at this point to correspond more or less exactly with the θυμοειδής sector of the ψυχή. Actual identification of the two is, in fact, found in the very first passage in which they are juxtaposed, although less clearly so afterwards.

590 a 9: '"Do not insolence and peevishness come up for blame when this lion- and snake-like element proliferates and asserts itself inharmoniously?"

"Yes."

"And are not luxury and effeminacy attendant on its slackening and relaxation, when it instils cowardice into the man?"

"Yes."

"Are not flattery and mean-mindedness found when a person subjects this same θυμοειδές element to the many-headed beast, and accustoms it from youth, by being abused for the sake of money-making and the beast's insatiability, to become a monkey instead of a lion?"'

Translators: 'the heart's high spirit' (Cornford), 'spirited animal' (Jowett), and 'that same element' (Lindsay, referring to the lion and the serpent elements, which indeed seem to be taken together as forming θυμοειδές). Then finally 'spirited element' (Lee), and 'irascible part' (Spens).

τὸ θυμοειδές and the lion here are, as we see, presented by Plato as explicitly one and the same thing. One inconsistency only seems to occur regarding such an identification in that, earlier on, the θυμοειδές is said never to come to the aid of the ἐπιθυμητικόν[106], while the lion does, at times, at least by implication. As in the following passage:

> 588 e 3: 'Let us say to the person who says that it is profitable to this man to be unjust but unprofitable to be just, that he is saying nothing other than that it profits him to feast the many-headed beast, thus making him strong, as also the lion and whatever has to do with the lion, but to starve the man and make him weak, so that he may be dragged wherever either of them hauls him, while neither accustoming them to each other nor causing them to become friendly, but allowing them to bite at each other and consume each other in their struggle.'

The beast and the lion tear each other when left to themselves. Or alternately they tear the man, or all three tear one another - the construction leaves all these possibilities open. But it is specially remarked that all three can also be made friendly (φίλα,etc.)[107], and in particular that the man can make an ally of the lion if he wants. We can conclude from this that, if he did not so want, the other two could make allies of each other against him. Their ability to cooperate is, however, not clearly asserted here or elsewhere, and is a subject for speculation. In addition, whereas earlier it was τὸ θυμοειδές

that developed into ἀγριότης[108], here it is the beast of ἐπιθυμία, not the lion, that produces ἄγρια[109]. The lion is a technically neutral, though in practice higher force - it is significantly a lion rather than a monkey. In its neutral guise it can theoretically be enlisted to support reason or desire. But it is definitely more explicitly linked to reason (589 b 3 σύμμαχον ποιησάμενος), and in serving this end it comes up, and with it brings τὸ θυμοειδές up, closer to the level of the English term 'spirited'.

b.63 Our aim is of course in the end to try to get as close as possible to discovering what sort of force Plato contemplated overall in θυμοειδής. One aspect of his treatment of it - the use of an illustration like the lion to represent it as a department of the soul - suggests an interesting inquiry. Indeed, his use of animals at all for this sort of purpose is worth looking into more closely.

Separation of the soul as a totally distinct entity from the body, while not Homeric, is indeed seen early on [110]. Plato is to use (or if the Phaedrus is earlier than the Republic, and it is probably later[111], he has already used) one important animal parable in his examination of the soul. This is the well-known illustration of a chariot driver[112] holding the reins which control his two subservient horses, one good and the other bad. The use of animals for this purpose might not in any case seem strange. Animals are so prominently live,

dynamic things which have a willed, directed dynamism. In this they are a great improvement on the less clearly intelligent natural forces such as winds, waves, volcanoes, etc. Yet their more-elemental-than-human behaviour ideally represents the different grosser aspects of the human behaviour-spectrum. On the same account, the Pythagorean notion of the transmigration of souls into the bodies of humans or animals probably also comes in here. The animal types chosen correspond in their behaviour with the various 'levels' of advancement the soul has achieved. Such a belief would naturally have prompted to Plato the pairing off of parts of the soul with specifically animal types. In as far as he shared the Pythagorean views, we would readily expect to find an appetitive beast on the epithumetic level. Then, next, would be a less appetitive, militarily nobler, animal at the purely thumoeidic. The most 'spiritual' type - the man - would be at the logistic. And this is what we do find. The many-headed beast takes up the ideally 'lowest' compartment, the lion the intermediate, man the uppermost.

b.64 The tripartite division of the soul is alluded to by Plato often enough[113]. The suggestion of Pythagorean connexions is prompted by the allotment of these animal labels to the three parts. But this mention of the doctrine in passing is such as to remind us that, so far from regarding himself as having originated it, Plato assumes that his colleagues in the discussion are already easily familiar with it as a piece of

stock formulary. There is no reasonable doubt that its origin is Pythagorean. Posidonius made this claim for it[114], and it would presumably in turn stem from the Pythagorean doctrine of the 'three lives'.

Plato is concerned, in classifying Guardians and non-Guardians, to give some account also of the physico-mental make-up of man. He would therefore draw on Pythagorean theory, as on other previous doctrines, to supply his own theory with illustrative images. This on its own is a fairly satisfactory explanation of his choice of animals for illustrative purposes.

But arising out of that, we have a further interesting question. Why should it have been three parts, and three animals, that should have been chosen? Admittedly Pythagoras had also had that arrangement. But Plato also clearly prefers a neat, systematic classification of the parts of any whole, where he can conveniently achieve this. And traditionally aphorisms concerning the middle course between two extremes, totalling three, had given the number three an inherent attraction[115]. Apart from that, there was the number's own symmetry and mathematical interest. We have observed that he probably liked the tripartite division for its neatness and mystical significance, apart from anything else. But, as has been observed before, he does not allow considerations like this to dominate his inquiry. And this is proved by the emergence of components of the triad that do not fit in with that system[116], but which he forces into it in spite of their

awkwardness. For instance, as we mentioned, the importance he attached to knowledge of the ideal forms leads him in the Republic to introduce above the Guardians the fourth class of philosopher-kings[117]. These "super-guardians", so to speak, are not just φιλομαθεῖς, that is, do not just possess standard wisdom. In addition, they are acquainted with the form of the Good. As philosopher-kings, they are not really (in spite of Taylor)[118] a generically different strain from the φιλομαθής type. They are only a somewhat advanced version of it. But they nonetheless have a distinct status of their own within that type.

b.65 Similarly, in the Phaedo[119], we are shown two distinct, separate types instead of three within the type proper to the lowest sector. There are those who become asses (the gluttons and drunkards), and those who become wolves, hawks, and kites. What seem to be meant to be exactly correspondent pairs - parts of the soul and human types - are therefore not, in Plato, invariably pedantically pigeonholed. This only happens where he finds that exact pigeon-holing still provides an adequate account of the reality as he sees it. The epithumetic sector of the mind may correspond easily with the moneymakers of the state. But when he comes to the Guardians of the state he finds that there is a problem. These men cannot be identical with the ἐπίκουροι, and exclusively θυμοειδεῖς, because they are also strictly scheduled to be φιλομαθεῖς. They appear to correspond with the highest sector much more than with the middle. But then, again, they

are also different from that highest sector. When the ἄρχοντες themselves come under consideration, they then occupy, as we have noted, not the highest, but the 'super-highest', position.

b.66 In the Phaedo we have clear reference to the epithumetic (81 e 1) and the philosophic (82 b 10) kinds of person. However, the thumoeidic man has metamorphosed. He is no longer the dynamic, vigorous person typefying the genus, but one who merely pursues civic virtue (82 a 11), and shows temperance and justice without philosophy or intellect. A phrase strongly similar to the Phaedo's ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ (cf. Phaedo 82 b 2) occurs at Rep. 586 d 1: ἄνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ. In the latter, Plato is clearly portraying the typically pure (extreme) type of θυμοειδής individual. To suggest that he means that this sort of man is still possessed of true temperance or justice, or that he could simultaneously be cultivating civil virtues, would be trifling with the text.

There are unquestionably two different types of individual at issue. That they are both made to fall technically into the 'intermediate' group is no detraction from the system. It just does emphasise that the compartments overlap. The triads are not exhaustive. Different blends of the three parts of the soul, and correspondingly of the three basic types of individual, have to be reckoned with. More than this, even the very archetypes in the soul (i.e. the ἐπιθυμητικόν, θυμοειδές,

λογιστικόν) seem to be conceived of as existing in some degree in combination. To take one instance, the character of the θυμοειδές compartment is (as mentioned)[120] mostly conceived of by Plato as having an intellectual rather than appetitive leaning. The lion can - if we adhere strictly to the text - only tear the many-headed beast (589 a). It certainly does not seem readily able to work in harness with it[121]. But it can readily be made an ally of the man. It leans preferentially towards cooperation with the higher element.

Again, in the Phaedrus, the one horse of the chariot pair is καλός and ἀγαθός[122], the other the reverse. There may be a correspondence - however slight - intended here between the soul compartments discussed in the Republic and those in this dialogue. But, if so, we see not so much an endowment of the θυμοειδές sector with unalloyedly good qualities, as a simple combination of θυμοειδές and λογιστικόν into a single whole.

b.67 Little further weight on the 'higher' side of its scale, as against that where anger predominates, is provided for τὸ θυμοειδές in the Republic beyond Book IV. A balance is maintained explicitly, where it is termed "μέσον" between ἐπιθυμητικόν and λογιστικόν[123]. Moreover, the suggestion is not lost that, just as in 440 e it is closely linked with λογιστικόν, so, by Plato's immediate viewing, it is closer to the higher than to the lower member of the triad. Admittedly, at 586 c, φιλονικία, φιλοτιμία, and δυσκολία are said to

generate envy, violence, and anger. Yet, in spite of this, competitiveness and ambition would, we might think, normally have a higher station than that. To be originators of such undesirable propensities as envy and violence is not an exalted fate. Yet they do not have that higher station. Spiritedness is, of course, light years away from these defects. e.g. at 548 c (taken together with 547 e 3 - 548 a 1, and earlier, 347 b 2) the clearest hint of baseness again occurs.

548 c: 'For it is mixed (the republic type being discussed),' I said; 'but one thing stands out really prominently when the θυμοειδές element is in control: φιλονικίαι and φιλοτιμίαι'.

For Plato's φιλονικίαι and φιλοτιμίαι, translators have: 'ambition and the passion to excel' (Cornford), 'party-spirit and love of distinction' (D. & V.), 'spirit of contention and ambition' (Jowett), 'ambition and the competitive spirit' (Lee), 'rivalry and ambition' (Lindsay), 'contention and ambition' (Spens).

These are scarcely vilificatory terms. Indeed, some would say that they were virtually commendatory. Yet Plato's clear intention here is obviously to set φιλονικίαι and φιλοτιμίαι down as thoroughly undesirable. The renderings of Jowett, Davies and Vaughan, and Spens are the only ones which incorporate, in 'contention', 'love of distinction', even a possibility of the disreputable feature pointed to. Depending upon how his words 'passion to excel' are taken, Cornford's version may admit it, in part. On the other hand, it may deny it even more decisively than Lee and Lindsay. The latter both,

in 'ambition and the competitive spirit', and 'rivalry and ambition', give the term an uncompromisingly lighter turn.

b.68 Here it is worth requoting the complementary passage at

547 e 3: 'And, fearing to put the wise men into positions of authority, since it no longer has this sort of men in their unadulterated, energetic form, but mixed, will it not incline towards the θυμοειδεῖς and more straightforward, the ones better adapted for war than for peace, and hold in honour the tricks and devices associated with that, and , making war all the time, acquire many of the characteristics of those people for its own?'

(Translators: 'with plenty of spirit' (Cornford), 'men of spirit' (D. & V.), 'passionate' (Jowett), 'hearty' (Lee), 'spirited' (Lindsay), 'forward' (Spens).) This repetition of the passage (cited at 50) is useful in consideration of the importance of bringing out more fully the unvarnished irritability ingredient that is so often and so clearly contained in τὸ θυμοειδές. Even Jowett and Spens with 'passionate' and 'forward' hardly give it due value. To be suited for tricks and devices, let alone for war, is a disgraceful mark of aggressiveness.

b.69 More directly we have, at

347 b 2: 'Do you not know that ambition (τὸ φιλότιμον) and covetousness are said to be - and are - an object of reproach?'

The lowliness proper to envy and violence would be especially appropriate if it were not for one thing: Their primary originator, τὸ θυμοειδές, is kept - most of the time - carefully separate from τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν[124]. Envy, and a tendency to violence, are passions very close to the baser types of desire. But in contrast, as was mentioned earlier, we tend conventionally nowadays to think of the will-to-win (φιλονικία), and the wish-for-honour (φιλοτιμία), as perfectly reputable qualities. We might well regard this association by Plato of φθόνος and βία (envy and violence) with them as somewhat extreme, a deviation from his ordinary treatment of them. Still, against this we have to lay the already familiar fact that the most normal senses of φιλονικία and φιλοτιμία in Plato's work simply are derogatory[125]. Once again, the special nature of the Greek attitude towards certain human qualities, here 'contentiousness' and 'ambition', is enlighteningly revealed. Or at any rate, whatever they most accurately mean, the Greek concepts φιλονικία and φιλοτιμία are as different from ours of 'will-to-win' and 'ambition' as that of τὸ θυμοειδές is from ours of 'spirit'.

Socrates uses these words φιλόνικος and φιλότιμος a great deal. It is too easy to ignore the to us at first strange point that there is indeed almost never anything commendatory about his way of using them. This is so throughout the dialogue, and even when he classifies them as higher than desire, that he thinks of them in general as possessing any particularly 'high' qualities must be strongly doubted. The fact must be faced that, as we have seen, he starts out early

with the direct comment that being φιλότιμος is a ground for reproach (ὄνειδος)[126]. It is even ranked along with the thoroughly vulgar trait of being φιλάργυρος, fond of money. Again, φιλονικία and φιλοτιμία are the main features of a state which is a mixture of bad and good (with the 'bad' put first - by Socrates)[127]. This is the state[128] which, inclining towards the θυμοειδής type of person, admires, by virtue of that inclination, the tricks and ploys of war[129]. There are further examples in the other dialogues (see s.v., Liddell and Scott) of this degeneracy attributed to it.

The aura of discredit clinging to these two terms φιλονικία and φιλοτιμία pervades Plato's writings. Yet the conventional tendency in English, or indeed overall modern western tradition is, we have noted, towards seeing good in 'ambition' and 'competitiveness'. The terms have strong connotations of 'aspiration', and 'honour-seeking' is, by the very flavour of the word 'honour', commendable[130]. (Their opposites, 'unambitious' and 'uncompetitive', certainly have markedly derogatory overtones, as though implying sloth and apathy.) The temptation to translate θυμοειδής by these words, the most familiar available in our language that convey the approximate meaning required, is certainly a ready one. But, equally, the temptation to see them as favourable then becomes absolutely automatic. It simply takes over from individual measured assessments of the word in its various instances. Accordingly, the moral status of φιλονικία and φιλοτιμία is raised out of all due proportion to its proper value.

b.70 The reason for the 'higher' status apparently subconsciously allotted by modern western translators to the words no doubt springs from the cultural conditions at present prevalent in the west. The sense given to 'ambition' alone is higher than it has been. For one instance, the Roman 'ambitus' has very much closer ties with 'φιλοτιμία ', and with essentially low aims of self-advancement, than modern 'ambition' has. The instance of the translators' conceptions concerning θυμοειδής itself, compared with that of the Greeks, is a case in point. As to Plato's reading of it, it may be that, in the atmosphere of the Greek democracy, where fewer legal checks probably existed to self-advancement by foul means than exist to-day, a struggle for high office implied a greater likelihood of crime. With its resultant harm to others, it was therefore suspected accordingly. Or, in contrast, it may be that Athenian culture had a more just appreciation of the sheer folly of ambition - for fame or self-aggrandisement at least. The probably less mature current Western viewpoint has no doubt not yet had the time to progress that far. Certainly in current (1985) English, to call a man 'ambitious' may not be praise, but it depends on the context.* And to call him 'unambitious' is without doubt even less like praise. The words 'ambitious' and 'competitive' used absolutely have a stronger implication in modern conventional usage of sheer energy and industry than of any other particular quantity. They are therefore, to that extent, not a just representation of the Greek φιλόνικος and φιλότιμος, where we can be confident that Plato is also using them in their conventional, unspecialised senses.

b.71 At any rate, then, the concept of an undesirable type of ambition or competitiveness is, at the present time, conventionally

* The remark "He wishes to make the world a better place" might quite aptly draw the reply, "He is ambitious".

virtually "out of date". Because of this, we may feel we can scarcely avoid being reduced to using out-of-date words to express it. We may, on the other hand, also feel that it is probably not much use trying to escape the discrepancy by doing this. After all, it only involves enlisting the help of somewhat dusty words like 'vainglorious', 'contentious', etc., which might in a technical sense translate the Greek terms more accurately, but sound too modish and clumsy to satisfy. The proper course would seem to be to try to achieve a compromise between accuracy and topical impact.

With this in view, 'vain' might, for a start, well be a better candidate than 'ambitious' for φιλότιμος. φιλότιμος seems limited to the sense 'loving of respect'. 'Ambitious' on the other hand conveys a glimmer of the sense 'eager for more concrete rewards' as well as the former.

But there is room, as we have seen, for reflection on this from a reverse viewpoint. Since Greek culture was in many respects so far advanced, we could expect many of its concepts of the 5th Cent. B.C. to be equally far advanced. Accordingly, so far from looking for obsolete words to translate certain Greek terms, we could far more plausibly expect to find them in avant-garde material. Certainly in the case of φιλόνικος we have a much more topical word than 'competitive' or 'ambitious'[131]. We have, in short, nothing less than the already several times quoted common-or-garden word 'aggressive'. To the extent that it not only has a fairly uniformly bad

sense, but also implies a constant tendency to attack, it is also more accurate than they. Yet it also has, modernly, a perversely 'good' sense. It is no doubt a shade too strong to meet all instances. The search undoubtedly cannot yet be presumed over. But the really 'impossible' candidates are steadily being eliminated.

b.72 The word 'contentious' as an 'overall' translation - if such, again, is possible or desirable - does suggest itself very persuasively. Atopical though it may be, the term has a more suitably moderate content of the element of anger Plato gives evidence of requiring than any other. In the circumstances, it may be best to fall back on it, at all events temporarily. Using the words 'vain' for φιλότιμος and 'contentious' for φιλόνικος, we then, in this particular passage, avoid falsely high-sounding impressions, which is all we can hope for from words like 'ambitious' and 'competitive'. As such, these simply do not fit in with Plato's use of the word θυμοειδής[132]. A man who is θυμοειδής is pugnacious; better suited to war than peace[133]; apt to become boorish if not given proper (musical) education[134]; inclined by nature to savagery and violence[135]. It would be strange if he came in for <u>any</u> serious sort of commendation. And that which <u>is</u> allowed him is allowed only because the 'φλεγμαίνουσα' ('inflamed' - i.e. with greed), aggressively fighting republic[136] was fixed on as the norm. But if Plato <u>decries</u> him, how can <u>we</u> commend him - in the context of Plato's work?

b.73 The quality θυμοειδές was only initially needed at all in the interests of bravery for purposes of making war successfully. Socrates holds no brief for war[137], so it is not surprising that τὸ θυμοειδές should so regularly have a somewhat deficient moral flavour. If we wonder how, in spite of all this, Plato can still, if not quite equally regularly, attribu certain high qualities to it, the defence may be made that these qual ties are allocated relatively. They are situated within the framewor of a republic subject to certain of the surrounding world's imperfections. For instance, Plato implies[138] that the war type of gymnastic is the best because the simplest. Given that, it is quite natural to suppose, granted other 'good' concomitants, that war must also, perhaps in itself, have something 'good' about it. But to suppose this is to ignore an essential fact. The level of gymnastic required for war lies within the framework of the state's adaptation for war. The ideal republic would, of course, be a state permanently at peace, unless fighting in its own defence. There would be no grounds for it to make aggressive war at all. It it were not for men's greed[139], it would never have become concerned with strife in the first place. But, seen also, in Plato's overall dialectical context, as a unit engaged in rational striving, as well as a unit for self-defence,it is inevitable that it should somehow be so concerned.

The result of this is that Plato's saying (404 b) that the war type of gymnastic is best does not really present a problem. It is no doubt, in effect, a 'natural' use of 'best' - like saying that a type of instrument which criminals find

ideal to break open locks with, silently and illicitly, is the 'best' instrument for that purpose. This does not detract from the fact that no law-abiding society would ever need this 'super-excellent' instrument. But the instrument still deserves recognition as 'good' within its own framework.

Similarly, in a peaceful society, gymnastic of the intensity required by actual war would, it appears, not be specially needed. Plato would, of course, want gymnastic even in the perfect society for purposes of health. He would just, we might suspect, not want an intense a degree of it. What is at first perhaps a little difficult to see is why he should take the trouble to suggest at all that it is the "war" type which is by way of being the simplest and the best.

b.74 The answer to this problem is perhaps more straightforward than it seems. There can be no doubt that he has tacitly abandoned as impractical the 'bests' of the hypothetical peaceful Republic first postulated. Again, an alternative answer might be that he genuinely means that he thinks the specific type of gymnastic required by war the best for young men to practise in peace or at any other time. Third (which seems less likely but which the sense allows of) is this.

He starts off by saying that the best type of gymnastic is simple, and a sister to simple music. In saying this, he is not necessarily implying that it is the war type that is best. He

is just saying that it happens to have something in common with the best, namely a particular need for simple music. However, this third possibility seems far-fetched. It is hard to believe that he would say that war-gymnastic has a notable characteristic of the best type of gymnastic unless, at the same time, he also meant that it is itself particularly good. And as he does not describe any other 'best' type, it is in fact the only candidate.

The point may seem to be laboured. Still, it will soon appear how fully the importance of gymnastic justifies this. It must certainly be admitted that to say that the war type of gymnastic is good (404 b) is by no means the same thing as to say that war is good. It is Plato's suggestion that concentrated gymnastic would be of benefit in a permanently peaceful republic that is so extremely interesting. In fact, it is radical to this thesis, and comes up for serious discussion later[140]. But it is more than a coincidence that all the very virtues most prized by Plato for the original peaceful republic should be those picked on as most suitable for the warring Guardians. Intelligence, moderation, simplicity, abstinence, sobriety[141], and finally gymnastic - all are included as apt qualities for fighting-men. One point at least that he must be implying is that the state never has much chance of being perfect. There are always people like Glaucon who demand the things which make it defective. One inference is of course that it must always be striving rationally towards that perfection, and this, if little else, does suggest a view of ἔρως on the socio-political level. But a good deal more must

also be inferred, and in particular the material concerning war-gymnastic, if an at all fully meaningful solution is finally to be reached concerning τὸ θυμοειδές.

b.75 At all events, to resume the previous argument, some transfer of thought has occurred. The Guardians are 'perfect' beings, but only as operating in an imperfect system. They have imperceptibly merged with the rulers of the 'inflamed' city[142], and their characteristics and requirements vis-à-vis war are held in common with such rulers. Yet Guardian training is at the same time to be the basis for dialectical research on Justice[143].

These considerations lead to a reassessment of the first possibility regarding Plato's treatment of the republic he chooses to discuss. This was that he is now explicitly concerning himself with a lower level of morality - a morality within the framework of an imperfect system. The system, that is to say, is one in which an overall grossly unjust thing, aggressive war, has to have 'just' and 'unjust' aspects allotted to it 'within', as it were, its own context (the rational striving concept here being excluded) precisely because it is unavoidable. It is as if Plato were saying: 'War has to occur. Granted this, the state must possess a system for dealing with it. Accordingly, citizens shall be called 'good' to the extent that they are effective within that system.' We must now take him to have passed into this different milieu of good, since his calling the Guardians'

warring qualities 'good' is otherwise unaccountable. Strictly, in terms of the original 'good' (where rational striving was not aggressive, but directed towards ultimate Good), we would expect them to be called something like 'bad but necessary'. Given that the good Republic was one framework, and the real Republic another, he would be saying that contentiousness was 'bad vis-à-vis the one', though 'good vis-à-vis the other'. (Actually he makes the transition without giving us notice of it. He does not make it altogether clear that he is moving in the new framework.)

This distinction of frameworks is, of course, in any case unnecessary. As has been said, it is hard - just to give one example - to tell whether he seriously means to call the war type of gymnastic 'good' even out of its capacity as gymnastic-for-war, or not. But his ultimate general meaning stays unquestionable. The 'extreme' type of gymnastic is of a very outstanding kind; it is a very good thing overall.

b.76 To sum up on the question of gymnastic, we can on the whole probably insist on the validity of this final conclusion on these grounds: the reasoning, after all, ran, 'The best gymnastic is a sister to simple music'. The conclusion to this is clear enough: The gymnastic of war is especially good. Plato virtually implies by this remark that it is the best, since, as we observed, he mentions no other that could be better. But we can let that pass for the moment. Even if a less thorny interpretation could be proposed, namely that the

gymnastic of war is a variety of the best gymnastic, the manner in which the passage is phrased demands more than that. It stands out that what is really meant is that it is an exceptionally good type of gymnastic. And even if he does not say outright that it is the best, why should he make such a point of saying that it is so specially good?

Since he does, we have to adjust our own view to accommodate this. The adoption of a 'common-sense' norm was inevitable, since to talk about a practical republic with one's terms of reference constantly those of an impractical would introduce a factor of clumsiness which any writer would wish to avoid. Plato would particularly have wanted to avoid it. The influence of Sparta could not be more evident, and we must take account of that here as well.

b.77 A fourth just possible explanation for the comment's apparent looseness could be worth mentioning. Plato may be neither tacitly abandoning the criteria of the original peaceful Republic, nor moving onto a new, lower level of morality. He may just be treating gymnastic with a properly lessened degree of gravity. As he has just previously pointed out, bodily well-being is decidedly secondary to mental[144]. The body does not by its excellence make the mind good remotely as much as vice versa. Gymnastic, being a bodily concern, does not therefore, on the social level, have that vitally fundamental importance for the political system that mental fitness has. It is not unthinkable to speak of it in association with a

thing like aggressive war. Socrates is, in any case, just giving a broad picture[145] of man's corporeal requirements. War may, as regards goodness or badness, be a somewhat indeterminate quantity (373 e), but, bad or good, its special type of gymnastic has limits. It not only does not therefore have to be strictly good or bad with war, but its[146] goodness or badness is not very important. It happens to be, as Socrates observes, good. Indeed, it is superlatively good. But it is ἐπίπονος[147], laborious, like all the rest of its genus - and so merely indirectly productive of good, not good <u>in itself</u>.

b.78 After these considerations, we may perhaps scarcely seem to need to decide all over again which of these possibilities concerning gymnastic seems the most likely. Still, some marshalling of a definite conclusion is not only in order, but an absolute priority. On the whole, the weight of preference seemed to lie in the direction of the first. This alternative allowed of Plato's using a new level of good - adopting a practical attitude (whereby survival now becomes a primary good) to the concomitants of war. He had taken a practical view of war itself. Why not take one of what inevitably goes with it? In the first place, although Socrates has said that immense ills arise from war[148], he has not committed himself to saying that war is itself good or bad. One simple reason for this would be that defensive war is obviously justified, but also, importantly, that <u>striving simplex</u> is something he sees as not only inevitable, but right, if only within the defined context of ἔρως. There still remains our

own certainty that for purposes of transcendental dialectic he must think any kind of gratuitous aggression extremely wrong. But we have to remind ourselves of the new, φλεγμαίνουσα system in which he is moving. Given, at all events, that war in these circumstances is inevitable, it is fair to regard him as supposing that those things which conduce to one's success in it are commendable.

He now proceeds to deal in different levels of good. He has already specified different levels of true existence[149]: ideal, physical, and represented-physical. Accordingly (through Glaucon), he divides good into good per se, good both per se and in bringing about good, and good in simply bringing about good[150]. Gymnastic is duly singled out as a member of the third category[151]. It is good purely in consideration of its good consequences - one of which would be survival in war. He interestingly regards it as laborious (ἐπίπονος) - so very contrastingly with modern views - so it incorporates some evil in itself. But, as was mentioned, this has little relevance, much less whether it is associated solely with things evil in themselves, since the good effects do not depend on its intrinsic goodness.

b.79 Our final conclusion, resulting from all this, on war-gymnastic could be that its being exceptionally good carries no implication for war at all. It need not necessitate that either war or war's concomitants be good, whether in themselves or indirectly (or even that gymnastic is good, except as a means to good). If this is kept in mind where τὸ θυμοειδές is

commended, e.g. said to be helper of an avowedly good property - τὸ λογιστικόν[152] - the inconsistency that had seemed to arise falls away. The quality 'being θυμοειδής' is not necessarily being said to be good in itself. It is merely being said to be good as a means, because it is forming a source of help to τὸ λογιστικόν. Indeed, in itself τὸ θυμοειδές is, as was observed earlier, strictly merely neutral. Or perhaps, to describe it more aptly, it is an ambivalent force, since it is able to be steered to good or bad ends. As far as it can be steered to good ends, it is (indirectly) good. As far as it can be steered to bad ends, it is the opposite. But the question of whether it is good or bad is in any case not the cardinal one about it. Its chief point of interest is that, as it unavoidably wells up in man, it must be catered for in such a way as to suit man's purposes best. That is, it must be handled in a way that will prevent it from running to the bad. In the connexion in which we are at present viewing it - that of war-gymnastic - we may thus conclude that what makes war-gymnastic so specially good is its special suitability for catering for θυμοειδής.

The way in which it would cater for it would be by tapping it through ethically neutral, but maximally intense, activity. This is critically important for τὸ θυμοειδές' part in injustice. The reason for what might well have seemed an unduly lengthy discussion now emerges. The exact attitude Plato had to aggressive war and related activities had, for explanatory purposes regarding θυμοειδές, to be extensively canvassed. It now begins to bulk clearer. Where θυμοειδής is designated

'righteous indignation', there is the limiting feature that righteous indignation only really comes in to play to counter acts of injustice. It would not be needed if there were no injustice. But if (as we hope to show) τὸ θυμοειδές itself contributes centrally to injustice in the first instance, it can obviously cancel out its own good consequences. In the ultimate issue, its gross accomplishment can be nil. The crucial question is, does it form the chief, or virtually chief, contributor to injustice? If so, how? Third, how is it to be restrained?

b.80 The importance of trying to decide whether Plato thinks the war type of gymnastic absolutely the best, rather than just the best in the context of suitability to a warring society, was essentially in the fact that it is an extremely strenuous form of gymnastic. Indeed, it is clearly in his view the most strenuous type of all. If, now, it is supposed to be suitable whether people make war or not, then there must be some special benefit that it secures for man which has no essential connexion with war. To all appearances, as we have seen, it looks as if this function were the critical one : strenuous gymnastic taps off the ever-accumulating fund of θυμοειδές which would otherwise sublimate in war. If such a fund of absolute energy were intelligently channelled, it could on release result in a beneficial version of the energetic conduct it promotes.

This view is set out provisionally here for its estimatedly

high potential importance. A further examination of the genesis of contentiousness supplies a fuller foundation for it.

b.81 The examination of τὸ θυμοειδές so far has shown that it constitutes a morally approximately neutral drive towards activity absolute. The balance, in accordance with Plato's varying emphasis, is tilted at times to good, at times to evil, but with a net approximate evenness of distribution in the outcome. The activity, just or unjust, prompted by τὸ θυμοειδές, is such in accordance with whether the reasoning part predominates adequately over the appetitive or not, and whether it has sufficient discriminatory powers or not. Plato's rationale for drive towards any end is expressed mainly in terms of desires (ἐπιθυμίαι, 580 d 8). These require satisfaction by "pleasures". There are pleasures proper to all three parts of the soul (580 d 7), and corresponding desires for corresponding pleasures. All creatures, however, desire the good[153]. And Plato is careful to state - and does so on several occasions[154] - that the good is distinct from pleasure. In parallel, he is careful to distinguish evil from pain.

b.82 A second crucial point may now be broached. Plato seems actually to have implied that pain as such could be desirable whether in the shape of strenuous gymnastic, aggression, or punishment - in short, emergency. At least part of the reason it is desirable must clearly be, then, that by

its own intrusion it relieves the pain caused by accumulated thumoeidic urge.

This must form a subject for more serious consideration than any other yet broached. Clear enough is the point that true pleasure can by his doctrine be to some extent an ultimate end, and true pain an object of avoidance. Less clear is the suggestion that some things hitherto thought 'pains' can be proved to be enjoyable. For to this extent they could not, therefore, actually be pains at all.

This poses an extremely profound question. Later on we investigate it to the farthest limits we can achieve. However, a third point which arises, and which must for the moment take our attention, is the seemingly trite one that some painful things can be desired because they lead to the avoidance of yet worse pains - just as some pleasurable things are avoided because they lead to the loss of yet higher pleasure. This, which is another matter altogether, has much to do with our immediate problem. The question of the exact nature of θυμοειδής hinges on it in the following connexion.

First, the θυμοειδές forms a drive towards activity which is characteristically of a strenuous kind. That is, it prompts what is by tradition technically 'painful' activity, and the incurring of pain generally. Second, since all activity must be one of either just or unjust, this activity must be closely monitored if one wishes to keep it just. Third, if the thumoeidic man seeks by this activity, as he must, a good[155]

proper to the θυμοειδές element present in him, i.e. an, as we conclude, painful activity, but one apparently relieving him of a greater pain - the discomfort of his thumoeidic urge - then it is going to seem logical to him to engage in it. In short, if all these things are so, then the thumoeidic man will embark on the activity concerned in the face of all but invincible opposition (and perhaps even that - opposition being, after all, just one more version of what he is seeking in the first place). And only one thing can ensure that, out of just or unjust, it will be just: namely, wisdom. Alternatively, utter exhaustion, via neutral media excessively tapping the θυμοειδές will, at least, ensure an avoidance of injustice. It will also involve a neglect of justice (through that sheer apathy of exhaustion), but the central aim would, we might say, have been attained.

b.83 However, not much further progress seems likely to be made in analysing τὸ θυμοειδές' position with regard to injustice until, first, its relation to pleasure, and, second, its relation to the good, are analysed. Pervading these two topics, and clouding them as long as it remains itself unresolved, is the supreme problem of the relation of the good with pleasure.

Some discussion of the ultimate Platonic criteria of good could clear up the motives through which people seek the good. In particular, it would throw light on the motives which cause markedly θυμοειδεῖς people to seek the good proper to τὸ

θυμοειδές. But most importantly of all, since numerous θυμοειδεῖς people seek injustice, it might provide some indication as to how they can think injustice a good (since, as we have accepted from Plato, all people seek 'good'[156]).

b.84 Relegation of the factor of pleasure-profit to the background in respect of the 'good' generally sought by man is unrewarding[157]. Indeed, Plato equates - if no doubt (?) playfully - pleasure with good in the Protagoras (354 b), and equates seriously desire for 'standard' pleasure with desire for profit (ἐπιθυμητικόν = φιλοκερδές[158]). He also states that he regards justice as more profitable (κερδαλεώτερον) than injustice[159], and the way he does this does not seem cynical, since he is here not dealing with justice in its transcendental form. It suggests that he means κερδαλέος (profitable) to be, if not precisely of the same substance as good itself, then somehow of the same 'family', if one might so speak.

It is remarkable also that Socrates at least suggests, in his story of what awaits malefactors in Hades, that the ultimate un-wanted thing[160] is pain[161]. Elsewhere, for instance, he also stresses that goods provide ἡδονή[162] (pleasure). Further, very importantly, as we have observed, he has established that justice is more profitable[163] than injustice. At the same time, nonetheless, he denies strenuously (excluding his possibly tongue-in-cheek arguments in favour of the opposite attitude, such as are given in the Protagoras) that ἡδονή itself is 'the Good'[164].

b.85 Plato's theory that an Idea of Good exists at all is no doubt one which costs him much difficulty. Socrates indeed altogether abandons the unequal struggle of working out what the highest Good is, choosing to postpone his investigation into it indefinitely. His simple explanation for doing this is that he doubts his own ability to find it out[165]. In fact, when he does hazard a definition, he is forced into tautology, saying at one point that things that are harmed become more evil (χείρους)[166], at another that evil is what does harm[167]. The idea of Good is a thing we must unceasingly try to acquire[168]. That much he does tell us. ἔρως has no other aim. But apparently this has to happen chiefly in order that one may thereby discover <u>how</u> justice, fineness, etc., are good[169], not so obviously for its <u>own sake</u>. Its great importance is made out here to be in its <u>application</u>. Except by reference to the application, he does not, as we have noted, show how one is to discover what the idea of Good is.

We could approach this from another angle. By Platonic ethic, the only real ultimate harm that can be sustained by a human is to his soul. There is less <u>reality</u> to the body than to the soul[170]. But Plato does not pin down the abstracts 'good' and 'evil' and their operation on the soul further than, as we have noted, to say tautologically that they make it 'better' or 'worse'. By a chain of reasoning (of which the pivot is at 610 e) he establishes that the soul is immortal and indestructible as well as disembodied. Where he produces a disastrous stumbling-block for us is in assigning <u>painful</u>, i.e. presumably <u>evil</u>, penalties to <u>evil</u> people in the after-life.

There is an aim to be pursued in living a good life, namely close association with the ideal Good[171] in the after-life. But pain seems to be chosen by Plato as a presumably correspondingly 'bad' reward for the bad. Pythagorean 're-living' of lives until attainment of perfection, as also the ancient Pythagorean lore of the after-life, may be mingled here in Plato's treatment. We should not confound Platonic evil and pain too soon. At all events, there is something apparently, from at any rate Socrates' viewpoint, so very corporeal about pain, that not only is pain all he can prescribe as a penalty for malefactors in Hades, but the only "painful" penalties he can devise are brutally physical[172]. Interestingly, and not surprisingly, when speaking of the reward of the just, he seems to be forced towards, but actually to avoid, the word ἡδονή (pleasure)[173] altogether. The unjust suffer ἀλγηδόνες[174]. The just are rewarded 'suitably on the same lines'[175]. They must, of course, presumably receive the opposite[176] of pains, but we are not told what it is that they get. We do not discover whether it is a kind of pleasure, or indeed anything else. As to the possibility of subtle, spiritual pains such as mental πολυπραγμοσύνη[177] or ποικιλία[178], which might be taken to be a fair counterpart to receiving (the 'pleasure'(?) of) the supreme 'Good', these may be hypothesised by the reader, but Plato does not make any specific mention of any. Indeed, at no stage in the whole Republic does he directly make the point that certain pains should be regarded as specially of a subtle, spiritual kind, or, contrastingly, apparently discarding Orphic doctrine in this respect, that any pleasures whatsoever, subtle or unsubtle, are experienced in

the afterlife. The crude bodily pains that are mentioned, those suffered by gross offenders in Hades, are purely the pains suited to crude bodily offences. Even the really cardinal, i.e. spiritual, offences, including oath-breaking and lying, are penalised by the 'most agonising and fearful' - again, clearly corporeal[179] - pains.

b.86 It might be possible to argue a way round this doubly one-sided impression. Proposals that φρόνησις, or again ἡδονή *, could be the good[181] were quashed by the need to admit that some pleasures were bad. φρόνησις, in turn, had to be 'of the good'. The problem of what we actually get from the good, except of course finally the Good itself, is not disposed of here or anywhere else. And yet this is obviously quite acceptable. It would be natural, now, that what we got from evil should be multiplex, vulgar, and explicable. The ultimate Good - being uniform, spiritual, and divine - is beyond explanation.

Similarly, one could maintain that the punishments of Hades were subtle, but, being for other entrants to Hades to see and take note of, had also to be of a visible kind (cf. esp. Gorg. 525c). Plato might not have meant them to be purely physical. The suffers might simply be supposed to show inner, mental agony in their outward expressions, where observers could detect it. (Or again, the allegory might not be intended to be pushed too hard in any case.) But while this is not impossible, it seems odd. And the fact that Plato himself

* (cf. esp. Gorgias[180].)

gives not the slightest hint that it could be the case makes it less convincing. Moreover, his outstanding argument in the Gorgias distinguishing the good from the pleasurable still does not prompt him to try to escape from the need to assess why the good should be worth having. The proposals that φρόνησις, or again ἡδονή, could be the good were, as we saw, annulled by the need to admit that some pleasures were bad, etc.

b.87 Socrates does at one point give something that looks for a moment very much like a definition of the good. It is 'that which every soul pursues and for the sake of which it does everything'[182]. But merely to point out that everyone seeks the good is not to indicate that its nature may be discovered by examining what people seek. He is not calling things good because people seek them. And even if he were pointing that out, the question would still remain: 'What is it essentially <u>about</u> the good that makes a soul wish to have it?' We have to admit the objection[183] that the term 'good' cannot be wholly replaced by any other term or terms. But we may still inquire what characteristics are regarded, here particularly by Plato, as constituting, or at any rate specially contributing to, good.

b.88 Plato's objection to a close linkage of good and pleasure is, we have seen, well established. Notwithstanding, he can at one point, perhaps - we have to concede - playfully,

treat pleasure as effectually constituting an ultimate end[184]. The main difference he makes between the various pleasures is in point of reliability, durability. The participants in the dialogue agree that those pleasures which occasion health, strength, and excellence in the body are the ones to be sought[185]. But his position now is that the pleasures are sought subject to acquiring a good. Good is the thing that is sought, not pleasure. Everyone wants good[186], but good is wanted apparently simply because it is good. It is not good because it is pleasurable, or because it is wanted. The health, strength, and excellence of the body, which are a good[187], are indeed regarded as pleasurable in themselves[188]. In fact, we are admitted by Plato himself to get more pleasure from them, ultimately, than from those intense pleasures that would rob us of them[189]. But the question inevitably follows whether they are wanted and regarded as good because they are supremely pleasurable (or would lead to what is supremely pleasurable), and may be so defined, or whether there is some other more correct way of defining what they provide. Yet, after all that, it would then still remain to run that mysterious quantity 'good', this thing that is distinct from the pleasurable, to earth.

b.89 In the first place, at all events, it might, in a reductio ad absurdum, justifiably be claimed that this 'wanted' quantity could not conceivably be pain[190]. It is also notorious that uninterrupted 'hedonistic' pleasure is not what is ultimately wanted. But this is not, presumably, because it

would not be wanted if it were possible to have it permanently. It just happens to be common knowledge that intense hedonistic pleasures never do go on permanently. More than that, all are defective when indulged in to excess - sometimes even normally - leading to worse pain than they can outbalance. It is by reason of the pain they involve that ἐπίπονα are ineligible as 'direct' goods[191]. The crux is here of course whether we can find Plato equating, or coming near equating, the 'thing ultimately wanted' with the 'truly' pleasurable. Certainly by a paradoxical corollary, if pleasure were at all comparable with pain in being an unwanted extreme, we should expect an excess of pleasure to be as unwanted as an excess of pain. It could, and here we come to a crux, indeed legitimately be inquired why wrongdoers who proceed to Hades should not be penalised by a permanent excess of 'pleasure'. This should, after all, theoretically be as 'bad' as an excess of pain. But there is no suggestion of their experiencing anything of the sort. No doubt it would seem just as incongruous to Greek as to English ears if there were. That being so, we might legitimately conclude that Plato regards 'pure pain' as more of an evil than 'pure pleasure'. It may be suggested that, by such implication (taken in conjunction with the description Socrates gives of Hades), he lays before us the conclusion that true pleasure may be the greatest good. To say that some pleasures are bad[192], and therefore that we seek a good beyond pleasures, does not as we have seen, discount this.

Yet all these conclusions still fly in the face of Plato's steady refusal[193] to identify any kind of pleasure explicitly

with the ultimate Good. He insists that pleasure, 'true' or 'non-true', is not an end in itself. It is a concomitant to goodness, which is. We could submit that he implies that attaining ultimate Good involves attaining ultimate Pleasure - pleasure, that is, of the highest kind. We could argue that he could hardly have objected to calling this 'Pleasure' the ultimate end. But, in short, we can submit many things. He does not say them.

b.90 A question that arises from this problem and illuminates it is this. Why is pain less sought-after than pleasure? Why are people more careful about avoiding excess of pain than they are about avoiding excess of pleasure? After all, both are evils. Are they unequal evils? An explanation of this could facilitate progress towards analysing the difference Plato makes between pleasure and the good vis-à-vis the θυμοειδές.

Unfortunately, there are no words that go further to describe the immediate state of 'wanting' something than simply that one 'likes' it (or 'desires', or 'longs for ' it, etc.), that it is 'pleasant', 'desirable', and so forth. These words are at the most basic level, of course, of desire indication, and we cannot answer the question with the help of any others. No doubt we want[194] a thing because of a phenomenon in our being which occasions us to want it. But alternately we may just choose to omit as logically irrelevant any such extra causal hypotheses (which introduce an infinite regression). Illumination as to why we want it can now only be obtained by

an inspection of accepted external concomitants of wanting, or again external concomitants by which pain's effects might be gauged. The latter are much more clearly present. Very painful things normally have an immediately dangerous effect on our health. This can less often be said of any very pleasurable thing, where ill consequences (if any) are normally more delayed.

b.91 We can assume that Plato had observed the coincidence that most things that maim or kill us cause pain. Again, we can take him to concede that it is the pain, and not their lethal nature, that originally makes us avoid them, and that this is the basic reason why we survive. These are obvious enough points, even in ancient circumstances. But there is one thing he may have missed. One paramount factor may have prevented him from acknowledging pain's particularly important status as an undesirable thing:

The whole ancient world assumed an absolute need for endurance of severe pain. For survival purposes alone, surgical, military etc. pain was 'indispensable'. The fact, for instance, that pain might not necessarily have had to be felt at all for a successful operation to be performed could naturally never even have occurred to the ancients. No-one knew about anaesthetics apart from alcohol, which was only partially effectual. Pain was regarded as an intrinsically inevitable concomitant of surgery, or of any kind of wound, disease, etc. Plato can hardly be expected to have had any

inkling of alternate possibilities. At the same time, he will have observed that pain holds pride of place as the thing which men will least tolerate. It is certainly a strong contender for the title of 'evil' if men always seek the 'good'[195]. For pain (except for the thumoeidic-type 'accumulation-tapping pain') is (even ac. Plato) what men most particularly do not seek. To total all this up, we nevertheless find that Plato has, almost incredibly, actually left room for such things as anaesthesia. That room is supplied very simply by his flat affirmation that 'some pains are good, some evil, therefore we avoid not pain but the evil'[196]. Chief point of all, he has left room for the rationale of thumoeidic 'pain-seeking'. Is it this which causes his doubts about pain's equivalence with evil?

b.92 Socrates' enigmatic remark that what is shameful (αἰσχρόν) is so either through pain or evil or both[197] concedes a great deal when conjoined with Gorg. 474 cd and 477 d. In Gorg. 474 d Socrates suggests that he believes that the words αἰσχρόν and κακόν have the same meaning. (However, he later makes the above point that what is αἰσχρόν is αἰσχρόν through being either λύπῃ or κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον or both[198].) This is to say, critically importantly, that anything that is more painful is by reason of that more hateful[199].

At first sight this may seem a distortion of logic. If we say, 'All hateful things are either painful or bad', this does not, by our original thinking, entail that all painful or bad things are hateful, since there are some 'good' pains. However, we have now established that the so-called 'good'

pains are even by Plato's doctrine only indirectly good. In themselves, they are bad. What is being said is therefore not 'All hateful things are (either) painful (or bad)', but 'All hateful things that are painful are hateful because of their painfulness'. In full, this totals up to 'All hateful things are hateful either because of painfulness or because of evil'. Or, in other words, pain, like evil, is an agency which in its own right makes things hateful. But if (as in Gorg. 474 d) 'hateful' tends in any case to be regarded by Plato as the same thing as evil, then clearly he tends to see pain as in itself an evil, despite the apparent distinction he draws in the sentence "...either through pain or evil or both." And this, of course, cannot just entail that there are only certain limited kinds of painful qualities, which we might call 'hateful-painful' qualities, that make hateful things hateful, i.e. evil. All painful qualities do. This conclusion is reinforced by corresponding Platonic statements about good[200], and pleasure or benefit[201]. From them we may legitimately conclude that, on a parallel interpretation of Plato, the converse - that pleasurable things are good in as far as they are truly pleasurable - applies.

b.93 The link of good with ἡδονή is even closer at 588 a. Here excelling in pleasure is said to go directly along with excelling in εὐσχημοσύνη βίου, κάλλος, and ἀρετή. No doubt it is as a 'bonus' supervenient on them. They are the actual goods. It is, so to speak, a 'secondary' concomitant good. But as καλός has the same value as ἀγαθός[202], excelling in ἡδονή has potentially the same weight as excelling in goodness.

However, any number of supposed proofs that Plato is 'strictly' saying that pleasure can be the same as the good are vain. Any number of allegations that he may 'legitimately be

construed' as saying it, etc., do not satisfy. The simple fact is that they cannot stand up in the face of his explicit statement[203] that the pleasurable is not the good. There are good and bad pleasures[204] and pains[205]. Points at which the doctrine that the painful is not the bad is stated are no less indisputable[206]. In these circumstances, we cannot but ask why Plato insists on this. We can accuse him of inconsistency if we wish. But at the same time we may have an elusive sensation that he is not being inconsistent.

b.94 For his conviction that pain is not always evil to be so deep-rooted, a general contingency must obtain. One possibility (excluding 'indirectly' good pains now) is that various things called painful (but sought after apparently directly, without a view to anything else) must, as he sees them, not be genuinely painful. Putting this in another way, there must be things which, in his view, people enjoy although they are apparently 'genuinely' painful in the normal sense of that word, since they seek them. And this would be so where the evidence (if any) that they drive out a yet greater pain is too lacking in obviousness for it to be possible to define what that pain could be. The nature of that greater pain, (if it even exists,) is too elusive.

To suggest that Plato has any theory involving the more complex modernly developed psychological features of pain might seem fanciful. That he should have speculated on its at times apparently 'inherent' desirability may seem to be 'expecting too much' of him. On the other hand, we may be certain of one

thing. He is trying to find a system which will account for what he observes. And from what he says about θυμοειδές, it is quite clear that he has observed that what seems to be 'genuine' pain is sometimes actually, to all appearances, being sought after. What is more, it is being sought after with no apparent ulterior aim in view, e.g. of getting rid of a worse pain.

It may be that his sole reason for distinguishing pleasure from the good and pain from evil is a wish for terminological strictness. 'Pleasure', for instance (or at least 'pleasures'), is, in Greek, as much as in English, a class of particularly intense vehicles of euphoria. It is not the term given to means of milder enjoyment. Plato would, of course, not wish to seem to be saying that the other categories of things we want are unpleasant, but just that they are not in the same class as the thing called 'pleasure'. The pleasure of, say, learning[207], is not quite a part of 'pleasure' simplex. But it is a more elevated member of the class of 'pleasures'. Usage demands these restrictions, and Plato is no doubt possibly just respecting usage. He takes for granted the already frequently cited truism that we avoid 'bad' pleasures because they end up in less pleasure than the choice of 'better' pleasures would have produced. He cannot have overlooked the fact that if a 'pleasure' may be defined as what is pleasant - however 'mildly' - to us, then good health alone is an immense 'pleasure'. Indeed he says exactly that [208]. He is just maintaining that, bad or good, these are still 'pleasures'. We at times avoid them, and therefore 'pleasure' can not be

synonymous with the 'good', which we never avoid (except in the case of a smaller good, to acquire a greater).

b.95 This particular subdivision of different senses of the word 'pleasure' still does not, however, bring us very far. We perhaps catch something closer to Plato's thought in the passage on 'true' pleasure[209]. He variously distinguishes true pleasure (the kind which would provide 'the best'[210] for a person) as being 'pure'[211], 'trustworthy'[212], 'durable'[213], 'proper'[214]. No-one would fail to admit that, if health is a pleasure, it is trustworthy and durable. But they would also add that it is very mild. Most of the time, if we are healthy, we do not even notice the fact. This too was of course obvious enough to Plato. He does, then, seem overall to want to say that in our aim for the good we are aiming at something we 'want', but that that thing, though pleasurable, must be a true rather than a false pleasure. It must be lasting. It must also, incidentally, apparently be consistent not only with uninterrupted εὐδαιμονία[215], but with prolonged life[216]. In favour of these two last, we will, if necessary, sacrifice intensity, variety, and other less crucial qualities. On this evidence, it may not be too drastic a step to conclude that, by his requirements of trustworthiness, purity, durability, etc., Plato is seeking to stress as best those pleasures which will promote indefinite prolongation of a temperate life[217]. At all events, he indicates that we should seek pleasures in much the same way as we seek the good.

No doubt a short cut to this is just to seek the good. But, as regards the good, he has made it clear that intense pleasures do not count as such if they are 'bad'. Complementarily, he suggests that 'bad' means 'adverse to health', 'transitory', 'causing later disproportionate pain', etc. In other words, he seems to be saying simply that pleasures that are bad are bad in as far as they are 'prejudicial to true pleasure'.

b.96 Let us briefly look past this at a possible deeper emanation from his treatment of pleasure and pain. A point central to the present topic is involved. It is certain that he recommends in the first place the regular endurance of discomfort to prolong healthy life[218]. In the second, he advises acceptance of judicial penalty (which is by implication painful) as beneficial for the 'cure' (and presumably prevention as well) of injustice in oneself[219]. These are just a pair of several prominent references he makes to pains through endurance of which we in turn obtain goods. As such, they deserve analysis as items he occasionally very strongly seems to mean are actually also at times apparently wanted 'for their own sake'. He seems, in short, to class them, however hesitantly and provisionally, as at times wanted irrespective of any further benefit.

Such a finding would have crucial significance for τὸ θυμοειδές. For if we reiterate that it is a very elusive and indefinable source of malaise, then we can see that Plato may

easily merely have strongly suspected the existence of that malaise. If it were not there, he would reason, then the pains sought would be sought not to avoid it, but 'for their own sake'. His integrity of thought and rational powers forced him to leave the possibility that it was not there open. For although he could not, it seems, yet absolutely pinpoint its source and nature, he was obviously confident of its existence.

The pain, then, had seemed to him quite clearly, in every event, to be sought. That it seemed to be sought directly as a good was a further critical possibility. But, if a pain could be a direct good, then clearly pleasure and good could never conceivably be the same thing. Still, he was not certain on the question. He simply had a strong inkling of the existence of a thumoeidic malaise which could occasion the search for that pain.

b.97 To sum up. Regarding the status of θυμοειδές in respect of Plato's account of the good and bad activities of man, then, we may now say that if one pain were necessary in order to avoid another apparently worse 'thumoeidic' 'pain', the former pain must obviously, in Plato's view - to the extent that he leaves the question open - merely have been the lesser of two evils. Now, summating all his allusions to this malaise, we may attribute to him a theory which includes it, and asserts exactly that: That pains sought by the 'thumoeidic' person are 'lesser evils', and they relieve him of the worse pain of thumoeidic malaise.

To enlarge more generally on the topic: θυμοειδές was

initially needed for war purposes[220]. For the purposes of the original peaceable, simple state it was strictly superfluous, let alone a recognised good, except in as far as it fuelled defence and rational striving. In short, there is by Plato's treatment very often much evil about it. By his system for the φλεγμαίνουσα state it is, however, also a good of the third type[221]. It is a means - a faculty necessary for winning the wars which have to be fought for the aggrandisement of the greedy nation. And his conversion of military-type virtues in fighting Guardians to absolute virtues in ruling philosophers and mankind generally[222] involves the transfer, in turn, of positively good features to τὸ θυμοειδές. For it is this property which fosters the military virtues. The highest human and military faculty is intellect (λογιστικόν). As an assistant to intellect[223], τὸ θυμοειδές must therefore come in for some degree of reflected glory. On the other hand, it has against its 'good' part the derogatory uses mentioned. And if it is not included with certain ἐπιθυμίαι[224] among the vicious natural propensities of man, then its products[225], when it is left unqualified by μουσική or λογιστικόν, certainly have ἀγριότης and ἀνομία in common with those of the ἐπιθυμίαι concerned.

Finally and most important, however, it is hinted by Plato, as we have seen, that τὸ θυμοειδές may generate the '<u>will-to-pain</u>' discussed above. This would cause the individual concerned to <u>aim deliberately</u> at pain as such, in order, evidently, to obtain a satisfaction through the release from greater pain. And this satisfaction is of course to be

classified in a rank similar to that of pleasure, though not of the 'truest' kind. Intellect promotes intelligent channelling of this thumoeidic urge. The result is the salubrious dynamism of justice. Finally, the eternal striving-according-to-reason (ἔρως), which all harmoniously functioning states must practise, receives its mainspring from the vital source τὸ θυμοειδές.

We have now come round, if by a long (but necessarily) tortuous route, to the kernel of the present thesis. Plato allows of the hypothesis that a certain kind of pain is produced by an individual's accumulating θυμοειδές resource in him. This pain, furthermore, is so great that the 'painful' methods he has to use to release it are relatively, to him, 'pleasurable'. The fact that all exertion, according to Plato's usage as opposed to modern, ranks as 'painful' says much for subconscious modern acceptance of the 'releasing' faculty of exercise. But other accepted media for θυμοειδές -tapping mentioned above (e.g. judicial penalty) are also modernly recognised as painful, At least, they are regarded as quite obviously nothing like pleasure. So that, even to us, pain is here quite obviously being sought as a positive gain, or as a pleasure overall.

The reason this point has hitherto not been adequately observed in Plato is very easily accountable when we consider that the observation by moderns of the 'θυμοειδές'-accumulation phenomenon is only recent. In consequence, for moderns as much almost as for Plato, there has also been

failure to notice other finer points, such for instance as the discrepancy between the size of the pain of the accumulation, and that of the exertion or pain that relieves it. Because it is normally inadequately relieved, the even greater pains springing from penalty for injustice, or gratuitously aggressive war, are, ultimately, voluntarily chosen in desperation. They are actually sought after by man. In the end, it seems that anything is preferable to enduring unrelieved θυμοειδές accumulation. Yet an instinct of caution seems to prevent its adequate draining until a state of desperation is reached, when "explosion" occurs. Then injustice and war amount to pleasures, however incongruous this may sound. They are deliberately pursued to that end.

Four conclusive facts are of interest. The pains these two things - injustice and war - cause are invariably vastly greater than man ever apprehends prior to embarking on them. He has therefore - obviously - subconsciously shut out previous knowledge of such considerations. Second, this same fact of their vastness, often resulting in his debilitation (let alone mass death as a social animal), produces not adequate, but excessive - inordinate - drainage of his θυμοειδές. This has taken the shape of the utter collapse, rather than 'peace', which regularly follows on war. Third, if, instead of that above-mentioned inadequate tapping of θυμοειδές-urge that does normally occur, genuinely proportionate tapping could be substituted by the logistic, then a true ἔρως would be achieved in individual, society, cosmos and the forms, and true justice reign throughout. Fourth and finally, if it can be shown, as it has appeared possible to show, that the θυμοειδές-urge can lead, for practical purposes, to as much evil as good, and if,

second, the term 'spirited' is demonstrably good and nothing but good in all its connotations, then its use as a virtually uniform translation of θυμοειδής is wholly unjustifiable.

The problems of pleasure and pain, good and evil, justice and and injustice must, of course, be seen in terms of the overall dialectic of striving for the Good. No other basis is acceptable. In accordance with this, certain things that are good on one level may be evil on another, pleasurable on one, painful on another, etc. But when Plato concerns himself with goods that may be evil, pains that may be pleasurable, etc., on the same level, an additional, more analytical treatment appears necessary. Some explanation must be tendered. And it is on this account that the above analysis has been considered essential.

NOTES

1. (Examples do not in fact appear before Book II.)

2. cf. LIDDELL & SCOTT under θύω A and B, Chantraine, Frisk, etc.

3. cf. raging and boiling of circulating blood: NAGELSBACH & AUTENRIETH, Homerische Theologie, p. 461; BICKEL, Homerische Seelenglaube, p. 261; ONIANS, p. 44.

4. Ed. Chart. VIII, 621 (1) (Ed. Bas. V 135). But re position between lungs and neck: Timaeus, 70 a.

5. cf. Iliad, 9.600, 22.296; ONIANS, ch. 1.

6. By Plato's time already separated from the body, cf. Epitaph on Athenians fallen at Potidaea, 432 B.C.: 'The ether has taken their souls, the earth their bodies;' cited in POHLENZ, M., Freedom in Greek Life and Thought, p. 65. Tripartite subseparation of the soul where a tripartite separation of man as a whole into soul, thymos, and soma has apparently already occurred, causes technical complication later in the dialogue (cf. WILLIAMS, B. in Exegesis and Argument, van Gorcum, 1973 special number of Phronesis; also λόγος - ψυχή connexion in e.g. Phaedrus, 270 e seq.).

7. Iliad, 2.196, 9.496.

8. Od., 10.461.

9. cf. PLATO : Cratylus, 419 e: 'θυμός from the seething and boiling of the soul' : 'θυμὸς' δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς θύσεως καὶ ζέσεως τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχοι ἂν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα.
also Rep., 440 c, Timaeus, 70 b.

10. 'Good temper' has unfortunately few dynamic connotations.

11. e.g. PARMENIDES: ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν ὅσον τ' ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἱκάνοι . HERACLITUS: θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπόν.

12. Rep., 440 c 5.

13. ibid. 439 e 3, 440 b 4.

14. ibid. 411 c 6. (TAYLOR, A. E., Plato, p. 282, warns against identifying τὸ θυμοειδές with 'will'; cf. ref. to Schopenhauer's doctrine of the Will, thesis-para. a.10.)

15. ibid. 548 c 6. cf. Timaeus, 69 d : θυμὸν δὲ δυσπαραμύθητον 70 a : φιλόνικον.

16. It is distinguished (375 b 4: τοῦ σώματος) from ψυχή.

17. Because of the sense-link of the English word 'spirit' with

/both θυμός

both θυμός and ψυχή, the term 'soul' is here mostly reserved for ψυχή, and θυμός is called 'emotional drive', or just 'drive', but if the sense of 'spirit' seems clear its use seems justifiable. (FRIEDLANDER, Plato, ch. 9, p. 193, referring to Phaedrus, 246 a, renders θυμός 'will', 'drive'.)

18. 572 a 5.

19. 580 d. It is fair to suppose that Plato uses θυμοῦμαι, 'I am angry', and θυμός with conscious collateralism (439 e, 440 b).

20. e.g. 411 c : θυμοειδεῖς contrasted with ἀκράχολοι and ὀργίλοι.

21. cf. also Timaeus, 70 b : τὸ θυμοῦ μένος.

22. 529 b 5, 585 b c.

23. I have termed qualities 'lower' or 'higher' in proportion as they incline towards the epithumetic or logistic pole respectively, to the appetitive or the intellectual.

24. 440 e 4.

25. 439 e 5.

26. 440 b ; cf. also Timaeus, 70 b d.

27. 585 d 1-3.

28. D. & V. 590 b give 'this same spirited animal' for τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τὸ θυμοειδές.

29. 589 a.

30. 456 a : absolutely favourable, but to be kept calm (572 a); cf. also Timaeus, 70 a : τὸ μετέχον ... θυμοῦ ... τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κατέχοι γένος.

31. 439 e.

32. 440 e.

33. In addition, NETTLESHIP (e.g. Lects. on the Republic of Plato, ch. XIII, p. 304), CROMBIE, GOSLING (Plato), more or less uniformly adhere to 'spirit' as their preferred version of τὸ θυμοειδές . (All instances of θυμοειδής occurring in the Republic will be cited.) On the existence of ψυχή in various parts of the body μυελός, Timaeus, 73 b seq., 91 b.

34. To give θυμοειδής the meaning 'alive' would of course not be allowable.

35. 375 a.

36. cf. 456 a, ἄθυμος given as counter to θυμοειδής.

37. 411 c 1, 572 a 4, 586 c.

/38. e.g. 548 c,

38. e.g. 548 c, where τὸ θυμοειδές is associated with φιλόνικος and φιλότιμος as well as δύσκολος.

39. The Republic of Plato, p. 62, 1.5.

40. 411 c 1.

41. See esp. 590 a b : ὀφεῶδες.

42. The singular form -ής is used here for simplicity in some cases.

43. cf. thesis-para. b.19.

44. 375 b 9.

45. 456 a 4.

46. and so θυμοειδής.

47. pace CORNFORD, p. 58.

48. 375 a 11.

49. 373 d 7 (ἀποτμητέον).

50. 'Is necessary', 'needs', uncommitting futures, gerunds, etc., are used throughout, e.g. προσέσονται (373 a 2), δεῖ (373 b 2), ἐμπληστέα (373 b 3), προσδεησόμεθα (373 c 4).

51. 374 d 8, e 8.

52. 375 e 10.

53. 440 e 5, 589 b 3.

54. 410 d.

55. ADAM : note on 410 e : 'the source of wildness is the spirited element'.

56. GOSLING gives 'violence' (Plato passim); cf. χολή μέλαινα producing ἄγριος ἰχώρ : Timaeus, 83 c.

57. e.g. 572 b : δεινὸν καὶ ἄγριον καὶ ἄνομον ; 589 b 3 : contrast with δίκαια.

58. 410 d 1, 586 c 8.

59. 586 c 9. Amongst other things, he here shows himself far from considering his proposed three parts of the soul an immutable, as it were sacrosanct, arrangement.

60. 410 b 6.

61. 410 d 2. cf. 375 c 7 : πρᾳεῖα (φύσις) is the given antithesis of θυμοειδής.

62. Thesis-paras. b.18, 19.

63. 410 d.

64. 440 b, 440 e.

65. Protagoras, 350 c.

66. 411 b 6.

67. 581 c 4.

68. 347 b.

69. 586 c 8.

70. Plato, p. 41.

71. 435 - 442.

72. The separate instances of θυμ- variants have been numbered in the passage, so that translations where cited may conveniently be traced to the relevant Greek.

73. Thesis-para. b.8 seq., 'spiritedness'.

74. cf. ὀφεῶδες (590 b).

75. Taking as source LEE's and CORNFORD's 'confidence' ('self-confidence') and 'energy' instead of the 'good health', 'sense of physical fitness' that they advocate.

76. e.g. 535 d.

77. 550 b 7.

78. 411 e 7.

79. 436 a 9.

80. 439 e.

81. 440 a.

82. θυμός, 439 e 3, 440 b 4, c 5.

83. 439 e 3.

84. 439 e 3, 7.

85. 440 a 5.

86. 439 e 2 - 4.

87. 435 e 4.

88. 439 e 7.

/89. 440 b.

89. 440 b.

90. 589 b 4; cf. also 441 e 5 : τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσήκει ... τῷ δὲ θυμοειδεῖ ὑπηκόῳ εἶναι καὶ συμμάχῳ τούτου.

91. e.g. 435 e (thesis-para. b.21) 'irascible disposition', where LEE has 'vigour and energy', CORNFORD 'high-spirited character', etc.

92. 410 d ; cf. Timaeus, 70 e, where the ἐπιθυμητικόν is 'θρέμμα ἄγριον'.

93. 586 c.

94. 586 c.

95. 588 e.

96. e.g. 375 a b, 411 a b, 465 a, 586 c.

97. Thesis-paras. b.1 - 16.

98. e.g. 375 a b, 411 a b, 465 a.

99. 586 c 9.

100. 606 d.

101. 548 c, 581 a.

102. 467 e 5.

103. cf. 590 a 9 : λεοντῶδες τε καὶ ὀφεῶδες.

104. Using this translation provisionally as closest to the true meaning.

105. 588 d.

106. 440 b.

107. 589 b 5 : φίλα ποιησάμενος ἀλλήλοις.

108. 411 e.

109. 589 b 3.

110. Thesis-para. b.2 (note 6).

111. cf. TAYLOR, Plato, ch. 12.

112. Phaedrus, 246 a 7.

113. Gorgias, 493 b, Phaedo, 81 a - 82 c, Phaedrus, 246 a b, Timaeus, 70.

/114. cf. BURNET,

114. cf. BURNET, Early Greek Philosophy, vol. III, p. 278 n. 2.

115. His regard for the mystical significance of certain numbers is strongly apparent in the Republic alone (e.g. 546 b c).

116. cf. both Republic and Phaedo.

117. 389 b 7.

118. Plato, p. 282 , subsect. 10.

119. 81 e - 82 c.

120. Thesis-para. b.7.

121. It has constantly to be reconciled to it.

122. 246 b 2.

123. 550 b 6.

124. e.g. esp. 440 e.

125. e.g. 347 b 2, 548 a 1, c 3. cf. also thesis-paras. c.27 - 30.

126. 347 b 2.

127. 548 c.

128. (thesis-paras. c. 27 - 30.)

129. 548 a 1.

130. Translators use 'honour' for τιμή, while the Greek seems to imply a shallower regard.

131. Translators use 'ambitious' for both φιλόνικος and φιλότιμος almost impartially.

132. Close relation - up to virtual identification - of φιλόνικος and θυμοειδής is suggested at 581 a 10, c 4.

133. 547 e.

134. 410 d.

135. 586 c.

136. 372 e 8.

137. 373 e.

138. 404 b : ἡ βελτίστη γυμναστική ... ἁπλῆ ... καὶ μάλιστα ἡ τῶν περὶ τὸν πόλεμον.
LEE contrarily translates: 'a physical training that is simple and flexible, particularly in its training for war';

/CORNFORD:

CORNFORD: 'especially training for war.

139. 373 d; cf. 572 b for his inborn defects.

140. Thesis-paras. c.18, 19 (cf. also b.18).

141. 375 e, 403 c - 406, etc.

142. 389 b.

143. 376 c d.

144. 403 d.

145. 403 e 1.

146. (i.e. the gymnastic's).

147. 357 c.

148. 373 e.

149. 597 b.

150. 357 b.

151. 357 c.

152. 441 e.

153. 438 a, 505 d, Meno, 77 d 5, etc.

154. e.g. 509 a 7 - 9, Gorgias, 500 a 2 - 3, d 6 - 7.

155. 505 d.

156. 438 a, 505 d, Meno, 77 d 5, etc.; 519 a : σοφοὶ πονηροί.

157. cf. 354 a ; Protagoras, 354 b c.

158. 580 e.

159. 345 a 3 ; cf. also 354 a 8 - 9.

160. 505 d : good is the most wanted thing.

161. 615 b 5 ; Gorg., 475 b 7.

162. 581 d, 586 d ; also, as φιλοκερδής = ἐπιθυμητικός, κέρδος would be equivalent to ἡδονή (581 a), and calling justice λυσιτελής (354 a 8 ; cf. also 344 e 2) close to calling it ἡδύς.

163. 354 a 8 ; by 580 e, 'more profitable' = 'more pleasurable'.

164. esp. Gorg., 500 d 7. Though cf. Protag., 351 c.

/165. 506 e.

165. 506 e.

166. 335 b 6.

167. 608 e.

168. 505 a.

169. 506 a.

170. 585 d.

171. 597 b (God made the ideal bed); also εὐπαθείας (615 a 3), θέας ἀμηχάνους τὸ κάλλος , beautiful sights, etc. cf. also Gorg., 526 c.

172. 616 a. Though cf. 363 e 3 : ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν.

173. 615 b 7.

174. 615 b 5; also Gorg., 525 b 7.

175. κατὰ τ'αὐτὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κομίζοιντο.

176. 583 c : λύπη is the opposite of ἡδονή.

177. 434 b 9.

178. 404 e 3.

179. Gorg., 525 c.

180. Gorg., esp. 499 d – 500 a.

181. 505 b c.

182. 506 d.

183. cf. HARE, Language of Morals, II, 5.4 ; MOORE, Principia Ethica, p. 7.

184. 581 c - 588 a.

185. Gorg., 499 d 6, Rep., 357 b 7, 404 e 4.

186. 438 a, 505 d, Gorg., 500 a.

187. 357 c 3, 5.

188. 357 c 3.

189. 583 c 13.

190. Evil is the opposite of what is sought (505 d). As Grote observes (Plato, vol. II, p. 41), 'Men punish for the purpose of prevention'. If there is to be any comprehensible reason

/why prevention

why prevention is maximally effected by pain, it is that all men maximally wish to avoid pain.

191. ac. Glaucon (357 c 7).

192. Gorg., 499 e 4.

193. esp. 509 a 9.

194. ADKINS, Merit and Responsibility, p. 273, comments that Plato can only claim to have proved (Gorg., 500 a) that a man ought to seek ἀγαθά for himself rather than pleasure, but (Adkins) does not carry the analysis further.

195. (505 d 11).

196. Gorg., 499 e.

197. ibid., 475 b.

198. ibid., 475 b 1; cf. also ibid. 477 d, 498 d 8.

199. αἰσχρός seems to make better sense as 'hateful' or 'loathsome' than 'shameful'.

200. καλός = ἀγαθός : e.g. Gorg., 477 a 1.

201. 474 e 2.

202. cf. Gorg., 477 a 1.

203. 505 b, 509 a, Gorg., 499 e 2, ibid., 500 d 7; all in spite of Protag., 354 c 4. Or he might be allowing that pain is always evil in itself, while maintaining that it can produce an overbalance of pleasure and so be good overall (Prot., 354 c 7).

204. Gorg., 499 d.

205. ibid., 499 e 2.

206. e.g. 357 c 7 : gymnastic is ἐπίπονος, and so not gone in for for its own sake; 380 b.

207. 581 d.

208. 583 c 13.

209. 584 - 588.

210. 586 e 2.

211. 584 c.

212. 585 e.

213. 586 a.

/214. 586 e.

214. 586 e.

215. Gorg., 494 d 7.

216. If health is a prerequisite (401 - 406).

217. 619 a : μέσος βίος.

218. 357 c 6.

219. Gorg., 477 a.

220. 375 a 11.

221. Thesis-para. b.78.

222. 401 - 406 : σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, etc.

223. 440 e, 589 b.

224. 572 b.

225. ἀγριότης, σκληρότης, βία, etc.

CHAPTER THREE

ASPECTS OF THE θυμοειδές CONCEPT.

c.1 A desirable next step would be to try to resolve as completely as possible - if possible totally - the problem of exactly how Plato saw thumoeidic objects of action. Did he conceive of them as direct goods, or as lesser evils? A convenient next step might, however, in view of the immense difficulty of this project, be rather to compare the various aspects from which the θυμοειδές element is viewed by him. These can for immediate purposes be divided into Cosmological, Anthropological, Socio-political, and Transcendental. The central considerations just advanced concerning τὸ θυμοειδές can then be reapproached from these points.

c.2 COSMOLOGICAL ASPECT.

Whether the unit whose θυμοειδές element is in question is state, individual man, cosmos, or the realm of transcendental Forms makes, in essence, little difference to Plato. He sees all Four as One through the Principle of Identity. This principle pervades his thought, and is quickly detected in the Republic. We find it, for instance, almost straight away in a critically simple assumption on Socrates' part: the truth about what applies to a collection of human beings[1] can be taken to apply with complete parallelism to an individual man.

We must, however, quickly make one proviso. It would clearly be as obvious to Plato as to anyone else that a collection of people does not bear any strict resemblance, physically, to the person of a single human. Even less, at a more exaggerated extreme, can numbers of microscopic 'little people' ('homunculi') "inside" an individual's thinking centre be believed to carry on the activities of his soul[2]. The principle must apply in at least one major sense. Collections of individuals are, basically, collections of fundamentally uniform individual beings. When numbers of people act, their actions cannot be planned upon any other principles than those which they share in common as individual humans. But this is as far as it goes. When an individual acts, his thumoeidic or epithumetic or logistic centre can be thought of as affecting him much as though a thumoeidic, epithumetic, or logistic 'homunculus' were operating inside his "soul". But the Principle of Identity is not based on humans. It is based on those sectors of which all that is essentially dynamically alive in the Universe, from Forms to grossest matter, can be seen to be made up. The actions produced by these sectors will then differ in as far as they are variants within a single "species", but the infinite regression produced by the concept of epithumetic, thumoeidic, etc. "beings" inside the soul, and others inside those, can never have been intended by Plato.

The anthropomorphising of cosmic events into such

entities as Love, Strife, Greed, Phlegm, etc., by his famous scientist predecessors has, of course, inevitable results for Plato. In the absence of almost all authentic scientific knowledge, he necessarily had to read the principles of human conduct into cosmic principles. The scientists had virtually identified the latter with the former. He proceeds a step further, and does the same in reverse. To them, the cosmos appeared to behave like a live individual. To him, the principles by which the individual is ordered show harmony in the same way as the cosmos. Cosmic harmony can only occur if the astral bodies move with due orderliness. To Plato, order in the distinct parts of the inner human soul must correspond, and following that, social order.

c.3 In all, this principle to which he consistently adheres can be simply termed. It is that by which the plurality can possess nothing that is not possessed by the individual. If the parts of any whole are all of the same uniform type, those principles of conduct found in the part must similarly be present in the whole. The early philosophers had been compelled to explain the cosmos by means of the forces found in man, because these were the only forces they knew at all intimately. Plato takes it as self-evident, on his Principle of Identity, that the same laws must apply to man in one direction, and the Forms in the other, as to the universe[3]. He can, he assumes, apply them throughout. We would be on difficult ground if we tried to find actual directives from Plato himself as to the nature

of the logistic, thumoeidic, or epithumetic sectors in the cosmos. These points tend to be left by him for us to infer. The nature of the ultimate creating agency (through which Ideas, etc., come into being) is similarly not expanded on. He might possibly have conceived of it as the 'mind' of Anaxagoras, or as pure λόγος, or just as a totally inscrutable entity. We have no explicit data. But while the three sectors of man's inner being are reflected in the three different sectors of the population, the cosmos, and the forms, it is straining the point of the doctrine to pry further. For the moment, at any rate, we may be content to have reached this stage - and Plato, indeed, gives us good reason later to be content.

What the logistic, thumoeidic, and epithumetic fractions of the cosmos in particular may be is a matter that can, in fact, readily enough be deduced. If the originating agency is taken as the logistic, we can proceed from there to rationalise the elements of fire, water, earth, air, etc. in accordance with it. Corresponding rôles can be given to these four essences, linking any suitable two to make the total three. Or we might take such a tale as Plato puts into the mouth of Protagoras[4], where, as the great sophist expresses it, the gods were first in existence; next, creatures made of earth, fire, and various mixtures of both elements, came into being; then finally a marriage of the two occurred. At that point, Protagoras relates, Prometheus, finding that Epimetheus had left only the humans naked and defenceless, stole for them the vital third element, the

wisdom-of-practising-the-arts which belongs to Athena and Hephaestus[5]. Together with it he also stole fire, for it was 'impossible for wisdom to be available or useful to anyone without the fire'.

Let us for the moment leave out any conclusions on the glaringly significant consequences of the parallel evident here, by which logistic, for Plato, becomes useless without thumoeidic to combine with it into ἔρως. The legend in itself would show a very fair parallel between individual and cosmos. The individual had presumably in the very beginning been made out of earth alone. Wisdom and fire must then stand, without question, for logistic and thumoeidic, later added to man by divine indulgence. Earth now naturally corresponds with the epithumetic sector. Consistency is complete enough here for no further inquiry to be needed. The four Empedoclean elements of air, fire, water, and earth are again easily squared with the triple Platonic formula. For the combination of fire-plus-water, as in the fiery-and-moist nature of the θυμός, can certainly be considered as a single unit. Air is logistic, earth desire, and the vitality and drive of fire the thumoeidic. If blends of these elements are worth speculating upon, then warmth and/or moisture in all life, vegetable or animal, most closely resembles thumoeidic.

A garnishing of intellectual power is added to fire in the Promethean legend, although intellect had been taken as

separate from it. But certainly this blend corresponds most compellingly with the combined energy-with-intellect which, we will find, Plato attributes to the θυμοειδές element.

c.4 The lack of explicit universalisation in all these departments can be simply enough explained by Plato's knowledge of the familiarity such matters held for the everyday listener. This simply caused him to take them as "read". He would have regarded current science as so perfectly obvious a backdrop for Greek minds, that no further explanation was needed. His tripartite unit would, on his own assumption, necessarily been seen against it. No further details were required. The scientists had already provided full enough explanations of the cosmos. It was not for him to involve himself in new alternative explanations. He simply used their already established data. Importantly, he also used it, however, as a basis for an examination, on the Identity Principle, of the nature of the soul. And the possibility, as we have mentioned, with which he was concerned was not that anyone could fail to understand that what applied to man applied to the universe, but the opposite. One further thing they might not have grasped, he no doubt felt, was not that the logistic-thumoeidic-epithumetic division applied to man. It was how it applied. This was what he now had to explain.

He therefore in the ensuing pages gives a detailed account of the way in which these sectors coexist and

interact. In giving it, he reinforces again and again the foundation of the Principle of Identity. This concept is fully in the spirit of the scientific findings, for these had sought always to discover a unifying, fundamental element from which the various constituents of the cosmos were built up. For this reason, its chief message was not, as we mention, in the fact of the principle's existence. It was in the manner of its application to the mind. The three elements of air, fire-plus-water, and earth were quite adequate to explain the elements of planning, energy, and vegetativity in the cosmos. These three principles were in evidence everywhere. It remained only to expound the nature of their application to the human soul.

Plato's answer to the question 'For what purpose does man exist?' was 'To attain perfection by rational striving (ἔρως)'. This must then be the same in regard to the cosmos. The thumoeidic element in the cosmos is its dynamism. It is the energy, most noticeably of fiery heat, through which the cosmic processes of life, the seasons, and other natural phenomena are kept in operation. The aim of this dynamism is to promote the ultimate attainment of perfection, and perfection can only reign once the intellectual element (air) has achieved ideal harmony of the other two elements, and of itself with them. This harmony will then constitute cosmic Justice.

c.5 Dialectically, then, the process involved in attaining Justice would in general be related to the two primary opposing forces, the Dionysiac and the Apollinian. This relation would be by way of two parallel entities, the epithumetic and logistic sectors of the soul. The dynamic drive of the third sector, the θυμοειδές, a force-orientated "compromise" (at first sight) between these two, will in turn now be represented as a third element. It is apparently shared in part by both others, but this is from now on no detraction from its individuality, since they are without a 'force' ingredient. The rational striving of the two principal opposites towards perfection has to be energised by such a 'drive'. This 'drive', the 'third' or θυμοειδές factor and the rational striving it institutes, now, by primary link with the logistic, becomes ἔρως. The striving is considered as a participation of the Dionysiac element with the Apollinian λογιστικόν. Such Rational Striving towards perfection, by which alone Harmony (i.e. Balance, Justice) is achieved, becomes then, to Plato, the only genuine rationale for existence.

We may feel obliged now to make a distinction between τὸ θυμοειδές and ἔρως. If so, it will probably be that the logistic factor in θυμοειδές does not seem as marked as in ἔρως. But the share each has of logistic is varied by Plato himself, and the point is not essential. What is essential is that the logistic gives rise spontaneously to the love for the λόγος, or ultimate form of the Good. And by means of τὸ θυμοειδές, the logistic is empowered to seek that Good. Only

through this Rational Striving can authentic existence be achieved, and the idea of καλοκαγαθία realised.

This, we recognise, is the aim of education. Under the aspect of Reason, the virtues appertaining to the various components of rational striving - epithumetic, thumoeidic, and logistic - will respectively be σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, and σοφία. When these are in balance (harmony) with one another, δικαιοσύνη (justice) will prevail. The same dialectical relationship applies to the human soul and to the state of the cosmos, and to the forms, when reason is in the ascendancy. And in this way the Principle of Identity holds all systems together.

The process of Rational Striving constituting ἔρως is, then, dialectically the only acceptable form of existence. ἔρως can, however, only be effective if the logistic element is sufficiently strongly represented. Otherwise it will be directed to incorrect ends. Such incorrect ends will then result in disharmony and imbalance - in short, Injustice. καλοκαγαθία (moral and spiritual excellence), and the approach to the ultimate state of perfection inherent in the realm of the Forms, is achieved only by effectual striving towards that end. An early forerunner of Schopenhauer's doctrine of the 'will' may indeed be seen in the eventuality that an unusually strong thumoeidic element may compensate the higher deficiencies of even a relatively inadequate λογιστικόν. The added force afforded will carry the whole through to that ultimate end, in spite of its intellectual

disability. Conversely, a particularly strong logistic element may compensate a feeble thumoeidic. In each case, however, if one of the two components is not simply weak but entirely lacking, no true ἔρως can result.

c.6 No discussion of the Dionysiac-Apollinian relationship will be complete if we do not totally reconcile the double-triple conundrum of Dionysos and Apollo as against logistic, thumoeidic and epithumetic. The Dionysiac element, embracing as it does all irrational forces, must, in short, constitute not only the thumoeidic, but the epithumetic element as well. These are the less rational sectors, and it can safely be taken to constitute the sum total of these humbler forces, whether on anthropological, socio-political, cosmological or transcendental planes. It is the means by which the Apollinian element obtains the energy to transform itself into ἔρως, and proceed towards the Forms. The epithumetic element, on the other hand, totally without logistic power as it is, must take second place in turn to the thumoeidic. In an inspection of the anthropological aspect of the question we obtain greater insight into this correlation.

c.7 ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASPECT.

The cosmological pattern can now be paralleled with the one immediately below it on the scale. In this section, the approach becomes less general. In examining individual man

in contrast with the cosmos, Plato's first concern had to be with the obvious springs of human action. He had to elaborate on how the thumoeidic and other 'urges' (concentrating here on the thumoeidic aspect of their nature) are accountable in terms of these.

The inquiry begun in the second chapter centred round the question of the links between the leading motivatory forces. The good and the pleasurable, the bad and the painful were related to the thumoeidic urge and its fulfilment from the anthropological point of view. A particularly illuminating point now presents itself. Plato states in so many words, as we saw in the previous chapter, both that all humans in their desires aim at some good[6], and that, at the same time, their desires are automatically for ἡδοναί[7], pleasures. Now, the φιλόνικον (= θυμοειδές), element, in just the same way as the ἐπιθυμητικόν (= φιλοκερδές), does not only have ἐπιθυμίαι (desires) associated with it[8]. It is in its very character - as a φιλία[9] - a type of ἐπιθυμία. Accordingly, we may rank it, in the present context, with the other desires.

From a wider survey of Platonic doctrine, we know that the goods that men seek, and the ἡδοναί they desire, are not identical. There is a very strong link between them, in as far as pleasure is taken by Plato to be supervenient on good. Technically, however, they are quite separate. Correspondingly, when everybody avoids evil, and pain with it, they are primarily avoiding the evil. The pain, being supervenient on evil, they are also avoiding, but on a secondary level. We

may further hypothesise, with Plato, from this beginning, that "good but painful" experiences, e.g. of surgery, exertion, etc., can only be indirectly good.
That is to say, they are good solely because of their subsequent good effects[10]. Painful experiences which do not have good effects are on the other hand necessarily utterly devoid of good. Pain, in short - and these are Plato's own words - makes things 'worse'*[11]. The conclusion that their painfulness is what is bad about them, i.e. that pain qua pain is bad, is compelling. Plato would very probably have openly concurred with this had he been prompted to discuss it specifically. The more important issue is nevertheless that the only sense that can be made out of an apparent actual desire amongst humans for pain - the kind they show in their thumoeidic tendencies - is this: the particular pain sought presumably, as we saw earlier, in some way prevents or diminishes a worse pain. This is at any rate what Plato's verdict increasingly appears to be in the case of τὸ θυμοειδές.

c.8 From this and what has gone before, we get a new insight into Plato's view of pleasure. We have seen that his distinction between pain and evil, and between pleasure and good[12] is easy to preserve only if pleasure is treated as a secondary, rather than a primary, end of desire[13]. Pain, in turn, is regarded as a secondary, rather than final, end of avoidance. But considerable elements of an explanation, hinted at earlier, of why Plato is unwilling to identify pleasure and good, pain and evil, may be found in his treatment of τὸ θυμοειδές.

* cf. p.192, the findings of which are conclusively confirmed by this

We have seen, first, that he does make pain an important object of avoidance. At the same time, he is reluctant to identify it with evil, although the latter seems at first not made out to be a specially more important ultimate object of avoidance. This reluctance, we concluded, could very possibly have sprung from his experience, as far as τὸ θυμοειδές is concerned, that certain pains can function as relievers of worse pain. The problem that he had begun to face was the suggestion that some pain might actually be 'pleasurable'.

Such a suggestion of course invites a very delicate paradox. And in fact he at no point makes it explicitly. The hypothesis that certain of what had traditionally been thought 'pains' might actually be felt as absolutely - or even overall - 'pleasurable' no doubt presented vital possibilities. Still, we just do not find him clearly alluding to anything quite as specific as this.

Whatever his view was, we can certainly not read him as retaining the 'good' as the sole and exclusive end. For this implies total neglect of his most explicit statement aforementioned that each desire has a specific pleasure (or at least 'diminution of greater pain') in view[14]. And, for certain highly important purposes, we want to be extremely careful not to neglect this.

Setting aside for the present whatever problem there may be in resolving the duality of desire for pleasure as well as good, attention may helpfully be paid to two statements of Socrates'. First, that each desire aims at a pleasure[15] as

well as a good. Second, that the pleasures aimed at are those pleasures proper to each respective part of the soul[16].

These statements lead roughly to the following conclusion. If each desire is automatically for a pleasure as well as a good, then all people, in desiring anything at all, are aiming secondarily at a pleasure. They may be aiming primarily at a good, but they also have the pleasure in mind. The pleasure involved will, moreover, in each case be proper to the agency desiring it. For logistic people it will be proper to logistic, for θυμοειδεῖς to τὸ θυμοειδές, etc. This, in other words, carries the consequence that - to take thumoeidic people as an example - they are going, by virtue of this quality, to have a desire proper to τὸ θυμοειδές. They will aim at a good, but also at a specific type of pleasure, which will be obtained through the specific type of behaviour proper to τὸ θυμοειδές.

A point centrally affecting the present thesis arises in this connexion. What pleasure is it that these θυμοειδεῖς people aim at? What do they actually get out of thumoeidic activity? They are, after all, the pugnacious and violent - the warriors[17]. They must, therefore, aim at pleasures inherent in pugnacity and violence. Or in an alternative way of putting it, they must either gain positive pleasure from these things, or be released by them from a worse pain. It might at first be argued that it is not pugnacity and violence, in short strife, that they aim at, or find pleasurable. Rather, it is the possessions obtained by means

of strife. The strife, it might be said, is solely an indirect good, painful in itself but producing good. However, this is obviously not a satisfactory verdict. The pleasurable features of possessions are proper to the epithumetic, not the thumoeidic element. The three elements are distinct. Their φιλίαι [18] (loves) are also distinct. The thumoeidic element, therefore, necessarily seeks as its pleasure solely those things peculiar to, and incorporated in, pugnacity and violence themselves.

c.9 A preliminary factor supplying empirical support for this proposition in the Republic is the incidence, cited earlier, of war. We can, in fact, make fruitful use straight away of this rather specialised earliest example of Plato's. Wars arise from man's imperfections. The ultimate end of war is ostensibly peace. Seen in the context of the whole, thumoeidic man occupies a reasonably comprehensible position in rational strife. But then, war is always, unilaterally at least, irrational. And if it constitutes an aggressive pursuit of what are conventionally taken to be non-essentials, we can no longer say that peace is its final end. We may, of course, be speaking of a specialised 'internal' peace for the society and/or individual. But this has so far only been touched on by Plato, not expanded upon in such a way as to suggest its applicability here.

To follow the sequence out: nations that initiate aggressive war are as often as not defeated. They are in any

case normally subjected at best to serious suffering, often mass death. Nevertheless, they had chosen originally to enter upon war. A favourable outcome was presumed to be predictable. Why? There are seldom even the most tenuous grounds for such predictions. Or provocation was alleged. Yet there are seldom the most vaguely convincing instances of crucial provocation to be found, if an at all deep investigation is made of war's root causes. There is almost never even a valid-sounding reason for embarking on direct aggression. It might, indeed, be said that people often enter upon war in ignorance. But only the most grossly ignorant individuals could be unaware of the fatal risks attending upon war-making. And to claim it as mere coincidence that whole nations should repeatedly accept that degree of risk as often as they do would be absurd. There can only be some other rationale for their behaviour. There can only exist some as yet unelaborated explanation of it.

Accordingly, we must follow out somewhat further the concept of gratuitous war (i.e. war for non-essentials). Let us first concede that several other reasonably convincing accounts of the facts exist. For instance, it is sometimes supposed that the wise in a nation are slowly but surely thrust into needless war by the sheer masses of the war-lusting ignorant. (Why the ignorant lust for war exists is not stated.) Or, second, individual extremists are said to persuade nations to seek war where they would otherwise not have done so. But even if these considerations are allowed to affect the argument, one point remains: the thumoeidic

man, however much or little λογιστικόν he may have, must, in as far as he is θυμοειδής, be seeking, by making war, a pleasure[19] proper to τὸ θυμοειδές. This pleasure must be one achieved solely by his specifically thumoeidic behaviour. The pattern of φιλονικία, φιλοτιμία, δυσκολία, etc. must provide it. It must be a pleasure peculiar to, unique to, the thumoeidic faculty. It can answer to nothing less than the particular φιλία[20] of that faculty. The thumoeidic man, for instance, in the shape of the φιλόνικος, by definition loves to win. But his love, as being that peculiar to a φιλόνικος individual, is not for gain, but necessarily solely of the process of winning for its own sake.

We have already shown that Plato maintains this. The love of the φιλόνικος man for contest is not concerned with the final attained victory. If this were otherwise, he would, at least in the first case - of material benefits - have to be ἐπιθυμητικός as well. Yet the thumoeidic Guardian is not permitted to be anything near epithumetic (φιλοχρήματος)[21].

Socrates' classification of the soul in its three sectors[22] has included two unconnected at first sight with desire. Yet it has not implied an absence of desires in them. These, we have seen, are incorporated in these sectors, and centre on the specific objects[23] of the sectors' activities. This means that, although only one member of their class is strictly that of 'desire' proper (the ἐπιθυμητικόν), all can be described as ἐπιθυμίαι of a kind.

Each constitutes a desire for a particular type of activity as well as a tendency towards it. And these activities, again, provide the pleasures[24] specific to those sectors. Learning[25] is the highest category of pleasure, high- or hot-tempered behaviour[26] the second, bodily pleasure-taking the lowest. The potential these considerations may have for advancing our knowledge of τὸ θυμοειδές may now be investigated.

c.10 There has, of course, been some natural conflation here by Plato. The three parts of the soul must to some extent have the universal 'desire' aspect of the third or epithumetic part attributed to them. This is simply because they cannot easily be thought of in any other way. The logistic element obviously "wants" to learn, the thumoeidic to compete, etc. So whereas at first it seemed that the three might purely be distinct faculties by which we respectively "happen to" learn, vent emotional energy, and satisfy passions[27], Plato has seen through this viewpoint to the actualities of the case. Possibly wishing, for reasons which may later become clearer, to present them not only as natural tendencies but as agencies of desire for their specific objects, he has at all events in that respect transformed them. The epithumetic sector as such was of immediate importance for the Guardians from at least one point of view: to be effective, they had largely to ignore it. It constituted the third, baser element which was the prime agency of desire. By a transfer of thought, however,

it apparently seemed better to Plato, since the epithumetic sector has disreputable ἡδοναί associated with it, to allot to the other two categories 'higher' ἡδοναί. One could then regard them not just as faculties by which those higher things were done, but as faculties by which those higher things were desired. Besides this, a step further, a correspondingly higher pleasure was taken in doing them.

Epithumetic desire had at first been mentioned somewhat deprecatorily[28]. It was solely connected with bodily pleasures. Indeed, Socrates suggests that, although the three sectors of the soul are all strictly parts of it, only the φιλόσοφον is truly so[29]. The verdict that the good was not pleasure because some pleasures were bad[30] did, however, necessitate that some pleasures should be good. This gave pleasure the wider and improved status we have seen it assume.

c.11 To sum up: We discover that the logistic, thumoeidic and eipthumetic parts of the soul not only handle thinking, competing, and appetitiveness respectively, but desire them as pleasures. And it is a not unnatural progression. Once again, there is now no question that what each element 'really' likes is something beyond the particular activity proper to it. The object of liking is that immediate activity. Nothing else. The object of liking of τὸ λογιστικόν[31] must necessarily be, directly, mental activity. That of τὸ θυμοειδές must be contest. That of τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν conventional gain. The enjoyment looked for by

the λογιστικός will lie in the actual thinking process, not in anything else that he may achieve by it[32]. Equally, that sought by the θυμοειδής will lie precisely in the activity of contending. Whether in the outcome the contest he takes part in is technically 'successful' or not (i.e. results in material gains, etc., or not) will be a matter purely for the third part of his soul. The competitive element in him will not be affected by it. As far as the thumoeidic element is concerned, whether contest turns out gainful or disastrous is not the critical consideration. Its outcome is successful from the individual's point of view on one condition only. It must have been strenuous and/or hurtful to the right degree.

In the shape of military activity, contest is indeed very likely to be strenuous and hurtful. To be military at all, it necessarily involves discomfort. First, gymnastic, an ἐπίπονος, laborious, activity, is one of its compulsory adjuncts[33]. Second, campaigning and combat are by definition at best stressful, normally also painful. These two, campaigning and combat, are, on a varied scale, part and parcel of 'contest'. Contest and campaigning of all kinds are made up of them. They are indeed their virtually exclusive ingredients. It follows, then, that, in liking and wanting contest in itself, the thumoeidic person both likes and wants stress and discomfort as such. And our conclusion as to why he wants them now poses its problem.

c.12 Let us expand on the above. One consequence of Plato's refusal to allow that pain is always an overall evil (since some 'pains' can be indirectly good[34]) is as follows. He has implicitly conceded that the presence of pain disqualifies a thing from being good in itself[35]. This suggests, as we have seen[36], that pain as such is probably, in Plato's view, always an evil. (He has, in fact, elsewhere more directly called it that[37].) Second, however, even if he does not mean it to be quite that, it still in his opinion derogates from the goodness of a thing to the extent that it transforms it into an inferior type of goodness[38]. Gymnastic, to take a standard instance, is a good only because it leads to improved health[39]. Improved health is good in itself, and pleasurable[40]; but the means to it belongs to the third type of good. It (the means) is of the type which is itself bad as such; but it leads to good which outbalances that bad element. The thing connected with gymnastic which is good in itself is the pleasurable health to which it leads. Its predominant pain and laboriousness is regarded as lowering its own status to the third level, the τρίτον...εἶδος[41], of good.

Now, the citations in this passage serve as evidence[42], first, that pain in Plato's view invariably adds to evil. But then, as we have noted[43], when he insists that it is not always totally evil, he means not that it can be good in itself, but that it can sometimes be a good in the third sense. i.e. it can lead to greater good (or lesser evil) than it counterbalances.

This observation shows up in added relief the to us particularly important respect in which discomfort may, from the standpoint of the θυμοειδής man or sector of the soul, be an indirect good. It is the laborious and uncomfortable process of strife (not necessarily rational) that the thumoeidic person wants. He very probably wants it in exactly the same way as the unjust man "wants" (however subconsciously) the discomfort of penalty by which he benefits[44], or the offender the pains of Hades by which he is purified[45]. At all events, he wants the strife in a way very closely allied to these. For argument's sake, let us for the moment presume that he wants it because it relieves him of a greater pain. However it is taken, a pain which, during the time that it is felt, is relieving us of a greater pain, can of course consistently be termed a pleasure overall, i.e. a pleasure of the secondary type.

Plato has, in short - and this is critically important for the present thesis - a suspicion that some so-called "pains", traditionally accepted as such overall, are in an important sense not pains. He supplies little evidence that such a supposition was doctrinally important to him. Perhaps this is because he has not as fully clear a concept of it yet as altogether satisfies him. Still, as he has prepared the ground for its derivation, a good deal of caution is needful before we conclude that he did not think it worthy of attention.

The application of this finding to the Principle of Identity, and therefore specially to ἔρως, is crucial. It will in the first place be that ἔρως is now a more easily explicable phenomenon. Embodying as it does the dynamic interaction of the epithumetic-thumoeidic (Dionysiac) with the thumoeidic-logistic (Apollinian) in a process of reasoned effort towards the Good, we see now that it is also a positively desired effort. If the All created by the Demiourgos is to be accorded any comprehensible meaning, Rational Striving must be continuous. The thumoeidic sector, as the energy-possessing sector par excellence, is the agency which irresistibly forces that striving. Its success - the degree to which the Good is attained - is desired and energetically pursued. But here a salient point enters in. That success can only result from adequate guidance by the logistic. If the logistic is not strong enough, then a strong thumoeidic will run adrift. It will persevere in forcing a search for its own specific good and the pleasure with it, but will grope towards these ends along erroneous and random paths. The mangled outcome of this activity will mainly constitute disharmony, imbalance, and, in short, Injustice.

To review once again the part of τὸ θυμοειδές in this retrogressive process. Identifying the directly good with what is directly wanted (individual goods being kept strictly distinct from the ultimate Good), we face a paradox. If a certain type (or types) of "pain" could be an absolute good,

the painful, qua painful, could at times be wanted as an end sufficient in itself. But this can surely only be applicable to pains falsely so called. It would be far-fetched - virtually a contradiction in terms - to suggest that pain, in the strict interpretation of the word, can be a thing wanted absolutely. It can only be wanted - as far at any rate as our understanding takes us - if it alleviates a greater pain, or leads to an outbalancing good. In short, if the painful things in question in regard to the thumoeidic element were absolutely wanted for themselves and nothing else, then they could not, overall, be genuinely "painful".

Where pain or discomfort is the only common factor present, no other conclusion than this seems possible. In the case of expenditure of the thumoeidic element, all else seems clearly fanciful. We have shown however that the situation is certainly not as it has been taken to be. The pain experienced in thumoeidic drive-expenditure most probably reduces a greater pain - namely the pain or "malaise" of thumoeidic accumulation. Nevertheless, the picture is not yet completely clear. Further investigation must be made.

The conclusion that some "painful" (i.e. traditionally, not genuinely overall, painful) things could be wanted purely because they are painful probably cannot, as has been said, be drawn from Plato's writings at all. Certainly not without much circumspection. He at no point at any rate formulates

this in so many words. But what he does say occasionally appears to accord with it. Indeed this is the case to so great an extent that it could amount to reading him incorrectly not to draw the inference.

As we see, the position needs the closest scrutiny. His resolute refusal to allow that the painful is evil except precisely qua painful, does not encourage the supposition that he believed it could ever actually be a good in itself. Yet he does insist so very strongly, on the other hand, upon pain's potential for being an indirect good in senses less obvious than those of surgery, war-wounds, etc., that we are forced to go yet further in our search. Plato is obviously certain that the thumoeidic person wants his "painful" activity. What he is less sure of is exactly why he wants it. If it relieves a greater pain, what is this obscure "greater" pain? Uncertain as he is of its nature, he is basically convinced that something of its kind exists. As a result, grounds have been given us by him, when we consider the sort of activities sought as pleasurable by the predominantly thumoeidic individual, for suspecting that what he meant is not that it is actually genuine pain overall, but that it is a means to good by alleviating greater pain. And though he himself does not explicitly make this last finding, he allows us to make it on our own. We are strongly invited to draw the relevant conclusions. We may infer, therefore, that the very pain of contest, as it is being felt, alleviates a 'greater' or in some other manner 'worse' pain - the pain of thumoeidic acumulation.

In the first place, then, this "pain" of contest, or penalty, etc., is not felt overall as pain. Therefore it is not, overall, a genuine pain. In the second, the 'greater' pain eliminated by contest can be nothing less than this thumoeidic accumulation. It torments the individual, and he takes the readiest way out. This is standardly in the shape of the counter-irritant pain of violent action.

c.13 The doctrine of penalty accruing to unjust action alluded to above[46] is, then, as we have shown, based on the same principle as that of contest. It is not an identical but very similar phenomenon. Penalised people, that is, are, as Plato states, not wretched. This is to say that people who have been subjected to a painful penalty (and only pain can, according to him, be effectual in releasing one from injustice[47]), are, by a paradox that is solely apparent, in fact suffering pain, but experience an overall satisfaction. The penalty, in its discomfort, parallels, to that extent, the experience of exertion. The exertion, for its part, is a "satisfying" discomfort (πληρῶν τὸν θυμόν[48]), obtained by a man who "fights it out" with his opponent. A contest may easily be guessed not to be "comfortable". The contestant nevertheless gains overall satisfaction by the process of undergoing it. And this, of course, again applies quite independently of any conventionally "concrete" results. Similarly, pain in the judicial penalty acts as a medium whereby people approach a good outweighing the evil the pain

represents. Unjust people presumably do not, of course (and Plato does not suggest that they do, merely that they should), consciously seek penalty in their injustice. They ostensibly seek the profit that they hope will ensue on committing it. This is, of course, because they are stupid, or they would not initially have embarked on unjust methods of gaining their ends. They reckon on not being detected, and, given good luck (their dependence on good luck further confirms their stupidity), they will derive gain. But they normally get their relieving penalty. Were they not, then, subconsciously seeking that as well? It is an unsatisfactory 'reward' to the extent that it is invariably much greater than they required, but that is another natural result of their stupidity.

As a strange variant, now, we can more easily consider at the same time the apparent existence of wise people who are unjust[49]. We have to account for some alleged and plausibly absolute inclination towards βία, φθόνος, and θυμός in all, even the most intelligent - but of course especially strongly θυμοειδεῖς - people. The existence of this absolute inclination is totally convincing. For if it can be shown that the general tendency in all humans is ultimately towards war, whether gain may best be assured by war or not, we have to concede that there must be much more than gain in the eye of the really aggressive individual. There must, in short, be vastly more if at a certain stage even highly intelligent individuals have trouble in finding just methods of tapping the total inclination adequately. The allegation that even

wise men seek injustice is therefore incontrovertible - yet also in a sense fallacious. For the reality after all is simply that they are not wise enough to cope justly with the thumoeidic urge harassing them when it has reached a particularly intense degree.

Concerning the "goodness" of the results of thumoeidic activity, in as far as any object sought satisfies a need, and satisfies it justly, it seems so far that, by Plato's criteria, it can be called a good. It is therefore owing to penalty's association with τὸ θυμοειδές that it (penalty) also becomes eligible for a claim to goodness. That this goodness is there, direct or indirect, and whether in the shape of penalty or conventional thumoeidic activity, can for the present be taken as settled. A problem that presents itself now is whether the act of injustice is a consequence of the ἐπιθυμητικόν only, or of the θυμοειδές only, or of both. Is injustice caused by τὸ φιλοκερδές, τὸ φιλόνικον, or both? On this will depend the link between τὸ θυμοειδές and injustice, the very fact that such a link exists at all.

c.14 There are various types of injustice dealt with by Plato. Some are handled explicitly, others by allusion. Traditionally, at all events, injustice seems to be the result of epithumetic desire. Thrasymachus outlines the most basic areas of desirability in his speech[50]. Variously, he refers appraisingly to τὸ συμφέρον; τὸ αὐτῷ βέλτιστον; ὅθεν

αὐτοι ὠφεληθονται; being εὐδαίμων; having more than the next man; not being μοχθηρός, and not being hated (ἀπεχθέσθαι). In sum, however, all injustice is to him ultimately one thing only. It is πλεονεκτεῖν[51] - 'getting more'. The greatest exponent of ἀδικία, the tyrant, apparently only does one thing worthy of mention: he takes (ἀφαιρεῖται[52]). He takes wholesale. This to Thrasymachus, this taking (including "taking", enslavement, of people), constitutes injustice. It represents to him, without any shadow of doubt, the 'whole sum' of it (τὴν ὅλην ἀδικίαν[53]). Glaucon later tells us that 'every nature' pursues πλεονεξία as a good[54]. No doubt he assumes (fairly justifiably) that as a human motivatory force it is so invariable as to be almost the only one worth talking about. He outlines Gyges' exploits: μοιχεύσαντα.....ἀποκτεῖναι, τὴν ἀρχὴν....κατασχεῖν: adultery, murder, seizure of power. Indisputably, for all their supposed variety, all aim at gain. Even the adultery has less to do with lust than with gaining control of the state. And if that were not so, it would in any case still come under the head of gaining so-called 'pleasure'. Further, control of the state, in turn, is clearly scarcely thought of as desired from the point of view merely of φιλονικία. It is borne in mind solely for its contribution to the cause of πλεονεξία. Ownership is the reigning purpose. Power over the state implies power to acquire as one's property all objects and persons in the state that present themselves to one's fancy. The question now arises: What, in all this, is

actually desired? Is it purely κέρδος, gain, that is desired in this injustice? Or, again, is there (and this is the viewpoint postulated in the present thesis) some other pleasurable feature of it as well? And is it this or the former that, largely, prompts people to commit injustice?

Direct evidence that Plato conceived of a pleasure of the novel type inherent in the "pains" of exertion, labour, or penalty is in fact not altogether absent. It is simply, we have found, very elusive. Socrates applies epithumetic desire most especially to the fields of food, drink, sexual satisfaction 'and their kin'[55]. Later he specifies ἀναλωτικαί (wasteful: e.g. ἀφροδίσια) and χρηματιστικαί (useful: e.g. eating, drinking)[56]. These are the dispensable and indispensable desires[57] respectively. Again, ποικίλαι[58] desires are unfavourably contrasted with ἁπλότης of appetite, but the limit is still to σῖτος (plain food), ὄψον (delicacies), and ἀφροδίσια (sex), The same limitation is applied in the case of excesses[59]: ὕβρις (arrogance), ἀναρχία (lawlessness), ἀσωτία (profligacy), and ἀναίδεια (shamelessness). There is, however, an important deviation when we come to the high-flown designations these types of excess are dignified with by the misled youth. For added to εὐπαιδευσία, ἐλευθερία, μεγαλοπρέπεια, there is a fourth - ἀνδρεία. In ἀνδρεία we have a quite new ingredient. It is one which causes us to take a much closer look at ἀναίδεια. A shamelessness which can be passed off as manliness, courage, has a great deal more common ground with τὸ

θυμοειδές than with ἐπιθυμία. It involves reckless behaviour gone in for on its own account. It is a boldness, albeit regardless of laws, which is implemented for the sake of its own special and intrinsic consequences, not for purposes of appetite or lust.

c.15 Significantly, ἀνδρεία was the first and leading characteristic[60] allotted to the thumoeidic element of the soul. And here again, perhaps reminiscent of the greed-inflamed (φλεγμαίνουσα) state, Plato is allowing an overflow of desire into the territory of τὸ θυμοειδές. The experiences involved in bold conduct can be, he maintains, precisely 'wanted'. They can be objects of positive desire just as food, drink, and sexual contentment. Glaucon was originally inclined to think of τὸ θυμοειδές as more closely linked with τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν than with τὸ λογιστικόν[61]. Perhaps the common ingredient θυμός in the two words prompted this. A root similarity was also suggested by the fact that both can lead to τὸ ἄγριον[62].

We have already found that there is a category of desire outside and embracing the three departments of the soul of which formal 'desire' is one. Indeed all three departments, we concluded, appear to incorporate, in a sense, types of desire[63]. But the wish to possess well-defined commodities of 'gain' or enjoy easily recognisable pleasures is clear enough. Almost equally clear is the one to indulge in intellectual pursuits. The desire to indulge[64] in thumoeidic

types of behaviour is not so clear. Their desirability, because of their strenuous or unfamiliar flavour, is very hard to see. Yet how, in spite of all this - if they are so substantial - can they be discounted?

Whether any of the thumoeidic type of activities are believed by Plato to be enjoyed precisely because they are uncomfortable is a point on which, we may repeat, he is not explicit. If he had been totally silent on it, the case for the present thesis could not have arisen at all. But, as we have interpreted his comments so far, he seems, at first sight at any rate, to be saying that the pain is enjoyed because during the actual experience of it a worse pain is removed.

Somewhat more illuminatingly, however, we do later find what looks like a more concrete stand taken on thumoeidic. This is the point where he makes an outright reference to fighting 'for the mere sake of fighting'[65]. There still, indeed, seem to be riders. The people involved are also acting ἕνεκα.....πλεονεξίας, for the sake of gain, δι' ἀπληστίαν, owing to insatiability, etc. But Plato does now explicitly separate the two categories φιλοκερδές (=ἐπιθυμητικόν) and φιλόνικον (=θυμοειδές). He distinguishes them quite unequivocally as discrete sources of pleasure[66]. He speaks outright of the desires appertaining to each with distinction of each respective compartment. No overlap or interdependence occurs between the two. And in doing this he commits himself more fully to the doctrine that conquering, acquiring τιμή, and venting anger[67] provide a

πλησμονή, fulfilment, in themselves, on the same principle as the objects of standard ἐπιθυμία do.

Yet, while he makes allowance for all this, it seems that he still cannot quite accept the conclusion as it stands. The tendency towards kicking, butting, and killing (λακτίζειν, κυρίττειν, and ἀποκτείνειν) in the brute animal is still in part referred back not to desirability of these actions themselves, but to ulterior objects of desire. This is to say, assuming that ἕνεκα and διά in ἕνεκα πλεονεξίας and δι' ἀπληστίαν mean 'in the cause of' and 'on account of' respectively (rather than 'as a result of'), as they most probably do , that πλεονεξία and ἀπληστία are not just background "fuelling" sources of the "real" trigger - thumoeidic. They are the trigger. Plato is therefore still, in part at least, maintaining here that contentious activity is indulged in because people want the food-drink-sex type pleasures which it is a means to getting. They may also want it for some consequence specifically confined to it, but that consequence has in its vagueness to share its status with them.

Adjustment may be made of the sense of πλεονεξία and ἀπληστία to 'repletion'. But now, even if the ἕνεκα and διά could be stretched to meaning 'as a result of' instead of 'in the cause of', the situation is not much better. The aggression seems then to be made a mere overflow of the excess indulged in. It resembles the aimless kicking of a corn-fed horse. So we are back where we started, because it is clear

that they cannot, in fact, be rendered as that. The last part of the sentence[68] shows that the random aggressiveness is occasioned by failure to satisfy urges by these methods. The urges continue unappeased because the objects used to appease them are 'unreal' (οὐχι τοῖς οὖσιν)[69]. Accordingly, thrown back on the first translations ('in the cause of', 'on account of'), we have to accept Plato's more apparent meaning. These persons, that is, who, like beasts, unacquainted with intellect or excellence, indulge in the less real pleasures[70] (those characteristic of ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμοειδές), actually kick and gore and kill one another in order to gain never-endingly greater supplies of the standard ἡδοναί. These are the things Plato means when he says that, being unreal, they never provide genuine satisfaction. We could, indeed, suggest that he does not exclude the thumoeidic "pleasures" from them. But he does not include them either. We must therefore inquire further.

c.16 To reach a satisfactory conclusion - if this is feasible - concerning what Plato meant here, we have to take further note of various of his references to the three soul sectors (λογιστικόν, θυμοειδές, and ἐπιθυμητικόν). Unless, that is, his correlation of these three is more clearly defined, we cannot expect to discover how he meant φιλία[71], and ἡδονή[72] (arising from the φιλίαι), to apply to the thumoeidic part of the soul.

A primary point is that these three initial soul parts

are made separate by virtue of their distinct activities. The division is almost imperceptibly introduced by scattered references[73], then in full[74]. Justice has initially been proposed[75] as a system of balance. It is the medium through which each class of person, man, woman, child, in the city performs its own specific work without interference. This proposal leads naturally to the discussion of what happens when there is interference. Groups whose mutual non-cooperation and intermingling would be even more catastrophic are brought up. These comprise the χρηματιστής, πολεμικός, and βουλευτικός[76]. (Later we find this nomenclature varied to χρηματιστικός, ἐπικουρικός, φυλακικός[77], or again φιλοκερδής, φιλόνικος, φιλόσοφος, etc.[78]) Socrates now comments that , just as in the city one has the σώφρων, ἀνδρεῖα, and σοφή sectors, so does one in the individual man. His separate mental sectors correspond. This being so[79], the φιλομαθής, θυμοειδής, and φιλοχρήματος sectors are as much departments in the mind as they are in the city.

We now have a more explicit grouping of the three. These are again the complementary parts: φιλομαθές, θυμοειδές, φιλοχρήματον[80]. The list is followed by their formal definition, which designates them as those parts comprising the soul with which we learn (μανθάνομεν), are angry (θυμούμεθα), and desire (ἐπιθυμοῦμεν)[81]. A full discussion of the separate but independent roles [82] of these parts in the soul is added.

On the strength of this account we might well come to the

fairly reasonable conclusion that each of these three parts carries out exclusively the function in connexion with which it is named. I.e. the logistic would control only thinking and nothing else, the thumoeidic contest and nothing else, the epithumetic desiring and nothing else. But, so far from this being the case, a hint of something more, as we saw a little while ago, came with the ascription of pleasure to the logistic[83]. It was here that the θυμοειδές could begin to lay claim to be considered alongside it in relation to this important finding.

c.17 To expand further on this. Pleasure had even earlier not been referred to as absolutely of the epithumetic sector[84]. Desire was, as such, ascribed to one part of the soul only. And pleasure, indeed, is presumably only possible from things one can desire. But it seemed that the desires associated with the epithumetic were limited[85]. They are described as 'those concerned with eating and sex, and related genres'[86], 'certain pleasures'[87], 'the so-called pleasures of the body'[88]. We are, therefore, not altogether unprepared when a distinct pleasure is suddenly ascribed to the ψυχή. But ψυχή is taken here in the sense 'rational (logistic) part of the ψυχή'. How can it conceivably be associated with vulgar-sounding 'pleasures'? Yet Cephalus had spoken early on of the desires and pleasures of the mind. There existed in his view, the περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ ἡδοναί[89]. And later, too[90], we have mention of them. Similarly, though reference to pleasures of the

thumoeidic sector is not as full, it is made quite clear that this soul element also seeks them. Here, then, we are being shown something quite revolutionary. A distinct pleasure can be predicated of activities by no means ordinarily associated with the pursuit of pleasure at all.

This does not really fit in with the original scheme. In fact, it seems an almost inconceivable departure when we find Plato allowing a formal metamorphosis of the three departments of the soul from functional to what seem at first like virtually appetitive units. The reason for his instituting this new approach seems also impossible to understand. Perhaps, however, we may get some arguable glimmering of his intention if we take the following stand-point. It is possible that, in following this line of thinking, he may be trying to account for what appear to him to be elements of 'drive' present in these units. Such elements would indeed make them deserving of a status as partly 'desires' in their own right. Earlier, he had attributed to θυμοειδές the principal element of drive found in the higher sector[91]. But the dynamic 'thrust' by the epithumetic sector towards things it desires is just as concrete. It may seem less violent than the thumoeidic's, but it is no less surely there. And the urge to learn is equally real.

Conceivably, the epithumetic element alone, without the thumoeidic, might have provided the logistic's motive power. We might ask why it was not enlisted to do so. But there could be a good reason for this. Plato recognised that there

was a very real desire for intellectual activities in 'superior' people. But at the same time he might have been most reluctant to assign this desire to the same agency (epithumetic) as desired such lowly items as food, drink, and sexual repletion. He had already called the epithumetic the μοχθηρότατον 'most degenerate', part of the soul[92]. Any agency he could condemn in terms of that sort would hardly be suitable as an associate of the highest. And this highest part, the logistic, may, too, have seemed to embody a type of desire different from both the epithumetic and the thumoeidic. After all, it is more refined, less intense (σφόδρος)[93]. Its source scorns bodily desires[94]. Nevertheless those desires had to be allotted to some source. It may have seemed natural enough - certainly convenient - to turn it into a composite unit. It would engage in, but also enjoy and desire, the pleasure proper to it[95]. And this would be on direct analogy with the other two sectors of the soul.

Perhaps the problem should be looked at in concordance with other passages (cf. the Protagoras)[96], where ἡδονή is - perhaps not as ironically as is believed by some scholars - singled out as supposedly the supreme good. Plato may be wishing to emend, or at least compromise on, a score on which he is not entirely satisfied - the possible underrating of the status and importance of pleasure. Consideration of its applicability to the higher pursuits would certainly suggest that he is not altogether happy with its "low" grading. He can, however, only correct the situation by raising pleasure

from its predominantly sensual association to the level of concomitant of higher pursuits. It has to be elevated first to coverage of competitive, second, and ultimately, to that of high intellectual, activity. If it could be found to be a sufficiently noble thing, there would at any rate be less hindrance to its being considered as an aspect of the ultimate end - the Good. And this elevation he at all events goes on to consolidate in subsequent paragraphs[97]. Here he maintains not only that there is a certain 'high' pleasure attached to intellectual activity, but that such pleasure is the only 'true' kind.

Whether or not to serve as an introduction, then, to this contention, he brings in two new proposals[98]. First, three respective pleasures and desires exist, corresponding to the three parts of the soul. Second, these three parts may, by virtue of this, be designated in each case to particular things as loves (φιλίαι), and hence termed φιλόσοφον, φιλόνικον, φιλοκερδές[99].

In assigning to each part an appetitive aspect, he establishes that each faculty will seek the enjoyment appropriate to the activity with which it is particularly concerned. And for the thumoeidic part this means variously κρατεῖν, νικᾶν, εὐδοκιμεῖν[100], indulging one's θυμός[101], exerting βία, and feeling φθόνος.

c.18 The first suggestion that enters one's mind on seeing the term φιλόνικος or φιλότιμος is that it is the victory gained, or the honour won, that is the object of desire. This is a point we have already gone into quite fully. At the outside, it could be the processes of 'being victorious', or similarly of 'being honoured', that are desired - but these seem somewhat artificial. At all events, what it does not appear to be is the actual laborious process of fighting to win victory or honour. Correspondingly, in the case of τὸ φιλόσοφον and τὸ φιλοκερδές, we would say that the most likely candidates for the object of desire are respectively knowledge and the standard κέρδη (money, bodily pleasures, etc.) We would not imagine that it might be the burdensome process of gaining these, the strenuous efforts that must go before actual enjoyment. But, first, we must make some further observations in this connexion.

To take τὸ φιλόνικον as a preliminary instance. If it is supposed to be νίκη, the completed victory, that is liked by the φιλόνικος, not the process of νικᾶν, 'conquering', there are still highly unsatisfactory features of the situation. The essence of the question here is clearly the same as in the instance of Ἔρως, discussed earlier. In its capacity as primary Dionysiac energy-source in the Dionysiac-Apollinian dynamism of Ἔρως, τὸ θυμοειδές has one salient characteristic. It constantly places the problem of its disposal on the Apollinian sector. Unless the Apollinian aids it in this, the θυμοειδές' relatively inadequate intellectual

component cannot make the grade. It falls short, and fails to achieve justice. The result has, inevitably, been that we have proportionate failure of direction. The ἔρως process goes astray, because the interaction of rational and irrational which it embodies is not consummated. With the intellect of the Apollinian rational no longer harnessing the energy of the Dionysiac irrational sector, the pursuit of the Good collapses.

Only the Apollinian sector* can truly know and desire the Good. And the Good in this case is not only its own particular object of desire. It is the sole justifiable overall object of desire that ἔρως can have. The two branches of desire which are proper to the Dionysiac (or 'thumoeido-epithumetic') sector are on the other hand not in themselves justifiable candidates as overall goods for the ἔρως process as a whole. They are specifically and forcefully sought by these two elements. Certainly, too, they are essential goods. But they are merely subsidiary, and exceedingly limited in their scope. The importance behind them is that, limited though they may be, they provide the fuel by means of which the struggle towards goodness by the logistic can be carried on. Further, if that logistic is not sufficiently developed to distinguish the right way to the Good, the thrusting violence of the Dionysiac sector will nonetheless assert itself. Its effects in such circumstances will, in sad contrast, be disharmony, imbalance, and so injustice.

* (assuming this to be adequate)

In a word, the aim of the Dionysiac sector per se is to satisfy the urges proper to it. For ἔρως to be successfully implemented, the Apollinian sector must guide these urges in coordination with the overall search for the chief Good. If it is successful, harmony, balance, and so justice will result. But these Dionysiac urges are on the δόξα, or even total ἀγνωσία, level. They are quite unconcerned (except partially, in the case of τὸ θυμοειδές) with the aims and aspirations of ἔρως. We might therefore regard νίκη, or τιμή, θυμοῦσθαι, etc., as 'commodities' ready-won and possessed. The fact of possessing them, rather than the process of winning them, is, we might propose, what is enjoyed. But this, once again, does not help. We are up against the old problem. Why, for instance, is the thumoeidic person said to aim 'continuously and totally' at mastery[102]? Why does he not let up except presumably over almost negligible "rest periods" following strenuous contest? Quite clearly because the bid for νίκη, τιμή, and δυσκολία is incessant. It parallels the bid for food, drink, and sexual repletion in the case of the epithumetic sector and seems at times similarly almost wholly devoid of intellect. There is never any question of getting enough. Its ravenous appetite runs ahead unchecked. This perpetual insatiability was initially the case only with uncontrolled ἐπιθυμία[103]. But as it is proper to the ἀπληστία of the lowest desires, it applies in great part to τὸ θυμοειδές by analogy. It does so, no doubt, but more slightly, even to the logistic. For ultimate knowledge may certainly satisfy

permanently, but it still, presumably, has to be dynamically maintained. Of course, Plato offers an explanation of why the search for both of the former classes of things is unremitting. It is that the objects concerned never satisfy. And the reason they do not, is, as we saw[104], that they are 'unreal'[105]. Perhaps a more modern way of putting this would be that, since the urges they satisfy are biological, they are constantly renewing themselves. They cannot be permanently stilled. And this tones in perfectly harmoniously with Plato's findings - provided that different degrees of intensity of the urges are allowed for.

c.19 We have established that one cannot, at all events, claim that the φιλόνικος, in seeking νίκη, does so because he wants subsequent material gains which are derived from victory. This desire is proper to the φιλοχρήματος (ἐπιθυμητικός). Nor can we confidently take him to be wanting the accomplished fact of being victorious, or of being paid honour (rather parallel to receiving material tokens of honour). The reason for this is that he no sooner conquers than his efforts to conquer, it is specifically stated, are renewed. He never even takes a substantial - least of all a permanent - rest. Not even after a decisive conquest. This may be because, as we have observed, his special object of desire is, in Plato's technical sense, too 'unreal'. (The proviso here is always that the νίκη concerned is of the common vulgar material type, which it

must be, unless adequately guided by logistic). But this is in any case a different kind of 'unreality' from that of material objects. It is even different from that of the semi-abstracts 'honour' and 'victory'. We can accordingly begin to consider again the possibility that it is not the νίκη but the actual exertion of attempting to attain νίκη that is in itself for him the desirable thing. Moreover, for the θυμοειδές element to discriminate on its own between good and bad victories and honours is putting too high a demand on its relatively less developed intellectual ingredient. It must have guidance from the logistic. As θυμοειδές element pure and simple, it can therefore only desire action limited to the gain of νίκη, τιμή, and δυσκολία. (These are taken as being on whatever level, with the bias at times towards the higher, at times the lower, types.) It follows that, now, for ἔρως to be successful, its logistic (Apollinian) sector must be adequately equipped to rule over the two lower sectors, θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν. Yet the fact of the matter is that it is not invariably supplied with adequate λόγος.

This is what makes the struggle a real one. A less than perfectly capable Apollinian λόγος is tried and tested to the utmost. The aim behind this is to bring its irrepressibly dynamic lower sectors into disciplined line; to fuel it in its pursuit of the Good. It does not always succeed. (This is proved by the presence of wrongdoing.) But if it did, the struggle could in any case not be genuine. It would thus not

be of the kind presumably intended by the Demiourgos.

We should revert for a moment to further analysis, arising out of this, of the mutual relationship of the various sectors constituting the Dionysiac and Apollinian constituents of ἔρως. The presence of an appetitive constituent in each of the three parts of the soul leaves their existence as distinct sections unaffected. At all events, this applies as far as the appetite in each is restricted to the private object-matter of each. For instance, Plato treats τὸ φιλόνικον throughout as a middle term between τὸ φιλόσοφον and τὸ φιλοκερδές. This he does in the sense that he keeps it separate from both, though at times he brings it closer to the one, at times to the other. (Overall, he seems to prefer to regard it as closer to τὸ φιλόσοφον than to τὸ φιλοκερδές[106], but the balance is about even.) In the last major passage in which the three parts of the soul are dealt with[107], he preserves this relation. The status of the middle part as the ally, perhaps more naturally of the higher than the lower, is confirmed[108], but they are still distinct.

In the instance of τὸ φιλόνικον and τὸ φιλοκερδές, the common factor of appetite produces uncompromising overlap. Early on we found an almost inextricable union of the two parts. This was at the stage where the primitive republic, by its choice of a drive for superfluous commodities instead of contented living on simple necessaries, 'unwittingly'

projected itself into war[109]. Plato later separates these parts, but his subsequent treatment of them as uniform 'desires' (φιλίαι) serves to reintroduce the earlier fusion.

c.20 The sequence at that early point was not quite straightforward. It is worth tracing it back in order to clarify the steps by which the progression to war occurs. The first stage comes with the observation that the simple provisions for life hitherto listed 'will not be adequate'[110]. They will not satisfy certain people who (in Glaucon's phrase) regard the plans made so far as good enough for a city of pigs, but not for one of humans. The new τρυφῶσα[111] and φλεγμαίνουσα city will want much more than it has so far been allotted. But it appears, also, that this wanting will be of a rather peculiar kind. It will extend not merely beyond the original point (of necessities) to a definite limit, but infinitely. For Socrates assumes, when he states that their current provisions will be insufficient, that they will need a bigger city[112] <u>even though</u> the population's size has presumably remained unchanged. Briefly, they will have to <u>seize other people's land</u>. They will have to become thieves on the largest scale. Yet the fact that their possessions would not immediately suffice had <u>not</u> entailed that they would need a bigger city. Much less had it necessitated that they should acquire the land for it by theft.

Socrates glosses over these seemingly fundamental issues.

The simple remark he uses in doing so is that parts of the neighbours' territory will 'have to be annexed' (ἀποτμητέον). And in this he strangely omits all aspects of the point, clearly obvious to him, made above. (This is the truism that people who want more, while already possessing essential needs, do not need to rob others.) The republic's inhabitants can for one thing work harder to make more, but it seems that this method holds no attractions for them. For another, they can expand into their own undeveloped territory, if, as is normally the case, they have some available. They do not need to avail themselves either of the moveable possessions or land of others. Yet, notwithstanding all this, the second stage - of seizing foreign territory - is reached in a sudden rush. There would seem to be many preliminary stages to be gone through before the final act of piracy, but our conclusion can only be that Socrates considers them self-evident and does not wish to waste time considering them. The hard final fact - and no-one recognises it better than he - is that ultimately these inhabitants of the would-be luxurious state are inevitably going to be wanting their neighbours' possessions and land. Above all, this is going to be the case however much they may have of their own. The reality might as well be recognised immediately. The intermediate stages can go by the board. They are simply going to want to engage in aggression irrespective.

And a further basic issue - which Plato has no doubt deliberately made room for[113] - is the following. There is, among these inhabitants of the so to speak 'luxus-staat', not

just this inherent interminability, this infinity, of baser πλεονεξία. There is not only the desire to get infinitely more of everything, without discrimination of good or bad. There exists, further, the clear-cut desire to get it precisely by forcibly wresting it from others. This is so not only although the attackers do not need it, but even if they do not need to apply force to get it. ἔρως has of course here clearly gone drastically astray. The Apollinian factor has fallen far short. But beyond all these in interest, Plato delineates here a desire for contest as such, with the emphasis on the amoral nature of that contest.

It is on this basis that the argument rests that Plato is not actually postulating a desire for νίκη as an achieved, completed goal. What he is specifying it to be for is a process of struggle. The struggle is to gain νίκη, but continues whether it is gained or not. τὸ θυμοειδές inexorably and incessantly desires νίκη. This is fundamental. Second, this desire is incompletely logistic, and , to result in good, must be properly guided by λόγος. Such is the condition of the success of ἔρως.

c.21 This is a striking suggestion on Plato's part. First, no amount of gain however great will ever satisfy unchecked (by the logistic sector) ἐπιθυμία. He is to repeat this point later, more than once[114]. But this is not all. The desire for more is not confined even within accepted, commonsense bounds. Acquisitiveness, it would be expected,

would at least be limited to the things one can get without endangering one's life. One's very ability to enjoy the things one gets should surely never be gambled with. To enjoy them one must, after all, be alive. Yet this gamble is to be taken. Other peoples are to be attacked superfluously, and their land wrested from them[115], a kind of act performed necessarily at the possible cost of everything the attacker has, including his life. More interesting than ever is that, judging by the way he phrases the passage[116], Plato regards this apparently needless aggressiveness not merely as an origin, but as the fundamental origin, of war.

For it is one thing to say that man's appetite for gain is never satisfied[117]. It is very much another to say that it can nag him to such an extent that he will actually virtually commit suicide to try to appease it. In particular, if ἀνδρεία is a prerequisite for aggressiveness, greed is nevertheless still all that is supposed to be needed to make one go to war. (Plato certainly at first implies that it is.) There should therefore be no need for the extra φιλόνικον (θυμοειδές) element to provide a fund of ἀνδρεία. Greed should presumably supply all the ἀνδρεία necessary. However, of course, ἀνδρεία is a noble thing. The relation of τὸ φιλοκερδές and τὸ φιλόνικον therefore needs closer inspection.

Why is τὸ θυμοειδές necessary for aggression? Why, if greed alone is apparently enough to drive a man to attacking, is something further required to supplement it? On the face

of it, there seems no need for any subsidiary aid to greed. If we may conjecture that Plato has neglected to make explicit any particular point resulting from his argument about the consequences of greed, this is undoubtedly one. The extent to which he incorporates in it the driving power he later makes the proper province of τὸ θυμοειδές is not clear. Still, he gives us some significant leads. τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν has, it seems, very compelling links with τὸ θυμοειδές. In spite of τὸ θυμοειδές' preferential links with τὸ φιλόσοφον, both τὸ θυμοειδές and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν are beasts. This is noteworthy. Even if the first is a lion and the evident superior of the other, these creatures are below man. Both can become ἄγριον[118]. And both can, by their separate, if simultaneous, efforts effectively cripple τὸ λογιστικόν[119]. Moreover, both have the principal core of their meaning in the stem θυμ-, and a resultant germ of dynamism emerges.

c.22 As far as τὸ θυμοειδές (and, somewhat in the same way, ἐπιθυμία) is a drive towards a particular type of conduct, it stands in contrast with that of τὸ φιλομαθές (λογιστικόν). The latter is of course a much milder, more ethereal tendency, far more so than ἐπιθυμία. Plato has now left it less completely defined than will make it fully independent. He has postulated τὸ θυμοειδές as a distinct feature because it seems to him to have an important independent existence. Consciously, however, or

unconsciously, he has made it look - at least at first - more like a secondary feature. It resembles more closely something supervenient on ἐπιθυμία[120] than a real force on its own. As such a feature, it adds extra weight on its own account to τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν (only later primarily to τὸ φιλομαθές), but has only a partially distinct separate existence. In short, first the φλεγμαίνουσα state desires limitlessly and indiscriminately. As a result it ultimately attacks (allegedly solely for yet further gain). Then mysteriously it is made out, we find, to be contentious not for the sake of contest as well as acquisition, but solely for the sake of acquisition. If any desire at all does exist on its part for contest as such, it is included with acquisition under the one label - τὸ φιλοκερδές.

Plato, in temporarily fusing acquisitiveness with contentiousness in this way[121], no doubt still thought of ἐπιθυμία and τὸ θυμοειδές as stages of the dialectical process of striving for ἀγαθόν. He began by placing them in both roles - greed and contentiousness - and simply omitting initial mention of τὸ θυμοειδές. In doing this, he was probably taking τὸ θυμοειδές temporarily as an additional contention factor, a kind of "supercharger", as it were, of the basic desire-machinery. The fact is, nevertheless, that we have τὸ θυμοειδές presented to us later independently, with a wealth of detail and in a very different light. This must certainly be considered important for modifying our view of the kind of greed Plato regards as culminating in war.

θυμοειδές should, further, be seen in that capacity as, once again, having a strong bearing on the nature of both war and injustice generally. The Apollinian factor is lacking, so θυμοειδές' application is unsatisfactorily guided. And the account of how war begins can be taken as an account 'writ large' of the beginning of any kind of deprivation - or, briefly, Injustice.

c.23 The reason for this interrelation, to recapitulate in part what has already been suggested, is that, as is now clear, more than just greed is needed in order to allow particularly greedy people to implement their desires. To possess the full force to achieve his ends, the unlimitedly φιλοκερδής (epithumetic) individual has also inevitably got to be φιλόνικος (θυμοειδής) <u>to some extent</u>. The very <u>act</u> of stealing, to which he must inevitably first resort, must consist first of all and basically in subjection of the victim. Only together with this can there be appropriation. Successful contest must precede (or can follow) removal of property, because the prospective or actual victim of stealing will at some stage resist. All these things require force to counter.

One can divide the supposedly single act 'stealing' (here of territory: τῆς...χώρας...ἀποτμητέον) into two distinct stages. These are respectively attack and appropriation. The identical principle applies even in surreptitious theft,

because the act of taking their property away from people involves an ingredient of trauma inflicted on them. And trauma of this sort has so much in common with that accompanying the actual act of wresting it from them that it is indeed almost impossible to tell the two apart. In short, the act of depriving anyone of anything, since it involves separating them from it, involves duress. Whether the 'separating' is done by open force or by stealth, it inflicts shock. This shock may be physical or mental, but, whichever it is, it invites forcible reprisal. And this reprisal the thief then has to resist - if only by flight.

Illicit deprivation cannot therefore, in principle, be anything other than 'contentious'. And, following from this combined with the above finding, we may conclude that any type of injustice whatever is, in principle, contentious. It consists fundamentally of deprivation of others in respect of goods, material or abstract, which are anything up to potentially vital to them. As such, it must in principle contain the element of aggression. The act of greed, on the other hand, does not on its own always[122] incorporate theft. It does not, therefore, always incorporate aggression. In as far as it observes the law, it will observe the legal boundaries of any undesirable consequences it may have, and, accordingly, it cannot rank as injustice unless it crosses those bounds. But once it does so, it becomes an unjust, and therefore a contentious, act.

The relationship Plato's treatment of the subject leaves

us with is this. All injustice is contentious. Not all contention is, however, unjust. This is clearly very significant for the part of τὸ θυμοειδές in the scheme of justice and injustice. For as it turns out, there would in effect be no injustice at all but for the existence of the θυμοειδές element. On the other hand, there would be no justice worthy of the name either. The θυμοειδές element is the driving factor that generates all noteworthy activity, good or evil, and the logistic determines how much good or evil will relatively be achieved by the activity. With the thumoeidic force removed, the universe would be a static hulk.

c.24 It will also be helpful to return temporarily to the earlier point, that Plato has quite simply maintained[123] that greed on its own initiates the type of war Glaucon's luxury state will set out to wage. In fact, it looks there very much as if he thinks of greed as having the inherent drive to sustain that war as well. We need to test afresh the picture so far given us of greed to see whether it will permit of this. Earlier we found references in the discourse between Thrasymachus and Socrates to greed in connexion with unjustice[124]. Yet πλεονεξία ('unlimited desire'), as we have seen, does not naturally follow from ἐπιθυμία in the normal Greek sense. Normal desire has a distinct object. On acquisition of that object, it rests satisfied for an appreciable time. When, in contrast, we conjoin with 'desire' the additional Platonic rider of insatiability, a new factor comes into play. Now the subject desires not just

a certain object or objects, nor for a limited time, but unlimited commodities all the time. This is the exact mental backdrop to greed. In short, πλεονεξία reveals itself as the term denoting, as it were, superimplementation of the mental attitude characteristic of desire. It is desire bolstered by τὸ θυμοειδές, and abandoned by λογιστικόν. And Plato may well have expected us to draw that conclusion. From this point at any rate we may set out to find whatever links there may be between 'high-temper-energy' (τὸ θυμοειδές), greed, and injustice, which when present together in predominant force cause ἔρως to fail.

Socrates is unwilling at first to discuss the problem of whether the war which arises from greed achieves (ἐργάζεται) good or evil[125]. At the same time he maintains that evils for men arise particularly plentifully from war. By this he seems to mean that, whether or not it might achieve an ultimate total of good outbalancing its evil products, those evil products are immense and sure. The good, for their part, are unsure. He is also positive that the gods (who are pre-eminently good)[126] do not fight among themselves[127]. To hate easily is a most loathsome thing[128]. A fortiori, since war is taken to imply hatred, making war must also be most loathsome. In these preliminary passages we find significant linkages of thought between greed, injustice, and contentiousness. Most important are the connexions between the latter two.

c.25 Having attributed luxury-grasping war to greed[129] alone, Plato however, as we have seen, then importantly introduces the θυμοειδές element[130]. This he now says supplies the courage (ἀνδρεία) necessary for the willingness to fight[131]. We have already noted the overlap between greed and 'high-temper' in respect to war[132]. To be the basic cause of war, greed, we found, would have to generate its own supply of courage. We could not see how it could do this solely with the help of ἐπιθυμία. But we have now been presented with the proposedly independent, specific source of courage - τὸ θυμοειδές. The greedy man who also makes war must get his courage from this. There is no other specified source.

To support this conclusion. There is that about greed which does not suggest an affinity with courage. At first sight, the sequence followed in greed's realisation would be this. The greedy man devotes himself to the wholesale legal gathering in of property. Then, if unappeased, he covets the property of others and tries to get it from them legally or semi-legally. Ultimately, he seizes it illegally. But this final step of seizure would, we have shown, invariably in principle involve overcoming resistance. It would involve a need for force, either in the shape of positive aggression, or defence, and/or evasion of reprisals. And here, unless he is courageous as well as greedy, the greedy man must stop. Either he will never actually set out to seize what he covets, or he will persuade others to seize it for him. But

then, if we believe we have escaped the problem by this shift (substituting "others" who will help him for his own courage), there is the question of the motive by which these others, the fighters he employs, will be led. Will they, similarly, be fighting for mere gain? Or will they be fighting merely - or additionally - 'for the sake of fighting'? If they are fighting for gain, then they are actuated by the same motives as the greedy man is. There is still the problem of where their courage comes from. For with only the motives of the greedy man behind them, they are in his position. They in fact, to take Plato's division strictly, could not fight at all. 'To fight for gain alone' (that is for superfluous gain, since fighting for the necessities of life can be excluded as self-explanatory - one fights rather than dies) involves a contradiction in terms. There must be the added factor of 'contentiousness' present. For people who are prepared to fight for superfluities, or just as a preferred way of making a living, require more than greed. If, therefore, they are fighting wholly or in part for the sheer sake of fighting, then they must to that extent be actuated by φιλονικία (τὸ θυμοειδές). They are not motivated, in that department, by greed. The process of gaining νίκη, that is of fighting itself, must be desirable to them.

c.26 In the previous chapter[133], we found that the φιλόνικος brand of the thumoeidic person could only partially satisfactorily be shown to enjoy the process by which he

achieved νίκη. It looked as though completed achievement of νίκη, the state of being victorious, was all that supplied him with satisfaction. He did not seem so clearly to enjoy the strenuous process of gaining it. But the indications were that Plato did not actually regard him as deriving full satisfaction from νίκη itself.

If these indications did not seem conclusive, a more thorough follow-up yields some illumination. Closer inspection of the case of the φιλόνικος on general grounds reveals νίκη as on its own a very tenuous object of desire. The νίκη enjoyed by a common soldier would certainly be extremely flimsy. Without the subsidiary factor of τιμή, it does not even carry real conviction as a reward in its own right at all. The common soldier earning pay for his services does not, further, win much τιμή in any case.

We have now substantially shown that some soldiers fight partly or exclusively owing to φιλονικία. If the findings just quoted are valid, it appears most unlikely that such soldiers will be fighting even largely for purposes of gaining an 'end-product' νίκη in the standard sense of the term 'end-product' - or indeed for τιμή or anything similar to it in the way of a 'final' end. They must, in fact, be fighting their external enemy in great part precisely because they wish to fight. They wish to experience the exertions and/or - if one likes - the 'end-product' of the exertions - a physiological state - involved in the process of fighting. φιλονικία, that is to say, is in this respect the sole efficient cause of their bellicosity.

The doctrine Plato puts forward harmonises with this. Greed may be an originating cause of φιλονικία's coming into play. Or the contenders may even use it as a pretext to cover their blatant φιλονικία. But it cannot be a cause of contention independently of φιλονικία.

This argument is recapitulated here mainly to draw greater attention to the third member (θυμός) of the three manifestations in question. These three (φθόνος envy, βία violence, θυμός hot-temper) are the definitive symptoms of the thumoeidic person who pursues[134] his thumoeidic propensity to the limit. The manifestation of the third member, θυμός (δυσκολία is given by Plato as its mainspring)[135], is in the form of indulgence of hot-temper, such as, for instance, in overt rage. It cannot reasonably be doubted that this specialised θυμός was blended in Plato's mind with the other two ingredients of the general θυμός of τὸ θυμοειδές. (These are the βία that sprang from φιλονικία, and the φθόνος arising from φιλοτιμία.) A pattern of thumoeidic action involving all three elements is the most natural one. Exclusive manifestations of πθόνος, βία, or θυμός respectively, as though each could be present in an absolute form, are less likely. This does not, of course, exclude the possibility that one or other of the threesome might predominate. If this were not so, the term φιλόνικος[136] could hardly be so freely used by Plato as a comprehensive alternate to θυμοειδής[137]. Where he speaks of φθόνος, βία, and θυμός, he must therefore be taken to mean these mainly in combination (θυμός perhaps lying somewhat to

the fore). He would only to a lesser extent be likely to intend them to apply separately. The overt expression of θυμός in rage, for instance, cannot be separated from φθόνος, or even from the infliction of βία. Finally, the full account of the actions of a person manifesting τὸ θυμοειδές without the curbing rein of λογισμός or νοῦς[138] includes all the ingredients of war. In particular, it includes the simplest raw material of war, namely θυμός coupled with βία - angry violence.

The three elements are φθόνος owing to φιλοτιμία, βία owing to φιλονικία, and third, θυμός owing to δυσκολία. Of these, θυμός seems on the surface to be the only manifestation in which something at all like contentiousness or violence is wanted unqualifiedly and for its own sake. In it, the mental condition (δυσκολία) produces the physical manifestation (θυμός). It is the only one in which the producer seems absolutely obviously to be of exactly the same type of substance as the product. This is to say that, first, envy does not seem so much to rely for its origin on love of honour. Nor, second, does violence rely on a love of triumph. But for anger a fund of hot-temper is essential. In other words, Plato seems to be fathering all five items - φθόνος, φιλοτιμία, βία, φιλονικία, and δυσκολία - onto θυμός irrespective. He pairs them off with each other as seems most apt, but makes θυμός ultimately their fount and raison d'être. He treats θυμός as at once a whole, and as part of that whole.

The same thing happens in the case of τὸ λογιστικόν and the soul (logistic coming to be termed the only 'true' part of the soul). Plato's tendency towards this dialectical technique is critically important, since it is only within the context of his total dialectic that the dialectic of θυμός can be seen in perspective. In accordance with it, in every event, we can say the following. Since θυμός is apparently wanted for its own sake, these five above items - φθόνος, βία, etc. - would all, as its several ingredients, also be wanted for their own sake. Envy, ambition, violence, contentiousness, and anger all receive a unique treatment from Plato. They are conceived of by him as indulged in at least as much for the sake of the experience of indulging in them as for any other reason. And the nature of that other reason (i.e. whether it is higher or lower) will depend on the Apollinian λογιστικόν's degree of success in channelling them correctly.

c.27 In passing, we may observe some of the consequences of separating these "sub-elements". We could, for instance, easily be prompted by the treatment of the various parts of the θυμοειδές element as distinct units to think of, say, the φιλόνικος man as an employer of essentially dispassionate violence. We could imagine that he indulged in violence unqualified by any other factor, which he inflicted on others in order to achieve victory. Then, on some entirely unrelated occasion, we might suppose, he would indulge in envy, or again, anger. For φιλοτιμία as purely a love of

honour can only have φθόνος, for one instance (a semi-aggressive manifestation), indirectly read into it. But this is clearly not what Plato meant. Admittedly, all that the word φιλότιμος strictly tells us about a person is that he loves a traditionally praiseworthy thing - honour. We are not told that he is envious of, much less that he inflicts violence on, anyone. Likewise, a φιλόνικος person is only violent by inference. That is, he is only so if νίκη is presumed to require violence for its achievement. One could justifiably suppose that, as he simply enjoys νίκη, he would be quite content with it even if it were available without the need for any effort whatever - least of all for violence. If his opponents gave in without the slightest sign of a struggle, this would apparently be quite satisfactory from his point of view.

This is a less convincing picture than for φιλοτιμία. For one can perhaps less readily conceive of victory being enjoyed without a preliminary process of assault and struggle than of honour being enjoyed without a preliminary process of envy. Still, it makes more or less acceptable sense. What does not make sense is the third proposition. The suggestion that all that it takes to satisfy δυσκολία is a private, 'self-contained' manifestation of θυμός is unconvincing. To propose that it would make no difference to the δύσκολος (bad-tempered man) if no other individual suffered from his effusions of δυσκολία does not ring true at all. It is in the essential nature of δυσκολία that it vents itself with disagreeable effects on others. People at large must suffer by it for the δύσκολος to be satisfied. And one of his chief

concerns is that they should suffer by it.

Listing the three mental states again with their respective manifestations, we have : φιλοτιμία engendering φθόνος, φιλονικία engendering βία, and δυσκολία engendering θυμός. Of these three sets, neither of the first two need necessarily (at first sight) entail a love of contentiousness for its own sake. Nor, following from this, need it imply a love of infliciting duress on others. Both the φιλότιμος and φιλόνικος have, on the face of it, only actual and realised τιμή or νίκη as their goal. No particular road to obtaining either goal is specified. But this must, we may now be certain, be an outcome more of strict, than of discriminate, reading of the text. We cannot genuinely believe Plato to have supposed that the seeker after τιμή or νίκη did not derive enjoyment from the dynamic process so much sewn up with it. The whole routine of envying, fighting, and emulating his fellow humans (as well as any concrete goals he might reach in doing so) demands inspection as a potential candidate for what attracts him.

This inspection is rewarded. For the very structure of the verbs φιλοτιμεῖσθαι and φιλονικεῖν indicates that dynamic processes are concerned[139]. The manner of their use by Plato further confirms it. φιλονικεῖν, for instance, expressly conveys the meaning 'love to engage in the process of conquering'. This implies 'love to contend', 'love to vie', 'love to endeavour to win'. And the effort to win is focussed not just on one particular victory, but on the

interminable attainment of - the interminable effort to attain - victories. The effect this has is to reduce victory to a mere hair-line of demarcation between successive stages of φιλονικεῖν, the end of one effort to win and the beginning of the next. Which lays fitting emphasis on the minor status of νίκη itself relative to the process of gaining it.

c.28 These evidences of the ingredient of contentiousness in the first two manifestations (φθόνος and βία) of τὸ θυμοειδές have, on this account, to be taken in combination with θυμός, the product of δυσκολία. θυμός immediately confers on each an added factor of active dynamism. δυσκολία, unlike φιλονικία or φιλοτιμία, does not look towards any static, ultimate goal (except no doubt temporary exhaustion of the δυσκολία). It has no final end upon attainment of which the δύσκολος will rest contented. The peevish man achieves contentment only by constant paroxysms of irascibility and rudeness. There is no 'loophole' through which he can attain permanent satisfaction, no other realised, distinct object (material or abstract) the acquisition of which will quiet his inclinations. There is nothing of any kind that he can achieve and enjoy simplex without further exertion on his part. In short, the main enjoyment derived from the actions characteristic of his θυμός does not come after, but during, the exercise of that θυμός. Enjoyment might, by contrast, be thought more likely to come after, than during, φθόνος or βία. But in the case

of δυσκολία it is the most obvious that what is sought is the state of being relieved of excess accumulation of θυμός. In this, again, it would differ from φιλονικία and φιλοτιμία. These two have the characteristic that the thing enjoyed has (if only on the strict interpretation made above) nothing necessarily to do with what one does oneself, but with what others do. The exercise of θυμός would, in that case (like gymnastic), be an indirect good - not enjoyed in itself, but leading to the enjoyable. But it would remain a good arising from a personal activity, while the goods of νίκη and τιμή need not (again at first sight only) necessarily arise from any personal activity at all.

c.29 The strict interpretation given above was, however, we found, nevertheless not the probable one. φιλονικεῖν and φιλοτιμεῖσθαι are verbs meaning, as we have seen, not merely to 'love conquest' and 'love honour'. They imply loving to do consistently the type of thing that leads to conquest or honour. The φιλόνικος and φιλότιμος are therefore, correspondingly, not just people who love conquest and honour once these are obtained. They are persons whose activities are incessantly efforts to get constant supplies of them. And that Plato had this view is further indicated by his doctrine of the natural interminability of φιλονικία and φιλοτιμία[140] (as of the ἐπιθυμίαι). There never, indeed, comes a time (except extremely transiently) when the φιλόνικος or φιλότιμος acquires enough νίκη or τιμή to convince him that he can relax his efforts. Nor is the

δύσκολος content but for the briefest moment with the results of his δυσκολία. At any rate, he does not let up for long enough for a marked pause in his conduct to become noticeable.

Plato's interpretation of this is that, like those of the inferior ἐπιθυμίαι, the pleasures of νίκη, τιμή, and δυσκολία are 'bastard' pleasures[141]. They lack truth and reality. Therefore, since they cannot ever satisfy, infinite quantities of them can be obtained by θυμοειδεῖς people, yet no lasting satisfaction be afforded. On our own explanation, they are biological requirements. They continue as long as the individual remains alive, and the constantly arising need for them is thus not strange. But this does not change the fact that we also regard them as '<u>inferior</u>' pleasures.

Irrespective of whether or not we accept his explanation of why νίκη and τιμή are insatiably sought by the less discerning θυμοειδεῖς, we must provisionally agree with Plato's observation that they <u>are</u> incessantly sought. This, in turn, poses the question why they 'lack reality'.

Plato's view that their lack of reality, and resultant inability to satisfy, is owing to their being subject to <u>change</u> is again a specialised point of dogma not easily accessible to us. What, in Plato's view, essentially <u>is</u> change? Its basic defectiveness in his eyes needs considerable analysis. We are therefore left, until we can achieve this analysis, with the key proposition that various people <u>do</u> seek the pleasures associated with τὸ θυμοειδές[142]

incessantly. They also do so without limit of quantity. No matter how fully they achieve νίκη, τιμή, or δυσκολία, they continue to seek them as though they had acquired none.

From such a finding, it might directly be concluded as above, with Plato, that these particular 'pleasures' are merely not of a specially satisfying type. Or one might further assume that the individuals engaged in seeking them must be too unintelligent to recognise the 'true' pleasures, which would afford greater satisfaction. On the other hand, the hard fact is that they continue insatiably to seek the experiences they do as though they were pleasurable.

This is solid evidence for pinpointing the real source of the pleasure they seek. Mere νίκη and τιμή may give satisfaction in themselves. We have no conclusive evidence that they do not. We may even say that we cannot be absolutely sure that their seekers enjoy the process of struggling to acquire them more than the - so to speak - 'completed' commodities. (But here Plato's use of φιλονικεῖν and φιλοτιμεῖσθαι helps us.) If we come out firmly, once again, with the contention that the strict interpretation of φιλόνικος we mentioned above was wrong, and that Plato means by φιλονικεῖν and φιλοτιμεῖσθαι constantly endeavouring to win fights or gain honour - not just being pleased with victory or honour etc. once gained - we cannot escape the clear inference. We must regard such people as wishing perpetually to continue the process of struggle. He must mean that they will necessarily do this regardless of whether

they achieve final success or not. The fact that owing to πλεονεξία and ἀπληστία they never stop trying is no reflection on the obvious consideration that those who, by contrast , seek the genuine 'true' pleasures never actually stop trying either. At each instance of their obtaining the pleasure, it is a truly satisfying one. To think of them as coming to a total standstill regarding its pursuit is however not convincing. They, too, will perpetually be continuing to try to gain that chosen pleasure. But, as we have mentioned, when they get it they are, to an appreciable extent and for an appreciable time, really satisfied. The others are not. Another differentiating feature would no doubt be that their efforts would be less gross and desperate (cf. assault, murder, etc. by the φιλοκερδής[143]) than those of the lesser humans. But the essence of the distinction is that the lower pleasures do not even temporarily give full satisfaction.

c.30 The question repeatedly posed here has, of course, one immediate answer. The φιλόνικος person gains pleasure both by the actual process of trying to win victory and by means of the victory won. This is so, it is argued, because the dialectical process of striving goes on perpetually, but obviously the attained victory must please in the first place. Also, in the light of reason (or the just state), the 'struggle', as such, assumes a different perspective. But, viewing the φιλόνικος (φιλότιμος, etc.) man strictly qua φιλόνικος, we have had a distinct problem to face, and it has been pursued for this substantial distance because of its

heavy bearing on the destiny of τὸ θυμοειδές. In its rôle of '<u>pressuriser</u>' of an individual's activities - both just and unjust - it has a pivotal importance. The only thing he can be incontrovertibly shown to enjoy is the process of contest for victory. And we may thrust the νίκη of which this φιλόνικος individual is a part towards justice or injustice. We may assume him to be adequately or inadequately guided by Apollinian λόγος. Whatever we do to him, the pleasures involved in his victory- and honour-seeking, as in the case of corporeal pleasures, are, as Plato has said, '<u>untrue</u>'[144]. An 'attained' and efficaciously satisfying goal would not be so classified.

In spite of all this, Plato does allow that certain corporeal pleasures are 'necessary' (e.g. eating, drinking, etc.[145]). It is not probable that, by this concession, he is suggesting that such pleasures partake of any measure of truth[146]. They are, after all, merely those employed in removing discomfort. Still, this does not lose them their status as 'pleasures', however lowly. The issue that chiefly presents itself is that, while the pleasures of repletion of certain states of need may not be 'true', it remains the case that, if Plato could call them 'necessary' pleasures, <u>they are still pleasures</u>. Degraded as they may be, they still hold that title. He would obviously not refer to them as 'most', or 'less', true[147] if only <u>one</u> class of 'pleasures' (the 'true' ones) provided pleasure at all. He would not allot the term to them if, because not altogether true, they afforded no pleasure whatsoever. However deficient some are,

they at least do, if only temporarily and to a limited extent, do what they are expected to. Therefore it makes sense that they should continue to be sought. They obviously do supply the means of filling the natural and inevitable physiological voids that develop in respect of them. These voids may immediately open up again. They may be incompletely filled, and the desire never fully cease, even for a moment. But the substance of fulfilment, even if it is only relative fulfilment, is there for the taking. The pleasure may not be βέβαιος[148], firm, but it is still genuine at least in so far as it serves to counterbalance the pain which is its opposite[149].

Plato's example of a 'true' pleasure, such as that of smell[150], reveals to us more fully his view of true pleasure. It is a 'bonus' on top of neutrality. The pleasure of smelling an attractive scent is neither preceded nor followed by the pain of an overwhelming craving. There would be no problem in deciding why there should be a desire, for instance, to experience the pleasure of a scent. The wise man, at mental and physical equilibrium, desires certain true pleasures. He then selects those of his particular choice to be experienced for their own sake. He certainly feels this desire to experience them, or he would not be moved to do so. But as he is a controlled person, it is not the pressing, painful desire of inanition of the epithumetic or thumoeidic type by which he is driven. Another aspect, mentioned above, of these 'true' pleasures is that it is impossible to be content to suppose that true enjoyment of

them can only occur by coincidence. This 'truest' type of pleasure therefore also, we found, because it can be deliberately selected, becomes analogous to the pleasures of repletion. The individual may, certainly without previous desire, happen by coincidence to come upon some desirable scent, and experience pleasure. But the pleasure of scent is not less true if he does desire it beforehand, and deliberately indulge in it.

True pleasure, as well as false pleasure, can therefore be positively desired. The 'pain' of desire for it is as real. The difference seems only to be in that this 'pain' seems to be not so intense as for the less true instances. And the pleasures concerned are not so abandonedly desired. Conversely, 'false' pleasures which are the subject of the more abandoned type of desire may not be 'true', but they must have validity at least to the extent that they fill, however partially or transiently, the vacuum that gives rise to the desire for them.

To relate this point to the problem of the pleasures sought by the θυμοειδής person. Whether he is predominantly φιλόνικος, φιλότιμος, or δύσκολος, we can say of him, first, that as φιλόνικος, for instance, he does have an unremitting desire for νίκη, but that in this he is not essentially different from the individual seeking true pleasures. The only differences are that he desires them more abandonedly than the latter, and that they satisfy him less fully and for a shorter time than the 'true' pleasures. Second, he does

obtain the object-matter of his desire by means of the pleasures he seeks (although, again, he cannot do this as completely or for as long). Finally, these repletions with their corresponding depletions are to certain people the only known objects of desire and sources of discontent respectively. And the simple reason for this is that they do not have the intelligence or knowledge to recognise, or seek, the true ones.

c.31 This leads to what now approaches our central consideration. Socrates at many points in the Dialogues postulates that only stupid people are unjust[151]. They are unjust, first, because they do not know <u>that</u> justice gives the most pleasure. Second, they are unjust because they do not know <u>how</u> to be just. This squares closely with his doctrine regarding τὸ θυμοειδές. A thumoeidic person who does not happen to have much logistic power lives a life of simple alternation between striving painfully for victory (<u>just or unjust</u>) and gaining it, uncomfortably accumulating his anger and venting it (<u>justly or unjustly</u>), and so forth. He goes through life in this fashion purely because he lacks the ability to devise <u>just</u> means for arranging the process. Likewise, the very stupid, but highly epithumetic (and averagely thumoeidic) persons spend most of their lives alternating between corporeal hunger and repletion, lust and satiation. Less inclined as they are towards the θυμοειδεῖς enjoyments afforded by honour and preferment, they achieve their maximally 'low' corporeal requirements justly or

unjustly by coincidence alone, because they are in fact in the first place too stupid even vaguely to distinguish the respective directions in which they should proceed.

These two doctrines, regarding the epithumetic and thumoeidic faculties respectively, can resultantly now go further in combination than Plato explicitly took them. The link-up between the higher pleasures and justice, and in turn between the baser pleasures and injustice, makes their relationship more obvious. Discussion of these two aspects brings us closer to an appreciation of the community of the origins of injustice, and of action in general, in relation to τὸ θυμοειδές.

Plato has specified the two morally most interesting branches of conduct characterising wisdom, or the absence of it. First, that of pleasure-seeking. By one of his most consistently elaborated ethical aphorisms, everyone seeks good for himself[152]. At the same time, the good is variably shown to be the most profitable, or most truly pleasurable, or simply the most obviously desirable, commodity. But in any case the reason it is sought is essentially taken to be self-evident. The only time anyone will not seek good for himself is apparently when he does not know enough to be able to recognise it for what it is. For after all, as the doctrine reasonably enough assumes, any normal person must want maximal profit or fulfilment of his desires, however merely 'supervenient' these are on actual good. How

effectively any person obtains good will therefore depend on his intelligence.

The second major branch of conduct which Plato relates closely to the possession of wisdom and its reverse is the practice of justice. Just methods of obtaining good are the most effective methods. Accordingly, the dual tendency of stupid people first to commit injustice[153], second to seek only the less 'true' pleasures of τὸ φιλοκερδές (or at best τὸ θυμοειδές), arises quite naturally. In the present context, however, this phenomenon provokes close attention. We will by now agree with Plato that θυμοειδής (as also φιλοκερδής) behaviour keeps the individual at a mere neutral balance of pain and pleasure. The desire for, e.g., νίκη, creates a pain of void. When νίκη is obtained, this void is filled, if transiently, relieving the pain. And νίκη, while not constituting a true pleasure, does constitute what the φιλόνικος wants - that is, what he thinks he wants. It therefore satisfies him to that degree, if merely on a rather low level.

If we now look at the object-matter of injustice in the same way, a very significant picture is obtained. We have several examples of traditional[154] unjust conduct* in Plato. Socrates' view on this is clear.

The opening part of the relevant passage concerning it is not very straightforward. The musical man's wish not to have 'more' (πλέον ἔχειν) than another musical man, but only than an unmusical man, is obscure. We may infer from it, in every

* (apart from its major constituent[155])

event, that it is characteristic of the wise man to want more only than an unwise man. That is to say, the wise man's characteristic is to want no more than is his due. The unwise man, owing to his unwisdom, wants and obtains so much indiscriminate matter that on the balance he no doubt ultimately gets rather little good. Indeed, he probably gets considerably less overall than is a normal man's due. As an unwise, and correspondingly unjust, man he is said to want more than both wise and unwise. But we can put this more briefly as that he simply wants more. More of everything (whether good or bad, because he cannot tell the difference) and more than anyone, indiscriminately[156]. In this respect - that he is never satisfied - he closely resembles the φιλόνικος and φιλοκερδής men, though in the last two cases, interestingly, the reason for failure of satisfaction lies in the falsity of the pleasures sought. The unjust man qua unjust (i.e. qua stupid) perpetually wants more both of true and of false pleasures. It is, however, his lack of discrimination that militates against his ability always to secure the true ones, and with them full satisfaction[157]. He does not know enough to be able to recognise them - as a result, he gets a random mixture.

c.32 The θυμοειδής'link with injustice becomes even clearer now. The second main sector of injustice in Plato is the θυμοειδές-originated one: contentiousness[158]. Unjust people may proceed to attack, even kill, others, on the face of it in order to get more possessions. But so far from this being the

whole truth, in reality they do it for the sake of contest as well. Here we find an even more striking correspondence between injustice and the search for both types of baser pleasures. The lust for the basest pleasures, those of the ἐπιθυμίαι, has, however, as leading features both greed and violence[159]. Bestial hedonists in the first place eat, drink, and indulge themselves sexually on the scale of farmyard animals, yet they are subject to constant πλεονεξία and ἀπληστία. But, in the second place, ultimately, to gain more of the pleasures which are the objects of their πλεονεξία, they attack and kill others[160]. These actions - comprehensive theft and aggression - could well be said, if the postulates made earlier in the thesis are valid, to represent the sum total of injustice, and from now on we will take the liberty of working on this as a valid hypothesis.

In the discussion of the genesis of war[161], Socrates, as was said, did not reveal explicitly - perhaps he just preferred not to waste his time revealing it, since his inner view must be so obvious - whether he regarded either the desire for more land, or the wresting of it from others[162], as unjust. Indeed, he seems to avoid the term 'desire' here altogether. He mentions that the state will 'need' (δεησόμεθα) these extra items; that previous territory will not be 'adequate' (ἱκανή); etc. The only compromising word he uses is ἄπειρον[163], unlimited. Their needing it 'unlimitedly' implies greed. We may, however, in any case infer his condemnation of contentious πλεονεξία, and hence warlike attack, from both earlier and later disapproval of unbridled πλεονεξία[164], and his patent condemnations

throughout of contentiousness[165].

This viewpoint of his regarding war is immensely important. Its central thesis is that, together with injustice and the seeking of baser pleasures, the sequence of war-initiation constitutes yet a third pattern of degeneration. This pattern is, of course, the θυμοειδής one. The φλεγμαίνουσα state indulges, as does the unjust and basely lustful man, in variegated unnecessary desires. Next, it grasps all that is immediately to hand. Then, apparently insatiable by peaceable acquisition, it begins to plunder people by violence. The important principle in point here (though it is, again, not one Plato explicitly mentions) must be this: Violence inflicted upon any unwilling party provokes return violence. The attacked person, robbed of goods (personal safety being taken as one) he in principle requires for his livelihood, retaliates. And, necessarily, he retaliates on anything up to a maximal scale. The result of this is that any attempt to rob him of those goods carries a fundamental risk of harm, ultimately of death, to the robber. This risk is most obvious in war, but in common-or-garden injustice it is just as familiar in principle. Indulgence of the baser lusts closely corresponds. Indeed, war very clearly has much, if not universally, common ground with injustice when the question of infliction of one's will on unwilling parties is concerned; and, in turn, injustice has much, if not universally, common ground with war. The element of violence, the θυμοειδές-generated element,is simply of a lesser and greater degree in the two respective cases.

c.33 In regard to their basic constituents, these last two (war and injustice) are then very similar. They are in fact, it seems, just views of precisely the same thing in differing degree. Without entering into an inquiry as to how the views differ in detail, we may throw some further light on the nature of injustice by making an examination of their points of coincidence, with special reference to their relation with τὸ θυμοειδές. In each of war and injustice we have as basis the sequence cupidity, acquisition, and aggression-with-risk. Each shows a man desiring, taking, and finally forcibly seizing from others, in the last case basically risking his life in doing so.

Plato's account of this is complete enough if we read between the lines. We ought also not to make too demanding an analysis of the explicit part he makes τὸ θυμοειδές play in the system. It has, in fact, almost no explicit part whatever, according to him, and we might imagine that it would deserve a great one. Taking unjust 'pleasure' first[166], we find that the bestially appetitive creature kicks and butts and murders ἕνεκα τῆς τούτων πλεονεξίας (τούτων here being the pleasures of food and sex). These are apparently the only ones it is interested in. Similarly, the unjust man, by the traditional view of Thrasymachus and Glaucon, is interested in aggression not by any means for its own sake, but only for that of the πλεονεξία which can be implemented through it. It seems, in Thrasymachus' view, to be worth mentioning in addition that the successful unjust aggressor is εὐδαίμων[167], and is not hated by his family[168], but these and a few other insignificant items are the only activities or states amongst those making up his

life pattern which (according to Thrasymachus) are not absolutely patently to do with acquiring objects of property. And even they look rather like it. ὠφελεῖν, in his usage, means to benefit materially[169]. τὸ συμφέρον is basically material benefit. Similarly, ὑπηρετεῖν is to provide material benefit. All that they are ever associated with, in these or his ensuing words[170], is πλεονεξία. His list of persons[171] committing jointly τὴν ὅλην ἀδικίαν (the whole of injustice) has not one single member who does not specialise in the removal by stealth or violence of other people's commodities (or persons) into the remover's own sphere of control. ἱερόσυλοι, ἀνδραποδισταί, τοιχωρύχοι, ἀποστερηταί, κλέπται: temple robbers, slavers, housebreakers, embezzlers, thieves - the full sweep of ἀδικία is covered. And on Thrasymachus' view (which we can safely take to be the one Plato attributed to the general public), the exclusive purpose of these individuals is to secure control over other people's property (χρήματα) and persons[172]. The road to standard pleasure as well as to wealth is assured by this[173]. βία[174], the essentially θυμοειδές-originated factor, is apparently understood to serve that purpose and that purpose alone. Finally, we have war, where the desire for incessantly more property precipitates those who desire it into armed attack on others.

In all these three cases (baser desire, injustice, and war), we have clear-cut reference to three principal things only: baser desire, acquisition, and contention. The objects concerned (property or pleasure) are desired. Second, they are gathered in where freely available for the taking. Then, at

the third stage, since desire continues insatiably, they are seized violently, and fought for.

A slightly confusing feature is that there seems to be no transition from stage two to stage three. One moment we have safe, peaceable gathering in of possessions. The next we have a flare-up into potentially deadly contest. But Plato no doubt felt that there was no need to specify this obvious intermediate stage. The greedy but peaceable gathering-in stage is a process of obtaining superfluous things. These may aid life, or give flavour to it, although not necessary to it. When the subject graduates to actually risking his very life, through inflicting violence on others, to gain more such articles (which are of course absolutely useless without life), a new and thoroughly strange element has entered into the picture. But the critical factor is that these articles are of the same type as those obtained peaceably. They are superfluous.

c.34 Two conclusions can arise from this. Either the desire for the superfluous articles, or the desire for the struggle to gain them is more pressing than the desire for life itself.

Yet, to take the first alternative: the likelihood that life itself could be less dear to anyone than a useless surplus of possessions is thin. The second major inference therefore arises yet again: it must be the contest involved in gaining

them for which this overwhelmingly potent source of longing exists.

That Plato at the very least suspected this is evident. He speaks, as we have seen, at more than one point of the desires and pleasures proper to τὸ θυμοειδές[175]. He clearly alludes to those mentioned above. The reason it perhaps does not claim his attention as much as we might expect may well be this: he most emphatically recognises this natural contentiousness in man (it is, indeed, the backbone of ἔρως). Nevertheless, he might ask, is there a serious enough importance attached to isolating the full-blown desire for contest as such, shorn of all the standard ulterior aims[176], as a factor in injustice? After all, such an omission would be natural. Granted that the Apollinian λόγος is the deciding factor in ordering the direction of application of τὸ θυμοειδές (its success or failure in ordering it depending upon its adequacy),it is that λόγος which will have the last word for good or evil, not τὸ θυμοειδές. And regarding rational strife and the intelligent man, does not love (ἔρως), which embodies his struggle for justice, spring rather from that λόγος than from the energetic factor? Do not Plato's φύλακες expressly have to be endowed with enough intelligence to have this love for justice? The emphasis on λόγος would clearly be preferred. ἔρως must indeed be seen as primarily dependent on λόγος, and the virtue of ἀνδρεία seen as a noble characteristic springing mainly from the moral and highest part of the soul.

Yet a further point reinforces the likelihood of Plato's

having treated the thumoeidic factor as more secondary to injustice than it could have deserved. The proposition that men normally attack others in order to gain the standard currency of money and pleasures makes ready sense. The most obvious reason for fighting is to steal something from your enemy (which in excuse you claim he does not rightfully possess). That people could, even qua θυμοειδεῖς, wish to fight and risk their very lives with no such ulterior end in view strains the imagination. To seek nothing beyond mere fighting, all thought of standard gain excluded, makes too little sense in common usage to convince.

Yet certain facts remain, and these facts are compelling. If the θυμοειδές factor is necessary to make a person contentious at all - if he just will not fight unless he has that quality[177] - then it is not enough to say that simple appetitive desire prompts him to enter into contest. There are pleasures proper to τὸ θυμοειδές. Plato is quite specific about that. These must therefore quite inevitably be different from appetitive pleasures. The efficient cause of contention cannot then be epithumetic. It must be solely and distinctly a thumoeidic appetite. The moral standard of its application, of course, will depend on λόγος. But the λόγος, it has also been shown, can by Plato's own implication not suppress, but only channel, the upsurge of τὸ θυμοειδές.

c.35 Rather, then, than deal with this difficulty (since it may not have presented itself to him as primarily important),

Plato does not waste time giving a full account of appetitive attack. Instead he introduces the thumoeidic man. But now his commitment grows heavy on him. For this thumoeidic man is the only kind of man interested, by definition, in fighting. And, on top of that, he is not necessarily epithumetically inclined[178]. The Guardians are said to be thumoeidic, but by no means acquisitive[179].

A combination of Plato's comments at 375 a 11 with the others referred to gives us this breakdown. First, greed gives rise to fighting. But second, greedy people need to be thumoeidic to fight. Third, thumoeidic people are not necessarily greedy. Now the conclusion from this is that fighting is therefore not done by merely greedy people. It is done by people who are thumoeidic as well as greedy. Or, most importantly, it can quite conceivably be done by people who are purely thumoeidic without being greedy at all. The three genres mentioned, incorporating the sequence Baser Desire, Surplus Acquisition, and Contention, have therefore an indispensable added qualification. Since they incorporate contentiousness, all necessitate an added thumoeidic element in the individual engaging in them.

This point has a critical significance for Plato's doctrine of Justice. For we may reasonably take it that in expounding his own view of Injustice earlier on in the Republic he is speaking of the conventional, not the internal and spiritual kind. In short, it more or less boils down to that of Thrasymachus[180], which as we noted centres round deprivation of

others with or without violence (although we have found that deprivation always incorporates a violence principle) of their property and/or freedom. As far as its cause, and that of κακία generally, is concerned, Plato's bias, differing diametrically from that of Thrasymachus, is later towards regarding it as a matter of ignorance[181]. This in turn he makes a matter of stupidity. His characteristic technique of ἔλεγχος (cross-examination) is then put into practice. He takes the term αἰσχρός[182], shameful, which is conventionally[183] all but synonymous with κακός yet also applicable to the disputed term (i.e. τὸ συμφέρον, the profitable). The first (αἰσχρός) he gets his dialogue partner to concede (in fatal error) to be equivalent to κακός. The last (τὸ συμφέρον) he has already easily got him to assume to be αἰσχρόν. He can then argue to the effect that, since injustice is αἰσχρός, it must also be κακή, and this leads to the clear conclusion that to want purely τὸ συμφέρον implies stupidity, for no-one wants what is κακός[184]. This is the view put forward in the Protagoras and Meno, and that propounded in the Republic is no different. The law-breaking man is least intelligent[185]. The φρόνιμος person is ἀγαθός[186]. The φιλόσοφος knows most about pleasures[187] and has most true pleasure[188]. However, while the finding that injustice is stupid is an immensely important one, it leaves unanswered that one further question, earlier touched on. And this carries perhaps the greatest importance of all. Why do many people, who might be considered intelligent enough to avoid it, nevertheless commit injustice[189]? Asked before (cf. para. c.13), this question can now be more fully treated.

c.36 Plato is well aware of this problem. In the Republic at least he seems to prefer to sidestep it[190]. Nevertheless he has himself provided the very means of solving it. It is well worth following this up. The only reason for anyone acting 'stupidly' when he is not stupid must be that he is experiencing some internal compulsion towards stupid activity which overcomes his λόγος. This will be a compulsion unrecognised by external observers, and most often even unrecognised by himself, but which it would be more painful for him to resist than to surrender to, notwithstanding the penalty. One such pressure may be found in τὸ φιλοκερδές. Greed and lust goad the individual to take commodities in the face, to some extent, of penalty[191]. But, as we found above, we do not expect them to goad him to the limit. We do not credit them with being able to harass him to the point of making him attack others at the risk of forfeiting his very life. To expect him to invite, for their sake, the risk of actually losing every single thing he has, and of dying as well, seems farcical. But it must nevertheless be conceded in the first place that injustice by its very nature carries penalties which totally disable the unjust man from enjoying the commodities which he unjustly takes, or even from living to hope for later enjoyment of them. To say that he is thrust into injustice purely by the prospect of that enjoyment of material goods accordingly becomes unconvincing. For, as we have premised, above, this man is not a fool.

To rehearse the situation: we are given, first, a sensible man. Second, we have under consideration a collection of

commodities he many seize illegally. Third, we are aware that he appreciates the heavy odds against his doing this unpunished, possibly to the limit. Only an abnormality of physical craving, we must assume, could prompt him to take the risk in spite of this threat. In the extreme case, certainly, few pleasures can possibly be worth losing one's life to gain. And this applies yet more strongly if the process of gaining them may involve death even before the actual gaining occurs. What is the solution? We have to hypothesise the existence of thumoeidic pains which make even death desirable if one cannot rid oneself of them, and that supreme intellect can occasionally be needed to find just methods of doing so.

c.37 To go back a little. The speculation about degrees of pleasure and pain is of course not conclusive. It is a matter of guesswork how powerful some desires are, or what degrees of pleasure can be derived from various activities. It must also be a matter of pure estimate what extent of risk we would expect them to provoke. What makes the speculation worth putting forward is, as we have said, that Plato himself has (if somewhat indirectly) pronounced on the topic. And his pronouncement is this: There is another source of motivation concerned[192], namely τὸ θυμοειδές. "No person who is not θυμοειδής will wish to be brave." Preparedness to risk one's life must therefore, again, be engendered by a separate internal force, namely τὸ θυμοειδές.

A closer analysis shows that, as it stands, his sentence[193] means 'No person who is not θυμοειδής will wish to engage in

war'. As we may now interpret it, engagement in 'war' includes engagement both in war and in two other types of contest. These are the contests characteristic of the two other things Plato typifies by desire and contention, namely baser pleasure-seeking, and injustice. τὸ θυμοειδές, therefore, in this early guise, first aids the individual in the struggle for self-aggrandisement. It assures him bravery in the contest which he goes in for ostensibly in order to grasp more possessions. But, in keeping with its double-edged character (compelling as well as enabling), τὸ θυμοειδές has a more complex part than this to play in the individual's life. It not only aids in any proposed struggle. We find now indisputably that it prompts that struggle. It sets it off, and, after igniting the blaze, fuels the flames. The more thumoeidic he is, the more eager the man concerned will be to enter into contest. He will actually want to engage in it for its own sake, and for nothing else. His preparedness to do so may, furthermore, even extend to hurling aside all vestiges of caution to fight bestially and with rabid ferocity for seemingly unaccountable purposes and at the risk of losing all he has, including life. Yet, as we observe, he will do so with no ulterior motive in view other than the wish to fight. He may, indeed, attack in order to obtain possessions because he wishes to combine two aims in one - indulgence of the thumoeidic and epithumetic elements. He may even do so because, in characteristically 'self-justificatory' effort, he wishes to convince others that it is purely possessions he wants when he enters into conflict; as though to seem to be attacking for any other reason would imply madness. But to the extent that he is thumoeidic, his wish to fight will have nothing to do

with his wish for gain. Indeed, it is only in a pronouncedly thumoeidic person that the wish for gain is not totally confined to honest and peaceable profit-making. The merely φιλοκερδής individual may wish to wrest the property of others forcibly from them. But unless he is also θυμοειδής, he never will. He simply has not, by Plato's own witness, that kind of drive. Conversely, the purely thumoeidic individual may seize people's property from them, but, unless he is also φιλοκερδής, this will not be because he wishes for property. His interest will not be in the property at all. He wishes for the contest itself: the violence and emergency. The quickest and surest road to obtaining these last three, as Plato will readily have seen - and no doubt expected us to assume - is to provoke the creatures who are most competent to hit back. In this department, other human beings are superior to any alternate source of opposition in the world.

c.38 From this it becomes clear that an unusually thumoeidic individual who also happens to have a considerable measure of τὸ φιλοκερδές in his make-up will have little potential for justice unless his logistic sector is exceptionally strong. He will be tempted not only to secure more wealth than he needs, but to do so by violence. And this will apply whether violence is necessary to his purpose or not. Violence will form a sine qua non for him of the process of gaining it. He will simply - and here we strike the very core of the question - have a propensity for injustice for its own sake. And the only way he can avoid channelling these urges of his unjustly is through intellect. If

his θυμοειδές element is very strong, he will, again, have to be exceptionally intelligent to avoid that injustice.

Although Plato does not explicitly carry his theory to this conclusion, we can again read between the lines. Indeed, even if he exhibits uncertainty at times as to whether a tendency to vice is acquired, inborn, or inspired[194], he does hint on several occasions at inborn funds both of savage, lawless appetite[195] and hostility[196]. (These are no doubt the ἐπιθυμίαι associated with τὸ φιλοκερδές as much as τὸ φιλόνικον, for it becomes equally likely, when ἀγριότης is predicated of both[197], that both are included.) Man therefore, as a species, has, in Plato's view, certain natural[198] vicious propensities for the δεινόν, ἄγριον, and ἄνομον. It seems highly probable, too, that he had in mind here the illicit lusts not only of τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, but of τὸ θυμοειδές (incorporating τὸ φιλόνικον) - the urge for contest per se[199]. Adam urges[200] that Plato rebuts the concept of original sin[201]. Depending on one's interpretation of 'original sin', Plato's statement seems, on the contrary, to be quite positive in this regard. The innate evil in man, he says, may be diminished, but it is there to begin with[202]. His reference to an inner εἶδος ἐπιθυμίων[203] confirms this view. τὸ θυμοειδές is an inborn potential for violent action. When inadequately regulated by τὸ λογιστικόν, it represents a tendency towards injustice or justice indiscriminately.

c.39 We have in the first place, then, the desires,

varyingly developed in different individuals, both for possessions, and for contest for its own sake. In the second, we have a natural fund of the δεινόν, ἄγριον, and ἄνομον, if in a restricted area[204]. These two groups have certainly to be linked. They might even to some extent be identified. The case of ἀνομία of the ἄγριον, δεινόν type and the tendency it represents is undoubtedly the same thing as that of the thumoeidic desire for contest for its own sake. But injustice (here 'ἀνομία') would be chosen only by the relatively ignorant as one of the categories of contest. This would be so whether it were chosen simply for the contest's sake, or because it seemed to him to incorporate material gain with contest.

At all events, whatever view is taken of their relation, the two groups - aggressiveness and desire - cover the whole range of injustice. It would be splitting hairs to see a difference between the savagery (ἀγριότης) produced by the thumoeidic tendency, and that emanating from the savage type of desires (ἄγριον εἶδος ἐπιθυμιῶν) inherent in man. It would even be pedantic to see one between these and the ἄγριον[205] part of the many-headed beast. The latter denotes the vicious aspect of general desire. Yet great stress must be placed on the point that, added together, the sum of them nevertheless does not represent an implication that Plato conceived of a natural tendency to injustice as such*.

A more sophisticated verdict than this is indicated. Only ignorance allows of injustice. The common factor in all implying the road to injustice is ἀγριότης. When each has that

*(in spite of the ἀγριότης of θυμοειδές[206], dreams[207], and the beast[208])

common factor removed, we have in the first case (τὸ θυμοειδές) several terms which also convey the meaning 'contest', but none conveying generally illegal conduct. The second (τὸ ἄνομον) denotes a limited field only of injustice - ἀνομία. The third is blank. So we can see that throughout, as far as inborn vicious characteristics are concerned, Plato places almost no stress on misconduct falling outside the borders of simple contest. The many-headed beast and the lion can carry one to injustice[209], but only when specifically feasted and strengthened. It is not, then, so much injustice as such that Plato regards as inborn. What he envisages as man's innate defect is a relatively unpolarised crudity or brutishness springing from his nature as an animal. This shows itself first and foremost in ἀγριότης, aggressive roughness (in short, violence). Second, it appears in greed and illicit lust. But it is only when these are given expression that they have validity. As mere tendencies residing in the soul, they have no significance for injustice on the social plane as it is here presented. The cardinal feature of both of them is, socially speaking, the contentious demand they make on others' rights.

The ordinary ἐπιθυμίαι are inborn, and they seem the more basic of the two major causes of contest (greed, and high- or hot-temper). Nevertheless, they are only so when allowed to grow unchecked, and obtain the collaboration of the θυμός. They are not themselves inherently ἄγρια. Such ἀγριότης as they may be conceived to have comes from their 'brutishly' lustful fraction, but the species of random kicking and goring

of each other that cattle do, in Plato's example, is so directionless and mindless as hardly even to amount to genuine ἀγριότης. It is rather a kind of reflex activity that could harm one if one got in its way, and this is no doubt how Plato sees it. The incidental violence concerned there can be regarded as implemented only for the utterly undirected indulgence of that particular part of the animal soul.

c.40 Some principal conclusions may now be listed. Man has certain natural inborn (or somehow otherwise developed) tendencies. One is the acquisitive (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν), another the high- or hot-tempered (τὸ θυμοειδές), a third the intellectual (τὸ λογιστικόν). These he can satisfy perfectly well, and justly, by his own efforts. To fall short of justice is to be ἄδικος, and so αἰσχρός, and therefore κακός. But no-one wants what they know to be κακός[210] (least of all as a personal and spiritual property). Therefore to go outside justice is <u>stupid</u>. On the other hand, just in the same way as ἐπιθυμίαι press people towards acquisition and the logistic towards knowledge, <u>so the thumoeidic element inexorably presses them towards contest</u>. The knowledgeable person will know better than the stupid <u>how</u> to obtain commodities, how to expend his contentious urges, and how to gain knowledge, without committing unjust acts. But since there is the <u>natural tendency</u> in all people to perform these three types of action: the search for knowledge, the implementation of hot-temper-accumulation-release, and the grasping of commodities, the

stupid will not always manage to remain just while engaging in these procedures.

Second, it appears clear that of the three urges the second, or thumoeidic, especially when abetted by the third, the epithumetic, is most potent for injustice. Yet that acts of deprivation and duress do not constitute a natural tendency to injustice as such is proved by the point that injustice does not necessarily have to occur as a result of them. Injustice incorporates as its two main components the two corresponding practices acquisition and contest. But acquisition and contest can be carried on justly. The knowledgeable will know how to direct them in that fashion. They can avoid their unjust forms, deprivation and duress, while the ignorant, unable to devise just action-media, cannot. In consequence, the ignorant will, first, inflict deprivation because they want commodities which they can think of no other way of getting. Second, they will inflict duress, being too stupid to find legal ways of competing with others, and crassly embarking on undesigned contest. They simply do not, in a word, have the intelligence to indulge in these activities justly. But they must indulge in them, so they go blindly ahead. Once again it should be stressed that they are not the only ones who want them either. The law-abiding people want them just as much, in proportion as the epithumetic and thumoeidic elements are varyingly present in them. But the law-abiding people are good because they have the brains to avoid injustice. The stupid are bad because they necessarily have not.

Perhaps most instructive as indicators of what Plato regards as the essence of injustice are his views on its 'cure'. And here we find the thumoeidic element taking the leading role. First, he prescribes organised contest for the disputants, πληρῶν τὸν θυμόν. This is of absolutely paramount importance. By this means strife will be lessened[211]. Second, pains and penalty are stated to be the only effective cures of injustice[212], and not much distinction is made between pains and exertion by Plato. (Gymnastic is ἐπίπονος, laborious, and ἰάτρευσις, healing, implicitly betrays the sense 'painful' in ἐπίπονος, while penalties on Socrates' plan are, in any event, always painful[213].) He approves of regular gymnastic, possibly even of the most strenuous type[214]. This he takes indeed as part of a normal régime. The κολαζόμενος, the punished person, becomes better[215]. Penalised people are not wretched[216].

All these individual points indicate an observation on Plato's part that the normal man needs regular exertion. But not only this: even pain and adversity are needful to his health. And, most subtle and thought-provoking point of all, all three are physically desired. For the erratically (and so sometimes justly, sometimes unjustly) contentious man, to encounter contest, trouble, or pain somehow corrects the state he is in. It gives him satisfaction which appears to take the shape of a type of relief. It will also provide satisfaction for the wisely and justly contentious man. Each of these men will in the process avoid injustice (and disproportionate pain) to the extent that he is wise. The thumoeidic element is looking for an outlet, and can be satisfied only by meeting

opposition in the shape of pain or reciprocated contest. If it is unprovided with such counters, it simply proceeds to find alternate outlets. It is worth reiterating that the contentiously unjust man must therefore, alongside other forms of adversity, even in a sense desire penalty. To him it is simply of the nature of one more outlet.

c.41 Plato's view of penalty as essentially traumatic[217] indicates that he thought of injustice, its complement, in the same light. We have already argued that this is so from a logical point of view. From the various passages we have seen it appears that, while Plato did not dissociate injustice from greed, he also in the final analysis thought of it as almost exclusively a matter of contentiousness. An important inference follows. The satisfaction by just means of the desires proper to τὸ θυμοειδές will be proportionately instrumental in preventing injustice.

It is certain that Plato believed that, if these thumoeidic desires were satisfied systematically in advance, the propensity for committing injustice would largely or totally disappear[218]. That he did not develop this theme is probably owing to his preoccupation with establishing the nature of the, to him, centrally important subject of discussion. This was, of course, injustice in the soul. The finding on his part that there was in man an innate factor of 'high-' or 'hot-temperedness', through which contest was generated and kept going, laid the foundation for wider conclusions. But again, having

given an account of τὸ θυμοειδές which revealed its part in the genesis of war, and later of contentious drive generally, he had completed the essential research. It remained for others, he no doubt felt, to draw the conclusions.

c.42 The overall consequence of these findings on the anthropological plane may now be summarised. To translate θυμοειδής virtually invariably as 'spirited' appears to involve a serious imbalance due to neglect of its frequently unfavourable 'injustice-prone' overtones. A single uniform translation valid throughout is impossible. Translations incorporating an anger-constituent are at times satisfactory. At others, the anger-constituent, while present, cannot preserve what are considerably higher than purely 'epithumetically' passionate connotations. The translation 'high-' or 'hot-tempered' does indeed suggest itself more often than any other. But a general rule can still not be laid down. The problem posed earlier was whether, for present purposes, a sufficiently marked common factor, of anger or anything else, ran at all through the uses of θυμοειδής, at least in the Republic. Was there, for instance, one great enough to justify modification of the translation 'spirited' to, say, 'hot- tempered'? On the whole, it seemed there was. But the main argument against uniformly substituting any single word, 'hot-tempered', 'violent', or whatever, for 'spirited' was exactly the same as the one against constantly using 'spirited' - that they could often be thought as strongly biased towards the 'lower' side of θυμοειδής as 'spirited' is towards the 'higher'.

'High-tempered' does most often escape this charge. The 'higher' and 'lower' constituents are distributed in it almost on a fifty-fifty basis. On even superficial inspection, while showing a bias overall towards the higher as in the case of 'spirited', it shows a much less marked bias. And this is certainly the more appropriate one. The word θυμοειδής has, again, no ring of militarist high idealism in the Greek where 'spirited' has it in English. It is more a utilitarian term, a 'passion-quotient' connoting 'capacity for being roused'. Radically, it simply and solely confers on a person usefulness as a contentious individual - or fighter - as such. This fighter need not have any ideals at all - he need merely wish to fight. Given these data, then even if 'high-tempered' is at first a strange-sounding translation of θυμοειδής, it is in most contexts a more accurate one. Its role, in its 'better' sense, as a critical constituent of ἔρως becomes clear too as a closer to neutral, sheer driving force. In this guise it properly aids the λόγος in their combined bid to attain the Good. But it still cannot stand throughout as a uniform equivalent of θυμοειδής. The position of θυμοειδής along the "emotion-spectrum" must, in each case of its occurrence, be specifically assessed.

c.43 SOCIO-POLITICAL AND COSMIC ASPECTS.

At the anthropological level, the θυμοειδές element has been seen as acting to some extent in combination with an intellectual ingredient. The whole thus constituted was then deemed to represent the entity conceived of by Plato as ἔρως.

By contrast, the socio-political θυμοειδές is perhaps a less complex concept. It is primarily limited to firing the λογιστικόν's struggle to survive efficiently in the world against external aggressors. Yet at the same time it also constantly fuels it in its necessary effort to maintain internal harmony.

At the socio-political level, proper control by the state's governing body, representing the logistic sector, ensures that the military and producer classes cooperate efficiently without intruding unduly on the total welfare. The logistic sector may fail in its work. It may be guilty of inefficiency, or of some other defect. (All these variants are simplified by Plato into one quantity: ignorance.) If so, it either neglects the thumoeidic drive altogether, in which case this drive emerges in random forms, or it actually deliberately turns it into indiscriminate channels. The result of both of these alternatives is a chance mixture of just and unjust actions, this time on a national scale. The more extreme the errors of the logistic element, and the stronger the thumoeidic, the wider the deviations produced. The situation will veer from extreme justice to extreme injustice, from the most sublime peace to the most brutalised war. The soldiery may incline to justly conducted defence or offence, or to cooperation with the basest element of the society.

At the ultimate stage of justice, we have total harmony and balance. The good of all is the sole consideration. At that of injustice, we have total chaos, resulting in unprovoked, wholesale aggression, random slaughter of innocent and guilty

alike - in short, all the results of violent ignorance. Cosmically, if the λογιστικόν is defective, the universe suffers major disorders. Comets appear, storms break out, droughts and famine, the effects of random celestial movements[219], take place. Finally, in the transcendental world of the Forms, the λογιστικόν, if it could be conceived of there as straying from ultimate perfection, would be unable to guide its thumoeidic and appetitive elements with full intelligence. It could not carry on perpetual harmonious maintenance of that perfection. Only when ultimate Justice had been achieved, would the harmony there be total.

For completeness' sake, an investigation should now briefly be made, in the light of the dynamics of "rational striving", into the virtues of the respective social classes (individuals having already been dealt with). First we have σωφροσύνη as that of the βάναυσοι (epithumetic sector), ἀνδρεία of the φύλακες (thumoeidic sector), σοφία of the ἄρχοντες (logistic sector). These operating in due proportion produce balance, harmony, justice (δικαιοσύνη).

Second, there is an independent dynamic and dialectical connexion between the epithumetic, thumoeidic, and erotic. It is by operation of the latter that σοφία is sustained. And throughout, the position predominantly taken in this thesis has been that the Apollinian (logistic) sector has not so much striven with, as guided, the Dionysiac (thumoeidic and epithumetic). So, rather than the process represented by

ἔρως, namely direction of the lower sectors by the higher in the cause of the Good, it is the simple harmonious combination of the three sectors that has been termed ἔρως. But clearly there is more to the question than this. We have been presented with a schema incorporating society as man-writ-large. This latter quantity we find embodied for us in the social unit, or state. We may now, exactly in the manner set out by Socrates, take the opportunity of getting a clearer view of that question.

In the social unit, the tradesmen (βάναυσοι) and soldiers (φύλακες) are the fundamental providers of the means of life for the whole. Without food and defence, the unit cannot exist. The question whether it can proceed in any direction cannot even begin to be put. Granted their presence, however, its existence is assured - and now the progress of the whole can be considered, and that progress must be ordered. The rulers must supervise the activities of the lower groups. Matters must be organised in such a way that the whole state is kept on a morally acceptable course. This moral acceptability implies, moreover, by Socrates' entrenched doctrine, the greatest profitability in every respect.

Here we have a picture in which the keynote is cooperation. Supervision must indeed occur. But if the lower sectors are sufficiently intelligent, they will acquiesce in it. This ordering by an adequate intellectual sector of the activities of its inferiors automatically brings about justice.

c.44 But there is a second point of view. The interrelationship of the various sectors may be somewhat differently seen. The two lower sectors were, we took it, for practical purposes almost devoid of logistic powers. Instead, they were filled, in varying degree, with an irrational energy. In the case of the epithumetic this was a lesser energy, aimed at satiation of its crude lusts. In the case of the thumoeidic it was a vastly more marked, driving force, aimed at every possible kind of contest and contentiousness (their justice or injustice unconsidered). The two together, at any rate, constituted to that extent a power basically in opposition to the logistic. The latter was there ostensibly to guide them, but they had their own specific, limited desires, and they aimed for them with a headstrong force which could only be deflected from unjust routes by corresponding force, or at least a powerful enough persuading factor to influence their small logistic component.

There are two possible solutions to this problem. First, the Apollinian λόγος may be taken to be able to exert a substantial diverting force on these lesser elements. Alternately (which is more likely) it may possess some kind of dynamic cunning adequate to persuade the relatively small rational elements present in these Dionysiac energy-sources that their interests lie in certain given directions. This relationship would itself almost seem to constitute a contest. It looks indeed more like a struggle, in a sense, than a mere process of guidance. And so it is. Yet the two pictures are quite consonant with each other.

'ἔρως must have this dual nature, since there can only be successful 'ἔρως where the Apollinian λόγος succeeds in its effort to direct its Dionysiac counterpart. There can only be 'ἔρως at all where effort takes place. The struggle may not succeed. The fact that the λόγος should need to struggle at all for success presupposes the possibility of failure. This may be due to error, to its own weakness, or to the undue strength of the other sectors. Furthermore, even if it does succeed in its persuasion, its own powers may not have been adequate to select the right direction for progress. Yet, despite these various factors, the divine nature of ἔρως remains.

The necessity of a struggle at all towards the Good is conspicuously obvious. Even if it fails - even if it is not even directed towards the Good - this can only be so because the logistic sector is not sufficiently gifted to recognise certain essentials. It may not know what the Good is. Alternately, it may not know how to reach it. It must desire the Good, because no individual deliberately desires evil. But it may be mistaken in what it conceives to be the Good. And the whole divine nature of the phenomenon rests in the fact of struggle. It is a struggle necessarily towards what the individual or social unit, etc., thinks to be the Good, but a struggle which might, after all, not even have taken place. There might be only vacuum and stasis. Such a situation, we found, could hardly be conceived of as divine. Instead, we have the eternal mysteries of Dynamism and Form. These two can

only be attributed to the Divinity.

c.45 TRANSCENDENTAL ASPECT.

It is a natural step from socio-political to transcendental considerations. Accordingly we may now examine the Platonic theory of Forms in relation to previous points with a fuller view of what they entail. It would not be of much importance whether the Forms were in Plato's estimation composed of air, or of Anaxagorean νοῦς, or of some other attenuated and unseen substance. Given the type and degree of abstraction we find them allotted in Plato's writings, they are a cornerstone of his philosophy, and are closely bound up with the θυμοειδής problem.

Substance, or ὕλη, was, as we have seen, everywhere - as far as Greek philosophy was concerned. A vacuum was impossible. In order to be maximally indestructible, the Forms had therefore to be maximally attenuated ὕλη. Indestructibility and eternity then conferred the ultimately supreme Reality on them. The sole reality was therefore these unseen Forms - but the existence of the Form of any particular thing could only be apprehended through that of the solid version available to the senses. We can therefore be certain that Plato acknowledged the validity of that means of access to the Forms. That he proposed to consider everything whatever in the guise of a relatively 'unreal' version of a divine Form is, however, hard to believe. In particular, that the θυμοειδές -

let alone the ἐπιθυμητικόν - element might have had a corresponding celestial 'Form' would seem a remote and irrelevant object of speculation. We can perhaps imagine that Plato contemplated a Form of the thumoeidic part of the soul, another of the epithumetic, another of the logistic, all three carrying on some kind of ideal, abstract interaction, although this would involve an infinite regression. The soul parts (or certainly the logistic), in their "pure" guise, unencumbered by worldly evil, were no doubt as abstract as anything could be. To conceive of them as sharing some yet more attenuated existence, with some further end in view than the attainment of what had already clearly been attained - namely Justice - could be thought of as straining the text. We need not therefore disturb ourselves on this account. Plato takes a common-sense view of his doctrines, and no doubt expects others to take the same view. He may have illustrated his meaning by means of a common household table, of which there was then a "form". But he speaks of Forms seriously only in association with such things as Truth, Goodness, Beauty. This probably in any case cancels out any belief that he contemplated, for instance, a perpetual series springing from the tripartite elements of the soul. An infinite regression in the 'upward'[220] (spiritual) direction is as repugnant to our conception of Plato's intention as one 'downward'. The existence of further logistic, thumoeidic, and epithumetic 'homunculi' within the logistic, thumoeidic, etc., sectors of the soul, and of others within those ad infinitum, cannot, we found, be a serious subject of speculation. Indeed, the sectors of the soul are with him, we can be sure, very

probably the ultimate divisions.

The purpose of all existence was for the logistic element in the soul first to achieve effective guidance of the thumoeidic and epithumetic elements. Having done this, it would, second, proceed to apprehension of the ultimate Forms. Finally, having separated itself totally from the body, it would achieve assimilation to the Forms themselves.

The soul, striving to apprehend the Good, and, by becoming independent of earthly things, to become one with it, ensures as fully as possible that, when its time comes to leave the body, it will be able to merge totally with the Good. But it is primarily the logistic element that achieves this merging. The thumoeidic element has only provided the drive to achieve it. The epithumetic in turn has supplied the nourishment for that drive. These lower elements of the soul, when we look closely at them, might scarcely seem to have a recognisable place in the state of perfection. We can hardly imagine that they belong there. We might hypothesise that when that state is reached they simply fall away. Or possibly, they now take on a duty of maintenance of the perfection attained. This possibility could be worth following up.

Let us suppose that the thumoeidic and epithumetic (the logistic has the ultimately plausible claim) elements might just conceivably have a part to play as Forms. Plato will, after all, scarcely have contemplated even perfection as a static

affair. The explanation of the fact that the Demiourgos had created dynamism might have been a mystery, but there was no question about the dynamism's presence and divinity. 'Rational striving' might, in a state of perfection, seem superfluous. Yet it could, as we have said earlier, also have represented a striving to maintain the existing state of perfection. The realm of the transcendental, i.e. that type of being which was beyond the cosmic, and in fact corresponded with - was - the Absolute, could never be quite on the same plane as that of the cosmic, social, etc. These last were moulded by the Demiourgos from lesser material, and therefore could not belong with it. Plato would never have ascribed to the Absolute, and the "World Soul", the same character as he ascribed to these lesser entities. There seems, however, some reason to suppose that he might have conceived of the Absolute too as in a sense a "dynamic" system. On that account we can suppose that ideal Forms of λογιστικόν, θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν may, in his view, have carried on, in the realm of transcendent Forms, a process of "maintenance" of that ultimate being which characterises the Absolute itself. This activity would then perhaps, in some degree, parallel the cosmic, socio-political, and anthropological strivings towards the existence enjoyed by the Forms. With them, it would thus fulfil the Principle of Identity. But on the whole, the concept of Forms as motionless, perfect Beings - indeed as Being itself - is paramount in Plato, and we must accept their difference in this respect from the also perfect, but "constantly moving" (cf. Phaedr. 245c), soul.

c.46 At the transcendentally perfect level, the three elements would have achieved harmony. The λογιστικόν would be exerting proper authority over its two inferior sectors (those

which give it its impetus), the two latter being primarily the θυμοειδές, secondarily the ἐπιθυμητικόν. With this hurdle crossed, it would be able to progress unhindered. The process it engaged in, instead of achievement of perfection, would now be one of sustaining that perfection. The irrepressible energy fountain of the θυμοειδές sector would be channelled with ideal correctness to this end. Instead of inexorably thrusting the whole off course into the imbalance and disharmony of Injustice, it would now be directed in such a way that it expended itself justly. In this way, it would further aid the λογιστικόν to achieve ideal Being.

NOTES

1. cf. Rep., 368 d : 'writ large' concept.
2. cf. WILLIAMS, Exegesis and Argument.
3. cf. Gorg., 508 a along with Rep., 368 d.
4. Prot., 320 c seq.
5. ibid., 321 d.
6. (438 a, 505 d).
7. 580 d 7 - 8, 586 d 4 - e 2.
8. 586 d 5
9. 581 c 4.
10. 357 d 1, cf. also 357 b 5 - 6.
11. Gorg., 477 c 4 - 5, ibid., 475 b 5 - 7.
12. e.g. Gorg., 500 d ; cf. thesis-para. b.82.
13. 580 d 7 - 8, 588 a 7 - 10, Gorg., 494 d 7.
14. 586 d 4 - 7.
15. 586 e 1 : οἰκείας.
16. 586 d 4 - e 2.
17. 547 e 4, 586 c 9, etc.
18. 581 c 4.
19. 586 d 5 - 7.
20. φιλονικία, φιλοτιμία, etc. (586 c d).
21. 347 b 5.
22. 435 b 6, b 9 - c 2.
23. 581 c 4.
24. 581 d e, 583 a 1, 586 d 5, etc.
25. 328 d 4, 582 c 8, 583 a 2.
26. 586 d 5.
27. 436 a 9 - 10.

28. 390 a - c, 402 e, 404 c d.

29. 485 d 11.

30. Gorg., 499 d 7.

31. or φιλόσοφον, φιλομαθές.

32. cf. specificity of τεχναί, Bk. I, e.g. 346 a 1 - 3.

33. 404 b 7.

34. e.g. Gorg., 499 e 2.

35. 357 c.

36. Thesis-para. c.7.

37. Gorg., 475 b, ibid., 477 d (cf. ibid. 474 c 8 - 9). He has called it αἰσχρόν, and at Gorg., 474 c 8 he has suggested that he believes what is αἰσχρόν to be κακόν.

38. 357 c 5.

39. 357 c 5 - 8.

40. 583 c 13.

41. 357 c 5.

42. (together with Gorg., 475 b and 477 d).

43. Thesis-para. b.82.

44. Gorg. 476 e 2.

45. ibid. 525 b 8.

46. e.g. 380 b.

47. Gorg. 525 b 8.

48. 465 a 2.

49. 519 a 2.

50. 343 b - 344 c.

51. 344 a 1 ; cf. 343 d 5 : πλέον ἔχοντα , 343 e 1 : κερδαίνει, 344 a 8 : ἀφαιρεῖται , 349 c 6 : πλέον ἔχειν.

52. 344 a 8

53. 344 c 2.

54. 359 c 5.

/55. 436 a.

55. 436 a.

56. 559 c.

57. 558 e.

58. 559 d.

59. 560 e.

60. 375 a 11.

61. 439 e.

62. 589 b 3 ; (thesis-para. b.62.).

63. 581 c 4.

64. 586 d.

65. 586 b 2 : ἀλλήλους ... ἀποκτεινύασι δι' ἀπληστίαν.

66. 586 d 5.

67. 586 d 1.

68. 586 b 4.

69. 586 b 3.

70. 586 d 5.

71. 581 c 4.

72. 580 d 7.

73. e.g 411 e 6, 412 a 10 (ἐπιστάτης).

74. 434 c.

75. 433 d.

76. 434 a b.

77. 434 c 8.

78. 581 c.

79. 435 e 2.

80. 435 e.

81. 436 a.

82. 442 d.

83. 485 d 11.

/84. 436 a 11,

84. 436 a 11, 439 d 8, 442 a 8.

85. 436 a 11, 442 a 8, et al.

86. 436 a 11.

87. 439 d 8.

88. 442 a 8.

89. 328 d.

90. 581 d, 583 a.

91. 439 e.

92. 577 d 5.

93. 580 e 3.

94. 581 b 6.

95. 580 d.

96. e.g. Protag. 351 - 355.

97. e.g. καθαρὰν ἡδονήν (584 c 1), ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς (587 b 5).

98. 580 d 7.

99. 581 c 4.

100. 581 a 9.

101. 586 d 1.

102. 581 a 10 : πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν ... ἀεὶ ὅλον ὁρμῆσθαι.

103. 586 b 3.

104. Thesis-para. c.15 c), d).

105. 586 b 3.

106. 440 e 5.

107. 588 c - 590 e.

108. 589 b 3.

109. 373 e 2.

110. 373 a 1.

111. 372 e 3.

/112. 373 b 2.

112. 373 b 2.

113. 581 a 9 - 10, 586 b 1 - 2, etc.

114. 586 b 3 ; cf. also 505 d 8 (τὰ ὄντα ἀγαθά only are wanted), and 529 b 5 (τὸ ὄν ... ἀόρατον).

115. 373 d 7.

116. 373 e 6.

117. cf. ἀπληστία (586 b 3).

118. 489 b 3, d 2.

119. 589 a 1.

120. Greed sparks off aggressiveness, but to be genuinely aggressive one needs to be θυμοειδής (375 a 11).

121. 373 d e, 586 a b, etc.

122. Thesis-para. c.8 b).

123. esp. 373 e 3, 586 b 1.

124. 349 c 6 : the unjust man wants more of everything; 349 b 2 : by contrast it is not proper to a just man to want more than any other just man.

125. 373 e 4.

126. 381 c 8.

127. 378 b 8.

128. 378 c 3.

129. 373 d e.

130. 375 a 11.

131. 547 e 4.

132. Thesis-para. c.21 b).

133. e.g. 548, 580 - 581, etc. (cf. thesis-para. c.18 a).)

134. 586 c 8 : διαπράττηται.

135. 586 c 9.

136. (or φιλότιμος).

137. 581 c 4, 583 a 8, 586 d 5.

138. 586 d 2.

/139. e.g. 499 e :

139. e.g. 499 e : ἀλλοίαν τοι δόξαν ἕξουσιν, ἐὰν αὐτοῖς μὴ φιλονικῶν ἀλλὰ παραμυθούμενος ..., ἐνδεικνύῃ .., Protag. 360 e 3 : φιλονικεῖν μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες ; (Gorg. 457 d : φιλονικοῦντας ἀλλ' οὐ ζητοῦντας τὸ προκείμενον ...).

140. 586 c 7, d 5.

141. 587 c 1; cf. also 586 b 1, d 8 : ἕνεκα ... πλεονεξίας ... κυρίττοντες; ὡς οἷόν τε αὐταῖς ἀληθεῖς λαβεῖν, etc.

142. 586 d 5.

143. 586 b 2.

144. 586 d 5.

145. 559 b 1.

146. 586 d 8.

147. 586 d 8 : τὰς ἀληθέστατας , 585 d 2 - 3, e2.

148. 586 a 6.

149. 583 c 3.

150. 584 b 6.

151. e.g. 350 c 5 : ἄδικος (ἔοικεν) τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀμαθεῖ; Protag. 353 a 2 : ὅ φασιν ... οὐ πράττειν ... (τὰ βέλτιστα) ἐπεὶ γιγνώσκειν γε αὐτά ; Meno 77 c 4 : οἰόμενοι τὰ κακὰ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι ... ἢ καὶ γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι κακά ...

152. 438 a, 505 d, Meno 77 d.

153. Regarding so-called 'σοφοί' who are unjust, cf. 519 a.

154. esp. 343 b – 344 c : Thrasymachus' main speech.

155. 343 d 5, 343 e 1, 344 a 8, 349 c 6.

156. 349 c 6.

157. Again, cf. so-called 'unjust' σοφοί, 519 a.

158. 344 a 8 : βίᾳ ; 351 d 5 : μάχας ; 360 b 2 : ἀποκτεῖναι, etc.

159. 586 a b.

160. 586 b 2 : λακτίζοντες καὶ κυρίττοντες ... ἀποκτεινύασι.

161. 373 e.

162. cf. 589 d 6.

/163. χρημάτων

163. χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἄπειρον , 373 d 9.

164. e.g. 350 b 13 it is ἀδικία; 590 b 8 : ἕνεκα ... ἀπληστίας προπηλακιζόμενον , etc.

165. i.e., no doubt, indiscriminate; e.g. 378 c 2 : αἴσχιστον ... τὸ ῥᾳδίως ἀλλήλοις ἀπεχθάνεσθαι ; 411 d 8 : βίᾳ δὲ καὶ ἀγριότητι ὥσπερ θηρίον. cf. other unfavourable refs. to ἀγριότης, χαλεπότης, σκληρότης at 375 b 9, 411 e 1, etc.

166. with 586 a b as the central passage.

167. 343 c 8.

168. 343 e 5.

169. 343 c 1, e 4.

170. 343 d - 344 c.

171. 344 b 3.

172. 344 b 6.

173. 580 e 5.

174. 344 a 8.

175. 583 a 1, 6, 586 d 5,7.

176. Except in the shape of 'inborn', 'natural' funds of viciousness, etc. cf. 470 c 6 : πολεμίους φύσει ; 572 b 4 : ἄνομον ἐπιθυμιῶν εἶδος ἑκάστῳ ἔνεστι.

177. 375 a 11.

178. 347 b 5, 485 e 3.

179. 485 e 3.

180. cf. 433 e 6 - 8 on his view of justice. τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν (433 a 8, 443 d 1 - 3, etc.) is a sophisticated way of formulating justice on the universal level.

181. (apart from tentative verdicts such as that of the Meno, 99 b 11, ascribing just behaviour to divinely inspired δόξα.)

182. cf. Gorg. 474 c 7 ; also εὖ (Protag. 351 b 4), δικαίως (Meno 73 d 8).

183. Consent by opponents (however bigoted) to an ethical norm at some level permits the argument and subsequent victory.

184. Protag. 345 d 8, Meno 77 c 6.

/185. 587 a 10.

185. 587 a 10.

186. 349 e 6.

187. 582 a 8.

188. 587 b 6.

189. cf. 519 a.

190. cf. virtue result of δόξα : Meno 99 b 11.

191. 373 d 7 : ἀποτμητέον.

192. 375 a 11.

193. 375 a 11 : Ἀνδρεῖος δὲ εἶναι ἄρα ἐθελήσει ὁ μὴ θυμοειδής.

194. e.g. Protag. 326 e, Meno 94 b.

195. 571 b, 572 b. Possibly also cf. Protag. 322 b 7.

196. 470 c.

197. 410 d 1, 589 b 3.

198. as also national : 435 e.

199. 586 c 9 : βίᾳ, 586 d 5 : ἐπιθυμίαι in connexion with τὸ φιλόνικον , 410 d 6 : ἄγριον.

200. Plato's Republic, Index 'original sin', and note on 571 b.

201. at 571 b.

202. see also thesis-para. c.17 a) : the three sectors of the mind are appetitive, but none specifically towards evil.

203. 572 b.

204. Given as in the restricted area of dreams, but this would be only when repressed in the conscious mind.

205. 589 b 3.

206. 410 d 1.

207. 572 b.

208. 589 b 3.

209. 588 e.

210. 438 a, Meno 77 d 5.

211. 465 a.

/212. Gorg.

212. Gorg. 525 b 9.

213. (Rep. 357 c 6 on ἰάτρευσις). Gorg. 525 b 9.

214. 404 b.

215. 445 a.

216. 380 b.

217. Gorg. 525 b.

218. 465 a.

219. The reconciliation of Socrates' 'the gods do no evil' (Rep. 379 c) with this provides the characteristic theological conundrum.

220. See WILLIAMS in Exegesis and Argument.

CHAPTER FOUR

CRITICAL EVALUATION

d.1 SYNOPSIS OF THE POSITION OF THE θυμοειδές ELEMENT IN RELATION TO JUSTICE.

The θυμοειδές element has, according to the present thesis, been assigned by Plato the position of driving force in the individual human, social, cosmic, and transcendental unit. It is the force, that is, on which the logistic primarily relies for all those of its activities that are not exclusively vegetative. As such, it must, we have found, necessarily be the force responsible for both unjust as well as just activity. A unit with a strong logistic but weak thumoeidic element would accordingly, on the one hand, be able to avoid injustice almost completely. On the other, however, it would be incapable of any really significant acts of positive justice either. By contrast, a strongly thumoeidic and weakly logistic individual would be capable both of great benefits to the whole, and of great crimes.

Because it is capable of promoting evil no less than good, we would be safe in thinking of the thumoeidic element as overall, morally, a neutral quantity. The fact that without it there can be no significant positive action at all, whether good or bad, militates for that designation. A medium in which significant action cannot occur, even if it gives no potential for evil, can scarcely have positive moral meaning for us. The potential for good must be there for any purpose - most of all a divine one - to be intelligible in the system. This point is

a salient one in support of pressing the hypothesis that the θυμοειδές is the critically important agency in the production of good and evil.

These considerations nonetheless leave it without the strong claim to morally positive value that Plato so often gives it. On the other hand they also divest it of the strong morally negative value he gives it at other times. The simple solution is, of course, that it has - and must duly be given - different values at these different times. The cosmos, with thumoeidic forces causing varyingly justice and injustice at random, is capable of transformation, through addition of and resultant successful rational striving of ἔρως, into a just one. If this morally positive tendency in it is more pronounced than the reverse, this does not mean that we have to see τὸ θυμοειδές in a more positive light. The cardinal force responsible in ἔρως for positive morality is the λογιστικόν. Yet critically, once again, a cosmos with thumoeidic forces must have the propensity for injustice as well as for justice. A world without a thumoeidic could only be conceived of as an abode of vegetable life; a world with it must have the alternatives of good or evil. If man was created with his full dynamic powers for any purpose - and Plato as much as anyone else without any doubt believes this - it must have been for a purpose in pursuit of which those powers could, and would have to, be used. No medium from which such powers were absent could allow the genuine "achievement" of that purpose.

d.2 The purpose of all Being is, by the Platonic system, to attain the Good beyond all other goods. For this reason, the force which makes its purpose possible must, to that extent, also be good in itself. This basic goodness places it in a distinct category. It is the agency which makes the creatures of the Demiourgos capable of becoming divine. Yet it also permits them to become diabolical. Why does the Demiourgos not provide each individual with a logistic element powerful enough to see the right way to go? This is a question that has been put, and not answered. The reason He does not is an enigma. Certainly if He did, there would, as we have concluded, be no real striving, no genuine effort to find the truth with partially effective intellect, no place for error, no choice between good and bad, and no acquisition of knowledge by experience. In short, there would be stasis and nullity. Instead, with imperfection, we see dynamism. The Demiourgos must, it might accordingly well be believed, have planned dynamism, the struggle which incorporates it, and the complexity of the universe which gives added variety to that struggle. Why He should have done so appears, of course, as the final inscrutable question which man seldom pretends to comprehend. Plato treats the problem in the only way it can be treated - with silence or myth. It must for others, as it no doubt does for him, remain sufficient that, as far as their understanding takes them, the fact that the Demiourgos has planned things in this way involves certain consequences. And these, in their turn, imply "duties" for humanity.

d.3 We have found that if a strong λογιστικόν can guarantee just behaviour where the θυμοειδές is extremely weak, this guaranteed just behaviour is nevertheless so trivial as to be negligible. The guarantee is worthless. By contrast, a strong θυμοειδές can similarly generate a justice worthy of a strong λογιστικόν. Likewise in turn, a strong θυμοειδές coupled with a weak λογιστικόν can, reversely, be maximally evil. (It also can, coincidentally, be maximally good, but this - since it is coincidental - means little.) The critical point emerges, at all events, that in each case it is the θυμοειδές, not the λογιστικόν, factor which has to be present for anything significant to happen at all. It is in fine the θυμοειδές which seems the more ultimately indispensable factor in the divine plan. Certainly without it, neither of the other two - logistic or epithumetic - can attain any palpable effect whatever. The logistic in particular can never come near a divine level of notability. Both need that extra thrust of driving emotion, passion, even sometimes the anger of indignation to propel them forward. If any appreciable height of achievement is to be attained, they cannot do without it. Without the thumoeidic thrust no amount of λογιστικόν, much less ἐπιθυμητικόν, can ever push man upward to full comprehension of, and association with, the Forms.

Because that thrust can also lead to the grossest evil, the error in calling θυμοειδές at all uniformly 'spiritedness' becomes manifest. Without it, man must stay impotently on the ground, like any other animal. This has to be admitted. But

the negative aspect cannot be lost sight of. Man can be helped by his logistic element, and enabled by the limited energising effects of his epithumetic portion, to outdo less intellectually gifted creatures. But if he is not endowed with that quantity of thumoeidic vigour, producing ἔρως, which can raise him to a significant level of intellectual and spiritual accomplishment, he cannot emulate the gods of crafts and learning. He cannot approach closer to the supreme God. However, should he have strong thumoeidic gifts unaided by logistic, his life can sink to levels of the utmost degradation. That, too, must be interpreted as part of the divine dispensation. The natural capacity for aggression and savage war is a proper part of man. But the term 'spirited' is in no sense relevant here.

Where he harnesses his thumoeidic and epithumetic elements correctly, then, justice results. This is defined as the situation in which logistic, thumoeidic, and epithumetic sectors work together harmoniously. For that justice to be noteworthy, some aspect at least of the harmoniously functioning sectors must also be great and noteworthy. And we have found that, in essence, it is the thumoeidic sector that has to be strong for there to be a chance that this will be so. To repeat, however, if the logistic is weak there is no chance whatever of real achievement either. ἔρως cannot succeed if τὸ θυμοειδές is small, but if the logistic is not there, it can be direly misdirected.

d.4 The effect of a fuller interpretation of the thumoeidic factor on Plato's Theory of Justice specifically is, accordingly, to throw light on the attainment of significant, and ultimately the highest, Justice (or Injustice). On the balance, we might estimate that Socrates makes the θυμοειδές appear to incline more to justice than to injustice. But this depends on the way in which we happen to interpret that balance. He also has, as we have seen, a very great deal to say in derogation of θυμοειδές. As we saw, for the just outcome of its operation to be guaranteed at all, it must in any case be accompanied by a strong logistic element. Any general estimates of its significance are therefore of no real value. The leading feature of τὸ θυμοειδές is not so much its hypothetical tendency to goodness or badness. It is its continuous "auto-generation" within the individual, and its need for provision of a constant outlet if it is not to accumulate to bursting point. The logistic sector must constantly be present in sufficient strength to be able to devise effective channels into which it, the thumoeidic force, may be directed.

On the four "levels" we have man, the leaders of the society he lives in, the logistic sector of the cosmos, and the λογιστικόν of the transcendental plenum. In all four the λογιστικόν must be sufficiently developed to guide the thumoeidic element in such a way that it will produce that "level's" own particular type of justice. Lack of intelligence produces a mutual clash among logistic, thumoeidic, and epithumetic units - briefly, injustice. It is precisely because the θυμοειδές is a double-edged agent that it can, we

may fairly hypothesise, most immediately of all three lead to the decay and ultimate disappearance of the unit. It is precisely because it is a neutral emotional quotient which one can turn to good or evil, rather than a purely elevated quantity such as the translations 'spirit' or 'spiritedness' convey, that it has to be directed along the right route, whether human, social, cosmic, or transcendental, by the essentially "divine" logistic agency. It is, in a word, the critical source both of Justice and Injustice. Only its intelligent channelling will ensure the promotion of Justice, with the corresponding disappearance of its opposite. And only through its proper guidance by λόγος can the ἐρωτικός process, the ratio existendi of forms, cosmos, society, and man, bear fruit.

SUMMARY

a. The first object of the thesis was to ascertain what the word θυμοειδής means, in particular connexion with Justice. The context in which its meaning was principally sought was that of its usage in Plato's Republic. The term was examined with specific reference to the θυμοειδής element of the soul in his tripartite division of it, and the finding arrived at was that it constitutes overall a morally neutral, constantly accumulating energy-source.

b. The second object, arising from this, was to make clear the deduction that "spirited" is therefore an inadequate overall rendering of the word. The reason for specially attempting to show this is that this rendering is still used almost universally by scholars, as though adequate as a virtually uniform equivalent of the term.

c. Third, and most important, it is postulated that Plato deliberately hints at certain highly significant consequences of τὸ θυμοειδές' nature as an irrepressible energy-source. That is to say, he suggests that, owing to this characteristic (as well as its general nature as explored earlier in the thesis), τὸ θυμοειδές represents a permanent potential for justice or injustice irrespective. To give an analogy, it builds up, as it were, an excess "energy-pressure", which must be periodically released in suitable quantities if "explosion", and/or total exhaustion, is not to occur. In the human context, this appears as the truism that man's surplus energy can be prevented from causing harm only by systematic channelling. But the fact that

the energy-accumulation is constant and irrepressible is central, and, again critically, the channelling must be supervised by intellectually capable authorities. In the third place, it is noted that the most common eventuality is total and disastrous neglect to channel it at all.

d. To place it in its proper perspective, when seen together with other vitally important quantities such as ἔρως, ἀρετή, τὸ ἀγαθόν, etc., the background of τὸ θυμοειδές in myth and early philosophy and theology is examined. Then a detailed analysis of its meaning is attempted by means of close study of all instances of it occurring in the Republic. Where this has seemed useful, other dialogues are also consulted. The minuteness of this investigation has been thought justifiable on more than statistical grounds.

e. A more general assessment follows, in which the application of these detailed findings to basic Platonic terms is discussed. Their bearing on the specific issues chosen for investigation is also examined. The conclusion is arrived at that the term θυμοειδές should therefore not virtually uniformly be rendered 'spiritedness', 'spirited element', 'spirit', etc., but also, where relevant, as 'high-' or 'hot-' 'temper', and regularly 'anger-element'. It is indeed defined by Plato as that sector of the soul by which θυμοῦμεθα ('we are angry') (Rep. 436 a), and this definition must be regarded as decisively significant in any assessment of the word. The "anger"-ingredient must be considered whether τὸ θυμοειδές is thought of as 'anger' simplex, as the morall more neutral concept of "driving emotion", "indignation", etc., or a

any other manifestation on the emotion-spectrum. "Spiritedness", at all events, applies only at the morally "higher" pole - which is moderately rare. Nowhere else.

f. In this more balanced guise, θυμοειδές can more easily be seen for what it is. It is nothing less than the cardinal source of Platonic dynamism - leading to ἔρως, but equally also to all just and unjust activity. Properly channelled, it appears as the driving force with which the λογιστικόν, at all levels, combines to constitute that ἔρως. The composite whole of ἔρως can then itself go forward (with the subordinate aid of the ἐπιθυμητικόν), to the attainment of the perfect Forms. The ultimate state of Harmony (= Justice) consequent on that progress of perfect ἔρως has therefore, by its now perfected functioning, led to the realisation of what to Plato is the aim of all existence - apperception of the Forms themselves.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. WORKS BY PLATO.

1. PLATONIS OPERA : Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis : Oxford Classical Text edition of Complete Works by BURNET, J., 1900.

2. REPUBLIC : ed. ADAM, J., Cambridge University Press, 1902 (two vols.).

3. " : ed. BEKKER, I., Berlin, 1816 - 23.

4. " : ed. BURNET, J., with commentary, Oxford, 1902.

5. " : ed. CHAMBRY, E., Budé, Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1965.

6. " : ed. HEINDORF, L., Berlin, 1802 - 10.

7. " : ed. HERMANN, C. F., Lipsiae in aedibus B. G. Teubneri, 1911.

8. " : ed. SHOREY, P., London & Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1963.

9. " : ed. STALLBAUM, G., Lipsiae, 1827 - 60.

10. " : tr., with commentary, APELT, O., Platon, der Staat, Leipzig, verlag von Felix Meiner, 1923.

11. " : tr., with commentary, BASTIEN, A., l'Etat ou la République, Garnier, Paris (no date).

12. " : tr. CORNFORD, DAVIES & VAUGHAN, JOWETT, LEE, LINDSAY and SPENS: see under modern authors.

/13. PHAEDRUS

13. PHAEDRUS : ed. THOMPSON, W. H., London, 1868.

14. TIMAEUS : ed. TAYLOR, A. E., Oxford, 1928.

15. GORGIAS : ed. DODDS, E. R., Oxford, 1959.

16. MENO : ed. BLUCK, R. S., Cambridge, 1961.

B. ANCIENT AUTHORS.

1. AESCHYLUS : esp. Danaids, fr. 44, 1 - 5.

2. ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS : In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria ed. Michael Hayduck, Berlin, 1891.

3. ANAXAGORAS : Fragmenta, (cf. DIELS - KRANZ).

4. ANAXIMANDER : " " " " .

5. ANAXIMENES : " " " " .

6. APULEIUS : Florida.

7. ARISTOTLE : Metaphysics, Nichomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics, Topics, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Physics, de Anima, Rhetoric, etc.

8. AVESTA : Iranian sacred writings (Mazdean Texts)

9. CICERO : de Re Publica.

10. DEMOCRITUS : cf. DIELS-KRANZ, KIRK & RAVEN, s.n.

11. DIOGENES LAERTIUS : "Handbook" of Ancient Philosophy.

12. EMPEDOCLES : cf. DIELS-KRANZ, s.n.

13. EURIPIDES : passim; esp. Alcestis, Hippolytos.

14. GALEN : Opera Omnia, ed. KÜHN, C. G., (20 vols.), 1821 - 33, reprinted Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1964-5.

15. HERACLITUS : cf. DIELS-KRANZ, KIRK & RAVEN, s.n.

16. HERACLITUS HOMERICUS : Quaestiones Homericae.

17. HERODOTUS : The Histories.

18. HESIOD : Theogony, Works and Days.

19. HOMER : Iliad, Odyssey.

20. IAMBLICHUS : Vita Pythagorae, Protrepticus.

21. PHILOLAUS : cf. DIELS-KRANZ ; ZELLER-MONDOLFO, Filosofia dei Greci, 1.2.304 seq., 367 seq. (1938).

22. PINDAR : Pindari Carmina, (Schroeder, O., 1900; Bowra, C. M., 1947).

22. PLUTARCH : de Iside et Osiride.

23. SEXTUS EMPIRICUS : adversus Mathematicos.

24. SIMPLICIUS : Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca.

25. THALES : cf. DIELS-KRANZ, KIRK & RAVEN, s.n.

B. SECONDARY REFERENCES.

1. ADAM, J. : (see under WORKS BY PLATO).

2. ADKINS, A. W. H. : Merit and Responsibility, Oxford, 1965.

3. APELT, O. : (see under WORKS BY PLATO).

4. ASTIUS, D. F. : Index Platonicum, in libraria Weidmanniana, Lipsiae, 1836.

5. BASTIEN, A. : (see under WORKS BY PLATO).

6. BEKKER, I. : " " " " "

7. BICKEL, E. : Homerische Seelenglaube, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für P. und G., Berlin, 1926.

8. BLUCK, R. S. : (see under WORKS BY PLATO).

9. BOSANQUET, B. : Companion to Plato's Republic, London (Rivington's), 1895.

/10. BOWRA, C. M.

10. BOWRA, C. M. : Early Greek Literature, Oxford (OPUS series), 1967.

11. BROAD, C. D. : Five Types of Ethical Theory, London (Routledge and Kegan Paul), 1930.

12. BURKERT, W. : Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1972, (tr. by L. Minar, Jr., of Weisheit und Wissenschaft: Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaos und Platon, verlag Hans Karl, Nürnberg, 1962.

13. BURNET, J. : Greek Philosophy, 1st Ed. 1914, reset and reprinted Macmillan, 1964.

" : Early Greek Philosophy, London (A. & C. Black), 1930.

" : (see also under WORKS BY PLATO).

14. CHANTRAINE, P. : Dictionnaire Etymologique du Langue Grec, Paris (Klinksieck), 1970.

15. CORNFORD, F. M. : The Republic of Plato, tr. with introduction and notes, Oxford (Clarendon Press), 1942.

16. CROMBIE, I. M. : An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, (two vols.), Routledge, 1962-3.

17. DAVIES & VAUGHAN : The Republic of Plato, tr., London, MacMillan, 1921.

18. DIELS-KRANZ : KRANZ' revision of DIELS, H., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Berlin, 1934-54.

19. DODDS, E. R. : (see under WORKS BY PLATO).

20. FIELD, G. C. : The Philosophy of Plato, Oxford, 1969.

21. FRIEDLANDER, P. : Plato, tr. Meyerhoff, Pantheon, 1958.

22. FRISK, H. : Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch, Carl Winter, Heidelberg, 1960 - 72.

23. GIMBUTAS, M. : Gods and Goddesses of Old Europe, London (Thames & Hudson), 1974.

/24. GOSLING, J. C. B.

24. GOSLING, J. C. B. : Plato, Routledge, 1973.

25. " : Pleasure and Desire, Oxford, 1969.

26. GROTE, G. : Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, London, 1865, and John Murray, 1888 (4 vols.).

27. GRUBE, G. M. A. : Plato's Thought, Methuen, 1935.

28. GUTHRIE, W. K. C. : A History of Greek Philosophy, (3 vols.), Cambridge, 1962-65.

29. HACKFORTH, R. : ed. Meno, Cambridge, 1955.

30. HARE, R. M. : The Language of Morals, Oxford, 1975.

31. " : Freedom and Reason, Oxford, 1977.

32. HEINDORF, L. F. : (see under WORKS BY PLATO).

33. HERMANN, C. F. : " " " " "

34. HOFMANN, J. B. : Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Griechischen, München, 1950.

35. JOWETT, B. : tr. of the Republic, Oxford, 1953.

36. KERENYI, K. : Dionysos, tr. Manheim, copyright 1976 by Princeton University Press, published Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.

37. KIRK & RAVEN : KIRK, G. S. & RAVEN, J. E., The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge, 1971.

38. LEE, H. D. P. : tr. of the Republic of Plato, Penguin, 1974.

39. LEOPOLD, E. F. : Lexicon Graeco-Latinum Manuale, Lipsiae, sumptibus succ. Ottonis Holtze, 1896.

40. LESKY, A. : Greek Tragedy, tr. by Frankfort, London (Benn), 1965.

41. LIDDELL, H. G. & SCOTT, R.: Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford, 1968.

42. LINDSAY, A. D. : tr. of The Republic of Plato, Everyman, London (Dent), 1935.

43. LLOYD, G. E. R. : Polarity and Analogy, Cambridge, 1971.

/44. LOBECK, C. A. L.

44. LOBECK, C. A. L. : Aglaophamus, Königsberg, 1839.

45. MAROUZEAU : l'Année Philologique, Paris, Soc. d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres", 1970-.

46. MENGE, H. : Griechisches-Deutsches Wörterbuch, Langenscheidsverlag Buchhandlung, Berlin, 1903.

47. MOORE, G. E. : Principia Ethica, Cambridge, 1968.

48. NAGELSBACH & AUTENRIETH : Homerische Theologie, 3rd Ed., G. Geiger, Nürnberg, 1884.

49. NETTLESHIP, R. L. : Lectures on the Republic of Plato, London (Macmillan), 1967.

50. NILSSON, M. P. : Geschichte der Griechischen Religion, (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, v : 2 : i, ii), 2nd ed., Munich, 1955-61 (two vols.).

51. ONIANS, R. B. : The Origins of European Thought, Cambridge, 1954.

52. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY: ed. Murray, Bradley, Craigie & Onions, Oxford, 1961.

53. SHORTER O. E. D. : ed. Little, Fowler, Coulson &c., 1959.

54. CONCISE O. E. D. : ed. FOWLER, H. W. & F. G., Oxford, 1970.

55. PAULY-WISSOWA : Real-Encyclopädie, Stuttgart, 1839-.

56. POHLENZ, M. : Freedom in Greek Life and Thought, Reidel, 1966.

57. RANKIN, H. D. : Plato and the Individual, Methuen, 1969.

58. RATHMANN, W. : Quaestiones Pythagoreae Orphicae Empedocleae, (Diss. Halle: Klinz, 1933).

59. RAUCHE, G. A. : A Student's Key to Ancient Greek Thought, Fort Hare, 1966.

60. RITTER, C. : Platon, sein Leben, seine Schriften, seine Lehre, C. H. Beck, München, 1910-23 (reprint Arno, 1976).

61. ROHDE, E. : Psyche: Seelenkult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen, Tübingen, Mohr, 1925.

/62. ROSCHER,

62. ROSCHER, W. H. : Ausführliches Lexikon d. griech. und röm. Mythologie, Leipzig.

63. ROSE, H. J. : Handbook of Greek Mythology, London (Methuen), 1964.

64. RYLE, G. : Dilemmas, Cambridge, 1977.

65. SCHLEIERMACHER, F. E. D. : Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato, tr. Dobson, Cambridge, 1836.

66. SCHOPENHAUER, A. : Sämtliche Werke, herausgegeben von A. Hübscher, Wiesbaden, 1948-60.

67. SNELL, Bruno : The Discovery of the Mind, tr. Rosenmeyer, Harper & Row, 1960.

68. SPENS, H. : tr. The Republic of Plato, Everyman, London (Dent), 1919.

69. STALLBAUM, G. : (see under WORKS BY PLATO).

70. STENZEL, J. : Plato's Method of Dialectic, tr. Allan, Oxford, 1940 (Arno reprint 1973).

71. TAYLOR, A. E. : Plato, Methuen U. P., 1966.

72. " : comm. on Timaeus, Oxford, 1928.

73. TEDESCHI & FANTONETTI : TEDESCHI, R. & FANTONETTI, C. R., Dizionario Moderno Inglese/Italiano, Italiano/Inglese, Edizioni Scholastiche Mondadori, 1966.

74. THOMPSON, W. H. : (see under WORKS BY PLATO).

75. VERSFELD, M. : Plato, 'n Handleiding tot die Republiek, Buren, (undated).

76. VLASTOS, G. : ed. Plato, II, a collection of critical essays, Anchor Books, Doubleday, New York, 1971.

77. " : Exegesis and Argument, studies presented to GREGORY VLASTOS, ed. Lee, Mourelatos, Rorty, representing Phronesis suppl. vol. I, van Gorcum, 1973.

78. WEBSTER, N. : Webster's New International English Dictionary, ed. Harris & Allen, G. & C. Merriam Co., Cambridge, Mass.

/79. ZELLER, E.

79. ZELLER, E. : Die Philosophie der Griechen, ed. Nestle, Leipzig, 1920-3.

80. ZELLER-MONDOLFO : La Filosofia dei Greci, ed. Mondolfo, Florence, 1932 and 1938.

81. ZUNTZ, G. : Persephone, Oxford, 1971.

C. ARTICLES.

1. BRINGMANN, K. : "Platons Philebus und Herakleides Pontikos' Dialog περὶ ἡδονῆς", Hermes, vol. 100, 1972.

2. CALDER, W. M. : Classical Review, 1927, pp. 160 ff., Dionysos, Guardian of the Dithera, & D. Dithurambos.

3. DYSON, M. : "Knowledge and Hedonism in Plato's Protagoras", Journal of Hellenic Studies, XCVI, 1976.

4. GALIS, L. : "The State-Soul Analogy in Plato's Argument that Justice Pays", Journal of the History of Philosophy, (Berkeley, Calif.), XII, 1974.

5. HUART, P. : "Platon et la Société de Consommation", Annales de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de Nice, no. 21, 1974.

6. HUBY, P. M. : "Plato and Modern Morality", Journal of Hellenic Studies, XCIV, 1974.

7. IRWIN, T.H. : "Euripides and Socrates", Classical Philology, vol. 78, no. 3, 1983.

8. MOLINE, J. : "Euripides, Socrates, and Virtue", Hermes, vol. 103, 1975.

9. RAUCHE, G. A. : "Arts and Human Existence in Friedrich Nietzsche's 'The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music'", UNISA English Studies, Sept., 1969.

10. RENEHAN, R. : "The Greek Anthropocentric View of Man", Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. 85, 1981.

11. STALLEY, R. F. : "Plato's Argument for the Division of the Reasoning and Appetitive Elements within the Soul", Phronesis, XX, 1975.

12. SZLEZAK, T. : "Unsterblichkeit und Trichotomie der Seele im zehnten Buch der Politeia", Phronesis, XXI, 1976.

13. VLASTOS, G. : "The Argument in the Republic that Justice Pays", Journal of Philosophy, 65, 1968.

/14. VOIGTLANDER, H.-D.

14. VOIGTLANDER, H.-D. : "Hermann, Platons Auffassung von der Hedoné", Gnomon, 1976.

15. WILLIAMS, B. : "The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato's Republic", Phronesis, suppl. vol. I, 1973 (also reprinted in Exegesis and Argument, Studies in Greek Philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos, van Gorcum, 1973).