



**EXPLORING ELITES' ARRANGEMENT AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN
NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC: CHALLENGES OF ROTATIONAL
PRESIDENCY**

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
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A dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
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DECLARATION

I, Olumuyiwa Temitope Faluyi, declare that this study is my original work and that it has not been submitted for the award of any degree or examination at any other university. I acknowledge that all the sources used have been fully referenced. The dissertation is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2022.

Signature:



Date: 10th February 2022

DEDICATION

In memory of all the victims of political, ethnic, and religious violence in Nigeria and all those who lost their lives in the process of rescuing the difficult situations.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AD: Alliance for Democracy
AG: Action Group
APP: All Nigeria People's Party
ANPP: All Nigeria Peoples Party
APC: All Progressives Congress
APP: All People's Party
CA 1: Constituent Assembly
CA 2: Constituent Assembly
CDC: Constitution Drafting Committee
DPA: Distributable Pool Account
FCC: Federal Character Commission
FCT: Federal Capital Territory
FAAC: Federation Account Allocation Committee
GNU: Government of National Unity
HDI: Human Development Index
IGR: Internally Generated Revenue
INEC: Independent National Electoral Commission
ING: Interim National Government
IPOB: Indigenous People of Biafra
IYC: Ijaw Youth Council
MDC: Movement for Democratic Change
MKO Abiola: Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola
MOSOP: Movement for the survival of the Ogoni People
NRMAFC: National Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission
NCIC: National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NCNC- National Council of Nigerian Citizens
NDA: Niger Delta Avengers
NDDC: Niger Delta Development Commission
NDVS: Niger Delta Volunteer Service
NPC: Northern People's Congress
NPN: National Party of Nigeria
NYSC: National Youth Service Corps

OBR: Ogoni Bill of Rights
ODM: Orange Democratic Movement
PANDEF: Pan Niger Delta Elders Forum
PDP: Peoples Democratic Party
PNU: Party of National Unity
PRP: People's Redemption Party
RMAFC: Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission
SAP: Structural Adjustment Programme
SDP: Social Democratic Party
SGF: Secretary to the Government of the Federation
SNC: Sovereign National Conference
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UPN: Unity Party of Nigeria
USA: United States of America
USA's: United States of America's
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VAT: Value Added Tax
ZANU-PF: Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

ABSTRACT

The Nigerian state is ethnically and religiously diverse and this plurality culminated in crises that have displaced many and claimed lives and property. The response of the government and political elites to address this political quagmire include federalism, constitutional conferences, the creation of states and local governments, revenue allocation formulas, the National Youth Service Corps, federal character principle, among other integrative policies. However, these mechanisms have not resolved the instability in the system. The country's political system is overly centralised with sprawling presidential power. Given a divided political elite, competition for power in executive positions at all levels of the government has become intense. To this end, they exploit ethnic and religious sentiments to actualise their pecuniary interests. This often results in political violence orchestrated by the elites. This study focused on the rotational presidency as an integration tool. The study adopted the interpretive approach using the qualitative method for data collection and analysis. Twenty-two participants were purposively selected from the six geo-political zones, based on their vast knowledge of the Nigerian political system. They were interviewed face-to-face using semi-structured interviews. Interviews data were thematically analysed. The study revealed that a rotational presidency should not be jettisoned provided good leadership qualities are considered. The study used elite, integration, and relative deprivation theories as well as consociational and centripetal power sharing models as theoretical and conceptual frameworks. The study discovered that the political elites exploit rotational presidency and zoning to advance their interests, most often, by violent means. The study contended that failed integration processes have metamorphosed into feelings of deprivation because the political elites have failed to harness the principles for the intended purposes. The study recommends a rotational presidency combined with social, political, and economic restructuring. Other recommendations include revamping the educational system to boost cultural acceptability, accountability, and strong civil societies, among others.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND INSIGHT INTO THE NIGERIAN STATE

1.1 Background to the Study

Plural societies are diverse societies with, among others, different ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious groups. The management of this plurality determines whether it will culminate in conflict or otherwise. Countries like the defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), former Yugoslavia, former Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia (before the secession of Eritrea), Burundi, Rwanda, United Kingdom (before the exit of Ireland), Nigeria, among others, have plural features and have had challenges with national integration. Other countries in Africa that have experienced ethnic conflicts due to national integration challenges include Somalia, Congo-Brazzaville, Sierra Leone, Sudan (North and South), Uganda, Chad, and Ethiopia (Ojie and Ewhrudjakpor, 2009). In most of these states, the quest to control state power and resource allocation has led to exclusionary and winner-take-all situations, and these have in some cases resulted in agitations by minorities, civil war, secession, and other forms of conflict (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005: 4).

National integration is germane to mitigate the adverse effects of these differences in these countries and the disintegration tendencies they portend (Imhonopi and Onifade, 2009). Integration makes citizens see themselves as citizens of a country first as against viewing themselves as belonging to an ethnic group or religion *ab initio*. These integrating measures may be cultural, economic, political and/or social. Some of these states characterised by ethnoreligious diversities have adopted the federal system of government to foster unity.

Nigeria is one of the most diversified countries on the globe. Since independence, this diversity has come with its ills as ethnoreligious crises have claimed several lives and property. This division is captured by Osaghae and Suberu (2005: 4) when they state that ‘by virtue of its complex web of politically salient identities and history of chronic and seemingly intractable conflicts and instability, Nigeria can be rightly described as one of the most deeply divided states in Africa’. Nigeria has three major ethnic groups: the Hausa/Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba. However, each of these does not form the majority in terms of population. Muslims and Christians are close in terms of their proportion in the Nigerian population and the traditional religion faithful amount to a very small percentage (US Department of State,

2018). Hence, the country has ethnic and religious dichotomies based on the North-South and Christian-Muslim divide, respectively.

There are symbols of national integration in Nigeria. These include the national flag, national anthem, coat of arms, among others. Successive governments in Nigeria have adopted some national integration strategies to ensure a sense of national community. These include the adoption of the federal system of government, constitutional conferences, state creation, revenue allocation formulas, National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), federal character principle, quota system, mandating political parties to be national in outlook, among others. These measures have not brought federal stability appreciably as these ethnic and religious differences still breed tensions in the country (Falade and Falade, 2013).

Nigeria is a very centralised state with overwhelming power in the presidency. For this reason, political parties, ethnic and religious groups focus their attention on this office. The hope among ethnic and religious groups is that they will benefit if a president is a member of their group. To minimise conflicts among ethnic and religious groups, Nigeria has been divided into geo-political zones. The idea is that the highest executive offices, including the presidency, would alternate among these zones. Thus, since the commencement of the Fourth Republic in 1999, the office of the President and five other top political positions: Vice President, President of the Senate, Speaker, House of Representatives, Deputy President of the Senate and the Deputy Speaker, House of Representatives, have been rotated on an ethnoreligious basis.

The narrative political elites give the masses is that rotational presidency will reduce the challenges that come with political exclusion and boost national integration. Hence, the awareness about the practice has continued to grow. The annulment of the June 12, 1993, presidential election results, adjudged to have been won by late Moshood Moshood Kashimawo Abiola (MKO Abiola), a politician from the South Western part of the country, made this presumption more pronounced. Abiola had over 58% majority in the 1993 election and even won in Kano, the state of his opponent (African Elections Database, 2011; Falola and Heaton, 2008: 227). The general opinion then was that the military Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida, took action to deny people from another region other than the North to emerge as the country's leader. Since May 29, 1999, rotating power has led to the emergence of presidents from three different geo-political zones: Olusegun Obasanjo from the South

West. Umar Yar'Adua from the North West, Goodluck Jonathan from the South-South and Muhammadu Buhari from the North West. President Yar'Adua died in 2010 before the completion of his term.

Nevertheless, this has not stemmed the agitations for equal and balanced ethnic representation in the political system. Indeed, the demand for secession by some sections of the county has remained a political conundrum. Political violence occasioned by reactions from other ethnic groups has not ceased. A very good example was the killings and destructions in some Northern states after the emergence of a Southerner as the winner of the 2011 presidential election (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Against this backdrop, this study seeks to interrogate the feasibility of power rotation as a political solution to the national integration and unity crises in Nigeria.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The Nigerian government had to apply force by deploying the military to the Eastern part of the country where a section of the Igbo people was threatening the declaration of an independent Biafra (Isiguzo and Obi, 2017; Njoku and Egenuka, 2020). According to Patrick Utomi, the demand of the people is motivated by a sense of marginalisation and the lack of federal presence in the region (Ojoye, 2017). There have also been agitations for secession and the creation of Oduduwa Republic by the Yorubas triggered by the spate of killings and the general state of insecurity in the region (Johnson, 2021). The threats and the agitations of the Igbos and Yorubas, the persistence and consequences on Nigeria's political environment created an awareness of a nation still grappling with the crises of national integration.

Furthermore, there have been killings in the Southern Kaduna, some parts of Plateau and Benue States, allegedly associated with ethnic and religious factors. These and other historical crises have generated reactions. Political elites from the Southern parts consisting of the three geo-political zones have been clamouring for the restructuring of Nigeria's federal structure while their counterparts from the North are less disposed to this (Abu, Akhaine and Alabi, 2017; Adeseri and Olowoopejo, 2017; Tauna, 2017). Successive Nigerian governments have adopted a series of both constitutional and informal integrative measures to boost national unity and reduce exclusionary claims by various groups (Imhonopi and Onifade, 2013: 78-79; Suberu, 1993: 46-49). In a bid to reduce the resort to violence over

political offices, an informal, arrangement on power sharing have become part of Nigeria's political calculations. The six major political positions: President, Vice President, President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy President of the Senate and the Deputy Speaker, House of Representatives, are rotated among the six geo-political zones (Aiyede, 2012: 40). The essence of this political arrangement is to stem the tide of violence often associated with the issue of political positions. This, the political elites believed would make ethnic groups have a sense of national community. This arrangement has been put in place for a while, yet violence and tensions emanating from feelings of exclusion have not ceased. These developments are indications of a larger political problem beyond the issue of alternation of the political positions among the geo-political zones. With the informal but generally acceptable arrangement measure of alternating the six top political positions among the six geo-political zones, political elites still 'raise' some issues. Marginalisation still occupy their agitations. They are still clamouring for the restructuring of the Nigerian federal structure despite the various integrative measures being practised. Some sections of the political elites are resisting devolution of the central powers to the component units.

1.3 Research Questions

This study has five broad questions to proffer answers to.

1. How can one access Nigeria's integrative efforts?
2. What are the various measures adopted by successive governments in Nigeria to foster national integration in Nigeria?
3. What factors necessitated the adoption of rotational presidency by the elites as a national integration tool?
4. In what ways have the adoption of rotational presidency fostered national integration in Nigeria's Fourth Republic?
5. What are the additional measures that could foster national integration, unity and peace in Nigeria?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study are to:

1. assess Nigeria's integrative efforts.

2. explore the previous national integration measures adopted by successive governments since 1960.
3. examine the factors that made the political elites embrace rotational presidency as a tool of national integration
4. examine the ways the adoption of rotational presidency has fostered national integration in Nigeria.
5. explore additional measures that could foster national integration as a symbol of unity and peace in Nigeria.

1.5 Significance and Originality of the Study

The significance of a study conveys the essence of the problem being studied to different groups who may read and use the findings of the study, and this includes how the study adds to scholarly research and literature as well as how it helps to improve practice and policy (Creswell, 2009:107-108). This study seeks to contribute to scholarship, policy, and practice.

The assessment of rotational presidency in relation to national integration is crucial. Notably, violence has erupted in different parts of the country from the time of independence until recently. Consequently, rotational presidency in Nigeria's Fourth Republic has become a major political issue, especially among the political elites and their supporters. This makes this study essential towards improving peace in Nigeria.

The study will also contribute to the existing literature on ethnicity, federalism, national integration, power sharing in Nigeria as well as elite, integration, and relative deprivation theories. Consequently, this will create the opening for future research. The outcome of this research will improve the existing policy frameworks on how to have sustainable national integration in Nigeria. It will also be useful for practitioners whose duty is to promote peace and development.

The originality of the study is captured in the nature of the data collected. Interviews were collected among various stakeholders in the Nigerian political system to elicit their views and opinions on the issue of national integration in Nigeria.


1.6 Profile of the Nigerian State

1.6.1 Geography

Nigeria occupies a land area of 923,768 square kilometres, and it lies within the rain forest and savannah vegetation zones of the African continent (Sanusi, 2010: 16). It is bordered in the North by the Niger Republic, to the East by Cameroon and Lake Chad, the West by Benin Republic, and the South by the Atlantic Ocean. Information obtained from the official website¹ of the World Bank revealed that the country's population as of 2019 was about 202 million. Nigeria has over 350 ethnic groups (National Conference, 2014: 52). As a political unit, Nigeria is one of such formed because of the Nineteenth Century regrouping of some African territories (Attah, 1987: 393). The country had metamorphosed from two protectorates (regions) in 1914 to 36 states in 1996. The 1994/95 Constitutional Conference recommended a six-region structure to have all the 36 subsumed in them. Figure 1 below gives details.

¹ <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview#1>

Figure 1: Map of Nigeria showing the geo-political zones



Source: <https://www.nimc.gov.ng/nimc-enrolment-centres/>

Nigeria is divided into six geo-political zones: North West, North East, North Central, South West, South East, and South South. These geo-political zones have enjoyed governments' recognition, but the 1999 Constitution does not accord them recognition. The defunct Northern region comprises the North West, North East and North Central geo-political zones while the Southern region comprises the South West, South South, and South East geo-political zones. The North West is made up of Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, and Jigawa States. The North Central comprises Niger, Kogi, Nasarawa, Benue, Plateau, and Kwara States while the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) is domiciled within the zone. The North East is the conglomeration of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba,

and Yobe States. The South West states are Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, and Oyo. The South South is made up of Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, Cross River, Akwa-Ibom, and Rivers States. The South East states are Anambra, Abia, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo. In essence, there are 19 states in the North, while the South has 17 states. It is pertinent to note that from the regional structure to the present state structure, there has always been the majority group(s) and minority groups within each territory (Anugwom, 2000: 66).

The North West is mainly the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups, but it has few minorities, and the occupants of the zone are mainly Muslims. The North East consists of several minority ethnic groups, some Hausa and Fulani and a mixture of Christians and Muslims. The North Central and the South South are made up of several minority groups, with the North Central having Christians and Muslims almost at equal proportion and the South-South mainly Christians. The South West are mainly Yorubas and have nearly an equal fraction of Christians and Muslims while the South East are mainly Igbos and Christians. The Hausa/Fulani, Igbos and Yorubas form the highest fraction of the population compared to other minority ethnic groups. The North alone occupies more than half of the landmass and population (Abah and Okwori, 2002: 3). A survey by the Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion and Public Life estimated that Muslims constitute about 48.8% of the population, Christians, about 49.3%, while the remaining 2% are made up of other religions and those that have no religion (US Department of State, 2018).

Southern Nigeria experienced early exposure to western education, and this meant the influx of Christian missionaries into the South (Uzoma, 2004: 654). The colonialists checkmate movement upward into the North (Uzoma, 2004: 654). However, Christianity still found its way to present-day Northern Nigeria states like Bauchi, Borno, Adamawa, Taraba, Plateau, Niger, Benue, Gombe, Kogi, Kwara, and Kaduna. Islam had existed in Nigeria for about 600 years before the introduction of Christianity. After the introduction of Islam by North African traders, the spread of the religion across Northern Nigeria was actualised through the efforts of the Fulanis, Wangara, Kanuris and Nupes (Uzoma, 2004: 655). It is a factor that blurs social and political segregation in the region (Uzoma, 2004: 655). Those who adhere to traditional religion in Nigeria are few, predominantly in the South (Uzoma 2004: 656). The indigenous religion has always been identified with preserving the people's culture (Uzoma, 2004: 656).

The religious plurality of the Nigerian state makes the adoption of a secular status imperative (Oduwole and Fadeyi, 2013: 53). The provisions for a secular state are in Sections 10 of both the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions, which state that ‘the Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion’ (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1979; Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999).

1.6.2 Politics and Systems of Government

The British on arrival, discovered that each ethnic group had its system of government. They subsequently introduced the indirect rule system. This was a blend of the British and the local administration systems. African elites were used as native rulers to serve as symbols of the colonial state in their respective territories (Abah and Okwori, 2002: 3). The British aimed to strengthen its foothold in the territory that later became Nigeria with little desire to develop it economically, socially, and politically (Duruji, 2008: 78). The system of indirect rule created ethnicity in Africa and Nigeria because it was a divide and rule policy meant to sustain colonial rule because different groups were kept separately (Osaghae, 2006: 8). This was aided by the regionalisation of the North and South after the amalgamation of 1914 and restrictions of Southerners to certain parts in Northern cities (Osaghae, 2006: 8).

The federal system was introduced in 1954 to take care of the tensions that emanated from regional, ethnic, and religious differences (Kirsten, 1996: 506). The East and West attained self-government in 1957, while the North followed suit in 1959 (Meredith, 2011: 77). The country gained independence in 1960 after the adoption of the federal system. The country practised a parliamentary system from independence in 1960 until January 15, 1966, and it switched to a presidential system of government on October 1, 1979. The country has experienced both military and civil rules since independence. Consequently, the country has witnessed some successful and some unsuccessful military coup d'état. On May 29, 1999, the transition to civil rule was the beginning of the present Fourth Republic. The 1999 Constitution is the framework within which the Fourth Republic operates.

The practice of federal and presidential systems in the Fourth Republic is responsible for the type of legislative systems the country operates. Members of the legislature are not members of the executive arm at both the federal and state levels. Nigeria now operates a bicameral system for its parliament at the federal level. This parliament is called the National Assembly.

It comprises the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate is made up of 109 senators while the House of Representatives is made up of 360 members. The country operates a unicameral system at the state level, and the parliament is called the State House of Assembly. Each of the 36 states has its State House of Assembly. The local governments have executive and legislative arms as well.

The head of the executive at the federal level is the President, assisted by the Vice President, ministers, and other public servants. At the state level, the governor is the head of the executive, assisted by the deputy governor, commissioners, and other public servants.

Federal and state governments have their judicial arms. The Supreme Court is the highest court, followed by the Court of Appeal, Federal High Court, High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory and Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory (Ayua and Dakas, 2005: 260; Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999). The state judiciary has State High Court, Sharia Court of Appeal of a State and Customary Court of Appeal of a State (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999). There also exist specialised and lower courts at different levels.

1.6.3 Resources and Economy

The Nigerian economy is classified into three sectors. The primary sector comprises agriculture and natural resources, processing and manufacturing constitute the secondary sector, and the tertiary sector comprises the service sector (Sanusi, 2010: 16). The primary sector and, partly, the tertiary sectors, play significant roles while the secondary sector plays fewer roles in the economy (Sanusi, 2010: 21).

The Nigerian economy has rarely been multi-cultural at any point in time as it depended on agriculture at independence, but from the 1970s, the country mainly depended on the oil and gas sectors (Adenugba and Dipo, 2013: 403). The early 1970s global oil boom was responsible for generating a lot of revenue from oil. This led to the neglect of agriculture. Agriculture accounted for over 70% of Nigeria's total export in the 1960s, but it has declined due to the shift to oil production (Obadina, 2000: 14). The Northern region produced groundnut, sorghum, maize, beans, cucumber, watermelon, rice, millet, potatoes, tomatoes, among other agricultural products. The Eastern region was known for oil palm production, while the Western region produced cocoa, rubber, kola nut, and timber. This made the regions

fiscally buoyant than the government at the centre. However, there existed disparity in terms of revenue, the high demand for cocoa and groundnut made the Western and Northern Regions, respectively financially stronger than the Eastern region (Odeyemi, 2014: 5).

Crude oil was discovered in Nigeria in 1956. This made the Eastern region richer than the other two regions because the revenue generated from crude oil sales far outweighed those of agricultural products (Odeyemi, 2014: 5). The Northern region is still predominantly agrarian. The region is also endowed with livestock production. Presently, the agricultural sector is having challenges regarding land ownership, poor infrastructures, inadequate funding, low quality seeds and poor mechanisation (Okojie, 2020). In contemporary Nigeria, agriculture still holds potential, as shown in **Table 1** below.

Table 1: Agricultural Products Distribution Across States in Nigeria

S/N	AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS	STATES FOUND*
1	Oil Palm	Cross River, Akwa Ibom, Ekiti, Delta, Bayelsa, Ogun, Rivers, Anambra, Ondo, Enugu, Imo, Oyo, Abia, Edo, and Ogun.
2	Rice	Kebbi, Kano, Ebonyi, Anambra, Niger, and Taraba
3	Cotton	Kaduna, Ondo, Kano, Katsina, Oyo, Kwara, Ogun, Zamfara, Jigawa, Sokoto, and Kebbi.
4	Garlic	Kano, Kaduna, Kebbi, Sokoto, Jigawa, Bauchi, Katsina and Zamfara
5	Ginger	Kaduna, Gombe, Bauchi, Benue, and Nassarawa
6	Gum Arabic	Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Yobe, Jigawa, Gombe, Taraba, Plateau, Sokoto, Kebbi, Katsina, Nasarawa, Niger, and Zamfara.
7	Hibiscus	Jigawa, Kano, Bauchi, Sokoto, Zamfara, Katsina, and Borno.
8	Groundnut	Niger, Kano, Jigawa, Zamfara, Kebbi, Sokoto, Katsina, Kaduna, Adamawa, Yobe, Borno, Taraba, Plateau, Nasarawa, Bauchi, and Gombe.
9	Yam	Taraba, Benue, Niger, and Nasarawa.
10	Cassava	Imo, Ondo, Anambra, Kogi, Taraba, Cross River, Enugu, Ogun, Benue, Delta, and Edo.
11	Cashew	Enugu, Oyo, Anambra, Kogi, Osun, Abia, Ondo, Benue, Cross River, Imo, Ekiti, Ebonyi, Kwara, and Nassarawa.
12	Maize	Niger, Kaduna, Taraba, Plateau, and Adamawa.
13	Cowpea	Borno, Zamfara, Sokoto, Kano, Gombe, and Yobe.
14	Soybean	Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, Kebbi, Kwara, Oyo, Jigawa, Borno, Bauchi, Lagos, Sokoto, Zamfara, and FCT.
15	Rubber	Edo, Delta, Ondo, Ogun, Abia, Anambra, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Rivers, Ebonyi, and Bayelsa.

16	Sesame Seed	Kano, Nasarawa, Jigawa, Benue, Yobe, Katsina, Kogi, Gombe, Kwara, Niger, Bauchi, and Plateau.
17	Sugar Cane	Sokoto, Taraba, Niger, Kogi, Kwara, and most Northern states.
18	Pepper	Kaduna, Kano, Jigawa, Katsina, Sokoto, Plateau, and Bauchi.
19	Timber	Ondo, Cross River, Ogun, Edo, Delta Ekiti, Osun, and Oyo.
20	Tomato	Grown in most states in the country but Jigawa, Katsina, Zamfara, Sokoto, Kaduna, Bauchi, Gombe, Taraba, and Kano lead in commercial production.
21	Sorghum	Zamfara, Niger, Plateau, Katsina, Kaduna, Benue, Kano, Bauchi, and Borno.
22	Wheat	Borno, Yobe, Jigawa, Kano, Zamfara, Katsina, Adamawa, Sokoto, and Kebbi.
23	Hides and Skin	Kano, Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Niger, Kaduna, Zamfara, Borno, Taraba, Jigawa, Kebbi, Oyo, Kwara, and Nasarawa
24	Cocoa	Ondo, Osun, Cross River, Ekiti, Oyo, and Edo.
25	Plantain	Lagos, Ondo, Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ekiti, Edo, Delta, Cross River, Akwa Ibom, Imo, Bayelsa, Abia, and Ebonyi.

Source: compiled by author from <http://agronewsng.com/nigerian-states-and-their-agricultural-products/>

*Most of the states are major producers but very few are not major producers. However, some minor producers of some products are not included. The table does not include livestock that can be reared in different parts of the country.

These agricultural products, if well harnessed, are potentials for an economic boost. They may be sold locally and exported commercially. The crucial role crude oil plays in Nigeria makes it important to consider. Crude oil was discovered in Nigeria in Oloibiri (in the present Bayelsa State) in 1956 (Odularu, 2008: 6). A statement obtained from the website² of the Nigerian Investment Promotion Council states that oil, gas, and allied products constitute about 90% of total export (ranks 8th in oil export volume globally) and over 80% of government revenues. The same source has it that the country is the number one producer of crude oil in Africa and the sixth largest producer in the world and the largest natural gas reserves in Africa and seventh in the world. Nigeria's oil and gas are situated mainly in the present South-South region. The federal government controls crude oil production, making it fiscally stronger than the states.

² <https://nipc.gov.ng/opportunities/industry/>

Nigeria is also endowed with solid minerals spread across all the states of the federation, and these minerals are 34 in number, but the federal government has given priority to nine which are coal, iron ore, tin ore (cassiterite), manganese, lead, zinc, gold, columbite, bitumen and barite (UNDP³, 2014: 1). The table below gives a breakdown of these resources found in different states.

Table 2: Solid Minerals Distribution Across States in Nigeria

S/N	MINERALS	STATES FOUND
1.	Tantalite	Cross River, Ekiti, Kogi, Kwara, and Nasarawa
2.	Kaolin	Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Ekiti, Imo, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Ogun, Ondo, Plateau, and Rivers
3	Mica	Ekiti, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, and Oyo
4	Barite	Benue, Cross River, Nasarawa, Plateau, Taraba, and Zamfara
5	Coal and Lignite	Abia, Adamawa, Anambra, Bauchi, Benue, Cross-River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Gombe, Imo, Kogi, Nasarawa, and Plateau
6	Rutile	Bauchi, Cross River, Kaduna, and Plateau
7	Talc	Ekiti, Kaduna, Kogi, and Niger
8	Bismuth	Kaduna
9	Gypsum	Adamawa, Edo, Gombe, Ogun, Sokoto, and Yobe
10	Marble	Edo, FCT, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, and Oyo
11	Gemstones	Bauchi, Kaduna, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Ogun, Oyo, Plateau, and Taraba
12	Feldspar	Bauchi, Borno, FCT, Kaduna, and Kogi
13	Gold	FCT, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Niger, Osun, and Zamfara
14	Clay	In all the States of the Federation
15	Silver	Ebonyi and Kano
16	Ilmenite	Benue, Cross River, Kaduna, and Plateau
17	Limestone	Benue, Cross River, Ebonyi, Edo, Gombe, Kogi, Ogun, and Sokoto
18	Columbite	Bauchi, Cross River, Kaduna, Kano, Kwara, Nasarawa, and Plateau
19	Cassiterite	Bauchi, Cross River, Kaduna, Kano, Kwara, Nasarawa, and Plateau
20	Diatomite	Borno and Yobe
21	Phosphate	Ogun and Sokoto
22	Manganese	Katsina, Kebbi, and Zamfara
23	Silica Sand	Delta, Jigawa, Kano, Lagos, Ondo, and Rivers
24	Fluorite	Bauchi, Ebonyi, Plateau, and Taraba
25	Bitumen	Edo, Lagos, Ondo, and Ogun
26	Lead	Cross -River, Ebonyi, FCT, Plateau, and Zamfara
27	Zinc	Cross -River, Ebonyi, FCT, Plateau, and Zamfara

³ United Nations Development Programme

28	Bentonite	Borno, Edo, Kogi, Ogun, and Ondo
29	Kyanite	Kaduna and Niger
30	Iron - Ore	Enugu, FCT, Kaduna, Kogi, Nasarawa, and Zamfara
31	Lithium	Kaduna, Nasarawa, Niger, and Zamfara
32	Wolframite	Bauchi, Kaduna, Kano, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, and Zamfara
33	Molybdenite	Plateau
34	Dolomite	Kogi, Oyo, Edo, Kwara, and the FCT

Source: UNDP (2014)

These mineral resources should have been good sources of income for the country if well harnessed, but oil and gas have continued to be the dominant natural resources. This oil largesse has not translated to fortune for the citizens because of corruption, swelling external debts, bad government policies, (Lewis, 1999: 50; Ojukwu and Shopeju, 2010: 15-16) and nepotism. Oil prices have also been inconsistent, and the price of the commodity has crashed in the last few years (Ajakaiye, Jerome, Nabena, and Alaba, 2015). The effects on the Nigerian economy have been severe because of the high dependence on oil and the vulnerability of oil prices due to fluctuating international oil prices (Bello-Schünemann and Porter, 2017: 23). These had effects on the economy in the mid-1980s, and its consequences became evident through growing debts and inflation. Consequently, the country formally adopted the Bretton Woods initiated and sponsored Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in July 1986 (Attah, 2011: 93; Osaghae, 1995: 10). The programme ended in December 1993 (Osaghae, 1995: 29).

The SAP was characterised by International Monetary Fund/World Bank programmes like currency devaluation, subsidy removal, reduction of tariff barriers, increase in prices of agricultural produce, downsizing the bloated bureaucracy, privatise or close public enterprises, price deregulation, budget deficit reduction and removal of restrictions on foreign investments (Meredith, 2011: 370). SAP had its flaws in Nigeria. For instance, four-fifths majority of shares in the 100 state-owned companies privatised were acquired by military officers, one-fourth of proceeds from exports was used to service debts, prices of cocoa fell by 48% between 1986 and 1989, among others (Meredith, 2011: 375). The ripple effects of SAP by 1992 were the perennial trend of rising budget deficits and inflation, increasing arrears on external debt, blatant corruption, near breakdown of infrastructures and mounting criminal activities (Egbefo, 2015: 61; Lewis, 1999: 50). As a result, the country has fallen from a middle-income status as it was in independence, to be among the low-income

developing countries from the late 1980s (Lewis, 1999: 50). Put differently, mostly low-income earners have replaced the hitherto middle class.

The situation has not changed in the Fourth Republic. For instance, Nigeria ranked 146th out of 180 in terms of least public sector corruption status in the 2019 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index⁴. This is a high level of corruption. Nigeria has not fared as expected economically for over sixty years after independence. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2018 Human Development Index (HDI), Nigeria ranked 158 globally (UNDP, 2019: 302). The indicators of the HDI are summed in the broad headings of a long and healthy life, expected years of living and a good standard of living (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018a: 6). The country is experiencing an infrastructure deficit, and this decimates potentials for economic growth and development, and this is because the rate of population growth is far above the access to good health, good education, viable electricity, water, roads, sanitation, among others (Bello-Schünemann and Porter, 2017: 1).

Nigeria's life expectancy at birth as of 2018 was 54.3; the maternal mortality ratio was 814 per 100,000 as of 2015 (UNDP, 2019: 302 and 318). A child's tendency to make it until age 20 is 0.7833 while the propensity to make it to age 70 is 0.6453 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018a: 11). Access to safe drinking water is also a challenge, and the percentage of sources varies in the rainy and dry seasons. In rainy season, the sources include piped, 3.3%; public/standpipe, 4.2%; tube well/borehole, 32.1%; protected dug well/spring, 9.8%; unprotected dug well/spring, 11.3%; rainwater collection, 17.7%; surface water, 5.8%; bottled water/sachet water, 14% and others, 1.7% (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020: 90). In dry season, the sources include piped, 3.2%; public/standpipe, 4.8%; tube well/borehole, 38.6%; protected dug well/spring, 11.7%; unprotected dug well/spring, 12%; rainwater collection, 1.2%; surface water, 9.6%; bottled water/sachet water, 16.3% and others, 2.6% (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020: 91). In addition, 30% of Nigerians have access to improved sanitation compared to more than half in countries with similar income levels (Bello-Schünemann and Porter, 2017: 1). Consequently, citizens are at risk of waterborne diseases, with limited access to good toilet facilities. The breakdown of toilet facilities is bush

⁴ https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2019_CPI_Report_EN_200331_141425.pdf

or open field, 25.1%; flush to piped sewage/septic tank, 24.6%; flush to pit latrine, 11.3%; ventilated improved latrine 0.6%; pit latrine with slab, 21.1%; pit latrine without slab/open pit, 14.9%; composting toilet, 0.2%; hanging toilet/hanging latrine, 1.5% and others 0.7% (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020: 96).

Net attendance rate among children of primary, junior secondary and post-primary school age is 65.8%, 38.3% and 33.8%, respectively, with the highest in FCT and the least in Yobe State (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020: 12). Additionally, 14.3% of people aged five and above has never attended school (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020: 13). The roads paved in Nigeria are 16% compared to half in other middle-income countries, a little above 63% have access to electricity compared to 80% in countries with a similar level of income (Bello-Schünemann and Porter, 2017: 1; National Bureau of Statistics, 2020: 76). Of the 63% that have access to electricity, Lagos (98.7%) has the highest and Taraba (19.2) has the least (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020: 76). Out of these, 82% are powered through the national grid while 16% are powered by generator and those powered by the former only have power for 6.8 hours per day while those powered by the latter are powered for 4.1 hours per day (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020: 76).

These have had effects on the socio-economic status of the country. The private sector hardly thrives if a country operates under these indicators. These may contribute to poverty. The percentage of the poor is 53.7% with Sokoto being the highest at 89.9% and Osun the least at 17.5% (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018a: 18). The regional disparity in the poverty level is further broken down. The average poverty rate in the North Central is 53.3%; North East is 70.7%; North West is 76.5%; South East is 42.8%; South-South is 47%, South West is 29.4% and the FCT is 43.5% (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018a: 121). The North is educationally, socially, and economically disadvantaged compared to the South, but the former had ruled the country most since independence (Okpanachi, 2009: 8). This region has the highest number of poor and those vulnerable (Barungi, Odhiambo and Asogwa, 2017: 11). Unemployment rates in the country in quarters one, two and three of 2018 were 21.83%, 22.73%, and 23.13%, respectively (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018b: 12). All these indicators make it easy for the electorates to be susceptible to manipulation by the elites for electoral fraud, ethnic and religious division. This is because people are not empowered, and they can take any resources to 'promote' the parochial interest of the political elites.

1.7 Structure of the Dissertation

The study has nine chapters. The first chapter provides a background to the study and the statement of the problem. It also contains research questions, objectives of the study and the significance of the study. It includes a brief profile of the Nigerian state, including the geography, politics, and systems of government as well as resources and economy.

The second chapter reviews the extant literature on the principles associated with the federal system. The chapter explores the subject of ethnicity and religion in diverse societies. Notably, the authors who focus on these themes, present the issues within the context of the domestic environment in different countries. However, the extant literature is mostly silent on the attitudinal dispositions of the Nigerian political elites towards the principles associated with the variants of the federal system in the country. These are gaps that have remained unresolved in literature and this study aims to contribute to filling such.

Chapter three presents the theoretical frameworks that guide this study including, elite, integration, and relative deprivation theories. The chapter also explores the roles of political elites in making decisions aimed at integrating the country and how these may breed feelings of deprivation.

In the fourth chapter, the study reviews the literature on power sharing. It explores the models of power sharing: consociationalism and its four principles of government by grand coalition, group autonomy, proportionality and minority veto and centripetal models. It also explores the literature on power sharing in selected countries, focusing on Switzerland, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Lebanon and the lessons Nigeria needs to learn from these countries.

Chapter five presents the methodological approach of the research, including the sampling technique, sample size and categories. It also contains data collection and analysis methods, trustworthiness, ethical consideration, and limitations of the study.

The sixth chapter discusses the historical evolution of the federal system in Nigeria. This is explored from the pre-independence to post-independence periods. The chapter also discusses the history of marginalisation and agitations in Nigeria which are encapsulated in the fault lines in the Nigerian federal system. These include issues of population, religion, ethnicity and military coups, resources, threats of secession, civil war, and unresolved grievances.

Chapter seven explores the integration measures of successive governments. These include constitutional conferences, revenue allocation, federal character principle, and the creation of states and local governments. These were examined based on how these have contributed to federal stability.

Chapter eight examines and discusses rotational presidency as a measure to confront the national integration question in Nigeria. The chapter examines rotational presidency as a concept, the constitutionality of zoning and rotational presidency from the historical and political angles and as a booster of sense of belonging and stability. It also explores rotational presidency in the light of merit and development, and a pedestal for ethnic and religious manipulation by the political elites.

Chapter nine presents the conclusion and recommendations of the study. Conclusions and findings are drawn from the information in the preceding chapters. This chapter also explains the study's contribution to knowledge and suggestion for further studies.

CHAPTER TWO

THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF FEDERAL SYSTEM: NATURE, SCOPE AND CHALLENGES

2.1 Introduction

This chapter examines federalism as a system, the factors responsible for its practice, the features, and its pros and cons. This becomes necessary because Nigeria is a federal state. With respect to this study, taking cognisance of the federal system is pertinent because most of the countries that have adopted the system did so because it is perceived as a panacea to the challenges that come with diversity. Consequently, diversity with respect to ethnicity and religion is also part of the chapter. As such, the chapter explores how ethnicity and religion are the two major factors responsible for violence in different countries.

This chapter is in two major sections. The first section is about the federal system. The section is further divided into federal systems across the globe and factors determining the adoption of the system in different countries. The section also delved into features and arguments for and against the federal system. The second section is about plurality, and it examines this phenomenon from the perspectives of ethnicity and religion. The section is further divided into ethnicity and religion as concepts. It also explores the comparative view of ethnoreligious violence. The last part of this section explores the comparative nature of ethnic and religious violence.

2.2 Federal System

The word “federal” has a Latin origin, *foedus*, which denotes, “covenant” (Elazar, 1987: 5). Modern authors on the concept of federalism like McMahon, Riker, amongst others recognise the symbiotic interaction between, and direct interaction with, a minimum of two levels of government in a federal state (Daniel, 2015: 49). K.C. Wheare defines a federal system as one in which there exists a division of authority ‘between a general authority and regional authorities which are not subordinate one to another but coordinate with each other’ (Wheare, 1953: 2). Wheare’s approach to federalism is legal and constitutional, and he used the United States of America’s (USA’s) Constitution as a yardstick for constitutional provision for division of powers between the central government and component units (Hassan, 2014: 40). This definition is rooted in the 1787 USA’s Constitution. His position is that federalism is a

legal division of powers and functions between two equal and supreme levels of government who act directly on their citizens through their respective laws within the template of a written constitution (Aliff, 2015: 72; Daniel, 2015: 49; Omololu, 2012: 15-16). This establishes the fact that federal states have more than one tier of government. Wheare's study emphasises how central and regional governments can have the dual relationship of being coordinate and independent in resource allocation, areas of exercise of authority, services provisions and administration of government programmes (Tarlton, 1965: 864).

Wheare's definition has been the reference point for all federal systems, and the lens through which other scholars view federalism with some modifications and criticisms. Wheare postulates a financially independent central government and component units (Daniel, 2015: 54). In practice, each level of government cannot be entirely independent of the other. Dare disagrees with Wheare on the independence of each level of government. He asserts that in the real sense, the subnational units do not enjoy financial autonomy as they still get intervention from the federal government in the form of monetary policies, grants-in-aid, among others (Dare, 1979:28 cited in Omololu, 2012: 19). Dare's assertion is obtained in Nigeria where the federal government controls the exclusive list, takes the bulk of the revenue, and disburses monthly allocation to other tiers of government.

Wheare's definition of federalism takes the constitutional approach to federalism; the shortcoming of the definition is that informal characteristics that shape how government operates were not given consideration (Thorlakson, 2003: 2). The rigidity, legalistic and inflexibility of Wheare's approach are points that attract criticism (Hassan, 2014: 41). In addition, Wheare's definition hardly reflects how federal systems operate in each state (Thorlakson, 2003: 3).

Livingston introduces the socio-cultural theory of federalism. According to this perspective, federalism goes beyond institutional and constitutional matters, which restricts it to division of power. Livingston suggests the consideration of economic, social, historical, political, and cultural factors, which are crucial for the relationship among groups in the society, along with the protection of the federal society through the federal constitution (Livingston, 1969: 12 cited in Omololu, 2012: 17).

Livingston's view of federalism focuses more on the society where the system operates than constitutionality (Osaghae, 1990: 92). Livingston postulates that the knowledge of social and geographical divisions boost understanding of how a federal system operates. Livingston's claim was faulted by Osaghae who submits that emphasis on diversity is an assumption that all states are federal, hence there is a need to take cognisance of diversity and the existence of a federal constitution that promotes division of power without jeopardising autonomy jointly make up a federal state (Osaghae, 1990: 92-93).

In a partial shift from Livingston's perspective, Carl Friedrich submits that the combination of unity with diversity represents federalism (Friedrich, 1956 cited in Omololu, 2012: 20). Friedrich also recognises the existence of two levels of government that will accommodate decentralisation and balance of power between the federal government, component units and the communities (Friedrich, 1956 cited in Omololu, 2012: 20-21). Similarly, Omololu combines the constitutionality aspect of federalism with the socio-cultural dimension and concludes that this produces a compact federal system (Omololu, 2012: 18). Hence, Wheare's definition cannot be jettisoned even though authors have brought the dimensions of diversity and unity.

Riker criticises Livingston by faulting his dismissal of the jurisdictional component of federalism (Osaghae, 1990: 93). Riker takes cognisance of the need to have two levels of government with each having some scope where it can independently take decisions (Osaghae, 1990: 93-94). Riker sees federalism as a product of bargain which comes to the fore because of the need to expand territory, meet external military or diplomatic threats (Riker, 1964 cited in Omololu, 2012: 20). The author also argues that political actors may need to jettison part of their independence (Riker, 1964 cited in Omololu, 2012: 20). Riker concludes that there exist two levels of government, sometimes with overlap functions, which administer the territory. However, Ostrom sees no reason why overlap must be restricted to only two levels of government and opines that more than one level of government may exist to mitigate conflict among the people, hence, such overlap may be more than two and varies (Ostrom, 1973: 204). The variations are an indication that different realities obtain in different states.

According to Elazar, no identical federal system exists rather each has its means of dividing and sharing power (Elazar, 1993: 191). It is difficult to transfer the exact way a federal system

operates in a state to another state without some adjustments to suit the peculiarities of the receiving state (Elazar, 1993: 191). Elazar further echoes that:

As a political principle, federalism has to do with the constitutional diffusion of power so that the constituting elements in a federal arrangement share in the processes of common policy making and administration by right, while the activities of the common government are conducted in such a way as to maintain their respective integrities (Elazar, 1987:5-6).

In a narrower sense, it is about intergovernmental relations, but in a larger sense, it is a combination of self-rule and shared rule through decentralised constitutional power sharing (Elazar, 1987: 84; Pokharel, 2017: 211). ‘While self-rule describes the scope, nature and extent of regional autonomy, shared rule subsumes types and areas of regional influence over central decision-making’ (Mueller and Mazzoleni, 2016: 46).

Federal systems constitutionally distribute power between the central and subnational governments to preserve the existence and authority of each tier of government (Elazar, 1987: 6). In agreement, Aliff (2015: 72) posits that federalism seeks to establish that the relationship among the tiers of government is in order. The author further establishes that all cadres of government in a federal state ought to have independent and joint decision-making responsibilities (Aliff, 2015: 73). An example of joint decision-making is in Germany, where the other two subnational units implement federal policies (Kincaid, 2017: 1063). In Nigeria, the appointment of the Chief Judge of a State has the input of both the concerned state and the National Judicial Council, headed by the Chief Justice of the federation.

The views about Wheare’s definition attest to the fact that there are divergent views on the definition of federalism, but a converging point is the reality of the federal system to engender unity in diversity and the existence of more than one level of government (Ikeji 2011: 122; Ogunnoiki, 2017: 65; Omoleke, 2010: 163; Omololu, 2012: 15; Omoregie, 2015: 1; Tsuwa and Asongo: 2013: 43). For this study, federalism is conceptualised as a political system comprising of more than one level of government; they independently and collectively have revenue generation power and responsibilities; the various groups in the country fall within territorial jurisdictions as well as have primary and secondary levels of government that represent their interest. This definition depicts the situation in Nigeria where there exist exclusive and concurrent legislative lists in the constitution, and each ethnic group can identify with the country, a state and one or more local governments.

2.2.1 Factors Necessitating Federal Arrangements

The dynamism in the practice of federalism in the world explains why federal states are of different sizes, and why countries adopted the system at different times in their history. Some of these federations are very big (Canada, Russia, and United States of America (USA)); others have very large populations (India), while some are very small in size and population (Comoros) (Aliff, 2015: 74).

The advent of modern federalism is traceable to the USA in the 1780s (Fenna, 2007: 300). The USA was initially a confederal state, but it transformed from this system to federalism between 1781 and 1789 (Aliff, 2015: 72). The practice of the federal system has transcended the USA as more countries have embraced the system. Fenna (2007: 300) and Ogunnoiki (2017: 57) describe the 18th and 19th Centuries as the 'Age of federalism' because this period in history symbolised the emergence of federations around the world. The emergence of federalism in different countries is also timely dispersed (Switzerland, 1848; Canada, 1867; Australia, 1901; Nigeria, 1954) (Aliff, 2015: 74; Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008: 7; Fenna, 2007: 300; Glass, 1977: 31; Ikeji 2011: 122).

Countries like the USA, Switzerland, and Canada, which are today successful federal states, have faced challenges like threats of secession and civil war, but they survived (Cameron, 2009: 312). It was after the first half of the 20th Century that some European countries embraced federalism, and these are Spain (1978: a quasi-federal system), Belgium (1980) and Bosnia (1995) (Roeder, 2009: 204). From 1901 to mid-2008, some federal systems have experienced varied transformations (Roeder, 2009: 213). Many federations have been disintegrated while some have been more united through the instrumentalities of foreign interference and dictatorship (McGarry and O'Leary, 2009: 5).

Federal systems in Cameroon, Zaire, Uganda, and Kenya failed during their respective democratic transition processes (Bandyopadhyay and Green, 2008: 7; McGarry and O'Leary, 2009: 5; Suberu, 2009: 68). Seven (Austro-Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Serbia-Montenegro, the USSR, and Yugoslavia) are no more; courtesy of secessions (Roeder, 2009: 213). However, after the secession of Eritrea, present-day Ethiopia still operates a federal constitution (Osaghae, 2003a: 89). That of Cameroon was in a quest to integrate the Anglo-Franco territories, but it was abolished in 1972 (Suberu, 2009: 69).

Britain and France administered the Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon, respectively separately for forty years, but these twin territories were amalgamated in 1961 to become a country (Awasom, 2002: 426). That of Zaire was from 1960 to 1965; Uganda was 1962 to 1966 while that of Kenya was shortly after independence (Bandyopadhyay and Green, 2008: 7; Suberu, 2009: 69).

Proposals for some federal systems in Africa never came to fruition. These include the Federation of East Africa (Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Kenya, and Uganda), the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Federation, the Libya-Tunisia Union, and Kwame Nkrumah's call for a United States of Africa (Adamolekun and Kincaid, 1991: 174). In Africa, over-centralisation of power is much in Nigeria, but in Ethiopia, there is greater devolution of powers (Okojie, 2013: 471). Presently, in Africa, Ethiopia, and Nigeria operate federal constitutions while in practice, South Africa operates a mixture of federal and unitary systems (Osaghae, 2003a: 89). Nevertheless, no part of the South African Constitution states that it is a federal state (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996).

Bosnia is being administered internationally because the international community facilitated an arrangement for decentralisation so that each ethnic/religious group had some form of autonomy while three (Belgium, Canada, and India) have remained unabridged, autonomous, and democratic (Roeder, 2009: 213). Bosnia-Herzegovina was repackaged as a federation in 1995, and this has been sustained with the help of international forces (McGarry and O'Leary, 2009: 6). Nigeria, India, and Malaysia are perhaps the only countries among developing countries where federalism survived within their first few years of independence (Tsuwa and Asongo: 2013: 44). Factors that have made the Nigerian federal system distinct in Africa is the civilian support for the system and the peculiar nature of the country's ethnic diversity and political landscape (Suberu, 2009: 71). Nonetheless, Tsuwa and Asongo (2013: 44) disagree with the view of the success of the federal system in the Nigerian state owing to the activities of elites. The authors submit that the elites have decimated the relevance of federalism in Nigeria and Africa, generally through the instrumentality of ethnic mobilisation for political competition and resource allocation (Tsuwa and Asongo, 2013: 40).

Consequently, federal experiments have come with challenges in Nigeria and some African countries; hence, disintegration and threats of disintegration have emerged in these countries (Tsuwa and Asongo, 2013: 40). It can, thus, be concluded that federalism in Nigeria has

survived over the years but has continued to grapple with instability. The situation is like this because Nigerian political elites have not steered the country to practise federalism in a manner that suits the peculiar dynamism of the country.

The historical and political processes that result in a federal system in each country are unique (Hassan, 2014: 82). The adoption of a federal system by a state is in response to real situations in each country (Elazar, 1987: 10). Compromise and bargain are not the origins of all federal systems (Ross, 2010: 6). Federal states like the USA, Canada, Australia, and Belgium, were not formed through single negotiation, they were products of progressive processes where their constitutions did not neglect existing divisions but reflected the realities concerning each state (Aziegebe, 2014: 32).

Several factors are responsible for the emergence of federalism in different countries; however, Stepan (2005) identifies three broad ways for the *raison d'être* of federalism and used this to differentiate types of federations. These are the *coming together* federation established through coagulation or coming together of pre-existing states. In support of this assertion, Tsuwa and Asongo (2013: 39) affirm that a 'federal system of government is the coming together of independent or autonomous states (countries) who by agreement, want to stay together as a nation-state'. In cases like this, such territories are geographically close. The early federal systems evolved because of autonomous communities wilfully giving up parts of their sovereignty and joining together to form a state that will benefit all, and they will be bound together through a social contract (Cameron, 2009: 311; Stepan, 1999). Their goal of coming together is to boost their joint security and economy (Stepan, 1999). Countries that fall within the sphere of *coming together* are the USA, Australia, Canada, and Switzerland (Aliff, 2015: 73; Stepan, 2005).

The *holding together* federations emanate because of decentralising a unitary country (Stepan, 1999). *Holding together* also known as "new federalism", aim at neutralising groups' dissatisfaction with central policies through decentralising responsibilities to constituent units (Aliff, 2015: 73). This is responsible for the possible contemplation of federalism in unitary states like Sri Lanka and Britain and the *modus operandi* in federal systems like Brazil and India as well as emerging federation like Spain (Aliff, 2015: 73; Stepan, 2005). To accommodate ethnic pluralism, the two major federal states in Africa, Nigeria and Ethiopia transformed into a federal state on the pedestal of *holding together*

federalism (Dickovick, 2014: 553). In agreement, Cameron (2009: 311) opines that in the contemporary federal system, the inevitability of warring societies to forge a political relationship gave rise to state formation, as a feasible choice of the parties concerned.

Federations that are products of elites' bargaining either by coming together or holding together tend to receive acceptance by the people and lasts longer than federal systems than emerge through putting together (McGarry and O'Leary, 2009: 19). This accounts for why Canadian, Swiss, and Belgian federations have been successful (McGarry and O'Leary, 2009: 19).

Putting together federation, developed through a heavily coercive effort by a non-democratic centralising power to put together a multinational state, some of the components of which had previously been independent states. *Putting together* also represents the situation in Africa where the imperialists brought together independent territories to form states without considering ethnic and religious differences (Ross, 2010: 7). The adoption of the federal system received buoyancy because of the collapse of European empires and resistance to colonialism after World War II, and these are responsible for why some states in post-colonial Africa and Asia adopted federalism (Aliff, 2015: 73). After World War II, there was the need to bring together previously autonomous territories, the colonial powers settled for the establishment of the federal system in such colonies (Roeder, 2009: 204). This led to the emergence of federal systems in Burma (1948), Indonesia (1949), India (1950), Ethiopia (1952), Pakistan (1956), Nigeria (1954), Malaysia (1963) and Tanzania (1964) (Roeder, 2009: 204). A country may fall within the three emergence platforms depending on the factors highlighted above.

Wheare gave the conditions necessary for different territories to come together as a federation. These are military purpose and defence, the desire to be independent of external influence, economic advantage, and the relationship between the political communities before deciding to form a federation, the similarity of political institutions, geographical proximity, and similarity in political matters (Wheare, 1963: 37 cited in Babalola, 2013: 48; Obidimma and Obidimma, 2015: 147). Consequently, federal systems have been applied to integrate new societies while protecting existing internal diversities and to link established states for economic gains and better security (Elazar, 1987: 6). Babalola (2013: 48)

corroborates this and is of the view that these factors led to the formation of federal states like the United States, Switzerland, Canada, and Australia.

Politically, Obidimma and Obidimma (2015: 147) also recommend some minimum criteria for the existence of a federal system, which are the presence of a political system with more than one level of government, a written constitution, and a power sharing arrangement. Aside from those mentioned above, the size of the country or the population may also be the reason for federal integration, and an example is Canada, hence, having subnational units gives the citizens a sense of inclusion (Weinstock, 2001: 80). Ironically, Indonesia is over 200 million, has over 2000 Islands as well as linguistically, ethnically, and religiously diverse, but it is still not a federal state (Stepan, 1999).

Globalisation has also midwived federalism in some states. The intervention by international organisations and other countries in the domestic affairs of some countries have determined, to some extent, the adopted system of government. Hitherto authoritarian, conflict-ridden and centralist states like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russia, Ethiopia (in 1991) and Iraq have embraced federalism either by international imposition or internal factors (Aliff, 2015: 73). There are also considerations for the adoption of federal systems for war-ravaged countries of Sri Lanka and Somalia (Aliff, 2015: 73). In the case of Africa, Nigeria for instance, colonial and elites' arrangement aside the plurality of the Nigerian state led to the adoption of a federal system (Graham, Miller and Strøm, 2017: 77-78; Osaghae and Suberu, 2005: 16). The political elites have since continued to have a great influence on the operation of the Nigerian federal system. Notable among these areas of influence is the rotation of power on an ethnic and religious basis.

2.2.2 Features of a Federal System

The nature and extent of power distribution among levels of government are what distinguishes a federal system from other related systems. The operations of the federal system vary across countries in terms of intergovernmental relations, fiscal relations, among others. Federalism entails legal/constitutional settings, which define the legal or jurisdictional and political capability of the levels of government (Omoleke, 2010: 163). A federal system of government has more than one level of government. This multi-level government, according to Horowitz (2007: 963), must have component units that have equal powers and

size, an appreciable number of component units and existing boundaries. However, some of these may not be obtainable in a practical sense. For instance, the states in Nigeria are not of equal sizes. Hence, Thorlakson (2003: 5) recognises federalism as the existence of a minimum of two levels of autonomous government that connect the people to at least two political authorities where the people are represented. This means there is a power sharing procedure between levels of government. These levels rule the same people, and each has an area of juridical autonomy (Riker, 1964, Cited in Ostrom, 1973, 202).

The autonomy granted to each level of government is what distinguishes federalism from the unitary system (Ogoma, 2018: 2; Thorlakson, 2003: 4). Ogoma (2018: 2) and Osaghae (1990) echo that in a unitary state, subnational units are subordinate to central authority and the power the latter gives the former is revocable, but in a federal state, there is an irrevocable division of power between the central and subnational units. Federalism encourages decentralising power and is an anathema to the centralisation of power (Tsuwa and Asongo, 2013: 40). In a federal system, a level of government should not be subordinate to another, and there should be a division of power and some level of financial independence for each level (Sunday, Ocheni and Okechukwu, 2014: 86).

In every federal state, each level of government has the scope within which it exercises its authority. The federal government is concerned with what affects the whole country like defence, currency, foreign matters, signing of international treaties, among others while the component units have control over local government creation, marriage registration, issuing driver's license, public health, agriculture, primary education, among others (Obidimma and Obidimma, 2015: 148). Hence, each level of government enjoys some form of autonomy through constitutional provisions (Obidimma and Obidimma, 2015: 148). These levels of relationship among the levels of government are examples that show how territories can be bound together within the structure of a federation and serve as a platform for intergovernmental and intergroup relations.

Inequality in power and resources between the federal and regional governments cannot be ruled out in a federal state but there should be financial autonomy (resources) at the disposal of each tier of government that will be commensurate with their constitutional responsibilities (Obidimma and Obidimma, 2015: 151-152). In a federal state, each state must have the power and resources needed to function as a government (Omotoso and Abe, 2014: 1796). However,

in the case of Nigeria, this seems not to be the case because the federal government is more powerful than the states courtesy of the former's control of resources.

A federal system has a rigid and written constitution that can only be amended through the joint efforts of the federal and subnational (state) governments (Obidimma and Obidimma, 2015: 147; Ogunnoiki, 2017: 58; Omotoso and Abe, 2014: 1797; Osaghae, 1990). The parliament at both levels of government spearheads this process. Most federal states have a bi-cameral legislature, as they may practice presidential or parliamentary systems or a blend of the two (Ogunnoiki, 2017: 58). Nigeria and the United States have bi-cameral parliament at the national level. Nevertheless, while Nigeria has a unicameral legislature (State House of Assembly), states in the USA, except for Nebraska, have two legislative houses, the House of Representatives (few states use a different name) and the Senate (Fagbadebo, 2016: 17 and 84; Yagboyaju, Oni and Faluyi, 2019: 145).

The umpire in a federal system is the judiciary (Horowitz, 2007:963). In most federal states, there exist courts at the federal and state levels, the Supreme Court is the highest, and this court mediates in disputes among the levels of government (Osaghae, 1990: 86; Suberu, 2008: 472). For instance, the dispute between the Federal Government of Nigeria and Lagos State government on the release of funds meant for the latter's local government was decided by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in 2004 (Suberu, 2008: 472).

2.2.3 Pros and Cons of a Federal System

Having considered the positions of the early scholars on federalism, the common thing to note is that federalism seeks to maintain unity and preserve diversity (Aliff, 2015: 73; Omoleke, 2010: 163; Omoregie, 2015: 6; Tsuwa and Asongo, 2013: 40). Federalism as a system of government has been espoused to ensure cordiality in a heterogeneous society (Adamu and Ocheni, 2016: 1; Daniel, 2015: 47; Fagbadebo, 2010: 90). Omoregie (2015: 6) sees federalism as being 'popular for its elastic capacity to provide solutions to the numerous challenges of keeping people of diverse ethnicity, religious affiliation as well as social and racial differences together'. Thus, federalism is one of the panaceas to the challenges of a plural society. Federalism enables the division of power between the centre and the constituent units while still allowing the groups in the constituent units to keep their identity and still belong to the larger unit (Aziegbe, 2014: 34).

Federal arrangements have been applied to foster relationships, which include the USA utilising federalism in sustaining group pluralism and individual rights, to applying it to engender local liberties in Switzerland, accommodate linguistic differences in India and have some bit of decentralisation in Venezuela (Elazar, 1987: 10). Canada, Belgium, Spain, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, and Nigeria have applied federal arrangements to take care of ethnic differences (Elazar, 1987: 10). In a democratic setting, federalism gives a boost through giving credence to decentralisation and by extension granting autonomy to different subnational units, which serve as platforms for minority representation in the decision-making process (Aliff, 2015: 73). In a country like Nigeria, this has been actualised through the federal character principle.

To serve as an antidote to the challenges of plurality, a federal system should be able to manage the centrifugal forces through the instrumentality of the centripetal forces that are present in such a country. National integration is to engender centripetality in a federation (Fakanbi and Raji, 2013: 62). Centripetal forces are factors that can unite a country while centrifugal forces are factors that have the propensity to set the various groups apart (McLoughlin and Bouchat, 2013: 63).

However, Scholars (Eric Nordlinger 1972; McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, 1993: Ronald Watts, 1999; Will Kymlicka, 1998) argue that federalism does not have a favourable record of regulating conflicts, may engender territorial divisions along ethnic, cultural, language and religious lines as well as encourage the quest for secession by minorities (Roeder, 2009: 205-206). Interest groups may not be sufficiently represented in a democracy, and that may make majority groups permanently shut minority groups out of power (Aliff, 2015: 73). This explains why Omololu Olunloyo, a delegate of the 1994/95 Conference advocated for ethnic equity and not majoritarian rule (Omololu, 2012: 84). The author averred that in a country like Nigeria if majority rule was to be adhered to, the major ethnic groups may dominate the political scene while the minority groups on account of the low population may not be able to ascend to power. This assertion provides further justification for the current study.

In addition, if a sub-unit is homogeneous in ethnicity, there will be discrimination against migrants who are not indigenes of such ethnic group (Horowitz, 2007: 963). This is common in Nigeria and India (Horowitz, 2007: 963). Federalism may generate secessionist agitations by the minorities because of little or no stake in decision-making (Aliff, 2015: 73). For

instance, the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia suggest that federalism is yet to be the best solution to the bane of diversified societies (Fagbadebo, 2010: 90). Hence, the need to consider the peculiarity of each society.

The relevance of federalism in multi-ethnic societies generated some scepticisms after the collapse of the socialist federations of the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and incessant impasses that characterise federalism in Belgium (Aliff, 2015: 73). Multi-ethnic states do not experience the challenges that come with diversity in the same way (Osaghae, 2006: 3). This also explains why the adoption of federalism is not always taken as a solution to challenges of multi ethnicity in some states. A more diverse state like Tanzania is not as problematic and prone to violence as least diverse states like Rwanda and Burundi (Osaghae, 2006: 3). Although, the three are not federal states.

Linder and Vatter (2001: 110) criticise federalism on the basis that it is an incomplete instrument with respect to protecting minorities. They cite the example of Switzerland and conclude that the German speakers in Geneva are minorities. Despite the fact the German Language is recognised as a national language, such a speaker will have to address the authorities in French. Federalism brings about duplication of facilities, personnel, functions, and infrastructures, and this increases the cost of running the government (Horowitz, 2007: 963; Ogunnoiki, 2017: 64).

Mangut and Egbefo (2010: 2) married these two schools of thought by submitting that Federalism is seen as a panacea to weak integration, but its efficacy may be jettisoned through the imbalance of power between the government at the centre and federating units. The revived debates on the need for a federal system in Kenya and Uganda as well as the consideration of federalism as a solution to the problems of the war-ravaged South Sudan are indications that federalism is still recognised as an integration tool (Tsuwa and Asongo, 2013: 44). These criticisms notwithstanding, federalism remains a system of government still in operation in different countries of the world.

2.3 Plurality: A Fusion of Ethnicity and Religious Diversity

Scholars have presented analysis on the heterogeneity of societies especially with respect to how religious and ethnic factors relate to the phenomenon (Alapiki, 2005; Dahl, 1978; Fearon, 2003; Jinadu, 1994; Okpanachi, 2009; Tholand, 1993). Pluralism is synonymous with

diversity (Dahl, 1978: 191). Diversity is a component of most societies in the world, but the form and origin differ. Human beings exist as individuals with a family, lineage, kinships, and clans background (Duruji, 2008: 97). Diversity may represent differences in language, religion, culture, ideology, region, ethnic group, race, national identity, among others (Dahl, 1978: 196; Okpanachi, 2009:2). Interestingly, culture may be confined to a territory, while religion may transcend territories (Jiménez, Jiang, Petersen, and Gammelgaard, 2019: 14). Social, political, economic, professional, religious, and ethnic groups are groups men may belong to, but among these, the group that stimulates the greatest feelings is ethnic groups (Adamu and Ocheni, 2016: 5-6).

For the past 5000 years, cultural diversity has been what humanity has grappled with, and this complexity evolved because of colonialism, redefinition of boundaries and migration (Tholand, 1993:2). Most of the present African territory was colonised by some European countries. Before the colonial era, some parts of Africa had what may be designated as ethnic communities which are societies with each having a governmental institution within its territory and ethnic identities roughly overlapped (Ake, 1993: 1). Between 1881 and the First World War in 1914, the Europeans invaded and occupied Africa and amalgamated strange bedfellows in territories (Olaiya, 2014: 6).

During the colonial period, ethnicity was in existence but not so significant because intergroup relations was greased by the instrumentalities of migration and the use of force by the non-African rulers to hold the colonies together (Odeyemi, 2014: 2-3). In these years, the colonialists established armies, appointed diplomats, and acquired more territories through treaties and killings (Aziegbe, 2014: 21). In essence, Africa was not formed or built as a state, but it was packaged and fabricated through the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference (Odeyemi, 2014: 3). Ake lent his support to these in describing ethnic groups as derivatives of inventions and constructions to some extent, but he did not jettison the reality that ethnic groups existed, but ethnicity was less conspicuous (Ake, 1993: 1). In summary, many reluctant groups with different institutions, history and culture were forcefully conglomerated into territorial units called states (Ake, 1993: 1; Alapiki, 2005: 50).

The peculiar nature of state formation in Africa resulted in the reality that some groups suddenly found themselves as minorities, while some assumed the position of majorities (Odeyemi, 2014: 4). These groups are pitched against each other, and this explains why we

have irksome competitions in Africa (Odeyemi, 2014: 4). The groups in these ‘nascent’ states were reluctant to identify with the states and never had collective identities but only cooperated because of the struggle for self-government (Alapiki, 2005: 50). Hence, the plurality in these states has been characterised by fluid unity.

Plurality cannot be eliminated (Anugwom, 2000: 69). Consequently, some iota of ethnic rivalries and conflict is expected in plural societies but when they are kept under control, their dynamism may be a catalyst for the development of a society (Anugwom, 2000: 69). One of the ways to achieve this is by embracing a political culture that substantially provides for all the interests and groups in society (Anugwom, 2000: 75). Plural societies include Sri Lanka, Belgium, Netherlands, India, and former Yugoslavia, among others (Jinadu, 1994: 165). Multicultural and plural states in Africa are Nigeria, Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, Congo Brazzaville, Mali, Ivory Coast, Libya, Kenya, Ethiopia, Burkina-Faso, among others (Fadakinte and Amolegbe, 2017: 66; Maurice and Oluseyi, 2016). Having established that diversity in ethnicity and religion are crucial components of plurality; it is salient to consider the concepts of ethnicity and religion.

2.3.1 Ethnicity

Members of an ethnic group are cognisant of the existence of common interests peculiar to them (Peterson, Novak, and Gleason, 1982: 2). De Vos (2006: 4) views an ethnic group as ‘a self-perceived inclusion of those who hold in common a set of traditions not shared by others with whom they are in contrast’. He further posits that things that make an ethnic group distinct from other ethnic groups are religious beliefs and practices, a feeling of historical continuity, as well as common extraction or place of origin (De Vos, 2006: 4). Ethnic groups can be conceptualised as a culture-bearing unit that shares a common culture, a social organisation, and a certain category of people with a basic identity (Yusoff and Sarjoon, 2016: 147).

Ukiwo (2005: 8) submits that an ethnic group is a group of people who share a common identity that distinguishes them from others. Therefore, ethnic groups always get involved in conflicts and compete for scarce resources with other ethnic groups (Ojo, 2009: 384). In a similar vein, on the dichotomy between members of an ethnic group and non-members, an ethnic group is ‘a group whose members share a common identity and affinity based on

common language and culture, myth of common origin and a territorial homeland, which become the basis for differentiating ‘us’ from ‘them’, and upon which people act’. (Osaghae, 1995: 13). This study adopts this definition because it represents the description of an ethnic group in Nigeria. Members of an ethnic group in Nigeria take the identity of their ethnic group before acknowledging being a Nigerian and portray members of other ethnic groups as being inferior. Hence, the importance of carrying out a study on national integration in Nigeria.

There is conscious unity about ethnic identity among the members of an ethnic group albeit such consciousness may be a mirage or misguided (Ake, 1993: 1). The interactions between the ethnic groups in a political society characterised by ethnic diversity produce ethnicity (Ikpe, 2009: 680). The existence of more than one ethnic group in a state make ethnicity possible (Adamu and Ocheni, 2016: 7; Ikpe, 2009: 680; Onwuzuruigbo, 2010: 1801).

Ethnicity is beyond cultural differences, but it is culturally historical (Igwarra, 2001: 88). Ethnicity is a phenomenon that is historically snowballing because past wrongs, inequalities and conflicts provide a framework that shapes how members of an ethnic group relate with the state or members of other ethnic groups (Osaghae, 2003b: 58). Hence, an ethnic group changes due to people’s entry and exit, historical changes, change in social and cultural settings (Salamone, 1997:304). Clothing, language, and behaviour make boundaries that distinguish an ethnic group from another (Salamone, 1997:304). ‘Ethnic groups come into being, mutate, split, merge, and, even, disappear’ (Salamone, 1997:304). Human creativity is not necessarily changing one’s ethnic group but how members of an ethnic group relate with other groups. For instance, in Nigeria, before the creation of the Mid-West region in 1963, the Binis had familiar relations with the Yorubas, but after the creation, the former saw itself as a different ethnic group and distinguished itself from the latter (Osaghae, 2003b: 58).

Osaghae linked ethnicity to the economy because the implementation of economic programmes affects social, political, and economic relations among the ethnic groups (Osaghae, 1995: 6). Political elites play the roles of ethnic/communal voices, and they contend with other communal patrons for the shares of their communities from the ‘national cake’ and their rewards as patrons (Ikpe, 2009: 683). In response, members of the communities support their leaders irrespective of the fact that they know that the latter most times hold positions for personal aggrandisement (Ikpe, 2009: 683-684). Membership of an

ethnic group has been seen as an epitome of political, economic, and social groups who enjoy some prerogatives for belonging to the group (Salamone, 1997: 304).

Ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic state have the wherewithal to mobilise their members politically, and this may threaten the stability of such state (Ibrahim, 1994: 16-17). In multi-ethnic states, different groups try to outsmart other competing groups in the society to be politically, economically, religiously and culturally supreme (Kalu and Oguntinyinbo, 2012: 88). The competition for state power as well as economic and social benefits result in ethnic politics and lead to conflict, and a means to challenge state validity (Osaghae, 2003b: 71).

The major reason why people struggle for political power is premised on the politics of allocation, and this makes competition among groups in a multi-ethnic state inevitable and brutal (Odeyemi, 2014: 5). This view is supported by Adamu and Ocheni (2016: 13); Appiah, Arko-Achemfuor, and Adeyeye (2018: 7) and Mahoney (2018: 179) who submit that in many African states, different ethnic groups have been brought into conflict due to the struggle for political power as it is seen that having access to power, secures access to the nation's resources. Many African countries had similar ethnic situations after independence. For example, Nigeria, Liberia, Burundi, Rwanda, Angola, Zaire, Sudan, and Ethiopia (Ikpe, 2009: 684).

Ethnic segregation is also responsible for the existence of majority and minority ethnic groups. Most countries of the world have at least one ethnic group that is a target of discrimination, and such groups have organised themselves to channel, promote and defend their interests (Yusoff and Sarjoon, 2016: 148). Ethnic minorities experience discrimination and domination by the majority groups in many spheres, because of their numerical strengths, inferiority, and some historical and sociological factors (Osaghae, 1998: 3). However, there are exceptions to this in the sense that some minorities are not dominated, but they dominate others. The Fulanis in Northern Nigeria is an example (Osaghae, 1998: 3).

Ethnicity is like two sides of a coin that represents alienation and branding of identity and these warrant situations where rights, opportunities and privileges are derivatives of who you are and where you come from (Mahoney, 2018: 179; Odeyemi, 2014: 2). This assertion aligns with (Osaghae, 1995: 11) who defined ethnicity 'as the employment or mobilization of ethnic identity and difference to gain an advantage in situations of competition, conflict, or

cooperation'. For this study, this definition will be used. This is because ethnicity has been the basis for antagonism, dispute, and cooperation in Nigeria.

2.3.2 Religion

Religion remains a strong force in the world so much that the majority have affiliations with a religion (Johnstone, 2016: 1). In most countries in the world hardly is there any village, town, or city where there is no place of worship or monument tagged with a specific region (Johnstone, 2016: 1). There exist different religions in the world. These include Judaism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, and Zoroastrianism, among others (Bader, 2007: 41; Jong, 2015: 16). A basic feature of religion is that it is a belief system, held by a group of people who publicly share its doctrine (Babatola, 2015: 2). Each religion is organised into groups, and each group influences its members, other groups, and institutions (Johnstone, 2016: 3).

Johnstone identifies other features of religion as:

a). a group phenomenon because it is a composition of two or more people who interact with one another, have shared norms, members have roles, there is hierarchy and its members identify with the group. b). It includes a body of beliefs and moral prescriptions that have been passed through generations of the adherents of such religion. Such beliefs are enshrined in books like the Holy Bible, for Christians, the Qu'ran for Muslims, Book of Mormon among others c). It includes a set of practices like gathering to worship, sacrifices, feasts and so on. d). they have sacred attributes which include the supernatural personified by Jesus, Allah, Vishnu; place or situation personified as churches, Mecca in Saudi Arabia, Mosques, Hindus giving right of way to cows (Johnstone 2016: 8-14).

The author merges these features to propose a definition for religion as, 'a set of beliefs and rituals by which a group of people seeks to understand, explain, and deal with a world of complexity, uncertainty, and mystery, by identifying a sacred canopy of explanation and reassurance under which to live' (Johnstone, 2016: 14). This definition emphasises the existence of belief systems and relationships rather than on religion, as a group, and its influences on the behaviour of the members. Fox (2018: 4) filled this lacuna when he postulates that religion has a relationship with human behaviour and that politics is about the study of the political behaviour of people, hence, there is a nexus between religion and politics. The author further defined religion from the perspective of how it affects human behaviour in society as explained below.

Religion seeks to understand the origins and nature of reality using a set of answers that include the supernatural. Religion is also a social phenomenon and institution, which influences the behavior [sic] of human beings both as individuals and in groups. These influences on behavior [sic] manifest through the influences of religious identity, religious institutions, religious legitimacy, religious beliefs, and the codification of these beliefs into authoritative dogma, among other avenues of influence (Fox, 2018: 4).

This definition encompasses the spirituality of religion, including its impact on human behaviour, and recognition as an institution. This definition suits this study because it has the components highlighted in the preceding sentence.

The influence religion has on human behaviour is not the same everywhere. Therefore, most countries in the world are custodians of religious diversity (Zavala-Pelayo and Góngora-Mera, 2016: 65). Religious diversity may occur in different forms. It may be diversity within the same country, diversity within the family (like having Christians and Muslims within the same family) or diversity within the same religion (like Greek or Russian Catholics) (Jiménez et al., 2019: 15). The feeling that there exists home, and alien religions fuels this diversity. Membership within a religion is viewed as home religion, while those who practise outside this religion are said to be members of alien religion (Griffiths, 2015: xiv). The former is called religious kin, while the latter is called religious aliens (Griffiths, 2015: xiv). Consequently, activities in the political and economic spheres affect religiously diverse people and as such favour the beliefs, norms, and preferences of some; they may be against the tenets of others (Jiménez et al., 2019: 15). This is exacerbated because different religious stakeholders represent the interest of their religion, which may conflict, with those of others (Jiménez et al., 2019: 15). This has snowballed into nexus between religion and politics.

In third World countries, the relationship that exists between religion and politics is undeniable. This has become conspicuous since the 1970s (Haynes, 1999: 6). Instances include the Iranian Revolution of 1978/79, Islamic activities in the Middle East political landscape, the socio-political effects of the growing protestant evangelical groups in Africa and Latin America. Others are the political strength of the Bharatiya Janata Party, which won the majority of seats in the 1996 general elections and is among the Hindu Nationalist Parties in India and the growth of New Buddhist movements in Thailand and other parts of South East Asia (Haynes, 1999: 6). Third World countries face the challenges of political instability, economic problems, insecurity and weak social integration and the poor/marginalised take

solace in religious groups to meet some of these needs especially the economic one, but those with higher social status also embrace such religious constituencies to get votes (Haynes, 1999: 7). Ethnic and religious diversities have been responsible for violence in several parts of the world. However, the existence of ethnic and religious diversities is not an anathema to unity and unity does not imply there is no diversity (Sotillos, 2016: 133). Peculiarities occur in territories. These make it imperative to have insight into the nature of ethnic and religious violence.

2.4 The Nature of Ethnoreligious Violence: Comparative View

War and violence are not new phenomena to humanity, but the dimension such have taken in countries necessitates attention (Allen, 1999: 368). These have been characterised by the targeting of civilians, extreme brutality, states initiating and sponsoring violence, commercialising wars as well as the emergence of warlords (Allen, 1999: 371-372). Ethnic and/or religious violence is one of the most dangerous violence faced by states (Burger, 1993: 79). They are almost inseparable from political conflict and by extension, political violence. Political violence encompasses a conglomeration of attacks within a political community against the government in power and its policies as well as opposing groups (Gurr, 2016: 3-4). It may assume the form of actual or threatened use of violence, and it may be used to accomplish socio-political change through violence, and may take the forms of limited violence or guerrilla wars, coup d'état, rebellions, terrorism, and riots (Gurr, 2016: 4).

Ethnic, language and religious diversities are potential conflict instigators (Bove and Elia, 2017: 230). Jinadu (1994: 165) and Mushtaq, Muhammad, and Alqama (2011: 275) opine that in most plural societies, political conflicts are weaved around ethnic mobilisation. In societies where ethnoreligious violence is persistent, national integration is often seen as the light at the end of the tunnel. Ethnic conflict, otherwise known as identity-based conflict, is an offshoot of human conflicts, which could sometimes be inseparable from racial, regional, religious, or communal bonds (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999: 33). Therefore, in some instances, ethnic and religious violence are inseparable.

Ethnic conflicts are not only restricted to conflicts between ethnic groups but may also be within an ethnic group. Irrespective of the size of an ethnic group, they are scarcely homogenous or united because there is the probability that there will be conflicts among its

sub-groups: this is intra-ethnic conflict (Onwuzuruigbo, 2010: 1804). This reveals that conflicts cannot be in oblivion in most societies but can only be moderated or managed so that it does not snowball into violence (Azarya, 2003: 3).

Post-colonial African conflicts have not been devoid of ethnicity (Azarya, 2003: 8). The worldwide spread of conflicts was further exacerbated due to a series of events which include the economic reforms of the 1980s; the breakdown of the Soviet Republic; the end of the Cold War; and the globalisation of liberal democracy (Onwuzuruigbo, 2010: 1798). The poor economic status of Africa from the 1980s due to decline in oil prices, unfavourable international trade, rising external debts and capital flight coupled with the proliferation of arms made youth readily available for recruitment by warlords for the perpetration of ethnic violence (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999: 37-38; Osaghae, 2006: 12). The privatisation of states' assets as well as not meeting the democratic and economic expectations of the people have eroded legitimacy and good governance (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999: 38). Not feeling the impact of the state in infrastructural provisions and not being represented politically may lead an ethnic group to seek redress through violence (Kifordu, 2011: 432). Politics in Africa in the last decade of the Twentieth Century was stained by violence (Allen, 1999: 367).

Perception of exclusion from access to economic, religious, commercial, linguistic rights, among others, could lead to ethnic conflicts (Ibrahim, 1994: 17). In post-colonial Africa, differences in character, attitudes, way of life, habits and feelings lead to antagonism and bitter hostility to one another mainly in power struggle and resource control (Fadakinle and Amolegbe, 2017: 61).

Resource struggles, identity conflicts and wars nearly chomped countries like Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, among others (Oguonu and Ezeibe, 2014: 327; Onwuzuruigbo, 2010: 1798). The struggle for resources has been corroborated by Azarya (2003: 3) when he emphasised that conflict is common and natural with man, and this persists if resources are scarce. Land was the cause of conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Arab Nomads and other ethnic groups in Sudan, Zimbabwe, Cote D'Ivoire, Angola and other African Countries (Arowosegbe, 2016: 266). That of Sudan had an ethnic dimension (Arowosegbe, 2016: 266). Land for grazing and farming has led to a series of clashes between herdsmen and local farmers in Nigeria (Abbass, 2014; Adisa and Adekunle, 2010; Omilusi, 2016). This has also taken ethnic and to some extent, religious dimensions. Merging the dual causes of colonialism

and resource struggle as causes of ethnic and religious violence, Nzongola-Ntalaja (1999: 35) posits that ethnic conflicts and identity could be traced to the colonial tactics of divide and rule and competition for power and resources by African elites. The author gave Rwanda and Burundi as examples.

Ethnic/religious and or regional conflicts are common in Nigeria but are purposefully stimulated by the state in Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan (Allen, 1999: 378). In addition, the challenges highlighted in the preceding paragraphs have led to the rise of dissident groups. In recent years, there has been an upsurge in the number of ethnic militias in Africa and Asia due to the transition from electoral democracy to the consolidation of democracy (Agbu, 2004: 5). These groups existed but were dormant in dictatorial regimes. For example, militia groups became more active in Nigeria after the commencement of the Fourth Republic. Group competition (which may be facilitated by militia groups) is a major component of a diverse society, but this may be made oblivion by an authoritarian government or accommodated in a democratic dispensation (Adamolekun and Kincaid, 1991: 179). In a democracy, the right to choose is allowed, and this is a pedestal for ethnic groups to slug it out on who gets what, how and when (Anugwom, 2000: 67). Put differently; in ethnically plural societies that are democratic, there may exist intense competitions, rivalries and struggles for power and resources (Anugwom, 2000: 67). Competition is good for democracy, but when it is associated with ethnicity and ethnic factors, it may pose some threat to democracy (Anugwom, 2000: 67). Ethnic agitation becomes extreme when it metamorphoses into the emergence of ethnic militia movements, which bear the identity of such groups, and the platforms through which the desires of the groups are pursued (Badmus, 2006: 193).

Post-colonial African states are presently undergoing social, political, and economic challenges (Agbu, 2004: 13). The state in Africa is weak in autonomy, people would rather prefer to give their allegiance to sectional groups (militia), and this breeds ethnic conflicts (Osaghae, 1999: 262-263). For instance, where the number of people educated has increased but the economic wherewithal to absorb them is not strong; there may be a political disorder or decay (Agbu, 2004: 14). In Nigeria, these ethnic militias represent and protect the interest of their ethnic groups because of the inability of the government to discharge, effectively, its basic responsibilities and the turning of deaf ears to the peaceful presentations by various

ethnic groups (Agbu, 2004: 5). Porous borders have made these militia groups thrive as this encourages free movement of arms.

The proliferation of small arms and prior military experience of members aid the activities of ethnic militia groups (Agbu, 2004: 12). The proliferation of arms was a boost to violence in Angola, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone (Agbu, 2004: 12). Consequently, groups that are threatened resort to arms and in the long run, turn warlords (Allen, 1999: 378). The rise of militia groups and proliferation of arms have produced foot soldiers and tools respectively to carry out ethnic and religious violence. Violent conflicts have led to the loss of lives and property, increased costs for the countries, concerned hardships on the innocent as well as problems for neighbouring countries due to problems of refugees (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999: 38). From a holistic view, Osaghae (2006: 9-10) submits that these conflicts were a result of economic problems due to structural adjustments, underdevelopment of power sharing and weak accountability, justice, equity, and conflict management mechanisms.

2.4.1 Ethnic and Religious Violence

Some countries have not been spared from ethnic and religious conflicts since the Twentieth Century. Ethnic conflicts and tribal resentments were two major factors responsible for civil wars in Somalia, Liberia, Angola, and the massacre in Burundi (Samatar, 1997: 687). Huge political violence was created in Liberia, Rwanda, and Somalia due to dwindling viable and effective states (Clapham, 2001: 14). 'Extensive violence and warfare became seemingly commonplace in Africa in the late 1980s and 1990s, marking Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, South Africa, Algeria, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, and Zaire' (Allen, 1999: 368).

Aside from these countries, Ghana has also been affected by ethnic violence. Northern Ghana has been bewildered by inter-ethnic conflicts over the years due to land rights, chieftaincy disputes and competition for power and this has led to the loss of lives, property, displacement of people and negative effects on social and economic activities (Mboruwa, 2014: 108). Northern Ghana is culturally, ethnically, historically, and religiously diverse with about 16 different ethnic groups (Mboruwa, 2014: 108).

Beyond the shores of Africa, ethnic and religious diversity have also twisted into violence. Iraq is also diverse along ethnic and religious lines. The Arabs are about 75% while the Kurds

are about 20% (Brancati, 2004: 8; McGarry, 2017: 523). The Arabs are predominantly Muslims of which over 50% are Shi'a while 30% to 40% are Sunnis (Brancati, 2004: 8; McGarry and O'Leary, 2007: 674; Rothchild and Roeder, 2005: 2). Although some Kurds are also, Muslims, while others practise Christianity and Judaism, Saddam Hussein was against the Kurds, and he insisted on forcing them to become Arabs by making it compulsory for them to speak Arabic as the official language and answer Arabic Names (Brancati, 2004: 8-9). He also killed several Kurds with over 100,000 deaths alone during a 1988 chemical weapon attack (Brancati, 2004: 9). This is an example of a state orchestrated ethnoreligious violence. There is also discrimination against the Shia's in favour of Sunnis by Saddam to the extent of attempting to force all Muslims to be Sunnis (Brancati, 2004: 10).

Ethnic division was the pedestal for political confrontation and conflict in Northern Ireland, Belgium, France, and Spain in the Nineteenth Century (Glass, 1977: 31). In these countries, the perceived second fiddle status by members of important ethnic groups evolved into political dissatisfaction and deprivation, and consequently, many of these ethnic groups expressed their frustrations through different forceful political avenues including violence (Glass, 1977: 31).

2.5 Conclusion

The federal system of government was considered in this chapter. Federalism in different countries was given consideration. One of the cardinals of federalism is to promote unity in diversity. Hence, pluralism in different countries was given consideration. It was discovered that differences in ethnicity and religion had been the major factors responsible for violence in different societies. The fact remains that both federal and non-federal states have grappled with this scourge. All these depict that diversity has led to inequality, which is the root of most crises, but federalism has not been the perfect response. Mill's law of federal instability which states that instability in a federal state is a progeny of inequality supports this assertion (Omololu, 2012: 4-5; Peter, 2014: 193; Porter, 1977). This leads to the next chapter which is the theoretical framework. The theories explain the roles of political elites in a society where ethnic groups feel relatively deprived due to the diverse nature of the state and the parochial interest of these elites.

CHAPTER THREE

ELITES, INTEGRATION AND RELATIVE DEPRIVATION: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

3.1 Introduction

The origin of the word theory can be traced to the Greek word '*theoria*' that signifies 'look at' or to carry out a study through sensual observation (Ogunnoiki, 2017:60). 'A theory is a statement or set of statements describing the relationship among concepts' (Babbie, William, and Zaino, 2019: 6). Theories are constructions because they are people's creations, can be reformulated, can be criticised, and a researcher can propose new theories to explain a phenomenon (Bezuidenhout, 2014: 40). A theory helps to understand, analyse, and design ways to investigate a problem (Grant and Osanloo, 2016: 16). It offers explanations about the patterns that exist in human social life (Babbie et al., 2019: 6). A theory provides an outline for organising knowledge about a phenomenon. Future findings may substantiate and build on a theory, and hence a theory may grow or be modified. A theory may be an abstraction because one theory cannot sufficiently capture the explanation of a phenomenon (Bezuidenhout, 2014: 39-40). Thus, to adequately grasp a phenomenon, one may need many theories. It is for this reason that more than one theory will be used for this study.

A theoretical framework consists of a theory or theories that boost understanding of a phenomenon under research. A theoretical framework also helps researchers as they are planning their research. A framework also grounds concepts and definitions that are relevant for research (Grant and Osanloo, 2016: 1 and 13). The authors further state that:

The theoretical framework is the "blueprint" for the entire dissertation inquiry. It serves as the guide on which to build and support your study, and also provides the structure to define how you will philosophically, epistemologically, methodologically, and analytically approach the dissertation as a whole (Grant and Osanloo, 2016: 13).

A theoretical framework is like a building plan upon which the answers to the research questions and solutions to the research problems are built and developed (Bezuidenhout, 2014: 37). To have good research, the theoretical framework is very relevant as it knits every aspect of a study together. Statement of the problem, literature review, methods or research

design, data presentation, and discussion must all be in congruence with the theoretical framework of the study (Grant and Osanloo, 2016: 16).

The functions of a theoretical framework as given by Bezuidenhout (2014: 55) are:

- i). it helps to have a theoretical scope that defines and demarcates the things that are relevant or not to our study.
- ii). it guides and gives a specific perspective through which a topic can be examined.
- iii). it spots the concepts that are needed.
- iv). it is a catalyst to find the important key variables or facets to incorporate in our investigation of a topic.
- v). it determines how the data for the study is collected, analysed, and interpreted.
- (vi). it is a platform to help identify salient new issues and concepts to integrate into the study.
- vii). it is a direction to the most crucial research questions to be answered to boost the understanding of a certain phenomenon.

These functions, no doubt, make the theoretical framework very crucial to realising successful research. This study uses elite, integration, and relative deprivation theories. Elite theory serves as the platform to explain the roles of elites in national integration and power sharing in Nigeria. Elite theory claims that the elites, a minority that controls major social resources, play hegemonic roles in social, economic, and political decision making. This study uses elite theory to explain the pivotal role of elites in politics in general and in discord and violence in Nigeria in particular. Integration theory explains how integration is germane to help a plural society mitigate divisive tendencies and how national integration can be bolstered in Nigeria. Integration is primarily an elite-driven agenda in post-colonial heterogeneous societies. However, since African elites and Nigerian elites for this case study are characterised by a winner-takes-all mentality, integration results in some groups feeling relatively deprived and hence, resorting to violence. It is for this reason that this study also uses the relative deprivation theory. Relative deprivation expatiates on why different groups in Nigeria aspire to have one of their own occupy the seat of the President and why that is

seen as an avenue to control state resources. The theory is used in this chapter to explain why marginalisation has led to agitation and, finally, ethnic, and religious violence in Nigeria.

The first section of this chapter has explained the concepts of theory and theoretical framework as well as their uses. The subsequent sections critically discuss the three theories chosen for this study. The chapter also relates the theories with the research objectives and serves as the foundation to make the analysis chapter achieve its purpose. The exposure this chapter gives this study will be relevant for the analysis of data.

3.2 Elite Theory

The origin of elite theory can be traced to the field of sociology, where it was used to explain how individuals behave in social settings. The application of this theory in politics was developed by two Italian sociology scholars, namely, Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) and Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941) (Domhoff, 2005). The seminal works of Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, and Robert Michels (1875-1936) brought about consciousness that exercise of power in organisations lies with a minority, the elites (Domhoff, 2005; Leite, 2016: 2). Apart from the above-mentioned contributors, other early contributors of the elite theory are James Burnham and Wright Mills' *The Power Elite* (1956), while recent elite theorists are Joseph Schumpeter, Robert Dahl, among others (Duru, 2012: 3; Gel'man and Tarusina, 2000: 311).

Pareto submits that, in societies with open social mobility, elites would be made up of the most talented and worthy individuals, however, in actual societies, elites are individuals who can use force and/or persuasion and come from wealthy and connected families (Higley, 2010: 161). Michels opines that elites are oligarchies who are leaders and experts needed by large organisations and consequently control funds, the flow of information and other aspects of organisational functions, which make power concentrate in their hands (Higley, 2010: 161). Mosca posits that small minorities are more organised than the majorities, and he termed the former as political elites who possess material, intellectual or moral advantage over those they govern (Higley, 2010: 161). Weber believes that small numbers/groups manoeuvre superior political power to determine political actions (Higley, 2010: 161). The positions of Michels (1911), Mosca (1939) and Weber (1978), which emphasise the minority status of elites aligns with Ojukwu and Shopeju's (2010: 16) submission that elites represent

a privileged minority with organisational skills, leadership prowess, knowledge, information, drive, and ambition. The assertions of these scholars prove that elites can assume more than one role, including economic, religious, political, military, educational, among others. The members of one elite group can influence the activities of the members of another elite group. For instance, the Kaduna ‘Mafia’ is a small group of Northern Muslims who influenced the political activities in the country behind the scenes from the 1960s until the 1990s (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 196). They consisted of top civil servants, businessmen, military and police officers, members of the academia and captains of industries (Ekwe-Ekwe, 1985: 620). They aimed at protecting the interest of the North and to make the region control power at the centre, and the assassination of Ahmadu Bello in the first military coup was a mobilising factor to pursue these objectives. In summary, the key features of the elite theory are given below:

- There exist minorities who are in charge of power in society. This is in line with the views of Mosca and Weber as highlighted above.
- These elites most times get their power through their possession of wealth. This aligns with Pareto and Michels’ views as mentioned above. They may also get their power through force. This is seen in the way military seizes power.
- Elites replace themselves. They may ‘empower’ non-elites into the elitist position, and it may be crossing from one elite class to another. This may be done peacefully or through violent means (López, 2013: 2). Therefore, elite composition is so dynamic that those in a class may change over a period. Elites also do all it takes to remain in power. This is common among modern elites who are bent on retaining power through their continued rule or recruitment of elites. A continued rule may be in the form of reaching a consensus on some matters to remain relevant.
- An elite can belong to more than one group, and that is why a political elite may also be an economic elite. However, most elites have links with political elites because cooperating with this group fosters the influence of the former on government decisions. ‘A political elite is a group of people, corporations, political parties and/or any other kind of civil society organization [sic] who manage and organize [sic] government and all the manifestations of political power’ (Vergara, 2013: 33). They

substantially influence political decisions because of their positions (Higley and Moore, 2001: 176).

In summary, elite theory posits that decisions cannot be made by everyone in the society on issues affecting such society, but a 'selected' few make such decisions on behalf of the society. This minority group assumes such a position because of their access to material and/or intellectual resources or sometimes force. The decisions they make on behalf of society primarily serve the interests of the elites, while the secondary purpose is for the benefit of the society. Different elite segments will at times cooperate and at other times, compete. The unity or otherwise of elites (especially in developing societies) emanate from interests that have to do with state wealth. The nexus between state power and wealth represents a vicious circle because access to state power means access to wealth, and the possessor of wealth easily possesses state power (Adetoye and Omilusi, 2016: 24).

Elites' differentiation prevents a monolithic situation, promotes plurality, solidifies checks and balances (Burton and Higley, 2001: 184). Elites may also agitate conflicts by mobilising their supporters to intensify conflict situations by raising their anxieties (Azarya, 2003: 6). In other words, if elites' differentiation is not well managed, this may also snowball into conflict among their supporters. Groups engage in conflicts, and the roles of elites at such times may be on supporting such moves (Azarya, 2003: 6). So, settling differences have multiplier effects on societal peace.

Elites' cooperation implies elites' accommodating themselves, which is transforming from divided into consensual elites (Burton and Higley, 2001: 191 and 193). This aligns with consociationalism. A typical example is power sharing, as seen in different countries, including Nigeria. Rather than slog it out in polls, elites prefer to rotate positions among groups. This rotation may be in the form of majority elite groups seeking alignment with minority groups to boost the chances of the former or rotating power between majority and minority groups. The theory no doubt can be used to explain why peace and conflict may occur in societies, but it has its critics.

Elite theory negates the democratic process because the interests of the few are taken care of while the interests and opinions of the majority (masses) are neglected (Azeez and Adenuga, 2015: 153). Elite theory allocates passive political activities to the masses (Azeez and

Adenuga, 2015: 154). Hence, who emerges the winner is subject to the whims and caprices of the elites, which is against the principle of majority vote. The implication of this is that most decisions are always made in the interest of the elites with less consideration or input from the masses.

This criticism notwithstanding, elites and by extension, elite theory have proponents. Scholars who have used the theory have made its utilisation outweigh the criticism. For instance, Leite (2016: 3) submits that elite theory can be used as a theoretical lens to study the activities of political actors like candidates, elected politicians, and political parties. The activities of these stakeholders are not devoid of elites' participation; obviously, elite theory is very useful to understand them better. Duru (2012: 2) posits that elites integrate society and prevent it from falling apart as well as safeguarding democracy through suffocating authoritarian rule. Binder (1964: 628) opines that sociologically, the characteristics of elites are not only about determining who gets what but also in designing a template for political formula and the potential for national integration. These positive attributes of elite theory make it relevant for the use of the theory for this study. Furthermore, it is germane to consider specific cases where elite theory has been applied.

Henry (2018: 182) did a comparative study on political elites in the Middle East and North Africa with a focus on how they have evolved through the instrumentalities of colonialism, Islamic influence as well as internal and external politics. He gave the instance of Tunisia where elites evolved out of the mass struggle for independence, unlike some of these countries where the elites did not involve the masses in the struggle for independence. He also observed that the USA's invasion of Iraq and the Arab Spring polarised elites in Iraq, Libya, and Yemen. Still, on North Africa, Blaydes (2008) did a study on how competitive parliamentary election in Egypt has been used as a tool of elites' management. The author averred that such elections make it possible for more state resources to be distributed among elites, as holding parliamentary positions make it possible for these elites to enjoy some level of immunity despite acquiring state wealth through corruption. Hence, the regime enjoys the support of the elite class.

There have also been studies that focused on Sub-Sahara Africa. Osei (2018) used elite theory in the study of the relationship between elite configuration and regime outcomes in Ghana and Togo. The author further posits that elite interactions shape the structure and level of

democracy. The roles of elites in the power sharing deals in Kenya and Zimbabwe will be explored in chapter five. The reviews about Kenya and Zimbabwe corroborate contemporary scholars' claims about elite theory that there is a nexus between elites' behaviour and regime change (Higley and Burton, 2006; López, 2013: 1). These studies are also indications that political elites' roles are germane in determining the political direction in these countries in Sub-Sahara Africa.

The theory has also been applied in studying Nigerian politics. Ambali and Mohammed (2016: 1) explains rotational presidency among ethnic groups in Nigeria and argues that the concentration of too much power in the centre is responsible for the political elites' struggle for their share of the 'national cake' through attaining power at the federal level. Ekundayo (2017: 1) explains political elites' recruitment in Nigeria through the instrumentality of elite theory. Musa, Ibietan, and Deinde-Adedeji (2020:54) apply elite theory to explain the roles of political parties in democratic consolidation in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. Monday, Abiola, Adewale, and Abiodun (2020: 200) use the lens of elite theory to explain leadership questions and national development in Nigeria. The elites' system is not nascent in Nigeria. They have been the architect of policy formulation and implementation in the country with the major aim of promoting their interest. Nigerian political elites have a history, and they are divided along ethnic/regional lines. These elites were offshoots of the creation of regions, but their evolution will still be considered in the next section. It is essential to consider the characteristics of Nigerian elites. These features evolve with the evolution of political elites' composition in the country. Although the features of elites earlier outlined also apply to Nigerian elites, some features are 'peculiar' to Nigerian political elites.

3.2.1 The Evolution of the Nigerian Political Elites

This section will serve as a platform to historically illuminate how the features of elites apply to the Nigerian case, especially with regards to the issue of rotating the presidency and sharing power at all levels. These elites' composition, structure, and roles have transformed over the years, and they have cooperated and disagreed in pursuing their agendas. Their cooperation and otherwise have become fluid over the years due to the interests they are pursuing at any point in time. Orji identifies five categories of Nigerian political elites which are Northern, Yoruba, Igbo, Niger Delta, and Middle Belt elites (Orji, 2008: 65). The Northern and Middle

Belt elites are from the Northern region, while the Yoruba, Igbo and Niger Delta elites constitute the Southern region. The cooperation and differences among these groups of elites have determined the level of integration in the country and dominated the politics of power sharing. A chronological view will be salient in exploring their activities.

Colonialism was preceded by systems solely run through African political systems. The Hausa/Fulani, Yorubas, Igbos and other minority groups had their systems and the influence of elites varied across regions. The Hausa/Fulani system was under the leadership of the Sultan of Sokoto and centred on the traditional theocratic rulers which made religion their source of power (Okonofua, 2013: 3). They were less challenged mainly due to Islamic doctrines. Among the Yorubas, political elites could be checkmated. For instance, the excesses of the Alaafin of Oyo could be checked by the Oyo Mesi (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 50). The Oyo Mesi are the seven principal councillors of the kingdom headed by the Basorun. Hence, the elites derived their powers from a structured traditional system that was based on the instructions of deities, and this also shaped their interest (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 196). Put differently, the dictates of the deity were ranked above pursuing parochial political interests. The Igbo system was egalitarian as no group of elites could claim authority over others (Falola and Genova, 2009: 163). They operated on an age-grade system, and individuals in the society were free to express their opinions. This system derived its powers from the council of elders, age-grade associations, oracles, secret societies, ancestral spirits, among others (Onyeozili and Ebbe, 2012: 29). Hence, power was hardly concentrated in the hands of a few who could hardly lay claim to pursuing any personal or group political interest.

Colonialism led to the shift from absolute traditional systems of governance in different parts of the country (Falola and Genova, 2009: 163). This culminated in the introduction of the indirect rule policy. Those used by the colonialists to operate this system represented the political elites of that time, but their activities were restricted to their ethnic enclaves. There was a dichotomy between the systems in the North and the South because the indirect rule was more successful in the former (Kew and Lewis, 2016: 503). The North was more receptive to the indirect rule due to the ability of the British to control the Sultan, but they still gave him the freedom to exercise religious control over the North (Okonofua, 2013: 3). However, in the South, there was a dispersed traditional system with this being more obvious

in the East. The British still used traditional rulers in the West while strengthening the few traditional institutions in the East or appointed warrant chiefs (Kew and Lewis, 2016: 503).

The quest by the British to make it possible to explore the resources of the country and fund the administration of the North with Southern resources led to the amalgamation of the North and the South (Okonofua, 2013: 3). The British knew they brought together ethnically, culturally, and religiously incompatible people, but the colonialists placed their economic interests above the future challenges ethnicity may pose to the country. They governed these territories separately, and the British viewed the Southern leaders as being more aggressive while the Northern leaders were more subservient to them. Consequently, and in a bid to weaken the South and give the North hegemony, the South was divided into the East and West to disintegrate the unity of a more enlightened and aggressive South (Okonofua, 2013: 3). Furthermore, the British ensured that the 1931 and 1952 census were rigged in favour of the North, and this with the balkanisation of the South resulted in the North (68) having more seats than the East (34) and West (34) in the national parliament (Okonofua, 2013: 3). All these culminated in a sort of elites' differentiation with respect to views about the British.

The struggle for independence was championed by some nationalists. These were the first set of political elites to operate under a purely Western system. These elites assumed the status because they were educated and were inclined towards politics. The creation of provinces on major ethnic basis of North-Hausa and Fulani, West-Yoruba and East-Igbo engendered ethnic consciousness on the political elites as they were more comfortable operating on provincial (later regional) levels. This British approach was a divide and rule tactic that made ethnicity the basis for identification and mobilisation (Kew and Lewis, 2016: 503). This was a deliberate attempt to break the ranks of the elites so that the colonial government would always have its way. These led to the emergence of the Northern, Yoruba and Igbo elites from the majority ethnic groups.

The Southern elites were less interested in cooperating with their Northern counterparts as the interest of the former was to make Nigeria attain independent status and to become at least post-independence leaders in their respective regions. The Northern elites felt that their region was more educationally disadvantaged than the other regions (Peter, 2014: 197). Thus, they were afraid that early independence would lead to the domination by Southern elites in the Nigerian political system (Falola and Heaton, 2008:165). These led to staggering years of

self-government for the regions (Elaigwu, 2002: 74). The North only agreed to independence when they were assured by the British that political power and population advantage would accrue to the region.

Political elites that evolved from independence were less concerned about truly cementing the different groups together to achieve nation building, national integration, and development (Olukayode, 2015: 65). The elites, in a bid to ensure a unified political front, pretended to have resolved their differences shortly before independence. This cooperation was short-lived as divisions between the majority elite groups in the regions swelled due to the quest to control federal power, which was seen as a platform for wealth accumulation. Also, the feeling that elites from 'our' region controlled the centre brought a form of euphoria to the elites. This was fuelled by the concern of the Southern leaders that the North was geographically, demographically, and politically (having half of the seats in the House of Representatives) positioned to dominate the government at the centre. This pitched the North against the South, and even the political parties that participated in the 1959 general elections were platforms for each region to project their regional elites for federal positions. In other words, they were regional based political parties. However, this was fluid because the North dominated Northern People's Congress (NPC), and the Igbo dominated National Council of Nigerian Citizens⁵ (NCNC) later formed a coalition government to produce the Prime Minister in 1959. These activities were shortly before 1960, and they were signs of elites' cooperation. Nevertheless, the disparities with associated acrimonies resurfaced immediately after independence (Aziegbe, 2014: 1). The post-independence struggle for power among the members of the dominant classes became evident (Fadakinte and Amolegbe, 2017: 65).

In contemporary Nigeria, most elite groups have also evolved. Northern elites comprise mainly of the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups and some minority ethnic groups. Religion, ethnicity, military profession, and population are their sources of power. They are geographically in the present day North West and North East geo-political zones. Islamic tenets to a great extent are cogent factors in the activities of these elites. Hence, the division based on anti-Islam causes less friction within the Northern elites' fold. The belief before was that Northern elites were homogeneous in their political interest and affiliation, but this has

⁵ It was formerly called National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons

not been the case. In the First and Second Republics, some advocated for the course of the aristocrats (the NPC which later operated as National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in the Second Republic) and those that serve as the voice of the poor (the Northern Elements Progressive Union which later operated as Peoples Democratic Party in the Second Republic) (Ezonbi, 2014: 544). The pro-poor are more disposed to mass literacy, peasant participation in politics, reduction in feudal powers and health care facilities' provision (Ekwe-Ekwe, 1985: 620). In contemporary Nigeria, there are still some minority Northern elites who do not completely align with the dominant Northern elites' group. For instance, Shehu Sanni, a human rights activist has always criticised the Buhari led government on national issues. Former Vice President Atiku Abubakar's group is not always in support of Buhari's group in the North. However, Northern elites have a propensity towards their unity even if it means sacrificing their personal interests when the need arises.

The Yoruba elites have remained almost the same. These include Ijebus, Ijeshas, Egbas, Ekiti, Ondo, Ibadan, Ibarapas, among others. They are from the South West part of the country. They have most times spoken with a common voice on national matters (Nwala, 1997: 1-2). Although some Yorubas are in Edo, Kwara, and Kogi States, they would rather prefer to associate with elites in their zones and not the Yoruba zone. For instance, in the First Republic, the NPC dominated the present Kwara and Kogi States because they were within the Northern region as against AG, which was mainly a Yoruba party (Obiyan, 2010; Onoja, 2014: 274 and 277). In 1999, ANPP won the elections in Kwara and Kogi states, and even a Yoruba man emerged as the governor of Kwara State. This was against the AD success wave in the South West. Education and holding of top positions in the corporate world were their sources of power (Peter, 2014: 197).

The Igbo elites had education and commerce as their sources of power (Peter, 2014: 197). They are from the South Eastern part of the country while a few of them are from the South South. The Igbo elites experienced slight disintegration due to state creation; this is due to the creation of two states for the minorities in the Eastern region in the 1967 state creation exercise and the creation of Delta State in 1991 (Egbefo, 2014: 258; Odey, 2014: 337). However, this did not lead to a major depletion of the Igbo population. Nevertheless, the effects of the civil war and the continued agitation for Biafra have always made it difficult for Igbo elites to earn unity and appreciable strength in bargaining on national matters

(Obuseh, 2021). This is because other elite groups trust them less. The common interest among these three major elites was attaining political power, and one of their tools was using ethnicity and religion by making the masses from their blocs vote for them on these bases.

Some activities before and after independence led to differentiation within the Northern elites and the emergence of the Middle Belt Elites. Spearheaded by the Tiv, the Middle Belt elites emerged due to Northern hegemony (Ukase, 2014: 211). These are elites from minority groups in the North who saw the need to have a common voice to resist Northern political supremacy (Sambo, 2002: 339-340). They are against the imposition of the Islamic Emirate system in the North. This is because these minority groups have their existing traditional institutions which are not fashioned after the Northern theocratic system (Kew and Lewis, 2016: 502). They drew their inspiration from the fact that breaking from the Northern hold would strengthen their non-Islamic traditional institutions. The composition of the Middle Belt elites has evolved over the years especially due to the creation of states. More groups have now identified with their course. Consequently, we now have elites from most of the groups in the North Central and some groups in the North East and North West as members of this group. These elites have become a very strong force in the North that they do not always agree with the decisions of the Northern region on some matters. A proof of this is that they sometimes align with the South on some decisions through the South and Middle Belt Leaders Forum (Olatunji and Nwachukwu, 2019). These two groups of elites derive their inspiration from mitigating the dominance of Northern elites, but their ultimate interest is to attain political powers at least in their respective enclaves.

The Niger Delta elites emerged due to three major historical factors. These are the discovery of crude oil and its attendant of environmental degradation and poverty, creation of Mid West region and creation of states and the existence of the *de facto* sub-region of South South. The discovery of crude oil in the region came with environmental and economic challenges. These were responsible for the Adaka Boro-led uprising in the mid-1960s which was due to neglect from the Federal Government and the region is still battling with these two issues in contemporary Nigeria. The Mid West was carved out of the Western Region in 1963. Prior to this, they were dominated by the Yorubas. The new Mid Western states comprised of Ijaws, Urhobos, Itsekiris, Benin, Esan, among others. Hence, new elites sprang up from the newly created region. The creation of states during the civil war also implied that the subjugation of

these minorities in the Eastern region was greatly checked. The Eastern region metamorphosed into three states, of which two were of non-Igbo majority. Two minority states created had the Ijaws, Efik, Ibibios, Ogonis, Annang, Oron, among others. Although, there are some Igbos in present day Delta and Rivers State. Finally, the recognition of the South South as a geo-political zone and the 'identification' of that part of the country with oil production played a major role in elites' evolution in the Niger Delta. These metamorphosed into the emergence of militants in the area due to feelings of being relatively deprived economically and environmentally. This led to the vandalism of oil installations, kidnappings, among others. However, in a bid to give a political face to the plights of these minority oil producing areas, Niger Delta elites emerged (note that they have been in existence for decades, but their composition and influence had always evolved) (Ojakorotu, 2006: 230-233; Osaghae, 2001: 12). They do not only advocate for the correction of these issues but are also vibrant enough in the bargaining table when it comes to power sharing in Nigeria. Hence, their elites' interests lie in liberating these minorities from Igbo hegemony, fighting environmental degradation, resource control, among others, but ultimately, it is still on the attainment of political power. Succinctly, the possession of oil within the region was a power source that made the region a force to reckon with in Nigeria.

It is expedient to know that these groups of five elites may seem to represent their ethnic enclaves, but they do have intra group disagreements which are most times suspended if there is a need to bargain for some issues or cooperate with elites of one or more of the other groups. However, what binds the elites in each group together may be religion, language, ethnicity, history, common frustration, environmental and/or economic problems.

3.2.2 The Characteristics of the Nigerian Political Elites

The first feature of Nigerian elites is that they use ethnicity and religion to advance their interests. In most cases, when they observe that their interests are at stake, they switch to the frequency of ethnicity to realise such interests. They garner the support of their ethnic constituency to achieve such. Nigerian political elites often exploit ethnoreligious differences to advance personal political interests through violent activities. For instance, the post 2011 election violence was the epitome of how the North sought to control power at all costs. The protest was not because of the nature of the election but the outcome of the election, which

gave power to a Southern elite against the intention of the Northern elites. The latter was able to use the tool of ethnicity to mobilise the North against Southern interest.

The second is that there is a very low level of accountability. This is aided by two factors which are long years of military rule and weak state institutions. The way military governments operate makes it difficult for the populace to seek accountability as the military feel they do not owe any group any explanation (Kifordu, 2010: 294). If accountability is demanded by the populace/civil society organisations, such is reacted to with force. This has become part of the political culture in the country that even after the return to civilian rule, accountability has become a very rare phenomenon. State institutions have become appendages of the political elites as they ensure these institutions operate at the whims and caprices of the latter. They are used to satisfy the interest of the political elites (Kifordu, 2010: 292). This makes it difficult for the excesses of the political elites to be checked. The institutions are not allowed to operate effectively.

The third feature of Nigerian political elites is that it is too executive centric. This corroborates Kifordu's (2011: 428-429) assertion that the executive arm has dominated governance, and this has been made easy through the weakening of the legislative and judicial arms. The checks that the lawmakers and interpreters of the law ought to always give the executive arms have become less effective. This is also an indication of the abuse of elites' differentiation. Long years of military rule cannot be exonerated as a major cause for this. The reason is that in a military dictatorship, the legislative arm is suspended while the judiciary is spared but may be subjected to the dictates of the military ruler. Hence, the military ruling body headed by the Head of State assumes the law making and implementation duties, and the judiciary always finds it difficult to declare such *ultra vires*. Legislative functions have also been abused in the civil rule. Two of the major factors responsible for this are the transferring of the military culture of usurpation/abuse of legislative roles to civil rule and the participation of some ex-military personnel in civil administration. The weakness of the legislative arm has been seen in the arm twisting of that arm of government to impeach some governors and deputy governors (Fagbadebo, 2020). The author further opines that the handwriting on the wall, in most cases, is the presidency and the governors of such states with cooperation from political godfathers. This also represents a lacuna in Nigeria's 1979 and 1999 Constitutions which did not specify what gross misconduct means in impeachment.

Hence, the manipulators and their legislative errand boys cook up offences and declare such as ‘gross misconduct’ to justify their impeachment. In addition, the judicial arm has been dragged into the politics of impeachment as the constitutional requirement for setting up panels to investigate gross misconduct levelled against governors and deputy governors are often compromised. Those supervising such impeachment moves make it difficult for state chief judges to work freely in the discharge of this duty (Fagbadebo, 2020).

The fourth feature of Nigerian elites is that they do not operate based on political ideology. They are after their interests, and they only pitch their tent where the largesse flows. This is responsible for cross carpeting among political parties. Any party that offers the platform to win elections and consequently have access to state wealth is the one that the political elites will cross to. For instance, during Peoples Democratic Party’s (PDP) 16-year rule, politicians from opposition parties were in the habit of moving to the ruling party, but since the All Progressives Congress (APC) took over in 2015, politicians from other parties are moving in droves to the ruling party. Even if a politician is in the ruling party and feels he cannot secure the ticket of the party to run for elective posts, he may move to an opposition party. A typical example is the cross carpeting of the former governor of Borno State, Mala Kachalla from the ruling All People’s Party (APP) in the state to the Alliance for Democracy (AD). A recent example was the movement of Edo State governor, Godwin Obaseki from the ruling APC to PDP when he was not allowed to secure the former’s ticket as its governorship candidate (Ayitogo, 2020). These constitute abuse of elites’ cooperation and differentiation because cross carpeting to another party is for selfish reasons and refusing to stay in the opposition means constructive criticism that would aid the development of the country becomes jettisoned.

The last feature of Nigerian elites is that there are no permanent friends and enemies. Those in the same political camp today may be in opposing camps tomorrow. This is corroborated by the reckless decamping from one party to another, as explained in the preceding point. What the political elites are concerned with are the cronies that will help them push their interest to manifestation. It also explains why the political ideologies of political parties are difficult to sustain and why development is not the centrepiece of their political actions.

3.2.3 Elites' Activities since 1960

It is germane to explore the activities of these elites from 1960 till date. This will be done from the perspectives of their cooperation, differentiation, and intra-group disagreements. The build up to the 1964 federal elections was a watershed in elites' cooperation in Nigeria. This is because elites from these five elite groups coagulated across ethnic and religious lines to form the two political parties that participated in the election (Ezonbi, 2014: 548). This action led to the formation of the Nigerian National Alliance and United Progressive Grand Alliance. The various events that led to the first military coup, among others were disagreement among these elites, intra group disagreement between Obafemi Awolowo and Ladoke Akintola's faction in the Yoruba elites' caucus with the latter backed by the aristocratic Northern elites.

The military coup culminated in the emergence of military/political elites. The military assumed this dual role because of the staging of the first military coup in 1966 as it culminated in a military general becoming the Head of State. The event also signified the transplant of the ethnic-based elites' activities to the military. The ethnicising of the military could have started during colonialism, but it was not evident. It became evident during the first military coup and the counter coup of 1966. The first coup which was seen as pro-Igbo led to division within the military along ethnic lines as the Northern dominated Hausa/Fulani saw it as an instrument against them. The counter coup of July 1966 was also shrouded in ethnicity but now pro-North and anti-Igbo. The counter coup saw the Northern and Middle Belt elites uniting not only to upstage the Ironsi led government but to install a Middle Belt military/political elite and Christian as Head of State. The counter coup further strengthened the ethnic consciousness in the military. These activities led to the civil war, which was an ethnic war. Shortly before the war, Ojukwu felt Gowon should not have emerged as the Head of State because he was Gowon's senior and found it difficult to take orders from Gowon, and the latter also had other senior officers ahead of him (Venter, 2015). These were Brigadier General Ogundipe and Commodore Joseph Wey, who were Southerners (Venter, 2015). These were instances of cooperation and differentiation of elites.

After this, subsequent military rules witnessed the military elites being more united and the 'conscription' of some civilian political elites to the juntas through appointments. The other side of the coin was political elites who were against military rule, and this cut across elites

from all the five elite groups. However, most of the past military rulers were from the North. Hence, the Northern elites were always reluctant to oppose military rule. The latter also saw this as an opportunity for the group to stay longer in power because civil options might warrant rotation of power with other elites, which could have shortened the stay of the North in power. The civil war depreciated the trust in Igbos, and for most of the period of military rule (1966-1979 and 1983 to 1998), among the first three elite groups, they had the least appointments at the federal level (Kifordu, 2011: 438).

There was a short civil rule within the almost three decades of military rule, the Second Republic. These five groups of elites ensured they had political parties to promote their interests. What differentiated them from those of the First Republic was that the political parties were ethnically based, but the magnitude was not as strong as those of the First Republic. For instance, the NPN was still to promote the interests of the Northern aristocrats, but in its formation, Northern elites associated more with the party but drew more elites from other elite groups compared to other political parties (Kifordu, 2011: 439). The result of the 1979 election was also an indication that there was elites' cooperation as some parties won across the strata of these elite groups. For instance, the NPN won in non-Northern elites' group states like Benue, Kwara, Cross Rivers and Rivers (Akinsanya, 2002a: 126). The author further states that the Nigerian Peoples Party which was more of Igbo won the Plateau governorship seat. However, the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), a Yoruba-based party won all the four Yoruba States and a stronghold in the Niger Delta, Bendel. These are all signs of elites' integration across groups. There were disagreements, especially between the NPN and UPN elites, but this was less on ethnic tension and more on policy issues. Democracy was again restored in 1999.

The build up to the return of democracy in 1999 was characterised by elites' integration, especially between the Northern and Yoruba elites. This was due to the circumstances surrounding the June 12 annulment of the Presidential election. The major areas of cooperation or differentiation of elites in this Fourth Republic are in rotating the presidency, resource control matters and intra elite issues. Elites from these five groups cooperate or do otherwise based on the issue at hand at any point in time. An example is the formation of Southern (Yoruba, Ibo, and Niger Delta elites) and the Middle Belt Leaders Forum. One of the areas of focus of this forum is restructuring the country because they see that the present

structure favours the Northern elites most. On rotating the presidency, in 2011, Middle Belt, Yoruba, Igbo and Niger Delta elites teamed up to ensure that Goodluck Jonathan, an Ijaw and Niger Delta political elites emerged as the President. However, in the 2015 election, Yoruba elites teamed up with Northern and Middle Belt elites to ensure that Buhari, an epitome of Northern elites won the election. This shows the fluidity in elites' cooperation and differentiation. Another feature of elites' relationship in this Republic is intra elites' conflict. This manifests so much in impeachment matters. This has been explained earlier as the actors involved in this are always within the same ethnic elite group. Even if third parties like the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and presidency are involved, their roles are with no ethnic colouration.

These explanations about Nigerian political elites are reflections of the general features of elites and those more peculiar to Nigeria as well as how they have operated over time. These features will be useful tools in the analysing chapters of this study. Conspicuously, the roles of elites in politics and integration in Nigeria continues, and therefore it is germane to utilise elite and integration theories to carry out this study.

3.3 Integration Theory

The mid-Twentieth Century marked the period of political independence for various African and Asian countries. Given that most of these countries are made up of diverse linguistic, religious, ethnic, and cultural groups, political independence was accompanied by the need for national integration. In this sense, individuals are expected to suspend individual or parochial allegiance and subscribe to identifying with the larger community (Ilievski, 2015: 39). It is not spontaneous as it is a process where *we-ness* is built among different groups in society through the instrumentalities of rules, reconciliation, and different interests (Osaghae, 1999: 262). This is buttressed by the social contract which explains the reality that the extent to which different groups transfer their identity and loyalty to the state is a function of a state performing its responsibilities which gives the citizens a sense of belonging, even if it entails using coercion in some instances (Osaghae, 1999: 264 and 278). The concept of integration is aptly summarised by Hadden thus:

The objective or aspiration of policies of integration, as has been indicated, is to create an inclusive society in which members of different ethnic, religious and linguistic communities may mingle and share in the full range of social, economic,

and political activity without having to abandon their distinctive characteristics or cultures (Hadden, 2005: 34).

Hence, it is difficult to have one culture but possible to achieve allegiance to the country above ethnic, religious, and cultural affiliation. Integration thus aligns with the tenet of federalism as it promotes unity without rescinding the identity of the various groups (Tsuwa and Asongo: 2013: 40). In the context of Nigeria, integration efforts have taken such forms as rotational presidency. However, these integration efforts are led by divided national elites whose concerns are only their narrow group interests. These elites are leaders at various levels who utilise ethnic and religious sentiments to access state resources. This brings to the fore the need to examine two types of leaders.

Bass (1999) views leaders from two perspectives: transformational and transactional. The author averred that transformational leaders emphasise what can be done for the country, and in trying to achieve this, they lift the morale, motivation and morals of their followers. Transactional leaders focus on what the country can do for them. It is about the relationship between the leaders and the followers to meet their self-interest. In a nutshell, a leader can have the traits of both, but it is ideal to be more transformational. Leadership in Nigeria is more transactional because integration measures put in place in the country by leaders' appeal to ethnicity, religion, and political patronage. This is responsible for situations where integration programmes have also bred feelings of deprivation. The integration process has thus appeared as a zero-sum game with the losers feeling that they were unfairly at a disadvantage. It is in this light that relative deprivation theory is appropriate for this study.

3.4 Relative Deprivation Theory

Samuel Stouffer and other authors coined relative deprivation to describe the complaints that affected the relationships between two arms of the USA military (Pettigrew, 2016: 8). Some men in the Air Corpsmen alleged that their military police counterparts were promoted faster than they were (Grasso, Yoxon, Karampampas, and Temple, 2017: 401; Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, and Bialosiewicz, 2012: 204). However, Stouffer maintained that the best basis of comparison should not be the military police because some members of the former had enjoyed promotion (Smith et al., 2012: 204). Relative deprivation is associated with the works of Ted Gurr, *Psychological Factors in Civil Violence* (1968) and *Why Men Rebel* (1970) (Borum, 2004; Richardson, 2011).

In defining relative deprivation, three steps are crucial. The first is that individuals or groups must make a comparison. The second step is that there must be mental appraisal through which an individual or group concludes that he/she is being deprived of some things (Smith et al., 2012: 204). The third is that such disadvantages must be perceived as unfair. The affected group must believe that it deserves better, and this belief leads to anger and resentment (Smith et al., 2012: 204). Thus, relative deprivation suggests that one views one's group as worse in comparison with some other groups (Smith and Pettigrew, 2015: 1).

Relative deprivation may be individual or group relative deprivation. The first one applies when a person compares his or her condition with those of others around him/her while group relative deprivation is when a group compares its conditions to those of another group (Asingo, 2018: 67; Smith and Pettigrew, 2015: 2). Group relative deprivation may include a group examining if it has been unjustly treated or denied its entitlements compared to other regions or with other ethnic, religious, and/or linguistic groups (Asingo, 2018: 67). For instance, based on a survey, Black South Africans feel more aggrieved at the individual level, while white South Africans feel more aggrieved at the group level (Smith and Pettigrew, 2015: 5). This form of relative deprivation also describes the situation in Nigeria where an ethnic group feel deprived compared to other ethnic groups. The third type of relative deprivation is intrapersonal, in which an individual feels deprived considering one's previous living condition (Asingo, 2018: 75).

Relative deprivation theory refers to the idea that feelings of deprivation and discontent are related to a desired point of reference (Flynn, 2011: 100). Relative deprivation depicts the difference between what people want and what they obtain (Saleh, 2013: 165). The practical detail of relative deprivation theory is that persons or groups feel disadvantaged when they perceive their situations or entitlements as inferior in comparison with those of others (Flynn, 2011: 100). The essence of relative deprivation is the feeling that the present situation could be improved when compared to an existing or perceived existing better situation. Hence, until a feeling of relativity occurs, one may not know there is deprivation, and there may not be any need to address the root causes of such deprivation. Thus, elites play an important role in articulating this feeling of relativity. In the case of Nigeria, political elites, in a bid to advance their interest, instigate their followers to embark on political and religious protests to claim

deprivation of their socio-economic entitlements (Omololu, 2012). This has led to the emergence of various ethnic organisations and resulted in ethnic and religious crises.

Relative deprivation has been criticised by scholars (Dube and Guimond, 1986; Martin and Murray, 1984) because it neglects actual deprivation and uses perceived deprivation (Asingo, 2018: 68). Even with these criticisms, relative deprivation theory can be used to explain why violence occurs in societies. Relative deprivation theory has been used in several studies. Relative deprivation theory has been used to explain matters like poor physical health (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, and Ickovics, 2000 cited in Smith et al., 2012: 203) and collective protest participation (Newton, Mann, and Geary, 1980 cited in Smith et al., 2012: 203). Asingo (2018) and Grasso et al. (2017: 402) have used it in explaining voting. Guimond and Dubé-Simard (1983) used it in their study of the Quebec nationalist movement. Walker and Mann (1987) utilised the theory in their study of unemployment and social protest. Stark and Taylor (1991), in their study of migration incentives, made use of the relative deprivation theory. Farooq, Bukhari, and Ahmed (2017) equally made use of the theory with respect to the Arab spring.

Relative deprivation has also been used as a prism to study insurgency in Nigeria (Agbibo, 2013; Agyemang and Lukman, 2018; Akinyetun, 2020). It has also been applied in studying how the different ethnic groups claim superiority over other ethnic groups and identity politics in Nigeria (Okeke, 2016; Yakubu, 2018). Ezemenaka, (2021) demonstrates that failure in governance had brought feelings of deprivation which have orchestrated youth violence and threat to national security in Nigeria.

The common trend among these studies is that if a group is relatively deprived and the situation is not well managed, the group may resort to aggressive tendencies. Hence, frustration-aggression is relevant to the analysis of relative deprivation theory. Put differently, relative deprivation may breed frustration and consequently, aggression. The nexus between the two theories was established by Gurr (2016: 23), who opines that 'Relative deprivation denote [sic] the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the "ought" and the "is" of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes men to violence' (Gurr, 2016: 23). Frustration-aggression theory is strongly linked to Dollard and his colleagues at Yale University in 1939 (Gurr, 2016: 33). Aggression is always the progeny of frustration and anger, especially when there is frustration in getting what a group feels is due to it (Agbu,

2004: 13). They essentially postulate that ‘the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression’ (Gurr, 2016: 33). The anger that emanates from frustration, especially prolonged or sharply felt, leads men to aggression, and these are catalysts for political violence (Gurr, 2016: 36-37).

This study uses the theory to explain how, in the context of failed integration strategies, political elites manipulate ethnic and religious factors to instigate the citizens to protest perceived deprivation. This has remained a potent political instrument used by the Nigerian political elites to advance their interests. Political elites often manipulate the claims of deprivation to encourage violence, using the diversified ethnoreligious differences. They use this to arouse the consciousness of most citizens within their ethnoreligious groups on the perceived inequality in the economic and educational sectors (Carment, 2003: 425; Richardson, 2011: 1). They rationalise the various socio-economic failings such as unemployment, poverty, poor education, among others, on the prevailing deprivation engendered by the diverse nature of the polity (Richardson, 2011: 1). While these prevailing crises generated by inadequate basic infrastructures affect many citizens in their respective ethnic groups, the few elites often enjoy the largesse of adequate access to such facilities.

3. 5 Elites, National Integration, and Deprivation in Nigeria

Federal stability is not an abstraction. It is a function of the attitudinal disposition of the elites concerning the implementation of the various legislative frameworks necessary to promote a sense of national community among the component units. Thus, the promotion of national integration in a diverse society connotes the implementation of policies that would lead to equitable distribution of amenities among the federating units to avert any sense of deprivation. This explains the importance of analysing the Nigerian federal system within the context of elite, integration, and relative deprivation theories.

Existing literature tends to use one or two of the chosen theories. The originality of this study is partly based on its use of the combination of these three theories to study the Nigerian federal system. The use of the three theories is so crucial as they support each other, and it also allows the subjection of the study to a robust analysis. Proponents of the elite theory argue that the elites play pivotal roles in social, political, and economic decision making. In

the context of Africa in general, and Nigeria in particular, elites played important roles in pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial eras. At independence, most colonised countries were faced with the task of national integration. It is for this reason that integration theory is part of the theoretical framework. Colonialism created divided indigenous elites that competes among itself. The result is that all policies and programmes are viewed in zero-sum game lenses. Thus, the side-effect of most policies and programmes is a feeling of relative deprivation and it is for this reason that this study chose relative deprivation theory.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter critically presented the theories used as the framework of analysis of this study. The first theory, the elite theory is important in political science as it postulates the importance of elites in decision-making. In the context of Nigeria, this chapter showed the interests, resources, divisions, evolution, and characteristics of the political elites. Since national integration is formally given priority in national agendas, integration theory is the second theoretical tool chosen. Integration theory is used, in this study, to explore and evaluate the various measures aimed at integrating Nigeria. However, elite theory alerts the researcher to the central role of elites' interests in all these actions. Since the elites of post-colonial African countries are divided, all policies and programmes are understood as zero-sum games. This chapter thus presented relative deprivation theory as an additional component of its theoretical framework. Relative deprivation theory is used to analyse the rationale and motivations for intergroup violence. The next chapter focuses on power sharing models.

CHAPTER FOUR

POWER SHARING MODELS

4.1 Introduction

In heterogeneous societies, majoritarian electoral democracy tends to perpetually exclude minorities from power. Chapter three argued that this exclusion may be a source of relative deprivation and conflict. Power sharing models are proposed as solution to this predicament. This chapter discusses two power sharing models, namely, consociationalism and centripetalism. To elicit lessons for Nigeria, the discussion of these models will be embedded in the discussion of their applications in other countries. This chapter begins with a general discussion of power sharing, this will be followed by the discussion of consociationalism and centripetalism, respectively. Section 4.5 discusses the use of these models in African and non-African countries. Section 4.6 ties chapters three and four by showing the alignment of theoretical and conceptual tools with research questions.

4.2 Power Sharing

An understanding of what power sharing entails is essential in this section. Power sharing within the context of this study obtains within the political sphere. Power sharing means ‘political arrangements that aim to produce joint government between groups, and the label attaches to attempts to move beyond straightforward majoritarian governments towards some form of group accommodation’ (Bell, 2018: 7). This definition will be utilised for this study because the focus of the study is on how various groups can be accommodated to foster national integration. Considering the ethnic configuration of Nigeria, the major ethnic groups, Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo have what it takes to dominate the others in governance, but power sharing creates a platform to involve other groups.

It has been argued that democratisation will pose a problem if the liberal democratic practice of the first-past-the-post system of election is applied in multi-ethnic societies (Ukiwo, 2005: 18). This is because certain groups would be excluded from governance, and this may breed ethnic disaffection and conflicts (Ukiwo, 2005: 18). Majority rule is jeopardised because of the incessant claims by minorities to have their ‘deprivations’ acknowledged (Khidasheli, 1999: 196). Protagonists of power sharing as a conduit for improving democracy argue that

government by many is more acceptable than government by just majority rule (Uluşahin, 2007: 189).

This does not negate the fact that power sharing can be practised in any form of democracy. In some countries where minority groups allege poor representation in government, there may be a crisis, as often the case in Nigeria. Elites collaborate to enlarge representation. In agreement, Agbu (2004: 37) broadly recognises democracy, devolution of power and power sharing as the three main institutional archetypes of ethnic conflict management. In most democratic systems, political parties play crucial roles in elites' collaboration.

Political parties need to cut across ethnic lines and represent diversity to avoid domination by majority groups (Osaghae, 1999: 265). This is essential because political parties are the pedestal to attain elective positions in most democratic settings. Democracy is a significant force in legitimacy, and this helps to develop and maintain consensus: all these point to national cohesion (Osaghae, 1999: 264). Democracy essentially promotes inclusiveness but cannot prevent conflict. Democracy can be a catalyst for national integration if it can address the conflicts that emanate from ethnic grievances, inequality, and marginalisation, and it provides representative platforms for various groups through a competitive multi-party system, but it does not mean it can put a final stop to such (Agbu, 2004: 37; Osaghae, 1999: 264). Hence, power sharing is meant to appease hitherto unhappy or potentially dissatisfied groups in a society, and elites determine the process.

Power sharing may operate through structured institutional frameworks and can also be a form of informal/semi-formal agreement among elites. Power sharing institutions give room for more formal situations, while power-sharing arrangements can be formal or, to some extent, drift away from being formal (Rothchild and Roeder, 2005: 20). Power sharing has been deliberately and comprehensively instituted in countries such as 1917 Pacification in the Netherlands, the National Pact of 1943 in Lebanon, the Grand Coalition Accord of 1945 in Austria, and the Malayan Alliance of the early 1950s (Lijphart, 1996: 262; Lijphart, 2008: 49). Power sharing design may include determining how mandatory executive power sharing will be, the legislative design, which may be achieved through the type of electoral system and inclusiveness and representativeness in the appointment of judges (Wolff, 2010: 3). However, representativeness in those who constitute the judiciary may not be easy because the process is not subject to the electoral system (Wolff, 2010: 3). Rothchild and Roeder

(2005: 19) submit that power sharing institutions are 'federalism, collective executives, communal legislative chambers, reserved seats in legislatures, the list system of proportional representation with a low threshold, and formal rules mandating proportional resource allocation'. Similarly, O'Flynn and Russell (2005: 1) submit that power sharing may be achieved through institutions and procedures like a coalition government, legislative vetoes, guaranteed representation, federalism, devolution, functional autonomy, and international actions through treaties between countries.

Power sharing arrangements that have endured for some years are Bosnia, Bulgaria, Burundi, Djibouti, Indonesia, Macedonia, Nigeria, Nepal, and Suriname (Bieber, 2005: 108-110; Horowitz, 2014: 18). Rothchild and Roeder (2005: 19) opines that less common types of power sharing include rotational presidency and schemes of nonterritorial federalism (examples are the communal councils anticipated for the Austro-Hungarian Empire).

The challenges that come with power sharing include difficulty in arriving at an acceptable formula to all groups, difficulty in implementation and even if the implementation is possible, it may not stand the test of time (Spears, 2000: 105). Power sharing agreements in Ethiopia and Angola in the 1990s did not last (Spears, 2000: 106). Deeply divided societies can have power sharing in the mode of consociational or centripetal forms (McGarry and O'Leary, 2016: 497; Wolff, 2010: 4).

Power sharing in Nigeria has been operated at various levels through structured institutional frameworks and arrangements. For instance, the constitutional provision for the appointment of ministers from each state, with three senators from each state, are structured frameworks. Concerning arrangement, it may cut across executive and legislative arms of government as seen in Nigeria. It is salient to know the forms power sharing take before and after elections.

4.3 Consociationalism

Arend Lijphart is the proponent of consociational democracy (Lijphart, 2018). Consociationalism seeks to share, disperse, and limit power (Lijphart, 2012: 2). This is actualised through consensus. It is about how power can be shared in diverse societies and those that will benefit from this. The political elites are the drivers of consociationalism, and they are the primary beneficiaries. They assume this position because of the followership they command ethnically and religiously and their economic prowess. Lijphart has used other

terms like accommodation, consociation, power sharing and consensus, but the static point is that compromise among groups in a divided society needs to meet the four basic characteristics (Lijphart, 2018: 1). These characteristics are cultural autonomy, grand coalition, proportionality, and minority veto. These are what are referred to as principles of consociationalism.

Consociationalism promotes a grand coalition of majorities and minorities through the establishment of agreed guarantees, including proportional group participation in government and minority vetoes of policies (Horowitz, 2014: 5). To have a comprehensive overview of consociational democracy, its four basic principles as offered by Lijphart are expedient (Lijphart 1977: 25-44; Lijphart, 1996: 258; Lijphart, 2008: 42-43). These are:

1. Government by 'grand coalition', that is, by a broadly representative coalition of all significant ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups.
2. Group autonomy by means of territorial and/or non-territorial federalism and decentralisation.
3. Proportionality, especially in political representation and civil service.
4. Minority veto power concerning issues of vital and fundamental importance to minority rights and autonomy.

The four basic elements of consociationalism enable the government to become a wide-ranging multi-ethnic alliance (Duruji, 2008: 97). Executive power sharing, distinctive veto rights, and joint autonomy help prevent a group from becoming so powerful to become a threat to the fundamental interests of other group(s) (Deets, 2018: 136). This is achieved through the cooperative attitude of the elites, and this encapsulates these four principles.

In Nigeria, this power sharing principle has been adopted in the form of the unofficial sharing of political offices among ethnic and religious groups. Allocation of positions of principal officers of political parties and federal character principle for occupying offices in the public service have also been based on equity format and not merit (Mustapha, 2009: 568). Rotating the office of the President and Vice President and the appointment of a Minister from each state in Nigeria are typical examples. Other measures that the Nigerian state have adopted to

boost inclusive participation are the NYSC scheme, quota system, state creation, the establishment of unity schools, establishment of federal universities, among others.

Consociations in the form of documented agreements and constitutions have been adopted in different countries at different times. These are Switzerland (1943), Belgium (1970), Malaysia (1971), South Tyrol (1972), Lebanon (1989), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), Northern Ireland (1998), Burundi (2000 and 2005), Macedonia (2001), Afghanistan (2004), Iraq (2005) and Kenya (2008) (McCulloch, 2014: 507; McGarry and O'Leary, 2007: 677; O'Flynn and Russell, 2005: 1). Others are South Africa, Uruguay, Colombia, Malaysia, among others (Deschouwer, 2006: 895; Hazan, 1999: 109; Lijphart, 2008: 278; Loizides, 2018:155; Mushtaq et al., 2011: 284; Qvortrup, 2018: 181).

Consociational democracy has recorded success in Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium, while it has failed in Cyprus, Fiji, and Malaysia (Jarrett, 2018: 42; Wolff, 2010: 4). It is a significant ingredient in international intervention in conflict-ridden countries like Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Iraq (McCulloch, 2014: 501). Northern Ireland experimented with centripetalism in 1974 and since 1998 (though irregular) embraced consociational coalition government characterised by chronological and proportional allocation of rules (McGarry and O'Leary, 2016: 498). Aside from its partial adoption in the 1960s, India has not embraced consociationalism with respect to having cross-community representation with executive power sharing at the centre, but it has always taken diversity in religion, language, and ethnicity into consideration in the civil service and cabinet appointments (McGarry and O'Leary, 2009: 16). Undermining consociationalism was greatly responsible for the breakup of the Yugoslav federation because Serbians dominated the army and the federal executive (McGarry and O'Leary, 2009: 16).

4.3.1 The four principles of Consociationalism

1. Government by Grand Coalition

The main idea of Lijphart is elites' cooperation and grand coalition among ethnic representatives (Spears, 2000: 107). Grand coalition accords greater security and guarantees the input of the minorities in decision-making (Traniello, 2008: 31). Grand coalition is an elites' cartel designed to respond to the problems of fragmentation into unfriendly subgroups (Lijphart, 2008: 31). Grand coalition through elites' cooperation is expected to achieve

political security for smaller groups and peace (Sullivan, 2005: 78). Grand coalition in consociationalism may take the form of a large representative and multi-party coalition cabinet, informal advisory structure, and rotating presidency (Lijphart, 2008: 8).

Grand coalitions are linked with ethnic, linguistic, religious, partisan, and sectarian factors. These have resulted sometimes formally and mostly informally in agreement on allocation of President's Office, Office of the Prime Minister, Presiding officer of the Parliament and other top government positions (Deschouwer, 2006: 895; Khidasheli, 1999: 199; Lijphart, 1998: 148; Lijphart, 2008: 45). This is in congruence with the rotational presidency in Nigeria because, since the commencement of the Fourth Republic, political elites have used ethnic and/or religious yardsticks to support or oppose the emergence of some candidates for the positions of the President and Vice President. For instance, the emergence of the two Yoruba elites candidates as presidential candidates in the 1999 presidential election was ethnically driven. This was because political elites in the country felt that Yoruba elites were short-changed in the annulment of the 1993 presidential election.

Grand coalition has operated in different dimensions in Belgium, Colombia, Lebanon, Switzerland, Germany, Cyprus, Burundi (1999), Fiji (1997), Kenya (2008), Zimbabwe (2009) (Deschouwer, 2006: 895; McGarry and O'Leary, 2016: 500; Lijphart, 2008: 67). It has also been in operation in Austria, Malaysia and South Africa (Lijphart, 1996: 259). Other forms include the Dutch design of permanent makeshift councils or committees with better influence than advisory roles (Lijphart, 1996: 259). The Indian Congress party which was in power⁶ in India during the first two decades of its existence was inclusive and had a grand coalition in its intra-party framework because the ministers it produced belong to all the foremost religious, linguistic, and regional groups (Lijphart, 1996: 260).

2. Group Autonomy

The necessity to make ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups govern themselves is responsible for the existence of autonomous administrations within the state (Rothchild and Roeder, 2005: 8). A federal system is one of the good ways to provide group autonomy for geographically concentrated groups in a divided society (Lijphart, 2008: 8 and 83). In

⁶ The party has been in power more than once since then, and it ruled until 2014. The ruling party in the country is Bharatiya Janata Party which has been in power since 2014.

consociationalism, segmental autonomy may take the form of territorial self-government where diverse societies are represented in geographically concentrated territories- this is federalism epitomised (McGarry, 2017: 522; Sullivan, 2005: 80). One of the ways the autonomy of a constituent unit can receive a boost in a federal state is for the former to have its constitution (Lijphart, 2012: 185). However, constituent units do not have their respective constitutions in a federal state like Nigeria but rely on the federal constitution to operate. Irrespective of having a constitution or not, the purpose of group autonomy is to fill the gap of inequality experienced by the minorities.

Segmental/group autonomy may mean giving a segment some form of ethnic, religious, or cultural control over their institutions like education or culture. Cultural autonomy mostly thrives on the pedestals of religion and language (Lijphart, 2008: 46). Put differently; this encompasses creating agencies or institutions to promote minority language, culture, religion, legal system, and a very good example is the granting of linguistic and educational functional autonomy for the two main groups in Belgium (Hadden, 2005: 38).

In Switzerland, federalism has been the platform through which power sharing has guaranteed the autonomy of the cantons in keeping their government, enough prospect to live differently and sustain their religion and culture (Linder and Vatter, 2001: 109). Therefore, cantons play major roles alongside the federal government in language and cultural policies (Thorlakson, 2003: 15). Power sharing vis-à-vis group autonomy takes the forms of a federal arrangement with linguistic boundaries and autonomy, as obtained in Switzerland, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia (Lijphart, 2008: 46). Another form is the establishment and administering of independent schools by ethnic and religious minorities, as in the cases of Belgium and Netherland, as well as allowing religious minorities to separately promulgate their laws on marriage, divorce, children adoption and inheritance with Cyprus and Lebanon as typical examples (Lijphart, 2008: 46). This is similar to what obtains in India. Concerning cultural/group autonomy, there was linguistic and religious autonomy as religious and linguistic minorities were granted autonomy to establish their schools, and groups had the prerogative to have their laws concerning marriage, divorce, custody, child adoption, and inheritance (Lijphart, 1996: 260).

In Nigeria, every individual is free to practice the religion they desire. The constituent units have some level of autonomy in the education sector, but this is shared with the federal

government. Also, the cultures of each ethnic group are being respected as long as its practices are not beyond what the law permits. Group autonomy also comes to operation with respect to location. The five groups of elites and the masses are domiciled within specific ethnic, linguistic and, to some extent, religious territories in the form of geo-political zones, states, and local governments.

3. Proportionality

Proportional representation is the most common and sought after electoral system for consociationalism (McGarry, 2017: 518). It encourages minority representation, a multi-party system and coalition government, which is always a product of compromise among groups (Lijphart, 2008: 181). However, proportional representation is just a form of proportionality. Hence, proportionality is not limited to the electoral process as different countries have different measures for representation. Proportionality means, among others, proportionality in legislative representation, proportional distribution in the civil service and proportional allocation of funds (Lijphart, 2008: 8). Proportionality allows for a laid out means of allocating government resources and, it will enable all segments of the society to have proportional influence in political issues (Sullivan, 2005: 81). In power sharing, there is proportionality in allocating state resources like military and public service positions, constitutional or essential laws that provide positions and budgetary funds allocation (Rothchild and Roeder, 2005: 8). Proportionality allows for a more inclusive result because it reduces incidences of being left out in access to representation, positions, and resources (Traniello, 2008: 31).

For instance, the South African 1994 interim Constitution provided a Government of National Unity, which allowed all political parties with a minimum of 5 per cent of seats in the National Assembly to participate, and this system operated between 1994 and 1999 (Lijphart, 2008: 78; Traniello, 2008: 36). This is proportional representation. Lijphart (2012: 36), in his submission, supports the South African case, as 'the basic aim of proportional representation is to divide the parliamentary seats among the parties in proportion to the votes they receive.' Still, in South Africa, elections into the National Assembly and Provincial legislatures and representation in the Government of National Unity were based on proportionality (Lijphart, 1998: 146). In the first two decades that India upheld the four pillars of consociationalism,

the Congress Party ensured that cabinet and parliamentary seats were proportionally allocated among linguistic and tribal groups (Lijphart, 1996: 261). Concerning proportionality in India, majority and minority groups have access to ministerial posts, legislative seats, and public service admission into higher institutions based on quota systems (Lijphart, 2008: 48-49).

A form of proportional representation in Nigeria is determining the number of those that will represent each state in the House of Representatives. The population of states is a major determinant. The higher the population of a state, the more representatives it has. Another typical example of proportionality is the quota system which determines admission into educational institutions and the federal character system. The latter allows people from each state in Nigeria to have representation in the public service.

4. Minority Veto

Minority veto is a pedestal that allows minorities to shield their autonomy by preventing attempts to eradicate or diminish it (Lijphart, 2008: 49). It gives minority groups the power to block a policy change and reduce the power of the majority (Traniello, 2008: 31). Minority veto helps to allow the minority to stay in government, make the decisions of the grand coalition to gain acceptance and guarantee political security (Sullivan, 2005: 81). This situation is not always about having majority and minority groups, but there may be several communities with none claiming to be the majority (Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995) or when two communities have almost the same population size (Northern Ireland 1998) (McGarry, 2017: 525).

Minority veto may also entail that majority alone cannot amend the constitution but will need the support of minorities (Lijphart, 2008: 8). For instance, in South Africa, there is a need to have a two-thirds majority in a constitutional amendment and other major national issues, and this aligns with minority veto (Lijphart, 1998: 146). In Nigeria, for the constitution to be amended, two-thirds of votes from the National Assembly and two-thirds of State Houses of Assembly consents are needed (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999). This means without inputs from some states dominated by minority groups, the constitution cannot be amended.

Minority veto may have constitutional backing as obtained in countries like Belgium, Cyprus, and former Czechoslovakia (Lijphart, 1996: 261). A very good example of minority veto in India is that despite Hindi being spoken by the majority, there was an informal agreement in

1965 that the language will not be made the sole official language without the simultaneous approval of the major non-Hindi speaking territories (Lijphart, 1996: 261; Lijphart, 2008: 49). In addition, in 1981, a court case did not favour Muslims in separate personal laws, which was vetoed by the Muslim minority and consequently persuaded the parliament to promulgate a law to reverse the judgment (Lijphart, 2008: 49). Swiss elites progressively established minority influence in all spheres of Swiss politics in their attempt to avert the advancement of minority discontent (Glass, 1977: 32). In Switzerland, those living in the smallest cantons, which constitute like 9% of the population, may block the votes of the remaining 91% (Linder and Vatter, 2001: 108; Loizides, Kovras, and Ireton, 2011: 2-3; Vatter, 2005: 6). These outlined instances attest that consociationalism has been in practice in countries and has come with benefits.

The inclusive nature of consociationalism is seen as its benefit. However, consociationalism is not without its criticisms concerning the nexus with democracy. Donald Rothchild and Philip G. Roeder submit that consociational power sharing limits the two elements of democracy- competition and accountability (Traniello, 2008: 32). Another critic of consociationalism opines that the phenomenon creates segregation, promotes rule by elites' cartels, promotes one's ethnic group above others, does not foster integration, is less democratic and aligns with authoritarianism (Dixon, 2018: 58-59). The criticisms notwithstanding, consociationalism is germane to actualising peace in a plural society.

In ethnically plural societies, consociational democracy positively impacts national integration (Kifordu, 2011: 434). Consociationalism exists to address the security quandaries ingrained in ethnicity (Deets, 2018: 135-136). It is good to have 'provisions' that will make conflicting parties know that violence is not the way to achieve their political agendas and one of such is power sharing (White, 2018: 85). Consociational democracy produces leaders through consensus and internal mechanisms by ethnic groups (Enloe, 1977: 151-152). Consociationalism entails elites' constructed power sharing arrangement, which is a negotiation to accommodate different segments of the society in the power calculations (Enloe, 1977: 152; Jinadu, 1985: 73; Thorlakson, 2003: 5-6). It recognises the claims of minorities through power sharing (Lemarchand, 2006: 1). Arend Lijphart notes that 'consociational democracy means government by elites' cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy' (Lijphart, 2008: 31). It is a

deliberate cooperative effort by elites to stabilise a political system (Hazan, 1999: 117). The existence of consociational institutions in diverse societies may guarantee a peaceful political environment, but this, in an actual sense does not mop up centrifugal tendencies (De Briey, 2005: 2). The success of consociationalism lies in conflicting groups seeing the platform to pursue their agendas in the consociational arrangements (White, 2018: 94).

With respect to Nigeria, these consociational principles play out in the polity. However, a model plays out during the electoral process that has constitutional backing. It is a platform that has prevented the domination by majority groups and accorded minorities to be major stakeholders in the electoral process, thereby giving some sense of belonging. This brings to the fore the need to examine centripetalism.

4.4 Centripetalism

Centripetal school of thought of power sharing is customarily linked with the work of Donald Horowitz (1985; 1990; 1991; 2002), and later that of Timothy D. Sisk (1996) as well as Reilly (2001) (De Briey, 2005: 3; Wolff, 2010: 9). Horowitz and his supporting scholars oppose consociationalism because ethnic elites may find it difficult to agree on power sharing (McGarry and O'Leary: 2006: 276). The other scholars that criticise consociationalism are Barry (1975), Halpern (1986), and Taylor (1992) (Lijphart, 1996: 259). They argue that politicians should be encouraged to have reach across ethnic lines through political institutions (McGarry and O'Leary, 2006: 253). Critics of consociationalism argue that because it focuses on elites' bargaining and mutual veto, it precludes the growth of a steady culture of compromise at the grassroots level (Loizides et al., 2011: 3). Centripetalism is equally crucial in a diverse society. In diverse societies, majorities want majority rule while minorities want protection against majority rule (Horowitz, 2014: 8). Ideally, majorities will not have vied for centripetalism if they have their way but will have preferred unrestricted majority sole determination of election results and rules (Horowitz, 2014: 11). Hence, minorities' disaffection increases when the centripetal structure depletes (Horowitz, 2014: 11).

The crux of Centripetalism is a deviation from rigid political arrangements in which those elected work together after elections, but it is a shift towards an electoral system that encourages parties to form coalitions across groups to spread the ethnic acceptability of

political parties (Horowitz 2004: 507–508). The centripetal approach makes political representatives seek to promote cooperation among different groups using the electoral system to garner support outside their ethnic enclaves (De Briey, 2005: 3). It is about utilising electoral incentives by political parties to have the support of other ethnic groups in addition to where they have a strong base to have the victory that is reflective of the votes of more than one ethnic group either in direct or indirect elections (McGarry and O’Leary, 2016: 502; Wolff, 2010: 10). Centripetalists advocate dividing the country into more sub-units so that no group can have a vast territory but require the votes of other regions and other ethnic and religious groups to win elections (McGarry, 2017: 522).

This system encourages conflict reduction through inter-ethnic cooperation before and during elections and not after the elections (Wolff, 2010: 11). A centripetal arrangement is always ideal if the votes of the majority are split among parties and the votes of the minorities are valuable to make the votes of the majority meet electoral requirements (Horowitz, 2014: 9). In a society where ethnicity, race, religion, and language differences determine political affiliations, candidates who cooperate with people from other groups may be rewarded with electoral victory (Reilly, 2003: 17). Consequently, such a candidate will enjoy legitimacy and represent a national and not sectional choice. Having a national choice emerge as the winner is a catalyst to national integration.

To emerge winner of the presidential election in Nigeria, you must have majority votes in not less than two-thirds of the states and a similar method was adopted in Indonesia in 2002 and Kenya in 2010 (Horowitz, 2014: 10). Centripetalism was included in the 1979 and the 1999 Constitutions of Nigeria. Sections 125 and 126 of the 1979 Constitution stated that for a person to emerge President, he must have not less than one-quarter of votes cast in at least two-thirds of all the states (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1979; Mustapha, 2009: 568). According to Section 134 of the 1999 Constitution, to emerge as the President, a candidate cannot only win with the majority of votes nationally but also at least one-quarter of votes in twenty-four out of the thirty-six states and in the FCT (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999; Suberu, 2009: 72). The same sources have it that same applies to the election of a governor according to Section 179 of the 1999 Constitution, in which a contesting candidate is expected to win 25% of votes cast in two-thirds of local governments in the state. This has been beneficial to Nigeria because it has necessitated the cooperation of elites from the North

and the South and from different parts of a state in securing presidential and state governors' victories, respectively. This might not have been possible if winning is strictly by a simple majority, and the implication is that elites will be comfortable with operating from their zones alone. Although the majority elite groups would have benefited from this, it may threaten the peace of the country because several ethnic groups in the country will feel alienated.

4.5 Power Sharing in Selected Countries

Countries that have adopted power sharing in different dimensions have been listed in this chapter. However, it is crucial to have a more detailed look into power sharing in some countries that experienced post-election violence and those that did not experience such. Wolff (2010: 17) concludes that the mechanisms of consociationalism and centripetalism can provide the panacea that is acceptable to negotiators and accommodate conflicting parties in a system where disputes can be settled peacefully.

4.5.1 Switzerland

The diversity in Switzerland is linguistic and religious. The country is divided along German, French, Italian and Romansh languages as well as Protestants and Catholics (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008: 7; McGarry, 2017: 523). The language distribution in Switzerland has Germans who constitute about 64%; French, 20%; Italian, 6%, Romansh, 1% and other languages, 9% (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008: 48). Religious distribution has Roman Catholic to be about 44.1%; Protestants 36.6%; Muslims, 4.5%; no religious adherence, 11.7% and others are 3.1% (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008). The country has 26 cantons, of which 20 are cantons, and 6 are half cantons, and these cantons have municipalities (Bolleyer, 2006: 24; Church and Dardanelli, 2005: 172; Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008: 7). The Swiss system is neither presidential nor parliamentary. The various government institutions are created to reflect the diversity that exists in the country. The country has bicameral parliament (Federal Assembly), and both chambers have the same powers which have inevitably made cantons to influence federal decision making (Church and Dardanelli, 2005: 168-169; Donato and Mahon, 2009: 283; Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008: 7; Vatter, 2005: 4).

As one of the longest running federal systems, Switzerland has avoided civil conflicts and war (after that of the Nineteenth Century) for years, and it has a representative seven-member

presidential council that is rotational (McGarry and O'Leary, 2007: 694-695). Switzerland's collective presidency portrays left-right ideological balance and cantonal, religious, ethnic, and linguistic representations (Roeder, 2012: 69). Switzerland is a federal state with the division of powers among the central government, twenty cantons and six half-cantons (Lijphart, 2012: 37). The National Council is based on proportional representation, and it represents the entire Swiss people while the Council of States is constituted of two representatives from each canton and one from each half canton (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008: 7; Linder and Vatter, 2001: 95; Mueller and Mazzoleni, 2016: 49).

Power sharing may be introduced not only for political offices but also for all levels of the state (Khidasheli, 1999: 199). Typical examples are the seven-member Federal Council, all crucial institutions and selection of seven three-star generals of the Swiss Army, and the three directors heading the Swiss federal postal service who share the positions according to their linguistic attachments (Khidasheli, 1999: 199). The Federal Council is a seven-member executive government which is also a collective executive government jointly elected by both chambers of parliament and it is structured in a way that it represents the different regions and language groups in the country (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008: 8; Lijphart, 2012: 33). The position of the President annually rotates among the seven Federal Councillors (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008: 8). In the judicial arm, the country has cantonal and federal courts (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008: 8). The composition of the federal court judges is designed to reflect equity like that of the Federal Council, and the parliament selects its members (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008: 8). The decisions of the Federal Court are published in either German, French, Italian or Romansh (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008: 8; Glass, 1977: 42).

The Swiss system has some similarities with that of Nigeria. For instance, the National Assembly is Bicameral, and it represents different ethnic groups. The emergence of the president in both countries are also elites' driven. However, the tenets of the Swiss presidential council operate with a blend of informal and structured institutional framework and is well respected by the political elites. Hence, there is a clear-cut knowledge of who emerges as the president when it is expected. That of Nigeria remains an arrangement subject to elites trying to manipulate the process, which was once a threat to the country's stability in 2011.

4.5.2 Kenya

Kenya, as a country, has always had challenges with ethnicity/ethnic politics (Adamu and Ocheni, 2016: 15). Voting in Kenya is also along ethnic lines because of fear of any ethnic group being excluded from the government (Mueller, 2011: 105). Elections in Kenya since 1992, apart from that of 2002, have always been with some level of violence (Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis, 2014: 2). The battle between Raila Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and Mwai Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU) in the post-2007 elections orchestrated a power sharing arrangement in Kenya (Cheeseman, 2011: 351). Suspicion by ODM that the ruling PNU was rigging the election led to violence that left over 1,000 dead and about 300,000 displaced (Cheeseman, 2011: 351). The PNU wanted its continued hold onto power, but the ODM latching on its strength in parliament requested that the position of Prime Minister be created with Raila Odinga being the beneficiary and that they should also have some seats in the cabinet (Cheeseman, 2008: 180).

Kofi Annan orchestrated mediation talks meant to end the violence with the instrumentality of having a coalition government that both sides will accept (Cheeseman, 2008: 180). Former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki played a crucial role in the post-election power sharing arrangement in Kenya, the success of this made him and his allies replicate almost the same in Zimbabwe (Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010: 204). The African Union, with the support of African leaders and eminent African elders, played a cogent role in the peace process, which culminated in the signing of the National Accord and the birth of a Grand Coalition Government (Juma, 2009: 407-408). The National Accord was engrafted into the constitution through an amendment passed by parliament in March 2008 (Juma, 2009: 420). The power sharing arrangement started in 2008, and it entailed the incumbent, Mwai Kibaki emerging as the President with the opposition leader, Raila Odinga, becoming the Prime Minister (Cheeseman, 2011: 352; Cheeseman et al., 2014: 7). This accord created the Prime Minister's office, his two deputies, and a coalition government of cabinet appointees made up of the two political parties (Juma, 2009: 420). The Prime Minister was given the authority to coordinate and supervise the government's functions, and he and his deputies could be removed through the parliament's vote of no confidence (Juma, 2009: 420).

The challenge with the case in Kenya was that state institutions are weak. They are unable to prevent a stalemate during the election, whereby the emergence of a winner becomes

difficult. It also implied that the country which practices a presidential system had to adopt an impromptu parliamentary system primarily to satisfy political elites. The benefit lies in the fact that peace was finally achieved, and the country has not experienced any electoral violence of that magnitude since then.

Following the 2007 election violence in Kenya, the country established the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) (Cheeseman et al., 2014: 10). Although it is not a power sharing institution, it is a preventive mechanism against political violence. Its existence is also to sustain peace. The NCIC, in conjunction with administrators, organisations and different bodies is to monitor hate speech (Cheeseman et al., 2014: 10). Other functions of the NCIC include promoting national identity and values, eliminating racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination and fostering national reconciliation and healing⁷. The role the organisation plays in an election is of significance. It has started a campaign towards a peaceful 2022 election and organised the signing of election peace pledge by relevant stakeholders.

4.5.3 Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is one of the countries in Africa that election dispute has threatened its existence. Towards the 2008 elections, the ruling government in Zimbabwe, with the support of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), military, police, and war veterans, attacked members of the opposition (Cheeseman, 2011: 349). The June 2008 election in Zimbabwe did not produce an outright winner (Chigora and Guzura, 2011: 20). This necessitated a rerun, but the opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai boycotted it because of no trust in the system and as a result, the incumbent, Robert Mugabe had a questionable victory (Cheeseman, 2011: 349-350; Kriger, 2012: 11).

As a result, there was a Global Political Agreement between the ZANU-PF and MDC, which was the bedrock of the power sharing arrangement (Kriger, 2012: 14). A power sharing agreement called inclusive government/Government of National Unity was signed between

⁷ Check NCIC website: <https://www.cohesion.or.ke/index.php/about-us/ncic-at-a-glance>).

ZANU-PF and MDC in February 2009 (Chigora and Guzura, 2011: 20; Kriger, 2012: 11). To accommodate Tsvangirai, the new office of the Prime Minister was created (Cheeseman, 2011: 350; Chigora and Guzura, 2011: 21). The power sharing arrangement meant that the prime minister would share executive power with the president. In practice, however, Mugabe retained almost all executive power because he still controlled the security services, police, and intelligence agencies, assenting of bills passed by the parliament, appointing, and determining the roles ministers played concerning specific acts of parliament, among other powers (Kriger, 2012: 14). Consequently, there was a power sharing government with ministerial slots shared among ZANU-PF and the two factions of MDC (Cheeseman, 2011: 350). The ZANU-PF took the significant portfolios like Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Defence, and Internal Security while the less critical offices like health, education, among others, were left for the MDC (Cheeseman, 2011: 350).

The Government of National Unity (GNU) in Zimbabwe had challenges. The first is that the GNU came because of accord from leaders of the major political parties while civil societies, leaders of small political parties and other leaders were not included in the process (Chigora and Guzura, 2011: 23). In addition, a parliamentary system needs an opposition in parliament, but there was no opposition representation in parliament (Chigora and Guzura, 2011: 23).

Having considered power sharing in Kenya and Zimbabwe. The common thing about power sharing in the countries is that it served the purpose of the incumbent retaining their position in the face of imminent deposition (Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010: 207). There also exists a difference between the power sharing deals in the two post-election crises tussled countries. ZANU-PF, with the support of the military, did not give much support to the power sharing agreement with MDC, and consequently, the unity government did not last long (Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010: 206). In the case of Kenya, military elites were excluded, and there was political elites' understanding, this made it more successful than that of Zimbabwe (Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010: 206). Succinctly, in Kenya, political leaders saw the unity government as an avenue to secure their places in governance, while in Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF saw it as a threat to its continued stay in power (Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010: 207). Nigeria has experienced post-election violence like Kenya and Zimbabwe, but the responses are not the same.

In Nigeria, prior to the aborted Third Republic and in the present Fourth Republic, there has been post-election violence after the 1993 and 2011 elections, respectively. That of 1993 led to the annulment of an election that was adjudged the freest and fairest in the country. The outcome was the 'stepping aside' of the military ruler and having an Interim National Government (ING). The winner of that election was never included in the government. What was done to appease the ethnic group of the winner of the election was making someone from his ethnic group the chairman of the ING. Perhaps, if he had been given his mandate or included in the ING like the case of Kenya, the distrust of the Yoruba elites towards the Northern elites might not have been so enormous. That of 2011 was discontent by some Northern elites about the victory of a Southerner as a president-elect. This was because the Northern elites in the opposition party felt that the region was robbed of its slot to produce the President after the death of President Yar'Adua, who could not complete his term of office of four years. This did not result in any power sharing deal but violence in some parts of the country.

4.5.4 Lebanon

Lebanon is religiously divided mainly between Christian and Islamic groups (Deets, 2018: 137). To foster peace among these groups, there was an agreement, The National Pact between 1943 and 1975 (Lijphart, 2008: 29; McCulloch, 2014: 503). The Maronite Christian occupied the position of the Presidency, the Sunni Muslims were given the position of the Premier, the Greek Orthodox held the Deputy Premier's position while Shi'a Muslim was the Speaker of the Parliament (Lijphart, 2008: 29; McGarry and O'Leary, 2007: 673; Zahar, 2005). The two major religions and other major groups were represented.

Another agreement, the Ta'if Agreement was signed in 1989 to end the 14-year civil war, but this agreement did not alter the existing power sharing arrangement (Zahar, 2005). However, the powers of the President were reduced, but those of the Council of Ministers (including the Prime Minister) was increased, and parity in legislative composition was introduced (McCulloch, 2014: 503).

The power sharing agreement in Nigeria in the Fourth Republic, to a great extent, mirrors that of Lebanon. The Lebanese style is similar to how the offices of the President, Vice President, President of the Senate and his Deputy, Speaker of the House of Representatives,

and his Deputy are distributed. These positions are reflections of people from the six geopolitical zones and the two major religions- Christianity and Islam. The only difference is that it changes. A zone may produce the President for four years; another zone may occupy the same position after the expiration of the tenure of the incumbent. This snowballs into having different groups and religions occupying the other five positions on a rotational basis at four or eight-year intervals. The lesson Nigeria needs to learn from the Lebanese system is that the latter though somehow informal is very specific in its power sharing arrangement, and this makes it less subject to manipulation of the process by the elites. Manipulation in this sense means elites supporting power sharing when it favours them and disapproving it when they are disadvantaged.

4.6 Power Sharing Models and Theories as Analysis Platforms

Chapter 3 discussed elite, integration, and relative deprivation theories. Power sharing models complement the theories discussed in chapter three as these models are meant to alleviate relative deprivation. The theories and models chosen for this study are aligned with the study's research objectives. This is outlined in the table below. Nevertheless, it is expedient to first consider how consociationalism and centripetalism apply to the analysis chapters. Chapter seven is the response to research objective two, and consociationalism is a useful analysis tool for the chapter. Chapter eight addresses research objectives three and four. Grand coalition and centripetalism are cogent analysis tools for the chapter. The table below outlines the nexus among the theories, models, and the research objectives.

Table 3: Theories, Models and Research Objectives Linked

S/N	THEORIES	RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
1.	Elite and relative deprivation theories	To assess Nigeria's integrative efforts.
2	Elite, integration, relative deprivation theories and consociationalism.	To explore the previous national integration measures adopted by successive governments since 1960.

3	Elite, integration, and relative deprivation theories. Consociationalism and centripetalism.	To examine the factors that made the political elites embrace rotational presidency as a tool for national integration.
4	Elite and integration theories. Consociationalism and centripetalism.	To examine the extent to which the adoption of rotational presidency has fostered national integration in Nigeria.
5	Elite and integration theories	To explore additional measures that could foster national integration as a symbol of unity and peace in Nigeria.

Source: Compiled by author

4.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, power sharing models were discussed. The chapter discussed consociationalism and centripetalism. The chapter also reviewed the experiences of some countries where these models have been applied. Switzerland has a sustained culture of elites' cooperation; this seems to be the prerequisite for successful informal power sharing arrangements. It is this lack of a culture of cooperation that, perhaps, accounts for power sharing issues in Zimbabwe and Kenya. The last section of the chapter pointed out the nexus between these models, the theories, and the research objectives. Through **Table 3**, this chapter showed that the chosen theories for this study are aligned with research objectives. These theories are directly applied to give theoretical colouration to participants' views and literature. Hence, the next chapter is on research methodology and research methods that are used in this study.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explains how literature has been sought for this study and how information was obtained from participants towards realising the objectives of this study. The chapter also discusses the approach to data collection and analysis in this study. It also explains the steps taken to mitigate subjectivity and ethical issues during data collection. The study is guided by the interpretive school of thought because the perceptions about ideas differ. Hence, the study adopts a qualitative approach because its central focus is on the impact of human behaviour in the shaping of government structures. Key informants' interviews, public documents and archival materials provided primary data, while secondary data was sourced from the extant literature.

5.2 Methodological Approach

The subject matter of this study centres on understanding the attitudes of elites towards the topic of rotational presidency and how it affects national integration in a diverse country. Evidently, a quantitative approach based on the positivist school of thought is not appropriate towards understanding the attitude of elites in the power play and the consequences of such for federal stability. This is because the study goes beyond the aim of ascertaining quantitative aspects and requires the ability to explain why some issues are the way they are. Consequently, understanding the concepts of interpretivism, methods, and methodology are expedient.

The interpretive school of thought is in congruence with this study because the researcher's experience and background made it possible for the proper interpretation of the meaning that research participants give to the subject under study (Creswell, 2007: 21). The interpretive paradigm is as such adopted in this study because it gives room to 'assign meaning to activities, situations, events, gestures and so forth' (Leavy, 2017: 129). Hence, an understanding of the position of each participant is easy to grasp. However, the outcome is guided by working within the frameworks of theories and trustworthiness towards reducing subjectivity.

Research methods encompass the forms of data collection, analysis, and interpretation that researchers utilise in a study (Creswell, 2009: 15). For instance, it may be open-ended or close-ended questions or numeric or non-numeric analysis (Creswell, 2009: 15). Methodology means ‘a broad, theoretically informed, framework that guided the choice of methods and interpretation of data appropriate to the study’ (Francis, 2008: 34). The knowledge of these two serves as the bedrock of the research approach adopted for this study. Consequent on its leaning towards the interpretive philosophical school, the study adopted the qualitative approach towards realising its objectives. It is difficult to quantify lived experiences and experiential meanings of individuals and groups, and that is why qualitative research was necessary towards gaining in-depth knowledge of the issues (Strydom and Bezuidenhout, 2014; 173). Nieuwenhuis and Smit (2012: 126) note that:

Qualitative research is concerned with understanding the processes and the social and cultural contexts which shape various behavioural patterns. It strives to create a coherent story as it is seen through the eyes of those who are part of that story, to understand and represent their experiences and actions as they encounter, engage with, and live through situations.

As such the qualitative method does not concern itself with what can be quantified – the qualitative method does not seek to explain, measure, quantify, predict, and generalise but aims to explore, understand, and describe (Strydom and Bezuidenhout, 2014; 174). Creswell (2007: 37) and Creswell (2009: 195) lists the features of qualitative research as:

- i). Data is collected in the natural settings where participants experience the issue or problem under study.
- ii). Researchers are key instruments because they are directly involved in examining documents, observing behaviour, and interviewing participants.
- iii). Reliance on multiple sources of data which may include interviews, observations, and documents.
- iv). Premium is placed on the meaning participants place on the issue or problem.
- v). It is dynamic because upon getting to the field, questions may change, forms of data collection may change, individuals studied, and sites visited may be altered.

vi). Social, political, or historical context may be the theoretical lens through which the study will be carried out.

vii). It results in giving a holistic account (multiple perspectives) and is not restricted to cause and effect connections among factors.

The focus of this study is on understanding rotational presidency as a tool for national integration. Since the measure remains a matter of debate and national integration in Nigeria has been on the low side since 1999, it is germane to carry out the study. The views expressed by study participants are varied considering that some were directly involved in the political game, some were involved constitutionally and as a regulator, some religiously, some socially/historically, and some as researchers. Hence, the views of participants became relevant, and they were given the flexibility to express themselves. Apart from the interviews, some available documents were also used to ascertain the views of participants. To understand how some of these features were reflected in the data collection process, it is central to explain how participants for the study were selected and how data was collected.

5.3 Sampling Technique and Population

According to Pascoe ‘A sample....is a subset of a population that is representative of the population’ (2014: 135). The population of this study comprises relevant stakeholders that have vast knowledge about the Nigerian political system. Sampling is the process of selecting a group of individuals on whom the research will be conducted (Laher and Botha, 2012: 98). It is essential to sample because, in most situations, data cannot be collected from the entire population (Biggam, 2008). The study favoured the utilisation of purposive, quota, and snowball sampling.

According to Neuman ‘Purposive sampling occurs when a researcher wants to identify particular types of cases for in-depth investigation. The purpose is less to generalize [sic] to a larger population than it is to gain a deeper understanding of types’ (2007: 143). This also justifies why there are key informants. Key informants are a group of experts who are selected non-randomly because of being knowledgeable about a matter (Parsons, 2008). These individuals were met on a one-on-one basis because of their ample knowledge regarding certain aspects of this study. The participants were purposively selected among the stakeholders in the Nigerian political system. Hence, participants were selected based on their

expertise and experience in the Nigerian socio-political and legal environment. Some of them have participated in some of the constitutional conferences and have been privy to the Nigerian political landscape from the First to the Fourth Republic. In addition, some of them have held various political positions in the country.

Quota sampling makes the segmentation of the population possible, and this accommodates diversity among the participants (Neuman, 2007). Therefore, politicians and opinion leaders from the six geo-political zones of Nigeria were interviewed. Snowball sampling entails asking a participant to refer the researcher to another possible participant (Rugg and Petre, 2007). In this, sampling occurs through referral making by participants in the research, suggesting those in the population who fit the parameters required and who will desire to participate in the research (Pascoe, 2014: 143). Snowball sampling allows the size of the sample to grow because some participants that the researcher has met may refer him or her to other prospective participants who may hitherto be difficult to access (Laher and Botha, 2012: 93). Most of the participants were difficult to access; hence, referral worked. This was the case especially with the politicians and opinion leaders. The participants that were accessible referred the researcher to others for interviews and interactions.

5.3.1 Sample Size and Categories

In qualitative studies, the sample size may be small because of its in-depth nature (Laher and Botha, 2012: 88). The calibre of people selected depends on the ability to provide solutions, answers to the research problem, and questions respectively (Pascoe, 2014: 132). The type and purpose of research determine the sample size, and it is difficult to determine the number of participants at the beginning of the research (Dawson, 2002: 54). This was why the snowball technique was necessary. Twenty-two participants were interviewed. This figure was settled for after reaching saturation. That was the point when participants no longer produced fresh information (Pascoe, 2014: 137). The participants in this study are listed below:

- 1. Politicians and Opinion Leaders:** The researcher selected and interviewed 14 politicians and opinion leaders from the six geo-political zones. The choice of these participants was based on their experience as members of the different constitutional conferences organised in Nigeria, the leaders of their political parties, and holders of

different political positions in the government of the country. The opinion leaders interviewed were prominent citizens representing the various ethnic groups with no political affiliation.

2. **Religious Leaders:** The religious leaders were interviewed because of the religious dimension to violence and rotational presidency in Nigeria. These religious leaders include one Christian and one Islamic cleric because these are the two main religions in Nigeria. Their choice is important for this study because the two religions have always been involved in religious violence against each other and the membership of either of these faiths is a major determinant of who emerges as the president.
3. **Constitutional Lawyers:** Two constitutional lawyers were selected because they are well-grounded on the *modus operandi* of the Nigerian Constitution, especially how it relates to the provisions of the federal structure and integrative measures. This became necessary because of the (un)constitutionality of zoning arrangement; and, how politicians always use it as a political tool to advance personalised interests.
4. **Researchers:** Three researchers from the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER) were interviewed. This research institute was selected because it has a pool of researchers from different political, social, and economic sub-fields and its existence dates to over seven decades. The researchers are specialists on diversity in the Nigerian federal system.
5. **An official of the Federal Character Commission:** One principal officer of the Federal Character Commission (FCC) was interviewed. The FCC is a Federal Government of Nigeria agency responsible for monitoring compliance with the principle of federal character and quota system in federal appointments and distribution of projects. The federal character principle is one of the measures to deal with the problem of national integration and foster federal stability. This gave a regulatory perspective to national integration in Nigeria.

5.4 Data Collection

Data was sourced from primary and secondary sources. Primary data comprises direct speech, interviews and comments or reports that are documented (Biggam, 2008). Primary data for this study were sourced through interviews, public documents, and archival materials. An interview, according to Nieuwenhuis and Smit (2012: 133), ‘is a two-way conversation and

a purposive interaction in which the interviewer asks the participant (the interviewee) questions to collect data about the ideas, experiences, beliefs, views, opinion and behaviours of the participant'. It allows a researcher the opportunity to get information from the person or people that have the information needed and this assists in realising the aims of research.

The interview enables the researcher to obtain more information from participants because it is a convenient means of mutual interaction than a questionnaire (Bertram and Christiansen, 2014: 83). Unlike the questionnaire survey, the researcher conducting an interview will gain deeper insights from the people. However, the relationship of the researcher with the participant may influence the information supplied by the latter. Even though it generates a large amount of textual data, the response of participants may not be a true reflection of their views. Thus, observation is sometimes used as an additional tool of data gathering (Bertram and Christiansen, 2014: 83-84). Regardless of these weaknesses, an interview is ideal for this study because the subject under study requires detailed views of the participants. An interview gives participants the flexibility of reflecting on events without committing themselves to write information, which may look confidential to them (Gray, 2004: 214). In an interview, the voice response is not only taken into cognisance but also the body language of the interviewee (Gray, 2004: 213). In this study, the gesticulations and facial expressions of participants were also taken into consideration in posing questions to them.

Interviews may be structured, unstructured and semi-structured. A structured interview entails having prepared questions where the same set of questions are directed at participants (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009: 1). It does not give room for flexibility and the experience of the researcher does not change the manner the interview may go during the process. The unstructured interview does not involve having predetermined questions because questions surface due to interaction between the researcher and the participants (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009: 1). A semi-structured interview enables the researcher to gain a thorough understanding of a participant's beliefs, perceptions, and account of a topic (Greeff, 2011: 351). For semi-structured interviews, the researcher makes use of an interview schedule or guide that shapes the line of inquiry (Nieuwenhuis and Smit, 2012: 134). This study does not favour the use of structured and unstructured interviews because the nature of the study warrants having some prepared questions for each category of participants. In a semi-structured interview, the researcher and participants enjoy enough flexibility such that during the interview, if another

area of interest comes up, the researcher can obtain enough information from the participant especially if such questions are very useful in meeting the research objectives (Gray, 2004: 217; Greeff, 2011: 351-352).

In this study, participants were asked questions that allowed more questions to emerge during the interviews. This flexibility also brought more insights into sourcing for more literature to verify some of their claims. The ‘additional’ questions that emerged were reflections of the experience and response of each participant. There were slight differences in the questions each category of participants was asked because of the nature of the study. For instance, the questions directed to the politicians were not completely the same as those posed to the religious leaders.

In a bid to maintain anonymity, the participant(s) were ascribed abbreviated codes, as indicated below:

PINEP- Personal Interview North East Politician

PINEOL- Personal Interview North East Opinion Leader

PINWP 1- Personal Interview North West Politician 1

PINWP 2- Personal Interview North West Politician 2

PINWOL- Personal Interview North West Opinion Leader

PINCP- Personal Interview North Central Politician

PINCOL- Personal Interview North Central Opinion Leader

PISWP 1- Personal Interview South West Politician 1

PISWP 2- Personal Interview South West Politician 2

PISWOL- Personal Interview South West Opinion Leader

PISEP- Personal Interview South East Politician

PISEOL- Personal Interview South East Opinion Leader

PISSP- Personal Interview South South Politician

PISSOL- Personal Interview South South Opinion Leader

PICL 1- Personal Interview Constitutional Lawyer 1

PICL 2- Personal Interview Constitutional Lawyer 2

PICCL- Personal Interview Christian Cleric

PIICL- Personal Interview Islamic Cleric

PIR 1- Personal Interview Researcher 1

PIR 2- Personal Interview Researcher 2

PIR 3- Personal Interview Researcher 3

PIFCCS- Personal Interview Federal Character Commission Staff

Other primary sources of data include official government documents and publications. These comprise reports of the Constitutional Conferences, past and present Constitutions of Nigeria, documents from the Federal Character Commission, National Bureau of Statistics, Central Bank of Nigeria, United Nations Development Programme, among others.

Secondary sources provided the relevant literature to support the primary sources. The secondary sources include extant literature from books, journal articles, magazines, and newspapers. In addition, websites of some organisations were visited, and relevant information was extracted from them. Secondary data is useful in the effort to find out what others have unravelled about a study (Rugg and Petre, 2007). The utilisation of secondary sources assisted in understanding the motivation behind getting the views of participants on why there is still federal instability in Nigeria, despite the national integration measures and rotational presidency. The secondary data was equally useful towards understanding the context and the theories which undergird this study.

The combination of primary and secondary data sources was justified considering the objectives of this study. In essence, the secondary sources are useful for scholarly analysis of the phenomenon under study whilst primary sources form the bedrock upon which answers are provided to salient questions that are answered (Rugg and Petre, 2007). This was the case in this study, and secondary sources aided in answering some of the research questions.

5.5 Data Analysis

The data were analysed following the thematic technique. Methods used in data collection and type of data collection determine the data analysis method (Pooley-Cilliers, 2014: 290). Thematic technique/analysis is ‘a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organizes and describes your data set in (rich) detail’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 79). Thematic analysis entails analysing data by theme, and such themes do not emerge from the researcher but are from the data (Dawson, 2002: 117). This allows detailed explanation and supports the study of human behaviour. The reason for

choosing thematic analysis is that it gives room for a broad understanding of the potentials of any phenomenon (Marks and Yardley, 2004).

The recorded data was transcribed, interpreted, and analysed. Data from other primary and secondary sources were also systematically extracted. Through these, themes were mapped out in the study, and this informed the analysis. These themes were also reflections of the views of different groups of people interviewed. However, in achieving these, subjectivity did not overrule the objective nature of the study.

5.6 Trustworthiness

The actions and opinions of human beings are not quantifiable, and this makes studying human beings susceptible to subjectivity. Qualitative research tends not to be value-free, which implies that the researcher may have some subjectivity and bias, and such may influence the findings. Hence, to ensure trustworthiness, some measures need to be put in place to overcome anything that may negatively influence the findings (Nieuwenhuis and Smit, 2012: 137). Trustworthiness is further broken into credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability (Lincoln and Guba, 1985 cited in Koonin, 2014: 258-259).

Credibility entails interpreting the data provided by the participants with accuracy (Koonin, 2014: 258-259). Credibility may be bolstered during data collection and analysis. It can be fostered with mechanical devices to record an interview, as this will be more accurate than jotting down notes (Bertram and Christiansen, 2014: 188). Credibility also encompasses the ‘use of persistent observations; triangulation (of data, methods, theories and investigations); member checks (where data and interpretations are tested with research participants)’ (Gray, 2004: 345). Triangulating means using different data sources through probing evidence from the sources and using it to build consistent justification for themes (Creswell, 2009: 191). Also, triangulation may mean asking one question in more than one way during an interview (Bertram and Christiansen, 2014: 188-189).

Transferability is being able to use the results and analysis beyond a research project (Koonin, 2014: 258-259). Transferability can receive a boost if what the researcher has done can be transferred to other conditions with similar features (Bertram and Christiansen, 2014: 189).

Dependability entails that the method of data collection, data analysis and the theory generated from data have to be integrated (Koonin, 2014: 259). It can also mean giving an

account for why there are variations, like comparing previous studies with the present one and explaining the differences (Bertram and Christiansen, 2014: 188). For dependability, an audit trail is necessary. An audit trail is 'where the data collection and analysis processes are made transparent, are critically discussed and the researcher looks for places of possible bias or distortion' (Bertram and Christiansen, 2014: 188). This can be likened to the job of an auditor in a firm.

Confirmability can be enhanced by making the research process transparent by providing enough information for a reader to check and arrive at similar conclusions (Bertram and Christiansen, 2014: 188). Confirmability means findings must flow with the data, and if others use the same data, similar conclusions must be arrived at (Koonin, 2014: 259). It means there must be a nexus between the data and the researcher's interpretation (Gray, 2004: 345).

Most of these were observed in this study. For instance, some of the information given by participants were checked with some literature. A review of some literature also helped to compare present studies with previous ones. The use of semi-structured interviews also made it possible to ask one question in different ways. Ideally, participants should have been briefed about the progress of the study, but time constraints did not allow this. Alternatively, the study was subject to review by the research supervisor and an independent researcher. These strategies were employed to mitigate subjectivity and ensure that the views of participants are well presented and analysed in a just, equitable and fair manner.

5.7 Ethical Consideration

Ethical issues come up in the social sciences because human beings are the objects of study (Strydom, 2011:113). 'Ethics provides us with guidelines in terms of what can be considered acceptable and unacceptable behaviour' (Pooley-Cilliers, 2014: 291). Ethics may be synonymous with integrity on a personal basis, but its implications extend beyond that of individual, and that is why the stakeholders in ethical matters are participants, the broader public, local and international communities, academic institutions, funding bodies, community, policymakers, mass media and the researcher (Louw, 2014: 262-263). Ethical issues that have to do with participants include informed consent, prioritising physical and psychological comfort of participants in collecting data, dealing with sensitive information, providing incentives, avoiding harm, dealing with confidentiality versus anonymity as well

as avoiding deception (Louw, 2014: 264-269). Ethical issues that concern the researcher include falsifying information, distorting results, giving room for bias to affect interpretation or results, misusing information and use of inappropriate research methods (Louw, 2014: 270-273).

There may be a need to write letters to individuals (for instance gatekeepers) in an institution by stating duration, the possible impact, and the outcomes of the research, to be granted permission to meet participants in the concerned institution (Creswell, 2009: 90). Gatekeepers are those who make it possible for the researcher to access an organisation or community to carry out research. They may be community or organisation leaders, elected officials, or heads of households (Ogletree and Kawulich, 2012: 64). Informed consent entails that participants agree to partake in the research without feelings of coercion and they are adequately informed about the drive, period, methods, and prospective uses of the research (Ogletree and Kawulich 2012: 64). To interview individuals, it is important to inform them of their anonymity/confidentiality, and informed consent should be sought to allow voluntary participation (Pooley-Cilliers, 2014: 291). The research process from design to implementation and the final write up should be given ethical consideration (Ogletree and Kawulich, 2012: 71).

Ethical standards relating to research that involves human objects were complied with, in this study. Letters were obtained from two institutions to be granted the opportunity to carry out interviews. These are the FCC and NISER. These letters, research proposal, informed consent forms, and other documents were sent to the ethical committee of the school for review before the ethical clearance was granted. Prior to this, the research proposal was approved before and after the presentation and the Informed Consent Form was scrutinised by the researcher's supervisor and the ethical committee. Ethical principles were upheld to safeguard the self-confidence and confidentiality of all the participants in the study. The anonymity of participants has been observed throughout this study. Data has not been influenced nor has any information been falsified at any stage of the study.

5.8 Limitations of the Study

It was a challenge to access all the desired participants (especially politicians) owing to distance and the busy schedule of politicians. This was because participants were interviewed

in different cities in the country, so this warranted travelling. To tackle the difficulty in accessing politicians, there was the need for referral and the need to reschedule appointments with some of them before they could finally be met. All these came with time and cost implications. Nevertheless, these challenges did not hinder the success of the study.

5.9 Conclusion

This chapter discussed how data was generated, interpreted, and analysed. The reasons for an interpretive school of thought and qualitative approach were justified. These culminated in the choice of participants, method of data collection, interpretation, and analysis of data.

Face-to-face means of an interview made it possible to observe every means of communication each participant utilised to respond to the questions. For instance, tone of voice, gesticulation, facial expression, and body language. All these impacted how data was interpreted.

Trustworthiness was also ensured to reduce the effects of subjectivity and ethical standards were observed because human beings were the objects of study. The time and cost limitations did not prevent the study from being successful. Having considered how data was collected and analysed for this study, the next chapter focuses on the evolution of the Nigerian federal system. It will explore the alleged marginalisation and agitations by different groups.

CHAPTER SIX

THE EVOLUTION OF THE NIGERIAN FEDERAL SYSTEM

6.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the operations and challenges of the Nigerian federal system. The diverse nature of the ethnic composition of the hitherto independent nationalities made federalism a suitable system of government for Nigeria. However, despite the adoption of the federal system, the country still grapples with intermittent ethnic and religious conflicts. Against this backdrop, this chapter explores the evolution of federalism in Nigeria.

The chapter is presented in two major sections and subsections. The first is on federalism in Nigeria, which encapsulates how the country operated before federalism, federalism in the pre-independence, independence, and post-independence eras. These will shed light on the actors that have been involved in fabricating federalism in Nigeria in each stage, and how each stage has impacted stability in the country. The second section interrogates some of the fault lines of the Nigerian Federal system. These fault lines include population, ethnicity, religion, resources, and the civil war and its unresolved grievances. The dissertation argues that these structural weaknesses of the Nigerian Federal system are exploited by the elites to stir feelings of marginalisation and deprivation.

6.2 The Evolution of the Federal System in Nigeria

6.2.1 Pre-Independence Era

One of the features of a federal state is having more than one level of government. In a plural society like Nigeria, its diverse nature necessitates the existence of more than one level of government. The decision to adopt the federal system for Nigeria was made between 1946 and 1954 (Afigbo, 1991:13). The country practised a unitary system until 1947 (Richards Constitution of 1946) when a federal system was introduced in structure but not constitutionally. This is reflected in the existence of legislative councils for the Eastern, Northern and Western regions (Ayua and Dakas, 2005: 242; Kirsten, 1996: 502). Concisely, Nigeria practised a unitary system from 1914 until 1947, but the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 constitutionally recognised federalism as a system of the structural arrangement of the

hitherto independent nationalities. By this arrangement, the three regions became autonomous as the federating units of the tripartite federal structure (Kifordu, 2011: 430).

Before colonisation, Nigeria was comprised of several politically independent ethnic groups/kingdoms (Alapiki, 2005: 52). These include the Hausas, Fulanis, Kanuris, Oyo, Benin empires, Igbos, Jukun, Idomas, Udomas, Tivs, among others (Adamu and Ocheni, 2016: 2; Attah, 1987: 400). Each of these kingdoms had its governmental structures, systems of selection of rulers and the structural arrangement and control of power. These groups had developed a web of socio-economic interactions and networks of relationships but rarely on political grounds (Attah, 2011: 85). The political relations were characterised by conflict, diplomacy, and mild cooperation (Attah, 2011: 88; Uhunmwuango and Ekpu, 2012: 118).

Colonialism transformed the relationships, as the British forced these independent political systems into one entity without considering ethnic compatibility (Isumonah, 2004: 433-434). The British officially colonised these territories in 1861 with the establishment of the Colony of Lagos (Ayua and Dakas, 2005: 241). In 1900, the British established the Protectorates of Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria (Alapiki, 2005: 52). The Colony of Lagos was merged with the Southern Nigeria Protectorate in 1906 to form the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. The British amalgamated these entities in 1914 to have a single political entity.

These ethnic groups had different administrative, political, historical, religious, cultural, and legal backgrounds (Muhammad, 2007: 188). The ethnic groups were dissimilar in the light of religion, culture, and language (Imhonopi and Onifade, 2013: 77). In other words, the indigenous people in the different ethnic groups neither requested nor were consulted by the British, before they were coagulated to form a country. The statements of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Obafemi Awolowo corroborated this assertion:

Since 1914 the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their backgrounds, in their religious beliefs and customs and do not show themselves any sign of willingness to unite... Nigerian unity is only a British invention (in Meredith, 2011: 8).

Similarly, Obafemi Awolowo postulated:

Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no “Nigerians” in the same sense as there are “English”, “Welsh”, or “French”. The word “Nigerian” is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria and those who do not (in Meredith, 2011: 8).

This unification was an excessive ambitious move by the British because they showed less concern for the existing natural boundaries (Anugwom, 2000: 65). They were more concerned with economic benefits as they operated through companies such as Royal Niger Company and United African Company. Hence, the unity of these groups was of less importance to them. The colonialists placed administrative convenience above the danger of bringing unwilling groups together (Adamu and Ocheni, 2016: 2). The Amalgamation Proclamations of 1914 was the framework to govern hitherto separate protectorates under one administration for economic and administrative purposes. The details of the amalgamation and the indirect rule system that operated around that time have been explored in chapters one and two of this study. Hence, *ab initio*, the requirement that all parties should be willing to come together, was absent in the case of Nigeria (Aziegbe, 2014: 20).

The Clifford Constitution of 1922 was a representation of a unitary system. Under this Constitution, the country had the Southern and Northern provinces, and electorally, the South was accorded more privilege than the North. The elective principle introduced in the 1922 Clifford Constitution was the legal backing for the elective positions. Political parties were encouraged to field candidates for the four legislative seats (Obiyan, 2010: 513). A Nigerian Legislative Council was established in 1922 (Fagbadebo, 2020: 382). This was made up of 46 members, and most of them were British. Only four were elected. Three from Lagos and one from Calabar. The Nigerian National Democratic Party won all three seats in Lagos while an independent candidate won that of Calabar. Hence, from the protectorate level, the North could not produce an elected legislative representative. This move by the British contributed to the distrust between the North and the South.

The country had three regions and Lagos under the 1946 Richards Constitution (Onoja, 2014: 270). Some provisions of the Constitution had features of federalism. The three regions had Regional Council and Houses of Assembly, but only the North and West had a House of Chiefs while the North was now included in the central legislature (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 148; Genyi, 2014: 480; Onoja, 2014: 270). A Central Legislative Council was created in 1946, which provided a platform for the representatives of the three regions to meet and

discuss national issues (Ukase, 2014: 209). Sir Arthur Richards was criticised by nationalists for not consulting Nigerians on his constitutional proposals (National Conference, 2014: 7). Regional legislative assemblies were appointed by the colonialists, and they operated with no legislative powers but mere advisory roles (Fagbadebo, 2020: 382). Furthermore, the regional assemblies also operated like the appendix of the central legislature because the latter approved the former's decisions (Fagbadebo, 2020). This was corrected under the Lyttleton Constitution.

The weaknesses of the Richards Constitution of 1946 led to the promulgation of the MacPherson Constitution of 1951 (Elaigwu, 2006: 211). Governor Macpherson had made consultations at the village, district, provincial, regional, and national levels (National Conference, 2014: 7). There was also the Ibadan General Conference of 1950. All these led to the emergence of the MacPherson Constitution. The MacPherson Constitution provided for Council of Ministers; 12 Nigerian Ministers, 4 from each region and 6 official members (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 152). The House of Representatives became the central legislature with half of the members from the North, and the other half shared between the East and West (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 152). This was a catalyst to relative deprivation because of the proportionality of the central legislature, which favoured the North. The legislature in the North and West were still bicameral while that of the East remained unicameral (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 152-153). The Constitution also granted more legislative and financial powers to the regional legislature (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 153).

The London Constitutional Conference of July 1953 and the Lagos Conference of February 1954 gave birth to the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 153; Nwala, 1997: 9). The Constitution further established Nigeria as a federation of three regions and Lagos as a federal territory administered by the central government (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 153). The British and the early nationalists opted for federalism to contain the elasticity that may always come to the fore because of the heterogeneity and different interests of the various groups (Muhammad, 2007: 188; Omoregie, 2015: 1). Aziegbe (2014: 22) posits that the political elites conceded to federalism more for attaining self-government than economic or military reasons. The Constitution granted autonomy to the regions so that they could function independently. It granted an exclusive legislative list to the central government, a concurrent legislative list to both tiers of government and a residual list to the regions.

The House of Representatives had 184 members with 92 from the North, 42 from East and West, 6 from Southern Cameroon and 2 from Lagos. The Senate was established in the late 1950s. The legislative houses at the centre and the regions were structured to ensure representation of the different groups that constitute Nigeria. The public service and the judiciary became regionalised. At the national level, the Privy Council was the apex court, but this was replaced by the Supreme Court in 1963. The creation of three regions in 1946 further resulted in each region having a core majority ethnic group, and this was exacerbated in 1954 when financial powers were devolved to the regions (Luqman, 2014: 164). In 1954, the Nigerian Marketing Board became regionalised and regional executives, and legislatures became operational (Elaigwu, 2006: 223). However, the Nigerian federal system is not a product of social contract or referendum but a result of a resolution by a few political elites at pre-independence constitutional conferences (Majekodunmi, 2015: 112).

One of the major effects of the manner the Nigerian federal system originated allayed the minority fears of being dominated by the majorities. The former demanded their own regions. This culminated in the setting up of the 1957 Willink Commission on the Fears of the Minorities and Means of Allaying them (Egwu, 2014: 7). Henry Willink Commission concluded that the creation of states would not proffer a solution to the fears of the minorities (Luqman, 2014: 164). In an actual sense, the commission did not recommend the creation of more regions but rather recommended unified police, central prisons system, and promotion of minorities into positions of authority to balance inequality in power control (Abdussalam, 2014: 60). The Willink Commission also recommended that to allay the fears of oppression and of being maltreated, the independence constitution should have fundamental human rights to protect citizens (Onoja, 2014: 274). Domination by majority groups was meant to be checked through these recommendations. The report of the Willink Commission and the Constitutional Conferences of London in 1957 and Lagos in 1958 shaped the 1960 Independence Constitution.

6.2.2 Independence and Post-Independence Era

The 1960 Constitution was a product of bargaining and negotiation by political elites from the different regions and ethnic groups. The 1960 Independence Constitution recognised the minority issues and domination fears through its entrenchment of fundamental human rights

(Azelama and Oarhe, 2010: 500). What the minorities got in the Independence Constitution of 1960 was not the creation of states but the guarantee of their rights (Vande, 2012: 39). A distinct feature of the Independence Constitution was that the regions had extensive powers, which was a boost to their autonomy, and they had the revenue prowess that made them carry out their responsibilities (National Conference, 2014: 11). However, the Constitution still had some colonial linings. For example, an appeal from the Supreme Court goes to the Privy Council in England (Azelama, and Oarhe, 2010: 500-501). The Queen of England remained the Head of State represented by a Governor-General. Nevertheless, each region had its constitution, which was embodiments of its historical, cultural, and future aspirations (Egwu, 2014: 4-5).

The 1963 Republican Constitution came into force on October 1, 1963, and it replaced the 1960 Independence Constitution. This constitution also upheld the practice of the federal system because most of the provisions of the 1960 Constitution were still retained in it. The significance of the Republican Constitution was that the Queen of England ceased to be the ceremonial president and the highest legal appeal terminated at the Supreme Court rather than the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (National Conference, 2014: 10-11).

The similarities between the two Constitutions are that each region had a separate constitution apart from the federal constitution. In addition, each region had its coat of arms and motto, apart from that of the country, each region had its mission in the United Kingdom headed by an Agent General and any power not allocated to the federal or regional government was placed on the residual list, and vested in the regions (National Conference, 2014: 11). The regions had financial capacity between 1960 and 1966. They collected import and export taxes as well as controlled the produce marketing boards (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 165). The 1954 Lyttleton Constitution confirmed Nigeria's federal status and the 1960 independence Constitution solidified the federation system the more (Elaigwu, 2006: 211). The 1963 Constitution was no exception but the creation of the Mid-West shortly before its commencement meant lesser influence for the Western Region where the new region was carved out.

It is no doubt that federalism thrived especially in the First Republic, but integration was still a major issue in the country within the period reviewed. This explains the reason for some political violence that took place within that period. Aside from the Civil War, there have

been numerous incidences of political violence indicative of the reality that some groups and ethnic nationalities were discontented with the Nigerian federation (Orngu, 2014:329-330). These include the Kano riot of 1953, 1960s Tiv revolts (this was due to Northern Hausa and Fulani domination and the Tivs have always rejected Northern domination since the 1920s), the 1963 census crisis, and the 1965 Western Region crisis. Most of these were caused by feelings of relative deprivation as some groups felt that some privileges which should have been enjoyed by them are restricted to certain groups/classes.

6.2.3 The Military, the Second and Third Republics

Prior to the 1966 coup, the Nigerian federal system had features that were akin to Wheare's model where each of the four regions had its independent government and constitution while the federal constitution was still in operation (Fagbadebo, 2010: 88). The federal and regional governments shared functions and powers (Fagbadebo, 2010: 88). The takeover of power by the military in January 1966 ushered in Decree 1 of 1966 which abrogated the offices of the President, Prime Minister, National Assembly, Regional Governors, Premiers, and Regional Parliaments (Akinsanya, 2002b: 10). Decree 1 of 1966 not only suspended the 1963 Republican Constitution but also made the Supreme Military Council the highest law-making body in the country (Isijola, 2002: 193). It, however, retained the offices of the Chief Justice and all other judicial appointments but brought the Local Government Police and Native Authority Police under the control of the Inspector General (Akinsanya, 2002b: 10-11). The Decree also ensured that a regional military government needs the approval of the Federal Military Government to legislate on any item in the concurrent list (Akinsanya, 2002b: 11).

Considering the centralised nature of the military, the regime did away with the federal system and opted for a unitary system. Decree 34 of May 24, 1966, abolished the federal structure and opted for a unitary system but preferred to call the regions 'group of provinces' (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 173). The Decree also provided for a National Public Service and a National Public Service Commission (Akinsanya, 2002a: 122). The intention was to make Nigerians identify more with the country than their ethnic groups, but this was construed as a means to entrench Igbo domination on the country because of the Head of State being Igbo, among other factors (Akinyele, 2013). The Northern civil servants also felt threatened by the unification decree because they felt their Southern counterparts were more educated

(Akinsanya, 2002b: 17). The actions of this administration and successive military governments in Nigeria degraded the tenets of federalism (Oni and Faluyi, 2018: 5).

Decree 9 of 1966 replaced Decree 34 of 1966 and the former restored the federal system of government, though under a centralised military structure (Nwala, 1997: 11). One of the things that was reverted was the decentralisation of the civil service. This Decree was promulgated by Gowon's regime, but the regions were restructured to become twelve states. This, coupled with lesser fiscal autonomy and military rule, paved the way for a more centralised federal system.

Federalism operated under the military until October 1, 1979. This opened the floor for the Second Republic, but the drafting of the 1979 Constitution under which the Republic functioned was under the supervision of a military regime. The hitherto suspended features of a democratic system gave federalism some boost, but party differences bolstered poor intergovernmental relations. The provisions of the Constitution included legislative and judicial arms of government, fundamental human rights, federal and state civil services and a Nigerian Police Force, bodies which had federal and state officials as members; 66 items were exclusively left for the federal government while the federal and state governments shared powers on 28 items (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1979). Among the exclusive list is the control of mining and mineral resources by the federal government.

The implication of this was that more revenue accrued to the federal government. This made the states less autonomous as they had to depend on the federal government to discharge most of their duties. Even under the concurrent list, where they may sometimes clash in the discharge of their responsibilities, the wish of the government at the centre still prevailed.

The 1976 local government reforms gave recognition to local governments as the third tier of government and not as administrative units they were prior to that time (Elaigwu, 2006: 226). This did not translate to more powers to the subnational units as the federal government still wielded the most powers courtesy of the resources it controlled. Having oil as the mainstay of the economy which was controlled by the federal government meant that states and local governments became fiscally weak and by implication a more powerful centre.

Another thing that made the federal government more powerful in the 1979 Constitution was that in the case of a crises/crisis in a state, the federal legislature could take over the law-

making functions of that state and declare a state of emergency in a state with less hurdles (Elaigwu, 2006: 225). In essence, the State House of Assembly will be suspended, and a sole administrator will be appointed by the president to rule the state. The implication of this was that the government at the centre may use this as a punitive measure against a perceived enemy (state governor) irrespective of the political party.

The military governments of Buhari, Babangida and Abacha still maintained the federal nomenclature, but the structures were unitary in nature. However, the regime of Babangida oversaw the emergence of the 1989 Constitution, which operated relatively in the aborted Third Republic. This Constitution had some similarities with that of the 1979 Constitution in its provisions. For instance, the 1989 Constitution still retained the federal system of government. The Abdulsalam Administration was no different because it operated under decrees, but it ushered in the Fourth Republic through the 1999 Constitution. The various crises that took place between 1966 and 1999 further attest to the weak federal system in the country. They had ethnic and religious undertones, and these were signs that national integration had eluded the country for a long time.

6.2.4 The Fourth Republic

The 1999 Constitution is the framework for the practice of federalism from 1999 until date. The Constitution is a derivative of some of the provisions of the 1979 and 1989 Constitutions. The Exclusive List consists of 68 items while the concurrent list is made up of 30 items. Just like in 1979, the federal government still controls mining and mineral resources. This means revenue and power were still more concentrated in the centre. Notable revenue and resource control issues that dominated the early years in the Republic are the Onshore-Offshore dichotomy between the oil producing states and the federal government.

Ironically, state control of mineral resources recently ‘started’ in Nigeria but with contentions and threats to stability. The abundance of gold in Zamfara State and the control of the commodity by the state has further generated some heat on the issue of resource control. The Nigerian government has vested control of gold found in Zamfara state under the control of the state. The state is even proposing to sell gold worth N5billion to the Central Bank of Nigeria (Godwin, 2020). This negates item 39 of the exclusive list of the 1999 Constitution which provides for control of mineral resources by the federal government. This has

generated concerns from the Deputy President of the Senate and a Niger Delta group, Coalition of Riverine Deltans (Amaize, 2020; Godwin, 2020). According to the same authors, they noted that the proceeds of oil from the Niger Delta region goes to the Federation Account, which is shared by all tiers of government. The authors posit that it is improper for the proceeds from gold to go to Zamfara State alone. The control of gold by the state, if reciprocated in all states with respect to the mineral resources they possess would have been a very good idea. This would have reflected true federalism. However, granting the exclusive preserve to a Northern state is a threat to the stability of the country. The distrust between the North and the South may increase through this. This substantiates the need for restructuring where the groups in the country would come together and discuss how true federalism can be realised in which each geo-political zone will not be short-changed.

The democratic nature of this period means that the subnational units still enjoy some level of autonomy. However, the government at the centre have meddled with the affairs of the state inappropriately at different times. There are notable cases, for example, in May 2004, statutory allocations meant for local governments in Niger, Nasarawa, Ebonyi, and Lagos were withheld by former President Obasanjo on the grounds that they created new local governments and conducted elections there (Elaigwu, 2006: 230); however, that of Lagos State was withheld longer. Impeachment of state governors under controversial circumstances and declaration of state of emergency in two states were also indications that the states were mere appendages of the centre. Local governments have also accused states of illegal deductions from their allocations and shortening their three-year tenure (Elaigwu, 2006: 231).

Federalism during this period has also been threatened by ethnoreligious crises. These include riots that emanated after the introduction of Sharia in some Northern states, Jos riots, Shagamu violence between Hausas and Yorubas, Boko Haram insurgency, perennial herdsmen/farmers crises, among others. Another flaw in the Nigerian federal system since post First Republic is the absence of state police. Section 215 of the 1999 Constitution provides for a Nigeria Police Force, which is federal police. This no doubt has largely hampered the state's reaction to ethnoreligious crises because federal police may not have a good knowledge of cultural and geographical features of areas where it posts its personnel.

For instance, a police officer from Bauchi posted to Anambra state may face such a challenge, and this may limit his discharge of responsibilities.

In a similar vein, the ‘abduction’ of former Governor of Anambra State, Chris Ngige by a group led by an Assistant Inspector General of Police was an indication of the overwhelming power of the central government over police deployment (Fagbadebo 2020: 154-155). One of the participants emphasised the unitary nature of Nigeria’s federal system, with respect to one of the most recent security challenges in the country. He emphasised that, ‘You have instances where state governments for instance in Zamfara with all the killings carried out by bandits on innocent citizens, the governor is incapacitated to take the necessary measures because he does not command the security apparatus’ (PICL 1, January 2019). This expression resonates with the submission of Suberu (2019: 18) that one of the virtues of true federalism is the removal of police from the federal list. That means in Nigeria, though the governor is the chief security officer of his state, the commissioner of police does not receive instructions from him but the Inspector General of Police.

However, if states can have their police, governors may use the agency as a tool of intimidation. This narrative is justified because even some state governors still use federal police to promote their selfish political interests. For instance, in 2000, the former Osun State Governor, Chief Adebisi Akande used policemen to disrupt the proceedings of the House of Assembly to scuttle his impeachment process. The Aide de camp to the governor and the Chief Security Officer in the government house led policemen who manhandled the legislators (Fagbadebo, 2020: 437). Thus, state police could further strengthen the incumbent to intimidate opposition political groups and individuals.

In conclusion, federalism does not mean the absence of diversity, but it should be structured to promote unity in diversity. However, the Nigerian federal system operates with perpetual linings of ethnicity and religion in almost all matters. A participant substantiated this, asserting that ‘ethnicity and religion have emerged as the major fault lines in the Nigerian federal politics today. Even issues that had no ethnic or religious bearing, once they get politicised, they become interpreted as ethnic and religious and that divides the country immediately’ (PISSOL, December 2018). Usman (2014a: 376) elaborates that the challenges of the Nigerian federal system are fiscal federalism, resource control, activities of ethnic militias, ethnic and religious conflicts, census politics, state creation demands, allegations of

inequality, among others. The author also notes that the Nigerian federal system has been threatened with coup d'états, secession threats, civil war, several ethnic and religious conflicts, and the emergence of ethnic militias (Usman, 2014a). Moreover, the sharing of revenue between the centre and the component units is a major problem of the Nigerian federal system (Usman, 2014a).

6.3 Fault Lines of Nigerian Federal System

Several factors seem to trigger instability in the Nigerian Federal system. These factors include population, religion, ethnicity, and resources. In different ways, these factors lead to feelings of relative deprivation and conflict. This dissertation argues that the elites articulate these grievances and package them as that of certain groups be they ethnic or religious.

The elites would portray their group as being marginalised. The root cause of these is most times the feelings that a group has been favoured above another group. This is encapsulated in the view of one of the study's participants who explained what marginalisation is. 'Marginalisation means you were equal before and suddenly you are now less, or you were both winning before and suddenly, you have been shut out of winning or you could do something, and they have refused you the opportunity to do that thing' (PISSP, January 2019). The theoretical underpinning of relative deprivation (Asingo, 2018; Flynn, 2011; Smith and Pettigrew, 2015) supports this opinion. The theory further explains that this could snowball into violence (Gurr, 2016).

Elites play a crucial role in nurturing marginalisation. There has been the perception that without the elites raising the issue of marginalisation, feelings of denial and the effects would not have held the country to ransom this much. Some of the participants substantiate this assertion. One of them said, 'It is not the average man on the street or the poor man that talks about marginalisation' (PINEOL, January 2019). In a similar vein, another participant said, 'the elites exacerbate ethnic and religious sentiments. The elites create consciousness about marginalisation to whip up sentiments for their selfish interest, and most times, the masses are ignorant' (PINEOL, January 2019). A similar opinion is shared by PIR 1. However, another participant considered marginalisation holistically; 'We are on a different level of marginalisation, not in the context of religion alone but the context of tribe, economic sharing, political power and every other thing' (PICCL, January 2019). According to PISSP, 'Every

region of this country has a peculiar problem tied to each of these states as one ethnic group suffers from marginalisation’ (PISSP, January 2019).

PINWP 2 believed it is imaginary. ‘The question of marginalisation does not even exist. It only exists in the imaginary. I do not think there is any ethnic group that is marginalised’ (PINWP 2, January 2019). The participant believed elites fabricated these claims to generate divisions. These claims align with the findings of Odeyemi (2014: 10) that in situations where political elites have not performed well in office in Nigeria, rather than admitting their faults, they would whip up ethnic sentiments by claiming that their ethnic groups were the target of marginalisation. A participant shared a similar viewpoint, saying, ‘I think the whole idea of marginalisation.....is a hoax and the elites have always used it as an instrument to cover their poor governance or localising governance or should I say personalising governance’ (PISWOL, January 2019). This opinion resonates with the position of Ojukwu and Shopeju (2010: 17) that the patrons provide the followers with jobs and other resources in exchange for the political support from the latter. The roles of the elites in fabricating marginalisation are not a pushover, and that is why elite theory is germane to this study. Irrespective of the varying opinions, marginalisation has been on the lips of Nigerians even before independence. It is a factor, which has not only determined the extent of peace in the country but also shaped government policies over the years.

6.3.1 Population

Population plays an important role in a federal system as it is a source of economic and political power. Population is a major factor in determining the number of seats in parliament, the number of local governments and to some extent, revenue allocation. The 1953 Census result was the basis for allocating seats for the regions in the House of Representatives and revenue sharing, and this favoured the North (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 168). The Southerners felt the British favoured the North in the 1953 result, and the Southerners were not initially enthusiastic about the census (Diamond, 1988: 132). The author further posits that upon seeing what a higher population can give a region, the Southern politicians embarked on vigorous propaganda campaigns and toured every constituency in the region to educate and prepare its people for another census. Consequently, the 1962 census result (the South had 70% increase while the North had 30% increase) was not appealing to the NPC led

government and that led to the cancellation of the result and conducting another one in the following year (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 168; Iwara, 2010: 530). The actions of the South, as well as the cancellation of the result, decimated the integration of the country as the two regions became suspicious of each other.

According to the 1963 census, the population of the North was 53.5%, East was 22.3%, Western region was 18.4% while the Mid-West was 4.6% of the country's population (Elaigwu, 2002: 74). The 1962/63 census results fueled ethnic and regional tensions in Nigeria (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018: 10). Although, the religion an individual belongs to has not been asked since the 1963 National Census (Odubajo, 2011: 16). The North's population has since then surpassed that of the South, and this has created a sense of deprivation for the South despite not giving religion and ethnicity recognition. Religious and ethnic questions were excluded from the 1991 population census, but the outcome was still a Northern majority of 53% (Suberu, 1993: 44).

6.3.2 Religion

Religious crises have been a bane to integration in Nigeria. Factors that have bolstered religious sensitivity and religious disturbance in Nigeria include joining the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986, the status of Sharia in the constitution, the role of government on religious pilgrimage, the religious affiliation of political office holders, construction of religious centres with government fund, allocation of public land to religious institutions, among others (Suberu, 1993: 42-43). The fear of losing Northern Muslim support made Babangida attempt to join the Organisation of Islamic Conference, and this was not in tangent with Nigeria's Christians' understanding of the country's secularity; he had to shelve the plan to join the OIC due to pressure from Christians (Falola and Heaton, 2008: x1 and 222).

The Maitatsine religious uprisings of the early to mid-1980s were not really an inter-religious matter. The sect mainly targeted Muslims on ideological issues. Most of the riots that occurred during the Babangida regime centred on religion in the form of violent clashes between Christians and Muslims which led to death from both sides and destruction of property (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 222-223). There was a bloody uprising by non-Muslims in some Northern states regarding the economic and cultural dominance of the Hausas and

Fulanis in the late 1980s (Suberu, 1993: 43). These include those of Ilorin in 1986, Kafanchan, Kaduna, Katsina, Funtua, Kano, and Zaria in 1987; Bauchi in 1991; and Zaria in 1992 (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 222). Zango-Kataf is a town inhabited by the People of Kataf and Hausas, and both have lived in tension over land ownership and location of market. In February and May 1992, there were clashes between the Hausas (predominantly Muslims) and Kataf (predominantly Christians) which led to the killing of many Hausas and later snowballed to a broader Muslim-Christian clash (Falola and Genova, 2009: 378). This created a sharp ideological and religious divide, especially between the majority Muslims and minority Christians in Northern Nigeria, and this has created distrust among them.

The unity of the country was threatened in the early months of the Fourth Republic due to the introduction of Shariah by some Northern states. The Nigerian legal system stands on the tripod of English Common, Sharia and Customary laws (Elaigwu, 2006: 209). The issue of Sharia is not new in Nigeria. As far as 1978, Northern Muslims had lobbied that a Sharia Court of Appeal should be included in the Constitution so that Muslims could be tried at the federal level using Islamic law (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 205; Olosos, 2010: 277). Christians opposed this and the compromise reached was that Muslim judges could seat to hear appeals in higher courts on cases emanating from local Sharia courts (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 205). The Nigerian system provides that Sharia law should handle only civil cases like divorce, guardianship, inheritance, among others, and it applies to only Muslims (Elaigwu, 2002: 91).

Zamfara state introduced Sharia legal system in 1999 (but took effect in 2000), and it was the first state to utilise it for criminal matters. Although it was meant for Muslims, non-Muslims feared it was a step towards Islamising the country (Falola and Genova, 2009: xli). Eleven other states soon followed Zamfara with varying degrees of implementation. Southerners saw the move by the Northern States as an attempt to frustrate the administration of Olusegun Obasanjo, a Southern Christian. The Muslims in the Northern States were more disposed to the practice of the Sharia Legal System, while Southern Muslims had mixed feelings (Olosos, 2010: 278). The reasons for the response are not far-fetched from having an almost equal population of Christians and Muslims in the South West and North Central as well as Christian majority in the South South and South East. The introduction of Sharia in Kaduna led to the killings of Southerners in the state and the reprisal killing of Hausa/Fulani in Abia and Imo states (Elaigwu, 2002: 91).

6.3.3 Ethnicity and Military Coups

The way the British designed their handover was such that the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups were saddled with the political control of the country (Wara, 2014: 29). This created suspicion by other ethnic groups and fear of being dominated by the Hausa and Fulani groups, and it became a conducive atmosphere to support the activities of the coup plotters especially in the South (Wara, 2014: 29). Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of Northern Region also alleged that the Igbos like to dominate wherever they are. These passive factors snowballed into the first military coup of 15 January 1966. Some officers in the Nigerian Army of which all except one were from the East carried it out. However, the obvious reasons for the coup include the Tiv riots of the 1960s and the military response of the Northern region government to quench it, the 1962/63 election crisis, the Western Region crisis of 1962, the 1964 General Election issues, the 1965 Western region election brouhaha, among others (Nwala, 1997: 11; Tamuno, 1970: 575).

The ethnic dimension with the coup became conspicuous because most of the victims were Northern and Western politicians and military officers. The North was not happy with the way the Sardauna (the premier) was killed. Although, the coup was not successful but Ironsi, the most senior military officer who was also Igbo became the Head of State. What added salt to the wound apart from the Unification Decree earlier mentioned was that most of Ironsi's advisors were Igbos and this sent a continued Igbo domination signal to the North (Heerten and Moses, 2014: 173). In addition, the plotters of the January 1966 coup did not face trial but were just detained and were still receiving their salaries (Akinsanya, 2002b: 16-17). All these events caused dissent between the North and the East and were some of the major causes of the civil war.

A counter-coup was carried out in July 1966, and mostly Northern military officers executed it. This cost the lives of Aguiyi Ironsi and Adekunle Fajuyi, the military governor of the Western Region. This was seen as revenge against the Igbos over the first coup. This no doubt widened the divisions between the North and the Igbos and was one of the immediate events that led to the civil war.

Apart from the two coups explained above, there were coups in 1975, 1976, 1983, 1985, 1990, 1993, 1995 and 1997. Some were successful, some were not, and some were alleged.

Among these, that of 1990 was conspicuously ethnically inclined and threatened federal stability in the country. The April 22, 1990 Coup was an ethnically lined coup because it was carried out by officers from the Middle Belt and the Southern part of the country against Northern officers. Major Gideon Orkar, a Tiv man from the North Central, led the coup. The announcement that the core Hausa, Fulani and Islamic states of Borno, Bauchi, Kano, Katsina and Sokoto were to be excised from the rest of the country exposed the ethnic undertone of the plotters (Wara, 2014: 30). Major Orkar's statement further established the ethnic marginalisation paintings of the coup thus:

We wish to emphasize that this is not just another coup, but a well-conceived, planned and executed revolution for the marginalised, oppressed and enslaved peoples of the Middle Belt and the South with a view to freeing ourselves and children yet unborn from eternal slavery and colonisation by a clique of this country (in Mordi, 2015).

It has been posited that the Gideon Orkar-led coup against the Babangida administration was another confirmation of minorities' frustration (Genyi, 2014: 486). Their actions were mostly in support of the people of the Middle Belt and the Niger Delta. This was history in action like the agitations of the Middle Belt and Niger Delta in the First Republic. It was a sign that some parts of the country were still not satisfied with the Nigerian project.

6.3.4 Resources

Resource allocation and distribution are pivotal for a federal system. Once the borders of the federal units are settled, the contention revolves around the distribution of resources. The distribution of oil revenue has been a contentious issue in Nigerian politics. The Niger Delta Region, located in the South is the major oil producing area in Nigeria and is occupied by minority groups. These groups include Ijaws, Itsekiris, Urhobos, Ogoni, among others.

The Niger Delta challenges alongside other minority issues led to constituting the Willink Commission. The composition of political parties which was dominated by majority groups and the fear that the majority groups will dominate them in each region culminated in the setting up of the commission. The Middle Belt area also contains minorities, but the conceptions of their status and issues in Nigeria are different. The Niger Delta people believe their problems are rooted in their minority status while the Middle Belt subscribe to the view that the Hausa/Fulani Oligarchy is the *raison d'être* of their problem and not the entire Nigerian State (Egwu, 2014: 7).

The Niger Delta Development Board was created in 1958, following the recommendation of the Willink Commission, because of the neglect and ecological challenges witnessed by the region (Osaghae, 2001:13). Nevertheless, this project was tainted with politics through the establishment of similar basin authorities across the county (Ama-Ogbari, 2010: 132). The continued exploration of oil in the region led to the continuous deepening of economic impoverishment as well as social, environmental degradation and these made Isaac Adaka Boro set the pace for Niger Delta agitation (Ama-Ogbari, 2010: 132). According to Fawehinmi, (2004), the focal points of Boro's agitation were socio-economic and political exclusion, neglect, and deprivation of the Niger Delta region by the Nigerian State (Fagbadebo, 2010: 87). These led to the establishment of the Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) (Fagbadebo, 2010: 87).

Isaac Adaka Boro declared the Niger Delta People's Republic on 23 February 1966, and this culminated in a twelve-day revolution against the Nigerian state (Ama-Ogbari, 2010: 132; Fagbadebo, 2010: 87; Omede, 2010:120). The Nigerian government later quenched this uprising, but it has since created political awareness on the plight of Niger Delta citizens, and this has threatened the integration of the Nigerian state. The Niger Delta issue generated less political tension (except for petitions) from the civil war period up to the Babangida administration (Nyityo, 2010: 17-18). Although, the government in the Second Republic set up a Presidential Task Force Known as the 15% committee in 1980. This did not deplete the challenges of the region.

After this period, Niger Delta groups started their agitations with a soft approach and not violence. These include petitions to the government, sponsoring motions in parliament, media publicity, the formation of a mass movement group, which drew up the Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) (Nyityo, 2010: 17-18). Ken Saro Wiwa-led activities for the Niger Delta from the 1980s to the mid-1990s marked the end of somewhat peaceful agitations (Larab, 2010:189). In the 1990s, the Ogonis of Niger Delta clamoured for improved resource allocation to the region and environmental protection because of the activities of the multinational oil companies (Usman, 2014b: 292). Hence, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) was formed in 1992 (Falola and Genova, 2009: xxv).

The government in response formed the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission in 1992, but the challenges with the region persisted. The demands in the Niger

Delta have been documented by the agitators through the OBR (1990), Ijaw Youth Congress Kaima Declaration (1998), Ogbia Declaration (1999) and the Ikwerre Rescue Charter (1999) (Osaghae, 2001: 11). These demands are enveloped in three main points: more political autonomy and resource control like that which the regions experienced in the First Republic as well as inclusiveness and equality in the composition of the government at the centre (Osaghae, 2001: 12); the second one is the provision of large financial compensation by the multinational corporations for environmental damages as well as developing the host communities and employing their youth (Osaghae, 2001: 12); the last one is to restructure revenue allocation so that oil-producing states can have more from derivation (Osaghae, 2001: 12).

Up until 1998, the people in the Niger Delta region were making demands without much violence. The military government jettisoned the derivation principle (Nyityo, 2010: 14). For instance, before this time, in 1970, derivation was 45%, it was later reduced to 20% and by 1979, it was eliminated in favour of the federal government (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 186). The killing of Ken Saro Wiwa, eight others, and the continued negative response of the state to protests by the oil producing communities made militancy become the only option to make their grievances known (Walter and Uhumwuango, 2010: 377). The Nigerian government in 1998 deployed personnel of the Nigerian Army and Navy as well as two warships to volatile states (Delta and Bayelsa) (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018: 6). In response, more than 2000 youths protested in the state capitals and soldiers opened fire on them (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018: 6).

The problems of the region have become more complex in the Fourth Republic, and this led to the springing up of several groups of which most of them took to militancy. Since the advent of the Fourth Republic, some actions of the government have made the region feel alienated the more. The Odi massacre, the onshore-offshore dichotomy case that favoured the federal government, the loss of Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon and the failure of the government to properly settle the indigenes of Bakassi (Nyityo, 2010: 15) all have negative effects. The Odi Massacre had its root cause in the Killing of some policemen by Ijaw people on November 21, 1999 and the retaliatory killing of over 60 civilians in Odi by the Nigerian military (Santas, 2014: 241).

Ojakorotu (2006: 230-233) identifies causes of conflict in the Niger Delta to include the structure of the Nigerian federal system, perceived/real marginalisation of the region, activities of oil and gas firms, and ethnicity/nationalism. Others are the failure to repeal or amend perceived obnoxious legislations, alliance of the government with the oil companies at the detriment of the oil communities as well as military response and proliferation of arms. The militants used these among other historical reasons to justify their operations. One of the participants explained the reasons for militancy in the Niger Delta thus:

Marginalisation is in terms of degrees as an ordinary citizen of Nigeria from whatever part of the country you come from. You have certain entitlements as a citizen, and you do not get that, you may well feel marginalised. If it becomes part of a group, then the group is marginalised. That is at the first level, but the greater part of marginalisation is the type being cloned by the people of Niger Delta. Is not just that you have certain entitlements for being citizens of Nigeria, the resources are derived from your territory, yet you do not have access to.....the bulk of it is being taken elsewhere, controlled by other people, used in developing other parts of the country whereas your own part of the country stagnates in misery, despoliation, and poverty. So, that is like a double tragedy, and then when the resource we are talking about happens to be oil and gas, the tragedy becomes triple because in collecting these resources, further damage is done to the environment. You cannot even maintain your pre-style level of existence, peasant farming, fishing, artisanal vocation and so on, so you are not benefiting from the resource derived from your area, you are not compensated as a citizen of Nigeria, and your environment/source of living is despoiled, and that is the worst form of marginalisation. Yes, for me, where I come from, the Niger Delta, I experienced it first-hand (PISSOL, December 2018).

The views support Nyityo's (2010: 10) position that the Niger Delta produces the main revenues for the country and the groups in the region believe that they are being deprived of the full benefits of the wealth that flows from their areas. Similarly, the Niger Delta region grapples with environmental degradation, unemployment, poverty, abuse of rights by security agents due to unfair share and management of oil revenue (Akai, 2010: 48). The challenges with the Niger Delta portray what relative deprivation represents. The poverty experienced in the region and other regions makes the masses susceptible to becoming foot soldiers for executing elites' orchestrated marginalisation propaganda.

The groups that sprang up include the Movement for the Survival of the Ijaw Ethnic Nationality in the Niger Delta, the Ijaw National Congress, the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), the Itsekiri General Assembly, the Urhobo Union, the Chikoko Movement and MOSOP (Luqman, 2014: 171). The hostility in the Niger Delta later metamorphosed into hostage taking, kidnapping, killings, as well as clashes between security agents and militants

(Akinola, 2010: 212). Hence, militancy dominated the political landscape of the region since the commencement of the Fourth Republic. The Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Alhaji Mujahid Asari Dokubo emerged in 2004, with an all-out war against oil companies in the region and the Nigerian state (Luqman, 2014: 171). The leader was arrested in 2005, and charged for treason, but this did not stop the operations of militant groups in the region (Luqman, 2014: 171).

The response of the government was the setting up of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in early 2000 and more of military intervention, but this did not stop the violent agitations from the region. The steps taken by President Yar'Adua to end the conflict in the Niger Delta include reorganising NDDC, having a Niger Delta Master Plan, creating the Niger Delta Ministry and finally granting amnesty (Odoemelan, Okeibunor, Alikor, and Agu, 2014: 722). The last one was the magic that drastically reduced conflict in the region (Odoemelan, et al., 2014: 715).

Hitherto, negotiations were difficult. The large number of armed groups that exist in the Niger Delta region has always made negotiation with the government and oil companies difficult. Consequently, the Pan Niger Delta Elders Forum (PANDEF) has risen, to harmonise these grievances and engage in talks with the government (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018: 4). This helped to bring a great measure of peace to the region since the end of 2016 (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018: 4). The activities of the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), which emerged in January 2016, truncated the peace that had been experienced in the Niger Delta between 2009 and 2015 (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018: 4). Following negotiations between PANDEF and the government, NDA reduced its attacks on oil installations, and this led to the emergence of Reformed Niger Delta Avengers, which is committed to ensuring that government fulfils its developmental promises to the region (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018: 4).

6.3.5 Threats of Secession, Civil War and Unresolved Grievances

Aside from the threat to secede by the NDVS on issues affecting the Niger Delta, there have been threats of secession from different sections in the country. These were signs that Nigeria's federal system did not address unity in diversity as expected. Northern Nigeria threatened to secede from the country in 1950 if it did not have 50% representation of the

Legislative Council in Lagos (Elaigwu, 2006: 220). The Western Region also threatened to secede in 1953 if the Colony of Lagos was not merged with it (Elaigwu, 2006: 220). The Eastern region threatened to secede in 1964 following the way the 1964 election was conducted (Tamuno, 1970: 574). Because of the maladministration of their territory from the colonial period to independence, the Tiv people threatened to secede in 1965 (Tamuno, 1970: 575). When General Aguiyi Ironsi changed the country to a unitary system in 1966, the North threatened to secede (Elaigwu, 2006: 220). The secession attempt that threatened the integration of the country most was that of Biafra in 1967.

Earlier on, the Unification Decree of General Ironsi sent a signal of Igbo domination of the civil service and other sectors of the country. The unification decree was designed to jettison regionalism as well as tribal loyalty and consciousness (Teniola, 2017). This negates the federal principle of unity in diversity because no matter how a country needs to be united, people are still aware that they belong to an ethnic group. He went further to centralise the public service, and the major component of this was to downplay the quota system but embrace merit (Teniola, 2017). According to Teniola (2017), these decisions never favoured the North because in terms of human resources, the South, especially the Eastern region, had more qualified personnel. The author further averred that while the Eastern Region governor, Odumegwu Ojukwu applauded the decree, the governors of the Mid-West and North were against it. The Western region governor was neutral. The Head of State was also an Igbo man. This led to the pogrom of tens of thousands of Igbos resident in the North between May and September 1966 (Hill, 2012: 52).

After the July 1966 coup (executed by some Northern officers), the pre-coup events and the death of Ironsi aggravated the fears of the Igbos in the North. Gowon became the Head of State and Ojukwu being the Governor of the Eastern Region rejected him on the ground that he was not the most senior military officer in the country and should not have been made the Head of State (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 174). In September 1966, Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu asked Igbos living in other parts of the country to return home. In January 1967, there was a meeting between the Supreme Military Council and Ojukwu to prevent the impending crises, but the outcome was not a success. Ojukwu declared that the Eastern region was going to take over federal government departments and agencies domiciled in the Eastern Region, but the federal government declared such intention as illegal (Hill, 2012: 52). By

May 30, 1967, Ojukwu declared the independent state of Biafra, and by July 6, 1967, war broke out between the Nigerian and Biafran forces (Falola and Heaton, 2008: xvi-xvii; Hill, 2012: 52-53).

The war ended on January 12, 1970. It is believed that the major reason the federal government fought against the secession is the abundance of crude oil in the then Biafra (Hill, 2012: 52). Biafra was reincorporated back into the country after the war (Falola and Heaton, 2008: xvi-xvii). The 30-month civil war led to the death of 1 to 3 million people (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 158). The circumstances surrounding the civil war and the continued secession bid of Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra and IPOB has decimated the trust other parts of the country bestow on the Igbos as actors on national integration. This has affected the trust other Nigerians have in an Igbo man becoming the president. There are claims that the ethnic group is being marginalised in terms of producing the president of Nigeria and holding other key positions. This is shared by PISEP holistically.

Yes, mine has been marginalized, and there is a historical argument to it. I am of the Igbo stock. Prior to the Biafran crisis or the Nigerian civil war, there has always been this suspicion of the Igbos trying to dominate the other parts of the county, then of course when the civil war now occurred, the Igbos were like defeated. Certain amnesties were reached, certain structural arrangements were equally put in place, then you now talk about re-integration of the people that supposedly broke away from the federation, and now you started noticing certain levels of limitation of people. The public service, military institutions and stuff of that nature which is what you hear reverberating up till this moment. People will tell you that they do not have any senior military officer in any command position or even within the security apparatus of the country. These are all issues that you look at within the political angle and now say okay here could be marginalisation (PISEP, January 2019).

This reiterates the belief that elites can use these as instruments to propagate manipulation even though they will be the ones to occupy these key positions with little development. This elitist attitude and approach to development are not peculiar to South East Nigeria, but it is a national issue. However, PISWP 1 disagreed with PISEP's opinion by focussing on the positions people from the region have occupied in this Fourth Republic. He stated that:

For the Igbos, to them, their marginalisation is that they have never been able to head the federal government and they hope that by 2023 they will be able to achieve their ambition, but the South East will not look at appointment structure even from 1999. They dominated the Obasanjo administration if you check. The key offices, the key positions. They did the same thing with Jonathan but as far as they are concerned, even when you look at the National Assembly, how many Igbos have been president of the Senate, not less than five of them (PISWP 1, December 2018).

This resonates with the fact that deprivation may not be absolute but relative. However, PISWOL posited that the region's demands are unimportant. He submitted below.

Now let us take a case of the Igbos. The Igbos are saying that since the civil war, they have not been president of this country.... this and that. That is correct, that is a fact. Now before the civil war, you said you do not want Nigeria. Do you really have legitimacy in asking to be president of a country you said you do not want? They are yet to provide answers to that question; we want to build; we do not want to destroy. We should ask that question then. The second question is there are still clamour for Biafra, IPOB, and all that is all over the place and none of the leaders is speaking against it, and at the same time, you say you want to be president of Nigeria. You cannot be here and there, let us know where you are. Then you now say we are being marginalised; you marginalised yourself because you have shown insincerity, you have shown lack of patriotism, lack of support for this nation. You cannot lead a nation that you are fighting (PISWOL, December 2018).

The fact that there is still demand for secession by the South East indicates that national integration is still fractured in Nigeria. All these fault lines have repercussions on achieving peace agenda in Nigeria.

6.4 Implications for Peace

The crises that the country has experienced have culminated in peace being threatened in the country. This is shown in **Table 4** below. The global peace index reveals how the skirmishes that have bewildered the country since independence have portrayed Nigeria's peace in comparison to other countries.

Table 4: Global Peace Index

S/N	YEAR	RANK	NUMBER OF RANKS PER YEAR
1	2010	137	149
2	2011	142	153
3	2012	146	158
4	2013	148	162
5	2014	151	162
6	2015	151	162
7	2016	149	163
8	2017	149	163
9	2018	148	163
10	2019	148	163
11	2020	147	163

Source: Compiled by author from the Institute for Economics and Peace⁸ Global Peace Index from 2010 to 2020.

These rankings as shown in **Table 4.** were arrived at because of some indicators. The indicators are internal and external conflicts fought, number of deaths from conflicts, percentage of displaced people to the population, political instability, terrorism, level of violent crimes, the possibility of violent demonstrations, militarisation, among others. These indicators are no doubt obvious in Nigeria as depicted in the electoral violence, activities of Boko Haram/Islamic State in West Africa Province, Niger Delta violence, banditry (terrorism) in some Northern states, kidnappings, among others. The positions Nigeria has occupied for the past 11 years attest to the low level of national integration in the country. These issues and other events highlighted in this chapter are major factors that have contributed to this ranking. However, something worthy of note is that some countries share the same position, so the number of countries under examination are more than the figures in **Table 4.**

Over the years, these series of violence have affected the unity of the country. They have further created distrust among the various groups in the county. It is true that they started from the pre-independence period and these centrifugal forces have continued.

⁸ <http://economicsandpeace.org/>

6.5 Conclusion

The Nigerian federal system has been characterised with much concentration of power with the centre compared to the subnational units. Colonial factors, military rule, and control of resources by the government at the centre are responsible for this. This imbalance in the system has made it difficult for the subnational units to effectively carry out their responsibilities. Consequently, different sections of the country feel less governmental impact.

The weak federal structure is pivotal to the allegations of marginalisation and agitations from different sections of the country. These discontents in the polity explain why national integration is being threatened in the country. It is also responsible for why different measures have been designed to address the situation.

The next chapter examines the different approaches being employed by the government to address the feeble integration in the country. These measures have evolved over the years depending on each situation and the government in power.

CHAPTER SEVEN

GOVERNMENTS' MEASURES TO FOSTER NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN NIGERIA

7.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the measures designed to ensure unity in diversity in Nigeria. Successive governments have adopted these in the country, and they cut across different segments of Nigerian society. The chapter explores the various measures and the motives to mitigate these conflicts and the success of these integrative programmes. These include, among others, constitutional conferences, revenue allocation from pre-independence until date, federal character principle, and the creation of states and local governments. This chapter argues that the competing interests of the elites undercut the success of these initiatives and measures.

7.2 Convocation of National Constitutional Conferences and Constitution Drafting Committees

A national conference is the formal convergence of the various groups in a diversified society designed to ventilate on challenging issues of instability to arrive at common solutions to the pressing national problems (Ajayi, 2006: 124). It is a formal platform for dialogue by constituent units of the nation convened by the national government of a country to discuss issues or problems that inhibit national progress or challenge national cohesion (National Conference, 2014: 2). Conversely, a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) assumes all legislative and executive authority, whose outcomes might lead to the formation of a new government and promulgates a new constitution (Nwala, 1997: 5). The various National Constitutional Conferences in Nigeria were not sovereign. Their outcomes were subjected to legislative and executive approvals for implementation. The conferences were convened in response to the challenges associated with the operation of the country's federal system. The various conferences organised by different administrations in Nigeria will be explained subsequently.

7.2.1 The 1966 Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference Committee and the 1977 Constitution Drafting Committee

The military coup and the counter coup of January and July 1966, respectively, marked the first post independent challenge to Nigeria's federal system (Akinsanya, 2002b). Decree 34 of 1966 which was promulgated by the first military administration was welcomed by some Southern elites but was vehemently opposed by the Northern elites. The outcome was the counter coup of July 1966.

The tension generated by this development signaled a drift in the country's national cohesion. In a bid to forestall a looming civil war occasioned by the counter coup, the government set up an Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee in September 1966 to draft an acceptable political framework for the future political stability of the country (Hill, 2012: 52). The four regions sent their delegates to the Committee, with their regional demands. Except for the Mid-West Region, which insisted on a strong and true federal system, the other three regions sought a loose federal system that guaranteed regional rights to secession (Akinsanya, 2002b: 20; Omololu, 2012). The position of the Mid-Western Region was occasioned by the size of the region, even though it had a large deposit of crude oil that could sustain its fiscal needs. On the other hand, the elites in the other three regions were mostly concerned about the political exigencies that would place them at a vantage position of control of the political power of their respective autonomous regions (National Conference, 2014: 34; Omololu, 2012).

However, the Committee could not conclude its deliberations because of the killings of citizens of the Eastern Region resident in the North. The delegates of the Eastern and Western regions withdrew from the Committee. Therefore, the Committee was adjourned, *sine die* (Akinsanya, 2002b). This development prompted the Regional Military Governor, Odumegwu Ojukwu, to order the citizens to move back home (Hill, 2012). This development reached a climax when the region declared the secession of the Eastern Region from Nigeria, under the name Republic of Biafra, in 1967 (Hill, 2012). The consequence of this was a 30-month civil war that began on July 6, 1967.

The end of the Civil War, on January 15, 1970, heralded a search for a measure to stabilise the divided nation and establish a united national consciousness. The Murtala/Obasanjo government initiated a transition to a civilian administration and announced the composition

of the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) in September 1977, with the mandate of drafting a constitution for the country (Phillips, 1980). The 50-member CDC had two delegates from each of the states (Phillips, 1980: 2-3). They were charged to find a lasting solution, through constitutional measures, to the centrifugal forces in the country's federal system (Nwabueze, 2013).

While the CDC was to produce a draft constitution, the Constituent Assembly (CA 1), which was also constituted in 1977, was to debate on the propositions of the CDC (Azelama, and Oarhe, 2010: 502). The elites in the CDC and the CA 1 were unanimous in their resolve to ensure the country's unity. This was possible because the elected and selected elites to the CA 1 and the CDC, respectively, used the platform to test their political popularity in preparation for the national elections (Suberu, 2019). Thus, their participation at the CA 1 was essential to project their political interests through alignment and realignment of political forces.

The CDC report was submitted to the CA 1 and the draft of the 1979 Constitution produced by the CA 1 marked a remarkable departure from the federal structure in the 1963 Constitution. Sixteen items on the concurrent legislative list in the 1963 Constitution were moved to the exclusive list in the 1979 Constitution, thereby reinforcing a centralised federal structure (Suberu, 2019: 10-11). The implication of this, coupled with the creation of 12 regions out of the 4-regional structure, further weakened the autonomy of the component units of the country's federal system.

The draft constitution also recommended a presidential system of government, with the president and the governors, accorded executive power in their respective domains. In essence, the central government is further strengthened with the president exercising executive power in a federal structure in a manner that undermines the powers of the component units (Sambo, 2002: 343). As a negotiated document among the political and military elites, the Constitution strengthened the quest for political powers at the various levels of government. However, it further weakened the powers of the component units of the federal system and strengthened the central government's power. This marked the beginning of the centralised federal system that shifted the focus of the political elites to the quest for control of the central government.

A major issue that polarised the elites at the CDC and the CA 1 was the propriety of the inclusion of Sharia law in the constitution. Nevertheless, the secular status of Nigeria resolved the universal application of Sharia law and its inclusion in the Constitution (Hasan-Bello, 2019: 9). The Constitution established the Sharia Court of Appeal mainly for litigation from the states that would seek to implement Sharia laws in their domain.

The 1979 presidential Constitution was implemented between October 1, 1979, and December 31, 1983, when another military coup led to the overthrow of the civilian government. This military putsch was occasioned by the greed of the political elites as well as their penchant for the control of power for their pecuniary advantages. This led to the spate of the crises of governance that characterised the government of the Second Republic and the violence that followed the conduct of the 1983 general elections.

7.2.2 The Political Bureau and the Constitution Review Committee (CRC)

A counter coup of August 1985, led by General Ibrahim Babangida, toppled the leadership of the 1983 putsch. Consequent to the demand by the political elites and civil society for return to civil rule, the military government initiated a transition programme. The first phase of the programme was the composition of the Political Bureau, charged with the responsibility to consider the historical antecedent of political and federal instability in the country (Nwala, 1997; Omololu, 2012; Report of the Political Bureau, 1987). The 17-member Political Bureau established in 1985 composed of intellectuals and constitutional experts selected by the military government. This phase further consolidated the power of the military government as the political elites began to juggle for alignments in preparation for another round of transition programmes. Its main responsibility was to collate submission from citizens and groups on their preferred structure and system of government that would be more suitable for the country's future stability (Report of the Political Bureau, 1987). The Political Bureau, in its report submitted in 1987, recommended the presidential system and retained the existing centralised federal structure.

On September 7, 1987, the military government inaugurated a 46-member CRC and a Constituent Assembly (CA 2) to consider the report of the Political Bureau (Suberu, 2019: 8). The CRC and the CA 2 also provided the platforms for the political elites to establish their political networks once again in preparation for the impending political activities. The

deliberations at the two fora, which were mainly controlled by the military, centred around the need for a new political orientation that would involve the participation of citizens from the grassroots rather than the reification of the existing political alignments (Suberu, 2019). Thus, the concept of grassroots politics became dominant during the period. Nevertheless, as lofty as this orientation might sound, the political elites whose acolytes were elected and selected into the CRC and the CA 2 exploited the fora to reinforce their political alignments (Azelama, and Oarhe, 2010: 504). The outcome of the CRC and the CA 2 activities was the drafting of the 1989 Constitution designated to be used for the truncated Third Republic.

One of the novelties in the 1989 Constitution was the creation of two political parties by the military government: the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 225). Nevertheless, the annulment of the 1993 presidential election, won by the SDP candidate, Moshood Abiola (a Yoruba elite), re-enacted the ethnic crises that characterised the previous civilian regimes. Even though the outcomes of the election marked a shift in the country's political landscape, nevertheless, its annulment sought to confirm the perception that the Northern political and military elites would not concede political power to the political elites from the Southern part of the country (Omololu, 2012). This fear of domination and marginalisation has remained a characteristic feature of the Nigerian federal system and the demand for a decentralised federal structure.

7.2.3 The 1994/1995 National Constitutional Conference

Consequent to the political instability generated by the annulment of the 1993 presidential elections, the demand for the restructuring of the Nigerian federal system reechoed through the convocation of a SNC (Fagbadebo, 2000; Omololu, 2012). This implication was that the SNC would be autonomous, and its outcome would not be subjected to any other authority (Nwala, 1997: 5). The intensity of the demand and the ensued political crisis compelled the government to announce the inauguration of a National Constitutional Conference in 1994 (Nwala, 1997: 24; Report of the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference; Omololu, 2012). Even at that, major political elites in the South West, who were already established in the country's political landscape, objected to the participation of the region in the Conference. Thus, the elected and selected delegates from the South West at the Conference were regarded as the second best (Fagbadebo, 2000).

The 1994/95 Constitutional Conference was made up of 369 members, comprising 273 elected and 96 selected delegates (Report of the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference). The major decisions of the Conference that attracted national debate were power sharing through rotational presidency, devolution of the federal system, revenue sharing formulas, application of federal character principle in national appointments, and a six-zonal federal arrangement (Nwala, 1997; Omololu, 2012). Deliberations of these issues at the Conference brought the divisive characteristics of the North-South dichotomy to the fore.

Delegates from the South were unanimous on their demands for a restructured federal system that would incorporate the entrenchment of power sharing formula in the constitution, devolution of the powers of the central government to the component states, and equitable representation of all the six geo-political zones in political and bureaucratic appointments (Fagbadebo, 2000; Omololu, 2012). The delegates from the North were opposed to these issues and sought the continuation of the *status quo*. For the former, power devolution to the component units meant stronger component units that would allow them to seek their political fortunes within the confinement of their respective geo-political zones (Fagbadebo, 2000). The latter sought to consolidate their domineering power of control in the centralised federal structure and its adjoining principles of the quota system, which favoured them in terms of federal appointments. In essence, stronger federating units would whittle down the sprawling influence of the Northern political elites on the central government.

The 1994/95 Constitutional Conference in its report endorsed rotational presidency between the North and the South, created six Vice Presidents, each representing the six geo-political zones, reflection of federal character in federal appointments, and devolution of more powers from the central government to the states (Report of the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference). The rotational presidency clause in the report was the high point of the achievement of the Conference (Fagbadebo, 2000; Omololu, 2012). It rekindled the hope among the political elites from the South that one of them would be elected as the president of the country.

7.2.4 Constitutional Conferences in the Fourth Republic

President Obasanjo inaugurated the National Political Reforms Conference 2005, also known as Confab 2005, in February 2005, and its members were mainly picked by the president and state governors (Nwabueze, 2013). The Confab 2005 had no constitutional backing, neither

did the National Assembly approve the fund to finance it (Ajayi, 2006: 124 and 127). Its mandate was to look into issues like political party system, electoral, legal, civil society, police/prison reforms, intergovernmental relations and structure of government (Ajayi, 2006: 124 and 126). The 'no-go areas' are the country's unity, federal character, federalism, religious diversity, separation of powers, essential objectives, and principles of state policy (Ajayi, 2006: 124 and 126). The purpose of the Conference, as stated by the then Attorney General, Akinlolu Olujimi was part of the consultation process to aid the Presidency and National Assembly in addressing salient national issues (Nwabueze, 2013).

In the 2005 Conference, the Niger Delta delegates (Niger Delta elites) demanded an initial 25% derivation for a short term and for it to become 50% in the long term, but the Northern delegates (Northern elites) rejected that and tabled 17% before the Conference which the oil producing areas' delegates rejected (Okpanachi and Garba, 2010: 6-7; Usman, 2014a: 383). This led to a walkout by the delegates from the South South and South West (Niger Delta and Yoruba Elites, respectively) who demanded 'more favourable' fiscal federalism (Usman, 2014a: 383). The Conference ended abruptly due to failure to agree on certain issues, especially that of derivation (Nwabueze, 2013). It is apparent that the distribution of resources dominated the interests of the elites during this Conference. It can be concluded that Northern elites had their way because the country still uses the 13% derivation principle, which has been in use before the Conference. The Confab 2005 still could not cement the fragments the North-South relationship had generated.

The administration of Goodluck Jonathan convened a constitutional conference in 2014. The National Conference was inaugurated on March 17, 2014, and it was made up of 492 delegates and a six-member conference management (National Conference, 2014: 23 and 44). The 2014 Constitutional Conference had an imbalanced composition as Muslims were 198 out of 492 delegates despite their population in the country; its establishment without legislation by the National Assembly portrayed it as trying to hijack the functions of the National Assembly and bringing out the conspicuous gulf between the Southern decentralist and Northern centralist perspectives on federalism (Suberu, 2019: 18).

President Goodluck Jonathan mandated the Conference to proffer a solution to the challenges of national unity and development and that the only 'no-go-area' is any discussion on the break-up of the country (National Conference, 2014: 34). The conference recommended that

police should be moved from the exclusive to the concurrent list, independent candidacy, minority rights, recognition of traditional rulers in the constitution, devolution of political and fiscal powers, among others (National Conference, 2014: 140, 339, 342, 346 and 347). It also recommended rotating public offices at the three levels of government. That the office of the President should be rotated between the North and the South and among the six geopolitical zones, rotation of the office of the governor among the three senatorial districts in the state and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) should divide each local government into two or three areas which should be the basis for rotating the chairmanship position (National Conference, 2014: 286). It also recommended that women, youth and the physically challenged should be allowed to participate in the political process (National Conference, 2014: 286).

The delegates from the South-South (Niger Delta elites) demanded that the 13% derivation should increase and threatened that failure to do so meant the creeks will know no peace (Nwabughio, 2014). Conspicuously, the distribution of resources was also a key feature. The Northern elites, as usual, were not in support of this. This is in congruence with Suberu's earlier view on the centralist (Northern elites) and decentralist (Southern elites) views of these elites (Suberu, 2019: 18). It is difficult to fully ascertain which side the pendulum swung because the resolutions of the Conference are yet to be implemented. The resolution of the Conference (on pages 78 to 527 of the report) can promote true federalism if implemented, but Jonathan's government had no time to implement them, and Buhari's government has not considered the report either. This view is shared by PISSOL, but he preferred considering not only the 2014 Constitutional Conference but also the Constitutional Conference of 94/95. He stated that 'the 1995 Conference, the 2014 Conference, those volumes contain lofty ideas on how Nigeria can wax stronger as a federation and as a presidential government and as a democracy' (PISSOL, December 2018). Although all the resolutions cannot be implemented, if some of them have been implemented, integration would have received a boost in Nigeria.

Generally, the 'no-go areas' specified in these conferences, reduces the actualisation of national unity. PINCP was of the view that:

What makes a Hausa man afraid of the Igbo man and why is the Igbo man afraid of the Yoruba person. These are issues we need to look at for us to have national integration. Until we look at that and agree because each time, we have national conferences, we are told, do not deliberate on these areas. These areas are precluded

from deliberation. We must come together, our hands on the table, face up and agree as to what we need to address as a nation. Then we can move forward and begin to talk about national integration (PINCP, January 2019).

This assertion attests to the fact that past conferences need to be revisited (utilise some of the recommendations and agree on new things). To achieve this, all stakeholders need to convene a SNC and be sincere on how to bolster integration in Nigeria.

7.3. Revenue Allocation

7.3.1 Definition of Revenue Allocation

Revenue allocation in a federal state connotes how revenue is shared among the levels of government. It also captures how such funds are generated. Fiscal federalism entails the allocation of tax/revenue and expenditure functions or the sharing of a federal state's fiscal resources among the tiers of government in the country (Babalola and Okafor, 2019: 4). Fiscal federalism is meant to correct the imbalance between the functions of an arm of government and its revenue raising capacity through a structure of intergovernmental fiscal transfer (Suberu, 2003: 11). The nucleus of revenue allocation in a federal state is fiscal federalism. The revenue allocation in Nigeria has constitutional support.

7.3.2 Constitution and Revenue Allocation

In Nigeria's fiscal federalism, revenue allocation, resource control, and derivation are inseparable because oil is the major source of the country's revenue. The federal government controls this source of revenue. Although there are other sources of revenue that accrue to the government at the centre. Federally collected revenues include petroleum and gas profit tax, royalties from oil, mining rent, corporate tax as well as customs and excise duties (Suberu, 2003: 11-12). Considering the oil-centric nature of the Nigerian economy, other sources of revenue, especially agriculture, have been given less attention. This has negatively affected the income of states. Sources of revenue for state governments include personal income tax, vehicle license fee, land tax, among others, while those of local governments are birth and death registration, tenement rates, environmental violations fines, among others (Babalola and Okafor, 2019: 15; Suberu, 2003: 14). These revenue sources are inseparable from the constitutional functions of each tier of government. In the First Republic, the regions had expenditure and revenue responsibilities that positioned them to be viable stakeholders in the

Nigerian federal system. However, since the first military coup in 1966, the permutation has been so skewed in favour of the centre. **Tables 5 and 6** show the revenue and expenditure responsibilities of the central, states and local governments during the Fourth Republic.

Table 5: Expenditure Responsibilities of the Three Tiers of Government in Nigeria

Federal Government	State Government	Local Government
Defence	Education	Primary education
Foreign affairs	Health	Markets
Currency and insurance matters	State roads	Cemeteries
Citizenship	Agriculture	Sewage, public conveniences, and refuse disposal
Customs	Water supply	Local Roads
Immigration	Social welfare	Homes for the destitute and infirm
Police and prisons	Housing	Establishment and maintenance of slaughter houses
Mines and minerals		
Aviation		
Shipping and interstate water resources		
Post and telecommunications		
Railways*		
Federal roads		
Nuclear energy		
Commercial and industrial Monopolies, patents and, trade marks		
Minimum national education standard at all levels		

Compiled by author from Federal Government of Nigeria (1999) and Suberu (2003)

*There is a bill in the National Assembly to move it to the concurrent list where the states and federal will be able to operate rail transport.

Table 6: Revenue Responsibilities of the Three Tiers of Government in Nigeria

Federal Government	State Government	Local Government
Company income (and accompanying) tax	Personal income tax (regulated by national legislation)	Tenement rates for property
Personal income tax* for personnel of the armed forces, police, staff of the ministry of foreign affairs and residents of the FCT.	Capital gains tax and stamp duties on corporate entities (regulated by national legislation)	Shop, kiosk, and motor park fees
Petroleum and gas profit tax	Road or vehicle licenses fees	Radio, television, bicycle, cart, and domestic animals' licences
Mining rents and royalties	Business registration fees	Naming of roads and streets and numbering of houses
Value Added Tax (VAT)	Land tax	Marriage, birth, and death registration fees
Capital gains tax and stamp duties on corporate entities		Cattle tax
Import, export, and excise duties		Signboard/billboard advertisement fees

Compiled by author from Federal Government of Nigeria (1999) and Suberu (2003)

*Please note that this is not paid into the federation account. It is solely taken by the federal government and not shared with the states and local governments.

Tables 5 and 6 show that the federal government is more fiscally buoyant than the other tiers of government. Ideally, revenue allocation entails allocating actual or prospective revenue to the levels of government so that each of them can have the financial wherewithal to perform its assigned functions (Abubakar, 2005: 3). However, in the case of Nigeria, states and local governments in the country mostly depend on federal allocation to survive.

The 1999 Constitution provides for the functions of the three tiers of government. The exclusive list is meant for the federal, concurrent is shared by both, and some functions are

solely state and local government affairs. The 1999 Constitution stipulates that the exclusive list consists of 68 items while the concurrent list is made up of 30 items. As a result of over-reliance on oil, more revenue comes to the federal government compared to other tiers of government. Although the example of Zamfara state controlling its gold is not in line with the provisions of the Constitution.

Aside from the oil factor, most of the functions of the government at the centre have good revenue opportunities attached to them. The same is not the story regarding state and local governments. Some taxation responsibilities that fall under the concurrent list are designed such that except the National Assembly authorises a state, they cannot utilise such avenue to generate profit. Most of the matters that fall under the concurrent list like agriculture, education, health, some road construction, among others, require a lot of expenditure with less income considering the over-reliance on oil. These duties are designed in such a way that if there is a clash of responsibility, the law of the federal prevails. Although the states are solely responsible for chieftaincy affairs, this generates no/insignificant income for the states.

Regarding local governments, the same constitution spells out their functions. These include assisting the state it falls under its jurisdiction in economic development, collection of rates, issuing of television and radio licences, establishing and maintaining cemeteries and homes of destitute, licensing bicycles, canoes, wheelbarrows, and carts, naming of streets, among others. Most of these functions are still subject to approval by the State Houses of Assembly. These responsibilities attract less revenue, and they exclude resources that could fetch revenue to effectively carry out their responsibilities.

Concurring with the assertions above Suberu (2003: 11) submits that most federal systems assign the most lucrative revenue-generating functions to the central government under the guise of macroeconomic management, modification, or development. The unevenness of the federal being 'favoured' in the revenue game has bred discontent, especially from the oil producing states. They want to control the resources. They feel other parts of the country are being developed using resources extracted from their territory while their communities are not developed and face a lot of environmental challenges due to oil production. These support the postulation of relative deprivation theory. PISWP 2 echoed this thus, 'but from my point of view, the South South based on the oil and the level of development in the South South has been marginalised' (PISWP 2, December 2018).

These factors were responsible for militancy in the Niger Delta and the vices attached to it. It is also an abuse of true federalism. An interviewee expatiated on this below.

You mentioned the issue of sharing of revenue. That is talking of resource control. If you share what belongs to the whole country, is it not also important to look at? Federating unit is a crucial point in our political system because you share what you have, but it appears we are sharing what belongs to others. If you must aggregate all the resources of the country into one pool and share it, without taking cognisance of the ratio of contribution to that pool, then the question of equity and justice will come to play, and that is the bedrock of our political upheaval. So, when you talk of true federalism, you cannot have a resource without generating that resource. If you are federating the revenue, you also must federate the generation of that revenue, so that is where you have a discordance (PICL 2, December 2018).

A revenue allocation formula that gives more attention to revenue sharing than revenue generation is a setback to economic development, and this breeds ethnic rivalry and makes the government less efficient (Report of the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference: 139). Nigeria earlier experienced a situation where subnational units could generate revenues to match their expenditures. However, this is not the case presently because most states cannot survive without federal allocation. In both dispensations, revenue transited between the tiers of government, and these were fabricated through the vertical and horizontal revenue allocation formulas. The vertical and horizontal criteria have been subjects of manipulation. The military altered the revenue sharing formula without going through the parliament but only 'scrutinised' through the Armed Forces Ruling Council or Provisional Ruling Council (Elaigwu, 2002: 86). Although they set up committees and decrees to put in place formulas, these did not result in healthy fiscal federalism. The military rule from 1966 to 1979 saw the federal government shrinking the fund it hitherto transferred to the component units which included offshore mining rents and royalties, export and import duties on tobacco and motor fuel (Suberu, 2003: 15). It also punctured the financial viability of the states by centralising the agriculture marketing boards, abolishing taxes and duties on domestic agricultural produce, restricting, or abolishing the powers of the states to levy petroleum sales as well as betting and gaming taxes (Suberu, 2003: 15). The situation was similar in the military rule from 1983 to 1999.

All these affected the Nigerian federal system negatively. The states became financially weak and could hardly carry out developmental projects. A major challenge of fiscal federalism in Nigeria is the disparity between expenditure functions and revenue-raising capacities of

component units (Akujuru, 2015: 24). Similarly, Usman (2014a: 384) posits that there is financial subordination in the absence of resource control, which is anathema to true federalism because each level does not have the financial capacity to garner resources for its developmental purpose. It was assumed that these flaws were because of not having a body that manages revenue allocation in the country. Consequently, a constitutionally backed statutory body was set up.

The National Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission (NRMAFC) was established by Decree No. 49 of 1989 and later modified by Decree 98 of 1993 (now RMAFC Act CAP R7 LFN 2004) (RMAFC Website⁹). Hence, its name has changed to Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC). It cooperates with other statutory bodies and government agencies to discharge its functions. Its functions are to monitor the additions to and distribution of revenue from the Federation Account, regularly review the revenue allocation formulas and principles in operation to ensure conformity with changing conditions, advise the Federal and State Governments on best fiscal practices that can emanate into an increase in their revenue, among others.

The RMAFC has been a major stakeholder in revenue allocation in the Fourth Republic. Revenue allocation in the Fourth Republic is shared using horizontal and vertical formulas. This brings to the fore the need to have a historical look at the different vertical and horizontal revenue allocation formulas from 1946 to date. This will illuminate how the pendulum swung in favour of the states till 1966 and how it has always been a federal-dominated game since the military takeover of 1966. The analysis and claims made in this section will be explained further through the tables in the section below.

7.3.3 Vertical Revenue Allocation

In a federal system, there is vertical sharing between the federal government and the component units (Akujuru, 2015: 22). Within the Nigerian context, vertical revenue allocation shows how the revenue has been shared among the federal, states, and local governments (Lukpata, 2013: 33). **Table 7** gives a chronological outline of vertical revenue allocation from 1946 to date.

⁹ <https://rmafc.gov.ng/establishing-law/>

Table 7: Vertical Revenue Allocation Formulas from 1946 to the Fourth Republic

Commission/Committee/Decree	Formulas
The Philipson Commission (1946-1951)	Northern Region-46%, Western Region- 30% and Eastern Region-24%
The Hicks-Philipson Commission (1952-1954)	Northern Region-38%, Western Region- 27.2% and Eastern Region-34.8%
Chick Commission (1953-1957)	Northern Region-38%, Western Region- 27.2% and Eastern Region-34.8%
Raisman Commission of 1958	Northern Region- 40%, Western Region- 24% Eastern Region- 31% and Southern Cameroon-5%. Midwest- 8% out of the 24% allocated to the West
The Binns Commission of 1964	Northern Region- 42%, Western Region- 20% Eastern Region- 30% and Mid-Western Region-8%
The Dina Interim Revenue Allocation Review Committee Report of 1968	It recommended the establishment of a planning and fiscal commission.
Decree 13 of 1970	Export duty revenue allocated to the states was dropped to 60% from 100%, duty on motor fuel and excise duty accruing to the states also dropped from 100% to 50%
Decree 9 of 1971	Transferred rents and royalties of offshore petroleum mines to the federal government from the states.
Decree 6 of 1975	20% of onshore mining rents and royalties went straight to the state of origin, while all other revenues to be shared among the states had to pass through the Distributable Pool Account (DPA).
The Aboyade Technical Committee on Revenue Allocation of 1977	Federal government- 57%, state governments-30%, local governments- 10%, Special Grants Account- 3%
The Okigbo Commission of 1980	Federal Government- 53%, State Government-30%, Local Government- 10%, Special Funds (Mineral Producing States-Derivation- 2%, Initial Development of FCT, Abuja- 2.5%, General Ecological Problems- 1%, Revenue Equalisation Fund- 1.5%).

Equity Act of 1981 (nullified by the Supreme Court)	Federal Government- 55%, State Government- 26.5%, Local Government- 10%, Special Funds (Mineral Producing States-Derivation- 2%, Mineral Producing Areas-Development- 3%, Initial Development of FCT, Abuja- 2.5%, General Ecological Problems- 1%)
Revised 1981 Act	Federal Government- 55%, State Government- 30.5%, Local Government- 10%, Special Funds (Mineral Producing States-Derivation- 2%, Mineral Producing Areas-Development- 1.5%, General Ecological Problems- 1%)
1989 (NRMAFC)	Federal Government- 47%, State Government- 30%, Local Government- 15%, Special Funds (Mineral Producing States-Derivation- 2%, Mineral Producing Areas-Development- 2%, Initial Development of FCT, Abuja- 1%, General Ecological Problems- 0.5%, Destabilisation- 0.5%, Savings- 2%)
1990 (NRMAFC)	Federal Government- 50%, State Government- 30%, Local Government- 15%, Special Funds (Mineral Producing States-Derivation- 1%, Mineral Producing Areas-Development- 1.5%, Initial Development of FCT, Abuja- 1%, General Ecological Problems- 1%, Destabilisation- 0.5%)
1992 (NRMAFC)	Federal Government- 48.5%, State Government- 24%, Local Government- 20%, Special Funds (Mineral Producing States-Derivation- 1%, Mineral Producing Areas-Development- 3%, Initial Development of FCT, Abuja- 1%, General Ecological Problems- 2%, Destabilisation- 0.5%)
Proposal of the 1994/95 NCC Committee on Revenue Allocation	Federal Government- 33%, State Government- 32.5%, Local Government- 20%, Special Funds (Mineral Producing Areas-Development- 6.5%, Initial Development of FCT, Abuja- 2%, General Ecological Problems- 2.5%, Destabilisation- 0.5%)
RMAFC in the Fourth Republic* (Current as at 2020)	Federal Government- 52.68%**, State Government- 26.72%, Local Government- 20%, Special Funds- 20.60%

Compiled by author from National Bureau of Statistics, 2020; Babalola and Okafor, 2019; Suberu, 2003; Adedokun, 2002

*The current vertical formula is on the net federation account revenue distributable. That is after necessary deductions like 13% derivation and other charges and costs and excluding VAT (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020).

** This is broken down as general ecological problem-1%, FCT-1%, natural resources development- 1.68%, statutory stabilisation- 0.5% while the balance of 48.5% goes to the federal government. Aside from the federation account revenue distributable revenue, VAT also has a different sharing ratio which is federal- 15%, states- 50%, and local governments- 35% (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020: 82).

7.3.4 Horizontal Revenue Allocation

Horizontal sharing among the component units is a result of varying revenue capacities among the component units (Akujuru, 2015: 22). Horizontal revenue allocation depicts how each state and local government gets its share from the total allocated to states and local governments from the centre (Lukpata, 2013: 33).

Among the criteria that are used in horizontal revenue allocation are basic needs, minimum material standards, balanced development, derivation, equality of access to development opportunities, absorptive capacity, fiscal efficiency, minimum responsibility of government, population, social development factor, equality of states, landmass, and terrain as well as internal revenue generation effort (Lukpata, 2013: 33). These criteria have evolved in nomenclatures historically. However, five of them will be discussed.

Equality of states means all states in the country are equal (Babalola and Okafor, 2019: 10). All the states and local governments have equal access to revenue based on this principle (Akuul, 2017: 20). Hence, equality overrides the resources, population, need, landmass, among other factors that may determine the revenues that accrue to a state and local government from the Federation Account. The advantage is that no state is discriminated against while the flaw is that it makes states put in less efforts in generating revenue internally.

The criterion of population implies that the allocation of funds is positively related to the population size. The understanding here is that needs are tied to population; thus, the larger the population, the greater the needs (Babalola and Okafor, 2019: 10). The challenge with

this criterion is that census figures have always been contested. Available literature indicates that the 1950s and post-colonial census favoured the North (Iwara, 2010: 530; Suberu, 1993: 44). The 1991 population census was a little over 88.5 million with the North having 47,261,962 while the South had 41,242,512 (Abubakar, 2005: 33). The advantage of this criterion is that, if the census figure closely mirrors the reality, then different levels of government will be provided proportionate resources for their needs.

Landmass implies that the larger the space occupied by a state, the more it receives from the federation account based on this criterion. The North is larger than the rest of the country in size. This is contrary to Wheare's prescription that in a federal state the units that make up the country must be 'roughly equal in size, population, political power, administrative skills, economic development or relative geographical location' (Wheare, 1963 cited in Abubakar, 2005: 28). The size of the North was an issue of contestation in the First Republic as the North, because of its size, rivalled the central government (Suberu, 2019: 5). Given that the South is more economically developed than the North, this situation bred deprivation sentiments in the South (Suberu, 2019: 5-6). There is the feeling that the South is the goose that lays the golden egg for the large North.

Social development used to be mainly based on primary school enrolment. However, other factors have been added. These are secondary school enrolment, number of beds in state hospitals, water supply and average rainfall (Salami, 2011: 47). Social Development is about how to make the existing infrastructures meet the social needs. The advantage of this criterion is that states and local governments are encouraged to increase primary and secondary enrolment and to improve health and water supply. The weakness of this criterion is that the fund from federal allocation meant for this may not meet the infrastructural gap, and states may not be willing to raise enough revenue to do this.

The criterion of internal revenue means that states that generate more revenue receive more from the federation account based on this yardstick. The advantage that comes with this is that states will be encouraged to explore relevant revenue generating avenues to boost their internal revenue generation and get more from the federation account. The disadvantage is that some states are well positioned to generate more revenue than others due to population, the existence of sea ports, among others.

Aside from the four explained above, the derivation principle is also a very important horizontal yardstick. Derivation is 13% paid to the oil producing states (Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, Rivers, Cross Rivers¹⁰, Abia, Imo, Akwa Ibom, and Ondo) from the proceeds from onshore oil production (Salami, 2011: 21). It is also paid to states whose natural resources generate income for the federation. Constitutionally, it is 13% of revenue accruing to the federation account from proceeds from any natural resources (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999). Hence, it is paid before all other funds are disbursed to other tiers of government from the federation account. The 13% principle has been in operation since 1999.

In contemporary Nigeria, it is worth explaining because it has been an object of military decimation and elites' contestations. This principle has been subject to fluctuations at different times in Nigeria. Historically, non-oil revenue sources have also been included. Although derivation was employed in the 1950s, and this favoured the regions but excessive centralisation in the post-colonial period has whittled the derivation principle (Abubakar, 2005: 43-44). After the civil war, the derivation principle was no longer in favour of the states but favoured the government at the centre more (Luqman, 2014: 170). The global fall in the price of cocoa, groundnut, and oil palm, as well as the simultaneous increase in the global oil price, were part of the factors responsible for the shift of power and competition of state resources from the regions to the centre (Omitola, 2016: 181). Hence, it has ranged from 1% to as low as 100%.

¹⁰ There was a time Cross Rivers ceased to be an oil producing states due to ceding some of its territory (Bakassi) to Cameroon in 2008 and the Supreme Court judgment between the state and Akwa Ibom state in 2012 over some oil wells. The court ruled that these oil wells be ceded to Akwa Ibom State.

The Table below shows the horizontal revenue allocation formulas from 1946 till date.

Table 8: Horizontal Revenue Allocation Formulas from 1946 to the Fourth Republic

Commission/Committee/Decree	Formulas
The Philipson Commission (1946-1951)	Derivation and even progress
The Hicks-Philipson Commission (1952-1954)	Derivation, needs, national interest, fiscal autonomy and even progress
Chick Commission (1953-1957)	Derivation and fiscal autonomy
Raisman Commission of 1958	Derivation, fiscal autonomy, need and balanced development
The Binns Commission of 1964	Derivation, fiscal autonomy, need, balanced development and financial comparability
The Dina Interim Revenue Allocation Review Committee Report of 1968	Need, even development, derivation, and minimum responsibility of government
Decree 13 of 1970	Polulation-50%, Equality of States-50%
Decree 9 of 1971	Same as above
Decree 6 of 1975	Same as above
The Aboyade Technical Committee on Revenue Allocation of 1977	Equality of access to development opportunities- 25%, national minimum standard- 22%, absorptive capacity- 20%, independent revenue and tax effort- 18%, fiscal efficiency- 15%
The Okigbo Commission of 1980	Minimum responsibility of government- 40%, population- 40%, social development factor- 15%, Internal Revenue effort- 5%
Equity Act of 1981 (nullified by the Supreme Court)	Equality of States- 50%, population- 40%, landmass and terrain- 10%
Revised 1981 Act	Equality of states- 40%, population- 40%, social development factor- 15%, internal revenue- 5%
1989 (NRMAFC)	Equality of states- 40%, population- 30%, social development factor- 10%, internal revenue- 20%
1990 (NRMAFC)	Equality of states- 40%, population- 30%, social development- 10%, landmass- 10%, internal revenue- 10%

1992 (NRMAFC)	Equality of states- 40%, population- 30%, social development- 10%, landmass- 10%, internal revenue- 10%
Proposal of the 1994/95 NCC Committee on Revenue Allocation	Equality of states (minimum responsibility of government)- 30%, population- 40%, internal revenue effort- 10%, landmass and terrain- 10%, population density- 10%
RMAFC in the Fourth Republic (Current as of 2020)	Equality of states- 40%, population- 30%, social development- 10%, landmass- 10%, internal revenue- 10%

Compiled by author from Babalola and Okafor (2019); National Bureau of Statistics (2020); Suberu (2003)

The next section juxtaposes the vertical and horizontal formulas through the instrumentalities of **Tables 7 and 8**.

7.3.5 Horizontal and Vertical Revenue Sharing Formulas Juxtaposed

Over the years, different governments have set different instruments to devise the formulas for revenue allocation in Nigeria. **Tables 7 and 8** show the formulas that were devised from 1946 to date. The first column in both Tables shows the instruments that were used by the states. These instruments vary from commissions to decrees and committees. The second column of **Table 7** details the principles of vertical allocation while that of **Table 8** details horizontal allocation.

The period 1946 to 1964 was characterised by the regions having appreciable benefits from the resources they produced. The revenues that accrued to the regions were because they could function based on the comparative advantage they possessed. Hence, they had access to taxation functions that bolstered their revenue and derivation was also of advantage to the regional governments. Examples of their revenue sources are personal income tax, licenses, fees, mining rents, property rates, Jangali (cattle tax), tobacco import and excise duties and motor fuel duty (Abubakar, 2005: 59; Elekwa, Matthew, and Akume, 2011: 414). Another example was between 1958 and 1964. For derivation, tobacco import and export duties as well as motor fuel import and export duties were to be remitted to their regions of generation in 100% while mining rents and royalties had 50% allocated to the regions, 20% to the federal

government and the remaining 30% to the DPA¹¹ (Abubakar, 2005: 63). It also explains why regional elites were more comfortable with operating from the regions as they were more focused on developing their regions. The fiscal features of this period were the epitomes of true federalism because each level of government had what it takes to carry out its responsibilities.

However, the preference of elites on which formula to use metamorphosed with the resources that generated the most income at every point in time. For the Philipson Commission, elites from the North and West were very pleased with derivation because groundnut and cocoa which are cash crops respectively grown in these regions were the major sources of revenue for the country (Ovwasa, 1995: 73). The elites from the Eastern region were not pleased with the derivation principle because these cash crops were not produced in their region (Ovwasa, 1995: 73). The Hicks-Philipson Commission (1952-1954) also resulted in elites' differences. The West was against taking the principle of derivation with levity, the North opposed less emphasis on the principle of need while the elites from the East supported national interest being the overarching principle (Elekwa et al., 2011: 415). The Chicks Commission (1953-1957) widened the fiscal gap between the regions the more because the regions that had more resources received more (Elekwa et al., 2011: 415). Hence, elites from the regions with less resources advocated for equality of states, needs and national interest (Ovwasa, 1995: 74-75). However, since the discovery of oil in 1956, Southern elites, especially those of oil producing parts want derivation as the overarching principle, while the North has not always been in support of this (Abubakar, 2005: 59). The Northern elites favour landmass and population because this is to their advantage.

The second period of 1968 to 1977 was symbolic with state structure and military rule. Hence, the centralised nature of the military government came with its attendant effects on fiscal federalism. Consequently, the federal government became more fiscally powerful, while the states became weak fiscally. The centralised nature of the military made it possible for it to usurp these revenue powers (Ovwasa, 1995: 76). In addition, the creation of states by the military whittled the ability to vigorously pursue revenue generation hitherto possessed by

¹¹ Each revenue became structured such that a portion goes to the region, based on derivation, a portion went to the Distributable Pool Account, another one to the centre while the one that went to the Distributable Pool Account was to be shared among the regions (Elekwa, et al., 2011: 416).

the regions. Finally, there was the need for the military government of Yakubu Gowon to prosecute the civil war and restructure the country after the war and all these required adequate funds.

The third phase covers the Second Republic up to the Fourth Republic. It is also a transition from pre- NRMAFC/RMAFC to the NRMAFC/RMAFC. As a result of challenges with accepting the existing revenue allocation formulas, the military administration of General Babangida set up a statutory commission to handle revenue allocation matters (Abubakar, 2005: 68). However, more attention will be given to the Fourth Republic because it is the focus of this study.

Federally collected revenue is paid into the federation account and shared based on a law proposed by the president and the RMAFC, which is ratified by the National Assembly (Suberu, 2003: 12). Federation Account Allocation Committee (FAAC) is chaired by the minister of finance and has state commissioners of finance as members allocate money from the federation account during its monthly meetings (Suberu, 2003: 25). There is no equivalent of the FAAC between states and local governments and through the ‘State-Joint Local Accounts’, states lord their will on local governments on financial matters (Suberu, 2003: 25-26).

The current vertical formula is on the net federation account revenue distributable. That is after necessary deductions like 13% derivation and other charges and costs and excluding Value Added Tax (VAT) (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020). This also points to the fact that even in a democratic government, the states and local governments do not still have adequate funds to carry out most of their functions.

Furthermore, a look into how revenue has recently been shared will buttress the claim that fiscal federalism in Nigeria negates Abubakar’s (2005) (cited earlier in this chapter) view. In 2019, FAAC disbursed ₦2.93trn to the federal government, ₦2.47trn to the state governments, and ₦1.67trn to the local governments (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020: 82). Delta and Akwa -Ibom got the highest, ₦219.28b and ₦171.98b, respectively and this came because of derivation, being oil producing states while Osun received the least- ₦24.22b (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020: 82). This affirms the fact that Nigeria’s

economy is monocultural and not being an oil producing state is almost tantamount to a poor state.

The poor Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) (for instance, only 20.2% of total revenue in 2018; check Central Bank of Nigeria, 2018) base of the states also questions the rationale behind the continued creation of states on the excuse of bringing about development as well as boosting a sense of belongingness and national integration. In contrast, the inability of these states to provide infrastructures has put ethnic based organisations and militia groups in a good position to woo people to their side. Hence, ethnicity and religion have become easy tools to challenge the poor performance of the states. The situation at the states also 'justifies' why political elites are more attracted to the presidency. They perceive power at the federal level is directly proportional to a better source of revenue. The case of weak revenue is not different in local governments.

Local governments that are the closest to the masses also had only 2.9% of their revenue coming from internal generation (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2018). PINWP 1 captured the situation in states and local governments as 'gradually, we came to a situation whereby most of the states are just states by name because they cannot even exist without federal allocation' (PINWP 1, January 2019). PICL 1, PICL 2, and PISEP agreed with PINWP 1 on this.

This view is supported by Abubakar (2005: 9) as most states and evidently, most local governments in Nigeria generate very low revenue internally, and this makes them financially unviable. This is further compounded by over-reliance on oil. The form Nigeria's budget will look like at the federal, state, and even local government level is determined by the global oil market (Babalola and Okafor, 2019: 14).

Oil revenue is not invested into the productive sectors of the economy, or they are even diverted for personal use by public officials (Babalola and Okafor, 2019: 14). This challenge with diversification is why infrastructural development has eluded most parts of the country. On the issue of corruption, this occurs at all levels of government. A recent case is the former chairman of the Pension Reform Task Team, Abdurashheed Maina who has been tried and jailed for misappropriating funds under his supervision.

At the state level, a lot of former governors have been tried but convicting them of corruption has always been a herculean task. Although, some have been convicted recently, Joshua

Dariye of Plateau and Jolly Nyame of Taraba. They have been granted state pardon with Nigerians questioning the rationale for the pardon. Even the Southern states that receive 13% derivation are not better. The area is not developed as expected, considering the huge monthly allocation they receive.

PINEP submitted that:

When I went to the South South, I saw how people are suffering, with no pipe-borne water. Where is the 13% derivation? Where is the royalty? Where is the development levy from the multinational companies? Is it not the federal government that is responsible? You are given your share; you are given your 13% derivation. So, who is responsible for not developing the South-South? Ondo is part of the oil producing areas, which is South West, so who is responsible for not developing this place? (PINEP, January 2019).

Babalola and Okafor (2019: 15-16) affirm that despite the huge amount that has been received by the Niger Delta regions, corruption has made it of little effect as there are poor basic social services there. If there are infrastructures and the youth are employed, there will not be militancy, and if the environment is well taken care of, there will be peace in the region. All these flaws have corruption as the root cause. For instance, former governors Lucky Igbinedion of Edo State, James Ibori of Delta State, and Diepreye Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State were all charged for corruption.

Over-reliance on oil is responsible for this revenue problem and therefore it is expedient to explore other resources that if well harnessed in the spirit of true federalism, will make all the states financially viable and development will receive a boost. The distribution of mineral resources and agricultural resources establishes the fact that every state in Nigeria has what it takes to be financially viable to discharge its responsibilities. That of agriculture may not pose any challenge as it falls under the concurrent list. However, the federal government should give states the space to explore their agricultural potentials without unhealthy federal hegemony. In addition, security has been a challenge to the sector. The incessant crises between farmers and herders might have discouraged some investors from investing in the sector.

The challenge that has made the solid mineral sector to not generate the expected revenue is because the federal government controls the sector. Hence, the states are less concerned about

persuading the federal government to take the sector seriously. If resource control favours the oil and solid mineral producing states, such states will look inward and turn these products to correct the anomalies in their fiscal structure. However, the continued control of mineral resources has always pitched Niger Delta and Yoruba elites mostly against Northern elites. The situation of these inter elites' squabbles have been compounded by the double standard in the case of Zamfara's control of its gold. Niger Delta elites feel relatively deprived on the ground that a president from the Northern elites' block has favoured his constituency by making Zamfara enjoy the revenue from gold and sharing the oil from Niger Delta with other parts of the country. However, if every state is treated equally with respect to resource control, there will be fewer frictions. Hence, this would transform into development, poverty eradication and peace. If the poverty level is low, it will be difficult for political elites to manipulate the masses to involve in violence for the selfish interest of the former.

7.4 The Federal Character Principle

The Southern part of the country is more educationally advanced than the North. This puts the South at an advantage when positions are being competed for, especially government positions. Some states are also more economically developed than others, and this gap may continue if it is left unattended. This imbalance in government appointments and infrastructures received government attention even before independence (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 166).

The Federal Character Principle is an attempt to deal with ethnoreligious imbalances in public offices. The federal character principle requires that the composition of public institutions at each tier of government should reflect diversity (Suberu, 2009: 74). This imbalance in the composition of public institutions was initially addressed through a quota system. From 1958, the quota system was used to admit recruits into the military such that 50% of intakes were from the North and 25% each from the West and East (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 166). This was extended to the officers' cadre by the NPC-led government in 1961 as 50% was given to the North to be admitted to officers' cadre while the South took the remaining 50% (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 166). However, the quota system did not cover all public offices. The Federal Character Principle was drafted by the 1979 Constitution Drafting Committee (Peter, 2014: 198) and incorporated into the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions.

The 1994/95 Constitutional Conference also reiterated the need to continue with the Federal Character (Report of the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference: 145). Consequently, the Federal Character Commission (FCC) was set up through Decree No. 34 of 1996 (Federal Character Commission Handbook: 3). It is presented in Section 153(1) of the 1999 Constitution as one of the independent federal executive bodies. Its functions and powers have been constitutionally described in the 1999 Constitution and the Federal Character Commission Establishment Act 2004 (Federal Character Commission Handbook: 1).

As written in Section 14 (3 and 4) of the 1999 Constitution, the Federal Character Principle states that federal, states, and local governments need to promote national loyalty and unity by recognising diversity so that no ethnic or sectional groups will dominate the governments or their agencies. The mandate of the FCC 'is to enforce the Federal Character Principles which is aimed at ensuring fair and equitable distribution of posts and socio-economic amenities, infrastructural facilities among the federating units nationwide' (Federal Character Commission Handbook: 1). This means that each state shall produce not less than 2.75% and not more than 3% of the total workforce in any federal establishment, while the FCT shall produce 1% (Adieme, 2012: 11; Federal Character Commission Handbook: 20). The second part of the mandate of the commission implies that federal infrastructures should be well distributed to states.

The election of the President and the appointment of top political positions in the executive and principal officers in the federal legislative arms follow the federal character, but these are not enshrined in the constitution. However, the appointment of ministers is enshrined in the constitution. Section 147 (3) of the 1999 Constitution provides for the appointment of ministers from each state of the federation and that such appointees should be an indigene of such state. This makes each state appreciate the fact that it has a representative at the Federal Executive Council. PISSP concluded that 'because all the states and the FCT are represented, it brings a great level of trust because there is the feeling that some level of interest has been accommodated' (PISSP, January 2019).

The principle has also been used in recruitment and promotion in the public service, including those of security agencies. To achieve this, the FCC gets involved in the entire process. PIFCCS described that:

Basically, at the national level, there is compliance because you cannot see an organisation trying to recruit without seeking clearance from the Federal Character Commission. There is this thing they call certificate of compliance that the federal character issues out at the end of the exercise. The certificate is tantamount to telling the whole Nigeria or those concerned that in carrying out the exercise, you have put the federal character principle into consideration. They contact us before they start the exercise and brief us on what they want to do. We have the right to prosecute, but in most cases, we do not do that. We try to appeal, maybe there is lopsidedness in the appointment, for example in a particular organisation and when we feel that some communities, some areas have been cheated. What we try to do is to talk to the people at the helm of affairs to balance up by considering those areas that are short-changed (PIFCCS, December 2018).

The commission has the power to sanction erring agencies and its management team, but it hardly does that. This is despite being empowered to do such under Section 14 of its Establishment Act 2004 (Federal Character Commission Handbook: 16). This does not mean it cannot call off an interview process if the situation arises, especially if it has generated a national embarrassment as one of my participants noted below.

We do not really sanction or punish; we try to appeal. If we find out that such an organisation is, recalcitrant, we have the right to call off the interview process, the employment process. For example, about four or five years ago, Nigerian Immigration did a recruitment exercise in which a lot of people died, because of what happened, the Federal Character was forced to call it off. So, we can call off or cancel, and that is one of the ways to sanction (PIFCCS, December 2018).

The death was caused by a stampede in some recruitment centres due to poor coordination. This setback, notwithstanding, the FCC still brings some dynamism in the discharge of its responsibility of ensuring equity. This is further revealed by the same participant that:

Positions are shared in a way that the states will be fairly represented, and if it cannot go round the state, we use geo-political zones. You know Nigeria is divided into six geo-political zones. We will make sure those positions go round the geo-political zones in a very fair manner, and if it cannot go round the geo-political zones, we make it North and South (PIFCCS, December 2018).

This is meant to use the geographical structure of the country to create a spread. PIFCCS further submitted that it has become part of the Nigerian system. 'I think it is in our national life, anytime you want to make any recruitment, any selection, people will be talking about fair sharing, fair representation and when they talk about these, they are talking about federal character' (PIFCCS, December 2018).

However, in the real sense, the diversity of the country is beyond geographical spread, and federal character has not taken care of this. The Speaker of the House of Representatives, Femi Gbajabiamila recently observed that age, religious and sexual diversity is not taken into consideration in federal character (Orizu, 2020). If these have been considered, some agitations raised by youth, religion, and women organisations about being left out in governance might have been less. This observation, nevertheless, the principle will be explored in the light of how it operates on a geographical spread.

This arrangement also determines the election of the President, appointment of ministers, political party formation and composition as well as staff structure of the public service (Suberu, 2009: 74). The implementation of the principle has come with mixed feelings. That of electing the President takes the form of a rotational presidency. The way other top political positions in the executive and principal officers in the federal legislative arms have been structured since the commencement of the First Republic reflect the Federal Character principle. Most of these are not in the constitution, neither are they in the federal character handbook, but they are party/elites' arrangement. However, the type of personality appointed, and the position occupied matters. PINCP buttressed this by emphasising that:

For instance, you talked about ministers. Each state produces a minister, then you ask yourself, what portfolio is the minister given at the end of the day not minding what their qualification is? You get somebody who is old and redundant, somebody who has lost touch with modern realities of events and makes him handle a very sensitive portfolio. What he will give to us are outdated and out-modelled policies that will not take us anywhere (PINCP, January 2019).

Furthermore, some ministers do not even have the academic qualification and experience to occupy the positions they hold. Examples abound in this Fourth Republic as some past and present ministers have been given portfolios that do not align with their experience. For instance, the Minister of Labour and Employment is a medical doctor. The Minister of Interior is an engineer. The duo should have been those that have experience in labour relations and internal security, respectively.

Nevertheless, federal character aims to create a sense of belonging, which is to foster unity, but it has bred hatred among public servants. PICL 1 explained that:

One of the impediments of federal character in Nigeria is that regardless of the capacity and competence of an individual, you know, the federal character will come

and apply, and you often see a competent person being relegated to the background. The competent person will feel shut out, and this could be an impediment to national integration (PICL 1, January 2019).

In agreement with PICL 1, PIR 2 explained that in situations where a state has a slot to fill a higher position, an employee's junior might be promoted ahead of him/her not based solely on merit but because of filling the vacant position meant for his/her state in that government agency/ministry. In a different way, but still on division, PISWOL opined that the federal character principle divides the country through group representation. He stated below.

For example, you have a policy like federal character. Federal Character implies that you want people to be involved in their government, that is fine, but when you now decide that federal character must have an arithmetic meaning in terms of representing all groups, all shades, and conditions of people and so on. Then you might have a problem of overemphasising the division. If you emphasise division, then you cannot gain unity out of it (PISWOL, December 2018).

In a similar vein, PIR 2 emphasised how it causes nepotism but did mention that it has prevented lopsided appointments. He emphasised below.

So the way it is in Nigeria when somebody is in either the civil or public service, he is not representing the country, he is representing his state, he is representing his ethnic group, he is representing his village, and you now see in practice when people get to the position of power, they want to satisfy their state, their ethnic group, their villages and not national interest and that is why we talk about nepotism and so on. So, it is as if in the process of trying to achieve national integration through the federal character, the system also promotes nepotism officially in Nigeria but I cannot put all the blame on federal character because....but for Federal Character, development would have been lopsided; but for Federal Character, appointment would have been lopsided (PIR 2, December 2018).

The President's appointments since the inception of this administration in 2015 have been lopsided, especially in the composition of the service chiefs, heads of paramilitary and allied agencies.

Table 9: Heads of Military, Security, Anti-Corruption and Related Agencies based on Geo-Political Zones as of February 2022

S/N	HEADS OF ORGANISATION	GEO-POLITICAL ZONE
1	National Security Adviser	North East
2	Chief of Defence Staff	South South
3	Chief of Army Staff	North West
4	Chief of the Air Staff	South West

5	Chief of Naval Staff	North West
6	Inspector General of Police	North East
7	Director-General of the Department of State Services	North West
8	Director-General of the National Intelligence Agency	North West
9	Controller General of Immigration	North West
10	Controller General of Correctional Services	North West
11	Controller General of Customs	North East
12	Chairman/Chief Executive of National Drug Law Enforcement Agency	North East
13	Corps Marshal of the Federal Road Safety Corps	North Central
14	Commandant General of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps	North Central
15	Controller General of the Federal Fire Service	North Central
16	Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission	North West
17	Chairman of the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission	South West
18	Chairman of the Code of Conduct Bureau	North West

Source: Compiled by author

The President is from the North, and most of these heads of security and allied agencies are from the same region. The National Security Adviser, Minister of Defence and Minister of Police Affairs are all from the North, while the Minister of Interior is from the South West. The implication is that the South is a minority in national security decisions. The most affected is the South East because there is no one from the region among them. It also means that when crucial security matters are discussed in the country, the South East will be excluded from making such decisions. This approach by the President is also interpreted by other elite groups as an avenue by the Northern elites to dominate others. These have sparked reactions, especially from the South and even some Northerners are not comfortable with the tilted appointments. The President might indeed have appointed them for trust and safety reasons, however, the negative implication is that every qualified Southerner may feel that if the President does not trust them with security and related matters, it will be difficult for them to trust their Northern colleagues. Such may affect integration between the two regions. The current security situation in the country and corruption shows that these agencies have performed below expectations despite the trust the President vested in them.

The action of the President is one of the challenges the FCC faces when the approval of some appointments is not subjected to confirmation by the National Assembly. The FCC official posited that some of the challenges lie with appointments that do not need the approval of the National Assembly' (PICSSF, December 2018). Even if appointments are to be approved by the Senate, there is still a feeling of Northern centric approach to appointments. According to Colonel Abubakar Umar, a former Military Administrator of Kaduna State, Justice Walter Onnoghen, from the South South was appointed as the Acting Chief Justice of the Federation on November 10, 2016 but his name was not forwarded by President Buhari to the Senate for approval after the expiration of three months in acting capacity (Ukpong, 2020). His name was finally forwarded by the then Acting President, Yemi Osinbajo in 2017 and he was sworn in as substantive Chief Justice on March 7, 2017 (Ukpong, 2020). On corruption charges, Justice Onnoghen was removed questionably and hurriedly, a Northern Muslim was sworn in as acting Chief Justice, and there was no foot-dragging by the President in forwarding his name to the Senate for confirmation as the substantive one. Onnoghen is a Southern Christian.

A similar thing recently played out concerning the President of the Court of Appeal. The President, Justice Monica Dongban-Mensem and a Northern Christian was initially appointed in an acting capacity for three months, and there were speculations that she could run another three months in an acting capacity. Expectedly, she should have been confirmed after the first three months. The next in line to her is a Northern Muslim and this raised suspicion that she may be finally left unconfirmed and replaced by the next to her (Iriekpen, 2020). In the Judiciary, the most senior is expected to head that level of judiciary irrespective of where he/she comes from because other judges come from all the geo-political zones. However, she was later confirmed by the Senate on June 11, 2020, but the delay raised issues from some parts of the country. Such apprehension was because Christians have little trust in the President when it comes to the appointment of key officials. In the first case, it creates an ethnic and religious divide, while it is a matter of religious divide in the second case. Actions like these make Nigerians from different parts of the country feel less accommodated. However, appointments of Northern Christians and minority tribes from the region as the former and present Secretaries to the Government of the Federation: Babachir Lawal and Boss Mustapha, respectively are epitomes of the respect the President has for Christians.

Similarly, a reference was made by PINCP with regards to Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), and he questioned why personnel from the oil producing states had not been given preference to head the corporation and take key positions there. He explained below.

Oil comes from the South, NNPC regulates the sector, yet the key positions are held by the Northerners. My statements are verifiable, you can check. The GMD is from the North, the region does not produce oil. So how will the people themselves who have suffered from oil spillage and the others benefit? It is only the person who knows where it pinches that knows their problems better and will say let us pay back. There are no fishes in their rivers, they cannot drink the waters and the greatest ill-luck that they ever have was to have a president who did not know how to maximise his office to the betterment of his people (PINCP, January 2019).

The Group Managing Director is Mele Kolo Kyari, and he is from the North. The oil producing communities feel sidelined in the running of the affairs of the state-owned oil firm despite the Minister of State coming from the South South and some board members and executive management team from the South South. This resonates with the submission of Peter (2014: 199) that the federal character, instead of being an instrument of national integration, has become a source of disagreement between the North and the South.

Aside from the North-South grievances about federal character, there is also majority-minority issue. The essence of federal character is to protect the minority groups by giving them opportunities to attain public office and enjoy the dividends that come with being in a federal union (Azaigba and Yio, 2014: 392). However, some groups claim that they are still not well represented, considering the number of ethnic groups in the country. PINWOL, who is from one of the minority groups in Northern Nigeria gave his analysis and why representation brings disloyalty to the country because another group has been privileged to represent the larger group. He explained below.

So, if you are looking at it in terms of zones because even if you say okay the North West, the North Central, the North East.....in terms of Federal Character Principle, I will say my group was not represented because if you are bringing a Fulani person or a Hausa person, that one is not representing my group. So, at what point do we put a limit to the expectations of Federal Character? These are the complexities, and then people do not look at them critically because this country is not just meant for the three dominant groups or the six dominant groups because in each geo-political zone you have a dominant group. Those kinds of agitations and demands do not foster basically the principles of integration. They further polarise us because politically, people have the consciousness that we are not in charge, and

those ones are not representing us because we are different. That is what integration should address (PINWOL, December 2018).

Hence, he concluded that the principle of Federal Character system does not make up for the principle of national integration.

On lopsided appointments, it is fair enough to look at the other side of the coin. Statistics of presidential aides which includes ministers, special assistants, senior special assistants, special advisers, personal assistants, and others will also be examined. Owete (2020) as of May 2020, gave a breakdown. South West has 64, North West has 37, North East has 29, South-South has 24, North Central has 21, and South East has 15. The President is from the North West, and the South West has the highest. Hence, we cannot conclude that the President is a nepotist.

These appointments being put on the spotlight do not represent all, but opinion leaders from different zones have continuously opposed and supported the President's actions. Third Schedule, Part 1 of the 1999 Constitution outlines the appointments that must reflect the federal character principle. The Constitution states that:

Permanent Secretaries, Directors-General in Extra-Ministerial Departments and parastatals, Directors in Ministries and Extra-Ministerial Departments, senior military officers, senior diplomatic posts and managerial cadres in the Federal and State parastatals, bodies, agencies, and institutions (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999).

Also, judging by the composition of the head of these ministries and agencies does not give a holistic judgement. The fact that for other positions, the federal character principle is being considered for employing staff of all categories substantiates this claim. Allegations of lopsided recruitment exercises carried out by the Department of State Services in 2017 and 2020 call to scrutiny the strict adherence to the principle in recruiting staff of government agencies. The North had more candidates than the South in both recruitments (Ogundipe, 2017; Sahara Reporters, October 30, 2020; *Thisday Newspaper*, October 7, 2020). Explanation from the presidency that the 2017 exercise was meant to balance the vacant slots in Northern states was widely rejected, especially by Southerners. This was the epitome of divisive action. Hence, the task lies on FCC to always publish the state distribution of all categories of staff of ministries and government agencies so that we can know the states that have slots to fill.

These actions of the President that many have perceived as North-centric may have a reprisal implication. Any group of elites may have the feeling that if its own becomes the President, they may ‘replicate’ what is being done by this present administration for their bloc to be the major beneficiary. This snowball effect will threaten federal stability and national integration in Nigeria.

Aside from the flaw of having a lopsided appointment, Federal Character creates loyalty to the group an official is representing and not to the country. The person thinks and acts on issues bothering his/her group and not the country. PISWOL reiterated that:

For example, if we take the federal character. Federal character is good in terms of creating inclusiveness, but then there could also be a federal character in terms of division. So, our federal character is not geared towards inclusiveness, and because of this, it cannot achieve the goal of inclusiveness. That is one. Two, federal character also has been implemented in a way to show some people that what matters is not the level of development but the fact that somebody belongs to an area and so those issues continue to manifest even in the behaviour of those who are appointed. Once you create a feeling of belonging to a micro area because that is the qualification of getting there, the person that gets there will continue to perpetuate that micro area that sponsored him, that elevated him to that area (PISWOL, December 2018).

The issue of states and local governments not complying is another issue stated below by an interviewee that:

The politicians and the civil servants see the federal character as a federal thing. They feel reluctant to supply information, and when they make their employment/appointments, they do not carry us along. Ordinarily, they should submit to that effect, these are the number of people we want to employ, and we employed these number of people here. That affects their compliance (PIFCCS, December 2018).

This brings to query the unhealthy intergovernmental relations in Nigeria’s federal system, but at the same time, it establishes the fact that a federal agency has no business in regulating employment and promotion at the state and local government levels.

These facts about Federal Character in the preceding paragraphs reveal that it has come with success and failure. PIR 1 and PIR 3 partly attribute the failures to not bringing out the best from each region and jeopardising merit because there is a need for spread. PINCOL aptly captured this as ‘talk of Federal Character, of course, we have to understand our heterogeneity as a country, but despite that, we should not lose merit. Do we play out meritocracy out of the game because we want stability?’ (PINCOL, January 2019). However, even if merit is not to be jettisoned, spread should still be allowed so that there will not be lopsided

employment and promotion. PINCOL further submitted that. ‘I am not saying we should not recognise even development, equality and all that but the federal character must take cognisance of merit because otherwise, if you put a man who does not know anything about governance at the helm of affairs, then you cannot have good governance¹²’ (PINCOL, January 2019). PIR 3 shared a similar opinion.

The manner resources have been distributed is not different. Although the handbook provides for the distribution of infrastructures to reflect this, the FCC is yet to fully start its implementation. The commission’s official emphasised that ‘the second aspect is this socio-economic thing. We are just trying to go into it gradually. In fact, it may start on a full-scale next year. That one tends to look at situations whereby amenities are shared out into communities’ (PIFCCS, December 2018). However, successive governments have been implementing this, but not without some iota of nepotism. A lot of states will not have benefited from some federal infrastructures if not for the spirit of equality, but some states may need the infrastructure or parastatal more than where they have been situated. The establishment of a refinery in Kaduna State obviously means the project is situated in the wrong place. There is no oil in that part of the country. Refining oil in a non-oil producing region questions the motive behind such.

The establishment of federal universities in some states by former president Jonathan looks good as it made it possible for each state in the country to have a federal university. The states where these institutions are located may need other infrastructures and not universities. The establishment of some military and paramilitary institutions in some places also brings to scrutiny the intent. Some were established in the home state or hometown of the President, while some were established in the home state or hometown of the heads of such institutions. These include Nigerian Air Force Special Operations Command, Bauchi; Nigerian Air Force Mobility Command, Yenagoa; Air Force Reference Hospital, Daura; Nigerian Air Force Quick Response Wing, Daura; Central Naval Command, Brass; Nigerian Navy Medical Training School, Offa; 17 Brigade of the Nigerian Army, Katsina; 171 Battalion Nigerian

¹² Good governance within the context of this study means ‘the provision of political, social and economic public goods and services that every citizen has the right to expect from their government, and that a government has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens’ (<https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag>). These represent the basic responsibilities of government which are welfare and security and any government in delivering good governance must do so with transparency and accountability. The indicators that a county is experiencing good governance have been highlighted in chapter one under the HDI.

Army, Daura; Police Mobile Training School, Ila Orangun, among others. From some of these examples, military elites have also assumed the status of any of the five elite groups.

These institutions may make the host communities conclude that their sons have done great things for them because of locating such institutions in their territories. Political elites prefer the establishment of these institutions rather than providing basic infrastructures. Hence, the necessities of life are not provided in a manner that can reduce the hardship being faced by communities. The presence of good infrastructures boosts the private sector, which will reduce unemployment and poverty. That is why Nigeria's poverty level is still high since the advent of democracy in 1999. Prioritising the needs of these communities is important as explained by one of the interviewees that 'may be in a community, they need school, and in another one, they need a hospital. It entails that each community be given amenities based on what it needs, but the value should be almost the same' (PIFCCS, December 2018). PISSOL and PISEOL concluded that the federal character principle is good, but the implementation is the problem.

7.5 Creation of States and Local Governments

7.5.1. Transformation from Province to region

The amalgamation of the country meant bringing hitherto differently administered territories together, which became Nigeria. However, these territories have since 1939 been divided into 'autonomous' territories. It is presumed that such division will give the different groups some level of autonomy and access to resources and promote development, which will promote peace and unity. Sir Bernard Bourdillon divided the Southern Protectorate into Eastern and Western provinces in 1939, but the Northern Protectorate was left intact while all the three provinces in the country were named regions in 1947 (Falola and Genova, 2009: xxi-xxii; Genyi, 2014: 480). The Northern region was bigger than the combined territories of East and West, and another imbalance was that in each of the three regions, majority ethnic groups controlled government (Egbefo, 2014: 256). The minorities in each of the regions were not considered before the creation of the regions (Udo, 2014: 351). Hence, a commission was set up to investigate the fears of the minorities.

7.5.2. Willink Commission

One of the major challenges of Nigerian federalism is the minority question (Udo, 2014: 354). The Richards and Macpherson Constitutions were silent about the status of the minorities and by institutionalizing the autonomy of the three regions, the Lyttleton Constitution strengthened the hold of the ethnic majorities over the minorities (Udo, 2014: 356). Before the attainment of independence, minority groups saw that they were disadvantaged because the three major ethnic groups dominated the regions and the centre. These made the minorities afraid of independence on the basis that they will be relegated and consequently, they sought to redraw the map of the country. This led to agitations for self-determination and demand for separate regions for the minorities (Ukase, 2014: 211). Prior to independence, the Mid-West minorities feared that after independence, the Yorubas would dominate them while the minorities in the North, expressed concerns over emirs appointing district heads in non-Muslim areas (Fagbadebo, Bello, and Mbada, 2014: 305). In the East, the minorities feared the Igbos might overrun them politically and commercially (Fagbadebo et al., 2014: 305). The fears of minorities being dominated and that of the North dominating the two Southern regions created a suspicious relationship within and among the regions (Fagbadebo et al., 2014: 310). These led to the constitution of the Henry Willink Commission of 1957.

Willink Commission was set up to take care of the fears of the minorities. It recommended that to have unity in the country; there should be a balancing of power within the Nigerian state so that the majority will have less interest to utilise power for their benefits (Ukase, 2014: 212). Hence, the commission submitted that the creation of more states would create problems rather than solve minority problems (Ukase, 2014: 213). One of the reasons the Willink Commission did not grant the request of the minorities for state creation was because carrying out such an exercise a few years to independence seemed undesirable (Odey, 2014: 336). Hence, states were not created despite the setting up of the commission. One of the consequences of this was the Tiv Riots of the 1960s. The fears of the minorities have since continued in contemporary Nigeria. The fears the minorities have in contemporary Nigeria include coming out of majority domination, becoming relevant within the country's political spectrum, and benefiting from Nigeria's wealth (Adetoye, 2016: 4).

7.5.3. Creation of Mid-West Region

After independence in 1960, the minorities demanded fifteen states of which the notable ones were Middle Belt from North, Mid-West from West and Calabar-Ogoja-Rives from the East (Adeyemi, 2013: 162; Egbefo, 2014: 257). The NPC suppressed the agitation for the Middle Belt region demand and the NCNC saw the demand for Calabar-Ogoja-Rives as anti-Igbo and frustrated it (Adeyemi, 2013: 162). The Mid-West was created out of the Western Region.

It is widely believed that the creation of the Mid-West was beyond listening to the yearnings of the minority but more of weakening the strength of the major opposition party, Action Group (AG) (Egbefo, 2014: 258; Fagbadebo et al., 2014: 310). The Mid-West was created to decimate the national reach of the AG and make it less relevant in Nigeria as well as cause the infiltration of other parties, particularly the NCNC into the region (Udo, 2014: 357). Consequently, the new region preferred to align with the NCNC (Egbefo, 2014: 258). This it was believed was responsible for the creation of Mid-West by the NPC/NCNC led federal government in 1963 to serve as a punitive response to the AG for supporting the United Middle Belt Congress, which is a party that was against the Northern elites' party- NPC (Eze et al., 2015: 115; Yongo, 2015: 75). The politics behind this creation is in line with elite theory and was not in the interest of the minorities but based on the whims and caprices of the elites and for elites' supremacy over other elites. This is in line with Vande's (2012: 46) submission that state creation in Nigeria is about elites' interest.

7.5.4. Creation of States- 1967 to 1996

The 1967 state creation exercise was synonymous with doing away with the nomenclature, region and embracing state. State creation was one of the responses of the government to the 30-month civil war between the Eastern Region and Nigeria. This has been the assumption by Igbo. The creation of states from Eastern Nigeria also tilted loyalty more to Nigeria than the Biafra Republic by the minorities in the East (Odey, 2014: 340). The creation of states by the military, especially Yakubu Gowon, cannot only be attributed to selfish reasons of Northern military officers, but persistent demands by ethnic minorities for state creation was also a major factor (Yongo, 2015: 77). The first part of Yongo's view aligns with the feelings of Igbo, but at the same time, the age-long demand for state creation also justified the actions

of the military government. In essence, states created by the military were ‘response’ to agitations (Yongo, 2015: 77). This was because the states created were not only carved out from the Eastern Region.

The creation of six states from the North and six from the South was a relief to the South from the dissatisfaction because of the size of the North (Odey, 2014). However, agitations for more states never stopped. PINWP 1 asserted that:

So, if you say the creation of states in Nigeria address the issue minority, the issue of nationality, the answer is factually it has not, it has even further divided because each time in Nigerian political history when the states were first created in 1967, the next state creation, you had more agitations from other sections, and we saw constant creation of states. The more states you create, the more administrative units you set up, the more you have minority groups. So, really, it has not addressed that. If not for anything, it has even increased the agitation (PINWP 1, January 2019).

The creation of 12 States in 1967 meant that hitherto minority groups that fought for a state for instance now had one of the groups becoming the majority and others taking minority positions (Egbefo, 2014: 258). This has made state creation a snowball effect because the new minorities continue to demand for states so that they too can become majorities. For instance, the hitherto minority groups in the old Ondo State have become majority groups in Ekiti State.

General Murtala’s administration set up the Justice Ayo Irikefe Panel on state creation, and it received 32 demands for state creation (Babalola, 2016: 6). The Irikefe Panel observed in 1975 that the creation of 12 states led to the emergence of more minorities and this led to the creation of more states in 1976 and other years (Egbefo, 2014: 258). Seven additional states were created in 1976 because of the recommendation of the Justice Ayo Irikefe Commission on the review of state creation issues (Odey, 2014: 337).

However, there was still lopsidedness. The North had 10 states while the South had 9. The East was the most affected by this. After the 1976 state creation exercise, the Igbos only had two states (Anambra and Imo), the smallest compared to the number of states belonging to other majority groups (Vande, 2012: 40-41). This tacitly pitched the Northern and Middle belt elites against Southern elites (especially Igbos).

The Political Bureau of 1987 recommended the creation of six additional states, which should be done in 1991, but the Babangida administration created two additional states on September 23, 1987 (Odey, 2014: 337). These were Akwa-Ibom and Katsina. In August 1991, nine additional states were created to make the number of states in the country 30. The North had five while the South had four making the number of states in the North 16 while the South had 14. The Northern elites still prevailed and with respect to revenue allocation, the North benefited more than the South based on equality of states. General Abacha created six additional states in 1996 (Odey, 2014: 338). Each geo-political zone received one state. All the zones now have 6 states except the North West which has 7 and the South East that has 5. Presently, the North has 19 States while the South has 17 states. Minority groups populate 14 out of the 36 states in Nigeria (Suberu, 2010: 462). Local government in Nigeria rose from 301 in 1976 to 774 in 1996. The North has more local governments than the South. The FCT has 6 local councils (geographically, it is still located in the North). This gives the North advantage over the South in access to resources, federal employment, and appointment.

7.5.5. Implications of State Creation Exercise

The creation of states and regions in Nigeria have been of positive and negative effects on Nigeria's social, economic, and political systems. Past Nigerian governments have created states and local governments in the country to satisfy the yearnings of ethnic minorities to give them some degree of jurisdictional power and a sense of belonging (Peter, 2014: 200). Minorities have always feared being dominated, and that is why measures like federal character and state creation have given them some control over the nation's wealth and some degree of autonomy and self-determination (Ukase, 2014: 206). This may not completely be the case because of allegations of marginalisation by some groups which have been perpetuated. States were created from the Northern region to carve out autonomy for the ethnic minorities in the region. Surprisingly, the age-long complaint of domination of Middle Belt elites by Northern elites is still there. A contemporary example of this is the continuous attacks of communities in Benue and Plateau states by Fulani Herdsmen. These attacks are seen as a tool by Northern Hausa and Fulani to suppress the Northern minority groups.

Nigerian federalism has decimated ethnic and regional loyalty through state creation and reduced sectarianism. To win an election in Nigeria, there is the need to have votes spread

across a specified number of states; a development that has reduced sectarianism (Hill, 2012: 45-46). This worked during the civil war; because of state creation, the minority groups in the Eastern region reduced their support for the Igbos (Odey, 2014: 340). In addition, the creation of more states has domiciled ethnic conflicts in the states rather than holding the country to ransom (Suberu, 2010: 463). Consequently, it has weakened the prospect of secession in Nigeria because of the fragmentation of hitherto cohesive ethnic groups. The constitutional mandate of one-quarter of votes in two-thirds states to become a president has also made more states beneficial. This mirrors the centripetal power sharing model. A candidate would require votes from beyond his/her ethnic group to become President. This produces- a national leader and many groups across the country will have the feeling that they voted the leader into a position of authority. The implication of this is also elites' cooperation. Elites from across the five elite groups cooperate during elections to ensure that they secure votes from different sections of the country.

On the other side of the coin, state creation has not achieved its purpose in Nigeria, but satisfying the interest of some elites, and this is substantiated by the poor infrastructural facilities and poverty in those states as well as corruption among political office holders (Vande, 2012: 46). The author further opines that it has not fulfilled bringing the government closer to the people and national development (Vande, 2012: 33). These states have not been financially buoyant; hence, giving economic succour to its people becomes almost a mirage (Ukase, 2014: 206). This weak financial viability explains why they cannot put the necessary infrastructure meant for the good of their territories in place. It has made the component units very weak in comparison to the government at the centre. That is why the Nigerian federal system tilts more towards unitary in practice.

Political elites, especially from the majority bloc, perceive state creation as an avenue to have access to more federal revenues rather than promoting minority autonomy and security (Odey, 2014: 346). Even elites within the minority fold are the same. Unfortunately, the elites among the minorities have used state creation as an avenue to have selfish political and economic gains (Ukase, 2014: 206). It has not solved the problems of the ethnic minorities, but it has further been a setback to realising true federalism (Agboola, 2016: 8). It is also the same story for local government creation, as it remains an elites' affair as it is meant to satisfy their desire for power and make them more relevant (Agboola, 2016: 8). Creating states to

serve the parochial interest of some groups has further polarised the country rather than integrate it (Eze, Elimian, and Chinwuba, 2015: 115). This is because they have seen states as money-making avenues because of access to the central government. They prefer to run states that generate less, take more from the centre, and satisfy the selfish desires of the political elites. Having oil as the main source of revenue and making less emphasis on states relying mainly on IGR contribute to creating more states in Nigeria (Kraxberger, 2005: 17-18). Political elites believe that they can go cap in hand every month to collect federal allocation, hence, they see the administering of states not as a responsibility but as money-making enterprises and not revenue generation entities. This has been exacerbated by the increase in the cost of running the states. PINWP 1 explained below.

It has increased the cost of governance because if in the First Republic, we had just one set of ministers for the entire Northern region, regional ministers. In this same Northern region, you now have 19 states, you now have commissioners in every state, about 15 or 20, so that is why the bulk of the resources goes towards maintaining a few because if you look at the budget both of the Federal Government and the State Governments in Nigeria, recurrent expenditure is more than the capital (PINWP 1, January 2019).

PIR 3 shared a similar opinion on this. The root cause of this attitude, according to Ikpe (2009: 684), is that in Nigeria, the interests of the elites, most times, determine state policies. A good example is the creation of new states and local governments. The fund that would have been used on capital projects is being used to remunerate political appointees and civil servants. Although there are very few instances where capital expenditure is more than recurrent but if political offices have reduced, it would have been a far better proportion in favour of capital expenditure. This would have had positive chronological effects on infrastructures, development, and reduction of poverty. A Central Bank of Nigeria 2019 Public Finance Statistics¹³, which covered the year 2009 to 2019, indicated that recurrent expenditure of states was 60.7% while capital expenditure was 39.3%. This excludes extra budgetary expenditure.

Fiscal strength in a federal state is an indication of political capacity in intergovernmental relations. Creating states have also arrogated more powers to the federal compared to the states. The states have become so small that they have become financially feeble while the

¹³ <https://www.cbn.gov.ng/documents/Statbulletin.asp>

federal government has more resources. PINWP 1 submitted that ‘now in 1966 after the coup when Gowon came to power, they created the states and decimated their powers. So gradually, we had states which are smaller in terms of size, in terms of resources, with federal government leaving most of the powers to itself’ (PINWP 1, January 2019). This is not in tangent with Wheare’s postulation of federalism that each level of government has to be coordinate and independent in resources and the attendant functions (Tarlton, 1965: 864).

Aside from the resources angle, the issue of polarising Nigerians also exists. Creating more states have further divided the country and this bolstered statism and less interest in national unity (Odey, 2014: 344). Nigerians who have been staying in a place within the country earlier than others now discriminate against others. This has its root traced to the colonial days. The British promoted ethnic segregation. A good example was what obtained in Northern cities like Kano, Zaria, Jos, Sokoto and Kaduna where indigenes lived in ‘Birni’, which is the city proper, migrants from other Northern cities, lived in ‘Tudun Wada’ while Southerners lived in ‘Sabo Gari’ (Azaigba and Yio, 2014: 390). In contemporary Nigeria, migrants into other states are now called non-indigenes or settlers while those that have been living there before the migrants joined are called indigenes. Kraxberger outlines below that the

status as an indigene is based on biological and ascriptive characteristics, and a person can only be an indigene of one area (often operationalised through local government or state boundaries). Whenever a person is resident outside his or her area of patrilocal ancestry, that person is regarded as a ‘non-indigene,’ even if the person was born in that area or has lived there for an extended period of time (Kraxberger, 2005: 18).

This dichotomy has been a threat to our integration. The author gives more elaborate explanations that:

The definitions are based on contemporary usage in mainstream Nigerian society. An ‘indigene’ is a person tracing patrilocal ancestry through a particular area of Nigeria (i.e., local government, state, traditional political domain). A ‘non-indigene’ is anyone resident outside his or her area of patrilocal ancestry. Non-indigenes are further sub-divided into ‘strangers’ and ‘settlers’. ‘Settlers’ are non-indigenes who have lived in an area for a long period of time (for example, five years or more). ‘Strangers’ are those with shorter periods of residence in a place (Kraxberger, 2005: 18-21).

Nigerians should be free everywhere in the country, but this is not so. PINWOL expatiated on these definitions below.

And again, why should we at this point of our national history, almost sixty years of turning independent begin to identify or promote indigenship over citizenship? And almost every state does it. So, these are hindrances. So, if you, for example, migrate to a particular place and stay there for ten years, twenty years, thirty years and still be considered as a settler, then there is a problem about national integration. So, this does not come from the elites. It comes from the people around you. They remind you where you are coming from (PINWOL, December 2018).

Obviously, segregating is not an elites' affair alone, but the masses also share the blame. PISWP 1 gave similar assertion but fingered the elites as those that promote such divisions. He stated thus:

So, where every region or now state lays emphasis on indigenship. An indigenship concept is another problem that is really ravaging the political space now, *you are not one of us, you are just a settler*. Even though that ethnic group might have settled there for 100 years, they do not regard them as sons of the soil, and that is playing out very very negatively in the North. That is the basis of the problem in Plateau State between those who call themselves indigenes, the Biroms are mostly in Jos, the Fulanis are regarded as settlers, the same problem in Southern Kaduna, especially Zango Kataf area, the Fulanis there are regarded as settlers and is always a problem. So, our political leaders they have really not done enough to integrate the country. That is the major problem.....they make everybody feel that when the chips are down, to thy tent o ye Israel. So that is one of the major problems we have (PISWP 1, December 2018).

Having identified the dichotomy, it is salient to dissect what plays out because of this dual status especially because of the dynamism that manifests. Hence, in some instances, within a state, an indigene may also belong to the minority while a settler will be a minority. Dividing Nigeria into majority and minority is fluid because some minorities at the national level may be majorities in some states (Azaigba and Yio, 2014: 394). State creation in Nigerian has spread groups across states where they are sometimes referred to as non-indigenes. For instance, Tiv in Plateau, Nasarawa and Taraba States are seen as non-indigenes while they are indigenes and even majorities in Benue State (Eze et al., 2015: 116). The Jukuns are also found in Nasarawa, Benue and Plateau States, but it is only in Taraba that they are referred to as indigenes (Eze et al., 2015: 116). The Jukuns have claimed ownership of Taraba State and asked the Tiv to leave their state. This has led to conflicts between the two groups. Conspicuously, the creation of states has exposed the 'differences' among these states (ethnic

groups) and have made the people tagged minorities to be vulnerable to discrimination and attacks.

This dichotomy has also been responsible for the various crises in the country. Indigeneship and settler issues are responsible for conflicts like Uhrobo-Itsekiri, Ijaw-Itsekiri, Azare-Tiv, Hausa-Kataf, and Hausa-Bachama people (Santas, 2014: 241). The good relationship between the Hausa/Fulani and the Tarok, Biron, Anaguta, among others for years was tampered with due to the creation of Jos North and Jos South Local Governments as the two local government areas favour the Hausa and Fulani settlers (Eze et al., 2015: 117). Sometimes, the settlers are more economically successful than the indigenes, and the host community has sometimes developed resentment and resistance which have translated into conflict as the cases of Zango Kataf-Hausa conflicts of 1984 and 1992, Tiv/Jukun-Fulani conflict of 2001, among others (Salahu, 2014: 429). From a less violent perspective, non-indigenes have been denied privileges.

These states, especially those of the minority ethnic groups, denied non-indigenes some benefits and services, including those provided by the federal government situated in their states (Odey, 2014: 344-345). PIR 2 opined below.

Even till now, for those of us who are Yoruba, you were born in Ibadan, but your parents are from Osun or your parents are from Ogun State, but you were born in Oyo State, and you have lived all your life, 40 years, 50 years of your life in Oyo State, you work in Oyo State, you pay your tax here, you will still be reminded that you are not from Oyo State, that you are a settler. You can build your house, you can do all that, but you may not be able to work in the state public service, and you cannot contest for positions here, you will be reminded of that (PIR 2, December 2018).

This resonates with the views of Kraxberger (2005: 18-21) and Suberu (2010: 466) that discrimination against non-indigenes occurs in employment opportunities, admission to schools, access to social services, access to land, running for political offices and federal projects. In Nigeria, there is discrimination against non-indigenes in states in the civil service and generally in states (Kraxberger, 2005: 10). As a result of being indigenes of a particular place, Nigerians have been denied employment opportunities in other places (Azaigba and Yio, 2014: 394). The competition for scarce resources has also contributed to this. The decline in the country's economy has led to competition for state resources and indigenes 'preventing' settlers from competing the limited resources with them (Kraxberger, 2005: 17-18). This is echoed by PISEP that:

As a Yoruba man, if you were raised in Kano, you probably have not been to Ogun State where your father is from, you did your education, everything in Kano, probably you even got married to a Hausa girl, and you pay your taxes. In fact, you speak fluent Hausa. If not that they ask you to identify where you are from, you pass off as a Hausa person. But when politics now requires you to identify, you say you are from Ogun State. Already your discrimination starts. The solution here is wherever you are born, if you have lived there for a period of time, you say 10, 12, 15 years or more, that makes you part and parcel of that place. You are entitled to every rights and responsibilities of that place. We have this concept of citizenship and indigenship. Is not in the constitution that some are settlers and owners of the land, but the constitution says you are a citizen. Now which is higher in terms of content? Is it the discrepancy between citizenship or that between indigenship and settler? The composition of who a citizen is what we should be looking at now. What entitles you as a citizen? Do not forget, you have fundamental rights that you are supposed to live anywhere you want, move around wherever you want. Of course, within the law (PISEP, January 2019).

These issues of dichotomy cited above are indications that state creation exercises have further divided the country rather than unifying it. Those that are hitherto seen as part of a group are now seen as alien to such group.

7.6 Conclusion

Indeed, there cannot be full integration in any country, nevertheless, achieving it appreciably is what a country like Nigeria should experience considering its diversity. The measures explored in this chapter are national conferences, revenue allocation, federal character principle and creation of states and local governments.

The national conferences were designed to discuss national matters that bothered the unity of the country. They were elites' driven because political elites played crucial roles in determining the delegates. Hence, it was easy for the elites to protect their interests through these conferences. Most of the reports of the national conferences are not yet implemented. Nevertheless, political elites have ensured that those that favoured them have been fully or partially implemented.

Revenue allocation has been the pedestal to fund the governments at all levels in Nigeria and it has been a game of the elites. They have cooperated with and disagreed on the different formulas. Political elites have also cannibalised the revenue system through corruption. Evidently, the amassing of state wealth has been the driving force for aspiring for political positions.

Federal character has made it possible for positions in the public service to be less dominated by few states. However, the need for spread has weakened merit in placing personnel in these positions. Political elites have either abused the process by not observing the principle and some have used the influence of their offices to give less focus to integration but satisfy their ethnic enclave.

State creation has no doubt brought some groups some sense of belonging in the country. Nevertheless, the more states are created, the newer majority and minority groups spring. This creates new set of elites and leads to more agitations championed by these elites. It has also resulted in reducing the elites in the old states and carving empires for some political elites in the states that are created. Hence, corruption in the states has persisted.

These measures no doubt have their advantages and disadvantages but wherever the pendulum swings are due to elites' parochial interests, cooperation, and contestations. This brings to the fore the need to explore rotational presidency as a national integration tool in Nigeria's Fourth Republic in the next chapter. This becomes necessary because power sharing is also an elites' dominated exercise.

CHAPTER EIGHT

ROTATIONAL PRESIDENCY AND THE NATIONAL INTEGRATION QUESTION

8.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on rotational presidency in Nigeria. The phenomenon is also referred to as zoning within the Nigerian context. It sheds light on how zoning has been practised in the country and the political intricacies surrounding it. This is important because the issue of who becomes the President has at different times punctured the peace of Nigeria. Succinctly, the chapter explores the extent to which rotational presidency has fostered national integration in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. The chapter argues that rotational presidency has positive and negative effects on the Nigerian political and economic systems.

This chapter is presented in six sections. The first section focuses on the meaning of rotational presidency as an elites' arrangement and why it has become an object of emphasis in contemporary Nigeria. The second section touches on the constitutionality of zoning and argues that though the practice is not in the constitution, it has positioned some ethnic groups to produce the President. The third section emphasises the history and politics of rotational presidency from 1959 till the Fourth Republic. The fourth section argues that rotational presidency has made minority ethnic groups to have a sense of belonging in the country through producing the President. The second part of this section explains that rotational presidency has bolstered stability in the country. The fifth section establishes that rotational presidency may jettison the emergence of a leader based on popular vote and those with good skills who will promote development. The sixth section focuses on how rotational presidency is used as a tool to manipulate the masses. This section also dwells on rotational presidency as a tool for ethnic and religious manipulation, which makes political elites whip ethnic and religious sentiments to get the support of the masses. The chapter ends with a conclusion that identified poor leadership, weak institutions, and poor development as the challenges of the country. The suggestion is that if these three are fixed, rotational presidency may still be practised, but it will no longer be an elitist tool to manipulate the masses.

8.2 Rotational Presidency as an Elites' Agreement

As earlier explained in this study, power sharing in Nigeria takes different forms. This chapter interrogates the extent to which rotational presidency fosters national integration. It is important to reiterate that rotational presidency is an aspect of consociationalism. As it will be made clearer below, it is a form of grand coalition where different segments share executive power. Rotational presidency also encompasses centripetalism, which provides that the vote spread required to emerge as Nigeria's President is wide enough to include different parts of the country. Rotational presidency has become an integral part of Nigeria's political system. Eborka defines the concept below.

For the sake of clarity, a definition of rotational presidency is proposed here to mean, a situation where people from the different regions that constitute a particular socio-political formation shall in the course of time alternate the position of the President in an ordered sequence among themselves (Eborka, 2016: 35).

In taking cognisance of the regions, the six geo-political zones, the ethnic groups and religion are factored in. For this study, rotational presidency is taken to mean alternating the office of the President among the six geo-political zones and between the two major religions to ensure that no single ethnic or religious group monopolises the President's office. However, rotational presidency has implications for ethnic, religious, and geo-political zones of the Vice President and the first four principal officers of the National Assembly. Thus, power sharing in Nigeria's Fourth Republic means rotating the presidential, governorship, ministerial positions, and it is beyond ethnic balancing but also involves regional balancing (Asogwa, 2018: 5).

Several reasons have made rotational presidency to be an important factor in Nigerian politics. One of the reasons is that the North has dominated the Office of Presidency from independence until June 12, 1993. The Northern elites have also frequently issued inflammatory statements that imply that the North will always rule Nigeria. The North right from independence had always embraced the slogan 'born to rule', but ironically, the region is less economically developed than the South (Ademiluyi, 2019). In addition to this political reason, the issue of resources also comes to the fore. Hence, it is important to note that the push for rotating the presidency came from the Southern (Yoruba, Igbo, and Niger Delta elites) region. Elites from the South feel that being the goose that lays the golden egg, they

should have more years in occupying the seat of the President. Nevertheless, beyond the North-South dichotomy of the phenomenon, elites from the minority folds (Niger Delta and Middle Belt) support sharing powers at different levels. Minorities are in support of rotational presidency and zoning of other key positions at the state and local government levels (Egbefo, 2014: 260). This ensures that minorities are not disadvantaged because of their small population. The 1994/95 Conference also greased this awareness because it recommended rotating key political positions. The elites believe that the idea would bring equity because majoritarian democratic principles will always electorally disadvantage minorities (Omololu, 2012).

Rotational presidency aligns with Lijphart's (2012: 2; 2018: 1) view on consociational democracy that there is a need to share power through consensus. Political elites agree on presenting a candidate by considering factors like ethnicity and religion. PISSOL saw rotational presidency as purely elites' cohabitation. The participant felt elites use it to appease themselves with less concern for national integration and stated thus:

The issue of arrangement for national integration goes beyond just rotational presidency. Rotational presidency is an elites' phenomenon. I mean elites' arrangement for political accommodation. If you pose the question that rotational presidency is elites' arrangement for elites' integration, not national integration, we could nod and say somehow it helps, at least there is peace, relative peace among the elites. They can organise themselves hoping that the next time it will come to the South, the next time it will go to the North and so on. This is a very important point because you cannot simply say rotational presidency will help in national integration; it may help in elites' integration. I even doubt that it will help in elites' integration. It will help in elites' cohabitation, elites' political accommodation; they are able to accommodate themselves and manage themselves, bury some of their differences because of their joint interest of sharing of political power over a time horizon (PISSOL, December 2018).

However, ordinary people are not beneficiaries of this arrangement. The fact that certain regions have produced presidents has not translated to social and economic development. There are still bad roads in the South West and other parts of the country. There is high level of poverty in Northern Nigeria, and there are environmental issues in the South South despite political elites from the Yoruba, Northern and Niger Delta elite groups having ruled the country from 1999. Factually and nationally, 14.3% of people aged five and above have never attended school (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020: 13). The percentage of the poor in the country is 53.7%, with Sokoto being the highest at 89.9% (National Bureau of Statistics,

2018a: 18). These point to the fact that the economic conditions of the masses have not changed.

8.3 Constitutionality of Zoning

Zoning was not originally in the 1999 Constitution. The ideas of zoning and rotating the presidency and previous ideas like a quota system and federal character principle came up to mitigate the crises associated with federal instability. The constitution is a formal document that determines how society will be governed. Hence, the inclusion of zoning the president in the constitution makes it a formal consociational arrangement. However, within the Nigerian context, it is an informal consociational arrangement because it is not in the constitution or an act of parliament. This is why informal consociational institutions exist to reinforce formal institutions, but the former is a product of elites' imposition (Bogaards, 2019: 30). Nwozor (2013: 38 and 47) argues that without giving zoning a constitutional status and going by majoritarian democratic principles, the North will always electorally produce a President. This corroborates Omololu's (2012) earlier claim that without zoning, some groups will be shut out of assuming the presidential position. It is for this reason that some are advocating for zoning and rotational presidency to be incorporated into the constitution.

Despite the 'non-constitutional' status of the practice, some of the study's participants still opined that it has some measure of legality. According to PICL 2, 'what is unconstitutional is what the constitution says is unconstitutional. If the law says it is unconstitutional, it is unlawful; then it is unconstitutional. When the constitution is silent on it, then nothing makes it unconstitutional. It is a political arrangement' (PICL 2, December 2018). Hence, the participant recognises the role of elites in the arrangement. PICL 1 justified the arrangement because, being a political arrangement, it is linked to political parties and the activities of political parties are recognised by law. However, the participant did not conclude that it is constitutional. He submitted that:

So, to that extent, I will not call it unconstitutional because the same constitution allows the political parties to undergo primaries. The electoral act gives the political parties leeway to change their candidates after the primary elections. So, it is a kind of internal arrangement of a political party to determine how it can appeal to voters. So, for us to say it is unconstitutional which means it is illegal.....and the same constitution gives the National Assembly and the Independent National Electoral Commission power to issue guidelines for elections, and it gave the political parties

power to determine that, so we cannot outrightly say that it is illegal because they exercise those powers legitimately (PICL 1, January 2019).

PIR 1 explained that not being in the constitution is not an issue because all provisions cannot be in the constitution, but the participant did not shy away from stating that it can be put in the constitution later. He emphasised that:

Rotational presidency is not in the constitution, but it is implied. The constitution cannot be overloaded with every item or every element, but rotational presidency is implied, political parties are recognised by the constitution, and whatever they have as their internal arrangement should be recognised by the constitution (PIR 1, December 2018).

This corroborates Bogaards' (2019: 34) view that formal consociational institutions may be too rigid to adapt to the dynamism and uncertainties in societies and this justifies why informal consociational institutions are embraced. PIFCCS shared a similar view with PIR 1. He submitted that 'it is not in the constitution, but it has become part of our national life because we know which zone to produce the President at every point in time' (PIFCCS, December 2018). However, PISEOL relatively differed with PIFCCS by suggesting that it should be in the constitution so as not to cause arguments in the future. He posited that:

Yes, I think so. But if we want to do this, under what platform? Is it in our constitution? Let us study how countries that have been successful did it and put something about it in our constitution. Let it be part of our constitution; let it be embedded in our constitution. It should be that if it is not your turn if you try to contest, they will push you away. It should be that it will rotate among the zones. A zone will do, followed by another until the last zone gets it, and we start again, then there will be peace. Let the order on how it will go round be entrenched in the constitution. You know the way we behave in Nigeria; confusion may come up. If confusion comes, no zone will be able to go against the constitution. It will not lead to any issue of marginalisation because you are waiting for your own time (PISEOL, January 2019).

Rotational presidency may be difficult to sustain in Nigeria if there is no constitutional backing (Eborka, 2016: 37). There is a recent example to substantiate this. Professor Ango Abdullahi stated that the constitution did not provide for zoning so the North could still produce the President in 2023. He claimed that it was the PDP rule and that under former President Jonathan, the rule was downplayed when he contested in 2011 (Akasike, Adepegba, Isenyo, Abraham, and Ede, 2019). Socio-cultural groups like Afenifere, Middle Belt Forum, Ohaneze and the IYC, criticised Ango Abdullahi for this.

However, PISSP saw rotational presidency beyond being in the constitution but that our value system, which has been dented needs to be repaired. The participant posited that ‘we need to redefine our value system because even if it is enshrined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria that there is a need for rotational presidency, it will not address our problem’ (PISSP, January 2019). The value system has been tainted with elites’ corruption, which rests on the tripod stand of prebendalism, clientelism and rent-seeking (Ojukwu and Shopeju, 2010: 17-18). These have trickled down to corruption at all levels and poverty.

Nevertheless, the informal nature of rotational presidency makes it easy to switch from the practice in the future if the need arises. However, the major disadvantage remains that political elites will always attempt to thwart the gentle man’s agreement to achieve their parochial interests. Having established the fact that zoning the presidency is not in the constitution, its legality has not been set aside by any court in the country, so it subsists informally. It is salient to have a glimpse into rotational presidency in Nigeria from a chronological perspective.

8.4 Rotational Presidency in Nigeria: 1959 to 2022

Consociationalism assumes that there are identifiable segments that share power. In Nigeria, existing literature identifies these segments as ethnic and religious. To achieve peace, all segments have to feel like they are involved in power-sharing. This section looks at power-sharing among top executive offices, that is, President, Vice President, Presidents of the Senate and Speakers of the House of Representatives. **Table 10** shows the Heads of state and their deputies from 1959 to 2022. The table also shows the regional distribution of these offices.

Table 10: Heads of State/Presidents and their deputies since 1959

S/N	Heads of State/President and Deputies	Region, Zone and Type of Government	Duration
1	Nnamdi Azikiwe (President)/ Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (Prime Minister)	South (South East)/North (North East)- Civilian	October 1, 1959 to January 15, 1966
2	J.T.U Aguiyi Ironsi/ Babafemi Ogundipe	South (South East)/South (South West) – Military	January 16, 1966 to July 29, 1966
3	Yakubu Gowon/ J.E Akinwale Wey	North (North Central)/South (South South) –Military	July 29, 1966 to July 29, 1975
4	Murtala Mohammed/Olusegun Obasanjo	North (North West)/ South (South West) – Military	July 29, 1975 to February 13, 1976
5	Olusegun Obasanjo/Shehu Musa Yar’Adua	South (South West)/ North (North West) – Military	February 13, 1976 to October 1, 1979
6	Shehu Shagari/ Alex Ekwueme	North (North West)/ South (South East) – Civilian	October 1, 1979 to December 31, 1983
7	Muhammadu Buhari/Tunde Idiagbon	North (North West)/North (North Central) – Military	December 31, 1983 to August 27, 1985
8	Ibrahim Babangida/Ebitu Ukiwe	North (North Central)/South (South East)- Military	August 27, 1985 to October 6, 1986
9	Ibrahim Babangida/Augustus Aikhomu	North (North Central)/South (South South)- Military	October 6, 1986, to August 27, 1993
10	Ernest Shonekan/Sani Abacha	South (South West)– Civilian/ (North West)- Military	August 27, 1993 to November 17, 1993
11	Sani Abacha/Oladipo Diya	North (North West)/South (South West) – Military	November 17, 1993 to June 8, 1998 but his deputy left office December 21, 1997
12	Abdulsalami Abubakar/Michael Akhigbe	North (North West)/South (South South) – Military	June 8, 1998 to May 29, 1999

13	Olusegun Obasanjo/Atiku Abubakar	South (South West)/North (North East) – Civilian	May 29, 1999 to May 29, 2007
14	Umar Musa Yar'Adua/Goodluck Jonathan	North (North West)/South (South South) – Civilian	May 29, 2007 to May 5, 2010
15	Goodluck Jonathan/Namadi Sambo	South (South South)/ North (North West) – Civilian	May 10, 2010 to May 29, 2015 but Namadi Sambo became Vice President on May 19, 2010.
16	Muhammadu Buhari/Oluyemi Osinbajo	North (North West)/South (South West) – Civilian	May 29, 2015 till date

Source: Compiled by author

*The position of the Vice President during the military was called Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters or Chief of General Staff

Table 10 also shows the evolution of rotational presidency in Nigeria. Except for the Ironsi and Buhari/Idiagbon regimes, the top two executive offices were occupied by individuals from different regions throughout this period. It is also glaring that the pre-Fourth Republic era witnessed the domination of the office of the President by the North. The region ruled for 29 years and about 2 months from January 1966 until May 1999, while the South ruled for 4 years and about 4 months within the same period. This imbalance also fuelled the call for rotating the office in the Fourth Republic.

This table also shows that ethnic and religious differences were key to regime change in Nigeria. Thus, the first military government of Ironsi was seen as pro-Igbo by Northerners. Although Ironsi did not partake in the coup but was a beneficiary because he was the most senior military officer. The counter-coup of Gowon was a response by the Northern military elites to what they considered as Igbo agenda. While the face of regime change may be ethnic or religious, there are other factors responsible for change. Ekwe-Ekwe (1985:619) argues that the Kaduna 'Mafia' played a decisive role in Obasanjo's ascension to power. Ekwe-Ekwe further argues that one of the conditions that the Kaduna 'Mafia' gave to supporting Obasanjo was that he chose a Northern Muslim officer, Shehu Yar'Adua, to become his deputy (Ekwe-Ekwe, 1985: 619).

The annulment of the 1993 presidential election, which was won by Chief MKO Abiola, captures some of the complexities of rotational presidency. The uniqueness of Chief Abiola's candidacy was that his support was spread throughout the country, and he had Muslim and Christian support. The support even crisscrossed Northern and Southern regions considering the structure of the SDP (Agbaje, Akande, and Ojo, 2007: 84). The annulment shows that while ethnicity and religion are important, there are other factors that shape Nigeria's political landscape. What the case of Abiola also shows is that there are no rigid boundaries between the segments. While Abiola enjoyed popular support, he seemed unpopular with some of the elites. PINCP pointed out that:

The Northern oligarchy saw Abiola as a threat and that they will not be able to control him, and that he will be independent of any power block. They felt he will be assertive because he was wealthy. They were also scared because, being an international figure, it may be difficult to remove him through a military coup. Even some Southern elites opposed Abiola's emergence as the President because some Yorubas saw him as a threat to them because they felt being a Muslim, he would sell the Yorubas to the North. The Igbos were equally not happy that he did not pick an Igbo elite as his running mate. In essence, the elites at that time felt he towers above them (PINCP, January 2019).

The annulment of the 1993 presidential election seemed to confirm fears of Northern hegemony. PISWP 1 pointed out that:

The annulment of the election brought about the suspicion that the Northern oligarchy was not interested in allowing any other region to take the presidency. Hence, the need for rotational presidency. This culminated in the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference, which recommended rotational presidency (PISWP 2, December 2018).

These events signify elites' differences and corroborate the views of scholars like Nwozor, (2013: 47) and Obi-Ani and Obi-Ani (2010: 9) on how Abiola's victory was vehemently opposed. It also supports Okonofua's (2013: 6) claim that the Northern elites through the Sultanate worked in synergy with the military such that the Sultanate advised the military government of Babangida to annul the 1993 election. Although Babangida is from the Middle Belt, he did the bidding of the Northern elites. Consequently, political elites interpreted this as ethnic hegemony, and this prompted militarisation of various ethnic groups (Nwozor, 2013: 38). This led to the emergence of a group like the O'odua People's Congress to fight the course of the Yorubas. This group and other ethnic militia groups became so active in the Fourth Republic.

In August 1993, in an attempt to appease the Yoruba elites, Babangida handed over power to an ING headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan, from Ogun State like Abiola. Ernest Shonekan was the chairman and chief executive of United African Company, and he was someone who was never in politics before he was chosen to head the ING (Detheridge and Pepple, 1998: 480). This was obviously a ‘parley’ between Northern/Middle Belt and military elites and an economic and Yoruba elite. The sudden romance remains a subject of debate as Babangida gave no reason for his selection. However, Akeem (2014: 183) gave two possible reasons: Babangida saw Shonekan as an ally who could be trusted and felt his appointment could make it appear that the Hausa/Fulani oligarchy was not marginalising the Yorubas. The author further averred that the duration of the ING was not given. Hence, the motive of the Northern elites for setting up the ING appeared to tilt towards the sustenance of the North in power.

General Sani Abacha, who was the Vice Chairman and Secretary of Defence of the ING, unseated Chief Shonekan and became the Head of State. Further clarification was given by PISWOL that:

On Shonekan’s removal, Abacha was protecting the interest of the military and Northern elites as well as himself. He had been involved in most of the coups in the country, and the craving for power became more when he had the opportunity. He was encouraged by the declaration of the Interim Government illegal by the court (PISWOL, January 2009).

Aside from these, Abacha also enjoyed the support of Yoruba elites to oust the ING. Notable human rights activists, like Chief Gani Fawehinmi, Dr Beko Ransome-Kuti, Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi, including Chief M.K.O Abiola, the winner of the annulled election, had called on Abacha to take over from the ING (Nwala, 1997: 1-2). To pacify, the Yoruba elites, Abacha appointed a Yoruba as his deputy. In supporting Abacha, the Yoruba elites had hoped that Abacha would hand over to Chief MKO Abiola within a short time. As his reluctance to hand over power became clear, Abacha’s support started to dwindle by mid-1994 (Nwala, 1997: 2). When Abacha died in 1998, he was replaced by Abubakar who was the Chief of Defence Staff during Abacha’s regime. In addition to sharing the home state of Niger with Babangida, Abubakar was supported by retired military officers who were pioneer members of the PDP and loyal to Babangida (Agbaje et al., 2007: 85).

Ethnicity again came to the fore before the commencement of the Fourth Republic. The two presidential candidates for the 1999 presidential election were Yorubas. These are Olusegun

Obasanjo of the PDP and Samuel Oluyemisi Falae of the joint platform of the AD and APP. This was seen as an attempt to appease the Yoruba elites, who were robbed of the presidency almost six years earlier. Olusegun Obasanjo emerged as the winner. The emergence of Obasanjo evolved from the cooperation between Northern and Yoruba elites, with the former feeling its interest will be protected. The Northern elites were more comfortable with Obasanjo considering his military background and the fact that he had always cooperated with the North. This corroborates the claim by Ekwe-Ekwe (1985: 619) that Obasanjo implemented the desires of the Kaduna ‘Mafia’ when he became a military Head of State. Aside from the military and Northern factors, economic interest played out because some economic elites funded the PDP and its campaign in 1998/99 (Agbaje et al., 2007: 86). The authors listed among others Atiku Abubakar (Northern elite), Orji Uzor Kalu (Igbo elite), Aliko Dangote (Northern elite) and Mike Adenuga (Yoruba elite). The first two did this to protect their political and economic interests, while the last two displayed such gesture for economic reasons.

Nevertheless, the Yoruba elites still saw Obasanjo as a Northern puppet. The result of this was that Obasanjo received less votes from the Yorubas and more votes from the North. The Yorubas felt his opponent, Chief Oluyemisi Falae would protect their interest more. Obasanjo’s party, the PDP inscribed rotational presidency in their constitution. By this they, rotated key positions in the country and that their presidential candidates will not always come from one geo-political zone. This also affected the position of the Vice President, as seen in **Table 10**. It also, to a great extent, affected the positions of the President of the Senate and Speaker of House of Representatives as seen below:

Tables 11 and 12 show the distribution of the positions of president of Senate and Speaker of the House of Representative.

Table 11: Presidents of the Senate Since 1999

S/N	NAME	REGION	YEARS IN OFFICE
1	Evan Enwerem	South (South East)	1999- November 18, 1999
2	Chuba Okadigbo	South (South East)	1999 to 2000
3	Anyim Pius Anyim	South (South East)	2000 to 2003
4	Adolphus Wabara	South (South East)	2003 to 2005
5	Ken Nnamani	South (South East)	2005 to 2007
6	David Mark	North (North Central)	2007 to 2015
7	Bukola Saraki	North (North Central)	2015 to 2019
8	Ahmed Lawan	North (North East)	2019 till date

Source: Compiled by author

Table 12: House of Representatives Speakers from 1999 till date

S/N	NAME	REGION	YEARS IN OFFICE
1	Salisu Buhari	North (North West)	1999
2	Ghali Umar Na'Abba	North (North West)	1999 to 2003
3	Aminu Bello Masari	North (North West)	2003 to 2007
4	Patricia Etteh	South (South West)	2007 to 2007
5	Oladimeji Bankole	South (South West)	2007 to 2011
6	Aminu Tambuwal	North (North West)	2011 to 2015
7	Yakubu Dogara	North (North East)	2015 to 2019
8	Olufemi Gbajabiamila	South (South West)	2019 till date

Source: Compiled by author

As **Tables 11 and 12** show, the offices of the President of the Senate and Speaker of the house of Representatives were, most of the time, occupied by individuals from different geo-political zones. As part of elites' agreement, elites agreed to distribute these positions in different regions (Owete, 2019). The distribution of these offices is important because of the belief in the hierarchical importance of the first four political offices. Hence, the spread was done to pacify elites from different zones to have access to power at the federal level. This also became necessary because elites have the belief that the first four political offices in the country goes hierarchically as President, Vice-President, President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. In addition, the zones the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives came from determined where their deputies emerged from. Succinctly, they did not come from the same geo-political zones. The tables also show that elites from the five elite groups, despite their differences, pursue a common agenda- the acquisition of power (Owete, 2019). Elites also cooperated and had differences towards the second term (2003 to 2007) bid of Obasanjo.

For Obasanjo's second term, other ethnic groups came into the ring. Alex Ekwueme (Igbo elite), Alhaji Abubakar Rimi (Northern elite) and Chief Barnabas Gemade (Middle Belt elite) contested the primaries of the PDP presidential ticket with him (Genyi, 2014: 487). This was an attestation that despite rotational presidency, other geo-political zones still attempted to have the presidency come to their zone. It also affirms that elites will still try to jettison a 'gentleman's agreement' to protect their interests. Furthermore, for the general election, Obasanjo's main opposition was General Muhammadu Buhari of the Fulani extraction under the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP). Although Obasanjo received massive votes from the Yorubas for his second term, the ethnic and religious game was less competitive at the general election. These aforementioned proof that elites, irrespective of their group and any form of agreement among them, have power as their focal point.

Approaching the 2007 polls, aspirants from the South South wanted to run on the platform of the PDP, Obasanjo did not throw his weight behind them despite being Southerners and Christians like him. He preferred to support a Northern Muslim probably because he was the younger brother to late Musa Yar'Adua, his former Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters and the need to have a Northerner emerge as the President after the eight-year rule of a Southern President. The victory of Yar'Adua in 2007 was not a problem ethnically and religiously because most of the political elites felt it was the turn of the North and a Muslim to be in power. The candidate of the major party that contested against him was from the North and not only that, even from his state and of his religion.

The ethnic components of regime change raised dust after the death of Yar'Adua on May 5, 2010. The North felt it had not completed its tenure and some Northern elites even refused to allow his deputy, Goodluck Jonathan to act when the President was sick. Jonathan completed the Yar'Adua/Jonathan joint ticket in 2011, but he sought re-election. He won, but the Northern elites were not comfortable with this. The North felt it had been short-changed ethnically and religiously. Political elites from the North felt deprived and were able to 'convince' the masses in the region that the region had been cheated. This led to post-election violence in some Northern states. This was proof that the Northern elites later embraced rotational presidency.

The 2015 election also took an ethnic dimension as the Northern, Yoruba and Middle Belt elites teamed up to ensure Buhari became the President. The build up to the elections came

with ethnic tensions as some parts of the North became hostile to the news of the visit of the President. This was exemplified in the 2015 attacks on President Goodluck Jonathan in the North during his pre-election campaign. The opposition APC presented Buhari who emerged as the winner, and this was also an indication that despite rotational presidency being a PDP baby, it has also been embraced by the APC.

The 2019 election was less ethnic inclined because it was mainly a contest between two Northern candidates, Buhari and Atiku. Hence, the elites from the North and South could hardly exploit ethnic and religious keys to open the doors of agitation and violence. The activities in 2015 and 2019 reveal that rotating the presidency is not favoured by Southern elites alone, but the North has also come into the game. The intricacies of rotating the presidency in the Fourth Republic make it germane to examine whether the phenomenon is an integration agent or otherwise.

8.5 Rotational Presidency: Belonging and Stability

Rotational presidency as a catalyst for national integration rests on a sense of belonging and stability. Some of the study's participants feel it is a catalyst for national integration but did not leave out the clause that if it is well implemented, that is when it will serve that purpose. Belonging means that the minority status of minority groups does not make them have the feelings of being alienated or threatened. This resonates Osaghae's (1999: 275) assertion that ethnic domination is anathema to unity. Succinctly, if all the ethnic groups in a country see themselves as stakeholders in national affairs, it is a strong signal of national integration.

In a society that is divided based on ethnicity, one of the challenges of rotational presidency is that it may make one ethnic group feel they belong while alienating others. With the ascension of Goodluck Jonathan to the office of the presidency, the Ijaw people have a sense of belonging that they are part of Nigeria, but other groups felt that they were excluded. PIR 2 pointed out thus:

There is something we need to emphasise about rotational presidency; it is not constitutional, it is not in the Nigerian constitution, it is a *de facto* arrangement that came out of necessity to ensure some balance, some political stability in the country. So, we have practised it since 1999, and in terms of having symbolism of belongingness within the Nigerian state, it has worked, but in terms of integration, it has not really worked (PIR 2, December 2018).

PINWP 1, PINWOL, PIR 1 and PISSP agreed with PIR 2 that rotational presidency brought a sense of belonging. Specifically, PISSP believes that ‘it is a show of inclusiveness, is a show of oneness, it still does not guarantee stability, it does not guarantee national integration’ (PISSP, January 2019). PIR 1 posited that ‘if it is well implemented, it may graduate from creating belonging to fostering national integration’. PISWP 2 gave its efficacy a time frame and submitted that:

The reality is that the adoption of rotational presidency in Nigeria will cease at a particular point in time. May be in 20 years, but the reality is until every region has been pacified due to the mishap of ‘60s to the ‘70s, the civil war. Until every region has been pacified, North East; North West.....now the North West is there. Atiku is from the North East; we have had the South South, we have had the South West. Trust me, the North Central is going to come around and say it is our turn and until it has fully gone round, then may be a leader can rise and unite the entire nation. Then we do not care where the guy comes from (PISWP 2, December 2018).

This echoes Abacha’s proposition of a 30-year rotational presidency plan (Azelama and Oarhe, 2010: 507).

PINWP 2 is comfortable with the way zoning runs now and is of view that it is beneficial to the country as it brings stability. He clarified thus:

Yes, I will absolutely agree with that because you cannot concentrate power in only one people. We need to stabilise the country by rotating the presidency between the North and South. So, it is left for the three geo-political zones in the South to present a candidate from any of the political parties. The issue is it is good even though it is not written; it is just an acceptable norm, so this is the issue, and it works for the country (PINWP 2, January 2019).

Rotational presidency either as a tool of fostering belonging or a prospective tool of integration may help reduce the sense of deprivation. A sense of belonging may only breed a feeling of being among, but the deeper relevance of rotational presidency encompasses how it has entrenched stability in the Nigerian federal system.

Rotational presidency is an offshoot of consociationalism. Hence, associating rotational presidency with stability is in synchronisation with the position that consociationalism is designed to solve the enigma of instability in deeply divided democratic countries (Deschouwer, 2006: 895). PINEP supported zoning and purported that ‘if there are justice and equity in the implementation of rotational presidency, it will aid federal stability’ (PINEP, January 2019). PIR 3 gave a similar opinion but went further to posit that its proper

implementation is cogent and that it has afforded a minority to lead the country, and that minorities can still be accommodated to some extent, if not for the presidency but for other key positions. He expatiated thus:

I think it has the potentials to ensure federal stability in Nigeria. It is a well thought out policy. It is not as if Nigeria lacks policies, it is the effective implementation of policies that is problematic. The idea of rotational presidency is a wonderful idea and is a recognition of the likelihood of marginalisation of some sections. If you do not have rotational presidency, democracy being a game of numbers, you can be rest assured that some regions will not be able to have a shot at the presidency forever. If not for rotational presidency, how will South South get to power? Which political muscle will they muster together? One of the states in the South South has only eight local governments. So, if you go by number, by electoral strength, some states will be permanently shut out, and that was the thinking. You see, we have leaders who have really done a lot of thinking, and that is why it is a consociation arrangement. Let us try to rotate, and when you do that, you have a formula. Formula is that beyond rotational presidency; many other things are rotated with it. You have the first few important positions in the country. Presidency, Vice Presidency, Secretary to the Government of the Federation, President of the Senate, his deputy, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, among others. All these key positions are simultaneously rotated (PIR 3, January 2019).

Individuals from the major groups of Hausa/Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba form the bulk of the political elites in Nigeria (Kifordu, 2011: 437). Therefore, the pendulum swings in favour of the majority groups. As a way out, Azaigba and Yio (2014: 395) recommend that rotational presidency should not only be zonal but also between majority and minority groups in each zone. This resonates Osaghae's (1998: 4) opinion that the backbone of minority politics is the unrelenting efforts of minority elites and movements to recompense the imbalance and ensure the improvement of minority opportunities in the power equation and resource allocation. This statement echoes Arend Lijphart's view that consociational democracy is structured to turn a democratic state with an uneven political culture into a stable democracy (Lijphart, 2008: 31). A very good example is that if not for zoning, Goodluck Jonathan would not have become the Vice President and eventually the President because he is from Ijaw ethnic group. The emergence of Goodluck Jonathan as the President cemented the peace that emanated from amnesty extended to Niger Delta militants by former president Yar'Adua. This was because the militants felt uncomfortable engaging in violence when one of their elites was President. Having identified sense of belonging and stability as justifications for rotational presidency, there are certain indicators that rotating the presidency has its hitches.

8.6 Rotational Presidency and Merit and Development

Merit is being looked at from the perspective of possessing leadership skills. Ashkenas and Manville (2018) advocate that a leader should have good visions, translate such visions into strategies that will inform actions that should be taken or otherwise, work with people to implement such strategies, have a good monitoring and evaluation system and capacity to grow new leaders and improve as a leader. Aside from these, a leader needs to be more transformational by placing priority on service to the country more than self (Bass, 1999). If all these are applied in administering a country, it will metamorphose into good governance.

Rotational presidency whittles competitive democracy because a candidate who is more qualified in terms of possessing good leadership skills and more transformational in orientation may not emerge as the President. The fact remains that either in majoritarian democracy or power rotation structure, transformational leaders with good leadership skills are the best. However, the yardstick for determining who is a good leader remains a tool the masses are yet to be equipped with, in Nigeria. This is because in both ways of selecting a leader, the political elites still determine who will be fielded as candidates, and they set the barometer of good leadership. Their economic and political interests make the selection process less objective. Rotation may even make the situation more complex.

Rotating the presidency may box the country into a corner of being denied a good leader, but this does not mean that despite rotating, a good leader cannot still be selected. This is because rotation restricts the emergence of the President to a particular zone, and a candidate that is better with respect to transformational and good leadership skills at that time may be from another zone. Weak party structure on the basis of not having internal democracy, weak ideologies and programmes tend not to lead to the emergence of competent candidates, and these may also frustrate the emergence of skilful leaders (Eborka, 2016: 36). Parties would rather consider the ethnic interest of political elites and zoning to select candidates. The aforementioned are the flaws of rotational presidency concerning having the best candidate assume as the President.

PINEOL acknowledges that merit is being jettisoned in the practice because Nigeria is a diverse and a Third World country, but the participant did not leave out the good side of the arrangement and explained that:

Rotational presidency should not have been an issue, but for a Third World developing economy like Nigeria, it is an issue in view of our diversity. It should not have been an issue because we want to have the best, but while we allow the so-called rotation and what have you to come in, then we are ignoring the factor of merit. We are fielding ABC because of the factor of diversity, and so that deprives us the privilege of bringing up the best. What we have largely is a situation in which.... yes, it serves our interest for the purpose of national integration by saying allow this office to rotate around. But how has that been able to douse the tension? That has not addressed it (PINEOL, January 2019).

This still portrays the roles elites play in ensuring that their own emerges the President with little or no respect for merit. While PINCOL agrees that rotational presidency can promote peace and engender nationwide development, good governance should be a priority. The participant subscribed to the view that a candidate can come from anywhere in the country so far as such can promote peace; He elucidated below.

Peace and development go simultaneously. If you say you want stability in the country and you promote mediocre people to administration, then what are we saying? For me, I do not care whether my President is a Northerner or is a Southerner; what I want is to run government effectively. Look at countries that do not put sentiments in choosing leaders like us but rather consider merit. They are governing themselves effectively; the institutions and programmes of government are being run effectively. Because you want to promote even development, you now put someone who does not know anything about administration, who will rather, instead of governing well, introduce bad governance into the system (PINCOL, January 2019).

Merit in this sense is seen as deploying good leadership skills to promote good governance, which will translate to peace and development. This affirms the importance of the skills suggested above by Ashkenas and Manville (2018). In a similar vein, PISEP opined that Nigeria is still not so economically developed, and that is why rotational presidency is 'embraced'. According to the participant, good leadership is preferable because power sharing for the office of the President promotes mediocrity. The participant further posits that power sharing can only foster national integration for a short period and is not a long run solution. He clarified that:

Other parts of the world are advancing with speed, and we are just retrogressing. You do not talk about rotating presidency in the developed world now; you talk about getting the best. Currently, now we have presidents at the age of 30, 40, and the rest, and these are young men who are acquitting themselves creditably. The truth of the matter is that in the interim, you could make the argument that let the presidency rotate, but I am not a believer in that because it gives rise to mediocrity, and the challenge of leadership goes beyond where you are from. If we are faithful to policies that give a level playing field for you to aspire to your God given talent, where the

President is from will become irrelevant. The fear of why people talk about rotational presidency is because they feel it guarantees that the moment it is my brother, I have this sense of belonging, but we do not really need that. So, to answer the question more directly, in the interim, it could be like a solution to the problem, but to me, in the long term view, of it, it is not really a solution (PISEP, January 2019).

The above view is in line with the recommendation of the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference on rotational presidency. Lastly, because merit is downplayed, it affects more than one political party. PISWP 1's view illustrated how zoning arrangement in a party affects the choice of another party's candidate and how this may decimate merit; He revealed that:

The idea of rotational presidency limits the quality of the candidate that can emerge, you know..., so PDP probably would not have looked up to the North, but for the fact that the person they are competing with is from the North, they have no choice. Why not decide to take somebody from the South East? The first thing is that know that this principle is not a constitutional provision, it is not a statutorily endorsed principle, it is strictly a PDP arrangement so, and the possible disadvantage of it is that a candidate....candidacy choice is limited to a particular zone and that limits the national spread, a national search for the best candidate (PISWP 1, December 2018).

Conspicuously, our multi-party system may not solve the problem. A participant further expatiated that 'for a long time to come, we may never get our best hand to rule this country, and that is what rotational presidency/rotational governance brings. It is hard for us to ever get the best capable hands to do it' (PISWP 2, December 2018).

These resonate with Ololajulo's (2016: 164) view that the practice aids nepotism and favouritism because these two even make the masses support people of their ethnic extraction while relegating leadership qualities to the background. Hence, elites have made Nigerians advocate for leaders of their respective ethnic extraction with little or no consideration for visionary leaders who will bolster economic development. This necessitates the need to focus on the influence development can have on the polity.

PISWOL feels development is more important than zoning. The view is that if the former is given more importance, there would not be the need to clamour for zoning. He exemplified that:

When we talk about the problem of ethnicity and so on, that is one problem. The other problem which we have to look at is the problem of development. Would rotational presidency, which is supposed to cure ethnicity, would it also now generate development? It would not or let us say it may not because the requirements for both are different. But it is easier to cure ethnicity through development. You cannot cure development through ethnicity, is not possible. Now, if there is development, society

is developed. One thing that we know about ethnicity is that it results from competition (PISWOL, December 2018).

Development has been relegated so much. For instance, a leader will prefer to embark on a new project rather than carry on with the uncompleted projects of the predecessor. This is done because the culture among the politicians is that if they complete such ongoing projects, they will not get the full glory. This means a waste of funds because the abandoned projects did cost some amount of money, and it will also not serve its purpose. All these are caused by the belief that if *I start and complete a project, myself and if not me, my zone will be considered in the next election*. On the long run, infrastructures will not be adequately provided at the expense of zoning.

PINCOL opined that if basic amenities are provided, people will not be easily cajoled to see rotational presidency as a solution to their problems. The interviewee submitted that:

Is it constitutional to say we have rotational presidency? It is a ploy to deceive us. For me, I do not think we should promote rotational presidency. What I am asking for is let there be good governance. An average Nigerian does not care who governs him or her; what he cares about is his stomach. He does not want to know who the President is, either is Buhari or Atiku. That is why some elites are using the slogan *stomach infrastructure* to deceive people because they know that people are poor, people are looking for what to eat, so they use that as another ploy to deceive them. One needs to be careful about how these people deceive us; of course, they cannot deceive you and me. They can deceive some other people because they know that these people are poor. To me, your economic being determines your social, political, and environmental being. To me, rotational presidency is not a solution to the problem of national integration in Nigeria (PINCOL, January 2019).

It can also be inferred from the above point that if basic amenities are not provided, people can be manipulated to take to violence on the pedestal of marginalisation. The inability of governments in countries bewildered by ethnic conflicts to provide the basic needs and security for its citizens make the latter seek welfare and security in their ethnic organisations (Agbu, 2004: 38). This makes ethnicity a handy tool for politicians. In Nigeria, political elites whip religious, cultural, or regional sentiments to consolidate their political and economic aspirations (Kifordu, 2011: 432). If the right leadership is there, state institutions will be strengthened, development will be attained, and poverty will reduce. This will make it difficult for elites to use the masses as foot soldiers to agitate for zoning for the former's parochial interests. People will not care where the leader comes from but will support whoever will bring good leadership and development. This is because in present day Nigeria,

the poverty level is so high that the masses could easily be used as a tool for the elites to actualise their selfish ambitions (Ngara, Esebonu, Ogoh, and Orokpo, 2014: 49).

Similarly, PINWP 1 jettisoned zoning but advocated for good leaders. The view is that ‘if the institutions are working, at times, it does not matter who the political head is, but ours is a peculiar situation because we have a kind of deficit in terms of the calibre of leaders and in terms of people manning the institutions’ (PINWP 1, January 2019).

PIR 3 did not outrightly reject zoning but recognised that the bane of rotational presidency had been bad leadership. The participant preferred the option of blending good leadership that is nationalistic with zoning. The participant clarified thus:

For me, it has potential if it is well implemented to really ensure the stability of the federation and to even ensure you have good leaders to really ensure national integration. But a good leader would not be considered more about the region or his own ethnic or religious connotation, he will be nationalistic, and he will have a development mindset. He will see what he can do to bring development to the country and to all the parts thereof. So, it is a good policy, but its implementation must be strengthened (PIR 3, January 2019).

In consonance, Yahaya and Bello (2019: 27), submit that we need leaders that have knowledge of the economic and socio-political structure of the country and that are national and not ethnic/segmental in their leadership style. Such has been challenging to have in this Fourth Republic because ethnicity has become a solid avenue to scoop votes from the electorates. Elites have been accused of not fielding suitable candidates because of their selfish interests. This brings to the fore the next section on elites’ accommodation.

8.7 Rotational Presidency and Manipulation of the Masses

In Nigerian politics, elites manipulate the masses through the tools of ethnicity, religion, poverty, and illiteracy. These four tools account for the passive roles the masses play in the political process in democracy in plural societies (Lijphart, 1977: 49). These have become the pedestal for mobilising support for election and actualising rotating the presidency. The masses hardly exercise some level of independence in deciding on which candidate to support. On promoting ethnicity and geo-political affiliation, PINEP, asserts that ‘this rotational, to me, is even adding more problems. Is our turn, is our son, is our brother. And no matter how bad he is, he is our own’ (PINEP, January 2019). PIR 2 gave a similar but more comprehensive opinion. The participant submitted that:

Well, rotational presidency might not necessarily address ethnic diversity in Nigeria. Rotational presidency is more of elites' creation to allow access to the central power by different members of the ethnic groups who will represent their ethnicities. That is it. So, rotational presidency may not necessarily integrate Nigeria, but you know the way Nigerians see people in positions of power, he is our own. So, if an Igbo, Hausa, or Yoruba man becomes President, members of his ethnic group see him as their brother, and they will support him (PIR 2, December 2018).

Political elites are the ones that fabricate this and present it to the masses, and it spreads like wildfire. Elites utilise the tool of ethnicity provided they see that the benefits exceed the cost (Duruji, 2010: 95). The patrons provide the followers with jobs and other resources in exchange for the political support from the latter (Ojukwu and Shopeju, 2010: 17). This means irrespective of the credentials of the candidate; the masses have been given 'bait' to support him. Such becomes possible because of poverty. Ethnicity has been utilised by the elites in Nigeria to retain their positions as elected and appointed political leaders by playing on the poverty level of the citizens and making claims of representing their respective ethnic groups (Odeyemi, 2014: 10).

However, religion also plays a crucial role in rotational presidency in the country. Apart from 1993, when the SDP fielded Muslim-Muslim candidates, religion has become a veritable electoral tool to sway voters' preferences. It has determined those that emerge as the governors and deputy governors and other political appointees at state levels, especially in the South West, some North Central and North Eastern states. At the federal level, religion has not only been a determinant factor for the offices of the President and the Vice President but has also determined who occupies positions of the first four principal officers at the National Assembly as well as that of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation.

However, some religious leaders are critical of this use of religion. Thus, the Islamic cleric stated:

That is part of the lack of fairness and equity which God detests. When you are a leader, you are a leader not only in your house, not only in your own family, not only in your religion, not only in your own town. You are a leader of the geographical entity of the place you are leading. Nigeria from Calabar to Sokoto, from Lagos to Maiduguri is all Nigeria, from Kano to Port Harcourt. So, as leaders, there is only one seat for leadership, only one seat for President and only one seat for Vice President. A leader will definitely come from one of those towns. And so, he is a leader not for his own people, not for his own town but the entire country (PIICL, January 2019).

Similarly, the Christian cleric presented a view on the need for a nationalistic leader thus:

As a leader, yes, you can belong to any religion, but it does not matter what religion you belong to. Once you become a leader, you are a leader for all. This country has had past Christian presidents, and yet nothing much happened to the Church, and we have had Muslim presidents and nothing much happened to Islam or Muslims. So, if we have a Christian president, I will not expect him to favour Christians as against Muslims but expect him to have the fear of God with a national sense of responsibility, be just and fair in leadership to all cultures and all religions (PICCL, January 2019).

From interviews conducted, it was clear that these religious leaders did not support the political use of religion. It is political elites who have hijacked religion to secure the support of the masses. For instance, in Niger State and Jigawa States, during the campaign towards the 2015 general elections, former Vice President Namadi Sambo pointed out that the PDP is an Islamic party considering the key positions held by Muslims in the then PDP government and he also alleged that most of APC's key party officials are Christians and their Vice Presidential candidate is a Pastor (NewsWireNGR, 2014; NewsWireNGR, 2015). Given that Niger and Jigawa are Northern States that have high Muslim population, he was obviously appealing to religious sentiments. When political elites use religious and ethnic affiliations as rallying points for political campaigns, they create a fertile ground for relative deprivation and violence.

They also latch on illiteracy to have their bidding done. All these do nothing but may put the peace in the country in jeopardy. On this issue, illiteracy is inseparable from poverty. A very good illustration is given by PINWP 1 below.

We do not have independent candidature, and if you are privileged to have participated or had been at a place where the primary election of a political party is taking place, you would have seen illiteracy in practice. This is an issue you see in all the political parties, not only APC or PDP, almost all the political parties. If you look at who the delegates are, those who will be the one to elect the people who will fly the flags of those parties, who becomes the candidates, you will realise that most of them are semi-illiterates or illiterates. As such, the governors are given a kind of blanket or blank cheque to fill in the names of who the delegates will be, and they prefer the illiterates who they can easily buy off and manipulate. This is a problem that is not just peculiar to the Northern part, even the Southern part because if it comes to the recruitment system, the same delegates, the same party excos and if you look at them you notice they are not the best in the society. So, they are the ones that have been tasked with the responsibility of the selection of leadership. So, fundamentally, a competent person that has the capacity can lose out in an election because the only language that the delegates understand is who gives them material things to emerge as the candidate of the political party. Going forward, we can now ask ourselves, we have talked about the problem, the hindrance, then what could be the solution? I have witnessed instances during the primary elections in my home state of Katsina.

Usually, what they do, they send a leader to lead the primary process, a person who is not from the state. In our instance, they sent a former Senator, Senator Olorunnimbe Mamora. He was there. When the voting was about to commence, people met him and said each group/candidate needed to nominate someone who would write for the delegates. He said how? Asking what business, do we have by having illiterates coming to vote for who becomes the flagbearer of the political party. I have also witnessed instances whereby we will come for meetings here in Abuja or the national, they will send people from the national headquarters of the party to Katsina State, which is the state headquarters. They will invite the chairmen of the party from the 34 local governments, and the delegation from the national will come speaking to them, but they do not even understand English. So, at the end of the day, whatever you discussed there, they would not be able to communicate it down to the respective members of the political party. They do not have an independent mind of their own (PINWP 1, January 2019).

In Nigeria, illiteracy and poverty make the masses vulnerable for elites to present ethnicity to the latter as a tool to alleviate their present conditions (Duruji, 2010: 95). Illiteracy, coupled with poverty are also responsible for delegates being easily brainwashed, bought over and consequently unable to vote for a candidate that is more development oriented (Yagboyaju, 2015). This shows that elites manipulate at the party level and when they meet the electorates. Political parties become vulnerable because of how they operate in the country. All these are geared towards favouring elites. PIR 1's view on how the vulnerability of the system has favoured the elites is stated thus:

And I must tell you that no doubt about it, the system has its own inadequacies because it has also been exploited by the elites. Just like the elites do in most parts of the world. We should not forget the fact that the elites are human beings, and for the average human being, it is self-first. It has its own shortcomings and inadequacies, the system of rotation which favours the elites and of course, it must favour the elites because the elites are in charge, and we have agreed that this applies to many other governmental levels (PIR 1, December 2018).

No doubt, political elites are not promoting zoning to give a sense of belonging but for personal aggrandisement. The position of the President becomes more attractive because most revenues accrue to the centre. They intend to support a candidate to become the President, and that will grant them access to state resources. In a state like Nigeria where accountability is at a very low level, political elites seek to grab power to oversee the oil revenue rather than using such income to develop the country (Shkaeva, 2014: 12). Nigeria's elites are immensely corrupt with a limited desire for nationhood, and they use the state as an instrument of wealth accumulation (Ojukwu and Shopeju, 2010: 15). The political elites have divided the economy among themselves, and they get their share by identifying with and

mobilising their ethnic groups, religion, and regions but the masses benefit less or not at all (McLoughlin and Bouchat 2013: 39). The authors' views are further substantiated by PINEOL's view that:

In a way, it has served but, like I said go back to the elite-masses dichotomy. Who is talking about rotational presidency? What is the desire of the average man on the street? Good governance. He is desirous of having a person no matter where he comes from so long as he can deliver good governance. It is the elites that hijacked this concept to further divide.... that is my view (PINEOL, January 2019).

Elites further manipulate the process by playing hide and seek games with zoning. PINCP shed light on this below.

You will find out that some of the elites not in government will be crying foul of marginalisation. You can hardly find a poor man who says he is marginalised because he does not know the difference between marginalisation and when he is not marginalised. In actual sense, what we find in the Nigerian case is lack of good leadership. They tend to take care of their selfish interest as against those of the electorate (PINCP, January 2019).

Elites are known for creating anxiety in situations and not appeasing it (Azarya, 2003: 6). Whenever political elites, either from the North or South feel left out of the reigning bourgeoisies' group, that is when they support rotational presidency, but if they are within the caucus, they jettison the idea (Ambali and Mohammed, 2016: 8). PISSOL affirmed the authors' claim based on what ensued after the death of President Yar'Adua. The participant concluded that zoning would continue to separate the country because of elites' selfishness. His conclusion thus:

I doubt rotational presidency is an answer to national integration in Nigeria or is an answer to political stability. We have rotated for some time, has it brought stability? Has it brought integration? PDP rotated when the unforeseen happened, and the President died, and by constitutional imperative, the vice should take over. The North wanted to substitute political imperative for rotation. They insisted that it is still their turn. Was there any element of national integration in there? There was not even an element of elites' integration, and these are the elites of the same political party, and from these instances, it became obvious that from where we started this interview, religious and regional imperative superseded this arrangement for so-called national integration. The Northern elites in PDP were willing to fraternise with their Co-Northern elites in other political parties to oust the Southern interest. So, it has not helped at all. The rotation has aggravated.... the regional blocs are still the same, the elites' bloc remains the same. It is just a matter of political accommodation. You maintain your identity, I maintain my identity, when our interests diverge, we go our separate ways. So, I am critical of rotational presidency as a tool for national integration. It is not (PISSOL, December 2018).

There are other examples to flesh up PINCP and PISSOL's views as well as those of the authors. Although, the Northern elites had always antagonised rotational presidency because the region has ruled the country most while the South is more disposed to the practice. Also, if rotation was to be set aside, the North would be more favoured with respect to population and the number of states. However, the positions of the two regions have become fluid, depending on which region is in power at any point in time. Examples abound regarding this; the 2011 presidential election revealed that the North was in support of the practice because it was not in power at that period. Nwaneri (2019), in a 2019 New Telegraph Newspaper publication, gave other instances. During the campaign for the 2019 presidential election, Babatunde Fashola and Vice President Yemi Osinbajo advised Yorubas to vote for Buhari so that the South-West will stand the chance of presenting the President in 2023. Also, the Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF), Boss Mustapha, in two separate functions that had to do with Ebonyi and Abia States advised the Igbos to vote for Buhari in 2019 so that their zone, South East which had been clamouring for the presidency for a long time will be the zone to produce the President in 2023.

The same source also has it that the North is not relenting to continue to hold power beyond 2023. For instance, the President of the Arewa Youth Consultative Forum (AYCF) Yerima Shettima said his organisation is mulling supporting Northern presidency in 2023. In a similar vein, late Junaid Mohammed, a Second Republic lawmaker advised the South not to have so much hope in producing the President in 2023 and that zoning the presidency has deprived the country of good leadership. The same source further reveals that the former SGF, Babachir Lawal, claimed that it is not a must that Buhari's successor can emerge from the South and that any section of the country can produce the President. If the North cannot produce the President, Junaid Mohammed said he would rather support Bola Tinubu from the South West than support any South Easterner. Kaduna State governor, el-Rufai, was also not in support of zoning but clamoured for qualification, competence, and character. However, he later gave his support to Southern Presidency in 2023. Former Abia governor, Orji Uzor Kalu, believed zoning should not stop until the South East and North East had produced the President.

In a relatively different twist, Northern governors and some stakeholders from the region met in November 2020, and they opposed any form of 'premature' zoning of power to the South.

They were against the #EndSARS¹⁴ protest and other superlative agitations and alleged that they are subtle ways to regime change without the ballot (Erezi, 2020; HassanWuyo, 2020). Superlative agitations could mean issues like restructuring, power sharing, resource control and lopsided appointments in favour of the North. In addition, if the President is from the South, Southern leaders could make similar allegations, and the North might have supported the protest and the agitations.

From the above examples, it is apparent that political elites not only support zoning when it favours them but also use it as a tool to cause divisions among the zones. In summary, elites device any means, including the weakness of the electorate or the system to gain power. Politics in Nigeria is an elites' dominated game, and these groups of people have a sit-tight disposition to power in that they apply any tool to remain as the incumbent and not to relinquish power (Egbefo, 2015: 68). The manipulating tendencies of elites challenge the integration potentials of rotational presidency.

8.8 Conclusion

This chapter clarified that rotational presidency is the same as zoning in Nigeria. Rotational presidency was defined from the perspective of rotating the office among the six geo-political zones and between the two major religions in the country. This brought to the fore the exploration of the constitutionality of the arrangement.

There is no provision for rotational presidency in the 1999 Constitution. This does not make it unlawful because the constitution did not refer to it. It was suggested that if it is inscribed in the constitution, rotational presidency will generate less rancour, just like what happened after the demise of former President Umar Yar'Adua. This can only achieve this purpose if political elites abide by the provisions of the constitution.

It has been a practice in the Nigerian political system in both civil and military rules. In both forms of government, it has never been documented but always done through elites' consensus. This was revealed through the chronological view of regime change especially with the choice of presidents and their deputies. However, public awareness became stronger

¹⁴ The protests took place in some cities in Nigeria between September and October 2020. The aim was to bring the attention of government to the reality of gross brutality perpetrated by the police's Special Anti-robbery Squad (SARS). These snowballed into raising other national issues by the protesters. The protests were more active in the Southern cities than Northern cities.

in the Fourth republic due to PDP's orchestrated zoning arrangement and other factors. It has even trickled to the composition of the principal officers of the National Assembly.

Rotational presidency was also explored as an integrating tool. Rotational presidency has only brought a sense of belonging and to some extent, federal stability. The fact that an elite from an ethnic group is the President makes the group identify with Nigeria. Federal stability has been aided because, if not for zoning, the deprivation emanating from denial from power might have created a lacuna in the country's peace.

The chapter also explored the cons of rotational presidency. It identified that downplaying merit in choosing candidates may amount to the emergence of incompetent candidates as winners. This snowballs into having leaders that will not promote good governance. If there is development in the country, the clamour for rotational presidency will be given less importance because people will be more focused on electing good leaders without being driven by ethnic or religious reasons.

The last two sections of this chapter focused on elites' manipulation. The roles elites play in rotating the presidency is crucial, but personal aggrandisement being the rationale for their actions do pose some threats. Elites latch on the weak economic status and low educational exposure of the masses, and ethnoreligious sentiments to present candidates that may not deliver good governance. Such sentiments may threaten federal stability. In a nutshell, all these breed mediocrity and nepotism. This has resulted in ignoring the essence of governance which is to have good institutions which will provide infrastructures to aid development.

It only creates a brief euphoria for the group ruling at any point in time and not good governance that positively affects the nooks and crannies of the country. However, a pertinent view in this chapter noted that if zoning is blended with good leadership, it will boost integration and bring development.

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1 Introduction

The main objective of this study is to examine rotational presidency as a tool for national integration in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. This chapter presents the summary and conclusion of this study, which are derived from the literature reviewed and the analysis of the data collected. The chapter further suggests some pragmatic recommendations on how national integration can be improved in Nigeria. The recommendations are addressed to the Nigerian government, the masses, policymakers, and researchers. Finally, the chapter makes some suggestions regarding possible areas of future research, relating to the topic of national integration and power sharing in Nigeria.

9.2 Summary and Conclusion

Chapter one mainly focused on the introduction and background to the study. The chapter also consisted of statement of the problem, objectives of the study, research questions and objectives of the study. In the background to the study, the nature of the Nigerian state was explored considering that the focus of the study is on the Nigerian state; hence it was also pertinent to explore in chapter one Nigeria's social, political, and geographical landscape. The broader, historical context of the study focused on Nigeria's attempt to deal with its plurality through a federal system and other integrative measures. The research problem centred on the fact that despite the integrative measures, Nigeria still experiences ethnoreligious conflicts. The study, therefore, set itself the goal of interrogating the extent to which one of these integrative tools, namely, rotational presidency, plays an integrative role. Research questions and objectives align with the research problem. Five questions were outlined for the study, and the research objectives echoed these. The introductory chapter also discussed the significance and originality of this study.

In chapter two, literature on some concepts and themes related to the objectives of this study were reviewed. The literature review in chapter two also looked at how these concepts are defined in the extant literature and how they apply to this study. The first part of the chapter focused on understanding the federal system generally and how it is practised globally.

Chapter two also explored some of the reasons behind the adoption of the federal system in different contexts. In addition, this chapter focused on exploring the features, pros and cons of federalism and this was important towards establishing how federalism is meant to maintain unity in diversity and how this has worked and failed in some countries. Plurality in Nigeria mainly hinges on ethnicity and religion; in chapter two, plurality was explained from the perspectives of ethnic and religious diversity. Chapter two also focused on conceptualising ethnicity/ethnic groups and religion exploring the main features of these concepts as it concerns this study. The chapter also explained the origin of ethnicity in Africa, linking it to the advent of the colonialists in Africa and their divide and rule agenda. The chapter concluded by identifying that ethnic and religious differences are major factors responsible for conflicts in some countries.

Chapter three explained the theoretical lens used in this study, including the elite, integration, and relative deprivation theories. Chapter three also focused on explaining the roles that political elites play in making key decisions in a state. In that chapter, it was revealed that political elites could cooperate or differ on matters, but their major objective is to have access to power. Linked together, the chosen theories show the role of elites in national integration. The explored theories also helped illuminate how failed integrative practices result in feelings of relative deprivation and consequently conflict.

The focus of chapter four was on the consociational and centripetal models of power sharing. Power sharing in different countries was examined but most attention was given to Switzerland, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Lebanon because different situations necessitated power sharing in these countries. These could serve as platforms to explore how the models apply to Nigeria and what power sharing in these countries portend for Nigeria. The chapter also outlined how the power sharing models and theories would serve as conduits to achieve the research objectives.

Chapter five centred on research methodology. The interpretivist school of thought and the qualitative approach were adopted. Twenty-two participants were purposively selected for the study. Quota sampling and snowball sampling were used to select participants across the six geo-political zones of Nigeria. For data collection purposes, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the selected participants and key informants who have knowledge and experience in the operations of Nigeria's federal system. The key informants include

politicians, opinion leaders, religious leaders, constitutional lawyers, researchers, and a principal officer of the FCC.

The interview as well as local and international reports were sources of primary data. These were combined with secondary data sources. The thematic data analysis method adopted for this study was also discussed in this chapter. Considering the subjective nature of the qualitative method adopted in this study, chapter five also looked at the issue of trustworthiness and how this was ensured in this study. In addition, the chapter considered some ethical issues which concern this study since it utilised human subjects.

Divided into different sections and sub sections, chapter six answered the first research question which asks about factors that weaken national integration in Nigeria. This chapter commenced with a discussion of the evolution and practices of Nigeria's federal system. The chapter also discussed the fault lines of Nigeria's federal system. These fault lines include population, size, religion, ethnicity, and resources. These factors are exploited by elites to trigger feelings of marginalisation and relative deprivation thus possibly resulting in conflict.

Chapter seven was a response to research question two. The chapter explored four national integration mechanisms put in place by successive governments in Nigeria. These include constitutional conferences, revenue allocation, federal character principle, and the creation of states and local governments. While civil societies participated in constitutional conferences, the weaknesses of the conferences were that the decisions and recommendations were not binding on various governments. While at independence subnational units enjoyed fiscal autonomy, this was eroded after 1966. With the military centralisation, the fiscal pendulum swung in favour of the federal government. The subnational units were left without the required resources to fulfil their responsibilities. The impoverishment of subnational units resulted in economic underdevelopment and feelings of marginalisation by various groups. Regarding the federal character, it was found that states and local governments have not been compliant, and FCC has not been able to enforce the principles of the federal character. There is also the issue of discrimination between being an indigene and a non-indigene. State creation has led to small and fiscally weaker states due to overhead costs and overreliance on the federal government. New majority and minority groups emerge because of state creation. While the initiatives taken by various governments are good on paper, these initiatives have faced obstacles when it comes to implementation.

Chapter eight focused on responding to research questions three and four, by interrogating the role of rotational presidency in national integration. The chapter located rotational presidency within consociationalism it was identified as a form of a grand coalition. While rotational presidency is not constitutionalised, it is an accepted elites' power sharing tool. With few exceptions, Nigerian political history shows the consistent practice of power sharing among elites from different regions. However, a closer look shows the importance of other factors (for example economic and military power), behind ethnic and religious appearances. The history of power sharing in Nigeria shows the hegemonic role of the Northern elites; the chapter illustrated this point through the example of the annulment of the June 1993 election and the role of the Kaduna "Mafia" in Obasanjo's regime. To some extent, rotational presidency contributes to political stability by making different regions feel that they belong to Nigeria. This was the case when Goodluck Jonathan emerged as the President and there was a reduction in the level of agitations by the Niger Delta region against the central government. However, the role of rotational presidency as a tool of national integration has been hindered by conflicting elites' interests.

9.3 Recommendations

Against the backdrop of the above findings and to realise the fifth objective of this study, the following recommendations are made:

1. The Nigerian government should embark on more enlightenment programmes on unity. This should be done at all levels. The curriculum of schools should be reviewed to educate students at all levels on patriotism and inter-cultural relations. Languages and cultures across geo-political zones should be taught in schools, for instance, students at all levels of formal education should be given the privilege to be taught any of the languages and cultures of some ethnic groups outside their geo-political zones. Such knowledge will boost understanding of other groups and aid unity. Alternatively, there could be development and adoption of a national language (a very good one is Pidgin English) in Nigeria.
2. The state and various non-state actors need to nurture Nigerian patriotism and Nigerian identity. This can be accomplished by fostering popular participation in decision-making. This can be aided if the people are given a say to determine their co-habitation through a

national conference. The government should not restrict areas of discussion at national conferences. Integration issues such as fiscal federalism, resource control, service delivery, and anti-corruption should be discussed on democratic and participatory platforms. National integration should be beyond the issues of alternating power but should include values of love, respect and nationality. A SNC will be a major pillar to achieving these.

3. To address the indigene settler dichotomy, the government should make laws to empower traditional rulers to sanction anyone who discriminates within their domain. Also, if a traditional ruler supports any form of discrimination, there should be consequences for such a royal father which may be as serious as dethronement. The country needs to do away with state of origin but embrace place of residence. Its citizens should be able to access anything first as a Nigerian, so there should be a national principle or national law that gives everyone national identity first before group identity. Nigerians should first be considered as Nigerian before being considered as a member of this group or that group. For instance, in filling some forms, options like ethnicity, religion, and local government should be removed. There is a bill presently at the National Assembly which seeks to amend Sections 65 and 106 of the 1999 Constitution which will allow married women to contest elections to federal and state parliaments in the states of their husband. This is a step in the right direction. However, more needs to be done to make place of residence a yardstick to represent a state. Lagos State has recorded some achievements in this as those that are not indigenes of the state have represented the state in parliament and given political appointments.
4. The educational system should be improved to nurture a national consciousness, a national morality, and national ethics. Quality and accessible education will also empower ordinary people so that they are not easily manipulated by the political elites.
5. The independence of INEC should be enhanced. This should take the form of a manner of appointing its chairman and commissioners, ability to sanction electoral offences and making candidates' selection process efficient so that good leaders can emerge. The chairman and the national and state commissioners should no longer be appointed by the President (this appointment is approved by the Senate). They should be appointed by the National Judicial Council. In terms of dealing with electoral offences, those that promote

hate speeches (or such is done on their behalf) during campaigns, participate in vote buying, rig elections and commit other electoral vices should be disqualified from contesting. However, this action should be carried out after a thorough investigation. Finally, INEC should always educate and organise seminars and trainings for political parties, candidates, delegates in primary elections and the voters. These will engender good electoral culture.

6. Furthermore, all stakeholders must contribute to putting a stop to the practice of parading people with weak leadership skills as leaders. In most instances, it is apparent that those being paraded do not possess what it takes to grow and develop the economy of the nation. Rotational presidency is good and can even be made constitutional, but anytime each zone/group is to produce the president, the best should be taken from that side. Other qualities of a good leader include the attribute of being detribalised, being someone who does not use religion as a yardstick to discharge his/her duties and being a development-oriented person who is not corrupt. Governance system must be able to identify expertise, competence, morality, this will then mean that when someone gets into office, he/she has a template with which to work, and he/she must not be allowed to invent a personal template. If these virtues are present, it is possible to have good state institutions, development, increased employment, and reduction of poverty in Nigeria.
7. Anti-corruption agencies should be empowered to discharge their duties without fear or favour. There should be a declaration of assets for elected officials before they assume any position. There should be an annual check to verify that any addition to the official's assets corresponds with his/her income. Any apparent form of fraud should be investigated, and if there is probable cause, the official's immunity should be withdrawn, and he/she be prosecuted.
8. Security agencies should be well equipped to tackle security issues in different parts of the country. This will make it easier for Nigerians to live, work or be posted to any part of the country.
9. There should be a political will on the part of regional leaders in Nigeria to embark on true restructuring. Most of the suggestions by various scholars, elites and the participants highlighted in this study should be implemented. These will boost economic and political cooperation and reduce the security challenges in the country. For instance, Southern leaders should advise their Northern counterparts on the potentials (with respect to

resources) the North possess in having fiscal independence. This will go a long way in cooperation between the two regions on restructuring. There should be restructuring of the economy to reduce over-reliance on oil. There also should be fiscal decentralisation - sub-units should be allowed to control resources in their territories. This will make states look inward and explore avenues to make more revenues and engender economic development. By reducing economic vulnerability, economic development will also play an important role in reducing the power of the elites to manipulate the electorate.

10. The government should objectively manage information that can aid peace and development. Government should give information about governance and should be transparent enough. For instance, FCC should always publish the reports of its activities, and there should be laws that states, and local governments must comply with the principles, and such compliance should be published. Also, political appointments that are not subject to legislative approval should be done with respect to the federal character principle. Government should always do a thorough assessment to know what each community wants and not what it feels like giving the community. This will ensure putting in place projects that address the yearnings of the people. Finally, information about uncompleted projects by an outgoing administration should be made available, and a new government must always be mandated to complete such projects. Independent project managers and auditors should be called in to ascertain if such projects are worth completion or just mere white elephant projects.
11. It is also important to build strong grassroots based civil society movements that will ensure that resolutions taken by national conferences are carried out. Strong grassroots based civil society movements will also ensure that socially relevant projects are implemented.

9.4 Contributions to Knowledge

This study is unique in its contribution to the topic of national integration and rotational presidency in Nigeria. The assessment of rotational presidency in relation to national integration is crucial. Rotational presidency in Nigeria's Fourth Republic has become a major political issue, especially among the political elites and their supporters. Scholars have also studied either of the phenomenon or both. Alapiki (2005) considers national integration from the perspective of state creation and how it relates to local autonomy. Falade and Falade

(2013) consider the core values of national integration. Onifade and Imhonopi (2013) examine national integration measures like state creation, NYSC, federal character, moving of FCT from Lagos to Abuja, and revenue allocation. Bunte and Vinson (2016) did their study on local power sharing institutions (at district levels) and how this is intertwined with religious conflicts. They interviewed the relevant stakeholders. Nwozor (2013) focuses on ethnic hatred, marginalisation, and power shift in the Fourth Republic. Ogwudile (2019) examines the English language as a tool for national integration in Nigeria. Mbah, Nwangwu, Ugwu, and Simons (2019) consider contentious elections, political exclusion, hate speech, and how it affects national integration. Yahaya and Bello (2019) consider the challenges to peace and national integration in Nigeria. Their study also examines rotation of power between the North and the South, but they looked at it from the angle of how political elites have abused power and do not follow the rule of law in the electoral process and have a sit tight mentality. Their study further explored the provisions of the 1995 constitution on rotational presidency and how it was proposed to foster national unity. Onah and Onah (2018) explore the implications rotational presidency has on democratic development. These studies, except that of Bunte and Vinson (2016) make use of secondary data sources.

This study by interviewing participants gave a more empirical perspective to the topic of national integration and power sharing in Nigeria. In addition, interviewing politicians, and opinion leaders across geo-political zones laid more credence to the objectivity and originality of the study. Interviewing religious leaders also signified religious perspectives on national integration and zoning. The views of the researchers, constitutional lawyers, and the FCC official also bolstered the originality of the study. Examining some of the measures put in place for national integration aside rotational presidency also gave a more elaborate description for the study. In conclusion, the challenges with national integration in Nigeria is beyond rotational presidency, but there is a need for restructuring, which has fiscal federalism and resource control as its nucleus.

Another element of originality is the combination of elite theory, integration, relative deprivation, and power-sharing as this study's theoretical and conceptual framework. The combination of these conceptual and theoretical tools is important and original as this framework allows the researcher to identify weaknesses in Nigeria's power-sharing model. The study argued that integration policies, in the context of competition among elites, result

in relative deprivation and conflict. The combination of these theoretical tools alerts researchers and practitioners to the weakness of elites' power-sharing.

9.5 Suggestion for Further Studies

There should be further studies on how the indigene-settler dichotomy can be blurred such that once a citizen has resided in a locality for a certain number of years, he/she is entitled to any economic, social, or political entitlements meant for that place. In addition, there should be more studies on how Nigeria can have a national conference that will organically emanate from the people and not government instigated. This will make it possible for all stakeholders in the Nigerian state to discuss how its citizens can live together in peace.

Lastly, there should be further studies on the qualities of good leadership and how bad leaders can be screened out before and during elections. This encompasses studies on how delegates for political parties conduct their primaries, how educated delegates can emerge and how these delegates can make independent decisions. It will also include good leadership qualities. This will also include a study on how electoral violence will not prevent people from voting for the right leaders. These will be beneficial for the approaching 2023 presidential election and future elections in Nigeria.

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Appendix I: Informed Consent Document



University of KwaZulu-Natal

School of Social Sciences

Private Bag X01

Scottsville

3201

16th October, 2018

Dear Participant,

INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN AN INTERVIEW

My name is Olumuyiwa Temitope FALUYI. I am a PhD candidate studying at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus. The title of my research is: **Exploring Elites' Arrangement and National Integration in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: Challenges of Rotational Presidency**. The aim of the study is to consider the factors responsible for continuous federal instability in Nigeria despite the introduction of power rotation and proffer ways to foster sustainable national integration. The outcome of the research is expected to foster unity in Nigeria theoretically and in policies. I recognise you as one of the stakeholders in the politics of power rotation and stability in Nigeria's federal system. To gather the information, I am interested in interviewing you so as to share your experiences and observations on the subject matter.

Please note that:

- The information that you provide will be used for scholarly research only.
- Your participation is entirely voluntary. You have a choice to participate, not to

Informed Consent form for Participants

Please complete this form

Title of the Study: Exploring Elites' Arrangement and National Integration in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: Challenges of Rotational Presidency.

I..... hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

I acknowledge that I have been informed of the purpose of this interview. I am aware that participation in the study is voluntary and I may refuse to participate or withdraw from the study at any stage and for any reason without any form of disadvantage.

Participant

Signed.....Date:

Researcher



Signed.....Date 27th November 2018

Appendix II: Letter of Introduction



11/30/2018

Letter of Introduction

Mr. Olumuyiwa Temitope Faluyi is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa.

The University of KwaZulu-Natal's Ethics Committee has granted him full approval to conduct interviews on his PhD research project titled "Exploring Elites' Arrangement and National Integration in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: Challenges of Rotational Presidency". He prospects that at the end of this project, he would be able to design a power sharing mechanism that will foster sustainable national integration in Nigeria.

Please spare him some time to enable him the privilege to draw from your wealth of knowledge as he runs through his research questions. Thank you for your anticipated cooperation.

Warm regards.


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Appendix III: Semi-structured Interview Questions

Researchers

1. What factors would you identify as the major hindrances to national integration in Nigeria?
2. To what extent do you think that previous measures for federal stability have been able to achieve their purposes in fostering national integration?
3. What are your views about the adoption of rotational presidency as a panacea to federal instability in Nigeria?
4. Would you consider this as a viable solution to the problem of national integration?
5. What other measures do you think are available to foster national integration Nigeria?

Religious Leaders

1. To what extent are you concerned if someone other than that of your religion emerges as the president of Nigeria?
2. To what extent those of your religious faith would benefit if one of your own becomes the president of Nigeria?
3. Nigeria is a multi-religious country. To what extent would you say that religion has contributed to the problem of national integration in Nigeria?
4. From your own perspective, what would you suggest as measures to foster national integration in Nigeria?

Constitutional Lawyers

1. From the constitutional perspective, do you think Nigeria is practicing true federalism?
2. What are the constitutional impediments to national integration in Nigeria?
3. Considering the provisions of the 1999 Constitution on requirements for the office of the president, do you think that the practice of rotational presidency is in any way unconstitutional?
4. In your own view, what are the ways Nigerians can have allegiance to the country above their ethnic and religious cleavages?

Opinion Leaders

1. What factors would you identify as the major hindrances to national integration in Nigeria?
2. To what extent do you think that previous measures for federal stability have been able to achieve their purposes in fostering national integration?

3. Would you say that your ethnic group has been marginalised in Nigeria?
4. Talking about rotational presidency, do you think this measure is appropriate to address the problem of ethnic diversity in Nigeria?
5. What are your views about the adoption of rotational presidency as a panacea to federal instability in Nigeria?
6. Would you consider this as a viable solution to the problem of national integration?
7. What other measures do you think are available to foster national integration Nigeria?

FCC Staff

1. What are the mandates of your organisation in respect of national integration?
2. To what extent has your organisation achieved these objectives?
3. In view of your mandates, what would say are the major obstacle hindering national integration in Nigeria?
4. What are the steps you think your organisation can take to foster national integration in Nigeria?

Politicians

1. What factors would you identify as the major hindrances to national integration in Nigeria?
2. Would you say that your ethnic group has been marginalised in Nigeria?
3. To what extent do you think that previous measures for federal stability have been able to achieve their purposes in fostering national integration?
4. Talking about rotational presidency, do you think this measure is appropriate to address the problem of ethnic diversity in Nigeria?
5. What are your views about the adoption of rotational presidency as a panacea to federal instability in Nigeria?
6. Would you consider this as a viable solution to the problem of national integration?
7. What other measures do you think are available to foster national integration Nigeria?