



**A CRITICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN
POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA AND INDIA**

BY

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**SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE ACADEMIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (POLITICAL SCIENCE) IN THE
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF
UNIVERSITY OF KWA-ZULU NATAL, DURBAN WESTVILLE, SOUTH AFRICA**

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MARCH 2021

DECLARATION

I, **Jacob Moroe**, hereby declare that the study titled: '**A Critical Investigation into the Diplomatic Relations Between Post-Apartheid South Africa and India**', is my own work which has never been submitted anywhere in any form and that all sources used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete referencing.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my late father, Mr. David Tebogo Moroe.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank God the almighty for giving me the overall strength to complete this thesis, without whom I would not have made it on my own.

Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to my supervisors, Prof. H.O. Kaya, and Prof. S. Mutula for their continuous support and wisdom. They both pushed me to the limit, even when I was on the verge of breaking down. They both believed that I was equal to the task. I will continue to cherish their immense knowledge, wisdom, and patience. I also recognize the role played by Dr Lulu Magam in the completion of this work. She was pragmatic in how I should approach each task I faced in completing this thesis.

I remain indebted to my family, particularly my wife, Lebohang Moroe, and my mother, Puseletso Moroe. Their support has been immeasurable and selfless. I could not have imagined succeeding without the support of Prof. Edward Maloka. I thank him sincerely for his tough and uncompromising academic stance.

My special thanks to all participants in this research study, without whom the findings and recommendations of this work would not have been possible. Many respondents made insightful contributions and provided the much-needed encouragement, but also posed difficult questions. All these inspired me to expand the scope of my research which ventured into unexplored perspectives about this study.

My gratitude goes to the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Dr. Naledi M. Pandor, who was an inspiration to me by completing her own PhD, despite her Ministerial position which is characterised by a busy schedule. It will be remiss of me not to acknowledge the role played by the Director-General of the Department of International Relations and

Cooperation (DIRCO), Mr. K.E. Mahoi. I thank him for his wisdom, leadership, and for granting me an opportunity to interact with officials from his department. The contribution of DIRCO officials (and other departments/institutions) to this work was immense and of great value to the growing body of knowledge to studies related to relations between India and South Africa.

ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS

ABW	-	Anglo Boer War
AFAPR	-	Association of Former Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives
AFC	-	Africa Fund Committee
ALAO	-	Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance
ANC	-	African National Congress
APO	-	African People's Organisation
AU	-	African Union
AUPSC	-	African Union Peace and Security Council
BASIC	-	Brazil, China, India, and South Africa
BEM	-	Big Emerging Markets
BIAT	-	British Indian Association in the Transvaal
BRICS	-	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
BWI	-	Bretton Woods Institutions
CACPIR	-	Centre for Citizenry Participation in International Relations
CEA	-	Chinese Economic Area
CFR	-	Council on Foreign Relations
CFPHR	-	Committee on Foreign Policy and Human Rights
CISA	-	Centre for Indian Studies in Africa
CPSA	-	Communist Party of South Africa
CW	-	Commonwealth
DCE	-	Dutch Colonial Era
DG	-	Director-General
DIP	-	Durban, Pinetown and Inanda
DIRCO	-	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DSBD	-	Department of Small Business Development
DTI	-	Department of Trade and Industry
ECOSOC	-	Economic and Social Commission of the United Nations

EFF	-	Economic Freedom Fighters
EU	-	European Union
FDI	-	Foreign Direct Investment
FTA	-	Free Trade Agreement
GAA	-	Group Areas Act
GAAT	-	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
G7	-	Group of Seven
G8	-	Group of Eight
G20	-	Group of Twenty
G77	-	The largest intergovernmental organisation of developing states in the United Nations.
IAEA	-	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBEF	-	India Brand Equity Foundation
IBSA	-	India, Brazil, and South Africa
ICA	-	Indian Council for Africa
ICCR	-	Indian Centre for Cultural Relations
ICWA	-	India Council for World Affairs
ICT	-	Information Communication Technology
IHC	-	Indian High Commission
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
INSAF	-	Institute of African Studies and Indian Social Action Forum
ICP	-	Indian Congress Party
IORA	-	Indian Ocean Rim Association
IPAP	-	Industrial Policy Action Plan
IR	-	International Relations
IRB	-	Indian Relief Bill
ISA	-	Indian South Africans
IYC	-	International Youth Conference

IYC	-	Indian Youth Congress
JMC	-	Joint Ministerial Commission
KZN	-	KwaZulu-Natal
MOU	-	Memorandum of Understanding
NAFTA	-	North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement
NAM	-	Non-Aligned Movement
NGO	-	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIPF	-	National Industrial Policy Framework
NIC	-	Natal Indian Congress
NP	-	National Party
OAU	-	Organization of African Unity
PBSGA	-	Promotion of Bantu Self Government
PLO	-	Palestinian Liberation Organisation
PRC	-	Passive Resistance Campaign
RFD	-	Red Fort Declaration
RTAA	-	Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act
SA	-	South Africa
SAARC	-	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SACU	-	Southern African Customs Union
SACOIR	-	South African Council on International Relations
SAHC	-	South African High Commission
SAHO	-	South African History Online
SAIC	-	South African Indian Congress
SANNC	-	South African Native National Congress
SSC	-	South-South Cooperation
SSS	-	South-South Solidarity
TISA	-	Trade and Investment South Africa
TCIC	-	Transvaal and Cape Indian Congress

UNCTAD	-	United Nations Committee for Trade and Development
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	-	United Nations Education and Social Committee
UN	-	United Nations
UNSA	-	United Nations Students Association
USA	-	United States of America
UNSO	-	United Nations Students Organisation
UKZN	-	University of KwaZulu-Natal
UNSC	-	United Nations Security Council
UNC	-	United Nations Charter
UNO	-	United Nations Organisation
WB	-	World Bank
WEF	-	World Economic Forum
WTO	-	World Trade Organisation
WITS	-	University of Witwatersrand

ABSTRACT

The study made a critical investigation into the diplomatic relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India, using qualitative and quantitative research methods. The major arguments were based on the following aspects: First, Post-apartheid South Africa and India have shared good bilateral relations since 1994 and constantly aim to expand and diversify their trade and economic relations. However, it would seem the two countries have not fully exploited the potential role of the private sector and civil society in their relations, despite their vibrant private sectors and civic societies. Second, although South Africa and India have, since 1994, proclaimed themselves as partners for development, very limited critical interrogation has been made on the prospects and challenges embedded in their economic diplomatic relations regarding their bilateral and multilateral engagements. Both share membership in various organizations including BRICS, IBSA, UN, amongst others. They continue to make use of their membership in these groupings to advance national interests. Third, diplomatic relations between India and South Africa after 1994 have to consider the global shifts in political and economic power relations due to multipolarity. The study revealed that the historical relations between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Indian Congress Party (ICP) influenced the cordial diplomatic relations between the two countries in the post-apartheid South Africa. Fourth: there are contentious views on the position of Mahatma Gandhi regarding the historical racial relations between Indians and Africans in South Africa, and that he was more concerned about the freedom of South African Indians, and not black South Africans. However, there is a general acknowledgement that South African Indians contributed greatly to the socio-economic and political development of South Africa. The economic bilateral relations between the two countries have flourished since the end of apartheid, with India holding the most potential.

However, they are yet to make use of available opportunities such as the involvement of private sector and civil society in their relations. The study recommends that both countries should take advantage of their complementarities and comparative advantages for mutual benefits.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

South Africa and India share good relations, which historically date back before the end of the apartheid era in 1994. In fact, the association of Indians with South Africa could be traced back to the days of their migration as labourers to South Africa from 1860 to 1911, or even earlier in the 1560s. When the first batch of Indians arrived in South Africa, Natal, they were subjected to work in the sugarcane fields as laborers (Stiebel, 2016).

According to Solomon, et.al. (2010), due to the abolition of slavery in South Africa, the English settlers could not make progress in their plantations in the absence of a stable labour force, and they therefore opened negotiations with the government of India to request labour supply. Solomon, et.al. (2010) further argue that Indians arrived in South Africa between 1860 and 1911. Reddy (2005) states that the 6th November 1869 marked the arrival of the first batch of Indian indentured labourers in South Africa, and shortly after their arrival, another batch of Indians comprising of entrepreneurs joined them. Today, South Africa has become home to well over one million Indian South Africans and many South Africans of Indian ancestry. In fact, when Mahatma Gandhi arrived in South Africa in May 1893, he found three categories of Indians – ‘indentured’ who were under a five-year labour contract, ‘ex-indentured’ who had chosen to remain for another five years, and ‘passengers’, mainly traders who had paid their own fare to South Africa (Reddy, 2005).

According to Reddy (2005), when Indians arrived in Natal in 1860, part of their main responsibility was to provide services as indentured labourers. However, over the years, their significant contributions in the economy culminated into their assimilation into society. Mauritius was the first country to receive a large scale of Indian emigrants, including West Indies and British Guiana. A similar movement began to Natal in 1860 (Alves, 2007). Beri (2008) further argues that between 1860 and 1874, some 5000 “coolies” were imported to South Africa, but they were not the first to enter Africa.

Yadav (2014) argues that the discovery of good soil and suitable climatic conditions for the cultivation of sugarcane in Natal led to the arrival of Indians in the 1860s. During this period, the only impediment against successful plantation was a lack of labour force, and the majority of black South Africans were unwilling to work in the sugarcane plantations (Bhat, 2009). This is what led to the invitation of Indian laborers to work in South Africa, and at that point, many Indians were already recruited to work in Mauritius, Trinidad, St Lucia, and Granada.

India and South Africa share a long history marked by political, social, cultural, and economic interests, and remain the most significant relationship because of their intersecting history of colonialism. Although the two countries witnessed a 46-year-interval in their relations between 1946 -1994, due to sanctions imposed by India on Apartheid South Africa, their cultural relations remained unquestionably vibrant due to the eminent presence of Indians in South Africa.

As an illustration of the long-standing relations between South Africa and India, Mahatma Gandhi started his political-legal career in South Africa, experimenting with civil disobedience in the 1900s to improve the quality of life for Indians living in the country. According to Modi (2015) Mahatma Gandhi arrived in Durban in 1893 to serve as a Legal Counsel to a merchant

known as Dada Abdulla. Just like many other Indians in South Africa who arrived before him, he was treated with rebuke and disdain. The treatment he received was the same treatment accorded to Indians in South Africa, and blacks alike (Gupta, 2008). According to Kolge (2016), because of his own experience, and that of other Indians in South Africa, Gandhi developed the concept of Satyagraha. Sharma (2016), argues that the whole idea of establishing Satyagraha was to cultivate, promote and preach lasting peace. It replaced brute force by soul force, also known as love force through self-suffering with the sole objective of drowsing hatred in the opponent and arousing in him the inherent capacity, even if muted, to love the enemy. The term Satyagraha was invented and employed in connection with the struggle for the Indians in South Africa (Bhana, 2015).

It is against this background that the researcher argues that Satyagraha as a concept of non-violent resistance, conceived by Mahatma Gandhi, was designed for South African Indians to silently fight the repressive government of Natal.

According to Reddy (2005), in the realm of fraternal relations, the Indian Congress Party (ICP) contributed greatly to the African National Congress's (ANC) struggle against the apartheid regime. The INC-led government of India was an outspoken critic of the apartheid regime, and even refused to establish diplomatic relations with the apartheid government. As a result, the Indian government only conceded to the establishment of diplomatic relations with South Africa after the end of apartheid in 1994, with negotiations resuming around 1993 after most political parties were unbanned, and political prisoners such as Nelson Mandela were released.

Beri (2008) argues that South Africa and India share a number of commonalities. Firstly, both countries are regional powers, bordering on the Indian Ocean, strategically located in terms of

influencing events in the region and shared interests in this area through their common membership of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Secondly, both India and South Africa have a common history of foreign and largely British involvement – they were both colonized by Britain. Given the historical and strategic linkages between the two countries, the researcher argues that there is ample scope for cooperation between them.

Dubey (2003) shows that the economic relations between the two countries have flourished since the end of apartheid, with India possibly holding the most potential of all South Africa's emerging 'southern partners'. However, despite these rich historical, cultural, political, and economic relations, there is need to critically interrogate the prospects and challenges which are specific to the bilateral relations and others emanating from their multilateral engagements since the end of apartheid in 1994. The analysis of this study was conducted within the context of the international relations theoretical debates, taking into consideration that while these debates reflect the diversity of contemporary conceptual framework in international diplomacy, there are also obvious signs of convergence. Moreover, it also takes cognisance of the fact that the understanding of international relations will be impoverished if it is confined to only one conceptual paradigm. The methodological framework in data collection, analysis, and interpretation was also guided by these conceptual considerations.

1.2 Research Problem

The study was based on the following arguments regarding the diplomatic relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India:

First, Post-apartheid South Africa and India have shared good bilateral relations since 1994 and constantly aim to expand and diversify their trade and economic relations. However, it would seem the two countries have not fully exploited the potential role of the private sector and civil society in their diplomatic economic relations, although both countries have vibrant private sectors and civic societies. They have also increasingly adopted an aggressive stance on economic diplomacy as a means of promoting growth and reducing poverty. For instance, South Africa has a number of policy documents, including its National Development Plan, and India's government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also stressed the importance of economic diplomacy as a central tenet of its foreign policy, an idea which is also part of its National Plan. Patel (2012) argues that although government-business platforms have played a role in enhancing private-sector relations with the civil society from both countries, they should be actively engaged in promoting their economic-diplomatic relations.

Rana (2013) illustrates that although the India-South Africa private-sector relations have been positive, there has been less investment by South African businesses in India the other way around. However, in the midst of India's investments in South Africa, there still factors that hinder Indian investment in South Africa, and these are inadequate and inefficient infrastructural services, low levels of human-capital development, and non-conducive investment policies. Dubey (2010) advanced the view that the South African government has not taken an active role in promoting the role of the civic society in the economic diplomacy between the two countries. As the Indian government adopts and implements a more assertive approach to economic diplomacy, the South African government should also see how the Indian government's priorities fit with those of South Africa's national priorities and what opportunities exist for the civic society. The South African government needs to create awareness among the South African

private sector and civil society on developments regarding the Indian government's approach to economic diplomacy. By so doing, the government will be taking private sector and civil society into its confidence as this would be a display of willingness to create a symbiotic relationship with them as stakeholders.

Second, although South Africa and India have since 1994 proclaimed themselves as partners for development, very limited critical interrogation has been made on the prospects and challenges embedded in their economic diplomatic relations regarding bilateral and multilateral engagements. For instance, Sidiripoulos (2011) indicates that the two countries tend to articulate their Africa policy through a national interest prism, especially regarding energy security, trade, and terrorism – an approach supported by realist theorists. However, both countries have also consistently reiterated the importance of their bilateral strategic relationship and multilateral engagements through the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) and the India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) groupings in a poly-polar and multipolar world order. Nevertheless, their unequal economic positions in these multilateral groupings has not been critically examined in order to determine their levels of engagement outside their formal diplomatic relations.

Third, although South Africa and India share a long history of cordiality, and that of colonialism, both countries are driven by competing interests in their international relations engagements in and outside the continent of Africa. As already indicated, a result of the shared common history, they share membership of many organizations and groupings such as BRICS, IBSA, UN, amongst others. Both countries continue to make use of their membership in these organizations to advance their own national interest and lobby support for a multiplicity of matters related to their national interests. The researcher, therefore, argues that, although the two countries continue to enjoy good diplomatic relations after 1994, they are still obliged to use their

respective membership to advance their own interests. According to Downs et al. (2009), the behavior of states towards one another is influenced by their self-interests.

Fourth, Sequeira (2008) argues that diplomatic relations between India and South Africa after 1994 need to consider the global shifts in political and economic power relations. This includes being party to IBSA and BRICS as two exclusive multilateral groupings with potentially huge global impact. Furthermore, the two countries continue to engage in a volatile global environment characterised by poly-polar and multipolar world orders. Amongst others, this study will look at the threats and prospects for these relations amid a poly-polar and multipolar world orders, particularly a scramble for Africa's resources.

1.3 Aim of the Study

The aim of the study was to conduct a critical investigation into the diplomatic relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India.

1.4. Scope of the Study

The study involved a total of 65 participants selected from the academia, research institutes, government, diplomatic community, private sector, and civil society organisations. The study critically examined relations between South Africa and India after 1994 making use of qualitative and quantitative research methods, however, it does not extend beyond 2020. Although the focus was on diplomatic relations between South Africa and India, the researcher could not travel to India for data collection due to financial and time constraints. As a result, the entire data was collected in South African cities such as Johannesburg, Pretoria and Durban.

1.5. Study Objectives

Based on the aim of the study, the specific objectives of the thesis were:

- i) To determine the extent to which the rich historical, socio-economic, racial, and cultural relationship between the two countries has contributed to their diplomatic relations after the end of apartheid in 1994;
- ii) To assess the prospects and challenges facing Diplomatic Relations between South Africa and India in a Poly-Polar World Order;
- iii) To identify constraints impeding economic relations between South Africa and India;
- iv) To investigate the nature of diplomatic relations between South Africa and India in the scramble for Africa's Resources; and
- v) To highlight prospects and challenges facing South Africa and India in their post-apartheid relations, and how they affect their multilateral engagements such as IBSA and BRICS.

1.6 Research Questions

The following are the research questions which guided the study:

- i) What is the contribution of the rich historical, socio-economic, racial, and cultural relationship between the two countries to the diplomatic relations between them after the end of apartheid in 1994?
- ii) What are the prospects and challenges facing Diplomatic Relations between South Africa and India in a Poly-Polar World Order?
- iii) What are the constraints impeding economic relations between South and India?

- iv) What is the nature of diplomatic relations between South Africa and India in the scramble for Africa's Resources?
- v) What are the prospects and challenges faced by post-apartheid South Africa and India in their multilateral engagements such as IBSA and BRICS?

1.7 Conceptual and Methodological Framework

Any research study requires a conceptual framework because it is the researcher's obligation to understand how particular variables of the study relate to each other. It maps out the theoretical and methodological actions required in the course of the study given the researcher's previous knowledge of other researchers' points of view and their own understanding of the research problem and questions already outlined in the previous sections. It provides the researcher's "map" in pursuing the investigation (Edwards, 1998).

Furthermore, Edwards (1998) elaborates that the conceptual framework lies within a much broader framework called theoretical framework. The latter draws support from time-tested theories that embody the findings of other researchers on why and how a phenomenon occurs, in this case, the focus on the critical investigation into the diplomatic relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India. For instance, previous theories look at the study of international affairs such as the diplomatic relations between South Africa and India after the end of apartheid in 1994, as competition between the realist, liberal, and radical traditions.

This research study argued that not all conceptualizations on international affairs, including the diplomatic relations between the two studied countries fit neatly into these paradigms, but an interplay could be created. Accordingly, a critical analysis of the diplomatic relations between the two countries demonstrated that no single approach could capture all the complexities of

contemporary world politics, including the relations between South Africa and India. Therefore, this study suggests that a diverse array of competing ideas is better off than a single theoretical orthodoxy. This is based on the argument that competition between conceptualisations or theories of international relations helps to reveal their strengths and weaknesses and spurs subsequent refinements, while revealing flaws in conventional wisdom. The diplomatic relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India was analyzed as interplay between realism, liberalism and constructivism. The analysis started with an interrogation of the nature and characteristics of each theoretical framework or paradigms.

1.8 Structure of the Thesis

Chapter One provides the study background, research problem, study objectives, research questions, conceptual and methodological framework, and structure of the thesis.

Chapter Two discusses the theories that guided the study, theoretical debates and contestations, contextualizing of relations between South Africa and India after 1994, domestic policy, civil society, and private sector in international relations, application of economic diplomacy: a case of South Africa and India, examination of foreign policies of India and South Africa and conclusion. It provides a justification for the choice of the principal theories and illustrates the interplay amongst them despite their distinct differences.

Chapter Three is a critical review of the related literature in the context of the relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India after 1994. It looks at the relations between the two countries before and after 1994, their origin, and historical contributions of South African Indians to democracy and nation building in South Africa. Furthermore, this section gives a birds-eye view of relations among freedom movements between South Africa and India. This is

an assessment of views by different authors on how relations between South Africa and India have evolved from pre-1994 to post-1994. Efforts are also made to identify and highlight existing gaps in the literature reviewed, as well as the contributions of this study to the growing body of knowledge in the overall relations between South Africa and India.

Chapter Four outlines and discusses the research design and methodology of the study. It includes an in-depth account of the methodological approaches used in conducting the research study. It begins with a critical analysis of the conceptual methodological contestations in the field of international relations as they relate to the research problem. It then outlines the research methodological steps followed in the study, including justifications in terms of the qualitative and quantitative methods. The sampling procedures, data collection techniques and methods are discussed. The data analysis, its validity and reliability are highlighted, as well as the ethical considerations, and limitations of the research process by highlighting some of the challenges experienced by the researcher in the research process and the strategies used in mitigating or minimising such challenges.

Chapter five presents the background to the socio-cultural diversity of South African Indians, Mahatma Gandhi and racial inequalities in South Africa, contentions of racial relations between Indians and Africans before and after 1994, the relationship between the Indian Congress Party and the African National Congress, South Africa and India after apartheid in South Africa, historical contributions of South African Indians to democracy and nation building in South Africa and the conclusion.

Chapter Six presents a critical analysis of the following aspects: bilateral economic relations between India and South Africa within the context of the Red Fort declaration; South Africa and

India in the Free Trade Agreement; competition between India and South Africa in the continent: The quest for hegemony, South Africa and India in South-South Cooperation, South Africa and India in the United Nations; the China-USA Trade Tensions: Implications on India and South Africa relations and the conclusion.

Chapter seven discusses the contextualisation of civil society, the creation of cohesion between government, civil society and private sector, the critical role of civil society, contextualisation of private sector, rivalry between government and civil society, and the conclusion.

Chapter eight provides a conclusion of the study based on the following aspects: historical, socio-cultural and racial analysis of Africans and Indians in South Africa; prospects and challenges in the diplomatic relations between South Africa and India in a poly-polar world order; key role players in the advancement of diplomatic relations between India and South Africa; Perspectives on civil society and private sector; South Africa and India relations in the context of Africa; the relations between India and South Africa in the BRICS and IBSA groupings; India and South Africa towards the reform of the United Nations; the impact of USA-China trade tensions on India-South Africa relations and recommendations.

1.9. Conclusion.

In Chapter One, the researcher sought to provide the scope of the thesis in advance. He also highlighted the methodological approach to be employed in conducting the study. The basic tenets of research methodology in this section serve as a useful guide on how the researcher will undertake the study. The researcher also advanced the major arguments guiding the study on the diplomatic relations between South Africa and India.

The following chapter makes a critical discussion of the theories that guided the study, including their conceptual framework within the context of diplomatic relations between South Africa and India after 1994. It provides a justification for the choice of theories to illustrate the interplay amongst them, despite their distinct features.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

Chapter One was an introduction that outlined the study background, the research problem, objectives, research questions, and the overall structure of the thesis. This chapter makes a critical discussion of the theories that guided the study, including their conceptual framework within the context of diplomatic relations between South Africa and India after 1994. It provides a justification for the choice of theories to illustrate the interplay amongst them, despite their distinct features. Klotz and Lynch (2007) point out that each of these competing perspectives captures important aspects of global politics and emphasise the view that the understanding of international relations would be impoverished if it were confined to only one paradigm.

Hollis et al. (1990) elaborates that understanding the theories of international relations provides us with an opportunity to understand and make sense of the world around us and behaviour of states and international organizations, through divergent perspectives, each of which representing a different theoretical viewpoint. Dunne et al. (2013) adds that a comprehension of the behaviour of states in relation to each other goes beyond peace and war, poverty, economic, business and climate change and rather explores the major players in world politics, intrinsic political patterns, and categorizes the theories for the way resolution and cooperation could be achieved. Brown (1990) indicates international relations impact our lives daily as global markets and the World Wide-Web, whereas foreign travel stimulate a flood of people, products, services and ideas across national boundaries. This implies that an interdependent world is brought to our lives every day as national economics respond to debt and instability elsewhere (Luterbacher et

al., 2013). The theories discussed in the context of the diplomatic relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India are realism, liberalism, and constructivism.

2.2. Realism

Korab-Karpowicz (2018:1), states that “in the discipline of international relations, there are contending theoretical perspectives which try to explain the behaviour and relations among states and other international actors. For instance, realism, also known as political realism, which contends that realists consider the principal actors in the international arena to be states, that are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests, and struggle for power”. ‘The distinction should be drawn between classical realism—represented by such twentieth-century theorists as Reinhold Niebuhr and radical or extreme realism represented by Hans Morgenthau’. In the context of the diplomatic relations between Post-Apartheid South Africa and India, it will be idealistic for South Africa to think that the cordial relations are due to the historical relationship between ANC and ICP during the apartheid era in South Africa.

In his realism theoretical perspective, Pashakhanlou (2009) argues that India has often ensured that it advances its own national interest through a number of initiatives that seek to promote its influence on post-apartheid South Africa and hence maintain a superior position in this relationship. For example, the government of India currently provides periodic diplomatic training programmes to South African diplomats who are employed by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) in Pretoria. This programme seeks to enhance diplomatic skills of South African diplomats, whilst exposing them to India’s foreign policy principles. During the training programme, which takes place in India – New Delhi – South African diplomats are also exposed to the Indian culture, food and way of life. The curriculum

and the overall programme is designed to teach South African diplomats about Indian interests, demystify negative perceptions and influence their ideology and outlook about India's and its world view of global politics. The researcher therefore argues that this scholarship programme is not offered merely due India's affinity for South Africa as a result of their long-standing history of cordial relations, but due to India's pursuit of its own national interests, and struggle for power.

In his discussion of the limitations of realism, Wolfrum (2011) has a view that the theory advances a miserable picture of humans derived from assuming a supposedly unchanging conflict-prone human nature. This leads to the other weakness, i.e. the tendency to treat politics both within and between states as involving unending competition for advantage. Based on these expositions, realists concentrate more on persuasion, and provides a realistic explanation of dynamics of global politics as they appear, and the reason why relations amongst states exist. The theory highlights that nation states engage in relations with each other in order to advance their respective national interest by any means possible (Linklater, 1990).

2.3. Liberalism

Liberalism as a political doctrine emphasizes protecting and increasing the freedom of the individuals to be the central concern of politics. Accordingly, liberals have the view that it is the responsibility of government to protect individuals from being harmed by others, but they are also aware that government itself can pose a threat to the freedom of the individuals (Wissenburg, 2000). In the context of international relations, liberals advance the idea that international institutions play a key role in cooperation among states. They argue that given

proper institutions and diplomacy, states can work together to maximize prosperity and minimize conflict (Charvet et al., 2018).

The paradigm of liberalism, in the context of the diplomatic relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India, implies that both countries must be willing to respect, and accept different opinions from either side. In resonance with liberalism, both countries ought to promote openness to new ideas, and uphold the basic tenets of liberalism such as tolerance of political and ideological perspectives in their diplomatic relations (De Michelle, 2016). For example, although both countries seek to advance their respective foreign policies – which are characterised by convergences and divergences - they must always find a mutually inclusive approach in advancing their respective courses. To this end, the bilateral relations between the two countries are managed through a mechanism known as the Joint Ministerial Commission (JMC). This mechanism is an apex platform established to assist both countries to identify opportunities and reach consensus on what they choose to advance in their relations. Under the JMC, the two countries share common views on issues such as the reform of the UNSC and other Bretton Woods Institutions, the need to support India-Africa Forum, the importance of intensifying economic diplomacy, amongst others. All these aspects are always subject to consultation with each other and each of the two countries are at liberty to object or agree to any form of proposition which is in variance with its priorities.

2.4. Constructivism

It is indicated that constructivism as a social theory of international politics, was established in the late 1980s and early 1990s by such thinkers including Nicholas Onuf (1989), Alexander Wendt, Emanuel Adler, Friedrich Kratochwil, John Gerard Ruggie and Peter Katzenstein

(Chernoff, 2008). As a social theory of international politics, it emphasizes the social construction of world affairs as opposed to the claim of neo-realists that international politics is shaped by the rational-choice behaviour/decisions of egoist actors who pursue their interests by making utilitarian calculations to maximize their benefits and minimize their losses, hence the materiality of international structures (Searle, 2005; Jeffrey et al., 2008).

Much to contrast with realism, which views international relations as driven by the states' security and material interests, explained in terms of power, and in contrast to liberal internationalism that concentrates on the interdependency of international actors and their operation within institutional constraints, constructivism considers international politics as a sphere of interaction which is shaped by the actors' identities and practices and influenced by constantly changing normative institutional structures. The theory maintains that states' goals, either material/objective such as economic development, or immaterial/subjective such as international recognition and standing, are generated by their social corporate identities or how they view themselves in relation to other actors in the international community (Reus-Smit, 2005).

Constructivism could be applied to the context of diplomatic relations between South Africa and India, when one considers that the relationship between them is historical since the arrival of Indians to South Africa during the 1860's. The relationship between the ANC and ICP in the struggle against apartheid is linked to the fact that the freedom and liberation of the majority blacks in South Africa will translate to that of Indians in South Africa. This implies that, India was creating a symbiotic relationship between the oppression of Indians and that of black South Africans, as they both suffered from the racial injustices of the apartheid system. The creation of

this symbiotic relationship was constructed, and influenced by what is known, history in this instance, between the two countries.

2.5. The Multipolar World Order

In order to understand the concepts of multipolar world order, one needs to comprehend the scope of international relations as encompassing issues such as globalization, diplomatic relations, state sovereignty, international security, ecological sustainability, nuclear proliferation, nationalism, economic development, global finance, terrorism, and human rights. As global villages, all these impact on all states and nations. Therefore, the diplomatic relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India are intrinsically part of these global dynamics as members of the United Nations, and groupings such as BRICS, IBSA, etc. Spies (2010). This is elaborated by Unay (2013) who states that currently, the world is experiencing the rise of new and diverse global powers and groupings such as BRICS, etc. capable of exerting influence in both global markets and global governance. This makes multilateralism increasingly difficult, but more important. However, with regard to a polypolar world order, it is important to note that this is a system in which power is distributed within the international system. It provides the status of global politics at any time of engagements. It usually includes multipolarity, unipolarity and bipolarity, and focuses more on three or more centres of power (Spies, 2010)

Diplomacy has a renewed significance as a result of an emerging multipolar world. Deutsch et.al, (1964) looks at multipolarity as a distribution of power in which more than two nation-states have nearly equal amounts of military, cultural, and economic influence. Rosecrane (1966) adds that multipolarity is a distribution of power in which more than two nation-states have nearly equal amounts of military, cultural, and economic influence. The world of today is witnessing

the rise of new and diverse global powers capable of wielding influence in both global markets and global governance. Multilateralism has become increasingly difficult, yet never more important (Posen, 2009). As stated, diplomacy has a renewed significance, particularly with the rise of countries like China, Russia and India, in competition with the United States, hence making global economic, financial and military power unevenly distributed (Gowa, 1989). However, Mouffe (2009) has the view that the current international superpower dynamic is transitioning from a unipolar system with the United States as its centre to a bipolar system with China occupying the other pole. As demonstrated in this study, it will be noted that diplomatic relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India are an integral part of these ever-changing international relations dynamics.

2.6. Theoretical Debates and Contestations

The study has the view that, while the theoretical debates of the study reflect the diversity of contemporary conceptualisations and analysis on international affairs, there are also obvious signs of convergence as reflected in the building of various multilateral formations such as IBSA and BRICS, in which both post-apartheid South Africa and India are involved. Walt (1998) emphasises that most realists recognise that nationalism, militarism, ethnicity, and other domestic factors are important. However, liberals acknowledge that power is central to international behaviour; and some constructivists admit that ideas will have greater impact when backed by powerful states and reinforced by enduring material forces. The boundaries of each paradigm are somewhat porous, and there are many opportunities for intellectual arbitrage.

Klotz and Lynch (2007) point out that each of these competing perspectives captures important aspects of global politics and further elaborates that understanding international relations will be

impoverished if it is confined to only one of these paradigms. It is based on this diversity of contemporary conceptualisations on international relations that Sidiripoulos (2011) propounds the following observations on the diplomatic relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India: both express their Africa policy through a national-interest prism, especially with regard to energy security, trade and terrorism. Development cooperation among them is a by-product of their engagement in the continent rather than a central driving force; and while cooperation between them may be possible in certain areas such as the India, Brazil and South Africa Forum (IBSA), in others it may be too politically sensitive for them to be perceived to be working together. Both aim to advance their economic interests on the African continent – this is a realist paradigm which could simply be characterised by attributes of rivalry.

2.7. An Examination of Foreign Policies of South Africa and India

This section examines the foreign policies of South Africa and India and attempts to assess the extent to which the foreign policies have influenced their post-apartheid relations. According to Jayapalan (2001:1), foreign policy can be defined as “the set principles adopted and followed by a nation for securing the objectives of national interest during the course of its relations with other nations”. He further states that “foreign policy plays a prominent part in the peace and progress of every country in the world today. Every nation can aspire to be self-reliant. For this, it must depend upon others”. In other words, interdependence is an essential factor that leads to international relations. Aggestam (2018) further states that, for giving a meaning and direction to her behaviour at the international level, each nation adopts a set of principles, and a rational guide is the foreign policy through which the nation formulates, adopts, and attempts to secure the goals of national interest. In short, the behaviour of each nation is always conditioned by her foreign policy.

Beach (2012:3) argues that

“foreign policy is both the broad trends of behaviour and the particular actions taken by a state or other collective actor as directed towards other collective actors within the international system. Foreign policy actions can be understood using a variety of different instruments, ranging from adopting declarations, making speeches, negotiating treaties, giving other states economic aid, engaging in diplomatic activity such as summits, and the use of military force”.

According to Petrič (2013:1), “foreign policy is an activity of the state with which it fulfils its aims and interests within the international arena. This simple definition requires explanations and additions in order to allow us to understand how we interpret the concept of foreign policy and what foreign policy actually is”. Morin et.al, (2018:3) posit that, “foreign policy is a set of actions or rules governing the actions of an independent political authority because it is reserved to sovereign states”. According to Maloka (2019:1),

“foreign policy is about states’ actions and decisions in an environment external to them and over which they have limited control and within which their manoeuvrability is constrained. An assessment of foreign policy as an instrument in driving foreign relations reveals the critical importance of working with other nations in order to foster relations, and advance national interest by using of foreign policy as a conduit”.

According to Jayapalan (2001:25),

“the Indian foreign policy was oriented towards security of India as a vital part of India’s national interest. The integration of love for democratic means and socialist

goals has been a fundamentally important ideological orientation of the Indian people and their leaders. The policies, including the foreign policy, bear a clear imprint of a faith in democratic socialism. In the realm of foreign policy, this has led to the struggle for securing the right of the third world, particularly for securing a new International Economic Order based upon an equitable distribution of resources and wealth among all nations and their fairer economic relations between the developed and the developing countries”.

Malone (2011:22) states that “The Indian commitment to work for friendly and co-operative relations with both the communist and non-communist countries also shows commitment to both democracy and socialism”. The researcher, therefore, holds a view that India’s relations with both South Africa and China, with two different systems completely at variance with one another, demonstrates its ability to adapt and respond to the requirements of its foreign policy to address its national interest.

India’s foreign policy after independence was driven by Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India. It was the first ever foreign policy after the British colonial rule in India. The success of India’s erstwhile foreign policy is attributed to Nehru. Dutt (1991:1) highlights that,

“The Nehru foreign policy framework of ‘staying from bloc politics, of nonalignment, of the quest for world peace, of the struggle against colonialism and racialism, of the maintenance of the autonomy of judgment, of independent development, of cooperation with all the big powers but subject to the preservation of India’s interest, security and independence, of unity of action to the extent possible of the non-aligned and developing countries, all this was the conceptual

framework answering to the objective situation prevailing after the post-war period, securing and enhancing India's independence.”

Maloka (2019:1) argues that “South Africa is an African country, and so is its foreign policy formulation and implementation. It cannot escape its African context”. In addition to the vulnerabilities of the western powers facing South Africa as an African country, China and India have now featured prominently in its foreign policy radar (Shaw et al., 2017). Sidiripoulos (2011:16) adds by indicating that “South Africa's foreign policy is depicted as reflecting a more explicit South commitment as an extension of its African agenda. Its execution over the past decade has involved a complex balancing act aimed at advancing developmental goals embedded in an independent foreign policy”.

According to Kornegay (2009), South Africa's foreign policy elite has sought to weigh national imperatives with regional and continental goals and dynamics, factoring in South-South cooperation considerations, while navigating North-South tensions and opportunities.

“This has entailed exploring a workable partnership between Africa and the industrialized North in particular, North, and South in general. One of the major challenges facing South Africa has been balancing issues of principle and morality with unavoidable considerations of realpolitik. The Mandela government strove to position the country as a “good” world citizen conducting a principle-driven foreign policy. This was underscored by commitments to human rights and international law as a “guide” to the relations between nations, while promoting Africa's interests; at the same time, linking internal development to growing regional and international cooperation” (Kornegay, 2009:4).

According to Masters et al. (2015:3), “under the Mbeki administration, foreign policy making was deliberately centralized, with much of it happening in the Presidency. Under the Zuma administration, there has been greater emphasis on making the links between foreign and domestic policies clearer, which has entailed greater engagement with the public at large. South Africa, like India, is therefore one of a few states that includes communication with domestic audiences in their public diplomacy efforts”. However, Maloka (2019:71) argues that “there is a thesis being advanced in the media and academic literature that South Africa’s foreign policy declined if not regressed during the Jacob Zuma presidency. The narrative received intellectual codification in the National Development Plan (NDP) whose argument and recommendations on South African foreign policy are built around this view”.

While South Africa’s foreign policy was mainly driven by the African agenda and South-South Cooperation, India’s was found to be dictated primarily by diffused transnational security considerations, multilateral trading arrangements, and the need for United Nations (UN) reform, the changing “global strategic framework”, and increasing demands of global governance. Furthermore, India’s foreign policy comprises of four sets of relationship clusters: South Asia where India has preponderant great power relations with the US, the EU, China, Japan and Russia; the rest of Asia is encompassed in Delhi’s Look East policy, Latin America and Africa (The Economic Times, 2014).

India’s dilemma was how to balance its still developing country characteristics with its “emerging power” status in an unpredictable environment of changing power configurations. India’s pursuit of a bilateral nuclear deal with the U.S. has featured prominently as, perhaps, the signature issue determining how India will ultimately align itself within this fluid global environment and what this will mean for its foreign policy identity (Mian et al., 2006).

Flemes (2009:44) examines the foreign policies of India and South Africa within the context of, their IBSA trilateral relationship.

“While it was established that the three countries had aligned themselves as democratic like-minded regional powers sharing common objectives in altering North-South power relations in the global economy and in terms of global governance, their foreign policies reflect different trajectories. Each country’s diplomacy reflects an attempt to adapt to the dynamics of asymmetric globalization characterized by globally networked interdependencies between states within a set of shifting power relationships, wherein existing imbalances between developed and developing countries have been offset by an ongoing “Asian ascendancy” reflected in the rising power status of China and India”.

The researcher therefore argues that both foreign policies of India and South Africa are personified in how they are being assessed. They are linked to personalities or the leadership of the time and seem to place national interest in the hands of leaders to set the tone for a new national agenda whenever leadership changes. Furthermore, the foreign policies of India and South Africa bear certain similarities; therefore, they are both inspired and built upon their respective history. On one hand, it is India with its British colonial links, and on the other is South Africa with its struggle for freedom and liberation to which India contributed immensely. Accordingly, due to similarities in principles, values and vision, the foreign policies of both countries are comprised of convergences which continue to guide their post-apartheid relations. Both India and South Africa, despite their bilateral relations, are developing nations of the south which share similar developmental aspirations with similarities in their global outlook. Hofmeyr (2011) highlights that,

“South Africa and India make a compelling partnership in terms of their long-standing connections and similarities of historical experience which invite a comprehensive approach. United first through slavery (one quarter of slaves at the cape were from South Asia) and indenture. While official ties were ruptured by segregation and apartheid, other links between the African National Congress and Indian Congress Party were strengthened post-1994, when official ties were rapidly and officially resumed” (Hofmeyr, 2009:3).

2.8. Contextualising Relations between India and South Africa after 1994

Reddy (2005) argues that there are several historical factors which have contributed significantly in shaping India’s relations with South Africa. One of the major historical factors is Mahatma Gandhi’s struggle to end racial discrimination against Indians in South Africa. Because of this struggle, India made the abolition of apartheid the centerpiece of its foreign policy (Soudien, 2009). Its policy towards the South African government was characterised by conflict due to the apartheid system (Guruswamy, 2011). On the other hand, India’s relations, through the INC, with the African National Congress (ANC) was cooperative because of the struggle for freedom and liberation of the people of South Africa, particularly Indians in South Africa. Following the abolition of apartheid, India and South Africa were more likely to have positive relations under the newly democratically elected government. It was after 1994 that the two countries experienced strengthened relations in trade, diplomatic initiatives, and defense ties. In identifying literature gaps in this study, the researcher examines the literature gaps – literature review.

The post-1994 relations between India and South Africa revealed their true identities in the absence of a cloud of apartheid. The past 27 years of their renewed relations paved way for the

much-needed reflection on what constitutes the relations between India and South Africa after 1994. According to Burgess (2004:2),

“India and South Africa differ as democratic powers. South Africa has promoted free market democracy through NEPAD, while India has not been so assertive - the reason for the difference lies in the ability for South Africa to work with Nigeria, Senegal, and other continental leaders, and to persuade a majority of Africa’s 54 states to comply. South Africa’s skill can be traced back to the ANC-in-exile’s experience in building the anti-apartheid coalition in Africa and abroad, while India has been able to work through SAARC since the mid-1990’s to promote free market”.

Patel et al. (2012) hold a view that despite the warm historical and political relations between India and South Africa, post-apartheid diplomatic relations are driven by economic diplomacy that promotes Indian economic interests at home. The objective of this diplomacy is to facilitate investment, foster innovation, enhance skill development, protect intellectual property, and build best-in-class manufacturing infrastructure in India so that the country can become part of the global supply chain. The approach taken by India in advancing its economic interest seems to ignore the historical relations between the two countries in a sense that it only focuses on its national interest. The researcher therefore argues that there is prominence of a realist approach by India in its relations with South Africa, and that, for India, these relations are about national interest, power and might. Yet at the same time, the history between the two countries point towards a strong sense of affinity, which aligns itself with the constructivist paradigm of how relations can be shaped and influenced by a shared common history of colonialism.

At the same time, post-apartheid South Africa is currently reassessing how it articulates its national interest in the context of its African agenda. Therefore, it might see India's engagement in the African continent in a positive light, especially its focus on human-resource development, ICT, and agriculture. The scope for deepening the substance of their political and economic relations has been hampered by domestic capacity constraints on both sides and differing priorities (Sawant, 1994).

Soudien (2009) advances a view that there are several areas in which India and South Africa can strengthen their cooperation. These include finance, science and technology, housing, education, and defense. Such opportunities did not exist under apartheid, largely because of India's strong opposition to White minority rule. During apartheid, both India and South Africa were, to varying degrees, isolated from the world economy. Whereas South Africa was isolated due to apartheid, India was isolated because of its government policies and regulations that were hostile to foreign investment due to the legacy of former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who governed India from 1948-1964.

Post-apartheid South Africa has seen the emergence of the latter and India as members of what is known as the Big Emerging Markets (BEMs). Other BEMs are the Chinese Economic Area (CEA), including Hong Kong and Taiwan – South Korea, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Poland, Turkey and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines). Participation in the BEMs is likely to allow India and South Africa to establish and maintain economic links that extend beyond their trade in diamonds and gold (Soudien, 2009).

The researcher holds the view that South Africa must recognise its competing interests with India in the continent, and reflect deeply on how it will mitigate these. India continues to play a critical role in the continent, and some of its initiatives includes the provision of human resource development, out of which South Africa benefits, and other forms of support in sectors such as ICT. Consistent with the liberal paradigm, it is in the best interest of India's domestic policy to provide such support to Africa due to potential dividends that will accrue. Furthermore, South Africa should not only view this support as a sign of goodwill. India, like many other countries such as South Africa, make use of soft power as a public diplomacy tool to strengthen and assert their power and authority.

2.9 Civil Society and Private Sector in International Relations

According to Lord (2013), the Greek philosopher, Aristotle had the view that men are essentially political animals, hence the highest form of community is the political community (*koinōnia politikē*) in contrast to other communities and partnerships such as the household. This is due to his belief that public life is far more virtuous than the private. Miller (2009) elaborates that the Aristotelian conception of the political community did not involve the separation between state and society or between society and community. He referred to them as a unified body of citizens organized around a single set of goals and sharing a common ethos. Wolff (1994) explains that it was not until the enlightenment period in Europe that civil society became understood as a realm distinct from the state. Enlightenment was an intellectual and philosophical movement that dominated the world of ideas in Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries.

Civil society was conceptualized not only as a sphere where self-interested individuals interact in their attempts to satisfy their needs and desires, it included the realm where the interests of individuals are structured and given an institutional form such as corporations, so that they become universalized and do not contradict the interests of the community as non-state actors (Anheier et al., 2001). According to Outram (2019) the emergence of non-state actors is at the origin of the emergence of the notion of civil society in international relations.

Zafirovski (2010) has the view that different theoretical perspectives could be used to interpret global civil society. Kaldor (2013) distinguishes between three main schools of thought in the analysis of civic society, i.e. Liberalism, Marxism and Kantianism. Classical liberalism looks at civil society as the private domain of freedom outside the state, given by the economy, property and markets. In this perspective, economic activity constitutes a central feature of civil society. Anheier et.al., (2001) states that civil society is a place in where individuals and collective organisations advance allegedly common interests. Keane (2003) indicates that in the context of the diplomatic relations between post-apartheid South Africa and Indian civil society organisations could include community groups, non-governmental organisations, social movements, labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organisations, faith-based organisations, media operators, academia, Indian and other diaspora groups, consultancy groups, think tanks and research centres, professional associations, and foundations, amongst others. Greenstein (2003) adds that political parties and private companies could be counted as borderline cases.

Mathu (2009) argues that the Enlightenment thinkers in the 17th and 18th Century Europe, had the view that the essential feature of civil or “civilized” society is an efficient market, with the establishment of a system of justice, in order to respond to the “interdependence of needs”. They argued that the emergence of commercial society also involved the development of a new space of personal relations, voluntary, based on “natural sympathy”, unconstrained by necessity (Howell et. al., 2002).

In the context of international relations, Olssen (2004) advances the view that neo-liberalism patterns of globalization have challenged the exclusivity of states as actors in international affairs. This is attributed to the fact that globalisation links distant communities cultures, organizations and opens up spaces for new social, political and economic actors. This is elaborated by Curtis (2011) who states that among the non-state actors benefiting from this change are public-interest-orientated non-governmental actors, often known as civil society groups. Alongside the state, profit-orientated corporate actors and international governmental organisations, these civil society groups complete the diversity of actors on the international stage.

Robins (2008) reveals that the presence of civil society organisations in international affairs is increasingly becoming relevant. They play crucial positions in agenda setting, international law-making and diplomacy. Moreover, civil society organizations are involved in the implementation and monitoring of a diversity of significant global issues. These range from trade to development and poverty reduction, from democratic governance to human rights, from peace to the environment, and from security to the information society (Robins, 2008).

Curtis (2011) states that in the framework of global governance institutions such as the United Nations and its affiliated institutions, given their need to balance a deeper impact on society with greater legitimacy, they have been under pressure to be more inclusive and attentive to the socio-economic, cultural and political demands coming from below. The necessity of these dynamics have enabled civil society actors to increase their access to international agenda-setting, decision-making, monitoring and implementation in relation to global issues. However, the researcher argues that similarly, the challenge to the inclusion of civil society actors in global governance mechanisms remains crucial. This is necessitated by the fact that new institutional structures are continually emerging, and the challenge of integration must respond resonate with this evolution.

The issue of contested legitimacy is further explained by Unerman et al. (2006) who has the view that, since it is obvious that civil society organisations cannot aim at replacing the traditional channels of political representation, they often play a key role in ‘broadcasting’ viewpoints that need to be included in the political agenda, both nationally and international, including human rights, climate change, etc. Berman (2003) explains further that, from an activist perspective, the issue of political representation should not be interpreted as a matter of who they represent but, rather, what they aim to represent. It is the issues they tackle and the values they seek to uphold that are crucial – possibly more than their constituencies. It is on the basis of this consideration that the diplomatic relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India cannot be adequately analysed without taking into account the actions of civil society organisations in the diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Marxism on the other hand negatively associates civil society with the interests of bourgeois or capitalist society and the reproduction of unequal economic relations. Thus, in both Marxist and liberal conceptions, civil society and the economy of private property become largely overlapped, if not identical spheres (Paffenholz, 2010). This classical Marxist view disappears with post-Marxist reformulations of civil society. Arato (1989) gives an example of Gramsci who located civic society not just outside the state, but also outside the economy. He looked at civil society as the ensemble of so-called “private“ organs which correspond to the function of “hegemony“ which the dominant group exerts on the whole society (Gramsci, 1978). According to him, civic society is the sphere in which mechanisms of socialization (churches, family, schools, associations, political parties, media) secure generalized acquiescence (including of dominated groups) in the existing social order. Hence, emphasized the way civil society organisations contribute to legitimate the domination of some groups on others, how they perform a “hegemonic function”. However, contrary to classical Marxism, he conceptualized civic society to have an emancipatory potential and to play a strategic role in the revolutionary struggle, nationally and globally. In this viewpoint, civil society could be regarded as the sphere in which counterhegemonic forces can be constituted. It is invested with a key role in the struggle for social justice and the search for an alternative social order (Perret, 2006).

In the context of international relations, Kantianism looks at the main problem for humanity as the establishment of a civil society administering universal law. According to this perspective only a universal civil society is able to constrain states through the establishment of a civil constitution regulating their external relations (Marrow et al., 2002). The philosophical basis of this viewpoint is that the realisation of such a universal civil society is in line with the aspirations to universal peace and security, and represents the ultimate objective of human development.

This Kantian philosophy of publicity as the key characteristic of civil society is reiterated by Habermas (Johnson, 2006), who argues that a private space of public deliberation has progressively emerged between civil society and the state. Public opposition to absolutism and to privileges is increasingly emerging in a diversity of civic spaces including salons and coffee-houses. This implies that civil society is becoming the sphere where there is a development of critical use of reason in a public space for free discussion and rational argument. This contributes to the social emancipation of individuals and hence stimulating civic society participation in political processes, nationally and internationally. Nevertheless, Habermas states that currently, the problem is that public debates may not always lead to a rational and optimal understanding of the public interest, as processes of commodification creates inequalities and prevent equal access to voice and participation (Johnson, 2006). Hence, he proposes the return to a neo-kantian type of rationality, with the reconstruction of a space based on an ethic of discussion (communicational rationality) which can reduce social conflictual issues, bring about agreement and contribute to achieving consensus on the ends of the “good society” (Khan, 2013). This process is supposed to take place in the realm of civil society, because it is independent from state and economy, and excludes the family, and interests groups such as unions and political parties which respectively belong to the economic and political systems.

According to Wedell (2017) regarding the private sector in socio-economic development, liberalism emphasizes that self-interest is a basic component of human nature. In the economic sphere, producers provide society with goods, not necessarily out of concern for people’s well-being, but due to their desire to make a profit. Similarly, workers sell their labour and buy the producer’s goods as a means of satisfying their own needs. This leads to the belief in a natural harmony of interests. By each individual pursuing their own interest the best interests of society

are served. Stone (2013) argues that, the forces of a free competitive market economy would guide production, exchange, and distribution in a manner that no government could improve upon. The government's role, therefore, is limited to the protection of property rights, the enforcement of contracts providing public goods, and maintaining internal and external security.

Baxi et al. (2012) states that at national level, the private sector plays the role of a key stakeholder in economic development. It is a major contributor to national income and the principal job creator and employer. In most developing countries including South Africa and India, it provides approximately 90% of employment (including formal and informal jobs), delivers critical goods and services and contributes to tax revenues and the efficient flow of capital. Blakely et al. (2013) adds that the opportunities for the private sector in these developing markets are significant and go beyond extracting natural resources or benefiting from low labor costs. Nevertheless, Waddell (2017) argues that the existence of the private sector also comes with substantial risks for local communities. This is due to many examples of unethical business practices which tend to create distrust amongst various civil society actors.

In the realm of international economic diplomacy, Andonova (2009) has the view that currently transnational public-private partnerships have become a common subject including research. This partnership establishes a hybrid type of governance, in which non-state actors co-govern along with state actors for the provision of public goods and services, and thereby adopt governance functions that have formerly been the sole authority of sovereign states. Their recent proliferation is an expression of the contemporary reconfiguration of authority in world politics that poses essential questions on the effectiveness and the legitimacy of global governance. There is a growing discussion in international economic diplomacy on whether transnational

public private partnerships can in fact deliver public goods and services in an effective and legitimate way as governance instruments (Stone, 2013). The researcher has the view that using international relations theories in analyzing case studies on transnational public-private partnerships such as the economic diplomatic relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India, opens up possibilities for systematic comparative research that is necessary to obtain conclusive knowledge about transnational public-private partnerships including their impact on economic development.

Jomo et al. (2016) looks at public-private partnership in international relations within the context of attainment of the ambitious 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for 2030, in which South Africa and India are part. This is based on the realization that their attainment anticipates huge business responsibilities. The researcher further argues that public - private partnership is essential for both governments, to actively participate in reaching these goals in the areas of poverty, climate change, health and building strong institutions to bring about peace and justice. Dodds et al. (2016) states that business approaches promise faster, more scalable and sustainable outcomes, overcoming the longstanding problems of more traditional approaches that were overly reliant upon aid.

Nhamo et al. (2020) indicates that most of the SDGs have an indirect impact on people's health in these countries, especially SDG 3, which needs to ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all stages. As the role of the private sector increases, employee health insurance coverage will be one way of helping reduce the impact of global epidemics and chronic diseases on the private sector as well as on society as a whole. Roy (2018) adds that citizen behaviour and expenditure patterns of workforces and consumers are other examples of their influence of the

private sector. There is a growing awareness among global actors that dealing with global social misery is everyone's responsibility (Nhamo et al., 2020). The challenges on the public sector in the attainment of the SDGs, together with the dwindling development aid from western governments, the private sector's accountability and business opportunities have been added to the development discourse (Roy, 2018). This is also due to the increasing awareness among global actors that dealing with global social misery is everyone's responsibility.

World Health Organisation (2015) elaborates that a successful business, requires a healthy society. In emerging markets such as South Africa and India, the crucial societal challenges which might hinder business development include poverty, access to healthcare, lack of education, access to clean water, unreliable infrastructure and poor hygiene, sanitation and nutrition. These issues remain at the centre of bilateral relations between South Africa and India. Blakely (2013) adds that climate change, conflicts, natural disasters and unforeseen events such as arbitrary nationalization of assets, contribute to the challenges of doing business in these emerging markets.

Kelly (2003) states that, Marx wrote that "the splitting of man and human life into public and private" capitalism, divides and weakens the souls of individuals in a bourgeois or capitalist society. He envisaged a time when "social force is no longer separated from the individual as political power." Under capitalism, human activity as a social relationship is alienated. It takes the form of opposites between 'public life' and 'private life. According to Marx, the fragmentation of society into public/private disrupts the life of the individual citizen, making it incoherent; and mirrors an unjust division of society into social classes and into political and nonpolitical estates. Buecker (2003) states that Marx made a critique of public life (or politics) as

"partial" and "narrow-minded" because instead of responding to the wide and deep needs of people for social reform, politics is subservient to the state and its imperatives. Politics is the quest for political power, of which state power is the "official" expression.

Howard et al. (1988) argues that Marxism looks at a capitalist society as divided into social classes, i.e. the bourgeoisie, which owns property and has the franchise, while the proletariat or working class has neither. This implies that the bourgeois state by its very nature never acts decisively on behalf of a "public interest" and against the powerful "private interests" of civil society. According to Marx, the new republican constitutions not only leave those elements free from state interference, but elevate them to its goal. The "public interest" is thus a class interest, the interest of the bourgeoisie or capitalist class.

According to Gourevitch (1978), Marxism attaches much importance to the concept of social class, as the dominant actor in the international system. In this view, the international system clashes not because of its anarchical structure but because of class conflicts. For Marxism, two particular features characterize a social class: members of society that share the same relations to the means of production and class-consciousness. Howard et al. (1988) states that Marxism distinguishes two main social classes in the capitalist mode of production, i.e. the bourgeoisie that owns the means of production and the proletariat, which provides wage-labor and is employed by the bourgeoisie. This means that, in a capitalist society, the bourgeoisie, which is basically nationally organized and controls different governmental systems, and a growing international proletariat, are facing one another in hostility. The proletariat and the bourgeoisie are the main modern social classes. Since the peasantry lacks class-consciousness and relations

amongst themselves, Marx did not regard it as a modern class but as a traditional and conservative social class (Mayer, 1975).

San Juan Jr (2003) elaborates that, according to Marxism, the "economic conditions" or ownership and control, of the major means of production turned the majority of society into a workforce whose "common situation and common interests" are formed by "the domination of capital." Kang (1994) reveals that Classical Marxists share three fundamental assumptions: (1) the expansion of capitalism (production and trade) occurs "under the stimulus of a homogeneous world market"; (2) governments initially realize the interests of the ruling class; and (3) borders are unimportant because of the assumption that competitive trade is not only transboundary but also universal.

Kunnath (2006) further reveals that Karl Marx believed that capitalism would spread around the world and eventually destroy the divisions that set nation-states apart, thus creating a world capitalist society that would replace the international state-system. He had the view that colonialism was, historically essential because it would help capitalism to establish itself in non-capitalist societies by spreading industrial development throughout the whole world, as a precondition for the world socialist revolution. Furthermore, Bauzon, (2016) states that Marx noted that private property plays the key role in the transformation process from a traditional into a capitalist and finally into a communist society. Colonizing traditional societies, according to him, advances the conditions for an international socialist revolution because only when private property, which comes along with capitalism, exists in a society can it be abolished, and only with its abolition, can man emancipate himself from his alienated existence Kang (1994). This explains, despite his criticism of colonialism, Marx justified colonialism. For instance, although

he examined “the effects of colonialism on Indian society”, criticized British imperialism, as it oppressively destroyed the Indian textile industry, believed that "colonialism was beneficial" for the socialist revolution in India and globally.

However, because of the unequal distribution of capital between core and periphery countries, the neo-Marxist theory emerged (Buecker, 2003). Neo-Marxists believe that capitalism can cause severe conflicts, on the international level, and that imperialism is rooted in "insufficient domestic demand", so that "capital is compelled to seek outlets abroad and, if needed, with the use of force.

The Kantian approach to private sector and business ethics is known for defending the “respect for persons” principle, i.e. that any business practice that puts money on a par with people is immoral Bowie (2005). It further states that corporations including the private sector have benefited from society, they have a duty of beneficence to society in return. This is based on the argument that corporations benefit from society or the public sector. It protects them by providing the means for enforcing business contracts and provides the infrastructure which allows them to function, such as roads, sanitation facilities, police and fire protection and most importantly, an educated work force with both the skills and attitudes required to perform well in a corporate setting (Murphy,1994).

Furthermore, Ciulla (2014) states that the moral theory of Kantianism also emphasizes worker participation through democratization of the work place. As a minimum condition of democratization, this moral philosophy requires the representation of each worker in an organization be represented by the stakeholder group to which he/she belongs, and that these various stakeholder groups must consent to the rules and policies which govern the organization

(Stutzer, 2005). Buecker (2003) argue that the requirement for a more democratic work place is not purely utopian as it has some support in management theory and in management practice. It is based on the view that teamwork is universally acknowledged, and a number of corporations have endorsed varieties of the concept of participative management.

On the issue of cosmopolitanism and international business, Kantianism reveals that one of characteristics of the enlightenment was its cosmopolitan perspective as Kant himself was cosmopolitan (Stutzer, et.al, 2005). He believed that national boundaries have only a derivative significance and was thus concern with the human community and the ways in which the human community could live in peace. Lachapelle (2005) has the view that contemporary capitalism is also cosmopolitan because it does not respect national boundaries, thus contributing to world peace. In the context of international economic cooperation this provides the foundation for a universal morality that is consistent with Kant's philosophy (Cavallar, 2020). The view that commerce supports world peace was widely held in Kant's time. The supporters the thesis included Adam Smith, David Hume, and John Stuart Mill. They all believed that commerce is a way of bringing people together rather than keeping them apart (Guyer, 2003). Therefore, if commerce is successful in bringing people together, then the chances for peace among nations improves (Beck, 1971). The researcher argues that taking into account the exponential growth of international business, it is not surprising that this view has many adherents currently.

Dubey (2010:222) states that "although both post- apartheid South Africa and India have increasingly adopted an aggressive stance on economic diplomacy as a means of promoting growth and reducing poverty, there is no evidence that the two countries have fully utilized their private sectors and civil society organizations in order to strengthen their economic diplomacy".

In agreeing with Dubey (2010:222), the researcher posits that civil society and private sector, in both countries must be given space to play their role in supporting economic diplomacy. The developmental plans of both countries must be assessed and executed in a manner that creates mutual benefit for both countries, notwithstanding their respective national interests.

In support of the researcher's assertion, Patel (2012:79) states that "although government-business platforms have played a role in enhancing private-sector relations but, increasingly, it is also thought that civil society should be engaging on economic-diplomacy initiatives". Dadoo (1993:140) has the view that "in order to help achieve this, the Indian diaspora in South Africa could play a critical role in increasing the role of civil society in this diplomatic relationship between the two countries". The researcher holds the view that civil society could help government in promoting diplomatic relations by playing a role in conducting research and giving policy advice on capacity limitations.

For South Africa's part, better and stronger civic society and business structures would help improve engagement for trade and investment. The researcher believes that it is critical for South African civic society and business structures to be more self-sufficient, and less reliant on government. In this way, they will become more independent and learn to survive without the intervention of government. "In all the government initiatives, civil society either has been non-existent or has played a very limited role" (Singh, 2018:30).

According to van Nieuwkerk (2004:3), "given the country's (South Africa) economic profile, public policies focusing on the human security agenda (e.g. poverty eradication, job creation, economic growth, personal security) should constitute the core of South Africa's national interest. The concept of national interest – as well as that of national security - is often used by

the South African government and its critics. However, they often differ dramatically on how to promote the country's national interest”.

The researcher argues that these differences are a necessary exercise in order to enrich and guide government's approach and key strategies in how it should execute its foreign policy in a manner that addresses the overarching issues of national interest such as poverty eradication, job creation, economic growth, and personal security. This is a role that both civil society and private sector plays.

Furthermore, van Nieuwkerk (2004:4), makes an argument in his article titled South Africa's National Interest in which he makes reference to a statement made by former President Thabo Mbeki where he states that government's policies and programmes were “..... informed by the struggle against poverty and underdevelopment, and that it will respond by addressing the 'first' and 'second' economies”. In essence, van Nieuwkerk's (2004:4) question is “whether South Africa's foreign policy should mostly be about trade and investment, and also seeks clarity on the pursuit of other values, and how to choose?”

In the context of ensuring better organization and stronger business structures to help improve engagement for trade and investment between South Africa and India, the researcher agrees with the assertion by van Nieuwkerk that foreign policy must be all-inclusive. It must also recognise the role of civil society and private sector in its engagements with India. It must cease to be elitist and extend its mandate to be receptive towards participation by stakeholders who can add value to how the country should address its national interest through foreign policy.

2.10. The application of Economic Diplomacy: A case of South Africa and India

This section defines the concept of economic diplomacy and proposes different interventions by key role players to enhance economic relations between South Africa and India. The conceptualization and implementation of a structured and robust economic diplomacy strategy is a key ingredient towards building more beneficial trade and investment relations between two nation states (Van Bergeijk et al., 2011). According to Poulsen (2015), countries with knowledge of each other's economies are in a better position to succeed in their economic relations. This is the essence of 'economic intelligence' for every nation that seeks to grow its economic base and create job opportunities for its people.

Hedin et al. (2011) argue that market intelligence is about processing business information into actionable insights that help organisations understand, compete, and grow in their market. Within a market, a needs analysis always drives the process where data is collected and processed into analyses that will be utilised in decision-making. In the conduct of economic diplomacy between two or more nations, there is a need to identify key role players who will gather market intelligence to make informed investment decisions.

According to Bayne and Woolcock (2007), economic diplomacy is the conduct of relations between states and other entities withstanding in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means. The concept of economic diplomacy is concerned with the management of relations between states as well as between states and other actors. Furthermore, economic diplomacy is concerned with international economic issues. Gupta (2008:221) indicates that "the civil society organizations can assist government in identifying opportunities that exist by conducting research on the priorities of India in South Africa". Here, Gupta (2008:221) reaffirms Hedin's et

al. (2011) assertion about the need for governments to conduct market intelligence to make informed decisions about trade and investment. It is therefore critical that South Africa, making use of civil society organisations, identifies its specific priorities in India rather than simply engaging with India to merely service existing diplomatic relations. The researcher therefore argues that this relationship must create benefits and opportunities for South Africa using a robust economic diplomacy strategy. For example, India signed a deal with South African companies in the defense sector worth around US\$80 million to improve its defense capabilities. The South African government can therefore inform its private sector and civil society of developments in the Indian government's approach to economic diplomacy, determining if there are ways to engage that are of mutual benefit. At the same time, South Africa must also identify opportunities for itself in India, allowing the participation of civil society and private sector.

Bhana (2015) notes that the trade sector between India and South Africa needs to be broadened and diversified, with small and medium-sized enterprises playing a greater role. Both countries have a large informal sector, often excluded from the broader scope of trade between the two countries. This gap can be filled through the establishment of a well-regulated trade mechanism comprising of civil society whose role would be to advise government and business on how certain projects may have an impact on local communities, especially small businesses. Through this approach, civil society and business can also work together to ensure greater monitoring, transparency, and risk reduction in the small and medium-sized enterprises sector.

It is important for the Indian and South African governments to consider and consult with business on the underlying reasons for not stimulating investment in certain sectors, despite facilitation measures such as reduced trade barriers. Civil society could assist by carrying out in-depth research and analysis of why certain policies are not effective and use this information to

inform government positions. Civil society could also help create awareness of opportunities in the Indian private sector. This could be done by facilitating an economic study of the Indian market and by improving knowledge networks. Blindheimsvik (2009:170) has the view that “the South African and Indian governments must also consider how to use their embassies to enhance their economic diplomacy. One area of stronger focus might be enhanced engagement with Diasporas in India and South Africa to gain a better understanding of the challenges and opportunities for the private sector”.

Enhancing economic diplomacy requires a close partnership between all relevant stakeholders. Each of these stakeholders plays an important role in ensuring that the impact of relations is maximised. In the future, closer collaboration and continual dialogue will be essential.

According to Soudien (2009), to improve investment opportunities for Indian businesses in Southern Africa, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) has been in discussions with India over a SACU India Free Trade Agreement. However, the researcher believes that these discussions must also include other challenges faced by business people of member states such as visas, amongst others. There has been an outcry about difficulty in obtaining business visas to South Africa, and that this important issue has hindered business between the two countries. To this end, India and South Africa have already concluded an agreement on visa exemptions for diplomatic and official passport holders for both countries.

The researcher observed, during his posting as a diplomat in India, that a paradox exists in which most Indian businesses find it difficult to obtain business visas, yet there are more Indian investments in South Africa than the converse. It is not clear why South Africa is not giving priority to such applications in order to encourage more investments. More often, such

bottlenecks lead to gradual loss of interest by Indian businesses to invest in South Africa due to red tape and bureaucracy. The researcher therefore suggests that in order to improve India–South Africa relations, it may be useful for civil society organisations and private sector to examine why Indian businesses struggle to obtain business visas, and why South African companies are not well represented in India. This examination will reveal whether this is, in fact, due to limited knowledge of South African companies about the Indian market or perhaps there are other underlying barriers for South African companies to conducting business in India. For example, there are difficulties surrounding tax requirements, which vary in India from state to state. As a result, India is currently considering a goods and services tax, which would provide a uniform national taxation policy.

2.11. Conclusion

This chapter illustrated how the theoretical and conceptual framework was applied to the study by making use of chosen theories such as realism, liberalism and constructivism. These theories were chosen in order to demonstrate their efficacy in the diplomatic relations between South Africa and India. In addition, this chapter interlaced the post-apartheid South Africa relations with India into a multipolar world order and assessed the ability of their bilateral relations to respond to this ever-changing world order. Similarly, the agility of their foreign policies was examined against the shifting global powers, as well as their convergences, divergences, constraints and prospects. It was also critical to ensure that this chapter highlights one of the key aspects of this study which is the contextualisation of relations between South Africa and India in order to determine the extent to which the Indian Congress Party (ICP) and the African National Congress (ANC) has influenced the present day relations between the two countries.

The role of civil society and private in the diplomatic relations between the two countries was critical in understanding their relevance.

Accordingly, the extent to which civil society and private sector can participate in promoting economic diplomatic relations between the two countries was located and explained within the context of the chosen theories in order to illustrate their interplay. This is so because the three theories subscribe to different conceptual frameworks, however, despite that, they were merged to maximize theoretical benefits of the study. The theoretical debates also enriched the overall arguments of the study. On the basis of the theoretical interplay between realism, liberalism and constructivism, it can be concluded that the relations between the two countries are driven by history, but not to the exclusion of national interest and power. In brief, whilst the quest for power, hegemony, and dominance of one by the other is what essentially defines these relations, their history remains key, and their freedoms and liberties to participate and support each other in certain engagements is respected. All these demonstrate the interplay of realism, liberalism and constructivism in the relations between South Africa and India.

The following chapter focuses on research methodology and its application to the study. Amongst others, it will focus on the analysis of the conceptual methodological contestations in the field of international relations as they relate to the research problem.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

Chapter Two made a critical discussion of the theories of international relations that guided the study, as well as their interplay in the context of the diplomatic relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India. Amongst others, the chapter demonstrated how these theories can be applied collectively in a study, despite their distinct divergences. The sampling of the theoretical interplay was applied throughout the various sections of the chapter, thus providing the theoretical and conceptual justification for the study of diplomatic relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India.

This chapter presents an in-depth account of the methodological approaches used in conducting the research study. It begins with a critical analysis of the conceptual methodological contestations in the field of international relations as they relate to the research problem. It then outlines the research methodological steps followed in the study, including justifications in terms of its mixed methods, both qualitative and quantitative methods, sampling procedures, data collection techniques and methods, data analysis, validity and reliability of the data collection process, ethical considerations and limitations of the research process.

3.2 Research Methodological Contestations in International Relations

In his study of methodology and methods in international relations, Pouliot (2007) argues that studies of international relations tend to explain a broad range of political interactions among countries, societies, and institutions. Whether exploring economic cooperation, environmental

conflict on war and peace, research on international politics and relations requires a systematic approach in the identification of critical processes and forces influencing change (Choy, 2014). Walker (1980) adds that in response to growing economic interdependence and other fundamental changes in the international system in the last decades, the analysis of international relations (IR) has grown in three main directions.

First, scholars have undertaken investigations on new issues including international trade, environmental politics including climate change, international ethics, and globalization. Second, new research methods have arisen, and includes the two-level game analysis, spatial analysis, and the scope of methodologies has expanded to include greater use of rational choice models and statistical methods. Third, researchers of international relations have become increasingly specialized both in their respective subfields and in their use of various research methodologies. These developments have enriched IR research by drawing attention to additional areas of study such as compliance with international treaties and the explanation of economic relations including trade, civil wars, and by changing how researchers analyze these issues (Lamont, 2015).

Milliken and Morrison (2003) elaborate that the combination of new research themes, greater methodological diversity, and increased subfield specialization in international relations has overshadowed common methodological concerns among researchers. While general courses on research methodology are now standard in the international relations curriculum at both the advanced undergraduate and graduate levels, specific treatments of methodological problems in the analysis of international relations are still comparatively rare.

Accordingly, this research study on a ‘Critical Investigation into the Diplomatic Relations

between Post-Apartheid South Africa and India after 1994' has attempted to close the methodological gap by presenting empirical studies that address central methodological issues as they have emerged in substantive subfields of international relations research. These are clearly outlined in chapter five. The study has explored the application of the following methods of research: a questionnaire, in-depth interviews, focus groups discussions and case studies. It argues that based on many years of debate on which method is best for studying international relations, a serious dialogue across different methodological approaches, methods and subfields in international relations generated a better understanding of the advantages and limits of different methods and led to more fruitful research on both international and diplomatic relations.

Prominent scholars of international relations and diplomacy have elaborated on the need for a more robust discourse on methodology and methods in IR and diplomacy (Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2002). They emphasised the importance of both accumulation of knowledge and cross-methods research (Araujo et al., 2014). In his discussion of research methods and methodology theories in international relations, Kothari (2004) makes a distinction between methods and methodology. He posits that 'methods' are techniques for gathering and analyzing data, whereas 'methodology' is a concern with the logical structure and procedure of scientific enquiry. Aradau et al. (2013) elaborate that methodology is thus subsumed within ontology, epistemology and the theoretical arrangements of concepts structuring the discussions, while method becomes at best, a reflection on the tools for organizing empirical material and practical research design.

Kothari (2004) also argues that methods have increasingly been placed at the heart of theoretical and empirical research in International Relations (IR) and social sciences. However, in their exploration on the role of methods in international relations, Nyumba et al. (2018) state that methods can be part of a critical research study if conceptualized away from neutral techniques

of organising empirical material and research design.

The researcher argues that IR practitioners are supported by research methods to fully conceptualise knowledge about various studies within the purview of their field. This also allows researchers in IR to move away from the dominance of scientificity (and its weaker versions of systematicity and rigour) to understand methods as less pure, less formal, messier and more experimental, carrying substantive political visions. The study supports the view that the use of qualitative research method drives the research, and rigor, systematicity, objectivity and credibility in social science and IR (Flick, 2010).

To determine the contribution of the rich historical relationship between South Africa and India, to their diplomatic relations in post-apartheid South Africa, the study was predominantly qualitative in approach and research method/design. This approach was chosen to have an in-depth understanding of the research problem through interaction with various key informants on the research problem (Morgan, 1993). Quantitative methods including the use of a questionnaire were employed because the study involved an assessment of trade and other economic relations including investment, between the study countries (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).

The strength of qualitative research in the context of this study was based on its ability to provide complex textual descriptions of how those people involved in the research problem experience it (Wyse, 2010). However, it is time consuming, labor intensive, and not statistically representative. According to Atieno (2009), qualitative research is a type of social science research that collects and works with non-numerical data and that seeks to interpret meaning from the data that helps understand social life through the study of targeted populations or places.

Atieno (2009) further elaborates that quantitative data is the systematic empirical investigation of observable phenomenon via statistical, mathematical or computation techniques. It can be counted, measured, and expressed using numbers, relatively easy to analyse, can be very consistent, precise, and reliable. However, it comprises of limitations such as possibilities of difficulties in understanding context of the phenomenon, and that data may not be robust enough to explain complex issues. In this study, as indicated, the researcher only limited his use of quantitative method by making use of questionnaires only to collect readily available qualitative data for theoretical interpretation, and not mathematical or statistical.

The study also took a case study approach in its investigation of the research problem. A case study is a research strategy that involves an empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its real-life context (Crowe et al., 2011). In the context of this study, the case study approach provided a systematic and in-depth way of looking at events, collecting data, analyzing information, and reporting the results. As a result, the researcher gained an in-depth understanding on the research issues (Babbie, 1983). According to (Crowe et al., 2011) a case study approach allows an in-depth development of a detailed and intensive knowledge about a single case or of a small number of related cases.

Vinay et al. (1995) make a distinction between ‘method’ and ‘methodology’ arguing that ‘methods’ are techniques for gathering and analysing bits of data, whereas ‘methodology’ is a concern with the logical structure and procedure of scientific enquiry. However, according to Aradau et al. (2014), methods can be part of a critical project if conceptualized away from neutral techniques of organising empirical material and research design. They propose a two-pronged reconceptualization of critical methods as devices which enact worlds and acts which disrupt particular worlds, and hold a view that developing this conceptualisation allows a

foregrounding of knowledge and politics as stakes of method and methodology rather than exclusively of ontology, epistemology or theory.

It is against this background that International Relations has shifted either towards ontology or towards epistemology. According to Aradau et al. (2014), despite other differences, constructivists, post-structuralists, feminists and critical realists, scholars would largely agree on this move towards ontology or epistemology.

It therefore means that methodology can only be rescued when separated from the tyranny of method and reframed as an overarching epistemology, and the arranging of theoretical reflection. Accordingly, the main criticism leveled against method and traditional methodologies concerns their instrumentation as a ‘guarantee’ for the scientific and orderly research that the disciplines aspire to.

Klotz et al. (2007) further argue that, while methods have largely functioned as techniques linking empirical worlds with worlds of theoretical abstractions in undistorted ways, methods understood as devices are performative, and enact social and political worlds. In this sense, methods have effects, they make differences, enact realities, and can help bring into being what they discover. Aradau et al. (2014) argue that the critical methodological turn is not just towards methodology – the logos of method – but a foregrounding of methods as material devices that enact worlds. Williams (2007) advances the view that as devices, methods enact social and political worlds in multiple ways. The world of terrorism is different when accounted for by mapping global inequalities rather than terrorist networks.

Since methods as devices are substantive in their effects, it will not imply that ontology, epistemology, and theory are secondary. In this regard, the argument raised by Aradau et al.

(2014) is that methods are devices that experimentally connect and assemble ontology, epistemology, theory, and worlds by putting them into knowledge generating action. In other words, the foreground methods are not a move to reverse the priority of methodology over method but is rather a move to emphasise the effects methods have. The central point is to see methods as devices of connecting and assembling, as well as the effects in the social and political worlds in which methods operate.

Aradu et al. (2013) further developed intersexuality as a method for foreign policy and security analysis, drawing on post-structuralist insights. For them, understanding foreign policy text as intersexuality, links across a variety of media and genres for empirical analysis of how these links are made as well as for thoroughly theorising the way text build authority and their capacity to speak about a particular issue. Intersexuality implies an understanding of what texts are and how they generate meaning. In line with the linguistic turn, the texts perform and constitute foreign policy and identity through reference to other texts. Foreign policy is performed in links between texts across genres. These texts gain authority and obtain capacity to speak policy partly by being interwoven with other texts.

Intersexuality can be seen to function as an inscription device that draws together a series of things/documents and orders them in particular ways. According to Harkness et al. (2010), most texts should be taken from the time under study, but historical texts that relate to them should also be included. Harkness et al. (2010), further argues that key texts are those which are mostly used interchangeably. Therefore, this means that, although this study is about ‘Diplomatic Relations between Post-Apartheid South Africa and India’, the historical text is critical and equally important in enriching the study.

Methods as acts introduce another aspect to the criticality and politicality of methods. Methods as acts can be understood in a stronger sense as disrupting worlds. In conceptualizing methods not just as devices but also as acts, Aradau et al. (2014) draw inspiration from that which Engin Instin has drawn between acts and habitual practice, conduct, discipline, and routine as ordered and ordering qualities of how humans conduct themselves. Methods as acts offer a different lens on the production of knowledge and political struggles from methods as devices.

Methods are devices that are both in and of the world and that produce truth as well as politics. Yet as acts, methods can do something quite specific. They disrupt scripted, ordered enactments of worlds. The specific politicality of methods as acts does not depend on their form – whether being qualitative or quantitative, nor an ontological vision that all knowledge is political because it represents partial worlds. Rather, methods as acts are political by bringing forth an orientation informed by subordinate positions that ruptures the ordered and orderly worlds.

Accordingly, as devices and acts, methods are fragile and fragmented (Suter, 2000). They are many systematic wholes, like a particular statistical method, a pure ethnography holistically incorporating all the changes and contestations within ethnographic history, or a systematized discourse analysis that demands coherence and strict application (Aradau et al., 2014).

3.3 Description of the Study Sites

Although the research focuses on the diplomatic relations between India and post-apartheid South Africa, the study was conducted in South Africa. The researcher could not undertake a visit to India to collect relevant field data. This was attributed to financial, logistical and time constraints. However, the researcher has past experiences of India, having served for 5 years in that country as a diplomat at the South African High Commission (SAHC). During his posting,

the researcher established a strong network of relevant key respondents in both countries, in particular Indians doing business in South Africa, as well as South Africans doing business in India – all situated in Johannesburg, Pretoria and Durban. These were amongst key respondents who were approached during the study to provide the necessary information since they possess insights on the research problem.

In addition to the abovementioned business persons, participants from the following entities or institutions were identified to participate in responding to questionnaires, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions: Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the India and High Commission in Pretoria, Department of Small Business Development (DSBD), the Centre for Citizenry Participation in International Relations (CACPIR), and the Centre for Indian Studies in Africa (CISA) situated at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, Indian business people doing business in South Africa and South African business people doing business in India.

3.4 Sampling Procedure

The sampling procedure for this study was predominantly purposive. Etikan et al. (2016) define a purposive sampling as a non-probability sample that is selected based on the characteristics of the population and the objectives of the study. It is also known as judgmental, selective, or subjective sampling (Larson and Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). According to Palinkas et al. (2015), the main goal of purposive sampling is to focus on particular characteristics of a study population which will best enable the researcher to answer research questions and achieve his/her research. Table 3.1 reflects the distribution of the study participants out of the sampling procedure.

Table 3.1: Distribution of the Study Participants

Name of Institution	Public/Private/ Civic	Country	No. of Participants
The Department of International relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)	Public/Government	South Africa	15
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)	Public/Government	South Africa	15
Department of Small Business Development (DSBD)	Public/Government	South Africa	10
Indian High Commission in South Africa (Pretoria)	Public/Government	India	5
Centre for Indian Studies in Africa (CISA), situated at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg	Public	South Africa	5
South Africans doing business in India	Private Sector	South Africa	5
Indians doing business in South Africa	Private Sector	India	5
Centre for Citizenry Participation in International Relations (CACPIR)	Civic Organization	South Africa	5
TOTAL			65

Table 3.1 shows that 65 participants from across all specified categories of the historical relationship between the study countries took part in the research study. They served as key informants during in-depth interviews or focus group discussions and responded to questionnaires. The researcher was aware of the limitations of the purposive sampling procedure because irrespective of the type of purposive sampling used, it can be susceptible to bias, especially when compared to probability sampling techniques that are designed to reduce such biases. Therefore, the researcher chose this method to increase the level of accuracy.

In the context of this study, the researcher ensured that the purpose for which data were collected

was fully explained to all the research participants including their role in the research process. This was done to obtain their full cooperation in the data collection process. Their role in the process was also explained through an informed consent form. While some agreed to complete the consent form, others refused to do so. The following section presents the data collection methods for the research study.

3.5 Data Collection Methods

Data collection in research is the process of gathering and measuring information on variables of interest, in an established systematic fashion to enable the researcher to answer stated research questions and evaluate outcomes (Sandelowski, 2000). In this study, the data collection methods involved both secondary and primary sources of information to cross-reference and ensure the reliability of the instruments used, as well as the validity of the data collected (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).

Secondary sources included books, journals (articles), newspapers, past research reports and magazines, amongst others. The ethnographies, past research case studies and records provided an exceptionally good basis for other literature sources. These contained invaluable information on the diplomatic relations between India and South Africa. However, there was limited literature sources on the relations between the two countries after 1994, and how they have leveraged their history for a common good. Most of the literature was on the overall history of relations between the two countries. This included the early arrival of Indians in South Africa, the role of Mahatma Gandhi in the liberation struggle in South Africa, and India's support for South Africa's freedom and liberation.

The various research libraries in South Africa were of great assistance in gathering secondary

data. The library holdings had extensive sources of information available in various forms related to the research problem. Some of the most comprehensive journal databases were accessed via the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) and other research institutions' library electronic databases. These databases contained some of the most highly reputable scholarly journals in the social sciences related to international relations. The internet was a great source of data gathering, particularly on current affairs, and online newspapers and articles provided up-to-date data.

Primary data collection methods used in this study comprised of questionnaires, in-depth interviews, and focus groups discussions whose copies thereof are marked as annexures A, B and C, respectively. Each one of these data collection methods had both advantages and disadvantages. For example, regarding focus group discussions, the researcher witnessed interaction with respondents who projected different body languages and eye contact. A focus group discussion allows the researcher to interact with participants and observe their behaviour (Baral et al., 2017). It is also a mechanism through which the researcher can connect with participants to understand their thoughts and orientation about the subject of study (Villard, 2000). In the process of focus group discussions, participants may be apprehensive and doubtful about sharing certain information (Scharff et al., 2010). To an extent, this suggested to the researcher that the respondents either did not know the answer or intended to conceal some information due to mistrust. However, the researchers' observations may also not be entirely objective since the personal demeanours and attributes of some of the respondents were unknown – people behave differently when they interact with others, especially in an organised setting. The use of different data collection methods on a specific research subject assisted in cross-referencing the information collected.

3.5.1 Questionnaire

Harkness et al. (2010), defines a questionnaire as a research instrument that consists of a set of questions, which aims to collect information from a respondent. The questionnaire used in this study was a mix of both close-ended questions and open-ended questions. The open-ended and long-form questions offered the respondent the opportunity to elaborate on her/his thoughts on the research question. The data collected during the study was a mixed method, both qualitative and quantitative were applied (Creswell and Creswell, 2017) as the study involved an assessment of the economic, especially trade and investment relations between the study countries.

In this study the questionnaire was designed in such a way that respondents could easily respond to them within 15-25 minutes. The questions related to biographical information of participants; the state of trade relations between India and South Africa; the role of private sector and civil society in the diplomatic relations between India and South Africa since 1994; the significance of multilateral, trilateral and minilaterals in the bilateral relations between India and South Africa; the possible effects of global shifts in political and economic power to the current relations between India and South Africa in a poly-polar world order; the early arrival of Indians in South Africa; and Mahatma Gandhi as a human rights activist.

All questionnaires were personally distributed by the researcher at the workplace of each participant. Since the researcher was in possession of gatekeepers' letters, he arranged with participating institutions which assisted in identifying the relevant participants. He also worked with identified coordinators to distribute and collect questionnaires. The researcher constantly contacted coordinators until the time and dates were provided during which the distributed questionnaires were collected.

3.5.2 In-depth Interviews

Williams (2007) looks at an in-depth interview as a qualitative research technique which involves conducting intensive individual interviews with a small number of research participants or respondents to explore their views on a specific research problem. According to Bernard (1996) qualitative data is non-numerical and relies on information that is already available; in this case, the diplomatic relations between South Africa and India since 1994. Aradau et al. (2014) point out that the primary advantage of in-depth interviews is that much inclusive information can be collected as it creates a friendly environment for respondents to express their ideas and thoughts; thus, the results and feedbacks can be obtained more easily and accurately. An in-depth interview is usually conducted in person or over the telephone with the researcher asking questions of an individual respondent (Petitmengin, 2006).

Strauss and Corbin (1998) elaborate that an in-depth interview differs from a focus group discussion in the sense that the latter involves a group of interacting individuals brought together by an interviewer as moderator who motivates the group and its interaction to gain information on a specific research problem. During the in-depth interview, the researcher interacts with respondents on an individual level, one at a time. It differs from a semi-structured interview in which the interviewer has a checklist of questions.

In this study, in-depth interviews formed a larger part of the research method and technique on data collection. In this study, the interviews lasted from 30 to 60 minutes in each case. The researcher, through this research study, realized that in-depth interviews could be quite time-consuming, as interviews had to be transcribed, organised, analysed, and reported. If the

interviewer is not well skilled and experienced, the entire process could be undermined. The process could also be costly.

During the interview process, the researcher was mindful that it was necessary to gain insights into the key concepts of the research as the interviewees were telling their experiences and views. As a result, the researcher only used the interview guide to direct the interview discussions, but never restrained any additional information that arose. At all times, richness of data was sought from participants as they were encouraged to talk openly about their experiences to enable insights through words and numbers, since the research methodology combines both qualitative and quantitative methods. For instance, the interview participants from DIRCO were South African diplomats who were previously posted in India and had in-depth knowledge of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The researcher interviewed them separately at the premises of DIRCO. They agreed with the researcher to meet at different times and each in-depth interview lasted for approximately 30 to 60 minutes.

The interviews were all conducted in English since most participants possessed good command of English. The researcher was able to transcribe the interviews as presented by the participants without translating the narratives. There were no instances where participants expressed themselves in a language other than English, and this made it easier for the researcher to transcribe. To uphold ethical norms, during the interviews, the researcher treated all participants with respect (Ridley, 2009).

However, interviews alone were deemed insufficient for the study, especially with the business community. They were supplemented using participant observation to improve the validity of the findings. Participants' observation was used because it provided the researcher with ways to check for non-verbal expression of feelings, to understand how participants communicate with

each other and check how much time is spent on various activities (Kawulich, 2005). Participant observation has been used in an array of disciplines as a tool for data collection about people, processes, and cultures in qualitative research (Ridley, 2009).

The researcher was able to access different types of information that may not be easily accessible to an outsider, especially with members of the business communities for both Africans and Indians. The researcher had to integrate with them in their business environment as customer, including purchasing different products, mostly fabrics, cellphone accessories etc. During this period, informal discussions were held with them about their overall business engagements, including some of the challenges they are facing in doing business, both in South Africa and India.

The researcher often held informal dinner or lunch engagements with participating business community members in their premises, knowing that they would be in a state of comfort, including winning their confidence. The researcher also managed to secure authorization to attend certain meetings of DIRCO, since he is also a staff member of the department and understands the culture and the environment of the department very well. This was utilized as an advantage to gain leverage for the research study. As already indicated earlier, the researcher is a South African diplomat, who served at the South African High Commission in India, New Delhi, as First and Second Secretary Political, respective from July 2005- August 2010. Due to this diplomatic background, and knowledge on the subject for research, the researcher was in a position to participate during interviews and discussions, making use of his lived experience in India to enhance the quality of discussions. However, the researcher ensured that at all times, his knowledge and background did not influence the thoughts of participants or impose personal outlook and views.

Through a network of diplomats, business community, and academics established by the researcher in both South Africa and India, during his posting in India as a diplomat, assistance was obtained and research activities related to the research problem were organized such as focus group discussions, etc. the researcher also visited the South African departments of trade and industry, small business development and was invited for radio interviews at CACPIR, a civil society organization whose members also served as respondents. Acquaintances were made with some members and views about an array of issues exchanged.

The main objective of conducting the research using participant observation as a data collection method was mainly to develop a holistic understanding of the research participants' knowledge and insights of the Diplomatic Relations between Post-Apartheid South Africa and India.

The researcher was aware that one of the limitations in using the participants' observation technique was that sometimes, the researcher must rely on the use of key informants and not be interested in what happens out of the public eye. Sometimes researchers are not easily accepted in the communities where they are conducting their research. Several factors such as race, appearance, gender, ethnicity, and class may affect the researcher's acceptance in the community (Kawulich, 2005). For example, officials in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation were uncomfortable in responding to some questions because the researcher was previously the head of office of the Director General and was known to them.

Due to the researcher's previous position and association with the Director General, officials were apprehensive that if they could reveal some information, the researcher might share it with the Director General. As a result, they were not at ease with certain questions. In order to mitigate these limitations, the researcher assured participants of the highest level of confidentiality, and also informed them that in order to conduct this research, an ethical

clearance was obtained which requires upholding all necessary ethical prescripts and academic values attached to the research study. A copy of ethical clearance was already shared with respondents ahead of different engagements.

3.5.3 Focus Group Discussions

Gill et al. (2008) elaborate that a focus group differs from an in-depth interview in that it is a group rather than a one-on-one interview. Furthermore, getting the participants to discuss among themselves is a fast and easy way of collecting qualitative data in less time than would be needed for individual interviews. The researcher observed a few limitations during interaction with focus groups. For example, because participants knew in advance that they were going to form part of a focus group discussion, they were too conscious of what they said in response to questions asked. Despite being uncomfortable with the researcher, they also seemed apprehensive about how their responses would be interpreted by others who formed part of the group. As a result, there was uniformity in the responses they provided largely.

Although others had agreed with some responses, they had shown signs of disagreement with other responses without being verbal. The issues of race also influenced a lack of originality in how responses were provided. Some respondents in the group were White, some Indian, and the rest of African descent. Historically, there is trust deficit amongst these different races. This prevented them from being open about what they knew in relation to the study. In focus group discussions, participants were grouped in a meeting room, thus they behaved differently from how they would have behaved if they were not in a group. This affected the quality of research results (Dolan et al., 1999). The overall objective of using a variety of data collection methods was to explore people's knowledge and experience on the research problem. Accordingly, a

combination of questionnaires, in-depth interviews, participant observation and focus groups discussions provided a better understanding of the research problem from the community perspective through interaction.

According to Smithson (2008), a focus group discussion is a good way to gather people from similar backgrounds or experiences to discuss a specific topic of interest. A moderator (or group facilitator) who introduces topics for discussion and helps the group to participate in a lively and natural discussion amongst themselves guides the group of participants. Its strength, argues Kruger and Casey (2001), lies in allowing the participants to agree or disagree with each other so that it provides an insight into how a group thinks about an issue, the range of opinion and ideas, and the inconsistencies and variation that exists in a particular community in terms of beliefs as well as their experiences and practices.

Dawson et al. (1992) highlight that the focus group discussions can be used to explore the meanings of survey findings that cannot be explained statistically, the range of opinions/views on a topic of interest and to collect a wide variety of local terms. In bridging research and policy, the group can be useful in providing an insight into different opinions among different parties involved in the change process, thus, enabling the process to be managed more smoothly.

3.6 Data Analysis

Dey (1993) defines data analysis as the process in which a phenomenon is broken down into its constituent parts for it to be understood better. Carrington et al. (2005) elaborate that data analysis involves making sense out of the information gathered from research and to bring out meaning from data. In the context of this study, the researcher analyzed data by making use of qualitative method. According to Strauss and Corbin (1988) qualitative data is information that

cannot be measured, is non-numerical without any data. Validation checks were conducted through all phases of the research process to ensure the highest level of data accuracy.

Schreier (2012) explains that in content analysis, the researcher classifies key ideas in a written communication, such as a report, article, or film. It is a systematic, research method for analyzing textual information in a standardized way that allows the researcher to make inferences about the data collected. The central idea in content analysis is that many words of the text are classified into much fewer content categories. Qualitative data in a form of voice-recorded in-depth interviews conducted with research from the different institutions were transcribed, typed, and analyzed through content analysis, with the assistance of the supervisor and presented as empirical evidence.

At the beginning of the analysis, the researcher read data collected to obtain an overall sense of the data and to observe the variation of opinions from different participants. During this process, the researcher took note of the way participants constructed the meaning of the concepts that were being investigated. Each individual response was observed repeatedly to ensure that the constructions of the concepts were fully documented by the researcher and to avoid new interpretations emerging from each successive re-reading.

In the second phase of the analysis, the researcher identified common responses and meanings that emerged from the different interviews. The responses were then interpreted to gain a better understanding of each account given by different individuals. During the interpretation phase, the researcher examined the text for contradictions, similarities and ambiguities emerging from the responses of the participants. After the discourses were interpreted, the researcher searched for similarities and differences regarding the ways in which participants gave accounts about

different discourses. The researcher also drew on the historical background as well as the context within which the participants were operating to gain clarity on the discourses.

3.7 Validity and Reliability

Validity in qualitative research is the extent to which the researcher provides sufficient detail to enable the reader to interpret the meaning and context of what is presented (Whittlemore and Chase, 2001). Furthermore, it refers to consistency with which the research will produce the same results if repeated. In this regard, findings are more likely to be scrutinised and questioned (Johnson, 1997). This part of validity ensures that findings are believable, applicable, and credible. Validation is thus dependent on the transparency with which the data collection and analysis procedures are presented.

Kocs (1994) indicates that the trustworthiness of the research process can be determined by the extent to which the research provides information and the process by which the product has been reached. For this study, the researcher ensured that no evidence of data obtained was repetitive or irrelevant relative to the research question(s). This process assisted the researcher to determine when to stop or continue with data collection, literature review and data analysis.

In qualitative research, stability is also used as an indication of validity (Golafshani, 2003). Stability in qualitative research refers to the trustworthiness of data and is concerned with whether the observations are repeatable during the data collection process (Solomon, 1997). In order to ensure that data is stable, the researcher continuously reflected on the objectives of the study, to ensure that the participants are guided to remain within the domain of the study. In addition, during the analysis phase, the researcher remained within the scope of the study.

Golafshani (2003) further states that the stability of the findings is concerned with the degree to which the findings respond to the focus of the inquiry and not the biases of the researcher.

Evidence-based practice includes, in part, implementation of the findings of well-conducted quality research studies. Consideration was given not only to the results of the study but also the rigour of the research. Rigor refers to the extent to which the researchers worked to enhance the quality of the studies. A simple example of validity and reliability is an alarm clock that rings at 9:00 each morning, but is set for 8:30. It is very reliable (it consistently rings the same time each day), but is not valid (it is not ringing at the set time). It is important to consider validity and reliability of the data collection tools (instruments) when either conducting or critiquing research.

3.8 Ethical Considerations

Ethical considerations are essential in ensuring that, amongst others, the privacy of participants is assured. Fox et al. (2003) point out that ethical considerations refer to rules of conduct typically to conformity to a code or set of principles. In this study, the researcher fully complied with all the prescripts underlying ethical conduct. Cacciattolo (2015) highlights that no information revealing the identity of any participant must be included in the final report, or in any other communication in the course of the research process. Hence, confidentiality and anonymity of data were ensured by:

(i) Maintaining confidentiality of data/records, from identifiable individuals including storing the codes linking data to individuals; (ii) refraining from engaging in discussions arising from an individual interview with others in ways that might identify an individual; (iii) desisting from disclosing what an individual said in an interview during discussions of data; (iv) refraining from

engaging in discussions arising from an individual interview, focus groups, and questionnaires with others in ways that might identify individuals; (v) ensuring that participants and/or individuals and/or places in the dissemination of the study are concealed in order to protect their identity; (vi) anonymising individuals and/or places in the dissemination of the study to protect their identity.

For informed consent, permission was sought to record the in-depth interviews and conversations to allow the interview to focus on the interviewees, and their responses, rather than on note taking. The questions pertaining to interviews were listed in the informed-consent sheet that each interviewee signed. In addition to respecting the privacy of the respondents, the researcher ensured anonymity of the respondents and an environment of comfort was ensured throughout the research process to facilitate the greatest flow of views and insights from each participant. All interviews were conducted at the premises where participants either worked or conducted their businesses. Furthermore, participants were given choices to withdraw from the study whenever they felt that they had lost interest to participate. To protect the confidentiality of the research participants, their genuine names were kept confidential and pseudo names were used when referring to their shared experiences.

3.9 Limitations of the Study

According to Price and Murnan (2004), a limitation of a research study design or instrument is the systematic bias that the researcher did not or could not control and which could inappropriately affect the results. Research manuscripts submitted for publication should include an adequate declaration of the limitations. During the process of conducting this research study, the researcher encountered a few challenges, especially the data collection process. For example,

of the 15 identified participants from DIRCO, only 10 agreed to complete questionnaires, and the rest of the 5 questionnaires were only submitted after a follow-up. Although the 15 agreed to participate in a focus group discussion, they were not comfortable having the discussions recorded on the audiotape, or even filling in an attendance register. However, two middle managers agreed to participate in an in-depth interview and agreed to be recorded in an audiotape recorder/cellphone.

At the Indian High Commission in Pretoria, the High Commissioner indicated that his staff members are prohibited from participating in such research, since it would reveal the bias of Indian diplomats towards the relations between India and South Africa. Accordingly, neither the questionnaires nor declaration forms were completed, but were returned to the researcher.

At the department of Small Business Development, all questionnaires were distributed but never returned to the researcher. The senior manager who met with the researcher also prohibited selected staff members to participate in either focus group discussions or in-depth interviews. However, she agreed to conduct an in-depth interview with the researcher, but later withdrew.

At CACPIR, the entire selected participants completed questionnaires and declaration forms without any objection; however, they were never returned to the researcher. A focus group discussion was held, including in-depth interviews with the Director for CACPIR and two other officials. However, authorization was not granted to record proceedings on the audiotape, or even to fill in an attendance register.

After a rigorous vetting process at the Department of Trade and Industry, the researcher could distribute questionnaires, which were subsequently completed by all participants, and returned to the researcher. Although Director and a Deputy Director agreed to conduct in-depth interviews,

the rest of the participants were not comfortable conducting focus group discussions because they did not want their views to be known by others. They even declined to conduct in-depth interviews in the absence of others. As a result, focus group discussions were never held with DTI officials.

The researcher also struggled to conduct focus group discussions and in-depth interviews with officials at the Centre for Indian Studies in Africa (CISA) due to scheduling challenges. Although questionnaires were distributed, they were never returned to the researcher. With regards to Indian businesspeople doing business in South Africa, questionnaires were completed and returned to the researcher. Some informal discussions were held, but they did not indicate if the researcher can use the information. However, the researcher decided not to make use of this information in keeping with the ethical prescripts. They were also doubtful using their real names on the declaration forms. They were concerned that if they agree to participate in focus group discussions and in-depth interviews, their details may reach the department of home affairs and that they could run a risk of being deported back to India. The researcher began to have doubts about their legal status in South Africa.

The South African businesspeople doing business in India participated in the completion of questionnaires and returned them back to the researcher. They too declined to conduct in-depth interviews and focus group discussions stating that these may prejudice their businesses. It is, however, evident that many participants were not comfortable to conduct in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. As highlighted in the report, this phenomenon was very prominent in the researcher's interface with almost all participants. This is an indication of prevalent stigmatisation of face-to-face interviews, as opposed to questionnaires – there were visible signs of mistrust on the part of participants. As a result, participants were more comfortable

completing questionnaires, with their alias, than conducting recorded face-to-face interviews with the researcher.

3.10 Conclusion

This chapter provided an in-depth account of the research methodology used in conducting this study. It presented a crisp analysis of specific descriptions and processes undertaken by the researcher in order to arrive at certain conclusions, and revealed the methodology used in conducting the study, data collection methods and analysis, data validity, ethical clearance, and limitations of the study. This chapter further outlined specific phases of this research and outlined the tools selected by the researcher to conduct the study. Critically, it highlighted the role and conduct of the researcher, and his expectations from participants. The data selection process was thoroughly outlined, and methods selected carefully.

It is recalled that the study explored a critical investigation into the diplomatic relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India. Accordingly, in collecting data, the researcher made an undertaking to – (1) distribute questionnaires, (2) conduct focus group discussions, (3) conduct in-depth interviews, and (4) participant observation. All these instruments were used with a view to understand the extent to which South Africa and India have made use of their strong historical relations to enhance their diplomatic relations after 1994.

The following chapter reviews related literature in the relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India. It makes a critical discussion of the existing literature pertaining to the relations between the two countries for the study before and after 1994.

CHAPTER FOUR

LITERATURE REVIEW

4.1 Introduction

Chapter three presented an in-depth account of the methodological approaches used in conducting the research study. It begins with a critical analysis of the conceptual methodological contestations in the field of international relations as they relate to the research problem. It then outlines the research methodological steps followed in the study, including justifications in terms of its mixed methods, both qualitative and quantitative methods, sampling procedures, data collection techniques and methods, data analysis, validity and reliability of the data collection process, ethical considerations and limitations of the research process.

This chapter reviews related literature in the relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India. It makes a critical discussion of the existing literature pertaining to the relations between the two countries for the study before and after 1994. This includes the background and historical contributions of South African Indians to democracy, nation building in South Africa, South-South Cooperation, especially perspectives on South Africa-India relations in the BRICS and IBSA formations. It also highlights existing gaps in the literature reviewed, as well as the contributions of this study to the growing body of knowledge in the overall relations between South Africa and India.

Webster et.al, (2002) define literature review as a comprehensive summary of previous research related to the research problem. According to Rowley and Slack (2004:1), “a literature review is

a summary of a subject field that supports the identification of specific research questions”. A literature review needs to draw on and evaluate a range of distinct types of sources including academic and professional journal articles, books (Hart, 2001). The literature review process must include web-based resources, and searches thereof to help in the identification and location of relevant documents and other sources (Dawidowicz, 2010). Furthermore, Hart (2001:8) argues that, “A good literature search demonstrates the ability to search, identify and select materials relevant to the topic and which needs to be reviewed at a level appropriate to the project”.

In the context of this study, the review surveyed scholarly articles, journals, books, and other sources relevant to the critical investigation into the diplomatic relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India. The review provided the theoretical and methodological base to determine and support the nature of the research study. It gave the researcher foundational knowledge on the research problem, formulation of the research questions and specific objectives, theoretical and methodological frameworks, identification of areas of prior scholarship to prevent duplication and gave credit to other researchers, inconsistencies including gaps and conflicts in previous research and open questions left from other research studies.

The following sections present a critical review of the literature on the diplomatic relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India and covers the following literature: the nature and origins of relations between South Africa and India in the context of the contributions of South African Indians in the socio-economic development of South Africa; relations amongst freedom movements in South Africa and India; the socio-economic, cultural and political relations between India and post-apartheid South Africa; mechanisms to manage diplomatic relations between India and South Africa; south-south cooperation: perspectives on South Africa and India

in the IBSA and BRICS formations; South Africa and India in the global context, and the conclusion. The following section reviews the literature on the nature and origin of the relations between South Africa and India especially that which pertains to the contribution of South African Indians in the political, cultural, and socio-economic development of the country.

4.2 The Nature and Origins of Relations between South Africa and India

This section reviews the literature on the nature and origin of the relations between South Africa and India, with special reference to the contribution of South African Indians in the political, cultural, and socio-economic development of the country. Dhupeli-Mesthrie (2007) shows that the sugarcane producing colonies in the early years of the 19th century were temporarily hit by the abolition of slavery. Several attempts were made to introduce alternative labour. In Mauritius, for instance, Indians under the control of Sirdars filled a gap, but certain abuses led to an enquiry by the British Government in 1837. Five years later, the Government agreed to a system of Indian indentured emigration. Later regulations provided that migration should be voluntary, recruiters licenced, protectors of emigrants stationed in the old and in the new country, and certain indenture conditions adhered to Indian emigration on a large scale began to Mauritius, West Indies and British Guiana. A similar movement to Natal began in 1860s. Furthermore, Dhupeli-Mesthrie (2007) argues that most accounts of the settlement of Indians in South Africa point to 1860 as the founding year when the first indentured Indians arrived in Natal to work on the cane fields.

According to Reddy (2005), the historical connection between India and South Africa began with the introduction of Indian indentured labour to Natal Province in 1860 (to work on the sugar and tea plantations) following the abolition of slavery by the British in the mid-nineteenth century.

After an eight-year period, the indentured labourers were free to work on their own or return to India. There was another group of Indians in South Africa known as traders who were classified as passengers because they financed their own travel. Although the local government promised them equal treatment and protection under the law if they remained in South Africa, like other Indians, they experienced widespread discrimination which led to the suspension of Indian migration to South Africa between 1866-1871.

Raman (2004) has the view that the introduction of Indians into South Africa was due to the discovery in the 1850s that the soil and climate of Natal were ideal for the successful cultivation of sugarcane. The one obstacle blocking the establishment of a thriving plantation economy was a lack of labour, as the local African population produced few willing workers. The eyes of the planters consequently turned hungrily towards India, which had already come to the rescue of Mauritius, Trinidad, St Lucia, and Granada when they had faced a similar problem. Indentured workers, mainly Tamil and Hindi speaking and of Hindu faith, came to South Africa between 1860 and 1911 to work at the Natal's sugarcane fields.

According to Kolge (2016), it was the development of the sugar industry in the coastal region of Natal in the middle of the 19th century which led to the presence of almost a million Indians in the Union of South Africa. The first batch of Indians arrived in the Union of South Africa in 1653. The Dutch merchants, returning home from their voyages to India and the East Indies, had taken them to the then Dutch Cape Colony and sold them as slaves to the early Dutch settlers.

Clark and Worger (2011) reveal that Indians were made to work as domestic servants, or to join the African slaves who were already toiling on the newly established farms. Between 1653 and the early 19th century, there were already as many as 1.195 Indians in the Cape, forming 36.40%

of the slave population imported into the colony. In 1852, a committee elected with the objective of studying the possibilities for sugar-cane production in Natal reached a conclusion that no scheme for the development of the resources of the soil ought to be attempted unless the government will provide the sufficiency of labour (Hughes, 2007).

Eldredge et al. (2010) indicate that by analysing the first contradiction, it became noticeably clear that there was no realisation that in 1653 slavery was already abolished in the Union of South Africa. However, the Union decided to source labour from India to serve as slaves in the sugar cane fields. Since slavery was abolished, it was virtually not possible for Indians to join African slaves who are purported to have been working there.

Heller (2016) points out that the Natal colony, as it was new, was potentially rich in coal and held out great possibilities in agriculture, especially maize and sugar cane. It was the latter possibility that pointed to the need for Indian labour, which had by then been associated indelibly with sugar-cane cultivation in nearby Mauritius and distant Fiji. The European settler in Natal (which had a fair and wholesome climate), whether Boer or Briton, had become not only unaccustomed to manual labour but had begun to look upon it as the functions for a servile race, with slavery abolished and native labour either confined to the reserves or tied up in individual farms, the Natal sugar planter cast wistful eyes at India for labour.

According to Ray (1989), there seemed to be contradicting accounts on the main reasons leading to the government's decision to acquire Indian labour. While one is attributed to the abolition of slavery, the other points to the fact that the Britons had little trust that the ability of blacks to sufficiently produce desired outcomes.

The large number of Indians in South Africa attracted other prominent Indians such as Mahatma Gandhi who arrived in South Africa in 1893, and influenced the social, religious, and political spheres (Nussbaum, 2011). According to Reddy (2015), when Mahatma Gandhi arrived in South Africa in May 1893, he found three categories of Indians – ‘indentured’ who were under a five year labour contract, ‘ex-indentured’ who had chosen to remain for another five years, and ‘passengers’, mainly traders who had paid their own fare to South Africa. Many Indians in the latter two categories qualified to vote and shared the same franchise as the Natal’s white settlers; however, they were not allowed to exercise that right. It was at this point that Mahatma Gandhi mobilised other Indians and established the Natal Indian Congress on 22 August 1894; and later launched the Indian Opinion, a publication which became the voice of Indians in South Africa. Despite his influence, there were prevailing contradictions about his conduct. While some believed that he was a strong social activist whose interest was to advance the course of humanity regardless of race, many believed that he was racist due to his racial slurs and frequent reference to blacks as ‘kafirs’, a demeaning word for black South Africans.

According to Reddy (2005), the plight of Indians in South Africa became a great concern for the government of India. In subsequent years, it became clear that the Indian government was opposed to the apartheid system in South Africa and became one amongst the countries to raise concerns in the United Nations in 1946. The researcher maintains that, despite India’s interest in protecting the interests of Indians in South Africa, this was an illustration that resistance to the apartheid government was not a preserve of black Africans but a concern to countries such as India. Even amongst the white race in South Africa, there was a vast number that was opposed to the apartheid system and racial segregation.

Reddy (2005) states that for the apartheid government of South Africa, race was a pre-requisite for voting. This is the principal reason why Mahatma Gandhi decided to establish the Natal Indian Congress to defend the franchise of ‘passenger’ Indians and ‘ex-indentured’ labourers. The institutionalisation of apartheid in South Africa earned its government the frequent condemnation of the United Nations and forced her withdrawal from the Commonwealth. Reddy (2008) notes that the United Nations (UN) also played a critical role in providing a platform for engagements on the issue of apartheid and segregation in South Africa before 1994. It began considering the issue of racism in South Africa in 1946 at the request of the Government of India; a UN document introducing the subject by India in July 1946, succinctly underlined the latter’s pioneering role in the world movement against apartheid. According to Vats (1991), in 1947, India took a policy decision to be one of the first countries to raise the question of human rights abuse in the UNO – many countries could not share the same sentiments since their foreign policies towards the apartheid government of South Africa were in convergence, and one such country was the United Kingdom.

While freedom loving nations of the world have always expressed their solidarity with South African cause, India went further than doing just that. It never missed a single opportunity at any international forum to raise its voice against the racist regime. It became the voice of the South African leaders who were languishing in jails or were massacred by the government of South Africa. While countries sympathised with the South African cause, India took it up at all international forums from Commonwealth (CM) Summits, Non- Aligned Movement (NAM) meetings right to the United Nations (UN) Assembly, amongst others.

Vahed et al. (2010) look at the racial inequality in South Africa by pointing out that the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as President of a non-racial democratic South Africa on 10 May 1994 denoted the de-territorialisation of old apartheid racial identities. Race separateness was no longer codified in law and common citizenship was meant to glue all into a South African 'nation'. The process has been far from simple as 'Indian' identity has been constructed, deconstructed, and re-made over the years. A central dynamic of this process has been the tension between the way the state has tried to define identity. In the post-apartheid period, there is unravelling of Indian identities in response to external factors such as the rise of the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) in India, the struggle of Tamils in Sri Lanka, and the Global War on Terror, while the state continues to play an interventionist role through its race-based affirmative action policies. This underscores tensions among Indians on how best to assert their sense of belonging in Africa in general, and South Africa in particular.

Alves (2007) indicates that the development of Mahatma Gandhi's Satyagraha philosophy and movement was a reaction to the Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance (ALAO) of 1906 which proposed that Indians and Chinese were to register their presence in the Transvaal by giving their fingerprints and carrying passes. The protest to the act united the two Asian communities and they decided to oppose the ordinance by peaceful methods. According to Gandhi, Satyagraha was a unique weapon to fight injustice (Mathew and Jones, 2012). Its emphasis was on the principle of truth, non-violence, tolerance, and peaceful protests. In his mass campaign, he practiced civil disobedience, which involved breaking a law and courting arrest. The main objective of Satyagraha was to eradicate the evil or to reform the opponent. He advocated that in the existing socio-economic political system, there was a dire necessity to wean the individual away from the influence of wealth, luxuries, and power.

Reddy (2015) states that the origin of Satyagraha was influenced by the Hindu religious principles to resist the racial injustice in South Africa by refusing to follow an unjust law. In doing so, a Satyagrahi would not be angry, would put up freely with physical assaults to his person and the confiscation of his property, and would not use foul language to smear his opponent. A practitioner of Satyagraha also would never take advantage of an opponent's problems. The goal was not for them to be a winner and loser of the battle, but rather, that all would eventually see and understand the 'truth' and agree to rescind the unjust law. Vahed highlights that,

“Mahatma Gandhi achieved greatness for the struggles that he fought on the political, economic, cultural, and moral fronts. His ideas about love, truth, soul force ('brahmacharya') and Satyagraha have universal appeal beyond the Indian setting and mark him as one of the most outstanding individuals of the twentieth century. Yet the 21 years that Gandhi spent in South Africa were critical in the 'Making of the Mahatma'. The African experience impacted Gandhi's conception of Indian identity and nationhood, Hinduism, and understanding of colonialism. These years also allowed him to develop his special technique of transforming society” (Vahed, 2000:201).

In spite of his concern for promoting human justice, peace and equality, Mahatma Gandhi's focus during his life in South Africa was predominantly on his fellow Indians. There are a number of testimonies advanced by the researcher to support this contention. The racist attitudes Gandhi had towards Africans in South Africa contradicts the views associated with the famous

Gandhi the world knows. Many people are not aware of this aspect of Gandhi's life in South Africa because the researcher believes that it is deliberately omitted from his later writings.

In his discussion of the socio-cultural diversity of South African Indians, Neocosmos (2006) argues that there is a tendency amongst Africans in South Africa to look at Indians in the country as homogenous. The researcher therefore argues that this is an indication that not much is known about South African Indians by black South Africans. This omission is occasioned by the segregatory laws of the apartheid regime which advocated for the separation of people according to race or colour – black South Africans were the most isolated. Accordingly, it would not have been possible for black South Africans to know and understand the nuances of Indian culture when they were isolated from the Indian communities.

Although South Africa has the largest Indian population in sub-Saharan Africa, they remain isolated from black communities. This is indicative of the perpetuation of the apartheid divide and rule principles which seem to have been embraced by South African Indians and accepted by blacks in South Africa. For example, Desai et al. (2010) confirm that as a result of the historical reasons which have been discussed in this research, the majority of South African Indians are concentrated in KwaZulu-Natal's largest city of Durban with over 1 million people of Indian. They are mostly concentrated in townships such as Phoenix, and Chatsworth, which were created by the apartheid government to segregate Indians from other racial groups. Although they mostly live in isolation from the rest of other racial groups due to the apartheid social engineering, their lives are characterised by socio-cultural and religious differences.. These have been attributed to the multi-cultural diversity of their origins as Indians, and the diversity in South Africa. Singh (1994) indicates that most South African Indians still retain a sense of cultural and social

connection to India, as the concepts of primary and secondary ancestral identity is prevalent among them.

Much like Raman (2004), he argues that the Indian subcontinent comprises a vast collection of peoples with different morphological, genetic, cultural, and linguistic characteristics. While much of this variability is indigenous, a considerable fraction of it has been introduced through large-scale immigrations into India in historical times. From an evolutionary standpoint, it is of immense interest to quantify biological diversity in contemporary human populations, to study biological affinities and to relate observed patterns of affinities with cultural, linguistic, and demographic histories of populations. Such efforts are intended to shed light on the people of India.

To this end, the researcher argues that South African Indians, in spite of their association with South Africa, still find it appropriate to identify themselves with all forms of Indian human identity beyond culture, language, etc. They consider India their second home. According to Pitkanen (2008) in the strain of modern society, second home is often perceived as an ideal habitat, however, in constant change in relation to time and space. Their affinity to India is shown through the retention of the overall Indian cultures.

Raman (2004:30) and Singh (1994) support the assertion by the researcher that “South African Indians, in spite of their association with South Africa, still identify themselves with all forms of Indian identity beyond culture, language, etc”. This assertion is further supported by respondents who stated that, ‘due to cultural and religious affiliations of their historical places of origin in India, most Indian communities in South Africa are still attached to India’. Raman (2004:30) and Singh (1994) further state that, even for early Indian migrants who arrived in South Africa, the

idea of India and homeland remains an important component of their sense of identity and belonging. That this form of identity took place some fifty years and more before Indian independence, and at a time when it was extremely hard for many Indians to maintain direct contact with 'home', makes this all the more remarkable (Mukherjee et al., 1999). Indian identity in South Africa was strongly influenced by the growth of the nationalist movement in India, which helped formulate ideas of Indian subjectivity, and an association with 'others' in scattered geographical locations. Central to this was the concept of India as the 'motherland' to which all Indians were connected (Chandra et al., 2016). These sentiments came to a powerful culmination in the 1940s, when state legislation directed against Indians increasingly undermined their right to citizenship. Yusuf Dadoo became especially an articulate exponent of dialogue, which combined socialist ideas with nationalist and transnational belonging.

Despite this very old connection between Indians and South Africa, the contribution of South Indians in building the economy of South Africa is not well documented, yet the history of their enterprising skills and knowledge is well known. This positive attribute was suppressed by the apartheid regime. In order to illustrate the business acumen of Indians, Padayachee (1999) states that by the 1940s, an industrialised, urbanised, and semi-skilled Indian working class filled Durban's clothing, textiles, food-processing and printing factories. By the late 1980s and 1990s, a highly mobile and well-respected elite of businessmen and professionals, politicians and state officials had come to play an important role in the making and shaping of the new South Africa. According to Reddy (2015), Indians in South Africa have contributed to shaping the socio-economic and political landscape of the country, regardless of their religion or political affiliation. Today, many South African Indians are occupying positions of power and influence, both in the private and public sector.

The researcher argues that, in spite of their strong affinity to India, South African Indians have over the years demonstrated a strong sense of national duty by embracing their second home, South Africa, and playing a critical role to ensure that they contribute in building and shaping the future of the country. Dadoo (1993) argues that, a number of South Africans continue to express divergent opinions about the arrival of Indians in South Africa more than 150 years ago. For example, there are those who hold a view that Indians who arrived in the colony of Natal to work on the sugar cane plantations were no different from the African people, who were hunted like animals, captured and forcibly transported to the Americas to work on the white farms, in households and in the construction industries that created the great civilisations of Latin and North America. On the other hand, there are those who believe that Indians have always received special treatment different from black South Africans, especially during the apartheid regime in which they enjoyed privileges extended to them through the Tricameral government.

According to the *Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora*, some years before the end of apartheid in 1994, there was considerable concern among South African Indians that the simmering resentment against them from the general black population due to the superior status of the Indians in apartheid days would be translated into reprisals once White rule ended. Sensing the prevalent mood among the Indian community, Nelson Mandela and his senior colleagues in the ANC went out of their way, as the date of the first democratic election drew nearer, to reassure them that there would be no reprisals.

Nevertheless, Lalla (2011) states that due to their social orientation, many people of Indian Origin (PIO) were in favour of the National Party (NP) during the first democratic elections in 1994. As a result, they voted for P.W de Klerk with the hope that he would emerge as South

Africa's first President under democratic rule. They had hoped that under the National Party, their livelihood would be secured, and that they will be accorded the same privileges they received during apartheid. As a matter of fact, the POIs in South Africa were more privileged than the majority blacks during apartheid. To this end, the researcher argues that the belief that the National Party government will be responsive to their needs was symptomatic of the attitudes of South African Indians towards the majority blacks, and the ANC in general. They had no confidence in black governance and leadership and continued to associate themselves with the white minority. In 1999, the same scenario played itself out when the PIOs voted in favour of the then newly formed White-dominated Democratic Alliance (Lalla, 2011).

Hiralal (2014:63) places the issue of Indian unity in South Africa from a more informed perspective. She argues that, "from the arrival of the indentured labourers in South Africa in 1860, there was a strong sense amongst immigrants of the need to nurture religious and cultural identity". "The diversity of the Indian population in terms of religion, caste, language, and region played an important role in the development and establishment of Hindu organisations in South Africa, both at provincial and national levels".

The following section discusses the literature on the relationship between the African National Congress (South Africa) and the Indian Congress Party during the struggle against apartheid in South Africa.

4.3. The Struggle for Freedom and Liberation in South Africa: Relationship between the African National Congress (ANC) and Indian Congress Party (ICP).

This section discusses the literature on the relationship between the African National Congress of South Africa and the Indian Congress Party of India, particularly during the struggle against apartheid in South Africa.

Dubey et al. (2016) look at the relations among freedom movements in South Africa and India by indicating that the relations between political movements, notably the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and the Indian Congress Party (ICP) in India, started long before India could raise the issue of apartheid in the United Nations Organisation (UNO) in 1946. The first African National Congress (ANC) office for Asia was inaugurated in New Delhi, India, on 14 November 1967. Gupta (2003) reveals that the late Mr Alfred Nzo, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa and the then Secretary General of the ANC, was the chief representative of the ANC in New Delhi, along with Mr Moulvi Ismail Cachalia as his deputy.

Mr. Alfred Nzo chose the date for the inauguration of the ANC office in New Delhi since it marked the birth anniversary of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India. In January 1987, the International Youth Conference (IYC) was convened in New Delhi under the aegis of the Indian Youth Congress (IYC) to mark the 75th anniversary of the African National Congress (ANC). It was attended by the indefatigable champion of racial harmony, Trevor Huddleston, the then ANC Secretary General, Alfred Nzo, and delegates from 84 countries. The role of the Indian Youth Congress (IYC) in the freedom struggle against apartheid has been indefatigable and extensive. The IYC provided a base for resurgence in the people's movement against apartheid. Under the leadership of Mr. Anand Sharma, the IYC assumed the cause of South

Africa through mass campaigns to highlight the sufferings of the people. In November 1985, the IYC convened a non-aligned youth conference in New Delhi, which was attended by representative delegations from 81 countries (Reddy, 2005).

According to a publication of the South African High Commission in New Delhi dated September 2003, the then Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, inaugurated the IYC conference. It was during this period that Nelson Mandela's daughter, Zenani Mandela, slipped out of the country to attend the conference. Her presence along with that of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) leader, Yasar Arafat, helped attract universal attention and drew sharp focus to the issue of apartheid. The declaration adopted in New Delhi was as follows:

“The conference notes with great appreciation the intensification of the liberation struggle in South Africa and the unprecedented momentum it has gathered. Consequently, the racist South African regime, in her attempt to save the obnoxious apartheid system from total collapse, has instituted, draconian measures to stem the tide of liberation”.

In essence, this conference reaffirmed its total support to the African National Congress to free their country from the bondage of the illegal Pretoria regime. The conference demanded the eradication of the apartheid system, the immediate and unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners. The statement reads:

“In order to compel the Pretoria regime to accept the values of civilisation, we call for the urgent imposition of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa under chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter (UNC) and support the

proposal of the Organisation of African Union (OAU) of a World Conference on sanctions against racist South Africa in 1986”.

Shreve (2012) recalls that the Indian Youth Congress actively followed up this conference by mobilising the students and the youth of India through public rallies and meetings in various parts of India. Renowned leaders like Mr Moosa Moola, the ANC chief representative in India and Mr Anand Sharma, besides many youth parliamentarians and student leaders, addressed these conferences. To commemorate the 75th Anniversary of the African National Congress, the IYC president Mr Anand Sharma proposed to convene an international conference against apartheid.

Apart from the IYC, there were a number of other organisations that were exclusively devoted to spreading the message of the South African majority i.e. against the apartheid regime. Prominent among these were The Indian Council for Africa (ICA), Indian Centre for Cultural Relations (ICCR), Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), Institute of African Studies and Indian National Social Action Forum (INSAF). Alexander (2007) elaborates that in addition to these organisations, a number of institutions of higher learning were actively involved in exposing the South African anti-democratic, inhuman, and racist activities.

A very large number of lecturers, seminars, debates were organised by Indian chapters of the United Nations, Educational, Scientific, and Cultural organisation (UNESCO), United Nations Students Association (UNSA), and UN Students Organisations all over India in thousands of colleges. The ANC freedom Charter was the guiding manifesto of these discussions. Yadav (2014) notes that although rallies were banned, many went behind bars, exiled, crowds were massacred and yet the voices did not die. The voices found their way to another continent where

the leaders gathered again to address crowds. The message remained the same, and only the stage was different (Reddy, 2005). India's contribution through fraternal organisations is well documented and needs not be regurgitated. But how this democracy has been of significance in building post-apartheid relations between the two countries is a subject that requires further exploration, including an assessment of possible parallels in their democracies.

In explaining the relative success of democratic consolidation in India and South Africa, some shared factors come on the surface. Most obviously, the transition to democracy and the initial period for consolidation was managed by an ideology cohesive, unified, and highly effective political elite that enjoyed enormous political legitimacy. Some have argued that both transitions were in effect hijacked by elites, but even elites played the central role in managing transitions and untimely answered to narrow interests. Their efficacy was largely based on the fact that they led and represented broad-based movements, enjoyed enormous moral standing and for a significant period received periodic electoral affirmation. This historically conferred legitimacy gave the two congresses – the INC and the ANC – and their leadership enormous leeway not only in laying the institutional foundations of democracy, but importantly, in forging a nation from disparate ethnic, racial and regional identities (Heller, 2016).

The following section contextualises the literature on the relationship between South Africa and India after the 1994 democratic elections in South Africa.

4.4 Contextualising South Africa and India Relations after 1994

This section contextualises the literature on the relationship between South Africa and India after the 1994 democratic elections in South Africa.

According to Khanna (2007), the extent to which the two study countries have cooperated with each other after 1994 draws inspiration from the journey they have travelled together from the apartheid era in South Africa, when India was very firm in its call for sanctions against apartheid as indicated in the segment above. For example, in 1946, the Indian government took a decision to cut diplomatic relations with the apartheid government on grounds of human rights abuse and discrimination against the people of colour. As a result, for a period of 46 years, the two countries did not enjoy any form of relations.

Notwithstanding the prominence of the apartheid regime, the common history of colonialism, values and affinity has played a key role in shaping the present-day diplomatic relations between the two countries, including their global outlook about world affairs (Alden and Schoeman, 2015). The statement made by former President Nelson Mandela amplifies the sentiments by Alden and Schoeman, *“India and South Africa are two countries held so closely by bonds of sentiments, common values and shared experience, by affinity of cultures and traditions and by geography.”*

Beri (2008) also gives credence to these strong historic relations by asserting that India’s association with South Africa is historic. The researcher argues that the relations between India and South Africa spans three strands – the first is the pre-apartheid era during which period Indians arrived in South Africa, second is the apartheid era during which period India supported freedom movements in South Africa in condemnation of the repressive regime for its racial laws, and the third is the post-apartheid era which is characterised by cordial diplomatic relations.

Bawa (2005) discusses the political, cultural and economic relations between south Africa and India by indicating that on 27 September 1993, India took a different foreign policy approach

towards the government of South Africa; it was during this period that the Indian government was convinced that the road to democracy in South Africa was clear, India officially lifted sanctions against South Africa. According to Singh (2018) when India decided to resume its relations with South Africa in 1993, just a year before the dawn of the new democracy in 1994, the intention was to stimulate economic relations between the two countries, and also initiate the expansion of the trade and investment scope between the two countries. According to India, these renewed relations would provide an opportunity for the majority blacks who were marginalised from participating in the mainstream economic activities of the country by the apartheid government.

Lessoni (2019) argues within the prism of socio-cultural links between India and Indians in South Africa after 1994, and the desire for the Indian government to maintain these links. He indicates that diplomatic relations between India and South Africa were formally restored after a gap of 40 years, and since then, South African Indians developed an even much stronger bond and desire to reconnect with their ancestral land, India. Similarly, the Indian government was receptive to the desires of South African Indians, and continues to embrace them as part of its overseas diaspora (Dickow et al., 2002).

However, the researcher argues that more still needs to be done to include South African Indians in the diplomatic engagements between South Africa and India. The Briefing Book III: Speaking Notes for Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, 19 May 2015, shows that on 22 November 1993, an Agreement on the Establishment of Full Diplomatic Relations was signed between India and South Africa. Subsequently, the Indian Cultural Centre in Johannesburg became a Consulate-General in the second week of December 1993. In April 1994, South Africa established a

Consulate-General in Mumbai (Bombay). The Indian High Commission was accredited in April 1994 and the new High Commissioner took office in July 1994. A second Indian Consulate-General was opened in Durban in April 1994.

The Briefing Book II: Country Profile for Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, 19 May 2015, shows that two important agreements serve as the basis for the relationship between South Africa and India. The first is the Agreement between South Africa and India on the Inter-Governmental Joint Commission for Political, Trade, Economic, Cultural, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, which was signed on 25 January 1995 by former President Nelson Mandela and Prime Minister Narasimha Rao during a state visit to India.

According to Gupta (2003), the second important foundation of the bilateral relationship between India and South Africa is the Strategic Partnership, encapsulated in the principles of the Red Fort Declaration which was signed in March 1997 by the Prime Minister of India Shri Deva Gowda, and former President of South Africa Nelson Mandela in New Delhi. Apart from affirming historical links through Mahatma Gandhi, the Declaration, inter alia, also affirms a common commitment to the following principles:

- Working together for economic development and social justice.
- Co-operating in the mutual quest for universal human freedom and equality among nations.
- Co-ordinated efforts at making the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation an instrument of substantive economic partnership towards the development of a regional identity.
- Mutual consultation on matters of regional and global security.

- Economic cooperation between India and South Africa to promote mutual economic development.
- Combined efforts at the WTO, UN, etc. to ensure a more equitable dispensation for developing countries, as well as a shared belief in the vitality and crucial importance of the NAM.
- Sharing of a belief that the UN system needs reform, particularly that the Security Council should be expanded.

Dickinson (2015) has the view that South Africa and India enjoy a strategic partnership based on shared values and common interests, and has occupied a special place in the national ethos of India, with the link between its own independence and the struggle for equality and justice begun by Mahatma Gandhi in South Africa. According to Solomon (1997:1), “South Africa occupies an ambiguous position in the international political economy. It is one of the developed states on the continent of Africa”. It was, therefore, a proud moment for the people and the government of India, when South Africa entered a new phase in its history, with the inauguration of the government of National Unity under the Presidency of Nelson Mandela.

South Africa’s emergence from polecat of the world during the struggle for liberation, to a leading voice in the developing world for global justice, as former President Nelson Mandela has argued, reflects a revolution in the country’s international relations (Field, 2000). The change in political events in South Africa before 1994 necessitated the change in India’s foreign policy towards the apartheid government of South Africa. According to Alden and Schoeman (2015), not all analysts view middle powers in benign terms. They argue that despite claims to the

contrary, national self-interest and realpolitik concerns still largely influence the foreign policies of these states.

Thornhill (1998) states that in 1990, significant events that changed the history of black people in South Africa took place. A number of political parties were unbanned, particularly the ANC. This was a significant milestone by the nationalist government. Dickow et al. (2002) remind us that the year 1990 also marked a period within which many political prisoners were released, amongst these was Nelson Mandela, who later became the first black president of South Africa.

The researcher argues that the successful unfolding of these political events served as evidence to India that the key role it has played by placing the issue of apartheid on the agenda of the UN brought about significant changes in South Africa. These renewed political developments ushered South Africa into the global political arena (Holland, 1989). Yadav (2014:41) highlights that “the direction of independent India’s policy towards other independent sovereign countries was in fact shaped and determined during freedom struggle in the thirties when it had almost become clear that India’s independence was only a matter of time”.

These developments also ushered a new phase in the relationship between the two countries at the state level – from one of conflict of interest and confrontation to one of mutuality of interest and cooperation. In this new endeavour for future partnership in the development, the old ties of friendship and solidarity during the liberation struggle would undoubtedly serve as a sturdy foundation (Alves, 2007). According to Maylam (1990), in early days of the post-cold war era, India focused on on-going various civil strife in Africa, especially South Africa where the apartheid government was in the last stage.

Heller (2016:123) states that,

“India and South Africa are arguably the most successful cases of democratic consolidation in the developing world. In India, democracy has helped forge a nation from the most heterogeneous social fabric in the world. In South Africa, democratic politics and constitutional rule have managed a transition from white minority to black majority rule with minimal conflict. The fact that this has been achieved against a social backdrop of extreme social exclusions (the caste system in India) and the worst misdistribution of wealth in the world (South Africa), only underscores the achievements at hand”.

The researcher argues that India’s optimism about the future South Africa in which apartheid has been abolished was inspired by its desire to protect the interests and human rights of Indians in South Africa. As a result, after 1994, India realised the important role it has played alongside other countries in the liberation of the people of South Africa, in particular, South African Indians whose interests it had at heart. As a result of the abolition of apartheid, Solomon and Theron (2011) argue that the Indian government decided to resume diplomatic and economic relations with the new government of South Africa. The following section discusses mechanisms that have been established to manage diplomatic relations between India and South Africa.

4.5 South Africa and India: A Perspective on Diplomatic Mechanisms

This section highlights and discusses some mechanisms that have been established to manage diplomatic relations between India and South Africa.

Bjola (2013) advances the view that the study of diplomacy as a method of building and managing relationships of enmity and friendship in world politics can most successfully firm up the identity of the discipline. More specifically, diplomacy offers a specialised form of knowledge for understanding how to draw distinctions between potential allies versus rivals, and how to make and unmake relationships of enmity and friendship in world politics (Watson, 1982).

According to Rana (2018:1), “diplomacy covers the way relations between pairs are managed. It differs from multilateral diplomacy, including regional variants, in the partners engaged, but not in the intrinsic techniques. It is a principal task of foreign ministries, embassies, and consulates”.

The Briefing Book II: Country Profile for Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, 19 May 2015, indicates that the India-South Africa Joint Ministerial Commission (JMC) at the level of foreign Ministers was established in 1994 to manage relations between the two countries, and further identify areas of mutually beneficial cooperation. The 7th session of the JMC was held in Pretoria in February 2008. India hosted the 8th session of the JMC in March 2011 in New Delhi. The then External Affairs Minister, Shri S.M. Krishna, headed the Indian delegation, while Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane led the South African side. The 9th session of India-South Africa Joint Ministerial Commission meeting was held in Durban on 19 May 2015. It was co-chaired by Smt. Sushma Swaraj, Hon. Minister of External Affairs & Overseas Indian Affairs and South Africa’s Minister of International Relations & Cooperation, Ms. Maite Nkoana-Mashabane. During the visit, the External Affairs Minister paid a courtesy call to President Jacob Zuma. The 8th session of the India-South Africa Foreign Office Consultations (FOC) was held in Pretoria in May 2016. The 9th session was scheduled to be held in New Delhi on 18-19 January 2018, alongside the

Joint Ministerial Commission (JMC). The objectives of these two mechanisms were to plan, monitor, assess, and provide feedback on the progress made in the diplomatic relations between the two countries, in particular, the implementation of agreements towards a mutually inclusive growth.

The researcher argues that, although these mechanisms are critical in the management of relations between the two countries, they have not been fully serviced owing to scheduling challenges amongst principals of both countries. The two countries also share membership of a number of fora including BRICS, IBSA, AU, etc. The researcher believes that, while these mechanisms are important, they have great potential to undermine the bilateral relations between the two countries since they have in the recent past received more attention. However, it is equally commendable that some bilateral meetings are convened on the side-lines of BRICS, IBSA, UN, etc. by foreign Ministers of both countries.

The researcher is of the opinion that economic relations between South Africa and India should serve as the basis to determine the extent to which their historical relations have been of significance in advancing their trade relations. Alves (2007) argues that ties between South Africa and India have grown rapidly over the past few years. But despite close collaboration on a range of issues and growing trade and investment ties, the relationship is a long way from reaching its full potential and there are still areas of difference between the countries.

India requires a base from which to launch her initiatives in Africa, while South Africa's position on the continent makes her a natural partner in this respect (Homestrings, 2014). Since India's independence, India had maintained strict licencing requirements, government subsidies, government-run enterprises, and other protectionist policies that discouraged foreign investment.

The researcher posits that, even if India had not severed economic relations with South Africa, it would have been difficult for the two countries to conduct trade. Nagaraj (1997) believes that since the government had such a tight control over the economy, many private and public enterprises operated without much competition. This economic reforms of 1991-93 have opened some of India's markets to competition from abroad. Some of these reforms, which will already serve as a catalyst for economic exchanges between India and South Africa, include the removal of licensing requirements for all import goods except consumer goods, the reduction in import duties, the relaxation of export controls, the devaluation of the rupee, and the ability to import and export industrial inputs more freely.

According to Chetty (2013) as cited in Hofmeyr and Williams, good relations with South Africa will give India the opportunity to develop trade relations with the more developed part of the African continent, thus using South Africa as a conduit towards the attainment of rich mineral and other resources in Africa. There are a number of fields in which South Africa and India currently pursue common interests in, which are discussed in detail in chapter five.

Patel (2012) states that although levels of trade are promising in the economic sphere, the potential has yet to be exploited, and South Africa still lags behind with trade balances – the trade balance is in favour of India. This means that there are more exports from India to South Africa than vice versa. While the Indian economy is very buoyant because of the economic reforms of the past years - 1991, India is still struggling with the legacy of socialism.

Saxenian (2005) indicates that India has access to the technology of the West, Japan, and other economies, but has difficulty in developing appropriate technology to enable her massive peasant population to improve their standard of living. Maithra (2017) states that currently India needs

technology on a level comparable to her own economy since it is facing a huge challenge of shortage in energy resource, and this manifests itself more often through frequent power cuts in the capital, New Delhi, and the other states. Although Eskom, South Africa's State-Owned Enterprise and the largest power supplier in the country is going through its own challenges, the two countries can still engage on how best to collaborate in the area of power generation. The researcher is of the opinion that, although Eskom, South Africa's State-Owned Enterprise and the largest power supplier in the country is going through its own challenges, the two countries can still engage on how best to collaborate in the area of power generation.

India is also keen to learn more about the technology used by Sasol. According to Harmse et al. (2009) Sasol makes use of coal to produce oil and other chemical products. The sustainable and adequate coal is mined within the vicinity of the plant in order to ensure uninterrupted supply. The researcher also recalls that during his posting in India as a diplomat, India expressed interest to understanding South Africa's use of low-grade coal and the production of electricity without the use of water for cooling purposes. The researcher argues that, in spite of the fact that the trade balance between the two countries is in favour of India, the latter can still draw lessons from the developed industries of South Africa. The South African government should leverage the potential of its advanced industries and specific sectors to maximise its trade with India, including the absorption of civil society and private sectors into the mainstream economic diplomacy activities with India. The following section discusses the literature on the South-South Cooperation between South Africa and India as members of IBSA and BRICS formations.

4.6 South-South Cooperation: Perspectives on South Africa and India in the IBSA and BRICS Formations

This section discusses the literature on the South-South Cooperation between South Africa and India as members of IBSA and BRICS formations.

Nel and Taylor (2013:1091) state that,

“South-South Cooperation is assumed to reflect a deep attitude of solidarity among nations of the global South. Although India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA) present themselves as being in the vanguard of South-South Cooperation, their foreign economic policies make such solidarity somewhat thin. Solidarity in the context of international relations between states of the global South is assumed to go beyond observance of shared norms and institutions, which is the minimal feature of the society of states. Instead, South-South Solidarity (SSS) implies the mutual attitude of affective empathy flowing from a shared experience that involves common hardship of one sort or another, the collective pursuit of a common good, the recognition and observance of reciprocal moral duties, including respect for national sovereignty, fundamental equality and mutual benefit. It is in this context that India, Brazil, and South Africa have individually and collectively identified themselves closely with one another and with a solidarity understanding of South-South Cooperation (SSC)”.

According to Sequeira (2008:2), “IBSA was conceived in 2003 to counterbalance the Group of Eight alliance of industrialized countries and promote South-South Cooperation. The three members of IBSA, namely India, Brazil and South Africa share important national goals and

structural similarities that explain why they would choose to become a part of the dialogue”. For example, all the nations suffer from the AIDS epidemic and would prefer to legally change the international patent laws on pharmaceutical drugs. India and Brazil have consistently worked together to bring down the WTO meetings when the United States and the European Union refuse to budge on agricultural subsidies. Each IBSA member is a regional hegemon, specifically India and South Africa which are both study countries for this research work. Whilst India is a hegemon in South Africa, South Africa is the second biggest economy on the continent after Nigeria but remains more powerful and influential in global politics compared to Nigeria.

De Lima (2005) reveals that India and South Africa are members of the India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA), and Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) formations. Shongwe (2014) shows that the foreign Ministers of India, Brazil, and South Africa met in Brasilia and agreed to establish a Dialogue Forum for regular consultations. Woolfrey (2013) further states that the outcome of this meeting was the Brasilia Declaration wherein Ministers agreed to meet regularly on issues of common interest and mutual benefit in pursuit of their global agenda. Subsequently, in 2006, this was upgraded to Summit level.

Since its establishment, a number of IBSA Forums were held in both India and South Africa. However, Woolfrey (2013) argues that the commitment of the IBSA countries to the IBSA Forum seems to have dissipated, with suspicions that BRICS has subsumed the trilateral body and reduced it into a mere post office. The researcher argues that the establishment of BRICS may have led to loss of interest by IBSA member states to its activities. Its 10th anniversary in 2013 had to be postponed because member states did not confirm their attendance.

Furthermore, De Lima (2005:1) highlights that:

“India, Brazil and South Africa are considered intermediate states. Although there is no consensus among experts as to a precise definition of this concept, it generally includes at least one of three elements: material capabilities, a measure of self-perception and recognition by other states, especially the most powerful nations. The three countries have a common characteristic: they are regional powers and to them, this condition is a guarantee of additional international leverage”.

Nel and Taylor (2013:1091) have the view that,

“solidarity in the context of international relations between states of the global south is assumed to go beyond the mere observance of share norms and institutions, which is the minimal feature of the society of states. Instead, South-South solidarity (SSS) implies a mutual attitude of affective empathy flowing from a shared experience that involves common hardship of one sort or another, the collective pursuit of a common good, and the recognition and observance of reciprocal moral duties, including respect for national sovereignty, fundamental equality and mutual benefit.”

Flemes (2009) argues that India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum is a ground of emerging economies whose agenda is to identify opportunities that arise in the midst of a poly-polar world order. Miller (2005) further argues that, although there seems to be loss of interest, the IBSA schedule of activities somewhat highlights the strengthening of diplomatic ties between the three emerging southern powers over the last few years.

The researcher is of the view that the IBSA schedule does not necessarily highlight the strengthening of ties between the three emerging southern powers in a bilateral context, but a

trilateral context. An extent to which the acclaimed IBSA schedule can be of benefit to the bilateral relations amongst individual member states depends on their ability to align themselves with the founding principles embedded in their diplomatic relations. For example, Beri (2008) shows that the relations between India and South Africa are founded in the principles entailed in the Red Fort Declaration of 1993. The principles underpinning the Red Fort Declaration are outlined in this research.

Emerson (2012) states that South Africa was also admitted as a member of the BRICS grouping and attended the BRICS meeting held in April 2011 at Sanya Island in China, as well as another one in March 2012 in New Delhi, India. In March 2013, South Africa hosted the 5th BRICS Summit in Durban, after which the 6th BRICS Summit was held in Fortaleza, Brazil in July 2014, while the 7th was held in the Russian city of Ufa in July 2015. According to Modi (2015), the inclusion of South Africa further diversified the already desperate transcontinental grouping, spanning far flung geographical spaces across Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa.

The Briefing Book III: Background Document. South Africa-India Joint Ministerial Commission. Speaking Notes for Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane. 19 May 2015, indicates that India was the Chair of BRICS in 2016 and hosted its 8th session in Goa in October 2016. The 9th edition of the BRICS Summit was held in the city of Xiamen in China. This was the second time that the Summit was hosted in China, the last one being in the year 2011. At the end of the BRICS summit, the leaders adopted the Xiamen declaration which contained various diplomatic and cooperative guidelines.

On 25-27 July 2018, South Africa hosted the 10th Summit of the BRICS bloc, which groups Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. As host of the Summit, South Africa was able to

set the agenda for the Summit. This was the second time South Africa hosted the BRICS Summit after 2013 (Ricceri, 2019).

The researcher argues that, despite Nigeria's objection to South Africa's inclusion into BRICS, its membership in this grouping is seen as a milestone for the advancement of the continental agenda. With South Africa's pronouncement when it hosted the Summit in 2013, that it shall henceforth represent the interests of countries in the continent, the establishment of the BRICS Development Bank is seen as an asset for the continent. However, there needs to be an assessment of the extent to which BRICS has delivered its mandate by not assessing the frequency of meetings, but how the group has significantly changed the material conditions of its member states. Through its BRICS membership, South Africa seeks to promote the interests of the continent and protect its resources.

4.7 South Africa and India Diplomatic Relations: A Regional and Global Context

This section discusses regional and global contexts of the diplomatic relations between India and South Africa.

In his discussion on the diplomatic relations between South Africa and India in relation to the African continent and the poly-polar world economic order, Dubey (2010) largely argues that despite enjoying cordial bilateral relations, both India and South Africa continue to compete for resources in the continent. Their relations are therefore marked by both convergent and divergent interests. Alden and Schoeman (2015) further state that South Africa is the second biggest economy in the continent after Nigeria. However, Ahwireng-Obeng et.al, (1998) argue that South Africa's economic footprint in the continent is much bigger than of any country in the

continent. The researcher is of the view that it is in the interest of India that it also increases its footprint in the continent, however, and that a discussion about the scramble for Africa's resources will be incomplete if it only includes India and excludes China - a country which has for many years entrenched itself in the continent, mainly through its investment in the continent on infrastructure development. As it stands, the Headquarters of the BRICS New Development Bank is situated in Shanghai, China, and amongst its major focus is infrastructure development.

Sidiripoulos (2011) reveals that India has emerged in the 21st century as an important global economic and political actor and increasingly, a significant partner for Africa. Relations between the African continent and India date back many centuries. In the 20th century, India's role as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, a supporter of national liberation movements and the struggle against apartheid, further augmented those ties. However, it is the potential synergies between Africa and the subcontinent, created by the changing economic and geopolitical landscape that has deepened interaction over the last several years.

The researcher argues that, although South Africa shares common membership of BRICS and IBSA with these member states, there is still contestation and competition for resources in the continent.

Furthermore, according to the researcher, trade wars between USA and China have adverse implications for the global economy, and South Africa, not very much India, will not be spared from these effects. There is history to the altercations between USA and China, and therefore, the manifestation of trade tensions between the two countries is not a new phenomenon. Friedberg (2005) articulates that when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling one, violence is the likeliest result. According to Chan (2007), the power-transition theory sees faster-growing late

comers as inclined to challenge the status quo, and the neighbours of a rising power do not typically form a coalition. Over the past 500 years, these conditions have occurred sixteen times, war broke out in twelve. Zhao (2010) cautions that trade tensions and escalating protectionism are undermining the rules-based multilateral system that has governed international trade for decades, the diversification of trade partners, including the promotion of South–South cooperation.

Kehoe and Prescott (2017) observe that during the 20th century, much of the US economy was built on trade, relying on intermediate goods from other countries. Literature notes that trade liberalisation has benefited the United States positively, maybe more than the loss of opening up the market.

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR, 2019) reveals that the People’s Republic of China and the USA have not always traded with each other, emanating from the tension in 1949 when China gained its power from the Nationalists, which the USA support. It was only in the 1970s when China opened its doors to the United States, that talks started between the two countries. However, the relationship has not always been smooth with the USA banning trade with China in the 1980s over political disagreements. Official trade between China and the USA was reinforced in 2000, which paved the way for China to be a part of the World Trade Organisation on 11 December 2001 (Chan, 2007). The following section discusses identified gaps in the literature reviewed by the researcher in the relations between the two study countries.

4.8 Gaps in the Literature Reviewed

The review of related literature on the diplomatic relations between the study countries identified the following gaps: (i) there is insufficient literature on the relations between India and South Africa after 1994. Most of the available literature on the relations between the two countries is centred on their historical relations, particularly, their early arrival of Indians in South Africa in 1860-1911, and that of Mahatma Gandhi's Satyagraha; (ii) the works on Mahatma Gandhi do not reveal much on his relations with black African leaders, an observation that casts doubt about Gandhi's real contributions to the struggle for freedom and liberation in South Africa. There are views that he was more concerned about the plight of Indians than Africans; (iii) there is a lack of specific literature or thorough examinations on the relations between India and South Africa within the BRICS and IBSA formations, in particular, their unequal positions within the context of their IBSA and BRICS membership. The current works only focus on India and South Africa as members of a collective. The absence of such literature makes it difficult to assess their levels of engagement outside their formal diplomatic relations; (iv) although the extent to which history has shaped the relations between the two study countries has been well documented, how this history has been of substantial benefit to South Africa is a subject that requires further investigation; (v) there is limited literature on the competing and converging interests between the two study countries in Africa; (vi) Little has been written about the mechanisms used by South Africa and India in managing their diplomatic relations such as the Joint Ministerial Commission (JMC), Senior Officials Meeting (SOM), Foreign Office Consultations (FOC), and the South Africa-India Business Forum. Most of the documents that are available are classified as confidential by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation; (vii) the political activities between freedom movements are not well documented. The limited works that exist

only reveal steps taken by India in the promotion of anti-apartheid campaigns throughout the world, and little focus of the activities of the African National Congress (ANC) in India specifically, and South Asia in general; (viii) the contribution of Indians in the socio-economic development of South Africa after 1994 should be well investigated and documented including prospects and challenges.

4.9 Contributions of the Study to the field of International Relations

In the review of related literature on the diplomatic relations between the two study countries, there was a need to discuss, through identification of existing gaps, the way this study would contribute to the study of international relations. It is because of this consideration that the following remarks are made: (i) An analysis of relations amongst nation states must not be dominated by history and trade only, but a cross-section of issues such as immigration, citizenship, and crime amongst others. These aspects provide a holistic view of relations among nations; (ii) The study of relations between South Africa and India could also be explored within the context of the role of civil society organisations. This aspect tends to be neglected in international relations, especially among countries which share a long history involving movement and settlement of people; (iii) The realisation that the poly-polar world order makes South Africa and India vulnerable due to competing interests and pressure from great powers; (iv) the theories of international relations complement each other and could be used interchangeably without giving preference to one over the other; (v) the study will show that the historical relations between India and South Africa are only sentimental to South Africa as opposed to India; (vi) since the dawn of democracy in South Africa, foreign policies of many countries, including India continue to change from the pre-democracy era. Therefore, there is a

need to explore and examine reasons why there is a sudden change in the foreign policy of India, particularly its close association with superpowers and a deviation from non-alignment to alignment.

4.10 Conclusion

This chapter sought to illustrate the critical importance and usefulness of literature review in this study. Through literature review, the researcher was exposed to a variety of ideas by different authors on the subject of research. It gave an in-depth understanding of scholarly accounts by other authors on the study about the relations between South Africa and India. As a result, the researcher had an opportunity to assess and analyse different ideas to formulate his own, on the understanding that much has been written about the subject matter. Through the examination of different literature, it is evident that the study of the bilateral relations between South Africa and India, with their strong tapestry of history dating back to the 1860's, cannot be viewed in isolation from the present socio-economic and political dynamics that continue to haunt the global order.

The literature further illustrated that, amongst others, the emergence of trade wars, alliances, and threats amongst nations will continue to pose serious discomfort to the interests and relations between South Africa and India because theirs is a relationship woven across two emerging continents whose resources are highly contested by the West. The two countries are both intertwined to the rest of the world and remain an integral part of the global village; their relations are as significant as their relations with other nations of the world. From the analysis contained in this section, it is evident that South Africa and India are not immune to the socio-

economic dynamics of the world as seen today. Accordingly, in the assessment of relations between the two countries, global dynamics must be considered.

The following chapter presents a background on the historical relations between South Africa and India. Amongst others, it looks at issues such as: the socio-cultural diversity of South African Indians, the life of Mahatma Gandhi in South Africa in the context of racial inequality in South Africa, contentions on post-apartheid racial relations between Indians and Africans in South Africa, historical contribution of South African Indians to democracy and nation building.

CHAPTER FIVE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND INDIA: A SOCIO-CULTURAL AND RACIAL ANALYSIS

5.1 Introduction

Chapter four reviewed related literature in the relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India. It makes a critical discussion of the existing literature pertaining to the relations between the two countries for the study before and after 1994. This includes the background and historical contributions of South African Indians to democracy, nation building in South Africa, South-South Cooperation, especially perspectives on South Africa-India relations in the BRICS and IBSA formations. It also highlights existing gaps in the literature reviewed, as well as the contributions of this study to the growing body of knowledge in the overall relations between South Africa and India.

This Chapter and the following two Chapters, present the study findings based on data collected through both secondary and primary sources such as examination of secondary sources, a questionnaire, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, including participant and direct observations in the research process. For instance, this chapter uses both secondary and primary data to make a critical analysis regarding the historical background on the socio-cultural and racial relationship between South Africa and India before after the democratic elections in South Africa 1994. The following aspects are discussed: the socio-cultural diversity of South African Indians; the life of Mahatma Gandhi in South Africa in the context of racial inequality in South Africa; contentions on post-apartheid racial relations between Indians and Africans in South Africa; historical contribution of South African Indians to democracy and nation building in

South Africa; India and the liberation movements in South Africa; and a critical analysis of the diplomatic relations between India and post-apartheid South Africa. The Chapter advances the following arguments to this effect:

- (i) Most Africans in South Africa in their cultural, linguistic, and other diversities do not know that Indians living in South Africa are also not homogenous including the way they came to South Africa. They are characterised by cultural, linguistic, religious, economic diversity and tensions among themselves including the way they came to South Africa.
- (ii) One subject which tends to be avoided in the academic, socio-economic, and political discourse for different reasons including the sake of reconciliation, is an analysis of the contentious views regarding the historical relations between South African Indians and Africa.
- (iii) Although a lot has been written about the history of migration of Indians to South Africa, and the contribution of India to the liberation struggle of South Africa against apartheid, there is a view that despite India's general affinity for South Africa, the move to support the struggle for freedom during apartheid was predicated by the enormous presence of people of Indian decent in South Africa. As a result, the Indian government felt a sense of moral obligation to protect Indians in South Africa against the prejudices of the repressive apartheid regime. This was also a key factor that helped forge a common South Africa between Indians and other people of color including Africans in South Africa.
- (iv) The racial tensions between Africans and Indians in South Africa predate the period before the 1994 democratic elections.

- (v) In spite of his concern for promoting human justice, peace and equality, Mahatma Gandhi's focus during his life in South Africa was predominantly on his fellow Indians. There are several testimonies advanced to support this contention.
- (vi) The racist attitudes Gandhi had towards Africans in South Africa contradicts the views associated with the famous Gandhi the world knows. Many people are not aware of this aspect of Gandhi's life in South Africa because it is deliberately omitted from his later writings.
- (vii) Although the subject of the racial tensions between Africans and Indians in post-apartheid South Africa tends to be avoided in the spirit of reconciliation, these tensions persist. Racial tensions between Indians and Africans in South Africa have existed throughout the country's history.
- (viii) There is the view that Indians did succeed due to being favoured by the apartheid system because the apartheid laws discriminated against all non-whites equally.
- (ix) Despite the racial, socio-economic, and cultural differences between Africans and Indians in South Africa, there is an acknowledgement from both racial groups that South African Indians contributed greatly to the democracy and national building of the country.

According to Heller (2016), the struggle between Blacks, Whites and Indians in South Africa remains prevalent and visible through the residential locations – a legacy of apartheid which they have embraced, especially whites and Indians. Lessoni (2019) argues within the prism of socio-cultural links between India and Indians in South Africa after 1994, and the desire for the Indian government to maintain these links. These includes new desires of the Indian government to engage people of Indian origin in South Africa as part of its overseas diaspora strategy, the

growing role of South African Indian diaspora entrepreneurship, and the increasing influence of Indian and South African Bollywood promoters and film producers (Sarndal, 2011).

5.2 Background to the Socio-Cultural Diversity of South African Indians

This section discusses the historical cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity of the South African Indians including the way they came to the country. South Africa has the largest Indian population in Sub-Saharan Africa. As a result of the historical reasons which will be discussed later in this chapter, most of them are concentrated in KwaZulu-Natal's largest city of Durban with over 1 million people of Indian descent. Their socio-cultural influences have contributed to the multi-cultural diversity of the country. In-depth interviews with two South African diplomats at DIRCO who were posted at the South African High Commission in India, expressed the view that based on their five years' experiences of working and living in India, most Indians in India who have never been to Africa also have the perceptions that all Africans are racially and culturally similar. One DIRCO official expressed his views as follows:

“...During some informal and formal diplomatic interaction with many Indians in India, some of the prominent questions were whether Africans have different languages and religions like in India...It is at this point when I started explaining that Africa is a continent, larger than India. In fact, it is the second largest continent in the world, after Asia. Africa has different countries, cultures, traditions, and languages. It is not homogenous as many people outside the continent think”.

The researcher made in-depth interviews with South African Indians living in Durban and involved in business on the same issue.

One South African Indian who participated in the study expressed the view that:

‘most South African Indians speak English as a medium of communication and socialization. However, he went on to explain that some elderly Indians still speak certain Indian languages which include Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Urdu, Punjabi, and Gujarati. Religiously, most of them are Hindu’.

According to South African Gateway, an online publication, a third of black South Africans speak isiZulu as a first language, and 20% isiXhosa. Three quarters of coloured people speak Afrikaans, and 86% of Indian South Africans speak English. About 60% of white people speak Afrikaans and 30% speak English. Furthermore, the 2001 census suggests that 93.8 % of South African Indians speak English as an L1, which means they report English as a language most often spoken at home. (onlinelibrary.wiley.com).

Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs also came to South Africa from India from as early as 1860. This information was supported by South African History Online (SAHO), which elaborates that the influence of Indian Muslims began with the arrival of indentured workers from the west and south coast of India. As a result of their minority status among the Indian community (less than 10%), the founding father of Islam in Natal, Sheikh Ahmad, and later Soofie Saheb, ensured that impoverished Muslim Indians were not drawn to Hinduism. This was done through the demarcation of Islamic festivals and the establishment of Muslim schools or madrasahs. The Islamic community continues to thrive in South Africa in both Natal and the Western Cape, where indentured laborers moved with their families after the completion of their contracts. Esack (2007) further shows that the Indian Sikh faith forms a small portion of the Indian South African population, and is a religion influenced by both Hindu and Islam. The Sikh religion is

concerned with a belief in One Immortal Being and ten gurus. Many Sikhs wear an iron or steel bracelet as a symbol of their devotion to their religion. Originating in the Punjab region, prominent Sikh celebrations include Parkash Utsav, which celebrates 'Divine Light' or 'Divine Knowledge'.

Dubey (2003) notes that the first Indians arrived during the Dutch Colonial Era (DCE) as slaves in 1684. In the decades 1690 to 1725, over 80% of the slaves were Indians. This practice continued until the end of slavery in 1838. They made up majority of slaves that came from the Far East and were by the 1880s totally integrated into the Cape White and Colored communities. Reddy (2005) indicates that during the second half of the 19th Century, Indians came to South Africa in two categories, namely as indentured workers in 1860 and later as 'free' or 'passenger' Indians. The indentured workers were to work for the Natal colonial government on sugar plantations.

One Indian businessman with whom an informal discussion was held gave the following account in respect of the arrival of Indians in South Africa:

“...As far as I know, South African Indians were characterised by three different groups. First, was the indentured labourers who were still working under their five years contracts in the sugarcane fields of Natal; Second, was the ex-indentured labourers who had completed their five years contracts but decided to remain in South Africa; and Third, were the passenger Indians who paid for their fares to come to South Africa.”

The study was interested in establishing, through both primary and secondary sources, the reasons for the British to bring Indians as indentured laborers to the sugar plantations in Natal.

There are divergent views to this effect. For instance, information collected from two focus group discussions conducted with about 8 elderly South African Indians (over 70 years old) in Durban, indicated that when the sugarcane industry was established in Natal, the British tried to recruit local Zulu people as laborers to work on the sugar plantations. However, the Natal colonial authorities were culturally ignorant that the Zulu males regarded agricultural work as female activity. This was clarified by one Zulu traditional leader that, historically and culturally, Zulu men were mostly involved in grazing cattle and defending the tribe against foreign attack.

According to Dhupelia-Mesthrie (2007), what necessitated the migration of Indians to South Africa was the fact that the English settlers in South Africa could not make progress in their sugarcane plantations in the absence of a stable labor force due to the abolition of slavery in South Africa. The high labor turnover forced the colonial authorities to seek Indian labor that was already successfully employed in other British colonies. Jeenah (2006) explains further that the government of India under British rule, was reluctant at first, but was soon persuaded by the Natal planters to export labor to South Africa and on 16 November 1860, a group of 342 people, mainly South Indian Hindus with a small number of Christians and Muslims, arrived in Natal on a ship called the SS Truro. Ten days later the SS Belvedere brought 351 more indentured labourers from Calcutta. These regular shipments of people continued at random and according to the needs of white colonists, until 1866 when a world depression temporarily stopped the flow of Indians to Natal until 1872. Indentured labor continued to be imported until 1911.

Hofmeyr et al. (2007) reveal that the Indians who arrived in the colony of Natal to work on the sugar cane plantations were no different from the African people who were hunted like animals, captured and forcibly transported to the Americas to work on the white farms, in households and in the construction industries that created the great civilizations of Latin and North America.

Mukherjee (2011) adds that a significant proportion of Indian slaves imported into the Cape were from parts of India and Bangladesh. As a result, many slaves had no identity as Indians and were subsumed into the 'Cape Colored' and 'Cape Malay' communities. For example, one South African Indian in Cape Town had the following to say: "...*Some of the White Afrikaners may also have some Indian slave ancestry...*". He gave the example of the Former South Africa State President, F.W. de Klerk, who revealed in his autobiography that one of his ancestors was a female slave called Diana of Bengal. There is no reference to the real names of these Indians who were given "Christian" names for convenience. This all contributed to the loss of identity like the Mozambicans and other slaves who were brought to the Cape. It is documented that the Indian indentured laborers on sugar plantations were often mistreated and lived in unsanitary conditions. A large proportion of them returned to India following the expiry of their terms, and some of those who returned alerted authorities in India to abuses taking place in Natal. This led to new safeguards being put in place before further recruiting of indentured laborers could take place.

Mukherjee (2011) argues that the difference between slavery and indentured labor within the context of the duties performed by Indians after 1833 is the work of semantics. Despite the abolition of slavery through the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833, Indians in South Africa continued to work in the sugarcane fields, performing the same tasks previously assigned to African slaves. It is, therefore, a contradiction to suggest that the duties of indentured laborers differed significantly to those previously carried out by African slaves. The researcher believes that slavery may have been abolished through an Act, but it remained prevalent and edged in the nature of work assigned to Indians in the South African sugar plantations. Moreover, like the African slaves and workers in Americas, the Indian community in South Africa came from

diverse ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds in India. They were united by their cultural and spiritual traditions which nourished their self-respect, the culture of self-reliance, and a sense of development and progress. These values sustained their human dignity in diversity and aroused the disposition to associate with one another for mutual benefit.

Nevertheless, Reddy (2015) provides a divergent view that historically, Indians came to Natal by invitation to work as indentured laborers in 1860, a period within slavery that was already abolished. By decree, over the years, they moved into other occupations and into other parts of the country, making a visible contribution into the economy. Mukherjee (2011) shows that after serving their indentures, the first category of Indians was free to remain in South Africa or to return to India. This statement corroborates sentiments expressed by the Indian businessman in Durban who stated that Indians were classified into three categories, one of which is 'ex-indentured laborers' who chose to remain in South Africa after the expiry of their contracts.

By 1910, less than 30 % of the indentured Indians returned to India. Most of them chose to stay and thus constituted the forbearers of most of the present-day South African Indians. After the 1994 democratic election in South Africa and the advent of a democratic constitution, immigration policy restrictions, imposed by the apartheid regime, were scrapped (Lall, 2001). People from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh arrived in South Africa as new immigrants. However, there is a major cultural division between these new groups and Indian South Africans (Narain, 1995).

The majority of the former indentured laborers belong to the Hindu religion. The study wanted to find out the origin of the Indian Muslims. One elderly Indian Muslim had the following to say:

“Whereas a number of the indentured labourers returned to India after their period was over, a new wave of migration also began at this time in Durban, with the arrival of predominantly Muslim merchant Indians, mostly from Gujarat...”.

This is supported by Landy et al. (2004) who indicate that these Indian Muslims arrived in South Africa as passenger Indians, at their own cost and under the protection of British citizenship (which was later rescinded). They were seeking to explore business opportunities and the Europeans soon began to feel increasingly uncomfortable with the number of ‘free’ (post-indenture) and ‘passenger’ Indians who had become traders and farmers, and presented a threat to their monopoly in agriculture and trade. They sought to have them sent back to India and this was the beginning of a growing anti-Indian sentiment in Natal.

Huttenback (1966) shows that in 1893, Natal was granted the responsible government, and with it came the imposition of new laws which deprived Natal Indians of many rights, including the franchise (following the Glen Grey Act at the Cape), restrictions on further entry of Indians into the country and a new tax which was meant to compel them to return to India. It was at this time that Mahatma Gandhi arrived in South Africa to fight a legal case and remained for 20 years building a programme of passive resistance to the colonial state and setting up the Natal Indian Congress to oppose restrictions set on Indians (Chakarbarty, 2006).

According to Jain (1982), Durban, which had the largest concentration of Indians, developed a very specific cultural and racial identity. For instance, in places like Cato Manor, near the City Centre, land was leased to Indian market gardeners who had just finished their indenture and had nowhere to go. These first occupants of Cato Manor later leased plots to African families, who were prohibited from owning land at the time. The Times of India dated 22 July 2011, indicates

that Cato Manor became a space of hybridity and mixing of races and cultures. Durban fermented cultures which were compared to Sophiatown in Johannesburg or District Six in Cape Town. However, in 1949, the outbreak of the Durban Riots brought an abrupt end to this period. This came about when an incident on the commercial Grey Street fueled anti-Indian sentiment and led to massive violence, looting, the destruction of houses and shops and 137 deaths, mostly of poor Indians (Padayachee et al., 1991).

It is reported that thereafter, people were forcibly removed from Cato Manor, under the Group Areas Act, although people continued to mix despite restrictive laws. Most of the Indian populations were concentrated in the Durban, Inanda, and Pinetown (DIP) region. Nevertheless, Pillay (2014) indicates that more than 100,000 Indians were forcibly moved to the township of Chatsworth, a farmland 20 kilometers outside the city without access to drainage electricity and water, whilst many of their previous spaces of residence were rezoned as white areas.

An in-depth interview with one Indian in Durban on the historical racial and cultural tensions and solidarity among them, at the time, shared the following sentiment:

“... Although the Indian population in Durban consisted of various religions, castes, and cultural backgrounds, they sometimes constituted themselves as a community around conservative family values and a community of self-help. Out of hand-to-hand collections, they were able to build the first and only high school for Indians, Sastri College in Durban.... They also raised funds for the RK Khan Hospital, capital for the University of Durban Westville, which is today part of the University of KwaZulu-Natal; and build places of religious worship such as temples and mosques...”.

However, Vahed et al. (2010) has the view that despite these developments, Indians in South Africa remained a politically and religiously contrasting group with different religious and class interests. For instance, it is reported that from the time Mahatma Gandhi arrived, there were clear factions within the Natal Indian Congress (Ray, 1989). There were tensions between the radicals and the reformers, i.e. those who supported an alliance with the ANC and later joined when membership was open to members of all race groups, as well as those who joined the UDF, who were starkly opposed to politics of Indians that participated in the Tricameral parliamentary system or Apartheid reforms. Moreover, there were class tensions between the largely working-class and poor populations of Indians, descendants of indenture and merchant Indians, which continued to be a fault line in everyday relationships. While continuously circumscribed by the Apartheid state as a community and viewed as homogenous due to this classification, religious, caste conversations and class continued to stratify the Indian population, even today (Landy et al., 2004).

5.3 Mahatma Gandhi and Racial Inequality in South Africa

There have been contradictory views regarding the attitudes and position of Mahatma Gandhi on the racial inequality during his stay in South Africa. This is based on the argument that his racist attitudes towards Africans in South Africa contradicts the views associated with the famous Gandhi the world knows. It is argued that many people within and outside South Africa are not aware of this aspect of Gandhi's life because it tends to be deliberately omitted from his later writings.

Historical testimonies (1882-1990) on Indians in South Africa indicate that Mahatma Gandhi arrived in Durban in 1893 to serve as a Legal Counsel to a merchant, Dada Abdulla. Like other

Indians who arrived before him, he experienced the racial treatment accorded to Indians in South Africa, and people of color. It is documented that various events in South Africa since his arrival contributed to his political growth. For instance, he was thrown out of a train in Pietermaritzburg on his way to Pretoria, and after struggling to find a hotel in the city, he was told that he could not eat in the dining room of the hotel. Later, he was removed from the pavement outside President Paul Kruger's house and told to get a pass to walk Pretoria's streets (Markovits, 2014). Gandhi acknowledges his experiences in South Africa in the following words:

“Truly speaking, it was after I went to South Africa that I became what I am now. My love for South Africa and my concern for her problems are no less than for India”.

The study was interested in the history of Mahatma Gandhi in South Africa, especially the views of the research participants on this aspect. For instance, the researcher asked the views of one of the South African diplomats from DIRCO who lived and worked at the South African High Commission in India on the racial position of Mahatma Gandhi. He had the following to say:

“On the subject of Mahatma Gandhi being a racist or not, I am not sure whether he was a racist or not. But I know that he advanced the interests of Indians in South Africa. I don't remember him leading campaigns against black people of South Africa, he just wanted to advance the course of people who looked like him...”.

Lessoni (2019) indicates that the development of his Satyagraha philosophy and movement was a reaction to the Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance (ALAO) of 1906, which proposed that Indians and Chinese were to register their presence in the Transvaal by giving their fingerprints and carrying passes. The protest act united the two Asian communities and they decided to

oppose the ordinance by peaceful methods. According to Rai (2000), Satyagraha was a unique weapon to fight injustice. Its emphasis was on the principle of truth, non-violence, tolerance, and peaceful protests. In his mass campaign, he practiced civil disobedience, which involved breaking a law and courting arrest. The main objective of Satyagraha was to eradicate the evil or to reform the opponent. He advocated that in the existing socio-economic political system, there was a dire necessity to wean the individual away from the influence of wealth, luxuries, and power.

Reddy (2015), states that the origin of Satyagraha was influenced by the Hindu religious principles to resist the racial injustice in South Africa by refusing to follow an unjust law. In doing so, a Satyagrahi would not be angry, would put up freely with physical assaults to his person and the confiscation of his property, and would not use foul language to smear his opponent. A practitioner of Satyagraha also would never take advantage of an opponent's problems. The goal was not for them to be a winner and loser of the battle, but rather that all would eventually see and understand the 'truth' and agree to rescind the unjust law.

The researcher argues that Satyagraha was a concept designed to benefit Indians in South Africa, and not any other ethnic or racial group. By using this idea and movement, Gandhi was able to unite the Indians from different communities, languages, and religions, who had settled in South Africa. By the time he arrived in South Africa the racism perpetuated by the White ruling authorities and much of the White citizenry had already spread to Natal where he lived. Reddy (2005) indicates that the first discriminatory legislation directed at Indians, Law 3 of 1885, was passed in the South African Republic, or the Transvaal.

The right to self-government had been granted to Natal in 1893 and politicians were increasingly under pressure to pass legislation aimed at containing the 'merchant Indian menace'. Just like the

Indian government, Gandhi was propelled by the harsh treatment of Indians by the colonial regime. “The first resolution of the Indian Congress Party (ICP) on the treatment of Indians in South Africa was passed in 1894, and after 1900, it became a regular feature” (Dhupelia-Mesthrie, 2000:21). Mahatma Gandhi founded the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) in 1894, a year after he arrived in South Africa. In 1903 he founded the British Indian Association in the Transvaal (BIAT) and began the Indian Opinion soon afterwards, and a year later he established the Phoenix Settlement in Durban, an area of 100 acres, with the aim of promoting justice, peace and equality for Indians. According to Magar (2020), in 1908 Mahatma Gandhi mooted the idea of establishing a crematorium, mainly to service the Indian community. He was provided with land in the Brixton Cemetery. In 1918 the wood-burning crematorium was built in 1918, and it stands today as a national heritage site, and later in 1956, a gas-fired crematorium built. When he left South Africa in 1914, Gandhi had accomplished most of what he wanted to achieve for the livelihood of Indians in South Africa. In one of his autobiographies he wrote that he would “always be a South African Indian”.

Magar (2020) further indicates that by 1896, Gandhi had established himself as a political leader in South Africa and undertook a journey to India to launch a protest campaign on behalf of Indians in South Africa. It took the form of letters written to newspapers, interviews with leading nationalist leaders and several public meetings. His mission caused great uproar in India and anxiety among British authorities in England and Natal. In the spirit of Satyagraha, on 29 October 1913, hundreds of Indian men, women, and children led by Gandhi marched from Newcastle, in Natal Colony, into the Transvaal to purposefully defy the Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913 (Act no. 22).

The *South African History Online* highlights that Gandhi was followed by two parties led by Thambi Naidoo and Albert Christopher. This marked one of the greatest episodes in South African history. He was arrested the following day at Palmford. Prior to this march, Thambi Naidoo mobilised the Indian community at Newcastle to start the Satyagraha Campaign - Passive Resistance Campaign (PRC). Gandhi made strict rules for the conduct of the Satyagrahis who were to submit patiently and without retaliation to insult, flogging or arrest. While leading a march on 6 November 1913, which included 127 Indian women, 57 children and 2037 men, he was arrested and later released on bail, rejoined the march and was re-arrested. The Indian Relief Bill (IRB) was finally scrapped.

The Briefing Document for the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) (then Foreign Affairs - DFA) Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, 16 September 2004, indicates that by the end of November 1913, the produce markets in Durban and Pietermaritzburg came to a standstill, sugar mills were closed, and hotels, restaurants and homes were left without domestic workers. Reports in India relating the arrest of Gandhi and police brutality caused uproar and the British government was forced to form an agreement with the strikers. Gandhi was released to negotiate with General Jan Smuts over the Indian Relief Bill, a law that scrapped the £3 tax on ex-indentured workers. Gandhi was released and in January 1914, a provisional agreement was arrived at between him and General Smuts and the main Indian demands were conceded. Gandhi's work in South Africa was now over and, in July 1914, he sailed with his wife for England.

There have been various contentious views regarding Gandhi's racial attitudes during his stay in South Africa. Cohen (2013) states that in opposing arguments of the whites that Indians were uncivilised like the Africans and hence not entitled to civic rights, some of the early documents

by Gandhi contain statements reflecting the current racial prejudices against Africans. However, as he came to know the Africans, he overcame the initial prejudices and developed great love and respect for the Africans.

In 1908, Gandhi spoke of his vision of a South African nation in which all the different races could intermingle and produce a civilization that perhaps the world has not yet seen. His experiences in South Africa including his experiences of the savagery of the Anglo-Boer War (ABW), the heroism of the Boer women and the brutality of the white settlers in Natal during the Bambata rebellion against a poll tax, is said to have as well inspired him to discover Satyagraha as much as any books he had read. In turn, African leaders were inspired by the Satyagrahian South Africa and the campaigns of civil disobedience in India led by Gandhi. However, Mukherjee (2011) indicates that at the time when the South African government under the British Colony negotiated with the Indian government to solicit labor force for the sugarcane fields in Natal, slavery was already abolished but Indian laborers still worked under the same conditions of slavery. They worked as indentured laborers, which was another form of slavery and Gandhi's concept and movement of Satyagraha was mostly for the benefit of Indians in South Africa, and not South Africans in general.

Lessoni (2019) reveals that the British colonial authorities in South Africa had begun to break the promises made to Indians about land and freedom after indenture, and to harass the free Indians in order to force all but the workers under contract to leave. The Europeans, and even many educated and Christian Africans, treated the African masses as barbaric and uncivilised, calling them kaffirs. The researcher argues that, although much has been written about Gandhi's life in South Africa, the birth of Satyagraha and his transformation from a lawyer-servant of the Indian community to a Mahatma, there is limited literature on the interaction between Gandhi

and the African people including their leaders. As an activist, it was expected of him to interact with a cross-section of those who were discriminated against including the Africans.

Vahed (2000) points out that Gandhi himself is largely responsible for this omission because he wrote little about his discussions with African leaders of his time. For instance, he wrote in *Harijan* (July 1, 1939): *“I yield to no one in my regard for the Zulus, the Bantus and the other races of South Africa. I used to enjoy intimate relations with many of them. I had the privilege of often advising them”*. However, little is known about who he advised and the kind of advice he provided, and not much is known from his writings about this. This omission, by error or design, signified Gandhi’s lack of interest in advancing the interest of Africans.

Two South African Professors of Indian origin present a biting picture of Gandhi’s thoughts and actions towards Africans during his lifetime in South Africa. These are Ashwin Desai (University of Johannesburg) and Goolam Vahed (University of KwaZulu-Natal) in their publication *‘The South African Gandhi: Stretcher-Bearer for Empire’*. They point out that as a young man, Gandhi had negative opinions about Africans and has been characterised as a racist and someone who originally supported the British Empire. For instance, one of Gandhi’s first fight was for the establishment of a separate entrance for Indians at the Durban post office. He advanced the view that it was an insult to the Indian community to have to use the same door as black South Africans. In his own words he wrote: *“We felt the indignity too much”*. He petitioned the authorities to do away with the invidious distinction and they provided three separate entrances for natives, Asiatics and Europeans.

He propagated the view: *“We also believe that the white race in South Africa should be the predominating race”*. His concern for the Indian welfare was also reflected in an open letter to

the Natal parliament in 1893, in which he played on notions of racial superiority to complain against prejudice directed at the Indian community. Gandhi's letter articulates as follows: *"I venture to point out that both the English and the Indians spring from a common stock, called the Indo-Aryan. A general belief seems to prevail in the colony that the Indians are little better, if at all, than savages or the natives of Africa"*. Likewise, in 1895 he made an appeal against Indians being viewed as second-class residents, he argued that Indians would be degraded to the level of natives if they were afforded less rights.

The Briefing Document for the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) (then Foreign Affairs - DFA) Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, 14-18 September 2004 illustrates that, during a speech in 1896 in Mumbai, Gandhi told the assembled crowd that Europeans in Natal wished *"to denigrate Indians to the level of a raw kaffir whose occupation is hunting, and whose sole ambition is to collect a certain number of cattle to buy a wife with, and then, pass his life in indolence and nakedness"*. In response to White League agitation in 1903 against Indian immigration and Chinese foreign workers, Gandhi publicly declared that *"we also believe that the white race in South Africa should be the predominating race"*.

Furthermore, in what is likely the most bizarre instance of Gandhi's prejudice against Africans, he also complained about being given prison garments with the letter 'N' on them during the few weeks he was imprisoned in 1908. Having been sent to jail for refusing to carry an obligatory identity card, he wrote of the conditions facing him and others in prison, paying attention to the clothing he was issued. After his release, he reflected on this facet of his prison experience. He wrote: *"we were all prepared for hardships but not quite for this experience. We could understand not being classed with the whites but to be placed on the same level with the natives seemed too much to put up with."*

In 1904, he wrote to a health officer in Johannesburg that the council *"must withdraw Kaffirs"* from an unsanitary slum called the "Coolie Location" where many Africans lived alongside Indians. *"About the mixing of the Kaffirs with the Indians, I must confess I feel most strongly"*. The same year he wrote that, unlike the African, the Indian had no *"war-dances, nor does he drink Kaffir beer"*. When Durban was hit by a plague in 1905, Gandhi wrote that the problem would persist if Indians and Africans were being *"herded together indiscriminately at the hospital"*.

Chakrabarty (2006) contends that such kind of an attitude could not be associated with the famous Gandhi the world knew, yet prejudice against Africans reflected a consistent theme of fighting for the dignity of Indians within the colonial racial hierarchy at the expense of Africans. For his various protests in South Africa against the colonial injustices, all centered on the indignities endured by the Indian community. This approach against racism shows the way Gandhi's life in a colonial society compromised his very thinking about racial inequality. Safi (2018) reveals that many people are not aware of this aspect of Gandhi's life in South Africa because he deliberately omitted it from his later writings.

However, the question being asked is: *".... if Gandhi was part of the racist common sense of the time, then how does this qualify him to be a person that is seen as part of the pantheon of South African liberation heroes?"* The researcher argues that, one cannot have Gandhi as an accomplice of colonial subjugation in South Africa and then also defend his liberation credentials in South Africa.

The researcher further argues that, Gandhi's conduct deceived, betrayed, and undermined the struggle of Indians in South Africa by joining whites in their subjugation against blacks and

Indians in South Africa. His quest for Indian supremacy over Africans was in variance with the collective struggle of Indians, Blacks, and Colored's in South Africa. By only promoting the interests of Indians, he effectively polarized the plight of the oppressed groups of South Africa, and this was akin to the divide and rule principle of the British colony.

Gandhi's lack of affection for Africans is emphasised by Mantey (2018) who states that despite having lived in Africa for over two decades, Gandhi had no personal or professional interaction with black people during his time in South Africa. When he did finally leave the continent for India, he did not say goodbye to a single African. Safi (2018) further notes that the African public backlash to statues of Gandhi across the continent mirrors similar reactions against other colonial figures such as Cecil Rhodes in Southern Africa. The problem is that, while no one is building statues of Rhodes anymore, Gandhi has been categorized as the symbol for Indian soft power both in Africa and globally. Indian projects in Africa often use Gandhi statues as part of their wider efforts to instill India's goodwill. The African critics of Gandhi argue that this one-size-fits-all approach (which usually meets with no complaint in other parts of the world) often runs afoul of local sensibilities in various African countries. They advance the sentiment that, while Gandhi may be a positive symbol for many Indians, he does not invoke such feelings among many Africans.

According to Montey (2018), in 2016, Professors and students at the University of Ghana began a petition to remove a statue of Gandhi from the institution's Accra campus. Daniel Osei Tuffour, a former student at the University of Ghana, speaking to the BBC, indicated that *"Ghanaians should be confident in themselves and seek to project our own heroes and heroines. There is nothing peaceful about the activities of Gandhi. Anyone who claims to uphold peace and tranquility but promotes racism is a hypocrite."* He further elaborated that resistance to the

erection of a Gandhi statue should not be construed as resistance to Indian investment in Ghana, pointing out several development projects supported by India.

However, Mantley (2019) has the view that it is the young Gandhi that protesters in South Africa and other African countries including Ghana and Malawi are fighting against. The protests are not being wedged by African governments, but rather by ordinary African citizens and civil society organisations. This is elaborated by his biographer and grandson, Rajmohan Gandhi, who states that the younger Gandhi arrived in South Africa at the age of 24 years *"at times ignorant and prejudiced about South Africa's blacks"*. He believes Gandhi's *"struggle for Indian rights in South Africa paved the way for the struggle of black rights"*. He argues that *"Gandhi too was an imperfect human being, but the imperfect Gandhi was more radical and progressive than most contemporary compatriots"*. This is supported by Ramachandra Guha, who has the view that *"to speak of comprehensive equality for colored people was premature in early 20th Century South Africa"*. Therefore, attacking Gandhi for racism, *"takes a simplistic view of a complex life"*.

Nel and Taylor (2013) adds that Gandhi's early years in South Africa were clearly racist, but evidence shows that by the time he left the country, he was on the best of terms with Africans, including John Dube, the president of the movement that became the African National Congress. This is based on accounts from Betty Molteno, the daughter of a former Cape Prime Minister, and a close friend of Dube. For instance, in 1913 Gandhi launched his final campaign against the South African government, leading strikes that brought to a halt the sugar plantations and mines. The strikes spread and the country was grinding to a standstill. During these bitter confrontations, Molteno would walk from the Dubes' home to Gandhi's base at Phoenix. Betty Molteno argues that, it was clear that John Dube and Mahatma Gandhi were not just neighbours, but friends too.

Molteno wrote in a letter dated 3 December 1913 about a talk with Dube, who said that the Indian cause is the native cause and that the Indians are leading the way, showing them the way to strike, should that become necessary. It is argued that this could not have happened if Dube regarded Gandhi as a racist.

Molteno further points out that Dube was not easily won over to the Indian cause because he had previously made strongly anti-Indian statements. He was keen to be kept informed of Gandhi's campaign. She records how on December 14, 1914, she met Dube in Gandhi's campaign headquarters in Durban, where he was in discussions over how to continue the strikes. She advances the view that it would have been unthinkable for the president of South Africa's main African political party to participate in this way if he believed Gandhi had racist opinions about Africans.

In his analysis of what seems to be a contradictory picture of Gandhi, in which some people including politicians within India and globally look at him within a single lens as a global peace icon, and likewise, Lessoni (2019) states that many Africans across the continent conceptualise him only negatively as a racist, and that the discrepancy between the two perspectives demonstrates that neither view encapsulates the full story. Gandhi in Africa and Gandhi in India are two elements of the same imperfect person. While not dismissing his actions in South Africa, it is important to remember that people do change. Gandhi may not have bothered to say goodbye to any Africans, but he did return to Africa. Moreover, after his death in 1948, some of his ashes were flown to Jinja, Uganda where at the source of the Nile, they were scattered into the river and there is also a statue there.

Padhi (2014) states that many historians have written a lot about Nelson Mandela and Mahatma Gandhi, comparing, and contrasting their roles in the struggle for freedom and liberation in South Africa. Killian (1985) further argues that both leaders were outstanding and played a significant role in shaping the destinies of their respective countries. He further argues that both Mandela and Gandhi mobilized against oppression, against hatred and against prejudices. They suffered in jails, and politically but they steadfastly pursued their missions. However, the researcher argues that, while Gandhi mobilized the masses in South Africa, this mobilization was for the emancipation of Indians and not blacks and/or coloreds. The researcher further disagrees with the assertion that Gandhi was against overall hatred and against prejudices of the oppressed. He was only against the hatred and prejudices of Indians in South Africa and not Africans. He called them Kaffirs and believed that they were of a lower social status compared to Indians.

The researcher therefore has the view that, it will be a historical and philosophical anomaly to associate the role and values espoused by Nelson Mandela with what Mahatma Gandhi advocated during his stay in South Africa. This is despite the argument that he later changed his attitude towards Africans, and that he finally returned to Africa in a mortal form.

On the other hand, Nelson Mandela's role in the liberation struggle of South Africa was at a much higher and complex level. He fought for freedom, peace and most significantly, social equality of all races, a principle that Gandhi never believed in during his stay in South Africa. To support this assertion that Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela were significantly different in their philosophies on racial equality, the researcher lists a few quotations below from selected works of Nelson Mandela:

On equality, Mandela said:

“during my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal which I am prepared to die” (*Rivonia Trial, 20 April 1964*).

On adversity Mandela said: “*difficulties break some men but make others. No axe is sharp enough to cut the soul of a sinner who keeps on trying, one armed with the hope that he will rise even in the end*” (Letter to Winnie Mandela, 1 February 1957).

On authority, Mandela said: “*I have never regarded any man as my superior, either in my life outside or inside prison*” (Letter to the Commissioner of Prisons while on Robben Island, 12 July 1976).

On apartheid he said: “*Between the anvil of united mass action and the hammer of the armed struggle we shall crush apartheid and white minority racist rule*” (June 1980).

On being a man of the people, he said: “*I cannot and will not give any undertaking at a time when I, and you, the people are not free. Your freedom and mine cannot be separated*” (Message from Prison, read by his daughter to a rally in Soweto, 10 February 1985).

Whether Mahatma Gandhi could be compared to Nelson Mandela, one respondent said:

“...Mahatma Gandhi has always been a central figure in the relations between India and South Africa. It makes sense to make comparison between him and Nelson Mandela, as they were both influential leaders of their constituencies...”.

However, with great certainty, and without any contradiction, the messages shared by both Mandela and Gandhi at various levels of their leadership roles were the same but meant for different audiences. Nelson Mandela’s struggle was for all the oppressed people in South Africa, regardless of colour, creed, religion, or gender. Whereas Gandhi was more concerned with the plight of Indians in South Africa and overlooked the oppression and struggle of Africans because they were not deserving of the same social and racial status as Indians.

5.4 Contentions on Racial Relations between Indians and Africans, before and after

Apartheid

The research study found that despite the official end of apartheid in 1994, there remain contentious views and experience regarding racial relations in South Africa including those between South African Indians and Africans. The study presents these divergent views in this section of the research study. Singh (2018) adds that although much has been written about the history of migration of Indians to South Africa, and on the contributions of India to the liberation struggle of South Africa against colonialism and apartheid system, there is an argument that despite India’s general affinity for South Africa, the move to support the struggle for freedom during apartheid was predicated by the enormous presence of people of Indian decent in South Africa. This is supported by an argument made by Dhupelia-Mesthrie (2000:21) that “the first resolution of the Indian Congress Party (ICP) on the treatment of Indians in South Africa was passed in 1894, and after 1900, it became a regular feature”. As a result, the Indian government

felt a sense of moral obligation to protect Indians in South Africa against the prejudices of the repressive apartheid regime. This was also a key factor that helped Indians in South Africa forge a common enemy approach with other people of color including Africans. The Indian community in South Africa established a number of political formations, the most prominent being the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) established by Gandhi in 1894, and the Transvaal and Cape Indian Congresses (TCIC) in the early part of the 20th century. Members of the Indian Congress, together with socialist activists in the Communist Party of South Africa were instrumental, from the 1930s, in building cross racial alliances. The small Indian, Colored and White progressive sectors joined with progressive African activists, and together they conducted a common non-racial struggle for Freedom and Equality.

However, after the democratic elections, the harsh discriminatory laws that created a common enemy with Africans were no longer there. Rammamurti (1995a) reveals that racial tensions between Indian and Africans in South Africa have existed throughout the country's history. For instance, the three days of rioting in 1949 which left 142 people dead and 1 087 injured cannot be easily forgotten. This violent experience haunted Indo-Africans relations throughout the period of apartheid. Furthermore, the researcher holds an opinion that, despite the aspirational idea of non-racialism advanced since the democratic elections in 1994, racial tensions between Indians and Africans persist.

Pillay (2018) elaborates that although Indians were subjugated by the white regime during colonialism and apartheid, they were still considered superior to Africans. This mentality still exists in the Indian communities, even among those who were born after apartheid (Rammamurti, 1995b).

The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) commander-in-chief, Julius Malema, made controversial comments about Indians in South Africa during the party's 4th anniversary celebrations in Durban. He said to his followers in Durban:

“We also want to call upon our fellow Indians here in Natal to respect Africans. They are ill-treating them worse than Afrikaners would do. We don't want that to continue here in Natal. This is not an anti-Indian statement; it is the truth”.

While condemnation has come from all sides including political parties in South Africa, the EFF has refused to apologize. Others expressed the view that by condemning the EFF, South Africans, with their racial history, were shutting down an important conversation that needs to be held (Mail & Guardian, 2017).

Mantey (2018) reveals that Malema was not the first African to raise the issues of racial tension between African and Indians. In 2002, the playwright Mbongeni Ngema's song 'AmaNdiya' ('Indian') raised the same criticisms against Indians, that they do not accept Africans as equals, are only interested in money, and are exploitative. The song was later banned for promoting racial hatred. Historians Goolam Vahed and Ashwin Desai note in a 2010 study that despite the majority of Indian South Africans having indentured roots and shopkeepers making up a tenth of working Indians at present, “the stereotype of the exploitative trader remains strong”.

Another experience is given by Nelisiwe Msomi, a Black Muslim in South Africa, who had the following to say:

“We attend Muslim festivals so that we can get spiritual upliftment. We go to the masjid to talk with our creator. But instead, these places have become toxic places to

our well-being. Racism lurks in and selective Islamic principles become the norm of the day. For instance, someone tells me, you can only be a Muslim if you are married to a Bangladeshi or Pakistani man”.

Even some Indians have expressed the view that Indians have benefited more in the apartheid systems compared to Africans. For instance, in her book: *‘What Gandhi Didn’t See: Being Indian in South Africa’*, Zainab Priya Dala, a fourth-generation South African-Indian of mixed lineage, uses her own lived experience to articulate racial relations between Indians and Africans in South Africa. She shares her memories of growing up in South Africa in the 1980s, during the State of Emergency, and the atrocious Tricameral System advocated and supported by many South African-Indians, and the heightened efforts to have Nelson Mandela released from prison and finally usher in a democratic government. She saw that the Indian community were being given more privileges and access to basic human needs as compared to Africans. She says:

"It irked me that many Indian people benefited and lapped up these handouts and enriched themselves on a false sense of fairness. I felt that we were betraying Nelson Mandela by our complicit acceptance of this better life, and when he was released, I hoped that the playing fields would be levelled. But, the further challenge then came for me when I saw that unfairness seemed to again rear its head in that, again, every Indian was being painted with the same brush and looked at by the Black community as opportunists and sell-outs” (Vahed, 2001).

She further indicates that South African-Indians today are very mutable, according to the environment. They have always managed to maintain a cultural identity that is strongly Indian, and with that comes religion. She has the view that the defining roots of South African-Indians

remain in religion and cultural practices, but that is only when they are in their own communities and families. According to her, most South African-Indians have held onto their religious beliefs, but in doing so, they have also appropriated the language and culture of the Afrikaner, the Blacks, and all others in between.

The study wanted to establish from the South African diplomats who lived and worked in India at the South African High Commission in India regarding the racial situation between South African Indians and Africans during apartheid. One of them said:

“During apartheid, I think Indians were privileged by default, and not because of their own making. That is how the then government classified them socially. But on Nelson Mandela and Mahatma Gandhi being peers, I think I disagree. Nelson Mandela was a Universalist. He fought against racial dominations of one race by another. I think Gandhi really championed a course against apartheid in so far as the people of Indian decent were concerned. To compare both of them will be very unfair to Nelson Mandela. Nevertheless, the legacy of Gandhi in both South Africa and India is something that cannot be done away with...”.

There is also the view that Indians failed due to being favored by the apartheid system (Reeves, 1992). According to this view, Apartheid laws discriminated against all non-whites equally. If a sign read ‘WHITES ONLY’ it meant ‘whites only’ with no exception whatsoever. However, another opinion states that although apartheid categorized South African races into whites and non-whites, it also advocated the colonial policy of ‘divide and rule’. The apartheid system classified ‘non-whites’ into Africans, Indians and Coloreds and then sub-divided Africans into Zulu, Xhosa, Sotho, Tswana, Pedi, Venda, Ndebele, Tsonga, Pondo and Swati. Differences and

hatred were thus sewn into the fabric of South African ‘non-white’ society. Therefore, if all non-whites were treated the same, how did Indians make more progress than other non-white races?

There are divergent explanations to this effect. One is the contention that the different sections of the non-whites in South Africa were accorded unequal socio-economic and political opportunities in the apartheid system including education and skill development, according to their rank and social status in the apartheid system. One African who participated in the study said the following regarding the privileges of Indians before and in post-apartheid South Africa:

“Yes, I think they were. So, if you go to Soweto in Johannesburg, there is a designated place for Indians, and in Durban, there is a designated place for Indians, you go everywhere, Indians have grouped themselves. They also own shops in the areas where they live and support each other. Although African communities have also been grouped, they don’t necessarily own the economic means of their localities, it is now in the hands of foreign shop owners, and Indians are amongst them. I wish we black South Africans can learn from them. I think they work hard; this is why many of them are so successful in their businesses”.

The *South African History Online* (SAHO), defines apartheid as ‘apartness’, and describes it as the ideology supported by the National Party (NP) government introduced in South Africa in 1948, and lasted until 1994. As a result of the apartheid history of South Africa, most racial and ethnic groups still find themselves living in areas based on their common identities. The apartheid system made laws, and forced different racial and ethnic groups to live separately. As a result, they developed separately, and continued to be grossly unequal.

Another African research participant said the following on relations between the two racial groups in South Africa:

“...Indians in South Africa have always viewed themselves as more superior than black South Africans and this continues to create a sense of animosity between them and black South Africans.”

Beri (2008) elaborates that Apartheid was a social system which severely disadvantaged most of the population, simply because they did not share the skin color of the rulers. There were various reasons for the existence of apartheid. The main reasons lie in ideas of racial superiority and fear. In South Africa, the white people are the minority, and many were worried they would lose their jobs, culture, and language. Therefore, various legislations laws were enacted to enforce apartheid. Some of these legislations included the Population Registration Act 1950, which demanded that people must be registered according to the racial and ethnic groups; the Group Areas Act (GAA) 1950, which advocated for physical separation between races, especially in urban areas; and the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (PBSG) 1959, which compelled different racial and ethnic groups to live in different areas.

Arguably, the legacies of these apartheid laws are still prevalent even after 1994. The current social environment reflects the architecture of the laws of apartheid. Different racial and ethnic groups still find themselves living in designated areas due to their homogeneity. This was a strategy by the apartheid regime to create a divide and rule environment amongst the majority of South Africans. Vahed (2000) has the view that all these apartheid laws affected Indians as well, but the success of Indians lies in understanding the nature of their culture. According to this view, when an Indian achieves success, he/she does not climb the ladder alone, he/she takes the

community with by building schools, religious institutions like churches, mosques or temples and hospitals. So, one person's material success ripples along entire communities who share in the benefits and thus enjoy upliftment even under dire apartheid conditions. Therefore, those who advance the opinion that Indians' material success is attributed to a favored apartheid status and their racism, the perception is not only wrong but envious (Vahed, 2001). This contention goes on to indicate that just as the British colonialists had referred to Indians as "coolies", meaning a bag carrier in the Hindi language. The lowest in the social strata, the Zulus had adopted a similar superior attitude and adapted the word to "Amacoola". This is hurtful to Indians, particularly those who had fought for freedom side by side with African people, including Zulus.

Ray (1989) elaborates that during the apartheid era, Indians endured the same hardships as Africans. They were treated with disdain and discriminated against due to the color of their skin and segregated from pre-dominantly white communities and integrated into black communities. As a result of this segregation, Indians were classified and identified with blacks. The treatment of Indians by the apartheid system was at the heart of India's rebuke and disdain for apartheid, and subsequent support for the struggle for liberation of the people of South Africa. The researcher, however, argues that India supported the struggle for freedom and liberation to advance its own selfish interests – to protect the rights and civil liberties of Indians in South Africa.

Nevertheless, Dubey (2003) states that when the Indians migrated to South Africa as indentured labourers between the 1560s and 1860, they were forced to do so because they had to replace African slaves who worked in the sugarcane fields. Slavery was abolished, and Africans could no longer work as slaves in the sugarcane fields. Although they were given an option of returning

to India after their assignments, many Indians decided to remain in South Africa, and later formed an integral part of society, amidst the discriminatory laws they endured. Indians in South Africa suffered a double jeopardy regarding their treatment by both the governments of India and South Africa. Firstly, they endured the hardship of migration to South Africa as indentured laborers, essentially disguised slavery. Secondly, Indians in South Africa became victims of the apartheid system by being discriminated against as immigrants, and due to the color of their skin.

5.5 The Relationship between the African National Congress (ANC) and Indian Congress Party (INC) against Apartheid in South Africa

Reddy (2005:277) states that:

“there are important similarities between the Congress Party and the African National Congress to warrant systematic comparison. At the time of independence, the Congress Party was sixty-two years old. A vehicle for the emerging educated Indian middle class, it was established in 1885 to fight against British colonialism. Under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and later Jawaharlal Nehru, it built a nationwide protest movement and led the fight for independence. On the other hand, the African National Congress generally divides its history into fairly recognisable periods. The period between 1912 and World War Two, the post-war period covering the highpoint of passive resistance campaign of the 1950, the period of exile and armed struggle, and lastly, the period of negotiation and transition between 1990 and 1994. Similar to the Indian Congress, its formative period (in the ANC's case, the 1920s and 1930s) consisted in influencing white liberal parliamentarians and dispatching delegations of protest to the government of the British Crown to register

its protest over the multiplying discriminatory laws affecting Africans. The 1950s direct 'mass action', partly influenced by the success of the Indian independence movement, became the cornerstone of its resistance strategies. It increasingly saw itself as the 'people's movement'. It developed an alliance first with the Communist Party and thereafter with organisations of Coloureds, Whites, and Indians, all of which identified with the Freedom Charter and saw themselves as belonging to one broad national movement against apartheid”.

Lessoni (2019) indicates that the relations between the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and the Indian Congress Party (ICP) of India constitutes inspiring examples of liberation movements that fought side by side against the apartheid system in South Africa. In its case, the INC always rallied behind the ANC in its struggle for freedom and liberation against the apartheid regime of the white minority in South Africa.

Reddy (2005) highlights that the African National Congress (ANC) and the India Congress Party (ICP) were established in different times in history. Although the INC was established earlier in 1882, it worked very closely with the ANC after it was founded in 1912 as the African National Native Congress (ANNC). Because both India and South Africa were colonized by Britain, the two political parties shared similar resistance ideologies, amidst different times in their history. In South Africa, the ANC is known as the second largest liberation movement after the Natal Indian Congress established in 1894. The ICP advocated for the independence of India from British rule, while the ANC fought to defend the freedoms and rights of black South Africans. Both parties shared common struggles from different geographic destinations, and yet supported each other's course.

In 1951-1964, Jawaharlal Nehru dominated the Indian Congress Party (ICP) as its leader and became the Prime Minister of India. According to Reddy (2005), Nehru had significant influence on the thinking of young minds in South Africa. Following India's independence in 1947, its first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru (the father of Indira Gandhi), became a leading voice of the anti-apartheid struggle in Africa, and South Africa, in particular; India's complaint about the treatment of Indians in South Africa was taken up soon after Jawaharlal Nehru became head of interim government in September 1946.

According to Alexander (2007), the Indian leagues in London set up a South Africa Committee to promote solidarity with that movement. The struggle and sacrifice of the Indians in South Africa, and the actions of the Indian Government under the leadership of Nehru persuaded African militants to overcome their hesitations about multi-racial unity and build a united democratic front. Dubey (2003) reminds us that Nehru was always responsive to the requests from the leaders of the movement in South Africa.

Tan and Acharya (2008) articulates a reminder that in 1955, when India secured the exclusion of South Africa from invitations to the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, ANC wished to send Moses Kotane and Moulvi Cachalia as observers. Nehru not only offered to take them with him but also to introduce them to all the leaders at the Conference. Unlike Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru encouraged Indians living abroad to identify with the legitimate aspirations of the indigenous people and that the Indian public must recognize that the problem of Indians in South Africa was inseparable from the struggle of the African people. In 1960, when Oliver Tambo and Dr Yusuf Dadoo escaped from South Africa, Nehru provided them with emergency Indian travel documents and transport from Dar Es Salam to London. Gupta (2008) points out that in 1967, India welcomed the decision of the African National Congress to open its Asian mission in India

and by the 1980s, it had given the ANC office semi-diplomatic status equal to the UN office. This was in recognition of its popular support both in South Africa and in the international arena. India recognized the ANC as a national movement for freedom in South Africa, like the Indian Congress Party in India.

Under the leadership of the first Prime Minister of India, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, India was the founder member of the Non-Aligned Movement. In this context, India played an active role in strengthening the Movement and making it an effective voice in representing the collective aspirations and interests of the developing countries on such vital issues as development, peace, and stability, amongst others. The international outlook of the Indian national movement, under the influence of Jawaharlal Nehru, which inspired President Nelson Mandela, was based on a denunciation of power politics (Abraham, 2008).

The following section makes a critical analysis of the diplomatic relations between India and post-apartheid South Africa.

5.6 South Africa and India after Apartheid in South Africa

The shared history and the spirit of south-south cooperation between India and South Africa had a great influence on the diplomatic relations between the two countries in the post-apartheid period in South Africa. Khanna (2007) indicates that the extent to which the two countries cooperate with each other after 1994 draws inspiration from the journey they have travelled from the apartheid era in South Africa, when India was very firm in its call for sanctions against apartheid. For example, in 1946, the Indian government took a decision to cut diplomatic relations with the apartheid government on grounds of human rights abuse and discrimination

against the people of color. As a result, for a period of 40 years, the two countries did not enjoy any form of relations (Vats, 1991).

Furthermore, their common history of colonialism has also played a key role in shaping their global outlook about world affairs (Vieira and Alden, 2011). It follows, therefore, that, in the making of their diplomatic relations and policy formulations, there will be areas of convergence based on their shared common history, and divergences in order to fulfill national interests, and this includes their divergence in competition for resources in the African continent. India has been in the forefront of the world community in the struggle against colonialism. The Independence of India itself played the role of a catalyst in removing the vestiges of colonialism in other parts of the developing world, particularly in Africa, and specifically South Africa.

The diplomatic relations between India and South Africa have continued after apartheid. It is an integral part of South Africa's foreign policy to continue engaging with India through the India-Africa Forum. Through engagement with the AU under the banner of Africa-India Forum, India becomes an important partner for South Africa in fulfilling its key and foremost foreign policy objective of strengthening the African Agenda (Field, 2000). Both countries share mutual interests in their multilateral engagements, like membership of BRICS (Pant, 2013). Peace, security, and human rights remain a priority to the foreign policies of both countries. According to Heller (2012), throughout the years of their bilateral relations, they have become good models of democracy and good governance, despite the socio-economic challenges faced by both countries.

5.7 Historical Contribution of South African Indians to Democracy and Nation Building in South Africa

During the celebrations of the 150th Anniversary of Arrival of the Indian Community in South Africa, many South Africans expressed their views regarding the contributions of the South African Indian community to South Africa. There were divergent opinions; there were those who indicated that the Indians who arrived in the colony of Natal to work on the sugar cane plantations were no different from the African people who were hunted like animals, captured and forcibly transported to the Americas to work on the white farms, in households and in the construction industries that created the great civilisations of Latin and North America (Palinkas et al., 2015). For instance, Bhana (2015) reveals that although a significant proportion of Indian slaves imported into the Cape were from parts of India and Bangladesh, South African and other scholars tend to assume that these slaves were bought in ‘slave markets’.

Like in different parts of Africa, during the slave days, a large number of the Indian slaves were victims of kidnapping such that many slaves had no identity as Indians and were subsumed into the ‘Cape Coloured’ and ‘Cape Malay’ communities. It is even said that some of the White Afrikaners may also have some Indian slave ancestry. There is no reference to the real names of these Indians who were given "Christian" names for convenience. This all contributed to the loss of identity like the Mozambicans and other slaves who were brought to the Cape. It is documented that the Indian indentured labourers on sugar plantations were often mistreated and lived in unsanitary conditions. A large proportion of them returned to India following the expiry of their terms, and some of those who returned alerted authorities in India to abuses taking place in Natal. This led to new safeguards being put in place before further recruiting of indentured labourers could take place. Like the African slaves and workers in America, the Indian

community in South Africa, came from diverse ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds. They were united by their cultural and spiritual traditions which nourished their self-respect, the culture of self-reliance, and a sense of development and progress. These values sustained their human dignity in diversity and aroused the disposition to associate with one another for mutual benefit (Reddy, 2005).

Lessoni (2019) indicates that the South African Indians contributed greatly to the socio-economic and cultural development of the South African economy and society in general, the way we know it today. For instance, many of the former Indian slaves had the option of returning to their motherland, but instead they remained in South Africa and joined the fight against oppression with their fellow South Africans and contributed to the development of the country. They quickly established themselves as an important general labour force, particularly in Natal, as industrial and railway workers, with others engaging in market gardening, growing most of the vegetables consumed by the white population. Indians also became fishermen and worked as clerks in the postal service, and as court interpreters.

Besides the indentured labourers, the remaining Indian immigration was from passenger Indians, comprising traders and others who migrated to South Africa shortly after the indentured labourers. They paid for their own fares and travelled to South Africa as British subjects. These immigrant Indians who became traders were from varying religious backgrounds, namely Hindu and Muslims but largely from Gujarat (including Memons and Surtis), later joined by Kokanis and Urdu speakers from Uttar Pradesh (Reddy, 2005).

Vahed et al. (2005), posits that the Muslims played a significant role in the establishment of Islam in the areas where they settled. The Indian traders were sometimes referred to as "Arab

traders" because of their dress, and because large numbers of them were Muslim. The Indian traders, who initially operated in Durban, expanded inland, to the Transvaal (South African Republic), establishing communities in settlements on the main road between Johannesburg and Durban. Natal's Indian traders rapidly displaced small white shop owners in trade with other Indians, and with black Africans, causing resentment among white businesses.

The South African History Online reveals that during the 150th Anniversary of the arrival of the Indian labourers in South Africa, one Member of South African Parliament indicated that South Africans, as a nation, are especially proud of the role that the South African Indian community played in the Liberation of the country. Under the guidance of Mahatma Gandhi, through peaceful protests, they helped change the face of the country through non-violent demonstrations. From the early 1900s onwards, the Indian community recognised the evils of the colonial rule and later the apartheid system and the impact that the inequality was having on their fellow African brothers. It is for this reason that they stood side by side with them in the fight against racial oppression and inequality.

While working as slaves on the sugar cane plantations and in other industries, the Indians, like Africans in the diaspora, rediscovered their spiritual traditions and harnessed them for spiritual growth and development. Thus, they conducted their lives according to sound moral and ethical principles, despite the adverse conditions in which they lived and worked. The arrival of Mahatma Gandhi provided them with a spiritual and political leader who enriched all South Africans. Particularly, the principle of nonviolent struggle that Gandhi shared with people like Martin Luther King Junior should be noted.

The social and economic advancement of Indians in South Africa, like that of Africans in the diaspora, proves correct the wise words of President Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, that 'social transformation cannot be achieved without spiritual transformation'. The Indian community built its own temples, schools, mosques, and cultural schools, through which they preserved and practiced their diverse cultures, religions, and languages. These spiritual traditions and the working-class consciousness kindled the nationalist spirit which led to the formation of the Natal Indian Congress in 1894, and the Native Congresses of the four South African colonies at the beginning of the 20th century. These became the motive forces for the liberation of South Africa. The formation of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) in 1912, renamed the African National Congress (ANC) in 1923 and the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), were the product of spiritual and worker consciousness. The pact of the three doctors, Xuma, Dadoo and Naicker in the 1940s was the product of these people's movements. This implies that moral and ethical values have always guided the founders of South Africa, as a nation. These include John Langalibalele Dube, Mahatma Gandhi and Dr Abdullah Abdurahman who founded the African People's Organisation (APO), in 1902.

The above testimony signifies the fact that the arrival of the Indian community in South Africa has contributed to a powerful relationship between India and South Africa. Currently, we recognise the role of India in shaping the political landscape of South Africa. India has left an indelible imprint on humanity over the course of centuries. India is now not only a rising 21st century superpower, but it is the world's largest democracy. History records that South Africa and India - share a common past. Both countries were subjected to occupation by British imperialists and share hardships and experiences from this colonial past.

However, despite these shared historical experiences and relationships, South African Indians expressed the concern that, many socio-economic, cultural, and political challenges remain for South Africa's Indian community. One is the false perception that all Indian people are rich businessmen and women. This has created the myth that there are no poor Indians in South Africa. A quick tour around KwaZulu-Natal, especially where the majority of the Indian community in South Africa live, will reveal that some of the poorest inhabitants of KwaZulu-Natal Province are in fact, people of Indian origin. This calls for the government and NGOs to do more to assist those communities to access housing and other basic services. Furthermore, there is concern that not enough has been done to preserve and honour the culture, religion, and traditions of the Indian community. One of the cultural contributions of the South African Indians is the food diversity of the country. Indian curried dishes are popular in South Africa among people of all ethnic origins. The Indians have introduced a different line of culinary practices, including a variety of curries, rotis, sweetmeats, chutneys, fried snacks such as samosa and other savoury foods. For instance, Bunny chow, a dish from Durban which (has a large Indian community) is made up of a hollowed-out loaf of bread filled with curry, has adapted into mainstream South African cuisine and has become quite popular.

However, besides their participation in the liberation struggle and contributions to the food diversity of the country, the legacy of the Indian community of South Africa is far greater. Lessoni (2019) elaborates that the Indian community have made great contributions in the fields of business, labor, science, sports, religion and culture, and the achievement and consolidation of our democracy. Taking into consideration their humble beginnings as cane cutters in the sugar cane fields in KwaZulu-Natal to their significant presence in virtually every economic facet of South African society, the Indian community has made an outstanding contribution to the

evolution of South African society and development. They can boast of the fact that their labor pioneered the sugar industry in South Africa. According to Chauhan et al. (2011), today, the sugar industry in South Africa ranks as one of the major manufacturers of sugar and sugar by-products. Their contributions to cultural and language diversities have not been fully explored and shared across cultures and races. The language diversity of the South African Indians includes Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Urdu, Punjabi, and Gujarati. Many South African Indians are Hindu, but Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs also came to South Africa from India from as early as 1860. Hindu, the most prominent religion in India, originated 5000 years ago.

Reddy (2008) makes a point that South African Indians have played a critical role in the economic growth of the country, especially in the dawn of the new democracy. Today the country has a well-developed financial, legal, communications, energy, and transportation sectors. South Africa's stock exchange ranks among the highest in the world. The long-functioning and modern infrastructure supports an efficient distribution of goods to major urban centers throughout the region. In the decade since the end of apartheid, the South African economy has grown at an average rate of 2 per cent.

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter has brought into sharp focus some of the nuances characterizing the life of Indians in South Africa. It focused on the socio-cultural diversity of South African Indians in South Africa, their plight, challenges, and successes, including breaking the stereotype about the homogeneity. It made highlighted differences in their religious beliefs, customs, culture, and their overall way of life. It further focused on the controversial subject of whether Gandhi was racist or not and made use of some of the accounts given by several authors to strengthen their

arguments that indeed, Gandhi was racist. In this chapter, the contributions of Indians to the present day democratic South Africa is acknowledged, as well as the role they continue to play in building a better country. From this chapter, it is apparent that the post-apartheid diplomatic relations between India and South Africa have been greatly reinforced by their shared common history.

The following chapter discusses the prospects and challenges of diplomatic relations between South Africa and India in a multi-polar world order.

CHAPTER SIX

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND INDIA IN A MULTI-POLAR WORLD ORDER: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

6.1 Introduction

Chapter Five discussed the historical background on the relationship between South Africa and India within the context of socio-cultural and racial analysis. It made a critical analysis on the following aspects: the socio-cultural diversity of South African Indians; the life of Mahatma Gandhi in South Africa in the context of racial inequality in South Africa; contentions on post-apartheid racial relations between Indians and Africans in South Africa; historical contributions of South African Indians to democracy and nation building in South Africa; India and the liberation movements in South Africa; and a critical analysis of the diplomatic relations between India and post-apartheid South Africa.

This Chapter discusses the prospects and challenges of the diplomatic relations between the two study countries in a multi-polar world order. It is based on the proposition that, although South Africa and India have since 1994 proclaimed themselves as partners in socio-economic development, there is a need to undertake a critical analysis of the prospects and challenges embedded in their economic relations with regard to their bilateral and multilateral engagements in the multi-polar world order. For instance, Sidiripoulos (2011) indicates that both countries tend to articulate their Africa policy through a national interest prism, especially regarding energy security, trade, and terrorism. They have consistently reiterated the importance of their bilateral strategic relationship and multilateral engagements through the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) and the India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) groupings (Viera,

2011). However, their unequal economic positions in these multilateral groupings need to be critically examined.

The following section looks at the concept of multipolarity in international relations, with special reference to the Fort Declaration signed in 1997 by the then South African President Nelson Mandela and former Prime Minister of India, H.D. Deve Gowda.

6.2. The Concept of Multipolarity in International Relations.

According to Degterev (2019:404) ‘the concept of multipolarity has come a long way from its categorical rejection by Western politicians and scholars to the strong necessity of taking into account the realities of a multipolar world even by US close allies. However, the history of international relations reflects the sequence of different world order models with different types of hierarchy and balance of power playing itself out in countries such as Austria, France, USA, and USSR amongst others. ‘One of the most politicised and debated issues in the current international relations agenda is the type of world order – unipolar or multipolar. American scholars in their majority conclude that the world is unipolar and will remain so for a long time, presenting this world order as an unconditional good for the whole world. Expert community and political establishment of Russia, China and other BRICS countries, and even a number of EU member-states opt for the establishment of a more balanced multipolar world’ (Degterev, 2019:405).

Spies (2010:81) argues that, ‘the polarity of IR discourse entertained various successor scenarios, typically focusing on configurations of a multipolar system. Samuel Huntington has identified a combination of an unipolarity that he refers to as ‘uni-multipolarity’: a vertical structure of global power that is multi-tiered and hierarchical. She further asserts that this notion is supported

by authors such as Barry Buzan and Ole Waver, who posit that global power is increasingly regionally structured, with the hyper-power of the US being challenged not just by single-state powers such as China, but by groups of states that are regionally organised, such as the EU. Spies further states that 'Polarity' in Africa is a subject for the overlapping of participation by states in regional integration schemes, and compounded by cashing loyalties incurred by extra-continental partnerships. A case in point is South Africa's membership of IBSA, which in 2005 rendered the country much more sympathetic to the aspirations of Brazil and India which, as a member of the 'Group of Four' submitted a separate model for Security Council Reform. The model was sufficiently close to the AUs Commission Position to fuel expectations that a joint position could muster majority support in the General Assembly, prompting the two multilateral groups to engage in negotiations. South Africa, along with only a minority of other African states, was willing to make the required compromises and the joint position therefore failed to materialise' Spies (2010:81).

6.3 Bilateral Economic Relations between South Africa and India: The significance of the Red Fort Declaration in a Multi-Polar World

The Strategic Partnership between India and South Africa called the Red Fort Declaration was signed in 1997 by the then South African President Nelson Mandela and former Prime Minister of India, H.D. Deve Gowda (Mishra, 2019). Reddy (2005) states that an interrogation of the Red Fort Declaration is significant to the relations between India and South Africa because it forms the basis of their formal bilateral economic diplomatic relations. He further argues that this declaration is an important mechanism through which the two countries continue to plan, manage, and monitor their socio-economic and political relations. It defines the context of the relationship, the scope of operation, and places a great deal of emphasis on the principles of

peace, security, human freedom, and equity in the conduct of foreign policy. The declaration further details the significant role of multilateral approaches to dealing with the various challenges facing both countries. It also reflects on the need for a reformed global dispensation in which the needs of the developing countries are regarded as paramount.

Through the Red Fort Declaration, both countries affirmed the need to promote economic development through co-operation in projects, using their respective strengths including the role of the civil society in economic cooperation. In India's case, it was their strides in Small, Medium and Micro-Enterprises and employment generating programmes, while in South Africa's case, it was mining and infrastructure. A whole range of areas for co-operation were further spelt out, including in the political, economic, defence, scientific, technological, and cultural spheres (The Economic Times, 2007). At a global level, the Declaration noted the uneven impact of globalisation and the need for both countries to reinvigorate their efforts towards addressing their concerns in the context of the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The document further emphasised the need to work towards the reform of the United Nations to better reflect the present-day realities and thereby ensuring a more representative, equitable and dynamic global organisation.

The researcher argues that, while the partnership between South Africa continues to produce relatively satisfactory results, many trade and investment opportunities remain unexplored, in particular, by South Africa. The subsequent chapters will highlight the trade balance between South Africa and India in their bilateral relations, as well as in their minilateral relations such as IBSA and BRICS. Speaking at the South Africa - India Business Forum held in Delhi, India, on 25-26 January 2019, President Ramaphosa said, "*the two countries have worked to transform*

their relationship forged in struggle into a partnership for peace and economic prosperity, but more needs to be done". He further stated that, *"the two countries cooperate in multilateral formations such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa), G20 and the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation"*. He urged that the two countries should continue to forge a developmental path paved with pragmatism and a renewed sense of purpose as the challenges now faced by both countries have become greater and more complex. According to the researcher, the two countries continue to face high levels of poverty, inequality, and unemployment, particularly among women and the youth.

Alves (2007) argues that the two countries need to increase their production capacity, while considering the changing and increasingly unstable nature of the international trading environment. However, while these rapid changes create challenges, the two countries must not be blinded to the opportunities that lie ahead amid such challenges. There remain many unexplored opportunities that can propel India and South Africa to a better tomorrow, due to their complementarities and comparative advantages which can be exploited for mutual benefit, especially in trade, investment, technical exchanges in information and communications technology, and skills development. In the context of international economics, especially international trade, comparative advantage refers to an economy's ability to produce a particular good or service at a lower opportunity cost than its trading partners. It suggests that countries will engage in trade with one another, exporting the goods that they have a relative advantage in (Deutsch, 1954). According to the Oxford Dictionary of online languages, in economic terms, comparative advantage is an economy's ability to produce a particular good or service at a lower opportunity cost than its trading partners.

For instance, the researcher argues that India, as opposed to South Africa, is recognised as one of the biggest producers of IT equipment and provides related services to consumers throughout the world. This includes the mass production of medicines, clothes, etc. compared to other brands in the world market. All these milestones are attributed to India's endowment with large and cheap workforce. This reduces the cost of labour. It provides Indian companies the ability to sell its goods and services at a lower price than its competitors and realize stronger sales margins (Alden et.al, 2015). On the contrary, South Africa lacks these advantages (Alves, 2007). However, according to Encyclopaedia Britannica (2021) articulates the limitations of the comparative advantage theory based on Ricardo's publications of 1817 by indicating that transport costs, tariffs and exchange rates may change the relative prices of goods and services, hence distort comparative advantages. Moreover, imperfect competition may lead to prices being different to opportunity cost ratios (Soudien, 2009)

Reddy (2005) states that India is South Africa's fifth-largest export destination, fourth-largest import origin, and the second-largest trading partner in Asia. Both countries are working to boost trade volumes in the coming years. Bilateral trade between India and South Africa is set at a higher target, doubling the current figures to \$20 billion by 2021.

According to Alden et al. (2015), South Africa and India have a well-developed bilateral investment relationship, and that according to latest information, India's total FDI investment in South Africa amounts to approximately USD\$8 billion, whilst South Africa's investment in India is amounting to approximately USD\$1 billion, and will reach approximately USD\$2 billion between 2020-2021 if Indian investment announcements by Naspers is taken into account. According to estimates, there are over 130 Indian companies in South Africa, with an estimated investment value of approximately USD\$8 billion and employment of 18 000 South Africans.

Below are some of the recent and potential investments between South Africa and India (Chakrabarty, 2018):

- Tata Motors, Mahindra and Motherson Sumi have committed to expand plant manufacturing in South Africa for the automotive related sector. Furthermore, Eicher India has committed investment into a truck assembling plant in Pretoria.
- Motherson Sumi committed to an investment expansion of approximately R430 million in factories being operated in South Africa.
- Mahindra invested approximately R10 million in a local assembly production facility in South Africa.
- Aurobindo Pharmaceuticals committed to an investment of approximately R80 million to expand local production of pharmaceutical products.
- Vendata Resources committed USD\$1,3 billion as investment into South Africa's mining industry for the Gamsberg Zinc mine and a Zinc smelter.
- Exel, a major Indian call Centre company invested in a call Centre in Cape Town and intends to expand operations to other major South African cities.
- Mylan Pharmaceuticals has recently committed to an acquisition plant investment of approximately R400 million to manufacture pharmaceutical products in South Africa.

The *Briefing Book II: Country Profile Document. South Africa-India Joint Ministerial Commission, 19 May 2015*, highlights that Invest South Africa and Invest India signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to enhance the bilateral investment relationship between the two countries. The MOU covers co-operation on issues such as investment promotion best practices, country sectorial market intelligence information, information on

leading companies in each country that may look for foreign expansion opportunities and training opportunities for staff of both agencies. South Africa will continue to engage potential Indian investors on investment related opportunities in South Africa for sectors such as agriculture and agro-processing, automotive, pharmaceutical, aerospace, infrastructure, BPO, energy, ICT and electronics and metals and mining.

Tables 6.1 shows the development of the South Africa-India bilateral investment since 2003-2017/2018 – between India and South Africa (in Rand per annum).

Table 6.1: Development of the South Africa-India bilateral investment since 2003-2017/2018 (in Rands per annum)

Year	RSA FDI In India	India FDI to RSA
2017	58.9	-
2016	1,318.8	1,164.2
2015	313.0	2,979.2
2014	107.0	619.4
2013	-	9,944.9
2012	2,459.4	10,428.4
2011	863.0	3,745.1
2010	399.4	1,597.7
2009	-	5,199.2
2008	654.8	23,117.2
2007	730.8	324.8
2006	1,107.9	6,794.3
2005	603.7	1,656.7
2004	353.6	791.0
2003	1,059.5	1,847.9
Total	10,030.3	70,210.0

Source: FDI markets, updated March 2018

Table 6.1. Indicates that no investments from India were recorded in 2017, whilst South Africa invested R58.9 million during the same period in India. It further indicates that South Africa's total investments to India stood at R10.030.3 billion. There is a lot that must be done by South Africa on the investment side compared to India as its total investment stands at R 70.210.0 billion.

During a focus group discussion with participants from the Department of Trade and Industry, they expressed strong views that India is aggressive and pragmatic in how it approaches its trade and investment engagements with South Africa, and that this is an attribute that is missing in South Africa's approach to doing business in a general sense. For India, the issues of national interest and soft power are paramount in how they leverage available opportunities. In their account of trade and investment between the two countries, participants expressed the views below by stating that:

“...what is missing in the South African trade and investment approach is the element of aggression. South Africa is far from aggressive in doing business with India, and India is extremely aggressive in how it does business with other countries, including South Africa. India makes efforts not only to develop strategies, but implements them robustly too. They have the second largest population in the world and this on its own makes them much stronger than South Africa. South Africa also needs to develop a more pragmatic trade and investment strategy for India and forget about the sentimental attachment of a history of cordial relations. It is all about national interest, and India often makes use of every opportunity to fulfil its national interests in its interaction with South Africa...”.

In his statement during a State visit to India, in January 2019, President Ramaphosa stated as indicated above that, “*although the two countries share cordial relations forged in struggle into a partnership for peace and economic prosperity, more still needs to be done in order to promote trade between the two countries*”. The researcher concurs that this statement corroborates and gives credence to trade figures reflected in Table 6.1, especially on the part of South Africa, that a lot still needs to be done to increase this figure from a mere \$10.3 billion to more justifiable trade figures.

During an in-depth interview with a DIRCO official who was previously posted in India, he argued that trade figures between the two countries during his posting in India in 2005-2010, were in stark contrast with the two countries’ shared common vision of creating a strong trade and investment rapport amongst their business people. He expressed the view that:

“...for the better part of my posting in India, trade figures were always in favour of India. It would have been interesting to establish why this was the case, despite the unequal economies and population...”

The statements by President Ramaphosa and the official from DIRCO are in support of figures reflected in Table 6.1.

A Director from the Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa) stated that the trade and investment engagements between the two countries were at variance with the principles enshrined in the Red Fort Declaration. This is a mechanism established in 1997 by both countries to manage bilateral, economic relations between the two countries. He further referred to a reaffirmation statement, through the Tshwane Declaration of 2006, by former President Thabo

Mbeki and former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, during the latter State visit to South Africa in 2006:

“...conscious of the need to make the partnership more result-oriented and of greater direct benefit to the peoples of South Africa and India, they decided to intensify co-operation and committed themselves to raise the existing level of friendship and partnership between South Africa and India to even higher levels...”.

During an in-depth interview with another official who was previously posted in India, from Department of International Relations and Cooperation, he expressed the following view:

“... the current Foreign Direct Investment figures between south Africa and India suggest that there remained many unexplored opportunities for South Africa government in India...”.

However, the researcher argues that whether these opportunities have been presented to South Africa was a matter for discussion. He further stated:

“...South Africa’s trade figures were low because it cannot export certain products because of the protectionist market of India...”.

During in-depth interviews, a Director of a civil society organisation. i.e. Centre for the Advancement of Citizenry Participation in International Relations, CACPIR, stated:

“... although India and South Africa enjoyed cordial historical relations, India has made more strides in its relations with South Africa, as there was a strong presence of Indian companies in South Africa, including the employment opportunities created”.

However, he raised the following concerns: (1) political pressure was restricting the space for civil society actors to participate in some of the government activities; (2) government should realise that the impact of having a robust civil society in South Africa will play a critical role in creating a vibrant and enabling environment for the economic relations between the two countries to flourish; (3) the participation of civil society in bilateral meetings between the two countries will assist in allowing them to play an oversight role, working together with Indian civil society organisations; (4) whenever the Indian government adopts and implements a more assertive approach to economic diplomacy, the South African civil society organisations will assist government in how the Indian government's priorities fit with those of South Africa's national priorities, and what opportunities exist for civil society and private sector alike; (5) unexplored opportunities by South Africa may be a result of extending invitations to the same members of private sectors during official visits to India, and the exclusion of key civil society organisations; (6) although government–business platforms have increasingly played a role in enhancing private-sector relations, it was also thought that civil society should be engaging in economic-diplomacy initiatives as well.

A Director from the Department of Trade and Industry further stated:

“... the trade relations between India and South Africa needed to be broadened and diversified, with small and medium-sized enterprises playing a greater role.....Civil society could also play a proactive role in policy dialogue by ensuring that these engagements contribute to sustainable development and benefit the population as a whole, rather than a small number of individuals, by advising government and business on how certain projects may have an impact on local communities. Civil

society and business could also work together to ensure greater monitoring, transparency and risk reduction...”

Table 6.2 reflects South Africa’s investments in India between 2004 and 2017 (in Rand per annum).

Table 6.2: South Africa’s Investments in India between 2004 and 2017

Year	Projects	Total Capital Investment	Average Capital Investment	Jobs Created	Average Jobs	Companies
2017	3	58.9	19.6	201	67	1
2016	4	1,318.8	330.0	511	127	3
2015	2	313.0	155.8	251	125	2
2014	1	107.4	107.4	52	52	1
2012	3	2,459.4	819.8	644	214	3
2011	3	863.0	288.1	441	147	3
2010	1	399.4	399.4	390	390	1
2008	1	654.8	654.8	103	103	1
2007	2	730.8	365.4	156	78	2
2006	3	1,107.9	369.3	957	319	2
2005	1	603.7	603.7	939	939	1
2004	2	353.6	176.8	646	323	2
2003	2	1,059.5	530.4	143	71	2
Total	28	10,030.3	358.8	5,434	194	20

Source: FDI markets, updated March 2018

Table 6.2 shows that between 2003 and 2017, 28 South African projects in India were recorded. These projects represented a total capital investment of R10.030.3 billion which was an average investment of R358.83 million per project. During this period, a total of 5,434 jobs were created in India by 20 South African companies because of the 28 projects.

A DIRCO official who was previously posted in India, had the following to say during an in-depth interview:

“...South Africa’s investments in India were lower than Indian investments in South Africa...”

He estimated that India might have over 100 companies in South Africa, whilst South Africa had less. According to Table 6.2, the creation of 5.434 jobs had been done through 20 South African companies, a mere figure compared to 11.700 jobs created by Indian companies through 84 projects, which stood at 62 companies.

During an in-depth interview with the Director for the Centre for the Advancement of Citizenry Participation in International Relations, (CACPIR), he said:

“...government needed to work with civil society in order to jointly identify projects aimed at creating job opportunities for both the people of India and South Africa..... the perpetual exclusion of civil society from some of the bilateral engagements between the two countries created parallel processes since civil society organisations often engaged with their counterparts without the consent of government....”

Table 6.3 illustrates South Africa’s investments in India (per sector) in 2017-2018.

Table 6.3: South Africa's investments in India (per sector)

Industry sector	Projects	Total Capital Investment	Average Capital Investment	Jobs Created	Average Jobs	Companies
Financial services	9	5,069.5	563.1	1,565	173	7
Business machines & equipment	3	726.8	242.3	1,086	362	1
Materials	3	1,291.3	430.9	412	137	1
Software & IT services	3	326.1	108.7	388	129	3
Textile	3	58.9	19.6	201	67	1
Coal, Oil and Natural Gas	2	170.2	85.1	16	8	2
Beverages	1	603.7	603.7	939	393	1
Business service	1	132.3	132.3	156	156	1
Chemical	1	61.6	61.6	18	18	1
Food & Tobacco	1	399.4	399.4	390	390	1
Hotel & Tourism	1	1,190.4	1,190.4	263	263	1
Total	28	10,030.3	358.8	5,434	194	20

Source: FDI markets, updated March 2018

The data presented in Table 6.3 reflects 12 different sectors of South Africa's top 3 investments by total capital that include financial services, materials, and hotel & tourism. For example, with 9 projects 7 South African companies created 1.565 jobs in the financial services sector, 3 projects in the materials sector creating 412 jobs through 1 company, and finally 263 jobs created in the hotel & tourism sector through 1 project by a single company. Other stronger investments are in the business and machinery, beverages, tobacco & food, and much less on textile as reflected by the data in table 6.3. Although the financial services sector was ranked the highest with 1.565 jobs created by 7 companies, the business machine and equipment sector created 1.086 through only 1 company (Foreign Direct Investments Markets, 2018).

A focus group discussion with participants from the Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa) indicated that:

“...There is a need for South Africa to look into unexplored opportunities in other fields other than those listed in Table 6.3., through SMMEs. Alternatively, South Africa should endeavour to make use of its strong relations with India to explore untapped opportunities in sectors where South African companies have invested the least.....it may also be prudent to engage civil society organisations to conduct in-depth research in order to identify potential opportunities with a view to expand South Africa's investment portfolio in India...”

The data presented in Table 6.3. shows that there are fewer capital investments in areas such as textile, chemicals, and business services by South Africa in India. Moreover, although the Indian textile market is strong, participants were of the following views:

“...South Africa should make efforts to consider exporting African Prints to India...although India specialises in fabrics, African prints may be a new product to the Indian market...”

According to data presented in Table 6.3, there are fewer investments in the textile industry by South African companies, despite having created 201 job opportunities. The Director from the Department of Trade and Industry also made proposals, which were in line with the civil society organisation, CACPIR. by saying:

“...There must be heightened participation by both civil society and private sector in the bilateral discussions between the two countries with a view to pragmatically drive specific business initiatives and innovations...”

Although the Indian businesspeople operating in South Africa declined a request to be interviewed, they informally expressed views which corroborated information contained in Table 6.3. They indicated that:

“...There were areas such as textile, chemicals, and business services which South African business needed to take advantage of and invest on in India...”

They further indicated that, although India produced textile, African prints might not be produced to the best of their abilities. However, should South Africa wish to export African print material, the local textile firms in India may replicate such material, thus, destroying the export market of South African print materials to India.

Table 6.4 shows South Africa’s investments in India (per company) in 2017-2018.

Table 6.4: South Africa's investments in India (per company)

Investing company	Projects	Total Capital Investment	Average Capital Investment	Jobs Created	Average Jobs	Companies
Belgotex	3	58.9	19.6	201	67	1
De Beers	3	1,291.3	430.9	412	137	1
Sahara Computers and Electronics (SCEL)	3	726.8	242.3	1,086	362	1
First Rand	2	1,1291.3	645.6	296	148	1
Shriram Life Insurance	2	1,246.7	623.4	466	233	1
Axiom-Bio products	1	61.6	61.6	18	18	1
CKR consulting Engineers	1	132.3	132.3	156	156	1
Cockett Marine Oil	1	85.1	85.1	8	8	1
Datacraft	1	111.3	111.3	284	284	1
Dynamic Technology Holding (DTH)	1	107.4	107.4	52	52	1
Fry's Vegetarian (Fry Group Foods)	1	399.4	399.4	390	390	1
Hollard Insurance	1	623.4	623.4	233	233	1

Investing company	Projects	Total Capital Investment	Average Capital Investment	Jobs Created	Average Jobs	Companies
Lourensford wines	1	603.7	603.7	939	939	1
Mantis Collection	1	1,190.4	1190.4	263	263	1
MMI Holdings	1	623.4	623.4	233	233	1
Mxit	1	107.4	107.4	52	52	1
Naspers	1	6.5	6.5	1	1	1
Sanlam Life	1	623.4	623.4	233	233	1
SASOL	1	85.1	85.1	8	8	1
Total	28	10,030.3	358.8	5,434	194	20

Source: FDI markets, updated March 2018

The data presented in Table 6.4 reflects South Africa’s investments in India per company. It shows that South Africa had fewer companies in India compared to Indian companies in South Africa. South Africa had 20 companies compared to India’s 62. There were more jobs created by Indian companies compared to South African companies in India. While South African companies created 5,434 jobs, Indian companies created 11,700 between 2003-2017/2018 (Foreign Direct Investment Market, 2018).

During focus group discussions with participants from the Department of Trade and Industry, they expressed the following view:

“...Every country is looking to advance its national interests ahead of anything else. Even in the case of South Africa, as the world polarises, it continues to look at opportunities that exist in order to exploit them. However, India seems to have

utilised available opportunities in South Africa more than South Africa did in India...”

Table 6.5 shows India’s investment in South Africa (January 2003- February 2016).

Table 6.5: India’s investments in South Africa (January 2003- February 2016)

Year	Projects	Total Capital Investment	Average Capital Investment	Jobs Created	Average Jobs	Companies
2016	1	1,164.2	1,164.2	180	180	1
2015	11	2,979.4	271.1	1,1785	162	11
2014	3	619.4	206.9	254	84	3
2013	10	9,945.2	994.0	286	28	8
2012	6	10,428.4	1737.9	568	94	6
2011	13	3,745.5	288.1	1,979	154	10
2010	5	1,597.7	319.5	754	150	4
2009	9	5,199.2	577.5	1,389	154	8
2008	6	23,117.2	3852.9	761	126	5
2007	2	324.8	162.4	70	35	2
2006	6	6,794.3	1,132.8	1,637	272	4
2005	2	1,656.7	829.0	883	441	1
2004	6	791.0	132.3	272	45	6
2003	4	1,847.9	462.3	882	220	4
Total	84	70,209.5	835.5	11,700	139	62

Source: FDI markets, updated March 2018

According to the data presented in Table 6.5, between January 2003 and February 2016, a total of 84 Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) projects were recorded, reflecting Indian investments in South Africa. These projects represented a total capital investment of R70.209.5 billion which was an average investment of R835.5 million per project. During the period, a total of 11,700 jobs were created by 62 companies.

Reddy (2005) states that the Red Fort Declaration is significant to the relations between the two countries as it forms the basis for their formal diplomatic relations, particularly to monitor their socio-economic relations. This Declaration was signed in March 1997, and serves as a guiding principle on the commitment by India and South Africa to make use of their historical relations to advance issues of common interest and mutual benefit, and trade is one amongst the issues of common interest.

A Director from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), South Africa had the following to say during an in-depth interview:

“...There is a wider awareness about the strength of South Africa’s financial sectors in India. However, there is a need to replicate this strength into other sectors where there is a deficit...”

These deficits are already reflected in Table 6.3 and further articulated through focus group discussions with officials from DIRCO. One amongst the approaches suggested was the inclusion of private sector and civil society into the bilateral discussions between the two countries. It is believed that these stakeholders will help shape government’s approach into doing business in India, and that government should make use of the Indian diaspora in South Africa

due to their affinity with India to stimulate positive dialogue between the businesspeople of both countries.

Furthermore, the Director from the DTI stated that, in the broadening and diversification of small and medium-sized enterprises, it is important for the Indian and South African governments to consider and consult with private sector on the underlying reasons for lack of investment in certain sectors. This will unlock potential to increase production capacity, particularly on the part of South Africa as the trade balance is currently in favour of India.

The Director at CACPIR stated the following during an in-depth interview:

“...Civil society could assist by carrying out in-depth research and analysis of why certain policies are not effective and use this information to inform government positions... Civil society could also help create awareness of opportunities in the Indian private sector. This could be done by facilitating an economic study of the Indian market and by improving knowledge networks...”

The Director for the DTI further stated that whilst South Africa may wish to explore unexplored opportunities in India, the protectionist stance of the Indian government might stall this initiative.

A DIRCO official, who was previously posted in India, said:

“...The reason why India’s trade balance has always been higher than that of South Africa could be attributed to a number of reasons such as the size of the Indian population, and its huge economy... In its trade with India, South Africa is strong in only a few areas such as financial services, hotel & tourism, materials... and that there is a need to expand and diversify...”

Table 6.6 shows India's Investment in South Africa (per sector) in 2017-2018.

Table 6.6: India's Investments in South Africa (per sector) in 2017-2018

India's Investments	Projects	Total Capital Investment	Average Capital Investment	Jobs Created	Average Jobs	Companies
Software & IT Services	18	3,486.2	193.8	1,713	95	15
Financial Services	14	2,016.8	144.1	294	8	3
Automotive OEM	8	5,315.7	664.0	2,774	346	5
Coal, Oil and Natural	6	30,439.3	5073.4	554	92	6
Rubber	4	2,155.6	538.2	735	183	1
Alternative/Rene Wable Energy	3	11,143.5	3714.1	160	53	2
Biotechnology	3	2,174.0	724.2	392	130	3
Communications	3	259.3	86.4	177	59	3
Hotel & Tourism	3	4,836.4	1612.1	718	239	1
Metals	2	4,883.5	2441.1	1,673	836	2
Automotive Components	1	210.8	210.8	112	112	1
Electronic Components	1	38.0	38.0	11	11	1
Engine & Turbines	1	103.5	103.5	13	13	1
Leisure & Entertainment	1	103.5	103.5	4	4	1
Minerals	1	27.5	27.5	13	13	1
Pharmaceuticals	1	134.9	134.9	41	41	1
Plastics	1	724.2	724.2	473	473	1
Real Estate	1	470.1	470.1	20	20	1
Total	84	70,209.5	835.5	11,700	139	62

Source: FDI markets, updated March 2018

Data presented in Table 6.6 shows that 62 Indian Companies invested in South Africa, with 139 jobs on average created, total capital of R 70.209.5 billion, and an average capital of R 835.5 billion. The total number of jobs created by Indian companies in South Africa was 11.700. It also indicates that investment sectors by India in South Africa ranged from software & IT services, financial services, Automotive OEM, to Real Estate, and more. It also included the number of projects, total investment, average capital investment, jobs created, average jobs created, and the number of companies involved. For example, 48 projects were recorded, the highest being in the Software & IT Sector with 18 projects compared to 3 projects in the same sector by South African companies operating in the same sector in India. The Indian Financial Services recorded a total of 14 projects compared to 9 projects by South African companies in India. Data in Tables 6.3. and 6.6, respectively, reflect investments by both countries per sector, and according to data provided by the Foreign Direct Investment Markets (2018), India recorded 84 projects, while South Africa fell behind with only 28 projects.

Table 6.6 gives credence to the assertion by Sidiripoulos (2011), that amongst others, trade is at the centre of what drives national interests between the two countries and that despite their strong bilateral relations, they remain unequal, as reflected in the trade balance. The researcher, therefore, argues that the areas of investment listed in Table 6.6 were of national interest to India's trade and investment strategy with South Africa.

During an informal discussion and focus group discussions in Pretoria with Indian businessmen in South Africa, one of them said:

“...It might not be possible for South African companies to replicate the same investments in India because of the latter's protectionist market...”

The researcher therefore questions *'what is the value usefulness of historical and fraternal relations between India and South Africa if India can subject South Africa to trade barriers manifesting through a protectionist approach to doing business?'*

Amongst others, a response to this question would include the fact that, nation states are inherently driven by their national interests, as opposed to affinity. The researcher's view is supported by a statement made by a DIRCO official who was previously posted in India. He mentioned that:

“...Competing national interests become more visible when countries operate within and outside the scope of their bilateral relations...the world is anarchical and when it comes to matters of national interest, often times countries do not compromise...enjoying cordial bilateral relations do not translate to compromising national interest...the notion that India has emerged in the 21st century as an important global economic and political actor and increasingly a significant partner for Africa will continue to pose a serious challenge for South Africa...”

During focus group discussions with some South African businessmen doing business in India, the following was revealed that:

“...It was very difficult to penetrate the Indian market in areas such as real estate, entertainment and software & IT services... I previously failed in an attempt to establish partnership with an Indian production company in Mumbai, with a view to working on joint projects between South African actors and Bollywood actors to promote arts and culture between the two countries...”

Godwa (2019) states that, while the partnership between India and South Africa continues to produce good results, many unexplored opportunities in trade and investment remain. In this regard, the Director from CACPIR suggested during an in-depth interview:

“...It might be useful to determine whether less investments by South African companies in India was due to the limited knowledge by South African government of the Indian market or perhaps prevailing barriers to conducting business in India... if the former was the case, then the role that civil society can play would close the knowledge gap that could exist amongst South African businesses...”

He further added that, there are difficulties around tax requirements which varied in India from state to state. As a result, India was currently considering a goods and services tax, which would provide a uniform national taxation policy.

Bhana (2015) indicates that the trade sector between India and South Africa needed to be broadened and diversified, with small and medium-sized enterprises playing a greater role. In the broadening and diversification of small and medium-sized enterprises, it was important for the Indian and South African governments to consult with business on the underlying reasons for lack of investment in certain sectors. Table 6.7 shows India’s investment in South Africa (per company).

Table 6.7: India’s investment in South Africa (per company) in 2017-2018

Investing company	Projects	Total Capital Investment	Average Capital Investment	Jobs Created	Average Jobs	Companies
State Bank of India (SBI)	5	720.3	144.1	105	21	1
Apollo Tyres	4	2,155.6	538.2	735	183	1
Indian Hotels	3	4,836.4	1612.1	718	239	1
Mahindra & Mahindra	3	543.5	180.7	477	159	1

Investing company	Projects	Total Capital Investment	Average Capital Investment	Jobs Created	Average Jobs	Companies
(M&M)						
Aegis Limited	2	323.5	161.1	539	269	1
Bank of India (BOI)	2	288.1	144.1	42	21	1
Cennergi	2	9,107.0	4553.5	138	68	1
ICICI Bank	2	288.1	144.1	42	21	1
Shrenuj	2	271.1	134.9	261	130	1
Systime	2	151.9	76.0	18	9	1
Tata Motors	2	1,656.7	829.0	883	441	1
Tata Motors (SA)	2	1,737.9	868.3	932	466	1
Tata Steel	2	25,682.8	12840.7	1,158	579	1
Wipro	2	167.6	83.8	125	62	1
Zomato.com	2	151.9	76.0	18	9	1
Ashok Leyland	1	1,523.1	1523.1	844	844	1
Aurobindo Pharma	1	131.0	131.0	88	88	1
Bank of Baroda	1	144.1	144.1	21	21	1
Bharat Biotech	1	878.7	878.7	124	124	1
Canara Bank	1	144.1	144.1	21	21	1
Capillary technologies	1	76.0	76.0	9	9	1
Celkon Mobiles	1	34.0	34.0	10	10	1
CIM Global	1	34.0	34.0	10	10	1
Cipla	1	1,164.2	1164.2	180	180	1
CiplaMedpro	1	134.9	134.9	41	41	1
Coal India Limited (CIL)	1	290.7	290.7	54	54	1
Country Club India Limited (CCIL)	1	103.5	103.5	4	4	1
Cura Software Solutions	1	200.4	200.4	162	162	1
Cyberoam Technologies	1	76.0	76.0	9	9	1
Dabur Idia	1	213.5	213.5	243	243	1
HCL Technologies	1	127.0	127.0	151	151	1
India Oil (IOC)	1	290.7	290.7	54	54	1
Indusind Bank	1	144.1	144.1	21	21	1
ITC Infotech	1	180.7	180.7	49	49	1
Jindal Africa	1	654.8	654.8	21	21	1
Jindal Steel & Power	1	402.1	402.1	163	163	1

Investing company	Projects	Total Capital Investment	Average Capital Investment	Jobs Created	Average Jobs	Companies
JSW Energy	1	7,307.6	7307.6	116	116	1
Khopoli Investment s	1	2,036.4	2036.4	22	22	1
Larsen &Toubro (L&T)	1	38.0	38.0	17	17	1
Mahindra & Mahindra South Africa	1	133.6	133.6	39	39	1
Minerals and Metals Trading (MMTC)	1	27.5	27.5	13	13	1
Mira Inform	1	89.1	89.1	15	15	1
Praj Industries	1	38.0	38.0	17	17	1
Rsamco Systems	1	131.0	131.0	76	76	1
RatgeGain	1	76.0	76.0	9	9	1
Spice VAS Africa	1	98.2	98.2	16	16	1
Square Yards Consulting	1	470.1	470.1	20	20	1
SRF	1	724.2	724.2	473	473	1
SumiMotherson Group	1	210.8	210.8	112	112	1
Suzlon Energy	1	103.5	103.5	13	13	1
Syndicate Bank	1	144.1	144.1	21	21	1
Tata Consultancy Services (TCS)	1	180.7	180.7	49	49	1
Tata Iron & Steel	1	694.1	694.1	661	661	1
Tega Industries	1	133.6	133.6	72	72	1
Teledata Informatics	1	26.2	26.2	9	9	1
Union Bank of India	1	1441.1	144.1	21	21	1
Ushacomm	1	200.4	200.4	162	162	1
Vikram Solar	1	38.0	38.0	11	11	1
Vizury Interactive	1	76.0	76.0	9	9	1
Vserv.mobi (Vserv)	1	76.0	76.0	9	9	1
VVF	1	213.5	213.5	243	243	1
Wipro Technologies	1	1,715.6	1715.6	1,000	1,000	1
Total	84	70,209.5	835.5	11,700	139	62

Source: FDI markets, updated March 2018

Table 6.7 shows that between 2003-2018 India had 84 projects managed by 62 companies. Table 6.7 also reveals that these companies created 11.700 jobs with a capital investment of R70.209.5 billion. This is much higher than South Africa's 20 companies which have created 5.434 jobs

through 28 projects. There is also an indication from the data in the table that JSW Energy and Cennergi have recorded the highest capital investments with a combined total of R16.414.6 billion and created 254 jobs. The Apollo Tyres and Khopoli investments also rank high, with a combined investment of R4.192 billion, and 757 jobs created.

According to the Mail & Guardian (2013), Apollo Tyres started its expansion drive in 2006 when it acquired the South African company Dunlop Tyres International (since renamed Apollo Tyres South Africa) and the Vredestein brand in the Netherlands in 2009. Cennergi (Pty) Ltd. is a 50:50 joint venture between South African-based diversified resources company Exxaro Resources Limited (Exxaro) and The Tata Power Company Limited (Tata Power) of India through its subsidiary Khopoli Investments Limited.

Cennergi is based in South Africa and focuses on the development, ownership, operation, maintenance, acquisition, and management of electricity generation assets in South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia. The initial project pipeline focused on renewable energy projects in South Africa and Cennergi's strategy is to create a balanced portfolio of diverse generation assets. The JSW Energy Limited is amongst India's leading private sector power producing companies that believes in the efficient utilization of all available resources. From managing operations, enhancing social and economic benefits, minimizing environmental impacts, and employing cutting-edge innovation, JSW Energy has grown steadily and strongly through the years. The data in Table 5.9 show Imports and Exports between India and South Africa in the first 6 months of 2018 (in Rand value). Table 6.8 shows the Import/Export between South Africa and India in the first 6 months of 2018 (in Rand value). In Table 6.8 figures highlighted in red on the 'trade balance column' indicate a negative trade balance against South Africa. It means South

Africa imported more of a specific product category from India than what it exported to India. In brief, South Africa made more imports than exports to India.

Table 6.8: Import/Export between South Africa and India in the first 6 months of 2018 (in Rand value)

Description	Exports India	Imports South Africa	Trade Balance
Mineral Products	R20 837 083 310	R2 456 963 428	R18 380 119 882
Wood Pulp and Paper	R1 341 800 806	R260 390 009	R1 081 410 797
Products Iron and Steel	R1 793 798 697	R1 168 280 363	R625 518 334
Other Unclassified Goods	R232 592 595	R690 320	R231 902 275
Wood Products	R101 563 315	R9 425 548	R92 137 767
Precious Metals	R362 960 646	R345 170 406	R17 790 240
Works of Art	R403 597	R3 596 735	R-3 193 138
Animal and Veg Oil	R194 791	R33 109 635	R-32 914 844
Live Animals	R1 826 886	R72 031 663	R-70 204 777
Raw and Hide Leather	R11 942 526	R123 873 177	R-111 930 651
Stone and Glass	R70 647 292	R220 764 816	R-150 117 524
Footwear	R396 792	R157 309 838	R-156 913 826
Toys and Sport Apparel	R1 415 235	R184 550 795	R-183 135 560
Photographic and Medical Equipment	R49 301 111	R237 651 438	R-188 350 327
Prepared Foodstuffs	R74 422 467	R288 736 454	R214 313 987
Equipment Components	-	R500 327 318	R-500 327 318
Plastic and Rubber	R74 441 506	R742 655 534	R-668 214 028
Vegetables	R184 641 039	R1 019 830 643	R-835 189 604
Textiles	R 77 273 630	R1 002 553 177	R-925 279 547
Machinery	R1 058 641 550	R2 847 080 632	R-1 788 439 082
Chemicals	R1 419 196 134	R5 888 777 395	R-4 469 581 261
Vehicles, Aircraft and Vessels	R72 757 973	R5 058 825 299	R-4 986 067 326
Total	R27 767 301 118	R22 622 594 623	R5 144 706 495

Source: FDI markets, updated 2018/2019

The results in Table 6.8 reflect the cumulative value of trade of Import/Export between South Africa and India for the first 6 months of 2018 for a wide variety of product categories. It shows the total value exported, total value imported and then the trade balance which is (Exports -

Imports). A positive trade balance shows South Africa exported more of a product than what it imported from India. For example, mineral products, wood pulp and paper, products iron and steel, other unclassified goods, wood products and precious metals were the highest.

The 22 major product categories reflected in Table 6.8 shows that South Africa only had a positive trade balance in 6 of the 22 categories, while India was better off in 16 of the 22 categories. South Africa's saving grace when it comes to trade with India is the fact that South Africa exports so much coal to India. Even though South Africa only has a positive trade balance in 6 of the 22 product categories, South Africa has an overall trade surplus (positive trade balance) of R5.14 billion for the first 6 months of 2018. But if South Africa did not export coal to India, it would be sitting with a trade deficit (negative trade balance) to the value of around R13 billion (Foreign Direct Investment Markets, 2018).

According to Singh (2018), for South Africa's part, better organization and stronger business structures would help improve engagement for trade and investment. Just like Indian entrepreneurs, South African business structures must learn how to become self-sustainable and less reliant on government if they are to become more successful like their Indian counterparts. In all these initiatives, civil society has either been non-existent or has played a very limited role. A summary of the top 5 biggest exports of South Africa to India is presented on Table 6.9 below based on exports value and not trade balance value (Foreign Direct Investment Markets, 2018).

Table 6.9: Top 5 biggest exports of South Africa to India in 2017-2018

Sectors	Amount in Rand
Mineral Products:	R 20 837 083 310
Products Iron & Steel:	R 1 793 798 697
Chemicals:	R 1 419 196 134
Wood pulp & paper:	R 1 341 800 806
Machinery:	R 1 058 641 550

Source: Foreign Direct Investment Markets (2018)

According to Table 6.9, the biggest exports from South Africa to India in 2017/2018 were in the mineral products sector, followed by iron and steel. Table 6.10 shows the top 5 biggest imports by South Africa from India in 2017-2018.

Table 6.10: The Top 5 Biggest Imports by South Africa from India in 2017-2018

Sectors	Amount in Rand
Chemicals:	R 5 888 777 395
Vehicles, aircraft & vessels:	R 5 058 825 299
Machinery:	R 2 847 080 632
Mineral Products:	R 2 456 963 428
Products Iron & Steel:	R 1 168 280 363

Source: Foreign Direct Investment Markets (2018)

According to Table 6.10, the biggest imports by South Africa from India are in the chemicals sector, followed by vehicles, aircrafts, and vessels. Based on Tables 6.9 and 6.10, the researcher holds a view that India may be using its BRICS partnership with South Africa to get its hands on cheap coal from South Africa – the rest of the trade categories do not look balanced at all. The researcher argues that South Africa is losing out in trade with India in many other product categories. The following section looks at the relationship between South Africa and India in the Free Trade Agreement.

6.4 South Africa and India in the Free Trade Agreement

According to Van Seventer et al. (2001), free trade is a policy formed between two or more nations that permit the unlimited import or export of goods or services between them. Whereas a comparative advantage is the ability to produce goods or services for a lower cost, free trade eliminates tariffs and makes corporations more competitive in foreign markets. Many critics of free trade question the claim that everybody benefits from free trade agreements. This segment

will make a case for the importance of an FTA between India and South Africa, based on their shared common vision, and a desire to strengthen a mutually beneficial trade relationship.

Winston (2017) states that, not all trade is free trade. When nations do not have free trade agreements, which are treaties that outline the parameters of trade between trade partners, tariffs are imposed on goods and services. Tariffs are taxes that nations impose on imports, and increase the cost of goods, which is passed on to consumers; as a result, commodity prices will be high. However, tariffs can also be used as a measure to regulate or discourage importation of certain commodities to promote domestic market. This is one of the trade barriers imposed by India on South Africa.

South Africa successfully participated in the Uruguay Round of the then General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and has concluded a development and co-operation agreement (including a free trade agreement) with the European Union (EU), and subsequently sealed a free trade agreement with the Southern African Development Community (SADC). South Africa's interest with free trade matters is based on a realistic assessment of the growth potential of its domestic market (Van Seventer et al., 2001).

In recent years, South Africa has shown some potential for sturdy growth but has generally fallen short of the levels required to substantially reduce chronically high unemployment levels. The South African government is thus employing a strategy of limited domestic consumption stimulation; for example, through the reduction of middle-class tax levels, and a sharply focused export-oriented growth strategy. Thus, the agreements with the European Union (EU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) encourage South African manufacturers to specialise in those industries in which they have a degree of competitiveness and encourage

investment in South Africa by companies wishing to produce goods for export to the EU and SADC (Tsie,1996). It is within this context that the issue of an FTA with India arises. India has in recent years come to play an increasingly important role in multilateral fora such as the WTO, and as a relatively large and strongly growing economy, is an important developing country ally for South Africa.

In pursuance of increased bilateral trade relations between India and South Africa, the latter is in favour of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) approach because it will provide greater access to India's vast market of over approximately 1.2 billion consumers. This means that South Africa would have gained access into an economy that is otherwise viewed as highly protected. Because of the protectionist nature of the Indian economy, the latter is not in favour of this mechanism (Van Seventer et al., 2001).

Furthermore, Van Seventer et al. (2001) state that FTA between India with South Africa could raise concerns of trade creation and trade diversion for precious metals meant for jewellery, coal, iron and steel, basic chemicals, machinery and some non-metallic minerals. Because of its huge market, India is conscious that South Africa will benefit more from this FTA. As a result, South Africa is unable to gain access to many products which could otherwise contribute to the increase of its trade figures.

The Briefing Book II: Country Profile Document. South Africa-India Joint Ministerial Commission, 19 May 2015, indicates that, although bilateral trade has somewhat increased between the two countries, from a total of R68 billion in 2012 to R107 billion in 2017, India's resistance to accede to the FTA remains an impediment. There is, therefore, a need for both South Africa and India to take their bilateral relationship to higher ground, making use of the

FTA. However, the researcher asserts that for this to succeed, India must rethink its position of FTA and revise its current approach in conducting business with South Africa and Africa. Wagner (2019) states that India's relations with Africa have become more significant due to the significant importance it now attaches to Africa. He further states that to this day, India has sought to make use of this mechanism to increase trade and initiated new agreements or cooperation on security through its India-Africa Summit. The researcher argues that, despite the strong historical relations between the two countries, South Africa is still subjected to the same terms and conditions set out by India in its engagement with countries of the continent through the India-Africa Summit.

This implies that if India considers South Africa its historical partner, it should recall the building blocks of its relations with South Africa. There is a relationship anchored on a strong history of a struggle for freedom and liberation, mutual trust, affinity, and a pursuit for common growth. The post 1994 relations between India and South Africa have been characterised by their common membership of IBSA, BRICS, United Nations, and other institutions which constitute the building blocks of their bilateral relations. Holding common positions on issues of common interest and mutual benefit in relevant fora makes the two countries natural partners. Amid this strong background, India does not show any signs that its relations with South Africa should advance issues of mutual interest. It appears that according to India, the shared common history is insignificant compared to its interests (Roy, 2014).

In a multi-polar world order, there is need for India to review its protectionist approach to doing business with South Africa, and realise the immense importance, influence and power that South Africa yields in the continent (Bjork, 2015). If India were to ease its protectionist stance towards South Africa, the latter would witness improved trade with India, thus, creating more

opportunities for India in the SADC region. As developing nations, rising through the ranks of South-South Cooperation to countervail the continued dominance of the West, it is critical that they create a niche and become pioneers of a new world order driven by the developing nations.

In the context of Africa in the South Africa-India diplomatic relations, Singh (2018) states that, despite Africa and India's youngest population, Africa has emerged as an important market for the world. The researcher believes that it is critical for India to recognise the massive benefits of opening its market to South Africa and use it as a conduit to penetrate the African market. To this end, South Africa brings with it a huge market from both the SADC region, and the continent in general. Through the FTA, India can also benefit from the numbers and influence that South Africa commands.

The researcher further advances the view that the potential benefits between South Africa and India, for both the private sector and civil society from both countries are immeasurable, especially in Southern Africa and India. The architecture of the Free Trade Agreement has already demonstrated that the continent was on the way to creating a large domestic market for India (Singh et al., 2018). For instance, the former Minister of Trade and Industry of South Africa, Dr Rob Davies, on the occasion of a briefing on the FTA between India and South Africa, stressed that "*the reason Indian-South African trade had been so insignificant in 1994 had been India's steadfast opposition to apartheid*". He further stated that, "*India had been the first country to call for sanctions on apartheid South Africa. India was at the forefront of solidarity for our struggle!*". Now that South Africa has attained its freedom, India must see this as an opportunity to explore all possible and available avenues to increase trade and investment figures with South Africa, and not make use of its protectionist stance to stifle trade and investment relations.

During an in-depth interview with a Director from the Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa), he made a case for what he called a ‘paradoxical relationship’ between South Africa and India. He pointed out:

“...if trade figures between India and South Africa were low in 1994 due to sanctions against the apartheid government, why has the trend not changed much, despite the eradication of apartheid? ...”

The participant seemed to suggest that, since the apartheid system no longer exists, trade figures must increase. The participants therefore concluded stating that:

“...although apartheid was an impediment for trade between the two countries, there are no signs that much has been done to make use of the history of affinity between the two countries to increase trade, especially for the benefit of South Africa...”

An official from DIRCO who was previously posted in India said:

“...The relationship between India and South Africa is unequal in favour of India due to historical circumstances. Constant reference to historical relations between the two countries has not proven to be of benefit to South Africa, but India. Unlike in South Africa where there is a huge number of Indians, the converse cannot be said about India. Historically, no South African migrated to India due to the apartheid system, except for the launch of the ANC office in New Delhi, with few ANC members managing it while on exile...”

There is however, acknowledgement by both sides that they have enjoyed close, cooperative and multi-sectoral partnership encompassing political, security-related, economic, science and technology, human resource development, social, cultural and other areas of mutual interest and

accordingly committed themselves through the Framework for Cooperation to further strengthen their partnership in the new and existing areas of cooperation for mutual benefit. The FTA must give meaning to the already existing relations between the two countries. Furthermore, the FTA could be providing a solid basis for elevating the partnership to new heights, considering developments on both sides in the last two and a half decades. The two countries have a moral responsibility, based on their shared common history to help each other to become more self-reliant, economically vibrant, at peace with themselves and the world, and to work together to strengthen their close partnership.

6.5 Competition between India and South Africa in Africa: The quest for Hegemony

In his discussion on the diplomatic relations between South Africa and India in the African continent and within the context of the poly-polar world economic order at large, Sidiripoulos (2011) argues that despite enjoying cordial bilateral relations, both India and South Africa continue to compete for resources in the continent. Their relations are therefore marked by both convergent and divergent interests. The researcher further notes that South Africa is the second biggest economy in the continent after Nigeria. However, South Africa's economic footprint in the continent is much higher than that of Nigeria. It is in the interest of India that it also increases its footprint in the continent. Ghazvinian (2008) argues that a discussion about the scramble for Africa's resources will be incomplete if it excludes China, a country which has for many years entrenched itself in the continent, mainly through its investment in infrastructure development.

Sidiripoulos (2011) reveals that India has emerged in the 21st century as an important global economic and political actor and increasingly, a significant partner for Africa. Relations between the African continent and India date back many centuries. In the 20th century, India's role as a

leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, a supporter of national liberation movements and the struggle against apartheid, further augmented those ties. However, it is the potential synergies between Africa and the subcontinent, created by the changing economic and geopolitical landscape that has deepened interaction over the last several years.

Chan (2007) indicates that Russia has never had an African colony. It stayed out of the scramble for Africa, only engaging with African states in the 19th Century. In 1869, for instance, the Russians gave Ethiopia military support to threaten the position of the British in their quest to control the Suez Canal. They did this because Britain was one of their main European rivals. Friedberg (2005) states that it was not until the Cold War started in 1947 that Russia began to develop diplomatic relations with several African countries. This was a way to counter the influence of its rivals such as the United States of America (USA). The Cold War dictated the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR's) relations with many African countries for decades. This was followed by a period of relative inactivity, but more recently, relations have become increasingly important for Russia as well as some African countries. The result is that some African countries no longer need to choose between the Americans and the Chinese way of development. Ostensibly, China has the most pragmatic engagement with Africa. It claims that its policy is not to interfere with the internal workings of nation states or play geopolitics by pitting countries against each other. But it has become increasingly difficult for the country to resist using its military power to protect its economic interests. For its part, the US's aim is to tip the regional balance of power in its favour, while also gaining access to Africa's resources (Zubok, 2009).

As a matter of fact, the researcher argues that the strategy by Russian President Vladimir Putin is to redress the global balance of power by countering America's influence in Africa and try to

match China's large economic footprint on the continent. The researcher argues that Russia's primary goal is political influence, and with political influence comes access to and control of natural resources. However, despite making massive inroads, the Russian Federation is still less influential than the US and China on the continent (Chan, 2005).

Furthermore, the researcher advances a view that the emergence of the Russia-Africa Summit is a strategy by the Putin administration to further make a desperate attempt to lure the African continent into its fold with a view to muscle out countries such as India, China and the USA, amongst others. From the African point of view, Russia offers a strategic alternative to America's global hegemony, China's economic diplomacy, and the lingering influence of Africa's former colonial masters. The launch of the Russia-Africa Summit serves as a strategy by Russia to develop long-term economic influence. For example, if Russia is going to gain control of natural resources, provide military support and intelligence to countries in the continent, it means the economies of those countries will be inadvertently captured by Russia in future.

Arkhangeskaya (2013) posits that during the Cold War, the Russians provided diplomatic, economic, military, and educational support for numerous African liberation movements. These included Algeria, Angola, Cabo Verde, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Madagascar, Sao Tome & Principe, South Africa, and Tanzania. As a result, many young Africans were educated in Moscow. As a result, Russia began to trade and interact with these states routinely. It sent in military intelligence officers to establish a strong presence and ensure that Africa was not purely influenced by the West. The Russians developed relations with Africa so intensely that for the 10 years between 1950 and 1960 it surpassed the influence of colonising powers.

According to Friedberg (2005) Russia's primary interests in Africa is to build political alliances by supporting nation states economically and militarily, while remaining non-judgemental about their internal governance structures. Its long-term goal is to become a political, economic, and military mediator that can stand behind Africa's global interests and count on the continent's support in return. Russia's interest is areas such as conventional gas and oil fields in Africa and elsewhere. Arkhangeskaya (2013) shows that part of Russia's long-term strategy is to explore and supply energy resource to the continent. For example, Russian companies have made significant investments in Algeria's oil and gas industries. They have also invested in Libya, Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory Coast and Egypt. Russia is also expanding its African interests in minerals; Uranium – which is key to the nuclear power industry – is at the top of its list. In addition, Russian companies are producing aluminium in Nigeria, and have constructed hydropower stations in Angola, Namibia, and Botswana.

Competition over Africa's major resources and the search for geopolitical allies reflects and is a part of a larger battle playing out in the world. In Eurasia, the US is facing China and Russia, and the African continent is gradually becoming a similar stage for competition among these three players. Chinese influence in Africa is well known and is mainly characterised by a large resource pool, but it also indicates that in the scramble for African resources, China and Russia are challenging the West. This is troublesome for Washington as the US still does not have an effective strategic policy to oppose Moscow and Beijing in Africa. China and Russia once again find themselves aligned against America, and this trend underlines their deep cooperation. Although it is fashionable to portray the partnership between Moscow and Beijing as a mere alliance of convenience, its potential should not be underestimated. The two undermine the influence of the USA across the continents. The world will witness even greater competition in

Africa in coming years and larger infrastructure projects pulled off by Moscow and Beijing – their BRICS alliance standing in their favour. The following section looks at the diplomatic relations between the two countries in their shared membership of BRICS and IBSA, in which converging and divergent interests are experienced (Zubok, 2009).

6.6 South Africa and India in South-South Cooperation

This section makes a critical analysis of the diplomatic relations between South Africa and India in the context of South-South Cooperation, as members of the BRICS and IBSA groupings, in the poly-polar world order. It looks at their converging and divergent interests starting with an assessment of South Africa and India in BRICS.

6.6.1 The BRICS Formation: A Contextual Analysis

South Africa and India are members of the BRICS formation. According to Shongwe (2014), South–South Cooperation has existed for many decades and has played a key role in solidifying unity among developing countries. However, the concept of South–South Cooperation has evolved from being concerned with geopolitics and opposing imperialism, global racism, and colonialism, to an emphasis on geo-economics and political economy. Consequently, the focus has been on achieving sustainable development and growth for the South collectively, against the backdrop of rapid globalisation.

The Briefing Book III: Background Document. South Africa-India Joint Ministerial Commission. Speaking Notes for Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane. 19 May 2015, reveals that, in 2010, South Africa began efforts to join the Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) grouping, and the process for its formal admission began in August of that year. South Africa officially

became a member nation on 24 December 2010, after being formally invited by the BRIC countries to join the group. This was aimed at strengthening economic development within South Africa and Africa at large. Most importantly, this dialogue also formed part of the oversight mandate to establish how South Africa's involvement in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) would benefit the country and the economy. It is therefore critical for South Africa to assess its role and membership of BRICS, against its national interests, divergent policies, size of economies and global influence of other member states. This continuous assessment will greatly assist South Africa in knowing its place within the BRICS formation. For instance, Table 6.11 shows the intra-trade statistics amongst BRICS countries in 2016.

Table 6.11: Intra-trade statistics amongst BRICS countries and the rest of the World in 2016

Country	Import Value (2016)	Export Value (2016)	Import Ranking	Export Ranking
Brazil	USD 137552 (Million)	USD185235 (Mil)	4 (BRICS), 30 (World)	4(BRICS),30 (World)
Russia	USD 1822261(Million)	USD 285491 (Mil)	3 (BRICS), 25 (World)	2(BRICS), 25 (World)
India	USD 356904 (Million)	USD 260326 (Mil)	2 (BRICS), 14 (World)	3(BRICS), 14 (World)
China	USD1587920 (Million)	USD 2097637 (Mil)	1 (BRICS), 1 (World)	1 (BRICS), 1 (World)
RSA	USD 74744 (Million)	USD 74110 (Mil)	5 (BRICS), 5 (World)	5 (BRICS), 5 (World)
Total	USD 3229 Billion	USD 2902 Billion	-	-

Source: Export Genius, updated January 2018

Table 6.11 reveals that the contribution of all the BRICS countries in global imports and exports amounted to USD 3229 billion and 2902 billion respectively in 2016. This shows that the BRICS countries recorded a trade surplus in an aggregate during 2016. They had all contributed 14.6%

to global imports and 18.2% to global exports. The energy sector is in 2nd place to total imports, while 3rd place totals exports of BRICS countries (Export Genius, 2018).

Table 6.11 further indicates that South Africa remains at the bottom of the rankings within BRICS and globally. The data shows that, within BRICS intra-trade, South Africa was lagging behind India in its trade balance. This is a phenomenon reflected in both their bilateral trade relations, and BRICS membership.

During an in-depth interview, an official, previously posted in India, from the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), argued that:

“...South Africa’s economy and population were too small to warrant membership of BRICS, and that with this membership, South Africa ran the risk of being subsumed by the other BRICS member states whose economies and populations were larger...”

A Director at CACPIR also acknowledged the following:

“...through BRICS, efforts have been made to establish a working group on civil society. However, it may be difficult for South Africa to engage at an equal level with the other member states due to their sheer economic and population size, varied interests, policy shifts and alliances with other countries outside of the formation...”

At an in-depth interview, another DIRCO official who was also on a posting in India, expressed the following view:

“...the advent of BRICS had compromised bilateral relations between India and South Africa, in particular, the effects it has on the frequency of their Joint Ministerial

Commission (JMC). Often times, bilateral engagements between the two countries were relegated to the sidelines of BRICS Summits...”

Whilst he is not opposed to the idea, he believed that both governments must adhere to scheduled bilateral meetings, and only make use of the side-lines of such summits as BRICS, and the UN amongst others, to give impetus to their engagements.

Furthermore, the researcher argues that as presented on Table 6.11 above, apart from Russia, the emergence of China, India, and Brazil as economically and politically influential developing countries is beginning to reconfigure and reshape the terms of South–South Cooperation. However, South Africa does not feature anywhere as one of the influential member states of the group. These countries are driven by an ambition for global economic dominance and political leadership, a position arguably held by South Africa in the continent, except for Nigeria as the biggest economy in Africa. This development raises an important question: what are the benefits and prospects for the entire South? Will these countries accept the challenge and begin to assert South–South solidarity for the benefit of all, or are they using the notion of South–South for their own advantage?

The researcher is of the view that the principles underpinning South-South Cooperation oblige governments to play a leading role, with active participation from public and private sector institutions, non-governmental organisations, and individuals. Amongst a myriad of basic objectives of South-South Cooperation, the researcher has chosen an objective which best suits the aim and objectives of this segments, which is, ‘To enable developing countries to achieve a greater degree of participation in international economic activities and to expand international cooperation for development’. Enabling developing countries to leverage available opportunities

amongst themselves means that no country must exercise its might and strength over other, making use of its strong economy or large population.

According to De Lima (2005), the genesis of the acronym BRIC (a precursor to BRICS) is attributed to Jim O'Neill, a former chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management and former Conservative government minister. Amongst the many roles he has played, he has been hailed for coining BRIC. Originally, this acronym comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (prior to South Africa's membership). These are four rapidly developing countries that have come to symbolise the shift in global economic power away from the developed G7 economies. There was, however, an appetite by member states to include membership of an African country from the continent. Arguably, there were two contenders for this position in the African continent – Nigeria and South Africa. They were considered contenders because of their two rapidly growing economies. After significant diplomatic efforts, South Africa's inclusion into the BRICS grouping in 2010 can be regarded as one of South Africa's principal foreign policy achievements over the past years. It also fundamentally altered the nature of the BRICS group, giving it a more global structure. The researcher argues that little is known about why South Africa sought BRICS membership, except for a widely perceived notion that it did so for prestige. It is obvious that South Africa is the smallest economy compared to the other member states, and this has generated a lot of debate about South Africa's need to belong to such a big group of emerging economies – economically, and in terms of their respective populations.

Pouliot (2011), seeks to respond to these questions by arguing that South Africa's membership to the group was amongst others, premised on its strong accounting systems, and democratic governance as characterised by the separation of powers. The country's 'checks and balances' within the economic and political systems limit the power of each branch to prevent the abuse of

power. Ultimately, balance aims to ensure that no individual or group of people in government is 'all powerful'.

Oliver (2013) recalls that previous interaction between Brazil, China, India, and South Africa in the context of the BASIC and IBSA groupings contributed to generating trust between large emerging powers and South Africa. South Africa was therefore a far more natural choice and involved fewer risks of reducing the group's capacity to develop joint positions in multilateral fora. While both the BRICS grouping and South Africa significantly benefitted from the inclusion, it also made South Africa's foreign policy challenges more complex, as it increasingly must balance its emerging power commitments with its role as representative of Africa's poorer nations and that of regional leader. South Africa's foreign policy has recently been revitalising away from an appeal to Western powers, towards the establishment of new friendships in the Global South, especially with Asia and Latin America. According to Asuelime and Jethro (2013), the favouring of the Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa (BRICS) partnership and a rising tone of Anti-Western sentiments have increasingly been evidenced in South Africa's contemporary foreign policy which are of major significance to the nature and direction of its economic-diplomatic strategy.

Three broad perspectives or main arguments can be raised in the context of South Africa's membership of BRICS, in relations to some of the challenges it may be facing in its association with member states (Oliver, 2013). Firstly, most members of BRICS are troubled by slower economic growth, which should be of concern to South Africa's current foreign policy stance; secondly, anti-Western ideological concerns and related presumptions on the part of the South African government that the BRICS formation could potentially assume a counter-hegemonic character vis-à-vis the West, are questionable and dubious; and thirdly, there must be an

assessment on the extent to which South Africa stands to benefit from the opportunities provided by the BRICS network. At the same time, because of its low economic growth, high levels of poverty and lack of employment opportunities, South Africa cannot afford to follow an approach of narrow interest concerning the BRICS formation and to constrain itself in its economic diplomacy.

The South African government will therefore have to consider the opportunities offered by a more nuanced and pragmatic foreign policy designed on multiple identities. South Africa must find innovative means of creating avenues to benefit out of its membership of BRICS, amid the competing and divergent interests of member states (Oliver, 2013). De Oliveira and Daudelin (2009) argue that the changing global environment has seen a greater political and economic role for the BRICS and other emerging powers. By 2020, the BRICS countries were expected to contribute nearly half of all global gross domestic product (GDP) growth. Undoubtedly, BRICS is a powerful bloc of emerging economies which recorded a combined GDP of R18 trillion late in December 2010. The 2010 – 2011 Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum ranks South Africa favourably in relation to the other BRICS countries. The 2010 United Nations (UN) Conference on Trade and Development World Investment Report puts South Africa in the top 20 of priority economies for foreign direct investment in the world.

South Africa's membership of BRICS must bring tangible benefits for the economy to support the National Industrial Policy Framework and the Industrial Policy Action Plan. There is a need to start identifying concrete investment opportunities in key areas where South Africa has shown strength in its trade relations (per sector) with India. For example, areas for potential investment in the context of intra-BRICS trade could include financial institutions, hotel & hospitality, materials, food & beverages, telecommunications, amongst others. In other countries such as

Nigeria, South Africa has shown strong signs of success and positive breakthroughs in these sectors over the years (Steunkel, 2020).

South Africa must remain committed to the consolidation of the African Agenda and make use of its BRICS membership to increase strategic cooperation among emerging market economies of the South in support of this agenda. It also must ensure that the rest of the African continent benefits from its membership of BRICS, particularly in areas such as energy, information and communications technology, rail and road infrastructure, agriculture and food security (Besada et al., 2013). These sectors are key to the overall development of the continent, and will ensure that intra-Africa trade is bolstered, reduce the cost of doing business on the continent, innovate in order to create jobs, and enhance food security through the identification of agricultural projects funded by the BRICS Development Bank (De Oliveira et.al., 2009)

Flemes (2016) states that the official announcement at the 2013 BRICS Summit in Durban on the formation of a joint development bank, was a significant milestone regarding the future of development cooperation. Cooper (2017) adds that, the role of the development bank will be complemented by national development banks of the respective member states in their engagements to financing projects in developing countries. The researcher advances a view that the total development financing capacity of BRICS goes well beyond the New Development Bank. Furthermore, Cooper (2017) highlights that at the 2013 Durban Summit, the Interbank Cooperation Mechanism concluded two co-financing agreements: a BRICS Multilateral Infrastructure Financing Agreement for Africa and a BRICS Multilateral Co-operation and Co-Financing Agreement for Sustainable Development.

The Policy Briefing of the Institute for Development Studies, issue 5, 2014, highlights the sustained growth of rising powers, including BRICS is reshaping global governance arrangements, and that the BRICS Summits are emerging as a knowledge-exchange process among countries still classified as developing but looking to a future world order in which they have major roles and responsibilities. The failure to generate a strong recovery from financial crisis sparked by difficulties and dysfunctions in Western governance systems has opened the way for the BRICS countries to come forward as global leaders (Alden et al., 2015). According to Nel et.al., (2013), the BRICS summits are the only global process with an explicit objective to constitute a new global order in line with the massive change in economic weight that is coming in the next decade. The stated objective of BRICS is to ensure that the emerging world order is inclusive, just, and in line with historic South-South principles for a post-colonial world order, and with the United Nations as the centre of systemic legitimacy.

Although the BRICS Summits seek to project the voice of the global South, there are divergent interests and priorities among the BRICS member states. For example, Besada et al. (2013) argue that on the reform of the UN Security Council, some member states do not agree on certain issues that could compromise their national interests. The researcher also adds that there are even some on-going disputes on territorial boundaries between China and India, and in the case of South Africa and India, there remains a scramble for Africa's resources. This means that, outside of the BRICS formation and their bilateral relations, India and South Africa also compete for available resources on the continent. These are matters of national interest which often push countries, regardless of their partnerships, to be at cross-purposes with one another. It is evident that the BRICS formation, like some Bretton Woods Institutions, is facing its fair share of challenges due to differentiated interests of member states. This is a true test for this group of

emerging countries of the south which seeks to disrupt the global socio-economic and political system.

A Director from CACPIR said:

“...both China and Russia are trying to show that development is possible without democracy. The mix of non-democracies, and democracies within BRICS, has been one of the reasons for the BRICS grouping’s lack of cohesion...”

The BRICS formation operates amid a volatile global political environment, in which the present-day body politics is characterized by trade wars between the USA and China, unipolarity, and global dominance, amongst others. According to Clark and Worger (2011), the escalating trade tensions between USA and China could give BRICS countries renewed purpose to advance their trade agenda. However, the divergent trade policies and interests could be a challenge. Due to their varied interests, sizes of economies, alliances and global status, BRICS countries have struggled to establish a unified voice on the international stage.

The researcher holds the view that, although BRICS has rejected western dominance of international institutions, a lack of unity amongst member states has prevented them from advancing their global trade agenda efficiently and effectively. Nevertheless, member states may use the gap to negotiate trade with as many countries (outside BRICS) as possible, with China always being at the top, followed by Russia. The researcher further believes that the benefits that accrue because of the trade tensions between USA and China will not be of equal benefit to BRICS member states. Those with bigger populations and economies will benefit the most, while South Africa remains the least beneficiary, at the bottom of the value chain. According to Alex Capri, a senior fellow at the National University of Singapore, China might turn to India,

Brazil, and Russia to source products it originally bought from the USA, such as soya beans, wheat and meat. It is worth noting that, of all the BRICS members, Capri has excluded potential benefits for South Africa, by design or omission. This reflects an existing narrative and perception about South Africa's place in the BRICS formation.

Deborah Elms, Executive Director of the Asian Trade Centre, states that, "*The challenge for BRICS has always been what exactly holds them together beyond a cute acronym?*" She notes that, with their complex and varied domestic structures, China is outward looking and manufacturing oriented, Brazil is increasingly outward looking with a focus on agriculture, Russia is increasing its footprint on energy and gas, and India remains closed with its protectionist approach to trade. As for South Africa, no niche market has been established and much cannot be said except its export of minerals, of which coal is the highest.

To this end, South Africa's diversified foreign policy objectives and interests are said to allow for both IBSA and BRICS formations to co-exist since they are regarded as highly complementary. Accordingly, the complementarity of foreign policies of both India and South Africa are inherently encapsulated in the interplay of their membership of both BRICS and IBSA.

6.6.2 South Africa and India in the IBSA Trilateral: A Contextual Analysis

South Africa and India are both members of the IBSA. According to Shongwe (2014), the Foreign Ministers of the three countries initiated the India, Brazil, and South Africa Dialogue Forum in June 2003 in Brasilia. The Brasilia meeting was a culmination of extensive consultations amongst IBSA Heads of State on the formation of a strategic alliance of the South, to countervail the dominance of the North in global governance and to advance the agenda of the

South. Shongwe (2014) further states that, following the Brasilia meeting, the IBSA Heads of State met on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2003 to formally launch the Dialogue Forum onto the world stage.

The researcher argues that the principles underpinning the formation of IBSA are like those underpinning the establishment of BRICS. Both IBSA and BRICS formations are established to pursue the objectives of South-South Cooperation, and to neutralize the dominance of the North in global governance. Due to these similarities, there is a need to assess if there is any form of duplication in how the two formations function and examine the extent to which they complement each other. This examination will serve as a test to determine a notion that South Africa's foreign policy objectives and interests are diversified and allow for both IBSA and BRICS formations to co-exist, due to their complementarities.

Bjola (2013) states that before the rise of BRICS, the alliance between India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA) promised to align the globe's largest developing democracies across continents to trade with each other, to oppose the dominance by industrial countries of global trade, rules, ideas and institutions, and share development experiences. Bjola (2013) further argues that IBSA has been for all purposes under the shadow of BRICS, stating that IBSA meetings have in recent times been somewhat low-key affairs, compared to the fanfare that accompanies BRICS meetings. This may be so because BRICS is advancing a stronger agenda of developing countries in global trade, institutions, and rules, but not for global democracy, social and economic development in the same manner as IBSA. For example, Robinson (2015) highlights a point that China is a one-party state, pursuing state capitalism, with little freedom, and Russia is a one-party-one-leader dominant state, pursuing state capitalism, with controlled freedom. The

researcher argues that both Russia and China do not fit the profile of IBSA which is aimed at, amongst others, promoting democracy and good governance amongst member states.

In 2007, leaders from the IBSA countries mooted a plan to connect the three countries' markets to bring together the world's largest developing free trade area. The proposal was for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between the regional customs unions aligned to South Africa, Brazil and India. Although that goal was never realized (the new free trade area between South Africa, the Southern African Customs Unions and Mercosur), the Latin American regional grouping with Brazil at its center was a partial outcome of that early ambition. The IBSA member states strongly felt they must formally club together, to push for a bigger say in global governance for developing countries, to diversify their trade away from industrial countries and to share their unique lessons of the twin pursuit of development and democracy amidst multicultural societies, with deep poverty and inequalities (Grant, 2006). Brazil, India, and South Africa are the globe's leading developing country multi-ethnic democracies. The promise of the IBSA alliance was the idea of the countries not only pushing for fair global trade, institutions, and rules, but also for democratic ones (Kurtz-Phelan, 2013).

Shongwe (2014) further argues that one amongst the distinguishing factors between IBSA and BRICS is that the power projections of IBSA countries are those of soft powers, underpinned by democratic institutions which confer some legitimacy. However, the same cannot be said about BRICS. The latter has explicit democratic deficit in the governments and institutions of Russia and China.

According to Bawa (2005) one of the characteristics of less developed countries is the relative concentration of their exports in only a few products, and this makes them vulnerable to changes

in the foreign environment, since small variations in price or demand lead to major variations in the export revenue. Table 6.12. shows the Exports: Brazil-World, Brazil-India, and Brazil-RSA (2001/2011).

Table 6.12: Exports: Brazil-World, Brazil-India, and Brazil-RSA (2001/2011)

Brazil-World (\$256 Billion)	Brazil-India (\$3.2Billion)	Brazil-RSA (\$1.7Billion)
Iron Ore (16%)	Crude Oil (53%)	Chicken Meat (13%)
Crude Oil (8%)	Copper (15%)	Sugar (7%)
Soy (6%)	Soy (5%)	Tractors (7%)
Sugar (6%)	Sugar (4%)	Trucks (7%)
Coffee (3%)	Flat Iron Sheets (2%)	Vehicle Parts (7%)
Chicken Meat (3%)	Iron Residues (2%)	Iron Ore (3%)

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Comtrade, UN (2018)

Table 6.12 reflects the various commodities exported by Brazil to other IBSA member states. The data shows that during the period indicated, Brazil exports to India comprised of 53% crude oil, and 15% copper. The two highest in the list of commodities it traded in with India. The export of copper by Brazil to the world was at 16%; and chicken meat to South Africa constituted 13%. Brazil’s exports of iron ore to the world were strong, and constituted 16%, followed by crude oil at 8%.

During an in-depth interview with a Director from the Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa), he stated the following:

“...South Africa should take advantage of those commodities in which Brazil was weak at...although Brazil was beginning to look outward, with a focus on agriculture, South Africa could still explore opportunities in agriculture due to its strength, including minerals...”

A Director at the Civil Society Organization, (CACPIR), said during in-depth interviews that:

“...there was a grey area between IBSA and BRICS. They were both established within the context of promoting South-South Cooperation and counteracting the dominance of countries of the North...IBSA promotes democracy and good governance, whilst BRICS hinges on stronger global trade...”

Table 6.13 shows total of exports by India and other IBSA member states.

Table 6.13: Exports: India-World, India-Brazil, and India-RSA (2001/2011)

India-World (\$301 Billion)	India-Brazil (\$5.4 Billion)	India-RSA (\$4.3 Billion)
Petroleum Gas (18%)	Petroleum Gas (52%)	Petroleum Gas (35%)
Precious and Semi-Precious Stones (11%)	Synthetic Fabric (4%)	Trucks (11%)
Jewelry (5%)	Other Gases (3%)	Garments for Medical Purpose (6%)
Garments for Medical Purposes (2%)	Dyestuff (3%)	Microphones and Amplifiers (6%)
Ships (2%)	Work Vehicles (2%)	Special Vehicles (2%)
Microphones and Amplifiers (2%)	Extracts for Medical Purposes (2%)	Precious Semi-Precious Stones (2%)

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Comtrade, UN (2018)

Table 6.13 shows the various commodities exported by India to other IBSA member states. The data indicates that during the period indicated, Indian exports constituted 52% of petroleum gas to Brazil; 35% petroleum gas and 11% of trucks to South Africa. Precious and Semi-Precious Stones constituted 11% of India’s export to the world. During focus group discussions with Indian businesses in South Africa, it was suggested that:

“...South Africa should make use of its strong mineral resource endowment in its bilateral trade with India, to penetrate the IBSA market. This implies that South Africa should make use of India as a conduit to accessing IBSA markets and global networks in order to export its minerals...”

Table 6.14 shows total exports by South Africa and other IBSA member states.

Table 6.14: Exports: RSA-World, RSA-Brazil, and RSA-India (2001/2011)

RSA-World (\$93 Billion)	RSA-Brazil (\$0.8 Billion)	RSA-India (\$3.4 Billion)
Platinum (12%)	Coal (14%)	Coal (54%)
Iron Ore (10%)	Engines (9%)	Iron Residues (8%)
Coal (8%)	Iron Alloys (8%)	Phosphorus (6%)
Other (7%)	Propylene (8%)	Manganese (4%)
Iron Alloys (5%)	Aluminum (7%)	Aluminum (2%)
Cars (5%)	Insecticides (6%)	Chemical Cellulose (2%)

Source: Author's calculations based on data from Comtrade, UN (2018)

Table 6.14 shows the commodities exported by South Africa to other IBSA member states. The data indicates that South Africa exports constituted 54% of coal, and 8% of iron ore to India. Furthermore, South Africa exports constituted 12% of platinum, 10% of coal, and 8% of coal to the world. In its trade relations with Brazil, South Africa exports constituted 54% of coal and 9% of engines to that country.

In a focus group discussion with officials from CACPIR, the following argument was advanced:

“...South Africa must leverage its strong mineral industry to penetrate the IBSA market and beyond...”

Flemes (2016) reveals that, in 2005, the IBSA countries agreed to annually put money into an IBSA fund, which would be used to help developing countries. The fund, operational since 2006, is now managed by the UN Development Programme's (UNDP's) office for South-South cooperation. The fund, called the IBSA Fund for the Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger, has become the most active co-operation mechanism between the countries. Some of the projects funded included the strengthening of rice production in Vietnam, people with disabilities in Cambodia, building a hospital in Palestine and improving solid waste collection in Haiti.

Hedin et al. (2011) elaborate that the criteria for development support from the fund included knowledge sharing among developing countries, especially promoting the situation whereby developing countries' experts and institutions are used, the capacity of the beneficiaries is boosted, and projects build-in long-term sustainability. IBSA, just like the G20 and G8, established formal mechanisms for non-state organisations such as civil society organisations including the media, to influence the decision-making of the grouping. Channels for independent civil society organizations to influence BRICS were absent. In their domestic sphere, China and Russia did not give space for civil society to shape their countries' foreign policies. In contrast, South Africa and Brazil have formal mechanisms for civil society to participate in shaping its international relations, trade, and development policies (Mathi, 2008).

For instance, according to the former Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), Mr M. Masango, in 2015, the Department of International Relations and Co-operation established the South African Council on International Relations (SACOIR) and the Association of Former Ambassadors (AFAPR) to inform people on what DIRCO was doing in the international arena. This was after a realization that a platform of various stakeholders was needed to convene and discuss issues on a regular basis. The SACOIR membership was drawn from academia, organized labor, business, and non-government organisations (NGOs) to contribute to shaping the country's foreign policy.

Avritzer (2006) indicates that on the other hand, Brazil has established structured democratic channels for civil societal involvement in foreign policy and has a committee on foreign policy and human rights which pushes for transparency in international relations of the government. It holds public hearings in Brazil's Congress, reviews the country's positioning in the Human

Rights Council and pushes for information about the government's foreign policy decisions to be made publicly available.

Although India does not have structured mechanisms for civil society to influence foreign policy, the country's civil society organizations hold the government robustly accountable for foreign policy decisions, shaping official policies through stances in public debates and protests against malign policies (Maheshwari, 1995).

The researcher posits that the big question now is whether IBSA remains relevant, and if so, what should be a new role for the organization, given the prominence of BRICS. The researcher suggests that IBSA focus its attention on the sharing of best practices around democracy and good governance amongst its member states, as well as other non-IBSA member states. There is no regional or global alliance of developing countries which specifically seeks to promote democracy and development - making IBSA unique. Within BRICS, IBSA could be a formal caucus to push for participatory, ecologically sustainable democratic development. This means that IBSA would be a democratic lobby within BRICS itself. IBSA countries should continue to push for global democracy, country equality and ecologically sustainable development in international trade, even within the BRICS alliance.

Furthermore, the three countries must continue to push not only for developing countries to have a greater say in global governance, but to push for increased democracy within global institutions, rules, and country behavior. IBSA should form pro-democracy strategic alliances within global institutions such as the UN, World Trade Organizations and World Bank not only to reform these institutions, but for these institutions to adopt inclusive policies, have participatory decision-making processes and appoint globally diverse personnel. IBSA countries

must deepen their trade to diversify their trade away from industrial countries. There is also need for greater people-to-people exchange between these countries, and sharing of democratic, development, and nation-building lessons.

A Director from CACPIR is of the view that:

“...Civil Society organisations within IBSA countries can influence their countries foreign policies, which in turn, could influence the BRICS and global agenda. Civil society organisations across the three countries should join partners more closely, provide solidarity to each other and share resources, ideas, and lessons. Civil society must play a greater role in monitoring the sustainability, inclusivity, and community participation in projects of the IBSA Fund. Civil society organisations in IBSA countries must push to make it mandatory that their parliaments approve foreign loans for infrastructure...”

This is not currently a requirement in any of the IBSA countries. They must also push for domestic investment protocols that bind their countries’ public and private companies, as well as adhere to ecologically sustainable, consultative, and honest corporate behavior when they invest in foreign countries. Based on the researcher’s assessment and examination of table 6.14., despite their membership of both BRICS and IBSA, relations between India and South Africa remain unequal. The table clearly illustrates that India is stronger than South Africa in terms of trade figures, both in imports and exports. The same phenomenon is prevalent in the bilateral economic relations between the two countries. With a population of over 1 billion, India remains dominant over South Africa, with a measly population of less than 60 million.

The next part focuses on the multilateral cooperation between India and South Africa, specifically reform of the United Nations. It seeks to assess the level of engagement by both

countries at the UN and other Bretton Woods Institutions with a view to determining consistency with the principles enshrined in the Red Fort Declaration, signed in March 1997, which manage the diplomatic relations between the two countries. According to the latter, both countries committed to work together in the multilateral sector, and especially in the reform of the United Nations.

6.7 South Africa and India in the United Nations System

According to Pouliot (2011), students and practitioners of world politics need to assess the value of multilateralism not only as a means to an end, but also as an end in and of itself. The functional view, according to which multilateral channels are worth pursuing, only insofar as they allow actors to gain influence on the global stage or produce tangible and immediate results in fighting global harms, is incomplete.

The incompleteness referred to by Pouliot (2011) can be attributed to the need to reform the UNSC to include key players in developing nations. To be complete, it may also be supplemented by stronger cohesion and cooperation amongst member states on issues of common interest and mutual benefit. Both South Africa and India believe in multilateralism, and this is a path they chose to pursue in their varied bilateral and multilateral engagements, specifically, the United Nations. Their desire is to realise a more transformed UN, which is inclusive, impartial, and cognisant of the role played by countries of the south in global politics (Gida et al., 2014).

The African Union Summit which took place at the end of January 2018, endorsed South Africa as its candidate to replace Ethiopia on the UN Security Council, as a non-permanent member for

the term 2019-2020. The elections for the five vacancies on the Security Council took place on 06 June 2018, and South Africa won this seat for the third occasion.

According to a briefing document by DIRCO titled, '*South Africa's Non-Permanent Seat at the UNSC for 2019/2020*', the foundation of South Africa's foreign policy is based on the principles and purposes of the United Nations and informed by the goals and priorities of the African Continent aimed at achieving an Africa and a world that is prosperous, peaceful, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and united in contributing to a world that is just and equitable. Through this non-permanent seat, South Africa will further enhance and expand the continuously evolving relationship between the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the United Nations Security Council as well as the cooperation between the Commission of the African Union and the UN Secretariat.

According to Lucey and Makokera (2015), South Africa previously served on the Security Council in 2007-2008 and 2011-2012 respectively; continues to build upon its past experiences and to actively contribute to international peace and security by actively addressing lingering, new and emerging conflicts around the world; and makes a significant contribution to the international community's efforts to prevent and resolve global conflicts.

An official from DIRCO who was posted in India expressed the following view:

“...at the top of South Africa's priorities is the need to ensure that the continent remains a zone of peace, stability, and economic development, translating into the betterment of the lives of all our people....”

Modi (2015) states that South Africa will continue to resolutely promote Africa as a continent of resilience and hope, with the aim of consolidating Africa's ownership and leadership on matters

of peace and security on the agenda of the Security Council. South Africa's driving force behind its candidacy for the Security Council was to build on the legacy of President Nelson Mandela and his commitment to dialogue and negotiations as the only way to achieve lasting peace, his promotion of human rights and democratic values, and his enduring fight against poverty; and these values are ultimately reflected in our Continent's goal of achieving the "Africa we want" by 2063.

During the visit to India by President Cyril Ramaphosa on 25-26 January 2019, a review was made of existing bilateral relations between South Africa and India, as well as the close cooperation within several multilateral groupings including the United Nations, BRICS, IBSA, the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the G20. During this visit, both President Ramaphosa and Prime Minister Modi reaffirmed their commitment to share experiences and continue to actively contribute to international peace and security by addressing lingering, new and emerging conflicts around the world. This ideal is in line with South Africa's agenda on the UNSC for its tenure in 2019/2020.

A Director at CACPIR during an in-depth interview on the subject stated:

"...A commitment must be made by both India and South Africa that they will make a significant contribution to the international community's efforts to prevent and resolve global conflicts..."

Another official from DIRCO previously posted in India expressed a view that:

"...South Africa's non-permanent seat of the UNSC must be used as a conduit to cast the net wider in order to realise maximum benefits of the efforts made by the two countries. The issues of peace and security features prominently in the foreign

policies of both countries and continue to be discussed in their bilateral engagements...”

A Director from the DTI indicated the following:

“...South Africa has always felt constrained to openly canvass support from India for the UN position because India too had great interest. Despite enjoying cordial bilateral relations, this is one amongst many other areas in which the two countries display competing interests...”.

Due to their common global outlook, both India and South Africa participate in several multilateral fora and continue to provide support for each other. Within the Multilateral fora, the two countries are well placed to become the voice of developing nations, especially on issues of common interest. Incidentally, the two countries happen to share the same foreign policy framework as regards being a voice of developing countries – it is a convergence of their respective foreign policy frameworks. These multilateral discussions become even more poignant for India since South Africa assumed the non-permanent seat of the UNSC.

According to Dubey (2010), for India and South Africa, one of the key areas for attention is the strengthening of the United Nations system and reform in broad terms. Integral to this is a discussion in respect of the global power relations, the role of the United States of America and to what extent India, in respect of its close relations, has insights that would be of interest to the South African Foreign policy. In other words, is the US moving towards greater multilateralism, unilateralism, and alternatives to the current UN system? However, it is known that the US subscribes to a unipolar world.

Amongst a myriad of questions for South Africa in its current position in the UNSC should be: How does India view the USA's military policy evolving and around what technologies? What are the views of Russia in respect of UN Reform? Who is India backing on the Continent and globally?

In this regard, it would be useful to understand India's proposals on reform of the General Assembly, the Secretariat, ECOSOC, and the proposal to strengthen the Human Rights Commission by making it a Human Rights Council. There is a need for the two countries to find synergies in how the reform of the UN should unfold. Their endearing history must shape their thought process in what they seek to achieve as historical partners with similar developmental challenges and aspirations.

6.8 The China-USA Trade Tensions: Implications on India and South Africa Relations

According to Mian et al. (2006) the trade wars between the USA and China have adverse implications on the global economy. The researcher argues that this tension will have an even greater impact on South Africa than India, due to the socio-economic and political proximity between the two countries.

According to Chong and Li (2019), the manifestation of trade tension between China and the USA is not a new phenomenon. Over the past 500 years, these conditions have occurred sixteen times, war broke out in twelve. At a time when trade tensions and escalating protectionism are undermining the rules-based multilateral system that has governed international trade for decades, the diversification of trade partners including through the promotion of South-South cooperation advocated by both the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and the Export-Import Bank of India (Exim India) has become even more urgent. In fact, the institutional

commitment by Afreximbank and Exim India to strengthen South–South trade and economic cooperation has led to a surge in bilateral trade between India and African countries.

According to *The Economic Times* (2014), the United States of America (USA) has been trading in the global economy since the 1930s, following the first Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934, and has a long history of trading ties with other countries. In those earlier years, there were no set international agreements on tariffs and other rules of trade, and tariffs were high. Since then, the country has signed multiple trade agreements with its trading partners, as well as removed, modified, and added to its trade policies. Over the 20th century, much of the US economy was built on trade, relying on intermediate goods from other countries. Literature notes that trade liberalisation has benefited the United States positively, maybe more than the loss of opening the market.

The *Council on Foreign Relations* (CFR, 2019), reveals that the People’s Republic of China and the USA have not always traded with each other, emanating from the tension in 1949 when China gained its power from the Nationalists, which the USA supported. It was only in the 1970s, when China opened its doors to the United States, that talks started between the two countries. However, the relationship has not always been smooth, with the USA banning trade with China in the 1980s over political disagreements. Official trade between China and the USA was reinforced in 2000, which paved the way for China to be a part of the World Trade Organisation on 11 December 2001.

Walker (1980) indicates that, the rationale behind the US – China Trade War, according to an argument by the US president for an increase in tariffs, is that China is forcing American companies to transfer their technology, intellectual properties and innovation to domestic

companies in China, putting US companies and the US economy at a disadvantage. The initial tariffs were targeted at technological and machinery products or parts from China but have since expanded to all imports including agricultural products. The administration, amongst other things, rationalises that the local prices of US goods would be cheaper than Chinese imported goods, making consumers buy locally produced products. There is no doubt that businesses and consumers will suffer in both countries, although the full extent might not be known at this point. Not only will the countries involved be affected, but the rest of the world too.

Zhao (2010) shows that South Africa exports many products to China, which are directly or indirectly re-exported to the USA as processed products. Overall, these exports amounted to US\$ 8.6 billion (R114.0 billion) in 2018. Some of the raw materials that China uses for machinery, textile, and food processing such as minerals, fruits, skins & hides, and wool come from South Africa. South Africa's steel industry has already experienced the effects of an increase in tariffs, in which many companies have cut down on jobs due to an inability to keep up with the high duties that the USA has imposed on the industry. If the trade war continues, this could affect the trade of agricultural products with China, as demand for SA products diminishes in China.

To date, the USA has imposed approximately \$200 billion in tariffs (R2.9 trillion) worth of goods from China, and China has retaliated with tariffs valued at \$60 billion (R875.8 billion) on America's goods. The full list is provided by the US Trade Representative (USTR, 2019), with over 5 000 full or partial tariff lines. The USA has proposed tariffs on a further \$300 billion worth of products from China. Those goods subject to the new tariff from China include minerals used in manufacturing, various agricultural products, foods, beverages, ores, mineral fuels, inorganic and organic minerals (Mendoza Cota, 2016).

The researcher is of the view that, South Africa has found itself in the middle of a potential trade war between the United States and China. As the adage goes — *when two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers*. In this case, it will be smaller countries which could bear the brunt.

Chong et al. (2019) highlight that the former President of the US, Donald Trump, signed a proclamation, implementing new trade policies including 25% tariffs on Chinese exports, intended to recover at least \$50 billion in annual economic harm. Rana (2013) adds that this proclamation imposes a 25% duty on steel and 10% on aluminium imports from 12 countries — namely Italy, Korea, Spain, Turkey, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Russia, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam as well as South Africa — which are viewed as threats to US national security, according to a report by US Secretary of Commerce. South Africa did not make the cut in a list of countries that have been granted a temporary reprieve from the steel tariffs.

The India. Inc Staff, an online publication, further cautions that the recent back and forth of tariff hikes between the US and China are causing quite a stir in the global economy. However, eventually, this tussle could result in several advantageous opportunities for India. When the world's two largest economies, the US and China (that between them account for roughly 40 per cent of world's overall economic output), go for a full-blown trade war with each other, the impact is felt in every corner of this planet. The researcher argues that at a time when the global economy itself is fragile, a fight between the two is the last thing that is needed. Ever since President Trump spooked global markets and romped home to become the President of the US in late 2016 and was sworn in early 2017, the writing was on the wall. Trump, a religiously highly divisive individual, has been an opponent of free trade deals all his life and abhors the concept of globalisation like few others. Re-scripting the North American Free Trade Agreement and fixing

China, a country which enjoys a significant trade surplus with the US, were cornerstones of his economic policy during the Presidential campaign trail.

According to Chong and Li (2019) should the two nations conduct their respective threats, Chinese and US economic output would be reduced by 0.8 per cent and 0.3 per cent respectively and global trade would decline by 2 per cent. The impact will not be homogenous, and some nations will suffer more than others. Countries like Malaysia, Japan, Singapore, and Mexico that are more dependent on trade would suffer more. There will be an impact on India as well but there are some positive spin-offs too. The US is the world's biggest steel importing country and every year more than 25 million tonnes of the commodity reaches US shores from various parts of the world. India does not export much steel to the US (0.7 million tonnes in 2017) and hence is not majorly impacted directly but increased tariff will impact at least 50 per cent of the 25 million tonnes that US imports which will become surplus capacity globally.

As the largest producer and exporter of steel in the world, China would be saddled with excess capacity that would need a new market. India has been a bright spot in the global steel industry for long growing steadily year on year without a break, and the potential for future growth is also remarkably high. Thus, it becomes an automatic choice. According to Niladri Bhattachajee, who is a partner at MPMG, *“The countries which are currently exporting to the US (primarily from Europe and East Asia) will be forced to look at other major steel consuming markets like Africa, Middle East, India etc. to sell their surplus, even at lower prices, to recover marginal cost. If global steel prices decline, it will affect prices in India as well”*

According to Aggarwal (2002), India does have protection in the form of Anti-Dumping Duties, CVD, SD, Quality Control Orders, etc. but that is not as good a shield as the beneficial impact of rising steel prices worldwide.

There is a significant upside to this for India. According to an online publication, India. Inc Staff, chemicals and plastics will be the top sector benefiting from Chinese tariffs on the US, gaining about \$1 billion, while on the US side it will be communications and office equipment with a gain for India of \$2.44 billion. India's exports of machinery are expected to go up by \$2.4 billion because of US tariffs, and only \$714 million because of China's tariffs. Motor vehicles and transport equipment may benefit \$442 billion from US tariffs and only \$22 million from China's. In various other areas, India's exports are likely to go up by \$1.9 billion from US tariffs and \$222 million because of China's.

Further, there could be increased investment and capital flow between India and the US, as well as India and China, as China and the US seek to disentangle themselves (Maithra, 2017). Some of it is already visible; Chinese companies have in recent times made a beeline to invest in India, especially in telecommunications. India is one of the biggest markets for Chinese mobile brands like Xiaomi, Vivo, Oppo, Lenovo and Oneplus. A case in point is Huawei, the Chinese firm that is the world's largest telecommunication equipment supplier, which finds itself right in the middle of the trade war. Trump, on 16 May, signed an executive order banning American telecom companies from installing foreign-made equipment, a thinly veiled attack at Huawei. With the doors closing in on the US, the Chinese firm may now look at India more earnestly. Already, it has plans to invest \$100 million in India over three years starting in 2020 that includes expanding its local production.

“It is getting difficult for Chinese companies to invest in US. We are most active in investing in India, and it will be good for this country”, says Lei Jun, Founder of Xiaomi. “Yes, investments will grow in India due to what is happening between US and China”. Even if the US and China do strike a deal eventually and a full-blown trade war is averted, Mahindra group chairman Anand Mahindra feels India would still be a beneficiary. “Even if they settle a Chinese firm with large exports to the US would be wise to hedge & invest in a subsidiary in India & transfer its scale-manufacturing skills”, he tweeted on 15 May,2018 “Direct exports would simply become indirect. A wave of Chinese investment in India may be imminent”.

An August 2018 report from Singapore’s DBS Bank said, *“India could increase its trade footprint in (the) midst of the US-China trade conflict, particularly under categories on which US has imposed tariffs on China”*. India could benefit by \$11 billion as some manufacturers move production to the country, the report stated. However, businesses in India face some challenges, including the need for land and labour reforms, as well as the lack of infrastructure.

The India. Inc Staff reported that the South Asian nation’s pharmaceutical industry supplies over half the world’s vaccine demand and 25% of medicines in the United Kingdom, according to a July 2019 report from the India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF). On the engineering side, India was the world’s 12th largest producer of machine tools in 2017, a separate IBEF report said. The country also exports more than 60% of its engineering goods to the U.S. and Europe. The manufacturing sector may benefit too — particularly the textiles, footwear, and electronics sectors. That is because exports from the U.S. and China will become more expensive as the tariffs kick in, and some manufacturers may move production to other Asian countries including India.

According to Bloomberg News, 29 August 2019, the largest electronics contract manufacturer in the world, which assembles Apple products, moved production into India from China this year. This was to “diversify” their manufacturing supply chain away from excessive reliance on Chinese production. The Indian economy could benefit by \$11 billion from these trade shifts. Current land laws make it difficult for the private sector to obtain space for manufacturing units. Land and labour reforms are two of the “most important factors of production” needed.

The government has been seeking to improve some of these policies, but it will be some time before they can be fully realised. It is also trying to boost infrastructure and foreign investment in India through a multi-billion-dollar budget. Recent policy reforms in August were a step forward for investment. For instance, the government approved 100% foreign investment in coal mining, and eased rules in contract manufacturing and retail. More changes to existing laws are needed before India can reap the full benefits of these investments to boost the economy. As India is a big country, the state government controls many laws — not by the central government.

6.9 Conclusion

In a multi-polar world order, South Africa and India cannot manage and advance their bilateral relations without being affected by external factors. These external factors are phenomena characterising the present-day global set-up. The two countries must be conscious of factors such as the ever-changing global order, which affects priorities and national interest, alliances, which influence ideology, and interest groups, which are key in driving policy decisions.

However, amid these global dynamics, they ought to make use of the Red Fort Declaration, as it forms the basis for their formal bilateral economic diplomatic relations. It is an important mechanism through which the two countries continue to plan, manage, and monitor their socio-

economic and political relations. This mechanism is also key in guiding the two countries to increase their production capacity, while considering the changing and increasingly unstable nature of the international trading environment. However, while these rapid changes create challenges, the two countries must not be blinded to the opportunities that lie behind such difficulties. There remain many unexplored opportunities that can propel India and South Africa to a better tomorrow, due to their complementarities and comparative advantages, which can be exploited for mutual benefit, especially in trade, investment, technical exchanges in information and communications technology, and skills development. It has, however, become clearer that trade and investment engagements between the two countries were at variance with the principles enshrined in the Red Fort Declaration.

When nations with strong historical relations do not sign free trade agreements, which are treaties that outline the parameters of trade between trade partners, tariffs are imposed on goods and services. This is the case with India and South Africa. In pursuance of increased bilateral trade relations between India and South Africa, the latter is in favour of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) approach because it will provide greater access to India's vast market of over approximately 1.2 billion consumers. This means that South Africa would have gained access into an economy that is otherwise viewed as highly protected. Because of the protectionist nature of the Indian economy, the latter is not in favour of this mechanism.

The researcher advanced the view that the potential benefits between South Africa and India, for both the private sector and civil society from both countries are immeasurable. The architecture of the Free Trade Agreement has already demonstrated that the continent was on the way to creating a large domestic market for India and participation by civil society actors becomes critical.

In the global context, India remains an important and influential player in the global economy. Even during the trade war between the USA and China, India stands to benefit from its trade relations with China. South Africa exports many products to China, which are directly or indirectly re-exported to the USA as processed products. Overall, these exports amounted to US\$ 8.6 billion (R114.0 billion) in 2018. Some of the raw materials that China uses for machinery, textile, and food processing such as minerals, fruits, skins & hides, and wool come from South Africa.

South Africa's membership of BRICS must bring tangible benefits for the economy, to support the National Industrial Policy Framework and the Industrial Policy Action Plan. There is a need to start identifying concrete investment opportunities in key areas where South Africa has shown strength in its trade relations (per sector) with India. For example, areas for potential investment in the context of intra-BRICS trade could include financial institutions, hotel & hospitality, materials, food & beverages, telecommunications, amongst others. It is therefore critical for South Africa to assess its role and membership of BRICS, against its national interests, divergent policies, size of economies and global influence of other member states. Distinguishing factors between IBSA and BRICS is that the power projections of IBSA countries are those of soft powers, underpinned by democratic institutions, which confer some legitimacy. However, the same cannot be said about BRICS. The latter has explicit democratic deficit in the governments and institutions of Russia and China. Both South Africa and India believe in multilateralism, and this is a path they chose to pursue in their varied bilateral and multilateral engagements, particularly the United Nations. Their desire is to realise a more transformed UN, which is inclusive, impartial, and cognisant of the role played by countries of the south in global politics. India and South Africa must retrace the basis for their bilateral relations, and assess the

objectives set out in the Red Fort Declaration in order to realign the founding principles of their bilateral relations.

The following chapter discusses the role of civil society and private sector in the diplomatic relations between India and South Africa.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND PRIVATE SECTOR IN THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND INDIA

7.1 Introduction

Chapter six assessed the prospects and challenges in diplomatic relationships between South Africa and India in a poly-polar world order. This chapter focuses on the role of the civil society and private sector in the diplomatic relations between South Africa and India. It begins with conceptualisation of the civil society and private sector and outlines their role in harnessing social and economic linkages between the two countries. It reveals the current collaboration between government, civil society, and private sector including weighing the benefits and limitations of such collaborations. Amongst others, it looks at how government manages its relations with these entities for a common good. It further provides recommendations articulated by the research participants to mitigate existing constraints.

7.2 Contextualising Civil Society

In his discussion of the civil society, Fukuyama (2000:3) argues that “defining civil society is not a simple task, because while social capital has been given a number of different definitions, most of them refer to manifestations of social capital rather than to social capital itself”.

Ajay and Vijay (2000) elaborate that defining civil society is a difficult task because it is a relatively new concept in the scholarly discourse, but also in countries with a recognised tradition of the third sector. Terms such as civil society, non-governmental organisations, and not-for-profit organisations have been added to the public discourse. The modern definitions of civil society may vary. Van Dyck (2017:1) looks at civil society as a “complex and

interconnected network of individuals and groups drawn from rich histories of associational relationships and interactions”. Globally, the concept of civil society has evolved from these associational platforms to comprise a wide range of organised and organic groups of different forms, sizes, and functions. There have been significant changes over time in the civil society landscape. At different periods, community-based organisations, workers’ or labour unions, professional associations, and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) have been the most prominent. He goes further to argue that, defining civil society is not a simple task. In as much as there is evidence of similar experiences across continents and regions, countries and more specifically groups that share similar cultural values and attributes within a country, have some distinct forms of social organisation, cultural and political traditions, as well as contemporary economic structures.

Numerous academics and practitioners have proffered definitions for civil society based on their research and experiences. The most common definition was created by CIVICUS, which conceives of civil society as the arena outside the family, the state, and the market, which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations, and institutions to advance shared interests. This definition has been widely accepted and utilised within various platforms. However, it is critical that the definition of civil society represents its current evolution, nuances, and growing diversity.

According to the Founder and Executive Chairman of the World Economic Forum, Mr Klaus Schwab, in his article titled *'The Future Role of Civic Society'*, civil society is evolving in impactful and dynamic ways. He argues that definitions of civil society are gradually changing as the latter is recognised to encompass more than a mere ‘sector’ dominated by the NGO community; civil society today includes an ever wider and more vibrant range of organised and

unorganised groups as new civil society actors blur the boundaries between sectors and experiment with new organisational forms, both online and offline.

Civic society actors are demonstrating value as facilitators, convenors and innovators as well as service providers and advocates. While the private sector is playing an increasingly visible and effective role in tackling societal challenges, renewed interest in the role of faith is identifying powerful sources of social capital. Furthermore, the context for civil society is changing economic and geopolitical power. Such power is shifting away from Europe and North America; technology is disturbing traditional funding models and dramatically shifting social engagement; and political pressures are restricting the space for civil society activities in many countries. All these shifts pose challenges, create opportunities, and require rapid adaptation on the part of traditional actors. Perhaps political pressure as a mode of restricting space for civil society activities is part of the reason why. Although the past practices have revealed that there was animosity between government and civil society, Heam (2000) argues that the post 1994 democratic era in South Africa suggests that government recognises the role assigned to civil society. However, the researcher argues that the South African government has not taken an active role in promoting the role of the civic society in the economic diplomacy engagements between the two countries.

Lessoni (2019) argues that the impact of having a robust civil society in South Africa has played a critical role in creating a vibrant democratic culture and addressing the gap between the state and local communities. The South African government must leverage this opportunity in its relations with civil society groups. The involvement of civil society in the economic diplomacy engagements between India and South Africa will close the existing gap between government and civil society. As the Indian government adopts and implements a more assertive approach to

economic diplomacy, the South African government should also see how the Indian government's priorities fit with those of South Africa's national priorities and what opportunities exist for civic society. The South African government needs to inform the South African private sector and civil society on developments regarding the Indian government's approach to economic diplomacy, so that these sectors can serve as oversight for government.

7.3 Creating Cohesion between Government, Civic Society and Private Sector

In the context of South Africa's historical relations with India, Patel and Uys (2012) note that, although government-business platforms have increasingly played a role in enhancing private-sector relations, it is also thought that civil society should be engaging in economic-diplomacy initiatives. Dadoo (1993) has the view that to help achieve this, the Indian diaspora in South Africa could play a critical role in creating synergy with Indian civil society in India. It is suggested that civil society of both countries could help in promoting diplomatic relations by playing a key role in conducting research and giving policy advice on capacity limitations. For South Africa's part, better organisation and stronger business structures would help improve engagement for trade and investment. It has been argued that South African business structures need to be self-sustainable and less reliant on government if they are to become more successful. In all economic diplomacy initiatives, civil society either has been non-existent or has played an extremely limited role (Singh, 2018).

Bhana (2015) indicates that the trade sector between India and South Africa needs to be broadened and diversified, with small and medium-sized enterprises playing a greater role". The researcher has the opinion that the civic society in both countries could also play a proactive role in policy dialogue by ensuring that these engagements contribute to sustainable development and

benefit the population, rather than a small number of individuals, by advising government and businesses on how certain projects may have an impact on local communities. Civic society, business or private sector in both countries can also work together to ensure greater monitoring, transparency, and risk reduction. In the process of broadening and diversification of small and medium-sized enterprises, it is important for the Indian and South African governments to consider and consult with businesses on the challenges underlying lack of investment in certain sectors, which have been reflected in this study.

7.4 The critical role of Civil Society

Most participants who partook in this research study expressed the opinion that the role of civic society needs to be taken seriously in the relations between India and South Africa. This is because civil society could assist government in conducting in-depth research and analysis of why certain policies are not effective and use this information to inform government positions. civil society could also help create awareness of opportunities in the Indian private sector. This could be done by facilitating an economic study of the Indian market and by improving knowledge networks. Blindheimsvik (2009) holds the view that the South African and Indian governments must also consider how to use their embassies to enhance their economic diplomacy. One area of stronger focus might be enhanced engagement with diaspora in India and South Africa to gain a better understanding of the challenges and opportunities for the private sector.

The researcher further argues that enhancing economic diplomacy requires a close partnership between all relevant stakeholders including civic society as the ones mostly affected by the scourge of the triple challenges of poverty, inequality, and unemployment in both countries.

Therefore, each of the stakeholders can play an important role in ensuring that the impact of the relations is maximised, for mutual benefit of both countries. Despite the various social, cultural and racial contestation between black South Africans and Indian South Africans, the South Africans of Indian origin have historically contributed greatly to the socio-economic and political development of South Africa, including the country's rich cultural diversity. South African Indians retain a sense of cultural and social connection to India, and a concept of primary local and secondary ancestral identity is prevalent among people of Indian descent in South Africa – an opportunity that the South African government must leverage in its bilateral relations with India, especially within the context of engaging Indian civil society. The historical links between the two countries make the former more attractive to the Indian government and its civil society organisations. The Indian government and its civil society attach sentimental value to Indians in South Africa and considers them their own.

According to Dickow and Møller (2002) like any society, the Indian community in South Africa belongs to a multiplicity of civil society groups, be it Hindus, Sikhs, or Muslims. They are organised in a manner that government can integrate them into bilateral programmes with Indian civil society. Some advantages of such integration include amongst others that:

- A good number of South Africans of Indian descent are of Hindu background, and thoroughly understand the underlying fundamentals of the Hindu culture and its cultural practices. This would also extend to understanding the culture of doing business in India, within the context of the Hindu culture and Indian traditions. This is profound in winning the hearts and minds of Indians in India.

- This Hindu background, combined with a common cultural identity, creates a hybrid between South African Indians and Indians in India which government should embrace in its efforts to further strengthen and solidify its relations with India.
- Common cultural and religious sentiments can be used as a confidence building measure between Indians in South Africa and Indians in India. The issues of common identity are key in advancing issues of common interest and mutual benefit. These benefits would cascade to government-to-government interaction; thus, attempting to make inroads at improving trade relations in areas that are more critical.
- Not only do civil society organisations comprise of Indians, but also other ethnic groups in South Africa; thus, extending the group to other non-Indian members of civil society. If embraced by both governments, such civil society groups can forge a closer working relationship among themselves and with government, as well as extend support to its initiatives in advancing small business engagements with the Indian government.
- As a result of the architecture of civil society, government is often circumspect in dealing with civil society because they are robust in advancing the interests of their members with the state. However, civil society groups could also play a very progressive role of oversight, particularly how best the two countries can leverage socio-economic, technological and cultural opportunities available.

It is essential therefore, that the governments of both countries continue to look at civil society as partners for development and good diplomatic relations. Van Dyk (2017) is of the view that, there must be concerted effort by both governments to stimulate dialogue with civil society groups on issues of common interest and mutual benefit. It is incumbent upon government to be

proactive than reactive. Fukuyama (2000) argues that the sheer size, influence, and strength of civil society groups in both countries is a benefit to both countries, if used strategically.

Based on the above discussion, the researcher is of the view that it is of strategic importance that the governments of both countries include members of civil society in their delegations during official visits. According to the researcher, the integration of civil society in these diplomatic relations will enhance the quality of government engagements, increase the levels of trust, and sentimental values, as well as a secure potential investment opportunity for the South African private sector.

In-depth interviews and focus group discussions with members of civic society in South Africa revealed that currently, civil society groups are excluded from delegation lists during most official visits from South Africa to India. They are only included during engagements at the levels of IBSA and BRICS because these two mechanisms have established formal civil society working groups. The same should be replicated in the case of bilateral relations between India and South Africa – members of civil society must have a key role to play.

7.5 Contextualising Private Sector

The role of the private sector also needs to be considered seriously in the diplomatic relations between the two countries, particularly the promotion of economic diplomacy. According to Lucey and Makokera (2015), the private sector is the engine of economic growth, and government plays a central role in supporting economic growth and reducing poverty. It is the responsibility of government to support private sector, provide good policy, and create strong institutions and efficient public goods and services. By so doing, government will be ensuring that the private sector can thrive for the greater good of the economy.

Lall (1984) further argues that a hybrid between governments and private sector can make use of the strong bilateral relations between India and South Africa to create jobs through accelerated levels of exports, and less imports. The requirements for successful partnerships include a buoyant private sector alongside a capable and authoritative local government motivated by a common economic interest (Rosenberg, 1994). Policymakers in both countries need to work with civil society to develop a clear vision of Private Public Partnerships (PPP) objectives and a sound understanding of the local context to appreciate advantages and limitations (Mathi, 2008).

Singh (2018) suggests that, it is critical that high-level discussions between South African private sector with their Indian counterparts are led by a team of senior business-people, with a prominent commercial background, dedicated and delegated to the South Africa-India dialogue in strategic government consultations. This should be a team of business-people capable of creating links with the business community of India. It will also be essential that the team comprises of business-people of Indian decent as a soft-power strategy to appease the Indian side. This can be done through the South Africa-India Business Forum established to facilitate trade and investment between the two countries.

In a mixed economy, the private sector constitutes the largest sector of the economy. The role of a government in a mixed economy is grouped into two categories, namely: regulatory roles and promotional or development roles. The regulatory role of the government involves formulating and implementing various direct and indirect measures to monitor and regulate the economic activities of the private sector. These measures are required to prevent the socially restrictive activities of businesses and concentration of economic power and encourage private businesses to work towards the growth of the economy.

On the other hand, the promotional role of the government involves policies and measures taken for the progress of development infrastructure of an economy. The development infrastructure of an economy involves economic and social overhead capital that is necessary for the growth of industries and optimal utilisation of resources. In addition, it is required to improve the production capacity of an economy. These activities, in a mixed economy such as India, are performed by the government, through implementing various developmental programs.

For example, in India, a Five-Year Plan is a form of programme in which the government sets the goals to be achieved within five years and mentions the resources required to achieve those goals (Vakil, 1952). Similarly, South Africa also launched its National Development Plan (NDP), which remains a blueprint for the government's strategy towards the year 2030. To create synergies between the economies of both countries, private sectors of both countries, working together with civil society, should possess a thorough understanding of these documents to identify opportunities.

According to Homestrings (2014), the private sector is a key stakeholder in both urban and economic development, being a major contributor to national income and the principal job creator and employer. The private sector provides around 90% of employment in the developing world (including formal and informal jobs), delivers critical goods and services, and contributes to tax revenues and the efficient flow of capital (Lucey and Makokera, 2015). However, in South Africa and other developing nations, government is the biggest employer.

Private sector actors are perceived as playing a role in urban governance: they influence whether urban areas develop in inclusive and sustainable ways, and they affect poverty reduction and serve as drivers of fragility and conflict such as unemployment, exclusion and instability

(Homestrings, 2014). In support of the strategic role played by private sector in job creation, the researcher highlights the COVID-19 pandemic and the panic it has created amongst the public sector, private sector, and those employed by the latter. The initial 21 days lockdown announced by the President of South Africa, Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, was a bold decision in saving lives; however, it was characterised by much economic uncertainty. As a result, many people were overcome by the fear of losing jobs, and possible salary cuts. According to Alexander (2007), the Indian private sector and civil society have an opportunity through bilateral relations between India and South Africa to share views and ideas on what needs to be done to propel trade and investment between the two countries and countervail future eventualities, such as those imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Maithra (2017) argues it has been said that the postcolonial state in much of Africa has failed to emancipate its people from mass suffering, while the markets have not ensured that economic benefits trickle down to the poor. Due to the limitation of these two actors, civil society has become a sine-qua-non to development by mediating the failures of the state and the market. Ironically, the effectiveness of civil society in Africa is dependent on its relations with the state.

According to Fukuyama (2000), building a strong partnership between the state, private sector and civil society requires commitment, focus and a will power by all stakeholders to: identify opportunities that will grow the economy through stronger and mutually beneficial bilateral relations with India; create an inclusive and enabling environment for consultation between government, private sector and civil society; share appropriate information in order to ensure that all the role players are empowered in mutually beneficial issues of common interest in pursuit of promoting and strengthening trade and economic relations between India and South Africa. Manisha (2016) states that the growth of global public-private partnerships has opened new

spaces for civil society participation in global governance. Such participation is often justified by the claim that civil society organisations, because of their independence and links to communities, can help address democratic deficits in global-level decision-making processes.

Most people use the term ‘civil society’ to refer to non-governmental organisations and communities affected by particular health issues, and state that they expect these actors to represent the needs and interests of specific populations in global-level decisions about strategies, funding models and policies. Yet, such civil society actors have a relatively low level of representation within the partnerships’ boards and steering committees, especially compared with private-sector actors (10.3% vs 23.7%). Moreover, there is little evidence of civil society representatives’ direct and substantial influence within the partnerships’ global-level governing bodies, where many decisions affecting country-level programmes are made. Rather, their main role within these partnerships seems to be to implement projects, advocate and raise funds despite common discourses that emphasise civil society's watchdog function and transformative power.

7.6 Rivalry between Government and Civil Society

Mathi (2008) argues that one of the greatest challenges is a nuanced rivalry between government and civil society groups. Whilst civil society groups believe that they are the voice of the voiceless, government believes that issues and grievances often raised by such groups contravene legislation and interfere with the smooth running of government. There is a need to break the impasse between the two. This can be done through regular consultations, and proactive inclusion of civil society groups into committees established by government. Although under-

resourced in comparison to business and government, funding for civil society activities has grown substantially in specific areas, with support from major foundations and tailored funds.

According to the World Economic Forum article titled '*Challenges and Opportunities Facing Civil Society Organisations in the Digital Age*', the digital age has greatly assisted in growing civil society organisations all around the world. There are many civil society organisations exhibiting an energetic voice in promoting the principles of fair and equitable economic development, gender equality and human rights. On top of the pyramid today, social media has been at the heart of the citizen's voice. Today, the power of social media has given communities the advantage to challenge and demand better service.

Mathi (2018) states that steps to suppress or curb civil society freedoms include limiting access to national and foreign funding, erecting barriers to mobile communications, and applying onerous, arbitrary, or poorly administrated registration processes. Beyond steps taken by specific national governments, international civil society leaders have identified a more general decline in funding available for advocacy, rights-based activities, or "causes that challenge the status quo". Many of these measures may not constitute overt acts such as bans.

However, civil society leaders say the implications of these more subtly administered restrictions extend beyond specific activities to hinder the development of democratic governance, accountability, and stability over the long term (Rosenberg, 1994). There are implications too for the willingness of the private sector to engage in social responsibility programmes, particularly in partnership with civil society organisations. In regions where there is a risk, this could be perceived as a threat to the state.

Heller (2016:124) in his views about the relationship between government and civil society, develops a historical argument that “in South Africa and India, civil society is increasingly being subordinated to political society and that deliberation is being displaced by power”. This is consequential because a weakened civil society cannot perform three critical democratic functions: (1) provide a space in which citizens can meaningfully practise democracy on a day-to-day basis; (2) anchor the legitimacy of political practices and institutions in vigorous public debate; and (3) serve as a countervailing force to the power-driven logic of political society. Viewed historically, this weakening of civil society is paradoxically given that the democratic transition in both countries was driven to a significant degree by civil society, including the moral force of arguments based on inclusive and modern claims to democratic citizenship. This paradox alerts us to the fact that civil society and political society, though frequently assumed to be in a mutually reinforcing relationship, are often in tension, and that how this tension plays out has significant repercussions for the possibility of democratic deepening. When one juxtaposes the robustness of representative democracy in South Africa and India to the effectiveness of civil society, it becomes clear that consolidation may well have come at the expense of said democratic deepening.

7.7 Conclusion

For South Africa to succeed in maximising trade and investment benefits from its bilateral relations with India, it is important that government create cohesion with private sector and civil society groups alike. While private sector contributes to strengthening the economy and job creation, civil society groups are useful in identifying challenges that require attention by both government and private sector. The civil society organisations will play a critical role of oversight by assisting government and private sector to focus on essential socio-economic issues

that seek to propel development. The advent of globalisation and the emergence of the 4th industrial revolution compels government to create a hybrid with all relevant stakeholders in society to work together in finding solutions to challenges of the 21st century.

The following chapter provide a conclusion and recommendations on a critical investigation into the diplomatic relations between Post-Apartheid South Africa and India.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Introduction

This research study made a critical investigation into the diplomatic relations between Post-Apartheid South Africa and India. The major research question was formulated as follows: ‘To what extent has South Africa and India leveraged their historical relations before and after the end of Apartheid in South Africa to advance their diplomatic relations?’

Based on the major research questions, the study hoped to find answers to the following questions:

- i) What is the contribution of the rich historical, socio-economic, racial, and cultural relationship between the two countries to the diplomatic relations between them after the end of apartheid in 1994?
- ii) What are the prospects and challenges facing Diplomatic Relations between South Africa and India in a Poly-Polar World Order?
- iii) What are the constraints impeding economic relations between South and India, especially the role of the civic society and private sector?
- iv) What is the nature of diplomatic relations between South Africa and India in the scramble for Africa’s resources?
- v) What are the prospects and challenges faced by post-apartheid South Africa and India in their multilateral engagements such as IBSA and BRICS?

The following segment provides the summary and conclusion of the study based on the research questions.

8.2 Conclusion

The study advanced the following arguments which were empirically examined using both primary and secondary data sources: (i) despite both countries having increasingly adopted an aggressive stance on economic diplomacy as a means of promoting growth and reducing poverty since 1994, they have not fully exploited the potential role of the private sector and civil society in enhancing their diplomatic economic relations; (ii) although the two countries have since 1994 proclaimed themselves as partners for development, very limited critical interrogation has been made on the existing prospects and challenges embedded in their economic and other diplomatic relations with regard to their national interests in the poly-polar world order; (iii) although government–business platforms in both countries have played an important role in enhancing economic relations, the role of the civil society from both countries has not been actively engaged in leveraging these economic relations; (iv) the socio- cultural and economic relations between the two countries have flourished since the end of apartheid in South Africa, with India holding the most potential of all of South Africa's emerging southern partners.

In the analysis of theoretical perspectives, the researcher recognised that the study of international affairs has been predominantly protracted as a competition between the realist, liberal, and constructivist. Accordingly, the study demonstrated that not all conceptualisations on international affairs, including the diplomatic relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India fit neatly into the three paradigms. For example, a critical analysis of the diplomatic relations between the two countries demonstrated that no single approach could capture all the

complexities of contemporary world politics. Therefore, world politics is far more progressive with a diverse array of competing ideas, rather than a single theoretical orthodoxy. Competition between conceptualisations or theories of international relations helps to reveal their strengths and weaknesses and spurs subsequent refinements, while revealing flaws in conventional wisdom. To this end, diplomatic relations between Post-Apartheid South Africa and India were analysed as interplay of these diverse paradigms, through an interrogation of the nature and characteristics of each of these paradigms. The following sub-sections summarises and concludes the main findings of this study to provide recommendations for future relations.

8.2.1 Historical, Socio-Cultural and Racial Analysis of Africans and Indians in South

Africa

A critical historical socio-cultural and racial analysis of the relationship between India and South Africa before and after the 1994 democratic election in South Africa, revealed the following divergent perspectives:

- (i) most Africans in South Africa in their various cultural, linguistic, and other diversities did not know that Indians living in South Africa were also not homogenous, including the way they came to South Africa. They are characterised by cultural, linguistic, religious, economic diversity and tensions among themselves.
- (ii) one subject, which was frequently avoided in the academic, socio-economic, and political discourse for different reasons, including the sake of reconciliation, was the contentious views regarding the historical racial relations between South African Indians and Africans. Despite their reflections in different fora in South Africa, including the articulations by some political parties, racial tensions between Indians

and Africans in South Africa have existed throughout the country's history. It was further alleged that India's general affinity for South Africa and the support for freedom against apartheid was predicated by the enormous presence of people of Indian descent in South Africa. The Indian government felt a sense of moral obligation to protect Indians in South Africa against the prejudices of the repressive apartheid regime. This was also a key factor that helped Indians in South Africa forge a common enemy approach with other people of colour, including Africans.

- (iii) The study also discussed the contentious view that despite his concern for promoting human justice, peace and equality, Mahatma Gandhi's focus during his life in South Africa was predominantly on his fellow Indians. Accordingly, the study examined several testimonies advanced to articulate this contention. The study found that because of the evidence available, Gandhi's conduct during his stay in South Africa betrayed and undermined the struggle of Indians in South Africa by joining whites in their subjugation against blacks and Indians. His quest for Indian supremacy over Africans was in variance with the collective struggle of Indians, Blacks, and Coloureds. In his promotion of Indian interests only, Mahatma Gandhi effectively polarised the plight of the oppressed groups of South Africa, and this was akin to the divide and rule principle of the British colony (Du Toit, 1996). The racist attitudes Gandhi projected towards Africans in South Africa, contradicts the views associated with the famous Gandhi the world knows. Many people were not aware of this aspect of Gandhi's life in South Africa because it is deliberately omitted from his later writings.

- (iv) The study also showed that, despite the racial, socio-economic, and cultural differences between Africans and Indians in South Africa, there was an acknowledgement from both racial groups that South African Indians contributed greatly to the democracy and national building of the country.

8.2.2 Prospects and Challenges in the Diplomatic Relations between South Africa and India in a Poly-Polar World Order

The study examined critically the strategic partnership between India and South Africa, called the Red Fort Declaration, signed in 1997 by the then South African President Nelson Mandela and former Prime Minister of India, H.D. Deve Gowda. It forms the basis of the two countries formal bilateral economic diplomatic relations after the 1994 democratic elections in South Africa. It defined the context of the relationship, the scope of operation, and places a great deal of emphasis on the principles of peace, security, human freedom, and equity in the conduct of foreign policy. The declaration further detailed the significant role of multilateral approaches to dealing with the various challenges facing both countries. It also reflected on the need for a reformed global dispensation in which the needs of the developing countries including the two countries under study were regarded as paramount.

The researcher advanced the view that trade was at the centre of what drove and articulated national interests between the two countries. Despite their strong historical bilateral relations, they remain economically unequal, as reflected in the trade balance. This was articulated by Indian businessmen in South Africa during focus group discussions. They indicated that it might not be possible for South African companies to replicate the same investments in India due to the latter's protectionist market.

Using both secondary and primary sources and an investigation into the bilateral economic relations between South Africa and India in the context of the Red Fort Declaration, it became clear that India was South Africa's fifth-largest export destination and fourth-largest import origin and is the second-largest trading partner in Asia. Trade figures between the two countries in the period 2003 to 2018 were in stark contrast with the two countries shared common vision of creating a strong trade and investment rapport amongst their business sectors. The figures were skewed in favour of India. A lot still needed to be done on the part of South Africa to increase trade and investment between the two countries.

The current Foreign Direct Investment figures between the two countries suggested to the government of South Africa that there remained many unexplored opportunities in India. The study found that South Africa's trade and investment figures were low because of the protectionist economic policies of India. The study revealed that although India and South Africa enjoyed cordial historical relations, India has made more strides in its relations with South Africa, as there is a strong presence of Indian companies in South Africa, including the employment opportunities created. Existing data showed that South Africa has fewer companies in India compared to Indian companies in South Africa.

It was shown that India's trade balance has always been higher than that of South Africa. This was attributed to several factors: (i) the large Indian population as one of the possible reasons, but in its trade relations with India, South Africa was strong in only a few areas such as financial services, hotel & tourism, materials, amongst others; and (ii) according to data provided by the Foreign Direct Investment Markets (2018), India recorded a total of 84 projects in South Africa, while South Africa fell behind with only 28 projects in India. To this end, the researcher expressed a critical view that India was simply using its BRICS partnership with South Africa to

get cheap coal from South Africa. The rest of the trade categories did not look balanced at all. The researcher argues that South Africa is losing out on trade with India in most other product categories.

An investigation into the prospects and challenges of the India-South Africa Free Trade Agreement (FTA) revealed that because of national interests, South Africa was in favour of increased bilateral trade relations with India. This would provide greater access to India's vast market of over 1.2 billion consumers. This means that South Africa would have gained access into an economy that is otherwise viewed as highly protected. However, due to its protectionist policies, India was not in favour of this mechanism. This is based on the argument that a potential FTA with South Africa could raise concerns of trade creation and trade diversion for precious metals meant for jewellery, coal, iron and steel, basic chemicals, machinery, and some non-metallic minerals. As a result of its huge market, India was conscious that South Africa would benefit more from this FTA. South Africa was unable to gain access to many products, which could otherwise contribute to the increase of its trade figures.

8.2.3 Key role players in the advancement of diplomatic relations between South Africa and India: Perspectives on Civil Society and Private Sector

The study revealed that while the partnership between India and South Africa continued to produce satisfactory results, many unexplored opportunities in trade and investment remained. For instance, there was a view that the South African government has not taken an active role in promoting the role of civic society in the economic diplomacy with India. Other researchers who argued that the impact of having a robust civil society in South Africa played a critical role in creating a vibrant democratic culture and addressing the gap between the state and local

communities, supported this view. This is an opportunity that the South African government must leverage in its relations with civil society groups in its international engagements including its economic diplomatic relations with India. The historical and cultural relations between the two countries could enhance this opportunity.

Although there were many Indian companies operating in South Africa, it was unclear why the converse was not the case. It might be useful to determine whether less investments by South African companies in India was due to their limited knowledge of the Indian market or because of specific barriers to conducting business. If the former were the case, then the role that civil society can play would close the knowledge gap that might exist amongst South African businesses.

The study reiterated the importance of the role of the civic society, which needed to be taken seriously in the diplomatic relations between the two countries. For instance, currently, civil society groups were excluded from delegation lists during most official visits from South Africa to India. They were only included during engagements at the levels of IBSA and BRICS because the two have established formal civil society working groups. The researcher argues that the same should be replicated in the case of bilateral relations between India and South Africa – members of civil society must have a key role to play.

8.2.4 South Africa and India Relations in the Context of Africa

The study showed that despite enjoying cordial bilateral relations, both India and South Africa continued to compete for resources on the African continent. Both convergent and divergent interests marked their diplomatic economic relations. Although South Africa was the second biggest economy on the continent after Nigeria, its economic footprint was much higher than that

of Nigeria. India was also engaged in increasing its footprint within the continent. Both countries have young populations. It is therefore critical for India to recognise the massive benefits of opening its market to South Africa. The latter brings with it a huge market from both the SADC region and the continent in general. Through the FTA, India could also benefit from the numbers and influence that South Africa commands on the continent. It could make use of South Africa as a conduit towards entrenching its footprint into the continent.

The researcher advances the view that the potential benefits between South Africa and India, for both the private sector and civil society from both countries are immeasurable, especially in Southern Africa and India, and that the architecture of the Free Trade Agreement has already demonstrated that the continent is on the way to creating a large domestic market for India.

It was revealed that relations between Africa and India date back many centuries. In the 20th century, India's role as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, a supporter of national liberation movements and the struggle against apartheid, further augmented these ties. However, it is the potential synergies between Africa and India, created by the changing economic and geopolitical landscape, that have deepened interaction over the last several years (Jha, 2001). The discussion on the scramble for Africa's resources would be incomplete if it excluded the role of China. It is a country which has for many years entrenched itself in Africa, mainly through its investment in infrastructure development. Russian influence after the cold war, as a member of BRICS, was increasingly felt by some African countries, including South Africa. The result is that some African countries no longer must choose between the Americans and the Chinese way of development. This was testified by the recent Russia-Africa summit held in Russia. It is argued that this summit was an attempt by Russia to lure into its fold African countries with a view to muscle out countries such as India, China, and the USA, amongst others.

The study is of the view that, from the African point of view, Russia offers a strategic alternative to America's global hegemony, China's economic diplomacy, and the lingering influence of Africa's former colonial masters. The launch of the Russia-Africa Summit served as a strategy by Russia to develop long-term economic influence. For example, if Russia were going to gain control of natural resources, provide military support and intelligence to countries in the continent, it meant the economies of those countries would be inadvertently captured by Russia in future.

8.2.5 The Relations between South Africa and India in the BRICS and IBSA Groupings

The study revealed that South Africa remained at the bottom of the rankings within BRICS and globally. The existing economic data showed that, within BRICS intra-trade, South Africa lags India in its trade balance. This is a phenomenon reflected in both their bilateral trade relations, and BRICS membership. The study found that South Africa's economy and population were too small to warrant membership of BRICS, and that with this membership, South Africa ran the risk of being subsumed by the other BRICS member states whose economies and populations are larger.

In the context of civil society, it was found that through BRICS, efforts have been made to establish a working group on civil society. However, the study found that it might be difficult for South Africa to engage at an equal level with the other member states due to their sheer economic and population size, varied interests, policy shifts and alliances with other countries outside of the formation. There was a view that the advent of BRICS has compromised bilateral relations between India and South Africa, particularly, the effects it has on the frequency of their

Joint Ministerial Commission (JMC). It was revealed that often, bilateral engagements between the two countries were relegated to the seediness of BRICS Summits.

Existing economic data showed that the emergence of China, India, and Brazil, as economically and politically influential developing countries was beginning to reconfigure and reshape the terms of South–South co-operation. However, South Africa did not feature anywhere as one of the influential member states of the group. These countries were driven by an ambition for global economic dominance and political leadership, a position arguably held by South Africa in the continent, except for Nigeria as the biggest economy in Africa.

Three broad perspectives or main arguments were raised in the context of South Africa's membership of BRICS, in relation to some of the challenges it might be facing in its association with member states (Oliver, 2013): Firstly, most members of BRICS were troubled by slower economic growth, which should be of concern to South Africa's current foreign policy stance; secondly, anti-Western ideological concerns and related presumptions on the part of the South African government that the BRICS formation could potentially assume a counter-hegemonic character vis-à-vis the West are questionable and dubious; and thirdly, there must be an assessment on the extent to which South Africa stood to benefit from the opportunities provided by BRICS network. At the same time, because of its low economic growth, high levels of poverty and lack of employment opportunities, South Africa cannot afford to follow an approach of narrow interest concerning the BRICS formation and constrain itself in its economic diplomacy.

The formation of a BRICS New Development Bank among the BRICS countries is a significant milestone regarding the future of development cooperation. The role of the New Development

Bank was complemented by national development banks of the respective member states in their engagements to financing projects in developing countries. This means that the total development financing capacity of BRICS goes well beyond the New Development Bank. In addition, at the 2013 Durban Summit, the Interbank Cooperation Mechanism concluded two co-financing agreements: (i) a BRICS Multilateral Infrastructure Financing Agreement for Africa; and (ii) a BRICS Multilateral Co-operation and Co-Financing Agreement for Sustainable Development.

The study showed that the sustained growth of rising powers, including BRICS was reshaping global governance arrangements. The BRICS Summits were emerging as a knowledge-exchange process among countries still classified as developing but looking to a future world order in which they have major roles and responsibilities. The failure to generate a strong recovery from financial crisis sparked by difficulties and dysfunctions in Western governance systems has opened the way for BRICS to come forward as global leaders.

The BRICS Summits were the only global process with an explicit objective to constitute a new global order in line with the massive change in economic weight that is coming in the next decade. The stated objective of BRICS was to ensure that the emerging world order was inclusive, just, and in line with historic South-South principles for a post-colonial world order, and with the United Nations as the centre of systemic legitimacy.

However, the study showed that, although the BRICS Summits sought to project the voice of the global South, there were divergent interests and priorities among the BRICS member states. For example, the researcher makes a case on the issue of the reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). He argues that some member states may not agree to certain positions based on

their own national interest. According to Kocs (1995) India and China are in a dispute (territorial boundaries) over two relatively large and several smaller separated pieces of territory. One is known as Akasi Chin, which is in the Indian union territory of Ladakh or the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang. The other disputed territory lies south of the McMahon Line, and was formerly referred to as the North East Frontier Agency and is now called Arunachal Pradesh. In the case of South Africa and India, Kahn (2011) argues that, there remained a scramble for Africa's resources between the two countries. They both seek to expand their hegemony through their persistent presence in the continent. While South Africa has been involved in peacekeeping missions in the continent, India, just like China, continues to assert its presence through ICT, human resources and infrastructure development.

Outside of the BRICS formation and their bilateral relations, they also competed for available resources on the African continent. These were matters of national interest, which often pushed countries, regardless of their partnerships, to be at cross-purposes with one another. It was evident that the BRICS formation, like some Bretton Woods Institutions, was facing its fair share of challenges due to differentiated interests of member states. This was a true test for this group of emerging countries of the south, which seeks to disrupt the global socio-economic and political system.

For instance, both China and Russia were trying to show that development is possible without democracy. The mix of non-democracies, and democracies within BRICS, had been one of the reasons for the BRICS grouping's lack of cohesion. The BRICS formation operated amid a volatile global political environment, in which the present-day body politics is characterised by trade wars between the USA and China, unipolarity, and intransigencies by superpowers in their quest for global dominance (Kahn, 2011). The escalating trade tensions between the USA and

China could give BRICS countries renewed purpose to advance their trade agenda. However, the divergent trade policies and interests could be a challenge. As highlighted earlier, due to their varied interests, size of economies, alliances and global status, BRICS countries have struggled to establish a unified voice on the international stage.

Although BRICS has rejected western dominance of international institutions, a lack of unity amongst member states has prevented them from advancing their global trade agenda efficiently and effectively (Bohler-Muller, 2012). Nevertheless, member states might use the gap to negotiate trade with as many countries (outside BRICS) as possible, with China always being at the top, followed by Russia. The benefits that accrued because of the trade tensions between the USA and China will not be of equal benefit to BRICS member states. Those with bigger populations and economies would benefit the most, while South Africa remained the least beneficiary, at the bottom of the value chain.

For BRICS has always begged the question of what exactly holds them together, taking into consideration their complex and varied domestic structures. For example, China is outward looking and manufacturing oriented; Brazil is increasingly outward looking, with a focus on agriculture; Russia is increasing its footprint on energy and gas; and India remains closed with its protectionist approach to trade. As for South Africa, no niche market has been established, and much cannot be said except its export of minerals, of which coal is the highest (Besada et al., 2013).

According to the researcher, the study showed that the principles underpinning the formation of IBSA were like those underpinning the establishment of BRICS. Both IBSA and BRICS formations were established to pursue the objectives of South-South Cooperation, and to

neutralise the dominance of the North in global governance. As a result of these similarities, there was a need to assess if there was any form of duplication on how the two formations function, and the extent to which they complemented each other. This was to determine whether South Africa's foreign policy objectives and interests were diversified and allowed for both IBSA and BRICS formations to co-exist, due to their complementarities.

This was based on the consideration that before the rise of BRICS, the alliance between India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) promised to align the globe's largest developing democracies across continents to trade with each other, to oppose the dominance by industrial countries of global trade, rules, ideas and institutions, and share development experiences.

Furthermore, the researcher posits that IBSA had been for all purposes under the shadow of BRICS. Its meetings had been somewhat overshadowed by those of BRICS. He attributes this to the fact that BRICS was advancing a stronger agenda of developing countries in global trade, institutions, and rules, but not for global democracy, social and economic development in the same manner as IBSA. For example, Cooper (2017) argues that China is a one-party state, pursuing state capitalism, with little freedom, and Russia is a one-party-one-leader dominant state, pursuing state capitalism, with controlled freedom. Both Russia and China do not fit the profile of IBSA, which is aimed at, amongst others, promoting democracy and good governance amongst member states. The study, therefore, argued that the formation of BRICS might have been a protest by China and Russia against their exclusion from IBSA.

The participants argued that one amongst the distinguishing factors between IBSA and BRICS was that the power projections of IBSA countries were those of soft powers, underpinned by democratic institutions, which conferred some legitimacy. However, the same could not be said

about BRICS. The latter had explicit democratic deficit in the governments and institutions of Russia and China.

The study revealed that there was a grey area between IBSA and BRICS. They were both established within the context of promoting South-South Cooperation and counteracting the dominance of countries of the North. However, it is explicit that IBSA promoted democracy and good governance, whilst BRICS hinged on stronger global trade. For instance, IBSA, like the G20 and G8, established formal mechanisms for non-state organisations, such as civil society organisations, including the media, to influence the decision-making of the grouping. In their domestic sphere, China and Russia did not give space for civil society to shape their countries' foreign policies. In contrast, South Africa and Brazil have formal mechanisms for civil society to participate in shaping its international relations, trade, and development policies. However, South Africa must infuse this approach not only into IBSA and BRICS, but in its bilateral relations with India.

In 2005, the IBSA countries agreed to annually put money into an IBSA fund, which would be used to help developing countries. It is managed by the UN Development Programmes (UNDP's) office for South-South cooperation. The fund, called the IBSA Fund for the Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger has become the most active co-operation mechanism between the countries. Within BRICS, IBSA could be a formal caucus to push for participatory, ecologically sustainable democratic development. This means that IBSA would be a democratic lobby within BRICS.

During their membership of both BRICS and IBSA, relations between India and South Africa remain unequal. India was stronger than South Africa in terms of trade figures, both imports and

exports. The situation was also prevalent in the bilateral economic relations between the two countries. With a population of over 1 billion, India remained dominant over South Africa, with a measly population of less than 60 million.

8.2.6 South Africa and India Relations towards the Reform of the United Nations

India regards the UN reform, particularly, reform of the Security Council as a strategic objective and that it has the characteristics which qualifies it for that position. As a result, South Africa has always felt constrained to openly canvass support from India for this position because South Africa also has great interest. Therefore, despite enjoying cordial bilateral relations, this is one amongst many other areas in which the two countries display competing interests. However, both countries participate in several multilateral fora where they are well placed to become the voice of developing nations, especially on issues of common interest.

8.2.7 The Impact of China-USA Trade Relations on South Africa and India Diplomatic Relations

The study found that the trade tensions between the USA and China have adverse implications on the global economy, and both South Africa and India would not be spared from these effects. South Africa exports many products to China, which were directly or indirectly re-exported to the USA as processed products. South Africa has found itself in the middle of a potential trade war between the United States and China. As the adage goes — when two elephants fight, it is the grass that is trampled. The recent back and forth tariff hikes between the US and China have an impact on the global economy. However, this tussle could result in several advantageous opportunities for India. For instance, as the largest producer and exporter of steel in the world, China would be saddled with excess capacity that would need a new market. India has been a

bright spot in the global steel industry for a long time, growing steadily year on year without a break, and the potential for future growth is remarkably high. Thus, it becomes an automatic choice for the USA.

8.3 Recommendations

In the context of the above conclusions, the study makes the following recommendations:

- (i) Just as was the case with BRICS and IBSA, civil society groups should be included in bilateral relations and engagements between India and South Africa. This is to ensure that members of civil society have a key role to play in the diplomatic relations between the two countries. It was observed that currently, in all economic diplomacy initiatives between the two countries, civil society had either been non-existent or played an extremely limited role. Civil society could enrich the relations by conducting in-depth research and analysis about why certain policies were not effective; this information could be used to inform government positions. Civil society could also create knowledge and awareness of opportunities in the South African and Indian public and private sectors in the two countries by facilitating an economic study of the South African and Indian market and improving knowledge networks.

- (ii) It is suggested that the South African and Indian governments should consider using their embassies to enhance the role of civil society in economic diplomacy. Government could work with civil society to jointly identify projects and programmes aimed at creating job opportunities for both the people of South Africa and India. It was revealed that the exclusion of civil society from some of the bilateral engagements created parallel processes since civil

society organisations often engaged with their counterparts without the consent of government.

The study noted despite the various historical, social, cultural and racial contestations discussed, the South Africans of Indian origin have historically contributed greatly to the socio-economic and political development of South Africa including the country's rich cultural diversity. South African Indians retain a sense of cultural and social connection to India. A concept of primary local and secondary ancestral identity was prevalent among them. The governments of both countries should leverage this opportunity in their bilateral relations. The historical links between the two countries make the former more attractive to the Indian government and its civic society. Moreover, the Indian community in South Africa belonged to a multiplicity of civil society groups, be it Hindus, Sikhs, or Muslims. They were organised in a manner that government can integrate them into bilateral programmes with Indian civil society in India.

(iii) The governments of both countries should look at their civil society as partners for development and good diplomatic relations. This implies that there should be concerted effort by both governments to stimulate dialogue with the civil society groups on issues of common interest and mutual benefit. It is incumbent upon government to be proactive rather than reactive. The sheer size, influence, and strength of civil society groups in both countries could be beneficial to both countries if used strategically. Civil society should be included as part of delegations during official visits. The integration of civil society in these diplomatic relations would enhance the quality and relevance of government engagements, increase the levels of trust and sentimental values, as well as secure potential investment opportunity for business and civil society in both countries.

(iv) The role of the private sector in enhancing the diplomatic relations between the two countries was also discussed extensively. This needs to be considered seriously because the private sector is the engine of economic growth and job creation in both countries. The study had the view that it is critical that high-level discussions between South Africa and its private sector are led by a team of senior businesspeople with a prominent commercial background, dedicated and delegated to the South Africa- India dialogue in strategic government consultations. This should be a team of business-people capable of providing the link with the business community and civil society of both countries. The one from South Africa to India should comprise of business-people of Indian descent as a soft-power strategy to appease the Indian side.

(v) It is the responsibility of both governments to support the private sector by providing conducive business policies and creating strong institutions and efficient regulations. By so doing, government would be ensuring that the private sector thrives, and the benefits of growth reach the citizens in both countries.

(vi) It is further suggested that a hybrid between governments and private sector should make use of the strong bilateral relations between the two countries to create jobs through accelerated levels of exports, and less imports. The requirements for successful partnerships should include a buoyant private sector alongside a capable and authoritative local government motivated by a common economic interest. Policymakers in both countries need

a clear vision of PPP objectives and a sound understanding of the local context to appreciate advantages and limitations.

(vii) It is further suggested that enhancing economic diplomacy requires a close partnership between all relevant stakeholders including the civil society and private sector. The civil society members were the ones mostly affected by the scourge of poverty, inequality, and unemployment in both countries. The private sector is the engine of economic growth and employment creation. Therefore, each of the stakeholders should play an important role in ensuring that the impact of the relations is maximised.

(viii) As the Indian government has adopted and implemented a more assertive approach to economic diplomacy, the South African government should also see how the Indian government's priorities fit with those of South Africa's national priorities and what opportunities exist for the civic society and private sector. The South African government needs to inform the South African civic society and private sector on developments regarding the Indian government's approach to economic diplomacy. It is suggested that in the case of South Africa, better organisation and stronger business structures would help improve engagement for trade and investment with India. It has been argued that South African business structures need to be self-sustainable and less reliant on government if they were to become more successful.

(ix) The trade sector between India and South Africa needs to be broadened and diversified, with small and medium-sized enterprises playing a greater role. The civil society and private

sector in both countries should work together to ensure greater monitoring, transparency, and risk reduction. In the process of broadening and diversification of small and medium-sized enterprises, it is important for the Indian and South African governments to consider and consult with civil society and private sector on the challenges underlying lack of investment in certain sectors reflected in this study.

In the context of investment in India, it was suggested that South Africa should explore opportunities through SMME's in other fields other than those currently engaged in, involving both the private sector and civil society. It should endeavour to make use of its strong relations with India to explore untapped opportunities in sectors where South African companies had invested the least. The study revealed that there was wider awareness about the strength of South Africa's financial sectors in India. South Africa needed to replicate this strength into other sectors where there was a deficit.

(x) In the context of South Africa and India in BRICS and IBSA, it is suggested that South Africa should make use of its strong mineral resource endowment in its bilateral trade with India to penetrate the IBSA market. It should make use of India as a conduit to accessing IBSA markets and global networks to export its minerals. South Africa must leverage its strong mineral industry to penetrate the IBSA market and beyond.

(xi) IBSA countries should continue to push for global democracy, equality, and ecologically sustainable development in international trade, even within the BRICS alliance. Furthermore, the three IBSA countries should push at the global level, not only for developing countries to have a greater voice in global governance, but also for increased democracy within global

institutions, rules, and country behaviour. IBSA countries should form pro-democracy strategic alliances within global institutions, such as the UN, World Trade Organisations and World Bank, not only to reform these institutions but for these institutions to adopt inclusive policies, have participatory decision-making processes and appoint globally diverse personnel. IBSA countries must deepen their trade to diversify their trade away from industrialised countries.

(xii) There should be greater people-to-people exchange between IBSA countries, and a greater sharing of democratic, development lessons including nation building. This is based on the consideration that civil society organisations within IBSA countries could influence their countries foreign policies, which in turn, could influence BRICS and global agenda. Civil society organisations across the three IBSA countries should join partners more closely, provide solidarity to each other and share resources, ideas, and lessons. Civil society must play a greater role in monitoring the sustainability, inclusivity, and community participation in projects of the IBSA Fund. Civil society organisations in IBSA countries should push to make it mandatory that their parliaments approve foreign loans for infrastructure. This was not currently a requirement in any of the IBSA countries. They should also push for domestic investment protocols that bind their countries' public and private companies to adhere to ecologically sustainable, consultative, and honest corporate behaviour when they invest in foreign countries.

(xiii) On the issues of South Africa and India in the reform of United Nations system, it is suggested that the two countries must find synergies on how the reform of the UN should

unfold. Their endearing history must shape their thought process in what they seek to achieve as historical partners with similar developmental challenges and aspirations in the poly-polar world order.

(xiv) In the trade tensions between the USA and China, the countries that are currently exporting to the US and China should look at other major markets, especially in the developing world including South Africa and India, to sell their surplus products.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Ethical Clearance



29 August 2019

Mr Jacob Moroje (218025886)
School Of Social Sciences
Howard College

Dear Mr Moroje,

Protocol reference number: HSSREC/Q0000252/2019
Project title: A Critical Investigation Into the Diplomatic Relations between Post-Apartheid South Africa and India

Full Approval – Expedited Application

This letter serves to notify you that your application received on 29 August 2019 in connection with the above, was reviewed by the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (HSSREC) and the protocol has been granted **FULL APPROVAL**.

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment/modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number. **PLEASE NOTE:** Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

This approval is valid for one year from 29 August 2019.

To ensure uninterrupted approval of this study beyond the approval expiry date, a progress report must be submitted to the Research Office on the appropriate form 2 - 3 months before the expiry date. A close-out report to be submitted when study is finished.

Yours sincerely,



Professor Urmila Bob
University Dean of Research

/dd

Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee
Dr Rosamary Sibanda (Chair)
UGC/N Research Ethics Office Westville Campus, Govan Mbeki Building
Postal Address: Private Bag X64001, Durban 4000
Website: <http://www.ugcn.ac.za/research-ethics/>

Founding Campuses: Pietermaritzburg Howard College Medical School Pietermaritzburg Westville

INSPIRING GREATNESS

Appendix B: Permission to Conduct Research -Centre for Indian Studies in Africa



Page | 1

Mr J Moroe
PhD Candidate International Relations
University of Kwazulu Natal

Permission to conduct research with the Centre for Indian Studies in Africa


Dear Mr Moroe,

Permission is hereby granted for you to conduct research at the Centre for Indian Studies in Africa towards your PhD.

We note that your research topic is "A critical investigation into the diplomatic relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India", and that our participation in the study is voluntary.

Permission is subject to adherence to academic policies and procedures. We shall assist you in any way possible to obtain the required information.

Warm regards.



Dilip M Menon PhD (*Cambridge*)
Mellon Chair in Indian Studies
Director, Centre for Indian Studies in Africa
University of Witwatersrand
Johannesburg South Africa
Dilip.menon@wits.ac.za
0117174127

Appendix C: Permission to Conduct Research – International Relations and Cooperation



international relations
& cooperation

Department:
International Relations and Cooperation
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Private Bag X182, PRETORIA, 0001 - OR Tlokohe Bld, 180 Soulpensberg Road, REMONDA, PRETORIA, 0084
Tel: +27 (0) 12 261 1000 - www.dirco.gov.za

Mr J Moroe
PhD candidate: International Relations
University of Kwazulu Natal
Email: Moroej@dirco.gov.za & Kaya@ukzn.ac.za

Dear Mr Moroe


PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND COOPERATION

Permission is hereby granted for you to conduct research at the department of International Relations and Cooperation towards your PhD studies, provided ethical clearance has been obtained.

The department notes your research topic as *"A critical investigation into the Diplomatic Relations between Post-Apartheid South Africa and India"* and that participation in the study is voluntary.

Permission is subjected to adherence to all government policies and procedures. Our organization will assist the student in any way possible in order to obtain the required information.

Kind Regards,


Mr KE Mahaal
Director-General
Date: 22/10/2018

Ngqonyama Indaba • Tshintshano ka Ntshona ka Sopolitsheni • Lokuphila Okomkayo • Tshoqoqosho eSobunxele eSithandeni • Loluqoqosho oluqinisekileyo
Imi Dofeni eSithandeni • I-Minister • Umnyaniso Wokuzibonisa kokuqinisekisa kanye neqoqosho • Ukuqoqosho oluqinisekileyo oluqinisekileyo
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Batho Pele • putting people first

Appendix D: Permission to Conduct Research- Department of Small Business Development



science
& technology
Department of
Science and Technology
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA



National
Research
Foundation

Mr L. Mkhumane
Acting Director-General
Department of Small Business Development
77 Meintjies Street
Sunnyside
Pretoria
0002

5 July 2019

Mr L. Mkhumane

Re: Request for Gatekeeper's Letter for PhD Research Work – Mr Jacob Moroe.

The above matter refers.

This letter serves as a request for a gatekeeper's letter in respect of Mr Jacob Moroe (Student Number: 218085886). Mr Moroe is a PhD candidate (International Relations) at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. The title of his research is: *'A Critical Investigation into the Diplomatic Relations between Post-Apartheid South Africa and India'*. The aim of the study is to determine the extent to which the two countries have made use of their historical relations for the benefit of their diplomatic relations since 1994. It will further make an assessment of how South Africa has leveraged on economic opportunities presented by India in their bilateral relations.

Amongst others, he is desirous of conducting interviews with the relevant official in the Department of Small Business Development in order to share their knowledge and experience on the subject matter.

Accordingly, it will be greatly appreciated if Mr Moroe can be granted permission to conduct interview in order to gather the necessary data.

I look forward to your kind consideration.

Sincerely



Prof. Hassan O. Kaya

Supervisor and Director, DST-NRF Centre in Indigenous Knowledge Systems, University of

Kwa Zulu-Natal

Private Bag X54001, Durban 4000

South Africa

Tel: +27-31-260-7237/1794

Cell: 0828579425

E-mail: kaya@ukzn.ac.za



UNIVERSITY OF
KWAZULU-NATAL
UNYWEZI
YAKWAZULU-NATALI



UNISA



NORTH-WEST UNIVERSITY
YUNIBESITHI YA BOPHIRIPHE

From: Tlou Nong [mailto:tnong@dsbd.gov.za]
Sent: 05 August 2019 05:02 PM
To: Moroe, J Mr : Abuja, Minister Plenipotentiary, DIRCO
Cc: Yolisa Mkhize - NO; Tshego Magooa; Anna Mnguni; Mmatlala Maredi
Subject: FW: REQUEST FOR GATEKEEPER'S LETTER FOR PHD RESEARCH WORK - MR JACOB MOROE

Dear Mr Moroe;

I hope that this e-mail finds you well;

Please be advised that the Department of Small Business Development has approved your request to interview International relations Practitioners who have been working on the India South Africa Bilateral Relationship. For this purpose, you may send the questionnaire to Ms Anna Mnguni on AMnguni@dsbd.gov.za

We have further requested assistance from the Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA) which has can provide a practitioner who would be able to answer questions regarding the Bilateral relationship between South Africa and India. For this purpose please e-mail the questionnaire to Ms Yolisa Mkhize; ymkhize@seda.org.za

I hope the above is all in order;

Regards;

<https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ik=ceef2ba2fd&view=pt&search=all&permthid=thread-f%3A1667295827885230417&siml=msg-f%3A16672958...> 1/3

5/27/2020 Gmail - FW: REQUEST FOR GATEKEEPER'S LETTER FOR PHD RESEARCH WORK - MR JACOB MOROE

Tlou,

[Mr. Tlou Nong]

[Deputy Director: International Cooperation; Trade & Export Promotion]

[Department of Small Business Development]

[Block G, 3rd Floor, West Wing - DTI Campus: Pretoria]

[T. +27 12 394 5916 | F.086 674 3315 | M. +27 82 836 4330 | URL: www.dsbd.gov.za

[Private Bag x 84, Pretoria, 0001, 77 Meintjies Street| Sunnyside Pretoria

Appendix E: Permission to Conduct Research- Department of Trade and Industry

From: Charlotte Wolmarans [mailto:CWolmarans@thedti.gov.za]
Sent: 15 January 2020 01:33 PM
To: Moroe, J Mr : Abuja, Minister Plenipotentiary, DIRCO; Donald Mathavha
Subject: Re: FW: Proof of registration

Dear Donald,

This serves to confirm that Mr J Moroe participated in a short briefing at the Vetting Unit and signed a Declaration of Secrecy.

Regards

Charlotte Wolmarans

Office Number: 012 394 5558

Fax Number: 012 394 6558

E Mail: CWolmarans@thedti.gov.za

>>> Donald Mathavha 07-Aug-2019 9:52 AM >>>

Dear Bobby,

Your request to conduct research at the dti has been approved, please find the attached letter for your reference. You are expected to present this letter when conducting your research at the dti.

<https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ik=cee2ba2f&view=pt&search=all&permid=thread-F%3A1667295992263518752&siml=msg-F%3A16672959...> 1/3

5/27/2020

Gmail - FW: FW: Proof of registration

Please note that you have to fulfill conditions E and F (below) as communicated previously. Ms Wolmarans (copied) can be contacted at 012 394 5558 regarding arrangements.

e) You must participate in a briefing discussion with the Vetting Unit before commencement of the research; and

F) You will need to complete a Confidentiality Declaration form with the Vetting Unit to ensure compliance with Department policies.

Regards,

Donald

Appendix F: Permission to Conduct Research- The Indian High Commission

5/28/2020

Gmail - FW: High Commissioner of India to South Africa : Confirmation : Meeting on Monday, 20 January 2020, at 1100 hrs

From: Social Secretary to the High Commissioner <sshc@hicomind.co.za>
Sent: Thursday, 11 July 2019 15:44
To: 'MoroeJ@dirco.gov.za' <MoroeJ@dirco.gov.za>
Cc: 'hc.pretoria@mea.gov.in' <hc.pretoria@mea.gov.in>
Subject: High Commissioner of India to South Africa : Request for Gatekeeper's Letter : Moroe Jacob PhD Candidate

Good afternoon Mr. Moroe,

I wish to refer to your below letter addressed to the High Commissioner of India in Abuja, dated 3 July 2019.

The High Commissioner of India in Pretoria, H.E. Mr. Jaideep Sarkar, would be happy to meet with you to discuss diplomatic relations between India and South Africa after 1994, when you travel to South Africa at the end of the month.

It would be appreciated if you could please let us know when it would be convenient for you to meet with His Excellency closer to the time.

Thank you kindly Sir.

With warm regards,

Zelda

Social Secretary to H.E. Mr. Jaideep Sarkar

High Commissioner of the Republic of India

652 Francis Baard Street

Corner of Eastwood Street

Arcadia

0083

Tel. (012) 342-5392 / 342-2913

Fax (012) 430-3326

E-mail: sshc@hicomind.co.za

From: "Moroe, J Mr : Abuja, Minister Plenipotentiary, DIRCO" <MoroeJ@dirco.gov.za>
To: "dhc.abuja" <dhc.abuja@mea.gov.in>
Cc: "Moroe, J Mr : Abuja, Minister Plenipotentiary, DIRCO" <MoroeJ@dirco.gov.za>
Sent: Wednesday, July 3, 2019 4:18:55 PM
Subject: Request for Gatekeepers Letter - Moroe Jacob PhD Candidate.

**Appendix G: Permission to Conduct Research- Centre for the Advancement of Citizenry
Participation in International Relations**



158-231 NPO

PBO - 930052546

Chr. Koch & 7th Avenue
Selvokop
Tshwane
0001

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Mr. J Moroe
PhD Candidate: International Relations
University of Kwazulu Natal
E-mail: Moroej@dirco.gov.za and Kaya@ukzn.ac.za

Dear Mr. J Moroe

**RE: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH WITHIN THE CENTRE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
CITIZENRY PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

We wish to confirm that permission has been granted to conduct research at the Centre for the Advancement of Citizenry Participation in International Relations towards your PhD studies, with the hope that the perspective from the non-state sector will strengthen the research outcome.

The Centre for the Advancement of Citizenry Participation in International Relations has noted the topic of your research, "A critical investigation into the Diplomatic Relations between post-apartheid South Africa and India" and the CACPIR's participation in the study is voluntary.

The CACPIR is stands ready to support to assist you in your study by availing all the information that will be relevant to achieve the outcomes of your research study.

Regards

Tshepo Mashiane (Mr)
Programme Director: African Union and Special Programmes
Date:

Appendix H: Informed Consent Document- Officials of the CACPIR/Civil Society- South

Africa

Informed Consent Document Officials of the CACPIR/Civil Society- South Africa

Dear Participant.

My name is Jacob Moroe (S/N:218085886). I am a PhD candidate, studying at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College. The title of my research is: 'A Critical Investigation into the Diplomatic Relations between Post-Apartheid South Africa and India'. The aim of the study is to determine the extent to which the two countries have made use of their historical relations for the benefit of their socio-economic, political and diplomatic relations, after the attainment of South Africa's new democracy in 1994. It will further make an assessment of how South Africa has leveraged on economic opportunities presented by India in their bilateral relations. I am interested in interviewing you so as to share your experiences and observations on the subject matter.

Please note that:

- The information you provide will be used for scholarly research only.
- The language used in conducting this research is English.
- Your participation is entirely voluntary. You have a choice to participate, not to participate or stop participating in the research. You will not be penalised for taking such an action.
- Your views in this interview will be presented anonymously. Neither your name nor identity will be disclosed in any form in the study.
- The questionnaire will take approximately 15-20 min to complete.
- The record as well as other items associated with the questionnaire will be held in a password-protected file accessible only to myself and my supervisors. After a period of 5 years, in line with the rules of the University, it will be disposed by shredding and burning.
- If you agree to participate, please sign the declaration attached to this statement (a separate sheet will be provided for signature).

I can be contacted at: the School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College Campus, Durban. Email: Moroej@dirco.gov.za, Cell: 072 912 6999 or 079 923 6598.

My supervisors are Professors S. Mutula, and H. Kaya, both located at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Westville Campus. Contact details: Email: Kaya@ukzn.ac.za. Phone Number: (031) 260 1794 and Email: Mutulas@ukzn.ac.za.

The Humanities and Social Science Ethics Committee contact details are as follows: Ms. Phumelele Ximba, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Research Office, Email: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za, Phone Number: (031) 260 3587.

Thank you for your contribution to this research.

DECLARATION

I..... (*full names of participant*) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire. I understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate.

I consent / do not consent to have this interview recorded (if applicable)

SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT

DATE

.....

Appendix I: Questionnaire for the Centre for Indian Studies in Africa



QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE CENTRE FOR INDIAN STUDIES IN AFRICA (CISA)

Dear Participant.

My name is Jacob Moroe (S/N:218085886). I am a PhD candidate, studying at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College. The title of my research is: 'A Critical Investigation into the Diplomatic Relations between Post-Apartheid South Africa and India'. The aim of the study is to determine the extent to which the two countries have made use of their historical relations for the benefit of their socio-economic, political and diplomatic relations, after the attainment of South Africa's new democracy in 1994. It will further make an assessment of how South Africa has leveraged on economic opportunities presented by India in their bilateral relations. I am interested in interviewing you so as to share your experiences and observations on the subject matter.

Please note that:

- The information you provide will be used for scholarly research only.
- The language used in conducting this research is English.
- Your participation is entirely voluntary. You have a choice to participate, not to participate or stop participating in the research. You will not be penalised for taking such an action.
- Your views in this interview will be presented anonymously. Neither your name nor identity will be disclosed in any form in the study.
- The questionnaire will take approximately 15-20 min to complete.
- The record as well as other items associated with the questionnaire will be held in a password-protected file accessible only to myself and my supervisors. After a period of 5 years, in line with the rules of the University, it will be disposed by shredding and burning.
- If you agree to participate, please sign the declaration attached to this statement (a separate sheet will be provided for signature).

I can be contacted at: the School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College Campus, Durban. Email: Moroej@dirco.gov.za, Cell: 072 912 6999 or 079 923 6598.

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The Humanities and Social Science Ethics Committee contact details are as follows: Ms. Phumelele Ximba, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Research Office, Email: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za, Phone Number: (031) 260 3587.

Thank you for your contribution to this research.

QUESTIONS FOR DTI OFFICIALS

Biographical Information of Respondents.

Alias _____

1. What is your Gender?

Male	
Female	
Other (specify)	

2. What is your Educational Level?

None	
Primary Education	
Secondary Education	
Tertiary Education	
Adult Education	
Other (specify)	

3. What is your Employment/Occupational Status?

Farmer	
Teacher	
Government Employee	
Other (specify)	

4. Have you been on a foreign posting before?

Yes	
No	

5. In which country (ies) have you been posted?

6. Do you have any experience of bilateral work?

Yes	
No	

B. GENERAL QUESTIONS

A. The state of trade relations between South Africa and India since 1994?				
	Questions	Yes	No	N/A
1.	Does South Africa and India enjoy cordial diplomatic relations?			
2.	Does the historical background between India and South contribute, in a way, to their current bilateral relations?			
3.	The current trade balance between the two countries is in favour of South Africa?			
4.	South Africa has effectively made use of trade opportunities presented by India in their bilateral relations?			
5.	There is a higher volume in the movement of goods and service between India and South Africa?			
6.	South African Companies in India and Indian Companies in South Africa have contributed in the creation of jobs in both countries?			
7.	In its trade with India, South Africa enjoys tariff concessions?			
8.	South Africa continues to make efforts at increasing trade between India and South Africa?			
9.	There are more Indian Companies in South Africa than South African Companies in India?			
10.	South Africa's focus in its trade with in India is more on automobile parts, textile, etc?			
11.	In order to increase trade with India, South Africa should encourage SMMEs to participate in the bilateral activities between the two countries?			
12.	The informal sector in South Africa is big, with great potential to increase trade in favour of South Africa?			

B. The role of private sector and civil society in these diplomatic relations since 1994.				
	Questions	Yes	No	N/A
1.	The South African government is receptive towards the participations of private sectors in the diplomatic relations between India and South Africa?			
2.	Private sector and civil society have a critical role to play in advancing relations between India and South Africa?			
3.	Private sector and civil society are always included in high level delegations to India during official visits?			
4.	SMMEs enjoy the support of government in creating opportunities for them in India?			
5.	Government must take advantage of civil society involvement in these relations in order to widen the scope of partnerships between the two countries?			
6.	There is a formal business structure established to manage business relations between India and South Africa?			

7.	The government utilises civil society and private sector members of Indian descent to strengthen cohesion between the two countries.			
8.	Business delegations to India often comprise of big business?			
9.	Only connected business entities make it into the official delegations to India?			
10.	It is often difficult for SMMEs to know of scheduled business delegations to India?			

C. The significance of multilateral, trilateral and minilaterals in the bilateral relations between India and South Africa.				
	Questions	Yes	No	N/A
1.	Does India and South Africa share common membership of the United Nations (UN)?			
2.	If yes, do they support each other on issues of common interest and mutual benefit?			
3.	Both countries are guided by their strong historical relations in conducting their engagements in the UN.			
4.	Both India and South Africa are membership of BRICS and IBSA?			
5.	Both India and South Africa enjoy each other's support in their membership of IBSA and BRICS?			
6.	Both India and South Africa work efficiently in their bilateral relations, as opposed to structures such as BRICS, IBSA and the UN?			
7.	Has the establishment of BRICS and IBSA disrupted and affected the trajectory of global politics led by the western powers?			
8.	The global west is impressed with the emergence of BRICS and IBSA?			
9.	Both IBSA and BRICS were established to advance the agenda of developing nations?			
10.	The establishment of both IBSA and BRICS have been of benefit to South Africa?			
11.	South Africa makes use of BRICS and IBSA to advance not only its interests, but those of the entire continent, in line with its foreign policy trajectory?			
	There is no significant difference between IBSA and BRICS?			
	Due to its efficiency, BRICS has overshadowed the work of IBSA?			
	The emergence of BRICS has rendered IBSA redundant?			

D. The possible effects of global shifts in political and economic power to the current relations between India and South Africa in a poly-polar world.				
	Questions	Yes	No	N/A
1.	South Africa's membership of BRICS and IBSA has affected existing global order?			
2.	The emergence of both BRICS and IBSA threaten the hegemony of western powers?			
3.	The emergence of BRICS and IBSA has strengthened relations between India and South Africa?			
4.	India and South Africa are guided by their shared common history in how they engage in global organisations?			

5.	Both India and South Africa advocate for the reform of the UN, and other Bretton Woods Institutions?			
6.	South Africa's current non-permanent membership of the UN includes the promotion the interests of developing nations like India?			
7.	The current global shifts and balance for powers have affected IBSA and BRICS?			
8.	BRICS and IBSA were established as an alternative to Bretton Woods Institutions?			
9.	According to the west, the establishment of IBSA and BRICS suggest a break from their traditional relations with individual member states?			
10.	Bilateral relations between BRICS member states and other partners from the west have been affected by their membership of this formation?			

E. The early arrival of Indians in South Africa, and the Mahatma Gandhi as a human rights activist.				
	Questions	Yes	No	N/A
1.	Indians arrived in South Africa as slaves before 1994?			
2.	Indians were discriminated against in the same way as blacks were discriminated during apartheid?			
3.	Indians are now integrated within various communities in South Africa?			
4.	Indians in South Africa are known for their business acumen?			
5.	Indians in South Africa still have strong links with India?			
6.	Most Indians in South Africa are Hindus, and live in KZN?			
7.	Indian business persons have direct contacts with Indian business entities in India?			
8.	There are many Indians who have assumed strategic leadership positions in South Africa?			
9.	South Africa is the largest host of Indians outside India?			
10.	Mahatma Gandhi fought for the human rights of Indians and blacks, against the subjugation of the apartheid regime?			
11.	It is not true that Mahatma Gandhi was a racist?			
12.	Mahatma Gandhi believed in class society and promoted racial segregation according to race and ethnicity?			
13.	The concept of Satyagraha was meant to promote resistance by all the oppressed people of South Africa?			
15.	Mahatma Gandhi can be compared to Nelson Mandela, based on the role he has played in South Africa?			

Thank you very much for taking time to answer my questions.

Appendix J: Focus Group Discussion Schedule



FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION SCHEDULE FOR SOUTH AFRICAN DIPLOMATS

Name of Community:..... Date:.....

Place of Meeting:..... Time:.....

Introduction

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this focus group discussion.

The purpose of the discussion is to understand your views and experience about Diplomatic Relations between Post-Apartheid South Africa and India. You eight (8) in number, and have been chosen to participate in this focus group discussion because you are one of the key persons with insights and knowledge on the chosen case study. As a researcher, my role during the session will be to facilitate discussions and ask questions to guide the discussion, but will not be participating or offering my own comments or reactions. This approach will assist the group discussions to arrive at the most accurate and desired outcomes for the study.

Procedure:

Please note that this group session will take approximately 40 minutes to 1 hour, and all contributions made here will remain confidential and anonymous. There will be no trace to any individual participation of members of the focus group. It will be greatly appreciated if you can be honest and specific in your contributions in order to ensure that this session achieved optimal outcomes. Should the need arise, please feel free to provide examples where necessary. You are also encouraged to share your personal experiences and observations about the study. It would be prudent to stick to your own views than repeating what has already been said by other participants. If you hear comments or viewpoints with which you disagree, do not hesitate to explain your own viewpoint or opposing view. The idea is to hear everyone's opinion, not necessarily to reach an agreement. There is no correct or incorrect answer. For ease of reference, this discussion will be tape-recorded. In order to ensure high quality transcription, it will be supportive if you speak one person at a time, and try to speak clearly and with more volume than usual so your comments are captured on tape.

Benefits:

The opinions and experiences documented in this discussion will provide empirical data on the nature and scope of diplomatic relations between Post-Apartheid South Africa and India. It will also generate invaluable input on how, if at all, the two countries have used their historical relations to shape their bilateral relations after 1994.

Confidentiality:

During the discussions and recordings, you will be allowed to use aliases if you so desire to remain anonymous. All recordings and transcripts will only contain the names that you chose during the discussions. Your anonymity will be observed and respected through all stages of this research.

Compensation:

Please note that you will not be compensated for participating in this study. However, light refreshments may be provided to break the ice if the need arises.

Freedom to Withdraw.

Kindly note that you are free to withdraw from the discussion at any point in time without being prejudiced by the researcher.

Consent:

If you have understood the contents of this document and wish to participate in this study, kindly fill in your initials, signature and date at the spaces provided below. You will be provided with a copy of this form.

Initials and Signature of Respondents.

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

Date: _____

1. How would you describe the nature of diplomatic relations between India and South Africa?
 - If successful, why?
 - If unsuccessful, why?
2. What are some of the existing socio-economic gaps or impediments prevalent in the relations between the two countries?
 - If economic, why?
 - If social, why?
 - If political, why?
3. What are some of the prominent business transactions between South Africa and India?
4. Do you think the diplomatic relations between India and South Africa have been of benefit to South Africa? If so, do these benefits consider the following:
 - Job creation and economic growth?
 - Increase in trade and investment figures?
 - Social cohesion between the two countries?
5. Has South Africa taken advantage of economic opportunities presented by India, If so.
 - In which areas has South Africa leveraged opportunities?
 - In which areas does South Africa has to focus on?
 - In which areas has South Africa missed most opportunities?
6. What is the nature of the Multilateral engagements, and in which areas have they been supporting and cooperating with each other?
7. Are there any opportunities presented by BRICS to the socio-economic and political advancement of relations between South Africa and India.
8. What do you think are the main challenges between the two countries?
9. According to you, what would have been the best way/s for South Africa to approach its bilateral relations with India?
10. According to you, what role do you think DIRCO should play in advancing bilateral relations with India?
11. What the role do you think the private sector should play in taking advantage of opportunities presented by India in order to promote trade and investment between the two countries?
12. How can DIRCO and the private sector work together in advancing issues of common interest and mutual benefit to the country.

13. According to you, what do you think are strengths and limitations of these relations?

13. Anything else do you want to add?

(Here you can write any additional information or anything else you wish to add)

Thank you very much for participating in this focus group discussion